

THE LOGOS, TRINITY AND

INCARNATION

IN

EARLY GREEK APOLOGETICS

by

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PREFACE:

This study has a two-fold nature. In one sense the focus of attention is on the Apologists. The chapters on Clement and Athanasius attempt to follow through the basic questions raised by the Apologists. But in the other sense, what I have presented is four independent studies dealing with Justin, the other Apologists, Clement and Athanasius's *Contra Gentes*. Although much the same questions have been asked in all four sections, there has been no rigid attempt to systematize the answers. This may well be one of the strengths as well as one of the weaknesses of the work.

There is a major omission in the study. This is the lack of serious consideration of Celsus. He forms an essential part of the background to the Apologetic era, and it seems that an examination of his attitude towards reason would highlight and explain much of Justin's reaction towards philosophy.

Real difficulty has been experienced throughout the year due to unavailability of literature in South Africa. Another difficulty has been the elementary knowledge of and proficiency in German. The following are books which needed to be examined but could not be for either of the above reasons:

H Chadwick: Contra Celsus (CUP, 1957);

G. Andresen: Logos und Nomos: Die Polemik des Kelsos das Christentum (Berlin, 1955).

M. Elze: Tatian und seine Theologie (Göttingen, 1960);

E. Molland: The Conception of the Gospel in Alexandrian Theology (Oslo, 1938);

F.L. Cross: The Study of Athanasius (OUP, 1945).

I only managed to browse in, but not fully digest, N. Hyldahl's Philosophie und Christentum, Einer Interpretation der Einleitung zum Dialog Justins (Kopenhagen, 1966), but van Winden seems to be correct

in his assessment of this work (cf. below, p. 27f).

References:

All references to Albinus are to the page and line number of Platonis Dialogi, vol. VI, ed. C.F. Hermann (Leipzig, 1884).

References to all other writers, except Athanasius, are to the chapter and verse of the particular work cited; the brackets contain firstly the page number in the Ante-Nicene Christian Library (Edinburgh, 1867f), this is followed by the reference to the relevant volume of Migne. Athanasius is referred to by the chapter and verse from the Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. IV, followed by the Migne reference.

All quotes are from the ANCL or above, except were otherwise stated.

Finally I must thank my wife, Lynette, for her continual support and interest, and especially for reading the text and pointing out many stylistic and grammatical errors.

I. JUSTIN MARTYR.

(1) Introduction:

The second century was a period of crisis and rapid transition for the whole Christian Church. The points of conflict which had to be resolved can be divided broadly into two - firstly, the internal struggle against Gnosticism and Marcionism, and secondly, the external struggle both against the state and the Hellenistic world. While in many ways Gnosticism is representative of the Hellenistic milieu, the real struggle in the time of the Apologists appears to have been against the rationalism of the philosophical schools. The conflict between the Church and Celsus is indicative of a deeper and more general tension.

The glimpses we have of the Church life in the second half and the second century are mainly to be taken from somewhat earlier witnesses, that is the Apostolic Fathers. Here the communities are portrayed as being intimate, closely knit groups which are in virtual opposition to the whole surrounding culture. These groups are centred on the confession of Christ as Lord in their worship. This confession was in conscious opposition to the Emperor cult. It is out of such a context of worship that the early confessions of faith, such as that of Ignatius' Eph. 7, come. Of this type of confession W. Bousset writes that their distinctive mark 'is a reveling in contradiction'.¹ This appeal to the irrational, experiential element of religion is a characteristic of the Church which was well suited to its social background at the time. As has been stated, it is this element in Christianity which was so offensive to the well-educated pagan,² and which undoubtedly became a stumbling

(1) Kyrios Christos (New York, 1970), p. 327.

(2) cf. E.R. Dodds: Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety (CUP, 1965), p. 120.

block in the missionary work of the Church. This element of the Church's life surfaces in Justin in the many instances where he appeals to what 'we have been taught',³ and where he uses quasi-credal formulations which clearly come from the liturgical life of the Church.⁴ Justin's traditionalism is also seen in his use not only of the Old Testament, but also of what was yet to become the New Testament.⁵

Another major point concerning the Christian background to Justin is the extreme concern with morality in the post-Apostolic period. This is taken so far that it amounts to a legalism which is a denial of grace. Although the subject of ethics is not our immediate concern, the inheritance of this tradition by the Apologists can be seen in their refutation of the charges of immorality brought against the Church. There is also the central matter of grace, which we will be concerned with in this study mainly as the conflict between reason and revelation. In many ways, however, this background has been coupled by the Apologists with a similar concern in the philosophical tradition. Theophilus is probably the Apologist most influenced by the Judaeo-Christian legalism.

But the time had to come when the isolated, inward-looking nature of the Church became an obstacle conflicting with the priority of mission. The world was threatening the Church on every front.

- (3) cf. I Apol. 10.1(13,340C), and also R. Holte: "Logos Spermatikos: Christianity and Ancient Philosophy according to St. Justin's Apologies", Studia Theologica, 12 (1958), p. 117.
- (4) cf. J.N.D. Kelly: Early Christian Creeds (London, 1971), pp. 70ff, and also J. Daniélou: Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture (London, 1973), p. 22.
- (5) cf. W.A. Shotwell: The Biblical Exegesis of Justin Martyr (SPCK, 1965), and also R. Heard: "The Apomnemoneumata in Papias, Justin, and Irenaeus", NTS, 1 (1954-5), pp. 122ff.

Both Gnosticism and Marcionism can be interpreted as attempts of parties within the Church to come to terms with their environment. Thus A. von Harnack could call Gnosticism 'die akute Verweltlichung des Christenthums'.⁶ These heretical attempts to burst out of isolation had to be countered, but it was not sufficient to show their error; something positive had to be substituted for them. The whole Apologetic tradition is such an attempt, not only to defend the Church against the influence of its environment, but also to present the gospel message in comprehensible terms. In this sense all the Apologies are to be regarded as then 'missionary literature of the second century, the presentation of the Gospel in a pagan world'.⁷

The appearance of such literature at this particular time was no doubt due to the new flowering of philosophy in many forms. The emergence of Middle-Platonism and Marcus Aurelius' patronage of all philosophy provides part of the background that produced men like Justin and Athenagoras, who are well-schooled in the pagan philosophies and have crossed over to Christianity, and thus span both worlds. In this regard these Apologists follow in a noble tradition of which they were not unaware, namely, the tradition of Jewish apologetic. The Wisdom of Solomon, Philo, the Sibylline Writings and even St. Paul are all precursors to Justin, and Justin in particular was familiar with Hellenistic Judaism. But in the Apologist it is for the first time that the Church found itself actively engaged in real dialogue with the Greek world. It no doubt looked back to the tradition we have mentioned as legitimation for this task. Although the so-called Hellenization of Christianity cannot be said to have begun with the Apologists, it seems reasonable to say that it was with them that the encounter with the pagan world set in earnest. This process would eventually come to its climax with the conversion of Constantine.

It is of immense significance that, in many regards, Christianity found a valuable ally in philosophy. Both were fundamentally at odds with the polytheism of the times, and the Apologists found a special friend in Middle-Platonism because of their common belief in the transcendence of God.⁸ Also useful to the Apologists was the ground which philosophy had prepared for them by appealing to reason. The primary thrust of Justin's apologetic is the appeal to the reason of his reader, and especially to that of the Emperor, on the grounds that the Christians have the true Reason, the Logos of God. By this subtle play on the word *λόγος*, Justin is able both to apologetically accommodate his audience and to be very critical of the reasonableness of the philosophers. This proclamation of the reasonableness of Christianity may even have arisen out of the criticisms of the Church by the pagan world. It definitely intends to be an answer to the criticisms of a Celsus. Because of this apologetic it is really quite ironic that Justin should have been martyred under the 'philosopher-king'.⁹

When one inquires more closely into Justin's background, matters are no longer so clear. It seems that, because of a lack of direct evidence of dependence between Justin and the limited number of representatives of Middle-Platonism, the precise nature of his background will always be a matter of some conjecture, recent advances notwithstanding.¹⁰ Another point of controversy in Justin's

(6) Dogmengeschichte (Freiburg, 1898), p. 48.

(7) Daniélou, op. cit. p. 9.

(8) cf. ibid. pp. 20f.

(9) cf. W. Jaeger: Early Christianity and Greek Paideia (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 27f.

(10) For the Middle Platonic background cf. C. Andresen: "Justin und der mittlere Platonismus", ZNW, 44 (1952-3), pp. 159-199; Holte, op. cit., and now Daniélou, op. cit.

knowledge of, and thereby dependance on, Philo. Here one can discern the inevitable - scholars finding dependance between things about which they know the most. H.A. Wolfson, being an expert on Philo, finds that all the Church Fathers have an intimate knowledge of Philo.¹¹ Likewise E.R. Goodenough finds many points of similarity between Philo and Justin and he presumes that these similarities imply dependance.¹² While such a dependance is definite in the case of the Alexandrians from Clement onwards, it is by no means certain in the case of Justin. In an indirect way it has been questioned by Pannenberg,¹³ and directly challenged by Shotwell, who concludes that the differences between Justin and Philo outweigh the similarities, and that these similarities are best explained by postulating a background to Justin influenced by Philo, or even by ideas and methods represented in Philo.¹⁴ And so while Philo can shed much light on Justin's background, it would be folly to presume a relationship of dependance. A similar problem exists over the question of the background to Justin's Logos theology. Part of the problem here is whether or not Justin knew of John's gospel. In turn this question raises the whole problem of the history of the gospel of John in the early second century. It appears to have been used in

(11) The Philosophy of the Church Fathers (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), p. 233.

(12) The Theology of Justin Martyr (Amsterdam, 1968), passim.

(13) "The Appropriation of the Philosophical Concept of God as a Dogmatic Problem in Early Christian Theology", Basic Questions in Theology (SCM, 1971), vol. 2, p. 151.

(14) op. cit. pp. 99-109.

Gnostic circles and consequently it was suppressed or regarded as not the best source of authority in orthodox circles. Again scholars disagree on all fronts. Without apparently realizing the problem, Wolfson presumes that Justin used Philo 'as a sort of commentary on the Prologue of the Gospel according to John'.¹⁵ C.F.D. Moule¹⁶ quotes J.N. Sanders¹⁷ to show how uncertain Justin's knowledge of John is. This debate has been taken up by T.E. Pollard¹⁸ and J. Howton.¹⁹ The sum total of the evidence seem to be quite inconclusive, either to show that Justin knew John or that he did not. Because of this we cannot look to this source for the background to his Logos theology. We shall have to be content with the Stoic and Middle-Platonic traditions.

Methodologically criticism appears to have resolved itself fairly neatly into two camps. The one has concerned itself with theological, and the other with philological issues.²⁰ In this study, while the main emphasis is theological, we have tried not to avoid philological issues when they are either necessary or when they facilitate the exegesis. We have tried to be exegetical, to examine Justin and the other authors for what they seem to be saying on the topic under discussion. Scholarship is further subdivided because of the scope

(15) *op. cit.* p. 233.

(16) The Birth of the New Testament (A and C Black, 1966), p. 195.

(17) The Fourth Gospel in the Early Church (CUP, 1943), p. 31.

(18) Johannine Christology and the Early Church (CUP, 1970), pp. 39f.

(19) "The Theology of the Incarnation in Justin", Studia Patristica, 9 (1966), pp. 232ff.

(20) cf. J.C.M. van Winden: An Early Christian Philosopher: Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho, Chapters One to Nine (Leiden, 1971), pp. 1f.

of the various enquiries into different aspects of Justin's thought. For instance, Holte is concerned with the Apologies and does not seriously concern himself with the Dialogue. On the other hand, van Winden deals with Dial. 1-9 and not with the Apologies. While such specialization is inevitable, it is to be regretted, since neither approach is in a position to really assess the whole picture. It is because of this specialization that Holte maintains that the theory of the λόγος διπλομετρικός 'is not mentioned in the Dialogue'.²¹ This is quite true but not the whole truth, since the rejection in Dial. 1-9 of the Platonic idea of the immortality of the soul and thereby of rational apprehension of the deity, surely has a very important bearing on the adaptation of the Stoic idea of the λόγος διπλομετρικός in the II Apol.²² In this study an attempt is made to see the issues in the broadest possible perspective. Because of this aim, detail of an inessential nature has at times had to be overlooked.

These considerations lead naturally to our final point of introduction. This concerns the relationship of the different works to each other. The main difference between them is clearly that the Apologies are written for Greeks and the Dialogue is a conversation with a Jew. Here we are at the central methodological problem of all critical work dealing with apologetics. How much is the author influenced by his audience and how does the critic deal with this influence? Is there a Justin who is not apologetic and can the critic reach him? Luckily in the case of Justin he seems to give himself away to a certain extent. While this issue is dealt with in

(21) op. cit. p. 110.

(22) For these issues in more detail, cf. below, pp. 34ff.

more detail below,²³ we can note here that, despite some controversy, there is no conclusive proof that the I and II Apologies are really part of the same work.²⁴

(2) The Doctrine of God:

In an important article W. Pannenberg argued that one of the major theological problems of the apologetic era was the appropriation of the philosophical concept of God into Christian theology.²⁵

Pannenberg maintains that the main difficulty facing the Christian theologian was not the transcendence of God, nor even the elements of the Greek idea which describe God as completely impersonal, but indeed the tendency in all forms of Greek thought to regard God as the highest essence of the world. Even when God is described as 'beyond all essence' (ἐπέκεινα πάσης τῆς οὐσίας), he is still regarded as the ἀρχή of the world, in the sense of God being that which makes sense of the world or as the logical copula binding all existence together. In this sense ἀρχή becomes identicle with τέλος and God is still very much part of the world. Pannenberg regards this attitude to be in basic opposition to the biblical view, where God is not ever thought of as the prime ontological or even cosmological entity, but he is free from the universe and is the sovereign of it. In this sense God being the ἀρχή is interpreted very differently - he is not the explanation of the existence of the world, that which makes sense of the world, but the actual creator of the world, and the world is dependant in every sense for its existence on God and not vice-versa. God then, as the ἀρχή of the world is the

(23) cf. below, pp. 42f.

(24) For this debate, cf. A.W.F. Blunt: The Apologies of Justin Martyr (CUP, 1911), pp. xlv-xlvii.

(25) op. cit.

(26) cf. R.P.C. Hanson: God, creator, Saviour, Spirit (SCM, 1960), p. 18.

absolute sovereign and ruler of the world both in its creation and in its continued existence. It is because of the question of God's absolute sovereignty over the world that the question of creative ex nihilo is going to be of immense importance throughout this thesis.

When we turn to Justin, asking how he has adapted the philosophical concept of God, the first issue is to define what philosophical concept we are dealing with. That this is the Middle-Platonic concept is now almost an axiom of the scholarship concerned with this period. This seems to have come to Justin through the 'Schulplatonismus' for which Albinus is our chief source. But before describing Justin's use of this tradition, it is important to notice that this background is by no means the only source for his doctrine of God. Another major source is to be found in Hellenistic Judaism. Here there arises a major problem for the critic, for it is not always possible to trace one thought to the Middle-Platonic background and another to the Hellenistic Judaism. The thought of the time is so syncretistic that there appear to have been many features in common between the two, and nowhere is this more apparent than in the doctrine of God. This is immediately apparent from even a partial glimpse at Philo. But it is nevertheless important to bear in mind the fact that Justin is not a clean, shiny product of the 'Schulplatonismus'.

This Jewish background seems mainly to be evident in the language describing God as 'the Father and Maker (τὸν ποιῆσαντα as opposed to δημιουργόν) of the heavens and the earth',²⁷ which abounds in the Dialogue. This is quite natural considering the Jewish audience of that work. In the Apologies the creative activity of

(27) Dial. 74(190,649A) and (191,649B). For δημιουργόν cf. I Apol. 8.2(12,337B), 13.1(16,345B), and for γεννήτορα cf. 13.4(17,348A).

God is presented in Greek terms. In I Apol. 10 God is described as the 'provider of all things' (παρέχοντα πάντα) and the 'source of all good virtues'.²⁸ Justin goes on:

He in the beginning did of His goodness, for man's sake create all things out of unformed matter (ἐξ ἄμορφου ὕλης).²⁹

The term ὕλη is a technical term agreeing with the Platonic doctrine, but it was apparently adopted from Aristotle into Middle-Platonism.³⁰ The presence of the ὕλη is a point of contention is all the writers considered in this study. Justin's use of this tradition of course corresponds to Gen. 1.2 and the Timaeus 29d. Of interest to later studies on this subject is the next statement of Justin's, that 'He (God) created us when we were not' (ὡκ ὄντας). He explains this by saying: 'For the coming into being at first was not in our power'. From this evidence we must conclude that the ὡκ in ὡκ ἔστας is not used absolutely, and its use is here quite compatible with the lingering idea of the eternal ὕλη.³¹

In this respect Justin has not managed to remove the undesirable elements from the philosophical concept of God. Justin's doctrine of creation is, however, used as a polemical tool both against Cynical determinism and Marcionism. The determinism, so strong a feature

(28) 10.1(13,340C).

(29) 10.2(14,340C).

(30) i.e. Albinus: Didaskalos 9(163.10f), and, of course, Wis. 11.17.

(31) cf. also I Apol. 59.1(57,416Bf) where Justin writes as he agrees with Plato: ὕλην ἄμορφον ὄσαν ἐτρέφαντα τὸν θεὸν κόσμον ποιῆσαι.

of Gnosticism, is refuted by reference to creation 'for man's sake'.³² Determinism has no place in a creation where all 'things earthly' are subject to man and when God's care and providence rule over all.³³ Very similar to these references are both Justin's attacks on Marcion.³⁴ An element arising from this is the connection of this part of Justin's thought with his very close linking of Christianity and the Old Testament. The God who created all things and revealed himself in the Old Testament through his Logos is the same God who reveals himself through the Logos in the fulfilment of the Old Testament. The insistence that creation was *διὰ τὸν Λόγον* may also indirectly be against Marcion. We will return to this later.³⁵

Justin's debt to the Middle-Platonic tradition becomes more evident when he defines God's relationship with the world in negative terms. God is 'very Being' (*ἐκείνο τὸ ὄν*), having 'no colour, no form, no greatness'; he is 'beyond all essence (*ἐπέκεινα πάσης οὐσίας*), unutterable (*ἄτα φητόν*) and inexplicable, but alone honourable and good'.³⁶ Other words of similar meaning used by Justin are *ἀχώρατος*,³⁷ and *ἄρηγτος*.³⁸ These both have a very strong basis in Middle-Platonism.³⁹ Of more interest is the description of God

(32) cf. II Apol. 4.2(75,452A).

(33) cf. II Apol. 5.2(75,452B).

(34) I Apol. 26.5(29,368C) and 58.1(57,416A). cf. also 45.1(45,396C) and 46.5(47,397C). This point is noted by Goodenough, op. cit. p. 134, n. 4

(35) cf. below, pp. 45f.

(36) Dial. 4(91,484A). Here Justin is quoting Plato with apparent approval. For the precise meaning of *ἐπέκεινα πάσης οὐσίας* and the history of its use cf. below, p. 136.

(37) Dial. 127(261,772B).

(38) I Apol. 9.3(13,340B).

(39) cf. Daniélou, op. cit. p.331, and Albinus: Did. 10(164.7).

as $\alpha\gamma\epsilon\nu\nu\gamma\tau\omicron\varsigma$.⁴⁰ Goodenough regards Justin's use of the term as a mistake 'quite natural in a philosophical dilettante'.⁴¹ G.L. Prestige has however shown, despite Lightfoot,⁴² that there seems to have been no little confusion in our period between $\alpha\gamma\epsilon\nu\nu\gamma\tau\omicron\varsigma$ and $\alpha\gamma\epsilon\nu\gamma\tau\omicron\varsigma$.⁴³ A still more recent contribution to the debate comes from Daniélou, who maintains that the use of $\alpha\gamma\epsilon\nu\gamma\tau\omicron\varsigma$ should be traced through Josephus to Philo and thereby to the 'language of Jewish apologetic', whilst $\alpha\gamma\epsilon\nu\nu\gamma\tau\omicron\varsigma$ should be traced to Middle-Platonism.⁴⁴ Without more detailed argument from Daniélou it is impossible really to assess this suggestion, but it is an unlikely thesis. Daniélou suggests that the use of $\alpha\gamma\epsilon\nu\gamma\tau\omicron\varsigma$ in Philo is derived from Jewish apologetic, but it seems much more likely that the term comes straight from Plato. Justin anyhow seems almost certainly to be unaware of the difference in meaning between the two words.⁴⁵ Of course, as Prestige puts it: 'In so far as God was thought of as the universal Father, there was little need to distinguish between generation and creation'. Because of this 'God was the only being to which either word could properly be applied'.⁴⁶ Probably, despite Justin's apparent ignorance of $\alpha\gamma\epsilon\nu\gamma\tau\omicron\varsigma$, the term $\alpha\gamma\epsilon\nu\nu\gamma\tau\omicron\varsigma$ may often be interpreted in the light

(40) e.g. I Apol. 14.2(17,348B) and 25.2(28,365B).

(41) op. cit. p. 130.

(42) Apostolic Fathers (London, 1885), vol. 2, pp. 90ff.

(43) God in Patristic Thought (SPCK, 1959), pp. 37ff. cf. also J.F. Bethune-Baker: The Early History of Christian Doctrine (London, 1962), p. 122, n.1.

(44) op. cit. p. 324.

(45) cf. Dial. 5(94,488Bf), where $\alpha\gamma\epsilon\nu\nu\gamma\tau\omicron\varsigma$ is used where one would expect $\alpha\gamma\epsilon\nu\gamma\tau\omicron\varsigma$.

(46) op. cit. p. 41.

of a contrast between God the Father and the Son, who is the 'first-begotten'.⁴⁷ This is also noticed by Daniélou, but he takes the matter too far by suggesting that in this slight adaptation of the Middle-Platonic doctrine we find the beginnings of a doctrine of the Trinity.⁴⁸

As in Plato, the immediate problem of such language is how a God who can only be described in negative terms can be known. The original Platonic theory seems to be represented in Albinus, where God, or the first cause, or indeed the whole intellectual realm, can only be grasped by the mind.⁴⁹ The significance of this tradition will be realized when we come to deal with the doctrine of the Logos.⁵⁰ H.A. Wolfson maintains that Philo is the first person to take this tradition a step further and to maintain that God is unknowable. In this he claims that Philo is really indebted to his Jewish heritage. This applies also to the description of God as 'unnamable' (ἀκατονομάστου), which plays a large part in Justin's thought especially in the Dialogue. Philo describes God as 'incomprehensible' (ἀκαταλήπτου).⁵¹ This is taken to mean that 'He is not apprehensible even by the mind, save in the fact that He is'.⁵² That Philo developed this into an integral part of his

(47) cf. I Apol. 14.1(17,348B), 49.5(48,401A), 53.2(52,405C).

This suggestion is made by Prestige, op. cit. p. 39.

(48) op. cit. p. 330f.

(49) cf. Albinus: Did. 10(165.4): ἄρρητος δ' ἔστι καὶ τῷ νῦ μόνῳ λογικός. For this point cf. Daniélou, op. cit. p. 333.

(50) cf. below, pp. 29f.

(51) Somm. I, 11, 67. cf. H.A. Wolfson: Philo (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), vol. 2, p. 111. cf. also Sextus Empiricus: Sentences 28.

(52) Immort. 13, 62: ὁ δ' ἄρα οὐδὲ τῷ νῦ καταλήπτος ὅτι μὴ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι μόνον. cf. also Wolfson, op. cit. pp. 119-121.

his doctrine of God has been questioned by Pannenberg who argues against Wolfson.⁵³ We tend to side with Wolfson. Albinus' *ἀγνός* and Justin's *καταληγτός* seem to be decisive.⁵⁴ This tendency in Philo towards a Neo-Platonic doctrine of God is in some ways mirrored in Justin. The main source for this tendency is in the Dialogue. It is again at this point that we notice the close similarity between the philosophical tradition and Hellenistic Judaism. The central argument of the Dialogue is for the existence of a second God. The premiss for this argument is that since God cannot be named, he is properly speaking unknowable. As Pannenberg shows, this is not a peculiarly philosophical argument.⁵⁵ It seems rather to have been part of the common milieu of the time. It is hinted at in Middle-Platonism, and Justin's statement that the names given to God are 'but appellations derived from His good deeds and functions' is a natural statement both for a Middle-Platonist and a Jew.⁵⁶ From this premiss Justin uses the argument of the impossibility of God appearing in a theophany to prove that there must be a second God to reveal him.⁵⁷ God is thus:

(He) who remains ever in the supercelestial places, invisible to men, holding personal intercourse with none, whom we believe to be Maker and Father of all things.⁵⁸

(53) op. cit. p. 129, n. 33.

(54) Dial. 3(91,481D).

(55) op. cit. p. 150.

(56) II Apol. 6.2(76,453A). cf. also I Apol. 10.1(14,340C) and 61.11(60,421B).

(57) cf. Goodenough, op. cit. pp. 143ff. for the Platonic, Philonic and Rabbinic background to this argument.

(58) Dial. 56(158,596D-597A). cf. also Goodenough, op. cit. pp. 126f.

This fixing of God's 'locality' is not to the total exclusion of his activity in the world:

He sees all things, and knows all things, and none of us escapes His observation; and He is not moved or confined to a spot in the whole world, for He existed before the world was made.⁵⁹

But despite this, God has 'personal intercourse with none', and

he who has the smallest intelligence will not venture to assert that the Maker and Father of all things, having left all supercelestial matters, was visible on a little portion of the earth.⁶⁰

It is because of this kind of transcendence and remoteness of God that he sent forth his Son as an intermediary who appears 'sometimes in the form of fire, and sometimes in the likeness of angels'.

And: 'He declares whatever we ought to know, and is sent forth to declare whatever is revealed'.⁶¹

This argument leads to a conundrum. On the one hand God is the creator and maker of all things, but on the other he has nothing to do with the created order. One might like to describe the tension as existing between the Greek and Jewish conceptions of God as inherited by Justin, but this problem cannot be so simply explained, since the same problem existed in Hellenistic Judaism. This same difficulty is really manifest in the doctrine of the Logos, for how can this schema avoid deep subordinationism if various key attributes

(59) Dial. 127(261, 772B). For a similar view cf. Origen: Contra Celsus VI, 64(406, 1396B).

(60) Dial. 60(168f, 612C).

(61) I Apol. 63.5(61, 424Af).

of the deity are ascribed to God but not to the Logos? One can see why Justin uses the argument to justify the belief in a second God and it certainly does achieve this, but the problem is that this 'second God' must eventually end up being the Arian Logos.⁶² So far as the doctrine of God is concerned we can see how the difficulty arises over the vexed question of how God related to the world.⁶³ If Justin had got his doctrine of creation right and integrated it into the rest of his thought, there would be no problem, but as it is, the tendency of his thought is for all of God's relations with the world to be understood and described in terms of the Logos. If the only God so far as the world is concerned is the Logos, the relationship between God and the Logos becomes of vital importance. If God is considered only as the originator of the Logos and otherwise has only negative attributes, it becomes very difficult for the Logos not to become God in actual fact, and for Justin's God to disappear somewhere along his apophatic way. In this way the doctrine of God reduces to the doctrine of the Logos.

In conclusion then, we can say that in essence Justin has made no significant contribution to the problem of the appropriation of the philosophical concept of God into Christian theology. What he presents is mainly Middle-Platonism with its God made more personal with tinges of Hellenistic Judaism. His attempts to make this specifically Christian seem to fail because he never really comes to terms with the question of creation and of how God, rather than a 'second God', relates to the created order.

(62) cf. H. Chadwick: Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition (OUP, 1966), p. 16.

(63) For this question in Middle-Platonism cf. R.E. Witt: Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism (Amsterdam, 1971), pp. 123f.

(3) The Doctrine of the Logos:

(a) The Logos and God:

The most consistent way that Justin uses to describe the relationship of the Logos to God is that the Logos was begotten from God. Thus, the Logos is the first $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\mu\alpha$ from the $\alpha\gamma\epsilon\gamma\eta\gamma\epsilon\tau\omega$ $\Theta\epsilon\omega$.⁶⁴ He is the $\pi\rho\omega\tau\acute{o}\tau\omicron\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ $\tau\omega$ $\Theta\epsilon\omega$. An example of this kind of language is the following:

...and that Jesus Christ is the only proper Son ($\mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\varsigma$ $\text{ἰδ\acute{o}\omega\varsigma}$ $\upsilon\acute{\iota}\acute{o}\varsigma$) who has been begotten of God ($\gamma\epsilon\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\tau\omicron\iota$), being His Word and first-begotten ($\pi\rho\omega\tau\acute{o}\tau\omicron\kappa\omicron\varsigma$), and power ($\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$).⁶⁵

To understand this kind of language it is necessary to turn to Justin's use of the Wisdom tradition, and especially to his exegesis of Prov. 8.22ff (in all cases LXX). It is the thesis of H.A. Wolfson that all the Church Fathers can almost be classified by their different exegeses of this passage, and therefore by their different theories of the origin of the Logos.⁶⁶

In Dial. 129 we see how Prov. 8.22ff is used to describe the relationship of the Logos to God. Prov. 8.22 specifically is used to establish the separate existence of the Logos from God.⁶⁷ In this whole passage it is quite clear that Wisdom is identified

(64) cf. p. 13 above, and also I Apol. 12.7(15,344B): 'God who begat ($\tau\acute{o}\nu$ $\gamma\epsilon\gamma\eta\gamma\epsilon\tau\alpha$) him'; 21.1(25,360A): $\pi\rho\omega\tau\omega$ $\gamma\epsilon\gamma\eta\mu\alpha$; Dial. 129(263,777B) etc.

(65) I Apol. 23.2(27,364A). cf. also 46.2(46,397B) and 53.2 (52,405C), where there is a close connection of the 'first-born' ($\pi\rho\omega\tau\acute{o}\tau\omicron\kappa\omicron\varsigma$) with the 'Unbegotten God' ($\tau\omega$ $\alpha\gamma\epsilon\gamma\eta\gamma\epsilon\tau\omega$ $\Theta\epsilon\omega$); also 63.15(62,425B) and finally 58.3(57,416B), where $\pi\rho\omega\tau\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\nu\omicron\varsigma$ occurs in the same sense as $\pi\rho\omega\tau\acute{o}\tau\omicron\kappa\omicron\varsigma$.

(66) The Philosophy of the Church Fathers (Cambridge, Mass., 1956). passim.

(67) 129(263,777B): '...and that that which is begotten is numerically distinct from that which begets, any one will admit.'

with the Logos. This act of generation is described in several places, and is often, as in Prov. 8.22, linked with the creation of the world. This is the case in Dial. 61. Here we must depart from the ANCL and translate:

...God has begotten (γενόμενος) a beginning before all created things (ἀρχὴν πρὸ πάντων τῶν κτισμάτων), a rational power from himself, who at one time is called the glory of the Lord by the Holy Spirit, at another Son, at another Wisdom, at another Angel...⁶⁸

Here the begetting of the Logos and the creation of the world appear to be temporally separated. This quote, together with evidence such as the πρὸ τῶν ποιμάτων of II Apol. 6, leads Wolfson to conclude that Justin firmly advocated what he calls a 'twofold stage theory of the Logos'.⁶⁹ Actually there is one slight complication to this view. This is the interpretation of the ὅτι in II Apol. 6 (76,453A). Here there is almost a contradiction. The Logos is described as πρὸ τῶν ποιμάτων, καὶ συνὺν καὶ γενόμενος, ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν δ' αὐτοῦ (Λόγος) πάντα ἔκτισε καὶ ἐκόσμησε (Θεός). The πρὸ τῶν ποιμάτων is balanced by the γενόμενος, ὅτι...⁷⁰ Because of this it is advisable to bear in mind the warning of Bethune-Baker:

Some of his (Justin's) phrases imply that the Logos existed with God before the creation potentially only coming to actuality when the world was made.⁷¹

This must just be a cautionary note because Wolfson is undoubtedly correct. The following puts the matter beyond all doubt:

(68) Dial. 61(170, 613Bf).

(69) op. cit. p. 192.

(70) For the interpretation of the ὅτι, cf. Goodenough, op. cit. p. 154.

(71) op. cit. p. 124.

But the offspring which was truly brought forth from the Father (Ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ὄντι αὐτὸ τῷ Πατρὶ πρόβληθὲν γέννημα), was with the Father before all creatures, and the Father communed with Him (καὶ τούτῳ ὁ Πατὴρ προσομιλήσῃ).⁷²

Having established the time (if it can be called time) of the begetting of the Logos, that is before creation, we can now go on to examine the mode of begetting itself. In Prov. 8.22ff a number of verbs are used: κύριος ἔκτισέ με, ἐθεμελίωσεν and ποιήσας are used of creation, and προηθεῖν is used of the springs welling up; then finally the ἔκτισέ με is taken up and expressed as γενῆ με. What is startlingly noticeable in Justin's use of this verse is that he ignores the other verbs and uses the γενῆ με almost exclusively.⁷³ Also this language which would naturally be used of the Father-Son relationship is freely used of the relationship of God to his Logos.⁷⁴ Justin explains the use of the term, in order to counter this difficulty, with an almost Athanasian comment on the nature of analogy:

And if we assert that the Word of God was born (γενεῆσθαι) in a peculiar manner, different from ordinary generation (παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν γένεσιν), let this, as said above, be no extraordinary thing to you.⁷⁵

Although Justin almost always uses γεννάω, there are instances where other verbs occur. One of these has already been quoted, Dial. 62(172,617C). Here we find what seems to be one of the few instances of the use of προβάλλω, and here this very gnostic

(72) Dial. 62 (172, 617C).

(73) cf. Dial. 129(263,777B).

(74) cf. M. Wiles: "Eternal Generation", *JTS*, 12 (1961), p. 284.

(75) I Apol. 22.1(26,361A).

idea is qualified by τῷ ὄντι, which is clearly Justin's attempt to free the word from its gnostic connotations.⁷⁶ προπηδάω is used in Dial. 128(262,776A), and the same usage of this word occurs in Tatian: Orat. 5(9,813C). This word does not seem to have any special connotations, except perhaps a connection with the word coming forth from the mind. ἀπόβρελλω is used in I Apol. 63.5(61,424B) in conjunction with Christ being called 'angel and apostle'. Only once does προελθόν appear to have been used and this is only in an analogy similar to that of Prov. 8.24. When a comparison is made with Tatian, for instance, this reticence to use the more gnostic verbs, especially προβάλλω and προελθόν, seems to indicate an awareness on Justin's part of the dangers inherent in such vocabulary. When we come to discuss Justin's use of the δύναμις tradition this conclusion will be strengthened.

