UNIVERSITY OF FORT HARE

IS LAND TENURE A SIGNIFICANT VARIABLE FOR PROMOTING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY IN RURAL VILLAGES? THE CASE STUDY OF NONKCAMPA VILLAGE IN THE BUFFALO CITY MUNICIPALITY, PROVINCE OF THE EASTERN CAPE, SOUTH AFRICA

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTERS IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT

by

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CONTRALESA	Congress of traditional leaders of South Africa
CPA	Communal Property Association
CLR	Communal Land Rights
DD	Daily Dispatch
EC	Eastern Cape
ESTA	Extension of Security of Land Tenure Act
ILRAD	Integrated Programme of Land Redistribution and Agricultural Development
LTR	Land Tenure Reform
PTO	Permit to Occupy
SDI	Spatial Development Initiative
WBWS	Willing buyer, willing seller

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I owe my wife, Nompumelelo and my kids a lot of gratitude for sacrificing the family comfort for the good of my studies. Have they not done so, I would have not been able to trudge on with the studies.

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THE ABSTRACT

The research explored the causal relationship between the communal land tenure and the stagnant agricultural productivity in rural villages. It is assumed that there is covariance between the communal land tenure and the stagnant agricultural productivity. The communal land tenure deprived the villagers of the land ownership rights to mortgage their landholdings to secure agricultural credit from financial institutions, or to advance them as own contributions to obtain Government-provided grants under the ILRAD. Under such circumstances, the villagers could not raise the level of agricultural productivity. The Permit to Occupy (PTO) certificates, issued to the landholders, provided for usufruct rights only i.e. right to occupy and use an allotment.

The related research was conducted at Nonkcampa village. The metatheory, “Positivism” and the quantitative paradigm were applied to collate and analyse the data. The research findings confirmed the correlation between the land tenure and the agricultural productivity, as the respondents claimed not to have had any access to agricultural inputs. Hence, the agricultural productivity on the arable land had stagnated.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The study question, “Is land tenure a significant variable for agricultural productivity in rural villages…?” seeks to investigate the relevance of land tenure for agricultural productivity in rural villages. This does not imply that the land tenure is the sole remedy for promoting agricultural productivity. There are other complementary inputs, for example, access to credit, fertilizer, water, crop information and marketing policies (Todaro, 2000: 390).

Todaro (2000: 363-4) also asserts that approximately 70% of the world’s poor population lives in rural areas. The vast majority of them, which equates over 2.5 billion people, subsist on low-productivity agriculture. He maintains that, if a development process is to succeed and sustain itself, it has to start in the rural areas in general, and in the agricultural sector in particular. The pervasive problems of endemic poverty, increasing income inequalities and rising unemployment are traced from the economic stagnation in the rural areas. Therefore, any economic transformation needs to put emphasis on rural development in general, and on subsistence agriculture in particular.

In view of the stagnant subsistence agriculture in the rural villages of the erstwhile Ciskei Bantustan (nowadays, a part of the Province of the Eastern Cape), the study attempts to interrogate the communal land tenure. Barnes (Cross et al, 1988: 285) contends, “too often, tenure is used as a scapegoat for development failures”. It seems that the communal land tenure system has had negative impact on agricultural productivity in rural areas. The larger percentage of the available arable land, which remains uncultivated for sometime, is the testimony of the failed land tenure. For this reason, the study

seeks not only to expose the shortcomings of the prevalent land tenure, but also to suggest tenure options. Noting Barness' assertions (Cross et al 1998: 285), "actual land tenure always resides in the way, in which it is perceived by the people on the ground", the study also accords to the rural community an opportunity to express viewpoints on the question of a desirable land tenure system.

With the rising population rate in rural villages, there is also corresponding increase in landlessness in terms of access to arable land. Therefore, the study seeks to find ways to promote equitable access to arable land.

Whilst the post-apartheid Government has devised the institutional and legal frameworks to tackle, among others, the issues of land tenure and agricultural productivity, it is debatable that the frameworks can address effectively the problem of agricultural stagnation and its ramifications in rural areas.

1.1. Definition of 'tenure'

In an attempt to define the term 'tenure', Margeot (Cross et al, 1988: 285-6) traces its origin from the Latin word 'tenere' (to hold). Both Margeot (Ibid,) and Barnes (Ibid. 285) agree that the tenure relates to the relationships between people, either as groups or individuals on one side, and the land on the other side. In addition, Barnes (Ibid) holds the view that the study of the tenure should include the analysis of the political, economical, sociological and administration structures in a society. Normally, tenure systems evolve over the centuries, responding to changing pressures such as population growth, and consequently developing new relationships between people and land.

The succeeding sub-heading outlines briefly the categories of land tenure, which have had divergent effects on African agriculture.

1.2.What is 'Customary' or 'Communal' in land tenure?

There need be concern about the continuous interchangeable usage of these terms or words to describe the tenurial relationships associated with the village land. Firstly, the interchangeable usage of the terms may reflect the uncertainties and contradictions around the land tenure governing the rural villages. Secondly, the terms are also part of the post-apartheid vocabulary defining the agrarian relationships pertaining to the village land. Thirdly, there is need to debunk a motive/s behind the interchangeable usage. Perhaps, the interchangeable usage is intended to make any operational land tenure acceptable to either the African communities, or the African traditional leadership, or both.

The 'customary land tenure' has its origin from the Africans' traditional administration and use of land resource. The 'communal land tenure', being the distorted form of customary land tenure, is the invention of the colonialist, apartheid regimes. The Chapter Two on the Literature Review and Theoretical broadly presents the similar viewpoints in this regard. Thought the South African Concise Oxford dictionary defines 'communal' as "shared or done by all members of a community", there is nothing 'communal' about the 'communal land tenure. The African intelligensia, some African traditional leaders and communities rejected the contents of the communal land tenure in words and deeds, because they, inter alia, restricted the Africans' access to land, the major source of their livelihoods. The following subheading outlines briefly the different features of the customary tenure and the communal land tenure.

1.3. Different features of 'customary' and 'communal' land tenures

The 'customary' land tenure evolved and prevailed in the pre-colonial era. Amongst its prominent features were (1) that indigenous African communities entrusted traditional leadership with power to allocate land, (2) that an allottee exercised full land ownership rights over an allotment, and (3) that

the tenure contributed towards the economic self-sufficiency and the commercialization of African agriculture.

During the colonial, apartheid era, the ‘new form of land tenure’ i.e. communal land tenure was invented. Its antithetical characteristics included, among others, (1) denial of African communities of legally secure land ownership rights coupled with disempowerment of traditional leadership, (2) vestment of land ownership rights over African-designated areas in the State, and (3) restrained access of land by Africans blended with annihilation of technologically advanced, commercial African agriculture.

With the advent of democracy in 1994, the traditional leadership strove to regain authority over rural land. But the priority needs be the enhancement of land share in the hands of the African majority to create a favourable environment for promoting agricultural productivity in rural areas.

1.4. ‘Communal’ land tenure in rural villages

Despite my protestations against the interchangeable usage of these words, I would continue to rather regard the ‘communal’ land tenure, as the one, that continues to govern the African designated areas throughout the colonial, apartheid era.

