ETHNIC NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRATISATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RAINBOW NATION

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ABSTRACT

Ethnic identities in South Africa have had a particularly contrived history, set within the constraints and motivations of population classification by race. A more democratic political environment emerged with the dismantling of apartheid, bringing with it a multitude of issues including the design and character of the country's political institutions and framework. This thesis will address two principal questions. The first and primary one investigates what lies behind the initiation and development of ethnic bonds. The second concerns the political implications and management of ethnic expressions in a democratic South Africa. An analysis of Zulu ethnic nationalism will be undertaken, because it constituted the most prominent case of assertive communal interests during democratic transitional negotiations.

This thesis argues that circumstantial and instrumental factors (based on conditions, and the actions of individuals and organizations respectively), have been predominately responsible for the initiation and formation of ethnic bonds, especially amongst those who identify with a Zulu identity. The "conditions" describe the increasingly segregationist direction in which successive South African government authorities were moving, especially after the 1948 election victory of the National Party and the subsequent introduction of apartheid. Secondly, the "actions" denote the motivations of both Zulu actors and governments in generating and elaborating an ethnic discourse where their desired interests could be more effectively supported and assured.

It will also be argued that because of the instrumental and selective use of ethnicity, as well as the narrow interests being served by its popular and community-centred expressions, a developing South African democratic culture should seek to protect ethnic diversity rather than promote ethnic interests. To do so would be to deny the perpetuation of ethnic cleavages and the violence and instability perpetrated in its name in recent years. The "protection" of cultural diversity is consistent with a constitution that seeks non-discrimination among all South African identities. Finally, it is believed that an emphasis on the individual as individual, as well as member of a cultural group, will break from subordinating the individual to an ascribed racial and ethnic identity as in the past, and assist in reconstituting the state as equally reflective of *all* South Africans.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

BROAD CONTEXT

One of the most pervasive realities of modern African societies is the unstable and divisive manifestation of identity, including the expression of ethnic group consciousness, group "pride" and nationalism. Joseph Rothschild has stated that no type of society or political system, be it advanced, less developed, centralist or federalist, is immune from the "burgeoning pressure of politicized ethnic assertiveness," (Rothschild 1981: 15). He observes that the legitimacy of the state is often greatly dependent on the population's perception of a political system reflecting its ethnic and cultural identity (ibid: 14). In relation to African identities, and with respect to the formation of legitimacy, Patrick Chabal notices, "It is in the multifarious ways in which individuals define themselves and others that the political community takes shape and evolves." (Chabal 1996: 52). He specifically calls for an investigation into the relationship between identity and politics, primarily addressing factors that contribute to the politics of ethnicity. Rothschild's statement refers to popular perceptions, while also implying a responsibility to deter ethnically fractious occurrences by ensuring that individuals do not view injustices on the basis of ethnic affiliations and discrimination. Chabal and Rothschild also identify the notion of politicised ethnicity, and attach to it questions of composition, i.e. how do individuals define themselves and others; how does ethnicity become politicised and by what means, by whom and why; and finally, what are the ramifications implied by "burgeoning pressure"?

Generally speaking, this study will address two issues. The first will be the subject of primary investigation, and will complement the comments and suggestions directed at the second. Issue one concerns the composition of ethnicity, i.e. what lies behind ethnic attachments and development; and what are the objects accompanying the emergence of cultural bonds, why are they referred to, through what means are they expressed and by whom? Issue two looks at the political implications of ethnic nationalism, reflecting Rothschild's comment about a framework and responsibility in preventing the selective politicisation of ethnic ties.

SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT

Simon Bekker observed the diminished presence of ethnicity in South African scholarship during the 1980s and early 1990s, with the majority of work attached to questions of race and corresponding group inequalities in society (Bekker 1993: 72). Ironically for those who deemed ethnicity somewhat of a taboo subject, considering its perceived destabilising effects in reinforcing already existing social divisions, the run-up to South Africa's first all inclusive democratic elections in 1994 brought assertive ethnic interests to the fore, as the political arena was now open and unrestricted for various agendas to be advanced. Vincent Maphai observes that "South Africa is a paradigm multi-ethnic society, and for this reason, it can ignore potential ethnic conflict only at its own peril" (Maphai 1995: 111).

Although the relevance of ethnicity in contemporary South African society has been acknowledged, it is the nature of ethnic consciousness and mobilisation that allow one to consider how and why

ethnicity is valued, defended, transformed and manipulated, in other words, de-mystifying this concept and looking behind the scenes at how it functions, and how it is *made* to function.

Szeftel considers the content of ethnic appeals and the possible implications for a democratic South Africa by stating:

> The question of what ethnic interests are to be recognised and what powers are to be conceded to them becomes a difficult one. Are the ethnic interests to be given constitutional status an expression of popular concern and needs? Or are they in fact a euphemism, a synonym, for organisations, political machines and patronage networks set up under apartheid and now concerned to guard their old privileges? (Szeftel 1994: 198).

METHODOLOGY

Chapter one introduces the theoretical framework used in this study. This includes the primordial, circumstantial, and instrumental perspectives. The primordial approach describes the content (symbols and history) and emotional substance of ethnic ties. Scott defines the circumstantial approach as "resulting from certain social circumstances, both internal and external" under which members of ethnic groups exist (Scott 1990: 147). The instrumental view follows the activity of individuals and groups in utilizing the appeals of ethnic identity for selective self-interests, be they political and/or economic in substance.

The reason behind this theoretical structure is that it reflects Szeftel's question, that is, to what degree have recent appeals and expressions of ethnic nationalism in South Africa conformed to the primordial school, and so have been based on popular concern and needs. Alternatively, what about the influence

of circumstantial and instrumental forces on the initiation and development of ethnic attachments, corresponding to apartheid factors and individual/organizational protection of privilege?

CONCEPTUAL OUTLINE

Chapter two includes an assessment of the following concepts: identity, ethnicity, nationalism and ethnic nationalism. Identity is considered the antecedent of ethnicity, from which ethnicity is derived. As du Preez notes, "Without a common identity, individuals cannot form a collective agent" (du Preez 1980: 3). It is important to distinguish the notions of ethnicity and nationalism in order to appreciate the terms in their own right, as well as to discern their interrelationship. The term "ethnic nationalism" will be used because it more accurately represents the main interest of this work in identifying the factors involved in politicising ethnicity, and the consequent effects such as calls for autonomy and self-determination. It is the belief of this investigation that in this latter case, ethnic nationalism more accurately reflects the perceived argumentative thrust emanating from the organization to be discussed as a case study.

BACKGROUND AND CASE STUDY

Chapter three examines the background environment of apartheid, and chapter four conducts a specific analysis of Zulu ethnic nationalism. A background inquiry is undertaken because of the integral role that apartheid administration played in lending philosophical support and constructive detail to the notion of distinct and separate South African "nationalisms". Zulu ethnic identity as developed and advanced by the Inkatha organisation, will undergo particular scrutiny because of its prominent stature during the democratic transition, and its considerable effect upon questions of

political cooperation, constitutional design and regional stability. Few could have envisioned an essentially problem free transition, but the more clear and adversarial expressions of Zulu identity during the pivotal years of the early 1990s, exacerbated the violence, intimidation and spatial demarcation that had already been dividing, in particular, the Zulu speaking population of Natal/KwaZulu. This in turn threatened to undermine the relatively peaceful changeover being experienced by the country in general, and in concrete terms, highlighted issues of constitutional negotiation, administrative structure and allocation of powers.

By adopting a theoretical approach defined by Eller and Coughlan's social constructionist, cultural reproduction paradigm, the objective of this study is to investigate and clarify the substance and meaning of ethnic nationalism, as linked to Inkatha's brand of Zulu identity within the historical background of apartheid. This examination will assist in identifying its political implications, as well as in offering some suggestions for the accommodation of cultural diversity.

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO ETHNIC ATTACHMENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Debate surrounding ethnic attachments concerns the question of how these bonds can be satisfactorily explained, and consequently how much weight should be given to *primordial*, *circumstantial* and *instrumental* explanations. It will be argued here however that a careful reading of the literature suggests a distinction between the initiation and development of ethnic attachments needs to be made.

Making this distinction allows for a more comprehensive picture of how primordial, circumstantial and instrumental factors interact. It will be supported, with reference to Eller and Coughlan (1993), that the initiation of ethnic bonds is more persuasively affected by circumstantial/instrumental explanations, whilst the shaping of these attachments is more convincingly influenced by these factors, that may then utilise and project primordial features. This chapter will indicate a preferred relationship between the three approaches, as well as elaborate on each in order to identify relevant variables. These variables will contribute to a reference framework against which evidence pertaining to ethnic nationalism in South Africa will be assessed.

Although ethnicity in contemporary South African society has been well documented, it is the nature of ethnic consciousness and mobilization that allow for a consideration of how and why it has been valued, defended, transformed and even manipulated. In other words, looking behind the scenes at how this concept has functioned, and how it has been made to function. Recalling Szeftel's enquiry in the introduction to this thesis, what is the relationship between ethnicity and the constitutional accommodation of regional and group interests? Investigating what lies behind ethnic appeals will allow for a more balanced and realistic evaluation of ethnic concerns and their political/constitutional status.

1.1 THE PRIMORDIAL APPROACH

The primordial approach has been consistently criticized for its tendency to focus on ambiguous aspects of ethnic group solidarity. One of its earliest proponents was Geertz, who defined the approach in this way:

> By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the Agivens@-or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed Agivens@-of social existence, immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly Yfrom being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular languageYand following particular social practices (Geertz 1973: 259).

Geertz discusses ties of blood, speech, custom and a Aspiritual affinity@ or some Aunaccountable absolute import@ attributed to the tie of ethnicity itself (ibid: 259). Shils cites an example from a study of family and kinship ties where it became apparent to him that the Aattachment to another member of one=s kinship group is not just a function of interaction. It is because a certain ineffable significance is attributed to the tie of blood@ (Shils 1957: 142). Two observations need to be made: first, Shils and

Geertz contend that elements such as blood relations, language and traditions are held as more than the sum of their parts, and contain an emotional and spiritual significance that may transcend the act of social interaction altogether. Maintaining relations on the basis of kinship, community and traditional ties suggests the persistent character of ethnicity for primordial researchers. Secondly, the notion of ineffability comprises one of the major constituent features of primordial thought.

Between the 1950s and 1970s (which encompassed the research of Shils and Geertz), to the 1990s, the study of primordial ties became commonly associated with the features of *ineffability*: an overpowering and coercive force; *a priori*: prior to all experience and interaction, with the presumption of long histories; and *affectivity*: where ethnic ties essentially involve emotion and feelings (Eller and Coughlan 1993: 187). Scholars such as Eller and Coughlan, who hold serious reservations about primordialism on empirical, methodological and ultimately definitive grounds, acknowledge these features as do more sympathetic researchers such as Scott, who also notices the ineffable and affective relevance of the term (Scott 1990: 147). Moreover, Grosby, in a retort to Eller and Coughlan=s critique, believes there ought to be a recognition of ethnic ties as objects of emotion, in relation to ancestry, and nationality (Grosby 1994: 167). He holds that these elements need to be cognisized in order to become objects of attachment (ibid: 168), which suggests a psychological dimension to primordialism. Grosby views kinship as the principal object of cognition, the idea of belonging not just to an immediate family but also to a larger cultural collective (ibid: 164). Thompson adds that feelings of belonging or Awe-ness@ can be generated through appeals to common origin (Thompson 1989: 49).

It is apparent when discussing primordial ties that one often encounters references to feelings, or emotions related to such things as Ashared@, Acollectives@, Abelonging@ and Awe-ness@, which have strong associations with the concept of culture. In as much as culture refers to such material as traditions and customs and ways of life, an awareness that these features connect with people and groups, and that they are indeed shared and hence do involve more than one individual is for the most part taken for granted. If one speaks of the Zulu culture for example, it is very much implicit to the speaker as it is to the listener that one is speaking of a group of individuals. With this said, what about the social element in this definition process? According to the circumstantial perspective, the foundational weakness of primordial research is that it essentially limits its inquiry to the process of group self-definition, thereby failing to appreciate the impact of social relations within and between individuals and groups, and evaluating the influence of circumstances on ethnic bonds. Primordialism succeeds in identifying and describing the *effects* of collective self-organization, but what of the *affects* (which does not in any way refer to the notion of affectivity discussed above), but rather, the conditions that influence how ethnic bonds are built.

1.2 THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL APPROACH

If left purely to an encyclopaedic definition, the circumstantial approach to ethnic group solidarity (based on the fluidity of changing circumstances) specifically highlights those elements that its proponents advance in favour of the primordial approach. Circumstance is defined as Afact, occurrence, or condition, esp[ecially]Yconnected with or affecting an event etc.@ (Waite 1994: 107). Beginning with reference to occurrences or conditions in relation to events, Scott provides a good general definition of this perspective as Aresulting from certain social circumstances, both internal and

external, under which the members of the [ethnic] group exist@ (Scott 1990: 147). The social circumstances in question refer to interaction between individuals, as well as the intra and inter-relations within and between groups. Eller and Coughlan argue that ethnicity is affected by these social constructions, which can be a generating factor in group identity and behaviour (Eller and Coughlan 1993: 188,183). In the main, it is its emphasis on circumstantial evidence that supporters use to distinguish circumstantialism from its primordial counterpart. Eller and Coughlan prefer such an emphasis as opposed to the un-analytical, un-sociological, un-scientific (ibid: 183) and mystifying manner in which some have described primordialism=s almost Anatural@ explanation for ethnic affinities (ibid: 200). It is the measurable, and some have argued more scientifically-friendly way in which ethnic bonds are investigated, that advocates count in this approaches favour.

