Trials and Triumphs in Public Office
The Life and Work of E. J. N. Mabuza

A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology, Rhodes University

Ashley Sarimana 600s1118

Supervisor: Professor Olujimi Adesina

February 2011

ABSTRACT

Enos John Nganani Mabuza‟s life and work is used as a case study to highlight the conceptual and methodological theories and challenges in academic biographical writing regarding history, memory and legacies. This thesis answers the question: Who was Mabuza and what is his place or relevance in South Africa‟s history? We over-simplify and stereotype people because it is convenient. We judge others but there is no saint without a past or a sinner without a future. Mabuza reconciled with the main liberation movements and moved from a maligned position on the political fringes to a respectable one within the emerging black economic elite. History, like reference systems and values is not calcified or static. It is prone to interpretation, adaptation, modification, invention, manipulation, decomposition and re-composition.

Bourdieu‟s habitus-field analysis, theory or logic of practice, notions of capital (symbolic, political, social, cultural and economic) is used together with Latour‟s actor-network theory as the basis of analysis of the social contracts and trust bonds that Mabuza was able to create and which enabled him to navigate South Africa‟s socio-political and economic milieus during apartheid and the transition in the early 1990s. As people or actors, we believe in the mantra, nothing ventured, nothing gained. We exercise agency and take risks every day. We make choices and those choices have consequences. Mabuza‟s choices in the fields of education, politics and business had implications for how he is perceived or has been written into history. His choices put notions of identity, citizenship, power, legitimacy, ambition, elite accommodation, class, personal and professional networks, popular struggles, agency and structure under the spotlight.

Mabuza‟s involvement in Bantustan politics, for instance, is contextualised in terms of a historical overview of the unpopular role played by traditional authorities in South Africa before and during colonialism and apartheid. His later foray into the world of business, however, was facilitated in part, by the personal and professional contacts that he made whilst he was in politics and the opportunities which opened up during the country‟s political transition. Mabuza adapted to changing circumstances and demonstrated a level of versatility which other Bantustan functionaries did not or could not exercise.

SELECTED ACRONYMS

ANC - African National Congress

CODESA - Convention for a Democratic South Africa

CONTRALESA - Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa

COSATU - Congress of South African Trade Unions

FABCOS - Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services

IDASA – Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa

INM - Inyandza National Movement

NAFCOC - National African Federated Chambers of Commerce

NEUM - Non-European Unity Movement

NOTPECO - Northern Transvaal People"s Congress

PAC - Pan Africanist Congress

SACP - South African Communist Party

SANParks - South African National Parks Board

SAYCO - South African Youth Congress

TRC - Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UDF - United Democratic Front

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that "*Trials and Triumphs in Public Office: The Life and Work of N. E. J. Mabuza*" is my own work and it has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been acknowledged.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The financial assistance from the Penryn Trust, the Andrew W. Mellon Mentor Scholarship and the Andrew W. Mellon Identity and Citizenship Scholarship towards this research is hereby acknowledged. The opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to Rhodes University or the donors. I would also like to thank the staff in the Rhodes University postgraduate finance office for all their assistance.

Next, I would like to thank Professor Fred Hendricks and Professor Olujimi Adesina and all the faculty members in the Sociology department at Rhodes University as well as Ms Karen Kouari of the Faculty of Humanities. Their kindness, support, experience, mentorship, advice, guidance, commitment, words of encouragement and unfailing good cheer has been invaluable. Your support and faith in me, the precious time that you invested and the hand-holding in difficult times is well appreciated.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Susan Rionda at the Rhodes University main library and the Curator Ms Catherine Kennedy and Esmeralda at the University of the Witwatersrand South African History Archives (University of the Witwatersrand William Cullen Library – Historical Papers Department) for their assistance.

Finally, many thanks also go to my family and friends who sustained my spirits by believing I could do this even when I had doubts. I am truly grateful.

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my maternal grandmother Hellen Joyce Mutambara who passed away on 22 January 2010 and my paternal grandfather Percy Willy Sarimana who passed away suddenly on 1 August 2010. R.I.P.

Table of Contents

Chapters	Titles	Pages
	Abstract	**ii**
	Selected Acronyms	**iii**
	Declaration	**iv**
	Acknowledgements	**v**
1	**Introduction**	**1**
1.1	Research Focus and Justification	1
1.2	Key Questions	4
1.3	The Research Method Used	5
1.4	Who is Enos Mabuza‟s and what did He Achieve?	11
1.5	Background to the Role of Traditional Leaders within Apartheid Structures	12
1.6	The Bantustan System and Eligibility	13
1.7	The ANC, Traditional Authorities and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle	16
1.8	Saints or Sinners: Some Comparisons	18
1.9	Conclusion: Outline of the Thesis	20
2	**Literature Review**	**25**
2.1	Introduction	25
2.2	International Biographical Resources	30
2.3	The South African History Online (SAHO)	33
2.4	The Interpretive Paradigm and Biographical Research	33
2.5	The Value and Advantages of Academic Biographical Research	39
2.6	Structure and Themes in Academic Biography	44
2.7	Choice of Subject in Academic Biography	46

Chapters	Titles	Pages
2.8	Psychobiography: The Dominant Form of Biography in South African Scholarship	47
2.9	Methodological and Practical Considerations in Biographical Research	51
2.10	Merits of the Case Study Method in Studying Individual Lives	55
2.11	Biographical Sources	55
2.12	Criticisms and/or Limitations of Biographical Research	57
2.13	Popular Topics in South African History and Politics	60
2.14	Possibilities for *New* Histories	61
2.15	Political Biographies and Themes: Analogy of Politics as a Game	65
2.16	South African Academic Biographies (Theses) in History and Politics	67
2.17	Context for Biographical Research on Former Bantustan Leaders and How the Bantustan Policy was Marketed and Defended	72
2.17.1	Survey of Existing Literature on Some Bantustan Personalities	76
2.18	Introducing KaNgwane‟s Enos Mabuza	81
2.19	Conclusion	83
3	**Conceptual Framework**	**89**
3.1	Introduction	89
3.2	Colonial Divide and Rule Tactics	90
3.3	Racial and Ethnic Tensions Intensified under Apartheid	97
3.4	Persistent Divisions during the Negotiations and Transition	102
3.5	The Fate of Traditional Authorities in a Democratic South Africa	103
3.6	Conclusion	108
4	**Theoretical Framework for Analysis**	**109**
4.1	Introduction	109
4.2	Pierre Bourdieu‟s *Habitus-Field* Analysis	111

Chapters	Titles	Pages
4.3	Bruno Latour‟s Actor-Network Theory	116
4.4	The Social Contract and Trust Theory as Extensions of Networks	119
4.5	Conclusion	123
5	**Mabuza's Legacy in Education in the Former Eastern Transvaal**	**125**
5.1	Introduction	125
5.2	Bantu Education and Systematic Disempowerment	127
5.3	Mabuza‟s Experience and Distinction as a Student	131
5.4	Mabuza‟s Career as an Educator	133
5.5	Promoting Swazi Culture and Language	135
5.6	Pearls of Wisdom for the Next Mabuza Generation	136
5.7	Mabuza, People‟s Education and the Struggle for a Decent Education	139
5.8	Mabuza‟s Role in the Founding of Penryn College	141
5.9	Conclusion	146
6	**Mabuza's Contribution to Nature Conservation**	**149**
6.1	Introduction	149
6.2.1	SA Conservation in Historical Perspective (Colonial Period - 1994)	150
6.2.2	Forced Removals and the Deliberate Exclusion of Blacks from National Parks	153
6.3	Key Debates in Conservation Circles in Mabuza‟s Time	155
6.4	Conservation Stakeholders Linked to Mabuza	157
6.5	Mabuza‟s Conservation Initiatives in KaNgwane	169
6.6	Conclusion	177
7	**Challenges and Opportunities in Politics**	**182**
7.1	Introduction	182
7.2	Perceptions and Truths about Bantustan Leaders and/or Traditional	183

Chapters	Titles	Pages
	Authorities	
7.3	Mabuza‟s Entrance into Bantustan Politics	190
7.4	The Mandate of KaNgwane‟s Legislative Assembly	194
7.5	Mabuza‟s „Open-Minded‟ or „Progressive‟ Approach	197
7.5.1	The South African Black Alliance	199
7.6	Mabuza‟s Inyandza National Movement 1978-1990: Friend or Foe?	203
7.7	Mabuza and the Abortive Swazi Land Deal: A Test of Allegiance	231
7.7.1	Swaziland‟s Claim to „South African‟ Land	235
7.7.2	Mabuza Defies Swaziland and South African Authorities	246
7.7.3	Opposition to the Swazi Land Deal from Other Quarters	254
7.7.4	The Impact of the Abortive Swazi Land Deal	258
7.8	KaNgwane *vis* Escalation of Violence in the Transvaal in the Decade 1985-1995	260
7.8.1	Mabuza‟s Culpability: The TRC‟s Findings	271
7.9	Greed, Class and Corruption in the Bantustans	271
7.9.1	Mis/management in KaNgwane	273
7.9.2	Allegations of Corruption Levelled Against Mabuza	277
7.10	Preparing for the Transition: Can A Leopard Change Its Spots?	279
7.11	Conclusion	298
8	**Mabuza's Rise to Corporate Prominence**	**303**
8.1	Introduction	303
8.2	Enos J Mabuza & Associates: Vision and Objectives	308
8.3	Mabuza as a Valuable Ally for White Capital	314
8.4	Mabuza and Black ANC-Affiliated Businesses	325
8.5	The Strategic Aims of Cooperation between Black and White Businesses	331

Chapters	Titles	Pages
8.6	Conclusion	336
9	**Mabuza: Family and Community Man**	**346**
9.1	Introduction	346
9.2	Kith and Kin Loyalties	349
9.3	Mabuza‟s Legacy in the Former KaNgwane Area	356
9.4	Conclusion	366
10	**Conclusion**	**371**
10.1	Introduction	371
10.2	The Means-Ends Dilemma	375
10.3	Memorials and Commemoration in Honour of Mabuza	383
10.4	Conclusion	394
	Bibliography	400
	Appendices	459

List of Tables

Table 1: Pupil: Teacher Ratio 129

Table 2: Educational Spending (Million Rand): Primary, Secondary and Tertiary 129

Table 3: *Per Capita* Spending (in Rand) on School Education 130

Table 4: *Per Capita* Educational Expenditure (Rand) 130

Table 5: Bantustan Personalities 184

Figures

Figure 1: Enos Mabuza circa 1989. 24

Figure 2: Greater Kruger National Park area 169

Figure 3: Location of Mahushe Shongwe Game Reserve 174

Figure 4: KaNgwane Conservation.....176

Figure 5: Bantustan Personalities.....185

Figure 6: Bantustan Protest/Unrest.....186

Figure 7: KaNgwane‟s Coat of Arms.....207

Figure 8: Old South African Flag.....208

Figure 9: Cartoon of Swaziland-South Africa Land Deal.....257

Figure 10: Cartoon of Swaziland-South Africa Land Deal.....257

Figure 11: Cartoon of Swaziland-South Africa Land Deal.....258

Figure 12: Enos Mabuza and Oliver Tambo Circa 1990.....297

Figure 1: Levels of Trust in the South African Economy.....320

Figure 2: 1987 International Investment Conference, Enos Mabuza in the Foreground.....333

Figure 3: Mabuza in Traditional Swazi Dress.....353

Figure 4: Enos Mabuza.....399

Appendices

Appendix 1.....Interview Schedule 459

Appendix 2..... National Parks Board Affirmative Action Placement March 1995 (benchmark) to March 1996 (placement) for specific occupational categories…….. 465

Appendix 3.....Maps depicting the Bantustans 466

Appendix 4 ..... South Africa‟s Political History Timeline up to 1994 468

Appendix 5..... Enos J Mabuza & Associates - Briefings and Updates 483

Appendix 6 ..... Mabuza‟s Activities on the International Stage 485

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Research Focus and Justification

As actors, we are confronted by different choices at every step of any historical route and we choose a course of action from possible alternatives, no matter how limited they might be. Political opinions and attitudes change over time. Compromises and accommodations are made in response to changes in circumstances and other imperatives. The late Nganani Enos John Mabuza‟s life story reads like a fairy tale yet he is an obscure figure in the minds of most South Africans. This thesis is a critical engagement with Mabuza‟s life and career. It forms part of the race-class debate which is an integral part of South Africa‟s painful and complex history. Mabuza came from a poor mining background and rose to relative prominence and respectability in education, politics and business; particularly his contradictory role as a Bantustan leader within apartheid administrative structures on the one hand, and in the struggle against it on the other. This thesis is an appraisal of Mabuza as a person (his character) and as a leader and the circumstances of his leadership before presuming to judge him based on emotions like disappointment, shock, resentment or anger. Actions either have positive or negative consequences and Bantustan leaders were seen as greedy, corrupt; sell-outs who betrayed their own people and had a propensity for violence in defence of ill-begotten gains.

Individuals who were involved in apartheid structures (mainly traditional authorities/chiefs) were viewed with great suspicion or regarded as traitors because many of them became feared instruments of the vicious apartheid state, especially in the 1950s and 1960s after the passing of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 (Ntsebeza, 2002; Ribot, 2001:4; Mamdani, 1996; Callinicos, 1992; Mufson, 1990:286-310). The agendas followed by Bantustan elites and the reasons why they did so are still the source of much tension and conflict with ordinary people as they were with the liberation movements because of the divide and rule motive which was at the root of the Bantustan policy. However, it is a generalisation or simplification to say that all Bantustan leaders were greedy, corrupt, violent and short-sighted. This discussion tries to establish whether Mabuza did the unacceptable, inexcusable or unconscionable in light of the decisions that he made.

Enos Mabuza‟s participation in Bantustan politics was a choice and this choice is at the centre of this discussion for the same or similar reasons discussed by Bowden and Rooksby

(2006). The thesis considers what made Mabuza different, if at all, from other Bantustan politicians, as well as the nature and extent of his relationship with the African National Congress, United Democratic Front, the Mass Democratic Movement and other progressive organisations and individuals. The aim of this study is not to re-write history or to be sympathetic and make excuses for Mabuza but to learn and understand why he made the choices that he did.

Mabuza‟s career did not happen in a vacuum and this thesis uses a constructionist or historical perspective to gain insights by situating him in a particular place, time and socio-political processes. Relational theory and power discourses are employed to infer what his priorities and inspirations were and why. Tracing the political, business and conservation phases of his career shows how he set out to achieve certain goals and with whom he did so. He had a chequered career and this thesis traces the issues, processes, controversies, the ambiguities and incompatible or disagreeable things which propelled, sustained or conditioned it. Bowden and Rooksby (2006:241-256) discuss the supposed tension between judging and understanding; whether understanding tempers judgment and punishment and the role of determinism and our claims about knowledge, truth, morality, free will, responsibility, accountability and blame. They contend that particular people judge particular objects which are framed by particular contexts, relationships, social and official norms and expectations[1] (Bowden and Rooksby, 2006:245). They argue that:

> "we can condemn or be condemned for particular actions or goals, for roles we create or assume, for exercising discretion in those roles, for outcomes for our actions and consequences that ensue from those outcomes, for attributes, dispositions, habits and traits" (Bowden and Rooksby, 2006:244).

They consider reasons/motives, contexts, explanations or justifications which lead people to commit particular moral transgressions. In doing so, they try to humanise the act in order to show the human fallibility in all of us. Condemning has a regulatory function but as Bowden and Rooksby (2006:245) note, "to condemn is to affirm another‟s agency and responsibility, and one‟s own, to acknowledge both of us as participants in a shared project"; a position which fits in with the relational or interpersonal assumptions which underpin actor-network theory and social network analysis which is used as the theoretical framework for this thesis.

[1] Explicit and implicit assumptions and expressions of agency and responsibility.
[2] Ciraj Rassool, Andrew Nash, Jan Coetzee, Sikhumbuza Mngadi, Ashwin Desai, Fred Hendricks, Luli

The thesis considers whether Mabuza was called to account or censored - judged negatively and if anyone demanded retribution or negative sanctions against him in a way that was proportional to what he did and for what he was responsible for with respect to his participation in the Bantustan system. This entails an assessment of the degree to which he was responsible for the evils of apartheid, the Bantustans system and particular suffering, incidents or costs to the welfare of the people in KaNgwane specifically; and the struggle generally. He was a cog in a causal chain that he did not set in motion and one whose excesses he supposedly tried to mitigate in KaNgwane at the request of certain Swazi chiefs. His agreement to assume this position was perhaps misguided, naïve or idealistic but he did not bully the people like other Bantustan leaders did. This thesis assesses the intentions or causal connections of Mabuza‟s acts or omissions as well as the significance (intensity or severity) of the harm or injury that he personally caused to his „charges‟ in KaNgwane. The final analysis concerns how Mabuza‟s work or contributions were received and how relevant he is in the Mpumalanga lowveld or Eastern Transvaal where he came from as well as on a national level.

There are many stories that can be told about a person because of the layered identities and roles which they assume concurrently or consecutively (Eakin, 1999:70, 85). In the story of Hadji Murat, Tolstoy (1977) explores the fluidity of human character by depicting man in the many, often incongruous, facets of his nature or character (alternatively villain, angel, sage, idiot, strong man, courageous, loyal, dignified, weakling). This versatility that Tolstoy explores in the character of Hadji Murat is fascinating and relevant for our attempts to understand Mabuza and how his career unfolded by analysing the context in which it happened. Mulholland and Ludlow (1992) note that history is not simply about finding out what or when something happened. It is also about finding out the reasons for people‟s actions (why) and the material circumstances (time, place, the socio-political, cultural or economic contexts of the period) surrounding the relevant actors and events. Eakin suggests that we need to study the "situated self" as a product of a "particular place and time." According to Paris (2001) and Mulholland and Ludlow (1992), history is often a controversial and keenly contested terrain because of different interpretations which are influenced by prejudices and stereotypes inherited from the partial histories that are given of the past. People judge things (and people) from different perspectives (religious, educational, political or nationalistic) and these perspectives inform our differing experiences of reality. Accounts of events can be given from the perspective of winners, losers, the powerful or the

weak, the rich or the poor. Mulholland and Ludlow (1992) note, however, that none of these perspectives is necessarily correct or incorrect even though they often differ.

Different people hold different opinions about the positive or negative contributions that were made by Mabuza but he was not the cowardly "yes man" that it is convenient to label him as. Mabuza‟s political role was ambiguous and controversial and he was not the embodiment of the anti-apartheid struggle, humanitarianism or philanthropy but he tried to redeem himself through his deeds in ways that others who were in similar positions did not. His general goodwill is demonstrated, for instance, by the fact that he was the second Bantustan leader to open discussions and establish a working relationship with the African National Congress (as the future government of the country) (Mabuza, 1991:12). He was not apathetic but tried to make a difference by taking charge of his own destiny. Despite working within apartheid structures as a Bantustan leader, Enos Mabuza did not hide his opposition to apartheid (Pityana, 2005; Makwetla, 2005; Phosa, 2005; Mabuza, 1983). His actions and what he accomplished for himself and for others should not be negated because he made some questionable choices along the way.

Mabuza‟s life and career can be traced in four main spheres that he was involved in; namely education, politics, conservation and business. What can be interpreted as his subjective, individual experience was also partly the experience of those around him. Regarding the political aspects, Mabuza‟s impact can be understood through his interaction with the KaNgwane people and the Inyandza National Movement (of which he was President) and vice versa, his relationship with the ANC, UDF and IDASA. Investigating the complexity of these interactions and attendant ambiguities posed by Mabuza‟s political choices also shed light on on-going debates regarding the incorporation of traditional authorities into South Africa‟s government structures after 1994, despite such authorities having been labelled collaborators and oppressors in the past (Oomen, 2005; Ntsebeza, 2002; Mufson, 1990:286-310; Walshe, 1987).

1.2 Key Questions

The following questions are used to discover and explain the factors that determined the course of events in Enos Mabuza‟s life and career at different stages:

- What was his family background?
- What was his schooling experience?

- What influenced his life philosophy and career?
- How did he get to participate in Bantustan politics?
- How did he manage his roles as a Bantustan leader and president of the Inyandza National Movement and his alignment with the African National Congress?
- Was he ambitious, opportunistic and self-serving as Bantustan leaders/traditional authorities have been characterised?
- What role did his family play in his successes or failures?
- Who were his friends, colleagues, acquaintances and confidantes?
- Where Mabuza‟s involvement in business, conservation or the founding of Penryn College better received than his political exploits?
- What were the conservation issues that Mabuza championed?
- Why was he appointed to so many company boards?
- What is his legacy and how is he remembered nationally and in his home area?

1.3 The Research Method Used

According to Mulholland and Ludlow (1992:4), history tries to establish what is known about a person or event; what can be proven; what is not known about it; what has been omitted from the account of it; whose memories have been recorded; whose memories are reliable and whose interests are served by that particular account. Most of the history of Africa, for instance, has been told from a colonial, Eurocentric perspective because of white dominance, conquests and selective recollection at the expense of the knowledge of the trials, endeavours, insights and successes of other people who were considered to be inferior minorities. There are several complexities and challenges involved in interpreting the human personality or life. Every social field has its own culture, structure, rules and material conditions which affect the character of the relationships among its members (heroism, martyrdom, conformity, bitter struggle). When it comes to focus on the individual, biographical research is criticised or discredited for being too subjective; implying that biographical examinations of the single case lack reliability and external validity. Despite such reservations, social scientists across the disciplines have shown increased interest in, and acceptance of biographical and autobiographical approaches over the past two decades (Bertaux, 1981; Elms, 1994; McAdams, 2006).

An interdisciplinary workshop on the art or craft of biography was held at Rhodes University on 22-23 May 2008 with sponsorship from the National Research Foundation (NRF). The workshop was attended by many notable academics[2] who presented papers based predominantly on their own experiences or those of people close to them. The papers examined how the individuals have been written into South African history and how their experiences resonate with those of many other people. Many biographies, especially political biographies have been written since the end of apartheid[3] but they are generally in the mould of the cult of personality and hero-worshipping of the lives and sacrifices of venerated struggle icons such as Oliver Tambo who was president of the ANC in exile. However, it was lamented that the general tendency (as in Strachey‟s *Eminent Victorians*, Carlyle‟s *On Heroes and Hero Worship* or Emerson‟s *Representative Men)*, is still to focus on prominent political and social figures with purported moral vision and stature even if some of them were bullies, tyrants, neurotics, philanderers and adulterers. Cecil Rhodes is a historical figure associated with British empire-building and his beneficiation through the prestigious Rhodes Scholarships. His name is ubiquitous in Oxford, Cape Town, Grahamstown, Kimberly, Northern and Southern Rhodesia (Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively) and over twenty five biographies have been written about him. In addition, there are numerous plays, movies and memorials which variously portray him as a hero and a villain. Although Rhodes is often remembered as an initiator and innovator, Maylam (2005) questions this and notes that Rhodes was also an ambitious and opportunistic manipulator and egotist.

The papers presented at the workshop all focused on what motivates or propels people to do *X* and not *Y*. The intrigue is heightened when the subjects are politicians. Other themes raised in the workshop were family, marriage, society, career, politics, religion, power, ego, wealth, identity, agency and structure, the meaning of life itself and how these link history, the private and the public interface (the individual and the societal or collective). The importance of context in historical and biographical work was highlighted and it became apparent that people are often steered by currents beyond their control. Alternatively, history is made but not usually under conditions of our own choosing. The workshop echoed the methodological issues, challenges and concerns discussed in Chapter 2 regarding the purpose or value of

[2] Ciraj Rassool, Andrew Nash, Jan Coetzee, Sikhumbuza Mngadi, Ashwin Desai, Fred Hendricks, Luli Callinicos, Elinor Sisulu, Mark Gevisser, Jeff Pieres, Laurence Wright, Dan Wylie, Fackson Banda, Lynette Steenveld, Pregs Govender, Zubeida Jaffer, Chris Kabwato, Peter Mtuze, Russell Kaschula and Paul Maylam.
[3] Luli Callinicos‟ *Oliver Tambo: Behind the Engeli Mountains* and Mark Gevisser‟s *Thabo Mbeki: A Dream Deferred* are just two examples.

biographical research and the different sources that can be use when conducting biographical research. Other concerns revolved around problems with memory and subjectivity and the researcher‟s mediation of knowledge production through their interpretation and bias. Another concern is the role of ideology in the way biographical writing is framed and how heroes and legends are made or invented and distinguished from ordinary people. There is also the tendency for linearity in discursive practice around biographical writing which is aimed at giving lives order, unity and coherence but in reality, very few lives can be neatly packaged in such a manner.

Various speakers advocated a nuanced approach to analysis within the field because the stories that are to be told are layered, not static or monolithic. Elinor Sisulu‟s biography of her in-laws Walter and Albertina Sisulu is entitled *Walter and Albertina Sisulu: In Our Time*. It gives a feminist twist to the Sisulus love story, their domestic setting and political activism. Most biographies have one subject or individual as the focus but this one examines two lives in one but manages to give them their individuality. Gevisser‟s (2007) biography of Thabo Mbeki is a psycho-political exposition of his encounters with Marxism, Leninism, Africanism, Black Consciousness, Afrikaner nationalism and liberalism. It chronicles Mbeki‟s rise to power at home and in exile through strategic alliances, concessions and cooptation as well as his subordination of the personal to the political for most of his life. Mbeki was Mandela‟s deputy and successor and is a very influential person in his own right. He is described as a brilliant, diligent but unpopular and flawed man who is also considered to be a symbol of modern Africa and its renaissance.

Several speakers at the workshop questioned whose stories should be told or considered significant enough for the national record in South Africa, for example, struggle or liberation stories of those that went into exile, those that were banned or imprisoned and others who also suffered and sacrificed in small ways but did not go into exile or prison. Many of the speakers advocated for a humanising history which includes the stories of ordinary people, for example, indentured Indians in South Africa that first arrived in 1860 (1860 Heritage Foundation). Apartheid forced people, especially blacks, to make difficult choices everyday and Mtuze‟s autobiography entitled *An Alternative Struggle* is deliberately written to chronicle the struggles of an ordinary person. Mtuze worked as a court interpreter, radio announcer for Radio Bantu, a Foreign Affairs protocol officer for the Ciskei government, a

publishing representative for Via-Afrika, lecturer and professor at various institutions including the University of South Africa, University of Fort Hare and Rhodes University.

Based on the foregoing discussion, a qualitative research methodology was adopted for the study because it is better suited for hypothesis-generating research and provides a deeper understanding of social phenomena (meanings and actions) (Silverman, 2000:2 & 8; Miles and Huberman, 1994:8). Explorative, semi-structured, narrative interviews were used for data collection. Amongst those interviewed were Mabuza‟s widow Esther and son Sandile, his sister Margaret, colleagues and others who knew him, for instance, David Wylde, Michael Mndawe, Dr. Rob Snaddon from the Penryn Trust, Simeon Gininda of the Mpumalanga Legislature and businessman Mr Elias N. Ginindza. Interview guides traced the subject‟s basic life story, including the development or evolution of attitudes and significant events in their chronological or historical sequence and in relation to events in see Appendix 4.

Multiple sources of information were used for this study ranging from primary sources (original documents) to secondary sources (published documents, newspaper editorials, and interviews) in order to cross-reference for validity. Internal validity refers to the ability to draw conclusions about causal relationships from the available data. A study has high internal validity when strong inferences can be made that one variable caused the other. External validity is the extent to which the results can be generalized to other populations and settings but it is not a major concern for biographies because they are essentially case studies whose findings are not generalised to a wider population. In terms of reliability, it is difficult to ensure that the findings or conclusions of biographies can be replicated because the interpretation and analysis is subjective or speculative depending on the researcher‟s bias and the theoretical framework they adopt. However, the data and information gathered is triangulated to check for or eliminate distortions and inconsistencies (Bertaux, 1981; Elms, 1994; McAdams, 2006).

Maurois (1929:71) maintains that a person‟s own account of events has “a particular tone, a particular shade of significance, which no paraphrase can preserve.” Further, Maurois (1929:70) notes that “nothing is an adequate substitute for the personal impression to be obtained from direct contact with a man‟s letters or diary.” For this reason, interview data was cross-referenced and supplemented with Enos Mabuza‟s personal documents (personal and business correspondence) (Denzin and Lincoln, 2001:xxxvi; Gottschalk, Kluckhohn, and Angell, 1945), which, according to Maurois (1929:73) represent “exceptional moments” in a

person‟s life.” However, Mulholland and Ludlow (1992:3) note that when people write about their own actions or important things they have experienced, they often do not give the real reasons for the way things happened. Public archival documents and other secondary sources such as books, political organisations‟ archives and newspapers were also used to compliment the memories or oral accounts of interviewees which tend to deteriorate or be selective of facts over time (Thompson, 1998).

There are usually no simply explanations for human experience because human beings and events (actions, intentions and meanings) are influenced by many variables that form a complex chain over time (Miles and Huberman, 1994:146; Marcus, 1994; Maurois, 1929:30). These variables need to be examined and explained if we are to understand people‟s actions and decisions. We cannot ignore the impact of social relations or their context in a given society if we wish to retain the explanatory value of information obtained about people‟s actions and the possible reasons for those actions and their consequences (Mulholland and Ludlow, 1992:5, 8 & 29). It is better to analyse or interpret the lives of historically significant personalities in context in order to get an enriching, critical, reflective and interpretive outcome that enhances our understanding of lived human experience (Benton, 2005:206-226; Denzin and Lincoln, 2001:xi-xxv; Eakin, 1999; Marcus, 1994). Mulholland and Ludlow (1992:29) maintain that people do not make choices in a vacuum, thus “it is necessary to see individuals choosing and acting within a context and to examine the context as well as the actions.” Mabuza led the KaNgwane people at a time when institutionalised segregation meant that black people were oppressed and disenfranchised. It was also a time when the power of the racially exclusive apartheid state was at its zenith and any form of resistance was brutally crushed, for example, the series of states of emergencies under the Internal Security Act from 20 July 1985 until 1990 (Gish, 2004; Maylam, 2001).

Sociological theories that pertain to social networks and network effects explore the interaction between the individual and the group; the interrelatedness of personality and society; the environment and events. People occupy positions within economic and social structures. They may be members of religious groups or political parties on top of family or regional loyalties. They may be educated or illiterate, rich or poor and all these factors influence the decisions they make. One has to examine these dimensions to understand why something happened or why people chose to act as they did because it is important in trying to analyse information in an interpretive framework or paradigm (Mulholland and Ludlow,

1992:1 & 3). However, one should be careful not to reduce historical accounts to a simplified version of good and evil or distort history by over-emphasising one variable (Mulholland and Ludlow, 1992:22-25). Bertaux (2003:39) and Roos (2003:32-33) state that the context of events is important to sociological analysis because it enables us to understand and explain events by anchoring them in lived social-historical realities as an integral part of people‟s lives which cannot be separated from the subjective aspects of their personality and behaviour. By taking into cognisance the influence of context, we are able to identify the dynamics (power, conflicts, constraints, alternatives) that emanate from these because they combine to shape the courses of individual lives by preventing or enabling certain actions (Bertaux, 2003:40 & 43).

Pierre Bourdieu‟s conceptions of *habitus, field* and different forms of *capital* (1992; 1998) and Bruno Latour‟s (1999) actor-network analysis are used for this study to analyse Mabuza as a person who lived in a particular context and responded to it in specific ways. Latour (1999) argues that distinguished personalities like Albert Einstein and Louis Pasteur did not necessarily possess special features that made them successful. Latour maintains that the secret to understanding these individuals‟ achievements lies in understanding the principles that determine intellectual networks, or any other networks. Bourdieu explains *habitus* as a system of durable and transposable dispositions, orientations or behaviours (meaningful practices and meaning-giving perceptions) acquired through primary socialisation, as well as other skills acquired later in life to create structure in our lives. *Habitus* can also be explained as a socially constituted system of cognitive and motivating structures within several underlying structures (Bourdieu, 1998: 15 & 18). It is important to note, however, that the *habitus* is not uniform. Some people‟s *habitus* is more extensive and adaptable in different fields (contexts) than others.

Bourdieu and Latour‟s analyses offer an alternative way of reading and analysing biographies or treating and portraying their subjects as normal people. Latour (1999) and Benton (2005:206-226) object to the myth that people who become distinguished possess exceptional creativity or talent and suggest that we should analyse real people and real life experiences in a more holistic and encompassing way. This study is an investigation of how an individual is situated in a particular context and how that context moulds him or her. Bourdieu and Latour‟s theories have been used to explain the particular course that Enos Mabuza‟s life took within the socio-political context of South Africa at that time.

1.4 Who is Enos Mabuza's and what did He Achieve?

The late Nganani Enos John Mabuza was born in 1939 on the Anglo-Vaal Group‟s Sheba Gold Mine in the Barberton District of the then Eastern Transvaal where his father was a miner (van Wyk Smith, 1993:11). As a black South African, Mabuza had first-hand experience of deprivation. The Mabuza children struggled to get an education because the family could not afford it. According to Sandile Mabuza (Interview June 2007), the Mabuza family led a humble, pastoral lifestyle. Enos was the eldest child in a family of four children and used to herd the family‟s livestock, mainly sheep. His father worked at Sheba Gold Mine in Barberton and like most mineworkers, he visited the family at fixed periods. His mother was a housewife and raised the children with the assistance of their paternal grandmother (Margaret Mabuza, Interview June 2007). Mining did not pay well and Mabuza‟s father took a second wife which meant that he had to stretch limited resources in order to support another family. Consequently, Enos Mabuza‟s grandmother and aunt took responsibility for his initial education and sold some of their livestock (cattle and sheep) in order to do this. Enos did his primary education at Sheba Gold Mine were his father worked (Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Margaret Mabuza, Interview June 2007) and he was part of the first generation of black South Africans to experience the disempowering impact of Bantu Education (he was nine years old when the National Party came to power and fourteen years old when the Bantu Education Act was passed).

From this humble background, Mabuza rose to earn the respect, and often the hatred, of those who knew him and this thesis focuses on the significant roles he played in education, politics, conservation and business (van Wyk Smith, 1993:11). Mabuza had a sixteen-year career in education as a teacher and education inspector in the Eastern Transvaal. Later, he served on several educational boards. Mabuza stepped into the political arena following the establishment of the KaNgwane Bantustan and was appointed Chief Executive Councillor of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly in 1978. He became KaNgwane‟s first Chief Minister when KaNgwane was declared a self-governing territory in 1984 and resigned from this position in April 1991 (van Wyk Smith, 1993:11). In 1978, Mabuza co-founded and served as President of the Inyandza National Movement until his resignation from politics (van Wyk Smith, 1993:11; Mabuza, 1991). One of the highlights of his political career was his successful fight against the incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland in 1982. After he resigned as Chief Minister of KaNgwane, Mabuza was involved in the first Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) multi-party constitutional negotiations in 1991

(*Mayibuye*, 1990 Vol. 1 No. 3:51-52). The convention brought together the government, Bantustan leaders and liberation movements to discuss South Africa‟s future (Pityana, 2005; Makwetla, 2005; Phosa, 2005; Gish, 2004:138; van Wyk Smith, 1993:11).

Mabuza was instrumental in driving environmental conservation initiatives in KaNgwane where he helped establish three nature reserves. He advocated the conservation of natural and other resources and served on several environmental and community trusts, including the Independent Development Trust and the National Parks Board (Pityana, 2005; Makwetla, 2005; Phosa, 2005; van Wyk Smith, 1993:11; Mabuza, 1992; Mabuza, 1990).

Van Wyk Smith (1993:11) describes Mabuza as a "keen Methodist" and a humble and peaceful man who was committed to non-violence. He (van Wyk Smith, 1993:11) notes that religion influenced Mabuza‟s work and conduct, for instance, he valued the meaning of family (Mabuza, 1992; Mabuza, 1991). Penryn College which was initiated by Mabuza and others is linked to the Methodist Church and imparts Christian principles to develop the spiritual life and humility of learners (Penryn College‟s Mission Statement and marketing brochures, 2006). At the time of his death, Mabuza was a director on the boards of several companies, among them, Standard Bank South Africa, South African Breweries and the Anglo-Vaal mining group (Pityana, 2005; Makwetla, 2005; Phosa, 2005; Van Wyk Smith, 1993:11; Mabuza, 1992:3). He also ran his own consultancy business called Enos J. Mabuza & Associates which was launched at the beginning of August 1991. Further, Rhodes University recognised his contributions in 1993 by awarding him an Honorary Doctor of Laws (LLD) degree (Van Wyk Smith, 1993:11).

1.5 Background to the Role of Traditional Leaders within Apartheid Structures

Traditional leaders or authorities included paramount chiefs, chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen and they held positions of public trust over specific areas or locations (jurisdiction). Traditional leaders had "immense moral and political authority" in the maintenance of "civic morale and social order" in accordance with customary law (Sklar, 1994:1 & 2). Chiefs occupied the highest office and appointed councillors from the ranks of kinsmen or elders (or both) to assist and advise them. Authority was delegated through a hierarchy of sub-chiefs and headmen and the principle of government was based on consultation, discussion and consensus (Koyana, 1998:120; Lodge, 1995:1). Colonial powers (and later the apartheid system) exploited the trust that was vested in this traditional institution (Sklar, 1994: 1 & 2).

Investigating and explaining the rationale behind the Bantustan system sheds light on the ambiguities posed by Mabuza‟s political choices and debates regarding the incorporation of traditional authorities into South Africa‟s government structures after 1994 (Oomen, 2005; Ntsebeza, 2002; Walshe, 1987).

Indirect rule was a divide and conquer tactic employed by the British in their colonies by exploiting ethnic divisions (or the rural-urban divide) among different groups of people in order to expand and maintain white domination, for instance, British colonists capitalised on divisions among Xhosa chiefdoms in the Eastern Cape (Mufson, 1990:307). Tribal Authorities whose authority was originally rooted in the fusion of various powers or functions (judicial, legislative, executive and administrative) were co-opted into administrative positions by colonial administrations (Koyana, 1998:120; Mamdani, 1996; Lodge, 1995:3). Indirect rule in South Africa functioned in a context in which traditional authorities controlled 13% of the land which constituted the *native reserves* before apartheid was instituted. A series of statutes including the *Glen Grey Act* of 1894, the *Native Land Act* of 1913, the *Native Affairs Act* of 1920 and the *Native Administration Act* of 1927 (Ntsebeza, 2002:41-42, 47,52; Hendricks and Ntsebeza,1999) set the tone for the compromised position of traditional authorities by systematically curtailing their functions and powers. The French followed slightly different policies of assimilation or association in their colonies (Mamdani 1996).

1.6 The Bantustan System and Eligibility

The Bantustan system was established as an extension of the apartheid state‟s divide and rule strategy towards the black majority. It was also designed to control the influx of blacks into urban areas as well as to provide a pool of cheap migrant labour (Ntsebeza, 2002:47; Mamdani, 1996:22-24; Callinicos, 1992). Ten Bantustans were created - Bophuthatswana, KwaZulu, Venda, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, Transkei, Ciskei, Lebowa, QwaQwa and Gazankulu (Ntsebeza, 2002:74; Mufson, 1990; Mulholland and Ludlow, 1992:24). Not all Bantustan leaders were traditional leaders in the conventional sense like chiefs. This post was not ascribed or hereditary according to chiefly lineages but was created as an administrative function forcing traditional authorities to become salaried officials accountable to the government. Many Bantustan leaders were not elected by the people but imposed from above and to ensure that the system worked, some chiefs were created where they did not exist before (Ntsebeza, 2002:36). Some opportunistic traditional authorities who wanted to ensure

their political survival made alliances with the apartheid state as their original powers were systematically undermined or curtailed (Ntsebeza, 2002:60).

The *Separate Representation of Voters Act* was passed in 1951, together with the *Bantu Authorities Act* of 1951 which recognised the authority of chiefs and other tribal authorities, including people that had been appointed by the apartheid state, as legitimate rulers in Native Reserves or Bantustans. The *Bantu Authorities Act* made it almost impossible for traditional authorities to escape being co-opted into the apartheid machinery or to be neutral within the administrative arm of the state when they were mandated to implement hated government policy which included forced removals, taxes, livestock limitation or culling as well as land re-division into grazing, cultivation and residential areas (land tenure and administration under the auspices of conservation or Betterment Schemes). The result was that traditional authorities alienated themselves from their subjects by enforcing these policies (Ribot, 2001:4; Mamdani, 1996; Callinicos, 1992). The *Promotion of Self-Government Act* of 1959 was aimed at establishing self-government and separate constitutions in the Bantustans. Many people resisted this but it was forced on them and four of the ten Bantustans eventually became „independent." Transkei became self-governing in 1976, Ciskei in 1981 and KaNgwane in 1984 (Ntsebeza, 2002: 74 & 82).

Forced removals were used to push the black population into the Bantustans from the 1960s until the 1980s. The Bantustans became over-crowded, lacked adequate resources and infrastructure and offered little economic opportunities (Gish, 2004:40). Most of the responsibilities of traditional authorities were passed onto the Bantustan leaders such that they became responsible for policing pass laws, development and service delivery (roads, water, education), work contracts for migrant workers and pensions for the elderly (Ntsebeza, 2002:69, 80, 87). Bantustan leaders, like the hijacked traditional authorities which preceded them, were generally unaccountable and corrupt and thus did not have legitimacy in the eyes of the rural communities which they ruled over (Bank and Southall, 1996:408, 425-427).

As apartheid and the Bantustan system became established, it also became "difficult to discern where the power of apartheid"s black faces began and ended" (Mufson, 1990:287). According to Gish (2004:40), Bantustan governments were often more brutal than the apartheid government itself in rooting out opposition as some corrupt black civil servants in those governments viewed their employment in the Bantustan governments as a way to enrich themselves. Various inducements or enticements such as economic resources, prestige,

authority and politico-legal means of power were used to lure ambitious individuals, whilst traditional authorities that refused to collaborate or failed in their functions were deposed and new, cooperative or compliant ones were appointed in their place (Ntsebeza, 2002:25 & 33; Ribot, 2001:74; Ray, van Rouveroy and van Niewaal, 1996:25). The disdain towards blacks who worked within apartheid structures was once summed up by Mosiuoa Lekota"s dismissal of them as "fools, crooks and eunuchs" (cited in Mufson, 1990:286).

The Bantustan system was very unpopular when the government introduced the 1970 *Bantu Homelands Citizen Act* which forcibly grouped blacks along ethnic lines (Mufson, 1990:286). Blacks still could not vote and they had limited rights in these ethnically-based Bantustans (similar to Native Reserves in former British colonies or the Reservation camps for Native Indians in the United States). The apartheid government considered blacks as citizens of these Bantustans and not of South Africa itself. As a result, the Bantustan system was never accepted by most black South Africans (Gish, 2004:40) and traditional authorities became targets in the anti-apartheid struggle in the 1980s, for instance, in Lebowa in the Northern Transvaal and KwaNdebele in the Eastern Transvaal after the 1976 Soweto Student Uprising (Ntsebeza, 2002:72; Lodge, 1983).

Despite the evils of the Bantustan system, traditional authorities did not relate to the apartheid state in the same way and some managed to retain some degree of legitimacy and autonomy. Not all traditional authorities became oppressive intermediaries of the apartheid state or conduits to control blacks in the rural areas; although it became increasingly difficult for them to criticise the same apartheid policies that they were forced to implement (Ntsebeza, 2002:60; Bank and Southall, 1996). Individual leadership style, competence and personality distinguished those that were tolerated and the few that were respected by the people, for example, Paramount Chiefs Sabata Dalindyebo of the Tembu (who joined the ANC in exile after being deposed and forced out of the country) and Morwamoche Sekhukhune in the Northern Transvaal (Lodge, 1983), Chief David Dalindyebo and Chief Victor Ndamase, Chief Albert Luthuli and Nelson Mandela (Ntsebeza, 2002:60 & 78).

Part of this enquiry is to establish what mandate, authority or legitimacy Mabuza had as a Bantustan leader. He became a Bantustan leader even though he did not belong to a ruling house or chieftaincy. Although many Bantustan leaders were imposed from above by the apartheid state, this was not the case with him. Instead, some Swazi chiefs persuaded him to accept this position on their behalf. He was requested and later elected to join the traditional

leaders before he became a part of the Bantustan system. The Swazi chiefs wanted him to lead because he was literate (understood English and could read the fine print) whereas many of them were illiterate or semi-literate elderly people (Interview with Mrs Mabuza on 4 May 2006; van Wyk Smith, 1993:11). Mabuza accepted his appointment; "humbled" by the trust that the KaNgwane people had placed in him (Interview with Mrs Mabuza on 4 May 2006). Although Mabuza, as the leader of a small and relatively insignificant Bantustan, was not in the same league as people like Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu, Desmond Tutu and others, he tried to follow their non-violent doctrines of negotiation, forgiveness, reconciliation and duty to others. Like the traditional authorities in Zimbabwe who supported the freedom fighters and the country‟s liberation struggle (Spierenburg, 2002), Mabuza also supported the anti-apartheid struggle by working with the exiled ANC and the UDF (Mufson, 1990:209 & 304). Mabuza used his leadership position, albeit within apartheid structures, as a platform to speak out against injustice and the KaNgwane people, trusted and respected him for it.

1.7 The ANC, Traditional Authorities and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle

The ANC did not contest the history or legitimacy of traditional authorities in the rural areas when it was established in 1912. Traditional authorities were supportive of the ANC (mainly financially, the most prominent being traditional authorities from the Northern Transvaal, North-East Transvaal and the Swazi Regent) and in turn they enjoyed respect from the organisation until the 1920s when traditional authorities came under increasing pressure to ally themselves with the colonial government (Walshe, 1987:210). The ANC adopted a new, more radical constitution in December 1943 which, amongst other things, eliminated the House of Chiefs and from then on, the ANC no longer held a uniform view regarding the relevance of Traditional Authorities (Tabata, 1952:6 & 7). In contrast to the ANC‟s earlier position, the All African Convention (AAC, established 1935) and the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM, formed 1943) opposed traditional authorities and their institutions. These two organisations were founded on the principle of non-collaboration with, and boycotting of government created structures (Tabata, 1950:103 & 105) and they opposed traditional authorities because they saw them as collaborating with the state in oppressing Africans in the rural areas (Tabata, 1952:6 & 7).

Despite these shifts in opinion, Callinicos (2006:40) observes that the ANC was not a "monolithic" organisation and tried to be non-racial and inclusive of all people who wanted

to contribute to the struggle. The anti-apartheid struggle was a "Herculean, multi-faceted task" (Callinicos, 2006:26) that required a broad, multi-faceted liberation movement and traditional authorities came into the fray, despite being widely considered devious and opportunistic (Ntsebeza, 2002). The ANC"s alliance partners included the white Congress of Democrats from as early as the 1950s (Callinicos, 2006:3) and Traditional Authorities became important again to the ANC and the SACP when the two organisations were banned in 1960. According to Mufson (1990:190), the ANC became "a broad church of resistance with room in its pews for capitalists and communists, white and black, young and old." The country"s biggest trade unions, anti-apartheid organisations and student organisations all adopted the ANC"s Freedom Charter. The inclusive nature of the ANC was summed up when Oliver Tambo Oliver who led the ANC"s overseas operations in the 1960s said:

> "the ANC is the parliament of the people,… home of any number of political positions which are opposed to apartheid. So, don"t paralyse your ability to communicate effectively in that parliament, by rigidifying your ideological and political position" (cited by Neo Moikangoa in Callinicos, 2006:17).

Nelson Mandela was the main proponent for the strategy of working with Bantustan leaders such as Mangosuthu Buthelezi whilst others like Govan Mbeki vehemently opposed the idea; arguing that their institution was unrepresentative and undemocratic and a strategy of working with traditional authorities was desperate, naïve and dangerous (Ntsebeza, 2002:98-112). Mbeki and others like Patrick Lekota of the UDF and the Northern Transvaal People"s Congress (NOTPECO) did not trust traditional leaders who were not affiliated to the main liberation movements to faithfully fight apartheid from within the system even though leaders like Buthelezi and others had pledged to do so at various times (Ntsebeza, 2002:99). They maintained that the conflict of interest or contradictions were too great to ignore (Mbeki, 1996:92 cited in Ntsebeza, 2002:98) and their misgivings about such an alliance were confirmed by the fall-out between the ANC and Buthelezi in 1979 and the bloody conflict that ensued in the 1980s and the early part of the 1990s (Ntsebeza, 2002:111-112; Mufson, 1990:298-299, 307).

It has been argued that the Tribal Authorities" alliance with the UDF and the ANC was a ploy to ensure that they enjoyed another lease of life, although this did not deter the ANC from seeking the assistance of "progressive traditional authorities" by forging short-term alliances with them in the fight against the apartheid state when the ANC and the UDF had a weak

rural base (Ntsebeza, 2002:96). This inclusiveness was meant to incorporate as wide range of people into the struggle as possible and Lebowa‟s leader Nelson Ramodike even joined the ANC (Ntsebeza, 2002:114). The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) was launched on 20 September 1987 as part of the ongoing struggle for a free, non-racial South Africa and the ANC hoped that it would help mobilise the rural masses (Ntsebeza, 2002:101). However, this did not happen to the extent that had been hoped because members of the organisation were an elite that did not permanently reside in the rural constituencies. However, in the early 1990s, some ANC leaders reiterated the role of patriotic and heroic chiefs who were affiliated with the ANC as part of the coalition of forces struggling for national liberation. The ANC was still in exile and needed chiefs to be its main representatives in the rural areas (Ntsebeza, 2002:105).

Traditional authorities rose to significance again during the political transition which eventually led to South Africa‟s first democratic elections in 1994. Delegations of Traditional Authorities from the former Bantustans were part of the multi-party CODESA constitutional negotiations with the National Party after the un-banning of the ANC and the SACP and the release of political prisoners (Ntsebeza, 2002:107-109; van Rouveroy, van Niewaal and Adriaan, 1996). In terms of the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996, Chapter 12: Traditional Leaders), Traditional authorities have reclaimed a semblance of their original importance, dignity and respect within the new post-apartheid constitutional dispensation (at provincial and local government level) but many political commentators, authors and academics are sceptical about the role played by this institution in the past and the role it can continue to play in a democratic society (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed account).

1.8 Saints and Sinners: Some Comparisons

There is a saying that the past is never dead and Golding (2001:278) states that “men can die of shame” because of the things that they do or fail to do. In politics, individual contributions generally do not make or break a revolution but individuals add or subtract something to the collective voice. Mabuza‟s contributions to the anti-apartheid struggle were not conventional but his behaviour or response to oppression and domination (working on both sides) was not unique. His contributions are not taken seriously because he was not a radical anti-apartheid activist in the military or revolutionary sense but not everyone took that route. He was a Bantustan leader at a time when blacks were losing patience with the idea of a peaceful, non-

violent approach to ending apartheid and they were becoming angry with those who collaborated with the system (*Mayibuye*, 1984. No.5:8).

Mabuza, like other Bantustan leaders, was criticised, discredited and condemned because of his association with the apartheid government but he was also admired by those who knew him closely. By his own admission, he was a member of the ANC and supported the principles and objectives that the ANC stood for (*Mayibuye*, 1990 Vol. 1 No. 3:52). Many black liberation theories abounded at the time and everyone tried to make their contribution to the anti-apartheid struggle as they saw fit. Mabuza was optimistic about working with anyone who opposed apartheid, including white liberal allies, towards eventually dismantling the apartheid edifice. However, most people were sceptical about the efficacy of negotiating with such groups and maintained that they had no business working together because they stood on different sides of the fence. Desmond Tutu did not believe in or support violence in the anti-apartheid struggle and some people said that he was naïve for trying to negotiate with the enemy; a government that was so hostile to black interests (Gish, 2004:60 & 82). Tutu defended his stance in his eulogy to black consciousness leader Steve Biko by commenting that "being pro-black is not the same thing as being anti-white" (Gish, 2004:68). Similarly, Mabuza defended his political views with the words: "…unity should not mean conformity. Difference should not be equated with dissidence…" (*Mayibuye*, 1990 Vol. 1 No. 3:52). Mabuza"s position did not automatically mean that he pandered or deferred to the apartheid government"s every whim.

Mabuza"s contributions to the struggle were noted by the ANC"s *Mayibuye* publication in 1990 which commented that he was "actively pursuing a patriotic path" (*Mayibuye*, 1990 No. 1:15). When he received an honorary doctorate from Rhodes University, Mabuza explained his decision to join politics as a selfish one, motivated by his concern for the proper education of his people (van Wyk Smith, 1993:11). He was conscious of his precarious position as a Bantustan leader but he was committed to the mandate to represent the interests of those that put him in that position. He believed that Bantustan leaders and others with recognisable political constituencies had a role to play even if opinions differed (*Mayibuye*, 1990 Vol. 1 No. 3:52; Fabricius, 1990).

From a comparative perspective, the creation of Tribal Trust Lands or Reserves/Reservations for indigenous populations in different countries was similar to South Africa"s Bantustan system (Fogel, 2003; Fredrickson, 1995). In terms of political personalities who occupy

ambiguous or unpopular positions in history, parallels can be drawn between contradictions in Mabuza"s political roles and contradictions in Booker T Washington"s career (Fredrickson, 1995:33, 35-36; Malan, 2006:15). Other examples can be drawn from the political careers of prominent figures like Tom Mboya in Kenya (Shachtman, 2009; Wafula Okumu, 2001: 99-123; Kaarsholm, 1995:33-44; Maré and Hamilton, 1987; Goldsworthy, 1982:3-8, 11-13, 18-22; Mboya, 1970; Rake, 1962: 28-34, 54-75, 99-102, 147-156, 170-184) and Bishop Abel T Muzorewa in Zimbabwe (Mufson, 1990:293; *Mayibuye*, 1992 Vol. 3 No.7:34-35; Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference Report, 1979). In South Africa, Mangosuthu Buthelezi is one figure that springs to mind as actively antagonising or sabotaging the efforts of the liberation movements and being responsible for many incidences of violence (Gish, 2004:106-107, 126, 137-142, 165; Ntsebeza, 2002; Hamber cited in Paris, 2001:459; Mufson, 1990:295-308; *Mayibuye*, 1992 Vol. 1 No.2:6-7; *Mayibuye*, 1990 Vol. 1 No. 2:8; *Mayibuye*, 1989 No.2:4) The individuals mentioned above are just examples of leaders in different political milieus who are often regarded as divisive figures who betrayed their respective causes because of ambition, greed or divided loyalties. They have been labelled traitors and other unsavoury names and their legacies are controversial and contested as much as Mabuza"s. They are caught between ethnic, populism and nationalism ideologies and in some quarters they are considered to be men of fleeting consequence or failures.

1.9 Conclusion: Outline of the Thesis

This chapter introduces the research topic and subject and justifies why they are worth the enquiry. It outlines the research methodology used; the subject, Enos Mabuza and the socio-political context in which his career developed. Deliberate emphasis is on how the Bantustan system worked and the peculiar position that Enos Mabuza occupied within it. The chapter also looks at the ANC, as South Africa"s main liberation movement, and its early relationship with traditional authorities in the anti-apartheid struggle. The rest of the thesis is in thematic chapters as follows: Chapter 2 is a literature review which discusses the pertinent conceptual and methodological challenges in the field of biographical research within the context of *new* or alternative histories. It also highlights issues regarding the choice of biographical subjects, sources and materials which can be used and common themes. Chapter 3 provides the conceptual framework for analysis which is hinged on Mamdani (1996; 1999a; 1999b) and how he historicises colonial indirect rule, power and responses to it. This particular framework is relevant for this thesis because traditional authorities, Native Authorities and

Bantu Authorities in rural South Africa were the basis for the Bantustan system which Mabuza participated in. The problems and contradictions presented by these institutions forms the backbone of this evaluation of Mabuza and his contribution to or place in South African history because they also have implications for the current role of traditional authorities under the democratic dispensation; a role which came out of compromise and accommodation as a result of the country‟s negotiated transition and the need for reconciliation.

Chapter 4 is the theoretical framework adopted for the analysis of Enos Mabuza‟s career. The interpretive paradigm is used and it focuses on the role and power of networks in social mobility. Networks and their norms and rules, social capital, trust, reputations and agency are culturally constituted processes. Networks are relational and reciprocal and individuals gain power based on the strength of those networks as well as positive and negative aspects of associations within them. This psychology informs people‟s practices and mobility within given networks and it gives relational theories their enduring application in the social sciences (see Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu1998; Bourdieu, 1992a; Bourdieu, 1992b; Emirbayer, 1997; Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994; Latour, 1996, Latour, 1987; Latour, 1986; Latour 2005, Mutzel, 2009; Somers, 1994; Granovetter, 2002; Borgatti, Mehra, Brass and Labianca, 2009). Apart from his own competence and decisions, Mabuza had friends, colleagues and associates who made his life and career possible through the different types of capital or value which they contributed.

Chapter 5 is the first of the substantive chapters for this case study and it covers Mabuza‟s experiences as a student and his contribution to the field of education in the former Eastern Transvaal where he was a teacher and education inspector for sixteen years before he joined Bantustan politics. Later, Mabuza was one of several individuals who co-founded Penryn College as a way of addressing some of the problems in South Africa‟s schooling system which were caused by the apartheid government‟s policy of under-educating blacks (Karlsson, 2002; Morrell and Moletsane, 2002; Fleisch, 2002; Snaddon, 2006).

Chapter 6 focuses on Mabuza‟s conservation initiatives in KaNgwane from the 1980s and his other activities in nature conservation circles throughout his career by placing the key debates that were taking place at the time in historical perspective. Efforts were being made to address the racial imbalances that were fostered under apartheid, for example, the exclusion of blacks from national parks. Mabuza was a member of numerous organisations whose focus

was conservation and encouraging communities to participate in taking care of their environments, not just for themselves but for future generations. He also served as the chairman of the then National Parks Board (now SANParks).

Chapter 7 covers Mabuza‟s political career from his election to Bantustan politics and the challenges and opportunities that it presented, given the perceptions that the public had of Bantustan functionaries in general and the reputations that many of them created through the choices they made. The Bantustans were partly designed to create and maintain ethnic cleavages within the black population and this resulted in varying degrees of ethnic chauvinism (Maré and Hamilton (1987). Mabuza co-founded the Inyandza National Movement which represented mostly Swazi interests although it was not restricted to them. Inyandza/Mabuza cooperated with the exiled ANC even though he was also a member of the South African Black Alliance which represented mostly Bantustan leaders and other fringe politicians. Mabuza rose to prominence in 1982 during the abortive land deal in which South African authorities wanted to cede KaNgwane and Ingwavuma to Swaziland. The Bantustans were also associated with mismanagement, greed and corruption and Mabuza was not left unscathed. However, to his credit, there were few incidences of violence in KaNgwane at a time when violence was escalating in the rest of the Transvaal between 1985 and 1995. The chapter concludes with an exposition of how Mabuza prepared for the political transition and paved the way for his shift into business circles when other fringe politicians were bracing for a show-down with the main liberation movements and making alliances with conservative white groups.

Chapter 8 shows Mabuza‟s rise to corporate prominence and his new role as an ally for established white businesses as well as emerging black businesses which were aligned with the ANC during the transition and beyond. Political change was to be accompanied by economic transformation, restructuring and empowerment which were part of the reconstruction and development goals to benefit the majority of the masses that had been deliberately excluded in the past. Mabuza established his own socio-political consultancy firm to assist with this economic transition when he resigned from KaNgwane politics. Through this firm, he was able to advise businesses about their corporate images, labour issues, affirmative action and other relevant topics. Mabuza stayed in business and held numerous directorships until his death in 1997.

Chapter 9 briefly covers Mabuza‟s private or domestic life in so far as it informs the broader sociological study, since the family is the nucleus or primary site of social reproduction. As a Bantustan functionary, Mabuza faced challenges because of his politics and the support, encouragement and comfort given by his family, friends and community played a big role in his being able to stay in an otherwise unpopular political role for over a decade. The section also explores Mabuza‟s personal and professional influences, including the role of religion in his life. Chapter 10 concludes the study by pulling together Mabuza‟s attributes. He was able to traverse different arenas or fields on his own competence but also with the help and support of those around him. He held public office during a very difficult time in South Africa‟s history but he managed to put his controversial politics behind him when others did not or could not do so. He has a *tainted* legacy and credibility as a politician but he assumed other roles which were less controversial. Mabuza has been commemorated and celebrated by a varied group of people including the ANC, the Mbombela Municipality in Nelspruit, Penryn College and Rhodes University but does he deserve such recognition? His involvement in government-created structures and patron-client relationships relegated him to the undignified and unenviable position of a turncoat. Many would say that he was an imposter comrade who mocked, humiliated, degraded, vitiated or prostituted the true meaning and efforts of the struggle and that any claims to the contrary should be disregarded but he reconciled with the ANC and that endorsement cannot be overlooked. In the means-end debate Mabuza‟s legacy remains a contested one. He is not a hero or comrade in the regular sense but he did not commit any transgressions that would warrant the same amount of indignation as Buthelezi or Mangope, for example[4].

The struggle was not the monopoly of a select few so whilst Mabuza may have been opportunistic or strategically played certain situations to his advantage, his cooperation with the ANC and UDF and his defiance of the apartheid state over the Swazi land deal show that he could stand up for what was right and good if the conditions were right. Justified distrust and fear, frustration and despair prevailed in South Africa under apartheid but individuals found ways to make a difference.

All the people interviewed for this project describe Mabuza‟s demeanour, candour and treatment of those around him as gentle and soft spoken. They believe that he had the best

[4] (see articles in *Mayibuye*, November 1992. Vol. 3 No.10:18-19; *Mayibuye*, October 1992. Vol. 3 No.9:12-13; *Mayibuye*, October 1992. Vol. 3 No.9:17; *Mayibuye*, February 1992. Vol. 3 No. 1:13-14; *Mayibuye*, September 1990. Vol. 1 No. 2:22; *Mayibuye*, July/August 1990. Vol. 1 No. 1:34-36; *Mayibuye*, 1991 Vol. 2 No. 9:17; *Mayibuye*, 1984: No. 5:8).

interests of his constituency at heart but that remains a point of conjecture. Apart from what is available in the public records, we might never know why he did certain things the way he did or why things unfolded as they did in his personal and professional lives. At best, we can draw our own conclusions from his actions and their consequences, within the context in which they occurred. Mabuza might not be everyone"s here but he is also not a victim.

Enos J. Mabuza

Figure 1: Enos Mabuza circa 1989

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Biographical research recognises the interconnectedness of race, class, gender and the role of ideology. Stories of war survivors, refugees and others provide interesting examples of how these issues impact different people, for instance, in Eastern Europe during the Cold War, South Africa under apartheid and under democracy, life in the Nazi concentration camps or life after natural disasters. There is much that remains controversial and ambiguous, for example, some Holocaust memorials and their meaning but biographical research puts them and the issues they raise on the intellectual radar. Individuals, their relations with others and their place in history is fore grounded in this conjunction of history and the Self; the public and the private, the individual and the communal, the personal and the social. This chapter explores the relevance and uses of biographical research to different disciplines and sub-disciplines, the merits of the case study method, the researcher‟s role and importance of reflexivity in biographical research, competing theoretical frameworks that can be applied, the significance of context in analysis, the relationship between individual lives and social structures and methodological concerns regarding evidence, truth, comparability, identity, memory, selectivity and recollection. The chapter is a survey of past and current trends in biographical research in different fields or academic disciplines to show the relevance and popularity of biography writing and life history research in its many incarnations over time. Biographical research in its many guises has the common purpose of understanding the individual and their context or circumstances, from their own point of view. It attempts to explain the existential predicament by elucidating the human condition, conduct and potential by exploring lived experience and giving meaning to existence (Robert, 2002).

Human lives are storied and conceived in terms of settings, scenes, characters, plots and themes and these stories reflect who we are and where we fit in the world in which we live (McAdams, 2006:473). Biographical research is popular because researchers and audiences identify with the issues they raise whether it is the lives of the rich and famous or ordinary people whose biographies become best-sellers in bookshops. Human stories are told in a variety of ways including movies, documentaries and biopics, soap operas, plays, music, folktales, legends, myths, epics, history and pantomimes. Everyday news coverage on the internet, television, in newspapers, tabloid magazines and radio broadcasts is replete with human interest stories which highlight the appeal of the life story not just for academia

(McAdams, 2006:390-393, 464-465). The popularity of the genre shows the pull of the human story and its potential to up-lift those in despair and other hardships. Oftentimes, we are drawn to biographies in a voyeuristic fashion. We are intrigued, riveted or appalled by the inner lives and actions of others and the similarities, connections, inconsistencies or human failings that we can empathise with or find endearing or appealing (Roberts, 2002:52-72; Marcus, 1994; Denzin, 1989).

Biography is a life history written by an author who may or may not involve the cooperation of the subject of the biography. Biography is preoccupied with the historical and social – the lived realities of individual lives in relation to certain times and events which act as the focal points. Biographies also focus on the distinct and unique nature of the individual. No two lives are identical and there are numerous ways to reveal or express lived experience using a social-historical paradigm which emphasises a holistic description of the subject and highlights the interplay of different processes and contexts. A person‟s life or history has many components such as their occupation, significant relationships with spouses, parents, children, and friends as well as the different roles they assume in various contexts. The circumstances and meanings of relations with work colleagues, community, religious affiliations and state institutions also have relevance (Cole and Knowles, 2001; Elms, 1994; Gronn, 1993:343-358; Kaplan, 1998; Kets de Vries, 1990:423-431; Levinson *et al*, 1978; Levinson, 1996).

Different interpretations are possible and even desirable and the researcher plays an empathetic, collaborative but reflexive role instead of the traditional objective, detached enquirer, interpreter and presenter of the finished product. Biographies situate the subject within various social contexts such as class, religion, ethnic, race, culture, occupation, family, political system and occupational structure in a bid to understand their relevance to the subject. These are contrasted to the subject‟s own moral values and ideals, fantasies, wishes, conflicts, anxieties, aspirations, talents, skills, character traits, modes of feeling, thought and action and they are weighed against the subject‟s achievements, failures and regrets (McAdams, 1988:1-18; McAdams, 1994; McAdams, 2006; McAdams and Ochberg, 1988; Roberts, 2002; Runyan, 1984; Simonton, 1994; Linde, 1993; Watson, 1976: 95-131; Fiske, 1988:815-833; Bujold, 1990:57-69).

Biographical research encompasses people‟s hopes, struggles and despairs, their love, suffering, anguish, fear and hatred. People are immersed in the social, political and moral crises of their time which produce complexity and richness, disquieting aspects, perplexity and doubt and researchers give reasons for these, weigh the evidence and consider alternative interpretations for these. Biographical research attempts to reconcile the objective and the subjective, the absolute and the relative, the timeless and the historical through reconstruction whilst trying to avoid over-simplifying complex political, social, moral, theological or psychological issues. The different accounts generated offer the individual subject‟s own unique standpoint, which questions the notion of a singular objective reality. What is referred to as the „biographical turn‟ aids our understanding of major social shifts by examining how new experiences are interpreted by individuals and institutions (Roberts, 2002:5).

An individual selectively uses and is used by his world, through their evolving relationships and roles. Biographical research in its different manifestations – biographies, autobiographies, life histories, life stories, oral histories, narrative/discourse analysis, feminist writings and other genres which explore how individuals interpret experiences and social relationships have an interdisciplinary appeal for the study of racism, xenophobia and religious persecution. Biographical research is also useful in the study of old and new nationalisms, ethnic and national identity formation, democracy, migration studies, education, community history, political change, family studies, work/careers/professions, abuse, sexual orientation, health, illness, disability, aging/gerontology, gender studies, class, deviance and delinquency. Further, biographical research can be used in longitudinal or generational studies with different age cohorts (Cole and Knowles, 2001; Elms, 1994; Gronn, 1993:343-358; Kaplan, 1998; Kets de Vries, 1990:423-431; Levinson *et al*, 1978; Levinson, 1996).

Autobiographies/biographies are a serious field deserving serious consideration because it adds to a society‟s codified memory and collective history through the lives of capable, innovative, productive and competent individuals. Biographical research can be regarded as a kind of archaeology which allows us to read about the people that we admire or who have survived adversity and from whom we draw the strength and courage to dream bigger and demand better from our lives because they were able to do so (McAdams, 1988:1-18; McAdams, 1994; McAdams, 2006; McAdams and Ochberg, 1988; Roberts, 2002; Runyan, 1984; Simonton, 1994; Linde, 1993; Watson, 1976: 95-131; Fiske, 1988:815-833; Bujold, 1990:57-69).

Biographers, however, are often criticised for focusing on prominent and privileged people while ignoring the experiences of ordinary people. Famous people or those with status or power as well as the seemingly obscure, unheard and marginalised, for example, refugees all hold significance or relevance for someone else – their families, friends, colleagues or countries. All lives are important and worthy of study, depending on the purpose, whether the subjects are literate or not. There is growing interest in the life course, identity construction and how best to present them. Clifford (1962: xix) observes that there is no perfect biography because it can never be complete, exhaustive, completely objective, impersonal or detached.

According to Sir Sidney Lee (cited in Maurois, 1929:33), "the aim of biography is the truthful transmission of personality" and in a bid not to diminish, distort or suppress elements of the subject, the biographer attempts to draw a true portrait of that person without knowing what the finished portrait will be. Biographies and autobiographies are not meant to caricature the individual but are preoccupied with the individual"s values, motives, actions and their consequences, duties (*prima facie* or otherwise), moral philosophies and their relation or interaction with those of a particular society and time. According to Maurois (1929:63), "Objectivity and detachment are the supreme aesthetic virtues…the biographer must expose and not impose." The biographer should not judge but moral judgment may be hinted at (Maurois, 1929:127).

This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first one discusses biographical research within the interpretive paradigm. It begins with an outline of international biographical resources and repositories in the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe, followed by the South African History Online as examples of the vast array of subjects and disciplines that biographical research covers. The South African History Online (SAHO) is the closest to an online biographical repository available for South Africa but more academically oriented biographical research is currently being conducted across the country to make up for the deficit. In the social sciences, the interpretive paradigm draws on numerous definitions, concepts, methods and grand narratives or theories to explain social phenomena and human behaviour. Current debates and approaches are explored in so far as they are relevant to biographical research. Next, the value and advantages of academic biographical research, related approaches and concepts[5] are given. Their similarities and differences are explained

[5] Biographies, autobiographies, life histories, life stories, oral histories, life narratives, memoirs, histriographies and ethnographies.

followed by an explanation of the general structure and themes which are central in academic biographies.

The next section outlines how academic biographical subjects are chosen, followed by an exposition of psychobiography as the dominant or most popular form of biographical research at South African universities. The next sections cover methodological and practical considerations in conducting biographical research and other forms of archival writing, the merits of the case study method in the study of individual lives and the types of primary and secondary sources used in biographical research. The introductory section ends with some criticism or limitation of biographical research and its contribution to knowledge production.

The second half of the chapter focuses on political biographies and themes. It begins with an explanation of the analogy of politics as a game before summarising some of the academic biographies (theses) that have been written at South African universities in the fields of history and politics. This overview includes the biographies of noteworthy politicians, political activists and statesmen such as Isaac Bangani Tabata, Alfred Bitini Xuma, Raymond Mhlaba and John Xavier Merriman. This discussion sets the tone for biographical research on South Africa‟s former Bantustan leaders within the context of the Bantustan policy, how it was marketed and defended by the apartheid state and its agencies, the deplorable social conditions and cycles of violence which characterised it. This is followed by a survey of existing literature on specific Bantustan personalities such as Lennox Sebe and Oupa Gqozo of the Ciskei, Chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu and the Transkei‟s Matanzima brothers and Bantu Holomisa and their legacies. The section ends by introducing Enos Mabuza, the subject of this biography and former leader of the KaNgwane Bantustan who some believe was a double agent for working with both the ANC and the apartheid state.

The level of pessimism, optimism, nostalgia and sentimentality about what was good or bad about the Bantustans and their leaders varies according to who you speak to or which books you read, and when they were written (Africa Institute of South Africa, 1976; Bank, 1988; Bates, 1987; Buthelezi, 1979; Buthelezi, 1990; Charton, 1980; De Wet and Leibbrandt, 1994; De Wet, 1985; De Wet, 1995; Els *et al*, 1971; Gitywa, 1988; Hattingh, 1979; Holomisa and Meyer, 1999). As part of the apartheid regime‟s divide and rule strategy, the Bantustan system deliberately created regional and ethnic loyalties instead of a united national identity. Bantustan leaders were seduced by the promise of power. Discrimination, marginalisation

and underdevelopment underscored the Bantustan system and people had negative attitudes and perceptions about the black administrations in the Bantustans.

The political economies of the Bantustans were in shambles, wages were meagre and welfare was non-existent. Pretoria controlled the budgets and used carrots and sticks tactics to compel Bantustan leaders to do their bidding in return for budgetary concessions. Poverty was an everyday reality of neglect by the central government which was compounded by mismanagement or corruption by the Bantustan administrations. Further, the majority of households in the Bantustans were female-led because of the migrant labour system which took men to the cities for most of the year, creating a gender skew in Bantustan populations (Kotze, 1975; Mager, 1999; Mangope, 1988; Mangope, 1978; Maré and Hamilton, 1987; Maré, 1992; Matanzima, 1976; Meyers, 2008; Mzala, 1988; Proctor- Sims, 1978; Rogers, 1976; Sebe, 1980; Smith, 1988; Southall, 1983b; Streek and Wicksteed, 1981; Switzer, 1979).

The effects of the Bantustan system and attendant maladministration, as well as their dismantling in 1994 are still felt in those areas today and the resentment or stigma towards individuals who participated in these structure still lingers, regardless of whether those individuals are alive or not or they are still active in politics or not. It is for this reason that Mabuza‟s biography is still relevant for history, politics and the memories of the people who live in the areas where Bantustans existed. The discussion might seem passé as far as popular memory and official records are concerned but it is not insignificant for the people in those localities who see and feel the legacy of the Bantustan system everyday (Temkin, 1976; Temkin, 2003; Tessendorf and Boult, 1991; University of the Witwatersrand Development Studies Group Southern African Research Service, 1982; White, 2008; Yawitch, 1982).

2.2 International Biographical Resources

The life of any nation is told through the lives of its people in order to inspire future generations to follow their examples of courage, determination, honesty and willingness to work (Simonton, 1994). This history is not only told through the lives of famous people but also through the infamous as a cautionary tale or deterrent. This section shows biographical research as having a long tradition in America and Europe. Biographical repositories in the USA profile the lives and contributions of that country‟s founding fathers, slaves, abolitionists, presidents and first ladies, vice presidents, secretaries of state, governors,

senators, justices/judges, religious/spiritual leaders, civil rights activists, pacifists, scientists, businesspeople, humanitarians, educators, filmmakers, Oscar winners, athletes and socialites (Simonton, 1994). The 24-volume American National Biography is a biographical encyclopaedia with approximately 17 400 entries of people from all eras and walks of life. It was published by Oxford University Press in 1999 as the successor to the Dictionary of American Biography which was first published between 1926 and 1937 (www.anb.org). This resource is updated and revised quarterly.

The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography is a multi-volume collection of biographical articles and portraits of Americans published since the 1890s. It has over 66 500 entries in 63 volumes. It is more comprehensive than the Dictionary of American Biography and the American National Biography but less scholarly because it does not provide bibliographies or citations for the original sources used. It relies primarily on questionnaires which were sent to subjects or their relatives, as well as other information supplied by the subjects" families.

Appletons" Cyclopaedia of American Biography is a six-volume collection of mini-biographies of famous Americans which was originally published between 1887 and 1889 and republished in 1968. It includes the names of over 20 000 native and adopted citizens of the United States from different eras. It also includes the names of several thousand citizens of other countries in North and South America with the aim of embracing all noteworthy persons of the New World, including nearly 1 000 people of foreign birth who were closely identified with American history and contributed to its culture. Although deemed unreliable or inaccurate in some instances, this resource provides a vibrant picture of America"s history as defined by the diversity and inclusiveness of the men and women it profiles. The portraits capture the richness of American life from pre-colonial times onwards – from missionaries to musicians, social workers to statisticians, cowboys to chemists and Vikings to astronauts.

The African American National Biography (AANB) is a comprehensive eight-volume repository which was compiled as a joint project of the W. E. B. Du Bois Institute for African and African American Research at Harvard University and Oxford University Press using public records, private writings, published works, reference resources and primary scholarship. It was born out of a need to document and record black lives and a desire to deepen the overall understanding of the African American contribution to American history and culture because of a general tendency for history to ignore or document only those

individuals and facts which are deemed important as seen through particular lens and ideologies. The need for an African American national biography devoted exclusively to black lives cannot be over-emphasised in a country whose history of slavery, racial segregation and all manner of exploitation, degradation and deprivation still lingers today. The AANB was published in a print edition in January 2008 and covers a mosaic of over 4 100 African American lives from every discipline, profession and walk of life (slaves, blues musicians, political activists, philanthropists, entrepreneurs, scientists, mathematicians) as a representation of part of American history through the immediacy of personal experience. The repository includes great and famous African Americans who are known throughout the world as well as a selection of others who are all but forgotten. The AANB website claims to recover lost dimensions of the African American experience by acknowledging the influence of African Americans on America‟s history and culture; thereby restoring to history the achievements of thousands of ordinary and exceptional African American men and women whose stories would have otherwise been lost (W. E. B. Du Bois Institute for African and African American Research).

The United Kingdom and Europe also have a number of biographical repositories. The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (DNB) online contains approximately 57 258 biographies of people who shaped the history of the British Isles and beyond[6]. It is an illustrated collection of specially written authoritative biographies of the men and women from around the world who have shaped different aspects of Britain‟s past. This resource is updated three times a year and is available as a 60-volume print edition. Biographical references in the United Kingdom and Europe generally profile actors, aristocrats, artists, comics, explorers, holocaust survivors, innovators/inventors, monarchs/royalty, musicians, Nobel Prize laureates, poets, politicians, prime ministers and cabinet ministers, philanthropists, publishers and writers/authors (Simonton, 1994; http://www.oxforddnb.com).

The World Who‟s Who Europa Biographical Reference contains biographical information on more than 60 000 famous and influential men and women in all fields. Eminent persons included in the reference range from Heads of State, key ministers, politicians, diplomats and religious leaders, those famous and successful in business, finance, technology, film, music, literature, fashion, sport and many other professions (http://www.worldwhoswho.com).

[6] England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

2.3 The South African History Online (SAHO)

The South African History Online (SAHO) is the closest to an online biographical repository available for South Africa. It celebrates the courageous men and women who were involved in the struggle for democracy and the lives of South African nation builders in different fields. As a historical resource, it seeks to explore the diversity of South Africa‟s people, places and histories. It does so by providing biographical information about national symbols and heritage sites, key personalities including anti-apartheid activists, politicians and trade unionists, innovators in science and medicine, literary and philosophical minds, community and religious leaders, architects, sculptors, photographers, Nobel prize winners, celebrities, sports stars and musicians. It provides useful historical timelines, information on people/biographies (from Jan van Riebeek to Nelson Mandela and beyond), politics and governance, culture and society (http://www.sahistory.org.za).

2.4 The Interpretive Paradigm and Biographical Research

Biographical research is related to several well-known paradigms, namely social-constructivism, interpretivism, post-modernism and the narrative paradigm. There are numerous methodological and theoretical developments in the study of lives in the fields of sociology, social policy, communication studies, cultural studies, organisational studies, human geography, political science, psychology (behavioural, cognitive, psychoanalysis), criminology, oral history and anthropology/ethnography regarding the collection and interpretation of material, the uses of biographical research as oral or written accounts, the interview relationships between subjects and researchers, the construction and editing of the story, the question of memory and how it is tainted by the passage of time as well as the intergenerational transmission of stories, hidden ideologies in narratives, audience and the researcher‟s own biography. There are popular ideological conceptions of lives and life events, how identities are formed and grounded in spatial organisational and other structures (Roberts, 2002:151-166). The different social science disciplines and sub-disciplines mentioned in this chapter share common ground in epistemology, methodology, interpretation and theoretical frameworks, cross-fertilisation, pragmatism and eclecticism. Researchers find, or are encouraged to be receptive of new and creative ways to interpret the social world and the meanings that individuals give to it (Roberts, 2002:167-174). Researchers try to treat the individual not as an isolated figure but as one that should be understood in terms of social relations of the family and wider social structures or

institutions. The approach shows concern with the complete individual, their past, present and future because social action is both retrospective and prospective, with an attendant present-time dimension.

Grand narratives or macro-theories in Sociology, for example, are preoccupied with dominant ideologies, establishing patterns and regularities, the general rather than the particular. Such narratives or theories trace the role of customs, norms and values in the maintenance of social order, broad interpretive schemas for understanding, structure and agency and how individuals shape and are shaped by the world they live in. On the other hand, post-modernist approaches try to debunk grand narratives by focusing on the micro-level, its general acceptance of change, diversity and uncertainty, focus on the individual and the intentions and motivations which drive them to engage in particular forms of action as well as the parameters or constraints which determine the outcomes of such action and the meanings that individuals give to their experiences. The emphasis varies but both represent different ways of skinning the proverbial cat which are influenced by particular research agendas and traditions (Roberts, 2002). The individual (the specific or particular) is inextricably connected to society/the global (the collective or the general, including social structures) which puts doubt on the notion of the „self-made man".

Hermeneutics is the theory, principles or science of interpretation or analysis and it is generally accompanied by phenomenology, for instance, Schutz"s phenomenological perspective attempts to establish the meaning that the subject gives to *X, Y or Z*. Grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss) and analytic induction (Znaniecki) are more commonly suited to comparing multiple life stories because they have a realist orientation and involve a degree of empiricism and theoretical sampling (Roberts, 2002). The Chicago School"s (University of Chicago"s Sociology department) interactionism, Satre"s existentialism and progressive-regressive method and Weber"s *verstehen* can be used to understand lived experience in the same way that pragmatism, realism and constructionism can, depending on the purposes and best fit.

Reductionism focuses on internal (psychopathologies and other maladaptive behaviours) over external or environmental and historical considerations. However, describing the subject"s behaviours, decisions and actions in purely psychological terms is limiting because it disregards the complexity of the human personality. It is therefore important to acknowledge that psychological explanations add to, rather than replace, our understanding of a person or

life if it is to be done in a holistic fashion (Roberts, 2002). Postmodernism challenges writing conventions and the inter-texuality of written as opposed to oral texts. It also challenges subjective and objective interpretive practice or evaluation, the role of language and how we understand cultures, experience, give meaning to events or experiences, especially in the face of competing or contested meanings. Discourse analysis, for example, examines language use and deconstruction focuses on the hidden or unspoken information in narratives. Philosophical and literary perspectives are also common in biographical research (Roberts, 2002).

Common themes and emerging concerns in the social sciences and related fields include the purposes and processes in biographical research, its uses, the function of time and social theory, history writing and power relations, identity formation and concepts of the self juxtaposed to collective or group portraits, subjective and objective realities, myths and memories, public memories (obituaries and commemoration), their construction and impact on private memories or personal contexts, reminiscence, different perspectives, public moralising and the construction of meaning. McAdams (2006:447) argues that there is no complete interpretation or single answer. Human behaviour has multiple meanings, and like a text, it can be interpreted on multiple levels. Much of what we do, say or experience is a product of compromise among conflicting forces and demands. Theorising in the social sciences can be a goal in itself (generating a new theory from data) or a means to a specific goal (testing, applying or modifying existing theory). This is typical of biographical research where theorising is geared towards generating new or validating existing theory, whilst gaining new conceptual insights and hypotheses about the human condition – behaviour, mannerisms, moods, voice, health or dress as well as people‟s travels, reputations, hidden or secret lives (Roberts, 2002:12). Different theories are used in biographical research to validate or challenge orthodoxies in academic discourse about how lives are written, constructed, presented or communicated and read or received by audiences.

According to McAdams (2006), there has been an upsurge in biography writing in the past quarter century due in part to the growing acceptance of the value it can add to social science research. Since then, biography writing, as third person accounting, has been in flux as one of several ways of showing the variability and diversity of human experience and the challenges involved in making sense of individual lives. There has been an epistemological revival of biography writing in the social sciences which has been influenced by the work of Merton,

Mills, Weber, Mead, Satre and others who offer predominantly functionalist theories to explain the existentialist dilemmas that biographical research poses. In sociology in particular, according to Roberts (2002:175), this revival is marked by the work of Bertaux (1981) and Denzin (1989). The revival is evidenced by the growing number of research groups and journals on the topic, for example, the International Sociological Association"s research block (RC38) which is dedicated to investigating or linking Biography and Society. This proliferation is shown by the journals devoted to biographical research below (Roberts, 2002:73):

Auto/Biography – Journal of the Auto/Biography Study Group of the British Sociological Association.
Biography (USA)
Biography and Society Newsletter – Biography and Society RC38 of the International Sociological Association.
Bios: Zeitschrift fur Biographieforschung und Oral History (Germany).
Current Sociology (1995) Special Issue: Biographical Research 43 (2/3) – Journal of the International Sociological Association focused on and consolidated the study of lives within Sociology building on the work of Bertaux, Plummer, Denzin and others.
Oral History (United Kingdom) Journal of the Oral History Society.
Oral History Review (USA).
Sociology (1993) Special Issue: Biography and Autobiography in Sociology 27(1) celebrated the revival of interest in the use of biography and autobiography in sociology from the 1930s.
The Narrative Study of Lives (London, Sage).
Words and Silences – Bulletin of the International Oral History Association.
Journal of Southern African Studies. 2004 Vol. 30 No.4 Special Issue: Writing in Transition in South Africa: Fiction, History, Biography.

Biographies, autobiographies, life histories, life stories, oral histories, narrative/discourse analysis, feminist writings have a distinctly qualitative bias regarding theoretical orientations, assumptions, methods and practice and generally follow the life course approach to capture the storied nature of human conduct whether it is in an organisation or community. The interpretive paradigm contrasts the traditional scientific experimental or survey procedures and designs typical of a quantitative, positivist or realist orientation and its preoccupation with reliability, validity and representativeness (Roberts, 2002:151). This contrast partly

explains the prominence of the interpretive paradigm across the humanistic disciplines. The popularity of qualitative research and the interpretive paradigm in the social sciences shows the split between positivist, scientific hypothetico-deductive methods and non-positivist camps. Most notions of „science" disclaim certain things or choose not to problematise, for example, power. The testimony is a form of life history with the socio-political intention of communicating marginalised experiences or interpersonal histories directly to a chosen audience. They could be stories about exclusion, violence, resistance, oppression, persecution – the voices of socially or politically neglected or repressed groups (Roberts, 2002).

Social, economic, cultural, political and historical forces shape lived experience (Goffman, 1959; Bertaux, 1981; Denzin, 1989a). Autobiography, life stories, life narratives, life histories, memoirs, historiographies, ethnographies and case studies are all preoccupied with individuals and how they live their lives as well as what they achieve (Simonton, 1994). These approaches celebrate the uniqueness of an individual case, the relevance of socio-historical contexts and acknowledge both subjective and objective realities. Autobiographies are stories about a person"s life as recorded and described by the individuals themselves. Autobiographies are considered to be empowering, therapeutic or cathartic for the individual because of the occasion for review, taking stock, introspection and reflection which bring the private face to face with the public. The social aspects or motives behind writing, for instance, autobiographies are important. Autobiographies represent the public but private and are usually spurred by a variety of subjective reasons which might not be apparent. They are often written as a confirmation of the self or self-awareness but also to influence or flatter the audience (Barber, 2006).

Biographical research highlights individuality and the diversity of meaning as the private and public (ideological world, the environment or social-political milieu) coalesce or merge into each other. One"s identity – self, character and personality is weighed against what they represent in a community, nation or in religious or political contexts. However, autobiography is generally selective, biased and offers subjective accounts of lives and work even though the author/subject may refer to objective sources of information or facts. The focus of life histories is the similarities between or among identified individuals or cohorts in similar positions/circumstances or with a shared experience, rather than the uniqueness of a single life. Life histories use both subjective and objective data obtained from testimonies, observation and independent factual records. Life histories are mainly undertaken by

sociologists and anthropologists who search for commonalities within cohort groups in order to reconstruct or interpret a given phenomenon (Robert, 2002). Life histories and ethnography, for example, have been used as a research method for decades but the biographical method has become more significant or popular in social research in recent times because of disillusionment with arguably static approaches of data collection, rigid binaries, male bias and growing interest in the life course and lived experience (evolutionary).

Life stories can be written or oral accounts of events, relationships and other circumstances in a person‟s life by the individual concerned (similar to autobiography). As such, life stories are necessarily subjective because they are limited to the depth and extend of material offered by the narrator based on personal thoughts and feelings. Life stories tend to focus on meanings attributed to circumstances and events rather than factual information (Cole and Knowles, 2001; Elms, 1994; Gronn, 1993:343-358; Kaplan, 1998; Kets de Vries, 1990:423-431; Levinson *et al*, 1978, Levinson, 1996). On the other hand, life narratives are accounts of a series of events with emphasis on description rather than explanation. They are told in the subject‟s own words and in this way they are similar to autobiographies but with an emphasis on description rather than evaluation. Historiographies entail research which utilises public records, government documents, confidential reports, newspaper editorials, photographs, films and artefacts to reconstruct information and provide a plausible historical explanation for a past event (McAdams, 1988:1-18; McAdams, 1994; McAdams, 2006; McAdams and Ochberg, 1988; Roberts, 2002; Runyan, 1984; Simonton, 1994; Linde, 1993; Watson, 1976: 95-131; Fiske, 1988:815-833; Bujold, 1990:57-69).

Narratives entail the telling of a story regarding an entire life, a significant part of it or a specific event based on the respondent‟s lived experience. To this end, constant reference is made to life histories, passages and life cycles as natural history metaphors. There is variability in the context-bound discourses which constitute these stories or narrations because of constructed social realities. Because the individual is not abstracted from their context, the stories or narrations have plots or a trajectory describing human action, concerns with power relations and political goals as well as the adoption of political positions and the significance attached to human agency. This is in contrast to the positivist scientific paradigm and its emphasis on quantification, generalisability, hypothesis-testing, validity and objectivity. Narrative analysis or discourse analysis is generally informed by the work of

Foucault, Derrida and Barthes and focuses on piecing together small or seemingly mundane details as well as the dramatic - deciphering meanings, motives, images, establishing coherence, style and different voices or multiple perspectives. One needs to be aware of ideological contexts and the specific ideologies hidden in narratives/oral history. Narratives have uses in literature, history, autobiography, psychology, sociology, cultural studies, education, linguistics, anthropology and even medical research despite being criticised for certain ambiguities, inconsistencies, relativism and subjectivity (Roberts, 2002:122-124).

Biography is similar to the stories conveyed in folk tales, myths, legends, history, stage productions and films. Biographies are written in many disciplines and critical biographies have grown as legitimate areas of academic study at universities across South Africa and abroad across varied disciplines such as history, politics, psychology, theology/religion, literature, linguistics/languages, drama, art, music/entertainment, sports and so forth. Someone related to or not known to the subject undertakes to write the subject‟s life story using different theoretical approaches in order to analyse, understand and evaluate the subject‟s legacy and contribution (Cole and Knowles, 2001; Elms, 1994; Gronn, 1993:343-358; Kaplan, 1998; Kets de Vries, 1990:423-431; Levinson *et al*, 1978; Levinson, 1996; McAdams, 1988:1-18; McAdams, 1994; McAdams, 2006; McAdams and Ochberg, 1988). Biographical studies are, by and large, qualitative case studies but they often have a comparative aspect whereby the subject is chosen for their contribution or significance in a given field and is compared to their contemporaries. Establishing or understanding the history or socio-political context in which a subject lived and worked is a crucial element to biography writing because it situates the subject and the issues which they grappled with in their politics, music, writing and so forth (Roberts, 2002; Runyan, 1984; Simonton, 1994; Linde, 1993; Watson, 1976: 95-131; Fiske, 1988:815-833; Bujold, 1990:57-69).

2.5 The Value and Advantages of Academic Biographical Research

Biographical research represents different voices with different agendas and shifting scientific, religious, moral, political and other discourses. Academic biography tries to understand not only individual lives but also their production within the social through the interplay of individual and social elements – dichotomies between the individual and society, action/agency and structure and how individuals, as social beings learn from, use and

interpret their experiences, many aspects of which usually resonate with audiences. Traditional Western biography has focused on elite or middle class white men whose political, military, scientific, artistic, athletic, religious or entrepreneurial achievements have made them famous and belies the power and status of the societies they live in. However, recent developments have seen the inclusion of traditionally marginalised or dismissed groups, for example, women, people of colour and other disadvantaged groups (McAdams, 2006:473).

Biographical research is coming into its own in terms of respectability as an academic pursuit. It is different to positivist or empirical research but its currency is that it avoids giving supremacy to a single point of view (polemics) or interpretation. It is just as valuable as other types of research especially for general biography and family research, racism, xenophobia, migration studies, religious persecution, women and gender studies, sexual identity or orientation, old and new nationalisms, ethnic and national identity formation, political change/transitions, democracy, social and community history, education, media studies, literary history, legal studies, work/careers/professions, health, abuse, illness, disability, gerontology, class, friendships, deviance and delinquency (Roberts, 2002). The goal of biographical research is to transform a life into a coherent and illuminating story and to understand the subjective lives of biographical subjects. Focus is on the career development, creativity, health and wellness, psychological development or psychopathology of the individual. In everyday language, metaphors are used to explain abstract concepts like life or the nature of being by relating them to something else. Similarly, academics use analysis and theory to capture the essential aspects of human life. In short, they extrapolate or infer meaning and draw conclusions in biographical research from available data which is mediated by their own interpretations of given situations.

Biographies are usually about famous or infamous historical (deceased) figures but they can also be about people still living because they can tell us a lot about a particular time and place. The popularity of biographies betrays humanity‟s fascination with the pressures and pitfalls that life presents and how different people respond to them. However, we do not look at people with neutral glasses and judge so-called heroes and fools, pessimists and optimists with biting irony or unreserved admiration before we have walked in their shoes to get a better understanding of their motivations for doing certain things. Academic biographies try

to strike a balance between fact, social theory and subjective interpretation. One assumption that people make is that the more educated an individual is, the more balanced, tolerant, moderate or ethical they are but this is not necessarily true. On the other hand, one can find redeeming qualities in individuals deemed to be villains. Readers of biographies, like the authors/researchers, have to decide if their subject, famous or infamous, did the best they could with what they had in the face of prejudice, tradition, taboos, injustice, inequality, tragedy and other restrictions or privileges (Green, 2006; Levinson, 1994). They have to decide whether what is impressive and memorable about the subject has inspired them and if the subject"s legacy benefits others today.

Similes, analogies and metaphors are all parts of figurative language or speech which offer compelling descriptions and invite us to make comparisons or take action. Metaphors, for example, structure our thinking about and give coherence and insights into daily experiences, our world, interactions or relationships and ourselves. They function as heuristic devices to help us decipher the nature of being or the human condition (Weiner, 1992:11-14; Grothe, 2008:40-59; Wilkinson, 2002). The human condition is such that we all need affection, approval, belonging, pleasure, passion, freedom, charity, humility, loyalty, power, prestige, recognition, security, status and protection to some degree. Most people are competitive and greedy at heart and many strive for excellence over mediocrity. We take risks and stake our reputations on them in order to win or get an advantage and thus do not respond well to criticism, failure, loss, rejection or ridicule which hurt our pride or force us to compromise or show weakness. Metaphors are pervasive in different contexts and for a variety of purposes. They are evident in everyday language[7] and thought in fields such as linguistics/discourse, philosophy, motivational psychology and so forth. In the field of motivational psychology (Sigmund Freud, Spence, Clark Hull, Miller, Brown-Farber, Amsel, Maslow, Kurt Lewin, Fritz Heider, John Atkinson, Julian Rotter, Kelly), metaphors have been used to reveal the determinants of thought and action. They are used to explain why behaviour is initiated, persists or is terminated (the choices made and why). In psychoanalytic, cognitive, ethological, socio-biological and Gestalt theories emotions such as frustration, fear, shame, guilt, conflict, anger, rejection, anxiety, the need for achievement over failure, altruism and so forth are cited as drives that lead to certain actions (Weiner, 1992). Metaphors are rooted in different ideological views (and necessarily have a latent function) and are underpinned by a functionalist perspective. Consequently, metaphors communicate meaning, reveal the

[7] Conversation, national news reports, popular science, magazine advertising, novels and poetry.

conceptual systems of different cultures and are often used to motivate us (Grothe, 2008:1-20; Goatly, 1997:107-136, 283-328; Fairclough, 1989).

The ego is a very powerful thing and influences male and female motivation or drives in different ways. Male identity and sense of self is often tied up with accomplishment, power, success, autonomy, efficiency, strength, competence, independence and the achievement of particular goals. These are greatly valued by men because they have a deep seated need to prove themselves to others as well as to themselves; otherwise they are regarded as not being good enough, impotent or failures. Most women, on the other hand, value and are motivated or empowered by different things. Women‟s sense of self is more embedded in what they feel and that is why communication and relationships seem to mean more to them compared to men. In other words, for women, relating, loving, supporting, cherishing and serving tends to be more important than other achievements or rewards. Women are generally more sensitive or emotionally aware. They are relationship-oriented than goal-oriented and value sincerity more. They feel validated or fulfilled when they get the approval, acknowledgment, appreciation, encouragement, reassurance and understanding of those around them or those they care about. Women want or need intimacy and companionship more and will approach things more delicately than men when they are cared for, respected or needed by others but these are all generalisations or normative ways of classifying or grouping the drives that motivate particular actions. Individual lives allow us to examine such motivations or combinations thereof and their consequences or potential consequences (Weiner, 1992; Maslow, 1987).

A range of perceptions and inferences follow from metaphors and these in turn sanction or compel certain actions. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:51), for example, offer the metaphor of life or life situations as a gamble, walking on a tight rope or game like chess, poker, black jack or roulette, complete with winners and losers, rules, targets, goals and players because life involves taking chances or risks, betting against the odds, depending on the luck of the draw, playing your cards right, bluffing, winning big, upping the ante and sometimes playing one‟s cards close to your chest (Grothe, 2008:133,136). Life is also portrayed as a war or conflict with rivals or adversaries, mediators, power struggles, battle lines, campaigns, defence and offence, hostages, refugees, betrayals, treachery, loss, victory, victors and the vanquished. Life can also be taken as a business or trade with competition, negotiation, deals, compromise, accommodation, profit and corruption as individuals seek to gain an advantage

over others. Life is also described as a journey in which we get to explore different places, meet and interact with different people and experience highs and lows through the trials and tribulations that fate throws our way. It is a journey to be travelled no matter how bad the roads or accommodations along the route might be (Grothe, 2008:128). Other common metaphors describe life as a minefield full of the unpredictable or unknown. In this way, life is a puzzle which we have to figure out or unravel. It is an adventure with thrills and spills, a roller coaster or a river with bends and rapids which test our endurance. There are also metaphors of life as theatre or a stage with a script, roles, performers, heroes and villains (Grothe, 2008:117-137; Wilkinson, 2002). All these metaphors reveal life to be a competition, contest or race - a contact sport (disguised combat) with players, rules, winners and losers and it is the dynamics and interactions of these, the human strengths and weaknesses that it showcases that make biographical research fascinating and fulfilling. The challenges that life throws at us can be regarded as opportunities to learn, grow, adapt, change, develop and become stronger or better people. Human beings are complex social animals and deciphering human nature by applying or testing social theories to ascertain why we do what we do is the bedrock of academic biographies.

Biographies analyse and interpret the events in a person‟s life by finding connections, explaining unexpected actions and making arguments about the significance of the person‟s accomplishments or life activities. When all is laid bare about a particular life, we sit in judgment to decide if we consider the subject as someone to look up to as a role model or not, for instance, Bertrand Russell was a philosopher, educator, social critic, mathematician and political activist. We take into account whether or not they were misunderstood, successful and the factors which influenced the outcomes in their life as well as the positive or negative impact that the individual had on their community, country or the world. Karl Marx devoted his political ideologies to theorising about economics, philosophy and class struggle in the context of capitalism. Sigmund Freud is considered to be the godfather of psychoanalysis whilst physicist Albert Einstein contributed relativity theory and Charles Darwin is famous for giving the world natural selection or evolution theory. In coming to these conclusions, we also weigh out the lessons we learn from the oral and written records of the subject‟s life and whether or not we think that they could have done some things differently under the same circumstances. Ultimately, the evaluation is based on whether or not we think the world would have been a better place if the subject had not lived.

The mainstay of academic biographies as an analytical method is our interest in human agency and individuality *vis a vis* human sociability and interaction (socialisation, secretiveness, denial, avoidance, obsessions, reclusiveness, aggression, rationality, reciprocity). Academic biographies attempt to balance out individual qualities or characteristics with external environmental or social factors in explaining given actions and consequences. The aim is never to reduce a complex life, behaviour and experience to the point of caricature but to explore the many dimensions or facets of the individual‟s life and character within a particular social, cultural and historic matrix. However, the majority of biographies, authorised or otherwise, are still written as human interest stories devoid of rigorous theoretical explanations (not for academic purposes). Gish‟s (2004) biography of Desmond Tutu, Gevisser‟s (2007) biography of Thabo Mbeki and Maylam‟s (2005) alternative interpretation of Cecil John Rhodes‟ life are examples of this general interest or curiosity in leaders and the cult of personality.

2.6 Structure and Themes in Academic Biography

A chronological and/or thematic approach is the most common mode of writing biographies. Biographies are generally written following the chronological order of major events in the subject‟s life, which means that they follow a sequenced or logical format of presentation before an assessment of their importance or relevance is offered as a conclusion or final impression. Regarding time, the chronological or sequential narration of events is most common in biographical research but there are also instances where a-chronology or a labyrinthine chronology is used because the past, present and future are not always perceived in linear sequence (Roberts, 2002:84). Psycho-biographies, for example, use sequential life stages/lifespan or life cycle development theories such as Daniel Levinson‟s (1978; 1996), which is an integration of other theories such as those of Freud, Jung, Piaget and Erikson.

Some biographies group time periods around major themes or specific topics such as early adversity, ambition or achievement. Typical things included in a biography are the most interesting facts about the person such as their date and place of birth, critical events in their life, for example, whether early childhood experiences such as absent or abusive parents or sibling rivalry influenced their adult achievements, significant world events which occurred during the subject‟s lifetime to influence or change their life course, the mores or social codes of the time they lived in, people (heroes or role models) who influenced the subject in so far as they moulded their character by setting an example or encouraging them to pursue certain

goals. The subject‟s parents and their occupations tend to be significant if they are important to later events in the subject‟s life, the subject‟s siblings and other close family members, the subject‟s social background regarding whether they were wealthy or poor, their educational background and early career or occupation (intellectuals, artists, politicians, musicians etc), colleagues, acquaintances, associates, peers and friends, their early goals in life, their marriage and children or relationships with significant others such as spouses or lovers, their place of residence, their death and cause of death and finally, their legacy. The life-structure approach takes cognisance of the individual‟s socio-cultural world (class, religion, family, political systems, historical era).

A survey of biographies generally, academic or popular, shows that other common themes include traditional gender roles and expectations, patriarchy and its restrictions, marriage, sexuality, conceptions of masculinity and femininity, initiation, conformity and going against the grain (deviance), positive and negative sanctions for particular behaviours, expectations for oneself and from others, age and generational differences, piety and morality, friendship, companionship, feminism, racial and ethnic identity, racism, caste, class, different political ideologies, life philosophies and religious convictions (feminism, pacifism, Fascism, Nazism, populism, nationalism, capitalism, socialism, communism, clientelism). Many such philosophies carry conservative, puritanical undertones which have implications for human rights, stigma and alienation on an individual and group level. Other themes revolve around change and stability, rewards and punishments, right and wrong, personality formation or socialisation, private and public personas, honour, hypocrisy or double standards and inconsistencies, what people say and do in their private or public capacities, relationships with authority figures, the subject‟s bad habits, destructive tendencies or vices such as compulsive gambling, drug addiction or abuse, alcoholism, promiscuity, the need for validation or approval, the quest for respectability, abuse of power or position (Robert, 2002).

The list of what researchers deem interesting is limitless and only depends on their reasons for undertaking biographical work. The theses listed in the bibliography variously address themes such as deprivation, the loss of innocence, shame, guilt, respect, fear, anger, revenge, betrayal, obedience, ambition, fulfilment, self-actualisation, scandal, contradiction, fate, destiny, determinism, freewill or choice, the individual and society, duty and obligation, feelings of inadequacy, insecurity, rejection, abandonment, self-worth or self-esteem, trust and mistrust, vulnerability, compassion, the quest for autonomy, independence or control,

forgiveness, perceptions and misperceptions, the configuration of human relationships, love and support, how we deal with stress or criticism, abuse or neglect, frequent disruptive changes in residence (moving constantly), disability whether it is physical (blind, deaf, paralysed or crippled) or mental illness, empathy, acceptance, nationalist sentiment, patriotism, personal heartache, pain, grief, loss,[8] depression, social conflict or tension and the things that act as catalysts for them pique a researcher"s interest (Cole and Knowles, 2001; Elms, 1994; Gronn, 1993:343-358; Kaplan, 1998; Kets de Vries, 1990:423-431; Levinson *et al*, 1978; Levinson, 1996). The quest for order in society, stability, change or transition (revolutionary or gradual[9] - social, economic, material, political), support and coping mechanisms, encouragement or assistance received in times of need and how individuals grapple with or find the meaning of life within parameters defined by dominant ideologies which form part of socio-political contexts and histories are all important components. These themes or their variants in different combinations recur in most biographies but might be depicted differently in different contexts. They are amplified when we examine the lives, reputations and legacies of individuals to determine their rightful place in history. Biographical research allows us to see how the subject grappled with such issues and how they impacted their lives. What is evident is that many of these themes are intertwined and difficult to isolate or compartmentalise (McAdams, 1988:1-18; McAdams, 1994; McAdams, 2006; McAdams and Ochberg, 1988; Roberts, 2002; Runyan, 1984; Simonton, 1994; Linde, 1993; Watson, 1976: 95-131; Fiske, 1988:815-833; Bujold, 1990:57-69).

2.7 Choice of Subject in Academic Biography

Academic biographies are descriptive, analytical, comparative and evaluative in varying degrees. Respondents or subjects are chosen based on some outstanding feature which generates interest or has significance or relevance for the biographer or a given audience (Cole and Knowles, 2001; Elms, 1994; Gronn, 1993:343-358; Kaplan, 1998; Kets de Vries, 1990:423-431; Levinson *et al*, 1978; Levinson, 1996). In other words, purposive or deliberate selection is commonly used rather than statistical sampling. Subjects are chosen because they represent certain historical periods or processes as part of a group, community, hegemonic

[8] Job loss, personal illness or illness in close family members, death, or other major changes that radically change our lives.
[9] For example, apartheid in South Africa, a civil war, genocide, the Cold War, the Great Depression or the end of slavery or the Reconstruction period in the USA.

relationships or class consciousness (Roberts, 2002:106). Typical subjects of biographies are individuals of some historical importance because they have made an impact in their society, for example, state presidents/statesmen or politicians and their terms in office, political party affiliations and important policies or laws passed or introduced during their tenure (McAdams, 1988:1-18; McAdams, 1994; McAdams, 2006; McAdams and Ochberg, 1988; Roberts, 2002; Runyan, 1984; Simonton, 1994; Linde, 1993; Watson, 1976: 95-131; Fiske, 1988:815-833; Bujold, 1990:57-69).

The subject of biographies can be people famous for their major accomplishments and stand out from the crowd, for instance, courageous or brave war heroes, explorers, inventors, sportsmen and women and philanthropists. Biographies analyse the challenges or obstacles which the individuals faced or overcame, the risks taken in achieving particular goals as well as the role of luck or coincidence in their lives. They also highlight the subjects‟ weaknesses, failures, disappointments, frustrations, regrets, sense of morality justice and so forth – qualities which make them interesting and worth reading about. The different contexts of each life act as different frames of reference for what the individual did or did not do. Individuals who have made a name for themselves are popular research subjects as are individuals with handicaps but who manage to make noteworthy contributions or individuals with the clichéd rags to riches story. The interest of researchers as well as audiences/readers is drawn to the talented, unusual, peculiar, famous, infamous, deviant, disadvantaged, disgraced individuals as well as the ones that manage to redeem themselves because we all love a happy ending. McAdams (2006:138) agrees with Goffman (1968) that labels which denote success or failure and so forth also serve to control people or keep them „in their place‟ whilst at the same time offering a particular reading of a given situation or transmission of particular values.

2.8 Psychobiography: The Dominant Form of Biography in South African Scholarship

Psychobiography is a synthesis of psychological approaches and biographical data/sources of personal information. It presents the lives of famous, enigmatic or paradigmatic figures in terms of how well they fit the structures set out in psychological theories. The frameworks used to discern, discover or formulate the central story of the entire life from birth to death include psychoanalysis, object-relations approaches to personality, social learning perspectives, behavioural, humanistic and existential psychology as put forward by Allport, Bandura, Cattell, Eysenck, Goldberg, Hull, Jung, Kelly, Loevinger, Maslow, McAdams,

McClelland, Piaget, Rogers, Skinner and others (McAdams, 2006:503-506). Levinson (1978; 1996; in McAdams, 2006:508-517) has also put forward a popular life course approach to the study of lives in the field of psychology.

Life is complicated and individuals have to contend with uncertainty, serious illness, unemployment, divorce, single parent households or financial difficulties. Careers, marriages and family life are not always forever or as happy and satisfying as people expect them to be and many marriages end in divorce or individuals lead double lives punctuated by infidelity. Individuals experience or feel different levels of fear, hope, depression, self-awareness, altruism, faith or empathy because of their different outlooks or philosophies about life and the Dreams they have for their lives in particular contexts, eras, periods or settings. Biographical research attempts to explain the linkages of all these variables and how they define specific individuals (Carlson, 1988:105-138; Cole and Knowles, 2001; Elms, 1994; Gronn, 1993:343-358; Kaplan, 1998; Kets de Vries, 1990:423-431; Levinson, 1978; Levinson, 1996; McAdams, 1988:1-18; McAdams, 1994; McAdams, 2006; McAdams and Ochberg, 1988).

In reality, most people play multiple roles or wear many different hats because they refuse to be bystanders on the stage of life. This constant adaptation is partly the reason why psychobiography is currently highly valued in life narratives in social research in South Africa. Psychobiography is biography told through the medium of psychological theories such as personality, trait, developmental and social psychological theories to collect, analyse and discern stories about people‟s lives; linking the personal with the historical and the social in the process. Personality psychology draws on brain psychology, evolutionary biology (Charles Darwin), cognitive science, sociology and cultural anthropology and the contributions of personality theorists such as Erik Erikson, Alfred Adler and Henry Murray (McAdams, 2006:27). Humanistic and behavioural psychologists, social psychologists, motivational theorists, social cognitive and self-developmental theories are preoccupied with personality dynamics[10], processes, stability/continuity and change contextualised in time, space and roles. They are interested in human sociality and individuality and how we get along or ahead as individuals in a given society. An overarching interactionist perspective serves to link or explain individual behaviour as a function of the person (their traits, cognitive and motivational factors as well as their agency) in interaction with the external

[10] Values, beliefs, goals, interests and social-cognitive adaptations or adjustments, similar to Bourdieu‟s habitus which determines how people perceive and interpret their world.

environment. Roberts (2002:474) points out that "even under the most oppressive circumstances, human agency is a strong force to be reckoned with. Even when situations appear hopeless, people make choices." Psychobiography is by far the most common or popular approach currently used to understand individual lives in South Africa. This approach is based on the work of, among others, Freud (psychoanalytic theory), Piaget (cognitive development theory), Adler, Erikson (psychosocial theory), Marcuse, Brown, Lifton, Murray and Levinson (Roberts, 2002; Runyan, 1984; Simonton, 1994; Linde, 1993; Watson, 1976: 95-131; Fiske, 1988:815-833; Bujold, 1990:57-69). According to Biggs (2007:2), in South Africa alone, much research has been done in the field of psychobiography in the past decade, for example:

The Life of Jan Christiaan Smuts: A Psychobiographical Study (Fouche, 1999);

The Life of Helen Martins, Creator of the Owl House: A Psychobiographical Study (Bareira, 2001);

Bantu Stephen Biko: A Psychobiographical Case Study (Kotton, 2002);

A Psychobiographical Study of Mother Theresa (Stroud, 2004);

Karen Horney: A Psychobiographical Study (Green, 2006);

A Psychobiographical Study of Dr. H.F. Verwoerd (Claasen, 2007);

Balthazar Johannes Vorster: A Psychobiographical Study (Vorster, 2003) and

Cornelis Jacobus Langenhoven: A Psychobiographical Study (Jacobs, 2005).

The first psychobiography is considered to be Sigmund Freud‟s (1910) psychoanalytical *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood*. Numerous studies followed, for example, Lytton Strachey‟s biographical study of Florence Nightingale, Guttmacher‟s 1941 study of George III and Langer‟s (1943 but published 1972) *The Mind of Adolf Hitler* but Erik Erikson‟s[11] biography of German-would-be-lawyer-turned Monk Martin Luther (1483-1546) who led the Protestant Reformist movement in Europe, George Bernard Shaw (1959) and Mahatma Gandhi (1969) attracted considerable attention to psychobiography as a plausible or

[11] *Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History* (1958) and Gandhi‟s *Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence* (1969).

legitimate research approach as contrasted to the long tradition of literary biography (Carlson, 1988:105-138, Biggs, 2007:13; Green, 2006:14). It used to be rare for individuals to have an academic focus on biography writing but it has now become an established and formal area of academic pursuit supported by journals, conferences and other associations in certain American universities such as the University of California at Berkeley, North Western University and the Pacific University. In South Africa, the University of the Free State, the University of Port Elizabeth (now Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University) and Rhodes University are the institutions most synonymous with psycho-biographical research. Critical biography has also become established in sociology, politics and history.

Levinson‟s life span development theory (1978; 1996) is commonly used in psycho-biographical studies because the life structure is the framework within which internal aspects (subjective meanings, motives, conflicts, personal qualities) and external aspects (events, social contexts, roles, influences of all kind) are interwoven. According to this theory, in early and middle adulthood, individuals try to establish order, stability, security and control in their lives and choose a direction in which to strive with a specific sense or vision of the future in mind. This desired future is predicated on considerations about income, power, fame, authority, recognition, social standing/rank, quality of family life and social contributions. In later phases, seniority and adulthood have their own pressures and responsibilities as people settle down and age. Wisdom, good judgment, generosity of spirit and compassion are some of the qualities expected of individuals as they grow older, have fewer illusions and a broader perspective on things. Levinson‟s theory (1978; 1996) posits that at this stage, individuals are better positioned to reflect on and reappraise past choices and attempt to reconcile the sources of flaws and corruption in their life (themselves, their enemies and loved ones (Biggs, 2007:32).

The biographies cited in this chapter contribute to the social, cultural, economic, political, military and popular portrait of the history and character of the countries and times in which the subjects lived. However, they also show a general bias towards white and/or male heroes and notables. A point worth making is that the writing of biographies for academic purposes usually translates into books which are sold or distributed for a wider audience. This is true of some of the biographies listed in the bibliography. On one hand, this conversion of theses into books demonstrates that the projects are undertaken because of a genuine curiosity and desire to investigate and know more about the human condition – the ambitions, motivations,

personal philosophies, morals, values and ethics, beliefs, doubts, hopes, attitudes, role models, limitations, rejection[12], acceptance, failures and triumphs. Such fascinations with particular individuals might have limited appeal to wider audiences but there is no denying that they add to a body of knowledge about the individuals examined and the times in which they lived. The biographies or stories become conduits through which a specific version of the history of their time is told; a history which necessarily affects more people and possibly has implications for other situations in future. On the other hand, the conversion of biographical theses into books is a general trend, especially overseas (Germany, the USA, the United Kingdom, and Sweden). The popularity of such undertakings (commissioned or otherwise) shows that there is also profit to be made from our fascination with other people‟s lives, whether it is because we get to live vicariously through the narratives or we are simply inspired to greater things in their own lives.

2.9 Methodological and Practical Considerations in Biographical Research

Autobiography/biography is one of several ways to interpret, package or present the life and work of a chosen individual. The ethics of social research can be inhibitive, whether confidentiality is implicitly or explicitly promised. Regarding the ethics of biographical research, the general rules are that the researcher has to have the permission or written consent of the subject or their close family. It is a process that requires trust and is built on confidence, not exploitation and manipulation. Maurois (1929:15) is concerned with the amount of discretion used when writing favourable posthumous biographies because of loyalties or because one does not wish to offend the subject‟s family. It is possible for a famous or infamous subject to be overly idealised or disparaged. On the same issue of research ethics, Thompson (1998:175) notes that biographers are usually cautious when writing biographies and often censor their work or findings because they have a responsibility not to expose their informants to potential injury, whether through publicising confessions or illegal activity or through the risk of countersuits for libel or simply the risk of scandal and ridicule. Conflicts of interest may arise regarding respect for individual dignity and rights and balancing these with confidentiality, avoiding harm to the subject or their surviving family, academic freedom and the public‟s right to information. This point is demonstrated by the controversy and embargo of Warmenhoven‟s (2006) biography of Hansie Cronje. According to Green (2006:50), the American Psychiatric Association issued guidelines pertaining to

[12] Prison, drug rehabilitation, psychiatric hospitals or exile.

ethical issues in the field of psychobiography in 1976 and they recommend that ideally, psycho-biographies should be conducted on deceased persons, preferably ones that have been so for a long time, so that the surviving family is not embarrassed by any unsavoury revelations. Biographies on living subjects should be conducted with the consent of the individuals to interview, explore, speculate and publish the conclusions drawn.

Maurois (1929) notes that there are problems inherent in writing records of human lives and these problems relate to historical accuracy and ethics because the great men and women of our times are often unreservedly admired, overly idealised, unfairly criticised or hated yet many of them are flawed, divided, conflicted and contradictory beings. The „great man" syndrome in auto/biographical writing before the twentieth century was synonymous with hagiographers who used the lives of famous or important people as moral vignettes to showcase exemplary character traits and virtue (honesty, courage etc) in leaders such as Julius Caesar. Christian scholars also wrote hagiographies to venerate the Saints; using their lives of suffering and martyrdom as moral and spiritual lessons (McAdams, 2006:50-5021). Biographical research is often criticised for focusing on prominent and privileged individuals at the expense of lesser-known figures. The eulogising of "great men" by family members and close associates offered flattering accounts which painted the individual in a good light regardless of any bad qualities and destructive forces which they may have had. Strachey"s book *Eminent Victorians* (1918/1948) illustrates this reality as literary artists wrote biographies designed to be entertaining and artistically satisfying. Closer to home, Cecil John Rhodes, for example, is portrayed as a visionary, risk-taker and man of action but Maylam (2005) also shows the dark side of his many enterprises in Africa.

Maurois (1929:12) maintains that although the modern biographer cannot be a completely impartial being, he or she needs to strive towards being honest and impartial in finding the truth about the people that he or she writes about. Great men and women are human like everyone else and also have doubts and weaknesses, yet they succeed in achieving something worthy of note. A good biographer sees both the good and the bad in their subjects and shows how people can succeed as well as fail (Maurois, 1929:32). Maurois (1929:31) refers to Plato to illustrate this point. Plato conceived of the human soul as perpetually drawn by two horses, one white and the other black. One horse drags the human soul up towards the best that it can be and the other Drags it down to the lowest of its nature and a biographer should be able to recognise and explore both aspects in their chosen subject. From the late 1980s, life story

sociologists in Europe argued that there is more than one possible model for archival work and its priorities can reflect the needs of research communities (as well as funders) and also have considerable intrinsic value to the public (Thompson, 1998:167 & 174). The biographer has to be "prepared to accept whatever contemplation of their subject will reveal and to correct it in proportion to new facts that are discovered on that journey" (Maurois, 1929:12).

Thompson (1998:167 & 171) further argues that the American approach to social history research has been treated with suspicion because of its long history of recording the lives of „great men." The prevalence of and motivation for privately funded archival projects is also a major reason for this suspicion. Maurois (1929:13-14) states that distortions and inaccuracies often arise because a biographer"s judgment can be dictated by their preconceived ideas and prejudices, passions, fears, admiration and hostilities which can lead them to neglect some facts about their subjects" lives. One limitation of biographical research using the interpretive paradigm is that it is contaminated by researcher bias, which has a potentially negative impact on the value of the research. The researcher"s personal experience (gender, class, religion, race, ethnic background, and age), personality, values, norms, expectations and level of involvement are at the root of this criticism. The researcher"s social background or position, attitudes preconceptions, assumptions, intentions, prejudices and intellectual orientations influence certain judgments, expectations and motives which affect the research process; meaning that it is not as neutral as it might appear at first glance. Reflexivity or self-accounting and examination by the researcher is one way that is advocated to make visible or apparent their motivations and interests where relevant or where they might mediate, edit, interpret or contextualise the voices of the researched, especially where the researcher disagrees with the values or perspectives of the respondents so that they do not condescend towards or patronise the researched (Roberts, 2002:106-108).

Anthropology, for example, has oral roots and information is transformed by power relations and modes of representation by the media as spoken word becomes received text. Being consciously reflexive/self-monitoring is aimed at making researchers less self-indulgent as the „knowing researcher"/sociologist/observer with a superior or privileged gaze and understanding because this affects how knowledge is created. The researcher"s position in data collection, including possible contamination, evaluation, interpretation and the writing process is informed by meanings outside the research itself such that the researcher needs to be aware of when they dwell too much on moral and political issues, and why *vis* their

responsibilities or commitments to the researched in their alternative roles as advisor, advocate and of course the responsibility to do no harm (Roberts, 2002:151-166). The role or bias of the researcher can be evident in their field notes or diaries (like Malinowski) or they can be in the form of a confessional or auto-ethnographic acknowledgement of the different ways that the researcher sees or interprets things from the researched. Reflexivity is a form of self-monitoring or reflection which should ideally be part of all research because it can impact how the ethnographic researcher gains entrance or exits a research site (community etc) in which they are temporarily embedded for a period of time, explaining the difficulties encountered and/or overcome in that endeavour, mistakes made or avoided in the research practice. This is necessary because the researcher mediates between respondents/informants and an audience and their academic attachments and interests factor into that equation (Roberts, 2002:151-166).

Researcher bias was a common occurrence with many Victorian biographers. Virginia Woolf (cited in Maurois, 1929:14) agrees with this general assessment that Victorian biographers‟ thinking was dominated by ideas of goodness, the noble, the chaste, the upright and the severe and thus presented worthy, virtuous people in this light. However, one should not be preoccupied with passing these types of moral judgments but with revealing the truth in a balanced manner even though our prejudices inform part of our evaluations and judgements in different ways (Maurois, 1929:27). With regards to autobiographies, Maurois (1929:145) criticises them for their tendency to "rationalise and create events, feelings or ideas which might have been the cause of the event, but which in fact are invented from memory after the fact…we discover lofty, heroic motives for actions which we have performed unwittingly and unconsciously" because our memories are not always accurate.

Despite the shortcomings outlined above, the biographies and autobiographies of politicians and statesmen, authors, playwrights, musicians, sportsmen, religious leaders, philanthropists and humanitarians allow us to gain insight and understanding into the lives that they led as individuals and as products of a particular upbringing/socialisation, self-interest and prevailing ideologies. Some autobiographies/biographies are written with undue simplicity or undue complexity but individual circumstances cannot be dismissed out of hand. It is not just distinguished, famous or important people who should be or are written about but in practice, generally, few people are inclined to research or read about ordinary people with much care or empathy (McAdams, 1988:1-18; McAdams, 1994; McAdams, 2006; McAdams and

Ochberg, 1988; Roberts, 2002; Runyan, 1984; Simonton, 1994; Linde, 1993; Watson, 1976: 95-131; Fiske, 1988:815-833; Bujold, 1990:57-69).