The communal land tenure system has bequeathed the legacy of stagnant subsistence agriculture in the rural villages of the former Ciskei Bantustan, of which the sampled Nonkcampa village was part. The large percentage of agricultural allotments have remained fallow and not been used productively for a number of past seasons. The Chapter Two broadly outlines how the communal land tenure contributes towards the stagnant agriculture. The landholders exercise the usufruct rights, which entitles them to occupy and use their holdings. The PTO (Permit to Occupy) certificates confirm such agrarian

relationships. The villagers cannot mortgage their allotments to access credit for agricultural purpose. Consequently, the rural subsistence agriculture is deprived of requisite technological innovation. The sizes of plots of arable land range between 0.5 hectare and 11/2 hectares. In contrast, the Kenyan land tenure prescribes the minimum size of 12.6 hectares of arable allotment. Economic viability of farming units is the important determinant (Binswanger et. al, 1993: 1465). In the case of South Africa, the 'economic viability' is not a determining factor.

Rural people are wary about risking their profound, political, social, economical and intergenerational attachment to land. They exclusively extend the usufruct rights over their plots of agricultural land to family members only.

There is growing landlessness in terms of access to arable land. As the population rate rises, the agricultural land becomes scarcer. The majority of the households are, consequently, without the parcels of tillable land.

Almost all village households derive agricultural crops from the individual homestead gardens for either food security or cash economy. One of the contributory inputs is access to domestic piped water, which they use to irrigate their gardens.

1.5. Critical definition of "agricultural productivity"

Seemingly, the definition of "agricultural productivity" is only realizable by referring to a number of aspects. It is not definable by emphasizing the land or land tenure aspect only. What is clear is that raised agricultural productivity is one of the primary goals of any rural development project (Low, 1986: 134). In addition to the relationship between land tenure and agricultural productivity land, these inputs, viz. technological innovation, institutional innovation and improved human capital worth

considering to improve agricultural productivity (Eicher et al, 1990: 262). In turn, the increased agricultural productivity leads to increased agricultural yield per hectare.

The Literature Review has presented a detailed discussion about the technological innovation. It is, therefore, necessary to elucidate the issues of institutional innovation and improved human capital, which have been alluded to above. The institutional innovation concerns in this context the favourable marketing and price policies, which are designed to obviate market failures in agriculture, and to guarantee good price incentives for agricultural farmers. The narrowing of gap in prices between the rural and urban sectors is also very important, as it enhances potential to integrate the rural sector into the mainstream economy. The improved human capital implies improvements in human skills. Emphasis on human capital flows from the understanding that only human beings have the abilities to identify, define and tackle the agrarian problems effectively. Lack of improvements in human capital affects negatively the choices made by those involved in agricultural production processes. For example, one may earn a pittance for one's labour services (Eicher et. al, 1990: 262-283).

Therefore, the concept of agricultural productivity needs to be defined in association with land tenure, technological innovation, institutional innovation and improved human capital, because of their complementary roles.

CHAPTER 2:

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The first step in putting forward the research problem is to choose the general topic. The succeeding one requires the delineation of a problem area and description of one or more problems. To define a problem correctly, the researcher needs what the problem is. The researcher might have experienced the problem for which he/she sought a solution. Now that he/ she has identified the problem, he/she has to rephrase the problem so that it be operationally viable and enable the development of a hypothesis. The technique of defining a problem must answer the "why" question. It should also identify the factors, which have contributed towards the problem (Welman, 1999: 13-14).

The research problem arises out of the empirically observed stagnant subsistence agriculture in the sampled Nonkcampa village. The factors, which are assumed to have contributed towards the agricultural stagnancy, are the following:

2.1. Tenurial rights:

The sampled Nonkcampa village constitutes a part of the erstwhile Ciskei reserve, and is located in the Buffalo City Municipality of the Eastern Cape province **(Appendices A and B**). Like the majority of the villages within the former Ciskei Bantustan, it experiences agricultural stagnation. Approximately ninety percent (90%) of the available arable land remains uncultivated for many seasons. This may be attributable to the communal land tenure, according to which the village land is administered and used. The tenure denies the villagers of the land ownership rights. Instead, the PTO certificates, which they hold, provide for usufruct rights i.e. rights to occupy and use allotments only. The full land ownership

rights rest with the State. As a result, the villagers are prohibited to mortgage their landholdings as collaterals to obtain credit for agricultural purpose. In addition, whilst the villagers have not yet acquired the full land ownership rights under the post-apartheid Land Reform policy, they cannot advance the agricultural landholdings as own contributions to secure Government-provided conditional grants under the ILRAD. In essence, the Nonkcampa villagers are deprived of agricultural inputs, which could stimulate the productive usage of available agricultural allotments, and enhance agricultural productivity.

The slight, remaining ten percent (10%) of the village agricultural land is subject to productive use by a small elite group of public servants and retirees. The group accesses the tillable land by virtue of family ties. Though the elite apply the advanced technology such as tractor to promote agricultural productivity, they still depend on off-farm incomes. May be, the reason is either that the agricultural allotments are not economically viable, or that they cannot invest in physical infrastructure, e.g. irrigation dams to raise agricultural productivity because somebody else is the actual landholder.

Attempt at extending individual land ownership rights to the rural villagers faces possible resistance from the local traditional leader, Zwelizolile Toise of the AmaGasela administrative area. The mentioned Tshezi case study proved that traditional leadership opposed the granting of land ownership rights to the rural communities for fear of looming loss of power and control over its ‘ jurisdictional, administrative area’. Furthermore, it confirmed that the traditional leadership did not prioritize the urgent need of development in rural areas, since the envisaged Spatial Development Initiative in the Tshezi area was abandoned.

Therefore, the LTR process faces the potential similar obstacle at Nonkcampa village, which can impact negatively on agricultural productivity.

2.2. Land distribution as consequential of land tenure:

The communal land tenure restricts the Nonkcampa villagers to the paltry parcels of tillable allotments varying between 0.5 hectare and 11/2 hectares. In contrast, the mentioned Kenyan case study prescribes the minimum size of 12.5.hectares of land to guarantee the economic viability of agricultural allotments. The 'economic viability' has not been the determining factor for the colonial, apartheid systems of land distribution. The communal land tenure has failed to cope with the changing developments such as population growth and concurrent demand for arable allotments at Nonkcampa village. Hence, the majority of households do not hold plots of agricultural development. Some of them are endowed with agricultural experience and skills, gained from the White-owned technologically advanced, commercial farms.

Pervasive poverty makes it difficult, if not impossible, to meet the requirement of own contribution to purchase land under the market-assisted ILRAD. The approaches to access Government conditional grants are critiqued under the sub-paragraph – 4.4 of the Literature Review.

The post-1994 mine and industrial retrenchments have affected the unskilled rural people, led to massive rural poverty and unemployment, and deprived of sources of remittances, the crucial supplementary to agricultural activities. According to the 1996 – DBSA Socio-economic Review (Davies et al, 2004), the unemployment rates in the Eastern Cape and the Nonkcampa village reflects as follows

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Graph 2.1



The unemployment rate also reduces to zero any potential to raise credit with the Eastern Cape-based Uvimba agricultural bank to purchase land, as the unemployed cannot meet the requirement of "bankable clients" *("New agricultural bank launched"* in DD, June 16, 2000).

