

**South Africa and Malaysia:
Identity and History in
South-South Relations**

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Of

RHODES UNIVERSITY

by

Muhammed Haron

June 2007

ABSTRACT

The focus of this thesis is on the bilateral relationship between South Africa and Malaysia. The thesis appropriates ‘critical theory,’ and as a flexible theoretical tool, and, as an open-ended, loose frame in order to give voice to the marginalized and voiceless from the South. The thesis thus looks at the politico-economic ties that have been developed and brings into view the socio-cultural relations that had been established between the peoples of the two sovereign nation-states during the apartheid and post-apartheid eras respectively.

The basic purpose of this study was fivefold: (a) to contribute to the extant literature that concentrates on South Africa’s relations with Malaysia, (b) to examine the relationship at political and economic ties in some detail, (c) to demonstrate that apart from the aforementioned bonds IR specialists should also take into account the socio-cultural dimensions of international relations, (d) to bring to light the nation-state’s limitations when discussing the role of non-state actors and considering the contributions of other factors such as globalization, and (e) to stimulate further research on bilateral and multilateral relations in the South – particularly between South Africa and other states in Asia and Latin America - that would assist to better understand the past, present and perhaps the future.

KEY WORDS: South Africa, Malaysia, International Relations, Critical Theory, South, Globalization, Middle Power, Identity, Community, Ethnicity, Culture, Religion, Diaspora, Citizenship, Partnership.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	2
Table of Contents	3
Illustrations	7
Acronyms	8
Preface and Acknowledgement	11
Dedication	14
Declaration	15

PART ONE

Chapter One: Introduction – The Opening Passages of the Tale of Two Sovereign Nation-States 16-38

1. Introduction	16
2. The Thesis' Purpose Statement	20
2.1 Rationale for 'purpose statement'	21
2.2 Research Questions	22
2.3 Its Hypothesis	23
2.4 Its Methodology	25
3. Reviewing the Literature	27
3.1 IR Writings on Asia/Asean	27
3.2 IR Literature on South African-Malaysian Relations	31
4. The Thesis' Outline	37

Chapter Two: Identifying & Constructing a Theoretical Framework - towards Understanding South African-Malaysian Relations 39-70

1. Introduction	39
2. Significance of Theory and Paradigm	40
3. A Synopsis of IR Theory	42
4. A Relevant Theory and Relating Tales	47
4.1 Critical Theory	48
4.2 Critical Theory through the 'Art of Story-Telling'	57
4.3 Identity: A Crucial Concept for Critical Theorists in IR	61
5. Concluding Remarks	68

PART TWO

Chapter Three: South Africa and Malaysia – Telling the Tales of Two Sovereign States (circa 1960-1990) 71-126

1. Introduction	71
2. The Conceptualizing the ‘State’ and the ‘Nation’	74
2.1 State	76
2.2 The Nation	79
2.3 Nation-State	83
2.4 Ibn Khaldun’s conceptualization of the ‘body politic’	86
3. South Africa and Malaysia: Recollecting Stories of their past	92
3.1 Describing and Comparing the Two States circa 1948–1990	93
3.1.1 The Early Years: 1940s–1960	93
3.1.2 The Decade of Consolidation of the Federation & the Apartheid State, Circa 1960 – 1970	97
3.1.3 The Decade of Facing Internal and External Challenges: 1970-1980	104
3.1.4 The Decade of Botha’s Exit & Mahathir’s Entrance 1980-1990	108
3.2 ‘South Africa’ in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy (circa 1957-1990)	113
3.2.1 Tunku Abdul Rahman’s Narrative against Apartheid, circa 1957-1970	115
3.2.2 Dr. Mahathir’s Story: Showing support for the ANC, circa 1981-1990	122
4. Concluding Remarks	125

Chapter Four: South Africa and Malaysia – Narrating Their ‘Upstairs’ Ties in the Post-Apartheid Period (circa 1990-2005) 127-190

1. Introduction	127
2. Middle Powers and Partnership: Unpacking Two Conceptual Tools	131
2.1 Middle Powers	132
2.2 Partnership	136
3. South Africa and Malaysia’s Socio-Political Bonds	141
3.1 Their Partnership in the Making: The Tale of Cementing South-South Connections	141
3.2 Re-Connecting: From informal support to diplomatic ties	142
3.3 Being Connected: From diplomatic ties to a sustained relationship	148
3.4 Consolidating Connections: Laying Foundations for a Partnership	161
3.5 Expanding Connections: Towards a ‘Strategic Partnership’?	167
4. South Africa and Malaysia’s Trade Ties	173
4.1 Commercial Connections: Demonstrating a Solid Partnership	173
4.2 Explaining Commercial Connections	174

4.3 South Africa's Economic Position vis-à-vis Malaysia	175
4.4 Narrating SA-Malaysian Trade Figures: Towards a Tentative Interpretation	179
5. Closing Remarks	188

Chapter Five: South Africa and Malaysia's Cultural Activists' Narratives - Forging 'Downstairs' Socio-Cultural Connections in the South 190-250

1. Introduction	190
2. Conceptualizing 'Community' and 'Non-State Actors'	193
3. Cultural Citizenship in the Diaspora: The Experiences of Hj. Rabi'ah and Her relatives in the Federation of Malaya	197
3.1 Introduction	197
3.2 The Conceptual Tools: Citizenship and Diaspora	200
3.3 South African and Malaysian Citizenship: Setting the Context	203
3.4 South African Families Trekking to the Federation by Default	206
3.5 Bringing Hajjah Rabi'a's Story to a Close	218
4. Ismail Petersen's Narrative: A South African Cultural Activist's contribution to IR	219
4.1 Introduction	219
4.2 Employing Suitable Variables to Construct a Framework for this Story	220
4.3 Creating Cultural Connections during the Era of Apartheid	223
4.4 Bringing Petersen's Episode to a Close	236
5. GAPENA, Tan Sri Ismail Hussein & the SMA: Malaysia's Cultural Activists and Structures	238
5.1 Introduction	238
5.2 GAPENA: The Malaysian Cultural Vehicle	239
5.3 Ismail Hussein: The Outstanding Malaysian Cultural Activist	240
5.4 The International Malay Secretariat	246
5.5 Rounding of Tan Sri's Narrative	248
6. Concluding Remarks	249

PART THREE

Chapter Six: Bringing the IR Narratives of These Two Sovereign Nation- States to a Close 251-294

1. Introduction	251
2. Malaysians & South Africans: Promoting South-South Cooperation	253
2.1 A (Brief) Tale of Two Bandungs	253
2.2 Defining the Concepts: Third World and South	255
2.3 Malaysia's Long Narrative in the South-South Cooperation Project	259
2.4 South Africa's Short Story in the South-South Cooperation Project	265
3. South Africa and Malaysia: Different Dreams but Similar Styles and Common Causes	274

3.1 Asian Renaissance vis-à-vis African Renaissance	277
3.2 Anwar Ibrahim's Asian Renaissance	277
3.3 Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance	286
4. Concluding Remarks	291

**Chapter Seven: CODA - The Final Passages of the Tale of the Two
Sovereign Nation-States 295-304**

APPENDICES

Section One: Chronology of Socio-Historical and Political Events	305-315
---	----------------

Section Two: Maps of South Africa and Malaysia	316-317
---	----------------

BIBLIOGRAPHY	318-359
---------------------	----------------

ILLUSTRATIONS

Tables and Figures

Figure 2.1 Stages of International Relations Theory	45
Figure 2.2 Habermas and his Theory of Knowledge	52
Figure 2.3 Levels of Identity	63
Figure 2.4 Identity formation in International Relations	68
Figure 3.1 State and Nation: A Symbiotic Relationship	75
Table 3.1 The Modern Nation State	84
Figure 3.2 Sovereignty and the Nation-State	86
Table 3.2 Ibn Khaldun and the State's 5 Stages of Growth & Decay	91
Figure 3.3 Malaysia's Nation-Building Project	97
Figure 3.4 Mahathir's Contests for Power (circa 1981-1990)	111
Table 3.3 Malaysian Foreign Policy: 1957 – 1990	113
Table 4.1 Power Structures in International State System	134
Figure 4.1 South Africa – Malaysia: Towards a Partnership	140
Figure 4.2 South Africa: Foreign Policy Phases	141
Table 4.2 Malaysian – South African Trade circa 1993-2003	183
Figure 4.3 A Graphic Interpretation of Malaysian-South African Trade	184
Figure 4.4 A Graphic Interpretation of Malaysian-South African Trade	185
Table 4.3 Bilateral Trade Relations: Imports and Exports	186
Figure 5.1 International Relations Actors	196
Figure 5.2 Three International Relations' Variables	222
Figure 6.1 South – South Cooperation	258
Figure 6.2 An Afro-Asian Renaissance (?)	294

Acronyms

AAITPC	Asia-Africa Investment and Technology Promotion Centre
ABIM	Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia
AFC	Africa Fund Committee
APRM	Africa Peer Review Mechanism
ASN	National Unit Trust
ASB	Bumiputra Unit Trust Scheme
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
BN	Barisan Nasional
CCFMSA	Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COGSA	Commonwealth Observer Group to South Africa
COMSA	Commonwealth Observer Mission in South Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DCA	Department of Civil Aviation
DEIC	Dutch East India Company
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
EAEC	East Asian Economic Caucus
EPG	Eminent Person's Group
ERWG	Ethnic Redistribution with Growth
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FPDD	South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document
GAPENA	Malaysian Federation of National Writers' Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEAR	Growth, Economic and Redistribution Program
GNU	Government of National Unity
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
ICA	Industrial Coordinating Act
IDC	Industrial Development Corporation
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IMSC	Indonesian and Malaysian Seaman's Club
IOR-ARC	Indian Ocean Rim -
ISCOR	Iron & Steel Corporation
ISEAS	Institute of South East Asian Studies
IT	International Trade
JSE	Johannesburg Stock Exchange
KLSE	Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
LID	Langkawi International Dialogue
MAS	Malaysian Airlines Systems

MASSA	Malaysian South-South Association
MCA	Malayan Chinese Association
MCS	Malayan Civil Service
MIC	Malayan Indian Congress
MSABC	Malaysian – South African Business Council
MTCP	Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme
MTUC	Malayan Trade Union Congress
MU	Malayan Union
NAIL	New African Investment Limited
NAASP	New Asia Africa Strategic Partnership
NACTU	National Council of Trade Unions
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NDP	National Development Policy
NEC	National Empowerment Consortium
NEP	National Economic Policy
NESS	National External Security Strategy
NIC	New Industrialized Countries
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NP	National Party
NRF	National Research Foundation
NRM	Nortier’s Rooibos Museum
NSA	Non-State Actors
NOW	New World Order
OAU	Organization of the African Union
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference
PAC	Pan African Congress
PAS	Parti Islam se-Malaysia
PPP	People’s Progressive Party
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Program
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAID	Southern Africa International Dialogue
SAITEX	South African International Trade Exhibition
SAMCB	South African Malay Chamber of Business
SEANIC	Southeast Asian New Industrialized Countries
SMA	International Malay Secretariat
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
TCP	Technical Cooperation Programme
TEC	Transitional Executive Council
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UDF	United Democratic Front
UMNO	United Malay National Organization
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNCHE	United Nations Conference on Human Environment
UNCTAD	United Nations Cooperation for Technical Development
UNOMSA	United Nations’ Observers’ Mission in South Africa

UR Uruguay Round
WMO World Meteorological Organization
ZOPFAN Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

Preface & Acknowledgment

This thesis grew out of my special interest in South Africa's ties with the Muslim world in general and Malaysia in particular. Since my maiden voyage to the Malaysian Peninsula in 1993, I have somewhat grown attached to it via my social and academic contacts. And through these and over the years I became familiar with aspects of the Malaysian society; in fact, each visit that I undertook provided me with new insights and pieces of information that continued to enrich me. The gradual accumulation of information resulted in my desire to capture some of these as well as others via this research project that would assist in demonstrating nature of the ties that had been forged over the years at different levels.

On the one level, the South African democratic government gradually transformed its friendly diplomatic link and trade ties into a strategic partnership; and at another level, a people-to-people connection was steadily forged through business partnerships, marriage relationships and other socio-cultural activities. Many of these significant developments have unfortunately gone unnoticed, and in the process these have not been recorded and nor analyzed. And because of the paucity of material that have thus far been produced from within the social science sector, it spurred me on to research, explore and write about some aspects of the evolving socio-political and cultural connections that emerged over the many years, particularly from the time formal diplomatic links were established between South Africa and Malaysia in 1993. It was therefore felt that a research project such as this would help to capture the special relationship that evolved and developed between these two sovereign states over the years at both the diplomatic and non-diplomatic levels. The idea behind this thesis was, *inter alia*, (a) to contribute in a more substantial way to South-South connections, and (b) to closely study and examine the formation of a fairly good socio-political, economic and cultural relationship between these two sovereign nation-states since South Africa became one of the significant African democracies in the Southern African region since April 1994.

That said, this research project would not have been possible if it had not been for the constant moral and critical support from my supervisor, Professor Peter Vale. I, however, wish to acknowledge the following for their assistance in making important contributions towards the aspects of the text at different stages: Abdullah Ali & Imtiyaz Ahmad Haron, my two sons who were undergraduate students at the University of the Western Cape in the Economic and Management Sciences Faculty, for tracing and obtaining some of the bibliographical material. Moreover, I need to thank a coterie of scholars for providing me with their publications that were not readily available.

Furthermore, I express my gratitude to: (a) The National Research Foundation (NRF) that provided partial financial support for my research on South Africa-Malaysia Relations, (b) the University of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur), the National University of Malaysia (Bangi), and the Institute of South East Asian Studies (ISEAS – Singapore) that permitted me to use their library facilities whenever I passed through Southeast Asia for an academic meeting, and (c) the School of Oriental and African Studies – University of London, the University of Cape Town, the University of the Western Cape and the University of Botswana for having allowed me to use their library facilities.

Sincere thanks should go to Tan Sri Professor Ismail Hussein, GAPENA's president for having always extended me invitations to participate in GAPENA's gatherings and conferences over the years. I also extend my gratitude to Professor Asma from the Universiti Pendidikan Sultan Idris, who organized the Malay Civilization conference in 2004, and whose institution financially supported me to attend and present part of Chapter Five in one of panels. Appreciation is also expressed to Mr. Ismail Petersen and Hajjah Rabi'ah for having granted me the opportunities to interview them and permitting me to include their stories as part of this research project. At the same time I also thank those friends and colleagues who – in their busy schedules - read through the drafts of some of the chapters especially Keith Gottschalk (Political Science at University of the Western Cape), and Professor Sharifah Zaleha (Social Anthropology at the National University of Malaysia). I am also grateful to the former South African High Commissioner, Dr. Abraham Nkomo, and his first secretary, Mr. Philip Riley, in Kuala

Lumpur for their continuous interest in this project.

And finally, I want to express my sincerest gratitude and thanks to two sets of people that have provided me with continuous moral support. The one group of persons is my colleagues in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at the University of Botswana (where I am currently based) for having granted me the chance to pursue my research amidst my hectic teaching schedule and other (minor) administrative duties. And the other set of people is my beloved Cape Town families, who have had to endure my continuous absence from home and who deserve special praise for appreciating the work that has occupied my life over the past few years.

DEDICATION

This research project is dedicated to my dearest, beloved mother, *Galiema Sadan-Haron*, who supported me through trying times.

DECLARATION

I hereby wish to declare that this thesis has not been submitted in any form to any other tertiary institution in or outside South Africa to attain a post-graduate qualification.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION :

The Opening Passages of the Tale of Two Sovereign Nation-States from the South

1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War, which abruptly ended in 1989, was a defining period in world history because it, according to Mayo (2005: 81), signaled ‘a new triumphalism’ that has largely been dominated by USA capitalism. Even though Holm & Sorenson (1995: 3) responded negatively to the question whether the end of the Cold War produced a ‘new world order’, some scholars took the emergence of such an order for granted. In fact, the argument goes that the end of the Cold War also marked the *End of History* as was contended by Francis Fukuyama, but for others the doors of the old order closed and the gates of ‘the New World Order ushered in new complexities into the world system’ (Morris 2002: 6). This order, however, brought into focus a multitude of developments; examples of these outcomes were: the merging of transnational corporate companies such as Mittal Steel buying out rival companies (cf. Mayo 2005: 16-17), the creation of regional structures such as the European Union competing with similar structures in the economic arena (cf. Keohane 1995: 175), the development of cross-border state alliances such as Greenpeace yearning for environmental justice and peace (Mayo 2005: 66-67), the establishment of trans-cultural links such as GAPENA networking with diaspora ethnic communities (Haron 2005: 57-59), and the formation of new nation-states such as Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia emerging out of the former Yugoslavia (De Rivero 2001: 20).

All of these occurrences form part of the process of an ‘uneven’ globalization that Holm & Sorenson (1995: 4-7) discussed in their introductory chapter. Mayo (2005: 22) argued that globalization is a process that has not benefited every nation-state equally for it inherently contains both risks and opportunities (Holm & Sorenson 1995: 5). The process

- in which nation-states are not mere passive but active institutions - has however impacted upon and influenced bilateral and multilateral relations that have been (and are being) forged between sovereign nation-states such as South Africa and Malaysia and regional institutions such as the Southern African Developing Countries (SADC) – which, as a matter of information, was previously known as Southern African Development Community (SADCC) when it was initially formed in 1980 - and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in different and diverse ways.

It was thought, according to De Rivero (2001: 33), that when the Cold War ended that the international community was ‘poised on the threshold of a new world order based on capitalist democracy and global prosperity.’ De Rivero lamented the fact that this, alas, was not to be and it instead evolved into a ‘modern barbarism.’ The new world order affirmed the intensification of the North’s - represented by 24 nation-states and spearheaded by the USA with the UK along its side - stranglehold over the South - represented by more than 140 nation-states under the leadership of South Africa and Malaysia (in the Non-Aligned Movement [NAM]) - and its unstoppable penetration of ‘all national sovereignties with their merchandise, services, capital, technology ... and patterns of consumption’ (ibid 45). In the newly constructed international system in which the state’s role has been radically transformed, the industrialized/modernized North devised and instituted rules and regulations via the Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that obliged the developing South ‘to integrate into the global economy ... (even though these quasi nation–states were and are) unable to withstand the (one-sided) competition’ (De Rivero 2001: 5, 20, 27; Mayo 2005: 16).

The North, in other words, preferred ‘an imbalanced’ international state system or – to put to it slightly differently – a new world ‘disorder’ that served its interest and dissuaded any developing quasi nation-state from seeking alternatives (ibid). The desired system thus promoted the North’s interest and affairs at the expense of the South and as a consequence of this they were challenged by critical theorists whose ideas will be loosely employed to frame the exploration of this thesis’ contents (cf. Chapter Two). As the

dominant group in the international system, the North set down the rules of the new world (dis)order for the new millennium and maintained strict control so that whatever takes place in it only serves *its* interest and not those who choose alternatives. The liberal policies that it proposed and implemented for the world had to be strictly adhered to by the South otherwise action in the form of sanctions and other disciplinary measures would be imposed. Sovereign nation-states such as South Africa and Malaysia from the South were thus caught up in this web of international arrangement during this era of globalization in which the North intensified its exploitation of the rest of the world (Mayo 2005: 140). These nation-states thus had to fall in line with the North's prescriptive measures by adopting and implementing without question the liberal – exploitative – (socio-economic) policies and cultural practices.

Changes, however, did not only occur across Europe at the end of the Cold War; they also took place in other parts of the world. South Africa was one of the 'beneficiaries,' if one may describe it as such, of these transformations. After much international pressure throughout 1989 F.W. De Klerk, who took over from P.W. Botha and who did not initially show any commitment to change (Landsberg 2004: 70), was forced to bring about the required socio-political changes. He increasingly became aware of the fact that the 'total onslaught' strategy was no more tenable and that the best option was to accept the soft approach that entailed negotiating with the apartheid regime's 'enemy' and receiving financial rewards from the international community in general and the North in particular. De Klerk's parliamentary speech on the 2nd of February 1990 – contrary to what he wanted people to believe at that time and afterwards - was a clear indication that he yielded more to international pressure rather than internal coercion when he informed the public of the significant changes that were in the offing; the first was Nelson Mandela's release and the second was the liberation movements' unbanning (ibid 85-88).

As a result of these unexpected developments, the South Africans and the international community adjusted themselves to the new South African socio-political order. Subsequently De Klerk led his National Party (NP) to the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) table and began negotiations in earnest with the ANC under the

guidance of Mandela as well as with other political parties (ibid 111, 120). Their intense meetings between mid 1991 and early 1993 resulted in the formulation and acceptance of the interim Constitution. The agreements and the compromises, as captured in the sunset clauses, at these meetings, in turn, opened the path for the South Africans to go to the polls in April 1994 in order to vote into power their first democratically elected government. Throughout these intense meetings, Mandela demonstrated that he had the strength to lead the South Africans into a new era. And by the time Mandela was appointed as democratic South Africa's first democratically elected president, many nation-states queued to establish ties with South Africa.

Whilst these events were unfolding and impacting on the Southern African region as a whole, developments of a different kind were also unfurling in Malaysia. At the end of 1989 the Malaysians were bruised by the disputes and disagreements within Malaysia's major national party namely the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). These internal squabbles, which led to an internal split, created a sense of uncertainty within UMNO as well the other parties that made up Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition party as to whether they would win the 1990 elections (Cheah 2002: 220). Fortunately for Dr. Mahathir Mohamed and UMNO Baru – as it came to be called after the break up - the BN coalition party scraped through in the 1990 elections and secured a two thirds majority by a mere seven seats (Khoo 2001: 322; Cheah 2002: 220). Undaunted by this marginal win at the polls Mahathir looked ahead; since he and the BN were slightly jolted by this victory they tried to re-build their confidence by reclaiming the necessary support from the Malaysian populace, who had been deeply affected by the political separation within UMNO. And since the National Economic Policy (NEP) that was introduced in the early 1970s came to an end, Mahathir devised the National Development Program (NDP) that spelt out a new national plan for the future to replace it. In February 1991 he presented 'Malaysia: The Way Forward' and he enunciated his *Vision 2020* that confidently charted a map that would assist Malaysia to become a fully developed nation-state by the year 2020 (Khoo 2001: 327-331). By the mid 1990s, after Mahathir injected a renewed sense of purpose and direction, Malaysia attained the status of being among the emerging newly industrialised countries (NICs). The buoyant economy, the strong (refreshed)

political leadership with Anwar Ibrahim having joined the executive team, and the modernisation programme underway gave Malaysia the required self-assurance and conviction that it could cast its sights beyond the ASEAN region. This self-confidence thus drove Malaysia to seek bi-lateral ties with established and emerging democratic states in SADC. Since changes were in the offing in South Africa, Mahathir considered it opportune to pursue bi-lateral relations with the De Klerk regime in 1993.

These historical episodes, events and developments, which belong to a more detailed narrative that will be elaborated upon in this thesis, influenced my thinking particularly during the time I coordinated the seminar at University of the Western Cape between Malaysians and South Africa in April 1993. It, in fact, prompted me to ask a series of research questions that concentrated on the relationship that was unfolding between South Africa and Malaysia since that time (see 2.2 Research Questions). These questions again raced through my mind when I was a visiting lecturer at the National University of Malaysia (UKM) from December 1993 until May 1994. Even though a Memorandum of Understanding was eventually signed between UKM and UWC, the MoU and tentative agreements that were reached had to be shelved because of Malaysia's economic meltdown in 1997 and 1998. Nonetheless, all of these developments stimulated me to explore and investigate the ties that evolved between these two nation-states during the final decade of the 20th century.

2. The Thesis' Purpose Statement:

The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between two sovereign nation-states from the South. It thus focuses on (a) South Africa, which represents a new, inexperienced voice from within the SADC region, and (b) Malaysia, which represents a reasonably old, experienced voice from within ASEAN; both states belong to that group of states that have been aptly described as 'middle powers' because of their standing in international affairs and that belong to the 'South/Third World.' The study therefore intends to delve into and explore the relationship - which has simply been defined as 'the way in which two ... countries behave towards each other or deal with each other... or

the way in which two or more ... (countries) are connected' (*Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* 2001: 989) - and wishes to unpack it from two distinct but interrelated angles; from one level, it proposes to look at the government-to-government ties and, from the other, it plans to assess the people-to-people's connection.

Rationale for the 'purpose statement'

Bearing in mind the general 'purpose statement' as well as its central concept that underpins the connection between the two sovereign nation-states, I thought it useful to, albeit briefly, elaborate on **the rationale** behind embarking upon this research project; since there are quite a few reasons for pursuing this important research project, I will limit myself to a few. **Firstly**, my concern was why did Malaysia adopt an 'adversarial' attitude towards South Africa, and what role did it play in the international community against South Africa's status as a sovereign nation-state. I was therefore quite keen to study Malaysia's foreign policy towards South Africa from 1957 until the dramatic changes in 1990 (cf. Muda 1996). **Secondly**, I was increasingly eager to have a deeper insight into the two sovereign nation-states' bilateral relations by assessing their socio-political and economic connections and wanting to know to what extent they have carved out important niches for themselves within the international system. **Thirdly**, I was spurred on to explore the significant role non-state actors have in the international system; of late, they have increasingly come under the spotlight because of their transnational cultural activities that meant not just side-stepping sovereignty but moving 'beyond sovereignty' (cf. Magnusson 1996; Sorenson 2001; Cohen 2003). The personal stories of the cultural activists intrigued me and one definite conclusion that I reached was that they substantially contributed towards 'the return of culture and identity in IR theory' – to use Lapid & Kratochwil's (1996) title (cf. Krause & Renwick 1996). **Fourthly**, I felt that since I was dealing with nation-states from the South that it was incumbent that I take a closer view of the terms 'state' and 'nation' respectively as critical concepts. In the process of unpacking these concepts I was pressed to understand the process of globalization; a process that has had an immeasurable impact upon nation-states (Opello & Rosow 2003). And **finally**, I could not resist questioning the role of

democratic South Africa and Malaysia in the affairs of the South vis-à-vis the North; their joint participant in a number of international forums such as NAM, G-77 and other similar bodies drew my interest and eventually forced me to examine the extent of their participation and to know to what degree they have made a difference, if any, in the South-South Cooperation Project in order to advance the cause and perhaps improve the quality of life in the South as whole. And since these two nation-states were driven by particular visions, it induced me to undertake a brief comparative study of the 'Asian Renaissance' and the 'African Renaissance' that their respective political leadership advocated during the latter part of the 1990s.

Research Questions:

Since mention was made of some of the critical questions that I referred to *en passant* in the afore-mentioned paragraphs, I would now like to list them for they assisted me in plodding through the various sections of this research project and helped me in achieving its main objectives. I, however, started out by asking two fairly general questions. The first concerns itself with the question of theory: Which theory would be appropriate to assess the relationship between South Africa and Malaysia? And the second relates to ontological and empirical concerns: What was the nature of the relations between South Africa and Malaysia before and after the South African democratic government was installed?

The questions set the stage for more specific ones such as: What caused Tunku Abdul-Rahman and Dr. Mahathir Mohamed to adopt an 'adversarial' approach towards South Africa for almost three decades? How did each of them contribute towards isolating South Africa in the international arena and how effective were their inputs? In which way did Malaysia change its foreign policy agenda towards South Africa? Why did Malaysia change its stance in the 1990s and how did it benefit from the diplomatic ties that were forged in 1993? Who were the driving forces behind forging diplomatic bonds that exist between these two nation-states? Have the SADC and ASEAN - in which South Africa and Malaysia are located - also gained from the bi-lateral ties or were they mainly in the

interest of the respective sovereign nation-states? Were these two states prompted by their concerns for the South or did they forge connections because of self-interest? Are the states the only acceptable political units within the international system? Have the identities of these two nation-states change? After having found answers for these, I was then prompted to ask: What about non-state actors?

Do non-state actors not play a critical role in international relations? Have South Africa and Malaysia recognised the contributions of non-state actors or cultural activists who crisscross their boundaries? What factors stimulated these actors to make religio-cultural and ethnic connections? Does the state consider these variables important when signing bilateral or multilateral ties? How have the cultural activists' activities impacted upon foreign policies of nation-states? Has the nation-states' sovereignty been compromised when cultural connections were made in this era of globalization? Who benefits from these ties? Have South Africa and Malaysia's foreign policies accommodated the new players in the changing international system? In closing, all of these questions fed into the research project and helped me to attain one of my objectives and that was to evaluate the nature of the relationship between South Africa and Malaysia.

Its Hypothesis:

Before clarifying the thesis' hypothesis I wish to preface it with three basic assumptions that are important to state at this point. The **first** is the ontological assumption that questions the relevancy and reality of the proposed project. Since I come from a particular religious, ethnic and cultural background, a certain degree of prejudice might be reflected in this research – an issue that is in line with critical traditional thinking that regards the distinction between the subject and object as one of its essential features (cf. Jackson & Sorenson 1999). The main reason for this is that I concentrated upon an area that has been under-researched and one that requires the attention of the foreign policy practitioners, international relation specialists and a host of other interested stakeholders and groups. The **second** relates to the epistemological assumptions that are embedded in the project. Once again I undertook preliminary studies reflecting my interest in the

region and particularly South Africa's socio-cultural links with Malaysia. The axiological assumptions brings into question the values and biases reflected by me as a researcher. And the **last** issue raises the project's methodological assumptions; since it is associated with the qualitative paradigm its approach is inductive based upon the shaping of factors, patterns observed, categories identified, and theories employed for the understanding and explaining of the various state actors and non-state actors, namely the cultural activists. With these thoughts in mind, I want to very simply state the thesis' hypothesis.

Malaysia's behaviour towards South Africa was 'adversarial' from 1961 until Mandela was released in February 1990. It was firmly against South Africa's discriminatory policies towards its oppressed Blacks, and clamoured at various forums for punitive measures and sanctions against the apartheid state. And it only changed its hard-line stance towards South Africa when F.W. De Klerk, who came to power at the end of 1989, was pressurised from outside as well as within South Africa to make swift socio-political transformations in the beginning of 1990. The internal modifications that were made and mentioned earlier were naturally welcomed by the international community including Malaysia. And as a consequence of these transformations, the international community represented by states such as Malaysia steadily changed their behaviour and attitude towards the South African regime.

Malaysia, unlike a few other states from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), patiently bided its time before forging ties with South Africa. During the time when South Africa's *bona fide* political parties were rounding off their CODESA meetings, Malaysia set up a liaison office in South Africa that laid the foundations for the formation of diplomatic and commercial ties in 1993. And when the ANC - with whom UMNO had a warm relationship - came into power after the historic democratic elections at the end of April 1994, Malaysia intensified its ties through increasingly investing in diverse projects in South Africa. Although Malaysia had to re-adjust its economic structures after the Southeast Asian economic meltdown during 1997 and 1998, it maintained its links with South Africa. Subsequent to this period, the ties were strengthened and bolstered through investments and reciprocal official visits between

2002 and 2006; these activities and events transformed relationship into a ‘close partnership.’

Its Methodology

During the time I was collecting data for this research project I carefully considered a suitable and an applicable theory. For me this was an important entry point since its purpose was to assist me in unpacking the nature of the relationship between the two contemporary nation-states that have been active in the international system during the post-Cold War period on behalf of the South. After searching the relevant literature that covered International Relation theories and their interpretations, I consciously chose Critical Theory (CT); in my view I felt that CT was not only a useful theory and an applicable approach to organize and understand the data but one that was fairly flexible in terms of its relevance and its application (cf. George 1994; Devetak 1996; Burchill & Linklater 2001; **Chapter Two**). This theoretical frame - as well as the variety of questions that I posed - has without doubt impacted upon the outcome of this thesis.

In any case, during the course of deciding on the theoretical model for the project, I dug out primary and secondary sources. I passionately felt that the variety of sources that I could lay my hands on would provide me to adopt a fairly holistic approach to this important topic. As a result of this understanding I consulted primary texts such as parliamentary reports, statements/speeches and letters/correspondence. I must confess that I did not exhaust the primary sources as I should have; time was one factor that counted against a detailed scrutiny of these sources, and the other factors were my geographical location and the lack of funding to obtain some of the primary sources from Malaysia’s archives. Nonetheless, I gathered whatever material I could to write a fairly comprehensive socio-political overview of the relations between these two states. However, when it comes to the section that dealt with the trade ties between the two states in **Chapter Four**, I eagerly acknowledge that I was treading on shaky grounds since I am no economist and nor satisfactorily familiar with issues pertaining to direct foreign investments. That said, I tried as best as I could to interpret the available data.

Despite this drawback, the interpretation was of a tentative nature and it is definitely open for further scrutiny and re-interpretation by specialists. Some of the primary pieces of information were further supported by a few in-depth interviews that I conducted; a point that I will return to in a moment. I then also made use of secondary material such as academics papers, articles, books and newspaper clips that directly and indirectly reflected not only upon the topic that was being scrutinized but also the variety of variables that have been employed to enhance the understanding of the study and the issues at hand. I thus scanned these secondary sources for relevant information that were extracted, amended, re-constructed, and inserted into the text.

As stated earlier, I conducted interviews that were crucial to **Chapter Five** in this thesis. I included the stories of three ‘cultural activists’ in order to demonstrate their significance within the international system as such. For this particular chapter I relied heavily on extensive face-to-face interviews because they essentially revealed how the system of international relations has changed because of non-state actors’ inputs, contributions and interventions. These interviews, as already mentioned, were further shored up by the extant correspondence and newspaper clips that supported their oral claims of having been involved in transnational activities. One shortcoming of this thesis was that I did not interview some of the state representatives such as High Commissioners or the First Secretaries that have been directly involved in strengthening the relationship between South Africa and Malaysia and nor did I reach out to CEO’s of corporate companies that have made investments in South Africa; if I had done so it would have further enriched the contents of the project. In any case, this is perhaps what another researcher should consider doing for it would either complement the overall findings of this thesis or take issue with some of its conclusions.

Let me round off by stating that the thesis, despite some of its noticeable shortcomings, sees itself as a significant contribution to South – South relations and more specifically to the relationship between South Africa and one of Southeast Asia’s active – unquestionably not a paper - tiger, namely Malaysia. Few have ventured to examine the relationship between South Africa and Malaysia in depth. Whilst laudable attempts have

been made by scholars such as Janis van der Westhuizen to cover particular dimensions of South Africa and Malaysia in publications, the nature of their works was such that they were not able to deal with some of the issues that I reported on, discussed, analyzed, and interpreted in this thesis. In it I provide a detailed overview of the existential relationship that had evolved between these two states over many decades from a variety of angles. At this stage it might be prudent to review some of the available literature on the subject and illustrate where my contribution fits into the field of IR.

3. Reviewing the Literature

Rapid changes have indeed been witnessed since the very beginning of the 1990s in the field of international relations; many academic works and journalistic columns have captured these changes. Some of these published outputs demonstrated how South Africa's foreign policy and its IR agenda that reflected a particularist apartheid approach have transformed and shifted to one in which it adopted a universalist IR approach towards Asia and other non-traditional states (Bischoff 1998). A coterie of scholars has analyzed, from different dimensions, the types of relations South Africa forged with selected states on the Asian continent over the past number of years; for example, a sizeable amount of literature has been produced that gave attention to South Africa's relations with countries such as China, Japan and the Koreas. Alas, very little covered its relationship with ASEAN in general and Malaysia in particular. In fact, only a paucity of material, which focused on South African – Malaysian relations, exists and it is these writings that need to be assessed and evaluated at this point.

3.1 IR Writings on Asia/Asean:

South African scholars like their counterparts elsewhere shifted their sights to new areas of research when socio-political changes were underway in the post-Cold War era. From amongst the first few who brought Asia into the academic arena and who ventured to take this road was Deon Geldenhuys, a professor of Political Studies at Rand Afrikaans University (now University of Johannesburg). In his *South Africa: from international*

isolation to reintegration, a conference paper that was subsequently published, he made reference to Asia and the Middle East as new areas for research. Mr. L. Evans - in his capacity as the Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs - complemented the latter's paper when he penned *South African Foreign Policy and the New World Order* during 1993; he outlined the changes and challenges which South Africa faced as it forged ties with the new world, and he made particular reference to the links with the Middle East and Asia. In *Asiaweek*, an Asian magazine (18 May 1994), an anonymous contributor wrote 'Building a Nation: Asia's experience may hold lessons for South Africa'; he/she suggested that South Africans should consider looking at Asia when embarking upon their nation building project. This article as well as the general surveys sketched by Geldenhuys and Evans respectively provided a start and an acknowledgement that there was a need to forge relations with these neglected regions.

In the absence of a dedicated Centre/Institute on Southeast Asian Studies in South Africa, research projects continued to follow this generalist trend by the mid 1990s. Midway through South Africa's first ten years of democracy I came across the works of Marie Muller who was a political scientist at the University of South Africa; she had, by then, written two related articles. The first appeared in her jointly (with Walter Carlsnaes) edited work *Change and South Africa's External Relations* (1996), and the second titled 'South African Diplomacy and Security Complex' (1999) - which complemented and updated the earlier one. In it she attempted to correct and reinforce the importance of these areas by making ample reference to South Africa's representation in the Muslim world; a large chunk of which forms part of Asia. Moreover, Carlsnaes & Muller's edited work has, to some extent, made an effort to also include many of the neglected areas of research. In this volume Greg Mills has a chapter entitled 'South Africa and Asia: New Opportunities, Lessons and Dilemmas' in which he referred to heavily Muslim populated countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia and in which he stressed that cultural issues, which caught his eye, should also be given due attention when assessing the links that have been forged between South Africa and these Asian sovereign nation-states.

This edited work was succeeded by a number of others; they are: Paul-Henri Bischoff's

useful study, which focused on ‘Democratic South Africa and the Asian Paragon: Issues of Foreign Policy orientation,’ appeared in *Afrika Spektrum*; it gave a broad overview of South Africa’s foreign policy towards Asia after 1994. In the course of discussing South Africa’s stance he did not neglect to highlight the important trade relation that developed between South Africa and Malaysia. At the time when the latter’s contribution appeared, two other interesting articles appeared; these were written in French. The one was co-authored by Jean Coussy & Jerome Lauseig and rhetorically titled ‘La renaissance afro-asiatique? It basically compared the two continents and went on to discuss the extent to which the respective continents have been commercially active in one another’s affairs, and it examined issues such as affirmative action and black empowerment. And it also addressed to what extent Asian states were involved in supporting the liberation movements in South Africa and Zimbabwe and the regional connections that existed and continue to exist. The other article in the same issue of *Politique Africaine* (Decembre 1999) was penned by Jerome Lauseig and addressed ‘Quand la Malaysia Inc, joue la carte Sud-Sud en Afrique subsaharienne’. It captured the involvement and expansion of Malaysian business companies in Sub-Saharan Africa and made brief reference to the business investments in South Africa. From within the South African sector another article appeared; it was essentially an address by the Deputy Governor, Dr. Tim Thabane, of the South African Reserve Bank. The article basically assessed ‘Asia’s economic recovery and its implications for the African Renaissance’ with no specific reference to Malaysia; it appeared in the *BIS Review* (1999).

These contributions were further complemented by Andre Snyder’s ‘Asia-Pacific: Weathering the Storm’ in the *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1999/2000*; in which he (1999: 200) devoted only one paragraph to South African-Malaysian relations. The joint edited work by Monika Glinzler, William Mabene and Greg Mills titled *Multilateral Organizations in Asia-Pacific: Lessons for Southern Africa* (2001) consists of at least two articles that are of (minor) significance since they dealt with SADC’s relations with APEC: the one is Jacques De Vos’ ‘SA’s Relationship with the Asia-Pacific Region,’ and the other is Greg Mills’ ‘Regional Institution-Building in the Asia-Pacific and Southern Africa.’ Both Vos and Mills make mention of South Africa’s

relationship with Malaysia in passing but does not offer any detailed discussion as one would like to have seen. Not long after this work Greg Mills and Garth Shelton produced their co-authored work titled *Asia-Pacific and Africa* (2003); though these two scholars provided comparative understandings of these two regions and discussed the types of relations that presently exist between them, they – perhaps understandably so - avoided discussing specific bilateral connections between nation-states from these two continents.

At the same time when these were published by South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), the Africa Institute of South Africa (AI www.ai.org.za) produced *Asia's Economic Miracle: Lessons for NEPAD?*, which was jointly written by Jane Shen & Hussein Solomon (2003); the paper studied the economic development in the New Industrialized Economies in Asia and extracted some basic lessons from these countries for Southern Africa. And P.J. Botha's 'South Africa and Asia & Australia,' which appeared in Elizabeth Sidiropoulos' edited work *South Africa's Foreign Policy 1994-2004: Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future* (SAIIA 2004) is yet another that underscored the point I made at the outset. The Institute of Global Dialogue (IGD), which has been circulating its informative analytical *Global Dialogue* newsletter, published Francis Kornegay's *Pax AfroAsiatica? Revisiting Bandung amid a changing world order* (2004) occasional paper; this paper basically surveyed the dynamics of African and Asian regionalism and essentially attempted to re-conceptualise the new Afro-Asian multilateral terrain without raising or debating the bilateral relations between South Africa and Malaysia as a case study.

These specific contributions gave overall attention to the Asian region and regional organizations and not to particular countries. It is however my opinion that instead of providing paint brush pictures of South Africa's relations with regions or regional structures, a detailed account could have been offered by the researchers/contributors on the relationship between South Africa and Asian countries such as Malaysia; this approach would not only have given a better insight into the nature of the relationship at a specific level as compared to one on a broader regional level but also assisted in encouraging emerging potential scholars and researchers to advance the scholarship in a

more intense manner that would be of benefit to the public and private sectors in South Africa and Malaysia respectively.

The general intransigence to pursue serious research between South Africa/SADC and ASEAN could be attributed to, *inter alia*, the following: (a) the lack of funding for such research, (b) the importance that has been given to China as opposed to the significance of ASEAN in the region, and (c) the non-availability of qualified persons who were able to pursue research on ASEAN and more specifically on Malaysia. The absence of qualified expertise on Asian matters in South Africa, as noted by Alden (2002: 376-377), and the lack of research on South Africa/SADC's relations with ASEAN should act as a stimulus for potential individuals and researchers to pursue with vigour. The absence of skilled human resources and the lack of research on (Far East, Southwest and Southeast) Asia basically signify that the opportunity to explore the relationships and partnerships, which exist between South Africa and the many nation-states in Asia, is essentially an open terrain. And finally, if individuals are encouraged to pursue concentrated IR studies then I am confident that important lessons for social scientists and other stakeholders in South Africa would be learnt.

3.2 IR Literature on South African-Malaysian Relations:

Despite the highlighted problems in the academia (and NGO sector), the general outlines on IR issues have however stimulated some scholars to closely scrutinize the bi-lateral relations between South Africa and selected Asian states and also allowed some to study specific issues in these states that would be of relevance to South Africa. The first to touch on the latter issue was Professor Gillian Hart, a University of California based scholar who is also associated with the University of KwaZulu Natal; she published her article *The NEP and Redistribution in Malaysia: A Model for Post-Apartheid South Africa* during the time when transformation was afoot in South Africa, and when Malaysia was being bandied about as a model that South Africa could appropriate in order to restructure its economy and bring about racial reconciliation via affirmative action. In the light of these developments, Hart undertook a critical study of Malaysia's NEP and the

developments that took place since its implementation. Hart's article was somewhat complemented by the contribution of the South African Communist Party (SACP) which was included in its quarterly journal *The African Communist* (1995). In SACP's editorial and in an article printed in that issue, it critically responded to the views espoused by Minister Stella Sigcau, the then Minister of Public Works in Nelson Mandela's government, and other commentators who held the notion that Malaysia was a viable and indeed practical model to follow in various sectors such as racial reconciliation, affirmative action and economic reconstruction. The critical SACP article emphasised the weaknesses in the Malaysian model and the need to look at other examples too; one of the problems it pointed out was the existence of a viable and strong trade union body that would work in the interest of the indigenous population. During the time when these debates were raging on within confined governmental and NGO circles, Ian Emsley also produced his monograph entitled *The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa* (1996); the latter's text thus added to the debate and tried to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the Malaysian model with regards to its affirmative action policies, and maintained the view that South Africa has much to learn from the Malaysian model.

Before elaborating upon the inputs of other South African scholars, it is necessary to give attention to the contributions of two Malaysian scholars on this topic. Mention should be made of the fact that Southeast Asian scholars in general and Malaysian scholars in particular like the South African social scientists were also guilty of not directing their attention to one another's regions or nation-states prior to the 1990s. Nevertheless, a start was made by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, a Malaysian Think Tank, in 1988 when it published Shridath Ramphal's, the then Secretary General of the Commonwealth, *The South African Crisis: Why the Bells of Apartheid Tolls for Everyone* monograph to provide some information about what was taking place in South Africa at that time when Mr. P.W. Botha was still at the helm of the affairs of the South African apartheid regime. Serious interest by Malaysian scholars was only demonstrated in the early 1990s when diplomatic ties were initiated and eventually forged.

The two Malaysians who initiated scholarship in the IR arena came from two different backgrounds; the one, Juhaidi Yean Abdullah, was a journalist and he wrote 'Nkosi Sikele I' Africa: An Overview of Malay-South Africa Relations in the Post-Apartheid Era.' This illustrated article appeared in the first issue of the Institute of Strategic Studies 1995 Malaysian publication *Agenda Magazine*. And the second was Mohammad Muda, a diplomat, who wrote 'Malaysia-South Africa Relations and the Commonwealth, 1960-1995;' this appeared in the 1996 October issue of *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*. Both articles provided some useful insights into the diplomatic and commercial ties that began to develop since Malaysia resumed its relationship with South Africa in the early 1990s. On the whole, both Juhaidi Yean Abdullah and Mohammad Muda offered very valuable overviews of the connections that existed and continued to exist between these two important sovereign states until 1994. Since Juhaidi Yean Abdullah was a seasoned journalist, I found his analysis to be more simplistic in some instances when compared to the text of Mohammad Muda, the trained and informed diplomat.

Moving back to South Africa, I explored 'Forging International relations at grassroots level between the SA Muslims and the Southeast Asians: An Unacknowledged Diplomat' (1996); the article, which has been amended and included in this thesis, approached the study of international relations from a cultural activist's perspective and demonstrated this cultural activists operated beyond state sovereignty and trans-nationally. During the same year when my article appeared Glenda White wrote *Grassroots Foreign Policy: A Case for Provincial Participation?* (1996); in her paper she mentioned the significance of the twinning of provinces in South Africa with provinces in other countries. She referred to the fact that Gauteng twinned with one of Malaysia's key economically strong provinces, namely Selangor Darul-Ehsan, and that Malaysia had by then made a sizeable contribution towards the development of housing in South Africa. Another article, which did not address the issue of twinning but learning regional lessons from the other, was the one penned by Robert Curry Jr.; he entitled his text 'A note on ASEAN as a possible model for post-Apartheid SADC,' and it appeared in the *Journal of Third World Studies* 13(1): 41-56, Spring 1996.

One of the most significant articles that first appeared in 1997 and which went through two more editions was that of Vishnu Padayachee and Imraan Valodia; their article concretely depicted the trade relationship between these two states. Their joint article was initially titled 'Malaysian Money: Sustainable Investments?' and it basically related the trends of foreign investment inflows into South Africa; and it also recorded the development of South-South cooperation via these investment packages. When Padayachee and Valodia's seminal article appeared and was subsequently updated, Southall ventured to undertake an interesting comparative study between South Africa and Malaysia (1997) with specific reference to the two dominant parties in the respective countries, namely the ANC and UMNO. Southall, whose article was entitled 'Party Dominance and Development: South Africa's prospects in the light of Malaysia's experience,' argued that since South Africa was in need of rapid economic growth, which had been in a decline, it was very much encouraged by the fast growing economies of Asia and wanted to imitate the strategies that they adopted and the way they advanced their economies. Since South Africa was an emerging economy and a powerful player in the Southern African arena it was assumed that it would become Africa's first 'Tiger'. Southall however pointed out that it was in the experience of Malaysia that there was of particular interest because that country had earned itself a reputation for combining rapid growth with a racial redistribution of wealth. Greg Mills then followed with his 'Malaysia's Economic Crisis: A Comparative Perspective', which appeared in the *South African Yearbook of International Affairs* (1999). Mills sketched a background to the Malaysian crisis before looking at the economic recovery plan, political and regional environments. He concluded with lessons for South Africans that could be drawn from the crisis. In 2000 Fanie Cloete's HSRC publication titled *At Full Speed the Tiger Cubs Stumbled: Lessons from Southeast Asia about Sustainable Public Service Delivery*. The study, which focused upon 'good governance,' 'service delivery,' and sustainable capacity in the region, set aside chapter 4 to discuss the Malaysian model; it essentially highlighted the strength and pitfalls in each of the mentioned areas.

These studies and assessments coincided with Janis van der Westhuizen's important

research outputs at the turn of 2000. It should be stated that van der Westhuizen has been the only South African scholar who has made some serious inputs on South African – Malaysian relations to date. He pursued a comparative study between aspects of South African and Malaysian social life with respect to the issue of governance and globalisation; he titled his chapter: ‘Comparative Responses to the Challenges of Governance and Globalization: Malaysia and South Africa’ (2001). The ideas contained in this article emerged out of a more extensive and detailed study that he pursued and subsequently published under the title *Adapting to Globalization: Malaysia, South Africa and the Challenges of Ethnic Redistribution of Growth* (Praeger 2002); as a matter of information, the publication is a revised version of his doctoral dissertation that was completed at the University of Dalhousie in Halifax, Canada. The study identified both Malaysia and South Africa as ‘Competition States’ and it illustrated how both states’ elites, namely the Afrikaner (in the case of South Africa) and the Malay (in the case of Malaysia), ‘in the precocious Keynesian regimes’ managed their transformations towards the mentioned ‘competition state.’ The work thus compared these two elite groups by applying the ‘ethnic redistribution with growth’ model, and showed how these nationalists pursued the model until the 1970s and when changes in international political economic system took effect from the mid-1970s onwards these developments effectively forestalled the emulation of ‘ethnic redistribution of growth.’ And this naturally resulted in a divergence in the 1980s and beyond. Apart from van der Westhuizen’s critical and stimulating comparative study of specific issues between Malaysia and South Africa, there has been no other study that followed up on his work.

Subsequent to van der Westhuizen’s comparative study, Eric Germain, a French scholar who is attached to the Paris based EHESS, presented a paper ‘Religion and Ethnicity in South Africa and Malaysia: Some Preliminary Comparisons’ at UKM’s Third International Malay Studies Conference during 2001; from the paper’s title it clearly indicated that it was essentially another comparative study. Even though the debate regarding appropriating Malaysia as a model has come to a close, it was interesting to read the editorial of *The Financial Mail* (February 2002) that addressed the issue; the editorial argued in favour of looking at Malaysia as a model but with a critical eye.

Returning to the Malaysian scene, Hamidin Abdul Hamid, the Malaysian historian, produced a valuable socio-historical work entitled *Malaysia – Africa Relations: Searching for Common Goals* (2003). Although the work did not give specific attention to Malaysia's ties with South Africa it did so by using Africa as a backdrop and within that context made ample reference to South Africa. Based upon his research interest, Hamidin was able to comment on the historical links that existed between the South(ern) Africa and Southeast Asia regions and outline the contemporary relationship that exist between Malaysia and South Africa in his chapter entitled 'We Go a long way back: An Overview of Malaysia – South Africa Relations' (2007). Apart from this Malaysian scholar's historical inputs, there have been other Malaysian scholars such as Wan Hashim Wan Teh, Hanapi Dollah and Abdul Aziz Mohd Zin who contributed in the socio-cultural and religious arena in Bahasa Melayu. One example from their writings will suffice to illustrate the types of topics that they handled. Dr. Zin studied the missionary activities in the greater Cape Town area and identified the different players that have been involved in these activities; he titled his article 'Institusi Dakwah di Cape Town, Afrika Selatan Kajian Tentang Program Dakwah Masakini' and this appeared in *Jurnal Usuluddin* (Disember 1999). Although studies such as this might appear peripheral to international relations arena, it demonstrates that if cross-cultural studies and inter-disciplinary studies take off then researchers in IR can also benefit from these particular projects.

The above review of the available literature on South African – Malaysian relations clearly demonstrated that there are still glaring gaps that IR specialists and others need to fulfil. The lack of research on the subject allowed me to prod a significant arena and contribute in a fairly substantial manner; this was done with the hope that it will stimulate others to either add to the existing body of literature on South African-Malaysian relations or perhaps look at other Southeast Asian states and undertake a similar study. There is little doubt that the field of study is fairly open and lots of work needs to be done to adequately fill the gaps in international relations. Despite this thesis' shortcomings, I contend that its significance and importance cannot be ignored in South African scholarship. Whilst it has benefited from the comparative research contributions and

significant articles penned by some of the earlier mentioned South African and Malaysian scholars, it built and expanded upon some of their inputs by exploring and covering a variety of dimensions. Since this has been the case, the thesis hopes to stimulate further research on South Africa's ties with Malaysia in particular and on Southeast Asia in general. The thesis should therefore be of interest to a variety of scholars such as foreign policy makers, international relations specialists, sociologists, religionists as well as those who are fascinated with the role of non-state actors in the ever-changing international system. With these remarks, let me first give an outline of the thesis and then turn to the next crucial chapter in which I intend to make use of a theoretical framework that will assist to reflect upon and understand the Federation of Malay(si)a and (the Union/Republic) of South Africa relationship from the 1950s until 2005.

4. The Thesis' Outline:

The thesis has been divided into three parts and seven chapters. **Part One** consists of two chapters. **Chapter One** provides a general introduction to and rationale for the thesis and thereafter offers a critical review of the relevant literature that gave attention to South Africa's relationship with Asian states in general and Malaysia in particular. **Chapter Two** goes on a theoretical excursion and presents an account of CT. The chapter brings into purview a story telling framework that helps to narrate the relationship between these two sovereign nation-states and also assists in telling how the stories of non-state actors have been contributing towards international relations. And the chapter also discusses the concept of 'identity' as another conceptual tool that aids in the understanding of South Africa's relationship with Malaysia.

Part Two features three inter-related chapters. **Chapter Three** takes us on an in-depth study of the relationship that existed between the (Union/Republic of) South Africa and the Federation of Malay(si)a from the 1950s until 1990. Before giving a fair amount of attention to Malaysian foreign policy approach towards apartheid South Africa as expressed by the positions adopted by Tunku Abdul Rahman and Dr. Mahathir Mohamad respectively, the chapter critically assesses the twin concepts of 'nation' and 'state' as a

crucial conceptual tools that impacts upon the identities of and relationships between the two states. **Chapter Four** takes a closer examination of how the relationship evolved and developed between the two sovereign states; it begins by conceptualizing the notion of ‘middle power’ in order to comprehend contemporary the developments inside and outside these two nation-states as well as within the constructed international system. The chapter traces, in some detail, the diplomatic ties that had gradually been forged in the early 1990s and rounds off with an analysis of the close partnership that had been crafted by 2005. In addition, it weaved into the chapter a detailed discussion of the commercial connections that both states mutually pursued over a period of ten years from 1993 until 2003. **Chapter Five** records and analyses the stories of three non-state actors – a voluntary refugee and two cultural activists - who played a critical and indeed important role in forging socio-cultural ties at the ‘downstairs’ – to use Vale’s metaphor - or grassroots level in international relations. This chapter thus deals with a dimension in IR that had generally been disregarded and neglected, and it is an area which critical scholars have expressed their concerns about in the ensuing debates.

Part Three, which contains two chapters, brings the thesis to a close. **Chapter Six** rounds up the project by firstly illustrating how these two nation states have been deeply involved in the South-South Cooperation project, and secondly examining, explaining and comparing their respective visions, namely the Asian Renaissance and the African Renaissance, that have been the driving forces behind their commitment to the aforementioned project as well as to the advancement of their respective nation-states. **Chapter Seven** draws together the overall research findings by offering insights into the nature of the respective nation-states’ identities that they reflect in the contemporary international state system. The thesis finally ends with a list of **Appendices** and an extensive **Bibliography**.

CHAPTER TWO

Identifying and Constructing a Theoretical Framework: Towards Understanding South African-Malaysian Relations

1. Introduction:

Some of the literature reviewed in the previous chapter gave a fair insight into and an adequate overview of diverse aspects of South African – Malaysian Relations. Not all of these published pieces made use of theories or appropriated paradigms to justify the authors' arguments and points that they raised. It is assumed that if the authors employed a particular paradigm or invoked a tentative theory it would have restricted their reflections on the theme or topic under discussion in such manner that suggested a one-dimensional interpretation instead of allowing a multi-layered interpretation. However, among the list of scholarly contributions such as those written by Southall (1997) and van der Westhuizen (2002) theories form an important preface to the contents of the text. These scholars chose relevant theories (and suitable paradigms) that helped them in their critical comparative studies and which assisted to yield meaningful and reasonable interpretations and understandings.

The theories and paradigms that they used shaped the way they interpreted the issues that they carefully scrutinized and critically reflected upon. Burchill (1996: 13) clarified the rationale for making use of theories when he said that 'one aim of studying a wide variety of IR theories is to make international politics more intelligible and better understood' and he went on stating that it is '... to make better sense of institutions, events and processes which exist in the contemporary world.' And as far as he was concerned 'at times the theories will involve testing hypotheses, proposing causal explanations,

describing events and explaining general trends and phenomena, with the aim of constructing a plausible image of the world.' Cox (1992: 133) also added his voice on the relevant status of theory when he made the point that '(t)heory follows reality. It also precedes and shapes reality.'

2. Significance of Theory & Paradigm:

Theory, according to Burchill (1996: 2), is purely an intellectual inquiry that seeks to offer explanatory accounts of IR; or to put it slightly differently, it 'is nothing but (a) systematic reflection on phenomena, (that is) designed to explain them and to show how they are related to each other in a meaningful, intelligent pattern, instead of being merely random items in an incoherent universe' (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996: 5). The last two mentioned scholars further pointed out that the theory is there to (a) guide research, (b) provide a basis for explanation, and (c) lead to a predictive capability, and that it gives a sense of purpose and direction. Jabri (2000: 290) posited the view that theory is 'a way of making things intelligible' and that it is also 'a set of limited propositions designed to connect and interpret organized facts.' In Burchill's (1996: 8) review of the various theories, he listed a variety of definitions that were extracted from the works of their advocates. Neuman (1998: 2) cautioned that 'theories are not borne out by events in the Third World,' and according to Chan (1994:237), 'IR theory lacked nuance when viewing the Third World or even non-Western members of the developed world.' And Ayoob (1998: 32) emphasized that theories have been prisoners of time and space that capture approximate reality and that possess the power and ability to discuss, examine, and predict the behaviour of their subjects.

Although there was a spate of IR theories that were worked out, IR scholars like many others in the social sciences also opted to go for paradigms, which may be regarded as epistemological models, that were given prominence by Thomas Kuhn's influential 1962 work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Neufeld 2001: 130). Reusse (2002: 5) made reference to Kuhn who described a paradigm as follows: '... (it) is at the start largely a promise of success discoverable in selected and still incomplete examples'. He

went further by referring to Aurois (1995) who rationalized why there has been a disruption in theory formulation in developmental studies and the emergence of a number of paradigms as a better alternative to grasp the nature of the debates and issues. Whilst some scholars do not make a clear distinction between theory and paradigm, there were apparent shifts in the use of paradigms instead of theories in academic circles; since the concept 'theory' was earlier defined and explained, the following broad definition of the term 'paradigm' will assist in shedding added light on the distinction between the two concepts: Paradigm is basically a shared understanding and a manner of approaching a relationship or a problem in international relations, and it is used by scholars and students in the social sciences as a fundamental way of knowing how the state and non-state actors in the world operate and manage worldly affairs in the international system (Steans & Pettiford 2001: 212). Kegley & Wittkopf (1997: 17) footnoted their understanding of the concept when they stated that the word 'paradigm' is commonly used to describe the dominant way of looking at a particular subject such as IR. They added that a paradigm can be employed to compare the present (of South Africa) with the past (of South Africa) or one state (i.e. South Africa) with another (Malaysia) and it is also used to determine what issues in the changing global world are perceived to be most important. Burchill (1996: 11), who also invoked Kuhn, stated that 'a dominant paradigm is primarily a frame of assumptions dialectically conceived and consensually recognized as the cumulative wisdom of the discipline at any specific time in its evolution.'

From the afore-mentioned scholarly observations and definitions of these two concepts, it may be concluded that theories and paradigms are significant tools that complement one another when applied to various types of studies. These two terms help to unpack the nature of the ties that had been forged, developed, nurtured and sustained among nation-states as is the case between South Africa and Malaysia, and they also offer deep insights into the meaningfulness of relationships and partnerships among nation-states. Since social scientists in general and IR scholars in particular have painstakingly demonstrated the relevancy and appropriateness of the employment of theories and paradigms in a sound and stimulating manner, I, as a social science researcher, opted to follow their footsteps by appropriating theories and paradigms that would help to gain a fair

understanding of the rationale behind the relationship that has been reignited in 1993 between South Africa and Malaysia as well as the nature of the existing partnership.

At this juncture it may be instructive to state that there have been other contemporary IR scholars that have questioned and debated whether theory comes before practice or vice versa. Whilst scholars such as Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff (1996: 22-23) have tried to pursue a neutral stand where both the theorist and the practitioner have valid grounds for accepting theory before practice or practice before theory, there have been a coterie of critical theorists such as Steven Chan (2001) who favoured the latter. He and others who share these thoughts have substantiated reasons for arguing along these lines. Whilst I am inclined to accept this notion as valid, it is not my concern to delve into the pros and cons of its validity except to be fully cognizant of these theoretical concerns within the IR arena.

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: the first is to outline the philosophy of a key theory that has constantly been invoked and applied loosely throughout this thesis, and the second is to briefly introduce crucial concepts that are relevant to the contents of this thesis; they have been appropriated and tailored to fit within the broad theoretical framework that would help gain a general and perhaps a deeper understanding and insight into the relationship that has developed between South Africa and Malaysia over the past few years. But before identifying the theory that will be used as a basis for supporting the contents of this thesis, a few short paragraphs are devoted to the state of IR theory during the contemporary period in order to contextualize the theory that has been appropriated for this research. This will, however, be briefly addressed with the hope of not oversimplifying the state of IR during the 20th century.

3. A Synopsis of IR Theory:

International Relations (IR), which became an academic discipline in 1919 in the aftermath of World War I, has been a discipline that has been in a constant state of theoretical flux, and this has led scholars such as Chan and Mandaville (2000) to describe

it as a 'crude discipline.' From the very inception of IR and for much of the 20th century, Neuman (1998: 13) pointed out that mainstream IR theory such as Idealism, Realism, Neo-Realism, and Liberalism was and is still essentially Eurocentric theory. Most of which had, however, been manufactured in and exported from the USA (cf. Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996: 11; Paolini 1997: 34) and because of these developments, Tickner (2003: 297) preferred to describe the USA theorists as the gatekeepers of IR and which has ultimately resulted in an 'Amerocentric representation of global politics.'

When it was developed in the early 1900s it was molded and shaped along the notion that the state was and remained the sole actor in the world of politics and international relations. The sovereignty of the state was paramount and as such all socio-political and economic affairs are connected to the state and in the hands of its leadership who represents the state and its citizens; in other words, actors such as the president or prime minister of a state were the secondary actors whilst the state was viewed as the primary actor. As time moved on towards the 1960s and beyond there were many critical IR scholars who began to question the dogmatic view of the classical IR scholars who considered the state as sacrosanct and a non-negotiable political entity. These scholars forcefully argued that whilst the nation-state might have been identified by earlier IR classical scholars as the only actor, there are new actors such as Transnational Corporations (TNCs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Non-State Actors (NSAs) that play a greater role in international affairs. And because of this, they will have to forfeit that special position and allow space for the other actors to take their rightful place next to the state as key political players in the IR arena. Examples of TNCs and NGOs abound: Coca Cola (www.cocacola.com) and MacDonalds (www.mcdonalds.com) belong to those TNCs that have spread their tentacles to almost all corners of the world, and Amnesty International (AI www.ai.org) and the World Trade Organization (WTO www.wto.org) are NGOs that have made their mark in the IR arena and have thus become significant players in global affairs.

And as a consequence of the interventions of many of these transnational institutions, their concrete contributions have in some cases overshadowed the position of the nation-


state and forced the governments of these nation-states to accept them as important (and equal) international political players. When Strange (1996: 199) undertook a survey of world affairs, she proved that the state's position as a political actor has weakened as a result of the integration of national economies into a single global market economy. She thus concluded that we come across 'a ramshackle assembly of conflicting sources of authority' because when business dealings are executed or commercial ties forged then these are either with the government of a state, a TNC such as Barclays, or with a social movement such as Jubilee 2000; from this random selection of institutions, we deal with a variety of persons who represent their specific institution.

The impact of the TNCs and NGOs gave rise to the eventual emergence of IR scholars who proposed alternative theories such as Liberalism and Structuralism (George 1994; Jackson & Sorenson 1999; Burchill et al 2001; Steams & Pettiford 2001) that interpreted world events and developments very differently from their colleagues who still held on to the idealist and realist notions of the sovereignty of the state as espoused by the classical theorists. A synopsis of the theoretical developments over the many decades during the 20th century will provide an insight into the types of theories that have been proposed, debated, discussed and applied. IR scholars have however classified them into three broad 'debates'. The one group is referred to as the First Debate theories, namely 'Idealism' and 'Realism' during the 1940s and 1950s (cf. Swatuk 1991; Quirk & Vigneswaran 2005). This was naturally succeeded by the Second Debate theories which centered around the confrontations and conflicts between 'history' and 'science' and that took place during the 1960s and into the 1970s (cf. Knorr & Rosenau 1969). And since the 1980s, the Third Debate came to life; this debate has been characterized as the 'discipline defining' debate because of the variety of concerns raised by theorists such as Holsti, Kauppi, Little, Cox and an array of others (cf. Lapid 1989; Neufeld 1995).

According to Neufeld (1995), three contending paradigms that describe the present state of IR have been proposed; they are 'realism,' 'pluralism,' and 'structuralism.' According to this proposition, Realists appropriate the 'billiard-ball' model, which reflect the view how states intermittently collide. Pluralists deal with the 'cob-web' relationships where

there is constant crisscrossing of activities, and Structuralists face a ‘multi-legged octopus’ sucking up the wealth from the peripheries ‘to feed’ the centre. Whilst these may be viewed as complementary paradigms, there are however contradictory categories that are accommodated by these theoretical schools. Among these are (a) actors (states), (b) dynamics (primary force, complex social movements, economics), (c) dependent variables (IR explaining what states do and identifying the major events), (d) subject boundaries (state centric and world society), and (e) specific concepts (deterrence and alliance, ethnicity and interdependence, dependence and exploitation) (cf. Neufeld 1995: 48-49). On the one hand, the Third Debate brought to a close all the traditionally mainstream theories within the IR discipline, and on the other, it sparked off a string of new and vibrant debates that fired up the discussions from various dimensions. These debates were, in fact, affected and influenced by theoretical models that have been devised, advocated and applied in fields such as literature and linguistics etc. In fact, many contemporary IR scholars have responded critically towards the mainstream theories arguing that most of these theories ignore cultural varieties and are 'suspect' (Neuman 1998: 6). Another shortcoming, according to Ayoob (1998: 32), was that they '... do not concern themselves with the behaviour of the large majority of members of the international system.'

Figure 2.1:



Beyond the Third Debate, which Jackson & Sorenson (1999: 59-61) described as the Fourth Debate, there emerged a number of very vibrant and challenging theories. All of these theories have prised open new debates and discussions that critically questioned the ontological and epistemological foundations of the mainstream theories. The advocates of these theories have interrogated the philosophical foundations of the earlier theories to demonstrate how inadequate they were to comprehend the nature of the contemporary society and state. And since the classical theories failed to provide any satisfactory answers to the developments in the international system, the new coined and proposed theories could provide some positive responses. The theories that entered the IR arena were: Critical Theory, Postmodernism, Post-Colonial Theory, Feminist Theory and the Green Theory. With the invasion of these theories, the IR discipline provided new understandings and insights into IR. Figure 2.1 above gives a synopsis of some of the different theories that have been operating throughout the 20th Century.

In mapping out a theoretical framework for this thesis, which draws upon, at least, one particular theory, I am consciously mindful of Holsti's (1990: 12) desideratum when he said that the researcher/scholar should be 'employing concepts, categories and typologies that foster rather than hinder comparative analysis' and when Halliday (1995: 745) intoned that 'the philosophy of the social sciences' should always be kept in mind for theory to avoid the pitfalls. More importantly I take heed of Burchill's (1996: 14-15) remarks when he discussed the constitutive international theory, which is different from the explanatory international theory; he noted that generally every scholar comes to IR with preconceptions, experiences and beliefs which affect the way the person understands the subject. In other words, the scholar comes with his/her historical baggage such as language, culture, religion, ethnicity and ideology and thus frames his/her study with these factors impinging upon his/her interpretation.

These remarks are crucial when reflecting upon the relationship between South Africa and Malaysia from the standpoint of the observer who comes from a specific - or for that matter any - community within the broad-based South African society and someone who

belongs to a particular religio-cultural group within that society. Based upon these observations, the thesis is thus a reflection of my cognitive interests and normative assumptions. And since - reformulating using Edward Said's (1984) words - 'no writing is neutral or innocent', I have adopted a bias in terms of my choice of theories, variables and indeed interpretations. Let me now turn our attention towards the theory that has been appropriated for and applied throughout this thesis.

4. A Relevant Theory and Relating Tales:

Scholars of IR have critically questioned the relevance of many of the traditional theories such as Realism and Liberalism in relation to the developments that have taken place by the end of the 20th Century, particularly after the end of the Cold War. And with the onset and intrusion of globalization, some of these scholars proposed alternative theoretical models as new strategies of interpretation. These theories became popular because of their philosophical roots and interpretation of contemporary political and economic affairs. One from among the set of non-mainstream and unconventional theories listed in Figure 2.1 above is the concern of this section, namely Critical Theory (hereafter CT). It may be argued that CT created opportunities and space for other theories to be entertained by the IR specialists; this may be attributed to the way CT emerged and developed (Jackson & Sorenson 1999: 233-235).

The uniqueness of this theory lies in the fact that it opened up doors for the voiceless to be heard and the marginalized to be counted in on an equal basis and also have their say in world affairs (cf. Wyn Jones 2001). And since a coterie of IR scholars have identified themselves with issues that have been given scant attention by the traditional IR schools, CT as well as its relatives (Postmodernism, Feminism and the like) was a fairly successful theoretical framework for these scholars; it was successful in that – to borrow Robert Cox's words – 'critical theory can be a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order, whereas problem-solving theory is a guide to tactical actions which, intended or unintended, sustain the existing world' (quoted by Eckersley 2004: 30). CT is not just a practically oriented theory that investigates and untangles issues through a

series of strategic actions. It is a theory that is applied in order to transcend unreflective understanding, to uncover structures of domination, and to work in the interest of the silenced and marginalized communities from the South - popularly referred to as the Third World. And since most nation-states from the South have been voiceless, it is to South Africa and Malaysia - two sovereign nation-states from within the South - that will be this thesis' subject matter.

4.1 Critical Theory:

According to George (1994), Rengger (2001) and Devetak (2001), the roots of CT are found within the period of Enlightenment, and they are specifically located in the philosophical works and epistemological writings of W.V. Quine, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Jurgen Habermas and Michael Foucault. Prior to these scholars' invaluable contributions towards the critical debates that ensued and remained influential, the name of Karl Marx continued to loom large since he was the one who critically evaluated the nature of the socio-economic system in Western Europe and went on to demonstrate the inequalities and injustices that it yielded (cf. Marx's *Das Kapital*). In the light of Marx's numerous studies he had hoped that capitalism as a system would eventually reach a crisis point and come to an abrupt end. Although this was not to be, it was the critical theorists such as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer within the Frankfurt School who began to evaluate the reasons for the capitalist system's robustness and resilience despite the economic depression in the 1930s. They realized and concluded that the system was propped up by many other social structures such as the educational institutions and the mass media and that there was little that could be done to halt the capitalist system from forging ahead.

In Horkheimer's writings he distinguished between CT and traditional theory. Since he critically assessed the traditional theoretical schools and went on to propose an alternative route, he and his colleagues, who also made critical inputs on the subject, were associated with the Frankfurt School of critical theorists. (Steans & Pettiford 2001: 108-109; Rengger 2001: 94-96). These scholars saw that CT had the potential to critically

investigate theory itself; a task which traditional theory was incapable of doing. CT possessed the capacity to raise, *inter alia*, the following questions: for whom has the theory been formulated? What does it serve? Why has it been constructed? And how has it been employed? (Rengger 2001: 94). All of these interconnected questions assisted the critical theorists to comprehend the operations of international politics and international relations better and they generally did not accept the traditional limitations on explanations and thus never took for granted phenomena such as contemporary world politics as given (Hutchings 2001: 79-80).

Even though these scholars' line of thinking was 'that social progress was not dependent upon the scientific discovery and application of universal laws but on concrete social practice associated with critical reflection on dominant knowledge/power relations' (George 1994: 151), they became somewhat disillusioned and pessimistic with the workers who were themselves divided and whose 'revolutionary spirit' had waned. In the course of these critical theorists' assessments and writings about the capitalist system, they became extremely 'sensitive to multiple oppression (that was) inherent in capitalism,' and were thus looking for other ways of addressing these issues in order to bring about a meaningful change. Related to searching for alternatives a string of questions that was subsequently raised in the light of the gross inequalities which existed in different parts of the world was: 'How can critical theorists develop a conception of a fair and just society?', 'Who will be the agents of radical change? And what does it really mean to be emancipated or have freedom?' (ibid 110). These questions formed part of a set of ideas that stimulated the subsequent generation of critical theorists in the Frankfurt School led by Habermas to shift their focus from the workers' struggle to the cultural arena. Habermas was the one who basically set the 'emancipatory project' on course and pointed out that the earlier critical theorists in the school 'misunderstood the emancipatory task in seeking to overcome the power of instrumental reason in *all* spheres' (ibid 153). He thus injected a renewed spirit into the school and gave it a new lease of life that went beyond the CT of the earlier masters in the Frankfurt School.

CT tackled and challenged the fundamental philosophy of the traditional theories and

existing world order (Hutchings 2001: 87; Duvall & Varadarajan 2003: 81). The critical theorists' critique of the realists' stance such as, for example, taking for granted the state as the *only* political unit within the international system was not left unchallenged. The realists' assumptions ought to be questioned and debated, they insisted and argued. And as far as they were concerned, their decisive deliberations on the issue would be better accounted for in rethinking the rationale for this significant position. CT thus brought a more refreshing method of assessing developments within the IR discipline in particular and the process of modernity in general. This theory ventured to prise open new ways of comprehending contemporary changes in the field of IR and thus offered alternative theoretical views to what had traditionally been disseminated by idealists and realists. Robert Cox, one of the advocates of this theory, expressed the view that '(c)ritical theory is conscious of its own relativity but through this consciousness can achieve a broader time perspective and become less relative'. Hoogvelt (1997: 12), from whom this quote was taken, attempted to further explain what Cox actually meant by this statement; she opined that within the arena of CT '... the task of theorizing can never be finished in an enclosed system but must continually begin anew, beginning *not* with abstract conceptions but a description of historical experience, ferreting out the emerging contradictions between changing material conditions and associated social forces on the one hand, and the vested interests or overhangs from past institutions and ideologies on the other.'

According Jackson & Sorenson (1999: 233), Cox made a clear distinction between problem-solving knowledge and emancipatory knowledge. He argued that 'problem-solving knowledge' suggested a prejudicial position towards the international status quo which is based on inequality of power and excluded many communities. As far as Cox's position was concerned, this type of knowledge was basically conservative in construction and this being the case it will not be able assist in the progress of humanity nor in their emancipation. Linklater (1996: 281) captured some of Cox's thoughts by stating that '(p)roblem-solving knowledge is geared to making the international system function more smoothly on the understanding that fundamental change is either impossible or improbable. Critical-theoretical knowledge searches for evidence of change

on assumption that present structures are unlikely to be reproduced indefinitely.’

Critical theorists therefore came to the rescue via the process of deconstruction and, in effect, replace ‘problem-solving knowledge’ with a radically reconstructed form of knowledge – as part of the democratic impulse (Neufeld 2001: 130) - that sought to advance the position of humanity through ‘the emancipatory project’ (Rengger 2000: 143-172); a project, which Rengger (2001: 96) cautioned, also possessed a ‘dark side’ and one that critical theorists will have to confront if they wish to ‘make good on its emancipatory project.’ Although Rengger (2000: 158-156; 2001: 102-106) went on to demonstrate the project’s shortcomings, I will not reiterate his remarks except to say that they should be kept in mind when pursuing it.