2.10 Merits of the Case Study Method in Studying Individual Lives

Case studies have been widely used in anthropology, sociology and political science. Different factors affect our individuality and reactions or responses to different situations and the case study method allows us to examine variability in human psychological qualities and dispositional traits (social and emotional intelligence). In anthropology, the case study method may be applied to a particular culture or subculture whereas in sociology the focus may be a specific demographic group or organisation and in political science investigation may be on a single political institution or event. In all of these, the investigation is a single specific phenomenon studied in depth within its real-life context (McAdams, 2006:493; Cole and Knowles, 2001; Elms, 1994; Gronn, 1993:343-358; Kaplan, 1998; Kets de Vries, 1990:423-431; Levinson *et al*, 1978, Levinson, 1996). Purposive sampling is the most common way to choose an individual life or case study for biographical research. The whole person or individual life is the ideal unit of analysis. The case study method is popular in personality psychology because each person is unique in many ways. No two people have the same life, experience of the world or personality even though they might have much in common with each other (McAdams, 2006:34). Case studies allow us to identify the uniqueness of the individual within the whole or socio-historical context (McAdams, 2006:493-498).

Conversely, it has been argued that the case study method leads to deficiencies of validity, reliability and difficulties of generalisation and replication of research. Some critics note that even with corroboration or cross-referencing, the question of the generalisability, replicability or representation of findings in terms of a wider population remains unresolved because of the variations from person to person, according to gender, generation and so on as well as inconsistencies or ambiguities in some of the accounts given by interviewees. The case study is sometimes deemed unreliable and subjective because of the focus on the idiosyncrasies of a single life (McAdams, 2006:493-498).

2.11 Biographical Sources

Biographical research strives to pay sufficient attention to the complex social, historical and cultural factors which influence people, for example, cross-cultural interactions (racial or

ethnic) and economic or class differences. There are advantages and disadvantages to using firsthand accounts (primary) and secondary sources when analysing the particularities of different lives. Both written and oral accounts are subject to bias even though they complement each other, especially when one or the other is missing or inadequate. There are also concerns about the reliability of oral evidence and the discrepancies that tend to arise or whether or not the instruments used provide the same measurement each time. Empiricists question the validity of the instruments (questionnaires or scales) used in the production of data, internal consistency and development of explanations or theories (Roberts, 2002).

Important primary sources include oral or written testimony of the subject or eyewitnesses present at the time of an event. These include autobiographies, film documentaries, independent factual records from personal and business letters, logs, memoirs, diaries, wills, curriculum vitaes, journals, photographs, autobiographical internet web pages or social networking sites, any existing body of knowledge which is readily available to the public such as an extensive literary contribution (writers) or discography (musicians) and other personal artefacts including home videos, family memorabilia and heirlooms which are generally not intended for publication or public consumption but which are contemporaneous records that provide useful accounts of intimate experiences. Biographical fieldwork also includes in-depth or semi-structured interviews and sometimes participant observation which entails interaction with the subject/s over an extended period of time. The interview schedules used are both descriptive and explorative in content and form in order to elicit the most out of subjects regarding their lives, circumstances, daily events and the meanings they give to them. Emphasis is put on the dialogical nature of fieldwork in collaborative relation between the researcher and the researched. Individual lives are used as exemplars of particular social settings/contexts, processes, episodes or events. Secondary sources include the oral or written testimony of people who were not immediately present at a given event or experience. They represent second-hand or hearsay accounts of someone or an event. Examples of secondary sources include biographies, library and other archive material, reference books, textbooks, government documents, confidential reports, public records, newspaper editorials and written or oral histories of individuals or a group that provide information about the subject of the biography (Barber, 2006).

Once all the sources have been exhausted and prioritised, personal and career data about the subject is collected and collated to get a comprehensive overview in order to explore and

discuss the consequences of their decisions, actions and choices within the particular social, economic and historical context in which they lived. The coding of information/data refers to encrypting, indexing, sorting and categorising in order to summarise or order material, establish connections, conceptual updates or theory. Material can be coded to denote explanations, descriptions, family or other relationships and social contexts. Data is arranged to reconstruct a meaningful, and hopefully accurate, explanation for past events (Roberts, 2002:11).

2.12 Criticisms and/or Limitations of Biographical Research

Biographical research is not usually conducted on living subjects but deceased ones and because the life is „œcomplete", it is easier to analyse and evaluate the consequences of various decisions and choices made by the subject in their lifetime. However, many biographies are written with unabashed adoration and focus on the remarkable or admirable aspects of their subjects" lives and the learning experiences encountered on this journey but they tend to overlook the less savoury facts such as ambivalence or hypocrisy for nostalgic or sentimental reasons. The singular orientation of biographies, the case study method and the lack of statistical sampling generally means that the findings or conclusions drawn from biographical research are not representative, comparable or generalisable (Roberts, 2002).

Barber (2006) notes that there are concerns for some researchers around notions of truth, traditional standards of evidence and fabrication. Some researchers question the authenticity, authorship, credibility, factual accuracy, sincerity, editing, censorship, the origin and use of personal documents or artefacts such as the ones listed above, especially where the motive appears to be to justify or rationalise something. It is argued that authors can put a positive spin on speeches, letters or interview responses with future audiences in mind (Barber, 2006). These concerns notwithstanding, memoirs, in particular, have proven to be indispensible in the study of war and other traumatic experiences including slavery in the USA, the Holocaust, totalitarianism in the Gulags of the former USSR, ethnic cleaning in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and apartheid in South Africa. They are also crucial for comparative studies and offer multiple voices (for instance, from victims or perpetrators of atrocities), texts and mediums (sound, print, pictures, internet).

Biographical research reconciles the past/history, the present and possible future trajectories. We speak of popular memory, antagonistic memories, contested histories, remembrance,

recollection and the social functions of remembering but who makes history and how? Researchers have to question what is remembered, forgotten and why this is so (Paris, 2001). Accounts of people‟s experiences of slavery in American history, Nazism in Europe or any number of natural disasters differ significantly depending on who is giving them and their reasons for doing so. This gives the impression that there are different versions of history waiting to be discovered; depending on motive and ideological positions. South Africa‟s long violent past and different people‟s experience of it is no exception to this variability. Racial oppression and socio-economic inequality defined and continues to define, divide and distort people‟s conceptions of who they are and what they stand for or can achieve in future (Paris, 2001:166-239).

Roberts (2002:145), notes that the biggest criticism about memory and biographical research‟s reliance on it is that it is fallible. Memory is subject to the vagaries of power, emotions, unconscious desires and language. It is vulnerable to the imaginative construction of different elements into one coherent whole that is rehearsed as opposed to literal reproduction. Roberts (2002:147) observes that competing or changing historical discourses, dominant memory and the attendant oppositional forms including the commodified and repackaged forms on television tend to be conservative. Memory rewrites, recreates, selects, omits, reorders, reconstructs, distorts, alters and modifies reality and people‟s conceptions of themselves through reinterpretation, reassessment, suppression, loss or substitution of some memories. According to Freud (cited in Roberts, 2002:141), memory is inherently revisionist. Deliberate selective amnesia might attempt to eradicate or erase aspects of the past such as a heritage with particular political and economic conditions, values and ideals, for instance, the renewal of churches, the renaming of streets, buildings and towns. It can also be unconscious as part of sanitising, editing, refining, reformulating, censoring or culturally validating a legacy for the benefit of subsequent generations even though there may very well be different memories or accounts of the same events (Roberts, 2002:143). This selectivity and the questionable reliability or credibility of memory and the accounts of events that it generates over time, especially when they are corrupted by rumours, folktales and myths is a major concern when conducting research.

Memories can be unpleasant, painful or traumatic, for example, political repression, religious persecution and dispossession. The researcher then has a responsibility to empower or be an advocate for their subject or respondents. Empathy is required over detachment but this can

be problematic as the researcher might become over-invested in the lives of the respondents. Asking respondents to talk about or remember such events or experiences forces them to come to terms with them, for example, South Africa"s own Truth and Reconciliation hearings in the 1990s. The hearings were aimed at correcting historical records and healing communities in the spirit of nation-building but it is possible that they had the opposite effect for some individuals and communities. It is also possible that some details were omitted, underplayed or exaggerated in the accounts that were given (Roberts, 2002:93-113). However, despite these shortcomings or disadvantages, not everything that is remembered is fictitious. Birthdays, anniversaries, religious festivals, holidays and major political events help structure memories and how stories are composed and retold because individual lives are lined up against the course of history[13], allowing us to say „I was doing this at such a place when *X* or *Y* happened" (Roberts, 2002:136).

Biographical research is criticised for being time consuming, long-winded, cumbersome and deficient of methodological rigour or criteria according to positivist, objectivist scientific standards. The vagueness in approach and intent is one criticism that is often raised because the rational and the subjective are entwined. Further, the collaboration or interdependence of researcher and the researched means that the researcher is active in knowledge production. The researcher does not merely translate data for an audience, making this a concern for empiricists. With regards to the subject of a biography, individual motivations and societal influences are not easily distinguishable because of the interactional nature of social lives and the possibilities for merging the past with the present, fact and fiction, the private with the public, the self and the other, the subject and the object (Roberts, 2002).

Another criticism is that analysing an absent/deceased subject or one that the researcher cannot have direct contact with can be limiting because they cannot be interviewed, tested or directly observed. Another problem with writing the biographies of deceased individuals is that they cannot be involved in data verification processes when the study is concluded.

Biographical research methods generally rely on analytic induction and the data generated is criticised for lacking in accuracy, reliability and validity because it is based on essentially subjective evaluative criteria. However, the credibility, authenticity, plausibility or persuasiveness of interview accounts, oral histories and research findings can be enhanced by

[13] The assassination of President Kennedy, the fall of the Berlin wall, news of the death of Princess Diana, the terror attacks on the Twin Towers, South Africa"s first democratic elections in April 1994 and so on.

using multiple data sources known as triangulation or cross-referencing to give a composite picture which can usually be checked against other written, visual or oral accounts in order to understand the subject‟s behaviour (Roberts, 2002:8; Eakin, 1999; Marcus, 1994; Stanley, 1993:41-52; Dex, 1991; Frisch, 1990; Geertz, 1988; Popular Memory Group, 1982; Bertaux, 1981; Berger and Berger, 1975; Goffman, 1959; Goffman, 1968; Downes and Rock, 1995). Despite the limitations, sensitivities (privacy, confidentiality, anonymity) legal and ethical considerations that are designed to limit the cavalier use of facts, there is a wide variety of scientific uses to which life history may be put to illustrate the intersections of individual biography/experience and history in a given society.

2.13 Popular Topics in South African History and Politics

History generally acknowledges missed opportunities, pain, lapses of judgment, loss, mistakes, human failures and achievements over millennia. To this end, historians use tidy and confident moral judgments to explain causation or give meaning without necessarily understanding alternative views on gendered histories, ethnic minorities, gay or anti-institutional movements. Conservative and pedagogic historiographies tend not to allow ordinary people to take centre-stage by favouring or glorifying the wealthy, famous, heroic, masculine, the white and the colonial whilst denigrating ordinary people (Jeppie, 2004:4). Similar criticisms is levelled against history at the iconographic level because of its focus on national events and figures at the expense of regional or community level ones or voices on the periphery which are unlikely to appear in the pantheon of nationalist heroes.

Most literature on South African history recounts the way of life of indigenous Africans before the arrival of white settlers, the arrival of white settlers, the establishment of the Cape Colony, the frontier wars, the discovery of diamonds and gold, British imperialism, the beginning of segregation 1910-1948, apartheid from 1948-1978 and its crisis from about 1978-1989, the political transition 1989-1994 and the dawn of a new South Africa from 1994. Certain key political figures are mentioned again and again in the official records but others never appear (Thompson, 2001) and the same is true of certain omissions in accounts of South Africa‟s Bantustans and their administrations. Meyers (2008) and Rogers (1976) are some of the authors who trace South African politics and indirect rule from native administration to separate development, the use of chieftaincies and later Bantustan administrations as proxies to control rural populations (disguising of political power and aggression), the retreat of white rule, negotiating the political transition and the meeting of

tradition and modernity in the new role of chiefs in a democratic South Africa. Changing social, political and economic contexts, challenges and possibilities bring up the need for historical correctives and re-evaluations of past interpretations. The notion of *new* histories and history from below is, therefore, designed to take account of or bring different constituencies, rationalities, subjectivities and temporalities into the main historical frame and fill some of the gaps in the records (Jeppies, 2004:1-15).

2.14 Possibilities for *New* Histories

Pluralism allows for new possibilities to cross-pollinate ideas and practices across disciplines and sub-disciplines. The overlaps between academic disciplines show how flexible and versatile biographical research is and the depth of personal commentaries of historical significance that a researcher can access through interviews or other direct contact with the researched (Roberts, 2002:73-92). History and its interpretation or reinterpretation is a pervasive constant across the humanistic disciplines and it can be retold through the lives of individual and the connections they have with their contemporaries in specific socio-political contexts. The social sciences are about the interchange of ideas and experiences, understanding the development of human societies and explaining socio-political or economic situations through situational analysis. In the South African context, a country in transition, Hendricks (2003; 2004) speaks of the dawn of democracy and how little things have changed in many respects. He highlights the pervasiveness of institutionalised racism, inequality, classism and the politics of knowledge production in South Africa since 1994. Many authors (Jeppie, 2004; Hendricks, 2003; Gilomee and Mbenga, 2007) on South African history, politics and government also recognise the need to reinterpret or revise history as we know it; to approach it from different perspectives in order to gain new insights and critical understanding. Their work and the notion of *new* history (Cameron, 1991; Jeppie, 2004) brings into focus different notions of history, memory or amnesia, the value of history in its humanising capacity, historical complexity and ambiguity and the continuing crisis of inequality and injustice which pervades South Africa‟s fledgling democracy. The *old* history was full of propaganda promoting a particular national identity and specific societal values which marginalised the majority of the country‟s population in a seamless web of political projects and dimensions of power which are not value-free or politically neutral.

The debates and concerns highlighted in Hendricks (2004), Abe (2005:29-78) and Matshedisho (2005:1-28) point to the fact that the past has a place in the present and in the

practice (studying and teaching) of social sciences and social change. Reinterpreting and reconstructing the past, for instance, colonialism and post-colonialism, is part of the challenge to orthodoxies of the day. It is argued that social sciences and African Studies have been conceptualised by the West to study Africans but not by Africans themselves. White experience is taken as being superior or universal; forcing African social scientists, for example, into defensive transformation of disciplines (different manifestations of Africanism, Pan-Africanism or Africanisation) which is evident in the works of Mazrui, Mamdani and others. Many history projects undertaken on the African continent are an attempt to rewrite history and recast approaches to its study to undo the Eurocentric or Western intellectual hegemony, stereotypical thinking, prejudice or bias (Comte, Durkheim, Weber, Giddens, and Bourdieu) that prevails and is indiscriminately applied to African and other contexts and often portraying the locals as victims or losers. In the South African case, there is the reality of apartheid authoritative or official history which was foisted on the public towards particular racist ends. Hendricks (2004), Abe (2005:29-78) and Matshedisho (2005:1-28) assess the continuities, discontinuities and progress made in social science sub-disciplines such as journalism and media studies, anthropology, political studies, history, globalisation, rural and agricultural studies and higher education in this frame of mind.

Public memory includes traditions, legacies and commemorations in different spheres in the life of a nation or groups within it. It is carried through imagery and interpretation which are mediated by state institutions, local government, the media, businesses, theatrical productions, museums, oral history projects, historical or heritage sites, historical theme parks and tourism operations (Roberts, 2002:145). The National History Commission, the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999, the South African History Archive (SAHA) and the South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA) are all targeted at rewriting, rethinking and reassessing South Africa‟s history and national heritage. There is general consensus about the urgent need for this revision as evidenced by the South African History Project (SAHP) which was initiated by Professor Kader Asmal (then South Africa‟s Minister of Education) and launched in August 2001. This was followed by the Ministerial Conference on History, Memory and Human Progress held in Cape Town in October 2002 to look into creative ways or initiatives to reinvigorate interest and enthusiasm in history as well as to consciously preserve or retell different aspects of South Africa‟s history from perspectives other than the often sterile official or authorised ones. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is cited as an example of contemporary oral history and

living memory through which ordinary people challenged official histories. The TRC hearings contributed to South Africa‟s public record, and to some degree, gave back recognition and dignity to ordinary people whose experiences would otherwise never have been heard. The hearings were a meaningful and significant symbolic gesture designed to expose painful and shameful truths and give some modicum of closure to both the victims and perpetrators of apartheid atrocities (Jeppie, 2004:1-15).

Paris (2001) acknowledges that history and heritage or the past is part of the soul of a people or nation but whose history and whose memory appears in official records? It is hoped that *new* histories can uncover exceptions, nuances and subtleties that are part of the variation of human experience. A dose of doubt about the universality of official histories in not a bad thing if it encourages empathy with the experiences of others facilitates healing and symbolic restitution, though not necessarily absolution. *New* histories offer new opportunities and continuing debates in literary production by employing post-modernist relativism and literary theory and accommodating competing ideological and philosophical paradigms (Barber, 2006). They promote research into oral traditions, histories, indigenous knowledge and customs which include intangible parts of national heritage such as skills, memories, songs, dance, rituals and stories which also give meaning to physical heritage (Jeppie, 2004:1-15).

History matters for everyone for different reasons, not least among them that it tells us who we are and where we came from so that we can chart a course into the future. The apartheid state muzzled opposing views or different perspectives and it is for this reason that debates have been revolving around new or revised history curriculums in South African schools since 1994. Biographical research explores, consolidates, clarifies and complements other research methods through the insights gained into the meanings that people attach to actions in their lives. It validates personal experience and aids our understanding of psycho-social processes as well as our role or position in the world – making sense of it all. It can have a transformative, inspirational impact on other lives whilst also revealing the often artificial academic division of knowledge. Popular struggles, civil society, participation, leadership, liberation and democratisation can be very sensitive issues for localities because of the many dynamics at play but valuable lessons can be learnt from different experiences (caution, hope). Instead of focusing on one individual, Hruby‟s (1980) book profiles a series of influential intellectuals and communists who played significant roles in the former Czechoslovakia. He explores that country‟s history and politics in the context of a particular

brand of communism and government between the end of World War II in 1945 and Czechoslovakia‟s disintegration in 1992 to form the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. The period under review was characterised by radical change, risk-taking, opportunism, violence and a constantly shifting balance of power and the book draws comparisons between Czechoslovakia and Cambodia‟s experiences and violent pasts.

On the opposite extreme, objective, impartial or neutral history is a figment of our imagination because historians write from particular perspectives which are subjective and often blatantly biased. They also write for targeted audiences which also have specific prejudices and preferences. Many sanitized versions of history abound in which the ugly parts are omitted, villains become heroes and vice-versa. In South Africa, for instance, identities have been heavily racialised or ethnicised, or both, in the past and this influences how people relate to each other. Ranger (2004:215-234) observes with dismay that Zimbabwe‟s ruling party has manipulated what it terms „patriotic history‟ or the country‟s collective memory to legitimise its rule in its election campaigns since 2000. As a doctrine, „patriotic history‟ is distinct from nationalist historiography and is packaged as a form of Pan-Africanism and counterpoint to colonial history. It is politics in accordance with revolutionary tradition and it repudiates what Ranger (2004:215-234) terms academic history and western universalism. Patriotic history is disseminated in numerous ways including the president‟s vitriolic speeches, two key ministries; that of the Minister of Information and Publicity Jonathan Moyo and the Minister of Education Aeneas Chigwedere and youth militia camps. The ruling party has made youth training for school leavers compulsory in militia camps where they are indoctrinated in history which demonises the West and political opposition in the country. However, the rhetoric of the war veteran instructors oversimplifies history to that of revolutionaries and sell-outs and history courses and textbooks have been revised towards this end. The state-controlled media (television, radio and newspapers) is also used relentlessly to propagate „patriotic history‟, which is essentially propaganda in the form of documentaries and sound bytes about the liberation struggle and the atrocities committed by British colonial authorities. This experience in Zimbabwe shows that history is contested and is not immutable. It can be edited, rewritten and distorted by those with power to suit particular ends which obliterate the development of systematic and sustained counter-narratives. Ranger (2004:215-234) cautions that history matters, especially to those to whom it is denied by the excesses of narrow, self-serving nationalist narratives of the past which amount to nationalist authoritarianism. However, he add that shared and persistent suffering

due to racism or other prejudice and repression facilitated by state monopoly over the media and the use of violence does not translate into agreement on the means to end such suffering and gain dignity or equality (Ranger, 2004:215-234).

2.15 Political Biographies and Themes: Analogy of Politics as a Game

In the political arena or field, timing or procrastination (opportunity cost), over or underestimating a crisis or opponent, expectations, emotions, conventions, seemingly illogical or invisible forces all combine to determine success or failure. Ultimately, they can be very costly or rewarding in terms of individual reputations and legacies and that is at the heart of this thesis with regards to the actions or choices that were made by South Africa‟s former Bantustan leaders, particularly, Enos Mabuza of the KaNgwane Bantustan. Politics is often described as a chess game with numerous players who capitalise on cleavages in a society and make fixing them or exploiting them their mission, regardless of political persuasion[14] (Grothe, 2008:127-128). Success in this game of contingency with its many obstacles and challenges to be overcome is often determined by the mundane/trivial and the extreme, including how the legitimacy of one‟s rule, how they assume power (elections, votes, imposed) and prevailing social, economic or political conditions or crises in vastly different political systems (police states, military dictatorships, one-party states, multi-party democracies).

The political field can be enabling, restrictive and necessarily intrudes or infringes on the individual‟s personal life. There are also foreseeable and unforeseen dangers that come with a career in politics. An individual can be alienated or reified based on chance events or planned ones. As leaders and public figures, politicians become hemmed in by history, thus giving credence to the observation that people make their own history but under certain circumstances which are usually not of their choosing. Individuals become heroes or villains depending on their social class and the doctrines, philosophies or ideologies they subscribe. There is no strict code for manoeuvring the minefield that is politics but different systems and individual leaders are constantly being compared to each other. The actions of politicians are fascinating because they can affect entire regions, countries or the very course of world history. Politicians are either the protagonists or antagonists who play devil‟s advocate or gamble with people‟s destinies and we either approve or disprove their actions, paradoxes and end-games as progress or regression. They wield the power to include and exclude,

[14] Black radicals, Marxists, revolutionaries, reformists or moderates.

marginalise, subjugate, dominate, discriminate and torture. Their policies determine identity, rights, and citizenship status which can precipitate superiority and inferiority complexes and divisions (Grothe, 2008:254-273; Wilkinson, 2002).

Much interest is generated by the lives of politicians because we admire, are inspired by and want to emulate successful, influential or powerful people. The competitiveness, ruthlessness or vulnerability of figures such as Napoleon Bonaparte, Otto Von Bismarck, George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, John F. Kennedy, Charles De Gaulle, Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Chairman Mao, Winston Churchill, Jawaharlal Nehru, Che Guevara, Juan Peron and Fidel Castro come to mind. We are also intrigued by the ebb-tide unpredictability of the political arena. It is an interactive and competitive field characterised by predatory Machiavellianism complete with constituencies, hierarchies and chains of command, accomplices, allies, rivals, enemies, adversaries, advisers, opposition, power[15], ambition, smear campaigns or slander, arrogance, complacency, pedagogy, propaganda, patronage, treachery, violence, pre-emptive action, coups, opportunism, speculation, hostility, betrayal, hypocrisy, secrets, lies allegations, determination, perseverance, endurance, contradictions and controversies, disparities, plots, denials, cover-ups, justifications, liabilities, schemes, information and misinformation, disguises and deception, threats, inducements, strategies and stratagems to out-wit and out-last, collusion, brinkmanship, agreements, disagreements, dilemmas and conflicts. Political actions are based on a variety of assumptions, preconceptions and intentions. They also have consequences which can be interpreted in a myriad different ways. The political field affords individuals the opportunity to gain status and influence but politicians also tend to have chequered personal, public or professional lives which the media and critics live to scrutinise (Grothe, 2008:254-273).

A political biography traces the relations between the part/individual and the whole in a given political system and questions the relationship between dependence and relative autonomy, goals, agency, virtue and politics, integrity, reputations and legacies. The popularity and effectiveness of political leaders is subjected to the litmus test of public opinion and many are exposed as frauds. Success in the political arena is a balancing act and we judge, criticise or praise politicians based on what we think are their intentions, motives, functions and the aggregate or significance of their actions (deeds and speeches) in a particular context. Such

[15] Unequal power relations, powerlessness, the reality of power blocks and possibilities for consolidating power, shifting balances of power, power in its different dimensions or manifestations, for example, power over something or someone or power to do certain things.

an evaluation is both subjective and objective and is based on perceptions of their aspirations and visions as leaders, their image, personality, character, leadership style, credibility, ability, capacity, accountability, offensive or defensive action in times of crisis and its consequences, complicity in bad things, indecision, vacillation, inertia, successes and failures, defeats, scandal, ambiguities, guilt, regrets and comebacks. Political analysts, biographers and historians reflect on, investigate, contemplate and clarify the complexity, multiplicity, misunderstandings, distortions, myths, discontinuities and continuities of the above themes depending on the circumstances, contexts and what mediates them (historical relativism and the ruses of history). Politicians can be described as false prophets whose popularity has a shelf life. As part of the social contract they have with the people, they sell hope, change and prosperity but often times the smoke and mirrors are exposed when they fail to deliver in this fickle, dog eat dog world (Grothe, 2008:254-273).

2.16 South African Academic Biographies (Theses) in History and Politics

The academic biographies surveyed below offer a holistic understanding of how and why certain people came to be who history has recorded them to be. They offer critical, empathetic or sympathetic understandings, interpretations or perspectives which enrich our grasp of history and the subjects‟ role in it.

Isaac Bangani Tabata

Rassool‟s thesis (2004) is slightly different in structure from most that are surveyed here but it places intellectual, author and political activist Isaac Bangani Tabata (1909-1990) as a separate and autonomous individual who had views that did not always sit well with the mainstream political intelligentsia. There are different and contested narrations about Tabata as a leader, organiser and orator. Rassool (2004:323) analyses the contradictions and inconsistencies in I. B. Tabata‟s political career, for example, and one of the conclusions that he comes to is that loyalty to political ideals, not individual leaders, was understood as a more developed stage in the evolution of organised national resistance and national identity formation. The collective national memory (public) of him is framed in this light and his personal contradictions and versatility is interpreted by many as moral weakness but that is a harsh and short-sighted and only tells half the story. Naturally, his family‟s memory (private) differs from this cynical view.

Tabata is considered somewhat of a radical and controversial figure in the country‟s struggle history for some of his views but his political efforts cannot be overlooked. He was involved in the Cape African Teacher‟s Association (CATA), the New Era Fellowship (NEF) and the Society of Young Africans (SOYA). He helped found the Workers‟ Party of South Africa and he was the president of the Unity Movement of South Africa which formed a distinct segment in the struggle for liberation. The Unity Movement was founded in 1943 as the Non-European Unity Movement but it was often characterised as Trotskyite. Tabata was active in the All-African Convention which was founded in 1935 and advocated the boycott of all racial structures which were proposed by the government. Tabata wrote several articles and books which were critical of how the struggle was being led by different groups, for example the ANC whose leadership he thought was too conservative. The relationship between the All-African Convention and the African National Congress, as the main liberation movement, was not always smooth and Tabata was contemptuous of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Communist Party of South Africa‟s methods and leadership styles. In 1961 he established and became president of the African People‟s Democratic Union of Southern Africa (APDUSA). Tabata‟s writing was also critical of the reserve system, the state‟s imposed betterment and rehabilitation programmes and stock culling in the Transkei and other places, the compulsion of migrant labour and the education system in South Africa, specifically the Bantu education system. Education was regarded as a central part in the emancipatory project and a moral code of behaviour was counter-posed with that of the enemy. Tabata was banned in 1956 and went into exile from 1963 to 1974 but never tired in endeavouring to enhance the awakening of the oppressed to different concepts and methods of struggle and different perspectives on the politics of race, nation and identity. Tabata‟s views and contribution as presented by Rassool (2004) offer a slightly different view of what is usually portrayed in the mainstream media because history is open to different interpretations in as much as individuals have choices and use different means and their own agency, for better or worse, to achieve their goals.

Robert McBride

Mokae‟s (2004) thesis focuses on the good, the bad and the ugly of South African history – the social conditions, government and resistance to apartheid. It focuses on McBride as one of many political activists in the period 1961-1994. McBride‟s life and experiences are used to typically represent South African Coloureds and the contradictions they had to deal with on a daily basis in terms of culture, fitting in, taking sides and the law.

Alfred Bitini Xuma

Gish‟s (1994) doctoral thesis is on South African politics and government in the period 1909-1948 (the beginning of apartheid). The thesis revolves around the life and contribution of political activist Alfred Bitini Xuma to the struggle that was fomenting during that period. Xuma was an influential thinker and leader and was elected president of the African National Congress in 1940 until 1949. He worked closely with Dr Yusuf Dadoo of the South African Indian Congress to create an alliance between Africans and Indians.

Raymond Mhlaba

Orie (1993) profiles anti-apartheid activist and trade unionist Raymond Mhlaba. Mhlaba was active in trade union circles in Port Elizabeth. He was involved with the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) which led to his membership in the South African Communist Party (SACP). Mhlaba was also a member of the African National Congress and spent time in exile where he received military training. He became a commander of the ANC‟s military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, and was sentenced with Nelson Mandela and others in the Rivonia trial and subsequently spent 25 years in prison. He was elected ANC Premier of the Eastern Cape in May 1994. He was also instrumental in establishing the House of Traditional Leaders. Like many politicians after 1994, Mhlaba was involved in black economic empowerment circles. He later served as South Africa‟s High Commissioner to Uganda and Rwanda.

Ethel Tawse Jollie

Lowry‟s (1989) thesis is on the life and times of Ethel Tawse Jollie (1875-1950) and her experience (representing women) as a British colonial settler through Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) and into South Africa. The thesis focuses on the challenges of adapting to a new and different environment as well as the cross pollination or transference of British/Edwardian social and political ideas to colonial settlements as part of the expansion and consolidation of the British Empire. Jollie was the first female parliamentarian in the British overseas empire. She was also a political activist and prolific writer on political matters (propaganda) towards the attainment of Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia in 1923.

Theophilus Ebenhaezer Dönges

Bekker‟s (1987) doctorate in history chronicles the life and contribution of South African and senior member of the then ruling National Party Theophilus Ebenhaezer Dönges (1898-1968). Donges was South Africa‟s Minister of the Interior from 1948 to 1961. As such, he is considered one of the "architects of Apartheid.” He was responsible for introducing race-based population registration and removing Coloured voters from the common voters‟ roll as a prelude to disenfranchising them altogether. Donges also served as Finance Minister (1961-1966), acting Prime Minister of South Africa (September 1966) after Prime Minister Verwoerd was assassinated. Donges was elected State President in 1967 to succeed C. R. Swart but he did not take office due to illness after suffering a stroke and lapsing into a coma. He died aged 69 and Jozua François Naudé of the National Party succeeded him.

Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom

Basson‟s (1980) biography of South African statesman Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom is a historical and political account of the country‟s politics and government from the dawn of the Union in 1909 to the ascendency of the National Party in 1948. Strijdom was a lawyer by profession and an avid Republican active in the National Party. He was South Africa‟s Prime Minister from 30 November 1954 to 24 August 1958 and in 1956 he had Coloureds removed from the common voters‟ roll. He was an uncompromising Afrikaner nationalist and a proponent of segregation which led the way to Apartheid. He was closely identified with the policies of and loyal to D. F. Malan. He also introduced various measures to make South Africa less dependent on Britain, for example, in 1957 he abandoned the two-pole flag policy, making the South African flag the only flag to be flown without the Union Jack. He also gave South Africa only one national anthem, „Die Stem‟. Under Strijdom the ideals of the Republic were achieved as South Africa now had one flag, one anthem and undivided citizenship (Basson, 1980).

Tielman Johannes de Villiers Roos

Brits‟ book (1979) is about South African politics, government and Tielman Johannes de Villiers Roos‟ (1879-1935) role in it between 1907 and 1935. Roos was a right-wing South African politician and cabinet minister. He was a member of the South African Party which opposed the creation of the Union of South Africa by Louis Botha. He later joined D. F. Malan in the National Party as head of the party in the Transvaal. He was a popular figure and was able to build a following for the party among white workers (miners and the Industrial and Commercial Workers‟ Union) and persuaded the South African Labour Party

to share the vision of the National Party. Roos served as Justice Minister from 1924 to 1929 and was a strong advocate of racial segregation. He spent three years as a judge in the Supreme Court of Appeal (Brits, 1979).

Donald Barkly Molteno

Scher‟s thesis (1979) covers South African politics in the period 1909-1978. It covers *inter alia* race relations, legislators, government and the role or contribution of the South African Progressive Party and Donald Barkly Molteno. Molteno was a South African parliamentarian, lawyer, champion of civil rights and a prominent opponent of Apartheid associated with South African liberalism. He was a member of the South African Liberal Party before joining the Progressive Party. Among other things, Molteno served as the Western Cape regional representative on the South African Institute of Race Relations in 1936 and served as the institute‟s president from 1958 to 1960 (Scher, 1979).

John Xavier Merriman

Gruber‟s (1960) examination of Cape and South African statesman John Xavier Merriman‟s life and work (1841-1926) explores the politics and government dynamics of the time. Merriman was a gifted orator, parliamentarian, versatile administrator and veteran politician and he is compared to other prominent personalities such as Hofmeyr and Schreiner in the period 1836-1909 before the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910. His career in public life stretched fifty-five years of South African history from before the granting of Responsible Government, the discovery of diamonds and gold, before Hertzog and Malan came to power and before the awakening of Afrikaner nationalism. Merriman was the last Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, the largest and oldest settled community in South Africa, and heir to the Cape Tradition. He was considered a natural choice as Prime Minister of the Union which he helped establish but this did not materialise because he withdrew from active politics soon after he turned seventy. Gruber‟s examination raises various questions about how Merriman‟s contemporaries regarded him and his abilities. The thesis contributes to an understanding of the structure or nature of Cape Politics and the ramifications of various dilemmas faced in the colony as a Frontier territory which dealt with many wars and crises. The thesis also contributes to a holistic understanding of Merriman by studying his formative years and assessing his qualities in context in order to make some conclusions about the negative or positive aspects and impact of his contribution to South African politics. Gruber reconstructs Merriman‟s personality and analyses the nature of his statesmanship by examining the roles that he played in the years under review, as well as by assessing the role

he failed to play (becoming Prime Minister of the Union).This is done through the use of private correspondence (over 800 private letters dealing with family matters), newspaper articles and a large volume of Merriman‟s collected papers. In the process, many other sources[16] were consulted but, according to Gruber, this was a frustrating experience because significant material was sparse (Gruber, 1960).

2.17 Context for Biographical Research on Former Bantustan Leaders and How the Bantustan Policy was Marketed and Defended

Bantustan leaders are believed to have been public enemy number one - ruthless, ambitious opportunistic Shylocks that were more than economical with the truth regarding their motives in assuming token political positions and power after making pacts a with the devil (the repressive apartheid state). However, the tragedy or farce that was the Bantustans was not a product of their own creation. The function or purpose of the Bantustans, the problems encountered in the Bantustans and their solutions all lay within the power of the apartheid regime in Pretoria, with the Bantustan leaders the convenient scapegoats, traitors or undesirables. Very few people ever stop to think about the possible crossroads that some of the Bantustan leaders found themselves in during this embarrassing era of South African history. The Bantustan system is described as a tragedy by the University of the Witwatersrand Development Studies Group Southern African Research Service (1982) and other critiques such that very few people today, if any, can defend the travesty, farce or myth that was the Bantustan policy in South Africa. Traditional structures (chiefs and headmen) and ethnic identities were deliberately crafted into the design of the Bantustans as part of controlling rural black populations. Ambitious and some possibly well-meaning individuals were lured into inept Bantustan bureaucracies by the promise of power, status, class mobility and perhaps wealth. Unfortunately, because of the very design and purpose of the Bantustans, these individuals were effectively vigilantes for the apartheid state in the rural areas (Meyers, 2008; Rogers, 1976).

Although Bantustan leaders were not the masterminds of the Bantustan system, many acted like warlords or shadowy gangster godfathers similar to the mafias in underworld crime syndicates. The apartheid state gave them their own fiefdoms in which paternalism and

[16] Molteno and Hofmeyr Papers together with Merriman correspondence in the South African Public Library. However, Gruber notes that the De Villiers Papers in private possession and the Atherstone Collection were not available for consultation. The Spriggs papers in private collection were also not available for detailed examination as were the Carnarvan Papers on colonial material.

corruption was rife, loyalty was rewarded and individuals were chastised for daring to question the legitimacy of any of it. Some of the leaders of the Bantustans bought into the fantasy of running their own countries but ordinary people did not. Bantustan leaders‟ collaboration with the state, corruption, treachery and the violence which many of them used to quash resistance rendered the Bantustans the Wild West of the apartheid era. Many Bantustan leaders had acrimonious relations with liberation movements or parties such as the ANC because to them, the apartheid state was the goose that laid their golden egg by giving them this opportunity to gain power, wealth and status. The divide and rule or indirect rule function of the Bantustans was merely the costuming or disguising of political power by the apartheid state. In order to defend their *privileged* position, real and perceived political enemies or rivals inside and outside the Bantustans were harassed, intimidated and often assassinated and the people‟s legitimate fears, the leaders‟ paranoia, narcissistic self-indulgence, conspiracies, speculation, accusations and denials acted as catalysts for the cycles of violence (Meyers, 2008; Rogers, 1976).

Kotzé (1975), like the majority of Afrikaner historians and political writers in the 1970s or heyday of the Bantustan system focuses on Blacks, Black politics, political parties and government in the Bantustans in the period 1961-1978, highlighting the positive developments or *progress* that was being made. A Development Conference was held at the Lennox Sebe Teacher‟s Training College in the Ciskei (Zwelitsha) in May 1978 and Proctor-Sims (1978) writes a glowing report about the economic viability of separate development and the Bantustan policy citing successes or developments in the Ciskei as focal points.

Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana (1988) compiled a log of his own speeches and those of other leaders from the Frontline State and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) complaining about the economic sanctions which were imposed on South Africa in the 1980s because of the violence and injustice that prevailed under apartheid. The speeches are based on opinion research on the matter and Mangope hoped to get a sympathetic ear against the sanctions. Before this, Mangope (1978) wrote glowingly about the so-called independent Bantustans being inclusive places where everyone could live and prosper. However, this could not be further from the truth because of the racial segregation, corruption and marginalisation that underpinned the Bantustan system.

Many of the development corporations (Corporation for Economic Development, 1977-1980) which were formed to sell the viability of the Bantustan scheme as part of the grand plan for

separate development strenuously argue for the Bantustan policy‟s merits and successes. Bates (1987) covers the Ciskei‟s economic conditions, economic policies and tourism opportunities in this so-called tax paradise of Southern Africa during the rule of Lennox Sebe. Bates (1987) describes these developments and opportunities in the publication title as “spectacular evolvement”. In a similar vein, Crause (1982) writes about the Ciskei‟s welfare and social services. The work itself is dedicated to Lennox Sebe, then leader of the Ciskei and the first ambassador to the Ciskei, J. J. Engelbrecht. The general trend was to have the Bantustans Dressed as having huge potential for economic growth, as tax havens and ideal tourist destinations but industries were concentrated in white South Africa or on the edge of the Bantustans such that it was difficult for Bantustan residents to find jobs. Victimisation at work was widespread because employment opportunities were so scarce. Rural homesteads were already poor and mostly living off subsistence agriculture and relied heavily on remittances from family members that worked in white South Africa on the migrant labour system. Misguided rural development projects further reduced the people‟s quality-of-life as diseases associated with malnutrition, overcrowding and inadequate hygiene were rife.

Els *et al* (1971) of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs Study Group of Fort Hare in co-operation with the Fort Hare branch of the South African Academy of Arts and Science conducted a general survey on the history, politics and government, economic conditions, religion, social life and customs of the Ciskei in order to establish the changes, positive or negative, that were taking place. The majority of commentators in the fields of history, race relations, politics, economics, geography, anthropology, development and policy studies, for example, Hattingh (1979) and the Africa Institute of South Africa (1976) have analysed and tried to address the various problems that plagued the Bantustan system from its conception, administration, dismantling in 1994 and beyond. De Wet (1995), De Wet and Leibbrandt (1994) and De Wet (1985), has researched extensively into social conditions in the former Ciskei where Blacks were forcibly relocated as part of Betterment Planning and Villagisation programmes or agricultural development projects which were aimed at managing or implementing responsible land uses and conservation. Rural populations and general conditions were very poor in addition to the disruptions of forced migrant labour which was savaging families, communities, social life and customs before Betterment schemes were introduced (Yawitch, 1982). In addition to the socio-economic consequences of forced removals, De Wet has also written about poverty, the demographic variables that affect

health, land and livestock, welfare development and the continued marginalisation of communities in the former Ciskei post 1994.

Charton‟s book (1980) and Switzer (1979) also highlight the deplorable plight of many Ciskei residents (Xhosas/Fingos). They speak of the economic and social conditions as well as the politics and government of the Ciskei which fostered political and economic dependence in the cities and towns. According to Switzer (1979), the mass media in the Ciskei had a curious relationship with the state. More often than not, the media employed self-censorship to pacify the government instead of accurately reporting the news for fear of stirring the wrath of government officials by exposing heavy-handed or corrupt dealings. Mager (1999) writes about the social history of the Ciskei between 1945 and 1959. The Ciskei is used as an example of a typical South African Bantustan and the discussion centres around politics and government in the Bantustan, different gender and sex roles and the manifestations of human territoriality, ethnicity and race relations. The question of „independence‟ for the Bantustans was another sting in the tail which made an already bad situation worse. Most other commentators focus on variants of these themes because they were at the core of what was wrong with the homelands or Bantustans. More recent writing on apartheid focuses not just on the history or role of liberation movements but adopts a comparative slant in how they comment on the political transition or liberation as it unfolded or was negotiated in different localities, for example, in Stutterheim in the Eastern Cape between 1980 and 1994 or Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and resistance to the incorporation of Moutse into KwaNdebele between 1985 and 1987 (University of Cape Town Historical Studies Department, 2007).

Southall (1983) examines the political economy of the Transkei (one of the four „independent‟ Bantustans) and surveys its politics, government, economic and social conditions since it was the first one to become „independent‟ and was supposed to be the beacon for the others to follow. In a similar vein, Bank‟s thesis (1988) reveals the opportunism and underhandedness which characterised most political and economic dealings in the Bantustans and uses QwaQwa, a Bantustan for the Sotho, as an example. Conducive conditions for the establishment of small businesses were artificially created and entrepreneurship was encouraged at the expense of the moral fabric and customs of the people in order to give the illusion that the Bantustans were viable and could sustain their

populations. Some people benefited from this but greed and corruption took root as did other social evils which left communities poorer for it.

The realities are disheartening and the solutions to the problems are complex because the problems are layered. The Bantustans were designed to separate, marginalise and effectively ex-communicate thousands of black South African‟s by confining then to the most inhospitable places in the country. With all these complications, South Africa‟s democratic governments continue to grapple with redress issues in the former Bantustans, for instance, the consolidation of land holdings, land tenure, service delivery, reconciling dislocated communities, administrative and political divisions and duplications since the Bantustans were reincorporated into South Africa in 1994 (De Wet, 1995; 1985; De Wet and Leibbrant, 1994). A reading of the literature above shows Bantustan leaders as shadowy figures with a propensity for violence, betrayal, murder, corruption and intrigue, almost without exception. They are portrayed as opportunistic men Driven by ambition and overrun with the need for power and status, no matter how artificial the foundation. However, these same men that were so lacking in integrity according to the official records and oral accounts were sons, fathers and husbands and their loved ones have a different story to tell about them as individuals and leaders or spokesmen for black South Africans who did not have a voice. Their participation in Bantustan structures is explained, as Enos Mabuza‟s case shows, as a duty or obligation to the people and that in so doing, they stepped up and made the necessary sacrifices that few were willing or able to make. Of course, there are many ironies and ambiguities within and between these different perspectives regarding how conservative, parochial, corrupt, oppressive and disruptive the whole system was. Lord Acton‟s (John Dahlberg) famous comment “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” (cited in Grothe, 2008:259) is both true and false in the case of South Africa‟s former Bantustan leaders. They were given some power and it did corrupt most of them but they never had absolute power. Unfortunately, collectively they are forever held in contempt by history, regardless of what they did or did not do as individuals. They are not seen as patriots but as tyrants who treated the Bantustans as cows to be milked or plundered at their whim.

2.17.1 Survey of Existing Literature on Some Bantustan Personalities

The previous section outlined how the conception or design of the Bantustan policy sets the context for a discussion of specific personalities that participated in the system and their biographies. The attention of scholars has centred mainly on the four „independent

Bantustans – Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda and the specific personalities, political parties and atrocities committed in those Bantustans but very little has been written about the six self-governing territories - Lebowa, Gazankulu, KaNgwane, QwaQwa, KwaNdebele with the exception for KwaZulu.[17] Much time and effort has been devoted to KwaZulu and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and to a lesser extent on Bophuthatswana and Lucas Mangope because of the violence that plagued their territories from the late 1980s into the mid 1990s. There is a need for the history of the lesser known Bantustans to be recorded and debated before it is lost (White, 2008). The deficiency needs to be rectified as a matter of urgency because many of the official records or documents of that period have already been lost, burnt or otherwise destroyed in one way or another and some of the role-players of the period have died, like Enos Mabuza, and can no longer be interviewed and have their evidence recorded, whatever its worth.

The Ciskei"s Lennox Sebe

Gitywa (1988) is one author that has written the biography of one of the many Bantustan leaders. His biographical study is on the life of Lennox Sebe, erstwhile President of the Ciskei who is portrayed as a statesman in his own right because he was leader of an „independent" Bantustan. White (2008:201) notes that Sebe was taken by flights of grandeur and wanted to leave his imprint and image all over the Ciskei, for example, through the construction of the Bulembu Airport and the Ntaba kaNdoda monument. Sebe (1980), like Mangope, Matanzima, Holomisa, Buthelezi and others writes about the plight of Black South Africans, the complicated or layered race relations, politics and government in South Africa under apartheid and where the „independent" Ciskei with its own dynamics and challenges fit in that milieu. He outlines black people"s traditional attitudes to agriculture and resistance to what he considered to be worthwhile practical conservation policies under the aegis of the Betterment schemes (Sebe, 1980). Grootboom (2008) is amongst others who have written about Sebe focusing instead on Xhosa history, orature and literature and what can be

[17] Cedric Phatudi (Lebowa), Nelson Ramodike (Lebowa), Enos Mabuza (KaNgwane), Mangisi Cephas Zitha (KaNgwane), Simon Skosana (KwaNdebele), Prince James Mahlangu (KwaNdebele), Gabriel Ramushwana (Venda), Patrick Mphephu (Venda), Hudson Ntsanwisi (Gazankulu), Wessel Motha (QwaQwa), Kenneth Mopeli (QwaQwa), Mangosuthu Buthelezi (KwaZulu), Lucas Mangope, (Bophuthatswana), Oupa Qgozo (Ciskei), Lennox Sebe (Ciskei), Kaizer Matanzima (Transkei), Botha Sigcau (Transkei), Stella Sigcau (Transkei), Bantu Holomisa (Transkei) and those that served as interim or acting leaders at various times, their different political party affiliations, for example, Chief Buthelezi and the Inkatha Freedom Party and what it represented or stood for.

considered or criticised as apolitical, fictional or mythical within it. Grootboom"s thesis centres on the themes and techniques in Sebe"s book (1982) entitled "Ucamngco".

The Ciskei"s Oupa Gqozo

According to White (2008), very few books cover the historical events that occurred in Ciskei during the regimes of Lennox Sebe and Oupa Gqozo. Consequently, his (White, 2008) thesis in History focuses on the Ciskei from the eighteenth century, its politics and government into the twentieth century, internecine struggles and betrayals, the constitutional development of the Ciskei, the attainment of *independence* in 1981, the harsh, autocratic and nepotistic rule of Lennox Sebe (1973-1990) and his replacement by Brigadier Oupa Gqozo through a military coup d"état on 4 March 1990 (1990 to 1994). In the early months of his rule, Gqozo enjoyed the adulation and support of the apartheid government, the National Party and the Ciskei people. He also had the approval of the ANC including Nelson Mandela and Jacob Zuma because he did and said all the right things and welcomed and collaborated with the ANC alliance unlike his predecessor Sebe. White (2008) compares Sebe and Gqozo and concludes that as a leader, Gqozo was inept rather than evil. Whatever Gqozo"s failings, he is considered to be the better of two evils compared to Sebe who is described as an autocratic, iron-fisted dictator who brooked no opposition or interference and had no qualms about imprisoning known or suspected political opponents (White, 2008:201).

White (2008) casts Gqozo as a victim who was apparently misled, misinformed by his trusted advisors, Anton Nieuwoudt and Clive Brink among them, who preyed on his paranoia and insecurities for their own ends. Nieuwoudt and Brink secretly worked for the SADF Intelligence Service as counterintelligence agents. White (2008:188-192) is also sympathetic to the fate of Gqozo after he was forced to resign as leader of the Ciskei in March 1994 and became indigent, depressed and neurotic, followed by a series of misfortunes. White maintains that Gqozo did not fit the popular conception or stereotype of a ruthless African dictator. White (2008) argues that Gqozo respected the rule of law and was generally free of corruption but he did not have the necessary academic qualifications, experience and ability, insight and foresight to rule a country. He became paranoid about his own safety and the possible overthrow of his government and he was too easily swayed by others compared to his predecessor. Gqozo was discredited the most when he was implicated in the killing of General Charles Sebe and Colonel Onward Guzana and because of his later opposition to the ANC which undid his initial reputation of exemplary leadership. The onset of civil war in the

Ciskei and the Bisho Massacre of 7 September 1992 in which soldiers opened fire on demonstrators also did not do his reputation or popularity any favours. In the end, Gqozo could not be everyone‟s knight in shining armour. He turned against the ANC and its allies in October/November 1990 and the ethos of jubilation and adulation that had initially characterised his rule changed to one of doubt and eventual rejection. In July 1991, Gqozo formed a new political party, the African Democratic Movement (ADM) with the express aim of opposing the ANC and he compelled civil servants, the security forces, headmen, teachers and others to join it (White, 2008).

At the beginning of October 1993, Gqozo joined members of the Concerned South African Group (COSAG) who included Chief Buthelezi‟s Inkatha Freedom Party/the government of KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana, the Conservative Party and the Afrikaanse Volksfront (a coalition of twenty-one conservative Afrikaans groups). COSAG was a negotiating alliance which opposed the National Party/South African government and the ANC‟s Drive for a unitary state and campaigned for strong regional states or full regional autonomy for each of the regions it represented and a weak central government as opposed to a strong unitary system. COSAG wanted to be left out of the negotiations between the ANC and the South African government because it did not agree with the direction that the CODESA talks were taking. Later COSAG was known as the Freedom Alliance and it was prepared to „go it alone‟ (secede, fight and die) if the demands for a future federal structure failed via mediated talks. Gqozo also opposed the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) and pursued an isolationist policy to resist the reincorporation of Ciskei into South Africa (White, 2008).

KwaZulu‟s Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi

Smith (1988), Mzala (1988) and Temkin (1976; 2003) offer just a few of several biographies on Chief Buthelezi as one of many visible South African politicians. The biographies necessarily include a discussion of the history, politics and government of the Natal area, including KwaZulu since about 1961, Chief Buthelezi‟s role as KwaZulu‟s leader/statesman, what where or appeared to be his motives or agendas for doing certain things, Inkatha, the successes and failures, controversies and the wave of violence that swept Natal from the late 1980s into the 1990s. In 1979, KwaZulu‟s Chief Buthelezi published a book entitled *Power is Ours* which underscored the animosity which characterised South Africa‟s race relations between 1961 and 1978 but also chronicled his and Inkatha‟s relationship with the ANC from an amicable and cooperative one to being acrimonious and frosty. The works of authors such

as Maré and Hamilton (1987), Maré (1992) and Tessendorf and Boult (1991) can be seen to have built on this and similar publications as they revolve around KwaZulu‟s Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, the Inkatha Cultural Movement (Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe) and its later evolution into the Inkatha Freedom Party. In 1990, Chief Buthelezi again published a book entitled *South Africa: My Vision of the Future* which revealed his ambitions and hopes for future political participation and leadership during South Africa‟s transition into a democracy. Buthelezi/KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and right wing Afrikaner groups (the Conservative Party and the Afrikaanse Volksfront) vigorously campaigned for a federal type of government in a post-apartheid South Africa because they believed it was the only or best way for them to retain some power, influence, control and status (White, 2008). He also commented on the economic sanctions which had been imposed on South Africa because he was publicly opposed to them and their negative impact on the economy due to rolling disinvestment by foreign capital. The common thread is Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha‟s political ambitions, their particular brand of nationalism, alliances, appetite for power and propensity for ethnic violence which is shrouded in a Zulu warrior identity and the attendant notions of masculinity which date back to Chaka Zulu and the awe he inspired (Golan, 1994). The situation in KwaZulu provides the foreground for a general discussion of ethnic identity and relations, Black political activity and internecine violence in South Africa in the build-up to the first democratic election in 1994.

The Transkei‟s K.D. Matanzima, George Matanzima and Bantu Holomisa

An autobiography by the Transkei‟s head of state Kaizer D. Matanzima (1976) chronicles the history of the Tembu people, the politics, government, attempted coup or mutiny and foreign relations of the Transkei Bantustan as well as its generally respectful relations with the ANC. Matanzima portrays the Transkei‟s independence as having happened on his terms – that he successfully negotiated the terms and conditions with the apartheid state and that it turned out not to be such a bad thing while it lasted. Of course this is open to interpretation and one is tempted to say is downright delusional or impossible based on the divide and rule strategy that the apartheid state set out to achieve through the Bantustan system and the granting of *independence*. This counts because it is Matanzima‟s own perspective as someone who was directly ensconced in the politics of that time. Streek and Wicksteed‟s *Render Unto Kaiser: A Transkei Dossier* (1981) also traces the leadership of Kaizer and George Matanzima in the Transkei but they highlight the political corruption which swept through the Bantustan as the leaders amassed as much personal wealth as they could at the expense of the people. In

contrast, Holomisa and Meyer (1999) write in a hopeful mood about the future prospects of Holomisa‟s political party the United Democratic Movement and the Transkei. Their book is a review of twentieth century South African history including the racial and ethnic issues, tribal or Bantustan government, political leadership and main political parties, social life and customs, the sympathetic reception of the ANC and its activities in Bantu Holomisa‟s Transkei and the role or significance of the Congress of Traditional Leaders in South Africa (Contralesa). The establishment of CONTRALESA symbolises the revival and recognition of the relevance of chieftaincies as traditional institutions in South Africa post-1994 (see Chapter 3).

2.18 Introducing KaNgwane's Enos Mabuza

Enos Mabuza‟s odyssey begins in rural Barberton to political office and organisation and ends in numerous business boardrooms and now forms part of a particular region‟s history and heritage (the former Eastern Transvaal). Mabuza, like Gqozo, is described as charismatic, having a pleasant, disarming and attractive personality (White, 2008:198). Both men were full of hope, got along well with others and were dedicated family men and appeared to respect the rule of law; traits that have been confirmed by those that had contact with them. In some respects, Mabuza and the other leaders from the six self-governing Bantustans have been lost in the multitude and appear to have been merely biding their time within the system, not doing much to rock the boat either way. However, they had their backs against the ropes with all the others who were more prominent or conspicuous by their propensity for violence or political utterances. This thesis explores the life and work of Enos Mabuza who led the KaNgwane (Swazi) Bantustan in present-day Mpumalanga province. It shows that he used improvisation in his dealings with the people, other Bantustan leaders and the apartheid state. He composed his life by ear, feeling and instinct and tried to get through that phase of his life as honourably as was possible under the circumstances. He never did a volte-face or threw down the gauntlet to the ANC alliance like Buthelezi, Mangope or Gqozo did. Chief Buthelezi‟s belligerent treatment and vitriolic condemnation of the ANC and its supporters in the late 1980s and 1990s comes to mind. Instead, Mabuza was true to his words and left politics in the early 1990s when the ANC and other political organisations were unbanned like he always said he would. When he made the decision to resign from active politics, he joined the world of business which was opening up to more blacks in the early 1990s. Mabuza was one of few in a similar position who did not allow himself to be overtaken by

events and changing political tides. He may have been an inadvertent dictator whose faults were unintentional like White (2008) suggests about Oupa Gqozo but he had some redeeming qualities which kept him in power for so long. The South Africa government had quick and easy ways of disposing (military or police force, other black elites that had designs on power or the withholding of financial support/budgets) of uncooperative leaders but it did not get rid of him in KaNgwane, but not for lack of trying. The ANC wanted him and his Inyandza National Movement to act as a bulwark against the excesses of the state in KaNgwane which was in a strategic position between Mozambique and Swaziland and the South African interior.

Consent for this research was given by Mabuza‟s family because the subject could not do so himself. The timeline for his life, career, achievements and accolades begins with his birth in 1936 and his death in 1997. The subject lived in a different historical time and context from the researcher who is a black Zimbabwean female born in 1978 when the subject, a black South African Swati male born in 1936 was getting initiated into or entangled in Bantustan politics. The differences between the subject and researcher are obvious but this thesis is an attempt at a comprehensive examination of Enos Mabuza‟ life and achievements in politics, business, education and conservation, not just his participation in Bantustan politics, which he is generally known for. His life has not been recorded extensively for public access so the thesis traces Mabuza‟s upbringing in rural Barberton, his domestic life with his wife and children, his rise to political office in the Bantustan system, his modest attempts at reforming, for instance the labour laws of the KaNgwane Bantustan and the general atmosphere which prevailed in the Bantustan under his leadership. There is no evidence that he bought votes to keep himself in power. There is also no evidence that Mabuza was demanding, resentful, intolerant, judgmental or unreasonable as a leader, father or husband. He might have been a reluctant leader in a time of crisis which raised suspicion, conspiracy theories, questions of betrayal, manipulation, sacrifice and illegitimacy but he rose to the challenge and did not behave in a perfunctory manner even when he was perceived as an enemy of the people. Mabuza served as a board member for many companies in the early 1990s alongside many notable black and white businesspeople at the time who were chairmen, chief executive officers, directors, presidents or vice presidents of such organizations. Being a board member or corporate officer for so many organizations meant that Mabuza acquired an extensive knowledge of the different organisations‟ products or operations, specific industry information such as competitors, market data, company financials and labour relations.

Mabuza was able to reinvent himself and engage with people who had once been on different sides of the political divide. He avoided stagnation as he grew older and the political landscape changed around him. An outline of his life and career reconciles the different facets of a complex human life and highlights the different seasons or phases in it as he moved from one sphere to the other.

Contrary to what conventional wisdom has to say about former Bantustan leaders, an argument can be made for Mabuza being a decent man in a bad situation. He was resilient and found opportunity in adversity and the accolades that he received are the gold stars on his life"s balance sheet. Recognition gives us a sense of belonging, achievement, affirmation and satisfaction that we made a noteworthy contribution. He was one of few Bantustan leaders who knew when to quit and did not resort to secessionist positions. On 11 March 1990, Mabuza addressed the tenth annual congress of the Inyandza National Movement as Chief Minister of KaNgwane and leader of Inyandza. He appealed to KaNgwane residents to „set an example" and refrain from wanton and senseless damage to property such as that witnesses in Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei. On 26 April 1990 he called for the dissolution of the KaNgwane Bantustan"s government at the opening of the second session of the 1990 legislative assembly, noting that serious attention was being given to phasing out the present assembly within a year (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1990:502).

Mabuza, like all the other individuals mentioned in this survey, has a claim in history; a place of significance for those whose lives they touched. Reflecting on his „rags to riches story" is in some ways also a reflection on different or marginal political experiences and maligned identities. It is hoped that a critical biography of Mabuza"s life, his contribution in different fields and its significance within a wider context can add to the richness and diversity of South African history and experience as well as open new possibilities for political biography in South Africa. It is by no means a definitive account of the man and his work but it is hoped that it can form the foundation for further study on him and other lesser known or controversial South African figures from his generation and even those that are younger.

2.19 Conclusion

Very few things in life are coincidental or fortuitous. Realising one"s potential or success requires character, intelligent risk-taking, confidence and competence but also depends on the bonds, relationships or networks that we form with others. Fortune favours the brave and

those who keep up with local and world events and trends. Asking for ideas or input greatly increases the odds of success in one‟s favour just as much as attracting and retaining influential people around oneself is a networking strategy which offers different opportunities. Everyone has an agenda for doing something, whether the reason is noble or selfish. The Shylock mentality of always thinking „what is in it for me‟ creeps into most of our decisions, attitudes and commitments. There is much public moralising in political and intellectual thought or dominant ideas that mould our perceptions but there are also alternative avenues for discussion, explanation and interpretation which acknowledge, instead of silencing, dissenting voices which challenge the *status quo*.

One can not overlook the speculative dimensions of narrative biography and the shortcomings associated with it in the face of other explorations and competing explanations for varied purposes. Despite this, however, biography research adds to the body of knowledge and history of specific fields which are of interest to different people. Scholarly biography is the study of lived lives and experiences by famous, infamous, well-known and obscure personalities, all of whom are flawed in some way but remain relevant. It is evident from the biographies mentioned in this chapter that identity is not static in the same way that circumstances/contexts change over time. The common questions or threads in all the biographies outlined above are who, when, how and why subject *X* did *Y*. Biographical research highlights the place of narration in the formation of identity whilst also showing that biographies are rarely seamless narrations. Specific relations and conditions of each biographic production or reproduction are important and should be acknowledged when we assess individual lives as balance sheets or records of achievements and failures (Rassool, 2004). Biographical research offers us an opportunity to make sense of different life courses. It also makes us appreciate the bio-psycho-social character of human beings. People continue developing, changing, evolving and adapting throughout their lives, hence the popularity of the life-span approach to studying human development and growth (the cumulative effect of external/environmental, social and internal factors on physical as well as psychological growth).

White (2008) laments that one finds no more than passing discussion of the history of the *independent* Republics of Transkei and Ciskei, or of their leaders, but in reality, one is even more hard pressed to find more than cursory mention of the six self-governing Bantustans, their leaders and specific internal dynamics. However, this does not or should not mean that

the events that transpired there or the personalities that were involved are not part of South Africa‟s history or are so inconsequential that they should be relegated to the dustbin of history. There are many stories that can be told from contested pasts such as these but they presently rely heavily on interviews with key role players during that time as well as newspaper reports.

Thriving, prosperous and peaceful Bantustans were never a real possibility but a utopian ideal that carried the Dream of the apartheid state and their lackeys who aided and abetted it. The Bantustans represented strife, doubt, misery, injustice, violence and rejection. For a long time, during and after the end of apartheid, former Bantustan leaders were the untouchables of South Africa‟s political stage because of how they were used in the apartheid state‟s divide and rule strategy against their own people, the violence and repression that characterized most of their tenures and their non-co-operative stance during the political negotiations and transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, the tensions that developed over this subsided with the re-incorporation of the former Bantustans into South Africa, without the federal government that many of them had demanded. The re-absorption of the Bantustans neutralized whatever power the Bantustan leaders had enjoyed and gotten accustomed to by denying them a power base or constituency. However, even though their clout is now significantly reduced, regional and ethnic identities and loyalties endure and some of the former Bantustan leaders have managed to retain enough support in their former constituencies to allow them to remain in active politics, as part of the opposition. The Transkei‟s Bantu Holomisa and KwaZulu‟s Chief Buthelezi are examples of former Bantustan leaders who are members of parliament and leaders of their respective political parties, internal power struggles notwithstanding.

Goodman‟s book (1999) acknowledges the different routes or journeys that different groups, communities, organisations and individuals took to get into the new South Africa. His book charts through South Africa‟s modern or contemporary (twentieth century) history, its politics and government, social conditions, complaints against the police, issues regarding land titles, land reform, dispossession, relocations and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The more one reads about history, power, interpretations and the different levels at which they operate, the more unstable or unreliable historical sources appear. The contingent nature of facts is also uncovered but access to discernible fragments of the past afford us layers of understanding and make different interpretations of the past possible, hopefully free of the

excesses of abstraction history, expediency and convention. South Africa today has a vastly different political landscape but former Bantustan leaders seem to have smoothed over the rough edges, gotten rid of the excesses of the Bantustan heyday and earned a modicum of respectability along the way. Whether or not they have been *rehabilitated* or have repented or should be forgiven for what they did or represented remains a matter of personal opinion and debate. The jury is still out but the political structures appear to be more accommodating, tolerant and even reconciliatory towards these individuals in much the same way that they have been towards the new role and position of traditional authorities and chieftaincies in a democratic South Africa.

Ultimately, life or its meaning is an unanswered question for most of us. It is a puzzle or maze that we have to figure out as we go along. It is an experiment in which we make choices and live with their consequences. We take what seem like the desirable middle courses between ineffective extremes and hopefully learn from our mistakes. This chapter set out to advocate or support a multidisciplinary approach which acknowledges diversity and plurality in the social sciences and other disciplines, as well as an open mind to the study of individual lives, which forces us to revisit issues that we or others are eager to forget or erase from memory or historical record. Oral traditions and other means are being used more and more to uncover previously hidden histories in this sensitive but crucial national undertaking of nurturing historical consciousness, human values and morality, including tolerance, for each person‟s assertions of dignity and independence (Jeppie, 2004: 1-15). The practice of social science, its uses, effectiveness and contribution towards meeting contemporary challenges depends on such an open and challenging mind and reflexive control of knowledge production beyond sterile empiricism because things are often not what they seem.

It is hoped that this chapter gives a sense of the difficulties encountered in conducting biographical research, the progress that has been made, the value of biographical research the potential that it has for multidisciplinary projects as well as the required competence of researchers trying to understand human behaviour. The aim is not to become an apologist or start a crusade to change the official record but to put alternative interpretations into the public domain, to enrich the historical record by incorporating individual voices, certain accounts that are omitted or underrepresented in official records (reclaiming history), hidden struggles, politics and popular movements, including those of former Bantustan rulers, their formative years and other influences which led them into those positions. Being in that

position was fortuitous for some leaders (Mabuza, Gqozo) but not for others. Whatever „good" intentions or deeds any former Bantustan leader may have had or done are generally over-shadowed by the negative legacy of the Bantustans. But is the general condemnation, stigma, hostility, alienation and resentment against all former Bantustan rulers deserved, fair or biased? If Bantustan leaders were puppets of the apartheid state, to be manipulated at will, how much culpability or liability should Bantustan leaders have taken for the things, including the administrative disasters and near-political implosions which happened in the Bantustans which were orchestrated from without? Can anyone ever respect what they did or risked and what role do forgiveness, compassion and the spirit of reconciliation have to play in mediating their „reintegration" into democratic society? These are some of the questions that the reader should bear in mind as they read through this thesis.

Actions have consequences and former Bantustan leaders chose to wade in unchartered and murky waters where many feared to go. It can be argued that these individuals courted adversity and calamity with the hope of prosperity in unpopular positions which demanded some degree of courage. It was a path less travelled but for many of their critics, it was also a path of least resistance. Criticism is not agreeable but necessary up to a point. Bantustan leaders were used as decoys by the apartheid state and much violence and disruption resulted from the Bantustan system. There is no sun without shadow and many of these men were seeking to gratify their desires with the least exertion but they were not responsible for the system itself. Politicians or leaders have faults and inadequacies as do all people but it is hard to believe that all Bantustan leaders were of the same ilk. There were differences and similarities in the motives and objectives that were being pursued as well as the means that were used to achieve them, whether one regards them as self-serving aggressors, masochists or wayward sons in a tragicomedy. Some Bantustan leaders were definitely more vindictive or had a higher propensity for violence, some were more ostentatious, paranoid, power-crazed and greedy megalomaniacs after the accumulation of personal riches and some were endowed with more intransigent attitudes than others. Interviews with individuals that had contact with leaders such as Mabuza (later in this thesis) and Gqozo (2008) suggest that they possessed more honesty, integrity, took more personal responsibility for their actions and felt it was an honour to serve their people with pride. Perhaps it is true that some like Mabuza, according to oral accounts, tried to take on a David and Goliath contest thinking that they could take on the apartheid state from within its own structures and initiate some kind of change. Perhaps it was a well-meaning but mistaken and naïve undertaking with serious

ramifications for their reputations and legacies. Some of the Bantustan leaders, as White (2008) argues, just did not have the necessary insight or foresight to recognise the implications, immediate or future, of their actions.

Since the disbanding and reincorporation of the Bantustans into South Africa in 1994, and even before that, former Bantustan leaders have endured the humiliation, disrepute and stigma of their association with those apartheid creations. They have been caricatured as having been led by the nose and paraded around by the apartheid state as models of what it was to betray and oppress one‟s own people. Perhaps they did not see or refused to see the bigger picture, did not put the implications of the Bantustan system into proper perspective or assessed the risks superficially. Whatever the case might be, there is no denying the unpalatable truths about the Bantustan system and the individuals that ruled over them but hindsight is 20-20 and we can never achieve perfect understanding or appreciation of someone else‟s experience. We judge after the fact but things are not always as clear cut or predictable when they happen. It is thus the biographer‟s job to peel back the layers and reveal the hidden nature of the individual, their private desires, fears, longings, vulnerabilities successes and failures.

Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework

3.1 Introduction

Conquests, colonisation and migration create dislocations or disengagement between culture and territory (Oommen cited in Ratcliffe, 1994:10) and many political regimes have successfully used strategies of cultural separation to consolidate power and control. In most instances, white/colonial conquest and subjugation fostered tribalism by manipulating the African population‟s different histories and cultures. However, such arbitrary distinctions do not mean that people can be separated into neat, mutually exclusive compartments (Kaarsholm, 1995:34; Van den Berghe, 1990:1-15; Van den Berghe, 1970:80; Sharp, 1988). In a world where race is a salient factor, there also exist "social credentials that constitute the real bases of political inclusion" (Mehta, 1990 cited in Jacobson, 2006:653). Other discriminatory markers for eligibility for political rights include gender, culture and psychological conditions which are interwoven as preconditions for inclusion and exclusion (De Vos and Romanucci-Ross, 1975:305, Said and Simmons, 1976:111, 127).

In Africa, "tribal identity persists because colonial governments gave it an institutional and political support and because the tie to the tribal, communal, or lineage land, often phrased in the idiom of filial loyalty to ancestors, is still an important social and economic asset" (Uchendu, 1975:268-269). Uchendu (1975:269) notes that one can maintain expand or contract the social frame of reference which confers or imposes a certain social identity (choice between cultural alternatives). The frame of reference for identity can be continental, regional, national or ethnic, for example, Igbo, Zulu, Akan, Yoruba, Hausa, Kikuyu, Ganda or Lunda. The unequal nature of inter-group interactions gives rise to ethnocentrism or total avoidance of contact. Conflict and competition are endemic because people readily believe and magnify the perceived differences (distinctiveness and notions of superiority) between them as long as it benefits them in some way and competing groups try to impose their values on others. Unfortunately, increased inter-group contact and the attendant concomitants of economic growth and urbanisation exaggerate ethnic differences and competition for limited resources and opportunities (Said and Simmons, 1976:15, 20, 25; Wilson and Frederiksen, 1995:2, 4; Van den Berghe, 1970:12, 14, 269; De Vos, 1975:6, 15; Ratcliffe, 1994).

Bourdieu comments on the divisive aspects of culture and arbitrary distinctions as follows:

> …the culture which unifies (the medium of communication) is also the culture which separates (the instrument of distinction) and which legitimates distinctions by forcing all other cultures (designated as sub-cultures) to define themselves by their distance from the dominant culture (Bourdieu, 1992:167).

Identity politics, according to Uchedu (1975:273), is often embarrassing and uncomfortable for political elites who find themselves in conflicting roles as national leaders and as cultural brokers or custodians for their own ethnic groups (a dilemma of how to "keep faith" with competing loyalties). Government patronage in many instances has led to the persistence of ethnic enclaves and heightened ethnic patriotism or allegiance and tensions in many plural societies (Fein, 1999:157-163). This was the case in the former Yugoslavia (Stavrou, 1976:134-149), Rwanda and Burundi (Mamdani, 2001; Van den Berghe, 1970; Prunier, 1995; Said and Simmons, 1976:28; Destexhe, 1995; Taylor, 1999), Armenia and Cambodia (Kiernan, 1999:165-178), Somalia (Adam, 2008; The Africa Watch Committee, 1990), Uganda (Mamdani, 1976) and even the United States (Jacobson, 2006:645-650).

This chapter and the rest of the thesis are based on how Mahmood Mamdani historicises colonialism and the enduring socio-political problems that it created on the African continent.

3.2 Colonial Divide and Rule Tactics

Mahmood Mamdani"s (1996) thesis in *Citizen and Subjects* focuses on the different modes of rule in rural and urban Africa. It is an example of new paradigms that seek to account for the modern dilemmas facing African societies in theoretical frameworks that allow the identification of major actors and institutional structures which aid and frustrate social change. Mamdani argues that rather than being citizens, rural populations are subjects of undemocratic authority which does not have systems of accountability to the people. Being a citizen (under common law) is framed as being good, ideal and desirable whilst being a subject (under customary law) is bad. The „rural" is characterised by colonially and post-colonially re-invented „despotisms" while the „urban" is constituted by civil struggles. In terms of Mamdani"s conceptualisation, rural citizens under traditional authorities and Bantustan governments in South Africa were not true citizens and this is at the heart of this enquiry because Mabuza"s constituency and „power base" was rural, which has implications for the weight that one can assign to his political career and/or contribution.

Different groups tend to rely on or manipulate identity-based politics in struggles for access to the state and the resources that it controls or to protest against exclusion and oppression and demand basic rights and socio-economic provisioning. The problem with the native-settler, subject-citizen or indigene-settler distinctions is that they are artificially created to further certain agendas. Ethnicity is neither natural nor accidental, but is the product of a conscious effort by social actors. Individuals or groups that are classified as aliens or foreigners have their nationality and rights of citizenship questioned (entitlements, rights and obligations). They are unequally treated or discriminated (exploited, dominated, excluded or ignored) as a minority or as refugees by state authorities, non-state and other regulatory agencies (Mamdani, 1996:22-24, 47, 67-69, 143, 191).

Ethnicity is a matter of shared traits or cultural commonalities but it is also the result of the interplay between external categorisation and self-identification. Dormant ethnic identities are manipulated in pursuit of particular interests[18], thereby politicising ethnicity and ethnicising the polity as was done by colonial authorities, Christian missionaries and emergent African nationalist elites. Colonial indirect rule categorised Africans by „tribe" and promoted separate settlements between rural natives and settlers of urban centres. Despite the historicity and fluidity of ethnic identities, the general exploitation of popular ethnic grievances and the role of political institutions and policies in the framing of ethnic relations, ethnicity is not only manifest in conflictive or competitive relations but also in the contexts of cooperation. Ethnic groups are groups with ascribed membership usually, but not always, based on claims or myths of common history, ancestry, language, race, religion, culture and territory. Further, traditional leadership does not give everyone a chance to be elected, and it does not appear to have systems for recourse against the unfair exercise of power (Mamdani, 1996:22-24, 47, 67-69, 143, 191).

The tribe/tribalism was taken to be the building block of social life in Africa in particular and ethnicity, as a political identity, continues to be undergirded and reproduced by institutions of colonial vintage. Ethnicity/tribalism, taken as a primordial identity, was manipulated by different elite interest groups because such identities were regarded as more historically and institutionally durable as opposed to more fluid or transitory legally or institutionally

[18] Employing or mobilising ethnic identity and difference to gain advantage in situations of socio-economic competition which can lead to regional inequalities, lack of development, lack of economic unity, rivalry in provision of amenities as well as conflict which manifests as ethnic polarisation, sectarianism, factional politics, intolerance and extremism.

inscribed political identities. Mamdani (2001) shows how particular political identities (racial and ethnic) are the result of complex state formation processes, both cultural and market-based, in which registration papers translate into inclusion or exclusion from particular regimes of rights and entitlements as opposed to cultural or biological identities. The colonial state was the legal or institutional complex which set in motion specific political identities which in turn reflected how power was organised (officially enforced or insurgent).

Each person carries multiple identities ranging from those defined by ethnic, racial, geographical, economic, religious, political, moral and even aesthetic factors. Mamdani"s (2001) interpretation of the Rwandan genocide examines the social dynamics in historical, theoretical, political and regional perspective[19]. It illustrates how a failure to transcend certain identities can result in unimaginable acts of violence. The racialisation, ethnification, and later redefinition, of Hutu and Tutsi differences under colonialism in Belgian Rwanda created a set of circumstances which ignited genocide in the 1990s. Colonialism set into motion the world of the settler and the native and this confined or set apart Hutus as indigenous or native and the Tutsi minority as foreign, settler alien Hamites. The colonisers racialised, as opposed to ethnicised, the position of Tutsis and gave them a privileged position relative to the Hutu majority. This situation conditioned Hutu propaganda in the 1959 Hutu Revolution. Next, the Second Republic was ushered into power in 1973 with the Habyarimana coup and tried to redefine Tutsi from a racial category to an ethnic one (the opposite of what the Belgian administration had done). The acrimony between the two groups was again the fuel for Hutu Power propaganda after 1990 (Mamdani, 2001:14).

British indirect rule was similar to French „association" as opposed to „assimilation". The relationship between Europeans and Africans was based on differentiation – exaggerating differences in order to reproduce specific power distributions. However, it was both a solution and a problem in the long term because of the inherent contradictions associated with the concept of ethnicity (Mamdani, 1996:8). Mamdani"s theses (1996; 2001; 2010) dissect the dialectics of post-colonial citizenship and the analyses focus on distinctions between settler and native identities whilst linking history, geography and politics together in a bid to historicise political choices, the individuals that make them, their consequences as well as the legacies that remain. He illustrates how Europe ruled Africa by creating settler citizens and nativised subjects. Such identity construction was designed to justify political and economic

[19] The Hutu and Tutsi displacements, diasporas and refugees over the years who have settled in Uganda, Congo/Zaire, Tanzania or Burundi.

domination and later intolerant, selective nationalist discourses. Direct and indirect colonial rule legally enforced race and ethnicity as salient political identities. Direct rule was more synonymous with race-based political identities and indirect rule was synonymous with multiple and separate ethnic consciousnesses. Indirect rule or to use Mamdani‟s term, "decentralised despotism", involved the extensive use of ethnically defined Native Authorities to define and enforce custom and it was reinforced by the armed might of the central state as the means for controlling and exploiting the rural peasantry. Political and cultural identities cannot be differentiated all the time because of the complex web that entangles them. With regard to the chieftaincy and the application of customary law generally, the colonial state removed democratic accountability to those below and reinforced bureaucratic accountability to those above (Ntsebeza, 2002:1-2, 28, 34, 41-47, 52, 76, 88; Hendricks, 1990; Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 1999:99-119).

Mamdani extends the subject-citizen thesis to the current situation in Dafur, Sudan. At the root of the decades-long conflict in Sudan is ethno-regional identity cleavage between the northern and southern regions. Mamdani argues that the Dafur conflict has a local, regional, international, historical and geopolitical context for the global war on terror despite the fact that it dates back to the colonial making of settlers and natives; races and tribes and the building of Nation and State in independent Sudan (Mamdani, 2010:85-130,175-246). Mamdani (2010) traces the history, politics, ethnic relations and government of Sudan‟s Darfur region since 2003 and reflects on questions of belonging, identity and the different histories and interpretations which are available. Mamdani takes issue with the responses or intervention of the international community (the United States‟ Homeland Security Act in the War on Terror, the African Union, the United Nations, the Save Darfur Coalition, the International Criminal Court at The Hague), humanitarian aid organisations and the media which he accuses of having a saviour or Messiah-complex to rescue the people of Darfur whilst fighting ideological proxy wars, including that on terror in Darfur by manipulating the misery of the local people.

The on-going conflict in Darfur foregrounds ethnicity and race and their reconstitution over time from British colonial efforts to artificially tribalise Darfur and separate the population into natives and settler tribes. Under indirect rule, the power of native authorities was redefined and restricted to the judicial field and tax collection (Mamdani, 2010:175-200). In colonial Sudan, rights were defined by ethnicity, not citizenship and the national-ethnic

question of citizenship and rights in the context of cultural pluralism and militant nationalism has provided the fuel for conflict in the region. So-called native tribes were positioned above the settler tribes leading to marginalisation and struggles over land which were fuelled by drought and desertification. Civil war broke out between nomadic and peasant tribes over fertile land in the south between1987 and 1989 and the creation of tribal homelands (*dars*). Intervention by the Sudanese authorities in the 1990s gave rise to two rebel movements which became prominent from about 2003. Insurgency, counterinsurgency and repression has resulted and deteriorated[20] into what has widely been described as „genocide" involving landed southern African victims (non-Arab/Black/African) and northern landless Arab/Muslim perpetrators; identities which are mediated by stereotypical religious extremism (Mamdani, 2010).

Leaders and organisations reflect varying degrees of autonomy and cooptation. African politics today bears all the hallmarks of cooptation through the use of different pressures, coercion, inducements and clientelistic manipulations. Even in democratising and liberalising contexts, states seek to „engage" society by incorporating, co-opting, eliminating and harassing independent organisations. Clientelistic politics built along ethnic, religious, regional, clan and other such particularistic lines are evident in Uganda, Kenya, Darfur, South Africa and other places which privilege or have privileged particular social groups over others in the past in order to gain votes, funds or establish a popular support base.

In the game of politics or power, indirect rule or rule by proxy has had wide application. Mamdani"s thesis is relevant for this thesis for two main reasons. Firstly, because indirect rule was used during colonial times and during apartheid to dominate rural populations in South Africa. Secondly, the Bantustans, which Mabuza participated in, were an extension of the „reserves" which manipulated ethnic identities and the positions of traditional authorities. As has already been mentioned, colonialism was attended by the notion of nativism, population relocations and the creation of subjects and citizens. This was accompanied by conflicting forces and interests and the use of various pillars of control through traditional structures and chieftaincies to bolster apartheid capital accumulation (Hendricks, 1990); a situation which greatly compromised the position of chiefs. As an institution of traditional authority, the South African chieftaincy has struggled for legitimacy, more-so with redefined roles under a democratic dispensation. Many scholars have written about this appropriation

[20] Rape, torture, malnutrition.

and manipulation of identities and the manner in which traditional authorities were hijacked over the years but which still has implications for rural populations and traditional authorities today (Williams, 2009a:194-197; Williams, 2009b, Sithole and Mbele, 2008; Oomen, 2005; Cliffe, 2004:355-356; Mashele, 2004:349-354, Mamdani, 2001; Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 1999; Skweyiya, 1993; Holomisa, 1991; Posel, 1987; Mare, 1980; Legassick and Wolpe, 1976; Wilson, 1962).

The internecine violence of the 1990s in South Africa cautions us that we cannot underestimate the magnetism and staying power of ethnic identity which was one of the rationales given by the apartheid state for corralling people in the Bantustans. Ethnicity is multifaceted and has a certain fluidity, flexibility or fuzziness (situational and ambiguous) which allows it to be animated; politically activated and deactivated depending on the circumstances (Grundy, 1986). It is responsible, for example, for sectarianism and the politicisation of ethnicity and religion, which contributed to the problems Uganda faced under the Amin and Obote regimes in Uganda[21]. Similarly, nationalism, in its many manifestations and is an ideology subject to distortion from the point of view of popular interests.

South Africa, like Kenya, Nigeria and many other countries is a multi-ethnic state with tensions that wax and wane over time. The coexistence of various official state laws in South Africa began as early as the 1830s when chiefs in the Cape Colony were granted authority to enforce indigenous law (subject to review by a colonial official). Where indirect rule was the norm, chiefs ceased to claim their position by virtue of right or inheritance because they became bureaucrats appointed to those positions by a superior. They ceased to be accountable to local communities as they assumed a more despotic character. However, although collaboration was a potentially profitable partnership[22] with the colonisers, not all chiefs or customary leaders were simple cogs in the colonial or apartheid wheel. Social and spatial compartments in South Africa were typified by the different Native Reserves and later by ethnic-based Bantustans in which the functionaries were both instruments and beneficiaries of the system of fragmentation (Hendricks, 1990).

[21] Clientelistic networks based on clan, lineage, ethnicity, religion and region.

[22] To be simply identified with power whether it was real or not or to be regarded as part of power (no matter how low) or just being in proximity to power.

In South Africa, traditional authorities were sucked into a complex history of resistance and collusion with colonial and apartheid states and their relationship with the main liberation movements, the ANC and SACP, suffered. Today, they have a strained relation and peculiar role in a democratic South Africa. Their powers of land allocation and administration were confirmed through the Communal Land Rights Act, and their governance and judicial powers are established in terms of the Traditional Courts Bill (debated in 2008). However, the fundamental question of how to reconcile the role of traditional leaders and the democratic empowerment of ordinary people remains (Ntsebeza, 2002:1-2, 28, 34, 41-47, 52, 76, 88; Hendricks, 1990; Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 1999:99-119).

Indigeneity in Uganda and the citizenship crisis in the Eastern Congo also followed a similar course under indirect rule colonisation and have been one of the root causes of post-colonial political violence in the African Great Lakes region. Parallels can also be drawn from the experience of Hindu-Muslim violence at the time of the partition of colonial India. In these instances, colonially generated political identities – religious, national, racial etcetera were reproduced and reinforced (Mamdani, 2001). Similar comparisons can be made with the South African experience although South Africa was a hybrid of the direct and indirect colonial administration approaches. Nevertheless, it experienced the same debilitating, disempowering and disenfranchising effects of racial segregation between the coloniser and the colonised.

The focus on race and ethnicity created fractures within the social fabric of societies. South Africa has a culturally diverse population that is heavily laden with racial and ethnic stereotypes (not homogenised or assimilated) yet apartheid South Africa‟s doctrine of separateness divided the black population into distinct semi-autonomous sub-systems in the 1960s. State orchestrated cultural revivalism and the establishment of traditional authority structures was a recipe for tribal power struggles and territoriality (Van den Berghe, 1970:83,179 & 214). Race also coincided with ethnic identity when the colour bar was introduced (the Groups Areas, Reservation of Separate Amenities, Prohibition of Mixed Marriages, Bantu Education Acts) (Kaarsholm, 1995:33-44). The colonised became subjects deprived of rights of citizenship and the South African „reserves‟, Bantu Authorities and Bantustans were an extension of this colonial enterprise.

According to Magubane (2001:4), the term race and the ideology of racism should be understood as shorthand for inhuman social practices, exploitative and oppressive relations

that brutalise, degrade, and reduce people who are colonised and oppressed to less than human status. In the South African context, this is typified by the 1652 arrival of the Dutch under the leadership of Jan van Riebeeck and the Dutch East India Company and their treatment of the San and Khoi as a captive labour force to reap high profits, on territory appropriated without regard to the rights of the indigenous owners. Such treatment led to gross injustice, plunder, conquest and genocide (hostile reprisals through commando raids to exterminate those they could not control). This situation did not change much with the arrival of the militarist 1820 British settlers who treated the Xhosa with disdain accompanied by ruthless scotched earth campaigns. The British perfected the art of double-speak with the passage of Ordinance 50 of 1828 which defined the „Liberal Spirit of the Cape" by English apologists of British imperialism who had illusions about the boundless benevolence and Christian philanthropy of British colonialists (Jaffe, 1994:59 cited in Magubane, 2001:11). Missionaries subverted African chiefdoms and kingdoms from within, while British imperial forces in the so-called Kaffir Wars subverted them from without (Magubane, 2001:15). Cape liberalism, according to Keegan (1996:94-106 cited in Magubane, 20001:16) turned out to be a "shallow, tawdry, and deceptive conscience salving exercise." The English humanitarians, who criticised the excesses of Boer farmers" cruelty towards the San and the Khoi, did not do it in the name of anti-colonialism, but of furthering colonialism. They pursued it with renewed determination following the discovery of diamonds (1867) at Kimberly and gold (1884) on the Rand and they decided to make South Africa a permanent part of the British Empire. The only difference was that the focus changed from a concerted effort to exterminate Africans to keeping them as inferior cheap labour for new industries and the mines in order to preserve the illusion of white superiority by keeping whites out of menial jobs (Lewsen, 1969).

3.3 Racial and Ethnic Tensions Intensified under Apartheid

Apartheid"s grand plan to exclude Africans from South African nationhood was embodied in the resettlement schemes of the 1960s and 1970s which led to the creation the Bantustans. According to Hendricks (1990:154), the façade of independence, a meaningless vote (political co-optation) for the Transkei in 1976, Bophuthatswana in 1977, Venda in 1979 and Ciskei in 1981 and the collaborative relationship between the South African state and its junior/unequal partners in the Bantustans was the best result towards the realisation of this plan.

When the Afrikaners became the hegemonic force in 1948, they inherited a state in which white supremacy was already a *fait accompli* (from the introduction of the 1913 Native Land Act and the 1923 Urban Areas Act); a mandate to protect white interests (English capital and Afrikaners‟ control of state institutions) which they maintained for over forty years through laws such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act; an Amendment to the Immorality Act (criminalised sex across the colour line); the Population Registration Act (defined „race‟ and provide the bedrock for the massive apartheid structure); the Suppression of Communism Act (1950); the South Africa Act Amendment Act (1956); the Group Areas Act (confined each of the urban racial groups which to its own residential and trading areas); the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (segregated a variety of facilities ranging from public buildings and transport, parks, libraries and benches); the Bantu Authorities Act (paved the way for the „Bantustans‟ of the grand apartheid programme of social engineering); the Native Laws Amendment Act (influx control); the Abolition of Passes Act (a curiously named statute which introduced the reference book as the ultimate instrument of control), and the Bantu Education Act.

These laws built on deeply rooted notions of white superiority from the glory days of European empires. Apartheid ensured that blacks occupied the lowest rungs of colonial capitalism - as the unskilled or semi-skilled, unemployed and landless masses (Magubane, 2001). Indirect rule was extended with the Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 which paved the way or the creation of the Bantustans from the ashes of the old neglected reserves. This happened at the same time as the introduction of influx control measures which locked millions of South African families into poverty and landlessness, thus creating new openings or possibilities for contestation. The Bantustans were administered by government-paid chiefs and Bantustan councillors and they were deliberately underdeveloped by the Pretoria government. Bantustans were intended to serve as rural reservoirs for cheap migratory labour to the cities and industry in white South Africa. People were forcibly moved to the Bantustans and their economic and social decisions were conditioned by their unequal and distorted access to markets, services and opportunities. The Bantustans also created a legacy of landlessness, severe land pressure and land-related conflicts which persist today (Hendricks, 1990).

From the mid-1970s, the development of separate black national „Bantustan‟ identities and tribal orientations became a priority for the apartheid regime but it had little interest in

collecting statistics on the African population information and often suppressed data that depicted the poor conditions in the Bantustans. The regime excluded all South Africans living in the Bantustans from official records resulting in such statistics being significantly skewed and unreliable. Sixteen separate health departments were established in each of the ten Bantustans and six universities for African students were also located there but tightly controlled by the central government. The fragmented and weak systems of service delivery inherited from the former Bantustans and the legacy of apartheid in general is felt by many rural people. Before the Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana were given „independence", their direct health care funding consisted of expenditure on clinics, while all other health services in the Bantustans were funded and administered by the South African (formerly the Native and then Bantu) Development Trust, a central government body. Under apartheid, the main grant for child and family care was the state-maintenance grant (a combination of a parent allowance and a child allowance) which was awarded on a means-tested basis to particular categories of women and children. This state-maintenance grant was awarded on a racially differentiated basis with whites receiving the highest amount followed by Indian and Coloured people at the same level, then African people at the lowest end. The grant was unevenly administered under the racial and Bantustan-segregated welfare delivery system because some administrations did not award the grant at all whilst others awarded the child allowance component, without the parental allowance. Although African families constituted the majority of poor households, most African families did not benefit from the grant. They were mainly excluded through administrative measures, for instance, the self-governing Bantustans and the four „independent" states (Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda) did not administer the grant, thus leaving vast swathes of the African population without access to social welfare.

The establishment of the Bantustans was also, officially, designed to lead to the decentralisation of industry. The State"s industrial decentralisation policy was introduced in 1960, (the year of Sharpeville and Langa massacres), as an attempt to develop centres near the „reserves" and enforce racial separation on a regional basis. In 1970 the Prime Minister"s economic adviser, Dr Piet Riekert, explained that the „ultimate target" of the decentralization programme was to stem the flow of Africans from the „homelands" to the cities; and 24% of industrial investment would have to be channelled to the border areas and „homelands"(compared with 10% in 1968). In the early 1980s, the apartheid state offered absurdly generous incentives for labour-intensive industries to locate in industrial

decentralisation points in or adjacent to the former Bantustans. The incentives were easily abused and some of the decentralisation areas were patently incapable of surviving without subsidies. Consequently, wages were extremely low and Bantustan authorities frequently sought to ban union activity. However, the misadventures of the colonial and apartheid states which relied heavily on patronage proved to by dysfunctional and costly in the end.

Apartheid social engineering was an example of the flagrant abuse of power by the state (Held, 1989:236). Collusion between the interests of capital and state policies legitimised racial segregation which denied blacks their basic civil liberties. The poverty created by minority rule in South Africa partly destroyed traditional African norms and values (through the migrant labour system, legal insecurity, and economic dependency) and naturally affected the country‟s social fabric (Adam, 1990:117). However, there is much that is political mythology in South Africa‟s history, for instance, the "Verwoerdian vision of discrete racial and cultural groups with separate destinies" (Sharp, 1988a:9). This vision led to the "disaggregation of the African population" which was "functionally necessary to the policy of apartheid because it provided a rationale for allocating people to their respective homelands" (Sharp, 1988a:8) through laws such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949), the Population Registration Act (1950), the Group Areas Act (1950) and the 1955 Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas/Tomlinson Commission which defended apartheid segregation. The Bantustan system was designed to encourage ethnic or cultural revivalism and separatism by forcibly and rigidly categorising blacks according to ethnic identity to undermine the black population‟s resolve against apartheid injustice (containing widespread insurgency) (Kaarsholm, 1995:35; Ratcliffe, 1994:13).

The politics of exclusion and patronage was used by the white minority regime to indirectly control the numerically superior African population. The success of this co-optive tactic relied on the manipulation of ethnic identity (community/belonging, culture, language, and tradition/custom); which are real only in relation to particular world views. Bantustans were used to forcibly displace thousands of people and dump them in „Bantustans‟ which were modelled under a spurious notion of ethnic nation-states and their supposed desire for self-determination, regardless of ideological attachments. African leaders (Tribal Authorities, Development Corporations and Bantustan leaders) were made to actively participate in their own domination with the effect that black anger, resentment, opposition and discontent

against the prevailing political conditions in South Africa, particularly during the mid-1980s, was deflected from the white minority government onto its black „clients‟ working in Bantustan political structures (Omer-Cooper 1987:213 cited in Phatlane, 2002:416; Adam, 1990:116, 131, 135). The Bantustan system created a counterproductive „us and them‟ mentality which often made it imperative for people to demonstrate loyalty or patriotism to a given ethnic heritage.

Divide and rule tactics were also employed to fragment the liberation movement into sectarian partisanship which was marked by numerous pitched battles between the UDF/ANC, Inkatha, AZAPO/Black Consciousness and the PAC (Adam, 1990:132-133). The state‟s manipulation of ethnic differentiation to diffuse political opposition led to heightened ethnic awareness, rivalries among, as well as internecine violence within different ethnic groups. South Africa‟s apartheid regime openly venerated and incorporated ethnicity into its power plays such that, for example, the Zulu Inkatha movement and Inkatha Freedom Party played right into its hands and was mobilised to generate nationalism and conservatism alongside the Conservative Party and other Afrikaner right wing elements in opposition to what was seen as the ANC‟s centralised, hegemonic and unifying nationalism. Inkatha worked to counteract support for the universalism of the ANC by urging people to organise along ethnic lines and was deliberately provoking confrontations between Zulus and Xhosas. Inkatha managed to divide the ethnically segregated hostels on the Rand and large parts of Natal with the backing of the South African Defence Force and the South African Police (Kaarsholm, 1995:36). The ANC and other liberation movements could not afford to ignore the ethnic challenge represented by organisations like Inkatha. According to Kaarsholm, Inkatha‟s “monopolisation of traditional and ethnic articulations and potentials” (1995:39) compelled the ANC to form tactical alliances with some Bantustan governments, including that of KaNgwane led by Enos Mabuza, to counter the hardening and ethnic chauvinism (Maré and Hamilton (1987). In the eyes of the South African government and Swaziland‟s King Sobhuza, the success of the Swazi land deal hinged on an appeal to the KaNgwane people‟s loyalty to families, lineages, tribal communities, chiefs and the Swazi king. This appeal to their Swazi identity was regarded as fool-proof because individuals generally owe certain duties in return for security and a sense of belonging to a group; more so since the South African authorities had made it abundantly clear through the policy of apartheid that blacks did not belong and were not welcome in South Africa.

3.4 Persistent Divisions during the Negotiations and Transition

The notion of political/ideological or institutional continuity and change is given a twist in Mamdani‟s (1996) thesis that colonial rule in Africa generated a distinctive form of „bifurcated‟ state. Bifurcation follows the institutional contours of indirect rule, and reproduces and reinforces the division of town and countryside. This system also created the „native question‟ which refers to means of controlling subject populations. The town is the space of citizenship and civil society (racialised during colonialism and deracialised with independence), while the countryside is ruled through a „decentralized despotism‟ based in ethnicity. Rural people are thus constituted as subjects of customary or tribal law and authority, including „communal‟ land tenure. The latter, together with the labour and money tributes exacted by „traditional leaders‟, and/or their state cadre successors to local despotism, inhibits the deeper development of agrarian commodity production whilst simultaneously impeding the exercise of political rights (Mamdani, 1996).

When the political negotiations began in earnest in 1990, de Klerk‟s strategy was to aim for a „power-sharing‟ arrangement in which his party and his race would keep the upper hand. He set about building an anti-ANC alliance from among the black groups and Bantustans, the most prominent of these being Buthelezi‟s Inkatha movement in Zulu-land. These manoeuvres are exemplified by the gate-crashing of the negotiating venue at the World Trade Centre in Johannesburg by a few thousand enraged Afrikaner right-wingers and the near-civil war which was provoked by Buthelezi and his Bantustan allies in Ciskei and Bophuthatswana with the aided of the Afrikaner die-hard fringe. Mabuza was not a conservative force like the other homeland leaders who tried hard to thwart hope for the achievement self-determination in South Africa and bolstered Zulu and other „Bantustan‟ sub-nationalisms. However, the pejorative labels are applied equally to all former Bantustan leaders.

The formation of CONTRALESA was an attempt to reform the negative features of tribal authority which had been hijacked, used or abused in the past through the use of language and the force of custom and tradition whilst also exacerbating ethnic division. Native Authorities were responsible for managing local-state apparatus and were installed by the colonising power, sanctioned by it and presented as the traditional tribal authority. CONTRALESA was thus formed as an attempt to rehabilitate the chieftaincy as an institution but not to detribalise or create one uniform ethnicity. The ANC was unable to democratise Native Authorities as institutions of indirect rule and instead embraced the individuals in

those institutions who were willing to join the ANC in an electoral alliance. It was a compromise arrangement in which the ANC initiated intertribal alliance from above with the promise of a federated civic power. Unwittingly, however, this maintained unreformed customary power in the reserves and this became a new phase of qualified collaboration (some might say capitulation) to ameliorate the erstwhile system of representation without participation which had taken root in the reserves. The political choices appear contradictory and the alliances or compromises seemed like a big risk but the imperatives for participation, representation, autonomy and alliance carried a lot of sway (Mamdani, 1996:293, 194, Bank and Southall, 1996). However, the problems of trying to democratise customary rule in the reserves (rural) and hostels (urban) became quite apparent. The possibility for inter-tribal alliance or conflict is always there but the majority of chiefs in CONTRALESA stopped being hostile to the ANC even though the Zulus/the IFP remained aloof because they did not want their customary rule tainted by democracy. Rather, they wanted to retain and maintain their customary power and autonomy and to influence the political and other allegiances of Zulus in both the rural and urban (Mamdani, 1996:293). For these groups, straddling both spheres led to an almost inevitable inter-tribal collision and internecine violence of the early 1990s as customary rule proved to be potentially toxic for democracy.

When all the former administrations, including the apartheid Bantustans, were combined in 1994, they brought together administrations with diverse culture, skills levels, work ethics, as well as rigid human resource policies and practices. The dismantling of the Bantustans in particular led to the collapse of the systems for the issuing and registration of permission to occupy (PTO) certificates and a vacuum in state-supported land rights administration which led to growing (rather than reduced) uncertainty and insecurity for holders of communal land and other resource rights. Consequently, land reform in these areas has become a priority for South Africa‟s democratic government.

3.5 The Fate of Traditional Authorities in a Democratic South Africa

The controversial role, authority, powers, legitimacy, privileges and clientalism that South African traditional authorities (chiefs and headmen) have been associated with from colonial times to apartheid as well as their relevance or implications under the democratic dispensation (local government and CONTRALESA) have been discussed widely (Ray, Van Rouveroy van Niewaal and Adriaan, 1996:25; Switzer, 1993:3; Spierenburg, 2002:2-4,

Holden and Mathabatha, 2007; Callinicos, 1992). The Interim Constitution (1993) and the Final Constitution (1996) both outline what these new roles and powers should be. The Council of Traditional Leaders Act No. 10 of 1997 was amended through the Council of Traditional Leaders Amendment Act No. 85 of 1998 and the National House off Traditional Leaders Amendment Act No. 20 of 2000 to show just how contested the status of traditional leaders was and continues to be in South Africa today because of the particular history of chieftaincy. The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act No.41 of 2003 (TLGFA) contained transitional arrangements which deems existing tribal authorities (created by the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951) to be traditional councils.

It was argued, for example, that allowing traditional leaders to actively participate in politics would encourage political parties to fight over traditional leaders and create unnecessary confusion, sectarian consciousness, populism and factions along ethnic lines[23]. In the Eastern Cape, unresolved tensions between the ANC and traditional authorities led to the defection of several Transkei chiefs from the ANC. KwaZulu chiefs boycotted the CODESA negotiations of the early 1990s and Eastern Cape chiefs did not participate in the 1 November 1995 Local Government elections (Mashele, 2004:352-353; Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 1999:118-119; Skweyiya, 1993). Similar debates about the legacies of colonialism[24] and the accommodations that have been made since regarding traditional authorities have part of the politics of countries like Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Uganda, Namibia, Ghana and Botswana which have what can be described as a mixed polity.

South Africa‟s political map changed with the unbanning of political parties in February 1990 and individuals and parties alike took positions to play the last part of the political chess game (Mamdani, 1996:255). The force of transition took on board every group and tendency; if only to take stock of it, testing claims and discarding those groups found wanting. This was still a context of racial, ethnic and class antagonism, replete with interest-bearing agents making rational choices that would benefit them or their constituencies the most.

Mamdani‟s (1996) notion of bifurcated states along the rural-urban, traditional-modern axis is a reality that South Africans cannot escape as many in the poor rural areas can still be regarded as subjects and not citizens. In such a setting, chiefs still control access to resources in a patron-client relationship and also have moral authority (advisers) which is linked to

[23] Holomisa, Buthelezi, Gwadiso and others took advantage of the on-going confusion to engage in political brinkmanship.
[24] Appropriated, subordinated, redefined or repackaged by colonial indirect rule.

people‟s sense of belonging and identity and this gives them the legitimacy to act as the crucial link between the people‟s day to day lives, needs and concerns and the state‟s goals regarding reconstruction, development and service delivery. During the political transition in the early 1990s, traditional leaders, as *ex officio* holders of their positions, had genuine fears of being side-lined or over-shadowed in all the changes that were taking place (Holomisa, 1991:1-7).

The roles, functions and powers of traditional leaders, and by extension, Bantustan authorities were/are questioned in terms of "authority", "legitimacy" and "power" (Bellamy, 1995:477; Downie, 1995:69; Miliband; Weber, 1978:212). For authority to be effective, the person in authority has to be seen as legitimate and theories of legitimation establish why a given state or person deserves the allegiance of those that he exercises authority over.

The South African Office of the Presidency commissioned a review of traditional leadership to assess if the institution has been successfully integrated and aligned into the democratic system of governance in compliance with the Constitution. Section 211 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) provides for the recognition of the status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law and section 212 (2) outlines the role of traditional leaders as dealing with "matters relating to traditional leadership, the role of traditional leadership, the role of traditional leaders, customary law and the customs of communities observing a system of customary law". The focus of no-going debate is the association of democracy with traditional leadership or the perceived incompatibility of the two systems which are forced to tolerate or accommodate each other in what has been referred to as „democratic pragmatism‟ (Sithole and Mbele, 2008:4-10; Oomen, 2005; Ntsebeza, 2006). Traditional leadership is generally regarded as being antithetical to an orientation of human rights. This argument is understood in terms of Mamdani‟s (1996) thesis that rural citizens are not true citizens under traditional authorities because they are subjects of paternalistic and undemocratic authority (inherited, not elected and the primogeniture, patriarchy and chauvinism practiced in succession) which does not have systems of accountability to the people and does not promote equality and gender parity (Sithole and Mbele, 2008:5-6, 22).

Cousin (cited in Sithole and Mbele, 2008:27) suggests that history should inform our understanding of pre-colonial and colonial traditional leadership, its artificial legitimacy, hierarchies and roles and the current changes or attempts to transform its accountability. In

South Africa, this is also understood in terms of the historical reality that traditional leadership is closely associated with apartheid‟s manipulative and abusive measures which sought to legitimise separate development (Sithole and Mbele, 2008:5, 11). Holomisa (1991:1-7), on behalf of the ANC and as President of CONTRALESA, acknowledges the historical or traditional role and function of hereditary traditional leaders in African and South African societies, especially in the rural areas where they have the responsibility to adjudicate minor civil and criminal cases. He also notes how traditional leaders were stripped of their sovereignty by colonial and apartheid governments in South Africa and that traditional leadership, as an institution, has to be transformed in a democratic dispensation to diffuse tribal suspicion and arrogance.

According to Sithole and Mbele, (2008:7) political trade-offs have been made between government and traditional leadership for purposes of national and local elections; thereby allowing traditional leaders the space to strategically influence policy and legislative processes for their benefit. The result is that several pieces of legislation[25] specify the status, powers and responsibilities of traditional leaders (*amakhosi*) and appear to mark the resurgence of traditional authority (and customary law) or their reinsertion into political governance. Further, the government has established Houses of Traditional Leaders in all six provinces that have Traditional Authorities and the National Council of Traditional Leaders as part of the consolidation of the position of traditional authorities but a lot of ambiguity remains and not all stakeholders accept the government‟s accommodation of traditional leaders (Sithole and Mbele, 2008:7, 22). Consequently, the debate over the role and status of traditional leaders in the democratic dispensation continues to involve stakeholders including the South African government, policy-makers, academics and traditional leaders themselves (Sithole and Mbele, 2008; Oomen, 2005; Ntsebeza, 2006) and they remain divided on how to approach the thorny issue of integrating traditional leadership post 1994.

The National House of Traditional Leaders was established in 1997 to perform an advisory role and shortly thereafter, six[26] of the nine provinces established their own houses for

[25] National House of Traditional Leaders Act No. 10 of 1997, the Municipal Structures Act of 1998, the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act No. 32 of 2000 which gives traditional leaders *ex officio* representation in local government, the Communal Land Rights Act of 2005, the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Amendment Act of 2003 and the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims (Nhlapho Commission) which was set up in terms of section 25 of the Traditional Leadership Framework Act to address the sensitive matter of possible past illegitimate appointments to traditional leadership and colonially engineered succession disputes.

[26] KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, North West Province, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and Free State.

traditional leaders. The Preamble of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Amendment Act (2003 - TLGF) states that the institution of traditional leadership must be transformed to be in harmony with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The debates which eventually gave birth to the TLGF Act were intense and highlighted the contested nature of the apartheid past and historical accuracy. Contrary to claims that they were decentralised despots, traditional leaders argued that they were "liberators and protected rural populations from the National Party"s most pernicious policies, rather than puppets of the apartheid system" (Williams, 2009a:195). Traditional leaders lobbied the government through CONTRALESA and the Coalition of Traditional Leaders (CTL) which was formed in 2000 and includes the provincial and national houses of traditional leaders, the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa and the Royal Bafokeng nation. The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003 was designed to „transform" chieftaincy so that it became consistent with newly established democratic values and institutions.

Approximately 2 400 traditional leaders claim to rule over 14 million South African citizens, mostly in the rural areas, including the former Bantustans. Traditional leaders are public office bearers under the current dispensation but they are forbidden from active participation in party politics. They have a role to play in issues of local governance, judicial responsibilities regarding customary law and dispute resolution, agriculture and land affairs or the administration of communal land, sustainable development, lobbying for and coordinating service delivery and social welfare interventions for communities where local government is overstretched, mobilizing intervention on HIV/AIDS, heritage, custodians of culture, tradition, ritual and custom which restores the moral fibre of their communities and maintains local identities in the rural areas. As much as one will find sympathisers and the sceptics of traditional leaders, traditional leaders" perspective, realistic or not, is that they have been sidelined or alienated because they have been assigned a token consultative or supporting role to municipalities and they only exist subordinated to national, provincial and local government administrations (at the bottom of the food chain) which would much rather have them erased completely. They maintain that existing legislation which affects them was not passed in good faith and has made them vulnerable (Sithole and Mbele, 2008:23, 31, 33). Such arguments regarding contrived reintegration or incorporation are reminiscent of the sentiments of secessionist former Bantustan leaders such as Mangope and Buthelezi in the early 1990s but South Africa is not unique in experiencing this dilemma of having to formalise the role, functions, legitimacy and powers of traditional leaders that where

undermined and manipulated by colonial administrations. Ethnically defined Native Authorities which constituted a critical part of imperial domination and hegemony in the rural areas through the system of unelected chieftainships was largely left intact in most countries such as Botswana, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Namibia and Uganda which have also had to rationalise the role of traditional leaders after liberation from colonialism. The TLGF Act is a direct attempt by the government to reconfigure political space and it was met with scepticism and hostility in some cases by traditional leaders such as the IFP‟s Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, IFP MP Hlengwa, Chief Mzimela and the ANC‟s own Chief Mwelo Nonkonyana (Williams, 2009a:192).

3.6 Conclusion

As a conceptual framework, this chapter demonstrates how the past weaves itself into the present and the future by showing how political arrangements (power, roles, and influence) are negotiated, reconfigured or redefined over time through manipulation, strategy, power and political trade-offs. It also shows how seemingly archaic institutions such as traditional leaders in South Africa got a new lease on life in the new democratic dispensation despite the unravelling of their relationship with their subjects and liberation movements. Although their role under colonial rule and apartheid left many embittered, they were able to reinvent or recast themselves in a new political game with new rules. Politicians, good or bad, are adept at grafting themselves onto whatever is *de rigour* at any given time and Enos Mabuza, the subject of this thesis, was no different. Despite being a former disdained Bantustan leader, he was able to craft his resurgence from Bantustan politics and reincarnate in the fields of business and conservation. He managed to insert himself of the business world because he did not conduct himself in a perfunctory manner. Rather, he demonstrated tenacity, commitment and conviction of purpose and was also able to enrich himself in the process.

Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework for Analysis

4.1 Introduction

There is a necessary interdependence between and among individuals in the matrix of social relations in which individual lives and identities are formed. Elias (1991:60) notes that identity is formed through "the specific activity of the individual in relation to his fellows, and for his capacity to be influenced and shaped by their activity." This observation supports Hegel‟s (1979) view that „human subjectivities are interdependent and inter-subjective‟ and depend on each other for confirmation or recognition. The individual functions in a systematic way within the context of human behaviour (body-environment) and behaviour, therefore, cannot be explained by reference to isolated or atomised individuals (Crossley, 2005; 2001; Eakin, 1999:43; Merleau-Ponty, 1965). Merleau-Ponty (1965) argues that there is purposiveness to human behaviour. We are reflective and behave strategically and innovatively, thus implying a degree of goal orientation in our actions. Although humans are not mere products of circumstance, they are rooted in society or social groups that constitute the context of their behaviour, for instance, agent A‟s actions are a response to agent B‟s actions and vice versa. Crossley (2005; 2001) and Merleau-Ponty (1965) also note that the interaction between individuals and the environment is mediated by meaning and that the same stimuli can elicit different responses (and meanings) in different contexts. Social agents have to learn the rules that govern „social games‟, which exist by virtue of the activities of those that play them (Crossley, 2005:21).

Our identities are relational or interpersonal and develop in collaboration with others. Eakin (1999) maintains that we are social beings and our identity is experiential. He regards individuals as "situated selves and products of a particular place and time" (Eakin, 1999:85). For him, "the self is defined by, and lives in terms of its relations with others" (Eakin, 1999:43). Bourdieu (1991) refers to „relationalism‟ as the analysis or study of social relationships because individuals are located within social spaces or *fields* and often find themselves at the intersection of several such fields. Consequently, there are many stories that can be told about individuals because they are "dynamic", "changing" or "plural" (Eakin, 1999:70), for example, a woman can be a mother, daughter, sister or wife (different roles with different responsibilities).

This study investigates how an individual is situated in a particular context and how that context moulds him or her. Latour (1999; 1987) and Benton (2005:206-226) object to the myth that people who become distinguished possess exceptional creativity or talent and suggest that we should analyse real people and real life experiences in a more holistic and encompassing way. This chapter discusses Bourdieu‟s *habitus-field* analysis (1992; 1998; Swartz, 2003: 791-823; Hage, 1994) together with Latour‟s (1999; 1987) actor-network analysis with emphasis on Bourdieu‟s conceptualisation. Bourdieu and Latour‟s analyses offer an alternative way of reading biographies and portraying their subjects as normal people. Such an analysis examines the role of individual choice in relation to others (circumscribed) and focuses on how one adapts to changing conditions. The two theories are used to critically analyse and explain the particular course that Enos Mabuza‟s career took at a time of rapid, profound and violent socio-political change (Gish, 2004).

The realisation that conflict is inherent to social existence because of competing interests has given birth to numerous theories regarding how the state operates or ought to operate in relation to its subjects or citizens. One extreme is the Machiavellian argument that dominance is more important than the methods used to obtain power (Hoffman, 1995:46-51) and that morality, good faith, compromise, responsibility, obligation and accountability have very little import (Held, 1989:158-175). Similarly, Weberian state theory argues that the state can have the prerogative or autonomy to impose policy on any facet of human existence. In practice, Weber‟s elitist state can discriminate against the poor and other minorities; resulting in instability because the state is neither inclusive nor flexible and citizen participation and expression is not encouraged (Hoffman, 1995:46-51; Held, 1989:39-41). However, other theories recognise that political legitimation (concentration and organisation of power) is not absolute or immutable (Beetham, 1991:117-119). Hobbes‟ normative authority theory states that in order for subjects to submit to political authority, such political subjection and obligation is incurred by consent and must be fair. The state is given a mandate to act rationally in the public interest. State policies must be genuine and yield what is desirable, including law, order and prosperity (Held, 1991:32, 41). Rousseau‟s theory of a social contract posits that citizens obey the state if it represents their collective aspirations (Beetham, 1991:246; Held, 1989:29). It is assumed that the state responds to those aspirations and needs and does not act unilaterally. The state is an administrative body which performs the function of redistribution and regulation of collective social, economic and political life and to make provision for public goods or services. State policy should, therefore, be a united

projection of the general will of the people (Hoffman, 1995:105-108) and the electorate should be entitled to question the state or government‟s capacity to rule impartially and effectively. Given the various positions of authority held by Enos Mabuza at different stages in his life, analysis will necessarily include some discussion on theories of authority and legitimacy (Bellamy, 1995:477; Downie, 1995:69; Miliband, 1989; Weber; 1978:212) to explain why or how (mandate) he gained the trust and respect of those that he led.

Various tenets and assumptions of the trust theory (Khodyakov, 2007; Solomon and Flores, 2001; Good, 1988) and social contract theories put forward by Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Rousseau and Rawls (Skyrms, 1996; Binmore, 1994) are also discussed in so far as they help to explain how Enos Mabuza became a Bantustan leader; even though he was not eligible for the post according to the usual criteria.

4.2 Pierre Bourdieu's *Habitus-Field* Analysis

Bourdieu‟s *habitus-field* analysis was adopted for this investigation based on his argument that to conceive of action as being determined by the conscious aims of actors is "a well-founded illusion" that comes from the anticipated adjustment of their *habitus* to probabilities (prediction) within the *field* (cited in Hage, 1994:429). In this sense, behaviour may be understood as the pursuit of known goals or objectives. Bourdieu (1998:138) comments that people/researchers tend to simplify things by assuming that actors/agents always consciously plan the things that they eventually achieve and that the end point (result of their actions) can be projected backwards to explain the individual‟s life or career. Bourdieu (1998:138) suggests that, in reality, people adapt to the conditions around them (and distinguish themselves) without consciously setting that outcome or goal. In Bourdieu‟s own words (cited in Hage, 1994:436), "…we cannot capture the deepest logic of the social world unless we immerse ourselves in the particularity of a historically situated and dated empirical reality…" It is unlikely that people have clearly defined goals at the time when they make certain decisions which turn out to be significant (almost by accident) in their individual lives or to society in general. This realisation begs us to situate „great" personalities in context in order to explain their behaviour in relation to the social pressures that affected them, as well as the inter-dependences that existed with other social actors (Eakin, 1999; Bohler and Hildenbrand, 1995:331-340).

Bourdieu uses knowledge of social processes to theorise about „determinants of practices", that is, the social conditions which influence our functioning personas (cited in Hage, 1994:429). His theory brings up questions about determinism and voluntarism and in that sense resembles structural functionalism (Parsons and others).

Bourdieu"s *Habitus-field* analysis conceptualises networks as a resource for the enterprising individual (to take advantage of). Networks are comprised of connections or privilege from Bourdieu"s (1998; 1992) notion of „friends in high places" or „old boys" networks which people use in order to get ahead professionally. The theory suggests that sometimes it is not what you know that matters ultimately, but who you know (Bourdieu, 1998; 1992). The *habitus-field* analysis can help us to uncover reasons or explanations to account for people"s choices, behaviours and decisions, thus deepening our understanding of them. The key concepts in this theory are *habitus*, *field* and *capital*, which are outlined below. Bourdieu"s (1998; 1992) argument is that the aggregate of different combinations of these concepts conditions or influences human behaviour.

Bourdieu states that agents do not merely bear with the social structures in which they are positioned but add their own imprint to them (cited in Hage, 1994:419-440). The *habitus* creates structure and meaning to our lives by devising appropriate strategies and practices based on internalised schemas (Bourdieu, 1990 cited in Humphrey, Miller and Zdravomyslova, 2003:5-9). According to Hage (1994:429), „calculative rationality" is the product of the way our disposition to act is activated in specific social conditions (Hage, 1994:429). The theory presupposes that certain conditions should prevail in order for agents to engage in calculative rationality. *Habitus* is initially acquired through primary socialisation within the family and affiliation to other social groups that we are born into. A person"s perception of the general social environment of their upbringing (race, ethnic group, class, gender) shapes their identity and determines how influential the *habitus* will be in determining their choices, practices, thinking or lifestyle. *Habitus* is a system of durable and transposable dispositions, orientations or behaviours that generate meaningful practices and meaning-giving perceptions, thus giving the individual a sense of their position relative to others. The unique dispositions of a social class or group (due to their common codes of conduct and similar upbringing) are known as *social habitus* (Bourdieu cited in Eakin, 1999:65). According to Eakin (1999:65), the idea of the *habitus* is a "potentially deterministic vision of the individual"s social construction." Eakin (1999) criticises the notion of a *social*

habitus because it brings into question issues regarding individual power, agency and accountability.

Although, *habitus* is generally resistant to change, it can be adapted or altered in harmful or helpful ways in changed circumstances, for example, when the individual‟s society undergoes sudden or radical transformation which affects most aspects of life (Bourdieu, 1990). Subsequent to initial socialisation, the *habitus* is modified by other skills that we acquire later in life. *Habitus* can also be described as a socially constituted system of cognitive and motivating structures that transmit a person‟s history (experiences) within several underlying structures (Bourdieu, 1998: 15 & 18). It is important to note, however, that the *habitus* is not uniform. Some people‟s *habitus* is more extensive and adaptable in different *fields* (contexts) than others because different conditions produce a distinct type of *habitus*.

Bourdieu‟s *fields* in the *habitus-field* analysis are fluid and dynamic. A *field* is made up of relatively autonomous social worlds (disciplines and institutions) which include the family, church/religion, schools/education and the local community. According to Hage (1994:419-440), these arenas or contexts are social spaces in which the *field"s* effect is experienced and what happens to an object that traverses this space cannot be explained solely in terms of the object‟s attributes but also through its interaction with the *field*. The *field* structures or influences the *habitus*, which in turn also plays a role in constituting the *field* (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:127). The *field* and *habitus* determine which practices are appropriate and meaningful in given contexts. One can think of this in terms of acts and their consequences because the rules that apply in any particular *field* are constantly changing. In this way, the *field* and *habitus* also define the limits of our action in a similar way to Latour‟s (1999:182) argument below. The individual or actor requires tacit knowledge, as well as a good command of the unwritten rules that determine conduct and success in a particular *field* in order to participate in that *field* (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:94-104).

In the same way that Latour uses the actor-network analysis to make sense of what makes great scientists (discussed below), Bourdieu (1984:63-96, 101-113, 208-236, 319-330) tries to demystify the world of art and artists when he writes about artists such as Mozart, Beethoven, Da Vinci, Picasso, Coleridge, Byron and Shakespeare as creative agents and also as products of certain contexts. Bourdieu‟s claim is that such individuals negotiate the spaces that they come to occupy by strategising to maximise economic, symbolic, professional or social gains in the form of power or other forms of capital. Bourdieu‟s analysis considers how notions of

habitus, capital and social class can help us to make sense of artistic practice – what defines an artist or art at different periods in history, why and how artists enter specific artistic fields or disciplines (1984:63-96, 101-113, 208-236, 319-330). Bourdieu argues that the effects of social and political structures on aesthetic taste cannot be ignored, especially since artists depend on patronage (grants/funding), favourable reviews from recognised art critics and those that censor content intended for public consumption. Clear causal and relational links can be traced within different fields (institutions, discourses, traditions, values, practices) between artists and their audiences (who, what, when, where). Bourdieu maintains that creative production does not happen in a vacuum but that certain associations or conditions (contexts) help artists to sustain certain positions and possibilities in the fields in which they operate (1984:63-96, 101-113, 208-236, 319-330). In order for an individual to be regarded as being „gifted" or considered an „artistic genius", their talents have to be approved through various processes of legitimation. More often than not, the same talents that distinguish „gifted" individuals are open to interpretation and the individual can just as easily be labelled mad or eccentric. The individual"s background (class origins, family background, and educational opportunities) plays a part in their acceptance, success or failure. This study is an analysis of how Enos Mabuza used different forms of capital and his *habitus* to move from one *field* to the next (politics, education, and conservation) as well as his contributions to each *field*.

