

**The Foreign Policy Orientation and
National Role Conceptions of a Post-Apartheid South Africa:
Options and Scenarios**

by

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*All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players: They have
their exits and their entrances; And one man in his time plays many parts.*

William Shakespeare

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Chris Landsberg

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Chapter I

Introduction

The Consciousness of the self is not the closing of the door to communication...national consciousness, which is not nationalism is the only thing that will give us an international dimension.

- Franz Fanon, 1976

The challenge is before us. Unless we begin to work together (in Africa) to chart a course which can give practical effect to our shared principles, events will overtake us and we will find ourselves in a region largely shaped by others to our disadvantage.

Walter Sisulu, 1992

South Africa's power struggle and deep-rooted apartheid dispute have been resolved through the politics of genuine negotiations and compromise.

With the end of apartheid and white domination now achieved, the political debate and scholarly discourse is enthusiastically and increasingly focusing attention on South Africa's future; for example, a host of interest groups - including the government of national unity, leading members in the business community, civics and community organisations, academic institutions, religious institutions, etc. - is now seeking ways of becoming active participants in the much celebrated Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP represents the blue-print, or more precisely manifesto for post-apartheid reconstruction and upliftment in South Africa. In other words, most scholarly contributions to the debate on post-apartheid scenarios for South Africa have, regrettably however, not dealt in any substantial fashion with the perspectives of foreign policy orientations and strategies for South Africa beyond apartheid. Yet, this is an issue of paramount importance to South

Africa's future.

With the attention and concern understandably fixed on the dynamics of the important domestic situation, the fundamental foreign policy implications and ramifications of domestic political restructuring and manoeuvring have been largely ignored. The major documents of the African National Congress (ANC), *ipso facto* the most dominant candidate in the post-apartheid government, gives very little guidance to the foreign policy options of a liberated, "non-racial, democratic" South Africa. The ANC's *Freedom Charter* speaks of regional and foreign policy only in vague and general terms when it recognizes the right of all the people of Africa to "independence and self-government", and states that such independence provides the "basis of close cooperation between the peoples of Africa".¹ The ANC's *Constitutional Guidelines* of 1988 also falls short of framing a coherent foreign policy blueprint for a liberated South Africa. The *Constitutional Guidelines* merely hints that "South Africa shall be a non-aligned state committed to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and to the achievement of national liberation, world peace and disarmament".² The United Nations' *Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa* of 1989, for its part, also dimly proclaims that "a democratic South Africa shall respect the rights, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and pursue a policy of peace, friendship and mutually beneficial co-operation with all peoples".³ The first few drafts of the ANC's RDP are even more vague on foreign policy matters.

Suffice it to say here that in the challenging game of international relations with its high stakes of balance of power diplomacy, spheres of influence, and complex interdependence in an essentially self-help, Western dominated international system, the ANC's foreign policy declaration, that "The democratic South Africa will therefore move away from the position asserted by the white, minority regime, that South Africa must be

recognised as a dominant regional power",⁴ sounds like the blank lyric: 'Don't follow, I will not lead; don't lead, I will not follow. Just walk beside me, share my journey, and hope for the best.'

It need hardly be noted, that the demands and challenges of the foreign policy of a liberation movement differs quite fundamentally from conducting international affairs in a mixed-actor system in which the state is the primary actor. The two obviously differ fundamentally and should therefore not be confused. In other words, it is going to be important for an ANC led government to seriously adapt to changing circumstances in the post-Cold War world.

Of the abundance of Resolutions and Plans of Action that the ANC adopted since 1988, outlining their blueprint for the 'ideal', post-apartheid South Africa, it devoted no more than forty pages to foreign policy. These are serious omissions because it cannot just be assumed that South Africa's foreign policy will take care of itself, and that a liberated South Africa will naturally fulfil its potential role and assume its rightful place within the community of nations. As the Nigerian statesman Obafemi Awolowo avowed, "We would be deluding ourselves if we imagined that size, population and natural resources are all that are required to boost us into a position of eminence and leadership".⁵ What is more, in South Africa's case we are dealing with "...the nation in search of its identity, the people in search of material satisfaction, and the state in search of its security."⁶

The survival, prosperity and security of a nation, it should be pointed out, is critically dependent on, and partially determined by, the nature and dynamics of the foreign policy orientation and national role conceptions that the state articulates and identifies for itself. Holsti rightly observes in this regard that foreign policy orientation and national role models are fundamental *sine qua nons* if the state is to accomplish its domestic goals.⁷

It is pivotal that coherent, constructive and concrete foreign policy orientations and national role strategies for South Africa beyond apartheid be analyzed, developed, and constructed. Now that South Africa's rightful position in the world is finally restored and altered with the eventual removal of apartheid and white minority domination, the "new democratic republic" will suddenly and effectively be challenged and thrust into a responsible and demanding role, and there will not be any escape from this challenge. South Africa's unique historical experience, its peculiar foreign affairs circumstances, and its in-built foreign policy facilities - economic, military and industrial - equips it for a fundamental, crucial and influential role in world affairs. The principle and question of involvement and commitment after apartheid is no longer the issue therefore. What involvements and which commitments? That is the question!

1.1 The Goals of the Study

This study is in large part a reflection of the growing domestic interest in, and indeed paramount concern with South Africa's future; and in particular South Africa's future external relations and foreign policy. These, in turn, are the products of the profound changes in both South Africa's domestic political map and the dynamics of the contemporary international political *status quo post bellum*.

This thesis should essentially be considered as an exposition of the foreign policy of a "new", apartheid-free South Africa in a post-Cold War international arena, arguing for a *pro-active* and *prudent* foreign policy. An important goal of the study is to make as dispassionate and rational as possible a contribution to the debate on South Africa's future foreign policy, national roles and external relations. A further aim of the study shall be to deduce relevant conclusions and findings from the research, and endeavour to place the

results of perpetual and viable foreign policy orientations and national role models within the framework of policy alternatives to South Africa's decision-makers in the future. The fact that a scholarly analysis of this sort is attempted, is, at the end of the day, in itself significant.

The challenge and objective of this study is furthermore to investigate the viability of foreign policy postures for a post-apartheid, post-pariah South Africa on the basis of options and scenarios. Viable foreign policy options for the future can, after all, only be skilfully assessed and advanced on the basis of options and *scenarios*, that is to say an analysis of probable events that are most likely to occur and influence the future.

Considerable thought is given to approach and format, seeking above all an uncluttered and condensed donation to South Africa's future international affairs. The study is, further afield, substantially an exploratory probe, rather than a definitive policy blueprint of the foreign policy of a post-apartheid South Africa. It is essentially analytical, but also comparative in nature.

Turning to the list of contents, the treatise unfolds as follows: Chapter II sets out a conceptual framework for the analysis of foreign policy orientations, and national role conceptions; and attempts to place them within the framework of changing paradigms in international relations.

Chapter III reflects on the foreign policy orientations of the apartheid past, arguing that if we are to understand the challenges faced by a post-apartheid South Africa, it is indeed important to take a longer historical view at what the orientations and strategies of the past intended to accomplish, and what, even with the best of intentions, they could never even hope to realize.

Chapter IV analyses and distinguishes between three typical foreign policy orientations that states in the contemporary international system normally choose from, viz *isolationism (dissociation)*, *permanent neutrality* and *non-alignment (neutralization)*. In asserting that isolation and permanent neutrality can surely be considered non-starters, the study advances a re-defined non-alignment as a viable foreign policy strategy for a new South Africa. Very importantly, the thesis argues, that unless non-alignment proves itself capable of re-orientating itself, South Africa should seriously consider a new kind of internationalism as foreign policy orientation. A re-orientated non-alignment - or internationalism - is proposed not merely as the most feasible pro-active foreign policy strategy for a post-pariah South Africa, but, more importantly, as the best means to safeguard and protect the envisaged infant post-apartheid dispensation that is about to replace apartheid.

Chapter V strongly argues that the establishment of a legitimate post-apartheid democratic order is the only way through which South Africa can hope to assert its international legitimacy and rehabilitate its poor standing in the world. It is of the opinion that a revolutionary *zero sum* overthrow of the apartheid order would merely serve to obfuscate and destroy the chances of a firm democracy replacing the white racial oligarchy and apartheid *status quo*; a negotiated settlement of the apartheid dispute is, *ipso facto*, the best means of establishing and securing a "stable" and "prosperous" democracy. It believes that unless the South Africa government, both at present and in future, together with all major contending parties in the South African power struggle, effectively and speedily comes to grips with political instability, crime and its violent vicissitudes, it will have negative consequences for South Africa's foreign affairs. In fact, argues Chapter V, South Africa of the past has, of course, been little more than a functioning anarchy.

Given South Africa's peculiar position in the international system, particularly its

position within the African context, Chapter VI advances a series of realistic and credible national role models for a post-apartheid South Africa. These are regional leader, regional protector, pro-active independent, defender of the faith, regional-subsystem collaborator, developer, example setter, and internal developer.

A study of this sort, risky as it may seem, is indeed necessary.

Notes to Chapter I

1. See The African National Congress, "The Freedom Charter", in *ANC: The Road to Peace*, Resource Material on Negotiations, Department of Political Education, June 1990, p. 28.
2. The African National Congress, "The Constitutional Guidelines", in *ANC: The Road to Peace*, op. cit., p. 32.
3. See *United Nations Declaration on South Africa*, Special Session on Apartheid and Its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa, New York, 14 December 1989.
4. The African National Congress, *ANC Policy Guidelines For A Democratic South Africa*, National Conference, Johannesburg, 28-31 May, 1992, p. 73.
5. Obafemi Awolowo, *Awo: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo*, Cambridge, 1960, p. 301.
6. William Zartman, 'National Interest and Ideology', in Vernon McKay (ed.), *African Diplomacy*, New York, 1966, p. 35.
7. K. J. Holsti, *International Politics, A Framework for Analysis*, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1967, p. 98.

Chapter II

Foreign Policy Orientation, National Role Conceptions, and International Relations

Despite important changes in international relations which have broadened the range of actors, the scope of the issues and the complexity of the processes involved, it remains the case that much if not most of what goes on is in fact the product of the foreign policy behaviours of one or more states.

Brian White

Finding life in a state of nature impossible, men turn to the State to find the security collectively, that they are incapable of finding individually.

Kenneth Waltz

2.1 Conceptualizing Foreign Policy Orientation

Foreign policy orientation refers to a state's general attitudes and commitment (or lack of commitment) towards the international environment; it is a fundamental strategy for realizing its domestic and foreign policy objectives, and for coping with persisting external threats.¹ A state's general foreign policy strategy is often closely linked to the nature of its domestic political attitudes and socio-economic needs. The ever increasing linkage between domestic and external politics, said to Professor Koos van Wyk, leads to such a high level of penetration of domestic politics, that states cannot avoid participation in international affairs.² The international aggregation of interests, argues van Wyk, has become an essential part of the pursuit of foreign policy goals. Driven by an interest in survival, states are actually sensitive to any erosion of their relative capabilities which are the ultimate basis

for their security and independence in an essentially anarchical, self-help international arena.³

Professor Kal Holsti advanced a number of essential provisos that should be taken into account when selecting and articulating a foreign policy orientation.⁴ First, the models and patterns of dominance, subordination and leadership of the international system. These factors are important because they establish and set the constraints, demands and limits on the freedom of movement and manoeuvrability of the component units in the system.

Second, the linkage between overall foreign policy strategy and domestic needs and demands -political, socio-economic, and otherwise. Foreign policy orientation, it should be pointed out, is every so often formulated to fulfil socio-economic needs and to advance the national interests of the nation.

Third, the national decision-maker's persisting threat perception to their values and national interests will have a fundamental bearing on their orientation and attitudes to the external environment.

Finally, a state's geographical location, topographical characteristics, and endowment in natural resources are more than often linked to its choice of orientation. More important, the main geographic, demographic, and economic features of a state create general socio-economic and military needs and demands that can be fulfilled only through transactions and contact with the outside world. A country's distribution of natural resources, geographical location, and topography may indeed be the most important features, because they are the permanent factors.⁵ These permanent conditions also have the greatest relevance to military and defensive eminence and policies.

The foreign policy orientation of a state furthermore serves as a crucial frame of reference, a paradigm which exerts and provides a broad directional influence upon policy,⁶

and a prism through which leaders view the outside world.

States in the contemporary international system normally choose between three typical foreign policy strategies, viz. *isolationism*; *permanent neutrality*; and *alignment*, in our case *non-alignment*.⁷ The foreign policy orientation of a post-apartheid South Africa can be analyzed on the basis of these principles and notions of dissociation, neutrality, and neutralization in the international system.

The "go it alone" and inward-looking option of isolationism, with its emphasis on disengagement and dissociation in international affairs, would seem to be an improbable and costly foreign policy option for a post-apartheid South Africa. In order for the newly established democracy to prosper, the new state will need, if not be compelled, to maximize its political, diplomatic and economic integration and co-operation with the world community. What is more, given its peculiar position on the now peripheralised African continent, it will be crucial for South Africa to adopt a pro-active, constructive foreign policy if it hopes to realize even the minimum demands for security and survival.

Permanent neutrality on its part has been dealt a negative blow by the overall unprecedented and profound changes in the international system with its emphasis on the demise of the bi-polar Cold War and superpower rivalry between the United States and the ex-Soviet Union and their respective alliance blocs. The Cold War was, after all, the *raison d'être* of permanent neutrality.

Due to its alleged feasibility and viability, non-alignment has been articulated as the most attractive foreign policy posture for a liberated South Africa. Non-alignment as foreign policy orientation has as one of its major objectives the maximization of freedom of choice, manoeuvrability, and flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy, based on the dictates of national interests rather than ideological, dogmatic prescription.⁸ Non-alignment is

furthermore being proposed by its proponents as the best means and mechanism to protect the infant post-apartheid dispensation and democratic political *status quo ante* that will replace the apartheid racial oligarchy of the past, and the racial oligarchy in transition of the present. This depends on the ability of the orientation to adapt to new international circumstances and shifts in the global balance-of-power. If non-alignment proves itself to be incapable to adapt to these new realities, than South Africa's post-apartheid governing elite will have to consider a new internationalist orientation.

2.2 Defining Foreign Policy

George Modelski defines foreign policy as "the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment".⁹ Brian White on his part interprets foreign policy as "...that area of governmental activity which is concerned with relationships between the state and other actors, particularly other states, in the international system".¹⁰ White furthermore argues that foreign policy, just like domestic policy, is directed at (and implemented in the) environment and arena external to the state. For Joseph Frankel, foreign policy entails "...the decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent, relations between one state and others".¹¹ William Wallace again contends that foreign policy implies "a continuous process that bridges the analytical barriers between international and domestic political systems".¹² Evans and Newnham quite correctly assert therefore that foreign policy is "the activity whereby state actors act, react, and interact".¹³

Taken another step further, foreign policy can be said to denote that deliberate strategy and planned course of action developed and articulated by the decision-makers of a

state *vis-à-vis* other states and international entities.¹⁴ It is aimed at achieving specific goals and objectives defined in terms of *national interests* ; that is to say the fundamental objectives and ultimate determinants that guide the decision-makers of a state in the making and conduct of foreign policy.¹⁵ The national interests of the state is typically a highly generalized conception of those elements that constitute the state's most vital needs. The most important national interests include survival, self-preservation, independence, territorial integrity, security and economic well-being of the state. The goals of traditional foreign policy, in short, has been the attempt by governments to secure and extend the physical control of territory, and to gain diplomatic influence over foreign governments; what could be dubbed here the territorial-diplomatic imperative.

Foreign policy consequently involves a dynamic process of applying relatively fixed, and often rigid interpretations of national interest to the highly fluctuating and dynamic situational factors of the international (foreign policy) environment in order to develop a sustained course of action, followed by efforts to achieve diplomatic implementation of those guidelines and principles.¹⁶ As Charles Kegley Jr. and Eugene Wittkopf put it, "When we speak generically about foreign policy and the decision routines that produce it, we are referring to the goals that the officials representing states seek to obtain abroad, the values that gave rise to those objectives, and the means and instruments through which they are pursued".¹⁷ Because power is a means to realizing national interests, power, it is important to assert, is the main ingredient of foreign policy.¹⁸

The distinction between foreign policy and diplomacy is worth preserving here: while foreign policy refers to the substance of a state's relations with other states and agencies, diplomacy on its part refers to the process of dialogue and negotiations by means short of war.¹⁹ As Abba Eban asserts, diplomacy can be seen as "the prevention of war when

possible, the control of its course once it has broken out, and its termination under conditions likely to prevent its renewal".²⁰

2.3 Major Steps in the Foreign Policy Process

Because of the dynamics and complexities of international relations and the hard pushes and pulls of the international system, states are confronted with constant challenges to pursue numerous policies, identify many goals, map out various tactics and strategies, evaluate different capabilities, and initiate and implement specific decisions and actions, a challenge that South Africa's future leaders will have to heed.²¹ This demanding task, analysts argue, must always be co-ordinated and organized within the broad framework of national interest guidelines.²² More specifically, they argue, the major steps and procedures in the foreign policy process include *inter alia*:²³ 1) translating the normally vague and fixed interpretations of national interests into concrete goals and objectives; 2) determining and analysing the domestic and international situational factors related to foreign policy goals; 3) analysing and assessing the state's capabilities for achieving its desired results; 4) developing a deliberate plan or strategy for using the state's capabilities and resources to deal with the variables in pursuit of that goal; 5) embarking on the requisite actions; and 6) periodically reviewing and evaluating progress made toward the achievement of the hoped-for results.

It should be born in mind that the foreign policy process seldom, if ever, proceeds logically, smoothly, and chronologically; and because the international environment is in constant flux, the foreign policy process is dynamic and continuous. As Thomas Schelling

avowed, "foreign-affairs is a complicated and disorderly business, full of surprises, demanding hard choices that must be based on judgement rather than analysis, taking place in a world that changes so rapidly that memory and experience are likely out of date".²⁴ A post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy elite should take acute cognisance of Shelling's premonition.

2.4 Explaining and Analysing National Roles and Role Conceptions

The maxim, "the man makes the position", is equally pertinent to the dynamics of inter-state relations, and in particular for purposes of this thesis South Africa's foreign affairs. Because in the international system as it is some states are in much stronger positions than others, it follows that the weak states are more dependent on the strong. This equation fits the South African case well. In the global context, South Africa would want to pursue friendly relations with as many states as possible; this is so because of the importance of trade, economic interaction and foreign aid for this country's prosperity.

The concept of position as described above, connotes a behavioural entity in a behavioural setting with more or less well defined functions, duties, rights and privileges.²⁵ States in the international system (like South Africa) are by and large representatives of these positions. If the "position makes the state", the reverse of the coin is that states articulate and define for themselves the rights, duties, privileges, and appropriate forms of behaviour associated and identified with their locations, rank, strength and prestige that will suit their positions in the international society.²⁶ Professor Holsti replaces the term position with that of status; status denotes more or less a rough estimate of a state's ranking in stature in the international system.²⁷ The perception of a state's status in the international system has an

appreciable (or less appreciable) consequence, and implication for the way policy-makers define their appropriate international tasks and roles for their nations.²⁸

What then are national role conceptions? National role conceptions can be defined as the general foreign policy attitude and behaviour of governments.²⁹ It includes patterns of positions, decisions, responses, attitudes and commitments towards other states, and outlines the functions and tasks which states see themselves committed to within different international settings.

While foreign policy orientation reflects such factors as the structure and nature of the international system, threat perceptions, levels of involvement, *inter alia*; national role postures on their part reflect the basic predispositions, pledges, fears and attitudes toward the outside world, as well as the systemic, geographic, economic, and military proximities of states.³⁰ National roles range from high levels of involvement to very low levels of engagement in the international system. High levels of engagement suggest active, radical, and strong features of commitment, while low levels of involvement reflect conservatism, passivity and weakness, according to Holsti. National roles provide guidelines for actions when specific situations arise in the international arena. It furthermore reflects the general and specific objectives governments (hope to) pursue within regional sub-systems and in the international society at large.³¹

It is important to emphasise that national role conceptions, as both professors Holsti and Van Wyk argue, are closely linked to foreign policy orientations, and constitute foreign policy outputs associated, moreover, with states that are actively engaged and involved in systemic and regional affairs. More often than not, therefore, national roles are pro-active in nature. They are, however, more specific than orientations because they suggest and lend to more discreet foreign policy acts and outputs.

In *International Politics, A Framework for Analysis*, 1983, and "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", *International Studies Quarterly*, 14(1970), Professor Kal Holsti advances no less than sixteen types of national role conceptions that are part and parcel of the foreign policies of states. It should be pointed out that these role models are articulated with a specific cold war emphasis; they should therefore be revised and re-defined in order to make them relevant for the new post-cold war realities. Here follows a synopsis and synthesis of these role performances and postures.³²

1) *Liberator, Bastion of the Revolution*. This role conception - pursued mainly during the anti-colonial revolution age - suggests that the state commits itself to organize or lead various types of revolutionary movements abroad. Governments see as one of their tasks the liberation of subjected and oppressed people in other countries and to act as the bastion of foreign revolutionary movements. They keenly provide an area that foreign revolutionary leaders can regard as physical, moral, and ideological sources of support. The question now arise, will South Africa pursue such a revolutionary cause abroad? If so, how will South Africa go about practising such a model?