Unless the alternative option/s, which takes cognizance of the socio-economic status of the affected individuals, are introduced to redistribute the land resource, the post-apartheid Land Redistribution programme has potential to retain the pre-1994 land status quo, with few exceptions benefiting the village elite. Market forces, as embedded in the ILRAD, will fail to redistribute land to the needy, poor Nonkcampa residents. The market forces are, generally, unable to dispense social justice. The proposed options, which are, worth exploring to redistribute the land resource in an equitable manner, are discussed under the sub-heading,

CHAPTER 3

3.1. HYPOTHESIS

The hypothesis has its origin from the research problem. It states the assumed relationship between two or more variables in one population. One of the involved variables is designated as the independent variable and the other as the dependent variable

The hypothesis is also regarded as a tentative assumption or preliminary statement about the relationship of the two or more variables. One variable is regarded as the independent variable, and the other as dependent variable (Welman et al (1999: 11, 13, 72).

In this instance, the hypothesis reads as follows: **There is causal relationship between the communal land tenure and the agricultural productivity because the agricultural productivity has stagnated at Nonkcampa village.** This is attributable to the fact that;

- The tenure excludes the land ownership rights
- It is legally insecure
- It is unable to facilitate access to benefits of agricultural policies
- Uncertainty prevails on the question of land administration
- Proper infrastructure is lacking.

3.2. GOALS / OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

The research attempts to realize the following objectives:

- To investigate the causal relationship between the communal land tenure and agricultural productivity

- To point out shortcomings of the post-apartheid Tenure Reform process, which have bearing on both land ownership rights and agricultural productivity
- To facilitate the accessing of the technological innovation by the villagers
- To help landless villagers access arable land
- To promote sustainable rural livelihoods
- To strengthen the processes of development, commercialization and integration of subsistence agriculture into both national and global economies
- To create employment opportunities

CHAPTER 4

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Welman et al (1999: 6) assert that one needs to acquaint oneself with previous researches on the topic at hand. This will help, among others, to detect inconsistencies and shortcomings of the previous researches, which warrant further researches.

The researcher needs to keep abreast of the reports on his /her topic so that when the research findings are released, they should not become immediately obsolete. Whenever studies of the previous researchers are applied, it is of vital importance that the concerned researcher indicates how they relate to the topic at hand (Welman et al 1999: 34-35).

The question of land tenure appears as an intriguing, persistent problem in Africa, because land resource is the source of livelihood. The land tenure has consequently tended to affect negatively the land distribution as in Kenya, where the White settlers have accumulated a lot of land, part of which is not put to productive use. It lies idle, whilst there is demand for land. The Kenyan constitution protects the private property rights. The land tenure system has created a landless class, which does not hold agricultural parcels. How the issue of landlessness can be resolved is a complex problem.

However, the Kenyan case indicates that whenever the Kenyans apply the advanced production technologies in their small holdings, the productive capacity of land also grows tremendously. For example, the horticultural sector grows to such an extent that the Kenyans are able to export the horticultural products to the foreign markets. As a result, it is the major source of foreign earnings (Karuga et al. 2000)

The land tenure system in South Africa is faced with the similar situation, which is traceable from the colonial and apartheid eras as given below. As is argued critically, it is doubtful that the Land Reform

policy would resolve effectively the ills of the communal land tenure such as landlessness, whilst the White settlers hoard a lot of land, which is not productively utilized. Seemingly, as for the Africans, who hold the small plots of arable land in rural villages, the usage of technological innovation, institutional innovation and improved human skills can boost agricultural productivity.

The succeeding subheadings critically discuss the causal relationships between the customary and communal land tenures on one side and the agricultural productivity on the other side within the African communities. The land tenure was, at some stage, instrumental in annihilating the Africans' agricultural productivity. It also served to create landlessness within the African communities. Therefore, the land tenure has been at the centre stage throughout the African struggles for land.

4.1. Customary land tenure & Africans' self-sufficient peasant agriculture

The so-called customary land tenure, which prevailed in the pre-colonial period, had positive impact on agricultural productivity. Though the Africans entrusted the institution of traditional leadership with the power of allocating land, the traditional leader could not subsequently tamper with the land use patterns and administration. The allottee could do as he pleased with the allotment, subdivided it amongst his progeny without interference from the traditional leadership, if he so deemed ((Mafeje, 2002). Taking into account the fact that land resource was in abundance, the land tenure system did not restrict the landholders to the miniature holdings. Land allocation might be guided by, inter alia, the economic considerations such as agricultural viability of the allotment. Hence, the land-based livelihood was sustainable and self-sufficient.

Cross et al (1988: 290-) contended that the above hallmarks of the customary tenure affirmed the security of customary tenure. They were recognized as binding as those of the freehold tenure, because

the social system protected the customary land rights. The advantage of the customary was that it did not have to comply with the complex and expensive procedures of the Western-oriented freehold registration.

Only under exceptional circumstances such as serious offence, which was morally repugnant to the community, could the customary land rights be set aside in favour of land forfeiture. The forfeiture rule also applied when the landholder left the area permanently.

To arrest any decline in soil fertility and productivity, the Africans practised the “shifting cultivation” method, whereby they rotated the usage of arable lands (Todaro, 2000” 379). .

4.2. Land tenure & commercial rise of African agriculture

The nineteenth century (C19) is the era, in which the customary land tenure responded to a number of western influences and developments. The African agriculture integrated into the cash economy. It adjusted to the foreign concept of land market. Technological innovation was introduced to raise the levels of agricultural productivity. Seemingly, there was growing convergence or mutual complementarity between the customary land tenure and the freehold land tenure, particularly, on issues of land titling, as some landed Africans held the land ownership titles.

Initially, the arrival of the 1820 White settlers in the South Eastern part of South Africa (later known as Eastern Cape) did not pose a threat to the customary land tenure. Instead, it enabled the integration of African economy into the operations of the cash economy, from which the Africans derived monetary benefits or incomes via the exchange of goods. The White colonialists began to meddle in

the functioning of the customary land tenure, when they waged the wars to brutally dispossess the Africans of their land (Davenport, 1987: 103, 390: Thompson, 1990: 73, 75-80).

The wars affected negatively and to a certain degree the access to cultivable land by the African agricultural farmers. However, they (farmers) took advantage of the emergence of the land market. The market provided for the favourable rentiership terms with the White Settlers, who had obtained land grants from the White settler regime (Bundy, 1988: 114-5). The unrestricted access to agricultural landholdings enabled the African farmers to accumulate adequate financial capital to purchase the Western agricultural technology such as iron plough, harrow, planter, cultivator wagon, improved seeds and fertilizers. The technological innovation coupled with the method of crop diversification had the effect of improving the agricultural productivity. Crop diversification emphasized the growth of cash crops such as wheat, barley, oats, vegetables and fruit, rather than traditional maize and sorghum. This reflected that the African agriculture was getting commercially oriented. Reinvestment of agricultural dividends helped, for example, to construct irrigation infrastructure to mitigate the deleterious effects of drought, and to accumulate land. Consequently, individual wealthy Africans held titles on land varying in size between ten and eighty acres, and African land syndicates bought large tracts of land totaling to approximately 100, 000 acres (Hendricks, 1990: 20-21; Mafeje, 2002; Bundy, 1988: 88, 92, 97 & 116; Davenport, 1987: 104-106).

The commercial African agriculture became the source of agricultural produce required by the mining sector, particularly, with the discoveries of diamond and gold deposits in Kimberley (1867) and Johannesburg (1884). This also boosted the incomes of the African agricultural farmers (Hendricks, 1990: 20; Bundy, 1988: 71 & 121).