Another distinguishing characteristic of circumstantialism is its awareness of fluctuating ethnic attachments, as in how these have been documented as emergent and changing according to Asituationally variable circumstances and interests@ (ibid: 188). Barth observes the changing environments of group existence in that Athe elements of the present culture of that ethnic group have not sprung from the particular set that constituted the group=s culture at a previous time, whereas the group has a continual organizational existence..@ (Barth 1969: 38). Fluctuating ties can be connected to the emphasis that Scott places on behavioural over psychological explanations of individual and group actions. Behavioural-focussed patterns of individual and group interaction can perhaps be regarded as the modus operandi of circumstantial researchers, measuring the impact of social interactions and events.

A behavioural methodology can be seen in Barth's discussion of social boundaries, or that which defines the group ahead of the cultural material to which it subscribes (Barth 1969:15). As he states, AIf a group maintains its identity when members interact with others, this entails criteria for determining membership and ways of signalling membership and exclusion@ (ibid: 15). Through interaction, a group=s behaviour is such that a social boundary can be used not only to define it, but in so doing, to exclude those who do not fall within its self-definition, or viewing ethnic groups as categories of ascription and identification by actors themselves (ibid: 10). The extent of self-identification may be tested or seen in the instrumental approach, which focuses on how social conditions and ethnicity are utilized by actors to attain more specific goals. Before discussing this however, the question of race as a circumstantial factor in the South African context will be discussed.

1.2.1 South Africa: The Circumstance of Race

The sociobiological perspective, argued within the sphere of primordialism and discussed most prominently by van den Berghe, proposes a biologically centred explanation for ethnic sentiments. Van den Berghe takes evolutionary biology as the theoretical basis of primordialism, where ethnic and *racial* (a socially-constructed term referring to skin pigmentation as a distinguishing feature amongst human beings) ties are seen as extensions of kinship attachments (van den Berghe 1981:18, 29). Descent is considered the key defining characteristic of individual inter-relationships, indicating a more biologically-based attachment than that of kinship, which is mostly associated with cultural matter according to mainstream primordial thought (ibid: 27).

If primordialism is criticized for explaining relatively static, persistent and natural phenomena, rather than focussing on the sources of ethnic fluctuation, the sociobiological approach presents an even more rigid, genetically-based argument (Thompson 1989: 54). Reynolds has a problem with taking genes as decisive determinants in the progression from psychology, through to individual relationships, through to group structures and group interactions. He favours cultural and social factors in how individuals construct themselves and their surroundings. Implicit in his argument is that humans do have the capacity to change man-made constructions rather than being held captive by their genes (Reynolds 1980: 313) (Scott 1990: 156). Despite the rigid notion of race moreover, the fact that it is, as mentioned above, a defined social-classification, says something about how even this concept may be discussed within the context of changing circumstances and inter-group relations. Scott takes Reynolds' critique a step further, by recognizing the implicitness of individual self-construction tied to non-biological criteria, and identifying this flexibility with the effects of social, economic and political conditions (ibid: 156).

Does sociobiology occupy any place within the greater ethnicity debate? This question is weighed in relation to the role of ethnicity in recent South African history, a country defined along the lines of race for the majority of its history. Simon Bekker observed the diminished appearance of ethnicity in South African scholarship during the 1980s and early 1990s, with the majority of work attached to racial, Liberal and Marxist societal critiques (Bekker 1993: 72). He remarks that ethnicity should be evaluated against the statutory imposition of racial classifications during apartheid and the history leading up to its implementation; and secondly with respect to the identity-related repercussions of

apartheid on South Africa=s population. Bekker states that the potential for individual and group identification with markers other than race seems likely to occur, as South Africans proceed to dismantle the system of racial ordering (ibid: 19).

Despite the repudiation of sociobiology which this thesis supports, what aspect(s) of apartheid classification may be relevant to the rise of ethnic nationalism during the recent democratic transition? It may be worth considering race in a limited and precisely-defined capacity, tied to the emergence of ethnic associations, as corresponding to Bekker=s concern for the identity-related effects of apartheid on the country=s population. Can it be observed how a socially-constructed system of racial classification which produced social divisions to begin with, has affected divisions along ethnic lines, within a context of changing political circumstances? In this way, race may be explained as circumstantial.

1.3 THE INSTRUMENTAL APPROACH

The instrumental perspective could be considered a stream of circumstantialism, as Scott defines the latter as AOthers go[ing] further and explain[ing] how certain circumstances lead to the rational, strategic selection of ethnic identityYas a means of attaining desired political, economic, and other social goals,Y@ (Scott 1990: 148). This stream investigates how ethnicity can be used as an Ainstrument@ by individuals, groups, organizations etc. for the purposes of meeting desired objectives. The contemporary utility of instrumentalism is confirmed by Glickman, as he comments on its rise in prominence in recent years, influenced by political and institutional incentives and interests as defined by members of ethnic groups (Glickman 1995: 12). Rothchild identifies this with Africa by

stating that AWhat this implies is a shift in emphasis from culturally-based conflict that frequently marks non-African inter-ethnic encounters to conflict that involves collective struggles in the market-place for an increased share of scarce political, economic and social resources@ (Rothchild 1986: 66). Two observations must be made in reference to Rothchild's statement, concerning first the shift from culturally based conflict to more socially-based circumstances in respect of competition over scarce political, economic and social resources; and secondly, the implicitness of conflict or struggle as a result of these conditions.

Bates, arguing from the angle of rational choice (Glickman 1995: 13), views ethnic groups as primarily coalitions, formed partly of *rational elites* to secure the benefits of *modernization*, and regulated in a world of scarcity (Bates 1983: 152). Hardin defines rational according to narrowly self-interested intentions (Hardin 1995:14). The central players for Bates are elites, defined as Aformations within ethnic groups and classes that often play critical roles in ethnic mobilization@ (Brass 1985: 49). Of note in Bates= argument is the usefulness of organisation along ethnic lines as a means of attaining the benefits of modernization; with modernity defined as the attainment of higher levels of education, per capita income, urbanization and political participation in particular (Bates 1983: 164, 152).

Attempting to secure the benefits of modernization should not simply be limited to elite-driven competition between groups, for it is apparently more complex than that. It could involve both intra-elite and inter-elite competition and co-operation, for attaining more effective political mobilization. These relationships may also affect a manipulation and reinterpretation of group symbols (Brass 1985: 48).

Glickman views rational choice theory, but this time vis à vis electoral competition, in the following way,

> Traditional consciousness is seen as an apolitical tool employed by urban elites to gain support in rural areas. Thus investigations two decades ago in several African states revealed that it was clear that electoral competition, where it occurred, aroused ethnic conflict (Glickman 1995: 13)

Bates adds that ethnic appeals can be attractive and effective in competition for office if most constituencies tend to be dominated by members of one ethnic group. Furthermore, appeals to common ethnicity can be a more effective way of generating unifying support in light of intra-group occupational, social economic and lifestyle differences (Bates 1983: 161). But of what value are political/electoral competition and the need to mobilize effectively? Of what significance is the attainment of political power, and how does ethnicity factor into this? Returning to competition over the assets of modernization, and the significant influence that political power can yield over its distribution, Brass observes that it is not just political power at stake, but the benefits that this can have for the delivery of modernity itself (ibid: 161). Group political coordination can be seen therefore as a means of contesting societal allocations over such issues as access to jobs, land, and linguistic recognition (Hardin 1995: 25).

Considering the elite centred perspective of the above, what could be the ramifications of group mobilization? Hardin states that AWithin each group, the initial problem was one of coordination on common interests; in the larger society the eventual problem is often grim conflict of interest made grimmer by the fact that one of our groups may defeat the other@ (ibid: 25). Group competition can

create an environment defined by winners and losers, producing feelings of justice and injustice. Moreover the reality of Agrim conflict of interest@ refers to the violent experiences that many societies have endured as a result of ethnically characterised disagreements. Shirazu, reflecting upon the endemic state of conflict in Africa, argues that AA critical appraisal of society with a focus on how society has been structured on the basis of social, economic and political relationships would give a proper understanding and appreciation of the conflicts on the continent@ He dismisses the belief that ethnicity per se is the cause of conflict in Africa, and notes that it can be manipulated for various objectives, i.e. economic, political (Shirazu 1997: 19).

Hardin seeks to incorporate the motivations of individuals (who may not be considered elites), by evaluating these against the prospective outcomes of inter- and intra-group competition. This is especially pertinent to the question of ethnic attachments, and to a non-elite focussed argument. The eventuality of either being on the winning or the losing side, may influence some to identify more closely with a particular collective organization, as Aone need not be committed to the group in any normative or additional psychological sense to see one=s interests served by its success@ (ibid: 18). The idea of selective interest on the part of the individual to the group reinforces an instrumental view of ethnic attachments. Their own interests and the acquisition of benefits that may be derived from a particular association may motivate individuals. These benefits may include access to positions under a group=s control as well as its provision of a relatively secure and comfortable environment (ibid: 41).

1.4 PRIMORDIALISM, METHODOLOGY, AND THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL/ INSTRUMENTAL RESPONSE

The relationship between primordial analysis and cultural analysis is, methodologically speaking, perhaps best advanced by Geertz, who advocates an interpretive theory of culture in search of meaning as opposed to an experimental science in search of laws (Geertz 1973: 5). Shils seems to concur when discussing the relationship between theory and research, by stating that sociological theories can be abstract and as a result, may be taken as general truths as opposed to being formally tested under specific directives. The intangible and indefinite nature of ethnography or cultural analysis, as consisting of strange, irregular and complex conceptual structures knotted into one and other, should therefore be best approached interpretively rather than constrained by the rules of scientific investigation (ibid: 10, 11).

Geertz= approach attempts to incorporate such features as social events, behaviours, institutions and processes (features that have been linked with the circumstantial/instrumental perspectives) into the context of culture, something within which these features can be described (ibid: 14). His implication is clearly methodological and has been criticized by Eller and Coughlan who object on the basis of primordial research being unable to provide a mechanism for the rise of its phenomena, while Amystifying@ them into things natural, spiritual and always existing (Eller and Coughlan 1993: 200). Operationally, they do not appear to share the same opinion on interpreting culture according to intangible and ambiguous phenomena, which is reinforced by Geertz=s statement that Acultural analysis is intrinsically incomplete@ (Geertz 1973: 29). Moreover, recalling Eller and Coughlan=s criticism of the primordial approach as unscientific and un-analytical seems to be a clear attack on interpretation

not being based on clearly-defined analytical techniques, such as an awareness of the social interactions of ethnic members (Eller and Coughlan 1993: 194).

Contrary to Geertz' view, while at the same time incorporating social as well as cultural elements, Eller and Coughlan propose what they refer to as a Asocial-constructionist@ approach to ethnic attachments set within a cultural-reproduction paradigm (ibid: 197). They stress an observance of social phenomena within a context of circumstantial and instrumental stimuli, as the initiating factors of ethnic ties, shaped and developed according to the reproduction of culture. This is contrary to culture not being something to which these same social events etc. can be causally attributed, to paraphrase Geertz. Rather than culture defining the context within which social events, behaviours, institutions and processes can be described, Eller and Coughlan believe the opposite is essentially the case.

1.5 A THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIP: INDICATING A PREFERRED POSITION

In as much as the viewpoints presented above adopt different angles, what kind of interface may exist between the primordial and circumstantial/instrumental approaches?

Thompson wishes to uncover the social/psychological aspects of ethnic pride, or why should ethnicity be regarded as natural for some (Thompson 1989: 52). He specifically critiques Geertz=s analysis for taking historical events for granted, after which evaluating their impact without due attention to how history can be explained (ibid: 68). Important to consider here are questions such as what may be the

influential factors in the way history is explained, how is it being explained, and by whom, rather than the explanation itself. These questions address what lies behind certain recollections of history. This is consistent with Eller and Coughlan=s idea of a cultural reproduction paradigm, functioning according to social constructionist stimuli. The idea of historical/cultural reproduction must not simply be taken at face value, but rather should include the critical markers of whom, what and how?

Scott notes that human emotions do not simply occur Awilly nilly@, but have to be evoked by some experience whether cognitive, perceptual or emotional. Primordial sentiments must be viewed according to the circumstances under which they have been aroused (Scott 1990: 167). Scott attempts to provide a causal explanation for the human emotions included within a primordial study by citing circumstantial factors, whilst at the same time retaining the perspective to explain the reality that ethnicity is *felt*, and then analysing the kinds of emotions experienced (ibid: 167). While Scott=s argument provides a role for arousal Acircumstances@, what may be the instrumental motives behind the circumstances affecting arousal? Thompson proposes a view that seeks to explain ethnic sentiments through Athe dialectical interplay between deeply rooted historical ties based on assumed kinship, custom, language, and race and the recent demands placed on such primordial ties by the requirements for effective statehood@ (Thompson 1989: 54).

An emphasis on circumstantial/instrumental explanations assists in asking: if history is to be referred to; if emotions and feelings are to be aroused; if shared values and customs are to be drawn attention to, what may be the conditions and motivations behind how these sentiments are produced and

shaped? This is in accordance with Eller and Coughlan's social-constructionist/cultural reproduction approach, which this thesis will employ. Primordialism will play a contributory role, as referring to those objects and those features that serve to bind, under the conditions and instrumental factors directing their utilization, for desired objectives.