2) *Regional Leader*. Deriving from a state's strength and resource capabilities, this role conception refers to duties and special responsibilities that a state perceives for itself in relation to "its" region and territorial sphere of influence. For example, will South Africa conduct itself as the hegemon of southern Africa?

3) *Regional Protector*. With an emphasis on special leadership responsibilities on a regional and issue-area basis, this conception assumes an active emphasis on providing protection, especially military defence and security, for adjacent states, and for a region in general.

4) *Active Independent*. Emphasising the protection of the territorial integrity,

sovereignty, and independence of the state, this role conception underscores the necessity and importance of diplomatic interaction with as many states as possible, and occasionally, to become involved as mediators and facilitators in (bloc) conflict resolution.

5) *Liberation Supporter*. The role of liberation supporter does not indicate formal responsibility for either organising, leading, or physically supporting liberation movements abroad. They are, more accurately, sympathizers of these movements.

6) *Anti-imperialist Agent*. Especially during the Cold War era, many states saw themselves as agents of the struggle against the "imperial menace" fighting the "running dogs of imperialism".

7) *Defender of the Faith*. This role conception suggests that states view their foreign policy tasks in terms of defending certain values and principles, rather than specified territories from attack. In his inaugural speech, former U.S. President John F. Kennedy, for example, claimed that the United States would "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, or oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty".

8) *Mediator-Integrator*. The theme of this role model suggests that states see themselves as regional and/or global "fixers", "stabilizers", and "menders". In this conception, states typically see themselves as capable of, or responsible for, fulfilling or undertaking special mediatory tasks to reconcile other states or groups of states.

9) *Regional-Subsystem Collaboration*. The themes in this role conception do not merely envisage occasional interposition into issues or areas of conflict. Rather, they indicate far-reaching commitments to co-operative efforts with other states in order to establish wide communities, to coalesce, co-operate, mediate, facilitate, and integrate with other political units.

10) *Developer*. The treatise in this role model suggests a special duty or obligation

to assist developing countries. Reference to special skills, advantages and resources for undertaking such continuing tasks appear prominently in the foreign policy tasks that governments outline for themselves.

11) *Bridge*. This rather vague and ephemeral conception seems to stimulate very little concrete action. Because of such factors as unique geographical location or multi-ethnic culture, some states are in a peculiar position to create understanding among other states, or to act as a bridge in communication between others.

12) *Faithful Ally*. The faithful-ally role model suggests that a states will support, with great enthusiasm and vigour, its friends and allies. The state is not so much concerned with receiving aid as to committing itself to giving aid and pledging assistance to others.

13) *Independent*. This role conception is enunciated on the basis of the claim that on any given matter or issue, the state will pursue what it perceives to be its own legitimate interests. Other than this, it does not suggest any particular fixed tasks or functions in the system.

14) *Example Setter*. This role conception emphasises the importance of a state promoting prestige and gaining influence in the international system by emphasising and portraying its domestic political dispensation as an ideal type, and by pursuing certain domestic policies towards national peace and co-habitation. On this score, South Africa's own constitutional success story put this country in an ideal position to serve as an example in Africa.

15) *Internal Developer*. This role model does not refer to a pro-active function within the regional sub-system, or the international system. Instead, it suggests that most of the efforts of government should be directed towards domestic problem solving and internal socio-economic development. It often also refers to the desire to remain relatively

non-involved in the dynamics and complexities of international politics.

16) *Balancer*. This model refers to the traditional *balance of power* theory. It suggests that the state take upon itself the duty to act as "impartial" and "vigilant" "holder of the balance",³³ so that no state can "lay down the rules to others", in Vattel's words.³⁴ It is mostly associated with the historical role that England came to play in the European dominated State system. Writing in 1907, Sir Eyre Crowe argued that it had "Become almost a historical truism to identify England's secular policy with the maintenance of the balance by throwing her weight now in this scale and now in that, but ever on the side opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single state or group at any given time".³⁵ Balance-of-Power has been roundly criticized for causing considerable semantic confusion. Ernst B. Haas³⁶ located at least eight distinct meanings of the term; and Martin Wight³⁷ was successful in tracking down no less than nine such meanings. These meanings include, *inter alia* : 1) an even distribution of power; 2) the principle that power should be evenly distributed; 3) the existing distribution of power; 4) the principle of equal aggrandizement of the great powers at the expense of the weak; 5) a special role in maintaining an even distribution of power; 6) the principle that one side ought to have a margin of strength in order to avert the danger of power becoming unevenly distributed; 7) a special advantage in the existing distribution of power; 8) a preponderance of power; and 9) an inherent tendency of international politics to produce an even distribution of power. It follows clearly here, as Inis Claude observed, that the problem with the balance-of-power is not that it has no meaning, but that it has far too many meanings.³⁸

The outcome of the above exposition of national role conceptions suggests plainly that states can pursue and perform several roles and national-role conceptions in different sets of

relationships simultaneously. The more pro-active a South Africa will be in international relations, the more role conceptions it will develop and articulate for itself. Apart from its pro-non-alignment posture, the ANC did not really articulate concrete postures and role conceptions; the jury is still out on such models. It is important therefore for us to engage in analysis on post apartheid role conceptions for South Africa after apartheid.

It should be pointed out, in the first place, that given its peculiar position in the international system, it would be critical for a non-aligned (or internationalist) post-apartheid South Africa to adopt and apply a number of national role conceptions. The more realistic, feasible and critical conceptions that are being proposed here are:

- 1) Regional Leader
- 2) Regional Protector
- 3) Pro-Active Independence
- 4) Mediator-Integrator
- 5) Regional-Subsystem Collaborator
- 6) Developer
- 7) Internal Developer
- 8) Example Setter

2.5 International Relations and the New World Order

Because this study is future-oriented and concerned with the international affairs of a post-apartheid South Africa, a very important question comes to mind and needs serious consideration: What is the objective nature of the world; the emerging 'new world order', that will confront a post-pariah South Africa?

Long before South Africa's first universal franchise elections the ANC observed in response to this vexed question that "...the conduct of...foreign policy must take into account the realities of contemporary international relations".³⁹ "A democratic South Africa's foreign policy", the ANC maintained, "will further be influenced by the emergence of a New World Order".⁴⁰ These statements clearly recognised the importance of comprehending the evolving "new world order" which is still in a state of flux; in fact, it may take a decade or more before the concrete principles of this order emerges.

The study of international relations implies, by definition, the examination of the interaction between actors across national frontiers.⁴¹ This point is made here because it is important to stress that sovereignty of the new, democratic South Africa will reside in its government, not in some foreign entity such as the UN.

As a field of inquiry, international relations studies the distribution of power and influence on a global scale and the interplay between and among power centres.⁴² South Africa is about to become such a centre of power on the world stage; during the apartheid era this country's offensive domestic policies subtracted substantially from this country's ability to become an influential and important actor.

Not so long ago Hans Morgenthau defined international politics, indeed all politics, as a perpetual struggle for power.⁴³ Because international relations is about power, suggested Raymond Platig, the substantive core of international relations is the interaction of governments of sovereign states.⁴⁴ A democratic South Africa will be in a position to interact with much more foreign governments than the apartheid government could ever hope to have dealings with. In other words, with the end of apartheid the problem with South Africa's foreign policy will be resolved.

However, South Africa's new government wont be the only actor engaging in the

country's foreign affairs; non-state actors such as multi-national corporations, the business community, academic institutions, churches, to mention a few, are increasingly becoming involved in foreign affairs; this is incidentally a global trend. Far from being an exclusive and strict "state centric" arena, therefore, state actors have come to share the Western dominated international stage with an ever-growing variety of non-state actors (NSA's), making the world stage essentially a 'mixed actor' arena.

However, it should be stressed that while this tide clearly increases the complexity of the international environment, the state (governments) still appears to dominate the global theatre of western hegemony.

Because of this tension between state and non-state actors, two contending types of paradigms in international relations are busy emerging; these paradigms could be considered approaches to the conduct of international affairs that South Africa will have to realistically take cognisance of: viz. *realism* and *interdependence*.

Impressed by the levels and persistence of discord in world politics, political realism came to perceive international relations as an endless struggle for power⁴⁵ and survival in an essentially anarchic and hostile environment. In rather pessimistic terms realists depicted international relations as a Hobbesian state of war; a "dog eats dog" world; a world full of bulldogs and puppies; a world where the fittest and the toughest are more than likely to survive at the expense of the small and weak. At first glance realism seems a somewhat narrow perspective of world affairs and the new South Africa certainly does not face such a bellicose type situation. The end of the cold war had the implication that typical hot wars between states are less likely to occur in future. This should not be taken as an argument that wars are obsolete; instead it is an assertion that competition between states will now shift to different terrains such as the economic field.

But realists will persuasively maintain that international anarchy, that is to say the absence of an over-arching world authority, fosters conflict and competition amongst the principal actors, states, and seriously impinges on their willingness to co-operate, even when they share common interests.⁴⁶ South Africa will in future discover that in spite of the restoration of its political legitimacy, that is not likely to transfer into benefits for its economic relations with other states at all time. It will sometimes perceive its economic interests to be threatened by other states as is the case with its belated participation in the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

What came to be branded the traditional paradigm of international relations, viz. realism, still does have some relevance in the new post-cold war age. Realism is based on a number of assumptions and propositions found in realist theory⁴⁷ which is worth bearing in mind when considering a new, post-apartheid foreign policy posture for South Africa: first, states in a "state-centric" system are the foremost actors in world politics. Second, domestic politics can be clearly separated from foreign policy. As Henry Kissinger avows, "the domestic structure is taken as a given; foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends".⁴⁸ This is an a realist assertion that can be contested; it could be argued that domestic politics and foreign policy is closely linked and intertwined and that the two influences each other greatly. This was the case with South Africa's unavailing foreign policy experience during the apartheid years. Third, argue the realists, states are preoccupied with power, and international anarchy (or absence of authority) is the principal force shaping the motives and objectives of states. Fourth, the international environment severely penalizes states if they fail to protect their vital national interests. Fifth, there are gradations of capabilities among states, greater powers and lesser powers in a decentralized system of states possessing (only) legal equality and sovereignty. All states are equal therefore, but some are more equal than

others. Six, states are predisposed towards conflict and competition, and often fail to co-operate even in the face of common interests. Finally, the "national interest", the realist's "iron law" of international politics, is defined in terms of power to the virtual exclusion of all other factors, such as the promotion of ideology and in particular utopian principles. The nature of the anarchical international society, argues the realist, necessitates the acquisition of military capabilities sufficient at least to deter aggression and attack. The best means of self-preservation, according to the realists, is a vigilant and constant awareness and reiteration of the worst-case scenario. Once again we see in realism an obsession with power; political realism surely constitutes a pessimistic and dreary assumption of international affairs.

Not only for the boldness with which realists came to state their propositions, but also because of the visible trends towards co-operation between states, interdependence⁴⁹ observers vigorously tried to belie and dispel the realist depiction of world politics as a Hobbesian "state of war" and a struggle of all against all. Interdependence theorists argued that states are interdependent, that is to say they are involved in situations characterized by reciprocal effects between themselves, in strategic, social, ecological, and economic areas.⁵⁰ With its attention fixed on the economic dimensions of statecraft, interdependence is a refutation of the belief that international politics is a seamless web of power interests, a state-bound "billiard ball" scenario, infused with anarchy, whose actors are driven by a perpetual search for a military defined security.

The interdependence paradigm, with its claim of a fundamental shift in the allocation of power within the international system, is grounded on three main pillars.⁵¹ Firstly, the utility and fungibility of military force is becoming obsolete in international relations.

Secondly, the existence of economic relations, rather than military relations, assume the defining role in international affairs. Thirdly, international regimes, and not the state, are the governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence.⁵² On this score, interdependence theorists would argue that it will be important for South Africa to join international regimes and organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the GATT, etc. The assertion of the interdependence school is that international regimes help breed a common interpretation of events, and in so doing manipulate state actions by redrawing their particular interests into line with the interest of the international system.⁵³

In interdependence, a cobweb paradigm replaces the "billiard ball" paradigm of realism; South Africa could derive great benefits from the cobweb. Indeed, the new surge in interdependence led one of the principal exponents of 'cold eyed' realism, Henry Kissinger, with his deeply rooted belief in *realpolitik* and classical *balance-of-power* politics, to assert that "the traditional agenda of international affairs - the balance of powers, the security of nations - no longer defines the perils or possibilities in international affairs. Old patterns are crumbling, old slogans are uninformative". The world, said Kissinger, has become interdependent in economics, communications, and human aspirations.⁵⁴ For the interdependentists, therefore, international relations is at best "*les loups ne se mangent pas entre eux*"; that is to say, it is not a jungle out there. Based on the realist assumption, therefore, it would surely be a decidedly risky business to come out strictly in defence of the realist paradigm in international relations. The world, some interdependent scholars would heap, is becoming a safer place.

Alas, not quite. In spite of the very important and indeed necessary trends towards

interdependence and the alleged decline in the utility of force, the anarchic nature of the international system suggests that the world is still a "dangerous", and especially "selfish", place, as US president Bill Clinton argued; in such an anarchic world, each state is forced to cater for itself; it cannot depend too much on foreign largesse to guarantee its prosperity and safety. Because of the persistence of anarchy, there is still no over-arching authority to prevent other states from using violence or the threat of violence to destroy or enslave others.⁵⁵

In the anarchical arena violence will still occur exactly because "there is nothing to prevent them", as Waltz puts it.⁵⁶ Violence will not always take on the inter-state form but will shift increasingly to the intra-state level as is illustrated by so-called imploding states such as Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia and the former Yugoslavia to mention a few. Given the realities and nature of anarchy, individual well being is not necessarily the key interest of states. Instead, survival is likely to emerge as a core and primary concern of all states;⁵⁷ states will seek, as an important priority, the maintenance of their position in the international system. As Raymond Aron claims, "politics - insofar as it concerns relations among states, seems to signify - in both ideal and objective terms - simply the survival of states confronting the potential threat created by the existence of other states".⁵⁸ Hedley Bull also asserted that the anarchical international society consists of members who distrust one another and spend most of their time, if not actually attacking one another, at least protecting themselves from attack.⁵⁹ Similarly, Robert Gilpin countenanced, in the world as it is, "anarchy is the rule; order, justice and morality are the exceptions".⁶⁰ Thus, some states may be driven by justice and morality; by co-operation and friendship; some may sometimes be driven by greed or ambition; but anarchy and the danger of war still causes all states to be motivated, in some measure at least, by fear and distrust. Hence the notion here of "armed peace", or

as Kenneth Waltz contended, "the skilful non-use of force".⁶¹ Put differently, in the world as it is, the *modus operandi* of statecraft is 'prepare for the worst but hope for the best'; or as the old saying goes, *si vis pacem, para bellum*.

Put in yet another way, in a world of scarce resources and conflict over the distribution of those resources, states confront one another ultimately. In the Western dominated anarchical arena international relations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy.⁶² The foundation of all international political life still is "conflict groups"; it still is the state.

Because of this reality some adhere to the assertion that, because war is armed conflict among states, the abolition of the state must necessarily mean the end of war.⁶³ The fact of the matter is, however, that there is no evidence suggesting that the world is moving "beyond the state system".⁶⁴ The state system is "neither in decline, nor obsolete, nor dysfunctional".⁶⁵ For Robert Jervis, therefore, all the problem of international relations boils down to an unfortunate dilemma: "The central theme of international relations is not evil but tragedy. States often share a common interest, but the structure of the situation prevents them from bringing about the mutually desired situation."⁶⁶

Because of anarchy, international society still nurtures conflict and competition between states; it still seriously inhibits their ability and willingness to co-operate.

The irony and the paradox of international relations, therefore, is that the state is at once the greatest source of violence and conflict; and the greatest source of relative stability, well being, and security.

2.6 Power and International Relations

This brings us to another essential and indispensable theme in international relations: *Power*. Translated specifically into terms of this thesis, the question could be asked, what is South Africa's power?; how strong is South Africa?; what are the capabilities of South Africa to realise its foreign policy goals?

In this anarchical world, the arbiter of things political is to a great extent determined by the power of a state (South Africa); when we talk about power here we talk about power at home and power abroad. All noble goals, all moral and utopian schemes, will come to very little if this basic point is forgotten.⁶⁷ Anarchy, and the overall absence at the global level of adequate institutions and procedures for resolving conflict, compared and contrasted to most domestic political systems, makes the power factor in international relations more obvious, relevant, and consistent than any other element.

But what is this greatly evocative concept power? Power has been roundly defined as the ability to move individuals or collections of people in some desired fashion, through "persuasion, purchase, barter, and coercion".⁶⁸ For Arnold Wolfers, for instance, power connotes "the ability to move others or get them to do and not to do what one does not want them to do."⁶⁹

Power has furthermore been perceived as an influence relationship; that is the ability of one actor to induce another to act in some desired fashion, or conversely to refrain from such undesired behaviour. Professor Kal Holsti portrayed power as a multi-dimensional concept consisting of 1) the acts by which an actor (South Africa) influences other actors, 2) the capabilities utilized for these purposes, and 3) the response and reactions solicited.⁷⁰ Holsti's definition furthermore views power as "the general capacity of a state to control the

behaviour of others".⁷¹ Jeffrey Hart on his part measured power in terms of: 1) control over resource, 2) control over actors, and 3) control over events and outcomes.⁷² Combining all the points above, it is possible to offer a working definition of power as follows:⁷³

Power can be said to operate in international affairs when actor "X" (South Africa) is able to convert its resources into influence producing a pattern of behaviour in actor "Y" desired by "X".

It is not the premise of this thesis to suggest that power and security are the sole, or even the most important, objective of South Africa or other states. Least of all is it an attempt to discard the paramount importance of co-operation and interdependence, and of conflict resolution and peace-building in international relations. Instead, it is merely the advancement of the argument that in reality and in practice, most, if not all international relations are a mixture of realism and interdependence and most international relations lie disorderly somewhere between the two. We can dub this phenomenon *real interdependence*, a point often overlooked by international relations scholars.

The substance of this treatise on power is merely a recognition of the fact that in an anarchical, hostile, and selfish international society, survival is the prime motivation of states, and power is the ultimate means to this end.⁷⁴ Put another way, without the state's capacity to ensure its survival, all other goals and values are threatened. According to Kegley, Jr. and Wittkopf, "if this image derived from realpolitik is accurate, then foreign policy making consists primarily of adjusting the state to the demands of strife and struggle, and accommodating it to the pressures of a world system that remains permanent in its essential features."⁷⁵

2.7 The New World Order and a democratic South Africa

Since 1945, especially with the emergence of the Cold War, the international society has undergone uniquely contradictory trends. Regional and continental experiments and associations of states were evolving and exploring ways to deepen co-operation and friendship in order to ease some of the more contentious features of state sovereignty and nationalistic rivalries in and between states. One thinks here of the European Community's (EC) (now European Union) experiment in supra-nationalism; the Southern African Development Co-Ordination Conference's (SADCC) quest for regional co-operation and interdependence, for example.

Conversely, however, unrestrained new assertions of nationalism and reaffirmations of sovereignty continue to spring up internationally. Here we are reminded of the implications of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, with intra-state cohesion being threatened by fierce ethnic, religious, social, cultural, or linguistic strife, posing a grave threat to societal peace, such as the enigmas of Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and South Africa during the apartheid era. These are forces and tensions that have for long been held in check by the Cold War *balance of terror*. In South Africa, for example, the US and its allies have long viewed the apartheid problem through the cold war's East-west ideological prisms rather than a racist problem in its own right. It is only when racism became recognised for the destructive force it is, and apartheid and white supremacism were being dismantled, that the western powers start to change their attitude in dealing with the apartheid problem.

Today we see new tensions of ethnicity and identity are rising and finding expression in violence and bloodshed. These are both sources and consequences of conflict suggesting

that we are, in fact, heading for a post-cold war re-tribalization of international society. While the *ancient regime* of the Cold War had a set structure to it, the dismantling of the dreary possibility of all out war and mutual assured destruction, or MAD-ness as it is popularly known, provided an opening for the violent forces kept in check by the Cold War.

In order to grapple with these new challenges therefore, it is crucial that the respect for the integrity of the state and sovereignty on the one hand, and nationalism and the quest for self-determination of peoples on the other, are not viewed as opposing trends, doomed to conflict and reaction. While it is critical to have a strong sense of nationhood, in order to affect a more harmonious international society, respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights are all-important *sine qua nons* for peaceful co-existence in the international community of nations. As United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, puts it, "our constant duty should be to maintain the integrity of each while finding a balanced design for all."⁷⁶

In short, the jury is still out on whether it is possible to build a more harmonious society other than the conventional nation-state. After all, the decline of the primacy of the state is in the eye of the beholder!