Different forms of *capital* (cultural, economic and political among others) are referred to in Bourdieu"s analysis (1983: 241-258) but their value (direct or indirect) is not necessarily reducible to money. Individuals accumulate *capital* from different *fields* whilst forming their *habitus*. C*apital* is not randomly distributed within populations and different forms of *capital* afford individuals some advantages relative to other players in the same *field/s*. The different resources or forms of *capital* that are available to social agents act as a form of personal power (as a means to an end) in the pursuit of different objectives and are transformed through strategic investments and conversions that allow the individual to move from one *field* to another.

Social capital is not just associated with progressive French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu but also with the work of James Coleman, Gary Becker and Robert Putnam. Social capital has a wide scope of application (as an analytical, empirical and policy panacea) in social exchange theory because it acts as a glue that holds society or people together in a reciprocal or

dependent way. Social capital refers to the resources that people get through their personal or exchange (inter-dependence) networks, for instance, access to valuable resources, social support or financial assistance (Cook, 2005:4-14; Putnam, 2000; Portes, 1998:1–24; Coleman, 1988: S95–S120; Bourdieu, 1986:241–258). The meaning of social capital (customs, institutions, norms, rules, networks and associations) and how it relates to specific practices is socially constructed and thus differs from society to society and era to era. In this way, social networks (friendship, civic, family, work colleagues/associates) can be understood in a structural or functional sense (Crossley, 2005:32). Actors or social agents can be placed within a particular context according to how much capital they have, as well as its specific composition (status or value) relative to the different forms of capital that are available (Crossley, 2005:33).

Cultural capital can overlap with the *habitus* described above. Cultural capital comes in an objectified form (books, art), in an embodied form (long lasting dispositions or culturally valued competences) or in an institutionalised (educational qualifications, merits and abilities). The latter gives individuals access to certain privileges such as good jobs, money and status in a similar way to Marx‟s use and exchange value (Crossley, 2005:28-29). Embodied competence and educational qualifications, generally, do not lose their value over time and are a good investment to equip oneself with for future endeavours.

Economic capital or wealth is readily quantifiable in the form of property (land, real estate) or money and it is related to other forms of capital, for instance, symbolic capital, depending on the individual‟s ability to use its power to their advantage (Crossley, 2005).

Symbolic capital refers to the status, prestige, respect or recognition that individuals get from their peers, or the general public in the case of celebrities (Hollywood). Symbolic capital gives individuals certain advantages, for example, access to exclusive clubs. This form of capital is sometimes localised within specific domains or areas of specialisation, for instance, neuro-surgeons (Crossley, 2005:31; Bourdieu, 1998).

For Bourdieu, social conditions „activate“ in agents certain acquired qualities and capacities of the body and mind. This way, agency is seen as a socially and historically constructed structure or mechanism (theoretical, real and causal) so that, when confronted with specific situations, it generates forms of practices that normally exist in it as tendencies or potential (cited in Hage, 1994:430). Also, according to Bourdieu (cited in Crossley, 2005:49), crises

occur when the expectations of individuals (embodied in their *habitus*) are mis-aligned with the objective realities of social fields (any structured area of social life). Solutions to these crises are possible because the same crises act as a stimulus for innovation and social learning (Habermas cited in Crossley, 2005:43). The intensification of structural difficulties (discrimination and violence, poverty) experienced by the majority of South Africans after the 1976 Soweto student uprisings is a significant period which made it difficult for most people to remain unaffected by the issues around them and compelled them to take action based on the resources (*capital*) that they had at their disposal.

4.3 Bruno Latour's Actor-Network Theory

Latour‟s actor-network theory is used to support Bourdieu‟s habitus-field theory outlined above. Latour (1999:182) defines action as "a property of associated entities" in which an agent is allowed, authorised, enabled or afforded such action by others. Sociologists try to understand the material or structural realities (institutions, relations of production, class relations, power relations, norms), mechanisms, processes and norms that operate in a particular context because they combine to shape the courses of individual lives by preventing or enabling certain actions (Bertaux, 2003:40 & 43). Latour‟s actor-network theory and his commentaries on the production of scientific knowledge can be seen as an illustration of this important point. According to Latour (2005; 1999; 1988; 1987), there are social aspects to scientific or technological discoveries. This observation is extended to an analysis of the scientists themselves, the products of their labour and how these are consumed (application or uses). Latour‟s (1999) main argument in this regard is that scientists that changed the way we understand our world, for example, Albert Einstein, Louis Pasteur, Marie Curie, Thomas Edison, Isaac Newton, Sigmund Freud and Charles Darwin did not necessarily possess special features that distinguished them or made them successful. Latour maintains that the secret to understanding these individuals‟ achievements lies in understanding the principles that determine intellectual networks (collaboration), or any other networks, and using them to offer causal explanations for how ideas come into being and how they evolve over time (Latour, 2005;1999;1988;1987).

In Latour‟s analysis, a network is a mix of aligned (or potentially aligned) interests. Relations within a network can be between things or *actants* (non-human and human) and different actors/*actants* within a given network can have different interests. The *actants* actively try to convince other actors (bargain or negotiate) to align their interests with their own. As can be

expected, networks are not intrinsically coherent and are often conflictual (Latour, 2005; 1999; 1987). The introduction of different a*ctors* or „trials of strength" (moments in which the individual is defined and transformed) into a particular context or arena can lead to a change in individual actors" positions within the network, for example, promotion or demotion (Latour, 1999:179). *Position*, in Latour"s study of prominent scientists, comprises of three different aspects: academic rank, situation in the field and geographical location. The actor-network theory systematically traces the influence or contribution of different actors that are involved in an individual"s career development and emphasises collective action in the realisation of goals and the attainment of revered status, instead of individual merits. However, this seemingly harmonious and interdependent relationship is not immutable and can change through what Latour (2005; 1999; 1988; 1987) refers to as *translation* in the form of displacement, drift, invention, mediation or the creation of a new link or network.

In this investigation, Latour"s actor-network theory is used to determine and analyse the factors that influenced Enos Mabuza"s career in a tense and turbulent socio-political context in which allegiances (socio-political networks) and key actors were constantly changing. Enos Mabuza"s involvement in the despised Bantustan system naturally deflected attention from his contributions to the anti-apartheid struggle. His achievements earned him both the respect, and often the hatred, of those who knew him but he did not act alone or in a vacuum. It can be assumed that, to a considerable degree, he negotiated spaces or his mandate with his contemporaries on either side of the political divide and with his constituency (the KaNgwane people). Paris (2001) discusses issues regarding individual culpability or guilt, collective responsibility (associated guilt) and the complicity of a collective that passively stands by when something bad is being done and does nothing to prevent it. She argues (Paris, 2001:462-463) that witnesses or bystanders incur responsibilities and their position is, therefore, not a value-free (neutral) choice. The moral and political issues regarding Enos Mabuza"s career are tangled and complex but he did not operate with impunity. Whilst Enos Mabuza is accountable for his actions, it would be a falsity to try and assign absolute responsibility on him alone because he was allowed, authorised, enabled or afforded such action by those around him.

Social analysis cannot ignore an individual or society"s desire for growth, self-determination, responsibility, choice and the quest for identity and autonomy, which brings us to the realisation that behind enquiries into human action, agency and social networks lies

traditional theories of human motivation. Such theories argue that as humans satisfy basic physiological or biological needs for safety, belonging and love; they seek to satisfy successively higher order needs such as self-esteem and self-actualisation because the fulfilment of these needs is a means to finding the purpose or meaning of life, which ultimately leads to personal growth, integration and fulfilment (Maslow, 1987; Frankl, 1946). In the same way that Latour studied the lives of distinguished scientists, Maslow used biographical analysis and his „hierarchy of needs" to explain the remarkable lives of Albert Einstein, Eleanor Roosevelt, Abraham Lincoln and Thomas Jefferson and concluded that human motivation manifests itself in relation to a given situation or in relation to other people (Maslow, 1987:10). Maslow (1987) and Frankl (1946) do not think that self-actualisers were perfect because many of those that they studied were flawed or imperfect but transcended the dichotomies that others accept as being undeniable, for example, the differences between the spiritual and the physical or the selfish and the unselfish. They argue that self-actualisers are reality-oriented and treat life"s challenges as problems that require solutions (agency) and that the means used to achieve those ends can be ends in themselves (the journey or process) in terms of their results or consequences. This alludes to the purposefulness or meaningfulness of events and as opposed to accidents or providence (Maslow, 1987). Consequently, motivation theories have been applied in social psychology, education, business/economics, industrial relations, advertising, law, politics, philosophy, theology and sociology in so far as they explore the limits and possibilities for human potential and its implications for interpersonal relations within social institutions and society generally (Cox, 1987).

The African concept or ideology called *Ubuntu* compliments Latour"s theory. The main virtue espoused by this ideology is that the needs of the collective generally come before those of the individual. *Ubuntu* is a humanist ideology which emphasises people"s allegiances and relations with each other because we are social beings and no man can live in complete isolation. This mutual interdependence means that we are who we are because of our relations or interactions with other people and harmony and unity is maintained through sharing/generosity and selflessness. It is by recognising the humanity of others that we become dignified individuals that are worthy of respect (Forster, 2007: 245-289; Ramose, 2003: 230-238). Traditionally, African leaders (kings, chiefs, headmen) owed their positions, status and power to the people that they presided over and were expected to consult extensively with them and not impose their own will on their subjects. Modern democratic

societies today also expect leaders to be open and available to their constituencies so that everyone prospers as a result of their guidance and leadership (Forster, 2007: 245-289; Ramose, 2003: 230-238).

4.4 The Social Contract and Trust Theory as Extensions of Networks

According to traditional social contract theories (Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Rousseau and Rawls), the legitimate power or authority of a „sovereign" (Hobbes, Locke), leader or government must derive from a consensus by the governed (some or most but not necessarily all) regarding the form and content of rules, values, norms and goals. A scarcity or other motivation drives people towards a social contract with the hope or belief that social interaction and cooperation will be beneficial to all. However, there must be no coercion or fraud in the making of the agreement (Skyrms, 1996; Misztal, 1995; Binmore, 1994).

Bellamy (1995:477), Downie (1995:69), Miliband (1989) and Weber (1978:212) note that in order for authority to be effective, the person in authority has to be seen as being legitimate. Contractarianism can lead to the legitimation of totalitarianism because it is based on the assumption that people are motivated primarily by self or sectoral interests (Skyrms, 1996; Misztal, 1995; Binmore, 1994). However, there are elements that justify and explain why the social contract comes into being, for instance, Rousseau and Rawls"s principles of justice. A rational assessment of the best strategy for realising those self-interests might be one that also maximises joint-interest with a collective (Skyrms, 1996; Misztal, 1995; Binmore, 1994). Contractarianism by mutual agreement, therefore, deals with political theories regarding the legitimacy of political authority derived from mutual respect and moral principles that can be justified to each person who is bound by the contract (Khodyakov, 2007; Skyrms, 1996; Misztal, 1995; Binmore, 1994).

The link or intersection between the individual (Bourdieu"s *habitus*) and the *field* (Bourdieu) or network (Latour) is trust, regardless of whether it is explicit or implicit. Dippenaar points out that trust is crucial to any relationship but individual, cultural and institutional trust takes a long time to build and cannot be bought, remains fragile and is easily destroyed (2004:159-161). Honesty and sincerity builds trust, even when the truth is unpleasant to hear. He also points out that people can normally discern the intentions and degree of sincerity behind certain behaviour/actions and words. (Dippenaar, 2004:159-161). Trust is important to social organisation in the family between parents and children or between spouses; at work between

employers and employees and in a wider context between those that govern and their citizens. Gambetta (1988) and Kodyakov"s (2007) definitions of trust have been used to explain this decision or outcome and the focus of the analysis is on the factors that influence the creation, development, and maintenance of trustworthy relationships (trust-building as a relational exchange). Gambetta defines trust as:

> A particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or a group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action and in a context in which it affects his own action (1988: 217).

Alternatively, Khodyakov (2007:126) offers this definition of trust:

> Trust is a process of constant imaginative anticipation of the reliability of the other party"s actions based on (1) the reputation of the partner and the actor, (2) the evaluation of current circumstances of action, (3) assumptions about the partner"s actions, and (4) the belief in the honesty and morality of the other side.

In this way, trust is defined as a dynamic process which is underscored by the idea of temporality and the agency of individuals and institutions (Möllering, 2001:403–420; Nooteboom and Six, 2003; Misztal, 1995). It thus accounts for rational (Gambetta, 1988:213–237; Nooteboom, 2000:44–68), as well as non-calculative or affective dimensions of human behaviour (Jones, 1996:4–25; Lewis and Weigert, 1985:967–985; McAllister, 1995:24–59). Trust is treated as a process (creation, development and maintenance) and not as a variable with different levels of strength, because its composition changes in different contexts (Khodyakov, 2007:214; Nooteboom and Six, 2003). This „temporal-relational context of action" (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998:962–1023) develops under conditions of uncertainty or risk (Cvetkovich and Lofstedt, 1999; Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 1988:94–107) and is, therefore, contingent. Trust depends on the reputation of the potential trustee or another intermediary, for example, a civic organisation or a guarantor, who might be responsible for the successful placement of a candidate or potential trustee (Khodyakov, 2007).

Messick and Kramer (2001:89–119) and Yamagishi (2001:121–148) examine the characteristics of trustees as a criterion for building trust and conceptualise trust as a social practice and process because it involves the responsibility of both parties, commitment to the

relationship, and the possibility of change in whatever form. Jones (1996:4–25) notes that to trust is to anticipate that the other party will pledge some degree of moral competence in the form of loyalty, generosity, and honesty. Khodyakov (2007) argues that the type of social exchange involved in the case of interpersonal trust is „reciprocal and symmetrical." It entails gaining people"s confidence by being reliable, reasonable, fair, honest and having a good track record or reputation (Cook and Cooper, 2003:209–244; Gambetta, 1988:213–237). Zucker (1986:53–111) discusses „characteristic-based" trust which is similar to Uslaner"s (2002) „particularised" trust. Both types of trust are linked to characteristics or similarities like gender or ethnicity which the parties in the relationship might have in common. Trust based on these similarities is believed to be less risky and tends to produce close-knit networks (Bourdieu"s social capital) based on familiarity or a common experience, the dissemination of important and accurate information and mutual problem solving (Cook, 2005:4-14; Putnam, 2000; Portes, 1998:1–24; Misztal, 1995; Coleman, 1988:S95–S120; Bourdieu, 1986:241–258).

Uslaner"s (2002) „generalised trust" refers to a less stable form of interpersonal trust based on collaboration or cooperation (Gambetta, 1988:213–237) towards the realisation of a common goal, although the intentions or motives of the different parties may not be entirely clear. Zucker"s (1986:53–111) „process-based trust" is also characterised by higher levels of vulnerability or dependency on some else"s actions or decisions compared to „characteristic-based" or „particularised" trust. Despite this, however, one notes that this form of transitory trust is becoming second-nature in the global environment which is characterised by fast changes and concomitant risk and uncertainty (Misztal, 1995; Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 1988:94–107).

The term „political trust" is used by political scientists to refer to people"s trust in institutions like the state or government and its agencies (Uslaner, 2002). Sociologists, such as Giddens (1990), use the term „system trust" to refer to this abstract form of trust. According to Giddens (1990:83), trust in institutions is different from trust in individuals (and more problematic) because institutions do not necessarily know or deal with individuals or groups in an intimate way. Khodyakov (2007) shares the view that the impersonal nature of institutions makes the creation of institutional trust more difficult because people are asked to put their faith in „anonymous others." Khodyakov (2007:123) further notes that trust in

institutions depends on their "perceived legitimacy, technical competence, and ability to perform assigned duties efficiently."

It is argued (Khodyakov, 2007; Möllering, 2001: 412; Ensminger, 2001:185–202; Misztal, 1995; Coleman, 1990; Gambetta, 1988:213–237; Good, 1988) that the decision to trust depends significantly on the previous experiences and reputation of all parties in the relationship, thereby giving the relationship grounding in certain aspects of the past, the present and the future. Solomon and Flores (2001:15) put the point as follows: "Trust is historical, but it is not so much tied to the past as it is pregnant with the future." Anticipating the formation of a trusting relationship is a reflexive process which entails a cost-benefit analysis or calculation of future possibilities, options and risks (Cook and Cooper, 2003:209–244; Solomon and Flores, 2001; Cvetkovich and Lofstedt, 1999; Gambetta, 1988:213–237; Luhmann, 1988:94–107) without absolute knowledge or information about what is, or will, motivate other stakeholders in the relationship. Multi-level games theory is used in politics to define power relations based on a consideration of the information and skills/competencies that groups or individuals have and how they can use them to the best advantage for themselves, or to further sectional (class, race, gender) interests.

We can try and predict what will happen in the future but such predictions are limited by the information that we have in the present. Trust as a process of an „imaginative anticipation" goes beyond the rational choice perspective (the assumption that people are Driven by the desire to maximize their own profits) by implying that people cannot accurately predict the future (long-term), but can hypothesise about it, thus giving themselves (at least) a sense of readiness for action (Khodyakov, 2007:126-127). In reality, people are compelled to rely on the honesty and morality of others than on their ability to act rationally or make the best decisions in isolation (Messick and Kramer, 2001:89–119; Uslaner, 2002).

Dant (2003:132) discusses the link between knowledge and action based on the recognition of mutual socio-political needs and collaboration with others to realise them. Dant (2003:149 & 152) examines Gorz (1989) and Touraine"s (1995) theories about how individuals can evaluate their situation and "act in strategic and collaborative ways to claim their freedom", thereby giving their action a political effect or meaning. Touraine (1998) uses humanistic arguments (self-reflection and action mediated by social factors) to explain events in Eastern Europe and the relationship between actors/individuals and social action and movements in the 1990s. Touraine (1995:212) discusses how the individual or „subject" engages in struggle

against the established order or life determined by institutions (in this case an oppressive state). Touraine (1995:212) maintains that it is the character of individuals who are willing to "sacrifice their social success or intellectual prowess" for their own benefit and for others that Drives political action. However, Dant (2003:152) notes that such action can serve many (good and bad) purposes depending on the context and how they are interpreted, for instance, terrorism.

4.5 Conclusion

The above discussion does not mean however, that social contract, trust or networks theories are perfect. Beck (1992), for example argues that social contracts mean that decisions are made by a few elected representatives and that the rest of the citizens surrender their social, civil and constitutional rights and become invisible or silent subjects. This notwithstanding, Mabuza was born and raised in the Swazi community or constituency which made up the KaNgwane Bantustan and key elements of the trust theory are used to explain how and why he was nominated or elected to head the KaNgwane Bantustan (and accepted) even though he did not belong to a ruling house or chieftaincy. The context of events is important to sociological analysis because it enables us to understand and give meaning to such events by anchoring them in lived social-historical realities (Bertaux, 2003:39; Roos, 2003:32-33). Constraints (dynamics, power and conflicts) are not absolute even when they are generally perceived as such and human action is never fully predetermined (structure and agency). Certain outcomes can be anticipated or foreseen but they are never a foregone conclusion. Experiential (grounded) theory in the form of Bourdieu and Latour"s theories above, focuses on contextual/situational analysis to understand what Enos Mabuza, what he did or did not do, the reasons which informed his actions, the role of individual choice and how people adapt to changing conditions and rules.

Like other Bantustan leaders, Enos Mabuza"s career leads to a lot of speculation regarding his motives. His actions, methods and decisions are questioned or criticised because of the precarious position that Bantustan leaders occupied. Mabuza was not a saviour but neither was he opposed to the struggle (Pityana, 2005; Makwetla, 2005; Phosa, 2005; van Wyk Smith, 1993). His constituency had faith in him (as an individual) and in the Inyandza National Movement which he led with the expectation that his actions would be beneficial to them or at least not be detrimental to their interests or goals (a case of „better the devil you know" in the context of the apartheid state"s well documented brutality).

In terms of the theories outlined above, legitimate power and authority is seen as a property of social relationships and Enos Mabuza‟s position as the elected, not imposed, leader of a Bantustan does not seem as arbitrary as that of most other Bantustan leaders. This thesis depicts his career in relation to his time or socio-political (historical) context. Analysis has been done according to categories or themes, for example, politics, education, conservation, and religion and the main focus is on the purposes, causality, constraints and choices (Latour, 2005; 1999; Bourdieu, 1998; 1992; Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron, 1992; Creswell, 1998; Marcus, 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994:131-132 & 141; Clifford, 1962: ix-xx) behind the montage that was Enos Mabuza‟s career. A certain amount of causality is involved in the sense that events and actions create the conditions or possibility for later actions and events, through the mediation of human action (Bertaux, 2003:47 & 50). Bertaux (2003:46) and Humphrey, Miller and Zdravomyslova (2003:12) further note that when the structural parameters of normal everyday interaction at the personal, the family or group level change; strategic choice and conscious deliberation (cost-benefit analysis, rational or not) become important for adaptation and survival. As such, the study considers significant social changes or transitions that coincided with significant personal changes in attitudes or decisions that Enos Mabuza made (Humphrey, Miller and Zdravomyslova, 2003:2; Roos, 2003:32), by examining the material or structural realities (institutions, class and power relations, norms) and processes that influenced Enos Mabuza‟s life and work.

Chapter 5: Mabuza's Legacy in Education in the Former Eastern Transvaal

5.1 Introduction

The Human Capital Theory states that individuals and countries invest in quality education and training (qualifications) in order to enhance their productive potential and competencies with the hope of upward social mobility, which translates to better opportunities and rewards-better jobs, income and status in the future (Barker, 1999: 9, 209-211). Education transmits knowledge and skills and assigns people to certain roles that have varying degrees of prestige and esteem (stratification based on a form of natural selection which is determined by aptitude). In this regard, John Dewey notes that education is a constructive agency by which society maintains itself and by which it can be improved (1966:79). In an ideal, equal world, the ultimate purpose of education is so that people are informed and equipped to participate at their preferred socio-economic level or standard but often times, education acts as a filter which prevents this.

Dewy (1966) explored the academic-social divide in relation to social change. He argued that education is a re-organisation and reconstruction of experience through which we are able to see continuities and connections between thought, action and meaning. The educational experience stimulates and enriches the individual through interaction with others („flexible re-adjustment"), thus creating a sense of responsibility and pseudo-social contract which prepares students for participation in democratic society (Dewy, 1966:6, 83-87, 99, 160-163,120-21). Bourdieu"s (1986:241–258; Crossley, 2005:28-29, 32-33) theories about how social and cultural capital and „determinants of practices" in different social networks influence human behaviour support Dewey"s argument.

This chapter begins by highlighting the socio-economic circumstances of Enos Mabuza"s childhood as the pretext for his accomplishments in education. The second section provides an outline of the Bantu Education policy as a system of disempowerment which was deliberately designed to under-educate blacks by segregating the South Africa"s education system. Instead of building and empowering, the education system and curriculum was used as a weapon to exploit and control generations of blacks with far-reaching social and economic consequences (Lawson and Peterson, 1972; Fleisch, 2002; Karlsson, 2002; Morrell and Moletsane, 2002; Unterhalter, 1990). Blacks were so disadvantaged that the effects of the

Bantu Education system are evident in South Africa‟s deficit of skilled black workers (segmented labour market) and in schools that are still reserved for blacks, whites or Indians (unofficially but out of habit and a chronic lack of resources) (Barker, 1999; Standing, Sender and Weeks, 1996).

According to Frankl (1946) and Maslow (1987), psychological needs are enduring motivations or Drivers of human behaviour which become stronger as we make progress towards realising them (the continuous desire to fulfil our potential). The third section traces Enos Mabuza‟s achievements as a student from a disadvantaged background. He was part of the first generation of South Africans to experience Bantu Education but excelled academically in spite of it. The fourth section shows how the education that Enos Mabuza received enabled him to give back to his community and try to improve other people‟s quality of life. He understood how education can empower people and open new possibilities for them and it drove his passion to try and make others experience through his career as a teacher, headmaster and Inspector of Education. Mabuza and his wife raised their six children to value education because of the opportunities it provides. Mabuza imparted the same knowledge and wisdom to his children and his students so that they could make the most of their abilities and reach their potential in a socio-political and economic environment which was rigged to discriminate and disadvantage them.

The intention with which a person acts is a principle element of action. According to Langford (1971:71-99), some intentions are consciously and explicitly formulated while others are ill-defined and the people who hold them are often unaware of them. However, the deliberate individual and collective motivation for goal-specific action which characterises Enos Mabuza‟s educational legacy shows that individuals can make a difference in their own lives and those of others around them. According to Bringheti (2007:337), the way we see or perceive things influences how we act or intervene upon reality (agency). The rest of the chapter explores how Enos Mabuza‟s used his political position to influence educational developments in the KaNgwane area. Mabuza realised that education moulds our identity and he used it to promote the Swazi people‟s pride in their history, culture and language. His efforts, together with others, eventually led to the recognition of siSwati as a separate and official language in South Africa. Mabuza contributed towards overcoming the divisions and inequalities in the schooling system by supporting People‟s Education and establishing, for example, the Elijah Mango College during his tenure as Chief Minister of KaNgwane.

Mabuza also shared the vision which led to the establishment of Penryn College in Nelspruit. Penryn College is an independent school which is inclusive of all races, cultures, genders and creeds and promotes respect and tolerance for different thoughts and ideas. It is linked to the Methodist Church and twinned with South Africa‟s largest independent school, St Stithians College in Randburg, Johannesburg. It also has the largest school-based outreach programme in Africa called Penreach (Snaddon, Interview May 2006; Wylde, Interview August 2007). In turn, Mabuza‟s children benefited (their schooling) from the generosity of friends and colleagues.

5.2 Bantu Education and Systematic Disempowerment

Schools or education systems form part of an individual‟s socialisation because through them, social, economic and other values are transmitted or reinforced. Some approaches regard education as having a transformative role because of the ideal of free critical thought and educational qualifications which add value to individuals through the capital they confer (money/employment, power, status). The disadvantaged can be empowered through the opportunities that should be open to them because of the education system‟s capacity to confer cultural and symbolic capital (markers of distinction and social privilege). However, the educational field is shaped by, and also shapes, other fields (social, political religious), thus facilitating the reproduction of social structures- inequalities and divisions, instead of being a vehicle for social change (Webb, Schirato and Danaher, 2002:105-126).

Traditional Marxist and hegemonic views focus on how education systems discriminate and exclude certain groups of people from attaining certain types or levels of capital, thereby naturalising (pedagogy presents it as being legitimate and necessary) and reproducing social inequalities and divisions. Patriarchal and colonial assumptions and the unequal power relations they embody are partly attributable to, and are given expression in educational structures which perpetuate socio-economic inequality, stratification, dominance and racism (Apple, 1979), for instance, the stereotype that white and black are separate, hostile and unequal (Guarasci and Cornwell, 1997a:5). Bourdieu and Passeron (1977:54-67) refer to this arbitrariness as „symbolic violence.“

Bourdieu‟s commentary on practices within France‟s intellectual field (secondary and higher education-university/college) centres around issues of distinction, symbolic value, exclusivity and prestige which are associated with institutions such as Harvard, Yale, Princeton,

Cambridge and Oxford. Universities and the academy are sites charged with the duty of knowledge production. They are associated with refinement and superiority and are held in high esteem (status). Academics and students aspire to be a part of the rich traditions of such institutions but as with secondary education or just education systems in general, the traditions and practices within the higher education system also maintain or reproduce the relative disadvantage of certain groups (Bourdieu, 1988:73-127; Webb, Schirato and Danaher, 2002:127-145).

Bantu Education was a typical example of how an education system can be manipulated and used as a socio-economic filter. Bantu Education was a form of "indoctrination fit to subvert, pervert and destroy the foundations of democratic society" (Lawson and Peterson, 1972:7). The Bantu Education Act of 1953 put African education in the hands of central government which designed the curricula for black schools with the aim of systematically disempowering and disadvantaging them. The government‟s control of education in the townships was also characterised by fear and intimidation of both teachers and students (Fleisch, 2002; Karlsson, 2002; Morrell and Moletsane, 2002). Instead of equipping blacks for participation in all spheres of life, Bantu Education was designed to groom them for positions of servitude and to contain counter-ideologies in a white-dominated society. The main objective of Bantu Education was to create passive and compliant blacks who accepted authority, were punctual, dependable and could follow routine (Lawson and Peterson, 1972). Consequently, blacks provided cheap, unskilled labour in the diamond and gold mines which made South Africa rich (Callinicos, 1985:23).

The Bantu Education Act created two separate systems of education; a superior one for whites and an inferior one for blacks in the townships (and later in the Bantustans). Table 1 below shows the disparities in Pupil-Teacher ratios in white and black institutions after Bantu Education was introduced.

	1986	1990	1993
Whites	17.5	17.9	18.0
Africans*	37.4	37.0	44.4

Table 1: Pupil: Teacher Ratio

*Data for Africans excludes the former self-governing and TBVC territories (Barker, 1999:242).

Bantu Education disadvantaged blacks such that a black person and a white person with a Matric Certificate were note equally qualified and this tended to reinforce the stereotype that blacks are incompetent or lazy (Barker, 1999:241). Black education was severely and deliberately under-funded, for instance, the government‟s *per capita* education expenditure in 1986 was R2 746 for white students and R610 for black students (Barker, 1999:241). The tables below illustrate this point clearly when one considers South Africa‟s demographic profile (race ratios).

Year	African	Coloured	Indian	White
1953	16.0			
1955	15.8			
1960	19.5	24.3	7.9	79.0
1965	24.9	30.9	14.3	252.3
1970	66.3	45.0	19.8	366.0
1975	160.2	104.9	43.8	738.7
1980	553.0	247.1	122.7	1360.9
1985	1816.0	724.1	324.0	2973.7
1986	2453.4	868.3	367.1	3057.0
1987	3400.3	1007.6	404.7	3321.0

Table 2: Educational Spending (Million Rand): Primary, Secondary and Tertiary (Unterhalter, 1990:41).

Year	African	Coloured	Indian	White
1953	17.08	40.00	40.00	128.00
1955	15.68	N/A	N/A	N/A
1960	13.60	74.50	74.50	114.00
1965	12.70	71.00	91.50	357.00
1970	47.64	83.30	121.00	428.00
1975	50.00	126.00	171.00	605.00
1980	87.28	286.00	318.00	1021.00
1985	293.86	891.62	1386.00	2746.00

Table 3: *Per Capita* Spending (in Rand) on School Education

NB: *The per capita* figure for Indians and Coloured were calculated together in 1953 and 1960. The 1964 figures for white and Indian education are estimates (Unterhalter 1989 in Unterhalter, 1990:41).

	1986	**1990**	**1993**
Whites	2 746	4 087	4 372
Africans*	610	1 194	1 659
African Expenditure as a Percentage of White	22%	29%	38%

Table 4: *Per Capita* Educational Expenditure (Rand)

*Data for Africans excludes the former self-governing and TBVC territories (Barker, 1999:241).

According to Salmi‟s (1993:21) typology of violence, alienating violence (indirect) can assume the form of educational segregation whereby students are taught in an official language that is different from their mother tongue or they are taught a curriculum which is designed to systematically disadvantage them or which ignores their cultural background. Bantu Education in South Africa was designed specifically for this purpose and the Afrikaans language was imposed as the medium of instruction (Morrell and Moletsane, 2002) and the 1976 Soweto Student Uprising and People‟s Education were protests against such alienation.

Tertiary institutions were also reserved for different racial groups in order to realise the social dislocation that epitomised apartheid, for example, the University of Durban-Westville was reserved for Indians and the University of the Western Cape was for “Coloureds” and so on.

This separation determined the quality of education that the different racial groups received and the black majority received the most inferior education (Fleisch, 2002; Karlsson, 2002; Morrell and Moletsane, 2002; Standing, Sender and Weeks, 1996; Barker, 1999).

5.3 Mabuza's Experience and Distinction as a Student

According to most accounts, Enos Mabuza was born on 6 June 1939 at Viviya (Sheba Gold Mine) close to Fair View Mine on the mountains close to Barberton in Mpumalanga. Barberton is one of the oldest gold-mining towns in South Africa and Enos‟ father worked at Sheba goldmine in the area. However, according to an undated interview transcript (Interview with Julie Fredrikse), Mabuza was born in June 1942 in Johannesburg‟s vibrant Sophiatown. This creates a two year discrepancy and introduces a new place of birth. According to this account, Mabuza‟s father stopped working in the mines in Barberton and moved the family to Johannesburg in the early 1950s. He worked on and off, preferring to be self-employed most of the time because of the oppressive employer-employee relationships which characterised most work situations.

Mabuza‟s mother was a housewife and raised the children with the assistance of their paternal grandmother (Margaret Mabuza, Interview June 2007). As the family matriarch and disciplinarian, Enos‟ grandmother had a profound effect on him as a young man. Enos was the eldest of four children - siblings Margaret, Agripa/Boy and Norman Mhlupeki. His family led a rural, impoverished and humble pastoral life. According to his sister Margaret, he was very close to his mother partly because his father worked away from home. The distance between them increased when his father took a second wife and divided his time between the two families (Pillay, 2007:94-95). Enos‟ sister Margaret recalls that he was a quiet young man who enjoyed his own company and would often disappear and play his flute in the mountains. As the eldest child, he preferred to herd the family‟s livestock, mainly sheep, alone (Margaret Mabuza, Interview). Enos struggled to get an education because his family was poor. Mining did not pay well and his father had to stretch already limited resources in order to support another family. Consequently, Enos‟ grandmother and aunt assumed the responsibility for his early education by selling some of their cattle and sheep to raise money for his school fees.

Elias Ginindza first met Mabuza in Barberton when Mabuza was in Standard 6 at Ngwane Primary School. Elias Ginindza was in Form 1 at Emjindini Secondary School, also in

Barberton. Mabuza had transferred from Sheba Mine Primary School (Barberton) where he had done his initial primary education (Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007). According to Ginindza, Mabuza distinguished himself as a very good pupil and excelled in the quarterly tests and examinations. He was the top student at his school (not just his class). According to Mr Ginindza (Interview, June 2007), it was quite an achievement to be one of the top ten performers in the quarterly test in your class or school but Mabuza was modest about his achievements. Standard 6 was an important milestone in the olden days because the results determined which vocations people pursued, for example, teacher training. Mabuza passed Standard 6 with a First Class pass. He was one of the top students in the area and he progressed to Emjindini Secondary School, where Elias Ginindza was in Form 3 (Mr Ginindza, Interview June 2007). According to Ginidza, Mabuza was allowed to do Form 1 and 2 simultaneously because his grades were impressive yet he managed to remain the top student. The following year (Form 3), Mabuza was the only student chosen by the principle and staff to do what was known to as English A. Only a few exceptionally bright students were allowed to do English A and it was, therefore, a great honour for the school if its students performed well. Again Mabuza excelled and passed English A with distinction (Mr Ginindza, Interview June 2007).

Elias Ginindza completed his Junior Certificate (Standard 8) and left Emjindini Secondary School in search of employment because he did not have the financial resources to continue studying. Mabuza also studied up to Standard 8/Junior Certificate and went to pursue teacher-training at Vryheid in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands (Ndaleni Training College on the outskirts of Richmond) and Lovedale Teachers‟ College where he received his Primary Teaching Certificate in 1959. Mabuza distinguished himself as a student and obtained a two-year Primary Teacher‟s Certificate by the time he was twenty-one years old. He was requested to stay and lecture (music) at the college and he agreed and so began his career as an educator. However, competent teachers were in short supply in the Transvaal Lowveld where Mabuza grew up so he left Ndaleni Training College after two years and returned to the lowveld to use his passion for education to uplift his own community (Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Ms Margaret Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007).

5.4 Mabuza's Career as an Educator

According to his family, Mabuza was passionate about education and considered himself a teacher first and foremost. He had a career in the education which lasted sixteen years and he believed that the plight of black people could only be improved if they were educated or skilled (Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Esther Mabuza, Interview, June 2007). Mabuza returned to the Transvaal lowveld and started teaching in White River (the old Mbombela location in Kabokweni) at Mkwenyane Primary School (Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007) and by then Elias Ginindza was also teaching in Nelspruit (10 miles away). According to Elias Ginindza, it was an honour for young teachers to be chosen by their Principles to teach Standard 6 and Mabuza and himself were chosen to teach these top classes (Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007). As old friends and colleagues, Mabuza and Elias Ginindza met regularly to discuss how their students were performing and the problems they faced as teachers. They exchanged teaching notes and shared ideas to improve their students‟ learning experience as well as to enrich their own teaching experience (Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007).

According to Elias Ginindza (Interview, June 2007), teaching was not just a job for Mabuza, it was a "great passion and commitment." Mabuza believed that education should be an enriching experience, inside and outside the classroom and he encouraged his pupils to explore their interests in their respective subjects. The pass rate at Mkwenyane Primary School had been very poor but it improved significantly when Mabuza started teaching there (Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007). Mabuza is described as a dedicated, patient and nurturing teacher who devoted time (often after hours and on weekends) to the pupils who had learning difficulties. The majority of his pupils passed, including many that other teachers had given up on. Some of Mabuza‟s students obtained First Class passes and the community (Barberton Area) was abuzz with news about the new teacher whose students were performing so well when no-one had believed that such a turn-around was possible. The community was proud because a young, relatively inexperienced, teacher was able to produce such results and bring honour to the school (Mr Ginindza, Interview June 2007). This was a cause for celebration and schools in the area held functions to celebrate the successes of their teachers and students. The celebrations encouraged others to follow Mabuza‟s example (Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007).

Whilst teaching at Mkwenyane Primary school, Mabuza studied part-time and obtained his Matric Certificate by correspondence. He was then invited to teach secondary level at Emjindini Secondary School where he had done his secondary education. He accepted and during this time, he enrolled for a part-time Bachelor of Arts degree with the University of South Africa (UNISA). It was an honour for him to be recognised in this way and after a short while (still without his university degree) he was promoted to the position of Vice Principal at Emjindini Secondary School. His academic performance afforded him opportunities that would otherwise have been lost to him if he had not persevered. He was always looking to learn new things and improve himself. Mabuza obtained his degree (with distinction) in the minimum time expected for full-time students (three years), even though he did his degree by correspondence (Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007).

Mabuza returned to White River at Edwaleni Secondary School where he was a teaching Principal. This was a promotion because it was a level higher than the position he had at Emjindini Secondary School in Barberton (Margaret Mabuza, Interview June 2007). As a leader (principal), Mabuza treated his subordinates (teachers) and students with respect and created a supportive, productive and creative learning environment.

Based on his success as a teacher, Khumbula Secondary School in Ntsikazi/KaBokweni invited Mabuza to become a teaching Principle. Khumbula Secondary School was bigger than Emjindini Secondary School but it was a rural, impoverished school with poor, needy students and the disadvantages associated with a lack of resources. Many of the students at the school were mature (with families) and they were often difficult to discipline. The apartheid government had been threatening to close down the school because it had a high failure rate but Mabuza motivated the students and turned the situation around in approximately 2-3 years. As headmaster, Enos Mabuza established a library at the school and motivated his teaching staff. Khumbula Secondary School‟s fortunes changed and it started producing some of the best high school results in the KaNgwane area (Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007; Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Esther Mabuza Interview June 2007).

Enos Mabuza‟s performance at Khumbula Secondary School set him apart from other teachers. He was promoted to become the first black teaching Inspector of Education in the then Eastern Transvaal when the KaNgwane Bantustan was established. An Inspector of

Education was the equivalent of a Circuit Inspector, which was one of the top positions in the Education Department. However, in terms of apartheid policies, a black person could not become a Circuit Inspector so Mabuza‟s career had peaked. As Education Inspector, Mabuza was dedicated and sourced textbooks and other learning materials to improve the standards of black schools which were under his supervision (Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Margaret Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007).

Mabuza studied for a Bachelor of Arts Honours degree with UNISA and again he passed with distinction in 1974. Between 1989 and 1993 he added an MBA and an LLD (Honoris Causa) to his of qualifications.

5.5 Promoting Swazi Culture and Language

According to Fitz, Davies and Evans (2006) and Bourdieu and Passeron (1977), education moulds and sustains cultures, traditions and bridges the gap between the individual and society through the promotion of common rules of conduct and values (social reproduction). Zulu and siSwati are similar and are generally "mutually intelligible in spoken form", although often different when written (Woodson, 1991:381). Macmillan (1989:302) notes that there was limited literature on Swazi history and language until the 1970s. Notable contributions were by D. Ziervogel in his book *A Grammar of Swazi* which was first published in 1952. Other books were by historian J.S.M. Matsebula who was Swaziland‟s King Sobhuza II‟s chief counsellor and private secretary. Matsebula is credited with the creation of siSwati orthography in the late 1960s. He published *Izakhiwe ka Ngwane* (in Zulu) in 1952 and wrote several primary school texts which were published in the early 1970s, including *A History of Swaziland* in 1972 (Macmillan, 1989:302). Before that, although siSwati was spoken universally within Swaziland and in parts of bordering Transvaal (KaNgwane and other areas) and Natal, Zulu was used as the written language.

Mabuza followed in Matsebula‟s footsteps and promoted siSwati as a written language. He co-authored several siSwati literature and grammar books including a revised version of D. Ziervogel‟s *A Grammar of the Swati Language* in 1967 when he was an Inspector of Education in the Eastern Transvaal (Macmillan, 1989:302). Mabuza went a step further by establishing a siSwati Language Committee in 1974 with the aim of getting official recognition for siSwati as a separate language. Mr Ginindza (Interview June 2007) notes that for a long time, siSwati was treated as a dialect of the Zulu language and Swazi scholars

maintained that siSwati was a separate language and needed to be treated as such. Mabuza served as the siSwati Language Committee‟s first Chairperson and representatives from Swaziland sat on the committee as advisors (Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Macmillan, 1989:310). The scholars involved with the committee collected existing materials and also wrote new ones. Mabuza co-authored *Sifundza siSwati: Libanga 1* with S. S. Mahlasela and E. Posselt and helped to translate the English Bible into siSwati with Mr Elias N. Ginindza and others (Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Mr Ginindza, Interview June 2007).

The Swazi Territorial Authority was created in 1976 with Chief Mkolishi Dlamini elected as Chairman of the Executive Committee. Mabuza was elected Councillor for Education and Culture on this committee and supervised the introduction of siSwati into KaNgwane‟s schools in 1978 (Macmillan, 1989:303). Elias Ginindza was involved in this process and succeeded Mabuza as the Chairperson of the siSwati Language Board when Mabuza became Chief Councillor of KaNgwane. Contrary to Bantu Education‟s imposition of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction and the sustained attempt to stifle other cultures, as Swazis, Mabuza and others who worked on this project preserved and advanced Swazi culture and identity (its history, customs and practices) through the medium of language (Ossewaarde, 2007:378) and today siSwati is recognised as one of South Africa‟s nine official languages.

5.6 Pearls of Wisdom for the Next Mabuza Generation

Enos Mabuza met his wife Esther at Mkwenyane Primary School where they both taught (Margaret Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007) and like Enos Esther Mabuza holds a Bachelor of Arts degree (1992) from the University of South Africa and was the headmistress of a lower primary school for fifteen years (Mabuza, 1992:4). Mabuza‟s children (daughters Busisiwe, Nekeziwe/Grace and Nompumelelo and sons Vusumuzi, Sizo and Sandile/Christopher) had strong role models in both their parents who appreciated the value of formal education. The Mabuza family has done well in terms of developing its human, social and cultural capital. Mabuza‟s eldest child, Busisiwe, works in South Africa‟s highly competitive and male dominated private equity industry as a venture capitalist. She is a partner in Ethos Private Equity which is one of the major players in the industry. Busisiwe Mabuza holds a Bachelor of Arts in Mathematics from the City University of New York (Hunter College), a Computer Science degree from Spelman College in Atlanta (USA) and an MBA from the Stern School of Business (New York University) (Bouwer and

Dyantyi, 2008:84-85). Nekeziwe is an attorney and Nompumelelo is a researcher. Vusumuzi is an attorney in Nelspruit and Sizo is working in publishing (Juta Publishing), although he trained as teacher. The youngest child, Sandile, has a degree in Sociology and Law from the University of the Witwatersrand and is working in the horticultural sector in Nelspruit (Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007).

Mabuza‟s children were not coddled or allowed to sit on their laurels. Pressure was put on them to perform to the best of their abilities and to take advantage of the educational opportunities which were available to them. A series of letters between Enos Mabuza and his son Sandile (between 15 January 1987 when Sandile was in Standard 8 at St Stithians College in Johannesburg and 23 November 1990 when he was returning from the United Kingdom after completing high school) shows how the value of education was transmitted in the Mabuza household. Enos and Esther Mabuza were actively involved in the education of their children and encouraged them to always do their best. As parents, they communicated with their children‟s teachers and headmasters (Mr Wylde at St Stithians and Mr Roberts and Dr Stephen at Perse Boys High School) in order to keep track of their children‟s progress (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 12 May 1987:2; Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 10 September 1990).

Mabuza always asked if his son had settled down for a new term or year (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 27 July 1987) and Sandile‟s test and examination grades were the main topic of conversation in their correspondence during this period. Mabuza would advise his son to improve his grades by concentrating and working hard, being thorough in his homework, assignments and tests and participating in class discussions and other activities (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 15 January 1987:1). He also regularly advised his son to be disciplined in his studies and to "aim at no less than 56% in all subjects…You must start now striving to be amongst the best candidates for your Matric year" (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 31 January 1987:2). Enos Mabuza urged Sandile to ensure that his marks would be "the same or better than the class average" (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 12 May 1987:2) by working "hard and systematically" (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 27 July 1987) or "systematically and steadily" (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 28 0ctober 1987:1).

The tone of Enos Mabuza‟s letters to his son does not change much. In early 1988 he encouraged Sandile to read more for subjects that he did not do well in the previous year and encouraged him to ask for help from his teachers in order to "have an above average or good

pass" (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 14 March 1988:1). Mabuza commended the effort that Sandile put into his studies and advised that;

> "…at no stage should you be complacent…plan your studies and apply yourself. Use your time wisely… plan your revision well and be systematic in your studies…Aim at scoring high marks in your favourite subjects and at least above average marks in the other subjects" (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 30 October 1988:1).

Enos Mabuza did not just want his children to be focused and do well in school. He also wanted them to enjoy their experiences in school (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 12 October 1990:1). When Sandile was in his final year of high school, his father gently reminded him that being at Perse Boys High School was "a golden lifetime opportunity" and that he should make the best of it (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 30 October 1990:3). Enos and his wife emphasised the importance of working hard (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 14 March 1988:1) because they wanted their children to set high standards for themselves. Towards the end of Sandile‟s last term of Form 6 at Perse Boys High School, Enos Mabuza commented that; "I would not be surprised if you have been inspired to study at Cambridge or Oxford…Life is not an easy or free ride. You have to work hard. You have to survive through your own sweat" (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 23 November 1990:2).

Enos Mabuza‟s passion for education and his competence in the field did not go unnoticed by others in the field and this enabled him to build a network of friends and colleagues who assisted in the education of some of the Mabuza children, for example, when Sandile was at St Stithians College in Randburg (Johannesburg), Enos Mabuza often reminded him to write letters to or call Mrs Mary Rose and Mrs Hodgson because "you are where you are because of her" (Mrs Rose) (Mabuza, Letter-15 January 1987:1). Sandile also studied at Perse Boys High School in Cambridge, England through the efforts of Dr Schulter. The Schulters and Mr Zimmerman were family friends and would often meet Sandile at the airport when he returned from holidays back home in South Africa (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 10 September 1990). When Enos Mabuza travelled to London at the end of December 1990, he took presents for the Schulters to show his gratitude for their assumed role as Sandile‟s adopted family in the United Kingdom (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 23 November 1990).

Sandile also used to spend holidays with the Parks family in London. Enos Mabuza described the Parks as being "kind and generous" (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 25 May 1990). Mrs Dielle Fleischmann was another family friend in the United States and she used to enquire about Sandile‟s plans regarding university choices. She wanted to discuss how his studies could be sponsored as well as discuss career options for him in the USA (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 30 October 1990:3). The Mabuzas are grateful for friends who opened their hearts and homes and offered to help as this section shows. It was not just Sandile who benefited from his father‟s connections. Busisiwe studied at Spelman College in America with the help of family friends after she was expelled from the University of the North for political reasons (Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007).

Enos Mabuza was not just respected and valued as an experienced educator in the Eastern Transvaal. Perse Boys High School headmaster (Mr Roberts) invited him to address staff and students (Sandile‟s Form 6 class) on 14 November 1990 (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 30 October 1990:3; Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 23 November 1990:1). He was also called upon to share his insights with students and teachers by delivering the keynote address at the official opening of Penryn College at its premises in Nelspruit on 26 June 1993.

5.7 Mabuza, People's Education and the Struggle for a Decent Education

Education is one of several mediums for secondary socialisation which maintains social solidarity outside the family. Schools serve as rich repositories of social rituals which prepare us for events and transactions within broader institutional contexts, for example, politics (McLaren, 1993). Education has played an important role with regards to political awareness and the rise of nationalism in countries that were colonised, for instance, Ghana and South Africa where many of those that joined the armed struggle in exile began their militancy as students (Unterhalter, 1990:29-51; Apple, 1985). According to Giddens (1991; 1990), identity is modified by the way in which we adapt or adjust to new or available information and possibilities. Consequently, actions and reactions do not have to be determined by the disadvantage of inherited circumstances. Human agency means that individuals reflect on past actions, present opportunities and future potential and plan their life trajectories accordingly (to be in charge of their own destinies) and during apartheid, many black South African students were involved in politics. When Mabuza became Chief Minister of KaNgwane, he still kept his attention on educational issues and his government quietly

supported the political role of student organisations in KaNgwane (Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007).

At the height of apartheid oppression (the states of emergencies of the 1980s) black people‟s educational demands were linked to political and economic ones which formed the backbone of the struggle for national liberation. According to Adam (1990:127), People‟s Education was geared towards transforming the Bantu Education system (ill-trained teachers, an inferior curriculum, under-funded schools, intimidation). The focus of People‟s Education was on political relevance. Students demanded an integrated education system under a single ministry as well as equal expenditure and rights for all citizens.

Identity (being black), combined with poor education condemned blacks to a life of servitude and the Declaration on People‟s Education by the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee in December 1985 was informed by the realisation that only a decent education would prepare blacks for participation in a democratic South Africa. Enos Mabuza‟s government in the KaNgwane believed that a sound educational foundation was an imperative for the empowerment and economic emancipation of the majority of South Africans who were marginalised by the apartheid state and to this end; KaNgwane embraced People‟s Education (Unterhalter, 1990:34).

People‟s Education provided an alternative or parallel curriculum which was aimed at counteracting the mis-education of the apartheid system by mobilising students and making communities understand the evils of apartheid; to stimulate critical thought and analysis, thereby empowering them to take charge of their own destinies (Unterhalter, 1990:29-51). However, laws such as the Education Affairs Act of 1985 and the Education and Training Act were used to outlaw People‟s Education (in its original form) and some Bantustan governments also outlawed it, even though the Bantustans were not covered by the Education and Training Act. These laws prevented the circulation of books, pamphlets, badges, banners, flags and t-shirts which were associated with People‟s Education in South Africa‟s townships (Unterhalter, 1990:29-51).

The ANC and other political organisations had been banned in the 1960s and the national struggle was being undermined by the rise of numerous organisations with competing interests and agendas which were fragmenting efforts for national liberation. In its „programme of action‟, the Harare Declaration of the Organisation of African Unity *Ad-hoc*

Committee on Southern Africa (21 August 1989) also embraced the basis and ideals of People‟s Education and students vowed to make South Africa‟s townships ungovernable. They engaged in widespread school boycotts and sit-ins, marches and other gatherings which the police and other state agents interrupted and dispersed using assault rifles, tear-gas, dogs, baton sticks and sjamboks (horsewhips). Many students were killed, others were arrested and faced up to two years in prison, some were detained and released after paying heavy fines and others were abducted and never found (Unterhalter, 1990:29-51).

Mabuza used his position as Chief Minister to ensure, among other things, that educational provision was a priority. The small size of the KaNgwane Bantustan translated to a limited amount of resources but despite these limitations, its education system was fairly decent compared to other Bantustans which had more resources. In line with the black demand for better education and facilities Elijah Mango College of Education in KaBokweni, for example, was established during Enos Mabuza‟s tenure as Chief Minister. Mabuza sent a delegation led by his Education Minister to Israel to find an architectural design that would set the college as a flagship educational institution in KaNgwane. Years later, the Department of Health and Social Services proposed to take advantage of the infrastructure offered by Elijah Mango College and convert it into a Health Sciences Training College. Elijah Mango College is serves as an examinations centre for UNISA (Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007).

5.8 Mabuza's Role in the Founding of Penryn College

Mabuza witnessed first-hand the effects of Bantu Education (as a student, teacher, school principal and education inspector in the Eastern Transvaal). As an Inspector of Education, he did not just see disadvantage in one school. He saw the poor plight of all black schools in the region and the shortcomings of the education system. Most of the schools did not have adequate infrastructure and learning materials. School management, educator capacities and motivation as well as learner attitudes were in disarray (www.penryn.co.za/vision.htm; www.penryn.co.za/history.htm). Elias Ginindza (Interview June 2007) maintains that all good leaders abhorred Bantu Education because of its disempowerment agenda and Mabuza sought an educational alternative which would teach independent thought from what Bantu Education offered blacks in South Africa. Mabuza first explored this possibility by appointing people to research how they could enrich the lives of the disadvantaged black majority, not just individuals or particular schools but entire communities. He consulted with

people like Dr Hudson, as well as top administrators in the Methodist Church (of which he was a member). The idea gathered momentum when Mabuza‟s son (Sandile) was a student at St Stithians in Johannesburg. Against the background of simmering revolution in the late 1980‟s, David Wylde and others at St Stithians College had a similar vision to Mabuza‟s and they came together to this vision a reality (Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007).

Guarasci and Cornwell (1997a:1-16; 1997b:159-170) maintain that schools/education can provide a platform for linking student academic development with citizenship education by allowing them to engage difference in daily inter-group relations (how to become better citizens). Penryn College‟s founding vision was to establish a school that would provide a liberal education based on inter-group dialogue; with the aim of de-stereotyping students‟ conceptions of one another (to exorcise the ghost of apartheid Bantu Education). The individuals who established Penryn College wanted to make their own contribution to the dismantling of apartheid by using their professional expertise (education) to bridge the gaps that apartheid had created. Apartheid education policies translated into inequality in the labour market and other spheres (Karlsson, 2002; Morrell and Moletsane, 2002; Fleisch, 2002; www.penryn.co.za/vision.htm; www.penryn.co.za/history.htm) and these individuals wanted to intervene by bringing together learners from different backgrounds and offering them an equal and enriching educational experience. The attempt to reform the education system (granted on a small scale) was one step towards addressing the racial discrepancies that existed and to provide a synergy between the advantaged and disadvantaged, between the wealthy and the poor, black and white (David Wylde, Interview: 2 August 2007; Snaddon, Interview: 4 May 2006).

David Wylde was the headmaster of St Andrews College in Grahamstown (2003-2008) and he is one of the founders and trustees of Penryn College. As young men, Peter Anderson and David Wylde were students at St Andrews College in Grahamstown. Later, Peter Anderson became the headmaster of St Matthews Private Secondary School in Kliptown, which was part of the Lebowa Bantustan. David Wylde worked at Pretoria Boys High School, which was exclusively white. The two of them saw the racial disparities in the education system and discussed ways in which they could engage their communities to improve the situation and the idea of a school outreach project was hatched. Peter Anderson believed that the most beneficial form of community engagement was one that would involve the disadvantaged rural areas by connecting rural black students with urban white boys at St Stithians College

(Wylde, interview: 2 August 2007). The model would be based on an affluent school building or assisting a disadvantaged school to achieve high academic standards. In turn, this partnership or surrogacy would increase previously disadvantaged groups‟ access to a decent standard of education and encourage racial integration or cooperation.

David Wylde became the headmaster of St Stithians College (in affluent Randburg) in January 1989 but his dream of founding a school in a rural area stayed alive. Although Enos Mabuza had his own ideas for a similar project, he was not part of the original group that came up with the outreach concept and he did not attend the first meeting in which the idea was formerly raised at St Stithians. However, Mabuza‟s support for Wylde‟s idea was solicited at a later date. Bill Carter facilitated early discussions between Wylde (St Stithians) and Enos Mabuza regarding Wylde‟s vision of establishing an outreach school to bridge the gap between black and white; rural and urban. Wylde‟s vision was that at least 5 000 pupils could have a better future if the outreach project could positively impact 100 educators in 10 schools in the chosen rural community (Wylde, Interview: 2 August 2007; www.penryn.co.za/visi on.htm; www.penryn.co.za/history.htm).

Bill Carter was Vice-Chairman of the St Stithians Council and he knew Enos Mabuza in a professional capacity because they had met several times to discuss business in the Transvaal lowveld (KaNgwane). Although Mabuza was in politics at this stage, his reputation as a competent educator was well known. Further, although legal segregation was still in force, Enos Mabuza‟s son, Sandile, was in his Matric year at St Stithians College and Mabuza was a member of the St Stithians Council which meant that he had a good idea how the school was run and how it made a difference in the quality of education that his son received (Wylde, Interview: 2 August 2007; www.penryn.co.za/vision.htm; www.penryn.co.za/history.htm).

According to Wylde, when he broached the idea of an outreach project with the St Stithians Council, their initial response was stunned silence before they warmed up to it. However, the council suggested that instead of engaging with a rural school or community, it would be simpler to initiate a similar project with a school in Soweto or any other black disadvantaged school in the urban areas. As it turned out, similar initiatives were already underway with black schools in Soweto and Wylde decided to follow Peter Anderson‟s advice that “whatever you do, do it in the rural areas” because they had the greatest need for such a project. The plight of rural schools was demonstrated by the fact that at that time, the *per capita* expenditure on an urban white child and an urban black child was significantly

different in favour of the white child; and the amount spent on a rural black child compared to an urban black child was significantly less (Unterhalter, 1990:41; Barker, 1999:241; Wylde, Interview 2 August 2007). At the heart of this project was the need to reduce these disparities. The vision was for St Stithians College, which was situated in affluent white South Africa, to act as "a beacon or a magnet school" or "lighthouse"; a centre of excellence from which an educational outreach programme would be developed into the disadvantaged school system in deprived rural black South Africa (Wylde, Interview 2 August 2007; www.penryn.co.za/vision.htm).

Roger Cameron succeeded Wylde as headmaster of St Stithians in December 1990. Cameron had been heading a government school in Port Elizabeth and was aware of the inequalities that existed in the education system. Cameron shared Wylde, Carter and Mabuza"s vision and carried on from where Wylde and others had left off. The project was launched informally towards the end of 1990 and first formal classes for the „reaching-out" project began modestly in an Anglican Church hall (Plaston) in 1991.The class was comprised of 25 black students. The project"s viability was reviewed after a year by interviewing people at St Stithians College. Wylde, Simeon Ripinga and others were unhappy with its size and scope. Wylde notes that Ripinga was "categorical" about this and they discussed their concerns with Cameron. They wanted the outreach project to be situated in a rural setting so that it could set an example for others and they felt that the project (as it was then) was compromising this vision (Wylde, Interview 2 August 2007).

It was decided in 1992 that St Stithians" beacon school should be in the KaNgwane Bantustan. A high school was initially proposed but it was eventually decided that a private school in the region would be the best way to realise this vision. Carter suggested that instead of establishing the school in a black area or township, it had to be in a white area in anticipation of the repeal of the Group Areas Act and other discriminatory legislation. Ripinga and others supported this idea because it meant that the school would not be in a remote area and more schools and learners could have access to it. The massive socio-economic disparities between white and black South Africa in and around the former Gazankulu and KaNgwane Bantustans (Nkomazi, Malelane, Barberton, Ermelo, White River and Enhlanzeni) quite apparent in the educational infrastructure. Today, Penryn College is one of the few originally black schools that have become multi-racial as opposed to the trend

where previously white schools have become multi-racial. It is in this sense that the establishment of Penryn was a fairly radical political act (Wylde, Interview 2 August 2007).

Penreach is the biggest project of its kind in South Africa with more than 750 organised Penreach skills development events each year. Penreach services are essentially free but visiting educators pay a small fee per day, plus their transport costs. Penreach‟s annual expenditure is approximately R3 million and most of the funding comes from partners or sponsors such as the ABSA Foundation, Standard Bank, BarlowWorld Trust, Nedbank Foundation, Jet Stores, First Rand Limited, Sappi Papers, Pick „n‟Pay and the Sugar Industry Trust Fund. Part of the funding is used to source books for school libraries with the help of Rotary Clubs. The Penreach project has led to improvements in educator confidence and school productivity and thousands of school children who would not have had access to certain knowledge, expertise and resources are benefiting from Penreach‟s success (Wylde, Interview August 2007; Dr Rob Snaddon, Interview May 2006; www.penreach.org.za/facts.htm). Robbie Williams was the first chairperson of the Penryn Trust. Rob Snaddon and Paul Harris have served as chairpersons of the Penryn College Council. Prominent business people and educators are trustees of the Penryn Trust and they include singer and businesswoman Yvonne Chaka Chaka, co-founder David Wylde and Dr Rob Snaddon of H. L. Hall and Sons Ltd[27].

The Enos Mabuza Centre at Penryn College is named after him in recognition of his contribution to education in the area dating back to his years as a teacher, headmaster and Education Inspector. A collection of his personal papers are kept at the centre. In his address at the official opening of Penryn College at its new premises on 26 June 1993, Enos Mabuza reiterated that the vision for Penryn College was to produce high quality, effective learners who are dynamic and innovative, in spite of the challenges inherited from apartheid. Penryn College has lived up to this expectation by maintaining a very high pass rate since its first Matric group in 1998 (David Wylde, Interview August 2007; Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007; Rob Snaddon, Interview May 2006; www.penreach.org.za/facts.htm). In recognition of Penryn College‟s performance, the school has been awarded the Mpumalanga Premier‟s award for outstanding service to education (www.penryn.co.za/index.htm). Penryn College was envisioned as more than a just a school and this sets it apart from other schools in the country. At the sixth annual National Teaching Awards dinner held in Pretoria on 20 October

[27] For more information on Penryn and how it is run, how it raises funds and how it benefits other schools and educators, see (www.penryn.co.za/fees.htm; www.penryn.co.za/history.htm).

2005, the Minister of Education, Mrs Naledi Pandor, acknowledged the value of in-service and further training and the important role that continuous professional education plays in improving the educational experience for both learners and teachers (Ministry of Education, 2005).

Bantu Education made teachers believe that they could not make a difference (Ministry of Education, 2005). School administrators were frustrated and pupils believed they were destined to fail but Mabuza‟s career in education demonstrated that passion and dedication makes a difference (Dr Rob Snaddon, Interview May 2006). Mabuza was not a token black person brought in to endorse the project. He had demonstrated his passion for teaching over many years and actively participated in the founding of the school. He was a competent educator who understood the deficiencies in the education system, even though the majority of the partners had an affluent white background. The transformation agenda was at the heart of the project and it lives on today with the support of other like-minded people. However, some of the positive changes made by the school are slowly being undone. Instead of more disadvantaged children benefiting from the school and its community activities, Penryn is mostly seen as an elite institution for the well-heeled. Penryn College is an independent (private) school and its fees are competitive to the point where they are prohibitive to poor or ordinary people who are also entitled to a decent education (Mrs Esther Mabuza, Interview June 2007; www.penryn.co.za/fees.htm). Apart from the Penreach project, its core business is no longer to cater for the poor.

Despite the changes over the years, Penreach remains a shining example of schools engaging with communities to uplift as many people as possible. Similar projects include Rhodes University‟s Molteno Project which was founded in 1974 (named after the Molteno Brothers‟ Trust which contributed to the project, together with other funders). The project was originally a brainchild of Rhodes University but it is now an autonomous body with its head office in Braamfontein (Johannesburg) and other offices in Grahamstown (Gold Fields Centre for English), Pietermaritzburg, Nelspruit and Mmabatho. The project focuses on of language learning in disadvantaged black primary schools (http://www.ru.ac.za/affiliates/molteno/).

5.9 Conclusion

Mabuza believed that everyone could overcome adversity if they were given a little help and hope. The main driving force behind his career in education was to see more black people

overcome the depressing cycle of despair which was fostered under apartheid. Mabuza‟s own life demonstrates that breaking the cycle of poverty and disempowerment was possible even under apartheid. He came from an impoverished background, struggled to get an education and gradually rose to become distinguished among his peers. In recognition of Mabuza‟s contribution to education, he was elected to serve on several educational boards such as the University of the Witwatersrand Council, St Stithians College Council and Promat Colleges. In the end Mabuza was able to achieve what many would have deemed impossible for a black man at the time. He lived comfortably and his children received an adequate education. He was determined to succeed and to see others succeed (Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007). The vision which motivated Mabuza‟s endeavours in education was the need to restore human dignity and self-respect to marginalised black communities. He believed that educational empowerment offered hope and a sense of confidence, competence, achievement, independence and freedom.

The African concept of Ubuntu (Zulu: *umuntu u ngu muntu nga banye bantu*) means that a person is a person because of, or in relation to others (Forster, 2007; Ramose, 2003) and it complements Bourdieu‟s habitus-field and Latour‟s actor-network analyses. Together, these concepts highlight the fact that identity, status and other attributes that we possess are defined through our inter-connection with other people. Had Mabuza‟s grandmother and aunt not intervened by making sacrifices that afforded him the opportunity to go to school, he might have remained a poor, broken rural boy. Latour‟s (1999:182) argument that action is “a property of associated entities” in which an agent is allowed, authorised, enabled or afforded such action by others, even in the face of adversity. Mabuza‟s own diligence (agency) as a student led to professional competence, social mobility and personal growth (the development of his social and economic capital) which put him in a position to help the disadvantaged. Mabuza worked with different stakeholders in making his small contribution to education and it is more than others were willing to do.

Mabuza did not act alone or in a vacuum. The collaboration of different individuals on various educational projects illustrates Latour‟s argument in Actor-network theory that different actors (and networks) can align their interests in social interaction (1999; 1987) and that leaders do not necessarily possess special features that distinguish them or make them successful but that the secret to their success lies in the nature of their social networks which are used for mutual benefit. In the case of Penryn College, the need to realise a common goal

across racial and class/economic lines to redress imbalances in South Africa‟s education system was a convergence of such interests. The project drew individuals such as David Wylde, Bill Carter, Professor Selby Ripinga (who was KaNgwane‟s Minister of Education), Dr Lynn Hurry, Peter Laburn and others who had very different backgrounds but a common passion for education (Wylde, Interview August 2007). This also supports Bourdieu‟s (1986:241–258; Crossley, 2005:28-29, 32-33) *fields* and the interplay or collaborative efforts between people (agents), social structures (external factors or *fields*) and the different forms of *capital* they possess and/or contribute.

Chapter 6: Mabuza's Contribution to Nature Conservation

6.1 Introduction

Climate change and global warming are arguably the most crucial issues or environmental challenge of our time and many people agree that something must be done to help reverse the severe environmental degradation caused by development across the globe (Battel-Mink and Kastenholz, 2005:1-12; Brechin, 2008:467-474; Sekhar, 2003; Beck, 1995). The Green Movements of the 1960s and 1970s led to the founding of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in 1961 (of which Mabuza was a member) and Greenpeace in 1971. The Brundtland Commission of 1983 (World Commission on Environment and Development) was tasked to examine the world"s environmental problems and propose means to address them by devising strategies or mechanisms to ensure that the planet"s resources can cope with and meet the needs of present generations without compromising those of future generations. A report entitled *Our Common Future* was published by the commission and it advocated sustainable development as a way to reduce the effects of human activities on the environment for future generations through conservation or the preservation of renewable and non-renewable resources. Such measures were designed to reduce unnecessary pressure on these resources as well as reducing emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases to minimise the effects of global warming and climate change. Another important issue on the agenda were efforts to reduce the loss of plant and animal species (Brundtland Commission, 1987:8; Beck, 1995a).

The research carried out by the Brundtland Commission led to the first Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, followed by the 1997 United Nations Framework for Climate Change in Kyoto, Japan which culminated in the 2001 Kyoto Protocol on climate change aimed at preventing or effectively managing natural disasters. The third Earth Summit/World Summit on Sustainable Development was held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002 (26 August-4 September) and one of its aims was to create an awareness of environmental issues at grassroots levels. However the main problem that communities have/had with conservation efforts is that their long and short term goals do not seem to correspond with those of local communities in terms of survival and subsistence despite the imperative to protect natural resources for future generations. This antagonism has often led to half-hearted conservation efforts. Brechin sums up this attitude or ambivalence as follows: "Environmental concerns have become and continue to be seen as background noise, like distant thunder on an

otherwise sunny day, so why pack up the picnic?" (Brechin, 2008:472) but we cannot afford to bury our heads in the sand either. Ecological politics (Beck, 1995b) or what Giddens (1994a:15) terms life politics refers to a "politics of lifestyle which concerns how, both as individuals and collectively, we should live in a world where what used to be fixed either by nature or tradition is now subject to human decision" or the dark, destructive side of technology (the consequences of modernity).

This chapter examines Mabuza‟s contribution to the field of conservation and the networks (social and professional) that he was able to build with it. It begins with an overview of the key debates in the area followed by a historical perspective of South Africa‟s conservation projects from the colonial era up until the early 1994 when a new democratic political dispensation was introduced. This section covers forced removals of Africans from their ancestral lands to make way for game parks as well as their exclusion from visiting or decision making processes even though they lived on the boundaries of these parks. The next section is an overview of some of the conservation stakeholders (individuals and lobby groups) that Mabuza had on-going connections with. This network includes, among others, the National Parks Board and the organisation Food and Trees for Africa. Mabuza‟s interest in conservation issues publicly began in the late 1970s, around the same time that he joined Bantustan politics but his observable commitment to conservation came in the mid 1980s when he was instrumental in establishing three game reserves - Mahushe Shongwe, Songimvelo and Mthethomusha in the former KaNgwane Bantustan where he was born. The general character of these parks is outlined and the chapter concludes with a consideration of the utility or purpose (means-ends) of the linkages between the various stakeholders identified in the chapter and the attendant power dynamics in determining who does/did what, when and why.

6.2.1 SA Conservation in Historical Perspective (Colonial Period - 1994)

The Western or colonial conservation emphasis used to be biased in favour of scientific wildlife environmental management, research and monitoring (including publications) and to a lesser extent, tourism. This utilitarian outlook informed early conservation interventions in the Mpumalanga area where wildlife was targeted for commercial hunting. There were ready markets for large quantities of animal hides and ivory locally and abroad. Wildlife provided meat (fresh and Dried/biltong). Africans, on the other hand, valued certain wild animal species as sacred totem animals but hunted mainly for subsistence and not trade. The overall

result was excessive hunting and severe depletion of wild animals in the area (Carruthers, 2007a:152; Mabunda, Pienaar and Verhoef, 2003:6-7). The different values, approaches and priorities regarding wildlife from this stage laid the foundation for the conflict and injustice which was to poison African and settler relations over conservation matters. For one thing, nature enthusiasts in the region in the late nineteenth century were not bound to the country and their main objective was selfish, transient entertainment and the rush of the buffalo, giraffe, water-buck and elephant trophy hunt especially between the Crocodile and Komati rivers (Carruthers, 2007a:151). It was not a survival question for them but it most definitely was for the local inhabitants who needed to safeguard the natural resources which they depended on for a living.

A series of Location Acts passed in 1869, 1876, and 1884 and the 1913 Land Act outlawed rent-paying and share-cropping farming by blacks. Blacks lost rights to private property and free trade many years before the National Party and official apartheid was instituted. The division of South Africa into white and black areas had been virtually finalised by the Land Act of 1936 which outlawed black purchase of white land and the Group Areas Act of 1950 prevent the development of a system of private property for blacks. Further, during the 1960s, blacks who still owned land in white areas were forced to move. Until 1994, blacks could not own land in over 85% of greater South Africa and the result was overwhelming human suffering, widespread famine poverty and malnutrition (Keenan, 1987:120; Keenan and Sarakinsky, 1987:581-599; Unterhalter, 1987). In the barren reserves or Bantustans, the marginalised populations were involved in cattle herding and shepherding, tilling, ploughing and reaped barely enough to survive from small plots of land. They lacked basic economic and political rights (civil liberties) and chiefs and headmen tended to allocate land for political, not economic purposes since they derived their power and privilege from the right to allocate land.

The agricultural and industrial reforms of the 1980s left Bantustan populations with even less land for subsistence, let alone for productive, commercial black farming. This ensured that blacks remained dependent on (white) capitalists for their livelihood. Increased black spot removals and forced resettlement into the Bantustans and the redefinition of Bantustan borders to include many of the relocation or dumping grounds (consolidation of the Bantustans) which had originally been left on the South African side of the borders (Keenan, 1987:120; Keenan and Sarakinsky, 1987:581-599; Unterhalter, 1987). There was also

intensified squatting and slum clearance even though, as part of the reforms, influx control had been abolished and restoration of citizenship legislation had been passed in the form of the Aliens and Immigration Laws Amendment Act of 1984. Residents of the six self-governing territories, and not the four independent ones, could enter South Africa for employment without having to contend with elaborate immigration (Home Affairs) procedures but it was small comfort for everything else they had lost over the years.

The Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) published many materials regarding rural land struggles, forced removals, land claims, disputes and restitution in the early 1990s. The Association made a critical observation that conservation agendas had a bad image in local communities. Local communities were hostile to conservation efforts because they were often reminiscent of colonial times as well as black spot and other forced removals to make way for game parks from which they were excluded and for the consolidation of the Bantustans. Title deeds and property rights were disregarded and land was effectively stolen from them. This victimisation incensed local communities so that instead of embracing conservation as a way of life – taking responsibility for the conservation of soil, botanical and animal resources, land use, they were shunned and illegal hunting or poaching was rampant because of a general lack of consultation with them as stakeholders. With respect to the creation of game parks, communities were often displaced and relocated elsewhere to make way and the disruption led to a loss of traditional livelihoods (fish, animals, wild fruits, thatching grass, firewood, weaving grass and medicinal plants). The communities did not realise any benefit/revenue or benefit from the nature reserves which were imposed on them and they often were denied access as well as employment. Conservationists prioritised plants and animals over people and a balance or compromise was needed. Examples of this wanton disregard for local communities can be cited from Bantustan experiences. The establishment of the Thembe Elephant Park along the Mozambican border (in Ingwavuma District) by the KwaZulu government in 1983 and the Kosi Bay Nature Reserve and Thukela Biosphere Reserve in 1988 caused many problems and a similar thing happened in Bophuthatswana when Lucas Mangope‟s government commissioned a 7500ha game park in the Madikwe area without consulting locals, including the chiefs (Association for Rural Advancement - Karis Gerhart Collection).

6.2.2 Forced Removals and the Deliberate Exclusion of Blacks from National Parks

The Kruger National Park was created through forced removals of livestock, people and evidence of human habitation and production. The existence of the Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele and Lebowa Bantustans along the parks western border is testimony of these displacements (Jensen, 2007:196-197). With specific reference to KaNgwane, many of the families in its Nkomazi area were evicted from the Kruger National Park into the poorest part of KaNgwane on the border with Mozambique with Swaziland to the south and Kruger to the north. Life for these families was particularly difficult because Nkomazi is isolated from the industrial, mining and commercial farming centres and unemployment was high. The area is home to Shangaans, Swazis and Mozambican refugees that settled there during that country‟s civil war (Kloppers, 2005). Mozambican refugees ended up in camps on the rural areas of far flung places like in Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi Zimbabwe, Swaziland and South Africa, with those countries closest to Mozambique carrying the heavier burden. In South Africa, most of the refugees were concentrated along the north-eastern border, which was adjacent to the KaNgwane homeland. Mabuza‟s decision to house the refugees and assist them can be seen as being in defiance of the wishes of the South African government, given the ambiguous relationship that existed between Mozambique and South African despite the existence of the Nkomati Accord as well as the open aggression of the South African security forces in actively destabilising Mozambique (Grundy 1986:71-87; Dominy, 1986:71- 92; Kloppers, 2005). The socio-economic circumstances in this region and the population‟s composition make it ripe for tensions and open conflict even today (Jensen, 2007:196-197; Kloppers, 2005).

There is general consensus that the sustainable use of wildlife resources, pastures for livestock and land for cultivation should be a priority but conserving biodiversity is also important. Determining the relative weight of these is, however, a contested thing depending on who is advocating what, when and where. Historically, the first conservationists in South Africa (initially in the Kruger National Park) adopted a traditional, centralised, hierarchical or top-down approach. Forced removals of Africans from the Kruger Park and adjacent areas caused animosity between the park‟s management and local rural communities (Mabunda, Pienaar and Verhoef, 2003:9). The exclusion of Africans atomised and destabilised communities and many traditions were lost in the process as African indigenous knowledge about the land and its plants and animals was rejected in favour of Western science. The main focus for botanical and zoological experts was on cataloguing (naming and counting) the

different fish, reptile, mammal, amphibian, insect and bird diversity and, where possible, increasing the numbers of desirable species under controlled conditions (predator or vermin eradication- cheetah, wild dog, crocodile and leopard). Emphasis was also put on measure to deter poaching by local s around the park (Carruthers, 2007a:162). Other aspects of landscape heritage such as its geology, archaeology and history were neglected (Carruthers, 2007a:164).

Further, the National Party came to power in 1948 and introduced apartheid and as a parastatal, the National Parks Board received and implemented apartheid policies or directives without question. The few blacks who worked in the park were low paid labourers and were not promoted to higher positions (Carruthers, 2007a:169; Mabunda, Pienaar and Verhoef, 2003:13).

In championing environmental issues, Mabuza was not oblivious to the fact that his people had been removed from the best-known national park (Kruger) in the country (the oldest in Southern Africa) in the early 1900s in order to make way for wildlife. He also witnessed the Kruger National Park become the economic powerhouse of the Mpumalanga lowveld and deny blacks admission but he did not become bitter. Instead, it strengthened his resolve to find a way in which the park could be used to benefit local communities (Player, 2003). The most publicised land claim against SANParks has been that of the Makuleke community in the northern part of the Kruger National Park which applied for restitution in 1995. This community had lived in this area for roughly 200 years and was forcibly removed from 23 700 ha of land between the Levhuvhu and Limpopo Rivers by the Transvaal authorities in 1969 in order to expand the Kruger National Park to the north. The community was provided with alternative land to resettle on outside the park but wanted to return to its ancestral land in the park. The claim was resolved in 1998 with the land rights of the Makuleke being restored. However, the people would not re-inhabit the area but would manage it jointly as a protected area with SANParks. In this way, the community derives an income from the wildlife and tourist facilities in the area and has formed a partnership with Wilderness Safaris to run a tourist lodge (Carruthers, 2007:300-301; Fraser, 2007:299-311). Other notable claims against SANParks have been in the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park and the Pilanesberg National Park (instigated by Chief Pilane of the Bakgatla).

Mabunda, Pienaar and Verhoef (2003:13-14) note that the physical and psychological separation of blacks from the national parks meant that most blacks did not have a sense of ownership for them in the early 1990s. In the Mpumalanga area noted for its parks, for

example, blacks had very limited access to the major national parks and were encouraged instead to visit Manyeleti Game Reserve which was situated in the Gazankulu Bantustan and was far inferior compared to the Kruger National Park.

6.3 Key Debates in Conservation Circles in Mabuza's Time

Scientists and policy makers insist that the world has entered an environmental crisis and this has contributed to an almost fanatical need to protect natural areas from certain types of human use. The different groups involved do not agree on the extent of this crisis (if it already exists) or its imminence. The situation, however, cannot be dismissed simply as the imaginings of alarmists but there is no consensus regarding how it should be responded to in order to protect threatened flora and fauna species whilst guaranteeing socio-economic development and poverty eradication (Carruthers, 2007a; Battel-Mink and Kastenholz, 2005:1-12; Brechin, 2008:467-474; Sekhar, 2003; Beck, 1995a; Beck, 1995b; Giddens, 1994a:). Sustainable development as the guiding discourse for current environment and development planning which tries to overcome the shortcomings of traditional approaches by merging conservation and development goals. However, what constitutes sustainable development is ambiguous and, at best, depends on the social and power dynamics of specific locales or contexts (socio-economic, political and environmental) and the people‟s receptiveness to the interventions which are implemented (Carruthers, 2007a: 147-174; Carruthers, 2007b:293-297; Carruthers, 1995). Community conservation is designed to ensure that the benefits of infrastructure, revenue and capacity-building opportunities offered by national parks are widely shared through arrangements in which local residents benefit materially and/or gain in terms of education and training. Land restitution claims, in South Africa for instance, are enabling previously marginalised communities to reclaim heritage values or a sense of place and belonging re-connecting them to their ancestral lands (Carruthers, 2007a:170).

McNeely (1993) discusses instances of innovative uses of economic incentives to promote conservation or entice locals into supporting it in various conservation projects around the world. Different types of agreements include profit-sharing, resource utilisation, the preservation of traditional ceremonies and the creation of local employment have been reached between conservationists and the people surrounding protected areas and whether this is tantamount to bribery or not is one of the on-going debates (McNeely, 1993:146-147). However, difficulties have been encountered relating to unrealistic expectations of income

from tourism, lack of capacity as well as intra-community divisions which are compounded by inappropriate interfaces between management structures and incoherence in the articulation of community needs and those prioritising protected areas. Are these so-called new conservation interventions merely elaborate and perverted schemes to seduce people into forfeiting what was rightfully theirs? Are local communities deliberately misinformed about the benefits that will accrue to them and their distribution in a bid by conservationists to give legitimacy to their actions? Where does one draw the line and does the new emphasis on community involvement make today‟s conservation projects fundamentally different from the traditional utilitarian and business-like conservation approaches? In KaNgwane, for example, the site of the tourist lodge in the Mthethomusha Game Reserve was leased to the private sector with the lease being paid into a trust fund to be used for community projects elected by the tribal authority (McNeely, 1993:146-147).

Brian King has conducted research evaluating the impacts of conservation and development projects in Southern Africa (mainly South Africa and the Mpumalanga/KaNgwane area) using quantitative and qualitative data. KaNgwane‟s livelihood patterns ranged from subsistence-based agriculture and environmental resource dependency to full-time employment in a variety of sectors. And the focus of King‟s work has been on the intersection or debates between securing livelihoods for the poor and imperatives to save the environment - social versus environmental justice (livelihoods versus biodiversity and ecosystems) and the implications for human populations dependent on various resources for survival. The situation creates obvious political, socio-economic and ethical dilemmas but how do we balance these competing goals when conservation has long been commercialised and grown accustomed to demanding that sacrifices be made; usually by those in positions where they cannot afford such sacrifices. However, there are always new opportunities and avenues for development agencies to pursue their particular goals. King‟s research shows that there is measurable community variation in the perceptions and benefits arising from community conservation initiatives (King, 2007a:207–219; King 2007b:13-25; King, 2006:79-96, King, 2005). In the South African context, any conservation project has to take into consideration the history of racial exclusion and forced removals and current attempts at land reform (restitution) and what is meant by adequate compensation. Local conditions such as land use patterns (crop farming, pastoralism), land tenure systems, leadership struggles and contests between a modern youthful politicised element and the more traditional leadership structures. Although the vigorous promotion of national and international conservation

agendas have generated interest in community conservation projects that attempt to include local participation and their knowledge in natural resource management, King (2007a) points out that the initial excitement associated with community conservation has waned in light of recent assessments which have concluded that it has been unsuccessful in meeting its ecological and social goals. The elderly, destitute, widows, orphans, unmarried teen mothers - those on the fringes or neglected because of circumstances forced to exploit natural resources for survival .They are the most disadvantaged in these debates because they usually operate outside the economic mainstream and are unlikely to gainfully employed because of their levels of education and/or lack of formal skills.

6.4 Conservation Stakeholders Linked to Enos Mabuza

Ian Player is the brother of world renowned Grand Slam professional golfer Gary Player -a prominent member of the "white golfing establishment" according to Bell (2004:26). Bell quotes Gary Player in his 1966 book, *Grand Slam Golf* in which he declares: "I must say now, and clearly, that I am a South African of Verwoerd and apartheid" (Bell, 2004:26). She uses this statement to show that although Gary Player is celebrated as a progressive white person, he was in fact an opportunist who changed his tune to fit in after having spent most of his time as an avid supporter and promoter of apartheid governments and their policies. Bell also notes that B J Vorster was Gary Player‟s friend and sometime golf partner, an observation which she believes justifies her labelling him an opportunist when apartheid eventually met its demise. However his brother Ian is known for different reasons. Ian Player insisted that matters of beauty and spirit were as important to conservation as science, and that people and cultures are an important part of the environmental equation.

Walters‟ (2003) 3-page citation of outstanding and celebrated South African conservationist and environmentalist Ian Player‟s achievements notes that began his distinguished career (spans over 50 years) in conservation in 1952 before it became fashionable. He started out as a game ranger with the Natal Parks Board where he stayed for 22 years and retired as Chief Conservator in 1974 when he established The WILD Foundation. He was also the warden of the Umfolozi Game Reserve and sought the support of black leaders in order to get community buy-in for various conservation initiatives. He promoted conservation initiatives and raised funds for environmental projects to popularise the concept of conservation and to bring its urgency and importance to the widest possible audience. In doing so, he founded among others, the Wilderness Leadership School, the first organization in Africa dedicated to

providing a pure wilderness experience to people of all backgrounds, races and nationalities even during the dark apartheid days. The Wilderness Leadership School is a conservation education and experiential programme aimed at developing leaders and preserving the wilderness. Consequently, it spawned a global network of conservationists from all sectors of life committed to saving the wilderness and wildlife. He also started the Wilderness Foundation SA and co-founded the Wilderness Foundation (UK) (now the Wilderness Trust) in collaboration with Sir Laurens van der Post, Edmund de Rothschild and the Duke of Wellington. In his book The Dark Eye in Africa (1955), Laurens van der Post demanded battle against racism in Africa. Player established and convened the first World Wilderness Congress which first convened in Johannesburg in 1977. More that 2000 of the world‟s leading scientists, politicians, financial leaders, poets and artists, including Enos Mabuza, shared that platform to focus attention on the need for conservation and the protection of wilderness areas as well as promoting the practical means of accomplishing such goals[28]. Ian Player has received several honours for his work including the Knight of the Order of the Golden Ark from the WWF, Decoration for Meritorious Service (SA) (the highest Republic of South African civilian award), Conservation Statesman Award (SA), Gold Medal for Conservation (USA) and Conservationist of the Year (twice: USA). Player was a close friend of Mabuza‟s and greatly influenced his involvement in conservation. Mabuza tried to emulate Player on a smaller scale by contributing to conservation matters in his own community and helping to raise funds for various other conservation projects.

Enos Mabuza‟s passion and commitment to conservation issues developed early in his life as a young boy who loved the outdoors and grew up surrounded by the natural splendour of the Barberton area. He was invited by Ian Player to address the World Wilderness Congress in Johannesburg in 1977. He also attended the second World Wilderness Congress in Queensland Australia in 1980 with his wife attended and again addressed an audience of distinguished people such as Dr. Ian Player and Sir Laurens van der Post (Martin, 1997:48). The next year (1981) Mabuza addressed the Eighth International Game Conservation Conference in the United States of America and in 1986 he attended the Conference of the World Wildlife Fund in Italy. He became actively involved in various conservation organisations around the same time that he became involved in Bantustan politics and beyond. Compared to his politics and participation in business, conservation issues were a

[28] See http://www.wild.org/main/about/wilderness-network/ and http://www.wildernessfoundation.co.za for additional references.

scandal-free crusade for him. His entrance onto the conservation scene might have been a deliberate effort on his part to change tempo, slow things down and deflect attention from his politics. Compared to the politics and business phases of his career, conservation was probably less emotionally taxing and more satisfying even though it might have been just as time consuming as the others. Conservation presented a safer, perhaps neutral option for his advocacy because the chances of generating controversy, being judged and criticised were significantly less. It was a diversion or distraction in which he did not have to take sides necessarily or bear all the responsibility. His participation in conservation circles, however, allowed him to create new social and professional networks and standing as this chapter highlights. Dr. Frank Raimondo and Dr. Jeremy Anderson are among those that Mabuza worked with in conservation on the through Ian Player‟s initiatives. Dr. Jeremy Anderson is a respected environmentalist in Africa and he ran the KaNgwane Parks Board and worked closely with Mabuza (Ms Rosemary Smuts[29], email communication March 2009).

Mabuza was concerned about and encouraged the efforts of ordinary people in investing in or managing the environment/resources. He later came to serve on several environmental and community trusts, including the National Parks Board, Food & Trees for Africa, the Independent Development Trust and the 1820 Foundation. He was also a member of the Board of Trustees of the Wilderness Leadership School. Mabuza was instrumental in promoting responsible use of renewable and non-renewable resources, empowering the disadvantaged so that they can become self-reliant and helping to establish two nature reserves (Songimvelo and Mthethomusha in areas that made up the former KaNgwane Bantustan) in the Mpumalanga lowveld where he came from. Mabuza was committed to driving environmental conservation initiatives and prioritise ecological balance in order to counteract aggressive or careless developmental agendas. However, conservation was a white male dominated (like most other fields at the time) and a specialised arena[30].

Ian Player, a prominent conservationist first met Enos Mabuza in 1976 at a function in White River, Mpumalanga when Player was organising the first World Wilderness Congress which was scheduled to take place in Johannesburg in October 1977. Player (2003:170) recalls that he took to Mabuza when he joked about the name White River and asked “When do we get a

[29] She used to work with Enos Mabuza in the KaNgwane government and was later the Social Secretary to the British High Commissioner. She is co-founder, director and fundraiser for the Caring Network South Africa which operates in greater Cape Town since 2001.

[30] Wildlife ecology, park/biodiversity management, botanical research, wildlife management and community development based on needs assessments, research and lobbying policy.

Black River?" They became close friends after that and Player invited Mabuza to be a keynote speaker at the October 1977 World Wilderness Congress. Player comments that Enos Mabuza served as Chairman of the National Parks Board (now SANParks) "at a decisive time in the country‟s conservation history." He adds further that "It was my privilege and joy to serve under him until his untimely death and to witness his gentlemanly approach, incisiveness and humility during the crucial transformation period through which the National Parks had to pass" (Player, 2003:170). Mabuza lived his whole life on the edge of the Kruger National Park and "had a deep love for the landscape and the great variety of life within the Park."

Paul De Bruyn is another example of individuals that were in Mabuza‟s conservation circles. De Bruyn is Co-Founder and CEO of Ukwakhisana, an initiative focused on the socio-economic development of communities near the Kruger National Park. In 1988, De Bruyn raised R98 million on behalf of Enos Mabuza for low cost housing in KaNgwane. He was also responsible for private sector funding and the management of the establishment of the Maputaland Coastal Forest Reserve (1991-1998). In 1992/3 he successfully mediated a dispute between five communities and neighbouring farmers in KZN Midlands. Between 1996 and 1999 he raised approximately R500 000 for disadvantaged children‟s programmes - CHOC, Johannesburg Children‟s Home & Autism SA. At the third National Conservancy Conference held 30 April-1 May 2005 and entitled "The Power of Conservancies" De Bruyn‟s presentation was entitled "Local Communities: The Vital Denominator." The conference was hosted by the Mpumalanga Conservancy Association which was founded in February 2004 and whose members participate in shared tourism and conservation projects that involve local people. The Mpumalanga Conservancy Association is a member of the non-profit National Association of Conservancies/Stewardship South Africa (NACSA or NACSSA) which was established in August 2003 to promote community-driven conservation (stewardship of natural resources) and to network with local and international bodies with similar aims (http://www.nacsa.co.za/). NACSA defines conservancies (community-based conservation) as voluntary association between land users/owners who cooperatively wish to manage their natural resources in an environmentally sustainable manner (http://www.nacsa.co.za/).

James Stevenson-Hamilton and Sue Hart is a renowned Mpumalanga conservationist veterinarian that Mabuza worked closely with. She established the non-governmental

educational organisation Ecolink to nurture the connection between people and nature through enrichment programmes, including Environmental Youth Clubs, Environmental Education, Youth Outreach, Water Management, Skills Training and Small Scale Farming. There is also the Ecolink EarthCare programme which was established in 1986 and focuses on appropriate organic farming and small scale agriculture, including aspects of suitable seeds and crop varieties, marketing and sales, recycling, health and nutrition.

The National Parks Board/SANParks

The National Parks Board was/is the highest decision-making and most important body for wildlife and conservation in South Africa. It was essentially a government department and consisted of members appointed by the government. The early 1990s were a time of great change in South Africa – political, economic and social restructuring because of the negotiations which were underway. Changes were also introduced in the management, decision-making and research philosophies of National Parks Board to reflect these national changes and to align management systems with the democratic governance principles which were to be ushered in. Internally, the restructuring exercise was regarded as an imperative to make the organisation more representative of South Africa"s demographic composition - a visible way of projecting „transformation" and the compromises of negotiated political transition. The opportunities created by the political transformation led to blacks being promoted into the ranks of the previously all white National Parks Board of Curators. The main challenge was to make the National Parks relevant to the daily lives of all South Africans (Maguranyanga, 2009:80).

Affirmative action policies were introduced in the restructuring of the board and directorate (Pollard, Shackleton, and Carruthers, 2003:438-439). Enos Mabuza became the first black board member of the National Parks Board in 1991 when the end was imminent for the apartheid regime but it still meant that he was appointed by it. After the watershed 1994 elections, the cabinet portfolio of Environmental Affairs and Tourism was assigned to the Nationalist Party because it was not considered a powerful or threatening portfolio. The „sunset clauses" which came out of the negotiated political settlement ensured that public sector agencies and government departments were not radically overhauled. This enabled both the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) and the national park agency to continue to be staffed by bureaucrats from the old regime thus ensuring continuity in many of the organisation"s practices. However, Maguranyanga (2009:80) notes that the

new Board had some socially progressive whites, including environmental sociologists (activist scholars) such as Dr. David Fig and Professor Jacklyn Cock. Mabunda, Pienaar and Verhoef (2003:14) note that the ANC government did not take a clear stand on the role of national parks from 1994 until the 1998 Kruger Centenary Celebration when Nelson Mandela articulated the future relationship between national parks and the government. According to Mandela, South Africa had entered a new era in which national parks were to be regarded as important national assets and the "conservation responsibility rested with *new leaders* in partnership with neighbouring communities (cited in Mabunda, Pienaar and Verhoef, 2003:14). There were no blacks or women in Kruger National Park management positions until 1998 when David Mabunda was appointed the first black director (park warden). By 2002, there were 36 white men, 20 black men, 11 black women and 4 white women in management positions at the park (Mabunda, Pienaar and Verhoef, 2003:14 & 17).

Political imperatives prescribed managed, gradual or incremental change within the structures and culture of the National Parks Board after 1994. A Transformation Task Group was appointed for the National Parks Board in January 1995 to develop a shared vision and goals of what needed to be transformed within the organisation and to identify key stakeholders to ensure their full participation in the process. Management objectives and targets became focused on gender equality, affirmative action and equal opportunities. Appendix 2 shows the National Parks Board"s racial composition or profile for the period March 1995- March 1997 including affirmative action placements in targeted occupational categories.[31] The organisation"s affirmative action policies focused on occupational categories that had been historically reserved for whites, although whites were not forced out of their jobs to make way for black placements (National Parks Board, 1996/97:90-91). The thrust of the organisation"s transformation agenda was put on training and development, basic conditions, remuneration affirmative action, equal opportunities, career development, occupational health and retirement/pension benefits. Training was mainly focused on visitor service/hospitality and customer care, individual training for empowerment, supervisory/management development and nature conservation (National Parks Board Annual Report 1994/95: 45).

The National Parks Board increased its contribution to the Pension Provident Fund from 10 to 12% in January 1995. A participative management philosophy was introduced to improve communication and effectiveness in the organisation and salary scales were revised to make

[31] Skilled and supervisory staff, middle and senior management and executive personnel.

them market competitive. Affirmative action was actively pursued especially for positions that blacks had been traditionally excluded such as front desk reservations, secretaries, training and human resources managers and social ecology managers. Long service was recognised with 725 employees being given awards. Despite these changes, however, increasing union activity led to work stoppage in October 1994 and a labour dispute over salary demands and basic conditions was declared in March 1995 leading to negotiations (27-29 March 1995) which stalled in early April 1995. A mediation process was initiated but failed and the union went on a legal strike for ten days. One of the union demands was for the National Parks Board Provident Fund to be converted into a union-managed fund. There was also a change in the union representation of workers of the Parks Board from Municipal Workers Union to SATAWWU (National Parks Board, 1994/5:42-45; National Parks Board, 1995/6:55-61).

The restructuring of National Parks Board in 1994 was accompanied by a commitment to engage poor rural communities adjacent to national parks. The Social Ecology Department was introduced in August 1994 with the support of several international agencies to devise ways of enabling all stakeholders to derive optimum, tangible and equitable benefits from opportunities created through the national parks system. In what can best be described as a carrot and stick approach, much talk about public benefit/use and economic empowerment through the maintenance of bio-diversity was used to get the cooperation, and in some cases, the enthusiasm, of local communities for conservation initiatives or interventions (Pollard, Shackleton, and Carruthers, 2003:438-439). This marked a shift in the National Parks Board‟s thinking and revision of its corporate identity to focus more on the developmental, financial and social aspects of conservation initiatives on surrounding communities. National parks used to be rightly perceived as being racially exclusive because surrounding black communities did not have access to them or derive direct benefits from them and are excluded from the decision-making processes. The National Parks Boards new vision required a coordinated marketing and advertising campaign to rid it of its previous elitist image. A Director of Marketing and Communication was first appointed for this task in August 1994 (National Parks Board, 1994/5:33). The Social Ecology Department worked through environmental education drives facilitated by local community and park forums to devise action plans for community development. Shareholding targets were set for the previously disadvantaged to heal the divide and give communities real equity in the form of community-owned and managed camping sites, cultural villages and craft centres and

community lodges (National Parks Board, 1994/5:31). A Social Ecology Section was established at the Kruger National Park (the flagship of the National Parks Board) in 1995 and it sought to involve neighbouring communities foster a sense of pride and ownership among the park‟s neighbours by establishing open communication channels, curio shops and restaurants (Mabunda, Pienaar and Verhoef, 2003:14 & 17).

The restructuring of National Parks Board was accompanied by plans to expand existing national parks by acquiring land adjacent to them and trans-locating animals from crowded parks to stock others as well as the creation of trans-frontier parks (National Parks Board, 1994/5:20). However, such expansion also heralded the further intrusion of national parks onto community land which was used for other things and was reminiscent of the old ways in which conservationists bulldozed their way around the countryside and took what they wanted with little regard for the needs of local communities.

In 1995, new non-white board members with expertise and experience in conservation, human rights, business and social issues were appointed to the Board. The new members included Ms F Khan, Mr V Khanyile, Mr R Maruma, Ms P R H Modise and Ms M Mbengashe, thus transforming the racial profile of the board and its policies and culture to some degree. 1995 was the first time that women served on the National Parks Board and more confidence (positive response) was shown in the board. Enos Mabuza remained an ordinary board member until October 1995 (when the ANC was now in power) when he succeeded Mr T I Steenkamp as Chairperson of the 18-member board. Mabuza served in this capacity until his death in December 1997 when he was succeeded by Mr V. Khanyile as Acting Chairman (National Parks Board Report, 1996/97:102).

Mr Mavuso Msimang previously of the South African Tourism Board - Satour) was appointed as the National Parks Board‟s Chief Executive Officer in July 1997 (succeeding Dr. Robbie Robinson who had been the National Parks Board‟s Chief Executive). Professor Amareswa Galla was appointed by the board to facilitate the organisation‟s realignment process. As the board‟s Chairman, Enos Mabuza noted that Msimang‟s appointment “brings to the post extensive national and international management experience.” The organisation‟s priorities were to make it financially viable, transform its composition and strategies and to position it as a truly post-1994 organisation whilst retaining its standing as one of the leading conservation agencies in the world. In terms of its community engagement, the National Parks Board‟s Social Ecology department was involved in various programmes with

communities adjacent to all national parks under its management to ensure their economic growth and welfare (http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1997/072435397.htm). The name of the organisation changed from the National Parks Board to the South African National Parks (SANParks) in December 1997 and its logo would change the following year (National Parks Board, 1996/97:104).

Food and Trees for Africa (FTFA)

Food and Trees for Africa (FTFA) was founded in 1990 as Trees for Africa – a non-profit, environmental and education organization. Helen Suzman was a founding patron of the multiple award-winning FTFA which is the sub-Saharan partner of Global ReLeaf. It works in partnership with government, the private and public sectors, local authorities and civil society to improve the quality of life and environments for all communities in South Africa. Its sponsors and partners include Audi South Africa, ABSA, Woolworths Trust, South African Breweries, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, the Department of Agriculture, Eskom, USAID, the Danish Cooperation for Environmental Development (DANCED), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Green Trust, Barloworld, Deutsche Bank, the Royal Netherlands Embassy and the Urban Greening Fund, with Mabuza having served as a board member South African Breweries. Ms Jeunesse Park is the organisation‟s founder and Chief Executive Officer and she is also the founder of the Carbon Standard & Global Carbon Exchange which is primarily concerned with to offsetting carbon dioxide emissions. The organisation‟s focus was initially on the protection and management of the environment by developing, promoting and facilitating national greening programmes[32] in degraded environments, offsetting carbon emissions to manage climate change, food security and sustainable natural resource use and management. Individuals, schools, churches and other community centres big and small donate trees for the organisation‟s greening projects and vegetable seeds and seedlings for home food gardens/food security (http://www.trees.co.za/home/aboutus/history.html).

FTFA‟s founders wanted to contribute to a healthy and sustainable quality of life for all through environmental awareness, addressing the pressing issue of global warming. However, the organisation‟s name was changed in 2000 to reflect its increasing focus on food security through perma-culture food gardening activities designed to help alleviate poverty in

[32] Environmental stewardship programmes such as Trees for Homes, EduPlant and the Urban Greening Forum which have environmental/aesthetic, social and economic benefits such as trees for homes/timber/construction and capacity building and skills development with a consultative community-based approach to ensure sustainability.

low income households by contributing towards food security. FTFA has raised its corporate identity in the area of community environmental upliftment particularly in the townships and villages where it promotes self-reliance. In 1997, Kader Asmal was the Minister of Water Affairs & Forestry and he praised FTFA praised as "a dynamic, progressive and accountable NGO" (http://www.trees.co.za/home/aboutus/history.html).

Ms Park describes Mabuza as a wonderful and highly respected friend and Chairman of FTFA from 1993 until his death in 1997. She remembers him as an active and effective Chairman who contributed to conceptualising viable community programmes, connecting the organisation with high profile people and used his existing networks and high profile business connections to raise funds for the organisation. The FTFA started the Enos Mabuza Horticultural Bursary Fund after he passed away and it has been used to pay for a number of students to study horticulture since then (Jeunesse Park, email communication March 2009). In the FTFA 1994 Review, Enos Mabuza (then Chairman), noted that FTFA"s urban renewal programme had planted over 62 000 trees that year. He acknowledged that the symbolic value of the exercise far outweighed the immediate environmental impact but the organisation"s emphasis was the importance of environmental upliftment as a critical factor in urban renewal. Mabuza and others in the FTFA positioned the organisation to participate in the development of long-term environmental education programmes, particularly since its work was/is endorsed by the Departments of the Environment and Education (http://www.trees.co.za/home/aboutus/history.html). In 1998, Windsor Shuenyane replaced Mabuza as Chairman of Trees for Africa. He had been closely associated with the organisation since its inception nine years before. Shuenyane was succeeded as Chairman by Prof Mohale Mahanyele. Kumi Naidoo and Dali Tambo have served on the FTFA"s Board of Directors.

Team Africa, Open Africa and Afrikatourism

Mabuza was also a member of Team Africa which is comprised of corporations, professionals and individuals including Dr. G A „Robbie" Robinson; Dr. Ian Player; Prof W Roy Siegfried; Mr Errol Martin; Prof Ernie Heath; Dr. George R Hughes and Mr TI Steenkamp who formed a strategic alliance of those who share the non-governmental organisation Open Africa"s vision in the Afrikatourism Project. Open Africa was founded by Noel de Villiers in 1995 with representatives from Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Swaziland. Afrikatourism is based on sustainability and community

participation to optimise and balance the synergies between tourism, job creation and the conservation of natural and cultural resources, the continent‟s heritage. Nelson Mandela is a patron of Afrikatourism and some of its sponsors include the Anglo American Corporation, De Beers, FirstRand, Sanlam Investment Management, the European Union, Transnet Foundation, the Business Trust, Wilderness Foundation South Africa and the World Bank (http://www.africandream.org/navtop/aboutus).

The Wilderness Conservancy

Enos Mabuza served as a member of the Wilderness Conservancy advisory team with Nick Steele (Director of KwaZulu Department of Nature Conservation), Vance Martin (President of The WILD Foundation and The International Wilderness Leadership Foundation), Walter C. Quinn (President of The ZOO), Dr. George Hughes (Acting Chief Executive of KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Service who has also served as Chief Executive of the Natal Parks Board) and Ian Player (whose credentials have already been mentioned above) (http://www.wildernessconservancy.org/about/advisors.html).

Splendidly Alive People within Limited Environmental Resources (SAPLER)

The Splendidly Alive People within Limited Environmental Resources (SAPLER Population Trust) is a non-governmental organisation and as its name suggests, it is mainly focused on population issues such as birth and death rates, birth control, the AIDS pandemic, poverty and livelihoods - socio-economic, moral or political issues which depend on access to health care and health information and have implications for resource use in the long term. The HIV/AIDS pandemic, for example, has taken over significant portions of health budgets and services and less attention is being given to family planning issues as a result. Further, SAPLER has expressed concern over the tendency to want to replace AIDS deaths with new children, thus maintaining the population as it was, or increasing it. One of SAPLER‟s goals is to control population growth by reducing teenage pregnancies in order to contain human demands on natural and other resources/the environment. The organisation is also concerned about the general attitudes (resistance) of some religious groups, Catholics in particular, to discussing the issue of early marriages and child bearing, the legalising of abortion and oral contraceptives in as far as they impact birth control/family planning and population growth. SAPLER‟s trustees support abortion on request – if and when a woman makes the choice to have one. In the mid 1990s, one of the interventions or projects that SAPLER, in conjunction

with other organisations[33], undertook in a bid to address the population and AIDS problems was to try and motivate behaviour change in South Africa on a large scale through the provision of relevant information which would enable them to make informed or correct decisions regarding their reproductive health. It promoted correct and consistent condom use and at the same time aimed at reducing the stigma associated with AIDS and condoms especially among the most vulnerable population groups such as adolescents, migrant workers and commercial sex workers. According to the organisation‟s website, Archbishop Desmond Tutu supports its efforts (SAPLER National Survey online).

SAPLER acknowledged Mabuza‟s work as an "ardent environmentalist" but criticised the fact that he wrote the introduction to *The Green Pages (1991/92)* but failed to highlight or mention population or family planning. *SAPLER* does mention, however, that they visited the former KaNgwane and Lebowa Bantustans in the early 1990s and noted that the people of KaNgwane were wary of family planning programmes. When asked why this was so, they were either told, "This is a very Catholic area," or "This is a very tribal area where the women are afraid of the chiefs" (SAPLER National Survey online). From these responses, it is obvious that tradition or culture had direct implications for population control and, by extension, resource use or overuse – barriers that Mabuza and other environmentally conscious people had to contend with. Kaufman‟s research into the use of modern contraceptive use by black women, with a focus on the Bantustans, shows that South African geopolitics and the context of family planning (individual and community influences, including traditions and education levels) play a role. She found that KaNgwane had low levels of contraceptive use compared to the other Bantustans but notes that women who lived in KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, and the Ciskei were not significantly different from black women in Natal (the reference category) in their propensity to use modern contraceptives (Kaufman, 1998:429). KaNgwane and KwaNdebele had reasonable infrastructure and access to white South Africa, unlike Gazankulu, for example, but Kaufman comments that the governments of these three Bantustans were not particularly supportive of family planning (Kaufman, 1998:424).

[33] The United States based Population Services International and the South African non-governmental organisation "The Society for Family Health" (SFH).

6.5 Mabuza's Conservation Initiatives in KaNgwane



Figure 2: Greater Kruger National Park area showing Nelspruit, Barberton and the Mozambican and Swaziland borders with South Africa.

Carruthers (2007a:149) notes that our identities and sense of „belonging" is shaped by the places we grow up in or move to and vice versa. She acknowledges that certain landscapes are not just aesthetically pleasing but also have a powerful cultural component which is evidenced by numerous San rock art sites, for example. The natural beauty of the Barberton and its Bulembu Mountain Pass where Enos Mabuza was born, and what is now Mpumalanga province, held particular significance throughout his life. Mpumalanga is known for its impressive plant and animal diversity, many private game reserves and protected areas such as botanical and zoological gardens which offer a variety of activities such as walking and horse riding trails, bird watching, fly fishing, photographic safaris and trophy hunting expeditions. The Kruger National Park is the main attraction but it is not the only one. There are others such as the Nelspruit Nature Reserve, the Blyderivierspoort Nature Reserve, the Gustav Klingbiel Reserve and the 2500 ha Barberton Game Reserve (Carruthers, 2007:149).

Mabuza"s birth place, Barberton, features many reminders of the early gold rush in the form of museums such as the Cultural Historical Forestry Museum which showcases aspects of South Africa"s forestry industry. It also has the Mount Sheba Nature Reserve south of

Pilgrim‟s Rest, which is a living museum of the early gold mining town. Mount Sheba Nature Reserve is best known for its indigenous forests and the Lowveld National Botanical Gardens has rare lowveld species including indigenous ferns, trees and cycads. The Barberton area also has verdite deposits which are used by sangomas to promote fertility. Another attraction in the Barberton area is God‟s Window which provides a magnificent view of miles of thickly forested mountains and rich plant diversity. The Crocodile River cascades 12 metres into a series of rock pools to form the Montrose Falls in Schoemanskloof. Other spectacular falls include the Bridal Veil, Horseshoe and Lone Creek Falls. Other striking rock formations include the Sudwala Caves, Bourkes‟s Luck Potholes and the Blyde River Canyon which is a 26 kilometre gorge carved out of the face of the escarpment. The Blyde River Canyon is the third largest gorge in the world after the Grand Canyon in the United States and the Fish River Canyon in Namibia. Mpumalanga is also rich in coal reserves (Witbank, Secunda) and power stations which, unfortunately, cause high levels of air pollution. Forestry (timber plantation of pine, gum and Australian wattles) and paper mills are also part of the Mpumalanga landscape particularly in the Sabie and other areas. However, this naturally rich area, like many others, faces challenges to its preservation and leaders like Mabuza tried to do their part to preserve it.

Mabuza addressed guests at the 1990 Audi Environmental Awards with a speech entitled "The Stewardship of Creation" and quoted Robert Ardrey (1977) when he said "…A philosophy of enmity with nature and an urge to reduce the wilderness to extinction, is a philosophy of human extinction" (Mabuza 1990: pages un-numbered). He realised that the earth is non-renewable and that ordinary people needed a different attitude of different appreciation of this reality because our planet and everything in it, the things we take for granted and assume will always be there might not always be there. However, in doing so, he also noted that people will not see the need or urgency for conservation in the face of these more immediate socio-economic problems and deficiencies such as widespread poverty. It was, therefore, imperative for leaders to attend to matters of social justice (the distribution of resources) before people at the grassroots could buy into conservation ideals (Mabuza, 1990: un-numbered pages).

For Mabuza, conservation was about prioritising ecological balance instead of the aggressive developmental agendas and careless natural resource use. He acknowledged the pressures posed by rapid population growth and the attendant ills such as over-stocking, over-grazing

and others which lead to or exacerbate processes of land degradation and desertification (Mabuza, 1990: un-numbered pages). His address made a call for environmental legislation to define the parameters for technological development so that we can preserve vegetation, catchment areas, wildlife and the ozone/atmosphere (Mabuza, 1990: unnumbered pages). He advocated for holistic and integrated approaches to conservation by academics, big business, politicians and professional conservationists as well as local communities – similar to the bottom-up, consultative approach which was adopted when the Mthethomusha Game Reserve was established in KaNgwane in the mid 1980s (discussed below).

In his tribute to Mabuza, Player (2003) recalls, that at the congress, Mabuza delivered his address in slow, poetic, measured tones. He described the Swazi Bantustan of KaNgwane and the traditional Swazi way of life, including its respect for animals, birds and the land. He spoke about KaNgwane‟s need for wilderness conservation and explained the difficulties of setting aside land for conservation and balancing this need with that for land for settlement and cattle. According to Player (2003:170), the audience was impressed by Mabuza‟s grasp of the subject and during his tenure as Chief Minister of KaNgwane, Enos Mabuza fulfilled his promise or desire to set aside land for a game reserves in the area, perhaps as small comfort for blacks having been excluded from conservation projects for so long in the country‟s history. The paragraphs below describe the type of natural heritage that Enos Mabuza sought to preserve for future generations.

According to the Association for Rural Advancement (Reel KK/Reel 38 Karis-Gerhart Microfilm Collection), soil conservation measures included the planting of grass strips and the construction of 42km of diversion banks. However, less than 1% of the Bantustan‟s land area was used for afforestation. The three nature reserves that he had a hand in creating are his conservation legacy in the former KaNgwane Bantustan and Mpumalanga as a whole. Mabuza‟s conservation initiatives seemed to embrace the need for decentralised conservation in which local input and participation was actively sought. In some respects, this was a different and comparatively more popular approach to natural resource management.

Nadine Gordimer paid tribute to Enos Mabuza on 4 August 2001 Gordimer on the Occasion of the Opening of the Enos Mabuza Centre at Penryn College in Nelspruit. She recalled her friendship with him and their shared passion for literature, the politics of the day and conservation (Gordimer, 2001).What force was behind Mabuza‟s dedication to conservation issues when the Bantustans were already arid and unproductive? The creation of three

relatively nature reserves naturally deprived local communities of already limited means of livelihood. Given the history of long standing mistrust and misgivings about conservation initiatives; how was he able to convince local communities that the reserves were necessary? In the Bantustans in particular, conservation efforts seemed incompatible with developmental (meeting the needs of the poor) but eco-tourism was one way of providing employment opportunities even though they are never enough to satisfy demand in poor communities. Overcrowding, overstocking and droughts worsened the plight of marginalised Bantustan or rural populations but so too did unmitigated environmental degradation - erosion and desertification. Neither Mabuza nor the communities had control over the problem of over-crowding but they (Mpakeni community with respect to Mthethomusha) dedicated themselves to a cause on which the future of the human race and the planet itself depends. Mabuza‟s strategy was to engage the respective communities and giving them a sense of ownership in the projects (participation and empowerment); and approach which is being used by the South African Ministry of Tourism and others (Van Schalkwyk, 2004:325-327; Visser, 2004).

Mahushe Shongwe Game Reserve

Mahushe Shongwe Game Reserve was the first eco-tourist community conservation project to be initiated in the former KaNgwane Bantustan in 1986. The Matsamo Tribal Authority (covering the Mzinti community) has its main office in Schoemansdal. It agreed to the change in land tenure and use for the area covering the game reserve and in return participates in managing it. The reserve is owned by the surrounding the Matsamo community (Matsamo Tourism Association) and lies on the Kruger National Park‟s southern boundary along the Crocodile River, south of Malelane and less than two hours drive (145km) from Nelspruit. Mahushe Shongwe is close to Mzinti village and the Mzinti River (on the Lebombo flats, 30km from Malelane) flows through the reserve. Parts of the Malelane land system are made up of metamorphic greenstone rocks such as amphibolite and schist with dolerite dikes which are similar in composition to basalt and they weather into clayey-structured fertile soils which support moderately dense riverine bushveld and mopani as well as acacia woodland, Jackalberry, Tree Fuschia, Sycamore Fig and Potatobush in riverine thickets during dry season (Venter, Scholes and Eckhardt, 2003:98-105). The topography at Mahushe Shongwe is gently undulating with granitic rock outcrops just a stone throw away from the Swaziland border with the Mawewe Shongwe Reserve (Mawewe Cattle-Game project which is a 9000 ha integrated wildlife and livestock area created in 1994) to its south.

Mahushe Shongwe is a small game reserve covering an area of 1 200 hectares on communal lands (King, 2007a:210). The game reserve has approximately 150 bird species and is popular with birdwatchers. Several species of large herbivores have been reintroduced to the reserve. Visitors can go on day or night game drives in open 4x4 vehicles or on guided bush walks (http://www.mpumalanga.com/parks/mahushe.asp).

King (2007a; King, 2005), however, notes that conservation in this particular area has various impacts and meanings which remain tied to the livelihood and governance systems. A small number of part-time and full-time jobs are generated by the game reserve on a seasonal basis and revenue generated from hunting and game meat sales is shared between the Mpumalanga Parks Board (MPB) and the Mzinti community. The Matsamo Tribal Authority currently administers or controls access to a diverse range of resources in and around the game reserve and the majority of the 35 plots demarcated for the Mzinti community belong to households within the older section of the community which have stronger ties to the Matsamo Tribal Authority. King reports that the *induna* (local chief or headman) and members of his family, for instance, have been allocated small-scale sugar cane plots. It is also reported that the households that have been allocated plots are male-headed and that political elites have also benefited from the distribution of plots; suggesting that the tribal authorities continue to use development projects to control resources and reward allies within the region. The induna and local chief also grant permits for wood collection because communal land belongs to the tribal authority. However, rather than strictly viewing Mahushe Shongwe as a constraint to environmental resource access or site for limited employment, community members identify a number of benefits from its existence including education and development opportunities (King, 2007a). The apparent lack of transparency concerning land allocation reaffirms the sense of mistrust of the tribal Authority (King, 2007a:210; King, 2005:69) but new environmental legislation and agencies are now challenging the legitimacy of the tribal authority in managing certain resources to which it has historical claim (King, 2005:68).



Figure 3: Location of Mahushe Shongwe Game Reserve (King, 2007a:210).

Songimvelo Game Reserve

The eNcakeni area (known today as Songimvelo) was settled by the bakaNgwane (people of Swaziland) under the eMjindini Authority during the reign of King Mswati II (1840-1868). Since about 1882, mining and deforestation of wooded hillsides contributed to environmental degradation of the area, especially during the gold-boom of the late 1800s and early 1900s. Songimvelo Game Reserve in eastern Mpumalanga was established in 1984 in the former KaNgwane Bantustan in an area with the highest known plant and animal diversity including insects and over 300 bird species in Mpumalanga Province. It is the largest reserve operated by the Mpumalanga Parks Board and extends over 500 square kilometres or approximately 49 000 hectares of pristine bushveld, middle-veld and grassland which forms part of the eastern Drakensberg escarpment in the Komati valley (Carruthers, 2007a:166-167). It is adjacent to Swaziland‟s Malolotja Nature Reserve (on the border), south-west of the Barberton Mountain slopes which have greenstone rocks with 3 600 million year-old fossil evidence of primitive life forms. There are also archaeological sites dating back to 400 BC. The area is bisected by the Lomati and Komati rivers which have carved numerous sheer cliffs, deep gorges (the Msauli, Malolotja and Mlumati) and hidden valleys forming a ragged landscape of rocky outcrops, rolling hillsides, forest ravines, open plains and mountain streams. In addition to these focal points, there are many species of animals, including threatened species in the game reserve. More than 1400 known species of birds also live in

the reserve. One of the unique features about Songimvelo is that it was one of the first reserves to directly include local communities in natural resource management decisions (Carruthers, 2007a:166). It was handed over to the Mpumalanga Parks Board in 1994 by the KaNgwane authorities and has since been incorporated into the Lubombo Trans-Frontier Conservation Area (TFCA) which consists of five mini TFCAs based on an agreement between the governments of Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland which was signed on 22 June 2000. The mini TFCA which includes Songimvelo is called the Songimvelo-Malolotja TFCA between South Africa (Barberton area where Mabuza grew up) and Swaziland (Pigg‟s Peak) (http://www.mpumalanga.com/parks/songimvelo.asp).

Mthethomusha Game Reserve

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, new and different visions for conservation were being promoted by individuals and organisations and the creation of Mthethomusha Game Reserve was a prime example of these pioneering approaches which deliberately sought close community involvement in conservation. Mthethomusha Game Reserve extends over an area of 8 000 hectares (19 800-acre) of mountainous country situated on the south western border of the world-famous Kruger National Park in the south eastern part of Mpumalanga province with a view of the Lebombo and Malelane Mountain ranges. This region shares borders with Mozambique and Swaziland and straddles the Nsikazi Highland north of the Crocodile River Gorge. Mthethomusha has three distinct woodland vegetation types or ecosystems occurring among its jumbled granite boulders and craggy peaks. Mthethomusha Game Reserve was one of the very first game reserves to be built on what has now become the contemporary approach to community and conservation involvement and partnerships. Through an innovative initiative by the local Tribal Authority of the Mphakeni tribe under the leadership of the late Chief Charles Nkosi, low potential agricultural land was given over (sanctioned the establishment of the reserve) to the management of the KaNgwane Parks Corporation for optimal and sustainable development in 1986. The land is owned by the Mpakeni community and Mthethomusha Game Reserve and its privately operated Bongani Lodge is one of the premier tourist destinations in Mpumalanga today. The „Big Five‟ and other animals as well as a rich abundance of bird species are found in this game reserve. The African elephant, lion, buffalo and white rhino have been part of successful reintroduction programmes in the reserve. Remains of iron-age settlements are to be found in the hills and there are more than 250 well-preserved San (Bushmen) rock art paintings in its caves and overhangs which make

guided nature walks a truly memorable experience. The rock paintings are estimated to be 1 500 years old and provide the greatest concentration of rock art per square metre on earth.

The Mpakeni community shares in the proceeds from tourism and continues to harvest other resources – wood for fuel and grass for thatch, medicinal plants. This wild frontier is also made up of the historic towns of Barberton, Komatipoort, Kaapmuiden and Badplaas (http://www.sa-venues.com/game-reserves/mpl_mthethomusha.htm). It is significant that Mthethomusha Game Reserve in KaNgwane was one of the first places that Nelson Mandela visited on his release from prison in 1990 (Player, 2003:170). The map below shows the location of Mthetomusha and Songimvelo Game Reserves which were part of the KaNgwane Bantustan and which Enos Mabuza was instrumental in establishing.



Figure 4: KaNgwane Conservation
(http://www.savenues.com/accommodation/mpl_game_lodges.htm)

Although Mabuza does not have a nature reserve named after him, KwaNdebele‟s leader S. S. Skosana has the approximately 1800 hectares S. S. Skhosana Nature Reserve in Mpumalanga (north of Bronkhorstspruit in the former KwaNdebele Bantustan) named after him.

In recent years, cultural villages have also become striking features in or around the game reserves as extensions of the ecotourism vision. These include the four-star graded (Tourism Grading Council of South Africa) Matsamo Cultural Village (Emvelo) at Jeppes Reef border

post along South Africa‟s border with Swaziland. The village opened in 2001 and it is a showcase of Swazi culture by a rural community of the Shongwe clan. Traditional songs and dances, curios/crafts, *al fresco* restaurants which offer Swazi cuisine and traditional healers and herb gardens are showcased at Emkhayeni. Guest accommodation is in 14 traditional Swazi „bœhive‟ huts equipped with modern amenities. The village employs close to 100 people (75% of them women) who have shares in the venture. There is another Swazi Cultural Village at Matsulu off the N4 east of Nelspruit, approximately 50km south of the Malelane Gate of the Kruger National Park on the R570. The village offers conference facilities with swimming pool, horse riding, hiking trails and mountain biking. Ebutsini Cultural village is adjacent to Songimvelo Game Reserve and close to the Oshoek Border post to Swaziland.

