

POSTCOLONIAL MONUMENTS AND PUBLIC SCULPTURE

IN ZIMBABWE

A Thesis Submitted In Fulfilment Of The

Requirement Of The Degree Of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Of

RHODES UNIVERSITY

By

BIGGIE SAMWANDA

January 2013

Supervisor: Professor Brenda Schmahmann

Abstract

The study critically examines public art in postcolonial Zimbabwe's cities of Harare and Bulawayo. In a case by case approach, I analyse the National Heroes Acre and Old Bulawayo monuments, and three contemporary sculptures – Dominic Benhura's *Leapfrog* (1993) and Adam Madebe's *Ploughman* (1987) and *Looking into the future* (1985).

I used a qualitative research methodology to collect and analyse data. My research design utilised in-depth interviews, observation, content and document analysis, and photography to gather nuanced data and these methods ensured that data collected is validated and/or triangulated.

I argue that in Zimbabwe, monuments and public sculpture serve as the necessary interface of the visual, cultural and political discourse of a postcolonial nation that is constantly in transition and dialogue with the everyday realities of trying to understand and construct a national identity from a nest of sub-cultures. I further argue that monuments and public sculpture in Zimbabwe abound with political imperatives given that, as visual artefacts that interlace with ritual performance, they are conscious creations of society and are therefore constitutive of that society's heritage and social memory. Since independence in 1980, monuments and public sculpture have helped to open up discursive space and dialogue on national issues and myths. Such discursive spaces and dialogues, I also argue, have been particularly animated from the late 1990s to the present, a period in which the nation has engaged in self-introspection in the face of socio-political change and challenges in the continual process of imagining the Zimbabwean nation.

Little research focusing on postcolonial public art in Zimbabwe has hitherto been undertaken. This study addresses gaps in this literature while also providing a spring board from which future studies may emerge.

Declaration of Originality

I declare that this thesis is my own work and that all the sources that I have used have been acknowledged by complete references. This thesis is being submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the Doctor of Philosophy at Rhodes University. I declare that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at another university.

.....

Biggie Samwanda

January 2013, Grahamstown. South Africa.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TOPIC	PAGE
Abstract	
Declaration	
Acknowledgements.....	ii
List Of Illustrations.....	iii
List of Abbreviations Used in Thesis.....	xiii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 1: The public, public art and its history.....	23
CHAPTER 2: National Heroes‘ Acre: Chimurenga monument in symbolic conflict.....	43
CHAPTER 3: Old Bulawayo: A cultural monument’s performance of history.....	99
CHAPTER 4: <i>Leap Frog</i> : Play-children and street kids.....	136
CHAPTER 5: The <i>Ploughman</i> : A sculpture’s significations of the peasant in the land struggles of Zimbabwe.....	153
CHAPTER 6: Adam Madebe’s <i>Looking into the future</i> : A controversy in public art.....	176
CHAPTER 7: Conclusion.....	201
REFERENCES.....	211
ILLUSTRATIONS.....	242
APPENDICES.....	323
APPENDIX 1: A brief political history of Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2012.....	323
APPENDIX 2: A trace of the binaries in Zimbabwe’s socio-political community.....	326
APPENDIX 3: Historical background on the land issue	330

Acknowledgements

I am grateful and indebted to my supervisor, Professor Brenda Schmahmann for her invaluable guidance, advice and encouragement, to Professor Fred Hendricks (Dean, Faculty of Humanities) for the workstation in the Humanities Laboratory, to Professor Dominic Thorburn (HoD, Fine Art), Professor Ruth Simbao (HoD Art History), to all lecturers and postgraduate students in the Department of Fine Art (2008-2012), to Dr G. Mahachi (Executive Director, National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe), to Mr. Maboreke (the Deputy Director, National Archives of Zimbabwe), to Voti Thebe (Acting Director of the National Gallery of Zimbabwe in Bulawayo), to the artists Dominic Benhura, Adam Madebe, and Yun Kyong Chol, and to all those who took part in my fieldwork without whom I could not have written this thesis.

Funding for my studies by Dr E. Tuomey in 2008, the Wurth Bursary in 2010, Chinhoyi University of Technology in 2010 and 2011, and the B Bursary in 2012 are hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at in this thesis are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the funders hereby mentioned.

I would like to also acknowledge the unquantifiable moral, material and financial sacrifice and unconditional support that I received from family and friends throughout my studies. My wife, Eunifer Rose Samwanda, *mhai wangu* Florence Muzama, *baba wangu* Tapera *_SaJikinya_* Chakupa, my in-laws *sekuru* Eden Mhandu *namagogo* Kina Mhandu, and my sisters - Marita *_maMalvern_*, Hamufari *_maRutendo_*, Hatina *_maTalent_*, *naMary* *_maAnesu_*. My friends; Charles and Jacqueline Zanza, Isaac Matanda Gundhla, Munyaradzi Andrew Chinzvende, Shepard and Shay Chandomba, and Cryton Zazu. My former-students from Chinhoyi University of Technology's Creative Art and Design Department; Knowledge Mushohwe, Resta Nyamwanza-Chikomo, Kudzai Chikomo, Munyaradzi Mashamaire. The elders; Dr Hilton Chikuya, Mr Phebion P. Kangai, Mr Phillip Njanji Sithole and Mrs Sian Newsome Magadza. The *visionary* staff members of Gatsi Government Secondary School, Honde Valley in 1987: Mr Francis B. Kwari (Head), Mr John Ngirande (D/Head) & Mrs Ngirande, Mai Audrey Chatora, Ms Precious Guramatunhu, Mr Cheatley N. Dzinduwa (A Second *Chimurenga*/liberation war veteran), Mr J. Sithole, Mr Charles Mudiwa, Ms Jennifer King, Mr Enda Tuomey and Mr Michael Rupapa. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at in this thesis are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the above mentioned family members and friends

Last but not least, this dissertation would not have been possible without the diligent editing by Irene Bronner and Libby Lamour.

Nyatene ngaakukomborerenyi mwese! May God bless you all!

All photographs used in this thesis, unless mentioned, were taken by the author with the kind permission of either the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe (NMMZ) or the National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAC).

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Please note that all photographs were taken by the author unless otherwise indicated.

Figure 1: Map showing the research focus areas of Bulawayo and Harare, Zimbabwe.

(Reproduction taken from

<https://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=ml/zimbabwe/100mi/200km>).

Figure 2: John Tweed, *Cecil John Rhodes*, 1904. Bronze. Approximately 250 x 100 x 60cm. National Archives of Zimbabwe, Harare. Photographed in September 2012. Courtesy of the National Archives of Zimbabwe.

Figure 3: John Tweed. *Sir Alfred Beit*, 1906. Bronze. Approximately 150 x 170 x 65cm. National Archives of Zimbabwe, Harare. Photographed in September 2012 with permission of the National Archives of Zimbabwe.

Figure 4a: E. Armstrong. *The Shangani Memorial*, 1935. Bronze on cement bricks pier. Approximately 180 x 310 x 30cm. Photographed in August 2012 with permission of the of the NMMZ.

Figure 4b: E. Armstrong. *The Shangani Memorial detail*, 1935. Bronze on cement bricks pier. Artwork approximately 180 x 310 x 30cm. Photograph in August 2012 with permission of the National Archives of Zimbabwe.

Figure 5: E. Armstrong. *The Indaba*, c1935. Approximately 600 x 140cm. Bronze bas relief plaque. Bulawayo city Hall. Photographed by Resta Nyamwanza Chikomo in October 2011. (Reproduction courtesy of Resta Nyamwanza Chikomo.)

Figure 6: William Reid Dick. *David Livingstone*, c1930s. Bronze. Approximately 400 x 600 x 60cm. Photograph by Tim Rogers, 5 October 2000. (Reproduction taken from http://upload.wikimedia.org/Wikipedia/commons/c/c8/David_Livingstone_memorial_at_Victoria_falls_Zimbabwe.jpg).

Figure 7: Google map's location of the National Heroes Acre, Harare. Zimbabwe. (Reproduction taken from <https://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=ml>).

Figure 8: Google-earth satellite map of the National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. (Reproduction taken from <https://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=ml>).

Figure 9: The National Heroes Acre cemetery side, viewed from the public arena. Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 10: The public arena for sitting at least 5000 people. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 11: Rim Woh Guk *et al* /Mutasa and Ndudzo. *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* statuary, 1984. Bronze. Approximately 745 cm in height. National Heroes Acre, Harare. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 12: Rim Woh Guk *et al*/David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. Detail of the female combatant. *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier*. Approximately 745cm in height. National Heroes Acre, Harare. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 13: Rim Woh Guk *et al.* / David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier Statuary* (1984). Bronze. Approximately 745cm in height. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 14: Rim Woh Guk *et al.* / David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier Statuary*, 1984. Bronze. Approximately 745cm in height. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Harare. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 15: Graves standing for the AK 47 rifle's bullets on the eastern wing platforms. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 16: The western wing's curving platforms that signify the AK 47 rifle's magazine. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 17: Part of the revellers at the National Heroes Acre viewed from the public sitting arena when facing southwards. Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 18: Part of the crowd who sit in the 5000 capacity arena, NHA, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 19: Mutasa and Ndudzo, *NHA reliefs and the Zimbabwe Bird*, 1984. Bronze. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 20: David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo/ Rim Woh Guk *et al.* *The Zimbabwe Bird* (1984). Bronze. Approximately 100 x 100 x 50 cm. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 21: The Zimbabwe Police Band sitting on the middle ground. NHA, Harare Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 22: *The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier's* epitaph plaque. Engraving on polished granite panel. 160 x 105cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 23: The catafalque in use. National Heroes Day, 13 August 2012. NHA, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 24: The catafalque-like platform marking the south point immediately behind the statuary. National Heroes Acre, NMMZ. Harare. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 25: The south marking catafalque like platform in use on Monday 13 August 2012. National Heroes Acre, Harare Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 26: NMMZ. *The coat of arms*, c2000. Bronze. Approximately 155 x 135 x 5 cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 27: Yun Kyong Chol. Name list of National heroes/heroines before portraits were added. 2010. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 28: Yun Kyong Chol .*Portraits of National Heroes*, 2011. Stipple engraving on polished black dolerite stone plates. 6 x 5cm. NHA, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 29: Revelers and relatives take photographs of names and portraits of national heroes/heroines. NHA Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 30: The grave of Amai Sally Mugabe, first wife of President Robert Mugabe. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 31: Yun Kyong Chol. *Portrait of the late Vice-President Dr Simon Vengai Muzenda*. (c2010) Stipple engraving on polished dolerite stone panel. 25 x 20cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 32: New ZANU PF and Zimbabwe's co-Vice President (and former PF ZAPU Leader) Dr Joshua Nkomo's grave. National Heroes Acre, Harare Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 33: The three of the four symbolic graves of Edison Sithole, Ethan Dube and Guy Clutton-Brook (Right to Left). National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 34: Figurines carved from black serpentine stone mostly used in contemporary stone sculpture. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 35: The chevron and dry masonry appropriated from the ancient city of Great Zimbabwe and Khami. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 36: Part of the walkway that leads to the tower bearing the 'eternal flame of independence'. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 37a: David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. *Scenes during colonial times in Rhodesia*, 1984. Bronze. 450 x 1179cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 37b: David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. Detail of *Township scenes*. 1984. Bronze. 486 x 307cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 37c: David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. *Discussing political events*, 1984. Bronze. 390 x 486cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 37d: David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. *Weapons distribution in the training camp*, 1984. Bronze. 360 x 280 cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 37e: David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. Detail of the *traditional beer clay pot and the drinking gourd* underneath a makeshift wooden table. 1984. Bronze. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 38a: Rim Woh Guk *et al.* The Western Reliefs, 1984. Bronze. 508 x 1274cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 38b: Rim Woh Guk *et al.* *Battle scene*, 1984. Bronze. 371 x 483cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 38c: Rim Woh Guk *et al.* *Celebration*, 1984. Bronze. 382 x 394 cm. NHA, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 38d: Rim Woh Guk *et al.* *Celebration time with leader, Robert Mugabe*, 1984. Bronze. 508 x 597cm. National Heroes' Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 39: Government of Zimbabwe. Black and white poster. 1983. Ink on card. Approximately 100 x 45cm. (Reproduced with permission of National Archives of Zimbabwe, Harare).

Figure 40: Heroes' Acre Namibia. Aerial Photography by Brian J. McMorrow, 1999-2010. (Reproduction taken from <http://www.pbase.com/bmcmorrow/image/125830293>).

Figure 41: Mansudae Overseas Projects artists/Namibian government. 2002. Bronze. 8m in height. The stature on the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* and the epitaph on one face of the plinth. Heroes' Acre, Windhoek, Namibia. (Reproduction taken from http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Heroes_Acre_1.jpg).

Figure 42: Mansudae Overseas Projects artists/Namibian government, *Namibian people fighting colonial occupation*. 2002. Bronze relief. Photography by Raymond June, 2010. (Reproduction taken from http://farm2.static.flickr.com/1175/5140968976_a809f19ac2.jpg)

Figure 43: Mansudae Overseas Projects artists/Namibian government. *Celebrating Namibian independence*, 2002. Bronze relief. Photography by Raymond June, 2010. (Reproduction taken from <http://www.flickr.com/photos/raymondjune/5140355583/>)

Figure 44: Mansudae Overseas Projects artists/Namibian government, 2002. *Mandume ya Ndemufayo's symbolic grave*. Namibia Heroes Acre, Windhoek, Namibia. Photography by Willie Olivier. (Reproduction taken from <http://www.tournamibia.net/content/mandume-ya-ndemufayo-last-independent-kwanyama-king>).

Figure 45: Memorial stone. Approximately 40 x 35 x 28cm Old Bulawayo, NMMZ, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed on 15 April 2010 with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 46: Plaque on the foundation stone. 100 x 65 cm. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed on 15 April 2010 with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 47: The Old Bulawayo palisade from a distance. Approximately 2m high. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed on 15 April 2010 with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 48: The palisade from outside. Approximately 2m high. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed on 15 April 2010 with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 49: The Mopani tree palisade that surround Old Bulawayo's royal enclosure. Wooden poles. Approximately 2m high. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed on 15 April 2010 with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 50: Sign post at the cattle kraal. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe Photographed on 15 April 2010 with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 51: One of King Lobengula's two brick on thatch houses. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed on 15 April 2010 with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 52: King Lobengula's house in brick and thatch (Left) and his wagon shed in stone and thatch (Right). Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed on 15 April 2010 with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 53: Bee-hive hut structures within the royal enclosure. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed on 15 April 2010 with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 54: Bee-hive hut entrance. Old Bulawayo Zimbabwe. Photographed on 15 April 2010 with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 55: A contemporary Ndebele roundavale with entrance facing west, just before Gwanda Town along the Beit Bridge- Bulawayo road. Matebeleland South, Zimbabwe.

Figure 56: Old Bulawayo palisade burns on 23 August 2010. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed by Kudzai Chikomo. (Reproduction courtesy of Kudzai Chikomo).

Figure 57: A beehive hut now in ashes, 23 August 2010. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed by Kudzai Chikomo. (Reproduction courtesy of Kudzai Chikomo).

Figure 58: Firemen try to rescue King Lobengula's Palace and the wagon shed on 23 August 2010. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed by Kudzai Chikomo. (Reproduction courtesy of Kudzai Chikomo).

Figure 59: What remains of the Palace. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe .Photographed by Kudzai Chikomo. (Reproduction courtesy of Kudzai Chikomo).

Figure 60: The state of King Lobengula's Old Bulawayo palace in July 2012. Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 61: Old Bulawayo's Interpretive Centre or Site Museum. NMMZ. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe .Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 62: An attendant at Old Bulawayo's Site Museum. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 63: Part of the inside of Old Bulawayo's site museum. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 64: Interpretive text for baskets or *izitsha* in *isiNdebele*. 75 x 50cm. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 65: Historical text on the migrations of Nguni people due to Mfecane. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 66: Historical text on the *Inxwala* rituals held at Old Bulawayo. Approximately 100 x 60cm. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 67: Artist's impression of King Mzilikazi, founder of the Ndebele state. Approximately 180 x 65cm. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 68a: Tafadzwa Gwetai. An impression of King Lobengula's sitting statue. 2005. Painted plaster of Paris Approximately 170 x 75 x 50cm. Old Bulawayo site Museum, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 68b: Tafadzwa Gwetai. Close-up on the statue of King Lobengula. 2005. Painted Plaster of paris. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 68c: Tafadzwa Gwetai. Close-up on *King Lobengula's* left leg. 2005. Plaster of paris and oil paint. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 68d: Tafadzwa Gwetai. Detail of *King Lobengula's* left hand, 2005. Plaster of Paris and oil paint. Old Bulawayo Site Museum. Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 69: Artist's impression of King Lobengula. Black and white photograph. Approximately 180 x 65cm card. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 70: Insignia for City of Bulawayo. Wood, brass and oil. Approximately 25 x 3x 20cm. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 71: Wooden mortars. Approximately 60cm in height. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 72: Penis sheath /*Umcwado* (*isiNdebele*). Tree Fibre Approximately 15 x 5 x 4cm. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 73: Winnowing basket or *inhlungulo* in *isiNdebele*. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 74: A drawing of spears that are in dispute. Drawing on vinyl. Approximately 65 x 45cm. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 75: A close up on decorated clay pots. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 76: Different types of handmade *ilala* and bamboo baskets. Old Bulawayo, Site Museum, Zimbabwe. Photographed with permission of the NMMZ.

Figure 77: Coiled baskets. Compare these with those in photographs in Figures 32. (Reproductions taken from Nyathi, P., 2000, *Lawo Magugu: Material culture of the AmaNdebele of Zimbabwe*. Pietermaritzburg: Reach Out Publishers.p58 &p9).

Figure 78: Dominic Benhura. *Leapfrog*, 1996. Black serpentine stone. Town House garden. Harare, Zimbabwe.

Figure 79: Map of Harare's Town House, next to State Lottery Hall, along Julis Nyerere Way corner Jason Moyo. Harare, Zimbabwe. (Reproduction taken from (http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&source=s_q&hl=en&geocode=&q=Town+hous...)).

Figure 80: Dominic Benhura. *Leapfrog's* child running. 1996. Black serpentine rock. 125 x 50 x 25cm. Town House. Harare, Zimbabwe.

Figure 81: Dominic Benhura. *Leapfrog* child bending in anticipation of the leap over. 1996. Black serpentine stone. 110 x 45 x 70cm. Town House garden. Harare, Zimbabwe.

Figure 82: Dominic Benhura. *Leapfrog's* leaping moment broken 1996. Black serpentine stone. 112x130x45cm. Town House garden. Harare, Zimbabwe.

Figure 83: Dominic Benhura. *Leapfrog* viewed from another angle to reveal the breakup 1996. Black serpentine stone. 112 x 130 x 45cm. Town House garden. Harare, Zimbabwe.

Figure 84: Dominic Benhura. *Leap frog*. 1997. Black serpentine stone. Atlanta Airport Gallery, Georgia, USA. (Reproduction taken from http://zoisrus.smugmug.com/Travel/Zimbabwe-sculpture-Atlanta/704694_Kjarm#30734947_ptTn4-A-LB).

Figure 85: Dominic Benhura. *Leapfrog* viewed from another angle. 1996. Black serpentine rock. 112 x 130 x 45cm. Town House garden. Harare, Zimbabwe.

Figure 86: Dominic Benhura, *Leapfrog*. 1996. For some time the sculptures remained fallen for some weeks. Black serpentine stone. Approximately 110 x 130 x 35cm. Town House garden. Harare, Zimbabwe.

Figure 87: John Takawira, *Look at my mirror*. 1980, Black serpentine, 75 x 58 x 42cm. NGZ Permanent Collection. Harare. Photography by Alice Tavaya. (Reproduction taken from Sibanda, D. (Compiler)., 2004. *Zimbabwe stone sculpture: A retrospective, 1957-2004*. Harare: Embassy of France/ Weaver Press.p84).

Figure 88: Brighton Sango. *Beer drinker*. 1996. Fruit serpentine. 80 x 80 x 60cm. Photography by D. Weinberg. Cafmeyer Gallery, Knokke, Belgium. (Reproduction taken

from Bourgois, G. G., ed. 1997. *Legacies of stone: Zimbabwe past and present, Volume 11*. Tervuren: Royal Museum of Central Africa. p148).

Figure 89: Gladman Zinyeka. *Too much in my head*. 1996. Springstone, 72 x 56 x 45cm, Cafmeyer Gallery collection, Knokke, Belgium. Photography by L. Cafmeyer. (Reproduction taken from Bourgois, G. G., ed. 1997. *Legacies of stone: Zimbabwe past and present, Volume 11*. Tervuren: Royal Museum of Central Africa.p149).

Figure 90: Dominic Benhura. *Joy*.2001. 200 x 80 x 50cm. Springstone, Dominic Studio, Harare. Photography by Alice Tavaya. (Reproduction taken from Sibanda, D. (Compiler)., 2004. *Zimbabwe stone sculpture: A retrospective, 1957-2004*. Harare: Embassy of France/ Weaver Press.p107).

Figure 91: Agnes Nyanhongo. *Woman of Authority*. 2002. Opal. 276 x 155 x 101cm. Artist's Collection, Harare. Photography by Alice Tavaya. (Reproduction taken from Sibanda, D. (Compiler)., 2004. *Zimbabwe stone sculpture: A retrospective, 1957-2004*. Harare: Embassy of France/ Weaver Press.p123).

Figure 92: Samkele Malaba. *Bird and chick*. 2004. Springstone, granite, opal and paint. 47x29x61cm, Dominic Studio, Harare. Photography by Alice Tavaya. (Reproduction taken from Sibanda, D. (Compiler)., 2004. *Zimbabwe stone sculpture: A retrospective, 1957-2004*. Harare: Embassy of France/ Weaver Press.p84).

Figure 93: Victor Nyakauru. *Zongororo*. 2008. Black serpentine, bones and wire. 15 x10 x 120cm, NGZ's BAT Art school. Harare, Zimbabwe.

Figure 94: Hurudza House, Nelson Mandela Ave corner Park Street, Harare. (Reproduction taken from http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&source=s_q&hl=en&geocode=&q=Hurudza+hous...).

Figure 95: Adam Madebe. *Ploughman*.1992. Welded 2mm steel. Approximately 200 x 315 x 60cm. Hurudza House, Agribank. Harare, Zimbabwe.

Figure 96: Fleet Utria Architects. *Runhare House*, c1990s. Second Street/ Union Avenue, Harare. Photography by Jane Stillwell. (Reproduction taken from Gallery Publications., 2001. Art and architecture; Victor Atria discusses the practice of the integrated vision. In: *Gallery*. 27, pp. 10-15. Harare: Gallery Publications.p13)

Figure 97: Pearce and Partners Achitects. *Eastgate building complex*.c2002/3. Harare CBD. Photographed by Shay Chandomba. (Reproduction courtesy of Shay Chandomba)

Figure 98: Fleet Utria Architects, *Causeway Post Office*,c1992. Harare CBD. Note the landscaped 'picture frame'. Photography by Jane Stillwell. (Reproduction taken from Gallery Publications., 2001. Art and architecture; Victor Atria discusses the practice of the integrated vision. In: *Gallery*. 27, pp. 10-15. Harare: Gallery Publications.p10).

Figure 99: Richard Jack. *Painted post boxes*.c 1991. Oil on metal.Causeway Post office, Harare. Photography by Jane Stillwell. (Reproduction taken from Gallery Publications., 2001. Art and architecture; Victor Atria discusses the practice of the integrated vision. In: *Gallery*. 27, pp. 10-15. Harare: Gallery Publications.p112).

Figure 100: Thakor Patel. *Mural*, c1991. Oil on wall. Inside Cuaseway Post Office, Harare. Photography by Jane Stillwell. (Reproduction taken from Gallery Publications., 2001. Art and architecture; Victor Atria discusses the practice of the integrated vision. In: *Gallery*. 27, pp. 10-15. Harare: Gallery Publications.p11).

Figure 101: Adam Madebe. *Construction workers*. 1993. Welded steel. Approximately 375cm in height. Construction House. Harare, Zimbabwe.

Figure 102: David Mutasa. *The Zimbabwe Bird*. 2000. Bronze Approximately 235cm in height. New Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Building. Harare, Zimbabwe.

Figure 103: Pearce and Partners Architects. *Hurudza Building*, 1993. Corner Nelson Mandela and Park Street, Harare. Reproduction taken from [xnormal_2005_02_Hurudza_House_jpeg_pagespeed_ic_KWhsWiHmYo](#)).

Figure 104: Adam Madebe. *Ploughman*. 1992. Welded 2mm steel. Approximately 200 x 300 x 60cm. Hurudza House, Agribank. Harare, Zimbabwe.

Figure 105: Adam Madebe. *Ploughman*. 1992. Welded 2mm steel. Approximately 200 x 300 x 60cm. Hurudza House, Agribank. Harare, Zimbabwe.

Figure 106: Madebe's *Ploughman*. 1992. Welded 2mm steel. Approximately 200 x 315 x 60cm. Hurudza House, Agribank. Harare, Zimbabwe.

Figure 107: Vera Mukhina, *Worker and Collective farm woman*, 1937. Bronze. (Reproduction taken from http://www.illuminationsmedia.co.uk/blog/index.cfm?start=136&news_id=951).

Figure 108: Adam Madebe. *Looking into the future*. 1985. Welded iron pieces. Approximately 500 x 100 x 45cm. NGZ, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.

Figure 109: Adam Madebe. *Looking into the future*, 1985. Welded iron pieces. Approximately 500 x 100 x 45cm. NGZ, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.

Figure 110: Adam Madebe. *Looking into the future*. 1985. Welded iron pieces. Approximately 500 x 100 x 45cm. NGZ, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.

Figure 111: Detail. Adam Madebe. *Looking into the future*, 1985. Welded iron pieces. Approximately 500 x 100 x 45cm. NGZ, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.

Figure 112: Adam Madebe. *Looking into the future*. 1985. Welded iron pieces. Approximately 500 x 100 x 45cm. NGZ, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed by Resta Nyamwanza-Chikomo. (Reproduction courtesy of Resta Nyamwanza-Chikomo).

Figure 113: Adam Madebe. *Looking into the future*. 1985. Welded iron pieces. Approximately 500 x 100 x 45cm. NGZ, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed by Resta Nyamwanza-Chikomo. (Reproduction courtesy of Resta Nyamwanza-Chikomo).

Figure 114: North Korean Mansudae Overseas Projects. *Joshua Nkomo statue*, 2010. Bronze. Approximately 200 x 55 x 45cm. Intersection of Main Street and 8th Avenue,

Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photographed by Resta Nyamwanza-Chikomo. (Reproduction courtesy of Resta Nyamwanza-Chikomo).

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED IN THE THESIS

AFC	Agricultural Finance Corporation
ANC	African National Congress
AIPPA	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
BSAC	British South Africa Company
BURA	Bulawayo Residents Association
CBD	Central Business District
CHRA	Combined Harare Residents Association
CAZ	Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FROLIZ	Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LSCF	Large Scale Commercial Farm
LSCFs	Large Scale Commercial Farms
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDC-T	Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirayi
MDC-M	Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara
MDC-N	Movement for Democratic Change-Ncube
MP	Member of Parliament
NAC	National Archives of Zimbabwe
NASS	National Sports Stadium
NGZ	National Gallery of Zimbabwe
NHA	National Heroes' Acre
NMMZ	National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe
PCC	People's Caretaker Council

PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
PF	Patriotic Front
POSA	Public Order and Security Act
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RF	Rhodesian Front
TTLs	Tribal Trust Lands
UANC	United African National Congress
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UDP	United Democratic Party
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WOZA	Woman of Zimbabwe Association
WMM	War Memorial Museum
WLLG	Women Land Lobby Group
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZBC TV	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Television
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

INTRODUCTION

The context of public art in independent Zimbabwe

‘Public art’, as a term, has been used historically to refer primarily to monuments and memorials. While structures of this type continue to be built in the contemporary world, the term is also used to embrace community based public art projects, multimedia projects, murals, earthen works, and even performance and poster art (Miles, 1997; Philip, 2000; Art Plus, 2005). Events and accoutrements associated with celebrations of heritage, such as flags, uniforms and anthems, have also been included under this term (Usherwood, 2007; Chaney, 2002; Sharp et al, 2005). The function of ‘public art’ has also changed over time and according to different social contexts. As Senie (1992: 216) writes: “In its traditional form as monument or memorial, public sculpture represented the ruling classes and their values, and as such was rightly seen as an extension of their authority.” However, in the case of contemporary art, “the relationship of art and politics is less clear”, she further observes (Senie, 1992: 216).

Drawing from the above evaluations, one realises that prior to Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, in the then Rhodesia, public art in the form of monuments and memorials represented and served the minority white group and their settler state. Arnold (1989: 174) writes that “achievements and significant personalities were commemorated [...] by statues”. For example, sculptures for Cecil John Rhodes were commissioned in 1904 and 1932 for both the cities of Harare (then known as Salisbury) and Bulawayo, respectively (see map of Zimbabwe in Fig. 1 and the sculpture in Fig. 2). Similarly, a statue for Alfred Beit was produced in 1906 for Harare (Fig. 3). Besides stand-alone statues, relief sculptures were also commissioned, as seen in the *Shangani Memorial* at Matopos World’s View (Figs. 4a and 4b) near the city of Bulawayo. All the above mentioned colonial-era public artworks were rendered realistically in bronze by John Tweed, a British artist. Another colonial period public artwork was fashioned by E. Armstrong: a bas relief plaque that still remains mounted on Bulawayo’s City Hall entrance (Fig. 5). This work forms what Arnold (1989: 182) describes as an “obvious offensive reminder of humiliation” to the *amaNdebele* people in that it shows a meeting or *indaba* held in 1896, in which Rhodes and other European settlers sat on a rock outcrop above Chief Somabulane and his Ndebele subjects, who sit on the ground below. Such an arrangement obviously denotes the Ndebele (the chief or *induna* included) as subjects to Rhodes, indicating a predetermined outcome of the *indaba*. These colonial

monuments and sculptures as public art continue to exist as markers of history in the shift from the colonial into the colonial. However their official significance to the state in independent Zimbabwe is down-played and as such they have become politically insignificant in the postcolonial identity.

In their exploration of Soviet-era monuments and the formation of a post-Soviet identity, Forest and Johnson (2002: 525) suggest that monuments and other places of memory may either be “re-opted/glorified, disavowed or contested” during critical moments in the history of a country. While those monuments “disavowed” are “literally or symbolically erased from the landscape [...] through active destruction or through neglect by the state”, those that remain standing as “contested” sites are “neither clearly glorified nor disavowed” - they remain as items of “political conflict”, Forest and Johnson (2002: 525) argue. In effect, the discretion that politicians exercise in deciding which existing “sites are and are not ‘usable’ — and the inclusiveness of the [surrounding] debate — reveal a great deal about changing official conceptions of national identity and the nation-building process”, suggest Forest and Johnson (2002: 525). Relating this to independent Zimbabwe, statues of Cecil John Rhodes, Alfred Beit and others that were perceived as bearing undertones of “an oppressive past that offended Africans” (Kriger, 1995: 142) were removed from their original public spaces. These are now to be found either at the site of the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe (NMMZ) or the National Archives of Zimbabwe, located in the cities where they were originally displayed as public art. On the other hand, some monuments and sculptures, such as the First and Second World War memorials for white servicemen, and statues of missionaries, like that of David Livingstone (Fig. 6), presently still stand at their original sites in independent Zimbabwe as presumably contested images of public art.¹

Apart from engaging with public art produced under the auspices of former colonial dispensations, the post-independence government has commissioned a number of new public art projects. The National Heroes Acre monument, located seven kilometres to the north-west of Harare’s Central Business District (CBD), and Old Bulawayo cultural monument, situated about seventeen kilometres south-west of Bulawayo’s CBD, are places of memory that are particularly worthy of analysis. A study of these sites as *lieux de memoir* or places of memory

¹A ministerial National Monuments Committee formed after independence that was led by Minister Nathan Shamuyarira felt that the new majority government supported those who fought against fascism even if some African servicemen who fought side by side with whites were not honoured in these memorials (See Kriger, 1995).

(Nora, 1989), as undertaken in this thesis, will ~~–~~[provide] an ideal way to trace underlying continuities and discontinuities in national identity politics”, to use Forest and Johnson’s (2002: 525) words. Hence, making a critical investigation of the visual codes and performances deployed at these public sites is intrinsic to this study, as is the analysis of the monuments’ reception by the public in their performance of history.

On a related note, examples of public sculpture commissioned or donated by corporations and/or individuals for the independent Zimbabwean cities of Harare and Bulawayo are important to the discourse of this dissertation. These include two commissioned metal-welded sculptures – *Looking into the future* (1985) and the *Ploughman* (1987) – created by artist Adam Madebe, and a set of stone sculptures, *Leap frog* (2003), depicting children, which was donated to Harare by its sculptor Dominic Benhura. Examining the effects of these artworks on citizens, and the various public sphere debates that have emerged in relation to not only the artworks’ meanings but also their reception within public spaces, will illustrate how public sculptures easily attain new meanings. In this dissertation I argue that it is often these associated readings by the audience, other than those intended by the artist, which make sculptures acceptable or unacceptable to those who constitute the public audience. Thus public sculptures in open parks and in city gardens as well as those used in association with architecture can be seen as ~~–~~having interesting histories and convey[ing] particular historiographies” (Alley, 1997: 967). Thus it is also imperative, at this point in time, to paint an overview of who, in postcolonial Zimbabwe, constitutes the public art audience, for this has a bearing on framing the discussions that the dissertation will engage with in chapters that follow.

The audience for public art in Zimbabwe

Communities making up independent Zimbabwe are divided within and among themselves on the basis of language, ethnicity, race and gender, which makes them more inclined to be polarised when it comes to debates on issues of religion, morality and politics. This accounts for ~~–~~the search for a common national identity for indigenous development policy frameworks and the perceived need to mobilise the Zimbabwean society” (Moyo, Makumbe & Raftopoulos, 2000: xiii), soon after independence, for the sake of the development of a new nation. However, divisions within the Zimbabwean society stem not only from a colonial legacy, but also partly from the activities of the ruling ZANU-PF party and other perceived

external machinations (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Report, 1997: 37). (See Appendix 1.)

The racial divide between blacks and whites, inherited from British colonialism, has continued despite overtures for national reconciliation in the 1980s. The Gukurahundi operation in Matebeleland and Midlands provinces (see Appendix 2) aggravated the colonial legacy of divide and rule that had promoted ethnicity among the Africans, who were classified mainly as either Ndebele or Shona (Ranger, 2010). There is also a divide between rural and urbanised black people. Historically, peasants who bore the brunt of the liberation war are located in rural areas which, at independence, were characterised by over-crowding on mostly arid land (see Moyo, 1986). Along with those simply seeking refuge from the effects of the war of liberation or trying to find work in industry, more educated sectors of the black population had begun to gather in urban areas where they constituted an emerging indigenous middle class.² Whites remained owners of industry as well as of large tracts of fertile land where commercial farming took place. The divide in income levels between the rural and the urban populations encouraged increased migration to cities after independence. This resulted in rapid urbanisation, rising unemployment, over-crowding and urban poverty. Most of this rapidly growing urban population would later become the pool upon which emerging political parties like the MDC would draw support from, other than civic organisations, to form opposition for the sitting ZANU PF government.

It is important to note that when discussing public art in Zimbabwe, one is talking about an urban context and not a rural framework. The rural population are by and large African traditionalists who have embraced equally conservative Christian morals (a result of the long-term influence from widespread missionary activities which also provided formal education and vocational training [Coombes, 1994], designed to serve the colonists). This conservatism has begun to wane amongst the urban black population, with globalisation gaining increasing ground. Also, while in the earlier years of independence it was only the white population who tended to have knowledge about western cultural practices such as participating in and appreciating ‘high’ art, a cultural gap between whites and urbanised blacks was greatly reduced by the postcolonial government policy of nationalising education to make it affordable, and thus increasing primary and secondary school as well as tertiary-education enrolment in the 1980s to 1990s (see *Zimbabwe Quarterly Digest of Statistics*, 1989).

² Interview with David Mutasa, 28 April 2010, Harare.

Sports personalities and public figures in other facets of society began to emerge from within the rural and urbanite ranks of educated Africans in the 1990s. Craftspersons and contemporary artists also began to be noticed.³ Among them also were leading and *avant garde* artists who experimented with media, surfaces and techniques, challenging established power bases and some of Zimbabwean society's perceived values and attitudes.

However, traditionalist attitudes concerning moral uprightness have endured in indigenous cultures. The cities of Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare and Gweru –attained population growth rates of over 5% per annum throughout the 1980s” (Tibaijuka, 2005: 22) due to migration from rural to urban areas and this has meant that a sizable number of culturally conservative people have continued to interact with a sophisticated urbanite population and have played a role in ensuring that traditional belief systems continued to be influential. One should also recognise that most indigenous people cannot in fact readily be categorised as either ‘urban’ or ‘rural’. Not only during the colonial years but also post-independence, people who settled in urban areas remained in touch with their rural roots and folks. They invested in rural areas by putting up modern homes where they would retire at old age and even wished to be interred there upon death. In explaining the meaning of ‘home’ to Zimbabwean urban workers and its direct implications, Fisher (1998: 110) cites Kabweza (1981) as saying:

[...] the term ‘home’ refers primarily to the rural area where ancestors are buried and which gives a person a totem and clan identity. Urban workers, most of whom wish to retire, die and be buried at the rural home, invest in property and social relationships centred on this location throughout their working lives (Kabweza 1987:1 cited by Fisher 1998: 110).

Fisher (1998: 110) also adds that this bond with rural homes was –demonstrated by the almost obligatory ‘month’s end’ journey home with provisions and cash”. This trend endures, and urban folks continue to invest in rural areas and to travel there to bury and conduct rituals for the dead and even the living.⁴ These African family traditions happen throughout the year

³The aggressive publicity and marketing efforts by Frank McEwen (of the Rhodes National Gallery of Rhodesia and its Workshop Art school in the then Salisbury, now the National Gallery of Zimbabwe's Art School and The National Gallery Art school, in Harare, respectively) working with Jorum Maringa, together with the formal training by Father John Groeber (of the Catholic Serima Mission in Masvingo) and Edward Paterson (an Anglican priest of Cyrene Mission) and the Mzilikazi Arts and Craft Centre of Bulawayo produced African artists who continued to inspire others to pursue the visual arts (see Arnold, 1989).

⁴All things being equal, a couple exchanging marriage vows through a Christian wedding ceremony in the city usually hold two receptions, one immediately after the exchange of vows in town, and a week later, another

but are more pronounced on public holidays such as Independence Day in April, and National Heroes and Defence Forces Days in August. This is additional to travel (from urban areas to rural areas or vice versa) for family reunions during the Easter and Christmas seasons.

Goals of the dissertation

This dissertation was primarily inspired by the need to understand not only the iconography and social meanings attached to monuments and public sculptures in postcolonial Zimbabwe, but also the immanent contestations that arise from these, together with the implications they have for the reception of public art. Specifically, in my dissertation I would like to accomplish four goals. Firstly, I intend to examine how post-colonial monuments and public sculpture relate to, and play a part in constructing concepts of national identity. My second goal is to identify ways in which public sculptures might be bound up with political imperatives. Third, I explore the reception of public art in contemporary Zimbabwe, focusing specifically on controversies relating to particular artwork and how these controversies assist in the shaping of perceptions. Investigating the meanings of selected public artworks in light of their relationship to contemporary social and cultural issues in Zimbabwe is my fourth goal.

In formulating the research questions, I was motivated by the need to interrogate the efficacy of monuments and public sculptures that emerged after independence and their impact on an urban audience in Harare and Bulawayo. In this regard, my arguments are guided by the need to address three major research questions. I am interested, firstly, in the meanings that monuments and memorials – spaces designated for politico-social rituals - embody for the individual and the collective within a nation. Secondly, I am concerned with the ways in which monuments and sculptural work assist in shaping discourse on public art and how this affects audience responses to those works. Thirdly, I am interested in the challenges and opportunities presented by the act of re/constructing monuments for cultural heritage tourism.

The first hypothesis of this dissertation is that while monuments in postcolonial Zimbabwe are set in place with the intention to preserve a historical and cultural past and elements of the

wedding reception is done in the rural areas. Usually this will be at the bridegroom's rural home. For some payment of *lobola* (the customary bride price) is conducted at the rural home of the would-be bride even when the parents stay and work in town/city.

present for the sake of posterity, they are also memorialised for the purposes of influencing and controlling the nation's collective memory.

In his postulations on symbolic systems of power Bourdieu (1989: 20) posits that the "social space tends to function as a symbolic space" and in it are different groups whose status and lifestyles are also different from one another. It is in this social space that people or what he terms "agents" deploy in accordance to their power or capital as well as its type "in the total volume of one's total asserts". Bourdieu (1989: 17) mentions "economic capital (in its different forms), cultural capital, social capital and symbolic capital" as the fundamental powers. Ultimately, symbolic capital is the form that the various types of capital become for an "agent" perceived and recognised as legitimate in his/her engagements within the social space of competition. Once legitimated the agent begins to use words to effect action from others, Bourdieu explains:

Symbolic power has to be based on the possession of symbolic capital [...] to impose upon other minds a vision, old or new, of social divisions depends on the social authority acquired in previous struggles. Symbolic capital is credit; it is the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition [...]. Symbolic power is the power to make things with words (Bourdieu, 1989: 23).

Understood in relation to the above, the commissioning of monuments in Zimbabwe is bound up with the desire to accumulate symbolic power (Bourdieu 1989). Clearly underpinned by propagandistic agendas, decisions taken in regard to their iconographies and form speak of imperatives on the part of the ruling elite to retain power and impose their worldview on the general population. In this dissertation I will examine how local government as well as central government not only commission public art, but also, when it suits them, invoke and institute laws and by-laws that influence what is to be located within the visual landscape of Zimbabwean cities.

The second hypothesis is that in postcolonial Zimbabwe, the kind of reception that a public artwork receives from its targeted audience within the public sphere is largely dependent upon that audience's historical and socio-cultural background. An historical and socio-cultural background encompasses lived experiences and behaviours of a people, and these stem from unequal societal distribution of power along the basis of race, gender, class,

ethnicity, age and even sexual orientation (Liestyna & Woodrum, 1999: 3). The conviction that “political culture and public art are intertwined” as posited by Flanagan (2008:134), is thus continuously foregrounded in my study of public art in Zimbabwe.

Monuments and public sculptures are visual texts that are the outcome of societal needs to remember some heroic and some not so heroic occurrences. In some instances monuments and public sculptures may be erected in memory of victimhood of a people and/or even an individual. In order to understand such creations, one might decipher each as a cultural text which communicates its own understanding of a particular cultural group or society. As Bonnell (1997: 19) observed in a study of soviet posters: “Art of any kind is best understood as part of a cultural system” or systems because it is from these that that culture’s way of seeing issues is projected. Thus in this dissertation, I employ important markers of these cultural systems in my attempt to examine how monuments and sculptures, as public art, shape the beliefs and thinking of a postcolonial Zimbabwean society.