Notes to Chapter II

1. See K. J. Holsti, *International Politics, A Framework for Analysis*, Fourth Edition, Prentice-Hall, USA, 1967, p. 98.
2. See Koos van Wyk, *Foreign Policy Orientations of the P. W. Botha Regime: Changing Perceptions of State Elites in South Africa*, Unpublished Paper, International Studies Unit (ISU), Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 1991, p. 5.
3. See for example Hans J. Morgenthau, "A Realist Theory of International Relations", in John A. Vasquez, *Classics of International Relations*, Second Edition, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1990, p. 32; also see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society, A Study of Order in World Politics*, MacMillan, London, 1977, p. 25.
4. See K. J. Holsti, *International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
5. Ibid.
6. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics, A Reference Guide To Concepts, Ideas and Institutions*, Harvester/Wheatsheaf, London, 1990 p. 299.
7. See K. J. Holsti, *International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 98. Also see Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy", *op. cit.*, pp. 1, 2.
8. K. J. Holsti, *International Politics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-4.
9. George Modelski, *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, Pall Mall, London, 1962, pp. 6-7.
10. Brian White, "Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches", in Michael Clarke and Brian White (ed.), *Understanding Foreign Policy, The Foreign Policy Systems Approach*, Edward Elgar, 1989, p. 5.
11. J. Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, p. 1.
12. William Wallace, *Foreign Policy and the Political Process*, Macmillan, London, 1971, p. 7.
13. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 123.
14. Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, *The International Relations Dictionary*, Fourth Edition, Oxford, England, 1988, p. 5.
15. See Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate': the National Interest of the United States", in John A. Vasquez, *Classics of International Relations*, *op. cit.*, Arnold Wolfers, "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol", in John A. Vasquez, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-137.

16. Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
17. Charles W. Kegley, Jr, and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics, Trend and Transformation*, Macmillan, London, 1989, p. 37.
18. See Hans J. Morgenthau, "A Realist Theory of International Politics", in John A. Vasquez, *op. cit.*, p. 33; *Martin Wight, Power Politics*, Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (ed.), Leicester University Press, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1978, p. 68; also see James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations, A Comprehensive Survey*, Third Edition, Harper & Row, New York, 1990, p. 85; George Modelski, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
19. Adam Watson, *Diplomacy, The Dialogue Between States*, J. W. Arrowsmith, Britain, 1982, p. 11.
20. Abba Eban, *The New Diplomacy: International Affairs in the Modern Age*, Weidenfield and Nicolson, London, 1983, p. 5.
21. Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
22. Ibid.
23. Plano and Olton mapped out a series of crucial and indispensable steps that outline the foreign policy decision-making process. They argue that it is important for the decision makers to realize that foreign policy actions are difficult to evaluate because 1) short-range advantages or disadvantages must be weighed in relation to long range consequences; 2) their impact on other nations is difficult to evaluate; 3) most policies result in a mixture of successes and failures that are hard to disentangle.
24. Quoted in Charles, W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics, op. cit.*, p. 35.
25. K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", in Stephen G. Walker (ed.), *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*, Duke University Press, USA, 1987, p. 7.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid, p. 9.
28. Ibid., p. 10; also see K. J. Holsti, *International Politics, op. cit.*, p. 116.
29. See K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", *op. cit.*, p. 12; K. J. Holsti, *International Politics, op. cit.*, p. 116; also see Koos van Wyk, *Foreign Policy Orientations of the P. W. Botha Regime, op. cit.*, p. 5.
30. K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13; K. J. Holsti, *International Politics, op. cit.*, p. 112.
31. Ibid.

32. K. J. Holsti, *International Politics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-120; K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", in *International Studies Quarterly*, 14, 1970, pp. 233-309; K. J. Holsti, "National Role conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", in Stephen J. Walker, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-39.
33. See Emmerich de Vattel, *Les Droits de Gens*, in Wright, M. "The Theory and Practice of the Balance of Power", *International Organisation*, Winter 1982, 36:1.
34. Ibid.
35. Sir Eyre Crowe, "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany", in G. P. Booth and Harold V. Temperley, (eds.), *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1889-1914*, London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928, p. 402.
36. Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?", *World Politics*, V (July) 1953, pp. 442-447.
37. Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-190.
38. Inis L. Claude, Jr. *Power and International Relations*, New York, Random House, pp. 13-14;

Plano and Olton have argued that the balance-of-power phenomenon pervades international politics and is the central feature of power politics. It is the net effect, or result, produced by a state system in which the sovereign units (states) are free to join, or to refrain from joining, alliances and alignments as each seeks to maximize its security and to promote its national interests. See Plano and Olton, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-107 advanced three typical functions preserved by the balance of power system; viz

- i) The existence of a general balance of power system throughout the international system as a whole has served to prevent the system from being transformed by conquest into a universal empire;
 - ii) The existence of local balances of power has served to protect the independence and sovereignty of states in certain areas from absorption or domination by a locally preponderant power;
 - iii) Both general and local balances of power, where they have existed, have provided the conditions in which other institutions on which international order rests and depends; diplomacy, war, international law, great power management; all these have been able to operate.
39. See African National Congress, "Resolutions On Foreign Policy", *National Conference*, July 1991, p. 33.
 40. See African National Congress, *ANC Policy Guidelines For A Democratic South Africa*, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

41. Deon Geldenhuys, *Isolated States, A Comparative Analysis*, Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 1990, p. 4; also see Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-195; James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
42. See Raymond E. Platig, "International Relations as a Field of Inquiry", in James N. Rosenau, *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, (ed.), The Free Press, New York, 1969, p. 13. For Platig power encompasses the entire range of man's influence and control over his fellow men. It includes both his ability to exert and his actual exertion of influence and control over the minds and actions of other men.
43. Hans J. Morgenthau, "A Realist Theory of International Relations", *op. cit.*, p. 33; Morgenthau's depiction of international relations is derived from the Hobbesian description of international society and international relations as a struggle of all against all, a "perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death". See *Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan*, Michael Oakshott (eds), Oxford, England, 1946, p. 64.
44. Raymond E. Platig, "International Relations as a Field of Inquiry", *op. cit.*, p. 16.
45. Realism is sometimes referred to as "The Power-Politics" school of thought. The most prominent members of the realist school have included *inter alia*: Thucydides, Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, E. H. Carr, Reinold Niebuhr, H. J. Morgenthau, G. Shwartzemberger, Martin Wight, Nicolas Spykman, George F. Kennan, R. Aron, Richard Rosecrance, Arnold Wolfers, Kenneth W. Thompson, Kenneth N. Waltz, Henry Kissinger, Hedley Bull, Robert E. Osgood, R. W. Tucker, Robert Strausz-Húpe, Robert Gilpin.
46. See Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Co-operation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism", in *International Organisations*, 42, 3, Summer 1988, p. 488.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 488-489.
48. Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", in James N. Rosenau, *op. cit.*, p. 261.
49. See James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*, *op. cit.*, p. 124; Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-341; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation", *op. cit.*, pp. 489-490; Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organisation*, Stanford, California, 1964, pp. 26-29; Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, New York, Basic Books, 1984; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions", *World Politics* 38, October 1985, pp. 226-52; and especially Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Boston, Little Brown, 1977.

50. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependence Revisited", *International Organisation*, 41, 4, Autumn 1987, pp. 2-4; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation", *op. cit.*, pp. 488-490; Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-183.
51. Stephen Krasner, "Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables", *International Organisation*, 36, 2, Spring 1982 p. 185; Stephen D. Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables", in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes*, Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 357.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power", in *Foreign Policy*, 80, Fall, 1990, p. 156.
55. Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation", *op. cit.*, pp. 489-498.
56. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War, a Theoretical Analysis*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, p. 232; also see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 113.
57. Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation", *op. cit.*, p. 498.
58. Raymond Aron, *International Relations: A Theory of Peace and War*, trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox, Garden City, N.J., Doubleday, 1973, p. 7.
59. See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
60. See Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", in Robert O. Keohane, (ed.) *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia University Press, 1986, New York, p. 304.
61. Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of Power", in James N. Rosenau, *op. cit.*, p. 308.
62. See Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", in Robert O. Keohane, (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, *op. cit.*, p. 307; also see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 48; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation", *op. cit.*, p. 498.
63. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, *op. cit.*, 235.
64. See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 248.
65. Ibid, p. 315.
66. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in World Politics*, Princeton, M. J. Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 126.

67. Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", in Robert O. Keohane, *Neorealism and its Critics*, *op. cit.*, p. 304; said Martin Wight: "What distinguishes modern history from medieval history is the predominance of the idea of power over the idea of right; the very term "Power" to describe a state in international aspect is significant, and the view of the man in the street, who is perhaps inclined to take it for granted that foreign politics are inevitably "power politics", is not without a shrewd insight."
68. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*, *op. cit.*, p. 84;
69. Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, Baltimore, South Hopkins Press, 1962, p. 103.
70. K. J. Holsti, *International Politics*, *op. cit.* p. 193.
71. Ibid.
72. Jeffrey Hart, "Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations", *International Organisation*, 30, 2, Spring 1976, p. 289.
73. See Brian Hocking and Michael Smith, *World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations*, Harvester and Wheatsheaf, New York, 1990, p. 196.
74. See Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", in Robert O. Keohane, (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, *op. cit.*, p. 304; also see Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation", *op. cit.*, p. 498.
75. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics*, *op. cit.* p. 37.
76. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary-General, Statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council, 31 January 1992, p. 5.

Chapter III

South Africa's Crisis of Manoeuvrability: The Foreign Policy Orientations and Role Models of the Past

"History repeats itself" and "History never repeats itself" are about equally true... We never know enough about the infinitely complex circumstances of any past event to prophesy the future - by analogy.

G.M. Trevelyan

When I want to understand what is happening today or I try to decide what will happen tomorrow, I look back.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

In order to understand the foreign policy challenges faced by South Africa, and develop concrete and sustained scenarios for the future, we need to take a longer historical view at what the foreign policy strategies and manoeuvres of the past intended and meant to accomplish, and what, even with the best of intentions, they could never accomplish. As the Churchillian dictum goes, '[t]he farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.'

Will South Africa's future foreign policy also be circumscribed by its domestic policy? In the analysis of foreign policy making the *Aussenpolitik* school of foreign policy argues that states conduct their external policies for strategic reasons and self-interests purposes, primarily as a consequence of the dynamics of international sways and drives, and not for further domestic ends.¹ For Kissinger, for example, the domestic structure is a given; foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends.² If this is true, than South

Africa's domestic policies in future will have little bearing on the country's foreign policy.

The *Innenpolitik* school of foreign policy, on the other hand, asserts that international politics and domestic politics affect one another greatly.³ Throughout the ages, argued Otto Nintze for example, pressure from without has been a determining influence on internal structure.⁴ In similar fashion, Raymond Platig asserts that "international relations penetrates as deeply into the internal life of a nation as is necessary to understand the actions of the government and other nationally based actors in a multinational political system."⁵ Henry Kissinger is more on the spot therefore when he contends that "to some extent, of course, every society finds itself in an environment not of its own making and has some of the main lines of its foreign policy imposed on it."⁶ If one subscribes to the *innenpolitik* notion of foreign policy, then it is true that South Africa's domestic cohesion - or lack of cohesion - will in future greatly influence its foreign policy and international standing.

Unlike the conventional *Aussenpolitik* proposition that domestic politics can be clearly separated from foreign policy, it will be countenanced here that domestic politics and foreign policy are, in fact, inextricably intertwined. Within any state, there exists both a casual and a causal relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy; this point is vividly demonstrated by South Africa's pro-apartheid foreign policy.

Domestic politics influence foreign policy and foreign policy, in turn, influences domestic policy. As Charles Beard asserts, "however conceived in an image of the world, foreign policy is a phase of domestic policy, an inescapable phase".⁷ Kegley Jr. and Wittkopf, on their part, states that "... the domestic and systemic sources of state's foreign policies remain ultimately linked, much as two rails of a railroad track are tied together in pursuit of a common goal...".⁸ Barber and Barratt quite correctly contend in this regard that "the question in foreign policy analysis is not whether domestic affairs are to be examined,

but rather how much attention should be paid to them, what sectors are to be investigated, and in what depth".⁹

The history and nature of South Africa's post-World War II external relations, as argued above, highlights the peculiar intimate relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy quite vividly; in fact, "it has become a truism to say that South Africa offers one of the clearest examples of the interplay between domestic and foreign policies".¹⁰ This interplay between domestic and foreign affairs was so strong and obvious in South Africa's case that the overall substance of its foreign policy became, by and large, a product and a prisoner of *apartheid* and its internal ramifications. South Africa's manoeuvrability and freedom of movement in the international society was so severely circumscribed by the apartheid dispute and conflict, that its foreign policy became, for all intents and purposes, *obscurum per obscurum*; that is to say an obscure foreign policy by an even more obscure domestic policy. South Africa's foreign policy was in fact a major pillar supporting the system of apartheid and white minority rule, and the defence of apartheid had become the single, overarching function of South Africa's foreign policy in the past.¹¹ The Republic's conception of national security, too, became synonymous with the preservation and perpetuation of apartheid: apartheid and security were little more than two sides of the same coin.¹² In South Africa's case, it is clear, foreign policy began at home. Both *Innenpolitik* and *Aussenpolitik* considerations and analyses are relevant for the South African case therefore.

But why was South Africa's domestic policy of apartheid considered to be such an affront in international society? To be sure, South Africa was by no means the only state in the international society deeply divided by race.¹³ Virtually all nation-states, or more

properly state-nations, can be considered "confederations of tribes". Juxtaposed with this is the phenomenon that the overwhelming majority of states in the contemporary world are by nature pluralistic mosaics, made up of diverse racial, cultural, ethnic, and religious "conflict groups". Stemming from this reality, racial divisions and conflicts are key factors in the political and social maps of many, if not most states in the contemporary world, and are every so often great sources of bloodshed and loss of life.¹⁴

The domination of one ethnic or cultural group over others is, equally, not an uncommon phenomenon.¹⁵ However, while South Africa is certainly not alone in the league of states troubled by racial tensions, the South Africa dispute in the past, in which white's quest for security, prosperity and *lebensraum* to the virtual detriment of all other groups featured prominently, had special qualities which made it rather unique.

The observation that South Africa is the only country in the post-United Nations Charter era that was gutsy enough to blatantly institutionalize racial discrimination, and based political, indeed all participation in - or for that matter exclusion from - society on racial criteria, are symbolic characteristics of what Deon Geldenhuys labelled a "pigmentocracy" or an "albinocracy"; R.J. Vincent used the concept pigmentational sovereignty.¹⁶ The National Party's (NP) 1948 social engineering of "separate development" or *apartheid* officially split the South African population into four main racial categories: Whites, Asians, "Coloureds", and Blacks, with Whites constituting no more than 14 per cent of the total population. The strategies and policies of apartheid comprised legislation controlling and dictating virtually all aspects of the social, political, and economic lives of these groups. Places of residence, property, movement, social and recreational amenities, educational facilities, rights of association and dissociation, and of course, the franchise, were all divided along racial lines, thereby securing a virtual monopoly of power, political and otherwise, for

whites.¹⁷

With the formal institutionalization of apartheid and the politics of "pigmentation" in 1948, South Africa found itself starkly *contra bones mores* with the new international morality and law of self-determination and equality of peoples that characterised the post-United Nations Charter world.¹⁸

From 1948 onwards, the stark elevation of apartheid into a symbol of white survival, white supremacy and white security made South Africa's degradation into international unpopularity and eventual exile inevitable. The question was not whether, but when that collapse would come.

The formal induction of apartheid in 1948 coincided with profound changes and immense alterations in the western dominated international society; these changes were spurred on by the anti-colonial and liberation revolutions by people of colour throughout the globe.

Two crucial points should be stressed at this here. Firstly, white supremacism and domination of "people of colour", had by this time long been a glorified European preserve. What is more, this peculiarity was considered and hailed by many in the European world as a normal and acceptable state of affairs. In fact, one of the great constants of international history, at least since 1492 with Christopher Columbus' voyages, has been the perpetual predominance of white racism.¹⁹ Domination has for long been associated with the privileged position of the 'white man'. As Lothrop Stoddard avowed, the basic factor of human affairs was "not politics, but race": the great enterprise of the discovery of the Americas by Columbus in 1492, the *Pax Romana* of antiquity, the *Civitas Dei* of the medieval Christian Commonwealth, and the European Concert of nineteenth-century balance-of-power diplomacy, as well as the twenty-years order of the inter-war period in the early

twentieth century.²⁰ The notion of the Western-dominated international order and the privilege standing of the white race were, therefore, inextricably linked. Peoples of colour everywhere suffered the label and stigma of inferior - in fact uncivilized - status. White racial superiority and prejudices played crucial parts in the age of European ascendancy and supremacy. In fact, argued Christopher Thorne, "in one of its vital aspects, the Pacific War of 1941 to 1945", the major high-water mark for European domination, "was a racial war": The European powers became greatly concerned about the implications and ramifications for white predominance, and sought to avert the coalition of Asian powers against a White dominated world order.²¹ But then came the watershed; the Second World War was not only a battle against Axis military aggression. It was also purportedly a war fought for the values of human dignity: human rights, equality, reason and decency; it was a war fought between European human values of dignity on the one hand, and authoritarianism and aggression on the other.²²

Secondly, by the time of the Second World War, South Africa had long enjoyed a history of racism and struggle for power by whites; there was nothing new about South Africa's preposterous racial politics in 1948. If anything, apartheid was not mistaken but indeed a positive and deliberate affirmation of this state of affairs.

The expansion of the international society reached a climax by the end of the Second World War, by which time it became apparent that European hegemony of international affairs and domination of the outside world was clearly threatened.²³ The new global international system, while still grudgingly and stubbornly evolving at the time, was being shaped and moulded less by Europeans, and more by the oppressed subjects all over the world.²⁴ The black states of Africa, Latin America, and Asia started to throw off the colonial yoke; they came to take their place alongside European states, not merely as

participants but as legitimate members of the transformed international society, accepting its roles, institutions and rules of the game. These "winds of change" were to have serious implications for the white ruled republic in the south.

The revolt against Western dominance and hegemony boldly manifested itself in the new coalition of Third World States with their strong anti-colonial and pro-national liberationist posture; in the ensuing years these states came to spearhead the anti-apartheid campaign against South Africa. Their struggle for liberation comprised five assertive shapes or themes as elucidated by Hedley Bull in *The Expansion of International Society*.²⁵ First, there was what can be depicted as the struggle for *equal sovereignty*. This was the battle of those states which retained their formal independence, but enjoyed only a subordinate or inferior status, to achieve equal rights and status as sovereign states.

Secondly, there was the *anti-colonial* revolution, by which is meant the strife of African, Asian, Caribbean, and Pacific peoples for formal political independence from European and American colonial rule and hegemony. The premium given to the principle of national self-determination by Lenin in the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, the 1919 Paris Peace Settlement, and United States President, Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points in the inter-war period, certainly disturbed the colonial system.

Moreover, the revolution that toppled the colonial arrangement in the non-Western world belongs chiefly to the post-1945 era: The Asian colonial dependencies became independent for most part in the late 1940's and 1950's, and the African territories in the 1960's and 1970's. With the final collapse of the Portuguese empire in southern Africa in 1974-5, the era of classic European colonialism and hegemony formally ceased to exist, and the anti-colonial movement was left with two further targets: white minority rule in southern Africa and Jewish rule in Palestine.

Thirdly, there has been the struggle for *racial equality*, or more precisely the fight of peoples of colour in the non-Western states against white supremacism. The solidarity of non-European states against whites has been one of the primary forces making for the cohesion and coalition of the Third World states and movements.

Fourthly, there has been the battle for *economic justice*. It was especially during the 1960's that avowed economic objectives attained pride of place and foremost priority in the agenda of the Third World movement. The next battleground was therefore on the economic front. The quarrel between Western and Third World countries clearly asserted that the rich had an important stake in the underdevelopment and exploitation of the poor; and the poor in the further development of the rich. Hence the familiar phrase, '[t]he rich gets richer, while the poor gets even poorer'.

Fifthly, there has been the quest for what has been branded *cultural liberation and emancipation*: the strife of the Third World people to throw off the intellectual and cultural yoke of the Western world so as to assert an imprint of their own identity and autonomy in the world.