This emancipatory project, being an essential part CT, thus effectively gave space to the silenced and marginalized voices that belonged to the world described and categorized as the ‘underdeveloped states’ or ‘developing states’ (George 1994: 141; Low 2004). In fact, Jackson (1996: 215), who based himself on Linklater’s ideas, captured the idea quite succinctly when he said that ‘(c)ritical theory takes notice of ‘the other’ which could be any social category whose members suffer from exclusion at the hands of the insider.’ However, in order for CT to offer an alternative as a user-friendly and relevant theory, it was largely informed by the traditions of hermeneutics and *ideologiekritik* (Devetak 2001: 163), and much of which has been appeared in Habermas’ *Knowledge and Human Interests* (1972) in which he stressed his ‘theory of communicative action’ (Linklater 1996: 284; Jones 2001: 17-18). Embedded in this work and other writings of Habermas, Halliday (1994: 53) recognized three forms of knowledge; these three are positivist, hermeneutic and critical and have been captured in Figure 2.2 below.

Linklater (1996: 281), drawing upon the work of Ashley, has however listed the three interests that had been expressed by Habermas; they were:

- The technical interest in understanding how to extend control over nature & society;

- The practical interest in understanding how to create & maintain orderly communities; and
- The emancipatory interest in identifying & eradicating unnecessary social confinements & constraints.

Figure 2.2



According to George's (1994: 154-155) and Devetak's (2001: 164) observations, it was the mentioned text that catapulted Habermasian themes into IR. Seans & Pettiford (2001: 112-121) detected six sets of significant themes that cropped up in the agenda of critical theorists; they were 'State and Power,' 'Institutions and World Order,' 'Identity and Community,' and 'Inequality and Injustice,' 'Conflict and Violence' and 'Peace and Security.' Brief attention will only be given to two sets from the list since these directly impact upon the contents of this research project. The first set of themes, namely 'state and power,' consists of two loaded, yet important, concepts in IR theory and practice. Going back to early IR theoretical literature, the sovereign nation-state was and remained the only political actor in the eyes of the Idealists, Realists, Neo-Realists and Liberalists who deliberately ignored the fact that the state was not a purely European invention;

similar systems existed in slightly different forms and in another world order between 900 and 1500 in Africa and Asia. And because of this traditionally dogmatic perception, the critical theorists de-linked the concept of the 'state as actor' and placed it alongside other groups of politico-economic actors whose acts have also affected and influenced IR in both the political and economic spheres.

They thus argued that the state as a political entity developed alongside the economic system and it therefore does not make any sense to force them into distinct areas of activities when they should be viewed as 'two sides of the same coin.' And they further advocated the idea that the state should not be regarded as the basic unit of analysis in IR and that it is imperative to grasp and understand the historical nature of the state and the state system. In this regard the critical theorists posed some of the following questions that helped to inform them about forms of socio-political and economic organizations: What is the state? Why did it take on a dominant role? How does it contribute to the world order? In which way do all the political actors make substantial input towards human emancipation? And who holds the power to bring about the changes globally? The latter question brings into the discussion the second problematic concept, namely 'power,' a concept that has been given significant focus in the critical tradition (Jackson & Sorenson 1999: 233; Sorenson 2004: 14-15).

In the literature on political science and in other disciplines, the definition for 'power' abounds. Hill (2003: 129) highlighted the fact that power is 'a foundational concept in political science and a central pillar in international relations.' Kegley & Wittkopf (2001: 378) made reference to a few scholars' conceptualization of power; they stated that most of these scholars operate from the traditional assumption that power gives the state the ability: (a) to promote and protect national interests, (b) to win in bargaining situations, and (c) to shape the rules governing the international system. Couched differently, they accepted the notion that power is a political phenomenon that revolved around the capacity of one state to persuade another to do what it otherwise would not. In other words, the one who has the most power is the one that is in control. For example, South Africa's position in relation to its immediate sovereign neighbors demonstrate that it is

the major power in the region and thus generally 'win in bargaining positions' and persuade a neighbor such as Lesotho to act in a way it otherwise would not (cf. Landsberg 2004: 164-165; Wulf 2005: 90-91). The same argument may be applied to Malaysia in relation to Singapore in the case of the 'water problem.' Nevertheless, based within the state system, one could gather from the afore-mentioned interpretations that power is essentially 'politics.'

And since power is essentially or is inextricably tied to politics, the state exercises its will through the amount of power it has, and this power is usually supported by other state structures, namely the economic and military institutions. When comparing South Africa with other countries in the SADC region it is not difficult to identify where South Africa stands in relation to all of them and the same can be said about Malaysia in the ASEAN. In each case, their power is assessed according to their economic standing in the region, the political position in relation to their neighbors and their military might within their geo-strategic areas. However, the power that these states possess is normally disseminated through ideas and beliefs in their respective states, which legitimizes the existing order. The critical theorists were thus concerned with the nature of power and power relations that exist among the social groups; for example, the power of the merger between Petronas and Engen over local communities who are dependent upon the employment that these joint ventures generate in South Africa and Malaysia respectively or the power of business over the mining communities (South Africa) and rubber industry communities (Malaysia). This brings us to the second set of concepts, namely 'identity' and 'community.'

Although the special attention will be given to the concept of 'identity' towards the end of this chapter and that of 'community' in a subsequent chapter, at this point it is a useful exercise to explore the concepts according to the insight of the critical theorists. The critical theorists did not only challenge the position and identity of the state, which they argued has the potential to transcend the logic of the state system reflected by realism (Hutchings 2001: 82), as the main political actor within the IR arena, but they also questioned the powers it exercised in adopting an exclusive approach by demarcating

borders – marked out by the *disappearance* of authors (Neocleous [2003: 123] referred to Denis Wood) - within which it distinguished and decided who should or could be ‘citizens’ and who should or could be ‘non-citizens,’ or for that matter ‘nationalists’ as opposed to ‘foreigners’ or ‘aliens’ (ibid 109-110). It basically identified who belonged to the ‘us’ and who formed part of the ‘other.’ In other words, the identity of the communities and societies, who reside within the state borders, has been defined according to the rules and regulations stipulated within ‘the political order of modernity’; an order in which the citizen is protected by a set of rights (ibid 108). These identity markers, namely ‘citizen’ and ‘non-citizen’ and ‘nationalist’ and ‘foreigner,’ have been viewed within the CT school as highly problematic and indeed contentious because the rights for the citizen can only be achieved via the political form of the nation-state. And this thus begged the question: ‘if rights are granted to citizens of states, what happens to those with no states?’ or phrased differently ‘what happens to those who belong to no territory or are stateless?’ (ibid 109). Critical theorists thus proffered the notion that these issues should be judiciously assessed and, in the process, they be displaced and alternatives offered in their place. The work by Mark Neocleous entitled *Imagining the State* (2003) and that of Seyla Benhabib entitled *The Rights of Others* (2004) devote a substantial number of pages to this debate and offer significant insights into it.

For the critical theorists, whose main objective was and remains human emancipation, the state's borders and its regulation pose as a threat to the 'emancipation project' in that it restricts the individual and community's movements and development. It decides who it wishes to recognize as a citizen and who it wants to classify as an alien or foreigner. These acts are all problematic and no 'emancipation project' will be able to achieve its objectives if these rules are strictly applied and enforced; in fact, if these rules are enforced they may inevitably cause the nation-state's citizens to rebel and overthrow the government which would effectively become ‘illegitimate.’ At the heart of the critical theorists' argument is a desire for the governments or those in power to work in the interest of the societies that they control and manage, and as an extension of this desire is the concern for basic 'human rights' for all. The fundamental concern of the critical theorists is the leveling of the playing fields by bringing about justice and doing away

with all forms of inequality.

Taking our guide from Habermas and (later) Foucault, CT aimed at resuscitating the critical faculty, and it 'is committed to extending the rational, just and democratic organization of political life beyond the level of the state to the whole of humanity' (Devetak 2001: 163). According to George (1994: 153), Habermas insisted that CT undertakes an 'emancipatory task in seeking to overcome the power of instrumental reason in all spheres.' The fundamental issue, George continued (1994: 154), was for CT 'to reconnect (rational) knowledge to human interests,' and 'to regenerate the critical potential of modernity in terms of an ideologically unhindered, communicatory process.' In this regard Linklater (1996: 284-295) elaborated upon the notion of 'discourse ethics' as a key method of communication that had been advocated by critical theorists. 'Discourse ethics,' he (1996: 295) stated, 'encourages open dialogue between the diversity of moral views and facilitates the expansion of the range of moral and political points of view.' 'Open dialogue,' he continued, 'is a check against domination inherent in some claims about cultural difference' (also see Linklater 2001). I suppose when making this point Linklater was conscious of the racial conditions, ethnic differences and cultural constructions that were prevalent in apartheid South Africa as well as in other countries where open and critical dialogue was stifled rather than encouraged and promoted.

In sum, critical theorists such as Linklater did not dismiss the theoretical standpoints of the realists but preferred to argue against the three basic postulates of positivism. They adopted this approach as a means of demonstrating that concepts and issues are not fixed and given but open to interpretation. The three postulates that Linklater critically assessed were: (a) an objective external reality, (b) the subject/object distinction, and (c) value-free social science (Linklater 1996: 279-281; Jackson & Sorenson 1999: 232; Rengger 2000: 152; Rengger 2001: 97; Neufeld 2001: 130-131). As far as these scholars were concerned the 'social world is a construction of time and place' and this implies that 'the international system is a specific construction of the most powerful states.' Based upon these observations, they further claimed that since world politics are also constructed, the distinction between subject (the analyst) and object (the focus of analysis) is marginal.

They further averred that knowledge, which is produced by the analyst, contains an inherent bias because of the analyst's social perspectives and interpretations. According to Jackson & Sorenson (1999: 233), they also expressed the view that all IR theories, which have been proffered by different theorists, openly display a position that clearly demonstrates their bias. In support of their view they made reference to Robert Cox's famous quote: 'Theory is *always* for someone and for some purpose' (Murphy 2001: 70 – his emphasis).

It is this oft-quoted statement of Cox that has prompted me to appropriate CT as a helpful and meaningful theoretical tool to not only to investigate the relationship between two nation states from the South that have been marginalized but to, in a way, re-write aspects or parts of international relations from 'the point of view of the interests and aspirations of the impoverished South' (ibid). In addition, it also intends to write into the narrative through providing adequate space to the voices of NGOs and NSAs who have generally been overlooked and silenced as significant IR actors. And since Cox (1992: 132-157) resurrected and critically interrogated the sociological ideas of Ibn Khaldun, an early North African Muslim scholar and theorist that has been silenced but not eclipsed by medieval and modern contributions on world order, Ibn Khaldun's ideas on the 'body politic' (i.e. the state and the society/nation) will also be given attention in the next chapter as part of a detailed discussion that deals with the conceptualization of the state, the nation and the nation-state. Before relating the earlier mentioned complimentary IR narratives of the nation-states and the NSAs, I wish, at this juncture, (a) to demonstrate the connection between CT and the 'art of telling stories' and (b) to use this art form in order to chronicle the bilateral relationship between two nation-states from the South as well as to profile the biographies of the NSAs who have made interesting contributions towards IR in their respective regions and their nation-states.

4.2 Critical Theory through the 'Art of 'Story Telling':

Before I make the connection between CT and the 'story telling' process, I have to briefly clarify one specific concept and that is 'narratology,' which is simply understood as

‘story telling.’ A narrative, according to Dudley (1982: 103), is defined as ‘a discourse wherein a teller relates an event containing both actions and agents’ and it is composed of a speaker, speech events, agents and narrated events (cf. Manfred 2003: N3.1.1). The latter (2003: N1.2) couched the definition as follows: ‘a narrative has a story based on an action caused and experienced by characters, and a narrator who tells it.’

In line with the afore-mentioned definitions as well as with the understanding of ‘narratology’ or ‘story telling’, Bleiker (2001: 37-66) – in his chapter entitled ‘Forget IR Theory’ - categorically stated ‘... IR appears as nothing but a set of narratives that provide us with meaning and coherence...’ He continued and opined that ‘... stories provide the state with a sense of identity, coherence and unity’ and that ‘... (s)tate stories also exclude, for they seek to repress or delegitimise other stories and practice of identity ...’ Bleiker aptly captured the idea of stories or narratives in his chapter and this influenced us to view the notion of narratives as a useful way of discussing the contents of this thesis. In fact, the work of Stone-Mediatore (2003) bears this out when she argued very fervently in favour of appropriating story-telling as a method of making known information that are relevant but hidden, important but marginalized, crucial but deliberately cast aside as non-events and unimportant.

The idea in this section is not to regurgitate the thoughts on CT, which was adequately addressed by the respective scholarly works of George (1994), Devetak (2001) and Jones (2001), and outlined, explained and summarized in the section above. The intention of this section is quite plain, and that is to connect CT to the process of story telling. Chan and Mandaville (2001: 4-5), who described IR as a ‘crude discipline’, made a strong case for the employment of stories in IR. They posed the question: What can be done with stories in the interest of IR? And in response stated that ‘if stories are the metaphors that disguise events ... is it the role of IR to disentangle them ... or is it to be merely fascinated by them, seeing the world as a site in multiple truth?’ They also referred to Hidemi Suganami’s chapter in their edited volume, who used the ‘research assessment exercise’ cycle and viewed stories as an important tool when trying to explain and understand IR. ‘How do stories work?’ was the fundamental methodological question that

he successfully explored. They pointed out that ‘a story, which is undefined, expresses the interests of any ‘epistemic community’, and as a consequence, every story – from wherever it originates – is treated as having some value.’ And since this is the case it has essential political scientific benefit and because it ‘confers an equality upon stories both east and west’ (Chan & Mandaville 2001: 6).

In the introductory essay Chan and Mandaville also made reference to Roland Bleiker’s – the co-editor of the work - critical concerns on the same subject. Bleiker (2001: 37) publicly challenged IR representatives who espoused mainstream thoughts when he scripted an article titled ‘Forget IR Theory’. He felt the need to challenge their hegemony over international relations’ debates since they viewed themselves as the gatekeepers and the ones who decide what theory should be allowed in and which one should be left out; a stance that is very much contra the critical tradition. According to Bleiker, these gatekeepers argued against the use of ‘stories’ in order to understand IR, and they basically opined that stories are not part of IR scholarship. Bleiker thus considered this attitude to be foolhardy because when we observe the trends and developments in IR, ‘it appears nothing but a set of narratives that provide us with meaning and coherence.’ And he continued his argument by making reference to the way IR scholars portrayed and reflected upon the state, the *locus classicus* of IR; they not only dealt with it as an institution but also related it via a series of stories and narratives. Another scholar, who also employed the story as her point of departure and whose arguments fall in line with that of Bleiker, is Shari Stone-Mediatore (2003).

Stone-Mediatore’s book sought ways to ‘engage productively narratives of marginalized peoples’ experience. She argued that the received theoretical discourses are inadequate and turned to experienced oriented-writing to communicate their struggle, and that these theories ‘... do not investigate the role of narrative in political (and IR) thinking nor do they theorize a way to confront stories critically... we ... interpret our world in terms of stories, but we lack the theoretical apparatus to do so in a reflective and responsible manner’ (Stone-Mediatore 2003: 2, 4). And earlier in the introduction she (ibid 2) also made the point that ‘when we dismiss stories of experience as ideological constructions,

we not only undermine authority of many marginalized voices but also overlook the importance of experience to critical theory.’ As far as she is concerned individuals’ daily experiences that are captured and contained in stories can inform and empower CT, and in the process the stories’ epistemological values are affirmed; this is exactly what this thesis intends to do when it narrates the stories of cultural activists such as Mr. Ismail Petersen and others in South Africa and Malaysia respectively. Stone-Mediatore’s arguments as well those of Chan et al and their team of contributors have made a strong case for the use of stories in political studies and IR. Stone-Mediatore, who invoked Hannah Arendt, based her work on essays that were penned by individuals that had made a qualitative difference in their respective communities and nation-states.

In this thesis, I firstly narrate the social histories of the two states by briefly reflecting upon their earlier connections and comparing the two from 1948 onwards; this is then followed by narrating the relationship that had been forged between since 1990. Alongside the stories of these two nation-states, it will also be zooming in on marginalized narratives; narratives of individuals who operated outside the ambit of the governmental circles to make international connections for no financial gain. These individuals, who may be described as non-state actors or cultural activists, have made inputs over more than a half decade and they are clear examples of how the picture of the discipline of IR has changed because of their contributions. It should be borne in mind that these individuals had no political profile or clout or affiliation and nor did any of them possess any politician ambitions to aspire to work with the government to attain some personal objectives. An important lesson however is the fact that their life stories demonstrate ‘how experience informs political (and IR) thinking through the medium of narrative because we generally encounter, discuss, and invoke experience in narrative form’ (Stone- Mediatore 2003: 5).

And one of the crucial themes that invariably crop up in these narratives as well as the story of the state is the notion of ‘identity;’ a concept that is also of relevance and importance to the contents of this thesis. In fact, when Wyn Jones (2001: 17) compared Horkheimer’s paradigm of production to Habermas’ paradigm of communication, he

made the point that whilst Horkheimer's paradigm concentrated on 'redistributive struggles' and Habermas' paradigm was concerned with 'community' and 'identity.' Since this was the case, let me address and unpack 'identity' as a significant concept.

4.3 Identity: A Crucial Concept for Critical Theorists in IR

Traditional IR scholarship has somehow overlooked a few significant concepts and variables that have had a direct bearing on developments within world politics and the IR arena. Even though they were sidelined at earlier stages in IR development, contemporary non-traditional IR scholars have brought these concepts into the general purview since they have come to play key roles in understanding contemporary IR developments (cf. Lapidus & Kratochwil 1997; Vandersluis 2000). The specially selected concept, which is discussed in this section, is strongly connected to all the others mentioned issues discussed in different sections of this thesis. There is little doubt that the notion of 'identity' has, during the closing stages of the 20th century, impacted heavily on IR affairs in general and in the lives of nation-states such as South Africa and Malaysia particular that form part of the developing world of states which are struggling to survive in the globally competitive world (Clapham 2000: 45). This section thus undertakes to interrogate the concept of 'identity,' a fairly significant concept in that it brings to the fore the very nature of the South African and Malaysian identities through the political process of nation building as well as other important socio-economic processes and international relations developments within and beyond these sovereign nation-states.

The question of identity as a variable has been and remains an ambiguous one because it implies both uniqueness and sameness. But apart from the ambiguity it expresses, it is important because, as Gilroy (1997: 301) said: 'we live in a world where identity matters' not only as a concept but also as a contested terrain of contemporary socio-political life. He further elaborated stating that it 'provides a way of understanding the interplay between our subjective experience of the world and the cultural and historical set-up in which that fragile subjectivity is formed.' And in the process of providing this type of understanding, identity also harnesses an exceptional plurality of meanings, which – as


mentioned moments ago - is much about difference or uniqueness as about shared belonging or sameness, and marks out the divisions and sub-sets in our social lives. His views concurred with those of Zalewski & Enloe (1995: 282-283) who argued that the concept is multi-layered in that 'identity determines how you are treated, what is expected of you, what you expect of yourself Whether you will be seen as an enemy or (as) a friend.' The multi-facet nature of identity and more particularly identity politics force us to explore groups that have been politically privileged such as state decision makers who are in turn influenced by the facets of their personal identities. For example, in apartheid South Africa it was usually the White, Afrikaner, male who made decisions on behalf of the state and the society that it manages and at no stage could an African female find herself in that position; however, in contemporary democratic South Africa the situation has radically changed where its Deputy President – Ms. Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, for example, is an African female. Similar examples are also observed in Malaysia where the Minister of International Trade and Industries has been under the leadership of a Malay female, namely Dato Seri Rafidah Azizan, for many years.

Returning to Hall (1997), the two questions that need a response: 'Who are we' and 'what have we become' – Burgess (2002: 10) phrased the questions slightly differently when he asked: 'Who are you' and 'Who are you now' - assist us to fully appreciate the debates that have been, on many occasions, raging around the issue of identity. In fact, many of these have been at the heart of racial conflicts as was the case throughout apartheid South Africa and on occasions in Malaysia. What this all boils down to is that a person holds a multiplicity of identities; these identities are employed to assist in directing behaviour depending on the circumstances in which the person finds him/herself. For example, when Mahathir Mohamed was the Prime Minister of Malaysia, he was the leader of a nation, a medical doctor, a husband, a father, a Muslim, and a Malay (cf. Rajendran 1993; Khoo 2001); and in the case of Thabo Mbeki, he is the President of South Africa at present, a husband, a brother, a Christian (?), a Xhosa and a key member of the African Union as South Africa's representative (cf. Gumede 2005). Each of the concepts reflects a particular identity and a special status that each of the two holds in their respective

situations. However, since Mahathir's retirement from political life, he no more holds that prestigious position as Prime Minister of Malaysia but is still revered by the Malaysians as the 'Father of Vision 2020' who modernized Malaysia. And Mbeki, who has retained his position as President for a second term, is known for his 'African Renaissance' project and for being the key drivers behind the NEPAD programme on the African continent and for consolidating the democracy project in South Africa.

Based upon these observations, it is noted that everyone including those who hold the highest offices in their respective countries construct networks of related concepts known as schemas in which each of them are associated (Burgess 2002: 11). In a similar fashion the identity of individuals, communities and states are constructed. As the individual moves from one position to another and into the upper echelons of society, he/she encounters experiences on a variety of levels, namely the individual and social levels, and in the process learn more about 'who they were' and 'who they are' at that point in time. And as a result of these social interactions, according to Burgess (ibid), individuals construct three different types of schemas – see Figure 2.3 below - about themselves: at the primary level a personal identity, at the secondary level a relational identity, and at the last level a social identity.

Figure 2.3



Burgess then points out when taking into account the individual's upbringing and participation in different stations of social life that no matter how the individual defines him/herself, social identity forms an integral part of that individual's personal identity. And this in effect means that the individual is not just a member of a social group but also of a community, a society and a nation; and this in turn implies that the individual is emotionally connected to a specific socio-political group. And when the individual interacts with members of his/her social group, the individual's identity becomes depersonalized, and a social identity automatically replaces it because he/she sees him/herself as part of a desirable social group that shares similar values and aspirations, and the individual is thus influenced by them and also by the environment in which he finds himself. When reflecting upon the position of Tan Sri Professor Ismail Hussein in this thesis, many of the ideas that Burgess expounded on in terms of identity applies to him.

Burgess appropriated the social identity theory as espoused by Henri Tajfel, the French psychologist, in order to have a deeper and indeed better understanding of the post-apartheid South African society that has been deeply traumatized by years of racial discrimination and social hardships. Grounded in numerous observations social identity theory research, according to Burgess (ibid 17), suggests special reasons for considering its effects in South Africa (and perhaps Malaysia); one of these, he mentioned, was that the contact made by members of one group (i.e. whites in South Africa/Malays in Malaysia) with another (i.e. blacks in South Africa/Chinese in Malaysia) reduced negative perceptions, prejudicial attitudes, stereotyping and other undesirable outcomes.

South Africans and Malaysians share a common feeling regarding social group identity and that is: it is a sensitive issue; however, it has been more so in the case of South Africa where racial discrimination was 'legally' constructed and instituted and which privileged the one social group (i.e. the whites) over another (i.e. the blacks [Africans, Coloureds

and Indians]). In the case of Malay Peninsula and the surrounding areas, the Malays were always in a subordinate position within the British colonial system; the latter privileged the Chinese and Indians, whose forebears were brought to the region as labourers by the colonial powers. Subsequent to the departure of the British, the Malays introduced legislation such as affirmative action as a strategy to counter the Chinese and Indians' control and influence. In response the off-spring of these communities, who were born and reared in Malaysia, challenged the strategies that had been implemented more than three decades ago and desired a fundamental change in the legal system and attitudes so that they can truly feel that they form part and parcel of the Bangsa Malaysia (i.e. Malay race) and not be discriminated against. Mahathir, being as pragmatic as ever, obliged by opening up the UMNO – the governing ruling party in Malaysia - to the non-Malay bumiputras and included Bangsa Malaysia as a crucial cog in realizing *Vision 2020* (Reid 2004: 18). This act of the Malaysian Prime Minister minimized the tension between ethnic and civic nationalism, and forced these diasporic Indian and Chinese communities to view 'who is a Malay?' differently in a new context in the 1990s.

In the context of what took place in Malaysia since it became independent in 1957, and what transpired in South Africa throughout the era of apartheid and more so during the post-apartheid period, the issue of identity, namely 'who is a Malay' or 'who is an African', has been repeatedly raised by individuals and groups whose positions have been threatened within their particular societies or within the geographical boundaries where they were born and bred. In his capacity as South Africa's deputy president in 1996, Thabo Mbeki ventured to define who is an African when he delivered his passionate speech 'I am an African.' In a similar vein, Mahathir Mohamed, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, expressed his candid opinion about who the Malays were in his significant publication titled *The Malay Dilemma* (1970), and in subsequent writings he continued to comment upon the Malay identity (cf. Reid 2004: 18); the last significant input on this concept was when he was on an official visit as the Prime Minister of Malaysia to South Africa during August 1995.

Academics and cultural activists in South Africa and Malaysia mulled over the notions of both politicians and critically discussed much of what they wrote. However, these concepts were not only debated within the confined borders of these two nation-states; they were also re-visited by other African and Asian leadership in other parts of Africa and Southeast Asia, namely Singapore, Brunei and Indonesia as well as the diasporic communities living in Sri Lanka, South Africa, Madagascar, Philippines and elsewhere (cf. Barnard 2004). Although there existed diverse opinions on the concepts, there seem to have been a common understanding of the essence of these two concepts within their specific regions towards the end of the 20th Century. The mere fact that societies have been carved up and were boxed into nation-states - which was in essence socially constructing and engineering national identities - by their former colonialists during the specific periods, it forced social science scholars to handle the issue of multiple identities (ethnic, racial, cultural, and religious) in a delicate and sensitive way.


This is clearly illustrated when reflecting upon the position of South Africa's 'Cape Malays' who seemed to have preferred during the late apartheid era (beyond the 1980s) - instead of this ethnic identity, which has been viewed as a colonial invention - their 'religious identity' (i.e. as Cape Muslims); it was considered a more convenient - if not a more appropriate, better suited and perhaps a neutral - label than the 'ethnic identity' that have been fraught with problems, and one that was constructed and employed by the apartheid regime for their own political objectives (cf. Jeppie 1996). The circumstances in Malaysia was and is, however, very different; but even though this has been the case, Yamashita (2003: 8), Vickers (2004: 28) and Shamsul (2004: 137) cogently argued along the lines that the 'Malay' identity was one of the 'invented traditions' by the British. Be that as it may, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia clearly defined what was meant by the concept 'Malay'. But despite this, it continued to be an issue of debate vis-à-vis the other racial groups that exist within the geographically demarcated (and disputed) borders of Malaysia (cf. Kahn 2006).

It might be further illustrated in a slightly different way when we undertake a comparative perspective of how the ethnic/racial identity was accepted by the Malaysians and Cape Malays in their respective regions (cf. Haron 2005). Hall's (1997) exposé of cultural identity fits in neatly with the discussion that tackles and interrogates the Malay identity, which is not just a cultural identity – as has already been established - but also a religious one in the case of the Cape Malays and a religio-political one in the case of Malaysia's Malays. If one compares the two, then one will observe the similarities and differences of which Hall so eloquently spoke about. The former Malaysian Prime Minister's, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, speech in August 1995 in South Africa in which he outlined the Malay identity can be used as one example of how the 'cultural identity' was conceptualized and applied within the Malaysian society. With this framework in mind, along with the various ingredients, the role of non-state actors such as cultural activists in South Africa and elsewhere should be borne in mind and will be addressed in Chapter Five.

Bringing this chapter to a close, the general agreement is that identity is not a fixed, closed or an unchanging variable, and that it has always been part of a process of formation and construction. And the acceptance of a multiplicity of identities in the contemporary societies such as those in South Africa and Malaysia respectively – and as illustrated in Figure 2.4 - is indicative of the fact that identity construction has always been in the making. And since this is so, the South African nation building – and as was the case with nation-building process in Malaysia over many decades - has been dynamic and will continue to demonstrate its dynamism for the foreseeable future. That said, the concept of identity is at the heart of socio-political identity structures, religious identity interpretations, and cultural identity analyses (Jacquin-Berdal et al 2002: 5). This has been so particularly during this contemporary era of globalization where contradictions about identity formation abound and where the relationship between the state and different identities has been and continues to be a complex and, in some instances, self-contradictory. Mayall & Vandersluis (2000: 1) cautioned that when an attempt is made to fathom the relationship and processes of identity formation then one should be wary of

the fact that they are by nature tentative and indeed contestable.

Figure 2.4:



5. Closing Remarks

The fairly detailed theoretical framework as well as the conceptualization of ‘identity’ addressed in different sections of this chapter acts as an important backdrop to the important discussions that are to follow regarding the special partnership that has been developed between South Africa and Malaysia. Both South Africa and Malaysia have been viewed for many years as part of the developing world that is located in the South. However, since they have never remained passive nation-states in the South, some scholars have re-classified their position in world affairs as potential or emerging ‘middle powers’; a concept that will be addressed and explored later in the thesis (Cox 1996; Nossal & Stubbs 1997; Vale 1997; Cilliers 1999; Schoeman 2000; Hamill & Lee 2001; Taylor 2001; van der Westhuizen 2003; Spence 2004; Pfister 2005). This has thus placed great pressure on the shoulders of the South African and Malaysian political leadership - as well as their respective civil societies - in that their countries have been identified as key states from within the ranks of the South. This has been so for a number of reasons: (a) they have played pro-active roles in world events, (b) they have been in sync with neo-liberal world affairs, and (c) they have generally conformed to the standards set down by the neo-liberal world bodies such as IMF and the World Bank.

And despite the difficulties that they have encountered along the way to transform themselves and having been conscious of their shortcomings as nation-states they have, for example, modernized their industries and infrastructure to compete with other major world players. They have hooked up and complied with the global economic system even though their economies were and are somewhat smaller in size; they have worked hard to demonstrate that they have transformed their socio-political identities from being backward, lazy nation-states to ones that are forward looking, progressive in their thinking, liberal in their practice and open to change in the interest of their respective national communities and regional societies as well as the global society; and, more importantly, they have reflected via their special narratives that they fully identified with the plight of the poverty-stricken, downtrodden, isolated and marginalized nation-states and communities in various parts of the world. These character traits, which are in conformity with those that are approved and supported in the critical tradition, thus placed them in a special category of nation-states that have been given special recognition by world societies residing in the South (and the North) for their contributions.

The approach, which has been used, applied and expressed via the story telling method throughout this thesis, is indeed an appropriately critical theory that would assist in exploring the relationship that existed between South Africa and Malaysia prior to the former transforming itself into a democracy, and a relationship that had been forged during South Africa's democratic era. Since the theory's key objective is to free the silenced and marginalized voices and reinforce their own authentic identities, it has been used to do just that. Both democratic South Africa and Malaysia belong to the South, a region that has been marginalized and indeed silenced by the global structures and institutions that have been dominated by hegemonic, powerful forces of the North represented by states such as the USA. The thesis thus relates the stories of how these two states from the South forged a partnership and how they struggled, during the final decade of the 20th century, to represent themselves and their fellow strugglers from the South - the voiceless and marginalized – at international fora and platforms to fight the

dominant groups from the North.

However, since the socio-political tales of the two states differ from one another and since they created an interesting story line through the identities they reflected and the relationship they forged at the respective political and cultural levels during the final decade of the 20th century and beyond, their stories have been recorded and analyzed in the following chapters to demonstrate how they have made a significant contribution to the IR as a whole. With these remarks, I wish to move on and narrate the narratives of these two (emerging) ‘middle power’ nation-states that have carved out interesting niches for themselves among different nation-states in the international system. Here I intend to record their stories, compare and analyze their positions vis-à-vis one another. Before moving in that direction, I first want to discuss in the chapter that follows the relationship and attitudes that these two sovereign nation-states adopted towards one another throughout the Cold War era.

CHAPTER THREE

South Africa and Malaysia: Telling the Tales of Two Sovereign Nation-States (circa 1948-1990)

1. Introduction:

The apartheid state of South Africa was classified as a pariah state alongside that of Israel [in Southwest Asia] and Taiwan [in Far East Asia] in the 1980s (Vale 1977a; Geldenhuys 1990; Mills 1994). It was conferred this status by the international community because of South Africa's inhumane internal policies towards its oppressed masses. International bodies such Non-Aligned Movement and many members of the Commonwealth condemned South Africa for its domestic policies. These bodies and members were eventually able to persuade the UN General Assembly to declare South Africa's internal policies as 'a crime against humanity', and to intensify sanctions against it by literally isolating and shunning it. South Africa's international status in the eyes of the international community took a nosedive and it was forced to reposition itself within the international system and simultaneously reformulate its foreign policies to accommodate new changes. Among the countries that kept diplomatic connections and trade ties with this pariah state were the USA, Britain and a few European states. And with its restructured foreign policy it lured states from Asia to enter into its socio-political and commercial domain. Apart from Japan, which had links and had been toeing the British line (cf. Skidmore 2003; Alden 2002), Hong Kong and Taiwan joined these coterie of sanction busting states without due consideration to the conditions of the oppressed masses (Moorsom 1989; Barber & Barratt 1990; Love 2005; Pfister 2005). As a result of South Africa's status as a nation-state that espoused apartheid doctrines, its sovereignty was very much curtailed and constrained by the UN's firm stand against apartheid. This situation favoured the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa's largest liberation movement, in many ways.

The ANC's international profile gradually increased within the circles of the international community. A number of socialist and communist states fully recognised its position as the legitimate representative of the oppressed masses and thus allowed it to open up offices (cf. Thomas 1995). The significant political position that the ANC charted out for itself and the international recognition that it was accorded by the international community to establish its unique profile resulted in it far outstripping the profile that the apartheid regime had in the 1980s. In its capacity as the representative of the South African oppressed communities, it lobbied on their behalf for support from the international community at different forums (Vale 1977; Vale 1994; Thomas 1995). In this sense, it may be argued that while the ANC's foreign policy and international relations were very much in line with the South African oppressed masses' wishes, the apartheid state's foreign policy was divorced from the South African society (Schrire & Silke 1997: 14; Vale 1994: 80). And it may further be contended that the apartheid state's international relations agenda was partially moulded and shaped by the UN's imposed sanctions as well as South Africa's revised foreign policy in order to strike ties with island-states such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. This was indeed a significant foreign policy shift by South Africa since its traditional trading partners were North America, Britain and Western European states. It is assumed that if the UN sanctions had not been in force many countries would have forged ties with the apartheid regime (Pfister 2005). Nonetheless, the pragmatic, self-centred approach adopted by the apartheid regime also provided South Africa the opportunity to demonstrate its internal sovereign rights by conveniently reformulating its racial policies in order to recognize the citizens from Japan - as well as Taiwan and Hong Kong - as honorary 'whites.'

When the apartheid government underwent a leadership change at the close of the 1980s, which coincided with the end of the Cold War, efforts were made from within and outside South Africa to apply as much pressure on the government in order to gradually bring about meaningful transformation and amend its tarnished international profile. Under Mr. F. W. De Klerk's stewardship internal and external policies were gradually in the process of being revised and altered (Pfister 2005: 125-130). One of the first things

that his government did at the beginning of the 1990s was to release of Mr. Nelson Mandela from prison, and to lift the ban on the liberation movements. In the eyes of the international community, this was the most tangible evidence that the apartheid regime under De Klerk's leadership was prepared to bring about the necessary socio-political changes. The international community was, however, not prepared to lift sanctions after these apparently noble gestures, and applied extra pressure on the apartheid regime to deliver substantial changes that would satisfy the world community and particularly the South Africans who suffered oppression over the many decades.

This chapter sets itself the task of describing the socio-political relationship that existed between these two nation-states before South Africa became a democracy. It does so by charting out, in some detail, the stance the Federation of Malaysia adopted towards the Republic of (Apartheid) South Africa from the time before its independence in 1957 until the end of the Cold War in 1989/1990. The chapter provides an important backdrop for the one that follows, and thus critically analyses - from empirical sources - a relationship that shifted from Malaysia's peripheral support for the ANC into one that developed into a strong bond. But before relating this significant socio-political narrative - one which changed from an 'antagonistic' and 'adversarial' position from the late 1950s to one that may be described as a 'friendly' relationship by 1992 when diplomatic ties were cemented, it is incumbent to construct a conceptual framework within which to assess and comprehend this relationship. This framework is intimately connected to the conceptualization of the conjoined term 'nation-state' that was underpinned by another critical concept, namely 'sovereignty' which was an European creation; the latter construct, which was fully realized after World War II and throughout the Cold War period and one that was transformed in the post-Cold War and post-modern period (Denham & Lombardi 1996), will not be dealt with in this thesis. This chapter attempts to scrutinize and analyse the conjoined term with most examples extracted from South Africa and Malaysia; the two nation-states that are the main focus of this thesis. It begins by de-linking the two respective interconnected concepts of 'nation' and 'state' before analysing them separately; immediately thereafter it discusses the two concepts as a conjoined term.

2. Conceptualizing the 'State' and the 'Nation'

Political pundits agree that the nation-state is a modern construct; a construction that historically emerged out of the Westphalian system and one which gradually evolved through a socially engineered process over many years (Sorenson 2004: 10-12). Amidst this evolutionary process and construction, the two terms - namely 'state' and 'nation' - have commonly been used as interchangeable terms in IR and which have led to confusing assumptions and conclusions. In the light of these confusing assumptions, it would perhaps be best to treat the two terms separately and demonstrate the different meanings that each possess. Related to this point, it might be mentioned at this juncture that Ernest Gellner (quoted by Withey-Vandiver 2001: 1591) contended that the 'state' was formed without the assistance of the 'nation' and the 'nation' came into existence without the state's blessing. Camilleri & Falk (1992: 27) reinforced Gellner's theory when they stated that '... states and nations have seldom evolved simultaneously... in some cases the nation, understood as national and cultural consciousness, preceded the state (e.g. in Germany), in others the reverse sequence applied (e.g. in France).'

However, when the two are coupled together, they reflect a special meaning in the international system within which the modern state operates as a significant political unit. In their combined format the term 'nation-state,' according to Kegley & Wittkopf (1997: 40), implies 'a convergence between territorial states and the psychological identification of people within them which is relatively rare, as there are few independent states comprised of a single nationality.' Nagan & Hammer (2004: 109) proposed a definition that contains four essential characteristics that traditional international law requires from a state; according to them a state is required to:

- Control a territorial base with determinable boundaries;
- Control a population connected by solidarity, loyalty, and primary notions of group affiliation and identity;
- Control internal power and competencies; and
- Appoint a controlling power to represent the state/territorially organized body

politic in the international environment (cf. Bornemann 2001: 14967; Storey 2001: 23; Sorenson 2004: 15).

When taking into account Gellner's contention, which advanced the view that the state evolved independently of the nation and the nation separately from the state, it was acknowledged that as the two evolved over time and in space they slowly became interconnected. And as result of this interconnection and close association with one another, the impression that it gave was that they were tied to one another, and as a consequence the terms were either used interchangeably or coupled together in the form of 'nation-state' (Morris 1998: 42). Even though views have been expressed that favour the de-linking of the 'state' from 'nation,' a general consensus seems to prevail that they remain coupled. Support for this may be gathered from Gelber's (1997: 1-32) first chapter of his work entitled 'The growth of the nation-state.' In this section, each of these terms – beginning with the 'state' - is separately defined and explained before coupling the two and linking them to the concept of sovereignty.

Figure 3.1



2.1 State:

There are indeed a variety of factors that gave rise to the origin of the state, which ‘has no physical existence ... but is ... a real entity’ (Cox 1992: 133). The factors that gave rise to its existence will not be regurgitated here (Storey 2001: 22-23; van Niekerk 2001: 41). The term has been derived from Latin *stare*, which meant ‘to stand,’ and *status* and one that conveyed the idea of ‘a type of condition.’ Van Niekerk explained that in its original form the concept implied a fixed position or an unaltered condition. A number of theories have emerged that try to demonstrate how the concept evolved (Storey 2001: 23-29). For Storey, a political geographer, states are special entities that are comprised of the four essential features; all of which have been alluded to by Nagan & Hammer list of characteristics recorded earlier. For Bornemann (2001: 14965) the state simply meant ‘a form of polity that links people and territory in societies, and thereby demarcates itself from other states’ or worded differently, according to van Niekerk (2001: 41), it refers to ‘a group of people inhabiting a specific territory and living under a common legal and political authority.’ The latter also added that the state may also be defined as ‘a structure that has the legal right to make rules that are binding over a given population within a given territory,’ and he made reference to Chazan et al who defined it as ‘the organised aggregate of relatively permanent institutions of governance.’

Since the state, which Sorenson (2004: 15 – his emphasis) described as a *unitary* and *coherent* actor, as an institution has undergone a mutation, different types of states have also been identified. According to van Niekerk (2001: 44-48) there were, among others, the feudal state, the absolutist state, the city state, and the contemporary state or modern state. Sorenson (2001: 74), however, concentrated mainly upon the contemporary international system and thus pinpointed to three types of states; they are the modern state, the post-colonial state and the post-modern state (also see Shaw 2000a: 213). Nagan & Hammer (2004: 131-135) provided yet another list; their one was distinct from the list provided by van Niekerk. They identified states within the international political system that were responsible for misusing and abusing the notion of sovereignty. In their detailed study, they classified states into twelve types and they are, among others, the

Failed State, the Anarchic State, the Genocidal State, the Homicidal State, the Rogue State, and the Kleptocratic State. Apart from these types, Root (2001: 14978-14983) further divided the contemporary modern state into two broad categories, namely 'strong' and 'weak' states; thereafter he discussed how the one set differed from the other.

Tivey (1981: 3), who made reference to Quentin Skinner in his introductory essay, stated that the modern idea of 'state', which was 'a form of public power separate from both the ruler and the ruled and constituting the supreme political authority within a certain defined territory,' was absent from earlier usages; this is borne out by the types of states highlighted by van Niekerk as well as those listed by Nagan & Hammer. Tivey reasoned that the central conception of the modern state is that of an 'independent political apparatus,' which is operated by an authoritative government that can change or be replaced. And the legitimacy of the modern state is based upon the notion of the consent of its own citizens to rule and on the recognition by other states (Bornemann 2001: 14968). Shaw (2000a: 185) made similar points regarding the modern state and underlined the fact that 'sovereignty has been seen by international relations as conditioned by anarchical relations between separate sovereignties.'

Be that as it may, Camilleri & Falk (1992: 24) highlighted the multifunctional nature of the modern state, which, they argued, was underestimated by Hinsley. They asserted that the modern state has played an instrumental role in the accumulation of capital and the development of the national markets in a very fundamental way. And they (ibid 24-25) specified two functions in which the modern state pivotally engaged itself; in the first case it asserted 'its primacy in the control of geographic space, thereby reinforcing the territorial conception of community' and in the second 'its territorial function was inextricably linked with its economic function.' The modern sovereign state, they maintained, developed 'an intricate system of legal rights and emerging political guarantees for the maintenance of property relations....'

For Sorenson (2001: 78) '(t)he modern state is, in ideal-typical terms, a nation-state.' Both the Republic of South Africa and the Federation of Malaysia are fairly well-

established sovereign nation-states. And as a result of their healthy status within world rankings, they have been categorised as two contemporary medium size nation-states that fulfil most – if not all - of the modern state's criteria such as good governance, stable rule of law, and the protection of private property. In both states successful elections have been held over the past few years, and both have been fully recognized and respected for the role they have been and are still playing in world affairs as 'middle powers' – a phrase that shall be discussed in the next chapter. The political leadership of both states has demonstrated their commitment to transform and modernize their respective developmental states and, at the same time, channel their efforts to change and advance the cause of the people of the weak nation-states from the South.

Coming back to the conceptualization of the 'state,' Tivey established the fact that the idea of sovereignty, which was a single authority both for making laws and with force to sustain them within a defined territory, accompanied the emergence of the modern state. Nevertheless, the term 'state' has been defined as 'a legal entity that enjoys a permanent population, a well-defined territory, and a government capable of exercising sovereignty.' Ray (1995: 168) referred to a slightly different definition forwarded by Leache & Said who stated that the state is 'a kind of political organization, or a government which exercises supreme authority over a defined territory.' When taking a glimpse at either the South African or Malaysian government, it shows that the governments of the respective states hold and exercise sole sovereign authority over their respective territories under their jurisdiction as well as over the people (i.e. the nation) under their management. However, since the international system has recognized the presence of other actors such as non-governmental organizations and transnational corporations that also wield a certain degree of authority within the system and among nations, the governments of these two states as well as all other states have been forced to acknowledge and respect the role they play and the contributions they make towards the transformation of the nation in particular and the changes in the international socio-economic and political system in general.

2.2 The Nation:

Earlier reference was made to Gellner's contention that the nation emerged without the blessings of the state. Since this was the case, one may wish to ask: how did the nation then come about? Storey (2001: 52-56) mentioned a few theories that attempted to respond to this question and Albert & Brock (2001: 43) boldly stated that 'nations were invented to strengthen the states as well as to create states.' Nonetheless, the answer is found in Gellner's *Nation and Nationalism* referred to by Withey-Vandiver (2001: 1090). She made the point that Gellner contended that 'nation are born from nationalism;' for nationalism is 'the crystallization of new units...' and a term that was so aptly described by Conor Cruise O'Brian as 'a conglomerate of emotions' (Gelber 1997: 109; Storey 2001: 52). Gellner also posited the view, according to Anderson (1983: 15) and Withey-Vandiver (2001: 1090), that nationalism, a distinctly modern phenomenon, 'is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it *invents* nations where they do not exist' [Anderson's emphasis] (cf. Orridge 1981: 41-52; Storey 2001: 55). This view was supported by Frogner (2001: 10295) who called attention to the modernists who expressed the view that 'the rise of the nation can only be understood as the product of state action, and more particularly, according to the hypothesis of Gellner, as a result of the nationalist action of its elites.'

Ray (1995: 168) quoted Walker Connor who ventured to define the nation as 'a group of people whose members believe they are ancestrally related. It is the largest group to share such a myth of common descent.' Ray (ibid 176) made a significant point regarding the evolution of the concept; he stated that the idea that the 'nation by definition refers to ethnic or racial ties is not inevitable, immutable, or logically necessary' for it had developed and evolved over time. And he continued by stating that 'the idea of nation as it came out of the American and French Revolutions was considerably more synonymous with state.' He highlighted this fact by mentioning that during the era of the mentioned revolutions the concept of nation was defined by 'the work, and the frontiers of the state' and that nation, in this sense of the word, 'stressed the equality of all citizens rather than the need to discriminate between (people) on the basis of culture or language.' Ray went

on to quote Hinsley who argued that the theorists of nationalism ‘insisted that a nation rests on cultural, ethnic, and linguistic uniformity and distinctiveness, and came to be defined only in cultural, ethnic and linguistic terms.’ The latter definition was appropriated by subsequent scholars such as Kegley & Wittkopf (1996: 40) who defined nation as ‘a collection of people who, on the basis of ethnic, linguistic, or cultural affinity, perceive themselves to be members of the same group.’

A slightly different understanding of the concept ‘nation’ was articulated by Anderson in his celebrated work *Imagined Communities*(1983). For him nationality or nation-ness as well as nationalism are cultural artefacts (Anderson 1983: 13) and the nation ‘is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.’ He advocated the notion that the nation is imagined because its members:

- will only meet small section of the entire population;
- are restricted and limited as a result of physical boundaries;
- act as a community because it provides a deep sense of comradeship; and
- wish to be sovereign because the nation was born when Enlightenment was in the process of destroying the legitimacy of the divinely ordained dynastic realm, and they dreamt of being free in a sovereign state (ibid 15-16; Shaw 2000a: 50-51; Storey 2001: 55; Withey-Vandiver 2001: 1091).

The definitions provided a fair understanding of the concept; however, they may not be easily applicable to each and every state in the international system. This may be attributed to the heterogeneous nature of some of the communities that make up these nations (eg. former USSR), and also to those communities seeking self-determination in some states (eg. the Palestinians and Kurds). Nevertheless, the definitions offer an inventory of criteria that make up a ‘nation;’ an inventory that may change. This is partially based on the observation of Morris (1998: 235) who cautioned that the concept of the nation changes with time like that of the state. This point is germane when looking at the South African and Malaysian societies respectively.

Prior to the April 1994 democratic elections the South African state was an apartheid state; a state that was illegitimate in the eyes of the vast majority of the oppressed South African population who was not given any recognition as rightful citizens. The issue of legitimacy and illegitimacy of authorities in power was brought to the fore by Halliday (1994: 82) when he posed the question of ‘how far (does) the state represent the nation?’ In the case of apartheid South Africa, the oppressed population never consented to the rule of the white, racist minority government and thus rejected it as their representative. And, in turn, the illegitimate regime enforced its own rules by excluding all of those it oppressed as part of its own invented and constructed apartheid nation and also consciously choosing not to give the oppressed masses any form of recognition except on its own terms. The racist regime engineered its own ‘imagined political community’ and thus contrived a nation that was anchored in a system of racial discrimination. The apartheid regime only considered the whites (and those whom they regarded as ‘honorary whites’ [eg. the Japanese]) as part of *the* South African nation; the rest of the population was classified as second class citizens with much fewer rights and less opportunities within the South African territory and in its economy.

The South African apartheid regime exercised what may be called ‘a racist national sovereignty’ as opposed to ‘non-racist popular sovereignty.’ And it relished its sovereign racist position because it was given external recognition and indeed legitimacy by the UN members (including those who opposed its domestic policies). It was, in fact, this juridical recognition by the international community that gave the apartheid regime the powers and the authority to exercise its internal racist sovereignty towards its oppressed masses and its external racist sovereignty towards its neighbours without immediate impunity. Measures to apply sanctions were, however, only introduced sometime after the racist state implemented its system of discrimination with the tacit approval of major states such as the USA and UK. Inayatullah (1996) argued that the recognition of sovereignty is incumbent but not a sufficient condition for realizing it because it ignored economic inequalities as well as, one may add, that of social injustice in the case of South Africa and in most of the South (cf. Biersteker & Weber 1996: 15). The situation radically changed after the first democratic elections took place in April 1994.

Since then the South African society slowly evolved and transformed into a representative democratic nation and taking on a new identity as encapsulated in its unique liberal Constitution; this transformed state was one in which everyone was given full recognition as members of the South African democratic society. The democratic government had to deconstruct its apartheid identity through the institutionalization of various structures and via a process of reconstruction particularly the legal system that it inherited from the racist regime. The purpose for this reconstruction was basically twofold: on the one hand, it had to first wrench ‘racial sovereignty’ from its the racist structures within which it was deeply embedded and then sanitize it from any form of racial contamination before passing it into the hands of the people where ‘popular sovereignty’ resided; and on the other, it had to legally accommodate the diverse ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural identities that inhabited the South African territory.

The contemporary South African nation and Malaysian nation may be described as nations that are composed of multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious communities. And in both states the respective governments faced and continue to face major difficulties in bringing about social cohesion in order to maintain and manage a strong nation. Both governments thus formed and set-up viable structures to cope with social transformation, and, more importantly, to help towards nation-building in order to avoid any form of disintegration or break-up. Malaysia has for more than five decades been juggling with the sensitive process of nation-building (Verma 2004), and the young South African democracy only started with this process a little more than a decade ago (Lodge 2002; Le Pere & van Nieuwkerk 1997). With regards to the nation-building process Cooper (2003: 73) pessimistically commented that it is ‘a long and difficult task: it is by no means certain that any of the recent attempts are going to be successful.’

Since the socio-political histories of both South Africa and Malaysia provide ample evidence of the racial conflicts and inequalities that have plagued their respective nations, their governments have worked hard to reduce the racial conflicts and, at the same time,

strove towards minimising the inequalities, which are among the very difficult tasks in nation-building. Although there might have been relative success with regards to the latter, it has been and will remain a gigantic task and challenge for the foreseeable future because of the rise in unemployment, spread of poverty and a few other socio-economic factors that have exacerbated the situation. And, in fact, the trend of globalization has also added yet another dimension to the process. That aside, the point that this section stressed was that (a) the nation remains an integral part of the territory and thus interconnected to the state, and that (b) national sovereignty is fused with state sovereignty (in South Africa and Malaysia respectively). And it is because of this interconnectedness that scholars in the social sciences have generally employed ‘nation-state’, which was aptly described by Cooper (2003: 22) as the engine of modernization, as a practical and meaningful term. It is to this conjoined term that I now wish to briefly discuss.

2.3 Nation-State

The definitions recorded above of the two terms, on the one hand, clearly demonstrate how they differed from one another and, on the other, show how closely they are connected to one another. Morris (1998: 42) alluded to the fact that ‘the word “nation” is often used more or less equivalently with “state” ...’ and he then expressed the view that whilst the two are clearly connected the relations are complex and difficult to unravel. Sorenson (2001: 78) captured the relationship between the two in the following way: ‘the contemporary understanding of what a nation is assumes a basic identity between state (as government) and nation (as people within a territory). That identity signifies a specific understanding of the relationship between state and society; the state is an expression of the nation, representing it and catering for its basic social needs: security, freedom, order, justice and welfare.’ In a subsequent publication, Sorenson (ibid 12) clarified the notion of the nation-state further. He said that ‘(a) modern state is a nation-state in the sense that the population shares the characteristics of citizenship (common rights and obligations towards the state) and nationhood (the cultural-historical ideas of an imagined community).’ ‘A nation-state,’ he continued, ‘in this sense is not necessarily based on a

homogenous ethno-national group of people. Very few modern states are nation-states in this more narrow sense.’

Tivey (1981: 69-70) explained the relationship differently; he argued that the state, which is an abstract entity and one that has been described in mechanical terms, needs to be enabled and operated. For this to happen, it was tied to the nation (i.e. the people who populate the defined territory). Gelber (1997: 3) couched his thoughts on the relationship between nation and state as follows: ‘the idea about sovereignty of the people clearly depends upon deciding who and what belongs to ‘the people’ and who does not. It is here that the idea of the nation becomes cemented to that of the modern state.’ Along similar lines, Opello & Rosow (2004: 191) stated that ‘... nationalism re-formed the state as it had appeared in Europe and transformed the world of colonial empires into the present global grid of sovereign nation-states.’

Table 3.1 (Sources: Sorenson 2001: 82-83 and 2004: 14)

● ● ● | The Modern Nation-State

GOVERNMENT	A centralised system of democratic rule, based on a set of administrative, policing & military organizations, sanctioned by a legal order, claiming a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, all within a defined territory
NATIONHOOD	A people within a territory making up a community of citizens (with political, social and economic rights) and a community of sentiments based on linguistic, cultural and historical bonds. Nationhood involves a high level of cohesion, binding a nation & state together
ECONOMY	A segregated national economy, self-sustained in the sense that it comprises the main sectors needed for its reproduction. The major part of economic activity takes place at home.

The modern nation-state had a number of functions that distinguished it from earlier forms of the state. According to Camilleri & Falk (1992: 24-31), they are, *inter alia*, (a) territorial function, (b) economic function, (c) legitimation function and (d) stabilizing function. Their analysis of the various functions generally ties in with the views

expressed by Sorenson with regards to the components of the modern nation-state. He identified three inter-connected components and these are captured in the Table 3.1 above; I will, however, not elaborate upon them since Sorenson offered a self-explanatory column that explains each of the components. In his discussion on the 'changes in statehood' Sorenson (2001: 83-91) went on to compare and explain the modern nation state's characteristics with those of the postcolonial and postmodern states respectively (cf. Cooper 2003: 50-54).

In closing the discussion on the nation-state, Tivey (1981: 70) aptly described the close connection between the two as a symbiotic relationship; he stated that 'the symbiosis of nation and state is a mind/body relationship – a ghost in a machine.' And he (ibid 3), in fact, opined that 'the rise of the nation-state is ... (intimately connected to) ... the story of the rise of sovereignty' (cf. Figure 3.2 below). Morris (1998: 40) concurred with this for he stated that the concept of the modern state developed along with the concept of sovereignty and in support for his opinion he invoked Thomas Hobbes who had identified sovereignty with the monarch in his famous *Leviathan*, and he seemed to have been oblivious that Ibn Khaldun also made similar remarks in his *Al-Muqaddima: An Introduction to History* (The Prolegomena).

Since Ibn Khaldun's name has been dropped at this point, it is quite helpful before finally rounding off my discussion and observations regarding the contestable term 'nation-state' to bring into the discussion this scholar's views. As far as Cox (1992) was concerned he identified Ibn Khaldun as one of the most significant North African theorists on 'world order' and expresses the view that this scholar made important comments on the 'body politic,' namely the state and society. At this point I wish to expand more on Ibn Khaldun's thoughts since they relate to the notions of the state and the society/nation respectively and will also be of great interest to scholars who mooted the Critical Theory tradition.

Figure 3.2



2.4 Ibn Khaldun’s conceptualization of the ‘body politic’ (i.e. The State & the Nation):

In a provocative piece by Ahmed (2002: 24), he posed a series of questions in relation to Ibn Khaldun whose ideas he also explored and applied to the contemporary period: Who is he? Another ‘terrorist’? Any links to Usama bin Laden? The questions were raised because the contemporary scholarly audience have overlooked and indeed marginalized this significant scholar’s works that were produced from within the Muslim heartlands during the medieval period. Be that as it may, who was Ibn Khaldun and what was the main thrust of his famous work *Al-Muqaddima: An Introduction to History* (The Prolegomena) that was translated by Franz Rosenthal in three volumes in the 1950s and subsequently abridged into one volume by N.J. Dawood in 1969. Since all the works that gave attention to his work sketched his biography, I will only provide a synopsis.

Ibn Khaldun of Tunis lived during a period of transition – or at a turning point in history (Issawi & Leaman 1998: 625) – and travelled extensively across North Africa and Spain. After intimate participation in social affairs and close observation of the developments, he withdrew from social life and this seclusion culminated in the completion of *Al-Muqaddima*, which was the introduction to his world history, namely *Kitab ul-‘Ibar*, in

1377. This three volume historical work sociologically captured the events that he personally witnessed and based upon these events he arrived at significant intellectual observations that have much relevance for the contemporary era; hence the variety of social scientific studies including IR scholars such as Cox (1992) and Ahmed (2002) that focused upon this significant work. Cox (1992: 147), for example, suggested that Ibn Khaldun provided ‘a point of access to the understanding of Islamic civilization’ and he enabled us ‘to examine how a differently constituted mind confronted similar problems to those we now face and what factors shaped his understanding of and response to these problems,’ and Katsiaficas (1997) demonstrated how ‘Ibn Khaldun: (should be viewed as) A Dialectical Philosopher for the New Millennium.’

The ideas that Ibn Khaldun shared and the opinions that he advocated led scholars such as Pasha (1997: 58) to aptly describe Ibn Khaldun as a ‘theoretical synthesiser whose ideas violate established boundaries of modern social science.’ The reason for describing him as such was because he was appropriated by almost everyone in the social scientific field. Tainter (qtd by Adem 2004: 577) who considered Ibn Khaldun to be the originator of ‘conflict theory’ was supported by Pasha (1997: 59) who viewed him as a theorist of transformation. According to Fakhry (1983: 324) Ibn Khaldun’s most significant contributions were his extensive remarks on and criticisms of Greco-Arab philosophy and the formulation of the first and last major philosophy of history of Islam. Fakhry (ibid 328) stressed that Ibn Khaldun’s theory of history and of civilization is acknowledged with little doubt to be ‘his major claim to a position of pre-eminence in the history of philosophical ideas in Islam.’ Even though he has not been recognised as part of the traditional mainstream Muslim philosophical circles, his systematic codification and analysis of the relevant data placed him above them all.

In his *Prolegomena* he cogently argued that the historical process be viewed as ‘cyclical patterns of history’ due to the interaction of the nomads and townspeople whose ecologies and economies were different from one another (Issawi & Leaman 1998: 625; Cox 1992: 151). Ibn Khaldun systematically set out his ideas to establish a critical study of history upon a solid foundation of geographic, political and cultural knowledge

(Fakhry 1983: 329). And Ibn Khaldun steered clear of the traditional way of listing and explaining in a chronological fashion the historical events and he went on to treat history as a science geared towards comprehending the different forms of culture (Pasha 1997: 59). In his work he blended the genetic method, which yielded an understanding of culture via different phases of development, with the analytical method, which helped to comprehend the various dimensions of culture (ibid). Ibn Khaldun thus provided the student of history with the necessary criteria to discern between true and false historical records in a demonstrative and infallible manner (Fakhry 1983: 329). And as a result of his profound insights and rich experience, he developed an exciting new discipline *'Ilmu al-'umran* (the science of civilization), which dealt with the totality of human existence and 'functions to illuminate the science of good governance' (Ahmed 2002: 29); this discipline was rooted in the Aristotelian maxim that the *homo sapiens* 'is a political animal by nature' and, for him, reason was the distinguishing mark of the *homo sapiens* (ibid; Pasha 1997: 58; Adem 2004: 575). Ibn Khaldun did, however, not only adopt the deductive method of reasoning as was observed by Pasha (1997: 59), but he also weaved this method into the inductive method when he penned the 'science of civilization.' Ibn Khaldun's adoption of both the inductive method and the deductive method set him apart from Hobbes who chose the latter only (Adem 2004: 574).

Ibn Khaldun's persuasive and lucid way of reasoning and his depth of understanding regarding the nature of the state and society induced Issawi & Leaman (1998: 624) to conclude that he stood out and was in a category of his own. They (ibid) reasoned that his attitude towards the study of social phenomena was 'suffused with a spirit which has caused several commentators to call him the founder of sociology.' A central concern for Ibn Khaldun, according to Pasha (1997: 60), was the tripartite relationship between the rise of civilization, economic prosperity and social disintegration; an issue that has also been raised by critical social scientists. And Pasha further commented that for Ibn Khaldun human society was the collective product of three basic elements, namely reason, social reproduction and social cohesion, and that '(b)oth nature and nurture must coalesce to ensure the existence and development of society.' Since he based his examination of society on the cyclical interaction between the nomadic community and

the sedentary urban dwellers, he made certain crucial observations: The nomadic culture was one of blood relations under patriarchal leadership/authority and a community who was generally satisfied with minimum of material necessities and who enjoyed relative economic equality; these nomads enjoyed a more natural mode of life and inclined to natural goodness. Compared to the latter, blood relations thinned out in the urban dwelling or sedentary society, and that this kind of society was based upon 'a division of labour' arrangement that cultivated the arts and crafts. These specialised activities culminated in and led to the creation of social wealth that was, in turn, rooted in the system of mutual co-operation. In the process of accumulating wealth via mutual co-operation the sedentary society tended to become corrupt and indulged in vice and as a consequence invited invaders who, when settled, went through the same cycle of stimulus and response (Fakhry 1983: 330-331; Issawi & Leaman 1998: 625).

Co-operation buttressed by a sense of '*asabiyyah* (tribal solidarity [Fakhry 1983: 329]/group feeling [Rosenthal 1987: 566]/ form of intersubjectivity [Cox 1992: 153]/social cohesiveness [Pasha 1997: 61-62]/ethnic nationalism [Adem 2004: 574]), which – for Cox (1992: 153) was 'the creative component in this critical phase of human development' and for Ahmed (2002: 30) was 'the core of social organization' - led to the formation of the state. 'Hence, the state is the natural outcome of co-operation, (and) not anarchy' and in order for the society to survive and subsist it must take a state form (Pasha 1997: 60). IR scholars such as Pasha (ibid) and Cox (1992: 148) agreed that the state was the focal point of Ibn Khaldun's analysis which is the form that civilized culture must take. In fact, according to Issawi & Leaman (1998: 626), Ibn Khaldun dismissed the views of political theorists such as Al-Farabi (d. 950) who espoused the notion that the rational government was based upon an ideal prophetic law (cf. Cox 1992: 153).

Ibn Khaldun was a realist and a practical oriented scholar who saw no point in employing idealistic theories that had no relation to the existential political life. Ibn Khaldun, in fact, argued that Al-Farabi and others, who concurred with his views, basically overlooked the historical realities of political power for they ignored the fact that the 'royal authority' in charge was often maintained by force or rooted in the traditional system of '*asabiyyah*

and this has resulted in the formation of a rational form of government. This implied that the laws by which the authority ruled were purely rational as opposed to the prophetic authority who governed according to divine decree (Fakhry 1983: 329).

The non-prophetic 'royal authority' depended heavily upon the system of '*asabiyyah* – the non-value free organizing principle of society - as well as on the principles of rational and religious justice in order to consolidate his(/her) political power. And since the authority also acted as God's vice-regent on earth, according to Islamic theology (Ahmed 2002: 25), he(/she – invariably a 'he') thus finds him(/her)self in a divinely favoured position. Adem (2004: 576) argued that the royal element in Ibn Khaldun's theory injected the idea of the divine right of kings which was also 'to become a popular theme during the 17th century among the post-enlightenment European philosophers who had come forward in defence of the notion of an absolute state.' Nevertheless, as soon as the (royal) authority begins to misuse his(/her) position and indulges in practices such as using the public treasury for his(/her) own gains then the good and favourable conditions gradually disappear giving way to corruption and this eventually leads to internal civil strife causing the state to decline and slide into anarchy (ibid 331; Cox 1992: 153). When this phase is reached the authority in charge is expected to abdicate in order to allow a more capable individual to take over the state's reigns otherwise the state will be in a chaotic state; a condition that is not approved at all by Islamic theology. In fact, Muslim theologians advocate the view that to avoid anarchy it is best to accept the rule of a tyrant so that a semblance of social order can be maintained.

For Ibn Khaldun, the rise of the state and its decline were not dependent upon individual human action and nor on the efforts of prominent persons in history but upon 'the collective human action in history' (Pasha 1997: 60; Cox 1992: 152; Katsiaficas 1997); a point that is indeed relevant within the critical tradition. Mention should, however, also be made of the fact that Ibn Khaldun was well aware of the role economic and climatic factors played in the lives of societies and states (Cox 1992: 152-153; Ahmed 2002: 26). In any event, the process of the decline lasts approximately three – and not four as stated by Ahmed (2002: 30) - generations of 40 years each or cumulatively: about 120 years

(Issawi & Leaman 1998: 625). Fakhry (1983: 331) described the different generations as follows:

- The first generation: it is marked by frugality of the nomadic life and the ardor of the spirit of solidarity holding them together and moving them to share in the authority of the monarch;
- The second generation: it is characterised by the weakening of that spirit, in consequence of the transition to a civilized mode of life, and the unwillingness to share in the monarchical authority; and
- The third generation: it is symbolized by the complete loss of the spirit of solidarity and with it the loss of the militant spirit which was the fortification of the state.

Table 3.2

● ● ● | Ibn Khaldun and The State's 5 Stages of Growth & Decay

Consolidation	Authority established on a solid democratic base of popular power
Tyranny	Authority resorts to the gradual monopoly of political power, Tribal bonds between authority and subjects weakened & his dependence on foreign elements intensify
Exploitation	Privileges of authority increase: levy taxes, accumulate wealth, construct buildings, compete with other authorities
Pacification	Authority and subjects endeavour to continue that traditions and institutions of ancestors
Dissolution	Authority squanders public treasury in gratification of his personal pleasures and those of his cronies

When the last signs come to the fore then, for Ibn Khaldun, the ‘death of the state is immanent’ and it is finally and timely sealed by God’s decree. And to conclude this tour of Ibn Khaldun’s thoughts on society and states, I wish to reiterate that the basis of Ibn Khaldun’s critique of philosophy, according to Issawi & Leaman (1998: 626), was his close identification with the notion of the state; and, according to his valuable insights, each and every state experienced five phases in their evolutionary path: the establishment, consolidation, prosperity, complacency and decline (Pasha 1997: 60). The

table above captures Fakhry's (1983: 331-332) list and explanations extracted from the *Prolegomena*.

The conceptualisation of the state and society by Ibn Khaldun as described and discussed above demonstrate that even though some of his ideas have been eclipsed by modern scholarship, his views are generally still valid and indeed applicable to the contemporary circumstances. It is thus not surprising to find that the social scientists referred to and quoted here have given him the necessary recognition and have been able to draw insightful comparisons. Refer in particular to Adem's 2004 published paper that made ample comparisons between Ibn Khaldun and other Western scholars such as John Locke (cf. Alatas 2006: 786-787). They found similarities and differences in Ibn Khaldun's intellectual output and their analysis led them to conclude that that he stood out in terms of his contributions for many centuries. With this fairly in depth discussion of Ibn Khaldun's views and overall treatment of the state, the nation and the nation-state, its best to recollect the stories of the two nation-states, namely South Africa and Malaysia.

3. South Africa and Malaysia: Recollecting Stories of their past

It will indeed be a well-nigh impossible task to record in detail all the events that occurred in South Africa and Malaysia respectively over four decades, and this will indeed be beyond the scope of this chapter. Since there is a definite need to sketch some of the salient features that stood out in their respective socio-political histories, an attempt will be made to provide a fair description of the respective states in a comparative manner; a descriptive process that is not a straight forward and easy task. The year 1948 has been chosen as the appropriate starting point for the descriptive and comparative study; this is a year that witnessed important developments in both countries as well as significant events in other parts of the world; one such event was the formation of the UN and the formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

3.1 Describing and Comparing the Two States circa 1948-1990:

3.1.1 The Early Years: 1940s – 1960

The year 1948 marked a significant change in the socio-political developments in South Africa as well as in Malaysia. In South Africa the Nationalist Party, a party that was fully supported by the white Afrikaners who espoused ideology of Apartheid, wrested political power from the United Party when it defeated the latter in the all white 1948 elections. The Nationalist Party enforced an authoritarian system that was far worse than the segregationist policies, which were implemented by the earlier white governments. The elections took place against the background of black mass action against the government and the formation of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) in 1944, which came under the collective leadership of individuals such as Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu.

When D.F. Malan was appointed the Union of South Africa's Prime Minister in 1948, he also held the external affairs' portfolio. In his position as the chief bureaucrat, Malan advocated his 'African Charter.' This Charter contained five aims; they were to (a) preserve it for Africans, (b) ensure that its developments were on Western (European) Christian lines, (c) protect it from Asian domination, (d) keep out the Communists, and (e) make it non-militarized zone (Olivier 1977: 128; Barber & Barratt 1990: 35-37). Through these aims Malan envisaged the construction of a relationship with the rest of the continent based on the Union's terms; this notion is partially embedded in his statement that 'We are part of Africa...and our actions in South Africa are largely influenced by what takes place in the rest of Africa.' And one of the aims that he deliberately inserted, i.e. to protect Africa from Asian domination, was probably in response to India's 1946 decision to vote against South Africa's discriminatory policies at the UN. It could however be assumed that this aim was not meant to include Asians such as the Japanese and Malaysians with whom South Africa enjoyed commercial connections at that juncture.

Whilst the struggle under the ANC and other groups against white rule in South Africa

continued relentlessly during the 1940s and beyond, the Malaysians continued to challenge the British rulers – before and soon after British rule was briefly interrupted by the Japanese invasion and occupation between December 1941 and August 1945 - who restructured the whole of Malaya into a crown colony called the Malayan Union (MU) in 1946. The United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malay party that was formed around the ethno-nationalist idea in 1946 and led by Onn ibn Ja'afar, rejected the MU project and forced the British to replace it in 1948 with the Federation of Malaya Agreement 'in which the centrality of Malayness was explicitly expressed' (Reid 2004: 17-18; Cheah 2002: 2-3; Verma 2004: 27-29); the Federation, according to Reid, was designed to be a state constructed around a core ethnic with the defining identity being *Bangsa Melayu*. This development is clear evidence that the question of identity was critical for the indigenous population of the Federation; it was an issue that was at the heart of the Federation's ethnic communities.

In the same year when the Federation came into being, there was communist-led insurrection that prompted the British to impose the Malayan State of Emergency, which remained in effect until 1960. The Federation, which was worked out together by the British officials, UMNO, and the Malay Rulers, laid the foundations for a modern administration, citizenship and the future basis for the construction of nationhood. During the process of negotiations and as the British were slowly relinquishing its colonial rule, they compelled UMNO nationalists to work out a formula of inter-racial co-operation, unity and harmony among all the racial groups (Cheah 2002: 2). And as a result of these efforts, the two non-Malay political parties, namely the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), found common grounds with UMNO; and as a coalition, they (together) won the emerging nascent state's first general elections in 1955. The coalition drafted the *First Five Year Plan (1956-1960)* in order to create the infrastructure and slowly transform the economy of the emerging nation state (Cheah 2002: 83).

When returning to the South Africa scene, the blacks were under constant discrimination, and the notion of nationhood that they yearned for remained a far-fetched and an

unreachable ideal. The blacks were further impeded by an array of repressive legislation and policies that was devised by the Apartheid government. The first two Acts that came into effect were the Group Areas Act, which rigidified the racial division of land, and the Population Registration Act, which classified all 'citizens' by race, in 1950. By the time the pass laws, which effectively restricted the movement of the oppressed communities across the country particularly the Africans and Indians, were enforced in 1952, the mass mobilized Defiance Campaign got under way to apply pressure on the Apartheid regime. Even though thousands were arrested, the increased unity that was forged among the various resistance groups during the Defiance Campaign gave rise to the Congress Alliance. And as a consequence of these developments, the Congress Alliance led by the ANC – and which became known as the Congress of the People - on the 26th of June 1955 in Kliptown (Soweto) produced, issued and signed the 'Freedom Charter' document; the Freedom Charter was based on the principles of human rights and non-racialism (cf. Lodge 1990). In reaction to this mass meeting, the apartheid authorities arrested 156 leaders during 1957 – the year when Malaya was granted its independence - and charged them with high treason; they were however acquitted in 1961.

By 1959 the apartheid government was led by Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, who succeeded Advocate J.C. Strijdom in 1958, and Robert Sobukwe, who broke away from the Congress Alliance, founded the Pan African Congress (PAC) that pursued the African philosophy of 'Africa for the Africans.' The PAC adopted a more radical approach by confronting the apartheid system. One of the first acts of the PAC that challenged the apartheid system head-on was the passive anti-pass campaign; this took place on the 21st of March 1960 in Sharpeville. The apartheid security forces reacted heavy-handedly by killing 69 unarmed protesters and wounding hundreds of others. As a result the 'State of Emergency' came into effect and this meant that the regime implemented a 'detention without trial' policy; and it also declared the ANC, PAC and other resistance organizations as illegal, and this declaration thus forced these organizations and their leaders such as Oliver Tambo into exile. Other leaders such as Nelson Mandela, who tried to evade the apartheid authorities, were eventually caught, tried, and imprisoned on Robben Island (cf. Motlhabe 1984; Lodge 1990).


During the time when the oppressed communities increased their resistance against the apartheid authorities, the Malays were granted their independence based upon the Federation of Malaya Agreement signed by the British officials, the Malay Rulers, and UMNO. On the 31st of August 1957 Malaya was born as an independent, sovereign state - with a Federation of 11 states - under its respected leader, Tunku Abdul-Rahman (hereafter Tunku); as a sovereign state it subsequently joined the ranks of a number of other states such as South Africa to become a member of the UN and the Commonwealth. As a sovereign state, it adopted a pro-Western policy, anti-communist position and a free-market economic system that welcomed foreign direct investments. Despite its new found status as a sovereign nation-state and its acceptance as a member of international organizations, the Federation was grappling with a number of pertinent issues, which were major hurdles left behind by their former colonial occupier.

One of the immediate challenges was that of nation-building; how does a nation go about re-building itself where there existed wide-spread discrimination against the Malays? And how does a nation restructure the society without marginalizing and harming the 'immigrant' communities or becoming xenophobic? What are the elements that make up a citizen? Who qualifies as a citizen? Can an immigrant's son or daughter who had been born on Federation soil take up citizenship? (cf. Verma 2004). These questions were also of concern to those who critically engaged with political scientists and others regarding those that have been marginalized and isolated within their own states. The critical scholars who discoursed about these issues expressed the desire to include rather than exclude the muzzled voices of the marginalized groups. Whilst it was understandable that the majority of the society in the Federation was discriminated against through the British divide-and-rule policy, scholars critically argued that it does not give this former marginalized community the right to discriminate, marginalize and isolate others such as the Chinese and Indians that were born and brought up within the Federation.