6.6 Conclusion

Mabuza may have had a disproportionate focus on conservation issues at a time when people in the Bantustans were poor and faced with many hardships such as unemployment, inadequate service delivery and no rights. Perhaps at the time, his projects with the game reserves had little value or meaning to people leading miserable and uncertain lives, battling to survive on a daily basis but in one respect, the game parks that he helped establish were a symbolic reclamation of what these communities had lost when they were forcibly removed and excluded from benefiting from national parks which were reserved for whites. Would it have been more preferable for Mabuza not to have done anything at all on a national or local scale with regard to conservation given the extensively documented alienation of communities around the Kruger National Park and the locals‟ resentment towards it and the hegemony, dispossession and disempowerment that it represented? Agency or action is always directed towards something (goal-oriented) and is inseparable from the dynamics and/or problematic features of those situations. Compelled or voluntary action reproduces or transforms situations with positive or negative results. How then does one interpret Enos Mabuza‟s contribution to conservation? If Mabuza was exploited in a historically exclusive white field to peddle the conservation gospel; he also used them to further his own ends and ambitions. However, there was some degree of respect and recognition of the knowledge/expertise or value that each stakeholder brought to their interactions. Mabuza‟s entrance into the white dominated world of conservation and the timing of his chairmanship of the National Parks Board opened up the field to more blacks, and women as the transition

too root. His involvement in conservation showed that one did not need to have an affluent social background to care about the environment.

Was Mabuza the best black candidate to champion conservation issues? Perhaps not but he was at the right place at the right time and had a keen interest for conservation, which may or may not have been a prerequisite, but nonetheless allowed him to make the best of the situation for mutual benefit. This can easily be labelled cronyism but affirmative action, which was seem as being necessary, also played a significant role. By its very nature, the policy is expedient even though it is usually flawed in its implementation in different contexts. As this chapter shows, Mabuza shared similar values and had close contact and rapport with a good number of prominent conservationists dating back from the mid 1970s. Like his politics and relations with certain Swazi chiefs that he acted as proxy for in the Bantustan structures, Mabuza‟s conservationist persona seems to have been consolidated with the help of patronage links into what was exclusively a white upper class domain. His family has asserted that his commitment to conservation issues started in his childhood so there was a definite personal and genuine dimension to it even though, in some respects, he acted on behalf of or in concert with a powerful white business and professional environmental interests. Does this then mean that his contribution to this field was irrelevant or that the results of his actions where only one-sided? Not at all. Apart from the personal satisfaction he derived from it and the professional and personal contacts that he made, other people that he did not know on a personal level also benefited from his knowledge and the environmental projects that he was able to initiate with others, ostensibly on the behalf of various communities/stakeholders, and their long-term effects or implications. As noted above, the Matsamo Tribal Authority, for instance, worked with Mabuza‟s KaNgwane government in shaping household patterns of access to a variety of resources that resulted in locally understood rules. Today, although the Matsamo Tribal Authority has diminished in power since 1994, it has become a barrier to accessing environmental resources within, and around, the Mahushe Shongwe game reserve (King, 2007a:214). The Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act of 1998 expanded the regulatory authority of governmental agencies and the Wildlife Protection Service (WPS) of the Mpumalanga Parks Board has been empowered to enforce new restrictions on the collection of wood and medicinal plants as well as fishing (King, 2005:70). Although King is sceptical about benefits that accrue to local communities, apart from corrupt traditional authorities with power to allocate resources, he is more upbeat about the role of the Ehlanzeni District Municipality which has been generating economic

and political opportunities for individuals to access previously unavailable resources (King, 2005:68).

Mabuza did not re-invent the wheel in the field of conservation but he did not just have a fleeting fascination with it. It was a sustained passion which presented him with an opportunity to preserve the natural heritage and splendour of the place of his birth and in doing so he joined existing and new stakeholders including scientific experts, advisors, consultants and non-governmental organisations to preach the themes mentioned in the introduction above. For better or worse, Enos Mabuza tried to raise conservation awareness and motivate people to support conservation efforts (advocating responsible land and other resource use to ensure the sustainability of ecological/environmental, socio-cultural and economic systems not just in KaNgwane. The direct economic and social impacts of community conservation have been questioned because while some benefits accrue to local communities, such efforts do yield some benefits, they do not necessarily or significantly reduce poverty as claimed by their proponents, especially when compared to the revenue generated by national parks and tourism to other stakeholders including politicians, policy makers, consultants, businesses in the tourism industry and professional conservationists and the organisations they patronise (Pollard, Shackleton, and Carruthers, 2003:440; King, 2007a:207–219; King 2007b:13-25; King, 2006:79-96). Mabuza‟s hand in establishing the game reserves in KaNgwane in the 1980s might have been an elaborate public relations exercise; a way of distracting the locals with promises of benefits. It could also have been a way to show up the other Bantustans and their casinos or one way through which he manoeuvred and positioned himself for the National Parks position in the early 1990s. Politics (power blocks and interests) is an integral part when it is decided who gets what, when and how (Lasswell, 1936; Fischer, 1988:127-132; Davenport, 1987:391-394) and the transformation of South Africa‟s conservation arena was no different.

Bantustan authorities were controversial figures from the outset and they were not respected by the people because they were drawn into the administrative system of the apartheid state as its proxy in the rural areas. They were even more unpopular because they were generally responsible for implementing policies such as forced removals, policing pass or influx controls and imposing a variety of taxes on an already impoverished and overcrowded rural population. Further, they implemented some version of conservation in the form of livestock limitation or culling, land re-division into grazing, cultivation and residential areas

(Betterment Schemes) which limited their access to already inadequate resources and marginal infrastructure development. These issues put traditional authorities and Bantustan elites in conflict with rural communities (Ntsebeza, 2002:25 & 33; Ribot, 2001:74; Ray and van Rouveroy van Niewaal, 1996:25; Fischer, 1988:127-132; Davenport, 1987:391-394) and this makes the case for Mabuza‟s three game reserves (one in each of the three main land masses which made up KaNgwane) in a small Bantustan like KaNgwane a curious one. Mabuza was not authoritarian per se because in all his dealing, he consulted the local chiefs who, it seems, looked to him for answers to issues that were typically outside their usual areas of expertise. They went along with whatever Mabuza deemed to be necessary, responsible or beneficial action.

One of the main reasons that Mabuza became a Bantustan leader was that the chiefs were illiterate and needed an educated person to „show them the way.‟ As such, the local chiefs were receptive of most ideas or suggestions that Mabuza made. Consulting the chiefs was more of a formality which placated the chiefs or reassured them that they were really the ones in charge, thus giving his actions legitimacy or the appearance of it. With the cooperation and/or support of the chiefs, the people at the grassroots felt no real need to question his motives in a public sense. The only time that there was notable discord and contestation was when Mabuza and some of the chiefs and their supporters disagreed over proposed incorporation into Swaziland in 1982. Overall, Mabuza avoided conflict, scandal and bad publicity by consulting or involving the major power brokers, no matter who they were, in partnerships such that his actions were sanctioned in one way or another and were thus acceptable in principle.

To conclude, conservation is traditionally conservative so whose interests are served at the end of the day, in spite of protestations that its long-term goals are meant to benefit everyone? Who has the power and who initiates what? Community or individual views of conservation projects have not been significantly affected by an idealised appreciation for natural landscapes or the popularity of sustainable development in the past decade or so. For many, conservation projects are not always a good thing for those affected in one way or another. Incorporating issues that matter to them the most (immediate or short-term goals) such as redress for land dispossession based on racial considerations, ensuring food security, adopting appropriate land use patterns to minimise land degradation and being able to make independent choices from given alternatives without having inducements or incentives thrust

upon them in return for supporting external and/or joint conservation interventions into conservation programmes. These challenges will remain for years to come and have to be negotiated in other ways; especially in the developing world where rural households need to particular ways of accessing environmental and economic resources to produce livelihoods - wood for cooking and heating as well as for construction; land for farming and grazing of livestock (cattle, goats, sheep), thatch grass for construction (roofing), medicinal plants to cure common ailments and wild animals to supplement protein in local diets. In the final analysis, it might be that the old conservation issues and power dynamics have simply been given a facelift (the chameleon effect) much like Mabuza‟s many incarnations in other spheres. Maintaining legitimacy and relevance means that organisations and individual have to regularly reposition or adapting to their changing environments.

Chapter 7: Challenges and Opportunities in Politics

7.1 Introduction

The political arena is often described as a spider‟s web of deceit, loose cannons, red herrings and dark horses. It entails a good measure of idealism or cynicism, second-guessing, mistakes, blunders and appeasements Personal desires make strange bed-fellows with individuals‟ sense of duty or patriotism and in the end everything has a price. It is also described as a contact sport like gladiators doing battle as in the Roman Coliseums of old. A politician or leader needs to be intelligent enough to understand the game because ultimately winning is all that matters (Grothe, 2008:254-273; Wilkinson, 2002). Bourdieu‟s social analysis and theory of practice (1977; 1998a; 1990) borrows from classical theorists such as Marx, Weber and Durkheim in trying to explain social hierarchies, divisions or differentiation. Bourdieu‟s theory states that individuals are positioned in social space or fields according to the forms of capital they possess. Clusters form around distributions of these forms of capital and a class or group *habitus* (mentality) is formed within the clusters in the process. In turn, their decisions or actions are informed by an individualistic framework or rationality (maximum utility) in pursuit of different goals (1977; 1998a; 1990). Power corrupts‟ because of the effort it requires to acquire and retain it (ambition often breeds tyranny) amidst other power-seeking rivals but there are exceptions to the rule.

The general persona of a leader is accepted as one that requires character, courage, integrity - not expediency, accommodation and short-range opportunism. However, a career in politics is rarely a charmed experience because politics is a game of survival in which contenders are faced with different challenges and make decisions to address them as they see fit, which, unfortunately is often misguided. A career in politics requires some degree of cunning in order to stay in a game which can be described as a rat-race or a game of musical chairs. It is often marked by inconsistencies and *quid pro quo* arrangements (marriages of convenience/alliances) of all types and typically has an indeterminateness (shades of gray) which does not make saints of the majority of those involved in it. Winston Churchill once commented on the questions of conscience, integrity, character, honour, sincerity, truth, actions, failure, mistakes and defeat in politics (life generally) as follows:

> The only guide to a man is his conscience; the only shield to his memory is the rectitude and sincerity of his actions. It is very imprudent to walk through life without this shield, because we are so often mocked by the failure of our hopes and the upsetting of our calculations; but with this shield, however the fates may play, we march always in the ranks of honour – Winston Churchill.

The disdain towards blacks who worked within apartheid structures was once summed up by Mosiuoa Lekota‟s dismissal of them as "fools, crooks and eunuchs" – apartheid‟s foot soldiers (Mufson, 1990:286). However, the ANC‟s allies over the years included whites (the Congress of Democrats) from as early as the 1950s (Callinicos, 2006:3) and to some degree, traditional authorities became important to the ANC and the SACP, particularly in the rural areas, when they were banned in 1960. Mufson (1990:190) describes the alliances which made up the Mass Democratic Movement and the ANC‟s central position within it as a "broad church of resistance with room in its pews for capitalists and communists, white and black, young and old."

This chapter partly compares the similarities and differences between Bantustan leaders (Mabuza‟s cohorts or contemporaries in the late 1970s and 1980s) who both claimed to be supporting the black man‟s cause despite working in apartheid-created structures. It considers how they got to those positions, how they managed to stay there (what they did) and who they cooperated or formed alliances with - the networks to which they belonged (Mills, 1956).

7.2 Perceptions and Truths about Bantustan Leaders and/or Traditional Authorities

Bantustans seemed to Promote ethnic nationalism (Mayer, 1972: 8-9,11) and various inducements such as economic resources, prestige and politico-legal means of power were used to entice and lure ambitious leaders into Bantustan politics and traditional authorities that refused to collaborate or failed in their functions were deposed in favour of more cooperative ones (Ntsebeza, 2002:25 & 33; Ribot, 2001:74; Ray and van Rouveroy van Niewaal, 1996:25, Hendricks, 1992:58-82; Rogers, 1980; Frederikse, 1990:179; Mayer, 1972:6, 9, 15-18, 20). The strife and violence which was synonymous with most Bantustans was internally and externally induced by systems of patronage and repression (between chiefs and other politicians and the apartheid state) which were the foundation of the Bantustan

system (Bank, 1994:87-90). The backgrounds of Enos Mabuza‟s contemporaries in the Bantustan system in 1976 were as follows:

Name	**Bantustan**	**Credentials/Qualifications**
Cedric Namedi Phatudi	Lebowa	Royalty + Educator + Intellectual + Inspector of Schools
Gatsha Mangosothu Buthelezi	KwaZulu	Royalty
Hudson William Edison Ntsanwisi	Gazankulu	Intellectual + Educator
Kaizer Daliwonga Matanzima	Transkei	Royalty + Lawyer
Lennox Leslie Wangoma	Ciskei	Royalty + Educator
Lucas Manyane Mangope	Bophuthatswana	Royalty + Educator
Naganani Enos John Mabuza	KaNgwane	Teacher, headmaster, school principal, Inspector of Schools
Patrick Ramaano Mphephu	Venda	Royalty
Simon Skosana	KwaNdebele	
Tsiame Kenneth Mopeli	QwaQwa	Royalty + Teacher, Principal and Inspector of Schools

Table 5: Bantustan Personalities

A significant number of Bantustan leaders in the mid-late 1970s were of royal blood (Paramount Chiefs and other chiefs) because of the way the South African government used the conservative political system of traditional institutions or leaders (already in existence/authority and commanding a fair amount of respect or deference from the people) to deal with the „native problem‟ whilst also giving legitimacy to the Bantustan policy. In accordance with this, the constitutions of some Bantustans (KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana and Venda) specified the composition of their respective Legislative Assemblies. In most cases, a certain number of Cabinet Ministers had to be chiefs, representatives of Paramount Chiefs or headmen in order to be eligible. However, this was not strictly so in Gazankulu, Lebowa and

KaNgwane. Some Bantustan leaders who were of royal descent also had careers as educators (teachers, headmasters, school principals, Education Inspectors) like Enos Mabuza. General Bantubonke Harrington Holomisa is of royal descend and a military man. Mabuza was not the only commoner to rise to be the leader of a Bantustan. Professor Ntsanwisi was the son of a migrant labourer, Joshua Oupa Gqozo was the son of labourer and religious minister and Lennox Sebe was born a commoner but was elected as a representative of the Ama Ntinde Tribe in the then Ciskeian Territorial Authority in 1968 and became Chief Minister in 1973 (Malan and Hattingh, 1976:241-245).

Figure 5: Bantustan Personalities from left to right: Chief Buthelezi, Chief Pathudi, Chief Mangope, Chief Matanzima, H. W. E. Ntsanwisi, Chief Mphephu and Chief Sebe (Malan and Hattingh, 1976:245).

The contribution of Bantustan leaders like KaNgwane‟s Enos Mabuza who claimed to support the struggle was, if genuine, tenuous compared to that of other organisations, not least because of their dependence on unpopular and unstable power bases and general perceptions about them being part of the apartheid regime‟s collaborative network. For many people, it was “difficult to discern where the power of apartheid‟s black faces began and ended” (Mufson, 1990:287). The pictures below illustrate this and the general brutality of Bantustan police forces did not do much to dispel these perceptions.

Figure 6: Bantustan Protest (*Mayibuye* Vol. 3 No. 9, 1992:12) Bantustan Protest *(Mayibuye* Vol. 3 No. 9, 1992:17).

On top of their precarious position in relation to the state, Bantustan leaders were also vulnerable to rivals from other political parties in the Bantustans. Some Bantustans were more volatile than others because of this internal strife and frantic jockeying for position and power. These power struggles manifested, for instance, in several coup d"etats that were staged in Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, KwaNdebele, Transkei and Venda in the mid-1980s and early 1990s (Bank, 1994:75-98) in which the biggest casualties were usually ordinary people, especially when the different factions called upon the security police and other government operatives to „manage" (contain or suppress) the sporadic revolts and hostile take-overs. In the 1990s, the independent Bantustans were the most problematic because they did not really consider it worth their while to resubmit to a higher power in the form of a unified state when apartheid finally ended. The leaders had become drunk with power and were accused of corruption and many other atrocities against their people but they did not resign and disband their political parties voluntarily like Enos Mabuza in KaNgwane. Instead, they were hell-bent on making the transition/negotiations (CODESA, the National Peace Accord etc) as difficult as possible for all concerned (obstructionist or belligerent). They were selfish and not really interested in doing what was best for everyone (being constructive – promoting peace, reconciliation, goodwill) and some like KwaNdebele"s Skosana in the mid 1980s

demanded independence for their Bantustans - a sign that they fully were co-opted into the apartheid state‟s divide and rule strategy.

Disaffected elements in the Bophuthatswana Defence Force, led by Rocky Malebane-Metsing (leader of the Bantustan‟s opposition Progressive People‟s Party) and Warrant Officer Mothuloe Timmy Phiri of the Bophuthatswana National Guard Unit, unsuccessfully attempted a coup in Bophuthatswana on February 1988. Their grievances against Lucas Mangope‟s government included allegations of corruption, misappropriation of government funds and nepotism to stifle political opposition and manipulation of the October 1987 elections in Bophuthatswana. There was also dissatisfaction with low salaries in the civil service and Defence Ministry and the dominance of whites in the ruling BDF party. The coup was crushed by the SADF, undermining the Bantustan‟s claim to independence A period of severe repression followed the failed coup attempt, for example, the Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC), the Bafokeng Women‟s Club and the Black Sash were banned in the wake of the 1988 coup (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:641). On 11 March 1994, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) staged an invasion of Bophuthatswana (the capital Mmabatho) claiming that they had been invited to defend the Bantustan, except they were met with fierce resistance from the Bophuthatswana Defense Force (Goodman, 1999:297).

In the Ciskei, Charles Sebe was jailed in 1984 for plotting a coup against his brother, Chief Lennox Sebe. Charles Sebe was broken out of jail in 1986 with the assistance of South African security forces during Operation Katzen. On 4 March 1990, Brigadier Gqozo seized control of Ciskei in a bloodless coup, finally deposing Lennox Sebe. This is followed by a brief period of liberalisation or calm in that Bantustan. Again in 1991, Ciskei rebels, Colonel Onward Mangwane Guzana and former General Charles Sebe were shot dead at a roadblock on 27 January, following an apparent ambush on their coup plot/attempt against Brigadier Oupa Gqozo‟s government (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998: 731).

KwaNdebele was one of the last Bantustans to be created by the South African government in the mid-1970s. It was reportedly run by a coalition of businessman-thugs (including local taxi drivers) trying to extract as much money as possible from trading licences and the limited budgets and other „aid‟ afforded to Bantustan leaders. The two dominant figures in this coalition were Chief Minister S. S. Skosana and Piet Ntuli of the Mbokodo Party (meaning „grinding stone‟), a thinly veiled vigilante group which used violence, torture and intimidation to maintain its position of power. They mobilised their supporters and armed

them to squash resistance. This heavy-handedness led to the car bomb assassination of Piet Ntuli in July 1986 which an ANC spokesman claimed the ANC was responsible for. Violence in KwaNdebele escalated over the proposed incorporation of Moutse into KwaNdebele (late 1985) to consolidate it in preparation for independence, which Skosana and Ntuli wanted. Anti-independence protests ensued leading to a mini-war led by Prince James Mahlangu and King David Mabua Mapoch Mahlangu of the KwaNdebele royal family. Prince James Mahlangu was elected as KwaNdebele‟s Chief Minister IN March 1990 and he and decided, with the support of the Legislative Assembly, to support national negotiations and to move to dissolve the Bantustan as a whole (Holden and Mathabatha (2007:255-258).

September 1987 witnessed a coup by the Transkei Defence Force in which Prime Minister George Matanzima was deposed and replaced by the short-lived civilian government of Stella Sigcau. On 30 December 1987, Major General Bantu Holomisa led a military coup which deposed Stella Sigcau. Holomisa installed himself as Transkei's military and government chief on 6 January 1988. On 22 November 1990, a former Transkei Defence Force MI chief, Lieutenant Colonel Craig Duli (who was supported by the South African security forces), died while attempting to overthrow the military government of Major General Bantu Holomisa (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998: 731).

In Venda, the government of President Frank Ravele was overthrown by Colonel Gabriel Ramushwana in a military coup (bloodless) but on 5 April 1990. Coup leader Colonel Ramushwana announced that he would manage the Venda's affairs until it was re-incorporated into South Africa (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998: 731).

The majority of Bantustan elites got carried away with the illusions of power given by the system as the conclusions of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have put on record. The Bantustans, particularly those that had achieved „independent‟ status, had security powers that sometimes exceeded those of the South African state itself. A discernible difference in the nature of violations emerged in this period between the self-governing Bantustans which did not have their own police forces and army and the independent Bantustans, which had their own security apparatus complete with SADF personnel or SADF ex-members on secondment who occupied high level positions in the forces (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998: 635; Grundy, 1986:75, 78).

In comparison, Enos Mabuza had a fairly smooth ride in KaNgwane where no attempts were made to remove him from office (by coup or other means). The only period of uncertainty in that Bantustan was when the apartheid regime suspended KaNgwane‟s nominal self-rule status for six months (June to December 1982, after which they were re-instated) following the dissolution of its Legislative Assembly over the Swazi land deal. Enos Mabuza resigned from Bantustan politics of his own accord. According to his wife/widow, it had been a difficult and uncomfortable job, one that he would not have chosen on his own had he not been duty bound. Nevertheless, Mrs Mabuza maintains that her husband did not have regrets about his life or career (his decisions) because "he believed that he served his people to the best of his abilities" (Esther Mabuza, Interview, 6 June 2007). He did not believe that political office or power should be the monopoly of one person or a select few and was anxious about overstaying his welcome as leader. He believed that there were many capable leaders and was happy to let someone else carry on from where he left off and he fully supported Mr. Zitha who succeeded him (Esther Mabuza, Interview 6 June 2007). However, Holden and Mathabatha (2007:260) point out that at the time of Mabuza‟s resignation from his position as KaNgwane‟s Chief Minister, the UDF (Albertina Sisulu) suggested that Inyandza should remain in existence with Mabuza as its leader so that it could guard what had been achieved and not leave a back door open for others with unscrupulous motives. They felt that his resignation was at an inopportune moment because the ANC had not taken over officially and the fragile CODESA negotiations which had just begun were marred by ultimatums, stalemates and violence. They feared that the South African government would install someone to lead KaNgwane and undo everything that Mabuza had done to keep it in step with other anti-apartheid organisations. The UDF/ANC wanted Mabuza to be the one to guide the will of KaNgwane residents during the negotiations (transition period 1990-1994). Mabuza considered these arguments but declined to stay on because he believed that a new democratic era was inevitable and nothing that the Pretoria government did could change the course of events because political organisations had been unbanned, political prisoners had been freed and the exiles were returning. According to him, Inyandza had been formed as a temporary measure and had lived its course and had to be dissolved. To Elias Ginindza, this decision was also meant to signify to Pretoria that it was time to dismantle the Bantustan system (Elias Ginindza, Interview 8 June 2007).

Enos Mabuza advised or suggested that Inyandza members were free to join the ANC during the negotiations process and make their contribution under its banner. In April 1990, he

called for the dissolution of KaNgwane (enacted soon after) and the Inyandza National Movement in preparation for reintegration into South Africa (27 April 1994). This gesture was true to his word that he/Inyandza were merely holding the place of the banned ANC in KaNgwane (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:260).

7.3 Mabuza's Entrance into Bantustan Politics

The birth of the KaNgwane Bantustan was not without difficulty until the attainment of „self governing" status in August 1984. Mabuza describes KaNgwane"s constitutional development between 1978 and 1982 as "turbulent" even though, according to him, "KaNgwane is a stable progressive region" run by "dedicated leaders" (Mabuza, 1983:10). Enos Mabuza"s family only has fond memories of him and others who knew him or worked with him describe him as being „gentle" and „dignified" (Wylde; M. S. Gininda; Elias Ginindza – interviews June 2007). They insist that Mabuza was unassuming because he was not in politics for instant gratification or an easy ride to fame or fortune. Mabuza"s family notes that he reluctantly accepted the position out of duty (the ties that bind - obligation, service) and that he appreciated the challenges involved. He did not think he was in that position by right (entitlement, which was the general attitude of many Bantustan leaders of chiefly decent).

Compared to the other Bantustans, KaNgwane was created almost as an after-thought because, for instance, it was simply known as Swazi until 1978 and it was the last of the Bantustans to have a Territorial Authority established (1976). KaNgwane was the smallest Bantustans in terms of the land area under its jurisdiction. It was initially one block of land comprised of 20 Tribal Authorities, 4 Regional Authorities (Nsikazi, Nkomazi, Mlondozi and Mwsati) and one Territorial Authority - The Swazi Territorial Authority which officially opened in April 1976. The Nsikazi Regional Authority was supposed to disappear after consolidation and the establishment of a new authority in 1975 when compensatory land was granted to the Bantustan. This did not happen in the end and KaNgwane ended up as three distinct land masses after consolidation (Malan and Hattingh, 1976: 206 & 216). As part of the arrangement which led to KaNgwane being given self-governing status, the apartheid regime bought out some white farmers (land) in the remote, peri-urban but fairly affluent KaNyamazane/Louisville and KaBokweni areas where the majority of black people led a pastoral life. The KaNgwane government headquarters was in Louisville/KaNyamazane where Mrs Mabuza still lives (Sandile Mabuza, Interview 5 June 2007). Mpumalanga"s Ehlanzeni District Municipality and under it, the Umjindi, Mbombela and Nkomazi Local

Municipalities constituted the KaNgwane homeland which was basically 3 separate land pieces interspaced by white farmland.

South African Swazis in the Transvaal included clans under Mhola Dlamini, Dantyi Nkosi and others, the Shongwe and Khumalo clans (from the Barberton and Nelspruit areas), the Hlwatwayo of Mhlaba and several smaller tribes (Dlamini, Magagula, Sukazi, Shongwe etc) around Piet Retief and a few in the Paulpietersburg District. There were also smaller groups, mostly under independent chiefs, who inhabited Sekhukhuneland, Nelspruit and Pilgrim‟s Rest (descended from small groups which survived by agreeing to be subjects of Swaziland‟s Mswazi (1840-1875), who was a descendent of Sobhuza I. The remainder were people left in the wake of Mswazi‟s raiders (Macmillan, 1989:289; Malan and Hattingh, 1976: 206). In 1970, the Swazi areas which eventually made up KaNgwane at the end of the decade consisted of 14 tribal authorities – the Nkomazi Regional Authority was established in 1959 and the Nsikazi-Legogote Regional Authority was established in 1962. Eight chiefs were resettled within the Bantustan with their subjects in 1974 and 1975 and this paved the way for the establishment of the Mlondozi and Mswati Regional Authorities in 1975.

From the recollections of Enos Mabuza‟s immediate family, he was not very politically inclined as a young man in high school and he had no aspirations of becoming a political figure, let alone a controversial one. Enos Mabuza‟s son Sandile has had personal communication with some of the surviving Swazi chiefs who were responsible for his entrance into Bantustan politics. These include Chief Tikhontele Dlamini (who later worked closely with Enos Mabuza as Chief Minister) and Chief Ngomane who were part of the Swazi Tribal Council. Mabuza was approached by members of the Hhoyi Tribal Authority (one of the 20 tribal authorities in the KaNgwane area) - led by Chief Tikhontele Dlamini to lead the newly created KaNgwane Bantustan. Most people in the area, including the chiefs, were rural-based, poor, uneducated or illiterate. The chiefs felt vulnerable or exposed to the under-handed tactics of the apartheid government and feared that it would take their land and manipulate them. They needed someone who had formal education at a higher level to help them lead the people. Enos Mabuza was fortunate enough to have been educated and spoke fluently in siSwati, English and Afrikaans Mabuza obtained a Primary Teaching Certificate in 1959; Matriculation Certificate in 1964, Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of South Africa in 1969, a Bachelor of Arts Honours degree also from the University of South Africa in 1973 and completed the Executive Development Programme at the University of the

Witwatersrand‟s Graduate School of Business in 1989. Enos Mabuza was considered as a suitable candidate because he was seen as being neutral, educated and understood the white man‟s language (English and Afrikaans). The chiefs had confidence (faith, trust) that he had the necessary credentials and personality - he was respectful of culture and tradition, humble, intelligent, giving and he could lead - „wise‟ and calm enough to guide them (Bourdieu‟s forms of capital). According to those that knew him, Enos Mabuza was passionate and dedicated about his work and as a teacher, headmaster and education inspector, he made efforts to source as materials (textbooks etc) for the schools as he could in order to improve the standards of black schools in the KaNgwane area. His performance at Khumbula High School set him apart and showed his leadership abilities such that he was offered a post as an education inspector in the region and again he distinguished himself in that position. Mabuza agreed to help the Hhoyi traditional leaders in an advisory capacity for a few months until they decided what direction they were going to take in the political environment of the time. He was made a member of the Hhoyi Tribal Authority in Nkomazi on the border with Swaziland. According to his son Sandile (Interview 5 June 2007), the chiefs referred to Enos Mabuza as "umfana wemakosi" (son of the chiefs/kings) because he was loyal and obedient. He was from the Barberton area and had never lived in Nkomazi so he did not have any real connections with people there. The Swazi chiefs thought this was the best way to protect their interests and once Enos Mabuza agreed to join the Hhoyi Tribal Authority, they were in a position to nominate him (a commoner) to the position of Chief Executive Councillor of the Swazi Bantustan. Mabuza maintained good relations with the Swazi chiefs until his death in 1997, long after he resigned from Bantustan politics (Margaret Mabuza, Interview 6 June 2007; Esther Mabuza, Interview 6 June 2007; Sandile Mabuza, Interview 5 June 2007).

Other people from the other Regional Authorities saw/heard about Enos Mabuza‟s work with the Hhoyi Tribal Authority thought that they could all benefit from his input and competence and a joint meeting of all the tribal authorities requested him to join them in politics on a full time basis (give up his career as a teacher) since they had become quite dependant on him (assistance in handling the daily administrative the affairs of the area in relation to the South African government). According to the Mabuzas (his wife, sister, son – interviews, June 2007), these invitations were extended by the hereditary chiefs based on merit and competence. They recognised that, although was a commoner, leadership does not have to be restricted to the traditional or individuals of royal extraction, especially if it is potentially detrimental in the long term. Asked if the chiefs‟ decision to approach Mabuza with this

request was unanimous, Mr. M. S. Ginindza (Interview – 7 June 2007), is slightly hesitant (which suggests that there were some dissenting voices) but says yes, the majority of the leaders agreed that this was the right strategy to better serve their people. Mabuza‟s election or co-optation into politics by the hereditary chiefs was not how Bantustan leaders were chosen different from what was the norm at the time (the chiefs jealously guarded and competed for such positions amongst themselves – see section on perceptions about Bantustan leaders). Most Bantustan leaders were chosen from among the senior chiefs within a given Territorial Authority or hand-picked (and replaced with more malleable candidates if they became obstacles to the apartheid government‟s vision) (Margaret Mabuza- 6 June 2007, Esther Mabuza - 6 June 2007, Sandile Mabuza – 5 June 2007, David Wylde – 2 August 2007).

Both Enos Mabuza‟s parents were still alive when the chiefs made their offer and Enos discussed it with his family and they in turn advised caution. Everyone involved agreed that it was dangerous to take up such a position in terms of possible confrontations with the South African government or other chiefs who would feel robbed of their „rightful‟ positions of authority since he was, strictly speaking, not eligible for the position because he was a commoner. There was a fear too that ordinary people would not accept him in that position. Mabuza accepted the family‟s input and concerns but decided to take the offer because his elders had made a sincere request and he felt he had a duty to perform. The family (parents, siblings and wife) supported his decision but it made all of them very nervous. Margaret Mabuza (his sister) notes that it was a difficult and sad decision for him to make because he loved teaching so much but he was also an obedient person and liked to help where he could. It was not part of his nature to be indifferent or cavalier and he saw and experienced how the apartheid government treated the black people. He was concerned about the leaders being used by the government to oppress their own people because they did not understand what they were asked to do in order to avoid a repeat of Ndebele King Lobengula‟s signing away of his people‟s land (Rudd Concession) out of ignorance (Maylam, 2005:115-116).

Mabuza‟s consultations with his family and a close friend (Dr Nyathi – Mabuza‟s colleague in the teaching profession) means that he did not make the decision lightly or unilaterally. His family members note, however, that Enos Mabuza never really considered himself a politician even though he spent over a decade in politics. According to his family, Enos Mabuza‟s first and real passion was always education and he regarded himself not as a

politician/Chief Minister or businessman but as a teacher first and foremost (Sandile Mabuza; Margaret Mabuza; Esther Mabuza).

Enos Mabuza was appointed a member of the Nkomazi Regional Authority by the Hhoyi Tribal Authority in 1975. Shortly thereafter, representatives from the South African government (Bantu Administration and Development) met with all the local chiefs to discuss the formation of the Swazi Territorial Authority. The government did not impose a particular candidate to lead the new body but gave the chiefs the option to nominate or elect the person who they wanted as a leader (Sandile Mabuza, Interview 5 June 2007. The Swazi Territorial Authority was established in April 1976 and consisted of 28 elected members, including Enos Mabuza. Chief Johannes Mkolishi Dhlamini was considered the most senior Swazi Chief in South Africa by the South African government (the officials of the then Department of Bantu Administration and Development) and was appointed as Chief Executive Officer of the Swazi territories. Three Executive Officers, Enos Mabuza among them, were elected to work closely with Chief Johannes Dhlamini (Mabuza, 1983:5).

The Swazi territory was supposed to be granted Legislative Assembly status in April 1977 but a dispute over Trust Farms (white farmer which were bought out by the South African government to consolidate the Swazi Bantustan) arose between the Executive Committee and the Swazi Territorial Authority on one hand, and the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development on the other. The Commissioner General, Professor E. F. Potgieter, and senior officials from the Department of Bantu Administration and Administration had not anticipated the resistance of the people whom "they had been made to believe were soft, pliant and condescending" (Mabuza, 1983:5).The Territorial Authority resolved that if it had to negotiate the question of Trust Farms from a position of strength because it wanted to expedite the granting of legislative assembly status and transfer responsibility for the Swazi territory to the new body. As Chief Executive Officer, Chief J. M. Dhlamini refused to accept this resolution of the Territorial Authority and was removed from office by a motion of no confidence on 23 June 1977. As one of the three existing Executive Officers, Enos Mabuza was elected to succeed Chief Dlamini as Chief Executive Councillor[34].

[34] See also Macmillan (1989) regarding Mabuza"s entrance into politics and the divisions in that KaNgwane polity

7.4 The Mandate of KaNgwane's Legislative Assembly

The KaNgwane Legislative Assembly was established with effect from 1 October 1977 by the KaNgwane Constitution Proclamation R214 of 1977 in respect of the area defined in Schedule 1 of the Proclamation. Proclamation R214 of 1977 was gazetted simultaneously with a host of other supplementary (to specify the Bantustan authorities" rights, powers, authorities, duties, obligations and functions) ones as follows:

R215 - Established departments for the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly
R216 - Salaries and allowances of members of KaNgwane"s Legislative Assembly
R217 - Specified the financial regulations for KaNgwane
R218 - Specified requirements for the withdrawal of moneys from the Revenue Fund
R219 - Rules of procedure for KaNgwane"s Legislative Assembly

The National States Constitution Act 21 of 1971 empowered the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly to make laws for the areas under its jurisdiction. However, the tough stand taken by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development and Chief Dlamini"s handling of the impasse created tensions which Mabuza partly blamed on the "political ineptitude of the Chief Executive Officer", Chief J. M. Dhlamini (Mabuza, 1983:5). Chief J. M Dhlamini was not satisfied with the way he had been removed from office and challenged the dismissal in the Transvaal Supreme Court. In a judgment delivered on 10 November 1977, Justice Van der Walt found that the procedure provided for in the Swazi Territorial Authority Constitution had not been followed in summoning the meeting at which Chief Dhlamini had been voted out of office. The resolution of the Swazi Territorial Authority was consequently declared invalid and Chief Dhlamini was reinstated as Chief Executive Councillor. According to Mabuza, it was clear, however, that a political leader who was not popular (had no support) with the people or the Legislative Assembly could not continue to lead by virtue of a court order (Mabuza, 1983:6). On 14 December 1977, Chief Dhlamini"s Executive Council resolved to request the State President to dissolve the first KaNgwane Legislative Assembly and constitute a new one which would elect a new Chief Executive Councillor. This was granted and the second KaNgwane Legislative Assembly was convened on 23 March 1978. Chief Dhlamini and Enos Mabuza stood for election to the position of Chief Executive Councillor. Enos Mabuza won or was re-elected unanimously (Mabuza, 1983:6) and served in this capacity through three successive Legislative Assemblies (proof of his popularity) and his title changed to Chief Minister in 1984. According to Elias Ginindza (Interview, 8 June

2007), Enos Mabuza was a very methodical, orderly person and he overhauled the structure of the then Swazi Territorial Authority so that revenue could be collected and tribal issues could be dealt with in a systematic manner (efficiently) and resources and decisions could be accounted for and each chief was allocated a staff compliment to assist in the execution of their administrative duties. Below is a summary of KaNgwane‟s leaders and their period of tenure:

Chief Councillors

Johannes Mkolishi Dlamini April 1976 – 1977

Enos John Mabuza 8 October 1977 - April 1981

Chief Executive Councillor

Enos John Mabuza April 1981- 18 June 1982

Administrator

N.J. Badenhorst 18 June 1982 - 9 December 1982 (during the controversy of the Swazi land deal)

Chief Ministers

Enos John Mabuza 9 December 1982 - 1 April 1991

Mangisi Cephas Zitha 15 April 1991 - 26 April 1994

Social capital is highly embedded in class structure; which is why "old boys networks" from elite schools and universities offer individuals access to different resources (capital) which give them an advantage when climbing the social ladder (who and not what you know or friends in high places who are usually met in high places or *en route* to high places). Being born in a „high place‟ considerably increases one‟s chances of having influential friends in high places too. Buthelezi was born into royalty or a chieftaincy line and became chief but Mabuza was a commoner brought in by some chief to replace another chief, which possibly put him in the middle of an on-going power struggle in which he was used as a proxy. In evaluating KaNgwane relative to the other Bantustans, it is important to point out that the Transkei was the first Bantustan to have a Territorial Authority established in 1956, roughly twenty years before one was established in KaNgwane. Transkei attained partial self-governing status in December 1963 and became independent in 1976 – almost two years before the KaNgwane Bantustan was constituted. KaNgwane was granted nominal self-rule status on 1 April 1981 and it was the last of the Bantustans to be granted self-governing status on 31 August 1984. KaNgwane lagged behind all the other Bantustans in terms of political

and socio-economic development. KaNgwane was the smallest Bantustan population estimated at 597 783 in 1992 and a GDP of approximately R151 620 000 in 1986. However, experiencing the growing pains much later than the other Bantustans might have been an advantage in that KaNgwane‟s leaders could learn from the experiences of others and possibly avoid some of the pitfalls which they fell victim to.

7.5 Mabuza's 'Open-Minded' or 'Progressive' Approach

Enos Mabuza‟s father stopped working in the mines in Barberton and moved the family to Johannesburg where he occasionally worked as a general labourer. However, being employed by someone else did not appeal to him or satisfy him for long periods because he did not like the oppression and exploitation which characterised most employer-employee relationships at the time and he would ask to have his work pass cancelled in anger. After that, he would either look for another job or do odd jobs for himself selling pots, sharpened axes, knives, scissors and other goods from house to house. Enos Mabuza‟s father had only passed Standard Four but was very politically aware and chose the insecurity of self-employment over working for abusive white bosses. When asked if his father belonged to any political party or group, Mabuza‟s response is that his father was once a paid-up member of the ANC but the membership probably lapsed (Frederikse interview with Mabuza, undated).

Mabuza notes that his mother was a strong woman who brought up the children in between doing odd house-keeping jobs for English-speaking whites in the suburbs. According to Mabuza, black women „preferred‟ to work for English-speakers because although they were condescending, they were not as bad as their Afrikaner counterparts. However, this distinction between Afrikaners and the English was blurred when more blacks started seeing "…a general white greed, so to speak…", even though there were some white individuals who were civil. It is clear from this comment that from this early age, Enos Mabuza wanted to steer away from the stereotype that all whites are bad (Frederikse, interview with Mabuza, undated).

Enos Mabuza was aware of the ANC as a child in Sophiatown because of the songs that people used to sing on the roads – songs about suffering, oppression and freedom and he also got to know the names of ANC leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu (Frederikse interview with Mabuza, undated). Asked if he had negative feelings towards whites, coloured or Asians when he was growing up in Sophiatown, Mabuza

comments that he did not, although he had limited contact with them. He remembers having negative feelings towards the police, particularly white policemen, because they were the ones the township people had the most contact with or experience of, most of it negative. He comments that occasionally there were fights between black and Afrikaans kids when they did have contact at a shopping complex or other such places but Mabuza is reluctant to say that such clashes were consciously political or malicious in nature (no real bitterness or resentment). His feeling is that, as children, they were aware that there were differences between blacks and whites or Indians and Asians (appearance, class/possessions) because blacks always bought from the other groups and not the other way round. As children, the only confrontations he experienced with children from other racial groups were mere playground rivalries or hostilities and the only „weapons" that either group had where slings. He remembers this because one of his younger brothers was once injured by a sling but at this stage, all the children did was wonder why they were different and why they did not have the same material things that the Indian or Asian children had at school. Mabuza struggled to understand why he had to do odd jobs during the school holidays (selling peaches, oranges and chicken entrails) to buy school books and contribute to the family"s well-being when the other children did not. Mabuza"s realisation that the economic system was fundamentally skewed came much later when he was doing his Junior Certificate and white brutality was getting worse (more arrests for pass offences etc). It became clear to him why his father had been adamant to work for himself and why so many people despised the "Boers" (the brutal police and the "*Baas*" or employers). Around this time, Mabuza says he started to make links between the circumstances he found himself and other black people in and what he was learning in school (Frederikse interview with Mabuza, undated).

Enos Mabuza"s family was forcibly moved from racially mixed Sophiatown and relocated to Meadowlands, Soweto (on the West Rand) following the passing of the 1950 Group Areas Act. His political awakening took root in 1954-1955, around the same time that Bantu Education (1953) was introduced. Education and schools in general were being separated from the churches too and this was a problem for Mabuza who made the realisation that blacks were being governed against their will (Frederikse, interview with Mabuza, undated). The Sharpeville Massacre of March 1960 happened when Mabuza was in high school as a boarder at St Joseph"s in the Natal midlands (Pietermaritzburg). He recalls that he came into contact with boys who were involved with the PAC when he was doing Matric and they discussed politics and change with those that he befriended. They resolved to make a

contribution to improve the black man‟s lot in life. However, Mabuza‟s account stresses that violence was never discussed and they kept their ideas and plans away from their families. Asked if he thought the PAC and ANC were the same, different or opposed to each other (as in being more anti-white or more Africanist), Mabuza comments that he regarded the PAC as a party with a "different thrust" from that of the ANC but not necessarily opposed. In his own words, Mabuza adopted a "live and let live attitude" to most things and people throughout his life. He tried to be tolerant and to keep an open mind – not criticising, judging, condemning or controlling others unnecessarily. He says that at the time, he was not preoccupied with the details about whom or what would bring about black people‟s liberation but that liberation was needed and would come (Frederikse, interview with Mabuza, undated).

The contradictions which seemed to plague Mabuza‟s career were already evident when he took a part time job as a clerk at the newly created Resettlement Board offices in Meadowlands for two years after he finished high. He had decided that he would be a religious minister and help save the world that way but he needed preaching lessons and this job was a way for him to pay for them. He admits that this was an odd thing to do because the township folk hated the Resettlement Boards but he says he did it anyway because, apart from the money, he wanted to get closer to the Afrikaners in order to get to know and understand who they were as a people, particularly since they controlled everything. Working there meant that he could experience both worlds because it also exposed him to the people‟s suffering when they came to the offices after their houses had been bull-dozed or widows were evicted and so forth. This was Mabuza‟s first real encounter with the intricate workings of the system and racism. Not surprisingly, however, the job at the Resettlement Board offices did not win him many fans among the black folk who saw him there at a time when anti-white, especially anti-Afrikaner sentiment was growing in the townships. Mabuza commented that he was surprised that his superintendant, an Englishman called Bernard or Bennett, treated him badly quite contrary to the general view that some blacks had that the English were a lesser evil (Frederikse interview with Mabuza, undated).

7.5.1 The South African Black Alliance

The South African Black Alliance (SABA) was formed on 11 January 1978 or in March of the same year (discrepancies in the accounts) by the KwaZulu Bantustan‟s Chief Buthelezi in Ulundi in order to mobilise anti-independence Bantustan leaders. The Alliance‟s main objective was to convene a National Convention of representatives of all population groups to

seek a peaceful, negotiated solution to the country‟s problems. The Dikwankwetla Party from the QwaQwa Bantustan was set to join the alliance but the organisations represented would not merge into one solid block because doing so would contravene the Political and Interference Act of 1968 which banned inter-racial mixing in political parties.

SABA succeeded the abortive Black Unity Front (BUF) which was also a Buthelezi initiative to „unify black resistance‟, in solidarity with the leaders of Gazankulu (Ntsanwisi) and Lebowa (Chief Cedric Phatudi) who shared Buthelezi‟s opposition to sanctions/dis-investment. SABA‟s stated aims were to help bring about an open, democratic South African in which the principle of one man, one vote applied and there was equality before the law and equality of opportunity. These were common concerns - the reasons or aims of the struggle and they were shared by most other groups within the struggle. Buthelezi‟s grand plan envisaged SABA operating along the same lines as the Congress Alliance in the 1950s (the ANC, Congress of Democrats, Coloured People‟s Congress, South African Indian Congress and the South African Congress of Trade Unions). However, one glaring difference between the Congress Alliance and SABA was the latter‟s link to state-created structures (Bantustans and councils) which meant that its „resistance‟ or antagonistic stance towards apartheid was informed by sectarian considerations mixed with some communalism, but remaining loyal to their own interests and those of the apartheid state.

SABA and its predecessor (the BUF) have been described as pragmatic but with a populist, some would say vague and opportunistic agenda designed to serve specific class interests (petty bourgeoisie functionaries in the Bantustan and other apartheid structures) (Maré and Hamilton, 1987: 135-179). Critics, including Rev. Allan Boesak, argue that SABA (Bantustan political parties such as KwaZulu‟s Inkatha and KaNgwane‟s Inyandza National Movement) was merely a means to an end (getting onto and/or staying on the political gravy train), especially for Buthelezi who initiated, led and dominated it (Maré and Hamilton, 1987: 157-163).

Chief Buthelezi led (was Chairman) SABA and he presented it as being concerned with social, political and economic reforms in South Africa and planning the type of future that South Africa would have after apartheid (industrial relations between workers/unions and employers, businesses and consumers, among business people themselves and politicians). The sanctions debate was at the centre of SABA‟s discussions on these issues, especially in the mid 1980s. Buthelezi‟s stance regarding sanctions was ostensibly because of their

potential effects on the poor/ordinary people who, in his view, would be hardest hit. He also opposed sanctions because he believed that they would cripple the country‟s economy long after apartheid ended (Maré and Hamilton, 1987: 157-163).

There was nothing objectionable about SABA in principle or on paper, save for its composition and their „ulterior motives‟, especially Buthelezi who had open and on-going courtship or „guarded cooperation‟ with state agencies (Davies, O‟Meara and Dlamini, 1998:404-405; Maré and Hamilton, 1987:157-163). Consequently, SABA had mixed successes and failures because it was originally meant to provide a broader platform for black politicians who wanted to widen their political bases, make a contribution to the struggle, or perhaps simply wanted to assuage their consciences. SABA failed to attract an urban base (political and community organisations) even though it participated in the boycotts of white bread (after price increases) and a boycott of Fatti‟s and Moni‟s following a strike at the company (Davies, O‟Meara and Dlamini, 1998:404-405; Maré and Hamilton, 1987: 157-163).

Ntsanwisi (Gazankulu) and Phatudi (Lebowa) from the defunct Black Unity Front did not join SABA. Mabuza/Inyandza National Movement/KaNgwane joined in mid 1978 and Mopeli‟s (QwaQwa) Dikwankwetla Party which joined SABA in 1979 disaffiliated in 1981.Other SABA members, apart from Buthelezi‟s Inkatha and Mabuza‟s Inyandza national Movement (Bantustan parties), were Allan Hendrickse‟s Labour Party and the Reform Party (based respectively on the Coloured and Indian Councils imposed by the apartheid regime). Through SABA, Mabuza came in contact with the controversial Indian leader Amichand Rajbansi of the Reform Party, South African Indian Council and the National People‟s Party (Bank, 1994:86; Maré and Hamilton, 1987: 157-163).

Maré and Hamilton‟s (1987:157-163) evaluation of SABA‟s overall contribution to the struggle is negative because, according to them, the organisation or alliance was ultimately divisive. They cite Buthelezi‟s activities (by extension SABA‟s) in explaining this opportunism and divisiveness - Buthelezi‟s relations with the white political establishment and businesses in South African, his forays abroad, his strained relationships with the ANC, Black Consciousness (the Black People‟s Convention (BPC) and the South African Students Organisation (SASO)), the PAC, the Committee of Ten and others. SABA (its members) were born out of the tribal and ethnic institutions of the apartheid state – the Bantustans, many of which were notorious for their volatility - ambition and repression (propensity for

violence), as well as feuds in the ruling families/tribal politics. Despite the lack of enthusiasm for SABA, the organisation held meetings and organised under its banner for over 5 years, for instance, to protest the KaNgwane and Ingwavuma land transfer to Swaziland in 1982 which meant territorial and political separation from South Africa for the affected territories. Buthelezi drafted background papers, a memorandum to all South African political groups (June 1982), briefings and addressed the people of Chief Nyawo, Mathenjwa and Mngomezulu (28 May 1982), the Tembe Tribe (24 June 1982), a prayer meeting of the South African Black Alliance at KaNyamazane Stadium in KaNgwane (25 July 1982) and University of Pretoria students (4 August 1982). Inkatha and the Progressive Federal Party (not a SABA member) held a joint protest meeting on 12 and 13 July (Durban City Hall) 1982 on the same issue of the South African government‟s decision to excise these territories without consulting the people (the dilemma of „black voicelessness‟) (Davies, O‟Meara and Dlamini, 1998:404-405; Maré and Hamilton, 1987:32,163; Buthelezi Karis-Gerhart Collection).

SABA was short-lived and collapsed in 1983 soon after it condemned (and expelled in early 1983) the Labour Party‟s decision to enter the new/proposed constitutional arrangements of the apartheid regime (the tri-cameral parliament in the early 1980s). The Labour Party‟s decision was in contrast to the Reform Party‟s withdrawal from the 1981 Indian Council elections because of the unfairness of the proposed arrangements to blacks/Africans. SABA also criticised the President‟s Council which was supposed to refine Prime Minister Vorster‟s constitutional proposals. Apart from opposing the proposals, SABA attacked the President‟s Council for its exclusion of Africans/Blacks and this led to the Labour and Reform parties refusing to accept nominations to the council. However, one of the contradictions or ambiguities regarding Enos Mabuza political career is that he did serve as an advisor on the President‟s Council for about 5 years in the early 1980s (period soon after the KaNgwane Bantustan was created and Mabuza Inyandza joined SABA - overlaps). SABA also put forward ideas for consociational democracy along the same lines as that recommended by the Buthelezi Commission (Davies, O‟Meara and Dlamini, 1998:404-405; Maré and Hamilton, 1987: 157-169). Despite Mabuza‟s many forays into unknown and contradictory situations, he managed to earn the respect and ear of senior members in the South African government, the ANC/UDF‟s leadership and other organisations, regardless of their political affiliations.

7.6 Mabuza's Inyandza National Movement 1978-1990: Friend or Foe?

One can regard the formation of Inyandza as a populist endeavour or a template for ethnic chauvinism given populism‟s associated appeal to both the political left and right. However, for Laclau (2005:3-20, 99, 138, 157-172, 221-222), populism is the embodiment of a set of demands; a political alternative with a social logic and Inyandza fits this unassuming definition like any other party or organisation. It was created to address certain questions related to representation and popular participation. For Laclau (2005:155), there is "no political intervention which is not populistic to some extent" in its constitution. He argues that populism is not evil and that it is the very nature of the political even though in its excesses it has the potential to become the very things that it initially sets out to change. Mayer (1972:20) concurs and points out that "political identification requires trust – the feeling that the state to which one gives one‟s loyalty protects one and takes care of one‟s vital interests." Taking the foregoing discussion of the South African situation, Mabuza and Inyandza were not the real enemy.

The tri-cameral parliament was supposed to establish a National Council to negotiate with leaders within government created structures (councillors in black urban areas, Bantustan leaders and other black leaders. Mabuza opposed the setting up of and participation in such a forum because it would not represent the aspirations of blacks. According to Mabuza, the National Council was an unacceptable arrangement to the majority of black people. Mabuza (cited in the *Financial Mail*, 1989:54; Mabuza, 1989b:4) stated that he would only participate in the National Council if the following conditions were met:

- the unconditional release of political prisoners,
- the unbanning and lifting of all restrictions on proscribed and restricted organisations and persons/ leaders of extra-parliamentary organisations
- the removal of troops from the townships
- the repeal of discriminatory and repressive legislation such as the Internal Security Act
- an end to all political trials and executions and the lifting of the State of Emergency
- a commitment towards a meaningful negotiation process to resolve the political crisis

Mabuza (cited in the *Financial Mail*, 1989:54) added that "I do not see myself as being representative enough of the people to be there (together with other Chief Ministers), to negotiate even if these conditions were met" to create the right climate "….for it would be meaningless to release Nelson Mandela into a vacuum; he must be released into a political constituency and he must be invited to participate or to make proposals on the process of negotiation." It was not just the ANC that Mabuza wanted to see at the negotiating table but also the PAC, UDF, AZAPO and other organisations that had legitimate or recognised constituencies. Mabuza‟s insistence on these things was echoed in the unifying perspective for the November 1989 Conference for a Democratic Future (Frederikse, 1990:240). From his speeches and interviews, it appears[35] that Mabuza was well aware of the fact that the Bantustan system was imposed on the people but could not just be wished away. Something drastic had to happen to bring lasting change. The truth or morality of what he did remains a point of conjecture. He was not infallible and anyone is free to pass judgement about it but the fact remains that Mabuza refused to be quietly obliging, inoffensive or docile. He had his reasons for participating in Bantustan politics and perhaps his „progressive‟ actions in the latter part of his tenure as Chief Minister were tantamount to political grandstanding but the truth is that he was one of very few leaders in his position to challenge the state and essentially bite the hand that fed him. It might not have changed general attitudes towards him but he tried to do something different; and edit his personal story in the history books.

It is difficult to separate some of what Enos Mabuza did and that which was done by the Inyandza National Movement as an organisation because Mabuza was one of its co-founders and President for most of its existence. Enos Mabuza has been labelled a populist because he mobilised support for his vision by co-founding and leading the Inyandza National Movement. Mabuza was not oblivious to the opportunistic tendencies of many individuals in the Bantustan system. He commented that "one of the most irksome flaws of the „Bantustan‟ policy is that it invites unemployable wolves who see it as an opportunity to jockey for positions of power and money" (Mabuza, 1983:7). His family maintain that he was not in politics for the prestige, power or wealth but to serve his people. Was this deceptive? Possibly. Was he beyond reproach? His (and others like him) position of „power‟ naturally attracted envy, suspicion and resentment from rivals and mere observers alike. There was no easy solution to South Africa‟s problems and the transition to a democratic state had to be

[35] What he verbalised could have just masked the real reasons for his certain actions.

managed carefully. The argument of people like Mabuza and others who found themselves working within government created structures was that they were in it to give expression to their opposition to apartheid. Many wrote them off politically as traitors or at best, misguided people who were committing political suicide. However, Nelson Mandela wrote an article entitled "Our Struggle Needs Many Tactics" which appeared in the journal *Liberation* in February 1958. The article focuses on the issue of boycotts as a weapon to be used in the struggle but part of it addresses the issue of participation and non-participation in government created bodies. The following extract sheds light on Mandela‟s pragmatic approach, which is also how politicians generally respond to different circumstances and opportunities as they present themselves. Although Mandela‟s piece deals with boycotts as a tactic, the article can also be read to include the formation of partnerships or allegiances with different groups because; as the saying goes, there are many ways to skin a cat:

> In some cases it might be correct to boycott, and in others it might be unwise and dangerous. In still other cases, another weapon of political struggle might be preferred. A demonstration, a protest march, a strike or civil disobedience might be resorted to, all depending on the actual conditions at the given time. In the opinion of some people, participation in the system of separate racial representation in any shape of form, and irrespective of any reasons advanced for doing so, is impermissible on principle and harmful in practice. According to them, such participation can only serve to confuse the people and to foster the illusion that they can win their demands through a parliamentary form of struggle…" (Mandela, 1958:15).

All the Bantustans had party-political organisation not long after a Legislative Assembly was established or the Bantustan became a self-governing territory and such organisations regularly competed in elections, often against official opposition parties. The Inyandza National Movement was founded in 1978 as a political vanguard of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly and was disbanded voluntarily by its founders/leaders when the CODESA negotiations were concluded. Holden and Mathabatha (2007:259) estimate the Inyandza National Movement‟s members to have been approximately 100 000 in 1982 when the controversy of the Swazi land deal took centre stage. According to an interview with Mr

M. S. Ginindza[36], the Inyandza National Movement‟s membership was form all over South Africa and the organisation had representatives in Pretoria and Johannesburg to mobilise support. Inyandza was visible and active not just in KaNgwane despite its size compared to other organisations, financial limitations and security concerns. People could join the INM voluntarily and all that was required was that members be interested in its policies, principles and programmes which were "directed by Enos Mabuza‟s wisdom and vision" to highlight flaws in the apartheid system as well as to mobilise support for the improvement of living conditions in the KaNgwane area. Inyandza/Mabuza‟s speeches as President of Inyandza and Chief Minister of KaNgwane often denounced the apartheid regime at its rallies (at Inyandza congresses and through various publications). Mabuza called for the release of political prisoners and the return of those in exile ("Viva ANC! Viva Nelson Mandela, release Nelson Mandela!") like other anti-apartheid organisations and this greatly upset the apartheid regime (Elias Ginindza[37], Interview 8 June 2007).

In terms of class composition, the Inyandza National Movement‟s rank and file members were mostly from the working class but its leadership had a distinct class bias in that most of the leaders were from the black educated class (teachers, clerics, small businessmen- „middle class‟). The same individuals also formed the majority in the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly, which can be read as nepotism or cronyism. However, Sandile Mabuza (Interview 5 June 2007) claims that the KaNgwane cabinet was quite efficient because there was little or no tokenism, even though some of the semi-literate hereditary chiefs were Cabinet Ministers holding relevant or appropriate portfolios such as the Ministry of Arts and Culture (later renamed the Ministry of Education and Culture) and thus acted symbolically as the custodian of Swazi culture. Ministers in the KaNgwane government following a cabinet reshuffle which was reported by the Lowveld Bureau in *The Star* on 5 November 1986 were as follows:

Mr. E. Mabuza - Chief Minister
Chief T. S. Dhlamini - Minister of Finance
Mr. T. M. Nkozi - Minister of Justice and Police

Mr. P. I. Masilela - Minister of the Interior
Mr. M. C. Zitha - Minister of Health and Welfare

[36] He was friends with Enos Mabuza and also a colleague (teaching and politics). M. S. Ginindza was an office bearer in the INM as well as an executive member of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly. At the time of the interview, Mr Ginindza was a member of the Mpumalanga Provincial Legislature.
[37] Mr Elias Ginindza was Enos Mabuza‟s colleague from the teaching years. He regarded Mabuza as a brother and friend and affectionately refers to him as E.J.

Mr. D. S. Mkhwanazi - Minister of Public Works

Mr. E. C. Mango - Minister of Education and Culture

Chief E. N. Ngomane - Minister of Agriculture and Forestry

Figure 7: KaNgwane‟s Coat of Arms

Government Notice No. 2213 published in the South African Government Gazette (Number 7400 of 10 November 1978) announced the coat of arms registered for the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly (Certificate of Registration No. 995 issued on 6 April 1979). The coat of arms has the motto: SIYINYANDZA (“We are a bundle of wood tied together” - symbolising unity, solidarity or bringing together). Other Bantustans designed their own flags and had their own anthems but KaNgwane did not do so. Instead, it used the South African flag (old below) and the generic "Nkosi sikelel'i Afrika"(God, Bless Africa) as its anthem to demonstrate that it (the leaders and the people of KaNgwane) were part of South Africa and would remain so.

Figure 8: Old South African Flag

A number of questions spring to mind regarding the motives and directives of a political and cultural formation such as the INM:

- Who did the INM represent?
- What were the INM‟s ideals or objectives?
- What organisations, if any, was it affiliated with?
- Was there convergence between the INM‟s objectives and those of the main liberation formations such as the ANC or UDF?

According to Mr M. S. Ginindza, Enos Mabuza was so politically inclined that he decided that the INM should affiliate with the ANC in exile although this was kept out of the public sphere because the ANC was banned and by law one could not be a part of it. However, underground structures were being formed - networks and alliances were being nurtured and Mabuza and the INM‟s leadership decided to align their organisation with the ANC in exile. They believed that the INM would serve the struggle better if its objectives were in sync with those of the ANC (to form a partnership in which the INM would act as a rearguard for the ANC along with other formations like the UDF). The movement‟s constitution declared, like the current South African Constitution of 1996, that South Africa should belong to all who live in it and that it should be non-racial and non-sexist. The following excerpts from the preamble of the Inyandza National Movement‟s Constitution (adopted at its first national congress in November 1978) summarise KaNgwane leadership‟s political aspirations or Inyandza‟s declaration of intent.

> "Whereas KaNgwane is a „self-governing territory" which now and forever shall remain part of the Republic of South Africa, and believing that our national unity, peace and progress are the cornerstones of national development;
>
> Desiring to abolish all forms of discrimination and racism based on tribe, clan, sex, colour or creed, and striving to promote the principles of equal opportunity, justice, liberty,…peace and economic, social and political progress…,
>
> We accordingly declare ourselves a peaceful movement…"

Mabuza"s criticism of the divisiveness of the Bantustan system whilst simultaneously defending his involvement in it represents a double-bind but he summarises his position as follows:

> "Although I do not agree with the RSA government"s „Bantustan" or „separate development" policy, I have found myself bound to be involved in my present leadership role in spite of the fact that my people had neither a say in the formulation of the policy nor a choice in its implementation" (Mabuza, 1983:6).

Regarding the Swazi land deal of 1982, Mabuza and the Inyandza National Movement regarded KaNgwane as part of South Africa and "not as an independent political entity or a vassal state to be a constituent part of Swaziland" (Mabuza, 1983:9). They were committed to peaceful negotiation with the South African government to bring about peaceful change so that Africans could have a say in the decision-making processes which affected their lives and their future. The preamble to the INM"s constitution cited above was also used to oppose the proposed Swazi land deal of 1982, a decision which the ANC approved. However, the South African government did not see things the same way and retaliated by shutting down the KaNgwane government offices in Louisville. The vehicles that were used by the officers/ministers were taken away and a white administrator was brought in from Pretoria. The KaNgwane government/Mabuza effectively became a "prodigal son" because it went against the South African government"s wishes („the parent"s expectations"). Mabuza proved

that he was not the government‟s stooge, or at least not to the same level as other Bantustan leaders who did its every bidding (Elias Ginindza, Interview 8 June 2007).

The cooperation or understanding between the ANC and Mabuza/Inyandza was deliberately concealed or not known by ordinary people for security reasons. Aliases were often used in correspondence between Mabuza and the ANC to disguise his identity, for instance Mabuza is referred to as "Comrade Jonathan" and KaNgwane as "The Sparrow" in the ANC‟s minutes of a meeting them on 19 April 1986 and 21 September 1986 (ANC. 1986a; 1986b). Elias Ginindza (Interviews 8 June 2007) also claims that Enos Mabuza went by the name Reagan to keep his identity hidden from security agents who might have wanted to harm him. Mabuza‟s Inyandza National Movement reached out to the ANC and UDF and leaders such as Mosioua „Terror‟ Lekota often addressed crowds at Inyandza‟s rallies in places like Nkomazi and Nelspruit. An example of the cooperation or rapport between the ANC/UDF and Inyandza/Mabuza was Mabuza‟s involvement, small though it might be, in the Delmas Treason Trial (1985-1988). The trial turned out to be one of the longest political trials in South Africa history. The apartheid government sought to expose (and make example of/warn others) the activities of trade unions such as the South African Allied Workers Union, students and residents organisations affiliated to the UDF as part of a revolutionary conspiracy. Twenty-two Transvaal UDF leaders including Mosioua Lekota (UDF Publicity Secretary), Popo Molefe (UDF General Secretary), Moses Chikane (secretary of the UDF in the Transvaal), Rev. Tom Manthatha (South African Council of Churches) were indicted for treason under security laws in June 1985. Crimes such as terrorism and treason both carried a maximum penalty of death by hanging. In December 1988, Justice Kees van Dijkhorst of the Pretoria Supreme Court convicted eleven of the twenty-two accused and eight were acquitted. The Judge handed down sentences ranging from 5-12 years imprisonment but six of the eleven convicted were given suspended sentences for terrorism. However, on 15 December 1989, the Appellate Division overturned the convictions (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:598).

The ANC requested Mabuza, Nadine Gordimer (award-winning literary witness to South Africa‟s tragedies, political activist and apartheid critic, UNDP Goodwill Ambassador) and others to testify in their defence (give evidence-in-mitigation) in the Pretoria Supreme Court. These individuals were called to testify publicly on behalf of the UDF (the ANC‟s internal surrogate) despite the dangers that would arise from the association. Mr M. S. Ginindza

accompanied Enos Mabuza on this mission to speak the truth to the South African authorities with the hope that justice would prevail (M. S. Ginindza, interview 7 June 2007).

The Delmas Trial was the setting for Gordimer and Mabuza‟s first meeting and they became friends after that. In 2001, Gordimer recalled her friendship with Mabuza. She said they shared passion for literature, the issues of the day and conservation. She described Mabuza as having two deep strengths - his political convictions in the inevitability of freedom from apartheid and his Mabuza‟s religious faith which moulded his personality and beliefs in the power of good triumphing over evil and his truth to it in word and deed Gordimer said people listened to Mabuza and valued his input on an array of issues because of his "searching intellect and integrity" (Gordimer, 2001:1).

Mabuza acted against the expectations of the South African government by travelling to Maputo and Lusaka where ANC exiles could be found and posed the biggest „security‟ threat to the establishment. He helped several people, including Jacob Zuma (ANC) and Matthews Phosa (AZAPO, later ANC), to go into exile. He also sent parcels with basic supplies and information that was requested from time to time. According to Esther Mabuza, the apartheid government suspected that something fishy was going on in KaNgwane but they never had concrete proof. One of the few times that tensions got to a head was when the security police descended on a school which was accommodating ANC operatives and burnt down sections of the school (Elias Ginindza, Interview 8 June 2007; Esther Mabuza, Interview 6 June 2007). Also in contravention of the expectations of the South African government, Mabuza housed nearly 50 000 refugees and soldiers (mostly attached to Frelimo) that were fleeing the conflict in Mozambique (provided refuge to those in need). This gesture was well appreciated. A representative of the Mozambican refugees addressed an event attended by the British Ambassador in 1988 and commented on Enos Mabuza‟s inclusiveness:

> The troubles in Mozambique made our world so unhappy we had to run away from our land. Here we found the police going from door to door looking for us. But Mabuza gave us a home, and we thank him for being so brave. He says we are all Africans (in Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:260).

In 1986, approximately 4 000 KaNgwane students protested against Bantu Education. The South African police opened fire and one student was killed. Twenty-six students were arrested for public. The South African police tried to block the funeral of the slain student

(political gathering) by surrounding the township in which the protest had occurred and intimidating mourners. Mabuza was requested to intervene by demanding that the South African police remove themselves from the township and allow the funeral to take place. In negotiating with the police, Mabuza explained that freedom of speech was the „inviolate" right of every citizen. He managed to convince them to allow the funeral which was attended by 15 000 people and addressed by members of the UDF (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:260).

George Bizos also worked with Enos Mabuza on some matters pertaining to the ANC and the UDF. Mabuza also had contact with leaders of the white opposition such as Dr. Frederick van Zyl Slabbert. He also became close to Graca Marcel when her husband, Mozambican President Samora Marcel, died in a plane crashed in Mbuzini, close to the Swaziland border. Graca Marcel attended Enos Mabuza"s funeral in 1997 (Sandile Mabuza, Interview 5 June 2007).

On 28 February 1986, Enos Mabuza led a 20-member Inyandza National Movement delegation to meet with a 21-member ANC delegation (led by Oliver Tambo) in Lusaka. This meeting between Mabuza/INM and the ANC in Lusaka was at the invitation of the ANC and it dealt with „the way forward"; how to get the ANC and other organisations unbanned before meaningful negotiations with the South African government could begin. Inyandza understood the realities of the political situation in South Africa (that it was ruled by a minority government but that the rightful leaders of the people were in exile and would return). Inyandza"s objectives were to find a common ground with the ANC in order to consolidate the latter"s position "as the government in waiting" (Sandile Mabuza, Interview 5 June 2007). The meeting was successful and the result was a communiqué that affirmed that the ANC and Inyandza shared the same values and goals (hence the apparent alliance between them). The ANC accepted (trusted) Mabuza"s reasons for operating within apartheid structures and he in turn accepted the necessity for armed struggle. The ANC accepted that the INM had to operate within apartheid structures but appreciated the KaNgwane government"s continued assistance to liberation fighters („guerrillas") who were taking up arms and regularly in transit in and out of South Africa through KaNgwane territory (its location presented an easy opportunity) to Mozambique and Swaziland (M.S. Ginindza – interview, June 2007; Elias Ginindza, Interview 8 June 2007). The communiqué titled

„Mobilise All Forces for Freedom: Joint Communiqué between the ANC and the Inyandza National Movement Held in Lusaka" was published in *Mayibuye* Vol. 3, 1986.

They agreed that the solution to the problems facing our country lies in the institution of a system of majority rule in a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa. Accordingly, they were united in their opposition to the entire system of *„separate development"* as represented by such institutions as the tri-cameral parliament, the Bantustans, community councils, the Regional Services Councils, the proposed National Statutory Council and so on. The two delegations also agreed that the obstacle to a negotiated resolution of the South African problem is the Botha regime. They concluded that no negotiations are possible while the leaders of the people are in prison and while the Pretoria regime refused to accept that our country should be governed by all its people, both black and white, as equals, brothers and sisters (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:260).

Holden and Mathabatha (2007:260) describe this as "remarkable moment, especially in view of the ANC"s hard line and polemic-filled approached to Bantustan leaders" (2007:260). This meeting with the ANC in Zambia was reported in the news across the country and it gave Enos Mabuza and the Inyandza National Movement national coverage in terms of their allegiance with the ANC and contribution to the struggle (Elias Ginindza, Interview 8 June 2007). According to the media reports, Mabuza had proved that he had a different political agenda from that of other Bantustan leaders by denouncing both apartheid and the Bantustan system on numerous occasions. In 1984, for example, he condemned the idea of a tri-cameral parliament which he described as „monstrous." He also promised the people of KaNgwane that his government would actively "seek to promote non-racialism, equality and democracy in KaNgwane, just as we hope in the future to participate in the development and promotion of non-racial democracy in South Africa as a whole" (Mabuza cited in Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:260.)

However, Mr M. S. Ginindza (2007) notes that despite the successful meeting and communiqué (agreement) between the ANC and INM, the more militant quarters of the liberation movement inside the country – UDF, SAYCO and COSATU did not understand or necessarily tolerate why INM operated the way it did (fighting apartheid from within). The suspicion (and need to prove themselves) was particularly true of the INM"s relations with rank and file members of the main liberation and civic groups (grassroots- opposed to sell-outs, traitors and those deemed compromised and, therefore, risky as alliance partners) who

were not always privy to what their leadership discussed or agreed to with other groups in terms of alliances and strategies. Inyandza had to rely on the ANC‟s leadership to explain the link between the organisations; why Inyandza was relevant to this marriage of convenience.

KwaZulu‟s Chief Buthelezi considered Mabuza a confidante (SABA link, working in the Bantustan system etc) to the extent that Inyandza regularly sent representatives to Inkatha meetings to share ideas since none posed a threat to the other. However, Mabuza‟s cooperation with the ANC caused Chief Buthelezi great annoyance, especially after Inyandza met with the ANC in Lusaka. Buthelezi felt betrayed by Mabuza‟s open association with the ANC which Buthelezi refers to as "the forces of darkness." Buthelezi regarded Mabuza‟s actions as defection or breaking rank and he said some very unflattering things about Enos Mabuza (Sandile Mabuza, Interview 5 June 2007). Buthelezi and the ANC‟s once mutually beneficial association had gone sour and so did his relationship with Mabuza and it was during this time that Buthelezi‟s Inkatha began fuelling internecine violence in Natal. In an address to an Inkatha annual general meeting on 5 July 1986, Buthelezi accused Mabuza of misconceiving the aims of Inkatha and criticised Mabuza/Inyandza‟s meeting with the ANC in Lusaka as a form of "seeking political succulence" (Buthelezi, 1986b:27). Buthelezi describes Mabuza as a man who "used to be under my armpit and now look where he stands" (Buthelezi, 1986b:27). Buthelezi attributed this alleged betrayal by Mabuza on the divisiveness of the ANC which, in his view, was hell-bent on stripping him of allies (destroying him and Inkatha) such as Mabuza and others who fell by the way-side. Buthelezi continues his attack on Mabuza as follows:

> Those who are thus so easily stripped, would in any case have proven to be no allies at all when the going got tough. We are well rid of such flimsy allies in the great struggle which lies ahead. I am simply mentioning Mr. Mabuza in passing because I know that this conference will lament and mourn yet another victim who is consumed by the fires of black dissent" (Buthelezi, 1986b:27).

Buthelezi variously labels Mabuza and others like him "lily-livered", "faint-hearted", "politically rotten" and "disloyal" – fallen victim to human foibles such as cowardice, lack of conviction and greed (1986b:27; Maré and Hamilton, 1987:163).

Recollections by former INM members paint Inyandza as having been an integral part of South Africa‟s mass democratic movement. They like to think of the organisation as having

been an umbrella body (loosely along the lines of the UDF – an amalgamation of different groups with similar interests) to circumvent legal restrictions whilst filling the political vacuum created by the banning of most political organisations (ANC, PAC, BC and others). The INM worked with the UDF and its affiliates including the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) as well as progressive churches under the banner of the South African Council of Churches (SACC). Minutes of underground meetings between the INM/KaNgwane‟s leaders and the exiled ANC (meetings/briefings referred to in ANC/O. R. Tambo papers held by the University of Fort Hare) provide evidence of the latter encouraging or suggesting that the INM should work with all progressive forces within South Africa. The UDF was an obvious choice as a partner because it was unquantifiable (ubiquitous) in many respects and had access to different constituencies which made it difficult for the apartheid regime to clamp down on its activities (ANC. 1986a; 1986b).

As part of the INM‟s former leadership, Mr M. S. Ginindza insists that their organisation‟s aims and objectives corresponded with those of the ANC in almost all respects. They note that the only difference was the name of the organisation for the reasons outlined above but one might wonder whether this convergence was by design or coincidence. However, Enos Mabuza showed his deference to the ANC by stating repeatedly that he would hand over or submit to the ANC once it was unbanned (the real leaders returned to South Africa) and it did indeed happen that way. Enos Mabuza, Elias Ginindza and M. S. Gininda were founding members and leaders of the organisation and structured it in such a way that it had or represented more or less the same aims and objectives as the ANC. According to the people interviewed, Inyandza‟s connection with the ANC was deliberate, not coincidental. Several newspaper articles including the one by Stevens (1986:33) and others which appeared in *BONA* magazine and several (July/August and December issues) of the ANC‟s 1990 *Mayibuye* publications variously commented on this and other issues labelling Enos Mabuza the ANC in disguise because of the similarities in their objectives and approaches. Inyandza‟s leader, Enos Mabuza, came to be seen as a „comrade within the system‟ by the ANC‟s leadership because, for instance, he/Inyandza National Movement succeeded in uniting the people of KaNgwane to seek common citizenship in South Africa (the Swazi land deal) by refusing to be handed over to independent Swaziland. The Inyandza National Movement was a Swazi cultural organisation but its leaders were the most vocal against the Swazi land deal

in 1982 instead of showing deference to all things Swazi since the deal was presented as the right of the Swazi king. Inyandza also refused to opt for „independence" for KaNgwane.

The Inyandza National Movement (INM) convincingly won in KaNgwane"s first general elections in 1988 in which the average voting percentage was 39.7%. According to a statement issued at the time, this is regarded as good for a first general election. The 1988 election was the first time that women voted in KaNgwane. The INM won 10 of the 14 contested seats, which shows to its popularity, at least in KaNgwane. Following this election, the INM held 52 seats in the legislative council. Candidates of the INM, among them Enos Mabuza himself, took 42 undisputed seats when nominations closed on 22 August 1988. Just one of the contested seats was won by an independent candidate. Five of the fourteen candidates fielded by David Lukhele"s break-away Insika National Party forfeited their deposits. The INM took the result as a clear confirmation of Enos Mabuza"s policy to use self-government to promote the social and economic development of the people of KaNgwane and to oppose South Africa"s racial policy and the notion of Bantustans as „independent states" (SAPA, 1998:10).

The Inyandza National Movement held its 12th Annual Congress on Sunday 30 September 1990 at the Lowveld Showgrounds. The Congress was themed "The Realities and the Role of Democracy in a New South Africa." Some of the discussions held at the Congress centred on the future of the Inyandza National Movement, organisational structures, alliances, the future of the KaNgwane government, the Negotiation Forum and the constitutional basis of the role of democracy in a new South Africa. Mr John Stuart Kane-Berman was a guest speaker at this Congress. He is former Vice-President and current Chief Executive of the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) which has a proud history of involvement in the fight against apartheid. He also served as a board member of the Ithuba Trust and New Era Trust and is the author of several books on South African political experience.

On Thursday 10 February 1994, at a Special Session of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly in Matsula, KaNgwane"s Chief Minister Mr. M. C. Zitha (Mabuza"s successor as Chief Minister of KaNgwane and President of Inyandza who had been part of the Inyandza National Movement from its inception) continued with the work and vision of set by Enos Mabuza by reiterating the message that reconciliation as the only way to resolve the problems that were besetting the transition to democracy (Elias Ginindza, Interview 8 June 2007). Zitha was commenting on white right-wing violence which threatened to derail the negotiation

process from 1990 (threats of war, senseless destruction and intimidation such as the bombings in the western Transvaal and the Free State). Further, most Inyandza members joined the ANC when Inyandza disbanded and the ANC was unbanned. Mr. Elias Ginindza is one such individual and he is a member of the Mpumalanga Legislature (as ANC). The ANC did not object to this „œconversion‟ because the Inyandza had played a supporting role for the ANC. However, it has been noted that there were some individuals within Inyandza who wanted the organisation to be an autonomous entity – separate from the ANC or any other organisation. Inyandza‟s office bearers (National Executive Committee) in 1990 were as follows:

President: Mr. Enos J. Mabuza
Deputy President: Mr. M. C. Zitha
National Chairman: Mr. E .N .Ginindza (Mpumalanga Provincial Executive Council)
Deputy National Chairman: Mr. E. C. Mango
National Organiser: Mr. J. M. Matsana
National Treasurer: D. S Mkwanazi (Chairperson of Committees, the Mpumalanga Provincial Legislature)
Secretary General: Prof S. S. Ripinga (now with the ANC and served as South African High Commissioner to Cameroon)
Deputy Secretary General: Mr. N. S. Ngozo
Administrative Secretary: Mr. M. S. Gininda
Assistant Administration Secretary-Records: Dr. P. M. H. Maduna (ANC and has served as an ANC member of parliament, Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of State for Minerals and Energy Affairs and Minister of State Justice and Constitutional Development)
Publicity and Information Officer: Mr. D. Z. Makhubela (now with the Mpumalanga Department of Education).

Mabuza, Inyandza and the Spectre of Populist/Sectarian Ethnic Politics

Bank criticises the Bantustan system, Bantustan-based political organisations and the South African Black Alliance (SABA) which was comprised various bodies led by co-opted elites. Some of the other Bantustan leaders were distrustful of Buthelezi‟s personal ambitions in creating and heading SABA, especially his claims that his Inkatha party was a national liberation movement which represented all blacks in South Africa (Zulu imperialism) but Mabuza of KaNgwane and Mopeli of QwaQwa joined him together with the leaders of the

Coloured Labour Party and the Indian Reform Party (Rogers, 1980:91). Because of Enos Mabuza/the Inyandza National Movement‟s involvement in or association with such organisations, Bank labels them as populist (1994:86-87, 94) without differentiating them from Buthelezi and Inkatha, Allan Hendrikse and the Labour Party or QwaQwa‟s Mopeli and his Dikwankwentla Party. The label is convenient and warranted in some respects but in reality, there were similarities as well as differences (nuances) in the way these organisations operated - what and how they tried to achieve. Despite blanket criticism and labels such as those offered by Banks, Mabuza‟s administration earned respect, if not support (benefit of the doubt), for the relative peace and stability which prevailed in KaNgwane.

Mabuza did not regard Inyandza as owing its existence to the KaNgwane Bantustan but as existing in spite of it. Inyandza did not cater to just the interests of Swazis although it was unavoidable that the majority of its members would be united by Swazi identity since it was an organisation in a predominantly Swazi area. It was open to everyone (working class, petty bourgeois, peasants and others) in South Africa that shared its vision for a united and democratic South Africa and wanted to join because of a shared experience of apartheid injustice. George Hutchinson was one of Inyandza‟s founding members and he was considered a comrade by the ANC leadership (Mabuza, 1989a; 1989b; 1989c). Other respected leaders, for example, Penuell Maduna believed in Inyandza and put their weight behind it in spite of its Bantustan connection. Maduna was an Inyandza office bearer in 1990 and was later chairman of the working group which was responsible for redrafting proposals on transitional executive structures (phase one of an interim government). Does their participation in or endorsement of a so-called populist organisation make them populist too? Other notable people who associated with Mabuza in different capacities included the former deputy president of the PAC, Dikgang Moseneneke, Rev. Stanley Makgoba also of the PAC, Barney Pityana who was a close friend of Steve Biko and an adherent of Black Consciousness as well as a member of SASO and Rev. Simon D. Sibanyoni of Kabokweni in KaNgwane.

The ANC, PAC, SACP and other organisations were banned or restricted but apart from the banning of organisations, individual activists, certain books/literature and music was also banned in South Africa. In 1978 alone, 1 096 publications and 300 films were banned or subjected to age restrictions and excision. However, a Bantustan formation, Inyandza was not restricted in the same way and could thus fill in the political vacuum that existed (Mabuza,

1989a; 1989b; 1989c). It was perhaps unusual for Inyandza to actively seek or forge alliances more *bona fide* organisations in the struggle because Bantustan elites/politicians were considered its natural enemies but there were many dynamics at play and the conditions or realities on the ground were always changing. An alliance with Mabuza and Inyandza was deemed necessary and constructive for the struggle to be effective as part of a strategy for the widest possible base from which to bring down the apartheid state (Frederikse, 1990:206).

Debates around the possibility and/or form of inter-racial cooperation (alliances or collaborations between black, white, Indian and Coloured South African against a „common" enemy in the struggle) raged on throughout the struggle, especially during the racially polarised mood of the 1970s. There were tensions and suspicions over what role (substance) whites would play if they were allowed into black organisations. Some Africans wanted a clear designation of who would lead the struggle and who would follow or play a supportive role. Naturally, there were concerns over what was entailed by the liberal white conscience in practice given the juxtaposition of poverty and privilege, power and wealth along racial lines. There was the distinct possibility that a good number of whites who would express interest in or support the liberation efforts would do so to infiltrate the movements as spies for the government in order to cause discord and derail the struggle. Consequently, the more inward looking groups that subscribed to hardline BC and Africanist ideologies strongly held that Africans should be the vanguard of the national struggle because of their experience of oppression and their numerical superiority over other groups. They did not want whites to formulate policies and programmes or decide on the methods of struggle because Africans suffered more than any other group under apartheid. The formation of the PAC as a split from the ANC was over this and other disagreements because the Africanists were not convinced about how genuine white allies could be or their ability to change their long-standing attitudes and prejudices towards other races. The formation of the South African Students organisation (SASO) as a splinter group from the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) was also evidence of the different ideologies born from different experiences of injustice between blacks and whites (Frederikse, 1990).

Blacks bore the brunt and indignity of race-specific oppression such as the pass laws, forced removals, the Group Areas Act, Bantu Education and job reservation, all of which inevitably shaped negative attitudes towards other racial groups. Coloureds, Africans and Indians experienced varying degrees of discrimination and oppression under apartheid. At some point

Coloureds, for example, had a qualified franchise, could own property, become petty bourgeois to some degree and benefited from preferential employment policies such as the 1955 Coloured Labour Preference Policy, all of which were aimed at undermining Coloured-African relations and incorporating Coloured moderates into the middle level of the apartheid hierarchy. The stratification that was created through such measures and privileged status, however illusory, alienated Coloureds from the mainstream African-dominated resistance because it created a reluctance to take on the system (Frederikse, 1990:39,184). This was a similar predicament to that of the Bantustan elites who were lulled into a false sense of security and grew accustomed to artificial power and the trappings which it provided. However, while the ideologies and arguments of Africanists and Black Consciousness adherents (the PAC, AZAPO and Black Consciousness organisations), particularly the more militant youths, were consciously anti-white or had strong racial overtones, a backlash, against white involvement or the nature of white involvement in mass-based organisations, the leadership of the ANC, UDF and Mass Democratic Movement was more open to the idea[38] and welcomed anyone who purported to be part of the mass movement and was willing to work with them towards their goals (Frederikse, 1990:202). The ANC and the rest of the organisations which were driving the struggle (UDF, MDM) did not want to alienate potential allies, for example, the Congress Alliance was comprised of racially or nationally specific organisations which were linked through joint campaigns.

The PAC, AZAPO and BC organisations raised legitimate concerns over the nature of white participation in the struggle and this led to an ANC consultative conference in Morogoro, Tanzania in April 1969 to try and chart a way forward (Frederikse, 1990:99). It was argued that workers, academics and youths from the other racial groups who were opposed to apartheid could act as reinforcements or take a supportive, logistical, consultative or advisory role. People were wary of them, particularly whites, hijacking the struggle out of guilt or the arrogant need to further patronise and dominate because of the skills or resources which they brought to the table. Frederikse (1990:99 & 214) notes that one pressing issue for whites was compulsory conscription into the South African Defence Force and they wanted a way to campaign against it or an outlet for their anxieties and frustrations over the South African situation generally. Further, progressive whites often had an unstable base from which to organise because other whites who might have shared their sentiments were afraid of the

[38] However, the ANC"s leadership had to sell idea of co-operating with whites to the rank and file members in small doses as the political terrain changed from the mid 1970s onwards.

consequences of sticking their necks out in support of a popular black struggle. In these debates, Frederikse (1990:169-171) notes that as far as the government was concerned, the more radical, seemingly racist or separatist organisations such as the PAC, AZAPO and Black Consciousness affiliates were a safer, less threatening or more predictable enemy. Their rigid non-collaborationist stance inadvertently advocated separatism which worked in the state‟s favour whereas the ANC‟s non-racialism threatened to create a force which the state would not have been able to resist. As a result, Frederikse notes the limited or delayed state interference in the activities of the non-collaborationist organisations.

The Black Consciousness Movement, for example, was critical of the ANC‟s caution and pragmatism which it argued was sterile and ineffective. At the Morogoro conference, the ANC adopted the „Strategies and Tactics of the ANC‟ programme which addressed these issues and included the ANC‟s new approach to the armed struggle and political mobilisation which gathered momentum following the 1976 Soweto Student Uprising. However, the dilemma or question of alliances/partnerships and principles remained high on the agenda of liberation movements through to the negotiated transition[39] because of the variety of class forces and sectarian interests represented which needed balancing, including the question of the Bantustans (Egero,1991:41-42). It was also compounded by concerns over the palpable reality of ethnic identification which justified arguments in favour of constituency-based politics. Fears that ethnic and other interests would take precedence over the broader struggle were evident in AZAPO‟s attacks on the Transvaal Indian Congress and opposition to the 1981 elections for the government-controlled South African Indian Council (SAIC) which was in a sense an „ethnic body.‟ Some of the strongest criticism of mobilisation along ethnic lines for non-racial ends came from the National Forum Committee which rejected unprincipled alliances that had the potential to dilute the revolutionary content of the struggle. In a speech entitled “Nation and Ethnicity in South Africa” which he delivered at the launch of National Forum Committee, Neville Alexander commented on the matter as follows:

> The fact remains that ethnic or national group approaches are the thin end of the wedge for separatist movements and civil wars fanned by great-power interests and suppliers of arms to opportunist ethnic leaders. Does not Inkatha

[39] The first known meeting between President PW Botha and Nelson Mandela took place in July 1989 followed by the 2-4 May 1990 Groote Schuur and 6-7 August 1990 Pretoria minutes, CODESA I and II and signing of the Record of Understanding in September 1992 but several „secret‟ meetings preceded all this.

> in some ways represent a warning to all of us? Who decides what are the positive features of a national group?...Class, colour and nation converge in the national liberation movement. Cultural organisations that are not locally or geographically limited for valid community reasons should be open to all oppressed and exploited people…In this way we shall eliminate divisive ethnic consciousness and separatist lines of division without eliminating our cultural achievements and cultural variety (cited in Frederikse, 1990:206-207).

In reality, however, ethnic-based organisations were not confined to Bantustan politics. Coloured and Indian political formations, for example, worked in their own group areas or communities and catered for the distinct character of those communities because of the effects of Group Areas and other Acts which enforced geographical separation. Consequently, judgment of the Indian Congresses, the Natal Indian Congress for instance, was ultimately based on what they achieved rather than their composition (Frederikse, 1990:196, 201 & 204) because they worked in solidarity with Africans (Frederikse, 1990:29-35). Mabuza and Inyandza can be analysed in a similar light within the context of the Bantustans system in which they operated. Although in many respects Inyandza enjoyed a monopoly in KaNgwane politics generally and in the legislative assembly, it was as transparent as it could be about its leadership and practices in its internal structures (regular elections). A „genuine" attempt to establish the primacy of working class or other popular interests on its own is unlikely to merit an ethnic tag. The Congress Alliance was a compromise for practical purposes and included the ANC, the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), The South African Indian Congress, the South African Coloured People"s Organisation (later renamed the Coloured People"s Congress) and the South African Congress of Democrats (Frederikse, 1990:59). Alliances with white liberal organisations were often a short-lived improvisation because of cyclic nature of clashes over agendas and definitions of the role they could play long term. However, collaborations with white liberal groups such as IDASA and the Five Freedoms Forum were more sustained in response to black the community"s request for liberal whites to take a stand against the states of emergencies from 1986.

One of the people interviewed for this paper is Jabulani Michael Mndawe and he worked in the KaNgwane administration in the late 1980s with Simeon Gininda and others even though he was a member of the UDF, not Inyandza. Mndawe was in charge of KaNgwane"s

townships, including inspecting the accounting records of the eight municipalities which fell in the Bantustan‟s jurisdiction (Michael Mndawe, interview, Mpumalanga Government Offices, 7 June 2007). Mndawe is from Lydenburg in the Mpumalanga lowveld and was chairperson of the UDF affiliated South Africa Civic Association branch in KaNgwane and led its resistance efforts against the regime as a community structure. Resistance leaders in the lowveld including Michael Mndawe (UDF), John Baloyi (South Africa Council of Churches) and Sipho Sukati were taken into custody when the state of emergency was declared in 1986. According to Mndawe, the intension of the apartheid authorities was to have a Nelspruit treason trial similar to the Delmas treason trial. According to Mndawe, the Minister of Police at the time, Adriaan Vlok, was personally monitoring the movements of people who were believed to be causing destabilisation in the country. Efforts were made to make the detainees believe that they were being held on the insistence of the KaNgwane administration (Mabuza himself) but they did not fall for it. Mabuza risked everything by visiting them during their detention. Mndawe reports that Mabuza was very supportive and used his own resources to see to the welfare of the families of activists who were detained for longer than two years at a time. Mndawe was eventually released with the help of Steven Ngwenya and Phineas Mojapelo who were attorneys that represented ANC and UDF activists who fell foul of the apartheid authorities (Michael Mndawe, interview, Mpumalanga Government Offices, 7 June 2007).

Mabuza established relations with some UDF officials and organisers including Mosiuoa Lekota and Popo Molefe who used to visit KaNgwane. In terms of contact with the ANC, Mabuza had a working relationship with Jacob Zuma, a former ANC youth League member who spent 1963-1973 in prison on Robben Island for Umkhonto we Sizwe and SACTU activities and left for Swaziland in 1976. Zuma was elected onto the ANC‟s National Executive Committee (NEC) and moved to Mozambique as the ANC‟s chief representative until 1987. In 1990, he was the first member of the ANC NEC to return to South Africa to prepare for talks with the government. Mabuza also had on-going contact with Matthews Phosa who is a celebrated businessman, the ANC‟s current Treasurer-General and former Premier of Mpumalanga[40]. According to Mndawe, Mabuza also had contact with Cyril Ramaphosa from the trade union side of the resistance movement (Michael Mndawe, interview, Mpumalanga Government Offices, 7 June 2007). Mndawe believes that his being

[40] Phosa went into exile in 1985 and underwent political & military training. He became Umkonto we Sizwe‟s Regional Commander in Mozambique in 1986 and returned to South Africa in 1990. He participated in CODESA 1& 2 and was also a Commissioner on the Truth & Reconciliation Commission in 1995.

able to work in KaNgwane‟s administration whilst being an active member of the UDF, and through it, associating with the ANC is proof that there were no contradictions in terms of their aims. The common denominator with Inyandza, as with all the other organisations in the broad alliance, was that it made positive and consistent statements about a future South Africa in which racism would be eradicated (Michael Mndawe, interview, Mpumalanga Government Offices, 7 June 2007).

One of the documented cases of police brutality and death in detention in the Eastern Transvaal is that of Michael Mndawe‟s younger brother Thembuyise Simon Mndawe who lived in KaNyamazane Township outside Nelspruit. According to his brother, Simon was active in the Student Christian Movement and the banned ANC and from about 1979 he operated from Swaziland recruiting men for military training and distributing ANC propaganda in the country (pamphlets, slogans and other means) to conscientise, mobilise, inspire and counter the apartheid state‟s propaganda and misrepresentations. According to his brother, Simon Mndawe had regular contact with Mabuza from outside with information about ANC activities or plans in the lowveld. He had managed to evade capture several times and had been questioned by police about six months before his death. Mndawe was finally arrested at midnight on 22 February 1983 in terms of section 29 of the Internal Security Act of 1982. The section allowed for detention without trial for lengthy periods and detainees were often kept in solitary confinement, denied access to lawyers and visits from family members (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:538). Many fatalities and torture victims or detainees during the1980s were male youths between the ages of thirteen and twenty-four. Many of them were activists and held local leadership positions. They were targeted (seen as terrorists and subversives) because the government hoped that their detention would significantly weaken organised opposition and thus contain the wave of mass protest that was sweeping the country (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:615).

The proximity of Mozambique and Swaziland meant that the greater Nelspruit area was often used by guerrillas to enter the country covertly and Mndawe was suspected of being one of these guerrillas or terrorists. When Simon was arrested and charged, his family approached the Nelspruit law firm of Phosa, Mojapelo and Makgoba for assistance. Whilst in custody, Simon Mndawe was repeatedly assaulted (choked, punched and kicked) and sustained facial bruises and a fractured right cheekbone. He was also tortured (suffocated and electrocuted) but his complaints were ignored and medical treatment was withheld. The security police

forced a confession out of him a day after he was detained (on 23 February 1983). It is reported that he was taken to the security police for more questioning on 7 March 1983. Simon Mndawe died at Nelspruit police station on 8 March 1983 as a result of the injuries he sustained in prison but his death was officially recorded as „suicide by hanging". According to Michael Mndawe, although Simon Mndawe was an ANC cadre, his funeral was organised by Enos Mabuza. Representatives of the British anti-apartheid movement tried to attend Simon"s funeral and make a documentary about the torture that was rife in the prisons but they were arrested as part of the cover-up. A commission of inquiry into malpractices in South African prisons was also ordered by the Minister of Justice on 29 September 1983 following this and other deaths in detention, including those at the Barberton Prison Farm in the Eastern Transvaal on 29 December 1982 (African National Congress, 1984:28-29). Subsequently, an investigation into Mndawe"s death was conducted in February 1984 (Michael Mndawe, interview, Mpumalanga Government Offices, 7 June 2007; African National Congress, 1984:23; Bizos, 1998:133-151).

Unlike other Bantustans, KaNgwane was small and did not have a university where the youth could mobilise as radically as they did at the University of Fort Hare or the Turfloop campus of the University of the North where the Black Consciousness aligned AZASO and other student formations were active. The Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO) was active in whites-only universities and blacks-only universities (in the Bantustans as well as Coloured and Indian campuses) whilst student organisations such as the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) and the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) focused on mobilising mostly urban high school students from 1978 onwards (Frederikse, 1990:171 & 182). Without such a nucleus, the students in KaNgwane relied on information about boycotts and protests that were happening elsewhere in the country and only then could they support such protests (solidarity). An example of such boycotts and protests is that of high school and universities in April 1980 which originated in the Western Cape and spread nationally. The boycotts were over the standard and quality of education and quickly spread to include primary schools as well. This protest gradually spread to schools countrywide and grew into a general political protest which turned violent in response to police retaliation. Sporadic schools and university boycotts continued in 1982 and in 1983 similar demonstrations at schools affected 10 000 pupils countrywide and at least 22 meetings were banned.

In the Transvaal, the 1980s were marked by the violent and sustained enforcement of the UDF"s programmes such as consumer boycotts and mass stay-aways from work and school. Communities were urged to boycott local businesses, particularly those owned by black councillors, policemen or whites. The UDF and its affiliates demanded the withdrawal of the SADF from the townships, the release of political prisoners, improved housing and electricity, lowering of rentals and the resignation of councillors and these activities led to the emergence of „street committees", „People"s Courts" and declarations of „People"s Power", for example, in Alexandra in the wake of the 1986 Six Day War (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:600). The year 1984 was characterised by widespread rent and schools boycotts and demonstrations and in August demonstrations affected 800 000 school children. The Vaal Triangle rent boycotts spread and by June 1985 tension around rent and school boycotts peaked in the townships surrounding Barberton (KaNgwane) in the eastern Transvaal but many of those injured in the ensuing skirmishes were not directly participating in the boycotts (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:607). The Congress of South African Students (COSAS) was banned in August 1985 for leading or masterminding the wave of boycotts. Soweto pupils returned to school in January 1986 in response to a call from the Soweto Parents" Crisis Committee and in March a meeting of the National Education Crisis Committee resolved to end the schools boycott. In April 1986 black workers in White River north of Nelspruit and in Nelspruit itself take part in a crippling stay-away.

A nascent political formation like Inyandza which supported or was sympathetic to the struggle had a purpose because it could conscientise the ordinary people who had no other immediate alternatives in the Bantustan. Inyandza had greater freedom to operate politically but people were not badgered to join Inyandza. Mabuza did not exaggerate his own importance in the broader context of the national struggle. He was aware that extra-parliamentary organisations were highly critical of Bantustan-based political organisations as rent-seeking collaborationist formations in their character and operation but he was relieved that most organisations involved in the struggle accepted and even respected Inyandza"s political stand and role in the struggle. Inyandza was not rejected because its aims did not contradict or threaten those of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). Mabuza maintained that Inyandza existed only as a caretaker body holding fort in KaNgwane until the ANC and other political organisations were unbanned and the true leaders of the people, all the oppressed African people, the ANC, returned from exile and were released from prison and could lead again (Mabuza, 1989a; 1989b; 1989c). Inyandza voluntarily disbanded in 1990 in

response to the unbanning of political organisations and encouraged its members to join the ANC.

The proposed Swazi land deal of 1982 (discussed in detail below) was not only about returning South African Swazis to their motherland even though Swaziland‟s King Sobhuza and Pretoria presented it as such. The Bantustan‟s territory had been claimed by King Sobhuza of Swaziland as part of the Swazi monarchs‟ traditional realm, and the South African government hoped to use the Bantustan as a buffer zone against guerrilla infiltration from Mozambique. While it is possible that Mabuza opposed the deal because it would mean the loss of his position and whatever power he wielded as Chief Minister of KaNgwane, his official objection and challenge to the state through the courts was based on the argument that the move would deny all the residents of KaNgwane their citizenship as South Africans first and foremost. The struggle which was being waged in the country was about South African citizenship, equal rights and dignity and agreeing to cede the territory to Swaziland would negate that. The land deal did not go according to Pretoria‟s plans because of Mabuza‟s intervention and this led to the punitive dissolution of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly. Mabuza/Inyandza rallied national and international support from legal experts such as local International Law expert Professor John Dugard, the American Lawyers for Civil Rights Committee which was based in Washington DC and the International Commission of Jurists based in Geneva Switzerland in order to keep KaNgwane as part of South Africa. The success of this campaign eventually led to the reinstatement of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly and the retention of the Bantustan and its people (Mabuza, 1989c:5). Had the deal been successful, it was not only Swazis that would have been affected because there were also Shangaans, Zulus, Sothos and Mozambican refugees living in KaNgwane and not all of them had direct ties with Swaziland or King Sobhuza‟s claims on which the land deal was premised (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:51-64; Macmillan, 1989:289-316; McGregor, 1994:545-567). The connectedness of constituency which was served by Inyandza was only ever really undermined by the development of internal factions over the question of the proposed incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland. Disagreements or conflict between the chiefs and the nostalgic elderly who expressed the desire to become part of Swaziland again and those that did not created rifts within Inyandza which led to the formation of an opposition or rival faction, Inyatsi which was led by David Lukhele who had known connections to Pretoria and chiefs who supported the incorporation idea. However, Inyandza

as an organisation did not come under direct threat and managed to maintain credibility and some degree of legitimacy in spite of the acrimony and confusion which was created by this.

Inyandza was envisaged as a temporary intervention and it was able to establish a working relationship with the ANC and UDF which it mimicked in terms of its ideological template. Mabuza explained that the "two-fold objective of Inyandza was and still is the socio-economic development of our people at regional level, and the promotion of the national struggle by peaceful means for the liberation of the black people of this country. From its inception, Inyandza has been a non-ethnic and non-racial political movement..." (Mabuza, 1989c:5). The Inyandza logo consisted of an undivided map of South Africa on which a bundle of firewood (Inyandza in siSwati) was superimposed. Firewood is commonly collected by women in the veld for fuel to keep home fires burning and its adoption as Inyandza‟s logo was meant to symbolise the people unified in their struggle for a just, united and democratic South Africa. Inyandza acknowledged that while South African was comprised of many cultural and racial groups with varied backgrounds, they shared one motherland in their opinions and visions. The colours of the Inyandza logo were the same as those of the ANC - black for the people, green for the land and gold for the country‟s wealth (Mabuza, 1989a; 1989b; 1989c).

Inyandza chose to align itself with organisations in the Mass Democratic Movement in an attempt to break out of the ethnic straight jacket of government-created structures (Mabuza, 1989c:4-6). The MDM was representative of the feelings and aspirations of the oppressed people and Mabuza/Inyandza was committed to reaching out to organisations such as the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), United Municipalities of South Africa (UMSA) and the Urban Councils‟ Association of South Africa (UCSA). Inyandza subscribed to the same principles, values and beliefs as the organisations in the MDM – the call for a united, democratic and non-racial state with full and equal citizenship and equality for all before the law irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed (Mabuza, 1989b:2). The apartheid regime used the Bantustans as dumping grounds for blacks that it did not want in the urban areas and public resentment led some of the Bantustans to become battle grounds in the 1980s (Egero, 1991). Once the political transition was well and truly underway in the early 1990s, some Bantustan elites tried to resist their reincorporation into a united, non-racial South Africa. In Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei, for example, the ruling cliques stood to lose lucrative sources of income from gambling resorts such as Sun City. However, a rejection of ethnic

separation, rising rural resistance and demands for the reintegration of the Bantustans led to coups in Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei and a crippling general strike in Gazankulu in early 1990 (Frederikse, 1990:264).

Inyandza was committed to non-violent change and supported sanctions against the apartheid state. It also supported the 21 August 1989 Organisation of African Unity Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa‟s Harare Declaration which approved the ANC‟s position for negotiating with the South African government urged to remove, not amend or reform apartheid, the establishment of a multi-party state and an independent, non-racial judiciary. These principles were embodied in the ANC‟s Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa which where tabled on 8 August 1988 in Lusaka, Zambia. The same principles also formed the basis for the formation of the Democratic Party which was co-led by Wynand Malan; an invited guest at Inyandza‟s eleventh annual congress (Mabuza, 1989b:2). Mabuza‟s presidential address at Inyandza‟s eleventh annual congress came three days after the induction of F.W. De Klerk as South Africa‟s State President. De Klerk‟s tone was conciliatory, emphasising the need to create conditions conducive for negotiations to accommodate black political aspirations and as a gesture of goodwill, he had allowed peaceful anti-apartheid demonstrations in Cape Town, Pretoria, Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth on 15 September 1989 (Mabuza, 1989b:1).This was a widely taken as a positive development and Mabuza, like other leaders in the Mass Democratic Movement, was optimist about South Africa‟s future prospects.

Ethnic organisations mobilise on the basis of a set of perceived ethnic interests and symbols and this was the basis of KwaZulu‟s Chief Buthelezi‟s Inkatha and Zulu nationalism which increasingly relied on the manipulation of ethnic symbols in their activities or the interests which they represented. It was also the basis of Inyandza‟s formation to some degree but unlike Buthelezi and Inkatha, it appears like Inyandza was able to maintain consistency in its stated priorities and emphases as contained in Enos Mabuza‟s speeches or the KaNgwane government‟s official documents. Buthelezi was a member of the ANC‟s Youth League and his entry into KwaZulu politics was supported or encouraged by the ANC in the 1970s to thwart apartheid from within. His Inkatha (Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe) was a national cultural liberation movement founded in 1975 also with the ANC‟s „approval‟ but serious rifts between Buthelezi and the ANC in the late 1970s led to the rapid deterioration of the rapport which they had had in the initial stages. He initially won popular support for refusing

to accept independence for the KwaZulu Bantustan which was the most populous of the Bantustans. It later became apparent that this refusal was linked to Buthelezi‟s ambitions for national leadership (Frederikse, 1990:211; Egero, 1991:30-31; Mare and Hamilton, 1987:46).

Apart from Buthelezi‟s ambitions and increasingly erratic behaviour, after 1980 non-participation in state-created structures became a holy principle and made pariahs of individuals who found themselves in those positions. Buthelezi felt isolated and became resentful to the point of joining ranks with Pretoria in curtailing the efforts of the liberation movements. Through such actions, he drew the line in the sand and has been widely criticised for building a personal and regional power base rooted in Zulu chauvinism, often in violent opposition to mass-based movements such as the ANC, UDF and COSATU. Inkatha the national movement transformed into the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) which was officially launched as a political party in July 1990 and vigorously pursued a separatist agenda for the Zulu nation (Mzala, 1988; Mare and Hamilton, 1987). Buthelezi and Inkatha antagonised the liberation movements from mid 1987 until after the landmark 1994 elections. The „Reef Township War‟ in August 1990 was the result of the escalation of violence in the Transvaal and the Natal Midlands. The „Battle of the Forest‟ in June 1991 left twenty-three people dead in fighting between IFP and ANC supporters in the Richmond townships of Ndaleni and Magoda, Natal. In July 1991, the „Inkathagate‟ scandal exposed government funding of Inkatha anti-ANC activities. In 1992 the KwaZulu legislative assembly adopted a constitution for a future state of KwaZulu-Natal as an autonomous state within a federation and the next year, the IFP and KwaZulu Legislative Assembly embarked on a Self-Protection Unit (SPU) training project. Training of SPUs begins at Mlaba Camp in September with the assistance of Vlakplaas commander Eugene De Kock with weapons delivered by IFP member Philip Powell and by April 1994, an estimated 5 000 Inkatha supporters had received training as part of this secessionist plan in KwaZulu. In March 1994, the Goldstone Commission concluded that there was *prima facie* evidence of a hit squad in the KwaZulu Police. It was only with less than a week to the historic national April 1994 elections that Buthelezi and Inkatha finally gave up their separatist agenda (boycotting the election) and encouraged its supporters to vote (Frederikse, 1990:211; Egero, 1991:30-31).

Cultural symbols reinforce identity and KwaZulu‟s Chief Buthelezi contributed significantly to the “politicisation of culture” and identity politics (divisive) by wearing Zulu traditional dress at every opportunity (see pictures below) he could (Wilson and Frederiksen, 1995:4).

General Holomisa and Brigadier Gqozo were both military men and they were either pictured in military uniform (themselves a symbol of oppression or force) or in normal suits instead of cultural dress, this despite belonging to specific ethnic groups or tribes. Enos Mabuza was never pictured in traditional Swazi attire but in blazers and formal suits, as was the majority of the other Bantustan leaders. Perhaps this betrayed their bourgeoisie aspirations but it did not mean that they denounced their cultural heritages. Mabuza, for example, celebrated his Swazi identity by taking part in Swazi festivals (first fruits/harvest etc) and making regular visits to Swaziland (Sandile Mabuza, Esther Mabuza – interviews, June 2007). According to Ginindza (Interview, 8 June 2007), Swaziland‟s King Sobhuza II and Enos Mabuza were fairly close and Mabuza used to attend annual Swazi cultural events and ceremonies at the king‟s court in full traditional Swazi clothing. Mabuza was a member of one of the king‟s regiments, respected tradition and the position of Swazi chiefs. This, Ginindza (2007) argues, led King Sobhuza to mistake Mabuza‟s celebration of Swazi identity or "bukhosi" („kinship‟) for unquestioning loyalty when the issue of the Swazi land deal came up in 1982. King Sobhuza tried to influence Mabuza into accepting the land deal by appealing to tradition (the Tibiyo structure, the Tinkundla councils) and national images to reinforce traditional hierarchies and respect for the king, the tribute system and other obligations but he failed to convince Mabuza that the land deal was in the best interests of the people of KaNgwane.

In terms of KaNgwane‟s leadership, the „success‟ of the ruling Inyandza National Movement was partly because of its cultural appeal since the Bantustan system was loosely ethnic-based. The Inyandza National Movement was influenced by the Swazi culture‟s strong traditional element. Its formation was similar to that of Chief Buthelezi‟s Inkatha in KwaZulu-Natal and both formations behaved more like political parties than cultural organisations (Elias Ginindza, Interview 8 June 2007). Macmillan (1989) notes that there were Swazi artefacts on display at the KaNgwane government offices in the capital Nyamazane (Louieville) but despite this, Inyandza‟s leaders were unequivocal about wanting to be South African citizens and ultimately chose or prioritised their South African identity over the Swazi one. Was the KaNgwane government/Inyandza leadership deliberately circulating or exhibiting these Swazi cultural symbols to encourage partisan behaviour and attitudes? The answer to that question is unclear because Bantustan leaders generally denied forming political parties (disguised as cultural parties) to cement regional identities in line with apartheid‟s divide and rule tactics with the Bantustan system. However, the pictures below capture the type of tribal

or ethnic excesses (frequent reference to tribal/ethnic elements/symbols) that most people knew and some only suspected as far as traditional and Bantustan leaders were concerned.

7.7 Mabuza and the Abortive Swazi Land Deal: A Test of Allegiance

Ingwavuma is in the Umkhanyakude District Municipality of KwaZulu-Natal Province and falls within the Mngomezulu Tribal Authority. It is over 700 metres above sea level in the Lebombo Mountains and is just three kilometres from the border with Swaziland, overlooking the plains of Maputaland to the East. South African authorities, through the Department of Cooperation and Development led by P. G. J. Koornhof who was in charge of homeland affairs, wanted to divest themselves of the population of KaNgwane and Ingwavuma and it is alleged that members of the SADF intimidated people in Ingwavuma to encourage acceptance of the incorporation of Ingwavuma into Swaziland (Grundy, 1986:66; Dominy, 1986:71-92).

According to Enos Mabuza, the KaNgwane-Ingwavuma land deal called into question the honesty of all concerned, especially honesty towards those who would be directly affected if the deal was pushed through. It was argued that the South African government‟s decision was inspired by its policy [Bantustans] of bringing together those who belong together. KaNgwane‟s leadership disagreed with this argument based on the logic and principle which had been used when independence was granted to the Ciskei "cheek over jowl with the Transkei and amidst the vocal protestations of President Matanzima" (Mabuza, 1983:8). The KaNgwane leadership questioned whether South African Swazis were the only national group which overlapped into an adjacent independent state outside South Africa since the Xhosas, Southern Sothos, Tswana and Shangaan-Tsongas were in the same predicament and yet nothing was being done to them. These apparent inconsistencies alluded to the under-handed, dishonest reasons or motives that were behind the land deal. Mabuza wanted people, including the South African government, to understand and appreciate where KaNgwane‟s leadership‟s frustration and bitterness stemmed from (Mabuza, 1983:8). Mabuza reminded his audience of Afrikaner history and aspirations – the causes of the Anglo-Boer war; mainly that the Boers did not want to be treated as foreigners or second-class citizens in the land of their birth. He cited the same reasons to explain why his government and the Inyandza National Movement fought (in the courts) for their place in South Africa so that they would not "become pariahs in a foreign state" (Swaziland) (Mabuza, 1983:9).

One can be argue that Mabuza resisted the temptation to fall into the ethnic/tribal politics fanned by the controversial land deal of 1982 but still others can argue the opposite; that there were more selfish reasons why he opposed the deal. It is somewhat ironic that Mabuza appeals for self-determination for the people of KaNgwane by comparing their position with that of Afrikaners under English rule because this in fact contributed to the policy of apartheid. However, there are obvious similarities in the circumstances around the two events. Acrimony between the two Boer Republics and two British colonies continued until unification in 1910. British political dominance and the indignity it subjected the Boers to led to extreme and concerted efforts (reactionary in a sense) by white Afrikaans speakers to create and assert their own identity through Afrikaner nationalism (history about the Afrikaner *Volk*, their political destiny, political will and common culture – values, symbols and aspirations, plus attendant ideologies regarding racial and cultural exclusivism). The ideal of an Afrikaner *Volk* was given substance through a national consciousness which was built on an unapologetic, uncompromising desire for unity, autonomy and self-determination. Afrikaner identity and loyalty were promoted through trade unions, the economic movement (*Reddingsdaadband*, the *Ekonomiese Volkskongies* and the *Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners*), schools, churches, the family and political party/organisation such as the *Broederbond*. Religious dogma was manipulated to give credence to this vision and this desire or need was eventually used to legitimise a more sinister vision (apartheid) over the years (Sharp, 1988b:82-89).

Did this comparison or argument deliberately and skilfully conceal a calculating pretentiousness designed to consolidate his position and self-importance? Was Mabuza‟s assiduous campaign against the land deal an end in itself or was it a means to an end? Perhaps it was a manifestation of his ego and growing narcissism because of the power that he thought he had as a Bantustan leader, regardless of the respect that he supposedly had for King Sobhuza and traditional political hierarchy (conservative monarchy) in general. Historical facts supported the King‟s claim; which is why Mabuza‟s opposition to the deal was incomprehensible to the Swazi intelligentsia (some chiefs and other observers who supported the land deal and regarded Mabuza as flirting with disaster by standing in the way). They were convinced that Mabuza was over-stepping the authority of the Swazi King and that this was a gamble or risk which Mabuza could not possibly win despite the fact that the timing of the deal and the South African government‟s enthusiasm for it were highly suspect. There is no concrete evidence to suggest that Mabuza opposed the deal for personal reason

(selfish reasons) and his motive will probably always be questioned. However, Mabuza‟s actions did not contradict his pronouncements on the issue and the only adverse effect which is directly attributable to his actions was that the few dissenters who wanted to become part of Swaziland did not get to do so, at least not in the way envisaged by the South African government and Swaziland‟s King Sobhuza II (see section on the Swazi Land Deal). Mabuza responded to criticism levelled against him and his government by some Swazis and Swazi chiefs (acrimony) in the aftermath of the abortive Swazi land deal as follows:

> While it is said that politics is a dirty game, I feel qualified to claim that „Bantustan‟ politics is the dirtiest game of all games. I have, in five years time, gone through the mill of such politics and I have borne the curse and the scourge of Mickey Mouse politicians who believe that they can lead the people in KaNgwane while living in Disneyland. My government and I have often been accused by these political imps of trying to wrest political power from traditional chiefs and of not promoting the purity and sanctity of the Swazis (Mabuza, 1983:7).

Further, he criticised what he termed “adventurous” white seconded officials in the KaNgwane government joined ranks with his Swazi detractors when they realised that Mabuza was not following the designs, desires and course dictated by Pretoria. However, despite these attempts to vilify and discredit him, the KaNgwane people whom Mabuza ranked “amongst the most highly politicised Africans in this country” came out in support of the KaNgwane government‟s decision to oppose the land deal and the Ministry of Cooperation and Development eventually withdrew the white officials who were interfering in KaNgwane‟s political affairs (Mabuza, 1983:7).

Mabuza appealed to his audience that the people of KaNgwane should not be denied the opportunity to choose, map out and prepare their own road into the future in accordance with the principle of self-determination. Between 18 June and 25 November 1982, the South African government forcibly tried to determine that road or destination for the people of KaNgwane. In stating his opposition (and subsequent handling of) to the proposed land deal, Mabuza also took the opportunity to criticise other Bantustan leaders‟ propensity for violence:

> As far as the proposed incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland is concerned, we are of the conviction that the matter will, sooner or later, be resolved amicably and with dignity on the basis of the will and the wishes of my people and in compliance with the principle of their right to self-determination. My people and I also cherish the hope that the RSA Government will be receptive to the voices of reason, moderation and reality as expressed by those Black leaders who believe in a South Africa that has room for all its peoples. I cannot, except with trepidation, contemplate the day when Chief the Honourable M. G. Buthelezi, Dr. the Honourable C. N. Phatudi and other African leaders like them, will turn back to our people and tell them that moderation has failed and the people should decide what should be done. I sincerely pray that that day will never dawn (Mabuza, 1983:10).

Enos Mabuza‟s Inyandza National Movement was a cultural-political organisation, which suggests that he played into the hands of the South African government and, by extension, supported the Bantustan system which separated the black population along ethnic lines. Mabuza‟s opposition to the land deal has been interpreted by some to mean that he had become consumed by power and ambition that he could no longer submit to the authority of the Swazi King - become a god unto himself and that resisting the land deal was a way to safeguard his position of power as Bantustan leader. The reality of the situation, however, is that the South African authorities could have deposed him and replaced him with a more pliable candidate that was willing to follow orders, no be a hindrance to their plans. He could have lost his „power‟ either way, but he did not.

7.7.1 Swaziland's Claim to 'South African' Land

Swaziland‟s part in the proposed land deal was based on an emotional appeal to irredentism. Swazi authorities alleged that Swaziland‟s borders with Ingwavuma District north of present day KwaZulu-Natal and KaNgwane had been at the centre of border disputes with South Africa since the colonial era and further back. The Transvaal (under Presidents Pretorius and Kruger) entered into land deals with Swaziland in July1846, 1855 and others throughout the 1800s which, for example, gave to the inhabitants of Lydenburg District (Transvaal) or its government lands officially belonging to the Swazis in exchange for 70 head of cattle even though the king was not authorized to cede land without the approval of the nation. The present boundaries of Swaziland were first roughly demarcated in 1866, and were further

redefined by the British during their occupation of the Transvaal in 1880. The Swazi accepted the southern (and much of the western) boundary line but objected to the line in the north and north-west which cut off from Swaziland three important royal villages: Mbhuleni (in the Carolina district); Mjindini (near Barberton where Mabuza was born) and Mekemeke (north-east of Barberton). A deal between Britain and the Transvaal in 1895 made Swaziland a protectorate of the Transvaal and the convention of 1894 protected the rights of the Swazi king over his subjects (Macmillan, 1989:292). Later, however, Swaziland‟s King (Mbandzeni) disputed the border in this area until 1889, during which time Swazi definition of „Swaziland‟ extended beyond Barberton to the Crocodile River in the north and along the upper reaches of the Komati River in the west (Macmillan, 1989:291). Following the 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War, Swaziland was administered as a part of the Transvaal from 1902 to 1906. Several disputes ensued involving Swazis, Zulus and the authorities (Government of Natal-British) and the Boer South African Republic (Transvaal) over these land allocations. Theophilus Shepstone who was the Secretary for Native Affairs and Sir Garnet Wolseley (Governor of Natal) were involved in discussions regarding the establishment of boundaries between Swaziland and the Transvaal (Woodson, 1991:385-386). The redrawing of political boundaries which cut across the Swazi nation and put many people who traditionally owed allegiance to the Swazi king physically outside his kingdom planted the seeds for Swaziland‟s irredentist Dream which was revived rather vigorously in the 1980s (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:51).

Successive Swazi rulers (King Sobhuza I and Queen Regent Labotsibeni and council, with the help of J.L. Dube, Pixley Seme and Sol Plaatjie‟s South African Natives‟ National Congress and its publication *Abantu-Batho*) made concessions with the British and other settlers at different times in order to get back some of their land and to consolidate their authority which was fragmented by the land partitions (Natives Land Act of 1913, The Native Administration Act of 1927). Swazi authorities were desperate to counteract the subsequent dispersal of Swazis into the Transvaal and the Witwatersrand as “detribalised” mining and agricultural labour as well as what they regarded as social disintegration caused by education, urbanization and proletarianisation (Macmillan, 1989:299).

In 1936, Pixley ka Seme (President of the African National Congress) wrote a letter to P. G. W. Grobler (Minister of Native Affairs) which was entitled “Petition of the Swazi Chiefs and Swazi Tribes of the Eastern Transvaal.” The letter addressed the issue of Swazi sacred lands

and requested the establishment of a native council for Swazis in the Transvaal (Woodson, 1991:389). Swaziland‟s King Sobhuza II began voicing claims to Swazi territory in the Eastern Transvaal more loudly when colonial rule ended in Swaziland in 1968 and his argument was that he wanted re-unite the Swazis on either side of the border before he died (MacMillan, 1989:290). Woodson (1991:382), for example, notes the existence of a letter by Swaziland‟s King Sobhuza II to the Native Commissioner (T. Ramsay) in Barberton (South Africa) in the Matsebula Collection at the University of Swaziland. The letter is dated 6 May 1936 and in it, the king explains the traditional allegiance to him of the many ethnic Swazis living in bordering areas of South Africa. There is also a letter dated 28 August 1956 letter by King Sobhuza II to the British High Commissioner on the reversionary rights of concessions granted by his grandfather Mbadzeni.