Clearly, in this new dynamic *zeitgeist*, apartheid, with its glorification of racial exclusiveness and white supremacism, and its staunch moral weakness, was bound to become a great bone of contention. The newly independent states of Africa in particular, and the Third World in general, quickly moved into the vanguard of attempts to ostracize and isolate South Africa, and swiftly moved to label colonialism and apartheid the "twin evils". In the popular sense, in fact, Africa and the rest of the Third World's handling of the apartheid dispute has assumed a kind of unity and solidarity rarely demonstrated in international affairs. When Toura Gaba stated that "the African continent is shaped like a question mark, and at the same time like a pistol pointed as if by chance towards the Union of South

Africa," he was illustrating this unity and solidarity. Having emerged victoriously from the struggles of European colonial domination, carried to their heights and depths against apartheid and white domination in southern Africa, Africa appeared as a seething area and a battle ground against white domination. In a true sense, Africa was unified by its goals and needs: the drive towards self-government and independence, the quest for economic emancipation and independence, and the opposition to domination by racial discrimination - all suggests a sense of true unity throughout the African continent.

African unity against apartheid had such a great impact on South Africa's fate that, whereas South Africa enjoyed a role and influence in international affairs quite out of proportion to its relative strength and status in the inter-war era, after World War II, conversely, the beleaguered South Africa enjoyed a standing in the Western dominated world strictly incommensurate with its relative power.²⁶ As Deon Geldenhuys puts it, South Africa has "...for so long and so openly been at odds with the world community that it is easy to overlook the fact that South Africa too once had its era of international glory."²⁷ Sarah Pienaar succinctly summed up the South African dilemma when she states that South Africa indeed descended "from paragon to pariah, from a respected and active member of the international community to the defensive and embattled figure it cuts today". The United Nations (UN) General Assembly has over the years passed resolutions condemning and criticizing the policies and practices of Pretoria, branding apartheid "a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind" and a "threat to international security".²⁸ The high-water mark of this sustained campaign occurred in 1977 when the UN Security council voted in favour of implementing a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa, the first time that the Security Council had undertaken such action against a member state under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Apartheid, in fact, became the world's foremost *morale contra mundus*, uniting

the world community in ways never encountered before, and the Republic became firmly established and entrenched as the world's foremost pariah.²⁹ To quote Professor Geldenhuys:

Apartheid has made South Africa the world's moral sitting duck at which virtually all governments, regardless of their own moral virtues, feel obliged to fire criticism.³⁰

In similar fashion, Professor Hedley Bull observed:

There is not a world consensus against communist oppression, or oppression by military governments, or of one Asian or African ethnic group by another, comparable to that which exists against this surviving symbol of white supremacism that all societies in the world, to different degrees and in different ways, have repudiated over the last three decades... While this should not lead us not to protest against...other [violations of human rights], we should also recognize that it is not now possible to unite the international community on any other basis than that of a clear perpetuation of white supremacism.³¹

This brings us to the greatly overlooked controversy of 'double standards' in international affairs. Indeed, white South Africans greatly complained in the past that the international community judged them by a 'hypocritical' double standard; that the world failed to recognise the precarious "historical predicament" in which whites in South Africa were caught up. The Afrikaner complained that the western world judged them to standards they failed to apply to others, or to themselves for that matter.³² There is, surely, an even greater force in the assertion that the Western powers, having ordered white South Africans

for so long to concede political rights, and more fundamentally, political power to the black majority, was asking South Africans to do something that Western societies themselves would not dare even consider; in so doing the international community asked them to commit political suicide. Thus, the formula and crusade of universalizing one-person-one-vote and majority rule, which alleged Western liberals abroad so long urged the white minority in South Africa to practice, they argued, is one the Western world would certainly not accept for themselves if it were to be applied in a single world state as a whole.³³ These contentions typically evoked the impugned question: "[w]ell, what would you do in our situation?"; a question normally posed with serious intent.

Surely, South Africa's white oligarchy was not unique in denying political, economic, and social rights to the majority of the population over which it ruled; yet the South African regime long enjoyed the number one position on the hierarchy of human cruelty and wickedness.³⁴ To be sure, no other government, whether the socialist authoritarian government of the former Soviet bloc, the many squalid tyrannies of Africa with their dismal human rights scores, the regimes of Central and South America, or for that matter the treatment of black people in Western countries, has been subjected to so much condemnation and punishment as white South Africans over apartheid.

At first glance, it is clear, these are truly forceful contentions. Yet, this should not be read as a justification for the doctrine of apartheid. On the contrary, these controversies, if anything, only serve to highlight the continued unjust nature of the preponderant liberal international system and the plain hypocritical position of the Western powers in this society of states. Of course, double standards and hypocrisy have long been part and parcel of the arrangements of the western dominated international society. The western powers - notably the US, Britain, Germany - refused to see the apartheid problem as a racist problem in its

own right; instead they saw it as a cold war problem which demanded cold war attention. On this score. South Africa typically revealed a microcosm of the macrocosm, the globe: just as the white minority in the republic faced the challenge and inevitable prospect of ultimately having to come to terms with the black majority, so the Western states within the international society, who have long enjoyed a position of privilege and dominance, faces the prospect of eventually having to come to terms with the Third World majority.³⁵ In this regard, apartheid has been little more than a drawn out attempt by the South African white minority elite to force a closer association with the dominant position of the Western minority in the world.³⁶

In the end, this greatly fragmented international community became truly united against the avowed perpetuation and survival of white supremacism and racism. In a world conscious and concerned about white minority domination, the transgression of apartheid was little more than a grave injustice and insult to black people. These transgressions made the errant white minority "more of an outlaw - to be hunted down to face international justice".³⁷ Peter Vale went on to liken South Africa's international relations and position to "a kind of *bywoner*; a tenant called frequently and angrily to account for its lease".³⁸ In the words of former Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, Gerhard de Kock, "South Africa is a member of the club, but cannot use its facilities."³⁹

The dilemma of South Africa's unavailing political expediency abroad, therefore, was not a "naive", "ill natured", and "cruel" international community. Rather it was its obnoxious domestic policy of apartheid and white supremacism that secured for South Africa its poor standing in the new international society of states.

It should furthermore be noted that a country's foreign policy seldom undergoes

abrupt, dramatic change and manoeuvres. A nation's foreign policy, instead, should be marked more by continuity than change. Far from having been a smooth, inexorable and solid process, however, close investigation reveals the abortive, haphazard, and defensive nature of South Africa's foreign policy experiments of the past. In a desperate quest for friends and allies in a hostile world that sought to eradicate it, apartheid has inflicted severe constraints on South Africa's external relations that forced the country into constant manoeuvres, fluctuations, and changes. The severity of this process was clearly recognized by Neil Van Heerden, South Africa's former Director-General of Foreign Affairs, when he lamented that international rejection and condemnation of apartheid has forced South Africa to conduct an "underground and secretive" foreign policy and diplomacy that was executed "quietly and unobtrusively".⁴⁰

South Africa's complex and bitter stand-off with the post-UN Charter world community certainly forced it to resort to undercover and behind-the-scenes foreign-affairs dealings. This helps to explain why South Africa's "oligarchic-bureaucratic" foreign policy process was characterised more by short-range, *ad hoc* planning, and emergency, non-linear regulations and perspectives.⁴¹

There were too many institutional and personal discontinuities and tensions in South Africa's decision-making process and government for its strict apartheid-oriented foreign policy to be defined coherently and effectively over any significant period of time. Fragmented institutions, plus highly personalized, rubber-stamp styles of policy and decision making were common practices. Foreign policy decision-making was marked by fits and starts, inconsistencies and incongruities, by reaction instead of anticipation, and by frequent panic about the process, given the illusion of continuity and movement about the process because of the perpetual contention to stumble from one crisis to the next.

The foreign policy branch became, for all intents and purposes, a collection of often haphazardly coordinated, feuding bureaucratic fiefdoms. Pretoria, it is true, conducted a foreign policy process disturbingly, even dangerously removed from both global and domestic realities. Conflict and a high degree of disorder were intrinsic and ambiguity was the norm. The foreign policy making process always maximised and exacerbated the possibilities of surprise, costly reversals, and political embarrassment.

South Africa's overall manoeuvrability was greatly hamstrung by apartheid and the republic was left with a handful of friends in an international community that seriously sought to fundamentally alter its structure. In its misdirected and ill-advised search for survival, security, and prosperity, the first major priority of successive South African administrations was to foster closer approximation to Western powers.⁴² The overriding goal was pretty clear-cut: liberal abroad and oppressive at home. The hope was just as obvious; an attempt to impress and imprint an image of the republic as a 'stable', 'prosperous', and 'secure' society; a paragon of the Western dominated international order, and a "[w]hite bastion of western civilization" on the "derelict, dark" continent of Africa. The Republic's attempts to assert itself as a friend of the West, in the frontline of the fight against the "evil communist empire", came to little however, as the Western powers came to realize the costly embarrassing prospect of becoming implicated in the defence of apartheid and white minority domination. Instead, the West kept Pretoria at arms length, and South Africa's association with the Western bloc eventually boiled down to a low-ebb, "love-hate" dualistic relationship at best.⁴³

In the wake of repudiation by the West, Pretoria's "mad elite and foreign policy specialists" even gambled with the idea of taking the hard-line, anti-West position, viz. seeking and alignment of some sort with the West's enemy number one, the Communist

bloc,⁴⁴ a dangerous notion that starkly contradicted the Afrikaner's McCarthy-like paranoia and doctrine of "total Marxist onslaught". Needless to say here that Moscow's strong anti-apartheid stance and support for the liberation movements naturally doomed the Communist-option to failure.

Superpower rejection forced Pretoria into the scapegoat of advocating "the neutral option".⁴⁵ The threat of taking a neutral stance between the superpowers represents one of several typical South African *ad hoc* responses in its complex and fiery love-hate affair with the West. Rather than counting and altering their disapprobations, Pretoria instead accused the West of *male fides* and the politics of deceit,⁴⁶ and moved to defy the West to do their damndest. This typical attitude, if anything, only underscores the reactive and grudging nature of Pretoria's foreign policy and diplomacy.

The advocacy of the neutral option seemed more of an impulsive, *ad captandum*, and defensive response to Western pressure, than a rational, considered response.⁴⁷ Pretoria even considered fixing attention to the powers in the southern hemisphere, leading to the illusion of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization in the diplomatic and military spheres.⁴⁸ Being so far removed from the states on the other side of the Southern Atlantic, geo-political realities served as a great obstacle however, and very little came of the SATO option (this too?).

In yet another desperate option, South African officials began to give great currency to the hazardous venture of a close-knit community of "outcast states", by cultivating close ties with its beleaguered fellow pariah brethren, Israel, Taiwan, and Chile.⁴⁹ While the "pariah" option was also little more than an impulsive and grudging response to Pretoria's alienation and expulsion from the club of Western powers, it should be noted that the "outcast" option actually went beyond the mere rhetorical exercise and cheap display of self-

pity and hurt feelings *vis-a-vis* the West.⁵⁰ South Africa and its outcast partners collaborated in the economic, technological and military areas, *albeit* with limited benefits.⁵¹

It was closer to home, moreover, that the "furious giant" sought to realize its foreign policy objectives, by using the "carrots and the big sticks" in an attempt to get its black neighbours to want what Pretoria wanted. A traditional aspiration and strategy of successive South African administrations was to begin a self-conscious exercise of regional *giantism* in the Southern and central half of the African continent in order to win friends and beat enemies. This quest for "sub-continental solidarity" too should be seen in the context of South Africa's low-ebb affairs with the Western powers.⁵²

It should be remembered that Pretoria long viewed the continent as a foreign entity, an irritant and a threat. Only when South Africa's isolation from the Western bloc began to bite, was Africa grudgingly seen as an undesirable but necessary 'route' back to the West. Concern for stability and white security and prosperity always weighed heavily with policy makers, and Pretoria's seeking of a *cordon sanitaire* and improved relations with Africa were both means to a goal, and an objective *per se*: a way back to the international community and a means out of its international isolation; and a means to survive in a hostile and unfriendly world that sought to ostracize it. In the words of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha: "Our road to the world runs through Africa".⁵³

In a subtle exposition of *Pax Pretoriana*, South Africa used its purported economic, industrial, and military *giantism* to avowedly assert itself as a regional *tour de force*. With virtual impunity and great success every so often, Pretoria used its levers, both incentive and disincentive, to manipulate and frustrate the political, economic, and military vulnerabilities and dependence of its neighbours.⁵⁴ This constant exercise only served to unleash the *destabilization* wrangle: South Africa will punish, or conversely reward, its neighbours in

order to get them to do what it wanted. Professor Deon Geldenhuys went to great lengths to conceptualize this controversial concept: destabilization. What for a target state (this is the state which is, or perceives itself to be, subjected to destabilization by another) constitutes destabilization, argued Geldenhuys, may for the "offending" state represent no more than the legitimate protection of its national interests.⁵⁵ Destabilization in this regard, some would say, merely boils down to preemptive self-defence. Asserted Professor Geldenhuys:

The destabilizer's primary objective is an strictly political one. Essentially, he wishes to promote (or force) profound political changes in the target state. These may or may not involve structural change - in effect toppling the regime in power - but certainly involve major changes in the target state's policy vis-a-vis the destabilizer. The destabilizer may in addition want a drastic change in the target's domestic policy; this would typically require the target state to abandon or at least significantly, alter (whether [to] moderate or radicalise) its ideological leanings.⁵⁶

The above interpretation and definition of destabilization can be strictly operationalized in the southern African context, in which South Africa's relations with its neighbours suggests deliberate attempts at destabilization. In the Southern Africa destabilization theatre, South Africa undoubtedly had the upper hand with its abundance of carrots and sticks. Some realist observers would strongly argue that Pretoria's charging bull diplomacy, and tough behaviour *vis-a-vis* its neighbours were understandable, if not justifiable, because South Africa was up against antagonistic and hostile neighbours "ganging up" against her. Pretoria and its neighbours, they hold, were engaged in mutual and reciprocal destabilization at best.

All this controversy notwithstanding, it is clear that at the heart of the regional antagonism between South Africa and the states of the region and South Africa's international affairs in general, are South Africa's superseded domestic policy of apartheid and passé peculiarity of white domination. Apartheid and white domination in South Africa have for very long been anathema to the black states, and the international community at large, and charges and accusations of South Africa's subversive and aggressive destabilization of its neighbours only served to give Pretoria the image of bully and desperado.⁵⁷

Unless apartheid and white domination is finally removed, therefore, South Africa's overall regional and international relations will remain badly incarcerated and the Republic will remain a quasi-outcast at best. The complete rehabilitation of South Africa's international relations begs for one fundamental *sine qua non*: the end of the outstripped doctrine of apartheid and white domination. As the old Gladstonian premise goes: here is the first principle of foreign policy: good government at home!

There is only one last thing that remains to be said here about South Africa's desperate international manoeuvres and feat of *folle de grandeur*; *C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la politique!*⁵⁸

Notes to Chapter III

1. See Ruth Henig, *The Origins of the First World War*, Routledge, London, 1989, p. 41.
The *Primacy of Foreign Policy (Primat der Aussenpolitik)* analysis was particularly relevant for the debates on the origins of the Great War of 1914-1919. Many historians, by focusing strictly on Germany's role in the war, advanced the argument that imperial Germany's foreign policy since the end of the Crimean War was dictated overwhelmingly by external considerations. Domestic policies, they maintain, were marshalled to meet the requirements and demands of the external situation.
2. See Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", in James N. Rosenau, *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 261.
3. By the 1970s the *Primacy of Foreign Policy* analysis was toppled by some historians who came to advance the counter-fit argument that the *Primat der Innenpolitik (Primacy of Domestic Policy)* was crucial in shaping German foreign policy on the eve of the Great War. The historian Hans Ulrich Weber asserted that social imperialism in Germany was the great 'diversion outwards of internal tensions and forces of change in order to preserve the social and political status quo' and this was, at best, 'a defensive ideology' aimed against 'the disruptive effects of industrialization on the social and economic structure of Germany'. (See Ruth Henig, *op. cit.*, p. 42).
4. See V. R. Berghahn, *Germany and the Approach of War in 1914*, Oxford University Press, London, 1973, p. 53.
5. See Raymond E. Platig, "International Relations as a Field of Inquiry", in James N. Rosenau, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
6. Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", in James N. Rosenau, *op. cit.*, p. 262.
7. Charles Beard, quoted in Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
8. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
9. James Barber and John Barratt, *South Africa's Foreign Policy, The Search for Status and Security 1945-1988*, Southern Book Publishers, New York, 1990, p. 4-5.
10. Deon Geldenhuys, *Foreign Policy Options for South Africa: Apartheid and Beyond*, *op. cit.*, p. 1. South Africa's politics of apartheid provides a case in *Innen-Aussenpolitik* linkage *par excellence*. A welter of variables, interactions and sequences constantly emerge which hints and suggests the complexity of the task of assessing the process of foreign policy-making by South Africa's paranoid racial oligarchic elite of the past.

11. Robert S. Jaster, *The Defence of White Power*, Macmillan, London, 1988, p. xiii. Far from being the result of an alignment of forces outside, South Africa's badly damaged foreign standing was essentially the product of its bizarre apartheid policies and ramifications arising from this combustible order to things.
12. See Deon Geldenhuys and John Seiler, *South Africa's Evolving State Security System*, Occasional Paper, Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs, 1984, p. 12.
13. See Chris Landsberg and Mark Suzman, "South Africa's Quest for Democracy", in *The Oxford International Review*, Vol. III, No. 3, Summer Issue 1992, p. 25; also see David Munro and Alan J. Day, *A World Record of Major Conflicts Areas*, Edward Arnold, London, 1990, p. 64.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Deon Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation, South African Foreign Policy Making*, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Macmillan, 1984, p. 2; R. J. Vincent, "Racial Equality", in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (ed.), *The Expansion of International Society*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, p. 252-253.
17. Chris Landsberg and Mark Suzman, "South Africa's Quest for Democracy", *op. cit.*, p. 25; also Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
18. See Jack Spence, *Republic under Pressure, A Study of South African Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, London, 1965, p. 15; also see Deon Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, *op. cit.*, p. 2; Deon Geldenhuys, *Isolated States*, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-112.
19. See R. J. Vincent, "Racial Equality", in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, (ed.), *op. cit.* p. 239.
20. Ibid.
21. Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The US, Great Britain and the War Against Japan 1941-1945*, London, 1978, p. 356.
22. See Michael Walzer, "World War II: Why Was This War Different?", in *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 1, 1979, p. 18; see also Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, 1980, p. 79. "World War II", said Telson, "was itself a humanitarian effort", see Fernando R. Telson, *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality*, Transnational Publishers, USA, 1988, p. 136; R. Sohn, too, depicted World War II as "the human rights revolution", in "The New International Law: The Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States", in *American University Law Review*, vol. 1, no. 9, 1982, p. 32.

23. Hedley Bull, "The Revolt Against The West", in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.
24. Ibid, p. 7.
25. Ibid, pp. 220-223.
26. Quoted in Thomas Hovet, *Africa in The United Nations*, Faber & Faber, London, 1962, p. 19.
27. Deon Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, *op. cit.*, p. 5; and Deon Geldenhuys, *Isolated States*, *op. cit.*, p. 111.
28. Sara Pienaar, "South Africa from Paragon to Paraph: Contrasts between the League of Nations and the United Nations", *International Affairs Bulletin*, vol. 9, no. 3, 1985, p. 14.
29. See Chris Landsberg and Mark Suzman, "South Africa's Quest for Democracy", *op. cit.*, p. 25.
30. See Deon Geldenhuys, *Isolated States*, *op. cit.*, p. 113, also see Chris Landsberg and Mark Suzman, "South Africa's Quest for Democracy", *op. cit.*, p. 25.
31. Deon Geldenhuys, *Isolated States*, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
32. Hedley Bull, "The West and South Africa", in *Daedalus*, Vol. III, No. 2, Spring, 1982, p. 266. Surely, the case could be advanced that an association with the white supremacist oligarchy in a post-European dominated world, one that was transcended bravely by the struggles of the peoples of the Third World, is little more than an association with the perpetual insult to people of colour throughout international society.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid, p. 264.
35. Ibid, p. 265.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Deon Geldenhuys, *Isolated States*, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
39. Peter Vale, "Full Circle", *op. cit.*, p. 8.
40. Quoted in Richard Rolfe, "Club Ties", *op. cit.*, p. 77.
41. Neil van Heerden, "South Africa and Africa", in *RSA - Policy Review*, vol. 2, no. 6, 1989, p. 17.