3.1.2 The Decade of Consolidation of the Federation & the Apartheid State: 1960 – 1970

All of these inter-related questions and issues were of major concern to the UMNO Alliance in particular and to the society of Malaya in general. Nation building in Malaya - and since 1963 Malaysia – was a difficult task because those Chinese and Indians who were born in Malaya/Malaysia had the right to be considered as lawful citizens; however, those who were not born within the geographical boundaries of the Federation after a specific date had to be repatriated back to his/her country of birth. It was however not an easy task to implement these policies; much thought had to be given as to how to implement the policies without being unduly unjust and discriminatory. Whilst Verma (2004: 34-36) suggested that there were two phases within which the nation-building project was shaped, one may divide the last phase into two and also add a third; the first was between the time of independence until the May 1969 race riots, the second was from 1970 until 1991 when *Vision 2020* was formulated, and the third was from 1991 to the present. See Figure 3.3 below:

Figure 3.3:



In the process of assessing the Malaysian scenario, one finds that similar issues of concern were dealt with when the new democracy of South Africa came into existence after historic 1994 elections; the evolving non-racial South African society, which was subsequently dubbed by Rev. Desmond Tutu as ‘The Rainbow Nation,’ was part of an important and crucial nation – building project (cf. Baines 1998; Ramutsindela 2001: 31-34; Schrire 2005: 264-274).

In the case of South Africa, throughout the apartheid era the issue of nationhood and citizenship was not a clear cut one. Both institutions were tied to the white regime’s philosophy of apartheid, which was based upon the exclusion of blacks in general and Africans in particular from being *bona fide* citizens and identifying fully with the South African nation; the regime, for example, devised special plans that would accommodate groups such as the Coloureds and the Indians within the political system. And it also later restructured the South African landscape according to the Bantu Homelands Act of 1970, by pushing the different African ethnic groups into separate and ostensibly ‘sovereign’ homelands known as Bantustans (Hoffman 1997: 14; Storey 2001: 128). The Transkei was the first ‘to accept nominal independence’ in 1976. The apartheid authorities thus not only defined nationhood and citizenship for the blacks but also firmly imposed it upon them; their policy of discrimination clearly defined ‘the citizen’ as someone who is white as opposed to someone who is black. The apartheid regime constructed social identities that suited its racial policies and that were in line with the apartheid philosophy that it espoused; in essence, the regime constructed an apartheid identity. Even though this identity was rejected by the oppressed masses - the majority of whom expressed an African value system that was rooted in the concept of *ubuntu*, they were forced to adopt and adapt to a white dominated socio-political system that was enforced upon them.

During the first half of the 20th century the Union of South Africa embarked on a nation building project, which was rooted in racism and one that laid the foundations for the white Afrikaner nationalists to further entrench and socially engineer. These nationalists were fully aware of the fact that the power that they possessed and manipulated were tacitly approved by the former European – Dutch and British - colonial powers with

whom they shared similar ideals and values. They thus espoused values that were embedded in an European philosophy that relished in holding onto and maintaining power within the hands of whites and promote political values that enhanced their status at the expense of the Africans and others in the South. It is indeed against such power relations and hegemonic structures that critical theorists were weary of and spoke out against. Even though these scholars only came onto the IR scene in the late 20th century and despite their warnings to the populations from the South/Third World against the powers exercised by the North/First World, they seemed to have been a little too late in saving the South from the hegemonic forces of the North; after all the North, which was and is still made up of a conglomerate of Western nation-states, crafted the international political system in such a way that it served and continues to serve the needs of the North at the expense of the 'developing' colonized populations.

Nonetheless, the social engineering process and construction pursued by the Afrikaner nationalists throughout the early 20th century obviously incensed the Africans who were deliberately excluded from the Union's power structures. And as a consequence of this, the Africans created a socio-political platform for themselves, namely African nationalism, to counter the white Afrikaner hegemonic structures. Since then the Africans, who were represented by the ANC (est. 1912), pursued an uphill battle for their basic freedom. The ANC leadership realised that though they were numerically strong, they were powerless politically and thus could not sway the power structures in their favour; they were basically up against their former colonial powers as well as the Union's white administrators.

By the time the Nationalist Party won the white elections in the Union during 1948, the party entrenched its powers and relentlessly pursued its divide-and-rule policy in the form of apartheid. The chief architect of this ideology was Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, who also conceptualized 'the theory of multi-nationalism.' Since the powers were in the hands of Verwoerd and his apartheid conquistadors, the ANC stood no chance in grabbing political power because it remained weak and also did not have the support of the Western nation-states from the North who still scorned the Africans and their liberation

movements. Even though the ANC was aware of its politically weak position, it still sought the assistance of the Western powers; some of whom only tried to appease the hearts of the ANC's leadership for they knew that the Union administrators and the apartheid regime worked in their political and economic interests. Since the ANC realised that they were not reaching any of their planned goals by the time the Afrikaner nationalists came to power, they changed their political strategies when they drafted the Freedom Charter in 1955 and gradually adopted a more militant and aggressive attitude towards the apartheid regime by the end of the 1950s. The ANC - (and PAC [est. 1959]) - radically changed its political position by taking up arms against the white Afrikaner nationalist government as soon as it was banned and it – and the PAC - was forced to go into exile soon after the massacres of the 21st of March 1960. As a liberation movement, the ANC (and the PAC) depended upon the UN, NAM, the Commonwealth and other bodies for moral and financial support (cf. Thomas 1995).

Both South Africa and Malaya had been members of the British Commonwealth; however, since the British had large investments in South Africa, which was under the tutelage of its white Afrikaners, they persisted in favouring and supporting the apartheid regime against the black oppressed masses that remained powerless and marginalised. Although the Malays(ian population), on the whole, were fully informed about the discrimination that was widespread in South Africa at that time, they were acutely aware of what discrimination meant since they suffered under the British rule who had curry-favoured the immigrant workers and their off-spring, namely the Chinese and Indians. In both South Africa and Malaya discrimination was the order of the day during the first half of the 20th century, but this changed in Malaya in the interest of the Malays after the Second World War when the British realized that they had to relinquish power and hand it over to the Malay nationalists. In the case of South Africa, the British had lost power, decades before the Second World War, to the Afrikaners who stubbornly expressed the notion, which was based on an erroneous Biblical interpretation, that they were the chosen community who had the legal right to take over the land that their forebears had fought for (against the British [and blacks]) and to rule over the blacks who, they considered, were an uncultured and uncivilized lot of people!

Returning to the early 1960s, South Africa strategically held an all white referendum; the positive outcome of this referendum gave the South African apartheid government under Verwoerd the right to abandon its status as a 'Union' and to form a 'Republic'. This resulted in the change of its identity and status on the 31st of May 1961; new symbols such as the flag and anthem of the apartheid republic were thus introduced and a new identity was forged under the banner of Afrikaner nationalism. By then the Republic of South Africa had to reapply for continued membership of the Commonwealth; in the end apartheid South Africa could not withstand the pressure from the international community to bring to an end to its desired apartheid policies, it automatically withdrew its application to remain a member. South Africa's status as a 'republic' within the international system did not mean much to the black oppressed masses because they were not enjoying nor benefiting from any of the socio-economic and political powers. In fact, black labour was exploited and served the interest not only of the apartheid regime but also the conglomerates such as Anglo-American; a conglomerate that had been heavily involved in the mining and other industries and one that gained much from the available cheap labour from within apartheid South Africa and the neighbouring emerging states. So, for the blacks in apartheid South Africa in particular and the region in general any form of human emancipation during these decades was a pipe-dream.

The realists - as opposed to the critical theorists - considered the republic a legitimate political player in the international system and apartheid South Africa's sovereignty to rule over the people within – and outside (i.e. South West Africans) - its borders to be respected and tolerated. This hypocritical position, which was of course the official stance of the Western nation-states, persisted for decades and it was one that critical theorists was bound to attack since realists seemed to overlook the inhumane policies that had been adopted by the apartheid republic. When Verwoerd was assassinated in 1966, Advocate John Balthazar Vorster, who was the Minister of Justice in Verwoerd's cabinet, took over the reins as Prime Minister. Vorster's iron-fisted approach further entrenched the apartheid ideology. He and his apartheid cabinet continued to devise laws and legislation that would secure the rule of the white Afrikaner nation; together they directed

South Africa's foreign policy and international relations in Africa. Apartheid's foreign policy was then characterised by Dialogue, Secret Diplomacy and Détente (Pfister 2005: 39). The 1960s in South Africa was generally described as 'a decade of overwhelming (state) repression;' for it was one in which restricted any form of internal resistance and one that forced the ANC and the PAC to take up armed struggle outside the apartheid republic's borders.

The armed struggle implied that these liberation movements were politically helpless and indeed powerless within apartheid South Africa's borders, and that the only way for them to gain political power in South Africa was to solicit international support for their just military struggle. With hindsight the ANC and PAC were, unfortunately, caught up in the political power game that was played out by the capitalist states represented by the Western powers particularly the USA and the communist states represented by the communist block especially by the USSR. Both groups targeted and supported organizations and movements in the South that would assist in expanding their spheres of influence and as a result many of these organizations were used as pawns in the world chess game between the super powers throughout the Cold War era.

The South African struggle was indeed different from the 'racial' struggle that was experienced in the Federation in the 1960s. Verma (2004: 34) argued that the struggle in the Federation during the colonial period was of an ethno-cultural nature and this has since changed to a political-cultural one in Malaysia. The Federation under Tunku Abdul Rahman was slowly changing. In 1961 – the same year when NAM was established - the Federation experienced a name change; it was renamed the Federation of Malaysia. Thereafter it sought to expand the nation; it succeeded when the peoples of Borneo and Singapore agreed to enter the Federation and this came to fruition on the 16th of September 1963 (Hill & Lian 1995: 55-59). The inclusion of these two geographical regions was significant in that it gave the Federation greater political clout and leverage in the Southeast Asian region. This was quite evident when the Federation came into conflict with its neighbour, the Indonesians, regarding territory and the issue of being pro-western in its approach to regional issues; this was known as the *Konfrontasi* period

(1963-1966) (Joseph 2005: 93). Fortunately the period did not continue for many years and it came to an end with Soekarno being replaced with Soeharto who cultivated a more open and friendly relationship with the Federation. It was during this period when Dr. Mahathir Mohamed (hereafter Mahathir) entered the political arena as member of UMNO. By 1965 Singapore seceded from the Federation; a development that was not welcomed by Tunku but something that he expected and an outcome that he had to accept (Hill & Lian 1995: 60-61; Milne & Mauzy 1999: 19).

Despite this political set back Tunku continued to work at harmonising the relationship among the nations of the region; this effort resulted in the formation of ASEAN in 1967. In the domestic arena Tunku had to handle the 'racial' problems that were gradually brewing; this came to a head on the 13th of May 1969. The race riots deeply affected all the Federation's citizens and occupied the minds of the social theorists at that time. One assumes that the 'problem solving theory' of positivists as explicated by critical scholars such as Robert Cox would not have provided the necessary solutions to the racial problems experienced by the peoples of the Federation of Malaysia. However, although the Federation was able to contain the riots, it reflected that the issue could not be wished away since the economic power remained in the hands of the minority Chinese Malaysians and that a radical solution had to be sought to emancipate the Malay Malaysians from this economic stranglehold.

Soon after the racial riots Mahathir was the first to openly criticize Tunku for being out of touch with the opinions of the Malays and for having been too weak and powerless to deal with the dominant Chinese and Indian communities, who continued to play a dominant and powerful role in the economy of the country (Milne & Mauzy 1999: 22). The issue of power, a key concept in CT, was therefore at the heart of the racial tensions that existed throughout the 1960s and it demonstrated that the Malays were not satisfied at all with the economic status quo since they were at the mercy of the Chinese Malaysians who held economic power. Thus a solution had to be sought to resolve the racial conflicts, on the one hand, and to deal with the economic concerns, on the other. Mahathir therefore vehemently argued that Tunku was not in the position to find a lasting

solution to the existing problems. And since then, Tunku, who only relinquished the Prime Minister's post by June 1971, effectively lost his political power to rule. A few months after the riots, the political power in effect shifted to his deputy, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein (hereafter Tun Razak), who became the *de facto* ruler.

3.1.3 The Decade of Facing Internal and External Challenges: 1970 - 1980

The 13th of May 1969 race riots in Malaysia forced the government to impose a National State of Emergency (until 1971) to contain and stop the violence that deeply scarred the Federation's society on the 14th of May and in a sense jolted its identity as a nation. Although the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong (King) suspended the Parliament and the Constitution the same day, a cabinet was sworn in with Tunku as the Prime Minister on the 20th of May. The actual political power was, since then, in the hands of his deputy, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein. The latter was appointed by the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong as the Director of Operations to deal with any unrest and violence (Hng 2004: 97-98). The riots were essentially about the racial imbalances that existed in the civil service and many of the other sectors. Too many non-Malays, the Malay Malaysians argued, were in the key and powerful posts, and they averred that the non-Malays dominated all sectors of the society. And in response to the slow transformation on the part of Tunku's government to address these inequalities, the Malays revolted and demanded social equality. In accordance with this and other demands the government had to act fast to set things right.

It was thus able to cobble together and implement in 1971 the National Economic Programme (NEP), a programme which had an indelible impact upon the society with the basic aim of rectifying the racial inequalities through socio-political and economic means (cf. Hart 1996; Eyre 1997: 129-134). One assumes that a programme such as this would have been approved by the critical tradition for it was a strategy that intended to emancipate the majority of disadvantage Malays. Nevertheless, the NEP was essentially a nation-building initiative that aimed at restructuring the society in favour of the Malays

(Hng 2004: 97), who had been discriminated against by the British and continued to be in a disadvantaged position throughout Tunku's reign as Prime Minister. Its introduction was a departure from the socio-economic policies of the past.

An important outcome of the NEP was the formation of a Malay business class that would drive the economic transformation. The NEP gave the Malays the chance to obtain their licenses, granted them lucrative government contracts and compelled the banks to provide them with the necessary credit. The eventual outcome of this strategy led to an affirmative action process in which Malay owned businesses slowly expanded and the Malay business group gradually increased (Crouch 1992: 29-30). The opportunities that were granted to the Malays unfortunately led to a certain degree of corruption or what has been termed 'cronyism' that negatively affected and impacted on UMNO's management of the Federation of Malay(sia). It is this type of strategy that was harmful to Malaysia's democracy and an issue that needed attention in order to stave off any open conflict among the racial groups or between the different economic classes.

It was at this crucial time in the Federation's fragile history that Mahathir, who had written a stinging letter - mentioned earlier - to Tunku Abdul Rahman, wrote *The Malay Dilemma* (Singapore: Times Books reprint 1995). The essential ideas that are contained in the NEP are said to have been extracted from the book, even though the government decided to ban the book because it was a potent text that had the potential to further instigate the racial conflict (Khoo Kay Jin 1992: 49). Since this was the case, a few questions may be raised: why did Mahathir write the text, what were its contents, and in which did it impact upon the Malay mind at that time? A brief summary of its salient aspects will be helpful in order to understand the Malay mind, and it should also not be forgotten that Mahathir was expelled from UMNO's Executive Committee and he was thus inactive in the party's political projects. In this significant work he suggested ways of how the Malays should become rehabilitated. He delved into their past to investigate the reasons for Malay backwardness; he attributed their position to hereditary traits, old-age social practices, environmental factors, colonial policies, incompetent Malay leaderships, Chinese resourcefulness and Chinese dominance in the economic arena (cf.

Yao 2004; Milne & Mauzy 1999: 162-163; Cheah 2002: 202). Mahathir offered a road map for the Malays to shift gear and work towards advancing their cause instead of remaining incompetent and unskilled; he wanted the Malays to emancipate themselves through the available power structures that have been created and constructed.

When turning to South Africa at the turn of the new decade, Vorster increased his repressive measures. Despite the stranglehold that the state had over the oppressed black communities, they were not deterred and pursued ways and means of countering the state; they for example, organized strikes and protests in tertiary institutions and at factories. It was during these trying times that the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) came onto the scene. BCM infused in the old and young blacks a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, and it implanted a black consciousness philosophy that permeated the thinking of many of the blacks throughout the 1970s. The key ideologue who inspired that generation was Steve Biko; his writings such as *I Write What I Like* contained the basic philosophy of the BCM. Biko's killing at the hands of the apartheid security forces in 1977 provided further impetus for his and that of BCM to spread and remain influential for quite a few years (cf. Motlhabane 1984).

Amidst the emergence of the BCM and its impact, the 1976 Soweto protests erupted on the 16th of June against the enforcement of the Afrikaans language in the state schools in the predominantly African townships where English and the indigenous languages were the languages in use. The state clamped down in a vicious way but this did not bring the protests to a halt; the protests spread like wild fire across the country and affected most of the schools as well as the tertiary institutions that were located in the cities and towns. The protests, it may be argued, was a form of emancipation in which they gradually gained social power and challenged the apartheid state whenever the opportunities arose. Nonetheless, 1976 marked the start of a sustained anti-Apartheid stand. And alongside these developments, the state continued, via the process of ethnographic engineering, to impose its Bantustan project by creating 'homelands' – and, in a sense, offering its peculiar meaning to 'sovereignty' - for each of the African 'tribal' communities, who made up the majority of the black population. The apartheid state's resurrection of new

identities in the form of tribal structures resulted in the creation of ‘homelands’ in rural reserves that were ‘degraded by overpopulation and soil erosion.’ The first ‘independent homeland’ that was created in 1976 was the ‘Transkei.’ This area was earmarked for the Xhosa-speaking Africans; and other tribes, who spoke different indigenous languages such as Zulu and Venda, were given their pieces of land in the years that followed. By the year 1978 Vorster decided to retire and in his place Mr. P.W. Botha, who was the Minister of Defence in Vorster’s cabinet, was voted into political power by the whites. Botha embarked on an external policy that came to be known as the ‘Total Onslaught Strategy’ policy (cf. Schrire & Silke 1997: 5; Crawford 1995; Pfister 2005: 104-105); this policy was therefore further employed to embed Botha’s political powers and the apartheid value system. The policy, which was initiated in 1978 and followed through into the 1980s, was consciously engineered by the apartheid regime to transgress the sovereignty of its neighbours. The apartheid regime, for example, overpowered the Front Line states through military incursions, and subsequently subjugated these states economically and it funded South African rebel groups such as Renamo in Mozambique that would work solely in its interest.

A different story was unfolding in the Federation in the 1970s. Mid 1971 saw the veteran politician, Tunku, vacate his seat for his deputy, Tun Razak. He had a short reign but was able to accomplish a fair amount. He was known for having had a hand in: the drafting and the implementation of the NEP, the formation of an enlarged ruling coalition of political parties – replacing the Alliance Party with Barisan Nasional (BN) in 1974, the construction of the infrastructure, and the opening up new avenues in foreign policy with an emphasis on laying the foundations for Malaysia’s support for the South (Milne & Mauzy 1999: 24-28; Cheah 2002: 123). In fact, Tun Razak was the one who took a lead in regional détente and also adopted a non-aligned stance. In the region, he proposed the neutralization of Southeast Asia, namely a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN); this proposal was accepted by all in the region including the superpowers. Tun Razak passed away on the 14th of January 1976, and the following day Tun Hussein Onn took over as Prime Minister. The latter, according all reports, had no intentions of sitting in the hot seat; it was somehow forced onto him.

Government corruption was the very first issue that Tun Hussein Onn had to tackle when he stepped into office. How he was going to handle this and other issues were going to define his premiership. Dato Haron Idriss was one of the ‘old guard’ of UMNO members who was found guilty by the court for corruption. Since Dato Haron was a fairly popular UMNO member and leader, the youth was in favour of him being considered the premier. This thus meant that Tun Onn had to face two rival groups within UMNO; those who supported and accepted his position as the premier and those who favoured Dato Idriss. Although the internal UMNO conflict was not resolved by the end of Tun Onn’s tenure in 1981, he had been able to maintain his control of the Federation as the premier. In addition to the corruption that he faced and dealt with, he had to challenge the communist insurgents, the secession of Sabah and the outbreak of riots in Kelantan. On the whole, Tun Onn’s tenure was short but the most resistant to change; according to Cheah (2002: 159-160), Tun Onn on the whole succeeded in maintaining political stability and racial harmony. At this point it may be stated that Malaysia was still very much ‘a developing state;’ a state that was still moulding its identity, pursuing its nation-building project and one that was gradually stabilizing its economy and carving out an political image in the region.

3.1.4 The Decade of Botha’s Exit and Mahathir’s Entrance: 1980 – 1990:

Botha’s Total Strategy policy might appear to have been successful but failures and blunders were inevitable; these occurred along the way. The same can be reported on the domestic front where he and his apartheid cabinet drafted a new constitution and went to establish the 1983 Tricameral Parliament that kept the Africans out and reined in the respective Coloured and Indian communities. This experiment, which was used as a ploy to further divide the oppressed communities, was totally rejected by the blacks. In response, they formed the United Democratic Front (UDF), which was umbrella body for a variety of civic organizations that were totally opposed to the apartheid system as well as other anti-apartheid structures, and it was a structure that adopted a non-collaborationist strategy to fight the system (Schrire & Silke 1997: 6-7). The UDF was

given further support with the formation the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU); these unions alongside the UDF - as well as numerous anti-apartheid lobby groups in Europe and elsewhere -strengthened and reinforced the apartheid opposition groups and applied formidable pressure on the apartheid government from all sides. These new power structures undoubtedly boosted the confidence of the blacks who felt that they were in a position in the coming years to take the political power from the apartheid regime and emancipate themselves.

Since Botha underestimated the strength of these extra-parliamentary organizations, he decided to form the State Security Council, which he of course headed, to oversee the states of emergency that was imposed and to implement 'a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy to combat the insurrectionary spirit' that was on the rise in different parts of South Africa. The legitimate insurrection, which was coordinated through mass mobilization in the urban and rural areas, was further bolstered by the sanctions and boycotts that were enforced by the UN (Lovelace 2005: 132). In fact, the anti-apartheid representations abroad were able to convince the UN and many other international bodies that apartheid was 'a crime against humanity.' This, to some extent, helped to persuade members of the international community particularly those countries that continued to have ties with South Africa to reconsider their diplomatic and economic relations with an apartheid state that acted inhumanely towards the majority of its peoples. In the meanwhile the external pressure increased and Botha began to negotiate with Mandela, whilst the latter was still incarcerated, to find solutions to the unending insurrection. This action clearly indicated that the power that the white Afrikaners possessed through sheer military might was slowly whittling away and that they had to seek other methods of dealing with the ongoing political problems. In 1989 F.W. De Klerk, who had served in Botha's cabinet, succeeded Botha as South Africa's last apartheid president and he continued with the negotiations with Mandela amidst an international 'Free Mandela' campaign. De Klerk was compelled to review the socio-political situation in which he found himself as president; for, by then, the ANC had also been regularly communicating with a variety of organizations including Afrikaner nationalists in order to seek ways of


how the apartheid system could be brought down. The strains weighed heavy upon De Klerk, who for all intents and purposes, chose an option that worked in the favour of all groups. He lifted the banning that was imposed on the liberation movements since the beginning of the 1960s and also freed Mandela from prison in February 1990.

The situation in Malaysia was unlike that of South Africa. UMNO, which was the dominant party that coalesced with others to form the BN, was affected by internal divisions. This could be attributed to the earlier two premiers' inability to effectively resolve the problems and mend the rifts. Mahathir, who had been Tun Onn's deputy, became the Prime Minister in 1981 and wished Datuk Musa Hitam, his long time friend and fellow UMNO member, to become deputy Prime Minister and deputy president of UMNO. This wish was challenged by Tengku Razaleigh in 1981 and 1984 respectively. Even though Datuk Musa won, the splits remained, and, by then, Anwar Ibrahim had joined the ranks of UMNO in 1982 (Crouch 1992: 30-32). During Mahathir's first number of years in office he demonstrated a liberal-minded and foresighted leader. Since he realized the significance of the process of modernization and the positive aspects of globalization, he embarked on an industrialisation drive to revamp the economy and this was largely inspired by what happened in countries such as Japan and Korea. And for this reason he introduced and stressed the 'Look East' policy. In general Malaysia experienced economic growth in the early 1980s; however, it went through a brief period of recession during 1985.

During this period he adopted and gradually introduced his 'Islamization' policy, which was not – and understandably so - favourably looked upon in many quarters (Hng 2004: 138-144). The policy of 'Islamization,' although clearly defined by Mahathir, was not well comprehended by Malaysia's minority communities, who had already expressed their misgivings about the NEP, and now had to contend with new policies that used religion as a tool for (apparent) discrimination. Mahathir defended his position in the basis that the majority of Malaysia's citizens were Muslims and that the policy does not intend to discriminate or marginalize the minority non-Muslim citizens. During this period, whilst defending these new policies Mahathir's leadership was seriously

challenged in 1987 by Tengku Razaleigh and Datuk Musa; the latter two tried their utmost to use the democratic machinery to bring him down. The end result was that they instead of Mahathir were defeated; and since Mahathir was triumphant, he led Malaysia into the final decade of the 20th century. Milne & Mauzy (1999: 29-30) identified three contests of power in Mahathir's first decade as premier: (a) limiting the power of the Agong and traditional rulers, (b) control of UMNO, and (c) challenging the judiciary (see Figure 3.4 below). Challenges such as these seemed to have been among the factors that caused him to change from a relatively liberalist position to a more authoritarian ruler in handling state affairs internally and externally (also cf. Verma 2004).

Figure 3.4:



As an authoritarian, he was able to keep close control over the party and policies, and he was able to restrict any form of opposition within the party; this character-trait did not go down well with critical thinkers because authoritarian rulers not only stifle open debates

but muzzle marginal and critical voices. Even though Mahathir brought about important and laudable changes within the state and ones that steadily paved the way for Malaysia to transform itself into a 'middle power,' the manner in which he dealt with opposition groups within his party such as Anwar Ibrahim's dismissal and treatment in the late 1990s led scholars to critically question the nature of his power, the intention of his actions and the impact of his rule. Mahathir's methods and actions undermined the democratic state in which the freedom of expression and action supposed to guaranteed and not taken away.

3.2 ‘South Africa’ in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy (circa 1957-1990):

In the section above an attempt was made to compare internal and external developments that occurred in South Africa and Malaysia respectively. This section intends to zoom in specifically on Malaysia’s foreign policy towards South Africa. However, South Africa’s location should be viewed within the broader parameters of Malaysia’s foreign policy that is reflected in Table 3.3 below. Johan Saravanamuttu, a specialist on Malaysian affairs, (qtd by Zakaria Hj. Ahmad 1990: 125) identified four distinct phases; his contribution has been slightly adapted, and two more have been added in the Table below:

Table 3.3:



Malaysian Foreign Policy: 1957 -1990

TIME - FRAME	PHASES
1957 - 1963	Dilemma of Independence
1964 - 1969	Confrontation, Turmoil & Change
1970 - 1975	New Directions under new order
1976 - 1980	Consolidation of Policy
1981 - 1986	Expansion of Policy
1987 - 1990	Consolidation of Expansionary Policy & PM chief architect

Malaysia’s foreign policy swung from facing certain ‘dilemmas of independence’ during Tunku’s premiership to ‘consolidating its expansionary policies’ that began to unfold towards the end of Mahathir’s first decade in office. Amidst the sweeping foreign policy changes that the Federation experienced, Malaysia like all other nation-states gave priority to the enhancement of relations with its neighbours (Badawi 1997: 287); this was

particularly so after ASEAN was created in 1967. Malaysia's harmonious relationship was always fundamental and crucial for its own survival and continued progress (Muzaffar 2001: 147). Despite the hiccups in its bilateral relations with some of its neighbours and the other ASEAN members, it tried to diffuse conflict through negotiations (Joseph 2005: 90). And it also depended upon the political leadership that helped to steer the process of negotiations ahead. Tunku and Mahathir, who had their fair share of experiences in this regard, demonstrated their leadership skills in handling the conflicts that they found themselves in; they were the main political actors and the individuals who were the decision makers and indeed the agents of change (cf. Hill 2003).

Since ASEAN was one of the primary considerations in Malaysia's foreign policy, it also reflected on issues distant from its shores. It, for example, was deeply interested with the crisis in Palestine and the situation in apartheid South Africa. Although these two particular places did not dominate Malaysia's foreign policy agenda, they featured on its agenda because of the human rights abuses that were meted out against the oppressed people in both areas by the apartheid regimes of South Africa and Israel respectively. For example, South Africa's domestic policies, which discriminated against the majority of the black people in the country, had a direct bearing on the way the apartheid government perceived and related to the respective international communities in Africa and Asia. Nevertheless, since South Africa pursued this inhumane policy Tunku and Mahathir took the lead by using Malaysia's foreign policy as an instrument – along with other nation states - to persuade and bring an end South Africa's failed apartheid experiment.

The section, which follows, undertakes an assessment and an evaluation of the extent to which the political leadership of Malaysia used South Africa as an important case to not only increase its international profile in the eyes of the developing nations but to also stem the tide of human rights abuses in that country. During Tunku and Mahathir's respective terms of office, South Africa featured prominently on their foreign affairs agenda. And it is to their important international relations stories that this thesis now turns.

3.2.1 Tunku Abdul Rahman's Narrative against Apartheid, circa 1957–1970:

As soon as Malaya gained its independence in 1957, Tunku steered his nation into the international arena and formulated responses to various developments. Malaya became a significant member in the Commonwealth; this was only after it was given permission by the highest decision making committee to become a member. In this regard, South Africa, which was one of the senior member countries of the Commonwealth, was amongst the handful of members that had the privilege of deciding which states should be granted membership. According to Mohamed Muda (1996: 429), South Africa seemed to have been hesitant in approving Malaya's application to become a member of the Commonwealth soon after it gained independence; and, according to Muda, the same attitude was adopted towards Malaya when it forwarded its application to become a member of the UN. The rationale for South Africa's ambiguous role towards Malaya was attributed to the fact that the latter proposed to extend an invitation to South Africa's Cape Malays to attend the Merdeka (Independence) Day celebration on the 31st of August 1957 in Kuala Lumpur (Adam 2004: 285).

Mr. Ismail Petersen, whose story is narrated in Chapter Five, was the one who was invited to the Independence Celebrations (cf. Haron 1996); unfortunately, due to disagreements among this small South African ethnic community and the objections expressed by the Cape Town based Muslim Progressive Society (est. 1950-1980?) the invitation extended to Mr. Petersen was reluctantly withdrawn. Individuals such as Mr. Petersen, as a matter of information, were among the very many who suffered at the hands of South Africa's discriminatory policies and who were hindered from travelling to countries such as Malaya to forge socio-religious and cultural links with their – to use Dr. Hussaynmia's phrase (1987) - 'lost cousins.' Even though Mr. Petersen was very disappointed at the outcome, it did not deter him from relentlessly pursuing his interest in creating connections with his distant and 'lost cousins.'

That story aside and returning to Tunku's story, it was observed that Tunku did not take

umbrage against South Africa's diabolical role for its hesitancy in approving Malaya's membership at the outset, he however made good use of the opportunities that came his way when he participated in the Commonwealth gatherings and other international fora; it was at these gatherings and forums that Tunku diplomatically aired his opinions against South Africa's policies.

Tunku and his Indonesian counterpart, namely President Soeharto with whom he had been at loggerheads regarding regional issues (cf. Chinyang Liow 2005: 93), were among the most vociferous voices against apartheid at the Commonwealth and UN meetings. Tunku was part of a group of international leaders who spearheaded 'a discussion on South Africa's racial policies at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in 1960' (Mohamed Muda 1996: 424). The latter argued that Tunku's opposition to apartheid was in line with the notion that the Commonwealth should be seen as a multiracial forum. And it was also in consonance with Malaya's policy which stated that: 'whenever human rights are violated ... we always make our stand firm and clear ... we never made any distinction whenever there is violation of human rights' (Malaya Parliamentary Debates 21 April 1960 col. 251). Prior to this he also used the UN fora to attack the apartheid policies and, in fact, co-sponsored a number of UN Resolutions related to these policies. Within Malaya itself, the different political parties were in full agreement with the government's stance towards South Africa.

The Manifesto of the Alliance, which represented the three ethnic political parties, clearly expressed that 'the Alliance is determined to uphold the UN Charter, which calls for respect for human rights and contains freedom for all without distinction of race. The policy of the South African government in this respect must be condemned.' The People's Progressive Party (PPP) of Malaya not only issued a strongly worded manifesto but also gave a directive as to what should be done in the light of South Africa's adamant stand; the manifesto stated that 'it is sheer hypocrisy for pronouncements to be made about the Commonwealth being a brotherhood of nations when the South African government continues to heap indignities on the coloured people of the world ... as an immediate measure we will demand that economic sanctions be declared on South Africa

and an embargo be placed on the import of all goods from South Africa.’ The 1959 declaration of the manifesto, which was made when Malaya and South Africa had ongoing trade links, should be read in conjunction with the trade figures between South Africa and Malaya; for example, in 1958 Malaya imported goods worth \$19.6 m, whilst South Africa exported \$47.2 m – an amount of more than double that of Malaya. The Malayan Trade Union Congress (MTUC) was amongst the many NGOs that came out endorsing the imposition of sanctions and boycotting South African goods. In December of 1959 the MTUC, without any hesitation, fully supported the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to boycott South African products. The *Strait Times* cautioned MTUC and others that in adopting such a stand would cause the Malaysians to suffer financially more than the South African apartheid regime. Despite the position of PPP and the firm stand of MTUC, the government of the Federation under Tunku was conscious of the consequences of such an action and thus did not immediately implement sanctions as had been mooted and supported by the swelling anti-apartheid groups. This is borne out by Dato Ismail’s, the then Minister of External Affairs, public position on the issue; he indicated that the Malaysians’ unilateral action will not affect and impact upon the South African government and that it is the UN that should lead the way.

A firmer position was taken by the Malayan government when the world witnessed the tragic Sharpeville massacre that took place on the 21st of March 1960. Nations of the world reacted unanimously in condemning the apartheid regime’s dastardly deeds and demands were made by representatives from the continents of Africa and Asia to take a more decisive action against South Africa. The stand adopted by most of the nations resulted in a more concerted effort from amongst those who co-sponsored the UN Resolutions against Apartheid. Tunku thus dispatched a letter on the 25th of March 1961 to then British Prime Minister; the latter tried to persuade Tunku not to raise the issue at the Commonwealth May 1961 meeting and, in support, of his argument, invoked the non-interference doctrine. Since Tunku could not get joy from the Britain’s lukewarm and nonchalant response, he, at least, received overwhelming support from all the political parties in the Federation particularly from the Alliance. The Alliance showed their full support by giving him a mandate to raise it at the Commonwealth meeting. Tunku, armed

with the unanimously passed and mildly worded Dewan Rakyat resolution, left to attend the meeting on the 3rd of May 1961 (Mohamad Muda 1996: 426).

At the Commonwealth meeting Tunku was given the honour of addressing the heads of state and to the dismay of Harold Wilson, who was one of the leading members of the British parliament and who had strongly suggested that a different position be adopted, unexpectedly raised the situation in South Africa. In response, an informal meeting was arranged between Mr. Louw, South Africa's Minister of External Affairs, and a few Commonwealth Prime Ministers in order to trash out the issues that had been brought out at the meeting. Even though the hastily organized informal meeting was held nothing came out of it and it was concluded that the British government under Harold Wilson's influence was able to suppress the issue. Tunku was indeed upset with this immoral stand by the British and some of his colleagues in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting. And in reaction to their intransigent stand and indifference to what was happening in South Africa, Tunku publicized his stand in defiance of the outcome of the informal meeting. What this political narrative demonstrated was that the British in particular were not at all concerned with the welfare of the oppressed communities in apartheid South Africa and that they were more interested in not jeopardising their commercial interests. Although the British's hypocrisy was quite conspicuous, the representatives from the South did not have the political clout and nor the will within the international system to force the Western nation-states to observe and support human rights in troubled nation-states.

Even though Tunku's public stance did not mean that he would stand in the way of the UN if it decided not to expel South Africa, he nevertheless felt that it was his moral duty to take a firm stand against South Africa's immoral laws and also demonstrate to his colleagues in the Commonwealth that they should not ignore the plight of apartheid South Africa's masses who were discriminated against by the minority white apartheid regime. Tunku further incensed the apartheid regime when he invited South Africa's small 'Cape Malay' community to migrate to Malaya and take up citizenship, if and when they desire to do so (cf. *Muslim News* December 1960). The gesture shown by

Tunku was indeed noble, but little did he realize that most of the ‘Cape Malays’ had no interest in taking up the invitation. The reasons for this are based on three facts: the first is that the ‘Cape Malays’ were a heterogeneous group who traced their origins to *inter alia* the eastern part of India and the Indonesian archipelago (cf. Bradlow & Cairns 1978), and as a result of their genealogical roots did not seriously consider Malaya as their ‘motherland;’ the second is that most of the families, who belonged to this community, adapted to the socio-political circumstances even though they – along with their fellow oppressed - abhorred and rejected the way they were treated by the white minority regime; and the third is that they saw themselves first and foremost as ‘citizens’ of South Africa - even though the government of the day treated them as second class citizens – and were therefore not prepared to exchange their citizenship for another even if it was freely offered. Since this was the case, the invitation was taken up by a few ‘Cape Malay’ families whose fascinating story will be told in Chapter Five.

Pressure slowly mounted against South Africa’s policies after the March 1960 Sharpeville massacre. Tunku persisted in applying sustained pressure without forcing the international bodies to expel South Africa. South Africa was pushed into a corner and, as expected, rebutted by highlighting the fact that many Commonwealth countries practiced discrimination too. The South African government made direct reference to Malaya, which implemented discriminatory policies against its fellow citizens, i.e. the non-Malays; this below-the-belt posture was however not enough to secure its membership in the Commonwealth and the UN. In the end, the apartheid regime under Verwoerd decided to voluntarily withdraw on from the Commonwealth; however, it was automatically expelled from the UN agencies. Despite its expulsion from the UN structures, it still kept diplomatic and trading ties with nation-states that derived valuable economic benefits. Unsurprisingly, Britain and France, the former colonial powers, along with Japan were among those who did not sever diplomatic ties and thus continued to enjoy the diplomatic and commercial connections with the apartheid state. This once again reinforced the view that the international system as it was constructed by the North worked in its interest and not in the interest of the Afro-Asian block that formed an integral part of the South/Third World.

Most of those in the Afro-Asian bloc took a bold stand by cutting off diplomatic links and trade ties (cf. Haron 1997: 6-7); Malaya was among this group. Sharma (1969: 273) was critical of Western powers that had to be persuaded to support the Afro-Asian bloc's quest for South Africa's expulsion. He applauded those countries (of which Malaya was an active member) that were involved in the drafting of the resolution against South Africa; this was with special reference to the Five-Power Asian states' (Ceylon, Malaya, India, Indonesia and Afghanistan) draft resolution (ibid 279-281). Sharma was critical of those in the Afro-Asian bloc who abstained from supporting the resolution. Nevertheless, Malaya imposed a complete boycott of South African products and severed all ties. The decision was, of course, in line with the UN General Assembly's Resolution 1761(XVII) of the 6th of November 1962. Malaya also participated and co-sponsored another resolution that demanded total economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa, and it fully endorsed the UN General Assembly Resolution 1978(XVII) of 1963 that sought to find ways and means of providing relief and assistance to all persecuted South Africans.

The Federation of Malaya, which was re-named the Federation of Malaysia after Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak joined the Federation in 1963 - the same year when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed, demonstrated its sincere and firm stand by making a small contribution in this direction in contributing \$5,000.00 towards bringing about substantial changes in South Africa. But despite the commitment shown by the Federation of Malaysia and members of the Afro-Asian bloc, apartheid South Africa steadily powered ahead into the 1960s with its inhumane and dreadful policies. Malaysia and many Afro-Asian states observed the Gleneagles Agreement, which discouraged any sporting ties with South Africa, as well as all other forms of sanctions. There were, regrettably, Afro-Asian states such as Japan, Taiwan, and Malawi that broke the sanctions and deliberately ignored the plight of the oppressed. Fortunately, none of the founding members of ASEAN, a regional organization founded in 1967, was part of the sanction busters group of states; states that financially benefited from and which were given preferential treatment by the South African apartheid government.

Tunku was indeed the prime force behind the Federation's successful regionalism such as the formation of ASEAN and international role such as his stand against apartheid. It was however unfortunate that he seemed to have lost sight at what was taking shape on the home front where 'racial' confrontations were brewing and resulted in the 13th of May 1969 race riots. Even though this event cost him his premiership of the Federation, he only relinquished it by mid 1971. Tunku handed over the reins to Tun Razak, his deputy who became well known for introducing the affirmative action project under the NEP (Hng 2004: 97). Whilst Tunku's immediate successors – Tun Razak (from 23rd of September 1970 until his death on 16th of January 1976) and Tun Hussein Onn (from the 15th of January 1976 until January 1981) - did not divert from Malaysia's anti-Apartheid policy, they did not give much attention as to what was happening in the Republic of South Africa because they were forced to deal with a number of internal issues and regional developments. One specific example that showed the Malaysians were somewhat affected by the internal developments was when a special committee in the UN ratified certain policies against South Africa after the 1976 uprisings in Soweto.

When Mahathir came to power in 1981, he made his mark from the very outset as a statesman that had to be reckoned with internally and externally; on the internal front he was concerned with the question of Malay identity and the process of Malaysia's modernization, and on the external front he stressed Malaysia's Islamic identity and demonstrated his unstinting support for the communities from the South/Third World (cf. Hng 2004: 135-141). In the light of his dynamic, charismatic leadership and his support for the communities of the South, he threw all his weight behind the liberation movement(s) in South Africa from the moment he stepped into office. The first few years of the 1980s, he was involved with his deputy in directing foreign policy, and towards the end of the decade he took over that responsibility and thus became the chief foreign policy architect (Nair 1997: 87) In the section hereafter an attempt will be made to record Mahathir's fascinating story and important contribution.

3.2.2 Dr. Mahathir Mohamad's Story: Showing support for the ANC, circa 1981-1990:

Dr. Mahathir Mohamad's leadership style differed from that of his predecessors in many ways. This could be attributed to his charismatic character and the way he demonstrated his leadership qualities. For a more insightful understanding of his style of leadership, the works of Adam, Khoo and Rajendran as well as others may be consulted. Mahathir had by then become Malaysia's fourth Prime Minister, and 'his accession to power ... has meant that the locus of foreign policy decision-making has effectively shifted from Wisma Putra to the Prime Minister's office' (Zakaria Hj Ahmad 1990: 127). In this powerful position and being pragmatic, innovative decision-maker, Mahathir literally moved the foreign policy project from its traditional moorings to a pro-active one, which engaged its partners; it was a foreign policy that marketed Malaysia as a destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) and where healthy trading could freely take place, and one which brought into sharp focus South-South linkages. Mahathir, in effect, progressively worked towards developing Malaysia into a 'middle power.' Among the list of issues that cluttered Mahathir's busy agenda was the anti-Apartheid cause; he followed through this cause with great passion because he saw that the communities of the South were hamstrung by obstinate governments such as the apartheid regime in South Africa that were given all the financial and moral support by the nation-states of the North.

He was thus an ardent supporter of sanctions against South Africa, and he was in the vanguard actively carving out a vibrant foreign policy for Malaysia and leading the way on behalf of the Southeast Asians. Mahathir led Malaysia from the front and by example and as a consequence his international profile as a campaigner for human emancipation from the hegemonic forces of the North steadily increased. When Mahathir became Prime Minister of Malaysia in 1981, he adopted a hard stance towards South Africa and those who tacitly supported its inhumane domestic discriminatory policies (cf. Mohamed Muda 1996; Hamidin 1995). One of the clear signs of his commitment was when he

consciously decided as Malaysia's Prime Minister to absent himself from the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Melbourne and New Delhi respectively; the former was held in 1981 and the latter in 1983. He accused the rich members of the Commonwealth of dragging their feet when it came to taking action and applying sanctions against South Africa and its apartheid policies. This stand, in addition to others, tangibly reflected that Mahathir was committed to South affairs and South Africa was thus an important state to target since it violated and transgressed many international laws and defied UN sanctions. Whilst it assisted in building his international profile, it did not endear him to the major international players, namely the USA, UK and other Western states that continued to maintain trade ties with the pariah state.

When Mahathir attended CHOGM, which took place in Nassau during 1985, he took the opportunity of lambasting the policies in South Africa and blamed the First World states for their lack of support and decision making in South Africa. At the meeting, Mahathir pleaded for tougher economic sanctions and reiterated his stand at CHOGM that took place in Vancouver and Kuala Lumpur in 1987 and 1989 respectively. Apartheid was placed high on CHOGM's agenda at Mahathir's insistence. This was intensified as Mahathir's respect steadily grew within the Commonwealth camps, particularly those in the Afro-Asian bloc. Mahathir was appointed with eight others to be part of a specially selected Commonwealth Committee that would attend to South African affairs (cf. Landsberg 2004: 82). It was this position that granted him the unique chance in May 1990 to have a face-to-face meeting with Nelson Mandela at Abuja, Nigeria, soon after Mandela's release in February. Mandela requested that the sanctions be kept in place until sufficient evidence emerged that the De Klerk regime had made substantial progress in their negotiations. Mahathir concurred with this view and only reacted and moved when Mandela gave the green light to have the sanctions lifted.

Returning to the CHOGM that was hosted by Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur in 1989, Mahathir took advantage of being on home turf, and being the host nation it drafted a strongly worded statement against South Africa. By then Mahathir had convinced many Commonwealth members of the need to take decisive action and oversee its

implementation. As heads of states, they agreed ‘that the only justification for sanctions against South Africa was the pressure they created for fundamental political change. Their purpose was not punitive but to abolish apartheid (and) by bringing Pretoria to the negotiating table and keeping it there until that change was irreversibly secured’ (Abdullah 1995: 71). Malaysia was sensitive to the acts of violence that intended to destabilize the democratic forces in and outside South Africa. The heads voiced their opinions condemning South Africa’s regime in appropriating public funds for clandestine activities undertaken by ‘third forces’ in order to neutralize the democratic forces represented by the UDF and its external allies, the ANC. Malaysia provided assistance in the form of IDAF; this aid package offered legal assistance to South African political prisoners, their families and dependents (ibid 92). This gesture by Malaysia was further evidence of its concern with what was happening in South Africa; it thus endeared the ANC towards the Malaysian authorities in general and Mahathir in particular.

Way back in 1979 Malaysia introduced the Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) to provide the necessary assistance to countries in the South. It thus used TCP to channel funds through to give technical assistance to the ANC. And since Malaysia had become an active of NAM member, Malaysia pledged \$2 m to the Africa Fund; a fund that was established by Malaysia and other stakeholders. The monies that it pledged was allocated for training assistance in management, administration, communication, health care, transport, land and agricultural development (*Foreign Affairs Malaysia* 1990: 23[2]: 50). The aid was basically intended for the liberation movements and the Frontline States. The Africa Fund Committee (AFC) adopted a programme of action at its January 1987 meeting that was held in New Delhi; Malaysia fully endorsed the programme and remained committed to it because this was in harmony with the mandate expressed at the 8th NAM meeting in Harare. Malaysia for the first time participated in the 6th AFC meeting that took place on the 17th May 1990.

To summarise, at many of the fora such as the UN General Assembly, the Commonwealth gatherings, and NAM meetings, which Mahathir addressed and participated in, he pleaded for a tougher action against the South African regime. For

example, at the September 1989 meeting of NAM, Malaysia formed part of a 10 country anti-apartheid committee to place apartheid on the UN Security Council's agenda (Landsberg 2004: 83). He always adopted a critical attitude and was among the few leaders from among the long list of developing countries which were consistent in their criticisms against South Africa's racial policies (ibid 22, 41 & 82); the rationale for his hard and firm stance was that he was fully conscious of the plight of South Africa's oppressed people, and he was also aware of the fickle-minded position that was displayed by western powers such as Germany, UK and the USA that foul-mouthed the apartheid regime at open fora but continued to enjoy trade relations with South Africa without them being duly censured (cf. Danaher 1989; Freeman 1989). Malaysia's position vis-à-vis the apartheid regime was crystal clear, and it was its steadfast, unwavering stand that led to the formation of a sound relationship between Malaysia and post-apartheid democratic South Africa from the mid 1990s.

4. Closing Remarks

The chapter, which gave attention to the relations between the Federation of Malay(si)a and the Union/Republic of South Africa from 1948 until 1990, was constructed within the framework of conceptualizing and explaining the twin concepts captured in the conjoined term 'nation-state.' The nation-state has been an instrumental player in the world system and one that was exploited by the South African apartheid regime since the Nationalist Party came into power in 1948, and one that has been used by the Federation of Malay(si)a to demonstrate its independence and equality in the eyes of international community. The chapter, however, not only depended upon European scholars' conception of these two terms but also took in to account the views of Ibn Khaldun, the north African scholar who made an indelible intellectual contribution, on the subject.

After having charted out a conceptual framework, the chapter first provided a descriptive and comparative overview between South Africa and Malaysia. Thereafter it offered an analysis of the position of 'South Africa' within Malaysia's foreign policy between 1957 - when the Federation gained independence - and 1990 - when internal changes in South

Africa became concretely visible. This comparative historical narrative demonstrated how these two sovereign nation-states shifted positions from being trade partners and members of the Commonwealth in the late 1950s to being adversaries from the beginning of the 1960s until the end of the 1980s. The adversarial position was adopted by Malaysia because of the South African regime's obstinacy in defending, justifying and maintaining its internal apartheid policies, which was only subsequently described by the UN as 'a crime against humanity' act that the regime devised and forcefully implemented. This chapter thus acts as an important backdrop to a more detailed discussion in the next chapter regarding the socio-political and economic relations that have been forged and developed from 1990 onwards.

CHAPTER FOUR

South Africa and Malaysia: Narrating Their ‘Upstairs’ Ties in the Post-Apartheid Period (circa 1990-2005)

1. Introduction

The description and comparison between the two sovereign nation-states in Chapter Three demonstrated that even though both have had unique experiences, there have been (few) commonalities and (more) differences in the way the respective governments responded to the socio-political developments that took place over the four decades. The Malaysian government, which was initially voted in through the Alliance, showed that it had to adapt itself to new situations in the years that followed. Like all other major parties, it was bogged down in internal strife and conflict that split the party into two camps. But amidst this difficult exercise of settling internal disputes, it also had to handle the affairs of the society particularly that of nation-building with extra-care. It tried its best to avoid at all costs the events of May 1969 and thus charted out a unique path in the 1970s and beyond by introducing policies that assisted in transforming the Malays and at the same time, to some extent, satisfy the non-Malay communities. The Malaysian government, which has been sensitive to the racial tensions that existed, has thus generally been successful in monitoring and containing any possible racial conflict through its BN structures. Since Malaysia acted sensitively towards its domestic issues, it acted in a similar fashion on the international front. This was clearly demonstrated in the stories of Tunku and Mahathir; the latter was vehemently opposed to all forms of inhumane treatment of the blacks in South Africa and therefore used much his energies to direct himself and his government against apartheid. For critical theorists any form of opposition and protest against discrimination is crucial in order to bring about meaningful transformation. Thus when Mahathir lambasted the developed states that perpetuated and

tacitly supported the discrimination policies in South Africa through their policies of liberalisation and modernisation, his ideas reflected the view taken by critical theorists.

Whilst Malaysia was accused of discrimination and also of human rights abuses at some points in its social history and may be guilty of some of these acts (Eldridge 2002: 90-111; Verma 2002: 167-206), it did not practice a divide-and-rule policy nor did it discriminate against the non-Malay communities as had occurred in South Africa; however, some dissenters openly expressed the opinion that the Malaysian state continued to display features of an 'apartheid' state (cf. Anon 2002). Nevertheless, the divide-and-rule and discrimination were the core character traits of the apartheid regime, and its white community enjoyed all the benefits at the expense of the majority oppressed blacks. Since the white South African government's ideas and practices were grounded in an apartheid philosophy and a distorted Christian world-view, its foreign policy and international relations activities were moulded around them. These policies grounded to an abrupt halt when the apartheid government, via external and internal pressure - and not out of goodwill as some might wish to argue - did a right-about-turn in lifting the ban on the South African liberation movements and freeing Mandela. This move also implied that it had to make a radical change in its foreign policy towards its neighbours in SADC – prior to 1993 it was still referred to as SADCC - in particular and the international communities at large.

The previous chapter thus acted as an important canvas for the discussion and analyses that will be undertaken in the present chapter. This chapter devotes itself solely to the socio-political and economic relationship that has evolved and developed between South Africa since 1990 until 2005. It may be argued that the current phase in the relationship between these two states would not have reached a level of a fairly 'close partnership' if the earlier developments in their social history did not take place; of course, this is a highly debatable issue but in the light of the factors that have thus far shaped the events and outcomes, the argument cannot be otherwise. Their relationship should also be viewed against the backdrop of the ongoing twin processes of globalization and regionalization. These processes have impacted upon the nature of South Africa and

Malaysia's bilateral and their multilateral relations in their respective regions.

These processes, particularly that of globalization, have given rise to an uneven development of world affairs and the creation four distinct worlds, namely the First World, Second World, Third World, and Fourth World, towards the end of the 20th century (Toye 1993: 21-31; Cardoso 1993: 156; Castells 1993: 21-22 & 35-39). The approximately 180 states that exist across this globe have been slotted into their specific categories by the North/First World's social scientists that have been schooled and entrenched in their Eurocentric philosophies. They and their categories represent 'the victory of a 'new rationality' of the technological revolution wedded to decentralized forms of management and decision-making' (Cardoso 1993: 155).

It is indeed these divisions and categorizations that critical theorists have rejected; they, as already observed, argued against any form of discrimination and thus proposed the human emancipatory project that would allow for radical changes to do away with all forms of injustice and bring about relative equality, and a project that would help towards the process of emancipation and eventual freedom for the South/Third World and perhaps lifting it out of its South/Third World status. However, for the South states to gain their distance from dependence and relative independence, they will have to implement a deliberative democracy in which civil society should be able to exercise its rights and air its views against and in the favour of the state via the public sphere. Habermas' claim, according to Eckersley (2004: 178), that the political will-formation should be bounded to the national community is problematic because he overemphasised the boundaries of the nation-states; and because of holding onto this view, he, in effect, underestimated the vibrant public sphere and the democratic opinion of civil society that can move beyond 'the territorially bounded national community of citizens' and be transnationalized through multilateral cooperative projects and arrangements. And by transnational Eckersley (2004: 197) meant 'both including the nation and going beyond the nation' and it at no stage meant the nation's displacement.

She made the point that though Habermas argued along these lines he was not fixated by

the idea of the nation-state and that he advocated that ‘the connection between citizens in modern multicultural polities should no longer be based on ethnicity but rather ‘constitutional patriotism’ or a shared commitment to democratic procedures that enable *abstract, legally mediated* social integration’ (ibid 177 & her emphasis). And she (ibid 178) added that Habermas’ constitutional state is of the virtuous kind in that ‘it can open itself internally to a range of different cultural and social identities by welcoming all citizens to participate equally in the civic nation.’ If this is so, I would like to ask whether the present South African state, or for that matter the Federation of Malaysia, is a state that has welcomed all its citizens to participate equally in the civic nation. Compared to the apartheid era, the response in the new democracy has been positive. Whilst this is laudable, the questions that critical theorists would, however, wish to pose are: Do South Africa and Malaysia’s citizens demonstrate ‘constitutional patriotism’? If not, does racism/ethnicity still wield a great deal of influence at the expense of being patriotic? What about the status South Africa’s African refugees and what about Malaysia’s illegal Southeast Asian workers? Are they not permitted to participate in the activities of the civic nation on an equal basis? If not, then why not? Even though these problematic questions will have to be left unanswered for now, they will have to be responded to sometime in the near future.

Coming back to South Africa and Malaysia, it was noted that both states, despite their vibrant democracies and relatively healthy socio-economic systems, have generally been classified by the First World members as Third World developing states. In the light of the socio-political and economic changes in both states, they have become locked into the new world of management and decision-making since the 1990s; and as a result of their respective internal transformations and international contributions, they have been placed in yet another devised set of categories by international relations theorists. This time they have been identified as emerging ‘middle powers’; a status that distinguishes them from the ‘super powers’ and ‘small powers’ (see Table 4.1 below). The middle powers, however, are a set of states that have moved beyond the ‘Third World’ status on the continuum but have not as yet, according to these theorists and the gatekeepers of the First World club, graduated from the ‘Third World’ stage and nor have they reached the

‘First World’ stage. Who decides who fits into this new category? But more importantly what does ‘middle power’ exactly mean? These questions I intend to respond to by defining and unpacking the concept, and it will however be conceptualized alongside the notion of ‘partnership.’

2. Middle Powers and Partnership - Unpacking two conceptual tools:

South Africa and Malaysia reconnected to pursue diplomatic links and trade ties after an absence of approximately 30 years. This reconnection meant a great deal to the Malaysian government under Mahathir and the ANC under Nelson Mandela because when the Federation of Malaya government under Tunku in the early 1960s took the decision to sever trade ties with apartheid South Africa, it negatively affected the Federation’s economy, and indirectly impacted upon the society that experienced job losses and other negative social developments. These types of decisions softened the leadership of the liberation movements such as the ANC towards governments such as that of the Federation of Malaya (then) /Federation of Malaysia (now). In addition, these movements also showed much respect to the feisty Malaysian political leadership that persisted in adopting an anti-Apartheid stand amidst all the odds stacked against it.

Based upon these commitments for social change in the South, South Africa’s new political leadership under Nelson Mandela, who reflected similar sentiments, was bound to pursue strong bilateral relations with nation-states such as Malaysia; and it did so with a burning desire to bring about a ‘close partnership’ that would not only benefit both states but also the regions that they represent. Before telling the tale of the evolution of this ‘close partnership’ and also addressing their status as ‘middle powers’ in the contemporary socio-political scene, it will be necessary to first unpack the respective concepts that underpin their relationship and place them in a different socio-political category in the world order.

2.1 Middle Powers

A fair amount of discussion has taken place in scholarly circles regarding how and which countries should be classified as 'middle powers.' According some of these scholars, South Africa and Malaysia seem to fit the list of criteria that have been identified as the main ingredients that make up a 'middle power.' Let us first address the concept and then identify the ingredients before assessing whether the two mentioned states fit the bill.

In Cooper's (1997: 1) introductory essay of his edited work he argued that whilst the primary powers still have an important role in this rapidly changing world, there are secondary powers that have and are performing significant socio-political functions in the world order, without wanting to eclipse the position of the primary powers, in different ways than the manner it had been done in the past. These secondary powers have been grouped under the category of 'middle powers;' the term Cooper (ibid) suggests is problematic 'both in terms of conceptual clarity and operational coherence....' The middle powers are a group of states such as Canada, Sweden, Australia, and The Netherlands, according to Cooper (1997: 3 qtd Gareth Evans), that have pooled their resources and ploughed them into areas that have been and are able to generate returns worth having instead of trying to cover all areas. Various sets of measurable criteria - or behavioural tests (Cox 1996: 252) - are used to rank these groups of states; and based upon these they are distinguished from others, namely the super powers and small powers, because of their different capabilities (ibid 244, 252). Hamill & Lee (2001: 34) revealed that each country's position is determined by aggregating various critical indicators of economic, military and strategic factors. They further argued that whilst it has been easy to differentiate the middle powers from the super powers using the mentioned criteria, it has not been that simple to do so when wanting to tell them apart from small powers; a category that, I assume, critical theorists will not easily accept nor entertain since it further entrench the North-South divide along different lines.

Defining 'middle powers' has not been an easy task as is shown by Schoeman's (2000) study; he identified three aspects that help earmark a 'middle power' state. The first is the

position that middle powers hold are in relation to the great/major powers, and that their position points to a specific location within the broad state system based on the notion that there is a hierarchy of states. The second is that their size and rank, which were determined by the international system, placed them in an international division of labour and also offered them the opportunity to exercise their influence in the international system. And the third – here he makes reference to Robert Cox - is that the middle powers are closely connected to the international organization as a process (Cox 1996: 243); in other words the middle power state supports the process of international organization because of its interest in maintaining a stable political system and orderly environment via legislating international law (ibid). The middle power is, in effect, actively involved in international activities to secure peace, promote security, ensure global responsibility, resolve conflicts, bring an end to human rights abuses, and establish democracy. In Cox's (1996: 244) informed opinion '... a commitment to orderliness and security in inter-state relations and to facilitating of orderly change in the world system are the critical elements for fulfilment of the middle power role.'

Schoeman (2000) distinguished between middle powers and emerging middle powers. These groups of states, namely Brazil and India, are in their own ways dominant regional powers, and also play different roles in the international system. They basically carry out the task of peace-maker in the region or try and broker peace in other parts of the world where the super powers have failed; for example, South Africa was requested to intervene and act as peace broker in Haiti, Kosovo, Palestine, East Timor, Burundi, and Sudan. The emerging middle powers' functions differ slightly from the first wave of 'middle powers' that were generally subordinate to the super powers.

Hamill & Lee (2001: 35) made reference to Cooper, Higgott & Nossal's *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* (Vancouver 1993) who made use of behavioural criteria, which posits the view that 'to be included in the category of middle powers, countries have to act as middle powers.' The common strand that connects these three forms is the diplomatic skill, which has been employed by them, in the service of foreign policy initiatives, building coalitions, establish formal

institutions, and work towards international peace and stability; the three forms that have been singled out were (a) catalysts, (b) facilitators, and (c) managers.

When taking into account the mentioned forms in conjunction with the aspects listed prior to that then it is not difficult to classify South Africa and Malaysia as middle powers. With respect to the former, Hamill & Lee (2001: 37) argued that it is an intermediary developed country, which has enough economic capabilities as well as the necessary military means to be ranked as a middle power state. Van der Westhuizen (1998: 436) had earlier posited the view that South Africa was an economic power house compared to its neighbours and thus automatically found itself in the middle power category. The studies of Hamill & Lee and Van der Westhuizen were further supported by the views of other scholars such as Taylor (2001), Barber (2004) and Spence (2004).

Table 4.1:



Power Structures in International State System

Type	Selected Countries
Super Powers	USA
Middle Powers	Sweden, Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Brazil, South Africa, Malaysia
Small Powers	Nicaragua, Honduras, Ecuador, Cambodia, Vietnam, Cameroon, Liberia, Senegal, Swaziland

Nossal & Stubbs (1997: 147), however, raised the critical question: ‘Mahathir’s Malaysia: An Emerging Middle Power?’ In response they demonstrated that Malaysia, which had a steady but sustained growth rate since the 1980s, did not – at the time of their evaluation - achieve this status even though Malaysia - under Mahathir’s strong leadership such as championing the cause of the South and speaking out against the West – gained a high international profile in the view of the international community. When one takes into account the forms that Hamill & Lee mentioned then there is little doubt that Malaysia qualifies. A few examples will suffice to prove that it qualified to be ranked as a middle power state: (a) Malaysia has been intimately involved in building formal regional institutions such as ASEAN, (b) it initiated the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), and (c) it has been instrumental participating with other countries in peace-keeping efforts in parts of Africa and elsewhere.

In any case, both South Africa and Malaysia have proven to possess the necessary qualifications, resources and capacity in being ranked as middle powers. Both countries have been guided by strong leaders and have proven their ability to steer their states into the international arena and face the diverse challenges. They might have been at variance with other middle powers such as Norway or Sweden when it came to applying their diplomatic skills, but this should however not in any way disqualify them from being placed in this category. A fair amount of evidence exists that suggests both states have succeeded well in pursuing diplomatic and bilateral relations with states in different parts of the world. This they have been able to do through the formation of partnerships; a process that has become widespread in the international political system where governments have been striving to stimulate economic growth and bring about, to a certain extent, social equality and, to some degree, national autonomy – if that is ever possible – in the contemporary circumstances. ‘Partnerships’ have also been stressed by regional structures such as the African Union (AU) and ASEAN in their bid to promote trade and commerce with other regional partners.

2.2 Partnership

The Asian-African Summit, which was held in Jakarta on the 22nd and 23rd of April 2005 and which was jointly sponsored by South Africa and Indonesia, formulated a strategic partnership between Asia and Africa in order to promote cooperation in the fields of economy, investment, technology and human resources development. The crucial word used at this summit as well as other gatherings prior to this summit was ‘partnership’; what does the word mean and what are the implications when it is employed within these circles? The concept has been used as a way of advancing the interest of all parties involved in the partnership. A helpful point to start is a commonplace source, namely the *Oxford Advance Learner’s Dictionary of Current English* (2001: 850); it offered the following meanings: (a) the state of being a partner in a business, (b) a relationship between two people, organizations, etc. and (c) a business owned by two or more persons who share the profits. A close look at these dictionary meanings reflected that each of them is interconnected. The last mentioned implies that the owners who own the business have a pure business relationship in which they have agreed upon the way the business should be managed and how the profits and losses should be shared.

Shifting from the dictionary understanding of the concept to another proffered by a *New Straits Times’* columnist, John K.S. (2002: 11), will bring out a slightly different interpretation of the concept. He expanded on the notion of ‘partnership’ in his article entitled ‘Adopting Smart Partnership Ideals.’ John argued that the mode of partnership is premised upon two variables: (a) mutual respect for one another, and (b) trust to jointly take a risk and reward sharing. From this it is understood that all parties share equally and that they have a common goal and where both ‘act’ towards profit sharing; in others both win through the process of action. John further made the point that real and smart partnerships ‘must ensure that all parties in a venture experience a win.’ He referred to the Langkawi International Dialogue (LID) that was initiated and promoted by Mahathir as a way of contributing towards South-South dialogue and cooperation. The LID forum

sought to develop and promote a smart partnership philosophy of ‘Prosper Thy Neighbour;’ a philosophy that is somewhat embedded within the religious philosophy that Mahathir espoused and followed as well as the ideas of Confucius that permeated the Asian continent. The relationship in this partnership is thus viewed as being one where there is mutual trust, respect and openness; within this type of partnership there is ample opportunity for dialogue, cooperation and collaboration in all spheres. This explanation links up with what Axelrod (2004: 9) had to say about the concept. He stated that ‘a working definition of partnership is a collaborative relationship between entities to work towards shared objectives through mutually agreed division of labor.’

Another dimension of the notion of partnership has been explained by a group of researchers who worked on the crime prevention project in South Africa. The National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) requested that guidelines be worked out that would assist everyone in South Africa in fighting crime and which has become endemic in many parts of South Africa. The team (Nel et al 2000) produced a manual in which they viewed ‘partnership’ as a key concept that would help stem the criminal tide and minimize its effects on different levels and in various sectors. Even though the ideas expressed regarding this concept have been confined to crime prevention, I am of the view that the concept, which they neatly unpacked and explained, could be usefully appropriated in other areas such as International Relations. Nel et al (2000: 27) stated that ‘partnerships are a way of using the resources and skills in a community (and government) in such a way that all partners benefit....’ Partners, they argued (2000: 28), are not short-cut to obtain quick (financial) rewards. By partnership is meant bringing groups together to participate in discussing about potential business projects, consulting one another regularly, setting up the relevant structures, and balancing the competing interests. In this regard, Axelrod (2004: 9) highlighted the fact that ‘a partnership is not a gift ... (but) aims to take advantage of what the recipient, as well as the donor (i.e. the investing state/company), can bring to the relationship,’ and this would include local expertise and better understanding of the needs and priorities. And this further connects with the view expressed by Ingram (2004: xiv) when he referred to Douglas North who stated that partnership should be viewed ‘as an instrument to build the institutional capacity that is

needed to improve economic performance.’

In the light of these definitions and explanations, one of the key principles of a smart, close and, indeed, strategic partnership is that it should be well thought through, and should be considered as more important than who initiated the project or partnership. Within an open and trusting environment and a well planned partnership the individuals or companies that enter into partnership must (a) share information, (b) coordinate activities, (c) identify, (d) set priorities and (e) be accountable and transparent. In order for these ingredients to flow smoothly within a business project, a qualified (foreign affairs) manager should be appointed; someone who is able to provide crucial leadership and who has a good understanding not only of the business but also of numerous other variables such as the cultural practices of the (foreign) companies that form part of the partnership. The pro-active foreign affairs manager should possess a vision and a plan of action that would advance the interest of all the partners involved, and he/she should be able to stimulate an interest in the project and have the skills that would easily access decision makers such as the foreign affairs ministry or the presidency.

Habib & Selinyane (2004: 56) cautioned those who entered into a partnership not to romanticise it, and Kuseni (2004: 180) argued that for the state to move forward, business is a strategic ally of government in the creation of wealth. Since this is the case when reviewing the relationship between South Africa and Malaysia, the process of partnership or partnering becomes an important factor in achieving the common goals of both nation-states. He added that their interaction within the global economy requires sound partnerships. It is therefore assumed that when South Africa and Malaysia resumed their trade ties, and forged diplomatic bonds in 1993, they envisioned establishing and forming a worthy partnership in which both nation states would mutually benefit. In concluding the discussion on this concept, I wish to appropriate and adapt the ideas of Botchwey (2004: 101-102) who spoke about ‘giving partnership an operational meaning.’ In forging an effective partnership between, for example, a Malaysian company and South Africa, it should include the following components:

- Country (eg. South Africa) ownership of the agenda. This is broadly defined as leadership by the recipient country (i.e. South Africa) in setting the agenda, mobilizing and coordinating support for it, and sustaining it through the intellectual and political commitment of the (South African) government and the broad support of stakeholders, based upon their participation in the policy making process and understanding the key objectives of the investment/project;
- Support by the (Malaysian) investor company of the national development agenda through an adaptation of their programs and administrative procedures to the recipient country's (i.e. South Africa's) national strategy and local conditions. This should be achieved through a consultative process, preferably conducted in the recipient country (South Africa); and
- A rationalization of the (Malaysian) investment programs and projects within the overall framework of the (South African) national agenda, a harmonization of (the Malaysian) investor administrative procedures to ease pressure on country (i.e. South Africa's) capacity.

The conceptualization of 'middle powers' and 'partnership' in the afore-mentioned paragraphs and sections assist to frame the subsequent discussion that gives attention to the bilateral relations that developed between South Africa and Malaysia, two sovereign nation-states from the South. The conceptualization of these two terms helps to provide a fair overview and a better understanding of the South Africa and Malaysia's middle power status, on the one hand, and they also aid one in assessing and reflecting, on the other, upon the nature of the close partnership that has developed between South Africa and Malaysia since the beginning of the 1990s. Figure 4.1 below is an attempt to capture the relationship between these two states after 1994. Whilst it might be well-nigh impossible to identify, record and analyse most - if not all - of the activities that had taken place between these two states since official diplomatic ties were resumed in 1993 until the end of 2005, an attempt will be made to, at least, demonstrate to what extent the socio-political ties developed and to what degree the commercial connections between

the two states transformed and changed their relations into a fairly close partnership. The following section thus first concentrates on the socio-political bonds, and it thereafter discusses the commercial connections.

Figure 4.1



South Africa – Malaysia: Towards a Partnership




3. South Africa and Malaysia's Socio-Political Bonds:

3.1 Their Partnership in the Making: The Tale of Cementing South – South Connections

In identifying and analysing the partnership that has developed between South Africa and Malaysia, the following section wishes to review the respective countries' foreign policies; policies that have remained crucial issues in the critical tradition. Since these policies did not emerge within a vacuum, but alongside socio-political developments within the respective states, this section of the chapter intends to make reference and record (some of) these developments. The purpose is to show how the domestic issues had a direct and indirect bearing and impact on the respective states' foreign affairs decision making processes. The figure below provides a crude synopsis of South Africa's foreign policy phases; this was adapted from Muller's study (1999).

Figure 4.2:



The De Klerk regime's decision to lift the ban on the South African liberation movements, free Nelson Mandela and terminate its nuclear deterrent program during the month of February 1990 was a welcome move. Externally, the pressure had been enormous from the side of the external actors towards South Africa's political and economic policies (Love 2005: 181). In order to understand the latter's policies towards

South Africa during the pre-1994 period, Landsberg (2004: 12-13) pinpointed to three concurrent dimensions: (a) a political transition from apartheid to democracy, (b) an economic transition from a closed, white-dominated economy, to a gradually globalising, more open economy which increasingly strove for black participation, and (c) a military transition from resistance and armed struggle to democratic peace under democratic rule. As a result of these events, the National Party (NP) under De Klerk's leadership and the ANC were forced to negotiate. The NP, the ANC under Mandela and a number of other *bona fide* stakeholders participated in the CODESA negotiations, which involved a fair amount of compromises; these negotiations were part of an important constitutional process that eventually produced the 1993 interim Constitution (Deegan 1999: 16-17); this interim Constitution contained a few basic values such as 'the rule of law,' and 'freedom and equality' that underpinned it and was thus able to take the South African society into a new era.

During the time when the negotiations were underway, members of the international community were spurred on by these socio-political developments in South Africa. Many showed an interest to forge links at various levels; some initiated diplomatic ties whilst others, being more circumspect, decided to wait for an official signal from the ANC to enter into a relationship with South Africa since they were aware that the UN sanctions were still firmly in place. Internally, South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) was also gradually being overhauled in order to meet the needs of the changing international environment. With its slow shift in foreign policy it set up in March 1992 a Multilateral Affairs division, which accommodated space for countries from Asia (Muller 1999: 597). According to Landsberg (2004: 88), the De Klerk regime formulated three clear foreign policy strategies:

- Bringing to an end South Africa's international ostracism and reintegrating it into the international community;
- Persuading the international community to end sanctions and support a liberal, free-market economic dispensation; and
- Securing international backing for the NP's goal of a consociational democratic dispensation in which (white) minorities would enjoy a veto right over decision

making in a majoritarian system.

Evans (1993: 4), the then Director-General of Foreign Affairs under Minister Pik Botha, shared his thoughts on the DFA; he showed how DFA positioned itself to adapt to the new situation and how it anticipated significant links with countries in Asia and the Middle East (Pfister 2005: 125-130). In attempting to define South Africa's Foreign Policy in the new climate, Evans (1993: 8) acknowledged that it should be a continuous, dynamic process and promote the country's vital interests. It is indeed ironic for someone who had been part of an apartheid foreign affairs outfit to suddenly come up with a list of factors such as 'South Africa is part of the African continent, (that is) a reality which creates a whole series of practical interests, needs, common problems, etc' and 'The South African government needs to be conscious of the major social and human problems of society' that would provide parameters for South Africa's policy determination (ibid 9-10). He admitted that under the De Klerk's regime since 1990 certain countries were targeted; for example in Asia, on the one level, missions were opened in Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, and China and, on the other, channels of dialogue were created with countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan and India. This concretely demonstrated that De Klerk and his ilk thought they could steal a march on the ANC before it was able to establish a democratic government (Pfister 2005: 130-139). De Klerk was, it may be assumed, also aware that the ANC had 'a distinctive international personality which enjoyed extensive legitimacy and enjoyed larger space in world affairs than did the South African state' (Vale 1994: 80). There is no doubt that the apartheid South Africa under De Klerk's leadership worked tirelessly at improving its international relations profile – part of what Evans (1993: 12-13) called the 'image building' process, and also opening up opportunities for its white dominated businesses to benefit before anyone else from South Africa would.

Turning our focus to Malaysia during the first three years of the 1990s, one witnesses some significant internal and external developments. Based on mere speculation, Hassan (1992: 29) posits the notion that the 1990s would mark the watershed decade for Malaysia. This speculative opinion was grounded in his interpretation of Malaysia's

ambitious *Vision 2020* plan that would transform the country into a fully developed country by the year 2020. Prior to peeping into this significant document, let me quickly record a few other developments before the document was issued.

Mahathir had been victorious in the late 1980s elections and he was able to continue his reign as Prime Minister into the 1990s. When the changes took place in South Africa, he adopted a cautious approach and bided his time until the circumstances were more favourable. Since he gained credibility within the ANC leadership and rank-and-file for his tough stand against apartheid throughout the 1980s, he was in constant communication with the leadership. In May 1990, when Nelson Mandela was on his travels to Nigeria, Mahathir, as a member of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CCFMSA), met Mr. Mandela in person in Abuja. Subsequent to this meeting a trip was planned to visit a few Asian states including Malaysia. In the meanwhile, the De Klerk regime was also hoping to lure Malaysia into allowing a mission to be set up; however, Mahathir was not willing to budge on this and not until after the ANC officially gave him permission. What this stance implied was that the ANC was also flexing its muscles in the international arena to compete with the 'reformist' apartheid government led by De Klerk. Malaysia was among the few that were not prepared to 'break' the sanctions that were still in place; its neighbours, namely Thailand and Singapore, saw the opportunity and allowed South African missions to be established and they reciprocated likewise. As already noted, Malaysia treaded cautiously and showed concern not to fall out of favour with the ANC, the major stakeholder with whom the Barisan Nasional (BN) had strong links. A month or more before Mandela was to visit Malaysia the BN, which fought one of its most crucial battles, was victorious at the polls and this placed Mahathir and his party in an extremely strong position.