CHAPTER 2

DEFINING ETHNIC NATIONALISM

2.0 INTRODUCTION

Chapter one dealt with explanations for ethnic group attachments and their formulation. Its main concern was to highlight the questions of *why* and *how* these bonds are initiated and developed. Chapter two will provide substance to these questions by investigating *what* makes an ethnic tie. This thesis is primarily concerned with ethnic nationalism. This is a composite term which must logically be analysed by its composite parts. These include identity, ethnicity, and nationalism. This chapter will outline these three concepts, and in so doing, identify the inter-relationship between each. Identity concerns the questions who am I? and what am I?, defined either individually or collectively. Ethnicity describes a particular type of collective, generally including cultural materials, history and descent. Nationalism refers to the political aspirations of ethnic groups, tied to a particular territory and its administration. The synthesis between these concepts is crucial to a better understanding of the behaviour of ethnic nationalist movements. In describing and seeking to explain the behaviour of such entities, one must be aware of each concept individually, as well as how one complements another. Endeavouring to discuss a notion such as ethnic nationalism demands such an integrative approach.

2.1 IDENTITY

Identity is an ambiguous yet essential term to the study of ethnicity and ethnically influenced political movements. The reason for its complexity concerns how the term is defined, its constituent elements, and the questions emerging from the defining process itself. Furthermore, what about the exercise of identity with respect to the activities of collective identities. In this regard, the concept will be de-constructed to show how its applicability may be pursued. In so doing and with respect to its relationship to ethnicity, it will be understood at this stage that the term collective identity will be provided with a Acultural@ character, in order to establish a link with ethnicity, while at the same time leaving a more thorough study of ethnicity for a later section.

Perhaps at the very heart of identity for most people comes a psychological reflection of just what Amy@ identity is, and how do AI@ define my identity and identities? Du Preez states that an identity is the way the Aself@ is perceived and understood by others, adding that the ASelf is a component of the psychological processes by which we explain behaviour, and identity is the appearance of self in that process@ (du Preez 1980: 7). Epstein notes that many have attempted to explain the roots of identity and the Aself@ using psychoanalytical procedures and have focussed more on an Aintra-psychiatric process@ of who AI@ am? (Epstein 1978: 7). The problem with a psychoanalytical approach has been its tendency to concentrate on the internal processes of identity formation, while neglecting a more sociological treatment. Du Preez ties the psychological and sociological streams together by stating that AThe individual, too, cannot be either the subject or the object of action without an identity which orients him towards others in transactions@ (du Preez 1980: 3). The value in this statement rests in the recognition that individuals do interact with others in social environments. Jenkins concurs by adding that Aeven the most private of identities is not imaginable as anything other than the product

of a socialized consciousness and a social situation@ (Jenkins 1994: 218). How then is the development of the Aself@ considered against sociological factors?

In addition to the contrast between psychological and sociological procedures lies the distinction between *individual* and *collective* identities, which for Smith translates into the questions: who am I ?, and what am I? Who am I? is defined as the assertion of continuity through genealogy and residence, including lineage and place/residence of birth. What am I? denotes distinctiveness through culture and community (Smith 1995: 130). Identity can then imply both uniqueness and sameness, with person AA@ carrying an identity document displaying her uniqueness as distinct from person AB@, whilst at the same time person AA@ and AB@ may belong to one particular group or several groups defined by a collective identity (Martin 1993: 1). At this point, individually oriented definitions of identity will be dropped in favour of collective identity and the influences of social transactions on. Before proceeding however, Jenkins ties the individual and collective elements together nicely with respect to ethnicity, by citing Barth=s distinction between internal and external identities. Although an internal identity is considered as Aself-identity@, Jenkins qualifies that Aalthough it only makes sense to talk of ethnicity in an individual sense when the identity being defined and its expression refer to a recognized socially-constructed identity and draw upon a repertoire of culturally-specified practices@ (Jenkins 1994: 199). The external definition moreover, based on the distinctiveness of cultures and/or communities, which implies the existence of one or more groups to be considered distinct in relation to, suggests validation of another group's internal debate as well as the imposition by one set of actors on another of putative characterizations (ibid: 199). Both the internal and external definitions reflect the questions who am I and what am I, and using both Smith and Jenkins= contributions, it can

be seen how the socialization process works within and between groups. Collective identity will now be further developed, specifically looking at the influence of circumstances in a multi-group environment.

Spicer provides a definition of collective identity as Aindividuals hold[ing] in common a belief that, for example, a flag stands for something they conceive of as a land area, a political structure, perhaps a person in a leadership role, and a series of past events involving triumphs and sufferings of other people like themselves@ (Spicer 1971: 796). The key thing is commonality of belief as held by individuals who by means of sharing these are then said to constitute a collective. Isaac speaks of sharing a series of past events, called Ainheritances of the past@, but also of the force of present circumstances under which a particular group exists, these being affected by social, economic and political conditions. Political circumstances are especially important in influencing how group members see and bear themselves in relation to others (Isaacs 1975: 32-33).

Spicer recognizes areas of importance for the maintenance of an identity system vis à vis fluctuations in the intensity of sentiments between individual and group symbols, or what he calls the Aflexibility@ of a persistent identity system. Two of these areas include communication through language, and political organization for achieving the objectives of group policy (Spicer 1971: 799). Spicer specifies language as that used by a people at a given time rather than that maintained continuously through time. Important here is the changing conditions under which groups exist at given times, and the accompanying changes in the intensity of sentiments (ibid: 799). The kind of language used as well as how a particular context of circumstances affects language may be useful questions. Spicer also

discusses common political participation and organization according to the realization of objectives. It is worthwhile to recognize the circumstances that influence the degree and make-up of political organization, as well as, according to the instrumental perspective of ethnic attachments, the actors involved in the participatory and organizational processes. Furthermore, one can seek to explore the use of language in the political formation process. All of these questions impinge upon the dynamics of identity, for as much as it is accepted as a persistent phenomenon tied to an existence as psychological and social animals, it is most certainly shaped by the circumstances that define the times in which people live.

Collective identity has thus far been equipped with a cultural characterisation. The purpose has been to orient the discussion towards ethnicity. Despite having utilized a generally accepted but basic definition of ethnic identity as that tied to the cultural material of a collective, the concept is more elusive than has thus far been described.

2.2 ETHNICITY

The term Aethnicity@ as with identity has also travelled along an ambiguous road of definition concerning its composite elements and usage. The aim here is to provide a generally agreed-upon definition, and in so doing to identify and discuss those characteristics that assist in understanding the term more comprehensively.

The Oxford Dictionary has defined *ethnic* as A(of social) group having common national or cultural

tradition;@ (Waite 1994: 217). The word *ethnicity* is said to be derived from the Greek *ethnikos*, which refers to a Aself-conscious collection of people united, or closely related, by shared experiences@. Furthermore, Cashmore speaks of a collection of individuals who possess some degree of solidarity and coherence, being at least potentially aware of having common origins and interests (Cashmore 1994: 102). Key words to begin with while at the same time recalling an earlier definition of collective identity, include a group, sharing historical experiences and traditions, and a collective self-awareness, the result of which produces a degree of cohesion. The above characteristics on their own and in conjunction with each other do not provide sufficient material to distinguish an Aethnic@ group from any other collection of individuals who happen to be aware of sharing in common the above features. An ethnic group more clearly emerges when the sharing involves a Acultural@ tradition. Features that make up this cultural tradition may include language, religion, customs and symbols. Some have gone further by stating that belief in common origins and descent requires inclusion in any comprehensive definition of ethnicity. Ethnicity then, encompassing shared cultural materials and history, as well as common descent, appears to have become a generally agreed upon term of application.

The debate over ethnicity has not simply been confined to the above questions of composition, for as Glazer and Moynihan pointed out in their 1975 work on the concept, as defined by the American Heritage Dictionary in 1973, the phrase ethnic Apride@ was included, which was judged a decidedly subjective phrase, transcending more easily distinguishable elements such as cultural objects and language (Glazer and Moynihan 1975: 1). The notion of ethnic pride reflects the ambiguity of primordial bonds, more appropriately representing an *effect* of the cultural reproduction paradigm, viewed as an *effective* product rather than a *descriptive* element of ethnicity. The words on the

following poster illustrate how pride is tied to ethnic compositional material such as tradition (including cultural symbols and history) which itself is subordinate to social constructionist factors:

> I was born a Zulu I am a Zulu
> I will be a Zulu in a new S.A.
> and I will die being a Zulu I am
> proud of my tradition (Garson 1993: 33)

One needs to look beyond the vague notion of Apride@, as residing with seemingly primordial sentiments, to explore not the pride nor the cultural features as such, but the factors influencing these, which was the main thrust of the theoretical argument made earlier. One can discern a clearer path ironically in Banks= non-specific definition of ethnicity as a Acollection of rather simplistic and obvious statements about boundaries, otherness, goals and achievements, being and identity, descent and classification, that has been constructed as much by the anthropologist as by the subject-...@ (Banks 1996: 190). Banks= reference to ethnically-relevant statements and features as Aconstructed@ may be taken as suggestive of circumstantial factors, for as he remarks immediately preceding the words just quoted, AThere is a constantly changing terrain of human relations to be mapped out by anthropologists and others@ (ibid: 190). Human relations certainly appears to be a social reference, and as if to confirm this, one can turn to the last piece in the contemporary dictionary definition of ethnic as, A(of social) group@, as indicating that social factors must be discussed in an effort to obtain a clearer account of ethnicity.

Maré has argued that ethnicity should be viewed as comprising at the formative level, *social*

identities, which rely on cultural differentiation, and that build on a strong notion of common origin and sense of history (Maré 1992: 2). His argument implies that ethnic ties have a social basis, rather than allowing such a factor to be taken for granted as simply part in parcel of group dynamics. This thesis is interested in how one can go about exploring these social identities: what could they entail and what may be the observations of such an analysis?

Abner Cohen provides a jumping off point into sociological analysis when he defines an ethnic group operationally as a Acollectivity of people who (a) share some patterns of normative behaviour and (b) form a part of a larger population, interacting with people from other collectivities...@ (Cohen 1974: ix). His definition emphasises the interaction between groups/collectives as defining the essence of ethnicity, ahead of the relative cultural make-ups of groups per se (ibid: xi). Chapman et al isolate an especially important consequence of interaction, i.e. *opposition*, as describes the meeting of distinct ethnic groups in society (Chapman et al 1989: 15-16). The phenomenon of opposition represents one of the most disturbing elements of inter-ethnic interaction, for it has essentially spawned Acompetition@, Astruggle@ and violence, prosecuted in the name of ethnicity, but underpinned by factors such as the availability and distribution of scarce political, economic and social resources; and the pursuit of modernization as discussed in chapter one. Violence has become an especially problematic and destabilizing force that has sometimes served as much to perpetuate continued hostilities than to engender more cooperative relationships in an effort to avoid its perils. What could this interaction and opposition mean for the behaviour of individuals and their relationship with ethnic collectives? Yelvington may be consulted here as he seeks to characterize ethnicity within the context of inter-group relationships.

Yelvington observes the influence of the socialization process within and between groups, thereby recalling Barth's distinction between internal and external identities influenced by social conditions. It suggests to him that a shifting can occur within these internal/external boundaries where ethnicity may undergo constant re-definition and re-invention, seemingly argued according to the fluidity of social relations and the fluctuation of ethnic ties. He then states that these observations allow the analyst to empirically evaluate the efforts of individuals to re-define the content of their ethnic identity within these structural parameters (Yelvington 1991: 164-165).

Yelvington offers an instrumental perspective, as he argues that ethnicity by definition implies Ahuman intentionality and history, but history largely as >invented tradition= included in practice theory@ (ibid: 165-166). Ethnicity therefore is considered a social identity characterized by fictive kinship (ibid: 168). The meaning of invented tradition as concerns the use of culture, history and descent, in influencing how history is recounted, is a legitimate question here. Also, what does one make of practice theory? Is this a reference to the circumstances against which intentional/inventive behaviour is carried out, and if so, what can be said of this relationship? Employing an instrumental approach, what about the question of who or whom is directing/influencing the process of invention?

To conclude, a contemporary and general explanation of ethnicity has been offered. Despite its association with cultural traditions, history and descent, considered the binding elements that constitute and define an "ethnic" group as such, it is the circumstances, social interaction, of opposition and of human intentionality that this thesis views as most salient to the binding process,

for what constitutes the actions to bind and organize? One can view cultural traditions, history and descent as, according to Eller and Coughlan=s perspective, features of the Acultural reproduction paradigm@ which Asocial constructionist@ actions such as interaction, circumstances, opposition and intentionality draw upon for organizational cohesiveness.

2.3 NATIONALISM

The word "nation" appeared earlier in a way that suggested a close relationship with ethnicity. Indeed the two terms are often used as if very little distinguishes them. The importance is not as much the closeness of the relationship as much as it is what distinguishes them. Exploring this latter question can yield a clearer understanding of "ethnic nationalism".

The term >nation= is derived from the Latin *nasci*, Ato be born@, and in the form of *natio*, refers to a Agroup of people united by birth or birthplace@ Heywood observes that in its original usage nation possessed no political significance but rather implied a breed of people or racial group. It was not until the late 18th century that it acquired the political overtones that would come to dominate its meaning thereafter. Of significance was the French Revolution which symbolized popular sovereignty and self-government tied to the French people or AFrench nation@, as against the monarchal rule of the French kingdom (Heywood 1998: 152).