Having dealt with the actual verb used to describe the act of begetting, we can now move on to describe what other hints are given as to what this verb signifies. A very important text in this regard is to be found in Dial. 61:

For He can be called by all these names, since He Ministers to the Father's will (τῷ πατρικῷ βουλήματι), and since He was begotten by the will of his Father (ἐκ τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς θελήσει γεννηθῆαι);⁷⁷

- (76) προβάλλω is also used in Dial. 61(170,616A), which is quoted below. For προβάλλω and the resultant προβοδή cf. Irenaeus: Adv. Haer. I.1.1(5,445A) and I.1.2(5,449A).
- (77) This chapter shows evidence of a confusion between γεννηθῆαι and γεννηθῆναι. We first find ὁ θεὸς γεννηκε δύναμιν τινα, then ἐκ τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς θελήσει γεννηθῆαι. These are followed by γινόμενον (variant γινόμενον) and λόγον γεννώμεν. The use of γινόμενον cannot really be considered since the two γ-ed γεννώμενον never occurs. Then most importantly we find αὐτὸς ὡν οὐτος ὁ θεὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς τῶν ὄλων γεννηθείς, which is directly parallel to the γεννηθῆαι already quoted. ... τῆν δύναμιν αὐτῆν

just as we see happening (γενόμενον) among ourselves: for when we give out some word (λόγον γάρ τινα προβάλλοντες), we beget the word (λόγον γεννώμεν); yet not by abscission (ὡς καὶ ἀποτομήν), as when we give out a word we do not lessen the reason in us (τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν λόγον): and just as we see also happening in the case of a fire, which is not lessened when it has kindled (another), but remains the same.⁷⁸

In this passage Justin implies that the begetting of the Logos is best understood in the manner of the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος προφορικῶς schema. It is significant that the verb προβάλλω is used only on the human side of the analogy. This text is evidence of the non-technical nature of the language of the period. προβάλλω can be equated with γεννάω, and there can be confusion over γεννηθεῖν. The ἐνδιάθετος / προφορικῶς schema is not only used in the analogy, but is hinted at by the begetting ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς θελήσει. There is also a close connection between ministering to the Father's will (τοῦ πατρικῆς βουλήσει) and the θέλημα of the Father in the begetting of the Logos. This phrase is a favourite of Justin's and is strong evidence for a background of the ἐνδιάθετος / προφορικῶς kind. For, if the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος is the 'will of the Father', then the 'will of the Father' is a most convenient link between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικῶς, which quite naturally can apply to the relationship between God and the Logos. But while Justin uses this schema as an analogy, he nowhere formally

(77 cont.) γεννηθεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς occurs in Dial. 128(262,776B), and γεννηθεῖν occurs in the same sense in I Apol. 22.1 (26,361A). This confusion is surprising in the light of Justin's use of ἀγέννητος instead of ἀγέννητος, where no confusion exists. There is also no evidence for surposing that the matter is a textual difficulty.

(78) Dial. 61(170,616A). The translation is adapted.

introduces it, as does Theophilus.⁷⁹ This too may be significant, but it is difficult to see what he gains by not introducing it. The formal schema with the direct analogy of the $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ begetting the $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ could have been used to connect God and the Logos in a much stronger fashion than Justin's subtle play on $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$. Goodenough thinks that Justin avoided the schema in order to avoid a cosmic duality of the Logos, which is the necessary implication of the $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ ἐνδύαθτος/προφορικός schema.⁸⁰ This seems quite likely, but his reticence to accept this schema does make his position more subordinationist than it need be. This is clear when Justin is compared to Athenagoras for instance.⁸¹

The passage from Dial. 61 concludes with a further analogy of a fire not being diminished when it lights another fire. This, together with the analogy of the rays of light from the sun, seems to be more closely connected with Justin's use of the $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ tradition. It is at this point that Justin is closest to the Gnostic doctrine of emanations and it is important to examine his qualifications of that tradition in some detail.

In the Middle-Platonic tradition the $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ is closely connected with the world soul,⁸² and with creation.⁸³ That Justin was aware

(79) cf. below, pp. 69f.

(80) op. cit. p. 151. Daniélou (op. cit. pp. 352ff.) groups all the Apologists together in their use of the schema. This overlooks a lot of the subtilty of their thought.

(81) cf. below, pp. 76f.

(82) cf. Albinus: Did. 14(169.30): $\kappa\alpha\iota$ τὴν ψυχὴν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τῶν κόσμου οὐχὶ ποιεῖ ὁ Θεός, ἀλλὰ κατακοσμεῖ, καὶ ταύτῃ δέχεται ἂν καὶ ποιεῖν.. and also (171.10): ὁμοίως δὲ πᾶσιν ἢ ἀνωθεν δύναμις περιβάλλεται

(83) cf. Atticus (Eusebius: Praep. Ev. XV, 6.7(Gaisford, p. 30)): $\kappa\alpha\iota$ πᾶσι θεῶν τῶν τῶν παντὸς ποιητῆ δύναμις δὲ ἤσ καὶ οὐκ ἄρα πρότερον ἐποίησε τὸν κόσμον.

of this tradition is certain from I Apol. 60, which is remarkably similar to Albinus: Did. 14. But this almost Stoic element in both Middle-Platonism and Plato has been modified by 'Judaeo-Christian' elements, so that the δύναμις comes from God and retains its cosmological function but loses its too intimate association with the world.⁸⁴ The δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ is considered more as an emanation from God than as an element of the world. Thus Justin writes:

And the first power (ἡ πρώτη δύναμις) after God the Father and Lord of all is the Word, who is also the Son.⁸⁵

And:

It is wrong, therefore, to understand the Spirit and the power of God (τὴν δύναμιν τὴν παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ) as anything else than the Word, who is also the first-born of God.⁸⁶

In Dial. 128 the emanation of this δύναμις is explained and qualified:

...but (they) maintain that this power is indivisible and inseparable from the Father (ἄεμυκτον καὶ ἀχώριστον τοῦ Πατρὸς), just as they say that the light of the sun on earth is indivisible and inseparable from the sun in the heavens; as when it sinks, the light sinks along with it; so the Father, when He chooses (ἐὰν βούληται), say they, causes His power to spring forth, and when He chooses, He makes it return to Himself.

Justin, after ascribing to the angels the same kind of origin, continues:

(84) Daniélou, op. cit. p. 347.

(85) I Apol. 32.10(35, 380B).

(86) I Apol. 33.6(36, 381B).

And that this power which the prophetic word calls God, ... , and Angel, is not numbered only as the light of the sun, but is something numerically distinct, I have discussed briefly in what has gone before; when I asserted that this power was begotten from the Father, by His power and will (ἐν δυνάμει ταύτην γεγονῆσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς, δυνάμει καὶ βουλήν αὐτοῦ), but not by abscission, as if the essence of the Father were divided (ἀλλ' ὡς κατὰ ἀποκομῆν, ὡς ἀπομεριζομένης τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας).⁸⁷

Apart from the theologically rather dubious implication that the Father could choose to stop begetting his Son, these qualifications of the δύνάμις tradition are an important development. The union and the separation of the Father and the Son are balanced, although under the circumstances it is more important for Justin to emphasise the union. There is one rather strange thing, which appears to be echoed in Tatian. This is that the power is begotten from the Father by his power. Could this be similar to the qualification of the λόγος ἐνδιώθετος / προφορικός schema, where authors are concerned lest the λόγος coming forth be thought to render the νοῦς without its rationality (λόγος)? The last qualification hints at what later came to be the identity of οὐσία between Father and Son.⁸⁸ One wonders how Justin would have tried to reconcile the shared οὐσία with his argument derived from the impossibility of God appearing in a theophany, for the basis of this is surely that the Logos does not have the identical οὐσία as the Father. It is interesting that in the argument from theophanies the language of God and Logos is used, but here in the δύνάμις tradition God becomes the less exclusive Father.

(87) Dial. 128(262,776A-B).

(88) For Tatian on the same question, cf. below, pp. 66f.

When one bears this tradition in mind, and especially the Middle-Platonic doctrine of the world-soul, the confusion between the Logos and the Spirit in Justin is not at all surprising.⁸⁹ The tendency to give all sorts of names to one entity is part of the general milieu, and might go back to very early syncretism, when the gods of other nations were apologetically regarded as one's own gods under different names.⁹⁰ One can observe a direct contrast between the Middle-Platonic tradition, where the world-soul is the only real intermediary between the world and the *κοσμὸς νοητός* or God, and the less philosophical tradition which involves the multiplication of the intermediaries. This in its extreme form is manifested in Gnosticism. In Justin the world-soul is elevated so that instead of contemplating the divine ideas, it is identified with them,⁹¹ but Justin has not managed to reconcile this with his steadfast belief in other divine powers. The result is that, while he can speak of them as separate things in one instance, there is always the tendency to equate all the names with one object. So Justin can refer to the Logos and the Spirit, but also reveal that he really considers them to be the same thing. It is this kind of background which seems to explain the dreadful confusion of I Apol. 6, where the angels seem to be placed between the Logos and the Spirit, which gives the impression that they have a superior status to the Spirit.

There is, however, yet another side to Justin's thought on the subject. There are many passages where Justin's language is completely orthodox

(89) cf. I Apol. 33.6(36,381B). For the apparent identification of the pre-existent Christ with Wisdom in Paul and the resultant confusion over the pre-existence of the Spirit, and the similar problem in Johannine theology, cf. Wolfson, op. cit. pp. 177-191.

(90) A good example of this is the syncretism involved with the incorporation of El into the Hebrew religion. Another example is the identification of Wisdom with Isis which lies behind the

and innocuous. Most of these passages are however just the outlines, which would probably be explained by Justin in terms of the generation or emanation of the Logos as discussed above. Interestingly many of these comments are closely associated with references to the incarnation.⁹² The more traditional side of Justin also surfaces in the instances where the Spirit is given a separate existence:

...and that we reasonably worship Him, having learned that He is the Son of the true God Himself, and holding Him in the second place (ἐν δευτέρῃ χώρῃ), and the prophetic Spirit in the third (ἐν τρίτῃ τάξει), we will prove.⁹³

This is clearly the beginnings of a kind of Trinitarianism. Not only, however, is this quote subordinationist, but Justin continues: 'we give to a crucified man a place second (δευτέρῃν χώρῃν) to the unchangeable and eternal God, the Creator of all'. The undeveloped nature of this quote, with its seemingly identical use of χώρῃ and τάξις, is to be compared with a similar statement made by Athenagoras that avoids subordinationism.⁹⁴ Apart from this instance and that of I Apol. 6, which has already been mentioned, all the Trinitarian formulae clearly come from the context of liturgical worship.⁹⁵ The element of worship is even present in the quote from I Apol. 13. From this it is quite clear that Trinitarianism is not an integral

(90 cont.) book of the Wisdom of Solomon. cf. W.L. Knox: St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles (CUP, 1961), pp. 61ff.

(91) For this and other differences between Justin and Middle-Platonism, cf. Daniélou, op. cit. p. 351.

(92) cf. I Apol. 12.7(15,344B) and II Apol. 13.4(83,465C). The διδάκαλος of I Apol. 12.9(15,345A) is similarly connected with the incarnate διδάκαλος of 13.3(16,345B).

(93) I Apol. 13.3(17,348A).

(94) cf. below, p. 89

part of Justin's thought. Where Trinitarian references do occur they point directly to the contrast between Justin's theological thought and his traditional Church life, but the two are in no way integrated.⁹⁶

(b) The Logos as Revealer:

Here we find ourselves at the heart of Justin's theology. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is here that controversy rages. As was suggested in the introduction to this chapter, much of this controversy revolves around too limited a field. It seems that, when the evidence of all three works is considered, a fairly clear picture emerges. Essential to the whole doctrine of the Logos, and especially to that of the Logos as revealer, is the nature and origin of philosophy. If this question is resolved all other aspects of Justin's thought seem to fall into place.

(i) The Nature and Origin of Philosophy:

Since this is the central subject under discussion in Dial. 1-9, and because this is Justin's most considered statement of the issues at stake, it is proper to start our investigation from this point and then to go on to consider the evidence from the other works. The interpretation of Dial. 1-9 is a matter of some contention. Especially acute is the controversy between J.C.M. van Winden⁹⁷ and N. Hyldahl.⁹⁸

(95) cf. I Apol. 61.3(59,420C) and 61.13(60,421B), both in the context of baptism; 65.3(64,428Af) in the context of the eucharist, and 67.2(65,429B) in a more general sense.

(96) cf. Goodenough, op. cit. p. 186, and Barnard, op. cit. p. 105.

(97) An Early Christian Philosopher: Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho, Ch.'s 1-9 (Leiden, 1971).

(98) Philosophie und Christentum, Einer Interpretation der Einleitung zum Dial. Justins (Kopenhagen, 1966).

On the surface these chapters read as a dialogue with a Jew named Trypho. When the preliminaries are over, Trypho's question sets the stage for what follows:

Tell us your opinion of these matters, and what idea you entertain respecting God (τίνα γνώμην περὶ Θεοῦ ἔχεις), and what your philosophy is.⁹⁹

Justin then narrates his philosophical pilgrimage and reports an extended discussion with a mysterious old man who leads him to conversion. From this structure it could be thought that Justin regarded Greek philosophy as a praeparatio evangelica but, whilst this is certainly a large element in Clement's thought,¹⁰⁰ Justin is a lot more critical of philosophy than this. When Trypho asks 'Do not philosophers turn every discourse on God?', Justin replies with an almost total dismissal of all philosophers.¹⁰¹ He maintains that the true nature of philosophy should be 'to investigate the Deity', but that philosophers do not concern themselves with this. And so, while Justin complains about the philosophers' total lack of concern over the number of gods and the nature of providence, his real criticism is not directed at any one school. van Winden writes:

Justin is not refuting anything here; he makes it clear that most Greek philosophers are not interested in the proper task of philosophy, viz., to inquire about the divine (ἐξετάζειν περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ).¹⁰²

It is in the wake of this criticism that Justin speaks about his pilgrimage to conversion and criticizes each of the most important contemporary schools. He ends with the Platonic school, which in its

(99) 1(86f,476B).

(100) cf. below, pp. 117f.

(101) 1(86,473B-C).

(102) op. cit. p. 32.

turn is to receive a lengthy scrutiny and severe criticism at the hands of the old man. The essence of this criticism is foreshadowed in Justin's closing comment:

And so the perception of immaterial things quite overpowered me, and the contemplation of ideas furnished my mind with wings, so that in a little while I supposed that I had become wise; and such was my my stupidity, I expected to look upon God, for this is the end of Plato's philosophy.¹⁰³

It is on this matter of the knowledge of God that the old man centres his attack:

How then.....should the philosophers judge correctly about God, or speak any truth, when they have no knowledge of Him, having neither seen Him at any time nor heard Him?¹⁰⁴

To this criticism, which is familiar to modern man as the basis for logical positivism, Justin replies with the Middle-Platonic doctrine that 'the Deity cannot be seen merely by the eyes, but is discernible to the mind alone' (ἀλλὰ μόνῳ νῷ καταληπτόν). Here the issue is laid bare. The Platonic or Middle-Platonic doctrine is at stake.¹⁰⁵ The old man shows that if the mind is to know God it must have some affinity with God: 'Is the soul also divine and immortal, and a part of that very regal mind?'. After the posing of this question, the rejection of the Middle-Platonic doctrine follows from the easy step of denying the immortality of the soul, at least in the sense that the soul cannot be 'ingenerate' or 'unbegotten':

Nor ought it to be called immortal (ἀθάνατον); for if it is immortal, it is plainly unbegotten (ἀγέννητος).¹⁰⁶

(103) 2(88,477C).

(104) 3(91,481C).

(105) cf. above, p. 13.

(106) 5(93,485C).

By drawing a clear distinction between God who is ἀγέννητος and ἄφθαρτος and 'all other things' (τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πάντα) which are γεννητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ, Justin can go straight on to his conclusion and show that the soul lives because of God and is not naturally immortal:

Now the soul partakes (μετέχει) of life, since God wills it to live. Thus, then, it will not even partake (οὐ μετέχει) (of life) when God does not will it to live. For to live is not its attribute as it is God's.¹⁰⁷

This whole argument against the immortality of the soul has been shown to be that used by Atticus and is in its origin Aristotelian.¹⁰⁸

It is of interest that Justin does not recognize it as such. In his rejection of the immortality of the soul, Justin uses the Platonic idea of μέθεξις to define the soul's proper relationship to God. But in using the idea care has been taken. Not only does he carefully state ἕτερον δὲ εἶ τὸ μετέχον τοῦ ἐκείνου οὐ μετέχει, but also the statement quoted above defines the relationship as not a necessary one. These statements are important for our discussion of the relationship between the divine Logos and human reason.

If the soul is not naturally immortal then it cannot have knowledge of God. The Middle-Platonic theory has collapsed. With the collapse of the τῶν ἄνω the old man has opened the way for revelation. The main thrust of the argument is clear: God can only be known because he has revealed himself. In Dial. 7 the prophets of Israel, who are 'more ancient than all those who are esteemed philosophers', are the agents of this revelation.¹⁰⁹ This is undoubtedly the position adopted

(107) 6(95,489B).

(108) cf. van Winden, op. cit. p. 101 and R.M. Grant: "Aristotle and the Conversion of Justin", *JTS*, 7 (1956), pp. 246f.

(109) cf. van Winden, op. cit. pp. 111f.

by Justin and is not to be confused with the apparent reference to the Posidonian prophets of Dial. 2. There is some evidence for regarding the ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν of Dial. 2(87,476B) as on a par with the prophets, but as van Winden points out, they seem to be more the founders of the philosophical schools than of the Posidonian Ur-philosophie.¹¹⁰ This stress on revelation is even taken so far as to question the validity of 'logical proofs':

For they did not use demonstration (ὅτι ... μετὰ ἀποδείξεως) in their treatises, seeing that they were witnesses to the truth above all demonstration (ἀνωτέρω πάσης ἀποδείξεως).¹¹¹

But yet, after all this most devastating criticism of the philosophy of his time, Justin can still claim that this revelation is the philosophy which he has found 'alone to be safe and profitable'.¹¹² But in this definition of philosophy, Justin has undercut the whole philosophical tradition. It is indeed a strange philosophy which is so completely based on revelation and so critical of reason. The word has become packed with a totally new meaning. This seems to be the general attitude of Justin towards philosophy in the Dialogue. Thus, the rest of the Dialogue, which is so full of Old Testament exegesis, would also be called philosophy.

But when we turn to the I Apol., we find what appears to be a very different picture. Here Justin's description of the relationship between Christianity and philosophy contains three features. The first is the play on the word λόγος; the second is the loan theory, and the third, which is coupled to the second, is the theory of demonic interference.

(110) *ibid.* p. 44, and cf. Holte, *op. cit.* pp. 164f.

(111) 7(96,492B).

(112) 8(96,492C).

The play on the word $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ is a constant feature of Greek thought in general. In the Apologists the appeal to the reasonableness of the Emperor is closely linked with the demonstration of the reasonableness of the Christian faith.¹¹³ To understand how this kind of connection can be made, it is necessary to return to the question of creation.

Although in I Apol. 10 there is no reference to the activity of the Logos as the $\delta\eta\mu\iota\omicron\upsilon\rho\gamma\acute{o}\varsigma$, there is reference to man's rôle in his own redemption as being 'by means of the rational faculties ($\delta\iota' \acute{\omega}\nu \dots \lambda\omicron\gamma\epsilon\kappa\acute{\omega}\nu \delta\upsilon\omicron\nu\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\tau\omega\upsilon\upsilon$) He has Himself endowed us with'.¹¹⁴ In II Apol. 6 this hint is developed by connecting the order within the universe with the agency of the Logos in creation:

He (God) created and arranged all things by Him
($\delta\iota' \alpha\beta\tau\omicron\varsigma$) (who) is called Christ, in reference to
His being anointed and God's ordering ($\tau\omicron \dots \kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\acute{\eta}\sigma\alpha\iota$)
all things through him ($\delta\iota' \alpha\beta\tau\omicron\varsigma$).¹¹⁵

A connection should be made between this ordering activity of the Logos and the Wisdom tradition. The similarity of ideas between the Stoic $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ and the Wisdom tradition is very close. In Justin we notice the endpoint of a development. The Stoic/Wisdom idea was that rationality is part of the universe,¹¹⁶ although in the Wisdom tradition it would undoubtedly be ascribed to God's activity in creation, as in Prov. 8.22ff. But then, as a later development this rationality assumed a separate existence,¹¹⁷ and finally, through the identification of $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ and $\sigma\omicron\phi\acute{\iota}\alpha$ in Philo,¹¹⁸ the transcendence of the immanent $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ / $\sigma\omicron\phi\acute{\iota}\alpha$ is achieved as we find it here in Justin.

(113) cf. above, p. 4.

(114) 10.4(14,341A).

(115) 6.3(76,453A).

(116) cf. G. von Rad: Wisdom in Israel (SCM, 1972), pp. 145ff.

(117) Thus von Rad regards even Prov. 8.22, and similar passages in Prov. 1-9, as a development of the original Wisdom idea, cf. *ibid.* pp. 147f.

The reference to creation $\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ gives a sure point of connection between the $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ of man and the $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$, and it is this implicit connection that explains Justin's attitude towards human reason and philosophy. Thus man is created 'with the power of thought ($\nu\omicron\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu$) and of choosing the truth...for they have been born rational and contemplative' ($\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\iota\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \theta\epsilon\omega\rho\gamma\epsilon\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\iota$).¹¹⁹

The question that faces the critic is whether this acceptance, indeed propagation of the Middle-Platonic $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \nu\omicron\iota$, rejected in the Dialogue, is wholly an apologetic device similar to the appeal to the reason of the Emperor. This difficulty has also been noticed by S. Laeuchli, who writes of a 'deep conflict which exists between I Apol. 68, which represents the primacy of reason, and Dial. 7, which insists on the exclusivism of revelation'.¹²⁰ It seems that it is the balancing of these two sides of Justin's thought which leads scholars to different conclusions as to Justin's attitude towards philosophy.

But before continuing with this particular inquiry we must briefly mention the loan theory, because it deals with the same issue from an historical point of view.¹²¹ The theory is simple. It states that Greek philosophy is a bad copy of the pure philosophy which was given through Moses. The distortions in Greek philosophy are due to the interference of the demons. This theory has clear implications for a doctrine of history. The whole of Greek history would be interpreted in the light of the struggle between the truth and the demonic distortions of the truth.¹²² The theory as such can be used with a positive or a negative intention. It can be used either

(118) cf. Leg. All. I.65, and Agric. 51; also TWNT, vol. 4, pp. 88f.

(119) I Apol. 28.3(31,372C).

(120) The Language of Faith (London, 1965), p. 179.

(121) cf. H.A. Wolfson: Philo (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), vol. 1, p. 160 for the loan theory in Philo.

to discredit Greek philosophy or apologetically to explain the similarities between Greek philosophy and the Christian faith. From what we have already discussed it seems possible that Justin is using this theory much more positively in the I Apol. than in the Dialogue. In the I Apol. the theory is used to say that Socrates knew the divine Logos, that Greeks who lived rationally (*μετὰ λόγου*) are Christians and that fundamentally there is no divergence of goals between philosophy and Christianity.¹²³ This is very different to the picture of Dial. 1-9, where the discontinuity rather than the continuity between philosophy and Christianity is stressed. The problem is whether or not we can legitimately ascribe this discrepancy in Justin's thought to the apologetic intention of the I Apol., or whether there is really a deep conflict in his writings. To come to grips with this same problem at a deeper level we turn now to the specific question of the relationship of the divine Logos to human reason.

(ii) The Divine Logos and Human Reason:

The problem of Justin's Logos doctrine is a puzzle that despite rapid advances is still something of an enigma. Once again it would seem that, where scholars have come to definite conclusions, they have either ignored serious difficulties or not examined all the evidence. For the moment let us consider the problem as it exists in the Apologies alone. It lies in the interpretation of both the statements in the I Apol. about men sharing in the Logos, and in the *λόγος ἐπιερματικός* doctrine of the II Apol. In the I Apol. we find the following:

(122) cf. Daniélou, op. cit. p. 33.

(123) cf. I Apol. 5.4(10,336B) and 46.3(46,397C).

For not only among the Greeks did reason prevail to condemn these things through Socrates (διὰ Σωκράτους ὑπὸ Λόγου ἡλέγχθη τὰύτα), but also among the Barbarians were they condemned by Reason (or the Word, the Logos) Himself (ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τῷ Λόγῳ), who took shape, and became man, and was called Jesus Christ.¹²⁴

And:

We have been taught that Christ is the first-born of God, and we have declared above that He is the Word (λόγον ὄντα) of Whom every race of men are partakers (μετέχει); and those who lived reasonably (μετὰ λόγον) are Christians, even though they have been thought atheists.¹²⁵

The difficulty in both these texts is to distinguish Λόγος as the divine Logos and λόγος as human reason. In every instance the capitalization or otherwise of the lambda prejudices the case.

Theologically the issue at stake is that, if Justin's play on the word goes so far as to obscure the difference between them, then he represents a reductionist point of view which will be very difficult to distinguish from real Stoicism. Bearing this in mind, let us return to the interpretation of the first passage from I Apol. 5.

Here Holte's translation needs to be considered. It reads:

For not only among the Greeks through Socrates (i.e. through his reasoning) were these things revealed by Logos...¹²⁶

Here the issue is clearly revealed. Do the ὑπὸ λόγῳ and the ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τῷ λόγῳ both refer to the Logos or not? Holte would maintain that they do, although, by the insertion of 'i.e. through his reasoning'

(124) 5.4(10,336B).

(125) 46.3(46,397C).

(126) op. cit. p. 131.

in brackets, he allows for an ambiguity in the first instance. But the difference between ὑπὸ λόγῳ and ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν λόγων is surely greater than this. The ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν λόγων seems to distinguish this λόγος from the first, which is even without the article. From this point of view perhaps the ANCL translation might be better, since it distinguishes between 'reason' and 'Reason'. This interpretation is supported by the reference to 'true reasoning and definite evidence' (λόγῳ ἀληθείῃ καὶ ἐξεστρακῶς), which occurs earlier in the same chapter. The λόγῳ ἀληθείῃ seems to be the equivalent of ὑπὸ λόγῳ. It is just possible that the use of ὑπὸ instead of the dative may refer to a more personal agent, but it is just as likely that the ὑπὸ is a result of the passive ἠλέγχθη, whereas the λόγῳ follows a middle - ἐπειράτο. The ANCL translation is at fault when it translates the participles μορφωθέντος καὶ ἀνθρώπου γενομένου as a relative clause. Holte is undoubtedly correct that this should be taken as temporally qualifying the revelation to the barbarians.

A very similar problem exists in the second passage. Holte insists that both the λόγον ὄντα and the μετὰ λόγον refer to the Logos, but by far the most straightforward interpretation is that they again reflect Justin's apologetic, with the first referring to the Logos and the second to human reason.

The truth of the matter seems to be that Holte does not exegete these texts without the bias of his thesis. This is derived from texts in the II Apol. and especially the following which he translates as:

For the seed and imitation of something, imparted according to capacity, is one thing, and quite another is the thing itself (i.e. Logos), the participation and imitation of whom is effected through the grace coming

from Him.¹²⁷

This sentence is structured around the contrasting $\epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu \dots \epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$, and it clearly separates the participation in the Logos from the Logos itself. Holte goes on to show how the references to the $\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho\mu\alpha \tau\omicron\upsilon \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon$ ¹²⁸ and the $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \epsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ ¹²⁹ in the II Apol. can be best interpreted along these lines. He shows that the $\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho\mu\alpha \tau\omicron\upsilon \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon$ is that part of the Logos which is in man, but that this seed, although it is connected with the divine Logos, is not the Logos ($\epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu \dots \epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$). On the other hand the $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \epsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ is the Logos sowing the $\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho\mu\alpha$ in the hearts of man. By this exegesis, which is now universally accepted,¹³⁰ he can maintain a clear distinction between the Logos and human reason. The only difficulty which still remains is the texts of the I Apol. which we have already mentioned.

Holte goes on to show how Justin envisages the relationship between the Logos and human reason. Two theories appear to have been used by Justin to describe this relationship. The first is from Stoicism. The clue to this is the use of $\epsilon\mu\phi\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu \sigma\pi\epsilon\rho\mu\alpha$ in II Apol. 8.1 (also 6.3 and 13.4) and the Stoic implications of the $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \epsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$. The background to this is the Stoic theory of the $\epsilon\mu\phi\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu \pi\rho\omicron\lambda\gamma\psi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ and the $\kappa\omicron\iota\nu\alpha\iota \varphi\upsilon\sigma\iota\kappa\alpha\iota \epsilon\psi\nu\sigma\alpha\iota$. Holte shows how this Stoic $\pi\rho\omicron\lambda\gamma\psi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ doctrine has been modified in a Platonic direction. Evidence of this is Justin's use of $\epsilon\mu\phi\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ in II Apol. 6.3, where an opinion ($\delta\omicron\delta\epsilon\iota\alpha$) of God is implanted in human nature.¹³¹ Further evidence of such an adaptation is taken from the same passage at the end of II Apol. 13 where the $\epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu \dots$

(127) 13.6(83,468A).

(128) op. cit. pp. 138f, II Apol. 8.1(78,457A) and 13.5-6(83,468A).

(129) 8.3(78,457B) and 13.3(83,465C).

(130) cf. A. Grillmeier: Christ in Christian Tradition (London, 1975), p. 92, n. 193.

ἕτερον occurs. Here the ἐπέρομα... καὶ μίμνημα κατὰ δύναμιν is contrasted with κατὰ χάριν.... ἡ μετάνοια καὶ μίμνησις. The Stoic idea of the ἐπέρομα is coupled with the Middle-Platonic theory of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν.¹³² But both of these are bluntly contrasted with the κατὰ χάριν. This adaptation is exactly parallel with Justin's rejection of philosophy in Dial. 1-9, where the Middle-Platonic τῷ νῷ represents the κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν and the need for revelation corresponds to the κατὰ χάριν. As Holte puts it:

This is the fantastic statement with which Justin undermines the claims of Ancient philosophy to be able to lead Man to a telos, i.e. to salvation and perfection.¹³³

The other theory that Justin uses in this regard is the Platonic μετέθεσις doctrine. The Stoic theory originated in the field of ethics, but the Platonic idea originated in the need to connect the forms and the objects derived from them. It is possible, as Holte maintains, that the μετέθετε of I Apol. 46.3(46,397C) really has a Stoic background. This detail is not important here. There is just a small adaptation needed to use the Platonic theory of the relationship of God to man. This Justin might have found in Middle-Platonism.¹³⁴ How closely Justin is following Plato can be seen from the comparison of the following:

(131) Holte, op. cit. p. 139.

(132) cf. Albinus: Did. 28(181-25f).

(133) op. cit. p. 141.

(134) cf. ibid. p. 145, n. 119, where reference is made to Plutarch: de Iside 53, 372F.

τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μετασχὼν τῷ ὄντι ἕξει μὲν
διὰ τούτων τὴν μέθεξιν, ὃ μὲν ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὅ
μετέσχον ἀλλ' ἕτερον, 135

and the already quoted

ἕτερον δὲ τὸ μετέσχον εἰνὸς ἐκείνου ὅ μετέσχε. 136

Despite the very close connection between these two statements and the similar use of the idea of μέθεξις in these quotes, there is a new element in Justin which cannot be ignored. In Plato the μέθεξις is always the relationship of the ideas with objects, or, as in the case of the quote from the Sophist, between 'being' and things which are neither 'being' nor 'non-being'. Justin apparently uses the word in this sense.¹³⁷ But the whole context of the quote from Justin is the rejection of the Platonic τῶν νῶν. In Justin then, we find Platonic epistemology (τῶν νῶν) and Platonic cosmology (μέθεξις). Justin rejects the first and accepts the second. One would expect such meddling with a philosophical system to cause further difficulties. In Plato, however, it is not at all sure how his epistemology relates to the μέθεξις doctrine. In a sense the τῶν νῶν and the postulate of an immortal soul are an attempt to describe some kind of μέθεξις between the intellectual and the sensible realms, but in this it is unsuccessful since it just necessitates the further definition of the relationship between the soul and the body. This is the old tritos argument. The rejection of the immortal soul as a solution to the epistemological question is very similar to the criticism of the μέθεξις idea itself in Parm. 132f. Both are fundamental problems of any dualistic system. And so it is that we are left by both Justin and Plato not being sure what μέθεξις really

(135) Plato: Sophista 259a.

(136) Dial. 6(95,489B).

(137) cf. Holte, op. cit. p. 143.

means. Both stress the ἕτερον ... ἕτερον and both are uneasy about the positive description of the relationship between the two sides of the sharing. Justin's positive contribution is eventually his κατὰ χάριν, and even if this could be criticized as begging the question, it is probably the most satisfactory Christian answer.

The sum total of all this is that the II Apol. agrees with Dial. 1-9 on the relationship between Christianity and philosophy, and therefore of that between the divine Logos and human reason. They are highly critical of both philosophy and human reason and explain any truth philosophy might have to the loan theory. The relationship between the Logos and human reason is clearly defined in a manner which criticizes the Platonic idea of ἐμύσῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν with an emphatic reference to grace. This is very similar to the stress on the need for revelation in Dial. 1-9 and the rejection of the possibility of knowledge of God even μόνῳ τῷ νῷ. But Holte appears to have ironed out the difficulty which still remains. The texts of I Apol. are still a problem. Are they to be interpreted so that they conform to the pattern of Justin's other works, can they stand on their own, or should they be interpreted as apologetic concessions? Although Holte attempts the first of these alternatives, he also adopts the last and regards any hints of a positive relationship between Christianity and philosophy as being 'presented in purely apologetic interests'.¹³⁸ Goodenough, being earlier than Holte's contribution towards the debate, interprets Justin's attitude towards philosophy as positive even if rather selective.¹³⁹ Harnack is often reported as presenting the reductionist evaluation of Justin, but this is not the case. He even seems to have anticipated Holte

(138) op. cit. p. 110.

(139) op. cit. pp. 106f.

by identifying the *σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου* as the *μέρος επερματικός*. He does deal with the Logos ambivalence but stresses the importance of revelation in Justin. He writes:

For the final stage has now arrived and Christianity is destined to put an end to natural human philosophy.¹⁴⁰

Harnack does, therefore, represent an early version of the position that we have adopted. Laechli, not having the excuse of being pre-Holte, seems to fail completely in his estimation of Justin by accusing Justin of perverting Christianity by equating philosophy and rationality with belief.¹⁴¹ Barnard, as is his wont, is too simplistic,¹⁴² and Jaeger agrees with the traditional interpretation following Harnack.¹⁴³

What seems to be a more reasonable solution to this dilemma is to try to avoid forcing the exegesis of the I Apol. by postulating a difference between it and the later works due to apologetic tact, together with a development of viewpoint. It is the insistence on absolute consistency and uniformity that we criticize in Holte. He fails to notice that all the developed arguments and references to the *σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου* and the *λόγος επερματικός* occur in the II Apol. This, together with the *ἕτερον ... ἕτερον* and the evidence of Dial. 1-9, seems to group the II Apol. and the Dialogue together as a development of a fairly simple but dangerous apologetic in the I Apol. It might be possible to couple this hypothesis with yet another evaluation of Dial. 1-9. As is now generally accepted, the literary form of this conforms to

(140) cf. The History of Dogma, trans. N. Buchanan (London, 1896) vol. 2 pp. 179-188.

