

**Comparative media frames and their invoked
solutions of the 2021 attack on Palma, Cabo
Delgado**

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Abstract

This study examines the online media reporting of the violent attack that took place in Palma, Northern Mozambique, in March 2021. The study uses a qualitative inductive thematic analysis to identify the dominant and oppositional frames used in the published online articles of the United Kingdom's *The Guardian*, South Africa's *Daily Maverick* and Kenya's *Nation* newspapers, between 1st Jan 2021 and 31st Dec 2021. Furthermore, it seeks to identify what these frames in turn propose as responses to the conflict. The findings of this study point to a dominant frame that portrays these attacks as a 'terrorist' problem that warrants a military response. This frame, which is placed within the discourse of the US-led 'war on terrorism', obscures the local context of political struggles and grievances, such as government corruption, youth unemployment and neglect of the Cabo Delgado Province. This dominant frame is supplemented by an additional frame that views the discovery of natural gas as a resource curse and contributing factor to the conflict. There is also an oppositional frame that takes a broader view and advocates for a political and humanitarian response to try and address the root causes of the problem through development. Ultimately, the thesis illuminates the limitations of media framing in fostering a holistic understanding of the events unfolding in Cabo Delgado. The interplay of dominant and oppositional frames reveals the tension between maintaining established narratives and addressing the multifaceted realities of a changing conflict. While the oppositional frame "Cabo Esquecido" attempts to advocate for development and long-term solutions, it is often overshadowed and falls short of challenging the underlying assumptions of dominant frames in the reporting. This underscores the need for more critical, context-sensitive reporting that transcends entrenched narratives and paves the way for more comprehensive and sustainable responses to conflicts in the region and Africa as a whole. Thus, this study contributes to the understanding of conflicts and the world of media sensemaking.

Keywords:

African state, Cabo Delgado, terrorism, ASJW, media frames, conflict reporting

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Acronyms

ASWJ: Ahlu Sunna wa Jama (referring to a group in Cabo Delgado)

AU: African Union

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

CISLAMO: Islamic Council of Mozambique (Portuguese: Conselho Islamico de Moçambique)

CIP: Center for Public Integrity (Portuguese: Centro de Integridade Pública)

DAG: Dyck Advisory Group

DIN: Document Identification Number

DM: Daily Maverick

DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

EU: European Union

FRELIMO: Mozambique Liberation Front (Portuguese : Frente de Libertação de Moçambique)

IESE: Institute of Social and Economic Studies (Portuguese: Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos),

IR: International Relations

IS: Islamic State

ISCA or ISCAP: Islamic State Central Africa Province

ISS: Institute for Security Studies

LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas

NGOs: Non-Governmental Organisations

OMR: Rural Environment Study (Portuguese: Observatório do Meio Rural)

PIMO: Independent Party of Mozambique (Portuguese: Partido Independente de Moçambique)

RCD: Rally for Congolese Democracy

RENAMO: Mozambican National Resistance (Portuguese: Resistência Nacional Moçambicana)

SA: South Africa

SADC: Southern African Development Community

SAMIN: Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique.

SANDF: South African National Defence Force

SASOL: South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation (initially, South African Coal and Oil)

TA: Thematic Analysis

TG: The Guardian

UK: United Kingdom

UNITA: National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Portuguese: União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola)

USA: United States of America

Chapter One

Introduction: “Nauliza Kiswahili ni lugha ya watu gani”¹

1.1. Broader Indian Ocean history: An overview of place and time

The conflict in Cabo Delgado must be contextualised within the historical backdrop of the region. This is done in order to better understand and unpack the various identities that make up the area of study. Further, a brief consideration of regional history is fundamental for understanding the multicultural nature of the region and the frictions that might exist beneath the social topsoil. After this broader context is provided there is discussion on the contemporary conflict that is unfolding in Cabo Delgado, illuminating the current state of conflict that is under investigation. Importantly, following this there is a short explanatory note that clarifies terminology of names of actors in this conflict and finally the problem statement and aim of the study. Here the justification of the study is outlined along with the primary and secondary research questions.

When looking at conflicts in Africa, the longer (and more complex) pre-colonial history is neglected. To understand the history of the East African coastal region central to this investigation, it is useful to think in terms of time periodisations as employed by Gilbert (2002)². I make use of these time periodisation's and update them to help us to think through the changing situation in region and Mozambique. The first of these time periodisations would be 800–1500. In the 8th century Persian and Arab traders moved down the Somali coast bringing Islam with them. Then according to the Kilwa Chronical around 1000 seven sons of Sultan Shiraz settled in same area and established Afro-Shirazi polities (Morier-Genoud, 2024: 8; Pouwels, 2002: 397). In the 12th century there was an expansion down the coast with influential settlements in Mobasa and Kilwa but many smaller Sultantes and sheikdoms in Cabo Delgado and Nampula which led to settlements in places such as Tunge, Quissanga, Pemba, Memba, Angoche, Sangage, and Quitanhonga (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 8; Spear, 2002: 264). These cities promoted trade up and down the East African coast, fostering greater connection with the Arab and Indian worlds (Pouwels, 2002: 415). Evidence of the Islamic influence can be seen in the building of early mosques in this time period and the high percentage of Arabic loan words that exist in the Swahili language (Gilbert, 2002: 9;

¹ Swahili writer and poet Ahmod Bahlo. “Nauliza Kiswahili ni lugha ya watu gani” is a quote from his poem titled *Swahili*. It translates to, “I ask, for what sort of people is Swahili the language”. This is pertinent as it ascribes the complex nature of this region.

² Periodisations are grouping of important historical events in order to make sense of the passage of time and understand causality between events (Gilbert, 2002).

Chami, 1998: 200; Pouwels, 2002: 402). The end of the period is marked by the first appearance of European traders and colonisers in the region, with the arrival of Portuguese explorer Vasco Da Gama in 1497.

The second period in the region's history would be 1500–1750. Over this period, the European influence that started with the Portuguese (but was later supplanted by the Dutch, English and French) became entrenched (Pouwels, 2002: 418). This put immense pressure on these Afro-Shirazi polities, which was coupled with the expansion of the Zimba and Maravi empires (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 8). The Europeans competed with and displaced local traders trying to influence and control the coastal routes (Pouwels, 2002: 418; Alpers, 1976: 32). The third time period would be 1750–1850 and might well be termed the 'golden age' of integration of the region. As colonial powers found their stride, it led to huge increases in exploitation, but also trade (Gilbert, 2002: 17; Alpers, 1976: 34). Several large kingdoms thrived during this period, particularly in Madagascar and under the newly arrived Omani Sultans in Zanzibar (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 8). Slavery also reached its height, having a drastic effect on local demographics and culture. Simultaneously, this was the period in which the British sought to formally end the slave trade (Bhacker, 2002: 157).

The fourth time period would be 1850–1960. This period is one of transition and the beginning of a decline in strong regional identity. A major event during this period was the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 (Gilbert, 2002: 26), which facilitated trade directly between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and thus the coast of East Africa. This allowed for the thriving of the steam ship but reduced travel around the southern tip of Africa (Headrick, 1979: 234).

Importantly, the 1884–85 Berlin Conference forced Portugal to actively occupy claimed colonies, including northern Mozambique of importance is the Quionga Triangle up to the Rovuma River. To establish control, Portugal finalized borders with German East Africa via treaty. However, disputes with Zanzibar persisted, leading to a Portuguese ultimatum in February 1897 which led to war. Portugal won three battles, securing control up to the Rovuma River ending formal Zanzibari influence while informal trade and religious connections persisted (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 9).

This is a turning point for the formation of the modern Mozambican borders and state. One of the focuses of this thesis is formation the ‘African’ state and frames around its inability to ‘function’. It is important to pause and briefly discuss the Westphalian state system here. This system emerged from a European context where nations coalesced around singular identities and cultural ties with a growing need for a state apparatus to support their militaries (Schoeman, 1999: 242). The imposition of this state system formally occurred during the 1884 Berlin Conference across the African continent (Schoeman, 1999: 241). Across the continent, borders were drawn up arbitrarily to suit the whims and needs of European colonial conquest, individual rulers and corporations (Grovoqui, 2001: 35). There was absolutely no care or thought given to the geographic, ethnic, cultural, historical and linguistic differences that were encompassed in these borders (Schoeman, 1999: 241). As African states began to rapidly decolonise from 1960s onwards, local elites retained these arbitrary borders (Dunn, 2001: 15). These borders were then adopted wholesale at the 1964 Cairo Conference (Ajala, 1983: 186). This imposition – and then outward acceptance – of the state system led to states that were weak and divided, at least in the Weberian sense³, and embodied what is known as a “legitimacy deficit”. Understanding the formation of states within Africa is important to understand the contemporary situation in Mozambique.

This period is also when European colonisation reached its height and decolonisation began, starting as a stream and quickly turning into a torrent. The rise of the colonial administration and the somewhat stability it brought with it along with new infrastructure allowed for Sufi evangelists to expand their influence (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 10). As calls for independence rose much of the local elite including local sheiks were co-opted into the administration in an attempt thwart them joining any independent movements (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 23). This rise of African and Indian nationalism led to a fracturing of broader regional identity in the area of current day Mozambique, which occurred along emergent nationalist lines instead of regional ones. The introduction of air travel and increased containerisation was a further and somewhat counterintuitively a further disconnecting force for this greater regional identity (Gilbert, 2002: 30).

The fifth and final time period would be from 1960–up until the present moment. The early part of this period might best be categorised by the full disintegration of regional identity,

³ Max Weber (1948) viewed modern states as a community that had a legitimate monopoly on violence in a given geographic area.

driven by the factors mentioned above. A prime example of this disintegration can be located in the Zanzibar Revolution in 1964, when the Omani Sultans were overthrown and everything Arab was shunned (Speller, 2007: 284). A similar rupture in the social fabric occurred in many African States, where independence movements sought to forge new identities separate from older ones (Ghandi, 1998: 4). Within Mozambique initially in 1975 with the assumption of power by Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)'s policy was more an attack on religious power rather than religion practice itself. For instance it nationalise the property of all religious organisations the overwhelming proportion of which was in the hands of the Catholic Church (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 24). By 1977 took a far more aggressive stance and embarked on a "secular war" to replace religion with Marxism, materialism and atheism (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 24). This policy was more harshly instituted against Muslims due to much of the FRELIMO leadership being Christian. These policies led to revolts in the Cabo Delgado province and generally a harsher push back from religious leaders and institutions. Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) which was established in 1976 took advantage of this and often would condemn the attacks on Islam and even sought funding from gulf countries (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 24).

However, in more recent times there has been a re-discovery and celebration of regional identity, as well as an increased academic interest in studying it (Gilbert, 2011: 75; Bissell, 2007: 183). While the multicultural nature of Mozambique's past has left a patchwork of different identities, certain cultural symbols such as the *dhow* sailing boat have emerged within the region (Gilbert, 2011: 78). Specifically in Cabo Delgado this broader regionalism is also mixed with the a sense of neglect by the central government while there is a sharp resurgence of the need to protect the Islamic traditions brought through the Swahili coast trading system (Estelle, 2021: 8; Azani, 2020: 7).

Though admittedly condensed, the presentation of time periodisations for the region surrounding northern Mozambique is helpful when considering the tides of change that have swept through the area over the last thousand-plus years. This historical perspective provides a way to think about and contextualise the present moment and place it in the longer story of the region. Furthermore, this history is important for understanding the recent events that took place in the town of Palma, Cabo Delgado, and allows one to look beyond the confines of a narrow analytical lens. It is true that some events seem to fall outside of the timeframe that best describes them. However, the broader themes are always present.

1.2. Politicisation of Islam in Mozambique

Between 1975 and 2000, the public position of Islam in Mozambique experienced significant shifts. Initially, following independence in 1975 and up to 1979, the state marginalized and opposed Islamic faith and its organizations. However, by the early 2000s, Islam had gained a more prominent and influential role in public life, representing at least 20% of the population. This was a marked departure from the marginal status Islam had throughout most of the 20th century (Estelle, 2021: 8; Azani, 2020: 8).

The transformation began in 1980 when FRELIMO abandoned its anticlerical stance, allowing Muslims to reclaim social and political activism. This was facilitated by the creation of organizations such as the Islamic Council of Mozambique (CISLAMO) and the Islamic Congress, backed by foreign governments and international Islamic bodies, with the Mozambican government's tacit support (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 43). The liberalization of religious policies in 1989, when FRELIMO adopted a free-market approach to religious regulation, further enhanced the visibility and activism of Muslims. The first multiparty elections in 1994 provided Muslims with political representation, enabling them to advocate for policies that reflected their beliefs, such as the recognition of Muslim holidays (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 43).

The factors driving this shift were multifaceted. Internally, FRELIMO's initial repression alienated Muslims, pushing some within Mozambique and in the international sphere to oppose the government, especially amid the ongoing civil war (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 43). This pressure led to a relaxation of FRELIMO's religious policies. Another reason was the government's limited understanding of Islam, which led to policy missteps causing further tensions and by the late 1980s, officials openly admitted to the failure of these policies.

Additionally, internal developments within Mozambican Islam, including the rise of reformist movements like Deobandism and Wahhabism, spurred political activism. Organizations such as CISLAMO and the Islamic Congress, despite their differences, worked effectively to engage with the government (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 43). FRELIMO's shift away from Marxism in 1989 also allowed for the inclusion of assertive Muslims in its ranks, amplifying their political influence. External support from global Islamic organizations provided financial and diplomatic backing, applying pressure on the government to respond favorably to Muslim communities (Estelle, 2021: 8).

By the late 1990s, Wahhabism gained traction, especially as Mozambican students who studied abroad returned to support CISLAMO. New reformist movements emerged, like Ansar al-Sunna, contributing to the diversification of Islamic activism. Meanwhile, Sufi elements organized under the Islamic Congress and related associations, balancing the influence of reformist groups (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 43).

Political militancy among Muslims emerged, with leaders demanding recognition of Eid festivals and contesting family law proposals (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 45). Although these efforts faced resistance, they reflected an enduring political consciousness. The establishment of PIMO (Independent Party of Mozambique), the first Muslim political party, demonstrated political aspirations, though its failure in the 1994 elections led Muslims to collaborate with dominant political parties instead. Despite internal divisions within the Muslim community, by the end of the 1990s, Islam had established itself as an important socio-political force, with ongoing efforts to navigate Mozambique's predominantly Christian postcolonial state (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 45).

1.3. Contemporary Palma: Dislocation, identity and the politics of Islam

The focus region of this study is Cabo Delgado, the northernmost province of Mozambique, and specifically the town of Palma. It is the only province with a majority Muslim (52%) population followed by Catholic (36%) according to the 2017 census (Estelle, 2021: 6). The region is ethnically and linguistically diverse. Many people speak Makonde in the districts of Nangade and Muidumbe and the town of Muede, whereas Makuhwa is most commonly spoken in Palma and other southern areas (Estelle, 2021: 6). The coastal areas in between speak largely Mwani, with both Makuhwa and Mwani mostly spoken in Muslim-majority areas.

Since the country's independence there has been an increasing economic dislocation in the Cabo Delgado, with multiple cases of foreign companies disrupting local industries. This feeling of 'neglect' led to the formation of Salafi movements that became increasingly violent and separatist in their nature. (Estelle, 2021: 8; Azani, 2020: 7). Beyond the economic situation the formation of originally peaceful Salafi movements had its roots in the growing divisions within the broader Muslim community. One contributing factor to those divisions was the adoption of Wahhabi religious education introduced in the early 1990s. Followers of the Wahhabi system found CISLAMO to be too close to the government creating further

ruptures (Estelle, 2021: 8). These more conservative Muslims began keeping their children out of government schools and challenged local Imams. The rupture lines between local Muslims and the Salafi movement was further influenced by cross border relations with Tanzania. This was due to followers of the Kenyan cleric Abud Rogo Mohammed, who was killed in 2012, moving southwards further radicalising the region (Estelle, 2021: 8; Azani, 2020: 8).

By 2015, the now Salafi-jihadi movement members were expelled from mosques, which was in turn followed by harsh police crackdowns in 2016. In 2017 the armed insurgency began in earnest with an group retaliated with an attack on a police station in Mocímboa da Praia to free their members and steal weapons (Estelle, 2021: 9; Morier-Genouf, 2024: 117). With increasingly harsh repression and the closing of mosques, the movement became more radicalised and militarised while being driven underground (Estelle, 2021: 8; Azani, 2020: 8).

By 2018, the Salafi-jihadi movement began to use beheadings and target civilians, and in July 2019 they formally aligned themselves with IS (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 117). News coverage of the group drastically increased after that (Estelle, 2021: 10). Their attacks grew and in 2020 they held the port of Mocímboa da Praia, which was used as a base to launch attacks—their first one into Tanzania occurring in October 2020, with the insurgency continuing into 2021. These attacks culminated with the attack on Palma in March 2021. This insurgency caused mass internal displacements, with most estimates describing 500,000–700,000 displaced people in Cabo Delgado alone (Estelle, 2021: 10; Azani, 2020: 8).

The assault on Palma on March 24th, 2021, marked a significant event in the ongoing crisis in Northern Mozambique, as armed insurgents targeted the town, garnering extensive coverage from local and international media outlets. This attack brought renewed attention to the region's unfolding crises, particularly in light of Palma's proximity to the newly discovered Afungi gas fields, which had attracted substantial investment from multinational corporations like Total (Estelle, 2021: 7).

This attack, at this particular juncture is an excellent example of two competing ideas about the origins of the insurgency. One of the dimensions debate argues that the insurgency is really, at its core, about the continued marginalisation and economic neglect of the region particularly the youth. Religion is used more as a 'cloak' or 'rallying cry' to for these

grievances. Authors such as Hanlon (2022)⁴, Estelle (2021), Mutasa and Muchemwa (2002) and Ntaka (2023) point to the discovery of natural gas and other natural resources as creating vast unmet expectations that serve to exacerbate these challenges. Morier-Genouf (2024: 17) on the other hand points out authors such as Habibe, Forqiulha and Pereira point to Islam as the central factor behind this insurgency. In particular they argue that many young Muslims have undergone a process of radicalisation that is responsible for increasing violence been radicalised.

The second dimension tries to uncover the extent of the external influences on the insurgency. As we have seen some argue it's due to internal factors such as poverty while others point a strong external influence. There are those such as the International Crises group (2018), West (2018), Pirio et al, (2018) Matsinhe and Valoi (2019), and Beevor (2020) who point to the influence of Kenyan Militants, fleeing Southward after heavy repression form Tanzanian authorities. Of course as the insurgency changes so do the influences and Bonate (2018) points to the need to keep this in mind.

The ensuing chaos resulted in the evacuation of both the gas fields and the town itself, as thousands of individuals fled the violence. Of paramount concern to both the media and government was the apparent affiliation of the assailants with the Islamic State (IS), raising apprehensions about the destabilization and radicalization of the broader region (Estelle, 2021). Importantly, understanding the conflict through a solely ethnic lens overlooks its socio-economic underpinnings. While the Mwani community has historically faced neglect from the central government, their role as custodians of Islamic traditions along the Swahili coast is significant, emphasizing the need for a multifaceted analysis of the crisis (Estelle, 2021; 8; Azani, 2020: 10).

1.4. Terminology of names

Lastly, for context, some terminology associated with the insurgency needs to be explained. The Salafi-jihadi group mentioned above has become known as Al-Shabaab ('the youth') locally, but should not be confused with the Al-Shabaab organisation based in Somalia.

IS refers to the Mozambique group as Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCA or ISCAP), but the group is also widely known as *Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama'a* or 'the People of

⁴ Hanlop (2022) specifically uses the theory of Resource Curse to analyse the origin of the insurgency.

the Sunnah and the Community' (ASWJ).⁵ Indeed, seeing as ASWJ is how the Salafijihadists refer to themselves, this is how they will be referred to in the remainder of this thesis.

1.5. Problem Statement and aim of the study

The conflict in Northern Mozambique, particularly the 2021 attack on Palma, attracted intense media attention, yet remains insufficiently examined in terms of the media framing of the events that unfolded. While there is extensive literature examining how Global North media reports on African conflicts in general, there is a significant gap in studies analysing how Global South media, especially African media, frames conflicts within the continent (Mushwana, 2014; Ileri, 2013; Nothias, 2019; Wahutu, 2018; Schraeder, 1998). This points to a secondary gap that in research being scarce analysis done on how both Global North and Global South media view conflicts in Africa.

In an ideal decolonised academic landscape, the focus would naturally extend to how media from the Global South portrays issues affecting the region (Entman, 2007; Carruthers, 2011). Instead, research remains disproportionately centered on American and British media narratives about Africa, often skewed toward themes of violence, conflict, and instability (Entman, 2007; Chong, 2007; Njogu, 2009; Lawlor, 2017; Savelsberg, 2015; Waisbord, 2015; Carruthers, 2011; Seaton, Allen, 1999). This phenomenon has been termed the “CNN Effect.” (Gilboa, 2009; Robinson, 2011; Coban, 2016; Hawkins, 2011). This framing neglects broader socio-political and economic contexts, reducing complex situations to simplistic narratives (Bunce, 2017; Adams, 1986; Gilboa, 2009).

This study aims to address this gap by analysing how South Africa's *Daily Maverick* (DM), the UK's *The Guardian* (TG), and Kenya's *Nation* framed the Palma attack in 2021. Firstly, this refocuses attention on how Global South media outlets report on conflict within Africa. Secondly, this offers a unique comparison between Global South and Global North media sources. Given the minimal scholarly exploration of Mozambique's conflict in Cabo Delgado in this area of research, which at the start of this study was none, this study contributes impactfully to the literature around this specific conflict. By focusing in on coverage of the 2021 attack on Palma, this research aims to deconstruct the framing behind media coverage of this conflicts and challenge existing norms that prioritize Western media perspectives,

⁵ Somewhat confusingly, this same designation is also used by other groups – particularly Sunni Muslim groups – to describe a variety of formations, including some paramilitary groups in places like Somalia (Estelle, 2021: 5; Azani, 2020: 7).

thereby contributing to a more balanced and critical understanding of media's role in conflict reporting within Africa.