42. Deon Geldenhuys, *The Neutral Option and Sub-continental Solidarity*, A Consideration of Foreign Minister Pik Botha's Zürich Statement of 7 March 1979, South African Institute of International Affairs, Braamfontein, 1981, p. 5. Frustrated by the international community's deliberate and sustained attempt to bring South Africa to justice, Pretoria resorted to an erratic and aggressive foreign policy every so often. South Africa's foreign policy response to these external pressures was an ill-conceived pervasive vendetta at best. Under the P. W. Botha oligarchy, for example, foreign policy and defence policy making had its focal point in the State Security Council, an invisible government in effect, the huge energy-radiating centre of securocratic / militarized foreign policy processes.
43. See Deon Geldenhuys, *The Neutral Option and Sub-continental Solidarity*, *op. cit.*, p. 3; also see Deon Geldenhuys, *Foreign Policy Options for South Africa: Apartheid and Beyond*, *op. cit.*, p. 7; Hedley Bull "South Africa and the West", *op. cit.*, p. 265; Robert S. Jaster, *The Defence of White Power*, *op. cit.*, p. 143.
44. Deon Geldenhuys, *The Neutral Option and Sub-continental Solidarity*, *op. cit.*, p. 3; also see Koos van Wyk, *Foreign Policy Orientations of the P. W. Botha Regime*, *op. cit.*, p. 7. It should be borne in mind here that throughout the apartheid era, the major Western powers, in particular the Republican administrations in the United States and the Conservative governments in Britain, considered it "prudent" to foster a quasi-alignment with Pretoria. Typically perceiving African problems in East-West terms, Western powers gave great priority to their alleged 'tangible interests' in South Africa. The Western powers' vital strategic interests in Africa; viz. the resistance of Soviet encroachment and hegemony in Africa, it was argued, required an alignment with the Republic as the toughest anti-communist power in Africa. Further afield, the Western powers' major economic interests in the Republic, it was alleged, especially its desperate need for access to crucial mineral resources was best served by a close association with the apartheid regime. Also, the Western powers came to lament that the moral slander by the rest of the international community failed to comprehend the unique dilemma of the South African white minority on the continent.
45. See Chris Landsberg "South Africa and the World: Apartheid and Beyond", in *The Woodstock Road Editorial*, St. Anthony's College, Oxford, Hilary Term 1992, p. 16; and see Deon Geldenhuys, *The Neutral Option and Sub-continental Solidarity*, *op. cit.*, p. 4; Koos van Wyk, *Foreign Policy Orientations of the P. W. Botha Regime*, *op. cit.*, p. 8; Chris Landsberg and Mark Suzman, "South Africa's Quest for Democracy", *op. cit.*, p. 25. Moscow has, since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, presented itself as a bastion of the anti-colonial revolution. Surely, unlike the Western powers, the Soviet Union was no inheritor and perpetrator of colonial domination of Black Africa. In fact, Moscow was in a unique position to present itself as an ally against neo-colonial imperialism by providing political, economic, ideological and military backing for anti-colonial combat forces throughout the continent.
46. Deon Geldenhuys, *The Neutral Option and Sub-continental Solidarity*, *op. cit.*, p. 5; Koos van Wyk, *Foreign Policy Orientations of the P. W. Botha Regime*, *op. cit.*, p. 7; Denis Venter, *Suid-Afrika: 'n Onverbonde Buitelandse Beleidsrigting*, Suid-

Afrikaanse Instituut vir Rasseaangeleenthede, Braamfontein, 1979, p. 4.

47. See Deon Geldenhuys, *Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's "Total National Strategy"*, With particular reference to the "12-point plan", SAIIA, Braamfontein, pp. 33-35.
48. Deon Geldenhuys, *The Neutral Option and Sub-continental Solidarity*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
49. Ibid.
50. *RSA - Policy Review*, vol. 3, no. 6, June/July 1990.
51. Deon Geldenhuys, *The Neutral Option and Sub-continental Solidarity*, *op. cit.*, p. 7; Koos van Wyk, *Foreign Policy Orientations of the P. W. Botha Regime*, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.
52. Deon Geldenhuys, *The Neutral Option and Sub-continental Solidarity*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
53. Deon Geldenhuys, "The International Isolation of South Africa", in *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, vol. XI, no. 2, November 1989, p. 43.
54. See *RSA - Policy Review*, vol. 2, no. 6, 1989, p. 47.
55. Deon Geldenhuys, "The Destabilization Controversy: An Analysis of a High-Risk Foreign Policy for South Africa", in *Politikon*, vol. 9, no. 2, December 1982, p. 25; Chris Landsberg, "Beyond Apartheid: What new role can the 'regional giant' afford to play?", in *The Zimbabwe Bird*, Special Report, Rhodes House, Oxford, Trinity Term, 1992, p. 9.
56. Deon Geldenhuys, "The Destabilization Controversy: An Analysis of a High-Risk Foreign Policy Option for South Africa", *op. cit.*, p. 17.
57. Ibid, p. 18.
58. Ibid.

Chapter IV

Isolation, Permanent Neutrality or Non-Alignment: Towards a Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy

...the experience brought its disillusionment. The lady did not remain as glamorous; she did not even seem particularly grateful; she became demanding. And then, too, there was no secure and serene place to ride to. Our castle walls had crumbled, we found ourselves living on the plain with everyone else. We had the problem of neighbours. And so the occasional challenge of high adventure became the constant and nagging problems of everyday life.

Dean Acheson

In order to realize its foreign policy goals, a post-apartheid South Africa will be in a position to choose between three typical foreign policy strategies, viz. *isolationism*, *permanent neutrality*, and *non-alignment*.

4.1 Isolationism as Foreign Policy Strategy: A Non-Starter

Isolationism, in its popular usage, refers to a state's deliberate avoidance of political, diplomatic and military commitments. As a doctrine, isolationism views the national interest of a state as best served by withdrawing the country from the political entanglements of the international community.¹ Proponents of isolationism typically base their arguments on the geographical, ideological and cultural separateness, and insulation of a state. Isolationism is furthermore a strategy associated with diplomatic mobility and political flexibility of the state following the dictum 'no permanent friends, no permanent enemies, only permanent interests.'²

Professor Deon Geldenhuys draws an important distinction between *self-isolation* or *isolationism*, and *enforced isolation* or *ostracism*.³ According to Professor Geldenhuys, self-isolation is "a protective strategy designed to shield the state against perceived harmful influences from outside."⁴ Isolationism, asserts Geldenhuys, is "a deliberate strategy, voluntarily pursued by a state, of restricting and continuing its international interactions and thereby withdrawing to a greater or lesser degree from normal international practice."⁵ Enforced isolation, on the other hand, is a "punitive measure applied against an offending state; it is a means by which a group of states or the international community at large exerts pressure on that state."⁶ Unlike isolationism, which is voluntarily planned, enforced isolation is an international, punitive policy pursued by two or more states against another, aimed at severing or curtailing a particular state's international relations against its will.⁷

Isolationism as foreign policy orientation is a self-imposed immunization of involvement and entanglement in the international system.⁸ It is furthermore a means to an end: a deliberate attempt to seal off the country against various (undesired) forms of external penetration and intervention.⁹ Isolationist strategies are often based on the premise that the state can best gain security and survival by reducing transactions with the outside world and building political-control walls around the home.¹⁰

An important qualification should be added here: states that adopt an isolationist posture are usually economically and socially self-sufficient, convinced that they can 'go it alone'. In order to maintain 'an ideal life style', such states do not feel obliged to change the external environment in their favour. More importantly, these states do not believe they depend upon others to fulfil their socio-economic needs and demands.¹¹

Isolationism as foreign policy strategy is particularly associated with the foreign policy of the United States. Mainline historians argue that United States foreign policy from 1783

can best be understood in terms of more or less permanent tensions between the forces of 'isolationism' and the forces of 'interventionism', both of which spring from the underlying assumptions about exceptionalism of the United States' political experience and position.¹²

It was during the inter-war period, moreover, that isolationism in the United States was raised to the level of political dogma rather than a set of practical policy guidelines to suit a particular set of circumstances. Almost from the outset, isolationism in the United States was bound up and obsessed with the geographical insulation of America from the main centres of political activity, with its uniqueness as a 'liberal' state, and with its belief in the moral superiority of the American way of life.¹³ South Africa clearly faces a different foreign policy challenge; it can ill-afford to resort to a sort of hypothetical isolation from the African continent, for example. The OAU understandably wish South Africa to play a more prominent role in conflict areas such as Rwanda, Liberia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Angola, to mention a few. South Africa can resort to isolationism only at the peril of inviting hostility from its new Africa partners.

Compared to the US experience, it should be stressed that there was always something circumstantial about America's isolationism. The high-water mark of United States isolationism came in the wake of the aftermath of the Great War with the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and membership of the League of Nations. The subsequent endorsement of the policy of 'isolationism' in the 1920 election and the legislation of a succession of Neutrality Acts - 1935, 1936, 1937 - was evidence of the alleged consensus in the United States that isolationism was its general and orthodox position in world politics.¹⁴ The notion of isolationism has aroused much debate among American diplomatic historians, some of whom have argued that, because of the absence of economic isolationism, the whole

conception of isolationism is in fact mythical.¹⁵

In the 1930s, it became increasingly apparent in the United States that the 'head-in-the-sand' approach of the Neutrality Acts was highly inappropriate and indeed counter-productive to the demands of US national security and the challenges faced by a great power in a European dominated system dictated by a hard-core balance of power diplomacy.¹⁶

Doctor Ian Clark summed up the American dilemma succinctly:

Having thrown her weight into the balance at the crucial moment in order to prevent German predominance, America then reverted immediately to continental isolation. The wish gave birth to the belief that the balance, once restored would remain in equilibrium. This failed to take account of the blunt fact that, just as her intervention had restored the balance in 1918, so her refusal to play a permanent role in Europe was to leave the door open to a further challenge of this balance.¹⁷

In the words of Professor Joseph Nye, "Isolationist free riding in the inter-war period came back to haunt and hurt Americans by the end of the 1930s."¹⁸ Out of this negative experience came a serious re-examination, by the time of World War II, of America's vital national interests. Out of this exercise in turn, came a realization and determination by the United States, however ill-conceived, to play a proper role in world affairs: to shirk no responsibility and to be committed.¹⁹

By taking cognisance of the dilemmas and of the inter-war years (what E.H. Carr so aptly described as 'The Twenty Years Crisis') South Africa can indeed learn from the American experience in 'isolationist free-riding' of a great power. If only because of the great expectations prevalent in some African quarters that the 'strong brother' in the south will come to play a pivotal anchor role in the continent, the isolationist option can most

certainly be considered a non-starter for a liberated South Africa. To put it bluntly, Africa and a democratic South Africa need one another, and Africa in turn needs critical interaction with the self-interested world community. Put differently, South Africa will not be spared the hard choices that international relations in a post-apartheid, Cold War *status quo post bellum* will demand from her. Hence, South Africa should realize that it will be virtually impossible to stay aloof from the often leaden arena of world politics with its high demands, and try and judge its role and position in abstract moral terms, like a spectator watching the play. As the old saying goes, it is tough at the top.

4.2 Permanent Neutrality: An Insufficient Foreign Policy Strategy

Permanent Neutrality, unlike isolationism, is "an international legal status", asserting that "the independence and territory of a neutralized state are permanently guaranteed by one or more other states, in return for an undertaking on the part of the neutralized state to abstain or refrain from any commitments that might lead to war."²⁰ Hakovirta advanced the following working definition of neutrality: "in an international conflict, a policy is the more neutral the less it interferes in the conflict, the more equally it benefits or harms the parties concerned, and the less it affects the outcome of the conflict."²¹

This modern definition of neutrality can be traced back to the Middle Ages, as it emerged in connection with the rise of the modern nation-state with its origins in 1648 in the aftermath of the Thirty Years War.²² The original conception was one of non-participation by a state in a war between two or more other states and from the eighteenth century onwards the notion of impartiality, or equal treatment of belligerent, was added.²³ These two important qualifications of permanent neutrality have constituted a stable and perpetual core, but within the post-World War II context it has been complemented and, in fact, largely

superseded, by a stricter political notion of neutrality as non-involvement and impartiality in international conflicts in general, and in the East-West bipolar rivalry in particular.²⁴ After World War II, the realities of the Cold War became, for all practical purposes, the *raison d'être* of neutrality.

The essence of permanent neutrality remains the obligation for a state not to participate in any future war, no matter where, when or among whom such a war may occur.²⁵ Permanent neutrality involves certain typical duties that include, *inter alia*: armed neutrality, territorial neutrality, neutrality from treaty obligations, and ideological and moral neutrality.²⁶ Of all these incumbencies, unwillingness to commit a state's military capabilities and instruments to belligerent can be considered the hallmark of neutrality. All these obligations and rules, it must be stressed, are applicable to, and must be observed in, time of both war and peace. A further qualification should also be observed: a neutralized state, unlike a non-aligned state, attains its status by virtue of the actions of other states and there are no guarantees that its position will be honoured by others.²⁷

Furthermore, although most scholars use the terms 'neutralization' and 'permanent neutrality' interchangeably, a distinction can be drawn between them. Neutralization, whatever its form may be, can be regarded as a process leading to the establishment of the *status* of permanent neutrality.²⁸ The effect of neutralization of a state "is to support its military security and its political and territorial integrity".²⁹ Neutralization in this regard serves as an instrument of conflict management by insulating the state against international intrusion and contention.

Although permanent neutrality is a posture that has long been guaranteed by international law, it finds only very limited expression and application in the contemporary world. Even though the proclamation of neutrality can be traced back to the United States'

unilateral neutral declarations in 1793, the institutionalization of permanent neutrality in international law began to take shape only in the early nineteenth century.³⁰ It particularly reflected the case of Switzerland, whose neutral status was the first to be internationally confirmed and declared *perpetual* by the Congress of Vienna in 1815.³¹ The Perpetual Neutrality of Switzerland was later reaffirmed by the Versailles Treaty in 1919, and by the League of Nations in 1933.³²

Another classic experiment in neutralization is that of "the self-neutralization of Austria".³³ In 1955, the Austrian parliament adopted the Austrian Neutrality Law which undertook "to practise in perpetuity a neutrality of the type maintained by Switzerland".³⁴ Although there is little to choose between Swiss and Austrian neutrality in principle, there are, however, significant practical distinctions. Whereas Switzerland adopted a "passive foreign policy and active self-defence", Austria, by contrast, pursued a "passive self-defence and active foreign policies".³⁵

Hakovirta distinguishes between two further types of neutrality, viz. *occasional neutrality* and *continuous neutrality* without a legal basis.³⁶ Occasional neutrality is also known as temporary, ordinary, simple or *ad hoc* neutrality.³⁷ This is the neutrality applicable and practised in a particular war between other states.³⁸ The international law of occasional neutrality applies to any state that remains neutral in a war, regardless of its prior policies. Conversely, occasional neutrality in a war does not commit a state to neutrality in another war or to rules of conduct in peacetime.

Continuous neutrality, also known as conventional neutrality without an international legal basis, is a recurrent variant of permanent neutrality.³⁹ States that pursue this line, typically tend to call their policies neutral, but fail to commit themselves to permanent neutrality under international law.⁴⁰ In the case of Switzerland, one may detect a sequential

shift from occasional to continuous, and eventually to permanent neutrality.⁴¹ Sweden, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, is perhaps the best example of the continuous brand of neutrality.⁴² Swedish foreign policy, it would suffice to say here, is the most vaguely defined neutrality and lacks any established name.

Since the *raison d'être* of permanent neutrality has been to stay aloof from the intricacies of the Cold War and superpower animosity, it is important to consider the viability of permanent neutrality as a foreign policy strategy for a liberated South Africa against this backdrop. It should be stated at the outset that the question of viability of neutrality looks different from the perspective of war, on the one hand, and that of peace, on the other.

The demise of the Cold War, and the emergence of 'A New World Order' in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm for 'the liberation of Kuwait' in 1991, undoubtedly negatively impacted permanent neutrality as foreign policy orientation. To this should also be added the dynamics of European integration and co-operation in search of a new European interdependent paradigm. From these perspectives, and more importantly, in the present Cold War *status quo post bellum*, the question of permanent neutrality or not takes on yet another form: is permanent neutrality feasible as a peacetime foreign policy strategy?

The point of the above hypothesis is, the less likely a new Great power hot-war, the more independent the problem of the question of wartime neutrality and a neutral defence policy, and the less feasible permanent neutrality as foreign policy orientation becomes.

It is evident that the changes in the overall international balance of power and the end of the Cold War makes permanent neutrality far less attractive as a foreign policy alternative than during the era of the super-power *balance of terror*.⁴³ Conversely, the counter argument would seem to suggest that the viability of neutrality obviously grows in proportion to the internal domestic attraction and demands, and that South Africa would be a suitable

candidate in this regard. Unfortunately for South Africa, the newly liberated state would hardly be in a position to exercise a choice. The new democratic South Africa would, by and large, be compelled to maximize its political, diplomatic and economic interactions with the international community in order to realize its foreign policy goals and meet its demanding socio-economic challenges. Suffice it to say that permanent neutrality would place substantial restrictions on the new apartheid-free state's international freedom of movement and flexibility to manoeuvre.⁴⁴ Thus permanent neutrality, as attractive as it might seem at first sight, should in effect also be considered a non-starter for a post-apartheid, democratic South Africa.

4.3 Non-Alignment: Towards a Viable Foreign Policy Strategy for a Liberated South Africa

A great deal of confusion has been caused in the study of neutrality by the emergence of Third World *Non-alignment*. The principles and policies of the recently emerged orientation of non-alignment partly converge with those of neutrality, the main common point being the rejection of membership in multi-lateral great power alliances.⁴⁵ This is, by the way, a typical ingredient of balance of power politics. There are, however, fundamental differences as well. Above all, non-alignment is the foreign policy strategy adopted and pursued by the liberated new states of the developing Third World whose main concerns, at least until recently, have been genuine decolonization and the removal of apartheid, national liberation, inter-Third World co-operation and solidarity, and the restructuring of the predominantly 'liberal' international economic and political system.⁴⁶

A distinction should be drawn here between non-alignment as a principle of foreign policy and the non-aligned as a collective movement in world politics. This treatise is mainly

concerned with the former aspect of non-alignment.

Some observers hold that non-alignment as a coherent body of ideas and principles, propounded by a group of like-minded states, was not born until 1961.⁴⁷ In 1964, moreover, the participants in the Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned States moved to declare that "under present conditions, the existence and activities of non-aligned countries in the interest of peace are one of the more important factors for safeguarding world peace".⁴⁸ The participants went further to "...consider it essential that the non-aligned countries should participate in solving outstanding international issues concerning peace and security in the world as none of them can remain unaffected by or indifferent to these issues".⁴⁹

According to Peter Willets, peaceful co-existence, equal state relations, co-operation for development and the ending of colonialism, are demands upon all non-aligned countries, and together constitute a comprehensive 'foreign policy programme' of non-alignment.⁵⁰ The September 1970 *Lusaka Declaration on Peace* is the closest the Non-aligned Movement came to articulating, conceptually that is, the principles of Non-Alignment. The Lusaka Conference declared that:

... the following continue to be the basic aims of non-alignment: the pursuit of world peace and peaceful co-existence by strengthening the role of non-aligned countries within the United Nations so that it will be a more effective obstacle against all forms of aggressive action and the threat of use of force against the freedom, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of any country; the fight against colonialism and racialism which are a negation of human equality and dignity; the settlement of disputes by peaceful means; the ending of the arms race followed by universal disarmament;

opposition to the establishment of foreign military bases and foreign troops on the soil of other nations in the context of great power conflicts and colonial and racist suppression; the universality of and the strengthening of the efficacy of the United Nations;

and the struggle for economic independence and mutual co-operation on a basis of equality and mutual benefits.⁵¹

During the early stages, the term non-alignment was substituted with that of 'positive neutrality'.⁵² The prefix 'positive' was intended to be an instructive one: non-alignment, it was alleged, seeks to be 'part of the solution'; not 'part of the problem'.⁵³ Non-alignment neither requested nor required outside guarantees beyond the accepted commitment towards *Peaceful Co-existence*, the golden-rule of non-alignment established at Bandung in 1955. Far from opting out of the system, like the roles pursued by traditionally neutral states, the non-aligned vigorously sought to exercise a pro-active diplomacy by asserting their sovereignty as active and legitimate members of the international society.

The non-aligned movement always saw as one of their tasks the importance of emphasizing the principle of non-involvement in the controversies dividing the world. It reflected a certain conception that sees formal association with any alliance as reducing the freedom and cohesion of the Third World. The desire to avoid involvement in the East-West bi-polar rivalry was *primus inter pares* among these concerns of the non-aligned states.

It is important to emphasize here that this abstentionist posture of non-alignment can be goal-directed, and the principles and policies of a non-aligned party in this regard converge to some degree with those of neutrality, the main common ingredient being the outright repudiation of membership in multi-lateral great power alliances and balance of

power politics.⁵⁴

Edogum depicted non-alignment as a 'protest-demand' ideology: on the one hand members of the Third World bloc protest against economic exploitation and dependence, as well as hegemony and dominance of the 'advanced capitalist world' in the international system, and on the other hand they demand that the wealthy countries must make special efforts in helping the once-subjected poor countries to catch up.⁵⁵ The non-aligned body has long placed a high premium on distributive justice to compensate for years of European imperial and colonial exploitation.⁵⁶ In order to realize its goals, the Non-aligned Movement has long raised their voices in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid and racism.