(141) op. cit. pp. 181f.

(142) op. cit. p. 89.

(143) op. cit. p. 119, n. 13.

a stylized pattern. This, together with the content, forces one to the conclusion that it is not meant to be directly historical. Here Barnard again misses the point, insisting on the historicity of the Dialogue and that Dial. 1-9 represents Justin's historical journey to conversion.¹⁴⁵ One suspects that Barnard's criticisms are more than a little conditioned by parallel controversies in the realm of biblical studies. But accepting the conclusion of Goodenough, van Winden and others, might it not be possible to take the matter a step further? All previous scholarship seems to have regarded Justin in Dial. 1-9 as giving a critique of current philosophical schools from his Christian perspective. But, since this critique represents a more developed theological position than the I Apol., two options are open. Either one regards the I Apol. as totally apologetic and the Dialogue, therefore, as historical in at least its theological outlook, or one can regard Dial. 1-9 as representing criticisms of philosophy and an assessment of the position of human reason that Justin had, at the time of writing the I Apol., as yet not developed. Since we are unwilling to regard the theology of the I Apol. as totally apologetic, the second alternative is to be accepted. Our hypothesis will, therefore, include the postulation of a gap between the I and II Apologies sufficient to allow for such a development. Although this suggestion requires much more detailed examination than can be given here, a few points can be made. These concern mainly the attitude towards Platonism in the I Apol. In general, despite the loan theory and the demonic interference, Justin seems favourable disposed to Plato. He is quoted with approval¹⁴⁶ and is regarded as being in

(145) op. cit. pp. 7-11.

(146) 8.4(12,337C) and 59.1(57,416B).

fundamental agreement with Christianity over the question of the cosmological significance of the cross.¹⁴⁷ This, together with the positive references to Socrates, does not portray the polemical attitude of the Dialogue. This contrast is, however, softened by the real apologetic of I Apol. 20, where Justin can even draw an analogy between Christian and Stoic doctrine. The problem of separating the apologetic from Justin's real thought will always remain. Another question which must be answered, if the I Apol. is to be interpreted as purely apologetic, is why the II Apol. is not apologetic in the same way. The difference between the two is not all that easily explained away to apologetic intentions, since both are meant to be apologetic. In the case of Justin there are obvious passages which are plainly apologetic, but to postulate both a pure and an apologetic version of that thought seems to ignore the very real apologetic nature of his thought, even at its core. When this is borne in mind such distinctions are not very helpful.

Whatever the outcome of this particular debate the position of the II Apol. and the Dialogue on the relationship between philosophy and Christianity seems to be Justin's considered judgement on the issue. Here the original true philosophy was handed by God to Moses. Thus philosophy is not the seeking of God by human intellect, but the true acceptance of God's revelation. Part of the distortion of Greek philosophy is that it can claim to know God $\tau\omega\ \nu\omega$ and thus to deny the grace of revelation. In stating this position Justin makes a clear distinction between the Logos and human reason, which shares in the divine Logos by grace. This capacity of man to share in the divine Logos is connected with the activity of the Logos in creation.

(iii) The Logos in the Old Testament:

As has been shown above, for Justin the Old Testament stands in a very special position. It is the prime source for knowledge of God. To explain how it came to be in this position Justin has a doctrine of inspiration. At this point Justin's confusion between the Logos and the Spirit is once more revealed. The inspiration of the prophets is 'by the Divine Word who moves them',¹⁴⁸ but the prophets also spoke 'those things alone which they saw and which they heard, being filled with the Holy Spirit'.¹⁴⁹ Inspiration is really the only function of the Spirit.¹⁵⁰ But Justin is emphatic that all revelation is through the Logos (διὰ τοῦ Λόγου). The Logos is regarded as the sole and total source of knowledge of God. After quoting Mt. 11.27 Justin continues:

Now the Word of God is His Son, as we have before said. And He is called Angel and Apostle; for He declares whatever we ought to know, and is sent forth to declare whatever is revealed; as our Lord Himself says, "He that heareth me, heareth Him that sent me".¹⁵¹

The connection between the Logos as revealer and his relationship to the Father is made explicit in Dial. 128. All the different names given to the Logos for different modes of revelation culminate in the following:

...and they call Him the Word, because He carries tidings from the Father to men.¹⁵²

(148) I Apol. 36.1(38,385A). For an examination of Justin's theory of prophetic inspiration cf. Goodenough, op. cit. pp. 177f.

(149) Dial. 7(95,492B). cf. also I Apol. 6.2(11,336C) and 13.3(17,348A).

(150) cf. I Apol. 31.1(32,376A), 32.2(34,377B), 33.2(35,381A).

(151) I Apol. 63.4-5(61,424B). cf. also 63.10(62,425B).

(152) Dial. 128(262,776A).

The background to the Logos being the sole agent of revelation is the impossibility of God himself appearing in a theophany.¹⁵³ As has been mentioned, the result of this argument is that all our knowledge of God comes from the 'second God'. The difficulties of this have already been noted, but here we can see that, because of the subordinationism which is part of the argument, the splitting of revealedness and remoteness in this way tends to make it difficult for the revealing Logos to reveal anything other than himself. This is, of course, the same as the reduction of the doctrine of God to the doctrine of the Logos, but viewed from a slightly different perspective.

Part of Justin's intention in stressing the Old Testament may have been to attack Marcion. We have already noted how his doctrine of creation implies such a polemic.¹⁵⁴ Further, by linking the inspiration of the Old Testament by the Logos with the Logos who became man, Justin forges a very clear and unbreakable connection between the two very things which Marcion was unable to reconcile. Justin's thought is so Logocentric that Marcion's division must have been almost completely incomprehensible to him. By so connecting the incarnation and the Old Testament, Justin safeguards himself from Marcion's dualism but, since Justin separates God from the revelation in the Old Testament, this dualism tends to appear in a subordinationism. But this dualism will always tend to reduce to a monism of the Logos.¹⁵⁵ The difficulty of this doctrine of revelation has been very succinctly stated by Bethune-Baker:

...there is a danger, on the one hand, of the Logos being identified with God. His essence ($\sigma\upsilon\beta\acute{\iota}\alpha$), as it were, rests eternally in God - immanent: his hypostasis is conceived only in the work of revelation.¹⁵⁶

(153) cf. above, pp. 14f.

(154) cf. above, pp. 10f.

(155) cf. also below, p. 54.

Such a split between $\nu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha$ and $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is impossible. Bethune-Baker also quotes Loofs as writing:

...it is not God who reveals Himself in Christ, but the Logos, the depotentiated God, a God who as God is subordinated to the highest God.¹⁵⁷

It seems that this must be true if Justin's thought is built up into a rigid system. But as it stands Justin is not so systematic. He is very careful to explain that the 'second God' of the Dialogue is not separate from the Father and that he is truly God. These qualifications must be given their full weight, for they are evidence of Justin's attempts to extricate himself from a system of thought which is fundamentally at variance with Christian Trinitarianism. This becomes abundantly clear quite apart from the question of the necessity to distinguish between the Logos and the Spirit.

(4) The Incarnation:

Many of the references to the incarnation follow a similar pattern.¹⁵⁸ The more detailed of these mention all the particulars of the schema of the Logos being the divine Son of God, becoming 'Jesus Christ, our teacher', then, following the credal pattern of birth and passion, one moves to the Ascension by which one is pointed back to the universal Logos. Many of these references are however more or less abbreviated. An interesting case is that of I Apol. 12-13, where first the divine Logos is rather indiscriminately confused with the incarnate teacher Jesus Christ,¹⁵⁹ but later this teacher is quite definitely he who 'was crucified under Pontius Pilate, procurator of

(156) op. cit. p. 128.

(157) ibid. p. 120.

(158) I Apol. 13(16f,345Bf), 21.1(25,360A), 42(43,392B), 46(47,497C), 63(62,425B); II Apol. 6(76f,453Af); Dial. 63(173,620B), 67(180,629D), 71(187,644A), 76(193,653C), 85(205,676C), 87(209,684A), 95(219f,701Bf), 100(224,709B), 106(232f,721Cf), 113(241,737A), 132(266,781C).

Judaea, in the times of Tiberius Caesar'.¹⁶⁰ Moreover it is this person whom 'we reasonably worship', 'holding Him in the second place (to the true God), and the prophetic Spirit in the third'.¹⁶¹ Justin takes great care to explain that it is the divine Logos who became man. Of this there is no doubt. In some instances there is, however, a notable lack of reference to the incarnation. Although it is not the subject under discussion in Dial. 128-9, one suspects that it would be impossible for Justin to have coupled the theory of the Logos being a δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ with the incarnation, without suggesting that Jesus the man was nothing more than a δύναμις τοῦ Λόγου. Justin never suggests this. It is the Logos himself who becomes man. As such the incarnate Logos can be confessed to be God,¹⁶² and to be both God and man.¹⁶³

How the incarnation comes about is of interest. Sometimes this is just 'through the will of the Father'.¹⁶⁴ This is similar to the generation of the Logos himself. The other explanation is of

(159) 12.8-9(15f,344Bf).

(160) 13.3-4(16,345Bf).

(161) I Apol. 32.2(34,380B).

(162) cf. Dial. 68(184,636B). Here there is a difficulty in exegesis. The text runs: ἔλεύσεται δὲ καὶ παθεῖν, καὶ βασιλεύσει, καὶ προσκυνητὸν γενέσθαι Θεὸν ὁμολογᾶν. The problem is whether to take γενέσθαι Θεὸν with προσκυνητὸν or directly with ὁμολογᾶν like the other infinitives in the sentence. The ANCL translation tries to get the best of both alternatives by treating both the προσκυνητὸν and the γενέσθαι as independently dependent on ὁμολογᾶν: 'But they admit that he will come to suffer...and to be worshipped, and to be God'.

(163) Dial. 71(187,644A).

(164) i.e. I Apol. 63.10(61,424C) and 23.2(27,364A).

course the birth by Mary, and here, yet once again, there is confusion between the Logos and the Spirit. The confusion is clearly caused by the biblical references to the δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ. Justin follows the Lukan tradition and identifies this with the Spirit, but then also with the Logos.¹⁶⁵ This we have now come to expect. But here the confusion is taken even further with the δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ being called the δύναμις τοῦ λόγου.¹⁶⁶ Some such confusion may even exist in the New Testament, where there occurs a fusion of the pre-existent Jesus and the Spirit.¹⁶⁷ The solution offered by Goodenough is that, where the phrase δύναμις τοῦ λόγου occurs, 'the δύναμις of the Logos means here a faculty or ability of the Logos, not a personal Power'.¹⁶⁸ The difficulty with this answer is that in the context there seems to be no reason why the meaning of δύναμις should change so radically just because of its qualification. There appears to be an unsolved confusion at this point.

The belief in the full humanity of the incarnate Logos is made clear by the repeated formal references to Jesus' birth from the Virgin and his suffering under Pontius Pilate. The significance of these references will be returned to very shortly. Despite them there has been a fairly lively debate as to whether Justin had adopted an Apollinarian solution to the incarnation or not.¹⁶⁹ While all such technical debates are quite alien to Justin, there is some

(165) cf. I Apol. 33.6(36,381Bf). In I Apol. 32.10(35,380B) it is the πρώτη δύναμις μετὰ τὸν Πατέρα πάντων who takes flesh (σαρκοποιεῖς) and becomes man.

(166) I Apol. 46.5(47,397C) and Dial. 139(274,796B).

(167) cf. Wolfson, op. cit. pp. 155-167.

(168) op. cit. p. 237.

(169) cf. ibid. pp. 241f and Barnard, op. cit. p. 119.

advantage in examining the issue very briefly. Although, at one level, Justin simply accepts that Jesus was a man, at another he denies that this humanity was derived from Mary. Thus, Jesus 'had blood, but not from men; just as not man, but God, has begotten the blood of the vine'.¹⁷⁰ Justin apparently contradicts himself when he says that the Christ 'assumed flesh by the Virgin'.¹⁷¹ But the sum total of the evidence seems to be correctly assessed by Goodenough:

Christ was a new creation, like the first creation of old, made directly by God. Thus the Logos did not assume humanity, but became a human being. He was a man like men, but He had no real blood relationships with the human race.¹⁷²

This kind of thought is actually counter to the Church's interpretation of the Virgin birth, which is that it is precisely from the Virgin that Jesus received his humanity.¹⁷³ While denying the rôle of the Virgin does not in any way deny the humanity of Jesus, it does open the door to docetism.

Returning once more to the form of the references to the incarnation, it is of immense importance to note that many of these are couched in quasi-credal language. A typical example is the following:

But why, through the power of the Word, according to the will of God the Father and Lord of all, He was born of a virgin as a man, and was named Jesus, and was crucified, and died, and rose again, and ascended into heaven, an intelligent man...¹⁷⁴

(170) Dial. 76(193,653A). cf. also Dial. 54(156,593Cf) and 84(204,673Bf).

(171) Dial. 100(224,709B).

(172) op. cit. p. 242.

(173) i.e. Irenaeus: Adv. Haer. III.19.3(346,941Bf).

(174) I Apol. 46.5(47,397Cf).

These stereotyped references reveal a number of important points. As J.N.D. Kelly points out, they are glimpses into the liturgical life of the Church of the time.¹⁷⁵ For our purposes here the relationship of these texts to the early creeds is not of great significance. But what is significant is that the heart of Justin's thought on the incarnation is expressed in these terms. Almost every mention of the incarnation calls forth an automatic response of this semi-formal nature. If one were to remove all such instances from his writings, one would be left with very little reference to the incarnation indeed. It is also remarkably striking how this language of a credal nature is almost forcibly inserted into what is otherwise language related to Justin's Logos theology.¹⁷⁶ The conclusion is irresistible, and is attested to by the whole credal tradition of the Church: that the Logos theology fails to be a basis for an incarnation-al theology. Justin's main emphasis is not on the incarnation but on the Logos as the revealer. The revelation in the incarnation has an important position but it is not essential. Justin's theology would remain much the same without it. The difficulty of the incarnation of the Logos seems even to have been realized by John, of course. Jn. 1.14 is stated in its full paradoxical force and left there only to be taken up in other terms. Here in Justin the same paradox is perhaps felt in the relationship between the Logos theology and these credal interspersions. What makes Justin's methodology difficult is that there is no inherent relationship between the two halves. The Logos theology does not entail an incarnation. He may not be able satisfactorily to weld his thought

(175) *op. cit.* p. 72.

(176) This has been noticed by Laeuchli, *op. cit.* p. 183.

into a unity, but his experience and faith have made him realize that the two do necessarily belong to each other. In this way we see how traditional Justin is and how the tradition of the Church, in which he is soaked, has provided a safeguard to the other side of his thought. It is precisely at this point that Justin differs from the other Apologists.¹⁷⁷

An important area in which Justin does relate his Logos theology and the incarnation is in his approach to the Old Testament. By insisting that the Old Testament is inspired by the Logos and that it refers to Christ, he shows that he regarded the incarnation to be the hermeneutic key to the Old Testament. Again it is fitting to mention that by this link the whole of the Dialogue can be regarded as a massive repudiation of Marcion. It is difficult to assess this question in great detail because Justin did not have the problem of directly relating the Old and the New Testaments. But if one were to guess at what his approach to this problem would be, one would not be far wrong, it seems, to suppose that he would have tended to interpret both Logocentrically. Even the New Testament, that is the incarnation, would be used to point to the Logos. Thus in relating the Old and the New Testaments, he would have so united them that he would probably have obscured the differences between the two. This would be very similar to many modern 'fundamentalist' interpretations.

In Justin the soteriological aspect of the incarnation is also present, and an examination of this will help us to assess further the previous conjectures. First of all the incarnation is both part of God's *οἰκονομία* and the *οἰκονομία* itself. This word is especially related to the conquering of evil demons:

(177) cf. below, p. 93.



...this Christ, Son of God, who was before the morning star and the moon, and submitted to become incarnate, and be born of this virgin of the family of David, in order that, by this dispensation (διὰ τῆς οἰκονομίας), the serpent that sinned from the beginning like him, may be destroyed, and that death may be contemned...¹⁷⁸

In this Justin closely connects the οἰκονομία of the passion with the ἡδρασία. But when we come to look more closely at the οἰκονομία of the passion, we find Justin's thought a little thin. Most of the significance that Justin sees in the passion is connected with the defeat of evil, and especially evil demons.¹⁷⁹ Here the part played by the Cross in exorcisms is undoubtedly important background.¹⁸⁰ The cosmic significance of the crucifixion is hinted at in the reference to Plato's chi placed 'cross-wise' in the universe.¹⁸¹ But in all this it is not made clear why Jesus had to become man to achieve these ends. An exception is the following:

If then, the Father of all wished His Christ for the whole human family to take upon Him the curses (κατάρας) of all, knowing that, after He had been crucified and was dead, He would raise Him up...¹⁸²

The blood of Jesus also has significance, especially in connection with the passover.¹⁸³ But despite these references and a few others like them,¹⁸⁴ Goodenough appears to be correct when he

(178) Dial. 45(144,572Cf). For Justin's use of οἰκονομία cf. Daniélou, op. cit. p. 158f.

(179) cf. Goodenough, op. cit. p. 252.

(180) cf. ibid. p. 258 and Dial. 85(205,676C) and 100(225,709Df).

(181) cf. I Apol. 60(58,417Af).

(182) Dial. 95(219,701Bf).

(183) cf. I Apol. 32.7(34,380B) and Dial. 111(238,732C).

(184) cf. Goodenough, op. cit. p. 259 and Barnard, op. cit. p. 124.

states:

It is in the incarnate Logos that men come to know the entire Logos, but the special value of the fact that the Logos became man is not included in this theory of the work of Christ.¹⁸⁵

This deficiency in Justin is yet another bit of evidence for the conclusion that Justin's thought is fundamentally Logocentric rather than Christocentric, and therefore cosmological rather than soteriological.¹⁸⁶ The problems in his description of the incarnation seem to arise from his starting his thought from the Logos rather than from the radical paradox of the Logos become man. Because of this, the human side of the incarnation fails to have any real significance. This, apart from Justin's clinging to tradition, would either have left him with a docetic incarnation or led him to ignore the incarnation altogether. This particular subject is one of the major issues in the next chapter dealing with the other Apologists. As we will point out there, one of the major problems in assessing the whole question of the incarnation in these writers is, once again, the apologetic nature of the works. While we must leave a conclusion to this debate to the next chapter and indeed to the conclusion of this whole study, we must note here that despite Justin's apologetic intent, he finds it essential to include the incarnation, even if he cannot integrate it successfully with the rest of his thought.

(5) Conclusion:

Justin was a theologian of the Logos and every aspect of his thought must be assessed by how it relates to the Logos. His doctrine of God is fundamentally that of Middle-Platonism, but instead of including

(185) op. cit. p. 257.

(186) For the latter observation cf. Daniélou, op. cit. p. 345.

the Logos into this, Justin tends to exclude it. Even the idea of the λόγος ἐνδύθητος, although present in an undefined way, has been suppressed. This, together with the stress on the generation of the Logos by God which is adopted from the Wisdom tradition, is powerful evidence of an underlying subordinationism. But because of Justin's description of God, this subordinationism does not resolve itself into a dualism, but rather into a monism with God disappearing altogether. As we stated, the doctrine of God reduces to the doctrine of the Logos.

From the other side, we saw how a similar reduction occurs between the incarnation and the Logos. The tendency for the incarnation to be viewed totally from the perspective of the cosmic Logos meant that the incarnation failed to have any fundamental significance. Indeed, we found that it was only due to Justin's traditionalism that he retained the incarnation in his thought; it is not an essential feature of his theology. And so, not only does God reduce to the Logos, but the incarnation is also resolved back into the Logos.

It is at this point that Justin rather paradoxically does not carry his thought through. One would expect the failure of his Christology to reflect itself in his theory of revelation. A similar reduction either of human reason to the Logos or vice-versa should occur. This would set the seal on a completely monistic tendency in his thought. As we have been at pains to point out, this reduction does not occur. The qualifications in the II Apol. and Dial. 1-9 of the Logos theory of the I Apol. emphatically reject this. It is, indeed, these qualifications themselves which reveal how inherently possible this reduction is to any Logos theology, particularly when the ambivalence between the λόγος as divine Logos and human reason occupies a central position. The whole strength of Justin's theology lies in the avoidance of this danger. It is very likely that this too is the

result of his traditionalism, for his rejection of monism at this point amounts to an affirmation not only of the transcendence of God, but also of revelation as the sole means of knowledge of God.

In this Justin has tackled the central issue of Greek thought, which always gave Stoicism the edge on Platonism, and which has made the monistic solution to all problems more readily acceptable than the dualistic.

But why is this very advanced thought not represented in the other areas of his thought? If the thesis of development which has been suggested is accepted, then one partial explanation might be forthcoming. It is in the I Apol. that there is the most obvious clash between the Logos theology and the credal language used to describe the incarnation, and it is here that the $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ ambivalence tends to lead to the reductionism that Justin later rejects.

Could it be that these two things are connected? It seems likely that this is so. It would be marvellous for this thesis if a developed incarnational theology could now be found in the Dialogue. But what we must conclude is that the development made in Justin's theory of revelation has not as yet been paralleled in his Christology. We would like to find the development from reason to revelation paralleled by a move from Logocentricity to Christocentricity. In This way the incarnate Christ instead of the Logos would be the supreme revelation of God. For this adaptation, or perhaps real rejection of the Logos theology, we must wait for Athanasius.

An important aspect of Justin's Logos theology appears to have been missed by other scholars. This is its relationship with Marcionism. By connecting all spheres of his thought to the Logos, Justin creates a theology which has presuppositions fundamentally at variance with Marcionism. Marcion had difficulty in reconciling the natures of God and the Logos - to use Justin's terms. Although Justin and

Marcion were concerned with very different aspects of the nature of God, it is precisely this same problem which occurs in Justin and which produces his subordinationism. The dualism of Marcion is quite foreign to Justin's subordinationism, and the reduction of God to the Logos would be the ultimate horror to Marcion. But in both Marcion and Justin the problem of God still remains; for the one it is a moral problem and for the other a more abstract philosophical difficulty. In this similarity Justin and Marcion are found to be contemporaries, but products of very different backgrounds.

II. TATIAN, THEOPHILUS AND ATHENAGORAS.

When Tatian, Theophilus and Athenagoras are compared with Justin, we find some notable advances and some equally notable regressions. Part of the problem of dealing with these three is that we have comparatively little of their work extant. This has given rise, especially in the case of Athenagoras, to questions as to what he might have written in a work intended to be Christian theology as opposed to apologetic. But we can only analyse the texts we possess to the best of our ability. There is no possibility of assessing what other works contained, if they every existed in the forms suggested.

In this chapter a different methodology is employed. Each of the three apologists is examined in turn in three sections. In this way the contrast between the three is highlighted. Constantly all three are to be compared with Justin. The three sections employed do not directly correlate with the sections of the previous chapter. This is inevitable since the characters of the works differ.

(1) Christianity and Philosophy:

(a) Tatian:

In Tatian we find almost the complete antithesis to his teacher, Justin.¹ Even though Justin's developed position is critical of philosophy, he was most diligent to describe the relationship between the two and is not above using similarities to apologetic advantage. But Tatian openly and bluntly rejects philosophy altogether:

...you who parcel out wisdom are cut off from the wisdom that is according to truth.²

(1) cf. esp. Ch.'s 2-4, 8-10.

(2) 26(31f,861C).

Tatian's conscious, vitriolic attack on philosophy precludes any apologetic. The contrast is even greater than this, for Tatian does not appear to have any real knowledge of the higher forms of Greek culture. He indiscriminately groups together philosophy and the crudest forms of Hellenistic polytheism and directs his polemic against both.³ Thus, in the only instance where he acknowledges the existence of philosophers as such, their doctrines are totally ignored, while Tatian only concerns himself with their inability to come to consensus:

Wherefore do not be led away by the solemn assemblies of philosophers who are no philosophers, who dogmatize one against the other, though each one vents but the crude fancies of the moment.⁴

Tatian also indirectly shows himself to be aware of the loan theory by being much concerned with proving that Moses was prior to Homer.⁵ He regards the loan theory as a negative tool used to exclude rather than include philosophy, whereas Justin could use it in both senses. There is no finesse in Tatian. He is not concerned with persuading his reader. But nevertheless, Tatian is most interesting because, while he completely rejects the Hellenistic world in his attacks on it, he uses very Hellenistic thought forms and language to describe God and the Logos. And so, as he rejects Hellenism out of the front door, we will find that he has allowed it to sneak into the back door and to penetrate every nook and cranny of his thought. Because of Tatian's complete rejection of the possibility of the Greek world having any knowledge of God, he can also tremendously

(3) e.g. 21(27f,852A) and 34(39,876Bf).

(4) 3(8,812Af) and also 25(30f,860Af). For a similar comment cf. Justin, Dial. 2(87,476B).

(5) cf. Ch.'s 31, 36-41 and also Theophilus: Ad. Aut. III, 20-30.

simplify the doctrine of revelation as found in Justin. The complex relationship between the Logos and human reason, or between λόγος ἐπερματικός and ἐπέσμα τοῦ λόγου, is all foreign to Tatian. This total rejection of philosophy and, by implication, of human reason is at least partially the logical conclusion of Justin's ἕτερον ... ἕτερον. If one were to trace the development from Justin's I Apol. to the II Apol. and the Dialogue one stage further, in many respects one would find oneself with Tatian. Tatian can thus be seen to be Justin's pupil, who like most pupils has not understood the full subtilty of his master's thought.

(b) Theophilus:

When we move on to Theophilus we find a more sophisticated account. Like Tatian he attacks pagan idolatory,⁶ and the crudity of the Greek gods.⁷ These attacks are designed to contrast with the nature of the true God. In this approach all the writers of the period revelled. But Theophilus, unlike Tatian, at least acknowledges that all of Greek culture is not uniformly degenerate. He can align himself with Greek poets and philosophers in attacking the Hellenistic deities,⁸ but mainly he quotes Greek sources to show their disagreement with each other.⁹ This is similar to the criticisms made by Tatian, but Theophilus's criticism is much more widely informed. The poets, indeed even Homer and Hesiod, spoke 'not with a pure but an erring spirit',¹⁰ and where there is agreement between the two

(6) cf. I, 10(60f,1040Af) and II, 2(65f,1048Bf).

(7) cf. I, 9(59f,1037Bf); II, 3(66f,1049Af), 5-8(68-74,1053Af); III, 7-8(112-114,1129Bf).

(8) cf. II, 36(102ff,1109Cf), where he quotes extended passages from the Sibyl; also II, 37(104ff,1116Bf).

(9) e.g. II, 5-6 and esp. II, 6(70,1056C): 'Besides, he is found in every way to talk nonsense, and to contradict himself'.

(10) II, 8(74,1061B).

worlds, they 'stole these things from the law and the prophets'.¹¹ Here Theophilus follows Tatian in his negative use of the loan theory, but at least admits that some similarities do exist. The climax to Theophilus's use of the loan theory is the mammoth, though incredibly tedious historical proof of the priority of the Hebrew scriptures.¹² Theophilus is then almost as derogatory as Tatian about the claim of the Greek world to truth, but by his readiness to quote authors and to admit a certain degree of similarity in some instances, he gives a much more satisfactory critique of the Greek world than Tatian's universal condemnation. But neither of these has Justin's apologetic thrust, and so they escape the resulting theological problem.

(c) Athenagoras:

Athenagoras is a complete contrast to these two. He is really even more apologetic than Justin in that the ethos of his writing is more cultured and seemingly more in tune with the philosophical frame of mind. He approaches Greek culture very positively and quotes Euripedes with approval,¹³ even using the Stoics as an example of the belief in the divine unity.¹⁴ He also quotes Plato with approval.¹⁵ To explain this attitude, Athenagoras uses the loan theory positively, allowing that the philosophers have accurate conjectures of the truth 'by reason of their affinity with the afflatus from God'.¹⁶ This

(11) II, 37(106,1117C).

(12) III, 18-30.

(13) Leg. 5(379f,900A).

(14) 6(382,904A).

(15) 6(381,901A).

(16) 7(382,904B): *κατὰ συμπάθειαν τῆς παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ πίστεως.*
(Here *παρὰ* must be a misprint for *παρά*).

last statement has a very close similarity with the theories of Justin, although phrased in different terminology. Like Justin, this connection with the pagan world is sharply contrasted with the true revelation through the prophets:

But we have for witnesses of the things we apprehend and believe, prophets, men who have pronounced concerning God and the things of God, guided by the Spirit of God.¹⁷

Furthermore, appealing to the intelligence and piety of the Emperor, he expresses his belief in the absolute rationality of accepting the divine revelation:

...it would be irrational (ἄλογον) for us to cease to believe in the Spirit from God (τῷ παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ πνεύματι), who moved the mouths of the prophets like musical instruments, and to give heed to mere human opinions.¹⁸

And so, in a manner similar to Justin, the pagan is given credit for the truth he possesses, but this truth is sharply put into perspective by a very definite appeal to revelation. Athenagoras also includes the usual attack on idolatry and polytheism,¹⁹ and the immorality of the gods.²⁰ Even the philosophers previously quoted with approval are criticized,²¹ and the distortions in the Greek world are also explained as the result of the activity of evil demons.²² Athenagoras manages, however, to blend the positive

(17) 7(382,904Bf).

(18) 7(383,904C).

(19) cf. 8(383f,904Cf), 15(390f,920Af), 17-18(392-5,921Cf), 28(410f,953Bf).

(20) e.g. 21-22(393-403,932Cf).

(21) cf. 19(395f,928Bf); the Stoics are criticized in 22(401,937Af) and Thales and Plato in 23(403ff,941Bf).

(22) cf. 26(408,949Df).

and negative sides of his thought together to a remarkable degree. It is this very subtle apologetic which has led to a difference of opinion between L.W. Barnard²³ and D. Powell.²⁴ Barnard maintains that Athenagoras may have been deeply influenced by Galen and Marcus Aurelius. The main issue is that Athenagoras is regarded as having moved away from the insistence on the Old Testament as the sole source of revelation and as a praeparatio evangelica, in order to present the Christian position rather as a universal truth than in the exclusivist fashion of the Old Testament. Thus Athenagoras is regarded as concentrating more on Platonism as such. Barnard's argument as to Athenagoras's knowledge of Galen rests mainly on his medical knowledge displayed in the De Res., and he carries these results back into his assessment of the Legatio. So Barnard's argument depends to a large extent on the common authorship of the Legatio and the de Res. This is not a safe assumption since it was severely challenged by R.M. Grant.²⁵ Powell, on the other hand, challenges Barnard's thesis that Athenagoras has moved completely away from Justin's use of the Old Testament. He stresses, as we have pointed out, that Athenagoras strongly maintains a doctrine of inspiration, in this and other ways strongly criticizing the Greek world.²⁶ Powell also maintains that Athenagoras is writing to answer specific charges before a specific audience and that he should be evaluated with this in mind. Although the full complexity of the issue will only become apparent when we deal with Athenagoras's Logos doctrine, it is possible to conclude here that, while Athenagoras

(23) "Athenagoras, Galen, Marcus Aurelius, and Celsus", CQR, 168(1967), pp. 168-181, and the chapter of the same title in his book: Athenagoras: A Study in Second Century Apologetic (Paris, 1972).

(24) "Athenagoras and the Philosophers", CQR, 168(1967), pp. 282-289.

(25) "Athenagoras or Pseudo-Athenagoras", Harvard Theological Review, 47(1954), pp. 121-129.

(26) Powell, op. cit. p. 284.

has not departed from Justin as far as Barnard maintains, Powell has not fully taken into account the full extent of Athenagoras's apologetic. The absence of the Old Testament in Athenagoras is most relevant, and while one senses that he would have appealed to it if pushed into a corner, the fact that he does not has the effect of making his writing more universally acceptable. But by turning away from the Old Testament Athenagoras loosens his thought in an important respect from the tradition of the Church. And thus, while in many respects he is a more successful apologist than Justin, the question of how successful a Christian theologian he is is still very much open to debate.

(2) The Logos and Creation:

In Justin the doctrine of creation, as we have seen,²⁷ is apparently conditioned by a rejection of both Marcionite and other forms of dualism. But while this is so, Justin has not progressed beyond the tradition of Gen. 1.2 and the Platonic idea which developed into the Middle-Platonic ἀμορφὸς ὕλη. The doctrine of creation is not as important in an assessment of Justin's theology as is the case for these other apologists, for whom it becomes the testing ground for almost every aspect of their thought. We saw how Justin connected the Logos with creation and how he exegeted Prov. 8.22.²⁸ It was not possible to ascribe to Justin either a full doctrine of the eternal generation of the Logos or, on the other hand, generation just for the purpose of creation. If the latter position is adopted the theological implications are widespread and serious. The main question that is here raised is the basic matter of how God relates to the world. Indeed, this includes the even more fundamental questions of who God

(27) cf. above, pp. 10f.

(28) cf. above, pp. 17f.

is and what the world is. Thus we move from creation to the nature of God and back again. The dynamics of the two questions reveal how the two issues cannot be separated. And so it is that in this section, although the major question is that of creation, a large part of the discussion is over the nature of the Logos and his relationship to God.

(a) Tatian:

In Tatian there are two main passages dealing with creation, Ch.'s 4-5 and 12. The first point to note is his descriptions of God as timeless and without a beginning.²⁹ These statements are to be directly contrasted with the description of the Logos as the ἀρχή.³⁰ But in Ch. 4 there is no mention of the Logos. The ἀναρχος θεός is not the Stoic god,³¹ but indeed, 'the Maker...of the forms that are in matter' (τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ ὄγκματων κατασκευαστής). This, together with the description of God as 'the Father of both sensible and invisible things' (αἰσθητῶν καὶ ἀοράτων), is very Platonic and could easily contain the idea of an eternal ὕλη. But in this chapter it is God who is the creator, and it is only when these ideas are set out 'more distinctly' in Ch. 5 that Tatian incorporates the Logos. This has its implications for the identification of the Logos with God.

(29) 4(8,813A): θεός οὐκ ἔχει οὐρανὸν ἐν χρόνῳ, where οὐρανός probably means 'origin'. God is also θεός... μόνος ἀναρχος ὧν and αὐτὸς ὑπάρχων τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχή.

(30) 5(9,813B): τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν λόγου δύναμιν;
5(9,816A): τοῦτον (τὸν λόγον) ἴσμεν τὸν κόσμον τὴν ἀρχήν.

(31) 5(9,813A): Πνεῦμα δὲ θεός, οὐ διήκον δια τῆς ὕλης.

Ch. 5 is characterized by a movement of thought from God being the creator to the activity of the Logos in creation. Thus, at one moment the Logos is the creator, but at the next it is God who is the 'Lord of the universe' and the 'ὑπόστασις of all being'. This is explained by the statement: 'with Him were all things'. ὑπόστασις, therefore, seems to be used in its more proper Greek sense as almost the 'ground of existence'. It refers to the dependence of all things on God for their existence both in creation and thereafter. Thus there is here a reference to the idea lying behind the doctrine of creatio continua.