The study employs qualitative thematic analysis (TA) of identified newspaper reporting on the 2021 Palma Attack to answer the primary and secondary research questions below:

Primary research question: *What are the media frame/s of the attack on 2021 Palma, Cabo Delgado?*

Secondary research question: *What, in turn, do these frames produce as 'solutions' to the conflict?*

1.6. Thesis outline

This mini thesis is divided up into six chapters. This introductory chapter has sought to contextualise the study by setting out a broader history through the use of time periodisation of the region. This was done to help describe the deeply layered tapestry of influences in the region, where past, present, culture and religion all intertwine, and to move beyond the idea that there is a 'single story' that describes the situation happening there today. It has also provided a brief discussion on the contemporary dynamics at play in the region highlighting the ongoing conflict with a sharper focus on the politics of Islam in the region. It has also discussed the different names given to the insurgency in the region.

The second chapter focuses on the methodology used. This goes into detail on inductive coding that was used to collect the data, and how it was analysed through the use of inductive thematic qualitative coding to answer the identified primary and secondary research questions.

The third chapter is a comprehensive literature review that flows from the inductive methodological approach adopted in this thesis. It firstly unpacks Framing Theory followed by a meditation on the role of online and social media space on reporting on conflict. From this point there is a discussion that seeks to problematise the nature of the 'African state' by tracing discussions and theories about this notion, before going on to discuss the changing nature of conflict on the continent. Following on from this the chapter moves to dissect literature on terrorism and finally ends off with a number of common theories that attempt to explain what drives conflict on the continent.

The fourth chapter provides the main findings of the thesis derived from the qualitative inductive Thematic Analysis. This chapter breaks down the various findings and elaborates on the main themes that were identified in the newspaper reports cited in this study. Importantly, this chapter finishes off with an answer to the research questions identifying the frames present in the reporting and their invoked solutions, as set out in Chapter One.

Chapter Five seeks to unpack and interrogate the findings of the thesis in more detail. This chapter examines specifically the framing of the conflict versus the oppositional framing using the established literature to surface these. In particular, the chapter illuminates the staying power of the word ‘terrorist’ and the way it is employed by mainstream media to help build and sustain the narrative frames of the conflict.

The final chapter provides the conclusion to this thesis.

Chapter Two

Methodology

This chapter will outline the methodological approach of this study. In particular it highlights the integral part that Thematic Analysis plays in qualitative research, explaining the bottom up inductive approach used and why this was an appropriate method for this study. Firstly, this chapter will look at the scope of data collected, providing a brief description of the three newspapers that were used in the corpus. These papers are the South African DM, the UK's TG, and Kenya's *Nation*. This is followed by an explanation of the Qualitative Inductive Thematic Analysis method outlining how in turn this method of research is well suited for the construction of main themes which are the foundation of the dominant, additional and oppositional frames of this conflict as discussed in the findings. Lastly, this Chapter will transparently detail the step-by-step application of this method in collating and dissecting the data with results presented in Table 1.1 Document Organisation, Table 1.2 Final Tallies, Table 2.1 Coding Tree for the *Daily Maverick*, Table 2.2 Coding Tree for *The Guardian* and Table 2.3 Coding Tree for *Nation* in the appendices.

2.1. Selection of data set

In order to answer the research questions posed in the previous Chapter, a selection of 'print' online broad sheet newspapers media from 1st January 2021 until 31st December 2021 were analysed.⁶ Broadsheets are typically seen as less biased and less sensationalized, striving to report the facts of events (Connell, 1998). The choice of a broadsheet newspaper for this study is based on two key factors: the general reliability associated with broadsheets, and the perception that, despite inherent media bias, broadsheets are among the least biased sources. The year 2021 was chosen as it marked the attack on Palma (24th March 2021) with a subsequent increase in media coverage as well as activity on the ground. Articles were sourced by searching the respective newspapers' online databases using the following terms: "Cabo Delgado 2021" and "Palma 2021". In order to gain a chronological understanding, each search had the month added. Words such as 'terrorist', 'violence', 'conflict', 'attack', 'insurgency' and 'radical Islam' were purposefully omitted from the search in an effort to avoid skewed results and in order to gain the largest scope of reporting.

⁶ 'print' is placed in a single quotation mark because all newspaper articles used are found online.

The selection of three specific newspapers used an overarching framework. They needed to have a high readership reach, be geographically diverse, not be state run and have ease of access to their online archives. As a researcher a further constraint was the fact that I only speak English as such the newspaper had to have an English addition. It was important to analyse a year's worth of reporting to gain a broad perspective on how and if reporting on the issue changed over time. The more in-depth reporting that occurred after the initial attack was particularly instructive, as this often consisted of think pieces and deeper analysis, which is where key frames of the conflict emerged and solidified, and 'solutions' were offered and interrogated. Gerber *et al* (2009) notes that even a cursory exposure to newspapers can influence public opinion on a topic.

The DM, which was the first newspaper analysed, started as a free online newspaper founded in South Africa in 2009. Now it has a weekly print as well. It has over 14.4 million unique website visits a month, more than 1 million registered users and a weekly newsletter with 700 000 subscribers (Daily Maverick, 2024). It counts itself as an independent newspaper with no affiliations to political parties, larger news organisations or religious groups. It is funded through a combination of philanthropy, commercial and voluntary reader support, all of which is carefully detailed on its website (Daily Maverick Website "About us"). This newspaper was selected for its broad readership, the proximity of South Africa to the unfolding conflict and the accessibility of its online archives.

By contrast the second newspaper analysed, the UK's TG was founded in 1821, and openly accepts that it defends liberal values and is designated as a newspaper of record in the UK (Frost et al., 2017: 27). It is also free to access online with roughly 1 million online subscribers, but allows members to donate voluntarily (Guardian Press Release, 2022). TG has been cited as one of the most trustworthy newspapers globally, with a broad international readership (Duffy & Rowden, 2005). This newspaper was similarly selected for its broad readership, that it often reflects a more Western liberal viewpoint and the ease of accessing its online archives.

The third newspaper *Nation*, was founded in 1958 as the Swahili weekly Taifa. It was later acquired by Nation Media Group in 1959. Its daily newspaper holds a significant market share, with about 47% readership among newspaper consumers in Kenya (Answer Africa, 2024). Known for its independence, *Nation* has expanded into the Great Lakes region, with an estimated 3 million daily online portal users, encompassing both Kenyan and Ugandan

editions (Nation, 2020). Like the other two newspapers in this dataset, *Nation* (Kenyan Edition) was chosen for analysis due to its high readership and the relative ease of accessing its online archives.

These three newspapers provide a broad perspective on reporting, offering key insights into the formation of conflict frames. The DM can be seen as a frontline newspaper due to South Africa's proximity to Mozambique. TG offers insight into a more traditional Western liberal media ecosystem, while *Nation* is situated in a region with a long history of dealing with active "terrorism", "insurgency", "Jihadism" and "Islamism".

2.2. Qualitative Inductive Thematic Analysis

This research was conducted using an inductive qualitative method called Thematic Analysis (TA). Qualitative research is, at its core, primarily concerned with what other humans are doing (Schwandt, 2000: 200). This is different from quantitative research, which relies on mathematical precision in predicting and controlling natural phenomena (Guba & Lincoln, 2000: 106). Qualitative research allows for the exploration and understanding of meanings behind people's actions (Guba and Lincoln, 2000: 106).

Identifying themes and analysing them is important for all types of qualitative research. Sandelowski (2012:1407) elaborates: "...we could not think of any qualitative method that does not inherently entail thematic analysis—or the search for something recurrent in a data set—and thematic synthesis, or the integration of data segments into some unifying idea." Linking the importance of TA to the rest of qualitative research, Sandelowski (2012: 1407) goes on to comment that, "Grounded theories, ethnographies, phenomenological descriptions, and the results of narrative/discourse studies are composed of thematic syntheses of data...in the forms of hypotheses, conceptual models, narratives, arguments, and other such modes of presentation." This underlines the integral part that TA plays in qualitative research.

This view is buttressed by Braun and Clarke, who elaborate on the method:

TA is a method for systematically identifying, organising, and offering insight into patterns of meaning (themes) across a data set. By focusing on meaning across a data set, TA allows the researcher to see and make sense of collective or shared meanings and experiences (2012: 58).

This method is well suited to answer the research questions posed in this study and is highly flexible in its approach to working with varied sets of data. It was been used in numerous

studies that share the same methodological approach such as Cain, Donaghue, and Ditchburn, (2016) who conducted a thematic analysis of “obesity” and fat discourse in digital news media, generating their their data set from online news sources such as Huffington Post, BuzzFeed and Daily Life (Cain et al, 2016: 173). Another example is the work of Uwlaka (2021) which did a thematic analysis of the 2021 #EndSARSMemorial protests in Nigeria. A recent study by Katerynych (2023) investigates Belarusian state Telegram channels and the way in which they communicate on the Russo-Ukrainian War. These three examples are by no means an exhaustive list but demonstrate the versatile use of Thematic Analysis but and show briefly the broad and varied application of this method in qualitative research.

One of the advantages of TA is that it allows for the creation of codes that can be grouped into categories and built up into themes. A code is “a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data” (Saldana, 2021: 6). These themes can then be coded into dominant and oppositional frames using framing theory (which will be explained in Chapter Three). Once a corpus of data has been established, coding can begin.

2.2.1. Coding Process

To begin the coding process in this investigation, it was first necessary to collect and collate the relevant news clippings. This was done using identical search terms for the three newspapers to explore their online archives.⁷ Once the articles were collected and saved using the desktop application *Evernote*, they were assigned a Document Identification Number (DIN). From here they were transcribed into the Document Organisation Table (See Table 1.1 in appendices). The clippings were then excluded or included in the study based on whether they fit the appropriate time period, had relevant content (or at least not wildly irrelevant content, such as reporting on Ugandan gas fields, for instance), and whether or not they were reprints from other news organisations, such Reuters (Grant, 2018: 49). Following this, they were ‘scrubbed’ of unnecessary information such as advertisements, external links and photos thus leaving a ‘clean’ text version. The next phase was to subject these articles to the coding process.

⁷ As an aside, it should be noted that in this style of research there is room to do a separate analysis of the types of images that are used and what these images present to the world, but this was unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper.

Sample of Table 1.1 Document Organisation Daily Maverick

DIN	Publication	Date	Title	Author; Category	Article	Duplicate	Exclude for other reason	Include
DM 7	Daily Maverick	2 Mar 2021	SA company to investigate after Amnesty says it shot at civilians in Mozam	Reuters Newsdesk		YES	Not an original DM article	NO
DM 8	Daily Maverick	4 Mar 2021	Africa can learn Maritime security lessons from its small Island states	Richard Chelin and Denys Reva ISS Today		NO	Not relevant	NO
DM 9	Daily Maverick	16 Mar 2021	Mozam militants beheading children as young as 11, Save the Children says	Reuters Newsdesk		NO	Not an original DM article	NO
DM 10	Daily Maverick	17 Mar 2021	US military joins the fight against Isis in Mozambique	Peter Fabricius		NO	NO	YES

In this study, three main forms of inductive coding were used to ‘open up’ the data. The first form was *pre-coding*, which is just an initial reading of the data to pick up anything that is of interest (Saldaña: 2021: 59). Secondly, a focused *Invivo coding* took place, which focused on word/s or phrases from the language found in the data set. This is, "the terms used by [participants] themselves" (Strauss, 1987: 33 in Saldaña, 2021: 91). In this case the ‘participants’ are the journalist writing these articles. The last type of coding used was *emotion coding*, which was used to identify the emotions recalled and/or experienced in the given data source (Saldaña, 2021: 105). These three cycles of coding produced a comprehensive coded dataset that could then be organised into categories (second cycle coding). Categories are formed based on similarity, so that meaning could be consolidated (Saldaña, 2021: 13). These categories were, in turn, grouped into themes, closely following Saldaña's example (2021: 18).⁸

It is critical to note that themes do not “emerge” but are actively created by the researcher. This is done by shaping and grouping codes in a replicable way (Braune & Clarke, 2012: 63). Once the themes were established from categories, the final step was the construction of dominant and oppositional frames. Each theme could then be interrogated for dominant and oppositional frames using framing theory, allowing for proper analysis and discussion.

⁸ This process was completed for Daily Maverick Table 2.1 The Guardian Table 2.2 and Nation Table 2.3 see appendices

Sample of Table 2.1 Coding Tree for the Daily Maverick

First Cycle Codes	Second Order Categories	Dominant Themes in Reporting
1. Total		
2. Ravuma gas fields (sea)		
3. Afungi site LNG (land)		
4. CD is Mozam’s poorest province (location of project)	1. Who, where, cost	The conflict in relation to resources especially natural gas
5. \$60 billion investment		
6. Entire gas fields controlled by three companies: Exxon Mobil(USA), Eni(Italy), Total(France). Only Total has committed to developing any of the field.	2. Monopoly of resources	
7. Expected production is down from 100mt/y to 16m/ty before attack		
8. Many people signed eviction without knowing what they were signing		
9. Businesses have a duty not to harm people	3. How access was gained	
10. Conned into signing documents many people could not read		

2.2.2. The complete data set

The final data sets can be seen in Table 1.2. This comprehensive dataset consisted of 78 collected articles for DM, of which 54 made up the final sample set. After being thematically coded, these articles produced 169 codes. These codes were further grouped into 23 second order categories (second cycle codes) and, finally, those categories were grouped to form four main themes. TG underwent the identical process, resulting in 24 articles being collected with a final smaller sample size of 15. This resulted in 88 codes, which were then grouped into second order categories, resulting in a total of 13 categories. These categories were then also further refined into four dominant themes. Lastly, *Nation* underwent the identical process. This in turn resulted in 50 collected articles and a slightly larger final data set of 32. From this data set there are a total of 111 codes, which were grouped into 17 second order categories. From these categories four themes were constructed.

Sample of Table 1.2: Final Tallies

Source	Number of Articles downloaded	Number of Duplicates	Number of externally copied articles	Excluded for other reason	DINs of final Sample	Final Sample
Daily Maverick	78	0	7	17	DM1-5; DM10-14; DM16-16; DM28-34; DM36-40; DM42; DM44-45; DM47-48; DM50-53; DM55; DM58; DM60; DM62;	54

					DM64-65; DM67; DM70; DM73-74; DM76; DM78.	
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The methodology has been documented to ensure full transparency in the conduct of this study. This clarity not only reinforces the study’s credibility but also serves as a comprehensive guide for future researchers who may wish to build on or incorporate these findings from this study and the methodology used therein for future work.

2.3. Limitations of the study

In any study of discourse, it is crucial for researchers to situate themselves within the research. I approach this topic without an Islamic background, nor do I have proficiency in Arabic, Swahili, or Portuguese. Proficiency in these languages would likely have provide deeper insights into local and cultural nuances and unlocked more avenues for primary research. My interest in the Swahili coastal trade networks emerged from a history honours course that examined the regionalism of the Indian Ocean basin, which introduced me to the complexities of East African histories and cultural exchanges. As I progressed into my master’s studies, I began to notice news stories on the conflict in Northern Mozambique. My curiosity intensified following the attack on Palma, which spurred an unusual surge in media coverage around this particular event.

I often questioned why Palma became such a focal point for media, while the larger conflict, ongoing since 2017, had previously received comparatively less attention. Naturally, I began to scrutinize the media I regularly consume, which is largely English-language and online. Media coverage on conflicts often portrays terms like “Jihadism” and “Islamism,” “terrorism” and “insurgency” in broad strokes, with little nuance beyond the bold, dramatic headlines. These portrayals build powerful frames of conflict that shape public perceptions about regions like Northern Mozambique. This study, therefore, is an effort to examine and deconstruct these frames to pull back the curtain and question the layers behind the narratives presented to us.

The data set is restricted to articles from DM, TG, and Nation. These sources provide a valuable geographic and editorial spread that ranges from ‘frontline’ proximity (South Africa) to a Western liberal viewpoint (UK) and a perspective from within an African country frequently affected by ‘terrorism’ (Kenya). Due to the language barrier naturally, none of these newspapers are from Mozambique or Portuguese-language media such as *Carta de*

Moçambique, *Canal de Moçambique*, and *Savana*. The absence of Portuguese sources, despite Portuguese being the official language in Mozambique, limits the study's ability to directly analyse local narratives or perspectives on the conflict. This is not to say there is not in depth analysis on the conflict dynamics in Cabo Delgado from sources such as *Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos* (IESE), *Observatório do Meio Rural* (OMR) and *Centro de Integridade Pública* (CIP). In recognition of these constraints careful effort has been made to compensate for this limitation with extensive engagement with secondary literature, particularly works by scholars such as Morier-Genoud (2024) who have conducted in-depth research in the region.

In addition, the original scope of this study aimed to include reporting from *The New York Times*, *Al Jazeera*, and potentially Rwandan and Tanzanian media sources. Evidently, this was not done as exclusions were necessary to maintain a manageable and coherent focus of the study. Yet they represent a limitation in terms of the diversity of international perspectives and state media versus free media in on the conflict that might otherwise have enriched the analysis.

Firstly, Rwanda is a significant actor in the conflict sending extensive contingents of police and other security forces, making it a potentially valuable perspective. However, due to the state-controlled nature of Rwandan media and a lack of in-depth reporting on the conflict identified in a preliminary search, Rwandan sources such as *The New Times* were ultimately excluded.

Secondly, Tanzania, due to the fact that it borders the Cabo Delgado Province and has close links to the region was also a candidate. However due to the limited number of online, non-government controlled newspapers publications like *The Daily News* were excluded.

Thirdly, *The New York Times* was also initially considered to expand the range of perspectives. However, *The New York Times* was excluded as it generally shares a similar editorial stance with TG, which already provides a Western liberal perspective. Including both would have introduced redundancy in terms of editorial viewpoint and not added much value in terms of the ultimate goal of the study which identifies key frames and invoked solutions therein.

Lastly, *Al Jazeera* was also excluded to maintain a more focused scope on African media sources. The inclusion of *Al Jazeera* would have broadened the study's scope considerably, potentially making the analysis overly expansive and detracting from a concentrated examination of African media perspectives. Notwithstanding there is already quite extensive research that has been conducted on both *Al Jazeera* (Campbell and Hawk, 2012; Fahmy and Al Emad, 2011) and the *New York Times* (Kothari, 2010; Ha, 2017). As such in terms of value proposition it made more sense to focus this study on newspapers that are under researched thus making a more meaningful expansion and contribution to the field.

This study focused on text through the use of thematic inductive coding, no reference is made to the use of specific images. However, in the course of the study I realised that there are a large majority the articles that often have some form of provocative imagery accompanying them. It should be noted that this could prove a fruitful additional layer of analysis in the way that newspapers report on this conflict. This study could be used as a comparative study with the images to see if the findings are comparable.

Despite these adjustments and outlined limitations, the selected sources of DM, TG and *Nation* still provide a wide geographic and editorial spread while maintaining the study's focus on under-researched African media framing.

2.4. Conclusion

The use of Inductive Thematic Inductive Coding as outlined in this chapter has been instrumental in systematically constructing themes that in turn will allow for the answering of the primary and second research question. By meticulously coding and categorizing data from three carefully selected broadsheet newspapers, this study not only highlights the diversity of perspectives but also ensures that the resulting frames are grounded in a thorough methodical analysis. The choice of newspapers that deliberately span different geographies and editorial stances was aimed at providing a comprehensive answer to the research questions posed. This approach allows for a robust understanding of how media frames are constructed, offering valuable insights into the role of journalism in influencing public perception and discourse on the conflict. The next Chapter will be a discussion on the literature that flows from this methodological approach and will provide a strong theoretical basis from which to dissect the findings in this thesis.

Chapter Three

Literature Review: Framing of changing African conflicts: Locating crises in Cabo Delgado

3.1. Conflict on *Cabo Esquecido*⁹

It is important to preface this chapter with a short explanation of the underpinnings of its structure. As outlined in the methodology chapter this thesis took an inductive qualitative approach, and as such, the literature flows from the data. This was a carefully made choice as not to be too prescriptive in trying to “find” data that matched existing literature. The literature is grouped into four broad areas that assist in the analysis of the findings in the following chapter. Firstly, there is an explanation on Framing Theory which is a key component of this thesis. Secondly, a discussion of the evolving media ecosystem and, more specifically, ideas on conflict reporting in media. This is important to note as newspapers analysed operate and compete in this fluid and dynamic online/social media space. Thirdly, there are a series of important elaborations on concepts that help to make sense of the data. Necessarily there is brief interrogation of the idea of the ‘African state’ and how such states are often classified as ‘failed’. This followed by contemplations on the changing nature of terrorism. This concept is central to dominant frames of this conflict which will be elaborated on in the next chapters. Lastly, there is an examination and the theories of conflict in Africa that will help in analysing the frames and their invoked solutions.

This literature situates the reporting on the conflict unfolding in Cabo Delgado in broader discussions on the nature of the African State, conversations on the role of ‘terrorism’ and broader conflict in Africa. Informed by the methodological approach, this literature allows for a deep interrogation of the findings that follow this chapter.

3.2. Framing Theory – Making sense of the world

Druckman and Chong (2007: 104) refer to framing as “the process by which people develop a particular conceptualisation of an issue or reorient their thinking”. Similarly, according to Reese (2001: 7), framing can be defined as, “[The] way events and issues are organised and made sense of, especially by media, media professionals and their audiences”. This simply points to a fact that all media is invested in framing every issue they cover.

⁹ *Cabo Esquecido* is another name for Cabo Delgado used by locals. It translates to Forgotten Cape and denotes the neglect the region faces.

Frames by their nature sometimes contain an unconscious element and bias to them. This can influence both dominant and oppositional frames. Entman (1993:53) elaborates, "schemata and closely related concepts such as categories, scripts, or stereotypes connote mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals' processing of information". It is important to understand this is what makes frames sometimes hard to identify due to the way they are often accepted by our own bias. Furthermore frames, "highlight some bits of information about an item that is the subject of a communication, thereby elevating them in salience" (Entman, 1993: 53). Thus, when trying to identifying frames, it is essential to look at what is highlighted and what is not in equal measure. Heeding this warning special effort was taken to identify both dominant and oppositional frames in order to guard against this bias.

Frames that succeed in becoming dominant will often pass themselves off as a type of common sense, mainstream or as widely accepted fact and framing analysis is thus a vital tool for interrogating the construction of these taken-for-granted common-sense understandings (Tucker, 1998). Frames are also necessarily political in that they are "connected to asymmetric interests" (Reese, 2001: 12; see also Butler, 2009). As such it is also important to elaborate not only on theories of media conflict reporting but broader discussions on how we understand conflict in general.