The fact that the African commercial farmers surpassed their White counterparts in the agricultural fairs testified to the economic effectiveness of the customary land tenure. Hence, the Cape Labour Commission of 1894 reported, “Europeans cannot compete with Natives” (Louw in Cross et al, 1988: 294-5). The evidence of the Commission proved that, comparatively, the African agriculture had grown commercially and competitively, whereas the White agriculture remained inefficient and uncompetitive.

The appeal of the White farmers to the colonial regime to protect them against the fierce competition from the wealthy African agricultural entrepreneurs was clearly an assault upon the customary land tenure, which had brought about the enhanced agricultural productivity. The envisaged land tenure was the one, which could annihilate the African economic self-sufficiency, and create the landless, wage-dependent African class, among others (Hendricks, 1990: 24-5).

What can be deducted from the above contentions is that the customary land tenure provided for land ownership rights, facilitated access to land through land market, enabled land accumulation, promoted agricultural investment, commercialized African agriculture, increased rural incomes and ensured sustainable rural livelihoods.

The succeeding subheading reflected on how the colonial apartheid regimes distorted the customary land tenure with a view to destroying the Africans’ self-sustaining agriculture-based livelihood and creating a landless wage-dependent class.

4.3. Communal land tenure and forced decline of African agriculture

The Cecil John Rhodes' colonial regime responded to the concerns of the White constituents by establishing the political, social and economic processes to distort the customary land tenure, a significant factor for agricultural productivity for the African agriculture. With the passage of the Glen Grey Act of 1894, the process of distorting the customary land tenure manifested itself, inter alia, denying the Africans of land ownership rights, restricting access to land by the Africans and depriving traditional leadership of the power to allocate land. The administration of African land affairs devolved or decentralized to the institution of Magistracy or Native Commissioner, with the community-based new institutions of village headmanship and Council serving in the advisory or consultative capacities.

Despite my earlier reservations about the so-called 'communal land tenure', I shall continue to use it.

The restricted access to land took various ways. The principle of "one man one lot" served to restrict each African household to no more than a parcel of 8.4 acres of landholding. Neither was consideration given to the household size in relation to the allotment, nor to the economic viability of such an allotment. The subdivision of any allotment was prohibited to create a landless wage-dependent African class. The landholders held the Permit to Occupy (PTO) certificates, which granted the usufructuary rights i. .e. rights to occupy and use their respective allotments. Deprived of the security of land tenure over their landholdings, the landholders were susceptible to arbitrary confiscation of such holdings by the State in the cases of non-beneficial occupation, conviction of stock theft, or rebellion. As the Africans did not own the allotted portions of land, it was not easy for

them to make productive investment on such land (Hendricks, 1990: 29-31, 34; Davenport, 1987: 392-3: Bundy, 1988: 135).

The African intelligensia criticized the Glen Grey Act, which complemented the communal land tenure. For example, Charles Pamla asserted “No man is allowed to occupy more than one lot. This shuts out all improvements and industry of some individuals who may work and buy…trees differ in height”(Bundy, 1988: 136)

The Act did not have immediate negative effect on African agriculture, particularly, in the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). Some Afrikaners, having obtained land grants, stealthily resorted for survival to sharecropping and labour tenancy terms with the Africans, who owned agricultural implements and draught oxen. Prosperous African farmers also purchased White-owned farms on market. (Bundy,1988: 136-7; Davenport, 1987-139).

The Nationalist Party regime’s ascendancy to political power in 1910, however, translated into the ruthless abolition of the customary land tenure. The Land Act No 27 of 1913 abolished the sharecropping, rentiership (squatting) and labour tenancy systems, which previously guaranteed accessing of agricultural land by the Africans. The affluent Africans, residing between Grahamstown and Transkei boundaries (i.e. former Ciskei), were concerned with such drastic measure, as they had derived wealth mainly from the sharecropping system, (Plaatjie: 177). The Act also forbade the Africans to access or purchase land outside the designated Reserves. The Reserves were destined to become convenient pools of landless wage-dependent, surplus African labour (Thompson, 1990: 163). By 1920s, there was already sharp decline in agricultural productivity. It increasingly grew difficult to

subsist on agriculture. The agricultural allotments were, too, not economically viable. Prosperous peasants were, systematically, wiped out.

The decline of agricultural productivity was the testimony to the negative effects of the communal land tenure system (Hendricks, 1990, 92-5; Bundy, 1988: 222-224: Thompson, 1990: 164).

In contrast, the White farmers, who enjoyed the freehold land tenure, accumulated as much land as they could afford. In addition, massive assistance in the form of state subsidies, grants, transport concession, favourable credit facilities, tax and drought relief, tariff protection, research, extension services, large tracts of land and availability of labour was provided. The assistance amounted to a huge sum of 112 million British pounds (+-R784m) between 1911 and 1936 (Bundy, 1979: 116; Coetzee et al. 2000: 291; Thompson, 1990: 166). Hence, the White agriculture grew commercially

The addition of extra 7, 250, 000 morgen land to the Reserves following the Native Land and Trust Act of 1936 did not improve access to land by the Africans, because the regime leased much of the additional land to the White farmers for grazing purpose. Furthermore, the rest of the land was already overcrowded (Williams et al, 1998: 8; Yawitch, 1981: 10; Thompson, 1990: 163; Davenport, 1987: 166). The Betterment schemes were, subsequently, designed in accordance with the Proclamation Nos. 31of 1939 and 116 of 1949 to *prima facie* counter the worsening agricultural effects of the "one man one lot principle", to stabilize and increase agricultural production. They provided for the subdivision of the African-designated areas into the residential, arable and grazing plots. Too, the Betterment schemes had the negative effect of reducing the agricultural holding to a meagre .43 hectare, and of creating landless households in terms of tillable land. As a result, the Africans were agriculturally worse-off (De Wet, 1994: 361: De Wet, 1989: 329). The Betterment schemes failed to address the

fundamental issues such as unequal distribution of land and support services between White and Black agriculture. Nonetheless, the Africans were not passive in the face of the Betterment proclamations. They waged fierce resistance (Yawitch, 1981: 15-24; De Wet, 1989: 342).

Although the Tomlinson Commission recommended the issuing of freehold land title in the Reserves, and juggled with the notions of economically viable units and successful farmers, the Nationalist Party regime did not go along with such proposals (Williams, 2000: 5; De Wet, 1989: 338). This could be due to either fear for possible resuscitation of Africans' economic self-sufficiency, among others.

Advanced technology in the form of mechanization of White agriculture in 1960s, 1970s and 1980s caused the evictions of large numbers of former workers and labour tenants from the farms into the overcrowded villages in the Homelands. They became part of the landless class, who did not hold any plots of agricultural land.

4.4. Post-apartheid Land Reform Policy (1998)

The post-apartheid political dispensation has stipulated, among others, the goals, of providing security of tenure to land previously held under the legally insecure land tenure, of redressing the inherited, inequitable distribution of productive asset i.e. land resource, and promoting agricultural productivity. The Land Reform policy comprises three pillars i.e. Land Tenure Reform, Land Restitution, Land Redistribution. The latter two programmes can play effective complimentary roles towards transforming the land tenure to have positive impact on agricultural productivity.