But one of these things of which God is the ὑπόστασις turns out to be the Logos himself, who almost paradoxically 'subsists...in Him by Logos-power'.³² What follows this is the classical ἐνδιάθετος προφορικός distinction, with the λόγος προφορικός being described as the ἔργον πρῶτον καὶ τὸ πᾶν πατρὸς. This partially explains the phrase διὰ λογικῆς δυνάμεως which seems to refer to the Logos as God's rationality and therefore to be equivalent to the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος. This interpretation is made possible since Tatian could not have thought that the Logos existed eternally in God through the activity of the Logos. What we have here is a puzzling confusion of the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός.³³ It seems that this use of δύναμις as the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος is not understood in the reference to the Λόγου δύναμις. This would turn everything upsidedown and into complete confusion. The Λόγου δύναμις is identified with the ἀρχὴ τοῦ κόσμου and is therefore to be regarded as the Logos in action. The continued

(32) 5(9,813C): εὐν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα (εὐν αὐτῷ γὰρ) διὰ λογικῆς δυνάμεως, αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ Λόγος ὅς ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπέσχεθε.

(33) cf. above, p. 29.

existence of the λόγος ἐνδιδάθεις as the 'Logos-power' means that we have what Goodenough calls a 'cosmic-duality' of the Logos. This must be the result of the adoption of this schema. And so Tatian writes:

...the Logos, coming forth from the Logos-power of the Father, has not divested of the Logos-power Him who begat Him.³⁴

This is again the two-stage theory of the Logos.³⁵ The ANCL translation paraphrases the Greek but brings out the connection of the λόγος ἐνδιδάθεις, which is the Logos-power (ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς δυνάμεως), with the λόγος ὑποφορικός. Here the verb προσελθῶν is used of this movement of the Logos, in contrast with Justin's systematic avoidance of the term.³⁶ But even if this verb does hint at more gnostic vocabulary, the stress on the λόγος ἐνδιδάθεις remaining in God forbids a completely emanantist interpretation.

Justin's qualification of emanationism, that the emanation is οὐ κατὰ ἀποκομήν, ὡς ἀπομετρίομένης τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας, is taken up by Tatian as: Πέγονε δὲ κατὰ μετρίομόν, οὐ κατὰ ἀποκομήν.³⁷ This appears to be the kind of distortion quite possible from aural memory. Justin's second phrase indicates that he would not have been at all happy with Tatian's κατὰ μετρίομόν. Tatian's emanantist tendency reveals itself in many other ways.³⁸

(34) 5(10,817A): οὕτω καὶ ὁ Λόγος, προσελθὼν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς δυνάμεως, οὐκ ἄλλοθι προπαύκεται τὸν γεγονενήκόσα.

(35) cf. Wolfson, op. cit. p. 193. The connection of the begetting of the Logos with the creation of the world is mysteriously denied by V.A.S. Little: The Christology of the Apologists (London, 1934), p. 187.

(36) cf. above, p. 20.

(37) 5(9,816A).

(38) cf. below, pp. 79f.

The coming forth of the Logos from the Logos-power is also called 'begetting', and this is shown to correspond to the generation of the world:

And as the Logos, begotten in the beginning (ἐν ἀρχῇ γεννηθείς) begat (ἀντεγέννησε) in turn our world, having first created (συμμορφώσας) for Himself the necessary matter....³⁹

This quote reveals the last shade of meaning which is given to the word ἀρχή. God was ἄναρχος but ἐν ἀρχῇ, whereas the Logos is the ἀρχή and now is begotten ἐν ἀρχῇ. ἀρχή is used both of a temporal beginning and as the causative source of the world.

This kind of play on the word, although probably not in any way directly related, is similar to that of Col. 1.15ff and is typical of rabbinic methodology.⁴⁰ Inevitable in this use of the word

is the impression that while God is ἄναρχος the Logos is not.

This must be so, since the Logos is properly speaking only the

λόγος προφορικός. In this quote the Logos is begotten explicitly to beget in turn (ἀντεγέννησε) the world. This very close associa-

tion between the relationship of God to Logos and Logos to the world

again points to a slight influence of emanationism. That the

movement of the Logos from ἐνδιάθετος to προφορικός is firmly

connected with the Logos becoming the ἀρχή τοῦ κόσμου, gives

support for the idea that the Logos is partially thought of as the

world of ideas which sprang from the mind of God and out of which

the world derived its order. This is to be connected with the

reference to the ἔχρημα in Ch. 4.

(39) 5(10,817A).

(40) cf. Daniélou, op. cit. p. 349 and the reference there to his Theology of Jewish Christianity, pp. 166-168. cf. also W.D. Davies: Paul and Rabbinic Judaism (SPCK, 1948), pp. 151f.

The manner of the creation of the world is a little difficult to ascertain with certainty. The question is whether or not such statements as the above - 'having first created (δημιουργήσας) for Himself the necessary matter' - refer to an actual creation ex nihilo of matter (ύλη). The verb δημιουργέω definitely does not imply such a connotation. Tatian does however directly contrast God, who is ἀναρχος, with the ύλη, which has an ἀρχή. The ύλη is also described as a γεννητή, which 'has been brought into existence (προβεβλημένη) by the Framer (δημιουργῶ) of all things alone'.⁴¹ These statements appear to be a rejection of Justin's lingering belief in the eternity of the ύλη. Both Daniélou⁴² and Pannenberg⁴³ maintain this, and to a certain extent it is true. Tatian may be on the surface attacking the doctrine, but his attack has problems and in many ways he himself is still clinging to the idea.

His attack is problematical firstly because of the close connection between the begetting of the Logos and the world. If the world's begetting is ex nihilo, what about that of the Logos? Also the constant description of both God and the Logos as δημιουργός has very Platonic overtones. Further, προβάλλω is so very closely connected with the Valentinians that even if it does allow for a certain kind of ex nihilo, it is the kind of ex nihilo that is most undesirable. An example of this is the following:

(41) 12(16f,8290).

(42) op. cit. p. 357. Daniélou does not seem to be correct when he maintains that 'for Tatian it is the Father who creates matter, and who utters the Logos to impose order upon it'. The references to creation by God without the Logos, as has been shown, occur before the Logos has been introduced to the reader and so no such distinction can be made.

(43) op. cit. p. 145.

...the whole structure of the world, and the whole creation, has been produced from matter (ἐξ ὕλης), and the matter itself brought into existence (ὑποβεβλημένην) by God.⁴⁴

Here the created order could be an emanation of the divine, and only ex nihilo in the sense that it was not derived from anything foreign to God. It is possible that Tatian may have intended a contrast between the Logos coming forth (προελθών) from God and the world being thrown forth (ὑποβάλλω) from God. There is one further positive indication that Justin was clinging to the doctrine of the eternal ὕλη. In an analogy of creation in Ch. 5, he compares creation with speech which orders 'the unarranged matter (ἀκόσμητον ὕλην) in your minds'.⁴⁵

In Tatian then, there is a use of the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος / προφορικῶς schema in which the coming forth of the Logos is closely associated with the creation of the world. The description of the creation of the world contains a polemic against the idea of the eternal ὕλη, but in this polemic Tatian appears, in one more way, to have been influenced by his Gnostic Background, and so what starts out promisingly, ends up not being a proper creation ex nihilo. Furthermore, as we shall show, the idea of the evil ὕλη seems to have crept into his thought at other points not directly connected by him with creation.⁴⁶

(b) Theophilus:

Theophilus is the only Apologist to explicitly mention that he adopts and approves of the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος / προφορικῶς schema. In doing this he does, however, make a major departure from the other Apologists by his blending together of this tradition with the

(44) 12(16f, 829C).

(45) 5(10, 817A).

(46) cf. below, p. 80.

Wisdom tradition. The major development that he includes is the separation of the Logos and Wisdom.⁴⁷ Even in his description of the generation of the Logos he gives several clues as to how deeply he is influenced by the Wisdom tradition. The Logos was emitted or belched forth (ἐξερυσσάμενος) 'along with His own Wisdom before all things'. The only relevant precursor of the use of this verb is Ps. 44(45).1: ἐξερύσασατο ἡ καρδιά μου λόγον ἀγαθόν

This is very useful to Theophilus in that it gives him a biblical precedent for regarding the Logos and Wisdom as separate entities, both proceeding from God. Ps. 44(45).1 refers to the emission of the Logos and Prov. 8.22 to the generation of Wisdom. But Theophilus does not maintain a rigid distinction between these two events, or between the two sides of the one event. He also couples both with the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος / προφορικώς schema. The λόγος ἐνδιάθετος is described as 'a counsellor (σύμβουλος) being His own mind (νοῦν) and thought (πρόνοειν)'.⁴⁸ Here the descriptions of σοφία as a σύμβουλος in Wis. 8.9 and Job. 15.8 are applied to the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος. Theophilus does not, however, draw the conclusion that the Logos and Wisdom are identical as the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, but that, when the Logos becomes προφορικώς, they split into the Logos and Wisdom with Wisdom remaining ἐνδιάθετος. What happens ἐνδιάθετος remains vague. As in other writers, a connection between the two forms of the Logos is made with reference to the will of the Father. But even though the λόγος προφορικώς becomes the πρῶτον πᾶσης κτίσεως, paradoxically this 'does not empty Him of the Word' (ὃ κενωθείς αὐτὸς τοῦ Λόγου).

Why this can be, is described as follows:

(47) cf. below, pp. 84f.

(48) II.22(88,1088B).

...but He begat the Logos (ἀλλὰ Λόγον γενήσας), and yet He has fellowship always with His Logos (καὶ τῷ Λόγῳ αὐτοῦ διαπαντός ὁμιλῶν).⁴⁹

This not entirely satisfactory solution does, however, again show signs of influence from the Wisdom tradition. The ὁμιλῶν is very similar to the description of Wisdom as God's σύμβουλος and to the idea of συμβίωσις in Wis. 7.28-8.12.

But returning to the question of creation, we can see that the description of the λόγος προφορικός as the πρῶτότατον πάσης κτίσεως (another phrase from the Wisdom tradition, cf. Col. 1.15) is also balanced by the emphatic πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων .

The πρῶτότατον πάσης κτίσεως becomes even more anomalous in Theophilus because of the great stress on the difference between created and uncreated entities. This differentiation of the ἀγένετος and the γενετός is revealed in his acute attack on the idea of an eternal ἕλη .⁵⁰ Interestingly, this is included in an attack on the whole Greek, and especially the Stoic, concept of God. Theophilus clearly regarded the issues of the nature of God and of creation as closely connected. He argues that the notions that the ἕλη is ἀγένετος and that God is the creator τῶν ἄλλων are incompatible, and that the incorrect statement is the first. The ἕλη being ἀγένετος is shown to be equivalent to it being ἰσόθεος . By this development of the implications of the Middle-Platonic doctrine, Theophilus includes a subtle attack on the Stoics. The whole argument depends entirely on accepting the basic Platonic that there are two classes of being, the ἀγένετος and the

(49) *ibid.*

(50) II, 4(67,1052B).

γενετός.⁵¹ This distinction is shown to be equivalent to that between ἀεραϊτός and εραϊτός. This rejection of the immortal ἕληγ is not just an isolated argument but is echoed in all of Theophilus's thought. And so, he scoffs:

And what great thing is it if God made the world out of existent materials (ἐξ υἱοκαταμένους ἕληγ).⁵²

In many instances Theophilus refers to creation ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων :

But the power of God is shown in this, that, first of all, He creates out of nothing (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων) according to His will, the things that are made.⁵³

By themselves these references would not have much significance, but together with the refutation of the idea of the ἕληγ, they amount to a very strong case for maintaining that Theophilus taught a strict doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. That Theophilus realized the importance of the doctrine is not only evidenced by his direct exposition of it, but also by his connection of creation with what

(51) Theophilus is consistent in his use of ἀγέννητος rather than ἀγέννητος. The following does, however, occur which shows that, despite his preference for the single v-ed variety, he does not rigidly distinguish them:

Πλάσειν δὲ καὶ αἱ εἰς ἀγέννητος ἀποδοθεὶς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὁμολογῶσιν, ἀγέννητον, καὶ πατέρα... Εἰ δὲ ἀπὸς ἀγέννητος...

cf. also below, n. 53 and also above, p. 20, n. 77.

(52) II, 4(68,1052B). cf. Athanasius: de Inc. 2.3(M25,100A), and below, p. 147.

(53) II, 13(79,1072B). cf. also I, 4(55,1029Af): (God) Ἄναρχος δὲ ἕσται, ὅτι ἀγέννητος ἔσται. (The two v's are unlikely to be significant, cf. above, n. 51). The quote goes on to describe God as πρὸ πάντων ὄλων, a favourite phrase, and as the δημιουργός who is the ποιητής and the κτιστής τῶν ὄλων, and he who τὰ πάντα... ἐποίησεν ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων εἰς τὸ εἶναι.

came to be called the 'cosmological argument',⁵⁴ and also in his lengthy commentary on the Genesis accounts of creation.⁵⁵ But in his description of the Logos, the coming forth of the Logos, while it occurs before creation, is still part of the process of creation. This perhaps explains why in his thought the Logos is the *πρωτότακτον πλάσις κτίσεως* and yet not part of the created order.

(c) Athenagoras:

Leaving aside, for the moment, the nature of the generation of the Logos in Athenagoras, let us first turn directly to his description of the created order. Like Theophilus, Athenagoras's main stress in this regard is the complete separation of God from matter:

But to us, who distinguish God from matter (*διακρίσειν ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης τὸν θεόν*), and teach that matter is one thing and God another, and that they are separated by a wide interval (*τὸ διὰ μέτρον πολὺ*) (for that the Deity is uncreated and eternal (*ἀγέννητον ... καὶ αἰδῶν*), to be beheld by the understanding and reason alone, while matter is created and perishable (*τῆν δὲ ὕλην γενετὴν καὶ φθαρτὴν*)...⁵⁶

This quote conclusively separates God from matter, but it fails to say anything definite about the status of the *ὕλη*. The Platonic

(54) II, 13(79,1072B).

(55) I, 10-29.

(56) 4(379,897B). Here one manuscript, Codex Anglicanus, has *γεννητὴν* for *γενετὴν*. This may have resulted from the influence of the previous *ἀγέννητον*. Here *ἀγέννητον* is compared with *γενετὴν*, but elsewhere the single *ν*-ed word is used, i.e. in 15(390,920A) we find *τὸ ἀγέννητον καὶ τὸ γενετὸν*, *τὸ δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν*. Not only does this indicate that there is no strict distinction between *ἀγέννητον* and *ἀγέννητον*, but in 19(395f,929A) quoted below, *γενετὸν* is used where one would expect *γενετὸν*.

nature of the thought^s is brought out even more clearly at the conclusion of the same chapter. Here God is described as $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\gamma\epsilon\nu\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$, which is equivalent to $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\gamma\epsilon\omicron\nu$. This language of process or becoming is continued: $\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon \tau\acute{\omicron} \acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$, $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha} \tau\acute{\omicron} \mu\acute{\gamma} \acute{\omicron}\nu$.⁵⁷ The $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\gamma\epsilon\omicron\nu$ is described as $\tau\acute{\omicron} \acute{\omicron}\nu$, while the $\gamma\epsilon\nu\gamma\epsilon\omicron\nu$ is $\tau\acute{\omicron} \mu\acute{\gamma} \acute{\omicron}\nu$. And since the $\psi\lambda\gamma$ has already been described as $\gamma\epsilon\nu\gamma\epsilon\omicron\nu$, the implication is that its state of being is $\tau\acute{\omicron} \mu\acute{\gamma} \acute{\omicron}\nu$. By itself this quote, distinguishing between the $\acute{\omicron}\nu$ and the $\mu\acute{\gamma}$, might lead one to the conclusion that Athenagoras was deliberately employing the Aristotelian distinction between actuality and potentiality.⁵⁸ If this were the case, one would suppose that Athenagoras would consistently distinguish between $\tau\acute{\omicron} \mu\acute{\gamma} \acute{\omicron}\nu$ and $\tau\acute{\omicron} \acute{\omicron}\nu$, where the latter would be absolute non-being rather than a potential or relative non-being.

But that this is so is by no means clear. In a passage very similar to the above, Athenagoras, in a polemic against idolatry, distinguishes between God and matter once more.⁵⁹ Here $\tau\acute{\omicron} \acute{\alpha}\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\gamma\epsilon\omicron\nu$ is equated with $\tau\acute{\omicron} \acute{\omicron}\nu$ and $\tau\acute{\omicron} \nu\omicron\gamma\epsilon\omicron\nu$, while $\tau\acute{\omicron} \gamma\epsilon\nu\gamma\epsilon\omicron\nu$ is equated with $\tau\acute{\omicron} \acute{\omicron}\nu$ and $\tau\acute{\omicron} \acute{\alpha}\iota\omicron\theta\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\omicron\nu$. In this context, which regards creation as God's ordering and shaping of the $\psi\lambda\gamma$ and which is very similar to Albinus,⁶⁰ the $\tau\acute{\omicron} \acute{\omicron}\nu$ seems to be equated with $\tau\acute{\omicron} \mu\acute{\gamma} \acute{\omicron}\nu$ and could have been used to describe the $\psi\lambda\gamma$. Athenagoras's use of the Platonic language is clearly revealed in the following:

(57) 4(379,900A).

(58) cf. Barnard, op. cit. p. 141, and E. Hatch: The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church (London, 1897), p. 197, n. 3.

(59) 15(390,920A).

(60) Did: 8-9(162.3).

τὸ δὲ οὐκ ὄν , τὸ αἰσθητὸν , γεννητὸν ἄρχόμενον
εἶναι καὶ παυόμενον.⁶¹

Barnard finds it 'odd that so accurate a thinker should reproduce here the Platonic teaching of the unreality of the world of phenomena which he elsewhere rejects'.⁶² It is unfortunate that Barnard does not expand on this statement, because from this examination of the evidence it would appear that Athenagoras is not, at least in this regard, so accurate a thinker, nor does he appear to reject this idea. There is only one real instance that can be claimed as a rejection of the idea of the ὕλη and this is so isolated that it cannot claim to be an integral part of his thought.⁶³ Rather, he uses the Middle-Platonic doctrine of the ὕλη with hardly any modification. From the evidence of our study it is just possible that Athenagoras used the μύ when dealing solely with the ὕλη, and the ὄν when there are overtones of the distinction between τὸ νοητὸν and τὸ αἰσθητὸν , but this must remain at best a very tenuous possibility. Of course, as with all of Athenagoras's thought, it is always possible that what we have is plain apologetic and that the single reference to the rejection of the idea of the ὕλη betrays Athenagoras's real thought. But while this remains a possibility, there does not appear to be sufficient solid evidence to really develop this thesis. Athenagoras's view of creation is, although he strongly separates God and matter, totally Platonic and as such far from a creation ex nihilo.

We turn now to Athenagoras's theory of the origin of the Logos, and then go on to how the Logos is connected with creation. In his

(61) 19(395f,929A).

(62) op. cit. p. 141.

(63) 22(401,937A). There is also 19(396,929B): 'Neither again, is it reasonable that matter should be older than God'.

thought on the Logos Athenagoras seems to show one slight confusion.

In the one instance he writes:

...the understanding and reason (νοῦς καὶ λόγος)
of the Father is the Son of God.⁶⁴

But he also writes:

...for from the beginning, God, who is the eternal
mind (νοῦς), had the Logos in Himself, being from
eternity instinct with Logos (λογικός).⁶⁵

From this it is probable that, despite the first quote, Athenagoras regarded God to be the νοῦς containing the Logos in himself. This would be the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, although Athenagoras does not mention the term. This Logos does come forth (προεβλήθη) 'to be the idea and energizing power (ἰδέα καὶ ἐνέργεια) of all material things'. The process of the Logos becoming προφορικός is thus closely linked with creation. The Logos also becomes the πρῶτον γέννημα but οὐχ ὡς γινόμενον.⁶⁶ But this is the only instance where the change in the godhead is described in these terms. The traditional language of generation used to describe the relationship between the Logos and God seems to be scrupulously avoided even when he refers to the Father and his Son. Because of this, Barnard writes:

It is significant that he nowhere suggests that the the Logos needed to be originated - he merely "proceeds" from the Father, being from all eternity the Logos.⁶⁷

(64) 10(385,909A). Migne has Λόγος for λόγος.

(65) ibid.

(66) This conjunction of γέννημα and γινόμενον may be intentional, in which case it is most Athanasian, or, as is much more probable it is due entirely to linguistic awkwardness which would result from consistency in either direction.

(67) op. cit. p. 100.

In this Athenagoras appears to be closest of all the Apologists to the true significance of the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος προφορικῶς* schema. This is due either to his ignorance or his avoidance of the Wisdom tradition, which insists on the notion of 'betting'.

The phrase *ἰδέα καὶ ἐνέργεια* is very closely connected with the Logos when *προφορικῶς*. The Son of God is the Logos *ἐν ἰδέα καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ*.⁶⁸ From this one gathers that the Logos, being *ἐνδιάθετος*, could not be called the Son of God. The Logos comes forth 'to be the *ἰδέα καὶ ἐνέργεια* of all material things'. By this the procession of the Logos is linked with creation. This is Athenagoras's way of saying that the Logos is the *ἀρχὴ τοῦ κόσμου*. Daniélou uses these references as evidence that Athenagoras has linked the Son of God with the Platonic 'idea' 'which, in Albinus, is identical with the divine thought'.⁶⁹ He goes on to say:

In Justin, by contrast, the Son of God is compared to the Platonic world-soul, which is begotten by God and distinct from him.

This statement is, however, very dangerous. Just the use of *ἐνέργεια* with its very close association with *δύναμις* provides a connection with the world-soul tradition. Furthermore, such a statement gives the impression that Athenagoras has ignored the world-soul, and that Justin ignores the Platonic ideas. Neither of these impressions is correct. Actually the world-soul is connected with the Spirit rather than with the Son of God.⁷⁰ Where Daniélou is right is in mentioning the difference as being due to the generation

(68) 10(385,908B).

(69) op. cit. p. 348.

(70) cf. below, pp. 90f.

of the Logos. These issues will be taken up later.

Here we just mention that Athenagoras regarded the distinctions within God as 'self-existent' and that the Logos exercises his rôle in creation because, as Bethune-Baker puts it, 'he is already in idea all that was required for the exercise of the special work of creation'.⁷¹ And so, by closely connecting the λόγος προφορικός with the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, Athenagoras makes creation an action of God rather than of just the Logos. The Logos is the reason of God and is identified with the Platonic world of ideas. In this side of his thought Athenagoras is much more sophisticated than the other Apologists, but in the matter of creatio ex nihilo he is a disappointment.

When we look back over these three Apologists' treatment of the origin of the Logos and the creation of the world, we see that all of them link creation with the generation of the Logos. They all, like Justin, use as the underlying theory of the origin of the Logos the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος / προφορικός schema, but Theophilus is the only one to explicitly adopt it. In Tatian and Theophilus the Logos comes forth or is begotten to be the ἀρχή of the world. While they add cautionary riders to this theory explaining how the Logos is always related to God, they cannot escape the tendency for the Logos to be part of the created order instead of the absolute source of it. It is this problem which leaves the way open for an Arian interpretation. This may have been sensed by Athenagoras who avoids language about the generation of the Logos and reference to the Logos being the ἀρχή τοῦ κόσμου, although this same idea is expressed by the Logos being the ἰδέα καὶ ἐνέργεια of the world. He manages this by avoiding the exegetical complications

(71) op. cit. p. 129.

of Prov. 8.22ff., and by keeping to the Greek philosophical tradition. In Tatian we find the first glimmerings of a Christian reaction to the Greek doctrine of the $\epsilon\lambda\gamma$, and in Theophilus this doctrine is clearly rejected and he can therefore maintain a proper creatio ex nihilo. This is not the case in Athenagoras. Of the three, Athenagoras's theory of the origin of the Logos is by far the most sophisticated, and both this and his doctrine of creation are the most suited to the philosophical tradition.

(3) The Logos as Revealer:

(a) Tatian:

In the previous section we saw how Tatian accepts the $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ $\epsilon\upsilon\delta\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\upsilon\theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ / $\pi\acute{\rho}\omicron\phi\omicron\rho\omicron\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ framework and how he relates this to creation. Here, however, we must briefly mention the relationship between God and the Logos, and then move on to the question of the doctrine of the Logos, both apart from the question of creation per se.

We noted how Ch. 4 describes creation as an act of God, and how this is expanded in Ch. 5 to include the Logos. This in itself is very powerful evidence for Tatian's belief that the Logos was fully divine. This evidence is strengthened by the caveats regarding the manner of the emanation of the Logos, which are similar to those of Justin. It is not unreasonable that Tatian could maintain two such contradictory ideas as the full divinity of the Logos and the generation of the Logos for the purpose of creation, for the thought of the period would have found this quite acceptable. But this claim for the Logos to be fully divine is undermined by almost the whole of the rest of his thought.

Tatian's emanantist thought is the first serious difficulty. He appears to have accepted the Gnostic idea of a progression of emanations. We see this in his distinguishing the spirit of God 'not

pervading matter', and 'the spirit that pervades matter' (τὸ
διὰ τῆς ἑλγης διήκον).⁷² In this way he accepts the Stoic
language of the divine immanence, but splits the Stoic logos into a
transcendent God and an inferior immanent spirit. This immanent,
inferior spirit is called ψυχὴ and is closely associated with matter,
which is also shown to be inherently evil:

Therefore the demons...having received their structure
from matter and obtained the spirit which adheres in
it, became intemperate and greedy.⁷³

This earthly spirit turns out to be in conflict with the divine
spirit. Thus the soul,

if it continues solitary,...tends downwards towards
matter, and dies with the flesh; but, if it enters into
union with the Divine spirit, it is no longer helpless,
but ascends to the regions whither the Spirit guides it..⁷⁴

This very Gnostic passage is continued in Ch. 15, where Tatian stresses
that

it becomes us now to seek for what we once had, but
have lost, to unite the soul with the Holy Spirit, and
to strive after union with God.⁷⁵

This union with God is effected by the indwelling of the 'superior
spirit' (διὰ τοῦ ὑπερένδοξου πνεύματος). It is this spirit

(72) 4(9,813Af).

(73) 12(17,832B). cf R.M. Grant: "The Heresy of Tatian", JTS,
5(1954), p. 63, where this is compared with Justin and Grant
points to a similarity with the Valentinian doctrine expressed
in Clement: Exc. Theod., 72.2(M9,692C), although the similarity
is not as close as his reference might suggest.

(74) 13(19,833B).

(75) 15(20,837A).

which enables men to escape the tyranny of matter.⁷⁶

All of this must be evidence for how Tatian really conceived of the $\pi\rho\omicron\epsilon\lambda\theta\acute{\omega}\nu$ by which he describes the origination of the Logos. The relationship between this emanantist tradition, using the language of the spirit, and the Logos doctrine is not very clear. There is, however, one indication of a connection:

For the heavenly Logos, a spirit emanating ($\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\omega\varsigma$) from the Father and a Logos from the Logos-power, in imitation of the Father who begat Him made man an image of immortality, so that...man, sharing in a part of God, might have the immortal principle also.⁷⁷

This 'immortal principle' ($\tau\acute{o} \acute{\alpha}\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$) was apparently lost at the fall. Here Tatian advances beyond Justin, although it may well have been for the wrong reasons. But, to get back to the point, this quote shows that Tatian saw no real difference between the Logos and the divine spirit, and that probably the only difference between the two vocabularies is that the 'spirit' terminology is used in his more Gnostic passages, while he reserves the Logos language for his more traditional moments. Because of the close connection of the lower spirit with the world, one cannot but speculate that this might correspond to the world-soul and that the higher spirit of Logos might be more closely connected with the realm of ideas. But the Gnostic nature of Tatian's thought does not allow positive conclusions on this point, and it may be more accurate to trace

(76) cf. 15(21,840A): $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma$ καταξουδίαζεν ἡθλίβεν
and 20(26,852A): $\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$ γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐστὶ καθέλεκται, καὶ
 $\delta\iota' \acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\upsilon\lambda\alpha\nu$ τὴν ὑλὴν ἐκτίθειται. Both of these references indicate the inherently evil nature of the ὑλὴ, which is, of course, almost the basic tenet of Gnosticism, but is also present in other traditions, cf. Wis. 9.15 and its parallel in the Phaedo.

(77) 7(11,820B).

Tatian's background to the similarity between Middle-Platonism and Gnosticism in so far as they both contain elements concerned with a divine hierarchy.

The above quote also raises another interesting matter. Tatian writes of man 'sharing in a part of God' so that he 'might have the immortal principle also'. This is strongly reminiscent of Justin's $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\mu\alpha$ doctrine. The resemblance is, however, only superficial, since in Justin the $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\mu\alpha$ $\tau\omega$ $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omega$ really comes down to man and operates in his reason, but in Tatian it is impossible that the higher spirit could really incarnate itself in the domain of the lower spirit, which is significantly called $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$. Man then, does not in his humanness 'share in a part of God', but can only share in God by escaping from the tyranny of matter, and thereby escaping from his true humanity. This Gnostic picture of revelation is carried over quite naturally into Tatian's description of redemption which is, as in Justin, seen as a deliverance from evil demons, to whom man has voluntarily become subject.⁷⁸ But Tatian takes the theory further and twists it into a dualism involving matter by stating that the demons are 'the reflexion of matter and of wickedness'.⁷⁹ The conclusion to this is that revelation is seen solely in terms of man becoming a part of God, but since this involves man becoming free from matter it is not revelation. This difficulty is manifested even in Tatian's doctrine of creation. For if he hints at creatio ex nihilo and at the same time clings to the idea of an evil $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$, how could he possibly maintain that the Logos was the agent of creation? Even the ordering of the $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ by the Logos becomes inconceivable in this dualistic system.

(78) 14(20,836Cf).

(79) 15(21,840A).

These difficulties would of course reach their most definitive form in any description of the incarnation. Tatian only once refers to 'God in the form of man' (θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώπινα μορφῇ),⁸⁰ but otherwise there is no mention of the incarnation. As we have seen, Tatian's thought on revelation almost precludes the incarnation. Grant notes this and goes on to speculate what Tatian's Christology may have been. He refers to the notion of the descent of the Spirit,⁸¹ and thinks that Tatian would have followed this pattern. The result would be that 'the Logos descended to Jesus and was mingled with his soul'.⁸² Grant shows the similarity of this with the Christology of Theodotus.⁸³ While Tatian may have held such views, we have no evidence that he had any kind of Christology at all, and we have also shown how even such a Christology would strain the seams of his thought. Further, to attempt to justify Tatian's lack of concern with the incarnation by appealing to his peculiar purpose would be unsatisfactory. As Daniélou says: 'To Tatian's understanding of the Gospel any sort of emphasis on the historical was completely alien'.⁸⁴

(b) Theophilus:

The adoption by Theophilus of the λόγος ἐνδύθητος / προφορικός schema together with his clear doctrine of creatio ex nihilo character-

(80) 21(27,852C).

(81) cf. 13(19,833B): Πέγονε μὲν ὁ θεὸς ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἀρχὴθεν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. There is also just prior to this a reference to the ἐκσυγία.

(82) op. cit. p. 66.

(83) cf. Clement: Exc. Theod., 3.1(M9,653B).

(84) op. cit. p. 23.

ises his whole theology. On the one hand the connection of the $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ $\pi\rho\omicron\varphi\omicron\rho\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ with the $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$ tends to separate the Logos and God, but on the other hand, the thought on creation keeps the Logos firmly on the godward side of the God/creature divide. The Logos is not a created being, at any rate in the sense that other things are created beings.

There are several notable advances in Theophilus. The first of these is a new distinction between the Spirit and the Logos.

This distinction is shown when he writes that the Logos 'is emitted ...along with His own Wisdom before all things'.⁸⁵ But this distinction between the Logos and Wisdom is not just in the $\pi\rho\omicron\varphi\omicron\rho\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ stage:

For the prophets were not when the world came into existence, but the wisdom of God which was in Him, and His holy Word which was always present with Him.⁸⁶

This quote is slightly ambiguous. It may be that here we do not find a description of Wisdom and the Logos both being $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\theta\epsilon\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma$, but being $\pi\rho\omicron\varphi\omicron\rho\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ before creation, that is in the interval after the coming forth of Wisdom and the Logos and before creation. But it also may be that the phrases 'in Him' and 'always present with Him' do refer to the $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\theta\epsilon\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma$ state, in which case we come very close to a real Trinitarian concept of God. The argument for this view is slightly strengthened by Theophilus's reference to the Trinity, which occurs in a rather oblique fashion and is drawn out of an analogy of the first three days of creation. These three days are said to be $\tau\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$... $\tau\eta\varsigma$ $\tau\rho\iota\acute{\alpha}\delta\omicron\varsigma$, $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$, $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$, $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\tau\eta\varsigma$ $\Sigma\omicron\varphi\iota\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$.⁸⁷

(85) II, 10(75,1064C).

(86) II, 10(75,1065A). cf. also II, 18(84,1081B) and I, 7(58,1036A).

(87) II, 15(82,1077B).

Theophilus also departs from the other Apologists by identifying Wisdom with the Spirit and not the Logos.⁸⁸ This is clear from what has been said above about the distinction between the two. One would suspect that this would create havoc with the exegesis of Prov. 8.22, since it would make the Spirit and not the Logos the ἀρχή of the world. Theophilus does not seem to have really noticed this difficulty, but in one instance when referring to the ἀρχή he shows a measure of confusion:

He (the Logos), then, being Spirit of God, and governing principle (ἀρχή), and wisdom, and power of the highest, came down upon the prophets.⁸⁹

The inspiration of the prophets is elsewhere also attributed directly to the Spirit.⁹⁰ These references all point to a similar confusion to that which occurs in Justin, although here in Theophilus these confusions are more the exception than the rule, and so we can safely conclude that Theophilus has progressed significantly towards a proper Trinitarianism.

The Logos, or the Spirit, who created is engaged in some form of revelation through both the law and the prophets.⁹¹ Theophilus also uses Justin's argument of the impossibility of God appearing in a theophany and thereby ascribes revelation to the Logos.⁹² On this there is no need for comment.

Where Theophilus fails is in having no theology of redemption. Although there is a vague idea that keeping the commandments will result in receiving immortality,⁹³ it is not at all clear why the law and the prophets existed. While there is reference to the fall,⁹⁴

(88) II, 9(74,1064A). cf. Pollard, op. cit. p. 40, Wolfson, op. cit. pp. 234, 236, 246, and Irenaeus: Adv. Haer. IV.20.3 (M7,1033C).

(89) II. 10(75,1064C). cf. also II, 22(88,1088A): ... ὁ δὲ Λόγος αὐτοῦ
... δύναμις ἦν καὶ σοφία αὐτοῦ.