Equally, the notion of identity formation in any given society has always been viewed as transient. Zimbabwe is a country fanatically evolving from colonialism, and therefore is continuously grappling with the processes of asserting itself as a sovereign state. This means that the issue of identity becomes inherently topical. But the search for a more enduring and critical understanding of identity in Zimbabwe cannot be complete without looking at the colonial and postcolonial cultural concerns and projects, among which are monuments and public sculpture. Although a lot has been written on the postcolonial in the social sciences, particularly on the social-political front, this has not been the case with public art. While a selection of scholars have written about national monuments, this focus has not extended to public sculpture. Among those who wrote about the National Heroes Acre (NHA) visuals are Arnold (1989), Gaidzanwa (1992), Kriger (1995/2003) and Werbner (1998). In the case of Old Bulawayo, work has been done by Pwiti and Ndoro (c1992), Muringaniza (1998) and Makuwaza (2002). Only articles by Arnold (1989), McCartney (2001) and a recent brief study by Mushohwe (2012) engage with postcolonial public sculpture, however.

In an article titled “A change of regime: Art and ideology in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe”, Arnold (1989) offers a brief engagement with the NHA’s statuary of *The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* in a text that includes a summary of sculptures and monuments in Rhodesia and early Zimbabwe. Importantly, Arnold sees the sculptures and monuments as designed

mostly to serve the incumbent regimes, and thus one can posit that in both Rhodesia and Zimbabwe these worked as objects of propaganda.

In an article entitled “Bourgeois theories of gender and feminism and their shortcomings with reference to southern African countries”, Rudo Gaidzanwa (1992) principally surveys how gender theories apply to the subcontinent. She considers the NHA statuary, especially its portrayal of a woman cadre in a skirt rather than pants, and in contrast to the two male cadres juxtaposed next to her who are in full military gear. This patriarchal construction is attributed to the postcolonial government. The roles that women played in the Chimurenga, side by side their male comrades, argues Gaidzanwa (1992), appear to be downplayed as women are supposed to appear modest in culturally acceptable feminine roles. She further argues that, in postcolonial Zimbabwe, women are suddenly domesticated while men go about performing government business.

On the other hand, Kriger’s 1995 treatise, “The politics of creating national heroes: The search for political legitimacy and national identity”, examines the early days of transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. She argues that colonial symbols were disposed of in a newly independent state, in a process of instituting a hierarchy of national heroes and shrines for the dead as new symbols of the nation. She examines how these new replacement symbols are used to entrench political power by elites. She writes:

The official celebration of the guerrilla war and the war dead were central to the ruling party’s legitimation of the new order it sought to construct. Two new national symbols, Heroes Day and Heroes Acre, demonstrated the new rulers’ use of war to legitimate themselves and the new nation. Minister of home affairs, Joshua Nkomo told parliament that the nation will celebrate heroes days (parliament approved in June 1980 designated days, 11 and 12 August) to remember those who fought and fell in the struggle for our freedom and recognition of our Independence by the whole world (Kriger, 2003: 64).

While Kriger comprehensively assesses the relationship of liberation veterans and the new state in the matrix of making national heroes in the first years of independence (1980 to 1987), her engagement with the NHA’s visual symbols is rather brief and general.

However, a close attempt to interpret some of the NHA visuals and activities that unfold at the shrine is presented by Werbner (1998), who also acknowledges drawing a lot from Kriger’s (1995) article. In an essay that discusses postcolonial memory headed “Smoke from

the barrel of a gun: Postwars of the dead, memory and reinscription in Zimbabwe”, Werbner (1998) tackles a number of issues. Besides providing a critique of the head of state’s nationalistic speeches delivered at NHA, Werbner points out the NHA’s gender and racial bias which respectively favours men and blacks as national heroes. He also examines the hierarchic structure in declaring and burying heroes in the nation as well as the shrine’s visuals which he views as “postcolonial pastiche” (Werbner, 1998: 8).

Even though Werbner (1998) extends the NHA discussion, his interpretation of some visuals - for example, the monochromatic narrative bronze reliefs - tends to be brief and generalised. Further, Kriger’s and Werbner’s texts, which date respectively to 1995 and 1998, necessarily attend only to the activities at the shrine up to about the mid-1990s, and there is a clear gap in its history which ought to be filled. Thus, along with revisiting some grey areas in the work of the above scholars, the activities associated with the NHA in the period leading up to the new millennium and the present, where the socio-political and economic fortunes of the country became turbulent, are given attention in my dissertation.

Related to monuments issues above is the NMMZ’s desire to revive Old Bulawayo as a cultural heritage ‘themed’ site for tourism. This has seen some studies and conference proceedings discussing the site, mostly from an archaeological and heritage management perspective. This is seen in the archaeological finds on Old Bulawayo reported in a compilation document by Hughes (2005) and the environmental impact assessment of the general Matopo precincts done and presented by Ndoro and Pwiti (c1993). Joseph Muringaniza’s 1998 Master of Philosophy dissertation entitled “Community participation in archaeological heritage management in Zimbabwe; The case of Old Bulawayo” examines the royal Khumalo clan’s and some of Matebeleland people’s participation in the interpretation of archaeological findings during and after the excavations of the Old Bulawayo site. The study also highlights the challenges encountered in the early reconstruction phase of Old Bulawayo’s royal enclosure in 1993 up to about 1998 (see Muringaniza, 1998: 32-33). But Old Bulawayo’s interpretive centre or site museum and the subsequent activities associated with the cultural heritage monument during re/construction, like the collection of Ndebele material culture and presenting it, remain unexplored in scholarly work.

At an International Council of Museums (ICOM) symposium held in Zambia, Makuwaza's (2002) paper entitled "Towards a new type of 'ethnographic' museum in Africa" which, while discussing the challenges that traditional museums and theme parks in Africa and in Zimbabwe generally encounter, makes an attempt to discuss the vision on the Old Bulawayo project ever since the beginning of re/construction. He posits that in the Zimbabwean context a theme park is "a 'living museum' where visitors can experience typical structures and activities of a past era". Makuwaza, (2002) tells us that Old Bulawayo would engage in the "production of typical artefacts of the [20th-century Ndebele state] period" which would be exhibited and sold to tourists. On the side-lines, "[cultural] arts performers at Old Bulawayo" in traditional cultural costumes would entertain the visitors (Makuwaza, 2002). While Makuwaza was futuristic in his outlook, I build on what really happened and continues to unfold at Old Bulawayo: the debates around involvement and non-involvement of the Ndebele stakeholders in re/construction; material culture collection, its interpretation and presentation; and the progress or lack of it, with regards to the realisation of the Old Bulawayo project as a culturally *themed* heritage monument.

Turning to public sculpture, Murray McCartney's (2001) article, "Beyond the Gallery walls: Art in Public" in the Zimbabwean journal, *Gallery*, appraises mainly public art that is related to architectural projects. Consequently, while he considers Madebe's *Construction Workers* (1993), *Looking into the Future* (1985) and the *Ploughman* (1993), among many post-independence art work in his article, he gives only basic information about them. For instance the article comments on the removal of *Looking into the Future* (1985) but falls short on unravelling exactly what may have prompted government action. He only mentions the fact that the artwork's depiction of male nudity was perceived as perverting society. In my study, I closely scrutinize the issues behind the banning. I factor in the socio-cultural beliefs of the indigenous audience, the influences of local politics and the insights from the artist (Madebe) regarding his work and relate these to the first and the second banishments of *Looking into the future* from public view.

McCartney (2001) also looks at the *Ploughman* as a peasant farmer who enhances the architecture of the Agricultural Bank structure known as Hurudza House. The placement of the sculpture on a 5-metre pedestal distances the *Ploughman* from the ordinary pedestrians beneath it (McCartney, 2001). While McCartney aptly notes this, he does not however interrogate it as an issue, perhaps because of space limitations or simply because he did not

see the need to do so. As is the case with *Looking into the future*, McCartney does not seem to recognise the *Ploughman*'s symbolic ties with politics and indigenous beliefs associated with the land struggles intrinsic to Zimbabwean history. It is these oversights that I address in my analysis of the *Ploughman* as a signifier in social semiotics. However, McCartney's text does include some valuable observations. He observes the lack of very recent public art in Harare and laments the silence of its citizens in demanding the kind of art that they want, even if he does not suggest how this may be done.

Writing on a related subject in *The Herald*, a national daily, with the title "Sculpture and maintenance", Knowledge Mushohwe (2012) primarily addresses the issue of maintenance of art, and in the process he mentions Dominic Benhura's *Leapfrog* (1996) as an example of a neglected work. He observes that there are inadequacies in Zimbabwe in regard to maintaining artwork in both the public and private domains. While he speculates that it is probably the wind that broke *Leap Frog* and condemns the failure by city authorities and artist to restore the work, Mushohwe (2012: 6) also advises that "the change of ownership from sculptor to another party [must be] accompanied by instructions on how to prolong the sculpture's existence". Despite the fact that Mushohwe appears to have not established the circumstances of *Leap frog*'s placement on site, his article is forthright on two issues - the need to involve artists and ensure that they superintend over their creations' installation on sites, as well as making sure that they partake in regular site visits to assess the condition of works for the sole purpose of instituting maintenance (Mushohwe, 2012: 6). While Mushohwe writes briefly on the *Leap frog*, he does not focus in detail on it. Concerns about site and installation, along with issues of meaning and the reception of the sculpture, tend to be glossed over in what is in fact a short newspaper report. In this dissertation, I therefore interrogate these issues. I solicit opinion from the audiences that experience the artwork on a day-to-day level as well as glean information from officers of the Harare City Council and Benhura.

Accordingly, the results of this dissertation offer new perspectives on how the nexus of public art, identity and culture influence the understanding of intricate processes of interaction in a nation-state undergoing critical but necessary phases of change associated with the postcolonial. In dealing with public art, the study also addresses critical issues of culture, social memory and politics. In addition, it attempts to show how these disciplines are changeable and yet remain instrumental in shaping a contemporary Zimbabwe.

It is important to note that the dissertation does not attempt to provide general encyclopaedic coverage of all public projects that have been undertaken since 1980 but instead explores selected examples in depth. Through focused engagement with specific examples and with controversies that have arisen in regard to them, it casts new light on the ways in which public images and symbols are linked to constructs of identity and the socio-political landscape of post-independence Zimbabwe.

Research methods and positioning of the research

Critical theory has had a considerable influence on this dissertation in that most of its ideas make use of classical sociological theory, which in principle, aims at comprehending the origins of the social order for purposes of transforming it. Thus ideas from critical theorists from the Frankfurt School (Kellner, 1989: 1) such as Antonio Gramsci, Pierre Bourdieu and Jurgen Habermas, among many others, will be used in this study. As critical theory embraces a multi-disciplinary approach to research that concerns itself with tackling contemporary and social issues (Kellner, 1989: 1), it lends itself to deployment in a study in which I seek to interpret contemporary issues inherent in the memorialisation associated with state monuments and to discern the meanings the public ascribe to public sculpture in independent Zimbabwe.

In this context, qualitative research methodology was central to this study because it is ~~multi-method~~ in focus, [and involves] an interpretive, naturalistic approach to [...] subject matter” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998: 3).⁵ Most importantly, qualitative research is designed to discover answers to questions that focus on how social experience is enacted and assigned meaning. Qualitative research also uses ‘thick descriptions’ for presenting its findings (Geertz cited by Lincoln and Guba, 1985) and quantitative researchers who primarily dwell on statistical variables often criticise this. Thick descriptions, however, provide ~~sufficient~~ information about the context in which an inquiry is carried out so that anyone else interested in transferability has a base of information appropriate for judgment” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985: 124-5).

⁵See Lincoln and Guba (1985: 39-43) who give comprehensive reasons of naturalistic methods for conducting qualitative research.

In attending to issues raised by the research questions, I draw from not only art history and philosophy of art but also history, anthropology, psychology, political sociology, social geography and some of their sub-disciplines. This eclectic approach meant that public art issues herein were critically analysed using strengths gleaned from other research disciplines. Content analysis as a research process was employed for “making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the context of their uses” (Krippendorff, 2004: 18). Other than this, the study employs primary data from fieldwork undertaken in South Africa and Zimbabwe. As is typical of naturalistic qualitative research, data gathering for this study began gradually in June 2008. This was followed by six intensive months of field work between December 2009 and May 2010. Additionally, purposively informed follow-up activities implied a continuous process of data gathering and analysis even as the dissertation writing steadily progressed in 2011 and 2012.

After presenting a synopsis of my intended research to the NMMZ in Harare, Zimbabwe, I was officially permitted to access NMMZ sites and libraries to conduct research. NMMZ personnel were also permitted to grant me interviews in the event that I assessed that the personnel in question possessed the requisite information for this study. Essentially, I was placed in a position of trust. I made it a point to clearly state the objectives of the research at the beginning of every interview and assured participants that all sensitive matters which might be compromising to them, if revealed, would be treated as confidential. This is in line with best practice for research (see Lofland and Lofland cited by Hoepfl, 1997). On a related theme, Hoepfl also observes that “because naturalistic researchers are asking participants to grant access to their lives, their minds, [and] their emotions’, it is also important to provide respondents with a straightforward description of the goals of the research”.⁶

Purposive sampling and a preliminary field assessment done in 2008 influenced the selection of participants with special knowledge of the area under investigation in advance (Patton, 2002: 243; Berg, 2001: 32). Purposive sampling seeks out ‘information-rich cases’ for purposes of in-depth analysis (Patton cited in Hoepfl, 1997). I also used snowball sampling to access key informants. McNealy (1999: 157) defines a snowball sample as “the population of interest [that] cannot be identified other than by someone who knows that a certain person

⁶www.scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/JTE/v9n1/hoepfl.html - 61k

has the necessary experience or characteristics to be included”. Thus I used my contacts within the academic and the art community in Zimbabwe as informants in recruiting respondents. Their recommendations and links facilitated interviews with the most knowledgeable persons in the field using the snowball aspect of purposive sampling.

The study required that I purposively interview key informants and these included: NMMZ personnel like directors, monuments curators and heritage management consultants; National Gallery of Zimbabwe (NGZ) personnel, such as directors and curators; ‘public art’ artists and other visual artists; museum and gallery display officers or artists; Harare City Council officials; historians and sociologists; liberation war veterans (demobilised and those actively serving in the military); and members of the public who interact with public artwork.

While the dissertation draws substantially from primary data generated from in-depth interviews, it also makes use of secondary sources of information. Some data was also gleaned from websites, electronic media newscasts and interviews, documents, and archival material such as newspaper articles, peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed periodicals, political posters, parliamentary debates, governmental and non-governmental organisations’ bulletins and brochures, photographs and films. Therefore methods used include in-depth interviews, observation, document and content analysis, and photography. This array of methods arguably ensured that information used in this dissertation is validated and/or triangulated. As Patton (2002: 242) stresses, “triangulation strengthens a study by combining methods”.

In qualitative methodology, the researcher typically becomes the main tool for conducting field work, especially interviews (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 39). The interview process is an exercise of engaging in “a conversation with a purpose” and that “specifically the purpose is to gather information” (Berg, 2001: 66). I pre-tested interview schedules prior to embarking on fieldwork and this informed on the revision of instruments and ensured that they are unambiguous and effective in eliciting the intended information from informants. In Krugersdorp and Sandton, Johannesburg, South Africa, two in-depth interviews lasting about an hour and a half each were conducted and recorded on an mp3 voice recorder. These used

semi-structured questions⁷ because they allow the interviewer and participant to engage in natural conversation about events (Denzin, 1985: 107). In Harare, a total of 24 interviews were completed, out of which two of the informants requested anonymity. Of the four interviews held in Bulawayo, one informant wanted anonymity and confidentiality guaranteed. Only one interview was conducted in Chinhoyi. Thus the total number of interviews conducted between June 2008 and February 2012 was 31.

Of the 24 interviews conducted in Harare, 19 informants agreed to be recorded on an mp3 voice recorder, while five did not, so I took notes. For 24 of the participants I left a questionnaire in advance, and then came later, as agreed on scheduling, to conduct the in-depth interview basing on the same questionnaire. For the other seven informants, interviews were circumstantially conducted without having made prior arrangements. However, all these conversations yielded rich primary data. Most interviews lasted between 40 and 60 minutes. Later, transcribed interview scripts were sent via email to those informants on internet, for verification and editing. For those without internet, I sent hard copies for them to read and add/or remove statements as they verified the transcriptions. This “member checking” exercise meant that participants were called upon to “corroborate” findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985: 313-316). Participants were also telephoned to confirm emerging issues during the unfolding processing of data and its analysis (Strauss, 1987: 27). Even though verification proved to be time consuming and expensive, it was an ethical exercise which not only ensured that field data was authenticated but also that participants would not feel short-changed in the report writing. Fundamentally, the verification process also became an act of guaranteeing internal validity. Notably, voices recorded on mp3 format were also saved on compact disc and the profile of interviewees is given in the reference section.

Document analysis involves describing and interpreting a social group’s or society’s artefacts. Usually, these are written texts such as newspapers and books. However, other forms of communication like music, pictures or political speeches could be included (Marshall and Rossman; 1999, Bogdan and Biklen; 1992). Observation, on the other hand, entails “gathering impressions of the surrounding world through all relevant human faculties”, without necessarily manipulating the subjects under observation (Adler and Adler, 1998: 80).

⁷One of these interviews was with Edward Matenga, a heritage management consultant who was in charge of establishing Old Bulawayo cultural monument. The other was artist, Adam Madebe whose public artwork is being considered in this thesis. These two have been based in South Africa for some time and information to reach them was acquired during my preliminary fieldwork conducted in June 2008 in Zimbabwe.

I used document analysis in conjunction with the observation methods at the NHA, Old Bulawayo and on other public sculpture sites. Thus the study incorporated content analysis of both written information and visuals found on sites of study as observable exhibited data worthy of interpretation.

In adhering to qualitative research's use of multiple means of enquiry, the study also used photography and this made the camera a research tool for gathering ~~data~~ that is both selective and specific" (Collier & Collier cited by Leavy, 2009: 217). Thus photographs taken during fieldwork were organised into categories and subcategories that related to themes that emerged as processing and analysis of the data progressed. During the process of writing the dissertation, a sequence of images was used to ~~provide~~ a more reliable insight than individual photographs" would have done (Martin & Martin, 2004: 18). Therefore photographs anchor my explanations and arguments as they also stand as arbiters in instances where interpretation from secondary sources was casual or in doubt. Leavy aptly captures this as follows:

Visual images are a powerful communicative tool with the potential to help us see things in new ways. Therefore researchers are using visual imagery as part of data analysis as well as medium to represent data, often with the intent to confronting and challenging stereotypes and the prevailing ideology that normalises them (Leavy, 2009: 263).

The use of images not only as a data gathering method but also as a process of data presentation and analysis was in fact recognising that images assist to ~~communicate~~ both theoretical and empirical meaning effectively" (Webber, 2008: 50). In this respect photographs were useful in the analysis of data as they could be compared and contrasted with what participants in interviews had said. Eysenck and Flanagan (2000), cited by Martin and Martin (2004: 12), contend that using words and photographs concurrently gives a much deeper and comprehensive analysis, which leads to ~~longer~~ lasting, stronger memory trace", when compared to what they termed the ~~shallower~~ levels of analysis" usually experienced in using words only.

Qualitative data analysis involves a search for general statements about relationships among categories of data and this makes it a process which ~~is~~ a messy, ambiguous time-consuming, creative, and fascinating" (Marshall and Rossman 1999: 12). The simultaneous act of data collection and analysis coding that has been characteristic of this study was influenced by

constructivist ideas of Lincoln and Guba (1985). In constructivism interpretation is based on purposive sampling, grounded theory, inductive data analysis and contextual interpretations (Denzin 1998: 330).

To this effect, I did the transcriptions of the interviews in a process of sense-making out of the data using a three-stage data colour-coding system; the open coding, the axial and the selective coding (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). While the process is non-linear in practice because analysis of data is never complete, the coding system is sequentially described to attain clarity. After transcribing data, there were instances where informants were not clear such that I emailed and or telephoned them to gain clarification. Notes and photographs taken during fieldwork were also introduced into the transcripts in a process that entailed minutely breaking, classifying, comparing and contrasting data in a repetitive fashion of going over the transcripts building concepts about the data - a process that Strauss (1987: 28) calls “open coding”. In this prolonged process of continually comparing and contrasting data for concepts and categories, broad themes with relational ideas began to emerge and for every identifiable theme a code would be assigned.

The axial phase involved analysis “around one category at a time” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 32) and this led to the understanding of the inter-connectedness between one category and other categories, including their subcategories. Essential in this stage was that connections were made to other categories that emerged in the literature review as well as in the open coding stage such that contexts of categories were beginning to form what would ultimately be nucleus in the last stage of selective coding.

In selective coding, emphasis was placed on one category or theme with the “other codes becoming subservient to the key code under focus” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 33). Thus other categories and sub-categories in their relatedness became additions to a core category that would emerge from amalgamating, through selective coding, all identically colour-coded themes or categories from interview transcripts. The same process of colour-coding used for interviews was applied to secondary collected data. When the two data sets were collated into a single data set, it became easier to identify individual colours around nucleus themes and it was these themes that constituted different chapters for the dissertation. It is noteworthy that selectively coded data that came from interviews is used as excerpts in the thesis.

Qualitative research method is characteristically subjective in that it always intends to construct meanings without influencing or manipulating the subject or site of inquiry. For this, qualitative research methodology has often been criticised by traditionalist researchers as not being objective (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Farmer et al, 2006.) This explains why it is vital in this dissertation, to thoroughly and clearly explain the processes involved so that the research is seen as having been subjected to analytical rigour such that issues of validity, objectivity or reliability are put to rest. It is actually in the use of multiple processes of collecting and analysing data in a process of triangulation that qualitative research's claims to validity are founded. Stake (1994: 241) regards triangulation as ~~a~~ "a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation". However, it will be naive to expect both interpretations and observations to be entirely repeatable particularly when one takes into consideration that triangulation helps in illuminating on ~~the~~ meaning by identifying different ways the phenomenon is being seen" (Flick cited in Stake 1994: 421).

On a related note, Denzin (cited in Lincoln and Guba 1985: 305) identifies four types of triangulation where a researcher can use manifold and diverse ~~sources~~, methods, investigators and theories" to validate a study. In this qualitative research, I made use of three types; methodological, data and theoretical triangulation. In utilising the in-depth interview, observation, document analysis and photography as data collecting techniques, I ensured that there was methodological triangulation (Farmer, *et al* 2006: 379). Webber came to the conclusion that even though ~~the~~ triangulation by methods may be difficult, it is very much worth doing, because it makes data believable" (cited in Lincoln and Guba 1985: 306). As for data triangulation, Farmer *et al* (2006: 379) posit that it ~~involves~~ the use of multiple data sources (e.g. two types of reports) or respondent groups (e.g. professionals versus lay)". In applying this logic, I interviewed professionals drawn from the NMMZ, NGZ, heritage management, curators and local and North Korean artists. Liberation war veterans plus Bulawayo and Harare residents constituted the lay persons. In the theoretical triangulation, I utilised different ~~theoretical~~ lenses" (Farmer *et al*, 2006: 379) spanning from art-related to non-art disciplines to interpret emerging themes of data phenomenon. Crucial in these protocols (data gathering, analysis and thesis writing) is that I consistently exercised reflexivity – a process of engaging in ~~an~~ internal dialogue that repeatedly examines what the researcher knows and how the researcher came to know about it" (Berg: 2001: 139). Reflexivity implied that I not only present, in the dissertation, ~~findings~~ as facts" but I

robustly construct –interpretations of experiences in the field” and then interrogate how these fundamentally came about (Hertz 1997, Van Maanen, 1988 all cited in Berg, 2001: 139). Therefore the collection and interpretation of data was subjected to critical analysis.

Dissertation structure

In Chapter One, as background to my discussion of Zimbabwe specifically, I discuss debates about the ‘public’ and the way in which so-called public art is received. I begin by focusing on the concept of the public sphere as postulated by Jurgen Habermas and the resultant criticism thereof by other scholars who suggest the notion of counter-publics or subaltern public spheres. It is here that ideas of the public sphere are related to public art. I then discuss the origins of public art in selected Western societies as from the 1960s, in particular the issues associated with public art, privatised public art and ‘site’ as public art. I follow this by offering an overview of monuments as places of collective memory and as public art considering also their relationship to tourism in postcolonial Africa.

Chapter Two examines the National Heroes Acre (NHA), which is a Second *Chimurenga* or Liberation War monument located in Harare. It is a burial site where in the main liberation war heroes and heroines of the Zimbabwean nation are interred. I explore the resemblance of the architecture of the NHA in its design to the AK 47 rifle that was commonly used in the Second Chimurenga, as well as analysing the other visual symbols at the shrine in order to establish their meanings and significance. I also link these motifs to the symbolic conflicts associated with the monument from as far back as 1981, beginning with that of local and North Korean artists who collaborated in the work on sculptures and sculptural reliefs at the NHA. Furthermore, I examine the process of conferring the status of heroes/heroines. I argue in the chapter, that symbolic contests arise from the conferment process for the institution of hero/heroine and that this directly led to the diminishing of the sacredness associated with the NHA shrine as a war memorial and national monument from 1999 to the present day. I also contend that the reading of the NHA mnemonics and its associated rituals changed as the socio-political climate in the country altered from that of a one-party-state to the current multi-party system of politics ushered in by a Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2008.

An analysis of the reconstruction of Old Bulawayo as a cultural heritage monument is undertaken in Chapter Three. Here I analyse the critical process of reconstructing structures

of King Lobengula's royal court, the small interpretive museum and the associated controversies that go with Old Bulawayo as a place of collective memory and as a "place of history" or *lieu d'histoire*" (Nora, 1989: 19). I also consider the envisaged re-enactment in the 21st- century of cultural rituals and ceremonies associated with Old Bulawayo. Thus in this chapter I argue that contested interpretations of the activities and material culture of Old Bulawayo stem from the perceived exclusion of the 'Ndebele people' in the framing of their cultural image by the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe (NMMZ). Finally, in this chapter, I consider how the planned celebration of an Ndebele cultural heritage would feed into the construction of a national cultural citizenship, whereas cultural capital would serve the needs of the elite and politicians.

In Chapter Four I investigate a set of stone sculptures, *Leap Frog* (1996). Donated to the City of Harare by artist Dominic Benhura in 2003, the sculptures were installed in the Town House garden. Although damaged in 2008 and not repaired, they remain on view – a factor that, I argue, has important implications for the kinds of meanings that the work conveys. In this chapter I explore the concepts of 'site' and 'publicness', as I review the circumstances of how *Leapfrog* ended up in the Town House gardens. I argue that the artwork is not appropriately located, considering among other things the circumstances of its damage and how this affects the artwork, the sculptor and the viewer. I also argue that the sculpture conveys commentary about the bearers of office at Harare Town House and indeed how *Leapfrog* in its damaged state ends up offering social commentary about the activities that take place in the city's public spaces.

Adam Madebe's welded-metal sculpture, *Ploughman* (1992), is mounted on a pedestal outside Hurudza Building in the city of Harare – a structure that houses Zimbabwe's agricultural bank, Agribank. It is not only a sculpture that embellishes the architecture, but also relates to the land struggles in Zimbabwe. In Chapter Five I examine the *Ploughman*, arguing that the sculpture is a socio-semiotic sign which assumes the mythical status of 'child of the soil'⁸ in its association of the peasant farmer with land use, land rights, and identity in Zimbabwe since its inception in 1993. I examine how the *Ploughman*'s signification of 'child of the soil' originates from an African understanding about people embedded in a relationship with the land that they work, highlighting how this 'myth' resonates with significance for

⁸*Mwana wevhu/umtwana wemhlabathi* are the Shona and Ndebele equivalents for 'child of the soil', respectively.

many Zimbabweans. In this chapter, I also consider how significations of ‘child of the soil’ are informed and transformed by patriarchy and the politics of colonialism. Through this, I indicate how *Ploughman’s* construction as ‘son of the soil’ marginalises women – yet it is females who in fact are the primary workers of the land. Finally, I consider *Ploughman’s* significations in light of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) of 2002 also known as the Third Chimurenga or Third Liberation War.

In Chapter Six I consider the controversy associated with another of Adam Madebe’s welded-metal sculptures, *Looking into the future* (1985). Representing a male nude, it was removed from public view twice, in 1985 and (following its reinstallation) in 2010. In this chapter, I examine not only the circumstances surrounding the sculpture’s commission by the Bulawayo City Council, but also its reception by the Bulawayo public and the subsequent announcement to remove it from public view by central government, as I track the public sphere debate that ensued. I argue that the flawed process of commission and the resultant debate in the public sphere partly contributed to the removal of the sculpture. I also contend that the Zimbabwean ‘art world’ could have engaged the public who voiced their dissent, and the artist, who might have accepted an invitation to ‘dress’ the statue, if the Bulawayo City Council had tasked the ‘art world’ to intervene before the minister of Local Government and Town Planning censored the sculpture. I also argue in the chapter that the two acts of banning the sculpture were not without symbolic capital for central government.

Finally, in my Conclusion, I summarise the main themes undertaken in the six chapters on the overview of literature and on monuments and public sculpture in postcolonial Zimbabwe. I argue that in Zimbabwe, monuments and public sculpture provide the necessary interface for the visual, cultural and political discourse of a postcolonial nation constantly in transition and dialogue with the everyday realities of trying to understand and construct a national identity from a nest of sub-cultures. In essence, monuments and public sculpture abound with political imperatives because as visual artefacts and performances they are conscious creations of society and therefore are constitutive of that society’s heritage and social memory.

CHAPTER ONE

The public, ‘public art’ and its history.

Introduction

Public art is a subject that incorporates several issues and often attracts controversy. Debate may revolve around, for example, features of artworks, sites that have been chosen, processes of commissioning and patronage, or how the work is perceived by those who are likely to interact with it. But while debates might focus on very different aspects of public art or indeed on examples in very varied geographical contexts, most will ultimately demand consideration of what it might mean to produce art that is ‘public’, specifically, as opposed to ‘private’.

In this section of the dissertation, I provide a background for the specific examples which I explore in subsequent chapters by considering discourses on art in the public domain from theoretical and historical angles. The chapter is essentially an attempt to ground the issues that underpin, or are raised during, my explorations in later chapters. I begin with an analysis of notions of the ‘public sphere’ by a number of scholars. This leads to a discussion of the relationship between the ‘public sphere’ and ‘public art’ and how this link feeds into understandings of democracy in the public realm. I then explore some key considerations in contemporary public art in the West which also have relevance to African contexts as well as providing an overview of monuments as places of memory. Focusing specifically on the postcolonial, my chapter culminates in an assessment of monuments as part of heritage and cultural tourism

The concept of public

In its Greek and Latin sense, the concept of ‘public’ is deemed to have two meanings; ~~the~~ “the socio-political one (the polis or whole body of people)” and the ~~visual~~ “visual-intellectual (fame or open exhibition)” according to Holscher (cited in Peters, 1995: 7). In this respect, the diverse senses of the verb public in his words ~~shows~~ “shows a shading of the political into the visual register” (Peters, 1995: 7). Dwelling on the socio-political angle, Hoffman explains her view of the public

as a form of social organization transcending particular communities and the restraints of existing norms to achieve corporate unity through critical interaction and public discourse; a public is constituted when persons have the ability to speak to each other across divergent cultural boundaries (Hoffman, 1991: 541).

In a related dimension of examining the term public, Taylor (cited in Peters, 1995:7) says it ~~is~~ what matters [...] or belongs to the whole society, or pertains to the instrument or institutions or loci by which society comes together as a body and act". Whatever concerns the people ~~as~~ a body" is also always subjected to ~~public~~ exhibition" (Peters, 1995: 7). Also implied in the conceptions above is that interaction by the public is acted in a place or social space of some kind. Hannah Arendt (1958) refers to such spaces of public discourse as the public realm. The expression *public realm* may also mean a public arena and is oftentimes referred to in scholarly writings as the public sphere. Inherently, the public sphere is an entity that keeps changing its structure with the passage of time and unfolding of events (Mar, 2000).

Habermas (1989) idealised a public sphere as a place where individuals (men in particular) gather to rationally debate and put together ideas that influence public opinion as well as formulate rules that assist in administering society. Those who enter into the public sphere, Habermas insists, should not be officials of the state, and similarly, those from the public sphere ought not to be part of the state (Peters, 1995). This upheld the autonomy of both the public sphere and the sphere of the state in society and, because of publicity in the press, opinions of the public sphere were made known and the state was not secretive in its operations.⁹ However, with the passage of time the public sphere grew too powerful and started to interfere in matters of the state and, as the state became absolutist, it also interfered in matters of the public sphere (Habermas, 1989). Other than this, the opening up of the public sphere to everyone and the proliferation of the press which also shaped public opinion, also led to the ideal public sphere collapsing (Habermas, 1989).

⁹The public sphere played a regulatory role and made sure that the state is answerable to society as is observed by Nancy Fraser (1990: 58).when she writes that:

At first this meant requiring that information about state functioning be made accessible so that state activities would be subject to critical scrutiny and the force of ~~public~~ opinion". Later, it meant transmitting the considered ~~general~~ interest" of ~~bourgeois~~ society" to the state via forms of legally guaranteed free speech, free press, and free assembly, and eventually through the parliamentary institutions of representative government

Given that Habermas (1989) talks only of a single overarching public sphere, this became the major weakness in his conception.¹⁰ Fraser (1990) along with Negt and Kluge (cited in Deutsche, 1996) recognise the excluded other of the overarching public sphere as constitutive of what are known as counter-public spheres. These provide alternative or counter-discourse to that of the main public sphere (Sheik, 2004). Fraser calls them subaltern counter-public spheres (Fraser, 1990) while Negt and Kluge (cited in Deutsche 1996) speak of proletariat counter-public spheres.¹¹

The public sphere(s) most importantly denote dynamic spaces for citizens as strangers who ideally rise above particular social groups and communicate with one another. Communication, however, is not only dependent upon the availability of an enabling media, but also education and physical public spaces that are properly administered to provide citizens with the necessary powers to exercise choice (Calhoun, 2005; Habermas, 1989). These empowering choices appear to be completely guaranteed where there are multiple publics rather than in a single domineering public sphere (Fraser, 1990).¹² Therefore the

¹⁰The conception of Habermas' single public sphere tended to alienate a number of social groups like the working class, women and all non-white people in what Geof Eley (quoted by Fraser, 1990: 60) calls a ~~process~~ "processes of class formation".

¹¹In the subaltern counter-public, Fraser (1990) prefers that it takes a binary view of the traditional public sphere, where there are weaker publics and strong publics. In the former, she asserts, the participants only discuss ~~opinion forming~~ "opinion forming" and not decision making, while participants in the latter group's (of the so-called sovereign parliaments) discourse would include both ~~opinion-formation and decision making~~ "opinion-formation and decision making" that is ~~deliberating on authorisation of the use of state power~~ "deliberating on authorisation of the use of state power" (Fraser, 1990: 75).

¹²With the increase of communication media and new technologies, publics that have been mostly place-based have become less place-based, which has had the effect of diluting the consensus that appears to have been conceived of in the public spheres discussed above. On the contrary, radical democracy advocates like Chantal Mouffe view the participative deliberations of the public spheres as overly concerned with reaching consensus at the expense of the ~~articulation~~ "articulation of difference and conflict outside deliberative democracy" (Karppinen, 2008: 33). This implies that consensus does not represent the views of all in the processes of discourse and instead is meant to enhance control over others. Mouffe (cited in Karppinen, 2008: 33) argues that in liberal democratic societies, consensus is ~~and~~ "and will always be—the expression of hegemony and the crystallisation of power relations[...]because it postulates the availability of consensus without exclusion".

Thus even when radical pluralists concede that Habermas conceived the public sphere as a field for rational and critical debate that leads to consensus, they still maintain that in the public sphere, democracy ought to be seen as ~~agonistic confrontation or continued contestation~~ "agonistic confrontation or continued contestation" (Karppinen, 2008: 33; see also Sheik, 2004: 6). Carmmearts (2007: 4) offers the same view when writing that attaining consensus ~~reinforces the hegemony and dominance of the ruling elites rather than bring about empowerment and social change~~ "reinforces the hegemony and dominance of the ruling elites rather than bring about empowerment and social change". Radical democracy proponents see a typical weakness of deliberative democracy in that it disregards the affective element that is brought about by collective identifications and passions in politics (Mouffe in Karppinen 2008: 33). Consensus, as Karppinen (2008: 33) astutely argues, does not recognise ~~the~~ "the contingency and ambiguity of social identities".

These identities come with a wide range of communicative approaches like ~~the~~ "the affective, the poetic, the humorous, the ironic and so forth", as Dahlgren (2004: 156) tells us. These social identities are not fixed and so are always being contested. This makes the agonistic public sphere not only a field for the ~~firmation~~ "firmation of discursive public opinion, or the aggregation of predefined interests, but also a site for the formation and

public sphere is better off with ~~m~~ultiple publics and varied spheres of interest” writes Harrison (2013: 44).

The public sphere-public art relationship

Barbara Hoffman (1991: 540) notes that art is usually an ~~i~~ndividual inquiry by a sculptor or painter” and embodies ~~s~~elf-expression and vision that may challenge conventional wisdom and values”. The difficulty in pinning down public and art into a singular concept of public art, she suggests, comes from the fact that the term public ~~e~~ncompasses a reference to the community, the social order [and] self-negation” (Hoffman 1991: 540).

For Deutsche (1992: 39), however, deploying the idea of public art in relation to the idea of a public sphere ~~r~~eplaces definitions of public art as art that occupies or designs physical spaces and addresses independently formed audiences with a definition of public art as a practice that constitutes a public by engaging people in political debate”. This conception of public art as intricately involving political dialogue with critically-minded publics and which is thus participatory would also mean that it

thwarts the ability to use public art - with its connotations of universal accessibility - to legitimate existing locations as democratic. With the public realm defined as an inclusionary arena of political participation, a sphere having to do with rights and social legitimacy, arts administrators can less easily ignore either the displacement of social groups from public space or the conflicts of public space while continuing to describe it as ~~a~~ccessible” (Deutsche 1992: 39-40).

contestation of social identities” posits Karppinen (2008: 34). In effect, the public sphere is ideally supposed to uphold these identities while simultaneously letting rational debate persist. Consequently, Malcolm Miles’ (2006) postulation becomes important: that the conception of a possible public sphere will only exist through social dialogue and not in the context of a definitive design. He writes ~~S~~ocial dialogue enables the shaping of social imagination, hence glimpses of how else a society might be organised. This resembles Lefebvre’s idea of lived time - constituted by moments of liberation within the routines of everyday life” (Miles, 2006:4).

In taking cognisance of the fact that the internet provides ~~p~~articipatory and interactive” characteristics, Natalie Fenton (2010: 24) sees it as carrying the potential to drastically influence the way in which persons relate to the public sphere. When interacting on the internet citizens ~~b~~ecome creators and primary subjects [...] engaged in social production”, writes Fenton (2010: 24). Of significance in this social process is the fact that the internet, as part of the new and broadening media, does ~~a~~t work on the basis of consensus building” but it brings in experiences that are ~~c~~ontradictory and contingent” (Fenton, 2010: 32). Arguably, this dimension of the internet could also be construed as useful in shaping debate in the plural public spheres, especially in situations where there is censorship or tight control of public media by the state. Online newspapers, editorials and blogs have become arenas that amplify open debate, thus actively acting as counter-publics. On the other hand, the internet perhaps also subtly informs people on consensus seeking debate that happens in the main public spheres of society.

Deutsche believes that the public and its attendant categories of public sphere, public function, public art, public intellectual and public space are “discursive objects” and should not be simply taken as being “transparent designations of groups, realms, activities, places or entities” (Deutsche, 1992: 44). Understood in these terms, the divide between museum or gallery and out-of-the-walls art is becoming increasingly blurred. In more cases than one, ‘the public’ in public art and public places now stands for activism and we experience this in works that tackle social functions in society. For instance public art is increasingly being seen in support of “the goals and identities of community movements and those forms of social struggle [...] of new social movements” as is the case with feminist, gay, AIDS activists, environment and ecological calls (Trend, cited by Deutsche, 1992: 45). Public art also comes in as social commentary, all in a bid to spur debate and create what Trend (1989:6 cited in Deutsche, 1992: 45) terms “civic consciousness”.

What can help public art to realise its public function and at the same time become political in the public space is for it to assume a publicist form. Arguing for such an approach, Kwon (2002: 1) analysed the development of public artwork in the USA spanning a period of thirty-five years, and classified it as “different models of communicative practices or forms of public address” rather than as genres of art. For the task Kwon made use of a four-way quasi-evolutionary communications-community theory propounded by Williams (1961: 23, in Gable, 1989: 23) which is hierarchical and uses categories beginning with the authoritarian and moving to the paternalistic, the commercial and, finally, the democratic. At the end of his taxonomy, Kwon (2002: 4) concluded that “the ‘democratic’ public sphere emerges as a competitive, formless and inconclusive process”.

Emerging in this discussion is the premise that it is through public engagement that members of any society shape and influence values of that society. Some of the opinion within public spheres is what is responsible for the public art that we see in our midst. But at the same time it is also public art that stimulates debate in the public arena.

It becomes important at this juncture to make an historical analysis of what has been happening in the *actual* public sphere with regards to public art.

Tracing public art

In the 1960s a lot of contemporary artwork found its way into city squares, street corners, and public gardens and outside corporate and public buildings, even railway stations, schools and hospitals in most western countries (Miles, 1997; Curtis, 1999). Some of this art came in the form of sculpture, murals, cobbled attachments on architecture and some merely as stand-alone works on external walls of buildings. This artwork in public spaces from the sixties sought to regenerate and embellish cities and in the process entertain the urbanites, in that it was art outside the museum and gallery walls and was available to a wider audience. As such, it became known as “public art” (Senie, 2003: 1).

The proliferation of public art mostly happens with the blessing of state sponsorship through not very open means and is oftentimes implemented through bureaucratic administration (Miles, 1997). In both the United States of America (USA) and Europe, public art was mostly commissioned by or through public bodies on behalf of the private sector, individuals or government (Miles, 1997; Sandler, 1995; Deutsche, 1996). In the case of the United Kingdom (UK), the Arts Council promotes the ‘Percent for Art Policy’ where a given percentage in the budget for a building project is set aside for the commissioning of an artwork. As for the USA, federal government programmes were initiated by the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and the General Services Administration (GSA). These two institutions with their “panels and committees of select experts deciding the fate of public art commissions” funded public art projects known as ‘Art in Public Places’ and ‘Art in Architecture’ whose “purpose was to bring the ‘best’ accomplishments in art to a general public” (Kwon, 2002: 2). Individual American states and cities took a cue from these two federal programmes to institute their own ‘Percent for Art’ programmes (Senie, 1992; Kester, 2006; Schroeder, 2002) which operated on more or less similar lines as in the UK. There has been a subsequent practice that came in opposition to site-specific-art and based itself on participation and collaboration of audiences in the making of the artwork in public. These public-engaging art ideals were referred to as “new genre public art” according to artist and writer Suzanne Lacy (cited in Kwon, 2004:60).