It is important to stress here that non-aligned orientations can be linked to a series of domestic considerations and pressures with which governments have to grapple on a constant basis. Some actors have opted for non-alignment as a means of obtaining maximum economic concessions from as many blocs in the system as possible.⁵⁷ To be non-aligned is therefore also to maximize opportunities and possibilities to meet complex socio-economic needs and demands, while minimizing dependencies.⁵⁸

A seriously re-defined non-alignment - or internationalism - can be well suited to the domestic political conditions and needs of developing countries in search of security and prosperity. Some of the non-aligned units in the past came to realize that it pays political dividends at home, as well as abroad, to portray the impression of not making any permanent military or ideological commitments and to protect their independence.

Non-alignment, it is often argued by its practitioners, greatly increases the diplomatic influence and manoeuvrability of those who adopt it as foreign policy strategy. As independent and sovereign units, non-aligned states have room to manoeuvre and may be able

to exert influence on the behaviour and actions of all contending blocs in the system. Non-alignment, qualified Michael Sinclair, "is not an isolationist or "non-committal" policy but implies that non-aligned states must inevitably take sides in any international issue or conflict...The essence of non-alignment is the right to decide freely in accordance with the interests, ideals and objectives of one's country".⁵⁹

In short, non-alignment is relevant and appropriate in explaining both the external threat perception and the domestic, economic and political variables of states.

A post-apartheid South Africa will be in a unique position, not only to adopt non-alignment as foreign policy strategy, but also to make an indispensable contribution to the reorientation of non-alignment for the demands of post-Cold War conditions. It should be stressed here that a lot of the contents of non-alignment were relevant for the cold-war era; that era is now gone and the non-aligned states will have to seriously re-position themselves for international circumstances without the cold war.

The ANC's National Conference of July 1991 rightly observed in this regard that a future foreign policy must take cognisance of the realities and dynamics of "contemporary international relations, characterized in part by... a tendency towards the disappearance of the Cold War and a departure from the conduct of international relations on the basis of a bi-polar order, dominated by the conflicting interests of the super-power and the two military blocs, Nato and the Warsaw Pact...".⁶⁰

It should be stated here that non-alignment needs to be redefined and reorientated in order to become pro-active in posture so as to suit the demands of international relations in a post-Cold War world. The point is, non-alignment has for long been little more than a repudiation of the bi-polar order with its competitive groupings and confrontation zones that came to dominate the post-1945 international order. According to Professor Holsti, non-

alignment as orientation was more geared toward the East-West conflicts than as a true strategy toward all issues in the international system.⁶¹ In an international order characterized by diffuse structures or diffuse-bloc structures, there will be little room and little reason for this kind of orientation. Some scholars also argue that the complex and multi-faceted North-South dispute will start to figure more prominently on the global agenda in the post-Cold War arena.⁶² With the emphasis increasingly on the contentious North-South axis, therefore, the Non-aligned Movement will have to become less confrontational and isolationist in approach, and geared more towards pushing for wealth-welfare issues.

It is going to be crucial for a liberated South Africa to face up to the challenge of exploiting the opportunities and dynamics of a vastly different world order after the Cold War. As early as a decade ago, Dennis Venter rejected "confrontational" and "isolationist" foreign policy conceptions for South Africa and suggested that South Africa should instead pursue a foreign policy of flexible response, combining the best ingredients of a three-dimensional posture, viz.:

Substantive technical-functional cooperation on a regional level, and domestic policy adjustments in order to create the right climate and provide a sound substructure for an 'association of states in Southern Africa';

Lasting normalization of relations and *rapprochement* with black Africa; and

The pursuit of a purposeful and consistent 'non-aligned' direction in foreign policy globally.⁶³

These proposals are in line with one of the most important functions that non-alignment seeks to perform, namely the determination to maintain the international freedom to manoeuvre and base actions on the dictates of the national interests of the state rather than dogmatic ideological prescriptions. Perhaps the most crucial function which non-alignment

intends to perform is the maximization of foreign policy alternatives and manoeuvres in international politics freely and without any severe restrictions and limitations. Non-alignment, therefore, seeks to create and articulate viable foreign policy options, and to implement them in practice.

Non-alignment, as proposed here, is a new foreign policy orientation for a new, apartheid-free South Africa. It would be the best possible means of establishing and securing an external milieu favourable to the stability, prosperity and security of the new democratic South Africa. Non-alignment will also have, as one of its major functions, to try and influence the external milieu so that it becomes favourable for South Africa to pursue its goals and interests. The ANC noted the important rider in this regard that "The foreign policy of a democratic South Africa will be primarily shaped by the nature of its domestic policies and objectives directed at serving the needs and interests of our people."⁶⁴

It should be warned, however, that non-alignment is no *panacea* for the problems and challenges that a post-apartheid South Africa will face on the home front. Nor is non-alignment a legitimate substitute for inadequate defence measures in the face of threats to South Africa's national stability and security. Non-alignment is furthermore no guarantee against possible confrontational and isolationist foreign policy conceptions of a possible unstable and desperate post-apartheid regime that might come to replace the racial *oligarchy* of the past. On the contrary, non-alignment might in fact serve to stimulate flexibility in favour of foreign policy manoeuvres in defence of the new regime.

In conclusion, it is worth remembering that successful strategies of non-alignment require the juxtaposition of many conditions, all of which include, *inter alia*, favourable structure of power and influence in the system; national capacity to defend independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity against extraneous foreign forces; the benevolent attitudes

or indifference of the great powers; reasonable remoteness from the main centres of international and regional conflicts; reductions in the levels in inter-state conflict; and securing a reasonable level of internal political stability.

Notes to Chapter IV

1. Graham Evans and Jeffery Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 202.
2. Graham Evans and Jeffery Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics*, *op. cit.*; also see Deon Geldenhuys, *Isolated States*, *op. cit.* p. 6; K. J. Holsti, *International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
3. Deon Geldenhuys, *Isolated States*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Deon Geldenhuys, *Isolated States*, *op. cit.*, p. 6; also see K. J. Holsti, *International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
9. Deon Geldenhuys, *Isolated States*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
10. K. J. Holsti, *International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
11. Ibid, p. 100.
12. See Frederick H. Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, Macmillan, New York, 1983, p. 415; and Graham Evans and Jeffery Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 202, Robert D. Schulzinger, *American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, p. 62-63.
13. Frederick H. Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, *op. cit.*, p. 415; Robert D. Schulzinger, *American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
14. See Graham Evans and Jeffery Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 202; also see Robert D. Schulzinger, *American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, *op. cit.*, p. 121; Frederick H. Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, *op. cit.*, p. 414.
15. Graham Evans and Jeffery Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 202.
16. Frederick Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, *op. cit.*, p. 411.
17. Ian Clark, *The hierarchy of states, Reform and resistance in the international order*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991 p. 153.

18. Joseph Nye, Jr., "America After the Cold War: What Role for Alliances?", *The Oxford International Review*, Vol. II, No. 3, Summer 1991, p. 6.
19. Frederick Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, *op. cit.*, p. 421.
20. C. E. Black, R. A. Falk, K. Knorr, and O. R. Young, *Neutralization and World Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1968, p. 19.
21. Harto Hakovirta, *East-West Conflict and European Neutrality*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, p. 8. Hakovirta goes further and elucidates the following working definition of neutrality: A state is neutral towards conflict X between states B and C if and only if A does not seek to affect the outcome of X.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
23. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 271.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 272.
25. Deon Geldenhuys, *Foreign Policy Options for South Africa: Apartheid and Beyond*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
26. H. Newhold, "Permanent neutrality and non-alignment: Similarities and differences", *India Quarterly*, vol. 35, no. 3, July-September 1979, p. 287.
27. Deon Geldenhuys, *Foreign Policy Options for South Africa: Apartheid and Beyond*, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 23-24.
30. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 271-272; Harto Hakovirta, *East-West Conflict and European Neutrality*, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
31. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 271.
32. *Ibid.*
33. C.E. Black, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. xiii.
34. F. Hartemayr, "The European doctrine of neutrality - Austrian case", *Korea and World Affairs*, vol. 6, no. 2, 1980, p. 38.
35. Deon Geldenhuys, *Foreign Policy Options for South Africa: Apartheid and Beyond*, *op. cit.* p. 33.

36. Harto Hakovirta, *East-West Conflict and European Neutrality*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid, p. 10.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. *Balance of terror* refers to the condition of parity that exists between the military capabilities between two or more actors, credible to the threatening of mutual assured destruction (MAD-ness). The nuclear deterrence that emerged and existed during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union is a classic example of mutual deterrence.
44. See Deon Geldenhuys, "*South Africa's Post-apartheid Foreign Policy*", *op. cit.*, p. 2.
45. K. J. Holsti, *International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
46. K. J. Holsti, *International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 102; Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 125.
47. Peter Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, Nichols Publishing Company, 1978, p. 21.
48. Ibid; p. 22.
49. Peter Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 29; also see Will Singham, *The Non-Aligned Movement in World Politics*, Lawrence Hill, Westport, 1978, p. 56, Richard L. Jackson, *The Non-Aligned, the UN, and the Superpowers*, Praeger Scientific, New York, 1983, p. 14.
50. Peter Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 29; W. A. Singham, *The Non-Aligned Movement in World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
51. in Peter Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
52. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 278.
53. Ibid.
54. K. J. Holsti, *International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

55. Deon Geldenhuys, *Foreign Policy Options For South Africa: Apartheid and Beyond*, *op. cit.*, p. 12; Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 278.
56. See, for example, Peter Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 25; Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 125; Richard L. Jackson, *The Non-Aligned, the UN, and the Superpowers*, *op. cit.*, p. 15; K. J. Holsti, *International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
57. K. J. Holsti, *International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 104-105.
58. *Ibid*, p. 105.
59. Michael R. Sinclair, "The Concepts of Neutrality, Neutralism and Non-Alignment", in *Strategic Review*, University of Pretoria, June 1979, p. 9.
60. African National Congress, *Policy Guidelines for A Democratic South Africa*, *op. cit.*, p. 72.
61. K. J. Holsti, *International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
62. See, for example, Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy", *op. cit.*, p. 2., Ibrahim A. Gambari, "Africa and the New World Order", lecture delivered at the Oxford University Africa Society, Oxford, March 13, 1992; p. 14.
63. See Denis Venter, *Suid-Afrika: 'n Onverbonde Buitelandse Beleidsrigting?*, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
64. African National Congress, *ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa*, *op. cit.* p. 72.

Chapter V

Transition Scenarios: South Africa's Functioning Anarchy?

...One should bear in mind that there is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more dubious of success, nor more dangerous to administer than to introduce a new order of things.

Niccolo Machiavelli

Any recommended foreign policy orientation for South Africa beyond apartheid should rest on a number of key assumptions regarding the nature of the post-apartheid state and the transition process *en route* to that order. Foreign policy benefits for South Africa will, in any event, mainly derive from the developments and successes on the home front. South Africa's alleged national greatness, it seems, will in future be largely defined in terms of domestic behaviour and cohesion. Only by being strong at home, it has been pointed out by some, can South Africa hope to be strong abroad. As the old truism goes, '[a]ll politics are local'.

An important observation should be noted at the outset: South Africa's politics, in both its black-white and black-black dimensions, constitutes essentially a struggle for power and influence in a quasi-anarchical arena. Power is defined here as the control, allocation, and distribution (read: re-distribution) of resources. In the South African quasi-anarchical arena, violence and instability are the rules, order and justice the exceptions. Some would in fact argue that South Africa is little more than a functioning anarchy.

Because of this power struggle, South Africa seemed to have been in a position to exercise two options in its attempt to effect change and political transformation. The one option was that of a revolutionary overthrow of the apartheid order; the other alternative was

that of a hard-won negotiated settlement of the protracted apartheid dispute.

There seems to have been a realisation on the part of South African negotiators that a revolutionary *zero sum* overthrow of the apartheid order would merely have served to obfuscate and destroy the chances of a steadfast democracy replacing the apartheid *status quo*. This violent option, it was argued, would furthermore have had far-reaching implications and adverse repercussions for favourable foreign policy manoeuvring after apartheid. Besides, it would have been a futile error to replace the apartheid racial oligarchy with yet another desperate regime and volatile order.

The negotiated alternative on the other hand, one could argue, was *ipso facto* the best means of establishing and securing a relatively stable and firm democratic order after apartheid; one that will have the important benefit of enjoying international acceptance and legitimacy. The ANC's Harare Declaration properly stated in this regard that the contending parties to the South Africa power-struggle "...should, in the context of the necessary climate, negotiate the future of the country and its people in good faith and in an atmosphere which, by mutual agreement between the liberation movements and the South African regime, would be free of violence."¹

An important observation that is more than likely to have an implacable bearing on South Africa's future external relations should be noted here: the spiral of violent crime and potential political instability endemic in contemporary South Africa. The threat in some quarters - especially by militant white Afrikaner - of a violent destabilization of the of nascent democracy in South Africa is becoming a well-known phenomenon. What is more, there are clear indications that this conspicuous trend is likely to continue unabated in future. Hence the prognosis by some of the more pessimistic observers that South Africa is in fact heading for a broken-backed, Lebanon-style anarchy; that is to say the gradual disintegration

of societal stability, and the eventual collapse of order, that will, all in all, inevitably lead to the elevation of disorder into a perpetual and uniquely-styled anarchy in South Africa.² But why the analogy with Lebanon? Indeed, the once unprecedentedly prosperous Lebanon now finds itself in a state of overall anarchy. It is ironic that the roots of Lebanon's present troubles, just like that of South Africa, lie mainly in its ethnic and racial tensions. Years of perpetual civil war had unquestionably reduced Lebanon to a state of general war. Few observers of the Lebanese crisis saw any obvious way out of the quagmire, given the protracted positions of the key participants and the obstinate loyalties and fears which for so long underpinned them.³

Does South Africa truly run the risk being turned into a Lebanon style anarchy? This depends on a number of variables, including the ability of the suggested government of national unity (gnu) to hold together and consolidate democracy. If negotiations work out it is highly likely that such a government will comprise of candidates that does not necessarily share the same sense of purpose in such an arrangement; hence, that government will be faced, at least some times, with clashes of interests between its members, and this could threaten the workability and survivability of it. The consolidation of the nascent and infant democracy will therefore be crucial.

If violence escalates, needless to say, the infant post-apartheid democracy will become nakedly vulnerable in the face of potential anarchy. That is why some analysts have argued that, given such a scenario, a Brazilian-option of authoritarian, most probably military, rule, with a facade of multi-party power sharing, seem to be the inevitable root for South Africa. Hennie Kotzé and Deon Geldenhuys, in an analysis of probable prognoses for South Africa, predicted, amongst other things, a potential "NP-ANC executive coalition with the hallmarks of a typical bureaucratic, authoritarian state".⁴ In this scenario, a government of joint rule

will assume the role of "guardians of law and order", first and foremost. But the Brazilian option is not a forgone conclusion; this scenario too depends on a number of variables and factors - including the prospects for holding a divided centre together. In other words, the greater the level of consolidating democracy, the less likely the Brazilian option and the higher the prospects of affecting a workable government of national unity (gnu). Conversely, the lower the chances of effectively consolidating democracy, the greater the prospects for resorting to the Brazilian-option, and the greater the threats to the government of national unity.

This brings us to an important observation: because negotiation is no *panacea*, the politics of negotiation, and foreigners, will hardly be in a position to come to the rescue of South Africa's infant democracy after apartheid. It would be fair to conclude, therefore, that unless government and all contending participants to the proposed government of national unity pact come to grips with political instability, crime and their violent vicissitudes, very little will come of its envisioned post-apartheid democracy, let alone its external relations.

Either way, the outcome of South Africa's convoluted transition will have important implications for the country's foreign policy and international affairs. In other words, the outcome of the transition will largely determine South Africa's standing in the world after apartheid.

Once the stage of successful negotiations has finally been reached, South Africa's "functioning anarchy" will be forced to confront a new range of problems and challenges that may prove every bit just as intractable as did apartheid. Some would argue that South Africa clearly highlights the frustrating verity that a good cause does not necessarily ensure a good outcome. To repeat the old adage: the more things change, the more they stay the same.

Notes to Chapter V

1. ANC, "The Harare Declaration", in *The Road to Peace*, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
2. See Chris Landsberg, "South Africa and the World: Apartheid and Beyond", *op. cit.*, p. 19; Chris Landsberg and Mark Suzman, "South Africa's Quest for Democracy", *op. cit.*, p. 27.
3. See, for example, David Munro and Alan J. Day, *A World Record of Major Conflict Areas*, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-107; also see Fawwaz N. Trabulsi, "Lebanon in the Middle East Peace Talks: Player or Bargaining Card?" in *The Oxford International Review*, vol. III, no. 2, Spring Issue 1992, pp. 19-21.
4. Hennie Kotzé and Deon Geldenhuys, "Damascus Road, The Presidency", in *Leadership*, December 1990, p. 25.

Chapter VI

South Africa from Pariah to Paragon: The National Roles and Role Conceptions of a Post-apartheid South Africa

...There is no such thing as absolute power. Whatever the wealth, the power, and the prestige of a nation may be, its means are always limited. The problems of the makers of policy is to select objectives that are limited - not the best that could be desired but the best that can be realized without committing the whole power and the whole wealth and the very existence of the nation.

Walter Lippmann

The ability of any state (South Africa) to secure its survival, security, and prosperity in the international system is critically dependent on the endowment and utility of its *elements of national power*;¹ that is to say, those factors and resource instruments that collectively constitute the *power-in-being* and *power potentiality* of the state. Some elements of national power are natural factors commonly subject to human control or alteration, while a great deal of the ingredients of natural power are natural factors not ordinarily subject to human impulses, organisation, and capacities.²

The major components in the national power equation include *inter alia*:³ 1) the size, location, climate, and natural topography of the national territory; 2) the natural resources, sources of energy, and foodstuffs that can be produced; 3) the population, its size, density, age and sex composition, and its *per capita* relationship to national income; 4) the size and efficiency of the industrial plant; 5) the extent and effectiveness of the transportation system, infra structure and communications media; 6) the educational system, research facilities, and the number and quality of the scientific and technical elite; 7) the size, training, equipment,

and spirit of the military forces and army; 8) the nature and strength of the nation's political, economic, and social system, 9) the quality and strengths of its diplomats and diplomacy; 10) the policies, attitudes and perceptions of the nation's leaders; and 11) the national character and morale of its people. All these factors (or elements) determine how strong a country is.

It is crucial to bear in mind that there is no single constituent or tool of national power that is likely to be exclusively decisive in determining a country's influence and preponderance, or for that matter the outcome of its relations with other states. Most power factors and results are relative in time and to the strength of other actors, and any assessment of national capabilities that omits consideration of the comparative nature and relative strength of other states may turn out to be dangerous to the nation's security. Conversely, the effectiveness of a nation's strength, influence, and capabilities also rest strongly on how other states assess its elements in the power equation, and the subsequent action produced by these assessments.⁴ In the final analysis, though, the effectiveness with which national power is employed to achieve a state's objectives depends chiefly on how successful the nation's leaders marshal, integrate, and direct the instruments and tools of national power in pursuit of its goals.

6.1 South Africa and Africa: A Case in Giantism

It has often been remarked that South Africa is the *Leviathan* and *force de maitre* of Africa: a small power on the periphery of global politics, but a superpower in regional terms.⁵ Hence, the all too familiar equation of South Africa's position in the region with typical hegemonic principles, in both official and scholarly discourse.

The "old" diplomacy of the apartheid era frequently made reference to the "Regional power", "Powerhouse of the Region", "Power Point", and most recently "The Gateway",

"The Agent of Salvation for Africa", and the "Hub of the South".⁶ The underlying theme, which is being reinforced repeatedly, domestically as well as by powerful external actors, is that a powerful "solution", indeed "redemption", for Southern Africa, and the whole of Africa for that matter, is the endorsement and replenishment of South Africa's hegemony.

For example, during official public relations exercises and their highly-touted foreign summits with key external players over the course of the last four years of the transition, South African officials typically and self-consciously appropriate and confer for themselves the roles and functions of the self-approved representatives, protectors, and custodians of the interests of the entire region.⁷ This continued a long theme in South Africa's politics and foreign policy; the projection of perpetual South African hegemony, or suzerainty, over the black states in the region has long played a central part in South African official thinking.