(90) II, 9(74,1064A).

it is not reversed in any way. Interestingly enough the major sections of Theophilus's work dealing with man's knowledge of God occur in Bk. I, that is before the Logos has really been introduced.⁹⁵ In all of this there is simply no reference to Jesus or to the incarnation of the Logos. His thought just does not include this. Because of this, Laechli is quite correct that Theophilus might well convert a pagan to Diaspora Judaism instead of to Christianity.⁹⁶ Apart from his development towards Trinitarianism there is nothing in Theophilus which is peculiarly Christian. This is a great pity since in so many ways he has prepared the way for a developed and orthodox Christology.

(c) Athenagoras:

We have already dealt fairly exhaustively with Athenagoras's adoption and use of the ἐν δὲ θεῷ / ἡρωφωρικὸς schema.⁹⁷ His use of this schema and of the almost automatic ἡ ἀρ' αὐτῶν limits the tendency of the Logos to become detached from God.⁹⁸ Athenagoras also uses

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- (91) cf. II, 14(81,1076A), and III, 9(114f,1133C) where God reveals rather than the Word, Spirit or Wisdom.
- (92) II, 22(88,1088A).
- (93) II, 27(92,1096A). The creator Logos is linked with the bestowal of immortality in I, 7(58,1036A).
- (94) II, 21(86f,1085Af) and II, 26(91f,1093Af).
- (95) cf. I, 2(54,1025B), where knowledge of God is hindered by man's blindness caused by sin, and I, 4(56,1029B), where he can gain some kind of knowledge 'through his works'.
- (96) op. cit. p. 165.
- (97) cf. above, pp. 76f.
- (98) i.e. 4(379,900A).

the Johannine reciprocity to good advantage.⁹⁹ But when we move on to consider the Logos as revealer, this clarity of thought does not emerge.

The play on the word λόγος occurs fairly frequently. In one instance the λόγος appears as 'Christian doctrine', creation is διὰ τοῦ πατρὸς λόγου, and the Christians suffer ἀλόγως.¹⁰⁰ This is continued with the λόγος being the νοῦς καὶ λόγος τοῦ Πατρὸς,¹⁰¹ which is also echoed in man being able to know the Deity by mind and reason (νῶ μόνῳ καὶ λόγῳ θεωρούμενα).¹⁰² And finally, it becomes 'irrational (ἀλόγον) for us to cease to believe in the Spirit from God'.¹⁰³ All this is very similar to what we found in Justin, but Athenagoras does not make it clear precisely how the divine Logos and human reason are related. The only hint of a direct connection between the two is in his reference to man's 'affinity with the afflatus from God'.¹⁰⁴ The knowledge resulting from this 'affinity' is contrasted with the knowledge which comes 'from God concerning God', which comes through the prophets 'who have pronounced concerning God and the things of God, guided by the Spirit of God'. Thus, probably, as in Justin's I Apol., this 'affinity with the afflatus' should be understood to

(99) i.e. 10(385,909A): ὄντος δὲ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐν Πατρὶ, καὶ Πατρὸς ἐν Υἱῷ

(100) 4(379,897Bf).

(101) 10(385,909A).

(102) 4(379,897B).

(103) 7(383,904C).

(104) 7(382,904B), cf. above, pp. 60f.

be an impure participation in the Logos, and when he refers to knowing God $\nu\omega\acute{\iota} \mu\acute{o}\nu\omega \kappa\alpha\iota \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omega$, we should understand this both as an apologetic device and as the purified reason being in full fellowship with the Logos. In this regard we can really take stock of Justin's tremendous achievement in sorting out this issue. Athenagoras nowhere explicitly deals with the nature of this affinity, and so, while we know that the Logos will not reduce to human reason, we do not find out how the two relate.

Athenagoras does, in a rather different way to Theophilus, make notable advances in his thought on the Trinity. The first thing to note is his introduction of the Spirit who is 'an effluence ($\alpha\pi\acute{o}\rho\acute{\rho}\omicron\sigma\alpha\nu$) of God'.¹⁰⁵ The background to this appears to be Wis. 7.25.¹⁰⁶ The Trinitarian structure of Ch. 10 is taken up in Ch. 12 in a most sophisticated way:

...they know God and His Logos, what is the oneness ($\xi\nu\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$) of the Son with the Father, what the communion ($\kappa\omicron\nu\nu\omega\iota\delta\alpha$) of the Father with the Son, what is the Spirit, what is the unity ($\xi\nu\omega\theta\eta\varsigma$) of these three, the Spirit, the Father, and their distinction in unity ($\delta\iota\alpha\lambda\epsilon\tau\eta\varsigma \xi\nu\omega\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\nu$).¹⁰⁷

Here there is a very skilful balancing of the unity of the Trinity and the distinctions within that unity. It is probable that the use here of the term $\kappa\omicron\nu\nu\omega\iota\delta\alpha$ is not derived from the Platonic

(105) 10(386,909B), and cf. also 24(405,945B).

(106) cf. A.J. Malherbe: "The Holy Spirit in Athenagoras", *JTS*, 20(1969), p. 538, where he notes the interesting variants in the tradition of Wis. 7.25 resulting in the change of $\alpha\epsilon\mu\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ to $\alpha\kappa\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma$, which we find in Athenagoras.

(107) 12(388,913Bf). cf. also 24(405,945B), where the ANCL translate $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha} \delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\nu$ as 'in essence'. At this stage $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha} \delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\nu$ seems to mean the same as $\kappa\alpha\tau' \omicron\beta\acute{\epsilon}\iota\alpha\nu$, as is stated in n. 32 of Migne 946C: ' $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ hoc loco idem est ac $\omicron\beta\acute{\epsilon}\iota\alpha$ et divinitas'. cf. also Hipp.: *G. Noet*, 8(M10,816B) for $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ and *Ref.* 1.20(M16,3045D) and 10.33(3450B) for $\omicron\beta\acute{\epsilon}\iota\alpha$.

idea, but from the Christian tradition, especially as it is represented in II Cor. 13.14.¹⁰⁸ Any argument that this passage portrays a quasi-Sabellian view is more than mildly ridiculous. But despite these tremendous technical achievements, Athenagoras does not seem to have placed Trinitarianism as such on quite as sound a footing as Theophilus. In Athenagoras the real distinction is between God and the Logos and the Spirit suddenly appears as an extra $\delta\epsilon\upsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\nu\sigma\alpha$, and one gets the feeling that he mentions the Spirit just to enable him to speak of the Trinity.

In the above quote Athenagoras refers to the 'distinction in unity' ($\delta\iota\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\upsilon$). Later he refers to the Trinities 'power in union and distinction in order' ($\tau\eta\upsilon \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\eta \acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\sigma\epsilon\iota \delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\epsilon\upsilon \kappa\alpha\iota \tau\eta\upsilon \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\eta \tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\iota \delta\iota\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\tau\epsilon\sigma\epsilon\upsilon$).¹⁰⁹ By contrasting the 'distinction in unity' with the 'distinction in order' he avoids any subordinationism altogether. Here $\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$ is used in the sense of 'order' rather than 'rank', that is it describes the arrangement of the three Persons without any preference. This is different to Justin's use of the term. It is strange that this technical achievement is not paralleled in his theory of the origination of the Spirit.

There is some evidence that Athenagoras would have agreed with the Filioque clause. He describes the relationship between the Father and the Son as being $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota \kappa\alpha\iota \delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\epsilon\iota \Pi\acute{\nu}\kappa\tau\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$.¹¹⁰ There is here a difference of opinion between Migne and the ANCL translators as to whether or not there is reference to the Spirit, but the easiest sense is that the power of the Spirit is the bond of unity

(108) cf. Barnard, op. cit. p. 110.

(109) 10(386,909B).

(110) 10(385,909A).

between the Father and the Son.¹¹¹ If Athenagoras was really intending this, he is a precursor of much later thought. It is difficult to be positive about this because of the paucity of evidence. Indeed the whole of Athenagoras's thought on the Trinity is rather isolated from the rest of his thought, and even the technical advances in the description of the Trinity are somewhat disjointed from the descriptions of the origination of the Logos and the Spirit.

There is a very different side to Athenagoras's Trinitarianism which is especially evident in his treatment of the Spirit. It is A.J. Malherbe who has noticed that the Spirit in Athenagoras corresponds closely to the world-soul of Middle-Platonism.¹¹²

His argument deals with several issues, which we must briefly summarize. The first point is the interesting problem of the exegesis of the following, which in turn introduces a reference to Prov. 8.22:

συνάδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ προφητικὸν πνεῦμα...¹¹³

The usual exegesis, reflected in the ANCL translation, is that τῷ λόγῳ refers to the previous argument. Malherbe believes instead that it should refer to the Logos, in which case the sense is that Prov. 8.22 refers to the Logos and therefore that the 'prophetic Spirit corresponds to the Logos in its creative activity'. In Athenagoras generally there is no absolute certainty about whom Wisdom is to be identified with. The different functions of the Spirit, that Malherbe finds in the above, are definitely found in the following:

(111) An interesting feature of this language is that σύναμις is not used, as in Justin and the others, as a description for or synonym of the Logos, cf. Barnard, op. cit. p. 97f.

(112) op. cit.

(113) 10(385,909A).

God...has framed all things by the Logos, and holds them in being (ἔχει τὰ πάντα) by His Spirit.¹¹⁴

This quote follows on a reference to Timaeus 41a, which is a discussion on the Platonic world-soul, and so one begins to suspect that we are not here concerned so much with a division of Platonic transcendence and Stoic immanence, as with an appropriation of the world-soul into the Trinity. Malherbe also finds a link between 'by whose Spirit they are governed'¹¹⁵ and the Phaedrus 245-7. As we have shown, much of Justin and Tatian appears to have been influenced by a similar problem.¹¹⁶ Malherbe concludes:

Athenagoras thus conceives of the function of the Spirit in creation along the lines of the Middle Platonic Word Soul. In this respect the Spirit corresponds to the Logos, with the exception that the Logos is the agent through which God created the world while through the Spirit He maintains and controls it.¹¹⁷

Our problem, which is not mentioned by Malherbe, is now to try to understand how this aspect of Athenagoras's thought is to be reconciled with the other side of his Trinitarianism, for there we find no inkling that the Spirit referred to is really a spiritualized or divinized world-soul, except perhaps in the Spirit being an ἀνθρώπινον αἶμα of God. What we seem to find here is an excellent example of what Pannenberg calls the 'appropriation of the philosophical notion of God'. The appropriation of the world-soul into the Trinity is both an excellent means of illustrating the threeness of God and of relating God to the created order. In Athenagoras we find a remarkable illustration of theology in transition. It does not appear to

(114) 6(381,901C).

(115) 5(380,900B), cf. Malherbe, op. cit. pp. 540f.

(116) cf. above, pp. 22f, 81f.

(117) op. cit. pp. 541f.

be correct methodologically to ask whether he started from Trinitarianism and then developed the theory of the Spirit's association with the world-soul, or indeed vice-versa. What we can discern, however, is the influence of the traditional Trinitarian formulae on the Middle-Platonic background, and the amalgamation of these two. Athenagoras provides us with a very good example of theology being produced from a meeting of traditional faith and philosophy, and even in his theology we can discern the influence of both sources; the more orthodox Trinitarian passages show the influence of the traditional forms, and the Spirit and world-soul association the influence of the philosophical background.

This tremendous theological achievement does not however seem to help Athenagoras in other areas. Like both Tatian and Theophilus, he is completely deficient in any proper reference to the incarnation. There is only one reference to the Logos as man, and this only refers to him giving commands about the kiss of peace, and seems to be derived from some missing apocryphal writing.¹¹⁸ Revelation is therefore not connected with the incarnation. The pattern is completed by an absence of any soteriology. This is especially apparent in the de Ress., where one would expect the argument to proceed from the resurrection of Jesus. This illustration is still appropriate even if, as Grant maintains, the de Ress. was not written by Athenagoras. Daniélou maintains that the doctrine of the resurrection 'occupies a prominent place in the writings of Justin, Tatian, Athenagoras and Theophilus'.¹¹⁹ The evidence that Daniélou brings forward for this view is not sufficient to justify his claim. It does however show that these writers seem all to be concerned with their own, or the Church's resurrection, without real reference to Christ's resurrection. The attempt to rationalize the very

(118) 32(417,964C).

(119) op. cit. p. 24.

concept of resurrection was probably an attempt to remove the 'offence' that the resurrection undoubtedly was to the Greek mind. Barnard criticizes those who point out the problem of Athenagoras's omission of both the incarnation and the resurrection, by laying claim to Athenagoras's apologetic intent.¹²⁰ But surely an apologetic which just avoids the offence is either a rather underhand trick or a prostitution of the gospel. While not wishing to be embroiled in such a theoretical debate, we must conclude that Athenagoras, by avoiding the incarnation and the resurrection, reveals in a very clear way how difficult it is for the Logos theology of the Greek world to come to terms with this nettle.

It is at this point that we must refer back once again to Justin and the question of tradition. We have shown how Justin's thought falls into two camps and how the tradition of the Church appears to have kept him from losing himself in his apologetic. What we seem to find in all the other apologists is the loss of this restraint especially with regard to the incarnation. The influence of tradition in Theophilus is slight, but in Athenagoras it definitely surfaces in his treatment of the Trinity. Also remarkable is their apparent ignorance of the New Testament. And so, while Athenagoras makes some giant leaps forward, it appears that it is by his failure to come to terms with the traditional teaching on the incarnation that he has in fact failed in the real apologetic endeavour of the Church, which is to present 'Christ and him crucified'.

And so it is that Justin must be regarded as the greatest Apologist, even if he is not the most sophisticated. Theophilus shows an advance concerning the question of creation and in the separation of the Logos and Wisdom, while Athenagoras has developed the doctrine

(120) *op. cit.* p. 180.

of the Trinity, but they all fail in developing Justin's doctrine of revelation, and perhaps as a consequence, succumb to the Greek mind in avoiding the incarnation, and by so doing they lose the historical basis of their faith. While Justin may not have successfully managed to synthesize his apologetic, at least he presents the problem. The others do so only by avoiding it.

III. CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.

(1) Introduction:

When we turn from the Apologists to Clement we enter a very different world. The chronological difference between them is small, so small that in fact the similarity of outlook between Athenagoras and Clement has led to the conjecture that Clement was his pupil.¹ There is, however, no real evidence for this, and it seems more likely that Clement comes from a Christian background which was more permeated with the mystical Middle-Platonism that was shortly to become Neo-Platonism. Because of this, it has been suggested that Clement, at least for some time after his conversion, was taught by Ammonius Saccas.² This in turn provides a connection with Posidonius, whose influence appears to be discernible in Clement's treatment of the relationship of Christianity and philosophy.³ From the complexity of Clement's thought and the short time span between the Apologists and Clement, it becomes abundantly clear how rapid both the development of Christian thought was and how successful the missionary endeavors of the apologetic age had been. From the Apologists' defence of the faith against the attacks of the pagan world, we move to a much more confident statement of the faith in Clement. This is even true of Clement's Protrepticus which, when compared with the earlier apologies, reveals a different tone, almost as if one has moved from jagged, jarring chords to placid, flowing cadences confident of their own beauty and worth. Even

(1) cf. R.B. Tollinton: Clement of Alexandria (London, 1914), i, p. 12.

(2) cf. R.E. Witt: "The Hellenism of Clement of Alexandria", CQ, 25(1931), p. 195.

(3) cf. below, pp. 114f.

the title of the work is positive rather than defensive. Tollinton writes that Christianity in Clement

is at once more positive, more aggressive, more religious, than either Justin or Athenagoras had dared to represent it.⁴

This positive attitude seems to have been made possible by Clement's intimate connection with Hellenism. While the details of this are to be the subject of constant discussion in this chapter, we can note here that only one part of Clement's work is devoted to the refutation of paganism, that is the Protrepticus. The other works contain Clement's 'esoteric' teaching, in which he strives to achieve an acceptable synthesis between Christianity and the higher forms of Hellenism.⁵ In the Apologists, apart from Athenagoras, Greek culture is regarded as something alien to the Christian faith, even if this separation is not carried through in practice. But in Clement, although he can be extremely critical of Greek thought and especially of the Greek laxity of morals, there is an open attempt to bring the Greek mind and the Christian faith into harmony. It is because of this that he has been called the first Christian thinker to contribute meaningfully to the rapprochement of Christianity with Hellenism and classical philosophy.⁶ It is this synthesis that we need to analyse in order to understand the dynamics at work and to assess its lasting value.

(4) op. cit. pp. 225f. cf. also E.F. Osborn: The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria (CUP, 1957), p. 54, and Jaeger, op. cit. p. 133, n. 29.

(5) cf. Witt, op. cit. p. 199.

(6) cf. Osborn, op. cit. p. 122, and Witt, op. cit. p. 195.

But this is no easy task. Clement's writings are perplexing and present many difficulties to his readers and especially to his critics. Firstly Clement's practical concern, which is always his first priority even when he is at his most mystical, tends to obscure the theological issues lying behind it. But more than this, Clement himself even claims to be writing in order to confuse the uninitiated reader.⁷ At times one seriously wonders whether this confusion is not so much in order to confuse the reader, but to hide Clement's own confusions. Clement's intentions expressed in his 'programmatically statements' certainly do not appear to have been fulfilled.⁸ But this attempt to hide his real meaning, so characteristic of the Gnostic attitude, gives way to a more serious consideration. Osborn claims that Clement's methodology is 'multi-systematic'. 'He will give several different solutions to a specific problem and not indicate an exclusive preference for any.'⁹ This is probably a deliberate attempt to accurately reflect all that is good in his eclectic background. In this transitional stage in the history of both pagan and Christian thought, Clement is not the person to rise above his background to give the world a new system or direction. He rather presents both the fragmentation of eclectic Middle-Platonism and the fragile nature of the emergent Christian theology. Osborn concludes:

The answer to the riddle is that Clement is at once breaking up old systems and creating a new synthesis. The disconnected style and thought of the Stromateis deny old connections and the autonomy of old systems.¹⁰

(7) i.e. Strom. I, 1(359,708A).

(8) cf. R.P. Casey: "Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Platonism", HTR, 18 (1925), p. 46.

(9) op. cit. p. 9.

(10) *ibid.* p. 13.

It is this that renders the critic's task almost impossible. How in this rambling jungle of ideas is one to find out what Clement himself thought? This aspect of Clement will make us most suspicious of clear-cut answers and rigid systematisations of his thought. We must rather attempt to submerge ourselves in his problems in order to understand his difficulties and some of his partial answers.

Because of the difficulties surrounding us on all sides, this chapter has to keep fairly ruthlessly to the point, ignoring large sections of Clement's thought which could be relevant. Thus we cannot consider the nature of Clement's ethics, which would have a definite bearing on all aspects of his thought, nor can we deal explicitly with Clement's relations with the mystery religions and Gnosticism, both of which would probably shed much light on Clement's attitude towards philosophy. But despite these limitations, the narrow preoccupation with Clement's Logos theology and the incarnation does seem to yield positive results.

(2) The Doctrine of God:

Clement's doctrine of God is mainly derived from the Middle-Platonic tradition, but there is abundant evidence in his writings of the emergence of Neo-Platonism. And so in this section we will be concerned with examining this development and how it influences some aspects of the rest of his thought.¹¹

Once again it is the transcendence of God which is the focus of interest. The Greek suspicion of anthropomorphism is taken up, and Clement is very emphatic that God has no human shape and is devoid of every human quality:

(11) A large part of what follows has been taken from S.R.C. Lilla: Clement of Alexandria, A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism (OUP, 1971), pp. 212-226.

Wherefore let no one imagine that hands, and feet...
are said by the Hebrews to be attributes of God.¹²

This naturally leads to the more general statement that God is
'above both space and time, and qualities of objects' (ἐῤῥῶν τῶν
γεγονόντων ἰδιότητος).¹³ So far we have mentioned nothing that is
not found in similar form in Middle-Platonism, but Clement also says
that God is even 'beyond the one, and above the Monad itself'
(ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἑνός καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆν μονάδα).¹⁴ This appears to be
a development on Philo, who writes:

The "one" and the "monad" are, therefore, the only
standard for determining the category to which God
belongs. Father we should say, the One God is the sole
standard for the "monad".¹⁵

R.P. Casey follows Inge in speculating that it is significant that
Clement does not use the formula ἐπέκεινα πᾶσης τῆς οὐσίας,
which we find in Middle-Platonism, Justin and in Athanasius.¹⁶
He deduces from this that Clement regarded God as having οὐσία and
therefore that this is a point of contrast with Neo-Platonism. This
argument is defective and while Clement may seem to ascribe οὐσία to
God, this is not to be taken in the sense that God shares in the
οὐσία of the world, and indeed might well not really be ascribing
any kind of οὐσία to God.¹⁷ The real differences between Clement

(12) Strom. V, 11(262,104B). cf. Philo: De Sacr. Ab. et Caini 96
and De Somniis I.235, and also Albinus: Did. 10.

(13) Strom. II, 2(4,937A). cf. Philo: De Post. C. 2.7 and 5.14.

(14) Pd. I, 8(161,336A).

(15) Leg. All. II.1.3: τέτακται ὁ ὁ Θεός κατὰ τὸ ἓν καὶ
ἐν μονάδα, μᾶλλον δὲ ἢ μονάδα κατὰ τὸν ἓνα Θεόν.

(16) op. cit. pp. 74-78. For this question cf. below, p. 135f.

(17) cf. below, p. 103 and Strom. II, 2(4,936Af) where God is
described as ἰσὺς μὲν κατ' οὐσίαν

and Neo-Platonism are set out by Lilla.¹⁸ He notes two main differences between Clement and Plotinus: (1) Clement's God is a νοῦς comprehending the ideas in himself,¹⁹ whereas in Plotinus God is above the νοῦς ;²⁰ (2) God in Clement has thought, whereas in Plotinus God is beyond 'noetical activity'.²¹ These differences tend to modify Clement's Neo-Platonism in the direction of Plato's Timaeus, but despite these modifications Clement can be seen to represent a stage of the development between Albinus and Plotinus.²²

When we move on to the issue of the knowability of God, a similar pattern is discernible. As in Justin, God cannot have a name, and is ineffable.²³ God is aloof and 'difficult to reach'.²⁴ God is not comprehensible by human intellect.²⁵ In this Clement appears to be following Philo. The Neo-Platonic development of this is discernible in the following:

(18) op. cit. pp. 221f.

(19) cf. Strom. IV, 25(212,1364C): νοῦς δὲ χώρα ἰδεῖν, νοῦς δὲ ὁ Θεός .

(20) cf. Enn. V.1.8(6-7).

(21) cf. Enn. V.3.13(35-36).

(22) cf. Osborn, op. cit. p. 26, and R.E. Witt, op. cit. pp. 197f.

(23) cf. Strom. V, 12(270,121Af). Here the influence of Parm. 142a may be discernible. cf. also Origen: Contra Celsus VI.65 and Hippolytus: Ref. 6.20. For Clement's use of ἀπύκτος and ἀβρατος cf. Daniélou, op. cit. p. 332.

(24) cf. Strom. V, 12(267,116B) and the quote there of Tim. 28c. cf. also Albinus: Did. 10(164.15-16) and Parm. 138a.

(25) cf. Strom. II, 2(4,936B): 'God is not to be known by human wisdom' (ὅτι οὐδε ἀνθρωπίνῃ σοφίᾳ γνωσθήσεται); and Strom. IV, 25(212,1365A): 'God, then being not a subject for demonstration, cannot be the object of science' (... ἀναπόδεικτος ὢν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστημονικός).

...we may reach somehow to the conception of the Almighty knowing not what he is, but what he is not (οὐχ ὅ ἐστιν , ὅ δὲ μὴ ἐστὶ γνωρίσαντες).²⁶

This via negativa is, however, only one side of the picture. In Strom. II, 2, where we find the statement that 'God is not to be known by human wisdom', there is a clear indication that God is to be known by his own Wisdom. In addition Clement uses the general Platonic epistemology:

For bound in this earthly body, we apprehend the objects of sense by means of the body; but we grasp intellectual objects by means of the logical faculty itself (τῶν δὲ νοητῶν δὲ αὐτῆς τῆς λογικῆς ἐφαπτόμεθα συνήκτως).²⁷

This theory, which we noted to be the essence of Middle-Platonism,²⁸ is used as the basis for a doctrine of revelation by the simple step of identifying God with the supreme intellectual object,²⁹ which is knowable by the gnostic's purified reason. Corresponding to the Platonic epistemology, his thought also reflects the Platonic anthropology:

...the soul consists of three divisions; the intellect (τὸ νοερόν), which is called the reasoning faculty (ὁ δὲ λογιστικὸν καλεῖται), is the inner man which is the ruler of this man that is seen. And that one, in another respect, God guides (αὐτὸν δὲ ἐκείνον ἄλλως ἄγει ὁ Θεός).

As we have hinted, this anthropology is used to describe the gnostics, who have their intellects illumined so that they can paradoxically be 'the Gnostics of the unknown' (οἱ ἐν τῷ

(26) Strom. V, 11(264,109A). cf. also J. Kaye: Some Account of the Writings and Opinions of Clement of Alexandria (London, no date given), p. 190.

(27) Strom. V, 1(224,16Cf).

(28) cf. above, p

(29) cf. Strom. IV, 25(215,1372B): ἡ δ' αὖ ἐστὶ νοῦς , (ἀρχὴ) εὐσὺ λογικῶν καὶ κριτικῶν ῥοπῶν.

ἀγνώστῳ γνωστικῷ).³⁰ In this section Clement stresses that the gnostic's knowledge is by faith. Indeed 'There is no knowledge without faith, nor faith without knowledge' (ἡδὴ δὲ οὐτε ἢ γνωστὸς ἄνευ πίστεως, οὐθ' ἢ πίστις ἄνευ γνώσεως). This adaptation of the Platonic epistemology is also revealed in the theological language of grace as follows:

It remains that we understand, then, the Unknown, by divine grace (θεῖα χάρις), and by the word alone (μόνῳ τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγῳ) that proceeds from Him.³¹

From this cursory glance at this problem in Clement, there appear to be three strands of thought. The first is the Neo-Platonic adaptation of the Middle-Platonic doctrine of God,³² which tends to render God absolutely remote and unknowable. The second is the Middle-Platonic idea that God can be known μόνῳ τῷ νῷ. It would seem that these two have been synthesised by saying that God is unknowable only to unregenerate human wisdom, and that, when we speak about the μόνῳ τῷ νῷ, we are really speaking about the mind led by grace and by the Word from God. This strand of faith and grace, as the basis for revelation, is the third strand which unites the seemingly

(30) Strom. V, 1(220,9B). cf. Daniélou, op. cit. p. 338.

(31) Strom. V, 12(270,124A).

(32) cf. Witt, op. cit. p. 197, who maintains that the via negativa originates in Middle-Platonism. He cites Albinus: Did. 10(165.5) as an example. There God is described as ἄρρητος δ' ἔστι καὶ τῷ νῷ μόνῳ ἁγίου and then Albinus continues with a series of negations, οὐτε ... οὐτε ... οὐτε This is undoubtedly evidence of a via negativa, but it is the really Platonic interpretation of the μόνῳ τῷ νῷ which falls away in Neo-Platonism.

opposed first two. But even in this schematization we can see how Clement has a foot in every camp. Not always is he consistent. He can in one instance state the one point of view without the others. This makes it very difficult to come to terms with his thought. This subject will be taken up in more detail in our next section. There is another perhaps more philosophical element in Clement's thought. He follows Philo in drawing a distinction between the 'essence' and the 'power of God':³³

"I am a God that draws near", says the Lord. He is in essence remote (ὑπόρρω μὲν κατ' οὐσίαν) ...but He is very near in virtue of that power which holds all things in its embrace (Ἐγγυέτω δὲ δυνάμει ἣ, τὰ πάντα ἐγκυκλίπτει).³⁴

We will later show how such a distinction probably is not only conditioned by the need for revelation, but even more importantly by the problem of having to relate 'the One' to 'the Many'.³⁵ Important for us here, however, is not this, but the evidence of the problem of God's remoteness, and indeed how this remoteness necessitates the doctrine of the Logos. It may just be because of Clement's diffuseness and rambling methodology that the remoteness of God does not, as in Justin, tend to lose God altogether, so that the doctrine of God tends to reduce to the doctrine of the Logos. This may be, but on the other hand Clement does not seem to divide the remoteness and the immanence of God so clearly between God and the Logos, nor

(33) cf. De Post. Co. 6.20: λέγεται δ' ὅτι καὶ ἐγγύτατα ὁ αὐτός ὢν καὶ μακρὸν ἔσται cf. Tollinton, op. cit. i, p. 335, and also cf. above, p. . . . for how κατ' οὐσίαν and κατὰ δυνάμει appear to be synonymous in earlier times.

(34) Strom. II, 2(4,936Af). Here the ἣ should probably be ἧ. This is the only way any grammatical sense can be obtained, cf. Migne 936Bf, n. 20.

(35) cf. below, p. . . .

does he describe God almost totally as the source of the Logos. And so, while the Logos is for Clement God in his immanence, he gives a much more important place to God as such.

One such place is in his doctrine of creation. There is not as much evidence for Clement's thought on this issue as one might like, and that which we have involves some tricky exegesis. But before we begin this, it does seem fairly clear that Clement's thought about creation is in conscious opposition to the Gnostic dualism.³⁶ This is especially manifest in his treatment of the problem of evil. Rejecting dualism he writes:

But nothing exists, the cause of whose existence is not supplied by God.³⁷

By this Clement undercuts any radical dualism and especially a dualism which connects the ὕλη with evil. This last point is brought out in all Clement's lectures on morality, although it is somewhat undermined by his more Gnostic passages.³⁸ But in this particular quote Clement cannot be said to be really speaking about a creation ex nihilo. God could easily be the cause of the being (τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ εἶναι) of something created from the ὕλη.

In another passage describing the relationship of God and the world, Clement writes:

But God has no natural relation to us, as the authors of the heresies will have it; neither on the supposition of His having made us out of nothing (ἐκ μὴ ὄντων), nor on that of having formed us out of matter (ἐξ ὕλης),

(36) cf. W.E.G. Floyd: Clement of Alexandria's Treatment of the Problem of Evil (OUP, 1971), pp. 1-4:

(37) Pd. I, 8(155,325B).

(38) cf. below, pp. 124f.

since the former did not exist at all (τὸ μὲν οὐδ' ἄλλως ἔστω), and the latter is totally distinct from God, unless we shall dare to say that we are a part of Him, and of the same essence as God.³⁹

This is very interesting, because he does not attack 'the authors of the heresies' by refuting the idea of the ὕλη and developing a doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. In actual fact Clement's argument is defective since the point he wishes to defend, namely that 'God has no natural relation to us', finds its way into his final statement: 'unless we shall dare to say that we are a part of Him'. If we care to adopt this position and the doctrine of the ὕλη as a Gnostic emanation, Clement has not touched us. But nevertheless, this passage is interesting in that it shows that Clement equated ἔξ μὲν ἄνω with τὸ μὲν οὐδ' ἄλλως ἔστω. In other words, he has not separated the absolute and relative use of the negatives. But again this quote has nothing to say about creatio ex nihilo.

Another passage is claimed by Floyd as evidence for a belief in creatio ex nihilo. Here the reference to the ὕλη occurs in the context of a polemic against idolatry of a gross sexual form. He writes:

Matter always needs art to fashion it, but the deity needs nothing (ἐνδεής ἀεὶ ποιεῖ ἡ ὕλη τῆς τέχνης, ὁ θεὸς δὲ ἀνευδεής).⁴⁰

But this says nothing about the origin of the ὕλη. It is therefore also useless for our purposes.

Apparently the only other evidence is the following:

(39) Strom. II, 16(44,1012C).

(40) Protr. 4(61,153B).

But the philosophers, the Stoics, and Plato,....
suppose the existence of matter among the first principles
(...ὕλην ὑποτίθενται ... ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς); and not
one first principle (οὐχὶ δὲ μίαν ἀρχήν). Let them
know that what is called matter by them, is said by them
to be without quality, and without form (ἄσῳον καὶ
ἀσχημάτιστον) and more daringly said by Plato to be
non-existence (μὴ ὄν). And does he not say very
mystically, knowing that the true and real first cause
is one (μία τὴν ἀΐως ὄντων ἀρχήν ἐδίωξ), in
these very words...⁴¹

This is a marvellous piece of argumentation since he attacks an
opinion held by Plato be appealing to Plato. He rejects the idea
that the ὕλη is an ἀρχή on the grounds that there is only one true
ἀρχή, which would presumably be described as ἀναρχος. But the
question cannot rest here, because Clement apparently rejects Plato's
view of the ὕλη being an ἀρχή by saying that something which has
non-being (μὴ ὄν) cannot be eternal. While Clement might be trying
to point out the inconsistency in the Platonic view, and while he
may be interpreting μὴ ὄν in the sense of οὐκ ὄν, his rejection
of the Platonic view cannot hold water, since all he does to reject
it is to state it again, agreeing with the position of Gen. 1.2.
This is very similar to the argumentation analysed above. Later
in the same chapter he writes, quoting Plato indirectly:

...he not only showed that the universe was created
(γενεσθῆναι), but points out that it was generated by
him as a son, and that he is called its father, as
deriving its existence from him alone, and springing
from non-existence (ὡς ἂν ἐκ μόνου γενομένου καὶ ἐκ
μὴ ὄντος ὑποστάσαντος). The Stoics, too, held the
view that the world was created.⁴²

(41) Strom. V, 14(274,132A).

(42) (276,136B).

From this we can deduce that Clement has not grasped the issues at stake. He approves of the Platonic theory but takes exception at the ὕλη being and ἀρχή. We must therefore disagree with Floyd that Clement had any doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. This may seem a little strange in the light of Clement's rejection of the ὕλη being an ἀρχή and his treatment of the problem of evil, but there is just no clarity in Clement on this issue. But at the same time, Photius's claim that Clement taught that the ὕλη was ἀχρονον, is unsubstantiated by the evidence available to us.⁴³

Only one further issue need be mentioned in this section. Since God is the ἀρχή of all things and the only self-existing entity, he is ἀνεκδοξός and ἀπαιδοξός.⁴⁴ A lot of other predicates typical of the deity of the Greek philosophical world are used, but it is God's ἀπαιδοξία which has the most influence on Clement. God's ἀπαιδοξία is absolute since he is in need of nothing and cannot be influenced by anything other than himself.⁴⁵ The notion of suffering is completely incompatible with the Deity. Clement's use of the negative attributes are part of the continual process of avoiding the Stoic cosmology. This particular attribute of God is important in its own right and becomes of immense significance when it is carried over into Clement's thought on the Christian life. Here it provokes tensions in Clement's Christology and consequently in his soteriology.⁴⁶

(43) cf. (M8,45D).

(44) cf. R.M. Grant: The Early Christian Concept of God (Charlottesville, 1966), pp. 111-114. For this in Justin cf. I Apol. 25.2 (28,365B), II Apol. 1.2(71,441A) and Dial. 124(257,765B); and also Irenaeus: Adv. Haer. II.17.7 (M7,764B).