The above developments make evident that public art is patronised in one way or the other. Patronage comes in various forms. It may come from real estate market developers, financial institutions or corporations, for example, or it might be the work of political bodies. In

addition, some patronage comes from individuals in their private capacities – and ostensibly *public art* can in fact end up being owned by private players (Deutsche 1996; Senie, 1992). It is probably for this reason that Deutsche observes that, by simply making reference to ‘the public’, whether the phrase is attached to art, spaces or other objects or ideals and practice, the uneven development that takes place in some cities (in her case New York) is given a type of ‘democratic legitimacy’ (Deutsche, 1996: 56). Instructively, ‘the public’ tag at times becomes a disguise employed to render authenticity to urban renewal and gentrification projects which may appear to have the intention of enabling the social upliftment of communities whereas in fact they are designed to serve and further private business interests. Thus the private and public use of the public spaces becomes conflictual. Deutsche (1996: 57) indicates that:

[...] under current circumstances the provision of space for the ‘public’ attests to the wholesale withdrawal of space from social control. Clearly the local state can meet with only limited and precarious success in harmonising its goals of meeting capital’s demands and maintaining democratic legitimacy since the two goals are, objectively, in conflict.

Drawing from the above, it can be argued that the result of sanctioning private patrons to commission art work, in public squares and such spaces symbolically renders them ‘public’ spaces when in reality they are not. Some if not most of such spaces become in practice accessible and functional only to particular social groups while at the same time shutting out others (Deutsche, 1996).

This leads into a debate about the divide between conventional art in museums and galleries on one hand, and that in public places, on the other. It is important, as Hilda Heine underscores, to put it on record that, as ‘places paradigmatically designed for private aesthetic viewing, museums and galleries are public in that discounting the increasingly prohibitive price to enter, they are open to everyone’ (Heine, 2001: 4). It is what is inside the edifice that cannot be classified as public art. The artist’s public art is thus ideally exhibited in public places to engage an audience that, to a large extent, rarely visit art museums or galleries (Sandler, 1996: 190). Perhaps it is for this reason that Armajani (an artist himself) insists that the public artist is a citizen first (Sandler, 1996: 190) and not the mystic genius of avant-garde art and the museum cult. It is this desire by artists to negotiate the boundaries between art and everyday space (Pinder, 2005) that they enact and/or perform public art. It is

indeed an act and attempts to counter the “commodification of art by its markets and institutions” (Miles, 1997: 12). In fact, this has resulted in “a rejection of the self-contained aesthetic of modernism, and reflects a critical realism derived from Marxism, feminism and ecology which implies that artists act for and with others in reclaiming responsibility for their futures” (Miles, 1997: 12). Therefore, stated differently, conventional public art is largely one from museums and galleries, whereas in community art or new genre public art “the community artist and indeed the new genre public artist act as catalysts for other people’s creativity” (Miles, 1997: 8).

This act of bringing art from the seclusion and exclusivity of museums and galleries into public sites also means “opening access” to artwork for a larger audience and/or viewership. Hein (2001: 4) tells us that “public placement does, however, make the work available to more people than might otherwise experience it, and, depending upon the extension of legal coverage to it, the freedom of expression of the artist(s) is more or less protected.” Instructively this connotes democratising the placement and viewing of artwork in public sites. No one pays to view the artwork as is the case with artwork in museums or art galleries where work is “commodified.”

However, it does not always stand to reason that being viewed in public spaces by a wider public implies that the public understands the paradigms in which the artist was working (Senie, 1992; Deutsche, 1996; Sandler, 1996). This contradistinction becomes even more marked if that audience is devoid of the experience gained by those who visit art museums and galleries. With time this situation potentially foments dissent. This can be seen when those who know little or nothing at all about public art and its histories team up with those who detest state control and dispute the commissioning methods used and the location that the public artwork eventually occupies (Senie, 1992). These groups are normally constituted of right-wing politicians, foundations and activists whose intent is to vilify the state for being wasteful of public funds (Kester, 2006).¹³ While some of these criticisms may be valid, in most cases they also mask their owners’ intent to cushion and protect their capital interests within cities. Arguably, in campaigns for free market systems, budgets get trimmed and

¹³A case in point is the American artist, Richard Serra’s *Tilted Arc* (1981) sculpture, a massive Cor-ten steel plate, 12 feet high, 2.5 inches thick and 120 feet long and the controversy it sparked. (For a detailed analysis see Friedman, 1995 and Schroeder, 2002). Rosalyn Deutsch contends that debates around the *Tilted Arc* have influenced changes in the commissioning of public art mostly out of the need to escape controversy than the need to advantage the public and enhance democracy (Deutsche, 1996).

funding for public art is channelled through partnerships within the private sector ~~whose~~ definition of public good is politically ambivalent”, remarks Kester (2006: 249).

Monuments as public art and places of memory

Kultermann (1967: 153) pronounces that monuments are landmarks in which men¹⁴ create symbols of their ideals, aims, and actions. He contends that their purpose is to outlive the epoch in which they were created and bequeath a legacy to future generations as they link between past and future. This perhaps accounts for the tendency of monuments to signify ambiguities in their relationship with society as they not only affect individuals, but also the collective. Johnson (2002: 293) acknowledges Halbwachs (1992) by noting that in earlier use within religious ritual, monuments that were deemed successful played a dual role - as objects of veneration and as objects carrying a common group symbolism. Nevertheless, monuments as facets of public art can serve as useful symbols of the past within the visual landscape, stirring political sentiments that touch not only individuals but also the collective. Some of these sentiments ignite memories of yesteryear that symbolically are shared by social groups and even sustain individual remembering within communities as Hutton (1993: 78) observes:

Collective memory is an elaborate network of social mores, values, and ideals that marks out the dimensions of our imaginations according to the attitudes of the social groups to which we relate. It is through the interconnections among these shared images that the social frameworks (*cadres sociaux*) of our collective memory are formed, and it is within such settings that individual memories must be sustained if they are to survive

Even if it appears as though there is an element of preserving a past in collective memory, it is observable that as communities put up archives, museums, school curricula, monuments, and stage public exhibitions and or performances, they socially construct the past (Gillis, 1994; Osborne, 2001).

Naula Johnson, too, writes on the idea of collective memory or social memory as being embodied in monuments:

¹⁴I am using ‘men’ rather than ‘people’ here deliberately to invoke a sense that historically monuments were often tied into gendered concepts which glorified the endeavours of males specifically.

The concept of social memory has been linked to the development of emotional and ideological ties with particular histories and geographies. Memory is not simply a recollection of times past, it is also anchored in places past and visualised in masonry and bronze (Johnson, 2002: 294).

Essentially, Johnson (2002: 194) considers that the “ordering of memory around sites of collective remembrance” has a double effect in that it not only provides a focus for performance of rituals of communal remembrance but also occasionally provides forgetfulness. Thus continuous time is put into “symbolic dates and events” that are publicly ritualised as sites of memory (Johnson, 2002: 194) or what Pierre Nora often terms *lieux de memoire* (Nora, 1989). These “sites become the landmarks of remembered geography and history” as they bridge the official and vernacular culture of a people (Johnson, 2002: 194).

Tied to places of memory are the words ‘monuments’ and ‘memorials’, terms that can be used interchangeably although a distinction between them can also be made. “Whereas a monument most often signifies victory,” Sturken (1998: 164) suggests, “a memorial refers to the life/lives sacrificed for a particular set of values”. Memorials “embody grief, loss and tribute” and they “tend to emphasise texts or lists of the dead, whereas monuments are usually anonymous”. When sentiments of loss and honour, texts, and/or lists of the dead, coupled with artwork or architecture, are made to merge, they construct the memorial, and this in turn constitutes the cultural paraphernalia. It is from here that they have a “shared significance embodied in form”, according to Griswold (1987a: 13 in Wagner-Pacifi & Schwartz, 1991: 376). Shared significance in culture is almost always synonymous with collective memory. Memory, as viewed by Till (1999: 254), is a “dynamic process by which groups map myths (in an anthropological sense) about themselves and their world onto a specific time and place”. When this dynamic process is allowed to take its course in society, individuals and groups will continuously reify their identities embodied in public monuments and their attendant rites (Johnson, 2002). Thus, a memorial becomes an “artefact that imposes meaning and order beyond the temporal and chaotic experiences of life” (Yi-Fu Tuan cited in Mayo, 1988a: 63).

However, both monument and memorial constitute important sites of memory, necessary for humankind’s continuous existence, and as such ought to be preserved where necessary. Pierre Nora (1989: 12) underlines this when he writes that

Lieux de memoire originate with the sense that there is no spontaneous memory, that we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organise celebrations, pronounce eulogies, and notarise bills because such activities no longer occur naturally. The defence by certain minorities, of a privileged memory that has retreated to jealously protected enclaves, in this sense intensely illuminates the truth of *lieux de memoire* - that without commemorative vigilance, history would soon sweep them away. We buttress our identities upon such bastions [...].

The concept of *lieux de memoire* in most public art today comes predominantly in the form of war memorials, be it in first, second or third-world countries. Griswold (1992) admits that memorials by their very nature tend to recall struggles to the death over values. He also observes that the architecture employed in the memorialisation by a people is in itself a kind of “pedagogy” in that it “seeks to instruct posterity about the past” and in the process has an impact upon the “decision about what is worth recovering” (Griswold, 1992: 80). He however, cautions that memorials of this type should not only be viewed “aesthetically, in abstraction from all judgements” but must also be understood for their symbolism, their social context and “the effects its architecture works on those who participate in it” (Griswold, 1992: 81. See also Wendy Griswold 1987b in Wagner-Pacifi & Schwartz, 1991: 416).

In his analysis of symbolic devices, Turner suggests three levels of meaning: the exegetical, the positional and the operational (Turner cited in Wagner-Pacifi & Schwartz, 1991:7). The exegetical is expressed in what people say about a given symbol while a positional meaning refers to the relationship of one symbol to others in a broad semiotic system. The operational meaning, as Turner proposes, resides in how the symbol is used. All these measures of interpretation can be very insightful in constructing a nuanced understanding of places of memory if they are used in an eclectic sense.

Also affecting representation, however, are questions around the accuracy of memory as well as the fact that one person’s recall may be different from that of another. We perhaps see this contested notion of memory of representation best in the USA’s Vietnam Veterans Memorial (VVM) wall in Washington¹⁵ and in Holocaust memorials. While the victimised European

¹⁵The VVM is a war memorial in the form of a V-shaped horizontal polished granite wall on the ground which bears names of the servicemen who died in the Vietnam War. The VVM was probably fulfilling what Mayo

nations built themselves memorials, Germany built counter-monuments. These counter-monuments are described by Young (1992: 53) as “those of the persecutor remembering the victims” and these come as “brazen, painfully self-conscious memorial spaces conceived to challenge the very premises of their being”. Some of these memorial spaces, as presented by Johnson (1992: 292), can be seen in the appropriation of Holocaust death camps into places of memory about genocide after the World War 2. A question one might ask is: to what extent should war memorials take a position for or against war, and what form should they assume as representation for it?

Postcolonial monuments

Most monuments in the West have been places of memory for wars fought for imperial capitalism’s so-called modernist project of ‘enlightenment’, and later its endurance when challenged by communism, fascism, and self-determination demands from the oppressed of the world. In Africa, monuments have been mostly a means for postcolonial authorities to offer ‘a new narrative for the nation’ (Arnoldi, 2003; Hess, 2006), particularly with the advent of independence. Due to colonialism, “the colonised found themselves exiled from the history and memories that once bound them with their ancestors and an imagined posterity”, posits Norton (1993: 453). Implied is that the colonised were removed from history and community as these became latent and subaltern to that of the coloniser.¹⁶ Hence Norton goes further to observe that the colonised were not only in “exile from their past” but also found themselves in exile “from their future” (Norton, 1993: 453). It is this future that the postcolonial memory tries to restore to the present by imagining all the heroic acts of the past (i.e. the pre-colonial and the nationalist struggles), in fashioning monuments, and thereafter, ritualising the commemorations. Through such rituals or “performances”, as Coombes, 2003:

(1988: 170) steadfastly sees as the need for citizens to recognise “the willingness the soldiers show in fighting for the nation.” Its minimalistic design by Maya Lin courted debate involving surviving veterans, their relatives and the general USA citizenry who regard it as not heroic (see Foss, 1986; Wagner-Pacifi & Schwartz, 1991; and Griswold, 1992 who dwell critically on the VVM subject). Apparently, whether with or without minimalism in design, Mitchell (1992: 37) still argues that “violence may be in some sense ‘encoded’ in the concept and practice of public art”. However, Lin gets acknowledgement for mellowing this down since the VVM does not foster masculine ego gratification as is manifest in most ‘upright’ or vertical memorials that in a sense are phallic - a symbol largely construed in gender discourse as evocative of male dominance and violence. As Friedman (1995: 71) tells us, Lin’s minimalism on the VVM has been applauded for being didactic and successful in that “it minimises the disturbance on the landscape; it minimises heroising the war; it minimises the glorification of violence; it minimises the valorisation of war’s infernal commerce”.

¹⁶Hegel in his dialectic view of history racially dismissed Africa as “an unhistorical continent, with no movement or development of its own”, according to Morton (2007: 163).

12) prefers to call them, the monuments reify meaning to the citizens and are thus handmaidens to the construction of new national ideals.

However ‘performances’ in postcolonial memorialisation have not been without ambivalence. We have sometimes seen the failure in postcolonial memory to reconcile with the colonial past, especially in cases where a nation state is founded on the premise of pre-colonial existence only. This has seen some places of memory being viewed with contempt by the very people whom they are supposed to inspire. It is important in commemoration to take cognisance of the fact that “the postcolonial world is one in which we may live after colonialism but never without it” (Dicks, 1992: 3 cited in Alley, 1997: 701). Therefore coming to terms with this immediate past will assist postcolonial imagining of the present of the previously colonised, and indeed, their futures.

The period of political transition is not only restricted to the postcolonial but also follows upon a sudden change in regime or political administration. This usually results in new scenarios in the construction and reconstruction of *lieux de memoire*. New *nationalistic* monuments may displace colonial ones, and yet some existing colonial monuments may still acquire different meanings to their biographies in the postcolonial (Errington, 1998; Forest & Johnson, 2002; Coombes, 2003; Hess, 2006; Marschall, 2010). Therefore histories of some of the “recycled monuments” (De Jong, 2008) can be reinterpreted. Apart from being appropriated, some monuments get disavowed or contested (Forest & Johnson, 2002). Those monuments that get co-opted acquire new symbolism and in the process may assume new significance. Some may also gain a new audience over and above the traditional one, and this audience may attach new meanings onto already existent symbolism by aligning it with their own beliefs (ones that may be dissimilar to those of the memorial’s old and faithful audience). This can arguably be the case with post-apartheid South Africa’s Voortrekker Monument which earned itself new meanings or what Annie Coombes (2003: 37) terms new ‘translations’ since the attainment of majority rule in 1994. Prior to this the monument had largely been perceived by those opposed to it as epitomising the image of an “oppressive legacy of a lynchpin in the armoury of apartheid” (Coombes, 2003: 37). However, its past symbolism does not make the Voortrekker Monument a lesser *lieu de memoire* for all South Africans of different persuasions and colour, even when they interpret it differently.

De Jong discusses a related recycling process in which a colonial monument is now being celebrated in postcolonial Senegal in honour of World War 1 African servicemen in the French Army, who also built Dakar's railway station. The *Demba and Dupont* (1923) statue was created by the French sculptor Paul Ducuing, who depicts a Frenchman and a Senegalese man in military fatigues. Such forms of recycling prompt De Jong (2008: 208) to make the important observation that, whilst ~~national~~ national memorials may recognize the death of national citizens as a sacrifice to the nation (dissimulating, as Rowlands suggests, that the state sacrificed *them*), it is less clear how imperial memorials should provide recognition to postcolonial citizens."

When it comes to independent Zimbabwe, Werbner (1998: 82) posits that the new ~~g~~government was reluctant to obliterate the Rhodesian memorials of the second World war even for the sake of anti-colonial inscription". However, it should be comprehensible that the elements of identity and nation building processes, particularly in the changeover to independence or majority rule in the postcolony, are largely dependent on the impulses of those in possession of political power or the referent symbolic capital, as Bourdieu (1989) expresses it. By virtue of wielding the symbolic capital, ruling elites determine what should be state memory and as politicians they establish commemorations or ritual performance protocols for that emerging nation. In fact, as Werbner (1998: 82) writes, African nationalism in Zimbabwe ~~was~~ was represented as being within internationalism, and the Second World War memorials were kept as anti-fascist and thus within the anti-colonial struggle".

Considering the Senegalese, South African and Zimbabwean translations or new readings of colonial monuments in the postcolony, as cited above, it is also vital to note that the same spirit of nationalism, coupled with national identity reconfigurations, also account for why some monuments quickly fade into oblivion. Forest and Johnson (2002: 525) spell out the fate of monuments disavowed or contested:

Disavowed sites are literally or symbolically erased from the landscape either through active destruction or through neglect by the state. Contested monuments remain the objects of political conflict, neither clearly glorified nor disavowed. The choices that political actors make about which existing sites are and are not ~~usable~~—and the inclusiveness of the debate—reveal a great deal about changing official conceptions of national identity and the nation-building process.

However, the elements of identity and nation building processes in the changeover to independence and/or majority rule in the post colony, as in the colony itself, are largely dependent on those with political power. It is mostly the ruling elites who wield the symbolic capital and determine what should be state memory. Apparently, those in power literally hand down the commemoration protocols for the nation.

A case in point is in Zimbabwe where the postcolonial state is responsible for what Werbner (1998: 8) prefers to call ~~a~~ “whole complex of *elite* memorialism” (emphasis is in original). Given that graveyard sites constitute the greater part of the monuments in Zimbabwe, the postcolonial government handed down a ~~state~~ “state-manufactured hierarchy of value” where the ruling elite’s ~~inner~~ “inner circle,” get buried at the National Heroes Acre in the capital in Harare, while others are interred at provincial and district heroes’ cemeteries (Werbner, 1998: 78). Official commemoration for those buried in these places only happens annually, that is, on the Heroes Day, which is a public holiday. While the state assists in burial and commemorations of the three mentioned categories, Werbner correctly remarks that the laypeople or ~~povo~~ “povo,” occupying the lowest rung, are left with the burden of having to ~~bury~~ “bury their own dead” (Werbner, 1998: 78).

Monuments as heritage and cultural tourism

Monuments as part of landscapes from the past naturally claim inclusion in what we term heritage. While acknowledging that heritage is broad and cannot be pinned down by a definition, Harrison (2013: 5) also adds that heritage ~~might~~ “might be used to describe anything from solid – such as buildings, monuments, to the ethereal – songs festivals and languages”.

Monuments may be repositories of memory but they may nevertheless also readily become victims of commercialisation by ~~e~~ “contemporary local politicians and those involved in promoting and developing an international and national tourism and heritage market” observes Coombes (2003: 58). The moment heritage is marketed as tourism, Hewison (quoted by Harrison 2005: 4-5) argues, promoters begin to ~~sanitise~~ “sanitise the past”. He observes that in ~~re~~ “re-presenting it as an entertainment, the ‘heritage industry’ mocks the dark, grim reality of what actually happened” (Hewison quoted by Harrison, 2005: 4-5) We see this in a number of places that have been burdened by injustices or places which seek to rally a people

emerging from past injustices. Among them are the slave forts of Ghana and the Goree Island of Senegal, the Nazi Death War Camps, the Berlin Wall or Iron Curtain of Germany, and Robben Island of South Africa.

In South Africa the Minister of Art and Culture Paul Mashatile indicates, the National Liberation Route project is developing a series of museums, memorial sites and monuments that honour those who fought for the liberation of South Africa (Manyathi, 2012: 21). In Zimbabwe this phenomenon is manifest in the development of the National Heroes Acre and the reconstruction of Old Bulawayo, King Lobengula's ancient capital of the 1870s (discussed in Chapters Two and Three of my dissertation). This becomes a process of heritage telling history to current and future generations. It is also revealing that this is spurred by a combination of a longing for an imagined past, economic and cultural insecurity, as well as a growing demand for activities aligned with cultural heritage (Osborne, 2001).

Monuments and memorials are thus being adopted to re-establish the past as well as to generate cultural heritage tourism. Debate on the restoration and alterations resulting from renovations of these sites does not always align well with the nostalgia that is associated with such monuments. Consequently this puts at variance the local people, nation state politicians and the wider public because all wish to impose their varied remembrances. Even though the state's ideas will get diluted by negotiation and changes coming from a fragmented "community of citizens", whatever form the re/construction and or renovation ultimately assumes, monuments and memorials even as heritage will always "embody the coercive power of the state" (Meringolo, 1999: 103). Besides this, because as places of memory they aid in the shaping of culture, which in turn impinges on national identity and national capital, postcolonial monuments become commemorative objects that wield ritual power (De Jong, 2008; Arnoldi, 2003).

Theme parks are perfect examples of what has been termed an "experience economy".¹⁷ In theme parks "institutions or objects are given an overall narrative that is unrelated to their

¹⁷An "experience economy" came about when money was invested into the tourism and service industries in the 1980s/1990s resulting in a change from the marketing and selling of "services" to the marketing and selling of "experiences" in "a new economic model" which appreciated goods and services not for their function but for "their engagement of the senses and the experiences that surround their purchase and use" (Harrison 2013: 85). Disneyland, an amusement theme park which opened in 1955 is an example of an experience economy apart from shopping malls, casinos, hotels and restaurants that make other examples of themed attractions. Jensen (cited in Harrison, 2013: 85) observes that in the late 20th Century there came about a "Dream Society" which

history or function” and this is done on the site or *in situ* (Dicks cited by Harrison, 2013: 86). In these circumstances, heritage ceases to be an exercise of merely conserving the past but also becomes an act of enacting that past as “visitable experience” (Dicks cited by Harrison, 2013: 86). In Canada, for instance, visitable experience can be in the form of theme parks, ghost tours,¹⁸ romanticized murals, and “historical” re-enactments and displays (Osborne, 2001: 27). This effectively makes heritage sites places where the public as tourists go to get an “experience” of the past (Handler & Gable cited by Harrison, 2013:86). Such a conception coincides well with Urry’s (1995) analysis of tourism as marketing which gives due consideration to the connectedness “between modernity, identity, and travel and the significance of heritage [...] in the making and remaking of place” (Urry, 1995: 29). In his explanation of the “complex and inchoate” nature of tourism, he emphasises the importance of the tourist “gaze”. He writes that “Central to tourist consumption [...] is to look individually or collectively upon aspects of the landscape or townscape which are distinctive, which signify an experience which contrasts with everyday experiences (Urry, 1995: 132).

Highlighting intangible heritage is the other way in which the “visitable experience” being peddled by heritage tourism can be gained. This is given as either a feature “of traditional culture (e.g. in the form of traditional dances, songs, food, and various other cultural performances staged in place) or as heritage re-enactments of various kinds involving actors/or audience members in some aspect of a fantasy role play” (Harrison, 2013: 86). After all it is suggested that tourists travel to fulfil a longing for the past in order that they might either “escape to reality” or “escape to fantasy” (Ashworth & Howard cited in Harrison, 2001: 28). The late-modern heritage and museum sites in some destinations typify such an “experiential complex” in which heritage is staged “as a themed attraction combining interactive entertainment, simulation of the past, and the opportunity” for the tourist to buy mementoes and souvenirs from which an individual experience of that site “can be re-lived” (Harrison, 2013: 86). Central to the marketing of monuments as cultural tourism in the model of experiential heritage, is that tourist promoters underscore the fact that heritage is not only a symbol of civic society or a didactic tool but also an important stand-alone industry (Harrison, 2013; Osborne, 2001).

commercialised emotions and opened markets bent on exploiting “the economic potential of human emotions”. This new thrust on “experience” has impacted on heritage and museums especially on the modes of exhibition and presentation of heritage today (Harrison, 2013).

¹⁸Ghost tours are conducted at night in darkness for those who wish to emotionally experience the fear (see Osborne, 2001).

Hewison quoted in Harrison (2005: 5) is, however, highly critical of heritage's commoditisation and sale of heritage that the tourist and service industries now thrive on. The fact that heritage is successfully becoming a saleable commodity, he argues, has meant that heritage begins to supersede history. Hewison explains:

My criticism is not simply that it is largely focussed on an idealised past whose social values are those of an earlier age of privilege and exploitation that it serves to preserve and bring forward into the present. My objection is that Heritage is effacing History, by substituting an image of the past for its reality. Our actual knowledge and understanding of history is weakening at all levels, from the universities to the primary levels (Hewison, 1989: 21 cited in Harrison, 2005: 5).

While Harrison (2005: 5) concedes to the argument given above, he is also mindful of some assumptions underpinning Hewison's (1989) assertion – observing that it presupposes that “someone somewhere, has privileged access to *real* knowledge, to a proper understanding, of what history and heritage are *really* about”. However, it is noteworthy, as Harrison (2005: 5) writes, that whatever constituents of the past are presented or re-presented “as heritage – arts and crafts, events, rituals or buildings – they have passed through a complex filtering process, whereby someone, or some group have *selected* them” (all emphasis is in original text). To this effect, Weber aptly inputs that “all knowledge of cultural reality is always knowledge from particular points of view” (Weber cited by Harrison, 2005: 5). It is also in alignment with the above reasoning that, when it comes to theme parks in Africa as aspects meant to stage cultural heritage tourism, Van Eeden (2004) has misgivings. As she observes in her concluding remarks in a journal article entitled “The colonial gaze: Imperialism, myths, and South African popular culture” which examines the advent of shopping malls in South Africa: “The Western mind generally has represented Africa either as the Dark Continent and the white man's burden, or as the home of the exotic noble savage” (Van Eeden, 2004: 32).

However, even with the commercialisation of monuments and their attendant rituals as heritage tourism, by private players, government agents and city councils, two issues still stand out. One should be aware that, as Harrison (2005: 6) observes, “where heritage is involved collective amnesia is common” and whatever “is remembered as heritage or tradition is selected from a vast range of a built, natural and cultural environment to celebrate the past and bolster the present” (Harrison, 2005: 6).

Conclusion

Ideas on the concepts of public and the notion of debating within public spheres discussed in this chapter, like Habermas's public sphere, are admittedly ideals that related to Western societies whose context is far removed from that of Zimbabwe. However, an examination of a 1950 argument by Hans Speir (cited in Peters, 1995) enables one to see that some issues pertaining to public spheres in the west also have validity to postcolonial Zimbabwe.

Arguing that public opinion is in essence communication, Speir distinguishes undisclosed opinions from opinions "disclosed to others or at least noted by others" (Speir cited in Peters, 1995:3). He considers opinion as made up of, first, "citizens deliberating with each other over issues of public concern" and, second, as "the upward communication of such deliberations to the powers that be". In the vein of Habermas some years later, Speir adds that "the persons deliberating should not themselves be officials of the state, and that their deliberation must be anchored in a shared belief of freedom of expression and the right to exert influence" (Speir cited in Peters, 1995: 3). Even though Speir does not outline specifically how "the upward communication" of their deliberations might occur in a practical sense, the process of constituting public opinion by definition implies "communication – mass and interpersonal" argues Peters (1995: 3).

Drawing from Hans Speir's realisation that public opinion implies communication by a public body that is interpersonal, I argue that opinions expressed in both state-controlled and independently-run newspapers – not to mention social network sites and bloggers – regarding monuments and public sculpture, constitute communication in the public arena of contemporary Zimbabwe. As such, discussions in this chapter on the concept of the public and attendant activities in multiple public spheres, in some sense inform my examination of opinions expressed by Zimbabweans through electronic and print media (and other forums). Most significantly, contestations associated with the NHA, Old Bulawayo and Madebe's *Looking into the future* (1985), as discussed in my chapters on those examples, are best understood via discourses that draw on opinions and perceptions of various public spheres.

Furthermore debate in various forums and media regarding public art's assumption of functions like social commentary on urban contemporary problems tend to factor in issues

associated with *site* in more ways than one. In this regard there are various issues of relevance to my dissertation which I draw on in subsequent chapters. These span from concerns about a site's accessibility (or non-accessibility) to some social groups, as pointed out by Deutsche (1992), to meanings that might be invoked when a new artwork is added to a site which has already been imbued with social and political values, to the diverse 'artistic and audience responses' to new commissions, as highlighted by Senie (2003) and others, to questions around the participation of communities in the process of commissioning artworks for public sites. Additionally, historical developments in public art in the context of western societies, discussed above, also cast some light on why patrons commission or sponsor public art in Zimbabwe and why government, city authorities, business persons, artists and individuals in Zimbabwe may want to identify with and/or distance themselves from some artwork and/or rituals linked to public art and its spaces.

The yearning to remember is simultaneous with amnesia and so it aids and at times distracts our understanding of events as they relate to particular sites in our visual landscape. This also influences one's appreciation and understanding (or lack thereof) of the past and indeed one's collective memory. I have sought in this chapter to introduce ideas about the connectedness of heritage and memory as these are highlighted in my dissertation and are particularly relevant to my discussion of the NHA and Old Bulawayo. Introducing issues underpinning the building of monuments and memorials in not only the West but also postcolonial African contexts, I have sought simultaneously to introduce some of the ways in which colonial monuments have been negotiated in postcolonial African cities while also indicating how new postcolonial monuments may in fact depend on ideas and tropes with origins in Europe. I have also commented briefly about the relationship of cultural tourism to heritage - an issue of relevance to Old Bulawayo.

In summary, this chapter gave a theoretical overview of the public arena and how this merges into public art and its related discourse. This was done in both a theoretical and an historical sense. Fundamentally, the insights and ideas gained from these conceptions of the public and public art inform and assist in the framing and projection of my arguments as I critically analyse issues in public art within postcolonial Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER TWO

The National Heroes' Acre: A Chimurenga monument in symbolic conflict.

Introduction

Commissioned in 1981, the National Heroes Acre (NHA) appropriates the Warren Hills landscape into the visual space of a monument, which is designed “to honour the heroes [and heroines] of Zimbabwe, past, present and future” (*A guide to the Heroes Acre*, 1995: 2). Occupying some 57 hectares of land, the shrine is located along the Harare-Bulawayo road, seven kilometres north-west of Harare's central business district (see maps in Figs. 7 and 8).

To the left, as one turns off from the main road, is the War Memorial Museum, an adjunct to the NHA, where visitors register on entry and departure. From the War Memorial Museum, an all-weather road winds up to the shrine in the hills, which are covered mostly by indigenous *Musasa* trees (*brachystegia spiciformis*). The shrine utilises the mountains' saddle morphology, with a cemetery to the south (Fig. 9) and a sitting arena to the north (Fig. 10) of the indented space.

The oft-repeated saying that not much remains the same after thirty years of independence on the Zimbabwean political landscape applies also to the reading of the NHA monument and its associated rituals. The politics of the country have been dominated by only one party, ZANU PF, for the better part of two decades of independence. But as unemployment and poverty escalated, discontent among civil society grew and new political players joined the political fray (see Appendix 2). The MDC in the third decade began to erode the one-party-state political base and at the same time challenged the monopoly of the institution of the hero/heroine associated with the NHA monument. The shrine thus became a centre of symbolic conflicts.

According to Simon Harrison, symbolic conflicts are contests or “competition for power, wealth, prestige, legitimacy or other political resources” (Harrison, 1995: 255). In the context of this understanding my main argument in this chapter is that the National Heroes Acre will always be invoked as a legitimating symbol of the ‘struggle’, by those who are in

state power as well as those who intend to acquire it. To support this argument I will explore the monument's eclectic visual symbols, the nature of the rituals enacted at the shrine, and the perception of these by the people of Zimbabwe since independence.

As noted in Chapter One, a number of scholars have written on the NHA, including Arnold (1989), Gaidzanwa (1992), Kriger (1995) and Werbner (1998). Arnold's (1989) article, "A change of regime: Art and ideology in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe", offers a brief engagement with the NHA's statuary of *The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* in a text that provides an overview of monuments in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe. Gaidzanwa, in her 1992 article, "Bourgeois theories of gender and feminism and their shortcomings with reference to southern African countries", primarily makes a survey of gender theories and their applicability to the subcontinent. It is in this feminist engagement that she fleetingly considers the NHA statuary and its gendered presentation of women in postcolonial Zimbabwe. Kriger's (1995) article is titled "The politics of creating national heroes: The search for political legitimacy and national identity". In it she examines how the colonial symbols were discarded, in a newly independent state, in a process of instituting a hierarchy of national heroes and shrines for the dead as new symbols of the nation. She examines how these are used to entrench political power. While Kriger is thorough in her analysis of the relationship of war veterans and state in the process of making national hero symbols from independence in 1980 to 1989, she is brief and general in her engagement with the NHA's visual symbols. It is Werbner (1998) who considers the NHA monument and attempts to interpret some of its visuals, while also drawing extensively from Kriger's (1995) article in his discourse on postcolonial memory. In "Smoke from the barrel of a gun: Postwars of the dead, memory and reinscription in Zimbabwe", Werbner (1998) addresses a wide range of issues: he appraises the NHA's gender and racial bias which favours men and blacks as national heroes, and the hierarchic system of heroes of the dead; he assesses the deployment of what he terms "postcolonial pastiche" found at the shrine; and he provides a critique of the nationalistic political posturing by the ruling ZANU PF elite during state rituals held at the shrine up to 1995. But while Werbner (1998) extends the NHA discussion, he interprets selected visuals only, and in a generalised way.

Enlightening as they are, the articles cited above also leave gaps in the discourse of the NHA. They do not, for instance, indicate what specific roles the North Korean and the Zimbabwean artists played in conceptualising the shrine's artwork. In addition, the scholars

selectively interpret the visuals at the shrine; considering mostly the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* statuary but only interpreting some aspects of the bronze reliefs and the shrine's architectural design. Furthermore, all the articles primarily consider the NHA monument's historiography from the period of 1981 to 1995, years dominated by a one-party state in Zimbabwe.

Apart from examining the individual roles played by both the North Korean and Zimbabwean artists at the shrine, I consider closely how the NHA's architectural design draws upon the structure of the AK 47 rifle used in the liberation war. I analyse all the visual symbols used at the shrine in terms of their meaning and significance. I also relate these motifs to the symbolic conflicts immanent at the shrine since 1981. I argue that the reading of the NHA mnemonics and its associated rituals changed as the socio-political climate in the country changed. I contend that symbolic contests arise from the conferment process for the institution of hero/heroine and that this has directly led to the diminishing of the sacredness associated with the NHA shrine as a war memorial and national monument. Last but not least, I briefly analyse the Namibian National Heroes Acre inaugurated in 2002 as I draw comparisons of these two liberation war shrines' symbolisms of their war past. In this chapter I thus build on the existing literature on the visual symbols of the NHA shrine. In addition I extend insight about the shrine's history, most especially the kinds of ways the site has been deployed since 1999 by the Government of National Unity (GNU).

This chapter is organised in four main sections of which some have subsections. The first section focuses on the use of sculpture in service of the state and nation. The second and its subsections assess the commissioning, and the conflicts arising from it that involved local artists. It then proceeds to appraise the iconography of the NHA and the importance of cultural timing in the shrine's rituals. The interpretation and reinterpretation of bronze reliefs at the NHA comprises the third section. In the fourth section I examine the conferment process for hero/heroine status and the inherent symbolic conflicts that undermine the previous sacredness of the NHA. This leads to the conclusion of the chapter.

Public sculpture and nationalism

While distinguishing the concepts of 'nation' and 'state' can be difficult, particularly when they are used to refer to a geographic area, understanding the difference between these terms is nevertheless necessary for an analysis of visual symbols that are deployed in the imagining and rituals of a nation. In making a distinction between nation and state, Spencer and Wollman (2002: 2) point out that 'state' concerns itself with "sovereignty", that is, with "power and authority over a given territory and its population", whereas 'nation' implies the "relationships between people" and how they perceive themselves as "connected over both time and space, as sharing some kind of collective identity". This makes nationalism an ideology that links the state and the people in the formation of what can be termed national identity (Spencer & Wollman, 2002: 3). Those who rally a people around a national cause or ideals – individuals who can be loosely called nationalists – are not, however, selfless. On the contrary, Kellas (1991) cautions, they are also romantics who harbour their own ambitions, which are enhanced by partaking in nationalist activities, like engaging in politics for the purpose of gaining symbolic power. He posits:

Nationalists are clearly idealists, since they propound the idea of the nation and the ideology of nationalism. They are also people with interests of their own to promote, whether feudal power in relation to a monarchy, or a material or psychic advantage as individuals or as members of a group. So nationalist ideology is a justification for the pursuit of self-interest (Kellas, 1991: 23-24).

Thus self-interest manifests in the state's use of public sculptures as an ideological tool in service of the state. War memorials as public sculptures have a long history of such a relationship to the state, dating from "Hellenistic Greece, imperial Rome, republican France, Leninist Russia and Fascist Germany" within Western society (Arnold, 1989: 182). As such, public sculptures were conceptualised as realistic and symbolic masterpieces that embodied mostly those virtues which the state regarded highly, like the "aggrandisement of heroes, moral purpose of action, and ethical actions of the state" (Arnold, 1989: 182).

In the same vein, the idea of creating ritual space with mnemonics for the purposes of honouring the selfless warriors who died in pursuit of ensuring human rights and dignity has origins in the past. War memorials were erected to validate those principles for which people sacrificed their lives. Sabine Marschall explains:

The concept of creating a site in tribute to those who sacrificed their lives for freedom and humanity is ultimately derived from the historical tradition of war memorials and heroes' acres, which honour death in the context of military conflict, and legitimate the loss of life pointing to higher moral objectives (Marschall, 2010: 262-3).

Therefore the exercise, by interest groups and states, of constructing memorials in public space, is intended to define ~~the~~ historical figures that became national heroes and establish the historical incidents that became the formative events of a nation's identity" (Forest and Johnson, 2002: 526). The events associated with a nation's identity require places to act them out as a community and this implies inventing mythical spaces in which to make history. In this space ~~national~~ mythologies and symbols" are deployed to strengthen identification with the state as a means of sustaining the state's omnipresence (Osborne, 2001: 8). To this effect, Marschall (2010: 102), when alluding to Anderson's (1983) definition of nation ~~as~~ an imagined political community", also notes that ~~mechanisms~~" become requisite to sustain the principle of nation and to instil in the general public a sense of belonging. Public shrines in the form of national monuments and in particular ~~enotaphs~~ and tombs of the Unknown Soldiers" become necessary tools in the national landscape because they inculcate a sense of ~~awe~~ and reverence" (Marschall, 2010: 102). In Zimbabwe, the NHA shrine, as a war monument and ritual space to honour liberation war heroes/heroines, is one such space. It is imbedded in the ~~foundation~~ myth of the post-colonial nation", where nationalism and the liberation struggle are conflated into a single phenomenon (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 41). Thus the National Heroes' Acre as a war memorial appropriates the nation's liberation war history to the extent that one cannot divorce the imagining of the nation from the liberation war.

In his assessment of the link between war memorials and history, Mayo (1988: 8) posits that inasmuch as war memorials can be preserved, their surrounding society and its history are bound to change and this happens in three possible ways. First ~~historical~~ interpretations" may not change but the advent of new information may improve the symbolic meaning of the memorial (Mayo, 1988: 9). Second, the ~~historical~~ events and interpretations of them change the course of history" because as the public re-read ~~meanings~~ in memorials for past wars" they may develop new meanings (Mayo, 1988: 9). These new meanings could be ~~contradictory~~" (Mayo, 1988: 9) to those originally assigned to the memorial. Last, some ~~wars and events~~" could be rated as insignificant and these could be ~~forgotten~~" so their meaning diminishes (Mayo, 1988: 9). It is therefore important to assess all of Mayo's

observations in relation to the NHA as a war memorial in order to have nuanced insights. Essential in making these analyses is to take cognisance of the fact that whatever ritual symbols and/or monuments are employed by nationalists to rally the populace, the readings and interpretations of those symbols will always be relative and multiple. Hall (in Osborne, 2001: 8) points out that the “preferred reading” always mirrors the dominant norms and ideals of those dominating power, while an “oppositional reading” would attempt to challenge these norms. In the case of a “negotiated reading”, meaning will still rest with those governing who, however, will now allow certain nuances as they “accommodate specific situations” (Hall in Osborne, 2001: 8). It is in the light of this perspective that the NHA as a war monument in Zimbabwe’s ritual space can be discussed.

The National Heroes Acre’s iconography

The monument, whose budget is estimated to have been Z\$12 million (Kriger, 1995: 146), was funded by the Zimbabwean government with assistance from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). North Korea’s Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies got the commission for bronze sculptures and reliefs artwork at the monument without going through an open tender process. It was simply awarded on the basis of a relationship built during the nationalist liberation war years, when ZANU PF obtained munitions and military training for some of its cadres from communist DPRK.¹⁹ John Sisk and Company, a local construction firm, was given the tender for the architectural structures at the monument. Granite rocks were quarried in Mutoko in Zimbabwe’s Mashonaland East province and made into usable blocks at the John Sisk plant in Mabvuku, Harare.²⁰ About 250 locals were employed during the early construction phase from 1981 to about 1984, with the Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing monitoring the construction process (*A Guide to the Heroes Acre*, 1995: 2).²¹ To underline the significance of the NHA project, the government appointed cabinet ministers to a National Monuments Committee that was chaired by the then Minister of Information, Publicity and Tourism, Nathan Shamuyarira. The committee was charged with overseeing the project (Kriger, 1995: 141).²²

¹⁹Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2010, NHA, Harare.

²⁰Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2010, NHA, Harare.

²¹Construction is an ongoing process. According to Lovemore Mandima (interview, 15 January 2010), additional burial terraces are continually built to accommodate more heroes and heroines.

²²Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2010, NHA, Harare.

Local artists' outcry and co-option.

The North Korea's Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies appointed seven artists,²³ who later collaborated on the project with five Zimbabweans (NMMZ Heroes Acre Records File, undated). Of the Zimbabweans, two were artists and three were the artists' assistants who would also double as models.²⁴ While the seven North Korean artists may have been in charge of the statuary's bronze casting, local artists, David Mutasa²⁵ and Barnabus Ndudzo, were instrumental in the rendering of indigenous African facial features on the sculptures of the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier*, consequently making it a collaborative artwork.²⁶

The first final version of the statuary presented by the North Korean artists is said to have borne Asian facial features instead of Zimbabweans' indigenous African facial characteristics (Gaidzanwa, 1992: 117). This portrayal was experienced as tantamount to saying that North Koreans were the combatants who fought in the liberation war, and this sparked an outcry from local artists as well as former combatants in the liberation war.²⁷ Local artists - among them stone sculptor John Takawira, Barnabus Ndudzo and David Mutasa of the Zimbabwe Co-operative Craft Workshop based in Harare - were overlooked when the commission was awarded to the North Koreans because it was assumed that they

²³I secured only six names of the seven DPRK artists who took part in the NHA sculptural and relief artworks and these include their leader, Mr Jin Sung Phil, and the crew of Mr Ri Myong Jun, Mr Chi Myong Sik, Mr Pak Man Gil, Mr Ri Woh Guk and Mr Ri Yong Taek, according to Yun Kyong Chol in an interview held at the NMMZ Head Office, Harare, on 9 February 2012. The Zimbabwean artists were David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo, together with one woman and two male assistants whose names I tried, but failed, to establish during my interview with David Mutasa on 28 April 2010, in Harare.