On the 3rd of November 1990 the BN hosted a dinner for Mandela when he came on visit as ANC's deputy president. Mahathir's speech reflected the joy the Malaysians shared with Mandela and the black South Africans. Whilst he lauded the transformations that were taking place, he reminded the audience that this was partly because of the

international communities' pressure on the apartheid regime under De Klerk. Mahathir promised Mandela that Malaysia will continue to apply the pressure until apartheid has been completely dismantled and requested that other states also adopt a similar attitude. He also declared that he was not in agreement with those Western states that were willing to reward De Klerk for the changes that the latter initiated, and as a CCFMSA member Malaysia continued to monitor the developments in South Africa. He also argued that democracy should not be taken for granted but should be nurtured and protected; this is indeed ironical since he flouted some of the basic democratic principles when he adopted a more authoritarian position during the final years as Malaysia's Prime Minister. After consultation with the ANC during Mandela's November 1990 visit to Malaysia (cf. Mahathir Speech 1990; Makaruddin 2000), which had been experiencing a buoyant economy during that time, the Malaysian government approved the idea of building a working relationship with all the South African stakeholders at the socio-political and cultural levels, and it pledged to support the ANC financially when it prepared itself for the polls in the future.

When 1991 ushered in the BN announced the replacement of the NEP with the National Development Policy/Plan (NDP). Its announcement and introduction was indeed a significant event in the Malaysians' social history. Many had expected the NEP to be scrapped with a new policy; one that would not 'discriminate' against the non-Malays. The NDP, according to Milne & Mauzy (1999: 74-75), has been more accommodating to the non-Bumiputras than the NEP and this thus tapered the tension among the ethnic groups. The new policy has also positively contributed to the alleviation of poverty in Malaysia. Although these were significant developments, they were and are, however, not enough since the ideal is to effectively bring an end to poverty and obliterate the tension that exist within the Malaysian society.

Nonetheless, soon after the introduction of the NDP, Dr. Mahathir presented his speech entitled *Malaysia: The Way Forward* in which he had a vision of a *Bangsa Malaysia* (Malaysia Nation) by the year 2020. This came to be referred to as *Malaysia's Vision 2020* document; a plan that was different from the NDP but one which complemented it.

It was meant to inspire and assist the Malaysians in transforming themselves in both the economic and social sectors into a ‘fully developed’ society. In his formulation of this document, Derichs (2001: 194) argued that Mahathir Mohamed and Anwar Ibrahim, his deputy as from December 1992 after he defeated Ghafar Baba in an UMNO contest, were fully aware of the impact of globalization in trade and industry, and they decided that globalization should be viewed as an opportunity rather than a danger for Malaysia to promote progress and modernize. And one of the outcomes of this decision was the Multimedia Super Corridor.

Mahathir identified the variety of challenges, one of these being establishing ‘a united Malaysian nation with a sense of common and shared destiny’ and another being ‘fostering and developing a mature democratic society’ (Milne & Mauzy 1999: 165; Cheah 2002: 65-66). Hassan (1992: 29) argued that *Vision 2020* encompassed Malaysia’s key domestic goals and aspirations for the following two decades. And he stated that the ‘national unity’ has been ‘the overriding objective of all national policies,’ and that it has been the single most important challenge confronting the nation in its quest to become a fully developed country by the year 2020. Nation-building thus continued to be of continuous concern for the Malaysian government and its multiracial society; the non-Malays were indeed satisfied with the Vision’s formulation because it counted them in and saw them as an integral part of Malaysia. This was indeed a departure from the previous policy which favoured the Malays and the affirmative action project that intended to rectify the imbalances (also cf. Nazaruddin Hj. Mohd Jali et al 2003: 314-315); developments that were welcomed by political pundits and other observers. As far as Malaysia’s ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy goes, Nathan (1995: 226-227) highlighted the fact that it ‘rests firmly on the assumption of a stable, Malay-led, multi-ethnic Malaysia that is broadly capable of satisfying national aspirations across a wide spectrum of competing demands and interests.’ This document has not only inspired the Malaysians as a society to look towards the future, but it also gave other international communities the opportunity to adopt and adapt the document to suite their needs. Two examples from SADC member states will suffice; the one is Malawi’s *Vision 2020* and the other is Botswana’s *Vision 2016*.

Coming back to South Africa – Malaysia relations, one noted that after a long wait, the Malaysians eventually set up a liaison office in Johannesburg during 1992; it was an office that was to pursue some basic field work in order to suss out the existing opportunities for potential Malaysian investors and corporations before formal diplomatic ties could be cemented. The office was a life-line between the Malaysian government and the office of the ANC, and, by then, a direct line of communication had been established between Dr. Mahathir and Mr. Mandela in order to keep tabs on the internal developments and progress and also to provide the technical assistance to the ANC when necessary. The Malaysian liaison office fast tracked trade relations after sanctions were lifted, and along with the Malaysian Airlines company supervised the first MAS flight from Kuala Lumpur to Johannesburg during October 1992.

Towards the end of 1993 the influential *Foreign Affairs* journal published Mandela's 'South Africa's future foreign policy' paper; in this particular paper Mandela stressed that human rights was going to be one of the key principles that would underpin democratic South Africa's foreign policy (Venter 1997: 78; Suttner 1997: 300). This was indeed the case when the ANC and later Mandela, as the president of the new democratic state, got involved in the Nigerian affair (see later). Nevertheless, the ANC indicated in September 1993 that an attempt was already underway to revamp the foreign affairs; this, however, seems to have begun only after certain technical changes had taken place (Muller 1997: 63). More-or-less at the time Mandela and the ANC were busy preparing for their future role in the new South Africa, the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave the Malaysian Federation of National Writers' Union (GAPENA) under the leadership of Tan Sri Professor Drs Ismail Hussein from the National University of Malaysia permission to travel with a contingent of about 50 academics and non-academics to participate in seminar that was held at the University of the Western Cape during April; this was the first formal cultural links that was made between Malaysia and South Africa bearing in mind that Malaysia had lifted the people-to-people sanction at the end of 1991 in accordance with the Harare Declaration of Commonwealth Heads of State in Zimbabwe (cf. Haron 2005: 54-55). And by the 25th of September Malaysia lifted all the

sanctions and on the 8th of November 1993 it established formal diplomatic ties with South Africa; its High Commission subsequently replaced the one that was located in Harare to represent Malaysia in the region. South Africa reciprocated when it established an Embassy on the 17th of January 1994; this Embassy was eventually transformed into a High Commission when South Africa formally re-joined the Commonwealth (Mills 1997: 192). When returning to November 1990, Dr. Mahathir had, by then, pledged Malaysia's moral and financial support to the ANC. And it fulfilled this promise when UMNO gave the ANC financial support to prepare for the historic 1994 April elections.

3.3 Being Connected: From diplomatic ties to a sustained relationship

The formation of diplomatic ties between the two states at the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994 demonstrated that both states were deeply committed to pursue bilateral relations; one avenue to concretize this was through developing strong trade and commercial connections. Even though the bilateral relations were particularly reflected during the early years at the state-to-state level, interest was also expressed at the people-to-peoples level in the sizeable Cape Malay community; the earlier mentioned example of GAPENA's visit was one such case. Another example was when Riedewaan Isaacs, Abdul Gamiet Flax and Mohamed Hussein Bux, three 'self-appointed' members of the community, created the South African Malay Chamber of Business (SAMCB) and went on a fact finding 'Mission to Malaysia' with the hope of striking business partnerships with counterparts in Malaysia. Although the visit, which took place between the 3rd and the 11th of February 1994, was considered successful by the three man delegation, there is no tangible evidence that suggests that they were able to make inroads into the Malaysian business sector. One reason for this was that the business culture was very different from that practiced among the Cape Malays, and the other was that the Cape Malays could not compete with the types of businesses owned by the Malays or the Bumiputra in Malaysia; they did not possess the necessary finances and nor did they have any financial backing. In addition, they also did not have the specific business skills, and may generally be described as opportunists who tried their luck during a period when Malay businesspersons from Malaysia demonstrated a fair amount of empathy for the

Cape Malays and were prepared to pursue joint ventures. Very few of these joint ventures - as far as could be ascertained – took off as planned, and many others grinded to a halt because the Malaysians realised that the Cape Malay partners did not possess the necessary business clout, financial support and the required skills.

During the month of March 1994 the Malaysian government agreed to bestow the Tun Abdul Razak International Award on Mr. Nelson Mandela, who was then the ANC's president, for being in the vanguard of fighting against apartheid; the award was, in effect, only accepted on the 10th of August 1994, a few months after Mr. Mandela became the president of South Africa. When Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as the first president of the new democratic South Africa on the 10th of May 1994, Malaysia was amongst the many governmental representatives from various parts of the Asian world who attended the auspicious occasion. In fact, soon after the elections Mahathir made a one day private visit to congratulate Mr. Mandela on his appointment. The presence of these states and the personal initiatives that were made by statesmen such as Mahathir were clear indications that they came to celebrate with all South Africans this unique historical event in which some of them indirectly contributed. It was also a reflection of the change of attitude in the world towards South Africa and its newly elected GNU.

In the socio-cultural arena mention should be made of the fact that Dato Najib Tun Razak, (then) Malaysia's Minister of Defence and presently the Deputy Prime Minister, represented Malaysia at a significant cultural event in Cape Town. This event was organized by South Africa's 'Cape Malays' and it celebrated the Muslims 300 year presence on South African soil (cf. Ward 1996; Jeppie 1996). Although this was a one-off event, it created opportunities for representatives from the Muslim community to pursue cultural relations with Malaysia via the good offices of the Minister of Defence. In a related sphere - by the end of 1994 - Malaysia welcomed many South African students to be trained in areas such as Information Technology and engineering. In the process many MoUs were signed between South Africa's Ministry of Education and academic institutions in Malaysia. This was thus in addition to the increasing number of investments that Malaysian business persons have been making in various sectors in

South Africa between 1993 and 1996 (cf. Padayachee & Valodia 2000).

After the 1994 elections the South African society was slowly transformed via a process of ingenious social engineering - on the part of the new democratic government as well as other players – to overcome its past. One such social construction was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (cf. Villa-Vicencio & Verwoerd 1999; James & De Vijfer 1999; Haron 2002). Even though it never fully succeeded to bring the perpetrators to book for the heinous crimes that they committed throughout the apartheid era, it was a strategic mechanism and institution that assisted to help South Africans to deal with their past and work towards nation-building (cf. Baines 1998). This structure as well as others such as the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), which was subsequently replaced by Growth, Economic and Redistribution Program (GEAR), was an attempt to bring about significant changes in the society internally. However, on the external plain, South Africa was the new democratic kid on the bloc; one that was the most sought after state on the African continent with which to have bilateral and multilateral ties since Mandela's inauguration. This had also partly to do with Mr. Mandela's status in the eyes of the international community. South Africa was basically under the spell of 'Madiba's magic.' Whilst it is acknowledged that Mandela was the key political figure in South African international affairs, it cannot be denied South Africa's mineral and other resources as well as a strong infrastructure caught the eye of many politicians and business persons from many parts of the world. Their interest to forge ties with South Africa was not for mere political objectives but more importantly for economic purposes.

Whilst the formation of relations with more than a 160 countries was a plus at the time, it was also a minus in that South Africa's DFA was still stuck in the past with white decision makers of the apartheid regime still calling the shots (Kornegay & Landsberg 2000: 33) and, it may be assumed, ANC members with years of experience in IR were, for a while, left out in the cold instead of being brought on board. One example that comes to mind is the position that was Mr. 'Rusty' Evans' - a hard-line apartheid foreign affairs fellow; the latter retained his position as the Director-General of the DFA for quite a while after South Africa became a democracy. The DFA made no effort to have him

replaced during those crucial years of transformation (Muller 1997: 64). That aside, foreign policy making was – at that time - a muddled affair and one that might have appeared new but was indeed old and stagnant. In fact, Venter (1997: 77) observed that there was lack of a coherent policy framework and the absence of a *White Paper on Foreign Policy* has resulted in an eclectic approach. He made reference to Nkuhlu (1995) who stated that the DFA could afford to construct a ‘rainbow (foreign) policy’ for it could be everything to everyone.

The GNU’s aspirations, according to Cilliers (1999:55), have been partly attributed to a foreign policy that ‘reflected the values explicit in the constitutional settlement’. Vale (1994: 81) described the foreign policy status aptly when he said that ‘South Africa’s ‘new’ foreign policy suffers from a crisis of multiple identities.’ This identity crisis spilt over into other sectors of the government (as well as the South African society) and there was an urgent need to attend to its affairs. It, indeed, took a while for the new South Africa to break loose from the apartheid foreign policy ghost, which was essentially an elitist, non-transparent structure. It was inevitable that South African’s DFA under Madiba’s leadership consciously planned to reconstruct its ties with the international community particularly those that were ignored by the apartheid regime that had favoured its relationship with the Western world. Whilst it maintained and did not reduce links with the Western states (Muller 1997: 59), it gradually shifted to begin a relationship with many African, Latin American and Asian states; Malaysia being amongst the many.

Returning to the relationship that has been strengthening year after year between South Africa and Malaysia since 1992, it was not surprising that Malaysia reflected an interest in most of South Africa’s good quality products. Since Malaysia was an emerging ‘middle power’ state with a strong economy, stable society and an influential leadership, it demonstrated special interest in some of South Africa’s high quality defence material. South Africa along with many other arms producers was invited by Malaysia to exhibit its defence equipment at the Langkawi Arms Fair (cf. Juhaidi Yean Abdullah 1995). Malaysia was keen on purchasing the Rooivalk helicopters that South Africa produced. On an official visit in January 1995 Mr. Joe Modise, the then South African Minister of

Defence, went to finalize some of the Defence agreements that were processed between the two states. Perhaps a question needs to be raised with regards to such agreements: why is Malaysia so keen on beefing up its military when there is dire need to reduce arms trade? And why is South Africa persisting in increasing arms trade with African and Asian states? For those critical of realism, the 'arms trade' would be considered one of the problematic issues in the contemporary international system because instead of reducing conflict 'middle power' states such as South Africa and Malaysia are contributing to it – directly or indirectly; and through their actions in manufacturing and acquiring arms they maintain an imbalance rather than bringing about a balance within the international system. Nonetheless, it is not the intention to find or proffer answers for these and other related questions; they should, however, be posed to reflect critically on how these two nation-states view themselves within the international system in the years and decades to come.

During July 1995 Mahathir initiated the Langkawi International Dialogue (LID) smart partnership project which dedicated itself to South–South cooperation. And Malaysia considered South Africa as one of the most important states from the developing world in this partnership, and it thus extended an open invitation to the South African government to be at all the planned LID gatherings. The first LID meeting took place before South Africa appointed its first High Commissioner to Malaysia, namely Ms. M. Mohale. And by August 1995 Mahathir paid an official visit to South Africa in order to sign agreements and deepen the relationship that had already been cemented. Mahathir spoke about the long association that existed between the two countries at a special dinner hosted by the then second GNU Deputy President of South Africa, Mr. F.W. De Klerk.

In his speech the Malaysian Prime Minister noted that the volumes of trade increased soon after the links had been forged between the two states in 1993. And he was upbeat about the joint low-cost housing project that Malaysians and South Africans have embarked upon in Gauteng (Jesudasan 1996: 212), and reminded De Klerk that he was fully aware of the RDP in which Malaysia had similar experiences. Mahathir extended an invitation to participate in ventures that result in a win-win situation and a shared

prosperity. He commended the South Africans for being able to overcome the hardships of the past through the process of reconciliation (cf. Mahathir Speech 1995).

In a speech to the South African business community in Cape Town Mahathir emphasised ‘the vote of confidence’ that Malaysia’s business community has shown in the future prospects in South Africa. He commented on the strong bilateral relations that have developed between the two countries based upon the growing trade activities. In the trade sector he also pointed out the types of products that Malaysians would be interested in as part of enhancing the links between the two states (cf. Mahathir Speech 1995a). Mahathir’s speech fingered all the positive developments that his country was involved in and the positive outcomes taking place in South Africa that he was able to see from a distance. In this speech there appeared to have been no room for negative or critical comments. It is assumed that at such gatherings there is no room for critical comments of any kind for they are basically unsuitable or inappropriate. Since Malaysia has been involved in partnerships with many other nation-states, one would like Mahathir to have, at least, cautioned the business community of the pitfalls in doing business in one another’s countries and to have advised them to create early warning systems and mechanisms that would assist in avoiding possible failures in business ventures; alas, this was not to be. In fact, if Mahathir had highlighted the negative aspects vis-à-vis the positive dimensions it would have provided a list of helpful hints to the potential business partners as to how they should work towards strengthening the emerging bilateral links. It would also have shown to what extent the political leadership was prepared to acknowledge their own pitfalls in the interest of having firm bilateral relations and forging a close partnership.

Subsequent to Mahathir’s official visit, Mr. Yahaya Ahmed, the Chairperson of Proton – Malaysia’s foremost car company, led a delegation of 250 business persons to South Africa to scout for investment opportunities. Soon after this significant visit, one was forced ask: What has happened after this prominent visit? Did all members of this business delegation invest immediately after their departure? Why have only a handful of Malaysians decided to take the risk of investing in South Africa? In order to respond to

these questions, many factors should be taken into account. Two factors that played a critical role in venturing to pursue business may be cited: the first is that the business cultural practices are not the same in the two countries and the second is that the economic status of the two states was also somewhat different. And since this delegation was led by Proton's chairperson, it is quite interesting to have observed that it took more than a decade for Proton to finally enter the South African market; as a matter of fact, it officially found a foothold into the car market after a fair amount of negotiations by August 2005 – more than ten years after the chairperson's visit! Why did it take this company such a long time to open up offices in South Africa? With hindsight one can, on the one hand, attribute this to the economic meltdown in Southeast Asia in general and Malaysia in particular, and, on the other, one may ascribe this to status of the car market in South Africa as well wanting to build a sound partnership between Malaysians and South Africans through these specific investments and projects.

Since South Africa's GNU restructured its position within the international arena, it had to carefully review its IR agenda and its foreign policy behaviour. One hard lesson South Africa learnt during the first year of the democracy was not to assume a principled role in trying to resolve regional and continental issues. One specific example was when Mandela failed in his intervention efforts to resolve the Ken Saro-Wiwa affair in Nigeria. Mandela responded by requesting Nigeria to be suspended by the Commonwealth as a method of punishing President Abacha's actions. This caused a stir within the OAU crowd who basically did not support and heed Mandela's call. He thus had to make an about turn on this issue; as fate would have it, President Abacha died and he was replaced by Mr. Obasanjo with whom Mandela forged a sound relationship. In fact, Mandela was also severely criticized for not having been in close contact with representatives of the Nigerian civil society in order to have found a reasonable solution to the issue (Henwood 1996: 260-262; Venter 1997: 91-95; Landsberg 2004: 176-178). This and other failed interventions by South Africa, noted by Venter (1997: 88-91), Landsberg (2004: 163-165) and others, in its neighbourhood (Lesotho) and in other parts of the continent (Angola) led Maxi Schoeman (quoted in Naidu 2004: 218) to appropriately observe that South Africa struggled (in the first few years) to be accepted in the African circles as a

viable leader because its foreign policy; a policy that was embedded in 'liberal democratic values,' which were basically associated with the West, and this was thus perceived to be contrary to the 'African way' of doing things. And these negative developments led some to question South Africa's status as an emerging middle power that has the capacity and ability to play the role as 'peace maker.' Nevertheless, it is for this very reason that Mbeki worked towards reversing this negative perception when he gave his famous 'I am an African' speech on the 8th of May 1996 and charted out a vision in the form of an 'African Renaissance' strategy (see Chapter Six).

These negative developments were in a sense a wake up call to the South African government; these developments pushed the DFA under the leadership of Mr. Alfred Nzo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to not only restructure the directorates within DFA by mid 1995 (Muller 59-60), but more importantly to prepare and issue an important discussion foreign policy document that would rid itself from its apartheid legacy and guide it into the future. The 1996 *South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document* (FPDD), which should be read alongside other DFA policy documents such as *Transformation Document: Core Business of the DFA* and *National External Security Strategy: Draft input to the Growth and Development Strategy* (NESS), was prepared and written at a critical juncture during South Africa's first few years of democracy; the document not only radically shifted away from the apartheid approach to international relations but reformulated its policies on foreign affairs matters and IR issues in order to make itself relevant in the contemporary global world. NESS, according to Landsberg (2004: 189), promoted a significant external strategy when it identified partnership as a key vehicle in building a regional and global environment of peace and stability. South Africa stood out as an excellent example of a country that was able to shift from a 'pariah state' position to 'good world citizen' being prepared to contribute to regional and global peace. And as an important member of the 'global south' it would - in the interest of the latter - engage with the industrialised North to bring about social equality and reverse the uneven development brought about by the process of globalization (cf. Poku 2001: 17-20). In this regard, the South African government seriously considered the FPDD, which accentuated and identified the following issues (Landsberg 2004: 180):

- The globalization of the world economy;
- The growing importance of multilateralism;
- Enhancing regional and continental cooperation;
- The electronics revolution and information superhighway;
- The growing – no diminishing - gap between the North and the South;
- The growing complexity of technological issues;
- The focus of good governance, human rights and democracy; and
- The redefinition of international security to encompass greater dimensions of human security.

These crucial issues affected South Africa's socio-economic and political position directly, and it was thus viewed as major areas of concern. In addition to these developments the interim Constitution also gave parliament a more active role in foreign policy formulation. And as a result of the Constitutional support, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs was established (cf. Henwood 1996:246; van Wyk 1997: 192-194).

Towards the end of March 1996 the first significant 'Asian Tigers and African Lions Business Conference' was organized in Johannesburg by Dr. Denis Worrall's Omega Investment Research unit; at this conference Mr. Thabo Mbeki, the then Deputy President of South Africa, gave the opening address on the 26th of March in which he reflected on the transition in South Africa and the desire to follow the example of the Asian tigers in achieving 'high rates of growth on a sustained basis.' He highlighted what measures were being taken by the South African government to open up opportunities for the economy to grow. Mr. Mbeki emphasised the emerging relationship between Asia and Africa and the need for South-South cooperation and reminded the delegates of their position within NAM (Mbeki Speech 1996a). Mr. Mbeki's speech like Mahathir's earlier mentioned diplomatic discourse was positive; it was upbeat about the relationship between the two regions/continents and was optimistic about the transformation that was taking place in South Africa. No negative or critical remarks were entertained for, it appears, that he

wanted the potential Asian tigers businesses that were attending the conference to view South Africa in a positive light and as a viable economic destination. Mbeki should have cautiously advised the participants about the strengths and the weaknesses of South Africa and guided them as to how they should try to overcome the obstacles that they might face during South Africa's transformation process and in doing business. In fact, from a critical perspective stressing the shortcomings of the evolving socio-political process in South Africa would have provided the potential investors with a more realistic picture of the way things were developing in South Africa. This realistic and tangible presentation of the economic status in South Africa would perhaps have helped the potential Asian tigers to have taken the risk of prudently injecting their foreign direct investment into the country without expecting immediate financial kick-backs and turnovers. Maybe one should not expect too much from diplomats and politicians who, in their flowery speeches, wish to 'sell' their state as 'possible product' without taking into account the inherent shortcomings that also need to be highlighted for the potential partner.

It is indeed quite coincidental that during the month of May 1996 that Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia's deputy Prime Minister and Mbeki, South Africa's second deputy president, addressed audiences in their respective regions on the Asian and African Renaissance; issues that will be given separate attention later in one of the following chapters. Nevertheless, one of the spin-offs of conferences such as the one recorded earlier was the formation of the first South Africa – Malaysia Forum that further cemented the relations between South Africa and Malaysia. Concrete evidence of the ongoing ties that was being forged was when Petronas, Malaysia's petroleum company, invested 30% in Engen, the South African petroleum company. And this was further bolstered when Malaysia's Minister of Defence, Sayed Hamid Albar, came on an official visit to South Africa in order to sign an MoU on military cooperation between the two states during November 1996.

By 1996 Mahathir, who was still in the Malaysian driving seat, was shown and given a great deal of respect by the Malaysians and by the peoples from the South. He, for

example, demonstrated his ant-Zionist stance and spoke out against the atrocities of the Israelis against the Palestinians. The PLO under Yassar Arafat had been on good terms with the Malaysian government and had on a few occasions visited Kuala Lumpur. It was also during 1996 that he adopted an Islamization posture with regards to transformation and this meant that Mahathir challenged PAS, the opposition party and the one that remains dominant in Kelantan as the representative of Islamic leadership in Malaysia. In fact, PAS and Dar Al-Arqam, a Muslim organization that was subsequently banned by Mahathir for its ideas and practices (Mohamad 2002: 210), challenged UMNO's religious legitimacy for quite some time (Jesudasan 1996: 2002). He thus created structures such as PERKIM that advanced the Islamic cause in Malaysia (Camroux 1996: 856-863). Although Mahathir has not sought for the formation of an Islamic state, he tried to portray a modern Islam; an Islam that was vibrant and that could accommodate all perspectives and communities of diverse backgrounds. He took this road as opposed to the road taken by PAS; a party that has been bent on wanting to establish an Islamic state in Malaysia (cf. Martinez 2001a).

In the international arena during early March of 1997, which coincided with the ANC's 'Developing a strategic perspective on South Africa's Foreign Policy' that was circulated for discussion and whilst the debate of Islamization was raging on within the Malaysian civil society, Mr. Mandela led a strong delegation of 105 persons on an official visit to Malaysia. At the state banquet on the 7th of March, Mr. Mandela praised the Malaysians for their commitment towards Africa as a whole and South Africa in particular and admired the country for its sense of purpose as embodied in its *Vision 2020* (cf. Nathan 1996; Derichs 2001) that was launched by Mahathir in 1991. And during this important visit he also delivered a lengthy speech to the South Africa – Malaysia Forum on the 8th of March; in his speech, he was cheerful when he reported that Telekom-Malaysia and SBC Communications succeeded in their bid for a 30% stake in South Africa's Telecommunications Corporation (cf. Burrows 1997: 103).

On this positive note, Mr. Mandela was hopeful that this agreement consummated a strong and firm phase in the relations between the two states. Mandela (1997a) expressed

the view that it constituted ‘a platform for greater things to come’, and he conveyed optimism when he stated that since the delegation’s arrival in Malaysia ‘we have felt the pulse of this partnership-in-the-making’. On the same day he also gave a speech at the launch of the Malaysia – South Africa Business Council; he was extremely glad that this council was formed for it was yet another sign that the business communities in both countries were serious about enhancing the trade ties and commercial connections between South Africa and Malaysia. He also observed that it was ‘a valuable avenue for tapping experience and skills, and a window on new and exciting opportunities’ (cf. Mandela Speech 1997b). Since Mandela gave these important speeches I am somewhat compelled to ask: what was the nature of the ‘partnership-in-the-making’? At that juncture it was gradually blossoming into a close partnership with the hope of developing into a strategic partnership. Regrettably the number of Malaysian investors did not swell into large numbers - as might have been expected - between 1993 and 1997. Padayachee and Vahed (2000), who concretely showed that Malaysian direct investments slowly trickled into South Africa, argued that these financial indicators could not be used as proof that a strategic partnership had been forged or was in the making. In fact, there was a concern that even though the political leadership was fairly optimistic, the business community demonstrated a degree of hesitancy in taking investment risks. And since the potential businesses were still dragging their feet to make decisions and take the risks, it was going to take a long while before the relationship between South Africa and Malaysia transforms itself into ‘a strategic partnership.’

These issues are also related to the observations Mandela made in his second speech. When reviewing his comments on tapping experiences and skills within the South African society, it has been noted that no genuine effort has been made by the South African business community to tap and train local/national (disadvantaged) talent to help strengthen the emerging business projects and partnerships; and if it had been so then we would have seen a substantial contribution in the commercial arena. Mandela in his address also spoke about the investments and ties benefiting the poor. Unfortunately more than ten years has passed and South Africa as well as Malaysia has fallen short of some of their noble goals such as eradicating poverty. For example, the Orang Asli as

well as poorer states (i.e. provinces) such as Kelantan in Malaysia have not reaped from the economic profits and nor have the poor disadvantaged communities in South Africa's urban and rural areas receive the necessary financial injections as expected. Ten years have passed and nothing substantial has reached the tables of the poor whose numbers have increased in South Africa. Many black graduates – potential entrepreneurs that Mandela alluded in his talk - are jobless and this has added to the numbers that have remained unemployed since before South Africa became a democracy. It is conditions such as these that coerce critical theorists to question the intention of the political leaders of these nation-states and question whether international relations will ever be written from 'the point of view of the interests and aspirations of the impoverished South' (Murphy 2001: 70).

Nonetheless, the culmination of Mandela and the delegation's official trip resulted in him signing the 47th trade agreement between the two countries. Later that year representatives of the two states also signed other trade agreements as well as shipping agreements and Malaysia approached South Africa on the possibility of concluding *inter alia* Technical and Scientific agreements. And after Mahathir participated in the first Southern Africa International Dialogue (SAID), which emerged out of LID, he passed through South Africa where he was conferred the Cape of Good Hope award for his role in international affairs and for having given unstinting support to South Africa; this took place on the 7th of May.

By mid 1997 the Asian tigers experienced an economic meltdown and this negatively affected the investments that these countries made in different parts of the world; the crises continued into 1998 (cf. Kunis 1998: 161-175; Chin 1998: 183-189; Setboonsarng 1998: 18-36). Some of the Malaysian companies that invested in South Africa had to wind down their investment plans and others had to slowly withdraw in order to save themselves from bankruptcy (cf. Mills 1998: 365-371). South African companies that opened up offices and branches in Malaysia were naturally also affected and were obliged to make alternative plans. But despite these set-backs and whatever was left of the relationship between South Africa and Malaysia in the aftermath of this event, the

(weakened) economic ties between these two states persisted.

3.4 Consolidating Connections: Laying Foundations for a Partnership

During the early part of 1998 Mr. Mbeki delivered his well known African Renaissance speech which echoed similar ideas embedded in the Asian Renaissance speech that was made by the former deputy prime minister of Malaysia, namely Dato Anwar Ibrahim (1996) and those made by Dr. Mahathir (cf. Makaruddin 2000; also see Chapter Six the section on ‘Asian Renaissance vis-à-vis African Renaissance’). When Mills (1999: 391) published his article ‘Malaysian Economic Crisis: A Comparative Perspective,’ he quoted a few lines from Anwar Ibrahim’s speech and illustrated how similar they were to those echoed by Mbeki. The African Renaissance speech, which invigorated some debate within South African academic circles, was welcomed in some - and not all - quarters on the African continent. Nevertheless, it stimulated pockets of Africans to reconsider their position within world affairs. Mbeki’s thoughts on this theme were also similar in content to those delivered by Mahathir when the latter spoke about and elaborated upon ‘Asian Values.’ Mbeki highlighted African values, which were and remain rooted in the concept of *Ubuntu* (i.e. humaneness).

When the 12th Non-Aligned Movement meeting was organized and hosted by South Africa between the 29th of August and the 3rd of September of 1998, South Africa took over the chair and thus demonstrated its ability to lead NAM members into the years that followed. It was within NAM that both South Africa and Malaysia found an added avenue via which they continued to show warmth and friendship towards one another. And this was given added weight when Mr. Mbeki visited Malaysia during mid September to be at the Commonwealth Games and at the same time pay a visit to the Malaysian government that was publicly celebrating its ‘Malaysian Identity’ and using ‘sport’ as an instrument of foreign policy (cf. van der Westhuizen 2004: 1285-1288).

The recession and economic slump continued into 1998 and this meant that Malaysia had to brace itself for the coming years. As it was trying to manage the crisis, Mahathir used the opportunity to criticize the international media for the negative reporting of Malaysia,

accused the USA of meddling in Malaysian affairs, and question IMF's tough prescriptions (Felker 1999: 43-54; Funston 2000: 167). Whilst his tough stand against these institutions might be considered understandable in the light of the crisis and the speculations regarding the cause of the crisis, it came as a shock to the Malaysian nation when Mahathir consciously decided to sack his well-liked, popular deputy, Anwar Ibrahim on the 2nd of September 1998. Funston (2000) titled his article 'Malaysia: A Fateful September' to capture the mood of that particular month. Prior to this – at the UMNO general assembly of June 1998 - a booklet entitled *Fifty Reasons why Anwar cannot be Prime Minister* was circulated to its almost 2000 members and this caused a rift within the party; those who fully endorsed Ibrahim's candidacy for the post as Prime Minister questioned the purpose of the text and in reaction raised corruption charges against government as well as the nepotistic behaviour by government officials (Case 1999: 2-6; Verma 2004: 147-148; Funston 2000: 170-171; Eldridge 2002: 108-110).

Anwar Ibrahim's sacking and his subsequent incarceration was indeed a blow to the image of Malaysia for he was seen – at that time - as the most obvious successor to Mahathir. Milne & Mauzy (1999: 156) identified three key reasons for Mahathir's actions: (a) Ibrahim's conservative economic policies, (b) signs of militancy and aggressiveness displayed within Ibrahim's wide spread support group particularly the UMNO youth and (c) the perception that Ibrahim had weakened due to the character attacks against him. These authors (1999: 156-157) demonstrated how Mahathir used his executive powers to slowly elbow Ibrahim out of office as Deputy Prime Minister. In fact, this acrimonious event tangibly demonstrated that Mahathir's actions was that of an authoritarian who disregarded the rule of law and employed unsavoury tactics to get rid of anyone that opposed him. Mahathir did not give any credence to the 'emancipatory project' when he exercised his executive powers and nor did he take cognizance of the oppositional voices that echoed far and wide across Malaysia.

Apart from the Ibrahim episode, Khoo (2000: 170-175) recorded other developments that added to the crisis. The one was the question of *reformasi*, a social movement that was proposed by Ibrahim and which demanded justice and reform; and the other was the

emergence of Barisan Alternatif, a coalition of opposition parties including KeADILan (sic) – party led by Ibrahim’s wife, Wan Aziza (Mohamad 2001: 212; Verma 2004: 118). These two groups posed a threat to UMNO’s, which prepared itself for the general elections in November 1999, hegemonic position. Verma (2004: 118) submitted by stating that the Ibrahim affair was a critical one in Malaysia’s political history because it raised questions about (a) the rule of law, (b) the independence of the judiciary, and (c) the professionalism of the police force. Mohamad (2001: 211) captured the situation quite well when she stated that ‘the Anwar crisis, which began as a contest over leadership in the party, culminated in the manifestation of a dislocation in Malay identity politics.’ She then clarified what was meant by this identity crisis and how it played itself out during the year of Anwar Ibrahim’s arrest and the years thereafter.

On the issue of Ibrahim’s arrest and subsequent incarceration, there was a deafening silence from the side of Mandela’s government as far as could be ascertained. Why the silence, one may wish to ask, when South Africa upheld ‘human rights’ and was generally in the forefront against arrests such as this; one where there was no tangible proof of the allegations that were made by Mahathir and his support group against Ibrahim. It is quite ironic that Mandela did not keep silent in the Ken Saro-Wiwa case and even went so far as to request some form of sanction against the Abacha regime. Perhaps Mandela realized that he had burnt his fingers in the latter case and thus chose not to say a word and nor in any way interfere in Malaysia’s internal affairs. But is also reflected that there was a cosy and friendly relationship that existed between Mandela and Mahathir and that overshadowed any other development. I assume Mandela was not keen to rock the Malaysian boat that found itself in the choppy Malaysian straits at that time. The incident said much for South African and Malaysian relations and does bring into the open South Africa’s stand on Malaysia’s position with regards to human rights issues such as the Ibrahim case in particular and human rights in Southeast Asia in general (cf. Eldridge 2002). For those critical of realism, this was and remained a grave matter that needed immediate attention by members of the world communities; unfortunately, the governments were mute but some NGOs – as expected – voiced their concerns. Be that as it may, let me return and continue to narrate the unfolding Malaysian

story.

By June 1999, when Ahmad Badawi was appointed as Mahathir's deputy after months of speculation (Felker 2000: 49), the South African government appointed honorary consuls in the states of Penang and Sarawak respectively, and in August, the then Deputy President of South Africa, Mr. Jacob Zuma attended the 4th LID meeting, which took place months after the 3rd SAID meeting in Zimbabwe. And in October South Africa sent representatives to participate in the Asia-Africa Business Forum that was held in Kuala Lumpur. During November 1999, just after the Malaysian election took place and when it was announced that the BN was victorious, members of the Northern Province legislature and other stakeholders from the province paid an official visit to Malaysia and on the 15th November; a special gathering was held to meet the delegates. This meeting was jointly organized under the auspices of the South African High Commission, MSABC, Asian Strategy Leadership Institute and the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry Malaysia. The visit was significant in that it was one of the first official visits to Malaysia after the 1997 and 1998 Asian crises and it laid the grounds for the coming of other official delegations to Malaysia.

Malaysia was still reeling after the Ibrahim debacle, and Mahathir had to contend with numerous protests led by Ibrahim's supporters. Mahathir however kept these protests in check. On the regional front, the relationship between Malaysia and ASEAN was not at all pleasant, and Mahathir chose not to attend the November 1999 Summit that took place in Manila (cf. Felker 2000). The basic reason was that he was busy securing his position at home and preparing for the elections; an election that he was not very confident of because of the Ibrahim affair. Fortunately for him and UMNO, he was re-elected into power. It should be stated that by then many speculated that he would step down but because of his resilience and despite the growing internal opposition, he managed to hold on to power for a few more years. After the elections, he regained his energies and strength and re-directed his energies in championing the course of the South. He thus graced the LID meeting where he addressed heads of state and captains of the industries

as well as the G-15 meeting in Cairo. He also presented the EAEC proposal at the ASEAN Summit of 2000. And he, yet again, took a swipe at the hegemonic role of the West during the era of globalization (Martinez 2001: 199).

Between the 15th and the 22nd of April in 2000, the same month when the South African Chapter for African Renaissance was established in Pretoria, the Deputy Minister for Finance, Expenditure and Economic Affairs in the Free State province led a delegation to Malaysia. During that visit the then – now Deputy President - Minister of Minerals and Energy, Ms. Phumizile Mlambo-Ngcuka, gave a special address on the ‘Investment opportunities in the Mining Industry’ on the 20th of April. And on the 23rd and 24th of May South African representatives attended the Asia-Africa Forum that was held in Kuala Lumpur under the theme: ‘Joining Hands for Strengthening Partnerships.’ During this period the Asia-Africa Investment and Technology Promotion Centre (AAITPC) was formally established in Kuala Lumpur after continuous consultation since 1993; the main purpose of this centre, which is under UN management, was to build linkages in the form of investments, trade and technology transfer from Asia to Africa. The centre is located within a framework of South-South Cooperation and aimed to assist business communities and institutional partners on both continents to identify business opportunities and create ‘a mutually beneficial win-win situation.’ This was followed by the SAID meeting that was initiated by Malaysia during the month of August 2000 in Maputo. On the 6th of September, Mr. Popo Molefe, the premier of the North West Province, delivered on behalf of his delegation an address in Kuala Lumpur to attract investments to his province. Soon after this event, Ms. Lindiwe Mabuza was appointed as the new South African High Commissioner to Malaysia during October 2000. According Funston (2001: 205), Malaysians have been searching for new opportunities to invest in Africa since it has been viewed as an acceptable model for the South. Their search may be attributed to an accelerated economic growth at 8%, which marked the levels achieved before the 1997 economic crisis, in 2000 (ibid 200).

Whilst Malaysia was enjoying this positive economic performance, the cultural activities

continued between South Africa and Malaysia. Since the 'Cape Malay' community shared historical links with the Southeast Asians, the community also shared religious and cultural connections. These connections have been nurtured through organizations such as GAPENA and other religio-cultural groups. In the light of these ties, the Selangor Council of Welfare and Social Development organized the Cape Malay Charitable Concert on the 23rd of June 2001 in Shah Alam to inform the Malaysians about the cultural practices that are still being kept alive in South Africa. During this period the Dr. Nortier's Rooibos Museum (NRM), which was established in 2000, decided to create a small permanent 'Cape Malay' display within NRM structure to share and show the Malaysians what 'Cape Malay' culture was like in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Although the charitable concert and the latter display were at no stage dragged into an identity debate, some South African scholars such as Shamil Jeppie have been and remain opposed to the use of the term 'Cape Malay' and preferred the use of 'Cape Muslims.' Whilst I am inclined to accept this view, the employment of the latter term is not that simple either. In any event, reflexive theorists have generally viewed the issue of identity as problematic and contentious; and in essence it is an issue that is not easily resolvable and one that will continue to engage the minds of social scientists. As a matter of fact, I tried to briefly touch on the question of 'Malay' and 'Malayness' when I conceptualized 'identity' as one of the contested IR variables in Chapter Two.

Moving back to the story of consolidating the connections, the SAID meeting that took place on the 20th of August 2001 in Kampala, Uganda, discussed regional issues as well as the agenda for the Afro-Asia Dialogue conference that was to take place in Johannesburg between the 17th and 19th of February 2002. Soon after the Kampala gathering, in early September 2001, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, met with her Malaysian counterpart to discuss issues of mutual concern and to establish a joint Ministerial Commission. And on the 23rd of October 2001 the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was launched in Abuja, Nigeria (cf. Bond 2002; Herbst & Mills 2003; Kotze & Steyn 2003; Hughes 2004; Nkuhlu 2005).

3.5 Expanding Connections: Towards ‘A Strategic Partnership’?

During the first quarter of 2002 the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided a draft document to South Africa on the joint Ministerial Commission; it included the signing of MoUs in Sport and Recreation and other fields. And, by then, the South Africa’s DFA had decided to appoint Dr. Abraham Nkomo to replace Ms. Lindiwe Mabuza as South Africa’s third High Commissioner to Malaysia on the 22nd of March. Subsequent to these diplomatic events, the inaugural summit of the African Union (AU) was held during July 2002 in Durban; the AU effectively replaced the OAU according to the Constitutive Act of the AU. The radical restructuring of this age old organization into a brand new outfit, namely the AU, implied that it also amended some of the old and set fresh goals that it hoped to achieve within years ahead. One of the primary aims of the AU was ‘to promote peace, security and stability on the continent.’ NEPAD was constructed as a significant policy initiative and development strategy to address the aims that the AU desired and still desires to realise (Malcomson 2004: 11-12). The African Renaissance concept popularised by Mbeki provided a philosophical foundation for this important and crucial policy initiative (Melber 2004: 90). NEPAD, which ‘blends in nicely into the neo-liberal mainstream of globalisation’ and is in line with South Africa’s economic strategy (ibid 94), essentially seeks (a) to promote accelerated growth and sustainable development on the African continents, (b) to eradicate widespread poverty, and (c) to halt Africa’s marginalisation in the globalisation process (Kotze & Steyn 2003: 10). The chief architect and driving force behind this particular initiative was Thabo Mbeki, the president of South Africa and the then chairperson of the AU. And in his capacity as chair of the AU, he promoted the objectives of NEPAD at all the regional and international gatherings in order to demonstrate that the Africans are serious about solving their own problems (the African way?). In order for Africa to meet its development challenges, Mbeki and other continental leaders driving NEPAD have emphasised ‘the necessity of collective responsibility’ (Melber 2004: 92); a method of doing things in line with the African value system that has been espoused by some of the African political leadership.

Since Mbeki took it upon himself and encouraged his colleagues in his cabinet to promote this policy initiative, NEPAD as the name suggest – a new partnership – has been used to attract partners from the North such as the USA as well as those from the South such as Malaysia to assist through striking partnerships in the process of fast tracking Africa's development. In this regard, Mr. Jacob Zuma, the (former) Deputy President of South Africa, discussed the policy initiative at the 5th LID meeting in November 2002. And on the 5th of November 2002 Mbeki was granted the opportunity via the good offices of the Malaysian government to attend and address the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (Henwood & Vickers 2003: 330). This was indeed an important meeting for it was the first time that an African leader addressed ASEAN. Mbeki addressed ASEAN in his capacity as the AU chairperson and at the end ASEAN leaders unanimously agreed to organize a special ASEAN-NEPAD conference with the purpose of wanting to know how the partnerships will be built between the African leaders/countries and potential donor countries from ASEAN (Landsberg 2004: 196). As far as one could ascertain, nothing substantial developed out of this meeting.

When 2003 ushered in South Africa officially handed over NAM leadership to Malaysia during February at the 13th NAM summit in Kuala Lumpur. By August of that year Mr. Zuma was invited by the Malaysian World Peace Federation to participate in its conference and to also be involved in a Statesmen Roundtable discussion prior to the conference. Mr. Zuma's visit also paved the way for Mr. Mbeki's official visit to Malaysia during the first week of September 2003. Before reflecting on this important visit, a quick comment on Malaysia's position during 2003 will be in place. According to Ganesan's (2004) scholarly observations, Malaysia's economy was buoyant and it was generally stable and in a fairly strong position. Throughout the year speculation was rife as regards Mahathir's successor; even though Ahmad Badawi – being the deputy - was touted for the post, there was no clear indication from Mahathir on this subject during the early part of the year. However, by the end of October 2003, Mahathir finally resigned and handed over the 'hot seat' to Ahmad Badawi. The latter continued to steer Malaysia into 2004 whilst Malaysia was enjoying economic growth and stability. Malaysia,

moreover, occupied itself throughout 2003 (and 2004) with the formulation of policies and the pursuance of the NDP in an aggressive way.

The earlier mentioned visit by Mbeki to Malaysia was a significant one in that it was the first visit in his capacity as South Africa's president. At the formal meeting bilateral talks ensued, agreements were signed and an MoU was put in place to set up a joint commission between the two countries. The two leaders also discussed other mutual cooperative projects and engaged in a debate North-South relations. In Mr. Mbeki's reply to the toast by His Majesty, Yang di-Pertuan Agong, on the 2nd of September he expressed his thanks on behalf of the South African government and the South African people for Malaysia's support against apartheid and he paid special tribute to Mahathir's unstinting efforts in forging a close partnership that existed between South Africa and Malaysia since the two former statesmen (i.e. Mandela and Mahathir) struck a cordial and brotherly relationship. Mr. Mbeki also stated that South Africa has gained from Malaysia's Bumiputra programme when it designed and finalized its Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) project. In addition to these remarks, he touched upon the role the two states can play in transforming the UN, NAM, the Commonwealth and similar international institutions for the benefit of all in the South via the AU and ASEAN structures (Mbeki Speech 2003).

The outcome of the Malaysian elections on 21st March 2004 secured the BN a solid victory and this meant that Badawi - or Pak Lah as he is popularly known in the socio-political circles - was given the necessary support and motivation by the Malaysians to lead them. And in April Mbeki began his second term after the South Africans voted the ANC back into power. During April Badawi introduced the 'National Integrity Plan' to root out corruption; this plan as well as a few others lined up helped Badawi to create his own identity, though he made himself vulnerable to criticisms from party members as well as from the former Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir. Whilst he pushed for greater ethnic tolerance through dialogue, he also demonstrated a certain degree of transparency after ordering the release of Anwar Ibrahim during September 2004. On the internal front, Badawi continued to be critical of USA's invasion of Iraq and its policy towards

Palestine. And under his leadership he warmed up to his ASEAN buddies, namely Singapore and Indonesia. Malaysia, according to Welsh (2005), was ‘fostering quiet cooperation’; a strategy that is not the same as the ‘quiet diplomacy’ adopted by South Africa towards its neighbour, Zimbabwe.

An important official South African visit took place between the 23rd and 24th of June 2005 and it was led by Dr. Dlamini-Zuma (Speech 2005), the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Malaysia to bring into fruition the First South Africa – Malaysia Joint Ministerial Commission meeting that was planned during Mr. Mbeki’s official visit in 2003. In her speech she emphasised the ‘solid foundations’ on which the two countries’ relations have been built and reflected briefly on some of the events that had taken place over the many years. Dr. Dlamini-Zuma reinforced the view that their ‘... countries share common sentiments regarding many international issues and we talk the same language when it comes to ... the importance of South-South cooperation or the imperatives for developing countries to participate in the global political and economic system on an equitable basis.’ And she expressed her unstinting support for Malaysia’s efforts to advance the ‘Agenda of the South’ as well as her unqualified support for regional cooperation via the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership ‘Plan of Action’ that was adopted in Jakarta in Indonesia. Dr. Dlamini-Zuma also thanked the Malaysians for giving their support to the AU and NEPAD. Dr. Dlamini-Zuma’s passionate speech tangibly underscored the relationship and partnership that had been formed between the two states. She, for example, mentioned that the two countries have concluded ‘a total of five official agreements and two Memoranda of Understanding in areas of mutual interest...’ and that many others were being concluded and negotiated. The questions that come to mind are: What do these agreements in real terms mean? In which way have they been concluded in the interest of their respective societies and have these agreements also taken into account the needs of their fellow member states from the South? When would the person in the rural area or the disadvantaged sector in South Africa and Malaysia be able to see the tangible results of these agreements? For social scientists these and other related questions need responses for they will assist in changing the images of their communities; particularly when these communities are able to see and

experience what bilateral relations actually mean and how they affect communal relationships in reality.

Dr. Dlamini-Zuma's significant meeting laid the foundations for Dato Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's first important official state visit in his capacity as Malaysia's Prime Minister on the 26th and 27th of July 2005 to South Africa. Mr. Badawi's delegation consisted of 5 cabinet ministers, a parliamentary secretary, 7 members of the federal and state legislators, senior government officials and a number of persons from the Malaysian business community. In Mr. Badawi's 2005 speech he thanked Mr. Mbeki for the official invitation and expressed his delight to have been able to be in South Africa. He was optimistic about the close partnership that had – until then - been forged between the two nation-states and was of the firm opinion that the Malaysians consider the '...relations with South Africa as pivotal and strategic.' After he briefly reflected upon the historical ties that existed between the two countries and the anti-apartheid stand Malaysia took since its independence in 1957. Mr Badawi reiterated that Malaysia was determined 'to further elevate Malaysia-South Africa relations... to cooperate to undertake specific ventures and establish various programmes to enrich the tapestry of Malaysia-South Africa ties.' And he also recognised the nature of the partnership that had up to that moment been established between the two states in trade, commerce and technology; he, however, re-emphasised the need for the relationship to be transformed into 'a strategic partnership.' Badawi made the point that he viewed the relationship to be 'pivotal and strategic' but also added that there was much room to expand and deepen it in areas that need further exploration via sharing information and devising strategies in order to face the variety of international challenges in different spheres.

And Mr. Badawi acknowledged that both states share much in common; both, he stated, were against any form of unilateralism and the use of force. He strongly suggested that both states should work closely so that the international system is made conducive to economic and social development, and to pursue the idea of promoting dialogue between cultures and civilizations. The question that comes to mind is: how far has the two states' close relationship succeeded in forcing the international system particularly those from

the North to make the environment conducive for socio-economic development and pursue meaningful dialogue without it resulting in realizing Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis? Nevertheless, towards the close of his speech, he aired his views against terrorism and the adoption of a multilateral approach when finding and identifying its real causes. He ended off by making reference to Malaysia's position as chair of a number of significant world bodies, namely NAM, OIC and the ASEAN, and the efforts it has made to bring an end to the Palestinian crises and to also give special attention to the empowerment of women and bringing about gender equality and equity; issues that critical theorists fully support and endorse. He expressed his desire to have a close working relationship with South Africa on all of these and other matters that would 'advance the interests and concerns of the Non-Aligned Movement.'

The lengthy and detailed speech, which Badawi gave on his visit as Malaysia's prime minister, brought to the fore a number of critical questions that assist in understanding the relationship that had been ongoing for more than ten years during the post-apartheid era: To what extent have South Africa and Malaysia reflected 'good governance' in their respective regions? Compared to many other states in their midst, they seemed to have fared quite well. Have their governments adopted a critical attitude towards themselves to monitor whether they are upholding and sticking to the ideals of democracy? It seems that whilst this might have generally been the case, there have been occasions when they have fallen short of these ideals by remaining uncritical towards developments within their governments and the parties they represent. Have the governments of these two states not been affected by the rapid rise in white collar crimes and particularly cronyism? Unfortunately, corruption has been on the increase and members of the ruling parties in both states have been guilty of practicing cronyism; a fact that cannot be wished away but one that needs to be weeded out before the whole government becomes tainted with malpractices and corruption. In South Africa the Shabir Sheik case and in Malaysia the Dato Shamsuddin case are two specific examples. These few questions and responses provide some idea of the nature of the relationship between the two states. Badawi's plea that both accept the relationship to be a strategic one demonstrated that there was a desire to deepen the links at almost each and every level.

4. South Africa and Malaysia's Trade Ties:

4.1 Commercial Connections: Demonstrating a Solid Partnership

Among the many issues that had been mentioned in the respective speeches of Mbeki and Badawi during their official visits were those of mutual trade and investments. And since the commercial connections between South Africa and Malaysia have developed into a fairly strong one – despite the financial hiccups that occurred along the way - over the years since diplomatic ties were forged, a detail discussion regarding these ties demonstrate the nature of the economic partnership that developed.

Both South Africa and Malaysia have been described by specialists on economics such as Jones (2002) and Alavi (2004) to possess ‘open economies.’ According to Mohr (2002), from the 1980s onwards South Africa’s international trade and financial relations were liberalized. Malaysia compared to South Africa had a head start in this regard when it designed and adopted the National Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971 that worked towards similar goals (Osman-Rani 1990: 204-226); this program thus set Malaysia on course to implement a liberalization strategy that assisted in opening up its economy. Since both these states pursued this strategy and found themselves in sync with the world economy supported by the industrialized nations, these two states became significant players in their specific regional economic systems.

South Africa is a crucial cog in SADC and Malaysia a significant structure within ASEAN. This section attempts to interpret the trade figures that both countries have published on their respective websites; however, much of the updated information was taken from the Malaysian site. The main objective of this brief but tentative study is to demonstrate the trade trends in the respective import and export sectors of the two states. Another objective is to obtain an overall view of the nature of the trade relations that exists between these two states since they resumed diplomatic links in 1993 and began to initiate trade agreements soon thereafter. Before embarking upon this, it is perhaps necessary to address albeit briefly South Africa’s position vis-à-vis that of Malaysia as

regards international trade from 1994 onwards; the discussion is, moreover, prefaced by a few theoretical considerations.

4.2 Explaining Commercial Connections:

States such as South Africa and Malaysia have spent a significant amount of time to review their economic status within the world trade and investment system. The main purpose for undertaking this activity was to address a key variable within all national economic policies, namely economic growth. Economists basically argue that this variable needed to be maximized in order to measure the change in the goods' volume as well as the gross domestic product (GDP) or services produced by the country concerned. The maximization process would then, in turn, enlarge the country's consumption basket, create job opportunities and, as a result, 'yield disposable income for consumption purposes' (Rangasamy 2001).

Thus for countries such as South Africa and Malaysia to move ahead in the economic arena, they had to accept the contemporary macroeconomic policy that gave emphasis to *inter alia* foreign direct investment (FDI) and international trade (IT). FDI, which basically denotes 'the export of productive, non-loan capital from one country to another' (Milios & Harvey 1999: 365), has been considered crucial for a number of reasons; it was seen as a vehicle to: (a) stimulate the economy, (b) create job opportunities, (c) provide the means for increasing domestic production, (d) facilitate and encourage the transfer of the required skills & relevant technology, and (e) create space for trade deficits (on the current account) (cf. Grubel 1988; Rangasamy 2001; Rasiah 2003). Inextricably tied to FDIs is international trade (IT). According to Fairchild (1997: 772), the theories of IT can be categorized into two distinct categories; the one explains trade in 'standardized production' and the other discussed trade in 'differentiated production'. Within the latter category, numerous other theories have emerged; they are: (a) overlapping demand theory, (b) productive life-cycle theory and (c) economies of scale theory. These three theories have thus provided a significant understanding of the operations of the open market system in the contemporary world; a more technical and

detailed understanding of IT can be gauged from John Chipman's (1988: 922-955) lengthy article entitled 'International Trade'.

Setting these theoretical terms and concerns aside, it is important to take into account the fact that IT has become an area of concentration because of the nature of the open market system. A system that evolved and encouraged trade that would benefit all countries involved in commercial activities of various kinds. International trade therefore offers two states such as South Africa and Malaysia the chance to export and import raw materials as well as manufactured or consumer goods that are needed by the consumers of the respective states; this would provide employment opportunities for their respective citizens and more importantly result in export revenues that would allow for the purchasing of import goods or material. Since the trade liberalization model has been accepted as common practice in the contemporary world, South Africa and Malaysia have followed this model - despite its inherent faults – because of (somewhat unstoppable internal and) external factors such as the process of globalization (Bouare 2001: 35-37); however, many of these factors have been devised by significant world players such as the World Bank and IMF and who have also imposed them on the 'global village;' and any state not abiding by the rules and regulations are immediately penalized in different ways so that they fall in line with the contemporary requirements stipulated by the aforementioned institutions as well as other world bodies. One specific example in SADC is South Africa's northern neighbour, Zimbabwe that owes the IMF millions of dollars and was given in August 2005 a six months reprieve to pay the balance owed.

4.3 South Africa's Economic Position vis-à-vis Malaysia

Months before South Africans went to the polls to participate in the first democratic elections in April 1994, many countries such as Malaysia that formed part of the non-traditional economic market took a proactive position to establish diplomatic ties with the emerging democratic state; this state was in the process of casting off its apartheid past through the elections and other structures and at the same time adopted the macroeconomic policy plans that were operative in the developed states and that have

been accepted by the new industrialized countries (NICs) such as Malaysia. Since South Africa was known to be rich in minerals and other resources, it was understood to be a potential exciting economic market; a market that was bound to not only open up, but one that would become active in IT and one that would permit FDI to flow back in. This was indeed the case when the elections took place and when the GNU was put in place under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, the then president of the ANC.

By the time the GNU came into power, it had to deal with an economy that was in decline because of a number of factors such as the drop in the gold price, the weakening of the currency, the stifling domestic market, and the rate of unemployment (Bond 2001; Jones 2002). The GNU embarked upon a Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), which was a broad-based social and economic development strategy (Lester et al 2000); this strategy fell in line with the macroeconomic policy plans. Unfortunately, since the RDP was unsuccessful as a strategic mechanism it was shelved and in its place another was devised; this was the Growth, Economic and Redistribution program, popularly referred to as GEAR (Lester et al 2000; Taylor 2001). GEAR, like the RDP, was described as 'statements of ideals' and it was to work along one basic principle and that was 'fiscal discipline' (Rangasamy 2001: 123); GEAR's goals were to: (a) achieve high rates of economic growth, (b) expand the private sector, (c) improve output of employment, (d) attain fiscal reform, (e) encourage trade and investment, (f) recover investments, (g) work towards redistribution, (h) overcome poverty, and (i) raise the basic living conditions. Even though GEAR has been critically assessed by some economists (Lester et al 2000: 256; Bond 2001: 85-86; Maasdorp 2002: 20), it has been partially successful since structures were implemented to monitor and check its implementation process. Bond (2001) pointed out that in addition to GEAR's failure to deliver there were also other factors at play that negatively affected the South African economic status; these were the FDI and trade inflows, the domestic dimension of the problem such as the reliance of mineral exports and domestic (and foreign) indebtedness.

When turning to Malaysia and comparing its status to that of democratic South Africa in terms of economic reforms, a slightly different story has been told by economic

historians. According to Rasiah (2003), Malaysia belonged with Thailand and Indonesia to the second-tier Southeast Asian newly industrializing countries known as SEANIC – the first-tier nations are Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea; they became known as Asia’s Newly Industrialized Economies. Malaysia, which is the leader of the pact and which has been described by Athukoral (2003: 118) to be ‘an urbanized economy,’ has generally been richly endowed with resources. These resources Malaysia used in its interest and subsequently recorded a substantial manufacturing growth since the 1970s. This, in turn, has led to a rapid export growth. Rasiah (2003: 19) observed that SEANIC adopted a liberal export-oriented policy and their growth was associated with market-friendly policies (cf. Ariff & Khalid 2003; Rasiah 2005). These three states, which adhered to the macroeconomic fundamentals within a market friendly environment, became major exporters of primary commodities; in the process they secured sustained investments and savings, and they also provided high corporate shares. Their main objective was to achieve macroeconomic stability during the earlier stages of their rapid growth. Malaysia and its neighbouring states expanded their economies and also diversified their commodities (Rasiah 2003: 22-25). Malaysia, which was given impetus in the 1970s through the formation and implementation of the NEP and in the 1990s by the NDP, remained the leader of this group for quite a while.

When South Africa was welcomed back by the international community in the early 1990s, it immediately set its sights on improving the economy by devising earlier mentioned strategies such as the RDP and GEAR; these were however not on par with the types of policies and strategies that Malaysia had been implemented between the 1970s and 1990s. Nevertheless, South Africa learnt its lessons of how to address important areas of interest within its growing economy; one of these was IT. Maasdorp (2002: 16) mentioned that in the mid-1980s the financial sanctions had an adverse effect on the South African economy and that it did not really recover from this; and in the process when it was intensified it was forced to become ‘a capital exporting country’ in order to repay debts and stave off capital flight. These were further exacerbated by misspendings, corruption, inefficiency, and complacency. The new democratic state, which inherited this state of affairs, had to therefore act proactively by signing the

General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT) as a way forward in 1994. According to Maasdorp (ibid 23), it paid serious attention to all external trade agreements for it realized that attracting FDI and encouraging IT would contribute towards the alleviation of a number of internal problems such as unemployment - that had been partly the reasons for the high crime rate in different parts of the country, the increase in agricultural imports because of the changes in the climatic conditions, and the depreciation of the South African currency. The positive approach eventually resulted in South Africa's economic status being described as 'a service economy' because of the presence of its significant high tech industry and it was also viewed as 'an investment grade country' by the year 2000 (ibid 26, 28).

Despite the credit ratings accorded to South Africa, according to Stuart Jones (2002), its economy was still on a continuous decline. Leaving aside his negative perceptions, South Africa has been able to make inroads into IT and has been able to enter new markets; markets that have been viewed as non-traditional ones during the era of apartheid and that have been off-limits in terms of trade because of South Africa's despicable, inhumane domestic policies. During this era it was the industrialized countries such as the UK, Germany, France and the USA that have turned a blind eye to the internal South African policies and pursued IT for their own ends. Since the dawning of a new era, South Africa was inundated with diplomatic links and trade partners. Malaysia was among the many favoured partners because of Malaysia's support for the ANC against apartheid and the close relationship that was forged between Nelson Mandela and Mahathir Mohamed when both were the heads of states of their respective countries. As already noted by Maasdorp, South Africa took great care to service the bilateral agreements that it signed with all of the new partners in trade, politics and other areas.

A statement issued by the DFA and Department of Trade and Industry officials clearly demonstrated how they viewed the trade, political and economic ties that developed and currently exist between the two states; they said that 'trade with Southeast Asia is relatively evenly spread between Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia. South Africa has built its strongest ties in Southeast Asia with Malaysia. This is evident in

Malaysia being the second largest investor on a cumulative basis in South Africa since 1994. In 2002 bilateral trade amounted to R5.6-billion, focusing on the hospitality, telecommunications and energy industries. South Africa and Malaysia co-operate closely in forums such as the Commonwealth, and Malaysia's intensive Technical Co-operation Program provides numerous training opportunities for South Africans across a range of sectors' (cf. http://www.southafrica.info/doing_business/sa_trade/agreements/trade_asia.htm). This statement described the relationship in a very positive manner, and this implied that South Africa will remain confident about its strong economic ties with Malaysia.

The 1997 and 1998 Asian crisis dented the economies of the Southeast Asian states (Tran Van Hoa 2001) as well as the economies of countries elsewhere in the global village; but despite this drawback, it provided an impetus for Malaysia to jump back (Athukorala 1998: 100; 2003: 115-116). And even though South Africa was one of the many countries that were affected by the crisis, it did not cause South Africa to adopt a pessimistic approach about future trade prospects with Southeast Asian states such as Malaysia. The economic melt-down during these years were viewed as a slight intervention in IT and one that stimulated new strategies to combat it in the years thereafter. Malaysia has been considered a close ally of South Africa in the ASEAN region, and South Africa generally viewed and continues to see Malaysia as a significant partner, which will respond to its call for aid when it comes to supporting important challenging projects such as NEPAD, an African based project that has been initiated by South Africa, and it is fully aware of the fact that many parts of the world is increasingly focusing on other growth areas.

4.4 Narrating SA-Malaysian Trade Figures: Towards a Tentative Interpretation

Mention was made in the introduction to this section on trade relations that most of the figures that feature in it have been lifted from the Malaysian Ministry of International Trade's website, which provided useful data and a brief analysis; however, the same cannot be said for its South African counterpart. That being the case, according to the Malaysian Ministry of International Trade it made the following observations as regards

the trade relations: 'Bilateral trade between Malaysia and South Africa grew robust by 14.9%, which valued at RM1,814.1 million (US\$484.5 million) in 2000 as compared with RM1,579.1 million (US\$415.6 million) in 1999. The growth in total trade recorded in 2000 was a positive turnaround as compared to -6.8% in 1998 and -2.8% in 1999. Trade with South Africa accounted for 0.2 % to Malaysia's global trade in 2000. For 2001, bilateral trade between Malaysia and South Africa amounted to US 487.8 million as compared with US\$477.4 million in 2000. The Trade Balance was in favour of Malaysia at US\$24.4 million. Since 1998, Malaysia's exports to South Africa dropped by -18.6% from RM1,169.9 million (US\$307.9 million) to RM951.4 million (US\$250.4 million) in 2000. However, during the same period, Malaysia's imports grew higher by 89.9% from RM454.1 million (US\$119.5 million) in 1998 to RM862.7 million (US \$227.0 million) in 2000.' It also stated that: 'Malaysia's export to South Africa increased by 2.3% to US\$256.1 million from US\$250.4 million in 2000, whilst import from South Africa increased by 2.1% to US\$231.7 million from US\$227.0 in 1999. For the period Jan-May 2002, bilateral trade between Malaysia and South Africa amounted to US\$178.6 million with exports valued at US\$91.7 million and imports valued at US\$86.9 million. During the period, Malaysia registered a trade surplus of RM4.8 million. If compared to the corresponding period in 2001, exports to South Africa recorded a decrease of 8.4% and imports decreased higher by 14.1%.'

The figures supplied and the analysis given provided some clear ideas regarding the extent of the trade between these two states. It demonstrated that the trade losses suffered in the 1997 and 1998 period was made up – to some degree – from 1999 onwards; according to Athukorala (2003: 117) the GDP which contracted by 7,5% in 1997 moved beyond where it used to be - before the crisis - in 2000. And it basically showed that trade bounced back and that the two countries have not abandoned their relations in the light of the Asian crisis. Their relations were, in fact, reaffirmed along with their commitment to pursue trade if the circumstances and conditions continue to be favourable to both. When taking into account Malaysia's total export in 1999 to SA was RM 321.18 bn, it was noted that it was at that time the 31st largest export destination; this indicated that Malaysia and South Africa had a long road to plod before reaching a point in which their

relationship could be described as a strategic one. It should be borne in mind that by 1999 Malaysia had gradually regained its economic strength, and that it took Malaysia a while to reinforce the gaps and mend the economy. It was, of course, preparing and protecting itself from other possible economic crises in the years ahead. When Malaysia re-invested in South Africa, it approached its options with trepidation and a fair amount of caution so as not to negatively affect the country's economic growth. It therefore avoided investing all its wealth in one state. A useful exercise would be to refer to South Africa's DTI's quarterly report (2004), which provides some statistical analysis as regards South Africa's import and export partners, and which showed that Malaysia did not feature in the top ten trading partners in both the import and export sectors. The latter point reinforced the notion that though the relationship between South Africa had been close because of earlier developments, there is little evidence to support the view that the partnership has developed into a strategic one; the political leadership would dearly wish that this be the case – as noted from Badawi's 2005 speech mentioned earlier - for it would not only enhance their individual profiles but also demonstrate to what degree nation-states from the South are able to make substantial contributions to their own economies and to those of the regions that they represent.

The trade figures below in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 respectively, provide a glimpse of the import and export status between the two states (cf. <http://www.matrade.gov.my/economy-trade/bilateral-archive/s-africa.htm>). It can be gauged that when official relations began in 1993, speculations were already rife that commercial activity will gradually increase; this was no doubt the case. South Africa's DTI informed its potential investors to consider petrochemicals, telecommunications, hospitality, and property markets as important investment opportunities. It argued that Malaysians were the second largest new investors in South Africa by 1996. It was estimated that the increase to 97.1% of Petronas shares in Engen had a total value of R4 billion (US \$714 million). Petronas divested 20% ownership in Engen to Worldwide Africa Investment Holdings in support of the South African government's empowerment strategy in November 1999.

Unfortunately, few were in the position to predict the Asian crisis that took place during

1997 and 1998; and when this occurred trade between the two states was visibly affected and this resulted in financial investments being pulled out and thus a decrease in trade. The Asian crisis was indeed a blow to the economies world wide including that of South Africa; its own companies had to either close doors or restructure to accommodate the new economic circumstances. This was the case with many South African companies that went into Malaysia with wishes of financial windfalls and a variety of other objectives. The same may be said of the Malaysian companies that entered the SA economic market. The Asian financial crisis caused a number of Malaysian companies to withdraw from their overseas commitments and consolidated at home. Besides the Petronas investment in South Africa's Engen, BusinessMap indicated that Malaysian interests in South Africa were marked by net disinvestment in 1998. It also added that during 1997 and 1998, apart from the Petronas and Telekom Malaysia investments, not much original currency was brought into South Africa (<http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2003/malay0805.htm>).

A number of South African businesses that had been actively doing business in Malaysia at the time were affected by the crisis; as a consequence some curtailed their staff and others shut down offices. The following South African companies closed offices in Malaysia: Grinaker Construction Ltd., BKS and Armscor. The major companies that remained in Malaysia were Murray & Roberts, Africon, Plestel (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. and Rhine Ruhr Process Equipment. By January 2000, Murray and Roberts withdrew their South African representatives from Malaysia while maintaining local representatives in Kuala Lumpur. In early 2001, Denel reopened its offices in Kuala Lumpur after closing them for a year. The reopening followed a US\$49 million sale of 22 units of the 155mm G-5 artillery gun for the Royal Malaysian Army. The franchise chain Nandos introduced and subsequently expanded its fast food operations in Malaysia. (cf. DFA & DTI, South Africa & Padayachee & Vahed 2000). The table below reflects the economic activities over a ten year period from the beginning of 1993 until 2003. It also proved that joint ventures were slowly forged as was the case with SA Freight, which had signed a joint venture bid with Sabah Shipyard Sdn Bhd. to build a training patrol vessel for the Royal Malaysian Navy. The value of SA Freight was US\$ 60 million for the hull of the vessel to be built in Durban. Between 1999 and 2002 the exports were somewhat pegged at 0.95 per year and this changed dramatically by 2003. The 2003 figure surpassed that of 1998


when the export reached 1.17 as compared to 1.27. In the import sector, the downturn was already noted in 1998, and it was slowly inching its way back to a more reasonable figure of 0.85 in 2003.

Table 4.2: Malaysian-South African trade c. 1993- 2003 (Value in RM Billion & June 2006 Exchange Rate: 1 RM = 1,942 ZAR)

Year	Total Exports	Total Imports	Total Trade	Balance of Trade
1993	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.01
1994	0.46	0.31	0.77	0.14
1995	0.68	0.51	1.19	0.17
1996	0.72	0.64	1.36	0.08
1997	0.81	0.93	1.74	-0.11
1998	1.17	0.45	1.62	0.72
1999	0.95	0.63	1.58	0.32
2000	0.95	0.86	1.81	0.09
2001	0.94	0.89	1.83	0.06
2002	0.95	0.73	1.69	0.22
2003	1.27	0.85	2.12	0.42


The graph in Figure 4.2 (and Figure 4.3) below basically complements the table above and offered a different overview of the manner in which the imports and exports have fluctuated over the ten year period. It also showed the nature of the balance of trade. The balance of trade, which started out at a miniscule amount of 0.01, was steadily on the rise and for some reason dropped by more than 50% in 1996. This was made worse when the market was affected by the Asian crisis and it contracted further to -0.11. But despite this, it swung back to a reasonable figure of 0.72 but then began to fall once again; by 2000 and 2001 the figures that were reached were 0.09 and 0.06 respectively. This was not very encouraging. By 2002 it slowly shifted back and reached 0.22 and 0.42 in 2002 and 2003 respectively. These positive developments, it is assumed, will continue into the forthcoming years, if the market remains stable and friendly to FDI and IT activities. It is moreover interesting to compare and observe the data that have been captured by both the Malaysians and the South Africans.

Figure 4.3: A Graphic Interpretation of Malaysian-South African Trade between 1993 and 2003.



The Asian financial crisis had a dramatic effect on South African exports to Malaysia; it decreased by R480 million from November 1997 to October 1998 (SA exports totalled R546 million between November 1997 to October 1998). In the same period South African imports from Malaysia rose by R495 (Imports from Malaysia totalled R1769 million). The trade balance in Malaysia's favour, for this period, amounted to R1223 million. Before this dramatic reversal, the trade balance between the two countries had only slightly been in Malaysia's favour. The SA imports from Malaysia amounted to R1274 million (Nov 1996 to Oct 1997) whilst SA exports amounted to R1,026 million.

Figure 4.4: A Graphic Interpretation of Trade between Malaysia and South Africa (circa 1992 – 2007)



The table and graphs demonstrated that, despite the Asian crisis that intervened, a steady overall growth rate continued to be on the rise. In 1994 the total trade started out at 1,096,957 and reached 5,654,163 in 2002. When looking specifically at SA's Export figures to Malaysia, the steady growth began in 1994 but was deeply affected by the Asian crisis and this resulted in low figures recorded in 1998 and 1999 respectively; however, when the Malaysian economy slowly recovered, SA Exports was also on the increase as from 2000. And as regards SA's Import figures from Malaysia, there remained a continuous growth between 1994 and 2002 (See Table 4.3 below). Moreover, when reviewing the total trade figures, it may be suggested that trade between the two states have not really slackened and that it continued to be on the incline; this therefore bodes well for both states.

Table 4.3: Bilateral Trade (ZA Rand '000 – 1 ZAR = 0.515 RM [Source: DTI, SA])



SA Bilateral Trade Relations

Year	Export	Imports	Total
1994	348,954	748,003	1,096,957
1995	661,682	892,332	1,554,014
1996	742,534	1,076,632	1,819,166
1997	1,150,030	1,305,092	2,455,122
1998	396,181	1,780,970	2,177,151
1999	749,993	1,781,826	2,531,819
2000	1,109,222	2,062,585	3,171,807
2001	1,524,001	2,448,658	3,972,659
2002	2,010 334	3, 643 829	5, 654,163

Malaysia has over the years diversified its economy, which was bolstered by the FDI that helped in this regard. In the manufacturing sphere it was able to make its mark with the full support of the government as illustrated by Tan Eu Chye & Ariff (2001: 61-62). By the 1990s the manufacturing industry contributed handsomely towards the country's economy. South Africa, like many others, benefited from this industry and it has thus been amongst those countries that have been importing a variety of products. From amongst the list of products, vegetable fats & oils and telecommunication equipment reaped in a sizeable amount in Ringgits. On the mentioned website, Malaysia also highlighted products such as chemicals, petroleum, metal, plastic and food ingredients as marketable ones for the South African market.

When comparing the export products to those that Malaysia imports, it is quite noticeable to observe the types of items that South Africa produced and has exported to countries such as Malaysia. Since 1999 Aluminum stood out as one of the most important products

on the import list; however, in 2001 there was a slight drop in the amount that was imported. This was followed by Ferrous Waste & Scraps where one witnesses a substantial increase since 1999. Copper appears third from among the minerals that have thus far been imported; in 2001 the amount reached 76.38 as compared to 20.87 in 1999. In Jones' (2002: 207) assessment all of the mentioned products belong to the seven top products that have generally been exported. Among the non-minerals items Sugar etc seems to be in demand; in 1999 the amount of sugar was only 61.82 and this figure doubled to 121.22 by the year 2001. It would however have been interesting to have mentioned some of 'the other imports' that have been referred to in the table that appears on the website; the figures in 1999 and in 2001 are after all relatively high and need further explanation. In any case, this is where DTI's figures and information came to the rescue (cf. <http://www.thedti.gov.za/econdb/raportt/463.html>). The DTI statistics listed a variety of products that are exported to and imported from Malaysia, and gave one a fair idea of the types of products other than 'the priority listed ones' that are exported and imported; this information is crucial for the small emerging businesses in South Africa that wish to develop trade ties with Malaysians.