(45) cf. Strom. VII, 6(426,440B) and (428,444A).

(46) cf. below, pp. 125ff.

(3) The Doctrine of the Logos:

(a) The Logos and God:

Before beginning the investigation as such, it is as well to note that Clement's thought seems to move on two levels. The first is the level of practical faith and experience. Here the doctrine of God is deduced from his experience of faith both in his personal communion with the Logos 'in Christ' and through his participation in the on going traditional life of the Church. The other level is more philosophical, and here we see how his thought on the Logos has been influenced by his acceptance of a particular idea of God. In actual fact, of course, Clement did not distinguish between these two factors, but the tension between them explains a lot of the diversity in his thought.

On the philosophical side of his thought, Clement appears to have been well aware of the problem of the relationship between 'the One' and 'the Many'. To this problem he finds the Logos to be a partial answer. For instance he writes:

...all the powers of the Spirit, becoming collectively one thing, terminate in the same point - that is, in the Son...And the Son is neither simply one thing as one thing, nor many things as parts, but one thing as all things; whence also He is all things. For He is the circle of all powers rolled and united into one unity.⁴⁷

In this way the functions of the second bypostasis of Middle and Neo-platonism (ὁ νοῦς as distinct from ἀὐτόν) are taken up in the Son. The problem is solved by the Son being both one and many at the same time.⁴⁸ But since this merely pushes the problem back one

(47) Strom. IV, 25(212,1365A).

(48) cf. Osborn, op. cit. pp. 41ff.

stage, in that it does not explain why God himself cannot have such contradictory attributes, this solution shows that Clement regarded the problem to be insoluble.⁴⁹

On a slightly different tack, Clement can call the Logos the εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ, who is the 'genuine Son of Mind' (καὶ υἱὸς τοῦ Νοῦ γνήσιος).⁵⁰ Clement has thus not completely adopted the Neo-Platonic triad. The Logos is also identified with the Platonic world of ideas. In Clement the powers are closely associated with the Platonic forms, which come to be unified in the Son. But the Logos is also the first idea and, as Tollinton puts it: 'His agency is a necessary condition for all process and all becoming'.⁵¹ This thought is also influenced by the problem of 'the One' and 'the Many':

...and amongst intellectual ideas, what is oldest in origin, the timeless (ἄχρονον) and unoriginate First Principle (ἀναρχοῦ ἀρχῆς⁵²), and Beginning of existences (ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ὄντων) - the Son - from whom we learn the remoter Cause.⁵³

However, when Clement describes the relationship between God and the Logos, he often shows himself to have been influenced by the Wisdom tradition. Quoting Prov. 8.30 he writes that the Logos, who is also Wisdom, is 'the counsellor (σύμβουλον) of the Father "in which" the Sovereign God "delighted"', and he is the 'power of God' and 'the Father's most ancient Word before the production of all things (ἄρα πρὸ πάντων τῶν γενομένων αρχικώτατος Λόγος τοῦ Πατρός) and His Wisdom'.⁵⁴

(49) *ibid.* p. 60.

(50) *Protr.* 10(91,212C).

(51) *op. cit.* i, p. 339.

(52) This is a misprint for ἀναρχον ἀρχῆν . cf. Wolfson: The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, p. 206.

(53) *Strom.* VII, 1(407,404C).

(54) *Strom.* VII, 2(411,412A). cf. also *Strom.* VI, 7(337,280Bf) and Kaye, *op. cit.* p. 197.

Precisely which theory of the generation of the Logos Clement adopted is a matter of some controversy. This controversy can once again be seen to be due to Clement's methodology. Many passages in Clement seem to reflect either a one-stage theory or an eternal generation of the Logos.⁵⁵ Some of these have already been mentioned or quoted above. Wolfson systematically examines these statements and argues that they do not necessarily imply a one-stage theory, but in his exegesis he seems to be a little too rigorous. He concludes that 'there is no evidence to prove a belief in the single stage theory',⁵⁶ but we would like to conclude that elements of a belief in the eternal existence of the Logos are present although they are not developed into a detailed theory. Clement does reject the idea of the *λόγος προφορικός*,⁵⁷ but in many instances seems to indicate that he really does accept this theory of the origin of the Logos. In one instance Clement uses the almost technical *προελθών*:

Now the Word issuing forth (*προελθών*) was the cause of creation; then also he generated himself "when the Word had become flesh", that he might be seen.⁵⁸

Other evidence brought forward by Wolfson is the apparent distinction between *Νῶς* and *Λόγος*.⁵⁹ In this he discerns a similarity with Philo, who apparently regarded *Νῶς* as the equivalent of the

(55) cf. Wolfson, op. cit. p. 204ff.

(56) ibid. p. 207.

(57) cf. Strom. V, 1(224,16B), and Witt, op. cit. pp. 199f.

(58) Strom. V, 3(230,33A).

(59) cf. Protr. 10(91,212Cf), and Wolfson, op. cit. pp. 209ff.

λόγος ἐνδιάθετος. While this is possible a definite conclusion, which Wolfson makes, seems rather to force the issue, since there is no definite proof that Clement had firmly identified God described as Νῶς with the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος. Other evidence has been brought forward from Photius's reporting of the Hypotyposes.⁶⁰ Here there appears to be a definite distinction between the Logos as Son and the 'paternal Logos' (τῷ πατρικῷ λόγῳ),⁶¹ and there is also reference to 'a kind of emanation (ἀπορροή) of his Logos that became reason' (νοῦς γινόμενος). This is undoubtedly the two-stage theory. But how much weight are we to give to this evidence? As always with Clement, it is incorrect to try to weigh text against text with a view to getting one consistent picture. This just does not work. And so we get no really clear picture of Clement's use of the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος προφορικός schema, except perhaps that formally he rejected it while in actual fact, elements of it remain in his thought.

We also find other descriptions characteristic of the same type of thought. The Logos is a δύναμις θεϊκή or σοφία υπερέμβριος and πατρική εἰς ἐνέργεια,⁶² and in this regard Clement seems to echo the qualifications of both Tatian and Justin:

For the Son of God never leaves his own place of view, not being divided nor severed (οὐ μεριζόμενος, οὐκ ἀποστεμνόμενος), not passing from place to place, but being at all times in all places and in no respect circumscribed, completely Νῶς, completely light of the Father. To this the paternal Logos, all the hosts of angels and of gods is subordinate.⁶³

(60) cf. R.P. Casey: "Clement and the Two Divine Logoi", JTS, 25(1923), pp. 43ff.

(61) (MS,48A).

(62) cf. Tollinton, op. cit. i, p. 349f, and Kaye, op. cit. p. 198.

(63) Strom. VII, 2(409,408cf). This abbreviated translation is from Witt, op. cit. p. 200.

This quote is actually important evidence against the two-stage theory, especially in the light of the phrase 'the paternal Logos' (τῷ Λόγῳ τῷ πατρικῷ), which is evidently not used in the sense of the λόγος ἐνδιόθετον . But this does not mean that Clement could not use it in that sense in the other passage mentioned above.

There is one passage, of somewhat doubtful authenticity, which clearly reflects the true beginnings of the theory of eternal generation:

Cum enim dicit quod erat ab initio, generationem tangit sine principio Filii cum Patre simul exstantis; erat ergo Verbum aeternitatis significativum non habentis initium...⁶⁴

As Wolfson, writes, it is possible that this has been written by Cassiodorus rather than Clement, or Clement may have come under the influence of Origen late in life.⁶⁵

In all of this we see how Clement never comes firmly down on any one side. He represents all positions from the two-stage theory to the one-stage, and even perhaps eternal generation. He can use emanantist together with Plotinian language. But despite these uncertainties there can be no doubt that Clement regarded the Logos as God. He like Athemagoras is fond of the Johannine reciprocity:

For the Son is in him (the Father) and the Father is in the Son.⁶⁶

This language is used in one instance in a significant manner.

Clement writes that 'He, who is in Him who truly is (ὁ ἐν τῷ ὄντι ὄν) has appeared'.⁶⁷ Here the implication is that the Logos does

(64) Ad. in Epist. I Jo. 1.1(M9,734D), cf. also 755A

(65) op. cit. p. 216f.

(66) Pd. I, 7(149,312Cf). cf. also Pd. I, 5(130,277C) and Kaye, op. cit. p. 196, n. 2. Note the interchangeability of the ἐν and πρὸς, cf. Tollinton, op. cit. i, p. 344.

(67) Protr. 1(22,61C).

not have true existence. But in many places the Son or the Logos is directly described as God,⁶⁸ as 'the divine Word' (ὁ θεῖος λόγος), and 'He that is most manifest Deity' (ὁ φανερώτατος ἕως θεός).⁶⁹ Perhaps the strongest assertion of the full divinity of the Logos is the following, which in other authors could easily be a description of the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος:

But we speak in this way about the Word who is God in God, who is said to be 'in the bosom of the Father', inseparable (ἀσύντατος), indivisible (ἀμέριστος), one God.⁷⁰

There is however once again no certainty that Clement wrote this, although it is a strong possibility.⁷¹ And so, while there are uncertainties and ambiguities in Clement, we have found no evidence to support Photius's accusation that Clement brought down 'the Son to the level of a creature' (εἰς κτίσμα).⁷²

To conclude this section we must mention Clement's belief in some kind of a Trinity. There is one explicit reference to τὴν Τριάδα,⁷³ where the background is the famous Platonic statement.⁷⁴

(68) cf. Pd. I, 2(115,252C), where the Logos is θεός ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ βχγμάει; Pd. I, 7(151,316Bf): ἄγιος θεός Ἰγβῶς; Pd. I, 6(131,280C): ...θεὸν ὄντα, οὗ γὰρ μίσην εἰς εἶγ εὐδ λόγος; and the comprehensive list in Kaye, op. cit. p. 196, n. 1.

(69) Protr. 10(98f,228Af).

(70) Exc. ex Theod. 8(M9,657C). Is ἀσύντατος another misprint?

(71) cf. Tollinton, op. cit. i, p. 344.

(72) (M8,45D).

(73) Strom. V, 14(282,156B).

(74) II Epistle, 312e.

In one instance the Trinity seems to have a fourth member in the Virgin Mother, who apparently represents the Church.⁷⁵ As in our previous authors, there is considerable vagueness over the identity and nature of the Holy Spirit.⁷⁶ While there is no doubt that Clement knew of the Spirit, and that he had some idea of the special work of the Spirit, there is no clear demarcation between the Logos and the Spirit. This problem is clearly a result of Middle-Platonism, where there is no need for two intermediaries. In the following, which could have been written about Justin, Tollinton writes:

...there is no place left in Clement's system for a Third Person, because every office that has been assigned to Him is so fully discharged by the Logos.⁷⁷

There is a possibility that Clement regarded the Spirit as a deified Platonic world-soul, but there is no real evidence to support this view other than the Platonic analogy.⁷⁸ There is thus no real doctrine of the Trinity, nor does Clement show any interest in it.

(b) Christianity and Philosophy:⁷⁹

In a previous section we mentioned one of the points to which we must now pay special attention. This was Clement's adaptation of the Middle-Platonic $\mu\acute{o}\nu\eta\tau\acute{o}\varsigma\ \tau\acute{\omega}\ \nu\acute{\omega}\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$. In this regard Clement can perhaps be best understood as a development on Justin, although there does not appear to be any reason to suggest that there is any

(75) Pd. I, 6(142,300B). For other references cf. Kaye, op. cit. p. 195, n. 1.

(76) cf. ibid. p. 208.

(77) op. cit. i, pp. 359f.

(78) This is hinted at by C. Brigg: The Christian Platonists of Alexandria (OUP, 1968), p. 101.

(79) For this cf. Daniélou, op. cit. pp. 48-73.

direct connection between the two. In Justin's I Apol. we found that knowledge of God by the pagan philosopher was a real possibility, but in the Dialogue this position is sharply criticised. This leaves Justin expressing an extremely critical attitude to philosophy and stressing the absolute priority of revelation. This leaves us with the doctrine of the $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\mu\alpha\ \tau\omega\ \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omega\varsigma$, but does not allow philosophers independent knowledge of God. What Clement does is to establish a compromise position by retaining the Middle-Platonic $\tau\omega\ \nu\omega\varsigma$, while at the same time stressing the necessity of revelation. As is his wont, Clement approaches the problem from many different viewpoints and nowhere expresses what can be taken as a definitive answer. Philosophy is admitted to have real value, and its approximation ($\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$) to the truth is derived from several sources. Clement distinguishes between a 'general' and a 'special' revelation by appealing to the Stoic/Middle-Platonic theory of the $\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\ \xi\nu\nu\alpha$ or $\kappa\omicron\nu\nu\acute{o}\varsigma\ \nu\omega\varsigma$:⁸⁰

For there was always a natural manifestation ($\epsilon\mu\phi\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$... $\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$) of the one Almighty God, among all right thinking men; and the most, who had not quite divested themselves of shame with respect to the truth, apprehended the eternal beneficence in divine providence.⁸¹

The mind, which enables man to catch glimmerings of the truth, is 'infused ($\epsilon\nu\epsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\chi\theta\alpha\iota$) into Man at his creation'.⁸² This gives the $\kappa\omicron\nu\nu\acute{o}\varsigma\ \nu\omega\varsigma$ a connection with the $\epsilon\iota\kappa\lambda\acute{\iota}\nu\ \tau\omega\ \theta\epsilon\omega\varsigma$. This is all fairly similar to the theories of Justin,⁸³ and the following reflects a similar qualification as that of Justin to the theory:

(80) cf. Strom. I, 19(415,809B), and Strom. V, 14(298,197A) where the $\xi\nu\nu\alpha$ is shown to be identical with the $\pi\rho\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\gamma\psi\iota\varsigma$.

(81) Strom. V, 13(273,128C).

(82) Strom. VII, 2(411,412B). cf. also Protr. 6(70,173A).

(83) cf. above, pp. 37f.

The Platonists hold that mind is an effluence of divine dispensation in the soul (... νοῦν ... ἐν ψυχῇ Θεοῦ μοίρας ἀπορροῶσαν ὑπάρχοντα), and they place the soul in the body..... But it is not as a portion of God that the Spirit is in each of us (ΑΛΛ' ὡς ὡς μέρος Θεοῦ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα).⁸⁴

The knowledge of the philosophers is also seen to derive from the devil or evil demons.⁸⁵ This is, of course, not as complimentary as the idea of the φυσικὴ ἔννοια. As in Justin, the history of philosophy is closely aligned with demonic interference.⁸⁶ Clement is, however, more systematic in that he traces philosophy back to some Posidonian philosophers who are barbarians and who, in turn, derived their knowledge from the Jews.⁸⁷ This is a more sophisticated version of the loan theory than that of Justin and the historical proofs of Theophilus. Clement uses this loan theory in both a positive and a negative sense. Chadwick maintains that Clement gives it an anti-Hellenic force, making his use of the theory similar to that of Tatian rather than that of Justin.⁸⁸ This seems to be a rather simplistic verdict, since Clement uses it in both senses to suit his immediate purpose. An interesting suggestion is that Clement's use of the loan theory is a conscious polemic against the opposite use of the theory by Celsus,⁸⁹ although here one must be

(84) Strom. V, 13(273,129A).

(85) cf. Strom. I, 16(405,796A).

(86) cf. Strom. V, 1(226,24Af).

(87) cf. Strom. I, 15(398f,777Af).

(88) op. cit. p. 44.

(89) cf. Lilla, op. cit. pp. 34ff.

careful since the theory has a venerable tradition beginning perhaps with Philo.⁹⁰

Alongside this historical theory, Clement does allow that certain Greek philosophers are directly inspired,⁹¹ and this leads on to the distinction between the natural knowledge and the revealed knowledge. While philosophy is always regarded as inferior to the direct revelation in the law,⁹² and both the law and the prophets culminate in and are fulfilled by Christ,⁹³ it is still a *διὰ θεοῦ* and is regarded as the equivalent of the law to the Greeks.⁹⁴ But for the Christian Clement can, on the one hand say:

Wherefore since the Word Himself has come to us from heaven, we need not, I reckon, go any more in search of human learning (*ἐπι' ἀνθρωπίνων ... διδασκαλῶν*) to Athens and the rest of Greece, and to Ionia...and the whole world, with Athens and Greece, has already become the domain of the Word (*ἔργον τοῦ Λόγου*).⁹⁵

But, on the other hand, Clement can balance this overridingly negative stance by regarding 'philosophy...as...a stepping to the philosophy which is according to Christ'.⁹⁶ This introductory function of philosophy appears to be useful to the gnostic but not to the simple believer: 'Philosophy (for the gnostic) is a preparation for theology

(90) e.g. Quaest. in Gen. 4.152.

(91) cf. Strom. VI, 17(398f,389Bf) and Protr. 6(71,176C).

(92) cf. Strom. I, 5(336,717C) and VI, 5(327,261B).

(93) cf. Strom. VI, 17(399,392Bf) and V, 5(238,52B).

(94) cf. Strom. VI, 8(342,288Cf), and also VI, 5(326ff, esp. 327,261B).

(95) Protr. 11(100,229A).

(96) cf. n. 94 above.

just as grammar prepared for more advanced study'.⁹⁷ Thus Clement refers to 'philosophy and other preparatory instruction' (ἄλλης προπαιδείας),⁹⁸ and philosophy can have the function of nourishing 'the spiritual seed' (σπέρμα πνευματικόν) which is 'cast into it'.⁹⁹ But even in this positive use of philosophy Clement is careful to stress that the gnostic must only use it as a tool and it is not absolute in itself:

Not preferring to the truth itself what appears plausible, or, according to Hellenic reasoning, necessary; but what has been spoken by the Lord he accepts as clear and evident, though concealed from others.¹⁰⁰

Philosophy is thus given a positive content, both in itself in the Greek world and in the gnostic's search for God, but in both cases Clement stresses that the natural knowledge has to be supplemented by revelation. Even while they use their reason, the philosophers rely heavily on inspiration and on the revelation passed down ultimately from the Jews. But because of demonic interference the whole philosophical tradition needs the corrective of Christ, who came to be the true philosopher/teacher. It is most interesting that philosophy as such is not directly attributed to the Logos, but rather to reason implanted into man, and even this needs to be judged in the light of the divine Logos.' Clement can use the ambiguity of the term, but unlike Justin, he avoids using it as an apologetic device.¹⁰¹ By this he escapes the theological dilemma, but still gives philosophy its due place. It is not a matter of reason versus revelation, but of revelation supplemented by reason which in turn comes from God. The revelation and reason stay

(97) cf. Chadwick, op. cit. p. 40, who refers to Philo: Congr. Essid. passim, and to Albinus. cf. also Lilla, op. cit. pp. 56ff.

(98) Strom. I, 1(358,705A).

(99) ibid. (359,708A).

(100) Strom. VI, 9(348f,300A).

stay separate, but are shown not to be fundamentally opposed to each other. In this advance over all the Apologists, Clement is showing how the debate of revelation versus reason, which for most of the Apologists was between Christianity versus the pagan philosophy, has moved into a debate which is domestic to the Church. The Church is no longer opposed to the world but attempting to come to terms with the problem of how to use the sanctified world in its midst. As with his appropriation of the Gnostic terminology into his language, Clement here shows himself to be a synthesizer rather than a dialectical analyst.

(c) The Logos and the Salvation of Mankind:

In this section we are to follow a particular method of enquiry. Initially only the Protrepticos and the Paidagogos are to be examined, and after this we will proceed to the Stromateis. The reason for this will become clear.

We have already shown how the Logos is active in human reason and in special revelation, which combine to make up philosophy. Philosophy was a special covenant for the Greeks which prepared them for the true revelation in Christ. As such it was a way of salvation for the Greeks. But Clement was emphatic that reason by itself could not discover God:

...so, had we not known the Word, and been illuminated by Him, we should have been no wise different from fowls that are being fed, fattened in darkness, and nourished for death.¹⁰²

And in contrast to this, it is through the Logos that man can enjoy immortality:

(101) cf. Strom. I, 9(380,741C) and Pd. I, 13(184,372Af).

(102) Protr. 11(101,232A).

Jesus, who is eternal, the one great High Priest of the one God and of His Father, prays for and exhorts men... do not only have the advantage of the irrational creatures in the possession of reason; for to you of all mortals I grant the enjoyment of immortality...I desire to restore you to the original model, that ye may become also like me.¹⁰³

The Logos brings salvation to man as the Instructor, the Teacher and the Revealer of the 'true gnosis'. He can do this because:

The face of God (πρόσωπον) is the Word by whom God is manifested (ὃ φωτίζει τὰς ὀφθάλμους) and made known (καὶ γνωρίζει τὰς ψυχὰς).¹⁰⁴

It is in the accepting of this revelation that man finds his salvation in being made 'also like me'. It is this that is characteristic of Clement, and what seems of great significance is the way in which this theology of revelation is connected with the incarnation.

None of the above quotes refer to the incarnate Logos. The Paidagogos of man is not thought of as incarnate:

The Logos is like this: he is the Paidagogos who is the creator of the world and of man.¹⁰⁵

The full implications of this will be drawn out later, but now we turn to the Logos as the incarnate Revealer, primarily to examine how the two phases of the revealing activity relate. Unlike our previous writers, Clement does in a fairly meaningful way relate the divine Logos and the man Jesus. In the following passage the two are equated:

(103) Protr. 12(108,241Bf).

(104) Pd. I, 7(152,320A).

(105) Pd. III, 12(341,680Af). cf. also Strom. VI, 8(343,289C) and Kaye, op. cit. p. 198, n. 6.

...our Instructor is like His Father God, whose Son He is, sinless, blameless, and with a soul devoid of passion (ἀπαθὴς ἐν ψυχῇ); God in the form of man (θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἰσέμορφοι); stainless, the minister of His Father's will, the Word who is God (Λόγος θεός), who is in the Father, who is at God's right hand, and with the form of God is God (ὄν καὶ τῷ εἰσέμορφοι θεός).¹⁰⁶

Leaving aside the Christological problem implied by the ἀπαθὴς ἐν ψυχῇ just for the moment,¹⁰⁷ we note in this quote a most interesting balancing of θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἰσέμορφοι and ὄν καὶ τῷ εἰσέμορφοι θεός. The relationship of the Logos with man in the incarnation is very closely related to the relationship of the Logos to God within the godhead. But even here in this identification, the reference to the incarnation is perfunctory and the main stress remains on the divine Logos who is 'the minister of His Father's will'.

As always, the best approach to assessing the significance of the incarnation is to examine the writer's soteriology. Clement does consider the incarnation to be a special form of revelation:

Yes, I say, the Word of God became man (ὁ Λόγος ὁ εἰς θεὸν ἀνθρώπῳ γένομενος), that thou mayest learn from man how man may become God (ὅτι... παρὰ ἀνθρώπου μάθῃς, ... ποτε... ἀνθρώπῳ γένηται θεός).¹⁰⁸

(106) Pd. I, 2(115,252C). Similar identifications occur in:
 Pd. I, 3(118,257A): ὁ Κύριος ... καὶ ὡς ἀνθρώπος, καὶ ὡς θεός;
 Pd. I, 7(151,316Bf): παιδαγωγός ... ἄγιος θεός Ἰησοῦς, ὁ πάσης τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος καθυπέμνητο Λόγος;
 and also Pd. I, 9(172f,356A).
 Also cf. Protr. 1(22,61Af).
 (107) cf. Grillmeier, op. cit. p. 137, and below, p.124f.
 (108) Protr. 1(24,64D).

But this still does not answer the question why the Logos should have to become man to teach man to become like God. There is an element of Clement and of the whole of Alexandria theology here, which regards the incarnation just as the highest form of revelation, that is revelation which comes to man on his own terms.¹⁰⁹ But Clement does go deeper than this:

Believe him who is both God and man (ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ Θεῷ);
...believe, O man the living God, who suffered and is
adored (εἰς ἰαθῆναι, καὶ προσκυνοῦμένῳ Θεῷ ἑῷναι).¹¹⁰

The purpose of this suffering is mentioned:

Man...was found fettered to sins. The Lord then wished to release him from his bonds, and clothing himself with flesh (καὶ σαρκὶ ἐνδεθεῖς)...vanquished the serpent, and enslaved the tyrant death.¹¹¹

This developed statement incorporates both the elements of Christ's identification with man (ἐνδεθεῖς) and his deliverance of man from his helpless, defenceless position. But even in this instance we find that this is not of central significance to Clement, who proceeds immediately to his favourite theme: 'we have a Teacher from whom all instruction comes'. Indeed, while Clement certainly believed in evil demons and the devil,¹¹² this seems to be the only place where the incarnation is directly connected with evil; moreover it seems to be the only place where the devil can really be regarded as having any kind of cosmological importance. Elsewhere evil is always connected with moral, or rather immoral, behaviour. The stress is always on

(109) cf. also below on Athanasius, p. 152 . cf. also R.P. Casey: "Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Platonism", p. 63, who refers to Clement's conception of the incarnation as having 'much in common with the Stoic notion of the perfect Sage'.

(110) Protr. 10(96,224A).

(111) Protr. 11(100,228C).

(112) cf. Kaye, op. cit. p. 213.

the Word as Instructor or Revealer rather than on his action as a man. But while this appears to be the direction of Clement's thought, there is no doubt that Clement regarded the incarnation as important from both a purely revelatory and a soteriological point of view. Most of his references to the incarnation do not even hint at any developed Christology but merely identify the Logos who is God with the Logos who is man. The references to the $\epsilon\chi\theta\acute{\upsilon}\mu\omicron\varsigma$ could be taken to refer to the outward form rather than inward content. The reference to $\alpha\pi\alpha\theta\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma \tau\acute{\upsilon}\nu \psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}\nu$ and the use of $\epsilon\nu\delta\epsilon\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ could point to a docetism, but definitely the latter has respectable precursors. The evidence examined thus far does not really help us in this regard. For this and the development of our initial theme of the relationship between the divine and the incarnate Logos we must now turn to the evidence of the Stromateis.

In the whole of Strom. I there appears to be only one reference to the incarnation:

...for those who in their own estimation are wise, consider it fabulous that the Son of God should speak by man and that God should have a Son, and especially that that Son should have suffered ($\kappa\alpha\iota \delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu \kappa\alpha\iota \pi\epsilon\pi\omicron\nu\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\iota \tau\acute{\omega}\nu$).¹¹³

Examining this for its Christological content, we find little more than that the Son suffered. This the 'wise men' find difficult to swallow. This quote is interesting because it is set in the context of Clement's exegesis of I Cor. 1.21-24. He deals with the problem of philosophy, declaring that the 'contemned barbarian philosophy', that is Christianity, is the light which destroyed the 'wisdom of the

(113) Strom. I, 18(410,804B).

wise'.¹¹⁴ But in doing this Clement misses Paul's point, which is that all wisdom must be measured from the 'folly of the Cross'.

Clement rather concludes that:

The apostle designates the doctrine which is according to the Lord, "the wisdom of God", in order to show that the true philosophy has been communicated by the Son.¹¹⁵

Clement is almost there, but not quite. He has opposed one wisdom with another as Paul seems to do, but misses the subtlety of Paul's argumentation. Clement spells out this true philosophy in terms of morality, whereas Paul would speak of the power of the cross.

Clement is always concerned with abstracts, whereas Paul moves from the specific act of God to the abstract.¹¹⁶

In Strom. II we find the statement which has already been quoted about the God who 'draws near' although he is $\pi\acute{o}\rho\theta\omega$ κατ' ὄψιν.¹¹⁷ Obviously in this framework any part of God which became incarnate could not be κατ' ὄψιν, and therefore not properly God at all. The difficulty with which Clement is grappling is most clearly revealed over the issue of God being $\delta\iota\alpha\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\varsigma$. Thus:

...the Divinity needs nothing and suffers nothing
($\delta\upsilon\epsilon\nu\delta\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ μὲν γὰρ τὸ θεῖον καὶ διαθές).¹¹⁸

The context of this is morality. The quote continues:

...whence it (τὸ θεῖον) is not, strictly speaking, capable of self-restraint, for it is never subjected to perturbation, over which to exercise control; while our nature being capable of perturbation, needs self-constraint, by which disciplining itself to the need of little, it endeavours to approximate to the character of the divine nature.

(114) (411,804C).

(115) (411,805A).

(116) cf. Strom. I, 7(375,733A) and I, 13(390,756B).

(117) Strom. II, 2(4,936Af), cf. above, p. 103.

(118) Strom. II, 18(48,1020B).

In this way, through the general doctrine of the ὁμοίωσις τῷ
Θεῷ which we have noticed already, the gnostic attempts to conform
his nature to the divine nature and so, since God is ἀπαθής, the
gnostic must also become ἀπαθής. While God's ἀπαθία is primarily
the quality of not being subject to anything, that is ἀπαθής,
is almost equivalent to ἀρρητός, and God is always active and never
passive, this is integrally tied up with the question of suffering.
This is most clearly revealed in the Patripassian controversy. In
that controversy the matter of God suffering was resolved. He
did not suffer; only the incarnate second Person suffered. Clement
reveals his uneasiness over this solution both in his aversion for
the whole concept of suffering in that the gnostic is trying to put
himself beyond it, and in his Christology. Thus it is that, as we
have mentioned, in the Paidagogos it is the Son who has a soul
devoid of passion (ἀπαθής τὴν ψυχὴν) who suffers. The Son is
here nothing more than the perfect gnostic. This is however contra-
dictory, and so it is that, as Clement moves more and more towards
the Gnostic gospel, this problem manifests itself.

This Gnostic development results in a radical spiritualization of his
anthropology, which culminates in a dualism of which the following
gives clear expression:

The severance, therefore, of the soul from the body,
made a life-long study, produces in the philosopher
gnostic alacrity, so that he is easily able to bear
natural death, which is the dissolution of the chains
which bind the soul to the body.¹¹⁹

This division between the ψυχὴ and the σῶμα is the logical conclusion
of accepting the Platonic epistemology which underlies the whole of

(119) Strom. IV, 3(144f,1225A). In Strom. IV, 6(157,1252A) the
true gnostic is described as being in a 'state of impassible
identity' (αὐτοόρατος ἀπαθούς).

Clement's thought of man's knowledge of God and thereby of man's redemption by God.¹²⁰ This is, of course, quite different from the Pauline distinction between $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ and $\sigma\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$. The difficulties that Clement now found himself in are reflected in the following statements:

So that on these accounts he is compelled to become like his Teacher in impassibility ($\kappa\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ $\lambda\iota\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta\tau\alpha\varsigma$). For the Word of God is intellectual ($\nu\omicron$ $\epsilon\rho\acute{\omega}\varsigma$), according as the image of mind is seen in man alone.¹²¹ Thus also the good man is godlike in form and semblance as respects his soul. And, on the other hand, God is like man. For the distinctive form of each one is the the mind by which we are characterized.¹²²

and:

For by going away to the Lord, for the love he (the gnostic) bear Him, though his tabernacle be visible on earth, he does not withdraw himself from life, for that is not permitted to him. But he has withdrawn his soul from the passions. For that is granted to him. And on the other hand he lives, having put to death his lusts, and no longer makes use of the body, but allows it the use of necessaries that he may not give cause for dissolution.¹²³

This acceptance of the Platonic epistemology is really fundamentally at variance with his stress on revelation which we noted above. Here the $\nu\omicron\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ of man is the connecting link between God and man.¹²⁴ Clement seems to allow himself these liberties since he is now addressing the gnostic, or should one rather say that Clement can now express what

(120) cf. Strom. V, I and esp. V, 1(224,16C).

(121) For the confusion in the text at this point, cf. ANCL p. 345 and Migne, 293.

(122) Strom. VI, 9(345,293B).

(123) *ibid.* (347,296Bf).

(124) cf. Casey, *op. cit.* pp. 55, 59-61.

he really thinks? If this is so, all his careful qualifications of the rôle of reason wear rather thin. This kind of contradiction is characteristic of Clement. This use of $\nu\acute{o}\nu\varsigma$ as the connecting link between God and man, logically and practically has the effect of introducing the God-man dualism within man in the form of the dualism between $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ and $\beta\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$.

From such a background the appearance of an extreme docetic position is not at all surprising. In one passage, which incredible claims to attack docetism,¹²⁵ Clement writes:

The Gnostic is such, that he is subject only to the affections that exist for the maintenance of the body, such as hunger and thirst, and the like. But in the case of the Saviour, it were ludicrous (to suppose) that the body, as a body, demanded the necessary aids in order for its duration. For He ate, not for the sake of the body, which was kept together by a holy energy, but in order that it might not enter into the minds of those who were with Him to entertain a different opinion of Him; in like manner as certainly some afterwards supposed that He appeared in a phantasmal shape ($\delta\omicron\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\beta\epsilon\tau\iota$). But He was entirely impassible ($\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\theta\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$); inaccessible to any movement of feeling - either pleasure or pain. While the apostles having most gnostically mastered, through the Lord's teaching, anger, and fear, and lust were not liable even to such of the movements of feeling as seem good, courage, zeal, joy etc.¹²⁶

This amounts to a straight denial that 'the Saviour' could suffer.

This is emphatically in contradiction to the previous claims that he

(125) Chadwick, op. cit. p. 51, n. 99, mentions a polemic against docetism. In the two passages cited (Strom. III, 13(128,1192C), 17(133,1206A)) Clement attacks $\delta\epsilon\ \epsilon\gamma\varsigma\ \delta\omicron\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\beta\epsilon\omega\varsigma\ \beta\acute{\epsilon}\tau\alpha\rho\chi\omega\upsilon$ 'Ιούλιος Καβέωνός, but the substance of the attack is concerned with regulations about sex and eunuchs, not with anything Christological.

(126) Strom. VI, 9(344,292C).

did suffer, but it is the logical conclusion of the rest of Clement's thought in the Stromateis. If 'the Gnostic does not share...in those affectations that are commonly celebrated as good',¹²⁷ how can the Saviour of that gnostic suffer? As Clement puts it, 'It were ludicrous' (γέλως ἂν εἴη). It is in this that Clement reveals his true colours. He is arguing from his experience of the Christian life and concluding that his Saviour could not be different from the absolute towards which he is striving. The appeal to rationality which lies behind this γέλως ἂν εἴη is almost the stamp of Alexandrian theology. But as with the Λόγος - νοῦς dilemma, it causes problems which appear to be only solved in the theology of Athanasius, where his appeal to what is 'fitting' is radically conditioned by revelation rather than by human reason.¹²⁸ It is a dangerous mode of argumentation and only achieves the correct results if the revealed truth and the results of human reason are in fact identical. In this case Clement has clearly got it wrong. He should have been arguing from the reality of Christ to what is fitting in the Christian life, and not vice-versa. And so Clement writes:

For, in fine, it is impossible (ἀδύνατον) that the immutable (τὸ ἀερέναιον) should assume firmness and consistency in the mutable (ἐν τῷ ἐπιτομένῳ).¹²⁹

Poor Clement, what could he do about the ἀδύνατον? The hold of the Greek world on his mind was just that bit too strong. Revelation, the folly of the cross, has not broken down the citadel of reason, however much he might claim to the contrary when he is not dealing with the issue which presents him with the inescapable problem.