²⁴Note that Mutasa disputes the accuracy of the record in the booklet *A Guide to the Heroes Acre* (1995: 1), which states that there were 10 local artists who worked with the North Koreans. I could not find another interviewee who could substantiate this statistic. Interview with David Mutasa, 28 April 2010, Harare.

²⁵David Mutasa subsequently got British Council funding to study bronze casting at MB Fine Art Bronze Foundry in Wales for six months. Before this David had trained as an artist at Job Kekana's Art and Craft School of Rusape from 1972 to 1975. David had to leave rural Rusape as a youth to practice his art in Harare due to the constant harassment and detention from the Rhodesian authorities who suspected him of assisting the liberation movement of Zanu PF in the recruitment of young cadres who were leaving the country to train as freedom fighters in neighbouring Mozambique. As for Barnabus Ndudzo, he had been an earlier student of the Job Kekana Art and Craft School in the 1960s. Barnabus perfected his sculpting and artistic skills as a professional in Harare and would later leave Zimbabwe to practice his art in Botswana. (Interview with David Mutasa, 28 April 2010, Harare).

²⁶Interview with David Mutasa, 28 April 2010, Harare.

²⁷Interview with David Mutasa, 28 April 2010, Harare. /Interview with Robert Makoni, 26 April 2010, Chinhoyi.

were not familiar with working with bronze as an art medium.²⁸ But all of them contended that they could have rendered Zimbabweans' indigenous African features better than the North Koreans did.²⁹ Local artists registered their concerns with Mr Antony Ndoro, the permanent secretary in the then Ministry of Information, Publicity and Tourism, which was responsible for all activities associated with the NHA until it ~~h~~anded over to the NMMZ in the 1990s".³⁰ David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo, two of the artists who were at the forefront of the protest, were then co-opted into the NHA project. Initially they were tasked with re-working the facial features to render them African. Later they were commissioned to do one of the two high-walls' bas-reliefs on the eastern side of the shrine, as discussed below.³¹

The act of challenging the North Korean artists' representation of Africans on the statuary of the *Tomb of The Unknown Soldier* (and by implication the state which had commissioned them) could be seen as the earliest manifestation of symbolic conflict at the shrine in the form of what Harrison (1995: 265) terms ~~v~~aluation contests".³² Local artists adopted the negative tactics associated with valuation conflicts in order to undermine the status' of the North Koreans as their competitors (Harrison, 1995: 265), using the local press and presentations to the elite as forums for this. Thus even if, as local artists, they did not play a leading role, their intervention, aided by the print media, diminished the North Koreans' perceived status as specialists in bronze art. As a result Mutasa and Ndudzo were recognised

²⁸Interview with David Mutasa, 28 April 2010, Harare.

²⁹Besides criticising the poorly rendered African anatomical features, local artists also criticised the representation of liberation fighters standing on bricks instead of rocks (*The Sunday Mail*, 28 March 1982). It was implied that the North Koreans knew little, if anything, about the country's geography - where rock outcrops as kopjes litter the landscape - making them preferred plinths on which to stand.

³⁰Interview with Kundishora Chipunza, 28 April 2010, NMMZ, Harare.

³¹Interview with David Mutasa interview, Harare. 28 April 2010.

³²Simon Harrison argues that ~~e~~ompetition for power, wealth, prestige, legitimacy or other political resources" result in contests or ~~s~~ymbolic conflicts" (Harrison, 1995: 255). In his analysis of the political symbols of groups and their identities, Harrison (1995: 255) postulates that political action has a basic ~~e~~pressive dimension" which uses of symbols. He suggests that investigation of conflictual circumstances enables the understanding of the relevance of political symbolism because this is where the rivalry ~~f~~r power, wealth, prestige, legitimacy or other political resources" reside (Harrison, 1995: 255). The motivation for competition is the desire to influence and preside over symbols. Harrison (1995: 255) also contends that groups invest their symbolic representations with status or sacredness. He calls the ~~o~~bjects and properties" that help to differentiate one group from another ~~s~~ymbolic inventories" (Harrison, 1995: 255). Competition or ~~s~~ymbolic conflict" (Harrison, 1995: 255) is usually dictated by the need to get the recognition in society that comes with amassing symbolic power, or ~~s~~ymbolic capital" (Bourdieu, 1989: 21). According to Harrison (1995: 255), ~~t~~here are only four ways in which a political symbol or a complex of symbols" can be utilised. He argues that during ~~t~~he course of their use, political symbols can undergo four corresponding sorts of change" in order to ~~a~~ffect the distribution of symbolic capital". These symbolic conflicts manifest as contests in the form of valuation, proprietary, innovation, and expansionary contests.

as worthy artists and were co-opted to work on the anatomical features of the statuary. After proving themselves in this project, the two artists were commissioned to work on reliefs on the eastern high wall at the shrine.³³

Tomb of the Unknown Soldier statuary and codifications

Zanu PF proclaimed socialism as the philosophy on which the nation was to be founded. This was not surprising, considering that both ZANU and ZAPU had sent their cadres for training in communist countries, and Mugabe was considered a communist (see Ranger, 1980: 87). It also follows that the most recognisable feature of the NHA, which stamps its mark on the landscape of Zimbabwe as a monument of the liberation struggle, is the bronze statuary, of the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* (Fig. 11). This group of statues features three combatants, rendered in a socialist realist style. Socialist Realism as a visual art style in the communist bloc was not directed at creating work that had a transcendental quality or would appeal to the sensibilities of Western culture of the time. It appears that in the Communist bloc socialist realism was the means through which artists could express their perception of life around them with sincerity, while also intending that the art would appeal to their audience on an emotional level. Ella Efimova, who assessed several treatises and Soviet-era paintings between 1935 and the 1980s, sums up how the subject was conceived artists implicitly directed their artwork at stirring emotions of their audience:

Socialist Realism [...] was theorised in Soviet art discourse not as an appeal to sublime feelings and thoughts or to the intellectual capacities of the viewer but rather as an appeal to life instinct. As interpreted and practised by artists, not as prescribed by doctrine, Socialist Realism can be seen as a true aesthetic [...] it was a theoretically and ideologically elaborated system with intentional aspiration to affect the viewer on a sensory level (Efimova, 1997: 80-81).

Countering the views given above is Susan Reid (2001: 154) who notes that Socialist Realism was prescriptive, in that, in 1934 a Soviet artists' conference defined it primarily as an artistic method that strived to make "a true, historically concrete depiction of reality in its revolutionary development". Using a type of pseudo-classicism to produce what Sergei Kruk (2008: 38) terms "epic narratives", Socialist Realist artists in the Soviet Union were, as Reid (2001: 157) points out, "contracted to produce paintings and sculptures on predetermined themes subordinate to a master narrative".

³³Interview with David Mutasa, 28 April 2010, Harare.

In tracing the origins and subsequent use of visual icons for political purposes in the Soviet Union, Kruk (2008) draws from the church's use of visual art. He likens the seventh-century Pope Gregory the Great, a reformist in the Christian Church who ~~defended~~ visual representation as a book for illiterates – *liber idiotarum*”, to what obtained in Soviet Union during the genre Socialist Realism art under Lenin (Kruk, 2008: 28). In Soviet Russia after the 1917 Revolution, illiteracy in the population stood at 73% such that the ruling elite realised the potential that visual art presented as an instrument of political communication to reach out to the illiterate citizens, writes Kruk (2008: 28). He extrapolates further:

For Lenin, visual art was a simple and easily comprehended instrument of political communication. Borrowing the idea from Campanella, who envisioned of educational frescoes, Lenin considered that artistic monuments and poetry were the most appropriate media for soviet Russia's situation (Kruk, 2008: 28).

Thus while Efimova (1997: 81) concludes that Socialist Realism ~~was~~ not an “impossible aesthetic” but the only aesthetic system made possible”, others view it as essentially propagandist and inhibitive of artistic experimentation and self-expression. Apparently, because monumental propaganda became a visual book of instruction, Yoo (in DPRK Studies 2000-2007) observes that Socialist Realist as an art is not created as “Art for Art [s sake]” but as “Art for Society's sake”. Similarly, the Yugoslavia era art critic, Bojana Pedic, underlines the propaganda streak in the communist era art when he makes a comparison of it with that of the west. He points out that, “The modernists understood art as a creative process, as opposed to socialist realists who insisted on “art-as-education”” (cited by Stankovic 2006: 158).

Related to tenets of socialist realism, is the NHA statuary, where ZANU PF and the state apparatus arguably ~~ecommissioned~~ the North Korean artists who specialise in producing didactic memorials” (Arnold, 1989: 182) in a bid to teach and validate its liberation war past to the masses of Zimbabwe who were largely uneducated at independence. The statuary (Figs. 11 to 14) portrays three figures - one female and two male combatants. Although there is no official explanation for the choice of figures, it could be speculated that the two males stand for the two officially recognised liberation movements of ZANU PF and PF ZAPU.³⁴ The inclusion of the woman along with two males possibly acknowledges the

³⁴Interview with Robert Makoni, 26 April 2010, Chinhoyi.

–often-cited figure of one-third of the armed forces [...] having been women” (Lyons, 2004: 236). But the female can also be read semiotically in terms of a tradition of using a female figure to connote the nation.

In the triangular sculptural composition of the statues, a male figure is positioned behind the female and the other male. He stands on a raised boulder, bearing the flagpole in his right hand. This rear combatant’s AK 47³⁵ is strapped on his back and his left hand is clenched against his waist as if standing akimbo. The female figure stands on two levels of brick courses, which gives her height over her compatriot to the left. This male figure stands on the first level of the course of bricks that go full circle on the granite tomb which also doubles as the plinth of the statuary. The female statue is portrayed in a modest knee length skirt. She holds her AK47 rifle in her right hand while the left holds the drapery of the national flag against her left breast. Her stance resembles that of a patriot singing a national anthem. The male figure to the left of the female grips a loaded missile launcher by the neck, in his left hand. The butt of the launcher rests on the ground so that the weapon inclines slightly forward. His right hand holds a pistol strapped onto his right front side pocket. The stance common to all three statues is of head held high with eyes focusing steadfastly ahead. If the figures were at attention and more numerous, they would give the impression of a guard of honour ready for inspection. However an –emphasis on gesture and frozen action” (Arnold, 1989: 184-5) in the rendering of the figures underlines their state of alertness, giving a sense of preparedness for action.

In its erect upright quality the statuary stands out on the landscape as –a traditional phallic monument” (Mitchell, 1990: 888) that glorifies and celebrates the liberation war violence in the ‘public sphere’, while women are generally relegated to the private domestic sphere of home (see Habermas, 1989). While the two male figures appear in full military attire from berets down to combat boots, the female combatant lacks these, although it is known that women also wore them in the liberation struggle.³⁶ The female figure’s head carries no army headgear, and she appears in ordinary shoes and socks, as well as the long skirt, elements which Gaidzanwa (1992: 117) dismisses as –an inaccurate portrayal of [women’s] garb

³⁵The AK 47 or Automatic Kalashnikov is a Russian-designed assault rifle widely used by liberation movements in Southern Africa. It is named after inventor Mikhail Kalashnikov. The rifles are made mostly in the former Soviet Union with counterfeits being produced in Bulgaria, Poland, China and USA, according to *The Herald* of 11 November, 2009.

³⁶Interview with David Mutasa, 28 April 2010, Harare.

during the war”. Gaidzanwa (1992: 117) is mindful that women combatants ~~had~~ to run, climb hills, mountains or trees and generally live rough” like their male colleagues, and she contends that it ~~was~~ impractical for them to wear skirts”. War documentaries broadcast on ZBC TV in an historical programme called Chimurenga Files depict women combatants in trousers, wearing berets as did their male counterparts.³⁷ The use of the skirt, civilian shoes and socks as artistic devices could be seen as an attempt to bestow feminine dignity on the female figure, in the conservative African sense where a woman’s dress is supposed to cover most of the body.³⁸ Gaidzanwa (1992: 117) offers two reasons for the North Koreans’ portrayal of women in skirts: it was possibly ~~because~~ of their [North Koreans’] view of what women should wear”; or the North Koreans could have been directed ~~to~~ depict women combatants in skirts” by politicians superintending the statue-making project. One cannot help but observe that Gaidzanwa also implies that the North Koreans and the supervising politicians in the statuary project were all men and that if there were any women these were content to let men present the ‘male view’ in the statuary. Apart from this, Gaidzanwa’s second hypothesis that ‘political instructions’ were issued to the sculptors appears more tenable, given that the statuary could be described as a ~~didactic~~ public sculpture” portraying the ~~official~~ version of information” (Arnold, 1989: 185) on the behalf of a state which appears to identify with conservative African cultural codes of dress. This notion of conservative African dress codification gains currency when one considers the reminder by Arnold (1989: 185) that with public art ~~seldom~~ does a commissioned artist have the freedom to offer a personal interpretation of events or personalities”, largely because he/she is charged with presenting an ‘unambiguous’ image.

In effect, when a modestly dressed woman is given a gun and is juxtaposed with fully combat-dressed men, this prompts the suspicion that dress is not only denoting sex but culturally connoting gender roles. Apparently, dress may codify ~~unequal~~ relations of power between men and women” (Davis cited in Schmahmann, 2005: 74). Thus the statuary could be portraying women as handmaidens to the liberation war in that ‘dressing’ in skirts and ordinary shoes implies that women were assigned less gruelling duties than those of men. This disparity is possibly intended to convey the impression that violence and battle front

³⁷ZBC TV’s Chimurenga Files features ZANU PF archival materials, on the Second Chimurenga war. These are broadcast, mostly in black and white, between 13h30 and 14h00hrs on Sundays, as a way of reminding the populace of the liberation war and ‘educating’ those born after independence, usually referred to as ‘the born-frees’.

³⁸Interview with David Mutasa, 28 April 2010, Harare.

aggression in the liberation war was only for men. This contradicts the acknowledged truth that women rose above “traditionally subordinated gender positions” and fought equally with their male contemporaries (Lyons, 2004: 41). In this way the downgrading of the woman on the statue attracts criticism to the postcolonial state. From the reading of this statuary, the state is seen largely as a patriarchy, given that “women as symbols of the nation appear in skirts while men appear in pants” (Lyons, 2004: 222). It is arguable that women are being removed from the war narrative as fighters and re-framed as unequal partners. They are being re-imagined as mothers and supporters of the men, who are the ones to perform political and economic decisions on behalf of the nation. Gaidzanwa (1992: 117) views this new order as “redomestication” and “depoliticisation of women in Zimbabwe” and argues that it gained currency soon after the liberation war.³⁹

On the other hand, the juxtaposition of a woman with men in the statuary could also be read as acknowledging “the willingness of women to offer unequivocal support to the nationalist cause at the expense of their emancipation” (Johnson, 1994: 91). This is indicative of the burden of responsibility for the nation that women in Zimbabwe seem to carry always; it is their sons and daughters who suffer during war-induced violence. Besides this, it is mostly women and their children who get displaced when wars induce instability within society. To compound this, women may even get violated by their male counterparts through rape even when they are also soldiers within the struggle.⁴⁰ Consequently, one imagines that when some women come to view the monument they may re-live some of their traumas instead of observing the heroism intended by the statuary.

On the other hand, in imaging the soldier as martyr or hero in the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* statuary, the shrine is reminiscent of the colonial past. Rhodesian nationalism in fact sometimes used a similar idiom of the soldier as martyr in its visuals, as noted by Arnold (1989). This is evident, for example, in the *Shangani Memorial*, commissioned by Cecil John Rhodes and designed by John Tweed in 1935, which is comprised of a four-sided concrete brick wall that is pier-like, bearing bronze mural panes on each of the four sides

³⁹At independence, Harare’s Parerenyatwa Group of Hospitals’ maternity ward was named Mbuya Nehanda Maternity Ward after the woman spirit medium and the First Chimurenga leader. This could arguably be seen as the postcolonial state’s patriarchal move of ‘depoliticising’ women given that Nehanda was and still is celebrated for her political and spiritual roles rather than as a mother (see Gaidzanwa, 1992: 116).

⁴⁰Ingrid Sinclair’s *Flame*, a documentary film on the liberation war made in 1996 showcases the experiences of women during the struggle, experiences that included sexual abuse and rape by male fellow soldiers (see reviews on www.zimmedia.com/).

(see Figs. 4a and 4b), and with a coping at the top that shelters the artwork from extremes of weather. The memorial depicts thirty-five men of the Shangani Patrol led by Major Allan Wilson who were ambushed and killed by Ndebele warriors and, as Arnold (1989: 183) points out, “the memorial is dedicated ‘To Brave Men’, and the names of the dead soldiers are inscribed on the plaques.”⁴¹

The AK 47 rifle as design in the NHA monument

In his 1984 memoirs, *The story of my life*, Joshua Nkomo, the father of Zimbabwean nationalism, notes that in most of the fighting to liberate Zimbabwe small-arms and simple weaponry were used. However, it was the AK 47 rifle that he says “became every young man’s [and woman’s] dream [because it was] stubby and reliable” (Nkomo, 1984: 165). Perhaps the AK 47 rifle also made the young men and women feel empowered to liberate their nation, so the symbolism of the rifle was carried into the postcolonial state. A view of the NHA precinct as it scars the natural mountain vegetation reveals two AK 47 rifles back-to-back. They share one butt, one trigger, one barrel and one bayonet but not the magazine, the chamber that carries the live rounds of ammunition (see Fig. 9).⁴² The symbolic magazine chambers at the shrine appear to face opposite directions.

The use of the AK 47 rifle in the NHA’s design suggests a fascination with war on the part of the state as it makes a deliberate social construction of war memory on behalf of the people of Zimbabwe. The state systematically brings its ideas into the realm of general acceptance through a process of state rituals; first in the burial of a national hero/heroine, and second in the commemoration of those heroes/heroines at the NHA on Heroes Day on the second Monday of August annually. In undertaking this process, the state employs both valuation and appropriation strategies as described by Harrison (1995). The state seeks superiority status (Harrison, 1995: 266) in that it shapes the culture by commemorating what it considers its heroic past. In the process it is determining what future generations ought to remember and forget regarding the Second Chimurenga/Umvikelwa. The state thus legitimises itself in its myth-making about the nation and its identity, and these are

⁴¹Arnold (1989: 182) sees no ‘jingoistic rhetoric’ in this memorial commissioned by the conquering Rhodes over the Ndebele people. But one could argue that jingoism may well be perceived by Ndebele (and most Africans), given that the *impis* or Ndebele warriors (who would have regarded the ambush as successful defence of their state which was under siege from settlers) are obviously being connoted as *not brave men*.

⁴²Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2010, NHA, Harare.

characteristics that correspond with Harrison's (1995: 266) proprietary strategies (see explanation in footnote number 38). This myth-making on the part of the state is also consistent with Shanken's (2004: 167-8) postulation that ~~in~~ the cultural sense, memory is a social construct, a constant negotiation between people, in part over what they decide not to forget and how to shape it for posterity". In this instance, however, it is the state that takes centre stage in the memory-making at the NHA.

In justifying the use of the AK 47 rifle in the symbolism of the cemetery design, a military colonel seconded to the War Memorial Museum in the NHA precincts romanticises the AK 47 rifle and its user as symbolically uniting in death after successfully executing the liberation war. He muses:

[T]he main weapon that was used [in the struggle] was the AK 47 rifle. So there is a sentimental attachment to the rifle because of what it [was used to] achieve, that is our independence. So the heroes [/heroines] are interred in a place that has an aura of fighting, an aura of war. So the rifle and [its] user are brought together at the shrine because the two contributed to the liberation of the country, Zimbabwe.⁴³

This symbolism is mostly seen in the polished black dolerite stone entombments as they appear on burial platforms of the NHA, where black stands for the grief experienced when a hero/heroine is laid to rest.⁴⁴ The tombstones on each banana-like curved platform that stands for the AK 47 rifle's magazine appear arrayed in a row that signify the bullets (see Figs. 15, and 16).⁴⁵ Viewed from the northern end of the NHA's sitting arena, the platforms, as magazines, move away in semi-circles from a walkway of stairs that ascends the southern hill (Figs. 9 and 17). This walkway forms the shared barrel of the two AK 47 rifles that appear to face opposite directions as indicated by the magazines.⁴⁶ It can be assumed that, like the two men on the statuary, the symbolism of the two Kalashnikovs also represent the two liberation movements of ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU as officially recognised for waging the guerrilla war. However, this credit is mostly monopolised by ZANU PF in the postcolonial era, as will be illustrated in the thesis.⁴⁷

⁴³Interview with Colonel Kennedy Kazambara, 16 January 2010, NHA, Harare.

⁴⁴Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2010, NHA, Harare.

⁴⁵Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2010, NHA, Harare.

⁴⁶Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2010, NHA, Harare.

⁴⁷The Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZ) led by the late James Chikerema while in Zambia after splitting from ZAPU in 1971 is another organisation. It has not received as much attention as ZANU-PF and PF ZAPU.

The public sitting arena

The general public who attend the state rituals associated with the shrine normally occupy the 5,000 capacity sitting arena (Fig. 18) to the north. Observable on occasion is that some of the commoners perch up on tree branches when a popular national hero/heroine is being buried, as the sitting space fills quickly.⁴⁸ Essentially, the turnout in this commoners' arena has become an indicator of how popular or unpopular a hero/heroine is. In recognising that attendance is an indicator of popular support, the state sometimes has had to bus people from across the country to the shrine (Nyangove and Chimhete, 2011). It has also not been uncommon for the ordinary people from Harare's suburbs to be forced to abandon their chores by ZANU PF Party youths, most likely acting in compliance with their commissars' directives. As Mushekwe (*The Zimbabwe Independent* of 18 August 2006) reports, "youths rampaged through Mbare suburb [...] forcing residents onto buses to attend the Heroes Day commemorations [in order] to boost numbers at the National Heroes' Acre" when Assistant Police Commissioner Changara was to be laid to rest.

When NHA activities are broadcast on national television, the state-controlled Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Television (ZBC TV) creates an impression of a filled-to-capacity shrine. To the television viewer this expansionary strategy (Harrison, 1995: 266) gives the positive reading that the state's rituals are popular and can therefore be identified with. Thus it is envisaged that this spurs political support for the state. However, since the turn of the second millennium the 'popular image' projection has increasingly failed to gain currency. There has been an increase in other means of information dissemination, such as cell phone picture messaging and satellite television, which offer alternatives to receiving 'state accurate' news from ZBC TV.

Apart from the symbolism of the AK 47 or Kalashnikov rifle, the process of commandeering people to attend rituals at the NHA shrine "encodes" violence (Mitchell, 1990: 37). It also alienates some members of the public from state rituals. In assessing the positioning of the AK 47 rifle in the layout of the NHA, the public sitting arena is placed behind the butt. This could be read as projecting two meanings regarding the Second Chimurenga. First, by situating the public symbolically behind the butt of the rifle it may mean that some of the masses willingly took part and supported the Second Chimurenga and its attendant violence.

⁴⁸Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2010, NHA, Harare.

Second, it may also imply that some of them were coerced into the nationalist agenda, since the butt was used by nationalists to nudge them into acquiescence.⁴⁹

The middle ground as the butt

From below the commoners' sitting arena stretches a vast flat open space of rough cobalt rock surface, said to represent the "arduous road of the struggle", while at the same time signifying the shared butt of the back-to-back AK 47 rifles.⁵⁰ This space is bordered on either side by a high brick wall bearing life size bas-mural panels. The Zimbabwe Bird perches atop each of these two walls, facing north as if sentries guarding the shrine (Figs. 19 and 20). The murals form three distinct sets of co-joined plates in a historical narrative of events on the inner sides of each of the high brick walls. These will be discussed below. Besides holding the murals, the two walls also appear to serve as wind-breaks as they partially close the gap between the hills and shield the middle ground. In effect the walls could be read as demarcating the outer boundaries of the symbolic butt of the AK 47. This middle ground has a multi-purpose function. It does not only serve as the car park for government executives, it also serves as the sitting bay for the uniformed forces and their families besides hosting a collapsible entertainment platform that is centrally located for the visibility of both the masses and the elites. Entertainment groups like the Zimbabwe Prison Band, for instance, who are charged with belting out official state-function songs apart from the entertaining revolutionary songs done in an orchestral format, usually sit and perform from here during state rituals (see Fig. 21).

However, the rough cobalt surface merges into a smaller area of polished black granite steps that taper, like the butt does in giving way to the barrel, when approaching the cemetery hill. Two pathways cut through the arena of steps dividing them into three segments, leading to a raised platform where there is the first of four catafalque-like frames in polished granite rock that mark the major cardinal points at the shrine, with the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* at their centre. On the occasion of a state ritual, the two pathways and the platforms are covered by the ceremonial red carpet. This emphasises the degree of importance the rituals at the shrine assume, differing from those involving the burial of an ordinary citizen.

⁴⁹Nkomo (1984) and Sithole (1979) illustrate that some cadres were coerced while others voluntarily joined and trained as freedom fighters in neighbouring countries.

⁵⁰Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2010, NHA, Harare.

The platform behind the northern point marker which is also the catafalque of the shrine is where the ruling elite, the service chiefs, members of the diplomatic corps sit facing northwards, whereas the nucleus family of the deceased hero/heroine and lesser dignitaries are seated to the western side of the catafalque and they face eastwards, but all in comfort under marquees. This shade is necessary since the pre-burial protocols are longer than the actual burial and wreath-laying ceremonies that come afterwards. Pre-burial protocol usually include singing the national anthem as the official opening of proceedings, the fly-past by air force jets, the singing of church and revolutionary songs, and the burial eulogies or commemoration speeches by the state president. The seating arrangement at the NHA arguably mirrors yet another of the binaries; the elite and dignitaries are on one end and the general population are on the other, without the luxury of shade covering and comfortable seats. It becomes important at this point to also evaluate the timing of rituals performed in this area of the shrine.

The NHA as a monument and place of ritual has “political and cultural meaning” attached to it (Johnson, 2003: 293), which can only be understood fully in the context of indigenous cultural practices for relating to the dead. At the shrine, the president is the last to arrive and his presence marks the commencement of the official ritual. The president always arrives after 9 a.m. but never later than 11 a.m. for a burial ceremony. This is in keeping with the African culture, common to both the Ndebele and the Shona ethnic groups, that a person is either buried before noon or after 2 p.m.⁵¹ At the shrine morning burial appears to be prevalent and preferable, probably for the sake of accommodating state protocol.⁵² Adherence to burial times is in keeping with the logic that while burying the dead, those who are the living are presenting the deceased’s spirit to the spirit world and this ought to be respected”.⁵³ It is assumed that the ‘spirit world’ will be resting and therefore inattentive at midday.⁵⁴ In the context of this tradition, presenting the dead to the spirit realm of ancestors at midday would be going against tradition and is therefore culturally proscribed.⁵⁵ Such a practice would bring misfortune to the living as the spirit of the deceased would linger somewhere between the worlds of the spirits and the living.⁵⁶

⁵¹Interview with Professor Claude Marariki, 6 January 2011, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.

⁵²Interview with Professor Claude Marariki, 6 January 2011, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.

⁵³Interview with Professor Claude Marariki, 6 January 2011, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.

⁵⁴Interview with Professor Claude Marariki, 6 January 2011, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.

⁵⁵Interview with Professor Claude Marariki, 6 January 2011, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.

⁵⁶Interview with Professor Claude Marariki, 6 January 2011, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.

The burial ritual at the NHA is dominated by the presidential speech, which is formulated not only to praise the dead hero/heroine but also to –glorify the revolution and those who fought [in] it” (Nyathi, 2004: 66). This narrative is structured in such a way as to remind the nation of its unending debt to those who fought to bring freedom, a fact which the ruling elite reiterate for purposes of making the war memory sacrosanct. Binding together of official memory with heroic identity is the elite’s attempt at forging social unity, sustaining their institutions and cultivating loyalty to themselves. As Gillis (1994: 4) tells us, in the state’s bureaucracy, identity and memory are meant to –support one another [and] also sustain certain subjective positions, social boundaries, and, of course, power”.

Apart from burial rituals, the shrine also hosts the annual commemoration ritual in August each year. Culturally the period from August to October is when most –bring-home-the-spirit’ rituals for the deceased or *kurova guva/umbuyiso* are held by individual families across the nation.⁵⁷ The ceremony is a process where a dead person’s spirit is brought home to its kith and kin so that it superintends the wellbeing of the living, together with other spirits of departed relatives who now live in the spirit realm of the ancestors.⁵⁸ This is a practice that illustrates the close bond which exists between the living and the dead in Shona/Ndebele cultures.⁵⁹ Thus the ritualised commemoration of heroes in August, while taking into account African cultural beliefs, is meant to bring the nation to a moment of reflection.

The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier

Returning to the theme of the AK 47 design, behind the elite’s seating platform space are five curvilinear steps leading to a second smaller platform. On this platform is the octagonal *Tomb of The Unknown Soldier* (refer to Figs. 11 to 14), which also doubles as the plinth on which the classicised three-figure bronze statuary stands.⁶⁰ This explains why, in all the references, it is referred to collectively as the *Tomb of The Unknown Soldier* statuary.

⁵⁷Interview with Professor Claude Mararike, 6 January 2011, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.

⁵⁸Interview with Professor Claude Mararike, 6 January 2011, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.

⁵⁹It is a ritual that is normally done 12 or more months after a person has died, but can only be conducted from the months of August to October. November is a month when traditional rituals, including weddings are not conducted as people are preparing the fields for a new farming season. Performing a ritual at this time would contravene a sacred tradition that has been followed for generations, and would be expected to bring misfortune, according to the interview with Professor Claude Mararike, 6 January 2011, Harare.

⁶⁰Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

Besides representing the anonymous guerrillas who died in the liberation war, the *Tomb of The Unknown Soldier* is also placed as the trigger in the appropriated AK 47 rifle design.⁶¹

According to Piehler (1994), the notion of the *Tomb of The Unknown Soldier* is a tradition that began in Europe and was adopted by the United States in 1921 after the First World War. Thereafter it spread world-wide. As such, anyone could claim and even identify with the Unknown Soldier, in particular those families “whose sons [or daughters] were missing in action” (Piehler, 1994: 175). In the case of the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* at the NHA, the tomb houses two miniature graves with symbolic soils.⁶² This places it at the centre of the “affective dimension of dead-body politics” of reburial (Verdery, 1999: 33), experienced in many societies undergoing social transformation. Verdery aptly observes that the emotion attached to dead bodies comes from the living persons’ association with the dead and the desire to institute “proper burial” (Verdery, 1999: 33). These “kinship notions”, observes Verdery, “are powerful organisers of feeling in all human societies [such that] other social forms (such as national ideologies) that harness kinship idioms profit from their power” (Verdery, 1999: 33). This profiteering comes into play at the shrine on the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier*. The soils in the two symbolic small graves were collected from various known training bases outside the country where unidentified cadres were buried in mass graves, mostly after the bombings in Zambia and Mozambique by the Rhodesian Defence Forces.⁶³ Traditional rites were conducted at the NHA shrine, using these symbolic soils to “bring home [to Zimbabwe] the spirits” of those buried in mass graves in neighbouring countries.⁶⁴ This process was carried out according to the spiritual guidance of traditional leadership and spirit mediums from across the country.⁶⁵ Performing this traditional ritual reified Zimbabwean traditional African culture⁶⁶ and in the process sanctified the NHA monument. The ruling elite gained the symbolic profit for identifying with the exercise that

⁶¹Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

⁶²Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

⁶³Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 14 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

⁶⁴Interview with Robert Makoni, 26 April 2010, Chinhoyi.

⁶⁵Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

⁶⁶In the African cultures of Zimbabwe, it is expected that when a family member disappears without trace, that family will seek advice from diviners (*N'anga* in Shona and *Inyanga* in *isiNdebele*) to ascertain death. After that they consult cultural elders of the community and this culminates in a ritual where the deceased will be symbolically buried even without the remains. This culturally ensures that the dead person's spirit rests, while simultaneously it also puts to rest the psychological collective guilt on the part of the living, who would otherwise always carry the burden for failing to conduct “proper burial” for the dead person. As such it is assumed that most families did this for their war dead especially if they could not be accounted for after the war of liberation (Interview with Robert Makoni, Chinhoyi held on 26 April 2010). Also see Verdery (1999) who explores in detail issues concerning dead bodies and re-burial in Eastern Europe.

made the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* a cenotaph in one sense and a symbolic mass grave in another.

At the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier*, inscribed in capital letters on one of the octagonal plinth's polished black granite sides facing the public arena, is an epitaph plaque (Fig. 22). It reads: "Our eyes are on you, our brothers and sisters, the fallen heroes of Zimbabwe. We bleed for you, yet we must not grieve, for in you is our rebirth and you are all that we shall ever be." This abridged epitaph is originally recorded in the guide booklet as a poem written in 1983 by E. Zaranyika (*A guide to the National Heroes Acre*, 1995: 1). At face value, the epitaph appears to have been abbreviated for the purpose of making the words fit on the plaque. However, it could also have been done for patriotic posturing; the epitaph not merely glorifies the heroes/heroines of the liberation struggle but also appeals to a sense of patriotism on the part of those who view it.

Considering that the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* at the NHA represents those anonymous cadres of the Second Chimurenga, it is not surprising that with the socio-political transition in the country, such a memorial may soon come to gain other meanings. It could be seen, from the perspective of those who lost their loved ones, as also representing those who lost their lives in the violence surrounding the inconclusive 2008 election.

The catafalque

The *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* is at the central point of the four cardinal points marking north, east, south and west. The northern point marker also happens to be the catafalque; that exclusive framework on which a casket of a hero/heroine rests in state during a burial ceremony (see Fig. 23). The eastern and western catafalque-like frames rarely get used and might probably be used when more than one hero/heroine is being buried.⁶⁷ Behind the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier*, is a fourth catafalque-like structure marking the south point (Fig. 24). It is sheltered by a dug-in wall making it unexposed like the other three. While Werbner (1998: 83) suggests that it is probably reserved for the head of state, others however, consider it to be reserved for traditional chiefs who might be declared national

⁶⁷Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 14 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

heroes/heroines.⁶⁸ Kings and chiefs in Zimbabwe's indigenous African tradition are not buried in the same graveyard as their subjects, and the funeral is normally performed in retrospect since the death is announced well after the burial rite has been conducted (Gelfand, 1959: 203-4).⁶⁹ However, with the NHA, there appear to be exceptions, as Senator Rekayi MagodoTangwena was the only traditional chief buried at the shrine.⁷⁰ Similarly, the act of burying national heroes/heroines in this mountain shrine could be understood as a re-interpretation of indigenous knowledge systems, and thus read as an act of deference to Zimbabwe's indigenous African culture by contemporary politicians.⁷¹ Returning to the southern catafalque-like southern marker, I observed that it is used as a table where snacks for the elites are served, as is seen in Fig. 25. This would also account for why it is not exposed like the other three compass point markers mentioned earlier.

Senie (2003: unpaginated) underlines the amount of thought that is put in choosing site for public art when she says –all sites have local, if not national, content established well before they are transformed by public art.” This is certainly true of the NHA. ZANU-PF and its state are probably making a cultural statement in choosing to locate the NHA in proximity to the National Sports Stadium (on the other side of the Harare-Bulawayo road), the War Memorial Museum (WMM) and the planned Revolutionary History Museum.⁷² Presumably the agglomeration makes the arenas of state rituals and memory highly relational as they then tend to work in unison with other state activities which may or may not occur on the same days or months as was experienced in ancient times and still is observable practice in most rural areas presently. The ancient Kingdoms of pre-colonial Zimbabwe's capitals served as the centres where social, political, religious, economic and military rituals took

⁶⁸*Mambo* in Shona or *Nkosi* in isiNdebele means king, *ishe* or *induna* refer to chiefs. However with colonialism the term king/queen became reserved for those of Europe thus statements like ‘paramount chief’ and ‘chief’ became enforced references to *mambo/inkosi* and *ishe/induna* for the titles of indigenous leadership in the English sense. Zimbabwe's indigenous Africans upto the present day retain the original meanings of their traditions. Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 14 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

⁶⁹They are embalmed and then buried secretly in mountain caves known only to elders and spirit mediums (*Zvikiro* -singular, *Masvikoro* - plural in Shona and *Intshomane* - singular, *Amantshomane* -plural in isiNdebele) of that community. The process causes traditional chiefs, who are culturally respected as leaders, in life, to become even more revered as sacred ancestral spirits in death. It might be this principle of cultural respect that the fourth catafalque at the shrine is designed to serve.

⁷⁰He is known for having assisted Robert Mugabe and Edgar Tekere to escape into exile in Mozambique in 1975, from where they organised and led the guerrilla war. Tekere (2007: 153) explains how the Tangwena people had to agree to bury him at the NHA instead of the site where their chiefs are buried, when government threatened that they would not receive the Heroes' benefits if they refused.

⁷¹Interview with Professor Claude Mararike, January 2011, Harare.

⁷²Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

place.⁷³ This can be seen in Munhumutapa's state capital of Great Zimbabwe, Changamire Dombo's Torwa state capital of Khami, Mzilikazi's capitals of Mahlokohlokweni and Mhlahlanjela, and Lobengula's Ndebele capital of KoBulawayo. These are generally on higher ground than the surrounding places where the kings' subjects dwell.⁷⁴ True as it may be that the site of these ancient capitals was motivated by security needs, in both the Shona and Ndebele speaking cultural groupings, veneration took first place.⁷⁵

The coat of arms, national flag and the eternal flame

Behind the *Tomb of The Unknown Soldier* is a protruding arc-shaped wall with panel-like structures that seem to hedge the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier*. This design is an attempt to imitate the arc that protects the trigger on a real rifle.⁷⁶ On this wall, behind the statuary, hangs the Coat of Arms or National Emblem (Fig. 26) which seals the shrine as a national landmark. In an effort to "reflect the entire background, thought and culture of a nation" (Firth 1972 quoted in Hobsbawm, 1993: 11) the Coat of Arms is flanked on its adjacent walls by the national flag. Considering that the National Anthem is always sung at the shrine to mark the official start of any state ritual, the national flag, the Coat of Arms and the national anthem constitute a set of symbols with "which an independent country proclaims identity and sovereignty, and as such they command instantaneous respect and loyalty" (Firth cited by Hobsbawm, 1993: 11). Behind the wall that signifies the trigger arc are two staircases; located at either end of the arc, they merge centrally into the walkway. This in turn leads up to a sundial on which stands an accessible 40 metre high tower. In the AK 47 symbolism the walkway is the barrel, the tower represents the bayonet and the sundial becomes the front sight of the two AK 47 rifles, used for taking aim at a subject.⁷⁷ One can view the city of Harare and its environs from the tower (in Fig. 9) whose pinnacle carries the 'eternal flame' of independence lit in 1980. This fire is said to represent "the flame of our revolution" (Mugabe in *The Herald* of 12 August 2008).

In a possible move to detach itself from a colonial past, the state recalled the 'eternal flame' from the Harare Kopje (Kriger, 2003: 65), where it was initially based, and had it installed at

⁷³Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

⁷⁴Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

⁷⁵Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

⁷⁶Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

⁷⁷Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 14 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

the NHA precinct in time for its official opening in 1984. Other than this politically inspired move, the NHA also happens to be geographically the highest point in the Harare area, and this makes it a suitable site for the flame because many people can see it at night.⁷⁸

Of name lists, reserved graves

Most guerrillas adopted war names or Chimurenga names, also known as *noms de guerre*, during the liberation struggle. A *nom de guerre*, like a stage name, is usually different from one's actual name. In practice it can consist of only a single name or can include multiple names, as for example a first name, middle name and surname. It was by this Chimurenga name that the cadre would be identified in every activity and not by his/her real name(s). This practice became a way of protecting the families who had remained in Rhodesia during the Second Chimurenga (Tungamirai, 1995). Some cadres regularised their Chimurenga names after independence, whereas others reverted to their original names. However, the names that appear on the list of those honoured at the shrine are the real names of the deceased and not Chimurenga names. These are impressed on two polished black granite panels on the eastern and western sides of the wall around the *Tomb of The Unknown Soldier* (Figs. 27 to 29). The side of the panel onto which a name appears is also the platform wing in which that person is interred. A small portrait measuring 6 x 5cm is pasted against each of the names of a hero/heroine (Fig. 28). These portraits were etched by a DPRK artist of the Mansudae Overseas Projects, Yu Kyong Chol. However, irregularities in the 'list of honour' are noticeable blank spaces within the names list. This possibly implies that a living spouse of an already buried national hero/heroine will one day be buried at the shrine and then his/her name will be engraved to fill the space. This seems to be the case of the gap seen below the name of the late Vice-President, Simon Vengai Muzenda and the next hero, Robert Mubayiwa Marere (refer to Fig. 27 but also see a blank space in Fig. 28). The name of the wife of the late vice-president could be planned for the next space. This is plausible given that there is an unoccupied grave next to that of the late Vice-President Muzenda. It is also noticeable that there are two graves that appear to be reserved next to President Mugabe's late wife, Amai Sally Mugabe's grave (Fig. 30). This implies that there is a hierarchy at the shrine when it comes to those perceived as the highest in rank; as

⁷⁸Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 14 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

couples they may lie next to one another and even have their graves reserved.⁷⁹ In light of this, the meeting of the politburo committee to determine hero/heroine status for some of these elites' spouses would arguably be a matter of fulfilling protocol.

Related to this is the fact that the graves are on three terraced levels⁸⁰ which decrease in size as you ascend to the apex of the inselberg at the NHA. Each of the graves is marked by a polished black dolerite tombstone bearing the name and the life dates of the hero/heroine, on the right when facing the headstone. Pasted onto the left side and on an equally polished black dolerite stone panel of 25 x 20cm is a stipple-engraved black and white realistic portrait of the deceased hero/heroine (as in Figs. 31 and 32).⁸¹ This makes the portraits permanent like the tombstones as they will not be easily worn away by weather. Behind some of the tombstone may be seen other inscriptions listing the virtues that the person had in life, or other names, though not necessarily Chimurenga names. However, some tombstones do not yet have their stipple-engraved portraits, perhaps because they are more recent burials.

Inasmuch as the NHA shrine strives to create uniformity in its pristine arrangement of graves, what is placed beside the grave is variable. Some graves bear a cross while others do not. Most of the tombstones have items installed next to them; varied objects on sides of tombs include traditional clay pots and contemporary decorated vases with and without

⁷⁹Currently it appears that only spouses of the leading nationalists are amongst the six women, including president Mugabe's sister, buried at the shrine. Some have argued that the spouses were in the spotlight of the struggle by virtue of being harassed by Rhodesian authorities whenever their husbands went underground, or were held in restriction camps or in detention. The Secretary for ZANU PF National Women's League, Oppah Muchinguri, argues that women do not have to die so that many of them could be interred at NHA in numbers that match that of men as if dying is a competition. Instead the Women's League was fighting for the empowerment of women across the spectrum of society through legislation in order to redress ideologically oppressive systems in the country (ZBC TV, 2009). However, a lot of women cadres who were worthy of national heroine status have died, but were not buried at the NHA because they either died in the Gukurahundi period and belonged to ZAPU, or died as critics of ZANU PF and its state. Consequently they were not given heroine status (see Kriger, 1995). This hierarchic order of naming heroes/heroines has been criticised (see Werbner, 1998). To date, Joshua and Mafuyane Nkomo, Edison and Julia Zvogbo, Josiah and Ruth Chinamano and Leopold and Sunny Ntombiyelanga Takawira are the only four couples interred at the shrine.