Lastly, it is essential to note that "frames in the communications of elites (e.g., politicians, media outlets, interest groups) in turn influence citizens' frames and attitudes" (Druckman, 2007: 109). This shows their deep prevalence and inescapability within all types of media as well as the real world affects that frames have on the general public.

There has been wide and varied research done using framing theory such as on conflicts in the case of the Ukraine Conflict (Katerynych, 2023) Arab Spring (Hoyle, 2016; Ha, 2017), or Darfur crises (Kothari, 2010). Specific events such as the the 2021 *#EndSARSMemorial* in Nigeria (Uwalaka, 2021), Clothing campaigns (Tucker, 1998), or even the portrayal of refugees (Lawlor, 2017), and end "Fatness" in media (Vincent, 2016). This shows the versatility and usability of this type of theoretical framework as well as the important it has in understanding the way in which the media affects our understanding of the world around us.

3.3. What's in a story? Media reporting on conflict in a tumultuous online space

When examining the mainstream media's reporting on conflict, two main forms of conflict appear to capture its attention. The first is inter-state conflict, which involves conflicts between different countries, and has been extensively studied by scholars such as Bennett (2008), Entman (2007), Robinson (2011), and Hallin (1986). The second form of conflict is intra-state, which refers to internal conflicts or crises, like civil wars, natural disasters, and humanitarian disasters. The presence of international agencies often increases media interest in these situations, and researchers such as Kothari (2010), Hammond (2018), and Carruthers (2004) have explored this area of research. This intense focus on conflict, to the exclusion of other socio-economic or political contexts, is known as the "CNN Effect" (Gilboa, 2016; Robinson, 2011; Hawkins, 2011). Media coverage can be driven by that which is sensational because that is what attracts viewers consequently; media coverage tends to prioritise violence, crises, and destruction while neglecting other aspects of conflicts (Adams, 1986). This in turn has a strong effect on the composition of frames present in media reporting.

The media, particularly in the West, has a disproportionate role in shaping the coverage and public response to global events, especially those occurring in the Global South. Studies by Entman (2007), Chong (2007), and Njogu (2009) highlight this phenomenon. It is also important to note that what constitutes "Africa" within mainstream Western media spaces typically excludes regions like Northern Africa (Mudimbe 1988; Bassil 2011; Evans 2011), and often portrays Africa according to negative stereotypes and generalisations about the continent (Terrell, 1989; Linscott, 2017; Thomas, 2018). Furthermore, the media's interest in Africa is often limited to its crises (Schraeder, 1998). Similarly these influences shape the type of frames that are present on reporting on conflict in Africa.

Nevertheless, there are some emerging alternative perspectives suggesting that narratives about Africa are changing, not only within Western media but also within the continent itself. New frameworks such as "Peace Journalism" or "Citizen Journalism" are gaining traction, particularly in the realms of social media and photography (Keller, 2021; Bunce, 2017; Joseph, 2014, Njogu, 2009; Ziegler, 1992). This is all to say that the space in which the media finds itself in is more fluid than ever and requires further study.

In particular, the rise of social and online media has had a disruptive effect on the media space and sparked debate regarding its role in conflict reporting. Some researchers such as

Ette (2018), Hoskins (2013) and Hossain (2018) argue that this type of media provides a platform for breaking free from traditional media reporting, enabling new stories and frames that are more positive. On the opposing side researchers such as Makortykh (2017), Patrikarakos (2017) and Singer (2018) contend that online and social media is influenced by traditional media framing, leading to similar patterns of reporting. So, although social and online media provides different avenues and, what would seem like a rupture from the control of editors, there are also many continuities that remain in the way that it functions. Some of these ruptures and continuities will be briefly elaborated here and especially as they relate to framing theory.

A significant aspect of social media's impact on conflict reporting is the role of user-generated content. Social media platforms have empowered individuals to become active contributors to news reporting, blurring the boundaries between traditional journalists and citizen journalists. User-generated content, such as photos, videos, and first-hand accounts, can provide valuable on-the-ground perspectives that traditional media may not capture and thus play a role in creating different frames of conflict (Hermida et al., 2012; Lotan et al., 2011). As this study looks at 'traditional' online media newspapers it is important to understand the context within which these newspapers operate and compete with.

Self-gatekeeping and gate-watching practices are observed in online media and social media, where traditional broadsheet media narratives still permeate and define what is 'newsworthy' (Ogunyemi, 2011). The "echo chamber" effect, where like-minded individuals reinforce each other's beliefs and opinions, can further polarise online discussions and hinder constructive dialogue (Nguyen et al., 2014; Cinelli et al., 2021; Patrikarakos, 2017). Moreover, social media algorithms and personalisation features contribute to the selective exposure of information, reinforcing users' existing beliefs and biases, which can create filter bubbles, as well the aforementioned echo chamber effect, where individuals are exposed to a limited range of perspectives and are less likely to encounter opposing viewpoints (Bakshy et al., 2015; Pariser, 2011). This type of gate keeping and selective exposure to information is important to be aware of for two reasons. Firstly, it creates much stronger frames of issues reported on which are reinforced and secondly, it is important for researchers to be aware and take into account these effects when doing research in an online media space, which this study is.

Scholars have examined whether social media in particular contributes to an increase in collective violence, with conflicting findings. Some argue that social media amplifies violence, while others increases of collective violence to media bias in conflict reporting (Warren, 2015; Zeitzoff, 2017; Weidman, 2016). This debate is covered by a complex literature on social media's impact on collective violence. Some studies suggest that social media can exacerbate (real world) conflict by facilitating the spread of misinformation, hate speech, and extremist ideologies (Chadwick, 2009; Tufekci, 2017; Tsfaty & Weimann, 2002). The rapid dissemination of graphic images and videos through social media platforms can also contribute to the emotional intensity of conflicts (Hoskins & O'Loughlin, 2010; Kraidy & Khalil, 2017). The insurgency in Cabo Delgado in particular made use of online platforms to disseminate graphic videos of violence such as beheadings.

On the other hand, there is a contrasting perspective that highlights the positive role of online and particularly social media in conflict reporting. For instance, online platforms often provided opportunities for citizen journalists and eyewitnesses to document and share their experiences, offering alternative perspectives and voices that challenge dominant frames of conflict that are created by more traditional media (Allan & Thorsen, 2009; Lotan et al., 2011; Papacharissi, 2015). The viral nature of social media also plays a role in shaping conflict reporting. Information spreads rapidly on social media platforms, often without thorough fact-checking or verification. This can lead to the rapid dissemination of misinformation and rumours, which can fuel tensions and escalate conflicts (Vosoughi et al., 2018; Zubiaga et al., 2016; Tufekci, 2017).

Essentially this highly contested online media space, in which these "traditional" newspapers operate in where they are co-opted into the social media space. This is evidenced of share to X (formerly Twitter), Facebook and a myriad of other social media platforms. It has thus been necessary to briefly explore some of the developing literature on the every changing online media space to properly situate this study.

3.4. African state – from quasi-statehood to failed states

Authors such as Booth (1991), Hopf (1998) and Hendricks (2011) posit that a simple state centric view of International Relations (IR) is no longer sufficient in fully addressing the increasingly complicated field that includes transnational and domestic actors. In order to fully understand how this conflict has been framed by media, and how in turn the media

proposes to solve the conflict it is important to move beyond a solely state centric approach of analysis.

Although the Westphalian state system is an important aspect of understanding the formation of states in Africa, Grovogui invites a deeper analysis on why African states seemingly 'fail' that goes beyond the 'Westphalian common sense' argument and the Weberian standards of state function. According to Grovogui, European and Western powers still play a major role in creating and then propping up (or alternatively undermining) new states (Grovogui, 2001: 35).

To make his point, Grovogui (2002) uses the examples of two small European states namely: Belgium and Switzerland. Neither of these states followed traditional Westphalian state formation in their creation and yet these states were given much support, as well as guarantees and security by their European neighbours due to the 'realpolitik' surrounding their formation (Grovogui, 2002: 38). He rightly points out that, "while one regime [of international support of sovereignty] contributed to the 'resilience' of European 'quasi-states', another helped to undermine the sovereignty of African entities and, later, to assist in the 'failure' of a number of African states" (Grovogui. 2002: 316).

Grovogui chooses the contrast of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Switzerland where Western powers actively supported the Swiss state in consolidating control over its diverse ethnic regions (Grovogui, 2002: 332). This in contrast of the attitude of Western powers, particularly Belgium and its allies, towards DRC's first elected Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba's efforts to unite his ethnically diverse and newly independent country. Western powers saw the country's diversity as a chance to weaken Lumumba's central government, especially in the valuable Katanga region. They used the potential for division to support his political rival Mobutu Sese Seko and gain access to valuable resources (Grovogui, 2002: 332). Using this example, Grovogui (2001:45) points out that although the actions of Mobutu in bankrupting the DRC must be condemned, so surely must the actions of Swiss banks for facilitating this along with Western meddling.

The main point to be made here is about the seeming double standards when it comes to what gets labelled as a 'failed state' and what is not. It also begs the question, by whose standards are these ideas are judged (Grovogui, 2001: 45)? Grovogui's analysis provides a deeper understanding of the situation that many African states face. He sums up:

This effort [understanding the complexity of statehood in Africa] requires an appreciation of the domestic institutions that corrupt public life but also of their broader context — the complex instantiations of power relations that manifest themselves temporally and spatially as inter-national regimes (Grovoqui, 2002: 336).

Grovoqui complicates our understanding of the nature of statehood in Africa and helps to guard against single narratives on why which states “fail” and others do not. This analysis is key in guarding against dominant frames of media reporting around ‘failed’ African States and is applicable to the media framing around the conflict in Cabo Delgado. Similarly to Grovoqui, Verhoeven takes umbrage with the idea of the ‘failed’ African state, noting that “all too often, a dichotomy is created between ‘functioning’ and ‘failed’ states: whereas the former are associated with stability and predictable political processes, the latter are equated with insecurity, chaos and ‘vacuums’. Such labels and their associations are (partially) misguided and far from innocent” (Verhoeven, 2009: 412). It must be noted that such labels are also liberally applied on the reporting on the conflict in Mozambique.

Again Verhoeven points to the larger global dynamics at play, stating that, “Western leaders ... point at internal dynamics while refusing to recognise how the international political economy and global power asymmetries shape states’ abilities to deal with crises” (Verhoeven, 2009: 412). Verhoeven disputes that states are the natural and final end of institutional evolution and criticises this normative approach sighting a fear of “blank spots on the map”. These Western views of statehood bleed into the construction of frames of conflict on the continent. It is pertinent to keep these observations by Grovoqui and Verhoeven in mind when dissecting dominant and oppositional frames of reporting.

The unfolding security crises in Cabo Delgado requires a careful consideration of the existing literature on conflict in Africa. There are a myriad of factors that contribute to the ongoing security crises in the region that need to be carefully unpacked to allow for a clear conceptualisation of the factors that influence the conflict. Within the very reporting by the newspapers used in this study, there is a significant shift in the way in which the armed non-state actors are referred to.

3.5. Changing nature of conflict in Africa: ‘Terrorism’ to War Economies

Having briefly unpacked discourses on ‘failed’ African states we can shift our attention to a specific area of terminology used namely that of “Terrorism”. It is important to understand

the historiography of the word, how its use has changed over time and to situate it in broader discussion on conflict within Africa. This idea of ‘terrorism’¹⁰ is a central component to the formation of frames in the reporting on the Cabo Delgado conflict and key to answering the primary and secondary research questions. As such it is necessary to carefully analyse and situate it in border theoretical discussion on the nature of African conflict.

3.5.1. Terror during the back drop of a Cold War

Indeed, the idea of ‘terrorism’ is highly contested and, as such, there is no one universally accepted definition (Mutasa & Muchemwa, 2021: 336). ‘Terrorism’ often adheres to no rules of law and uses a combination of physical and psychological methods to achieve its goals with varying degrees of violence. In this way, ‘terrorism’ can act in a dual manner, as defiance of state authority or in the service of the state against opponents of the state. The way that ‘terrorism’ operates likewise has also undergone significant shifts. This thesis will contemplate the nature of terrorism here before returning to a discussion on the changing nature of conflicts more broadly.

Mamdani seeks to further contextualise this idea of ‘terrorism’ by pointing to the 1970s, in which observes, “The United States decided to harness, and even to cultivate, terrorism in the struggle against regimes it considered pro-Soviet” (Mamdani, 2002: 769). In particular, Mamdani cites the USA’s covert support for the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (UNITA) and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), which led to major human rights abuses and use of terrorist methods. The only difference between this and other forms of ‘terrorism’, Mamdani writes, is that the, “CIA and the Pentagon called terrorism by another name: ‘low intensity conflict’” (Mamdani, 2002: 769).

This discussion can be supplemented by Clapham who provides a broad discussion on the core elements of ‘terrorism’. He does this by peeling back the often-emotive way that people try to analyse ‘terrorist’ groups, pointing out that in order to fully understand them we have to look at them in a strictly analytical and academic sense (Clapham, 2003: 13). According to Clapham, there is a relationship between ‘terrorists’, their political environments, and their willingness to use violence. ‘Terrorist’ groups operate in a political environment that they do not usually fully control. Some organisations work in repressive political environments while others operate in relatively liberal ones. Whatever the case may be, their environment will

¹⁰ ‘Terrorism’ is placed in single quotation marks to problematise the term. This section seeks to explain the history of the use of term and demonstration the changing use and nature of the term.

influence the methods and types of violence they employ (Clapham, 2003: 13). The common thread between all terrorist groups is that they all employ violence of one kind or another to try and achieve their stated political goals (Clapham, 2003: 14).

Closely connected to terror tactics are the tactics of guerrilla fighters, although Clapham argues that the two types of fighting are distinct. Guerrillas operate in a grey area where they often control the space they are in but do not have effective long-term control, and therefore have to operate with very fluid operational mobility (Clapham, 2003: 14). By contrast, terrorists often do not have physical control of their operating space at all. Their spaces are either contested or controlled by someone else (Clapham, 2003:15), meaning that these groups have to act like criminal organisations—hiding in plain sight. Due to the way groups using terror tactics operate, they are often treated as ‘criminal’ or worse. Often terrorist acts are not necessarily defined by civilian only targeting tactics but a host of other such political aims (Clapham, 2003:15). Helping to think of what ways guerrillas and ‘terrorists’ operate provides tools with which to dissect the reporting on conflict in Cabo Delgado.

The backdrop of the Cold War is an important contextual lense that must be used to understand the changing nature of ‘terrorism’. As such southern insurgencies, conflicts and international terrorism received substantial backing and material assistance from either of the two major superpowers. This was clearly a state sponsored effort to undermine each other and maintain equilibrium in the balance of power by supporting proxies. However, during the transition from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, and the collapse of the Soviet Union this state-sponsored support significantly diminished (Duffield, 2002: 157). For many African governments, the end of the Cold War saw the collapse of much external funding from either of the super powers (Clapham, 2003: 25). Many in turn eagerly advanced the threat of ‘terrorism’ as a means of regaining some of the external aid for state coercive capabilities and this term began to take on a new meaning (Clapham, 2003: 25). Beyond this change in use of terms the end of the Cold War also heralded the success of the UN-led US-backed world where liberalism, democracy and the Weberian state system seemed to be the standard of success (Verhoeven, 2009: 408). States would become interdependent and the expectation was that there would be a peace dividend. However, many regions continued to experience conflict and an increase in ‘terrorist’ activities in particular from none state actors. With the reduction in state sponsorship from major super powers, conflicting parties were

instead compelled to adjust and, to varying extents, become self-sufficient thus changing the nature of War itself.

For instance the sponsorship of conflict in Afghanistan, where the ‘Islamic world’ had not seen an armed jihad for centuries but the CIA was determined to create one, putting a version of tradition at the service of politics, all in order to undermine the Soviet Union in the region (Mamdani, 2002:770). The CIA trained various Afghanistan groups and encouraged the adoption of specific characteristics, such as using terror tactics; the embrace of holy war or jihad; and the use of fighters from across national borders (Mamdani, 2002: 771). The point here is that fundamentalism is not some sort of cultural hangover. Rather it is an active contemporary project encouraged and supported largely by the USA (Mamdani, 2002: 772). This idea of Jihad is still very prevalent and is mentioned often in the framing of the conflict in Cabo Delgado.

This is very similar to much of the activity in Cabo Delgado where Islam is used a legitimising force. Often claims of ‘purer’ religious authority are used to advocate for more use of violence and that are linked sometimes to more globalist narratives (ie War against the West/Secularism etc.) while being suited for local political contexts (Clapham, 2003: 25). These types of religious authority often invoked as a way to “purify”, “correct” and “cure” societal degradation and set out to legitimise particularly violent actions while combatting what are seen as illegitimate forms of governance such as corruption (Clapham, 2003: 27). In most cases these religious justifications for violence transcend local borders and identities, which can at times lead to the creation of networks that are used for funding, recruitment, training and co-ordination (Clapham, 2003: 28).

3.5.2. The 9/11 inflection point

The aftermath of 9/11 where the Twin towers and Pentagon were attacked by Al-Qaeda was an inflection point in the changing nature of ‘terrorism’. The definition suddenly took on a far more reductionist approach. This started the “Global War on Terror” which still has real world consequences.

Firstly, Mamdani noted that “culture talk” ensued around the supposed unbreakable links of Islam to terrorism (Mamdani, 2002: 766). Being a terrorist essentially became shorthand for being a “bad” Muslim and there was a feverish need to distinguish so-called “good” Muslims from “bad” Muslims and to find out what had gone wrong with the faith. This culture talk

was used to justify war against entire countries or to imply that individuals born into a particular culture were unchanging and static in their understanding of the world, ignoring changing contexts and histories (Mamdani, 2002: 767). We see this type of culture talk – or in the case of media reporting dominant frame as terrorism in Cabo Delgado and the attack on Palma being conducted by a series of ‘bad Muslims’ and specifically bad Muslim youth. The contemporary idea particularly in the West remains largely fixated on the ‘bad’ Muslim reductionist narrative of terrorism.

Somalia provides a case study on a ‘failed’ African state and, specifically, the rise of political Islam in this space of ‘failure’. Mwangi (2012: 514) outlines this, “[in the case of Somalia] Islamism is used to refer to the use of Islam by individuals, groups and organisations as an instrument to pursue political objectives”. In addition to this idea of Islamism these sorts of actors use the word *Salafi* in reference to themselves or their actions. This is all in an effort to often as a way to connote doctrinal purity and thus in turn gain further religious and political legitimacy for their actions (Mwangi, 2012: 515). All while being seen as ‘bad Muslims’ by the West.

The extremism that grew within Somalia emerged in part as a response to the external military interventions of Ethiopia and the USA (Mwangi, 2012: 518). This type of self-fulfilling prophecy shows that by “diabolising” these insurgents, more moderate factions joined them adding further legitimacy to their cause (Verhoeven, 2009: 407). The only way to end the growing Jihadist threat (as part of a broader Global War on Terror) was seen as increased securitisation read military intervention (Verhoeven, 2009: 408). Likewise this process of ‘diablosing’ insurgents, which in turn requires a military response plays out in the dominant framing of conflict in Mozambique.

Moreover, USA-led interventions that have sought to hunt down ‘terrorists’ in Somalia only led to a further destabilisation of the region and a self-fulfilling prophecy of ‘state failure’. Mwangi asserts that:

Al-Shabaab emerged as the main source of armed resistance to the Ethiopian [and USA] occupation and combined its jihadist rhetoric with Somali nationalism and anti-Ethiopianism to win both passive and active support from many Somalis, including those who had been wary of its extremist Islamism (Mwangi, 2012: 520).

In becoming more legitimate, Al-Shabaab used a variety of methods, including the use of carefully curated propaganda, something we see unfolding in Cabo Delgado (Mwangi, 2012: 522). It is therefore the case that people joined Al-Shabaab for a variety of reasons, and so to pigeon hole them simply as a religious terrorist organisation will naturally lead to a misguided response and which all too often happens in the construction of dominant frames and in particular the military solutions they invoke for the conflict (Botha & Abdile, 2014: 3).

The nature of the conflict in Cabo Delgado is twofold. Firstly, ASWJ actively identified as Islamist- that is that reject the secular state (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 123). That they wish to institute Sharia law and that they shun dialogue and are willing to use violence to achieve these goals. As Bassam Tibi (2016) explains “Islamism is not Islam” Islamism is a political ideology that is regionalised politics that aims to establish a sharia political order and to wage Jihad in order to achieve these goals.

Secondly, the Al-Shabaab movement themselves are a religious sect (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 123). Rather than attempting to reform the political system, they withdrew from it, isolating themselves from broader society to enforce sharia law within their own community. Members were instructed to avoid engaging with secular institutions for justice, health, and education, with these services being provided within their mosques, thereby forming a ‘counter-society.’ (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 123). By definition, sects are newly established religious groups that challenge aspects of their parent religion and society. They exist in significant tension with these established structures, condemning them as ‘corrupt’ while presenting themselves as a return to the ‘true religion’ (Morier-Genouf, 2024: 123). The group known as al-Shabaab in Mozambique fits this description: it operated as an Islamist sect until 2017, when it shifted from isolation to active efforts to transform society through violence.

Ultimately, the use of ‘terrorism’ by certain groups must be seen as part of a much longer conversation about the changing nature of conflict within Africa. Although in recent times terrorism has come to the forefront of securitisation discussions, it is not the only – or even most appropriate – lens with which to view unfolding conflicts on the continent. Often, the language of ‘terrorism’ simply serves as an ill-fitting patch that gets placed over other forms of resistance and opposition, with the consequence that any nuanced understanding of what gives rise to extremist groups, is lost.

Having interrogated the nature of terrorism and its evolving meaning, which is important in identifying and deconstruction frames in relation to the primary and second research questions of this thesis. There will now be a discussion on broader theories of conflict.

3. 5. 3. Understanding of conflict in Cabo Delgado: A New War, Resource Curse, Greed vs Grievance or Economy of Violence?