4.4.1. Land Tenure Reform

The Land Tenure Reform (LTR) programme targets specifically at granting the security of tenure for the land previously held under the legally insecure land tenure for decades by the holders. The supportive legal framework, for example, Communal Property Association Act (CPA) No 28 of 1996 caters for a group of people wishing to jointly own land. Agricultural allotments are held *individually* under the PTO system in the villages. Yet, the conversion of land tenure to a legally secure individual-oriented tenure is made conditional upon the consent of the *community*, or when necessary, subject to appeal to alternative institutions provided for in the Communal Land Rights (CLR) Act of 2003. The procedure for tenure conversion, complex and cumbersome as it is, is further compounded by the recognition of role of *traditional leadership* in land transaction, as is provided for in the ILRAD. Traditional leadership is likely to oppose conversion to an individual-oriented tenure. For example, the case study of Tshezi administrative area in the Transkei region (Ntsebeza in Coetzee et al, 2000: 317-328) illustrates the unresolved question of land tenure in the former Reserves. The CONTRALESA-affiliated traditional leaders, namely, Holomisa, Nonkonyana and Gwadiso conspiratorially swayed the Tshezi traditional leader, chief Ngwenyathi into rejecting the notion of Tshezi Communal Property Association (CPA) as well as the envisaged Government's Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) in the Tshezi administrative area.

In accordance with the Communal Property Association Act, the Tshezi CPA was conceptualized, not only provide land rights to the affected community, but also to promote local development initiatives. Fearing the looming loss of power and control over the 'Tshezi administrative area', The CONTRALESA-affiliated traditional leadership connived not only to deny the Tshezi residents of land rights, but also to stifle the related SDI. As the result, the issues of extending the land rights to the Tshezi community and of SDI were abandoned.

4.4.2. Land Restitution

The Land Restitution programme, though intended to restore land ownership rights to individuals, groups and communities previously and unjustly deprived of such rights by the colonial, apartheid regimes, is supposed to contribute towards the creation of economically viable entities. The programme can help address effectively the pitfalls of the communal land tenure such as sizes of landholdings, only if the post-apartheid Government recognized that the apartheid land legislation, e. g. Land Act of 1913 and Betterment Proclamations of 1939 and 1949 had unjustly deprived the Africans, now resident in the former Homelands, of the land.

The implementation of the Land Restitution programme is not, however, immune from problems. The major contentious issue concerns the principle of 'willing buyer, willing seller' (WBSB) with its particular emphasis on a negotiated sale price for land. For example, the land claim lodged by the Dibakwanyane community over the 1270 hectare Lydenburg farm, Boomplaats faced the similar difficulty. The land in question was bought at the cost of whopping 50, 000 pounds (+-R350, 000) in 1906 by the 600 African families, but confiscated by the apartheid regime between 1957 and 1961. A White farmer, Willem Pretorius subsequently bought it at the petty, below market value price of R119, 000 in 1983. By 2001, he demanded the exorbitant sale price of R2.1million for the same land. In recognition of the Constitution, the Government offered the "equitable" rather than "marketable" value of R848, 485. After the long drawn dispute, the disputants agreed on the negotiated price of R1, 5 millions. The necessary deductions reduced the amount to R1.2 millions (Business Day, March 23, 2001: 6: Daily Dispatch, June 1 2001: 7).

Despite the problem such as above, the Land Restitution programme has potential to raise the size of agricultural allotment to match the size of 12.5 hectares prescribed by the Kenyan Government for

reason of economic viability. In that way, the restrictive measures of the communal land tenure would be overcome.

4.4.3. Land Redistribution

The Land Redistribution programme, which is intended to transfer the portion of land from the advantaged White minority to the previously disadvantaged Black majority, could assist in tackling the scarcity of agricultural land in the villages. As a point of departure, it recognizes the historical fact that 87% of the South Africa's land resource is in the hands of the few White settlers, whereas the remaining paltry 13% is held by the many indigenous Blacks. Hence, it has targeted to transfer 30% within the first five years of democracy to redress the highly unequal structure of land ownership. The fact that it has managed to transfer the mere 4% of the land between 1994 and 2005 testifies that the programme implementation is no plain sailing. Its WBWS clause is specifically blamed for the tardy progress. Hence, Cousins et al (DD, July 28 2005: 6) advocate the vigorous state intervention in land matters as the rational option

To counteract the stalemate over land transfers, the Section 25 of the South African constitution and the Expropriation Act No 63 of 1975 provide alternative recourses for land confiscation. It seems that the Government vacillates on the question of applying these legal and constitutional provisions. The dilly-dallying is attributable to the constitutionally enshrined right to private property, among others.

The Land Redistribution programme also provides for support services in the form of Government grant/s to increase agricultural productivity. Access to them is contingent upon an own contribution/s. A particular formula determines an amount of Government grant in relation to that of own contribution. For example, the minimum contribution of R5000, alternatively own labour or

equipment, or stock to the value of R5000, entitles a beneficiary to the minimum grant of R20, 000. The ceiling contribution of R400, 000 matches the maximum grant of R100, 000.

The programme can assist extensively the rural villagers to augment own contribution/s and Government grant/s, on condition that the villagers gain land ownership rights over and subsequently advance the land holdings as part of own contributions under the ILRAD. As the result, the villagers may access, to some extent, the required technological innovation. Even the landholders with profound attachment to land can be in a better position to make productive use of their holdings, given the land ownership rights. If necessary, some may mortgage their allotments as collaterals to raise credit with financial institutions with a view to improving agricultural productivity.

Whether the marketized WBWS principle of the ILRAD could assist in redistributing the agricultural land equitably to the landless class in the rural villages is quite debatable. For example, the lowest Government grant plus own contribution may be inadequate to purchase land for a landless, poverty-stricken rural individual. Though there is a tendency to uphold a group approach, it is, too, prone to problems. For example, it stifles individual creativity and industry. Perhaps, a group approach may operate effectively within the closely-knit family membership.

The Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) No. 62 of 1997 protects farm workers and labour tenants against illegal evictions from the farms. Concurring with the retrogressive effect of the Land Reform policy dating as far back as 1913, The ESTA is supposed to provide a form of compensation to the former farm workers and labour tenants previously affected by the evictions, and dumped in the Bantustans. The positive step in this regard could reduce the problem of landlessness associated with the agricultural land.

CHAPTER 5

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

5.1. Research design

According to Welman et al (1999: 46), the research design reflects on how a *sample* is drawn from the *population*, and how data is to be gathered. It is the survey design, which tests the relationship between variables. It is *cross-sectional*, as the participants differ in terms of other variables, e.g. access to agricultural allotment. It takes place at the moment of the research. In other words, it does not take place over a long time. The quantitative paradigm is adopted, and statistics used to analyse data.

5.1.1. Positivism

The research was guided by the "Positivism" tradition. The proponents of Positivism argue that social science should emulate the methodology of natural sciences as far as the establishment of the causal relationship between the social phenomena. The natural science methodology lays down three criteria to guarantee the scientificity of the natural sciences, which criteria are also applicable to the social research. The criteria are as follows

Empiricism: It is grounded on observable relationships between social phenomena, or direct experience. .

Objectivity: This means the value-free judgment i.e. free from any bias or prejudice. The social facts are instrumental in arriving at findings

Verifiability: The finding on the relationship between social phenomena can be verified, whenever it deems necessary to verify the relationship.

Causality: Hume has incorporated the criterion of "causality" into the positivist tradition. This refers to a regular relationship between observable events, which can be formalized into a law-like statement. (Babbie et al 2001: 21-27)

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The quantitative paradigm goes hand in hand with the metatheory, "Positivism". It emphasizes the statistical measurements.