The Nation Party's (NP) *Plan of Action* for the whites-only general election of 6 September 1989, for example, avowed that "South Africa, as the regional power in Southern Africa, must play an increasingly dynamic role in this subcontinent".⁸ Similarly, during his now celebrated 'epoch-making' address of 2 February 1990, President De Klerk asserted that "the government is prepared to enter into discussions with other Southern African countries with the aim of formulating a realistic development plan".⁹ In similar fashion, De Klerk proclaimed during the opening of parliament in February 1991 that "South Africa is also interested in how current world events will affect our region... Regional developments is of decisive importance to South Africa".¹⁰ During an interview with the *Washington Times* on 6 May 1990, De Klerk went as far as lamenting that "Africa projects a dismal picture that goes from bad to worse. I've met with many African leaders and they realize that South Africa must be the springboard, the platform, from which the economic revival of Southern

Africa must be launched".¹¹ During his summit-meeting with President George Bush at the White House, Pretoria's Commander-in-Chief similarly maintained that "in being one of the strongest regional powers in the southern hemisphere, being the hope of the rebuilding of prosperity and opportunity for almost the whole continent of Africa, where South Africa will, by shaking hands, as we are now already doing with you and with others, will play a constructive role in ensuring stability on the globe...".¹² Similarly, during what was hailed as his "European lap of honour", De Klerk boldly declared that "All are waiting anxiously for us to succeed. The world is waiting to welcome us back. Our neighbours want us to prevail. Africa is waiting for our success".¹³ President De Klerk even went as far as linking the volatile reform process in South Africa to the economic survival of Africa when he avowed that "The political die in South Africa is cast. There is no turning back in the road to a new and just South Africa. What is at issue is the economic future of South Africa and, in fact, the African continent".¹⁴

The 'greater dialogue' between Pretoria and African states had, in fact, the prime objective of asserting South Africa's purported "co-responsibility for the upliftment of countries in Southern Africa and especially Africa where conditions are deteriorating almost daily."¹⁵ South Africa "with its infrastructure, strategic location, relatively strong economy, and advanced skill", argued Pretoria, "could play a vital role in the survival of the continent".¹⁶ "However", warned De Klerk, "South Africa's downfall would also mean Africa's downfall".¹⁷

Even powerful foreign actors joined in the chorus of replenishing South Africa's alleged pivotal and prestige role in Africa. The French Secretary of State for Humanitarian Aid, Dr. Bernard Kouchier, claimed that "this country is so important for Africa that we must pay special attention to what is going on here".¹⁸ The German Deputy Foreign Affairs

Minister Helmut Schaefer, on his part also declared that "South Africa could play a very important role towards stabilizing southern Africa and Germany would do everything it could to make this possible."¹⁹ Former United States Assistant secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman J. Cohen, went to extra lengths to strongly plead for the "need to acknowledge South Africa's critical role as an engine of growth for the rest of southern Africa".²⁰

It is the specialists and commanders in charge of South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, who came to boldly articulate a "New Africa Diplomacy". The "new" diplomacy identified Africa as a special foreign policy target to try and boost South Africa's profile as an indispensable African performer. Pretoria's Foreign Affairs Minister, Roelof "Pik" Botha vehemently disclosed that "We in South Africa must ensure that we remain economically strong, that our strength as a regional power subtly filters through and that Africa and Southern Africa take note that without South Africa there is no solution to the problems of this region".²¹ Botha's 'Marshall Plan' went even further and stated that "Many African leaders agree with us that apartheid is no longer the issue. The issue is Africa's survival: economically, socially, and politically".²²

Pik Botha's second in command, the Director General of Foreign Affairs Mr Neil Van Heerden, hailed South Africa as "a mature regional power" with the "infrastructure and capabilities to be the cornerstone of regional development".²³ In strict *realpolitik* terms, seemingly forgetting that great powers also have great responsibilities, Van Heerden divulged that "nations have interests, not friends", and South Africa will only "tilt towards Africa under conditions of vital national interest".²⁴ Van Heerden went on to avow: "We have a head start. Politically we are in the world game" and South Africa's "diplomacy thus has a golden opportunity to lay the basis for future peace and prosperity in Southern Africa".²⁵

Leon Wessels, the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, courted South Africa as "the launching pad" with an inherent ability to "literally be the catalyst for an economic about-turn in Southern Africa".²⁶ Wessels confessed that Pretoria "can and want to create opportunities".²⁷

Ostensibly forgetting the Horn and Central Africa, Foreign Ministry officials went as far as jointing a "regions of influence plan", demarcating four economic-industrial "power-houses" of the continent: Egypt in North Africa, Nigeria in West Africa, Kenya in East Africa, and, of course, South Africa in the Southern region.²⁸

The official *Southern African Facts Sheet*, in its September 1991 edition entitled "Southern Africa; A Stocktaking", arrogantly declared that "In Southern Africa there is growing pressure on governments to achieve closer interaction with South Africa and to move towards acceptance of that country as a full partner in the socio-economic structure of the subcontinent - a development which, by general consensus, would be a significant boost to the struggling economies of the region".²⁹

In similar fashion the October 1991 edition of *RSA Update*, an official mouthpiece of the South African Embassy in London, labelled the Republic "South Africa: Sub-Saharan Economic Clout" and declared that "South Africa now wields more economic clout than all 35 neighbouring states in Southern Africa put together".³⁰ An advertisement in the British *Financial Times* of Friday 5 June, 1992, saluted South Africa as the "Gateway to Africa" and, indeed resounded the Republic as "the centre of one of the most sophisticated and technologically advanced economies in Africa".³¹ The commercial went ahead and endorsed South Africa as "the gateway to the continent's largely untapped markets".

Eric Leistner, African specialist of the Africa Institute of South Africa, an African affairs think-tank for the Department of Foreign Affairs, is of the opinion that "the facts of

geography, history, and economic life have turned Southern Africa into a regional system that is unique in Africa because it includes, and is focused on, the only industrialized economy south of the Sahara".³² According to Leistner, "The impulses from this regional power-house, in the form of trade, transport, labour migration, and technology transfers are felt throughout Southern Africa and beyond".³³ Leistner's colleague, Professor P. Smit, also echoed these lyrics and argued that "whereas most African regional co-operation schemes have failed or have never got off the ground, even severe critics of present-day South Africa acknowledge that an informal but fairly effective regional system is in function in Southern Africa, centred on South Africa."³⁴

Even the more prominent South African foreign policy scholars sought to objectively document South Africa's unparalleled economic, industrial and military *giantism*, and place the Republic's special and distinct missionary potential within its 'proper' African context.

Despite the fact that South Africa belongs to the club of small powers, and forms part of the now greatly neglected African continent, argues Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa will have at its disposal one particular potent bargaining instrument: its status as a regional power".³⁵ On the assumption that South Africa's economic and military capabilities will be maintained after apartheid, maintains Geldenhuys, South Africa "will in future still be in a position to exert a decisive influence on the destiny of Southern Africa."³⁶

Peter Vale, too, insisted that South Africa's highest call to international service will be in Africa.³⁷ Vale even detected the ironical "Alarm bells... ringing throughout the continent", urging the long suspended Republic to come in from the cold "to halt the continent's slide".³⁸ Vale's line seems pretty simple: "a buoyant South Africa has the weight to lift the region out of its present malaise".³⁹

John Barratt, also convinced that Africa will finally become South Africa's home, resembled the sub-continent as South Africa's *sphere of influence*.⁴⁰ For Lance Morrow, there is but "one potential *deus ex machina* to which eyes are already turning: South Africa".⁴¹ Many Africans, asserts Morrow, "believe that with apartheid withering away, South Africa will pull the continent out of its economic slough, and down the track of prosperity".⁴² Because of the indispensable presence of the "giant", avowed Tom Young, "South Africa is arguably the only part of the African continent which can look forward to a genuinely regional dynamic".⁴³ Ruth Ayisi again contended that Africa is indeed "waiting for the giant".⁴⁴

6.2 Wither Africa?

The permeating theme of the foregoing assertions is that Africa can, and indeed should be seen as South Africa's *sphere of influence*; that is to say South Africa's demanding region of operation and preferential status. Sphere of influence in this regard, it is important to qualify, refers not so much to claims of dominance or control, but to assertions of military, economic and political exclusiveness and preponderance, determining the special rights, status, and *responsibilities* of the state - South Africa, in the region - Africa.

Having outlined the special traits of South Africa's prodigious *grandeur*, it is crucial here to examine the peculiar characteristics of Africa, South Africa's "region of operation" and "sphere of responsibility", and to determine its objective position within the international society, and the emerging 'new world order'.

The popular phrase '*ex Africa semper aliquid novi*', is particularly true in pessimistic terms. It is the rapid revolution of decolonization and *Uhuru*, in which African states came to assert their emergence onto the post-World War II international stage as legitimate

members of international society, that prompted the British Prime Minister in 1960, Harold Macmillan, to hail 'the winds of change blowing through the African continent'. The realities of post-independence Africa, however, soon dampened the great optimistic Pan-Africanist vision of a common and dynamic political, economic and military structure. Indeed, dreamed and envisioned Kwame Nkrumah:⁴⁵

...once we start, the momentum will increase. With capital controlled by our own banks, harnessed to our own true industrial and agricultural development, we shall make our advance. We shall accumulate machinery and establish steel works, iron foundries and factories; we shall link the various states of our continent with communications by land, sea and air. We shall cable from one place to another, phone for one place to the other and astound the world with our hydroelectric power; we shall drain the marshes and swamps, clear invested areas, feed the under-nourished, and rid our people of parasites and disease. It is within the possibility of science and technology to make even the Sahara bloom into a vast field with verdant vegetation for agricultural and industrial developments. We shall harness the radio, television, giant printing presses to lift our people from the dark recesses of illiteracy...

Such far-fetched optimism, based on a strong anti-imperialist stance, proved greatly ill-founded to the realities of least-development in post-independence Africa. Suffice it to say here that centuries of slavery, the legacy of Westphalia, or 'The Black Man's Burden' as Basil Davidson would avow, and the scramble for Africa's heart, only served to secure a largely crippled and misformed Africa at birth.

Africa's failure to build a genuine sense of nationhood every so often led to anarchy

and virtual collapse of law and order. Heinous dictators sprang up in some African countries masquerading as the self-appointed providers of security and order, and while they uncompromisingly championed 'one man, one vote', the final motto of so many of Africa's post-colonial *kleptocracies*, all things being equal, was "one man, one vote... once only!"⁴⁶ Fortunately for African dictators, the freezing politics of the post-War order served as a check on their grave violations of freedom and human rights.

However, the end of the Cold War and the loosening of Moscow's grip on the former Soviet satellites, sparked off radical change throughout the globe, including Africa. The end of the post-World War II bi-polar *balance of terror* saw super-power animosity turning into a newly found *rapprochement* and cooperation, making plain to Africans that they had in fact outlived their strategic and ideological usefulness. The new post-Cold War *Weltanschauung* of democratization and quests for human rights, self-determination and genuine prosperity blowing through many regions of the world, makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible for Africa, with its dismal records on this score, to escape this 'second wind of change'. Needless to say that in future, only those African states which will be able to quench the thirst of their masses for participatory democratic politics and practice, security and prosperity, would have the possibility of avoiding even further social upheaval and instability, and restore relative order and stability in society.⁴⁷

As the Western powers concentrate their resources on the 'more' strategically profitable countries of the newly liberated states of Eastern Europe, and seek to grapple with their own imperative of carving out a more interdependent Europe, Africa is in fact becoming further isolated by a new Iron Curtain of peripheralization; all this at her greatest hour of need.

Lest the uncertain euphoria of the new world order lead to the same ill-conceived

optimism that accompanied the 'first wind of change', a few facts are worth bearing in mind about the African plight. Some analysts have been avowed in their criticism. Africa, one analyst noted, has developed an incompatible problem and bent of chaos theory; a destructive paradigm *par excellence*.⁴⁸ A great deal of the African continent, he continued, has turned into a neo-post-colonial scramble for existence and survival; a battleground of contending dooms;⁴⁹ a state of affairs too ghastly to contemplate: famine and starvation, AIDS and over population, illiteracy and homelessness, corruption and social break-down; fading resources and drought, war and the common practice of *coups d'etat*.

The 'vast and mysterious' continent, as some Afro-pessimist argued, has become well grounded as 'The Third World of the Third World'. Of the 169 countries that make up the United Nations *Annual Development Index* of economic and political progress, 32 of the 40 poorest and lowest on the chart are indeed African states.⁵⁰ Between the United Nations First Development Decade (1960 - 1970) and The Third Development Decade (1980 - 1990), Africa's share of the global Gross National Product (GNP) dropped from 1,9 per cent to 1,2 per cent.⁵¹ Over the last decade (1980 - 1990), Africa's foreign debt has tripled to about \$174 billion.⁵² The continent desperately needs additional financial resources to ease its external debt problems and to implement the OAU and UN endorsed *Programme of Action on Africa's Recovery and Development 1986 - 1990*, as well as the *New Agenda for Action for the Development of Africa*.⁵³ Although the average external resource requirements of these programmes is estimated at US \$ 24 billion, based on 1985 price levels, total net resource flows to Africa as a whole in 1985 was about \$16 billion.⁵⁴ The situation has since gotten worse, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, there is now a reverse net transfer of resources flow from Africa. The New Agenda envisages that African GNP must grow by at least 6 per cent per annum in real terms, in order to enable the continent to

double *per capita* income by the year 2015.⁵⁵ This level of growth will require \$30 billion in resources during 1992 alone.⁵⁶

Infant mortality in Africa stands at 120 per every 1,000 live births; as many as sixty per cent of all Africans are illiterate; only twenty-five per cent of all Africans have access to safe drinking water; and in a continent plagued by multifarious diseases, there is but one doctor for every 2400 people.⁵⁷ Life in some quarters in Africa is indeed pretty 'nasty, brutish and short', as Thomas Hobbes would have lamented.

6.3 South Africa: Bound to Lead?

South Africa's region of operation, it is clear, is not a particularly pleasant one. Africa's marginalisation is real and is becoming increasingly burdensome. Given the grim features of South Africa's region of ascendancy, a non-aligned (or internationalist) South Africa would be compelled to pursue and marshal a substantive, vigilant and pro-active foreign policy.

The following is an elucidation of the more credible and responsible role performances that a post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy posture should include; the absence of which make it difficult to see how the country's foreign affairs will come of age.

1) **Regional leader.** In a predominantly western dominated self-help international system that demands of each state to take care of, and cater for, its own interest first and foremost, South Africa will have to realize that it does not only have vital national interests, but also demanding duties and responsibilities, especially towards its neighbours in Africa.

South Africa will in particular be challenged into an organising and leadership role. This should not be taken to mean that South Africa should not actively pursue its own

legitimate interests. On the contrary, South Africa, just like any other state in the international system, will obviously be concerned, in the first instance, with securing its own position in the international society. It will be important for South Africa therefore, to organise its foreign policy around the strict understanding of its vital interest and responsibilities based on its proper international, domestic and vocational context.

In a post-Cold War era of multipolarity and *complex inter-dependence*, the management of interdependence should be a major rationale for investing South Africa's resources in regional leadership and must be central to a post-apartheid foreign policy strategy. Moreover, as interdependence and the diffusion of power increasingly grow, the implications for stability and welfare will depend heavily on whether the strongest state takes lead in organising collective action.⁵⁸ Getting the other states in Africa to share the costs of providing order and stability will have to become a crucial ingredient of a future, post-apartheid foreign policy wisdom. In short, because South Africa carries more leverage and prestige as a strong power in the region, it will have to act wisely and prudently in organising leadership for collective action in southern Africa in particular, and Africa in general. It is particularly within the framework of the former Frontline States arrangement that South Africa would be able to play an important role in organising a new security arrangement for the sub-region.

2) **Regional protector.** Deriving from its leadership posture in the region, South Africa should assume an active role in creating protection, especially by the creation of new military defence and security structures, for the adjacent states, and the region in general. The establishment of Frontline security arrangement will be important on this score as well.

It should be said at the outset that South Africa must avoid developing a presumption

that it must act boldly and police Africa. Some African states have already argued that South Africa is not the father figure of Africa and should not act as such. Instead, South Africa should attempt to maintain its current levels of military strength in order to articulate a regional security policy that encompass matters beyond military threats. Intervention, in particular humanitarian intervention, and the use of military force, undesirable as it might appear at first sight, may in fact become inevitable in future. Rwanda in particular has already posed that challenge to South Africa. Soon after the Rwanda crisis escalated, the new democratic republic came under persistent pressure to assume a crucial role in attempts to resolve the crisis in that country.

On the non-military front South has already been approached by the UN and OAU to play a role in Angola, Mozambique and Lesotho. Even US president Bill Clinton thought that the inclusion of South African forces in the prospective US-led invasion of Haiti might be an important factor tipping the moral balance in his favour back in the US.

South Africa, some observers point out, should realize the necessity of distinguishing constantly between that which is really important to it in the world in terms of its potential power and responsibilities, and that which is not. In so doing South Africa will be compelled, every so often, to put aside such comfortable possessions as emotional judgement and instead move to look at the international and regional environment coldly and realistically.

3) The Practice of a **Proactive Independence**

By asserting its integrity as an independent and sovereign state, South Africa will surely want to foster sound diplomatic relations with as many states as possible. "...A future South African government", argued Deon Geldenhuys, "will try to integrate itself as fully

as possible into the international community in order to prove to the world that the era of forced isolation under apartheid is finally over".⁵⁹ The role of pro-active independence would therefore be "...of major importance for the new South African government in order to emphasize its break with apartheid and international isolation".⁶⁰

A post-apartheid South Africa will therefore have to place a high premium on its professional diplomacy. As the ANC rightly proclaimed, albeit only vaguely and generally: "A democratic South Africa will aim for the establishment of a professional foreign service, in which training, employment equity and affirmative action will be important components for the attainment of high standards of service".⁶¹

4) **Mediator - Integrator.** Based on its strengths and capabilities, South Africa will be relatively well equipped to pursue a stabilizing and conciliatory role in Africa by undertaking special mediatory and "fixing" tasks for the reconciliation of contending and conflicting states, especially in the region. The foundation stones of this conflict-resolutionary role for South Africa should be:⁶²

1) Preventive Diplomacy; that is to say the articulation and marshalling of a coherent strategy and planned practice of action in order to prevent quarrels and disputes from arising between states in the region; to prevent existing and prevalent disputes from escalating into serious conflicts; and, if it comes to the worst, to limit the spread of violence and instability when they occur. This role seems to be appropriate especially for Lesotho; that crisis did not reach outright level yet and it seems to be a quarrel that could be contained peacefully. South Africa could play an important third-party or mediatory role in that country and get involve in preventive diplomacy efforts in order to resolve that conflict.

2) Peacemaking; that is actions and concrete efforts to bring hostile and conflicting parties and states to agreement and peace, essentially through pacific means which include

inter alia: genuine negotiations, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, enquiry, judicial settlement, and resort to regional agencies and arrangements. This model could be pursued especially in Angola and Mozambique.

3) Peace-keeping, that is to say the deployment and demonstration of military force, as last resort, with the *consent* of all the contending parties concerned. Peace-keeping, it is important to bear in mind, typically requires the successful resolution of conflicts and deliberate attempts to preserve the peace once it is attained. True and genuine resolution of conflicts occurs ultimately in the face of the successful application of the pacific means as outlined above. A post-election role for South Africa in Mozambique would seem to fit that of peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building.

The most desirable and efficient employment and utilization of diplomacy - be it in Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda or Lesotho - it should be pointed out, is to ease tensions before they escalate in conflict, or, conversely, when conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and seriously attempt to resolve its underlying causes.⁶³ In the final analysis therefore, South Africa should realize that constructive and successful diplomacy depends on the resolution and addressing of the deepest causes and symptoms of the conflict: economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression.⁶⁴

5) **A Strong Regional-subsystem Collaborator**

This conception challenges a post-apartheid South Africa into profound and irrevocable commitments to cooperation and the building of understanding among the states in the regional sub-system and the Africa continent, and to act as a bridge in cooperation, communication, mediation, facilitation and integration.

The ANC's *Freedom Charter* has long committed the organisation to "...strive to maintain world peace and the settlement of international disputes by negotiation not war".⁶⁵ Similarly, the ANC's *Policy Guidelines For A Democratic South Africa* of May 1992 proclaimed that a post-apartheid foreign policy will "contribute to the democratization of international political and economic relations, and so help secure a global context within which a democratic South Africa will be able to coexist peacefully and to cooperate on a democratic basis with its neighbours in the region and further afield."⁶⁶

By joining, amongst others, the following regional organisations after apartheid, South Africa would be in a position to make an indispensable contribution to regional cooperation and development: The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), The African Development Bank, The Preferential Trade Area (PTA), and, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). South Africa can be instrumental in raising the effectiveness and prestige of organisations such as the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement. All these organisations, from SADC, to the OAU, to the NAM, face the crucial challenge of reorientating themselves so as to become relevant and well-equipped for the challenges posed by the post-Cold War international dynamics. Furthermore, Africa in general, and the southern African sub-continent in particular does seem to run an increasing risk of overlap and duplication and streamlining and down-sizing these organisations does seem to be important. For example, the PTA, SADC and Southern African Customs Union (SACU) all seems, by and large to perform the same function and one could make an argument in favour serious amalgamation.

To be sure, regional cooperation after apartheid should become a deliberate policy, not just an opportunist interest or activity, but a conscious policy; a dedication and commitment.