(127) *ibid.* (346,296A).

(128) *cf.* below, p. 164.

(129) *Strom.* VI. 9(348,297B).

In Strom. VII Clement seems to double back on himself, for he stresses repeatedly that the humanity which the Logos assumed could indeed suffer:

And He who for our sakes assumed flesh capable of suffering (ὁ ... τὴν παθητικὴν ἀναλαβὴν ἕρκα) is far from being luxuriously indolent.¹³⁰

This statement occurs as an aside, but the same claim is repeated twice more in the same chapter, although they have not escaped some Gnostic adaptations:

...who having assumed flesh, which by nature is susceptible of suffering (τὴν ἕρκα τὴν ἐμπροσθὶ φύσει) trained it to the condition of impassibility (εἰς ἕξιν ἀπαθείας).¹³¹

How such a theory could be reconciled with a doctrine of atonement is a mystery, but even the admission that Jesus could suffer is an important corrective to the previous emphatic denial of this. But even in this more acceptable context we still find traces of Clement's latent docetism. This is most noticeable in his soteriology, or rather his lack of it. Gnostic training, rather than the acceptance of the death of Christ by faith, is the way to salvation:

Now it is well-pleasing to Him that we should be saved; and salvation is effected through both well-doing and knowledge, of both of which the Lord is the teacher.¹³²

The assumption of humanity by the Logos is explained thus:

(130) Strom. VII, 2(410,409B).

(131) *ibid.* (411,412A), and also:

...who, for His exceeding love to human flesh, despising not its susceptibility to suffering (ἐπιτάθειαν αὐχ ὑπερδίων), but investing Himself with it (ἐνδυνάμενος), came for the common salvation of men.

(132) Strom. VI, 15(376,345C).

But having assumed sensitive flesh, He came to show man what was possible through obedience to the commandments.¹³³

The incarnate Lord is once again revealed to be the Stoic sage, the Teacher and Revealer, but this, even his example leaves man still essentially untouched. The distance of the Logos from man is revealed in the statement that, 'The Gnostic even forms and creates himself'.¹³⁴ And so, while Clement notes the need for Christ to suffer,¹³⁵ and in one instance actually presents his reader with a statement which could really be described as soteriological, the deeper levels of his thought reveal that this whole issue has little importance for him. Indeed, his thought is much more conditioned by the concept of *ἁγιασμός* and Gnostic ascetism, which of itself leads to salvation. Here the incarnate Logos is only an example or guide.

When we return once more to the question with which we first started, about the relationship of the divine to the incarnate Logos, we can now see that while the incarnation is certainly present in Clement, the functions of the incarnate Logos are identical or very similar to those of the divine Logos, and so, as Tollinton puts it:

...throughout...(Clement's) faith and interest find their centre in the universal Logos, rather than in the human life of Jesus.¹³⁶

This interest in the divine Logos is a direct parallel with Clement's interest in what we called the abstract rather than the specific act of the incarnation. Furthermore, this must naturally lead to the incarnation being regarded as but one episode of the total work of the

(133) Strom. VII, 2(412,412C).

(134) Strom. VII, 3(415,417A), and see the note in Migne explaining this.

(135) cf. Tollinton, op. cit. ii, p. 14f.

(136) ibid. ii, p. 2.

Logos, rather than the cosmic activity of the Logos being interpreted in the light of the incarnation.¹³⁷ This means that, like Justin, Clement's thought must be regarded as Logocentric rather than Christocentric. But has Clement integrated the Logos theology and his references to the incarnation more successfully than Justin? In Justin the tension was revealed in the incursions of the credal formulae and the lack of other reference to the incarnation, but in Clement there is no such problem. His language is very uniform. The tension in Clement is rather manifested in his methodology, which can express contradictory positions because of its diffuseness. It is perhaps significant that different Christological positions seem to be assumed by Clement as he maintains different stances on the issue of the rôle of philosophy. In the Paidagogos and the Protrepticos Clement is usually fairly scathing about human wisdom, and while little real mention is made of the incarnation here, there is no doubt of the Logos becoming really man who can suffer, even if there might be doubt as to his soul. But in the Stromateis, when philosophy is viewed positively from the perspective of the gnostic, a fully developed docetism comes to the fore. This is corrected in Strom. VII, but by then the damage has already been done. A similar point can be made about Clement's relationship with the Gnostics proper. His attempt to incorporate much of their terminology and perspective, results in the centre of thought moving from the Logos to the gnostic's own striving for salvation. When these two factors are borne in mind, we see that the fairly consistent picture that emerged in our study of Clement's attitude to philosophy has not itself been integrated into his thought. The careful balancing of reason with revelation seems to fall down when applied to specific issues. Why is this? The answer seems to be in Clement's whole concept of revelation. Because it is not centred on

(137) *ibid.* ii, pp. 9f.

the incarnation, revelation tends to become a gnosis which in turn is far too amenable to reason. The reason/revelation issue in Clement is, as we pointed out, an issue between two alternatives which are fundamentally similar, rather than totally different. Because he has failed to come to terms with the historical nettle, Clement finds it very difficult to really distinguish between reason and revelation, between the Logos and the incarnate Jesus. The problem here appears to be directly connected with the whole Hellenistic thought world and is perhaps even more serious in Clement than in the Apologists, because of his tendency towards Neo-Platonism which manifests itself concretely in the Gnostic search for *ἁπαθία*. If one starts one's theology with the Greek thought on the nature of the divine and the created order, is it really possible to explain satisfactorily, that is in any Christian sense, their relationship? The question is most sharply focussed on the incarnation and the person of Jesus. Clement's failure to deal adequately with this is a reflexion of his failure to deal with the wider issue.

IV. THE NATURAL THEOLOGY OF ATHANASIUS'S CONTRA GENTES.

(1) Introduction:

The natural thing to do after studying Clement is to move on to Origen, and then from there, to Athanasius. Origen is relevant to this study, despite the fact that he never formally wrote an apology; the Contra Celsus would admirably serve the purpose of one. We have, however, omitted Origen from this study primarily because of the complexity of the issues which are raised by him. By leaving him out, we unfortunately interrupt the historical development of thought that we have been tracing. This chapter is then, in one sense, a slightly disconnected postlude. But in another sense, it is still the fitting conclusion.

In Athanasius, the conflict which was external in the Apologetic age and which became internalized in Clement, has almost completely disappeared. This is not to say that the mission of the Church had ceased with all nations believing, but now the thinking or theology of the Church was not so much concerned with the we/they issue, but more with getting its own thought right. In the Contra Gentes (C.G.), the debate is not with a pagan Gentile, as one might expect, but with a Christian, Macarius. None of Athanasius's other works is concerned with the pagan world directly, but with heresy internal to the Church. Because of the systematic nature of Athanasius's works, it is helpful to analyse how he deals with the same issues that we have dealt with above, from his different perspective.

As we have just mentioned, typical of this change in perspective is the Christian audience of the C.G. But this is not all. The C.G. is, as we shall see, really an introduction to the de Incarnatione (de I.). This is similar but not identical to the relationship of the Protrepticus to the rest of Clement's thought, but the

Christian audience of the C.G. takes the matter a step further.

The close relationship between the C.G. and the de I. gives us an invaluable insight into Athanasius's theological methodology, and this insight illuminates a lot of what we have already examined.

Another indication of the change in perspective is the different approach to the Logos ambiguity. In Justin and in Clement, a large part of the evidence available to us for examining the relationship between the divine Logos and human reason came from their treatments of the relationship between Christianity and pagan philosophy. In Athanasius this subject is not specifically dealt with in any detail. His attention is focussed immediately on the relationship between reason and revelation, and this comes to a head in the incarnation, the very point where our previous writers were all deficient.

But in his attention to this issue, Athanasius is very subtle, and great care must be taken in analysing the C.G. in the light of the de I. It is truly fascinating how the Platonic epistemology is accepted in the C.G. but put to such a completely different use.

The extent to which the C.G. is a completely natural theology must be discussed, but more important to us is how Athanasius adapts his Logos theology to lead straight to the incarnation.

How Athanasius accomplishes this conjuring trick is the subject of this discussion. For it is in his solution that the real difficulty of the earlier writers is revealed; their problem lay precisely in their inability to bring together the Logos theology and the incarnation. This is true whether their Logos theologies reduce to a natural theology, or remain entirely revelational.

As a whole, the C.G. is built around the argument from design, that knowledge of God is possible from the order and rationality within the world. In order to justify this, Athanasius has to start from creation and to describe how the rationality of the creation is

(ἐπιτελεῖν ἡμῶνς γενεῶνς οὐρανῶν).³ The use of these two phrases shows conclusively that Athanasius was using οὐρανία in the sense of γενεαὶ οὐρανία. The history of this phrase is of some interest. The tradition seems to have been started by Plato's mention of the idea of the good being ἐπιτελεῖν ἡμῶνς οὐρανῶν.⁴ From here it passed into Middle-Platonism and is used in Justin⁵ and in an adapted form in Clement.⁶ Meijering suggests that Justin uses the phrase in the Athanasian sense, but that Clement shows the influence of Neo-Platonism, in that the phrase denies all οὐρανία to God as in Platinus.⁷ But Athanasius seems to have totally redefined his notion of οὐρανία. He writes:

...by what is, then, I mean what is good, inasmuch as it has its pattern in God who is (ἐκ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ θεοῦ).⁸

Although such a definition occurs in the context of the problem of the existence of evil,⁹ the next sentence specifically mentions οὐρανία, and so we find that οὐρανία is that which comes from God's creative activity and from no other source. The οὐρανία, the γενεαὶ οὐρανία, has being because it is ἐκ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ θεοῦ. This radical focus on the creative activity of God, and the stress on the dependence of the created order on God is something new, and

- (3) 35.1(69A) and 40.2(80C).
- (4) Rep. VI, 509b.
- (5) Dial. 4(91,484A).
- (6) Pd. I, 8(161,336A) and Strom. V, 6(244,65A).
- (7) Enn. VI, 7,40.26-27, and cf. above, p.49.
- (8) 4.4(9C), cf. also de I. 4.5(104B).
- (9) cf. below, pp. 142f.

is an important step away from the Greek idea of God being the highest essence of the world.¹⁰ From this definition of οὐσία it follows necessarily that God is ἐπέκεινα πάσης οὐσίας. He could not be otherwise. It follows that Meijering cannot be correct in identifying this use of the the Platonic phrase with that of Justin. Justin is far from such subtleties. Nor has Meijering dealt with Clement correctly, but we have already dealt with this. The phrase ἐπέκεινα πάσης οὐσίας does, then, skilfully separate the world and God, at the same time as describing the positive side of the relationship.

Another element in Athanasius's use of οὐσία is probably his belief that the Logos and the Father are identical in their essence (οὐσία). This belief would be nonsensical if the phrase ἐπέκεινα πάσης οὐσίας were to be interpreted in the Neo-Platonic sense.¹¹ But even with this definition of οὐσία a different sense of the word would have to be understood to incorporate this belief.

The difference between God and the world is described directly in terms of the origination of the world. The race of men 'is made out of nothing (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων), while God is ingenerate or unmade' (τὸν δὲ ἀγένετον).¹² This distinction between the created order and God is also used with reference to the Logos, putting the Logos on the godward side of the divide. Rejecting the Stoic λόγος συμπαντικός doctrine, he says that the Logos 'is not that which is involved (τὸν ... συμπαντικόν) and inherent (συμπαντικόν)

(10) cf. above, pp. 8f.

(11) cf. Meijering, op. cit. p. 126.

(12) 35.1(69A).

in all things created' (ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν γενομένων).¹³ He echoes the ἐπέκεινα πάσης οὐσίας, and Justin's ἕτερον ... ἕτερον, when he says that the Logos 'is different from things that are made and from all creation' (ὅς ἄλλος μὲν ἔστι τῶν γενησῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς κτίσεως).¹⁴ This distinction between God and the created order is also the difference between true existence and derivative existence, as expressed in the definition of οὐσία. Similar to this is the distinction between God, who has 'true existence and is not composite' (ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ὧν ἔστι, καὶ οὐ σύνθετος), and 'men (who are) composed of parts and made out of nothing' (ἐκ μερῶν συγκείμενοι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μηδὲντος γινόμενοι).¹⁵ This background to all of Athanasius's thought became one of the vital issues in the Arian controversy. The precise significance of the definition of the relationship in these terms becomes abundantly clear in his Christology.¹⁶

After these introductory remarks we can move on to the actual description of the act of creation itself. This can be described solely as an act of God, but usually it is qualified with the now familiar διὰ τοῦ Λόγου. The creative activity of the Logos operates at two related levels: firstly, in the creation of man, and secondly in the wider sense of the creation of the world. This order may seem surprising, since the creation of the world must temporally precede the particular creation of man. But Athanasius is sure that theologically the order is the other way round.¹⁷

(13) 40.4(81A).

(14) *ibid.*

(15) 41.1(81C).

(16) *cf.* below, pp. 165f.

(17) *cf.* Ch.'s 2, 35ff and 40ff.

The world was created as a setting for the creation of man, and although both are for the glorification of God, man has a special relationship with God, which sets him apart from the rest of creation. There is another aspect to this question. Athanasius is not primarily concerned with describing the cosmological aspect of creation. He is much more concerned with the implications of creation for his soteriology. And so, in dealing with the creation *διὰ τοῦ Λόγου*, Athanasius is already pointing not only to the argument from design, but also to the de I. and the recreation of mankind in Jesus Christ. The more cosmological description of creation through the Logos is a necessary preliminary, but still a preliminary, to the salvation of man through the Logos, both by the order within the world and by the Logos as man in the incarnation. We deal then, firstly with the creation of man and then with the creation of the world.

(a) The Creation of Man:

In Ch. 2 of the C.G. Athanasius gives an idyllic picture of the original perfect man. This is, as has often been noted, a Platonic description of the bliss of Eden.¹⁸ Although this is certainly true, the central point is not Platonic, but directly from Gen. 1.26: the human race is created after God's own image (*κατ' ἴδιαν εἰκόνα*).¹⁹ There is a direct relationship between the Logos being 'the Image of the Father' and the image after which man is made.²⁰ This is made especially clear in a passage from the de I.:

Whence, lest this should be so (that man should be no different from the 'brute creatures'), being good, He gives them a share of His own Image, our Lord Jesus Christ, and makes them after His own Image and after His likeness.²¹

(18) cf. Meijering, op. cit. p. 5.

(19) 2.2(5C).

(20) 2.2(8A).

(21) 11.3(116A).

While the central point is biblical, Athanasius describes both creation κατ' εἰκὼν and its implications in purely Platonic terms. The image results in man being able 'to know realities by means of this assimilation (διὰ τῆς ... ὁμοιώσεως) to Himself'. Man thus has θεωρητὴν καὶ ἐπιεργάσαν together with the 'conception and knowledge of His own eternity' (τῆς ἰδίας ἀιδιότητος ἔννοαν καὶ γινῶσιν).²² Man is made to know God and thus to 'rejoice and have fellowship (συνομιλή) with the Deity'. This knowledge is also expressed in terms of the Platonic distinction between τὰ νοητά and τὰ αἰσθητά:

He is awestruck as he contemplates that Providence (ἡρόνσαν), which through the Word extends to the universe (εἰς τὸ πᾶν), being raised above the things of sense and every bodily appearance (ὑπεράνω ... τῶν αἰσθητῶν), but cleaving to the divine and thought-perceived things in the heavens by the power of the mind (τὰ ... νοητὰ τῆ δυνάμει τοῦ νοῦ συναυερόμενος).²³

This is plainly the Platonic and Middle-Platonic picture of the philosopher who perceives the deity τῷ νῷ μόνω. The implication is clear: the image of God is directly connected with the mind of man. But there is more to it than this, for the image of God directs man's mind upwards, 'and seeing the Word, it sees in Him also the Father of the Word'. Again the two images of God are connected. This relationship with God through the mind of man is also described in terms of the soul:

For she (the soul) is made to see God, and to be enlightened by Him;²⁴

The way to God

is the soul of each one of us, and the intelligence which resides there (τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ νοῦν). For by it alone can God be contemplated and perceived.²⁵

(22) 2.2(5C), cf. Albinus: Did. 3, and Wis. 7.17 and Thaet. 176a-b.

(23) 2.2(8A).

(24) 7.5(16B).

(25) 30.3(61A).

The fact that man has a soul, 'and that soul rational', is important for Athanasius. This soul is shown to be immortal, although not in the sense of uncreated, and to live 'without ceasing by reason of God who made it thus by His own Word, our Lord Jesus Christ'.²⁶

To make sure he has made his point, Athanasius concludes:

For the soul is made after the image and likeness of God...the soul beholds as in a mirror the Image of the Father, even the Word, and by His means reaches the idea of the Father, Whose Image the Saviour is.²⁷

We have already dealt with this concept as found in Middle-Platonism and how it is challenged by Justin. In Justin, as in Athanasius, the soul is made rational (λογικός) by the activity of the Logos at creation, but Justin not only emphatically separates the Logos and human reason, but denies that human reason can know God. The difference is that the Middle-Platonic $\tau\hat{\omega}\nu\hat{\omega}$ carries an active connotation that Justin denies, for he allows only a passive rôle to be played by the mind. But this theory, as found in Athanasius, still regards God as being 'by nature invisible and incomprehensible' ($\alpha\acute{\omicron}\rho\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \alpha\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\pi\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\ \tau\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$).²⁸ This Philonic distinction between perceiving God and knowing his nature or essence has already been noted in Clement.²⁹ But even though God is incomprehensible by nature, there is no doubt that man can know him. At one point Athanasius remarks that because man is 'made out of nothing while He is unmade', 'mankind was likely to miss the way to knowledge of Him'.³⁰ Here the possibility of real knowledge of God remains open to man through the God-created mind, the rational faculty of the

(26) 33.3(68A).

(27) 34.3-4(68Df).

(28) 35.1(69A).

(29) cf. above, p. 103.

(30) 35.1(69A).

soul. The comparison between Athanasius and Justin goes deeper than the acceptance or rejection of the λογος υἱος . In Athanasius the λογος υἱος is coupled with a very sophisticated description of God's relationship to the world, and in Justin the rejection of the λογος υἱος is coupled with a complete lack of understanding of this problem. In fact, in Justin it could almost be said that, because he has not come to terms with how God relates to the world, his doctrine of the Logos tends to be reductionist and hence, apart from any other reasons, it becomes imperative to reject the λογος υἱος . In Athanasius there is no such problem.

This is then how God made man. Athanasius does not stop here, and it is part of his great achievement that he comes to terms with man's fallenness. When we come to discuss this, more light will be shed on what man should be.

(b) The Creation of the World:

It is an interesting exercise to try to establish whether or not the C.G. by itself teaches a doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. This is interesting for the general assessment of the nature of the C.G. As usual the issue is complicated by the question of absolute or relative non-existence. For this reason it is helpful to start the enquiry with the question of the nature of the existence of evil. Athanasius is quite clear that 'in the beginning wickedness did not exist' ($\text{ἐξ ἀρχῆς, μὲν οὐκ ἦν κακία}$).³¹ This statement is linked with the rejection of dualism and Marcionism.³² The result is that, even when evil has come into existence, it has a relative rather than a substantive existence, for 'good is, while evil is not' ($\text{ὅτι καὶ τὸ εὖ εἶναι εἶναι καλῶς, οὐκ ὅτι καὶ τὸ κακὸν εἶναι φασίλη}$).³³ To avoid complete

(31) 2.1(50). cf. Wis. 14.12f: $\text{ὅτι οὐκ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, οὐκ εἶναι εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα ἕσται}$, which is quoted in 11.1(24B).

(32) Ch.'s 6-7.

(33) 4.4(9C).

this must be connected with the definition of 'being' mentioned above. In contrast to true being, which is derived from God, evil, which is not, has its source 'in a false imagination in the thoughts of men' (ἐπινοίας ἀνθρώπων).

Time and time again Athanasius stresses that evil does not have 'a substantive and independent existence' (ἐν ὑποστάσει καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν εἶναι οὐκ ἔστι κακίαν).³⁴

It is because of his definition of existence, that his statement that evil is οὐκ ὄντα does not lead him to a position similar to that of the Christian Scientists. The issue is between absolute existence, which is solely God's and derivative from him, and some kind of relative existence, which seems to be derived from the ἐπινοία of mankind. Now, could it be argued that Athanasius should have described evil as μὴ ὄντα rather than οὐκ ὄντα, while in the beginning and at the end of time, evil would be described as οὐκ ὄντα? From the evidence we have surveyed, it seems that some such conclusion should be reached. It seems from this preliminary study that Athanasius does not discriminate between the niceties involved in the distinction between οὐκ and μὴ.

When we turn directly to the issue of creatio ex nihilo, this conclusion may give grounds for regarding Athanasius's ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων as not absolute. There is one extended passage in the C.G. which needs special consideration in this regard:

For the nature of created things (ὧν ... γενεῶν), in as much as it is brought into being out of nothing (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ὑποστάσει), is of a fleeting sort (ῥησολύ), and weak and mortal, if composed of itself only. But the God of all is good...for which reason he does not grudge even existence, but desires all to exist, as objects of his loving kindness. Seeing

(34) 6.1(12D). In the next sentence οὐσία is listed as another quality evil cannot have.

then all created nature, as far as its own laws were concerned, to be fleeting ($\rho\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\nu$) and subject to dissolution, lest it should come to this and lest the Universe should be broken up again into nothingness ($\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \tau\acute{o}\ \mu\acute{\eta}\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$), for this curse He made all things by His own eternal Word, and gave substantive existence to Creation ($\sigma\upsilon\beta\acute{\sigma}\tau\alpha\varsigma\ \tau\acute{\eta}\nu\ \kappa\tau\acute{\iota}\sigma\iota\varsigma$), and moreover did not leave it to be tossed in a tempest in the course of its own nature, lest it should run the risk of once more dropping out of existence ($\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \tau\acute{o}\ \mu\acute{\eta}\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$).³⁵

Meijering writes about the comparison of this passage with Plato's Politicus 273d, that the most important change is the substitution of $\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \tau\acute{o}\ \mu\acute{\eta}\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ for Plato's $\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \tau\acute{o}\nu\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\sigma\omicron\tau\omicron\tau\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$. Meijering uses this change as proof that 'Athanasius's major objection to Plato's doctrine of creation is that Plato does not teach the creatio ex nihilo'.³⁶ As it stands, this argument is not valid. In this whole passage there seems to be a strong tendency to ascribe some kind of existence to the world before the creative activity of the Logos. Despite the fact that creation is $\epsilon\zeta\ \sigma\upsilon\kappa\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\varsigma$, the world can be considered to be 'composed of itself only' ($\kappa\alpha\theta'\ \epsilon\lambda\upsilon\tau\eta\acute{\nu}\ \sigma\upsilon\gamma\kappa\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\tau\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$). In this state it is $\rho\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}$, which is a technical term in Middle-Platonism used to describe the state of being which is not the $\sigma\upsilon\beta\acute{\sigma}\tau\alpha\ \nu\omicron\upsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}$.³⁷ This same thought is repeated when creation is considered 'as far as its own laws were concerned'. It is lest this state of being be broken up that the Logos acts and gives 'substantive existence to Creation'. It seems that there are three forms of existence described in this passage: firstly, there

(35) 41.2-3(81Cf).

(36) op. cit. p. 36.

(37) ibid. p. 35. cf. Albinus: Did. 1(153.9) and Athenagoras: Leg. 22(401,937A).

is non-being (εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι); then there is the state of being
ῥευστή, which is always tending towards non-being; and thirdly, there
is the proper existence which is a result of the activity of the
Logos.³⁸ It is, of course, impossible to argue anything from the
μὴ of εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, since the construction does not allow the use
of οὐκ.³⁹

If this is so, and it does seem to be the case, then the creative
activity of the Logos could only be indirectly described, if at all,
as creatio ex nihilo. There is further evidence in the C.G. for
this contention. In the whole work, the activity of the Logos in
the world is that of ordering the world. The previously quoted
passage continues:

...but, because He is good He guides and settles the
whole Creation by His own Word, Who is Himself also God,
that by the government (ἐν ... ἡγεμονίᾳ) and providence
and ordering action (πρόνοια καὶ διακοσμήσει) of the
Word, Creation may have light, and be enabled to abide
always securely.

This is repeated in several places:

...for this cause God by His own Word gave the Universe
the Order it Has (ἐν κτίσει αὐτοῦ διακόσμησε).⁴⁰

...our Lord and Saviour Christ, steer and preserves
and orders all things (ἐν πανταχοῦ διακυβερωτὶ σωτηρίως
καὶ διακοσμεῖ).⁴¹

For being the good Word of the good Father He produced the
order of all things (ἐν τῶν πάντων διακόσμησε διατάξεν).⁴²

(38). Is it possible to find a similar pattern lying behind de I.
4.5, where the state of being 'everlastingly bereft even of being'
is described as being 'disintergrated' (τὸ διαλυθῆναι μὲνεν)
and abiding 'in death and corruption'?

(39) W. Goodwin: A Greek Grammar (London, 1898), sec. 1611.

(40) 35.1(69A).

(41) 40.2(80C).

(42) 40.5(81A).

And the Logos also produces the harmony existing in all creation, bringing order out of warring opposites.⁴³ At no stage, even when $\pi\omicron\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is used, does the activity of the Logos move from the function described by the verbs $\delta\iota\alpha\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\epsilon\iota\omega$ and $\sigma\upsilon\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\omega$.⁴⁴ Where the Logos is described as creator, maker and artificer, these designations all naturally refer to this function of arranging and sustaining. It would be pushing the argument too far to say that Athanasius regarded creation ex nihilo to be the function of the Father and the ordering of the resultant matter to be the function of the Logos, but some such view is implied. So, when Athanasius writes as follows, he need not be referring to creatio ex nihilo:

...all things subsist ($\sigma\upsilon\tau\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota$) by the Word and Wisdom of God, nor would any created thing ($\tau\omicron\iota\ \tau\omega\ \gamma\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma$) have had a fixed existence had it not been made by reason, and that reason the Word of God.⁴⁵

It is not difficult to find the reason for this emphasis. The whole argument is the argument from design, from the order in the universe, not from the existence of the world. The only place where it is possible to observe anything resembling some kind of argument from existence, is in the section about the unity of God which is proved because the universe is one.⁴⁶ But again, in the forefront of Athanasius's mind is the ordering of the universe into a unity, rather than its creation, that is, rather than the brute fact of its existence at all:

(43) Ch.'s 42ff.

(44) cf. 41.1(81C).

(45) 40.6(81B).

(46) Ch. 39.

Creation, then, being one, and the Universe one, and its order one, we must perceive that its King and Artificer (δύμιουργόν) also is one.⁴⁷

And so, in terms of the C.G., Meijering is a little hasty. Neither creatio ex nihilo nor the exact status of the pre-ordered world is clear in the C.G. In fact, it seems possible to find traces of the idea of an ἔργον, and if this was the only evidence we had of Athanasius's thought on creation, we would have to conclude that he had come to some kind of compromise position. But we are fortunate that this is not the only evidence available. In the de I. there is a very clear rejection of the Middle-Platonic doctrine of the ἔργον.⁴⁸ The argument is very similar to that used by Theophilus.⁴⁹

Athanasius concludes:

So that if this be so (the doctrine of the ἔργον), God will be on their theory be a Mechanic only (τεχνίτης), and not a Creator out of nothing; if, that is, He works at existing material, but is not Himself the cause (αἴτιος) of the material.⁵⁰

He goes on to describe, in a setting almost identical to that of C.G. 41, the creation διὰ τοῦ λόγου, and in this context it is quite clear what the ἐξ ὕλης ἄνωγαν means.⁵¹ To complete the change, we find that here Athanasius has used the verb παύσκει instead of διακοσμεῖ καὶ συνέχει.

Returning with this clear picture to the C.G., it is difficult to see how to reconcile the two views. One could perhaps appeal to

(47) 39.6(80A).

(48) Ch. 2, and esp. 2.3f(100Af).

(49) Ad. Aut. II, 4(67,1052B) and cf. above, p.

(50) de I. 2.4(100B).

(51) 3.3(101B).

C.G. 6, where the rejection of a substantive existence of evil and of dualism could imply a doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, but this does not help in our exegesis of Ch. 41. There are two possible reasons for the difference in outlook. Firstly, Athanasius has purposefully and apologetically let these tinges of unacceptable Platonism slip through in order to accommodate his reader, knowing that this particular issue would be modified in the next work. The second reason should probably be closely linked with the first: the argument of the C.G. is that from design, and so Athanasius is purposefully stressing the ordering of the world by the Logos, and it is therefore incorrect to place too much emphasis on the apparent lack of interest in the other aspect of God's creative work.

(3) The Fall and its Reversal:

After the Platonic picture of the bliss of Eden, Athanasius goes on to describe how men turned from the 'things perceived by thought' ($\rho\acute{\omega}\nu \dots \nu\omicron\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$) and 'began to regard themselves'.⁵² This turning from the intellectual things to the world of sense perception results in man growing familiar with and preferring his own lusts. This movement of the soul from the contemplation of the good to the 'vain imaginings' is due entirely to the 'mobile nature ($\tau\eta\nu \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\nu \alpha\kappa\acute{\iota}\nu\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma$) of the soul'.⁵³ The fall is due to man's free-will rather than the action of evil. In fact, it is out of man's wrongful exercising of his free-will that evil comes into being.⁵⁴ The evil choice results in evil action, which further corrupts the soul until it is very difficult for it even to catch a glimpse of God as it

(52) C.G. 3.2(8C) and 4.1(9B).

(53) 4.2(9Bf).

(54) For the existence of evil, cf. above, pp. 142f.

should. It is as a result of this progressive decay that the soul first gives existence to evil, but then it even goes on to the depths of iniquity by creating idols for itself.⁵⁵ But in all of this the soul does not lose its capacity of being the way to God.⁵⁶ It is interesting that at this point Athanasius does not carry through the doctrine of the fall. It would appear that man's rational, immortal soul is inviolable, in that it can turn away from God, but not lose the ability to turn back and return to the knowledge of God:

Or why, in like manner as they have departed from God, do they not betake themselves to Him again? For they are able, as they turned away their understanding from God, and feigned as gods things that were not, in like manner to ascend with the intelligence of their soul, and turn back to God again. But turn back to God they can, if they lay aside the filth of all lusts...until they have got rid of all the foreign matter that has affected their soul and can shew it in its simplicity as it was made, that so they may be able by it to behold the Word of the Father, after whose likeness they were originally made.⁵⁷

This possibility of reversing the fall receives a startling contrast in the de I., where a more detailed discussion of the restoration of the imago dei occurs.⁵⁸ But even in the C.G., while it is acknowledged that man can return to knowledge of God, it is realized that man's will has been so corrupted that it is not willing to leave its lusts.⁵⁹ Because of this, another way to God is provided:

(55) 8.1(16C).

(56) 30.3(61A).

(57) 34.2-3(68C).

(58) cf. below, p. 161.

(59) 2.4(8B).

Or, if the soul's own teaching is insufficient, by reason of the external things which cloud its intelligence, and prevent its seeing what is higher, yet it is further possible to attain to the knowledge of God from the things which are seen since Creation, as though in written characters, declares, in a loud voice, by its order and harmony (ὁ δὲ τῆς κόσμου καὶ ὁμοιότητος), its own Lord and Creator.⁶⁰

The basic logic behind this 'way' is no different to the 'way' of direct knowledge through the soul. Both the soul and the ordered universe are created products of the Logos, and it is their rationality and order which point to the perfect rationality of the Logos. Athanasius makes it quite clear that the order within the universe is not the Logos, but is only a witness to the Logos. And so, while God remains in his being 'beyond all created existence', he has given 'the Universe the Order it has, in order that since He is by nature invisible, men might be enabled to know Him at any rate by His works'.⁶¹ Athanasius denies the Stoic solution, but is impressed by the same phenomenon. Pointing to the order of the stars and the moon, he concludes:

...who can resist the conclusion that these are not ordered by themselves but have a maker distinct from themselves who orders them?⁶²

The same argument is strengthened by considering how all the 'opposite natures' combine into a 'concordant harmony'.⁶³ This Heraclitian and Stoic argument is even used with reference to generation from the opposite sexes.⁶⁴ After dwelling on the universe and

(60) 34.4(69A).

(61) 35.1(69Af).

(62) 35.4(72A).

(63) 36.1(72A).

(64) 36.4(72Df).

its order, Athanasius compares it to a peaceful city, and in so doing, reveals his premiss that order necessarily implies a ruler: 'for disorder is a sign of absence of rule, while order shews the governing authority'.⁶⁵ This means that from the one order of the world, he can deduce that there is one ruler of the world. Similarly from the unity of the universe, one must necessarily believe that 'its Maker is one'.⁶⁶ This argument as it stands is fairly ordinary and cannot evoke much comment, but the next stage of Athanasius's thought is most significant:

Who then might this Maker be?...For if our argument has proved that the gods of the poets are no gods, and has convicted of error those that deify creation...it strictly follows from the elimination of these that the true religion is with us, and that the God we worship and preach is the only true One, Who is Lord of Creation and maker of all existence.⁶⁷

Of course the claim that 'it strictly follows' is incorrect, and it shows how Athanasius has had to smuggle the God, whom he had in the background all the time, into his argument. This is made even clearer in what follows:

Who then is this, save the Father of Christ...Who... by...His own Word, our Lord and Saviour Christ, steers and preserves and orders all things, and does as seems to Him best?⁶⁸

After revealing himself in this way, Athanasius goes straight back to the argument from the order of the world, but now he stresses that the

(65) 38.2(76A).

(66) Ch. 39, esp. 39.6(80B).

(67) 40.1(80B).

(68) 40.2(80C).

order in produced by the Logos. There is another point where a similar shift is noticeable. Here the argument from design slips into the revelation through scripture:

...for if when a word proceeds from men we infer that the mind is its source,...by far greater evidence and incomparably more, seeing the power of the Word, we receive a knowledge also of His good Father...But this all inspired Scripture also teaches more plainly and with more authority...For the people of the Jews of old had abundant teaching, in that they had the knowledge of God not only from the works of Creation, but also from the divine Scriptures.⁶⁹

The 'way' through the scriptures is, thus, a third way to knowledge of God. There are three ways to God described in the C.G.: through the rationality of the soul, the order of the universe and through scripture. To these a fourth is added in the de I.: through Jesus Christ, the incarnate Logos of God. It is of considerable importance to examine the relationship between these different ways, for in doing so, we come to the core of Athanasius's apologetic. By showing how Athanasius moved beyond the bounds of the argument from design, modelling his designer to the biblical witness, it is clear that, although he is employing the argument from design as his central theme in the C.G., the whole treatise keeps the revelation of God in scripture, and especially in Jesus Christ, in the background as a normative guide. The argument from design is not used absolutely, but as a preliminary to the real revelation in Jesus. The mechanics of how Athanasius does this become much clearer when the nature of the C.G. is compared with that of the de I.