⁸⁰As one approaches the first platform, to the left at ground level are four relatively smaller tombstones (see Fig. 33). These are just symbolic graves with no corpses; Guy Clutton-Brook, the only white person declared a national hero was cremated in Britain and his ashes were also symbolically buried at the national shrine. Ethan Dube of ZAPU disappeared on 13 October 1974 after he was abducted in Francistown, Botswana, and so did Edison Sithole, publicist secretary for Bishop Abel Muzorewa's faction of the ANC. He was also abducted outside the Salisbury Ambassador Hotel in Harare on 15 October 1975, together with his secretary, Miriam Mhlanga. Sithole and Mhlanga's bodies were reportedly found and were to be exhumed, according to Chagaka, (2010). Another symbolic grave with cremated ashes is a Zimbabwean of Indian descent, Senator Kantibhai Gordanbhai Patel symbolically interred on the occasion of the National Heroes Day, Monday 12th of August 2012. This means every Zimbabwe race is now represented at the national shrine.

⁸¹For more on stipple engraving as a printmaking technique see Chamberlain (1972: 125-6).

plants or flowers (Figs. 32 and 34). The fact that there are visible residual markings of previous positions of some of the pots suggests that some families of the heroes/heroines place and move objects on the graves from time to time. This performance is in keeping with independent family cultural rites which authorities allow as a way of promoting individualised memorialisation by those who are Christian as well as those who follow an African cultural belief system.⁸² These varied religious traditions hamper attempts to keep the cemetery uniform and pristine for visitors or posterity but express the individuality of each hero/heroine interred in the cemetery.

Appropriation from ancient cities

The terraces at the NHA shrine, on which the heroes/heroines' graves symbolically represent bullets of the AK47 rifle, are built using roughly fashioned granite stone as bricks that bond without mortar. The design appropriates an array of pre-colonial heritage symbolism. Architectural theorist, Christopher Alexander (quoted by Mayo, 1988: 11) postulates that "people cannot maintain their spiritual roots and their connections to the past if the physical world they live in does not also sustain these roots". The chevron pattern, the dry masonry, the Zimbabwe Bird and the terraced platforms (see Figs. 35 and 36) are idioms from the ancient iron age Shona royal capitals of Great Zimbabwe and Khami, which are national monuments and world heritage sites.⁸³ Thus the NHA incorporates elements of "local material cultural etiquette seen in Zimbabwe's past".⁸⁴ In choosing from the pre-colonial: the chevrons, the Zimbabwe bird, the dry masonry and the idea of burying venerated persons in the mountains of the Heroes Acre, ZANU PF and its state could be seen "as offering historical continuity with an earlier world" (Johnson, 2008: 92).

However, Werbner (1998: 85) observes that "for some Zimbabweans this resonance, taken as distinctively Shona, is also a more or less welcome expression of a cultural nationalism that divides the nation into Shona, Ndebele and others". Werbner's assessment bears elements of truth. In this regard it becomes important to explore this myth held by "some Zimbabweans" and perhaps in doing so one ought to mention that chevron patterns are also characteristic of the ancient city of Khami found in Matebeleland South. Although it was originally an ancient Shona capital, established by Changamire Dombo's Torwa state of the

⁸²Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 13 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

⁸³Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

⁸⁴Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

Rozvi around AD 1684 after the decline of Great Zimbabwe, Khami came under the rule of the Ndebele, who overran the last Rozvi kingdom ruler or Mambo, named Tohwechipi, in the 1830s.⁸⁵ As they settled into present day Matebeleland, the Ndebele “re-opted” Khami but allowed the Shona people already domiciled there to continue with the rainmaking activities that were conducted in the Khami shrine.⁸⁶ In appropriating Khami and its attendant chevron pattern “into their own ethnic group” (Harrison 1995: 259) or nation (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2009), it could be argued that the symbolism of the chevron became of equal importance to both the Ndebele and the Shona-speaking elements within the Ndebele state. This incidentally fulfils a pre-condition for proprietary contests advanced by Harrison (1995: 259), who suggests that there should be “consensus on the importance of the property of symbolic value” by competing groups. The Khami structure, its idioms and related ceremonies symbolically become *property of value* in this instance.⁸⁷ As such the chevron pattern as it relates to the stone architecture in Zimbabwe ceased to belong only to the Shona people - they also became a motif of the Ndebele state.

In Ndebele material culture today, the chevron motif is seen on baskets, on sitting and sleeping mats and even on curved wooden head-rests (Nyathi in *The Sunday News* of 5 September 2010). Besides this, research on the chevron patterns assert that they have been motifs associated with most of Southern Africa’s black people due to their shared *Bantu* origins (Walton, 1960). Therefore, the chevron motifs in Zimbabwe cannot be claimed to be distinctly Shona. What seems important is that in appropriating the symbolism from the pre-colonial civilisation at the NHA, the state is desirous of constructing an historical continuity in the ‘myth of the nation’ as dating back to the primordial.

The fact that the NHA shrine’s design is in the form of an AK 47 rifle, thus drawing eclectically from the modern imagined nation as well as from various elements of a primordial society, is significant. It conveys how much the rifle is valued as a weapon of the liberation struggle. The design communicates the emotional attachment that liberation war

⁸⁵Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

⁸⁶Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

⁸⁷Conversely the Shona, by virtue of maintaining their rainmaking activities within an Ndebele state, symbolically retained the superiority of their own rainmaking culture even if other aspects were subjected to the dominating Ndebele kingdom. Given that rainmaking was an important ritual, for Harrison (1995: 257) the Shona may have got the better of the “inter-ethnic valuation contest”.

nationalists ascribe to the process of shaping the state's history and collective memory⁸⁸ for the sake of retaining political capital and for purposes of posterity.

Sculptural Reliefs re/interpretation

Given that the Koreans and the local artists collaborated in the reliefs, a distinctive individual expression or style was muted by adopting a general working style for rendering the art work: the realistic portrayal of the human figures in the monochrome-rendered reliefs (see Figs 37a to 38d). Artists assigned each other aspects to work on for purposes of achieving elements of consistency in rendering of the narrative.⁸⁹ This was done in a bid to ensure that in the final monument the artwork would have unity among its elements.⁹⁰ However, even when this approach has been established as a *modus operandi*, in the final artwork residual traces of individuality still remain. This is discernible in the NHA reliefs in which Mutasa and Ndudzo undertook the rendering of indigenous African anatomical features. One might even suggest that the idiom of quoting the chevron pattern on women's skirts came from the local artists (see Fig. 37c and 37d). But then the exaggeration of figural proportions, seen in the elongating of limbs and the torso, is mostly characteristic of heroic realism seen in Soviet Socialist Realism. However, David Mutasa likens it to the mannerist painters of the high renaissance whose neo-classical inclination idealised form while at the same time ensuring harmony of the figures in realistic depiction of size, form, dress and features.⁹¹ The reliefs tend to suggest three-dimensionality in the heads and limbs of subjects, more than in other elements which appear as two-dimensional. Even though the two groups of artists had different narratives for the two sets of reliefs, the fact that there is not much discrepancy in style and idiom between the two relief sets, as discussed below, points to a positive working relationship. Mutasa remembers that at first they had to overcome resistance and resentment from the North Koreans induced by the local artists' earlier challenge, discussed above. Once the locals had demonstrated their capabilities, they earned the Koreans' respect and the two groups worked in a symbiotic process to come up

⁸⁸Interview with Professor Claude Mararike, 6 January 2011, Harare.

⁸⁹Interview with David Mutasa, 28 April 2010, Harare.

⁹⁰Interview with David Mutasa, 28 April 2010, Harare.

⁹¹Interview with David Mutasa, 18 June 2011, Harare.

with an eclectic but unitary set of reliefs that could be seen by a viewer as far away as the public arena.⁹²

The eastern set of bas reliefs

In the first of a three-set panel (Fig. 37a), Mutasa and Ndudzo illustrate scenes and experiences of police brutality in Harare's African township of Highfield in Rhodesia during the 1950s and 1960s which led to people joining the liberation war in neighbouring countries.⁹³ For this mural set to make historical sense as a narrative, it has to be read from right to left, which is unusual. While some objects in the reliefs are depicted two-dimensionally, a suggestion of three-dimensionality is also discernible particularly in the human figures in the foreground. The figures and objects in the foreground are in deep relief, providing elements of three-dimensionality especially when effects of shadow and light act upon the relief (see Fig. 37b). It is the deep relief that also assists in creating an impression of depth and distance to the beholder: a somewhat shallower relief is used in the middle-ground figures while the background elements are in low relief.

In the first panel set (Fig. 37b), an armed Rhodesian policeman, probably a white man, sets his police dog on a defenceless bare-footed woman and her baby, while both scream in horror. Besides them another policeman, most likely a black man, wields his baton on another cowed man, who protects his head with his hands but exposes the rest of his torso. In the middle ground, three hand-cuffed men despondently shuffle along, seemingly to the police station. Ahead of this manacled trio, a man runs in possible escape while another appears to shout in warning for others to either flee or come out in numbers to counter the police assault. In the background, small rectangular buildings with tin or asbestos roofs indicate that the scene is happening in the crowded African townships. In observing this set, the beholder is most likely to be moved by the aspect of violence that appears one-sided, coming from authorities and meted out to a cowed and defenceless citizenry. The idiom of making most of the victims cast their heads down coupled with the screaming of the woman and child, makes the composition resonate with melancholy.

⁹²The master moulds took at least six months, with the casting taking another six months, according to the interview with David Mutasa, 18 June 2011, Harare.

⁹³Interview with David Mutasa, 28 April 2010, Harare.

In the second panel (Fig. 37c) men, women and possibly students appear to be discussing topical issues –like police brutality as they decide [whether] to join the struggle [or not]”.⁹⁴ The effect of light and shadow on the relief creates an element of three-dimensionality in the subjects in the foreground. While the middle ground shows a vegetative landscape, people in the background cross to the other side of a river in a canoe, possibly entering a neighbouring country, probably either Zambia or Mozambique where there are rivers on the borders with Zimbabwe.⁹⁵ The three thatched huts that perch in the near background suggest a rural setting, in which most schools had to close as teachers and students joined the liberation war en masse in the 1970s.⁹⁶ However what stands out in this panel is the aspect of public discussion on a grave subject as the citizens are portrayed as absorbed and attentive to the central male figure in shorts who is speaking. This figure also appears to be giving his attention to someone outside the composition thus involving the beholder in the subject under discussion.

The adjoining panel (Fig. 37d) depicts cadres being armed in the bush, and also makes the same distinction between the foreground, middle ground and background as in the sets discussed above. The portrayal of a woman and a female cadre barefooted in this panel suggests continuity of a narrative device that recurs from the preceding relief panels. It could be suggestive of poverty and the lack of material resources prevalent in the Zimbabwe’s African townships. These conditions also existed in the training camps during the liberation war (see Chung, 2006) even if this is downplayed on the main heroic statue of the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier*, discussed above. However, it is the inclusion in the panel of a clay pot and gourd (Fig. 37e), supposedly holding traditionally-brewed beer, that needs further interrogation. This could be seen as an idiom that quotes from indigenous Zimbabweans’ African culture and traditional religion.⁹⁷ Spirit mediums in Zimbabwe’s indigenous cultures offer a connection with the ancestral spirits and God, who are believed

⁹⁴Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

⁹⁵Zambezi River separates Zimbabwe and Zambia to the North. To the East, the Honde, Pungwe and Gairezi rivers spread for a few kilometres each as part of the border with Mozambique. Tekere and Mugabe crossed the Gairezi River into Mozambique. These rivers are prone to floods besides being home to crocodiles according to the David Mutasa telephonic interview on 15 April 2011. It should be noted that while there is the Limpopo River between Zimbabwe and South Africa, the latter country was a friendly neighbour to the Rhodesian regime during the war days.

⁹⁶Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

⁹⁷Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2009, NHA, Harare./Interview with David Mutasa, 28 April 2010, Harare.

to protect the people from harm when they are accorded respect.⁹⁸ Whenever one is seeking guidance from the ancestral spirits and God, indigenous Africans who believe in traditional religion perform traditional rites of worship, where beer is brewed in clay pots and worshipers drink only from the gourd and not from metal cups.⁹⁹ Gelfand (1959: 9) investigated Shona rituals and writes that beer is mandatory for most of these religious activities. In the worship process an ancestral spirit would communicate as a voice to the living through a chosen person, male or female, who would host the spirit and is known as the ‘spiritmedium’ or *svikiro*.¹⁰⁰ The woman spirit medium, Mbuya Nehanda, is believed to have played important political-religious roles in both the First and Second Chimurenga (Gaidzanwa, 1992; Tungamirai, 1995; Chung, 2006). Nehanda is often cited as a heroine by ZANU-PF and the state when they invoke the Zimbabwean indigenous African political-religious memory.¹⁰¹ Mararike (1999: 161) contends that “there was a vigorous re-activation of cultural rituals during the Liberation War”. He posits that this was intended to develop human traits like patriotism, unity, courage, determination and accountability for the implementation of the war (Mararike, 1999: 161). Traditional religion has also been used by elders for purposes of control and ensuring complicity with traditionally accepted norms for communities (Bourdillon, 1993:72, Ranger, 1993: 254-5). In the same vein it can be added that by invoking traditional religion in the struggle, the nationalist leaders also sought to contain and manage the young guerrillas. Therefore, quoting cultural religious symbols in the murals at NHA could be a visual attempt by ZANU PF and its state to project the liberation war as a struggle that was spiritually inspired by the ancestors. The NHA curator, Lovemore Mandima explains the clay pot and gourd symbolism as follows:

The traditional clay pot [in the mural] has some significance. When you are asking for guidance from ancestors you brew beer in such containers. It implies that our struggle was a success due to the fact that as [a] people we sought guidance and our ancestral spirits guided us [...] we shall never forget that.¹⁰²

⁹⁸Interview with Professor Claude Mararike, 6 January 2011, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.

⁹⁹Interview with David Mutasa, 28 April 2010, Harare.

¹⁰⁰Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2009, NHA, Harare./Interview with David Mutasa, 28 April 2010, Harare.

¹⁰¹Prior to being hanged Nehanda is believed to have said “*Mapfupa angu achamuka*” (Translated from Shona language it means ‘my bones shall rise from the dead’ implying that I will fight you again at some point and time). The Second Chimurenga is therefore linked to this spirit of revolution that Nehanda foretold, as the spirit of Nehanda used Nyamita as another woman spirit medium during the Second Chimurenga. This medium was in action during the recruitment of cadres from Northern Zimbabwe in 1973 before moving to Mozambique (see Tungamirai, 1995: 41).

¹⁰²Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

This enlisting of traditional religion has been seen by others as legitimising President Mugabe and ZANU PF “as anointed and indigenous to Zimbabwe” while simultaneously de-legitimising those in opposition, like the MDC formations, as outsiders and “not pre-ordained” (Tendi, 2010: 41). Therefore the African traditional belief system or religion, which influenced perceptions during the liberation struggles of Chimurenga One and Chimurenga Two, continues to shape perceptions in the postcolonial state. The NHA invokes this through the motifs of the beer ceramic pot and the gourd, as well as through ritual performances by individual families and as a collective during burial and commemoration of national heroes/heroines.

In a related reading of the NHA reliefs, Werbner (1998: 84) gives an interesting interpretation about the liberation war as pitting blacks against whites, suggesting that, in the murals, coloured people are left out. Quoting him is useful for the purpose of interrogating some of his assertions. He writes:

Racial opposition dominates the murals (sic), and the liberation struggle is represented as a simple racial conflict: fighting on the heroic side of good are blacks only; whites with their black henchmen and dogs, attack on the other side. Those who bear the identity of Coloureds in Zimbabwe have no place in the murals (Werbner 1998: 84).

It is the statement that “Those who bear the identity of Coloureds in Zimbabwe have no place in the murals (sic)” (Werbner 1998: 84) that could be read as simplistic.¹⁰³ Given that the bronze relief in discussion is monochromatic (see Figs. 37a and 37b), it can be argued that it is difficult to come up with acceptable criteria that can be used to pinpoint a ‘coloured’ person within the relief. However, it may equally be easy to distinguish an indigenous African from a European in this mono-chromed mural, using facial features as criteria. Apart from this, a black or white person depicted in any monochrome can still pass as a coloured person. However, the inclusion of anyone with Caucasoid features within the “heroic side of good blacks” as Werbner (1998: 84) puts it, would have blurred the racial character upon which the armed struggle in Rhodesia was premised. Hastings (1979: 138)

¹⁰³Only Senator Culverwell (coloured), Guy Clutton Brook (white) and Senator Kantibhai Gordhanbhai Patel (Indian) are interred at the NHA as non-blacks. While this underlines the unequal ratio of blacks to other races, and that of men to women buried at the national shrine which tends to favour black men, as Werbner (1998) observes, it is expected in a widely patriarchal society where mostly the oppressed black majority fought against a Rhodesia apartheid system.

cogently argues that the ~~R~~hodesian Front stood unabashed for white supremacy” and did this with the complicity of the clergy. Related to this is More-King’s (cited in Parpart, 2007: 109) remark that young white Rhodesian males who fought against liberation guerrillas were made to believe that the war was a passage into ~~m~~anhood, a war that was right and always honourable, a war where the good were white and the evil were black”. Thus one can posit that including any white person fighting side by side with the blacks would have muted the didactic intent that the relief probably seeks to project - that it was indeed a racial war. This does not, however, take away the fact that there were some whites who supported the liberation war in the same way as there were blacks who supported the Rhodesian regime (Parpart, 2007; 107). Josiah Tongogara, the ZANLA General, who sought to paint the liberation struggle as ~~n~~on-racial” (Tendi, 2010: 128) was aware of this contradictory reality.¹⁰⁴ Perhaps it is the rhetoric associated with the NHA rituals that is race-nuanced, to the extent that minorities in the country are uneasy and feel excluded not only from the Liberation War narrative, but from enjoying the fruits of the struggle for liberation (see Muzondidya, 2004).

The western set of bas reliefs

The second set of panels on the western wall appears to portray animated action in the last days of the war, and the celebrations associated with the attainment of freedom (Fig. 38a). While ascribed to the North Korean artists, Ri Woh Guk, Ri Myong Jun, Choi Myong Sik, Pak Man Gil, and Ri Yong Tuk,¹⁰⁵ these reliefs bear traces of similar devices to those employed in the rendering of indigenous African facial features in the Mutasa/Ndudzo eastern wall murals, which seems to evidence the two local artists’ involvement in the second set of panels. Mutasa does not deny this.¹⁰⁶ There are two distinctive differences from the eastern reliefs though; in this western set the narrative is read from left to right, and, rather than including much in the way of background imagery, the imagery is shaped in such a way that it forms a silhouette against the red brick supporting the reliefs.

¹⁰⁴When explaining why the guerrillas had not attacked some farms in the North East of the then Rhodesia as was anticipated by Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front regime, Tongogara noted that some white farmers supported the struggle and added that ~~the~~ white man who warned me where my enemy was appeared more comradely than my African brother who would report me to the enemy” (Tongogara in Tendi, 2010: 128).

¹⁰⁵Telephone interview with David Mutasa, 15 April 2011./Interview with Yun Kyong Chol, 9 February 2012, NMMZ Head Office, Harare.

¹⁰⁶Telephone interview with David Mutasa, 15 April 2011.

In the first panel (Fig. 38b) men and women are depicted performing similar tasks of fighting at the front and carrying ammunition. In this panel the aspect of freezing animated action is more pronounced than in the Mutasa/Ndudzo reliefs. It appears that there is more emphasis placed on motion as seen in the rendering of drapery of the unbuttoned shirts of the figures in the foreground and the one immediately ahead of him within the middle ground; these flow in opposite directions of movement. Besides this the forward thrust of the subjects' torsos also aid in this rendering of motion.

However, in the triumphal panel (Fig. 38c) the portrayal of proportions of the limbs of the torso in most figures register clearly as exaggerated. This is observable particularly on the two women in the foreground and the male cadre holding an AK 47 in the middle ground. The two tiny rondavels in the far left of the background of this composition suggest a rural setting. One cannot help but notice too that the overall stylistic idiom correlates with that of the statuary of the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier*. The munitions identifiable with cadres on the statuary are repeated in this relief: the AK 47 and the rocket launcher, and to an extent, the type of differentiation between the dress of men and women. While some combatants are depicted as celebrating with open palms, it is only women who embrace children. Thus the mural tends to emphasise, at least implicitly, the woman's feats in both production as a liberation fighter and in reproduction as a mother (see Bonnell, 1997: 119). This could also imply that it is mostly women who bear the burden of continuity for a nation, be it in times of peace or of turbulence as during times of war. This reading is further underlined by the inclusion of the chevron motif on the women's long skirts. Pathisa Nyathi, an ethno-historian, argues that the depiction of the chevron motif in architecture and on items of material culture within indigenous African societies symbolises a desire for continuity and long life.¹⁰⁷ These aspects, he argues, are symbolised by the triangle that is pointing downwards, signifying a woman's pubic area that is endowed with the power of regeneration through reproduction (see also Nyathi, 2008: 5).¹⁰⁸ Thus in its repeated form, the motif can be suggestive of longevity and continuity.

¹⁰⁷Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

¹⁰⁸Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

The polysemy of the open palms.

In the twilight of the second decade of independence, the triumphal relief's symbolism of open palms (see Fig. 38c) to represent the celebration of freedom arguably acquired new iconography. From September 1999, at the time of its formation, the MDC Party adopted the open palm as a political symbol. When chanting slogans the MDC raise the open palm, in direct contrast to ZANU PF's use of the clenched fist, which the MDC perceives as representing violence and corruption (MDC on Monday, 2001).¹⁰⁹ Although the open palm is being re-interpreted to represent what the opposition party sees as its five major goals, symbolised by the five fingers, essentially the celebration of freedom remains inherent in the symbol of the open palm. The opposition explains:

The MDC open hand [...] represents openness and transparency [...]. The five fingers signify the five priority areas [...] of [...] restoring economic growth, tackling land redistribution, fighting corruption, rewriting people's constitution and delivering social services to the people. The open hand also signifies the spirit of liberty, peace and joy that awaits the citizens of this country with the advent of an MDC administration (MDC on Monday, 2001).

It should not go without mention that the wave of the open palm on the part of MDC supporters brought considerable discord and discomfort to bear on ZANU-PF's rank and file. The act of waving with an open palm is often performed by politicians acknowledging cheering supporters or greeting crowds or even when simply bidding farewell to a friend. However, from September 1999 onwards, waving with an open palm in any circumstances played favourably into the hands of MDC, while it became very unsettling for ZANU-PF members who had been making wide use of the gesture before the MDC was formed. Thus accidental waving on the part of ZANU PF attracted unwarranted attention and was interpreted as implying sympathy to the 'counter-revolutionary' opposition MDC. This implies that the MDC had successfully 'appropriated' (Harrison, 1995: 258) a feature of symbolism that had been in open use by politicians or others, causing it henceforth to be identified as their own. In the process they undermined ZANU PF's use of that symbol which is also a mnemonic at the NHA. The 'proprietary strategy' towards the symbol of the open palm had such an intense effect that in 2001/2002 some ZANU PF enthusiasts proposed banning the use of the open palm as a party symbol because they strongly felt that

¹⁰⁹It is however a known fact in Zimbabwe among nationalists that the clenched fist as a political symbol represents the act of symbolically holding soil in one's hand as a way of making a birth-right claim for its ownership.

it was causing discomfort in the everyday operations of people (*The Daily News*, 21 February 2001).¹¹⁰ This reasoning was ridiculed in the independent media by the public and the MDC party.

Although the open palm still symbolises the celebration of freedom, the MDC has interpreted it differently from what ZANU PF and its state sought to represent within the NHA relief. This attests to the often cited principle that mnemonic devices in monuments are open to dissimilar interpretation by different people at different times, often for a variety of motives that were not even anticipated by those who envisioned them (Mayo, 1988; Marschall, 2010). Thus the NHA mural idiom of the open palms becomes what Barnes and Duncan (cited in Johnson 1994: 91) term “polyvocal”. Similarly, Jenson (cited in Osborne, 2001: 8) calls this open interpretation of meaning associated with monuments “polysemic”. Given this instability in meaning, people are inclined to read memorial mnemonics in relation to what obtains in their current settings and not as directed historically by the state (Osborne, 2001: 8). Arguably, this could be the case with the MDC’s reading of the open palm.

Mugabe: The iconic face of the liberation struggle?

In the last of the three panels, the North Koreans’ contribution is unmistakable in the portrait of President Robert Mugabe (Fig. 38d) among the anonymous faces that make up the didactic reliefs on both walls. In this mural set’s foreground, the figures are portrayed as excited and rushing ahead. Most of them appear to focus forward with heightened expectation. Whatever it is that the subjects see ahead, it is left to the imagination of the beholder, as it is not included in the composition. This creates suspense and leaves the viewer imagining what might happen next. What is discernible though, is that this panel depicts the figures with different registers not seen in other relief sets at the shrine. First, the only military figure is a male shown in martial attire minus his AK 47 rifle. Second, all women are portrayed with relatively shorter skirts than in the rest of the relief sets at the shrine. Another anomaly is a woman in the foreground who is depicted with adornments, ear-rings and beads, a sign that

¹¹⁰*The Daily News* of Wednesday 21 February 2001 reported that besides two Baptist Church members of Bulawayo, Odvianeeth Munkuli and Wonderful Muleya, two other youths and three Zanu PF Members of Parliament, Eliot Chauke of Chiredzi North, Isaac McKenzie of Kariba and Eleck Mkandla of Gokwe teamed up to petition the government to ban the MDC symbol. Their argument in the petition said that the open palm was an “international symbol for parting friends”, and its use as a symbol by the MDC violated basic human rights.

could be associated with peaceful times as these could have been impediments in the guerrilla war zones. Third is that there are two figures with flags: a girl has a smaller flag whereas a male figure holds a rod bearing the larger flag which spans the breadth of the whole relief panel set. This flag-bearing figure appears to be beckoning with his right hand to others (subjects not in the mural) to join the procession. Lastly, another figure appears formally dressed in a neck tie, while another bears a portfolio in hand and seems to peer ahead while keeping in step. When this is collated with the formal dressing, in a necktie bearing a motif of the Zimbabwe bird, of president Mugabe (then the Prime Minister), who appears superimposed as a huge portrait indicative of movement behind the huge flag, (as is suggested by his shoulders and the angles that his hands assume) it likely depicts a time of relative peace after the hurly-burly associated with war. This is further supported by the quotations of the conical tower, a feature synonymous with Great Zimbabwe and the balancing rocks, also a common feature seen throughout Zimbabwe and also is a symbol used on independent Zimbabwean currency. These idioms are placed to the extreme right of the composition and appear to have been meant to serve as a landscape background when one discounts the president's visually intruding portrait brought in to possibly emphasise the relief's depiction of a triumphal march.

The president's portrait looms large ~~over~~ "the people as father of the nation" according to Lyons (2004; 236), projecting him wrongly as the only leader behind the liberation struggle that the shrine memorialises. It is fact that Joshua Nkomo, who as the elder statesmen of the two carries the title of 'father of the nation', was one of the liberation war leaders. Even though North Koreans are well-known for exalting their leaders in a culture handed down from their brand of communism¹¹¹ where ~~pre~~premium is placed on political loyalty" (Hunter quoted in DPRK Studies 2000-2007),¹¹² at the NHA they did so with the collusion of ZANU PF and its state.

Inasmuch as personality cult fails to flow down to the populace, there is need to assess further the depiction of one leader only at the NHA shrine. It is fact that all heroes/heroines interred at the NHA shrine acquired that status upon death, as conferment of the standing of hero/heroine is a posthumous activity. It could be argued that this practice seems not to apply

¹¹¹Kim Il Sung statue at Grand Monument to Kim Il-sung on Mansu Hill can be seen on; <http://1stopkorea.com/index.htm?nk-trip3.htm~mainframe>.

¹¹²www.dprkstudies.org/documents/dprk003.html

to President Mugabe because he is already identified at the monument as a hero while he is still alive. This makes him a *de facto* hero. His party and state do not have to wait to bestow that status posthumously as is the practice with other heroes/heroines. This gives an impression of being partisan¹¹³ and could imply most certainly that he was elevated ~~to~~ a place where he was considered to be above criticism” (Tekere 2007: 159) which may suggest that he is hero-worshipped within his ZANU PF Party.¹¹⁴

As such, the portrayal of Robert Mugabe at the NHA shrine as the sole leader of the struggle or the only leader emerging after the struggle could be read to mean two things. First, making him unique might have been designed to satisfy his ego in part, but to a larger extent it could have been done to ~~feed~~ the personal and selfish ends of those in the hierarchy around him”.¹¹⁵ Mills (cited by Taylor 1987: 143) instructively posits that usually ~~the~~ forum of public honour [...] has not been built from below [...] it has been created from above.” He contends that more often than not, iconic status or honours can be stage-managed by leaders to legitimate the status and power of their own positions in society (Taylor, 1987: 143). Considering that PF ZAPU had been expelled from government in February 1982 (Nkomo, 1984: 228, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Report, 1997: 7), when the NHA construction had begun in 1981, Taylor’s (1987) assessment would seem entirely accurate. It can be suggested that by sanctioning the mural’s projection of Mugabe as the leader of the struggle ZANU PF elites were not only legitimising his status as leader of the new postcolonial state but also subtly legitimising themselves as his governing partners. One can further posit that in allowing particularisation of Mugabe in the relief, ZANU-PF elites declared their allegiance to his leadership and in the process created opportunities for their selves to be recognised and rewarded with government posts. This might have been a well-calculated move, given that the expulsion of PF ZAPU from government in 1982 could not have been sudden. It had to be the culmination of a well-orchestrated process to which ZANU PF elites were surely privy (see Nkomo, 1984: 223). As such one can posit that the initiation of the idea to particularise Mugabe and the consent to implement this at the shrine could have

¹¹³Interview with Robert Makoni, 26 April 2010, Chinhoyi.

¹¹⁴Edgar Tekere in his memoirs implies that this is the practice but distances himself from it in his narrative of events of the formulation of a new negotiated ZANU PF party born of the 1987 Unity Accord, in which he was participant. He would later opt out of the process because he rejected the proposal from his old ZANU PF colleagues that Mugabe’s portrait should be on the ‘new’ ZANU PF Party membership card. He explains, “[W]e have always ridiculed ZAPU for carrying a picture of the leader on the Party card, and now you are violating the basic rule that leaders come and go and the Party lives on.[...] Why [do you want to] humiliate [Joshua] Nkomo so much? [...] I don’t want to be part of such a big deception!” (Tekere, 2007: 156).

¹¹⁵ Interview with Robert Makoni, 26 April 2010, Chinhoyi.

been “stage managed” (Taylor, 1987: 143) in the hierarchy for purposes of stamping their legitimacy as leaders of the new nation.

Secondly, when the NHA was officially opened in 1984 there was a lack of political stability in Zimbabwe, in particular within the Midlands and the Matebeleland provinces (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Report, 1997: 7). Joshua Nkomo, his PF ZAPU party, ex-ZIPRA cadres and the generality of the Ndebele speaking people were being projected erroneously as “political rebels” by ZANU PF and state propaganda (Nkomo, 1984: 230; Lindgren in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2009: 185). This was followed by punitive measures from the state. It can be suggested then that during this period Joshua Nkomo, together with those perceived to be his supporters, was being painted out of the liberation war history as a perceived enemy of the state (Tendi, 2010; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Nkomo, 1984). From 1982 to 1987 most of the hierarchy of ZAPU was incarcerated. Nkomo left the country quietly for exile in Britain after alleged attempts on his life (Nkomo, 1984: 241). When the Unity Accord was signed in 1987 to usher in a ‘new’ ZANU PF party, it can only be assumed that the NHA reliefs did not become an issue because attention by those joining from ZAPU was focussed on curbing the Gukurahundi excesses perpetrated on *isiNdebele* speakers (Tekere, 2007: 156), and portraying unity from the leaders so that it would also filter down to the masses. However, one would have expected those from ZAPU who were part of the new ZANU PF party to question the dominant narrative that particularised one person at NHA. The ‘new’ ZANU PF and its state would, however, factor in ZAPU and Nkomo’s roles in their reinterpretation of the liberation struggle narrative as rallying points for national unity among the various ethnic identities under one-party state leadership. With reference to the tenets of Harrison’s (1995: 263) expansionary strategy, it can be assumed that ZAPU, as Tekere (2007: 156) crudely puts it, was “swallowed by ZANU” in the process of the 1987 Unity Accord. In the new dispensation the political symbol of the bull became non-operational but the political symbols of the ‘old’ ZANU PF continued.¹¹⁶ Using Harrison’s framework of expansionary symbolic conflict the postulation would be that ZANU PF’s goal (dating back to the nationalist rivalries of the 1960s and 1970s) to use Harrison’s (1995: 263) language was “to suppress [...] and replace” PF-ZAPU, a rival liberation war Party, together with its symbols. This would ensure that ZANU PF had

¹¹⁶Even today the old ZANU PF party symbol is used in conjunction with the portrait of President Mugabe: the cockerel (*jongwe/iqudhe* in Shona/IsiNdebele) still exists on the Party’s Headquarters, corner of Rotten Row and Samora Machel roads in Harare.

no political competitor; Mugabe, in *The Chronicle* of 25 January, 1982, reportedly said that “there should be one party, with one government, and one prime minister” implying a one-party-state (in Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 311).

Joshua Nkomo died as a cadre of the ‘new’ ZANU-PF and as its state’s co-vice president. As such, in the terminology of expansionary and proprietary contests, ZANU PF managed to put its “mark or stamp” (Harrison, 1995: 264) on him as its own; Joshua Nkomo was officially acknowledged as ‘Father Zimbabwe’. His entombment at the shrine as a “Hero of Heroes” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007: 73) symbolically signifies him as one of the bullets of the AK 47 rifle at the NHA shrine. Drawing on the postulation of ‘proprietary contests’, one can also suggest that ZANU PF got the better of the competition in that Joshua Nkomo in death serves as “a prestigious” liberation war “icon” (Harrison, 1995: 259) within its own ranks and not in PF ZAPU, now reviving under the leadership of Dr Dumiso Dabengwa¹¹⁷ (see Appendix 2). To this end, Mugabe will arguably remain as the face of the liberation struggle at the shrine to the dismay of relatives of other undeclared but deserving heroes/heroines of the war of liberation.¹¹⁸

Conferment of hero/heroine status and associated contests

Since the completion of the NHA monument in the early 1980s its symbolism is only made visible and comprehensive in performance of rituals after the conferment of national hero/heroine status. This exercise has been a preserve of ZANU PF and its state but has become contested with the advent of multi-party politics since 1999. It could be suggested therefore that the issue of heroism has been partisan and consequently flawed since independence. The project appears to have been driven by a desire for a one-party-state socialism. While some national heroes/heroines may not correspond to the definition of a heroism that appears to have emerged within the second and mostly third decade of independence, where one ought to have participated in the liberation war and be “certified for consistency and persistence” in serving ZANU PF (Ndlela, 2010: 7), others can fit into this narrow category. As one observer noted, a hero/heroine to ZANU PF has come to be “one

¹¹⁷Dr Dabengwa of the revived PF ZAPU claims (not without substance) that Joshua Nkomo belongs to them ZAPU as their icon of their liberation movement.

¹¹⁸Venah Sithole, wife to Ndabaningi Sithole, founding leader of ZANU when it broke from ZAPU in 1963 is one such relative. Her statement that: “All the time Zimbabwean history is skewed to make it as if Mugabe was the only man who fought for freedom from white domination, when this isn’t the case” (Taylor, 2007) is revealing.

whose history and lifestyle dovetails along the shadow of the party and its supreme leader, President Mugabe [and any] deviation from the party and the leader automatically disqualifies one from being a hero [/heroine]" (Jack Zaba cited in Nyathi, 2010). This conceivably reduces ~~what~~ what is supposed to be a timeless band of heroes, into a time-bound identity, which is dependent on the life of a political party" (Maisiri in *The Financial Gazette* of Thursday, 14 October 2010).

The National Heroes Acre as a monument and war memorial is the most prestigious place to be buried in the three categories of a ~~state~~ state-manufactured hierarchy of value" (Werbner, 1998: 78) for heroes/heroines that includes the national, provincial and the liberation war heroes/heroines.¹¹⁹ The designation of heroes/heroines is conferred upon death by the president who considers exceptional service to the country and recognises this in an individual. According to the National Heroes Act (Chapter 10: 16),

where the President considers that any deceased person who was a citizen of Zimbabwe has deserved well of his country on account of his outstanding, distinctive and distinguished service to Zimbabwe, he may, by notice in the Gazette, designate such a person a national, provincial or district [liberation war] hero of Zimbabwe (Manzvanzvike in *The Herald*, 8 July 2010).

Although the process of conferring hero/heroine status is the prerogative of the president, as outlined above, it is in fact carried out by a committee of ZANU-PF's policy making body, the politburo, which then makes recommendations to the head of state. This makes the exercise a well-thought-out way of instituting control over loyalty to an establishment. Related to this, the living spouse(s) of the deceased hero/heroine receive state stipends through an act of parliament, the Heroes and Dependants Act of 1995. Prior to the amendment of this act, only the national heroes'/heroines' spouses were eligible. The amendment to cater for all categories of heroes/heroines was an expansionary scheme ~~where~~ where one intends to preserve one's stamp or mark on something in order to keep it", according to Harrison (1995: 264). ZANU PF and its state extended the paying of stipends to all the categories of heroes/heroines as an indirect means of enlisting allegiance from families of the dead. It is most likely that these family members attend the Heroes Day commemorations. Incidentally, through attending the ceremonies, families get updates on prospective changes to their stipends because ~~major~~ major policy announcements are also part of the ritual speech"

¹¹⁹The provincial and district heroes' acres respectively are the two lesser shrines where a hero/heroine may be entombed.

made by the head of state at the NHA shrine (Nyathi in Raftopoulos and Savage, 2009). Thus a pronouncement by President Mugabe like, “government [...] provides monthly maintenance and health allowance for all [...] heroes’ dependents as well as school fees for their children” (in *The Herald*, 12 August 2008) at the NHA shrine is revealing. It can be argued that such a pronouncement on the Heroes Day is tantamount to reminding living families of the deceased of how indebted they are to the party and government.¹²⁰

Therefore the institution of heroes and heroines and their commemoration is a well-orchestrated control process by the state for the good of the ruling elite. In explaining civil society as a hegemonic project in Europe, Marxism views civil society as an uneven economic relationship that is dominated by the bourgeois (Cohen quoted in Woods, 1992: 82). This means that those who own property and control economic capital also tend to have their way as they have general control over those without property. Thus in most cases the less privileged always will depend on the ‘propertied’ for their livelihood. One could argue that such a relationship exists between the dependants of some of the heroes/heroines and the state particularly since the economy regressed in the third decade of independence. The state provided welfare to its supporters but alienated those it saw as belonging to the opposition MDCs (Hammar & Raftopoulos, 2003: 14), while increased food shortage assailed the nation amid hyper-inflation.

On the other hand, Antonio Gramsci contends that civil society is a field in “which class and national identities are formed” (Woods, 1992: 82). Thus there always exists a conflict over who will manage to impose their “norms and economic interests” upon that civil society (Woods, 1992: 82). Inherent in this understanding of hegemony is that a dominant group, as in the case of ZANU PF in Zimbabwean politics, will always employ its “political, moral and intellectual leadership” to come up with a world vision that is universal and all-encompassing, and will use this vision to “shape the interests and needs of subordinating groups” (Carnoy cited in Woods, 1992: 82). Gramsci also acknowledges the importance of networking or “associational activity” and posits that a dominant group not only uses the state to secure its leading role but also sustains its political and economic control via “mediating institutions which represent and express in their actions” the desired standards of

¹²⁰This argument is further undergirded by the statistics of 2008, according to which there were 3,699 declared heroes/heroines, 542 spouses and 577 children recognised as dependants across the three categories of hero/heroine (Mugabe in *The Herald*, 12 August 2008).

those in power (Woods, 1992: 83). In Zimbabwe such ‘mediating’ civic organisations observably include, but are not limited to, the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), the ZANU PF Women’s League, Affirmative Action Group (AAG), the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU)¹²¹ (see Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004: 268), Destiny for Afrika Network, the Zimbabwe Revolutionary Volunteers Front, and the Ex-detainees and Restrictes Association.

The various groupings above lobby for hero/heroine status for a member of theirs who has died. Arguably one has to be an affiliate of these associations to be considered for hero/heroine status, as those falling outside of these politically ‘correct’ groups rarely gain recognition. Even when one has impeccable nationalist or liberation war history like Ndabaningi Sithole and Henry Hamadziripi,¹²² one could be overlooked for not identifying with the ‘revolutionary’ ZANU PF agenda or being at odds with its leader (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Moore, 2008). Lookout Masuku, a ZIPRA commander, and other ZAPU nationalists were only recognised as national heroes after the signing of the 1987 Unity Accord (Nyathi, 2010).

Perhaps in that it won a majority in general elections from the 1980s to the 1990s, coupled with being a liberation movement, it could be suggested that ZANU PF knowingly chose not to separate activities of the party from those of the state as it pushed for a one-party-state (see Nkomo, 1984). Given that the status of heroes/heroines is recommended by a party organ, and then endorsed by the president through the National Heroes Act, it becomes increasingly clear that the politburo committee charged with determining that status is the organ of control conflated to serve as an arm of state. This paints a scene in Zimbabwe where “nominally liberal representative democracy co-exists uneasily with the hegemonic aspirations of a political elite inclined to conflate party and state structures” (Lodge, 1998:

¹²¹Initially the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions used to support ZANU PF and its state until the discord brought about by the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in the mid 1980s that saw workers retrenched and food prices escalating in the 1990s. ZANU PF’s war veterans formed the ZFTU to counter and rival ZCTU which had become a fierce critic of the ZANU PF led government (see Magure, 2008; Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004).

¹²²Sithole’s sin was advocating for negotiation with Ian Smith instead of war only, while Henry Hamadziripi was a leader in Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA), formed during the liberation war to unite trained guerrillas of ZANU and ZAPU in exile, and was unpopular with detained ZANU leaders who were opposed to unity of the liberation war movements (see Moore, 2008). He was also a founding member of a less militant grouping of war veterans of the second Chimurenga, the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (see Gatsheni Ndlovu, 2009). ZIPRA/ZAPU cadre Andre Ndlovu complained that they were not being recognised because of the claim that they pulled out of the ZNLWVA Zimbabwe Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) and Zanu PF and formed ZAPU (Mlotshwa, 2011 *Newsday*, 15 May).

35). Essentially it is hegemony by ZANU PF and the state over the nation. As Gramsci points out, hegemony by the ruling class can only be diminished by enacting a counter-hegemony that acts “through mediating institutions”, thus underlining the role of social associations in determining “norms of society” (Woods, 1992: 83). Arguably, in the context of the emergence of the MDC in 1999, backed by civic society organisations like the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) (see Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004), and the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (ZLP), coupled with the voice of the reviving opposition, ZAPU, the institutional “valuation” strategy (Harrison, 1995: 262) of hero/heroine that ZANU PF and its state used to monopolise the power structure is being challenged and increasingly diminished.