The politicisation of the nation associated with the French Revolution was not only intended to imply the unity of people in birth or birthplace, but also a desire to define and legitimise state sovereignty itself. Thus nation became a synonym for the state, representing concrete political objectives designed

to express the interests of peoples. In order to make the distinction between Aethnic@ and Anational@ groups, one must look to the original meaning of *natio*, which in its early usage focussed more on a Agroup of people@ rather than on a group Aunited by birth or birthplace@. Nation is more closely tied to the idea of birthplace, it is essentially based on territory, about the relationship between peoples and the land in which they live or associate with. The act of people affiliating themselves with a particular territory can result in the formulation and articulation of political objectives, designed to link the administration of the territory concerned, with the interests of the group. One may generally call the connection between people and their political, social and economic objectives towards a particular territory, "nationalism", or a movement to territorially constitute the ethnic group. Specifically, these territorial objectives may include boundaries of territory and population or both; sovereignty or at least aspiration to it (and as a result a recognition of formal equality with other nations); the idea of a legitimate or just government tied to that supported by a popular will or at least when serving the interests of the people; and popular participation and mobilization on the basis of national membership (Calhoun 1997: 4-5).

Thus far nation has referred to the political and territorial objectives of people, without specifying how segments of people seek to define themselves, and are defined by others. Nation may be divided into *inclusive* or *exclusive* characterizations, the former referring to a state that wishes to create a degree of cultural unity amongst its diverse peoples, and the latter stressing the importance of a state representing the interests of a uni-ethnic collective above others. According to Heywood, the inclusive state highlights civic consciousness, patriotic loyalty and favours a multi-ethnic composition. The exclusive state implies that countries be defined essentially along ethnic lines, or that every ethnic

group should have its own state (Heywood 1998: 159-160).

Borne out of the formulation of political objectives based on the exclusive nation is the notion of *self-determination*, where the goal of ethnic groups is to have their own ›nation-states‹ (Heywood 1998: 162). Heywood notes that nationalism and the nation-state entity legitimises the authority of government, as it is seen to be carried out either for or by groups of people in accordance with their ›national interest‹ (ibid: 164). Furthermore, some groups may be satisfied with a measure of political autonomy short of statehood and full independence. Nationalism should not always then be associated with separatism, but can refer to federalism or devolution of power (ibid: 164).

2.3.1 Ethnic Nationalism

Exclusive nationalism, or that tied to the interests of any one group where ethnicity is the most salient feature, can be termed *ethnic nationalism*. Govers and Vermeulen point out that many views concerning the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism exist, based on which of the two main views of nationalism (as mentioned above) one decides to take. One can conceive of a nation as an ethnic group whose aim it is to have its own state or at least a degree of autonomy within an existing state (or a group that has already reached a degree of autonomy or independence) ; or an ethnically heterogeneous state(s) which has attained or is trying to attain a high degree of unity and cultural homogeneity (Govers and Vermeulen 1997: 13-14).

The main interest of this study is to explore nationalism of the first sort, tied to the aims of particular

ethnic groups in achieving at most their own states, or at least a degree of autonomy within an existing state. This exclusive brand of ethnic nationalism re-appeared on the South African political scene during the country=s transition to democracy in the 1990s. One could refer to the accommodation of South Africa=s various peoples in the apartheid era as *negative diversity*, or that which sought a divisive and unequal co-existence through a system of racial classification. In contrast to this were efforts in the post-apartheid period to re-define South Africa through *positive diversity*, promoting unity through an integrated South African identity.

The next chapter will expand on the discussion generated thus far, by looking at ethnicity and nationalism within the South African context. The importance of such a discussion is that it will seek to draw the very important connection between the political, economic and social conditions prior to the 1990s, and how these affected the emergence of ethnic nationalism as a political force, a force aided and abetted by the apartheid policy of population division. These can be said to have created the conditions conducive to the utilization of ethnic nationalist sentiment during the democratic transition.

CHAPTER 3

ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT

3.0 INTRODUCTION

An ethnicity framework provides a structured and clearly organized reference tool, designed with both the reader and writer in mind. It is composed of the major points taken from the theory and concepts discussed in chapters one and two respectively. The points are a reflection of Eller and Coughlan:s social-constructionist, cultural reproduction paradigm. In particular, they highlight political conditions, along with accompanying economic and social factors, as significant factors in the development of ethnic and nationalist bonds. These were especially salient in the "ethnic" division of South Africa through the apartheid policy of homelands. The points described below will be applied to an analysis of Zulu nationalism in a later section, but it is their strong association with the initiation and appeals to ethnicity in the South African context, that will be discussed below.

3.1 OUTLINING AN ETHNICITY FRAMEWORK

An ethnicity framework consists of the following points:

- Emphasizing the **circumstances or conditions of ethnic group existence,** and hence employing a social perspective vis à vis interactions within and between groups.

- Being aware of how **objects of cultural significance such as language, traditions and kinship, are reproduced and reasserted**, utilized with emotional appeal in mind, for the purposes of ethnic mobilization.

- Being aware of the **use of circumstances by individuals, groups and organizations, as instruments**, for the purposes of meeting desired objectives such as the **acquisition of scarce political, economic and social resources.**

- Being mindful of the **attractive and effective appeal of ethnicity in competition for political office**, given the considerable affect political power can yield over the distribution of societal resources.

- **Being observant of political organization and participation tied to the realization of objectives**, whilst aware of the environment influencing the degree and make-up of political organization, as well as the actors involved in the organizational process.

- Recognizing the **use of language** and the changing conditions of group existence, especially as regards political organization.

- Being aware of the **conflict of interest, at times manifested violently, that follows from ethnic group-defined objectives**. Group interest is often communicated to the population in an adversarial, rather than in a co-operative spirit, even though more co-operative dialogue

may be taking place amongst those in the leadership of ethnic communities. This supports a circumstantial approach.

- Being aware of **individual selective interest and ethnic attachments.**

- **Keeping in mind ethnicity as human intentionality and history largely as "invented tradition"** included in practice theory, which may refer to the circumstances within which intentional/inventive behaviour is carried out. Indeed as Scott notes, AWhat is important for an ethnic group=s persistence is an interpretation of historical events that is *personally meaningful* to the individual or the group, even though this interpretation may not coincide with the views of genuine historians@ (Scott 1990: 159).

- **Being aware of the conditions influencing ethnic nationalist movements**: the combination of ingredients which bind the group, i.e. ethnic markers such as shared beliefs, historical ties, common descent, with objectives which consolidate the group, i.e. confines of territory and population or both, aspirations towards sovereignty, a legitimate or just government tied to the popular will or when serving the interests of Athe people@, and an exclusive conception of the Anation@, defined by popular participation and mobilization by national membership.

3.2 SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT AND THE "BANTUSTAN" POLICY

The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act in 1959 gave substance to the idea of grand apartheid or macro-apartheid, broadening the legislation enacted after 1948 which imposed strict social divisions and skewed benefits on South Africa=s population based on racial categorization. The creation of homelands or ABantustans@ for the Black population was instituted according to the principles of the separate development doctrine, and was argued by successive governments in this way, for Aseparate development@ meant enabling South Africa=s peoples, Black and White alike, to achieve their Anational@ aspirations through self-realization. The segmentation of the South African landmass resulting from this policy allowed successive governments to legislatively relinquish responsibility for the Black population within the homelands. Others have sought to question an argument based on the multi-national desires of the population, and instead have looked at the political and economic circumstances behind such a re-ordering of society, and how these contributed to the creation and perpetuation of ethnic cleavages.

With respect to the re-ordering of society, two questions are at play: the reasoning behind the re-organisation of the Black population, and how this was carried out. The economic argument favouring a Black Areserve@ population to meet the needs of an industrializing society is considered particularly strong with respect to the operational rationale behind the creation of homelands. The arrangement of homelands according to major linguistic Black communities provided a means for apartheid governments to legitimise the project to the outside world, by declaring that such a scheme allowed for the national desires of various peoples to be pursued. Others have viewed this as a politically expedient way of dividing the Black population and frustrating organized resistance to the

government and its policies. This latter argument will be supported. As a consequence of such a division, Maré observes that the Bantustan policy disorganized the Black population and re-ordered it into ethnic units (Maré 1992: 1).

3.3 THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENT

Simon Bekker has noticed that the Liberal and Marxist schools have been especially active in investigating the conditions of social divisions and inequalities in South African society. The history of this scholarship favours a view that social classifications were calculated and ascribed, and hence necessary for the maintenance of a particular economic and political organization of society. Liberals have observed that modernization and economic development did not serve to individualise South Africans, but rather imposed a racial identity which for the majority of the population prevented the Awidespread enrichment of life chances@ (Simkins as quoted in Bekker 1993: 44). Marxists, arguing according to the economic structure of society and the role of individuals within, saw South African society in terms of the Aincompatible interests of capitalist and worker, largely of White and Black@; with a large Black population representing the main source of unskilled and semi-skilled labour, and a White population representing the main source of skilled labour, capital and enterprise (Bekker 1993: 48) (No Sizwe 1979: 11).

No Sizwe argues that the real reason behind the establishment of homelands was the need to maintain an unlimited supply of cheap Black labour, Aunder circumstances where the basis of that supply-the Native Reserve System-had virtually been eliminated@ with respect to its original economic function (ibid: 33). The idea of maintaining a reserve population dated back to the nineteenth century, when

allowing Blacks a limited possession of communal land was considered beneficial to the labour requirements of adjoining White-owned farms and plantations (ibid: 34). The rapid industrialisation of South Africa beginning in the mid 1920s began to eat away at the supply of localized Black labour, as a result of the growing urbanisation of Black workers due to industrial and manufacturing growth (ibid: 38-40).

3.4 SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT: PROMOTING NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS OR ETHNIC DIFFERENTIATION BASED ON POLITICAL NECESSITY?

Maré distinguishes between negative and positive apartheid to point out that separate development was not a static but a more fluid concept, which reacted to both internal and external pressures. Negative apartheid which characterized the years 1948-1958, viewed the racial classification of people in terms of the threat that greater economic and residential integration of Blacks posed to continued White existence (Maré 1992: 2). Positive apartheid, as enshrined in the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959, appeared to defend the original intentions of the apartheid system, but from a different perspective, somewhat analogous to Ais the glass half full or half empty?@scenario. The government of the day held that the glass was half full by promoting the idea of divisional homeland self-government and eventual independence in accordance with the national desires of South Africa=s diverse population, implying that these desires could only be met through national exclusivity rather than within an inclusive South African society. Furthermore, Maré adds to No Sizwe=s account of the changes serving to undermine the Native Reserve System, by stating that the homeland acts of 1951 and 1959 were the policy results of internal and external pressures being exerted on the apartheid government. These included an increased rate of Black urbanisation, greater

involvement of Blacks in industrial output, growing worker militancy, the organisational growth of workers through unions, and the intensifying anti-apartheid movement represented by organizations such as the African National Congress (ANC). Added to these domestic pressures were condemnations of the South African government from the outside world, and the perceived irrationality of apartheid vis à vis the process of de-colonisation taking place throughout Africa (ibid: 3).

The theory behind positive apartheid can be seen in how the idea was communicated to the international community. A South African ambassador addressing the United Nations defended the policy in this way: AThe problem in Southern Africa is basically not one of race, but of nationalism, which is a world-wide problem. There is White nationalism, and there are several Black nationalisms...@ He goes on to say that the aim of the South African government is to Amake it possible for each nation...to achieve its fullest potential, including sovereign independence, so that each individual can enjoy all the rights and privileges which his or her community is capable of securing for him or her@ (No Sizwe 1979: 12) Identifying the term Anationalisms@ with ethnicity, Minister De Wet Nel, speaking during the introduction of the Bantu Self-Government bill in 1959, expressed that AIt is our deep conviction that the personal and national ideals of every ethnic group can be best developed within its own national community...This is the philosophical basis of the policy of apartheid...@ (ibid: 82).

Finally, the supporting role of Afrikaner nationalism must be touched upon as alluded to in the South African ambassador=s speech as quoted above, for as much as there are claimed to be various Black

nationalisms, there is also a AWhite nationalism@. Indeed Liberal and Marxist scholars agree that ascribed and calculated identities were advanced in the interests of maintaining a particular economic and political societal arrangement. Politically speaking, the apartheid state as governed after 1948 by the National Party (NP) was dominated by members of the Afrikaner community and largely corresponded with the interests of Afrikaners, as a community, in mind. It is interesting to note that the idea of separate development had strong support within the Calvinist religious tradition propagated by the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC). Du Toit explains that the Afrikaner Calvinist tradition at the beginning of the nineteenth century was used to interpret historical circumstances such as the Great Trek as exemplifying a concept of a nascent chosen-people, civilising a savage and heathen interior, which provided the Aroot source of Afrikaner nationalism and the ideology of Apartheid@ (Du Toit 1985: 209). More recently, a DRC statement of belief and intention in 1947 stated that the organisation recognises the existence of all races and nations as separate units foreordained by God. Moreover in accordance with this belief, it is considered imperative that these entities be distinguished for the sake of their Anatural@ linguistic, cultural and community development (Le May 1995: 201).