Mary Kaldor provides a stepping off point as she challenges traditional distinctions between so called new and old wars, internal and external conflicts, and local and global dynamics. In her analysis, Kaldor (2012) contends that contemporary conflicts are marked by intricate transnational connections, blurring the lines between aggression and repression. This complexity, she argues, arises from the intensification of global interconnectedness in political, economic, military, and cultural realms. This is particularly important as this thesis has carefully introduced the idea of connectedness in the Indian Ocean basin as well as the changing landscape of the conflict in Cabo Delgado- that there is far more interconnectedness to these conflicts. The world, as Kaldor notes, is more interconnected than ever before, fundamentally altering the nature and types of warfare (Kaldor, 2012: 2). This is a nuance often neglected in conflict reporting.

Kaldor's differentiation between new and old wars is not merely an intellectual exercise; it has profound implications for policymakers. The shift in perceptions is crucial, with the primary goal being to recognise that the objectives of new wars revolve around identity politics rather than the geopolitical or ideological motivations that characterised earlier conflicts (Kaldor, 2012: 7).

Furthermore, the means through which these new wars are fought have undergone a transformation. The changed mode of warfare is a distinctive feature of modern conflict, indicating a departure from traditional approaches to war (Kaldor, 2012: 9). This takes the form of a new 'globalised' war economy, signifying a shift in the economic structures sustaining conflicts (2012: 10). Duffield (2002) similarly elaborates on this by pointing out that conflicts have become increasingly asymmetric and exploitative of the global nature of the economy in the way they operate. This has been closely mirrored by the way that international security regimes, such as the United Nations (UN), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and even the business sector, respond to threats (Duffield, 2002: 153). According to Duffield, this type of 'network war' should not be considered a 'failure of

modernity' so much as "a realization of its inner potential and surprising capacities [for war and peace-making]" (Duffield, 2002: 156).

In this vein Williams (2017) notes significant strides in reducing conflicts since the 2000s. However, Williams also underscores the changing nature of conflict and the ongoing debate over what constitutes a conflict. Particularly in Africa he identifies two distinct 'worlds' of armed conflict: state-based conflicts revolving around governments and their challengers—primarily for access to state power; and conflicts occurring on the margins involving non-state actors like warlords, clans, tribes, and militias, motivated by reasons other than acquiring state power (Williams, 2017: 35). Here we see that the conflict in Cabo Delgado fits the characteristics of the latter as well as the notion of new wars put forward by Kaldor and Duffield.

Interestingly, Williams likewise challenges the conventional classification of Africa's state-based armed conflicts as 'internal', arguing that they are rarely confined to a single state's territory. Instead, these conflicts are influenced by dynamics at local, national, regional, and global levels (Williams, 2017: 37). This perspective aligns with Kaldor's and Duffield's argument about the increasing interconnectedness and transnational nature of contemporary conflicts, emphasising the need for a holistic understanding to address the multifaceted challenges posed by evolving conflict dynamics. It also is important to note these theorisations of conflict when confronting dominant reductionist frames of conflict that emerge. Being equipped with these concepts provides avenues to read between the lines and identify potential oppositional frames.

Duffield alludes to this ever-increasing complicated nature of the state and how conflicts are supported, "What we call war economies, terrorist networks and criminal syndicates have increasingly become interconnected, not only among themselves, but with legitimate businesses and established [state] systems as well" (Duffield, 2002: 158). This brings points to the grander conclusion that the nature of conflicts is changing as entire societal systems get dragged into them on a global stage and it is no longer as simple as 'us' vs 'them'. As Duffield writes, "Entire social systems and their components are against each other. This includes their shadow economies, diaspora communities, cultural networks and political alliances; each with its own mix and levels of elite/non-elite, rich/poor and male/female dynamics" (Duffield, 2002: 160).

Duffield (2002: 157) mentions concepts such as “war economies” and the concept of “new terrorism” elucidates how violent actors, leveraging the adaptive capabilities of underground networks, effectively compensated for the waning material support from nation-states especially post the Soviet Collapse. Nordstrom (2017: 36) goes on to show the truly vast and intricate “shadow” networks that support these varied types of inter and intra conflict. These underground networks and those that operate them may not be sovereign in the Weberian sense but they share many attributes of states. For instance, they have a type of social sovereignty in the way that they operate and codes of conduct and dispute resolution systems, as well as systems of enforcement ie the use of violence to enforce contracts (Nordstrom, 2017: 51). All this is to say is that the nature of sovereignty and state is far more deeply complicated than ever before.

Another critical perspective is provided by Mkandawire (2002), who challenges simplistic explanations for brutal violence in post-independence rebel movements in Africa. He argues against attributing such violence solely to African ‘culture’ or rational self-interest. Instead, Mkandawire emphasises the importance of understanding the political roots and ideological components of these movements, even as their actions confound their political agendas (Mkandawire, 2002: 181). Mkandawire’s work is critical in adding layers of analysis to the way in which media reports on conflict in Cabo Delgado, that assist in moving beyond the CNN effect of reporting on violence and chaos to interrogate the deeper roots of understanding the conflict, the frames that are constructed and their supposed solutions.

Within the literature on Cabo Delgado and the unfolding the conflict there is a recurrent phrase that is used is “violent extremism”. In the case of ASWJ, it arose out of a dire economic, political situation in Northern Mozambique and has now closely associated itself with IS. To be sure, there are acts of terror that have been committed, but the literature as it relates to Cabo Delgado does not refer to the insurgency as pure terrorism (Neethling, 2021: 91). Els and Chelin (2021: 106), for instance, mention the use of terror attacks but refer more broadly to the insurgency. It seems, therefore, that there is a broad awareness within the literature that the labelling of insurgent groups as ‘terrorists’ is not always appropriate.

To talk about the conflict in Cabo Delgado and not mention its links to resources and in the media’s eyes the discovery of natural gas would a great omission. Every one of the newspapers examined mentioned the role of natural resources in some form. The following

section now unpacks the varying theories on the role of resources in fuelling of conflicts in Africa.

The discourse around a ‘resource curse’ is not a new one and this section will briefly unpack the discussion here. This is a common theory that tries to explain conflicts within Africa. In simple terms this theory posits that countries that have large deposits of natural resources – particularly mineral resources – are more prone to conflict. These resources are considered prize territory and therefore foster conflict as interested parties compete for the control of their exploitation (Laudati, 2013: 34). According to the ‘resource curse’, a state’s reliance on resources can also mean that its economy may remain largely underdeveloped and dangerously exposed to fluctuations in demand, selling processes, or operational disturbances—and in the case of any danger to the resource, the stability of the entire state is threatened. Quite simplistically, this theory could explain the conflict in Cabo Delgado neatly like this: The discovery of massive LNG fields off the coast, their subsequent attempts at developing these created instability, led to conflict and attracted the interest of ‘terrorist’ organisations to leading conflict.

This has been criticised, however, as a somewhat one-dimensional approach to understanding of the nature of conflicts excluding longer term contexts in Africa (Laudati, 2013: 35). This thesis has gone to lengths in trying to provide longer term context and deeper analysis of the unfolding conflict in the region.

Paul Collier and Anke Hoefeller (2004) try to complicate narratives of conflict by using the idea of “Greed and Grievance”. This idea tries to demonstrate the interplay between the personal greed of groups (opportunities) in relation to resources that is in turn mixed with a variety of other grievances. These motivating factors ranging from religion, to economic exclusion that can help explain why conflict can develop and how it can in turn be sustained (Collier & Hoefeller, 2004: 587).

The idea of “greed vs grievance” finds traction in examples such as the DRC civil war in 1990 and the early 2000s, where a compelling argument can be made that these were actually examples of foreign aggression passed off as civil wars. Here, invading armies and foreign backed rebel groups strategically plundered mines and stockpiles in order to enrich themselves and sustain their efforts (Turner, 2013: 154). The convergence of the foreign actors and local groups with the twin motivations of greed and specific grievances (whether political, personal or otherwise) manifested itself in these wars and through the peace-making

process (Turner, 2013: 155). This theory of greed and grievance would help explain the large number of neighbouring and regional African governments involved in the conflict. Although this approach to understanding conflicts can seem attractive, it too closely links and attributes the motivation for conflict to that of control of strategic resources and minerals.

Collier and Hoefeller's work is then built upon by Laudati's (2013) and Dunne (2001) theory of "economies of violence". This theory does take into account the role of mineral resources and, additionally, other streams of income. Laudati also uses DRC as an example.

In some cases, the role of minerals as a source of income to fuel conflict plays a minor role. Rather the financing of different armed groups was sourced by other natural resources such as timber, coffee, or the taxation of the movement of people and goods (Laudati, 2013, 34). Laudati gives an example the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RDC) based around Goma which awarded the 25-year rights to fell timber in a 133,344 hectare site where the company would pay USD\$35,000 to extract 43,750 cubic metres while also paying an annual tax of USD\$113,344 (Laudati, 2013: 37). This demonstrates how armed actors would use any resources (not just minerals) at their disposal to fund their operations.

In contexts such as the DRC, issues of taxation are particularly important to sustaining localised rebel groups who often use roadblocks on important trade routes to "tax" the movement of people and goods. For instance, one roadblock from Walikale to Goma made around USD\$10,000 in a single week (Laudati, 2013: 35). These examples help to deepen our understanding of the way in which conflicts are sustained and provide insights to look out for when identifying dominant and oppositional frames in reporting of the conflict in Cabo Delgado.

Lastly, Dunn's ideas around "economies of conflict/violence" are also useful to consider in light of African conflicts. Dunn highlights four areas of particular benefit; firstly, that conflict economies allow actors (whether they be individuals, communities, armed groups, countries etc.) the ability to gain wealth for themselves, primarily through theft of resources (Dunn, 2001: 55). Secondly, that being involved in the conflict economy provides opportunities to remove rivals whether individuals or perceived ethnic groups—something that plays heavily into the past of the DRC, with its many ethnic groups viewing each other rightly or wrongly as rivals; thirdly, that war economies allow for actors to increase their power, which accounts for the greed principle; and lastly, that conflict economies allow for these same actors to capture strategic locations to their benefit (Dunn, 2001: 55). Ultimately, these four factors can

easily lead to the “institutionalisation of violence for profit”, where violence becomes an everyday occurrence and mode of survival centred on the resources of the region.

3.4. Conclusion

Chapter Three served as an exploration of the evolving nature of conflict, particularly on the African continent. It sought to delve into the challenges of conventional definitions of conflict, in an attempt to reach a more multi-layered understanding. The chapter emphasised the inadequacy of a purely state-centric approach while also looking closely at the rapidly changing media landscape.

It began with defining framing theory. This explains the construction of dominant and oppositional frames in the media space and helps understand the political nature of information presentation and interpretation, emphasising framing theory’s role in shaping ‘common-sense’ understandings of conflicts. This final point is key to answering the main questions of this thesis, (i.e., what are the dominant and oppositional frames of the conflict and how do they influence potential solutions to the conflict in Cabo Delgado?).

This is closely followed with a scrutiny of online and social media ecosystem. This underscores the influential role of media, particularly Western media, in shaping frames about conflicts in the Global South, and especially in Africa.

The chapter then turns its attention to that ‘failed’ African states and using authors such as Grovogui and Verhoeven sets out to carefully problematise and caution against its reductionist narrative about African states. This starts with the imposition of the Westphalian state system during the 1884 Berlin Conference which led to the arbitrary demarcation of African borders, divorced from geographic and cultural considerations. This resulted in weak and divided states with a persistent legitimacy deficit. The post-colonial meddling in these states exacerbated governance challenges and laid the groundwork for the emergence of conflicts across the continent and in Cabo Delgado.

Following from this chapter the changing nature of conflict, drawing on the work of authors like Kaldor, to challenge traditional notions of conflict and highlight the intricate and changing connections present in contemporary conflicts. Using the ideas of Mamdani, Grovogui, Clapham and others, it also delved into the contested realm of ‘terrorism’, offering a nuanced exploration of its definitions, political contexts, and operational considerations.

This was all done in an effort to position the thesis so that it can adequately interpret the inductive findings in the following chapter.

The chapter culminated with a brief look at the resource-related theories of conflict, including the 'resource curse', 'Greed vs Grievance', 'economies of violence', providing varied perspectives on the drivers behind conflicts in Africa. Though this examination of theories was not comprehensive, it has hopefully been sufficient to demonstrate that the literature surrounding these issues is far from settled, and rather exhibits increasing complexity.

The following chapter aims to methodically lay the groundwork for a comprehensive understanding of the complex factors in reporting on the conflict in Cabo Delgado. Breaking down the main themes in granular detail to from their codes to second order cycle coding and finally the answer to the primary and secondary research questions.

Chapter Four

Findings: Natural Gas Discovery, ‘Terrorists,’ Regional and International Responses and the Neglect of Cabo Delgado

4.1. Frames on newspaper reporting by the Daily Maverick, The Guardian and Nation

This chapter seeks to unpack the findings of the study and offer some preliminary explanations. Each of the main themes from DM, TG and *Nation* will be broken down and discussed following the extensive process of qualitative inductive coding that was completed. Each of the main themes is made up of several categories (second cycle codes) that are, in turn, composed of a series of first cycle codes. It is important to re-iterate that themes do not ‘emerge’, but are rather actively constructed by the researcher. Part of the purpose of this chapter is to carefully explain how the themes were identified and to break them down into their more granular parts. This is done for the sake of transparency, as well as to provide insight into the way the dataset was handled and the findings made. These themes in turn underpin the findings in the dominant, additional and oppositional frames of these newspapers and allowing for the answering of the research questions posed.

As mentioned in Chapter One, the data collected all came from a single year, namely 2021. This year was chosen as it was the year of the attack on Palma, which elevated the conflict in the eyes of media. A total of 54 articles for the DM were collected, with 15 articles for TG and for 32 *Nation* for a final data set of 101 articles. These articles were collected online from their respective archives. One of the most noticeable immediate findings concerns the quantity and style of reporting that was done by the three newspapers. The DM featured far more reporting on the conflict, ranging from think pieces, to analysis and live reporting. In contrast, TG generally had far fewer of these sorts of pieces and instead featured a high frequency of ‘live reporting’ around the date of the main attack while *Nation* had very few varied sources of reporting

4.2. Daily Maverick

As discussed in the methodology section, the DM has a total of 169 codes. These codes were formed into 24 categories and these categories were then separated into four main themes, namely; i) *the conflict in relation to natural resources, especially natural gas*; ii) *the role of*

'terrorists'; iii) *responses*; and iv) *live reporting*. This section addresses all four of these themes and explains them in detail (see Table 2.1 for the expansive coding tree of the DM).

The main writer covering the conflict for the DM is a researcher, Peter Fabricius. He contributed some 27 articles. This accounts for exactly half of the articles that were used in the final data set. Fabricius is closely linked to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), which itself contributed a further eight articles. The ISS is a prominent and recognised think tank that was formed in 1992. According to its website, “ISS is Africa’s leading multidisciplinary human security organisation, with a unique operational model that combines research, policy analysis, technical assistance and training”. The ISS has a head office in Pretoria, and regional offices in Nairobi, Kenya; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and Dakar, Senegal. Four of the ISS articles were written by Liesl Louw-Vaudren, the senior researcher and project lead for Southern Africa at the ISS. Louw-Vaudren was also interviewed on the subject by SABC news, eNCA and Newzroom Afrika¹¹. The other notable contributor to the DM collection of articles is Dr David Matsinhe, an adjunct research professor at the Institute of Africa Studies, Carleton University. Matsinhe, too, was relied upon for analysis by broadcast media organisations such as the Newzroom Afrika and eNCA¹². These main contributions are then supplemented by stories from a variety of other staff writers.

The following section looks, in turn, at the four themes identified in the DM articles.

4.2.1. The conflict in relation to natural resources especially, natural gas

The first theme concerns the role of natural gas; a topic that the DM focuses on almost religiously throughout their reporting. This theme is made up of thirty codes, which are then grouped into seven categories. The first of these categories is *who, where, cost*. This category consists of information such as the amount of investment made in the region, with reference to vast sums of “\$60 billion” thrown around (DM 20). There is also a discussion of the locations of the various gas fields, such as Ravuma (sea) and Afugni site LNG (land) (DM 5, but such descriptions can be found in almost all articles).

The second category to make up this theme is *monopoly of resources*. Here the newspaper details how there are only a handful of international companies that own the entirety of the

¹¹ See interviews for Louw-Vaudren here SABC News <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KbhLIQpizmE>; eNCA <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZbfoK88rQA> and Newzroom Afrika <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-CfBdnuzPEc>.

¹² See interviews for Matsinhe here Newzroom Afrika https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FPR_U29LoN4 and eNCA <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jyKMJ76rM3o>.

gas fields, with Total being the main company making the investment to develop production (DM 34). The link to resources appears often and strongly in most of the DM reporting.

The third category concerns *how access was gained* to the gas fields. In particular, this category is concerned with the way in which people were evicted from sites that were critical to gas production.

Fourth, is the *apportioning of blame to gas* directly for the violence, with a focus on how the discovery of gas only served to inflame tensions in the region and how the government in Maputo sought to use gas as another form of income for its patronage system. The blaming on gas for regional tensions is often unironically referred to in DM articles as ‘adding fuel to the fire’ (DM 34).

The fifth category is *the role of other resources*, although it must be noted that this is invariably mentioned together with gas. There is, however, a specific vein of reporting that goes beyond just natural gas. One recurring point is how local communities have been ‘cut off’ from their connection to the sea and, therefore, their livelihoods, as they could no longer fish. There is also mention of the ruby mines in the region as well as the way in which the illicit economy plays a major role in maintaining people’s livelihoods (DM 34).

Sixth, there is a focus in the DM on *the specific role of the Total facility during the attack*. Here, the DM articles look closely at the role that Total played in the attack (DM 31), especially focusing on the fact that Total withdrew its staff members and used the Mozambique government to protect the gas project sites.

Lastly, the *question of the profitability* is raised, particularly in relation to whether the gas fields will still be viable following the crisis. There is an examination of who will ultimately benefit from the development of the gas project (DM 25) and a lamentation that there seems to be very little benefit for the local community and zero trickle down from the investments in the region. There is also a longer discussion about how natural gas is no longer as profitable as it used to be and how the promise of the security and prosperity associated with gas has ultimately failed. DM 64 provides a good summation of the reporting: “The discovery of natural gas in Mozambique has produced tragedies, not economic promise”. This theme is strongly present throughout the DM’s reporting and serves as a sort of backdrop to everything else it would say on the matter.

4.2.2. The role of ‘terrorists’

The second theme that seems to dominate the reporting by the DM is that of the role of ‘terrorists’. There is a lot of contention in this theme, as well as plenty of detailed reporting. It should also be said that the way the DM reports on this evolves over time.

The first category of this theme is how the *violence manifests itself*. The reporting notes that Al-Shabaab is comprised of mostly unemployed youth and is mostly a local Islamist organisation, with little evidence that it is comprised of foreign fighters. The reports also acknowledge that there is a much deeper history to the insurgency and that the violence that occurred has led to shifting dynamics in the region—especially in the way illicit goods are now shipped, as the roots along the Swahili coast have shifted further southwards to avoid the violence. As stated in DM 33:

The Swahili coast has been part of a human-smuggling route for migrants moving from the Horn of Africa to South Africa...its coastal movement of people has ceased, due to ... the insurgency.

The second category looks specifically at *the names of the group and international links to terrorist organisation*. It is very important to highlight that there is an evolution in what the belligerents in the conflict are called. The paper starts off by calling them “armed opposition” but this language begins to shift to adopt terms such as “insurgency”, “festering Islamist insurgency”, “*Al Shabab*” or “Jihadists”. They are also called *Ahlu Sunnah wa Jama*, but most often referred to as “insurgents”. A large turning point for reporters came on 11th March, when AWSJ were designated a terrorist organisation by the USA (DM 13).

The last category in this theme is the *state of the conflict*. The scene is set with the taking of Mocimboa da Praia (Aug 2020). However, the newspaper regularly reports on other attacks such as those in Roma, Quionga. Most of the reporting concerns the attack on Palma, where the town is overrun and the conflict is described as “escalating” (DM 13).

4.2.3. Responses

The third and most complicated theme is that of *responses*. The five main categories that make up this theme are the *international community response*; *SADC response (regional)*; *SA’s role in the response*; *Rwanda response* and *Mozambique Government response* (see table 2.1 for the detailed coding tree).

The first category is the *international community response*. Due to the detailed reporting on this topic, this category is actually divided into several subcategories. This was necessary in order to make sense of the various threads of reporting and to more clearly organise these. These subcategories are the *international community's role*; *statistics on the humanitarian crisis*; and *the effect on the international community*.

The first subcategory is made up of the *international community's role*, and is constituted of codes like: calls for the international community to intervene; reports by NGOs, such as Amnesty International and the African Commission for Human and People's Rights; and the role of the EU (DM 17; DM 3).

The second subcategory is *statistics on the humanitarian crisis*. This topic is reported on consistently throughout the year, with statistics unfortunately trending upwards over time as the intensity of the conflict increased. There is a focus on displaced people, civilian deaths, and the number of food insecure (DM 40). The consensus is that the humanitarian response has been a disaster, especially in the realm of the broader international response to the unfolding crisis.

The last subcategory of this category is *the effect on the international community*. This effect is identified as largely twofold. Firstly, the effect concerns the increased involvement of countries like the USA, France and Portugal, which sent arms and advisors to help manage the situation (DM 51). The second effect concerns the labelling of the group as 'terrorists' by international players, especially the USA, which according to the newspaper has put a target on the backs of the organisation, as well as making the situation more dangerous for aid workers.

The second category in the *response* theme is the *SADC regional response*. Like the first category, this is subdivided into several subcategories, namely; *condemnation*, *consultation* and *action*. There is a clear line of reporting that follows the developments and response by SADC as a regional body.

Often this regional block is harshly criticised in the DM reporting. *Condemnation* is in relation to the "corpse called SADC", which is taken to task for its seeming inaction in response to the crisis that was unfolding in one of its member states. The long time lapse before regional leaders met after the initial attack on Palma (nearly a month), as well as the negative effects of this delay, particularly on women and children, are often emphasised.

There is then a period of reporting labelled *consultation*. Here, the DM details the negotiations that SADC leaders had and provides ‘think pieces’ that examine if and how SADC should intervene (DM 19 and DM 21). There is notably little debate about whether SADC *shouldn’t* be involved, but rather the extent to which it should. There are reports of fears by President Nyusi of Mozambique that SADC will pursue its own agenda and undermine him.