As far as this research is concerned, it is assumed that the Positivist tradition can assist in arriving at the objective and verifiable findings. As can be inferred from the statement of the problem, the research originated from the empirical evidence on agricultural stagnation.

5.1.2. Population:

Neuman (1997: 201) argues that a researcher needs to estimate the size of population under research. The *1996 population census statistics* projected the population size of the Nonkcampa village at *1469 people (N-1469).* In *2004,* there had been slight increase of the population size to *1680,* i.e. 12.6% increase (Davies et al, 1994). The estimate of the *households* was *220* with the *average ratio of households to occupants* equaling to *1:7. The unit of analysis* for the research was *'household head'*.

5.1.3. Sampling

Kane (1985:94) asserts that the size of a sample is "determined mainly by **the *type of sample, degree of precision required*** *and* ***degree of variability of the population***". These criteria remained paramount in determining the size of the sample. In addition, the researcher observed the research environment over some time, and had had the pilot talks with the members of the research population. To represent

the ***heterogeneity*** of the population, the ***stratified random sampling*** technique was applied. It produced the three following categories of ***subpopulations***, determined according to the following ***parameters*** viz. agricultural allotment, residential site & garden, and grazing commonage, formal / informal agricultural training, and access to technology such as tractor. The ***sampling frame*** was, consequently, as follows.

The **Category "A"** represents the individual households, who hold or access (1) plots of agricultural land (2) homestead gardens, and (3) grazing commonages

The **Category "B"** consists of those, who do not hold tillable allotments, but have access to (1) homestead gardens and (2) grazing commonage. Within this group, there are those household individuals, who, as the *former farm workers and / or labour tenants* on the Whites-owned farms, gained the informal agricultural training

The **Category "C"** comprises the *rural elite.* They, too, do not hold agricultural plots. They access both (1) the homestead gardens (2) grazing commonage. Very few of them have acquired the formal *agricultural education*. They are able to make use of *advanced technology* such as tractors. They *access portions of agricultural land by virtue of family ties.*

The succeeding **Table 5.1** reflects the sampling frame and its parameters. NB. The word ***'partly'*** stands for some of the respondents.

Table 5.1

STRATA	**PARAMETERS**				
	Arable l	*Homestead gc*	*Grazing comn*	*Formal / ir education*	*Advanced tecl*
Category "A"	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A
Category "B"	N/A	Yes	Yes	Partly	N/A
Category "C"	N/A	Yes	Yes	Partly	Yes

The **Graph 5(a)** below depicted the categories as follows**,**

- The Category "A" represesented the ***holders of arable plots***,
- The Category "B", the ***non-holders of arable plots*** and,
- The Category "C", the ***rural elite*****.**

The Graph 5a) showed, not only the subpopulations, but also the **sample size**, which equaled 10% of the 220 households, i.e.22. The sample reflected with reasonable accuracy the opinions and behaviour of the entire population.

Graph 5(a)



translated as in the **Table 5.2**

The ***simple random sampling*** technique, applied to draw representatives from each stratified sub-group, culminated to the representative sample in the **Table 5.2**

Table 5.2

STRATA	FEMALE	MALE
Holders of arable plo	8	2
Non-holders of arable	2	8
Rural elite	Nil	2

The “Nil” female representation against the stratum ‘Rural elite’ resulted from the non-involvement of the rural female elite with the arable allotments.

Fig. 5.1



From the very stratification stage, each respondent was assigned the ***Code Number*** as in the **Fig. 5.1** above to ***strengthen control, confidentiality and mutual trust,*** and to facilitate the ***analysis process.***

Despite the above classifications, the subpopulations shared the common denominator i.e. linkage to (i) the communal land tenure and (ii) agricultural productivity. Interestingly, they also projected the four production factors viz. natural resource (land), human and physical capital (knowledge, technology), labour (agricultural skills & abilities), and potential entrepreneurship (Le Roux et al. 1995: 2-3) But the production factors were, in practice, disjointed, because of egocentric patterns of human behavior.

5.1.4. Questionnaire compilation & administration

The structured questionnaire was compiled, as exemplified by the **Appendix C**. It covered the following variables: *family size, household head, gender, age, education/training, agrarian system, income, cropping, technology, infrastructure, arable holding and agricultural financing.* Literacy level was the determining factor whether the respondent could complete on his/her own. As far as the rural elite was concerned, copies of the questionnaires were delivered at the homesteads of the rural elite for *self-administration* after working hours. They were collected on the following day. Direct interviews were conducted with the rest of the interviewees. *Direct observation* was also used.

Quantitative method was applied to gather, analyse and interpret data.

The *unstructured interview* was held *telephonically* with the informant of the EC Department of Agriculture to validate the total of the agricultural allotments of Nonkcampa village, and the proper measurements for land such as hectarage.

5.2 Data Presentation

5.2.1. Questionnaire administration

Though the study intended to interview the twenty-two household heads i.e. the 10% of the number of the estimated 220 households, the mourning ritual affecting one respondent forced the reduction of the number of the respondents to 21. Taking into account the inadequate levels of literacy of the nineteen (19) interviewees, the completion of the questionnaires was done on a person-to-person basis. The remaining two respondents had the questionnaires delivered at their residences for ***self-administration*** after the normal work hours, and collected on the following day by the researcher. The following were the findings derived from the research project.

5.2.1.1. Household composition

The sampled households were female-headed and male-headed, as exemplified under**.**

Table 5:3

POPULATION SEG	***FEMALE-HEADED***	***MALE-HEADED***
Holders of arable allo	8	2
Non-holders of arable	1	8
Rural elite	None	2
TOTAL	***9***	***12***

6.2.1.2. Ratio: household to occupants

The number of the people occupying each household varies from 4 to 10. The household occupants include the parents, children and grandchildren. The average ratio of each household to a number of occupants equals 1:7.

5.2.1.3. Age groups

They are represented as follows:

Table 5.3

AGE-GROUP	STATISTICS
30 – 39 years	*4.7% (1)*
40 – 49 years	*9.5% (2)*
50 – 59 years	*14.2% (3)*
60 – 69 years	*33.3% (7)*
70 – 79 years	*29.5% (6)*
80 – 89 years	*9.5% (2)*
TOTAL	*100% (21)*

5.2.1.4. Education and / or training:

33.3% of the respondents has attained the primary education level, whilst the 28.3% has achieved the secondary education level. Only one respondent 4.7% has obtained the formal agricultural education at the Fort Cox Agricultural College . The few individuals have acquired the informal agricultural training from the White farms, whilst working as either farm worker or labour tenant. Only 28.5% of the respondents indicated that they were exposed to the extension services. One respondent gained the informal agricultural training from one's family members. The educational / training levels are tablated as below:

Table 5.4

EDUCATION LEVEL	STATISTICS
Primary education (Grades 1 – 7)	**33.3% (7)**
Secondary education (Grades 8 – 1	**28.6% (6)**
Formal agricultural training	**4.8% (1)**
Informal agricultural training	**23.8% (5)**
None	**9.5% (2)**
TOTAL	**100%(21)**

The former farmer farm workers and/or labour tenants are, particularly, endowed with tremendous *agricultural knowledge* covering the proper methods of planting seeds, relevance of *irrigation furrows* and usage of advanced technology such as tractor, harvester, tractor drawn-disc harrow and –planter, hammer-mill and baling machinery), and the application of suitable methods for planting seeds. Direct observation, e.g. planting of potatoe seed and irrigation furrows, coupled with the detailed explanation of the respondents testified to the acquired expertise. One of the former farm workers experiments the growth of pineapples in his home garden. Such extensive knowledge is *not fully utilized* for augmenting agricultural production, since they do not hold or own any agricultural allotments and agricultural equipment.