An interesting feature noted on the MATRADE website was the fact that the Ministry pro-actively posted on its site lists of products that may be potential imports. Similar efforts were also made by the DTI; for example, the site stated 'There are pockets of opportunities in Malaysia in the oil and gas industry (downstream)' and thus gave the example of a South African company, namely Polifin (40:40:20 in a joint venture with Petronas and a Dutch company), which entered a US \$40 million plastics venture in Kerteh, on Malaysia's East Coast in 1998/99. In fact, it prefaced the list by stating the following: 'A major area for potential growth and development in post-apartheid South Africa is the SADC which has a total population of 150 million people and a combined gross national product (GNP) of US\$170 billion. South Africa's economy is the most dominant in the region; it has 31% of the SADC's population, and 7% of Sub-Saharan Africa's, yet contributes 78% and 41% of the respective areas' gross national products. With a well-developed infrastructure and increasingly positive trade links with the rest of the world, it is an obvious point of entry for foreign trade and investment in the region.'

South Africa's DTI has however emphasized and highlighted the fact that its commercial policy toward Malaysia is focusing on trade and investment promotion. DTI's focus-specific areas are agro-forestry, dimension stone/granite, film production, petrochemical downstream, shipping/boat building and telecommunication equipment. It also went on to demonstrate that even though Malaysia's presence as an active investor has been significantly reduced it, it has not given up on the African continent as a whole and in South Africa in particular. The current crisis in Zimbabwe has, in fact, forced Malaysia not to abandon Africa but relocate its investments of a R30 million condom factory from Zimbabwe to Mpumalanga in South Africa. This is once again a sign that South Africa is still very much a credit rated country despite its shortcomings; and it is also gave the signal that Asian states such Malaysia continue to demonstrate its confidence in the stable South African socio-political and economic environment.

5. Closing Remarks:

International Trade has been one of the most challenging focus areas for South Africa since it became a democracy in 1994. The multilateral and bilateral agreements that it signed with numerous countries over the past few years are ample evidence to demonstrate that South Africa is a significant export-import destination. South Africa's trade, which has been characterized as Western during the apartheid era, may now be described as non-western or Afro-Asian; it has in fact adopted a 'Look East' policy, which included the African continent, to pursue its trade links and attract investments from states that are economically on a sound footing and that possess the necessary investments to plough into the South African coffers. South Africa took advantage of its new found status as a democracy to lure as many African and Asian countries. It has generally benefited from the agreements that have been signed and many of its companies have entered into joint ventures with companies in these states. The Malaysian state and many of its private companies have queued to become partners in many joint economic ventures. Although Malaysia's investments in South Africa might have shrunk because of the Asian crisis, they did not disappear. And the mere fact that the Malaysians were able to bounce back after the crisis and regain its position as a ferocious, fighting Asian Tiger, it has continued to trade and invest in countries such as South Africa;

however, this time round, the companies that have been looking for investment opportunities from Malaysia have done so in a more cautious and calculating manner.

In conclusion, South Africa undoubtedly remains an attractive country for Malaysian investors and traders. And since South Africa-Malaysia trade relations remain on a good footing, it is assumed that it will continue to grow as long as the circumstances are favourable to all competitive partners. Before finally bringing this section in particular and the chapter in general to a close, the bilateral relationship between Malaysia and South Africa forms an integral part of the growing and expanding partnership that has been cemented in the South via mutual diplomatic visits and the signing of agreements and MoUs in a variety of sectors over the few years. It, in a concrete and visible manner, demonstrates the strong bond that exists between the two nation states; this has, however, not been enough to forge 'a strategic partnership' in order to tangibly show members from the South what it really means to forge links and deepen relations. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the commercial connections and trade ties complement the socio-political dimensions of the relationship that had been outlined, discussed and analysed in the earlier sections of this chapter.

The contents of this chapter should therefore be viewed as an important setting for the next chapter in which the socio-cultural relations that exist will be discussed. In the socio-cultural arena, the relationship between Malaysia and South Africa has been spearheaded by refugees and cultural activists during South Africa's apartheid era and has continued into the post-apartheid period with greater support and enthusiasm from the side of the respective governments in South Africa and Malaysia.

CHAPTER FIVE

South Africa and Malaysia's Cultural Activists' Narratives: Forging 'Down-stairs' Socio-Cultural Connections in the South

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter it was demonstrated how South Africa and Malaysia have successfully forged a strong and firm relationship over the years between these two states. The chapter has shown that these two nation states have indeed become active and close socio-political and economic partners; partners that have also become locked into their respective regional systems, which they used as avenues to encourage trade and commercial relations at regional and continental levels respectively.

Both states have aggressively pursued bilateral trade links over the many years in order that their respective communities benefit from them through investments, business ventures, employment, and other ways. On the whole, there appears to be a fairly healthy relationship at the state-to-state level or to use Vale's expression at the 'upstairs' level. This strong relationship has to some extent clouded state-actors' vision as to what was taking and continues to take place at the 'downstairs' level; in other words, at the people-to-people's level. At this level NGOs and non-state actors (NSAs) have made contact with counterparts in other states and it is indeed this area that is of interest to those concerned with critical approaches to understanding. These theorists reflected their interest because the NGOs and NSAs fall into a category that has generally been marginalized and silenced. Critical theorists such as Habermas supported by a coterie of followers have argued that these silenced institutions and groups be included part in the emancipatory project; they, according to their grand theory, should be granted the

necessary space within the broader sphere of IR to freely exercise their desire and interests to forge ties across borders with like-minded groups and institutions; for example, the activities of cultural activists and groups wanting to make cross-border connections should be permitted and pursue ties that will be in the interest of the respective communities (cf. Josselin & Wallace 2001; Wyn Jones 2001).

Since the political leadership in both South Africa and Malaysia have been stressing on moving beyond politico-economic ties and by implication side-stepping sovereign decision making bodies, the leadership has in effect opened up an avenue through which cultural activists and their variety of activities may find new opportunities to express themselves and bond communities together. For example, both Mahathir and Mbeki have been highlighting the importance of cultural connections in their speeches and the value these would have for their respective nation-states. Whilst their political rhetoric and slogans have been considered commendable, it seems that the political leadership has been stuck and caught in their bilateral and multilateral relations with countries in the region and abroad that they seem to have become oblivious of the fact that NSAs such cultural activists have already been hard at work in establishing links and forging cultural ties that would be of interest and of benefit to the respective nations at large. This chapter thus turns its attention to these NSAs who have played and continue to play significant people-to-people's ties. In this chapter there are three individuals whose roles in forging international relations between the two states in their respective ways cannot be disregarded and overlooked. As far as one could determine, no serious IR academic work has been done in order to use these individuals as important case studies in discussing SA-Malaysian IR. It is therefore the intention of this chapter to do just that.

In the first part of this chapter, the socio-historical story of a South African family that migrated from South Africa to Southeast Asia as voluntary 'political' refugees is narrated. It, however, gives specific attention to Hajjah Rabi'ah's unique and interesting story that tells about her trials and tribulations as a voluntary South African 'migrant' or 'refugee' in seeking and obtaining citizenship in the Federation of Malaysia. The second part relates a completely different story; this time it's a story of a highly-motivated and a

self-styled cultural activist, namely Mr. Ismail Petersen, who has since the mid 20th century been actively involved in charitable work such as hosting Southeast Asian seamen who docked at the Cape. Mr. Petersen's narrative, which has not as yet been fully acknowledged by the state, has been recognized by Malaysian and Indonesian NGOs such as the Malaysian Historical Society. The example of Mr. Petersen as a case study clearly demonstrates the important role that individuals, like him, have been playing. It is assumed that similar stories are found – of which some have been recorded - in other South African ethnic communities such as the Portuguese, Greek, Chinese and Indians as well as in the religio-cultural communities such as the Hindus and Jews. And in the chapter's final part the story of a Malaysian cultural activist, namely Tan Sri Professor Drs. Ismail Hussein, and his organization, namely GAPENA, is narrated, recorded and analyzed. Tan Sri Hussein is an intellectual who dedicated much of his life to pursue socio-cultural relations in the era of globalization with groups in Southeast Asia as well as those who form part of 'Malay' diaspora such as South Africa's 'Cape Malays.' The separate but inter-related stories of these three individuals/cultural activists thus help to cover a different and indeed a generally little explored dimension of IR studies.

The chapter - like the previous ones - attempts to narrate, discuss and analyse by locating its contents within a specific theoretical framework. This framework assists to offer an understanding of the importance of bringing issues of identity and culture back into IR affairs. And by the same token it also emphasises the relevance of IR stories in not only enriching the IR discipline but in moving beyond the decision making body/bodies of the sovereign state. One important variable, which will preface this chapter, has been employed to construct a theoretical framework; this variable is the concept of 'community.' Since this concept acts as an overarching variable in which these individuals are physically and geographically located, other relevant variables such as NSAs will also be discussed when relating each of the stories below. Let me now discuss the concept of 'community' that would help to frame the three separate but inter-related stories.

2. Conceptualizing ‘Community’ and ‘Non-State Actors’:

The term ‘community’ has been considered as an imprecise and ubiquitous one by social scientists such as Rabinowitz (2001: 2387-2389) and Jacobs (2001: 2383) pointed out that the term is ‘open to wide interpretation’ (also cf. Milner 1972: 174-180); despite their problems in offering a suitable definition, they have appropriated Tonnes’ sociological model that helps to explain the term. Tonnes distinguished between two types of communities; the first is what he described as *gemeinschaft* and the second as *gesellschaft*. In the case of the former, it simply refers to a community that expresses feelings and the latter refers to associations that make up the community. Tonnes himself preferred to view community as the greater and more important entity than society; he argued that society is in essence made up of communities.

Community is thus the very foundation upon which society is based or created. The community is ‘... usually associated with an array of positive connotations such as solidarity, familiarity, unity of purpose, interest and identity’ (Rabinowitz 2001: 2387). Social scientists have, however, generally accepted the idea that it may be defined as a ‘type of collectivity or social unit’ or a type of social relations or sentiments.’ By collectivity is meant that the group shares a defined physical space or geographical area, and shares common traits or has a sense of belonging; and that it maintains social ties and that their interaction with one another shapes them into a distinct social entity such an ethnic or religious community. These descriptions remind one of Ibn Khaldun, the North African scholar of whom much had been said in Chapter Three, who advocated the notion of *‘asabiyyah* (group feeling/solidarity [cf. Rosenthal 1987: 566]).

Nonetheless Azarya (1996) pointed out that the term ‘community’ is a ‘type of social unit’ or ‘a type of social relations or sentiments,’ which shares physical geographical space and common traits such as a sense of belonging that brings about interaction that shapes it further into a distinct social entity, namely a religious community. From amongst the different minority religious communities in South Africa, the Muslim

community stands out as one of the more significant ones; various aspects of their significance have been dealt with in works by I.D. Du Plessis (1972), Bradlow & Cairns (1979), Davids (1980) and Tayob (1999). And in the case of Malaysia, the Malays – who are invariably accepted as Muslims according to the definition (cf. Barnard 2004; Kahn 2006) - form the largest religious community in that country.

In this chapter the interest is to look at representatives from these two communities. In general, when addressing the South African Muslim community or the Malaysian ‘Malay’ community, it can be cogently argued that they fit into Rabinowitz and others’ constructed and explained definition. For example, the South African Muslim community shares a physical geographical area and is made up of a variety of socio-linguistic and ethnic groups. And these different groups, *inter alia*, socialize with one another in the business arena, participate together in religious functions such as the celebration of the birth of the prophet, and involve themselves with one another in select sporting codes such as cricket. And whilst many of this community’s members are associated with their respective ethno-linguistic identity groups – taking into account Burgess’ (2002) critical thoughts - such as the ‘Cape Malays’ whose forebears hailed from parts of South Asia and Southeast Asia or Somali speakers who came to South Africa as refugees or Gujarati speakers whose forebears came as economic migrants from South Asia, they see themselves as part and parcel of the South African Muslim community. Arguments to describe and discuss the composition of the Malays in Malaysia can be constructed along similar lines (cf. Milner 1998; Barnard 2004; Kahn 2006).

Since these communities have been growing steadily in their respective states, representatives in each of them have been active in NGOs or community based organizations (CBOs) that tried to promote inter-cultural and religious relations with co-believers either within their own communities or with diasporic communities that share similar religio-cultural traits. Despite the debates regarding the exact origins of South Africa’s ‘Cape Malays’, representatives of these communities who have visited and toured Malaysia and Indonesia have observed similarities in physical features, religious practices, and cultural patterns of behaviour (cf. Haron 2005: 60-61). And since this has

been the case, these representatives have worked via CBOs or NGOs to connect these communities through religio-cultural structures. This was indeed what the stories of Mr. Ismail Petersen and Tan Sri Ismail Hussein reveal. In fact, these CBOs and NGOs have empowered the communities with the knowledge that they were able to accumulate about their respective communities and the opportunities that came along in the process of connecting and bonding through partnerships at the people-to-people's level.


Both communities via these representatives have become conscious of the positive value that this type of relationship brought about over the past few years, and they also became - to some degree - aware of what it can bring to bear on their respective countries' foreign policies and IR agendas. Since the position of NSAs such as these representatives has become an important and indeed a respectable role within in international relations, it is perhaps appropriate to briefly address the theoretical status of these representatives. Josselin and Wallace (2001: 1) noted that the state actors and NSAs form 'broad opposing categories' and that the latter group has learnt to exploit the space between the multilateral institutions in order to exercise their rights and pursue their interests in the socio-cultural and religious arena. These two scholars thus went on to define NSAs as individuals who are: autonomous from central government funding and control and emanate from civil society, operate and participate in networks which extend across borders of two or more states engaging in transnational relations that link socio-religion, cultural, economic and political ties (ibid 3-4). In the light of their observations, it can safely be concluded that both Ismail Petersen and Ismail Hussein have been acting autonomously without state support to pursue their socio-cultural activities within their respective communities as well as with groups in Southern Africa and Southeast Asia respectively. The transnational relationships that they have forged and have been engaged in over the many years are manifestations of trends across the globe throughout the era of globalization (cf. Kennedy & Rondometof 2002: 12).

And their cultural contributions have forced some states to acknowledge that these NSAs have made unique and indeed valuable contributions in international relations; contributions that have generally been ignored and overlooked in the past. As a result of

adopting a positive attitude towards the activities of these individuals and groups, the state actors have created the necessary space and opportunities for NSAs in the IR arena. This recognition and acceptance of the NSAs' significant position in the IR arena concretizes the suggestions that had been made by both Mahathir and Mbeki regarding the importance of cultural relations between and among communities in the South.

Whilst this is indeed a positive move, the state actors such as the presidents and prime ministers of states should encourage their foreign policy practitioners and IR specialists to take cognisance of the significant position that NSAs hold within the IR sector. As a matter of fact, the respective Departments of Foreign Affairs in South Africa and Malaysia should create the space and perhaps a port-folio within its structures to assist with the promotion and support of these cultural connections through mutual cooperation rather than the imposition of rules and regulations from those located in the 'upstairs section' onto those who are live in the 'downstairs section' (to use Vale's 1997 metaphor). If this should come about then it will fulfil one of the goals enshrined in NAASP and that is to allow for and recognize and respect 'people-to-people's interaction.' Let me record and analyze the role that some NSAs played in forging cross-ocean ties and the 'people-to-peoples ties'.

Figure 5.1



3. Cultural Citizenship in the Diaspora: The Experiences of Hajjah Rabi'ah & Her Relatives in the Federation of Malaya

3.1 Introduction:

Tunku Abdul Rahman's (cf. Adam 2004), the Federation of Malaya's first Prime Minister, was on one of the ships that sailed via the port of the Cape of Good Hope – as Cape Town was then known - from Britain to Southeast Asia in late 1959; this was after he attended a Prime Minister's Commonwealth Meeting. At the Cape he disembarked to gain first hand knowledge of the nature of apartheid policies and what the Cape Malays, South Africa's Muslim minority - many of whom were residing in the Cape and surrounding areas, were experiencing at that time. In fact, during the time when he attended the mentioned meeting in London, he received a letter from a Committee of the African Union, which spoke on behalf of 13 organizations and associations in South Africa; this letter outlined and explained the circumstances under which the Cape Malays have been living, and this gave him an added incentive to see for himself what was happening at the Cape (cf. *Berita Harian* 12 January 1992).

Soon after his arrival in the Federation, he made a clarion call to 'Cape Malays' to consider migrating – if they so wish - to the Federation of Malaya. When he extended the invitation to them during 1960, little did he realize that a group of families from this community had planned to do just that and would take him up on it (cf. *Muslim News* 16 January 1961). During the same time he had been harassing the South African government representatives at the Prime Ministers' Commonwealth meetings and the UN General Assembly gatherings regarding the apartheid policies that were being implemented (cf. Chapter Three). Even though Tunku was cautious not to 'interfere' in any of the Commonwealth members' internal affairs because of the important principles of sovereignty, he felt it morally bound to raise these inhumane practices at these important sessions where more pressure could be applied on the South African government to desist from devising and implementing such policies. The Tunku's

persistence eventually paid off when the Afro-Asian block within the UN were able to force South Africa to reconsider its position in the UN and other statutory bodies. As a consequence of the pressures, Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd announced at the Prime Ministers' Commonwealth meeting on the 15th of May 1961 that South Africa would withdraw at the end of May 1961 (Mohamed Muda 1996); this was not long after South Africa changed its status from a Union to a Republic. Tunku's constant opposition to the republics' indiscriminate and inhumane policies was widely respected and he was provided full support from within the Afro-Asian ranks; many of whom were signatories of the Bandung 1955 declaration, the same year during which the ANC drafted and signed the Freedom Charter in South Africa.

South Africa's withdrawal at no stage meant that it was going to back down on its policies; it basically did the opposite. From amongst the list of policies that stood out and upon which all others were based or derived was the racial policy. According to this policy the South African society was 'legally' divided along racial lines worked out by Dr. Verwoerd, the chief architect of apartheid. According to his plan the society was divided into whites, coloureds, Indians and Africans. All those that originated from Europe were classified as whites, and those with mix blood were categorised as coloureds; it is within this group that the 'Cape Malays' were classified. Although this label was constructed by the colonial powers, the South African apartheid saw it expedient to employ it for its own socio-political objectives. In response to these policies the oppressed masses of non-whites (Africans, Coloureds and Indians) members of these groups made attempts to work together in order to oppose the government; for example, the affiliated members of the ANC were the Coloured People's Congress and the South African Indian Congress who represented their respective constituencies. Tunku was thus vehemently opposed to this type of separation and racial disharmony that was being promoted and pursued by the South African regime. And since this was the case, he felt morally obliged to show his concern for the plight of the 'Cape Malays' in particular and the oppressed masses in general.

This moral obligation stems from the fact that he was acutely aware of the racial conflicts

that occasionally affected his own society and the conflicts that occurred because of the British 'divide and rule' policy (cf. Hnh Hung Yong 2004). He was also fully familiar with the Malay diaspora such as those whose forebears were shipped off as political exiles and slaves to Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) and to the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa by the British and Dutch colonialists. And since the (indigenous) Malay population found themselves being almost numerically outnumbered by the Indian and Chinese communities, it may thus be assumed that whilst his clarion call was a humanitarian one, it was also in effect a political one in that the return of the Malay diaspora particularly those who lived in apartheid South Africa would in a small way contribute towards boosting the numbers of the indigenous Malays.

Apart from this assumption, the issue of relocation and resettlement was never going to be an easy one as was experienced by Hajjah Rabi'ah bint Ebrahim (hereafter Hj. Rabia'ah) and her family when they landed in the Federation of Malaya. The invitation in essence also implied that the 'Cape Malays' would have had to renounce their acquired South African apartheid citizenship and nationality for a new one according to the rules and regulations that were operative within the Federation of Malaya. Whilst this exchange would have meant that it would have granted them the opportunity to express and practice their religion and culture within an environment of relative freedom, it could also have meant one of privilege vis-à-vis those Indian and Chinese (Malays) who were born and reared in the Federation. And this could also have meant that they would have had to exchange their position from being second – class citizens in South Africa to being first class ones in the Federation. Nonetheless, this was indeed an interesting challenge bearing in mind that the issue of 'citizenship' was very much part of the nation-state project on the continents of Asia and Africa respectively. Indeed the question of citizenship was lying at the heart of the emergence of nation-states, and the call of Tunku directly challenged it during the time of the Federation's nation building process; a process within which citizenship formed a crucial cog or building block.

The contents of this section are not about the internal strife that took place within the Federation, but about the travails of the South African families who chose to emigrate

and through fate landed in Federation territory. The section relates, albeit in brief, the struggle that Hj. Rabi'ah, who was one of the wives who remained behind, went through in order to gain citizenship in the Federation, and the innumerable bureaucratic structures she had to bypass before she could be granted her citizenship. Before narrating her struggle, the section first attempts to define the term 'citizenship' and 'diaspora' in order to provide another frame; this time the frame is constructed to fully comprehend Hj. Rabi'ah's quest for citizenship and for someone who was part of the 'Malay diaspora', and thereafter it locates her position within a broader socio-political context in South Africa and Malaysia respectively.

3.2 The Two Conceptual Tools: Citizenship and Diaspora

The term 'citizenship' has basically been a European construction which called for secular social membership and which is essentially different from the notion of citizenship within the Muslim world as argued by Verma (2004: 56). The latter however also pointed out that the process of globalization had also placed a strain on the term as understood and practiced in the western world. There is little doubt that process of globalization deepened the debates pertaining to the term and other related concepts. According to van Gunsteren (1998: 6), the post-1989 events and developments had a cascading effect upon the socio-political scene in the 'global village', and this, in turn, gave rise to revisiting a variety of concepts such as 'citizenship.' The latter concept begged an array of questions pertaining to the criteria of citizenship, the globalization of citizenship, etcetera. For the purposes of this part of the chapter, I will confine myself to a limited number of aspects dealing with the concept.

The desire for citizenship in the late 20th century has become a widespread phenomenon and indeed a complex one. The definition of citizenship has been and remains, according to Joseph (2000: 9), the task of the state via its structures. Delanty (2000: 4) offers the following definition: 'a citizen is born a moral being and a legal entity,' and these two variables demarcate the boundary between citizen and non-citizen. And Janoski (1998: 9) also provided a workable definition; he defined citizenship as being '... passive and

active membership of individuals in a nation state with certain universalistic rights and obligations at a specified level of equality.’

Delanty (2000: 15) quoted from a 1992 work of Marshall who expounded upon this concept. Marshall stated that ‘(a) citizen is a status (that is) bestowed on those who are full members of a community;’ in other words a person who has been granted this status he/she possesses civil and political rights. He continued and stated that the rights of a citizen differ from what has been categorised as ‘human rights.’ The notion of citizenship is thus (a) particularistic, (b) shaped by the principle of nationality, and (c) based upon a political understanding that a person is a member of a community and a nation-state. With regards to explaining the position of a citizen van Gunsteren (1998: 13) also made reference to a 1950 work of Marshall in which the latter also noted three important aspects of a citizen; the citizen has (a) a say in political decision making, (b) access to courts of law that are staffed by cocitizens who judge according to the rules that equally apply to all citizens, and (c) a guarantee of minimum socioeconomic conditions of existence.

Van Gunsteren (ibid 15) highlighted the fact that whilst these remain significant aspects of the concept, the debates about citizenship have changed since the 1970s onwards. He remarked that in the decades before the 1970s the emphasis was on ‘rights’ as outlined by Marshall (and also qtd by Janoski 1998: 3) who explained citizenship in terms of legal, political and social rights. It has however since then been accompanied by an emphasis on institutional duties, concerns and loyalties. Delaney’s comments are moreover not very different from what had just been stated; he furthermore made the point that the person holds a position that is ‘more than a matter of rights, and also entails an identification and commitment to the community’ (Delanty 2000: 19). Van Gunsteren (1998: 15) added that ‘... the point of departure for analysis is no longer unity but the multiple identities of minorities who have a responsibility to live together as citizens in one republic.’ From what has thus far been discussed, it is not difficult to observe that the citizen enjoys within the sovereign states certain rights; rights that have been denied to a non-citizen.

Both van Gunsteren (1998: 16-21) and Janoski (1998: 17-24) made reference to three theoretical models associated with citizenship; they are liberalism, communitarianism, and republicanism or social democracy that are applicable to contemporary societies. In contemporary South Africa and Malaysia the last mentioned is the most applicable; however, this theory will not be elaborated upon here because of certain obvious constraints. It should however be added that Benhabib (2004) and Neocleous (2003) highlighted the problems that surrounds the concept of citizenship vis-à-vis the non-citizen/alien/stranger and that the concept is closely related to the notions of diaspora. Let me briefly address the concept of 'diaspora'; a concept, which has initially been associated with the Jewish peoples in the diaspora, and during this period of globalization and transnationalism has become widespread and indeed a contested term.

Tedlock (1996: 431) stated that the notion of diaspora 'regenerate(d) a set of distinctive cultural and ethnic identities', and she added that the diasporic communities normally do not feel welcome and fully accepted by host communities, and they always regard their place of origin or birth place as their home to which they will someday return. She pointed out that diasporic communities differ in values and class; for example, there are the expatriate communities in host countries, who are usually associated with the 'aristocratic detachment,' the migrant communities who are viewed as upwardly mobile, the refugee communities who are separate from the host communities and always expect handouts, and then there are the resident aliens who always cannot legally eke out a living and live in a state of poverty.

Besides these categories Cohen (2001) posited a typology of victim, trade, labour and colonial diaspora, with victim diaporas serving as the protootypical core. Cohen (2001) also mentioned that it is important to make a distinction between the imperial diaspora, which is associated with the colonial era, and the victim diaspora, which is connected with refugees and political asylum seekers. It may again be stated that victim diaspora are occasionally viewed by sovereign states where they reside or took refuge as problematic cases in terms of offering similar rights as those given to their citizens. Although the

families in this study do not fall squarely in the victim diaspora category, their move from South Africa to the Federation contained elements of it. They were not displaced or forced to leave South Africa, their birth place, but chose to seek shelter elsewhere because of the worsening socio-political conditions within South Africa. Another issue that also provides another dimension to this type of diaspora is that these families yearned to return to the birth place of their fore-fathers and thus reconnect with their religio-cultural roots.

3.3 South African and Malaysian Citizenship: Setting the Context

The Nationalist Party came to power in the Union of South Africa in 1948 and devised its apartheid policies that had a devastating effect upon the social life of the oppressed masses in the country in the decades that followed. These events took place more-or-less at the same time when the citizenship laws were formulated by the British colonialists and the Malay nationalists, nine years before the birth of the Federation of Malaya; these laws were subsequently embodied within the Federation of Malaya Agreement and by 1952 these were amended and improved (Nazaruddin Hj Mohd Jai et al 2003: 126). However, citizenship laws in the Union before 1949 fell under the jurisdiction of the British Empire. This meant that the individual was a British subject and a South African national, and that it was only in 1926 that the South African Parliament defined the status of a British subject for the purposes of the South African legal system.

These laws were changed about a year after the NP assumed power. The NP formulated the citizenship laws along racial lines, and it legislated the South African Citizenship Act of 1949; this was in effect the first phase of apartheid citizenship, according to Klaaren (1999). The second phase came into effect with the Bantu Homelands Act of 1970; this was about 9 years after South Africa became a republic and a year after the racial riots in the Federation. These laws were couched in such a way that it considered the whites as the privileged class (and this is with the support of the theological interpretations of the Dutch Reform Church, which was the official state church), and all the non-whites were treated as second class citizens. These laws thus permitted those who originated from

Europe to be classified as white and those of mix blood were recognized as Coloured; it is within this group that the NP decided to categorize the 'Cape Malays.' The Indian communities from South Asia were classified as Indians and the indigenous communities were viewed as Africans but were further sub-divided according to their language groups.

The South African apartheid regime later introduced their infamous homeland policies in the 1970s as another way of defining who can be and who should not be a South African citizen. In response to these discriminatory laws the ANC led continuous campaigns against the system in the 1950s; the apartheid regime could not contain these protests and in the end banned the ANC and other liberation movements, groups and individuals who voiced their opinions against the state. In some instances their citizenship was revoked and they were forced to seek refuge in the neighbouring states or in other parts of the world and become 'victim diaspora' in many cases. Some members of the Cape Malay community such as Mr. Omar Cassiem from Port Elizabeth moved to the UK to take out British citizenship and to, of course, get away from South Africa's harsh, discriminatory system that was implemented (*MN* 9 September 1966). From the afore-mentioned, it is quite clear that the issue of citizenship became problematic and complex.

When returning to the formulation of citizenship in the Federation of Malaya, it is noted that it was also not a clear-cut affair. It was made complex by the British colonialist who had imported Chinese and Indian labour to the region, and this exacerbated matters since the latter two were favoured whilst the indigenous Malays were marginalised. Rajamoorthy (1999: 88) made a telling comment when he said that the 'fissures in Malay society not only hindered the evolution of a national consciousness but also served to buttress the British colonial policy of 'divide and rule'.' As far as Rajamoorthy was concerned, the British basically coloured the whole concept of citizenship in Malaya. In any event, the numbers of the immigrant labour population grew rapidly and this caused a concern among the indigenous Malays; this thus resulted in the formulation of the citizenship laws in favour of the indigenous population. Although concerns were raised by the offspring of the immigrant labourers who were born and grew up in the Malay territories, their fears were allayed through the formulation and amendments that were

later made particularly in 1962 when significant changes were made to citizenship laws; this was of fundamental importance at that time especially when the name changed to the Federation of Malaysia in September 1963. One of the changes was that ‘a person born in the Federation will not be a citizen unless one of his parents is at the time of birth either a citizen of, or permanently resident in it’. In the process of making these amendments the principle of *jus soli* was eroded and this also implied *inter alia* that ‘equal opportunities for employment throughout the Federation lost their virtue’ (Hickling 1978: 8-9).

The Federation’s constitution however underwent major changes soon after the Black Tuesday race riots on the 13th of May 1969 (Adam 2004: 408-423). In 1970 a National Consultative Council was established and it created, among others, the document enshrining the *Rukunegara*; the latter contained the following crucial points: (a) its basic philosophy, (b) evolution of a democratic Malaysian nation, and (c) the need to adhere to the rule of law (Hickling 1978: 13). Verma (2004: 54) mentioned that after 1970 ‘a new multicultural ideal of citizenship based upon assimilation of communities replaced the earlier goal of accommodation of rights of communities.’ And she (2004: 54) critically commented that it was the elite alliance that revised the nature of citizenship rights, and in the process marginalized the politics of the idea of multiculturalism. In her opinion, the NEP ruled out multicultural rights of citizenship that was later promoted. And she (204: 57) further expressed the view that ‘citizenship assumed a passive and rather negative form instead of developing notions of ‘civic responsibility, social trust and egalitarianism’’[she qtd Kalberg 1993]. According to Hassall (1999: 51), the constitution mandated affirmative programmes that privileged the bumiputra citizens over the other groups. Hassall highlighted the fact that boundaries pertaining to citizenship were imposed via the process of decolonization in the earlier period, and by the formation of multiethnic states in the later period. Sinnadurai (1978: 73-74) pointed out that for one to acquire citizenship in the Federation of Malaysia and in the years that followed three criteria had to be fulfilled: (a) operation of the law, (b) registration, and (c) naturalization; for the latter one had to obtain a ‘certificate of naturalization’ issued by the High Commissioner.

From the afore-mentioned discussion, it is observed that the process of citizenship went through transmutations in both states since the late 1940s. However, it is within this context that Hj. Rabi'ah found herself and thus struggled to become a Malaysian citizen. We now turn our focus to how she and her family members landed up in Southeast Asia, more specifically in the Federation of Malaya by the beginning of 1961.

3.4 South African Families Trekking to the Federation by Default

It appears to have been coincidental that when Tunku Abdul Rahman extended the invitation to the Cape Malays during 1960 that a few families from this community consciously decided - for socio-political purposes - to move to Southeast Asia, in particular to the Island of Tidore in Indonesia. The reason for making this assumption is based on the fact that Abu Bakr Abrahams, the leader of the group who suggested making the journey, was a member of the ANC whose activities were severely curtailed by the ban that the apartheid regime imposed upon the oppositional groups such as the ANC. However, according to the report of Othman Abrahams, Abu Bakr's brother and one of the members of the group of 39 who eventually arrived in the Federation in early January 1961, he and his brother had already thought about emigrating soon after the Job Reservations' Bill was implemented in the late 1950s; this act reserved jobs only for whites and this implied that even with their skills they would not be allowed or granted work opportunities. The apartheid regime would grant the whites first preference before employing anyone else. Abu Bakr Abrahams thus felt that since he was totally opposed to the apartheid government and would not be able to exercise his rights in the country of his birth, he might as well go back to the country where his forebears hailed from; and this was the Island of Tidore in Indonesia. The intention was therefore quite clear from the outset that the Abrahams brothers' objective was to reach Indonesia and not the Federation of Malaya.

3.4.1 The Trip from Durban to Singapore:

The trip thus went ahead as planned since the Abrahams brothers' desired to reach

Indonesia, the land of their forebears. It was spearheaded by Mr. Abu Bakr Abrahams, a former patron of the South African Malay Association; he was accompanied by his wife and children as well as his younger brother, Othman, and his family. Abu Bakr and Othman, who were the sons of Imam 'Pesbies' - an Imam at one of the mosques in Port Elizabeth, were, at that time, residing in Johannesburg. In addition to their families, Mr. Hussein Hartley and his family also joined after having been persuaded by the Abrahams' brothers. The names of the families are as follows:

- a) Abu Bakr's wife was Rogaya (44) & their children were: Mohamed Hanif (22), Toughida (23?), Norhidaya (18), Zaidah (15) and Khadijah (13);
- b) Othman's wife was Raziah (35) & their children were: Fazilah (10), Zaitun (8), and Yusuf (5); and
- c) Hussein's wife was Rabi'ah (29) & their children were: Yasmine (7), Sirajuddin (6), Feirouza (4), Hajira (3) and Ridwan (2). In addition to these families, there was Sediq Lawrence, a bachelor.

They were in all 19 and were viewed as the first batch; the second was to follow about a year thereafter (*Strait Times* 11 January 1961).

That said, these families, in particular the brothers, then under the pretext of intending to perform the annual pilgrimage in Mecca - this is also how it was reported in the *Berita Harian* (11 January 1961) after the delegation led by Othman and Abu Bakr Abrahams met Tunku and the Malaya Federation officials - an activity which was not viewed as subversive by all counts, boarded the Boissevain ship, which was bound for the east and not the east coast of Africa en route to Jeddah via Aden as some of their friends might have thought. The ship left in late 1960 and travelled from Durban to Mauritius and from there to Singapore.

When it docked at Port Louis, the capital of Mauritius, it was coincidental that Hj. Rabi'ah, who was the daughter of Ebrahim Ozeer Ally, was able to meet her relatives; these were from Mr. Ally's maternal side. As a matter of information, her father, Ebrahim

Ozeer Ally, hailed from Mauritius and came with his father, Ozeer Ally, to British South Africa where he became an important community leader. After a few days in Mauritius it sailed to Singapore; and whilst they were on board Abu Bakr Abrahams sent three telegrams to the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the hope that some positive response would come before they disembarked at Singapore since the ship was moving on to Hong Kong and Tokyo respectively. By the time the ship docked in Singapore, they had received no response, and they reflected deep disappointment and became somewhat despondent. They disembarked in Singapore with the hope of still finding a way to Indonesia.

At the time when they got off the ship, they had no Singaporean contact, nor any address of local Muslim associations who could have extended a helping hand; they were thus stranded and literally lost. A sympathetic Singaporean bystander came to their aide when he saw their distraught faces and directed them to a nearby and reasonably cheap Chinese hotel. They graciously accepted the person's advice and went off to this particular hotel without being aware that Chinese cuisine and culture (in Southeast Asia) differ markedly from theirs. When they entered the hotel and checked the conditions at the hotel, they were shocked when they saw the pig's head hanging in the hotel's kitchen; it should be borne in mind that the Muslim families in South Africa strictly observed the Islamic dietary rules that forbade Muslims to consume pig. The mere sight of the skinned pig hanging in the kitchen forced them to immediately leave the hotel's premises and search for the nearest mosque; they then landed at the Sultan mosque.

At this mosque they were introduced to Shaykh Haji Jofri, a pilgrim's broker, who was kind to assist the families settle in. Despite the hospitality that was shown by the Singaporean Muslim, they themselves became a bit frustrated with the circumstances in which they found themselves. According to Hj. Rabi'ah, Abu Bakr Abrahams seemed to have already given up hope and questioned why they left South Africa in the first place. Despite these difficult and trying times, they began to make concerted efforts to get in touch with the Federation of Malaya officials and remembering Tunku's invitation in which he officially invited 'Cape Malays' to take up residence and citizenship in the

Federation. Up until then, Singapore was not a member of the Federation, and they were thus at the mercy of the Singaporean authorities. Since the invitation was well known, the Federation officials complied with their requests and they were permitted to enter the Federation territory and assisted them to get to Tunku's office so that they could have the chance to forward some of their familial requests. The invitation, which was not seriously considered before and during their journey towards Singapore, became an important piece of paper and directive that would allow them to (eventually) settle on Federation soil. By this time, the idea of still finding passageway to Indonesia was abandoned and they seriously took up the invitation that was 'handed out' by Tunku.

3.4.2 Their Stay in the Federation:

The contact that was initially made with Federation officials bore fruit; the Abrahams brothers, being the main representatives, had the privilege of being invited to Tunku's official tea party; however, the tea party was not only for the two South African brothers but also for a special Ceylonese (Sri Lankan) delegation that came especially for the 3rd installation of Yang di-Pertuan Agong. At the tea party, which was held at Tunku's official residence, other governmental officials were also present. The tea party thus gave Tunku the opportunity to address the representatives of both diaspora communities in an open and frank manner. At the tea party Tunku was quite open and frank with the Ceylonese delegation telling them that '(your) conditions in Ceylon are different compared to the Malay people of South Africa. In this regard, I would like to advise them to adapt themselves to the government of Ceylon.' He, however, expressed his admiration for the Ceylonese Malays who were highly skilled and, diplomatically mentioned that the Federation is in need of such skilled personnel. The Tunku realized that these diasporic communities have been exposed to different conditions and had opportunities the Malays did not have in the territory of the Federation and was thus indirectly hoping that these skilled Malays might consider emigrating to the Federation.

As a result of this formal meeting, Tunku, at a press conference, gave a directive in which he approved that these families could stay. However, this could only happen on condition

that they fend for themselves and not in any way be a burden to the Federation's administration; in other words the Federation was not going to give any financial hand outs to the families and they will have to earn their keep. Apparently Tunku was prepared to also give the families, after they have proven to succeed in obtaining work and contributing towards the social life of the host society, land that they can use to further improve their social circumstances. At the time of the press conference, UMNO's delegates were also meeting in Kuala Trengganu and they, led by Garieb Abdul-Raof – the Secretary General, fully backed Tunku on his decision. Mr. Garieb couched the permission that was granted differently; he praised Tunku 'for granting political asylum to three South African Malay families.' The manner in which he expressed himself thus gave a slightly different meaning to the settlement in the Federation; the term 'political asylum', it is widely known, connoted a different story in the circumstances. Tunku's statement was repeated and circulated; it basically stated that 'any Malay families, who are suppressed in South Africa, are welcomed in this country' and also added that 'I understand that they suffered too much (*Berita Harian* 12 January 1961). And at the press report, Abu Bakr Abrahams boldly declared that 'we have decided to make Malaya our permanent home and have confidence in the future' (*The Malay Mail* 6 September 1961).

Othman Abrahams, who was the spokesperson at the time of meeting Tunku, is reported to have said: 'we understand the terms stated by Tunku Abdul Rahman and it is not our intention to be a burden to the government or our relatives (sic) here.' (*Berita Harian* 12 January 1961; *Utusan Melayu* 11 January 1961). As one of the chief representatives, he further mentioned that they should be able to earn their wage through working as a tailor (Abu Bakr), house contractor (Othman) or perhaps venture into business. He also commented upon the situation back in South Africa, describing the conditions to have been appalling and the Cape Malays having been viewed as 'a threat' and 'traitors'. For some reason, Othman Abrahams was reported to have been optimistic when he naively predicted that 'By God's will, in five years time, I believe, that there will be a huge revolt and the South African native will lead their own country', and he also mentioned that economic sanctions should be instituted by Malaya, Ghana and other countries in order to put pressure on the Union to change its internal policies. The report in *Utusan Melayu*

however remarked that Mr. Abrahams did not provide much information on the revolt he so glibly mentioned.

Since Othman had experience in the building trade, he was immediately offered a job to become a 'building instructor' in Kelantan to train the Malay youth for the building industry; at the time when the opportunity came his way he refused since he was unable to communicate in Bahasa Melayu; however, the real reason for his refusal only came to light a few months afterwards. Despite Othman's emotional outburst regarding the struggle in South Africa, he could not wait for decisions to be taken whether to stay or not. He was the first in the batch to get cold feet and decided with his family to leave the Federation during the month of May of 1961 for South Africa; the report in *The Malay Mail* (6 September 1961), which is questionable, seems to have given the idea that he returned to South Africa after he first went to perform his pilgrimage.

When these families were permitted to stay by the highest office in the Federation, the *Berita Harian* posed an interesting question: 'Will this mark a new point for South African-Malaya relations?' It explained this stating: 'in other words, will most of the Malay peoples in South Africa return once again to their ancestor's land?' The South African families who 'emigrated' did not realise what this question implied because they were then too occupied in trying to adapt and settle in; the question was extremely significant to the local communities in that it implied that the Federation was giving indirect permission to members of the Malay diaspora to trek back to the regions and to counter balance the numbers of the other ethnic communities. History demonstrated that the Malay diaspora remained stationed where they were and did not bother to take up this invitation because of their financial circumstances, and Tunku did indicate that the Federation was not going to be financially responsible for those who decide to take up the offer of emigrating to it.

The opposition party in the Federation, PAS, seemed to have questioned Tunku's intentions in extending an invitation to these diaporic communities. It first objected to the issue being raised in Parliament, and also expressed the view that this was not a domestic

matter but an international one. It opined that this is a complicated matter 'as the Federation of Malaya never practiced the method of 'blood linkage' of any race, and, furthermore, the national policy of the Federation of Malaya is not yet clear (*Berita Harian* 12 January 1961). The position of the opposition party as well as others who views were not publicly articulated was clear evidence as to how the issue was interpreted and understood within the Federation. The news report made another important comment and remarked that the decision of the Federation would have international repercussions for Tunku's stand. The latter's decisions were concretely captured the Federation's position vis-à-vis apartheid, and that the permission that was granted to these few Cape Malay families went beyond the legislation of the state. In other words, it quite simply gave support to selected groups of 'foreigners' who were in dire straits, and who have - as from that point onwards - been allowed to settle in the Federation as long as they did not burden state coffers, and were in the position to fend for themselves. At the press conference, mention was also made of the fact that accommodation was given to the Abrahams' and other families who accompanied them.

Subsequent to this meeting, they were given their accommodation as promised in the municipal flats, which was later named Razali Mansion, in Jalan Sula Besi, Sungei Besi district. Abu Bakr Abrahams was then given the chance to practice as a tailor, Othman as already mentioned was given an opportunity to work in the building industry, and Hussein Hartley - a machinist by profession - through the office of Tunku was able to work at the Malaya Tobacco Company as general worker. Apart from the vacancies that they were filled, the office of the Ministry of Works, Post and Telecommunications was also at hand to assist in finding any one of them suitable jobs. One of the persons who was extremely helpful during these critical times was Tun V.T. Sambanthan and his wife, Tok Puan Uma Sambanthan. These South African families' children frequented the Sambanthan's home and were able to school, which was not too far from the flats, where they obtained their secular education and was able to Bahasa Melayu. As a matter of interest, the language of instruction at the private school was in English and not in Bahasa as was the case in the state schools. It appeared from *The Malay Mail* report that the kids were attending a private school, which was financially taxing on the families. They were

later forced to take them out and wait for openings at the state schools where the instructions were only in Bahasa Melayu and not English as was the case at the private school. Although this was seen as a disadvantage, it was in fact a good move since one of the criteria for acquiring citizenship in the Federation was learning to speak, read and write in Bahasa. For the children it was a matter of adapting to new linguistic circumstances and, of course, one of the major challenges for the elders of these immigrant families. Whilst settling in the families were also required to have themselves registered with the local government so that they possess the necessary documents to stay within Federation territory. Being non-citizens with residency permits they were allowed to keep their South African passports; the issue of citizenship could not automatically be conferred on them for they were required to fulfil the necessary criteria stipulated earlier part of this chapter.

Hj. Rabi'ah was among the few elderly members who demonstrated that she was serious in taking up citizenship and make a contribution towards the society, which she viewed as her own in terms of the religion and the culture; two important ingredients that were embedded in 'Cape Malay' and Malay identities. She thus increasingly came to play an exemplary role as 'a survivor' and one who never gave up or reflected despondency in the state structures. Prior to relating her story, it is important to fill in some brief biographical data. She was one of many children – six boys and three girls - in the Ozeer Ally family; her mother's name was Zubayda. She was born in District Six – not far from the Cape Town city centre, where the family was then residing, on the 6th of October 1931. Since her father used to travel from one city to another, where he had business dealings, she found herself growing up and schooling in one of the outlying areas of Johannesburg. She attended the Potgietersrust Indian Girls School, which was a convent school. Travelling from one city to the other and one town to another became part of her upbringing. It, in a way, prepared her for the years ahead.

Coming back to the group of South African families, it was observed that they were generally slowly settling in except for the Othman Abrahams clan. The latter family unit remained restless until they decided to pack up and return to South Africa. As for the

others, they gradually adapted to the new environment, customized themselves to the Malay(sian) culture and learnt the language. It was apparently easy for the children, who could make friends without experiencing any major problems and gradually communicate in Bahasa Melayu, to adapt and fit in than the parents; for the fairly mature elders, this was indeed a rocky road to travel. They experienced difficulty in becoming fluent in the language and thus faced constant communication problems. In this situation, Abu Bakr Abrahams appeared to have given up because - in an interview recorded in *The Malay Mail* - it was stated that he was out of a job and the children were no more at school; it appears that one of the main problems that he faced was becoming fluent in Bahasa. Abu Bakr's enthusiasm to adapt and fit in seems to have faded, and his desire to stay on seems to have waned; this could partly be attributed to his brother's sudden departure and absence, and partly to the fact that he was unable to succeed in his profession as a tailor. Apart from the linguistic challenge and professional competition that he faced, he also had to deal with the issue of Malay(sian) cultural one; the cultural tradition as witnessed in the Federation was not the same culture they were familiar with back in Johannesburg or Cape Town (cf. Haron 2005).

These were various hurdles was indeed strenuous for Abu Bakr and his family to overcome and get used to. Abu Bake and his family bided their time and were given a moral boost when a second batch of families from Port Elizabeth joined them in 1962. These were the families of Mr. Ebrahim Baderoun and Mr. Jalaluddin respectively. Mr. Baderoun came with his wife and three kids, and Mr. Jalaluddin came with his wife and one child. They were also accompanied by two bachelors. This batch came from the city of Port Elizabeth, presently referred to as the Mandela Metropolitan area. These two fellows had no difficulty in fitting in; in the case of Ebrahim Baderoun, he was able to find work as a clerk in the Ministry of Defence and went on to stay for nine years. Jalaluddin also remained but for only about four years.

During these times the Federation was facing its own regional problems and these families were thus caught up in these regional squabbles of which they had no knowledge and nor any insight. Nonetheless, one of the internal political issues that came onto the

Federation's agenda was inclusion of Singapore as an extra state of the Federation; this took place in September 1963. On the one hand, it resulted in better intra-regional relationships and led to smoother cooperation among the group of states that came under the wing of the Federation; and, on the other, it made the situation complicated for the citizens when Singapore seceded in 1965 to become an independent sovereign nation-state (Hill & Lian 1995: 26). This was indeed the case for Hj. Rabi'ah whose personal circumstances had, by then, changed.

Her husband, Hussein Hartley, who had been working at the Malay Tobacco company soon after they were provided with housing and moral support from the administration, was never happy with being in the Federation and thus scouted for an opportunity to return to Johannesburg. When the chance came for Hussein to leave, he politely packed up and returned to South Africa without his family. He, in fact, tried to persuade his wife, Hj. Rabi'ah, to join him but she was much more determined to remain and stay on and not go back. According to the newspaper interview with her daughter, Ferouza, her mother felt that since the Federation was a Muslim territory she desired to have her children nurtured within Malay culture, which is primarily embedded in the Islamic tradition; as far as she was concerned, South Africa did not and could not offer that. This internal disagreement between husband and wife was left on the back burner until the husband made a more informed decision when he reached Johannesburg. Unfortunately for her and her kids, he did not keep in touch with them and chose not to return; the absence of her husband had a traumatic effect upon her life but she tried to look at the positive side of it and slaved on to help her children in the education. As the many months passed by with no correspondence from her husband regarding his stand on issues, she took a proactive position by requesting for a divorce; filing for one was no easy matter and it was also a matter not taken lightly in Muslim households and nor was it a smooth one according to Islamic law. Nevertheless, she felt that though it was a difficult and hard decision she was forced to fend for her children in the absence of her husband who did not even communicate with her or his children let alone sending financial assistance that would prove his love and loyalty. In the light of her difficult conditions, she had the right to act in this way.

With the passage of time, she met up with the Singaporean, Hajji Achmat Othman, with whom she entered into marriage on the 5th of March 1964. Hajji Achmat, who was heading one of the branches of the Singaporean Post Offices, took charge of Hj. Rabi'ah and her children. He saw to their education whilst Hj. Rabi'ah helped in other ways to run the house (*Berita Harian* 12 January 1992). When the split between Singapore and the Federation came into effect in 1965 it also affected Hj. Rabi'ah's situation. She was not allowed to stay in the Federation since she was married to a Singaporean and this also meant that she faced a dilemma. The problem was that she had to separate from her children who had the right to reside in Federation territory; but because of her marriage she had to follow her husband and her rights basically fell away. Four of her children stayed on in the Federation, and one from her first husband's union remained with her. The children were relocated from Kuala Lumpur to Johor Bahru, the capital of the State of Johor, where they continued with their studies. And even though the children were residing in Johor Bahru, which was less than ten minutes away by car from Singapore, Hj. Rabi'ah had great difficulty in seeing them regularly. Since then it was an uphill struggle for Hj. Rabi'ah who was never away from all her children. She thus travelled every month to Johor to meet them; this was of course a costly affair and not easy for someone who had moved on in years, and particularly for a woman. Hajji Achmat gave her all the necessary financial and emotional support for which, to this day, she highly appreciates. Out of this marriage three children were born; two died in infancy and one survived. The one who survived, namely Rahmat bint Achmat, went on to complete her doctorate in Arabic studies from the School of African and Oriental Studies at the University of London and, as far as we have been informed, presently lectures at the International Islamic University of Malaysia.

Between 1964 and 1971 Hj. Rabi'ah undertook her monthly travels and in the process tried to get hold of officials to assist her in acquiring her citizenship. She was a determined and firm lady who worked hard at achieving her goal. Since the rule was that the wife follows the husband; this rule became burdensome on Hj. Rabi'ah who tried to argue her case with various officials at different levels with the hope that someone in the

ranks will lend a sympathetic ear; unfortunately this was not to be and continued for many years. Her supportive husband also tried to pull strings with his contacts and relatives such as Lieutenant Colonel Izaidin Samsodien and Tan Sri Osman Cassiem, who was the secretary of Tan Sri Ghazali Shafi', the Federation's Minister of Home Affairs; but all of these came to naught. Even after having received a letter of endorsement from the High Commissioner to Singapore to grant her a lengthier stay in Johor, she still faced an uphill battle. Some officials showed their sympathies but also expressed that their hands were tied because of the bureaucracy involved in having to bestow citizenship on her or even grant her permanent residency.

The Minister of Social Welfare, Mr. Usman Wok, in Singapore was prepared to offer her Singaporean citizenship because of her marriage to her husband; she however felt that it would stand her in good stead to have the Malaysian citizenship because of her children and thus had to refuse the kind offer. The other problem that stood in her way was that she had to be a permanent resident of Malaysia before she could obtain the citizenship. Despite the problems she persisted in her quest and even went to see the retired statesman, Tunku Abdul Rahman, at his home in Penang to endorse her papers and allow her to pursue her objective. He thus wrote to the Minister Tan Sri Gazali Shafi', who, in turn, sent her on to the Ministry of Home Affairs. It was only 18 years after her arrival on Federation soil that she was granted her citizenship; this was on the 5th of July 1979.

Since then she never looked back. She did baking and sewing to keep her going; for example, she sewed dresses for Mrs. Curtis, whose husband was the personal executive of the Sultan of Selangor Darul Ehsan, the wife of Mr. W.T. Rook, who was the financial officer at the international company, Lever Brothers, and also for Wan Rahima, the wife of the Sultan of Selangor Darul Ehsan. She always had a passion for the society in which she lived and thus participated in socio-religious activities that would advance the quality of life in the circles she moved. She thus made full use of the opportunities that came her way; one of these was registering with the Department of Education and do courses that would not only personally benefit her but also the Malay society.

3.5 Bringing Hajjah Rabi'ah's Story to a Close

Although the story of Hj. Rabi'ah is inextricably tied up with the other families during the early years when they were trying to settle in and adapt to the new environment, her story stands out as a woman who was prepared to face the odds and move on with her life. It concretely demonstrated how she was able to fend for herself and her family. What this short narrative revealed was that she was a highly determined woman; one who was and remained different from her fellow sojourners who came from South Africa. She was at no stage unsettled by the circumstances in which she found herself with her family. In fact, she showed more courage than the others and was able to adapt and restructure her personal life by setting priorities which she followed through. She chose to be faithful to her religious identity by rooting herself and her children in Malay culture; a culture that harmonised with her religious ideals. Since both religion and culture were embedded in the Federation's identity, she was at home with these and could identify strongly with the ideals espoused by the Federation's constitution; issues that she came to learn as she struggled to acquire citizenship.

Although the quest for Federation citizenship somehow shaped her life and thinking, it at no stage caused her to be despondent or give up. The section showed the complexity of this issue of citizenship within nation states; more importantly, it demonstrated to what extent this issue could and did affect the lives of individuals and families. In the case of Hj. Rabi'ah it affected her deeply and she struggled for almost twenty years to get the piece of paper that would allow her to be with her children, and one that would allow her to roam freely in her adopted territory. However, at the outset she was not aware of the problems that were associated in acquiring citizenship. Although her story might not be a unique one, it moreover shares an important lesson about issues that are humanely constructed and socially engineered. To end off, the article that narrated a portion of this family's life through the interview with Ferouza, the third eldest child, somewhat captured the life that she led all her life; it read 'Being a nomad for 20 years' (*Berita Harian* 12 January 1992). And it was during Hj. Rabi'ah's nomadic ventures that Ismail Petersen continued with his activities as a cultural activist.

4. Ismail Petersen's Narrative: A South African cultural activist's contribution towards international relations

4.1 Introduction

Hj. Rabi'ah's desire for citizenship in the Federation and Ismail Petersen's services to the passing sailors from Southeast Asia took place throughout the Cold War era; an era in which the main actor in the arena of International Relations (IR), as already pointed out in earlier chapters, was the state. It was *the* legal actor because state sovereignty was paramount and inter-state relations was of crucial importance (Reynolds 1997: 15-17); state-to-state relations was the major concern of the governmental representatives, diplomats and politicians. Unfortunately, the contribution of NSAs were given no recognition; this only changed when the Cold War came to an end and period and one in which the IR discipline's status was described by Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff (1996: 5) to be in 'a highly tentative phase which makes its all the time more challenging and interesting'. It was indeed during this phase that transnational actors' (i.e. companies and individuals) activities were noted and acknowledged as significant players in world affairs (cf. Mansbach 1997). The IR discipline has for all intents and purposes cast its net wide and it, at present, includes many aspects of human activity that falls within the economic sector, religious domain, or cultural sphere (cf. Paolini 1999: 30-31). It is indeed in the cultural arena that the contributions of certain individuals have been observed.

This section thus introduces and discusses the activities of Mr. Ismail Petersen, a cultural activist, who may be identified as a NSA in IR. It outlines, in some detail, Mr. Petersen's activities as a (part-time) Cape Town cultural activist and someone who has been proactive in connecting cultural communities between two regions, namely the Cape and Southeast Asia. Since Mr. Ismail Petersen, a tailor by profession, devoted much of his life establishing international cultural links, an attempt will be made in this part of the chapter to demonstrate how he, as a representative of the 'Cape Malays' (cf. Haron 2002a; 2002b), was able to make an invaluable effort in connecting the Cape community and

their co-religionists in the Southeast Asian region.

In this section, we narrate the life story of Ismail Petersen who operated outside the ambit of the sovereign state circles to make international connections for no financial gain and with no political ambition. Whilst, on the one hand, we learn lessons from his inputs and contributions over more than a half decade, we also, on the other, use his life story as a clear example of how IR has been changed by marginalized and isolated individuals who had no political profile or clout and who have not as yet been given any form of recognition by their governments for their IR contributions. More importantly however is the fact that his life story demonstrates ‘how experience informs political (and IR) thinking through the medium of narrative because we generally encounter, discuss, and invoke experience in narrative form’ (Stone- Mediatore 2003: 5). Prior to telling his story, a theoretical framework needs to be constructed so that his and that of Ismail Hussein’s (in the following section of this chapter) IR activities can be fully appreciated and understood.

4.2 Employing Suitable Variables to Construct a Framework for This Story:


There are three ingredients or variables – captured Figure 5.2 below - in that have also played a significant role in the identity of NSAs such as Ismail Petersen and Ismail Hussein; these variables are religion, ethnicity and culture. And since IR theorists have realized the significance for these variables in present-day politics and IR, many have attempted to address them. Religion in general and religious fundamentalism in particular have become major issues in contemporary IR events, and this caused Scott Appleby & Martin Marty to embark upon an extensive study between 1991 and 1995. Other scholars such as Dark (2000) and Petition & Hatzopoulous (2000) also discoursed about religion within the context of IR. Religion was not the only term that had been defined in different ways; the same had been the case with culture. Social scientists such as Clifford Geertz have offered their interpretations of how culture should be understood. According to Hudson (1998), scholars have emphasized three interrelated definitions; culture has been defined as (a) organization of meaning, (b) value preferences, and (c) templates of human

strategies. The first is what is known via interpersonal expressions, the second what the individual or community desire or values, and the third is the advantageous bestowed by one's culture. All of these aspects have thus been reflected and displayed by cultural activists in their objectives and activities. One example would be suffice: Tan Sri Professor Ismail Hussein, GAPENA's chief representative, clearly articulated his views pertaining to language and culture that are significant and essential aspects of the Malay identity that have to be developed to the full so that the Malay society can regain their confidence in themselves. Cultural activists such as Tan Sri have thus been in the vanguard taking certain causes that have been ignored or marginalized and placing them on the agenda of IR. Scholars such as Lapidus & Kratochwil (1997) and Hudson (1998) provided their scholarly inputs as regards culture's relevancy to IR and foreign policy.

Ethnic identity, as the third variable, has been the topic of discussion by a number of social scientists of late; amongst them is Stack's contribution (1981). The latter pointed out that in world politics as well as in other fields that the political quality of ethnicity has been overlooked. He further stated that a close analysis of the transnational dynamics of ethnicity points to the structural realignments of international political and economic systems in the post-World War II (and also the post-Cold war) era. Taking into account these realignments and the fragmentation of the state system, it may be argued that the dynamics of ethnicity and various politico-cultural groups have used ethnicity as a vehicle to achieve objectives that were unattainable within the state system. For example, in the case of GAPENA and similar other organizations in Malaysia, Malayism as defined and explained by the political and cultural activists assisted to transform the attitude and perceptions of the Malays into a positive, confidence building exercise in order to uplift and change the socio-political and economic conditions of the Malay society as a whole. Ethnicity was thus considered a significant identity used by non-state actors during the contemporary period. And 'ethnicity' was also the focus of Carment & James (1995) studies; they assessed the position of ethnicity in IR. These scholars' writings have not only helped to understand the nature of IR as a discipline, but also assisted us in extracting from them ideas that are applicable to the make-up of the subject of this essay, namely Mr. Ismail Petersen; the three variables are significant strands in the

latter's identity. In fact, these strands are the ones that propelled him to connect with the Southeast Asians and particularly GAPENA with whom he was in constant touch over the past 20 years.

Figure 5.2



In the light of the present study, although religion might not be perceived as a crucial element within organizations such as GAPENA, one cannot disregard the fact that religious identity played an important role in the formation of the Malay cultural identity; in other words, the religious identity was seen and is viewed as an integral part of Malay society (cf. Barnard 2004). Malay leadership sees religion as a vital part of their being and in understanding the nature of their socio-cultural politics. And since this is the case, suffice it to say that earlier mentioned works by Dark et al have given religion its rightful place in the contemporary world alongside that of culture and ethnicity respectively. With this framework in mind, along with the various ingredients, the role of non-state actors

such as cultural activists in South Africa and elsewhere should now be addressed. Mr. Ismail Petersen is certainly one of the few surviving South African Muslim cultural activists who have made an indelible impression in making cultural connections during the latter part of the 20th century. And I turn to his story.

4.3 Creating Cultural Connections during the Apartheid Era

Mr. Petersen was born and bred in Cape Town on the 14th of 1924; his father's name was Omar and his mother's name was Zohra. He was born into a large family, and thus had 10 siblings. When he was only 16 years his father passed away, and he was then raised by his mother whose influence rubbed off on him and his other siblings; she however died much later. Having been part of a closely knit family, he appreciated the importance of caring for familial relations and upholding social activities that would strengthen communal bonds. These strong familial and communal ties caused Ismail Petersen to be conscious of his social duties and responsibilities, and it is this consciousness that, we wish to argue, led him to connect with the Southeast Asians (and others) in his early life.

As a NSA, Mr. Ismail Petersen's religio-cultural identity played a prominent role in his effort to create cultural connections with his co-religionists from the Southeast Asian region. He was therefore quite comfortable with the fact of having been referred to as a 'Cape Malay'; a term that has been considered derogatory by younger members of the South African Muslim community. Among this group is Shamil Jeppie (1991; 1996) who argued that the term has been invented and employed by the colonialists and apartheid regime to advance their own racial policies and that the Muslims should reject it at all costs. Whilst there is logic in the argument, it has been challenged by others who felt that in a new dispensation we can view it in a positive light rather than accept it with its negative connotations. The debate however rages on and we doubt whether it will be resolved; in any case, for the purposes of this section the term should be considered synonymous with the term 'Cape Muslim' and will be used throughout with this meaning in mind. During the colonial period and in the subsequent apartheid era the term was associated with anyone who professed Islam and practiced Islamic culture in South

Africa; however, those Muslims who hailed from an Indian lineage were regarded as Indians and not ‘Cape Malays’.

That said, Mr. Ismail Petersen belongs to those few individuals from within the NSA group that made use of all avenues to forge links with individuals and communities who shared similar character traits; that is being Muslim and reflecting a similar culture and identity. Unfortunately, he - like many - others were isolated and marginalized and as a result of this was not given any recognition for the efforts that he had made. The community that he represented in an unofficial capacity showed scant regard for his activities and efforts, and little did they realize that he was building bridges that would stand them in good stead in the future.

At the time when he was participating in these ‘extra-mural’ activities, apartheid policies were slowly being entrenched. The Cape Malays as well as the other disenfranchised and disadvantaged communities – who all formed part of the non-white community (Africans, Coloureds and Indians) - began to experience the wrath of this inhumane system particularly in the 1950s and 1960s. Throughout these years they faced all sorts of socio-political and economic hardships, and the apartheid system literally threw them out of their homes and they were forced to live in areas demarcated for the respective racial groups. Although these laws favoured the whites who enjoyed the best facilities and opportunities, the Cape Malays and their fellow disenfranchised never gave up or caved in; they struggled and toiled and faced the challenges that lay ahead. They were thus discriminated against in all sectors of life; not only socially and politically but also culturally and religiously.

But despite these socio-political, economic and religious stumbling blocks, he - and the community - never allowed these obstacles to deter him from making cultural connections or achieving his goals. He felt morally obligated to serve and assist the passing Southeast Asian seamen. Mr. Petersen personally pursued his goals at his own expenses; however, there were occasions when this was not possible and he was forced to request for communal help to accomplish his objective. And even though he was aware

of the apartheid legal structures, he always worked his way around it; his a-political profile and his status as a socialite granted him the opportunity to relentlessly pursue IR goals. It is assumed that he was oblivious that he was advancing the IR cause, and of the fact that he was laying the foundations for the future.

4.3.1 The Cape Cultural Traits:

Before recording his experiences, it is necessary to first give some insight as regards the cultural traits of the 'Cape Malays', who were categorised by the apartheid regime as a sub-group of the 'Coloured' community of South Africa. South African Muslims in general and the Cape Malays in particular have taken and still take their inspiration from the two primary sources of Islam, namely the Quran & the Sunnah. These sources thus formed the bases of their cultural identity, practices and perspectives. And because of this, they made a unique contribution to the Cape community's culture in almost all the fields; two examples would suffice in this regard: (a) when scanning the Cape cuisine list, we are bound to come across what has been labelled as 'Cape Malay' cuisine; these recipes are among many other types that are served in prominent restaurants and hotels in the Cape (and beyond) and quite a few recipe books have been published to celebrate the Cape Malay cuisine; and (b) a close study of the Afrikaans language reflect that the Muslims left an indelible imprint upon its development; their influence in the linguistic sphere has been of a permanent nature; and scholars such as Adrianus van Selms, Hans Kähler and Achmat Davids (1990) made invaluable inputs in this regard (Haron 2001).

Apart from these, they were highly respected by the other religious communities, and also by the government for their high sense of morality and loyalty. Thus it is observed that the one characteristic of the Cape Muslims is their hospitality towards their neighbours, friends and visitors from other parts of the country (cf. Du Plessies 1972). They have also been described by the latter as friendly and open-minded in matters of religion. Since these qualities formed the hall-mark of their make-up, it was not surprising to have found individuals amongst them who were quite willing to extend a helping hand to strangers. Mr. Ismail Petersen was thus one of those whose ideas and

outlook were shaped by the socio-cultural and religious issues of those times. He thus undertook the task of assisting the sailors and visitors from Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern countries, and considered it his duty to serve and contribute in a small way to create a strong bond between the small Cape community and the large Muslim communities in Southeast Asia.

4.3.2 A Cultural Activist's Helping Hand

During the late 1930s he entered his teens and frequented the Cape Town harbour not only to watch the massive tankers and beautiful cruise liners pass by, but to also meet with people of various backgrounds and from different countries. It was in 1938 - to be exact - that he felt the urge to extend a helping hand to some of the Southeast Asian sailors who passed through the port of Cape Town. He befriended the officers at the harbour who permitted him to make contact with them. This was the beginning of an ongoing relationship with Southeast Asians in Cape Town.

Since World War II broke out in 1939 many ships from Southeast Asia came pass and this led to an increase in communication with Southeast Asian naval officers and their crew. This also gave him the opportunity to pick-up words and sentences of the Southeast Asians; and since he found it refreshingly useful and beneficial, he had no difficulty in becoming familiar with Conversational Bahasa Melayu/Indonesia. There was unfortunately no grammar book or any other related text available to him to have learnt more about the language and to have delved deeper into it so that he could have developed his writing skills. Be that as it may, he made good progress in the language whenever Southeast Asian sailors visited the Cape shores.

As his involvement with them increased, they became familiar with the Cape cuisine and he also became accustomed to their food and drinks. This was undoubtedly an educational experience for him and for them. In addition to their growing familiarity with the customs of the Cape Townians, many of them became acutely aware of the religious practices which are almost similar to what they observe and practice in their countries. In

fact, there were occasions when he and a few of his friends conducted a religious session on board one of the passing ships, and once performed special ritual ‘tarawih’ prayers during the month of fasting. They were therefore very surprised that the Cape Town Muslim community also performed the *Ratib ul-Haddad* and the *Maulud Al-Barzanji* - these liturgies have been designed by theologians to help the community to improve their spiritual conditions and are still popular among the ‘Cape Malays’ and Malaysians. According to Mr. Petersen, the performance of these religious activities did much to make the seamen conscious and mindful of their religious duties, and, in some cases, kept them away from irreligious practices that usually take place at ports.

Continuous interaction with these passers-by and other visitors who disembarked at the Cape had caused him and a few of his acquaintances to establish a much needed Indonesian and Malaysian Seamens Club (IMSC) in 1945. He presided over all IMSC's activities since then. IMSC was also very much welcomed by the Cape Town seaport officials. The organization also helped to overcome all the red-tape normally put in place by the local governmental structures, and gave easy access to meet the officers, the crew and to board their ships. Mr. Petersen's circumstances changed somewhat in 1946 and he then left for Johannesburg for a while where he worked as a tailor. Upon his return he resumed the activities of IMSC.

Subsequent to World War II many cruise and commercial liners continued to ply through the Cape waters, and the Cape Muslims in general and IMSC in particular continued to benefit from these visits. From amongst all these encounters there were indeed a few which were very memorable and in a sense historical; these therefore need to be recorded.

4.3.3 The Cultural Activist's Destined Links

In Ismail Petersen's efforts to extend assistance towards passing visitors from Southeast Asia and other places from abroad, it should not be forgotten that he was also provided the necessary moral support from members of his family. He was in particular given all

support by his dear wife, Hawwah, whom he married in 1954 and settled down with her in Salt River, outside the Cape Town city centre. Hawwah played an important supporting role in hosting the visitors, and all of them in turn appreciated her services a great deal.

When the Middle East conflict broke out in 1956 Egypt's Abdul-Nasr decided to close the Suez Canal, all the ships from Europe which were heading for the east had to take the strategically placed Cape route. One of these ships had on board a delegation from the Federation of Malaya – a Federation that was about to attain its independence in 1957. This delegation consisted of the former Vice-Chancellor of the National University of Singapore - Professor Dr. Hussein Al-Attas, Tan Sri Abdul Kader - one of the chief secretaries in the Ministry of Internal Defense & Security, and Mr. Ismail bin Panjang Aris who was Negri Sembilan's District Officer. On behalf of the IMSC, Mr Petersen and his wife entertained the delegation as best as they could and introduced them to other role players in the community.

Soon after their return, Mr Petersen received a very warm letter (16 April 1957) from Mr. Abdul-Kader. The latter informed Mr Petersen that he requested the Chief Minister, who chaired the Merdeka (Independence Day) Celebrations Committee, to invite him or any other IMSC representative to attend the Merdeka Celebrations. He was no doubt elated by this news, and in the meanwhile took the liberty of writing a letter (IMSC letter 21 June 1957) to the Federation of Malaya's High Commissioner in London who was supposed to give the final recommendation. By then Mr Petersen had also informed the *Cape Times* – the local daily newspaper, which published a short article about the invitation he had received, and also about the cable he had sent to the then Prime Minister Tunku Abdul-Rahman. And in response to Mr. Petersen's cable of congratulations on the Federation of Malaya's independence, he received Tunku Abdul-Rahman's cable which read: 'greatful for your kind message.'

However, not too long thereafter he received another letter dated 29th of May 1957 from Mr. Abdul-Kader, who had by then shifted to the Government's Secretary's Office, in which the latter indicated that the Chief Minister experienced some problems in inviting

Mr Petersen because there were other 'Cape Malays' who also claimed that they were bona fide representatives of the community. One such claimant was Dr. A. Abrahams (d. 1996); the latter was the head of the Muslim Progressive Society (est. 1940) which had been active in social activities over the years. He, an outspoken and forthright individual, was not happy with Mr. Petersen being identified as the official representative of the Cape Malay community at that time; however, this placed the Federation of Malay authorities in a dilemma and they could not afford to get embroiled in a minor issue that affects a small community at the Cape. By the time the Chief Minister wrote to the Federation of Malaya's High Commissioner in London, a decision had been reached not to extend any invitation to anyone of the two (cf. Chief Secretary's letter no. CSO. 34/130 6 August 1957). For Mr. Petersen, this was a sad and unforgettable moment since he had, by then, dedicated 17 years of his life to serve these seamen from the Southeast Asian region. Despite this minor set back, it did not cause him to become disillusioned since he undertook these activities without expecting any form of remuneration or reward. On the 20th of August 1957 he wrote to the Chief Secretary, Mr. W.C. Wathustan, in Kuala Lumpur in order to congratulate the Federation on its Day of Independence.

As the conditions in South Africa became worse by the end of the 1950s, and particularly when South Africa became a Republic in May 1961, the Malaysian government led by Tunku Abdul-Rahman decreed that the Cape Malays could come and settle in Malaysia. It was then that a few Johannesburg families led by the Hartley family decided to go and stay there (cf. Earlier Section in this Chapter). On the 24th of April 1962, he received an enquiry from Mr. Ebrahim Baderoon who needed Ismail Petersen to recommend him since he also decided to settle in the Federation of Malaya. His correspondence with the officials of the Federation helped individuals such as these to find easy passage to their new place of residence.

During 1962, Mr Petersen met the Indonesian lieutenant-commander Solihin G.P., who was part of the Garuda and Siliwangi Battalion, and Des Alwi, who was the Indonesian Press attache. Solihin and his men spent about one year in the then Congo as a peace keeping force, and were returning home. In that same year President Soekarno decreed that

no Indonesians should work on Dutch ships because of some territorial dispute with the latter's government officials; the result of this decree meant that very few Indonesians passed-by the Cape shores. Although their absence to the Cape Town harbour was very conspicuous, Mr. Petersen's activities to assist other sailors continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s. During this time Mr Petersen met a number of individuals from the Middle East, particularly Egyptians, and this gave him the opportunity to learn Conversational Arabic.

One incident, which needed much patience and assistance since there was no diplomatic mission in South Africa was when the Indonesian coaster, Sri Rezeki, ran aground on the 6th of April 1971 along the Cape coast. In this incident many of the crew lost their personal belongings and he therefore tried his best to make their stay comfortable and pleasant until the shipping agents were able to ensure their return to Indonesia. He thus contacted all the Imams and placed notices on various mosques' boards to give assistance to these sailors in whichever way they could; the Muslim Assembly's executive director, for example, responded by giving a cash donation (cf. *Muslim News* Friday 30 April 1971). And shortly after the wreck was salvaged from the Cape shores, the wreck and its cargo went on auction. Before the auction took place Mr Petersen indicated to the auctioneer that the wreck and cargo rightly belongs to the Indonesians and not to the South Africans, and that the personal belongings of the crew should be returned to them. His attempts were fortunately not in vain since the wreck and its cargo were eventually sold on the 20th of April 1971 for a meagre R8,250.00 to a Mr. F.D. Duncan, a Cape Town businessman, who promised to give the crew's possessions back to them (cf. *The Argus* 20 April 1971).

In 1972 he and his wife decided to perform the annual obligatory pilgrimage, that is the Hajj; they left by ship for the United Kingdom where they stayed a few days; thereafter they spent a month travelling through Europe before finding their way via Egypt to Saudi Arabia. During his pilgrimage to Mecca he accidentally met Haji Ismail bin Panjang Aris in the precincts of the sacred Meccan mosque; this was after a period of 16 years. Through his friendship he was also introduced to a number of other prominent

Malaysians, namely Haji Ustadh Ebrahim Ahmad of the Tabung Haji – this institution assists potential pilgrims to perform their pilgrimage to Mecca, the PRO Haji Abdul-Kader Tamin of Penang, and the Malaysian and Indonesian Medical teams. Through his efforts, these teams willingly assisted the South African pilgrims who fell ill during their pilgrimage. In fact, each year when the pilgrimage is being performed many Cape Malays relate their personal impressions of the Malaysians and Indonesians and their interaction with them (Haron 2005). These social meetings no doubt helped to strengthen the bonds between the Cape Muslim community and the Southeast Asians.

He continued to correspond with whomsoever he could in order to keep the channels of communication open, and with the hope that one day he would be able to visit these Southeast Asian states. With these thoughts in mind he sent a letter in 1975 to the Consulate-General of Indonesia in San Francisco (USA) to convey his greetings for Aidul Fitr, and also posted information pertaining to the Indonesian seamen who have been passing through Cape Town. The Consul, Mr. Gunawan T. replied (Letter 14 October 1975) to thank him for the information; and the latter tried to maintain his links with him.

When Mr. Petersen planned to perform his second pilgrimage in 1982, he decided to be proactive by writing to the Indonesian Embassy in Washington, and the Malaysian High Commission in London as well as the Singapore Controller of Immigration for visas (cf. IMSC Letter 28 April 1982) with the fervent hope of getting a positive response to his wish; and that is to be permitted to enter their states. For weeks on end he waited for replies but received none from the Indonesian and Malaysian diplomatic missions. He then decided to contact his friends who were shipping directors/ managers such as J.M.J. De Cooker of the InterOcean Services Co. (cf. Letter 13 May 1975) and K. Scholte of the Nedlloyd Agencies (cf. Letter dated 30 July 1982) to assist in whichever way they could. In the meanwhile, he wrote (IMSC letter 14 June 1982) to Haji Aboubaker Maidin, who was the president of the Singaporean Jama`at (congregation), in order to expedite matters.