(69) 45.2, 4(89Af).

But even within the C.G. there is a clear indication of Athanasius's methodology. This is to be found in the opening chapter, where the purpose of the treatise is set out. Athanasius addresses his Apology to the Christian Macarius.⁷⁰ His purpose is to present 'the faith...of Christ the Saviour; lest any should hold cheap the doctrine taught among us, or think faith in Christ unreasonable' (ἀλογον).⁷¹ He then immediately goes on to show that the stumbling block to the reasonableness of the faith is the 'Cross of Christ':

For they would not have scoffed at such a fact, had they too, been men who genuinely gave heed to his Divine Nature. On the contrary, they in their turn would have recognised this man as Saviour of the world, and that the Cross has been not a disaster, but a healing of Creation (θεραπείαν τῆς κτίσεως).⁷²

This amounts to a similar kind of inversion of reason as we found in Justin. In Justin, philosophy, which is characterized by the Middle-Platonic search for God by man's reason (ῥῶν νόων), becomes identified with revelation. Here, in Athanasius, reason is shown to be moulded from the perspective of the cross - the very thing which is the supreme obstacle to reason. It is this semantic shift in the ordinary meaning of 'reason' which in the de I. is evident in the claim to what is 'fitting'.⁷³ But in the context of the C.G. this causes a problem, since the rest of the treatise claims to be based on the reason of man, and does not even deal with the incarnation let alone the cross of Christ. Because of this, Meijering has

(70) cf. de I. 1.1

(71) C.G. 1.3(4B).

(72) 1.4(5A).

(73) cf. below, p. 164.

suggested, following F.L. Cross, that both the C.G. and the de I. are a theological exercise, and that the C.G. is especially concerned with satisfying both the authors and his readers' *φιλομάθεια*.⁷⁴

It seems as if the matter goes deeper than this. The C.G. is not solely concerned with reaffirming 'his reader and himself in what they already believe: Christian faith is true and not unreasonable',⁷⁵ but the pattern of the introduction to the C.G., the body of that work, and the de I., shows forth the inner connection between the reason of man and the divine reason. The 'reasonableness' of Christianity could only be shown if Athanasius started from the perspective of C.G. 1. In actual fact, in the body of the C.G. the 'reason' is not purely and simply human reason; we have pointed out a few of the inconsistencies that indicate that it is rather the 'reason' of man used for a particular purpose, or perhaps viewed from the perspective of the divine reason. In this way the 'reason' of the C.G. has a dual nature: the work was written for Christians and operates from this perspective, but at the same time it incorporates into itself the reason of the writer and the reader in such a way as to include the Gentile reading from a different perspective. The structure of the C.G. points to a further level at which the work operates. Ch. 2 shows that Athanasius regarded reason as at least pointing in the right direction, and his description of the fall entails man not following his reason. It is because of man's unwillingness to follow his God-given reason that God has to resort to the other 'ways' in order to establish fellowship with man.⁷⁶

This structure both incorporates reason and shows how man has consistently failed to use it correctly. The positive and negative aspects of

(74) op. cit. pp. 106f.

(75) ibid. p. 108.

(76) ibid. p. 120.

this are similar to Justin's ambivalent use of the loan theory. Athanasius's methodology thus involves his reader but puts him in his place so that he is ready for the de I. But the methodology, although it is so apologetic, rests on the fundamental assumption that the reason of man is God-given; it is not then unregenerate reason, but the reason with which God endowed man. It is this human reason which does not stumble at the 'folly of the Cross' and which recognizes the Logos of God as the true reason.

(4) The Logos and God:

In this section we are specifically concerned with what hints the C.G. gives of the relationship between God and the Logos. We have already mentioned the strict distinction Athanasius makes between God and the created order and how he firmly places the Logos on the godward side of this distinction. We must examine how consistent Athanasius is in this, in the more detailed descriptions of the relationship. Athanasius seems to use three means for describing the Logos as God. The first is to describe how the Logos acts as God. This incorporates the second, which is a series of analogies concerned with the relationship of the Logos to the world. The third is a few examples which specifically deal with the relationship between God and the Logos.

The Logos acts as God chiefly in the management of the world. In this the Logos is God's agent, who 'steers and preserves and orders all things'.⁷⁷ Also:

He being the Power of God and Wisdom of God causes the heaven to revolve, and has suspended the earth, and made it fast though resting upon nothing, by His own nod.⁷⁸

(77) 40.2(80C).

(78) 40.5(81B).

We have dealt with this function of the Logos in the discussion on the nature of creation.⁷⁹ This aspect of Athanasius's theology contains an element of subordinationism which may be impossible to avoid. The problem is in essence the same as that in Justin caused by the argument of the impossibility of God appearing in a theophany. There the argument works from the premiss that God could not relate to the created world, and the Logos was therefore postulated as an intermediary. Here Justin's premiss is hidden, but it is pointed to by the Logos being God's instrument. The implication is that God needed the instrument. But on the other hand, it is made very clear that what the Logos is doing can only be done by God.

This same element of subordinationism is present in the analogies which Athanasius gives to describe the cosmological functions of the Logos. The first is that of the musician playing an instrument.⁸⁰ This and that of the architect are perhaps the most satisfactory analogies, because of the ontological difference between musician and instrument, or architect and building.⁸¹ Those of the conductor of a choir⁸² and of the soul and the body⁸³ both imply that the Logos is not different in essence but only in function. It may be significant that Athanasius only uses the first two in his summary in 47.3.⁸⁴

In all of his descriptions of the cosmological functions of the Logos, Athanasius is presenting the Logos as the deified world-soul, who is

(79) cf. above, p. 145.

(80) 42.3(85A).

(81) 43.3 (85C).

(82) 43.1 (85B).

(83) 43.2 (85C).

(84) (96A).

also the *κόσμος νοητός*. The Stoic version of the world-soul, the *λόγος επιθεματικός* is sensed by Athanasius to be a real threat, and he vehemently denies that the Logos he is presenting is the Stoic *λόγος*.⁸⁵ Indeed, the Logos is 'the powerful Word of the good God, the God of the universe, the very Word which is God'.⁸⁶

But as we have said, this is not enough. We need to know not only that the Logos is God but also, in order really to assess that statement, how he is God. Athanasius shows very little interest in this question in the C.G. He avoids the use of the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος/προφορικός* schema, which he elsewhere rejects,⁸⁷ but in the following we find an adaptation of the same idea:

But God possesses true existence and is not composite, wherefore His Word also has true Existence and is not composite, but is the one and only-begotten God (*μονογενὴς Θεός*), who proceeds (*ἡρκελθῶν*) in His goodness from the Father as from a fountain.⁸⁸

This analogy has very little to distinguish it from the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος/προφορικός* analogy except that it avoids the temporal difficulty and is therefore much more suited to the idea of eternal generation. Athanasius shows that he was aware of the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος/προφορικός* schema, but only uses it in a way that is so qualified that the analogy of human speech does not refer to the actual relationship between the Logos and his Father. The idea that the Logos has its source of being in the Father is also hinted at when Athanasius refers to the 'Word, Who derives true existence from

(85) cf. above, pp. 137f.

(86) 40.4(81A).

(87) cf. Ex.Fidei 1 (201A).

(88) 41.1(81C).

the Father' (εὖνως ὕψος ἐκ Πατρὸς Λόγος).⁸⁹ There is one

further very important passage, where the Logos is described as

the good Offspring (γέννημα) of Him that is good...
not being so by participation (οὐ κατὰ μετοχήν ταῦτα
ἔσθ'), not as if these qualities were imparted to him
from without, as they are to those who partake (μετέχοντες)
of Him and are made wise by Him.⁹⁰

Here the οὐ κατὰ μετοχήν is a rejection of both modalism and subordina-
tionism. The μεθεξῆς idea is rejected within the godhead, but
accepted as the description of how the created order relates to
the Logos. It is very interesting to compare this quote with Justin's
use of the μεθεξῆς idea.⁹¹ Justin also used the idea to describe
the participation of human reason in the divine Logos and stressed
the difference between the two (ἕτερον ... ἕτερον). Justin does
however not use the idea to describe the relationship between the
Logos and God. His qualification is: οὐ κατὰ ἀποσπασμῶν, ὡς
ἀποσπασθέντων τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας.⁹² Athanasius refines the idea
by stating οὐ κατὰ μετοχήν. Justin probably did think that the
Logos shared in the οὐσία of the Father, but Athanasius perhaps in
opposition to Paul of Samasata,⁹³ is aware of the difficulties of
this position. As Meijering shows, this statement does not necessarily
show any indication of an awareness of Arianism. Justin's qualifica-
tion could almost be in Athanasius's mind when he describes the
generation of the Son as οὐ ... μερισμῶν τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐσίας.⁹⁴

(89) 41.3(84A).

(90) 46.8(93B).

(91) cf. above, pp. 38f.

(92) cf. above, pp. 24, 66f.

(93) cf. Meijering, op. cit. p. 39.

(94) Contra Arianos: I.16(45Af).

This later qualification is however, in contrast to the above, in direct opposition to Arianism. These ideas hinting at an eternal generation of the Logos are found in the following:

...it follows that the Word is in Him that begat Him, and that He that is begotten lives eternally with the Father (καὶ τὸν γεννηθέντα σὺν τῷ Πατρὶ διασωθέντα).⁹⁵

But nowhere do we find these hints developed to the point that the slight subordinationsim which we have mentioned is completely contradicted. In this regard the C.G. reveals itself to have been written before the bursting out of the Arian controversy, but even at this stage Athanasius is clearly opposed to the idea of a divine hierarchy.⁹⁶ It is, therefore, remarkable how the treatise shows the fundamental shift away from the earlier theologies of the Logos and paves the way for Athanasius's later rejection of Arianism.⁹⁷

But it is a characteristic of this work that Athanasius is not concerned with these issues. Yet from the glimpses that we get of his thought on the subject it is notable how far advanced he is over the Apologists, for instance. He seems to guard successfully against the God-Logos language being used to subordinate the Logos. One of the most important reasons for this is that he is concerned to describe the activity of the Logos as the activity of God and he seems to regard the more metaphysical questions as having a secondary nature. In this he shows himself to be a theologian of revelation describing God as he has revealed himself, rather than as we speculate he (God) must be. Another possible reason for this advance is that, by his stress on the argument from design, Athanasius hints at the Logos being the rationality of God. That is, the Logos always retains the

(95) 47.2(93D).

(96) cf. Meijering, op. cit. pp. 128-130.

(97) Here we accept the early dating as given.

idea of the *λόγος ἐνδύεισθαι* In this way the Logos is more integrated into the godhead.

We find in Athanasius then, a new element, not found thus far in this study, which contains a circumspection and an awareness of the difficulties of the Logos theology. This caution bears the seeds of the rejection of Arianism and may even point to a subconscious awareness of the possibility of its eruption.

(5) The Incarnation of the Logos:

Although the de I. is not considered to be one of the basic texts of this study, it is necessary to include a section on it in order to compare it with the C.G. It is also instructive to compare the doctrine of the incarnation as it appears here with the thought on the same subject in the writers that have already been discussed.

In de I. 1 Athanasius briefly recaps the first part of his treatise, and then introduces the main topic of the second part of his work. He writes that the de I. will be about how the same Word who was active in creation and in the 'universal providence and power' became man. This straightaway introduces us to a new element. As has already been shown, it is not the creative activity of the Logos as such which is of central importance in the C.G.⁹⁸ In the de I. the critical issue is the linking of the creative activity of the Logos with the recreation of man in the incarnation. It is the same Logos who created, who also came to recreate his creation.⁹⁹ As we have shown, creation in the de I. is ex nihilo, whereas in the C.G. it is regarded more as an ordering of the chaotic

(98) cf. above, pp. 145f.

(99) 7.5(109A).

617. In the de I. then, the recreation of man is compared with a creatio ex nihilo. This complete recreation of man is necessary because of the complete corruption of man. Parallel to the difference in outlook over the matter of creation is the difference over the fall. In the C.G. the possibility of man's return to God is open, but in the de I. the imago dei is so destroyed that a complete restoration by the original creator is needed.¹⁰⁰ The issues of creation and the fall are closely related. This difference of outlook between the two treatises shows up the apologetic nature of the first, and is also a fairly serious critique of the natural theology which it contains. In the de I. the only 'way' to God that is truly efficacious is through the incarnate Logos. This is true despite the mention of the other ways:¹⁰¹

...it was in the power of none other to turn the corruptible to incorruption, except the Saviour Himself, that had at the beginning also made all things out of nought: and that none other could create anew the likeness of God's image for men, save the Image of the Father; and that none other could render the mortal immortal, save our Lord Jesus Christ, Who is the Very Life; and that none other could teach men of the Father, and destroy the worship of idols, save the Word, that orders all things and is alone the true Only-begotten Son of the Father.¹⁰²

Even in the C.G. the central thrust is soteriological, but here in the de I. this is overwhelmingly the case. The purpose of the incarnation was the salvation of mankind. It is from this basic fact that so much of the treatise stems. Athanasius goes to great

(100) cf. 14.1f(120C).

(101) This is noticed by G.C. Stead: "The Platonism of Arius", JTS, 15(1964), p. 23, n 2.

(102) 20.1(129Cf).

lengths to show how this salvation could be effected in no other way. At no stage is it even considered that man may not need salvation. What is considered, is the reason why God should have had to save man:

For if He had not made them, none could impute weakness; but once He had made them, and created them out of nothing, it were monstrous (*ἀνομήτως*) for the work to be ruined, and that before the eyes of the Maker. It was, then, out of the question to leave men to the current of corruption; because this would be unseemly (*ἀσχητόν*), and unworthy of God's goodness.¹⁰³

Since, therefore, man has to be saved, the only remaining question is how. Man has to be saved by the Logos who created him, in order to be recreated. Athanasius explains that the Logos has to become man, because

the threat against transgression gave a firm hold to the corruption which was upon us, and that it was monstrous that before the law was fulfilled it should fall through... And thus taking from our bodies one of like nature, because all were under penalty of the corruption of death He gave it over to death in the stead of all, and offered it to the Father.¹⁰⁴

This penal theory is the kind of emphasis totally lacking in all the works studied thus far. It is largely for this reason that we had reason to criticize their doctrine of the incarnation. Without this element of the identification of the Logos with man in his sinfulness, it is difficult both to justify and really to establish the humanity of the incarnate Logos. In this regard Athanasius goes so far as to mention the satisfaction of the 'debt':

(103) 6.9f(108B).

(104) 8.2, 4(109Bf), and also cf. 9.1(112A).

For being over all, the Word of God naturally by offering His own temple and corporeal instrument for the life of all satisfied the debt (τὸ ἐφειλόμενον) by His death.¹⁰⁵

A further reason for the incarnation is the necessity for God to condescend to man's level.¹⁰⁶ The different 'ways' all represent one further stage in God's condescension. The incarnation is the climax and the end of this series.¹⁰⁷ But perhaps most importantly, there is the necessity for the Logos to become man in order to conquer death. The background to this reveals yet another major difference between the two treatises. We have already mentioned the different attitudes to the fall. In the de I., the reason why the fall is so absolute, and why man cannot of himself return to God, is because a metaphysical change has come over man:

...and from henceforth (they) no longer remained as they were made, but were being corrupted according to their devices; and death had the mastery over them as king.¹⁰⁸

The incarnation, death and resurrection of the Logos are regarded as one event by which the mastery of death is brought to an end.¹⁰⁹

The redemption offered by the Logos is not just personal or a way out of the difficulties of the present world, as in Clement, but is a cosmic or metaphysical conquest. The cross is not only that which conquers the evil spirits, as in Justin, but is the ultimate victory over the power lying behind the evil spirits:

(105) 9.2(112Af).

(106) This is a feature of Alexandrian theology, cf. above, p. 122.

(107) 11.1(113Af).

(108) 4.4(104B).

(109) 27.1(141C).

And if, while previously death was strong, and for that reason terrible, now after the sojourn of the Saviour and the death and Resurrection of His body it is despised, it must be evident that death has been brought to nought and conquered by the very Christ who ascended the Cross.¹¹⁰

This too is an aspect which does not occur in the C.G. and has difficulty emerging in our previous writers. Why is this? Athanasius is arguing, as they were, for the 'fittingness' or rationality of his arguments. We can regard Athanasius's work as an amazing attempt to rationalize the 'folly of the Cross'. It is this indeed which offers the clue to the processes at work. Athanasius has adapted his 'reason' to the 'folly of the Cross' and translated the term as used in the philosophical sense. The ultimately rational is not part of our human experience and cannot be judged in terms of our reason, but when we have made that transmutation, so that the 'folly of the Cross' is the ultimately rational even of the Reason of God, the Logos, then the Christian faith is most reasonable. The C.G. seems to be attempting to show the rationality of the faith without openly accepting that transmutation. Thus it is that it cannot arrive at the fully Christian conclusions of the de I. We have already noticed how the tension between the two kinds of rationality are present in the C.G., where the reason which has not been recreated in Christ has been adapted and modified by the new and perfect reason. A very similar adaptation of terms was noticed with regard to Justin's adaptation of the philosophical tradition.¹¹¹

(110) 29.2(145B).

(111) cf. above, p. 31.

On the more technically theological side of his thought Athanasius makes an astounding advance. This is in dealing with the incarnation from the point of view of the divinity of the Logos while he is man:

For He was not, as might be imagined, circumscribed in the body, nor, while present in the body, was He absent elsewhere; nor, while He moved the body, was the universe left void of His working and Providence.¹¹²

Athanasius goes on to reveal how this can be, and in so doing defines in a definitive way the true relationship between God and the world:

...but, thing most marvellous, Word as He was, so far from being contained in anything, He rather contained all things Himself; and just as while present in the whole of Creation, He is at once distinct in being from the universe (ἐκτός μὲν ἔσται τοῦ πάντος καὶ οὐθέν) and present in all things by His own power.¹¹³

While this is partially similar to the distinction between οὐσία and δύναμις especially found in Clement, who seems to be following Philo,¹¹⁴ the real advance is not to be found in this line of thought but in the change from God being regarded as separate from the world to God containing the world. As Athanasius puts it:

Λόγος ὢν, οὗ συνέχετο μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος; συνέχετο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον αὐτός.

When this line of thought is used to describe the actual incarnation, we find:

Now, the Word of God in His man's nature was not like that; for He was not bound to His body, but rather was Himself wielding it (ἐκράτει), so that He was not only in it, but was actually in everything, and while external to the universe, abode (ἀναΐσκειτο) in His Father only.¹¹⁵

(112) 17.1(125A).

(113) cf. also C.G. 47.2(93C): 'But this being so, and nothing being outside Him, but both heaven and earth, and all that (is) in them is being dependent on Him...'

(114) cf. above, p. 103.

(115) 17.4(125C), cf. also 43.6(173A).

These hints in the early theology of Athanasius are, perhaps, the key to the refutation of Arianism. In Arianism the Greek (Platonic) concept of a separation between the sensible and the intelligible worlds reaches its climax in the radical separation, in the wrong sense, between God and his creation. The similarity of the dualism between created and uncreated entities in Arius and Athanasius has been noted by Stead.¹¹⁶ In Arius, however, the attempted solution is to place the creaturely Son in the position of mediator, while Athanasius resolves the matter in its entirety by a redefinition of the nature of the dualism. Athanasius shows that the dualism does not exclude God from the created order, but in fact God holds it in being at every point. The dualism is therefore open from God's side but closed from the creaturely side. T.F. Torrance has succinctly shown how this problem is related to two different concepts of space. He describes the dominating concept of space in Greek thought to be the 'receptacle or container' notion of space.¹¹⁷ The other Greek concept of space is that of the Stoics. They regarded space as a body which creates space for itself within which there is 'a sphere of operation and of place'.¹¹⁸ The difficulty with this view, although close to the biblical view, is that it conceived of the world as a finite body in an infinite void and 'failed to reach... any understanding of the transcendence of God'. But it is the tremendous achievement of Athanasius to go beyond both of these concepts and to model his concept of space on the incarnation. God and the Logos hold space in being and therefore are not alien in space or

(116) op. cit. p. 22.

(117) Space, Time and Incarnation (OUP, 1969), p. 4.

(118) *ibid.* p. 9.

time, and neither has to force himself into our creaturely existence. And so, because of the incarnation we see quite clearly that the notion of God's transcendence is not to be interpreted in terms of remoteness, but more in terms of the relationship between creator and creature, Saviour and redeemed. Torrance writes of this:

Since space is regarded here from a central point in the creative and redemptive activity of God in Christ, the concepts of space as infinite receptacle or infinite substance, or as an extension conceived as the essence of matter, or as a mere necessity of our human apprehension, and certainly the concept of space in terms of the ultimate immobile limit of the container independent of time, all fall away, and instead there merges a concept of space in terms of the ontological and dynamic relations between God and the physical universe established in creation and incarnation.¹¹⁹

In Athanasius then, the very basic preconceptions of the Platonic world view have been radically altered by his ultimate concern, to be true to the incarnation. By working from this point, the divine Logos can truly be both God and man without being untrue to either side. But more than this - the discovery of a true basis for a doctrine of the incarnation is clearly shown to be nothing other than an outworking of a true doctrine of creation. This in turn goes back to a true doctrine of God. If one looks at the incarnation from this point of view, the utter consistency of the de I. is most striking. Equally striking is the flash of light this sheds on the difficulties and tension with which each of our previous writers was grappling.

(119) *ibid.* p. 18.

(6) Conclusion:

In all the previous writers we have studied we discerned a tension between the Greek Logos tradition and the orthodox tradition of the Church. This has often emerged in the difficulty of the distinction between the Logos and the Spirit, in the whole issue of the incarnation and then indirectly in the doctrine of the Trinity. We will be dealing with all this in greater detail in the conclusion of the thesis. Is there such a tension in Athanasius?

What is really so different about Athanasius in this connection is that he reveals the tensions in the C.G., as we have tried to show, but that he turns the tables completely in the de I. It might seem as if Clement, for instance, tried to combine the type of apologetic in the C.G. with the type of theology in the de I. without the sound adaptation of concepts that we find in Athanasius. The C.G. is for Athanasius a prolegomenon to the de I. It in itself is not intended to express the whole Christian truth, but it leads up to and prepares the way for the de I. In this way Athanasius does not try to reconcile his whole theology with the preconceptions of his possible pagan opponents, but in a most subtle way he meets them on their own ground and, by leading them towards the incarnation, attempts to change their thought at its centre. Thus it is that Athanasius's Logos is not the Greek Logos as had been previously expounded, but this Logos seen through the 'folly of the Cross' and the incarnation. Even in the C.G. this perspective holds Athanasius on course and subtly changes the basically pagan argument from design into a Christian tool. It is this condescension, which is probably meant to be similar to the condescension of the Logos, that is meant to dupe the reader, or indeed to make the Christian reader with slight misgivings stronger in his faith. But Athanasius realizes that

unless he has met his reader in this complex and subtle way he has no real chance of leading him on to the real centre of the Christian faith. Athanasius's apologetic is then not like Justin's where we find two strands of thought moving parallel to each other but in reality remaining far apart, despite all his efforts. Nor is it like that of Clement, where the Logos theology has led to a compromise which tends to mar the essential heart of the gospel. In Athanasius the Logos theology together with the whole philosophical background is put to a searching scrutiny and criticized. The result is that while the Greek can still identify with the C.G., it cannot escape him that he is being led to something strange. In this he would not be disappointed by the de I.

The discrepancy existing between the fall and the resultant redemption in the C.G. and the de I. is proof of this process. It is fortunate that we still have the de I., or we might well miss the significance of C.G. 1. The whole shift of emphasis can be described as a move from Logocentricity in the C.G. to Christocentricity in the de I.

Before going on to our final concluding section it will be as well to remember that Athanasius was writing at the end of a long tradition with all its successes and failures. But more than this even, in the case of the Apologists they were fighting by themselves against a pagan world; by the time of Clement the battle is brought into the Church; and in Athanasius we find theology proper. The issues have settled and a calm seems to reign before the storm of Arianism. The C.G. is not a document written in the heat of debate; it is an orderly systematic treatise, which represents the culmination of refined thought. An apology written perhaps as an academic exercise is very different from one which is the product of a deep and disturbing conflict within the individual.

V. CONCLUSION.

The original question with which I set out in this investigation was whether or not there is a necessary connection between the doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation. It seemed that these two fundamentals of theology should be somehow related. It is also difficult to know from which one should begin. In a sense, the doctrine of the Trinity defines who God is and sets the scene for the incarnation. But on the other hand, one cannot find out who God is except through the revelation of himself in the incarnation. Further it seemed to me that slightly different solutions to the one problem must influence the solution to the other. Would not a modalistic solution to the Trinity almost necessarily imply an adoptionist and docetic Christology? Or what effect would subordinationism have on the doctrine of the Person of Christ? These questions can also be asked the other way round.

It was with this kind of concern that I approached this study. Rapidly it became clear that these questions were phrased in the wrong terminology. This in itself is significant. The relationship of the doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation is a complete non-issue. The writers do not write from the presuppositions of our developed dogmatic theology. Rather, the matter has to be translated into the language of God and revelation. Whereas originally I was concerned with the Trinity and the incarnation, I now had to be concerned with the nature of God and the revelation of himself. This translation leads directly to the fundamental issue lying behind the doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation. The issue remains the same, but the viewpoint is very different. In my original questions, the whole development of theology is presupposed, but in this study we find ourselves at the beginning of this development.

The issue is then reduced to the nature of God and his revelation of himself. There is, however, yet another semantic shift which is necessary. This perhaps leads away from the fundamental question, and is the translation of our terms 'God' and 'revelation', to include the Logos. This is a move away from the fundamental issue, since the doctrine of the Logos cannot be the solution to the related problems of the nature of God and of his revelation of himself. In a way this is the tritosis argument, used not to unite objects but doctrines. Unless the two primary doctrines are fundamentally open to each other, no changing of the parameters is going to do away with the problem. All that this can do is either to create new difficulties, or to obscure the problem. But it is precisely this attempt to overcome the difficulties which reveals them so clearly.

In this study, a further problem has been discussed at length. This is the nature of creation. The reason for this has been that the issue of creation brings out a yet more fundamental question than that of revelation. This is the question of how God and the created order relate. It is by examining the nature of creation that we see quite clearly the presuppositions lying behind the doctrine of revelation, for this gives a different perspective on the nature of the revealer and of the recipient of the revelation. It is in the adaptation of the Middle-Platonic background that these issues come to their sharpest focus. In Middle-Platonism, God relates to the world through the world of ideas and through the world-soul. The world has, however, a rather undefined status, but is in some way distinct from God. The thought on the world is not centred on its creation by God, but rather on the ordering of the world by God. There is thus an underlying dualism between God and the $\sigma\lambda\eta$, and until Christian theology came to grips with this, the basic problems of the nature of God and of the world surfaced in different forms in

every aspect of their thought. This is where the problem lay. The skilful incorporation of the *ὑβόμῳ νοῦτός* and the world-soul into the Godhead either into the Logos or even into a Trinity, does not solve the problem, although it is an effective apologetic device for those who are not aware of the problems of Middle-Platonism.

It is not necessary here to spell out in any great detail how this study has revealed these difficulties. They have been stressed often enough in the text and in the conclusions to the individual sections. It has been apparent that the Logos theology failed to come to terms with the doctrine of God. In Justin this failure is manifested in a subordinationsim, in the other Apologists in too close an association of the origination of the Logos with the creation of the world. In all of these writers, including Clement, the Logos theology fails not only because of the doctrine of God, but also in their inability to describe the incarnation or to ascribe any importance to it. It is at this point that the relationship between the two original issues becomes clear. The difficulty with the doctrine of God is directly analogous to the difficulty with the incarnation. In fact, the obvious difficulty with the incarnation reveals just how sketchy is the cover-up of the other problem by the doctrine of the Logos.

This is one possible approach to this study, but it cannot be all-sufficient, since it comes to the texts with questions needing answers, and will thereby of necessity be blind to the real achievements of the writers. That their theology has its problems is important to know, especially when it is possible to trace these problems and to see them adding to the general milieu out of which Arianism sprang. But this cannot be all. A fair number of scholars, especially Barnard, have attempted to reinstate the Apologists as theologians of worth, by appealing to their particular purpose. They explain away their

difficulties over the incarnation, claiming that mention of it would not suit their apologetic intention. This appears to be specious argumentation for a number of reasons. Firstly and most importantly, Justin and Clement, who mention the incarnation, have such problems with the concept that we can clearly discern why the others do not mention it. The theological structures of all of the writers from Justin to Clement are basically the same, that is Logocentric. The reason for the omission of the incarnation is not, therefore, primarily apologetic, but theological. Secondly, the claim resting on the grounds of apologetic intent presupposes a theology free from that intent. We have no evidence for such a theology at all. The difference between Clement's Protrepticus and the rest of his work does not lie in this particular. It is only in Athanasius's Contra Gentes that such a possibility arises, and this is part of such a developed theological work that it cannot be really compared in this respect with the works of the Apologists. In actual fact, this claim rests on the assumption that the Apologists were apologists in the modern sense of the word, that apologetic is but one branch of the total theological work of the Church, and that the dogmatic branch exists alongside of it. But this is not so. The Apologists were not the apologists of the Church, but its theologians. That their theology incorporated at some points elements which were directly apologetic, and others which were not quite so apologetic, does not mean that a completely non-apologetic theology existed. Rather, the central stream of theology was completely apologetic. The thought of the Church was in a process of rapid confrontation with and adaptation to the Greek mind. It is this which totally absorbed the Apologists and Clement. The Barthian dogmatics, reflexion on the pure kerygma, just does not exist. Nor could it exist, for the conceptual framework for this kind of reflexion still had to be evolved. The dogmatics

of later years to a large extent rests upon the achievement and the blunders of these early theologians.

But again this is not all. There is a very important element in all our writers, which hints at the later development of dogmatics, and the separation of apologetic and dogmatics as we find it in Athanasius. This is to be found in the strong influence of the tradition of the Church on its theology. In this study, 'traditions' of one kind or another have been frequently referred to, but in this sense we are not referring to oral tradition or even to liturgical traditions, although these are manifestations of what we mean. Nor when we refer to the tradition of the Church do we refer, for instance, to the Wisdom tradition. This, with which all our writers except Athenagoras were fully acquainted, belongs rather to the theological world of exegesis. In Justin the credal and the liturgical traditions surface to give expression to his incarnational and Trinitarian references respectively. In Theophilus and especially in Athenagoras, tradition seems to have influenced their Trinitarian theology. In Clement it is not quite so easy to isolate the influence of tradition. But in every case, what we find is a tension between these elements and the theological basis for the writer's thought. It does not even seem really possible to speculate that the Apologists regarded their theological task as an endeavour to reconcile this tradition with either the pagan world or their theology. If this were so, a more concerted effort in this direction would be evident.

It is at this point that our section on Athanasius is important, for here we found that the theological apologetic work is soundly based on the traditional. The theological methodology of the Contra Gentes leaves us in no doubt that in actual fact his starting point is the Cross of Christ rather than the Logos. We find here a methodology very similar to that of Anselm. The remoto Christo of

the Contra Gentes is very different from the remoto Christo of Tatian. The difference lies in the fact that Athanasius knew that his thought was centred on Christ, whereas the Apologists did not have this focus. There were too many problems in the way for them to see that far. The other essential ingredient of Anselm's methodology is also relevant. The fidens quaerens intellectum or credo ut intelligam also corresponds to the Contra Gentes, where there is a similar balancing of credo and intellectum as in Anselm. But in the Apologists this schema just does not appear to fit. The manifestations of traditional elements does not correspond to any credo, nor is the theology an attempt, as we have said, to understand these. The theological methodology of the Apologists has no firm direction. It is rather, and here one must be tentative, a scattered attempt to expound the Logos theology in various directions against various objections. In Justin we come closest, of all the Apologists, to theology proper in his reflexion on the Logos doctrine.

When these writers are viewed in this kind of light, there appear to have been only two really significant developments. The first is the adaptation of the Logos theology of Justin, which was the definitive step in introducing revelation, rather than philosophical enquiry, as the basis for the Logos theology. The second significant event is the theology of Athanasius, which takes Justin's achievement to its logical conclusion by adapting the Logos doctrine not only to revelation, but to the true nature of that revelation, that is centring it on the incarnation. In this development we discern a fundamental shift of emphasis. Justin really centres all his theology on the Logos. As we have shown, his whole thought has to be assessed as it relates to this central idea. But Athanasius centres his whole thought on the incarnation, and not only on the incarnation, but also on the cross. In this we move from revelation to soteriology, from abstracts to an

historical act of salvation. It is probable that the movement away from this central issue of the historical act creates in the Apologists the acute tension between their theology and the manifestations of the Church tradition. Is it not also important that the two points at which tradition manifests itself are precisely the doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation? Until theological thought centred itself around these two central concepts, there could be no real hope of a consistent theology. These concepts should be the starting point of theological thought. The attempt to place them at the end is shown by the Apologists to be a futile exercise.

What can we learn from this? I suspect that the most important thing we can learn from the Apologists is that the rigid distinction between the 'world' and the Church is, at least in one sense, limited. I have tried to show how the Apologists cannot be really understood if they are regarded as just being apologists in our sense of the word. They were not battling with issues which were external to them. By virtue of their existence and participation in humanity in their particular time, they were faced with the apologetic task as an issue of life or death. Their apologetic was not a luxury or something which, if not engaged upon, the Church could do without. Rather, if this task was not taken up, the Church would have turned away from its calling, from its true existence. The Church is in the world. In this way theology has apologetically the task of thinking within the Church which is in the world. This it cannot cease to do. But more than this: the Church also has to take care lest this activity in the world render it of the world. Being in the world is as vital to its existence as being not of the world.

This leads directly to my second point. In many ways it is possible to look back at these theologians and to see fairly clearly how they

were struggling with this problem of being in the world but not of it, and we can also see many instances where they are of the world. We can see how the thought forms of the world have dictated their theology and how this has moved them away from the central issues of the faith. In this way they have departed from strict orthodoxy. We can analyse their theology and show how it is defective in the light of our superior knowledge, which is derived solely from hindsight.

What we need to keep constantly in mind is that, in the struggle of the Church to be in the world but not of it, we find the grace of God operating in all its power. Just as the incarnation, in which the Logos of God was in the world but not of it, leads to the salvation of man, so in the apologetic or theological endeavour of the Church, the grace of the incarnation is let loose. Also, and this is the difference between the incarnation and the Church, the success of the Church's mission does not rest ultimately on its remaining uncontaminated by the world. The incarnate Logos never was in any way of the world, and it is the grace of forgiveness which he won for the Church which turns even its failures in its task to good effect. The success of the Church's mission in the second century did not rest on the orthodoxy of its theologians but upon the grace of God, the victory of the cross, let loose in the whole Church, and their endeavours were but one part of God's activity. Looking back then to the Apologists, their struggle is not to be measured in terms of its success as we see it now, but on the measure of their obedience to their Lord. It is from this obedience that the truly significant advances came, not only for theology and orthodoxy but also for the kingdom of God.

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