The earliest record of correspondence regarding the consolidation of the Swazi Bantustan (KaNgwane) is dated December 1976 in the form of a memorandum from Chief Johannes Mkolishi Dlamini to the South African Minister of Bantu Administration and Development (M. C. Botha). KaNgwane was created on 8 October 1977 and was known as AmaSwazi; a Bantustan for Swazis that were not incorporated into Swaziland along the border with South Africa. Enos Mabuza was its leader as Chief Councillor but this was not the end of Swaziland‟s claim. A report by David Lukhele and M. M. Nxumalo on the same KaNgwane issue was made in October 1977 (Woodson, 1991:390). These letters or reports were followed by talks between the South African government and authorities in Swaziland over the land deal and possible border adjustments in 1978, 1980 and several in 1982 (March, May, June, July, August, November and December) as well as some in 1983. There was more correspondence between the South African Prime Minister, the Rumpff Commission and Swaziland authorities (Prime Minister Bhekimpi, A. Magangeni Dlamini). On 30 August 1983, for example, the Swazi Council of Chiefs in South Africa wrote a memo to Justice Rumpff regarding the “opinions of South African Swazis and their supposed desire to be incorporated into Swaziland. G. I. A. Draper of the High Commission in London wrote a letter to Swaziland‟s Minister of Foreign Affairs (R. V. Dlamini) on 26 September 1983 entitled “Why Ingwavuma is part of Swaziland” as part of the justification for the land deal (Woodson, 1991:392). Most of the correspondence emphasise the importance of a sea port to Ingwavuma. However, the fact remains that these talks and correspondence happened between a select few individuals.

A newspaper article by Schalk van Schalwyk in the *Lowvelder* (23 March 1982) tried to implicate Enos Mabuza in the deal by alleging that he knew about it (complicity in its design) as early as March 1982; instead of June 1982 when it became public knowledge following a Presidential Proclamation R109 (Woodson, 1991:391-392). This though has very little bearing on the matter because it does not prove that he was part of the discussions since the record shows that the claim and correspondence to that effect had been on-going since the mid-nineteenth century. If the allegation was true, why then would he have been so vocal in opposing it? It is not inconceivable that as the leader of KaNgwane, Enos Mabuza would have eventually heard about the deal, regardless of whether he was consulted about it or not, which he was not because the deal was partly designed to ambush and undermine his authority as KaNgwane‟s leader.

The land deal was characterised by secrecy and its blatantly undemocratic nature (non-consultative). For South Africa, the deal was meant to ensure Swaziland‟s acquiescence to a mutual non-aggression pact which was secretly signed in February 1982. Important pronouncements about it were made belatedly (deliberately after the fact) to prevent contestation by affected parties. The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in Ulundi was notified about Proclamation R109 on 14 June 1982 (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259) and South Africa‟s intention of transferring KaNgwane and Ingwavuma district to Swaziland became public knowledge on June 18 1982 when the South African president, through the minister responsible for Bantustan development, Dr. Piet Koornhof, issued Proclamation R109 in the South African Government Gazette to announce the sudden abolition of KaNgwane‟s forty-two member Legislative Assembly and the excision of Ingwavuma from the KwaZulu Bantustan. KaNgwane and Ingwavuma were placed under the direct control of the Department of Cooperation and Development with the intention of incorporating them into Swaziland (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259-260). KaNgwane‟s nominal self-rule status and Enos Mabuza‟s position as Executive Counsellor were suspended for a period of six months between 18 June and 9 December 1982 during which time an administrator (N.J. Badenhorst) was appointed to run its affairs. KaNgwane‟s government offices in Louieville were locked and Mabuza‟s government was barred from getting on the premises and the Bantustan‟s budget for various projects was drastically reduced in a bid to force its submission. Based on these arrangements, Swaziland would accept South African citizens as its own. On 20 June1982, the Swaziland government welcomed South Africa‟s offer and agreed to receive the new citizens (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:51 & 61). However, it was the

traditional and authoritarian rulers in Swaziland that dealt alone with South Africa‟s white minority regime to decide the fate of the affected lands and their people.

The Swazi people of KaNgwane are subjects of the King of Swaziland, whilst also citizens of South Africa. The seeming contradiction or overlap of jurisdiction led Swaziland‟s King Sobhuza II to actively promote the deal by using tradition and history to persuade ordinary Swazis to support Swaziland‟s claim. Swazis on the South African side of the Swazi border in the districts of Barberton, Carolina, Ermelo, Piet Retief, and Wakkerstroom maintained close contact with the royal house in Swaziland and regarded themselves as loyal subjects of the Swazi king, even though excessive land partition and high taxation was the reason why many Swazis (from Swaziland) had been forced into migrant labour on the Witwatersrand (Macmillan, 1989:294). Despite this, however, the alienation of South African Swazis under apartheid strengthened their allegiance to the Swazi king. King Sobhuza had a particularly powerful influence on the Swazis who lived in the Barberton sector (Nkomazi) of KaNgwane such that chiefs and other leaders in these areas reportedly sent delegations to Swaziland in 1980 and 1981 to enlist King Sobhuza‟s help in forestalling future talks about KaNgwane becoming independent (based on the consolidation proposals of 1975). According to Griffiths and Funnell (1991:57), these leaders were unsettled by the creation of the KaNgwane Bantustan as a psuedo-state with its own political institutions, which in their view threatened their traditional allegiances with the Swazi king. These deputations to Sobhuza helped to fortify his resolve in pursuing the land deal but it is uncertain what popular opinion (ordinary people‟s views) was since the delegations were not comprised of elected representatives but traditional leaders. Enough pressure was put on the people such that many Swazis in Swaziland and KaNgwane ended up supporting the deal and its justification and aligning themselves with the king on the matter. It is important to note, however, that Swaziland‟s claim to the territories was only officially made public in Swaziland in August 1982; several months after the South African authorities had issued the June Proclamation R109 which ceded KaNgwane and Ingwavuma to Swaziland (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:52 & 56).

The Territories to be Transferred

KaNgwane had an initial population of 125 000 but, according to Holden and Mathabatha (2007:259), from its inception, the South African government was unconcerned about the welfare of KaNgwane‟s population and was also wary of the political position of Enos Mabuza and his Inyandza National Movement. Three separate parcels of land were to be

transferred to Swaziland in the proposed Swazi land deal; Ingwavuma district in KwaZulu and Nsikazi and Nkomazi in KaNgwane. The deal would have given King Sobhuza not just the Swazi citizens of South Africa but also KaNgwane‟s land and other resources which would have relieved some pressure off Swaziland‟s own (Ginindza, Interview, June 2007). At the time of the 1975 Bantustans consolidation proposals, KaNgwane consisted of two tracts of land in the eastern Transvaal. One was contiguous with Swaziland (Nkomazi) and one (Nsikazi) was separate from it to the north of the Delagoa Bay railway. The two KaNgwane areas had a combined surface area of about 1000 square miles. The 1975 consolidation proposals intended that KaNgwane would become one land mass by enlarging Nkomazi through the addition to it of Mswati and the removal to that area of people living in detached Nsikazi. KaNgwane was enlarged in 1976 by extending the land contiguous with and immediately north of Swaziland to include the barren highveld area of Mswati but Nsikazi remained part of KaNgwane such that the total land allocated to KaNgwane increased to 385 000 hectares from the 208 735 hectares that it was in 1973 (the difference is presumably the area of Mswati). The *de facto* population of KaNgwane increased from about 100 000 in 1970 to about 300 000 in 1982 because of the South African government‟s policy of forced relocation of black people from nominally „white‟ areas (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:52; Macmillan, 1989:289).

Ingwavuma District lies north of present day KwaZulu-Natal and east of southern Swaziland between the Lebombo Mountains and the sea. Ingwavuma is approximately 413 200 hectares and its Indian Ocean coastline includes the potential port of Kosi Bay. The Swazi authorities argued that they had never agreed to the various conventions which established borders between Swaziland and South Africa and that these boundaries had been unilaterally imposed on them by the South African government. They noted that the incorporation of Ingwavuma into KwaZulu in 1976 was based on the Tomlinson Commission Report regarding the "possible consolidation of Bantu Areas based on ethnic grouping" (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:57). Further, people living in Ingwavuma traditionally owed allegiance to the Swazi king, for instance, chiefs in the western part of Ingwavuma pay allegiance to the Swazi king. The map below indicates the three separate land masses which comprised KaNgwane and Ingwavuma which were at the centre of the controversial Swazi land deal.

What South African and Swazi Authorities Stood to Gain from the Land Deal

The examples of ethnicity being used to oppress other groups cited above have a theoretical bearing on the Swazi land deal because they constitute instances where the particular societies had to rethink or analyse the meaning and value of citizenship. In the KaNgwane case, South African Swazis had inter-married with other groups over the years since the disputed boundaries which were the pretext of the deal were set and such people, for instance, had a right to stay in South Africa with their families instead of being parcelled off to Swaziland based on a deal that the two countries‟ authorities made in a clandestinely.

One of the many tricks of the apartheid government was to try and make deals and pacts with different groups to weaken their resolve. Its divisive aggression was not confined to South Africa alone but was also targeted at the Frontline States – Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia. Prime Minister Botha was trying to cajole these states into signing non-aggression pacts to have the ANC and other liberation organisations such as SWAPO of Namibia uprooted and expelled from their territories or face the wrath of Pretoria in the form of political and military destabilisation as well as economic sabotage. All this was happening in spite of the fact that African nationalism has a myriad of historic, cultural and structural bonds. An example of this is the fact that Samora Machel and FRELIMO of Mozambique were the ANC‟s Marxist-Leninist ally until the signing of the 1984 Nkomati Accord. The ANC and Swazi elites (and even workers) also had a close link. According to Limb (1992), the Swazi monarchy took part in the founding of the ANC in 1912 and Swaziland‟s Queen Regent Labotsibeni provided the capital for the launching of the Congress' newspaper, *Abantu-Batho*. The position of Swaziland (surrounded by South Africa) offered strategic entry points for ANC operatives because it was within good striking distance of South Africa‟s military-industrial-complex which was concentrated around Johannesburg. Many ANC aligned South Africans were in exile in Swaziland; studying or working there in the mid 1970s and King Sobhuza II had promised the ANC‟s Oliver Tambo that he would shield the ANC from South African security forces. Swaziland was also in good proximity to Natal and the Transvaal where the ANC was re-establishing underground networks in the 1970s (Gevisser, 2007:341-353). Natal, for example, was a major centre for anti-apartheid resistance inside South Africa. It was the home of Black Consciousness and the radical labour movement, as well as the KwaZulu leader (Chief Buthelezi) with whom the ANC had a tumultuous relationship but enjoyed a *détente*-type truce at the time (Gevisser, 2007:316).

Callinicos (2004:517) notes that Swaziland‟s King Sobhuza II considered himself a member of the ANC because the Queen Regent Labotsubeni had inducted him into the party or movement when he assumed the throne yet Swaziland was the first country to enter an agreement with the South African government to thwart the efforts of the ANC. King Sobhuza was conflicted in his arrangements with the ANC and the South African government because he was indebted to South African authorities because Swaziland‟s economy was inextricably linked to South Africa‟s and Pretoria had *carte blanche* in many Swazi affairs, including control of the Swazi police (Gevisser, 2007:341-353). The South African government adopted a carrots and sticks approach to dealing with Swazi authorities and alternated between threatening and seducing them and for this reason; the ANC did not put all its trust in King Sobhuza (Gevisser, 2007:342-343). ANC operatives in Swaziland included Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, Joseph Mdluli, Cleopas Ndlovu and Albert Dhlomo who were arrested in Swaziland in 1976. From then on, relations between Swaziland and the ANC became increasingly hostile, repressive and often violent in the1980s (Mzizi, 2005; Limb, 1992). On 17 December 1982, up to 100 ANC members were detained in Swaziland when a large cache of arms was „found‟ in the north of the country and the arrests were confirmed by the Swaziland Police Commissioner. Again on 2 January 1983 several ANC members were detained in Swaziland. Another group of about seventeen ANC members left Mawelawela refugee camp near Mbabane fearing a South African attack. Gevisser notes that incidents like these led ANC/MK leaders like Moses Mabhida and Thomas Nkobi to describe the Swazi king as highly “capricious” (Gevisser, 2007:341-353) and eventually, the ANC left Swaziland for Mozambique.

The ANC needed alternative strategies to counteract the one outlined above and Enos Mabuza became a valuable ally. Holden and Mathabatha (2007: 259) note that as Chief Minister of KaNgwane, “Enos Mabuza saw his role as using the Bantustan structures to protect those under his control while simultaneously agitating for broader democratic rights and the destruction of the homeland system.” His government assisted the ANC‟s underground MK operations by providing safe shelter and intelligence/information when they came to or left South Africa from bases in Swaziland and Mozambique (a transit area for political activists). Mabuza‟s important contribution in this regard was to give cover to the ANC so that it could come and go undetected by South African security forces. However, the security forces eventually caught wind of these goings-ons and wanted to put an end to them.

Although it was never publicly admitted, the land deal was widely believed to have been used as bait by the South African authorities to woe Swaziland to a security deal in which it would assist the SADF to establish bases in Swaziland and to do counter-intelligence work (surveillance with the aim of neutralising ANC operatives) in Swaziland to track down ANC operatives working in Swaziland (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259-260). Ginindza (2007) agrees that the land deal and the expulsion of the KaNgwane Bantustan from South Africa was devised as part of a military strategy to block ANC activities; a fool-proof way of taking care of several problems with one stroke of a pen, including ensuring that Mabuza would no longer be a thorn in Pretoria‟s side. The land deal was, by and large, designed for mutual gain, although not necessarily equally. It was a secret *quid pro quo* arrangement between Swaziland and South Africa, although for the most part, it was initiated and manipulated by South African authorities to their own ends when it seemed opportune to do so. The land deal was merely a means to an end (the carrot or inducement) for the South African government.

Swazi and South African authorities (Foreign Minister Roelof „Pik‟ Botha) secretly signed a non-aggression or security pact on 17 February 1982. The ANC had been operating from Swaziland and Mozambique and part of the deal was that Swaziland would expel the ANC in accordance with cooperative plans to prevent terrorist incursions into South Africa. The subversion of KaNgwane‟s leadership (Mabuza and his cabinet in allowing ANC activities in their area of jurisdiction) would have been neutralised permanently, by elimination or dissolution of the KaNgwane Bantustan. Ingwavuma was included in the arrangement in order to create a buffer between South Africa and Mozambique which had given the ANC an operational base (military strategy to neutralise the security threat). The proposed land deal was a form of compensation, sign of goodwill or simply payment for Swaziland‟s geniality. The arrangement was initiated by South Africa and this established it as the steering force behind the deal, which was partly a reflection of Swaziland‟s dependence on the South African economy (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:56; Macmillan, 1989:290).

The Swazi ethnic group has Nguni, Sotho and Tsonga elements and KaNgwane was not homogenous but comprised of Swazi, Shangaan-Tsonga, Zulu and Northern Sotho ethnic groups. The South African government tried to manipulate ethnic identity in order to force KaNgwane out of South Africa and into Swaziland in terms of Swaziland‟s historical claim to South African land. It Officials from Pretoria (the Minister of Cooperation and Development, Dr Koornhof, and others) travelled to KaNgwane a few times to address the leaders and

convince them that they should accept the land deal. Memorandums were also sent which stated that King Sobhuza was anxious that the incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland take happen as soon as possible because he was already very old and frail and wanted to see it done in his lifetime (Ginindza, 2007). According to census figures, there were 786,835 people described as „Swazi" in South Africa in 1980 and about one third of them lived in KaNgwane. About eighty percent of KaNgwane"s population was described as „Swazi" and the remainder as „Shangaan" (Tsonga), Zulu or Sotho. Some Swazi also lived under their own chiefs in the Lebowa Bantustan but the majority of those outside KaNgwane remained settled in the towns, on farms, and in so-called „black spots" within „white" South Africa. Many lived on the Witwatersrand, quite far removed from the influence of Swazi language and culture (Macmillan, 1989:289).

The South African government presented the land deal as a way for South Africa to make amends for past injustices. Dr. Koornbof defended the proposed border adjustment as a step towards the fulfilment of a long-cherished Dream of the Swazi people to be united under one king in one country. However, it later became clear that the South African authorities did not support the claim for historical reasons but for something more sinister. It was a deliberate public relations exercise for the South African Authorities who wanted to win the hearts and minds of as many people as possible in order to undermine the struggle (destabilise the region). Swaziland had a population of about 650 000 and would have absorbed about one million people (854 000 people from KaNgwane"s *de facto* and *de jure* Swazi population as well as its non-Swazi component) and 96 000 more from KwaZulu"s sparsely populated Ingwavuma region. The handing-over of South African citizens to Swaziland would have almost trebled Swaziland"s population (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:52 & 54). The land deal would have allowed South African authorities to dispose of one Bantustan, thus simplifying the design of grand apartheid because there would have been less people to deal with or contain inside South Africa as the struggle gained momentum in the 1980s.

Swazi crackdown on ANC activities in Swaziland began in 1982 with the effect of crippling ANC activities in that country (Grundy, 1986:82). Bilateral non-aggression pacts between SA and the four independent Bantustans as well as with neighbouring countries like Swaziland and Mozambique were designed to create a strategic constellation of buffer states (Dominy, 1986:71- 92; Kloppers, 2005). The Venda and Gazankulu Bantustans, for example, provided a line of defence from insurgence, terrorism, subversion and hostile actions from ANC bases

in Zimbabwe and Mozambique and South African authorities removed people there to create a strip of South African land which it could directly control and thus secure the borders (Grundy, 1986:78). Parts of KaNgwane were adjacent to the Mozambique and Swaziland borders. Swaziland was a pawn in a bigger game and this is evidenced by the fact that the Swazi land deal was shelved or abandoned indefinitely once South Africa and Mozambique signed an alternative security pact in March 1984. The Nkomati Accord, like the agreement with Swaziland before it, also stipulated the expulsion of the ANC/MK members, including Joe Slovo (head of Special Operations), from Mozambique (Callinicos, 2004:517). There was considerably less fuss (media, judicial and political contention) around the Nkomati Accord and it rendered the Swazi land deal irrelevant (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:55; Grundy 1986:71-87).

The land deal was acceptable to Swazi authorities for three main reasons. Firstly, it served to crystallise Swazi irredentist claims which are outlined below. It would also have given landlocked Swaziland a seaboard in the process. Secondly, the proposal satisfied economic interests closely associated with the power base of the traditional rulers (the monarchy/royalty and senior chiefs) in their bid to consolidate their power since independence. Swaziland‟s economy is predominantly agrarian such that although some of its citizens have wage employment, they also retain usufruct rights over land because the number of jobs created by the economy is significantly less than the number of people entering the job market. Demand for land was compounded by the fact that there was no new land to absorb young families such that natural population growth was putting more pressure on available land and resources (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:55). Further, whites in Swaziland were a wealthy middle class of landowners and entrepreneurs who dominated the economy (Kuper, 1973:362) and King Sobhuza had grown to understand the value of political stability, patronage and the removal of unpleasant restrictions in order to attract investment (Kuper, 1973:364). For this reason, according to Woodson (1991: 396) King Sobhuza II did not support sanctions against South Africa and even wrote letters to the United Nations imploring them not to impose sanctions on his ally, South Africa. King Sobhuza II ruled through a palace clique for the benefit of South African investors who were involved in Swaziland‟s mining sector. Wealth was created for foreign investors and a small local elite but the wealth thus generated had little impact on the lives of ordinary Swazis even though Swaziland had become an established tourist paradise for wealthy South African

whites by the early 1970s (Martin, 1975:66). This situation was beginning to create fractures and dividing public opinion, thus threatening aristocratic rule and political stability.

Thirdly, politics in Swaziland can be described as cultural nationalism because the small kingdom has one numerically and politically dominant group (Swazis) such that the traditional leaders (the king and chiefs) use cultural identity as a symbol of national unity (Kuper, 1973:358). Consequently, cultural nationalism was an obvious avenue for the expression of political nationalism. The land deal corresponded with the political interests of the ruling monarchy in that it provided an opportunity for the Swazi government to "rid itself of undesirable elements" which were part of the struggle for change in South Africa. Swaziland is a non-party state such that political groupings including the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) and the People‟s United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) operate illegally (underground). The NNLC was founded on 12 April, 1963 as a pan-Africanist party whose objective was to liberate Swazis from colonial oppression until Swaziland was granted independence by Britain in 1968. Today, the organisation fights against Swaziland‟s monarchist regime which refuses to consider multi-party democratic politics in Swaziland. The NNLC played a prominent role in large-scale strikes by sugar, wood, asbestos and other workers in response to rising unemployment and the freezing of wages (Mzizi, 2005; Limb, 1992). It draws support from Swaziland‟s peasants, youth, intelligentsia and other disadvantaged groups and strives for equity whilst promoting the participation of the youth in party affairs (Mzizi, 2005; Limb, 1992). The advocacy of such organisations for radical change in Swaziland‟s political and economic structures was threatening the Monarchy‟s legitimacy. The land deal and the concomitant changes in Swaziland‟s socio-political landscape were one way to derail this agitation of ordinary Swazis into questioning the monarchy‟s prerogative to rule. The monarchy needed to divert the people‟s attention away from radical thinking by emphasising culture and heritage as the central issue behind the land deal (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:56).

7.7.2 Mabuza Defies Swaziland and South African Authorities

This section considers whether Enos Mabuza wantonly antagonised King Sobhuza II or if there was a real case to be made on behalf of those that were powerless to act against the heavy-handedness of Swazi and South African authorities in this deal which was a euphemism or pretext for a more sinister goal; the deportation of KaNgwane‟s South African Swazi population (treated as aliens) to fragment the struggle by appealing to ethnic identity

instead of a common South African identity or citizenship. Enos Mabuza was not ambivalent about his Swazi heritage. According to his family (Sandile Mabuza, Interview, 5 June 2007; Esther Mabuza, Interview, 6 June 2007) and friends, he did not try to disguise his Swazi-ness to make it convenient or easier for him to be a South African. He was proud of his identity, embraced and celebrated it. KaNgwane‟s ruling Inyandza National Movement which Mabuza led was formed in 1978 and had a strong Swazi cultural or traditional element similar to that of Chief Buthelezi‟s Inkatha Cultural Movement in KwaZulu (Macmillan, 1989; Elias Ginindza, Interview, 8 June 2007). The majority of Inyandza‟s members, including Elias Ginindza, were also proudly Swazi but opposed the incorporation on principle because of the manner in which the South African government tried to force the issue without consulting the people that would be directly and negatively affected by it (Elias Ginindza, Interview, 8 June 2007). The fact that KaNgwane‟s ruling party capitalised on cultural appeal was partly the result of the ethnic based Bantustan system but the leaders were unequivocal about wanting to be South African citizens with full rights, even though they had family in Swaziland and visited them often. According to Ginindza (Interview, 8 June 2007), Swaziland‟s King Sobhuza and Enos Mabuza were fairly close and Mabuza used to attend annual Swazi cultural events and ceremonies at the king‟s court in full traditional Swazi clothing. Mabuza was a member of one of the king‟s regiments, respected tradition and the Swazi chiefs despite being educated. However, Ginindza (2007) argues that King Sobhuza mistook this celebration of Swazi identity or "bukhosi" („kinship") for unquestioning loyalty on Mabuza‟s part. King Sobhuza tried to influence Mabuza into accepting or supporting the land deal by appealing to tradition (the Tibiyo structure, the Tinkundla councils) and national images to reinforce traditional hierarchies and respect for the king, the tribute system and other obligations. The king reminded Mabuza that he was a Swazi and was expected, therefore, to support any proposal which would unite all Swazis under one king.

Swaziland is based on the model of a tributary state under royal Dlamini leadership and national rituals such as the *ncwala* (a first fruits ceremony) are observed annually. The land deal was conveniently presented as a question of nationhood and ethnicity which was based on a known and legitimate historical claim by Swaziland, although it was not necessarily accepted by South Africa. The perception or feeling created around the land deal was that its success would affirm the KaNgwane people‟s Swazi roots, birthright and ultimately defend their cultural integrity, regardless of whether or not they had a say in the matter (Esther Mabuza, Interview, 6 June 2007). Bourdieu comments that:

> Culture is a stake, which, like all social stakes, simultaneously presupposes and demands that one take part in the game and be taken in by it, and interest in culture, without which there is no race, no competition, is produced by the very race and competition which it produces. The value of culture, the supreme fetish, is generated in the initial investment implied by the mere fact of entering the game (Bourdieu, 1984: 250).

This assessment of social interaction suggests that Enos Mabuza‟s position regarding the land deal was not entirely selfless but partly driven by a need to protect his position and privilege but the significance of his actions should not be disregarded out of hand even though the whole truth might never be known.

American debates over immigration and citizenship mentioned above are relevant to the Swazi land deal because the meaning or significance of human existence is comprised of many things. Individuals are not only defined by their ethnicity (which is a form of group identity) because an individual‟s past and present experiences are an important part of who they are, for example, professional, occupational or class loyalties. Furthermore, commitment to a state and its laws (citizenship) transcends ethnicity and often has nothing to do with birthright but circumstance (refugees, exiles) or choice (immigration). However, according to De Vos and Romanucci-Ross (1975:376), ethnicity retains certain instrumental and expressive uses which the individual manipulates on both a psychological and social level. Several power bases were entwined in the Swazi land deal and each had its own self-authorising justifications for what was unfolding.

Rational choice theory is normative insofar as it helps individuals to decide what they ought to do (bargain, cooperate, collaborate or compromise with different stakeholders) to achieve their aims. In order for action to be considered rational, there has to exist a desire for something else (cost/benefit/utility) and this precipitates the notion of strategy and competition in the pursuit of identified goals (Hoffman, 1995:105-8). Apartheid policies were decidedly under-handed and unjust and the Swazi land deal was no different. In terms of the failed Swazi land deal or incorporation debacle, being Swazi was not the consideration or essence of their being although most people in KaNgwane shared the same beliefs, values and social practices. KaNgwane was comprised of mostly Swazis but the notion of a Swazi identity gives a false sense of homogeneity; yet when reduced, the group is still comprised of individuals who did not have the same goals or visions for the future.

As a Bantustan leader, Enos Mabuza might have played into the ethnic identity trap to some degree since most organisations and leaders did so at some point because the scene had already been set through apartheid intervention and manipulation. His handling of the land deal, however, is quite contrary to this view of him and his intentions in joining Bantustan politics. Most Bantustan leaders argued that they were not sell-outs but that they were using the space granted to them by the system to protect their people but their actions proved the opposite in many instances. The Swazi land deal presented an opportunity for Mabuza to prove himself as far as this argument was concerned and his response to it won the respect of many people. Mabuza was not the only one to benefit from the failure of the land deal because the civil or class action case which he brought against the South African government eventually benefited all the Swazis of the former KaNgwane Bantustan who are now South African citizens, with the option to renounce it at their discretion if they so choose.

Mabuza and his party‟s position (Inyandza National Movement) was that the apartheid government could not make a decision like the land deal unilaterally on behalf of the Swazis in South Africa/KaNgwane without consulting them. The deal amounted to forced displacement, on the heels of the forced removals that characterised the way in which the African population was herded into the Bantustans in the first instance. Mabuza‟s opposition to the deal was on several fronts and his handling of the situation demonstrated his ability and strength as a leader. It was no secret that King Sobhuza was old and frail and a power struggle (jockeying for position) was brewing in anticipation of a possible power vacuum after his death and this made Mabuza‟s response to the land deal all the more shrewd and courageous. The fear of punitive action was a very real issue for potential dissenters during Botha‟s reign of terror and sceptics may very well have been considered Mabuza‟s challenge to the land deal delusional wishful thinking against determined, powerful and hostile forces. However, Mabuza was within his rights to oppose the land deal as an individual although it raises the question of whether or not he imposed his (supported by some) preference on the rest of the KaNgwane people in much the same way that King Sobhuza and the South African authorities were imposing the land deal on them.

Disagreements and divisions over the Swazi land deal proved that neither skin colour nor common oppression alone provides sufficient bond for group solidarity. The result was a rift between intellectual reasoning by the educated, including Mabuza, who opposed the deal and the emotional response and reality of people at the grassroots who did not believe that there

was anything to be gained from defending their South African citizenship when their status (with such citizenship) meant that they were discriminated and denied rights and subjected to violence on a regular basis. However, Swaziland is ruled by a monarchy which is not best known for upholding democratic values. Instead, it has a tendency to conflate political issues with Swazi culture and considers strikes and trade unionism to be un-Swazi (Mzizi, 2005; Limb, 1992). Many Swazis were illiterate and the education system was heavily censored to control political education and other topics that might turn people against the monarchy or „the Swazi way of life" (Mzizi, 2005; Limb, 1992). KaNgwane"s Swazi population stood a better chance of accessing land and finding jobs within South Africa"s own restricted political and social milieu given the population and employment problems that existed (still exist) in Swaziland.

Mabuza"s response to the heavy-handedness of the apartheid state was to use the legal resources of KaNgwane (his government) and the Inyandza National Movement which he led to contest the land deal (Proclamation R109 which ceded KaNgwane to Swaziland) in the Supreme Court, in particular Proclamation R109 which ceded KaNgwane to Swaziland (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259). Mabuza and Inyandza"s resolve was strengthened when the state tried to shut them down by dissolving the cabinet. Mabuza and others held meetings to mobilise people to resist the incorporation and enlisted the services of individuals such as Professor John Dugard who specialises in International Law and is an Honorary Professorial Research Fellow at the University of the Witwatersrand Centre for Applied Legal Studies and founding editor of the *South African Journal of Human Rights* (SAJHR).

De Vos and Romanucci-Ross (1975:385) note that maintaining one"s individual identity within one"s own social (class, ethnic etc) group may be a disadvantage to the individual when they pursue certain goals although the opposite is also true that group support can be beneficial in the cooperative or competitive realisation of goals. Either way, compromise is involved in which part of the individual identity is sacrificed. The perception or feeling created around the land deal was that its success would affirm the KaNgwane people"s Swazi roots, birthright and ultimately defend their cultural integrity, regardless of whether or not they had a say in the matter.

Mabuza objected to the abolition of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly and demanded a referendum of the people of KaNgwane to give them an opportunity to weigh their options and choose their own fate but the South African government repeatedly turned down the

request for a referendum and ignored Mabuza‟s objections to the abolition of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly. Griffiths and Funnell (1991:62) believe that, as chief Minister, Mabuza had an obvious axe to grind in opposing the deal because it threatened his own power and position, whilst offering important and lucrative gains (leadership positions) for the ambitious in the administration of these territories once the hand-over was finalised. Fractures began to show in the Inyandza National Movement as debate and differences in opinion over the land deal took centre stage (Sandile Mabuza, Interview, 5 June 2007) and in desperation, Mabuza applied to the Pretoria Supreme Court for return of the administration of KaNgwane to the tribal authorities, in essence offering to forfeit his own position as leader of the KaNgwane administration, in the hope that if Swazi traditional authorities were pacified, they might abandon the idea of „re-unification‟ with Swaziland and thus keep KaNgwane within South Africa‟s borders.

David Lukhele was one person who was won over by the arguments of the South African authorities and he was very angry when Mabuza rejected the land deal. Lukhele argued that the incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland was the right thing to do if King Sobhuza wanted it because there was only one Swazi king. Lukhele managed to win over several Swazi chiefs on based on an appeal to ethnic identity. He accused Mabuza of deliberately wanting to usurp or replace the Swazi king and dividing the people‟s loyalties (Ginindza, Interview, June 2007). Lukhele was a former KaNgwane cabinet minister and member of KaNgwane‟s ruling Inyandza National Movement that turned out to be the most outspoken supporter of the deal in KaNgwane. Lukhele had been removed from KaNgwane‟s cabinet and quit Mabuza‟s Inyandza Movement in protest to form his own movement called Inyantsi, whose sole purpose was to antagonise Mabuza‟s government. The South African government allegedly send Lukhele on several missions to Swaziland to iron out the details of the land deal and he was later assassinated by the ANC (Sandile Mabuza, Interview, 5 June 2007; Esther Mabuza, Interview, 6 June 2007; Ginindza, Interview, 2007). The impasse around the land deal created serious tensions in KaNgwane but Mabuza advised against violence and retaliation. His conviction that the land deal was unfair and unjust, along with the support granted him by the 100 000 strong Inyandza National Movement which he led, “ensured that KaNgwane avoided much of the violence that was endemic to most homelands” (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259).

Mabuza wrote several letters to the British Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher who took up the issue with Prime Minister P. W. Botha (Claassens, 1991). The Prime Minister (Pieter Willem (Pik) Botha) temporarily relented and denied that he was going to reconvene parliament to deal with this crisis. However, he did not rule out the possibility that this option would be explored at a later date. Mabuza travelled overseas to countries such as Canada and Germany to lobby support within influential international networks to prevent the incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland and this caused an international outcry which ultimately embarrassed the South African government into conceding defeat, thereby preventing the incorporation of KaNgwane and Ingwavuma into Swaziland. The case was taken to international courts since South Africa was a signatory to several binding treaties and accords which this decision or act violated (Sandile Mabuza, Interview, 5 June 2007).

Towards the end of the year (25 November 1982), KaNgwane‟s leaders scored their first victory. After papers were presented to the Supreme Court against the South African government‟s attempts to transfer KaNgwane to Swaziland, the South African government approached KaNgwane‟ leaders and reached an out-of-court settlement in which Piet Koornhof announced that the June 1982 Proclamation R109 which had dissolved the Legislative Assembly of KaNgwane was rescinded and the legal costs incurred by KaNgwane were borne by the South African government. As a result of the settlement, Mabuza withdrew his application to the Pretoria Supreme Court for return of the administration of KaNgwane to the tribal authorities. Mabuza was reinstated as Chief Executive Councillor of KaNgwane and this putt to rest the South African government‟s seemingly ingenious plan (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259).

The African National Congress‟ president O.R. Tambo gave a speech on 8 January 1983 on behalf of the organisation‟s National Executive Committee to mark the 71st anniversary of the African National Congress. The injustice of the Swazi land deal (the ceding of Ingwavuma and KaNgwane to Swaziland) was mentioned in this speech and the ANC president urged all the people to oppose attempts by the apartheid regime to deprive them of their South African citizenship. Tambo acknowledged Mabuza‟s help to the ANC which was operating under difficult conditions of illegality and police surveillance. Mabuza risked arrest and persecution by the security forces and this speech was encouragement for him to „keep fighting the good fight‟ in a sense (Tambo, 1983).

In January 1983 KaNgwane‟s leaders celebrated this victory with more than 5 000 residents who flocked to a stadium in Nelspruit for feasting and dancing. Mabuza addressed the crowd praising the efforts of local and international resistance parties and vowed to maintain KaNgwane‟s borders. The evidence acquired during the Rumpff Commission cemented the victory in the Supreme Court. Although the Commission was later dissolved, the evidence collected from various sources (including Punt Janson, the former commissioner-general of KaNgwane) sent the clear message to Pretoria that KaNgwane residents were opposed to their forcible incorporation into Swaziland (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259-260). Surprisingly though, Pretoria seemed to heed the message and the legal implications of the deal and in damage limitation mode, agreed to establish an Commission of Inquiry which would be chaired by Chief Justice Rumpff (the Rumpff Commission). The Commission was to investigate and report on the full circumstances surrounding the Swazi land deal and the conflicting claims between KaNgwane, KwaZulu (Ingwavuma) and Swaziland. It was expected to explain the inclusion of non-Swazi Ingwavuma in the deal as well as to assess the possibility of future land transfers (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259). According to Woodson (1991:392), KaNgwane‟s Executive Council sent a confidential report to the Van der Walt Commission regarding the settlement of South African Swazis (defending or explaining how KaNgwane came into existence) on 20 November 1983 just to cement the conclusions of the Rumpff Commission.

Ginindza (2007) acknowledges that there were definitely Swazis in KaNgwane who supported the land deal because of the historical link to Swaziland. These were mainly the elderly and other traditionalists and conservative royalists who were close to the monarchy and were convinced that the land deal was a good idea. However, KaNgwane‟s Bantustan authorities, together with a significant number of Swazis in KaNgwane who were concerned about losing their rights as South African citizens, especially the right to work in South Africa, opposed the deal despite this (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:61). Ginindza and Mabuza were among those who wanted to protect their South African citizenship and their families both still live in KaNyamazane/Louisville in the former KaNgwane Bantustan. King Sobhuza II died at age 83 at the height of the land deal fiasco and many Swazis from KaNgwane attended his funeral in Swaziland. However, loyalty to the king was not enough to make them want to renounce their South African citizenship even though KaNgwane was one of the poorest of South Africa‟s ten Bantustans.

Part of Mabuza‟s strategy in opposing the Swazi land deal was to consciously engage in media politics in order to communicate to a global audience what was happening to KaNgwane. According to Thorn, (2007:896-918), this strategy of lobbying world leaders and representatives of various global civil society groups across national borders was one of the pillars of the anti-apartheid struggle. The travels of ANC leaders abroad was an important conduit for information and a way of influencing views and global opinion by utilising or creating alternative and independent platforms whilst also circumventing banning orders and censorship laws in South Africa. Mabuza articulated his grievances about the Swazi land deal, mobilised public opinion overseas in countries like Germany, Canada and the United States which he visited to solicit support for his opposition to the deal. Giving the crisis a global dimension exposed the machinations of the apartheid state - emphasising the plight and injustice that would be suffered by the people of KaNgwane if the deal was successful. His visibility in the international public sphere during this crisis not only helped in its resolution but also earned him empathetic ears, admirers and valuable contacts in his bid to distinguish himself from other Bantustan leaders and putting himself on the political map (so to speak) in a more favourable light by championing the rights of the oppressed.

The deal would have involved significant boundary changes since large tracts of South African territory would have been transferred to Swaziland and the courts ultimately declared that the land deal was illegal despite the documented Swazi historical claim to South African land adjacent to the Swaziland border. At first glance, the deal seemed justified reason (albeit, only part of it) but the courts could not ignore public international law with regards to the acquisition of territory and redrawing of borders or the wanton re-assignment of citizenship in the modern age. Mabuza could easily have accepted the land deal as an order from above (the logic that Buthelezi used to wash his hands of the proposed Driefontein and KwaNgema removals) but he did not, which brought him in confrontation with Pretoria and ultimately lost him favour. Instituting civil claims for damages is a challenge to the existing balance of power and making the case public gave Mabuza some power or advantage, yet he did not try to bargain to get something to benefit only himself out of the proposed Swazi land deal. Instead, he sought the support of the legal fraternity in a defensive action to prevent further dispossession by the state through the incorporation of KaNgwane and Ingwavuma into Swaziland. He made contacts with influential people and conducted community meetings to discuss the case. The case and subsequent publicised protest became high profile and cost

the government financially and in terms of its image, particularly the Department of Foreign Affairs dearly.

7.7.3 Opposition to the Swazi Land Deal from Other Quarters

Proclamation R109 was strongly opposed by the governments of KwaZulu, KaNgwane and all four opposition parties in South Africa‟s cabinet. Some other Bantustan leaders expressed their concern over the move in more muted tones. Save for a few chiefs and other loyalists, the people of KaNgwane and Ingwavuma did not want to be incorporated into Swaziland because they feared that they would lose their South African citizenship and the limited freedoms they had (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259). It was clear that the rights of many people were being subordinated to other considerations because the trade-off was worthwhile for the two main instigators- the governments of South Africa and Swaziland. Having established what was on offer to for the key players in the deal, this section considers the reactions to it and why it ultimately failed. Many people were outraged by the proposed deal and opposition to it came from a number of different sources, including the Natal Provincial Administration, KwaZulu authorities and the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly through the Chief Executive, Enos Mabuza. General opposition also came from quarters opposed to apartheid, especially since the South Africa government was going to deprive almost a million blacks of their rights as South African citizens by giving them away to another country without their permission (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:54).

Holden and Mathabatha (2007:259-260) report that Headmen in Ingwavuma objected to the land deal thereby forcing KwaZulu‟s Chief Minister, Gatsha Buthelezi to respond. Buthelezi had and Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini objected to the deal (on behalf of Ingwavuma) which had been confirmed as part of KwaZulu in 1976. However, according to Griffiths and Funnell (1991:62-63), the Zulus had limited historical claim to the Ingwavuma territory; save for the fact that Zulu King Dingane was killed and buried there. The majority of people in Ingwavuma were neither Swazi nor Zulu but Tsonga although Ingwavuma was considered part of the Swazi sphere of influence rather than the Zulu (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:62-63). Zululand was annexed by the British in May 1887 but Ingwavuma was not included. On 23 April 1895, Britain annexed the western strip of Ingwavuma into Zululand in order to cut off the Transvaal (Boer Republic) from the sea. This was an expression of British policy against the Boers; not recognition of Zulu historical claim to it such that the largest part of the territory was treated separately. Tongaland, the larger part of Ingwavuma, was separately

annexed by Britain on 30 May 1895. In 1897, Zululand and Tongaland were incorporated into the crown colony of Natal and were not under Zulu control until the 1975 Bantustan consolidation proposals were implemented in 1976 (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:62-63). Given this history, the Natal Provincial Administration objected to the land deal because Ingwavuma had been part of Natal since 1897 and they had not been consulted about its transfer to Swaziland.

Zulu objection (and legal action against the land deal after soliciting the backing of Natal authorities) was a response to seeing what had been recently given to them being offered to the Swazis without prior consultation or agreement. The KwaZulu authorities applied to the Natal High Court to rule against the inclusion of Ingwavuma in the deal. On 25 June 1982, the Durban Supreme Court cancelled the state‟s Proclamation R109 of 18 June 1982 on the grounds that the South African government had not consulted (legal obligation) KwaZulu authorities before making the decision and the South African government‟s response was to issue a new Proclamation under a different law which placed Ingwavuma under government control. The state also referred the case to the South African Appeal Court in Pretoria. By 30 June 1982, the question of the land deal was reaching crisis proportions and at a special sitting, the Provincial Council of Natal passed a resolution urging the South African government to hold a referendum in Natal and in the Ingwavuma region of KwaZulu regarding the proposed land deal. The Supreme Court in Natal granted an order to the KwaZulu government to further stall the incorporation of Ingwavuma and on 6 July 1982, officials of the Department of Cooperation and Development began withdrawing from the disputed Ingwavuma area. On 30 September 1982, the Appeal Court in Bloemfontein upheld the decision of the Natal Court that the Presidential Proclamation R109 issued on 18 June 1982, purporting to restore Ingwavuma to Swaziland‟s jurisdiction was null and void because the State President had acted beyond/over-stepped his powers or jurisdiction (*ultra vires)* and as such, the inclusion of Ingwavuma in the deal was illegal (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:62-63). In October 1982 the Appeal Court upheld KwaZulu government contention that the land deal/ proclamation was unlawful and in November of the same year, Pretoria announced that it had accepted the court‟s decision and settled the matter with the KaNgwane government (Grundy, 1986: 79-82).

On 18 June 1984, KwaZulu‟s Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi was summoned to Cape Town by Dr. Piet Koornhof, South Africa‟s Minister of Cooperation and Development, and was

informed that the Rumpff Commission of Inquiry which had been investigating the claims of the different parties had been disbanded but it never issued a public report. The next day (19 June 1984), South Africa‟s Foreign Minister gave an assurance that the government would not go ahead with plans for the cession of land to Swaziland, unless it had the majority support of the people concerned. On 20 June 1984 Dr. Koornhof announced that the South African government had concluded that the leaders of Swaziland, KwaZulu and KaNgwane would discuss the matter among themselves. However, the Swaziland government did not recognise the legitimacy of the Bantustans and refused to be drawn into discussions including them on the matter (Grundy, 1986: 79-82; Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:55). In August 1984, Pretoria granted internal self-government to KaNgwane. The following series of cartoons appeared in several newspapers in protest against the Swazi land deal of 1982. They caricature the deceptions, assumptions and miscalculations of the South African authorities in formulating the deal without consulting the people that would be directly affected by it.

Figure 9: Cartoon about the Swaziland-South Africa Land Deal (Abe Berry and A. J. P Stidolph in *The Star*, 29 November 1990).

Figure 10: Cartoon about the Swaziland-South Africa Land Deal (Abe Berry and A. J. P Stidolph in the *Natal Witness*, 29 November 1990).

Figure 11: Cartoon about the Swaziland-South Africa Land Deal (Abe Berry and A. J. P Stidolph in *The Star*, 29 November 1990).

7.7.4 The Impact of the Abortive Swazi Land Deal

Failure of the Swazi land deal gave other people hope that they too could prevent the authorities from running rough-shod over them. Following Mabuza‟s prevention of the Swazi land deal; the stymieing of forced removals in Driefontein, KwaNgema and Daggakraal, opposition to Moutse‟s incorporation into KwaNdebele and the rejection of KwaNdebele independence put the spotlight on the struggles in rural areas which, according to Claassens (1991:156), the urban bias of the Mass Democratic Movement and trade unions did not focus

adequately on. Public outcry at both local and national levels or legal challenges that dealt with laws such as the Black Administration Act were doomed to fail unless they were directed at less obviously racial clauses (Claassens, 1991). Two events that happened in KwaNdebele/Moutse (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:255-258; Phatlane, 2002: 401-410, 414-417) and Driefontein (Claassens, 1991:144-156; Mulaudzi and Schirmer, 2007:234-238) in the 1980s illustrate the impact or implications of Enos Mabuza‟s stand against injustice and the unilateral manner in which the apartheid government conducted its affairs (no consultation or consent). Mabuza‟s connection with these cases is slightly tenuous but the relative proximity of KwaNdebele and Driefontein to KaNgwane and the question of South African citizenship were at the root of popular resistance in both cases. Further, although the outcomes were varied, they ultimately denied the South African authorities what they wanted or tried to impose. Mabuza‟s actions in successfully opposing the Swazi land deal set a precedent that these communities tried to emulate and in the case of Driefontein, his assistance (as an ally) was directly solicited.

The South African government‟s plans to forcibly incorporate Moutse into KwaNdebele in 1986 were designed to consolidate and strengthen KwaNdebele in preparation for independence. The case has similarities to the failed KaNgwane-Ingwavuma incorporation into Swaziland above and Holden and Mathabatha (2007:256-257) believe that resistance in Moutse (and KwaNdebele) was emboldened by the KaNgwane government‟s successful opposition to the Swazi land deal. The rejection of independence was the result of legitimate fears by KwaNdebele residents that they would lose their South African citizenship (which was part of Mabuza‟s argument in opposing and preventing the Swazi land deal). Unfortunately, however, the authorities were a bit wiser after the debacle of the Swazi land deal and successfully imposed the redrawing of boundaries through a series of proclamations and statutes which forced Moutse into KwaNdebele, but not without serious repercussions, including violence (TRC Report Vol. 2, 1998:482; TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:652, 657; Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:255-258; Phatlane, 2002: 401-417).

In Driefontein, the prospect of forced removal and the harassment that characterised it became was so unpalatable that it compelled the Driefontein and KwaNgema community leaders to request KwaZulu‟s Chief Buthelezi and KaNgwane‟s Enos Mabuza to intervene or lend their support in the dispute with the South African authorities (based on their recent experience of the abortive Ingwavuma/KaNgwane incorporation into Swaziland). They asked

that Buthelezi and Mabuza refuse to accept them in their Bantustans if the removal went ahead as planned but KwaZulu‟s Chief Buthelezi refused to assist stating that the tragic policy was not of his making or implementation. In contrast, Mabuza offered to meet with the leaders of these communities even though Pretoria officials had told him that the Ngemas were in favour of the removal. When the Ngemas contradicted this, Mabuza pledged to refuse to co-operate with Pretoria in any way on the matter. He subsequently told the Deputy Minister of Cooperation and Development that KaNgwane would not administer any land to which the Ngemas were relocated. Mabuza‟s refusal to cooperate with Pretoria meant that the South African government had to deal with a black spot that did not have proper housing schemes, water, schools, health facilities or structures of local government. The resettlement camp which was being constructed for the Driefontein and KwaNgema communities at Oshoek became a white elephant and Pretoria had nowhere to settle the affected people. The contested title deeds, permits, meetings and minutes, lawyers, publicity and special pleadings eventually led to Driefontein and KwaNgema being given formal reprieve from forced removal on 27 August 1985 (Claassens, 1991:147) and in October 1985, the government decided not to proceed with the removals from Daggakraal. Mabuza‟s intervention also forced the government to allow the two communities to remain on the land they already inhabited. The success of this protest meant that the disruption of extended families, community ties and old friendships was prevented (Claassens, 1991:144-156; Mulaudzi and Schirmer, 2007:234-238).

Although the Swazi land deal would probably have involved minimal physical movement since it was essentially a boundary change (and change in government), the net result would have been the same as what was proposed in the two cases below - alienation against their will or what was reasonable and legally permissible. The common experience or predicament of the residents in the two cases discussed in this section made them fellow travellers with residents in KaNgwane and Ingwavuma who were also confronted with the nefarious schemes of the apartheid state which wanted to make them victims of bitter, divisive and enduring land (and cultural) disputes. These experiences united them and strengthened their resolve to fight to determine their own destinies.

7.8 KaNgwane *vis* Escalation of Violence in the Transvaal in the Decade 1985-1995

The majority of the Bantustans fell in the Transvaal (parts of Bophuthatswana, Gazankulu, Lebowa, KwaNdebele and KaNgwane) and it is reported that violence and torture in the

Transvaal was perpetrated by the SAP, the Bophuthatswana security police and hit squads linked to the secret police and other intelligence organisations. In the absence of Bantustan armies (for self governing, as opposed to independent territories), the 1980s saw the emergence of conservative vigilante organisations, such as, Imbokodo, Inkatha and Kabasa. The confrontations mainly involved conflicts with the government which used the Bantu Authorities Act to impose chiefs amenable to its policies by deposing popular chiefs and Bantustan residents who opposed them. This happened in Venda and Bophuthatswana where some residents and chiefs were banished or deported from the Bantustans to remote areas where they were allowed minimum contact with others in order to neutralise them (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:549-552). Violence erupted in the urban areas on a regular basis from 1984 onwards and it began to manifest in the Bantustans from about 1986 with the spread of UDF and COSAS activities to the Bantustans.

Everyone who represented government authority (black policemen in the townships, community councillors and chiefs) became the target of widespread violence during the 1980s and in theory, Mabuza and his government were vulnerable to attack. Most attacks on government representatives and alleged informers were carried out through petrol-bombing of homes, arson (beer halls, buses, cars and administration board buildings) and neck-lacing in which the victim is doused with petrol and set alight. Such intolerance was advocated within a general climate of mistrust and fear generated by state violence and disinformation campaigns and victims also included those perceived to be beneficiaries of the apartheid system (business people or teachers antagonistic to school boycotts) (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:599). In the Transvaal, violence was most pronounced in Bophuthatswana, KwaNdebele and Lebowa with the most reported cases in Bophuthatswana and KwaNdebele where the ruling elites tried to quash political protest through widespread detention and torture. The amount of repression in turn led to cycles of retaliatory violence between Bantustan security forces and youths under the banner of the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) and the UDF. In KwaNdebele, for example, students, teachers and civil servants held successful stay-aways in protest against the KwaNdebele cabinet‟s policies and the detention of various resistance leaders. Violence in KwaNdebele peaked in May and June 1986 and only abated when the call for „independence was abandoned in August 1986 (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:656). Chiefs, like community councillors in the urban areas, targeted in these skirmishes because of their implementation of government policy, for instance in Lebowa and KwaNdebele.

Several massacres were recorded in the Transvaal between 1990 and the period after the historic 1994 democratic elections. These included a massacre in Sebokeng on 22 July 1990 (27 people killed), the Tembisa Vusimuzi hostel massacre on 12 September 1990 (25 hostel residents killed), the Jeppe Station train attack on 13 September 1990 (twenty-six commuters killed) and the Thokoza Hostel attack on 2 December 1990 (thirty killed). The Sebokeng Funeral Vigil attack followed on 12 January 1991 (13 people killed) and a few months later, the Swanieville squatter settlement (Kagiso) massacre took place in which twenty-eight people were killed on 12 May. The Gobizitwna Beer Hall attack in Sebokeng on 23 May 1991 left thirteen people dead. This cycle of violence continued into 1992 with the Crossroads squatter camp massacre (Katlehong) on 3 April 1992 (21 people killed).This was followed by the Alexandra Funeral Vigil massacre on 12 May in which fifteen people were killed. The 17 June 1992 Boipatong massacre (Vaal) left forty people dead. Further afield, the Bisho killings on 7 September 1992 claimed the lives of twenty-nine protesters and one soldier and left about 200 others wounded after months of violent conflicts between Ciskei Bantustan government supporters and ANC supporters. There was yet another Thokoza hostel attack in May 1993 which left sixteen hostel residents killed dead (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:675-676).

The Storm before the Calm: Violence and/or Its Relative Absence in KaNgwane

This section briefly outlines how Enos Mabuza became politicised and tries to trace why he seemed to adopt a moderate, open minded approach in his dealings with people regardless of who they were, black or white. The section chronicles the political transition from the experience of students and individuals in KaNgwane from the mid 1980s when the stage was set by the States of Emergencies which triggered concerted resistance and violence which was also felt in KaNgwane. Although Mabuza was not directly involved in any of the violence, he was found to be culpable, in his official capacity, for some of the deaths at the hands of the police. However, KaNgwane experienced very low to negligible levels of violence compared to the other Bantustans. The transition was a time of great, long-awaited change and it was accompanied by much jockeying for position, opportunism and changing attitude, some genuine and others merely expedient. Mabuza addressed the Annual Conference of the QwaQwa ruling party at a crucial time in December 1989 and his assessment of Bantustan leaders and what they had contributed in the past and what they could, realistically contribute in the future is worth some consideration.

The first State of Emergency was declared in 1960 immediately after the Sharpeville Massacre and the banning of the African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress and in the wake of the 1976 Soweto Uprising, the government widened police powers of detention even without trial in lieu of a State of Emergency. However, by the mid-1980s, a popular uprising was underway with militants advocating that the townships be rendered ungovernable. Increasing civil unrest and township violence led to the government declaring a State of Emergency in 36 magisterial districts[41] on 20 July 1985 to allow the regime to crack down opponents when resistance was heightened. Organisations as well as meetings were closely monitored and disrupted and could be banned and thousands of people were detained. The police could detain anyone for vague reasons of public safety without the option to appeal to the courts. The Commissioner of Police could impose a blanket prohibition on media coverage of the Emergency and the names of people who had been detained could not be revealed (Kruss, 1987:173-186; Webster, 1987:141-172).

Another countrywide State of Emergency was declared on 12 June 1986; four days before the tenth anniversary of the Soweto student uprising. The provisions of this State of Emergency were broader than previous ones but anti-apartheid mobilisation continued unabated. The president could rule by decree without referring to the constitution or to parliament. The government amended the Public Security Act thereby expanding its powers to include the right to declare certain places *unrest areas*. About 2 436 people were detained under the Internal Security Act which gave the police and the military sweeping powers to crush protests in unrest areas. The government restricted political funerals, imposed curfews to control the movement of people and banned certain indoor gatherings. Television cameras were banned from unrest areas to prevent international as well as national coverage of the township rebellion (the rent strikes, „people"s education" in the schools, consumer boycotts) and police repression. Instead, the state broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) provided propaganda in support of the government and its version of reality was challenged by a range of pro-ANC alternative publications. The Emergency succeeded in putting the trade unions, township and youth organisations (mass democratic movement) on the defensive and the state responded by renewing the Emergency and bringing more white troops to the townships to the point where a state of civil war existed in all but name. In the first half of 1986 labour-organised strikes reached new proportions with

[41] The Eastern Cape and the Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging region. The Western Cape was included three months later.

half a million days lost mostly through the activities of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU). The formation and growth of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) induced further panic in the ranks of the white regime and fascist groups such as the AWB became disillusioned with the National Party and led dissatisfied white workers and petit bourgeois, even penetrating the armed forces (Kruss, 1987:173-186; Webster, 1987:141-172).

The apartheid state used its most repressive measures between 1985 and 1990 and more human rights were violated during this period than ever before. It was a criminal offence to threaten someone verbally or possess documents that the government perceived to be threatening. It was illegal to advise anyone to stay away from work or oppose the government. It was also illegal to disclose the names of those arrested under the State of Emergency until the government saw it fit to release such names and individuals could be imprisoned for up to ten years for these offences. External sanctions were imposed and foreign companies stopped new investments and some even sold their operations in South Africa (General Motors, Honeywell, Barclays, Xerox). The 1986 Emergency was extended until 1990 when F.W. de Klerk became the State President and lifted the 30-year ban on the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress and the South African Communist Party (Kruss, 1987:173-186; Webster, 1987:141-172). De Klerk also made the first official public commitment to release Nelson Mandela, to return to press freedom and to suspend the death penalty.

As the conflict in South Africa deepened and escalated in the mid 1980s, gross human rights violations became increasingly generalised, drawing in an ever-widening range of sectors, organisations and individuals as perpetrators, including the ANC, MK and individuals associated with the UDF. Individuals aligned to the UDF and frequently referred to as comrades engaged in a range of violent actions against local representatives of the apartheid government and anyone perceived to be a beneficiary of the apartheid system. Councillors, police and government-appointed chiefs in rural areas were the main targets but individuals who owned businesses and those perceived to have unfairly amassed wealth in poor townships were also vulnerable to attack. Teachers and school principals who opposed the wave of school boycotts which were sweeping the country were also targeted. Black local authority offices, schools, homes and businesses were frequently attacked and „People"s

Courts‟ were set up in some townships as a rudimentary form of alternative governance to deal with informers („impimpis‟) and other matters.

KaNgwane was not insulated from the political upheavals in Johannesburg or the rest of the country. Although movement was limited because of influx regulations and pass laws, people worked outside the Bantustans and were influenced by events elsewhere. However, although there could not have been complete harmony, KaNgwane is not known to have been marked by political violence; a characteristic which distinguished it from the South African government and the other Bantustans. According to Nkosi‟s testimony, the community‟s attitude towards the police at that time was that they were merely doing their job and there were few running battles with them because people were generally free to do as they pleased. The policemen could walk around freely in the community without being attacked for merely being policemen (Hlanga‟s testimony). They did their job and People who committed crimes were arrested by the police when victims laid charges.[42]

1986 Student Unrest

The States of Emergencies which were declared from the mid 1980s led to mass resistance countrywide, including sustained student unrest. These events prompted the creation of the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee and the consultative conferences which followed soon after leading to the birth of People‟s Education (Muller, 1987:18-32). These developments contributed to an escalation of tensions in KaNgwane by the end of 1985. Development Board offices, a school and police vehicles were stoned and petrol-bombed at Kabokweni on 14 January 1986 and the crowd was eventually dispersed with birdshot. Violence flared up in the Nsikazi region, claiming the lives of at least two leading businessmen, a trade unionist and a chief. In February 1986, education-related protests and boycotts led to sustained conflict lasting well into the year. The Lowveld Youth Movement, a UDF affiliate, was partly responsible for the protests. On 22 February 1986, about 4 000 youths set fire to Khumbula High School and two shops, one of which belonged to a school inspector. A week later, twenty-three vehicles and a number of buildings were burnt in further unrest in KaNyamazane. Twenty-six pupils appeared in the Kabokweni Magistrate‟s Court on charges of public violence. Thousands of fellow pupils marched to court to attend the trials and pushed down a courtyard fence to get in. The lawyer for the students that were appearing in court stated later that the police opened fire on the students without provocation and without

[42] http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99110812_jhb_991111jb.htm

giving them any warning to disperse. The police fired repeated rounds of live ammunition into an unarmed crowd killing at least three pupils and injuring eighty, including Ms Elizabeth Mdluli. It was later revealed that most of the pupils had been shot in the back whilst fleeing. The shootings later came to be known as the Lowveld Massacre (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:662). The court shooting was followed by several incidents of unrest, including an attempt by a group of 200 pupils to hijack seven buses. In February alone, at least four people died in violent clashes and damage estimated at R2 million was caused in the townships of Kabokweni and KaNyamazane/Louieville (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:659-660).

Restrictions were placed on the funeral of the three students killed in the Lowveld Massacre and hours before the funeral on 22 March, there was further confrontation between students and police as mourners returned from the night vigil. Mr Msongelwa Amos Maseko was walking back home from the night vigil with a group of friends when they met the police and the police opened fire from a vehicle without warning. Maseko was shot and injured, one youth was shot dead, another was run over by a police vehicle and four were seriously injured. In another incident, a boy was killed when police dispersed a group of alleged stone-throwers. At Kadisiki school, another boy was seriously injured by police firing birdshot at 400 pupils who were allegedly intimidating other scholars (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:659-660).

The Kabasa Gang

A vigilante group known as *Kabasa* was formed in 1986 and operated in the areas around Nelspruit.[43] It was first mobilised in response to violence associated with the February 1986 school boycott and student unrest outlined above. Kabasa emerged as a powerful and violent conservative force opposing the general wave of solidarity (triggered by or in response to events in the cities and other political hotspots) protests in KaNgwane. According to TRC reports, the Kabasa gang had about seven members and was formed to fulfil the needs of a group of elite businessmen known to the community as *Sibaya S'khulu* (meaning the main or central kraal). Prominent members of *Sibaya S'khulu* were Mr D. R. Mazibuko and Mr Julius Nkosi and part of the gang‟s modus operandi was attacks on rival businesses. The TRC also received reports of joint activities between the South African security forces (the SAP, the

[43] KaNyamazane, Pienaars Trust, Luphisa Trust and Kabokweni.

SADF and the security branch[44]) and the Kabasa gang in June 1986 (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:659-660).

Neville Shabangu was a founding member of the Lowveld Youth Movement which was a UDF affiliate. He and told the TRC that Kabasa members were involved in burning down his home. He suffered severe burns and was hospitalised for more than four months. He was questioned by police whilst he was in hospital and he was detained and tortured for three months the day after he was discharged from hospital. Mr Shabangu told the TRC that members of the Kabasa gang openly worked with the police and were often seen helping in the police station. His nephew had also been shot dead by police outside the Kabokweni Magistrate‟s Court during the student protests in early 1986 (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:661).

The Murder of David Lukhele

According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission‟s Reports, in April 1986, David Lukhele [JB00646/02PS], a prominent former cabinet minister in the KaNgwane government was framed in a bogus pamphlet associating him with anti-ANC sentiments. A few days before his death, Lukhele had met with chiefs to discuss the unification of KaNgwane and Swaziland. This meeting was allegedly an attempt to resuscitate the failed 1982 attempt by the South African authorities to cede KaNgwane and Ingwavuma to Swaziland, a move which Lukhele had been in favour of and one which Mabuza successfully prevented. Lukhele had split from Mabuza‟s Inyandza National Movement in the fall out of the 1982 aborted land deal and formed his own party, Nsika. Instead of Mabuza or those closely connected to him in the Inyandza National Movement or KaNgwane government being held responsible or being implicated in the murder, ANC members Mr Neo Griffith Potsane [AM7159/97], Mr Jabu Obed Masina [AM5886/97] and Mr Frans „Ting Ting‟ Masango [AM7087/97] and Joseph Elias Makhura applied for amnesty for Lukhele‟s murder as well as a bomb blast at a bus stop in Silverton, Pretoria which injured 17 people in 1986 (TRC Report Vol. 2, 1998:336). All four men testified to having been members of the ANC‟s former military wing UmKhonto we Sizwe‟s “elimination unit” which was established to assassinate people the ANC considered „collaborators‟ including Bantustan leaders and members of the security forces. Potsane stated that Lukhele fell foul with the ANC in exile after he had written and distributed a document which called, among others, the incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland.

[44] Brigadier Visser and Captain van Loggerenberg of the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch.

Lukhele was gunned down in his home in Mamelodi on 6 June 1986 together with his sister-in-law, Mrs. Busisiwe Dludlu while watching television. Lukhele‟s wife, Elizabeth, was also wounded. Potsane, then member of the National Intelligence Agency, testified before the TRC at the Telkom Club outside Pretoria and described how he burst into the Lukhele home and sprayed them with high-calibre gunfire (machine-gun) and left Lukhele‟s bullet riddled body in a pool of blood while he escaped with his accomplice Masina (TRC Report Vol. 2, 1998:3360. Potsane and Masina drove to Lukhele‟s home and left their vehicle a short distance away and walked into the yard armed with an AK47 with two magazines. Masina stood guard outside while Potsane:

> I knocked at the front door, someone opened the door and I burst inside with my AK47 already drawn. I fired at least 31 rounds at Mr. Lukhele who fell on the floor. While lying dead on the floor I continued pumping his body with more than 31 rounds of ammunition. His wife was also hit in the leg as she was crawling towards the door apparently attempting to escape.

Potsane said that Bantustan leaders were perceived as legitimate targets for elimination and "Mr. Lukhele was targeted by our unit and killed by me only after the specific authorisation of the ANC was sought to eliminate him." Potsane added that after the ANC had sanctioned Lukhele‟s assassination, he was deployed to reconnoitre the Lukhele‟s movements and ascertained that he would be at home on Friday June 6.

In the mid 1980s, there were reported cases of UDF and ANC activists being given booby-trapped limpet mines and hand grenades („Operation Zero Zero‟) on the East Rand by covert units of the SAP, Vlakplaas and the SADF Special Forces in collaboration with *askaris* and Vlakplaas police informants posing as MK operatives. The operation was designed to eliminate activists and make them appear incompetent, whilst also undermining the credibility of the ANC‟s armed wing (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:628-629). In contrast, Potsane stated that Enos Mabuza was regarded as an ANC sympathiser so he was safe from elimination. Mabuza reportedly had a good working relationship with „comrades‟ in the area and either assisted or turned a blind eye to their movements to and from Mozambique and Swaziland. He did not use this information to entrap them for ambushes and elimination by the security forces as was common in other Bantustans. Consequently, there were never loud or persistent calls for Mabuza‟s resignation or that of members of the KaNgwane cabinet and legislative assembly since they were believed to act on a popular mandate.

10th Anniversary of the Soweto Uprising – 16 June 1986

A meeting of students commemorating the anniversary of the 1976 Soweto Uprising on 16 June 1986 was violently dispersed by members of the SADF and Kabasa. Fifteen year old Bethuel Mthethwa and Sydney Ndlazi were killed when members of the SADF and Kabasa opened fire on the gathering. Ms Phindile Mavis Ngobe was also shot and was taken to Temba hospital with three other injured students. According to reports, they were followed by members of the SADF to the hospital and the SADF refused to allow the students to be admitted. Instead, the SADF called the police in Nelspruit to come and detain them and they were assaulted further and denied medical treatment whilst in detention. Bethuel Mthethwa‟s sister, Ms Mildred Mthethwa, recounted to the TRC what happened before her brother‟s funeral:

> When the hearse arrived, the police were following… they were questioning where Bethuel is… until they found him. They kicked him even though he was dead, they continued kicking him. When they were busy kicking the corpse, my father was becoming very angry. He tried to fetch something which we could use to fight the police because he was angry at what they were doing to the corpse. He questioned them, how can they kick somebody who is already dead? He therefore asked the police to kill him and when we all saw that our father was angry we also decided to help our father to fight against the police. We fought against them (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:661).

The Murder of Dumisa Christopher Mabika

Keshla Timothy Nkosi (33 years old in 1996) was a card-carrying member of the Inyandza National Movement and he was convicted of the murder of Dumisa Christopher Mabika on 16 October 1991 by a Circuit Supreme Court that was sitting at Lydenburg and sentenced to 18 years imprisonment. There were six accused at the trial and Nkosi was applying for individual amnesty (Application No: AM1860\96) for his involvement in the murder of Dumisa Christopher Mabika (an allegedly aggressive council policeman) near St John‟s school. An angry mob attacked and killed Mabika with stones and sticks; stabbed him, kicking him with the intention of burning him alive (neck-lacing). Mabika was attacked in retaliation for the shooting of Nkosi‟s elder brother in Tlaza J, eLukwatini, a rural area in the former KaNgwane Bantustan. Mabika‟s sister, Sibongile Hlanga, was a policewoman in eLukwatini since 1986 (the time of the killing). She was a witness at the hearing and testified that she was a member of Inyandza like Nkosi. Nkosi‟s brother had also been a member of

Inyandza but worked in Johannesburg and was therefore not directly involved in the daily activities of the organisation[45]. Although Nkosi was a member of Inyandza, his actions were not based on the organisation‟s policies or instructions but a response to personal tragedy (his brother‟s murder). Nkosi‟s testimony before the TRC revealed that his brother had had an altercation with Mabika over an alleged girlfriend (Selinah Jane Bembe) so, on the surface, both killings were not politically motivated.

Nkosi‟s testimony, however, notes that Inyandza took the decision to kill Mabika following an incident in which he allegedly shot at Mandla (an active comrade within Inyandza) at a taxi rank. Mabika was not arrested for the shooting despite an organised march to the local magistrate‟s court to demand that action be taken. It is alleged that Inyandza‟s Chairman, Mr Solly Mhlule, suggested that they take this matter into their own hands (advocated vigilante justice). Nkosi reports that they planned the killing around June 1990 and went to Mabika‟s house a few times but they could not find him so they broke the windows to his house at No 1 Ntlazashe (as a warning) and left. Mabika was killed almost four months later on 14 October 1990.

Nkosi explained during court proceedings (examination by his counsel Ms Makhubele) where Inyandza fitted into national politics or the organisations it was aligned to. Nkosi began his testimony by noting that Inyandza operated in Mpumalanga Province (the former Eastern Transvaal) and that it was dissolved and became part of the ANC under the leadership of "Comrade Zitha."Nkosi is asked to comment on the political climate which prevailed in KaNgwane and his response is that "The situation was not a very bad because the Inyandza organisation is the one that fought the then government against oppression." Nstika was another political party or grouping that existed in the KaNgwane area but he only refers to it in passing. Nkosi identifies himself as a comrade and is therefore asked to elaborate on what he was fighting for and the activities that he was involved in. He begins by highlighting that KaNgwane was basically a rural "…where there was no water, no electricity. We were struggling so that the apartheid government could provide us with such resources as water and so forth." He adds that "The police would assault you or even kill you if they saw you engaged in demonstrations or protest activities like toyi-toying. However, the police was not controlled by Bantustan governments in the self-governing territories. These were deployed by Pretoria and acted according to its directive, by-passing the jurisdiction of local authorities

[45] http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99110812_jhb_991111jb.htm

and as such the Bantustan governments could not be held responsible for the police‟s actions, except for those that called for Pretoria‟s support to quell unrest and other disturbances.

Nkosi denies that Inyandza had any allegiance with the white government in Pretoria. He stresses that Inyandza fought against Pretoria‟s oppression of blacks and lack of service delivery[46]. Nkosi mentions the relationship between Oliver Tambo and Enos Mabuza and their meeting in London and the one in Lusaka Zambia in 1986 to show that the ANC and Inyandza had a common understanding because Mabuza was more progressive than other Bantustan leaders[47].

7.8.1 Mabuza's Culpability: The TRC's Findings

The TRC found the students responsible for the arson attack on police vehicles and Development Board offices in Kabokweni in January 1986 as well as attacks on Khumbula High school and two shops on 22 February 1986. It also found the Minister of Law and Order (Adriaan Vlok) and the Chief Minister of KaNgwane (Enos Mabuza) responsible (in their official capacities[48]) for gross violations of human rights in the police attack at the Kabokweni Magistrate‟s court on 11 March 1986.

7.9 Greed, Class and Corruption in the Bantustans

The apartheid regime‟s own bureaucracy was corrupt at all levels and the situation was worse when you added the mismanagement which was rampant in the Bantustans. Almost everyone turned a blind eye to the embezzling of public funds into Swiss and other foreign bank accounts (capital flight to tax havens) which led to the depletion of budgets for social security, health and public works, thereby further impoverishing the African population which already lived in dire circumstances. Local authorities routinely and illegally levied numerous taxes, institutionalised bribes for site, residence permits, work seekers‟ and other permits and withheld or stole social security payments and this bred more poverty, resentment, repression and more extortion[49] (Keenan, 1987:123-124; Van Vuuren, 2006). One example is that of local authorities, especially the traditional variety, imposed livestock taxes because they were anxious to squeeze more money out of the people for their

[46] Strictly the responsibility of the KaNgwane government which was, however, reliant on resources or budget allocations from Pretoria. Pretoria was ultimately in charge and homeland authorities were regarded as its surrogates.
[47] http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99110812_jhb_991111jb.htm
[48] As a nominally self-governing territory, KaNgwane did not have its own security forces.
[49] Denial of employment, withholding of social security, eviction and land seizure.

development projects and threatened to confiscate livestock people failed to pay the taxes (Rogers, 1980:109).

Independence was the logical extension of the Bantustan system but six of the ten Bantustans never became independent. This issue led to particularly bloody conflict in KwaNdebele in the 1980s when traditionalists were strongly in favour of independence and the rest, the majority, opposed (Phatlane, 2002). Local chiefs succumbed to pressure from Pretoria to accept independence in the four Bantustans and in the Transkei and Bophuthatswana alone, this meant that about six million people lost their South African citizenship and whatever rights they had. Arbitrary official decisions made them foreigners with no legal recourse (Roger, 1980:17). Approximately 80% of the Bantustans‟ budgets were supplied by Pretoria in various ways, one of the inducements used by the South African regime to get Bantustan politicians to accept independence, or accede to any other demand, included the threat to financially cut off Bantustans which were uncooperative (Rogers, 1980:33). This proved to be a potent enough threat to keep most Bantustan elites in check and it was used on KaNgwane and KwaZulu‟s governments when they acted like prodigal sons and refused to accept what was then an irrevocable step – independence- which would make the Bantustan governments desperately unpopular with the people.

Chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu and Enos Mabuza of KaNgwane refused to relinquish their people‟s birthrights as South Africans or to forfeit their share of the South African economy/wealth which the exploitation of Africans had helped built. As punishment for the slight, it is reported that KwaZulu had R4 million cut unexpectedly from its South African subsidy for 1977 and this meant that fewer people received pensions, the Bantustan could afford less teachers and it had to abandon some of its agricultural schemes (Rogers, 1980:33). In KaNgwane case, it was a commonly held belief that Mabuza was being punished for his “his steadfast refusal to accept independence or to participate in government‟s proposed National Council.” In an interview with the *Financial Mail* in 1989, Mabuza added to this list the fact that he did not think that Pretoria had forgiven him for his stand against the proposed incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland in 1982. He went against the government‟s wishes and as a result, KaNgwane was financially neglected by Pretoria compared to other self-governing territories. Mabuza made written submissions about this discrepancy in budgetary allocations to the then Education and Development Aid Minister, Gerrit Viljoen, impressing upon him the fact that KaNgwane was not getting an equitable share of the central

government‟s annual allocation and that what it did get was insufficient to meet its needs (*Financial Ma*il, 12 May 1989:53-54; Van Eeden, 1984:126-141).

Mabuza‟s complaints in this regard were also contained in an annexure to Mabuza‟s policy and budget speech which was delivered on Tuesday 9 May 1989. The Minister of Education and Development Aid (Gerrit Viljoen) was apparently sympathetic to the problems facing KaNgwane and had visited the Bantustan on three occasions to assess the situation for himself but had to operate within the parameters which were set by Pretoria (his mandate). Mabuza stated that when KaNgwane submitted its budget to Pretoria, it was told by government officials that it did not have the "capacity" or the executive authority to use the funds requested and its proposed budget would be cut to suit Pretoria‟s definition of the Bantustan‟s administrative capacity and constitutional status (*Financial Ma*il, 12 May 1989:53-54). Mabuza had to seek outside assistance to supplement the budgetary allocation that KaNgwane did get from Pretoria, for example, Paul De Bruyn raised R98 million for Mabuza for low cost housing/development in KaNgwane in 1988 (http://www.nacsa.co.za/).

7.9.1 Mis/management in KaNgwane

This section briefly outlines the bureaucracy which overlapped with Mabuza‟s Inyandza National Movement and the KaNgwane government to constitute the political elite, in addition to the many chiefs that existed there. Chief Ngomane (Mangweni area), Chief Mashego (Nsikazi) and chief Dlamini (Mlondozi), for example, were all installed by Mabuza as President of Inyandza and Chief Minister of KaNgwane in 1989 (Inyandza National Executive Report, 1989:5). Inyandza‟s structure is shown as having three basic levels – the national executive committee[50], seven regional executive committees[51] and branch executive committees (Inyandza National Executive Report, 1989:2). In 1991, Inyandza‟s National Executive Committee was as follows[52]:

Mr E J Mabuza – President
Mr M C Zitha – Deputy President
Mr E N Ginindza – National Chairman
Mr E .N Mango – Deputy National Chairman

[50] Elected by Congress to implement decisions and the general affairs of the Movement.
[51] Mlondozi North, Mlondozi South, Nsikazi North, Nsikazi Central, Nkomazi East, Nkomazi West and Greater Transvaal.
[52] A conspicuous absence of women on the Committee.

Prof S S Ripinga – Secretary General

Mr N S Ngozo – Deputy Secretary General

Mr D S Mkhwanazi – National Treasurer

Mr M S Gininda – Administrative Secretary

Dr. P M H Maduna – Assistant Administrative Secretary (Records)

Mr J M Matsana – National Organiser (field worker)

Mr D Z Makhubela – Assistant Secretary-Information

In addition to these individuals, the organisation had a secretary/typist, two Information and Publicity Secretaries (one would be based in Johannesburg), a Press Liaison Officer to work in conjunction with the Information and Publicity Secretaries. The ruling Inyandza National Movement‟s financial statements contained in the 1988/89 National Executive Report were handled by its treasurer, D. S. Mkhwanazi. Mr M. S. Gininda was the organisation‟s Administrative Secretary. Expenses for the party include motor vehicle expenses (R4 290.38), salaries (R9 065) stationary (R5 508.18) and travelling/entertainment (R15 978.49) which is by far the biggest draw on resources because Mabuza and/or some of Inyandza‟s other members travelled to Switzerland, United Kingdom, Egypt and the USSR in the 1988/89 financial year (National Executive Report, 1989:10-12). How much truth is in Inyandza‟s insistence on it financial independence from the KaNgwane government as such; one cannot say but in 1986, the organisation made the following statement:

> Inyandza does not want to depend or lean on the KaNgwane Government for its survival, but wants to exist and survive completely independent of any government-created structure. In order to achieve this, we need the manpower with the necessary brainpower to man our offices and organisational initiative (Inyandza National Movement, 1985:3).

It is not clear whether or not Inyandza‟s finances were partly derived from the KaNgwane government‟s budget but Inyandza‟s founding members in paid roughly R1 000 each as affiliation fees in November 1977 when the movement was established (Inyandza National Movement, 1986:2). Due to the recession and inflation rate of approximately 18.45%, increasing cost of living and low exchange rate f the Rand, Inyandza estimated that it needed

approximately R300 000 to finance its operations[53] in 1986 (Inyandza National Movement, 1985:3 & 5) Of this estimate, R10 000 would go towards Mabuza"s operational expenses (as President) and R30 000 would be for travel and subsistence (hotel and air fares). The money was to be raised from donations, self-generated income and joining/subscription and affiliation fees. However, as mentioned above, „donations" is a very ambiguous tem and in practice, it is difficult to ascertain what is or is not a donation from whatever source (Inyandza National Movement, 1985:6).

During his Presidential address at the official opening of the second ordinary session of the fourth KaNgwane Legislative Assembly[54], Enos Mabuza made the following remarks regarding his government"s management of the resources at its disposal:

> …our administrative history is not one to be ashamed of. In the past we have suffered the indignity, year after year, of being punished financially for our political views…because this leadership advocated the dismantling of the Bantustans. We have, however, maintained our integrity. Despite our people having to bear the brunt of inadequate bulk infrastructure, such as lack of purified, reticulated water, an acute housing shortage, overcrowded and inadequately staffed schools, and a mediocre health care service, we have managed our meagre resources well (Mabuza, 1990:2).

Alluding to the wastage of other Bantustans, by implication compared to the prudence of his, Mabuza commented in 1990 that "we do not have to face the question of what to do with extravagant and ostentatious buildings that will be veritable white elephants in a new South Africa" (Mabuza, 1990:2). However, the lack of such structures does not equate to a lack of excess. All it really alludes to is the fact that culpability or complicity in the rampant corruption was a matter of degree for different constituencies, some benefiting more than others. Professor Antonie, Nadine Gordimer and others who have defended Mabuza in the face of corruption allegations agree with his own assessment, admittedly biased, that as a government and ruling party, they "endeavoured to keep our administration clean and lean, to practice frugality with public money, to channel what little development funding we had into

[53] Mobilisation and its contribution to the Mass Democratic Movement which it firmly believed it was a part. A further concern was to stave off Swaziland backed "reactionaries" in the aftermath of the failed incorporation of the Bantustan into Swaziland a few years earlier.
[54] 8 May 1990.

meeting the enormous needs of our displaced and often un- or underemployed people" (Mabuza, 1990:2).

While proclaiming that there were no skeletons in KaNgwane‟s cupboards, Mabuza also acknowledged that there were "problems, shortfalls, inadequacies, bureaucratic foot-dragging, idleness, misuse of government vehicles and property, even questionable „deals‟". He reiterated the general view of the authors cited here that corruption was a virus which plagued almost all bureaucracies in the country to a lesser or greater extent. He then takes a more reticent or modest approach and concludes that KaNgwane‟s record is "reasonable" but that they should not become complacent and strive for a corruption-free and honest administration (Mabuza, 1990:3).

In spite of the squeeze on KaNgwane‟s finances by Pretoria, Egero reports that the KaNgwane government received official assistance from the British government to help support the thousands of Mozambican refugees that lived in the Bantustan (1991:10). In late October – early November 1988, Mabuza travelled to the United Kingdom for consultations with the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Sir Godfrey Howe. He also held consultations with officials in the Overseas Development Agency (National Executive Report, 1989:8). The British Ambassador visited KaNgwane in October 1989 to officially open the Community Centre at Schoemansdal which was built with British assistance for refugees in the area (Mabuza, 1990:29).

Egero is sceptical about the exact nature of KaNgwane‟s dealings with the British and posits that Mabuza‟s political connections with Britain alluded to broader motives, at least on Britain‟s part. The Thatcher government was ambivalent or reluctant to speak ill of Pretoria or impose sanctions on it and yet Mabuza had these arrangements with it and claimed to be pro-the liberation struggle. Egero (1991:12-13) maintains that the British government‟s aid schemes to KaNgwane amounted to a virtual *de facto* recognition of Mabuza‟s government and was therefore tacit endorsement of Pretoria‟s separate development policy, a reality which made Mabuza‟s position a contradictory one.

The realignment of political power from the transition period created a thick enough smokescreen or confusion which led to a frantic scramble to plunder as much as possible just before the 1994 elections. Mabuza (as cited above in speeches to his cabinet or party) gives the impression of a self-sacrificing martyr full of his own importance or paragon of virtue

who had to be the reasonable one against all odds but the next section below shows a different, more self-serving side to him and members of his cabinet. It is reported that KaNgwane politicians and civil servants, like all the others, took advantage of the final measures instituted by the Bantustan parliament to buy their official vehicles at bargain prices. Beneficiaries of the scheme included the speaker of the new regional legislature, the MEC for Environmental Affairs, ANC member of parliament Professor Ripinga and Mrs Yvonne Phosa, wife of the new premier, Matthews Phosa. Further, the KaNgwane government divested itself of several publicly owned farms, selling them to political incumbents for prices equal to the transfer costs (Lodge, 1998:172-173).

7.9.2 Allegations of Corruption Levelled Against Mabuza

Money and power generally have a corrupting effect on most people and corruption is something that shadows every government (any organisation in fact) at some point, some more than others. One of the many legacies of the Bantustan civil services is the reputation for stealing food from the mouths of poor people because of the endemic corruption involved in trying to maintain lavish lifestyles within a sea of poverty. Service delivery was non-existence or very poor and there was no end to the backlogs in many of the departments. The Heath Special Investigations Unit (the Special Investigations Unit after Willem Heath‟s departure) investigated acts of corruption before 1994 and concluded that, as a system, apartheid was sustained by the endemic corruption (from 1652 to the rise of crony capitalism and beyond) within the dominant class political and economic classes (Van Vuuren, 2006:25). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission also dealt with the issue of institutionalised corruption in South African politics and business in its hearings. Where any of the Bantustan elites innocent or where they all complicit in one way or the other? Was what was discovered and exposed just the tip of the iceberg?

The Bantustan policy was hated not just for its racially divisive purpose but also for the obvious class differentiation that it created within the African population. Greed and violence were the hallmark of most Bantustan leaders. The Bantustans were in serious debt by 1994 but their debt was incorporated after 1994 when they were reintegrated into SA. Several authors have commented on the large-scale and systematic corruption, extortion and self enrichment which went on in the Bantustans by those in government, the bureaucracies and different hierarchies of the ruling political parties. Abject poverty co-existed with the opulence of the ruling elites, especially in the „independent‟ Bantustans. Patronage was used

to gain and maintain the political support of the petty bourgeoisie who were dependent on and supportive of the Bantustan authorities. It was also used to maintain influence over local administrative control which was usually in the hands of traditional tribal or community authorities (Keenan, 1987:123-124).

Dishonest practices resulted in patronage and favouritism, fictitious tenders and awards of contracts to relatives/nepotism „under-the-counter" fees for advice, referrals and appointments, the misappropriation of pensions and disability grants, filing false expense claims, overpayments to suppliers, unsanctioned or unscheduled use of public resources for private ends and unexplained or imprudent pay rises. In the independent Bantustans in particular, political office was the main route to personal wealth and officials used public funds to pay for holidays for their families. The situation was somewhat different though not necessarily better for the six self-governing territories whose purse strings were directly controlled by Pretoria (van Vuuren, 2006:78). To add to this picture of endless plunder, audit records are sketchy or non-existent (for the central government and the two categories of Bantustans which existed) which makes the tracing of all the financial impropriety, irregularities and lack of transparency difficult to quantify such that the full extent of corruption in the Bantustans might never be known (Bank, 1994; Holden and Mathabatha, 2007; Lodge, 1998, Van Vuuren, 2006). Further, those implicated will not be prosecuted, notwithstanding the pseudo-clean slate they got with the transition, reintegration and reconciliation (concerted nation-building).

Mabuza"s FarmControversy

Mabuza comes across as either a self-righteous/sanctimonious individual or a highly principled public officer opposed to any kind of self-aggrandisement, misappropriation of funds, financial malpractice, embezzlement and nepotism but the farm scandal exposed the double standard or the fact that he was not above reproach (Mabuza, 1989). Lodge reports that in the final years of Bantustan administrations mass corruption was motivated by the realisation among officials that their powers and privileges were soon coming to an end or would be severely curtailed (Lodge, 1998:169).This observation rings true for what is believed to have happened in KaNgwane in the early 1990s. Justin Arenstein is the bureau chief and founding editor for African Eye News Service in Nelspruit. Mpumalanga. It is an independent news agency with a reputation for investigative journalism with particular focus on social justice, rural development and anti-corruption issues especially in government.

Arenstein is also chair of the Association of Independent Publishers (AIP) in South Africa and winner of several awards including the 1997 South African Award for Courageous Journalism which is sponsored by the Ruth First Memorial Trust and administered by the Rhodes University‟s Department of Journalism and Media Studies (*Rhodes Journalism Review* No. 15, November 1997:20).

Mabuza was investigated for a 19 hectare farm in Louisville which he bought for R6 000 from the Mpumalanga Provincial government in 1991 under allegedly irregular conditions. Three other farms were sold to former KaNgwane politicians who were serving politicians. These were the then ambassador to Mozambique, Mangisi Zitha (Mabuza‟s successor as Chief Minister of KaNgwane), national parliamentarian Professor Simon Ripinga and member of the Mpumalanga House of Traditional Leaders Chief Tikhontele Dlamini. Zitha‟s 5.7 hectare farm in the former KaNgwane Bantustan included two houses ad was bought for R5 795. It is alleged that Mabuza mortgaged his farm for almost R500 000 two years later. Then State President Nelson Mandela ordered Judge Willem Heath to investigate the sale of the farms concurrently with Mpumalanga‟s Department of Local Government following queries by the Auditor-General. The report which was compiled by the Auditor-General was handed out to the Mpumalanga government‟s Standing Select Committee on Public Accounts during a session which Arenstein attended. According to the Auditor-General, the sale of the farms violated existing tender board regulations and the land should have been put on public auction. In his audit report, the Auditor-General noted that no attempt had been made to verify the market value of the farms and that the politicians involved were only charged the legal transfer costs of the farms (Arenstein, 1997; Arenstein, 1996; Lodge, 1998:172-173; Rantao, 1996; *The Citizen*, 1996). Former Mpumalanga Premier Matthews Phosa and *De Laevelder* (a Mpumalanga newspaper) took issue with Arenstein‟s accusations of corruption in the 1990s and this resulted in two separate defamation court cases. Arenstein was accused of racism and pursuing a sinister reactionary agenda in some of his work and targeting the alleged corruption of blacks while ignoring whites who were guilty of similar offences. Whether or not the farms worth hundreds of thousands of Rand were „gifts‟ with a nominal fee attached exchanged between the outgoing and incoming governments; the issues seem to have quietly disappeared in some form of cover up.

7.10 Preparing for the Transition: Can A Leopard Change Its Spots?

The people who worked closely with Mabuza who did not belong to Inyandza included Professor Francis Antonie who was Enos Mabuza‟s political advisor and consultant for four years of his tenure as KaNgwane‟s Chief Minister. Beverly Johnson was his personal assistant at the Johannesburg office and Ms Rosemary Smuts[55] who worked with Enos Mabuza in the KaNgwane government and was later the Social Secretary to the British High Commissioner in Cape Town and Pretoria for almost nine years, which might also explain why the British government was willing to make financial contributions for the welfare of Mozambican refugees in KaNgwane (Ms Rosemary Smuts, email communication March 2009). Professor Antonie has lectured in political science at the universities of the Witwatersrand and Natal and he was also a council member of the South African Institute of Race Relations[56] (SAIRR) in 2000. Professor Antonie is a senior economist and policy analyst at the Standard Bank with Dr. Conrad Strauss who was also a colleague of Mabuza‟s. Professor Antonie tried to initiate a trust in Mabuza‟s name after his death in order to collect and preserve all his documents. He has defended Mabuza‟s integrity throughout and in particular over the farm scandal discussed below (Ms Rosemary Smuts, email communication March 2009). Notwithstanding such protestations, however, Van Vuuren (2006:79-80) reports that the Mpumalanga Provincial government inherited a debt of over R118 million (about R260 million in 2005 figures) from KaNgwane in 1994 because Enos Mabuza‟s government had gone on a multi-million Rand spending spree which was badly accounted to the extent that the Auditor-General could not complete reports for the financial years 1992–1993 and 1993–1994. However, without meaning to shift the blame, for most of the unaccounted period, Mabuza had handed over power (April 1991) to his successor, Mangisi Zitha.

The post-1994 governments have been rocked by corruption scandals of all manner and magnitude. Southall (2004) discusses the prospect and characteristics of black capitalism in post 1994 South Africa and cautions against the old evils such as irregular loans and undue influence on decisions regarding tenders and other favours. Lodge refers to the ruling ANC‟s “apparently indulgent attitude to corruption within its own ranks” (1998:185). It is alleged that in 1994 the ANC accepted a secret R500 000 campaign donation from Sol Kerzner, the

[55] She is co-founder, director and fundraiser for the Caring Network South Africa which operates in greater Cape Town since 2001.
[56] The institute stands for human rights, constitutional and economic liberalism and is known for its publications and consultancy work.

hotel and casino chain proprietor who faced bribery charges - which he denied (Lodge, 1998:184).

Corruption was and remains a big problem but the corruption of former Bantustan elites was not an isolated experience born by their association with the apartheid state. Their corruption was no better or worse than that which is happening today in high public office and in senior levels of management in the public sector. In 1991, Nelson Mandela publicly forgave Nelson Ramodike, leader the Lebowa Bantustan or his "past mistakes", including documented corruption, at a Soweto Uprising commemoration (Lodge, 1998: 185). By extension, all the other Bantustan leaders were forgiven for whatever mistakes they had made in the past (reconciliation) because the ANC was keen to attract allies before the 1994 election (expediency). As KaNgwane‟s leader for just over a decade, Enos Mabuza was clearly implicated in the corruption that took place in his Bantustan even though nothing was ever pinned on him by way of legal action. Could this have been because he had friends in high places to protect him as is typically the case with offenders who seem to escape the net all the time? Mabuza had worked closely with Mpumalanga‟s first Premier, Mathews Phosa who is believed to have pulled strings to shut down the probes into the farm controversy involving Mabuza and other former KaNgwane leaders. Only one post-1994 commission of enquiry, the Skweyiya Commission, focussed on corruption in a former Bantustan - the abuse of power in Bophuthatswana and not that of other Bantustans.

The ANC is no stranger to seemingly corrupt ventures and other controversies according to Randall (1996:672). He uses Thebe Investments as one instance in which influential black South Africans misused their political influence by manipulating the image of the ANC as a conduit for business purposes (a means to an end) and succeeded in creating a high media profile. Thebe was one of the first black-owned and black-run companies in South Africa which was set up to foster, promote or empower black businesses. As the country moved into the transition period, the ANC needed alternative sources of funding as it changed from a liberation movement to a political party and this metamorphosis was accompanied by a Drying up of international assistance which it had received while in exile. Vusi Khanyile was head of finance in the ANC from 1990 until he founded the Thebe Investment Corporation in July 1992 – and investment arm of the ANC in which the ANC would have a majority share holding. Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Tokyo Sexwale, amongst other ANC notables, were invited to sit on the Batho-Batho Trust which was set up to oversee Thebe Investments

and some of its business contracts were, according to Randall (1996:672), obtained through the use of blackmail/political leverage and promises of favourable consideration once the ANC became the government in power. By the end of 1992, Thebe had handled a portfolio of 30 projects across various sectors including telecommunications, financial services, transportation, property, distribution and travel.

At its inception, Thebe was chaired by non-executive ANC-aligned Enos Mabuza and included Tokyo Sexwale and Mr T T Nkobi on its board of directors (Southall, 2004:317) but it soon ran into problems with the way it was conducting business and eventually started putting some distance between itself and the ANC in order to stand or appear to stand as an independent body (Randall, 1996:681). Despite Thebe"s initial controversies, however, the inclusion of Mabuza in Thebe, and many other ANC-linked businesses (see business chapter – Kagiso Trust, New Africa Investments Limited), was a vote of confidence in his abilities and principles regardless of the allegations of corruption that surfaced in the press. These organisations did not owe Mabuza anything, especially if he was as traitorous and incompetent as Bantustan leaders were generally believed to be. He proved to be an astute and competent businessman, in spite of his questionable political past and they were able to accept him as a comrade and see beyond past blemishes. They had a use for him; and he for them so their partnerships were ultimately for mutual benefit, with profit or viability being the bottom line. They trusted him and it does not appear like he disappointed them since he followed a script which was ready-made when he got on board. Their common purpose was black economic empowerment as the next logical step after political freedoms and transformation was achieved. As chairman of Thebe, Mabuza made the following statement regarding Thebe"s role and vision: "It is our duty to be a business role model and pioneer new routes … to stimulate broader business cooperation between people from the disadvantaged communities and those who have the expertise and resources."[57]

In politics generally (business too), an apparent selflessness (service, duty, sacrifice) is put in the foreground but self-interest and self-serving behaviour (the potential to abuse power/authority) does not die out completely as has been shown with the general character of black business elites post 1994 (Lodge, 1998:183). Someone will always have their hand in the cookie jar (hand-greasing/bribes, kick-backs, „gifts" and cronyism) but the consequences, or lack thereof, depend on who catches them. Corruption was extensive in the apartheid

[57] (http://thebeemployeebenefits.co.za/TEB/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=23)

regime, both in central government and in Bantustan administrations where local chiefs and other Bantustan functionaries thrived on various rent-seeking behaviours. Corruption in the Bantustans snowballed out of control because „power" and financial resources were vested in reactionary local leaderships that were prepared to accept Pretoria"s patronage to build Bantustan apparatuses - police, army and administration/bureaucracy. This can be traced back to the initial corruption of the institution of traditional leaders/chiefs in the planning stages of the apartheid and Bantustan system/separate development.

Mabuza"s „winning hearts and minds" approach to his politics is evident in his speeches and addresses to the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly or the Inyandza National Movement but trying to be all things to all people also has the potential for damaging corruption scandals as Phillips and Coleman (1989:6) caution. The scourge of corruption in whatever form is no trifling matter but its pervasiveness helps to show the interconnections between various forms of capital (*habitus*) identified by Bourdieu (see theory chapter) as well as the networks that can be woven through individual or group agency to form new structures and power dynamics. A different set of circumstances (*field*) – parameters, goals and means help to channel individuals in certain directions (Bourdieu, Accardo *et al* 1999; Bourdieu, 1998; Bourdieu, 1977). The introduction of the Bantustan system presented an opportunity for such a realignment or adaptation and different Bantustan elites rationalised their participation in it in different ways, some more convincing than others. Similarly, the political transition in the 1990s, always with new class dimensions and inequalities (differentiation) brought with it different forms of corruption although continuities are also evident.

Scandal is nothing new to politics, the ruling ANC in South Africa and even its governing National Executive Committee (NEC) according to an article by the *Mail & Guardian"s* Adriaan Basson (2008) entitled "ANC Rogues" Gallery". The article was compiled after the ANC"s December 2007 Polokwane Conference and the election of 80 individuals to the NEC. Among these were individuals[58] that have had run-ins with the law for crimes ranging from fraud, theft, corruption, nepotism, departmental investigations, irregular tenders, racketeering, money laundering, drunk driving, dodgy drivers" licences, contempt of court,

[58] Tony Yengeni, Jacob Zuma, Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, Bathabile Dlamini, Enoch Godongwana, Ruth Bhengu, Jackson Mthembu, Ndleleni Duma, Blade Nzimande, Ngoako Ramatlhodi, Billy Masetlha, Nyami Booi, Thaba Mufamadi, Playfair Morule, Jessie Duarte, Angie Motshekga, Sibongile Manana, Baleka Mbete, Malusi Gigaba, Siphiwe Nyanda, Ncumisa Kondlo, Mathole Motshekga, David Mabuza, Joyce Mashamba, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele, Ayanda Dlodlo and Sicelo Shiceka.

kidnapping to culpable homicide. Many of these people were investigated, cleared by the courts or commissions of inquiry, convicted or remain under a cloud of suspicion because of unanswered questions concerning their dealings. However, many of them have never been formally charged and have been internally disciplined, moved or have resigned from the posts they held when the scandals broke. This situation shows that no organisation, or individual, even the revered ones are immune to corruption and questionable dealings. It was not something that was unique to the Bantustans and their functionaries although it was deeply rooted.

There was much talk about reforms in South Africa from the mid 1980s onwards – political, social and economic reforms by people from all political persuasions. The writing was on the wall for the apartheid regime and its repression was proving untenable, especially with the introduction of sanctions and increasing international condemnation. Radicals, conservatives and moderates alike wanted to be part of this restructuring or realignment. For better or worse, they wanted to be part of the process and to have history look on them favourably. Alliances were forged as a means to access political and other forms of power no matter what the outcome of the conflict or realignment turned out to be. The black middle class is one group which positioned itself in the middle to avoid becoming outsiders and in that process it tried to ensure that there was a buffer from the political storms that were being waged beyond its control (Glaser, 1987:383-392). It is within this context that Mabuza and the Inyandza National Movement‟s actions are examined. Black Consciousness philosophy was not regarded as being incompatible with that of the ANC or the PAC even though they were different (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:590). The similarities in purpose or intention are spelt out in the extract below:

> Even within the Black Consciousness organisation there was a general understanding that our role … is to keep the home fires burning, because we understood that those liberation organisations that were banned were going to eventually come back one day. And we saw our role as continuing on where they left off and preparing the ground for their eventual return into the country. So, within the Black Consciousness organisation there was general acceptance that you could belong to either of the liberation organisations: it was a matter of your individual choice (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:591).

The same argument was made time and again by Enos Mabuza and the Inyandza National Movement and they tried to live this thinking out in their day to day affairs. Mabuza‟s speech was not intended to be a comfortable solidarity note-comparing session. He referred to it as a process of "self-flagellation, for having failed to participate in our people‟s longed-for liberation more effectively than we have done…" It was designed to draw attention to the pertinent issues of the day and Mabuza sent out the warning that:

> "Those who believe that they can isolate themselves from this process and seek immunity from dirtying their hands and entering the fray at this stage in the proceedings, reliant on the conviction that they can come in at the end and find themselves a place, are deluding themselves most fearfully. The train is about to leave the station for a new South Africa, and even if all the tracks are not yet in place along the line, we in the Inyandza National Movement are ensuring that we secure our ticket to the future and earn our place on board, as a non-racial, democratic political party which ascribes to freedom of association on a non-racial and non-ethnic basis" (Mabuza, address at Phutaditjhaba, QwaQwa 2 December 1989).

Enos Mabuza was invited to address the annual conference of QwaQwa‟s ruling Dikwankwetla party and used the opportunity to preach the message that a single unified South Africa was in the best interests of all. This could not have been a very popular view amongst Bantustan elites but he made the point regardless. The cold war which was premised on democracy versus communism was coming to an end and so was apartheid rule in South Africa. There was a political reconfiguration happening locally and abroad and Mabuza advised the other Bantustan leaders to take heed of this and act accordingly and avoid trying to forge another confrontationist balance of power. His belief, and rightly so, was that there was no more room for hardline totalitarian regimes because the masses had defied their ruthlessness and illegitimacy in other countries, thus setting the stage for South Africa‟s own transition to democratic rule. In September 1989, the Conservative Party failed to win the 60 seats it had expected to win and the Democratic Party won more seats than it had dared predict and political prisoners had begun to be released. Mabuza began his address by saying „We live in stirring times" and proceeded to reflect on where Bantustan leaders had come from (created as the cornerstones of Grand Apartheid) and the litany of apartheid discriminatory laws, forced removals and underdevelopment in the Bantustans in abandoned

rural areas. He deplored the division of blacks along ethnic lines and the fact that they often found themselves at odds with each other. He did not sugar-coat the realities of apartheid or Bantustan leaders‟ role in this oppressive system. He admitted that the Bantustan system was "a perpetuation of the old divide and rule policy of British colonialism" which had "served its purpose all too well." He described Bantustans as unwitting bed-fellows to the policy of divide and rule saying that they allowed themselves to be "used, abused and discarded." The crux of his address was a consideration of where Bantustan leaders were and where they were heading (Mabuza, address at Phutaditjhaba, QwaQwa 2 December 1989).

Instead of distinguishing himself or KaNgwane as a special case, separate or different from the other Bantustans, Mabuza saw all Bantustan leaders including himself, as having collective responsibility for the shame of the Bantustan system. He stated that "Our apparent acquiescence to and, at times, all too ready absorption into the poor-relation system of self-governing territories, has given the white minority government the „justifiable‟ excuse to exclude blacks from participating in the central legislature."

He referred to how Bantustan elites had fallen "for the trappings of power" such as "grandiose government buildings, extravagant vehicles, and the pseudo-privilege of our office." He added that "we have been willing if unwitting puppets, ready to dance to the master‟s tune. In the process we have left many of our people behind, the poor, the undeveloped, those without opportunity, those without hope to attain even the most basic and simple standard of living." In a bold, candid, remorseful and self-critical and chastising mood, Mabuza distinguished between the leaders of the independent Bantustans and those of the six self-governing ones, the latter being regarded as a lesser evil because the former‟s complicity with apartheid seemed so final and complete. He sounded like a man who had had an epiphany of some sort - urging a change for the better, towards unity, peace and development for all. He strongly advised that Bantustan leaders reinvent or redefine themselves so that they did not land "on the rubbish heap of history in the new South Africa, along with the many politicians who have collaborated with their oppressor in the short term." He accepted the failures of Bantustan administrations - corruption and incompetence and acknowledged the very circumscribed role that they could play in a democratic South Africa. He was realistic about the consequences of their [Bantustan leaders] actions when the power balance shifted; a consequence and position which traditional leaders also had to accept when all the structures were reintegrated into the new South Africa. He stated that

Bantustan leaders had a choice to make; they could either hold on to the old and go down with the sinking ship or they could seriously consider where they would fit in and what role they could play „to bring to its resolution, our people‟s long, bitter and costly struggle for justice and liberty in the land of their birth" (Mabuza, address at Phutaditjhaba, QwaQwa 2 December 1989).

In typical political rhetoric, Mabuza put forward the questions:

> Where are we today, if not in disarray? What role have the „Bantustans‟ played to achieve not only the upliftment and socioeconomic development of the people under our care, but the emancipation of our people as a whole? Do we have a political track record to be proud of? Have we cooperated and worked together, sharing the few skills and resources we may have for the common good? What happened to black unity? It would seem that Dr. Verwoerd‟s vision has, in many instances, been realised. We are caught not only in the trap of race; but also of ethnicity. The divisions between black and white are appalling, and tragic. But what of the divisions and distance between black and black? Is Dr. Mopeli, your leader, really my brother, or is that no more than a cliché we have come to use carelessly through habit? In what way have the different tribes, and geographically demarcated ethnic groups of South Africa attempted to bridge these artificially maintained and fostered barriers? Are we going to be politically categorised forever as Southern Sotho, Swazis, Zulus and Xhosas?...Will we be able to defend ourselves convincingly? (Mabuza, address at Phutaditjhaba, QwaQwa 2 December 1989).

There are several ways to interpret Mabuza‟s speech - simple posturing or an opportunist‟s way out of a sticky situation - a way to redeem himself, sanitise what he had done and possibly present a way for the other Bantustan leaders to try and do the same out of a selfish, self-serving fear of being condemned by history and the people. There is almost a sense of desperation which conjures the image of rats scurrying off a sinking ship. He concluded his speech by noting that "given our experience as leaders of our own people and in administration, we have a modest role to play in the future, if we can show that we are genuine representatives of a constituency."

Throughout his address, Mabuza refers to „us", „we" and „our" not to refer to Swazis or Bantustan elites or blacks but to all South Africans. He uses collective to indicate that this was not only a personal or class issue for him but an attitude that everyone needed to adopt on an issue which required serious and concerted effort. He added that Inyandza believed "that at this critical juncture in the history of our struggle, one has to take the plunge and jump in at the deep end with all the others - and swim for the winning line. We will get left behind if we do not take this plunge." The country was entering unchartered territory of negotiation, dialogue and peaceful solutions to the constitutional and power-sharing impasse but it was not clear who was to participate in the negotiations and whether or not Bantustan elites qualified to participate given their history. Perhaps he was preaching to an already converted opportunistic audience. Mabuza suggested that all the Bantustan leaders, individually or together, meet or make contact with the leaders of these movements in line with calls by recently released ANC leaders for those serving in government-created structures to join the struggle. Mabuza saw the role of Bantustan leaders in the transition as a consultative one where they would not initiate, dominate or set the agenda for any proceedings because they were not really in a position of power and were not, strictly speaking, legitimate representatives of the people (Mabuza, address at Phutaditjhaba, QwaQwa 2 December 1989).

The liberation movement in South Africa was not a monolith and although white South Africans were privileged over the other groups, white political formations emerged which were sympathetic to the black man"s struggle. These included, among others, the African Resistance Movement (ARM), the Congress of Democrats, the white women"s group Black Sash and the Progressive Party (with Helen Suzman) which was renamed the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) after the 1977 merger with former United Party members of parliament. Their rise and contributions to the struggle, no matter how modest, were considered positive developments in the country"s struggle history because of the imperative for unity and joint or concerted action which became apparent as the struggle dragged on (Frederikse, 1990).

The period 1977-1987 is referred to as the reform era in South Africa"s apartheid history. The apartheid regime and white big businesses painted a positive picture of the reforms which were by all accounts shallow and led to more conflict and contradiction but it also led to different alliances and cooperation involving a wide range of groups. The Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa (IDASA), for example, was formed in early 1986 by

Progressive Federal Party (PFP) members Frederick van Zyl Slabbert[59] and Alex Boraine who responded to the UDF‟s call for whites to pull out of the sterile environment of parliament. Boraine went on to become the vice-chairperson of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Mabuza referred to Frederick van Zyl Slabbert as "one of the most prominent redeemed Afrikaners" in his briefing at the first ordinary session of the fourth KaNgwane legislative assembly in May 1989 following his trip to the Soviet Union with the IDASA delegation in April 1989 (Mabuza, 1989a:5).

Mabuza travelled to the Soviet Union with Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, his wife Jane and Prof of Philosophy Johan Degenaar from Stellenbosch University on the invitation of the Afro Asian Solidarity Committee. The IDASA delegation held meetings and discussions with South African students that were studying in Moscow, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Institute of the World Socialist System, professors and students at Leningrad University, the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University and the Africa Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Mabuza notes that at the press conferences he was repeatedly asked how he justified his position as homeland leader and a politician within the tribal and regional authorities to which he said "...involvement affords us the opportunity to politicise them, educate them politically and then absorb them into the political mainstream of our own movement. In KaNgwane we have succeeded in doing just that" (Mabuza, 1989:7).

Mabuza was asked where he had been before 1986 when he led a delegation to meet with the ANC in Zambia to which he commented that political activity was not as visible before 1986 so general members of the public did not know what was going on politically in KaNgwane, except for the Swaziland land deal but this changed with the institution of the tri-cameral parliament (Mabuza, 1989:8-9). Further, he was asked about the relationship between his Inyandza National Movement and Chief Buthelezi‟s Inkatha to which he responded, "The Inyandza National Movement accommodates and cooperates with all political organisations which are committed to a democratic and non-racial society in this country" (Mabuza, 1989:7). When asked about the future of the homelands, Mabuza stated that he believed that they would be stripped of their geo-political status and would eventually disappear because they had been rejected by the people. Mabuza was also asked how he reconciled his dual political role within and outside government-created structures (Mabuza, 1989:7).

[59] On 7 February 1986 Frederick van Zly Slabbert resigned as leader of the Progressive Federal Party, rejecting the white political structure.

IDASA went on to send several delegations to meet with the ANC in exile in Zambia and Senegal (Frederikse, 1990:223 & 225). At the same time, much went on in the Bantustans which was publicly unnoticed and unrecorded (Keenan, 1987:117). Mabuza was interviewed with the *Financial Mail* (1989:54) shortly after he returned from an IDASA trip to the former Soviet Union in 1989 where they had been invited by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and representatives of the Africa Institute in Moscow and had met with among others, two top members of the Central Committee – Dr Andrei Urnov and Dr Vladimir Shubin, South African students at the Patrice Lumumba University and ANC representative in the USSR, Simon Makana. This was during the States of emergency, restrictions on extra-parliamentary organisations spawned by the tri-cameral parliament, the impending retirement of P W Botha and the ascendency of F W de Klerk. The Soviet Union had suspended diplomatic ties with the South African government which was set on reaching a settlement on its own terms, for example, making the release of Mandela conditional upon the release of an SADF prisoner in Angola, the release of a Soviet dissident or the renunciation of violence by the liberation movements. Part of the mission was to assess the Soviet Union‟s attitude towards South Africa and the ANC as well as the liberation movement in general. They discussed the way forward and Soviet preference was for a political solution to South Africa‟s political impasse as opposed to armed struggle. The Soviet Union was not putting pressure on or prescribing any particular course of action to the ANC (Mabuza, 1989a:5-6).

The Five Freedoms Forum (FFF) was founded in late 1986 as a broad alliance comprised of twenty-five organisations ranging from human rights groups to religious, political, professional and student organisations. It was formed in response to a call from the black community for whites to respond to the State of Emergency. Individual activists such as David Webster were instrumental in the founding of the FFF and it gained prominence in the debate over white participation in the 1987 parliamentary elections and in 1989 it led probably the largest delegation of whites to meet with the ANC. The delegation represented the white power bloc comprised of business people, trade unionists, academics, activists, city councillors and students as well as politicians from the newest parliamentary grouping, the multi-racial Democratic Party which was formed in April 1989 as an amalgamation of the Progressive Federal Party, the National Democratic Movement formed in 1988 by breakaway PFP parliamentarian Wynand Malan[60] and the Independent Party led by a former ambassador to the United Kingdom, Dennis Worrall who had resigned from the National Party. This

[60] He later served on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

group met with approximately half of the ANC‟s National Executive Committee (NEC), including Oliver Tambo himself and was widely regarded as a precursor for future negotiations. The FFF‟s main objective was a campaign to heighten awareness of the five basic freedoms against which the policies of parties participating in the 1987 white elections could be measured - freedom from want, freedom of speech and association, freedom from fear, freedom of conscience and freedom from discrimination. Apart from striving for these five freedoms, the FFF opposed the Group Areas Act and committed itself to drawing whites into tangible anti-apartheid action such as defiance campaigns and supporting the Freedom Charter (Frederikse, 1990:223 & 225).

In addition to working with the ANC, UDF, MDM, IDASA, FFF and other „progressive‟ groups, the KaNgwane government consulted an organisation called Interlink Training Consultants in the mid-late 1980s in order to orient and position itself as a capable and willing change agent. The aim was to train or equip leaders to be change agents because meaningful change must be managed (initiated, directed). According to Interlink Training Consultants‟ Ronnie Matthews, their philosophy was that real change is found in the not so obvious places (unpredictable and unexpected) and sometimes all it takes is for someone to reframe the problem/s or issues and re-engage all stakeholders in a non-adversarial or constructive way. This applies to relations families, between trade unions and management, in business or politics. According to Vusi Nkosi of Interlink Training Consultants (1988), their business ran workshops in cross-cultural understanding and interaction. The training workshops were designed for a wide range of applications including use by individuals, groups, organisations and economic or political systems. At the interface level between supervisors and their subordinates in the workplace, these workshops were designed in response to increasing concerns by companies to enrich cross-cultural and intergroup relations among their employees so that they could discover and come to respect each other‟s personal values and views, thereby creating a foundation for future cooperation and understanding (team-building) within organisations. Companies including Volkswagen South Africa, Mobil, Tongaat Sugar, Johannesburg Hospital, Sentrachem and Eskom were coming to the realisation that creating a climate of openness and honesty was necessary to effectively manage conflict across ideological biases in the workplace and were taking advantage of Interlink‟s industry and commerce equity programmes. Interlink‟s programmes were not just focused on relations in the workplace but also at youth and community groups. Interlink‟s Equity Youth Course was primarily directed at Standard 7-10 and post-Matric

students in South Africa. Interlink Training Consultants‟ directors included P. J. van der Westhuizen, J. R. Matthews, B. M. Chalmers and J. A. Gon.

For any kind of movement or organisation to be successful, it must have founders, competent leaders and organisers, a name, slogans, goals/programmes such as change and the means to achieve it, a sizeable membership or constituency with specific problems or interests held in common (collective consciousness), resources and realistic expectations for it to be effective. Overlapping or competing social and political positions are part and parcel of any political undertaking and can easily lead to conflict and discord but Mabuza was magnanimous enough to put his ego aside for the greater good. Whilst it was not always clear if he was playing offence or defence, he was deemed decent enough an individual for these groups to engage and solicit support and ideas from. It was a leap of faith and Mabuza/Inyandza lobbied locally and internationally for change in South Africa, did fundraising work, delivered speeches that hit the right notes and granted interviews to the media (*Mayibuye*, *Financial Mail* etc). Mabuza was being accountable and pro-active in righting whatever wrongs he had done in the past. He tried to avoid entrenching hierarchical relations of domination, subordination, exploitation or paternalism as if the people were incapable of making their own decisions or responsible behaviour. Mabuza‟s administration in KaNgwane passed several laws which were considered to be progressive for their time given what was going on in the other Bantustans and the country generally.

1986 - KaNgwane: Labour Relations Repeal Act No. 6 (Commenced: 25 June 1987)
1988 - KaNgwane: Police Act No. 4 (Commenced: 27 January 1989)
1988 - KaNgwane: Local Authorities Act No. 9 (Commenced: 17 March 1989)
1989 - KaNgwane: Public Service Act No. 5 (Commenced: 16 March 1990)

The Freedom Charter is a document which was designed for intense politicisation or propaganda and the word „people‟ is fused into its inclusive spirit (The people shall govern; land to the people). According to Steve Tshwete (cited in Frederikse, 1990:160), the word „people‟ was used in this document to refer to all classes and social groups irrespective of race, colour or creed as long as they rallied around the banner of the ANC for a non-racial, united and democratic South Africa. The Mass Democratic Movement and the United Democratic Front were largely urban-based broad fronts comprised of civic organisations, workers, students, youth organisations and women‟s organisations but they did not preclude someone like Mabuza from joining the cause in whatever way they could. The main aim of

the UDF as stated in its journal *Isizwe* in September 1987 was to deprive the enemy (the apartheid state) of every support base and potential ally and in the process, render some of the regime‟s natural allies wavering and untrustworthy (the UDF cited in Frederikse, 1990:181). Enos Mabuza tried to demonstrate his commitment to fighting a common enemy by participating in the appropriate political campaigns without leveraging his/Inyandza‟s own interests or demands and doing what was within his power, circumscribed as it was, to make the lives of KaNgwane residents more better unlike what like Buthelezi and other Bantustan leaders chose to do. Mabuza followed these debates and resolutions and heeded calls such as these and in the end he chose to be counted on the side of the people and the struggle.

Mabuza on the International Stage: Validation or Networking?

Mabuza and his Inyandza National Movement (INM), like many others, participated in the struggle on the international stage, according to him, in support of the ANC‟s efforts (same goals), rather than trying to supplant it. Mabuza earned himself and the Inyandza National Movement some credibility within the liberation movement inside and outside South Africa. He gained the respect of some local and international leaders and networked with them to share views and ideas on the prognosis of political developments in South Africa, thereby informing himself about the realities and different perceptions about South Africa‟s situation in South Africa and the rest of the world. The proposed incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland in mid 1982 presented an opportunity for him to lobby support from foreign governments so that they in turn could put pressure on the South African government. He travelled to countries like Germany, Canada, America and Britain to highlight the unfairness of the land deal and this may have contributed to its abortion (Sandile Mabuza, Interview 5 June 2007). Mabuza was a member of the Jubilee Trust which was planning the future of a democratic South Africa within the international context. In that capacity, Mabuza attended and addressed numerous conferences and held consultations with different groups including the ANC (Oliver Tambo, Ismail Omar, Matthews Phosa) in exile in 1986 (3-day trip end Feb/beginning of March). One of the interviewees, Mr M. S. Ginindza was part of this delegation and says that the decision to have this meeting and let it become public knowledge was taken at the INM‟s annual congress in 1985. There were security concerns about the implications of this and whether the Inyandza delegation would return to South Africa alive or not or whether they would be arrested at the airport upon their return. Fortunately for all concerned, nothing untoward happened (Mr. M. S. Ginindza - 7 June 2007).

Other examples of the people that Mabuza was involved with include Desmond Tutu, Beyers Naude, Allan Boesak, Walter Sisulu and Mkhuseli Jack of the Conference for a Democratic Future (CDF) which was launched in 1989 and whose conference Mabuza attended in the United Kingdom in the same year. Another organisation that Mabuza was involved with is the Newick Park Initiative which was established in 1986 to help promote peace in South Africa (1987-1991) and later in Rwanda. Others who took part in the Newick Park Initiative (South African focus) included Professor Washington Okumu, Nathaniel Masemola, Mr. Tito T. Mboweni and Dr. Zola Skweyiya. The Newick Park Initiative was originally an initiative to promote credible strategies on constructive social engagement and to search for answers to the problems that societies in transition were faced with. This was a peace-building consultative process or platform which allowed people of different faiths (or no faith) to work towards a common political objective (consensus) during the 1980s States of Emergency in South Africa under President P W Botha at a time when hostilities were at their worst and there was almost no contact between the ANC and the South African government. Judeo-Christian teachings and values such as justice and stewardship and insights into social, political and economic life according to a biblical social model (love, law - Matthew 22:34-40) were the foundation used to offer different social models or paradigms to address the issues discussed. A total of 10 conferences on the South African situation were held over a four-year period. The Newick Initiative has since been renamed the Relationships Foundation International and now Concordis International Trust.

Yet another organisation that he was involved with is the Ditchely Foundation which was established in 1958 to advance international learning and to bring approximately 40 experts from different professions to discuss/brainstorm pertinent international policy issues and concerns at semi-formal conferences. Mabuza attended the Foundation‟s December 1985 conference which was themed: "Change in Southern Africa: How Substantial Is It, Where Is It Leading and Where Should It Lead?"

The foundations of such organisations on their own, however, do not exonerate any wrong doing on Mabuza or anyone else‟s part. The purpose of such organisations and meetings or networking was to consider the alternatives, their chances of success and the means to achieve them but such „noble intentions can easily be abused by unscrupulous individuals, rendering them ineffective. However, according to people interviewed (Elias Ginindza - 8 June 2007; Esther Mabuza - 6 June 2007; Sandile Mabuza - 5 June 2007), Mabuza

disseminated the insights and information that he gathered from these platforms to South Africans (Inyandza, KaNgwane and South Africans generally - who were open to them) as a way of preparing them for democracy and the rebuilding (focus, capacity) that needed follow the end of apartheid - not for personal gain.

What then is the difference between Buthelezi and Mabuza (since they were both Bantustan leaders) or between him and the white business people that also met with the ANC on several occasions? These groups; together or individually had agendas to put forward; declared or not. Buthelezi makes this point when he comments that the international community that entered the fray, voluntarily or by compulsion, necessarily took positions/sides on the South African question because they were individually or collectively pursuing specific agendas instead of doing it to be helpful or constructive for the sake of ordinary South Africans. Cold War politics, for instance, was a big factor during this time. Mabuza once led an Inyandza delegation to meet with then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who was known for being conservative and opposed to armed struggle in South Africa as well as the imposition of sanctions to force the hand of the South African government[61]. Despite this, however, Mabuza was able to make an impression on Mrs Thatcher and she gradually became guardedly sympathetic to the South African cause (Sandile Mabuza, Interview 5 June 2007).

South Africa's Struggle and the Global Dimension

Anti-racism, anti-privatisation movements, anti-xenophobia, green and solidarity movements such as the global justice movement lobby institutions such as the World Economic Forum, the World Trade Organisation, G8, the IMF, the World Bank regarding their global policies through independent platforms and/or alternative public spheres which demand a lot of well-meaning volunteers. The World Social Forum, for instance, has been meeting since 2001 as a gathering of representatives from various global civil society groups (Thorn, 2007:910-911).

South Africa is not an island and contact with the outside world was inevitable as evidenced by the diverse groups which negotiated the country‟s fate during the struggle. The struggle against apartheid was fought on many fronts and travel abroad was an important conduit for information (Thorn, 2007:905-907). The use of alternative media forms with a global reach (addressing a global audience) was an important source of political influence (public opinion) as well as state governments, global corporations and supra-national political institutions. Such a strategy for the sharing of political experiences, identities, values and aspirations

[61] See Appendix 6 for more on Mabuza‟s activities abroad

across national borders led to more than 100 trans-nationally integrated (Britain, India, Australia, Sweden, Canada, OAU, UN, EEC, the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF) and international labour movements such as the International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), as well as globally significant social movements involving anti-colonial, workers‟, women‟s, solidarity, human rights, church/religious movements and youth organisations in countries on all continents supporting the anti-apartheid struggles from the 1950s to the mid 1990s. The different formal and informal networks of organisations and individuals engaged in information gathering and dissemination (collective action/solidarity with the oppressed and exploited black majority) both through private and public means (letters, briefings, memoranda, meetings or conferences) for a common cause (Thorn, 2007: 896-918). Many South Africans in exile became the public faces of the struggle abroad as a way of getting the message to the rest of the world, whilst also evading censorship, repression, laws and bannings which made political engagement difficult inside South Africa. This type of visibility on the international stage carried great risk to individuals because the apartheid regime could target them for elimination through different means such as parcel and letter bombs.