Mr Ismail Petersen's attempts, however, were not in vain. In July 1982 he received application forms from Mr. Meiklejohn who was with the shipping company Trans

Oceana as well as from Mr. Chan Kok Kee from the Singapore Controller of Immigration office (cf. Letter no. V/6183/82 – 9 July 1982). He was indeed pleased with this because he thought that even though he received no reply from the Indonesian and Malaysian diplomatic missions he will apply to the ones stationed in Singapore. At the beginning of August 1982 he began his journey to Saudi Arabia, and thereafter travelled to Pakistan, India, Thailand and Singapore.

During his short stay in Singapore he tried once again to obtain visas for Indonesia and Malaysia respectively. The Malaysian authorities requested that he condemn the then apartheid regime before they would grant him a visa. He realized that the apartheid regime became harsher in its treatment of the oppressed of which he was a part, and particularly with those who spoke out publicly against its inhumane policies; he exercised his right not to do so since he was going to return to his place of birth after his trip to Southeast Asia and could not afford to jeopardize his position and come into conflict with the South African authorities. The Indonesians expected him to wait for an extra three weeks and to find a sponsor of \$500.00. Both conditions laid down by these diplomatic missions forced him to abandon the idea of entering their countries. Even though he was highly disappointed by their respective attitudes and behaviour, he did not give up hope and returned home after an absence of more than five months. Upon his return he continued with his IMSC duties.

In 1984 he received a letter (14 February 1984) of appreciation from Mr. D.A. Hamid Lainjong, the chairperson of the Jama'ah Keluarga Muslims in Canada, who is of Indonesian descent. The latter thanked him on behalf of the crew whose ship SS Rotterdam anchored at Cape Town for a few days. Mr Hamid Lainjong subsequently wrote to Mr Petersen a heart-rendering letter in July 1993 after reading an article about the latter's Indonesian trip. Letters such as these kept his spirits and hopes high. In fact, Mr Hamid Lainjong - this is gathered from a letter (24 May 1984) which he received from H.Masdar Wahab who resides in Macassar - wrote an article in the *Panji Masyarakat*, an Islamic periodical that circulated in Jakarta, in which reflected upon the Cape Malays, and in which he sketched the activities that Mr Petersen and the IMSC was

actively involved in.

As Mr. Petersen and IMSC's profile became known, a new opportunity arose to make new contacts and double-up his efforts. The contact was initiated through members of the International Tablighi Jama'at – a Muslim missionary movement, which had branches in almost all countries in the world. Members of this missionary movement seemed to have been able to send its missionaries to all parts of the world without any difficulty including South Africa, which was off limits to many countries that were members of the UN. It was indeed strange for Mr. Petersen to have met Indonesian and Malaysians tablighis who were on a religious mission to Cape Town; even though there were no diplomatic ties between South Africa and the Southeast Asian states, these fellows were able to enter without any hassles at the borders; be that as it may, it opened up another chance for Mr. Petersen to connect with other important cultural activists within Malaysia. These tablighis were thus instrumental in putting him into contact with Tan Sri Professor Ismail Hussein, the current president of GAPENA, who has been a cultural activist for much of his life. The contact that was struck since then between these two activists remained warm and cordial to this day.

Towards the end of July 1985, Mr Petersen received an invitation (Letter 16 July 1985) from Dr.B.A. Hussainmiya; the latter was the chairperson of the World Malay Symposium that was to take place in Sri Lanka and organized by the National Committee of Sri Lanka Malay Organizations. He responded on 26 July of that year informing the organisers that he was not able to come because of the late notification. However, invitations such as these were because of his communication with Tan Sri Professor Ismail Hussein. And in 1987 (KSLC Letter 30 July) he was kindly asked by Zahidi bin Dato Hj. Zainol Rashid on behalf of the director of the Kedah Public Library Co-operation to send material regarding the Cape Malays, which would form part of the Malay World Exhibition. In response he sent a fair amount of material, which they acknowledged and had displayed (KSLC Letter no.pak 0065/1/87 (67) 17 November 1987).

Even though correspondence continued to and fro, it was only in the 1990s that all his efforts began to bear fruit. This came about because of the strong ties which were galvanised, since the mid 1980s, with Tan Sri Ismail Hussein. Before referring to this link up there is a need to briefly comment on the socio-political circumstances of South Africa at that time. When 1990 ushered in the former apartheid president of South Africa, F.W. De Klerk, announced a few surprising changes such as lifting the banning of the ANC and other liberation movements as well as the release of the Nelson Mandela in February 1990. These developments also placed South Africa in a favourable position to forge trade links with many countries which previously boycotted it because of its apartheid policies. South Africa opened itself up to the Southeast Asian market. And since then commercial activities between South Africa and the Southeast Asian region increased dramatically. These activities also gave rise to the creation of cultural and educational ties between the two regions.

Returning to Mr. Petersen's unacknowledged diplomatic role, Professor Ismail Hussein, who was then director of the Institute of Malay Language and Culture at the National University of Malaysia, came for a short visit (cf. Letter no. UKM1.9/263/9 11 December 1992) towards the end of 1992. Mr. Petersen arranged meetings for Prof. Hussein with academic staff members at the Universities of the Western Cape and Cape Town respectively. This brief visit thus resulted in the planning of an International Seminar on Malay Identity at the University of the Western Cape in April 1993. Subsequent to his visit and with the moral support of Ismail Petersen, a Malaysian Welcoming Committee (MWC) was set up to work out the technical details for the planned seminar. Professor Hussein also explored the idea of the introduction of Malay Studies at the University of the Western Cape when he was in Cape Town in 1992, and during the time of the seminar in 1993. Although Tan Sri Prof. Ismail Hussein was not directly responsible for continuously pursuing this issue, he was able to influence the decision of Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, which is the Language and Literary Agency of the Ministry of Education in Malaysia to seriously take up the matter. After this researcher presented his paper entitled: 'Foreign Language Teaching in South Africa: Making a case for Bahasa Melayu' at the *First World Malay Language Conference* in August 1995, the Director-

General of DBP and the Education Ministry approved the introduction of Malay Studies at UWC as from 1997/8; a Memorandum of Understanding was signed during the early part of 1997. Unfortunately, the Asian crisis affected the plans of DBDP as well as that of UKM and UWC respectively. And to date there has been no progress on this issue.

The international seminar, which was hosted by the MWC of which Mr Petersen was a member, was indeed successful (cf. *Berita Harian* 8 April 1993; *Mingguan Malays* 9 Mei 1993; Wan Hasim Wan Teh 1996). However, there is no need to relate the contents of that meeting except to say that it led to the emergence of a few Cape Malay organizations such as the Cape Malay Business Chamber, South African Malay Society and Forum for Malay Culture in South Africa who wished to create ties with various groups in Malaysia and elsewhere in the region. Moreover, at this gathering there were individuals representing commercial companies and academic institutions such as Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia and the University of Malaya. Furthermore, the result of this visit caused Tan Sri Prof. Hussein to extend invitations to Mr. Petersen, Mr. Nurul Erfaan Rakiép, and Drs. Muhammed Haron to attend Malaysia's annual cultural event, popularly referred to as the Hari Sastera. In addition to participating in this important cultural gathering, he and his fellow travellers were granted the opportunity of meeting the then King of Malaysia, the Sultan of Selangor Darul-Ehsan. After Mr Petersen attended the Hari Sastera where he provided some of his personal accounts of his encounter and contact with Southeast Asians, he was deeply touched to be accepted as an honorary member of the Malaysian Historical Society; this was however only confirmed in an MHS letter dated 5 December 1994.

After the Hari Sastera, Mr. Petersen stayed on in Malaysia with the hope of finding his way to Indonesia. This came to fruition after he approached the Indonesian Consulate-General in Kuala Lumpur (cf. Sekretariat Negara's Letter no. B-526/Sekbang/6/1993 10 June 1993). And with the kind assistance of individuals like Mr. Taufiq Ismail (cf. Ali Al-Attas's Letter 29 June 1993), the outstanding Indonesian poet who is known to all Southeast Asians, Mr. Petersen was able to make his maiden voyage to Indonesia. His trip in 1993 was indeed memorable since history was in the making and since all his

efforts over the years came to fruition. When Mr. Nurul Erefaan Rakiep, Mr. & Mrs. Petersen reached Indonesia, they were treated as if they were dignitaries from the South African state administration. On that trip - on the 17th of August 1993 to be exact - he was also then informed through a letter sent by Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Mr. Ali Al-Attas, that his ministry bestowed on him the title of being the Honorary Consulate-General in Cape Town for all the work he had done since 1938. As a consequence of his maiden voyage to Southeast Asia, his contacts increased, and as a consequence, he received invitations from all quarters of the region. Despite his age, he remained active and continues to correspond with prominent individuals who had given him assistance and had been kind to him. At one of the conferences that he was invited to he penned a poem in Bahasa Melayu on the 14th June 1997 in Cape Town and it was presented at one of GAPENA's poetry reading sessions.

4.4 Bringing Petersen's Episode to a Close

This section of the chapter recorded Ismail Petersen's efforts in assisting Southeast Asians who sailed via South Africa to their country of destination. It demonstrated how he networked in order to facilitate opportunities not only for himself but also for many others from his community to pursue and forge links. His efforts resulted in individuals and institutions co-operating in a variety of fields such as culture and commerce; he might not have been instrumental in the successes and failures of these ties but he was one who took the initiative to bring individuals and groups together. As mentioned, even though all of these connections were not successful, it only showed to what degree the contacts were forged through his selfless efforts and followed up. And as a consequence of his individualist contribution, there has been a tremendous amount of criss-crossing of borders and the forging of transnational activities. The story of this cultural activist proved that his early efforts paid off handsomely, and that South Africa's IR profile was enriched and enhanced by these people-to-people's sacrifices and efforts; it is individuals such as these that brought the South African society in closer contact with their Southeast Asian counterparts.

The story of Mr. Petersen as a NSA actor has been and remains a fascinating one; it is individuals such as these who have, in effect, contributed in a substantial way to one sector of IR. He played the role of what we may wish to describe as ‘an unacknowledged diplomat’ throughout these years. The efforts and contribution of individuals such as this should be seriously taken into account by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant departments. Despite their disadvantaged circumstances and having been wary of the apartheid state’s attitude and interest in the oppressed communities, these individuals displayed genuine feelings towards the peoples in South Africa and thus worked in the latter’s interest and not that of the state. In any event, they have, in a small and humble way, helped to project a positive image of South Africa during the post-apartheid era. And his little known efforts in IR relations had undoubtedly been in the interest of both South Africa and Southeast Asia.

However, he has not been the only individual that has demonstrated an interest in forging socio-cultural ties with Southeast Asia; there have been other Cape cultural activists such as Mrs. Tasnim Kalam and Mr. Mogamat Hashiem Salie whose efforts should also not be overlooked. Each of them was in touch with Tan Sri Professor Ismail Hussein, the cultural activist from Malaysia. Tan Sri Professor Ismail Hussein who, with the full backing of GAPENA, dedicated much of his life to forging socio-cultural links within the Southeast Asian region and had, since the late 1980s, connected with South Africa’s ‘Cape Malays’ as a way of enhancing the bonds between the peoples of these two nation-states. Since his story is intimately linked to that of Ismail Petersen in particular and that of the ‘Cape Malays’ in general, I try in the next section to provide some insight into his contributions to IR.

5. GAPENA, Tan Sri Ismail Hussein & The SMA: Malaysia's Cultural Activist and Institutions

5.1 Introduction

One of the foremost cultural activists in Southeast Asia during the contemporary period and one who has dominated the cultural scene for more than four decades in Malaysia is Tan Sri Emeritus Professor Drs. Dato Ismail Hussein (hereafter Tan Sri). Tan Sri has been the president of the Federation of Malaysian Writers' Association (GAPENA) since its inception and as a broad based cultural vehicle has been used to forge Southeast Asian and Malay cultural relations. Through his tireless efforts and fulfilling some of GAPENA's objectives during the closing decades of the 20th century, he made important contacts with diasporic Malay groups in and around Southeast Asia such as the Champa community and the Sri Lankan Malays, took the initiative of cementing connections with South Africa's Cape Malays; this connection began with a visit and resulted in cultural exchanges at different intervals over the past decade and a half. The link therefore grew steadily and firmly (cf. Abdul-Latiff 2002).

This part of the chapter therefore intends to chart out the socio-historical connections between GAPENA led by Tan Sri and the Cape Malays, and evaluate the impact these connections have had upon the latter community during the past twelve years (and more). Since the forging of cultural connections fall within the ambit of IR, it is only logical that theoretical tools, which were discussed in an earlier part of this chapter, be re-appropriated for the purposes of understanding GAPENA and Tan Sri's (international) relations with South Africa's 'Cape Malays'. With the definitions and explanations of the three variables in mind, it grants us the opportunity to now address the role of NSAs in Malaysia. At this juncture of the chapter Tan Sri's role and contribution as an outstanding cultural activist in linking the diasporic Cape Malay with the larger Malay society in the Southeast Asian region will be addressed. It will first briefly discuss GAPENA's, a KL based cultural organization, role in the promotion of Malay culture before reflecting upon Tan Sri's position in the Malaysian society and his ideas in advocating Malay culture in

Southeast Asia and beyond.

5.2 GAPENA: The Malaysian Cultural Vehicle

GAPENA (est. 1970) came into existence at the time the Malaysian government put in place its National Economic Policy, which subsequently brought significant changes. Its origins apparently lie in the failure of the National Writers Union (est. 1961 hereafter PENA) to attract writers from different parts of the Malaysian Peninsula. In fact, it intended to unite all the literary associations across the country but was not successful. In the end the federation was agreed upon and it came to life during October 1970.

As a federation it became the home of a variety of bodies that drew literary figures, journalists, cultural activists, teachers, lawyers and a range of other interested individuals and parties. Over the years it grew rapidly and gained wide support for its cultural objectives and activities. An aspect which GAPENA was definitely proud of was that it attracted the individuals from diverse backgrounds, particularly those with natural talent (i.e. Bakat Alam) who showed a deep affection for their culture and language. GAPENA's cultural activities supported individuals to write short stories and novels, encouraged the reciting of poetry, offered journalists and artists the opportunity to demonstrate their writing and artistic skills. GAPENA was thus from the very outset at the vanguard of the cultural struggle. The organization has and still plays a crucial role in gathering talented persons from different parts of the country and the region to participate in seminars, workshops and conferences; at these forums they display their poetic and other talents. The Federation's success throughout the country gave them the necessary confidence to look beyond their borders and scout for talented individuals from amongst the diasporic Melayu communities.

Over the years it has become more than a writers' organization and it gradually developed an interest in promoting a global Malay Culture as well as a united Malay-Speaking World; this is clearly articulated in their in-house magazine, namely *Lampiran Warta GAPENA* (January 1996: 2). Between 1970 and 1990 GAPENA had organized numerous meetings, which yielded positive results for the society. In Abdul-Latief Abu

Bakr's (2002: 218 -283) biography of Tan Sri Ismail Hussein he listed all the events in which Tan Sri Ismail Hussein participated; and many of them were specific GAPENA gatherings. GAPENA was the home of politicians, academics, and a host of others. The first Hari Sastera gathering in Kota Baru on 2nd June 1972 was an historical event that proved overwhelmingly successful and attractive; it drew more about 3,000 people of all walks of life. The event demonstrated that modern Malay Culture is not an elitist type of culture only for the aristocracy, but a culture that could be enjoyed by all; in the oft-quoted words of Tan Sri Ismail Hussein (1977): 'modern Malay culture is a democratic culture.'

GAPENA has thus been actively organizing socio-cultural events in and outside Malaysia for the last 35 years and under the leadership of Tan Sri has been able to realize a number of objectives. And even though it has not been able to achieve some of its goals, it continued to strive towards them. In any event one of the problems that GAPENA will have to deal with when Tan Sri vacates the presidency is who will fill his shoes. This has been a major concern because the only main charismatic driver behind GAPENA has been Tan Sri.

5.3 Tan Sri Ismail Hussein: The Outstanding Cultural Activist (Haron 2003; Ismail Kassim 1992)

GAPENA's success and popular support may be attributed mainly to the time and effort Tan Sri Emeritus Professor Ismail Hussein (hereafter Tan Sri) has given to it since its inception. In his capacity as president, he has been the main initiator and driver of the events. His basic simple philosophy about culture being democratic - of the people for the people - transformed GAPENA into a vibrant cultural organization. Tan Sri's charismatic leadership changed him into a high profile cultural activist, who has been in the forefront in seeing to the flowering of Melayu culture through the use of the national language, and one who felt strongly about creating cultural consciousness amongst the Malaysians and in the region. Tan Sri desired that the culture and the language be made known not only in all the kampongs, towns and cities in Malaysia but also in the greater Southeast Asian

region and particularly among the diasporic Malay Communities. Let me briefly reflect on his biography in order to get a better insight into this cultural activist.

Tan Sri was born in the state of Kedah in 1932. He schooled in this state until 1954 and thereafter left to study at the (National) University of Singapore. He subsequently joined the Department of Malay Studies at the University of Malaya where he also continued with his post-graduate studies between 1955 and 1959. By 1961 he joined the Rijks University of Leiden where he completed a Doctorandus Degree in Malay Studies in 1964. He returned to the department at the University of Malaya and it was from that time that he made a substantial input to Malay studies. It was at the time when Malay consciousness and Malay identity was given all the support by the state structures and this thus placed him in a good position to advance the ‘Malay’ cause within the university structure; he was, in fact, Anwar Ibrahim’s lecturer at the University of Malaya. In 1987 he was transferred to the National University of Malaysia (UKM) where he established the Institute for Malay Studies (IBKKM – it has since changed the name to ATMA).

At UKM he managed to use the opportunity to realize his regional and international project by creating cultural connections with the (diasporic) ‘Malay’ communities. He was also during this time the president of GAPENA. And it was via this NGO that he was able to demonstrate his influence and intellectual powers. Tan Sri stood out not only as a provocative academic, but also as an intellectual. The latter was one of the key ingredients that forced him to remain at the helm of affairs of GAPENA. He towered above his colleagues and friends in this regard. Although he was no imposing figure, he had what may be described as a ‘soft-charisma’ that carried him, and made him influential.

However, before evaluating his impact and influence on the ‘Cape Malays’ it is perhaps necessary to pause and define the concept ‘intellectual;’ this will then be followed by a look at some of Tan Sri’s socio-historical connections and a few salient ideas that have given rise to the mission he has undertaken over the many decades. At the outset a question that begs a response is: who is an intellectual? What are the ingredients and cause the person to stand out for his/her intellectual abilities and impact? Richard Posner

(2001:5) defined the term as ‘.... Academics [who are] of modest distinction fortuitously thrust into the limelight, acquiring by virtue of that accident sufficient recognition to become sought after commentators on current events.’ He (2001:23) further elaborated that they write ‘ ... for a general public, or at least for a broader than merely academic or specialist audience.’ Elsewhere in his book (2001:35), he stated that ‘a public intellectual expresses him[her]self in a way that is accessible to the public, and the focus of his[her] expression is on matters of general public concern of (or inflected by) a political or ideological cast.’ Posner also argued that ‘they are controversialists with a tendency to take extreme positions.’ These ideas of Posner are complemented by those of Jeffrey Goldforb (1998:30) who explained that ‘intellectuals are those who use their expertise, their access to special knowledge, their capacity to manipulate symbols, for broader public services.’ He (1998:40) however specifically pointed out the role of intellectuals as being three-fold: (a) to have an organic relationship with critical social forces which question the existing order of things, (b) to clarify the position of these forces, and (c) to give clear articulation of their true vision.

The views of Posner and Goldforb assist one to locate Tan Sri’s position within the general intellectual arena. Indeed Tan Sri began his career by writing as early as 1956 in *The Cauldron* his views on Malayism; views that were considered controversial. And these ideas remained relevant many years after he had written the article. And when an excursion of Tan Sri’s writings is taken, one cannot fail to observe that as an intellectual he has the general audience constantly in his mind. In fact, he always demonstrated a great deal of interest and confidence in the masses and at no stage tried to underestimate the talent that was present amongst them. He, for example, made it quite clear in 1974 that literature was going to be created not by the professionals ‘but by Bakat Alam’ (*The Straight Times* 31st July 1974). And he was proven to be correct in his prediction. Statements such as the one referred to draw individuals to such leadership who has the insight and foresight. It is indeed this positive and inspirational attitude that has also attracted cultural activists within the Cape Malay community towards Tan Sri.

When Tan Sri reflected upon the Malay identity he highlighted the fact that due to the

role of the colonizers, they (the Malays) viewed their culture as inferior to other cultures. This perception resulted in them adopting a negative attitude towards their own culture. It was attitudes such as these that Tan Sri was concerned with. He thus took the initiative of reversing this trend by critically commenting upon the status of literature in the Malay society, and by actively participating in the Malay Intellectual Congresses over the years; it is at these forums that he was able to share his ideas and vision.

Friends and detractors have described Tan Sri as an ardent nationalist and who had influenced many key players with his ideas, mission and vision. All of these variables are embedded, since his undergraduate studies until he became a professor at the University of Malaya, within his psyche. Scrutinizing a few of his writings assembled in a UKM publication offers one a glimpse into his thinking and the way he perceived his role and the role of GAPENA. His writings demonstrated that he was and remained an intellectual pragmatist, and one who never stood at a distance from the crowds. Tan Sri is a person who had his feet on the ground, and his eyes set beyond the horizon. He advocated the idea of a Malay world and the enrichment and use of Bahasa Melayu as a significant vehicle in not only reviving and transforming Melayu culture, but in carrying it to different parts of the world and connecting with those communities that have strands of Malay blood. When the first historical Malay meeting took place in Sri Lanka, he was the one who foresaw the importance of such a gathering, and could envisage the results of those links. The same maybe be said when he made contacts with the Cape Malays.

Tan Sri travelled extensively in order to realize his objectives and he thus spent his time networking within Malaysia visiting villages and towns, and showing his passion for the culture, and he also crossed continents to initiate links and forge the connections. Before he landed with a strong delegation of 55 individuals in Cape Town during April 1993, he had been in close contact with the Sri Lankan Malays where the ‘Simposium Dunia Melayu’ was held from the 3rd to the 11th August 1985 (Hussaynmia 2003). This event had laid the basis for cementing connections with the diasporic communities. The major obstacle in his path that forced him to delay and initiate ties with the Cape Malays of South Africa was the country’s harsh, discriminatory laws; however, despite this factor

he corresponded with a few individuals such as Bapak Ismail Petersen whose role in cementing the connections cannot be overemphasized (cf. Haron 1996). Tan Sri Ismail Hussein was already clued up with the Cape Malays via the different texts that he had received from individuals such as Ismail Petersen, and whatever he had read about the community by then as well as having been in touch with members of certain families such as Abrahams and Isaacs families from the Cape.

When Tan Sri Ismail Hussein eventually had the opportunity of landing on the Cape shores in 1992, he met a number of representatives from the community and these meetings culminated in the planning of the seminar in during April 1993. The seminar was thus organized jointly between UKM and UWC under the theme 'The evolving identity of the Cape Muslim' and was given much prominence in some of the Malaysian newspapers that promoted and supported this type of relationship. For example, refer to report by Dino SS: 'Seminar Melayu di Afrika Selatan' in *Berita Harian* 8 April 1993, and Wahid Kasran & Yazid Othman's 'Misi budaya era baru dunia Melayu ke Cape Town' in *Mingguan Malays* on 9th Mei 1993 (The title of the latter article was excerpted from Hj. Hamzah Hamdani's report which appeared in GAPENA's newsletter, namely the *Warta GAPENA* of April 1993). And for the purpose of organizing the event a Malaysian Welcoming Committee (MWC) was formed. As a committee, which was in constant contact with Tan Sri Ismail Hussein, the issue of identity was dragged into the debate when GAPENA made its maiden voyage in 1993. The MWC in particular had endless debates about the theme since they disagreed as to whether the term 'Cape Malay' instead of 'Cape Muslim' should be used. At one stage they proposed a compromise by drafting the title in the following manner: 'The evolving identity of the Cape Malay/Muslim;' this concretely demonstrated their dilemma. In the end the term 'Cape Muslim' was employed because it reflected the sentiments of the younger, vibrant generation who preferred to be known by their religious identity rather than by their ethnic identity.

The identity crisis was a sign that members of the community have been giving serious

thought as to who they were within the late apartheid period and was concerned not to perpetuate the racial system by accepting racist labels. Nonetheless, the rejection of the label did not deter others from accepting it. In fact, when Datuk Najib Razak, the then Minister of Defense participated in the tercentenary celebrations of Islam in South Africa during 1994, many Cape Malays were proud to be identified with Malaysia. The mere presence of one of Malaysia's cabinet ministers left an indelible impression on them, and they therefore showed that they had no qualms in being referred to in the new South Africa as Cape Malay. As a consequence of these historical events, two organizations (re-)emerged in the 1990s; the first was the South African Melayu Cultural Society (est. 1988?) that was spearheaded by Mr. Mogamat Hashiem Salie, and the second was the Forum for Malay Culture in South Africa that was formed by Mrs. Tasnim Kalam.

Both organizations and the local cultural activists, who gained prominence after Tan Sri's contacts with them, were and remained in close contact with him; he patronized their activities in the Cape and in Malaysia. For example, Tan Sri participated in Mrs. Kalam's Cape conference in 1994 and brought with him a small group of Malaysian scholars. Her conference may be viewed as a follow up to the international seminar held in April 1993 at UWC; and its focus was on 'Cape Malay Culture vis-à-vis Malaysian Culture.' Amongst the key participants from the Malaysians' side were Dr. Mohd Najib and Professor Dr. Amat Johari Moain, and the South Africans were represented by, amongst others, Professor Abdul Kader Tayob – an academic, and Dr. Cassiem D'Arcy – a medical doctor and cultural activist. Even though the conference was poorly attended, it had its positive spin-offs in that ideas were shared and follow-ups were planned.

Be that as it may, Tan Sri Ismail Hussein has played a very diplomatic role when it came to communicating and liaising with the diverse groups and many Cape cultural activists, particularly those who did not work together in the interest of the Cape Malay community as a whole. Tan Sri continuously communicated with them and acted as a bridge-builder so that the communication remained intact, and in order that numerous projects get underway to advance the cause of the community rather than a handful of individuals. He was generally impartial and avoided the internal community conflicts and disagreements

at all costs so that he could draw the best from the different groups. Nonetheless, despite these internal squabbles and external divisions, Tan Sri and GAPENA kept their lines of communication open so that they could monitor the extent of the conflicts but more importantly to see that the Malay cultural activities were being given the necessary support and that their cultural project is advanced rather than hampered by petty internal, local differences. One mechanism that was thought to assist in steering clear of the local differences and drawing activists into international activities that would assist them in seeing the bigger cultural picture was the setting up of the International Malay Secretariat.

5.4 The International Malay Secretariat (*New Strait Times* 26 July 1995)

One of the most important outcomes of the seminars and symposiums that GAPENA organized was the setting up of the International Malay Secretariat (SMA) during April 1996 in Shah Alam, the regional capital of Selangor Darul Ehsan. The SMA was enthusiastically supported by Tan Sri Mohd Taib, the then Chief Minister of Selangor, and at the 4th Malay Intellectual Congress he informed the participants about its establishment. At this meeting he stated that the common problems of Malays world-wide will be studied and that the SMA, which was, at that stage, only in its planning stages. One of the resolutions was “the acceptance of the Malay culture, and literature to uplift the Malay race in the international world.” The idea of the secretariat was for quite a while embedded in the mind of Tan Sri Ismail Hussein as part of his vision for the future; he however had to hold back its formation and implementation because the structures nor the financial support were in place. It was only when Tan Sri Mohd Taib pledged his moral and financial support that the idea gradually unfolded and developed and he subsequently announced the setting up of the SMA on the 2nd of December 1995 and this bore fruit during April 1996; this was soon after the big Malay World Symposium that was held in the Philippines at the Mindanao State University under the theme ‘Rediscovering the roots of the Malays’ between the 31st of March and 6th April 1996 (*Lampiran Warta GAPENA* September 1996: 3). The main objective was to bring on board representatives from the diaporic communities that would advance the cause of

the Melayu world in their respective areas and regions.

Tan Sri Taib spelt out its function by stating that although the main purpose of the Secretariat was to facilitate an intellectual discourse on Malay culture, language and philosophy among the Malays the world over, 'it could directly help develop Malay networking in the business and economic field,' (*Lampiran Warta GAPENA* January 1996: 1). When it was formed the organizing committee also planned alongside the Malay World Symposium for September 1996 an International Malay Trade Exposition involving Malay business persons and entrepreneurs. The purpose behind the symposium was to project a new vibrant voice for the Malays around the world; a voice that would be "dynamic, strong and confident." Another reason was to rectify the image that the Malays are "a lazy race."

The SMA was boosted by the different chairs for Malay Studies that were established in New Zealand, and the Netherlands as well as plans for similar structures and programs in countries such as South Africa. The University of the Western Cape signed an MoU with Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka during 1996 with the intention of mounting and undergraduate and postgraduate courses on Malay Studies. In the September 1996 issue of the special SMA newsletter, namely *Lampiran Warta GAPENA*, Professor Salazar made some relevant remarks on 'Malay Networking.' He basically proposed that three circles be constructed in order that the first circle represent the core Malay states (Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Indonesia and Philipinnes), the middle circle the Malay diapora and the outer circle the rest of the world. Then he further proposed exchanges amongst the different communities at different levels, and people to people networking. In addition to these, he contributed a few other thoughts in advancing the SMA objectives. Unfortunately, although the SMA got off on an enthusiastic start, it faced a few problems along the way; the workings of the SMA were particularly affected by the economic meltdown that was experienced throughout the Southeast Asian region in the 1997-1998 period. In fact, this had a dampening effect on many other cultural activities including the Malay Studies project in South Africa. Its establishment in South Africa was to, *inter alia*, contribute towards the dissemination of images of Southeast Asia, the

construction of commercial and cultural relations, and the teaching Bahasa Melayu as a foreign language.

Even though the objectives of SMA as well as those of Tan Sri could not be fully realized because of the economic melt-down during the late 1990s as well as other factors that GAPENA faced during that time, it did not deter them from continuing with the contacts and inviting individuals to their annual fora. Ismail Petersen and many others have continued to participate in their activities and Tan Sri was instrumental in keeping these cultural activists informed about the developments in and around Malaysia as a method of keeping the unfulfilled ideals and incomplete objectives in mind, and also to spur them on not to give up but to pursue these ideals and objectives.

5.5 Rounding off Tan Sri's Narrative

In IR the concepts of globalization and transnationalism have caused significant impact that resulted in the acceptance of NSAs as important players. Many NSAs particularly cultural activists and cultural organizations have spread their wings across the territorial borders so that they were able to connect and cement ties with their fellow cultural activists and groups. Tan Sri and GAPENA have been in the forefront of the cultural struggles not only in Malaysia but in the region of Southeast Asia as well as in other parts of the world. They have been amongst those NSAs that have sacrificed the better part of their time and lives to create the bonds between themselves and the different communities in the Malay world. As cultural activists, they have enhanced the activities and input by forging ties beyond their respective communities; these methods were viewed as ways and means of attaining their cultural goals and objectives.

Cultural activists such as Tan Sri and Ismail Petersen have succeeded in undertaking the cultural struggle to another important level. However, this struggle depended largely upon the make-up of the individuals and leadership's character. It meant that certain characteristics such as charisma were crucial ingredients that individuals, who find themselves in leadership positions, had to possess in order to attain the desired objectives.

And in the case of Tan Sri, he indeed demonstrated that he possessed a soft charisma that caused individuals from different backgrounds to acknowledge his contributions and to take his ideas seriously. He generally took the initiative and spurred individuals on to pursue activities that would advance the cultural cause. Tan Sri can definitely be considered one of the present-day Southeast Asian cultural activists who played an outstanding diplomatic role as a NSA in advancing the cultural cause of the Southeast Asians in general and the Malaysians in particular.

6. Concluding Remarks

There is little doubt that the re-entry of identity and culture into IR during the past few years has enriched the IR discipline. More importantly, however, it is a fact that the people-to-people's relations have demonstrated that IR scholarship cannot afford to snub the contributions of diasporic communities, refugees, asylum seekers, and for that matter the role of cultural activists in IR. IR scholarship should take full cognisance of the contributions of a variety of NSAs, whether they are institutions, groups or individuals. And there is little doubt that IR will be enriched and will be more informed if it casts its net wider and bring into its purview the inputs of the institutions and individuals that have side-stepped sovereignty of nation states to achieve greater goals.

In this chapter, the stories of three different individuals (and their organizations) have been narrated in order to show to what extent their stories have enriched the IR discipline. When scrutinising these stories very closely, a general consensus emerges and that is that the actions of these individuals and their organizations in one way or the other moved beyond sovereignty - as articulated in IR literature – to achieve IR objectives. In other words, the stories narrated their activities and in the process created and developed links transnationally. The effect of the NSAs activities was such that the formation of their linkages had side-stepped the nation-state's sovereignty and at the same time brought to the fore sovereignty' limitations. In the IR discipline this was and remains a significant development in that it proved that traditional IR scholarship cannot afford to hold onto theories that have outlived their relevance. There is therefore a need to re-visit and re-

conceptualize theories and terms so that new understandings can emerge and new applications can be made.

This therefore brings me to the concluding chapter in which an attempt will discuss South Africa and Malaysia's participation in South-South Cooperation projects through special South programmes. Since both states have their significant stories regarding their involvement in these projects, each of their stories will be narrated independently of the other. In the process of narrating their stories, an effort will be made to point out where and when their efforts converged. And since the political leaders in both states articulated particular philosophies and visions, these will be compared and discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

BRINGING THE IR NARRATIVES OF THESE TWO SOVEREIGN NATION-STATES TO A CLOSE

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter it was demonstrated how NSAs have contributed towards a different understanding of the affairs of international relations. The chapter concretely proved that state actors are not the only substantial contributors towards international relations and it argued that there are many other marginalized groups and individuals whose stories need to be told. In fact, the narratives of these marginalized sectors of society are gradually being noticed for having made a sizeable input to the state of international relations in the socio-cultural sphere. This may be partially attributed to the process of globalization, which has indeed effected a change in thinking beyond the role of the state and a process that has also ushered in new ways of networking and operating in the world.

Globalization has thus forced contemporary social scientists and other stakeholders not only to consider the nation-states of the North as the pre-eminent players in the international system but it has also coerced the North to take cognizance of and listen to the voices of the marginalized voices – the NSAs and the nation-states - from the South. In this era of globalization the South's nation-states, which have generally been ignored and, of course, marginalized by the North, have gradually found ways of working with fellow nation-states to transform their socio-economic conditions at enormous costs. Although many parts of Africa and small parts of Asia are still studded with fractured or weak nation-states, a fair number of others from the respective continents have gone beyond the 'developing' stage and proved themselves to be worthy players in the international state system.

Malaysia, despite its shortcomings, is one example from Southeast Asia that transformed

itself into a tough Asian tiger and one that is a key member of ASEAN. And since South Africa attained its democratic status it has also come a long way in being an important member of SADC and a significant player in international organizations and structures. Since both nation-states have secured themselves important seats within the international state system as sovereign nation-states and more importantly as 'middle powers' that have been able to forge 'close partnerships' in their regions and beyond, they have also opened up important opportunities for themselves to play creative and meaningful roles in changing the image of the South from whence they themselves emerged as 'developing' states. Their general positive performance at the domestic level as well as at the international level has stood them in good stead and this has catapulted them into the vanguard of the struggle for the transformation of the South. However, their participation in South affairs is strongly related to the philosophies that they adhere to and advocate and these philosophies, in turn, gave rise to the formulation of important visions that would take them into the future.

In this closing chapter I therefore intend to address in a comparative manner two interrelated issues that would reflect upon the commonalities that exist between these two states' nations and the differences that they display in response to global issues. In the first case I want to discuss, analyse and compare Malaysia and South Africa's passionate concern with the affairs of the South. And in the second instance and related to the South-South Cooperation project, I propose to undertake a comparative study of the two visions that have in different ways stimulated interesting debates over more than a decade; the one is 'Asian Renaissance' that was advocated by Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia and the other is 'African Renaissance' which was espoused by Thabo Mbeki in South Africa. The fundamental concerns of both visions - as expressed by the two mentioned political leaders - dealt with in this chapter tie in well with the 'emancipatory project.' Both of them essentially argued along the lines of levelling the playing fields via South-South Cooperation in the international system and they made the case for a process of breaking out of the dependency syndrome and supporting the 'prosper-thy-neighbour' philosophy.

2. Malaysians and South Africans: Promoting South–South Cooperation

Promoting South – South Cooperation was one of the key principles enshrined in the Ten Principles at the Bandung Conference in 1955. And when the African and Asian countries met again in the same city to celebrate its Golden Jubilee, they reaffirmed their commitment to this and others that were slightly amended in the light of the new developments. Two states that were not represented at the conference in 1955 were South Africa and Malaysia; in the case of the former, the South African apartheid regime was preoccupied with devising its inhumane policies and did not bother with what was happening in the emerging South; and in the case of the latter, even though this historical meeting took place in the backyard of the Malay Peninsula the signatories of the Federation of the Malaya Agreement was too busy trying to achieve their desired independence from the British. However, both states were fully represented at the African and Asian Conference that took place during April 2005 in Bandung; this meeting was dubbed, according to Kornegay (2004), Bandung II.

2.1 A (Brief) Tale of the Two Bandungs

In the political world where imbalances continue to be perpetuated by the developed countries at the expense of the developing ones via top-down and core-periphery approaches, voices of opposition are bound to emerge and defend their rights to be granted equal treatment and their fair share in the running of world affairs. This has indeed been the case during the colonial period and during the process of decolonization. The very first concrete sign of opposition came from within the Afro-Asian camp took place during the mid 20th century. Between the 18th and 24th of April 1955 the first Afro-Asian Summit was organized in Bandung, Indonesia, with the view of eradicating war, fighting oppression, denounce colonialism, and striving for political freedom and national independence (cf. Pagaduan-Araullo 2005; Sison 2005). This gathering has since been dubbed Bandung I as opposed to Bandung II, which was held in April 2005.

At this significant historical Summit 29 African [6] and Asian [23] countries were represented. Among the participants were newly independent states such as India, China and Egypt as well as scores of national liberation movements' representatives that were still heavily involved in their revolutionary struggles; for example, there were the Federation of Malaya representatives, who were still negotiating for their independence in Kuala Lumpur, and then there were members of the ANC who have up - to that point in time – not as yet pursued armed struggle but had been involved in wide-spread protest campaigns against the Apartheid regime. Towards the end of the historic gathering, the conference communiqué issued the Declaration of Ten Principles; they are, *inter alia*, (a) settling of all international disputes via peaceful means, (b) promoting economic and cultural co-operation in the Afro-Asian region, and (c) supporting the fundamental principles of Human Rights as set forth in the UN Charter. The Bandung Summit gave impetus to the formation of NAM in 1961 with the objective of not being involved in the East-West ideological confrontation of the Cold War. NAM, which fully endorsed the Ten Principles of Bandung, set itself the task of focusing on national liberation struggles, promoting economic growth and eradicating poverty. NAM signatories further extended and entrenched the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which was formulated in 1954 by China and India as a guide to state-to-state relations in particular and international relations in general. Both the Bandung Summit and NAM, as a political movement, inspired the Afro-Asian communities to strive against all forms of imperialism and colonialism, to struggle for their national independence, and to support the liberation movements.

Between 22nd and 24th of April 2005 Afro-Asian Summit was held in Bandung and Jakarta respectively. The Bandung II meeting was significant in that it celebrated the 50th Golden Jubilee anniversary of this important historical event on the 24th of April. It reviewed its past and amended some of the principles that had been formulated at Bandung I. The rationale for this move was to consider the new developments and new realities that have taken place since the end of the Cold War and the challenges that face everyone during the 21st century. More than 86 ministers and seven sub-regional

organizations from the two continents attended this prestigious Asian-African Summit. At the Summit of the Foreign Ministers' meeting, 'a new strategic cooperation' plan of action was adopted that would cover (a) political solidarity – to bring about stability and prevent conflict, (b) economic cooperation – to reduce poverty and increase trade and investment and (c) social relations – to improve socio-cultural understanding and foster people-to-people contact and promote dialogue. This plan of action would, in turn, drive the NAASP, which was adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the Asian – African Summit. The Bandung II declaration thus resolved '... that the sustainability of NAASP shall be conducted through three tiers of interaction: an intergovernmental forum, sub-regional organizations, and people-to-people interaction particularly business, academia and civil society.' These significant developments paved the way for the establishment of organizations, institutions and structures that would work in the interest of the developing countries; countries that have been categorized by social science theorists in the USA and Europe as Third World states. Even though the categorization was frowned upon in leftist circles, developing nation-states in the early years seem to have accepted their fate without challenging their categorization and the concept has lived on to this day.

2.2 Defining the Concepts: Third World and South

What is the exact meaning of the phrase 'Third World', when did it originate, and why was it employed are questions that have been raised since it became part of everyday speech and popularised by the social scientists. The term was coined in the 1950s by a European demographer and economist, Alfred Sauvy who referred to the power monopoly of the aristocracy/clergy configuration at the expense of the commoners in the earlier centuries (cf. Carmen 1996: 26; Toye 1993: 27-28; Thomas-Slayter 2003: 4). The term, according to Carmen (1996: 26) signalled and highlighted the differences of social status and power in the modern configuration in the form of binaries such as First/Third, developed/underdeveloped and rich/poor. And since it has been universally accepted, some social scientists considered it a 'crisp term, easily understood by everyone' (Carmen quoted Johan Galtung [1980]). Carmen (1996: 26) mentioned the fact

that though the term has become part of contemporary conversation in the absence of credible, unbiased and equally valid terms, there have been critical responses to its use. Pannikar (quoted by Carmen 1996: 27) made scholars aware of the 'subconscious colonial and ethnocentric connotations' that accompany it. Toye (1993: 25) stressed the point that the Third World exists because it has been a politically constructed term; it was conjured up through 'Western guilt' and via 'foreign aid.' What this meant was that the West was and remained responsible for the underdevelopment, backwardness and poverty of the continents that have been declared part of the Third World. Further in his assessment of the term, Toye (1993: 28-31) tried to provide a positive spin to it, and Carmen (1996: 30) acknowledged that there is a glaring difference in the understanding and meaning of the term, which was coined by Sauvy, in the 1990s.

Thomas-Slayter (2003: 4) related another interpretation to the term's origin; she argued that the term, which has a 'condescending ring' to it, arose partly out 'a rejection of capitalist and socialist causes that crystallized at the Bandung conference...' According to her, the leadership under Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Achmad Soekarno of Indonesia declared that there was an alternative to the ideologies and lifestyles of the 'first world' and 'second world'. Even though she emphasized that the term never implied third rate/class, the meaning seemed to have lingered on and it has been associated with whatever was perceived as negative. The classification of Afro-Asian countries into Third World states thus connoted that they were and continue to be distinct from those handful of rich developed countries in the First World (cf. Robertson 2002: 477-478). Another related term that gradually came into use during the Cold War period was the 'Second World' and it referred to those 'developing' states that have substantially improved their socio-economic and political status. By the end of the Cold War, this term as a category has since disappeared. In addition to this development, Cardoso (1993: 155) and later Carmen (1996: 30) made reference to the fact that in the closing years of the 20th century, social scientists have (conveniently) added a 'new' category, namely the 'Fourth World'; a term that makes a clear cut distinction between the Third and Fourth Worlds respectively (Castells 1993: 21-22). The latter term implies that there are countries from within the Third World whose socio-economic and political


status has worsened and shifted to a level below the lowest rung. These states have lagged behind in all spheres and lapsed into 'total dereliction' where poverty is rife, famine is rampant and hopelessness is the order of the day (ibid 155). Their socio-economic and political position within the world system pushed them into the 'failed state' category.

In any case, since the negative connotations have persisted in accompanying the term, and found it difficult to brush off, social scientists from within the developing countries have chosen an alternative and more neutral term. Instead of using Third World, they have consciously replaced it with the term 'South' (cf. Galtung 1993: 75-77); a word that apparently appears to have no negative connotations, and one that does not possess the historical baggage that accompanied the phrase, 'Third World.' Since the new concept's employment, leading representatives from the 'South' have readily used it in their everyday discourses; and as a result the offices of Intergovernmental Organization for the Developing formed a special South Commission between 1987 and 1990 with a mandate to investigate how the South can come up with projects that can take its cause forward. The outcome of the commission was the creation in 1995 of 'The South Centre.' It was established to act as a think tank for and by the people of the South and managed by a Council, a Board, and a secretariat (cf. *South Letter* no. 39 2003). The South Centre identified, *inter alia*, the following as main issues of concern: (a) global governance and multilateral institutions, (b) sustainable development, (c) social development issues, and (d) Science, technology, knowledge and development (also cf. The South Centre 1993).

In line with the concerns of the South various meetings have been held and declarations have been made. A report appeared in the issue of the *South Letter* (2003: 3-5) in which it provided feedback on The Jordan Valley Declaration under the theme 'Mobilizing the South.' At this meeting the delegates highlighted the positive developments in the South as well as the disappointments that had been encountered in many countries; they reached an agreement on identifying 'goals for collective action' to advance the cause of the South; some of these were to (a) tap the South-South cooperation potential, (b) place development at the apex of the international political and economic agenda, and (c)

refocus South-North dialogue. Forums such as the one mentioned and the South Centre offered ample opportunities for South leaders such as Mahathir and Mandela to share their views via the centre's widely distributed publications and other related fora.

Figure 6.1:



Numerous South-South efforts have been underway over the decades and they have been organized by interconnected groups such as the G-77 and NAM. The First South Summit was held in Havana, Cuba, between the 10th and the 14th of April 2000. At this Summit a programme of action was adopted, and which, in turn, guided the High Level Conference on South-South Cooperation that was held in Marrakech, Morocco, from the 16th to the 19th December 2003. Out of this auspicious gathering a special Marrakech Declaration was produced; one that covered a number of issues in which it reaffirmed the commitment of the delegates to South-South Cooperation at all levels and on all fronts.

Since Malaysia and South Africa have been party to numerous such declarations, they have thrown their weight behind the South-South Co-operation projects, and have made specific contributions to South-South Co-operation in thought and deed (Shamsul 1996: 64-65); these will thus be illustrated in the forthcoming section. It will demonstrate the kinds of issues that have been emphasized and the types of projects that have been embarked upon by both states in order to realise the goals of the South.

2.3 Malaysia's Long Narrative in South-South Co-operation Project:

During the earlier years, after the birth of the Federation of Malaya/Malaysia, the political leadership demonstrated its commitment to what had then been identified as the developing world (initially referred to as 'Third World' and renamed 'South'). It was only when Dr. Mahathir succeeded as Prime Minister in July 1981 that Malaysia showed greater commitment to the South. In fact, it was, in a sense, through his dynamic leadership as well as a few other South politicians that the South gained more prominence at international fora. This was, moreover, done via his stand-off with the former colonial power, namely Britain, in the mid 1980s and when he also adopted a 'Look East' policy (Milne & Mauzy 1999: 123; Rajendran 1993: 91-107); during a time when the country experienced a down-turn in the economy (cf. Leifer 1995: 146). Mahathir was active as a political leader on the domestic front where he was occasionally challenged by his rivals in UMNO and other parties (cf. Rajendran 1993: 17-33). On the foreign affairs front he showed sterling leadership as Malaysia's premier and also as a reliable spokesperson for the South. He stressed the need for Malaysia to modernize its infrastructure, and overhaul its economy through initiating and producing viable local products that could compete favourably with other well-known brands in the international markets. An example of one such product was Malaysia's locally manufactures car, the Proton Saga (Rajendran 1993: 95-98). The car, which has since it was manufactured in the mid 1980s entered the international market, only reached the South African motoring market during August 2005 (*The Star – Motoring* 18 August 2005).

Mahathir was perceived by many in the South as the self-appointed spokesperson for

them. This began almost as soon after he became the fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia on the 16th of July 1981 and continued beyond 2000 until his retirement from politics in 2004. This was indeed a long innings and one that has been acknowledged by supporters and detractors alike as a significant reign. As he was gaining the confidence of the Malaysian populace and ascending the political structures, he voiced his opinion against all sorts of oppression in the South; he was one of key critics of the South African apartheid regime. At NAM's 7th Heads of State conference that was held in New Delhi, India, on the 8th of March 1983 as well as at the UN Assembly in 1984, he did not hold back any punches when it came to dealing with the apartheid regime. He advocated for a united stand against the inhumane acts of and the injustices that the regime meted out against its Black communities. (cf. Hamidin 2003: 35-36).

At these important conferences Mahathir signalled in no uncertain terms that he was concerned with the plight of the people of the South, and thus committed himself and his country to make a difference through trade and other projects. Malaysia thus stressed at forums such as the Afro-Asian Marketing Convention, which was held in New Delhi, India, during the early part of 1983 that the developing states should strive to trade with one another rather than giving emphasis to trade with the developed states (ibid 56). The Malaysian Minister of Agriculture, who echoed the sentiments of the Malaysian premier, stated that 'it is only by trading with each other that those developing countries can promote development to their own mutual benefit.' In Mahathir's address to the NAM delegates in New Delhi, he requested a re-evaluation of the South's relationship with the North when he said that 'The North-South Dialogue is no longer the hope of the developing countries...The North is not about to abdicate their role as the aristocrats of the world economies.'

Being a pragmatist, he attempted to convince the attendees that significant measures should be taken in order to achieve specific developmental goals and that developing countries should rely on their own resources and adopt frugal lifestyles that will in the end be in their own interest. Hope, he continued in his assertive manner, should not be

placed in the hands of the ‘unfeeling North.’ Mahathir’s lengthy discourses at these fora aimed at restoring faith and confidence in themselves rather than knocking on the doors of the West for assistance and acting as beggars. The seeds for the ‘Prosper-Thy-Neighbour’ policy were planted at this specific forum and were slowly nurtured during the succeeding years and one that became a key principle in Malaysia’s bilateral bonds and multilateral ties. During September 1986 the Commonwealth organized the Finance Ministers’ Meeting that Mahathir attended; at this gathering he reflected his concerns about the enormous debt owed by the developing countries, which has largely been due to unfair trade with the developed states as well as the restrictive economic measures these states have imposed upon the South (ibid 61). Malaysia was among those countries that morally and financially supported the formation of the South Commission that was referred to earlier.

At the Second South-South Cooperation Conference that was organized and hosted by Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur on the 5th of May 1986 – the First one was held in Beijing, China, during 1981, Mahathir reminded the delegates of the suffering and plight of millions of people in the South and the need to work together through bilateral and regional groupings to overcome these obstacles. And he cautioned them to be wary of the fact that ‘a handful of people can make or break us;’ here he was, of course, referring to the developed countries that have been controlling and manipulating the world economy. As a way forward Mahathir proposed the setting up of a Commission that was to take a careful study of South-South Cooperation; this proposal was overwhelmingly accepted by the conference delegates and he was appointed as the chairperson of the Steering Committee, which had its first meeting on the 9th of August 1986. By the time the 8th Meeting of the Heads of State of NAM got off the ground in Harare, Zimbabwe, during September 1986, the South Commission was approved and the former Tanzanian president, Mr. Julius Nyerere succeeded as chairperson. The latter thus steered the Commission into the years that followed and by March 1988 was able to identify its terms of reference, which were: (a) analysing the national development experiences in the South, (b) analysing the global environment, (c) encouraging South-South Cooperation for collective self-reliance and (d) addressing South-North relations. About 10 plenary

sessions were organized from 1987 until 2000 before the extensive, detailed Report titled *Challenge to the South: the Report of the South Commission* (OUP 1990) was produced with a second complimentary volume titled *Facing the Challenge: Responses to the Report of the South Commission* (London 2003); the responses in the latter volume came from key intellectuals and decision-makers around the globe (cf. Hamidin 2003: 71-74). And incidentally, during 1986 Malaysia was a founding member of the Cairns Group, a group of about 14 medium sized agricultural exporting countries, which represented both the developing and developed countries and placed agriculture on the multilateral trade agenda; and as an organization it has developed into 'a successful example of a bridge-building coalition between developed and developing nations' (Taylor 2001: 113).

Mahathir pronounced at almost each of the meetings and gatherings methods of dealing with the economic imbalances that plagued the relationship between the South and the North. For example, at the NAM's Belgrade conference on the 4th September 1989, he argued in favour of some labour-intensive industries to be relocated to the South so that people in this region can be employed and effectively contribute to the economies of their respective communities, and that measures be taken to stop the brain drain to the North by the governments of the South. According to Means (1990: 183-203), Malaysia achieved three important objectives in 1989; the first was defeating the opposition, the second introduced a formulaic revision of the NEP that came into effect in 1971, and the third was replacing the NEP with a new social ethic. Since Malaysia hosted the Commonwealth October meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Mahathir had mended his disagreements with the British; at this meeting he attacked South Africa's apartheid policies, called for an end to trade protectionism, requested for the endorsement of an environment accord and proposed a global meeting against drug trafficking.

Throughout the 1980s, the first decade of Mahathir's tenure as Prime Minister of Malaysia, neoliberal macroeconomic policies were imposed on the South by the USA and its North allies. Organizations such as the broad-based United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that tried to speak out on behalf of the South were forced to either fall in line or be prepared to experience the wrath to be meted out by the

USA and Britain. These types of high-handed measures caused endless hardships in the South, and they angered leaders such as Mahathir, who continuously spoke out against the North's hegemonic position in the globalised world economy (cf. Taylor 2001: 125-126). And since Mahathir has come to the defence of the South, Khong (1991: 176) predicted that the thrust of Malaysian foreign policy in the 1990s was going to be the Third World. He, however, hastily added that ASEAN remained at the heart of Malaysia's interest. In 1990 Malaysia hosted the first G-15 – a core group of the G-77 (Sridharan 1998: 368) - Summit of the South in order to (a) seek solution for the developing countries, (b) devise means of cooperation, and (c) propose the following: trade fairs, financial mechanisms, investments, business forums, IT for technical projects, and population & family planning. In a subsequent meeting that it organized for the G-15 in Kuala Lumpur, Mahathir urged and encouraged the pursuance of bilateral relations and he proposed a 'bilateral payment' scheme for developing countries that would circumvent the USA and Europeans. And at this meeting and as an incentive, Mahathir launched the South Investments, Trade and Technology Data Exchange Centre to assist in the creation of networks among South's small and medium companies. By 1991 and 1992 Malaysia, according to Van der Mehden (1992: 111-118) and Case (1993: 184-193), grew in stature because of its buoyant economy and it, in fact, scored high grades in the opinion of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

During this period he also strengthened ties with the Commonwealth and the Muslim world in order to network with a wider range of countries from the developing world. And it was during 1992 that he introduced his Vision 2020 (Jeshurum 1993: 203-223; also cf. Derichs 2001), a strategic plan that was adopted not only by ASEAN via Malaysia's influence but also by a few African states such as Malawi (Vision 2020) and Botswana (Vision 2016). Hashim (1993: 197-198) observed that although Malaysia's profile was viewed as being high in the eyes of the international community, it was somewhat of a risky affair. Nonetheless, Malaysia continued to support the South and expressed its dismay at the results that the Uruguay Round (UR), which occurred amidst tremendous structural changes across the globe, yielded for the South. The UR was marked by compromises, concessions and horse trading that favoured the North more

than the South. And in response to these results, Malaysia proposed the formation of the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) to decide on economic issues. It was however not warmly welcomed by members of APEC such as the USA; the latter chided Malaysian for setting up EAEC (Sridharan 1998: 361).

Milne & Mauzy (1999: 133) cynically commented on how Mahathir got to support the South project when they stated that ‘it is clear why Mahathir took an interest in ASEAN and in other organizations in the region. It is not so easy why he took up the cause of the South. Perhaps he simply wanted to exercise his political talents in a wider world.’ They seem to have based their arguments on the fact that he was snubbed by Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference that was held in Ghana during 1965 when he approached them to support the Federation of Malaysia’s position against Indonesia in the *Konfrontasi* spat (circa 1963 – 1966). They overlooked the fact that the Federation was and remained part of the developing world for quite a while, and that Mahathir closely observed in his capacity as a politician with hawkish eyes and sympathetic ears, how the rights of the developed states have been trampled upon by the developed world. Despite their critical appraisal of how he became a champion for the South, they could not deny that he was pro-active and fighting a good fight on behalf of the South. Milne & Mauzy (ibid 134) extracted one example where he addressed the NAM 1995 Summit and raised important issues that needed immediate action but was not acted upon; the one was on imposing a ban on nuclear weapons, and the other was the restructuring of the UN into a democratic body.

By the turn of the new century, Martinez (2001: 199) observed that Mahathir was accepted as a key South politician that had been ‘championing (the) rights of the Third World,’ and that he had consistently been preaching against the hegemonic forces represented by the West. It was reported in an article titled ‘Windows on the South’ that Mahathir always tried to provide structures via which the Asians and Africans could bond. He organized in October 1999 a four day meeting for about 350 African and Asian business executives, who came to form the Africa-Asia Business Forum (AABF), to discuss and consider investment opportunities. This venture was initiated by Mahathir

and was supported by a few partnerships; one of which was the Malaysian Government's Malaysian South-South Corporation Agency (MASSCORP) and another was Japan's Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD II) (*Cooperation South* 1999: 150). Mahathir, having been in the vanguard, also suggested alternatives for and within the South to combat the USA's hegemonic position by (a) convening new groups such as G-15, which subsequently became the G-22, (b) organizing the Langkawi International Dialogues, and (c) mooted the EAEC proposals at the 2000 Summit. These actions were concrete proof of Mahathir's commitment to bring developing countries together in order to create opportunities to improve their economies and transform the socio-political lives of their respective communities. Whilst there has been an acknowledgement from within the South that these were fairly innovative structures and proposals, critical questions were occasionally raised regarding Mahathir's style of doing things.

Mahathir has indeed injected a commitment for South affairs and he has inspired many other South leaders even though he might not have been liked for the way he handled some of his affairs internally, particularly the Anwar Ibrahim affair. As stated before, his style of leadership was somewhat abrasive but he was able to get the job done and to some extent earned the respect of friend and foe alike. Although some might point out a few similarities between Mahathir and Mandela, they differed in style and approach. However, despite the differences, they shared a few common concerns, and one of these was the transformation of the South and emancipating it from the shackles of the North. And it is to democratic South Africa's role in the South that I now assess.

2.4 South Africa's Short Story in the South-South Cooperation Project:

Apartheid South Africa's track record for human rights concerns and South affairs has been below zero. The hidden hand of the North was always behind South Africa's apartheid policies because many of the TNCs that were based in the North benefited financially from the status quo. South Africa was thus heavily protected by countries such as Britain and the USA. The respective governments turned a blind eye towards South

Africa's apartheid policies. It is for this very reason why international politicians from the South became fed up with the intransigent position displayed by North politicians such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan when they were in office. Since the South African apartheid regime was tacitly supported, it took full advantage of the situation and showed no sympathy for the South and did not care about the states in its own 'backyard;' in this regard, it subjugated the whole Southern African region through its 'Total Strategy' policy spearheaded by its arrogant and dim-witted president, P.W. Botha in the 1980s (cf. Crawford 1995). Most of the Front Line states were dependent upon South Africa and thus were not easily drawn into the circle of states that were prepared to openly condemn its despicable oppressive acts against the Blacks.

The moment South Africa was transformed into a democracy and slowly shedding its apartheid image under its new vibrant leadership, it was almost immediately welcomed into the fold of the international community. And it also received invitations from a variety of regional and international bodies to join their ranks as a member. During the first years of its democracy South Africa, which coincided with the era of (uneven) globalization, had to contend with sorting out domestic matters and also addressing international concerns. Mr. Mandela's Government of National Unity (GNU) could not however enter some of the international organizations over-night because it had to familiarise itself with the new world order and gradually work its way into the existing regional and international structures. It, moreover, also had to transform the state that it inherited to a democratic one, and at the same time build a new nation with a new identity that would be accepted and respected by the world community. On the domestic front, it had to work out, amongst others, a new Constitution (cf. Deegan 1999) and to give immediate attention to the atrocities of the past via the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (cf. Villa-Vicencio & Verwoerd 2000; James & Van de Vijfer 2000; Haron 2002). And on the international front, it had to radically reform its foreign policy, revise its policies on trade, and restructure its position to deal with the ongoing process of globalization and meet the standards set by the world bodies such as the UN. Since the South African apartheid foreign policy was principally pro-western, the new democratic South African government had to make radical adjustments by shifting it

to a more South-friendly oriented foreign policy; this it did, albeit not very successfully.

In the light of its own circumstances and its late (re-)entry into world bodies such as the UN, NAM and the Commonwealth and regional organizations such as SADC, it allowed itself to first familiarise itself with the developments in world affairs and then adapt to the socio-political and economic environment (Hamill & Spence 1997: 211). South Africa's pragmatic approach under Mandela was applauded for it helped the new democracy to settle into an environment that was active and vibrant. However, the dynamic leadership that was demonstrated by Mandela even before he was appointed the first president of the democracy signalled that an interesting era was to unfold with South Africa's re-entry into world affairs.

One of the first organizations that opened its doors to South Africa with a certain degree of trepidation was SADC. This newly overhauled institution welcomed South Africa into their fold amidst fanfare. However, on the one hand, there was a concern within the SADC circles that South Africa's population of more than 40 million, growing economy, vibrant polity, and strong military might in the region might impact negatively rather than positively on regional affairs; and on the other, there was hope that with its entry it will strengthen SADC as a regional group and that it will be able to effectively address issues on the continent; a continent that forms an integral part of the South (cf. Akomolafe 2003: 278-279).

Although South Africa has generally been categorised by some scholars as a developing state, there have been others who opined that it's a combination of the First and Third Worlds in terms of its infrastructure and economy. Be that as it may, the GNU under Mandela's leadership viewed itself as a strong developing nation, and it further demonstrated its commitment to the affairs of the South through its support for many South ventures and projects. With this in view, South Africa's profile as a champion of the South was slowly on the rise and was gradually being respected. At various gatherings Mandela frankly expressed his views regarding the plight of many developing countries and the role and the responsibility the North has in helping to bring solutions to

poverty alleviation and debt-reduction. Mandela's style in addressing the North was, however, different from the way Mahathir challenged the North; he was not abrasive as Mahathir nor did he act in an authoritarian way.

One of the first significant conferences that took place in South Africa subsequent to its re-entry into the UN was UNCTAD IX (cf. Hamill & Spence 1997: 225-227); this was held between the 24th and 28th of April 1996. As an international body formed in 1964 – the same year when the G-77 came into being, UNCTAD aimed to make use of 'international bureaucracy and conference diplomacy to alter current norms affecting trade and development' (Nye [1973] quoted by Taylor 2001: 123). In the mid 1970s UNCTAD was one of the key international actors that represented the concerns of the South. Much of its efforts to bring about meaningful changes had generally been thwarted and frustrated by the North's arrogant attitude reflected on different occasions; two examples, according to Taylor (2001: 125), that illustrated the USA's disdainful response towards efforts on behalf of the South; the one was the Brandt Commission's proposal to solve the deadlock on global negotiations, and the other was Ronald Reagan's address on 'Reaganomics' to the international community at the Cancun Summit (referred to a quote by Augelli & Murphy [1988] in Taylor 2001: 125).

At the UNCTAD IX conference, Alec Erwin, South Africa's Minister of Trade and Industry and the conference's president, played an important role in the drafting of its Midrand Declaration. The declaration made a renewed call for 'partnership for development' amidst the uneven process of globalisation and liberalisation of which the drafters were very wary of (ibid 130-131). The concept of 'partnership' – which was defined in more detail in an earlier chapter - has increasingly been bandied about in developing forums as an important vehicle for progress and advancement, and one in which the issues of common objectives and joint action had been underscored. The purpose of this approach was also to shift away from the begging-bowl syndrome as well as to avoid any confrontation with the North (ibid). Despite the emphasis on partnership between South and North in the interest of development at the UNCTAD IX meeting, it was criticised for assuming the foreign investments made by the partners from the North

would be a solution to the problems faced by the developing states.

One forum that followed in the footsteps of UNCTAD was NAM, the second-largest grouping of 115 countries within the UN. It was a natural outcome of the Afro-Asian Bandung 1955 conference and was eventually established in 1961 as ‘a global voice for developing countries’ and one that adopted a non-aligned stance in relation to the west-east conflict that was dominated by the USA and USSR throughout the Cold War period (Hamill & Spence 1997: 220-223; Cooper 2003: 12-15). Historically NAM was one of the few organizations that were consistent in their criticisms of the apartheid state, and many of NAM’s members gave moral and financial support to the liberation movements of South Africa since they went into exile and engaged the apartheid regime militarily (cf. Thomas 1996). Democratic South Africa became a full member during the latter part of 1994; the same year it rejoined the Commonwealth (*South African Year Book* 2003/2004: 337); this re-entry was an emotional one in that South Africa, which was a pariah state and shunned by the majority of the international community, regained its significance and respectability after the (former) liberation movements were victorious against apartheid in establishing a democratic state (cf. Taylor 2001: 143).

With South Africa’s ascendancy in the socio-political arena because of its internal reforms and external behaviour towards the South vis-à-vis the North, South Africa won over the hearts of many in the developing world and because of its favourable actions was granted the opportunity of hosting the XII NAM Summit Conference of the Heads of State and Government. This took place in Durban between 29th of August and 3rd of September 1998; and at this meeting Mandela in his capacity as South Africa’s president was unanimously appointed its new chairperson. Under the influence of Mandela, NAM was repositioned to take into account the new realities such as supporting the rights for the Palestinians, and strengthening dialogue among the developing countries – two issues which Dr. Mahathir harped on at previous NAM and other fora. It was quite evident from the newspaper reports and political commentators that South Africa, which postured a reformist agenda within the framework and spirit of dialogue and cooperation, acted as a bridge-builder between the South and the North. Mr. Alfred Nzo, democratic South

Africa's first Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that 'if we can serve as a bridge to bring the interests of the industrialised world and the Non-aligned world closer together, we will know that our struggle has been truly worthwhile' (quoted in Taylor 2001: 144).

South Africa's position as one of key drafters of the NAM Declaration was criticized by NGOs for its uncritical, social rhetoric and its tacit approval of the international capitalist system as is; and they argued that South Africa postured more in the interest of the business communities of the North rather than the South and that it pushed a conciliatory agenda in favour of the North at the expense of South (ibid 145-147). Despite the new government's good intentions to play a critical and an important role in gatherings such as this, it opened up itself to criticisms from different quarters and not being able to satisfy any of them. The major failure of South Africa at the NAM conference was that it did not engage the North on fundamental issues as expected by some South delegates and in the process it 'sacrificed its potential to take moral leadership of the post-Cold War world in favour of becoming chief negotiator' (an analyst in *Sunday Times* 12th of July 1998 was quoted by Taylor [2001: 148]).

Even though South Africa slowly adapted itself to the international environment by not trying to be seen and viewed as wholly 'pro-west,' it could not avoid being criticised for not acting more in the interest of the South, a position which South Africa purported to have been aligned with since its re-entry as a developing democratic state. It has however continued to strive in order to shed this pro-West image, and Mandela tried to stress that 'South-South Cooperation is of direct and central importance to our own national and international priorities' (qtd in Taylor 2001: 143). In any case, South Africa continued to pursue policies and support structures that would fulfil its national and international interests. In this regard it also joined the Cairns Group – a group of 18 developed and developing countries – on the 2nd of February 1998. This is a joint North and South initiative, which acted as a lobby group – some of them being middle-ranking powers 'with a stake in the smooth running of the global economy' - 'to prise open the markets of the USA and Europe', 'to push for greater liberalisation in cross-border agricultural commerce', and 'to dismantle protectionism' (ibid 113, 115). South Africa saw its

participation in this body as crucial; by being aligned with experienced, middle-powers states such as Australia and Canada, it afforded South Africa as a developing democracy the opportunity to make a difference in world trade and, more importantly, to be involved in multilateral engagements to press for liberalisation (ibid 119-120).

When Mandela was succeeded by Mbeki in 1998, the country was given another promising leader. Mbeki, who is a specialist in international relations, has been quite familiar with the international scene, and he was thus able 'to fit in like a glove' when he inherited the hot seat as South Africa's second democratically elected president. Mbeki's style has generally been very engaging in that he has been constantly debating issues via his weekly column on the ANC website (cf. www.anc.org.za). This demonstrates the extent to which he has been prepared to show his willingness to raise issues and be open to criticism for the decisions that he has taken in domestic and foreign policies. However, since Mbeki gave his popular 'I am an African' speech on 8th of May 1996, and during 1998 advocating the vision of an 'African Renaissance' with NEPAD as a strategic mechanism and key project to drive the continent into the future, he has sparked off various debates regarding the notion of an African identity and the question of an African Renaissance. These two issues had a direct bearing on the status of the African continent, a continent that is only made up of developing states.

At the NAM ministerial conference that was held on the 19th of August 2004, Mbeki opened the conference with a paper titled 'Strengthening South-South Relations.' Since the paper captured the main ingredients of Mbeki's thoughts on South-South Cooperation, this section will only give it some attention before shifting to the section that outlines and discusses his vision of an African Renaissance vis-à-vis the vision of an 'Asian Renaissance' advocated and expressed by Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia. Mbeki remarked in his opening paragraph that since the 50th anniversary will be celebrated in 2005, he wanted to take the opportunity of reflecting upon significant challenges facing the developing world. He went on to identify three main challenges; they were (a) the tackling of poverty and underdevelopment; (b) the

maintaining of peace and stability; and (c) the restructuring of the global exercise of power.

Mbeki expressed the view that continuous attempts have been made to tackle poverty and underdevelopment, and to maintain peace and stability. He further mentioned that these have been done through continental cooperation within a multilateral context. And he then made reference to different cases across the continent where endeavours were made to intervene and cooperate to overcome the conflicts. The lesson that has to be learnt from Bandung I was that relationships should be forged. On a regional level, he urged further contacts and cooperation between the AU and ASEAN as well as between AU and other regional and international organizations. In his speech he reflected optimism if member states work toward strengthening the ties through genuine South-South cooperation; and used the WTO negotiations as an example. And he stressed that delegates should take cognisance of the process of globalisation, which has brought with it a concentration of power in the hands of a few and that has been employed unilaterally. And in the light of these developments, concerted efforts should be made by the developing states via NAM to counter these actions. He emphasised that the challenges can only be dealt with in the context of multilateralism and he used Palestine, Iraq and Haiti as three contemporary cases that need urgent attention. And he was of the firm belief that NAM can play a pivotal role in finding solutions.

Midway in his speech he raised pertinent questions as to what gatherings such as NAM should do with the resolutions that have been agreed upon, and what it should do to provide the necessary guidance and directions to the way ahead. He used the Millennium Development Goals as an example, and argued that if there is no transfer of resources from the rich nations to the poorer ones then these goals will never be achieved. He then questioned as to how these resources should be released to meet the Goals, and which the practical steps should be taken to ensure the transfer takes place and the Goals are actually translated into reality. He mentioned that all of these questions and issues are connected to those who possess the resources and the power. And with regard to this, it means that major institutions should be restructured so that the developing countries can

benefit from them equally. The UN was used as an example; it is an institution that has taken too long to change, he lamented. He posed all these questions and concluded that there are no other global institution except NAM that can address these questions and provide hope for many of the poor and disadvantaged around the globe.

This opening address essentially tried to raise relevant questions that the delegates had to seek answers for in the different sessions. He attempted to inspire the representatives not to give in but have hope so that the people in the various communities in different parts of the world can have confidence in NAM as a global political instrument and as a vehicle for hope. The passionate appeal from Mbeki might not have yielded much results, it did however cause the representatives to mull over the serious questions some time after the conference. And it further illustrated that he has become somewhat frustrated with the reformation of important institutions such as the UN and seem to have the opinion that NAM can perhaps make a difference if everyone works together to achieve the agreed Goals for the South. As far as is known, despite his passionate plea at the 2004 NAM forum there were no concrete results in terms of transformation at the 2005 September UN Summit. Whilst African and Asian leadership might have demonstrated their frustration, some such as Mbeki and Badawi seem to have faith in their respective visions, namely African Renaissance and Asian Renaissance; two visions that are examined in the next section.

3. South Africa and Malaysia: Different Dreams but Similar Styles and Common Causes

The story that was narrated thus far demonstrated in a concrete way how the relationship has been transformed from having been adversaries in the early 1960s and late 1980s to being partners in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Despite the shortcomings of the leadership in both states as well as the perennial problems that both face within their respective borders and in their respective regions, they have been able to demonstrate that being geographically distant from one another has and is not an impediment but rather a stimulus to be together and participate in various fora such as NAM, G-77, and IOR-ARC, and work together in these organizations to achieve common goals whilst having different dreams. In terms of the common objectives that bind the two, the one that stands out above all is the fact that both countries have committed themselves to bringing about changes in the South. Indeed, South-South Cooperation has been given special focus within their wide foreign policy portfolio. Ample evidence was given above that clearly demonstrated to what extent each of the two states committed themselves to the concerns of the South. Despite this common cause, the two states reflected that they possessed different dreams for their respective states and continents and this has been reflected and expressed, to some degree, through similar styles of political leadership and public rhetoric.

Although many scholars such as Verma, Khoo, Milner, Eldridge, Alatas & others have expressed their fears regarding Mahathir's authoritarian style of leadership, there is little doubt that he spearheaded the South-South Cooperation project not for his own ego but for the betterment and advancement of the South as a whole. The mere fact that he not only morally supported the project but also ploughed a sizeable amount of Malaysian monies into it is clear proof of his commitment. One example is the setting of LID as a vehicle to work towards transformation in the South. A similar degree of commitment has been observed under Mandela and Mbeki's leadership in South Africa towards the South. Two specific examples that there have become major issues of concern during the past

few years were the drafting and implementation of NEPAD and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); these have been crafted to act as significant instruments of transformation and that would bring about a needed renaissance on the continent.

South Africa and Malaysia have been two important international nation-states that have on many occasions voiced their concerns on behalf of the South at gatherings where the North could gain and have a better understanding and insight of the former in terms of their needs, desires and aspirations and not continue to maintain and remain in a position of eternal exploitation and advance their developed status at the expense of the developing and underdeveloped states. These states have been arguing in the name and on behalf of the South to get rid of the 'begging bowl' mentality or the 'us-and-them' notion where social inequality continues to be the order of the day and where economic growth only takes place in the North at the expense of the South through socio-political and economic exploitation and be labeled as peripheral pawns and deeply dependent states. Both states have concentrated their efforts in doing away with the have and have-not conditions – if that is at all possible – through the eradication of poverty and reversing the underdevelopment process that has deeply affected the South; however, even if this is not possible then efforts should still be made towards that ideal so that the have-nots may have something that could sustain them rather than wallow in abject poverty and be forced and placed in 'Fourth World' category that Castells (1996) identified.

Both states with fairly stable economies have demonstrated their 'middle power' brinkmanship not only in committing themselves to the projects of the South but to contributing concretely towards a number of other areas such as brokering peace and sending their troops to form part of a peaceful corps in conflict prone areas. Since independence Malaysia has been involved in brokering peace in the region and has been sending its forces to team up with other military forces as peace troopers in Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa (cf. Shaikh Mohd Saifuddeen 2004: 77-78); as a consequence of these activities as well as its stable, growing economy and non-aligned political stance, it was placed in a position to act as (a) a catalyst in forming structures such as LID that are in

the interest of the South, (b) a facilitator in overcoming bilateral disputes with its neighbours, and (c) a manager overseeing the affairs of international organizations such as NAM and the Islamic Organization Countries (IOC). And because of these, it fulfilled the criteria as set out by Cooper et al and thus helped to reinforce the notion that Malaysia has reached that 'middle power' status.

A similar story unfolded since South Africa lost its pariah image by April 1994, and through its active involvement in regional and international organizations and projects that clearly characterized it as an emerging and indeed 'middle power' position in global environment. Mandela was and continued to be respected – despite, whilst in office, a few blunders in international affairs either because of his own shortcomings and short-sightedness in the field of diplomacy and because of incorrect advice from bureaucrats – as the model par excellence and someone who was approached to broker peace in East Timor, Burundi, Palestine and the Ivory Coast – to name but a few – during and after his stint as South Africa's first president. The peacemaking role, which was inherited by Mbeki, was continued by the latter particularly in the Ivory Coast and Burundi, and South African peacekeeping forces have been sent to conflict areas to assist in quelling the troubled spots. Despite South Africa's diplomatic failings that have been mentioned earlier, it has acted as (a) a catalyst on the continent when it participated in the restructuring of the OAU by transforming it into the AU, (b) a facilitator in brokering peace in the Ivory Coast for many months since 2004, and (c) a manager in supervising the SADC, NAM and other international organization affairs when it chaired these organizations for specific periods (cf. Hamill & Lee 2001).