Despite the primordial character of the above, it must be considered within the context of the economic rehabilitation and political development of the Afrikaner community, which in turn affected the resurrection of a belief in the cultivation of separate nations, and the realization of this through separate homelands. The period between the proclamation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 and the election of the National Party in 1948, has been characterized as a struggle for government control between Afrikaners and South Africans of British descent. The latter had not only the political

leverage, with respect to British victory in the Anglo Boer War of 1899-1902 and the end of the previously independent Afrikaner republics, but were also generally wealthier and better educated than their Afrikaner peers. The victory of the NP in 1948 signalled the Atriumph@ of Afrikaner nationalism which, through the acquisition of the political means, sought to economically uplift Afrikaners to a standard of living comparable to the English-speaking population. Indeed the policies and activities implemented after 1948 significantly reduced this social-economic gap (Ottaway 1996: 123). Bekker adds that as the Afrikaner nationalist apartheid state entrenched its political authority, Afrikaner nationalist thinking Adeveloped and elaborated elements of authoritarianism and of state-imposed racism, and of the protection of social and economic as well as cultural features of the Afrikaner community@ (Bekker 1993: 50). The assumption of political power provided the National Party with the means to redress the accumulated economic imbalances of the past. It also re-oriented its thinking to the danger of being inundated by the majority Black population, who by this time were becoming increasingly integrated into society both economically and residentially. Thus the idea of nation-hood was re-articulated, which, from the standpoint of those in the apartheid administration, could serve to neutralize these circumstances perceived as threatening to the benefits that the Afrikaner community were then in the process of accumulating.

Along with the promotion of separate ethnic national interests, No Sizwe recognizes that Minister De Wet Nel must have been well aware of the *real politik* advantages of encouraging separate ABantu Nationalisms@, with global Black nationalism then increasing in the country threatening to de-stabilize and potentially destroy the White-controlled political and economic establishment (No Sizwe 1979: 82). It is also of interest to consider how indirect administration had served the divide and rule

purposes of colonial authorities during the nineteenth century in the way that indigenous peoples had been spatially separated (ibid: 34). The strategy of separate Aethnic@ homelands would certainly serve to frustrate the organizational capacities of groups such as the ANC in building a national and cohesive anti-apartheid movement.

Bekker provides a suitable conclusion to the issues just presented by stating that in South Africa, individual identities were more imposed and more separate than in other societies. Moreover the causes for such impositions and separations, with particular reference to the Black population, and as argued by scholars from the Liberal and Marxist schools, can be found in the political economy of society, rather than from language, communal culture, religion or heritage etc. (Bekker 1993: 52). Despite the credibility of the above view, it remains as essentially an academic assessment, meaning in this case that beyond explaining the imposition of South African Aethnic@ identities, one must also consider how these identities played themselves out, and indeed were designed to play themselves out, within the homelands.

3.5 THE CONSEQUENCES OF "ETHNICISING" HOMELANDS

From the standpoint of the South African government, homelands provided the administrative means through which the country=s various ABlack nationalisms@ could fulfil their respective destinies. So what of the implications and effects of such a policy? First of all it must be reiterated that ethnic differentiation and the idea of ethnicity itself does not by definition imply something negative and conflict-ridden, for the definition of the term is more descriptive than prescriptive, or rather, it seeks to describe the elements which bind rather than attempting to determine the effects of such social

demarcations, be they positive or negative. But what of the forces which affect ethnicity in positive and negative ways? The importance of circumstances has already been expressed, and has been shown, the reasoning behind the homelands strategy can be tied more convincingly to economic and political priorities than to primordial motivations. With respect to the conditions affecting the apartheid government(s) of the day then, what can one say of the effects generated by homeland division?

Perhaps the most noticeable impact of division was the splitting apart of communities by ethnically reorganizing the Black population. Maré adds that much of the conflict after 1960 was characterized in ethnic terms, over resources such as land, pensions, schools etc. through their allocation to and through separate homelands (Maré 1992: 4). The difficulty of neatly separating South Africa=s Black population into ethnic units is substantiated by Horowitz, who observes that at the time of division several homelands included significant minority populations (ibid: 4) (Horowitz 1991: 74). A researcher with the South African Institute of Race Relations noticed in 1960 that:

> The Tsonga admit that until the Bantu Authorities system was imposed, they had lived peacefully together with both Venda and Sotho people...no one in the past sought to impose his authority or way of life on others...The Shangaan argue that the Bantu Authorities system has upset this delicate balance of co-existence...It is clear that the fragmentation of South Africa ***and its peoples*** has had the effect of creating antagonisms where none existed, and opening up old wounds where these were healing (Maré 1992: 4).

Horowitz expands on the theme of imposed authorities by observing that from the introduction of the homelands system, minority populations were marginalised politically, with some homeland leaders

promoting a strong territorial identity tied to the majority group. This was manifested through the general suppression of party competition and other measures designed to politically limit minority representation (Horowitz 1991: 74). Homeland leaders represented a mixture of motivations: some for instance appeared to embrace the central government=s idea of subordinate tribal nationalisms, if only because at the time this strategy appeared a more feasible alternative to majority rule. Others were described as political and economic opportunists/entrepreneurs, who benefited as they could from the offerings of the apartheid state, which included salaries, loans and bonuses. A general characteristic of all homelands was their political and economic dependence on the South African state, which influenced the repressive and authoritarian style of rule adopted by many homeland leaders, in line with the objective of Acontaining@ the Black population within their respective administrative units (Southall and Wood 1997: 14).

It is interesting to consider the development of ethnicity with respect to the political and economic entrepreneur, and the substantial external support provided by the South African government. These questions are viewed circumstantially, for the conditions of homeland rule were different during earlier years than during the late 1980s and 1990s. The maintenance of the apartheid system was up for serious consideration and eventual negotiation during this latter period. The dismantling of apartheid signalled the end of external support for homeland administrations. These were left with the critical question of how to negotiate their re-introduction into a new South African political dispensation. In light of the circumstances being thrust upon them, some sought to negotiate their continued existence (especially through the retention of some form of autonomy or independence), by citing ethnic interests, for as important as the political and economic entrepreneur was during the

early years, present conditions brought to the fore unlike at any other time, the Acultural entrepreneur@, as affecter of ethnic phenomenon, a point which O=Malley observed, was scarcely heard during South Africa's transitional national debate (O=Malley 1994: 80).

3.6 ETHNICITY AND THE LEGACY OF HOMELANDS

The previous discussion was not intended to imply that ethnicity was the only nor even the most significant feature of the post-apartheid transition. Political change forced upon those negotiating South Africa=s future the challenges of replacing a racially-based, non-democratic foundation, with one of non-racialism and democratic government; of attending to poverty, to land redistribution, education reform, job creation and constitutional design (Bekker 1993: 100-101). As pressing as these issues were, the question of how the new society would be administratively structured was accompanied by corresponding ethnically characterized ad vocations.

In a concerted effort to negotiate the future status of the homelands, the Concerned Group of South Africans (COSAG) including Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, the Inkatha Freedom Party of the KwaZulu homeland, and several groups of predominately Afrikaner interests, was formed in 1992. Their argument was one of maximum autonomy, which differed from the ANC view that favoured regional division with some level of autonomy, effectively rendering the homelands obsolete (Shepherd 1993: 31). The ANC moreover was poised to form the government once elections were conducted. A common denominator linking all of these organizations was the presence of ethnicity, in varying degrees, as a descriptive way of protecting the interests of distinct communities, in light of the revolutionary political changes about to take place. The most ethnically visible representations came

from the various Afrikaner social, religious, paramilitary and political organizations; and from the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) of KwaZulu. A major concern of political transition was maintaining security and stability, which was threatened by the prospect of violent conflict between the interests being negotiated at the time. The brand of nationalism being advocated by both the IFP and some Afrikaner organizations, at the extreme, was exclusive, maximally calling for independently-constituted territories, and minimally insisting on as much autonomy within a new South Africa as possible.

The role of Inkatha (later the Inkatha Freedom Party or IFP) in communicating Zulu ethnic interests is noteworthy for a number of reasons, not least of which because of the history of unparalleled violence and instability that has scarred the Natal/KwaZulu region as a result of the rivalry between Inkatha and organisations such as the ANC. Investigating Inkatha allows for a consideration of the circumstances of ethnic nationalist development from the introduction of homelands through to post-apartheid negotiations. This last point is in keeping with the circumstantially-based argument put forth in chapter one, tied to the social constructionist, cultural reproduction paradigm. Finally, there is the issue of the Acultural entrepreneur@, or, Awho@ or Awhat@ is doing the reproducing and why? Maré considers the importance of how the homelands system corresponded with the political agenda of regional ethnic entrepreneurs, a theme that has been discernable within the politics of Inkatha (Maré 1992: 1). Linking the instrumental and circumstantial streams, Horowitz believes that what homeland politics shows is that Athere is a substructure of allegiances and divisions available for activation when a new context brings African politics into the foreground (Horowitz 1991: 75).

It is thus to a consideration of Zulu ethnic nationalism, with reference to the above-stated points, and measured against the framework outlined at the beginning of this chapter.

CHAPTER 4

INKATHA AND ZULU IDENTITY: THE POLITICISATION OF ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS

4.0 ZULU HISTORY AND THE BIRTH OF INKATHA (1924): CIRCUMSTANTIAL STIMULI, INSTRUMENTAL MOTIVATIONS, AND THE RESURRECTION OF HISTORY

Many individuals who identify with a strong "Zulu" identity do so in reference to the Zulu kingdom that existed in the KwaZulu/Natal region in the 19th century. Ethnic affiliation can be expressed through such terms as "pride", community and nation, projecting a sense of cohesion and coherence. Many in the predominately Zulu speaking population-at-large subscribe to these primordial phenomena, and they are consistently articulated by political elites seeking to use the effective appeals of ethnic imagery. Despite the attractiveness of cultural symbolism though, it is the conditions behind, and instrumental effects of ethnic bonds, that this thesis is primarily concerned with. In the case of Zulu nationalism in South African history, an injection of social, economic and political perspectives reveals the extent to which these factors ahead of any considerable primordial stimuli, affected a particular construction of Zulu identity, providing an insight into ethnic attachments in an increasingly segregated society.

Challenging the supposed political cohesion of the Zulu kingdom, Hamilton and Wright observe that it was, rather, an amalgamation of previously independent chiefdoms, each with its own leadership, historical records and separate identities, and as a consequence of this diversity, was often plagued by civil instability and conflict. This should not dispute "how" the Zulu kingdom came into being, for it is commonly held by independent historians as well as proponents of Zulu nationalism that the kingdom as such came about through the conquest and incorporation of various chiefdoms in northern Natal by the Zulu clan. It is implied that despite its composite make-up, there was yet no evidence to suggest that during its lifetime a common "Zulu" identity ever developed amongst the "various descent groups" subject to the rule of the Zulu line (Hamilton and Wright 1993: 43). In addition, a generic application of the term "Zulu" was often used by outsiders including European travellers, missionaries and officials, to refer to the kingdom's inhabitants, as well as its later application by some to the people of the neighbouring colony of Natal. It was largely in response to the impact of eventual colonial incorporation that conditions conducive to a common Zulu identity, which cut across the distinct social differences then characterizing the Black populations of Natal and the kingdom, began to emerge (ibid: 44).

The incorporation of the Zulu kingdom into Natal by the end of the 19th century ushered in a period of increased African subjugation to colonial rule, through an increasingly rigid political, social and economic ordering of society. It is primarily in response to these circumstances, and the consequences of disorder and disruption within Black social-economic arrangements, against which a characteristic "Zulu identity" must be considered, especially when evaluating the instrumental motivations of segments of the Natal Zulu-speaking population.

These segments included a westernised, Christian, Zulu-speaking middle class elite; traditional leadership around the Zulu royal house; and the motivations of government authorities.

4.0.1 The Utility of Cultural Reproduction Under Circumstantial Change

Before considering the role of the aforementioned players vis à vis a Zulu ethnic revival, it is important to set these against Eller and Coughlan's cultural reproduction paradigm. De Haas and Zulu suggest that an ethnic affiliation was more likely to strike a cord amongst the majority of Natal's Zulu-speaking population in the early years of the twentieth century, for whom the familiar and attractive imagery of a proud history and powerful symbols such as Shaka[1] were present. This is understandable given the early stage of capitalist (class-consciousness) development in the region as well as a yet-to-be-defined and ambiguous "national" identity amongst the general South African population (De Haas and Zulu 1993: 46). As the combination of land reform and capitalist urban production requirements affected upheavals amongst the predominately rural Black populace, a Shaka-inspired notion of "order" could have appealed to many as a way of coping with the distress of colonial and capitalist conditions (ibid: 46). The environment of the early 1900s in Natal was favourable to an ethnic awakening, using the Zulu kingdom as a historical reference, which could be called upon to mitigate the restrictive measures being enacted against the Black population. These conditions will be expounded upon below.

[1]Shaka is considered by many to be the patriarch of the Zulu kingdom, credited with transforming a small clan-based chiefdom into a larger and more centralized kingdom.

4.0.2 Conditions Influencing the Instrumental Revival of Cultural Bonds

The following section will show that the initial revival of a broad Zulu identity in the 1920s was significantly driven by the interests of a small segment of Natal's Zulu-speaking population, increasingly faced with the constraints (primarily economic) of colonial administration. These constraints were mainly legislative in form including the 1913 Native Land Act, which restricted further purchases of freehold land by Blacks; and the 1920 Native Affairs Bill, which provided for a certain level of rural-based self-government (Cope 1993: 97; 100). These two statutes in particular extended the political subordination of Blacks and further limited their opportunities for economic advancement. It became commonplace during this period to speak in terms of "us" and "them", and "their" opportunities because of the segregationist direction in which the union governments were moving.