The ANC was the pre-eminent liberation movement but it also relied on allies who were not necessarily part of it to articulate the conflict/grievances against apartheid and aims to transform South Africa‟s social order. The ANC began to consciously engage in concerted media politics in the early 1970s when it established the Department of Information and Publicity in London (headed by Thabo Mbeki). The ANC‟s efforts were supported by the United Nations‟ Special Committee against Apartheid which financed short-wave anti-apartheid radio programmes (Radio Freedom) that reached people in different parts of the world, including South Africa. The ANC was also given airtime by radio stations in countries such as Tanzania Zambia and Ethiopia (Thorn, 2007: 896-918). Academics, journalists and activists were invited to conferences organised by various groups, for instance, the Commonwealth Secretariat (co-sponsored by the Association of British Editors, Harvard University and the African-America Institute) in London in 1988. A similar conference was held in Berlin in 1981 and another one in Lime in 1988 (Thorn, 2007:914-915). The efficacy of economic (disinvestment by some global corporations) and diplomatic sanctions (by the EEC, OAU and individual countries) against the apartheid regime, sports boycotts and other issues were debated and contributed to the eventual demise of apartheid (Thorn, 2007:913). Producing and distributing information through self-controlled channels which addressed

both national and global audiences was also a key way to get the message out through news bulletins (*AA News* in Britain or *Africabulletinen* in Sweden), magazines, films, performance art, street theatre, books, photographs, posters, leaflets, pamphlets, t-shirts, stickers, badges, cultural events such as drama and music concerts, for example, the *Amandla* and *Mayibuye* cultural groups which toured Western Europe, the Soviet Union and North America enacting dramas. Two „Free Mandela" concerts were held in 1988 and 1990 at the Wembley Stadium and they were broadcast globally by the BBC (Torn, 2007:909). All this, according to Thorn (2007:896-918), was a good thing but it can be argued that it practice was also hijacked by opportunists who were not necessarily fighting the same fight (Maré and Hamilton, 1987: 135-179).

Enos Mabuza and Oliver Tambo
Lusaka, March 1986

Figure 12: Enos Mabuza and Oliver Tambo circa 1990.

Galvanising support for the struggle was important for the struggle so the strategy, in itself, was not objectionable since it was an avenue for dialogue between and among different groups towards a solution to the worsening humanitarian crisis in South Africa but who decided who could represent or champion South Africa"s black aspirations to international audiences? Who initiated the meetings and what did they accomplish? Maré and Hamilton (1987: 135-179) argue that the apartheid regime"s divide and rule apartheid strategy to antagonise and undermine the struggle (black solidarity) was demonstrated on the global arena as functionaries in state-created structures such as the Bantustans also took to the

campaign trail for personal resource mobilisation and to gain visibility. When all this was happening KwaZulu‟s Buthelezi also took the power struggle abroad. Buthelezi travelled extensively abroad in attempts to influence reports and views, establish influential contacts with sympathisers[62]. He produced/wrote numerous materials designed specifically for journalists, including letters to newspaper or magazine editors. This was ostensibly done to highlight the plight and injustice suffered by South Africa‟s black majority but, often times, his actions did not reflect favourably on South Africans or the liberation movement (Buthelezi, 1986c:5). However, Buthelezi maintains that Inkatha was "truly democratic" because its leaders were appointed by the people and were held accountable to the people by Inkatha‟s constitution at annual meetings of ordinary members (1986c:4).

7.11 Conclusion

As Radcliffe (1994:7) has noted, individual identity or self-concept is layered and complex and Mabuza‟s career shows this clearly. Some of the roles he assumed appear incongruous and others overlap but they all existed in one person and adapted over time to match changing circumstances. Behaviour demanded on one level was often inconsistent with the behaviour that was expected on another. The political arena is a treacherous field with many variables and possible outcomes. Politics is a popularity contest, it is a game of winners and losers, selling ideas and maintaining the right alliances at the right time. Personality also goes some distance in maintaining the appeal of politicians, even when they do not always hit the right chords. Every leader exposes himself/herself to criticism such that even those that are celebrated are not without blemish. Leaders are often put a pedestal or others (circumstances) thrust them there but there is no guarantee that they will stay there. Popularity waxes and wanes and the fall from grace can be a non-event or it can be a spectacular public scandal. The political arena is synonymous with greed, competition, self-interest, rivalry and contempt, dishonesty. All the Bantustan leaders have defended, justified and rationalised their actions stating that they did not set out to exploit and manipulate the people‟s suffering for personal gain. However, there is no doubt that the majority of them actively took advantage of the opportunities for graft which were integral to the Bantustan system.

[62] US President Ronald Reagan, British Prime Minister Mrs Margaret Thatcher, Israel‟s Shimon Peres, West Germany‟s Helmet Kohl and France‟s Jacques Chirac.

Mabuza was essentially a trustee or custodian for his constituency since he entered the political arena through election by some Swazi chiefs because he was literate when the majority of them were not. It arrangement allowed the chiefs to gain an advantage which they would otherwise not have had, for example, in handling the land deal. Mabuza‟s position was one in which he was supposed to implement the unpopular policies of the apartheid regime but he modified it through his cooperation with leaders of the ANC and UDF. His position gave him access to resources and contacts that ordinary people did not have. He will never be a *bona fide* or „œconsecrated‟ struggle icon in the eyes of many because he occupied such a compromised position within apartheid administrative structures. However, Mabuza appears to have been more circumspect in his dealings with the South African authorities than other Bantustan leaders. Accepting the responsibility given to him by the Swazi chiefs may have been a misjudgement on his part but if one takes the KaNgwane government and the Inyandza National Movement‟s stated objectives to be an accurate reflection of his motives and intentions, his faults are not insurmountable.

Defending Mabuza seems like a misnomer but would KaNgwane have been the same place if a different leader was in charge? Would inaction have been a more moral, responsible, acceptable or honourable alternative? No one individual is inherently good or bad. It is a subjective judgement based on assumed or real motives and intentions and their consequences in relation to certain ideals. It is difficult to determine with any degree of certainty which of Mabuza‟s decisions, actions or utterances were genuine and which were not. The sentimentality of Mabuza‟s family is to be expected but he actually had some redeeming qualities. He dealt with conflicting interests and expectations, negative perceptions, suspicions and hostilities but was optimistic. The Swazi chiefs who elected him to Bantustan politics and the ANC which forged an alliance with him both took a risk with the hope that he would do what was mutually beneficial for them. He was authorised by the chiefs to articulate their hopes and aspirations. Although trust is a contract which carries many unspoken conditions, it was implicit in this arrangement that Mabuza would act on their behalf and do so in good faith. In making these associations, Mabuza risked the wrath of the apartheid state on himself, his family, his government and Inyandza.

With regards to the abortive land deal, Mabuza did not resort to violence to resolve the dispute. He pursued justice through the courts. In retrospect, opposing the land deal was a blessing for the thousands of South African Swazis who might never have experienced

democracy in South Africa had they been handed over to Swaziland in the early 1980s (Woodson, 1991:392). De Vos and Romanucci (1975:366) state that "ethnic identity can be a positive affirmation containing a negative potential for becoming a hysterical or paranoid defence" used to deny the humanness of others. The land deal was a divisive ploy by apartheid authorities who, as with the Bantustans, tried to appeal to ethnic identity to justify an underhanded manoeuvre (De Vos and Romanucci, 1975:366, 378-379; Kaarsholm, 1995:37). Mabuza"s appeal to a common South African citizenship was both instrumental and compensatory. He took a stand to expand the social frame of reference for the identity of the people of KaNgwane. He cannot be faulted for wanting their identity to be more than just Swazi but to be South African as well; for them to someday enjoy the benefits of citizenship which they had been denied for so long. The failure of the land deal moved him from relative obscurity into the spotlight and may have put the jewel in Mabuza"s political crown since it was debated on the international stage when Mabuza sought legal counsel on the issue. Mabuza"s successful opposition to the deal was ultimately a combination of local resistance, legal support from legal practitioners such as Professor John Dugard that prevented the state"s unlawful action in the Swazi land deal. This victory secured KaNgwane"s borders until 1994 when the Bantustans were reintegrated into South Africa (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259-260).

The failed land deal was not a simple issue of him relegating Swazi identity to a position of inferiority in favour of a South African identity but was Mabuza selfish, unpatriotic (un-Swazi) or irresponsible in refusing the land deal when, according to Kaarsholm (1995:42) people were losing "belief in the necessity for a single South Africa." The failure of the land deal strained relations among Swazis on either side of the Swaziland border and within KaNgwane. The situation created enemies for Mabuza and his Inyandza National Movement among those that had been promised positions in the leadership of the new territories once the incorporation was finalised. The Swazi Tribal Council was also upset and the media in Swaziland repeatedly attacked Mabuza as a prodigal son who had turned his back on his motherland. His detractors in Swaziland could not understand why he had „denied" them land which was rightfully theirs. The alternative would have been for him to comply with Pretoria and Swaziland"s wishes but South African Swazis were subjected to the same apartheid abuses as other African „groups" and their suffering would have been in vain if they accepted the deal (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:61-62). Mabuza"s resistance was an assertion that black South Africans, including Swazis, were entitled to rights and citizenship in South Africa.

Mabuza had professional and personal contact with white progressives such as Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, Frank Raimondo, Nadine Gordimer, Francis Antonie and Conrad Strauss. They all had their own agendas but they had enough common ground to sustain their contact over an extended period of time. Mabuza also had contact with many respected black politicians, businessmen and religious people at various stages in his career and their motives do not get scrutinised as being genuine or not. Mabuza‟s ability to amicably interact with all these personalities and form mutually beneficial bonds is a testament to his character. Mabuza enjoyed the acceptance of key figures in the ANC, PAC and UDF and it was some consolation for the scrutiny that his politics subjected him to. His name might always be a footnote in South Africa‟s struggle history but he was able to overcome the contradictions of his politics and reconcile with the groups that would hold the reins when apartheid ended. Unlike other Bantustan leaders that tried to maintain a strangle hold on power, Mabuza recognised and accepted from the outset that his position in politics was not permanent. As such, he tried wherever possible to have the confidence of key influential figures. It was a strategy that served him well as his transition from politics to business in the next chapter shows. He did not become *persona no grata* as one might expect. His cooperation and friendship, such as it was, was welcomed by those that he reached out to. Instead of being a puppet of the apartheid state, Mabuza showed initiative in a positive direction. According to Holden and Mathabatha (2007:259), Enos Mabuza saw his role as that of using the Bantustan structures and his relative influence to protect those under his control while also trying to urge the South African government to abolish the Bantustan system in order to create a unified and democratic South Africa.

To conclude, power is easily perverted by self-interest which in turn creates conflict (Held, 1991:50-51; Beetham, 1991:104). Berlin (cited in Held, 1991:49) makes the flowing comment about how conflict is inherent to society:

> "…an intrinsic, irremovable element of human life…we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate and claims equally absolute, the realisation of some of which inevitably involve the sacrifice of others. The ends of man are many and not all of them are in principle compatible with each other."

Social spaces are negotiated through legal and other means. Mabuza‟s government could have been replaced by the apartheid government or overthrown through a coup but this did

not happen. By and large, KaNgwane, as a constituency sanctioned Mabuza‟s by keeping him in office for over a decade. They would have devised ways to depose him if he was a monster. National symbols such as anthems and flags express people‟s ideologies, patriotism and loyalty to a particular identity and history (De Gruchy (1995:57, 67). When most of the ten Bantustans adopted their own flags and national anthems (tacit acceptance of the Bantustans being separate from South Africa), Mabuza‟s KaNgwane used the South African flag and anthem (Die Stem). This was a conscious decision and act of resistance or defiance of apartheid policies. It was a statement saying that KaNgwane was not content to be shut-off from the rest of South Africa. KaNgwane belonged in South Africa and having its own flag would have signified a claim to its own sovereignty, which was not Mabuza‟s wish. Several elections were held in KaNgwane and Mabuza and Inyandza retained the voters‟ trust and confidence. This endorsement, in turn, this gave Mabuza some degree of credibility and respectability.

Chapter 8: Mabuza's Rise to Corporate Prominence

8.1 Introduction

The entrenched unequal, disempowering and exploitative economic relations which existed in South African before 1994 are the justification or rationale for the implementation of economic re-dress and development policies such as Affirmative Action (AA) and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) in South Africa post-1994 and of the companies that benefited from apartheid policies acknowledged their complicity to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (see for example Gevisser, 2007:14-15, 28-29, 589; Department of Trade and Industry SA, 2003; Greenberg, 1998; O'Meara, 1983; Davenport, 1995; Lipton, 1986; UNESCO, 1988:10-20; May, 2001:302-326; Callinicos, 1985:7-25; Wilson *et al*, 2001:22; Barker, 1999:133, 186-189, 239-240; UNDP, 2000:8-11; Maylam, 2005:148-150; Moerdyk and Coldwell, 1990:17; van Niekerk and Heath, 1984; Mufson, 1990; Alden, 1996:58-59; Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report Volume 4, 1998: 27-50).

There were varied reasons and fears why white corporate South Africa was changing its management culture and philosophy, investing in training and developing human resources, corporate restructuring, black advancement, broadening the ownership and management base of the economy. Underneath all this, there was also concern over nationalisation and the imposition of an undefined taxation formula on wealth. In apartheid South Africa, specific notions of development were crucial to deliberate, systematic policies of domination. The South African authorities' over-arching need to separate blacks from whites and to dominate and exploit the black population eventually crystallised in the form of separate and inferior development for the black majority. These policies fundamentally altered their life trajectory; giving whites all the possible political and economic advantages (Fischer, 1988:127-132). Enos Mabuza entered the economic arena when most of these policies were still in force and he contributed to their transformation. South Africa's political transition in the 1990s was a time of uncertainty and possibility for different stakeholders, including Mabuza who had a meteoric rise in the corporate sector after resigning as Chief Minister of KaNgwane. Between May and December 1991, Mabuza was appointed to the corporate boards of the companies below as a non-executive director:

Anglovaal Limited
Foundation of African Business

Gola Investment (Pty) Ltd
Metro Cash and Carry Limited
The Premier Group
Shell South Africa Limited
Standard Bank Investment Corporation
Thebe Investment Corporation
Times Media Limited
Volkswagen South Africa

For strategic reasons, Mabuza was a part-time executive director for the Independent Development Trust Finance Corporation and accepted a position on the State President‟s Economic Advisory Council in 1993. At the time, the State President‟s Economic Advisory Council was dominated by members of the Afrikaner corporate sector and the Pretoria Bureaucracy which did not think that political change would necessarily translate into corporate transformation. These company directorships and business involvement entailed travelling from Johannesburg to Cape Town twice or thrice a month, attending business seminars and conferences. As a board member, he met, usually quarterly, with the other board members and was required to give his expertise, time and energy into the businesses or organisations that he was attached to. Mabuza commented that his sixteen years in education had prepared him for the business of politics but politics had not quite prepared him for "the complex world of the politics of business" (Mabuza, 1992:2). Mabuza‟s appointment to several company boards "triggered off a series of similar appointments such that black non-executive directors serving on hitherto white company boards increased from ten to forty within a period of six months" (Mabuza, Letter to Beverly Johnson and Chris, 25 November 1992:3).

Economic entities or businesses are socially constituted and „embedded‟ within a broader socio-political context (Bourdieu, 2005:205,210; Stokman and Wasseur, 2002; Scott and Griff, 2002; Hamilton, Orru and Biggart, 2002). Social and historical factors determine the environments in which organisations operate and this affects how they respond to changes in those environments and the 1992 King Commission and subsequent reports and recommendations[63] are a concrete expression of this view within the South African context (Stokman and Wasseur, 2002; Scott and Griff, 2002; Hamilton, Orru and Biggart, 2002;

[63] King Report I (1994) and King Report II (2002)

Newton-King, 2004:27-29). The new South Africa entailed many changes and the ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa (Draft for internal discussion 22 April 1992) put on the transformation agenda priority list the new constitution which was being drafted, economic policy and the unbundling of company shareholding, credit and development finance, land, a system of local government, housing and basic services, social welfare, health, education, human resources, science and technology, environmental issues, arts and culture, the police and army as well as international relations. This list covers divergent issues and problems which needed urgent redress and these are the same issues that Mabuza‟s consultancy kept a close eye on. As a consultant with useful connections, Mabuza had access to sensitive political information in the 1990s, for instance, IDASA‟s Public Opinion Service papers (POS Reports) No. 1 of October 1997 (The Evolution of Party Support Since 1994) and POS Report No.2 of November 1997 (Public Opinion and the Location of Parliament).

IDASA‟s surveys analysed the reconfiguration of the main political parties - African National Congress, National Party, Inkatha Freedom Party, Freedom Front, Democratic Party, Pan-Africanist Congress, ACDP, NCF and others and the support they enjoyed after the 1994 landmark elections. Former Bantustan leaders such as Bantu Holomisa and his United Democratic Movement (UDM) in the Eastern Cape stayed in politics as part of the opposition after 1994 as did Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The IFP was retained its reputation as an ethnic organisation whilst the PAC and AZAPO struggled to shake off their racist images. Constand Viljoen‟s Freedom Front focused on white Afrikaner interests in Gauteng, the Free State and Northern Cape and was regarded as a right-wing element which was resistant to change and was therefore not progressive enough such that it also had trouble reinventing itself. The Freedom Front lobbied for an Afrikaner Volkstaat as opposed to the nation-building aims of the all-inclusive democratic society or new rainbow nation. The survey also highlights defections to other parties, for example, Musa Myeni, Ziba Jiyane, Frank Mdlalose and Walter Felgate of the IFP defected to the ANC although partisan support for particular parties remained strong. Further, the survey showed high support for the ANC and IFP[64] respectively among the Swati who constituted the majority in the former KaNgwane Bantustan (Mattes, Africa, and Jacobs, 1997:15 - IDASA‟s Public Opinion Service papers No.1). IDASA‟s Public Opinion Service Press Briefing No. 2 (November 1997) follows the debate over where the seat of parliament was to be. It shows significant

[64] Mpumalanga shares a border with KwaZulu-Natal.

support for the seat of parliament to remain in Cape Town instead of moving it to Pretoria or elsewhere (Midrand, Bloemfontein).

The theoretical orientation for the analysis of Mabuza‟s business career is informed by the interactionist theories put forward by Langford (1971:1-10, 19, 25, 36, 42), Granovetter (1985), Emirbayer and Mische (1998), Bourdieu (1977; 1998; 2005:16, 193-222, 299), Bringheti (2007:335-336) and Giddens (1991; 1984). Social capital (networks) is essential to the functioning of the economic field and the economic practices of agents. In turn, the strength of these networks depends on the position occupied by the agents within a given field (Mills, 1956). Individuals form different types of associations or networks and the composition of these networks changes over time to reflect new interests and situations (Mills, 1956). Businesses and other entities also form groups and associations for similar reasons because economic relations are embedded in networks of social relations which depend on trust and also generate it as opposed to being atomistic or mechanistic.

Individuals assume multiple executive or board-level posts in different organisations to reinforce their influence, power or authority (Brint, 1984; Granovetter, 1985; Palmer, 2002; Scott and Griff, 2002; Naidoo, 2007). Koenig and Gogel (1981) refer to this as a class hegemony model which facilitates direct interaction and communication of values and beliefs among directors and creates a business elite or capitalist class culture which guides the behaviour of business leaders and socialises new directors. Multiple directorships, prominence and power among the business elite or capitalist class generally correlate to the individuals‟ positions in other social groups or networks, for instance, exclusive social clubs, business or government policy groups (Palmer, 2002:263-264; Scott and Griff, 2002:329; Bunting and Barbour, 2002; Mills, 1956). The extent to which the interests of directors coincide with those of the organisations which they are affiliated to determines the effectiveness or mutual benefit derived from the inter-organisational links. The phenomenon of interlocking directorships is not usually a coincidence but an orchestrated long-term goal within a given network. Individuals with multiple board memberships become recognised and respected captains of industry and opinion leaders and through their respective organisations, cliques or clusters, business executives are afforded opportunities to create matrices of social transactions with similar-minded capitalists[65] and thus perpetuate the privileges of a dominant

[65] Tokyo Sexwale, Matthews Phosa, Cyril Ramaphosa, Patrice Motsepe and others.

class (Emirbayer, 2002:140; Bunting and Barbour, 2002:186, 194; Scott, 1997; Dippenaar, 2004:159-161).

Multiple directorships allow individuals to influence socio-economic and political issues regarding policies by virtue of their positions and the performance of their firms. Several of South Africa‟s political or business leaders are related to each other and have economic interests in numerous corporations. Lunsche, Naidoo, Radebe, Bisseker, Hlengani, Honey and Ryan (2006:26-33) comment on a survey of South Africa‟s most influential power-couples which include politicians, trade unionists, parliamentarians (cabinet ministers) and business people, among them Trevor Manuel and his partner Maria Ramos, Sam Shilowa and Wendy Luhabe as well as Brian and Portia Molefe.

The network or web metaphor (Granovetter, 1995; 1998; Castells, 2000) and risk-trust theories (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Sztompka, 1999; Boon, 2004; Dippenaar, 2004; Ekberg, 2007) illustrate that Mabuza‟s rise to prominence in the corporate sector was not an accident. Trust is crucial in any sustained relationship and it was vital to the negotiations and compromises which led to South Africa‟s political transition. Mabuza‟s prominence in the corporate sector illustrates the link or intersection between an individual actor‟s interests (the need for validation derived from symbolic capital in the form of membership to a particular group or club, seniority, status and respect) and those of a group or class in the business field. It is not unusual for directors or the highest ranking officers of companies to sit on at least five different boards of big corporations at any given time through a system of co-optation which creates possibilities for policy co-ordination and information sharing (Stokman and Wasseur, 2002:340; Williams, 2006:20-24).Visibility within the public domain was empowering and beneficial in the long-term for Mabuza because key economic and political players valued his reputation as an even-handed person. He was useful to them in spite of his controversial and ambiguous position in the Bantustan system. Many of the companies (blue chip) which Enos Mabuza served as a director were (many still are) registered on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and others, such as, Anglo-Vaal were registered on the London Stock Exchange.

8.2 Enos J Mabuza & Associates: Vision and Objectives

Mabuza launched his own fledgling socio-political consultancy business[66] at the beginning of August 1991with Beverley Johnson as his was personal assistant. The business had its offices on the third level of the Premier Group Centre in Killarney, Johannesburg and it analysed South Africa‟s changing socio-political environment. An undated document entitled *The Strategic Direction of Enos J. Mabuza & Associates* states the firm‟s aim as that "to understand industrial and regional political structures and developments" taking into account the broad spectrum of political players. The mission or objective of the consultancy firm, in his own words, was "to influence the process and outcome of political change to a peaceful, democratic and prosperous country through the organisations in which I am involved; and to influence the policies and strategies of these organisations to position themselves to prosper throughout the transition and in the post-apartheid era." Mabuza was able to influence organisations through the power of knowledge (the relevant knowledge at the right time) by familiarising himself with the policies and strategies of client organisations, understanding their rationale in order to address inadequacies and keeping abreast with current affairs during South Africa‟s transition and beyond. He researched, read and discussed all the issues highlighted in this chapter in meetings and conferences which allowed him to establish an information network of contacts that could support him when he put forward ideas in board meetings. Some of the people he shared ideas with included Jeremy Horne (Deloitte and Touche), Conrad Strauss (Standard Bank Investment Corporation Limited), Don D. B. Mkwanazi (New Empowerment Trust) and Rob Cox (HL & L Holdings).

Mabuza‟s objective with Enos J. Mabuza & Associates was to learn from and add value to the corporate sector by attending as many conferences and business forums as he could to gather as much information as he could about the changing business environment. In the early 1990s, the main focus was on issues regarding affirmative action and the issue of token private sector appointments from a small pool of black professionals because of the lack of managerial and technical skills among blacks; reform in the education sector to address the skills deficit; the enrichment of individuals as opposed to prosperity on a broad-based front; the creation of a new black elite and the increase in black directors; corporate governance (practices, ethics, global trends and competitiveness); the privatisation of state-owned assets, unbundling the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, trade unions and pension funds, emerging

[66] Enos J Mabuza and Associates (P O Box 1553 Parklands 2121).

black businesses such as New Africa Investments Limited (Nail), Real Africa Investments and NAFCOC and the public sector. The role of banks (the financial sector) in development was also a major focus with regards to the extension of finance for small medium and micro enterprises.

To begin with, Mabuza‟s consultancy firm had Anglovaal, the Conservation Corporation, Deloitte & Touche and French-based Digital Computer Group as its clients. Through his consultancy business, Mabuza was able to stay on the pulse of corporate strategic planning and human resources development [67]. Mabuza was invited to numerous public speaking engagements and participated in local and international conferences, for example, he travelled to the United Kingdom in September 1989 and had a meeting with the Prime Minister. He also visited the Soviet Union in 1989 with an IDASA delegation led by Dr Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, University of the Western Cape Rector Professor Jakes Gerwel and Professor Johan Degenaar of the University of Stellenbosch‟s Philosophy department. This visit made Mabuza the first Bantustan leader to visit the Soviet Union. Mabuza and his wife also attended a luncheon in Phalaborwa hosted by the RTZ mining company and a dinner in Johannesburg hosted by Johan Rupert, both in honour of Britain‟s Margaret Thatcher in early 1991. In all this, Mabuza was surprised and concerned by the fact that he was usually the only black businessman travelling and attending such business conferences and seminars (Mabuza, Letter to Beverly Johnson and Chris, 25 November 1992:3). Mabuza managed to carve a modest niche for himself in the corporate sector and over time some of Mabuza‟s major clients included Anglo-American, Anglovaal, Gencor, Premier, SAB, Edgars, Eskom, Telkom, Standard Bank, Southern Life, Sanlam, Fedsure, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, the Ministry of Finance, Trade and Industry, the Foreign Affairs Ministry and some provincial departments, the office of the President and that of the Deputy President. The changes that were taking place enabled Mabuza to run his consultancy. They also showcased the power of personal ambition and having the right connections or *capital*.

Enos J. Mabuza & Associates offered political commentary and permutations for South Africa in the early 1990s. Through his consultancy firm, Mabuza compiled a series of political updates which outlined the progress of the CODESA talks; the political alliances and realignments that were forming, the risks, compromises and gambles, boycotters, dark horses,

[67] At various times in the 1990s, Enos J Mabuza & Associates had Dr E. J. Mabuza, Ms B. A. Mabuza (one of his daughters), K. Shubane and F.G. J. Antonie as partners and I. M. Melamed, K. Shubane and Dr. F. van Zyl Slabbert as associates.

stalemates and ultimatums which were made by the key players including the ANC, NP, IFP, SACP, PAC, AZAPO, COSATU, the Conservative Party, the Afrikaanse Volksfront and the Democratic Party. In a February 1993 update, for instance, Mabuza highlighted that Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi wanted the question of a federal constitution to be non-negotiable. The same update also touched on the importance of voter education and the role of the Independent Electoral Commission (Mabuza, 26 February 1993a, South Africa – A Political Update). Another briefing dated 18 June 1993 focuses on the Multi Party Negotiating Forum, the positions of left and right-wing political groupings, the South African government/National Party, the ANC and the security establishment including the police and army and the implications of their respective positions for the political transition. There were insiders and outsiders, front runners and the rest and this was accompanied by much posturing and political flirtation such that any changes in the positions of the main players had to be monitored closely (Mabuza, 18 June 1993b, South Africa - A Political Update). Appendix 5 lists the contents of some of the other briefings produced by Mabuza‟s consultancy as he continued to monitor the transition.

Mabuza served on several educational, environmental and community trusts including the Independent Development Trust, University of the Witwatersrand Council, St Stithians College Council, Promat Colleges[68], the National Parks Board, Trees for Africa and the State President‟s Advisory Economic Council. He comments that although the adjustment was challenging, it was also a rewarding experience which made "the remaining term of my national service" (Mabuza, Letter to Beverly Johnson and Chris, 25 November 1992:3). During his tenure as KaNgwane‟s Chief Minister, Mabuza had participated in numerous leadership development programmes in Africa, North America and Europe, for instance, he was an alumnus of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington DC and is listed under the class of 1990 in the programme sheets for the alumni reunion which was held in Helsinki Finland in June 2005 (Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, 2005: 26). Mabuza also attended the Georgetown School of Foreign Service Alumni Conference in East Berlin in 1992.

Almost a year after Mabuza resigned as Chief Minister of KaNgwane, he updated former members of his staff who had emigrated to Munich Germany about changes in South Africa, his new career in the "challenging and stimulating" world of business. He reflected on the

[68] Mabuza travelled to New York, Washington DC and London with John Rees in September 1992 on a Promat Colleges fundraising trip.

messages and letters of support and encouragement that he and his wife Esther had received from friends in South Africa and abroad upon his resignation from politics as follows:

> The generals and captains of industry academics, advocates, community leaders and the press were spontaneous and generous in their expression of appreciation for the modest contribution I had made towards the political changes that are currently taking place in our country. Although some members of the present government establishment, especially the bureaucrats and the security establishment, were pleased to see me go, two senior Cabinet Ministers pleaded with me to reconsider my decision and I had no reason to doubt their bona fide. The State President, Mr F. W. De Klerk, wrote me a nice and encouraging letter in which he thanked me for the contribution I had made to the current political transformation of our country. The National Executive of the African National Congress (ANC) sent a high-powered delegation to plead with me to rescind my decision. Although they did not persuade me, to change my mind, I was of course flattered that they thought so highly of me! On the other hand, I was puzzled that they wanted me to continue to lead a Bantustan government, indeed a structure which they had opposed so vigorously during the past thirty years (Mabuza, Letter to Beverly Johnson and Chris, 25 November 1992:2).

Mabuza comments on the speculation at the time of his resignation that he was "going to join and serve on the National Executive Committee of the ANC" (Mabuza, Letter to Beverly Johnson and Chris, 25 November 1992:4). Mabuza adds that "At no stage did I consider such a move, and in any event, it would have compromised my venture into the world of commerce" (Mabuza, Letter to Beverly Johnson and Chris, 25 November 1992:4). He claims that he wanted to be politically non-aligned whilst maintaining his relationships and contact with the African National Congress, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the National Party (NP), the Azanian People‟s Organisation (AZAPO) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) whose confidence and trust he was privileged to enjoy.

Within a period of about five years (from his retirement from politics in 1992 until his death in 1997), Enos Mabuza had served on the boards of no less than a dozen predominantly white-owned companies including Volkswagen SA, Shell SA, South African Breweries, Times Media Ltd, Gascor, the Premier Group Limited, Metro Cash & Carry, the Anglo-Vaal

mining group, Standard Bank SA, the South African Parks Board and the President‟s Economic Advisory Committee. Most of these positions, however, were non-executive but this was quite a coup for a black person since it was rare for a black person to occupy such positions at the time. He was already an influential public figure in his own right and thus had one foot in the door by the time the political changes were felt in the economic sphere.

Enos Mabuza had the support of moderate whites (particularly those in business) and the ANC leaders that he had worked with or assisted over the years when he was Bantustan leader. Mabuza‟s achievements in business no doubt roused much admiration, suspicion and controversy. It can be argued that his involvement in business was purely for personal gain and ambition but happened to fit into a bigger strategy which was designed to benefit the country or the previously disadvantaged population. In this analysis, the first question that comes to mind is: what qualified Enos Mabuza for these positions? Was he the victim of white capitalists (as an extension of the apartheid state) or did he deliberately redefine himself and carve out a new niche in the public sphere, thus consolidating the power and influence that he had enjoyed as KaNgwane‟s Chief Minister (Cheater, 1999; Friedmann, 1992)?

The immediate conclusion would be that these arrangements stood to benefit all the parties involved for strategic reasons (motives and intensions), given his previous position within the Bantustan structures. However, Enos Mabuza also had more active roles on the boards of investment companies which were aligned to the ANC, such as the Independent Development Trust, the Kagiso Trust, Thebe Holdings and New Africa Investments Limited (NAIL). According to his son, his role was to advise them and facilitated links between them and established white businesses on whose boards he sat (Sandile Mabuza Interview, 5 June 2007). This seems rather odd at first glance given Enos Mabuza‟s association with the apartheid state through the despised Bantustan structures. Bantustan leaders were regarded with suspicion as greedy sell-outs or traitors so why did the ANC‟s leadership trust him enough to give him such positions and responsibilities when his profile was sullied by this association?

This chapter answers these questions by arguing that although Enos Mabuza had been part of the Bantustan structures, he had more to offer and both white capital and ANC businesses compromised and accommodated him based on their strategic and long-term goals. Bourdieu (2005) argues that politics and business strategies within a capitalist system involve some

degree of greed, selfishness, opportunism, manipulation and risk-taking (by operational definition or practice). Braithwaite (cited in Langford, 1971:87) states that circumstances are "causes or part-causes of an agent‟s goal-directed activities at the time when an external occasion for the action arises." A disinterested act is not possible because individuals consciously (usually deliberately, although such decisions can be made under duress) invest their time and energy and often risk their reputations based on probable outcomes and utility maximisation. Based on the assumption that individuals think in terms of (or are Driven by) specific intentions, motives and goals and the uncertainty entailed by South Africa‟s political transition to democracy, one ultimately comes to the conclusion that all the parties (including Enos Mabuza) stood to gain from the arrangement in some form (Cheater, 1999; Freidmann, 1992). The conditions were ripe for many stakeholders to re-assess their positions and make the necessary changes (means-ends, win-win trade-off) to keep in step with the changing socio-political environment. These changes were driven by individual greed and ambition in some instances and in others; they were influenced by consideration of the long-term goals of different constituencies (Nattrass, 1994).

The African National Congress realised the limits of change and the need for co-operation in rebuilding and sustaining the economy. Delivering on promises that were made to all South Africans in a democratic dispensation and reconciling the needs of white capital and those of the black businesses required balance and long-term strategic planning. According to Bourdieu (2005:196), the information (as a form of capital or resource) that individuals who occupy prominent positions are privy to in the economic field, for example, through their presence on company boards allows them to improve their position by capitalising on changes in the environment. South Africa‟s transition following the unbanning of the ANC and other organisations in 1990 created enough room for individuals like Mabuza to re-invent themselves.

The continuities in Mabuza‟s career; first in education, then politics and later in business, shows that he either had good timing or that he was a versatile and adaptable opportunist who was able to capitalise on different situations and draw on different sources of support to endorse his transitions from the different spheres. By the time he joined the corporate sector, he knew from experience how the political game was played (who wins or gains and how they do it) and he applied those rules to his foray into business. At the same time, the ANC was transforming itself into a negotiating partner and government-in-waiting and its attitude

and the tone of its debates and negotiations, especially with regard to political and economic issues, is described by Nattrass as "pragmatic and accommodating" (1994:343). However, the ANC did not lose sight of one of its goals which was the political emancipation of the majority of South Africans who were excluded from the economic mainstream by apartheid. In realise this goal, one of the ANC‟s strategies was to cultivate black economic advocacy and forging partnerships with leading white businesses (McNulty, 1994:24-26).

The ANC groomed some of its leaders for business and the corporate sector so that they would be sufficiently equipped to control and defend the political and economic freedoms that were fought for in the struggle against apartheid (Gqubule, 2006). This strategy led many of COSATU‟s prominent leaders, including Jay Naidoo, Alec Erwin, Sam Shilowa and Marcel Golding to leave the labour movement in order to further the interests of labour as politicians (Nattrass, 1994:357-358). Although their reasons for embarking on a new career path most likely differed from Mabuza‟s, the example serves to highlight the fact that profound change marked the transition. Today, many politicians are resigning or retiring from positions in government to join the business sector and become „captains of industry‟. The distinction between personal ambition and greed is never a clear one. Whilst it is possible that Mabuza became an influential corporate figure for personal ambition and recognition, his own more pragmatic explanation is that he accepted these positions with the endorsement of ANC leaders in order to lay the foundation for the eventual benefit of South Africa‟s previously economically marginalised people (Mabuza cited in Randall, 1996:670).

8.3 Mabuza as a Valuable Ally for White Capital

The ANC‟s Oliver Tambo‟s commented as follows on a Radio Freedom broadcast from Addis Ababa on 5 October 1985 regarding whether or not businessmen and industrialists had a role to play in the struggle:

> There is room for their participation. They assess the apartheid system in terms of the profits or losses it yields…If they reach the conclusion that the apartheid system is going to destroy their interests, destroy their business, the whole economy, at that point they will want to remove the apartheid system and will even join with forces that are set out to destroy the system, provided they are sure that the system will not be replaced with something worse for their economy, for their pockets, for their profits. But to the extend that our

> struggle has demonstrated that there is no future for them or even for the economy to that extend they will begin to move out of South Africa promptly against the regime, because within limits, because they are still part of it, it means that they can be an additional lever, a position which favours our struggle…if it serves the purpose of weakening the ability of the regime to resist, if it helps to destroy the system, then we welcome that (Tambo cited in Buthelezi, 1985b:4).

The quote above alludes to the self-interests involved in the transaction as well as the changeable nature of the political terrain that everyone was treading. Afrikaner intellectuals and white business people were in favour of constructive engagement. They were concerned about the instability and damage which armed struggle would cause and thus approached the ANC mission in exile (Lusaka) to seek the suspension of armed struggle in favour of negotiation. Anglo American‟s Gavin Relly and Tony Bloom were among those who went on this mission.

South Africa was undergoing a political transition when Enos Mabuza entered the economic sphere and his services were sought after to facilitate the transformation objectives of historically white businesses in terms of the representation of blacks, business attitudes and policy, for example, when he was with the National Parks Board and when former President De Klerk appointed him on the board of the South African Broadcasting corporation; a position which Mabuza did not accept in the end. Transforming the economy was beginning to be accepted as inevitable and necessary and this attitude was starting to be mirrored in the business or economic sector to some degree in the early 1990s. White businesses were making a conscious commitment to business ethics, moral behaviour and accountability in labour relations, thereby contributing to reconciliation and development. A change in mindsets based on moral arguments which acknowledges business‟s social responsibility was necessary because as the TRC Report notes, “morality *is* an important ingredient of viable business” (TRC Report Volume 4, 1998:54) and businesses could no longer afford to dismiss social concerns.

Mabuza was a moderate politician (potential to be flexible and thus to unify through compromise), and was a good candidate to act as the vehicle for tentative image change for white corporates when the demise of apartheid was imminent. One can argue that Mabuza‟s acceptance of numerous corporate board appointments was not selfless but was fuelled by

personal ambition and the need to maintain his prominence as a public figure (status, influence and power) (Granovetter, 1985; 1995; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Castells, 2000; Bringheti, 2007). It is possible that he was merely a stooge board member for white capital but he was able to exploit useful personal connections to his own ends.

Bourdieu maintains that the *real* is relational and people negotiate social space or positions in all spheres of life (contexts and social constraints). Social spaces are differentiated positions which are defined by the place they occupy within a given *field* and the distribution of different types of *capital* (Bourdieu, 1998:3-9, 15). As such, there is nothing inevitable about the constraints and inducements which are introduced in the economic field by dominant firms and such constraints and inducements should be seen as conscious, deliberate or considered actions (Bourdieu, 2005:201-202, 206). People generally choose their associates, as well as those that they do not want to associate with and this entails a deliberate thought process or premeditation based on objective and subjective reasons which are not necessarily malicious but ultimately include or exclude one alternative or another from a given set of options. The social rules of association work on evolutionary, Darwinian rules of natural selection and are essentially alliances for mutual benefit. These „marriages of convenience" are most evident in the lives and careers of Hollywood celebrities (movie actors, musicians), politicians or when countries are at war and need allies, business people, everyday „normal" friendships and marriage. Individuals pick partners, spouses or business associates with certain qualities or connections and this is based on a calculation of how much they can each, or collectively, benefit from the association. Such an outcomes-based utility maximising behaviour can have positive (status, fame, sex appeal, power, money or reviving a career that has stagnated, perhaps even changing careers) or negative consequences, although the benefits normally outweigh the risks or negatives. The relationships are a function of ambition (career moves), opportunity and timing; provided it suits all the parties involved. These relationships of convenience or expediency benefit the *weaker* individuals who hitch a ride on the coat tails of the stronger or more successful ones, resulting in an instant upgrade in their credentials or profiles, which in turns gives them access to things they would otherwise have been excluded from (it opens doors).

This section considers why white capital was partial to Mabuza as demonstrated by the number of board-level positions which he held in historically white-owned and controlled companies in the early 1990s. Before the debacle of the incorporation of the KaNgwane

Bantustan into Swaziland in the mid 1980s, it would not have been difficult to imagine or project a future in which Bantustan politicians would have formed some sort of alliance with white businesses in a democratic South Africa. However, Mabuza‟s refusal of the apartheid government‟s incorporation plan created fractures in that relationship and led to the temporary suspension of KaNgwane‟s self-rule status and the imposition of N.J. Badenhorst as its administrator between 18 June and 9 December 1982. It is not improbably that his actions (non-co-operation) would have been seen as biting the hand that feed or becoming the prodigal son in some respects and alienated him from white capital too since it played an integral part in maintaining the apartheid system. Despite this, however, Mabuza was accepted back in the fold (so to speak) and became a prominent player in the high stakes economic game which was key to deciding South Africa‟s future once the political negotiations and transition was over (good corporate governance, responsibility, accountability and sustainability). The term „Uncle Tom‟ is derogatory and it is commonly used to describe black people whose political views or allegiances are considered by their critics (normally from the same group) to be detrimental to the groups aspirations by being deferential to white authority, usually with the promise of reward in kind (Stowe, c2007). Mabuza‟s sudden rise to prominence in the economic field, partly on the shoulders of established white capital can be analysed in this way but as the rest of this chapter shows, he capitalised on other factors which were at play at the time (opportunity cost).

Mabuza‟s rise to prominence within the upcoming black business elite was probably unforeseen by many but it has also been documented that the apartheid government actively tried to create a black business or middle class in the 1980s so that this group, because of its class interests, would act as a buffer between the state and the masses (Gevisser, 2007:133). Mabuza found himself on a new path which effectively gave him a new lease in the public sphere. At the time, white corporate South Africa had an opportunity to „voluntarily‟ redefine or transform itself by changing its practices and profiles and Mabuza was one of the few individuals that were seen as neutral within the political firmament of the 1990s. However, according to Bourdieu (2005:201-202, 206), there is nothing inevitable about the constraints and inducements which in the economic field, whether they are introduced by individuals or dominant firms. Most actions are deliberate and considered.

Among the explanations offered for Mabuza‟s nominations, acceptance and appointments to these positions are his biographical information (black male, educated, politically moderate

or ambivalent) and the contacts that he made with „moderate", „liberal", „progressive" or „sympathetic" whites. He was already privileged and part of an elite by virtue of being the leader of one of the ten Bantustans. During South Africa"s political transition, the onus was on white capital to show its commitment to change (goodwill) by involving people across the colour bar in directorships as well as creating the „right" work environment for employees to ensure that the economy did not suffer adversely (Wilkinson, 1998: 45; Vogt and Murrell, 1990). Essentially, the so-called progressive white companies needed black board members because as Williams (2006:20-24) notes, non-executive directors were the exception than the norm because former executives (white) served a company boards in the 1990s. Black directors were in short supply such that it was common for the few individuals operating at that level to hold several directorships or chairmanships simultaneously, provided their other commitments allowed it (time constraints in terms of board and committee meeting attendance) and as long as no obvious conflicts of interests arose between the different companies which they represented. As a retired politician, Mabuza could afford the time to serve on several boards in a non-executive capacity at any one given time and his board appointments consolidated the status that he already had. South Africa"s shortage of black directors still persists and many of the current ones hold numerous board positions (Williams, 2006).

In respect of contacts or networks being used to facilitate mobility, it is worth noting that retired politicians/civil servants are no strangers to the corporate world or company boards because they use this need for balance, together with the influence and social capital which they accumulate whilst still in public office, to propel themselves into new careers (Granovetter, 1995; Bourdieu, 1990). The contacts or networks created (who you know who already occupies a position/s of influence) are important resources (Mills, 1956). Mabuza"s son Sandile notes that his father used to host business breakfasts with moderate whites in the business community during his tenure as Chief Minister of KaNgwane (Sandile Mabuza Interview, 5 June 2007). Mabuza used his accumulated social capital to create links with influential business-people who assisted his entry into the corporate sector. Dr. Frederick van Zyl Slabbert (of white opposition parties such as the Progressive Party and later the Progressive Federal Party in the 1970s and 1980s) was one such contact. Van Zyl Slabbert later became the Director of Policy and Planning for the Institute for a Democratic South Africa (IDASA, now the Institute for Democracy in South Africa), co-founded the black investment trust Khula in 1990. Another examples of influential political and business

contacts that Mabuza made when he was Chief Minister of KaNgwane was Dr. Conrad Strauss of Standard Bank South Africa and Rembrandt‟s Anton Rupert who became a close friend (Sandile Mabuza Interview, 5 June 2007; Adam, van Zyl Slabbert and Moodley, 1997; Lazerson, 1994). Mabuza maintained these contacts with influential business leaders after he set up his own business consultancy firm when he retired from Bantustan politics.

According to Scott and Griff‟s (2002:331) distinction, the fact that Mabuza was black, a teacher and politician for most of his career means that he was an outsider to the white-dominated corporate system (the odds for success were against him). In practice, however, Williams argues that a mix of directors from inside and outside an organisation brings varied and valued input and expertise (in areas such as labour/HR, finance or sensitivity to the socio-political environment) in order to benchmark and evaluate strategies which affect the bottom-line (profits) and how the organisation is perceived (2006:20-24). Many South African businesses were high risks for investors because of sanctions and blacklisting at the height of apartheid. Change was necessary in order to create and boost investor confidence from the transition onwards (Newton-King, 2004:27-29). It became expedient for white businesses to adopt an inclusive common-purpose approach which created opportunities for mutual gain. Since then, manifestations of corporate responsibility and voluntarism have been based on this utilitarian win-win mentality and *Ubuntu* philosophy of collectivism - I am because we are (Newton-King, 2004:27-29).

During the TRC‟s institutional hearings, influential white businesses or business groupings including the South African Chamber of Mines, the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB), the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA), the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI), Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Ltd, Rembrandt International Group Ltd, the Council of South African Banks (COSAB), Shell South Africa and South African Breweries agreed that a racist corporate culture was a major impediment to the success of affirmative action and that steps needed to be taken to remedy the situation. They acknowledged that the failure of their businesses to allow black people into senior positions had obstructed economic growth and that a new framework that recognised and promoted black unions (job positions, wages, medical schemes, pensions and other benefits) was necessary to improve industrial relations. However, they did not reach consensus on how all this was to be achieved (TRC Report Vol 4, 1998:40).

The relationships in South Africa‟s economy were characterised by a high level of mistrust as the diagram below illustrates, with projections of the ideal or desired state as the ultimate goal:



Figure 13: Levels of Trust in the South African Economy (Boon, 2004:294)

There were a few things that Mabuza brought to the table in the general milieu of South Africa‟s political and economic transition. For starters, he was a political moderate or reformist who did not take extreme or radical positions. Instead of this fence-sitting or luke-warm approach making him a risky option, it made him attractive to both established white businesses and emerging black ones during the transition because he was flexible enough to transcend boundaries on either side. If one uses the utilitarian approach, it is easy to see why Mabuza was a „natural‟ candidate to be used by both white corporates and the ANC to mediate or act as a broker by sitting on the boards of white-owned businesses and black economic empowerment businesses which were affiliated to the ANC. Balancing the interests of both camps and being accountable to both might seem like a conflict of interest but it would also have made it difficult for him to be merely a proxy (window dressing) for white capital and doing its bidding. Mabuza‟s position in the intersection of these two groups (because of the political and economic connections he had created) provided him some sort of security. His success was, therefore, the result of actively sustained relationships of mutual interest and reciprocal trust. That, combined with his own personality and competencies gave him enough currency to carve a new niche for himself. David Wylde‟s description of Mabuza sheds some light on the personal qualities and other reasons why Mabuza became so prominent in business in such a short space of time (Wylde, 2007, Interview 2 August).

Wylde first met Mabuza in a professional capacity when Mabuza was Chief Minister of KaNgwane. They worked together with others, mainly white donors from the corporate sector, to found Penryn College in Nelspruit and eventually became friends. In an interview, Wylde (2007, Interview, 2 August) expressed great respect for Enos Mabuza because he was a "dignified leader, teacher, husband and father." Wylde believes that people respected Mabuza and listened when he spoke because he was "inspiring in his quietness…insightful, philosophical, never aggressive or antagonistic and he was seldom judgmental" (Interview 2 August, 2007). According to Wylde, Mabuza was a "substantial human being" who "had a huge calmness about him, a wisdom, a profundity and humility." He did not regard all whites as the enemy simply because they were white (Wylde, 2007, Interview 2 August). Wylde‟s account describes Mabuza as a soft-spoken, even-handed, objective, rational and calm person whose arguments and views in meetings or discussions were balanced and not clouded by radical political or racial views. Mabuza could focus on the real issues instead of attacking perceived adversaries or posturing. Although this is Wylde‟s personal and subjective memory or impression of Mabuza, which many might contest, it reflects to some degree how some liberal whites regarded him and why they trusted and confided in him enough to use him as a conduit to facilitate dialogue or negotiations between them (historically white-owned and controlled businesses) and other parties along the political spectrum during the transition of the 1990s. This, however, does not necessarily mean Mabuza‟s interests and those of white capital were different or that white corporates valued his input or put it into practice if indeed it differed with their own views.

To the passing observer, Mabuza‟s appointments to numerous company boards look easy (and perhaps suspicious) because he was, strictly speaking, an outsider to both established white-dominated corporate South Africa and the circles of upcoming black business people (many of whom had strong links to the ANC). The charm of his personality alone could not have been enough to catapult him into the sort of prominence that he enjoyed in business, which leads one to conclude that other factors, including his competencies and abilities as a seasoned politician and negotiator had a part to play in his success. According to Sandile Mabuza, whilst still in politics, Enos Mabuza had shares in Imbali Bakery which was owned by a local businessman but he did not own any businesses himself. The story goes that he used to insist that as civil servants, him and his ministers could not have business interests on the side because they needed to focus on serving the people and not on pursuing personal interest and enrichment (Sandile Mabuza Interview, 5 June 2007). When Mabuza retired from

active politics in 1992, his logic was that the political struggle was almost over, the ANC was unbanned and it had enough competent people to lead the political transition but the next stage or challenge was economic transformation and he felt that he could make a positive contribution there (Sandile Mabuza Interview, 5 June 2007; Elias Ginindza Interview 8 June 2007).

Mabuza opened his own business consultancy firm in Johannesburg (an entrepreneurial capitalist) to assist black business people because, according to Esther Mabuza (Interview 6 June 2007), he believed that addressing South Africa‟s gross socio-economic disparities was the next logical step once the country‟s political issues were resolved. The consultancy firm can be seen as groundwork for the economic transformation and empowerment agenda which was to follow. In 1995 Mabuza and Peter Vundla founded an investment company called New Seasons. Like Mabuza, Vundla has held numerous board positions, for instance, he was an executive at NAIL in its early days and serves on the boards of Santam, WesBank and the Mail & Guardian and is a trustee of a number of non-governmental organisations. He has also served on the boards of National Chemical Products, Sentrachem and Sanlam and is an active member of the Black Executive Circle. Vundla was a student activist in Black Consciousness circles at the University of Fort Hare and later worked to attract black people into the advertising industry as owners of businesses in the industry and not just employees or targets of advertising messages. In 1991, Vundla and his colleagues Happy Ntshingila and Dimape Serenyane had set up their own advertising company (HerdBuoys; later HerdBuoys McCann-Erickson following a merger with global advertising agency McCann-Erickson in 1997) and became proponent of transformation in the industry. In 1996 he joined two Soweto entrepreneurs to form the empowerment investment house Pamodzi which acquired a stake in the African Merchant Bank which was founded as the first empowerment bank from the stable of NAIL. Vundla become the executive deputy chairman of the bank (now AMB Holdings, a boutique investment advisory and private equity house, without the banking licence). As an educated black male (ethnic minority in terms of the unequal race and power relations under apartheid), Mabuza‟s entrepreneurial spirit and connections with other prominent black business people qualified him for nomination, recommendation and appointment to white corporate boards. However, in the beginning, Mabuza did not have the wealth of experience that such positions usually require because he had not been in business for too long when he was suddenly appointed to the boards of a wide variety of companies in different economic sectors. Despite this shortcoming, however, his interest in business

worked to his advantage because it showed that he had similarities with both groups (class, ambition and goals, possibly competence) which cannot be overlooked. White capital and upcoming black business people both identified with him (and his business acumen) in their own right, depending on their needs and the changing circumstances (Randall, 1996; Nattrass, 1994).

Firms that are considered market „first movers" or leaders have the capacity to actively shape or influence situations in the markets (production, marketing, research) by initiating what, when and why things will change (Stokman and Wasseur, 2002). In this respect, the organisations which nominated Mabuza onto their boards can be considered as first movers because they set the tone or opened the door for others to eventually get more blacks into the mainstream economy. They made tentative steps towards aligning corporate behaviour with socio-economic and environmental imperatives through dialogue, participation, collaboration and partnerships with their black counterparts. The Black Business Council and Business South Africa eventually merged to form Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) to help realise the country"s vision for growth, development and transformation. Other business groupings which share this vision include the Big Business Working Group and the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC). White businesses wanted to rebuild their reputations to consolidate democracy by making positive changes to their profiles to rebuild trust with their clients and investors as well as improve employee morale and productivity and this process is not over yet (Newton-King, 2004:27-29).

Actions demand or attract reaction*s* and once individuals like Mabuza were in the system, other historically white firms gradually followed suit in making tentative steps to reflect the country"s changing socio-political environment. However, it is important bear in mind that even at firm-level; individuals are instrumental in bringing about these outcomes, directly or indirectly (Stokman and Wasseur, 2002). A field"s boundaries are not absolute and decisions taken within the field do not depend on a single actor or variable. Different things are at stake for different people and power relations determine by struggles within the field. Decision by different firms to nominate Mabuza to their boards could not have been made by individual actors. It is also unlikely that the directors of the various firms were unanimous in their decisions to have him serve on their boards because of their different dispositions, experiences or the weight of their trade unions. Consensus, or lack thereof, brings up the question of whether Mabuza was a compromise candidate (and the reasons if indeed that was

the case) and who else could have been a possible substitute or alternative for these positions at the time.

Whilst it is important to note that the in-coming ANC leadership (at least some of them) regarded Mabuza as a fellow comrade, if not in the political struggle per se but in the economic one. It is understandable that ordinary people outside this elite group would have regarded Mabuza‟s association with white capitalist interests with suspicion (an Uncle Tom) and interpreted his involvement as selling-out by fraternising with and ingratiating himself with the enemy (again, see the chapter on his political career). This might be regarded as a marriage of convenience on Mabuza‟s part enter and stay in a preferred socio-economic group or class in order to acquire a certain status and resources (Bourdieu, 1998:10-13). These class aspirations could have been seen as pursuing self-enrichment at the expense of principles or considerations that resonated with the marginalised black majority, which he was part of. It should be born in mind that Bantustan leaders, black council workers, black policemen and spies were labelled traitors (many were killed) for this reason.

In the corporate sector, a big linker such as Mabuza could be regarded as affirmative action and BEE beneficiaries because they typically held multiple board positions by virtue of belonging to a minority ethnic group (Africans/black). Corporate big linkers can also be created based on their gender through policies geared to allow equal opportunities (see the section below on black economic empowerment). A host of policy interventions can result in greater numbers of people from designated or target groups in certain positions or occupations, including those that eventually create board-level interlocks which are discussed in Chapter 4 above (Stokman and Wasseur, 2002:353). Mabuza, was not the only black leader, ex-politician or business elite to hold several corporate board positions in the early 1990s. However, as with such policies in any other sphere, some organisations tend to merely go through the motions by filling stipulated quotas in order to give the appearance of change when in actual fact such appointees are not allowed to do anything substantial in the organisations (window dressing/impression management). Empowerdex admits that fronting operations (window dressing without real transformation) still exists in South Africa‟s corporate sector (Empowerdex, 2004:10). Another problem is that people from the targeted groups do not benefit equally from such policies and the policies come to be despised because they are unfair or do not apply equally to all people - in the targeted groups and those necessarily excluded from them, thereby creating more problems and resentment.

8.4 Mabuza and Black ANC-Affiliated Businesses

The state is a major player in the economic sphere (Bourdieu, 2005:204). It is not simply a regulator that maintains order and confidence or an arbiter in disputes between firms. The state actively contributes to the supply-demand logic of the market by intervening and regulating the operations and interactions of firms. On the other hand, business lobby groups try to get the state to pass laws or concessions in the form of policies which work in their favour (preferential tariffs, trade licences, funding or subsidies for job creation, research and development funds, public sector contracts and exports etc) (Bourdieu, 2005:204). However, the growth of indigenous business classes in Africa (Zaire/DRC, Kenya, Nigeria) attracted much interest, disparaging stereotypes and criticisms in the 1980s and early 1990s (Randall, 1996:661-662) because the main beneficiaries of economic „indigenisation" were political notables who assumed the role of "sleeping partners, manipulating the bureaucracy, and buying protection in return for a share of the profits and a range of other improperly acquired advantages" (Randall, 1996:684). The dominant argument in the early 1990s was that black capitalists were not genuine capitalists because many of them were people with stature and money but that they had no real interest in business and relied on their political connections and leverage (networks) to stay in the game (Randall, 1996:663). In many instances, the indigenous bourgeoisie class emerged straddling the private and public sectors and taking advantage of opportunities for political manipulation, corruption and rent-seeking activities for its survival.

Black capitalists in South Africa have not escaped similar criticism and many are generally perceived to have no independent financial base or to have risen on "expedient structures" to become the "tools of the old establishment" (Sam Shilowa 1994 cited in Randall, 1996: 662). This „necessary" relationship between the state and businesses was very influential in determining the ANC"s outlook during the political transition and led to the formation of the Consultative Business Movement between business and labour (COSATU). The United Democratic Front (UDF) brokered the deal in its capacity as the secretariat for the National Economic Forum.

Economic policy debates in ANC documents and statements in the 1940s and the 1956 Freedom Charter were influenced by a moral demand for compensation and centred on demands for redistribution of wealth from those that had benefited from apartheid to those that had been exploited. The Freedom Charter, for example, demanded that the mines, banks

and monopoly industry "be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole" (Nattrass, 1994:344) through nationalisation because unfettered free market forces were considered inadequate for such purposes. ANC leaders such as Walter Sisulu and Ahmed Kathrada initially argued that strong state intervention was necessary to create a more equitable and acceptable economic system (economic rationalisation) but these radical positions began to soften in the early 1990s. Nattrass (1994) believes that this was necessary because, as a government-in-waiting, the ANC was attempting to broaden its appeal without alienating its traditional political support base.

South Africa was emerging from international sanctions in the early 1990s and the new ANC government needed all the help it could get because it had inherited enormous debt from the outgoing government and the economy needed to stay afloat. Effective diplomacy was crucial (a delicate balancing act at the best of times) at all levels in order to gain access to international finance institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as to attract and retain foreign investments to ensure that the economy did not collapse (Gevisser, 2007:668). The previously disadvantaged population also had great expectations for the new government which were necessarily opposed to most of the rational economic arguments which would advance the former. The result was a mix of neo-liberal and pro-socialist policies, which the politicians argued was the only way to handle the dilemma. Several changes were initiated which generated controversy within the organisation as its economic policies became more "business-friendly and less structured by the trade union agenda" (Nattrass, 1994:344). The Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG) was aligned to the ANC (with a left-wing orientation). During the transition, the ANC‟s Department of Economic Policy was headed by individuals such as Trevor Manuel (the incumbent Minister of Finance) and Tito Mboweni (the incumbent Reserve Bank governor) (Gevisser, 2007:587) and Enos Mabuza‟s personal documents include copies of several MERG/ANC economic policy papers and addresses by Trevor Manuel. However, MERG and its policies fell victim to the lack of consensus over economic policy which plagued the ANC in the early 1990s (Gevisser, 2007:663-671).

The contradictions and tensions within the ANC‟s economic policy discourse are evident or magnified by the orientations of two the policies below. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP, 1994) reflected the socialist leanings of the ANC, SACP and COSATU and called for an active developmental state. On the other hand, the Growth

Employment and Redistribution (GEAR, 1996) and its recent revision in the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) (Bell, 2006) were underpinned by strong neo-liberal capitalist ideologies which necessarily constrain the role of the government (Gqubule, 2006a:5; Gqubule, 2006b:39-81).

The ANC wanted black business people to add value to the corporate sector and not just to rubber stamp what others decided for them. Black board members essentially acted as watchdogs for the CEOs (checks and balances/accountability) and they were expected to be proactive, not just reactive. This meant that black board members were duty-bound to act in good faith and with skill and diligence (Williams, 2006:20-24). Organisations such as NAFCOC (aligned to the ANC) were associated with the struggle for black economic freedom and were the early advocates of what is now known as BEE (Gqubule, 2006a). Some of NAFCOC‟s members included Archie Nkonyeni, Marina and Richard Maponya, Sam Motsuenyane and Enos Mabuza. Archie Nkonyeni, for instance, was one of the biggest black property moguls of the 1970s despite repressive apartheid legislation preventing black people from doing business. NAFCOC argued that economic growth, development and black economic empowerment were complementary and related process within the broad transformation agenda. A new value system was needed to restructure South Africa‟s socio-economic order and to deracialise the economy. As early as 1988, NAFCOC demanded concrete or tangible articulations of BEE similar to those set out in Malaysia‟s successful *bumiputra* programme. The organisation wanted quotas to be introduced in order to increase black ownership of companies, black board membership, the number of blacks in senior management positions and the allocation of procurement contracts (Gevisser, 2007:584).

The Black Management Forum (BMF) was comprised of the emerging black middle class in the early 1990s and desired to make its mark on South Africa‟s transition as a counter balance to white monopoly capital. Under the leadership of individuals such Eric Mafuna - co-founder and former President of the Black Management Forum and the National Black Business Caucus, Wiseman Nkuhlu (1994) and others, the organisation had an Africanist outlook (passionate about Black Nationalism) but was also pragmatic about South Africa‟s political and business future. These individuals were strongly influenced by Biko‟s Black Consciousness ideology which advocated self-determination, personal advancement and self-fulfilment as virtues or ideals to aspire to (Gevisser, 2007:583). In fact, the Black Management Forum and the National Black Business Caucus are credited with devising

Black Economic Empowerment and affirmative action in South Africa. This advocacy was not a one-way street because the ANC actively wooed the black business class in its bid to create a "loyal black intelligentsia" within the professional classes (Gevisser, 2007:588-589). However, black entrepreneurs also needed knowledge about corporate governance, legislation, stock exchange rules, sectoral as well as macro-economic and other policy issues from established big businesses, which were predominantly white.

Several consultative forums came into being to facilitate dialogue between the government and the private sector during South Africa‟s transition. The Consultative Business Movement (CBM) was formed as the businesses and was funded by the Anglo-American Corporation and other liberal corporations (Gevisser, 2007:577). Conrad Strauss of Standard Bank South Africa was the chairman of the South African Foundation (a lobby for big business) which was the predecessor of the Business Trust (established in 1988). Both formations were comprised of the country‟s leading corporations and the Business Trust was led by the ANC‟s Saki Macozoma (who was head of Transnet. The Business Trust had a mandate for employment creation, among others (Gevisser, 2007:688).

The ANC‟s investment companies, as well as other newly established black businesses needed allies in the corporate sector. They needed partners with integrity and good business sense to help their businesses off the ground and they showed their vote of confidence in Mabuza by appointing him to serve in various capacities on their company boards. He might have seemed like an unlikely candidate because of his history in Bantustan politics and he was certainly not owed a golden handshake by the ANC for having resigned from his political post since he had been employed by the apartheid state. It was even more unlikely that the more radical liberation movements would do him such favours or extend him an olive branch. Mabuza was respected in some circles as a rational and even-handed leader, as well as a skilled negotiator. His personality and charisma appealed to them enough to accommodate him and they put their faith in his business competence for mutual benefit. According to Sandile Mabuza (Interview, 5 June 2007), the ANC requested Mabuza to sit on the boards of its empowerment companies such as the Independent Development Trust, Corporate Africa Ltd, Thebe Investments where he was a founding Non-Executive Chairman, the Kagiso Trust and New Africa Investments Limited and he worked with respected black entrepreneurs such as Thato Mothlana, Wiseman Nkuhlu, Eric Molobi, Sam Motsuenyane, Archie Nkonyeni, Richard Maponya, Ashley Mabogoane, Peter Vundla, Zwelake Sisulu,

Vusi Khanyile and Saki Macozoma; people with unquestionable struggle credentials. Mabuza also worked with Dikgang Moseneke who was one of very few black advocates and the Deputy President of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), later became an influential industrialist and Deputy Chief Justice (Gevisser, 2007).

Mabuza found himself yoked with the ANC‟s hand-picked and groomed economic power brokers and elite entrepreneurs who were deployed into the business sector to initiate transformation by devising a workable compromise (reconciling competing interests and goals) with white capital to rebuild and sustain the economy whilst also trying to restructure it to benefit the previously marginalised. In this crusade, New Africa Investments Limited (NAIL) held shares (equities) in *The Sowetan*, New Africa Publications, New African Communications, MTN and Metlife Investment Holdings (in the form of black pension and provident funds) (McNulty, 1994:24-26). Metropolitan Life (Metlife), for example, is part of Metropolitan Holdings (Methold) and is a major player in the life assurance and communications industry. Metlife had ANC-aligned black businessmen on its board by the early 1990s and in 1994, Methold was the largest black controlled company listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Greig, 1994). Dr. Nthato Montlana (well known political activist from Soweto, medical advisor to Nelson Mandela and prominent black business entrepreneur) was the chairman of the Prosper Africa Group and Corporate Africa. He served on the board of the Development Bank of South Africa and was chairman of Methold where individuals such as Franklin Sonn, Sam Motsuenyane, Pal Gama and Enos Mabuza were on the board of directors.

Elias Ginindza defends Mabuza‟s entry into the economic sphere as having been driven by the same objectives that underpin BEE today (Elias Ginindza Interview, 8 June 2007). Ginindza insists that Mabuza‟s ultimate aim was to increase the participation of blacks in South Africa‟s economic mainstream and his presence on numerous company boards was meant to signify that apartheid (and policies such as job reservation) had no place in a democratic South Africa; that change was necessary and inevitable. Mabuza‟s rise to prominence demonstrated that the opportunities that blacks were previously denied were becoming available. Elias Ginindza is now a businessman in his own right and he maintains that Mabuza did not enter the business arena for his own self-interest but as a way of charting a new course for others and many black people were eventually appointed to similar positions (Elias Ginindza Interview, 8 June 2007). In his address to the board on 12 May 1998, then

Acting Chairman of South African Breweries, Cyril Ramaphosa said the following about Mabuza; “The untimely passing of the highly respected Enos Mabuza is recorded with sadness and our deepest sympathy is extended to his wife and family. SAB is extremely fortunate to be able to call on the services of such able and committed people.”

Mabuza‟s links with ANC leaders seems unlikely at first glance because of his history in the Bantustan system. Ironically, however, these links were forged while he was still involved in Bantustan politics. If Mabuza‟s political career was the sensitive or sore point that many would like to believe it was, how then was he able to jump onto the gravy train which was being driven by the politically connected (elite) black business class? Why would the ANC‟s leadership give him positions and responsibilities in its own investment companies at this crucial time when he was clearly not an ANC blue-blood and had questionable struggle credentials? The fact that Mabuza had access to many influential people, ANC policy documents and was privy to other information which might be labelled confidential alludes to the fact that he was trusted and permitted such access because he was considered important enough by those that made the key decisions even though he might have entered this arena for purely selfish reasons. The other alternative explanation is that he entered this arena to save face after the controversies of his political career, thereby redeeming himself. Whatever the answer might be, his ascendance to these positions shows that he was not as insignificant as the limited literature about him suggests, neither was he merely a capitalist crony. Well known politician and businessman Matthews Phosa lists Mabuza as one of the people who inspired him to venture into business. The transition seemed to offer limitless possibilities and it seemed like there was enough space in the economic pond for the new black business class to swim in. The result was relatively muted knit-picking, posturing and resentment amongst the fledgling black business elite on the economic front compared to what was unfolding in the often violently contested balance of power in the political arena.

Mabuza had resigned or retired from politics without making unreasonable demands and it is possible that he was regarded by both white and black business elites as being „harmless‟ since no malicious intent is evident from his actions („self-sacrifice‟ in a sense). If the general consensus was that he was not going to pose much of a threat on a company board then perhaps some of his board appointments were an acknowledgement of his „quiet‟ retirement. In this way, his actions would be kept in check by other board members and the procedural

constraints of rules that govern the conduct of board members (containing or neutralising future threats).

South Africa‟s business environment has changed, together with the dynamics that bind the major players in the BEE milieu. There are more candidates vying for the same opportunities at board level than in Mabuza‟s time and individuals such as Tokyo Sexwale, NAFCOC‟s Patrice Motsepe, Cyril Ramaphosa and Mzi Khumalo have risen to become some of South Africa‟s most prominent black captains of industry. Their dominance and political clout has been so pronounced that it has led to much criticism and earned them labels such as the "usual suspects" or "black oligarchs" in reference to the self-interest and the enrichment of a few individuals which has resulted from South Africa‟s economic transformation agenda so far (Ryan, 2006:53-54). These labels would also apply to Mabuza because of the monopoly that he enjoyed as far as board appointments were concerned, the ambition and appetite for power that Drove it, at least in part, regardless of whether or not he had *real* power when all the fluff, frantic realignment and confusion of the transition is taken out of the equation.

8.5 The Strategic Aims of Cooperation between Black and White Businesses

The late 1980s were a time of change, transition and the immediate goals for business were somewhat unclear, as were the methods to achieve them. South Africa was in a poor economic climate, the Rand value was down, the gold price was sluggish, inflation was soaring and tourism was declining. This economic recession coincided with the imposition of international sanctions against apartheid policies and the absence of meaningful political reform. Many investors, for instance, wanted the Group Areas Act to be repealed - to desegregate residential, commercial and industrial areas to allow their businesses more freedom or access to markets and labour. It was argued that integrating the black and white business sectors was the ideal and preferable option but the South African government was reluctant to introduce such reforms months before elections. Consequently, major foreign based multi-national companies such as General Motors, Barclays Bank, Kodak and the Bata Shoe Company were cutting links with South Africa and this disinvestment was causing panic because it was believed that many more would follow. This led to a realisation that the economic agenda could not be divorced from the political situation which prevailed and transformation was necessary; inevitable in order to boost investor confidence and reassure the rest of the world that South Africa was not oblivious to the problems it faced and that was willing to listen and commit to some changes in the direction of government policies, albeit

tentatively. It would have been reckless not to acknowledge the extent of the crisis and try to ascertain where South African goals and projections for 1987 would fit from a global perspective (*Financial Mail* Supplement, 28 November 1986).

A business conference themed "Forward in Confidence" was held on 7 November in Pretoria. The conference was hosted by State President P W Botha and members of his cabinet including the Finance Minister Barend du Plessis, Trade and Industry Minister Dawie de Villiers and the Reserve Bank Governor, Dr. Gerhard de Kock. Approximately 200 businessmen attended and a total of 420 individuals registered for the conference. It provided an opportunity for government and business to consider future options - where to and how? The Margo Commission of inquiry into the tax structure of the Republic of South Africa (1986) was one of the issues discussed at this conference because the recommendations contained in its report did not sit well with many people. The Commission undertook a review of fiscal policy during a period of rampant inflation and foreign disinvestments, a result of international pressure against the apartheid regime. Decreased tax burdens are strongly associated with increased economic growth potential in the same way that decreased indirect taxation relative to direct taxation is strongly correlated with increased economic growth potential (Margo Commission Report, 1987; Koch, Schoeman and van Tonder, 2005). The Margo Commission Report, for example, recommended that the primary rebate be increased to its correct level and that child rebates be retained until such a time when the state provided child grants. It further recommended that company dividends be exempt from taxes with the effect that the poor became a great deal poorer and the wealthy a great deal wealthier - rent seeking, economic efficiency. The Margo Commission also recommended fringe benefit taxation, lower and fewer personal income tax rates with fewer deductions, equal treatment of men and women (especially, marriage neutrality), no capital gains taxes, a modification of GST, a capital transfer tax, and retention of the source basis of taxation. Based on these recommendations, general sales tax was dropped in favour of invoice-based value added tax (VAT). Company tax rates were reduced to 35 per cent as part of incentives designed to encourage companies to retain earnings for investment purposes. These recommendations were similar to the proposals of the Franszen Commission which recommended: a reduction in the progressiveness of the direct tax structure, abolishment of the source basis of taxation, a shift toward indirect taxation, a broadening of the income tax base through redefinition (Koch, Schoeman and van Tonder, 2005).

Mabuza was a member of the President‟s Council and one of the people who addressed the delegates at this conference (*Financial Mail* Supplement, 28 November 1986). However, as the photograph below clearly shows, Mabuza was one of very few blacks involved with white business people and the despised government of the day (two pillars of oppressive white power) at that level and this undoubtedly brought the spotlight of suspicion on him.

Figure 14: 1987 International Investment Conference, Enos Mabuza in the Foreground (Financial Mail Supplement 28 November 1986:5).

Blacks generally had very negative perceptions of white businesses and it was widely believed that the expectations of the two could not be reconciled. The topics discussed at the conference ranged from the impact of financial and other sanctions, the world energy market (oil price - supply and demand) monetary policy and proposals for recovery in 1987 as seen by the South African Reserve Bank Governor, Dr. Gerhard de Kock, to the state of gold and gold share prices and the role of speculators as perceived by Warren Myers of Merril Lynch Capital Markets, property investment and/or development, labour relations, business and society (social responsibility to customers, employees, shareholders and the communities in which businesses operate – education, welfare), the economic impact or potential benefits of new technology, equity markets, interest rates in 1987, the American securities industry

(being the most dominant, capital intensive and liquid). In terms of labour relations, the recognition of black labour unions from the mid 1970s led to more organised representation when bargaining with employers in the determination of wages and other benefits. Industrial strikes had the power to disrupt production and reduce profits on one hand and could lead to loss of pay and/or employment on the other. It became quite apparent that the need to maintain dialogue and cooperation in industrial relations was imperative for responsible decision-making and the benefit of all parties (*Financial Mail* Supplement, 28 November 1986).

Pragmatic, long term strategies for cooperation and partnerships had to be forged between government and business but this was uncharted territory in many respects for South African businesses, many of which were built on the back of apartheid. Naturally, many business people were circumspect about some of the proposed changes but this was no time for sentimentality (nothing ventured, nothing gained). Both business and government needed to get out of their comfort zones to ensure political stability and economic growth. They were aware that embarking on this type of change posed many risks but also great opportunities for reward. Businesses were encouraged to be part of the solution, not the problem because the previous tendency towards adversarial relationships in business was proving unworkable and untenable. The conclusion was that everyone had to be resourceful to stimulate economic growth, restore prosperity and help create jobs at a rate commensurate with the country‟s population growth. Despite these challenges, however, there was general optimism regarding changing fortunes for South Africa in 1987 (*Financial Mail* Supplement, 28 November 1986).

Further, the legacy of discriminatory apartheid economic policies and other extra-market forces created illiteracy and deficiencies in technical skills, income disparities, poverty, unequal employment practices such as job reservation, labour market inequality, unemployment and exclusion (Kraak, 2006:128-159; Barker, 1999:186-189, 257-270; Ronnie, 2006:5; Dasgupta, 1993:189-201; Greenberg, 1980; Moerdyk and Coldwell (1990:21) which necessitated the implementation of the ANC‟s welfare-oriented Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), affirmative action (AA), black economic empowerment (BEE). Black economic empowerment was pioneered by black companies such as new Africa Investments Limited (NAIL) and Real Africa Investments and in April 1996 individuals like Cyril Ramaphosa left politics to join business and steer this

transformation process. Ramaphosa, for instance, immediately became Deputy Executive chairman of NAIL (Gqubule, 2006c; Ronnie, 2006:3). These redress policies are supported by laws such as the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 1998 and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and the Labour Relations Act of 1996 which safeguard the interests of all workers by preventing unfair discrimination and exclusion based on race, gender, sexual orientation, age, religion, or political affiliation (May, 2001:302-326; Romm, 2001:145; UNDP, 2000:8-11; Wilson *et al*, 2001:22; Standing *et al,* 1996).

Economic transformation was the responsibility of all stakeholders in partnership (businesses, labour and government) and this led to the formation of the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) was formed in 1995. Employers are represented by Business South Africa (now Business Unity South Africa), FABCOS[69], NAFCOC, the Black Business Forum and labour is represented by the main federations - the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA) and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU). Other stake holders include the National Economic Forum (NEF), the National Manpower Commission (NMC), the National Training Board, the Unemployment Insurance Board, the Compensation Board for Occupational Injuries and Diseases and the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), the Business Trust, the South African Foundation (Newton-King, 2004:27-29; The BusinessMap Foundation, 2003:23-27; DTI, 2003:13; Conger and Kanungo, 1988:471-482; Cheadle, Thompson and Haysom, 2005; Barker, 1999:217, 252, 274-288; Crankshaw, 1997; Ntsele, 2004:178; Randall, 1996).

Interventions which target or benefit the previously disadvantaged majority have not been without criticism and controversy because their current application appears to be inconsistent with their conception (theory and practice). Much criticism has been levelled against the implementation of BEE policies. It is argued that they have not been effective in job creation and they are simply not broad enough because it was benefiting a few individuals (Ronnie, 2006:1-11; Gqubule, 2006a:3-36; DTI, 2003; Ntsele, 2004:177; Gevisser, 2007:584-586; The BusinessMap Foundation, 2003:11, 29; Anderson, 2004:258; Wilkinson, 1998:40-56). This situation led to the Black Management Forum (BMF) calling for changes to the policy in

[69] FABHOLD (a holding company for FABCOS) had a ten-member board of directors who were appointed by the FABCOS national executive council and Mabuza served as chairman of its board.

November 1997 and the Black Economic Empowerment Commission was established in May 1998 under the auspices of the black Business Council to discuss proposed revisions. The commission was chaired by Cyril Ramaphosa and the result was the introduction of the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003 (Gqubule, 2006a:17; Ntsele, 2004:177).

The new black middle class is evidence of the upward mobility that has happened since the introduction of these policies but the excesses of this group have also attracted the criticism of many (Bisseker, 2007:36-37; Naidoo, 2007:42; Gqubule, 2006a:79; Bell, 2006, Radebe, 2007:38-40).

8.6 Conclusion

Sztompka (1999) notes that risk and trust have an inverse relationship (low trust-high risk, and vice versa). The adaptability of individuals, organisations or institutions improves when they have adequate information or when new knowledge is acquired. However, trust among individuals or within groups can be a substitute for knowledge in situations of uncertainty because it provides a sense of security. Legitimacy, integrity (good faith) and credibility are expressions or demonstrations of trust within associations or networks (Giddens and Pierson, 1998:108; Giddens, 1991; Giddens, 1990; Ekberg, 2007:343). Trust and good faith were crucial requirements during South Africa‟s political transition and this culminated in the formation of the Consultative Business Movement, comprised of both white and black business interests (McNulty, 1994). Established white businesses had to liaise with black business groupings such as the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC), the Black Management Forum (BMF), the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services (FABCOS founded 1988) and the Black Business Council (founded 1996) (Gqubule, 2006a). Mabuza was able to insert himself in business during this challenging and exciting time and interfaced with both black and white businesses.

The Empowerdex Report (2004:1-9) lists some of South Africa‟s most influential black directors and they include Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale, Saki Macozoma, Sizwe Nxasana, Phuthuma Nhleko, Konar Deenadayalen, Roger Jardine, Patrice Motsepe, Eric Mafuna, Franklin Sonn and Eric Molobi and several them worked in different companies with Mabuza. Agents are positioned in fields by virtue of their access to power and resources within particular fields and what they say or do assumes its significance as a consequence of

the structure of the field - its codes, schemas and norms (Crossley, 2005:81). The people he was involved with in business trusted him and thought that he was reliable and competent.

In the South African context of apartheid mistrust and the shift to tentative institutional trust through negotiations, policies such as BEE and affirmative action were both a risk and an opportunity for all the stakeholders or players (strategic concessions in modern societies or those in transition). Mabuza evaluated the benefits of reinventing himself by creating a new, more legitimate power base in the economic sector (representing blacks or black economic interests) instead of trying to hang on to political power like his colleagues in the Venda, Ciskei, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu Bantustans. In an interview, Esther Mabuza noted that she was concerned about her husband‟s corporate appointments and what the white businesses, in particular really wanted from him. She asked him what the shift from Bantustan politics to the economic arena meant, as well as why he accepted so many of them and his response was that he wanted to demonstrate to the white corporates that a black person is equally capable and that they should, therefore, admit more black people to top positions in their companies (Esther Mabuza, Interview 6 June 2007). Judging by the number of board positions that he held over a period of approximately five years, Mabuza indeed seized the opportunity and succeeded in achieving his objective of proving that a black person is just as capable as any other. If he was good enough, more black people were just as capable. He presence on white company boards convinced other white business interests to start implementing change in their organisations, thus paving the way for more black people who were subsequently appointed to similar positions (he tried to be exemplary in his trail-blazing). The impact of Mabuza‟s input in this regard (before and soon after 1994) were not obvious or measurable by current BEE sector scorecards (outlined above) because a focused and official BEE strategy did not exist at the time and he did not have the mandate or capacity to undertake such an intervention in his individual capacity. The sheer force of his personality, competence and negotiation skills/persuasion had to suffice.

The figures of black directors or executives on JSE listed companies seem disappointing at first glance but Empowerdex explains them partly in terms of de-listings and disinvestments by several companies on the JSE. Empowerdex also maintains that economic transformation should not rely on JSE figures as the only measure of economic transformation. The issue of economic transformation is an on-going project or agenda, especially since its real efficacy

depends not on official policies, laws or quotas but attitudinal changes at group and individual level (Empowerdex, 2004:10).

BEE was a deliberate, goal-directed intervention (Barker, 1999:257-270) but South Africa‟s economic transformation was always going to face a crisis of expectations (realistic or not) because policies never satisfy or get the approval of everyone and not everyone benefits in the same way. If Mabuza is guilty of milking the BEE cash-cow, he did not do so alone because his contemporaries, and new black economic power players of his time, continue to benefit from it. Those that worked with him benefited from their business involvements just as much as he did and their successors continue to benefit from the selective access they have to influential company boards via a variety of affirmative action policies and through new BEE deals. They did not, and are not, apologising for their „success, whether it was realised through their connections, elite networks and affiliations or it was because of their own competencies and abilities. Using such connections to further one‟s own interests and ambitions or those of a group is a common practise in politics, business and any other sphere of human interaction as the theoretical framework section above has shown. People use such links to catapult themselves into different orbits (utility maximisation) such that criticising Mabuza‟s business interest and involvements based on that alone or the assumption that his motives were bad or the opposite of what everyone was aspiring to at the time would be tantamount to arguing that everyone else that he worked with was more entitled to get those opportunities than he was; which is not true. Such an argument would mean that George Orwell‟s satire *Animal Farm* (1972) is accurate in the crudest sense and that some animals are indeed more equal than others. While it is highly likely that Mabuza‟s motives are not entirely selfless and that some amount of duplicity cannot be removed from the equation, no one‟s motives are entirely selfless and devoid of a degree of hypocrisy in a capitalist economy, regardless of whether they publicly admit it or not. While the idea of a few individuals getting obscenely rich at the expense of the majority is repugnant to those of a socialist persuasion (an orientation which informed the ANC, the SACP, the labour movement/COSATU and other struggle organisations‟ discourses) it does not make Mabuza more of a villain or a Shylock than others who benefited from such pursuits.

The SACP‟s Secretary-General, Blade Nzimande, has commented that most BEE deals have had no impact or have negatively impacted South Arica‟s economic transformation challenges (cited in Ronnie, 2006:8). This sentiment is shared by various parties, but not

everything about Mabuza‟s rise in the corporate sector is analysed within this broad appraisal of BEE. His rise to prominence in the economic arena can partly be attributed to the "revolving door syndrome" that Ronnie refers to (2006:8) because he had the social capital or networks and used them to charter a course in South Africa‟s changing socio-economic landscape in the early 1990s. South Africa‟s political transition necessitated a corresponding transition in the economy and this change brought together different individuals, groups and businesses (a predominantly white private sector, a militant civil society and the incoming black ANC government). These groups had competing interests, goals and agendas, which, according to Dippenaar (CEO of FirstRand) led to economic policy discussions which were characterised by low trust and created significant potential for mistrust (2004:159-161). Dippenaar points out that individual, cultural and institutional trust is fragile and cannot be bought (2004:159-161).

Honesty and sincerity builds trust, even when the truth is unpleasant to hear and people can normally discern the intentions behind certain behaviour/actions and words. These groups had to gradually develop respect for each other‟s opinions, honesty, openness, consistency, competence, fairness and integrity to establish some congruency between what was said and what actually happened regarding issues of mutual interest that affected or had the potential to affect business futures. By extension, whatever his shortcomings, Mabuza‟s mainstay was that he forged and sustained relationships (networks) with influential or connected people based on considerable levels of trust and goodwill. However, as George Orwell‟s (1972) *Animal Farm* illustrates; yesterday‟s oppressed can easily become today‟s oppressors, not just in a political sense but also economically and this is the crux of the criticisms levelled against current applications of BEE and its beneficiaries. Cyril Ramaphosa was a politician who was allegedly seduced by the possibilities that BEE opened into business and new forms of power. Members of the ANC‟s leadership were redeployed into the private sector and pioneering BEE companies such as NAIL were created and the debate regarding how genuine all this was continues alone class lines (Gevisser, 2007:641-643). Mabuza had a fairly high profile in business circles in a short period of time and his apparent dominance or monopoly (as an outsider because of his Bantustan connections) probably caused anxiety and attracted criticism from different quarters (the public in general, black business people and black politicians with supposedly more *bona fide* claims to the economic opportunities that democracy - socio-political change opened) who saw it as a blatant power play propelled by ambition and greed. His family and confidantes, for example, long-standing friend Roland

Kreher of Cargo Motors Johannesburg, his former personal assistant Ms Rosemary Smuts and Reverend Dr Frank and Ida Raimondo, do not share this view but it is one which will always linger in people‟s minds.

The early 1990s was a time of widespread change and negotiation, compromises. The economy was undergoing a restructuring or rebirth through various affirmative action measures, including early forms of BEE. The new democratic dispensation which was being ushered in was also a rebirth for all South Africans across the board, a renaissance. There was no easy or one way to meet the expectations or goals of an entire society and the dynamics and character of South Africa‟s transition conditioned the means by which individuals, groups and the state set about achieving these goals. Gqubule (2006a:10) criticises the „Minimalist‟ BEE approach as being "politically unworkable" but he also questions or has reservations about whether or not the „maximalist‟ or broad-based approach is even feasible in a globalising capitalist system where market mechanisms are used, as in the South African case, to achieve empowerment objectives. Tensions, conflicts and incompatibilities naturally arise and require tactical compromises (The BusinessMap Foundation, 2003:27-29). BEE tries to integrate economic and social criteria in commercial activity such that it has been criticised for its reliance on government‟s regulatory support as well as financial support from government and white businesses. Further, its emphasis on colour, race and good political connections instead of knowledge, business skills and good business plans tends to perpetuate rent-seeking and entitlement mindsets instead of encouraging self-reliance (The BusinessMap Foundation, 2003:9). Although society and/or policies are not static or immutable, the outcome of interventions such as BEE might never be ideal (zero-sum or win-win but not in the same proportions/equally) because someone or a class or group will always benefit more and this is a function of many variables as Mabuza‟s experience demonstrates. It was not new or unique/isolated one since several variations on the theme can be shown from both a personal and a corporate point of view.

The fact that Mabuza was able to straddle the divide between white and black businesses might make him look like a calculating, shrewd Shylock who got to have his cake and eat it too, regardless of whether or not he actively solicited his board appointments on either side of the divide. He might have had the competencies and capacity required for such positions at the time but this does not take away from the fact that these were ultimately *quid pro quo* (gentlemen‟s agreements) arrangements from which all the parties benefited personally and

as groups (classes). His family was proud of his achievements, he got status and some influence out of the arrangement, white businesses gained some legitimacy because of the „reform" and numerous other BEE candidates found an entry into the economic mainstream. *Quid pro quo* arrangements are common in political and economic spheres (means-ends debate, what is instrumental, expedient, fair or feasible). The terms or conditions of his appointments might not have been explicit on this but it is easy to see why and how Mabuza became a prominent, and perhaps an indispensible broker, in business circles during the transition.

Mabuza might not have been as prominent or notorious as other Bantustan politicians or as respected as „*bona fide*" anti-apartheid leaders but he was prominent and respected enough in some circles by people on either side of the political divide to be allowed to participates in these processes during the transition. As outlined in Chapter 4, multiple board memberships are usually derived from financial dependence between firms, stock ownership arrangements or family connections but this was not the case with Mabuza so one can speculate that his influence and clout lay in the strength of the personal networks that he maintained with the „right" people. However, there are limits to what an individual can contribute. Institutional change is generally a slow, gradual process because of risks, uncertainty and mistrust (Ekberg, 2007) such that, even today, black captains of industry remain an elite minority and still have to play the role of brokers and trailblazers. Further, the issues (improved industrial relations, social corporate responsibility) that were high priority areas for redress during Enos Mabuza"s tenure as a key corporate player are still relevant today. This though does not necessarily mean that he did not contribute to corporate transformation in South Africa.

Mabuza was not predatory or malicious but he was without a doubt an astute businessman and regularly addressed influential business gatherings such as the South African British Trade Association (Mabuza, 1986). Mabuza"s corporate positions benefited him as an individual in the short-term but the benefits of his input would have eventually been felt more widely through the now discredited trickle-down effect. In the early 1990s, his board appointments can be interpreted or evaluated essentially as representative participation during the transition since most of them were non-executive and meant that he could not vote on major decisions. If the ANC had Mabuza as its ally in the economic struggle, the debate regarding who he was representing (as a former Bantustan leader) is merely academic, not political. His ambiguous connections and associations suggest conflict of interests and

contradiction but both sides committed to breaching the frontiers of apartheid/white economic control through reform, not revolution (by degrees/moderation) although possibly positive associations. He could easily have been bogged down in management discourses which maintained the status quo as has been argued by critics of BEE but he could just as easily have contributed more beyond mere rhetoric. Admittedly, this approach and his contribution, whatever it was, would not be enough today as the introduction of broad-based BEE (revisions of the original BEE blueprint) and other measures have shown, but it sufficed at the time when he entered the corporate sector. Broad-based BEE combines various elements including ownership, employment equity, training, affirmative procurement and small business development in the financial services, energy, mining, information technology and government sectors. The broad-based nature of investments is currently achieved through business consortia and ownership channels such as employee share-ownership schemes or community ownership in the mining sector are "a political palliative" to counter the sting of the elitist outcomes of earlier attempts (The BusinessMap Foundation, 2003:15).

Mabuza‟s personal papers on economic policies (ANC papers) which he used to write some of his speeches show that he consulted with the ANC, black business people and white capital regarding the economic transformation agenda- pertinent issues regarding the ways or means (what, how, when) to achieve this objective. He used personal and professional links to act as a bridge or broker for future (inevitable) black economic empowerment strategies. His contribution was small but it is acknowledged by his business colleagues on either side of the divide. As part of the early BEE agenda, Mabuza‟s involvement does not appear to have eroded or taken away from the general or original BEE agenda and it subsequently gave way to more empowerment reforms. It is not uncommon for people in different professions, including politicians, to change careers or hold numerous corporate board-level positions simultaneously and the questions remains; How many boards of big companies (executive or non-executive) can one person serve on and still make a meaningful contribution (spreading yourself thin as well as conflicts of interests that might arise)?

Mabuza was not the only black person to hold multiply board positions or make the switch from politics to business. Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa was an ANC National Executive Council member for over a decade and he is CEO of Shanduka Holdings, chairperson of the Bidvest Group, MTN Group and SASRIA Limited. His other non-executive directorships include Macsteel Holdings, Alexander Forbes, Standard Bank and SABMiller. He was

appointed as the non-executive joint Chairman of Mondi in March 2007. Sakumzi J. Macozoma (Saki) is also a political activist turned businessman and is currently the Deputy Chairman of Safika Holdings (Pty) Ltd as well as Chairman of STANLIB and Andisa Capital. He is a member of the ANC‟s National Executive Committee and was a Member of Parliament after the 1994 elections until 1996 when he resigned to become Managing Director of Transnet. Mosima Gabriel (Tokyo) Sexwale heads Mvelaphanda Holdings and Mvelaphanda Resources (he is executive chairman for both) which owns shares in Moneyweb. He also chairs the boards of companies such as the Trans Hex Group Ltd and Northam Platinum Ltd. He is also a director of companies such as ABSA Group Limited, Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd (Altech) and Gold Fields Ltd (the latter two positions are non-executive). Patrice Tlhopane Motsepe is the non-executive chairman and largest shareholder in Africa Rainbow Minerals (approximately 43%) which has interests in gold, ferrous metals, base metals, and platinum mining. Motsepe is non-executive chairman of Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd, chairman of Naledi Mining and Future Mining. He is also a non-executive director of ABSA Group Limited and Sanlam. The business careers of these individuals demonstrate the intersection between the political and business elites. The main difference between Mabuza and individuals such as these lies in the details of how they got to where they are. Most of the individuals mentioned above were always aligned with the ANC (perceived to be legitimate) and Mabuza was seen regarded as being on the wrong side because of his association with the Bantustans.

Mabuza‟s credibility as a competent facilitator, mediator or broker is what kept him in the corporate arena. He had the personal qualities to encourage moderation, consultation, consensus-building through joint decision-making. He had the right temperament to manage tensions and determine acceptable proposals for negotiated solutions amidst the apprehension of the transition and it made good business sense for a political moderate like him to join the corporate world when he did. He was a relatively influential public figure in his own right and his entrance into the corporate sector was initiated (through nominations and subsequent appointments) by „progressive‟ white businesses so that he could serve their specific agendas (tentative transformation of their corporate images, cultures or public perceptions thereof). The early 1990s was a time full of possibilities for those that rose to the challenge, whether it was for personal gain or for the benefit of a particular constituency (Nattrass, 1994). Mabuza was part of this shuffling and reshuffling; presumably for personal gain and as a representative of a particular constituency, the emerging black business class. His foray into

the business sector might have embarrassed and angered fellow blacks who felt betrayed by his past involvement in Bantustan politics and the fact that not many blacks made up the business elite at the time.

Mabuza was known for his pragmatism and that is why he was integrated into business by the ANC (a calculated, strategic risk). The ANC could have been paranoid and suspicious about him but instead took a chance on him; trusted him to be one of the individuals to carry its vision for South Africa‟s economic transformation. He was not shunned or ostracised as one would have expected and there is no evidence to suggest that he antagonised the transformation agenda in any way. He was roped in by both sides to facilitate and/or manage economic transformation and his being accepted as a valued partner was a function of the dynamics of socio-economic and political change in pursuit of specific imperatives. It was by both design and coincidence that Mabuza found a new niche for himself in the corporate sector.

Mabuza‟s legacy in the business arena lives on in his daughter Busi who works in South Africa‟s highly competitive, demanding and male dominated R56.2 billion private equity industry. She works as a venture capitalist and is a partner in Ethos Private Equity which is one of the private fund management firms that dominate the industry. Other major players include Brait South Africa Ltd, Pamodzi Investment Holdings, Sanlam Private Equity, Sphere Holdings and the state-owned Industrial Development Corporation and Public Development Corporation. Fund managers or investment professionals need business savvy in order to create and maintain strong business networks in volatile markets. According to an interview with *Destiny* magazine, Busi Mabuza was attracted to the equities industry by its potential to contribute considerably to the black economic empowerment (BEE) or economic transformation agenda. She moved from Cape Town to Johannesburg and worked with Wendy Luhabe‟s consortium, the Women‟s Private Equity Fund, which had a joint venture with Glenhove Fund Managers. Ethos Private Equity invests (capital injections) in BEE empowered companies to allow them to grow and succeed. In turn, these investments create an interface which allows BEE empowered companies to acquire meaningful control of companies which they later invest in once they themselves are well established - the cornerstone of affirmative action and BEE policies which are aimed at black South Africa (Bouwer and Dyantyi, 2008:80-85).

Busi Mabuza is one of very few black women who hold high level, powerful positions in the industry. Busi holds a Bachelor of Arts in Mathematics from the City University of New York (Hunter College) and an MBA from the Stern School of Business (New York University). She has a background in information technology (IT) and asset management (Bouwer and Dyantyi, 2008:84-85). Busi Mabuza shares the same passion for business and empowerment which her father had when he entered South Africa‟s business arena to help restructure it for the benefit or participation of all South Africans, particularly the previously marginalised black population. It is worth noting ,however, that regardless of Busi‟s qualifications, competence, ambition and commitment to making a difference in the world of business in South Africa (and for women‟s empowerment), there can be no doubt that her father‟s business credentials have worked to her advantage in some respects. It also goes without saying that nothing in business is ever 100% selfless.

Chapter 9: Mabuza: Family and Community Man

9.1 Introduction

A life is given meaning in the religious, political and legal doctrines of a society; within the matrix of power relations (cultural and historical) which shape and constrain freedom and choice (Denzin, 1989a:29). This in turn defines the individual (the events, processes, causes and effects which relate to them) in a particular group and at a given time. Enos Mabuza began his adult life on one path as a simple family man, teacher and lay preacher and ended up on a different trajectory as controversial politician, businessman and conservationist. According to Goffman (1968), a person‟s moral standing, acceptability, propriety, integrity and respectability is reduced when their identity is spoiled by being placed in disvalued or discredited social categories contrasted with the valued status enjoyed by conformists. Mabuza found himself stuck between two antagonising camps which meant that he placed himself and his family in considerable danger especially if the balance tipped too much in one camp‟s favour or he fell foul of one camp for whatever other reason. He navigated a complex web of personalities and power interests (political and economic) and managed to come out the other side relatively unscathed; in spite of the rather prescriptive or restrictive[70] political lexicon of the time which cast him and others in similar positions as unredeemable turncoats. Like all of us, he was not above reproach but the words cunning, vicious, vengeful or petty have not been used to describe him even though he was, without a doubt, a driven and ambitious man.

Religious leaders, journalists/ the media in whatever form, teachers, politicians and activists influence or shape public opinion (Schur, 1980:19).In South Africa, these forces adopted a zero-tolerance approach in which they convicted the notoriously unpopular Bantustan leaders because of their link with the apartheid state and their role in curtailing the efforts of the liberation movement. Mabuza was not immune to, or insulated from, the stigma and spoiled reputation because he was part of the „powerful‟ Bantustan elite and that status left him vulnerable to harsh criticism. Politics is often an exercise in discretion and Mabuza might very well have been a lesser evil, a rebel with a cause, but his „fraternising‟ with the enemy led to his demonising along with the rest of the Bantustan leaders. The dislike for Bantustan leaders was not personalised as such so there was no conspiracy to single him out for

[70] Definitions, roles, expectations and perceptions.

criticism. The criticism itself was, by and large, based on accurate or objective assessments and was necessary. Some Bantustan leaders were used by the state to quell or neutralise radical elements in their constituencies and in doing so, they strongly discouraged the masses from resorting to violent protest (read as disorder). Rather than force cooperation, the state co-opted black leaders in the councils, police force, Bantustans and Traditional Authorities to help protect its interests.

Mabuza gave his pledge to the local Swazi chiefs (and the people by extension) and records of his speeches do not deviate from this pledge to serve the people as diligently as he could. He opposed the Bantustan system and apartheid at least in principle. Was he friend or foe? Was his allegiance to the people of KaNgwane and the liberation movement fact or plain fiction – a convenient ruse designed to confound the passing observer by playing at false modesty and humility? According to those that knew him (Esther Mabuza, Interview; Sandile Mabuza, Interview; Margaret Mabuza, Interview; Elias Ginindza, Interview, Simeon Gininda, Interview), he believed that he could make a difference from within the system but how realistic was that vision and how significant a different would that have been in what was essentially a David and Goliath battle of unequally matched opponents?

Connelly (2002) observes that politics and ideology, power, ambiguity, morality, rightness, justice, the relationship between personal (as well as social or group) identity and democratic politics in relation to a set of differences are ubiquitous in modern life and create pressures that cannot be ignored. In this regard, Ross (2002) notes that the „right act" is determined by a plurality of self-evident *prima facie* duties. This chapter is based on the assumption or assertion that social capital or networks in the family, community, church or work are relevant because humans as social beings, regardless of the frequency of contact or closeness (Putnam and Goss, 2002:3-19). The nuclear and extended family, friends and associates represent a form of social capital, as does the neighbourhood association to which one belongs or the civic organizations of which one is a member (Granovetter, 2002:60-80; Wuthnow, 1998). They constitute an important asset which can be called on in times of crisis (poverty vulnerability, disputes), enjoyed for their own sake or leveraged for material gain.

The conflict environment created by apartheid and resistance to it led to a range of divisions and intra-community dynamics arising from secrecy, silence and suspicions regarding spies, black community councillors, black policemen, police informers, collaborators, double agents and internal power struggles within the liberation movement. Piven and Cloward state that,

“It is the daily experience of people that shapes their grievances, establishes the measure of their demands and points out the targets of their anger” (1979:20-22). The deprivation, persistent poverty, unemployment and frustration fostered by blatant racial discrimination created anger, irrationality and aggression.

The term *mpimpi* (Zulu for spy) and its many variations and usages - in politics (and industrial action/strikes) strips the person so labelled of their humanity. Individuals so labelled become the enemy and targets of mob violence. The TRC hearings dealt with, among others, patterns of violence, its causes, motives and the perspectives of victims as well as perpetrators. As part of its destabilisation strategy, especially in the 1980s, the state did manipulate and exploit existing inter-community rivalries - rural-urban and conservatives-progressive divides which were usually articulated through intergenerational conflicts - through the security forces, intelligence agencies, covert projects and informer networks but often times, innocent people were labelled (creating perceptions) as collaborators and marking as legitimate targets to be killed (the neck-lacing phenomenon) (TRC Report Volume 5, 1998:160, 299, 424, 446). This included, among others, individuals who defected to the state and became informers or state witnesses in political trials. Also included in this set and witch-hunting expeditions were often political opponents with no links to the state apparatus and this experience has created a challenge of reconciliation in some black communities between those who fought against apartheid and those who were seen as collaborators because they participated in state structures and thus helped to enforce apartheid (Bantustan leaders/ some chiefs, black councillors or black police/*„kitskonstabels"* and *askaris*) (TRC Report, 1998:362).

According to Goffman (1968:129), a distinction can be made between social and personal identity; the personal identity being the individual‟s subjective sense of their own situation, continuity and character obtained through various social experiences. Despite all that he achieved in his lifetime as a politician, educationist, businessman or entrepreneur, conservationist and part-philanthropist, Mabuza liked to think of himself as a simple family man. His family and friends where his anchor, sanctuary and support in coping with his peculiar and precarious circumstances because he could rely on their acceptance and compassion even when they did not understand, had misgivings did not agree with what he was doing.

9.2 Kith and Kin Loyalties

Different registers are evoked when people differentiate between legitimate members of a moral community and those who hold no such claims even when membership to the moral community is negotiated or reconfigured at intervals according to ethnicity, race, nationality, class, gender or age. Moral status is normally achieved through marriage, home ownership and being gainfully employed. In the South African context, gender and marital status generally allows men and married women privileges over women (single mothers and widows). By naming, shaming or excluding certain individuals from the group, authority or power can be ascertained by those that conform to the standard (Jensen, 2007:194).

Bourdieu‟s (1998) *fields* in the *habitus-field* analysis are fluid and dynamic - made up of relatively autonomous social worlds which include the family, church/religion, schools/education and the community at large. Mabuza fulfilled the traditional expectation that one will marry and have children and assume various family responsibilities early in his life (Finch and Mason, 1993). Between 1960 and 1976, Mabuza taught at various schools in the Lowveld region‟s White River Circuit (KaBokweni). Enos married Esther Thokozile Mabuza (nee Miya) in 1963 and they had six children together - daughters Busisiwe (the blessed one), Nekeziwe (the one who is a gift)/Grace and Nompumelelo (the successful one) and sons Vusumuzi (the one who revives the family), Sizo (the helpful one) and Sandile (we are now a big family)/Christopher. He had a conventional two-parent family with children by the time he was twenty-one years old. He took on the extra responsibility of helping to raise his siblings, including the others from his father‟s second wife (Brannen, Moss and Mooney, 2005, Zelizer, 1994; Giddens, 1991; Durkheim, 1984). In a letter to Beverly Johnson, Mabuza comments that “the family unit is the anchor of our lives” (Mabuza, Letter to Beverly Johnson and Chris, 25 November 1992:2).

Mabuza became Deputy Headmaster at Emjindini Secondary School, Barberton in 1964; Headmaster at Khumbula Secondary School, White River in 1968 and Inspector of Education for the White River East Inspection Circuit in 1972. Whilst taking up these various teaching posts, Mabuza furthered his education via correspondence and received his Matriculation Certificate in 1964, studied for a Bachelor of Arts degree with the University of South Africa which he obtained in 1969, with distinction. After that, he completed a Bachelor of Arts Honours degree with the University of South Africa which he obtained in 1973, also passed with distinction. He topped the qualifications by completing the Executive Development

Programme at the University of the Witwatersrand‟s Graduate School of Business in 1989. He also spoke fluently in siSwati, English and Afrikaans. Mabuza was inspired by the examples of leaders such as Abraham Lincoln, Martin Luther king Jr. and Nelson Mandela who defended basic human rights and the oppressed. He enjoyed reading, listening to classical music, playing chess and activities related to nature conservation (Esther Mabuza, Interview; Sandile Mabuza, Interview).

It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the emotional cost and anguish which his family lived with because of how the public received them. It is also generally that people like him, and their families, had it easy because they jumped on the apartheid gravy-train. Mrs Mabuza (Esther Mabuza, interview) recalled several incidents when the political intruded on the personal and they received crank calls presumably from security operatives who were keeping an eye on Mabuza in the dead of the night. This generated a lot of anxiety and general reluctance to answer the home phone, especially at night but Mabuza also received important calls from ANC leaders (Esther Mabuza, Interview). Sandile, Mabuza‟s son recalls that as children they knew not to wake their father after a certain time at night but when the ANC calls came, he would bolt out of bed to take the calls (Sandile Mabuza, Interview).

Most of the people interviewed note that Mabuza was a devout Christian and believed in destiny and prayer played a big role in his life. Mabuza‟s consultations with his family and a close friend Dr. Nyathi (a colleague in the teaching profession) regarding whether or not to take the position of Bantustan leader meant that he did not make the decision lightly. Education was his first passion and he wanted to improve the lot of marginalised people. His sister says that it was a difficult and sad decision for him. He was reluctant to leave the teaching profession but he did not want to disappoint his elders either. It was possible that the ordinary people would not accept him in that position so was this as selfless as this suggests? Highly unlikely but he apparently prayed with the family every evening and morning because of the potential dangers that lay in his way. Esther Mabuza describes her late husband as a God-fearing, just and humble man. She believes these qualities added to his ability to lead; his charisma. People put their faith and trust in him and he took his job/responsibilities very seriously (Sztompka, 1999). Sometimes, his wife would find him kneeling and praying for guidance in the middle of the night. He also began most meetings with a prayer. He made a contribution; some would argue a valuable one, to his community despite being a „middle-of-the road black leader‟. His family is proud of the legacy or heritage he left them because he

tried to make a modest difference to the lives of the people he touched (Sandile Mabuza; Margaret Mabuza; Esther Mabuza - interviews).

Mabuza believed in something bigger than himself and his faith had kept him going through all the highs and lows of his life and it informed his non-violent approach to politics, his sense of justice and fairness. He liked to see the good in all people. Commins (1996) discusses the use of pacifism or non-violence in struggles in America (Day, Muste, King Jr, Merton). A similar approach was taken by religious groups and individuals in South Africa (Beyers Naude, Desmond Tutu, Frank Chikane and many others). Mabuza was a politician with a strong religious upbringing which was influenced by his paternal grandmother and he made a modest contribution to debates in the church. He became a registered lay-preacher in the Methodist Church of South Africa early on in his life (van Wyk Smith, 1993:11; Mabuza, 1992; Mabuza, 1991). Mabuza was an active member of, and a lay preacher in, the Barberton Methodist Church and later the KaBokweni and KaNyamazane/Louieville branches when he lived and worked there. He was also a member of the Methodist Young Men‟s Guild. These congregations were fairly small because they were segregated and based in the townships. In an interview with Julie Frederikse (undated), Mabuza recalls that scripture became really important to his life when he was Standard 6 and made up his mind to become a minister of religion and try to lead his people out of the suffering that he saw around him like the stories in the bible - "...the God of David and the God of Moses made a very strong impression upon me in terms of our life." He believed this was his calling and he would be able to reach a greater audience as a minister of religion. He was also convinced God would eventually deliver his suffering people (Frederikse interview with Mabuza, undated).

His religious convictions were a source of emotional strength for Enos and his family. Enos believed in the equality of all human beings before God, and thus saw apartheid as an injustice against not only the black people in the country but also as a doctrine that was fundamentally wrong and immoral before God (Email Correspondence with Sandile Mabuza, April 2008). Mabuza had contact with prominent figures in the Christian community both locally and internationally, for instance, Bishop Mvume Dandala, Rev. Peter Storey, Reverend Stanley Magoba (former head of the PAC), Justice Dikang Moseneke[71], Dr. N. Motlane, Reverend Solomon S. Nyoni and businessman Archie Nkonyeni who encouraged his faith. Mabuza did not use religious ideology as a weapon in the political struggle to

[71] Who also served as deputy chairperson of the Nelson Mandela Children‟s Fund.

counter the apartheid state‟s theology which called for church leaders to “bless injustice, canonise the will of the powerful and reduce the poor to passivity, obedience and apathy” (Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1986:17). However, Mabuza participated in international prayer events such as the Washington Prayer Breakfasts which were a moral challenge to Apartheid when Christians from around the world and from different denominations and racial backgrounds gathered to pray for an end the injustice that was in South Africa (Email Correspondence with Sandile Mabuza, April 2008). Mabuza attended church services as often as he could, which meant travelling between Johannesburg to Nelspruit for Sunday church services or funerals at his home parish even though he was based in Johannesburg for most of the 1990s. He kept up with his tithing and often commented that failure to do so for whatever reason felt like starting the day without his breakfast (Esther Mabuza, Interview). It was Mabuza‟s desire to see a school that would be open to students of all races and creeds and to actively promote Christian principles and values (but not impose or advocate a specific denomination) - unity in their diversity in a school setting as a sort of pilot for South African society as a whole. He did not want the school to have a Methodist orientation necessarily, although it did turn out that way at Penryn College which he helped co-found.

The relationship between Penryn College and the Church is governed by a Memorandum of Understanding and the Church exercises influence over the affairs of Penryn through participation in its governance structures (representation on both the Board of Trustees and on Council) as already mentioned. The church‟s representatives ensure that its views and interests in all matters pertaining to the governance of the institution are properly represented and voiced. When disagreements arise, they are resolved through dialogue with the office of the Presiding Bishop. The final resolution in such matters, however, is left to the Board of Trustees or the Council but with due consideration given to the Church‟s position as articulated by the Presiding Bishop (Penryn College Organization and Governance Guide page 9). A maximum of four and a minimum of one member of the Penryn Board of Trustees is nominated by the Annual Conference of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa. The Penryn School Council members include the Presiding Bishop of the Conference of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa or his nominee or proxy and a maximum of two other members proposed by the Conference of the Methodist Church of South Africa (Penryn College Organization and Governance Guide page 6).

The school curriculum at all times includes religious education and instruction therein is given according to principles determined by the Council. Penryn College and the Methodist Church also have an agreement that preference be given to filling any vacancy in the Chaplain‟s position with someone from the Methodist Church. The procedures for this are set out in the Memorandum of Understanding which governs the relationship between the church and the school. There is also a provision for an annual formal review with the office of the Presiding Bishop (Penryn College Organization and Governance Guide pages 5, 6 & 9). Further, as a quasi-private mission school, Penryn College has devotion every morning which is overseen by a Methodist Minister/Chaplain but the church is not the overall authority.

Between Mabuza and his wife, their children did not want for parental interaction, supervision or support. Enos identified closely with his Swazi culture and the concept of Ubuntu (shared humanity togetherness and interdependence). As parents, Enos and Esther transmitted these values to their children so that they too would know and respect their cultural heritage. Mabuza was proud of his Swazi identity and did not try to disguise it as the photograph below shows (Elias Ginindza, Interview, 8 June 2007; Sandile Mabuza, Interview, 5 June 2007; Esther Mabuza, Interview, 6 June 2007).

Figure 15: Mabuza in traditional Swazi dress.

As a family, they tried to lead a normal life as much as was possible and meals times were a particularly good bonding time. They cultivated a happy, nurturing, loving and harmonious home environment and made time to relax with friends to counterbalance the stresses that were part and parcel of his position. They felt safe in their home most of the time and the community also protected them because they (most of them) supported Enos‟/Inyandza‟s vision or goals (Esther Mabuza, Interview). He was recognised in public especially in KaNgwane and people generally showed deference to him and his family. Enos and Esther Mabuza were both teachers and they understood that a good education could open opportunities that would otherwise not be available. They taught their children to make the most of their abilities and not to take their education for granted, especially in a society that was structurally rigged to discriminate and disadvantage them from the onset (structure). Their children were not coddled or allowed to sit on their laurels as the series of letters between Enos Mabuza and his son Sandile between 15 January 1987 when he was in Standard 8 at St Stithians College in Johannesburg and 23 November 1990 when he was returning from the United Kingdom after completing high school shows (see Chapter 5).

The Mabuza children have done well for themselves in their chosen careers and he would have been proud of their achievements because he did not want them to endure the same deprivations that he did as a child. The eldest child, Busisiwe, works in South Africa‟s highly competitive and male dominated private equity industry as a venture capitalist. She is a partner in Ethos Private Equity which is one of the major players in the industry. She has a degree in Mathematics from the City University of New York (Hunter College), a Computer Science degree from Spelman College in Atlanta (USA) and an MBA from the Stern School of Business (New York University) (Bouwer and Dyantyi, 2008:84-85). Nekeziwe is an attorney and Nompumelelo is a researcher and holds a postgraduate Diploma in marketing and Management from UNISA. Vusumuzi holds an LL.B degree from the University of the Witwatersrand and is an attorney in Nelspruit and still lives in KaNyamazane. Sizo holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of the Witwatersrand and trained as a teacher but is currently working in publishing. The youngest child, Sandile, obtained Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology and Law from the University of the Witwatersrand and is working in the horticultural sector in Nelspruit ((Mabuza, Letter to Beverly Johnson and Chris, 25 November 1992:4; Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007).

Mabuza‟s individual identity and reputation was inextricably linked with theirs and he tried to shield his children from too much negativity or discomfort. However, there was one incident in which the family was brought under scrutiny after Mabuza resigned from Bantustan politics and was running his consultancy business in Johannesburg. Chief Tikhontele Dlamini, a member of the KaNgwane cabinet, could allocate land and houses to people who had been displaced by the white farmers and Mabuza was allocated one of the dilapidated farm houses in Louisville but, although he kept the Louisville property, the Mabuzas did not live in Louisville when Mabuza was Chief Minister. Instead they lived in KaNyamazane Township. Later, after resigning from politics, Mabuza demolished the old Louisville house and built a double-storey house on the old foundations. This is where Esther Mabuza still lives in Louisville and Enos Mabuza is buried there. Journalist Justin Arenstein wrote an article regarding this property (and other farms owned by former KaNgwane officials including Mongisi Zitha) alleging that corruption or serious irregularities were involved in their purchase. According to Sandile (Interview, 2006), the matter deeply upset his father because it questioned his integrity. Nadine Gordimer, who was Enos‟ friend, was also upset by these allegations because when Chief Tikhontele Dlamini re-allocated land or small holdings in the Louisville area, approximately forty individuals or families benefited.

As chief Minister, Mabuza was entitled to bodyguards but he felt uncomfortable being shadowed by them all the time and would often move around by himself. This might have seemed reckless for a person in his position but Mabuza did not think that he was invincible. He simply believed in a higher power and put his trust and faith in God - that he would protect him from any harm that might come his way. It was also meant to show that he was really just one of them at heart but sometimes the bodyguards complained to Mrs Mabuza that he prevented them from doing their jobs and they feared that they would be blamed if anything bad happened to him. The guards were also concerned because they thought that he did not trust them enough but Esther Mabuza insists that he never really felt in any kind of danger, at least not when he was in the community. Of course there were dissenters and those that whispered behind his back; raising concerns about his safety - and theirs. Mabuza‟s slogan was; “in everything God is there…leave things in God‟s hands.”

Mabuza‟s eldest child, Busisiwe, was the only one who ever took an active interest in politics when she was studying at the Turfloop campus of what was then the University of the North which was one of the most vocal centres in terms of student activism. Contrary to

expectations, Busisiwe was involvement in the student representative council and was vocal to the point where she was detained a couple of times and was put under house arrest during her final year of a Bachelor of Science degree. She was banned from the university a few months before she was due to sit for her final examinations and Enos and Esther were worried for her safety. They suspected that she might go into exile and join the armed struggle and pre-empted this by applying to schools in America after Busisiwe had been detained the second time and so she went into a family imposed exile of sorts (Sandile Mabuza, Interview; Esther Mabuza, Interview).

9.3 Mabuza's Legacy in the Former KaNgwane Area

There is no contrary evidence to indicate that Mabuza was viewed as a liability and not an asset in KaNgwane. He had a reputation for being open, caring and fair, not indifferent, authoritarian and acting with impunity. He believed that trust and good faith where the most effective political tool, not force. He was an ally, not an adversary. His treatment of the people and their support of him gave him a good alibi during the transformation period and beyond.

Many prominent leaders/politicians have been accused, vilified, stigmatised and marginalised as sell-outs. A determined and ambitious politician, therefore, needs a tough skin as part of the trade. In the United States, for example, historical definitions of what a sell-out is or what constitutes racial betrayal have varied over time, not least because of changes in definitions of who is black and who is not. According to Kennedy (2008:7) "blacks who attain success in a multiracial setting will always sooner or later encounter whispered insinuations or shouted allegations that their achievement is attributable, at least in part, to selling out", until proven otherwise. Former United States Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice is an example of a successful black person who held a powerful and respected position yet instead of being admired by most fellow blacks/African Americans she is denigrated. The Editors of the Black Commentator in the United States have gone so far as to charge her of being "the purest expression of the race traitor" (cited in Kennedy, 2008:66). Blacks have reservations about her as a role model because she did not comply with the dignified maternal silence generally expected of black women. She is educated, ambitious and patriotic yet in the same breath some would say ruthless, coldly efficient and war mongering. Her motives have been questioned in terms of the Uncle Tom notion of blacks merely doing the bidding of their white „superiors." She is not alone in this as Colin Powell and incumbent president Barack

Obama have also been criticised for their positions on several issues. As blacks, their class positions (privilege) is often cited as the reason why they seem to neglect struggles for group elevation; looking black but thinking and acting like whites. Their loyalty to blackness is questioned either because of mixed ancestry, privileged upbringing or the support they receive from whites in their political careers. Whether this preoccupation or particular experience in the American context is justified or not, parallels can be drawn between the hostility directed at these African American leaders and that which was generally directed at Bantustan politicians in South Africa.

In Mabuza‟s case, how could he have reassured his constituency that he was still one of them and how long would that reassurance have sufficed without tarnishing his identity, and at the same time maintaining community solidarity? There are legal and biblical/moral/ethical approaches to determining what is good (freedom, justice, peace) and why but good (for whom?) and evil are never absolute conceptions. There are many faces and expressions of wickedness in historical perspective but how do societies respond to wrong doing? Addressing such questions was part of the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa where ideology, politics and religion was corrupted and „good‟ people become villains, the lines between good and bad became blurred and group violence became endemic.

The topic of Bantustan politics still makes some people nervous and agitated but in KaNgwane itself, it appears that Mabuza managed not to burn bridges with his constituency. There is no denying that some Bantustan politicians were responsible for horrific actions and violence against their own people and were despised with good cause. It is only logical to hold top leaders to account and as Chief Minister, Mabuza was ultimately responsible for whatever happened in the Bantustan, good or bad but no wrong-doing has been proven in his case and this raises the question whether or not it is possible to play down his culpability to such an extent if it existed. He was not an interloper or usurper because his way was smoothed over by the Hhoyi chiefs (the gate-keepers) who gave him the mandate to enter the fray. As a leader, and in a sense the custodian of the KaNgwane people, Mabuza was committed to alleviate the suffering of his people in small, ordinary ways wherever it was possible, given the limited resources dispensed to the Bantustans for development projects compared to the populations they supported. Today we take clean water, clinics and decent schools for granted but the rural constituencies were not guaranteed such services under

apartheid. It can be argued that providing these was his given mandate or responsibility but the people there generally agree that he went over and above the call of duty to ensure that the people had access to these basic services.

Mabuza‟s legacy, especially at a national level is justifiably a matter of opinion and debate but according to Goffman (1968:81), “no matter how big a scoundrel a man is, no matter how false, secretive or disjointed his existence, or how governed by fits, starts and reversals, the true facts of his activity cannot be contradictory or unconnected with each other.” Rassool (2004) refers to arenas of knowledge creation and instruction as spaces in which identity is not only performed or demonstrated but also constituted discursively (as a by-product). He notes that during the anti-apartheid struggle, various political labels were generated and attached to individuals in both public and private spaces based on different points of emphasis and contradictions of nationalism and protest politics (Rassool, 2004:323). Some incongruencies are inevitable because of the multiplicity of selves or role identities and conflicting responsibilities that individuals assume but they need not be incompatible even when fulfilling some roles violates others. The apparent continuities and discontinuities do not have to be discrediting. To this end, Goffman (1968:81, 92) argues that the important thing is the effective management of role and audience separation or delineation in the sustenance of the different selves which constitute different facets of the individual identity. Different people (spouse, siblings, children, colleagues, subordinates) had different experiences of Mabuza but those interviewed all hold positive memories of him. His family (wife, sister, children) and others who worked with him at some point (Wylde, Elias Ginindza, Rosemary Smuts, Jeunesse Park, Mathews Phosa, Dr. Conrad Strauss, Dr. Frank Raimondo, Jacob Zuma, Professor Francis Antonie, Beverly Johnson, Nadine Gordimer) have commented about how humble and modest he was, for example, he was not given to conspicuous consumption compared to other Bantustan leaders who flaunted their flashy cars, big houses and entourages of body guards.