The last subcategory is that of *action*. This subcategory discusses the actions that SADC eventually ended up taking. There is plenty of discussion on the 3000 troops that were sent, as well as the types of assets that will be deployed by the various nations (DM 30; DM 38 and DM 39). The reporting also considers whether the action that SADC takes will also pose a threat to the criminal elites, and the need to imagine a constructive amnesty process too (DM 44).

The third category in this theme is *SA’s role in the response*. Here the DM discusses whether SA is equipped to lead the mission, especially with large budget cuts to the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the arising July unrest.¹³ The DM also expresses a fear that because SA is taking the lead, this could lead to it acting in a new imperialist fashion in the region (DM 45 and DM 60).

There is also a separate subcategory for the *Rwanda response* (DM 50). This is simply due to the DMs intense focus on Rwanda’s actions in relation to SA’s, as well as the broader response by SADC. The DM’s narrative is that Rwanda outsmarted SADC and SA by having its police and army forces deployed first and its actions came as a surprise to SA and the wider region (DM 47). The DM views this as an embarrassment to the regional hegemon.

The last category of this theme is that of the *Mozambique government response*. This category is made up of two subcategories; firstly, that of *government corruption and neglect*; and secondly, the *government’s military response*. In the first instance, the DM offers discussion about the ineffective Mozambican government response that centres on civic neglect and corruption (i.e., allowing elites to extract resources in a sort of “comrades agreement” (DM 34). The DM also refers to the “parasitic governing class” in Maputo (DM 34 and DM 40) and the local name for the region, ‘Cabo Esquecido’ or ‘forgotten cape’ (DM 36). They often use the phrase, “O cabrito come onde está amarrado” (a goat eats where it is

¹³ A series of riots and looting in the Gauteng and Kwa-Zulu Natal provinces. This led to the deaths of hundreds of people and billions of Rands in damage and theft. The army had to be deployed for several weeks to restore public order.

tethered) (DM 5). This is way of bemoaning the corruption in the region and the neglect that is felt on the ground in Cabo Delgado.

In the second instance, the DM concerns itself with the *Mozambique government response*, which focuses on the turf wars between the police, military, and private security companies. The DM posits that groups such as the Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) and Wagner Group indicate an incapacity of the state to effectively respond to the crisis in its northern most regions (DM 18 and DM 31). This is seen in reports carried by the DM of the Mozambique army running out of ammunition and retreating or being overrun. There is also a contestation that the military responses were the wrong approach, especially with regard to addressing the underlying social issues in the region. Early on in the DM reporting, there is a fear of ‘Iraqification’ of the security situation, especially with the emergent terrorism narrative. This narrative is hypothesised to be used to increase support for the Mozambican government and increase international aid (DM 23). This quote from DM 5 provides a clear summation and general thrust of the reporting on the government response in the in the DM corpus, “Goatism, Covid-19, turf wars, sheer incompetence, excessive sensitivity about sovereignty and regional hesitancy are all continuing to hinder the effort to push back the persistent jihadist insurgency in northern Mozambique”.

4.2.4. Live reporting

The last theme in the DM’s reportage of the crisis is *live reporting*. This theme was created in order to unpack the way that events occurring around the attack on Palma were reported, as close to real time as possible. At the time of the attack, there were many articles produced in rapid succession to cover the unfolding attack and the events that occurred just after this attack.

The first category in this theme is *detail of the attack*. Here there is a close monitoring of the basic facts of the attack, such as its location; the involvement of foreign nationals; and the attempted escape from the Amarula Lodge (DM 16).

The second category of this theme concerns the *detail of weapons* involved. Here there is an often quite expansive discussion regarding the types of arms and armaments that were involved in the attack and the way these weapons were used. The use of private military forces and sophistication of the attackers also received ample attention (DM 180).

The final category looks more closely at the details of the *evacuation*. This was referred to by the DM as ‘Dunkirk 2.0’, with the army only arriving late on the scene. The DM reported many people, including civilians, contractors, and tourists being evacuated by boat, with one boat having as many as 1,300 people on it (DM 12 and DM 16).

4.3. The Guardian

Identical to the DM, the TG has the same four themes in its reports. However, these themes come from a much smaller data set of fifteen articles. To recap, these themes are: i) *the conflict in relation to natural resources, especially natural gas*; ii) *the role of ‘terrorists’*; iii) *responses*; and iv) *live reporting*.

TG reporting, unlike the DM, is not singularly dominated by one person. Rather, Jason Burke has five articles (accounting for a third of the sample size), followed by Kaamil Ahmed and Peter Beaumont (three articles each). Jason Burke is a foreign correspondent based in Johannesburg and has published several books on “Islamist extremism”. The rest of the reporting is by various other staff writers.

4.3.1. The conflict in relation to natural gas

This first TG theme, *the conflict in relation to natural resources, especially natural gas*, is one of the strongest and most prevalent. It is made up of four categories and fifteen different types of code, and presents some of the newspaper’s key arguments (i.e., that the costs to the UK are high; that the UK should not be involved; and that the discovery and attempt to exploit this natural resource are to blame for the emerging security crises in the region).

The first category making up this theme is *who, where, how much*, which alludes to the main actors involved in the region and the main investments that the UK has made. The second category is *apportioning blame to gas*, which links the discovery and development of gas to the worsening conflict. The third category is that *the UK should not be involved*. There are some very explicit calls for the UK not to be involved in the region and not to further gas developments. TG sees the expansion of the gas fields as incompatible with the climate accords and previous promises made by the UK government. The final category of this theme is *fighting in relation to gas*. TG provides a lot of commentary about the way in which the fighting is related to the gas fields, often negating other local geographies such as nearby towns, as well as descriptions of exclusion zones and racial discrimination in evacuation processes, as these are deemed to be of less importance than the large gas investments.

4.3.2. The role of 'terrorists'

The second TG theme is *the role of 'terrorists'*. Within the reporting by TG there is a heavy emphasis on what are referred to as 'terrorists'. The nature of the conflict, as discussed by TG, does evolve over time, but ultimately comes down to the fundamental concept of 'terrorism'.

The first category under this theme is *insurgency/links to terrorism*. There is initial ambiguity within this theme, where the conflict belligerents are called rebels/terrorists interchangeably (TG 10). This then hardens into usage of 'Islamist militants/insurgents' or 'Islamic extremist rebels'. The references to Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and IS are made interchangeably when describing the group's formation, and there is debate around the strength of the group's links to international terrorist organisations.

The second category is *increasing destruction and sophistication of perpetrators*. Within this category is a focus on the types and extent of destruction, as well as the methods and increasing co-ordination of the insurgency. There is a focus on the destruction of towns with "trails of destruction" and commentary observing that the insurgency has morphed from bandits to a well-organised and coordinated unit with an escalation of terror tactics such as beheadings. The TG notes that in some cases the police and military have been overrun, and there is a lack of co-ordination between the Mozambican government forces and private hired groups such as DAG (TG 7).

The third category is *beheadings and attacks on Christians*. At times, TG focuses on the religious aspect of the conflict, with specific reference to the effects on the Christian community. There was, in particular, a close description of the brutality of beheadings and numbers of beheadings (TG 17). TG posited that there had to be meticulous planning with a target against "crusader nations" (TG 13).

The fourth category is that of *girl abductions*. The TG's mention of 1000s of girls who had been abducted called to mind the abduction of Nigerian girls by Boko Haram in 2014 (TG 15). These girls were either made into child brides or trafficked. TG noted the description of young desirable girls as "noodles" by locals, which equated them to a rare commodity in the region, as well as the fact that they were forced to get a Qur'anic education in order for them to be made into more desirable wives.

4.3.3. Responses

The third TG theme is broadly classified as *responses*. This theme encompasses the TG's description of a *mental health crisis*, *humanitarian observations* and *role of the UK and West*.

Unlike the DM, TG focuses closely on the *mental health crisis* of the ongoing conflict (TG 4). In particular, TG considers the trauma that has been inflicted on civilians, with a focus on the way in which humanity and dignity has been stripped away. TG comments that, in some ways, the psychological distress is worse than the physical distress that people have suffered and that it is largely going unaddressed. There is also mention of USD\$12 million in aid that has been dispatched to support women and children.

Humanitarian observations is the second category of this theme, which includes such things as the large number of people who have been displaced (estimated to be roughly a quarter of the region's population, equating to 670,000 people) and the 2,600 people killed (TG 2). There is also mention of the way in which the Mozambican government committed reprisals and a concern that the deployment of government troops needs to take heed of the social, political and economic situation (TG 21).

The last category in this theme is the *role of UK and the West*. TG reports that the UK is concerned for the long-term stability of the region and that there must be a coming together of 'Africa' and the West in order to find a solution to the crisis. There is a recommendation that the use of any UK forces should consist of the newly re-organised UK forces, such as the rangers who are trained in counter insurgency. Fear is also expressed regarding the role of Russia—in particular, the agreement that was signed with Russia that brought in 200 soldiers from the Wagner Group (TG 13). This agreement was compared to Western support, which included the deployment of USA green berets and Portuguese special trainers to assist the Mozambican government.

4.3.4. Live reporting of the attack on Palma

The last theme for TG is the live reporting of the attack on Palma. This was a necessary theme to create as it is definitely distinct from the other reporting from the rest of the year. In a similar fashion to the DM, there was an increased focus and frequency of reporting around the attack on Palma. This served as a focal point in the crisis for TG.

The first category in this theme is the *attack and emotive language*. TG goes into quite close detail about the attack and often quotes directly from those who witnessed it (TG 7 and TG 9). There are descriptions of the number of vehicles used; the way in which people tried to

escape; and the subsequent ambushes. The language used here is far more emotive than in the rest of the reporting by TG. Descriptions such as “absolute bloodbath”, “did not expect to make it through the night”, and “total chaos” pepper the reporting, painting a grim and dark picture of the events unfolding in real time with first-hand accounts from witnesses describing their experiences (TG 7).

The second and final category in this theme concerns *evacuation and weapons*. Here, there is a close description of the weapons used, such as the DAG helicopters; the ships used for evacuation; and the mortar fire that shelled the hotel. These descriptions contribute to the lurid depiction of the events that unfolded (TG 8).

4.4. Nation

Nation, like the two other newspapers consists of four themes. Namely i) *context of conflict*, ii) *responses*, iii) *international humanitarian involvement* and iv) *role of ‘Terrorists’*. These four themes are based on a data set of 32 articles and broken down into 17 categories and 110 codes. See Table 2.3 for full detailed coding tree of Nation.

By far the largest contributor to the data from Nation is a staff writer called Arnaldo Vieira with 20 of the articles used authored by them. There are other opinion pieces by once off contributors such as Charles Onyango-Obbo and Michael Mugwang'a. The rest the articles are from other staff writers. This shows that the data set is largely made up from the views of one journalist.

4.4.1. Context of Conflict

The first theme of the reporting by Nation is the *context of the conflict*. Notably, this theme is different from both TG and DM whose first theme is *the conflict in relation to natural gas*. Nation reports a broader approach to presenting the conflict that is more decoupled from the discovery of natural gas reserves.

Despite this de-coupling the first category of this theme is that of *natural gas*. This is placed as a category because although natural gas plays a role in the reporting it is not omnipotent to the same degree as reporting in the DM and TG. This can be seen in N 6 and N 16 which carefully details the discovery of Gas and the role plays “...the Mozambique LNG Project (involving Total and previously Anadarko) worth \$20 billion; the Coral FLNG Project (involving Eni and Exxon Mobil) worth \$4.7 billion; and the Rovuma LNG Project (involving Exxon Mobil, Eni and CNPC) worth \$30 billion.”

The second category of this theme is *Overview of Cabo Delgado*. There is a more significant attempt to give a broader overview of the conflict in relation to the neglect that this region face again in DIN 6 which spends a great time giving an broader overview of the instability in the region and how Cabo Delgado has been “neglected” (N 6) with topics like the 16 year long Civil War in the country being discussed. There is also a discussion the need to build the region from scratch such as in N 35 and create conditions for a lasting peace (N 16).

The third category in this theme is the *timeline of events*. This is smaller category as there is not much dissection of the time line of the events in the reporting when compared to TG and DM. There are discussions on the original attack in 2017 especially on security services (N 4; N 7; N 48 and N 50). These three categories make up the theme of the *context of the conflict* providing clarity on the approach taken by Nation in “setting the scene”.

4.4.2. Responses

The second and largest theme is that of *responses*. This is made up of several categories and subcategories see Table 2.3 for further details. These categories are *response of SADC, US response, Rwandan Response and Mozambican Response*. These four Categories make up the theme of *Responses*.

The first Category of *Response of SADC* is made up in turn of three sub-categories. The first is *Details of meetings of SADC*. This is an account of the various meetings SADC had especially the Troika meetings as reported in N 11 starting with a “proportionate response to the threat” to “Jihadists” (N 12). The second sub-category is *How the threat is perceived*. There is plenty of detail on the way in which SADC perceives and understands the emerging threat in Cabo Delgado. The highlights are things such combating “Jihadists” (N 12) responding to “acts of terrorism” (N 23) and the “ISIS linked Insurgency” (N 24) where there is a need to deploy troops to “fight terrorists” (N 27 and N 41). The overall deteriorating security situation in the region where SADC intervenes and successfully “kills terrorists” (N 44) is reported on. The last and largest subcategory is the *Role of Troops*. Nation focuses on the role of SADC troops in the region looking at the actual numbers (N 24; N 25; N 27 and N 40), the costs of the deployment and processes to get troops to Cabo Delgado and the creation of SAMIN (N 36). There is not much interrogation if this is the right course of action.

The next category is the *US response*. This focuses on the various interventions from the deployment of marines and special forces (N 34) to the designation of the grouping as a terrorist organisation (N 2). There is also a tracking of US training particularly of officers (N

39). There is a strong focus on the US intervention as opposed to other international actors, which leads to the next category.

The *Rwandan Response* is the next category that makes up the theme of Responses. This is its own category due to the heavy focus the actions of Rwanda. Here Nation is interested specifically with the with the speed in which Rwanda was able to deploy security forces such as 1000 police officers (N 27; N 2; N 29 and N 41), the entering of bilateral agreements outside of SADC interventions (N 27) and the state visit of Kagame to Nyusi (N 39). There is a focus and contrast between the Rwandan support and other support given by SADC and US is stark in the reporting by Nation.

This brings us to the final category of this theme, which is the *Mozambican response*. There are two subcategories that make up this response. Firstly, *Nyusi response* and secondly, *Broader Mozambican government response*. This will be discussed in detail below. *Nyusi response* focusing in especially on the apprehension of the president of Mozambique at the time (N 24). His initially blaming of Renamo (N 2) and use of language such as “rebels” (N 16). Nation tracks how this use of language changes over time to “armed groups” (N 21), “militants” (N 22) to pledges of “Victory over insurgents and criminals” made on Independence day to victory over the “terrorists” (N 29). There was also specific interest in the friendship between Mozambique and Rwanda and the praise Nyusi heaped on the Rwandan intervention (N 40). The *Mozambican government response* subcategory looks more broadly at the prime ministers governmental response, the need for investments into the Northern Crises Recovery Project (N 35) and the need as mentioned by the prime minister for “\$300 million to rebuild Cabo Delgado” N 42 as opposed to Nyusi’s response specifically.

4.4.3. International Humanitarian Involvement

The third theme in this theme is *International humanitarian involvement*. It is made up of three categories. Firstly, *Displacement and killing of civilians* secondly, *International concern about healthcare facilities* and lastly, *International aid financing*.

The first category documents the *Displacement and killing of civilians* in the region, specifically with focus on the number of displaced people, civilians killed or facing hunger with numbers starting at 300 000 (N 1) and escalating as high as 800 000 (N 24). Lobbying for the evacuation of civilians (N 35) and the lifting of the stopping of movement of people are also mentioned (DIN 31).

The second category is the *international concern about healthcare*. Here there is a substantial discussion on the affects the conflict is having on the access to primary healthcare facilities in the region with mention of up 1/3 of the province of Cab Delgado's health facilities closing and over 1.2 million (N 20) people being in need of health assistance and 950 000 people facing severe hunger facing food insecurity (N 18). This is mentioned by organisations like WHO (N 20) and Human Rights Watch (N 31).

The third category is the *International aid financing*. This category focuses on the amounts of aid that international actors believe are needed in responses. Such as \$3.5 million in donor support (N 20) or \$39 million invested by the USA in socio-economic projects in Cabo Delgado (N 2). Bigger figures are the \$100 million that the International Development Association made available and the even bigger \$700 million that the World Bank "unlocks" (N 35).

4.4.4. Role of 'Terrorists'

This last theme is made up of four categories. Starting with the *leadership of the group, radicalisation of the youth, names for the activities of the insurgency, descriptions of the violence with focus on the beheadings*. These comprehensively make up the last theme of Nation reporting which is *the role of 'Terrorists'*.

The first category unpacks tracks the Nation's reporting on the leaders of the grouping active in Cabo Delgado. Mention leaders like Abu Yasi Hassom also known as Hasan who the leaders are of the grouping, while tracking their pledge to ISIS in 2018. (N 2 and N 4).

This is closely linked to the second category which is the radicalisation of the youth. Nation in particular picks up on this point of the role of the youth (DIN 4; DIN 6; DIN 30).

The third category is the name for the insurgency ranging from Jihadist Attack (N 1) "Terrorists" (N 2), *Ansa al Sunnah* (N 4) "Insurgency" "Islamist Insurgency" (N 6 and N 25), "Armed groups (N 21) and Militants (N 11 and N 22) IS linked Insurgency (N 23). These names are often used interchangeability with very little distinction made between them. Although there is a more numerous uses of the "jihadist/terrorist" phrasing as the reporting continues throughout the year.

The fourth category is the *descriptions of violence with a focus on beheadings*. There is a very strong focus by Nation on the types of violence and in particular the beheadings that took place and violence towards children. This is extremely prevalent even more so than

other types of violence such as rape. There is a constant reporting on the escalating violence (N 18) and the reporting go beheading of civilians (N 18) and then the focus on kidnapping and behead go children (N 21 and N 22).

4.5. The Frames

4.5.1 Dominant Frame: 'kill terrorists' a military threat requires a military solution

These themes from all three newspapers can be refined into two broad frames. The first of these is that the activities carried out by ASWJ in Cabo Delgado (and specifically during the attack in Palma) were caused by 'terrorists', 'insurgents', or 'Islamic radicals', and whose use violence and religious fundamentalism. This 'terrorist' threat is responsible for the violence and it needs to be quickly and harshly confronted.

The invoked solution to this threat is that of military intervention in the region. For the DM, this intervention is more focused on SADC, while TG is more concerned with the role of the West's involvement and the "International" Response. For Nation the focus although inclusive of SADC and particularly US involvement focuses heavily on the involvement of Rwanda. The problem is clearly and strongly defined as a military one with close links to the resources of the region in all three newspapers.

4.5.2. Additional Frame: "Hope turned to ash" Gas and natural resources fuelled the fire of conflict

Similarly, what I term additional frame of this threat being caused and in direct relation to the natural resources is present. This frame is a sort of addendum and to the "terrorist" threat but none the less still equally potent in all three reporting but especially in that of TG and DM.

The invoked solution is to secure these resources for the benefit of 'the people' and 'development'. However, the only pathway to this solution is through the use of military force. In particular with the assistance of outside forces to re-assert control of the region and assist the weak and failing Mozambican government.

4.5.3. Oppositional Frame: "Cabo Esquecido" the forgotten Cape, neglect must be fixed with development

The weaker oppositional frame consists of a more holistic view that considers temporal, contextual and socio-political issues. There is a focus on the neglect that the province has experienced, the feeling of alienation by young people.

The solution invoked is that there is a need for a political and humanitarian solution rather than a military one. That the long term solution is development here. For instance, TG raises the question of mental health and environmental fall out, topics which are not broached by the DM. While Nation remains mum on most of the oppositional frame beyond providing for a broader context to the conflict.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has sought to unpack the findings from the data of the study. This data was analysed using qualitative inductive TA. All newspapers were described as having four main themes present in their reporting, though the number of articles considered for each paper was not equal and subsequently the number of codes and sub categories varied.

Though the main themes were the same for both TG and DM papers Nation differed in the first theme providing a broader context which was not as focused on Natural Gas as well as a theme of International Humanitarian Response. Between all three newspapers there were some differences within the categories and subcategories. For instance, the DM featured far more reporting on the response to the crisis while TG focused more on the humanitarian and psychological fallout and the Nation on specific violence such as beheadings.

Overall, the dominant and additional frames of the crisis for all papers were the same and strongly present. The first of which is that this was a ‘terrorist’ issue involving the need for a military response and the need to secure the province (and natural resources therein) militarily. However, it was also noted that this dominant and additional frame was occasionally tempered by an oppositional frame that spoke of a more holistic approach to the crisis in the region that ought to factor in more than pure military considerations. The next chapter looks more closely at these themes and frames.

Chapter Five

Discussion: Changing conflict, old frames

The previous chapter presented evidence that the DM, TG and *Nation* share dominant and oppositional frames and the solutions they invoke of reporting about the crisis in Cabo Delgado. This chapter delves into these findings with an emphasis on analysing them and highlighting their importance. This is done in two main sections the first, and most important, is a longer section on the analysis of the findings of the main and oppositional frames using the literature to unpack what these frames and invoked solutions mean. The second section has a briefer discussion on the type of reporting done by the newspapers in question. These two sections complement each other while also situating the findings from the previous chapter in conversation with the literature examined in Chapter Three.

5. 1. Changing conflict, old Frames

To briefly reiterate the findings: The dominant frame from the findings section are firstly, *'kill terrorists' a military threat requires a military solution*, with an additional frame of *"Hope turned to ash" Gas and natural resources fuelled the fire of conflict*. The oppositional frame of *"Cabo Esquecido" the forgotten Cape where neglect must be fixed with development*, is also present in reporting. These frames and the solutions they invoke are present in varying degrees throughout the entire corpus of data that was collated from the three newspapers under investigation.

It must be noted that both dominant, additional and oppositional frames can be present in the reporting of the newspapers simultaneously and can be at internal conflict with each other in the corpus of data. This is the nature of the newspaper reporting especially where there are different journalists with varying perspectives. This covers some of these internal contradictions that are present.