4.0.3 Instrumental Revival: The Actors

Apart from the consequences felt by Natal's Black population in general, the aforementioned policies were especially resented by a small collection of Zulu-speaking, relatively well educated, middle-class, Westernised elites, identified by the term *kholwa*, whose economically-privileged and socially well-positioned status amongst the majority of Blacks allowed them to more effectively articulate the rights and interests of Blacks, as in bodies such as the Natal Native Congress (NNC). Interestingly though, occupying such a position also provided the means through which to pursue narrower, self-interested pursuits. Marks for example describes Inkatha as an organizational partnership between the northern Natal section of the petty bourgeoisie and rural chiefs, facilitating the purchase and commercial development of land, as non-tribal land-buying syndicates were practically outlawed in

the wake of the 1913 Native Land Act (Marks 1989: 222). Cope adds that amongst the issues discussed at Inkatha's first meeting in October of 1924 were, *inter alia*: Black admittance to the franchise, the 1920 Native Affairs Bill and its allowance for self-rule, and a commercial agriculture scheme (Cope 1993: 111-112).

Apart from the economic concerns driving an alliance between *kholwa* and traditional leaders in the Natal countryside, Hamilton and Wright observe that the social-economic turbulence accompanying the 1913 Land Act and its corresponding ramifications[2] alarmed many rural leaders who saw their traditional authority being undermined (Hamilton and Wright 1993: 45). Cope adds that the pre-eminent chief and Zulu monarch, King Solomon kaDinuzulu, was somewhat attracted by an alliance with *kholwa* members which Inkatha represented, because it offered a degree of recognition and support for the institution of Zulu monarchy then beset by divisions going back to the civil strife of the 1880s, as well as promoting Zulu national unity (Cope 1993: 106). The point is not so much the decision to seek an alliance with members of the traditional rural hierarchy per se, but the decision to place the pre-eminent chief of the Zulu at the core of the future organization's activities. The Zulu king represented not only a reference of unrivalled authority for other chiefs, but also symbolized a collective identity, occupying an office that in the past succeeded in bringing together disparate identities. The symbolism of this office could again be called upon to re-constitute a healthy level of support behind which the activities of those at the helm of Inkatha could be carried out. The idea of a "Shakan order" represented by the monarchy would certainly have been of practical value in an

[2]The ramifications in question include an increasing dependency on wage labour on mostly white-owned rural lands, plus restricted rural-land access with industrialisation affecting migrant labour to the urban areas.

alliance of *kholwa* and chiefly authorities in the effective functioning of local government schemes, as envisioned by the 1920 Native Affairs Bill.

Marks notes that the high level of Black worker militancy during the 1920s, particularly in the Durban area of Natal and in the countryside, led so-called "architects of segregation" to look favourably upon the utility of ethnic-based organizations in defusing class-based ones (Marks 1989: 217). Maylam adds that during the 1920s, from the White perspective in Natal, the greatest threat to continued White supremacy lay in an emerging and increasingly vocal Black working class symbolized by such organizations as the International Commercial Workers Union (ICU). Some Natal politicians in addition to those in the federal Native Affairs department considered the benefit of a reunited but demilitarized Zulu kingdom as an instrument of political and regional stability (Maylam 1994: 10). Ultimately, the Zulu royal family represented a traditional authority structure, which, when considered against the historical conduct of colonial-indirect rule[3] suggests that the instability engendered by land reform and urban industrial development required such preventative measures as allowances for alternative and less threatening community allegiances.

4.0.4 Analysis

Some observations are necessary with respect to the framework and theory outlined in preceding chapters. First a recognition of the circumstantial context of an initial Zulu ethnic revival in the form of Inkatha and in relation to this, the role of legislation in creating the conditions for economic and

[3]Colonial-indirect rule favoured chiefs as intermediaries with local populations in the delivery and more effective application of administrative directives.

political entrepreneurs to utilize the organizational utility of ethnic support in pursuit of vested interests. Government consent for the formation of ethnic organizations is also important given the more dangerously perceived consequences of class consciousness in relation to increasingly unequal power relations in South African society favouring Whites. Secondly, circumstances are simply those, circumstances, and cannot act out of their own accord, hence requiring action by individual and group interests. The instrumental uses of circumstances were an important factor in "how" a Zulu ethnic revival came about in the first place, notwithstanding "why" it came about. Finally, one needs to be aware of the attractive and effective appeal of ethnicity in conjunction with a number of factors, including the orientation of the *kholwa* towards traditional rural-based elites as a way of acquiring effective allies and support (through appeals to traditional "ethnic" communities) in the rural areas to pursue local self-government and economic ventures. Also of note is the attraction of a strengthened traditional authority structure to major and minor chiefs and especially to the Zulu king, for not only would this have appealed to the monarch as an individual and representative of an office, but also would have capitalized on the communal symbolism of the monarchy.

4.1 THE REVIVAL OF INKATHA (1975): CIRCUMSTANTIAL INSTRUMENTALISM WITHIN INCREASINGLY RIGID SEGREGATIONIST CONDITIONS

A number of reasons have been offered to explain the revival of Inkatha as a Zulu-based cultural liberation movement in 1975. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)[4] states that the head of the KwaZulu homeland, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, rekindled a cultural liberation movement to support the

[4]The IFP is the political successor organization of Inkatha (which was not a political party in the technical sense). The IFP became particularly active in the early 1990s, broadcasting itself as the representative of Zulus in a multi-national society.

objectives and aims of Black liberation, and to frustrate plans by the South African government to persuade KwaZulu to accept nominal independence (IFP 1999: http://www.ifp.org.za/history.htm). Others have taken a more instrumental stance, such as Mzala, who noticed that despite Chief Buthelezi's co-operation with the apartheid state, his consistent criticism of the government's policy of segregation branded him unreliable and left his continued standing as Chief Minister in doubt (Mzala 1998: 6)(Maré 1992: 5). Bonnin adds that Chief Buthelezi also faced opposition from traditionalists within the Zulu monarchical establishment, as evidenced by his key role in the 1972 constitutional subordination of the king, who hence would serve a symbolic rather than executive function in the homeland's legislative assembly (Bonnin et al 1996: 148). The point is that even if one uses the more partial IFP explanation, one is essentially dealing with a circumstantial revival of Inkatha (1975).

4.1.1 Circumstances Facilitating the Re-emergence of Inkatha (1975)

Looking solely at the IFP explanation above indicates a constrained Black liberation movement, with the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in the 1960s. The apartheid state also released its "total onslaught" strategy by 1977, which described a more intensive approach to combatting the state's internally and externally perceived threats. The significance of Inkatha in this vein is that it could provide a means by which the anti-apartheid struggle could legally operate within South Africa's borders. Secondly as regards the avoidance of nominal independence, the independence option was simply an accompanying component of the larger homelands scheme, and so must be considered "a circumstance of" that particular policy. One also needs to consider the internal and external pressures exerted on Chief Buthelezi, or those applied by

the state and by traditionalists respectively. By doing this, the revival of Inkatha can be viewed as a means by which the Chief could seek to broaden his support base outside of KwaZulu and the broader homelands system within which it operated, the ultimate authority for which rested with the South African state. By looking closely at the relationship between the conditions of existence and instrumental responses therefore, this outlook can be better appreciated in terms of the background and establishment of Inkatha.

Assessing the South African government's attempt to pressure KwaZulu (or any other homeland for that matter) into accepting nominal independence must be viewed multi-dimensionally if apartheid influences for a revival of Zulu identity are of any value. These influences in particular refer to the policy of dividing the Black population into ethnic homelands. The difference between this policy and that which existed at the time of the first Inkatha was the expansion of earlier legislative acts that became more stringent after the National Party victory of 1948. Despite the more constrained conditions of Black existence, some things remained essentially the same from the period of the 1920s. The revival of a "cultural" liberation movement fell within the philosophical bounds of the apartheid separate development program and in this way conformed to the ethnic foundations of the homelands system (Mzala 1988: 116). Secondly, Marks points out that Inkatha was seen by many Whites as the answer to more radical forms of politics, be it nationalist or more openly class-based (Marks 1989: 216). One can correlate these observations with similar if not identical concerns during the 1920s, for the idea of ethnically based organizations was preferable to the communist fear of class-based associations and the numerical threat of a national consciousness infusing the Black population. The idea was to allow for a reassertion of traditional authority by permitting organizations

of a “cultural” nature, which could be an effective way of hindering organized Black resistance.

A traditional-leader-centric preference permeated not only the way the National Party conducted itself with ethnic elites, but also influenced the way Inkatha was structured. Nzimande remarks that the National Party government adopted a more “aggressive” approach in securing the support of chiefs, employing a combination of rewards and repression. Furthermore, the government also sought to induce sections of the petty bourgeoisie trading class who, as well-educated advisors to the Zulu monarchy in the 1920s, could be called upon to effectively administer the homelands in conjunction with traditional authorities (Nzimande 1994: 9). Mzala explains that Inkatha as an organization was “tailored” around the lines of African administration according to the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, where chiefs were seen as crucial mobilizers of rural inhabitants. Indirect rule was especially effective for colonial and later governments, primarily because it was based on the co-option of traditional leaders and depended upon their critical role as deliverers and intermediaries of government administrative directives to and with local populations. Ethnically speaking, it can be said that the “traditional” basis of indirect rule also provided a suitable and effective means of engaging and mobilizing a population along ethnic lines, for “tradition” in traditional is what is being evoked. Also, if one considers the top-down fashion/indirect style of rule, one can see that logically there must be an ultimate source of power, or direct power, for indirect power implies delegation (chiefs). As the apartheid-state represented direct power within the country as a whole, so did Chief Buthelezi represent significant authority within both KwaZulu and Inkatha. The latter was assured through the

constitutional relegation of the king to that of an advisor to the president of the movement[5], as was the case with the king's reduction to symbolic status in the 1972 homeland constitution (Mzala 1988: 118-119).

The connection between Chief Buthelezi's authority within KwaZulu and his authority in Inkatha requires further attention, for there was a tight knit cooperative and coordinative relationship between the two entities, which revealed Inkatha as an extension of KwaZulu government policy, and of "Zuluness". Both of these associations are significant because on the one hand, they support a "class agenda", where a new petty bourgeoisie were acknowledged to have utilized the levers of government for the benefit of Zulu trading interests and patronage networks. Bonnin et al add that homeland administrative control also allowed the authorities to distribute job prospects and commercial privileges in return for loyalty, respect and obedience (Bonnin et al 1996: 149). Instrumentally speaking, as much as government control provided the "means" for catering to the interests of a small, economically and politically privileged section of the population, control over the means of distribution was maintained by ethnic appeals to garner more widespread support around a governing elite. This utilized a particular type of imagery, symbolism and history, which emphasized community, loyalty, discipline and respect. A closer look will now be taken at "how" these images, symbols and histories were communicated.

[5]Mzala observes that Inkatha's constitution removed the King from contending for the position of president, leaving the Chief Minister (Chief Buthelezi) as the most likely candidate.

4.2 THE UTILITY OF HISTORICAL RECOLLECTION

4.2.1 Historically endorsed Positioning

Inkatha's use of history, symbolism and imagery must be considered against a background of order, allegiance and loyalty to Chief Buthelezi and the movement's leadership. Moreover, these features did not simply represent hollow declarations of an organization and government seeking to elicit widespread support. Rather, these can be tied to the specific way in which Zulu culture was portrayed in order to substantiate the collective ties of a population already segregated into an ethnically designated area. The instrumental key to this cultural portrayal was respect and allegiance to Chief Buthelezi in particular, for not only did he occupy the highest political office in the homeland, but, in many speeches and addresses, also asserted his historically-sanctioned role as advisor to the Zulu royal house. These assertions are evidenced in the following excerpts: "I was born to occupy a leadership position in South Africa...I am leader by hereditary right...I and my forebears have always occupied influential positions as prime ministers...to successive Zulu kings" and "It is in response to this demand of my ancestry that I took up my political role in KwaZulu. That role was preordained for me..." (as quoted in Mzala 1988: 103). Furthermore, at a 1974 Shaka Day address, the Chief stated that "I do not owe my political power to the KwaZulu legislative Assembly or to Pretoria. King Shaka never owed his political eminence to any colonial power" (as quoted in Bonnin et al 1996: 170). These statements suggest leadership being legitimized and justified, positioning the leader in such a way as to draw on traditional values of respect in modern day conditions.

If one were to leave the assertions of Chief Buthelezi untouched, one would only gain a partial understanding of ethnic historical sanctioning. This is so because the substance or legitimacy of this sanctioning, as different from the way in which Chief Buthelezi himself seeks to justify his position, has yet to be questioned. Although the Chief's blood relationship to the Zulu royal house is accurate, there is no established tradition that obliges Zulu monarchs to choose their chief advisors, or "prime ministers" as Chief Buthelezi so refers, from particular tribes. What's more, with reference to Zulu history, there is no tradition of members of the Buthelezi clan consistently occupying the post of chief advisor. Paraphrasing Mzala, Chief Buthelezi has used the "circumstance" that placed his great-grandfather in the position of paramount advisor, and has made a "tradition" of it (Mzala 1988: 105). This point reflects Yelvington's view of instrumentalism, or ethnicity seen as "human intentionality and history, but history largely as 'invented tradition'..." (Yelvington 1991: 165-166). It can also be seen in the ceremonial role of the Zulu monarch in both the homeland administration and Inkatha, despite the near unanimous agreements of historians that, historically, Zulu kings held wide executive, legislative and judicial powers. This contrasts with the official KwaZulu version, which states that Shaka was the only monarch to exercise real power (Maylam 1994: 21-22). The more direct instrumental (as this pertains to Chief Buthelezi himself) re-telling of history, is but an aside to the more significant question of how Zulu culture and history have been depicted in terms of loyalty to leadership, which says something about the method of using culture in ethnic mobilization.