As the social and political climate in a country changes, new meanings also emerge and historical narratives that used to be taken as granted become relative and dependent on the socio-political atmosphere prevailing in the country (Marschall, 2010: 157; Errington in De Jong 2008: 196). When Sabina Mugabe, sister to the head of state, died and was declared a national heroine in August 2010, the MDC formations in the GNU boycotted the burial ritual but were quick to raise the issue of lack of consensus-seeking amongst coalition partners in matters of determining hero/heroine status (Nkatazo, 2011). The two MDC groups proposed the establishment of a broad-based independent committee that would determine heroism for the nation. While debate on this thinking was still not finalised, the ZANU PF politburo committee, which had traditionally performed the task, was put to the test. The two MDC formations in the GNU petitioned President Mugabe to consider national hero status for one of the opposition leaders, Gibson Sibanda, who had died on 22 August 2010 (Nyathi, 2010).¹²³ The hero status was denied, possibly because ZANU PF as a ‘revolutionary’ party contemptuously considered Sibanda as a counter-revolutionary politician (see Appendix 2). ZANU PF, as a liberation movement, arguably considers itself solely legitimate and justified in monopolising the determining of heroes/heroines in Zimbabwe for the shrine that its government built. This is seen in the insistence in President Mugabe’s proclamation a month later while burying a disputed national hero, Ephraim Masawi, from ZANU PF’s ranks at a ceremony boycotted by the MDC formations. He declared that the shrine was not meant for those who have done well in other spheres but

¹²³Sibanda, formerly a ZAPU political detainee, was a respected trade unionist in ZCTU who became the first vice president of MDC when it was formed in 1999, then joined the splinter MDC-M in 2005 and again became its first vice-president. He died in 2010 while serving as the Minister of National Healing and Reconciliation in the GNU.

was only for those who partook in the liberation war. In his own words President Mugabe says the Heroes' Acre

is a place for those who fought for the liberation of the country. It's not a place for everyone; there are a lot of people who did good things, including pastors but they can't be buried here. Those who lead others be it at workplaces, cannot be buried at the Heroes' Acre [...]. Those who were buried here were involved in the war to liberate Zimbabwe (Mugabe in *The Zimbabwe Independent*, 30 September, 2010).

Following this statement, the MDC formations have continued to boycott every 'national' hero's burial at the shrine but attend the Heroes Day commemorations, perhaps as a gesture to respect heroes and heroines perceived as genuine, whether declared or undeclared.¹²⁴ President Mugabe's pronouncement has also come to make one war veteran's observation seem prophetic in that a government in Zimbabwe, as Nyathi (2004: 72) puts it, *is* one owned by war veterans or by those who place the significance of the War of Liberation before other concerns". However, one wonders if this will stand the test of time.

Implications of a partisan process to the sacredness of the shrine

Despite the statement by the president, calls have grown louder for an all-inclusive body, which would confer hero/heroine status without merely looking at the liberation struggle but by also incorporating post-independence tenets. The MDC leader in his newsletter, the *Prime Minister*, says, *—We do not forget those who sacrificed so much to get us our independence. There are some heroes who are fighting for the welfare for Zimbabweans that deserve to be recognised. [Therefore] it must not be a political party that decides who should be a national hero"* (Tsvangirai in *Prime Minister*, 2009: 5). His political party spokesperson, Chamisa, was more explicit in saying that an *—independent, inclusive and credible body that goes beyond the parameters and province of partisan politics"* was needed to confer hero status

¹²⁴Western diplomats, including US Ambassador Charles Ray, Germany envoy Albrecht Conze and the Greek and EU charge d'affaires Stephanos Ioannides and Barbara Plinkert walked away from the burial at the shrine of President Mugabe's sister, Sabina, when the West was criticised in the burial speech by the president. They did not attend the subsequent Heroes Day commemorations on the 9th of August 2010. As for the 2011 Heroes Day commemorations Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and his MDC party members buried their 'national hero', the late Professor Eliphas Mukonoweshuro at Warren Hills in Harare while President Mugabe presided over proceedings at the NHA shrine. However, on Saturday 20 August 2011 all political parties were present at the NHA burial of national hero, Retired Army General Solomon Mujuru whose *nom de guerre* was 'Rex Nhongo'. He died in a yet-to-be explained house inferno at his farm in Beatrice about 18 kilometres west of Harare. The burial of national hero, the late Vice President of Zimbabwe, Dr John Landa Nkomo on Monday 21 January 2013 was also attended by all political parties. Dr John Landa Nkomo succumbed to cancer.

(Mafirakurewa, 2011: 3). Thus in Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, ~~dead~~ bodies [...] can be a site of political profit” (Verdery, 1999: 33) for those who want to retain state power or usurp it.

The opposition MDC formations only started attending the rituals at the NHA shrine at the start of the GNU in 2009 since its formation. This gesture signified their acknowledgement of the need to respect the memory of the war of liberation and the desire to make the monument non-partisan and national. However, their boycott of some occasions at the shrine could be seen as their expression of dissatisfaction with the interpretation of what post-war heroes/heroines should be in light of multi-party democracy. It is also a clarion call announcing the need to move beyond the liberation war as a the *sole* determinant of what a hero/heroine is, as the nation continuously needs to be producing more heroes and heroines outside of the liberation war continuum for its sustained survival.

While there is a coalition GNU, ZANU PF considers itself the senior partner. This is fostered by the fact that it has been in control of state machinery since independence, which makes it more inclined to override its partners, who, while they won a majority they do not control the powerful ministries of defence and information¹²⁵ that appear to stall change in the GNU. Given that most of the civil servants in key posts in the GNU were inherited from a one party dispensation that is rooted in the liberation war, the MDCs are debatably seen and treated as parvenus in politics. Arguably, in boycotting the burial rituals at the shrine, the MDCs intend to undermine ZANU PF’s stranglehold of the NHA institution as a legitimatising symbol and expose it as partisan. This in turn puts ZANU PF and its constituency under criticism and pressure and they are compelled to make concessions, hence the process of determining heroes/heroines may get reviewed. Considering that ZANU PF wants the NHA shrine and the institution of a hero/heroine to have a national appeal, they may not be conceding *visibly* to the other political parties and civil society demands, but change is impelling them to soften. The heroes issue is now under consideration as one of the outstanding issues in the Global Political Agreement framework

¹²⁵Zimpapers, a print media company in which the government is majority shareholder and controls editorial policy, has seven newspapers in its stable, of which *The Herald* and *The Sunday Mail* are national, with the rest being regional. The national broadcaster, ZBC, has the nation’s only two television channels and four national radio stations. Zimpapers and ZBC all fall under the Ministry of Information and Publicity. Two new electronic media players, namely Zimpapers’ Talk Radio going by the airwaves name of Star FM and Supa Mandiwanzira’s AB Communications were given broadcasting licences. Its only Star FM that is now on air, however, these two companies are widely seen as allied to ZANU PF and as such are viewed with contempt (see Sibanda, 2012 on <http://www.thezimbabwemail.net/zimbabwe/11708-new-radio-groups-miss-six-month-broadcast-deadline.html>)

that has to be implemented, according to one of the GNU principals, Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara (Gonda, 2010). Harrison notes that “in a proprietary contest the contestants agree on the prestige of the symbols but dispute their ownership” (Harrison, 1995: 259). It appears that the political parties generally agree on the importance of the NHA as a war memorial symbol; what is in dispute is the ownership of the conferment process that ZANU PF monopolises.

The process of re-framing the NHA ought to be managed sensitively to avoid scenarios of defiling sculptures and tombs as witnessed in Eastern Europe as communism fell (Verdery, 1999). In the interests of ensuring that the NHA shrine continues to be respected,¹²⁶ many would want to see the process of determining heroes/heroines restructured. A veteran of the Second Chimurenga comments to this effect:

Assuming that the revolutionary party loses control of state power just like what happened in eastern Europe, that is where at times, when these processes [of declaring a hero/heroine] are not done well initially, the people will go all out to such places and desecrate the graves because they would be saying that “this evil person buried here is a fake hero”, in the sense that he caused harm. That’s why I am advocating for a more balanced, more inclusive, people participatory way of declaring a national hero.¹²⁷

New definitions and continuums of what makes a person a hero/heroine will most likely be set in place, because if conferment remains partisan there is “a danger of the national monument being disregarded”¹²⁸ as has started to happen. Relatives of some of those declared heroes/heroines do not want them to be buried at the NHA monument.¹²⁹ Besides this, there is a general feeling that people would be happier to bury their relatives closer to their homes in the traditional manner and “not at a distant place” like the National Heroes Acre where they would have to travel for familial rituals.¹³⁰ Eppel’s (2004: 58) research suggested that there is “ethnicism” towards heroes’ acres, which are viewed “as not African or useful, but rather have come to suggest corrupt political practice”. Nelson Chamisa of the main MDC-T formation sees the current definition of a hero as being “divisive talk” because it does not derive from “national consensus” (Mafirakurewa, 2011: 3) but from one sector of the nation.

¹²⁶Interview with Robert Makoni, 26 April 2010, Chinhoyi.

¹²⁷Interview with Robert Makoni, 26 April 2010, Chinhoyi.

¹²⁸Interview with Robert Makoni, 26 April 2010, Chinhoyi.

¹²⁹Interview with Robert Makoni, 26 April 2010, Chinhoyi.

¹³⁰Interview with Robert Makoni, 26 April 2010, Chinhoyi. /Interview with Lovemore Mandima, 15 January 2009, NHA, Harare./Interview with Colonel Kennedy Kazambara, 16 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

Some of those interred at the NHA may be most dear to ZANU PF but are not necessarily the most virtuous of national heroes/heroines. This perception is instructive as to why ZAPU had to pull out of the 1987 Unity Accord. One of its major grievances according to Nyathi (2008) was the “unfair treatment” that ZIPRA/ZAPU veterans were getting, not to mention the bureaucratic “time taken to declare them heroes/heroines”.¹³¹ In the event that they were given that status, it would be the lesser hero/heroine status. An example of this was the provincial hero status for Misheck Chinamasa (Nyathi, 2008).¹³¹ ZAPU argues that this would not have happened to ZANU’s deceased cadres.

An unsettling development related to the declaration of heroes/heroines, whether national, provincial or liberation war heroes/heroines was that “those who [...] served the [ZANU PF] party’s interests in the last few years [were] assured of space in heroes acres, regardless of whether they have tortured or murdered, and with little concern for their actual credentials” (Nyathi in Raftopoulos and Savage, 2009: 66). In light of this, even when the Heroes Acre had been highly regarded as an “ennobling place to be buried”,¹³² in the third decade of independence it began generally to be perceived as compromised, indeed sullied. The shrine was becoming a haven for some of society’s and opposition politicians’ perceived misfits, brought there by what Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2009: 313) crudely terms “political patronage and matronage”. Other than this, the state’s burial rituals at the shrine, underwritten by tax payers’ money, also began to be seen as a liability to a nation whose economy was on a downturn in the greater part of the third decade. Arguably, without the euphoria of independence, and that excitement induced by the 1987 Unity Accord, which ushered in peace and a sense of purpose among nationalists, the war monument is losing its lustre and sanctity in the eyes of the masses.¹³³ These developments attest to the evolving biography associated with monuments in times of social change (Mayo 1988; Till, 2005; Marschall, 2010).

¹³¹Senior PF Zapu officials, Swazini Ndlovu, Masala Sibanda and Isaac Nyathi, were declared heroes well after they had been buried, “but it did not take long for people like Border Gezi and others from Zanu to be honoured” (Nyathi, 2008). Soon after independence, when the NHA was instituted, the choice of national heroes sparked debate in Parliament, showing that from its inception there have always been contests concerning the NHA shrine even when ZANU PF and ZAPU were in government together. Lookout Masuku, Jason Ziyapapa Moyo and Dr Samuel Parerenyatwa were made heroes only after heated debates in Parliament, attesting to the one-sided nature of honouring Zanu PF cadres at the expense of ZAPU and other outsiders (See Kriger, 1995 for early post-independence analysis).

¹³²Interview with Colonel Kennedy Kazambara, 17 January 2009, NHA, Harare.

¹³³Interview with Robert Makoni, 26 April 2010, Chinhoyi.

While opposition political parties and civil society clash on the process of conferment, eminent individuals and the public started shunning association with the NHA rituals in the second decade of independence (see Tekere: 2006: 154). In the third decade, this process escalated, with some nationalists leaving written instructions to the effect that even if they were declared national heroes/heroines, they insisted upon their right not to be buried at the NHA. These are mostly persons who have been critical of ZANU PF's desire to establish a one-party state, of government corruption and of state victimisation and marginalisation of ethnic 'others', like the Ndebele speaking people (Tekere, 2006; Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2009; Tendi, 2010). Among these critics is Edgar Tekere, who is on record as having said that he would not like to be interred at the NHA shrine because some who lay there were "thieves and crooks" and that he did not want people to "speechify over my dead body" (Gagare and Murima, *Newsday* of 7 June 2011).¹³⁴ The national shrine is perceived as tainted, and has thus become "a mockery of the liberation struggle" such that Welshman Mabheha, the late Governor of Matebeleland, also did not want to be identified with it, and was buried at Lady Stanley in Bulawayo (Sibanda, 2010). Corneous Nhloko, an intelligence officer, opted to lie next to his father (*The Herald* of 18 February 2011). The latter two were declared national heroes but left instructions not to be taken to the Heroes Acre, wishes that their families upheld. Similarly, Thenjiwe Lesabe (former government Minister and ZANU PF Women's League Chairperson, who had left ZANU PF to revive ZAPU in 2007) was denied national heroine status (even though most people anticipated she would be given that) but had also left instructions against being buried at any Heroes Acre (Nkatazo, 2011).¹³⁵

Although ZANU PF National Chairperson, Simon Khaya Moyo, maintains that his party is not worried about "pioneers of the liberation struggle refusing to be buried at the Heroes Acre" (Nyathi, 2011), I would argue that ZANU PF must necessarily be concerned about evidence of increasing disrespect towards the shrine. Other notables who also declared that they would not rest in peace at the NHA include Enos Nkala, a founder member of ZANU PF and formerly a government minister (Sibanda, 2011), and Dumiso Dabengwa, former government minister and current leader of ZAPU (Radio VOP, 2011). They are unhappy

¹³⁴Edgar Tekere succumbed to prostate cancer on Monday 6 June 2011. He was buried at the NHA on 12 June 2011. President Mugabe did not 'speechify' over his dead body as he was attending a SADC conference in South Africa.

¹³⁵Thenjiwe Lesabe was only given a state-assisted funeral because she was no longer a member of Zanu PF. She had crossed over to Zapu according to Zanu PF spokesperson Rugare Gumbo (Moyo, 2011). It is implied that by crossing the floor from Zanu PF she forfeited her heroine status.

with the criteria of selection, which they perceive as partisan and which has resulted in ‘unknown’ and ‘tainted’ people lying in honour alongside respectable nationalists.¹³⁶ Inasmuch as it is only remotely possible, there have also been threats to exhume Joshua Nkomo from the NHA shrine, coming from his surviving son, Sibangilizwe (Matshazi, 2010), as well as from the reviving ZAPU’s leader, Dumiso Dabengwa (Mlotshwa and Ndlovu, 2011). They argue that his status is being abused by the ZANU (PF) elites for political mileage at the expense of his legacy (Matshazi, 2010). In essence, these developments are mostly aimed at undermining ZANU PF’s monopoly in using the shrine as a legitimising symbol to hold on to power as well as to own the liberation war memory, as seen in the perspective of Harrison’s (1995: 266) valuation and proprietary strategies.

The August National Heroes’ Day

In coming up with the NHA, ZANU PF and its state ~~have~~ for the past 30 years been rewriting the story of Zimbabwe through their own eyes” (Madanhire, 2010). In addition their control, let alone ownership of both electronic and print media, became handmaiden to the controlling of collective memory (see Connerton, 1989:1). While it is normal for electronic and print media to dedicate time slots and space for ~~Heroes~~ week (*Svondo remagamba*) [in Shona]” and the nation is reminded about ‘national heroes’ (Patsanza, 2002), when this becomes incessant it becomes an ~~innovation~~ strategy” (Harrison, 1995: 266) politically designed to nurture and uphold the state’s conception of collective memory.

In the new millennium, Zimbabwean national radio and television stations have been inundated by half-a-minute to minute-long musical jingles that extol the ZANU PF leadership, as well as revolutionary incantations every 30 minutes. Another tactic has been the utilisation of musical performances termed ‘national galas’ that are transmitted live on national television and radio stations on national occasions as of 2004 (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 287).¹³⁷ The Heroes musical event takes place on the weekend before the Heroes Day holiday, which now falls on every second Monday of August as opposed to the

¹³⁶The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), Menard Muzariri, buried as national hero on 14 April 2011, allegedly shot and killed ZAPU’s Njini Ntutha during the Gukurahundi era, claims Welshman Ncube, President of the smaller MDC-N formations (Tshuma, 2011).

¹³⁷Heroes Splash, the Independence gala and the Unity gala were introduced in 2004 by Professor Jonathan Moyo, then ZANU PF’s spokesperson and Minister of State for Information. Similarly, the ‘urban groove’ genre gained currency when Jonathan Moyo enforced a 75% local content on all music played on national radio stations.

traditional 11th of August in the first decade. This musical show began as a free concert for the public within a hosting town or city, as the show moved around the country annually (Chiremba, 2008). However, with time, entry fees were introduced. The performing groups featured include a few established artists as the main attraction while upcoming youth groups take up most of the programme. These youths, who lack equipment and crave exposure, experiment with different musical styles in a genre that has become known as ‘urban groove’. Besides becoming exposed, the musicians are paid by the state for participating. This underscores the musical gala’s function as a publicity stunt meant to win votes for ZANU PF from the youth, as war veterans become fewer with each passing year.¹³⁸ Thus, while the ‘innovative’ gala is framed as a national event, only ZANU PF functionaries like the national political commissar, local governors and Members of Parliament and the party spokesperson, are given the platform to make party slogans and address the nation.¹³⁹

The fact that ZANU PF does not condone competition but is focussed on ‘expansionary strategies’ for support was illustrated when a formerly MDC acting-Mayor for Harare, Mrs Sekesai Makwavarara, who had joined ZANU PF to retain her post, ~~attended~~ the National Heroes Acre in ZANU PF regalia” upon the commemoration of Heroes in 2004 (*The Herald* of 10 August 2004).¹⁴⁰ She became newsworthy for both electronic and print media as ZANU PF fully exploited the spectacle to wheedle opposition members to itself in its expansionary contests (Harrison, 1995) with the opposition MDC which controlled the Harare City Council. Besides this, solidarity marches by ZANU PF aligned groups, like Members of the Zimbabwe Revolutionary Volunteers’ Front and the National Youth Service, from ZANU PF Head Office (*The Herald*, 7 August 2010) to the NHA shrine is a norm embedded in ‘innovation’ strategies (Harrison, 1995) dating back to 1983 as gleaned from a poster in the Harare National Archives records (Fig. 39). At that time the grand march commenced at Harare’s City Sports Centre, beginning at 7.30 a.m. and arriving at 9.30 a.m. (National Archives of Zimbabwe), whereas it now starts from ZANU PF’s headquarters in Harare. These marches are designed to bring “political human resources” (Harrison, 1995: 266) to ZANU PF, in terms of new supporters, as also seen in the rushed

¹³⁸While many fall victim to diseases and conditions that are usual amongst the elderly, AIDS-related illnesses also result in a large number of deaths.

¹³⁹ZBC TV Live broadcast of Heroes Splash, 13 August 2010.

¹⁴⁰Mayor Sekesai Makwavarara later crossed the floor to be a ZANU PF member and this kept her at the helm of the City of Harare when an MDC elected Executive Mayor, Elias Mudzuri was suspended and later dismissed by the ZANU PF appointed Minister of Local government, Dr Ignatius Chombo due to political differences.

Joshua Nkomo statues project that was rejected in the City of Bulawayo, discussed later in the Chapter Six which explores the sculpture *Looking into the future*. The Nkomo statues had been set to be unveiled on Heroes Day of August 2010 for both Harare and Bulawayo if the project had gone as planned by the Ministry of Home Affairs and its NMMZ arm.¹⁴¹

The Namibian National Heroes Acre

Inasmuch as the NHA stands as a shrine that combines monument and memorial in its ritualisation of a war past, it is not a unique example in Africa, but has a companion in the form of Namibian Heroes Acre (Figs. 40 to 44). The latter, inaugurated on 22 August 2002 by its nation's founding President, Sam Nujoma¹⁴² of the ruling South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), also has traits synonymous with socialist realism. The Namibian National Heroes Acre, like the Zimbabwean one, was also a joint effort by Mansudae Overseas Projects, the North Korea experts in collaboration with the City of Windhoek, the Ministry of Basic Education and Culture, the National Monuments Council and the Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication".¹⁴³ For Namibia, the 26th day of August Heroes' Day also commemorates the start of their modern day armed struggle in 1966. Then, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) attacked South African occupation troops in Northern Omusati Region of Namibia. The shrine provisionally has 178 graves of which 9 are symbolic graves of traditional chiefs and/or kings who resisted earlier Western occupation and settler rule. Only four cadres from SWAPO are currently interred on the shrine (Olivier, 2010). Like at the NHA, names and portraits of the cadres are engraved on black marble tombstones with some tombs vacant and thus still awaiting future heroes/heroines. As in Zimbabwe, there are four symbolic graves and only one chief is actually buried at the shrine. Contrastingly, the NHA does not have any symbolic grave meant for any of the First Chimurenga heroes and heroines, despite the fact that these almost always receive mention at the NHA in ritual speeches.

The Namibian Heroes' Acre, like its Zimbabwean counterpart, is located between two hills and forms a symmetrical polygon that bears a 5000 capacity public sitting arena and an arrivals' platform makes the lowest part of the saddle (Namibia-1on1, 2012). Unlike at NHA

¹⁴¹ Interview with Kundishora Chipunza on 4 January 2011, NMMZ, Harare.

¹⁴² <http://www.namibia-1on1.com/a-central/heroes-acre-2.html>

¹⁴³ <http://www.windhoekcc.org.na/default.aspx?page=51>

where graves are curved in simulation of an AK 47 rifle's magazine, the graves here are in straight rows (see Fig. 40). The Namibian shrine also has a walkway leading up to a white granite obelisk and the Pavilion, from where one can view the city of Windhoek. While the City of Harare can be seen from the Pavilion which incidentally towers as the obelisk carrying the eternal flame, the Namibia Heroes Acre pavilion stands alone several meters further up the hill and away from the obelisk (see Figs. 9 and 40). The Namibian eternal flame is on the arrival platform on the lower saddle of the shrine. Whereas the NHA has a threesome of unidentified cadres as the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier*, its Namibian counterpart represents a single eight-metre high heroic male figure in military fatigues brandishing an AK 47 rifle in one hand and a command bell in another. This statue's athletic torso is endowed with a head that ~~strongly~~ resemble [that of] Sam Nujoma himself"¹⁴⁴ (see Fig. 41). (One might note that the lone male could be understood to underplay the role that Namibian women cadres surely played in the war effort to liberate the nation, and one is left wondering what roles females might assume in the postcolonial state.)

The entrance to the Namibia shrine is adorned by two statues on either side, unlike at the NHA. Additionally, larger than life-size bas reliefs at the Namibian Heroes Acre come in four parts on a singular wall. These narrate the early torment and resistance for Germany colonialism, shows the petitioning of the United Nations for Namibian independence from apartheid South Africa in the 1960s, depicts the struggle for self-determination and also portrays the eventual triumphant march upon independence.¹⁴⁵ A striking difference with the Zimbabwean NHA on reliefs is that the Namibian mural portrays both male and female cadres in similar military regalia (boots, pants etc.) with the introduction of dresses and/or skirts on women only being employed to suggest civilian women (Fig. 43). On the Zimbabwean reliefs, dress codifies difference in gender, and possibly, roles. Conspicuous at Namibia's Heroes Acre is the fact that they immortalise struggles against German occupation and imposed settler rule by earlier generations on their relief wall, whereas the Zimbabwean NHA only portrays aspects of the Second Chimurenga/Umvekelwa. However, both national shrines include polished tombstones for heroes/heroines as well as etched portraits of the deceased on tombstones (Figs. 32 and 44).

¹⁴⁴<http://www.namibiatravel.net/travelguide/southern-namibia/heroes-acre.html>

¹⁴⁵visit <http://www.namibia-1on1.com/heroes-acre.html> for details

Furthermore, there is a trend that is synonymous with socialist realism in both liberation shrines. This is the depiction of founding father figures of the nation either leading or among the masses. While in the Zimbabwe example, Robert Mugabe is depicted formally dressed and addressing a post-war situation, the Namibian monument represents Sam Nujoma as the flag-bearing lead soldier in a triumphal parade (see Fig.42). In both instances, as argued above, they are constituted as national icons and living legends. And while both countries have a policy of declaring heroes posthumously, these founding fathers appear to have earned their hero statuses by virtue of being founders of nations resulting from wars of liberation.

Both tombs of Unknown Soldiers deploy plinths supporting statuary and, beneath, samples of soil taken from mass graves where cadres killed by the ‘enemy’ are symbolically buried¹⁴⁶ This is in tandem with the tradition of wanting to ensure that the dead rest peacefully for the sake of the conscience and peace of the living (see Verdery, 1999). Inasmuch as these two plinths bear epitaphs, the Zimbabwean words are derived from the poem of a youthful citizen by the name E. Zarayika, whereas the Namibian words are inscribed and signed in the handwriting of the former state-president Sam Nujoma. Nujoma proclaims –Glory to the fallen Heroes and Heroines of the motherland Namibia!”¹⁴⁷ As at NHA, the statement is a symbolic incantation of patriotism. It appears that the NHA and the Namibian shrines share a lot of similarities given that all are products of the process of the liberation struggle against perceived injustices of colonialism and racial subjugation within southern Africa. It is also apparent that relationships forged with the communist bloc (the DPRK in this case) during years of the armed struggle have endured into the postcolonial era. During the liberation struggle, provision of munitions and cadre training in warfare was organised by Eastern Bloc countries, and the contracting of the Mansudae artists to work with both the Zimbabwean and Namibian people in the design and execution of national shrines appears to be a way of keeping these relations in place.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the NHA monument as a visual space that combines ritual and commemoration for the heroes/heroines of the Liberation War (also known as the

¹⁴⁶In the case of Namibia, soil samples were taken from mass graves from Casinga in Angola, from Ungulumbashe in Namibia, and from Oshatotwa in Zambia where liberators were killed by South African soldiers.

¹⁴⁷<http://www.our-africa.org/namibia/heroes-acre>

Second Chimurenga) as national symbols deployed by ZANU PF and its state for purposes of imagining the founding myth of the Zimbabwean nation.

I have indicated that at the NHA, ZANU PF and its state quote from a triple heritage; the pre-colonial, the colonial past and the liberation war, to create and sustain a patriarchy in the imagined nation-state. I have shown that the NHA has been manipulated to entrench symbolic power for the elite as seen in ZANU PF's conflation of party and state structures in the institution of hero/heroine. All this has been done for the purpose of closing out potential counter-action to its hegemony as a one-party-state drawing on 'revolutionary' nationalism while alienating the 'other' as counter-revolutionary sell-outs. This is what makes Zimbabwean society a place of opposing polar binaries (see Appendix 2).

I also showed how the emergence of the MDC, supported by civic society, has heightened the symbolic contests around the institution of hero/heroine and the rituals of the NHA since 1999. I have also highlighted that the Zimbabwean populace has reacted to ZANU PF and its state's hegemony at the NHA, and the process of identifying individuals as heroes or heroines, by extricating themselves from national activities including celebrations of such once-popular holidays as [...] Heroes [...] Days" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 34-5).

Furthermore, I have briefly compared the NHA to the Namibian National Heroes Acre. This was mostly meant to underscore the fact that the NHA is not unique to southern Africa. It also served to demonstrate the fact that different nations tend to ascribe different values when it comes to memorialising a heroic past regardless of the known fact that the two states have a common background of waging armed struggles against settler occupation and rule.

Given that monuments are bound to be interpreted differently by various elements of society (Mayo, 1988), their meanings will always be diverse, even though it will be the readings preferred by those wielding political power that mostly prevail. On the other hand, the hero/heroine status and NHA shrine will also remain central in shaping debate of a nation that is in conflict with itself as it searches for an identity that will make all its citizens proud to associate with its war past, in the present and in future. Sadly, in the present, as symbols of state ritualism and commemoration, the hero/heroine symbolism is focused more on the desire to retain or gain power for the elites. In this narrow focus, the NHA has lost its most

important purpose, that of critically and historically ensuring that Zimbabweans continually engage in honest conversations about identity, heroism and violence, dissent and authority, as well as loss and grief, without fear of being stigmatised as the ‘other’, let alone being labelled as either ‘patriotic’ or a ‘sell out’.

CHAPTER THREE

Old Bulawayo: A Cultural Monument's Performance of History

Introduction

Until recently, a reconstruction of a royal enclosure stood on the site of koBulawayo, a 19th-century royal settlement. This reconstruction of Old Bulawayo, planned from 1993, was completed in 2006. But while destroyed by fire in 2010, a museum built concurrently, and which survived the disaster, continues to operate today on the site.

Old Bulawayo as a cultural monument did not only seek to preserve the collective memory of the ethnic Ndebele people of Zimbabwe. It also seeks to produce a representation of past cultural practices in current settings and, in the long term, to serve as a pilot case for future monuments meant for other ethnic communities. But how focused on preserving and promoting an Ndebele cultural heritage is Old Bulawayo, and how does this initiative feed into the larger drives and self-imaging of the nation state? Why do such cultural monuments become proxies of power for elites and politicians? In examining the significance of Old Bulawayo as a cultural monument, I explore these questions.

The advent of colonialism in nineteenth-century Africa cut short the lives of some established and emerging kingdoms of indigenous people and their systems of governance. The processes of establishing a colony and of instituting emerging independent nation-states have contributed to the distancing of African societies from their pre-colonial histories, memories and traditions (Norton, 1993). These communities were coerced and sometimes ‘volunteered’ to learn the dominant traditions of those who wielded power (see Ranger, 1993). In these processes of acculturation, various indigenous peoples became subaltern to two successive authorities - firstly, a western European colonial authority, and secondly, a homogenizing central government after independence from colonial powers. In Zimbabwe, the newly independent state was keen to foster national cohesion for the sake of buttressing governance of a state made up of disparate peoples or ethnicities, and this tended to alienate indigenous people even further from their history and traditions. The ushering in of independence or majority rule also increased the longing, amongst some groups, to reclaim a pre-colonial past and its attendant traditions. However, re-establishing understanding of this past has been

difficult for most communities. This has been especially difficult in independent Zimbabwe because, as Katsamudanga explains:

A hundred years of interrupted practices at important shrines and new challenges from science and Christian evangelism created stiff challenges to the recognition and identification of intangible heritage to preserve. Indifference or negative attitudes of local communities to their heritage (tangible and intangible) today must be understood in the context of the dislocation created by colonialism (Katsamudanga, 2003).

Modern governments inherited boundaries of nations whose borders were crafted by Europeans in the 1884-5 Berlin Conference which did not consider indigenous peoples' own boundary systems. This meant geographically separating some culturally related ethnic communities, merging them with others of different languages and cultural orientation, and then giving them a collective territorial name like Rhodesia.¹⁴⁸ Because post-colonial governments are more concerned with building national unity and cohesion for these disparate peoples inherited as 'nation' for the sake of entrenching their political hegemony (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009) they tend to ignore vernacular cultural orientations as they create new traditions (Connerton, 1989; Ranger, 1993). The reconstruction of Old Bulawayo and other related cultural sites being pursued by the Department of National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe (NMMZ) is an attempt to redress this. Cultural sites, cultural buildings and cultural performances at designated sites are intended to involve a nation's civil society in remembering the past and considering it in light of the present. Such sites may be described in terms of Pierre Nora's concept of *lieux de memoire* or "sites of memory" (Nora, 1989: 19). A "site of memory", according to Nora (1989: 19), is "primarily there to preserve and promote heritage [...] so that people celebrate their culture".¹⁴⁹

A site of memory implies a place or location that embodies a sense of "historical continuity" even if, in its present outlook, it no longer possesses those settings of genuine and "real memory" (Nora, 1989: 7). In other words, it is a landscape imbued with cultural history and social memory of a people and individuals. Thus, in remembering, there is a tendency to

¹⁴⁸Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

¹⁴⁹The term 'culture' is fluid in meaning and has been employed in many different ways to denote behaviour that organises around the collective sense of social habits as in 'a collective way of doing things'. Chaney says it is "a way of doing things [...] which will be characteristic of a social group [...] usually imbued with moral force [...] as traditions, and they constitute a central element in group identity [and] will persist through generations (2002: 158). Thus it could be reduced to a few people's way of doing things therefore it becomes a local or vernacular culture. It can also involve several groups within different settings as in regional culture, national culture and even international culture.

“locate or localise images of the past” to particular places or landscapes (Hutton, 1993: 78). Zukin (cited in Yeoh and Teo, 1996: 27) sees a landscape as “an ensemble of material and social practices and their symbolic representation”. Thus it is space embedded with symbolic markers of the past which may have been “handed down to us” or that which we inherited and perceive to be invaluable and “irreplaceable resource essential to personal and collective identity and necessary for self-respect” (Lowenthal, 2005: 81). KoBulawayo, as an ancient monument, is one such symbol of collective identity for the Ndebele-speaking people “where habits of mind and particular recollections encounter and re-shape one other” (Hutton, 1993: 79). Acknowledging Old Bulawayo as a cultural monument worthy of revival does not only ensure that those narratives and memories once neglected get authenticated but also ensures that “the valorisation and preservation of their cultural values and beliefs” are upheld (Marschall, 2010: 1).

KoBulawayo has assumed different identities and meanings for different communities of people at different times. To those who speak *isiNdebele*, it embodies a political, spiritual, economic, legal and social standing for their state that was short-lived (Nyathi, 2000: 20). In other words, it is seen as celebrating an Ndebele culture now lost. To some Shona/Kalanga people and other smaller African groups that fell under Ndebele spheres of influence on the Zambezi-Limpopo plateaux, KoBulawayo symbolises wanton destruction and coerced assimilation. These neighbouring societies were “inculcated with Ndebele values and language” while others were often raided by the Ndebele warriors who would take away grain, cattle and young women and men as their spoil (Muringaniza, 1998; Chirikure, 2007; Cobbing in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Their annals suggest that, to European missionaries, traders and concession hunters who were entertained by King Lobengula at his royal settlement, koBulawayo was a “military settlement” whose inhabitants were not worthy of trust (Nyathi, 2000: XI).¹⁵⁰ All these perceptions make Old Bulawayo an important “site of memory” in present-day Zimbabwe.

It is Makuvaza’s (2002) seven-page conference paper entitled “Towards a new type of ‘ethnographic’ museum in Africa” which, while discussing the challenges that traditional museums and theme parks in general face in Africa and in Zimbabwe, makes an attempt to

¹⁵⁰In his book, *Three years with Lobengula*, J. Cooper Chadwick (cited in Nyathi 2000: IX) labels King Lobengula as “a wily old savage [...] the old buster”. Similarly, in his journals, the Reverend Robert Moffat describes the Ndebele as “emphatically men of war, a tribe of warriors” (Moffat in Nyathi 2000: IX).

discuss the Old Bulawayo project vision ever since reconstruction began. However, much has been written in terms of archaeological finds on the site (Hughes, 2005) and for environmental impact assessment of the general landscape including the Matopo area (Ndoro and Pwiti, c1993). All these were conducted as part of the NMMZ's efforts to revive the monument as a cultural heritage themed site for tourism.¹⁵¹

Similar research, on community participation in archaeological heritage management on the Old Bulawayo site, was done for a master of philosophy in archaeology by Muringaniza (1998). This dissertation gives insight into how the royal Khumalo family and locals were involved in the interpretation and reading of archaeological findings during and after the excavations of the site. It probably forms the basis of what was used to explore the feasibility of, and people's sentiments about, reconstructing Old Bulawayo in earnest after several false starts beginning in 1993. While Muringaniza (1998) reports on early discord encountered at Old Bulawayo since 1993/4, this is confined to activities associated with the early reconstruction phase of the bee-hives at the royal enclosure up to about 1998 (Muringaniza, 1998: 32-33). In this dissertation I explore the role of the royal Khumalo family in the totality of the Old Bulawayo project. Apart from making a comprehensive analysis of the problems that were encountered on the selection and display of an Ndebele material culture into the interpretive site museum up to the present day. Makuva, (2002) explains that in the Zimbabwean context a theme park is ~~a~~ a living museum where visitors can experience typical structures and activities of a past era". In supporting this definition, he tells us that Old Bulawayo would engage in the ~~production~~ production of typical artifacts [sic] of the [20th century Ndebele state] period" which would be exhibited and sold to tourists. On the sidelines, ~~the~~ the cultural arts performers at Old Bulawayo" would do so putting on traditional cultural costumes, according to Makuva, (2002). While Makuva discusses Old Bulawayo as a theme park ~~completed~~ completed [...] as a new form of a [living] museum in Zimbabwe", I examine the challenges associated with the project from its inception. I also assess the only spectacle that attempted to simulate *living* heritage that was staged at Old Bulawayo and its implications to the NMMZ, the royal Khumalo family, the Ndebele speakers and those in central government.

¹⁵¹Interview with Joseph Muringaniza on 28 January 2009, NMMZ, Harare.

In an effort to build on literature and the discourse of Old Bulawayo as a 'site of memory', I discuss the cultural monument from three perspectives. In the first component of this chapter, I outline the reconstruction activities at the Old Bulawayo memorial by describing the site in detail and contextualising it historically. I also examine the envisaged re-enactment of rituals and ceremonies associated with the site of Old Bulawayo in light of the fact that only one performance – the official opening ceremony – was conducted at the site. In the second, I examine how the dynamics of reconstructing an Ndebele past have been received and perceived by players with varying interests in achieving cultural capital and what this may mean for the history of such a site in a regional and national context. I find that contested interpretations of the activities and material culture of Old Bulawayo stem from the perceived exclusion of the Ndebele people in the framing of their cultural image. These disputes highlight the process of heritage preservation; it requires that the implementing authorities consult widely but to recognise that, even after such consultation, it is not a given that everyone will be happy with the end product. Finally, I consider how the intended celebration of an Ndebele cultural heritage would assist in the construction of a national cultural citizenship which serves to produce cultural capital for elites and politicians. Thus in this chapter I argue that Old Bulawayo as a cultural monument is being re/constructed to be representative of Ndebele culture, history and collective memory (also see Choay, 2001) while also feeding into constructions about Zimbabwe as a nation.

Re/constructing koBulawayo.

Edward Matenga, an author, historian and archaeologist who was also a consultant on the Old Bulawayo Project, believes that the key elements behind the reconstruction of the site (before it was razed down by a veld fire) involved an endeavour

to bring variety into our showcase of heritage in Zimbabwe because, firstly, this was going to be treated as a historical site and secondly, as a cultural heritage themed park. A cultural heritage themed park is a reconstructed place with a bit of activity; there are some community benefit programmes, and there is some kind of calendar or public programming of activities on the whole package of the exhibition park. The other dimension was that, given the polarity of things in Zimbabwe where you have got a Shona and a Ndebele segment, it was important to have some kind of equity in terms of projecting and creating heritage among the supposedly minority communities, especially if they have something to offer. In this case, Old Bulawayo with other places surrounding it, like Mhlahlandlela

and Matopos, all fall within a landscape associated with Ndebele royalty capitals and burial.¹⁵²

The issue of a theme park embedded in cultural tourism is a complex one especially when considering that a theme park is built around a particular and dominating single theme or idea (Yeoh & Teo, 1996: 28). This usually means amalgamating an array of issues like history and culture, time and place to service an “organising leitmotif” (Yeoh & Teo, 1996: 28). Theme parks involve “transference of culture which reduce[s] the differences between the past, present and future”: in a sense time and history are collapsed and then offered as a continuously present culture (see Pemberton in Yeoh & Teo, 1996: 28). Writing on culture, Manwa (2007: 466) suggests that its constituents may include performing arts, festivals, built heritage, museums, monuments, traditions and objects.

Therefore theme parks lump together components of history and culture and make these into saleable visual spectacles and simulations in tourism. These commodities become ready “signs” for a cultural “tourist gaze” (Urry, 1990: 3). In effect, Milman (in Milman, 2002: 139) sees theme parks as leisure activities directed at offering entertainment during an individual’s free time and therefore catering for, but not exclusively, a family touring as a unit. Crawford (in Van Eeden, 2005: 49) simply perceives “theme parks [...] as disguised market places”. Most importantly, theme parks strive to present a semblance of actual cultural experiences by attempting “to make the experience authentic” (Urry, 1990: 146) to clientele. Therefore, in an effort to harness the “real senses” of people in a themed cultural park, the concept of spectacle manifests itself in the form of staged performances (Urry, 1990; Van Eeden, 2004; Yeoh & Teo 1996; Harrison, 2013). On the other hand, buildings and architecture, whose authenticity derives from “spuriously appropriated past [or future] that substitutes for a more exigent and examined present” (Sorkin in Yeoh & Teo 1996: 29) lend themselves to simulation. This would explain why we have replicas and reproductions, dioramas and panoramas on sites: exemplars of the “idea of pure image ability”, they are also “oblivious to the real needs of traditions of those who inhabit the place” (Sorkin in Yeoh & Teo, 1996: 29).

¹⁵²Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

Cultural theme parks more often than not operate as simulacra that *stage* history and cultural activities of the past in the present and fall in the same category as living or folklore museums that have their genesis in North America and Europe (Marschall, 1977; Makuvaza, 2002). As such, theme parks may be perceived as “fortifying incorrect knowledge and false stereotypes which further skew people’s feelings about what they see as uncloudy and rustic past” (Marschall, 1977: 392). In essence, the notion of theme parks could be seen as perpetuating primitivising tendencies. Van Eeden (2004: 32) argues that theme parks in Africa tend to perpetuate the colonial gaze of “stereotypical views of Africa [...] as the Dark continent [...] home of the exotic noble savage”. This is particularly so when one realises that the increase in tourism was a direct result of colonial nostalgia as most colonies were attaining independence (see Van Eeden, 2004: 32) and Africans sought to portray themselves in a positive light.

The site of Old Bulawayo was declared a National Monument in 1966 by the Rhodesian government due to its historical importance as a former capital of King Lobengula, the second Ndebele king to reign in south-western areas of present day Zimbabwe (Muringaniza, 1998: 11). Mzilikazi, Lobengula’s father, had moved northwards, breaking from King Shaka’s Zulu kingdom in the present day KwaZulu–Natal province of South Africa during the 19th-century period referred to in Southern Africa as the time of upheavals or *mfecane*. According to Ndebele ethno-historian, Pathisa Nyathi, Ndebele tradition required that a new king upon coronation establish his own royal capital away from that of his predecessor.¹⁵³ Accordingly, King Lobengula did so in 1870 and named his capital *Gibixhegu*. The fact that he was Mzilikazi’s son by a junior queen meant that some among the Ndebele contested his installation as king. They preferred Nkulumane, a son born of a senior queen, as dictated by tradition, but he could not be located.¹⁵⁴ After a battle quelling opposition to his rule, King Lobengula renamed his royal capital *koBulawayo* (Nyathi, 2000: 20).