5.1.1. Dominant frame: 'kill terrorists,' a military threat requires a military solution

The role of 'terrorists' is also a pivotal focus, particularly in the DM and the Nation. This is above and beyond other labels such as "Jihadist Insurgents". This framing, rooted in the Global War on Terror, erases local context and history, perpetuating a narrative that culminates in a military response. TG, while also emphasising 'terrorism', contributes to the

oppositional frame, highlighting a critique of ASWJ's links to IS and acknowledging the role of unemployed youth.

After establishing the proximity of the conflict to the ongoing question of natural gas, the role of 'terrorists' is centrally expanded on. The DM in particular, strongly and often uncritically links the violence in the region to 'terrorism' and makes frequent reference to the term "Jihadist insurgents". This labelling is an important part of building a narrative of *military crisis* but ignores much of the context or developments that led to the increase in violence in Cabo Delgado. Similarly, Nation focus very closely on the 'terrorists' threat with a gruesome focus on the extreme violence committed in the region. Particularly that of beheadings. The terminology of 'terrorism' has immense staying power and is used both by newspapers, the Mozambican government and regional bodies like SADC. The quick adoption by both the Mozambican government and SADC is also noteworthy in this context as it legitimises the inevitable response they opt for, a massive military intervention.

The endurance of the term 'terrorist' is particularly of note within the media space, and has a two-fold nature. One facet of the uncritical use of the term 'terrorist' or 'terrorism' is that tends to automatically invoke the idea of a military response. When 'terrorist' is mentioned nowadays, it cannot be thought of outside of the Global War on Terror, as mentioned by Mamdani (2002) where there are strong links to ideas of "bad Muslims". It is no coincidence that Cabo Delgado is the only majority Muslim province in Mozambique and the originator of the new 'terrorist' threat to the entire region. The frame is extremely easily constructed.

An important inflection point that is strongly focused on by both the reporting of the DM and TG and mentioned by Nation is the US designation of the ASWJ as a terrorist organisation. The acceptance of this designation opens the way for a form of deep erasure; the erasure of local context or grievance; and the erasure of history and future—for there is no future or place for a 'terrorist' except in a hole in the ground and the notion that "we do not negotiate with terrorists" is almost a trope. It is also a strong international single in the context for the global war on terror for the types of only 'reasonable' response to terrorists- their total elimination militarily. Seamlessly the focus shifts to the military interventions of the likes of SADC. The solution to the problem is to get rid of the 'terrorist' or as Mamdani terms it "the bad Muslim" This attitude and use of the term therefore leaves no room for a deeper introspection about what the actual political grievances may be and how these can be overcome in a long term and sustainable way.

As mentioned, TG comments extensively on the IS/'terrorist' nature of the conflict and uses a variety of terms to describe it and those involved (such as, "rebels", "Islamist militants", "festering insurgency", "Islamic extremist rebels" and "unchecked havoc"), painting a picture of chaos. But in addition to these descriptors, the paper focuses closely on the gruesome nature of their activities, such as beheadings, abductions of girls and attacks on Christians. The subtext is that this requires a response and, in particular, one that follows the logic of the War on Terror where participants are thought of simply as thoughtless, faceless killing machines (Kothari, 2010). That although this extreme violence is repulsive, a type of strictly military response will not solve the deep underlying societal issues. Naturally, the solution to deal with this problem is then the use of force. In the case of TG, force is that which must come through and be guided by the international community and, by proxy, the West. There is little mention of the role of regional hegemony such as South Africa or Rwanda, or likewise regional formations such as SADC or the African Union (AU).

The identification of the problem as a military one is supported by comments such as this from the DM: "dissident, rebellious, and non-state actor forces undermined the democratic peace and credentials of the region" (DIN 19). This line of thinking is often connected to terrorist movements and their activity in so called 'de-territorial' spaces (Clapham, 2003: 25). This is where governance is weak and state authority is easily challenged. The concern of SADC here is that this will lead to an escalating conflict and spread of 'terrorism' through the region. It sets itself up as a self-explaining logic that in order to restore order, these spaces need to come under effective governance by military force. The following quote is from the joint statement of SADC, 9th April 2021:

...noted with concern, the acts of terrorism perpetrated against innocent civilians, women and children in some of the districts of Cabo Delgado Province of the Republic of Mozambique; condemned the terrorist attacks in strongest terms; and affirmed that such heinous attacks cannot be allowed to continue without a proportionate regional response.

The proportional response consisted of the deployment of 3 000 troops to the region, including land, marine and air assets. There is evidence here of a type of feedback loop, where media reporting emphasises the extreme danger posed by a group and regional bodies begin to act. This, in turn, moves the media into a further frenzy feeling "proven" in its analysis of the grave danger the group poses and the reinforcement of the "common sense"

frame of the need for a military response. This closely follows the warning of Tucker to be wary of frames that pass themselves off as “common-sense” (1998) This frenzy in turn misses a more holistic approach that takes into context the deeper history of the region, the failures of the government in addressing long standing issues of neglect and the extractive nature of the many foreign companies that are present in the region.

While both calling for responses of some sort of other, there are small divergences in the types of response demanded by the DM, TG and *Nation*. The DM focuses heavily on the regional response, and reserves particular criticism for SADC’s lethargy (the “corpse called SADC”). The DM further documents and criticises the process of consultation, noting that the “SADC response is lacking”. In addition, the government response is heavily criticised and largely written off as inadequate and unlikely to change. The “Comrade’s agreement” or “goatism” is referenced to describe the deep-seated issue of corruption. Likewise, the military is seen as incompetent, but it is equally noted that “private military contractors are not the solution”.

The intense focus on the failure of both government and SADC by DM seems to also negate the global environment that these, firstly regional, and then national blocs, operate in. While it is true that the SADC response seemed slow, this may have been over fear of undermining a further fragile sovereignty. The government’s response and the corruption that is often reported on could also be interpreted as the result of a creep of ‘economies of violence’ and fears about the way that other regional actors might become involved.

Nation response more closely aligns with that of DM. Although here is a discussion on the SADC response and deployment of SAMIN, it pales in comparison to the DMs in depth reporting. Instead *Nation* has a particular focus on the response and involvement of Rwanda. These differences are interesting as they focus on the closer regional hegemon, in the case of DM, South Africa and the case of *Nation*, Rwanda. *Nation* focuses on the speed of the Rwandan response – which sets this up as beating South Africa and SADC.

Rwanda has announced that it will deploy 1,000 soldiers to Cabo Delgado Province in Mozambique to help the southern African country tackle terrorism. A statement issued by Kigali Friday said the move followed a request from Mozambique ... The troops ... will also help restore state authority in the troubled province, the government said. Thousands have been killed and others displaced due to insecurity

in the gas-rich region since 2017 after terror attacks linked to Islamic militants who go by the name al-Shabaab ... (N 29).

Although on the surface this statement may look somewhat uninteresting, there are several important things happening here: Firstly, there is no critical analysis of the role of troops and ‘terrorists’, portraying the deployment of these troops as common sense enforcing the main frame of this conflict. Secondly, there is also the casual link to gas made here again, reinforcing the additional frame. So in a relatively short time frame paragraph the two main frames of are quickly reinforced and established.

TG instead focused on the humanitarian response and the need for the “West and Africa to work together”. This approach emphasises a deeper internationalisation of this conflict (Duffield, 2002). On the surface of things, this more holistic approach may be mistakenly understood to fall into the oppositional frame of reporting. However, this “working together” is ultimately in response to a perceived military issue—placing it back into the dominant frame of reporting. In short, the response is that this issue could be “solved” with more military intervention. It details the UK’s military capabilities and the number of training troops sent by the US and Portugal to help train up the Mozambican army. Interestingly, Russia’s involvement is also strongly identified as undermining the UK’s interests. It should be at least considered that this example of the West and Mozambique working together is fundamentally a geopolitical play to secure UK interests and prevent the spread of Russian influence. There is no mention of long-term solutions or paths to a lasting peace that take into account a holistic view of the unfolding conflict—only that the military operation needs to go ahead.

5.1.2. Additional Frame: “Hope turned to ash” Gas and natural resources fuelled the fire of conflict per usual

This frame of the conflict is not a surprising finding nor is it necessarily ground-breaking, what it does confirm is that the media still actively maintain the frame of resources in Africa as a curse, that are to blame where conflicts flair up. It is termed as an additional frame as it acts as a dominant frame adjacent, continuously present but not as omnipresent as the main dominant frame identified. The use of “additional” in this case is to establish a degree of separation.

The reporting in the DM and TG both universally link the conflict to the discovery of substantial natural gas deposits in the region, as well as some other minor resources in the case of the DM and for *Nation* there is a similarity and divergence. The DM robustly blames the role of gas development in the region for the escalating violence, especially the extractive elitist nature in which it is being managed. The paper notes that the “extractive governance” of multinational companies has led to increasing unhappiness in the region. The escalating violence is attributed to the extractive nature of gas development locally termed ‘goatism’,¹⁴ and multinational companies’ governance practices, aligning closely with the concept of a resource curse as discussed by Laudati (2013) The TG, it is reported that the conflict began because of “displacement” and “exacerbating conditions” caused by tensions in the discovery of natural Gas. *Nation* attempts to provide a broader discussion but gets drawn into the role of natural gas especially that of the international actors.

Both the TG and DM in particular are guilty of using the gas project as a baseline to enter into the conversation, making the idea that natural resources have been a curse—this is an extremely strong frame throughout their reporting and a present frame in the reporting of *Nation*. This idea links strongly to the discussion by Laudati (2013) that African nations in particular are “cursed” with natural resources that invariably lead to some sort of conflict and destabilisation. That these resources only act to fuel conflict further and as such as not a net positive. It is also noteworthy that this frame does not make much attempt to look more deeply into the conflict dynamics. There is no sizeable effort to see if the conflict unfolds in similar ways to theories such as Collier and Hoefeller’s (2004) “Greed vs Grievance” or even Dunn’s (2001) “economies of violence’ theory. This demonstrates a lack of deeper understanding and thinking around the conflict on the part of the framing of this conflict that is never addressed in the reporting fully by the newspapers.

There is never an article that does not mention the role of gas in the conflict in DM and TG. Almost all aspects of the conflict are linked to it, whether via government corruption; the evacuation of workers; or the suggested goals of the insurgency in the region. This issue forms part of the core of both frames, which seek to establish the role of the conflict in relation to gas, but offer very different solutions to overcoming it.

¹⁴ This term is from a local saying in Cabo Delgado, “O cabrito come onde está amarrado” (a goat eats where it is tethered). This means that local officials can only profit (‘eat’) from what is within their purview. See DM5.

The strong emphasis on natural gas as the cornerstone of the conflict narrows the scope of media the media frame, often side-lining other critical dimensions of the insurgency. While both *DM* and *TG* highlight the extractive nature of resource development, their framing largely avoids a more comprehensive analysis of underlying social, political, and historical factors contributing to the crisis. While the invoked solution is twofold both unsaid. One that the natural resources need to be protected militarily and that this is an unfortunate but predictable outcome for African states- that they invariably are unable to develop their immense natural resources to the benefit of their people and that conflict always ensues.

5.1.3. Oppositional Frame “*Cabo Esquecido*” the forgotten Cape where neglect must be fixed with development

The weaker oppositional frame presents a more holistic perspective on the conflict in Cabo Delgado, incorporating temporal, contextual, and socio-political dimensions. This frame highlights the chronic neglect experienced by the province, particularly the alienation felt by its younger population. It shifts the focus from a purely militaristic approach to one that emphasizes political and humanitarian solutions, advocating for a long-term developmental strategy to address the root causes of unrest and fallout of the conflict.

The solution invoked is that there is a need for a political and humanitarian solution rather than a military one with a longer-term view that development is needed. For instance, *TG* raises the question of mental health and environmental fall out, topics which are not broached by the *DM*. Similarly *Nation* raises issues of the collapse of health services in the province as a fall out from the conflict. *Nation* also gives a longer over view of the ongoing neglect by the people faced in the province helping o contextualise the conflict beyond that of the reductionist term of ‘terrorism’.

TG casts some doubt on *ASWJ*’s links to *IS*, while simultaneously noting that unemployed youth play a substantial role due to their feelings of neglect towards the government. For instance, the papers go as far as suggesting that there is “no evidence the insurgency is any large part composed of, or led by foreign fighters” and that it is the “youth uprising that has become militarised”. It is, however, interesting that there are attempts to complicate the narrative, unsubstantial as they may be.

Even *DM*, although firmly entrenched in the more militaristic frame provides glimpses of this oppositional frame by its exploration of terms such as *Goatism*, and *Cabo Esquecido*

(forgotten cape) these are linguist manifestations of the long term neglect and under development in the region coupled with a belief that the government is corrupt and uncaring.

There was almost no formal employment; there was almost no formal development; nearly seven out of 10 residents were illiterate. Locals called their home “Cabo Esquecido”. The Forgotten Cape. DM 36.

This oppositional frame links to the discussion by Verhoeven, that there is need to understand the broader power imbalances and contexts that help shape the way in which frames are constructed of the conflict in Cabo Delgado. These longer form of contexts ranges from the imbalances of colonialism, the long drawn out civil war, chronic neglect and and broader links to IS and the ‘War on Terror’.

While these efforts to complicate the narrative are valuable, they remain underdeveloped and overshadowed by dominant frames. The overall reluctance of media outlets to fully engage with such perspectives highlights the limitations of the oppositional frame and the strength of the dominant frames of ‘terrorism’ and resource curse.

5.2. Live Reporting and the CNN Effect

Both papers give summative assessments of the attack on Palma, the subsequent siege of Amarula Lodge and the ambush of those who tried to escape. This intense focus on the attack that unfolded is a clear demonstration of “CNN Effect” (Hawkins, 2011). As mentioned, the DM focuses closely on the weapons used by DAG and describes the evacuation as Dunkirk 2.0. There is also condemnation of the international community and its lack of help during the attack.

Although there is a similar focus on the attack with regard its somewhat summative assessment of the situation, TG differs significantly here in its use of on the ground reporting, emotive language and quotes. This type of emotive reporting makes use of eye witness accounts and quotes such as, “[We] did not expect to make it through the night” or, “Those trapped spelled out S.O.S. with white washed stones” and, “How the hell was this allowed to happen”. This use of quotes and a dramatic creation of ‘the scene’ ties in extremely closely with how the media often falls into the trap of the CNN Effect in the way that it reports on issues (Robinson, 2011). Describing the attack on the hotel and subsequent evacuation as an “absolute bloodbath” and “total chaos” further supports this dramatisation. This style of crisis reporting (Strauss, 2007) by TG, in particular, ultimately only heightens the crisis and shifts

focus squarely onto the barbaric nature of the conflict. The media needs to find the most riveting aspects of stories to gain readership. Thus, these dramatic first-hand accounts pass the internal test of what is 'newsworthy'. The experience of locals negated as all these accounts come from foreigners.

Lastly, the live reporting on the attack in both papers showcases the "CNN Effect", where both news outlets offer summative assessments, but TG is distinguished by its emotive language and dramatic on-the-ground reporting. This news style, focusing on the human experience, intensifies the crisis and reinforces the perception of an imminent need for a military response.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter underscores the complex interplay of dominant and oppositional frames in media coverage of the Cabo Delgado crisis, revealing how these frames not only shape public understanding but also reinforce specific narratives and solutions. In essence, this examination of media narratives reveals the complexities of conflict reporting, emphasising the importance of critically analysing framing, biases, and the impact of journalistic choices in shaping public perceptions. The dominant frames—"Kill Terrorists" and "Hope Turned to Ash"—highlight the media's reliance on familiar tropes of military intervention in the face of 'terrorism' and African resource curses, while the oppositional frame, "Cabo Esquecido," provides a counterpoint by emphasizing neglect and the need for development-focused holistic response to the unfolding crises. However, as the analysis demonstrates even oppositional frames often remain entangled with dominant narratives.

A recurring theme across the three newspapers is the portrayal of Cabo Delgado as a conflict inherently tied to a threat of 'terrorism' and the discovery of natural gas, perpetuating a reductive lens through which the crisis is viewed. The persistent framing of resources as a "curse" underscores long-standing stereotypes about African nations, reinforcing ideas of failed states and inevitable conflict. Similarly, the uncritical adoption of the "terrorist" label erases local grievances and context, embedding the crisis within the broader narrative of a resurgent Global War on Terror and normalising militarised responses to crises. These frames narrow the discourse, side-lining nuanced analyses of the historical, political, and socioeconomic drivers of the insurgency and thus similarly narrowing the proposed 'solutions'.

The chapter also highlights the media's role in creating a feedback loop between reporting and policy. By amplifying frames that focus on 'terrorism', resource conflict and conflict, the media in a typical CNN effect acts as a legitimising force for the actions of regional and international actors who prioritise military solutions. This dynamic not only sustains but reinforces the dominant frame, at the expense of alternative approaches that address the root causes of the crisis.

Ultimately, this chapter illustrates the limitations of media framing in fostering a holistic understanding of the events unfolding in Cabo Delgado. The interplay of dominant and oppositional frames reveals the tension between maintaining established narratives and addressing the multifaceted realities of the conflict. While the oppositional frame "Cabo Esquecido" attempts to advocate for development and long-term solutions, it is often overshadowed and falls short of challenging the underlying assumptions of dominant frames in the reporting. This underscores the need for more critical, context-sensitive reporting that transcends entrenched narratives and paves the way for more comprehensive and sustainable responses to conflicts in the region and Africa as a whole.

By situating these findings within the broader literature, the chapter challenges readers to reconsider the role of media in shaping public and policy discourse. It invites further inquiry into how media framing can evolve to better reflect the complexities of 21st-century conflicts, ensuring that the voices and experiences of affected communities are not overshadowed by reductive frames of conflict. In doing so, it sets the stage for a more nuanced understanding of the events unfolding in Cabo Delgado and the critical role of journalism in conflict reporting.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

The aim of this study was to conduct an in-depth investigation on the media framing of the conflict in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique by three newspapers. Importantly, beyond identifying the main and oppositional frames this study sought to investigate the invoked solutions that these frames employed to the unfolding conflict. The conflict in Cabo Delgado, ongoing since 2017, gained prominence when ASJW affiliated themselves with IS in 2019 and they launched a series of attacks culminating capture of Palma in 2021 close to recently discovered gas fields. This led to a large uptick in reporting and a broader regional military response.

The thesis identified a dominant frame, additional frame and an oppositional media frame and their invoked solutions present in reporting. The findings of the study show that the dominant frame and invoked solution is that of *'kill terrorists' a military threat requires a military solution* with an additional frame and invoked solution of *"Hope turned to ash" Gas and natural resources fuelled the fire of conflict*. The oppositional frame and invoked is *"Cabo Esquecido" the forgotten Cape, neglect must be fixed with development*.

This study has shown through the use of rigorous inductive qualitative TA that all three newspapers under investigation namely, TG, DM and *Nation* broadly fell into the identified dominant, additional and oppositional frames of reporting. Furthermore, that these newspapers respectively have four main themes identified in their reporting. These themes carefully dissected the reporting by each newspaper and allowed for the identification of the frames.

This research found that support for a military response was, crucially, foregrounded by the portrayal of the attack in relation to 'terrorist' activities. By framing the attack in this way, there appeared to be a lack of emphasis on the humanitarian aspect of the crisis, and a focus instead on the need for a military intervention to regain control of the situation. It was consistently portrayed as common sense that the appropriate response to the Palma attack should have been a military one. There was an intense focus on the shock and sophistication of the 'terrorist' attack, which was used to advocate for heavier military responses.

The of role of natural resources and in particular that of natural gas was an additional frame main frame thought-out the reporting of all newspapers. This easily fell into the trope of Africa as being ‘cursed’ with resources, the state as weak and a failure and ultimately ensuing conflict as an inevitability.

The newspapers often neglected to consider the longer term contextual issues affecting the region, or else considered them as inconsequential. For instance, little discussion was given to the issues of government corruption, youth unemployment or the religious tensions that have built up to this conflict over the decades. This study has sought to particular problematise this type of dominant framing of the conflict. It has done so in order to show that these types of conflicts, despite media framing, have far deeper historical and contextual roots than ‘terrorists’, ‘bad Muslims’ and “resource curses”.

This study shows however that there is a weaker oppositional frame present. This frame attempts to take into account a more holistic view of the conflict and sought to address the political grievances and unfolding humanitarian crisis in the region with this in mind. This oppositional frame points to the longer-term view of government corruption, and neglect of local populace as key drivers of the conflict and advocates for a longer term vision to restore peace to the region beyond military interventions.

This nuance continued with attempts to complicate the one dimensional “Islamic insurgency” narrative that took no account of the broader political and economic factors in the region. The media responses that were cognizant of these complications provided a more holistic view of the solutions to the conflict. This focus on the immediate humanitarian response and a longer term political solution to the 'terrorist' threat. It must be noted though that this oppositional frame was often over powered by the much more omnipresent dominant frames and reflects on just how entrenched these types of frames are within the realm of conflict reporting.

This study demonstrates that media framing of the Cabo Delgado crisis is not merely a reflection of reality but a powerful construct that shapes perceptions, policy, and potential solutions. The persistent framing of the crisis through the dual lenses of ‘terrorism’ and resource exploitation reflects broader stereotypes about Africa while sidelining the nuanced realities of local grievances, historical injustices, and socioeconomic drivers. By challenging these frames, this study advocates for a media landscape that prioritizes critical, context-sensitive reporting capable of fostering sustainable and inclusive solutions.

It is hoped that this study has shed some light on the normative frames adopted by mainstream Western media when reporting on conflict in the Global South, and especially Southern Africa. Further research on conflict reporting would be useful to interrogate the subject more comprehensively. This could be done using a larger data set from different media outlets or even within this corpus of data a focused study on the use of image with alongside that of text in newspapers.

This work invites scholars, journalists, and policymakers to reconsider the role of media in conflict reporting. It underscores the need for a nuanced approach to media studies, one that amplifies the voices of affected communities and moves beyond reductive narratives. In doing so, it lays the groundwork for future research to further interrogate how media framing influences not just the understanding of African conflicts but also the pathways toward their resolution. The lessons drawn from this study extend beyond Cabo Delgado, offering insights into the broader dynamics of media, conflict, and power in the 21st century.