5.2.1.5. Agrarian system

The respondents do not hold any land title to either residential sites or agricultural allotments. The 95% of them hold the PTO certificates, which entitle to usufruct rights. The remaining 5% awaits the outstanding PTO certificates from the Head of the local community structure. The respondents replied affirmatively that the Nonkcampa village falls under the traditional leadership. The 95% of the interviewees preferred to hold land titles for their holdings. This implies that they would like to acquire full land ownership rights. The 5% of the respondents, who still awaits the PTO certificates, prefer the PTO system. It seems that the latter group chooses the PTO system, because they have not yet received the awaited PTO certificates. The results regarding the preferences are graphically illustrated as below:

Graph 5(c)



95% = 20 respondents: 5% = 1 respondent

The overwhelming majority of respondents reject the communal land tenure, the features of which include, inter alia, the issuing of the PTO certificates to the landholders.

5.2.1.6. Income source

Three categories of sources of income are identified, as is reflected in the graph below:

Table 5.5

SOURCES OF IN	STATISTICS
Social pensions	**68% (14)**
Public sector	**20% (4)**
Nil	**12% (3)**
TOTAL	**100% (21)**

The monthly *social pension grant* amounts to *R780* per individual. The monthly public *sector income* varies *above the level of R3000*. The *"nil source of income"* group consists of the respondents, who are neither gainfully employed, nor yet attaining the qualifying age for the monthly Government-provided social pensions. The above graph demonstrates that the majority of the holders of the

cultivable land parcels are the social pension grantees. Only the minute number of the economically active people below the social pension qualifying ages holds or accesses the agricultural allotments.

5.2.1.7. Garden cropping, technology and infrastructure

All the correspondents have the gardens in their homesteads. The *62.5%* of them grows the variety of crops ranging from the *vegetables, fruit* to *grain crops (e.g. mealies and pumpkins)*. The *25%* prefers to grow the *vegetables* and the *grain crops*. The *12.5%* grows the *vegetables* only. The preferences are also entailed in the following Graph 6©

Graph 5(d)



5.2.1.7(a) Agricultural implements

The *75%* of the interviewees use *forks, spades, rake, watering cans and short-handled hoes* to plough the homestead gardens. Only *12.5 %* uses the *ox-drawn ploughs*, and the *12.5%* applies *all* of the mentioned agricultural tools. The preferences are tabulated as follows:

Table 5.6

AGRICULTURAL IMPEMENTS	***USER-RESPONDENTS***
Forks, spades, rakes, water handled hoes	**75% (15)**
Ox-drawn ploughs	**12.5% (3)**
All	**12.5% (3)**
TOTAL	**100% (21)**

5.2.1.7(b) Irrigation

All the respondents irrigate the gardens, applying the ***piped domesticated water***. One respondent, also a former farm worker, commented that ***such water is unsuitable for irrigation purpose***, as it contains the ***chemicals***, *which harm* ***soil fertility***. *Pure* ***rain water*** is preferable.

5.2.1.7© Regularity in sowing seed/s

The ***50%*** of the respondents grow the ***variety of crops throughout the year***. The ***37.5%*** grow the crops ***twice per year***, and the remaining ***12.5% once per year***. The *lowest percentage* depicts that the public servants, with the exception of the one with the agricultural qualifications, are engaged in other ***off-farm employment*** activities i.e. public sector. They accord less priority to the home-based agriculture. In contrast, the other percentages reflect that the respondents regard the gardening activities as the ***crucial source of rural livelihoods.***

Table 5.7

DEGREE OF REGULARIT	% RESPONDENTS
Once a year	*12.5%*
Twice a year	*37.5%*
Thrice a year	*None*
Throughout the year	*50%*
TOTAL	***100%***

5.2.1.7(d) Agricultural inputs

All the respondents apply the *kraal manure* to boost agricultural productivity. The manure is freely available for use, and obtainable locally.

The *50%* of the respondents use the *insecticides and / or pesticides*, whereas the rest *50%* does not apply them.

5.2.1.8. Subsistence or diversified agriculture

5.2.1.8(a) Food security & cash economy

The *25%* of the interviewees grows crops for *food security* only, whereas the remaining 75% caters for both *domestic consumption and cash economy*.

Table 5.8

PURPOSE	***INTERVIEWEES***
Food security only	25% (6)
Domestic consumption	75% (15)
TOTAL	**100% (21)**

Co-villagers, workers of the Zwelitsha-based Da Gama textile factory (near King William's Town), *individual urban hawkers* and the *King William's Town public market* are the target customers for marketing the cash crops. *Potatoes, pumpkins* and *cabbages* are the *major marketable crops*, sold in *bulks.* Means of cartage is, either hired local vehicle, or own transport, or buyer's transport. As the result, the crop-growers earn incomes.

5.2.1.9. Agricultural suggestions (homestead gardens)

The respondents have recommended access to the following inputs:

- Fertilizers, insecticides, Government grants, seeds, tractors, agricultural credit (loans), favourable marketing policy, extension services and information (crop rotation, planting seasons for crops, planting methods),

These desirable agricultural inputs cannot be met under the communal land tenure. For example, in the case of agricultural credit, the financial institution may demand collateral. Because of insecurity of land tenure, the landholder cannot advance the holding as collateral.

5.2.1.10 Arable land

5.2.1.10(a) Total & ratio: household to arable land

According to the EC Department of Agriculture, the *total arable land* allotted to the Nonkcampa villagers equals ***100.3 hectares***. The ***average ratio*** *of households to tillable land* is ***1: 0.46 hectare***. The ratio finding approximates the ***national ratio*** of the pre-democracy era i.e. ***1:0.43 hectare***.

5.2.1.10(b) Access to agricultural allotments

The *62.5%* of the respondents access parcels of tillable land. The *37.5%* of the rest does not access the cultivable allotments. **See Table 5.9**

The 66.6% of those accessing them are the actual holders of the tillable allotments, whereas the 33.3% accesses the allotments by virtue of either the family ties, or good neighbourliness. Refer to the **Table 5.9**

Table 5.9

Respondents accessing ti	**62.5% (13)**
Respondents not accessi	**37.5% (8)**
TOTAL	**100% (21)**

Table 5.10

Actual landholders	*66.6% (9)*
Land accessed by virtue neighbourliness	*33.3%(4)*
On loan	*Nil*
TOTAL	***100% (13)***

The *sizes* of the accessed portions of agricultural land vary between *half-a-hectare (1/2)* and *one-and-half hectares (11/2).*

6.2.1.10© Agricultural equipment

The 37.5% of the respondents use the *oxen-drawn plough* only. The 12.5% applies the *tractors and planters* to plough the fields. Also 12.5% of the respondents uses the *ox-drawn ploughs, tractor and planters* to cultivate land. Read Fig. 3

Table 5.10

Oxen-drawn plough	**37.5% (9)**
Tractor	**Nil**
Planter	**Nil**
Oxen-drawn plough &	**Nil**
Tractor & planter	**12.5% (2)**
Ox-drawn plough, trac	**12.5% (2)**
TOTAL	**62.5% (13)**

NB. These are the respondents, who access the arable land as in the **Table 5.9** above.