4.2.2 Cultural Portrayal and the Importance of "Order"

Permeating the recollection and articulation of Zulu ethnicity has been the general notion of "order" and the characteristics that contribute to it. These are especially apparent in the educational material produced by the KwaZulu authorities for its population. Maré for example notes that after the homeland was granted extended powers of self-government in 1977, which included authority over educational syllabi, the notion of 'ukuhlonipha', or respect (according to an analysis of Zulu language texts) became a central theme. This entailed respect for Chief Buthelezi as Chief Minister and political leader of the Zulu; respect for the law; and social cohesion defined around the "Zulu nation", with Inkatha representing this nation (Maré 1992: 6-7). Associating respect with being Zulu, Chief Buthelezi stated, prior to an outbreak of violence in KwaMashu township schools, that "In this region King Shaka was the first person to make us a disciplined people, and through the various traumas we have encountered as a people and where we have been split apart, I think Inkatha has been that instrument which sought to re-establish that discipline..." (as quoted in Maré 1992: 7). Attributes of a "traditional" Zulu character have also been applied to the functioning of the homeland's police force, as demonstrated by these words: "we do have a lot to gain from old Zulu discipline as established by that military genius in the person of King Shaka..." Also, we need to "infuse into our Police Force the sterling character and the great courage which has made the Zulu nation one of the great nations of the world" (ibid: 8).

The way that Zulu culture has been communicated is important not only because it assisted the KwaZulu leadership in more effectively garnering the support of an "ethnically" designed constituency, but also because it has been useful in assuaging an economically, politically and socially marginalised population under apartheid. Adam and Moodley notice that a cultural revival

emphasizing pride and successes in battle has been particularly attractive to the most deprived amongst the Zulu population. These associations have evoked a sense of dignity amongst the many Zulu-speaking hostel dwellers and urban unemployed migrant workers (Adam and Moodley 1992: 501).

If one recalls the notion of a Shaka-inspired "order" which accompanied the founding of Inkatha in 1924, one can draw parallels with its successor's use of this idea after 1975. As much as the socially-destabilizing effects of land reform and migrant labour were emergent in the early years of the century, the advent of National Party rule and the elaboration of increasingly segregationist and selective population constraining policies of apartheid, exerted new pressures on the African community. As described in the preceding chapter, territorial separation was largely undertaken for economic and political reasons, and hence had corresponding consequences, notably political subordination and economic dependency on the South African State. Theoretically, one can associate Inkatha's brand of ethnic revival with how culture is reasserted and reproduced, utilized with emotional appeal in mind, for the purposes of ethnic gathering. This angle however, when set within the social constructionist, cultural reproduction paradigm, tells only half the story, for what are the underlying factors influencing ethnic mobilization?

4.2.3 Circumstantial/Instrumental Influences and the Significance of Loyalty

Evaluating the cultural mobilization of the Zulu-speaking population does not necessarily allow one to easily appreciate the structure, implications and effects of social power relations. This can be tied generally to how the primordial and circumstantial theories were contrasted earlier in this work, for

circumstantial analysis inquires about the social relations within and between ethnically-defined groups, as well as the conditions of group existence. With this in mind, how does one assess the following: Mzala notes that a survey conducted in the Durban township of KwaMashu towards the end of the 1970s, suggested that a large majority of those in the urban areas who join Inkatha voluntarily, do so for reasons of social security, i.e. employment and trading benefits (Mzala 1988: 133). Bonnin et al reveal that information collected by a number of organizations involved in human rights, politics and unions indicated that the KLA and Inkatha withheld or provided services, jobs, and tenders according to loyalty. In addition, membership of Inkatha was compulsory for access to most civil and public service jobs within the homeland's jurisdiction (Bonnin et al 1996: 167-168).

The ability that some have at their disposal to distribute societal resources, as Bates touched upon earlier, was, in the South African context, furnished through the creation of territorial and homeland units. There are political elites in KwaZulu who by virtue of their control over the distribution of social welfare in particular, have been able to elicit support. Indeed a combination of instrumental means assisted by cultural stimuli (appealing to ethnic identity, community and "pride") can be viewed as a most effective way of drawing support, especially amongst a relatively poor and little-educated constituency. Finally, and in connection with the ethnicity framework, there is a clear case of individual selective interest towards ethnic attachments, for one is not dealing with elites but the general population. One is also dealing with motivations that can be tied to self-interest and more specifically benefits derived from a particular association (mainly social-economic). Certainly, as Hardin would concur, these benefits would include access to positions under the group's control as well as the provision of a relatively secure and satisfactory environment.

4.3 IDENTITY AND OPPOSITION

The development of Zulu identity has thus far been analysed largely from the perspective of those wishing to impart a particular characterization, utilizing an approach that implies inter-community differences. As much as identity is bestowed upon individuals as members of communities, the result that some are excluded from this same application of membership reveals questions of a sociological nature, of intra and inter-community relations, rather than viewing identity formation as an "intra-psychiatric process" as stated by Epstein earlier. This promotes a more comprehensive understanding of identity development and forces one to consider the impact of circumstances and social situations.

As much as Zulus were supposed to embody attributes such as discipline, respect, strength and pride, the increasingly discordant environment of Black political contestation during the 1980s provided these ascriptions with more serious implications and consequences. These can be seen in the inter-organizational conflict and violence involving Inkatha, the ANC, and the United Democratic Front[6] (UDF). Bonnin et al observe that from 1980 onwards, increasing competition frustrated Inkatha's attempt to monopolize "what" or "who" constituted a Zulu, especially in urban Natal where other emerging identities were often taking precedence over that of being Zulu. They describe a shift from the politics of allegiance to the politics of the "struggle". This refers to affiliations with the ANC and UDF in particular, and their condemnations of the injustices perpetrated by apartheid, which affected at the core, *all* Blacks, despite the state's policy of ethnic division and divide-and-rule (Bonnin et al

[6]A multi-racial movement campaigning against the injustices of apartheid. It operated within the liberation vacuum created by the banning of organizations such as the ANC and the PAC.

1996: 171).

Accordingly, identity relations can be evaluated in at least two ways: amongst Zulu speakers themselves and between Zulus and non-Zulus. In the first instance, King Goodwill Zwelithini remarked that "Not only do Zulus have valour, not only are they indomitable and not only are they prudent, but Zulus have a quality superior to any of these...The Final strength of our Zulu nation has always been wisdom...I command you to eliminate from your midst all those disgusting usurpers of our dignity without shred of malice in your beings...Root them out only to make them one of us" (as quoted in Maré 1992: 72-73). First of all this statement builds on prescriptive identity formation, defining what Zulus "are" and "what" they have. This description is then presumably applied to other Zulus (denoted by the word "usurper", or one who intrudes on or assumes) who, through their usurpation, degrade those characteristics which themselves constitute a more legitimate, traditional and royally-sanctioned Zulu identity. Usurper also connotes a removal of or de-throning, which can refer to a "legitimate" identity, especially when supported by the Zulu monarch as representative of the Zulu nation. Finally, the idea of a nation is suggestive of communal identity-construction based on "inheritances of the past" and in this way conforms to the cultural reproduction paradigm.

The second case seeks to distinguish Zulus from non-Zulus, and has been articulated in fairly exclusive tones, for often times non-Zulu speaking individuals and groups have been described as traitors and outsiders to "Zuluness", and importantly, characterised in ethnic and racial terms such as "Xhosa lawyers", "Sotho chief", "white liberals" and "Indian traders" (Bonnin et al 1996: 170). An interesting observation is Inkatha's use of both ethnic and racial differences in maintaining the

cohesiveness of their prescribed Zulu identity. This reflects the ambiguity of the organization in, on the one hand, wanting to be at the fore of the *Black* liberation struggle against *White* domination, while on the other hand, promoting a separate ethnic identity within the Black community, which increasingly came into conflict with other Black identities. The idea of separate Black identities gained a great deal of political mileage for Inkatha during the 1980s and 1990s, reflecting its dual and circumstantially influenced role as both a liberation organisation, and a Zulu-based organisation.

4.3.1 The Beginnings of Opposition

The duality of Inkatha's style reflects political organization and participation tied to the realization of objectives, within a context of changing environments. This was certainly the case in its self-proclaimed role as representative of Black liberation and Zulu interests alike. Inkatha held that it continued from where the ANC left off, claiming that the mantle of the liberation struggle was passed to it during a meeting in the 1960s between ANC president Albert Luthuli and Chief Buthelezi (Maré 1992: 58-59). Moreover, representing the wider liberation campaign went deeper than making an organizational claim to inheritance. Forsyth observes that after Chief Buthelezi's falling out with the ANC at the beginning of the 1980s, and during the years 1983-1989, he sought to deny it a traditional role in resistance politics, and rather, stressed the Zulu role in the origins of Black resistance (Forsyth 1990: 14). This is particularly significant for a number of reasons, first of which was the estrangement between the two organizations. One can see this in how, on the one hand, Inkatha was willing to "inherit" the liberation struggle from the ANC, whilst later denying it a place consistent with this position. In this case, Zuluness took on a pan-Black character of sorts, attempting to broaden and expand Inkatha's support base in general and Chief Buthelezi's in particular. This meant a more

prominent position on the South African political scene, and as a result, greater relevance and influence in political negotiations with the central government. Secondly, linking resistance politics with Zulu history is consistent with cultural resurrection, and as Forsyth notes, this was illustrated in museums in KwaZulu, exhibiting the "historical primacy" of the Zulu role in anti-oppression activities (ibid: 15).

4.3.2 Political Rivalry and Cultural Reinforcement

As competing identities emerged and developed during the course of the 1980s, a more exclusive Zulu identity took on greater salience in Inkatha's articulations, the consequences of which included inter-organizational opposition, competition and conflict. The violence which wracked Natal during the 1980s and early 1990s has too often been described as ethnic in nature, and as such has not promoted a deeper inquiry into *why* this is actually the case. It turns out that ethnicity is but an accessory of political contestation, which itself is more of a descriptive phenomenon, resulting from other instrumental motivations. The product of this drive to secure support presents itself as territorial contestation with consequences such as violent conflict. The dissolution of the homelands system and the unbarring of the ANC only inflamed already simmering political tensions. Moreover the reconstitution of Natal into KwaZulu-Natal province and the advent of majority rule ushered in an escalation of politically aligned violence, territorial no-go areas and regional instability, for the prospect of genuine democratic rule meant that organizations such as the ANC and IFP could now compete legally and openly for the votes of all South Africans. Politics in KwaZulu-Natal became synonymous with rivalry and control with the province's two major political forces vying for electoral supremacy and administrative influence. This can be significantly attributed to the waning years of

apartheid and the emergence of a new context of circumstances, for as Horowitz observed at the conclusion of the previous chapter, homeland politics showed that a substructure of allegiances and divisions were available for activation when a new context brought African politics into the foreground.

Finally, and as to substantiate the preceding through some empirical observations of South Africa's 1994 general election, Piper and Piper argue that explanations for political allegiance in KwaZulu-Natal cannot "fundamentally" be attributed to ethnic identifications, without assessing the background of political contestation, spatial domination and political power and influence in the province. An indication of this complexity is the observation that the Zulu-speaking population was roughly split 60:40 between the IFP and ANC respectively (Piper and Piper 1995: 3). They also point out that ethnicity, rather than being an independent predictor of party allegiance was but a component, largely of IFP party strategy, successfully deployed as part of its "regime of power" (ibid: 11, 14). Regimes of power moreover provide the contextual boundaries within which identity can be drawn. Indeed ethnicity can account for the cultural reproduction within these borders. But what about such instrumental factors as selective organizational association based on corresponding social welfare benefits (as discussed before), and Inkatha's control over the distribution of societal resources and opportunities within its designated jurisdiction; reports of intimidation in the run-up to the elections; as well as suspicion of fraud and manipulation of the final results? (ibid: 5, 7)

Political mobilization was increasingly reinforced with a more exclusive "ethnic" character as the national aspirations of Inkatha began to diminish in favour of more populist organizations such as the

UDF and ANC during the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover the legalization of the ANC and the transition to democratic rule saw a resurgence of ethnically marked conflict. For example, at the Congress for a Democratic South Africa negotiations in 1991, Chief Buthelezi's absence was taken as a sign of his unhappiness at the non-attendance of the Zulu king, as representing South Africa's seven million Zulus (Maré 1992: 62). Speaking at a rally in 1991, Chief Buthelezi remarked, "I want to make it quite clear that the ANC attacks are not only attacks against Inkatha...They are attacks against Zulu people just because they are Zulu" (Adam and Moodley 1992: 501). In a 1992 speech, he noted that "Zulus today are the product of a warrior nation...We will not cower to the demands and threats of the ANC..." (Golan 1994: 15). Finally, the announcement of a bilateral agreement between the National Party and the ANC in the same year influenced Inkatha's threatened departure from transitional talks unless the Zulu monarch was invited to represent the Zulu people (ibid: 21).

4.3.3 Analysis

Generally speaking, the above highlights such things as the changing and declining national fortunes of Inkatha; political contestation and rivalry tied to an emerging context that placed African politics in the spotlight; and support acquisition influenced by control over the distribution of societal resources as well as a corresponding individual selective interest. These are essentially circumstantial and instrumental questions, and can be tied to the social constructionist component of the main theory advanced in this thesis. Firstly one is dealing with social situations; and secondly "constructionist" as it exists within this phrase implies a building of sorts, a creation or interpretation affected by social conditions, and can be viewed as a term of utility. It is according to this background that ethnicity was interpreted and articulated.