During the mid 1990s and beyond, both Malaysia and South Africa as 'middle powers', which were in the process of developing their socio-commercial and political relations into a strategic partnership, popularized their respective 'renaissance' visions as a tool and an instrument to motivate their national communities and the peoples of their respective regions/continents to view the new millennium as a century that will bring about the necessary and needed changes and one in which their respective continents and peoples would reap great benefit; both envisaged the new century becoming an Asian

and/or an African century. This renaissance concept, which basically means revival, reawakening, reinvention and reinvigoration, became a driving symbol and force behind the projects that were created by the respective political leaders in Malaysia and South Africa. It was a 'concept of hope' and one that was stressed and emphasized in many of the political speeches that were delivered since the mid 1990s, and because of the amount of emphasis and exposure that it was given, the term aroused an enormous interest at different levels (cf. Derichs 2001).

Whilst there have been a coterie of scholars who discussed the concept in relation to the media, the environment, the socio-political transformation, the economic aspects, etcetera (cf. Makgoba 1999), there have been others such as Zaidi (1998) who have dismissed the 'Asian Renaissance' concept and argued that '(t)he Southeast Asian boom is not even an economic renaissance... the contemporary Southeast Asian scene is simply a good money-making business that is neither a recovery nor a rediscovery and certainly not a rebirth: this boom is the first time birth.' In the case of Asia, Anwar Ibrahim popularized the term 'Asian Renaissance', which was apparently coined by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies when it convened a Commission for a New Asia in 1994 (Suming Khoo 2004: 186-187), and in the case of Africa, Mbeki popularized the concept 'African Renaissance', which was coined by Cheikh Diop in the 1960s. Anwar Ibrahim and Thabo Mbeki, in their positions as the deputy prime minister of Malaysia and deputy president of South Africa, were optimistic that a renaissance was indeed on the rise. The political leadership in both states cast their sights on to the 21st Century and thus claimed that the 21st Century to be an Asian/African century.

However, since we are only at the entry point of the new century, critical questions may be posed as to whether this will indeed become an Asian or an African century (or both) and whether other factors such as climatic changes and environmental elements that have thus far been witnessed in different parts of the world will not act as an impediment in realizing this dream; a dream of transforming the century into an Asian/African or AfroAsian century. Whilst it might be difficult to speculate and reach a few definitive conclusions, there is no harm in charting out a vision for the respective continents by

their political leadership. Let me pause at this juncture and carefully peruse the two different dreams and expressions of a renaissance that have been expressed from two distinct quarters of the globe.

3.1 Asian Renaissance vis-à-vis African Renaissance

Is it an act of fate that the renaissance concept was used by Asians and Africans at the same time? How come Anwar Ibrahim addressed the issue of an Asian Renaissance two days before Thabo Mbeki was about to address an audience on a similar theme at a venue thousands of kilometres away? Whilst this section is not here to answer these questions, they are raised to show that even though leaders and communities might not have been physically connected to one another that they have had different dreams and adopted more-or-less similar inspirational styles to achieve their dreams and aspirations; and since this was the case they expressed and shared their dreams publicly and regionally for the sake of inspiring, motivating and taking their societies forward into the new century.

3.2 Anwar Ibrahim's Asian Renaissance:

The 'Asian Values' debate and discussions should be viewed within the context of expressing the 'Asian Renaissance' vision (cf. Shamsul 2001); a vision that was addressed by both Mahathir Mohamed and Anwar Ibrahim. It was however Anwar Ibrahim and not Mahathir who brought the term into full view and provided a fair exposition and understanding what it meant. Moreover, Mahathir Mohamed who envisaged and constructed *Vision 2020* used the renaissance concept to further his agenda that would particularly serve the interest of Federation's citizens as well as the peoples of the Asian continent in general. Before commenting on the vision as outlined and explained in Anwar Ibrahim's book, namely *An Asian Renaissance*, a brief summary of his biography will help to place him in context. Ibrahim, who was born in 1947, was schooled and educated in Malaysia and by the end of the 1960s he was intimately involved as one of the leaders in the student movement. With the formation of Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) he was automatically pushed into its leadership position,

and he articulated its ideals and guided the movement. ABIM's dual focus was on enhancing the Malay interest and Islamic renewal (Muttalib 1995: 16; Esposito & Voll 2001: 178). In the 1970s he came under the influence of a few Muslim scholars such as Ismail al-Faruqi, Sayyid Naquib al-Attas, Yusuf al-Qardawi, Hasan at-Turabi and Delia Noer. Ibrahim thus fused their ideas on 'the process of Islamization' with Malay nationalist aspirations and produced an interesting blend of thought and practices that struck a cord with the ideas and aspirations of members of the Muslim leadership in UMNO (Jamil 1995: 167). He was thus ironically drawn to the UMNO political ranks when Mahathir stepped into the office as Prime Minister at the beginning of the 1980s. Under Mahathir's influence and with the latter's unstinting support Ibrahim quickly moved up the structures to eventually become the Deputy Prime Minister; in this position he also held the key portfolio as Minister of Finance. Ibrahim's pragmatic and open approach caused him to gradually gain popular support among its diverse multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious communities. And as Ibrahim grew in stature as a possible candidate to replace Mahathir as Prime Minister, he used the opportunity to raise critical issues regarding the strengthening of Malaysia's civil society and the pursuing good governance that would cleanse the state from corruption at all levels; these ideas formed part of his quest for an Asian Renaissance. Mahathir and his strong support group within UMNO became weary of Ibrahim's rhetoric and devised ways of maneuvering Ibrahim out of office.

Mahathir, the skilful politician and leader who had brought Ibrahim into the UMNO fold, and his loyal supporters, succeeded in manufacturing material that would implicate Ibrahim on corruption charges and sodomy in 1998. And as a result of these imaginary accusations and imagined threat, Mahathir temporarily curbed Ibrahim's influence and automatically deflated his power structures that he built up over the years. And unfortunately for Ibrahim the Malaysian court was not kind to him; the court's verdict found him guilty on corruption charges and effectively locked him away for 15 years in 2000. As fate would have it, when Badawi stepped in as the new Prime Minister in 2003, he had Ibrahim released in 2004. And since his release, Ibrahim was able to make whistle stop lecture tours in different parts of the world. South Africa was one of the states that

he visited. In Cape Town he was hosted by the fairly influential Muslim Judicial Council that had members who were affiliated to the ANC, an organization that demonstrated staunch support for Mahathir and UMNO, and at the beginning of 2007 he, whilst being a visiting professor at George Washington University in the USA, was accorded patronage of the Cape Town based International Peace University of South Africa (est. January 2006).

Anwar Ibrahim's ideas on Malay nationalism and Islamic renewal have thus been formed over decades and by the time he was firmly established in his position as the deputy Prime Minister he began to concretely articulate his views on an *Asian Renaissance*, which was the title of the series of speeches and writings that appeared before and particularly in 1996, in an imaginative and pragmatic way. The book may be roughly divided under two themes; the first was the re-emergence of Asian culture, which has been minimized by those who have been over-impressed by the economic success of some Asian nation states during the 20th century, and the second was to enter into serious dialogue with others in order to reach a 'common vision' that is shared by both East and West. The main thrust of Ibrahim's argument on the promotion of dialogue is that it should move beyond economic issues, and if this can be achieved then Asia would emerge as a major contributor towards modernization and globalization.

Apart from these two general observations, there are specifically two elements that have formed an integral part of Anwar Ibrahim's Asian Renaissance project; they are democracy and civil society. According to Derichs (2001: 197), these concepts were popularized at a time when more emphasis in the western media was given to 'religious fundamentalism' in the late 1990s and to 'terrorism' in the early 2000s. The quest for these two elements, Ibrahim (1996: 49) averred, '... is an integral part of the continuum of the movement of national liberation and self-determination which began in the first half of the (20th) century' (cf. Derichs 2001: 198). The notion of democracy - where good governance is ensured and social justice is observed - as articulated and expounded upon in Ibrahim's text is somewhat different from that defined and expressed in the West; this type of democracy is one that is peculiar to the East and where, for example, the

rights of the society is stressed at the expense of the rights of the individual.

The notion of civil society - translated as *masyarakat madani* in Bahasa Melayu – has also formed an essential part of Ibrahim’s philosophy regarding an Asian Renaissance. Anwar Ibrahim (1996: 51) explained that ‘the civil society we envisage is one based on moral principles, where governance is by the rule of law (and) not human caprice, where the growth of civic organizations is nurtured not suppressed, where dissent is not stifled, and where the pursuit of excellence and the cultivation of good taste take the place of mediocrity and philistinism. For that, we have to retrieve, revive and reinvigorate, the spirit of liberty, individualism, humanism and tolerance’. Derichs (2001: 198) pointed out that the concept ‘civil society’ differs markedly between the way it is understood in the West and East respectively. Whilst the concept in the West has its roots within the enlightenment period, the concept in the East is embedded within the religious sphere. In the East the eastern religious traditions form the basis of an Asian identity, and the Asian way of thinking and acting. According to the Asian religious philosophy in general, the human being is a moral being with a transcendent dimension that has been endowed with inalienable rights as well as unconditional responsibilities to God, his/her fellow human beings and the environment (Ibrahim 1996: 51). He put it more succinctly in his 2nd of May 1996 speech entitled ‘Asian Renaissance and the Reconstruction of Civilization’ when he said that ‘(t)he Asian Man at heart is persona religious.’ In the words of Shamsul (2001: 252), Ibrahim’s intention, which was guided by ‘moral precepts and faith reawakened,’ was to construct ‘an ethical political system with an Islamic thrust that would facilitate the emergence of a responsible and accountable civil society that would be responsive to the government’s agenda.’ Certain characteristics such as individualism, selfishness, immorality etcetera that are prevalent within the West do not feature in the list that makes up the Asian identity.

Derichs (2001: 199) highlighted the fact that whilst Ibrahim’s personal identity is associated with the religion of Islam, he was open and sensitive to all the other religious traditions on the continent and thus drew from the rich legacy of the Asian continent and stressed the idea of civilizational dialogue at all levels in many of his speeches. For

example, in his opening address at the International Conference on Jose Rizal and the Asian Renaissance during the beginning of October 1995, Ibrahim illustrated how Jose Rizal – an individual who had benefited from the knowledge of the East and the West - adopted a multi-dimensional approach in solving humanities' problems. As far as Ibrahim was concerned, the main challenge for the Asian society in general and the Malaysian society in particular lie in the approach that is adopted; this 'holistic approach' includes morality as an essential part of the socio-political structures and economic sectors in Malaysian civil society (ibid 201). Whilst Anwar Ibrahim was languishing in prison during late 1998, he lamented in his open 'Prayer from prison' letter the fact that Malaysia was still a long way from boasting a robust civil society; he added that for civil society to really progress along the path of constructing a vibrant one, 'fundamental social, political, and economic reform is a *sine qua non*.'

Anwar Ibrahim (1996: 29) stated that '(t)he major Asian traditions stand for a holistic vision of life and society encompassing economic, social and political dimensions as opposed to partialistic and fragmentary approaches to development. If we want to lay claim to a unique Asian way, such a way is none other than the articulation of that vision in unequivocal terms. Central to this vision is the philosophy that economic development must proceed coterminously with cultural enrichment. The pursuit of prosperity must not be at the expense of environmental degradation. The quest for growth must always be balanced by a profound concern for social justice and equity. This is a master key to unlocking the secrets of the Asian of Renaissance.' Ibrahim referred to and addressed these issues in the light of the reawakening of Asian ideals and values, and the reinvention of Asian social and political order (Derichs 2001: 198). As far as Ibrahim was concerned, communities - with their diverse cultures in Asia - should aim to lead a balanced life at all levels (ibid 201); the central issue is not the origins of human rights 'but the balance of civil and political rights, on the one hand, and economic, societal and cultural rights on the other' (cf. Milne & Mauzy 1999: 146). He, in fact, reiterated this point in his 'Prayer from Prison' when he critically commented on Mahathir's economic program and stated that 'there cannot be an Asian renaissance without social and economic justice.'

Ibrahim's discourses on the Asian Renaissance and his particular references to democracy and civil society in the mid 1990s should be viewed against the backdrop that the nature of Malaysian governance has fallen short of being described as a true fully-fledged democracy. Verma (2004: 172) strongly argued that 'Mahathir's dominance over government and public policy is due to the system of populist authoritarianism'. And she continued her argument by stating that Mahathir's dominance over these structures '... has made it easy (for him) to control organizations of civil society and manipulate its growth in the declared national and community interest.' As far as Verma is concerned, Mahathir employed the constitution and the judicial system to effectively have firm control over all socio-political activities such as the parliamentary process and mass political activity. And since this was and still is the case, Verma (2004: 176) stated that the relationship between the Malaysian state and its civil society has not been a healthy one, and that civil and political rights have inadequately protected by the state. Similar sentiments were expressed Eldridge (2002: 90-115) in his chapter on Malaysia's 'illiberal democracy and human rights'. In this regard, Ibrahim (1996:63) highlighted the fact that 'one of the hallmarks of a civil society is the creation of entrenched constitutional safeguards for the protection of the people's civil rights and liberties.'

Ibrahim, in his capacity as deputy PM, was acutely aware of Mahathir's powerful position and stranglehold over the executive as well as the socio-political status that the Malaysians faced. He thus skillfully weaved some of the ingredients of an Asian Renaissance into his speeches and writings that offered advice to the society in general and the political leadership in particular. For example, he (1996: 52) adroitly made the point that '(f)or humane governance, it is essential that power be vested in a democratically constituted authority than in the hands of the individual. Power personalised is power plundered from the people.' It can safely be assumed that when he penned these words he had his Prime Minister and other rulers in the region in mind. This argument is partially supported by Elliot's (1998/1999) journalistic assessment when she stated 'Anwar actually started staking out his differences with Mahathir five years ago, when he became deputy prime minister... Anwar ... put together a book called *Asian*

Renaissance, a counterargument to Mahathir's 'Asian values'. And it is supposed that although Mahathir tolerated Ibrahim's lateral thinking and articulation of his ideas publicly, he found them problematic if not reprehensible for taking an indirect swipe at the nature of Malaysian political leadership of which Ibrahim was a part; and this could have been part of the build up to oust him in 1998.

Ibrahim's proposed 'Asian Renaissance' project was a way forward and a method of breaking the political impasse with the intention of bringing an end to the type of populist authoritarian rule displayed by political leaders like Mahathir in the region. Though Ibrahim's initiatives such as his drive for a vibrant civil society and the pursuance of good governance – the two essential ingredients of the 'Asian Renaissance' project - might not have ignited an enthusiasm among the Malaysian citizens for reform in the early 1990s, this changed soon after he was ousted out of his position as the deputy PM and imprisoned on cooked-up charges in 1998. Anwar Ibrahim's dismissal, according to Derichs (2001: 211), also implied 'a dismissal of the *civil society* in favour of the hard targets of Vision 2020, as the morally perfect man in favour of the progressive man (*New Malay*).' Nevertheless, the *reformasi* movement that Ibrahim initiated at the beginning of the 1990s mustered support from various sectors and visibly demonstrated its strength against the Malaysian government at the end of the 1990s; this wide spread demonstration caused the UMNO leadership to be quite nervous for it was uncertain whether the results of the 10th general elections during November 1999 would be in its favour or in the interest of the opposition parties. However, when the results returned UMNO in particular and BN in general to power, it was a great relief for Mahathir whose leadership was surely tested. In response to the BN victory, Felker (2000: 49-60) titled his article 'Mahathir's Pyrrhic Deliverance.' And since Mahathir came back into power, he fastened his grip over the executive and the domestic affairs; and he, at the same time, pursued the interest of the South (perhaps as a method of deflecting the attention of the international community of what took place on a domestic level). Mahathir's diplomatic skills rescued him from being abandoned by the voters, who – instead of voting for someone new - probably felt 'secure' with the type of authoritarian leadership that he has displayed over the years. The voters overlooked his shortcomings and thus remained

contented and satisfied with how he managed the affairs of the state internally and externally.

However, since Mahathir also made his special inputs to the 'Asian Renaissance' theme, it will be in order to make brief reference to his speeches that dealt with the theme. On the 11th of January he delivered a speech entitled 'An Asian Renaissance for a New Asia' to the New Asia Forum in Kuala Lumpur (cf. Makaruddin 2000: 173-180), and on the 15th of August 1996 he addressed the Regional Conference of the 'Harvard Clubs of Asia' in Kuala Lumpur on the same theme (cf. Makaruddin 2000: 129-137). At the latter gathering he pointed out that there were three challenges in achieving an Asian Renaissance; they were (a) domestic reform and revolution of which 'social justice' acts as the key, (b) regional cooperation and friendship of which the building 'peace' is crucial, and (c) striving for a more just and a more productive new world order which should contain a number of pertinent elements such as justice, respect, fraternity, peace and prosperity that would benefit all. In the former speech he demonstrated to what extent Asia's renaissance have been on the move and gone unnoticed by the world. He warned that there are states in the West that would like to see the failure of this renaissance so that the Asians remain subjected to the socio-political and economic hegemony of the West. Mahathir mentioned in passing the importance of democracy in the process of an Asian Renaissance but did not attempt to define and elaborate upon this concept as was the case in Ibrahim's writings. And at no stage did he comment on the position of 'civil society' as an important stakeholder in the transformation of the Malaysia/Asia and the eradication of poverty and the ultimate attainment of social justice; issues that have been raised and discussed by Ibrahim.

The Asian Renaissance debate has indeed played a crucial role in infusing a positive and optimistic attitude within the Asian communities in general and the Malaysian society in particular. The 'Asian Renaissance' project, which is an ongoing one, despite the obstacles that occurred with the apprehension and imprisonment of Ibrahim. It is a project that has brought about a degree of fraternity among the region's nation-states and has reinforced ZOPFAN as a region of relative peace. It is indeed this type of fraternity and

peace that is also envisaged by aspiring political leaders such as Thabo Mbeki during his position as South Africa's deputy president. In this key political position and as the second important political figure after Mandela, he advocated the idea of an African Renaissance vision and a process that was to replace the Afro-pessimism that has been pervading the continent.

3.3 Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance:

The African Renaissance is a phrase that has been popularized in South Africa by Thabo Mbeki in 1997 whilst he was still the deputy president of the newly found democracy. Prior to Mbeki's call, the concept was used at the Cheikh Anta Diop conference that took place in Dakar, Senegal, in 1996 and also addressed by earlier fora on the continent (cf. Maloka 2000; Horn 2000). This popular phrase was and remains a clarion call to all African peoples and nations to solve the diverse problems on the troubled continent by themselves in an African way. And when Mbeki gave his famous 'I am an African' speech on the 8th of May 1996 - which more-or-less coincided with Anwar Ibrahim's University Loyola Heights lecture entitled 'Asian Renaissance and the Reconstruction of Civilization' on the 6th May 1996 in Philippines' Quezon City - the ideas were weaved into the general African Renaissance philosophy (Mbeki 2001: 9-14). Vale & Maseko (2003: 135) explained in their footnote that Mbeki's speech 'drew together the diverse strands of the country's history, and outlined a new, unified framework for a post-apartheid South Africa.' The speech spurred scholars and journalists on to provide extensive commentary on its contents and more importantly to be associated with its spirit of reconciliation. Bearing in mind that the speech was made during the time when the South Africa's national project, namely the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (cf. Villa-Vicencio & Verwoerd 2000), got underway and that South Africans on the whole were seeking ways of renewal and social transformation. In the light of these circumstances, Mbeki advocated the idea of an African Renaissance during a critical period in its social history.

African Renaissance, however, became a key concept in the vocabulary of the post-

Apartheid African intellectuals. According to Landsberg and Kornegay (1998), it became a strategy that could be used to bring about a Pax Africana, a term coined by Ali Mazrui, and which meant that ‘... the peace of Africa is to be assured by the exertions of Africans themselves’. And African Renaissance, which is a version of the Pan Africana ideology and which Mbeki painstakingly clarified and explained at different gatherings, stimulated scholarly debates to unpack and understand the concept and its implications for South Africans in a post-Apartheid period in particular, and for African states, which faced the challenges of the post-colonial conditions, in general. In fact, Landsberg & Kornegay (1998) went on to question whether the SADC is a renaissance strategy because of South Africa’s involvement in the DRC disputes, and they also asked whether there was a consistent ‘Renaissance Africa’ policy. As far as their observations were concerned, the Renaissance Africa is ‘... in part the response to the strategic games of the Washington/Paris sphere of influence in Africa’. They also highlighted the challenges that face a Renaissance Africa strategy and commented on the security dimension of this strategy.

Vale & Maseko (2003: 124) adopted a more critical position when they offered their insightful interpretations of the ‘African Renaissance’ idea. Their interpretation suggests that ‘although rooted in structuralism, and buoyed by the same modernization theory that inspired apartheid’s African ambitions, South Africa’s ideas of an African Renaissance is abstruse, puzzling, even perhaps mysterious; more promise than policy.’ That said, they (2003: 125) further pointed out that the African Renaissance’s ‘essential features remain deliberately vague’ and that South Africa’s idea of an African Renaissance possessed specific ulterior motives; the one was to seek ways of maximizing its foreign policy options in Africa and to gain a permanent seat in the UN’s security council (Evans 1999: 626). These two scholars were cognizant of the variety of commentaries that reflected upon the concept, and thus confined their comments and explanations to basically two specific interpretations.

The first, they argued (2003: 126), is the globalist interpretation that is shaped within the modernist tradition and embraced by the South African elites of all races ‘whose

understanding of modernisation is the generation of wealth;’ and the second is the Africanist interpretation, which is post-structural, and it is connected to a process of ‘unlocking a series of complex social constructions’ and turn on ‘issues of identity’. These Africanist, according to Vale & Maseko (2003: 128), are intent on developing and reconstructing a situation in which Africans would be able to contribute towards civilization; however, this can only take place via a process of reinterpretation of African history and culture and through a process of reshaping and making of an African identity. The Africanist perspective, these two scholars argued, created the necessary space for alternative opinions and understandings of Africa’s position in the 21st century. Maloka (2000) slightly revised the categories offered by Vale & Maseko: he accepted the first category which he associated with Mbeki and the ANC. He qualified the second category by prefixing ‘pan’ to ‘africanist’ so that the South African debate on African Renaissance can be located in a broader Pan-Africanist tradition. And he added the culturalist dimension that harkens back within the African Renaissance process to its African roots and which is inextricably tied to the concept of *ubuntu* as well as the question of African identity. Returning to Vale & Maseko (2003: 133), they posed a critical question regarding Mbeki’s position vis-à-vis the two strands of interpretation: is he an Africanist or a globalist? They mentioned after scrutinizing some of Mbeki’s speeches that although he might be a committed Africanist as argued by Vincent Maphai, a political scientist, he – as an ardent modernizer - leaned more towards a globalist stance because of his adoption of neo-liberal economic policies and strategies. And Mbeki’s choice, preferences and decisions were made despite internal dissent within the tripartite alliance (ANC, SACP & COSATU) regarding his pro neo-liberal stance.

Apart from the critical remarks and observations by these informed scholars, the African Renaissance project’s supporters, who are also strong adherents of the neo-liberal policies, demonstrated the need for advocating an African Renaissance. Since some of them have been fully informed about the East Asian example, they argued in its favour and considered it as a useful model that could be adopted and adapted. Two examples will suffice: the first paper was titled ‘The African Renaissance: A Dream’ and it was delivered by Mr. Vusi Mavimbela, an Mbeki advisor, at a Foundation of Global Dialogue

forum during July 1997. In his paper, he acknowledged that when discussing the renaissance process that full cognizance will have to be taken of the Asian Renaissance as well as the East Asia economic miracle before debating the ideas pertaining to an African Renaissance. And he emphasized the point that the *raison d'être* for a renaissance on the African continent is to empower the African communities so that they may radically break from their colonial past and contribute to and benefit from all the achievements of human civilization. The second paper was delivered by Dr. Tim Thabane, the deputy Governor of the South Africa Reserve Bank. In his address to the African-Asian Society he reflected upon 'Asia's Economic Recovery and its implications for the African Renaissance' on the 5th of October 1999 in Sandton. He thus used Asia as an example and as a model for economic growth on the continent. Much of Dr. Thabane's ideas concentrated on the economic aspects of the African Renaissance and he illustrated that the growth in the Asian economies have a direct bearing on the development of an African Renaissance.

In the light of these criticisms and contributions on the theme, it provides us the chance to go directly to two of Mbeki's many speeches. Whilst some addressed the concept of an African Renaissance, others touched on other related themes. Mbeki addressed the Association of African Central Bank Governors in Sandton, Johannesburg, on the 16th of August 2001 and titled his speech 'Towards an African Renaissance.' Since the symposium that was organized tackled the issue of financial institutions and the African integration process, he stated categorically that 'the political and economic integration of the continent is central to that Renaissance.' This reinforces the point that was made by Landsberg & Kornegay (1998) when they argued that politics and economics were two important pillars of Mbeki's renaissance strategy. Mbeki tried to impress upon the minds of these governors not to be despondent when they read negative statements such as 'Africa, a hopeless continent'. He injected in them a positive spirit; one that will adopt a positive attitude towards the challenges that face each one of them and he did this by mentioning the rationale behind the African Renaissance. He said that 'when we speak of an African Renaissance, we speak of an ending of poverty and underdevelopment on our continent and, therefore, the building of a better life for the ordinary people of Africa,

especially the poor, and the assertion of our pride as human beings, with a culture and identity that define our personality.’ He further added that ‘as Africans (we must) design and implement programmes that impact positively on poverty eradication on the continent and the attainment of sustainable development.’ If these yield positive outcomes, then it is because of the inputs and efforts of independent African minds and not the ideas of consultants from the developed world. He reminded the bankers that the continent’s economic recovery is central and should be addressed because this and other economic categories such as growth, equity, development, and globalization should be related to the African past and future. And towards the end of his lengthy discourse, he stressed the fact that they, as central bank governors, have a decisive role in the future of the continent and ‘to restore the dignity to ourselves as Africans.’

On the 2nd of November 2001 he was a guest of the Malian government. In his address at the state banquet under the title ‘The Dream of the African Renaissance,’ he paid homage to the rich legacy left behind by the early generation of Malian scholars, artists, traders, etcetera. And mentioned that he was indeed touched and humbled by the substantial and profound contribution that was made these Africans at the time when much of the world was still in darkness. He commended Mali’s steadfast leadership under president Konare and inspired by the example shown by Mali despite its meagre resources. Mbeki emphatically stated that ‘our conviction for the realization of the dream of the African Renaissance, our firm belief in the necessity of the economic recovery of the African continent, and our support for the restructuring of the political agenda in Africa through the African Union is something that we share with the majority of the African leaders... Through the co-operation of the people of Mali and the people of South Africa, through this committed African family, together we shall create a caring, people-centred African future and the African child will prosper.’ In 2002 a Joint South African-Malian Commission on Co-operation was held in Pretoria, and one of the most significant outcomes was the formation of a South Africa – Malian committee that would oversee and work towards the rescuing and preservation of the thousands of unedited and unscrutinized Malian manuscripts. This formed part of the indigenous knowledge project -spearheaded by Dr. Shamil Jeppie in the Department of Historical Studies at the

University of Cape Town - that would be substantially contributing towards 'the dream of the African Renaissance' and further reinforce international relations on the continent by the academia.

The various statements in these and other speeches clearly demonstrate that Mbeki has remained positive and upbeat about the African Renaissance strategy. This has been particularly the case after the acceptance of NEPAD as a significant vehicle that would drive the African nation-states into a prosperous future by (a) observing and respecting the standards that had been set down by the AU, (b) working towards economic growth, and more importantly by (c) upholding the principles of democracy and practicing good governance. NEPAD was also welcomed by the communities of the South as well as those of the North. In the South, regional organizations such as ASEAN gave their full support to NEPAD principles and for its implementation, and ASEAN members also indicated their interest to assist through financial investments and technical assistance with the hope that these will help to give rise to reduction of poverty and unemployment and particularly to rapid economic growth on the African continent that would bring about equitable growth and sustainable development.

4. Concluding Remarks

In concluding my assessment, it may be speculated that NEPAD as a mechanism might perhaps bring South Africa/SADC and Malaysia/ASEAN closer together and act as a stepping stone towards realizing the respective African Renaissance and the Asian Renaissance visions that the political leadership of both states have been dreaming about over the past decade. And if this does happen, then it is assumed that it will further enhance the relationship and partnership between South Africa and Malaysia. Even though this relationship, as argued in this thesis, had developed into a close partnership and one that is slowly evolving into a strategic one, the major test is in sustaining and deepening the partnership into the decades ahead. This is however dependent on the two pillars that Ibrahim pointed out in his speeches, namely good governance and a strong civil society. It is hoped that these pillars will continuously be respected, observed and

supported in both South Africa and Malaysia for the foreseeable future particularly after Mbeki and Badawi vacate their positions to give way to other capable ones.


This chapter covered a few important issues and themes that have a direct bearing on the relationship that has been developed between South Africa and Malaysia since the early 1990s. It has done so in order that the relationship between these two states be understood within the context of the process of globalization; a process in which rapid and divergent socio-political and economic developments have taken place during the past two decades and more. The section prefaced the chapter with a brief discussion of the two Bandung meetings and with the conceptualization of 'Third World' and 'South' respectively so that the concerns and issues that have affected and continues to impact on the developments in the South be better comprehended. It then went on to show how these two nation-states became involved in the affairs of the South under their vibrant and capable political leadership.

In Malaysia it was Mahathir with Ibrahim on his side and in South Africa it was Mandela with Mbeki on his side who led the way to advance the cause of the societies in their respective states and in the interest of the peoples of the South. Although the philosophies that underpin the respective leaders' ideas and practices have not been investigated, it should be borne in mind that these (Asian and African) philosophies played a crucial role in these political leaders' attitudes and outlooks towards the South and the North. The Malaysian and the South African political leadership performed key roles in stressing the significance of South-South Cooperation through their participation in various international and regional gatherings. These leaders, however, promoted the interest of South-South Cooperation via the formulation of their respective visions that were discussed in this chapter. Anwar Ibrahim articulated the vision of an Asian Renaissance and Thabo Mbeki advocated the vision for an African Renaissance. Unfortunately, since the relationship between Mahathir and his deputy soured towards the end of the 1990s, the articulation for a clear vision of an Asian Renaissance came to an abrupt end but in the case of South Africa Mbeki, as the president of the country, continued to harp on and popularize the vision with the help of projects such as NEPAD.

There is little doubt that the political leaders in both countries demonstrated continuous commitment towards bringing about tangible and concrete transformation in their respective countries in particular and in the South in general. Examples were extracted from Mahathir's life to illustrate how he harped on the fact that the North should be mindful of the plight of the South, and how he suggested concrete ways in moving forward and in overcoming these difficulties. And the chapter rounded off a discussion that made reference to the examples displayed by Mandela and Mbeki respectively; it showed that their hearts were always with the developing countries and that they have remained concerned about how effective changes can be brought about and how the goals that have been listed at different meetings can be achieved in order to 'level the playing fields' in the socio-political and economic arena. In fact, both Malaysia under Mahathir/Badawi and South Africa under Mandela/Mbeki have been calling for radical reforms in the UN in order to accommodate the new realities and to give the South a greater voice in the UN's Security Council; at the UN's Summit between the 14th and 16th September 2005, it appears that their hard work has not been able to succeed in bringing about this important change.

These two states in particular and the South in general will probably have to wait many more years before their real emancipation will be witnessed, and its very unlikely that the North will allow themselves to be pushed into subordination at this critical juncture in world developments. In the meanwhile, they will have to use their positions in the regional structures such as SADC and ASEAN and international institutions such as UN, NAM and the Commonwealth to push from the bottom up for the radical reforms that they so much desire. In addition, they should also make ample use of newly formed structures such as the Indian Ocean Rim to foster the necessary economic cooperation among the developing and least developing states become less dependent upon the developed states (cf. Campbell 2003); if this should succeed then it might work towards levelling the playing fields and slowly addressing the socio-economic and political imbalances that presently exist.

Figure 6.2




An Afro-Asian Renaissance (?)

- Asian Experience:
Anwar Ibrahim

- Malaysia Boleh

- African Experience:
Thabo Mbeki

- Proudly SA



CHAPTER SEVEN

CODA: The Final Passage to the Tale of Two Sovereign Nation-States

In finally rounding off this thesis I offer a summary and bits of added commentary on the different chapters in order to demonstrate how the various socio-political, economic and cultural strands interconnect and, of course, to bring this interesting and indeed fascinating narrative of two medium size, middle power, sovereign nation-states from the South to a close. At the outset the thesis reviewed in **Chapter One** all the available writings on South Africa – Malaysia relations and it visibly illustrated that the amount of material that had been written was unbelievably thin. But despite the lack of publications, some of the works particularly those by Muda, Southall, Padayachee & Valodia, and van der Westhuizen made substantial inputs that cover important dimensions of the relationship. Their coverage of these aspects was, however, not sufficient in terms of the issues that had been broached, discussed and analyzed in this thesis. Their studies undoubtedly stimulated me to work towards adding to and expanding the existing body of research material by undertaking a detailed study of the socio-political and economic links that existed between South Africa and Malaysia, on the one level, and the cultural ties that were cemented, on another level, from the 1950s onwards.

Before I embarked upon this important task, I prefaced the study by constructing a theoretical framework in **Chapter Two**. This framework was engineered to largely assist in comprehending the relationship that existed between these two nation-states during the Cold War era, and one that was re-structured and developed to a different level in the post-Cold War period. After a brief synopsis of the various theories I expressed my dissatisfaction with traditional theories such as Realism, and naturally opted for a more user-friendly theory that was in vogue and one that accommodated not only one method of interpretation and understanding but many. In the process of searching for such a theory I stumbled across Critical Theory (CT) that was to open the path towards critical thinking and flexibility. CT, which was conceptualized by the Frankfurt School and

advocated by Jurgen Habermas and a host of other scholars, proposed - when examining issues and relationships - the notion of emancipation as a tool to unlock and prise open doors that would lead to a better understanding of these issues and relationships. Though the application of this theory was loosely applied throughout the thesis, it resulted in an understanding of the relationship that had been forged between these two nation-states; in fact, it assisted me in raising critical questions pertaining to the nature of their relationship.. It also helped to point to important variables that played a critical role in these issues and relationships; some of which were briefly discussed in relation to CT. One variable that was dealt with in some detail in Chapter Two was the concept of 'Identity;' a concept that impacted upon different structures in a variety of ways. At the state level, I observed the transformation the state underwent. Two quick examples: the shift in 1994 from an apartheid state to a democratic one was evidence of a radical change in state identity, and in the case of the Federation of Malay(si)a Singapore's initial membership and subsequent withdrawal in the early 1960s also impinged upon the issue of state identity in the region. And at the community level 'identity' played a crucial role particularly in situations where they have been challenged by the changing socio-political circumstances and have had to choose between accepting one national identity for the other. The example of Singapore and Malaysia again comes to mind: when Singapore de-linked itself from the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 it caused individuals to decide whether to opt for a Malaysian or Singaporean identity in Southeast Asia and when turning to apartheid South Africa the socio-political upheavals in the mid 1980s forced the South African Muslim youth to either retain the constructed 'Cape Malay' identity or to replace it with a 'Cape Muslim' identity. The question of identity formation was thus crucial to the debates throughout this thesis and was an issue that formed an integral part of CT.

The theoretical framework in Chapter Two cleared the way for the investigation of the nature of the relationship between South Africa and Malaysia, two sovereign nation-states, in **Chapter Three**. The chapter demonstrated how South Africa's relations with Malaysia evolved over the many years from the 1950s until the end of the 1980s when the winds of change swept across the world to create a new world order and socio-

political set up. Prior to showing, through brief comparative vignettes, how these two states developed and dealt with their respective internal and external affairs, the chapter discoursed in some detail about the conjoined term 'nation-state;' the term that consisted of two important concepts have been unpacked in order to comprehend the nature of contemporary nation-states After defining and explaining these terms, the thesis zoomed in on Malaysia's foreign policy towards apartheid South Africa and its discriminatory policies; it particularly examined the policies that were adopted and implemented by Tunku (1957-1961) and Mahathir (1981-1990). Whilst the thesis proved that Tunku adopted a soft approach towards apartheid South Africa, it went on to demonstrate that Mahathir assumed a no-nonsense hard approach; an approach that he followed through until the socio-political changes eventually took place at the beginning of 1990. The socio-political developments in both nation-states as well as the unwavering stand that Malaysia implemented towards South Africa provided an important background to the way the relationship was transformed and changed from 1990 onwards.

The reconnection, which was initiated in 1990 and fully realized in 1993, between Malaysia and South Africa is ample proof that the Malaysians were quite keen to establish diplomatic connections so that they could direct their investments into South African projects. The ties that were established were spurred on by, *inter alia*, their buoyant economy and their stable political conditions with the intention of developing and transforming their friendly bilateral relationship into a close partnership that would be mutually beneficial to both states as well as the regions they both represent. The mere fact that Malaysia committed itself to assisting the ANC morally and financially in the 1980s was enough evidence to suggest that they were fully prepared to back South Africa's transformation in the 1990s. Their sizeable investments that gradually trickled into various South African structures such as housing, communication system, hotel industry and many others were tangible proof of Malaysia's pledge. South Africa also reciprocated by sending in its business troops to Malaysia. Despite the economic melt down in Southeast Asia in 1997/1998 that temporarily affected the economies of the region and in other parts of the world, some of the businesses that were able to weather the economic storms generally gained from their investments and partnerships.

It was demonstrated particularly in **Chapter Four** that there has been continuous communication and cooperation at the government to government levels between South Africa and Malaysia; the numerous official visits as well as many other non-official visits by non-state actors further strengthened the bonds and enhanced the relationship in the socio-cultural, political and economic spheres. All of these demonstrated that the initiated and sustained socio-political and economic activities have played a crucial role in establishing ‘a close partnership’ at the governmental and non-governmental levels. Since both nation-states were classified by IR scholars as (emerging) ‘middle powers’, it forced me to unpack the concept in relation to the notion of ‘partnership’ in order to, on the one hand, fully grasp what was meant by the term, and, on the other, how it applied to the relationship that evolved between South Africa and Malaysia. The chapter thus depended upon some of the previous works that addressed the issue, and it was able to extract examples that demonstrated why they were labeled as ‘middle powers’ and how come they were able to maintain those positions within the international state system even amidst the formidable challenges that they faced on occasions.

Malaysia, whose economy suffered in the 1997/1998 economic crises and spoiled the investments its investors made in South Africa between 1992 and 1996, bounced back under Mahathir’s erstwhile leadership. The financial crisis, which had a negative impact upon the Malaysian economy, caused the Malaysians under Mahathir to respond in a proactive way and thus miraculously re-build the economy within a short period of time. Despite the internal conflicts such as Anwar Ibrahim’s dismissal that occurred at the time, Mahathir steered the country out of the crisis and this was once again another example of his tough leadership and indeed Malaysia’s resilience in fighting the challenges that came its way. Malaysia thus showed South Africa and all other African countries that even though the odds were stacked against it due to internal and external factors, it was able to challenge these head on and rise above them. For the South Africans, Malaysia continued to be a good example in the Southeast Asian region despite the intervening negative the socio-political and economic developments that occurred during the past few years.

In this chapter it was argued that even though the Southeast Asian economic crisis had a rippling effect and caused jitters amongst South African businesses that had investments in Malaysia trade ties were not broken at any stage during the crisis. I went on to demonstrate via an assessment of the trade figures that both nation-states remained committed to pursuing commercial connections despite the adverse conditions at that time. In fact, the figures showed that Malaysia regained its position by 2000 and continued with its investments; however, this time round it was more cautious because it wanted to avert and avoid any situation that would negatively impact upon its own economy and that of its partner. In the meanwhile, diplomatic ties flourished since Mbeki's visit to Malaysia in 2003 and after Badawi reciprocated in 2005. In fact, their visits and speeches have taken account of the cultural connections that have been ongoing. Their acknowledgement of this sector bolstered my argument to include and discuss the cultural connections that exist between the two communities as a crucial part of international relations and as a significant part of South Africa's relationship with Malaysia during the contemporary period.

Chapter Five therefore devoted itself completely to the role that had been played by three non-state activists or I should rather say two cultural activists and one voluntary refugee. In outlining and discussing the contributions of these three individuals (and their organizations in the case of the two cultural activists), I illustrated how their efforts have provided a different dimension to international relations. Discussing their respective contributions lead me to deal with a numbers of variables such as ethnicity, culture, religion and citizenship that were easily slotted in under the concept of 'Identity.' The case of Hj. Rabi'ah, the voluntary refugee, who joined the diapora strengthened the notion that citizenship has been and remains a problematic issue, and it also proved that a person's religio-ethnic identity does not provide one with an automatic ticket of entry and acceptance into another country that shares common religious and ethnic strands. And in addition, it also brought under the microscope the question of diasporic communities at large. Hj. Rabi'ah's trials and tribulations continue to be an interesting example for scholars of IR.

The second case study in this chapter focused on Ismail Petersen's struggle to serve strangers and forge connections with no ulterior motives. Peterson's commendable efforts demonstrated that despite his disadvantageous position within a racially structured society he was still able to pursue his personal goals. I contended that Mr. Petersen was oblivious of the fact that he was effectively contributing to international relations whilst he was attempting to fulfill his social and religious obligations towards passers-by from far-flung Southeast Asian states. Mr. Petersen's rich experiences differed markedly from that of Tan Sri Professor Ismail Hussein, my third subject, who was conscious of his inputs to international relations. Having been a former university professor and an ardent cultural activist from Malaysia, he was ambitious in pursuing his project of not only espousing the Malay language and culture nationally but also internationally. I showed that as an intellectual, a view supported by Opello and Rosow (2004: 194-196), that he played a key role in crystallizing the Malaysian society's aspiration in a very crisp and neat way; a way that Malaysian politicians found difficult to do. In fact, the Malay intellectual – like other intellectuals in other states such as South Africa - was the driving force behind the nationalistic ideals that were embedded in the Malay language and culture. Tan Sri, who was firmly entrenched within the Malaysian academia, wisely used the available resources to advance his objectives.

Since the academic environment was not sufficient for achieving his objectives, he went on to establish GAPENA as a suitable vehicle that would take them beyond Malaysia's national boundaries. As a consequence, Tan Sri connected not only with regional communities that shared his ideals but also with diasporic communities such as those residing in Sri Lanka, Madagascar and South Africa. GAPENA played an important supporting role in all his ventures and it helped to chart a significant niche for itself within the Malay cultural world. I described Tan Sri as a cultural activist par excellence because of the enormous amount of networks that he established in the region. And I further argued that even though he did not write a vast number of works, he was able to inspire and stimulate a variety of cultural activities such as poetry readings and Malay dancing that underpinned Malay culture not only in Malaysia but also in the region. In fact, he was able to arouse and instill an interest in these areas among many of the

diasporic communities who had been in constant contact with him. And these connections, in a sense, reinvigorated the debates surrounding the question of ‘identity’ as was the case when the first international seminar was held at the University of the Western Cape between South African and Malaysian scholars. Tan Sri’s story, along with the other two cases mentioned earlier in the chapter, stressed the point that the activities of non-state actors such as cultural activists have important lessons for foreign policy cum decision makers. For those critical of realism writing the stories of cultural activists into the grand narrative along with that of the state goes a long way in rectifying the social histories of the marginalized communities. As a matter of fact, the actions of these non-state actors not only brought into question the limitations of sovereignty but also the types of challenges that it had to face in the new constructed global village.

The actions of these cultural activists in particular and acts performed by the nation-states in general have led me to look at other aspects of these two nation-states. In **Chapter Six** I was compelled to look at two important issues that are partly rooted in the respective philosophies of Asia and Africa and partly in the imbalances of power that exist in the international system. It is in the nature of Africans and Asians to act collectively when it faces a variety of challenges and to push aside individualist trends of dealing with problems; this individualist trend may be viewed as a spin-off or an outcome of liberalism and a common characteristic of the modern European lifestyle. Since the West/North holds all the powerful positions in the international state system, nation-states from the South have desired to reach similar positions. Unfortunately for the South, the international system was constructed by the North to serve its interests and not those of the South. The South has remained in a disadvantageous position in relation to the West/North for whenever a nation-state from the South fulfilled all the criteria laid down by the North, then the latter tried to place other obstacles in its way that blocks the nation-state’s entry to the elite group of states; thus it has been somewhat impossible for the progressive and advanced ‘developing’ state to find a seat in the prestigious club controlled and managed by the North. Labels such as ‘Third World’ – a concept that defined and subsequently replaced with ‘South’ - were invented not to inspire confidence but to instill an inferiority complex in the minds of all the inhabitants residing in that

world; a world that has also been described as one that was in the perpetual process of ‘development’ and an issue that had been critically commented upon by critical theorists such as Cox and Habermas.

As a result of the stark imbalances in the world system and the negative labels that have been bandied about by the North, nation-states such as Malaysia and South Africa, which have achieved ‘middle power’ status and accomplished stable socio-economic polities, have struggled hard over the past decade - and a bit more in the case of Malaysia - to level the playing fields by committing themselves to the cause of the South; an act that has found favour with those expressing critical theoretical perspectives. Apart from the ties that had been forged and the activities that are taking place since their reconnection, Malaysia and South Africa considered their commitment to South-South Co-operation project of paramount importance and a significant avenue via which they could serve the communities of their fellow strugglers from South. The chapter illustrated in detail how Malaysia sacrificed much of its time and wealth in this direction and this was further complimented by democratic South Africa’s story during the past decade.

Both nation-states were greatly inspired and motivated, however, when their political leadership charted out visions for the future; visions that were embedded in their respective continental philosophies that were firmly located in ‘Asian values’ and ‘African values.’ The call for an Asian Renaissance by Anwar Ibrahim and an African Renaissance by Thabo Mbeki were – to paraphrase Kornegay, Landsberg & McDonald’s (2001: 112) concluding remarks - not mere ‘slogans of hope’ in search of continental solutions, but as global perspectives that encompass Asia’s and Africa’s ambitions within the world in the 21st century. These visions have been the driving forces behind their zeal to bring about profound changes within their respective nation-states and their regions as well as their respective continents.

And both states have ambitiously sought to strive towards higher goals via their close partnership and their participation in regional and international organizations. Their respective ambitions, which were mentioned earlier in the thesis, found further support in

the Joint Commission that was set up between South Africa and Malaysia. When it got off the ground mid 2005 after a few years of planning and negotiations, it further suggested that both states have been deadly serious in enhancing their relationship and establishing a permanent, strong (and hopefully a strategic) partnership. These exciting developments and the new energies that have thus far been ploughed into the projects in order to strengthen their blossoming relationship bode well for the future ties between these two sovereign nation-states. I assume that if both states develop a relationship that will realize 'prosper-thy-neighbour' ethos and create a friendly atmosphere within their respective regions, then that will be a good start for the regions as well as the continents.

Although I am somewhat pessimistic about the future, I hold onto the view that it will still take a while for the political leadership to reach that realization and this means that the regions represented by SADC and ASEAN will still have a long way to go. And related to this and other related policies and issues, the political leadership of both states should think hard when it comes to re-formulating thoughts about their respective communities in the light of regionalization and globalization. In other words, the Malaysian and South African political leadership should set their sights and minds on empowering their communities in their respective states as well as those in the region; they should in effect try to think beyond their borders that had been created by the former colonial powers and should not imprison themselves by the (artificial) borders. This attitude and approach will go a long way in bringing about emancipation in the form of tangible and concrete changes in their states and their regions. If a positive attitude and approach are adopted and cultivated, then it should also cause the leadership of both states to look beyond the nation-state as the final frontier, and take into account how their communities were connected and related in the distant past (Acharya 2000; Vale 2003); a time before the colonial powers came onto the scene and created borders and identities that have become physical barriers and indeed obstacles among nation-states on the continents of Asia and Africa and their different regions. Since this thesis captured the relationship between South Africa and Malaysia in the socio-political and economic arena, it acts as an important basis for further research between South Africa and other sovereign nation-states in ASEAN, Asia and elsewhere in the South.

An attempt was made to use and employ CT as useful analytical tool and framework in which alternative solutions could be sought for the variety of problems that nation-states such as South Africa and Malaysia faced and also for all the others from the South. The theory was further supported by the introduction of the concept of 'identity' to demonstrate how alternative identities were wrought by the changing conditions and circumstances. And it was given further impetus when I brought into the discussion numerous other concepts that critical theorists also grappled with; for example, I dealt with the notions of 'nation-state,' 'middle power,' 'partnership,' 'South/Third World,' 'diaspora' and 'non-state actors.'

On this note, I wish to close the thesis by stating that a Herculean effort was made to clearly illustrate the type of relationship that existed between these two sovereign nation-states during the Cold War era, and how their relationship transformed into one that exemplifies a fairly healthy, fraternal relationship during the post-Cold War period. I am, however, curious to know what the next decade will bring forth as these two nation-states continue to plough ahead into the 21st century: will they remain committed to the South? Will they be able to weather the socio-political and economic storms that lay ahead? Will their new political leadership work with one another the way Mandela and Mahathir cooperated? These and other questions I will leave for the researcher who has been stimulated by my findings and outcomes.

APPENDICES
Chronology of Salient Socio-Political & Economic Events in
South Africa and Malaysia:
Circa 1990 – 2005

The chronology hereunder is a selected list of socio-political and economic events, which took place between 1990 and 2005; its main purpose is to offer a bird's eye view of what had transpired over the decade and a half and particularly during South Africa's ten years of democracy.

The chronology bears testimony to the fact that South Africa and Malaysia have developed a very cordial relationship throughout these years, and they continued to enjoy a healthy relationship in all spheres and entered into what has been described as 'a strategic partnership;' this has been most notably so in the respective political and economic arenas. This relationship has emerged out of the passionate support Malaysia has given to the liberation movements, particularly the ANC, in their struggle against apartheid; and this was further bolstered when Mandela was released from prison in February 1990. Before Nelson Mandela became the president of South Africa in 1994, he paid tribute to then Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, for his unstinting support. And since then, the two developed a strong bond of friendship.

Their friendship and desire for meaningful transformation in the world political system as individuals and as world statesmen laid the grounds for a common realization of the importance of South-South co-operation. Their ties have paved the way for visits at the ministerial and other levels. Ministers, parliamentarians and other high standing dignitaries from both countries have exchanged visits. Delegations from the Provinces of Gauteng, the Northern Province, Northwest and the Northern Cape, led by their Premiers, have gone to Malaysia to forge ties in different sectors. The Malaysian cabinet and other important dignitaries reciprocated by leading delegations and groups to explore and cement the existing bonds. And at a people-to-people's level, socio-cultural and religious connections were also made as another way of cementing this relationship.

Herewith below are some of the events:

1990

2nd February South Africa's President F. W. De Klerk announced in Parliament that Nelson Mandela will be released and that the banning imposed on many of the anti-apartheid liberation movements will be lifted. On the 11th February Nelson Mandela was released from prison.

11th October Dr. Mahathir's government was voted back into power.

1991

Malaysia lifted people-to-people sanctions against South Africa (in accordance with the Harare Declaration at the Commonwealth Heads of State Meeting in Zimbabwe) at the end of 1991.

On 26 February Dr. Mahathir announced his *Vision 2020* and the concept of *Bangsa Malaysia*; this working paper he delivered at the Malaysian Business Council.

On 17th June the National Development Policy replaced the National Economic Policy that was introduced in 1971.

In early July the ANC elected a new National Executive with Mandela as its president

1992

Malaysia indicated that she wished to establish a Liaison Office in South Africa in order to facilitate direct contact with the South Africa. This Office would form part of the Malaysian Airline System (MAS) office in Johannesburg.

In October 1992 the first Malaysian Airlines flight arrived at Johannesburg.

Since the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Harare in 1991 had ruled out the official establishment of relations with South Africa, the Malaysian Liaison Office

would function until a South African interim Government was in place; the Liaison Office was established towards the end of 1992.

On the 10th of December Anwar Ibrahim defeats Gafar Baba in contest for Deputy President of UMNO.

1993

Air service agreement between South Africa and Malaysia signed on 5th January.

The GAPENA delegation under the leadership of Professor Drs. Ismail Hussein from UKM visited Cape Town in April, a year prior to the democratic elections, and they were hosted by the University of the Western Cape with the intention of setting up a Malay Studies program and to sign an MOU between UKM and UWC; the visit was approved by the Malaysian government.

The process of lifting trade sanctions began when the Malaysian International Shipping Corporation (MISC) was given authority to accept South African cargo from 1 July.

In a 1993 statement, the then Foreign Minister, Datuk Abdullah Badawi, mentioned that Malaysia intended to lift all remaining diplomatic, trade and economic sanctions against South Africa with effect from 25 September. Full diplomatic relations were established on 8th November.

1994

The South African Embassy in Kuala Lumpur was opened on the 17th January, and subsequent to South Africa's re-admittance to the Commonwealth, the Embassy was renamed the South African High Commission.

South African Malay Chamber of Business undertook an official 'Mission to Malaysia' trip between the 3rd and 11th February. The Mission leader was Mr. Riedewaan Isaacs, the chief executive officer, and he was accompanied by Mr. Abdul Gamiet Flacks, the

managing director, and Mr. Mohamed Hoosain Bux, an executive member.

In March Malaysia awarded the Tun Abdul Razak International Award to President Nelson Mandela. Mr Mandela received this award for his efforts in the forefront of the struggle to dismantle apartheid. President Mandela's daughter, Ms Zinzi Mandela, accepted the award on behalf of the President at a ceremony in Kuala Lumpur on 10th August.

During April first democratic elections in South Africa took place, and on the 9th May Nelson Mandela was elected and subsequently installed as first president of South Africa's Government of National Unity.

In April the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, was one of the first foreign statesmen to pay a private one-day visit to South Africa to congratulate President Mandela. The Malaysian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Datuk Abdullah Badawi, attended the inauguration of President Mandela on 10th May and held a short private discussion with President Mandela.

In September the Second Afro-Asian International Conference on Power Development was held; this coincided with Malaysia celebrating 100 years of electricity.

Between 12th and 16th December the Asia-Africa Forum held its meeting in Bandung.

Since 1994, Malaysia has assisted more than three hundred South Africans in their studies that range from short but focused courses to full scholarships for degrees like engineering and information technology. A number of South African universities signed MOU's with their Malaysian counterparts and co-operation was encouraged. The concept of South Africa as an affordable education destination for international Malaysian students was being promoted.

1995

Mr. Joe Modise, South Africa's Minister of Defence, visited Malaysia during January.

Dr. Mahathir and Barisan Nasional returned to power after general elections.

In March South Africa was one of the founding members of the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOC-ARC – formerly known as IOR Initiative) to further ties and trade in the region.

During July Malaysia hosted the Langkawi International Dialogue (LID) – a Smart Partnership, which dedicated itself to South-South Cooperation.

Ms M Mohale was appointed as South Africa's first High Commissioner to Malaysia, and she presented her credentials to the King of Malaysia on 25 July.

Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, the Malaysian Prime Minister, paid an official visit to South Africa in August, and Malaysia joins IOR-ARC in August.

Cape Al-Attas Dhikr Jama'at Group participate in Celebration of the Prophet's (s) birth under auspices of Pusat Islam in Kuala Lumpur on 18th of August.

Yahaya Ahmed, a Malaysian entrepreneur & then chairperson of Proton, led a 250 business delegation to South Africa and negotiated setting up a Proton plant in the Eastern Cape. (Mr. Ahmed died in a helicopter crash during his visit).

In December South Africa signed a business arrangement with Malaysia, allowing for the manufacture, under license in Malaysia, of the South African designed attack helicopter, the Rooivalk.

1996

The Department of Foreign Affairs issued a paper on 'South Africa's Foreign Policy: Discussion Document.'

26th March Asian Tigers and African Lions Business Conference, Johannesburg.

First South Africa – Malaysia Forum

6th May Deputy President Thabo Mbeki delivers his 'I am an African' speech to the South African Constitutional Court.

In June Petronas purchased a 30% stake in Engen.

Between 28th and 30th July LID had its third meeting.

The Asia-African Forum met in Bangkok.

During November a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation has been signed between Malaysia and South Africa. Malaysian Defence Minister D.S.H. Albar confirmed in Pretoria that talks on the purchase and production of helicopters have been held.

1997

Asian financial crisis hits Malaysia and other states and by October the ringgit lost 40% of its value.

In 1997 the ANC issued a 'Developing a strategic perspective on South Africa's Foreign Policy' document for discussion and debate.

President Mandela's – leading a delegation of 105 persons – three day visit in March witnessed the official launch of the Malaysia South Africa Business Council (MSABC) in Kuala Lumpur; Dr. Mahathir also attended this function. Mandela signed the 47th (trade) agreement between South Africa and Malaysia.

Second South Africa – Malaysia Forum meeting.

4th to 5th May the First Southern Africa International Dialogue (SAID) took place in Gaborone.

Dr Mahathir received the Order of the Cape of Good Hope from President Mandela in Cape Town, on 7th May.

South Africa and Malaysia signed a Trade Agreement as well as a Shipping Agreement in 1997. A Double Taxation Treaty was negotiated and subsequently signed. In addition, Malaysia has approached South Africa on the possibility of concluding an Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, as well as an Economic, Technical, Scientific and Cultural Co-operation Agreement.

1998

Deputy President Thabo Mbeki delivered his African Renaissance speech.

In May the Second SAID took place in Windhoek, Namibia.

12th NAM Summit of Heads of State and Government in Durban from 29th August to 3rd September.

On the 3rd September UMNO Supreme Council expelled Anwar Ibrahim from the party after Dr. Mahathir sacked him as his deputy.

The visit of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki to Malaysia, during the Commonwealth Games in September 1998, further bolstered the relations.

During 1998 the Department of Foreign Affairs presented its 'Thematic Review: Strategic Plans' paper for discussion and debate, and in October the White Paper on 'South Africa's Participation in International Peace Missions' was accepted.

South Africa acted as host and took over the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement meeting.

1999

The South African Government appointed Honorary Consuls in the States of Penang and Sarawak (in June) in an effort to further establish a presence outside the commercial heartland of Selangor (within which the capital of Kuala Lumpur is located).

Deputy President Jacob Zuma attended the Fourth Langkawi International Dialogue (LID) in Malaysia in August to participate in the Malaysian initiated LID Smart Partnership concept and this has taken a Southern African-leg with the establishment of a

Southern African International Dialogue.

During November BN and Mahathir came back to power.

In May the Third SAID took place in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe.

In October the Asia-Africa Business Forum met in Kuala Lumpur

"From Transition to Transformation" was the theme of the delegation from the Northern Province Investment Initiatives (NPII) program sent to Malaysia to promote trade and investment. On November 15th, a day to meet the delegates was co-hosted by the South African High Commission (SAHC), the Malaysia-South Africa Business Council (MSABC), the Asian Strategy Leadership Institute (ASLI) and the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry Malaysia (NCCIM) at the Hotel Istana in Kuala Lumpur

2000

The South African Chapter of the African Renaissance was formed during April.

Between 15th and 22nd April Mr. Zingile Dingani, Minister for Finance, Expenditure & Economic Affairs in the Free State Province & Delegation visited Malaysia.

20th April Mrs. Phumizile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Minister of Minerals & Energy addresses business forum on 'Investment opportunities in Mineral Industry.'

Between 23rd and 24th May the Asia-Africa Forum – Joining Hands for Strengthening Partnerships was held in Kuala Lumpur.

South Africa handed over the chair of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, which was held since 1996.

SAID was held in Maputo between 20th and 23rd of August.

6th September Popo Molefe, premier of the North West Province and his delegation makes a presentation in Kuala Lumpur to attract investments and trade to that province.

In October South Africa appoints Ms. Lindiwe Mabuza as the new South African High Commissioner to Malaysia.

2001

On the 23rd June Cape Malay Charitable Concert organized by the Selangor Council of Welfare & Social Development in Shah Alam.

A joint Ministerial Commission was proposed during a meeting that Minister Dlamini-Zuma had with her Malaysian counterpart in September.

President Thabo Mbeki handed over the chair of NAM, which held its meeting in Malaysia, to Dr. Mahathir Mohamad.

SAID was held in Kampala on 20th August.

2002

Between the 17th and 19th February Afro-Asian Dialogue Conference in Johannesburg

Dr Abraham Nkomo, South Africa's third High Commissioner to Malaysia, presented his credentials to the King of Malaysia on 22 March.

Malaysia Airlines - as from 1st of May – reduced its number of flights to South Africa; instead of the initial four flights per week it reduced it to three.

A draft document of the Joint Malaysian Commission was presented to South Africa during the first quarter of 2002. MOUs on Co-operation in the field of Sport and Recreation and Public Service Training between South Africa and Malaysia were also

considered.

Dr. Mahathir celebrates 20th anniversary in office as PM on 16th July.

Inaugural summit of the African Union in July, and the launching of NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development).

Deputy President Jacob Zuma attended the Fifth Langkawi International Dialogue (LID) in Malaysia in November 2002 to participate in the Malaysian initiated LID Smart Partnership concept and this has taken a Southern African-leg with the establishment of a Southern African International Dialogue.

2003

XIIIth NAM Summit in Kuala Lumpur during February

On the invitation of the Malaysian World Peace Federation, Deputy President Jacob Zuma traveled to Malaysia to participate in the Kuala Lumpur World Peace Conference from Saturday - Sunday, 9-10th August 2003. He participated in a Statesmen Roundtable entitled, "Reaping the peace dividend: discuss, disarm and distribute," on Saturday, 9th August 2003. Other participants in this session are Malaysia's Minister of Defense, Mohd Najib Tun Razak.

SAID was held in Mbabane, Swaziland, in August.

The first week of September President Thabo Mbeki led a delegation of 70 persons on a 3 day visit to Malaysia for (a) bilateral talks, (b) sign agreement on economic, scientific, technical and cultural co-operation, & (c) an MoU on setting up a joint commission.

31st October Dr. Mahathir resigned as PM of Malaysia and the following day had Datuk Abdullah Badawi installed as PM.

2004

On the 21st March marked yet another Malaysian election, which was comfortably won

by BN that was led by Datuk Badawi.

During April 'A National Integrity Plan' was launched as a way of rooting out corruption in Malaysia's civil service.

Between the 29th and 31st July LID members held a meeting.

From the 17th to 19th August NAM Ministerial Meeting in Durban.

2005

Asian-African Summit in Jakarta on 22nd and 23rd of April.

Prime Minister Badawi's official visit to Tswane/Pretoria on the 26th and the 27th of July

1. Map of South Africa



Source: <http://education.yahoo.com/reference/factbook/sf/map.html>

Basic Statistical Data about South Africa:

AREA, POPULATION & DENSITY

AREA (per square km)	1,219,080
POPULATION (census results)	
9 OCTOBER 1996	40,583,573
9 OCTOBER 2001	
MALE	21,434,033
FEMALE	23,385,737
	Total:
	44,819,770
POPULATION (official statistics mid-year)	
2002	45,454,211
2003	46,429,823
2004	46,586,607
DENSITY (per square km at mid 2004)	37.4

Source: *Africa South of the Sahara, 2005* - Europa Publications, 2004 & *Census 2001: Census in brief*. 2nd edition. Statistics South Africa. 2003.

2. MAP of MALAYSIA



Source: <http://education.yahoo.com/reference/factbook/my/map.html>

Basic Statistical Data about Malaysia:

AREA, POPULATION & DENSITY

AREA (per square km)	
PENINSULA MALAYSIA	131,686
SABAH (including LABUAN)	73,711
SARAWAK	124,450

	329, 847
POPULATION (census results)	
14 August 1990	18,379,655
4-20 July 2000	
MALE	11,853,432
FEMALE	11,421,258

	Total: 23,274,690
POPULATION (official statistics mid-year)	
2002	24,530,000
2003	25,050,000
DENSITY (per square km at mid 2003)	75,9

Source: *The Far East & Australasia*, 2005 - Europa Publications, 2004.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. BOOKS & ARTICLES

Abadi, Zakry. 1989. *GAPENA antara Politik & Sastera*. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Keramat SDN Berhad.

Abdul-Aziz Mohd Zin. 1999. Perkembangan Dakwah di Cape Town, Afrika Selatan dan Survivalnya Masakini. *Jurnal Usuluddin* 9: 153-168. July.

Abdul-Aziz Mohd Zin. 1999. Institusi Dakwah di Cape Town, Afrika Selatan: Kajian Tentang Program Dawah Masakini. *Jurnal Usuluddin* 9: 145-172. Desember.

Abdul-Latiff Abu Bakr (ed.) 2002. *Ismail Hussein bersama GAPENA: Biografi dan Koleksi*. Kuala Lumpur: GAPENA. 2002.

Abdullah Ahmad. 1984. *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysian's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing Sdn Bhd.

Abu Hamid. 1994. *Syekh Yusuf: Seorang Ulama, Sufi dan Pejuang*. Jakarta: Yayasan Ober Indonesia.

Acharya, Amitav. 1998. Beyond Anarchy. In *International Relations Theory and the Third World* (ed. Stephanie G Neumann). London: Macmillan Publishers. pp. 158-167.

Acharya, Amitav. 2000. *The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Acharya, Amitav. 2003. Democratization and the prospect for participatory regionalism in Southeast Asia. *Third World Quarterly* 24 (2): 375-390.

Adam, Ramlah. 2004. *Biografi Politik: Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra*. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.

Adem, Seifudein. 2004. Decolonizing Modernity: Ibn Khaldun and Modern Historiography. In *Islam: Past, Present and Future* (ed. A. S. Long, J. Awang and K. Salleh). Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. pp.569-586.

Ahluwalia, Pal. 2003. The Struggle for African Identity: Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance. In *Media, Identity and the Public Sphere in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (ed. Abebe Zegeye & Richard L. Harris). Leiden: E. J. Brill. pp. 27-40.

Ahmed, Akbar. 2002. Ibn Khaldun's Understanding of Civilization and the Dilemmas of Islam and the West Today. *Middle East Journal* 56 (1): 20-45, Winter.

Akomolafe, Olusofi. 2003. South Africa and Regionalization in Southern Africa. In

Globalizing Africa (ed. Malinda S. Smith). Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc. pp. 271-286.

Alatas, Syed Farid. 1997. *Democracy and Authoritarianism in Indonesia and Malaysia: The Rise of the Post-Colonial State*. London: Macmillan Publishers.

Alatas, Syed Farid. 2006. Ibn Khaldun and Contemporary Sociology. In *International Sociology*. 21(6): 782-795.

Alavi, Rokiah & R. Cribb. 2004. Malaysia's Economy. *The Far East and Australasia 2005*. London: Europa Publishers. pp. 611-669.

Albert, Mathias & Lothar Brock. 2001. What Keeps Westphalian Together? Normative Differentiation in the Modern System of States. In *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory* (ed. Mathias Albert, David Jacobsen & Yosef Lapid). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 29-49.

Alden, Chris. 2002. The Chrysanthemum and the Protea: Reinventing Japanese – South Africa Relations after Apartheid. *African Affairs* 101: 365-386.

Anon. 1999. Windows on the South. *Cooperation South Journal*. No. 2 December.

Anon. 2002. Apartheid State. *Asian Analysis*. Online: www.aseanfocus.com/asiaanalysis/article.cfm?articleID=462.

Appleby, & Marty, Martin. 1995. *Religious Fundamentalism*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Archetti, Eduardo P. 1999. Modernity. In *The Social Science Encyclopedia* (ed. Adam Kuper & Jessica Kuper). London: Routledge. 2nd edition, pp. 546-547.

Ariff, Mohamed & Ahmed M. Khalid. 2005. *Liberalization and Governance in Asia: 21st Century Challenge*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Athukorala, Prema-Chandra. 1998. Malaysia. In *East Asia in Crisis: From being a Miracle to Needing One?* (ed. Ross H. Mcleod & Ross Garnaut). London: Routledge. pp. 85-101.

Athukorala, Prema-Chandra. 2003. Growth, Employment and Equity: The Malaysian Experience. In *Trade Policy, Growth, and Poverty in Asian Developing Countries* (ed. Kishor Sharma). London: Routledge. pp. 110-130.

Aurois, Claude. 1995. *The Role of the State I Development Processes*. London: Routledge.

Axelrod, Robert. 2004. Theoretical Foundations of Partnership. In *Evaluation and Development: Partnership Dimension* (ed. Andres Liebenthal, Osvaldo N. Feistein &

Gregory K. Ingram). London: Transaction Publishers. pp. 9-20.

Axtmann, Roland & Robert Grant. 2000. Living in a Global World: Globalization and the Future of Politics. In *Issues in International Relations*(ed. Trevor C. Salmon). London: Macmillan. pp. 25-54.

Ayoob, Mohammed. 1998. IR Theory and the Third World: An Oxymoron? In *International Relations Theory and the Third World* (ed. Stephanie G Neumann). London: Macmillan. pp. 31-54.

Azarya, Victor. 1996. Community. In *The Social Science Encyclopaedia*, (eds. Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper). London: Routledge.

Badawi, Abdullah Ahmad. 1997. Malaysian Foreign Policy: Fostering Greater Political and Economic Cooperation. In *Malaysia Today: Towards a New Millennium*. London & Kuala Lumpur: ASEAN Academic Press & Asian Strategy & Leadership Institute. pp. 287-289.

Baines, Gary. 1998. The Rainbow Nation? Identity and nation building in post-apartheid South Africa. *Mots Pluriels*. Online: www.arts.uwa.edu.au/MotsPluriels/MP798gb.html.

Balakrishnan, K.S. 2003. Globalization and Malaysian Foreign Policy. In *Malaysia and Globalization: Challenges in the 21st century* (ed. Khairulzaman, O.S. Sells & N. Kanthasamy). Kuala Lumpur. pp. 397-430.

Barber, James. 1999. *South Africa in the Twentieth Century*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Barber, James. 2004. *Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South Africa's Political Revolution 1990-1999*. Cape Town: David Philip & Oxford: James Curry.

Barber, James & John Barratt. 1990. *South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security, 1945-1988*. New York & Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barrell, Howard. 2000. Back to the future: Renaissance and South African domestic policy. *African Security Review*. Online: www.issafrica.org/pubs/ASR/9No2/Barrell.html.

Barnard, Timothy (ed.). 2004. *Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity across boundaries*. Singapore: Singapore University Press.

Baynes, Kenneth. 2001. Deliberative Politics, The Public Sphere, and Global Democracy. In *Critical Theory and World Politics* (ed. Richard Wyn Jones). London: Lynne Rienner. pp. 161-170.

Beeston, Mark. 2004. Introduction: National Differences and Regional Dynamics in Southeast Asia. In *Contemporary Southeast Asia: Regional Dynamics, National Differences* (ed. Mark Beeston). London: Palgrave Macmillan Publishers. pp.1-14.

Beeston, Mark. 2004. The Rise and Fall (?) of the Developmental State: The Vicissitudes and Implications of East Asian Interventionism. In *Developmental States: Relevancy, Redundancy or Reconfiguration?* (ed. Linda Low). New York: Nova Science Publishers. pp.29-40.

Bekker, Simon. 1999. Recent Developments in Identity Studies in South Africa. In *Indentity?Politics, History* (ed. Simon Bekker & Rachel Prinsloo). Pretoria: Human Science Research Council.

Benhabib, Seyla. 2004. *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Biersteker, Thomas J. & Cynthia Weber. 1996. The Social Construction of State Sovereignty. In *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (ed. T. J. Biersteker & C. Weber). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-21.

Bischoff, Paul-Henri.1998. Democratic South Africa and the Asian Paragon: Issues of Foreign Policy orientation. *Afrika Spektrum* 33(2): 189-210.

Black, Anthony. 2001. Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406). In *The History of Islamic Political Thought*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp. 165-182.

Black, David. 2001. 'Lever or Carer?' South Africa, Multilateral Institutions and the Promotion of Human Rights. In *South Africa's Multi-Diplomacy and Global Change: The Limits of Reform* (ed. Philip Nel, Ian Taylor & Janis van der Westhuizen). Aldershot: Ashgate. Ch. 5 pp. 76-89.

Blaney, David & Naeem Inayatullah. 1996. The Third World and the Problem with Borders. In *Perspectives on Third World Sovereignty: Problems with(out) Borders* (ed. Mark Denham & Mark O. Lombardi). London: Macmillan Publishers. pp. 83-101.

Blatz, Charles V. 1996. Community, Recognition and Normative Sovereignty. In *Perspectives on Third World Sovereignty: Problems with(out) Borders* (ed. Mark Denham & Mark O. Lombardi). London: Macmillan Publishers. pp. 60-82.

Bleiker. Roland. 2001. Forget IR Theory. In *The Zen of International Relations: International Relations Theory from East to West*. (ed.: Stephen Chan, Peter Mandaville & Roland Bleiker). Basingstoke: Palgrave. pp. 37-66.

Bond, Patrick. 2000. *Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa*. London and Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.

Bond, Patrick. 2002. Thabo Mbeki and NEPAD: Breaking or Shining the Chains of Global; apartheid? In *Thabo Mbeki's World: The Politics and the Ideology of the South African President* (ed.: Sean Jacobs & Richard Calland). Durban: University of Natal Press. pp. 53-81.

Bongmba, Elias. 2004. Reflections on Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance. *Journal for Southern African Studies*. 30(2): 291-316, June.

Borneman, J. 2001. State: Anthropological Aspects. In *Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences* (ed. Neil J. Smelser). Oxford: Elsevier. Vol.22 pp. 14965-14970.

Botha, P.J. 2004. South Africa and Asia & Australia. In *South Africa's Foreign Policy 1994-2004: Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future* (ed.: Elizabeth Sidiropoulos). Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs. pp.297-310.

Bouare, Oumar. 2001. South Africa and Globalization. In *Empowerment through Economic Transformation*. (ed. M.M. Khosa). Durban: African Millennium Press (for HSRC). pp. 21-73.

Botchwey, Kwesi. 2004. Country-Focused Partnerships: Lessons from Experience. In *Evaluation and Development: Partnership Dimension* (ed. Andres Liebenthal, Osvaldo N. Feistein & Gregory K. Ingram). London: Transaction Publishers. pp.101-106.

Bradlow, Frank & Margaret Cairns. 1978. *The Early Cape Muslims: A Study of their Mosques, Genealogy and origin*. Cape Town: A.A. Balkema.

Burchill, Scott. 1996. Introduction. In *Theories of International Relations* (authors: Scott Burchill, Richard Devetak, Andrew Linklater, Matthew Patterson, Christian Reus-Smit & Jaquie True). Basingstoke: Palgrave. 2nd edition, pp. 1-27.

Burgess, Steven. 2002. *SA Tribes – Who we are, How we live, What we want from life*. Cape Town: David Philip.

Burrows, David. 1997. South Africa and the Asia-Pacific Region. In *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs. pp.87-104.

BusinessMap. 1997. *SA Insider – South African Investment Report 1997*. Houghton: BusinessMap SA.

Camilleri, Joseph A. & Jim Falk. 1992. *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.

Camroux, David. 1996. State responses to Islamic Resurgence. *Asian Surveys* 36(9): 852-868, September.

Cardosa, Fernando H. 1993. 'North-South Relations in the Present Context: A New Dependency?' In *The New Global Economy in the Information Age* (authors: Martin Carnoy, Manuel Castells, Stephen Cohen & Fernando H. Cardosa). Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 149-159.

Carment, David & Patrick James. (ed.) 1997. *Wars in the Midst of Peace: The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Carlsnaes, Walter & Marie Muller (ed.) 1997. *Change and South African External Relations*. Johannesburg & London: International Thomson Publishing.

Case, William. 1993. Malaysia in 1992: Sharp Politics, Fast Growth and a New Regional Role. *Asian Surveys*. 33(2): 184-193, February.

Case, William. 1994. Malaysia in 1993: Accelerating Trend and Mild Resistance. *Asian Surveys* 34(2): 119-126, February.

Case, William. 1995. Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of Legitimacy. In *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority* (ed. Muthiah Alagappa). Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp. 69-107.

Case, William. 1999. Politics beyond Anwar: What's New? *Asian Journal of Political Science* 7(1): 1-19, June.

Castells, Manuel. 1993. The Informational Economy and the New International Division of Labor. In *The New Global Economy in the Information Age* (authors: Martin Carnoy, Manuel Castells, Stephen Cohen & Fernando H. Cardoso). Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 15-44.