Dr Frank Raimondo and his wife Ida of Bishops Court, Cape Town were family friends with the Mabuzas and regularly exchanged letters[72], cards and advice updating each other regarding their views on the country‟s transition, their mutual friends the Renwicks,

[72] Personal correspondence from Enos Mabuza to Frank Raimondo dated 24 January 1989, 3 March 1989, 18 December 1989, 26 February 1991, 8 August 1991 and 2 March 1993.There is also letters from Frank Raimondo to Enos Mabuza dated 11 March 1991, 9 April 1991, 23 August 1991, 11 February 1992 and 16 May 1993.

Mabuza‟s resignation from homeland politics, his subsequent directorships[73] and consultancy business which was launched at the beginning of August 1991, general family news, their children‟s[74] progress in school and in life[75], their travels and Mabuza‟s honorary LLD degree by the decision of the Senate and Council of Rhodes University in 1993. The Raimondos and Mabuzas often had lunches, dinners and took scenic drives together. Mabuza and his wife travelled to the USA for their daughter Busisiwe‟s graduation at the City University of New York at the end of May 1991. Mabuza and Raimondo talked about books and classical music (Bach and Handel). Frank Raimondo worked at the University of Cape Town and the Raimondo family often hosted Mabuza on his business trips to Cape Town so that he would not endlessly suffer putting up in hotel all the time.

Trust is important to social organisation in the family between parents and children, between spouses and between neighbours in the community. Communities and good neighbours exist because of patterns of group life based on shared customs, language, manners, values, meanings, beliefs, sentiments, shared memories and a sense of common destiny - local patriotism and sense of belonging loosely based on common experiences (Ossewaarde, 2007:373, 378). It is relatively easy to trust people within a family, neighbourhood or small community because knowledge them has been established over a period of time (one knows which neighbours can be trusted and under what conditions). Mabuza was positioned within a specific historical and institutional context which generated particular social networks, suspicions and hostilities. However, despite the pariah status of Bantustan leaders, Mabuza was reportedly very neighbourly and was never actively alienated in his community. People who knew Mabuza well are not preoccupied with what some might call his professional transgressions. They do not think of him only as a man with a tainted legacy and his name, at least in the former KaNgwane Bantustan, does not evoke feelings of betrayal, humiliation or embarrassment.

According to a colleague and friend of Mabuza‟s, Elias Ginindza (Interview, 8 June 2007) he made an effort in the area of social development and general community upliftment despite

[73] For strategic reasons, Mabuza was a part-time executive director for the Independent Development Trust and accepted a position on the State President‟s Economic Advisory Council in 1993.
[74] The Raimondo‟s children were Michael, John, Joseph, Christina and Domitilla.
[75] In the Mabuza camp, son Vusimuzi had completed and LLB degree at the University of the Witwatersrand, Sizo was teaching and the youngest; Sandile was completing his BA degree at the University of the Witwatersrand. Daughter Nikeziwe was doing a Postgraduate Diploma in Marketing and Management with the University of South Africa. Nomphumelelo had just been admitted for a BA degree at the University of Natal‟s Durban campus from St Stithians‟ College in Johannesburg.

serious odds. In Mr Ginindza‟s view, Enos Mabuza conceptualised something similar to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was to be later implemented by the ANC government as a deliberate effort to help the poor. Mabuza use the resources that his government had/was given by the Pretoria government to improve the lot of the KaNgwane people even though the small size of the Bantustan translated to a limited amount of resources allocated to the Bantustan as shown by the table below.

It was a commonly held belief that Mabuza was being punished for his two main sins; "his steadfast refusal to accept independence or to participate in government‟s proposed National Council." In an interview with the *Financial Mai*l in 1989, Mabuza added to this list the fact that he did not think that Pretoria had forgiven him for his stand against the proposed incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland in 1982. Although Mabuza was in state structures (the Bantustans) he refused to participate in the new ones. This went against the government‟s wishes and to some degree earned him some credibility with the masses. Mabuza maintained that his political stand was taken in the interests of the country with both the short and long term in mind. As a result of these refusals or disobedience by Mabuza, KaNgwane was financially neglected consistently by Pretoria compared to other self-governing territories which received sizable shares of the income generated by GST and other taxes. Mabuza made written submissions about this discrepancy in budgetary allocations to the then Education and Development Aid Minister Gerrit Viljoen, impressing upon him the fact that KaNgwane was not getting an equitable share of the central government‟s annual allocation and what it did get was insufficient to meet its needs (*Financial Ma*il, 12 May 1989:53-54; Van Eeden, 1984:126-141). This complain by Mabuza‟s complaints in this regard were also contained in an annexure to Mabuza‟s policy and budget speech which was delivered on Tuesday 9 May 1989.

When interviewed by the *Financial Mail* regarding this matter Mabuza noted that the Minister of Education and Development Aid (Gerrit Viljoen) was sympathetic to the problems facing KaNgwane and had visited KaNgwane on three occasions to assess the situation for himself. However, Mabuza added that the Minister "has to operate within certain constraints" even though the same could not be said about some of Viljoen‟s officials. Whenever KaNgwane submitted its budgetary needs to Pretoria, it was told by government officials that it did not have the "capacity" nor executive authority to use the funds requested

and its proposed budget would be cut to suit Pretoria‟s definition of the Bantustan‟s administrative capacity and constitutional status (*Financial Mai*l, 12 May 1989:53-54).

This situation (the State‟s passive aggression towards Mabuza and his government) was compounded by a lack of economic opportunities in the area too. According to the *Financial Mail*, there were 49 manufacturing concerns, 1 759 employed people in KaNgwane and R17.8m had been invested in the Bantustan by the Development Corporations by 30 September 1988 (*Financial Mail*, 1989 Vol. 112 No. 3:55). However, despite these setbacks, Mabuza was able to secure funds by other means and built schools such as the Elijah Mango College. He expanded health facilities such as clinics and hospitals and build tarred roads. In addition to this, Mabuza initiated a programme to harness water from the Crocodile River into the rural areas or reserves which were not serviced before so that the people would have access to clean water and encouraged locals to take an interest in agriculture beyond mere subsistence (Elias Ginindza (Interview, 8 June 2007). The Crocodile River is part of the Kruger National Park and forms its southern boundary. The river flows through Malelane (part of the KaNgwane Bantustan) into the perennial Nkomati River in Mozambique. Impoundments in the river‟s upper reaches release abnormally high and stable winter flows to support irrigation on the southern banks opposite Kruger. However, the Crocodile River is prone to being infested with water hyacinth and requires regular water quality management (O‟Keefe and Rogers, 2003:449 & 453).

Co-founder and CEO of Ukwakhisana, an initiative focused on the socio-economic development of communities near the Kruger National Park, Paul De Bruyn, raised R98 million for Mabuza for low cost housing in KaNgwane in 1988. Since De Bruyn was involved in socio-economic developments in the area, this assistance can be interpreted as a positive injection in the negligible coffers of the KaNgwane government for social developmental to benefit the people. However, it could have been a *quid pro quo* arrangement in which the benefactors expected something in return - what were the circumstances and who where the donors (http://www.nacsa.co.za/)?

Most of the land in KaNgwane was devoted to pastoral and other non-productive agricultural use in the 1970s. Cattle farming was the main activity in the Bantustan approximately 55 500 head of cattle being recorded, 450 sheep and 300 goats in 1975. At least 110 small dams had been built and 173 boreholes sunk to water the livestock. Dipping tanks and sale pens were also constructed for the sale of livestock (Association for Rural Advancement - Reel KK/Reel

38 Karis-Gerhart Microfilm Collection). In the 1980s, plans were drawn up to boost the creation of an emergent black commercial farming class in Nkomazi (part of the former KaNgwane Bantustan) in order to increase rural production as well as alter the racial profile of commercial agriculture in the area. However, according to the Annual Reports of the KaNgwane government, the results of these attempts were quite modest (Jensen, 2007:198). Subsistence agriculture in most Bantustans was characterised by dry-land cultivation. According to the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) (Reel KK/Reel 38 Karis-Gerhart Microfilm Collection), approximately 3% of the Bantustan was irrigated and maize, beans, groundnuts, potatoes, cowpeas, sweet potatoes and yams were grown on a small scale by co-operatives and agricultural societies.

The Nelspruit area is the second-largest citrus-producing area in South Africa and is responsible for one-third of the country‟s export of oranges and other subtropical fruits such as mangoes, avocados, litchis, bananas, paw-paws, granadillas and guavas as well as a variety of vegetables. The Institute for Tropical and Sub-tropical Crops is situated there. The three land masses which made up KaNgwane were generally suited to horticultural production and attempts were made to focus on sub-tropical fruit, particularly citrus varieties, and vegetables such as green beans, cabbages, cauliflowers and onions, mostly for domestic use. Industrial crops included sisal and sugarcane (a large sugar industry is at Malelane in the former KaNgwane Bantustan east of Nelspruit) which was produced under irrigation and followed by labour intensive processing (cutting, treating/drying). Limited areas were devoted to the production of cotton, wheat and tobacco. Approximately 1 376ha of commercial and 78 non-commercial forestry plantations had been planted in the area by 1975 (Association for Rural Advancement - Reel KK/Reel 38 Karis-Gerhart Microfilm Collection).

The comments or testimonies given by his family, friends, colleagues and neighbours portray him as an approachable, cheerful and respectful person who was satisfied with what he achieved in his lifetime. Mabuza took his commitments to his family and community seriously and his family has no doubt that he left his mark on the area where he grew up and that he touched the lives of many people there. According to interviews with family members, Mabuza was reluctant to discuss his work even though he worked both from home and the KaNgwane government offices. He often left for the office as early as 6am and returned home around 10pm and even then he continued to work in his study (Esther Mabuza,

Interview). Esther Mabuza admits that to some degree politics robbed their children of quality time they would have spent with their father but she expresses satisfaction with the effort that Enos put into maintaining some semblance of normalcy at home. She does not question his love for his family remembers how he would sit and talk with the children whenever he could. He wanted to be an ordinary father at home; not a politician. When he did find the time, he tried to give each child individual attention and find out what was going on in their life - they had their meals together, went to church, he helped the children with their homework and they played outside.

It is apparent from the accounts of several family members that they only became aware of the full extent of Mabuza‟s relationship with the ANC in 2005 at a symposium which was held in Nelspruit in his honour. The fact that his political legacy stayed hidden from family makes it almost inevitable for ambiguity or speculation regarding his actions or contribution to persist amongst ordinary people who do not have ready access to this information. He is not a national hero but he was/is admired and celebrated by his family and those who knew him in various capacities. He lived a full life and opened new frontiers for his family and blacks generally through his varied contributions to education, politics, business and conservation. Throughout his life, Mabuza could genuinely connect with people such that he maintained strong ties with the KaNyamazane community where the family lived, even though he spent most of his time in Johannesburg once he retired from politics. A charmed domestic circle was provided by supporters in the community who shared some of the criticism which was directed at him. In a sense, the community embraced his perceived moral blemish as their own (Goffman, 1968:43 & 46). However, although a strong support system can rally around the individual in times of need, it can also give them the false impression that they are more fully accepted by the society at large than might be the case. The support system creates a bubble around the individual, insulating them from the unpleasantness or antagonism of outsiders (Goffman, 1968: 120).

Numerous authors (Bowden and Rooksby, 2006:241-256; Nielsen, 2006:175-197; Tabensky, 2006:129-151; Fellman, 2006:111-125; Kumar, 2006:153-174; Gilbert, 2006:94-114; Graham, 2006:256-268; Mallema, 2006:168-175; Sadler, 2006:115-144; Ross, 2002) have commented on the tension that exists between the imperative, role and significance of judge and holding individuals or groups accountable for their actions - good or bad - on one hand and ambivalence about making efforts to understand the contexts and motives for such

actions, on the other. People‟s reactive attitudes are easily activated because they are quick to claim that they know the facts or truth about a given situation when often times it is not the case. The mere existence of differences in perceptions and interpretations, therefore, means that struggle between free will and determinism will always exist thereby creating ambiguity regarding appropriate judgment and punishment/condemnation or reward (Bowden and Rooksby, 2006:241-256; Nielsen, 2006:175-197; Tabensky, 2006:129-151; Fellman, 2006:111-125; Kumar, 2006:153-174; Gilbert, 2006:94-114; Graham, 2006:256-268; Mallema, 2006:168-175; Sadler, 2006:115-144; Ross, 2002). An understanding of the rationale or explanations for particular actions or decisions often leads to a different, less negative conclusion regarding the moral and other responsibilities of the perpetrator/s. In Mabuza‟s case, it appears from the accounts given of his relationship with the KaNgwane community that they adopted a pragmatic, humanist approach to understanding or explaining his involvement in Bantustan politics. The general sentiment expressed is that there was no malice or evident greed on his part.

The proverb “to understand is to forgive” seems to ring true in this instance, if indeed there were misdeeds to be forgiven and wounds to heal. How complete is this process of justifying or moralising the good and the bad of what he did as a fallible human being and an obligated agent (because of the request of the Hhoyi chiefs)? Did he not get his just deserts because the community and his family saw or choose to see or remember only the good about him and ignore the rest - justifications to emphasise the positive consequences of certain actions or decisions that he made and excuses to mitigate responsibility for the bad things that happened on his watch? It has been argued that concentrated power (closing ranks) can shield wrong-doers from negative legal sanctions or other harsh penalties in business, politics and other arenas where power is a useful currency (Schur, 1980:168-183; Mills, 1956) but Mabuza and those that surrounded him only had relative power which was given and controlled by the state. Perhaps knowing why Mabuza did what he did was liberating enough for the community for it not to feel anger, resentment, hatred or bitterness towards him and his family. Perhaps their acceptance of the treacherous political milieu of the time as well as the reassurances that they were given through Mabuza‟s words and deeds was enough to give them peace of mind and reconcile them when all was said and done. Elias Ginindza notes that Mabuza did not separate himself from his people or his roots when he resigned from politics. Their welfare remained a priority for him and he kept in touch with developments in KaNgwane (Interview, 8 June 2007). In his own words, Mabuza admits that resigning from

politics was not an easy decision but he also gives justification for his continued interest in politics through his consultancy and other avenues as follows:

> "It was not an easy decision for me to resign my position as the elected leader of my people, albeit within an apartheid government structure. In retrospect, I am satisfied with both my decision and the timing thereof were correct. Even my constituency who were saddened by my unprecedented move, finally accepted and respected it. However, and in spite of their having reconciled themselves to the reality of my resignation, they still regard me as the "Chief Minister" and are looking forward to the day when I shall return to lead and represent them in a national (as opposed to homeland) and truly democratic government. Although politics in not part of my agenda for the future, I do keep in touch with my people and continue to take interest in their welfare and prosperity. Whereas I value the advice of one of my close friends and confidantes, Dr Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, viz. to steer clear of the kitchen of political parties and politics, I try to monitor closely what is happening in that kitchen. After all, I may find myself and my family having to eat what is cooked in that kitchen" (Mabuza, Letter to Beverly Johnson and Chris, 25 November 1992:2).

According to Fellman (2006:111-125), there are many moral complexities and responsibilities to be considered in times of strife so what moral standard is to be used to judge him and is it different supposed to be different to that applied to other black leaders? If so, would it be fair? Enos Mabuza was not a monster. He did not act unilaterally and he never sanctioned violence against his own people or leave them worse off than they were initially. He did not fall for the vanity of material wealth in the material. He did not want to be revered but to be treated as an ordinary citizen. He was approachable in his official and non-official capacity, be it on the streets, at church or at home and this attitude did not change when he resigned from active politics (Elias Ginindza, Interview, 8 June 2007). The people in KaNgwane did not think he was superior or that much different from them. He was their brother and they believed that they were in it together with him, not against him. His family and friends give him a very ordinary human face and character. They speak of him in terms of shared intentions and responsibility (collective ownership), not virtue, misdeeds, recriminations, blame, guilt, hostility, shame, victims, perpetrators and reparations (Esther

Mabuza, Interview; Sandile Mabuza, Interview; Margaret Mabuza, Interview; Elias Ginindza, Interview, Simeon Gininda, Interview). They claim that he was aware of the consequences of his actions, or the perceptions thereof, but he tried to do what was right for his people but one should bear in mind Durkheim‟s (1984:152) caution that "every harmony of interests conceals a latent conflict, or one that is simply deterred."

9.4 Conclusion

The liberation movement was punctuated by ideological differences, rivalries, healthy criticism and in some instances, counterproductive and open hostilities. In this political milieu, Bantustan leaders bore the brunt of much of the criticism. They were disparaged, disdained and condemned in the strongest words more than „normal‟ politicians in the media and other forums outside their homes and immediate communities or constituencies. Mabuza was a man seemingly at a crossroads for most of his adult life; stuck between conflicting demands and loyalties. It is convenient, almost natural to say that he was involved in cloak-and-dagger political chicanery because he was a Bantustan leader but such a generalisation over-simplifies the complexity of the relations he kept with key figures on either side of the political and social divide - it minimises the type of politician, businessman and family man that he was. Success is not only measured by how much you earn or who knows you but also by where you stand at times of crisis. One can only speculate about Mabuza‟s beliefs or motives, declared or secret, from what he did, said and the consequences thereof, which he cannot defend now. Interpretation is a subjective but some inferences can be made from the means he used to achieve his success or stature. His personal circumstances as a child were those of disadvantage and struggle but he was able to improve himself without resorting to the use of force or inducements. The evidence available does not suggest that he achieved success in the same way most of his contemporaries in the other Bantustans tended to do.

A person has a combination of life history details or social facts (record and reputation) attached to their name. These facts are reported in their obituary but there are also lesser known or celebrated facts about them which might be known even by people who have never met the individual personally. Mabuza‟s life and legacy raises the questions regarding whether or not individuals can redeem themselves when they have done something „bad‟; whether they can be fully exonerated in the case of false accusations and trust and dignity can be restored unconditionally? He rose to prominence during a difficult period in South Africa‟s history. The political mood was not inclined to accommodate ideological

ambiguities. In this regard, Rassool (2004:446) comments that the "process of the awakening of the people involved the rejection of anonymity and a conscious process of self-identification." Other identities were necessarily subsumed into the national one and the boundaries or restrictions imposed in this way were often prejudicial.

Mabuza could have distanced himself from all these complications by declining the request of the Swazi chiefs but he did not. It could not possibly have been an easy choice given the very real possibility of retaliation by the more radical elements within the liberation movement. He was no saint and his claim that he was working for the good of the black people from within the system is regarded by some as a smokescreen for a more sinister double agenda. He participated in the state structures because he believed that he could make the best of a bad situation but he did not strike other accommodations with the oppressor. He did not accept segregation but working within the system made sense to him and presented the one advantage of not attracting the state‟s wrath. The direct approach had led to the banning of many liberation movements in the 1960s and the state did not tolerate incidents when the masses asserted themselves. Mabuza was not a revolutionary but he was one among many others who encouraged understanding, mutual respect and goodwill for the benefit of all. For the attainment of a shared dream of freedom and equality, the liberation movement in South Africa depended on the support of or alliances with groups that had different ideological persuasions and class compositions.

It is difficult to say with any certainty that greed was or was not involved. The accounts given by family members portray Mabuza as having reluctantly accepted the request (patronage) of the Hhoyi traditional leaders to guide them through the minefield of Bantustan politics mainly because of the negative perceptions it would create for the casual bystander, whether or not he zealously enforced his own people‟s oppression. He took a controversial line from the outset which he has been castigated for and others which he has been given credit for but is he worthy of any mention as an individual who contributed to the liberation struggle alongside other struggle heroes? Some audiences have welcomed his contribution (the family, his immediate community, the Swazi chiefs who co-opted him into Bantustan politics, some members of the ANC and UDF leadership and other sympathisers) while some (more radical black nationalists) have been understandably hostile and critical because they do not see anything praiseworthy in what he did, especially as far as his politics is concerned.

The business of politics can be a fickle enterprise characterised by greed, fear and anger so what is the truth about Mabuza‟s legacy or contribution? Did the people of KaNgwane, broadly defined, distrust Mabuza or was he accepted as their legitimate, though not elected leader? There was some social distance between him and the people he led in terms of education, class and outlook but a workable truce existed. There are personal consequences and challenges of leadership at all levels in all institutions which the public and critics tend to overlook or ignore because of the preoccupation about what the individuals gain. There are risks and sacrifices involved in political transactions in terms of the costs to the individuals and their families, for example, unjust characterisations, distortions and even plain lies. Even though Bantustan elites were seen as implementing facilitating or implicitly supporting oppressive policies, Mabuza always made it a point in his interviews and speeches to articulate the grievances of blacks in South Africa, not just his constituency. I have not come across any record of him advocating any action that was detrimental to the welfare of blacks as a group. However, the existence of informers, spies and the like, both real and alleged, was highly effective in creating a climate of suspicion and breaking down trust within and between families and communities and the consequences of being exposed as an informer were social isolation and physical danger. Bantustan leaders, including Mabuza, were generally regarded in the same light and their links to the state were not as tenuous. They were seen as sell-outs linked to the apartheid system and were thus, not immune (including their families) to retaliatory violence the masses. As far as the black public was concerned, fault had little to do with blame for someone in Mabuza‟s position. He, and the other Bantustan leaders, represented a line of defence for the apartheid state, an impediment to the aims of the liberation movements.

Mabuza might not be significant in the national public memory but he remains in the fibre and lives family, friends and colleagues who survived him. Coser (1967:106-107) notes that by their nature, political structures cannot accommodate all political demands and violence is resorted to especially by those that have an interest in suppressing opposition or dissenting voices. Mabuza‟s strengths, competencies, personal qualities (willingness to listen, congenial), worth and legacy depend on what he did and said and the degree to which he uplifted or empowered those around him, not just in terms of his commitment to his family‟s welfare or that of the people of KaNgwane.

Enos Mabuza passed away on Saturday 13 December 1997 at the age of 58. He succumbed to pancreatic and liver cancer at his Johannesburg home approximately two months after he was diagnosed. A memorial service was held for Mabuza at the Central Methodist Church in Johannesburg on Thursday 18 December and he was buried at his home in Louieville near Nelspruit on Sunday 21 December 1997. The family held an intimate funeral for close friends and family and Samora Machel‟s wife Graça (now married to Nelson Mandela) attended Enos Mabuza‟s funeral in 1997. As his colleagues have testified, he was a humble man and it was fitting that his funeral was not turned into a huge political production despite the public profile he had. Religious (prayers, hymns and eulogies) as well as Swazi rituals were part of the service. In his address to the board on 12 May 1998, then Acting Chairman of South African Breweries, Cyril Ramaphosa said the following about Mabuza; "The untimely passing of the highly respected Enos Mabuza is recorded with sadness and our deepest sympathy is extended to his wife and family. SAB is extremely fortunate to be able to call on the services of such able and committed people."

Mabuza‟s story fits the clichéd rags to riches mould. He came from under class roots but rose above that, became a well-connected man, influential and respected man who was loved by his community, even though he might have exercised questionable judgment at times. His sister Margaret maintains that he was not politically inclined as a young man and he had no aspirations of becoming a political figure, let alone a controversial one. She insists that he did not do it for prestige, power or wealth but to serve his people. He did not become a Bantustan leader by „right‟ like other Bantustan leaders who came from a line of chiefs but he accepted the position out of duty and respect for the chiefs who requested him to do so (Margaret Mabuza - Interview, 2007). As the various *Mayibuye* (ANC publication) interviews with and articles about Mabuza in the 1980s show, he was not the worst thing that could have happened to KaNgwane. He might not have been the best thing that happened to it either but his leadership did not herald a bleak era for the Bantustan. Instead, it represented hope for many people there, including the Mozambican refugees whom it sheltered. His constituency never rejected him or revolted again him but this does not mean that he was a Pied Piper who had mysteriously cast a spell on them to make them docile? Not at all.

When asked if she thinks her brother has been given the sort of recognition he deserves, Margaret Mabuza unequivocally says that he has not because whatever recognition he has received has been confined to the Nelspruit- KaNgwane area of Mpumalanga Province. It

must be small consolation though that the Mabuza family is still respected as a residual effect of Enos‟ commitment to the people of KaNgwane, his sincerity, warmth and compassion. Although it has been over a decade since Mabuza‟s passing, his widow was honoured by then President Montlanthe when he delivered the State of the Nation address in February 2009. One Eminent Person nominated by the Provincial Speaker from each of the nine provinces is honoured in recognition of outstanding results in a particular field or contribution to society during this address. Mrs Mabuza was the nominated Eminent Person from Mpumalanga Province in recognition of her community and business leadership (*The Daily News*, 4 February 2009).

While the Mabuza family might have preferred to have Mabuza‟s name cleared a lot earlier, they felt relieved and vindicated after his activities and alliances with the ANC and UDF were laid bare and acknowledged/ celebrated at the April 2005 symposium which was convened in his honour and proving that he was not the enemy. It was also mentioned that Nelson Mandela visited the Mabuza home several times and that Mabuza visited Mandela on Robben Island when other, more prominent leaders, could not get access to him.

To conclude, charting a political middle course was a dangerous gamble which had the potential to backfire. This chapter has deliberately sought to tell Mabuza‟s story as his immediate family remembers him - how they have memorialised him. It therefore reflects their sanitised or sentimental view of him compared to anything that even the kindest of critics might hold. The family makes no apology for their views and one would not expect them to because he was their beloved son, brother, husband or father.

Chapter 10: Conclusion

10.1 Introduction

A reading of the literature on South Africa‟s struggle against apartheid oppression reveals pre-determined categories or notions of black popular resistance from 1976 through the highly volatile 1980s. Resistance, political mobilisation and black political expression focused on formal, highly structured, political organisations. Such history is told through the "experiences and opinions of political leaders, particularly at a national level" and centred on the ANC and its political strategies and traditions (Rassool, 2004:119, 138) and generally neglect individual or local histories. At the core of this thesis on Enos Mabuza‟s life and career are questions about agency and responsibility or individual action and accountability within specific structural constraints on one hand; and our reactions to certain actions; judging and condemnation *vis-a-vis* explanation and understanding, on the other. The thesis considers the specifics of Mabuza‟s character, his history or circumstances, upbringing, family situation, education and the socio-political climate against which his formative years were spent because all these factors combined prompted certain views and actions and provided the setting for his actions. The aim is not to exonerate, condone or justify what he did or did not do but to contextualise the type of "reformist accommodationism and middle class moderation" (Rassool, 2004:119) that Mabuza represents. He cannot be exempted from responsibility for his actions but an understanding of his motivations for them helps our understanding of the dynamics or nuances that were involved. There was nothing inevitable about Mabuza‟s career. This thesis has tried to establish Mabuza‟s place in the tapestry of South African history, particularly with regards to his links with the apartheid state and liberation movements and organisations such as the ANC and UDF. Mabuza did not go out of his way to set the record, his record straight. Either people knew what he stood for and did and valued that contribution or they did not. We can speculate and debate what Mabuza ought to have done but the ideal and the practical do not always overlap.

Mabuza has detractors and those that despise what he represented but he also has sympathisers and admirers who accept or appreciate what he was able to achieve and the sacrifices that he made. He might be identified as a quisling but the disdain is not universal. History is replete with heroes and villains; stories of betrayal, courage and hope set in different eras and locales but such stories do not mean the same things to everyone or for all time. Any number of motivations, ideologies, the quest for wealth, status and power inform

our actions and decision. As people, we have a tendency to over-simplify and stereotype people that we like or dislike but their lives are often intertwined with our own or those of individuals that we admire. It is natural for us to judge others but in reality there is no saint without a past or a sinner without a future. Reference systems and values are not calcified, static, fixed or stable. Instead, they are prone to interpretation, adaptation, modification, invention or manipulation, decomposition and re-composition. In turn, relativism creates particular brands of historical moralism, hypocrisy and historical consciousness.

Contested historical accounts, records, legacies and reputations exist even in the political mainstream where individuals have been branded many negative labels alongside good ones. Rassool (2004:247) acknowledges the fallibility of political and moral greatness and considers whether the negative aspects outweigh the positive. Also, former uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) Commander and former Minister of Defence and ANC member Joe Modise is believed to have "made many enemies and lost the respect of many soldiers" (Rassool, 2004:245). Other well-known South African politicians who have been accused of having spied or being corrupt include Peter Mokaba, and Tony Yengeni. There was and still remains some turmoil controversy surrounding Reverend Allan Boesak‟s status as a struggle hero. The 2003 Hefer Commission of Enquiry investigated allegations that former Director of Public Prosecutions (and former UDF leader) Bulelani Ngcuka had been an apartheid era spy (Rassool, 2004:247). Also in 2003, former President Thabo Mbeki attended the funeral of Kaiser Matanzima who was buried as a hero of the liberation struggle despite his contradictory reputation as a Bantustan "stooge" and "quisling chief" who had colluded with an oppressive regime (Rassool, 2004:247).

A politician, or anyone for that matter, cannot be all things to all people. Life and careers are about finding or creating opportunities to advance oneself whilst winning hearts and minds in the process. The career of a politician begins with great promises and expectations and unfortunately, experience has shown that many fall short on delivery and eventually become irrelevant, unpopular or both, depending on how they use or abuse political power. The cycle of political change and continuity is born as people search for alternative leaders who speak to the issues of the day. Individual politicians become too enamoured with the structures of power, do not prioritise the right issues, miss opportunities and make rash decisions. Before they know it, they are in political limbo or battling to survive professionally. As a Bantustan politician, Mabuza and others were de-cried as frauds or front-men that lied, deceived and

cheated long-suffering people of South Africa on behalf of the apartheid regime. They were not democratically elected but in Mabuza‟s case, he was hand-picked and groomed to suit a particular agenda by the Swazi chiefs (effectively his immediate handlers). They needed him to be a stop-gap contingency measure so that he would lobby for them and the people of KaNgwane.

Southall, Simutanyi and Daniel (2006) employ case studies to examine the relationships evolving between new regimes and their predecessors including the post-presidential years of the iconic Mandela in South Africa, Daniel arap Moi in Kenya, Nyerere in Tanzania, Rawlings in Ghana, Charles Taylor in Liberia (Southall, Simutanyi and Daniel, 2006:1-23). In Africa, the debate about constitutional term limits regarding the number of terms of office that an incumbent leader can serve, leaders who overstay in power or personalise power is situated in the context of military regimes, one -party states, multi-party democracies, parliamentary and presidential political systems and as well as the hybrids in between[76]. Museveni‟s bid for a third term in office in Uganda was unsuccessful as was Frederick Chiluba‟s bid in Zambia and Bakili Muluzi‟s in Malawi. Sam Nujoma‟s bid for a third term in Namibia was successful and Robert Mugabe has served more than five terms (over a quarter century) to date. Mozambique‟s Joachim Chissano did not try and get re-elected a third time, which is rare for an African leader. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela did not seek re-election after one term but there were rumours that his successor, Thabo Mbeki, wanted to make a bid for a third term (Southall, Simutanyi and Daniel, 2006:1-23). Few politicians are realists who truly see things as they are and do not wait to be forcibly ejected from power. Many are short-sighted and dig their heels in, get embittered, combative, confrontational[77], issue inflammatory statements, have bouts of irrational megalomania and are reluctant to step down or retire peacefully and gracefully. Whilst some leaders do leave office, they often retain too much power and influence over those that remain in power from the old regime or even within the new power blocs.

Most leaders, not just on the African continent, have chequered reputations, questionable principles, virtue and integrity but many manage to remain relevant in their countries or regions and assume constructive roles internationally as mediators, peace brokers in conflict resolution and as advocates for development. They continue being the locus of power and are immortalised in various philanthropic foundations and organisations which they found

[76] Nigeria has had numerous military and civilian rulers.
[77] Different manifestations of violence and sabotage, for example, Ghana‟s Jerry Rawlings.

themselves as well as the naming or dedicating of buildings, roads and other landmarks but this depends on their record in power; how they conducted themselves or the regimes over which they presided whilst in office, their successes and failures, for example, human rights abuses and other excesses and their consequences. A balance sheet is necessarily drawn up to weigh the good and the bad (judgment, assessment, appraisal), needs for justice, stability, peace and accountability when a head of state leaves office and often times granting immunity or amnesty from prosecution to the individual[78] is the price a country pays to maintain peace and order. Whether or not punitive measures or vengeance is taken is a delicate or sensitive matter involving a lot of speculation, trade-offs and the massaging of egos and accommodating the vicissitudes of elite alliances in presidential succession[79]. However, it does not always happen in a dignified manner which avoids political polarisation because the leaders involved are contentious, belligerent and erratic to the point where they negate any magnanimity which could be extended to them by their successors. However, through different compromise arrangements for political convenience, many countries constitutionally allow former leaders to retain their diplomatic and other privileges or special benefits (homes, assets, recognition, prestige, stature, personal assistants, physical security) when they retire quietly and get out of the political limelight (become passive or honorary) out of respect and gratitude for service to their country ((Southall, Simutanyi and Daniel, 2006:1-23).

Since 1994 and the dawn of democracy in South African, there have been many changes, but many things have also remain the same, for instance, poverty and inequality seem to be increasing rather than decreasing. One can point to structural and ideological limitations in post-apartheid South Africa and the contested terrains of its politics which make prioritising matters of redress problematic and insufficient, thus breeding discontent regarding distributive and social justice or the rights and entitlements of citizens.

This thesis on Enos Mabuza‟s life and career focuses mostly on his politics and it is important to take everything in context. It is also important to keep in perspective the fact that political opinions and attitudes change over time. Compromises and accommodations are made in response to changes in circumstances and other imperatives. Many Bantustan functionaries were accommodated into the national post-apartheid bureaucracy even though they were the subjects and instruments of agitation in their respective Bantustans and did not share or

[78] Chiluba in Zambia for corruption and Charles Taylor in Liberia and Sierra Leone for human rights abuses.
[79] Masire-Mogae-Khama in Botswana.

support the national-liberation discourse, ideology and rhetoric. The situation was no different for Mabuza and his case demonstrates these compromises and accommodations, especially with his transition from Bantustan politics to the business world. He was regarded as a maverick Bantustan politician in the late 1980s and early 1990s because of his relatively benign rule in KaNgwane and the fact that he actively danced to the tune of the ANC. He was able to ingratiate himself with the right crowd at the right time and was thus able to be of „æssistance" on the business front during the transition at a time when the majority of the other Bantustan kleptocrats were planning violent exit strategies, being insolent or pursuing secession as an option through hardball bargaining. Mabuza used his years of experience in politics to extend an olive branch instead and he benefitted immensely from the networks that he was able to build with both politicians and businesspeople.

10.2 The Means-Ends Dilemma

Mabuza took advantage of his positions and relative power or influence because it served him and others well, for instance, in his fund-raising efforts for the Penryn project (education) or his conservation interests. However, there is no evidence to suggest that he was a ruthless or vicious man who used his position or influence to do harm, despite general perceptions. From a philosophical standpoint, moral judgment and evaluation pertaining to what is right, good, bad, controversial or ambiguous about an individual and their contribution to society are closely entwined with how biographies are written or how lives are interpreted. According to Maurois (1929:120), biographies have some moral influence on the reader. This influence is often salutary or profound because the lives that we read about are the lives of people who have done great things in our social or political history; actions which differentiated them from others and made them stand out. The actions of such people are usually worthy of admiration and inspire us to become better people, for example, an individual like Mother Theresa (1910-1997) who dedicated her life to the service of the poor and dispossessed and became a global icon for selfless service to others. Through her Missionary of Charities organisation, she cared for thousands of sick and dying people in Calcutta and was awarded the Nobel Peace prize in 1979. Our moral attitudes are responses to perceived goodness and rightness. As such, moral terms such as good, bad, right, wrong, valuable, ought, duty, fitting, appropriate, or merited are value judgments. Moral judgments encompass and express positive associations and moral beliefs and certain empirical facts make an act *right* or *good*. Doing something good or bad can be regarded as an objective in itself and this brings into

question the nature of goodness and value in relation to other things or people and as relations or objectives. Ross‟s book *The Right and the Good* (2002) focuses on rightness and goodness and their relation to one another. It examines the difference between right, duty and moral goodness as its central theses by debating how and when the right can be derived from the good. It points to the essential normativity of moral discourse, certain moral propositions and evaluative judgments. Ross (2002) considers Immanuel Kant‟s views on the desire to do one‟s duty, conscientious or virtuous actions, scales of moral goodness (or badness), as well as bad and good actions. Duty can be a motive in itself but it can also be an observance of the rights and a furtherance of the interests of others, even if it benefits the agent in the process. However, principles of duty cannot ultimately be grounded in a single foundational principle as consequentialists and Kantians believe. Consequentialism attempts to ground the right in the good; in the value of their outcomes or their instrumental goodness.

Society generally defines and evaluates what is right in terms of that which is productive of a certain positive outcome - the greatest good or the best possible consequences. This view raises the question of whether deeds or actions and their consequences are commensurable - measurable in degrees as well as comparable (the balancing of virtuous actions and dispositions against one another). Ross (2002) suggests that what makes actions right is that they are productive of good. However, he further notes that the right act cannot be derived from the moral value of the motive from which it is done and that rightness is not entirely determined by the value of the consequences of one‟s action, whether the value is of some benefit to the agent or an agent-neutral good. There is ambiguity inherent in any definition of the meaning of right because of the subjective judgment it entails. What we say or do has implications for possible beneficiaries or victims and this creates a dilemma about meanings and consequences as it creates a morally significant relation in which we stand in relation to others. Ross (2002) maintains that the significance of what we say or do is derivative and contingent.

The right act is determined by a plurality of consequence-based considerations and self-evident *prima facie* duties. *Prima Facie* duties are defined as responsibilities to ourselves and to others which are contrasted to what we should do (duty proper). The distinction between what *seems* to be our duty and what *really is* our duty is determined by the balance of these responsibilities. Ross (2002) regards *prima facie* duties as seven intrinsically (moral) reason-giving features of actions from which all other moral features derive their reason-giving

force. They are considerations of fidelity, of reparation, of gratitude, of justice, of beneficence, of self-improvement, and of non-malfeasance (Ross, 2002:21). However, considerations of justice, beneficence and self-improvement can be subsumed under the promotion of intrinsic value (Ross, 2002:27) because happiness, virtue and justice are regarded as intrinsic goods which promote what is good and non-malfeasance (avoidance of bad). America‟s Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X were human, flawed, different but also heroic. The character and limitations of their respective contributions and the way they complemented each other in their differences have greatly influenced Black Americans and their politics (ideological heritage). Their periods of popularity waxed and waned when they were alive and possibly peaked after their martyrdom. Both were religious men with different upbringings and religion was crucial to their personal philosophies, dispositions, moral vision and leadership styles in the fight for dignity and justice at a time when black Americans were in search of messiahs. King is admired for his graceful humility, progressive civil protest/disobedience, social compromise and his optimistic integrationist strategy for achieving black equality through moral suasion and legal argument. His accommodationism is often compared to that advocated by Booker T Washington and Frederick Douglas. In contrast, Malcolm X represents social rebellion, dark, rabid, radical and corrosive black anger at American prejudice. Malcolm X rejected King‟s non-violence and integration and is remembered for his resurgent racism and separatist nationalism for black survival. Numerous biographies have been written on both of them in attempts to set the record straight regarding their contested legacies (Rassool, 2004).

Much criticism has been levelled South Africa‟s former Bantustan leaders and it seems like they did their characters, images and reputations irreparable damage. Most of the authors cited in this thesis reflect the general sentiments of ordinary people and portray South Africa‟s former Bantustan rulers as traitors, sell-outs, collaborators, outlaws or renegades that betrayed their people by fraternising with and aiding the enemy (the apartheid state) by serving in puppet governments which were part of the divide and rule strategy. Homeland leaders were the prostitutes and the apartheid state was their pimp or promoter. Each man had a price (some questionable or easy virtue) which allowed their interests to intersect or collide with those of the apartheid state. For many observers or commentators, the means did not justify the ends and vice versa and these individuals should be haunted by their deeds and choices forever. Whatever their motivations for participating in the system, it was virtually impossible for them to undo or reform the apartheid policy and the Bantustan system from

within, as Mabuza would have us believe. It was an exercise in futility because the system was internally rigged to fulfil the apartheid regime‟s aims. The image of an animal in captivity; vulnerable, weak, hopeless and powerlessness comes to mind and one almost feels pity for them, not so much because they were also victims in a sense, but because of the delusions which they sold to themselves about what they were doing or what they could do. The die was cast when they put themselves in a compromised, precarious position and for most of them the chickens came home to roost when the political transition began. They might have been thrill-seeking but they were not invincible. The false grandeur which came with their positions as the apartheid government‟s lapdogs ultimately crumbled around them. It is up to individual interpretation whether there is or should be gradations of dishonour for the men who served as homeland rulers during the dark and volatile days of apartheid.

The literature and analyses individualise, personalise or singularise the position of Bantustan leaders but there were deeper structural factors at work long before these individuals assumed these positions. These „leaders‟ did not appear in a social or political vacuum and it can be argued that, for a while, a perverse equilibrium or order was achieved in terms of the apartheid state‟s design, despite the stigma that was attached to participation in Bantustan structures and loss of faith in the moral fibre of the individuals that chose to participate in those structures. Mabuza‟s decisions or actions were creative, not passive, and depended more on his ingenuity and charisma than on following conventions or propriety (moral norms, technical correctness, ritual prohibition or taken for-granted routine).

South Africans had already endured many years of apartheid when Mabuza joined the Bantustan structures. The violence, rights abuses, insecurity and instability that accompanied apartheid and entrenched the political and financial interests of the ruling party and its beneficiaries or supporters created and perpetuated a deep sense of frustration and powerlessness among the oppressed. A social and political paralysis or fatigue was setting in because of the unpredictable yet assuredly violent character of apartheid and for Mabuza, who did not have a violent disposition; working against the system from the inside out was his way of trying to beat it when everything else seemed to be failing. The decision to become a functionary of the Bantustan system could not have been one taken merely for entertainment to cure boredom or simply to get off the beaten path. He found himself in an unenviable situation which seems to defy conventional logic, although it was not random or lightly entered into. The real question is whether or not there were limits to what Mabuza was

prepared to do *vis a vis* what his position in relation to Pretoria demanded. Coincidence and ambiguity might have played a significant role and paved the way for him in some respects but Mabuza‟s personal integrity was always going to be at stake; questioned, However, there was also the opportunity for prosperity in the harsh social, economic and political reality that was apartheid; provided one was at the right place at the right time and played the right cords. No one grew up aspiring to be a Bantustan functionary or leader and for many it was undesirable to be associated with them but someone had to serve in those positions once the institutions were created. Debates raged on among and within different movements, political affiliations, classes and generations about the proper solution to the apartheid crisis but until that solution was found, the Bantustan system was not going to miraculously disappear because people wished it away. The contradictions in Mabuza‟s life were borne of conflicting values. On the one hand he wanted to sincerely serve or fulfil the duty and responsibility put on his shoulders by some of the Swazi chiefs and that meant dealing with certain risks and drawbacks. One the other hand, he had to do what would best serve the material and other interests of himself and his immediate family whilst maintaining some honour and respectability.

The major theories and concepts in sociology, for instance Bourdieu, Putnam and Touraine cited above, aim to explain the relationship between the individual and society at large by demonstrating agency, free will and their limitations as well as by highlighting some comparative aspect across different time periods and contexts. Mabuza‟s career was a process and not an event. He knew what his handicaps were and could circumvent them by being able to anticipate changes in the political and economic mainstream and responding accordingly. He invested in his career through the networks that he created. The mutual trust and confidence between him and those he worked with allowed them to share delicate information with him throughout his career and in turn made him part of South Africa‟s emerging black middle elite.

People are not one dimensional but have many facets. In this thesis, Mabuza‟s life and career have been used to demonstrate this. Everyone has interests to protect in order to advance themselves but there does not need to be a conspiracy behind such action even when concessions are made in pursuit of such interests. Mabuza showed resilience, emotional and social intelligence in protecting his economic and political interests but it was not a symptom of a diabolical plan to destroy everything in his path. He was self-serving to a point but his

agenda was not to be at war with his own people. The Inyandza National Movement was committed to non-violent means of struggle after the 1-3 March 1986 meeting of their leadership in Lusaka, Zambia agreed to hold regular consultations on issues of common concern between itself and the ANC. This showed commitment to cooperation, not competition, with the rest of the democratic movement in South Africa and in a December 1990 interview with *Mayibuye Magazine*, Mabuza stated that he believed that the letter and spirit of the 1986 joint communiqué between Inyandza and the ANC had been adhered to. Despite the biased assumptions about him as a person and as a leader, as well as some misplaced expectations about what he could achieve once he was elected, he took his responsibilities seriously and understood the risks, costs and incentives that it entailed.

> ...it has always been a sacred duty as well as a privilege for me to serve the people of KaNgwane...As we know, there is no school or seminary for Chief Ministers. I have had to live and learn in the hard school of life. In carrying out my responsibilities, I have tried to employ honesty and consistency, as well as faith in Almighty God, as my guiding principles. Where I have failed by omission or commission, I would like it to be known that this was not by intention or design. We all, frail mortals that we are, fail sometime, somewhere (1991:15).

He was not oblivious to the assumptions and judgements which were often made about him and he was willing to take responsibility for his mistakes. In his resignation speech which was delivered to the Special Session of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly on Thursday 7 March 1991 (1991:2), Enos Mabuza states that "it is my firm belief that leadership is not a lifetime occupation." In the speech, Mabuza acknowledges the patience and stoicism of his family throughout his tenure as Chief Minister (1991:6 & 14). He singles out his wife Esther for her "support, patience and fortitude" and his children for their understanding and tolerance of his preoccupation with work. Mabuza thanked his Departmental Secretary and office staff as well as paid tribute to Chief Ngomane as the oldest serving member of the KaNgwane Cabinet at the time of his resignation. He describes Ngomane as amiable, humble and loyal. He also thanked KaNgwane"s former Minister of Education and Culture Mr E. C. Mango and Mr M. C. Zitha who he described as an outspoken colleague, confidante and friend. Mabuza had seriously considered tendering his resignation in 1983 (after the 1982 incorporation impasse) and 1988 and he says it was Zitha who dissuaded him from doing so

(1991:14). Mabuza thanks his father for his "Spartan and yet caring upbringing of me", his late mother who taught him to "endure suffering and still be able to love and care for others" (1991:14). By resigning from homeland politics of his own accord, Mabuza was able to cut the strings and end or reduce the co-dependence which the system fostered.

Governing fractious populations faced with many challenges including addressing racial and socio-economic inequalities and poverty led most Bantustan leaders to employ different strategies or combination of strategies[80] with varying levels of competence to neutralise political threats and manage perceptions within the confines of the system. Different interests and agendas had to be balanced out from the moment that ascended to positions of „power" but this is common to any position of political power where individuals put their reputations on the line, contend with rivals, have to address internal tensions and strife, loyalties and have to consider future relations with successors. The complexities of power in practice are that there are no elegant, swift or permanent solutions and for his part, Mabuza expressed that he wanted to be judged on the basis of having tried to make a difference. "It is our submission that we could not all go to prison, or into exile or engage in extra-parliamentary means of struggle. Some of us took the gap offered at the time and with the basic principles of our mission statement as our goal, gave our best, in the interests of not only the Swazi speaking people in KaNgwane; but all oppressed and disenfranchised South Africans" (1991:12). Mabuza's resignation was effective from 15 April 1991 and the speech is a reflection or summary of the failures and successes, challenges and rewards that he faced in thirteen years of serving in political office. His resignation speech has the following section headings: Inyandza's Mission Statement; Difficulties and Hardships of Office; Achievements; Friends, Inspiration and Support; and The Future based on President F.W. De Klerk's announcements on 2 February 1990 and 1 February 1991. Mabuza was not cynical but optimist about the future of South Africa's politics and business.

Mabuza participated in numerous leadership development programmes in Africa, North America and Europe and he piqued the interest and enjoyed the goodwill of some politicians and business executives who were major contenders in their spheres of influence. Bourdieu (1994:5) defines habitus as predispositions and resources (material and intellectual) acquired and developed through socialisation, cultural integration and the social reproduction of

[80]Elitism accommodation, patronage, widespread corruption and patrimonialism among people with connections to centres of power direct confrontation, backroom bargaining or isolating difficult individuals, reconciliatory bargaining, appealing to morality and patriotism, addressing minority interests, imposing or negotiating solutions.

values, norms, customs, kinship, identity and expectations of filial loyalty from generation to generation (Bourdieu, 1993). Social conditions or contexts mould the habitus over time and by being able to adapt his habitus or way of thinking and being, Mabuza survived the Bantustan system for thirteen years despite the prejudice, labelling and stereotyping that his position attracted. Instead of being written-off, Mabuza rose above it to eventually rub shoulders with the economic heavy-weights of the time. The political, social and economic capital that Mabuza was able to accumulate opened more doors for him than it shut. Mabuza was not antagonistic or confrontational and he derived relative power from the relationships that he was able to nurture through collaborative, consultative and other processes with those that wielded real power. Whether such interactions were genuine or contrived is irrelevant because by his association with them, Mabuza was able to acquire similar capital for himself and the networks that he created ultimately benefitted his children and their education ensuring that they went to good schools and derived all the benefits they could from them. Mabuza‟s connections possessed what Bourdieu terms social, economic and political capital. Mabuza became well-connected because of or in spite of his participation in the Bantustan system. In spite of the odds, Mabuza was trusted by many people and that trust served as a bridge between what was known and what was unknown during South Africa‟s political transition.

There were risks but based on his past conduct, his colleagues and associates could afford to take a chance on him. Mabuza enjoyed the favour of established white business as well as upstart black businesses which were affiliated with the ANC and he could act as a liaison between the two since a significant part of the country‟s political transition was on terms defined by whites because they held the economic power. Yet, the path the Mabuza‟s career took cannot simply be reduced to mere functionality, duty or necessity. His cultivation of patronage relations or networks which helped create opportunities, facilitate what he did next, where he went and who his audiences were over time. The major liberation movements were focused on the bigger picture, the greater good and a larger horizon. Although these were important to ordinary people too, more pressing or immediate demands and opportunities usually took precedence. Mabuza‟s sincerity, pedigree and legitimacy as a Bantustan politician is questioned because of what the institution represented. He is not exulted and will always be under scrutiny as different prejudices and assumptions are brought to bear. Consequently, little focus is put on his roles as an educator, conservationist and businessman. However, his sincerity and humility as a person – son, husband, father, friend and colleague

is acknowledged by those who knew him. Whether or not he got his just deserts is a subjective, political evaluation.

10.3 Memorials and Commemoration in Honour of Mabuza

Monuments and memorials are recognitions and celebrations of political contributions and meritorious service in other fields but they also mark complex and controversial representations or image making. The creation of national, provincial and local heroes who have served their country or community with distinction is a selective, often partisan and hierarchical process. According to Rassool (2004:270), public and private recollections and commemorations of historical pasts in South Africa are mainly told (evaluated) through hegemonic constructions of „great lives of resistance and reconciliation." What immediately comes to mind are national heritage frameworks which have turned Nelson Mandela"s biography into the national story (Rassool, 2004: 506)? Individuals such as Alfred Nzo, Z. K. Matthews, Alfred B Xuma, Sol Plaatje, D.D.T. Jabavu, Oliver Tambo, Albert Luthuli, Steve Biko, Robert Sobukwe, Govan Mbeki, Joe Slovo, Ruth First and Walter Sisulu have easily recognisable names, faces and established resistance credentials and they are held up as role models and icons to be emulated. Their construction in resistance biographies has become the template for triumphant national heroes and martyrs on whom grand narratives are based (Callinicos, 1993 cited in Rassool, 2004:168; Rousseau (1994 cited in Rassool, 2004:204).

Underneath all this is an assumption that lives, actions or careers are coherent, ordered, linear, harmonious and without contradiction but a person"s intentions or motives are not knowable in any ultimate or objective sense. In the case of the struggle against apartheid, a particular moral code, vocabulary or activities were used to identify, name and conceptualise the „enemy" through juxtaposition but Rassool (2004:321) points to collaboration, for example, as a survival strategy or necessity for some individuals under difficult circumstances which violated the idealised „indivisibility" or commonality of the struggle. Mabuza occupies a peripheral position in the public memory because of his association with the apartheid state. Recognition and legitimacy in the form of accolades, praise and tributes is given for "the heroic and pioneering deeds and public careers of national leaders." War heroes and others who have sacrificed some aspect of their life gain access to political patronage (Rassool, 2004:76, 143). Monuments and memorials give affirmation to the people they are named after, for example, living memorials like the Steve Biko Foundation or the

Nelson Mandela Foundation. John Vorster Bridge over the Buffalo River in East London has been renamed the Steve Biko Bridge (Rassool, 2004:226) which make one wonder if this means that Biko and Mabuza"s achievements, contributions or sacrifices are comparable.

The *Journal of Southern African Studies* is a special issue entitled *Writing in Transition in South Africa: Fiction, History, Biography* (2006 Vol.32 No.4) which reflects new theoretical approaches to the study of heritage in Southern Africa and covers how we can overcome contradictions and challenges in the way the past is represented. It suggests ways in which communities can get closure regarding neglected strata of local history and narratives[81]. The journal is dedicated to finding new ways of imagining and marketing public culture and history.

Politics is brutal, adversarial, contingent and contradictory by nature and it carries very real risks in the form of coups, secessions, assassinations and general skulduggery but not all leaders are tyrannical and strangle the life out of a country or people. However, most have blemishes on their records too. Some former leaders are revered heroes and others are feared, harassed, denigrated, humiliated, incarcerated or banished and exiled when they eventually get out of office, for example, Liberia"s exiled despot Charles Taylor. Southall, Simutanyi and Daniel (2006:1-23) write about the role, status and legacies of former African[82] Presidents or statesmen when they leave public office, especially given the myriad problems faced by the African continent. The authors focus their comparative study on the post-independence period 1960-2004 and the consolidation of democratic governance. Individuals including Mandela, Daniel arap Moi, Charles Taylor, Jerry Rawlings, Julius Nyerere and Robert Mugabe are variously categorised as despots, visionaries and nationalists in accordance with how they conducted or conduct themselves and how they will be remembered. It is noted that many African leaders, predominantly men, try to cling to power by any means necessary and entertain notions of life presidencies whilst others avoid or crush succession debates altogether. The reality is that few African leaders voluntarily retire because they grow accustomed to a life of power, authority, purpose, position and privilege and would rather die on the job if they are not pushed out of office by coup (Southall, Simutanyi and Daniel, 2006:1-23). Many leaders are not pragmatic enough to accept that it is

81 Postcolonial identities, alienation, community relations, monuments, landscapes and natural heritage, art and architecture.
82 South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, Nigeria, Liberia.

inevitable that their reign will eventually end. Perhaps they are simply not flexible, able or willing to adapt to changing political terrains.

There are limited options open to retired politicians, especially those with misdemeanours and misdeeds to answer for because they face the very real possibility of being displaced and made redundant. The treatment of former leaders is complex and contested as the varied experiences surveyed by Southall, Simutanyi and Daniel (2006:1-23) highlight. The political arena is marked by obvious and not so obvious vulnerabilities, guilt, ambition, strategy, gratitude, sentiment or nostalgia, resentment, vengeance, disdain, sympathy and loyalty. In all of this, some politicians manage to rise above the politics (and oftentimes pettiness) to become eminent persons upon their retirement. By examining the arena of institutionalised political power in Africa, one can see the continuities and discontinuities in past, present and future political practice in the different countries. We see how transitional politics and justice as well as the need for political stability reconstitute the political playing field in different contexts where former leaders are granted immunity or held accountable for the crimes they commit while in office. Moi in Kenya was given conditional immunity provided he stays out of active politics as a way of diffusing political tensions. Exiles include Uganda‟s Idi Amin in Saudi Arabia and Milton Obote who was in exile in Zambia, Liberia‟s Charles Taylor in Nigeria and Ethiopia‟s Mengistu Haile Mariam in exile in Zimbabwe (Southall, Simutanyi and Daniel, 2006:1-23).

People tend to exaggerate their own achievements but Mabuza was modest about his. The gestures and accolades bestowed on him by others show that he left his mark, made some positive contributions and someone noticed. Mabuza‟s work and contribution to South African history, particularly in his home area of Mpumalanga has been acknowledged by some quarters including the ANC, Mbombela Municipality, Penryn College, Georgetown University and Rhodes University but first, it is interesting to note that none of the bridges, community centres or halls that were built by the KaNgwane government are named after Mabuza as was generally the trend in the other Bantustans. According to his wife Esther, it is not because people did not want to name then after him but because he refused. He did not want to be worshipped in anyway and there are no effigies of him strewn across South Africa.

In 1993 Rhodes University conferred an honorary Doctor of Laws (LLD) degree on Mabuza (van Wyk Smith, 1993:11). Between 1990 and 1999, a total of 23[83] (3 women and 20 men) honorary LLD degrees were conferred by Rhodes University which suggests that Mabuza‟s credentials might not be equal to but are similar to those of these individuals and their obvious link to the law, equality and human rights. Gavin Walter Hamilton Relly was the Chancellor of Rhodes University and Derek Scott Henderson was the Vice Chancellor when Mabuza was awarded the degree, themselves recipients of honorary LLD degrees from Rhodes University in 1991 and 1997 respectively. Those that nominated Mabuza saw it fit to give him such an honour and make him part of a club of esteemed individuals who have made remarkable contributions to their professions and exemplify Rhodes University‟s motto "Where Leaders Learn" (Rhodes University Calendar, 2008:23-26). The South African Department of Education produced a report in November 2008 entitled *Report of the Ministerial Committee on Transformation and Social Cohesion and the Elimination of Discrimination in Public Higher Education Institutions* which put the on-going transformation agenda for higher education to undo the racist colonial and apartheid past in the spotlight. A scathing report entitled *SA Universities of Shame* on described Rhodes University as a historically white institution with an enduring colonial, male and elitist culture (Philip, 2009). The same year that Mabuza was awarded his degree by Rhodes University, Thomas Rodney Hope Davenport was awarded a DLitt and Bennett Alexander Jacobson was awarded an MPha by the same institution. All three recipients were male and Mabuza was the only black person. In the same decade, honorary doctorates were awarded to distinguished people including Govan Archibald Mvunyelina Mbeki but the majority of them were white males (Rhodes University Calendar, 2007:25).

One wonders whether Rhodes University nominated Mabuza for the honour out of genuine respect and recognition for his contributions and achievements and whether those achievements compare to those of the individuals that have had similar honours bestowed upon them by the institution. The awarding of the degree gives Mabuza a place amongst other distinguished Rhodes honorary graduates such as black educator and politician Davidson Don

[83] Wycliffe Mlungisi Tsotsi, James Martin, Colin Legum, Anthony O‟Reilly, Gert Johannes Gerwel, Alexander Lionel Boraine, Aron Bacher, Derek Scott Henderson, The Hon Mr Justice Arthur Chaskalson, Kader Asmal, Frene Noshir Ginwala, Allan William Buchanan Gray, Alexander McGregor, Alastair James Kerr, Michael Conway O‟Dowd, Nganani Enos John Mabuza, Peter Malcolm Searle, Chester Arthur Crocker , Gavin Walter Hamilton Relly, Helen Suzman, Gwendolen Truda Brock and The Hon Mr Chief Justice Michael McGregor Corbett.

Tengo Jabavu, former director of the Christian Institute Reverend Alpheus Hamilton Zulu, trade unionist Lucy Buyaphi Mvubelo, teacher and novelist E‟skia Mphahlele, novelist Cyril Lincoln Sibusiso Nyembezi, educator Miriam Toba Dakile, veteran ANC politician Govan Archibald Mvunyelina Mbeki, Theocritus Simon Ndziweni Gqubule, anti-apartheid activist The Most Reverend Winston Hugh, Njongonkulu Ndungane, actor, director and playwright John Kani, businesswoman Nombasa Nini, renowned diplomat Nigerian Chief Emeka Anyaoku, Judge President of the South African Land Claims Court Fikile Charles Bam, former president Nelson Mandela, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, veteran musician Miriam Makeba, Honourable Justice Lex Mpati, Eastern Cape Premier Nosimo Balindlela, Dikela Ndwebisa of the Grahamstown Civic Association, photographer Peter Magubane, former Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, businessman and entrepreneur Dr Reuel Khoza and Chief Justice Pius Langa. It seems highly unlikely that Mabuza would have had such an honour bestowed on him by a historically black university in 1993 (before the landmark 1994 democratic elections) since KaNgwane did not have its own university.

Perhaps the awarding of the degree was connected to Mabuza‟s links with the 1820 Foundation. The Settler Monument is situated on Gunfire Hill in Grahamstown and it is associated with change and reconstruction. The Monument was officially opened on 13 July 1974 and was rededicated in 1996 following a devastating fire on 13 August 1994 which destroyed part of it. The 1820 Monument is administered by the Grahamstown Foundation and both are synonymous with the arts, culture, science and education through various annual festivals[84]. The Monument serves as a reminder of the past and commemorates the significance and heritage of the British settlers in South African history. At the same time, it also implores everyone to look forward with hope and has become a centre of creative thought and activity with the aim of encouraging the ideals of freedom of speech, press and association (principles and ideals enshrined in the South African Constitution) through social interaction, free debate and open discussion. The monument was envisaged as a living monument promoting the English language, art, literature, poetry and music and this has led to the establishment of highly successful educational and cultural projects which are inclusive of all South Africans. The value of these projects makes them, and the Monument, part and parcel of the cultural heritage and educational enrichment of all South Africans, thereby forging a shared South African culture and identity (Neville, n.d.; personal communication

[84] The Sakhisizwe Project, the National Arts Festival, the De Beers English Olympiad, the South African Schools Festival of English, the Shakespeare Society of Southern Africa, The Village Green Fair, The Eastern Cape Eisteddfod and SciFest Africa.

with Ms Zenobe Vosloo of the Grahamstown Foundation, Grahamstown 17 March 2009; The Grahamstown Foundation website[85]). As an educator at heart, Mabuza shared the vision of these projects and what the Monument represents. He was a life member and served on the 1820 Foundation‟s Board of Trustees. Although Mabuza passed away in 1997, his membership only expired on 31 March 2006.The records held by the Grahamstown Foundation do not, however, indicate when he actually became a member of the foundation. Apart from the historical, cultural and educational links to the 1820 Foundation, there is a colonial connection which is difficult to ignore, especially given Mabuza‟s participation in Bantustan structures and the fact that he was also a member of the Royal African Society (London) and the Gold Shield Award.

However, Penryn College in Nelspruit named the Enos Mabuza Administration block after him and proudly has a bust of him at the entranceway. On 4 August 2001, Enos Mabuza‟s friend Nadine Gordimer paid tribute to him on the occasion of the opening of the Enos Mabuza Centre at Penryn College in Nelspruit. Penryn College has also created the Enos Mabuza Character Award in his memory. Penryn College acknowledges Mabuza‟s contribution to education in the lowveld for 16 years, as well as his part in the establishment of Penryn College itself.

An understanding of the provincial or regional politics of Mpumalanga sheds some light on how much Mabuza has been accepted by the ruling ANC even though his relationship with the party was covert for the most part. Mpumalanga, which covers the former KaNgwane Bantustan, has had an ANC government since 1994 and it‟s past Premiers Mathews Phosa and Thabang Makwetla are ANC members as is the current Premier David Mabuza. Thabang Makwetla was deployed by the ANC from Johannesburg and he has also been active in the KwaNdebele Bantustan. Makwetla referred to Mabuza as “Comrade Mabuza” at a symposium held on Saturday 9 April 2005 at the Emnotweni Arena to celebrate Mabuza‟ s contribution to the region even though the two probably never met. Although the recognition was posthumous, the ANC deployed then Vice President Jacob Zuma to give the keynote address at the symposium on his return from Pope John Paul XV‟s funeral in Rome. Other national ANC dignitaries and government officials included the University of South Africa vice-chancellor and principal, Professor Barney Pityana and then ANC Secretary-General Kgalema Mothlanthe. There was tension within the ANC leadership in Mpumalanga at the

[85] http://www.foundation.org.za/about/index.php (accessed 12 March 2009).

time and there was an ANC congress being held at one of the colleges but instead of heading straight for the congress like many people expected, Jacob Zuma attended the symposium and he took time to talk to ordinary people who had attended the gathering and have lunch with them.

Mabuza‟s assistance in whatever form helped the ANC‟s mobilisation efforts in the Eastern Transvaal at a time when the ANC was banned and overstretched. Zuma explained that the ANC was operating in KaNgwane (KaNyamazane, Barberton, Nkomazi, Matsulu, Malelane) at various times when the ANC had bases in Mozambique and Swaziland but lacked adequate resources. The ANC was also keen to use the Swazi border for its operations and it was necessary for KaNgwane/Mabuza to turn a blind eye to the ANC‟s activities in the area. Mabuza had KaNgwane government resources at his disposal and a favourable alliance with the ANC would be beneficial to both parties in the long term. The ANC local leadership heard that Mabuza was sympathetic to the liberation cause and contacted him. Million Mahunyela was a local businessman who belonged to the ANC. Mahunyela facilitated the first meeting between Mabuza and the ANC whose representatives explained the organisation‟s vision. Once Mabuza had struck this symbiotic relationship with the ANC, he was in a sense sub-contracted to carry out its work and was given the underground codename Jonathan. It is believed that then president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, requested Mabuza to remain as leader of KaNgwane because he had this crucial strategic role to play even though the position meant that he had to consort with the enemy. Thus, Mabuza continued in his position as leader of KaNgwane with the tacit approval of, and on the advice of the ANC‟s top leadership to facilitate its work. Mabuza had a close relationship with the ANC‟s Matthews Phosa when Phosa was an attorney in Nelspruit. When the special branch of the security forces found out about Phosa‟s activities with the ANC, Mabuza and Inyandza helped to spirit him out of the country into exile in Maputo, Mozambique to avoid arrest. After that, Mabuza made several trips to Maputo to meet with Phosa/the ANC. Even Thabo Mbeki who was the ANC‟s Secretary-General at the time used to call Mabuza at his family home in KaNyamazane to discuss matters of mutual concern.

Perhaps the symposium was the ANC‟s way of bringing Mabuza, the prodigal son, into the fold of individuals that advanced the struggle against apartheid. Mabuza was described as a comrade who stood up for what was right and just during trying times and the issues he

promoted and advocated when he was in public office continue to be relevant to the ANC as a political party and government today, more than a decade after democracy.

It probably came as a surprise to some people that ANC stalwarts including Jacob Zuma and the militant Peter Mokaba of the student wing of the ANC‟s youth league[86] publicly acknowledged Mabuza by attended his funeral in December 1997. Nelson Mandela sent a letter of condolence to Mrs Mabuza because he could not be there in person. Then President Thabo Mbeki gave the keynote address in which he explained or contextualised Mabuza‟s contribution and significance by stating that "the history of South Africa has not been written by the people who made it."

Mabuza‟s sister, Ms Margaret Mabuza noted that some local people did not accept Mabuza‟s role in the KaNgwane Bantustan, especially those that identified closely with the ANC. However, she believes that her brother‟s name and reputation were cleared when ANC heavyweights attended the April 2005 symposium and explained what Enos Mabuza did, including things that the Mabuza family was not privy to, for example, that Mabuza used to regularly visit ANC camps. Many people did not know this and used to say bad things about him because they were suspicions of his motives. According to Margaret Mabuza, after the symposium, some of Enos‟ critics admitted that they had perhaps judged him hastily when there were redeeming qualities about him (Interview with Ms Margaret Mabuza 6 June 2007).

The process of renaming of cities and roads to remove remnants of the colonial and apartheid past; to revise the country‟s history in a bid to include the majority of the people‟s history and honour individual contributions has been fraught with challenges but it has been welcomed by many as a way of rewriting the African heritage and culture which was suppressed for a very long time. Unfortunately, disagreements will always exist in such circumstances. Such renaming processes have been criticised by mostly Afrikaners who feel that their own history and legacy is being discarded or considered irrelevant under the new political dispensation because of the political justifications given for most name changes. They argue that everyone‟s history must be celebrated equally in the interests of unity, nation building and reconciliation (Swart, 2007; *Delivery Magazine*, 2007). However, specific processes are followed when a provincial or city council decides to rename a street or place. The relevant authorities placing adverts in newspapers or the government gazette inviting the public to

[86] The KaNgwane government had a relationship with the ANC youth movement because it used to give them and other student bodies venues to hold their congresses.

submit proposals in writing (to motivate/support the suggestion). A committee is then selected to discuss the proposals and decides which names to accept. After that, the names are and advertised in the newspapers and government gazette. The public is given 30 days to comment and objections have to be submitted to the authorities in writing. Further proposals, comments and suggestions are considered by the authorities before a final decision is announced and the change/s takes effect (Swart, 2007:89).

Swart (2007:88-89) notes that the changes to city and road names across the country has not been well received in some parts of the country for two main reasons. Firstly, some opposition politicians or parties and their supporters feel like it is only the ruling ANC‟s struggle icons that are being honoured in these exercises. This reason is given as the precipitating factor in the protest marches that occurred in Durban in May 2007 over proposed changes to street names. It was argued, among other things, that the proposed changes glorified ANC struggle icons at the expense of Zulu heritage. The second reason relates to the costs entailed by the changes in terms of changing the relevant street signs at the expense of the tax payer. Jan Smuts International Airport, for instance, was renamed Johannesburg International Airport. It was subsequently renamed yet again to O. R. Tambo International Airport. Pretoria is now being referred to as Tshwane and Pietersburg as Polokwane and so on. Some sectors of the public feel that this is an unnecessary expense when there are more pressing issues that need to be addressed, such as, service delivery but the politicians or powers that be equally argue that recognising iconic figures in our history is also a necessity left we forget what they have done (Swart, 2007:88-89). In many towns and cities across South Africa new streets names reflect the changing political and social environment. At present, nearly every municipality has a Nelson Mandela and an Oliver Tambo drive or street, though, in some cases, leaders with connections to an area have been favoured. It is often a case of out with the old and in with the new, as far as political figures are concerned. In Johannesburg, there has been a call for new names for streets in Randburg which are named after apartheid-era Prime Ministers Verwoerd and Strijdom. The Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) said it wanted proposals for names to replace those of Hendrik Verwoerd and Hans Strijdom Drives. According to the JDA, an initial study showed that most South Africans found the names offensive. Verwoerd, who was Prime Minister from 1958 until his assassination in 1966, is remembered as the architect of apartheid. Hans Strijdom, former National Party leader and Prime Minister, was among other things the man behind the establishment of a separate voters‟ roll for Coloureds, the

extension of pass laws to African women, and the end of multi-racial trade unions. At the time, the JDA Development Manager Ursula Ntsubane said the association was encouraging full public participation in the highly emotive issue. People in Randburg would be interviewed over the telephone and face-to-face and their views would be analysed in depth before the final determination was made. The City of Johannesburg‟s full council would make the final decision and the new names would be announced in November (Swart, 2007, *Delivery Magazine*, 2007).

To return to Mabuza, in July 2007 the ANC-led Mbombela Local Municipality in Mpumalanga approved the change of three street names in Nelspruit, one in White River and another in Hazyview. At the time, Mbombela spokesperson, Vusi Sibiya, said the streets would be renamed after struggle heroes including Enos Mabuza and the late Mozambican president Samora Machel. John Vorster Drive in Nelspruit was subsequently renamed Dr. Enos Mabuza Drive in Nelspruit[87] as homage for his contribution to the politics, conservation and education of the area. According to Mabuza‟s family, this initiative met with resistance (debates in the papers after the new road signs were put up) from Afrikaners who felt that their heroes[88] were being disrespected, discarded and forgotten and some of the new road signs with Mabuza‟s name were vandalised. These people questioned Mabuza significance and whether he deserved it, which alludes to the fact that Mabuza‟s connection with the ANC was not apparent to ordinary people outside the ANC‟s top leadership. Such objections from the white community are nothing unique in South Africa since it was generally them that objected to the renaming of Pretoria (to Tshwane), Jan Smuts International Airport (to O. R. Tambo International Airport) or the transformation and renaming of some universities (*Delivery Magazine*, 2007). However, the black people in the Nelspruit area and his home areas of Barberton and Louisville/KaNyamazane who knew Mabuza and respected him welcomed the initiative because they felt that it was high time that his contributions received the recognition they deserve.

The South African government was the architect and patron of the Bantustans which the ANC was vehemently opposed to but instead of putting distance between themselves and Mabuza and his „reprehensible‟ past, Nelson Mandela, for example, wanted to appoint

[87] Fourth (2006) Ordinary Meeting of the Mbombela Local Municipality held on Monday 31 July 2006 at 17:30 in the Council Chambers, Civic Centre, Nelspruit pp22 of the council meeting minutes Section A (25) with the heading Social Transformation: Renaming of Streets and Other Place Names in Mbombela (16/3/7)(10162925), Subsection (b).

[88] Vorster succeeded Verwoerd from 1966-1978

Mabuza as South African ambassador to Bonn, Germany during his presidency. When Mandela was in prison, Mabuza was allowed to visit him when other leaders were denied the privilege and upon his release, Mandela visited the Mabuza home several times because he had been briefed by Oliver Tambo and other ANC leaders that Mabuza was an ally. Mabuza and Mandela held several meetings together. In early 1990, Mabuza was among those that met with Mandela at a SAYCO congress in KaNgwane. In September 1990 and March 1991, Mabuza arranged President Mandela‟s holiday breaks at Bongani Lodge and Londolozi Game Reserve in the Eastern Transvaal. During the militant 1980s when the ANC youth‟s mandate was to make South Africa ungovernable, there were only a few clashes between the ANC youth and the KaNgwane government at street level (KaNgwane government officials‟ cars were burnt etc) when there were marches and huge groups of incensed people. However, KaNgwane was generally shielded from the type of violence which gripped the other homelands. Although KaNgwane was a symbol of apartheid, the people‟s anger was not directed at him. To use Bourdieu‟s (1998:102-104) term, the recognition that Mabuza did get in the end can be understood as symbolic capital which secures his place in the history of the Mpumalanga lowveld in particular and South Africa generally. Mabuza‟s life and work demonstrates that identity can be sectional and exclusive but it also overlaps (Bourdieu, 1998:75-91). Although Mabuza walked the slippery slope of Bantustan politics, the testimony to his good faith cannot all be fabrication. He is not without blemish and the public‟s ambivalence towards him is understandable but the ANC‟s symbolic gestures in the spirit of truth and reconciliation have vindicated him; cleared his name and reputation somewhat. Perhaps the Mabuza family would have preferred to have such people to have spoken up earlier and publicly defended Enos when he was still alive but at least they eventually did it and assuaged the insinuations that abounded about him. To some, Mabuza was worthy of all this and to others it might be construed as an insult. Given its commanding position in South African politics today, the ANC would not have felt compelled to pay tribute to Mabuza if he was the sell-out that his participation in Bantustan politics pigeon-holed him as. That unfortunate turn of events was but one dimension or facet of his complex character. Maybe Mabuza was not an honourable man. Maybe was Janus-faced double-agent or he was a hypocrite because of the contradictory aspects of his character but there is no one dimensional politician. Politics as a game is characterised by deceit, duplicity and double-dealing. In a country that is still rising from the ashes of apartheid and making concerted efforts to reconcile the varied histories of its people; subjectivity, contestation and ambiguity

remain part of South Africa‟s historical reconstructions and reinterpretations regarding identity and difference, reimagining the other, agency and patriotism.

10.4 Conclusion

There is no simple check-list for lived experienced so who is Enos Mabuza and what is his place in post-apartheid South African history? He was a son, brother, husband, father, community leader, educator, politician, business man, conservationist and lay-preacher. Perhaps what stands out the most about him or the different roles that he assumed is his involvement in Bantustan politics. Here, he was not quite the sensation that he became in business in a short space of time. At best, his participation in politics was unconventional (working for the state in order to work against it). Enos Mabuza is certainly not a familiar name to South African audiences, especially those born after1994 and for older generations, it might be synonymous with a political sell-out, betrayal or fence-sitter that lacked political conviction. However, the name has resonance in the Mpumalanga lowveld and in older generation business circles but is relatively unknown elsewhere. Unlike the other people that have been written about, there is no readily accessible or extensive critical writing which focuses on Mabuza‟s life and work. This thesis is a reflection on what shaped the person that he was. It is an evaluation of Mabuza‟s life and achievements - his deeds, passions, relationships, fears, anxieties, frustrations, paradoxes and controversies in a particular historical context. The chapters are arranged thematically for convenience but are not a rigid compartmentalisation.

Every person has needs for achievement, participation, competence, power, autonomy as well as affiliation/intimacy to give purpose or meaning to their existence. Mabuza‟s life and career fits the clichéd rags to riches mould from an early life of deprivation and few prospects as a black person in apartheid South Africa. He was undoubtedly an ambitious and success-oriented individual but he was not hostile, spiteful or arrogant. Despite poverty and an inferior education being major handicaps for the majority of black South Africans, he rose to make noteworthy contributions in different fields which earned him the respect of his contemporaries. Mabuza‟s life and career demonstrates how protagonists and villains come to be, how power can be attained, exercised and maintained through agency, personal and professional networks, influence and bargaining capabilities. As a leader, he cultivated and nurtured strategic relationships which helped him cope or navigate the treacherous seas that he found himself in. He did not give up or allow himself to be discouraged when he was

criticised. He was resilient grabbed the opportunities which presented themselves. Being ostracised by some did diminish his drive or initiative. He refused to stagnate and be defined as a one dimensional or inept leader. What he could not enjoy in status in the political structure of the society, he reclaimed to some degree in the business sphere. The changes he made in his career were always for something bigger, better or higher than the previous and in this way, change was a positive thing in his life.

Mabuza occupied a curious position which was associated with greed, patronage and a propensity for violence, upping the ante wherever possible and taking shortcuts to fame and fortune. Consequently, Mabuza is a problematic figure in South African struggle history and is not immune to generalised withering, destructive analyses of Bantustan functionaries which put their weaknesses, hypocrisy, infractions (the most common being corruption, fraud and pillaging from the already inadequate homeland coffers) and self-deceptions in the spotlight. However, he was not merely a caricature for the black man who wished to climb the social ladder at any cost and toadied up to the apartheid state. His position, ambiguous though it was, was a risk that others would not have readily taken against larger structures of power and control which had a long established history and genesis.

Mabuza was a mistrusted Bantustan politician, an outsider or a pariah on the fringes of mainstream South African politics but in the end he became a respected member of society. The apartheid machinery was well-oiled, determined, brutal and efficient and the Bantustans were created as regional-ethnic-political compartments. His decision to participate in Bantustan politics was unpopular because it went counter the general expectation for someone who claimed to be patriotic and loyal to the suffering black masses. However, Mabuza was not the only person in a compromised position. Many people were „tom" over their allegiances and found different ways to rationalise them to themselves and others. Maybe Mabuza would have been better off as part of an anonymous, faceless crowd but he tried to mitigate its effects to the people of KaNgwane by participating in Bantustan structures. It was a path least trodden and disdained as the easy solution for greedy and unprincipled individuals with a populist impulse but he believed that he could make a difference. In reality, he was hamstrung or limited in his abilities from the beginning so there was a limit to what he could do to make a real difference. However, this does not excuse whatever bad decisions, errors in judgement, miscalculations or ill intentions that he might

have had. His belief that he could make a difference may have been naïve and the position he assumed was ambiguous in that he rejected white domination whilst benefiting from it.

Mabuza could not have changed the fate of KaNgwane but those that knew him believe that he did what he could and was not an apathetic witness or by-stander. Contrary to the prejudice against Bantustan functionaries, Mabuza did not have a single-minded interest in riches and power. His approach to politics, and later business, was a mix of optimism and realism and it allowed him to playing devil‟s advocate. He could have let a fear of failure cripple him into inaction but he did not. Mabuza was effectively a civil servant with limited latitude or discretion to act provided he did not openly contradict the state and its policies. The state did not coddling dissenters and agitators but deposed, prosecuted and neutralised them in myriad ruthless ways, yet he carried on a clandestine alliance with the ANC/UDF for many years. He has been described by those who knew and regarded him favourably as polite, honest, proud without arrogance, obliging without insipidity. However, this can be interpreted as a deft mix of flattery, confidence, cheek, sincerity, charm and falsehoods.

Mabuza‟s election to the position of Chief Councillor came on the heels of the 1976 Student Uprising and this major event was closely followed by the apartheid state‟s declaration of the Total Onslaught and Total Strategy to combat endemic unrest in the country. The Inyandza National Movement was a means for Mabuza to create a separate, perhaps more enduring, power base from the „power‟ that was conferred on him by the state through his position as Bantustan leader. The main question, therefore, is whether or not he should be given credit for what he was able to accomplish even though he was complicit, by association, in the atrocities of the apartheid state which employed him? If he was alive today, would he be accepted and trusted unconditionally? Without the benefit of interviews with the subject, one cannot say if in hindsight there are things he would have changed about his life or choices. One can only assume that he accepted his life as it was and happy with what he achieved personally and professionally. One can be critical of the numerous roles that he played or the apparent lack of unity and wholeness as ambivalence or lack of occupational or ideological commitment but it can also be regarded as testament of his ability to reinvent and keep himself relevant by examining the occupational, ideological and interpersonal opportunities around him.

Mabuza was fifty-six years old when he resigned from politics but he could have continued working in that position until the Bantustans were dissolved and reintegrated into South

Africa. Instead, he pursued a career in business which afforded him the opportunity to make a modest contribution towards black rights and economic empowerment. His stint in business was cut short by his untimely death when he possibly could have continued working into his mid 60s or early 70s. Enos Mabuza died in 1997 aged sixty-one. According to Levinson (1978), at this stage, individuals tend to question or reassess their values, beliefs, goals and the means for achieving them. As people get older, they make peace with their career decisions. Mabuza searched for opportunities and outlets for personal fulfilment. He was actively involved in social programmes and engaged with his peers, church, community and other groups.

A lot was sacrificed in the compromises reached during South Africa‟s transition to democratic rule and the co-existence of unelected traditional authorities which were hijacked by colonial and apartheid regimes alongside democratic principles is an example. Parallels can be drawn between Enos Mabuza‟s precarious position as a Bantustan leader and the different faces and roles of traditional chiefs from colonial times, the dishonour of Bantu Authorities to the present as discussed above in chapter three above. The ANC actively courted traditional leaders and made them partners in the anti-apartheid alliance and this ensured that they did not become relics. The extension of this olive branch by the ANC afforded traditional leaders the space to emerge as a political force, whether they deserved it or not. Traditional leaders were able to turn the situation to some advantage from being active tools of oppression to being actual or perceived progressive agents in the liberation struggle. The chieftaincy and traditional leadership has shown its resilience and persistence by retaining some of its prestige and integrity as an institution. Enos Mabuza and other so-called progressive or cooperative Bantustan elites also entered into loose alliances with the ANC in the mid-late 1980s for similar reasons and such alliances afforded them opportunities to some reinsert themselves in difference niches once the political transition got underway.

To conclude, historical context provides the background for any dissection of a life and career because they are products of a particular time and place. Public figures have detractors and admirers as well as those that remain indifferent to or ignorant of their contributions. In terms of Bourdieu‟s fields of practice discussed in the chapter four above, history and politics provides many terrains or bounded spaces of relations, positions, struggles over power and resources as well as possibilities to pool such resources for mutual benefit. These fields are structured by rules and success, domination, exploitation or basic survival within them

depends on different forms of capital, including claims to authority, cultural, social, economic and symbolic capital. Rather than edit or sanitise Mabuza‟s memory to make it more palatable, this thesis has tried to reconcile his character, roles, public and private personas within the context of apartheid politics and the transition and the limitations or opportunities they offered.

Decisions or choices (human action and agency) are not always explained by necessity alone, irrespective of the circumstances that constrain or facilitate such action. There is no evidence to suggest that Mabuza was a particularly irresponsible person or leader or that he sought the help of the apartheid state to safeguard his position of privilege. Despite the moral ambiguity of his participation in the Bantustans, he did not abrogate his responsibility to the people of KaNgwane in terms of the mandate he was given when he assumed office in 1978. Like co-opted chiefs, Mabuza occupied a precarious position where he was mandated to implement unpopular government policy but he tried to be sensitive to the aspirations of the people of KaNgwane and risked brutal reprisals when he rejected the state‟s 1982 Swazi Land deal. It was not always practical to scoff at ethnic politics when the Bantustan system was hinged on the notion of ethnic identity and loyalty but Mabuza was able to tap into the creative potential of politics during the transition. He resigned and paved the way for a democratic transition which would include KaNgwane and show it in the best possible light under the circumstances. Mabuza‟s agency was constrained but he did use his position, as far as was possible, to ward off the excesses of the apartheid state and to negotiate.



Figure 16: Enos Mabuza (*Financial Mail* Supplement 28 November, 1986:39)

Bibliography

Abe, C. 2005. "The Social Sciences and Africa‟s Development: Between Construction and Deconstruction." in *The Social Sciences and Africa's Future*. Dakar: CODESRIA pp29-78.

Abrams, P. 1982. *Historical Sociology*. Somerset: Open Books.

Adam, H. 1990. "Comparing Israel and South Africa: Prospects for Conflict Resolution in Ethnic States." in van den Berghe, P. (Ed). *State Violence and Ethnicity*. Boulder, Colo.: University Press of Colorado pp113-142.

Adam, H. M. 2008. *From Tyranny to Anarchy: The Somali Experience*. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press.

Adam, H., Van Zyl Slabbert, F. and Moodley, K. 1997. *Comrades in Business: Post-Liberation Politics in South Africa*. Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers.

Africa Institute of South Africa. 1976. *Key Issues in Homeland Development*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.

African National Congress. 1984. *Torture is Part of the System: State Violence in South Africa and Namibia*. London: African National Congress.

Albertazzi, D and McDonnell, D. 2007. *Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy*. New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Alden, C. 1996. *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State*. London: Macmillan Press.

Anderson, P. 2004. "Beating the Skills Gap." in *South Africa 2014: The Story of Our Future.* Bowes, B.; Lundy, G and Pennington, S. (Eds). Johannesburg: South Africa-The Good News pp257-259.

ANC, 1992a. *ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa* (Draft for internal discussion) 22 April 1992.

ANC, 1992b. *ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa* (Draft for internal discussion) 27 April 1992.

Anon. 2009. "State of the Nation - What You Need to Know." *The Daily News* 4 February 2009.

Anser, L. 2007. "Matrimonial Strategies: Social Reproduction and Integration. A Case Study of Executive Staff from Algeria." In *Current Sociology* Vol. 55No. 5 pp718-741.

Apple, M. W. 1985. *Education and Power*. Boston: Ark Paperbacks.

Apple, M.W. 1979. *Ideology and Curriculum*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Arenstein, J. 1996. "Mabuza Named in KaNgwane Financial Chaos." *Mail & Guardian* (17 May 1996).

Arenstein, J. 1997. "Mpumalanga" Spending Spree Probed." *The Star* (19 June 1997).

Arnold, T. H., Killick, D. J. B., and Momberg, B. A. 2002. *Medicinal and Magical Plants of Southern Africa: An Annotated Checklist*. Pretoria: National Botanical Institute.

Asmal, K. 1990 (September) Discussion Paper on the Reincorporation of the TBVC States into South Africa.

Babbie, E. R. 2007. *The Practice of Social Research.* (11th Ed - International Student Ed). Baldwin, D. A. 1989. *Paradoxes of Power*. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell.

Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth.

Bank, L and Southall, R. 1996. "Traditional Leaders in South Africa"s New Democracy." In *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* Vol.37-38 (special double issue) pp407-430.

Bank, L. 1994. "Between Traders and Tribalists: Implosion and the Politics of Disjuncture in a South African Homeland" in *African Affairs* Vol. 93 No. 370 pp. 75-98.

Bank, L. J. 1988. *Traders and Taximen in QwaQwa: A Study of Class Formation in a South African Homeland*. Thesis (M.A.) - University of Cape Town.

Barber, K. (Ed). 2006. *Africa's Hidden Histories: Everyday Literacy and Making the Self*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Barker, F. S, 1999, *The South African Labour Market: Critical Issues for Renaissance*. (3rd Ed). Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers.

Barley, S. R and Bechky, B. A. 1994. "In the Backrooms of Science: The Work of Technicians in Science Labs." *Work and Occupations* Vol. 21 No. 1 pp85-126.

Basson, A. 2008. "ANC Rogues" Gallery." *Mail & Guardian* online 17 January 2008.

Bates, T. 1987. *Republic of Ciskei Industry, Tourism, Agriculture: Sixth Year of Spectacular Evolvement*. Bisho: Natal Publishers.

Battel-Mink, B and Kastenholz, H. 2005. "Transdisciplinarity in Sustainability Research: Diffusion Conditions of and Institutional Innovation." in *the International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology* Vol. 12 No. 1 pp1-12. London and Dumfries: Sapiens Publishing.

Beck, U. 1992. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage.

Beck, U. 1995. *Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk*. Cambridge: Polity.

Becker, H. S. 1963. *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*. New York: Free Press.

Beetham, D. 1991. *The Legitimation of Power: Issues in Political Theory*. London: Macmillan.

Bell, B. 2004. "Player a Distasteful Opportunist." *The Mail & Guardian* 15-21 October 2004 pp26.

Bellamy, R. 1995. "Legitimacy." in Honderich, T (Ed). *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Benton, M. 2005. "Literary Biomythography." *Auto/Biography* 13 (3): 206-226.

Berger, P. L. and Berger, B. 1975. *Sociology: A Biographical Approach* (2nd Ed). New York: Basic Books.

Bergesen, A. 1980. "Official Violence during the Watts, Newark and Detroit Race Riots of the 1960s." In Lauderdale, P. (Ed). *A Political Analysis of Deviance*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press pp138-174.

Bertaux, D. (Ed). 1981. *Biography and Society: The Life History Approach in the Social Sciences*. Beverly Hills and London: Sage.

Bertaux, D. 2003. "The Usefulness of Life Stories for a Realist and Meaningful Sociology." in Humphrey, R., Miller, R. and Zdravomyslova, E. (Eds). 2003. *Biographical Research in Eastern Europe; Altered Lives and Broken Biographies*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Binmore, K. 1994. *Game Theory and the Social Contract*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Bisseker, C. 2007. "Black Magic." in *Financial Mail* (6 July 2007) pp35-37.

Bizos, G. 1998. *No one to Blame? In Pursuit of Justice in South Africa*. Cape Town: Mayibuye Books and David Philip.

Bohler, K. F. and Hildenbrand, B. 1995. "Conditions for Sociological Research in Biography." *International Sociology* Vol 10 (3) pp331-340.

Boon, M. 2004. "Building Trust in the Private Sector." In *South Africa 2014: The Story of Our Future.* Bowes, B.; Lundy, G and Pennington, S. (Eds). Johannesburg: South Africa-The Good News pp293-294.

Borgatti, S. P., Mehra, A., Brass, D. J and Labianca, G. 2009. "Network Analysis in the Social Sciences. In *Science* Vol. 323 No. 5916 pp892-895.

Bourdieu, P and Wacquant, L. J. D. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (English Edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (trans into English by R. Nice).London: Routledge.

Bourdieu, P. 1986. „The Forms of Capital." In Richardson, J. (Ed). *The Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*. New York: Greenwood Press pp. 241-258.

Bourdieu, P. 1988. *Homo Academicus* (trans. P. Collier). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1990. *In Other Words*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1992a. *Language and Symbolic Power*. In J. B Thompson (Ed), trans. G. Raymond and M. Adamson. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1992b. *The Logic of Practice* (English Edition). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1998. *Acts of Resistance: Against the New Myths of Our Time* (translated by Richard Nice). Oxford: Polity Press and the New Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1998. *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P. and Passeron, J-P. 1977. *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (translated from French by Richard Nice; with a foreword by Tom Bottomore). London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Bourdieu, P., Accardo, A. [et al.] 1999. *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society* (translated by Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson *et al*). Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Blackwell.

Bourdieu, P., Chamboredon, J-C and Passeron, J-C. 1992. *The Craft of Sociology*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Bouwer, C and Dyantyi, A. 2008. "All Part of the Deal." *Destiny Magazine* Jan-Feb 2008 Issue 2 pp80-85.

Bowden, P. and Rooksby, E. 2006. "Understanding Condemnation: A Plea for Appropriate Judgement." In Tabensky, P. A. (Ed). *Judging and Understanding: Essays on Free Will, Narrative, Meaning and the Ethical Limits of Condemnation*. Hampshire and Burlington: Ashgate pp241-256.

Brandeis, L. D. 1914. *Other People's Money*. New York: Frederick A. Stokes.

Brannen, J., Moss, P. and Mooney, A. 2005. *Work and Caring over the Twentieth Century: Change and Continuity in Four-Generation Families*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Brechin, S. R. 2008 (May). "Ostriches and Change: A Response to Global Warming and Sociology." *Current Sociology* Vol. 56 No. 3 pp467-474.

Bringheti, A. 2007. "Visibility: A Category for the Social Sciences." in *Current Sociology* Vol. 55 No. 3 pp323-342.

Brint, S. 1984. "New Class and Cumulative Trend Expectations of the Liberal Political Attitudes of Professionals." *American Journal of Sociology* Vol. 90 No. 1 pp30-71.

Bujold, C. 1990. "Biographical-hermeneutical Approaches to the Study of Career Development." in R. A. Young & W. A. Borgen (Eds). *Methodological Approaches to the Study of Career*. New York: Praeger Press pp57-69.

Bunting, D and Barbour, J. 2002. "Interlocking Directorates in Large American Corporations, 1896-1964." In Scott, J. (Ed). *Social Networks: Critical Concepts in Sociology* Volume 3. London and New York: Routledge pp183-200.

Burawoy, M. 1976. "The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labour: Comparative Material from Southern Africa and the United States." *American Journal of Sociology* 81:1049-1087.

Burt, R. 2002. "A Structural Theory of Interlocking Corporate Directorates." in Scott, J. (Ed). *Social Networks: Critical Concepts in Sociology* Volume 3. London and New York: Routledge pp237-260.

Buthelezi, M. G. 1994a. *Inkatha Freedom Party Youth Rally. Address by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, President of the IFP*. Empangeni, 13 February 1994.

Buthelezi, M. G. 1994b. *Inkatha Freedom Party Youth Rally. Address by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, President of the IFP*. Pietermaritzburg, 20 February 1994.

Buthelezi, G. 1979. *Power is Ours*. New York: Books in Focus.

Buthelezi, G. 1990. *South Africa: My Vision of the Future*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Buthelezi, M. G. 1985b (29 October). Address to the South African Federated Chamber of Industries.

Callinicos, A. (Ed). 1992. *Between Apartheid and Capitalism: Conversations with South African Socialists*. London: Bookmarks.

Callinicos, L, 1985, *Gold and Workers*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Callinicos, L. 2004. *Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains*. Claremont: David Philip.

Callinicos, L. 2006. "Oliver Tambo: Memory, Family and Nation in Exile" Paper presented at Rhodes University, Grahamstown on 23 May 2006.

Calo, Z. R. 2005. (June). "The Indispensable Basis of Democracy: American Catholicism, the Church-State Debate and the Soul of American Liberalism 1920-1929." *Virginia Law Review* Vol. 91 No. 4 pp1037-1073.

Cameron, T. (Ed). 1991. *A New Illustrated History of South Africa*. (2nd Ed). Johannesburg: Southern Books.

Carlson, R. 1988. "Exemplary Lives: The Uses of Psychobiography for Theory Development." in *Journal of Personality 56 pp105-138*.

Carruthers, J. 1995. *The Kruger National Park: A Social and Political History*. Pietermaritzburg: Natal University Press.

Carruthers, J. 2007a. "Nature Conservation and Natural Resource Management in Mpumalanga 1870s to 2000." in Delius, P. (Ed). Mpumalanga History and Heritage. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press pp147-174.

Carruthers, J. 2007b. "South Africa: A World in One Country: Land Restitution in National Parks and Protected Areas." in *Conservation and Society* Volume 5, No. 3 *pp*292-306.

Castells, M. 2000. *The Rise of the Network Society. The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture Vol. 1*. (2nd Ed). Oxford: Blackwell.

Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1986. *The Kairos Document: Challenge to the Church: A Theological Comment on the Political Crisis in South Africa* (2nd Ed). Braamfontein: Skotaville.

Charles, R., and Ritz, D. 1978. (Revised and reissued 2004). *Brother Ray, Ray Charles" Own Story*. New York: De Capo Press.

Charton, N. (Ed). 1980. *Ciskei: Economics and Politics of Dependence in a South African Homeland*. London: Croom Helm.

Cheadle, Thompson & Haysom Inc. 2005. *Black Economic Empowerment: Commentary, Legislation and Charters*. Landsdown: Juta.

Cheater, A. 1999. The Anthropology of Power: Empowerment and Disempowerment in Changing Structures. London: Routledge.

Claassens, A.1991. "Contemporary Land Struggles in Rural Transvaal." in *Antipode* Vol. 23 No. 1 pp142-157.

Clegg, S. R. 1989. *Frameworks of Power*. London, Newbury Park & New Delhi: Sage.

Cliffe, L. 2004. "From „African Renaissance" to Re-empowering Chiefs." In *Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 31, No. 100, Two Cheers? South African Democracy's First Decade (June 2004)* pp354-356.

Clifford, J. L. 1962. *Biography as an Art: Selected Criticism 1560-1960*. London: Oxford University Press.

Cohen, A. K. 1974. *The Elasticity of Evil*: *Changes in the Social Definition of Deviance*. Oxford University Penal Research Unit Occasional Paper No.7. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Cole, A. L. and Knowles, J. G. 2001. *Lives in Context: The Art of Life History Research*. Walnut Creek: Alta Mira Press.

Coleman, J. 1988. „Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital". In *American Journal of Sociology* 94 ppS95–S120.

Coleman, J. 1990. *Foundation of Social Theory*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Commins, G. 1996. *Spiritual People, Radical Lives: Spirituality and Justice in Four 20th Century American Lives*. San Francisco, California: International Scholars Publications.

Conger, J. A and Kanungo, R. N. 1988 (July). "The Empowerment Process: Integrating Theory and Practice." in *The Academy of Management Review* Vol. 13 No. 3 pp. 471-482.

Connolly, W. E. 2002. *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*. [Expanded Edition]. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.

Cook, K. 2005. „Networks, Norms, and Trust: The Social Psychology of Social Capital - 2004 Cooley Mead Award Address." In *Social Psychology Quarterly* 68: 4–14.

Cook, K. and Cooper, R. 2003. „Experimental Studies of Cooperation, Trust, and Social Exchange." In E. Ostrom and J. Walker (Eds) *Trust and Reciprocity*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation pp209-244.

Corporation for Economic Development. 1977-1980. *Growth: Journal of the Homeland Development Corporations*. Pretoria: Corporation for Economic Development.

Corrigall, J. 1990. "Media" in Corrigall, J., Unterhalter, E., and Slovo, G. 1990. *Subverting Apartheid: Education, Information and Culture under Emergency Rule*. London: International Defence and Aid Fund Publications Limited pp1-28.

Coser, L. W. 1967. *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict*. New York: Free Press.

Cox, R. 1987. "The Rich Harvest of Abraham Maslow." in Maslow, A. H. 1987. *Motivation and Personality* (Revised 3rd Ed, originally published 1954). New York: Harper and Row Publishers Inc.

Crankshaw, O. 1997. *Race, Class and the Changing Division of Labour under Apartheid*. London: Routledge.

Crause, H. L. 1982. *Ciskei: Its Welfare and Social Services*. Port Elizabeth: University of Port Elizabeth.

Creswell, J. W. 1998. *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Crossley, N. 2001. *The Social Body: Habit, Identity and Desire*. London: Sage.

Crossley, N. 2005. *Key Concepts in Critical Social Theory*. Sage Publications: London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi.

Cvetkovich, G.T. and Lofstedt, R. E. 1999. *Social Trust and the Management of Risk*. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd.

Dant, T. 2003. *Critical Social Theory: Culture, Society and Critique*. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Daphne, P. 1991 (15 November) Discussion Paper on the Reincorporation of the TBVC States into South Africa.

Davenport, R. 1995. *A History of South Africa*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Davenport, T .H. R. 1987. "Can Sacred Cows Be Culled? A Historical Review of Land Policy in South Africa, With Some Questions about the Future." in *Development Southern Africa* 4 (3) pp388-400.

Davies, R. H., O'Meara, D. and Dlamini, S. 1998. *The Struggle for South Africa: A Reference Guide to Movements, Organizations and Institutions*. London: Zed Books.

De Gruchy, J. W. 1995. "Patriotism: True and False: Reflections on Bonhoeffer, Oom Bey and the Flag." in Villa-Vicencio, C and Niehaus, C. (Eds). 1995. *Many Cultures, One Nation: A Festschrift for Beyers Naudé*. Cape Town: Human and Rousseau pp55-68.

Delivery Magazine. 24 July 2007. "Signs of Change in Many Towns."

De Villiers, N. N. 1997b. Public Meeting Knysna 23 August 1997 – Address entitled "A Vision for the Future."

De Vos, G. 1975. "Ethnic Pluralism: Conflict and Accommodation." in De Vos, G. and Romanucci-Ross, L. (Eds). *Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change*. California: Mayfield Publishing Company pp5-41.

De Vos, G. and Romanucci-Ross, L. 1975. "Ethnicity: Vessel of Meaning and Emblem of Contrast." in De Vos, G. and Romanucci-Ross, L. (Eds). *Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change*. California: Mayfield Publishing Company pp363-390.

De Wet, C. J and Leibbrandt, M. V. 1994. *Separate Developments: The Different Effect of Homeland Policy on Two Ciskei Villages* (Development Southern Africa, Vol. 11, No. 2 May 1994).

De Wet, C. J. 1985. *An Analysis of the Social and Economic Consequences of Residential Relocation Arising Out of the Implementation of an Agricultural Development Scheme in a Rural Ciskei Village*. Ph.D. Thesis (Anthropology) - Rhodes University.

De Wet, C. J. 1995. *Moving Together, Drifting Apart: Betterment Planning and Villagisation in a South African Homeland*. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press.

Denzin, N. K. 1989. *Interpretive Biography*. Qualitative Research Methods Series 17. Newbury Park, London and New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds). 2001. "Editors‟ Introduction." In *The American Tradition in Qualitative Research*. Vol 1. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Department of Trade and Industry (DTI-South Africa), 2003. *South Africa's Economic Transformation: A Strategy for Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment*. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Dewy, J. 1922. *Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Publishers.

Dewy, J. 1966 (c1916). *Democracy and Education*. New York: Free Press.

Dex, S, 1991. "Life and Work History Analyses." In S. Dex (Ed). *Life and Work History Analyses*. London: Routledge.

Dinitz, S., Dynes, R. R. and Clark, A. C. 1969. *Deviance: Studies in the Process of Stigmatisation and Societal Reaction*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Dippenaar, L. 2004. "The Cultural Dynamics of Trust." in Bowes, B.; Lundy, G and Pennington, S. (Eds). *South Africa 2014: The Story of Our Future.* Johannesburg: South Africa-The Good News pp.159-161.

Dominy, G. A. 1986. "The Ingwavuma Dispute Revisited: African Trade Route and European Buffer Zone." *African Historical Review* Vol. 18 No. 1 pp71- 92.

Downes, D. and Rock, P. 1995. *Understanding Deviance*. (2nd Ed). Oxford: Claredon Press.

Downie, R. S. 1995. "Authority" In Honderich, T (Ed). *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Duba, V. V. W and Nathai, S. 1991 (December) Discussion Paper on the Reincorporation of the TBVC States into South Africa.

Dugard, J. 1988. "The Moutse Issue." In Kruger, G and Rainey, P. (Eds). *Kwa-Ndebele: The Future? Proceedings of a Forum Organised by Lawyers for Human Rights*. Pretoria: University of Pretoria.

Dugard, J. 2004. “Twenty Years of Human Rights Scholarship and Ten Years of Democracy.” In *South African Journal of Human Rights* Vol. 20 No 3 pp345-354.

Durkheim, E. 1984 (c1893). *The Division of Labour in Society*. London: Macmillan.

Eakin, P. J. 1999. *How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves*. Ithaca, N.Y and London: Cornell University Press.

Egerö, B. 1991. *South Africa's Bantustans: From Dumping Grounds to Battlefronts*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet Discussion Paper 4.

Ekberg, M. 2007. “The Parameters of the Risk Society: A Review and Exploration.” *Current Sociology* Vol. 55 No. 3 pp.343-.366.

Elias, N. 1991. *The Society of Individuals*. Schroter, M (Ed). Translated by Jephott, E. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Elms, A. C. 1994. *Uncovering Lives: The Uneasy Alliance of Biography and Psychology*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Els, W. C. *et al* (Fort Hare branch of the South African Academy of Arts and Science). 1971. *The Ciskei: A Bantu Homeland: A General Survey*. Fort Hare: Fort Hare University Press.

Emirbayer, M. 1997. “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology.” In *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (2) pp281-317.

Emirbayer, M. and Goodwin, J. 1994. “Network Analysis, Culture and the Problem of Agency.” In *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (6) pp1411-1454.

Emirbayer, M. and Mische, A. 1998. „What is Agency?“ *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (4) pp.962–1023.

Ensminger, J. 2001. „Reputations, Trust, and the Principal Agent Problem.“ In Cook, K. (Ed.) *Trust in Society*, pp.185–202. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Fabricius, P. 1990. “F. W.“s Leap across Rubicon.” *The Star Newspaper* 3 February 1990.

Fairclough, N. 1989. *Language and Power*. Harlow: Longman.

Fein, H. 1999. “Testing Theories Brutally: Armenia (1915), Bosnia (1992) and Rwanda (1994).” In Chorbajian, L. and Shirinian, G. (Eds). *Studies in Comparative Genocide*. London and New York: Macmillan and St Martin“s Press Inc pp157-164.

Fellman, M. 2006. “The Case for Moral Complexity.” In Tabensky, P. A. (Ed). *Judging and Understanding: Essays on Free Will, Narrative, Meaning and the Ethical Limits of Condemnation*. Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate pp111-125.

Fennema, M. 1982. *International Networks of Banks and Industry*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Financial Mail, 1989a. "Back from the USSR" in *The Financial Mail* Vol. 112 No.3 28 April 1989 pp54.

Financial Mail, 1989b. "KaNgwane: Paying the Price." in *The Financial Mail* Vol. 112 No.5 (12 May 1989) pp53-54.

Financial Mail, 1994a. "Communists and the ANC: Looking Under the Bed." *The Financial Mail* (28 January 1994) pp41-44.

Financial Mail, 1994b. "The Homelands: Apartheid Booby Traps." *The Financial Mail* (1 April 1994) pp20-21.

Finch, J. and Mason, J. 1993. *Negotiating Family Responsibilities*. London: Routledge.

Fischer, A.T. 1988. "Whose Development? The Politics of Development and the Development of Politics in South Africa." In Boonzaier, E. and Sharp, A. (Eds). *South African Keywords: The Uses and Abuses of Political Concepts*. Cape Town and Johannesburg: David Philip pp122-135.

Fiske, D. 1988. "From Inferred Personality toward Personality in Action." In *Journal of Personality 56*(4) pp815-833.

Fitz, J., Davies, B. and Evans, J. 2006. *Educational Policy and Social Reproduction*. London: Routledge.

Fleisch, B. 2002. "State Formation and the Origins of Bantu Education." In Kallaway, P. (Ed). *The History of Education under Apartheid 1948-1994: The Doors of Learning and Culture Shall be Opened*. Cape Town: Pearson Education South Africa.

Fogel, R. W. 2003. *The Slavery Debates 1952-1990: A Retrospective*. Baton Rouge, Los Angeles, London: Louisiana State University Press.

Forster, D. 2007. "Identity in Relationship: The Ethics of Ubuntu as an Answer to the Impasse of Individual Consciousness." In du Toit, C.W. (Ed). *The Impact of Knowledge Systems on Human Development in Africa*. Pretoria: Research Institute for Religion and Theology (UNISA).

Frankl, V. 1946. *Man"s Search for Meaning*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Fraser, A. 2007. "Hybridity Emergent: Geo-History, Learning and Land Restitution in South Africa." In *Geoforum* 38 pp299-311.

Frederikse, J. 1990. *The Unbreakable Thread: Non-Racialism in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Fredrickson, G. M. 1995. *Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United States and South Africa*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Freedom of Expression Institute. 2008. *The Broadcasting Independence Handbook: Lessons from the South African Experience*. Johannesburg: The Freedom of Expression Institute.

Friedmann, J. 1992. *Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development*. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishing.

Friedrich, C. J. 1972. *The Pathologies of Politics: Violence, Betrayal, Corruption, Secrecy and Propaganda*.

Frisch, M. 1990. *A Shared Authority: Essays on the Craft and Meaning of Oral and Public History*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Gambetta, D. 1988. „Can We Trust Trust?" In D. Gambetta (Ed.) *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*. New York: Basil Blackwell pp213-237.

Geertz, C. 1988. *Works and Lives*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Gevisser, M. 2007. *Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred*. Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball Publishers.

Giddens, A. 1984. *The Constitution of Society*. Berkeley CA: Berkley University Press.

Giddens, A. 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. 1991. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. 1994. *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. and Pierson, C. 1998. *Conversations with Antony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gilbert, M. 2006. "Who's to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and its Implications for Group Members." In French, P. A. and Wettstein, H. K. (Eds). *Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility*. Boston, MA: Blackwell pp94-114.

Giliomee, H. B. and Mbenga, B. (Eds). 2007. *New History of South Africa*. Cape Town: Tafelberg.

Gilson, E. 1955. *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages.* New York: Random House.

Giniewski, P. 1961. *Bantustans: A Trek towards the Future.* Cape Town: Human & Rousseau.

Gish, S. D. 2004. *Desmond Tutu: A Biography*. Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press.

Gitywa, V. Z. 1988. *Dr. L.L. Sebe: A Biography*. Bisho: Via Afrika.

Glaser, D. 1987. “Introduction: Ruling Groups and Reform in the mid 1980s.” In Moss, G and Obery, I. (Eds for the Southern African Research Service). *South African Review 4*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press pp383-392.

Goatly, A. 1997. *The Language of Metaphors*. London and New York: Routledge.

Goffman, E. 1959. *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life*. Garden City: Doubleday.

Goffman, E. 1968. *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. Hammondsworth: Pelican Books.

Golan, D. 1994. *Inventing Shaka: Using History in the Construction of Zulu Nationalism*. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers.

Golding, W. 2001. *Rites of Passage*. London: Faber and Faber.

Goldsworthy, D. 1982. *Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget*. Nairobi and London: Heinemann, New York: African Publishing Company.

Golofast, V. 2003. “Three Dimensions of Biographical Narratives.” In Humphrey, R., Miller, R. and Zdravomyslova, E. (Eds). 2003. *Biographical Research in Eastern Europe; Altered Lives and Broken Biographies*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Good, D. 1988. „Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust.“ In Gambetta, D. (Ed.) *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*. New York: Basil Blackwell.

Goodman, D. 1999. *Fault Lines: Journeys into the New South Africa*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.

Gordimer, N. 2001. Tribute to Dr Enos Mabuza on the Occasion of the Opening of the Enos Mabuza Centre at Penryn College, Nelspruit (4 August 2001).

Gottschalk, L., Kluckhohn, C. and Angell, R. C. 1945. *The Use of Personal Documents in History, Anthropology, and Sociology*. New York: Prepared for the Committee on Appraisal of Research, Social Science Research Council (U.S).

Gove, W. R. 1975. *The Labelling of Deviance*. New York: Halsted.

Gqubule, D. 2006a. “The True Meaning of Black Economic Empowerment.” In Gqubule, D. (Ed). *Making Mistakes, Righting Wrongs: Insights into Black Economic Empowerment*. Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers/KMM Review Publishing Company pp1-38.

Gqubule, D. 2006b. “A Macro-Economic Overview.” In Gqubule, D. (Ed). *Making Mistakes, Righting Wrongs: Insights into Black Economic Empowerment*. Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers/KMM Review Publishing Company pp39-81.

Gqubule, D. 2006c. "A Brief History of Black Participation in the Economy of South Africa before 1994." In Gqubule, D. (Ed). *Making Mistakes, Righting Wrongs: Insights into Black Economic Empowerment*. Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers/KMM Review Publishing Company pp82-102.

Gqubule, D. 2006d. "Black Participation in the Economy of South Africa after 1994." In Gqubule, D. (Ed). *Making Mistakes, Righting Wrongs: Insights into Black Economic Empowerment*. Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers/KMM Review Publishing Company pp103-127.

Graham, K. 2006. "Imposing and Embracing Collective Responsibility: Why the Moral Difference?" In French, P. A. and Wettstein, H. K. (Eds). *Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility*. Boston, MA: Blackwell pp256-268.

Granovetter, M. 1985. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness." In *American Journal of Sociology* Vol. 91 pp481-510.

Granovetter, M. 1995 (c1974). *Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers*. (2nd Ed). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Granovetter, M. S. 2002. "The Strength of Weak Ties." In Scott, J. (Ed). *Social Networks: Critical Concepts in Sociology Volume 1*. London and New York: Routledge pp60-80.

Graybill, L. S. 2002. *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or Model?* Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers.

Greenberg, S. 1980. *Race and State in Capitalist Development*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Greig, M. 1994. "Methold: Empowering the People." *Financial Mail* (3 June 1994) pp.78-79.

Griffiths, I. L.L and Funnell, D.C. 1991. "The Abortive Swazi Land Deal." In *African Affairs* Vol. 90 No.358 pp51-64.

Gronn, P. 1993. "Psychobiography on the Couch: Character, Biography and the Comparative Study of Leaders." In *Journal of Applied Behavioural Science* 29(3) pp343-358.

Grootboom, Z. F. 2008. *An Investigation of the Themes and Techniques in L.L. Sebe"s "Ucamngco"*. Thesis (M.A.)--Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University.

Grothe, M. 2008. *I Never Metaphor I Didn't Like: A Comprehensive Compilation of History's Greatest Analogies, Metaphors and Similes*. New York: Collins.

Grundy, K. W. 1986. *The Militarisation of South African Politics*. London: I. B. Tauris & Co.

Guarasci, R and Cornwell, G. H. 1997a. "Democracy and Difference: Emerging Concepts of Identity, Diversity and Community." In Guarasci R. Cornwell, G. H and Associates.

1997. *Democratic Education in an Age of Difference: Redefining Citizenship in Higher Education*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers pp1-16.

Guarasci, R and Cornwell, G. H. 1997b. "Liberal Education as Intercultural Praxis: Citizenship in a Diverse Democracy." In Guarasci R. Cornwell, G. H and Associates. 1997. *Democratic Education in an Age of Difference: Redefining Citizenship in Higher Education*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers pp159-170.

Habermas, J. 1996. *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hage, G. 1994. „Pierre Bourdieu in the Nineties: Between the Church and the Atelier." In *Theory and Society* Vol. 23 No.3 pp 419-440.

Halliday, S. 2006. "White Perspective Isn't the only Point of View in Society." *The Weekend Argus*. November 18 2006.

Hamilton, G.G., Orru, M and Biggart, N.W. 2002. "Enterprise Groups in East Asia: An Organisational Analysis." In Scott, J. (Ed). *Social Networks: Critical Concepts in Sociology* Volume 3.London and New York: Routledge pp.360-386.

Haralambos, M and Holborn, M. 1995. *Sociology: Themes and Perspectives*. (4th Ed). London: Collins Educational.

Harvey, L. and MacDonald, M. 1993. *Doing Sociology: A Practical Introduction*. London: Macmillan.

Hattingh, P. S. 1979. *Homeland Problems and Solutions: A Geographic Look at the Realities*. Pietersburg: University of the North.

Hegel, G. 1979. *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Held, D. 1989. *Political Theory and the Modern State*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Held, D. 1991. *Political Theory Today*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hellmann, E. (Ed). 1949. *Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa*. Cape Town, London and New York: Oxford University Press.

Hendricks, F. 1989. "Loose Planning and Rapid Resettlement: The Politics of Conservation and Control in Transkei, South Africa, 1950-1970". In *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15(4).

Hendricks, F. T. 2003. *Fault-lines in South African Democracy: Continuing Crisis of Inequality and Injustice*. Uppsala: Nordic African Institute.

Hendricks, F. T. (Ed). 2004. *The Social Sciences in South Africa Since 1994: Disciplinary and Trans-disciplinary Areas of Study*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa Research Paper No.74.

Hendricks, F. T. 1992. "Tribalism, Chiefs and Apartheid: The Case of Poto‟s Pondoland." In *South African Sociological Review* Vol. 5 No.1 pp58-82.

Hendricks, F. T. 1990. *The Pillars of Apartheid: Land Tenure, Rural Planning and the Chieftaincy*. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell International.

Hendricks, F. T. and Ntsebeza, L. 1999. "Chiefs and Rural Local Government in Post-Apartheid South Africa." In *African Journal of Political Science: New Series* 4(1) pp99-126.

Hoffman, J. 1995. *Beyond the State: An Introductory Critique.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Holden, P. and Mathabatha, S. 2007. "Mpumalanga 1948-1990: The Politics of Resistance." In Delius, P. (Ed). *Mpumalanga History and Heritage*. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press pp241-275.

Holomisa, B. and Meyer, R. 1999. *A Better Future: The United Democratic Movement: Towards a Winning Nation in Ten Years*. Arcadia: United Democratic Movement.

Holomisa, S. P. 1991. *The Role of Traditional Leaders in Local and Regional Government in a Democratic South Africa*. Paper delivered at a Re-incorporation Task Force Meeting of the African National Congress in Johannesburg on 11 December 1991.

Hornsey, M. J. and Jetten, J. 2005. "Loyalty without Conformity: Tailoring Self-Perception as a Means of Balancing Belonging and Differentiation." In *Self and Identity* 4 pp81-95.

Horrel, M. 1973. *The African Homelands in South Africa*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.

Humphrey, R., Miller, R. and Zdravomyslova, E. (Eds). 2003. "Introduction: Biographical Research and Historical Watersheds." In *Biographical Research in Eastern Europe; Altered Lives and Broken Biographies*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

IDASA Public Opinion Service papers (POS Reports) No. 1 of October 1997 (The Evolution of Party Support Since 1994).

IDASA Public Opinion Service Press Briefing No. 2 November 1997: Public Opinion and the Location of Parliament.

Inverarity, J. 1980. "Theories of the Political Creation of Deviance: Legacies of Conflict Theory, Marx and Durkheim." In Lauderdale, P. (Ed). *A Political Analysis of Deviance*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press pp175-217.

Jacobson, R. 2006. “Characterising Consent: Race, Citizenship and the New Restrictionists.” In *Political Research Quarterly* Vol. 59 No. 4 pp.645-654.

James, W. G. 1992. “Group Areas and the Nature of Apartheid.” In *South African Sociological Review* Vol. 5 No.1 pp41-57.

Jara, M and Hall, R. 2009. “What are the Political Parameters?” In *Another Countryside? Policy Options for Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa*. Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, School of Government, University of the Western Cape: Cape Town pp207-229.

Jensen, S. B. 2007. “Through the Lens of Crime: Land Claims and Contestations of Citizenship on the Frontier of the South African State.” In Buur, L., Jensen, S. and Stepputat, F. (Eds). *The Security-Development Nexus: Expressions of Sovereignty and Securitazation in Southern Africa*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet pp193-211.

Jeppie, S. 2004. “Introduction: New History?” In Jeppie, S. (Ed). *Toward New Histories for South Africa: On the Place of the Past in Our Present*. Lansdowne: Juta Gariep pp1-15.

Jones, K. 1996. „Trust as an Affective Attitude.“ In *Ethics* 107: pp. 4–25.

Jones, W. E. 2006. “Explanation and Condemnation.” In Tabensky, P. A. (Ed). *Judging and Understanding: Essays on Free Will, Narrative, Meaning and the Ethical Limits of Condemnation*. Hampshire and Burlington: Ashgate pp43-64.

Kaarsholm, P. 1995. “The Ethnicisation of Politics and the Politicisation of Ethnicity: Culture and Political Development in South Africa.” In Wilson, F. and Frederiksen, B. F. (Eds). *Ethnicity, Gender and the Subversion of Nationalism*. London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd pp33-44.

Kaplan, P. S. 1998. *The Human Odyssey: Life-Span Development*. (3rd Ed). Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole Publishing.

Karlsson, J. 2002. “Looking at Apartheid School Spaces.” In Kallaway, P. (Ed). *The History of Education under Apartheid 1948-1994: The Doors of Learning and Culture Shall be Opened*. Cape Town: Pearson Education South Africa.

Kaufman, C. E. 1998. “Contraceptive Use in South Africa under Apartheid.” In *Demography* Vol. 35 No. 4 pp421-434.

Keenan, J. H. 1987. “Reform and Resistance in South Africa‟s Bantustans.” In Moss, G and Obery, I. (Eds for the Southern African Research Service). *South African Review 4* pp117-136. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Keenan, J. H. and Sarakinsky, M. 1987. “Reaping the Benefits: Working Conditions in Agriculture and the Bantustans.” In *South African Review No. 4*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press pp581-599.

Kennedy, R. 2008. *Sellout: The Politics of Racial Betrayal*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Kets de Vries, M. F. R. 1990. “Leaders on the Couch.” In *Journal of Applied Behavioural Science* 26(4) pp423-431.

Khodyakov, D. 2007. „Trust as a Process: A Three-Dimensional Approach.“ In *The Journal of the British Sociological Association* Vol 41. No.1 p115-132.

Kiernan, B. 1999. “Pol Pot and Enver Pasha: A Comparison of the Cambodian and Armenian Genocides.” In Chorbajian, L. and Shirinian, G. (Eds). *Studies in Comparative Genocide*. London and New York: Macmillan and St Martin‟s Press Inc pp165-181.

King, B. H. 2005. “Spaces of change: Tribal Authorities in the Former KaNgwane Homeland, South Africa.” In *Area* 37 (1) pp64-72.

King, B. H. 2006. “Placing KaNgwane in the New South Africa.” In *The Geographical Review* 96(1) pp79-96.

King, B. H. 2007a. “Conservation and Community in the New South Africa: A Case Study of the Mahushe Shongwe Game Reserve.” In *Geoforum* 38 pp207–219.

King, B. H. 2007b. “Developing KaNgwane: Geographies of Segregation and Integration in the New South Africa.” In *The Geographical Journal* 173(1) pp13-25.

King, G. 2005. *The Hansie Cronje Story: An Authorised Biography*. Cape Town: Global Creative Studios.

Kitsuse, J. I. 1972. “Deviance, Deviant Behaviour and Deviants: Some Conceptual Problems.” In Filstead, W. (Ed). *An Introduction to Deviance: Readings in the Process of Making Deviants*. Chicago: Markham.

Kleyn, D and Viljoen, F. 1996. *Beginner's Guide for Law Students*. (2nd Ed). Kenwyn: Juta & Co.

Kloppers, R. J. 2005. *Border Crossing: Life in the Mozambique/South African Borderland since 1975*. D. Phil thesis (Anthropology), University of Pretoria.

Koenig, T and Gogel, R. 1981. “Interlocking Corporate Directorships as a Social Network.” In *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* Volume 40 pp37-50.

Kotzé, D. A. 1975. *African Politics in South Africa, 1964-1974: Parties and Issues*. London: Hurst.

Koyana, D. S. 1998. "Administrative Function of Traditional Authorities." In d'Engelbronner-Kolff, Hinz, M. O and Sindano, J. L (Eds). *Traditional Authority and Democracy in Southern Africa: Proceeding from the workshop, Traditional Authorities in the Nineties - Democratic Aspects of Traditional Government in South Africa*. 15-16 November 1995, Windhoek, Namibia.