Looking at the use of language in the last paragraph, equating ANC attacks against Inkatha as those against Zulu people because they are Zulu, not only suggests that Inkatha represents *all* Zulus per se, but also imparts an ethnic character on the interaction between the two organizations. Secondly, portraying Zulus as a product of a "warrior nation" and tying this to a hostile relationship with the ANC, draws on "one" feature of historical recollection which not only signifies "one" feature, but motivates the question of why this particular characterization? One can look at political contestation and the utility of such a characterization in light of descriptive support acquisition and effective competitive prosecution (as in a warrior past being inconsistent with Zulus as a "nation" submitting easily to the dictates of the ANC). Finally, one must be aware of the violent conflict of interest that political rivalry engendered in Natal, especially in the 1990s and the years immediately preceding the 1994 election.

Ethnicity was a tool of sorts, and part of a strategy of competitive and adversarial politics. As much as political contestation and cultural reproduction have been presented as more descriptive elements of Natal's ethnic politics, they do not constitute the whole story, for what may be the instrumental motivations underlying the above descriptions? The objectives of individuals and organizations have been significant factors in the initiation and revival of Zulu ethnic bonds. Indeed the same scenario can be painted during the 1990s. Nzimande argues that Inkatha's nationalism is an attempt by the Zulu bureaucratic bourgeoisie to "prevent its social, economic and political base from disintegrating", attempting to re-legitimise the homeland and its institutions under continued control of the petty bourgeois in a post-apartheid political arrangement (Nzimande 1994: 16). Southall adds that there was "widespread concern" within the IFP that boycotting the 1994 elections would allow the ANC

to contest Natal unchallenged, and that the re-incorporation of the homeland and its administrative machinery into a new regional framework would deprive the party of a long-standing means of patronage (Southall 1994: 633-634). Assessments such as these indicate instrumental motivations, and in this way reflect the attractive and effective appeal of ethnicity in competition for political office, for this provides the major institutional means by which the allocation and distribution of societies resources is determined (particularly under new and emerging political circumstances such as post-apartheid South Africa); and the way in which these "means" contribute to the continued status and relevance of political actors.

4.4 THE ZULU "NATION"

As discussed in chapter two, the word "nation" as distinct from "ethnic" refers to objectives such as territorial delineation and degrees of political structure and administration as defined by either inclusive or exclusive characterizations. At the outset though, and before the fundamental restructuring of South African political society was begun in earnest, what could the term have held in its earlier usage? It can be observed that "nation" went from describing a coherent, political-administrative unit maintaining relevance in a post-apartheid democratic environment, to underlying more concrete political arrangements in a "multi-national" society. The major factors bridging these two descriptions were circumstances, which brought an end to the old order while producing the conditions for a new one to take its place.

A "nationalist" discourse was clearly evident by 1979, when during a speech marking the centennial anniversary of the Battle of Ulundi, Chief Buthelezi stated that "The Zulus were already a closely knit

political unit which had reached a state of nationhood which no other Black group had reached...In fulfilling the destiny of this country for all its people, the importance of Zulu coherence must never be underestimated by anyone" (Mzala 1988: 120). This is not only a reference to Zulus as a distinct cultural-political group, but also suggests that this condition must be respected in any future South African political dispensation. The nature of the political framework envisioned by Chief Buthelezi was delivered in his 1986 book, *South Africa: My Vision of the Future*. In it, he puts forth a declaration of intent designed to facilitate meaningful discussion on power sharing and reconciliation. Recognition of South Africa's "groups" and "peoples" is a significant component of the declaration. This could be considered rather obvious given the structurally and administratively enforced divisions that apartheid engendered within South African society, especially when tied to reconciliation and power-sharing. But beyond a simple descriptive observation lies more prescriptive solutions such as: constitutional protection for the self-determination of "groups" and "people", best accomplished through power-sharing while seeking to avoid dictating to any group how to express its self-realization; as well as having the amended constitution more acceptable to all groups.

The use of the term "groups" is somewhat ambiguous because it is not explicitly clear who or what is being referred to. It could mean the apartheid classifications of White, Black, Coloured and Asian; it could also refer, with respect to politically delicate negotiations between Whites and Blacks, to allaying White fears of Black domination and hence safeguarding group interests to this end; or it could mean something else. The term "people(s)" is also left relatively open-ended. It is eluded to that "group" could refer to intra-Black cultural distinctiveness among others, by reference to a "national pride" tied to South Africans determining the country's future in acceptance of each other as

individuals and groups, as well as the appreciation of each others' "cultural" rights (Buthelezi 1990: 34-35). This is consistent with how a particular Zulu culture was presented by Inkatha, as part of a broader construction of Zulu identity.

These points are also in keeping with Inkatha's style of representation as mentioned in the previous chapter, for the lack of specificity concerning groups and people(s) can be viewed as politically adept, emphasizing such terms as sharing, self-determination, equal inclusion of all groups and peoples without apartheid qualifications (regarding citizenship for example), and cultural protection. Internationally these are fairly recognizable and acceptable principles. Domestically, they are designed in such a way as to court broader support, and as an aside, this is not necessarily so because these are anymore pro-active than re-active ideas, for they essentially concern changing the system of government then in place. This implies recognition of political circumstances then present. On the one hand, Chief Buthelezi's declaration is delivered in such a way as to appeal generally to a population reconciliation , as would seem appealing to a diverse audience critical of the injustices of apartheid, whilst on the other hand advocating a multi-national post-apartheid thesis in keeping with the protection of ethnic national interests.

Ethnic national concerns took on greater resonance during the course of critical transitional negotiations. At an October 1992 meeting of homeland leaders, Chief Buthelezi stated that secession would remain on the political agenda and might be necessary in the event that talks failed, resulting in a Balkanisation of the country in the worst case. He continued by saying that "We say no to any further appeasement of the ANC, with its designs to seize power for itself", suggesting that secession

was conditional on an acceptable degree of power sharing (Laurence 1992: 17). The ethnic factor also made an appearance, as Southall notes that the interim constitution, denounced as insufficiently federal, was portrayed as "an attack upon the status of [the] King...and an assault upon the identity of Zulus as a nation" (Southall 1994: 633).

This last paragraph indicates an intensification of political manoeuvring as the course of negotiations proceeded. Recalling Chief Buthelezi's declaration of intent, one notices that secession was neither directly referred to nor corresponded with the general theme of national reconciliation that permeated the document. Furthermore, perceiving an ANC "design to seize power for itself" is particularly telling of the IFP's motivations during this period. The point is that a new Afro-centric political context was beginning to materialize in the 1990s which was not the case even six or seven years earlier. The role of opposition appears to have been quite visible in the IFP's discussion of secession, as evidenced by Chief Buthelezi's reference to a power-grab by a competing organization.

The preceding are influenced by circumstantial and interactive variables, which, as can be observed above, utilize the popular appeal of ethnicity. This is consistent with the social constructionist, cultural reproduction paradigm. More specifically as regards the nation, it can be seen how a nationalist reference (constitutional design/federalism) combined with ethnic identifications under politically fluid conditions, underpinned by instrumental motivations. This last point should not be lost in the drama that cloaked the post-apartheid transition, because the re-design of a political structure transforming the ethnic group into the nation, provides the institutional means through which social, economic and political management and privileges can be had, and continued, by a small segment of

the population.

CONCLUSION

ETHNIC NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRATISATION: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

WHAT LIES BEHIND ETHNIC AND NATIONALIST BONDS?

This thesis has addressed two primary issues: The first discussed the nature of ethnic solidarity and nationalism, and the second concerns the political implications for a democratic South Africa. Issue one has been the main subject of analysis because issue two cannot substantively be assessed without de-constructing ethnicity and nationalism. The reason for this is that the implications which one arrives at require an appropriately evaluated theoretical and conceptual base, which must then undergo contextual and case-specific testing.

More precisely, Szeftel's query as stated in the introduction to this thesis served as a bridge linking issues one and two. It inquired into the substance of ethnic attachments and their constitutional accommodation, for are these interests an expression of "popular concern and needs", or are they a "euphemism, a synonym, for organizations, political machines and patronage networks...under apartheid...concerned to guard their old privileges?" (Szeftel 1994: 198). Taking apart Szeftel's question showed that its perspectives on ethnic interests corresponded with the primordial,

circumstantial and instrumental approaches. The task of constitutional engineering in South Africa resulted from the democratisation process that succeeded a non-democratic apartheid society. Finally, Zulu ethnic nationalism provided an effective example of a perceived ethnic/nationalist "interest" concerned with constitutional status.

Adopting a theoretical stance composed of Eller and Coughlan's social constructionist, cultural reproduction paradigm, it was shown that the initiation of Zulu bonds was primarily affected by circumstantial and instrumental factors, which then utilized cultural/ primordial phenomena. Apart from the instrumental motivations of Zulu elites, it was also seen that the increasingly segregationist policies of union and apartheid governments facilitated and encouraged ethnic affiliations, later organizing these within "nationally-based" territorial units. This is particularly important because it ties the circumstances of existence to the intentions of both South African government politicians and policy makers, and Black "ethnic" leaders. Moreover the ethnic division of the country allowed for the protection of White privilege through a divide and rule strategy. As regards the notion of race as a circumstantial variable, the evolving racial hierarchy of pre-apartheid society was ethnically elaborated after the assumption of National Party rule, which owed much to Afrikaner identity and upliftment. The maintenance of White, but Afrikaner privilege, was moreover supported by the nationalist thesis of grand apartheid.

ETHNICITY AND SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING

Issue two concerns the political application of ethnic bonds, corresponding to "political implications for the rainbow nation" used in the title of this thesis. This question has been dealt with from more

than one standpoint, and has had either a nation/ inter-communal building, or state/institution building emphasis. For example, O'Malley's contention is that unless ethnic interests are recognized and accommodated at the political/constitutional level, the "new" South Africa will not experience nation-building, inter-communal reconciliation nor state-building (O'Malley 1994: 77). Furthermore, the positive dimensions of ethnicity and nationalism need to be recognized as community building elements before endeavouring to discuss reconciliation and state restructuring (ibid: 87-88).

Degenaar takes a different tact by citing features of division and exclusiveness in the history of South African nationalisms, supporting a conclusion that South Africa does not require nation-building per se, but a focus on state and institution building and the construction of a democratic culture; addressing common problems such as social and economic injustices, economic growth, employment, housing, education and health care (Degenaar 1991: 14-15). Moreover this does not mean that cultural diversity is to be ignored, for within a democratic constitution, protection against ethnic discrimination is to be included along with, *inter alia*, common citizenship, the rule of law, and a bill of rights (ibid: 10-11). The idea is one of building inclusive bonds, i.e. every citizen equal before the law, meaning that functionally South Africans should seek constitutional affiliations, rather than emphasizing national ones. The law of the land should ensure the protection of persons as individual members of society, as well as individuals with broader cultural ties.

The political implications for a diverse, "rainbow" nation, correspond with the details of ethnic accommodation, preceded by the question how? How are the country and its constitution to accommodate ethnic interests; how much latitude and substance should be provided to ethnically-

identifiable groups, for example, how much self-direction/autonomy should be provisioned? What about questions of territorial identification and status?

The evidence presented here has shown that the "ethnic interests" referred to by Szeftel, owed much to the conditions affecting their emergence, and primarily to the motivations of those articulating and administering an ethnic dialogue. These actors moreover applied the effectively regarded community-building imagery of ethnicity and its historical symbols to support the political platform on which they stood. Does this realization then denigrate the concept of ethnicity? To answer yes would be to miss the point, for culture per se is not at issue, but the politicisation of culture. Culture is being acted upon: resurrected, evoked, utilized and manipulated to assist the interests of those doing the acting.

In sum,

1. Being mindful of racial and ethnic classifications that comprehensively divided South African society in the past, and as a result, created the background for ethnic expressions within a new and emerging, unrestricted political environment,

2. Being aware of the instrumental role of individuals and organisations, and supporting circumstances, in the *initiation* of ethnic bonds; thereupon relying on symbols and history in the *development* of ethnic attachments,

3. Concerned about the ethnic "interests" being expressed, as per who really benefits from the accommodation of ethnicity in constitutional and administrative designs,

It is argued here that the interests of the general ethnic membership are not being primarily served, but rather the self-sustaining motivations of political elites. In light of this, and in recognition of the above points, the following suggestions will be offered.

The institutions of democratic rule should be the focal point of state-building activities. This is recommended because the divisiveness of the past was perpetrated by the state, according to underlying economic motivations, and producing inter-communal estrangement as well as contributing to violence. The state was for many an illegitimate entity, which presented itself as the guardian of White privilege. Highlighting the state, and making it truly representative and accountable to *all* South Africans, is therefore viewed as a more suitable means of approaching inter-communal reconciliation. This could be enshrined in principle through a constitution that seeks protection, rather than promotion of cultural rights, i.e. prevention from discrimination on the basis of ethnic affiliations.

Administratively, this would reflect Maré's view of separating regional from ethnic identifications (Maré 1992: 10). The idea is representative and more stable administration, whereby the constitution common to all is also applied within the country's regional administrative units. The decision to empower regional administrative structures with elements of ethnic recognition could be, in principle, dangerous, given the seeds of divisiveness, exclusivity and instability that this could engender. In practice it could also be perceived as assisting a minority of political and economic elites in pursuing

narrow motives in the name of the "national" interest. This much has become apparent through an analysis of Zulu ethnic nationalism.

Using the constitution as a guide, and recognizing the inappropriateness of barring ethnically-associated political organizations, it should be incumbent upon all political parties and administrative officials (especially the government of the day), to sincerely address the concerns of those who feel they are being marginalised, un-represented, victims of injustice and even discriminated against on the basis of their particular ethnic ties. Not only would this be constitutionally compatible, but it would also seek to minimize and impede the effective and elaborate use of selective ethnic imagery by individuals and groups.

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