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Appendices

Table 1.1: Document Organisation

Daily Maverick							
DI N	Publication	Date	Title	Author; Article Category	Duplicate	Exclude for other reason	Include
DM 1	Daily Maverick	21 Jan 2021	Pretoria puzzled by Mozam's silence on aid to fight Islamist insurgency	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 2	Daily Maverick	31 Jan 2021	Mozam to kick out journalist reporting on Cabo Delgado insurgency	Peter Fabricius Media Freedom	NO	NO	YES
DM 3	Daily Maverick	12 Feb 2021	SA assisting Mozam in fight against insurgents, says Naledi Pandor	Peter Fabricius Interview	NO	NO	YES
DM 4	Daily Maverick	21 Feb 2021	ACFTA should be used as driver of peace and security on the continent	Tim Murithi Business Maverick Op-ed	NO	NO	YES
DM 5	Daily Maverick	28 Feb 2021	As the conflict rages on, ordinary Mozam's suffer while officials continue to benefit	Peter Fabricius	NO	NO	YES
DM 6	Daily Maverick	2 Mar 2021	SA company to investigate after Amnesty say it shot at civilians in Mozam	Reuters Newsdesk	NO	Not an original DM article	NO
DM 7	Daily Maverick	2 Mar 2021	SA company to investigate after Amnesty says it shot at civilians in Mozam	Reuters Newsdesk	YES	Not an original DM article	NO
DM 8	Daily Maverick	4 Mar 2021	Africa can learn Maritime security lessons from its small Island states	Richard Chelin and Denys Reva ISS Today	NO	Not relevant	NO
DM 9	Daily Maverick	16 Mar 2021	Mozam militants beheading children as young as 11, Save the Children says	Reuters Newsdesk	NO	Not an original DM article	NO
DM 10	Daily Maverick	17 Mar 2021	US military joins the fight against Isis in Mozambique	Peter Fabricius	NO	NO	YES
DM 11	Daily Maverick	24 Mar 2021	Armed grp attack town close to gas project	Catarina Demyon World	NO	NO	YES
DM 12	Daily Maverick	27 Mar 2021	SAns reportedly killed as Jihadist insurgents overrun hotel in Mozame's Palma	Peter Fabricius Africa Newsflash	NO	NO	YES
DM 13	Daily Maverick	27 Mar 2021	SA mulls over rescue mission to Mozam to evacuate trapped citizens	Peter Fabricius News Flash Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 14	Daily Maverick	28 Mar 2021	Civilians fleeing besieged Mozam gas town arrive in Pemba	Manuel Mucari World	NO	NO	YES

DM 15	Daily Maverick	30 Mar 2021	Palma attack may show increasing 'brazenness' of Islamic State in Mozam - U.S. official	Reuters	NO	Not an original DM article	NO
DM 16	Daily Maverick	30 Mar 2021	Terror in Mozam: Between 10 and 15 SAns still missing in Palma insurgent attacks	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 17	Daily Maverick	31 Mar 2021	AU asked to step up on CD insurgency as Mozam rests on a knife-edge	Liesl Louw-Vaudran Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 18	Daily Maverick	31 Mar 2021	SA military company in insurgent combat zone, the Dyck Advisory Group, will not extend contract with Mozam	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 19	Daily Maverick	01 Apr 2021	SADC grapples with response while mercenaries, energy companies and civilians quit Mozam's Islamic State crisis	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 20	Daily Maverick	02 Apr 2021	Total decides on total recall of all staff from troubled Afungi gas project	Peter Fabricius World	NO	NO	YES
DM 21	Daily Maverick	05 Apr 2021	SADC Summit: Regional leaders to meet in Maputo for talks on response to insurgency	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 22	Daily Maverick	05 Apr 2021	Mozam: Poverty and inequality fuel violent extremism (Part One)	Mark Heywood Maverick Citizen	NO	NO	YES
DM 23	Daily Maverick	07 Apr 2021	Mozam: What next for CD — dialogue or disaster? (Part Two)	Mark Heywood Maverick Citizen	NO	NO	YES
DM 24	Daily Maverick	08 Apr 2021	Islamist insurgents: SADC moves closer to intervention in Mozam	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 25	Daily Maverick	08 Apr 2021	Mozam's Frelimo gambled everything on gas – and lost	Joseph Hanlon NEW FRAME: OP-ED	NO	NO	YES
DM 26	Daily Maverick	18 Apr 2021	CD through a human rights lens: Amnesty Intr sounded the alarm but nobody listened	Muleya Mwananyanda Maverick Citizen Op-Ed	NO	NO	YES
DM 27	Daily Maverick	23 Apr 2021	Total operations potentially face another Islamic State-linked insurgency in Uganda	Peter Fabricius Africa ISS TODAY: ANALYSIS	NO	Not relevant (focus on Uganda)	NO
DM 28	Daily Maverick	25 Apr 2021	Recipe for conflict: Northern Mozambique's tinder-dry	David Matsinhe Op-Ed	NO	NO	YES

			fields of straw are ripe for burning				
DM 29	Daily Maverick	26 Apr 2021	Total declares Force Majeure and pulls all its people from Afungi gas plant	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 30	Daily Maverick	27 Apr 2021	SADC military officials to propose a 3000-strong rapid response force to take on Mozam jihadists	Peter Fabricius South Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 31	Daily Maverick	28 Mar 2021	Northern Mozam: Volunteer ships help to evacuate 1,000 from Palma after insurgent attack	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 32	Daily Maverick	28 Apr 2021	Focus on fighting 'terrorists' ignores real humanitarian needs in CD	Jonathan Whittall Maverick Citizen	NO	NO	YES
DM 33	Daily Maverick	2 May 2021	CB insurgency: The shifting shape of the illicit economy in northern Mozam	Oped Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime	NO	NO	YES
DM 34	Daily Maverick	2 May 2021	The transformation of Mozam into fields of straw and the resulting fire of conflict	Davd Matsinhe Opionista	NO	NO	YES
DM 35	Daily Maverick	4 May 2021	Protesters at Pretoria embassy demand accountability for Mozam corruption	Mark Heywood Maverick Citizen	NO	Not relevant	NO
DM 36	Daily Maverick	4 May 2021	IS-land: Has the age of Southern African terrorism properly begun?	Richard Poplak Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 37	Daily Maverick	6 May 2021	US and South Africa agree to cooperate on Mozam insurgency and expand Covid-19 vaccine production	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 38	Daily Maverick	20 May 2021	SADC leaders will meet this month to consider Mozam intervention plan	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 39	Daily Maverick	26 May 2021	Leaders meet to urge Mozam president Nyusi to accept regional military intervention	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 40	Daily Maverick	27 May 2021	Security and intelligence: What would it take to stabilise Cabo Delgado?	Jakkie Cilliers, Liesl Louw-Vaudran, Timothy Walker, Willem Els and Martin Ewi South Africa ISS TODAY	NO	NO	YES
DM	Daily	27 May	The African century has	Mandla Lionel	NO	Not relevant	NO

41	Maverick	2021	not yet begun — these are the reasons it remains elusive (Part One)	Isaacs Opinionista		(No mention of Cabo Delgado)	
DM 42	Daily Maverick	28 May 2021	Hunger and food insecurity in southern Africa – a region on the brink of mass starvation	Tatenda Mazarura Maverick Citizen	NO	NO	YES
DM 43	Daily Maverick	10 Jun 2021	Punch-ups and put-downs in Pan-African Parliament reflect a crisis in leadership	Liesl Louw-Vaudran Africa ISS TODAY: ANALYSIS	NO	Not relevant	NO
DM 44	Daily Maverick	18 Jun 2021	Mozambique government may regard SADC as foe more than friend in combatting militant insurgency	ISS Pretoria Africa ISS TODAY: ANALYSIS	NO	NO	YES
DM 45	Daily Maverick	22 Jun 2021	SANDF budget cuts threaten hopes of SA military intervention in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado	Siphokuhle Mathe OP-ED	NO	NO	YES
DM 46	Daily Maverick	22 Jun 2021	Weep not, child? Covid-19 is setting back children's rights across Africa	Tatenda Mazarura and Mark Heywood Maverick Citizen	NO	Not relevant	NO
DM 47	Daily Maverick	11 Jul 2021	Rwanda's deployment of forces into Mozambique irks SADC	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 48	Daily Maverick	11 July 2021	Southern Africa in crisis: SADC's interventions are mostly too little – and too late	Peter Fabricius	NO	NO	YES
DM 49	Daily Maverick	12 Jul 2021	EU agrees to send military training mission to Mozambique	Reuters	NO	Not original DM article	NO
DM 50	Daily Maverick	19 Jul 2021	Latent internal conflict on the cards over Rwandan troop deployment in Mozambique	Borges Nhamirre South Africa ISS TODAY: ANALYSIS	NO	NO	YES
DM 51	Daily Maverick	20 Jul 2021	EU's military deployment to Mozambique a sign of Europe's growing global muscle-flexing on security	Andreas Bohne and Fredson Guilengue OP-ED	NO	NO	YES
DM 52	Daily Maverick	21 Jul 2021	SA troops arrive in Mozambique to fight insurgents	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 53	Daily Maverick	21 Jul 2021	Torture still a weapon of choice against dissent in Zimbabwe, Eswatini, Tanzania and Uganda	Arnold Tsunga and Tatenda Mazarura	NO	NO	YES
DM 54	Daily Maverick	25 Jul 2021	South Africa's Insecurity Cluster: Anatomy of a	Marianne Thamm ANALYSIS	NO	Not relevant	NO

			cock-up foretold				
DM 55	Daily Maverick	26 Jul 2021	African Union faces a peace and security dilemma coupled with potential battle for relevance	Paul Simon Handy and Felicite Djilo ISS TODAY: ANALYSIS	NO	NO	YES
DM 56	Daily Maverick	27 Jul 2021	With SA democracy under threat, bridging the knowledge gap in civil-military relations is critical	Craig Bailie OP-ED	NO	Not relevant	NO
DM 57	Daily Maverick	27 Jul 2021	Speaker Modise's surprise move is good for Department of Defence, but a blow for Parliament	Marianne Merten CABINET RESHUFFLE	NO	Not relevant	NO
DM 58	Daily Maverick	8 Aug 2021	Strategic Mozambican port town of Mocimboa da Praia falls to Rwandan and Mozambican forces	Peter Fabricius South Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 59	Daily Maverick	10 Aug 2021	Troops Eject Rebels Who Besieged Total's Mozambique Project	Bloomberg Business Maverick	NO	Not original DM article	NO
DM 60	Daily Maverick	16 Aug 2021	A reluctant hegemon: The SANDF and its 'defined' role in sub-Saharan Africa	Martin Rupiya OP-ED	NO	NO	YES
DM 61	Daily Maverick	23 Aug 2021	Mozambique's ex-finance minister Manuel Chang to be extradited back home not US, Pretoria decides	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	Not relevant	NO
DM 62	Daily Maverick	23 Aug 2021	Top-level talks and strategic coordination lacking prior to troops' arrival in Mozambique	Liesl Louw-Vaudran ISS TODAY: ANALYSIS	NO	NO	YES
DM 63	Daily Maverick	30 Aug 2021	Ghost of Omar al-Bashir may have stopped South Africa's justice minister in his tracks in Manuel Chang extradition saga	Peter Fabricius Global Views	NO	Not relevant	NO
DM 64	Daily Maverick	01 Sep 2021	The discovery of natural gas in Mozambique has produced tragedies, not economic promise	Vijay Prashad OP-ED	NO	NO	YES
DM 65	Daily Maverick	14 Sep 2021	Rwandan dissidents fearful after prominent critic of President Kagame gunned down in Maputo	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 66	Daily Maverick	05 Oct 2021	Southern African bloc extends troop deployment in Mozambique to fight insurgency -communique	Reuters World	NO	Not original DM article	NO
DM 67	Daily Maverick	05 Oct 2021	SADC leaders extend Mozambique military mission to combat	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	NO	YES

			insurgency				
DM 68	Daily Maverick	16 Oct 2021	Is the death of a military junta rebel leader in Mozambique the curtain call for	Peter Fabricius GLOBAL NEWS	NO	Not relevant (diff conflict)	NO
DM 69	Daily Maverick	25 Oct 2021	Why the murder of British MP Sir David Amess will have political resonance throughout Africa	Paul Trehwela Opinionista	NO	Not relevant	NO
DM 70	Daily Maverick	26 Oct 2021	From Afghanistan to Mozambique's Cabo Delgado – the implications of Taliban rule for the southern African drug trade	Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 71	Daily Maverick	12 Nov 2021	Chang extradition displays SA's commitment to constitution, rule of law — but political fallouts may ensue	Peter Fabricius ISS TODAY ANALYSIS	NO	Not relevant	NO
DM 72	Daily Maverick	14 Nov 2021	Speaking with forked tongues: Why SA's climate energy policy needs consistency and commitment	Liz McDaid Opinionista	NO	Not relevant	NO
DM 73	Daily Maverick	24 Nov 2021	Islamic State insurgents could target South Africa, warns President Ramaphosa during Pretoria conference with Kenya's Kenyatta	Peter Fabricius Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 74	Daily Maverick	01 Dec 2021	Africa cannot afford a situation where governments' employment of mercenaries becomes the norm	PSC Report for ISS TODAY South Africa	NO	NO	YES
DM 75	Daily Maverick	13 Dec 2021	Capitalism's recalibration: From globalisation to deglobalisation to onshoring	Patrick Bond Maverick Citizen	NO	Not relevant	NO
DM 76	Daily Maverick	14 Dec 2021	'Torture and executions': EU slaps sanctions on Russia's Wagner mercenary group	Peter Fabricius DOGS OF WAR	NO	NO	YES
DM 77	Daily Maverick	15 Dec 2021	The year in rights: Embracing gains and continuing to fight for freedoms in 2021	Deprose Muchena Maverick Citizen	NO	Not relevant	NO
DM 78	Daily Maverick	17 Dec 2021	Mozambique's ISIS insurgency threatens to destroy conservation	Angus Begg Collateral Damage	NO	NO	YES

			progress and fragile environmental protections in Niassa Special Reserve				
The Guardian							
DI N	Publication	Date	Title	Author; Article Category	Duplicate	Exclude for other reason	Include
TG 1	The Guardian	2 Jan 2021	'The sea is rising, the climate is changing': the lessons learned from Mozambique's deadly cyclone	Sally Williams Cyclone Idai	NO	Not Relevant(Cyclone Coverage)	NO
TG 2	The Guardian	21 Jan 2021	Northern Mozambique in crisis as thousands flee escalating conflict Conflict and arms	Kaamil Ahmed conflict and arms	NO	NO	YES
TG 3	The Guardian	16 Feb 2021	Mozambique expels British journalist covering insurgency	AFP in Maputo Mozambique	NO	Not Original TG article	NO
TG 4	The Guardian	10 March 2021	'So much trauma': Mozam conflict sparks mental health crisis	Kaamil Ahmed	NO	No	YES
TG 5	The Guardian	25 Mar 2021	Fighting rages in Mozam close to Total's gas project	Staff and agencies	NO	NO	YES
TG 6	The Guardian	27 Mar 2021	Mozam: several dead as insurgents seize control of town	Agence France- Presse	NO	Not original TG article	NO
TG 7	The Guardian	29 Mar 2021	'Total chaos': survivors tell of insurgent attack in Mozam	Peter Beaumont	NO	NO	YES
TG 8	The Guardian	29 Mar 2021	Isis claims deadly attack in northern Mozam	Jason Burke and Peter Beaumont	NO	NO	YES
TG 9	The Guardian	29 Mar 2021	Mozam: up to 60 missing after insurgents attack convoy	Peter Beaumont	NO	NO	YES
TG 10	The Guardian	1 Apr 2021	Body found in search for missing Briton after Mozambique Isis attack	Edna Mohamed Mozambique	NO	NO	YES
TG 11	The Guardian	1 Apr 2021	Ferry brings 1,200 survivors of Isis Mozambique massacre to safety	Reuters in Pemba Mozambique	NO	Not original TG article	NO
TG 12	The Guardian	3 Apr 2021	Mozambique: French energy giant Total withdraws after militant attacks	Reuters France	NO	Not original TG article	NO
TG 13	The Guardian	4 Apr 2021	Africa and west must unite to halt Mozam insurgency, experts say	Dan Sabbagh	NO	NO	YES
TG 14	The Guardian	15 Apr 2021	UK support for Mozam gas plant fuelling conflict – Friends of the Earth	Jillian Ambrose	NO	NO	YES
TG 15	The Guardian	17 Apr 2021	Escaped girls tell of insurgents' mass	Jason Burke	NO	NO	YES

			abductions in Mozam				
TG 16	The Guardian	7 May 2021	Mozambique insurgency: 20,000 still trapped near gas plant six weeks after attack	Kaamil Ahmed Global development	NO	NO	YES
TG 17	The Guardian	13 May 2021	Contractors accused of rescuing white workers first after Mozambique attack	Jason Burke Mozambique	NO	NO	YES
TG 18	The Guardian	25 Jun 2021	Isis-linked groups open up new fronts across sub-Saharan Africa	Jason Burke Islamic State	NO	NO	YES
TG 19	The Guardian	25 Jun 2021	Isis-linked groups open up new fronts across sub-Saharan Africa	Jason Burke Islamic State	Yes	NO	NO
TG 20	The Guardian	26 Jul 2021	Mozambique: fears of escalating conflict as foreign troops clash with Islamists	Jason Burke Mozambique	NO	NO	YES
TG 21	The Guardian	18 Aug 2021	'I ran, my heart was broken': inside Mozambique's evolving Cabo Delgado conflict	Neha Wadekar Global development	NO	NO	YES
TG 22	The Guardian	20 Oct 2021	Credit Suisse fined £350m over Mozambique 'tuna bonds' loan scandal	Kalyeena Makortoff Credit Suisse	NO	Not relevant	NO
TG 23	The Guardian	25 Nov 2021	Return to the refugee camp: Malawi orders thousands back to 'congested' Dzaleka	Benson Kunchezera Global development	NO	Not relevant	NO
TG 24	The Guardian	8 Dec 2021	UK 'embarrassed' into funding Mozambique gas project, court hears	Isabella Kaminski Mozambique	NO	NO	YES

Nation

DI N	Publication	Date	Title	Author; Article Category	Duplicate	Exclude for other reason	Include
N 1	Nation	16 Feb 2021	Red Cross pledges more aid for conflict-hit Cabo Delgado	Arnaldo Vieira Angola Correspondent Africa	NO	NO	YES
N 2	Nation	16 Mar 2021	US boosts Mozambique's fight against terror threats	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES
N 3	Nation	17 Mar 2021	Mozambique militants beheading children — NGO	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES
N 4	Nation	27 Mar 2021	Alarm as Coast youth dump Somali terror group for Mozambique's Isis	Mohammed Ahmed	NO	NO	YES
N 5	Nation	29 Mar 2021	Dozens killed in Mozambique Islamist attacks, government says	AFP	NO	Not original Nation article	NO
N 6	Nation	31 Mar 2021	Offshore gas sparked hope in Mozambique. Then an Islamist	John Wessels The Conversation	NO	NO	YES

			insurgency happened				
N 7	Nation	1 Apr 2021	AU calls for urgent action after Mozambique jihadist attack	AFP	NO	Not original Nation article	NO
N 8	Nation	2 Apr 2021	Survivors from Mozambique attack stream into Pemba safe haven	AFP	NO	Not original Nation article	NO
N 9	Nation	6 Apr 2021	Mozambique attack survivors turned back by Tanzania, UN says	AFP	NO	Not original Nation article	NO
N 10	Nation	8 Apr 2021	Militant fighters 'driven out' of Palma, says Mozambique's President	AFP	NO	Not original Nation article	NO
N 11	Nation	10 Apr 2021	Mozambique officials say at least 36 militants killed in military operation	Arnaldo Vieira Angola Correspondent Africa	NO	NO	YES
N 12	Nation	10 Apr 2021	SADC vows 'proportionate' response to Mozambique's jihadists	Kitsepile Nyathi Zimbabwe Correspondent Africa	NO	NO	YES
N 13	Nation	10 Apr 2021	Jihadists beheaded 12 people in Mozambique attack	AFP	NO	Not original Nation article	NO
N 14	Nation	14 Apr 2021	'They are not sleeping': fears over Mozambique jihadists' next move	AFP	NO	Not original Nation article	NO
N 15	Nation	15 Apr 2021	WFP appeals for \$82m to help Mozambique IDPs	AFP	NO	Not original Nation article	NO
N 16	Nation	17 Apr 2021	Mozambique stares into uncertain future after insurgent attacks	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES
N 17	Nation	26 Apr 2021	Be wary, your philanthropist neighbour may be a terrorist	Michael Mugwang'a Opinion	NO	NO	YES
N 18	Nation	29 Apr 2021	Escalating violence in northern Mozambique forces thousands to flee homes	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES
N 19	Nation	14 May 2021	White people 'rescued first' in Mozambique attack: Amnesty	AFP	NO	Not original Nation article	NO
N 20	Nation	22 May 2021	Millions in urgent need of aid in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES
N 21	Nation	10 Jun 2021	Armed groups kidnap 51 children from Cabo Delgado, Mozambique in a year	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES
N 22	Nation	19 Jun 2021	Mozambican militants behead 2 children in Cabo	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES

			Delgado, says NGO				
N 23	Nation	21 Jun 2021	Terrorism, Covid-19 to feature in SADC leaders' meeting in Maputo	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES
N 24	Nation	24 Jun 2021	SADC to send troops to Mozambique's Cabo Delgado	Kitsepile Nyathi News	NO	NO	YES
N 25	Nation	28 Jun 2021	Nyusi pledges victory over insurgents in Cabo Delgado	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES
N 26	Nation	1 Jul 2021	Tanzania, Kenya fingered as region's narcotics hub	Allan Olingo News	NO	Not relevant	NO
N 27	Nation	9 July 2021	SADC to deploy troops to Mozambique in fight against terrorists	Nation Team Africa	NO	NO	YES
N 28	Nation	9 July 2021	Rwanda to deploy troops in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique	Aggrey Mutambo & Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES
N 29	Nation	11 Jul 2021	Rwandan troops arrive in Mozambique to help fight insurgents	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES
N 30	Nation	31 Jul 2021	President Samia Suluhu expected in Kigali	Ivan R Mugisha News	NO	NO	YES
N 31	Nation	6 Aug 2021	Lobby urges Mozambique to evacuate civilians from war-torn region	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES
N 32	Nation	8 Aug 2021	Rwandan troops help Mozambique recapture key port held by jihadists	AFP	NO	Not original Nation article	NO
N 33	Nation	10 Aug 2021	US sanctions Shabaab leader blamed for Kenyan attacks	Mary Wambui News	NO	Not Relevant	NO
N 34	Nation	13 Aug 2021	US Special Forces, Mozambican Commandos to hold joint training	Joaquim Nhamirre Africa	NO	NO	YES
N 35	Nation	3 Sept 2021	Why Mozambique may have to rebuild northern region from scratch	Arnaldo Vieira Angola Correspondent Africa	NO	NO	YES
N 36	Nation	8 Sept 2021	Soldiers reclaim areas seized by militants in Mozambique	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES
N 37	Nation	15 Sep 2021	Exiled Rwandan ex-army officer gunned down in Mozambique	AFP	NO	Not original Nation article	NO
N 38	Nation	17 Sep 2021	Rwandan dissidents live in fear after critic gunned down in Mozambique	Peter Dube Africa	NO	Not relevant	NO
N 39	Nation	24 Sept 2021	Rwanda's President Kagame in Mozambique for State visit	Arnaldo Vieira & Johnson Kanamugire Africa	NO	NO	YES
N 40	Nation	25 Sept 2021	Kagame says troops will stay put in Cabo Delgado	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES

			to ensure stability				
N 41	Nation	27 Sept 2021	SADC troops kill 17 terrorists in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES
N 42	Nation	29 Sept 2021	Mozambique needs \$300m to rebuild Cabo Delgado	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES
N 43	Nation	2 Oct 2021	Rwanda arrests 13 suspected of plotting 'terrorist' attacks	AFP	NO	Not original Nation article	NO
N 44	Nation	2 Oct 2021	SADC troops kill insurgents' religious leader Sheikh Njile North, 18 fighters	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES
N 45	Nation	6 Oct 2021	Child soldiers liberated in Mozambique, says UN	AFP	NO	Not original Nation article	NO
N 46	Nation	6 Oct 2021	Child soldiers liberated in Mozambique, says UN	AFP	NO	Not original Nation article	NO
N 47	Nation	13 Nov 2021	Mozambique launches new force to fight Islamist unrest	AFP	NO	Not original Nation article	NO
N 48	Nation	19 Nov 2021	Mozambican army kills 12 insurgents in Cabo Delgado	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES
N 49	Nation	18 Nov 2021	Are terrorists winning by losing?	Charles Onyango-Obbo Opinion	NO	NO	YES
N 50	Nation	22 Dec 2021	Concern as terrorism spreads from Cabo Delgado to Niassa in Mozambique	Arnaldo Vieira News	NO	NO	YES

Table 1.2: Final Tallies

Source	Number of Articles downloaded	Number of Duplicates	Number of externally copied articles	Excluded for other reason	DINS of final Sample	Final Sample
Daily Maverick	78	0	7	17	DM1-5; DM10-14; DM16-16; DM28-34; DM36-40; DM42; DM44-45; DM47-48; DM50-53; DM55; DM58; DM60; DM62; DM64-65; DM67; DM70; DM73-74; DM76; DM78.	54
The Guardian	24	1	5	3	TG2; TG4-5; TG7-10; TG13-18; TG20-21; TG24.	15
Nation	50	0	15	3	N1-4; N6; N11-12; N16-18; N20-25; N27-31; N34-36; N39-42; N44; N48-50.	32

Table 2.1: Coding Tree for *Daily Maverick*

First Cycle Codes

1. Total
2. Ravuma gas fields (sea)
3. Afungi site LNG (land)
4. CD is Mozam’s poorest province (location of project)
5. \$60 billion investment

6. Entire gas fields controlled by three companies: Exxon Mobil(USA), Eni(Italy), Total(France). Only Total has committed to developing any of the field.
7. Expected production is down from 100mt/y to 16m/ty before attack

8. Many people signed eviction without knowing what they were signing
9. Businesses have a duty not to harm people
10. Conned into signing documents many people could not read

11. Mineral and gas companies are responsible for the violence in the region
12. Gas adds “fuel to the fire”
13. Extractive governance by multinational companies especially gas - negative
14. Patronage system closely linked to gas
15. This system is called locally “goatism” “Cabritismo”
16. \$2billion secret debt
17. Gas disrupt local ecosystem


18. Primarily fishing and agriculture - link to sea has been severed “off limits”
19. Strong illicit economy also plays a role in region
20. Climate change – increased cyclones causing extra damage
21. Ruby mines in area
22. Little evidence that illicit economies are the groups’

Second Order Categories

1. Who, where, cost
2. Monopoly of resources
3. How access was gained
4. Apportioning blame to gas
5. Role of other resources (grouped here due to them always being mentioned in relation to gas)

Dominant Themes in Reporting

1. The conflict in relation to resources especially natural gas



main source of income

- 23. Total only returned on the 25th of Mar 2021 after the creation of a safe zone of 25km around their project attack started that day
- 24. Mozam Total compound not directly attacked
- 25. Mozam military used to protect the gas projects
- 26. Total withdraws staff

- 27. Who will ultimately benefit from the gas fields
- 28. No trickle down form gas profits
- 29. Gas no longer profitable - China rather signed on for none us dominated fields
- 30. Gas promised security and prosperity - failed

- 31. Al-Shabaab is comprised of mostly unemployed and disaffected youths
- 32. Local Islamist organisation
- 33. “No evidence the insurgency is any large part composed of , led by foreign fighters”- local group with local concerns
- 34. Youth uprising that has become militarised
- 35. Insurgency is decades in the making
- 36. Role of drug trade
- 37. shifting routes up and down the Swahili coast, disruption to established illicit flows of good
- 38. Drug trade avoiding instability of the conflict zone

- 39. “Armed opposition”
- 40. “Jihadist insurgents”
- 41. “Festering Islamist insurgency”
- 42. Insurgency
- 43. Festering insurgency
- 44. Islamist Insurgency
- 45. Ahlu wa Sunnah Jama (ASWJ)
- 46. IS links
- 47. IS linked insurgency

6. Total facility’s role during attack

7. Questions of profitability

8. Interrogation of how this violence manifests itself

9. Names for the insurgency/ links to terrorism

2. The role of “terrorists”

- 48. Militant insurgency
- 49. On 11 Mar 2021 ASJW designated a terrorist organisation by USA
- 50. Doubt of international links
- 51. IS claimed “responsibility” largely propaganda
- 52. Labelled terrorism - pushes groups further underground

- 53. Occupation of Mocimboa da Praia (Aug 2020)
- 54. Attack town of Roma
- 55. Quionga (19th Feb) attacked
- 56. Crises in Cabo Delgado
- 57. Threat of terrorism in Mozam is fairly new
- 58. Palma attack is the turning point
- 59. Attack on Palma 24 March 2021
- 60. “Violently overrun”
- 61. Islamist insurgents overran
- 62. Conflict is escalating
- 63. Those who fled and where found with dismantled weapons were arrested under suspicions of being insurgents

- 64. International Community must intervene
- 65. Concern for particularly women and children
- 66. Amnesty International reports abuses by Gov forces
- 67. Amnesty International was raising red flag from 2017
- 68. African Commission for Human and People’s Rights should take action
- 69. AU principal of subsidiary – but AU can use a fact finding mission
- 70. International Community needs to take responsibility
- 71. EU muscle flexing


- 72. 2500 civilians dead
- 73. 500 000 displace (number steadily increase)
- 74. 700 000 displaced (not refugees)
- 75. 850 000 food insecure
- 76. 1 million displaced (June 2021)

10.State of conflict

11. International community’s role

12. Statistics on humanitarian crises

International Community Response



- 77. Humanitarian response has been a disaster
- 78. US joins fight (Green Beret special forces), Portugal provides training and aid initially
- 79. French Navy ships patrol the canal
- 80. By labelling group terrorists becomes part of the tools to suppress and deny them aid
- 81. "Puts targets on back of aid workers"

- 82. Stalled SADC response
- 83. "corpse called SADC" – won't be able to do anything effective
- 84. "Wake up call" for SADC
- 85. SADC response is lacking
- 86. Conflict has a disproportionate effect on women and children
- 87. Regional leaders only meet on the 16th Apr 2021
- 88. Long delay in any action - Mozam resistant
- 89. Much more bi-lateral and private military intervention at first

- 90. SADC has the capacity but needs to firmer direction from Mozam
- 91. Regional hesitancy
- 92. SADC should get involved in a "helpful" manner
- 93. Special summit to be held
- 94. "rebellious, and non-state actor forces undermined the democratic peace and credentials of region "
- 95. Mission critical for entire region
- 96. Technical SADC mission will be sent - precursors to suggestion of military intervention should be a "proportional" response
- 97. Technical mission was only allowed to stay one day in CD
- 98. Nyusi fears SADC would pursue own agenda
- 99. Nysusi fearful SADC will reveal extent of the problem
- 100. Security problem

13. Effect on international community

14. Condemnation

15. Consultation →

SADC Response (regional)

3. Responses



- 101. SADC jolted by attack on Palma
- 102. SADC will deploy 3000 troops on advice of technical mission “neutralise” IS
- 103. “Nyusi very reluctant”
- 104. Call to also recapture port town of Mocimba da Praia
- 105. Land, air and marine assets will be deployed
- 106. Need to earn community trust for successful mission
- 107. Intelligence sharing critical
- 108. Must look at the amnesty and disbarment process-made difficult by categorisation as terrorist
- 109. Threat to criminal systems of the elites
- 110. Mozambique wants overall control of intervention


- 111. SANDF budget cuts threaten mission
- 112. R15 billion cut
- 113. July unrest threatens number of troops that can be sent
- 114. SADC abrogating to SA, SA could act in new imperialist fashion

- 115. Rwanda beat SA to battlefield “battle”
- 116. 1000 Rwanda Troops and police
- 117. Rwandan troops better trained
- 118. Egg on the face of SA
- 119. Rights groups crit Rwanda (refuges/ by-passing parliament)
- 120. Deep secrecy around deployment ”SADC Surprised”
- 121. Rwanda troops doing heavy lifting. Fire fight at Afungi
- 122. Mocimbaa da Prai falls to Rwandan and Mozam forces while SADC still 1000km away
- 123. Torture in ungoverned spaces (both militants and gov forces)
- 124. Pursue Rwandan economic interests as well as Rwandan refugees

16. Action

17. SA role in response

18. Rwanda response




- 125. Ineffective government response
- 126. Mozam gov has neglected the area
- 127. Wealth is extracted by the elites of society
- 128. “Comrades agreement”
- 129. Mozam gov bears responsibility – neglected region, failure to protect communities from big corporations
- 130. Parasitic governing class based in Maputo
- 131. Abysmal governance
- 132. Scramble for profits and land at expense of local community
- 133. “Cabo Esquecido” Forgotten Cape
- 134. Lack of gov lead to creation of local ecosystems to survive. They were disrupted and destroyed by discovery of gas
- 135. FRELIMO connected to smuggling and organised crime

- 136. Turf war between police, private security and military
- 137. Large numbers of armed none-state agents
- 138. “Private military contractors are not the solution”
- 139. Use of DAG
- 140. Amy unsure of how to respond
- 141. “Social problem arising from poverty”
- 142. Mozam army ran out of ammo
- 143. Anger at the little action that has been taken
- 144. Military response to the social issues on the region was the wrong approach to take
- 145. If international community gets involved Mozam losses control of the situation and agency in resolving the issue
- 146. “Iraqification”
- 147. New urgency for dialogue to take place
- 148. Mozam army only arrived 3 days after the initial attack
- 149. Gov did not extend DAG contract
- 150. Narrative of terrorism- requires military response without looking at underlining issues - shift blame

19. Gov corruption and neglect

Mozam Gov Response

20. Gov military response



- 151. Stranded locals foreigners
- 152. Amarula Lodge
- 153. Attempted escape
- 154. Did not succeed - no rescue boats waiting.
- 155. "Only 7 out of 17 cars made it"
- 156. 10-15 missing
- 157. Quotes from mother of one of the killed "distraught"
- 158. Around 200 South African in the area
- 159. No international help during attack

- 160. Mozam army ran out of ammunition
- 161. South Africa considering sending gun ships
- 162. Gunships, Mi24, Mi17, Ak47s (DAG)
- 163. Strafing of insurgents
- 164. Sophisticated bloody attack

- 165. Dunkirk 2.0
- 166. #dunkirk moment
- 167. Gov army arrived after 3 days
- 168. Picks up 200 people using military gun ships
- 169. Evacuation form boat one boat had 1300 people on it

21. Detail of attack

22. Detail of weapons

23. Evacuation

4. Live reporting on attack on Palma




Table 2.2: Coding Tree for *The Guardian*

First Cycle Codes

1. Total
2. Ravuma gas fields
3. UK has faced opposition to the development of a £705 million terminal in region

4. Natural gas is responsible for worsening the conflict
5. "Friends of Earth" said conflict started because of displacement "exacerbating conditions"
6. Few benefited have been shared
7. Resentment fuelled insurgency

8. Project is incompatible with Paris Climate Accords
9. PM says UK would not invest in foreign fossil fuels
10. UK embarrassed in supporting the gas deal - "Friends of the Earth"

11. Attacks after Ramadan
12. Exclusion zone reported as 4km
13. "Fighting rages close to total" no mention of town or people in some cases
14. Most people evacuated by sea
15. Racial discrimination jeopardised rescue efforts

16. Initial confusion "rebels" "terrorists"
17. Islamist militants
18. Islamist insurgency
19. Young Muslim men
20. "Festering insurgency"
21. Islamic extremist rebels
22. Rebels
23. ISIS, IS - often used interchangeably


Second order categories

1. Who, where, how much
2. Apportioning blame to gas
3. UK should not be involved
4. Fighting in relation to gas

5. Names for the insurgency/ links to terrorism

Dominant Themes in Reporting

1. The conflict in relation to natural gas



24. Sought info from UK foreign affairs and commonwealth development office limited international links mostly propaganda (International being outside of Africa)

25. Entire town destroyed

26. Trail of devastation

27. Rebels had better intelligence

28. Many attackers crossed over from Tanzania

29. Insurgency has turned from bandits to well-co-ordinated and increased capabilities

30. Escalating terror

31. “unchecked havoc”

32. Militants active since 2017

33. Police and military over run

34. Lack of co-ordination between Mozam and Dyck Advisory group

35. Fear of escalating fighting

36. Beheadings/mass beheadings and abductions

37. 50 beheadings carried out in a football field

38. Meticulous planning on the part of the attackers

39. Targeted against “crusader nations”

40. Focus on attack on Christians in the area

41. Insurgents have abducted 1000s of girls most under age of 18

42. Either made child brides or trafficked

43. Similar to Boko Haram abductions

44. Young desirable girls known as “noodles” – rare commodity in the region

45. Forced to get a Qur’anic education

46. Fears extremist Islamist enclave forming

6. Increasing destruction and sophistication of perpetrators

7. Beheadings and attacks on Christians

8. Girl abductions

1. The role of “terrorists”

- 47. So much trauma
- 48. Mental health crises
- 49. Mass beheadings
- 50. Humanity and dignity stripped away
- 51. Psychological distress worse than the physical distress
- 52. \$12 million in aid dispatched to support women and children

- 53. Quarter of the region's population displaced
- 54. Taken 2,600 lives
- 55. 670,000 people displaced
- 56. Lack of evacuation plan by government
- 57. Mozam forces committed reprisals
- 58. Troops need to be deployed with social, political and economic initiatives

- 59. Concerned for long term stability
- 60. Africa and West must work together to find a solution
- 61. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change
- 62. British soldiers had warned of a possible attack
- 63. UK armed forces re-organised with rangers specifically for anti-insurgency
- 64. Nysusi signed economic co-operation with Russia 2019 with 200 soldiers from Russia Wagner group arriving in Mozam later replaced by SA DAG group
- 65. Later US green berets arrived to help train (10)
- 66. Portugal also sent trainers (60)

9. Mental health crises

10. Humanitarian observations

11. Role of UK and the West

2. Responses

- 67. Strong description of the start to the attack
- 68. 7 out of 17 vehicles
- 69. Ambushed twice
- 70. Focus specifically on Adrian Nel
- 71. Mother account “numbing”
- 72. “Absolute bloodbath”
- 73. “Did not expect to make it through the night”
- 74. “Final SOS”
- 75. “How the hell was this allowed to happen”
- 76. “It’s very grim”
- 77. “Total chaos”
- 78. “I ran my heart was broken”
- 79. Descriptions of extreme violence and descriptions of refugee camps

- 80. Evacuated by ships
- 81. DAG used choppers
- 82. Hotel surrounded and shelled with mortar fire
- 83. Reports that DAG also committed human rights abuses
- 84. Amarula Lodge
- 85. DAG had to withdraw due to lack of fuel and nightfall
- 86. “Those trapped spelled out SOS with white washed stones”

12. Attack and emotive language

13. Evacuation and weapons

3. Live reporting on attack on Palma




Table 2.3: Coding Tree for the *Nation*

First Cycle Codes

1. Offshore gas sparked hope
2. \$60 billion – development for Palma and Mozam
3. Recent attacks put a lid on LNG deposits
4. Western Companies –Total, (\$20 billion) Exxon Mobil \$4.7 billion), Chevron and BP.
5. Japan- Mitsai
6. Malaysia –Pettonas
7. China- CNPC \$30 billion joint project with Exxon Mobil
8. Total abandoned Gas project
9. UK Should stop support for the Gas project

10. Cabo Delgado neglected
11. Rising incomes since independence largely confined to the country capital Maputo
12. 16 year civil war
13. Uncertain future after insurgent attacks
14. Chronic instability in Cabo Delgado
15. Conflict hit
16. 10 conflicts likely to worsen
17. Need to build Cabo Delgado from Scratch

18. Attacks started 2017, police stations Mocimboa da Praia, Palma and Nangade
19. Palma attacks 24 March 2021
20. Establish an Islamic Caliphate
21. Armed Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)


22. SADC Organ technical deployment
23. Double Troikia Summit
24. SADC needs to have a proportionate response
25. Terrorism focus of the SADC Troika meetings

Second order categories

1. Natural Gas
2. Overview of Cabo Delgado
3. Timeline of events
4. Details of meetings of SADC

Dominant Themes in Reporting

1. **Context of Conflict**




- 26. Concerned with Acts of Terrorism
- 27. Attacks on perpetrated against civilians
- 28. Deteriorating Security Situation
- 29. Threat to peace and security
- 30. Palma was a demonstration of the magnitude of the problem
- 31. Fight IS-Linked Insurgency
- 32. Hotspot of escalating terrorist attacks
- 33. Need combat Violent Terrorism and Extremism

- 34. SADC to send Troops
- 35. 3000 Troops
- 36. South Africa 1500 Troops
- 37. Threat to Gas projects and multinational companies
- 38. Combat Violent Extremism
- 39. SADC asks for UN Security Council Permission
- 40. \$12 million budget for SADC
- 41. SADC concerned about the deployment of non-member Troops in the region
- 42. SAMIN

- 43. US to boost fight against terror threats
- 44. US special forces to train Mozam Marines
- 45. US designates IS- Mozambique Terrorist Org
- 46. US joint forces and Mozam joint training
- 47. 100 Mozam Commandos

- 48. Rwanda already deployed 1000 Troops/Police
- 49. Rwanda has entered into a bilateral agreement
- 50. Conduct combat and Security and Stabilisation
- 51. Restore state authority
- 52. State visit by Kagame to Mozam
- 53. Rwanda footing the bill

- 54. Nyusi blaming Renamo
- 55. Nyusi apprehensive
- 56. Nyusi victory over rebels
- 57. Fighting Militants



- 58. Nyusi pledges victory over insurgents/criminals
- 59. Victory over terrorists
- 60. Support from “friends Rwanda”
- 61. Nyusi praised the Rwandan Troops
- 62. Need to create conditions for peace (through use of force)

- 63. Large investments into the Northern Crises Recovery Project
- 64. According to Prime Minister Mozam needs \$300 million to rebuild Cabo Delgado
- 65. Need to deal with these criminals with support from SADC

- 66. 300 000 Displaced
- 67. 800 000 displaced
- 68. Hasan’s command 1300 civilians have been killed
- 69. 700 000 displaced
- 70. 2600 killed
- 71. 930 000 people face severe hunger WFP
- 72. 364 000 children forced to flee/displaced
- 73. Hundreds displaced to Matemo, small Island
- 74. Lobby for evacuation of civilians
- 75. HRW – Mozam put in measure to stop people fleeing

- 76. 70% of healthcare facilities forced to close
- 77. 950 000 people face severe hunger
- 78. Violence has forced a third of the health facilities in the province to close down
- 79. WHO 1.2 million people in needed of health assistance, 1/3 provinces health facilities (132) shut

- 80. Red Cross- Need for more aid
- 81. Need \$3.5 million in donor support
- 82. US to invest \$39 million –Socio-economic Benefits
- 83. World Bank Unlocks \$700 million in Prevention and Resilience Allocation
- 84. \$100 million International Development Association

10. Broader Mozam Gov Response

11. Displacement and killing of civilians

12. International concern about healthcare

13. International Aid financing

3. International Humanitarian Involvement

- 85. Leaders Abu Yasir Hassan also known as Abu Qim
- 86. Seka Musa Baluku
- 87. “Terror Merchants”
- 88. Known locally as Al-Shabaab pledged to ISIS in April 2018
- 89. Al-Shabaab

- 90. Youth join/radicalised
- 91. Ansar al Sunnah
- 92. Youth radicalised by Aboud Rogo (shot 2012)
- 93. Mosques used to radicalise youth

- 94. Jihadist attack
- 95. Terrorism
- 96. Insurgency
- 97. Militants
- 98. Terror Threats
- 99. Islamist Insurgency
- 100. Islamic Movement
- 101. IS- LINKed

- 102. Escalation of violence
- 103. Brazen raids
- 104. Horrid kind of terrorism
- 105. Beheadings
- 106. Beheadings of Children – Save the Children
- 107. 12 People have been beheaded
- 108. 36 Militants killed
- 109. 11 people beheaded
- 110. Mozam Militants behead 2 children