One of the respondents intimated that, if *Government could make tractors available* for agricultural use in the village, he would *recommit himself to making the productive use of his agricultural parcel*, which he has lent to his neighbour for agricultural use.

5.2.1.10(d) Irrigation

The entire arable land is not under irrigation. The respondents would like to have the agricultural land under irrigation.

5.2.1.10(e) Regularity for sowing seed/s

The regularity for sowing seed/s is presented as follow

Table 5.11

Once a year	**83%**
Twice a year	**17%**
Thrice a year	**Nil**
Four times per year	**Nil**
TOTAL	**100%**

5.2.1.10(f) Domestic consumption & cash economy

The *25%* of the respondents grows crops for *domestic consumption*, whilst also *25%* of them produces *cash crops.*

5.2.1.10(g) Aspiration/s for agricultural allotments

The 50% of the respondents would like to hold own cultivable allotments.

This reflects the degree of landlessness in terms of arable land. It means that the communal land tenure fails to cope with the increasing population growth rate.

5.2.1.10(h) Agricultural suggestions (agricultural allotments)

The interviewees would like to access the agricultural inputs viz.

- Irrigation water, fence (to fence in each allotment), tractor, fertilizers, planters, favourable marketing policies, disc harrow, establishment of farmer support centres and farmers' cooperatives
-

5.2.1.11. Agricultural financing

None of the respondents has ever raised a financial credit with any financial institution.

The 62.5 of the respondents is aware of the Government support.

One respondent reported that the residents of the neighbouring villages have been receiving the 'agricultural vouchers' from the local 'tribal office' i.e. the office of the local traditional leadership to purchase agricultural inputs. Yet, the office has never furnished the Nonkcampa villagers with such vouchers. The selective distribution of the vouchers needs to be investigated.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND ECOMMENDATIONS:

It is *concluded* that the communal land tenure retained the casual relationship with the agricultural productivity. The tenure is legally insecure. Therefore, it excludes the land ownership rights. The result is that it deprives of access to technological innovation. Its effect is that agricultural productivity stagnates. The tenure cannot address itself to the question of landlessness in response to the increasing population rate.

It is, therefore, *recommended* that:

- Full land ownership rights be granted over the village land
- Landless people be allotted parcels of agricultural land.
- Access to technological innovation be encouraged.

Implementing the recommendations would make the land tenure a significant variable for promoting agricultural productivity in rural villages

CHAPTER 7

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APPENDIX A

LOCALITY PLAN OF NONKCAMPA VILLAGE



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APPENDIX B

CONCEPTUAL LAYOUT OF NONKCAMPA VILLAGE

CONCEPTUAL LAYOUT OF NONKCAMPA VILLAGE



APPENDIX C

RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

A. RESPONDENT'S PARTICULARS

(NB Please circle the letter next to the chosen answer)

1. Are you residing at Nonkcampa village?

   a. Yes b. No

2. Are you staying in this homestead?

   a. Yes b. No

3. How many people, including parents, children, grand-children, etc. reside here?

   _____people

4. Are both parents still alive?

   a. Yes b. No

5. If no, who is the surviving one?

   a. Mother b. Father

6. How old are you today?

   _____(Number of years)

7. What is your gender?

   a. Male b. Female

B. EDUCATION AND/OR TRAINING

8. What is your highest educational grade?

   _____(Grade)

9. Did you ever acquire any formal agricultural training at any educational institution, e.g. Fort Cox Agricultural College, University of Fort Hare, etc?

   a. Yes b. No

10. Did you ever undergo informal agricultural training either through working on a farm or through agricultural extension services offered by agricultural extension officer/s

a. Yes b. No

11. If yes, specify the type of training. Is it?

A	B
Working on a farm	Extension services

C. AGRARIAN SYSTEM

12. Do you hold any land title (itayitile) to your residential and / or arable allotments?

a. Yes b. No

13. Do you have any PTO certificate (Isiqinisekiso) to your residential and/or agricultural holdings?

i. Yes ii. No

14. Does your village land fall under the traditional leadership?

1. Yes 2. No

15. Which system of landholding do you prefer?

a. PTO
b. Land title
c. Traditional leadership

D. SOURCE OF INCOME

16. Do you have any source of income?

a. Yes b. No.

17. Which of the following is the source of income?

i. Public sector (govt. departments, parastatal, etc.)
ii. Private sector (firms, etc.)
iii. Self-employment (hawking, etc.)
iv. Social pensions
v. Any other_____

18. How often do you earn your income?

a. Weekly b. Monthly c. Quarterly

19. How much is your income?

a. below R500

b. R501 – R1000

c. R1001 – R1500

d. R1501 – R2000

e. R2001 – R2500

f. R2500 – R3000

g. R3000 – above

E. CROPPING, TECHNOLOGY AND INFRASTRUCTURE

20. Do you have a garden in your homestead?

a. Yes b. No

21. What crops do you grow in your garden?

i. Vegetables

ii. Fruit

iii. Mealies, pumpkins, etc.

iv. All

iv. Any other_____

22. What agricultural technology do you use in your garden?

a.	b.	c	d
fork	Ox-drawn plough	a & b	
spade			
rake			
watering can			
short-handled hoe			

23. Do you irrigate your garden?

a. Yes b. No

24. Where do you get the water from for irrigation purpose?

(i) piped domestic water

(ii) river

(iii) dam

(iv) windmill

25. How often do you plant crops in your garden?

a. b. c. d.

Once a year Twice a year Thrice a year Throughout the year

26. Which of the following do you apply to improve agricultural productivity?

1. 2 3

Fertilizer Kraal manure Both 1 & 2

27. Do you apply any pesticide/s, insecticide, etc.?

a. Yes b. No

F. SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE OR DIVERSIFIED AGRICULTURE

28. For what purpose do you produce crops?

a. Domestic consumption only

b. Cash economy only

c. Domestic consumption & cash economy

d. Any other_____

29. If you produce for cash economy, who are your customers?

i. Local villagers

ii. Outsiders

iii. Local villagers & outsiders

iv. Any other_____

30. State any suggestion /s to increase agricultural productivity?

_____

_____

_____

_____

G. ARABLE HOLDING

31. Do you access any parcel of arable land?

a. Yes b. No

32. Is it held or owned by you, or by family, or on loan?

a. b. c. d.

Mine family on loan N/A

32. What is the size of the agricultural land / field held or owned

_____hectares

33. What agricultural instruments do you use in your field?

a. Oxen-drawn plough
b. Tractor
c. Planter
d. Ox-drawn plough & planter
e. Tractor & planter
f. Ox-drawn plough, tractor, planter
g. Any other_____

34. Do you irrigate your agricultural allotment?

a. Yes b. No.

35. If yes, where do you get the irrigation water?

a. River b. Dam c. Windmill d. Borehole

36. If no, would you like to irrigate it?

a. Yes b. No

37. How often do you sow seed/s in your agricultural allotment?

a. Once a year
b. Twice a year
c. Thrice a year
d. Four times per year
e. Any other_____
f. N/A

38. Do you lease your agricultural allotment or portion thereof to somebody else for a mutually agreed period?

a. Yes b. No

39. Do you produce for domestic consumption or cash economy?

Choose
a. Domestic consumption
b. Cash economy
c. Domestic consumption & cash economy