Kraak, A. 2006. "Skills Development" Empowerment From Below? An Education, Training and Employment Perspective 1994-2004." In Gqubule, D. (Ed). *Making Mistakes, Righting Wrongs: Insights into Black Economic Empowerment*. Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers/KMM Review Publishing Company pp128-159.

Kruss, G. 1987. "The 1986 State of Emergency in the Western Cape." In Moss, G and Obery, I. (Eds for the Southern African Research Service). *South African Review 4*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press pp173- 186.

Kumar, C. 2006. "Philosophy, Determinism and Moral Responsibility in Times of Atrocity." In Tabensky, P. A. (Ed). *Judging and Understanding: Essays on Free Will, Narrative, Meaning and the Ethical Limits of Condemnation*. Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate pp153-174.

Laclau, E. 1977. *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism*. London: NLB.

Laclau, E. 2005. *On Populist Reason*. London and New York: Verso.

Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. 1980. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Langford, G. 1971. *Human Action*. New York: Anchor Books.

Lasswell, H. D. 1936. *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Latour, B. 1986. "The Powers of Association." In J. Law (Ed). *Power, Action and Belief*. London: Routledge and Keagan Paul pp264-280.

Latour, B. 1987. *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Latour, B. 1988. *The Pasteurisation of France*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Latour, B. 1993. *We Have Never Been Modern* (translated by Catherine Porter). New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Latour, B. 1996. "On Actor-Network Theory: A Few Clarifications." *Soziale Welt* 47 (4) pp369-381.

Latour, B. 1999a. “On Recalling ANT.” In J. Law and J. Hassard (Eds). *Actor Network Theory and After*. Oxford: Blackwell pp15-25.

Latour, B. 1999b. *Pandora"s Hope: Essays in the Reality of Science Studies*. Cambridge Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press.

Latour, B. 2005. *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lauderdale, P. 1980. “Introduction: A Power and Process Approach to the Definition of Deviance.” In Lauderdale, P. (Ed). *A Political Analysis of Deviance*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press pp3-14.

Lauderdale, P. and Estep, R. E. 1980. “The Bicentennial Protest: An Examination of Hegemony in the Definition of Deviant Political Activity.” In Lauderdale, P. (Ed). *A Political Analysis of Deviance*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press pp72-91.

Laurence, P. M. 1930. *The Life of John Xavier Merriman*. London: Constable & Co Ltd.

Lawson, M. D. and Peterson, R. C. 1972. *Progressive Education: An Introduction*. Sydney: Angus &Robertson Publishers.

Lazerson, J. 1994. *Against the Tide: White in the Struggle against Apartheid*. Bellville and Oxford: Mayibuye Books and Westview Press.

Legassick, M. and Wolpe, H. 1976. “The Bantustans and Capital Accumulation in South Africa.”In *Review of African Political Economy* Vol 3. No.7 pp87-107.

Levinson, D. J. 1996. *The Seasons of a Woman"s Life*. New York: Ballantine Books.

Levinson, D. J., Darrow, C. N., Klein, E. B., Levinson, M. H., and McKee, B. 1978. *Seasons of a Man"s Life*. New York: Ballantine Books.

Lewis, J. D. and Weigert, A .1985. „Trust as a Social Reality.“ *Social Forces* 63: pp. 967–985.

Lewsen, P. 1969. *The Cape Liberal Tradition – Myth or Reality?* Johannesburg: Institute for the Study of Man in Africa.

Lincoln, Y. S and Guba, E. G. 2001. “The Failure of Positivist Science.” In Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds). *The American Tradition in Qualitative Research*. Vol 1. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Linde, C. 1993. *Life Stories: The Creation of Coherence*. Oxford University Press: New York and Oxford.

Lippman, B. and Rogge, J. 2004. “Making Return and Reintegration Sustainable, Transparent and Participatory.” In *Forced Migration Review* Issue 21 September 2004 pp4-5. Oxford:

Refugee Studies Centre University of Oxford in association with the Norwegian Refugee Council.

Lipton, M. 1986. *Capitalism and Apartheid: 1910-86*. Aldershot: Gower Publishing.

Liska, A. E. 1981. *Perspectives on Deviance*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Lodge, T. 1991. "Reform, Recession and Resistance." In Lodge, T, Nasson, B *et al*. *All Here, And Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s*. Cape Town: Ford Foundation – David Philip South Africa Update Series pp23-32.

Lodge, T. 1995. Unpublished presentation made to the Commission on Provincial Government: Workshop on Traditional Leaders and the New South African Constitution. 20-21 April 1995.

Lodge, T. 1998. "Political Corruption in South Africa." In *African Affairs* Vol. 97 No. 387 pp157-187.

Loveman, M. 2005. "The Modern State and the Primitive Accumulation of Symbolic Power." In *American Journal of Sociology* Vol. 110. No. 6 pp1651–1683.

Lowveld Bureau. 1986. "KaNgwane Gets Cabinet Reshuffle." *The Star*, 5 November 1986.

Luhmann, N. 1988. „Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives". In Gambetta, D. (Ed). *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*. New York: Basil Blackwell pp94–107.

Lunsche, S., Naidoo, P., Radebe, S., Bisseker, C; Hlengani, T., Honey, P. and Ryan, B. 2006. "SA"s Power Couples: Hand in Hand." *Financial Mail* 22 December 2006 pp26-33.

Mabunda, D., Pienaar, D. J. and Verhoef, J.2003. "The Kruger National Park: A Century of Management and Research." In du Toit, J. T., Rogers, K. H. and Biggs, H. C. (Eds). *The Kruger Experience: Ecology and Management of Savanna Heterogeneity*. Washington, Covelo and London: Island Press pp3-21.

MacKendrick, N. A. and Davidson, D. J. 2007. "State-Capital Relations in Voluntary Environmental Improvement." In *Current Sociology* Vol. 55 No.5 pp674-695).

Macmillan, H. 1989. "A Nation Divided? The Swazi in Swaziland and the Transvaal, 1865–1986." In Vail, L. (Ed). *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa*. London: James Currey pp289-316.

Macmillan, H. 2009. "The African National Congress of South Africa in Zambia: The Culture of Exile and the Changing Relationship with Home, 1964-1990." In *Journal of Southern African Studies* Vol.35 No.2 pp303-329.

Mager, A. K. 1999. *Gender and the Making of a South African Bantustan: A Social History of the Ciskei, 1945-1959*. Portsmouth: Heinemann.

Magubane, B. 1987. "The Current Situation in South Africa: A Sociological Perspective." In *Journal of Law and Religion*, Vol. 5 No. 2. pp473-493.

Magubane, B. 2001. *Social Construction of Race and Citizenship in South Africa*. Paper prepared for the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) Conference on Racism and Public Policy, 3-5 September 2001, Durban, South Africa.

Maguranyanga, B. 2009. "Our Battles Also Changed: Transformation and Black Empowerment In South African National Parks, 1991-2008." PhD dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of Doctor of Philosophy in Natural Resources and Environment, University of Michigan.

Maho, J. F. 2008. Niger-Congo Noun Class Studies: A Bibliographical Survey for African Languages and Linguistics (http://goto.glocalnet.net/eball/ngcncs.pdf)

Maho, J. F. 2009. NUGL Online: The online version of the New (2nd) Updated Guthrie List: A Referential Classification of the Bantu Languages. (http://goto.glocalnet.net/mahopapers/nuglonline.pdf)

Malan, R. 2006. "Stop Suffering like a Victim." *The Saturday Star*. November 11 2006.

Malan, T. and Hattingh, P. S. 1976. *Black Homelands in South Africa*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.

Mallema, G. 2006. "Collective Responsibility and Qualifying Actions." In French, P. A. and Wettstein, H. K. (Eds). *Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility*. Boston, MA: Blackwell pp168-175.

Mamdani, M. 1976. *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda*. London: Heinemann Educational.

Mamdani, M, 1996. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Mamdani, M. 2001. *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mamdani, M. 2010. *Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror*. Dakar: CODESRIA.

Mamdani, M. (1999a), „Historicising Power and Response to Power: Indirect Rule and Its Reform." In *Social Research*, Vol.66 No.3.

Mamdani, M. (1999b), „Indirect Rule, Civil Society and Ethnicity: The African Dilemma." In

Martin, G.W. and West, M. O. (Eds) *Out of One, Many Africas: Reconstructing the Study and Meaning of Africa.* Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Mandela, N. 1958. "Our Struggle Needs many Tactics." in *Liberation* No.29 pp14-17.

Mangope, L. M. 1978. *A Place for All*. Goodwood: Via Afrika.

Mangope, L. M. 1988. *Mandatory Sanctions: Bophuthatswana and Frontline OAU Nations: Vintage Speeches*. Lagos: Emmcon (Third World Opinion Research Foundation).

Mann, M. 1989. "Power and Knowledge: The Case of Contemporary South Africa." *Public Administration* 67 (2) pp223-228.

Marcus, L. 1994. *Auto/biographical Discourses: Theory, Criticism, Practice*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Mare, G. 1980. *African Population Relocation in South Africa*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.

Mare, G. 1992. *Brothers Born of Warrior Blood: Politics and Ethnicity in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Maré, G. and Hamilton, G. 1987. *An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Margo Commission Report. 1987. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Tax Structure of the Republic of South Africa (Chairman: C. S Margo)." RP34/1987. Pretoria: Government Printer.

Marrone, S. 2001. *The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century*. 2 Volumes. Leiden: Brill.

Martin, R. 1975. "Swaziland: The Ideal Bantustan." In *Transition* No. 47 pp65-66.

Martin, V. G. 1997. "Remembering Sir Laurens van der Post." in *International Journal of Wilderness* Volume 3 Number 2 (June) pp48.

Mashele, P. 2004. "Traditional Leadership in South Africa"s New Democracy." In *Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 31, No. 100, Two Cheers? South African Democracy's First Decade* (June 2004) pp349-354.

Maslow, A. H. 1987. *Motivation and Personality* (Revised 3rd Ed; originally published 1954). New York: Harper and Row Publishers Inc.

Matanzima, K. D. 1976. *Independence My Way*. Pretoria: Foreign Affairs Association.

Matshedisho, K. R. 2005. "Reinterpreting and Reconstructing Africa: The Challenge for Social Science Scholarship." In *The Social Sciences and Africa's Future*. Dakar: CODESRIA pp1-28.

Mattes, R., Africa, C and Jacobs, S. 1997. IDASA Public Opinion Service Report No. 1 October 1997: The Evolution of Party Support since 1994.

Maurois, A. 1929. *Aspects of Biography*. London: Cambridge University Press.

Mayer, P. 1972. *Urban Africans and the Bantustans*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.

Maylam, P. 2001. *South Africa's Racial Past: The History and Historiography of Racism, Segregation and Apartheid*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Maylam, P. 2005. *The Cult of Rhodes: Remembering an Imperialist in Africa*. Claremont, South Africa: David Philip Publishers.

Mbombela Local Municipality, 2006. Fourth Ordinary Meeting of the Mbombela Local Municipality held on Monday 31 July 2006 at 17:30 in the Council Chambers, Civic Centre, Nelspruit pp22 of the council meeting minutes Section A (25) with the heading Social Transformation: Renaming of Streets and Other Place Names in Mbombela (16/3/7)(10162925), Subsection (b).

Mboya. T. 1970. *The Challenge of Nationhood: A Collection of Speeches and Writings*. London: Heinemann Educational.

McAdams, D. P. 1988. "Biography, Narrative and Lives: An Introduction." In *Journal of Personality* 56(1) pp1-18.

McAdams, D. P. 2006. *The Person: A New Introduction to Personality Psychology (4th Ed)*. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Inc.

McAdams, D. P. and Ochberg, R. L. (Eds). 1988. *Psychobiography and Life Narratives*. Durham: Duke University Press.

McAllister, D. J. 1995. "Affect and Cognition-Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal Cooperation in Organizations." In *Academy of Management Journal* 38: pp24–59.

McGregor, J. 1994. "People without Fathers: Mozambicans in Swaziland 1888-1993." In *Journal of Southern African Studies* Vol. 20 No. 4 pp545-567.

McLaren, P. 1993. *Schooling as a Ritual Performance*. (2nd Ed). London and New York: Routledge.

McNeely, J. A. 1993. "Economic Incentives for Conserving Biodiversity: Lessons for Africa." In *Ambio* Vol. 22, No. 2/3 (May, 1993). Biodiversity: Ecology, Economics, Policy pp144-150.

McNulty, A. 1994. "Seeking a Firm Hold." *Financial Mail* (29 July 1994) pp24-26.

Merleau-Ponty, M. 1965. *The Structure of Behaviour*. London: Methuen.

Messick, D. and Kramer, R. 2001. „Trust as a Form of Shallow Morality". In Cook, K. (Ed). *Trust in Society* pp89–119. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Mezerik, A. G. (Ed). 1967. *Apartheid in the Republic of South Africa: Bantustans, Boycotts, UN Action, Rhodesia, South West Africa*. New York: International Review Service.

Miles, M. B and Huberman, A. M. 1994. *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook*. (2nd Ed). Thousand Oaks, London and New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Miliband, R. 1989. *Divided societies: Class Struggle in Contemporary Capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mills, C. W. 1956. *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mills, C. W. 1973. The *Sociological Imagination.* London: Penguin Books.

Mezerik, A. G. 1967. *Apartheid in the Republic of South Africa: Rhodesia, South West Africa, Sanctions, UN Action*. International Review Service Vol.12 No.92.

Misztal, B. A. 1995. *Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Bases of Social Order*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Moerdyk A. P and Coldwell, D. 1990. "Empowering Black Managers in a Multi-Cultural Society." In *The Journal of Industrial Psychology*.

Möllering, G. 2001. „The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of Expectation, Interpretation and Suspension." *Sociology* 35: pp403–420.

Morrell, R. and Moletsane, R. 2002. "Inequality and Fear: Learning and Working inside Bantu Education Schools." In Kallaway, P. (Ed). *The History of Education under Apartheid 1948-1994: The Doors of Learning and Culture Shall be Opened*. Cape Town: Pearson Education South Africa.

Mouton, A. J. 1990. *Self-Governing Territories Statistical Abstracts*. Developing Bank of South Africa Information Clearing House: Halfway House.

Mufson, S. 1990. *Fighting Years: Black Resistance and the Struggle for a New South Africa*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Mufson, S. 1991. "Introduction: The Roots of Insurrection." In Lodge, T, Nasson, B *et al*. *All Here, And Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s*. Cape Town: Ford Foundation – David Philip South Africa Update Series pp3-17.

Mulaudzi, C and Schirmer, S. 2007. "The Legacy of Land Struggles in 20th-Century Mpumalanga." In Delius, P. (Ed). *Mpumalanga History and Heritage*. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press pp209-240.

Mulholland, R. 1997. *South Africa, 1948-1994*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mulholland, R. and Ludlow, H. 1992. *Teaching the Past for the Future*. Johannesburg and Cape Town: Peskor Publishers.

Muller, J. 1987. "People‟s Education and the National Educational Crisis Committee." In Moss, G and Obery, I. (Eds for the Southern African Research Service). *South African Review 4*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press pp18-32.

Muller, S. 2006. "The Black Middle Class." In Gqubule, D. (Ed). *Making Mistakes, Righting Wrongs: Insights into Black Economic Empowerment*. Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers/KMM Review Publishing Company pp187-219.

Mutzel, S. 2009. "Networks as Culturally Constituted Processes: A Comparison of Relational Sociology and Actor-Network Theory." In *Current Sociology* Vol.57 No.6 pp871-887.

Myers, J. C. 2008. *Indirect Rule in South Africa: Tradition, Modernity and the Costuming of Political Power*. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.

Mzala. 1988. *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda*. London: Zed Books.

Mzizi, J. B. 2005. *Political Movements and the Challenges for Democracy in Swaziland*. Johannesburg: EISA Research Report, No. 18.

Naidoo, P. 2007. "Interests to Protect." *Financial Mail* (6 July 2007) pp41-42.

Nathan, L. 1987. "Resistance to Militarisation: Three Years of the End Conscription Campaign." In Moss, G and Obery, I. (Eds). *South African Review 4* (Southern African Research Service). Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

National Commission on Higher Education, 1996a (22 August). *An Overview of a New Policy Framework for Higher Education Transformation*.

National Commission on Higher Education (NCHE). 1996b. *A Framework for Transformation.* Pretoria: HSRC Press. (Final report.)

National Parks Board, 1992. *National Parks Board Annual Report 1991/1992*. Pretoria: National Parks Board.

National Parks Board, 1995. *National Parks Board Annual Report 1994/1995*. Pretoria: National Parks Board.

National Parks Board, 1996. *National Parks Board Annual Report 1995/1996*. Pretoria: National Parks Board.

National Parks Board, 1997. *National Parks Board Annual Report 1996/97.* Pretoria: National Parks Board.

National Parks Board (Ian Withers, Enos Mabuza, Johan Fourie, Pauline Van der Spuy), 1997. Knysna Tourism Forum Workshop - 30 July 1997.

Nattrass, N. 1994. “Politics and Economics in ANC Economic Policy” In *African Affairs* Vol. 93 No. 372 pp343-359.

Neuman, W. L. 2006. *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. (6thEd). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Neville, T. (n.d.) *More Lasting Than Bronze: A Story of the 1820 Settlers National Monument*. Pietermaritzburg: The Natal Witness Printing and Publishing Company.

Newton-King, N. 2004. “Sustainability: A New Corporate Philosophy.” in Bowes, B.; Lundy, G and Pennington, S. (Eds). *South Africa 2014: The Story of Our Future.* Johannesburg: South Africa-The Good News pp27-29.

Nielsen, K. 2006. “Is to Understand to Forgive or at Least Not to Blame?” in Tabensky, P. A. (Ed). *Judging and Understanding: Essays on Free Will, Narrative, Meaning and the Ethical Limits of Condemnation*. Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate pp175-197.

Nixon, R. 1994. *Homelands, Harlem and Hollywood: South African Culture and the World Beyond*. New York and London: Routledge.

Nkomazi Local Municipality, 2006. Nkomazi Local Municipality Integrated Development Plan 2006/7.

Nooteboom, B. 2000. „Trust as Governance Device.“ In Casson, M and Godley, A. (Eds). *Cultural Factors in Economic Growth*. Berlin: Springer-Verlag pp. 44–68.

Nooteboom, B. and Six, F. (Eds). 2003. *The Trust Process in Organizations*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Ntsebeza, L. 2002. *Structures and Struggles of Rural Local Government in South Africa: The Case of Traditional Authorities in the Eastern Cape.* PhD Thesis, Rhodes University: Grahamstown.

Ntsebeza, L. 2006. *Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of Land in South Africa*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Ntsele, N. 2004. “Empowerment Makes Good Business Sense.” in Bowes, B.; Lundy, G and Pennington, S. (Eds). *South Africa 2014: The Story of Our Future.* Johannesburg: South Africa-The Good News pp177-178.

O‘Keefe, J and Rogers, K. H. 2003. “Heterogeneity and the Management of the Lowveld Rivers.” In du Toit, J. T., Rogers, K. H. and Biggs, H. C. (Eds). *The Kruger Experience: Ecology and Management of Savanna Heterogeneity*. Washington, D.C.: Island Press pp447-468.

O'Meara, D. 1983. *Volkscapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1934-1948*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

O'Meara, D. 1996. *Forty Years Lost*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Oakeshot, M. 1975. *On Human Conduct*. Oxford: Claredon Press.

Olssen, M., O'Neill, A-M. and Codd, J. A. 2004. *Education Policy: Globalisation, Citizenship and Democracy*. London: Sage.

Oomen, B. 2005. *Chiefs in South Africa: Law, Power and Culture in the Post-Apartheid Era*. Oxford: James Currey.

Orwell, G. 1972. *Animal Farm*. London: Heinemann Educational.

Ossewaarde, M. 2007. "Cosmopolitanism and the Society of Strangers" In *Current Sociology* Vol. 55 No. 3 pp367-388.

Palmer, D. 2002. "Broken Ties: Interlocking Directorates and Inter-corporate Co-ordination." In Scott, J. (Ed). *Social Networks: Critical Concepts in Sociology* Volume 3. London and New York: Routledge pp261-280.

Paris, E. 2001. *Long Shadows: Truth, Lies and History*. London and New York: Bloomsbury.

Peter, C. 2006. "Rian Malan Falls in Bigot's Trap." *The Weekend Argus.* November 18 2006.

Peters, R. S. (Ed). 1975. *Education and the Development of Reason*. London & Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Phatlane, S. N. 2002. "The Farce of Homeland Independence: Kwa-Ndebele, The Untold Story." In *The Journal of Asian and African Studies* 37(3-5) pp401-421.

Philip, R. 2009. *SA's Varsities of Shame*. South African *Timesonline* (accessed 17 May 2009)

(http://www.thetimes.co.za/PrintEdition/Article.aspx?id=1000927)

Phillips, M. and Coleman, C. 1989. "Another Kind of War: Strategies for Transition in the Era of Negotiation." In *Transformation* 9 pp1-30.

Pillay, C. 2007. "A Right Royal Waster." *Drum Magazine* 3 May 2007 No.763 pp94-95.

Piven, F. F. and Cloward, R. A. 1979. *Poor People's Movements*. New York: Vintage.

Player, I. 2003. "Enos Mabuza: A Personal Tribute." In Hall-Martin, A. J. and Carruthers, J. (Eds). *South African National Parks: Parks: A Celebration Commemorating the Fifth World Parks Congress*. Johannesburg: Horst Klemmpp.

Pollard, S., Shackleton, C. and Carruthers, J. 2003. "Beyond the Fence: People and the Lowveld Landscape." In du Toit, J. T., Rogers, K. H. and Biggs, H. C. (Eds). *The Kruger Experience: Ecology and Management of Savanna Heterogeneity*. Washington, Covelo and London: Island Press pp422-446.

Popular Memory Group. 1982. “Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method.” In Johnson, R., McLennan, G., Schwartz, B and Sutton, D. (Eds). *Making Histories: Studies in History Writing and Politics*. London: Huchinson.

Portes, A. 1998. „Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology.“ In *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 pp1–24.

Posel, D. 1987. “The Meaning of Apartheid before 1948: Conflicting Forces and Interests within the Afrikaner Nationalist Alliance.” In *Journal of Southern African Studies 14*.

Posel, D. 1991. *The Making of Apartheid*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Proctor-Sims, R. (Ed). 1978. *The Development of Viable Communities in Southern Africa with Particular Reference to the Ciskei*. Pretoria: Conference Associates.

Putnam, R. D. 2000. *Bowling Alone*: *The collapse and Revival of American Community* New York: Touchstone.

Putnam, R. D. and Goss, K. A. 2002. “Introduction” In Putnam, R. D. 2002. *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*. New York: Oxford University Press pp3-19.

Quinlan, T. 2000. “Anthropologies of the South: The Practice of Anthropology.” In *Critique of Anthropology* Vol. 20 (2) pp125–136.

Radebe, S. 2007. “Many Facets to Black Diamonds.” *Financial Mail* (6 July 2007) pp38-40.

Rake, A. 1962. *Tom Mboya: Young Man of New Africa*. New York: Double Day.

Ramose, M. B. 2003. “The Philosophy of Ubuntu and Ubuntu as a Philosophy.” In Coetzee, P. H. and Roux, A. P. J. (Eds.) *The African Philosophy Reader* (2nd Ed). New York and London: Routledge.

Randall, D. J. 1996. “Prospects for the Development of a Black Business Class in South Africa.” In *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 34 No. 4. pp661-686.

Ranger, T. 2004. “Nationalist Histriography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe.” In *Journal of Southern African Studies* 30(2) pp215-234.

Rantao, J. 1996. “KaNgwane, KwaNdebele Audit Reveals Graft and Abuse.” *The Star* (23 April 1996).

Rassool, C. S. 2004. *The Individual, Auto/biography and History in South Africa*. A dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History, University of the Western Cape, May 2004.

Ratcliffe, P. 1994. "Conceptualising „Race" Ethnicity and Nation: Towards a Comparative Perspective." In Ratcliffe, P. (Ed). "*Race", Ethnicity and Nation: International Perspectives on Social Conflict.* London: UCL Press Limited pp2-25.

Ray, D. I., van Rouveroy van Niewaal, E. and Adriaan, B. 1996. "The New Relevance of Traditional Authorities in Africa: The Conference; Major Themes; Reflections of Chieftaincy in Africa; Future Directions." In *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* No.37-38 (special double issue).

Republic of South Africa Budget Speech by the Minister of Finance D. L. Keys (17 March 1993).

Republic of South Africa Budget Speech by the Minister of Finance C. F. Liebenberg (15 March 1995).

Rhodes Journalism Review. 1997. "Courage at Work." In *Rhodes Journalism Review* No. 15 November 1997 p20.

Ribot, J. C. 2001. *Local Actors, Powers and Accountability in African Decentralisations: A Review of Issues*. Paper prepared for International Development Research Centre of Canada Assessment of Social Policy Reforms Initiative.

Roberts, B. 2002. *Biographical Research*. Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press.

Rogers, B. 1976. *Divide and Rule – South Africa's Bantustans.* Newgate: International Defence Aid Fund.

Rogers, B. 1980. *Divide and Rule: South Africa"sBantustans*. London: International Defence & Aid Fund for Southern Africa.

Ronnie, R. 2006. *Black Economic Empowerment - No Change in the Class Position of Workers.* Paper presented for the Harold Wolpe Memorial Trust. Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 11 May 2006.

Roos, J. P. 2003. "Context, Authenticity, Referentiality, Reflexivity: Back to Basics in Autobiography." In Humphrey, R., Miller, R. and Zdravomyslova, E. (Eds). 2003. *Biographical Research in Eastern Europe; Altered Lives and Broken Biographies*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Ross, W. D. 2002 (c1930). *The Right and the Good*. Philip Stratton-Lake (Ed). Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press Oxford University Press.

Runyan, W. M. 1984. *Lives, Histories and Psychobiography: Exploration in Theory and Method*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rwelamira, M. R. 1990. *Refugees in a Chess Game: Reflections on Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland Refugee Policies.* The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala Research Report No. 88.

Ryan, B. 2006. "Not the Usual Suspects: Government Pressure is Forcing Companies to Involve More Broad-Based Beneficiaries." *Financial Mail* (10 March 2006) pp53-54.

Sadler, B.J. 2006. "Shared Intentions and Shared Responsibility." In French, P. A. and Wettstein, H. K. (Eds). *Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility*. Boston, MA: Blackwell pp115-144.

Said, A and Simmons, L. R. 1976. "The Ethnic Factor in World Politics." In Said, A and Simmons, L. R. (Eds). *Ethnicity in an International Context*. New Brunswick N.J.: Transaction Books pp15-47.

Salmi, J. 1993. *Violence and Democratic Society: New Approaches to Human Rights*. London: Zed Books.

Sarantakos, S. 2005. *Social Research* (3rd Ed). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Schmidt, E., Lotter, M. and McCleland, W. 2002. *Trees and Shrubs of Mpumalanga and Kruger National Park*. Johannesburg: Jacana.

Schur, E. M. 1971. *Labelling Deviant Behaviour: Its Sociological Implications*. New York: Harper & Row.

Schur, E. M. 1979. *Interpreting Deviance: A Sociological Introduction*. New York, Hagerstown, Philadelphia, San Francisco and London: Harper & Row.

Schur, E. M. 1980. *The Politics of Deviance: Stigma Contests and the Uses of Power*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Scott, J and Griff, C. 2002. "Bank Spheres of Influence in the British Corporate Network." In Scott, J. (Ed). *Social Networks: Critical Concepts in Sociology* Volume 3. London and New York: Routledge pp319-335.

Scott, J. 1991. „The Evidence of Experience." In *Critical Inquiry* 17.

Sebe, L. L. W. 1982. *Ucamngco*. Goodwood: Via Afrika.

Sebe, L.L.W. 1980. *Challenges*. Goodwood South Africa: Via Afrika.

Sekhar, N. U. 2003. "Local People"s Attitudes towards Conservation and Wildlife Tourism Around Sariska Tiger Reserve, India." In *Journal of Environmental Management* Vol. 69 No. 4 pp339-347.

Shachtman, T. 2009. *Airlift to America: How Barack Obama, Sr., John F. Kennedy, Tom Mboya, and 800 East African Students Changed Their World and Ours*. New York: St. Martin"s Press.

Sharp, J. 1988a. "Introduction: Constructing Social Reality." In Boonzaier, E and Sharp, J. (Eds). *South African Keywords: The Uses and Abuses of Political Concepts*. Cape Town and Johannesburg: David Philip Publishers pp1-16.

Sharp, J. 1988b. "Ethnic Group and Nation: The Apartheid Vision in South Africa." In Boonzaier, E. and Sharp, A. (Eds). *South African Keywords: The Uses and Abuses of Political Concepts*. Cape Town and Johannesburg: David Philip pp79-99.

Shaw, C. R. 1966. *The Jack-Roller: A Delinquent Boy"s Own Story* (Revised Edition). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Shklar, J. N. 1989. *Ordinary Vices*. Cambridge Massachusetts and London: Belknap Press.

Silverman, D. 2000. *Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook*. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Silverman, D. 2006. *Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction*. (3rd Ed). London: Sage Publications.

Simonton, D. K. 1994. *Greatness: Who Makes History and Why*? New York: Guilford Press.

Sithole, P. and Mbele, T. 2008. *Fifteen Year Review on Traditional Leadership*. Cato Manor: Human Sciences Research Council.

Sklar, R. L. 1994. *The Significance of Mixed Government in Southern African Studies: A Preliminary Assessment.* Paper presented to the History Workshop Conference on "Popular Precedents, Popular Practice and Popular Culture. University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 13-15 July 1994.

Skweyiya, Z. S. 1993. *Chieftaincy, the Ethnic Question and the Democratisation Process in South Africa*. Occasional Paper Series, Bellville: Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape.

Skyrms, B. 1996. *Evolution of the Social Contract*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Smart, J. D. 1954. *The Teaching Ministry of the Church: An Examination of the Basic Principles of Christian Education*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.

Smith, J. S. 1988. *Buthelezi: The Biography*. Mellville: Strydom.

Solomon, R. and Flores, F. 2001. *Building Trust in Business, Politics, Relationships and Life*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Somers, M. R. 1994. "The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach." In *Theory and Society* 23 pp605-649.

South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR). 1990. *Race Relations Survey 1989/90*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.

South African Department of Education, 2008 (30 November). *Report of the Ministerial Committee on Transformation and Social Cohesion and the Elimination of Discrimination in Public Higher Education Institutions*. http://www.thetimes.co.za/pdfs/UniversityRacismReport.pdf

Southall, R. J. 1983a. "Consociationalism in South Africa: The Buthelezi Commission and Beyond." In *Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 21. No. 1 pp77-112.

Southall, R. J. 1983b. *South Africa's Transkei: The Political Economy of an "Independent" Bantustan*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Southall, R. J. 2004. "The ANC and Black Capitalism in South Africa." In *Review of African Political Economy* Vol. 31 No.100 pp313-328.

Southall, R., Simutanyi, N. and Daniel, J. 2006. "Former Presidents in African Politics." In Southall, R and Melber, H. (Eds). *Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics.* Cape Town: HSRC Press and Nordic Africa Institute pp1-25.

Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference Report. 1979. Lancaster House, London. September- December 1979. Printed in England for Her Majesty"s Stationery Office by Burrup, Mathieson & Co Ltd. S661980/MP Dd. 593426 K40 1/80.

Sparks, A. 1994. "South Africa: The Secret Revolution." *The New Yorker*, 11 April 1994 pp56-78.

Spierenburg, M. 2002. *Re-emergence of Traditional Authorities in the Struggle for Control over Land in Dande, Zimbabwe*. Paper presented at the IASCP Conference, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe 17-21 June 2002.

Standard Bank South Africa Memorandum 8: The Mbeki Era and South African Business, 1997. (compiled by S. Friedman of the Centre for Policy Studies for the SBSA board meeting to be held 2 September 1997).

Standing, G., Sender, J. and Weeks, J. 1996. *Restructuring the Labour Market: The South African Challenge*. Geneva: International Labour Office.

Stanley, L. 1993. "On Auto/biography in Sociology." In *Sociology* 27(1) pp41-52.

Stavrou, N. A. 1976. "Ethnicity in Yugoslavia: Roots and Impacts." In Said, A and Simmons, L. R. (Eds). *Ethnicity in an International Context*. New Brunswick N.J.: Transaction Books pp134-149.

Stevens, G. 1986. "Mabuza: The Man in the Middle." *Sunday Tribune*, 2 November 1986 pp33.

Stokman, F. N and Wasseur, F. W. 2002. "National Networks in 1976: A Structural Comparison." In Scott, J. (Ed). *Social Networks: Critical Concepts in Sociology* Vol. 3. London and New York: Routledge pp336-359.

Stowe, H. B. c2007 (orig. 1852). *The Annotated Uncle Tom's Cabin* (Edited with an introduction and notes by Gates, H.L. Jr. and Robbins, H; photos selected by Dalton, K.C.C and Biale, N). New York: W. W. Norton & Co.

Strachey, L. 1948 [1918]. *Eminent Victorians*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Streek, B and Wicksteed, R. 1981. *Render Unto Kaiser: A Transkei Dossier*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Swartz, D. L., 2003. "From Critical Sociology to Public Intellectual: Pierre Bourdieu and Politics." *Theory and Society*, 32 (5/6, Special Issue on the Sociology of Symbolic Power: A Special Issue in Memory of Pierre Bourdieu), pp791-823.

Swart, W. 2007 (17 May). "KZN Fights New Street War" In *Drum Magazine* No. 765 pp88-89: Media24.

Switzer, L. 1979. *Politics and Communication in the Ciskei: An African Homeland in South Africa*. Grahamstown: Rhodes University, Occasional paper No. 23. Institute of Social and Economic Research.

Switzer, L. 1993. *Power and Resistance in an African Society: The Ciskei Xhosa and the Making of South Africa*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Sztompka, P. 1999. *Trust: A Sociological Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tabata, I. B. 1950. *The All African Convention: The Awakening of a People*. Johannesburg: People Press.

Tabata, I. B. 1952. *The Boycott as Weapon of Struggle*. Cape Town: All African Convention Committee.

Tabensky, P. A. 2006. "Moved Movers: Transfiguring Judgement Practices." In Tabensky, P. A. (Ed). *Judging and Understanding: Essays on Free Will, Narrative, Meaning and the Ethical Limits of Condemnation*. Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate pp129-151.

Temkin, B. 1976. *Gatsha Buthelezi: Zulu Statesman: A Biography*. Cape Town: Purnell.

Temkin, B. 2003. *Buthelezi: A Biography*. London: Frank Cass.

Tessendorf, H. R. and Boult, B. E. 1991. *Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe: An Analysis*. Port Elizabeth: University of Port Elizabeth.

The Africa Watch Committee. 1990. *Somalia: A Government At War With its Own People - Testimonies about the Killings and the Conflict in the North (Report)*. London, New York and Washington DC: Human Rights Watch.

The BusinessMap Foundation, 2003. *Empowerment 2004-Black Ownership: Risk or Opportunity?* Johannesburg: Business Map Foundation.

The Citizen, 1996. "Ex-homelands Alleged Fraud to be Probed." *The Citizen* (4 December 1996).

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (Act 108 of 1996, Chapter 12: Traditional Leaders).

The *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996* (Act 108 of 1996, Chapter 12: Traditional Leaders).

The Financial Mail, 1986. "Special Report on the International Investment in 1987 Survey Conference." In the Supplement to the *Financial Mail* 28 November 1986 Vol. 102 No. 9

The Kairos Theologians. 1986. *The Kairos Document: Challenge to the Church. A Theological Comment on the Political Crisis in South Africa*. (Rev 2nd Ed). Grand Rapids Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing.

Thomas, W. I. and Znaniecki, F. 1958. *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (2 Vols). New York: Dover Press.

Thompson, L. M. 2001. *A History of South Africa*. (3rd Ed). New Haven: Yale University Press.

Thompson, P. 1998. "Sharing and Reshaping Life Stories: Problems and Potential in Archiving Research Narratives." In Chamberlain, M and Thompson, P. (Eds). *Narrative and Genre*. 1998. Routledge: London and New York.

Thorn, H. 2007. "Social Movements, the Media and the Emergence of a Global Public Sphere: From Anti-Apartheid to Global Justice." In *Current Sociology* Vol. 55. No. 6 pp896-918.

Tolstoy, L. N.1977. *Master and Man and Other Stories*. (Translated with an introduction by Paul Foote). Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Classics.

Touraine, A. 1995. *Critique of Modernity* (translated by David Macey). Oxford: Blackwell.

Touraine, A. 1998. *Return of the Actor: Social Theory in Post-Industrial Society*. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.

Uchendu, V. C. 1975. "The Dilemma of Ethnicity and Polity Primacy in Black Africa." In De Vos, G. and Romanucci-Ross, L. (Eds). *Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change*. California: Mayfield Publishing Company pp265-275.

University of Cape Town Historical Studies Dept. 2007. *From Apartheid to Democracy: Localities and Liberation*. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Department of Historical Studies.

University of the Witwatersrand Development Studies Group Southern African Research Service. 1982. *Homeland Tragedy: Function and Farce.* (Edited jointly by the Southern African Research Service and the Development Studies Group). Braamfontein: Southern African Research Service and the Development Studies Group, Information Publication 6.

Unterhalter, E. 1987. *Forced Removal: The Division, Segregation and Control of the People of South Africa*. London: IDAF.

Unterhalter, E. 1990. "Education" In Corrigall, J., Unterhalter, E., and Slovo, G. 1990. *Subverting Apartheid: Education, Information and Culture under Emergency Rule*. London: International Defence and Aid Fund Publications Limited pp29-51.

Uslaner, E. 2002. *The Moral Foundations of Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Uys, T. 2008. "Rational Loyalty and Whistle-blowing: The South African Context." *Current Sociology* Vol. 56 No. 6 (November) pp904-921.

Van Antwerpen, J. 2006. "Critical Sociology and the Interdisciplinary Imagination." *Thesis Eleven* No. 84 (February 2006) pp60-72.

Van den Berghe, P. 1990. "Introduction." In van den Berghe, P. (Ed). *State Violence and Ethnicity.* Boulder, Colo.: University Press of Colorado pp1-18.

Van den Berghe, P. L .1970. *Race and Ethnicity: Essays in Comparative Sociology*. New York & London: Basic Books.

van der Laan, H. and de Graaff, A.H. 1997. *The Ideal of Christian Schools*. Potchefstroom: Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education.

Van Eeden, F. J. 1984. "Financial Relations between the RSA and the Independent and Self-Governing States." In *Development Southern Africa* Vol.1 No.2 (August) pp126-141.

Van Niekerk, W. P and Heath, E. T. 1984. *An investigation into the Mdantsane/East London Bus Boycott*. Port Elizabeth: Institute for Planning Research, University of Port Elizabeth.

Van Schalkwyk, M. 2004. “Responsible Tourism: Engaging Local Communities.” In Bowes, B.; Lundy, G. and Pennington, S. (Eds). *South Africa 2014: The Story of Our Future*. Johannesburg: The Good News pp325-327.

Van Vuuren, H. 2006. *Apartheid Grand Corruption: Assessing the Scale of Crimes of Profit from 1976 to 1994*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

van Wyk Smith, M. 1993. „Citation for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Laws (honoris causa).“ In the *Rhodes Newsletter* July 1993.

Venter, F.J., Scholes, R.J. and Eckhardt, H. C. 2003. “The Abiotic Template and Its Associated Vegetation Pattern.” In du Toit, J. T., Rogers, K. H. and Biggs, H. C. (Eds). *The Kruger Experience: Ecology and Management of Savanna Heterogeneity*. Washington, Covelo and London: Island Press pp83-129.

Visser, W. 2004a. “Setting the Global Agenda for Ubuntu Capitalism.” In *South Africa 2014: The Story of Our Future.* Bowes, B.; Lundy, G and Pennington, S. (Eds). Johannesburg: South Africa-The Good News pp349-351.

Visser, W. 2004b. “Sustainable Business Futures: Setting the Global Agenda for Corporate Responsibility and „Ubuntu“ Capitalism”. In Bowes, B., Lundy, G and Pennington, S. (Eds). *South Africa 2014: The Story of Our Future*. Johannesburg: The Good News.

Vogt, J. F. and Murrell, K. L. 1990. *Empowerment in Organisations: How to Spark Exceptional Performance*. San Diego, California: Pfeiffer.

Wacquant, L. J. D. 1989. “Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu.” In *Sociological Theory* Vol. 7 No. 1 (Spring, 1989) pp. 26-63.

Wafula Okumu, F. 2001. “Ethnic Politics and the Decay of the State in Kenya.” In Ike Udogu, E. (Ed). *The Issue of Political Ethnicity in Africa*. Hampshire: Ashgate pp99-123.

Walshe, P. 1987. *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa.* Craighall: Ad Donker Publishers.

Walters, P. 2003. “Citation by the Rhodes University Public Orator, Professor Paul Walters - Dr Ian Cedric Player for the award of the degree of Doctor of Laws honoris causa” (Rhodes University).

Warde, A. 2004. *Practice and Field: Revising Bourdieusian Concepts*. Centre for Research Innovation and Competition Discussion Paper No.65 (April 2004). University of Manchester.

Watson, L. C. 1976. “Understanding a Life History as a Subjective Document: Hermeneutical and Phenomenological Perspectives.” In *Society for Psychological Anthropology 4* pp95-131.

Webb, J., Schirato, T. and Danaher, G. 2002. *Understanding Bourdieu*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Weber, M. 1978. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Eds). Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

Webster, D. 1987. “Repression and the State of Emergency.” In Moss, G and Obery, I. (Eds for the Southern African Research Service). *South African Review 4*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press pp141-172.

Weiner, B. 1992. *Human Motivation: Metaphors, Theories and Research*. Newbury Park, London and New Delhi: Sage Publications.

White, C. S. 2008. *The Rule of Brigadier Oupa Gqozo in Ciskei: 4 March 1990 to 22 March 1994*. M A. Thesis (History) - Rhodes University.

White, J. 1990. Black Leadership in America: From Booker T. Washington to Jesse Jackson (2nd Ed). London and New York: Longman.

Wiles, P. 1969. “A Syndrome, Not a Doctrine: Some Elementary Theses on *Populism*” In Ionescu, G. and Gellner, E. (Eds). *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics*. Macmillan pp163-179.

Wilkinson, P. R. 2002. *Thesaurus of Traditional English Metaphors*. (2nd Ed). London and New York: Routledge.

Williams, D. 2006. “Nice Guy no More: When a Chairman‟s Duty is to be Done, A Chairman‟s Lot is not always a Happy One.” *Financial Mail* (14 July 2006) pp20-24.

Williams, J. M. 2009a. “Legislating „Tradition‟ in South Africa.” In *Journal of Southern African Studies* Vol. 35 No.1 pp191-209.

Williams, J. M. 2009b. *The Chieftaincy, the State and Democracy: The Struggle for Political Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Wilson, F. and Frederiksen, B. F. 1995. “Introduction: Studies in Ethnicity, Gender and the Subversion of Nationalism.” In Wilson, F. and Frederiksen, B. F. (Eds). *Ethnicity, Gender and the Subversion of Nationalism*. London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd pp1-6.

Wilson, M. 1962. *The Principle of Maintaining the Reserves*. Port Elizabeth: South African Institute of Race Relations.

Wolpe, H. 1972. “Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid.” In *Economy and Society* 1.

Woodson, D. C. 1991. “The J. S. M. Matsebula Collection at the University of Swaziland.” In *History in Africa* Vol. 18 pp381-397.

World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission). 1987. *Our Common Future: World Commission on Environment and Development*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wuthnow, R 1998. *Loose Connections: Joining Together in America's Fragmented Communities*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Yamagishi, T. 2001. „Trust as a Form of Social Intelligence.“ In Cook, K. (Ed.) *Trust in Society* pp121–148. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Yawitch, J. 1982. *Betterment: The Myth of Homeland Agriculture*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.

Zelizer, V. 1994. *The Social Meaning of Money*. New York: Basic Books.

Ziervogel, D and Mabuza, E. J. 1976. *A Grammar of the Swati Language: siSwati*. (Revised Edition). Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik (the original 1952 edition was titled *A Grammar of Swazi)*.

Zucker, L. 1986. „Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure 1840–1920.“ In *Research in Organisational Behaviour* 8 pp53–111.

Documents from the South African History Archives (ref: AL2460 (OH) & AL2457 (B4)).

ANC/INM. 1986 (28 August). *Joint Communique Released after the Consultative Talks Between Delegations of the Inyandza National Movement and the African National Congress* (Lusaka, Zambia).

Fredrikse, J. (n.d). Transcript of interview with Enos. J. Mabuza the President of the Inyandza National Movement and Chief Minister of KaNgwane.

Interlink Training Consultants. (1988). *Training and Personnel Practitioners as Change Agents: Facilitating the Dynamic Interaction between Employer and Employees*.

Inyandza National Movement. (1991?) *Current Activities and Structure of Inyandza National Movement*. Inyandza National Movement: Barberton.

Inyandza National Movement. 1989. *11th Annual Congress 1988/89 National Executive Report*. Inyandza National Movement: Barberton.

Inyandza National Movement. 1989. *Resolutions Adopted at the Inyandza National Movement"s Annual Congress held at the Ngwane Hall, KaNyamazane 24 September 1989*. Inyandza National Movement: Barberton.

Inyandza National Movement. 1990. *Resolutions Adopted at the Central Council Meeting of the Inyandza National Movement held at Ngwane Hall, KaNyamazane on Sunday 11 march 1990*. Inyandza National Movement: Barberton.
Johnson, B. 1990. Letter to Dr Ronnie Bethlehem (28 February 1990).

Lowveld Bureau. 1986. "KaNgwane Gets Cabinet Reshuffle." *The Star*, 5 November 1986.

Mabuza, E. J. 1991. "Addenda A-D: The Way Ahead for the Homelands." In *A Collection of Addresses by Enos J. Mabuza The President of the Inyandza National Movement and Chief Minister of KaNgwane Delivered in the Course of 1990* (Address delivered at the Hollandia Reinsurance Forum, Vereeniging, Thursday 1 November 1990).

Mabuza, E. J. 1991. "Freedom and the Responsibility of Democracy." In *A Collection of Addresses by Enos J. Mabuza The President of the Inyandza National Movement and Chief Minister of KaNgwane Delivered in the Course of 1990* (Presidential address to the 12th Annual Congress of the Inyandza National Movement, Nelspruit, Sunday 30 September 1990). Inyandza National Movement: Barberton.

Mabuza, E. J. 1991. "Inyandza and a Future Democratic South Africa." In *A Collection of Addresses by Enos J. Mabuza the President of the Inyandza National Movement and Chief Minister of KaNgwane Delivered in the Course of 1990* (Address delivered to the Central Council of Inyandza National Movement, Ngwane Hall, KaNyamazane, Sunday 11 March 1990). Inyandza National Movement: Barberton.

Mabuza, E. J. 1991. "Policy Speech of the Ministry of the Chief Minister, Economic Affairs and Finance." In *A Collection of Addresses by Enos J. Mabuza The President of the Inyandza National Movement and Chief Minister of KaNgwane Delivered in the Course of 1990* (Annual address delivered during the Second Ordinary Session of the Fourth KaNgwane Legislative Assembly, Nkululeko Youth Centre, Matsulu, Tuesday 8 May 1990). Inyandza National Movement: Barberton.

Mabuza, E. J. 1991. "Statement to Prorogue the Second Ordinary Session of the Fourth KaNgwane Legislative Assembly." In *A Collection of Addresses by Enos J. Mabuza The President of the Inyandza National Movement and Chief Minister of KaNgwane Delivered in the Course of 1990* (Nkululeko Youth Centre, Tuesday 22 May 1990). Inyandza National Movement: Barberton.

Mabuza, E. J. 1986. *Memorandum Submitted to the South African Advisory Committee to the Secretary of State, USA by Enos Mabuza of Inyandza National Movement and Chief Minister of KaNgwane*. Inyandza National Movement: Barberton.

Mabuza, E. J. 1989. Impressions on a Visit to the Soviet Union 1-10 April 1989 by IDASA Delegation. (Report June/August 1989).

Mabuza, E. J. 1990. "Policy Speech of the Ministry of the Chief Minister, Economic Affairs and Finance Presented at the 1st Ordinary Session of the Fourth KaNgwane Legislative Assembly, 9 May 1989). In *A Collection of Three Addresses by the President of the Inyandza National Movement and Chief Minister of KaNgwane Enos J. Mabuza Delivered in the Course of 1989*. Inyandza National Movement: Barberton.

Mabuza, E. J. 1990. "Presidential Address at the 11th Annual Congress of the Inyandza National Movement." In *A Collection of Three Addresses by the President of the Inyandza National Movement and Chief Minister of KaNgwane Enos J. Mabuza Delivered in the Course of 1989* (Ngwane Hall, KaNyamazane, 23 September 1989). Inyandza National Movement: Barberton.

Mabuza, E. J. 1990. “Towards a Non-Racial Democratic South Africa: The Challenge Ahead for „Homeland“ Leadership.” In *A Collection of Three Addresses by the President of the Inyandza National Movement and Chief Minister of KaNgwane Enos J. Mabuza Delivered in the Course of 1989* (Address on the occasion of the Dikwankwetla Annual Conference, Phutaditjhaba, Saturday 2 December 1989). Inyandza National Movement: Barberton.

Mabuza, E.J. 1991. “Statement on the Current Political Developments in South Africa.” In *A Collection of Addresses by Enos J. Mabuza The President of the Inyandza National Movement and Chief Minister of KaNgwane Delivered in the Course of 1990* (A comment on the occasion of a Special Session of the Fourth KaNgwane Legislative Assembly, Nkululeko Youth Centre, Matsulu, Friday 16 March 1990). Inyandza National Movement: Barberton.

Stevens, G. 1986. “Mabuza: The Man in the Middle.” *Sunday Tribune*, 2 November 1986 pp33.

Viljoen, G. N. 1986. *Vote of Thanks by MR. E.J. Mabuza, Chief Minister of KaNgwane and President of Inyandza National Movement on the Occasion of the Official Opening of the Third ordinary Session of the Third KaNgwane Legislative Assembly by the Minister of Education and Development Aid at the Ngwane Hall, KaNyamazane on Thursday 24 April 1986*. Inyandza National Movement: Barberton.

Karis-Gerhart Microfilm Collection - Cooperative Africana Microfilm Project South African Political Materials: From Protest to Challenge, 1964-1990

ANC. 1983. Report on Visit to KaNgwane 15-16 January 1983 (dated 25 January 1983, plus appendices). Cooperative Africana Microfilm Project (CAMP) Karis-Gerhart Microform Collection 1999: South African Political Materials: From Protest to Challenge, 1964-1990 Reel 38: Folder 451.

ANC. 1986a. “Minutes of the Sparrow (KaNgwane) Meeting Held in Harbour on 19 April 1986 – Debriefing of a Senior Homeland Official (Enos Mabuza).”

ANC. 1986b. “Report on Meeting Between Ourselves and Comrade Jonathan (Enos Mabuza) of Sparrow (KaNgwane) Held on 21 September 1986.”

ANC/INM. 1986 (28 August). *Joint Communique Released after the Consultative Talks Between Delegations of the Inyandza National Movement and the African National Congress* (Lusaka, Zambia).

Anonymous. (n.d). "Brief Notes on the Refugee Crisis in Nelspruit." Cooperative Africana Microfilm Project (CAMP) Karis-Gerhart Microform Collection 1999: South African Political Materials: From Protest to Challenge, 1964-1990 Reel 38: Folder 451.

Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) - Reel KK/Reel 38. Karis-Gerhart Microfilm Collection - Cooperative Africana Microfilm Project South African Political Materials: From Protest to Challenge, 1964-1990.

Buthelezi, M. G. 1982a (27 May). Speech during "Visit of Members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly to Maputo." re Ingwavuma Land Deal.

Buthelezi, M. G. 1982b (28 May). "Visit to Ingwavuma by Members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in order to Report to the People of Chief Nyawo, Mathenjwa and Mngomezulu on Pretoria's Intention to Excise the Ingwavuma District in which these Tribal Areas are Situated and Hand Them Over with Its People to Swaziland", speech.

Buthelezi, M. G. 1982c (14 June). "The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly‟s Formal Response to the South African Government‟s Suggestion that Ingwavuma be Excised and Incorporated into Swaziland."

Buthelezi, M. G. 1982d (24 June) "A Report to Members of the Tembe Tribe on the South African Government‟s Decision to Excise Ingwavuma District and Hand it over to Swaziland."

Buthelezi, M. G. 1982e (June) "Memorandum to all South African Political Groups from Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi" re Ingwavuma land deal.

Buthelezi, M. G. 1982f (12 July). "Inkatha-Progressive Federal Party Protest Meeting Concerning the Proposed Excision of KaNgwane and Ingwavuma from the Sovereign Area of S.A. for Handing Over to the Kingdom of Swaziland."

Buthelezi, M. G. 1982g (13 July). "Address delivered at a combined protest meeting of the Progressive Federal Party and Inkatha over the Proposed SA/Swaziland Deal", Durban City Hall.

Buthelezi, M. G. 1982h (14 July). “Address Delivered at a Combined Protest Meeting of the Progressive Federal Party and Inkatha over the Proposed South Africa/Swaziland Deal.”

Buthelezi, M. G. 1982i (25 July). Speech at Prayer Meeting of the South African Black Alliance, KaNyamazane Stadium, re Proposed Inclusion of KaNgwane and Ingwavuma into Swaziland.

Buthelezi, M. G. 1982j (31 July). “On the Proposed Excision of the Ingwavuma District and the KaNgwane Region for the Purpose of Incorporating these Areas into the Kingdom of Swaziland.”

Buthelezi, M. G. 1982k (4 August). “The Swaziland Deal and the Dilemma of Black Voicelessness” - address to University of Pretoria students.

Buthelezi, M. G. 1985a (14 October). Remarks on the Occasion of a Lunch arranged by Mr Jacque Chirac, Mayor of Paris.

Buthelezi, M. G. 1985b (29 October). Address to the South African Federated Chamber of Industries.

Buthelezi, M. G. 1985c (19 October). “The Challenge of the Black Liberation Struggle to Black Womanhood in the Midst of Black on Black Violence and Institutionalised Violence of the Apartheid System and the Violence Used to Maintain It.” (Presidential Address to Inkatha‟s Annual Conference of the Women‟s Brigade, Ulundi).

Buthelezi, M. G. 1986a (29 June). Address at a Prayer Meeting for Black Unity at Jabulani Amphitheatre in Soweto.

Buthelezi, M. G. 1986c. “Address by Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi Chief Minister of KwaZulu, President of Inkatha and Chairman of the South African Black Alliance to the French Chamber of Commerce and Industries of Southern Africa.” Cooperative Africana Microfilm Project (CAMP) Karis-Gerhart Microform Collection 1999: South African Political Materials: From Protest to Challenge, 1964-1990 Reel 56: Folder 685.

Buthelezi, M.G. 1986b (5 July). Presidential Address at the Inkatha Annual General Meeting.

Inyandza National Movement. 1985 (19 October). Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for the Year Ending 31 December 1986.Oliver Tambo Papers: African National Congress Archives. Series C Roll 17 Box 77. University of Fort Hare.

Inyandza National Movement. 1989. *11th Annual Congress 1988/89 National Executive Report* (22 September 1989).

Mabuza, E. (n.d). "Thanks-Giving Prayer." Cooperative Africana Microfilm Project (CAMP) Karis-Gerhart Microform Collection: South African Political Materials: From Protest to Challenge, 1964-1990 Reel 38: Folder 451.

Mabuza, E. 1982. "Let Us Strive For Our Rights and Privileges in South Africa, the Land of Our Birth." (Address at Barberton 6 February 1982). Cooperative Africana Microfilm Project (CAMP) Karis-Gerhart Microform Collection 1999: South African Political Materials: From Protest to Challenge, 1964-1990 Reel 38: Folder 451.

Mabuza, E. 1986. "Letter from Enos Mabuza to Gatsha Buthelezi." Cooperative Africana Microfilm Project (CAMP) Karis-Gerhart Microform Collection 1999: South African Political Materials: From Protest to Challenge, 1964-1990 Reel 38: Folder 452.

Mabuza, E. 1986. "Mabuza on Black Unity, White Fear" (Interview with Business Day 19 March 1986). Cooperative Africana Microfilm Project (CAMP) Karis-Gerhart Microform Collection 1999: South African Political Materials: From Protest to Challenge, 1964-1990 Reel 38: Folder 452.

Mabuza, E. 1987. "Policy and Budget Speech of a Cabinet Minister Enos J. Mabuza to the 4th Ordinary Session of the 3rd KaNgwane Legislative Assembly – May 1987." Cooperative Africana Microfilm Project (CAMP) Karis-Gerhart Microform Collection 1999: South African Political Materials: From Protest to Challenge, 1964-1990 Reel 38: Folder 452.

Mabuza, E. 1987. Issues and Challenges: A Collection of Speeches by Enos Mabuza. Cooperative Africana Microfilm Project (CAMP) Karis-Gerhart Microform Collection 1999: South African Political Materials 1964-1990 Reel 38: Folder 452.

Mabuza, E. 1989. "Cast The Die." (Leadership Vol. 8 No. 6 pp86-88). Cooperative Africana Microfilm Project (CAMP) Karis-Gerhart Microform Collection 1999: South African Political Materials: From Protest to Challenge, 1964-1990 Reel 39: Folder 454.

Mabuza, E. 1989. "Extracts from a Policy Speech by Chief E.J. Mabuza of KaNgwane on 9 May 1989. Cooperative Africana Microfilm Project (CAMP) Karis-Gerhart Microform Collection 1999: South African Political Materials: From Protest to Challenge, 1964-1990 Reel 39: Folder 454.

ANC's *Mayibuye* Publications

Mayibuye, 1984. "We Must Break with False Leaders." No. 5 p8.
Mayibuye, 1989. "Stop the Killings in Natal: Forward to Peace Among the People!" No. 2 p4.
Mayibuye, 1990. "Bantustan Question: A New Approach?" Vol. 1 No.1 p15.
Mayibuye, 1990. "Brutal Repression in Bophuthatswana." Vol. 1 No. 2 p22.
Mayibuye, 1990. "Eroding a Pillar of Apartheid." Vol. 1 No. 1 pp34-36.
Mayibuye, 1990. "What Happened in Sebokeng?" Vol.1 No. 2 p8.
Mayibuye, 1990. "What Role for Homeland Leaders?" Vol. 1 No. 3 pp51-52.
Mayibuye, 1990. "When Peace Begets Violence." Vol. 1 No. 2 p22.
Mayibuye, 1991. "Mangope"s Recipe for Power." Vol. 2 No. 9 p18.
Mayibuye, 1992. "Bophuthatswana: The People Reject Mangope"s Rona re na le lona." Vol. 3 No. 11 pp15-17.
Mayibuye, 1992. "Ciskei: The State Wants to Start a Cycle of Violence." Vol. 3 No.9 pp12-13.
Mayibuye, 1992. "Inkathagate: More Revelations, Fewer Denials." Vol. 3 No. 1 pp13-14.
Mayibuye, 1992. "QwaQwa: The Seeds of Violence." Vol. 3 No.9 p17.
Mayibuye, 1992. "The Lancaster Constitution: Did the Sun Set on Zimbabwe?" Vol. 3 No.7 pp34-35.
Mayibuye, 1992. "Welfare and Wham: The Lebowa Experience." Vol. 3 No.10 pp18-19.

Interviews/Communication with Researcher

David Schegmann, Project Manager, Penryn Trust.
David Wylde - 2 August 2007, St Andrews College, Grahamstown.
Elias Gininda - 8 June 2007 (Hall & Sons offices, Nelspruit).
Esther Mabuza - 4 May 2006, Nelspruit.
Esther Mabuza - 6 June 2007, Banathi Farm, Louieville/KaNyamazane.
Jeunesse Park (Food and Trees for Africa), email communication March 2009.
M. S. Ginindza -7 June 2007, Mpumalanga Provincial Government Offices.
Margaret Mabuza - 6 June 2007, Schoemansdal, Nkomazi.
Michael Mndawe - 7 June 2007, Mpumalanga Provincial Government Offices.
Rob Snaddon (Chairman of the Penryn Council) - 4 May 2006, Nelspruit.
Rob Vollet (Mpumalanga Conservancy Association), email communication, 2008.

Rosemary Smuts (Caring Network South Africa), email communication March 2009.
Sandile Mabuza - 5 June 2007, Mattafin Farm, Nelspruit.
Zenobe Vosloo, Grahamstown Foundation, personal communication 17 March 2009.

Letters

Frank Raimondo to Enos Mabuza 11 February 1992
Frank Raimondo to Enos Mabuza 11 March 1991
Frank Raimondo to Enos Mabuza 16 May 1993
Frank Raimondo to Enos Mabuza 23 August 1991
Frank Raimondo to Enos Mabuza 9 April 1991
Enos Mabuza to Frank Raimondo 18 December 1989
Enos Mabuza to Frank Raimondo 2 March 1993
Enos Mabuza to Frank Raimondo 24 January 1989
Enos Mabuza to Frank Raimondo 26 February 1991
Enos Mabuza to Frank Raimondo 3 March 1989
Enos Mabuza to Frank Raimondo 8 August 1991
Mabuza, E. 1987-Letter to Sandile (15 January).
Mabuza, E. 1987-Letter to Sandile (31 January).
Mabuza, E. 1987-Letter to Sandile (12 May).
Mabuza, E. 1987-Letter to Sandile (27 July).
Mabuza, E. 1987-Letter to Sandile (28 0ctober).
Mabuza, E. 1988-Letter to Sandile (14 March).
Mabuza, E. 1988-Letter to Sandile (30 October)
Mabuza, E. 1990-Letter to Sandile (25 May).
Mabuza, E. 1990-Letter to Sandile (10 September).
Mabuza, E. 1990-Letter to Sandile (12 October).
Mabuza, E. 1990-Letter to Sandile (30 October).
Mabuza, E. 1990-Letter to Sandile (23 November).
Mabuza, E. 1992-Letter to Beverly Johnson and Chris (25 November).
De Villers, N. N. 1997a (Open Africa Initiative) – Letter to Enos Mabuza 17 August 1997 in response to press report the previous week entitled “Knysna Abandoned by National Parks Board.”

Biographical Theses Undertaken at South African Universities

Rhodes University

Berman, M. 1985. *Elie Wiesel"s Fictional Universe: The Paradox of the Mute Narrator*. M.A. (English) - Rhodes University.

Biggs, I. 2007. *Ray Charles: A Psychobiographical Study*. Thesis in partial fulfilment of a Master of Arts degree in Counselling Psychology - Rhodes University.

Burpeau, K. P. 2002. *A Historical Study of John Graham Lake and South African/United States Pentecostalism*. PhD. (History) Thesis - Rhodes University.

Faul, C. 1992. *The Biography and Style of Hubert Lawrence du Plessis with Special Reference to his Symphony Opus 14*. Partial Thesis for Bachelor of Music - Rhodes University.

Forster, D. A. 2001. *Aspects of the Cosmic Christ in the Spirituality of Dom Bede Griffiths*. M. Theology (Divinity) Thesis - Rhodes University.

Garner, J. M. 1983. *Jim"s Journal: The Diary of James Butler: A Critical Edition*. M.A. (History) thesis - Rhodes University.

Green, S. 2006. *Karen Horney: A Psychobiographical Study.* Master of Social Science (Counselling Psychology) - Rhodes University.

Gruber, R. F. J. 1960. *John X. Merriman: The Making of a South African Statesman (1869-1878)*. M. A. Thesis (History) - Rhodes University.

Hacksley, H. E. 2006. *An Edition of a Selection of Poems by John Randal Bradburne*. M.A (English) Thesis – Rhodes University.

Jackson, J. L. 1982. *A Commentary on Nepos" Life of Alcibiades*. M.A. (Classics) - Rhodes University.

Letcher, V. H. 1998. *Trespassing Beyond the Borders: Harriet Ward as Writer and Commentator on the Eastern Cape Frontie*r. Ph.D. Thesis (English) - Rhodes University.

Lowry, D. W. 1989. *The life and times of Ethel Tawse Jollie: A Case Study of the Transference and Adaptation of British Social and Political Ideas of the Edwardian Era to a Colonial Society*. PhD – History - Rhodes University.

Rabinowitz, I. A. 1973. *The Lyric Vision of W. H. Davies: Pastoral, the Unintelligible Universe, Community*. M.A. (English) Thesis - Rhodes University.

Smeeton, B. 2005. *The Psychological Development of a Springbok Rugby Player: A Psychobiographical Study of Raymond Carlson*. Honours thesis - Rhodes University.

Smith, A. E. B. 1991. *Peter Warlock: A Study of the Composer through the Letters to Colin Taylor between 1911-1929*. PhD - Music - Rhodes University.

Snyman, J. H. B. 2003. *Stepping into History: Biography as Approaches to Contemporary South African Choreography with Specific Reference to Bessie"s Head (2000) and Miss Thandi (2002)* M.A. Drama Thesis - Rhodes University.

Warmenhoven, A. 2006. *The Emotional Intelligence of Wessels Johannes "Hansie" Cronje: A Psychological Study*. PhD (Psychology) - Rhodes University.

University of Cape Town

Orie, T 1993. *Raymond Mhlaba and the Genesis of the Congress Alliance: A Political Biography*. M.A. Thesis - University of Cape Town.

Scher, D. M. 1979. *Donald Molteno: Dilizintaba - He Who Removes Mountains*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations and the Donald Molteno Memorial Committee (Revision of the author"s M.A. thesis - University of Cape Town).

Thurman, C. J. 2007. *Guy Butler from a Post-Apartheid Perspective: Reassessing a South African Literary Life*. D. Phil thesis (Department of English Language and Literature) - University of Cape Town.

University of the Free State

Jones, H. C.1986.*Tini Vorster: Van Maatskaplike Werkster tot Premiersvrou*. M.A. Thesis - University of the Orange Free State.

University of Pretoria

Basson, J. L. 1980. *J.G. Strijdom: sy politieke loopbaan van 1929 tot 1948*. Pretoria: Wonderboom. (Originally presented as the author"s doctoral thesis - University of Pretoria under the title: *Die politieke loopbaan van adv. J.G. Strijdom, 1929-1948*).

University of Johannesburg

Snyman, M. E. 2003. *Can Themba: The Life and Work of a Shebeen Intellectual*. M.A Thesis (English) - University of Johannesburg (Auckland Park Campus).

Vlachopoulou, F. 2001. *The Life and Times of Leon Sgouros: Byzantine Lord of North Eastern Peloponnese in the Early 13th Century*. M.A Thesis (Greek and Latin Studies) - Rand Afrikaans University.

University of Limpopo

Matsika, G. (1997). *Stanley Nyamfukudza: His Life and Times*. University of Limpopo (Turfloop Campus).

University of Port Elizabeth/Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University

Bareira, L. D. 2001. *The Life of Helen Martins, Creator of the Owl House: A Psychobiographical Study*. M. A. Thesis - University of Port Elizabeth.

Claasen, M. J. 2007. *A Psychobiographical Study of Dr. H. F. Verwoerd*. Master‟s thesis, University of Port Elizabeth.

Edwards, M. J. 2004. *A Psychobiographical Study of Albert Schweitzer*. Master‟s thesis – University of Port Elizabeth.

Fouche, J. P. 1999. *The Life of Jan Christiaan Smuts: A Psychobiograhical Study*. Doctoral thesis - University of Port Elizabeth.

Goosen, U. 1999. *The Music of Erroll Cuddumbey (b.1950): A Socio-Historical Profile of a Port Elizabeth Jazz Artist*. M. Music - University of Port Elizabeth.

Jacobs, A. 2005. *Cornelis Jacobus Langenhoven: A Psychobiographical Study*. Master‟s thesis, University of Port Elizabeth.

Kotton, D. A. 2002. *Bantu Stephen Biko: A Psychobiographical Case Study.* Master‟s thesis, University of Port Elizabeth.

Morrison, N. 2004. *The Personality of an Elite Ultra Marathon Athlete: A Case Study of Bruce Fordyce*. Master‟s thesis - University of Port Elizabeth.

Nchabeleng, P. M. 2003. *The rise and fall of Laurent Kabila: 1996-2001*. M.Phil. Thesis - University of Port Elizabeth.

Slinger, L. B. 2002. *Antjie Krog‟s Country of My Skull: Challenging Existing Notions of Autobiography*. M.A. thesis, University of Port Elizabeth.

Stroud, L. 2004. *A Psychobiographical Study of Mother Teresa*. Doctoral thesis. University of Port Elizabeth.

Vorster, M. S. 2003. *Balthazar Johannes Vorster: A Psychobiographical Study.* Master‟s thesis, University of Port Elizabeth.

University of South Africa

Brits, J. P. 1979. *Tielman Roos: sy rol in die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek, 1907-1935*. Pretoria: Makro-Boeke (Originally presented as the author‟s doctoral thesis - Universiteit van Suid-Afrika, 1978).

Brukman, J. J. 2005. *The Life and Music of Cromwell Everson*. D. Music Thesis - University of South Africa.

Hewitt, C. J. C. 1992. *Bishop G. K. A. Bell of Chichester: A Study of his Work in Relation to the Second World War*. M. Theology Thesis - University of South Africa.

University of Stellenbosch

Bekker, A. E. 1987. *Eben Dönges: Lewe en Loopbaan tot 1948*. D.Phil. Thesis (History) - University of Stellenbosch.

De Beer, J. C. 1992. *Professor BB Keet (1885-1974), Leraar en Hoogleraar van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk*. (Professor BB Keet (1885-1974), Minister and Professor of the Dutch Reformed Church). Stellenbosch University.

De Jongh, P. S. 1977. *Lewe van Erasmus Smit*. Cape Town: Holland-African Publishing Society (originally presented as the author‟s doctoral thesis - University of Stellenbosch, 1975).

Haus, F. H. 1999. *Carl Hugo Gutsche, 1843-1926: The Significance of His Life and Ministry for the Baptist Churches and Missions in Southern Africa*. Doctoral thesis (Theology) - Stellenbosch University.

Levenstein, A. J. 1940. *Willem de Merode*. Stellenbosch University.

Weyer, C. L. 2007. *Joan Metelerkamp: Poet of Connection*. M. A. Thesis (English) - Stellenbosch University.

Vista University

Mokae, G. 2004. *Robert McBride: A Coloured Life*. Ph.D. Thesis - Vista University.

University of the Western Cape

De Jongh, P. S. 1987. *„n biografie oor die voortrekkerfiguur Sarel Cilliers. Johannesburg: Perskor* (Revision of the author‟s 1984 thesis *Die Lewe van Sarel Cilliers* /The Life of Sarel Cilliers - University of the Western Cape).

Field, R. M. 2001. *Alex la Guma: A Literary and Political Biography of the South African Years*.
Doctoral thesis (English) - University of the Western Cape.
Rassool, C. S. 2004. *The Individual, Auto/biography and History in South Africa*. D. Phil. (History) - University of the Western Cape.

Biographical Theses Undertaken at Other Universities and/or Published as Books

Achinivu, A. K. 1979. *Ikoli Harcourt Whyte, the man and his music: A Case of Musical Acculturation in Nigeria*. Verlag der Musikalienhandlung Wagner: Hamburg. (from author‟s thesis, Freie Universität Berlin).
Casaretto, A-D. 2001. *Todessehnsucht und Heimatlosigkeit im Leben und Werk Klaus Manns*. (from author‟s Doctoral Thesis, Universität Düsseldorf).
Daniel, K. W.1980. *Francis Poulenc, his artistic development and musical style*. (revision of the author‟s thesis at State University of New York, Buffalo).
Drolc, U. 1997. *Swahili Among the Maasai: On the Inter-Language Swahili by Maa Speakers*. (from author‟s Doctoral Thesis - Universität Bayreuth)
Gish, S. D. 1994. *Alfred B. Xuma, 1893-1962: African, American, South African.* D.Phil. Thesis - Stanford University.
Haight, A.1971. *Anna Akhmatova: A Poetic Pilgrimage*. (based on the author‟s thesis, University of London).
Hardie, A.1976. *Statius and the Silvae: Poets, Patrons and Epideixis in the Graeco-Roman World*. (from author‟s PhD Thesis, University of Oxford).
Hruby, P.1980. *Fools and Heroes: The Changing Role of Communist Intellectuals in Czechoslovakia*. New York and Oxford: Pergamon Press. (Based on the author‟s doctoral thesis - Geneva University).
Ludemann, W. A. 2002. *Hugo Distler: Eine Musikalische Biographie*. (Hugo Distler: A Musical Biography). Augsburg, Germany: Wissner-Verlag.
Marshall, B. A. 1976. *Crassus: A Political Biography*. Amsterdam: Hakkert (Revision of the author‟s thesis - University of Sydney).
McCourt, J. 2000. *The Years of Bloom: James Joyce in Trieste, 1904-1920*. Lilliput Press, Dublin and University of Wisconsin Press. (from author‟s Ph.D Thesis University College Dublin).

Petruck, P. R. Y. 1979. *American Art Criticism, 1910-1939*. (from author"s Ph.D. thesis, New York University).
Reid, F. 1978. *Keir Hardie: The Making of a Socialist*. London: Croom Helm (Revision of the author"s University of Oxford thesis).
Snyder, H. A. 1980. *The Radical Wesley & Patterns for Church Renewal*. Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press (partly based on the author"s thesis at the University of Notre Dame).
Tilton, E. M. 1947. *Amiable Autocrat: A Biography of Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes*. New York: Henry Schuman (Originally presented as the author"s thesis, Columbia University).

Internet Sources/Websites

www.ipocafrica.org (Southern African Internet Portal on Corruption)
www.truth.org.za (Truth and Reconciliation Commission Reports)
www.nacsa.co.za (National Association of Conservancies of South Africa)
www.thebe.co.za (Thebe Investment Corporation)
www.penreach.org.za/facts.htm
www.penreach.org.za/
www.penryn.co.za/index.htm
www.penryn.co.za/history.htm
www.ru.ac.za/affiliates/molteno/
www.penryn,co.za/fees.htm (accessed 5 August 2007).
www.penreach.org.za/sponsor.htm (accessed 5 August 2007).
www.penryn.co.za/vision.htm (accessed 5 August 2007).
http://www.nacsa.co.za/
http://www.population.org.za/SAPLER/National%20Survey/Problem%20Areas.htm
http://www.trees.co.za/home/aboutus/history.html (Food and Trees for Africa)
http://www.africandream.org/navtop/aboutus (Open Africa)
http://www.wildernessconservancy.org/about/advisors.html (The Wilderness Conservancy)
http://www.wild.org/main/about/wilderness-network/ (The Wilderness Network).
http://www.wild.org/ (International Wilderness Leadership Foundation -WILD).
http://www.wildernessfoundation.co.za (The Wilderness Foundation SA).
http://www.savenues.com/accommodation/mpl_game_lodges.htm
http://www.mpumalanga.com/parks/songimvelo.asp (Songimvelo Game Reserve)
http://www.mpumalanga.com/parks/skhosana.asp (SS Skosana Nature Reserve)

http://www.mpumalanga.com/parks/mabusa.asp (Mabusa Nature Reserve)
http://www.mpumalanga.com/parks/mahushe.asp (Mahushe Shongwe Game Reserve)
http://www.sa-venues.com/game-reserves/mpl_mthethomusha.htm (Mthethomusha Game Reserve)

American National Biography (www.anb.org)

Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (DNB) (http://www.oxforddnb.com)

South African History Online (SAHO) (http://www.sahistory.org.za)

Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism/ (Accessed, 03.04.2007).

W. E. B. Du Bois Institute for African and African American Research at (http://dubois.fas.harvard.edu/african-american-national-biography-project)

World Who‟s Who Europa Biographical Reference (http://www.worldwhoswho.com)

Georgetown Leadership Seminar (Alumni Reunion) Helsinki, Finland June 16-19 2005. http://www3.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/gls/alumni/GLS%20Reunion%202005-3.pdf (accessed 16 March 2009).

Transcript of Keshla Timothy Nkosi‟s testimony before the TRC http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99110812_jhb_991111jb.htm

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 2 (1998) http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/TRC%20VOLUME%202.pdf

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 3 (1998) http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/TRC%20VOLUME%203.pdf

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 4 (1998) http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/TRC%20VOLUME%204.pdf

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 3. 1998. http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/TRC%20VOLUME%203.pdf

Limb, P. 1992. "Alliance Strengthened or Diminished? Relationships between Labour and African Nationalist/Liberation Movements in Southern Africa." A paper from the conference on "The Dynamics of Change in Southern Africa," University of Melbourne 18-20 May 1992. www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/37/074.html (accessed 27 September 2007).

Tambo, O. R. 1983. "We Must Organise Ourselves into A Conquering Force." (January 8 1983 Statement).http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/jan8-83.html (accessed 3 June 2008).

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998. *The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 2.* http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/TRC%20VOLUME%202.pdf

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998. *The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 3.* http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/TRC%20VOLUME%203.pdf

Arenstein, J. "Spies Caught in R180m Scam." *Mail and Guardian* (2 October 1998) www.mg.co.za.articledirect.aspx?articleid=181115&area=%2farchives_print.edition%2f

SAPA. 1992a (April 29). PAC Rejects Invitation – Johannesburg. Press Briefing 30 April 1992 http://70.84.171.10/~etools/newsbrief/1992/news9204.30 (accessed 1 September 2008).

SAPA. 1992b (April 29). 15 CODESA Applications Rejected – Johannesburg. Press Briefing 30 April 1992 http://70.84.171.10/~etools/newsbrief/1992/news9204.30 (accessed 1 September 2008).

SAPA, 1988. "Mabuza se party wen eleksie in Kangwane oortuigend." *Die Burger* Laaste, 27 September 1988 bladsy 10 (Johannesburg).

"Mr M Msimang, New National Parks Board CEO: Outlines His Plans for The Organisation, 9 July 1997" (http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1997/072435397.htm)

Koch, S. F., Schoeman, N. J. and van Tonder, J. J. 2005. Economic Growth and the Structure of Taxes in South Africa: 1960–2002. http://www.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/3667/1/Koch_Economics(2005).pdf (Accessed 10 October 2008).

Empowerdex, 2004 (February). Pioneers, Powers and Pundits: Influential and Powerful Black Directors on the JSE. http://www.empowerdex.co.za/downloads/Powers%20and%20Pundits%202004_Final.pdf

Bell, T. 2006. "Gear was a Reversal of RDP; Asgisa is more of the same." In *Business Report and Independent Online* (February 10, 2006) http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=553&fArticleId=3105404 (Accessed 27 March 2008).

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 1998. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 4. http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/TRC%20VOLUME%204.pdf

Wilkinson, A. 1998. "Empowerment: Theory and Practice." In *Personnel Review*. Vol. 27 No. 1 pp40-56. http://hermia.emeraldinsight.com/Insight/viewPDF.jsp?Filename=html/Output/Published/EmeraldFullTextArticle/Pdf/0140270103.pdf (accessed 16 November 2007).

Ministry of Education, 2005 (20 October), "Pandor: National Teaching Awards." www.polity.org.za/article.php?a_id=76202 (accessed 14 October 2007).

OAU Ad-hoc Committee on Southern Africa, 1989. Harare Declaration. www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/transition/harare.html

Sallaz, J. J. 2001 "Gambling with Development: Casino Capitalism in South Africa and on Indian Lands in California" (Working Paper from "The Corporation as a Social Institution" Program May 17-19, 2001). www.iir.berkeley.edu/culture/conference/sallaz.pdf (accessed 15 October 2007).

Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 1998. Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report Volume 5. http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/Volume%205.pdf

Mabuza Papers

Mabuza, 1989. Policy Speech of the Chief Minister, Economic Affairs and Finance Presented at the First Ordinary Session of the Fourth KaNgwane Legislative Assembly (9 May 1989) South African History Archives Collection.

Mabuza, E. 1986. "Mabuza on Black Unity, White Fear" (Interview with Business Day 19 March 1986). Cooperative Africana Microfilm Project (CAMP) Karis-Gerhart Microform Collection 1999: South African Political Materials: From Protest to Challenge, 1964-1990 Reel 38: Folder 452.

Mabuza, E. 1989a. *Policy Speech of the Ministry of the Chief Minister, Economic Affairs and Finance presented at the First Ordinary Session of the Fourth KaNgwane Legislative Assembly on 9 May 1989*.

Mabuza, E. 1989b. *Presidential Address at the Eleventh Annual Congress of the Inyandza National Movement* (23 September 1989 Ngwane Hall, KaNyamazane).

Mabuza, E. 1989c. *Towards a Non-racial Democratic South Africa: The Challenge Ahead for „Homeland" Leadership*. Address on the occasion of the Dikwankwetla Annual Conference, Phathuditjhaba 2 December 1989.

Mabuza, E. J 1990. "The Stewardship of Creation." - Address made at the Audi Environmental Awards 1990.

Mabuza, E. J, (n.d) "Address to SA British Trade Association" by Chief Minister Enos J. Mabuza of KaNgwane and President of Inyandza National Movement.

Mabuza, E. J. 1991. "Inyandza and a Future Democratic South Africa." in *A Collection of Addresses by Enos J. Mabuza the President of the Inyandza National Movement and Chief Minister of KaNgwane Delivered in the Course of 1990* (Address delivered to the Central Council of Inyandza National Movement, Ngwane Hall, KaNyamazane, Sunday 11 March 1990). Inyandza National Movement: Barberton.

Mabuza, E. J. 1977. *Learn SiSwati*. Cape Town: Via Afrika.

Mabuza, E. J. 1983. “KaNgwane – “The Road Ahead.” Lecture delivered at the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education in Honour of Professor J. H. Coetzee (14 April1983).

Mabuza, E. J. 1983. *KaNgwane: The Road Ahead*. Potchefstroom: Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education.

Mabuza, E. J. 1983. *KaNgwane: The Road Ahead*. Potchefstroom: Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education.

Mabuza, E. J. 1989. “Towards a Non-Racial Democratic South Africa: The Challenge Ahead for „Homeland‟ Leadership.” (Address given on the occasion of the Dikwankwetla Annual Conference held at Phutaditjhaba, QwaQwa on 2 December 1989.

Mabuza, E. J. 1990. “Presidential Address at the 11th Annual Congress of the Inyandza National Movement.” in *A Collection of Three Addresses by the President of the Inyandza National Movement and Chief Minister of KaNgwane Enos J. Mabuza Delivered in the Course of 1989* (Ngwane Hall, KaNyamazene, 23 September 1989). Inyandza National Movement: Barberton.

Mabuza, E. J. 1990. Policy Speech of the Ministry of the Chief Minister, Economic Affairs and Finance presented at the Second Ordinary Session of the Fourth KaNgwane Legislative Assembly (8 May 1990).Oliver Tambo Papers: African National Congress Archives. Series C Roll 15 Box 65. University of Fort Hare.

Mabuza, E. J. 1991. *Statement made at a special session of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly on Thursday 7 March 1991*: Louiville.

Mabuza, E. J. 1991. *Statement made at a special session of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly on Thursday 7 March 1991*: Louiville.

Mabuza, E. J. 1992. *Letter to Mrs Beverly and Chris Johnson* (25 November 1992).

Mabuza, E. J. 1992. *Letter to Mrs Beverly and Chris Johnson* (25 November 1992).

Other Sources

Penryn College‟s Mission Statement and marketing brochures, 2006.

2005 Press releases by the Mpumalanga Provincial Government (Premier‟s Office) for a symposium that was held in honour of Enos Mabuza on Saturday 9 April 2005[89].

[89] Professor and Reverend Barney (Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the University of South Africa, founder member of the Black Consciousness Movement, the South African Students‟ Organisation (SASO) and the short-lived African Student‟s Association (ASA), ANC member who was active in the struggle and was exiled in Lesotho and the United Kingdom and served as Chairman of the Human Rights Commission and Chairman of Higher Education of South Africa), then Mpumalanga Premier Thabang Makwetla, and former Mpumalanga Premier, ANC Treasurer General, former Mpumalanga Premier and businessman Dr. Matthews Phosa contributed to the statement.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Interview Schedule

The focus of the study is Enos Mabuza‟s career in politics; particularly his contradictory or unconventional role as a Bantustan leader within apartheid administrative structures on the one hand, and in the struggle against it on the other, as well as the implications of this complex and ambiguous situation. A wide range of people will be interviewed in an attempt to paint an accurate, candid and complete account of Mabuza‟s life- what he did, why, where, when and with whom. Apartheid laws and violence, both physical and psychological, constrained people‟s actions and identity politics is at the heart of this enquiry. The study seeks to identify the dynamics (power, conflicts, constraints and alternatives) that were available to individuals in this context and to obtain different perspectives from those who knew Enos Mabuza in a professional and personal capacity.

Potential Interviewees

Family: Mabuza‟s widow and children (Vusumuzi, Sizo, Sandile, Busisiwe, Nikeziwe and Nompumelelo).

Colleagues and friends in different fields: white opposition leader Dr Frederick van Zyl Slabbert (close friend and confidante), writer Nadine Gordimer (close friend), George Bizos, Dr Reuel Khoza, Dr Matthews Phosa, David Wylde, Rob Snaddon (Penryn Trust), Conrad Strauss, Professor Barney Pityana, leaders of the ANC‟s Youth League at the time, for instance, Mac Maharaj as well as Mr M C Zitha who succeeded him as Chief Minister of KaNgwane in from April 1991-April 1994 when the Bantustans were reincorporated into South Africa.

Introduction

How do you know Enos Mabuza? Was he a colleague, friend etc?

What were his principles, beliefs or ideals? Did Mabuza have a specific philosophy that influenced his character, conduct and decisions?

Mabuza played significant roles in education, conservation and politics. How would you describe his conduct as a politician, businessman, educator and as a family man? In what context did his life and career unfold and with what results? How did people react to it?

What were his personal aspirations or motives for his actions?
Where there specific precipitous events that influenced his life and work?

Family/Domestic Life

Enos Mabuza was a busy man but he has been described as a religious, caring, giving, family man. Mabuza has also been described as a humble and peaceful man who was committed to non-violence. Was he as selfless as this suggests? Did religion influence his work and general conduct? Did he hold any office positions (leadership) within the Methodist church?
What was like he like as a husband or father? Did he spend a lot of time at home when his work commitments permitted it? Did he have hobbies or interest in sports like other dads/husbands? Did he have a lot of friends or admirers?
How did you feel about his political career? Did you support him unconditionally?
How did having a political figure in the house affect life at home? Did you endure any hardships as a result of his political involvement? Were you ever ostracised/marginalised, harassed or victimised in any way (death threats, arbitrary searches, arrests) because of his work? Did you fear for his life or the safety of the family?
Was life difficult or were there advantages to having a prominent father/husband?
Would you say that Enos Mabuza‟s life and career was fulfilling and rewarding to him in terms of the ideals or principles he held?

Politics

How or why did Enos Mabuza become a Bantustan leader when he did not belong to a ruling house or chieftaincy? What mandate, authority or legitimacy did he have? Was he elected (democratic, consultative) and if so by who? Enos Mabuza refused to take the job initially so was he coerced/was pressure applied on him to accept the job in the end? Do you think he was motivated by power and the possibility of material gain? What promises, if any, were made to him? How much real power and influence did he have and how did he exercise it?
Enos Mabuza, like other Bantustan leaders who were regarded as corrupt and against their own people, was often criticised, discredited and condemned because of his participation in apartheid structures (the despised Bantustan system) but he was also admired and respected by captains of industry, academics, advocates, community leaders and the press, both in South Africa and abroad. Why do you think this was the case? Would you say he was corrupt, ambitious, opportunistic or self-serving as is generally believed of Bantustan leaders

such as Mangosuthu Buthelezi who was Chief Minister of KwaZulu or Kaiser Matanzima who was Chief Minister of the Transkei? Was Enos Mabuza ever accused of actively persecuting anti-apartheid leaders/activists like these two leaders have been?

Enos Mabuza often said that his leadership role and political career was inspired by the wisdom and vision of people like Abraham Lincoln, Dr Martin Luther King Jnr and Sir Winston Churchill, as well as the ANC leaders, Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela. How did Mabuza navigate his way through his contradictory roles in the political sphere; as a Bantustan leader and president of the Inyandza National Movement who was also aligned with the African National Congress?

In an interview with *Mayibuye* in 1990, Mabuza said that he was a member of the ANC and supported the principles and objectives that the organisation stood for. He was the second Bantustan leader to open discussions and establish a working relationship with the African National Congress. Do you think he was genuinely patriotic despite his precarious position?

Unlike the other Bantustans, KaNgwane did not adopt its own distinctive flag. Instead, it flew the then national flag of South Africa. What did this mean? Was this a form of protest through which the KaNgwane leadership symbolically identified itself/its people as part of South Africa at a time when the government‟s ultimate aim was the total removal of the black population from South Africa so that it would not have to accommodate them politically?

KaNgwane was the least populous of the ten Bantustans, with an estimated 183,000 inhabitants. Did the size of the territory make any difference in terms of political significance? Did his position as president of the Inyandza National Movement add to his clout as a leader to be reckoned with despite of the size of KaNgwane? What were the main objectives of Inyandza and were they achieved? Did his leadership of this organisation give him political leverage?

KaNgwane territory was claimed by King Sobhuza of Swaziland as part of the Swazi monarch and the apartheid government tried to use it as a buffer zone against guerrilla infiltration from Mozambique. However, attempts to incorporate parts of the Bantustan into Swaziland in 1982 failed following protests. Enos Mabuza became quite prominent (locally and internationally-Canada etc) as a result of his role in those protests and the apartheid government retaliated by temporarily suspending KaNgwane‟s autonomous status between 18 June 1982 to 9 December 1982, restoring it in 1984. Mabuza was also suspended as Chief Minister and N.J. Badenhorst was put in his stead as an Administrator for the same period. What was the reaction of the KaNgwane people? What was his reaction?

Mabuza resigned from active politics in early 1991.The apartheid security apparatus must have been relieved because he was critical of white right-wing political groupings and the violence that was endemic to the apartheid system. However, other parties objected to his resignation. The ANC, for example, sent a delegation to plead with him to reconsider but he declined. Why was there such a vote of confidence in him by the main anti-apartheid movement despite the ambiguities or controversies of his associations with the „enemy"? Did they trust him completely even though his political positions were unconventional?

Mabuza was involved in the first multi-party Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) interim/transitional constitutional negotiations in November 1991. The talks brought together the apartheid government, Bantustan leaders and liberation movements to discuss South Africa"s future (power sharing) and Mabuza acted as a political advisor. What were his positions in this debate? Would you say he was politically non-aligned or neutral about the main players on South Africa"s political scene (ANC, PAC, NP, AZAPO and the IFP)?

Did Mabuza keep in touch with the welfare and other interests of the KaNgwane people after withdrawing from active politics? What was the overall impact of his political career/engagement?

Education

Before becoming a political leader, Enos Mabuza"s career spanned 16 years in the education sector, first as a teacher (several teaching posts in Barberton, in KaBokweni at Khumbula High School where he later became a headmaster) and later as an education inspector in the Eastern Transvaal. Mabuza co-authored several literature and Swati grammar books including, *A Grammar of the Swati Language (siSwati)* with D. Ziervogel which was published in 1976 and *Sifundza siSwati: Libanga 1* with S. S. Mahlasela and E Posselt. He also helped to translate the bible into siSwati with Mr E. N Gininda and others. He served on several educational boards such as the University of Witwatersrand Council, St Stithians College Council and Promat Colleges.

In 1992, Mabuza and several others including yourself (then headmaster of St Stithians College), Bill Carter (then Vice-Chairman of the St Stithians Council), Professor Selby Ripinga (then KaNgwane"s Minister of Education), Dr Lynn Hurry and Peter Laburn) founded Penryn College in Mpumalanga.

What were the reasons behind such an undertaking? Was it a political decision? If so, what were the political objectives?

Who runs or owns the college?

What are the college‟s founding principles?

How was this educational initiative received by the apartheid government and the black community given the situation in the education sector at the time? What sets the college apart from others in the country?

Where did the funding for the establishment of Penryn College come from? How is the college funded today and have its original objectives changed over the years?

How many people benefited/continue to benefit from the establishment of Penryn College? What is its scope and impact?

The Corporate Sector

By December 1991, Mabuza became the first black person to be appointed to several, mostly white, corporate boards (Anglo-Vaal Limited, Foundation of African Business, Gola Investments (Pty) Ltd, IDT Finance Corporation, Metro Cash and Carry Limited, The Premier Group, Shell SA Limited, South African Breweries, Standard Bank Investment Corporation, Thebe Investment Corporation, Times Media Limited and Volkswagen SA) as a non-executive director. He was also on the State President‟s Advisory Economic Council. How were his appointments on these boards viewed by his contemporaries, both black and white? Was it interpreted as patronage?

What benefits were derived from this by ordinary people?

In the first six months of Mabuza‟s appointments to these boards, almost forty other black men were appointed to white company boards. Was this a genuine attempt by white companies to increase black participation in the economic mainstream if these positions were non-executive?

How much power or influence did the new appointees have on these boards? Could this have been the beginning of today‟s Black Economic Empowerment? What was the result of his involvement with these big, predominantly white controlled corporations?

Conservation

Mabuza served on several environmental and community trusts, including the National Parks Board, Trees for Africa, the Independent Development Trust and the 1820 Foundation. He

was instrumental (particularly in his home area in Mpumalanga where he helped establish two nature reserves) in driving environmental conservation initiatives to counter aggressive or careless developmental agendas. What was the content of this apparent need to prioritise ecological balance?

Did he lobby for environmental legislation to define the parameters for technological development or advocate the use of natural resources in a bid to conserve natural and other resources such as vegetation, catchment areas, wildlife and the ozone/atmosphere? If so, who did he lobby (big business, politicians and professional conservationists) and with what results?

Conclusion

As a member of a political „minority", did Mabuza"s loyalties to his family (as a father, husband etc), specific political parties or the region (South African, black, Swati) have an identifiable hierarchy?

People cope with adversity in different ways but do you think that Enos Mabuza could or should have done anything differently? Would you say he was a man of integrity?

How did Enos Mabuza evaluate or assess his own virtues and vices, accomplishments? Did he have frustrations, disappointments or regrets?

As a man who played many, often incongruous roles, would you say that Mabuza"s life and career had a positive or negative impact overall? Do you think things could have been more clear-cut than they turned out? Did Mabuza"s objectives and interests converge or vary significantly with those of KaNgwane people, anti-apartheid movements or black South Africans in general?

Appendix 2: National Parks Board Affirmative Action Placement March 1995 (benchmark) to March 1996 (placement) for specific occupational categories.

Job Grade	March 1995				March 1996				March 1997			
	Black	White	Total	% Black	Black	White	Total	% Black	Black	White	Total	% Black
C	38	325	363	10.47	57	290	347	16.43	95	264	359	26.46
D	7	100	100	6.54	16	113	129	12.40	33	134	167	19.76
E	1	14	15	6.67	4	13	17	23.52	7	15	22	31.82
F	2	5	7	28.57	2	5	7	28.57	3	4	7	42.86

(National Parks Board, 1995/6:57; National Parks Board, 1996/97: 90-91).

Key

C - Skilled/Supervisory

D - Management

E - Senior Management

F - Executive

Appendix 3: Maps of the Bantustans



Map 1: Black Homelands 1986

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/south_african_homelands.gif (Accessed 23/11/2006).



Map 2: Racial Concentrations and Homelands circa 1979

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/south_africa_racial_1979.jpg (Accessed 23/11/2006).

Map 3: Bantustans and Black Townships (Mufson, 1990).

Appendix 4: South Africa's Political History Timeline up to 1994

A brief chronology of events in South Africa‟s struggle history from the banning of the ANC and the PAC on 8 April 1960 which was followed by a period of relative calm as organisations absorbed what had happened and regrouped. The timeline highlights the eruption, conditions, patterns, conspiracies and intensity of violence and the perpetrators.

1963

Seven senior members of MK were arrested at Lilliesleaf Farm, Rivonia on 11 July 1963. The Rivonia Treason Trial of ten people including Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki and Walter Sisulu follows in 1964 and the accused were defended by George Bizos. Most of the accused were sentenced to life imprisonment.

1967

The Terrorism Act was passed, in terms of which the police were empowered to detain suspects in solitary confinement for indefinite periods and with no access to visitors. Further, the public was not entitled to information relating to the identity and number of people detained in this manner.

1969

The South African Students‟ Organisation (SASO) was formed by black students led by Steve Biko. The organisation was a breakaway from the white-dominated National Union of South African Students (NUSAS).

1970

The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 striped all black South Africans of their citizenship by making them automatic citizens of one of the ten Bantustans.

1971

The World Council of Churches allocates R91 000 of its annual R140 000 fund against racism to liberation movements in Southern Africa; including SWAPO, the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups.

1972

Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Lebowa were granted self-government status. The Black People‟s Convention (BPC) is launched in 1972 to co-ordinate the activities of black consciousness groups.

1973

A wave of strikes begins in Durban and spreads to all major urban centres.

1975

The Inkhatha Cultural Liberation Movement was formed in 1975 as a predominantly Zulu cultural formation. It eventually became a fully fledged political party - the Inkhatha Freedom Party.

1976

The Soweto Uprising began on 16 June and the police opened fire on approximately 10 000 pupils protesting against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. The resistance spreads countrywide and continued for several months. Approximately 575 official deaths were reported, including 390 in the Transvaal and 137 in the Western Cape. Over 2 000 people were injured. Numerous arrests, trials and sudden deaths in detention followed the revolt and hundreds of youths left the country for training in armed resistance in neighbouring countries.

Nominal independence is granted to the Transkei in October 1976 under the leadership of Paramount Chief Kaiser Matanzima.

1977

The KwaZulu Bantustan gains self-governance in February 1977.

Former ANC member Leonard Nkosi was killed by the ANC on 9 September after he joined the Security Branch.

Black Consciousness activist Bantu Stephen Biko died in detention in Pretoria on 12 September following his detention in Port Elizabeth. Widespread protests follow countrywide. Numerous other deaths in detention occur during 1977 and in subsequent years.

1978

In January/March, the Labour Party (Coloured), Reformed Party (Indian) and KwaZulu‟s Inkatha formed the South African Black Alliance under the leadership of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. Its main objective was to convene a National Convention of representatives of all population groups to seek a peaceful, negotiated solution to the country‟s problems. The Dikwankwetla Party from the QwaQwa Bantustan was set to join the alliance but the organisations represented would not merge into one solid block because doing so would contravene the Political and Interference Act of 1968 which banned inter-racial mixing in political parties.

Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster was succeeded by the former Minister of Defence PW Botha in 1978 following his resignation as a result of the Muldergate affair".

1979

Venda became independent in 1979.

In November, the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) was formed for high school students and the Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO) which was later renamed the South African Students Congress (SASCO) was formed for college students. The Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO) was also formed.

1980

Expelled ANC official Tennyson Makiwane was shot dead in the Transkei in June.

1981

General Constand Viljoen, Chief of the South African Defence Force, announced that a South African commando had attacked and destroyed the planning and control headquarters (three residences) of the ANC at Matola (Maputo, Mozambique) on 30 January 1981. Twelve ANC members were killed and 3 were kidnapped in the raid. On 8 February, Mozambican authorities proclaimed their continued support for the ANC in a statement made at the funeral of the twelve ANC members that were killed in the raid. Again, in reaction to the massacre, Mozambique‟s President Samora Machel declared his country‟s solidarity with the plight of the South African people on 14 February. In response, the South African Prime Minister

warned neighbouring states against supporting „terrorist" movement operations on 30 April 1981.

On 19 November, Durban lawyer, Griffiths Mxenge, is assassinated by security police in Durban.

The independence of the Ciskei, under Chief Lennox Sebe, is proclaimed on 4 December and self-governing status is conferred on KwaNdebele.

1982

Warrant Officer Selepe was killed by the ANC in Mamelodi in November.

On 9 December, the South African army raided houses in Maseru, Lesotho killing 30 ANC members and seven women and children who were caught in the crossfire. A chain of sabotage incidents on installations in South Africa were blamed on the ANC command structure in Lesotho and formed the pretext for the raid.

1983

On 19 January KwaZulu"s Chief Buthelezi met President Matanzima of the Transkei at Tongaat, north of Durban and pledged to oppose the constitutional proposals which excluded blacks.

South Africa"s Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, announced on 20 May that 6 districts on or near South Africa"s borders with Swaziland and Mozambique had been activated under the 1982 Amendments to the Defence Act. In three of the districts, all white men up to the age of fifty-five had to register for commando duty.

On 23 May the South African Air Force (SAAF) launched an air raid on 6 suspected ANC targets in Maputo. Five Mozambicans, including two women and two children, and one South African refugee were killed. Over 30 people were injured. South Africa embarked on a campaign to crackdown on ANC activities by curbing cross-border guerrilla activity through security arrangements with the governments of Lesotho and Swaziland.

The Transvaal and Natal regions of the United Democratic Front were launched in May 1983 and an ANC car bomb exploded outside military headquarters in Pretoria. The government responded with an air attack on Mozambique which killed ANC members and injured several Mozambican nationals.

On 15 August the Lesotho Foreign Ministry appeals for international help to stop South Africa applying an economic squeeze designed to force Lesotho to expel up to 3 000 political refugees. The Lesotho government announces on 8 September that an undisclosed number of South African refugees have decided voluntarily to withdraw from Lesotho. On 10 September Lesotho airlifted the first batch of 22 ANC members to Mozambique and Tanzania and another 200 would be evacuated shortly thereafter.

On 20-21 August, the United Democratic Front (UDF) with 575 affiliate organisations sympathetic to the Freedom Charter was formally launched nationally at a meeting in Mitchell‟s Plein, Cape Town. The meeting was attended by delegates from over 320 community groups, trade unions, women‟s groups and students‟ organizations. The newly formed organisation pledged to oppose the Indian Council, then the government‟s proposed Koornhof Bills and the Constitutional dispensation to Coloureds and Indians; in favour of a single, non-racial and democratic South Africa.

In September-October of the same year, calls were made by a variety of groups, including the South African Catholic Bishops Conference, the South African Council of Churches and the leaders of six self-governing Bantustans for the White electorate to reject the tri-cameral dispensation.

The leaders of the six self-governing Bantustans rejected the new Constitution on 5 October 1983 and their petition was also signed by a number of black business people and church leaders.

South African forces again raid offices of the ANC in Maputo on 17 October.

1984

Mutinies by frustrated MK soldiers at ANC Viana and Pango camps were crushed in early 1984 resulting in the execution of seven mutineers and the imprisonment of others at Quatro rehabilitation camp.

The Million Signatures Campaign (15 February 1984) was mobilised by the ANC, UDF and PAC to boycott referendums to pass motions for the new constitution and tri-cameral parliament. The campaign also demanded the release of Nelson Mandela and other prisoners.

P.W. Botha and Samora Machel sign the Nkomati Accord on 16 March and the Mozambique-South Africa Joint Security Commission meets for the first time in Maputo on 26 March. This

time raids are carried out against ANC houses and offices by Mozambican authorities, marking a shift in alliances for Mozambique despite its earlier pronouncements.
Desmond Tutu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for non-violent opposition to apartheid on 16 October.

The largest stay-away in the Transvaal up until then was organised by the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). It was staged on 5 November and signalled a student-worker opposition alliance.

1985

Residents in both urban and rural areas across the country began widespread attacks on collaborators and *askaris*, including police and community councillors. The killings result in numerous common purpose trials and death sentences are handed down for those convicted. Vigilante groups also emerge nationwide - groups such as the A-Team in Chesterville, Durban and the Phakathis in the Orange Free State. In the Durban/Natal area, vigilantes mostly target UDF activists. The Eagles Youth Club in the OFS (run by Military Intelligence from 1986) is also active in the harassment of UDF leaders and is responsible for violent disruptions at youth meetings.

In February violence erupted at Crossroads informal settlement in Cape Town after the state declared that squatters in the Western Cape had to move to Khayelitsha. Eighteen people were killed and 200 more were injured in clashes with police.

The first widely publicised necklace killing happened on 23 March 1985 when Councillor Benjamin Kinikini of KwaNobuhle/Langa and four of his relatives were killed by a crowd. The other counsellors had given in to demands for them to resign but Kinikini had refused. The SAP records show that 406 such necklace killings and 395 deaths by burning took place between September 1984 and December 1989 and a third of these took place in the Eastern Cape and Border regions.

A State of Emergency was declared in 36 magisterial districts across the country on 20 July following close to five hundred deaths in township violence since September 1984.

Maki Skosana was neck-laced on 25 July at the funeral of several people killed by police.
Durban attorney and member of the UDF and who represented the Pietermaritzburg Treason trialists, Victoria Mxenge, was assassinated in Umlazi on 1 August and the incident triggered

a rapid escalation of conflict between the UDF and Inkatha in Natal. Seventeen people died in the Umlazi cinema killings when Inkatha supporters armed with traditional weapons and firearms burst into a memorial service that was held for Victoria Mxenge on 8 August. Shortly after that, Inkatha‟s Central Committee – its highest decision-making body of declared KwaZulu and Natal no-go areas for the UDF.

American President Ronald Reagan imposed limited sanctions on South Africa on 9 September 1985.

Shortly thereafter, Gavin Relly of the Anglo American Corporation led a delegation of white South African businessmen and newspaper editors held talks with ANC leaders in Zambia on 13 September to discuss possible solutions to the apartheid crisis.

On 25 September church leaders issued the Kairos Document in response to increasing violence after the imposition of the first state of emergency in July. The emergency led to the killing, injuring, maiming and detention of hundreds of people.

On 13 October, the opposition Progressive Federal Party led by parliamentarian Frederick van Zyl Slabbert met the ANC in Lusaka and agreed with calls for the release of Nelson Mandela.

In what becomes known as in November 1985 at least twelve people died when police opened fire on 50 000 protesters demonstrating against rent hikes, funeral restrictions and the presence of the SADF in Mamelodi Township (the Mamelodi killings). In the same month, at least eleven people were killed in the Queenstown shootings when police opened fire on a meeting in a church hall.

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was launched on 30 November to create the largest mainly African labour federation.

1986

Residents of Alexandra clashed with police in the Six Day War in February and at least 17 people were killed.

On 3 March, seven MK operatives were shot dead by security forces in an apparent ambush (the Gugulethu Seven).

In the Winterveld killings, police opened fire on a thousand-strong crowd on 26 March, killing eleven people and wounding 200 others.

On 19 May South African commandos used air strikes on alleged guerrilla targets in Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe.

In May, the vigilante group *witdoeke* attacked and destroyed UDF-aligned satellite camps around Crossroads, Cape Town. A similar attack took place at KTC in June. Over sixty people were killed and tens of thousands were left homeless. This was followed by a nationwide State of Emergency on 12 June and this was accompanied by mass detentions, censorship and *de facto* military rule such that by the end of this state of emergency on 11 June 1987, over 25 000 people had been detained at various times (the emergency was renewed annually for four years until 1990).

On 1 July the Pass Laws were repealed.

Two other incidents involving entrapment and/or ambush were used in the killings of the Nietverdient Ten in June and the KwaNdebele Nine in July.

The Eastern Transvaal Target Work Group was established by joint security forces. TREWITS (Teenrewolusionêre Inligtingstaakspan), a counter-revolutionary intelligence task group was also formed to collect intelligence in that region and KwaNdebele‟s Home Affairs Minister, Piet Ntuli, was killed by a security force car bomb in July.

At least 24 people were killed in White City in August following police action against a crowd demonstrating against municipal rent raids in Soweto.

The European Economic Community (EEC) imposed sanctions on South Africa on 16 September and on 2 October the United States Congress overrode Presidential veto and passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act which imposed fiscal and other sanctions on South Africa.

1987

Inter-organisational conflict and violence broke out between Inkatha and UDF youth organisations in what became known as the Natal Midlands War. The violence continued until 1990 and resulted in many deaths and social upheaval. The home of UDF leader, Bheki

Ntuli, is attacked in January and 13 people, including eight children are killed (the KwaMakhutha massacre).

The Alexandra Treason Trial of five UDF activists begins in January and continues until their acquittal in April 1989.

Ciskei"s President Lennox Sebe escaped an assassination attempt on 19 February.

Israel freezes military contracts and imposes cultural and tourism sanctions on SA on 18 March 1987. On 22 March 1987 Archbishop Desmond Tutu met with the ANC in Zambia and failed to convince them to abandon the armed struggle. Still in March 1987, Joe Slovo resigned as Chief of Staff of the ANC's military wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*.

The „independent sates" of the Transkei and Ciskei signed a non-aggression or security pact with the South African authorities in Cape Town on 10 May which forbade cross-border violence. Transkei Defence Force (TDF) troops had attacked Ciskei President Lennox Sebe"s palace in January/February in a failed attempt to abduct or kill him (Operation Katzen) and at least two TDF troops died.

On 12 June the State of Emergency was extended for a second year.

Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, head of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA), led a delegation of 60 predominantly Afrikaans speaking white intellectuals and journalists who opposed apartheid to hold talks with the ANC in Dakar, Senegal on 9 July 1987 and Eric Mntoga, an IDASA official who organized the meeting is found stabbed to death. Several other key ANC personnel were assassinated in South Africa"s neighbouring states in July. Cassius Make and Paul Dikeledi, for instance, were both killed in Swaziland.

On 9 August 1987, the UDF adopted the Freedom Charter of 26 June 1955 and an estimated 200 000 members of the Black National Union of Mineworkers begin a three-week strike - the longest legal strike in South African history.

1988

On 10 February South African troops put down an attempted coup against Lucas Mangope in Bophuthatswana.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu and others were arrested as they tried to present a petition to parliament on 27 February.

Prominent white South African lawyer and ANC member, Albie Sachs, was critically injured by a car bomb explosion in Maputo on 7 April 1988. The ANC and Mozambican authorities blamed the South African agents. They claimed that Mr. Sachs was the latest victim of South African "death squads" but South African authorities denied responsibility for the attack on Mr. Sachs.

On 21 April PW Botha outlined reform plans involving a form of race federation and draft legislation providing for new regional assemblies for Black people living outside the „homelands' but Black leaders such as Dr Nthato Motlana argued that such reforms would not attract legitimate Black leaders.

On 27 May anti-apartheid Afrikaners led by IDASA director, Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, met with the ANC in Frankfurt to discuss a post-apartheid South Africa.

On 9 June the State of Emergency was extended for a third year.

Security forces bombed Khotso House in Johannesburg on 1 September, causing extensive damage and Khanya House (the headquarters of the SA Bishops Conference) was destroyed in an arson and limpet mine attack on 12 October.

On 8 July the government introduced the Extension of Political Participation Bill, empowering the government to divide the country into a number of regions. It also called elections to Legislative Council for each region through which Non-Bantustan blacks could articulate their political aspirations. The ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party expressed their opposition to the reforms.

Eleven people were killed by SAP members and special constables who stormed and fired on an all-night prayer vigil near New Hanover on 3 December - the Trust Feed killings. It was alleged that senior Inkatha leaders were involved in planning the killings.

1989

Prime Minister Botha met Nelson Mandela and agreed to work for a peaceful solution to the conflict in the country. Talks commenced with the ANC, prominent business leaders, the Commonwealth and the Eminent Persons Group.

South Africa‟s three liberal opposition parties - the Progressive Federal Party headed by Zach de Beer, the National Democratic Movement led by Wynand Malan and the Independent

Party led by Dennis Worrall, agreed to form a unified multiracial party on 4 February. The new grouping was to be formally founded on 8 April and would be known as the Democratic Party.

The Dutch Reformed Church unequivocally condemned apartheid for the first time on 10 March.

Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Reverend Allan Boesak and the Reverend Beyers Naude met with American president George Bush on 18 May.

Albertina Sisulu and other UDF leaders also met with American President Bush on 30 June.

The Defiance Campaign against bannings, restrictions and segregation of hospitals and other public facilities was launched in July by the UDF and Mass Democratic Movement. The campaign lasted until September.

A two-day strike called by the UDF and its affiliates to protest the exclusion of Black people from the September 6th parliamentary elections began on 5 September and hundreds of thousands of people boycotted work and school.

On 24 September Winnie Mandela was formally charged with four counts of kidnapping and assault in connection with a reign of terror in Soweto that included the abduction and beating of several Soweto youths on 29 December which led to the death of Stompie Moeketsi in December 1988. Winnie would stand trial with seven others believed to be part of her private militia called the Mandela United Football Club.

1990

On 2 February President De Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC, SACP AND PAC; the lifting of restrictions on the UDF, COSATU and thirty-one other organisations; the release of political prisoners and the suspension of the death penalty.

On 11 February Nelson Mandela was released from prison after twenty-seven years of imprisonment and thousands of people in South Africa‟s black townships and city centres took to the streets to celebrate his release. Police intervened on several occasions, firing teargas and rubber bullets. Ten people were shot dead and up to 20 were injured, when Ciskei police opened fire on a crowd celebrating Mandela's release.

Vigilante activities by the Three Million Gang (reported to have been active from 1989 to 1992 in the Orange Free State) targeted UDF and ANC activists, student organisations and self defence units.

Military officers headed by Brigadier Oupa Gqozo overthrew the leader of the Ciskei, Lennox Sebe, on 4 March while he was in Hong Kong. Gqozo and three other officers formed an executive committee to run the administration with civilian help until a society based on democratic principles could be established. South African authorities sent troops to restore order in the Bantustan at the request of Gqozo.

On 5 April the Venda government was overthrown by military coup.

At the end of their first formal talks 2-4 May, the ANC and the South African Government issued a joint statement - the Groote Shuur Minute- according to which a working group was established to address the issue of the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles. The Group was scheduled to complete its work before 21 May. In addition, temporary immunity from prosecution would be considered for selected members of the ANC and the Government would seek to modify its security legislation to adapt it to the new situation developing in South Africa. The South African government also pledged to work towards the lifting of the state of emergency. Both parties pledged to try and put an end to the climate of violence and intimidation that prevailed and reiterated their commitment to stability and to a peaceful process of negotiations.

The Indemnity Bill of 1990 which allowed exiles to be granted temporary immunity or permanent indemnity against arrest or prosecution was passed by 105 votes to 33 at a joint-sitting of the South African Parliament on 7 May. Only the Conservative Party opposed it. The Indemnity Act No. 35 came into effect on 18 May as outlined above, allowing exiles to return to South Africa. The Act was later repealed by s48 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995.

On 5 June the chairman of the Venda Council for National Unity, Colonel Gabriel Ramushwana, announced the lifting of the state of emergency and the unconditional release of all political prisoners in Venda.

On 7 June the South African government lifted the nationwide state of emergency in all provinces except Natal.

6-7 August, the ANC and South African Government held the second round of talks resulting in the Pretoria Minute which announced a cease-fire ending a thirty-year old armed struggle. The government pledged to release political prisoners from 1 September and to allow exiles to return from 1 October.

On 18 October, the government ended emergency rule in Natal.

On 2 November Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Mr. Andries Treurnicht, leader of the Conservative Party, met in Durban and issued a joint statement declaring that they were united in the rejection of "domination, terrorism and communism".

In the same month, ANC supporters are arrested for allegedly plotting to assassinate President Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana.

Former Transkei Defence Force MI chief, Lieutenant Colonel Craig Duli who was supported by the South African security forces, died on 22 November while attempting to overthrow the military government of Major General Bantu Holomisa in the Transkei.

1991

In January 45 people were killed when a night vigil for Christopher Nangalembe was attacked with automatic weapons in Sebokeng, Transvaal.

On 4 March the UDF National General Council decided to disband the organisation on 20 August, the eighth anniversary of its foundation.

On 26 March fifteen people were shot dead and at least eighteen others were injured in an attack on a funeral vigil for an ANC member who died in fighting in Alexandra (the Alexandra night vigil killings).

A group of about eight hundred alleged IFP supporters attacked the squatter settlement of Swanieville on the East Rand on 12 May. Twenty-nine people were killed and over thirty were injured.

On 5 June the Native Land and Trust Act of 1936 and the Group Areas Act were repealed.

On 17 June the Population Registration Act was also repealed.

In the Battle of the Forest in June, twenty-three people were killed in fighting between the IFP and ANC supporters in the Richmond townships of Ndaleni and Magoda, Natal. The

Inkathagate scandal broke in July and government funding of Inkatha and its union UWUSA for anti-ANC activities was revealed. F. W. De Klerk established the Kahn Committee to investigate secret projects such as the Esikhaweni IFP hit squad which was active in areas of Zululand, killing UDF/ANC and union supporters and leaders until 1993.

1992

The KwaZulu legislative assembly adopted a constitution for a future state of KwaZulu-Natal as an autonomous state within a federation.

In the Bhisho killings on 7 September, Ciskei Defence Force troops opened fire on ANC protesters demanding free political activity in Ciskei at Bisho. Twenty-nine protesters and one soldier were killed and about 200 were wounded following months of violent conflicts between Bantustan government supporters and ANC supporters.

The Goldstone Commission raid in November uncovered a campaign waged by the Directorate of Covert Collection (DCC) to discredit the ANC. Project Echo and Operation Thunderstorm, two extensive SADF projects aimed at undermining the ANC, were also exposed.

1993

The Afrikaner Volksfront was launched in May by 21 right-wing groups who demand self-determination in a federal state.

In July, Inkatha and the Conservative Party walked out of CODESA talks when 27 April 1994 was confirmed as the election date. They were later joined by the Ciskei and Bophuthatswana and established the Freedom Alliance. The announcement of the election date leads to an immediate escalation in politically linked deaths.

The IFP and KwaZulu Legislative Assembly embark on a Self-Protection Unit training project. Training of SPUs begins at Mlaba Camp in September with the assistance of Vlakplaas commander Eugene De Kock with weapons delivered by IFP member Philip Powell.

1994

Amidst a widespread public revolt at his decision to withdraw from the April elections, President Mangope drew in the white right wing including the Volksfront to defend his rule. Hundreds of armed Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) members drove into Bophuthatswana and attacked residents. More than 45 people were killed, including three AWB members.

The military ruler of the Ciskei, Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, resigned in March and the Transitional Executive Council took over control of the Ciskei.

Appendix 5: Enos J Mabuza & Associates - Briefings and Updates

Enos J. Mabuza & Associates, 1993a. *South Africa – A Political Update* (confidential briefing 26 February 1993).

Enos J. Mabuza & Associates, 1993b. *South Africa – A Political Update* (confidential briefing 18 June 1993).

The content of the political briefing and updates released by Enos Mabuza & Associates is as follows:

- 3 October 1994 – Industrial relations, education, Buthelezi and De Klerk and the impasse between their respective parties, Inkatha and the NP and the rate of inflation.
- 1 November 1994 – the TRC, SACP, SANDF, housing, finance, restructuring, privatisation.
- 1 December 1994 – land redistribution, law and order, affirmative action.
- 1 February 1995 – constitutional drafting, federalism versus centralism, revenue generation, taxes, the RDP, the NP after the 1994 election.
- 1 March 1995 – the IFP‟s brinkmanship and international mediation, government corruption, local government elections, abolishing the financial Rand, campus unrest at universities and technikons and the activities of COSAS.
- 1 April 1995 – the transformation agenda for tertiary education, black business and ownership on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, attracting foreign investment and making South Africa attractive, Winnie Mandela who was not towing the party line, the lobbying of businesses.
- May 1995 – The labour movement and its expectations a year after the 1994 elections, fighting between the ANC and the IFP, getting South African businesses to invest in the future, the RDP and housing delivery, inflation.
- June 1995 – the government of national unity, violence in KwaZulu-Natal, frosty relations between the ANC and the IFP and their rivalry and uncompromising positions,

the impasse between labour and business[90], Afrikaans right wingers and the carving of a Volkstaat (separatist Afrikaner homeland advocated by the Conservative Party and the National Party) in the new South Africa, local elections, the RDP and home ownership.

- July 1995 – Local elections, the new or revised role of traditional leaders, law enforcement, curbing crime, debate about abolishing the death penalty and the AIDS pandemic. Traditional leaders were accommodated in the new South Africa and became salaried officials but their powers were still eroded as they were under apartheid. Their new subservience and financial dependence of traditional leaders on Pretoria has peculiar parallels to their previous subservience during apartheid when the Bantustans existed. However, there was a realisation that chiefs have existed in our societies for many years and cannot be wished away. Traditional leaders dispense patronage and uphold cultural values but their role was to be reviewed and brought in line with constitutional democracy (Enos J. Mabuza and Associates, July 1995:3-4).

- 24 October 1995 – the government of national unity, political violence in KwaZulu-Natal, crime, local government elections and the business climate.

- November 1995 – Local government elections, cabinet reshuffle, 1995 in retrospect and the year ahead, the challenges and priorities for 1996.

[90] The National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), COSATU and NACTU.

Appendix 6: Mabuza‟s Activities on the International Stage (compiled from the Inyandza National Movement‟s 1990 and 1991 booklets of Mabuza‟s speeches).

Group	**Place**	**Date**
Embarked on a political and agricultural tour in several South American countries.	Argentina, Paraguay, Uraguay and Brazil	1978
Held Consultations with members of the State and Federal parliaments.	Australia	1980
Held consultations with city bankers.	United Kingdom	1982
Went on an extensive 2-month study tour, including consultations with the Lawyers Committee on Civil Rights whilst on a USIS visitor grant.	United States	1982
Attended the leadership Conference and political consultations in Zimbabwe.	Zimbabwe	1982
Held consultations with the international Commission of Jurists in the	United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Switzerland.	1983
Held discussions with British Prime Minister (Mrs Margaret Thatcher) and other senior government officials.	United Kingdom	1985
Attended the Ditchley Foundation Conference in	United Kingdom	1985
Attended a U.S. Congressional Prayer Breakfast	USA	1985
Attended the American Bar Conference organised by the Lawyers‟ Committee for Civil	USA	1985

Rights Under Law		
Held consultations with the Office of the Prime Minister (Jacques Chirac) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.	France	1986
Attended a Congressional breakfast and held consultations with the US Secretary of State (George Pratt Shultz)	USA	1986
Held consultations with bankers in the United Kingdom.		1986
Led a 20-member delegation of the Inyandza National Movement for consultations with ANC leaders.	Zambia	1986
Attended a U.S. Congressional prayer breakfast and met with the US Secretary of State (George Pratt Shultz).	USA	1987
Addressed Zurich bankers and businessmen and met with international Commission of Jurists.	Switzerland	1987
Held discussions with UK Prime Minister (Mrs Margaret Thatcher) and members of the UK Foreign Office.	United Kingdom	1988
Was part of the Newick Park Initiative	United Kingdom	1988
Held consultations with Egypt‟s Foreign office.	Egypt	1988
Attended the Association of Western European Parliamentarians Against Apartheid (AWEPA) Conference.	Zimbabwe	1988

Was part of a South African delegation to the Soviet Union	Soviet Union	1989
Held consultations with the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and members of the Central Committee of the Supreme Soviet and African Institute of the Academy of Sciences.	Soviet Union	1989
Held consultations with members of the French Foreign Office.	France	1989
Addressed the Arbeitsgruppe Südliches Afrika (ASA)/the Anti-Apartheid Movement of Switzerland	Switzerland	1989
As part of a South African delegation, Mabuza held consultations with the British Prime Minister (Mrs Margaret Thatcher) and attended the Wilton Park Conference on Southern Africa.[91]	United Kingdom	1989
Mabuza‟s Inyandza National Movement was invited to participate in the Conference for a Democratic Future	United Kingdom	1989

[91] Buthelezi attended and addressed this conference on the "Federal and Confederal Futures for South Africa", a revival of the Buthelezi Commission‟s recommendations.