The name koBulawayo comes from the verb *bulawa* and the locative *ko*. *Bulawa* means to be killed or to be persecuted. It is presumed that Lobengula took the figurative meaning of the word *bulawa*, as he was opposed and persecuted by his opponents. In this respect koBulawayo refers to ‘the place of he who is persecuted’. The names Gibixhegu and

¹⁵³Interview with Pathisa Nyathi on 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

¹⁵⁴Nkulumane was installed as king in 1867 when Mzilikazi had failed to show up for 2 years. When Mzilikazi eventually showed up he instructed those behind his overthrow be killed. Nkulumane is thought to have either been killed or escaped to South Africa.

koBulawayo have origins in Zululand where King Shaka had used them, in that order, for his royal capitals. The Zulu king had undergone a more or less similar ordeal to that experienced by Lobengula.¹⁵⁵ In drawing parallels of his plight to that of King Shaka, King Lobengula demonstrated that, like Shaka, he was well versed in the cultural memory of his state's origins and could anticipate the challenges that awaited him in his reign.

KoBulawayo was abandoned in 1881, arguably under duress from European missionaries, concession seekers and colonial forces intent on usurping Lobengula's political control (*The Herald*, 26 August 2010). King Lobengula ordered that koBulawayo be burnt down as he went on to establish another royal capital on the present day site of Bulawayo State House in modern day Zimbabwe. For many years, a stone marker was the only indicator of the former settlement at the koBulawayo site (Fig. 45).¹⁵⁶ The site is situated 17 km south-west of the modern city of Bulawayo in Zimbabwe's Matebeleland North Province. It is near the precincts of the Matopo Hills where Cecil John Rhodes, the founder of Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, is interred. The Old Bulawayo Cultural Monument was a reconstruction of King Lobengula's royal court, or *isigohlo*, in a similar position to that of the no longer existent 19th-century settlement. A small interpretive museum constructed out of bricks and thatch is positioned on the periphery of the traditional site as you approach from the direction of modern day Bulawayo. Prior to the fire, it was the only architectural component of the site that was in a modern rather than historic style.

At Old Bulawayo itself, in the initial re/construction, the original outer peripheral enclosure was not constructed as concentration was only on the royal enclosure or *isigodlo*.¹⁵⁷ In the royal enclosure (Figs. 51 to 54), most of the physical architectural structures had been reconstructed, including King Lobengula's house (Figs. 51 and 52). Eight bee-hive huts (*amaqhugwana* in *isiNdebele*), had been made out of thatch of elephant grass and armatures of pliable wattle were used to render the domed outward appearance (see Figs. 53 and 54). South African women from KwaZulu-Natal were brought in to teach the NMMZ and local people how to construct the huts because that knowledge had been lost by present day

¹⁵⁵Information panels at interpretive centre or site museum, NMMZ, Old Bulawayo.

¹⁵⁶Also note that this stone marker gives 1870 to 1878 as the period that KoBulawayo was a capital while it is known that Ko Bulawayo was burnt down in 1873. This was said to be one of the ways that colonial masters romanticised issues, according to the interview with Joseph Muringaniza, held on 28 January 2009 in Harare.

¹⁵⁷Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

isiNdebele-speakers of Zimbabwe.¹⁵⁸ One of the original two European houses, the wagon shed, the cattle pier, the goat kraal and the palisade (see Figs. 47 to 54) and a place presumably used to treat wounded soldiers had also been reconstructed.¹⁵⁹

The reconstruction of the royal enclosure was relatively faithful to the 19th-century original site.¹⁶⁰ Construction on the Old Bulawayo Cultural Monument began on 9 December 1993 with the NMMZ not only carrying out a geological survey, but also consulting the local Ndebele community for their input.¹⁶¹ Primarily, this approach sought to establish and ascertain vital spatial information scientifically, and then marry it to what the elders, as custodians of Ndebele culture, had committed to memory and what had been passed on to them by oral tradition. As a matter of formality recorded observations which more often than not were romanticised accounts by European fortune hunters and visitors to the royal enclosure in the 20th century, also had to be assessed.¹⁶² These various sources informed on the reconstruction of the royal enclosure and its immediate dwellings. Nyathi gives the following account:

First, we had a literature review. People had to know about the structure, the site and get a feel of it even before getting to the site itself. Then they did a topographical survey which was headed by Mr Murambiwa. After that they brought in new technologies - these geo-physical surveys from Bradford University in the UK. These were combined with excavation [...] so we were able to tell the extent of the village and where the huts were, although visually you could no longer see any remnants. That was useful [...] the idea was that it would be a collaborative endeavour involving archaeology, history and ethnography.¹⁶³

Archaeological excavations and geo-physical surveys therefore assisted in affirming aspects of Ndebele memory and oral tradition by complementing them where they fell short. Specifically, the geophysical surveys were used to delimit the actual perimeter of the burnt royal enclosure, the exact placement of structures, their real sizes and shapes within a

¹⁵⁸Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

¹⁵⁹Rectangular houses were built for the king by traders wishing to curry favour with him e.g. a trader named Haylet built one such a house at Old Bulawayo. See introduction to Nyathi, 2000.

¹⁶⁰The palisade (Figs. 47 to 49), however, has had to be reconstructed slightly inward or outward of the exact geophysical findings.¹⁶⁰ This was done in order to allow for additional, future research and reconstructions.

¹⁶¹Consultation for reconstruction was broad based initially; chiefs and elders from the Ndebele community and ordinary citizens were involved, though, with time this whittled down to a small royal Khumalo group; Nyathi was also in attendance according to an interview with Pathisa Nyathi on 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

¹⁶²Interview with Pathisa Nyathi on 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

¹⁶³Interview with Pathisa Nyathi on 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

geographical landscape (Hughes, 2005: 56). Such spatial specifics are unlikely to have survived in oral traditions. In addition to this, a delegation comprising staff from NMMZ, local Ndebele chiefs and members of the royal Khumalo undertook a consultative trip to Ondini, a related site in South Africa's province of KwaZulu/Natal,¹⁶⁴ where, unlike the Ndebele and other ethnic groups in Zimbabwe, cultural practices had not (ostensibly) been as disrupted and diluted by European influences. This was done before construction at Old Bulawayo started.¹⁶⁵ Thus through ethnographical consultations, an examination of historical records and a visit to KwaZulu-Natal, those constructing the site sought to determine how Ndebele architecture and its settlement pattern looked in the 19th century.

An example of a contestation that arose from the employment of techniques resulting from these different fact-finding exercises was the direction in which the bee-hive huts were supposed to face in the reconstruction (Figs. 53 and 54). Current practice in Ndebele culture and the evidence of the geophysical scans could not conclusively determine a correct direction¹⁶⁶ and the NMMZ sought guidance from the royal Khumalo group. However, consulting the Khumalo *only* was viewed by others as limited as knowledge of Ndebele ethnography is not a preserve of this clan alone.¹⁶⁷ The Khumalo family are alleged to have given incorrect information regarding the correct direction for the huts. Pathisa Nyathi explains:

[T]he first beehive that was constructed had its entrance facing west, because that is the general practice in Matabeleland today [...] So they thought that if the houses today face west, Old Bulawayo would also have its houses facing west. But that was wrong [...] The floor was there, if you cared to be guided by evidence of it, but they chose instead the current practice. Current practice was at variance with the situation on the ground. And again perhaps they did not understand a lot of ethnography. The position of the cattle byre was very clear - it was not a contested issue: it was on the eastern end. With that information alone, it would have told you that all huts would face that direction because you cannot have a man with his back to his wealth. It can't happen [...] Secondly, there was evidence on the back part of the hut we call *umsamo* in Ndebele. It is there and

¹⁶⁴The NMMZ later contracted a museums' organisation from KwaZulu-Natal called Amafa, who draw on a body of thatchers and beehive huts builders who sent in three of their persons; one male who did the beehive huts' wooden frames and a woman who did the thatching, while the third male was the overseer of the project. The NMMZ seconded three of its employees and contracted two local women from Bulawayo to work with the Amafa artisans. Joseph Muringaniza, email communication, 8 June 2011.

¹⁶⁵Interview with Svinurai Joseph Muringaniza on January 28 2009, NMMZ, Harare.

¹⁶⁶Interview with Pathisa Nyathi on 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

¹⁶⁷Interview with Pathisa Nyathi on 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

everything was there, but they wanted to consult the Khumalos on current practice, and it was all wrong.¹⁶⁸

In as much as Pathisa Nyathi may well be correct in his ethnographic interpretations, it can still be argued that the Khumalo were correct in following current Ndebele practice. Rondavels or circular pole and mud huts-under-thatch (see Fig. 55) were an improved version of bee-hive huts which could be destroyed in the event of fire. These huts today, like the huts of the 19th century, still have only one entrance and exit point. It appears that, fundamentally, an aspect of traditional African architectural design that continually got passed on without much change was the direction upon which the entrance/exit point on huts faced.¹⁶⁹ Besides, considering that this site was perceived as a bastion of all that was accepted as Ndebele governance, it is not an overstatement to say that royal sentries of refined military standing were always alert and on patrol in the royal enclosure and outside it (see Cobbing, 1974: 628). In effect, the King's cattle and his prized possessions could thus be at the back of the huts that faced west and still be safe. However, Nyathi's observation should perhaps be considered in terms of the issues surrounding the likely second time *reconstruction* of the site and that the royal enclosure, as is being planned by the NMMZ, would be destined to have fewer and most obviously lay people militarily unlike in the days of King Lobengula.¹⁷⁰

The initially reconstructed royal enclosure, with its combination of traditional Ndebele and European influenced architecture, was destroyed on Monday 23 August 2010 when a fierce wind-driven veld fire overcame fire fighters and swept through the royal settlement. The palisade (Fig. 56), the cattle pier and the bee-hive huts (Fig. 57), were razed to the ground by the fire while the rectangular houses, the King's palace and wagon shed, (see Figs. 58 and 59) had their thatch destroyed and interiors gutted (Chiwanga, 2010). Nonetheless, the academic and financial investment that had been put in the project's initial reconstruction underscores the site's significance and paves the way for another reconstruction. The impetus to do so is felt by the Executive Director of NMMZ, Dr Mahachi:

¹⁶⁸Ibid. Note that when Pathisa Nyathi talks of not securing one's wealth he contradicts himself here, because he alludes to impregnable security at the royal enclosure in his book; Nyathi, P., 2000. *Lawo Magugu: Material Culture of the AmaNdebele of Zimbabwe*. p21.

¹⁶⁹Interview with Edward Matenga on 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

¹⁷⁰Interview with Tawanda Mukwende on 21 July 2012, NMMZ, Old Bulawayo.

We still have the results of the academic information and the information is still available for reconstruction [...] What we need to do is come together and re-do the site. It is a national monument and we have to find means and measures to restore the site [...] The starting point is to clear the site of the debris and mobilise material [...] The beehive wattle sticks are harvested from the Eastern highlands. They are sticks that are long and flexible to put the framework of the structure [...] We have to estimate the quantities of the components required and getting a special type grass from Matopos that has to be cut at a certain time [...] We will have to replace the roof on the wagon shed, [the] King's palace and the exhibitions that were completely destroyed (Mahachi in *The Herald*, 26 August 2010).

Perhaps, as we await the second reconstruction of the royal enclosure to begin, it still is worthwhile to continue with an assessment of what had been done and what was yet to unfold had the site not been destroyed. Considering the planned, and now unrealisable, activities within the grounds of Old Bulawayo is elucidatory in determining its significance as a site where cultural memory is itself an ongoing construction.

The envisaged resuscitation of human activity around and within the royal enclosure (albeit on a smaller scale than in King Lobengula's days) is still as integral a part of the reconstruction of Old Bulawayo as is the rebuilding of its physical structures, despite the current setback brought about by the August 2010 veld fire.¹⁷¹ Should the NMMZ decide to bring in people to settle in the area, environmental consultants Weber Ndoro and Gilbert Pwiti recommend that at least 6 000 hectare of land is needed to hold 10 to 15 families in a Model D government resettlement scheme (Ndoro & Pwiti, c1993). Already 2 000 hectares of land have been secured for the exercise.¹⁷² The scheme entails bringing in families from the royal Khumalo clan and other selected people to constitute and revitalise a pre-colonial village or community. In this proposed project, it appears that the Old Bulawayo community families would still participate in the contemporary world, as they will not be cut off from the outside world.¹⁷³ Ndoro and Pwiti (c1993) are intensely sceptical of this proposition since they "doubt the viability of settling people in order to make them practice a 19th-century lifestyle [...] in a time freeze on a permanent basis". However, the NMMZ appears aware of these challenges as Tawanda Mukwende, the Assistant Curator on Monuments, describes:

¹⁷¹Interview with Tawanda Mukwende 21 July 2012, NMMZ, Old Bulawayo.

¹⁷²Interview with Tawanda Mukwende 14 April 2010, NMMZ, Bulawayo.

¹⁷³Interview with Tawanda Mukwende, 14 April 2010, NMMZ, Bulawayo.

We were hoping that we would have people staying at Old Bulawayo just like in the days of King Lobengula; practising that traditional way of life, staying at the site proper, doing traditional dances, in traditional dressing, [practising] traditional activities and ceremonies - all those kinds of activities that were being done in the time of King Lobengula. [...] We will try to revive and re-enact these in a modern society [...] It will, however, be farfetched to bring back some of those things that were there during Lobengula's time. We need to maintain a certain fabric of our culture that identifies us as a people, like in KwaZulu Natal where they have absorbed aspects of the modern world but have retained the basic fabric of their culture. It's not like they necessarily go back in time, like they are alienated from the modern ways of living. There might be special days where special traditional activities take centre stage. I think you have seen the South African president [Jacob Zuma] in traditional regalia with a spear and shield. But it is not on an everyday basis that they do that: we can have some of these things on occasions.¹⁷⁴

Seemingly, this would also imply having a calendar of events that would be advertised to attract cultural enthusiasts and tourists. This would entail aggressive marketing and promotional packages on the part of NMMZ to lure revellers from within and without Zimbabwe, as is seen in Swaziland's reed dance ceremony, for example.

Events of note that used to take place at Old Bulawayo, but were discontinued because of colonialist pressures, include the *inxwala* or the 'celebration of the first fruits', *umbuyiso* or the 'bringing home ceremony for the dead' and the passing-out parade of warriors.¹⁷⁵ It follows that the resettlement project would have the people staying in the community of Old Bulawayo donning traditional regalia on designated sets of days to coincide with the projected events calendar for cultural performances.¹⁷⁶ The Ndebele communities from outside Old Bulawayo would probably attend the occasions and also be encouraged to participate in one form or another with those domiciled at the site.¹⁷⁷ In these activities, the artefacts exhibited at the interpretive museum would be endowed with different cultural value and meaning as they would be put to use in "traditional expressions of a living culture", as Macdonald and Alsford (2007: 280) describe the relationship between cultural objects and activities.

¹⁷⁴Joy Msindo Khumalo, a descendant of King Lobengula, was appointed as custodian of Old Bulawayo and lived on the site. He died and was buried on the site according to an interview with Tawanda Mukwende, 14 April 2010, NMMZ, Bulawayo.

¹⁷⁵Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

¹⁷⁶Interview with Tawanda Mukwende, 14 April 2010, NMMZ, Bulawayo.

¹⁷⁷Interview with Tawanda Mukwende, 14 April 2010, NMMZ, Bulawayo.

Fundamentally, having a participatory community at Old Bulawayo seems a ploy by the NMMZ to lessen the burden of managing the site if, and only if, their idea of ‘_living heritage’ were to materialise. Edward Matenga projects:

The royal Khumalo family were going to appoint custodians, they would basically look after the site, [and] they would be the traditional element. In that case, there was going to be some kind of dual administration where the Museums [would] play an oversight responsibility with the day to day events being run by the people appointed by the descendants of the Khumalo clan.¹⁷⁸

While this community would serve as apparent ‘_living testimony’ to an ideological conception of a pre-colonial way of life, there is, at present, a small site museum on the periphery of the cultural monument which acts as an *interpretative* centre for Ndebele history and material culture (Fig.61 and 62). The museum houses cultural artefacts found in typical indigenous African households and settings of the Ndebele today. While they may have been crafted later, they employ idioms that have been handed down for generations and may not in fact be far removed from those of 19th-century koBulawayo. Some of these items include cooking utensils, indoor and outdoor domestic utility crafts, crafting implements, and military paraphernalia and other items pertaining to everyday life in the Ndebele state. Some of these are presented as photographs and panels bearing written text explaining the items’ use in English, while the items have their names given in both *isiNdebele* and English (e.g. Figs. 63 to 66). A chronological history of the Ndebele state is also in place in text, images and as plastic art (Figs. 64 to 77). The museum therefore functions as an educational introduction to the Old Bulawayo site. It can be asserted then that in reconstructing Old Bulawayo, the NMMZ was cognisant of the fact that as the site tries to portray an Ndebele culture it would also mean the site abounds with changing symbolism. In modifying Old Bulawayo’s symbolic meaning it also translated to changing what Ross (n. d.: 5) would call ‘key elements in the site’s meanings and presentation’ to the public.

¹⁷⁸ Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

Contestations in the selection and representation of cultural heritage at Old Bulawayo

Coombes (2003: 12) contends that the visibility of a monument is contingent upon debates concerning the reinterpretation of history that take place at moments of social and political transition. This is relevant to Old Bulawayo, whose reconstruction began at a time when Zimbabwe was facing economic ruin and political uncertainty. The state of instability soon transformed to little or no progress at all on a project that had much promise and hype upon inception in 1993.

The perceived lack of progress may also be tied to the discord between those directly and indirectly involved in the realisation of the project. Issues of contention include: the degree of involvement that the royal Khumalo clan should assume; the statue that portrays King Lobengula; the collection of artefacts perceived as *not* being Ndebele material culture, as well as other, undeclared sentiments. All these seem to dampen the spirit of cooperation and any meaningful progress on the Old Bulawayo project. Equally, the lack of visible involvement by Ndebele people in some aspects of Old Bulawayo's re-interpretation raises issues of perception in a well-intentioned project. These concerns warrant examination as they are determinants of the framing of Old Bulawayo as a 'cultural monument' as well as its success in this avowed role.

The Royal Khumalo role

Despite the fact that it is well-intentioned, the inclusion of the royal Khumalo clan in the Old Bulawayo project presents significant challenges. The fact that until the reconstruction there was no semblance of what could be termed a 'local' community within the precincts of Old Bulawayo is in itself indicative of problems. Old Bulawayo actually falls within private property, that of the Matopo Research Station.¹⁷⁹ This situation is unlike that of Great Zimbabwe, where Chief Nemamwa and his people stay a very short distance from the site, which is used for cultural religious rites.¹⁸⁰ In this regard the Nemamwa are strategically in a position to be regularly consulted by the NMMZ. In the case of Old Bulawayo, neither the royal Ndebele, nor any other group of people, conducted rituals at Old Bulawayo before the commencement of reconstruction in 1993. Instead, rituals have always been conducted at

¹⁷⁹Interview with Tawanda Mukwende, 14 April 2010, NMMZ, Bulawayo.

¹⁸⁰Interview with Tawanda Mukwende, 14 April 2010, NMMZ, Bulawayo.

King Mzilikazi's grave in the Matopo hills.¹⁸¹ This ritual reverence given to King Mzilikazi as a founder of the Ndebele state has meant that some isiNdebele speakers question the reconstruction of Old Bulawayo in honour of his son Lobengula and not his father, Mzilikazi.¹⁸²

There has also been disagreement as to which families among the royal Khumalo clan would occupy and live at the royal enclosure.¹⁸³ Questions have also been raised as to how representative of the Ndebele ethnic and cultural spectrum the Khumalo clan of today are.¹⁸⁴ Can they articulate the concerns of *all* the Ndebele people, bearing in mind this was a stratified society?¹⁸⁵ Ndebele society had a strict caste system in the 19th century which included ethnic *‘others’*. These *‘others’* included the *ebezansi*, those from the south in Zululand, the *ebehla*, the Sotho and Tswana clans north of Zululand who were seen as second class citizens, and the *amahole*, or the lowest class, comprising the Shona/Kalanga, Venda and other minority groups which were already domiciled in present day Matebeleland who were naturalised in the then Ndebele state.

In the same vein, the proposal to have ceremonies reminiscent of King Lobengula's time may appeal to some among the Ndebele and related groups who see this as an opportunity to moot for a king (and by implication a kingdom). This king, chosen from the royal Khumalo family, would be expected to preside over ceremonies and events included on the cultural monument's calendar. Traditionally King Lobengula presided over all ceremonies like *inxwala* or the *‘first fruits thanksgiving’* festival held every February. This would start as a

¹⁸¹Interview with Tawanda Mukwende, 14 April 2010, NMMZ, Bulawayo.

¹⁸²The first Ndebele royal capital was *Mahllokwehlokweni* by Mzilikazi who went on to move onto three other capitals with *Mhlahlandlela* being his last capital.

¹⁸³Field notes. Relatives of King Lobengula's in-laws, the Dlodlo, are also presumed to be insisting that they should be brought into the discussion, by virtue of their being relatives of the king from one of the queens' side (Field notes). Related to this, unsubstantiated reports from fieldwork point out that Prince Langa kaZvide Khumalo, the one who is at the forefront as the Khumalo representative is arguably not a Khumalo (Field notes). He was raised in one of the Khumalo families. This throws doubt to his claim to being the heir apparent of the Khumalo throne. The scholar, Julian Cobbing (1974: 608) notes that issues of inheritance or succession of chieftainship (and by extension kingship) in Ndebele tradition observes strict patrilineal laws. It can be hypothesised that what has been seen as —some *‘schemes’* within the Khumalo themselves, [where] there was no agreement [...] no internal cohesion or unity” on matters of Old Bulawayo¹⁸³ emanates from their failure to appoint and declare an elder who could speak for them. This may have basis in the fact that Lobengula was polygamous and there is no royal family unit of purpose in matters of reviving an almost forgotten tradition within a condescending and centralised republic.

¹⁸⁴ Interview with Tawanda Mukwende, 14 April 2010, Bulawayo. Pathisa Nyathi also questioned this Khumalo group's knowledge of ethnography, see footnote 151.

¹⁸⁵Tawanda Mukwende interview, Bulawayo, 14 April 2010.

secretive ritual led by *izinyanga* or traditional doctors in the king's quarters, culminating in a public expression through song, military dance, and royal assegai-throwing and feasting.¹⁸⁶

It is understandable that the government may be concerned about a greater interactive role envisaged for the site of Old Bulawayo (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009 in Chapter 3). If, for example, the *inxwala* ceremony were to be re-enacted it is conceivable that it would lead to agitations for the authority of an Ndebele monarch to be recognised by the government in order to preside culturally, as Mzilikazi and later Lobengula did, and not merely to *act* the part, as currently envisaged by the NMMZ in the 'themed' cultural heritage spectacle. Such a monarch, and wielder of cultural capital within the Ndebele constituency, could challenge existing elites and politicians for what Bourdieu (1989: 23) terms "symbolic power" and, in so doing, stir up Ndebele nationalism which has always been in existence and simmering (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 163). The precedent for such a challenge to the existing hierarchies may be seen in an incident in the 1920s where Nyamanda, one of the eldest sons of King Lobengula, believed that he and his *indunas* or chiefs could raise enough money to buy back Matebeleland from the Rhodesians and re-establish their own rule over the territory (Mlambo 1972: 24).

The yearning for a king and the cultural, if not always national, independence associated with this mythology, has long been strongly felt among Ndebele nationalists. The late nationalist Joshua Nkomo is said to have combed British archives for a written record of a promise that Cecil John Rhodes made for an "Ndebele national home" (Ranger 2010: 242). National homeland realisation in present day Zimbabwe would require a referendum, the amendment of the Traditional Leaders Act and the provision for either an 'executive' or a 'ceremonial' Ndebele king. Since colonial times and the fostering of indigenous submission, traditional leaders have been stripped of the titles 'king' and 'queen' and reduced to the titles 'chief' or 'paramount chief' as the former titles became reserved for Europeans (Ranger, 1993: 229-30). The present government would likewise certainly not welcome a competing centre of authority on the part of a recognised Ndebele monarch. These feelings among the Ndebele continue today. The late and former governor of Matebeleland North, Welshman Mabheba, reportedly wrote a letter to the British Ambassador in Harare in 2007. He was seeking redress for the Matebeleland Kingdom that was invaded by the British South Africa Company in

¹⁸⁶NMMZ Interpretive panel text, Old Bulawayo.

November 1893 in defiance of her Majesty Queen Victoria” (Mabhena in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 163-4).

The longing for a king is also driven by anger among isiNdebele speakers who view Matebeleland as a region marginalised politically and economically by the dominant, ruling ZANU-PF political party which is largely regarded as supported by the majority Shona speaking people in Zimbabwe (Kriger, 1995: 149; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 102). Its potential as a possible touchstone for a nationalist Ndebele movement is the reason given by Nyathi for the general attitude he felt prevalent on the part of Shona managers assigned by NMMZ to oversee the implementation of Old Bulawayo – namely, that the project was “better left alone to die”.¹⁸⁷ Old Bulawayo was conceivably proposed as a way of making the Ndebele feel included in a portrayal of a Zimbabwean national culture that is rich in sub-cultures. But its potential to enjoy success depended on its careful co-opting and negotiation of notions of symbolic capital in order to if not always directly benefit, certainly not cast in a negative light, the existing elites and politicians.

The interpretive centre and perceptions

The small museum (Fig. 61) on the site of KoBulawayo has been, and will in all probability continue to be, a flash point for debate and conflicting views. The centre has made evident what Macdonald and Alsford (2007: 282) describe as characteristic of museums: the “potency of images, the character of exhibits as primary visual media, and the ambiguity of both images and artefacts to hold different meanings to different beholders”. The museum is intended to celebrate the material culture and symbolism of the ethnicity of an Ndebele state as well as be an archive of oral information on Ndebele memory. In attending to the material, the symbolic and the functional of Ndebele cultural history and memory, the museum can be said to be striving to fulfil the role of a ‘site of memory’ and in the process serve a broad spectrum of people. As such, Ndebele cultural enthusiasts, cultural tourists, school children, scholars and politicians are envisaged as drawing from its wealth of artefacts and history. Concern about what is and what is not Ndebele history and memory as represented by the displayed artifacts has begun, however, to register.

¹⁸⁷This was before the veld fire swept through the royal koBulawayo. Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

Generally, with such kind of cultural heritage centres dissension typically stems from what has been included as cultural artefacts, how these are presented to the viewer and how the same artefacts have been interpreted in written text for audiences. Sometimes even verbal presentations by staff may provoke controversy – normally when a member of the audience has historical knowledge or understanding about a matter unknown to site personnel or which personnel may fail to invoke. Or at times conflicted readings may transpire simply because visitors wish to assert their own authority over museum personnel. Clearly, the display in the museum at Old Bulawayo makes it evident that objects are catalysts for struggles over conflicting interpretations of culture.

Some conflicting interpretations occur because what is represented in the museum can be said to be intangible heritage. The UNESCO 2003 Convention defines intangible heritage as

[t]he practices and representations, expressions, knowledge, skills - as well as the artefacts, instruments, cultural spaces associated therewith - that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognise as part of their cultural heritage.¹⁸⁸

The UNESCO Convention also notes that ~~“intangible heritage”~~ is an evolving and interactive process and integral to a community’s sense of identity:

[T]his intangible heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of community and identity.¹⁸⁹

When a people whose past is being portrayed identify with that past in the sense that, as Nora (1989: 16) phrases it, the ~~“greater the origins, the more they magnify our greatness”~~ then everything gets scrutinised. This is the case with the statue of a seated human figure purportedly representing King Lobengula displayed inside the small museum (see Fig. 68a to 68d). In the statue, Lobengula - whose limbs and torso are strangely disproportionate - is depicted draped with a leopard skin. Holding a spear and a flywhisk in one hand, his other hand is clenched and rests on his lap.¹⁹⁰ This is a piece of uninspired workmanship, and the

¹⁸⁸[UNESCO.org Heritage Declaration Japan.pdf](https://www.unesco.org/heritage/declaration-japan.pdf)

¹⁸⁹[UNESCO.org Heritage Declaration Japan.pdf](https://www.unesco.org/heritage/declaration-japan.pdf)

¹⁹⁰Leopard and lion skins are associated with royalty. Indigenous African tradition believes that the invincibility and aura that the lion and leopard carry in their lifetimes is mythically transferred to the human being who is adorned with its skin.

Khumalo family are said to have rejected it. They are reported to have said it was not a befitting representation of King Lobengula (and by extension, of them).¹⁹¹ The statue, cast in plaster of paris and painted in metallic brown, was done from a black and white artist's impression of the king (Fig. 69). It is most likely this was a drawing from memory given that Ralph Peacock 'relied' on a sketch of King Lobengula that was published by Rhodesia National Archives in c1950 that is credited to E. A. Maund, who could have adopted it from a European settler at koBulawayo.¹⁹² However, objection originates not from the inaccuracy of the representation but from the perceived ugliness of the sculpture. According to Pathisa Nyathi nobody knows what King Lobengula looked like and, as such, no one can be faulted for inaccuracy. However, Nyathi remarks that negative comments and rejection of the king's plaster of paris sculpture most likely stem from the unrefined workmanship on the part of the artist.¹⁹³

The unpolished workmanship suggests little expertise and inexperience on the part of the artist commissioned for the work and/or those who accepted and exhibited the piece.¹⁹⁴ Cutting corners in most cases tends to churn out half-baked products which do not reflect well on displayed work that is supposed to invoke and uphold cultural pride. The assistant curator on monuments at NMMZ Bulawayo, Tawanda Mukwende, concurs:

[W]e have concerns about the statue, one, and two, we have concerns on the artefacts. Funds being available, we would like to overhaul and come up with a new exhibition that tries to accommodate the concerns of all constituencies.¹⁹⁵

While there appears to be an attempt to accommodate the contemporary and the traditional aspects of Ndebele material culture as exemplified by the inclusion of artefacts like the insignia for the City of Bulawayo, the mortar used for pounding grain, the penis sheath or *umcwado* and winnowing baskets (see Figs. 70 to 73), other artefacts exhibited in the museum are dogged by controversy that may be derived from conflicting perceptions about

¹⁹¹Interview with Osborne Nhliyiyo, 28 December 2008, Harare.

¹⁹²Interview with Osborne Nhliyiyo, 28 December 2008, Harare. This is most likely to have been a Jesuit missionary Father Croonenberghs who did sketches of inxwala ceremonies at the capital c1880 (see Nyathi, 2000: 32).

¹⁹³Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

¹⁹⁴It appears that the artist commissioned to do the sculpture could not do it and the task was later handled by an art student, Tafadzwa Gwetai, who was serving as an intern with the NMMZ in 2005. The NMMZ had to make do with a makeshift piece because they wanted to meet the open official opening day target for the museum, according to my Fieldwork notes, April 2010, Bulawayo.

¹⁹⁵Interview with Tawanda Mukwende, 14 April 2010, Bulawayo.

intention and authenticity. According to Osborne Nhliziyo, a display artist who was in charge of mounting the material culture artefacts at the centre, he worked in consultation with the late Mr Mangethe (aka Msongelwayizizwe Khumalo). Mr Mangethe was an elder and custodian of Ndebele history and culture who was seconded by the royal Khumalo clan to work with the display officers on the site museum. This elder was evidently charged with representing the views of the Ndebele in interpreting history and artefacts collected from within and around Matebeleland.¹⁹⁶ Mr Mangethe reportedly passed most of the artefacts collected and these were mounted and displayed. However, in a pre-review of the exhibition, Mr Pathisa Nyathi questioned the provenance and authenticity of the artefacts collected. Nevertheless, in the wake of 99% of the items being dismissed as Kalanga and not Ndebele, by Nyathi, Mangethe could not suggest as to how and where to collect ‘actual’ Ndebele artefacts despite being given the opportunity to assist.¹⁹⁷ Since the interpretive centre would otherwise ‘have no artefacts if we had not collected’, whatever the people around Matebeleland were willing to give during the collection exercise was accepted, recalls Nhliziyo, and the lack of authenticity of the objects on display has been ignored.¹⁹⁸ Political suspicion is also operative. Although the collection of items of material culture appears to have been wholly unsystematic, it has been suggested that Nyathi dismissed the artefacts as ‘not’ Ndebele out of spite and because he had himself ostensibly desired to be appointed the Old Bulawayo project manager on the basis of being a specialist on Ndebele ethnography.¹⁹⁹

However, in accepting to undertake the Old Bulawayo Project when the NMMZ’s own attempt to do the job internally had yielded little²⁰⁰, Matenga, as consultant project manager, knew the challenges at stake. The first element which was relatively easy was to present a history of the birth and rise of an Ndebele nation, and this was done in terms of text, maps and photographs.²⁰¹ The second task of organising a display of Ndebele material culture

¹⁹⁶Interview with Osborne Nhliziyo, 28 December 2008, Harare.

¹⁹⁷Interview with Osborne Nhliziyo, 28 December, 2008, Harare.

¹⁹⁸Interview with Osborne Nhliziyo, 28 December, 2008, Harare.

¹⁹⁹Interview with Osborne Nhliziyo, 28 December, 2008, Harare.

²⁰⁰Initially there were three artists from Bulawayo’s NMMZ, Phenomena Silonda, Vusi Mpofu, and Memory Chada working on the Museum project with Joseph Muringaniza as the Project Manager. A new team was hired to complete and put up the display. Edward Matenga was project manager, Osborn Hliziyo (from Harare) was the display officer, Daniel Karavhina (artist from Harare) and an artist from Gweru worked on Lobengula’s bust. The Lobengula bust was later done by Tafadzwa Gwetai who was an art student on internship. This became problematic with some among the Ndebele who felt, firstly, that Matenga as a Shona could not interpret Ndebele culture, and, secondly, that most of the team was not resident in Bulawayo and thus were perceived as outsiders. A case in point is that of Osborne Nhliziyo was born and grew up in Bulawayo but now stays in Harare

²⁰¹Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010 South Africa, Randburg.

proved very difficult. The Ndebele today ~~are~~ “a hybrid society” and such a project meant traversing and combing the rural areas of Matopos, Mlamlankunzi, Esigodini and the Khumalo communal lands just after the Matopo National Park amongst other areas for the collection of artefacts.²⁰² Matenga explains the historiography of the Ndebele, pointing out that its core element of people originated from South Africa and that, along with individuals who claim to have come from Zululand, were people of Sotho-Tswana origins.²⁰³ He adds that upon crossing the Limpopo, the Kalanga, Rozvi, and elements of Venda, Tonga and Namibia constituted what are today an Ndebele people of Matabeleland and parts of Midlands. A case evidentially present is that of an isiNdebele language which includes some Kalanga, Shona and Tswana words not to mention some words from English and other languages. It is from this that Matenga argues that today Ndebele material culture is ~~quite~~ “a mixed pot”.²⁰⁴ In recognising that Ndebele culture is today an aggregate of all these elements and more, it is also implied that the material culture in the small museum should somehow be reflective of these elements of the various clans.

The complexity of collecting artefacts from a scattered and wide spectrum of people is challenging and problematic. Many may feel side-lined even when items representative of their cultural origins have been collected from a different place or even from their nearest neighbour. However, these sentiments and the ‘aggregated’ nature of the present-day isiNdebele speakers’ cultural standing expressed by Matenga are not shared by Nyathi. Nyathi laments that Matenga and his team went out to collect materials that were clearly not Ndebele and vehemently justifies his standpoint:

I didn’t agree with Matenga, when he started collecting items from the general area. If you do that you bring in Shona items of material culture, Kalanga, etc. which is what they have in their Interpretive Centre, an Interpretive Centre that does not interpret that site at all. They brought in *lots of useless* things which totally have *nothing* to do with the Ndebele (his emphasis).²⁰⁵

Despite Nyathi’s vehemence, there are in fact only two groups of items he could name as having ~~nothing~~ “to do” with Ndebele material culture: ~~decorated~~ “clay pots” and ~~Tonga~~ “fishing spears”.²⁰⁶ Nyathi ascribed these two groups of artefacts (see Fig. 74 and Fig. 75), to

²⁰²Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

²⁰³Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

²⁰⁴Matenga used an archaeological terms to refer to these groups that joined in as ~~the~~ “the intrusive element of the Ndebele population”, Edward Matenga interview, Randburg, 4 April 2010, South Africa.

²⁰⁵Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

²⁰⁶Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

Shona and Tonga material culture, respectively. Similarly, Prince Langa KaZvide Khumalo only singles out the spears (Fig. 74) and declares that they were “never seen in the Kings capital” but were those deployed in “fishing by the Tonga people on the Zambezi” (Intatheli, 2006).

When artefacts are dismissed as *not* being Ndebele these judgements are premised upon the artefacts in question lacking requisite ‘authenticity’. Assessing the ‘authenticity’ of artefacts would entail a select Khumalo group or a team of people certified as being Ndebeles of *ebezansi*.²⁰⁷ It may be inferred, as Nyathi does, that such a group would consider artefacts seen to belong to the other classes, *ebehla* or *amahole*, as inadmissible to ‘authentic’ Ndebele material culture. These kinds of exclusions would relate to unresolved issues of the 19th-century Ndebele nation’s caste society. They would mean that the interpretive centre display artefacts from the royal family and nothing else. But excluding artefacts reflecting the culture of the ‘other’ (*ebehla* and *amahole*) and exhibiting only those from *ebezansi* material culture would provide only a selective interpretation of history that ignores the dynamics of socialisation between groups that resulted in the present-day Ndebele culture.

An instance of 19th-century interaction between the Ndebele and the Shona/Kalanga, as Ellert (1984: 51) notes, is the use, by the Ndebele, of Shona blacksmiths and metal craftsmen which resulted in a change in style of Ndebele spears (also see Chirikure, 2007: 84). At *Matopos*, *Njelele* and *Ntabazikamambo* hills, rainmaking ceremonies and rites were conducted by the Kalanga/Shona elements with Ndebele cooperation (Robinson 1959: 2), a practice that continues today. In another instance, fragments of clay figurines unearthed at Old Bulawayo by archaeological digs suggest a strong Kalanga/Shona influence on ritual practices at Old Bulawayo. These were assumed to have been deposited there by Shona/Kalanga priests (*amanyusa*) or traditional doctors (*sangoma/izinyanga*) in some ritual practice to ‘fortify’ the enclosure from Shona/Kalanga sorcery (Matenga, 2005: 37), a fact which Pathisa Nyathi acknowledges.²⁰⁸ This placement most likely happened with the knowledge of the Ndebele (Matenga, 2005: 37). Another view given was that “the figurines may have been furtively deposited by the *amahole* elements in some other more private ritual” (Matenga, 2005: 37).

²⁰⁷ *Ebezansi* refers to those among the Ndebele who originated from the south in Zululand, like the Khumalo clan, then *ebehla* are those smaller groups who joined on the way as the Ndebele moved north (like the Sotho and Tswana speaking people, and the *amahole* are those groups that were already domiciled in the present day south-west Zimbabwe (like the Rozvi, Venda, Tonga and Kalanga people).

²⁰⁸ Interview with Pathisa Nyathi interview, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

Even when the first interpretation by Matenga was more or less similar to that given by Nyathi later²⁰⁹, the latter felt that the NMMZ should have excluded the former and asked the Ndebele, ~~as~~ “the people who were in the area”, to do the interpretation. His opinion is that Matenga is an outsider and thus unqualified to interpret Ndebele culture figurines ~~because~~ he has only researched extensively and written on Shona clay figurines”.²¹⁰ These concerns, however, border on being ethnocentric and implying that even those who deploy completely appropriate research methods and are insightful stand no chance of producing worthwhile research if they are foreign.

To avoid these perceptions, the NMMZ could have actively consulted local and interested Ndebele community members. Osborne Nhliziyo was a former display officer with NMMZ and is now a free-lance display consultant who worked at Old Bulawayo’s interpretive centre in Edward Matenga’s team. He estimates that 99% of the curators in the NMMZ are Shona. He contends that, in the case of Old Bulawayo, the Ndebele ~~find~~ “this uncomfortable” and see it as an ~~in~~ “invasion” of the site.²¹¹ It appears that this issue, however, was never raised formally with the consultants or with the NMMZ authorities by those who were disgruntled.²¹² Nonetheless, even though the resentment was expressed in undercurrents, these feelings were deep-rooted, as indicated by the following statement by Nyathi:

[T]he workers are Shona, and there we have an Ndebele cultural icon or symbol and then it’s no longer in the hands of the Ndebele. It will create problems of perception. They may come in as professional workers but we are here dealing not with professionalism but with perception. What will win at the end of the day is not professionalism, but perception. When we say, ~~Look~~ “at them”, and when we say ~~them~~ “it is the workers, the people, and their perception. The programme managers have never been Ndebele. Then some people will say; ~~How~~ “how much commitment will they show? How serious are they?”²¹³

The paradox of all these views is evident upon visiting the museum on site at Old Bulawayo. Some of the material on display actually relates to the artefacts pictured in Nyathi’s own

²⁰⁹Interview with Pathisa Nyathi interview, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

²¹⁰Interview with Pathisa Nyathi interview, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo. This is despite the fact that Edward Matenga was then an archaeologist working for the NMMZ. Interpreting archaeological findings on heritage sites was part of his job description even when he was based at Great Zimbabwe in Masvingo.

²¹¹Interview with Osborne Nhliziyo, 28 December 2008, Harare.

²¹²Interview with Edward Matenga interview, Randburg, 4 April 2010, South Africa.

²¹³Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo. It should be noted that until recently, most of Africa’s history was written mostly by Europeans whose accounts sought to promote ethnic division among Africans for purposes of imposing their rule and administration. However, some of their records possess elements of truths that African memory and intellectuals have ascertained and upheld.

publication, *Lawo Magugu: Material culture of the AmaNdebele of Zimbabwe* (compare Figs. 76 and 77). Therefore Nyathi's dismissive statements that Matenga and his team "brought in lots of useless things which totally have nothing to do with the Ndebele" in the museum could be seen as underlining his personal contempt for the Shona-speaking professionals involved in the project. His statement about 'perceptions' outweighing 'professionalism' appears to apply to his own perceptions as well. This instance highlights the kinds of interpretative conflict that can have a bearing on the representation of cultural memory and living heritage.

Perhaps in their intended revamp of cultural artefacts the NMMZ could consider giving more representation to what would be *perceived* as material culture of the Ndebele of *ebezansi* (Khumalo descent) and *ebehla* (Sotho/Tswana descent). Simultaneously, however, *amahole* (Kalanga/Shona/Venda) artefacts should not be omitted as these artefacts speak of the contemporary reality of a hybrid material culture synonymous with what obtained in a 20th-century Ndebele state.²¹⁴

It is important, also, that groups whose material culture is portrayed in Old Bulawayo museum presentations certify that their groups' perspectives are accounted for in the interpretations. Mangethe and Nyathi did this in the interpretations at the royal enclosure and the museum's history although this consultation was not representative of the spectrum of the ethnic Ndebele caste.²¹⁵ Visibly involving local members of society who are ethnically oriented and willing to work with NMMZ appointed professionals will assist in harnessing positive perceptions required for cultural projects of this magnitude. As such it becomes necessary to accommodate Nyathi and understand that, rather than being tribalist in his sentiments, he is one of many ethnocentric people keen on preserving what Msindo (2007: 268-9) would term "their cultural artefacts, their traditions and that which they imagine as the stuff from which their group is made".