6) **Developer.** It is as *regional developer* moreover, that South Africa's vital role will be called into service. The role of regional developer places a special duty and obligation on a post-apartheid South Africa to become actively involved in the assisting in the development of the region as a whole. "It would be extremely shortsighted", avowed ANC Deputy-president, Walter Sisulu, "merely to seek to expand our own narrow short term interests without taking the development needs of our partners aboard".⁶⁷ "Even from a self-interested trade point of view", Sisulu boldly stated, "we want Africa to grow and develop".⁶⁸ "Over and above that", corroborated the deputy-president, "we recognise and accept an historic obligation to cooperate with our neighbours both in overcoming the imbalances which characterise the existing regional economy and in redressing the consequences of apartheid destabilization".⁶⁹

In similar fashion, the ANC's *Draft Manifesto On Economic Policy* of 1992 avowed that "Trends in the world economy make it essential for countries located outside the major trading blocs of the advanced industrialized countries to forge greater cooperation".⁷⁰ "An ANC government", promised the *Manifesto*, "would give high priority to examining existing links and promoting close ties with other countries on the continent, and most especially, with our neighbours in the Southern African region".⁷¹

South Africa's developmental challenge will encompass all spheres of statecraft on virtually all levels: economical, military, industrial, developmental, diplomatic and political. The foreign policy of a liberated South Africa, affirmed Thabo Mbeki, chief of the ANC's department of International Affairs, "... will have to address a number of matters in the political, economic and military-strategic fields at the regional, continental and global levels".⁷² "Broadly stated", Mbeki continued, "the objective of foreign policy would be to help create the situation at all these levels in which South Africa would exist and develop as

a democratic, non-racial, peaceful and prosperous country".⁷³

Special emphasis will be placed on South Africa's skill and resources. The newly found *rapprochement* between South Africa and Africa, said Pretoria's former Director-General of Foreign Affairs, Neil van Heerden, "have raised the potential of increased cooperation in the field of development".⁷⁴ Convinced that South Africa possesses the necessary "indigenous" and "acclimatised technical expertise and scientific knowledge" which has already been tried and tested on Africa soil, Van Heerden is of the opinion that South Africa can make indispensable contributions in the areas of health, food production, mining, energy, animal production and veterinary services, engineering and conservation.⁷⁵ However, warns Van Heerden, "South Africa cannot hope to match the West in development capacity - for that we have neither the manpower nor the capital... Our contribution to Africa's developmental needs will be qualitative, rather than quantitative".⁷⁶

7) A Foreign Policy Strongly Emphasizing **Internal Development**

This crucial conception warns against South Africa overextending in regional and international affairs at the expense of grappling with its complex socio-economic problems back home. It begs for a regional and foreign policy with a strong inward-looking bias.

It is important to reiterate here that only by being strong domestically can a post-apartheid hope to be strong abroad and play a pivotal anchor role in foreign affairs. In fact, the *revolution of rising expectations* back home already anticipates that the post-apartheid administration will concentrate its efforts, first and foremost, on coming to grips with the enigmas on the home front. Unless South Africa successfully grapples with the dilemmas of domestic strife, its preeminence in Africa is bound to diminish. What is more, the realities of the South African situation suggest that the domestic political inertia will largely

remain persistent for some time in the foreseeable future.

While it is true therefore, that a post-apartheid South Africa's development in the region will be tenuously balanced at best, the challenge remains that a liberated South Africa will have to find the proper equilibrium between domestic policy and foreign policy.

8) South Africa: **Setting the Example**

With the politics of genuine negotiations approaching its conclusion, South Africa will be in a position to gain prestige and influence in the international society by portraying its process of negotiations and the dispensation that is about to replace it as an 'ideal type' to other countries, in particular to the countries of Africa.

"It is to be expected", said Professor Deon Geldenhuys, "that a post-apartheid South Africa would also play a strong **missionary role** in its foreign relations".⁷⁷ "Freed of apartheid and white authoritarianism", the new democratic South Africa would certainly want to portray itself as "a crusader against practices such as racism and oppression, and as a model of reconciliation and liberation."⁷⁸ "A democratic South Africa, corroborated the ANC's *Policy Guidelines*, "will objectively promote the objectives of democracy, peace, stability, development, and mutually beneficial relations among the people of Africa as a whole, as well as Pan African solidarity."⁷⁹

It is indeed ironic that South Africa, long condemned and expelled from the Pan-African league for practising the morally repugnant system of apartheid, seem to be moving toward the fortuitous position of establishing one of Africa's few genuine democracies, albeit a highly unstable one.

If South Africa manages to be successful in grappling with political instability and its violent vicissitudes, and move to establish an authentic ethos of tolerance and

accommodation, it faces the animated prospect of showing much of Africa a powerful new paradigm: how to practice the virtues of tolerance and accommodation in a divided society. South Africa can certainly become a leading player in Africa's long-stalled march towards democracy and peace by setting the example of establishing a firm dispensation of participatory democracy.

This obviously means that South Africa itself will have to go beyond mere rhetorical exercise and become irrevocably committed and concerned with the goals and objectives of peace, human rights, self-determination of peoples, and democracy.

South Africa's foreign policy, needless to say, will have to be transcended from one in defence of apartheid, to one that is driven by the commitment to racial equality, international peace, economic and social justice, and the strengthening of cooperation and good-neighbourliness. In short, South Africa will have to move from pariah to paragon. Put differently, South Africa's foreign policy must attain a bedrock self-confidence and esteem that its values are worth defending and promoting. The last thing that South Africa should do, however, is to act as the moral custodian of Africa. As the John Quincy Adams dictum goes: 'friends of liberty everywhere, custodians only of our own.'⁸⁰ In short, South Africa serves, for better or for worse, as an example to Africa and the rest of the world.

Notes to Chapter VI

1. Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, *The International Relations Dictionary*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
2. Ibid, p. 10.
3. Ibid, p. 9.
4. Ibid, p. 10.
5. South Africa has long developed a nuclear capability and in fact moved beyond threat, and advanced to construct no fewer than six nuclear bombs. Each one of these bombs contains a capacity and strength of force twice the size of the Atom-bombs used by the United States to destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II.
6. Walter Sisulu, *Statement by the Deputy President of the ANC*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
7. Ibid, p. 4.
8. National Party, *Plan of Action of the National Party*, Election 6 September 1989, Parliament Street, Cape Town.
9. See *Address by State President F. W. de Klerk*, DMS, At The Opening of The Second Session of The Ninth Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Friday, 2 February, 1990.
10. See *Address by State President F. W. De Klerk*, DMS, At the Opening of the Second Session of the Tenth Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Friday, 4 February, 1991.
11. See *Washington Times*, 6 May, 1990.
12. See Alexander Sullivan and Jim Fisher-Thompson, *Bush, De Klerk Look To End of Apartheid*, Article on visit by South African president, USIA Staff Writers, 24 September 1990.
13. See *RSA Policy Review*, "European round of Honour", Vol. 3, No. 6, June/July 1990.
14. De Klerk poignantly avowed that "...South Africa can only accept co-responsibility for the development of Southern Africa and Africa, which is at present in decline, with foreign support...".
15. See *RSA Policy Review*, "European round of Honour", *op. cit.*
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. See *RSA Update*, Issue No. 16, July 1990, p. 1.

19. See *RSA Update*, Issue No. 33, December 1991, p. 3.
20. Herman Cohen, *Testimony of United States Assistant Secretary of State For African Affairs*, United States Information Service, Johannesburg, 4 October 1989, p. 3.
21. *RSA Policy Review*, Vol. 2, Number 6, August 1989.
22. In backing up Pik Botha's "Marshall Plan", Raymond Ackerman, Chairman and Chief Executive of Pick 'n' Pay, corroborated that South Africa could be the "test-case laboratory for a new relationship between northern and southern nations...the next challenge facing the world". Continued Ackerman, "If South Africa, with northern help and encouragement, can achieve a peaceful transition to democracy, it may be possible to implement a South African-led economic revival through a co-ordinated Marshall Plan package to coincide with economic restructuring in Europe in 1992". See *RSA Update*, Issue No. 16, July 1990, p. 2.
23. Avowed Van Heerden, "Unless we self-destruct, we are destined to be a major power".
24. Quoted in Harvey Tyson, "Straddling The World", *South Africa's New World*, A Leadership Publication, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
25. *Ibid.*
26. See *RSA Policy Review*, "SA's key role in Southern Africa", Vol. 4, Number 7, August 1991, pp. 3-5.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
28. Van Heerden was quite bold when he went to extra lengths to single out a "big league" of states with which South Africa should formalize links: "Our new society will not relate to the lowest common denominator. We shall aspire to the big league. We can overcome any desire to jump into any basket of basket cases. We shall associate with Nigeria, Kenya, Angola and some others because we shall seek each other out for mutual gain. There will be a degree of Africanisation in our thinking, but not at the expense of a global role". See Harvey Tyson, "Straddling the World", *op. cit.*, p. 14.
29. *Southern African Facts Sheet*, "Southern Africa: A Stocktaking", Number 147, Southern African Editorial Services, Sandton, September 1991.
30. *RSA Update*, Issue No. 31, October 1991, p. 1. The Update went on to corroborate that "With a gross domestic product standing at \$88,245 million, South Africa emerges as the uncontested economic power-house on the entire continent".
31. *Financial Times*, Friday 5, June 1992.
32. G. M. E. Leistner, "Whither South Africa? The African perspective in foreign policy", in *Africa Insight*, vol. 18, no. 1, 1988, p. 2.

33. Ibid, pp. 2-3.
34. P. Smit, "The Regional Challenge facing South Africa", *SA Forum Position Paper*, Third Quarter, vol. 12, 1989, p. 7.
35. Deon Geldenhuys, "A Post-Apartheid South Africa's Foreign Policy", *op. cit.*, p. 2.
36. Ibid, p. 2.
37. Peter Vale, "Full Circle", *op. cit.*, p. 10.
38. Vale drew an acute parallel between South Africa and the states of the region: "...many on the continent are inviting - as they see it - the South African lion to lie down with the African lamb". See "Full Circle", *op. cit.*, p. 10; also see "Points of Re-entry", *op. cit.*, pp. 214-229.
39. Peter Vale, "Points of Re-entry", *op. cit.*, p. 218.
40. See Harvey Tyson, "Straddling the World", *op. cit.*, p. 14.
41. See Lance Morrow, "Africa: The Scramble for Existence", in *Time, International*, The Agony of Africa, No. 36, September 7, 1992, p. 37.
42. Morrow went on to argue that, "By the continent's standards, South Africa is undeniably a power house. Its gross domestic product - \$101.7 billion - is three times that of its 10 closest neighbours combined. It produces 60% of Southern Africa's exports and accounts for more than half of its imports. With apartheid receding a consensus is developing around the idea of a southern African economic community that would synchronize economic activities in the region and give it a platform from which to compete in the global market place". See "Africa: The Scramble for Existence", in *Time, International*, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
43. Tom Young "South Africa's Foreign Relations in a Post-Apartheid World", *op. cit.*, pp. 238-239.
44. Ruth Ansah Ayisi, "Waiting for the Giant", in *African Report*, A Publication of the African-American Institute, Vol. 37, No. 2, March-April 1992, p. 65.
45. Kwame Nkrumah, "Framework for African Union Government, *Extracts from the statement of Sekou Toure, President of Guinea 1958-1984, the Sixth Pan-African Congress*, Tanzania, 1974, pp. 32-33.
46. See Adekeye Adebajo, "The Second Wind of Change", *The Woodstock Road Editorial*, St. Anthony's College, Oxford, Hilary Term, 1992, p. 11.
47. Ibrahim A. Gambari, "Africa and The New World Order", *op. cit.*, p. 8.
48. See Lance Morrow, "Africa: The Scramble for Existence", *op. cit.*, p. 26.
49. Ibid.

50. Ibid, p. 30.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. See Ibrahim A. Gambari, "Africa and The New World Order", *op. cit.*, p. 11.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Adekeye Adebajo, "The Second Wind of Change", *op. cit.*, p. 11.
58. Joseph Nye, Jr., "America After the Cold War: What Role for Alliances?", *op. cit.*, p. 6.
59. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy", *op. cit.*, p. 2.
60. Ibid.
61. African National Congress, *ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa*, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
62. The roles of Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping are borrowed from United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Gali's report *An Agenda for Peace*, 31 January 1992.
63. Ibid, p. 6.
64. South Africa faces the unique challenge of finding the proper balance between a demanding foreign policy and external involvement and even more demanding domestic challenges. The South African case, in fact, suggests a unique catch-22 situation: It would be costly for a post-apartheid South Africa to neglect the region in favour of domestic priorities, but it will be even more costly for the country to over-expand in the region and internationally at the expense of domestic priorities.
65. ANC, *The Freedom Charter*, *op. cit.*
66. African National Congress, *ANC Policy Guidelines for A Democratic South Africa*, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
67. Walter Sisulu, Statement by the Deputy President of the ANC, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.

70. African National Congress, *ANC Draft Manifesto On Economic Policy*, Department of Economic Policy, 1992, p. 6.
71. Ibid.
72. Thabo Mbeki "South Africa's International Relations - Today and Tomorrow", *op. cit.*, p. 234.
73. Ibid.
74. Neil P. van Heerden, *South Africa and Africa: The New Diplomacy*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
75. Ibid, p. 9.
76. Ibid.
77. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy", *op. cit.*, p. 2.
78. Ibid.
79. African National Congress, *ANC Policy Guidelines for A Democratic South Africa*, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
80. Quoted in Frederick H. Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, *op. cit.*, p. 412.

Conclusion

We are not going to change the nature of man, nor to solve the dilemmas of political society. We are not going to find means to overcome the great irrational, emotional currents that sweep through nations and races and entire world areas... We are not going to be understood as a nation. In many instances we are not going to understand. All that [we] should do, is to follow the precepts of moderation and tolerance in foreign policy.

George Kennan

It has been the thrust of this thesis that the policy-makers of South Africa's racial oligarchically-run authoritarian state of the past have been too ill-equipped, intellectually, strategically and morally, to foresee, let alone adapt to, national political challenges and global queries at large. In fact, South Africa has, since 1948, conducted a foreign policy dangerously at odds with reality. The notion of apartheid on the one hand, and a constructive and purposive foreign policy on the other, needless to say, is inherently incompatible.

The apartheid grand design, with its glorification of racial inequality and white supremacy could not endure in a post-UN Charter world society sensitive for, and conscious of the politics of human rights, racial equality and the self-determination of people. A viable and successful foreign policy begs for a clear-cut fundamental *sine qua non*: the removal of apartheid and white minority domination, and the establishment of a faithful copy of constitutional democracy.

When that stage is finally reached, South Africa's foreign policy will be confronted with two main challenges; a double catch-up game in effect: catch-up with the true imperatives of democracy and catch-up with mainstream thinking and paradigms in world affairs.

A non-aligned (or internationalist) South Africa will in the future have to realize that, it cannot depend too much on foreign policy largesse, but would have to count, by and large, on its own strengths. In the final analysis of things, South Africa's international standing depends on the successful resolution of issues and challenges related to internal resilience and coping with the dilemmas of a divided and quasi-anarchical society.

The sources of true strength, it will become apparent, lie much deeper than sheer regional and military prowess. It lies eventually in a stable and secure domestic order.

The true predicament of South Africa's challenge should not be underestimated therefore. South Africa's case is unique and its case is new. Because its case is new, South Africa's statesmen will be compelled to think anew, and act anew.

The last thing that South Africa should do is to engage in excessive wishful thinking by overestimating its capacities to come to the rescue of its neighbours. South Africa will hardly be in a position to dictate lay down the rules and the law to Africa. Consider for example what can be depicted here as the *giantism paradox*, on the one hand, and the *giantism dilemma*, on the other.

Notwithstanding the fact that South Africa can generate more economic and military muscle than all the states in the region put together, teaches the *giantism paradox*, the South African functioning anarchy finds itself in the grip of a socio-economic crisis of unprecedented proportions. The following synopsis vividly illustrates the point. Even during the height of enforced isolation and sanctions, when the international community sought to 'squeeze the South African economy until the pips squeak', South Africa accounted for some 80 percent of total GNP of the southern African issue-area; 75 percent of total export; and 68 percent of its total imports.¹ Military too it has been alleged that South Africa's 'super-gun' outsmarts that of all the states in the region.

Yet, despite this manifest *grandeur* of the Republic's *military-industrial complex*, South Africa itself faces an illiteracy rate of over 40 percent back home.² In 1991 alone, South Africa's criminal homicide rate reached an astonishing 22,000, a murder rate five times that of the United States of America.³ In fact, the Republic is now well on its way to being entrenched in a unique culture of violent crime and South African politics is at best a two-speed process: the politics of crime running untrammelled alongside the politics of negotiations and reconciliation. To this should be added the fact that South Africa's own GNP is in the vicinity of US\$2,300, much closer to that of Mexico or Argentina than to the United States, or for that matter Britain, the great empire on the decline.⁴ Contrary to popular conception, South Africa is not a First World state. South Africa came to establish itself firstly as a Third World country, not a First World state with Third World sectors.

It is quite understandable therefore, emanating from the foregoing, that while a non-aligned South Africa cannot afford to divorce itself from the challenges posed by its immediate region of responsibility, great emphasis will unavoidably have to be placed on correcting the vast socio-economic problems back home. If South Africa isolates itself from the problems of the region, the spill-over effect into its domestic affairs might just escalate the crisis back home. Similarly, in order for the region to succeed, South Africa will have to succeed domestically. To put it differently, if South Africa weathers its raging storm domestically, the region will benefit immensely. If, however, South Africa fails, the region will go down with it. 'When South Africa sneezes,' it is clear, 'the rest of the region catches pneumonia'.

This brings us to the *giantism dilemma*.⁵ It is true, following on from the *giantism paradox*, that there are great expectations prevalent in some African quarters that their strong sister in the south will come to play the long awaited mainstay role in the development and

'prosperity' of the continent in order to avert the further deterioration and peripheralization of the continent. It is clear, therefore, that if South Africa decides to withdraw from the region, Africa's fears would only increase. Conversely however, evidence suggests that the 'bully-on-the-bloc-syndrome',⁶ reminiscent of the apartheid oriented foreign policy of the past, is not necessarily going to recede into the background of South Africa's perplexed regional politics. In fact, there is already great concern in some circles that yesterday's bully is not out of necessity about to become tomorrow's friend. In the words of Charles W. Kegley, Jr and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "a powerful and obtrusive neighbour or one that might become so".⁷ Africa, it seems, cannot live with South Africa, nor can it live without South Africa.

South Africa's diplomacy and foreign policy face yet another great challenge therefore: how to persuade the states of the region that it wants to become instrumental in the development and advancement of Africa without the quest to become the typical regional hegemon. In the words of Neil van Heerden: "A primary task of South African diplomacy in Africa is to convince fellow Africans that South Africa has the will and the capacity and, most importantly, the heart to be a good partner in making Africa a better place to live in for all its children".⁸ The litmus test of South Africa's future foreign policy, in other words, will be reassurance without dominance.

All this places a series of indispensable requisitions on South Africa's future foreign policy. It demands that South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy should start from *realism*. It requires a post-pariah foreign policy that will act from strength, both in power and purpose. It orders a future foreign policy that will stress the vital need to generate consent, build lasting agreements, and, very important, to negotiate on vital and fundamental issues. It demands the levy that South Africa should strive to use its strengths with

prudence, firmness and balance. And it demands a strict realization of the premise that, ultimately, foreign policy begins at home.

This seems to be a feasible way forward for South Africa; this way forward is the strategy of active and constructive diplomacy and moderation, tolerance and leadership through an assertive, consistent and purposive foreign policy.

Notes to Conclusion

1. See Christ Landsberg, "Beyond Apartheid: What new role can the 'regional giant' afford to play?" *op. cit.*, p. 9.
 2. Ibid.
 3. See, for example, Chris Landsberg and mark Suzman, "South Africa's Quest for Democracy", *op. cit.*, p. 27.
 4. Ibid.
 5. The idea of the *giantism dilemma* is borrowed from the concept *security dilemma*. Security dilemma refers to that predicament and case in the anarchical international arena that states, by striving to ensure and increase their own security - through policies that enhance their military capabilities, make other states inadvertently feel insecure. As a result, an endless web and spiral of security - insecurity arises. (See, for a brief discussion of the security dilemma Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 362).
- John Herz in his manuscripts *Political Realism and Political idealism* (1951), and the *nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics* (1976) was among the first scholars to conceptualize the *security dilemma*. Said Herz, Arms acquired for defensive purposes by some are perceived by others as constituting a threat, which then provokes similar behaviour by the one who feels threatened. In the words of Kegley and Wittkopf, "All nations search for strength; all cherish national advantage; none willingly accepts vulnerability" (*World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 352). Hedley Bull also summed up this dilemma: the anarchical international society as it is consists of members who distrust one another and spend most of their time, if not actually attacking one another, then at the least protecting themselves from attack. (See *The Anarchical Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 27).
6. See, for example, Harvey Tyson, "Straddling the World", in *Leadership, South Africa's New World*, *op. cit.*, p. 14. Tyson prefers to speak of 'the big boy on the bloc'.
 7. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
 8. Neil P. van Heerden, *South Africa and Africa: The New Diplomacy*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

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