Chan, Stephen. 1994. Beyond the North-West: Africa and the East. In *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory* (ed. A.J.R. Groom & Margot Light). London & New York: Pinter Publishers. pp.237-254.

Chan, Stephen & Peter Mandaville. 2001. Within IR Itself: A New Culture Rise Up. In *The Zen of International Relations: International Relations Theory from East to West* (ed.: Stephen Chan, Peter Mandaville & Roland Bleiker). Basingstoke: Palgrave. pp. 1-16.

Cheah Boon Kheng. 1988. The Erosion of Ideological Hegemony and Royal Power and the rise of the Post-War Malay Nationalism, 1946-1947. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 19: 1-26.

Cheah Boon Kheng. 2002. *Malaysia: The Making of a Nation*. Singapore: Institute for South East Asian Studies.

Childs, Peter & R. J. Patrick William. 1997. *An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory*. London & New York: Prentice Hall, Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Chin, James. 1998. Malaysia in 1997: Mahathir's Annus Horribilus. *Asian Survey* 38(2): 183-189.

Chinyang Liow, Joseph. 2005. Tunku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's relations with Indonesia, 1957-1960. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 36(1): 87-110.

Chipman, John. 2001. International Trade. In *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics* (ed. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman). London: Macmillan. Vol. 2 pp. 922-955.

Chua Beng Huat. 2004. Asian Values: is an Anti-Authoritarian Reading Possible? In *Contemporary Southeast Asia: Regional Dynamics, National Differences* (ed. Mark Beeston). London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp.98-117.

Cilliers, Jackson. 1999. South African Foreign Policy Identity. *Africa Quarterly* 39(1): 41-68.

Clapman, Christopher. 2000. Degrees of Statehood. In *The State and Identity Construction in International Relations* (ed. Sarah Owen Vandersluis). London: Macmillan Publishers. pp. 31-49.

Cloete, Fanie. 2000. *At Full Speed the Tiger Cubs Stumbled: Lessons from Southeast Asia about sustainable public service delivery*. Pretoria: Human Science Research Council.

Cohen, Robin. 1997. *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*. London: University College London Press.

Cohen, Robin. 2001. Diaspora. In *International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences* (ed. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes). Oxford: Pergamon. pp. 3642-3645.

Cohen, Samy. 2003. *The Resilience of the State: Democracy and the Challenges of Globalisation*. London: Hurst & Co.

Cook, Philip. 1990. *Back to the Future (Modernity, Post-Modernity and Locality)*. London: Unwin Hyman Publishers.

Cooper, Andrew. 1997. Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview.' In *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War* (ed. Andrew F. Cooper). Basingstoke: Macmillan Publishers. pp.1-24.

Cottan, James. 1999. The Horizon over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN mode of Regional Engagement. *Pacific Affairs* 72 (3). Fall.

Coussy, Jean & Jerome Lauseig. 1999. La renaissance afro-asiatique? *Politique Africaine* 76: 5-17, Decembre.

Cox, Robert. 1992. Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order:

Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun. In *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (ed. James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 132-159.

Cox, Robert. 1996. Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future world order. In *Approaches to World Order* (ed. Robert Cox & Timothy J. Sinclair). Cambridge: CUP. Pt. III ch. 13 pp. 241-275.

Crawford, Neta. 1995. *The Domestic Sources and Consequences of Aggressive Foreign Policies: The Folly of South Africa's 'Total Strategy.'* Southern Africa Perspectives – A Working Paper Series no. 41. Bellville: University of the Western Cape – Centre for Southern African Studies.

Crouch, Harold. 1992. Authoritarian Trends, the UMNO Split and the Limits to State Power. In *Fragmented Vision: Culture & Politics in Contemporary Malaysia* (ed. Joel Kahn & Francis Loh Kok Wah). ASAA Southeast Asia Publications Series. London: Allen & Unwin. pp. 21-43.

Crouch, Harold. 1993. Malaysia: neither Authoritarian nor Democratic. In *Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism* (ed. K. Hewison, R. Robison and G Rodan). St.Leonards, Australia.

Curry Jr., Robert L. 1996. A note on ASEAN as a possible model for post-apartheid SADC. *Journal of Third World Studies* xiii(1): 41-56, Spring .

Danaher, Kevin. 1989. The US Struggle over sanctions against South Africa. In *Sanctions Against Apartheid* (ed. Mark Orkin). London: Catholic Institute for International Relations & Cape Town: David Philips. pp. 131-141.

Daniel, Lynne; H. Demaine, R. Cribb & Rokiah Alavi. 2004. Malaysia. In *The Far East and Australasia, 2005*. London: Europa Publishers. pp. 611-669.

Dark, R. (ed.). 2000. *Religion and International Relations*. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc & London: Macmillan Publishers.

Davids, Achmat. 1980. *Mosques of the BoKaap*. Cape Town: AIS Research.

Davids, Achmat. 1994. The contribution of slaves to the genesis of Afrikaans. In *Taal en Identiteit: Afrikaans en Nederlands* (ed. Vernon February). Cape Town: Tafelberg. pp. 39-53.

Deegan, Heather. 1999. *South Africa Reborn: Building a new democracy*. London: University College London Press.

Delanty, Gerard. 2000. *Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture and Politics*. Buckingham & Philadelphia: Open Society.

Denham, Mark E. & Mark Owen Lombardi. Introduction. 1996. *Perspectives on Third World Sovereignty: The Postmodern Paradox* (ed. Mark Denham & Mark Lombardi). London: Macmillan Publishers. pp. 1-12.

Derichs, Claudia. 2001. Competing Politicians, Competing Visions: Mohamad Mahathir's Wawasan 2020 and the Ibrahim's Asian Renaissance. In *Mahathir's Administration: Performance and Crisis in Governance* (ed.: Ho Khai Leong & James Chin). Singapore: Times Book International. pp. 188-214.

De Rivero, Oswaldo. 2001. *The Myth of Development: The Non-Variable Economies of the 21st Century*. London: Zed Press.

Devetak, Richard. 2001. Postmodernism. In *Theories of International Relations* (authors: Scott Burchill, Richard Devetak, Andrew Linklater, Matthew Patterson, Christian Reus-Smit & Jacqui True). Basingstoke: Palgrave. 2nd edition, pp. 181-210.

Devetak, Richard 2001. Critical Theory. In *Theories of International Relations* (authors: Scott Burchill, Richard Devetak, Andrew Linklater, Matthew Peterson, Christian Reus-Smit & Jacqui True). Basingstoke: Palgrave. pp. 155-180.

Dobson, Andrew. 2003. States, Citizens and Environments. In *States and Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects* (ed. Quentin Skinner & Bo Strath). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 208-225.

Dougherty, James E. & Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. 1997. *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*. New York & Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc.

Doxey, Margaret P. 1987. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*. London: Macmillan Press.

Dudley, Andrew J. 1982. The Structuralist Study of Narrative: Its history, use, limits. In *The Horizon of Literature* (ed. Paul Hennadi). Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. pp. 99-124.

Du Plessis, Izak D. 1972. *The Cape Malays*. Cape Town: A.A. Balkema.

Duvall, Raymond & Latha Varadarajan. 2003. On the Practical Significance of Critical International Theory. *Asian Journal of Political Science* 11(2): 75-88, December.

Eckersley, Robyn. 2004. *The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty*. London & Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.

Eldridge, Philip J. 2002. *The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia*. London: Routledge.

Elliot, Dorinda. 1998/1999. Anwar: The Rebel Son. *Newsweek International*. 28 December/ 4 January.

Emsley, Ian. 1996. *The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa*. Cape Town: Human & Rousseau and Tafelberg.

Embong, Abdul Rahman. 2001. Melayu Baru and Modernization of Malay society.' In *Modern Malaysia in the Global Economy: Political and Social Change in the 21st century* (ed. Colin Barlow). Northampton, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar pp. 157-166.

Esposito, John & John Voll. 2001. Anwar Ibrahim: Activist Moderate. In *Makers of Contemporary Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 177-198.

Evans, Graham. 1991. Myths and Realities in South Africa's Foreign Policy. *International Affairs*. 67(4): 709-721.

Evans, Graham. 1999. South Africa's Foreign Policy after Mandela: Mbeki and his concept of an African Renaissance. *The Round Table*. 352: 621-628.

Evans, L.H. 1993. *South African Foreign Policy and the New World Order*. Pretoria: ISS.

Eyre, Jill. 1997. Ethnicity and Development in Malaysia. In *Uneven Development in Southeast Asia* (ed. Chris Dixon & David Drakakis-Smith). Aldershot: Ashgate. pp. 124-147.

Faaland, Just et al. 1990. *Growth and Ethnic Inequality: Malaysia's New Economic Policy*. London: St. Martin's Press.

Fairchild, Daniel R. 1997. International Trade: A Theoretical Overview. In *International Encyclopedia of Economics* (ed. Frank N. Magill). Chicago & London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers. Vol. 1 pp. 772-775.

Fakhry, Majid. 1983. *A History of Islamic Philosophy*. London: Longman & New York: Columbia University Press.

Felker, Greg. 1999. Malaysia in 1998: A Garnered Tiger bares its Claws. *Asian Surveys* 39(1): 43-54.

Felker, Greg. 2000. Malaysia in 1999: Mahathir's Pyrrhic Deliverance. *Asian Survey* 40(1): 49-60, January – February.

Felker, Greg. 2004. Southeast Asian Development in Regional and Historical Perspective. In *Contemporary Southeast Asia: Regional Dynamics, National Differences* (ed. Mark Beeston). London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp.50-74.

Fine, B & Z. Rustomjee. 1996. *The Political Economy of South Africa: From Minerals Energy Complex to Industrialization*. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press.

Freeman, Linda. 1989. All but one: Britain, the Commonwealth and sanctions. In *Sanctions Against Apartheid* (ed. Mark Orkin). London: CIIR & Cape Town: David Philips. pp. 142-156.

Frogner, A.P. 2001. Nation. In *Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences* (ed. Neil J. Smelser). Oxford: Elsevier. Vol.15 pp. 10294-10298.

Funston, John. 2000. Malaysia: A Fateful September. *Southeast Asian Affairs 1999*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp. 165-184.

Funston, John. 2001. Malaysia: UMNO's search for relevance. *Southeast Asian Affairs 2000*. pp.189-207.

Ganesan, N. 2004. Malaysia in 2003: Leadership Transition with a tall shadow. *Asian Survey XLIV* (1): 70-77, January-February.

Garnett, J.C. 1997. Sovereignty and Power in a Changing World. In *State and Sovereignty: Is the State in Retreat?* (ed. G. A. Wood & L.S. Lelan). Dunedin: University of Otago Press. pp. 36-55.

Gelber, Harry G. 1992. *Sovereignty Through Interdependence*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International.

Geldenhuis, Deon. 1990. *Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.

Geldenhuis, Deon. 1991. South Africa: From International Isolation to Integration. Unpublished 32nd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Vancouver, Paper. March.

Geldenhuis, Deon. 1997. International Involvement in South Africa's political transformation. In *Change and South African External Relations* (ed. Walter Carlsnaes & Marie Muller). Johannesburg & London: International Thomson Publishing. pp. 35-50.

George, Jim. 1994. *Discourse in Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Goldforb, Jeffrey. 1998. *Civility & Subversion: the Intellectual in Democratic Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gomez, T. & K. S. Jomo. 1997. *Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gumede, William. 2005. *Thab Mbeki and the Struggle for the Soul of the ANC*. Johannesburg: Zebra Press.

Grubel, Herbert G. 1988. Foreign Investment. In *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics* (ed. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman). London: Macmillan. Vol. 2 pp. 403-406.

Habib, Adam & Vishnu Padayachee. 2000. Economic Policy and Power Relations in South Africa's Transition to Democracy. *World Development* 28 (2): 245-263.

Habib, Adam & Nthakeng Selinyane. 2004. South Africa's Foreign Policy and a Realistic Vision of an African Century. In *South Africa's Foreign Policy 1994-2004: Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future*. (ed.: Elizabeth Sidiropoulos). Johannesburg: South African Institution International Affairs. pp. 49-60.

Halliday, Fred. 1994. *Rethinking International Relations*. London: Macmillan.

Halliday, Fred. 1995. International Relations and Its Discontents. *International Affairs* 71(4): 733-746.

Halliday, Fred. 2000. Culture and International Relations: A New Reductionism? In *Confronting the Political in International Relations* (ed. Michi Ebata & Beverly Neufeld). London: Macmillan. pp. 47-71.

Halliday, Fred. 2001. The Romance of Non-State Actors. In *Non-State Actors in World Politics* (ed. Dapne Josselin & William Wallace). Basingstoke: Palgrave. pp. 21-37.

Hamidin Abdul Hamid. 2003. *Malaysia – Africa Relations: Searching for Common Goals*. Kuala Lumpur: Rhythm Publishing Co.

Hamidin Abdul Hamid. 2003a. Malaysia's role in Africa: An Overview. In *Malaysia and Globalization: Challenges in the 21st century* (ed. Khairulzaman, O.S. Sells & N. Kanthasamy). Kuala Lumpur. pp. 373-395.

Hamidin Abdul Hamid. 2007. 'We Go a long way back': An Overview of Malaysia – South Africa Relations. In *South Africa-Malaysia Relations: Cementing South-South Connections*. Kuala Lumpur: Lim Kok Wing University College of Technology. Forthcoming.

Hamill, James & Jack Spence. 1997. South Africa and International Organizations. In *Change and South African External Relations* (ed. Walter Carlsnaes & Marie Muller). Johannesburg & London: International Thomson Publishing. pp. 211-228.

Hamill, James & Donna Lee. 2001. A Middle Power Paradox? South African Diplomacy in the Post-Apartheid Era. *International Relations* 15(4): 33-59.

Hart, Gillian. 1994. The New Economic Policy and Redistribution in Malaysia: A Model for Post-apartheid South Africa. *Transformation* 23: 44-59.

Haron, Muhammed. 1996. Forging International Relations at Grassroots level between the South African Muslims and the Southeast Asians: (the story of) An Unacknowledged Diplomat. *Journal for Islamic Studies* 16: 91-103.

Haron, Muhammed. 1997. South African – Middle Eastern Relations (circa 1948-1994). *Digest for Middle Eastern Studies* 6 (4): 1-24.

Haron, Muhammed. 2001. The Making, Preservation and Study of South African Ajami Mss and Texts. *Sudanic Africa: A journal of Historical Sources* 12: 1-14.

Haron, Muhammed. 2002a. The Cape Malays: An Imagined Community in South Africa – A Bibliographical Essay. *Africa Research & Documentation* 88: 35-58.

Haron, Muhammed. 2002b. The Crises of Identity: The Case of South Africa's Cape Malays. *E-Thought: A Journal of Opinion on Malaysians and International Affairs*. Online: <http://phuakl.tripod.com/eTHOUGHT/threone.html> 3(1) January – March.

Haron, Muhammed. 2005. GAPENA and the Cape Malays: Initiating Connections, Constructing Images. *Sari: Journal of the Malay World and Civilization* 23: 47-66.

Harper, T.N. 1997. New Malays, New Malaysians: Nationalism, Society and History. *Southeast Asian Affairs* 1996. pp. 238-255.

Hashim, Shafruddin. 1993. Malaysia 1992: Consolidation, Challenges and New Directions. *Southeast Asian Affairs* 1992. pp. 183-201.

Hassall, Graham. 1999. Citizenship in the Asia-Pacific: a survey of Contemporary Issues in Globalization. In *Globalization and Citizenship in the Asia-Pacific* (ed. A. Davidson & K. Weekley). New York: St. Martins Press & London: Macmillan Press. pp. 49-70.

Hassan, Mohamed Jawhar. 1992. Malaysia's key domestic goals and aspirations for the 1990s. In *Southeast Asia: the Way Forward* (ed. Rohana Mahmood & Thangam Ramnath). Kuala Lumpur: ISIS. pp. 29-35.

Hayter, Susan; Gerhard Reinecke & Raymond Torres. 1999. *The Study on the Social Impact of Globalization in South Africa: A report*. Geneva: International Labour Organization.

Henwood, Roland. 1996. South African Foreign Policy and International Practice in 1995/1996 – an analysis. In *South African Yearbook of International Law*. 21: 242-266.

Henwood, Roland. 2000. South African Foreign Policy and International Practice in 2000 – an analysis. In *South African Yearbook of International Law*. 25: 287-296.

Henwood, Roland & Brendon Vickers. 2002. South African Foreign Policy and

International Practice in 2002 – an analysis. In *South African Yearbook of International Law*. 27: 324-346.

Herbst, Jeffrey & Greg Mills. 2003. *The Future of Africa: A New Order in Sight?* Adelphi Paper No. 361.

Hickling, R.H. 1978. An Overview of Constitutional Changes in Malaysia. In *The Constitution of Malaysia: Its Development 1957-1977* (ed. Tun Mohamad Sufian, H.P. Lee, & F.A. Trindade). Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-26.

Hickling, R.H. 1982. *An Introduction to the Federal Constitution*. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysia Law Publishers Sdn. Bhd.

Hill, Christopher. 2003. *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hill, Michael & Lian Kwen Fee. 1995. *The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore*. London: Routledge.

Hng Hung Yong. 2004. *Five Men and Ideas: Building a National Identity*. Shah Alam: Pelandak.

Hoffman, John. 1997. Is it Time to Detach Sovereignty from the State? In *Reclaiming Sovereignty* (ed. L. Brace & J. Hoffman). London & Herndon: Pinter. pp. 9-25.

Holm, Hans-Henrik & Georg Sorenson (ed.). 1995. *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Hong, Mark & Hanns Maull. 1998. Europe – East Asian Co-operation in International Institutions: European Union and ASEAN.’ In *Europe and the Asia Pacific* (ed. Hanns Maull, Gerald Segal & Jusuf Wanandi). London: Routledge. pp. 212-228.

Hoogvelt, Ankie. 1997. *Globalization and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of Development*. London: Macmillan Press.

Horn, Peter. 2000. African Renaissance. <http://homepages.compuserve.de/PeterRHorn/african%20renaissance.htm>

Hornby, A. S. 2001. *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English* (ed. Sally Wehmeier & Michael Ashby). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hudson, Valerie (ed.). 1997. *Culture and Foreign Policy*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Hughes, Tim. 2004. *Composers, Conductors and Players: Harmony and Discord in South African Foreign Policy Making*. Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung.

Hussainmiya, B.A. 1989. *Lost Cousins: The Malays of Sri Lanka*. Bangi: National University of Malaysia.

Hussein, Ismail. 1989. *Statements on Malay Language and Literature*. Kuala Lumpur: National University of Malaysia.

Hutcheson, A. MacGregor; Christopher Saunders & Linde van Buren. 2002. South Africa. In *Africa South of the Sahara, 2001*. London: Europa Publishers. pp. 932-971.

Hutchings, Kimberly. 2001. The Nature of the Critique of Critical International Relations Theory. In *Critical Theory and World Politics* (ed. Richard Wyn Jones). London :Lynne Rienner. pp. 79-90.

Ibrahim, Anwar. 1996. *The Asian Renaissance*. Singapore: Times Books International.

Iheduru O. C. 2004. Black economic power and nation-building in post-apartheid South Africa. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 42(1): 1-30.

Inayatullah, Naeem. 1996. Beyond the Sovereignty Dilemma: Quasi-states as social construct. In *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (ed. T. J. Biersteker & C. Weber). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 50-80.

Inglehart, R. 2001. Sociological Theories of Modernization. In *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*. Oxford: Elsevier. Vol. 15 pp. 9965-9971.

Ingram, Gregory. 2004. Overview. In *Evaluation and Development: Partnership Dimension* (ed. Andres Liebenthal, Osvaldo N. Feistein & Gregory K. Ingram). London: Transaction Publishers. pp. xi-xxi.

Issawi, Charles & Oliver Leaman. 1998. Ibn Khaldun, Abd al-Rahman. In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(ed. Edward Craig). London: Routledge. Vol.4 pp.623-627.

Jackson, Robert. 1996. Is there a classical international theory? In *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth & Marysia Zalewski). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 203-218.

Jackson, Robert. 2000. *The Global Governance: Human Conduct in a World of States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackson, Robert & Georg Sorensen. 1999. *Introduction to International Relations: Theories & Approaches*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jacobs, B.D. 2001. Community Sociology. In *International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences* (eds. Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes). New York: Elsevier. Vol. 4 pp. 2383-2387.

James, Wilmot & Linda van de Vijver (ed). 2000. *After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa*. Athens: Ohio University Press & Cape Town: David Philips.

Jamil, Fadhlullah. 1995. Anwar Ibrahim. In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World* (ed. John Esposito). New York: Oxford University Press. Vol. 2 pp. 166-167.

Janowski, Thomas. 1998. *Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in Liberal, Traditional and Social Democratic Regimes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jehurum, Chandran. 1993. Malaysia: The Mahathir Supremacy & Vision 2020. *Southeast Asian Affairs 1992*. pp. 203-223.

Jeppie, Shamil. 1987, 1991. *Afrikaans-speaking intellectuals and their re-invention of the 'Malay' in South Africa, 1930s-1950s*. Unpublished UCT Department of History Mini-Thesis & Unpublished Rhetorics and Rights of Identity Paper – Rutgers University. April.

Jeppie, Shamil. 1996. Commemorations and Identities: the 1994 Tercentenary of Islam in South Africa. In *Islam and the Question of Minorities* (ed. Tamara Sonn). Atlanta: Scholars Press. pp. 73-91.

Jesudason, James. 1989. *Ethnicity and the Economy: the State, Chinese Business, and Multinationals in Malaysia*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Jesudason, James. 1996. Malaysia: A Year of Full Sound and Fury: Signifying ... Something? *Southeast Asian Affairs 1995*. pp. 199-219.

Jomo, K. S. 1990. *Growth and Structural Change in the Malaysian Economy*. London: Macmillan.

Jomo, K.S. 1993. Prospects for Malaysian Industrialisation in light of East Asian NIC Experiences. In *Industrializing Malaysia: Policy, Performance, Prospects* (ed. Jomo, K.S.). London & New York.

Jomo, K.S. 1994. Privatisation. In *Malaysian's Economy in the Nineties* (ed. Jomo, K.S.). Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan.

Jomo K.S. 1995. *Privatizing Malaysia: Rents, Rhetoric and Realities*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Jones, Barry. 2000. Globalization versus Community: Stakeholding, Communitarianism and the Challenge of Globalization. In *Globalization and the Politics of Resistance* (ed. Barry Gills). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 57-75.

Jones, Stuart. 2002. External Trade, 1970-1999. In *The Decline of the South African Economy* (ed. J. Stuart). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar & Pretoria: University of South Africa Press. pp. 195-214.

Jones, Stuart (ed.). 2002. *The Decline of the South African Economy*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar & Pretoria: University of South Africa Press.

Joseph, Suad. 2000. Gendering Citizenship in the Middle East. In *Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East* (ed. Suad Joseph). New York: Syracuse University Press. pp. 2-30.

Joseph Chinyang Liow. 2005. Tunku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's relations with Indonesia, 1957-1960. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 36(1): 87-110, February.

Josselin, Daphne & William Wallace (ed.). 2001. *Non-State Actors in World Politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Josselin, Daphne & William Wallace. 2001. Non-State Actors in World Politics: A Framework. In *Non-State Actors in World Politics* (ed. Daphne Josselin & William Wallace). Basingstoke: Palgrave. pp. 1-20.

Juhaidi Yean Abdullah. 1995. Nkosi Sikele I' Africa: An Overview of Malay-South Africa Relations in the Post-Apartheid Era. *Agenda Magazine* 1: 23-37.

Kahler, Hans. 1971. *Studien uber die Kultur, Die Sprache und die Arabisch – Afrikaanse Literatur der Kap-Malaien*. Berlin: Verlag von Dietrich Reimer.

Katsiaficas, George. 1997. Ibn Khaldun: A Dialectical Philosopher for the New Millennium. In *Perspectives in African Philosophy* (ed. Claude Sumner & Samuel Yohannes). Addis Ababa: Rodipi Publishers.

Kegley, Charles W. Jr. (ed). 1995. *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and Neo-Liberalism Challenge*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Kegley, Charles W. & Eugene R. Wittkopf. 1997. *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*. New York: St. Martin's Press. 6th edition.

Kennedy, Paul & Victor Raudometof (ed.). 2002. *Communities across Borders: New Immigrants and Transnational Cultures*. London: Routledge.

Keohane, Robert O. 1995. Hobbes' Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society. In *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War* (ed. Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson). Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 165-186.

Khong Kim Hoong. 1991. *Malaysia's General Election 1990: Continuity, Change and*

Ethnic Politics Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies.

Khong Kim Hoong. 1991a. Malaysia 1990: The Election Showdown. *Southeast Asian Affairs* 1990. pp. 161-179.

Khoo Boo Teik. 2000. Unfinished Crisis: Malaysian Politics in 1999. *Southeast Asian Affairs* 1999. pp.165-183.

Khoo Boo Teik. 1995, 2001. *Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamad*. Shah Alam: Oxford University Press.

Khoo Boo Teik. 2001a. Politics after Mahathir. In *Modern Malaysia in the Global Economy: Political and Social Change in the 21st Century* (ed. Colin Barlow). Northampton: Edward Elgar. pp. 135-146.

Khoo Kay Jin. 1992. The Grand Vision: Mahathir and Modernisation. In *Fragmented Vision: Culture & Politics in Contemporary Malaysia* (ed. Joel Kahn & Francis Loh Kok Wah). ASAA Southeast Asia Publications Series. London: Allen & Unwin. pp. 44-76.

Klaaren, Jonathan. 1999. *Post-Apartheid Citizenship in South Africa*. Unpublished Paper. www.law.uwits.ac.za/school/Klaaren/Klaarenc.htm

Kokot et al 2004

Kornegay, Francis. 2004. *Pax AfroAsiatica? Revisiting Bandung amid a changing world order*. Johannesburg: IGD.

Kornegay, Francis & Chris Landsberg. 2000. Overcoming White Foreign Affairs Domination in South Africa and America. *Africa Insight* pp. 33-36.

Kornegay, Francis; Chris Landsberg & Steve McDonald. 2001. Participate in the African Renaissance. *The Washington Quarterly* 24(3): 105-112, Summer.

Kothari, Raji. 1997. Globalization: A World Adrift. *Alternatives* 22(2): 227-267.

Kotze, Hennie & Carly Steyn. 2003. *African Elite Perspectives: AU and NEPAD: A comparative study across seven African countries*. Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Kreijen, Gerard. 2002. The Transformation of Sovereignty and Africa Independence: No Shortcuts to Statehood. In *State, Sovereignty and International Governance*. (ed. G. Kreijan). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 45-107.

Kunis, Bilon. 1998. Malaysia: A Year of Introspection. *Southeast Asian Affairs* 1997. pp. 161-175.

Kuseni, Dlamini. 2004. Foreign Policy and Business in South Africa Post 1994. In *South Africa's Foreign Policy 1994-2004: Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future*. (ed.: Elizabeth Sidiropoulos). Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs. pp. 169-182.

Landsberg, Christopher. 2004. *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa's Transition*. Johannesburg: Jacana.

Landsberg, Chris & Francis Kornegay. 1998. *The African Renaissance: A Quest for Pax Africana and Pan-Africanism*. Johannesburg: IGD.

Lapidus, Yosef & Friedrich Kratochwil. (ed.) 1997. *The Return of Culture and Identity in International Relations Theory*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Laurie, Nathan. 2005. South Africa: A Coherent Foreign Policy – Most of the time. *International Affairs*. 81(2): 361-372, March.

Lauseig, Jerome. 1999. Quand la Malaysia Inc. Joue La Carte Sud-Sud en Afrique SubSaharienne. *Politique Africaine*. 76: 63-75, Decembre.

Lee, Raymond. 2004. The Transformation of Race Relations in Malaysia: From Ethnic Discourse to National Imaginary, 1993-2003. *African and Asian Studies* 3(2): 119-140.

Le Pere, Garth; Kato Lamprecht & Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk. 1999. The Burden of the Future: South Africa's Foreign Policy. *Global Dialogue* 4(3): 3-8, December.

Le Pere, Garth & Kato Lamprecht. 1999. Globalization and National identity Construction and Nation Building in South Africa. In *Identity? Politics, History* (ed. Simon Bekker & Rachel Prinsloo). Pretoria: Human Science Research Council. pp. 11-38.

Le Pere, Garth & Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk. 2002. Facing the New Millennium: South Africa's Foreign Policy in a Globalization World. In *Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States' Foreign Policy- Making Process* (ed. Korwa Gombe Adar & Rok Ujulu). Aldershot: Ashgate. pp. 173-210.

Le Pere, Garth & Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk. 2004. Who Made and Makes Foreign Policy. In *South Africa's Foreign Policy 1994-2004: Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future*. (ed.: Elizabeth Sidiropoulos). Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs. pp. 119-134.

Lester, Alan; Etienne Nel & Tony Binns. 2000. *South Africa: Past, Present and Future – Gold at the end of the Rainbow?* New York, London & Cape Town: Longman.

Leander, Anna. 1997. Bertrand Badie: Cultural Diversity changing IR? In *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making*. (ed. I.B. Neumann & O. Waever).

London: Routledge.

Leifer, Michael & Soedjti Dijiwandodo. 1998. Europe and Southeast Asia.' In *Europe and the Asia Pacific* (ed. Hanns Maull, Gerald Segal & Jusuf Wanandi). London: Routledge. pp. 198-211.

Leysens & Lisa Thompson. 2001. Emancipating the dead? Changing notions of Human Security in Southern Africa. In *Security and Development in Southern Africa* (ed. Nana Poku). Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. pp. 53-66.

Lian Kwen Fee. 2001. The Construction of Malay Identity across nations. *Bijdragen tot de Tall-, land-, en Volkenkunde* 157(4): 861-879.

Lim Mah Hui. 1998. Contradictions in the Development of Malay Capital: State, Accumulation and Legitimation. In *Sociology of 'Developing Societies' Southeast Asia* (ed. J.G. Taylor & A. Turton). London: Macmillan.

Linklater, Andrew. 1996. The achievements of critical theory. In *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth & Marysia Zalewski). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 279-289.

Linklater, Andrew. 2001. The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory. In *Critical Theory and World Politics* (ed. Richard Wyn Jones). London: Lynne Rienner. pp. 23-44.

Lipton, M. & C. Simkins. 1993. Introduction. In *State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. (editors: M. Lipton & C. Simkins). Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press.

Lodge, Tom. 1990. *Black Politics since 1945*. Johannesburg: Ravan's Press.

Lodge, Tom. 2002. *Politics in South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki*. Town: David Philip & Oxford: James Curry.

Love, Janice. 2005. *Southern Africa in World Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Westview Press.

Low, Linda. 2004. Introduction and Overview. In *Developmental States: Relevancy, Redundancy or Reconfiguration?* (ed. Linda Low). New York: Nova Science Publishers. pp. 3-27.

Lyakurwa, William. 1999. A Regional Case-Study of the SADC. In *Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization in SubSaharan Africa* (eds. Ademola Oyejide, Ibrahim Elbadawi, & Stephen Yeo). New York: St. Martin Press & Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. pp. 250-280.

Maasdorp, Gavin. 2002. Economic Survey, 1970-1999. In *The Decline of the South*

African Economy (ed. J. Stuart). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar & Pretoria: University of South Africa Press. pp. 7-30.

Mabena, William & Monika Glinzler. 2001. Asia-Pacific IntraRegional Trade: Investment and Economic Development. In *Multilateral Organisations in Asia-Pacific: Lessons and Experiences for Southern Africa* (ed. Monika Glinzler, William Mabena & Greg Mills). Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs. pp.87-98.

Magnusson, Warren. 1996. *The Search for Political Space: Globalization, Social Movements and the Urban Political Experience*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Mahathir Bin Mohamad. 1970. *The Malay Dilemma*. Singapore: Times Books International.

Mahathir Bin Mohamad. 2002. *Globalization and the New Realities* (ed. Hashim Makaruddin). Subang Jaya: Pelanduk.

Makaruddin, Hashim (ed). 2000. *Selected Speeches by Dr. Mohamad Mahathir, Prime Minister of Malaysia*. Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publishers.

Makhudu, N. 1993. Cultivating a Climate of Co-Operation through *Ubuntu*. In *Enterprise* 68: 40-41, August.

Malaysia. 1971. *Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Printers.

Maloka, Eddy T. 2001. *The South African 'African Renaissance' Debate: A Critique*. Johannesburg: Africa Institute of South Africa.

Mamdani, Mahmood. 2004. Race and Ethnicity as Political Identities on the African Continent. In *Identity: For a Different Kind of Globalization*(ed. Nadia Tazi). Cape Town: Double Storey. pp. 1-24.

Mandela, Nelson. 1993. South Africa's Future Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs* 72(5): 86-97, November-December.

Mannens, Wolf. 2002. Shared Sovereignty? Minority Claims and the Effectiveness of State Authority. In *State Sovereignty and International Governance* (ed. G. Kreijan). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 145-163.

Mansbach, Richard W. 1997. *The Global Puzzle: Issues and Actors in World Politics*. New York; Houghton Mifflin Company.

Mansergh, N. 1963. *Documents and Speeches on Commonwealth Affairs 1952-1962*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mandaville, Peter. 2001. *Transnational Muslim Politics: Re-imagining the Umma*. London: Routledge.

Manfred, John. 2003. *Narratology: A Guide to the Theory of Narrative*. Cologne: University of Cologne. Online: www.uni-koeln.de/~ame02/pppn.htm.

Marsh, David & Paul Furlong. 2002. A Skin, not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science. In *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (ed. David Marsh & Gerry Stoker). New York & Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp.17-41.

Martinez, Patricia. 2001. Malaysia in 2000: A Year of Contradictions. *Asian Survey*. 41(1): 189-200, January-February.

Martinez, Patricia. 2001a. The Islamic State or the State of Islam in Malaysia. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 23(3): 474-503, December.

Matlosa, Khabele. 2001. The Dilemma of Security in Southern Africa: The Case of Lesotho. In *Security and Development in Southern Africa* (ed. Nana Poku). Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. pp. 83-102.

Mavimbela, Vusi. 1997. *The African Renaissance: A Workable Dream*. Johannesburg: FGD Paper.

Mayall, James & Sarah Owen Vandersluis. 2000. Prologue. In *The State and Identity Construction in International Relations* (ed. Sarah Owen Vandersluis). London: Macmillan. pp.1-4.

Mayo, Marjorie. 2005. *Global Citizens: Social Movements & the Challenge of Globalization*. Toronto: CSPI & London: Zed Press.

Mbeki, Thabo. 2001. I am an African. *Quest*. xv (1-2): 9-14.

Mbeki, Thabo. 2004. *Africa: Define Yourself*. Johannesburg.

McBride, Stephen. 2000. The Politics of Globalization and Labour Strategies. In *Globalization and Its Discontents* (ed. Stephen McBride & John Wiseman). Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd & New York: St. Martin's Press. pp. 24-40.

McGrew, Anthony G. 1992. Conceptualizing Global Politics. In *Global Politics: Globalization and the Nation-State* (ed. Anthony G. McGrew, Paul G. Lewis et al.). Cambridge: Polity Press. pp. 1-28.

McKay, John. 2001. Overview of the Role of Asia-Pacific Regional Organisations. In *Multilateral Organisations in Asia-Pacific: Lessons and Experiences for Southern Africa* (ed. Monika Glinzler, William Mabena & Greg Mills). Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs. pp.51-68.

- McKinnon, Don. 1997. New Zealand Sovereignty in an interdependent world. In *Stat and Sovereignty: Is the State in Retreat?* (ed. G. A. Wood & L.S. Lelan). Dunedin: University of Otago Press. pp. 7-12.
- Means, Gordon. 1990. Malaysia in 1989: Forging a Plan for the Future.' *Southeast Asian Affairs 1989*. pp.183-203.
- Means, Gordon. 1991. *Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Mfune, Pemplani. 1993. The Future of SADCC. In *Sub-Saharan Africa: A Sub-Continent in Transition* (ed. Rukhsana A. Siddqui). Aldershot: Avebury. pp. 287-303.
- Milios, John & John T. Harvey. 2001. Foreign Direct Investment. In *Encyclopedia of Political Economy* (ed. Philips A. O'Hara). London: Routledge. Vol. 1 pp. 365-367.
- Mills, Greg (ed.). 1994. *From Pariah to Participant: South Africa's Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990 – 1994*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.
- Mills, Greg et al. 1995. *South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs & Institute of Global Dialogue.
- Mills, Greg. 1997. South Africa and Asia: New Opportunities, Lessons and Dilemmas. In *Change and South African External Relations* (ed. Walter Carlsnaes & Marie Muller). Johannesburg & London: International Thomson Publishing. pp. 190-210.
- Mills, Greg. 1998. Asia's Economic Crisis and its effects on South Africa. In *South African Yearbook in International Affairs*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs. pp. 365-371.
- Mills, Greg. 2000. *The Wired Model: South Africa, Foreign Policy & Globalization*. Cape Town: Tafelberg.
- Mills, Greg & Garth Shelton. 2003. *Asia-Pacific and Africa: Realizing Economic Potential*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.
- Milne, R.S. & Diane K. Mauzy. 1999. *Malaysian Politics under Mahathir*. London: Routledge.
- Milner, Anthony. 1998. Ideological Work in Constructing the Malay Majority. In *Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey and the United States* (ed. Dru C. Gladney). Stanford: SUP. pp. 151-169.
- Milner, Anthony. 1999. What's Happened to Asian Values. In *Beyond the Asia Crisis* (ed. David Goodman & Gerald Segal). London: Routledge. Online:

www.anu.edu.au/asianstudies/values.html.

Milner, Anthony. 2004. 'Asia' Consciousness and Asian Values. Sydney: The Australian National University. Online: www.anu.edu.au/asianstudies/cons_vals.html. February.

Miner, Horace M. 1972. Community – Society Continue. In *International Encyclopedia of the Social Science* (ed. David L. Sills). New York: Macmillan Co. & Free Press. Vol. 3 pp. 174-180.

Mohamad Abu Bakr. 2004. Islam in Malaysia's Foreign Policy: The First Three Decades (1957-1987). In *Malaysia and the Islamic World* (ed. Abdul Razak Baginda). London: ASEAN Academic Press. pp. 17-30.

Mohamad, Maznah. 2001. The Unravelling of a 'Malay Consensus.' *Southeast Asian Affairs 2000*. pp. 208-225.

Mohammed Muda 1991. Malaysia's Foreign Policy and the Commonwealth. *The Round Table* 320: 455-466, October.

Mohammed Muda. 1996. Malaysia-South Africa Relations and the Commonwealth, 1960-1995. *The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*. 340: 423-439, October.

Mohr, Philip. 2002. Balance of Payments, 1970-1999. In *The Decline of the South African Economy* (ed. J. Stuart). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar & Pretoria: University of South Africa. pp. 215-229.

Moorsom, Richard. 1989. Foreign Trade and Sanctions. In *Sanctions Against Apartheid* (ed. Mark Orkin). London: CIIR & Cape Town: David Philips. pp.253-269.

Morris, Christopher. 1998. *As Essay on the Modern State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morris, Christopher. 2001. Sovereignty. In *Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought* (ed. Paul Clarke & Joe Faweraker). London: Routledge. pp. 673-676.

Morris, Susan C. 2002. *Trade and Human Rights: The Ethical Dimension in US-China Relations*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Moss, Michael. 1996. Malaysia: Managing the Environment in a Rapidly Developing Society. In *Southeast Asia: A Ten Nation Region* (ed. Askok K. Dutt). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing. pp. 291-306.

Motlhabi, Mokgethi. 1984. *The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid: A Social Ethical Analyses*. Johannesburg: Skotaville Press.

Muhammad Hj. Muhd. Taib. 1996. *The New Malay* (tr. E. Razali). Petaling Jaya: Visage

Communication.

Muller, Marie. 1997. The Institutional Dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions. In *Change and South African External Relations* (ed. Walter Carlsnaes & Marie Muller). Johannesburg & London: International Thomson Publishing. pp. 51-72.

Muller, Marie. 1999. South African Diplomacy and Security Complex Theory. *The Round Table*. 352: 585-620.

Munazzah Hj. Zakariah. 1998. *Katalog Manuskrip Melayu di Afrika Selatan*. Kuala Lumpur: Perpustakaan Negara.

Murphy, Craig N. 2001. Critical Theory and the Democratic Impulse: Understanding a Century-Old Tradition. In *Critical Theory and World Politics* (ed. Richard Wyn Jones). London :Lynne Rienner. pp. 61-78.

Muttalib, Hussin. 1995. ABIM. In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World* (ed. John Esposito). New York: Oxford University Press. Vol. 1 pp. 15-17.

Muzaffar, Chandra. 2001. Malaysia's Foreign Policy. In *Modern Malaysia in the Global Economy: Political and Social Change in the 21st century* (ed. Colin Barlow). Northhampton: Edward Elgar. pp. 147-155.

Muzaffar, Chandra. 2001a. Non-Governmental Organizations as a Vehicle for Social Chnage. In *Modern Malaysia in the Global Economy: Political and Social Change in the 21st century* (ed. Colin Barlow). Northhampton: Edward Elgar. pp. 189-199.

Nagan, Winston & Craig Hammer. 2004. The Changing Character of Sovereignty in International Law and International Relations. *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*. 43: 100-146.

Nagata, Judith. 1985. What is a Malay. In *A Reader in Islam in Southeast Asia* (ed. Ahmad Ebrahim, Sharon Siddique & Yasmin Hussein). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Nathan, K.S. 1996. Vision 2020 and Malaysian Foreign Policy: Strategies Evolving and the Mahathir Impact. *Southeast Asian Affairs*1995. pp.220-237.

Nazaruddin Hj Mohd Jai; Ma'rof Redzwan, Asnar ul-Khadi A. Samah & Ismail Hj. M Rashid. 2003. *Malaysian Studies and Nationhood* (tr. Wong Fook Khoon). New York: Pearce-Prentice Hall.

Nel, Philip. 2002. Untangling the 'Gamble of Investment': Elite Perceptions of Globalization and South Africa's Foreign Policy during the Mandela Era. In *Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States' Foreign Policy- Making Process*

(ed. Korwa Gombe Adar & Rok Ujulu). Aldershot: Ashgate. pp. 153-172.

Nel, Philip; Susan Lieberman, Karina Landman, Antoinette Louw & Rory Robertshaw. 2000. *A Manual for Community Based Crime Prevention; Making South Africa Safe*. Pretoria: NCPC.

Neocleous, Mark. 2003. *Imagining the State*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.

Neufeld, Mark A. 1995. *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Neufeld, Mark A. 2001. What's Critical about Critical International Relations Theory? In *Critical Theory and World Politics* (ed. Richard Wyn Jones). London: Lynne Rienner. pp. 127-148.

Neumann, Stephanie G. 1998. IR Theory and the Third World: An Oxymoron? *International Relations Theory and the Third World*. London: Macmillan. pp. 1-30.

Nicholson, Michael. 1996. *Causes and Consequences in International Relations*. London: Pinter.

Nkuhlu, Wiseman L. 2005. *NEPAD: The Journey So Far*. Midrand: NEPAD Secretariat.

Noor, Farish A. 1999. Values in the Dynamics of Malaysia's Internal and External Political Relations. In *Changing Values in Asia: Their Impact on Government and Development* (ed. Han Sung-Joo). Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange. pp. 144-176.

Nossal, Kim Richard & Richard Stubbs. 1997. Mahathir's Malaysia: An Emerging Middle Power. In *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War* (ed. Andrew F. Cooper). Basingstoke: Macmillan. pp.147-163.

Nussbaum, Barbara. 2003. Ubuntu: Reflections of a South African on Our Common Humanity. *Reflections* 4(4): 1-6. Online: www.barbara-nussbaum.com & www.positivelysa.co.za

Nussbaum, Barbara. 2003a. African Culture and Ubuntu: Reflections of a South African in America. *Perspectives* 17(1): 1-12. Online: www.positivelysa.co.za

Ojendal, Joakim. 2001. Southeast Asia at a Constant Crossroads: An Ambiguous 'New Region'.' In *Regionalization in a Globalizing World: A Comparative Perspective on Forms, Actors and Process* (ed. Schultz, Michael, Fredrik Soderbaum & Joakim Ojendal). London: Zed Press. pp. 147-172.

Olivier, Gerrit. 1987. *Suid-Afrikaanse Buitelandse Beleid*. Cape Town: Academia.

Ooi T. Beng. 2003. Dialectic Between Domestic and Foreign Policy Making. *Melayu* 1(2): 93-108, December.

Opello, Walter C. Jr. & Stephen J. Rosow. 2004. *The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Orridge, A. W. 1981. Varieties of Nationalism. In *The Nation-State: The Formation of Modern Politics*. (ed. Leonard Tivey). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 39-58.

Osman-Rani, H. 1990. Malaysia's NEP: After 1990. In *Southeast Asian Affairs 1990*. Singapore: ISEAS.

Oswei-Hwedie, Bertha Z. 2002. The Quest for Peace and Security: The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. In *Democracy, Human Rights and Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa*. (ed. Dominic Milazi, Munyae Mulinge & Elizabet Mukamaambo). Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. pp.154-172.

Padayachee, V. 1995. Foreign Capital and Economic Development in South Africa: Recent Trends and Post-apartheid Prospects. *World Development* 23(2): 163-177, February.

Padayachee, Vishnu & Imraan Valodia. 1997. Malaysian Money: Sustainable Investments? *Indicator SA* 14(2): 23-28, Winter.

Padayachee, Vishnu & Imraan Valodia. 1998. Malaysian Investment In South Africa: Some Initial Observations. *Economic and Political Weekly*. 33(38): 19-25, September.

Padayachee, Vishnu & Imraan Valodia. 1999. Malaysian Investment in South Africa: South-South relations in a Globalizing Environment. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. 17(2).

Padayachee, Vishnu & Imraan Valodia. 2000. Developing South-South Links: Malaysian Investment in South Africa. In *Ugly Malaysian: South – South Investments Abused?* (ed. K. S. Jomo). Durban: Institute for Black Research. pp. 29-46.

Paolini, Albert. 1997. Globalization. In *At The Edge of International Relations: Postcolonialism, Gender and Dependency* (ed. Philip Darby). New York: Pinter. pp. 33-60.

Paolini, Albert J. 1999. *Navigating Modernity: Post Colonialism, Identity and International Relations*. (ed. Anthony Elliot & Anthony Moran). London & Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher.

Paralegal Advice. 2002. Citizenship (in South Africa). In *Paralegal Manual*. Cape Town: Paralegal Advice Centre. Online: www.paralegaladvice.org.za/docs/02_full.html.

Pasha, Mustapha Kamal. 1997. Ibn Khaldun and world order. In *Innovation and Transformation in International Relations* (ed. Stephen Gill & James Mittelman).

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 56-74.

Payne, Richard J. 1990. *The Non-Super Powers and South Africa: Implications for US Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Pempel, T.J. (ed.). 1990. *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Petito, Fabio & Pavlos Hatzopoulos. (ed.) 2000. Special Issue: Religion and International Relations. *Millenium: Journal of International Relations*. 29 (3).

Pfister, Roger. 2005. *Apartheid South Africa and African States: From Pariah to Middle Power, 1961-1994*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co.

Poggi, Gianfranco. 2003. Citizens and the State: Retrospect and Prospect. In *States and Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects* (ed. Quentin Skinner & Bo Strath). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 39-48.

Posner, Richard. 2001. *Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Prinsloo, Erasmus D. 2000. Ubuntu Culture and Participatory Management. In *Philosophy from Africa: A Text with Readings* (ed. P.H. Coetzee & A.P. J. Roux). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 41-51.

Puchala, Donald J. 1998. Third World Thinking and Constructive International Relations. In *International Relations Theory and the Third World* (ed. Stephanie G Neumann). London: Macmillan. pp. 133-157.

Quadir, Fahimul; Sandra Maclean & Timothy Shaw. 2001. Pluralisms and the Changing Global Political Economy: Ethnicities in crises of Governance in Asia and Africa. In *Crises of Governance in Asia and Africa* (ed. Sandra J. MacLean, Fahimul Quadir & Timothy M. Shaw). Aldershot: Ashgate. pp.3-30.

Quirk, Joel & Darshan Vigneswaran. 2005. The Construction of an Edifice: The Story of a First Great Debate. *Review of International Studies*. 31(1): 89-107, January.

Rabinowitz, D. 2001. Community Studies: Anthropological. In *International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences* (eds. Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes). New York: Elsevier. Vol. 4 pp. 2387-2389.

Rachagan, S. 1980. The Development of the Electoral System. In *Malaysian Politics and the 1978 Election* (ed. H. Crouch, Lee Kam Hing & M. Ong). Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

Rajamoorthy, T. 1999. Globalization and Citizenship in Malaysia. In *Globalization and Citizenship in the Asia-Pacific* (ed.: A. Davidson & K. Weekley). New York: St. Martins

& London: Macmillan Press. pp. 87-103.

Rajendran, M. 1993. *Mahathir Mohamad: Prime Minister of Malaysia*. Petaling Jaya: IBS Buku.

Ramphal, Shridath. 1988. *The South African Crisis: Why the Bells of Apartheid Tolls for Everyone*. Kuala Lumpur: ISIS.

Ramutsindela, Maano. 2001. Nation-Building in South Africa. In *Unfrozen Ground: South African Contested Space*. London: Ashgate. pp. 24-38.

Rangasamy, Logan. 2001. Post-Apartheid South Africa: An Overview of International Economic Relations. In *Empowerment through Economic Transformation*. (ed. M.M. Khosa). Durban: African Millennium Press (for HSRC). pp. 107-136.

Rasiah, Rajah. 2003. Manufacturing Export Growth in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. In *Southeast Asian Paper Tigers? From miracle to debacle and beyond*. (ed. K. S. Jomo). London: Routledge Curzon. pp. 19-80.

Rasiah, Rajah & Thaboga. 2004. Technical, Local Sourcing and Economic Performance in South Africa. In *Foreign Firms, Technical Capabilities and Economic Performance: Evidence from Africa, Asia and Latin America* (ed. Rajah Rasiah). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. pp.50-71.

Reeves, Julie. 2004. *Culture and International Relations: Narratives, Natives and Tourists*. London: Routledge.

Reid, Anthony. 2004. Understanding *Melayu* (Malay) as a Source of Diverse Modern Identities. In *Contesting Malayness* (ed. T P. Barnard). Singapore: Singapore University Press. pp. 1-24.

Rengger, N.J. 2000. *International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order: Beyond International Relations Theory*. London: Routledge.

Rengger, N.J. 2001. Global Realism: Unmasking Power in the International Political Economy. In *Critical Theory and World Politics* (ed. Richard Wyn Jones). London: Lynne Rienner. pp. 91-110.

Reusse, Eberhard. 2002. *The Ills of Aid: An Analysis of Third World Development Policies*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Reynolds, P. A. 1996? *An Introduction to International Relations*. London: Longman.

Risso, P. 1995. *Merchants & Faith: Muslim Commerce and Culture in the Indian Ocean*. Boulder & Oxford: Westview Press.

Robertson, David. 2002. *A Dictionary of Modern Politics*. London: Europa Publications. 3rd edition.

Rogayah Haji Md. Yasin & Rosnah Yusof (ed.) 1993. *Jejak Langkah*. Bangi: ATMA, National University of Malaysia.

Root, H.L. 2001. Sociology of the State. In *Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences* (ed. Neil J. Smelser). Oxford: Elsevier. Vol.22 pp. 14978-14983.

Rosenthal, Franz. 1987. Ibn Khaldun. In *Encyclopedia of Religion* (ed. Mircea Eliade). London: Macmillan. Vol.5-6 pp.565-567.

Said, Edward. 1984. *The World, The Text and The Critic*. London: Faber & Faber.

Savaranamuthu. John. 1983. *The Dilemma of Independence: Two decades of Malaysia's Foreign Policy, 1957-1977*. Penang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia.

Schoeman, Maxi. 2000. South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power. *African Security Review*. 9 (3). Online: www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/9No3/SAMiddlePower.html.

Schoeman, Maxi. 2001. The Limits of Regionalization in Southern Africa. In *Security and Development in Southern Africa* (ed. Nana Poku). Westport: Praeger. pp. 139-156.

Schrire, Robert. 2005. Fragmentation or Nation-Building? In *Politics in the Developing World* (ed. Peter Burnell & Vicky Randall). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 264-674.

Schrire, Robert & Daniel Silke. 1997. Foreign Policy: The Domestic Context. In *Change and South African External Relations* (ed. Walter Carlsnaes & Marie Muller). Johannesburg & London: International Thomson Publishing. pp. 3-15.

Setboonsarng, Suthad. 1998. ASEAN Economic Cooperation: Adjusting to the crisis. *Southeast Asian Affairs 1997*. pp. 18-36.

Shaik, A.H. 1992. Malaysia's Public Enterprises: A Performance Evaluation. *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*. 9 (2): 207-17.

Shamsul, A.B. 1996. Australian in Contemporary Malaysia's Worldview. In *Australia-Malaysia Relations: New Roads Ahead* (ed. Zaniah Marshallsay). Victoria: Monash Asia Institute. pp. 46-74.

Shamsul, A.B. 2001. 'Asian Values,' moral communities and resistance in contemporary Malaysia. In *Malaysian Business in the New Era* (ed. Chris Nyland, Wendy Smith, Russell Smyth, & Antonia Marika Vicziany). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. pp. 245-260.

Shaikh Mohd Saifuddeen Sh. Mohd Salleh Suzalie Mohd. 2004. Malaysia and the IOC. In *Malaysia and the Islamic World* (ed. Abdul Razak Baginda). London: ASEAN

Academic Press. pp. 69-96.

Sharma, D.N. 1969. *The Afro-Asian Group in the U.N.* Allahabad: Chaitanya Publishing House.

Shaw, Martin. 2000. The State of International Relations. In *The State and Identity Construction in International Relations* (ed. Sarah Owen Vandersluis). London: Macmillan. pp. 7-30.

Shaw, Martin. 2000a. *Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sidiropoulous, Elizabeth (ed.) 2004. *South Africa's Foreign Policy 1994-2004: Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future.* Johannesburg: SAIIA.

Sidaway, James D. 2002. *Imagined Regional Communities: Integration and Sovereignty in the Global South.* London: Routledge.

Sinnadurai, Visu.1978. The Citizenship Laws of Malaysia. In *The Constitution of Malaysia: Its Development 1957-1977* (ed. Tun Mohamad Sufifian, H.P. Lee, & F.A. Trindade). Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

Sinodgrass, Donald. 1980. *Inequality and Economic development in Malaysia.* Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

Skidmore, W. 2003. *Japan & South Africa: Deepening Economic Relations.* Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.

Slawner, Karen. 1996. The Decline of Sovereignty? In *Perspectives on Third World Sovereignty: Problems with(out) Borders* (ed. Mark Denham & Mark O. Lombardi). London: Macmillan. pp. 139-151.

Smith, Simon. 2006. 'Moving a little with the tide': Malay Monarchy and the Development of Modern Malay Nationalism. *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History.* 34(1): 123-138, March.

Soderbaum, Frederik & Ian Taylor. 2003. Introduction: Understanding the Dynamics of Micro-regionalism in Southern Africa. In *Regionalism and Uneven Development in Southern Africa: The Case of the Maputo Development Corridor* (ed. F. Soderbaum & I. Taylor). Aldershot: Ashgate. pp.1-18.

Soesastro, Hadi & Richard Higgott. 1998. Open Regionalism. In *Europe and the Asia Pacific* (ed. Hanns Maull, Gerald Segal & Jusuf Wanandi). London: Routledge. pp. 84-106.

Sorenson, Georg. 2001. *Changes in Statehood: The Transformation of International*

Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Sorenson, Georg. 2004. *The Transformation of the State: Beyond the Myth of Retreat*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Southall, R. 1997. Party Dominance and Development: South Africa's Prospects in the Light of Malaysia's Experience. *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*. 35(2): 1-27.

South Africa Communist Party. 1995. The Malaysian Model? *The African Communist: Journal of the South African Communist Party*. 2nd Quarter, pp. 14-22.

South African Institute of Race Relations. 1995. *South Africa Survey 1994/95*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.

SAIRR. 1996. *South Africa Survey 1995/96*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.

SAIRR. 1997. *South Africa Survey 1996-7*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.

Sparks, Alister. 2003. *Beyond The Miracle: Inside the New South Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Spence, Jack. 2004. South Africa' foreign policy: Vision and Reality. In *Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future: South Africa's Foreign Policy 1994-2004* (ed. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos). Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs. pp. 35-48.

Spiess, Clemens. 2004. Betwixt and Between: the South African state's search for autonomy on the face of Globalization. *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*. 42(1); 129-155, March.

Sridharan, Kripa. 1998. G-15 and South-South Cooperation: Promise and Perform. *Third World Quarterly* 19(3): 357-373.

Stack, John F. Jr (ed.) 1981. *Ethnic Identities in a Transnational World*. London: Greenwood Press.

Steans, Jill & Lloyd Pettiford. 2001. *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.

Stedman, Stephen John. 1999. *International Actors and Internal Conflicts*. Project on World Security Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Online: www.rbf.org/pdf/Stedman_Actors.pdf.

Stone-Mediatore, Shari. 2003. *Reading Across Borders: Story Telling and Knowledge of Persistence*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

- Storey, David. 2001. *Territory: The Claiming of Space*. New York: Prentice Hall.
- Strange, Susan. 1996. *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the Global Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stubbs, Richard. 2004. ASEAN: Building Regional Cooperation. In *Contemporary Southeast Asia: Regional Dynamics, National Differences* (ed. Mark Beeston). London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 216-233.
- Su-ming Khoo. 2004. Think Tanks and Malaysian Development. In *Think Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas* (ed. Diane Stone and Andrew Denham). Manchester: Manchester University Press. pp. 179-197.
- Suttner, Raymond. 1997. South Africa Foreign Policy and the promotion of human rights. In *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs. pp.300-308.
- Swatuk, Larry. 1991. *Between a Hard Rock: IR Theories*. Halifax: University of Dalhousie Press.
- Swatuk, Larry. 1996. The Nexus of Sovereignty and Regionalism in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa. In *Perspectives on Third-World Sovereignty: The Postmodern Paradox* (ed. Mark Denham & Mark Owen Lombardi). London: Macmillan. pp. 120-138.
- Swatuk, Larry & Peter Vale. 2001. Why Democracy is not enough: Southern Africa and Human Security. In *Security and Development in Southern Africa* (ed. Nana Poku). Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. pp. 31-52.
- Syed Hamid Albar Sayed Jaafar Albar. Badawi, 1997. Towards Regional Peace and Security. In *Malaysia Today: Towards a New Millennium*. London & Kuala Lumpur: ASEAN Academic Press & Asian Strategy & Leadership Institute. pp. 291-297.
- Tan Eu Chye & Mohamed Ariff. 2001. Structural Change in the Malaysian manufacturing Industry. In *Modern Malaysia in the Global Economy: Political and social Change into the 21st Century* (ed. Colin Barlow). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. pp. 59-73.
- Taylor, Ian. 2001. *Stuck in the Middle GEAR: South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.
- Thabane, Tim. 1999. Asia's Economic Recovery and its implications for the African Renaissance. *BIS Review*. No. 107.
- The South Centre. 1993. *Facing the Challenge: Responses to the Report of the South Commission*. London: Zed Press.

Thomas, Scott. 1995. *The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the ANC, since 1960*. London: I. B. Tauris & Co.

Thomas-Slayter, Barbara. 2003. *Southern Exposure: International Development and the Global South in the 21st Century*. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, Inc.

Thompson, Leonard. 1995. *A History of South Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Tickner, Arlene. 2003. Seeing International Relations Differently: Notes from the Third World. *Millenium Journal of International Studies*. 32(2): 295-324.

Tivey, Leonard 1980. States, Nations and Economics. In *The Nation-State: The Formation of Modern Politics*. (ed. Leonard Tivey). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 59-81.

Toye, John. 1993. *Dilemmas of Development*. Oxford: Blackwell. 2nd edition.

Tran Van Hoa. 2001. Malaysia's recovery: Issues in Economic Management, Trade Policy, Knowledge-Based Industrial Economies & Globalization. In *The Asia Recovery: Issues and Aspects of Development, Growth, Trade and Investments* (ed. Tran Van Hoa). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. pp. 61-74.

United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC). 1992. *The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A Survey of the Evidence*. New York: United Nations.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 1995. *World Investment Report 1995: Transnational Corporations and Competitiveness*. New York: United Nations.

Vale, Peter. 1977a. Beyond Convenience: Diplomacy and South Africa's People. Unpublished UWC Paper. July.

Vale, Peter. 1977. South Africa as a pariah international state. *International Affairs Bulletin*. 1(3): 121-141.

Vale, Peter. 1994. Continuity rather than Change: South Africa's new Foreign Policy. *Indicator SA*. 12(3): 79-84, Winter.

Vale, Peter. 1995. Prisoner of the Past? The New South Africa Abroad. *Southern Africa Report*. 10(5): 7-10, July.

Vale, Peter. 1997. South Africa: Understanding the Upstairs and the Downstairs. In *Niche Diplomacy: Powers after the Cold War* (ed. Andrew Cooper). London: Macmillan.

pp. 197-214.

Vale, Peter. 2001. Dissenting Tale: Southern Africa's Search for Theory. In *Theory, Change and Southern Africa's Future*. (ed. Peter Vale, Larry Swatuk & Bertil Oden). Basingstoke: Palgrave. pp. 17-33.

Vale, Peter, 2003. *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Vale, Peter. 2003a. Sovereignty, identity and the prospects for southern Africa's people. In *What holds us together: Social Cohesion in South Africa* (ed. David Chidester, Phillip Dexter and Wilmot James). Cape Town: Human Science Research Council. pp. 23-41.

Vale, Peter & Ian Taylor. 1999. South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy Five Years On: From Pariah State to 'Just another Country?' *The Round Table*. 352: 629-634.

Vale, Peter; Larry Swatuk & Bertil Oden (ed.). 2001. *Theory, Change and Southern Africa's Future*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Vale, Peter & Siphso Maseko. 2003. Thabo Mbeki, South Africa, and the idea of an African Renaissance. In *Thabo Mbeki's World* (ed. Sean Jacobs). pp.121-142.

van Binsbergen, Wim. 2001. Ubuntu and Globalization of Southern Africa Thought and Society. *Quest: African Journal of Philosophy*. XV (1-2): 53-90.

van der Mehden, Fred. 1992. Malaysia in 1991: Economic Growth and Political Consolidation. *Asian Surveys*. 32(2): 111-118, February.

van der Westhuizen. 1998. South Africa's emergence as a middle power. *Third World Quarterly* 19(3): 435-455.

van der Westhuizen, Janis. 2001. Comparative Responses to the Challenges of Globalization: Malaysia and South Africa. In *Crises of Governance in Asia and Africa* (ed. Sandra J. MacLean, Fahimul Quadir & Timothy M. Shaw). Aldershot: Ashgate. pp. 70-88.

van der Westhuizen, Janis. 2002. *Adapting to Globalization: Malaysia, South Africa and the Challenges of Ethnic Redistribution with Growth*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

van der Westhuizen, Janis. 2004. Marketing Malaysia as a model modern Muslim state: the significance of the 16th Commonwealth Games. *Third World Quarterly* 25(7): 1277-1291.

van Niekerk, Dewald. 2001. The State and Government. In *Governance, Politics, and Policy in South Africa* (ed. Dewald van Niekerk, Gerrit van der Waldt & Alan Jonker). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 40-62.

van Niekerk, Dewald. 2001. The State and Government. In *Governance, Politics, and Policy in South Africa* (ed. Dewald van Niekerk, Gerrit van der Waldt & Alan Jonker). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 274-295.

van Gunsteren, Herman. 1998. *A Theory of Citizenship: Organizing Plurality in Contemporary Democracies*. Boulder: Westview Press.

van Selms, Adrianus. 1951. *Arabies-Afrikaans Studies I: n Tweetalige (Arabies-Afrikaans) Kategismus*. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co.

van Wyk, Jo-Ansie. 1997. Parliament and Foreign Affairs: Continuity or Change? In *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs. pp.189-213.

Venter, Albert (ed.). 1993. *Foreign Policy Issues in a Democratic South Africa*. Johannesburg: PWPA.

Venter, Denis. 1979. South Africa: A Non-Aligned Posture in Foreign Policy. *South African Journal of African Affairs*. 9(3 & 4): 178-190.

Venter, Denis. 1997. South Africa and Africa: Relations in a time of change. In *Change and South African External Relations* (ed. Walter Carlsnaes & Marie Muller). Johannesburg & London: International Thomson Publishing. pp. 73-101.

Verma, Vidhu. 2002 & 2004. *Malaysia: State and Civil Society in Transition*. Petaling Jaya: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc. & SIRD.

Vickers, Anthony. 2004. Malay Identity: Modernity, Invented Tradition and Formation of Knowledge. In *Contesting Malayness* (ed. T P. Barnard). Singapore: Singapore University Press. pp. 25-55.

Villa-Vicencio, Charles & Wilhelm Verwoerd (ed). 2000. *Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the TRC of South Africa*. London: Zed Books Ltd & Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press.

Wan Hashim Wan The. 1996. *Islam di Afrika Selatan: Sumbangan Rumpun Melayu Terhadap Perkembangannya*. Simposium Antarabangsa Mengenai Hubungan Antara Kebudayaan Di Laut Tengah Asia Tenggara. Paper no. 3. 2nd April. Kuala Lumpur.

Wan Hashim Wan Teh, 1998. Rumpun Melayu Diaspora Dalam Konteks Tori Hubungan Ras. Dalam *Pengajian Satera dan Sosio Budaya Melayu Memasuki Alaf Baru*. (editors: Hashim Awang AR, Zahir Ahmad and Zainal Abidin Borhan). Kuala Lumpur: Akademi Pengajian Melayu. pp. 202-215.

Watson, Adam. 1997. *The Limits of Independence: Relations between States in the*

Modern World. New York: Routledge.

Welsh, Bridget. 2005. Malaysia in 2004: Out of Malaysia's Shadow? *Asian Survey: A Bimonthly Review of Contemporary Asian Affairs*. XLV (1): 153-160, January-February.

White, Janet. 1996. *Grassroots Foreign Policy? A Case for Provincial Participation*. *Indicator SA*.13(4): 25-29, Spring.

Withey-Vandiver, Elizabeth. 2001. Nation. In *Readers Guide to The Social Sciences* (ed. Jonathan Mitchie). Fitzroy Dearborne Publishers. Vol. 2 pp. 1089-1091.

Wulf, Herbert. 2005. *Internationalizing and Privatizing War and Peace*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wyn Jones, Richard. 2001. Introduction: Locating Critical International Relations Theory. In *Critical Theory and World Politics* (ed. Richard Wyn Jones). London: Lynne Rienner. pp. 1-22.

Zaidi, Abbas. 1998. Renaissance in Southeast Asia? *Southern Ocean Review*. No. 6 Online: www.book.co.nz/abbzai.htm, January.

Zakaria, Hj. Ahmad. 1982. The Political Structure. In *The Political Economy of Malaysia* (ed. E.K. Fisk and H. Osman-Roni). Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

Zakaria, Hj. Ahmad. 1989. Malaysia Quasi Democracy in a Divided Society. In *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia* (ed. L. Diamond, J.J. Linz & S.M. Lipset). Boulder, Colorado & London Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Zakaria Hj. Ahmad. 1990. Malaysia's Foreign Policy: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, or, Looking Outwards and Moving Inwards? In *Malaysian Foreign Policy: Issues and Perspectives* (ed.: Mohd A. Karim, Llewellyn D. Howell & Grace Okuda). Kuala Lumpur: National Institute of Public Administration. pp. 122-134.

Zakry Abadi. 1989. *GAPENA: antara Politik & Sastera*. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Keramat Sdn. Bhd.

Zalewski, Marysia & Cynthia Enloe. 1995. Questions about Identity in International Relations. In *International Relations Theory Today* (ed. Ken Booth & Steve Smith). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Zialcita, Fernando N. 2003. Is Southeast Asia a Jigsaw Puzzle or a Collage? In *Globalization in Southeast Asia: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives* (ed. Shinji Yamashita & J. S. Eades). New York & Oxford: Berghan Books. pp. 21-41.

Zick, Timothy. 2005. Are The States Sovereign? *Washington University Law Quarterly*. 83: 229-337.

Yamashita, Shinji. 2003. Introduction: 'Glocalizing' Southeast Asia. In *Globalization in Southeast Asia: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives* (ed. Shinji Yamashita & J. S. Eades). New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books. pp. 1-20.

Yao Souchou. 2004. After the *Malay Dilemma*: Colonial Heritage and Ethnic Exclusion in Malaysia. In *Social Policy and the Commonwealth: Prospects for social inclusion* (ed. Catherine Finer & Paul Smyth). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp.138-150.

2. DOCUMENTS, REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE:

- African National Congress. 1994. *Reconstruction and Development Programme*. Johannesburg: ANC.
- Anon. 2004. *DTI Statistics in Brief Q4*. Pretoria: DTI (Online: <http://www.thedti.gov.za/publications/statsQ4.pdf>)
- Chief Secretary's letter no. CSO. 34/130 6 August 1957
- Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting 1960. Final Communique.
- Dr.B.A. Hussainmiya Letter 16 July 1985
- Foreign Affairs Malaysia. 1985. 18(4): 447-452, November.
- Foreign Affairs Malaysia. 1990. 23(2): 50, June
- Foreign Affairs Malaysia. 1990 23(4): 68, December.
- Gleneagles Agreement, 15 June 1977.
- IBKKM Letter no. UKM1.9/263/9 11 December 1992
- IMSC Letter 21 June 1957
- IMSC Letter 20 August 1957
- IMSC Letter 28 April 1982
- IMSC letter 14 June 1982
- KSLC Letter 30 July 1987
- KSLC Letter no.pak 0065/1/87 (67) 17 November 1987.
- Malayan Parliamentary Debates. 30 November, col. 678, 1959.
- Malayan Parliamentary Debates. 21 April , col. 251, 1960.
- Malayan Parliament 1960.Resolution passé by the on 26th April.
- Manifesto Federation Government. 1959. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information.
- Mr. Abdul-Kader Letter 16 April 1957
- Mr. Abdul-Kader Letter 29 May 1957
- Mr. Ali Al-Attas Letter 29 June 1993
- Mr. Chan Kok Kee (Singapore Controller of Immigration office) Letter no. V/6183/82 – 9 July 1982
- Mr. D. A. Hamid Lainjong Letter 14 February 1984
- Mr. Ebrahim Baderoon Letter 24 April 1962
- Mr. Gunawan T. Letter 14 October 1975
- Mr. H. Masdar Wahab Letter 24 May 1984
- Mr. J.M.J. De Cooker of the InterOcean Services Co. Letter 13 May 1975
- Mr. K. Scholte of the Nedlloyd Agencies Letter 30 July 1982
- PRO: CO 1030/437, 28 February 1957.
- PRO: CO 1030/437, 14 March 1957.
- PRO: DO 35/6281, 14 August 1957.
- PRO: CO 1030/437, 23 August 1957.
- PRO: DO 35/6259, 28 August 1957.
- PRO: DO 1030/525, 3 September 1957.
- Sekretariat Negara Letter no. B-526/Sekbang/6/1993 10 June 1993.
- South African Department of Foreign Affairs *Strategic Plan 2005-2008*.
- World Bank. 1992. *Economic work program on South African*. (Draft discussion document). New York: World Bank.
- World Bank. 1992. *World Development Report*. New York: World Bank.

World Bank. 1993. *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*. New York: World Bank.

3. NEWSPAPERS/MAGAZINES:

Asiaweek, Hong Kong. 18 May 1994
Berita Harian, Kuala Lumpur. 12 January 1961
Berita Harian 15 September 1985.
Berita Harian 12 January 1992
Berita Harian 8 April 1993
Business Day, Johannesburg 1 Aug. 1996.
Business Day, 6 Aug. 1996
Business Day 28 Aug. 1996.
Business Day 12 May 1998
Business Day 4 August 1998
Business Day 14 December 1998
Business Day 2 March 1999
Business Day 11 November 1999
Business Report, Johannesburg. 27 March 1997
Business Times, Kuala Lumpur 12 April 1996.
Engineering News, Johannesburg. March 1999.
Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong. 28 March 1991
Far Eastern Economic Review 5 March 1992.
Far Eastern Economic Review 22 July 1993.
F & T Weekly, Johannesburg. 6 June 1997
Independent Online, Johannesburg. 2 July 1998.
Lampiran Warta GAPENA, Kuala Lumpur. September 1996
Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg. 9 April 1998
Mail & Guardian 11-17 September 1998.
Mail & Guardian 2-9 October 1998
Mail & Guardian 20 November 1998
Mail & Guardian 27 May 1999.
Mingguan Malays, Kuala Lumpur. 9 Mei 1993.
Muslim News, Cape Town. 16 January 1961
Muslim News 30 May 1961
Muslim News 30 April 1971
Muslim Views, Cape Town. 15 December 2004
Natal Mercury, Durban. 12 November 1996.
Natal Mercury 31 January 1997.
Natal Mercury 17 February 1997
Natal Mercury 10 March 1997
New Straits Times, Kuala Lumpur. 19 October 1985
New Strait Times 22 October 1985.
New Strait Times 23 October 1985.
New Strait Times 30 October 1985.
New Straits Times 17 July 1986.

New Straits Times 21 May 1990.
New Straits Times 14 November 1991.
New Straits Times 15 November 1991.
New Straits Times 10 November 1994.
New Straits Times 13 January 1995
New Straits Times 4 February 1995.
New Straits Times 10 February 1995
New Straits Times 14 February 1995.
New Straits Times 15 February 1995
New Straits Times 16 February 1995.
New Straits Times 24 May 1995
New Straits Times 29 May 1995.
New Straits Times 3 June 1995.
New Straits Times 25 September 1995.
New Straits Times 8 November 1995
New Straits Times 12 November 1999
Straits Times, Singapore. 13 January 1960.
The Argus, Cape Town. 20 April 1971
The Financial Mail, Johannesburg. 2 August 1996
The Financial Mail 7 February 1997
The Financial Mail 26 June 1998
The Financial Mail 7 April 2000
The Financial Mail February 2002
The Malay Mail, Kuala Lumpur. 6 September 1961
The Star, Johannesburg. 6 December 1990
The Star 18 August 2005
The Star December 2005
The Sunday Independent, Johannesburg. 1 Sept. 1996.
The Sunday Independent 23 Feb, 1997.
The Sunday Independent 20 April 1997
The Sunday Independent 15 June 1997
The Sunday Independent 8 November 1998
The Sunday Times, Johannesburg. 17 November 1996.
The Times, London. 1 January 1991.
Utusan Melayu, Kuala Lumpur. 11 January 1961

4. SPEECHES:

Badawi, Abdullah. 2005. Speech at banquet hosted by Thabo Mbeki, president of South Africa. 26th July. Pretoria: Presidential Guest House.

De Klerk, F.W. 1995. South African Economic Prospects and Opportunities for Malaysian Business. Speech at jointly organized by the South African High Commission and Malaysia South-South Association (MASSA). 14th February. Kuala Lumpur: SAHC & MASSA.

Dlamini-Zuma, 2005. Opening statement on the occasion of the First South Africa – Malaysia Joint Ministerial Commission Meeting. 23-24 June. Kuala Lumpur.

Dompok, (Tan Sri) Bernard (Minister in PM's Department). 2005. Speech at Thanksgiving Dinner. April, Kuala Lumpur.

Gigaba, Malusi (Deputy Minister of Home Affairs). 2005. Speech at Thanksgiving Dinner. April, Kuala Lumpur.

Mandela, Nelson. 1997. Speech at state banquet in Malaysia. 7th March. Kuala Lumpur.

Mandela, Nelson. 1997a. Speech at South Africa – Malaysia Forum. 8th March. Kuala Lumpur.

Mandela, Nelson. 1997b. Speech at Malaysia -South Africa Business Meeting. 8th March. Kuala Lumpur.

Mahathir bin Mohamad. 1990. Speech at the dinner in honour of Mr. Nelson Mandela in Kuala Lumpur.

Mahathir bin Mohamad. 1995. Speech at Cape Town Business dinner. Cape Town.

Mahathir bin Mohamad. 1995a. Speech at the dinner hosted by Mr. F. W. De Klerk, Vice President of South Africa. 21st August. Pretoria.

Mbeki, Thabo. 2003. Reply to the Toast by His Majesty, Yang Di-Pertuan Agong, Malaysia, 2nd September. Kuala Lumpur: Istana Negara.

Mbeki, Thabo. 2005. Opening statement at the summit meeting of the new Asian-African Strategic Partnership. 22nd of April. Jakarta: Indonesia.