While the interpretive centre's exhibitions may be perceived by its critics to have failed, the controversies stirred may be considered instead to emphasise cultural interpretation (and re-

²¹⁴Matenga resisted the suggestion from some quarters of the Ndebele people to bring in artefacts from South Africa's Zululand because cultural practice there had been continuously passed on unlike in Zimbabwe. Matenga believed that such South African imports would not be representative of the Ndebele culture in Zimbabwe (Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa).

²¹⁵Pathisa Nyathi was one of the consultants on the Ndebele culture, since the NMMZ does not have historians and ethnographers on Ndebele culture they engaged him according to Hliziyo (Interview with Osborne Hliziyo, Harare, 18 December 2008) and Mukwende (Interview with Tawanda Mukwende, 14 April 2010, Bulawayo).

interpretation) as an on-going process, in which disagreements between vested parties are marked as, what Simpson (2001: 261) describes as ~~landmarks~~ in the development of new exhibition strategies, for they focus attention upon matters of importance to the public or specific groups, which may have been neglected or handled in an unsatisfactory manner by curatorial staff in the past”. Facilitating the active participation by locals and other affected people in processes of heritage site management is an aspect which the current NMMZ Act does not address adequately. Matenga sees the current status quo, particularly at Old Bulawayo, as emanating from the fact that the NMMZ Act appears to be now obsolete.²¹⁶ The Act does not bring in the local communities, interested and affected parties to actively participate in a programme. Even in the event that the law is reviewed, there is always a need for ~~a~~ memorandum of understanding (MOU)” between the community and the museum.²¹⁷ A MOU gives the ~~pr~~ protocols of the things that each part is supposed to do in the co-management of the programmes”²¹⁸ and this would ensure that whatever is enshrined in the statutes is supported by what happens on the ground, especially when there is a Management Plan of the site.²¹⁹ Matenga observed that both the MOU and the Management Plan did not exist in the case of Old Bulawayo.

Matenga’s observation that legislation inhibits ~~the~~ revival of traditional practices at monuments and sites”²²⁰ is echoed by Katsamudanga who cites Mataga in underlining the fact that inhibitive laws fuel ~~conflicts~~ of custodianship and in the process hinder the success of such efforts.”²²¹ Therefore, because there is no acquiescence with the intended activities planned for Old Bulawayo in the NMMZ Act, only the signing of a MOU on the parameters of co-management will circumvent the laws of the land‘ so that Old Bulawayo is realised. Drafting the MOU would call for wide consultations with stake holders to the cultural monument, including those with existing mining claims within its precincts (Ngoro and Pwiti, c1993).

Elsewhere in the world, the practice where ~~museums~~ were created to represent the values and attitudes of the dominant cultural groups within society” has been questioned and

²¹⁶Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

²¹⁷Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

²¹⁸Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

²¹⁹Interview with Edward Matenga, 13 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

²²⁰Interview with Edward Matenga, 13 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

²²¹www.international.icomos.org/victoriafalls2003/papers/c3-1%20%katsamudanga.pdf

addressed by attending to issues of perception (Macdonald and Alsford, 2007: 279). Canada's multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society has overcome many of the problems evident at Old Bulawayo by initiating dialogues between museums and community members and by re-evaluating the display practices of museums. Community members, for example, provided interpretation for artefacts and verified existing interpretations, were involved in installations and conducted purification rituals on sites (Macdonald and Alsford, 2007: 279). This averted needless confrontations in museum projects aimed at developing native galleries across Canada.

People visit museums in order that they might “understand authentic truths about the worlds of the past, the other, and their own predicament” according to Van Den Bosch (2007: 506). In the case of Old Bulawayo, we have seen that conflicts of representation within the Ndebele caste system and in the relationship between the Ndebele and other ethnic groups in Zimbabwe influence the responses to the artefacts on display in the museum and to the site of Old Bulawayo. The NMMZ can play a significant role in facilitating dialogue between these parties if its own organisational structures and procedures are self-reflexively examined. What is not in dispute is that Old Bulawayo is a site with a large amount of documented history, existing material evidence in the form of a Jesuit Mission nearby, as well as the remnants of a settlement uncovered by nearby archaeological activity. Reconstruction may thus be said to favour the site of Old Bulawayo. With its history of colonial exclusions and denigrations of indigenous culture, Zimbabwe's post-colonial cultural museums, Old Bulawayo's interpretive centre included, should strive to be as representative of all its cultural groups as possible (Simpson, 2001).

Re-living cultural history at Old Bulawayo

Memory, according to Le Goff (1992: 51), entails human beings' ability to preserve “certain information” initially to a group of “psychic” or extrasensory functions that permit us “to actualise past impressions or information that we represent to ourselves as past”. Whenever the process of preserving takes place, it also follows that some information may be lost as there are occasions of forgetting or amnesia. This implies that whenever we long to reach out to that past in the present, our attempt to relive it will depend largely on how our imagination will re-create that past. When that past has been successfully constructed in the now it also follows that our longing for that past ceases. Similarly, in explaining the relationship of a

remembered childhood invoked by materials of that era as souvenirs, Susan Stewart aptly uses semiotics to illustrate how nostalgia ends:

As in an album of photographs or a collection of antiquarian pieces, the past is constructed from a set of presently existing pieces. There is no continuous identity between these objects and their referents. Only the act of memory constitutes their resemblance. And it is in this gap between resemblance and identity that nostalgic desire arises. The nostalgic is enamoured of distance, not of the referent itself. Nostalgia cannot be sustained without loss. For the nostalgic to reach his or her goal of closing the gap between resemblance and identity, *lived* experience would have to take place, an erasure of the gap between sign and the signified, an experience which would cancel out the desire that is nostalgia's reason for existence (Stewart, 1993: 145).

In light of this consideration of how nostalgia functions, one might say that, when the architectural structures of Old Bulawayo, as is currently being planned, are again restored in the present, the nostalgic obsession with aspects of its material evidence of the past would not exist anymore. The royal enclosure and its combination of traditional Ndebele and European influenced architecture would exist as the bee-hive huts, the palisade, the cattle byre and those rectangular houses; the King's palace and wagon shed. In addition, the interpretive centre or site museum would also narrate, both visually and textually, the history of the Ndebele state as well as house a selection of cultural artefacts. Accordingly, Old Bulawayo, in all its aspects, as intended would then portray "a clear picture to historians," to both the local and international tourists, "how the traditional Ndebele king's capital used to look".²²² School children would learn about the settlement pattern, the hut structures and the grinding stones and other artefacts. They would also learn how, for example, Ndebele proverbs may relate to material culture or how the gendered components of power and wealth are signified through architecture.²²³

A foretaste of what is being planned for the living heritage can, however, still be gleaned from the activities of a once-off cultural indulgence performed in a week leading to the occasion of the official opening of Old Bulawayo monument that took place on Saturday, 13 October 2006. A series of activities were already re-enacting the experiences of KoBulawayo of Lobengula's days. Elderly Ndebele women brewed traditional beer or *utshwala* and prepared traditional cuisine. On the sidelines, cultural groups rehearsed dances for the once-

²²²Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

²²³Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

off occasion. Most significantly, Ndebele intangible heritage suddenly was functionally in use. Beer making clay pots (*izimbiza zotshwala*) and traditional cooking utensils got re-called and were put in use. Choreography of ceremonial and war dances evoked the donning of traditional garb and war-like material reminiscent of warriors or *amabutho* of an Ndebele state on a pass-out parade.²²⁴ While these cultural activities may reify the colonial gaze of primitive Africans (Van Eeden, 2005) the fact that it was a deliberate attempt in the post-modern to re-look and recoup a past and make it relevant in the present framing of heritage by non-other than Africans themselves is important. After all “[re]-created pasts ought to be based on the knowledge and values of the present”, writes Kevin Lynch (cited in Lowenthal, 1985: xvii). Because these activities highlighted what is no longer in practice in contemporary Ndebele culture, such re-enactments are important to the preservation of cultural history; as Nora (1989: 12) argues, re-enactments “illuminate the truth of *lieux de memoire* — that without commemorative vigilance, history would soon sweep them away”.

Present on that official opening day, were present-day state officials who subordinated themselves to traditional rituals as directed by cultural elders, and not vice versa as seen in the rituals of a modern state. The Vice-President Joseph Msika, governors, government ministers, the Mayor of Bulawayo and his councillors were in attendance. The royal Khumalo, Ndebele chiefs and custodians of Ndebele culture, *imbongi* or praise singing poets as well as the public, tourists and the media were also present. The eminent citizens and the NMMZ staff acted in deference to the Khumalo elders and custodians of Ndebele culture who led the ritual and most of the proceedings of the day. This may be interpreted as a public investiture of memory by the Ndebele as they showcased their knowledge of ancestral tradition and authority passed on by oral tradition and history despite many years of disrupted practice.

The activities were disseminated to a wider audience by media outlets. In ‘constructing the past’ and affirming its place as a site of both local and national heritage, Old Bulawayo, from the ground-breaking event by the head of state in 1993 to the official opening ceremony by the vice president in 2006, contemporary media, in the forms of national television and radio stations, regional and national print media and internet outlets, have been employed to cover the performances on the Old Bulawayo shrine.

²²⁴War costumes included chest cow-hide aprons, ostrich feathered-headdresses, armlets and garters, *isihlangu* or shields, *umkontho* or spears, and *iwisa* or knobkerries.

For some, the rituals gave significance and guarantee to the continued existence, practice and passing on of indigenous traditions and knowledge to contemporary generations without stigma being attached to them, inducing a sense of belonging synonymous with the importance of knowing one's 'glorious origins'. For others, celebrating traditional practices galvanised them against returning to what was perceived as heathen ways of darkness by the enlightenment project Western missionaries who came to assist in 'civilising' Africans. Thus the activities instead pushed them closer to their Christian faith and modernity. There were also those who sought to interrogate the apparent conflicts in the debate on the influences of traditional culture and Christian teachings as brought to bear on most indigenous people by missionaries.

Therefore cultural performances staged in that week and those being planned to come can be seen as an attempt to practice some of Mudimbe and Jewsiewicki's observations that Africans among other things tell, sing, produce (through dance, recitation, marionette puppets, sculpt and paint) their history (Mudimbe and Jewsiewicki 1993: 3). The official opening spectacle, in particular, reified Ndebele collective memory. The recent publication of books on material culture and traditional ceremonies that used to be held at Old Bulawayo in the 19th century, according to Nyathi, "provide reference to how rituals of yesteryear were undertaken; *inxwala* or the 'celebration of the first fruits', the domestic marriage ceremony and *umbuyiso* or the 'bringing home' ceremony."²²⁵ Such resources may serve those who would wish to live at Old Bulawayo, apart from serving scholars and becoming souvenirs for local and international tourists. While preparing a tourist 'themed' cultural product can be seen as asserting romantic notions created by colonialism that Africans are primitive, Fairweather (2006: 736) argues otherwise. Writing about 'themed' cultural performance of heritage by Namibian Youths who entertain tourists and anthropologists, Fairweather argues that it is actually an approach that presents history and culture to the 'other' in ways that permit the actualisation of "a distinctively modern subjectivity" (2006: 736). Reconstructing Old Bulawayo and reviving its associated cultural activities mean that the oral history of the Ndebele gains recognition as legitimate history. It affirms that, as Terdiman (1993: 6) puts it, "memory is our modality of our relation to the past".

²²⁵Pathisa Nyathi interview, 13 April 2010 Bulawayo.

The then Vice President Joseph Msika as a politician in attendance obviously picked up what Chaney (2002: 159) terms the “cultural vocabularies” or the rhetoric associated with the Old Bulawayo monument during the official opening ceremony. Msika first declared his respect for the leadership qualities exhibited by King Lobengula and then observed that Old Bulawayo, other than being a theme park and a tourist resort, would also be counted as an “educational resource which graphically illustrated the origins of the Ndebele nation – politically, socially and economically”.²²⁶

The events outlined above can be seen to be instrumental in the mythologisation of the Ndebele as a people. As Till (in Johnson, 2002: 295) points out, the mythologising of cultural identity (in this case, of the Ndebele) is a “map[ping] up” of myths that become “part and parcel of ongoing projects of establishing identities, symbolically coded in public monuments and their attendant ceremonials”. This mythologising nourishes an affirming conception of the past – of ‘heritage’ and cultural ‘origins’ – that is constructed in the present to meet the demands of the present. Matenga demonstrates this need when he asserts that “we want to survive spiritually because we respect our past”.²²⁷ Nyathi echoes this belief:

[Our heritage] is what positions [us] in this cosmos. You need to know where you have come from, where you stand today in the community of humankind [...] it’s a source of pride. And you need that pride and identity as this is what motivates you. When you know who you are and you are proud of yourself [...] you are equipped to face the future more resolutely with a vision rather than [...] just floating [...] When you do not appreciate this heritage, you will not see the grandeur, the glamour in our culture, the wisdom in our culture, the cleverness in our ancestors.²²⁸

Because of the co-option of this kind of nostalgia and cultural mythologisation by various factions, there is need to revisit the current NMMZ Act. In order to preserve intangible values at cultural heritage sites it is necessary to re-evaluate the contexts in which the sites were used. An analysis of the NMMZ Act by Katsamudanga (2003) indicates that the onus of defining the value of monuments lies with the professional heritage manager and in the process the act inhibits access to any given monument. Thus Katsamudanga posits that this

²²⁶“They think I’m mad” 2006. Msika: ‘They think I’m mad’ [internet]. Available at: http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/oct20b_2006.html Accessed 14 July 2008.

²²⁷Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April, 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

²²⁸Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April, 2010, Bulawayo.

throws doubts as to whom the board keeps ‘heritage’ in trust for.²²⁹ There is need to re-cast the legislation so that it reflects community-based objectives of heritage management. As Matenga explains:

The primary aim is, we want to develop those sites so that people celebrate their culture. We must be inspired by our association with the past [...] and developing that past has nothing to do with tourism in itself. It is something that we necessarily have to do in order to survive as a people. Then, of course, the tourist element is a bonus. It is coming in because now we have a product, so people feel that they want to see, to enjoy. Of course, people charge entry fees, people also develop a souvenirs market. It also develops the local people and also boosts economic development in a neighbourhood.²³⁰

The concern that emerges as most important, however, is to make Old Bulawayo a site that celebrates collective memory and history of the Ndebele people. It may mean classifying a people using a collective cultural identity and this unavoidably employs values and qualities which they identify with and share not in the likes of ‘rights’ and ‘obligations’, as was commonly done in the 1990s (Janoski, 1998). Then, issues of rights shifted to obligations such as paying taxes, participation in civic duties, voting and other things regarded as particular to citizenship. In his conception of collective cultural identity, Smith (1999: 228) notes, three basics that should be operative. First, he says there should exist within a given unit of population a –sense of shared *continuity* on the part of successive generations”. Second, that same unit ought to have –shared *memories* of earlier periods, events and personages” within their history. Lastly that group should have a –collective belief in a common *destiny* of that unit and its culture” (emphasis in original text). In the case of Old Bulawayo and the Ndebele people all three basics exist even though they may appear not to be particularly visible. If it were not for the hegemonic tendencies of colonial and the successive postcolonial governments, and the multiple identities that post-modernism has brought to bear on people, a collective identity for the Ndebele could unmistakably and visibly be in place. It is probably from this basis that, in the argument that the Ndebele can be both a nation as well as an ethnic grouping, Ndlovu-Gatsheni makes use of Stephen Barbour’s ideas about the factors which distinguish the two:

Unlike a nation, an ethnic group need not occupy a territory. Also, unlike a nation, its ‘common myths and historical memories’ may be plausible; ethnic

²²⁹ www.international.icomos.org/victoriafalls2003/papers/c3-1%20%katsamudanga.pdf

²³⁰ Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

groups maybe much smaller than modern nations [...]. And, rather than a ‘mass public culture’ uniting very disparate elements, there may be high level of shared cultural norms; and there is usually a shared language (Barbour in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 162).

However, cultural citizenship as an identity formation stems from the “membership of an actual or virtual community based not on nation but on, for example ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, region, age, etc” (Hartley, 1999: 208). When one refers to Old Bulawayo, the concept of ‘ethnicity’ denotes citizens as “sets (plural) of different and sometimes overlapping communities [...] which should ideally constitute the national (political) culture” according to Hermes (1998: 159). In this conception, several ethnic or regional cultures may amount to several cultural ‘citizenships’ that feed into and construct a ‘national culture’. Nyathi appears to affirm this conception:

A nation will not have a single identity that characterises it, but you have some kind of subcultures that together feed into the national identity [...] But that [cultural] identity, when celebrated, it does not mean destroying national identity, no. Or that it may lead to cessation. No, it won’t lead to that [...] people need to beat their drums. Let them celebrate.²³¹

Matenga also believes that a national culture should be constituted from the various cultures of all its peoples. As he says:

A nation is not supposed to be a homogeneous entity; it is sort of an aggregate of various elements. It does not neutralise projections of Ndebele culture [...] They are nations within a nation and their diversity must be respected. And to expect homogeneity in terms of behaviour, culture, language is not the case. So [...] there is nothing wrong in celebrating ethnic cultures, ethnicity - a smaller nation within a nation [...] can be celebrated in many ways; in cultural festivals, in these exhibitions, in theme parks or in the development of old sites like Old Bulawayo.²³²

Matenga’s affirmation of heterogeneous ethnic identities can however be read as conditional on such cultural celebrations remaining within the limits of ‘cultural festivals’, ‘exhibitions’, ‘theme parks’ and ‘the development of old sites’ and not developing into, for example, political demands.

²³¹Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

²³²Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

KoBulawayo as a source of symbolic power

The recognition and selective celebration of the diverse cultural citizenships that construct a nation's culture demonstrably appeals to local and national Zimbabwean elites. This is despite the fact that what is usually given attention, though, by the media and of course by NMMZ, are things like the architectural structures of KoBulawayo and the small museum in as far as what they represent in history and collective memory-making for the Ndebele people in the current time and space. Other subtle elements, like the power struggles seen in authenticating and shaping perceptions of an Ndebele material culture, and the possible downstream economic and social benefits anticipated by individuals and those in political office when the monument is made operational as a themed cultural heritage place, are overshadowed. But these factors are equally important for both ordinary citizens and politicians. Johnson (2002: 296) underscores that the materiality of a particular site of memory, like Old Bulawayo, at times —~~masks~~ the social relations undergirding its production” by focusing attention on ~~its~~ aesthetic representation independent of the sometimes less visible ideas (social, economic, cultural power relations) that underpin the final product”. Thus Old Bulawayo as a place of memory is a site where symbolic re-imaginings of the Ndebele past interlace with the materiality of the present, social, economic and political power. In his analysis of symbolic power, Pierre Bourdieu (1989: 21) acknowledges that persons or what he terms ~~agents~~” bring forth ~~the~~ symbolic capital that they acquired in previous struggles and [...] use this in their struggles for the production of common sense [...] or monopoly over legitimate naming”. It is this acquired symbolic power or symbolic capital that now serves different purposes of garnering recognition; in some cases it can be changed into economic capital to create social solidarities as social capital or to strengthen cultural status as in cultural capital (Bourdieu cited by Rose-Redwood, 2008:434). In the case of Old Bulawayo, it is the elites who attain ‘symbolic capital’ for its re/construction, despite the fact that this was initiated by the NMMZ for the commemoration of Old Bulawayo’s centenary in 1993.

Local elites like Phathisa Nyathi and Langa kaZwide Khumalo have gained social prominence as the spokespersons of the Ndebele people who take a stand against a perceived ‘Shona’ cultural dominance that stems from the Shona’s dominance of national politics particularly in the postcolonial. While some of their views may be viewed by others as controversial, getting coverage in the press now and then on behalf of the isiNdebele-

speaking people brings with it social capital. Nyathi has written books on historical traditions and material culture of the Ndebele not only in the anticipation of the benefits of projected cultural revival associated with cultural tourism at Old Bulawayo, but also representing a Ndebele voice in cultural heritage history. These publications portray the Ndebele in a more positive light than did the European missionaries and fortune hunters of the 19th century.

Edward Matenga and his team were seen as an intrusion by some in the Ndebele constituency, although their work at the site may be viewed as attesting to their integrity and attempted objectivity. The NMMZ may be seen as strategic in their tendering of the Old Bulawayo project to professionals outside of the immediate Ndebele community, especially for the interpretive museum. In the interpretive museum Matenga has arguably created an acceptable representation of material culture in the 19th-century Ndebele state. To do so, his consultations and his differences with Nyathi highlight issues relating to the perception of ethnicity that remain contentious.

Those who amassed much cultural prestige from the development of the Old Bulawayo site were the Khumalo clan and the contemporary state politicians. Although the royal Khumalo family's co-operation with the ZANU PF ruling party during Old Bulawayo activities may appear to imply their acquiescence to ZANU PF rule, a symbolic victory against a centralised authority may also be interpreted in their actions. Although the Khumalo royals do not have a 'king' or any leadership roles on the national political stage, they received symbolic recognition as custodians of Old Bulawayo and, implicitly, of the Ndebele kingdom's cultural traditions. Firstly, the NMMZ project design, though not yet fully realised, acknowledges the need for a symbolic royal family and community at Old Bulawayo to preside over a calendar of events. Secondly, by their presence at Old Bulawayo rituals, the state's highest functionaries (the president at the ground breaking ceremony and his deputy on the official opening rituals) sanction royal Khumalo clan activities on behalf of the Ndebele. The Khumalo clan can use this position as a basis to explore possibilities on how their authority can be restored through constitutional means with government approval. To pursue this course, the Khumalo family would need to be very clear on their *intentions* and the *parameters* for restoration to gain the confidence and sympathy of central government.²³³

²³³ Hopefully the royal Khumalo and their *indunas* spoke of this to the constitutional making process that is currently running in Zimbabwe under the Constitutional Select Parliamentary Committee (COPAC) that is

The social and cultural capital that may be gained leads politicians to associate themselves as social and political leaders with cultural monuments that intend to restore in contemporary Zimbabwe some dimensions of ‘living heritage’ of the kind of Old Bulawayo. Simply the participation by the president and his deputy improved their standing among people who cherish vernacular cultures. For citizens, these gestures by statesmen are charismatic in the perception that modern leaders identify with a 19th-century Ndebele culture. As Chaney (2002: 159) points out, “the manipulation of cultural discourses by politicians and elites legitimates and reinforces their own power”. Therefore, while their participation assists in the development and prominence of cultural heritage themed sites such as Old Bulawayo, this participation is conditional upon political approval of the perceived intentions of the site in question. Matenga’s comments in this regard acknowledge this relationship between heritage and power:

For you to develop a site, you need politicians to convince the treasury to release money. So there is no conflict there [...] the local MP or local leader from Matabeleland, be they ZANU or ZAPU²³⁴ if they have interest in a particular site, surely there is nothing wrong. But if they are going to use that resource or site to destroy or to subvert national authority, then there is a problem. But it is true [that] politicians will be interested in using any site for [their] political gain. Actually heritage managers or specialists are encouraged to approach politicians, to educate them about a site; because when you are lobbying for development [...] lobbying for the protection of a site, if politicians do not understand the meaning of a site, then nothing happens there. It’s natural that a politician can get associated with a site because he/she gains from that association.²³⁵

Old Bulawayo, once re/constructed and functional as a cultural monument, would become a celebration of Ndebele cultural memory. This ambience is one with which most elites wish to be associated. The state therefore may be seen to finance the rehabilitation of Old Bulawayo, not so much to celebrate Ndebele culture in the present, but rather because the cultural monument could, as Hamlish (2000: 151) puts it, “significantly enhance the public perception of its cultural authority and historical legitimacy”.

gathering views from the general population and interested groups for a new constitution that will end the existing Government of National Unity (GNU) that began in 2009.

²³⁴ZAPU means Zimbabwe African People’s Union, a political party that was led by the late nationalist Joshua Nkomo.

²³⁵Interview with Edward Matenga, 4 April 2010, Randburg, South Africa.

Conclusion

Old Bulawayo could be a visible landmark that celebrates the social origin of isiNdebele-speaking people in present-day Zimbabwe. If successfully reconstructed as planned by the NMMZ, with its intended revival of cultural performances of Ndebele rituals and ceremonies, the envisaged attention that the cultural monument would receive from both local and national elites and politicians would underscore its cultural significance. Such performances and attention would be reminiscent of the KoBulawayo traditional activities that King Lobengula once presided over. The contestation and perceptions about the activities and material culture that presently cloud Old Bulawayo are important pointers that should inform the on-going plans for the reconstruction and construing of Ndebele culture and history within this 21st-century cultural heritage project. These insights should also assist the NMMZ in its present and future efforts as custodian and manager of Zimbabwean heritage to ensure that this particular site involves, as Araujo (2007) discusses in relation to a situation in Benin, ~~a~~ living and dynamic process of creative reinvention of the past”²³⁶ rather than sustaining stereotypes or practices of ‘othering’ which are a hangover of colonialism. Last, but not least, the envisaged successful celebration of an Ndebele cultural past, once realised, would facilitate the construction of a rich cross-cultural citizenship within Zimbabwe, as well as provide elites and politicians with what Connerton (1989: 51) terms ~~a~~new ritual spaces”.

²³⁶www.history.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/Slavery/articles/araujo.html

CHAPTER FOUR

Leapfrog: Play-children in the city.

Introduction

Dominic Benhura's stone²³⁷ work, *Leapfrog* (1996: Fig. 78) is placed in Harare Town House's garden. The Town House, located along Julius Nyerere Way, is next to the State Lottery hall and it is also home to Harare's City Council offices for the mayor and most of the council's senior officials (see Map in Fig. 79).²³⁸ Most public art in Zimbabwe is commissioned, and this is true of *Ploughman* (1987) in Harare and *Looking into the future* (1985) in Bulawayo, discussed in the next chapters. *Leapfrog* (1996), however, was donated to the Harare City Council by the sculptor in 2003, because he felt that "the city did not have that much of public sculpture".²³⁹

Leapfrog appears to concern itself more with expressing the ideas and feelings of the sculptor in his portrayal of children playing than with rendering figures in naturalistic proportions and form. As semi-abstracted figurative sculptural units, *Leapfrog* is an artwork that is "more accessible to the public than the language of modernist abstraction or post-minimalistic art" (Kwon, 2002: 3). Although the "children portrayed in the sculptures do not have any definitive facial features, they can still relate to any kids" in any society.²⁴⁰

At the rear of the set is a child (Fig. 80) running to the next child who is approximately two metres ahead and is depicted bending over from the waist (Fig. 81). Besides bending, this second child clasps her knees with her hands, her legs slightly apart; a pose suggestive of

²³⁷Black serpentine stone is a popular medium with most of Zimbabwe's contemporary stone sculptors, not only because of its hardness which makes it durable, but also because it gives a pleasant finish whether or not it has been waxed and polished. For a detailed explanation on stone (rock types and their hardness) used in contemporary Zimbabwean sculpture see Stoops (1997: 59 -70).

²³⁸Harare city is unlike Mutare, Bulawayo and Masvingo cities where the council offices and departments are found in one building complex at the Civic Centre, the Tower Block or the Burombo Building, respectively. In Harare, council offices are dotted around several buildings in the city. However, it is at Harare's Town House where the running of the city is co-ordinated by the Mayor, city councillors and directors of city departments. Besides holding the mayoral office, all heads of departments and councillors have their offices in this building.

²³⁹Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19January2010, Harare.

²⁴⁰The set (Fig. 78) is supposed to be in three units, but now appears as four pieces as a result of a negligent act involving municipal workers in 2008. One of the units of sculpture that combines two children, one vaulting over another, repeatedly fell and broke. The artwork has not been repaired. Efforts to restore it are reportedly frustrated in what the artist perceives as "Harare City Council's red tape and disrespect of art" according to an interview held with Benhura on the 19th of January, 2010. Dominic Benhura interview, Harare. 19 January 2010.

stability. This braces the child to withstand the backward momentum which would be the normal reaction to the forward thrust associated with being leapt over in the game that the children are playing. In front of this bending child is a third child, whose legs are sprawled on the ground at an obtuse angle in a stunt common only with gymnasts and agile youth. This child's torso is thrust forward (Figs. 82 and 83) and his/her head faces downwards in concentration while his/her hands seem stretched as they touch the ground. The pose is supposed to portray the moment of vaulting over the next forward-bending child, depicting these two children in one sculptural combination similar in action to that shown in another version (Fig. 84) made a year after the Town House version.²⁴¹ What now appears like 'huge ears' on the bending child are supposed to be part of the jumping child as he/she surges in leap-frog action (Kjarm, 2011).

It has been argued in the history of art that a painter "cannot represent progressive actions" but he or she can employ a "single moment, and intimate what has gone before" (G.W.P. 1850: 74). Thus, the painter has "to select, as far as possible that instance which is at once expressive of the past and pregnant with the future" (G.W.P., 1850: 74).²⁴² This logic relates to the *Leapfrog* sculpture in that, like in a painting, that moment which is "expressive of the past and pregnant with the future" selected by the artist is in this case the instant when one child vaults over the other. One can argue, similarly, that although it is difficult to capture "progressive actions" in one piece and still make the process intelligible, Benhura negotiates this hindrance effectively. He incorporates support sculptural pieces to insinuate "where action unfolds in phases" (Gombrich 1964: 303).²⁴³

Benhura does not polish all of his sculptural pieces. He indicates that he wants his viewers to experience visually some of the tactile elements of his handiwork and that he consciously leaves traces of the process of hewing stone on some of the planes of his work.²⁴⁴ The limbs and torsos of his subjects are portrayed without detail; these are rendered in a simplified form

²⁴¹The *Leapfrog* children exist in only two sets. The first one, created in 1996 and seen at the Harare Town House, is discussed in this chapter. Dominic Benhura (interview 19 January 2010) explains that, in 1997, American clients who had seen the 1996 work commissioned a version for their underground gallery at Atlanta airport in the USA's state of Georgia.

²⁴²See also Gombrich (1964) and Wallenstein (2010) who also make reference to this 'moment' in sculpture in a relational analysis of the *Laocoon* sculpture.

²⁴³Benhura did not document his artwork when he donated it to Harare City Council, as one would have expected. Hence when I asked for a photograph of the combined sculpture piece before it was damaged, he referred me to another of his sculptural narratives which explored a similar theme of 'leapfrog' (Fig. 84) and is accessible on the internet.

²⁴⁴Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010, Harare.

not unlike figures in Cubist sculptures and with the surfaces of clothing smooth but left unpolished. However, the limbs are polished, possibly for the purpose of distinguishing body from clothing. The heads of the children display the effects of hammer and chisel and remind the viewer of the sculptor's hard work and patience in extracting the eventual form of the children from the blocks of stone. In making the heads of the subjects huge and abstracted, the sculptor stresses the fact that they are "children of any society in the world".²⁴⁵ By deliberately leaving some surfaces untouched, the sculptor appears to acknowledge the qualities of stone as a medium. He also allows the medium to influence his compositions: in this instance the contrast of dark polished stone against the light unpolished stone adds visual interest to the sculpture.

When Benhura donated *Leapfrog*, the city council did not allow him to pick a site nor did they allow him to install the work, promising rather that their city engineers and architects would undertake the task.²⁴⁶ But when the council eventually organised to 'place' the *Leapfrog* set at the Harare Town House Gardens they did so without making sure that the work would stand stably without fall upon contact. In time, the site proved to be not as the sculptor had envisioned, and in 2008 one of the main pieces in the *Leapfrog* set was damaged. Sometimes the ideal that "the site and its public must be considered at the time that the artwork is commissioned" (Senie, 1992: 220) or in this case when artwork is donated, does not obtain.

While *Leapfrog* has not been the topic within any publications, scholarly or popular, it was mentioned briefly in Mushohwe's (2012) newspaper article entitled "Sculpture and maintenance". In this essay, which studies how to preserve art within our homes and gardens, *Leapfrog* is used as an example of a sculpture neglected by both the artist and its supposed custodians. Not much analysis of the sculpture and its state of neglect are meaningfully explored, however, perhaps due to lack of space within this short article. *Leapfrog* is in fact a work that can yield powerful insights about how a work of art is read and received as a public sculpture by those who encountered it before and after it was damaged at its Town House garden location. This makes it an important sculpture in the discourse of public art in Zimbabwe. I therefore use mostly primary data gathered from fieldwork.

²⁴⁵Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010, Harare.

²⁴⁶Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010, Harare.

I consider the sculptural set in terms of four avenues of investigation. In the first, I explore how the artist's execution of three-dimensional form strives to render content and meaning to the *Leapfrog* sculptures. I then proceed, in the second section of the chapter, to assess Zimbabwe's contemporary stone sculpture movement and this leads to the third sector where I trace the artist's background as a sculptor. It is in the third section that I explore the concept of 'site' and 'publicness' within the realm of public art, and consider how *Leapfrog* ended up being placed in the Town House gardens as well as how the artwork was received by the public before and after it was damaged. In this section I also investigate the circumstances of its damage and how this affects the artwork, the sculptor and the viewer. In the fourth segment I consider how *Leapfrog* in its damaged state begins to make social comment on the activities that take place in the city's public spaces.

My overall point in this chapter is that *Leapfrog* is not well located and/or properly installed in the Town House garden, and that this affects its visibility while simultaneously exposing the artwork to damage. I also argue that the continued state of neglect of the sculpture lends credence to it becoming inadvertently a commentary on activities that take place in the city of Harare.

Contemporary stone sculpture in Zimbabwe

The 'father' of the Zimbabwe stone sculpture movement, Joram Mariga, first introduced his work to Frank McEwen (Bourgeois, 1997: 42, Sibanda, 2004: 22, Skogh, 2001: 184, Mhonda, 2006b: 42) in the early 1960s, and since then, the movement has grown in leaps and bounds to become Zimbabwe's contemporary art genre respected internationally. McEwen, the first Director of the National Gallery of Zimbabwe²⁴⁷ between 1957 and 1973, became its 'greatest ambassador in assisting the artists to distribute their works around the world and in promoting the qualities of that work to the international community' (Kahari, 1997: 17; also see Arnold, 1989: 181). However, it was not only McEwen who helped to nurture stone sculpture: Tom Bloomfield, introduced to stone sculpture by Chrispen Chakanyuka (Winter-
Irving, 2006: 33),²⁴⁸ was also instrumental. Further, Edward Patterson, a priest of the Anglican Cyrene Mission in Bulawayo, and Father John Groeber of Serima Catholic Mission

²⁴⁷The Gallery was then known as Rhodes National Gallery.

²⁴⁸Chrispen Chakanyuka, a nephew to Joram Mariga, was also taught how to sculpt by Mariga in Nyanga their home area to the eastern border of Zimbabwe, according to Mhonda (2006b: 42).

in Masvingo, were two clergymen among a number who encouraged and developed wood-carving skills among youths at their centres (Arnold, 1989; Randles, 1997; Sibanda, 2004).²⁴⁹

According to Paul Wade, the sculpture movement in Zimbabwe grew out of an indigenous expression with subject matter relating to the spiritual world of the African tradition, but at times social or political statements were hidden behind titles such as *The spirit of This* or *The spirit of That*” (Wade, 1997: 28, italics in original text). Wade argues that the sculptors did this as a way of disguising some of their work that had political connotations so that they could not be in trouble with the Rhodesian regime, given that these were the days of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and the liberation struggle. Other than this, the titles were also meant to satisfy a western clientele that sought what Wade (1997: 28) terms ~~a~~ “naive art form”. This explains why stone sculpture during the colonial era (and even to an extent, in the present) was marketed using an ~~ethnic~~ “frame” (Zilberg, 2002: 103) such as ‘Shona sculpture’. This was done despite the known fact that it was not only Shona-speaking people who were involved in sculpting stone (see Winter-Irving, 2004: 33, Bourgois, 1997: 41). Apparently this ‘framing’ of Zimbabwean stone sculpture is an aspect disputed by Zimbabwe’s leading contemporary artists before and after independence; Tapfuma Gutsa and the brothers John and Bernard Takawira, for example, have sought to combat this ethnic labelling (see Zilberg, 2002; Kahari, 1997).

As Wade (1997: 28) contends, after independence in 1980 there was no need to continue with ~~hidden~~ “messages” in sculpture and the visual arts in general because a lot of media for artistic expression became available. Besides this, art-related education at the BAT Art School run by the NGZ, international scholarships and workshops, and artists’ residencies offered by some galleries became vehicles of the development of contemporary stone sculpture (Zilberg, 1997; Bourgois, 1997; Mhonda, 2004a). The genre also became popular with a younger generation of artists who not only confined themselves to stone but also experimented with mixed media (Wade, 1997; Mhonda, 2004a).

While some credit Frank McEwen for exerting what Jonathan Zilberg terms ~~a~~ “modernist influence through his conscious selection and guidance” (Zilberg, 1997: 31)²⁵⁰ during the formative years of establishing a Western market for stone sculpture, others, like David

²⁴⁹Nicholas Mukomberanwa who began sculpting in wood at Serima Mission.

²⁵⁰See Arnold (1981: 40/137) and Beier (1968: 81) who dwell on this notion.

Joselit, see beyond McEwen when they view contemporary Zimbabwean stone sculpture as modernist. He writes:

In spite of McEwen's purist intentions much of Zimbabwean stone sculpture from the sixties to the present clearly echoes conventions drawn from European modernism: highly polished and abstracted surfaces recall those of Brancusi, and the sensuous play of convex and concave forms brings to mind Henry Moore (Joselit cited in Zilberg, 1997: 31).

There have been predictions that contemporary Zimbabwe stone sculpture would face challenges as a result of a dwindling market abroad, but this has not, in fact been the case. For Zilberg, the growth in positive Western perception of the contemporary sculpture movement is due to Chapungu Sculpture Park Gallery's activities which include "new generation exhibitions" and its residency programme which exposes artists in an environment "free of commercial restraints" (Zilberg, 1997: 37). However, other factors also contribute to the ongoing marketability of this art form. Most of the first generation sculptors broke away from the gallery and patrons associated with galleries only to settle on their farms and small-holdings for purposes of not only practising and selling their artwork, but also to impart their skills to the young (Mhonda, 2004a: 38).²⁵¹ Thus the removal of the middlemen meant individual artists had to directly deal with clients besides exploring other untapped markets. This had a widening effect on the number of players marketing and promoting the movement. The internet has also enhanced communication and the marketing of sculptures to the global village (see NGZ Art Forum Report, 2005: 17).²⁵²

Therefore armed with "a new wave of opinion, of style, and of self-promotion" in the early 1990s, a new crop of artists who are "students, associates or children of the independent first generation of sculptors [emerged and] moved freely between abstract, semi-representational and figurative art" (Mhonda, 2004a: 38). Among these artists (see Figs. 87 to 93) whose imagery is well received internationally is Dominic Benhura. His ability is most potent in portraying what Mhonda (2004a: 39) terms "arrested motion and implied buoyancy [in]

²⁵¹Nicholas Mukomberanwa (1940-2002) was the first followed by Sylvester Mubayi (1942), Boira Mteki (1943-1999), Bernard Takawira (1945-7) Joseph Ndandarika 1942-1991, Henry Munyaradzi 1931-1998) and Fanizani Akuda (1932-). Richard Mteki actually established his studio in Highfield before independence (see Mhonda, 2004a). The cutting of ties with galleries was not surprising considering that in the case of those sculptors affiliated to NGZ as their marketing agent normally received "a third of the selling price for their work" (Sibanda, 2004: 22).

²⁵²Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010, Harare.

children at their most innocent age running, dancing, frolicking, seated or swinging in their mothers' arms, address universal sentiments of love, joy, growth and maternity". Subject matter of this type was used in *Leapfrog* (1996) sculptures.

Benhura the sculptor

Dominic Benhura was born in 1968 in the rural Murehwa District of Mashonaland East Province of Zimbabwe to the east of Harare where he lived with his mother. His father had died a few months before his birth. At the age of ten he moved to Harare's Tafara High Density Suburb under the guardianship of his uncle, Mr Gutsa. While living in Harare, Benhura attended primary and high school in Tafara Township. It was in Tafara that he first encountered stone sculpture at Utonga Studio, which had been founded and was run by his cousin, Tapfuma Gutsa, in conjunction with other local sculptors.²⁵³ Gutsa first introduced Benhura to polishing stone sculpture and gradually encouraged him to sculpt small pieces - a mentoring process akin to the apprenticeship used for the transfer of familial crafts like blacksmithing, wood carving, basketry and pottery. The cultural practice has been passed on from generation to generation and is a process with its own strengths and weaknesses as is likely in any type of training. Doreen Sibanda writes to this effect:

Passing on the skills of stone carving customarily follows the tradition of apprenticeship, direct tutoring and working with the master. This method has resulted in a sound grasp of the technical skills of working in stone, but has also contributed to the narrow range of ideas explored, and the proliferation of a repetitive approach to the medium by some artists (Sibanda, 2004: 27).

With his training in the trade, Benhura sold his first piece at the age of twelve. He began to pay his school fees all the way to 'A' Level using proceeds from his own small sculptures of plants and animals. Benhura even went on to study drawing and painting with Harare's Ilsa College. He however had to discontinue because he felt he enjoyed "the challenge of design where one works with three-dimensional forms".²⁵⁴ Thereafter

²⁵³Tapfuma Gutsa studied art at London's City and Guilds School and started Utonga Studio in Tafara, where he worked with other artists who had trained at the BAT Workshop School run by the National Gallery of Zimbabwe in Harare, according to Dominic Benhura Interview (19 January 2010, Harare).

²⁵⁴Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010, Harare.

he pursued experiments on form using larger pieces of stone.²⁵⁵ This saw him becoming one of the many resident sculptors at Chapungu Sculpture Park in Harare, in 1990, where he was exposed to both local and international sculpting workshops. This residency meant that he could interact with many sculptors of different backgrounds and diverse working styles. Inspired by these windows of exposure, Benhura left Chapungu in 1994 to set up his own “Dominic’s Studio” based at one of his two adjacent houses in the suburb of Athlone in Harare.²⁵⁶ Dominic’s Studio has become home to both upcoming and professional sculptors who enjoy not only free equipment and free sculpting stone, but also the opportunity to market and sell their artwork without remitting commission to anyone.²⁵⁷ Benhura perceives this as his own way of “ploughing back to the community” that made him the artist he is today.²⁵⁸ His sense of indebtedness to the community may also explain his benevolence in giving away some of his sculptures to communities, charities and, in the case of the *Leapfrog* sculptures, to the city.

The Town House Garden as site and its impact on the reception of *Leapfrog*.

Most public artwork that acknowledges and incorporates the site as an aspect of its content may be termed ‘site-specific’ (Senie and Webster, 1989: 288). This might be in the form of one artwork or multiple pieces, installed on a single site or in more than one location (see Miles, 1999). As Senie and Webster (1989: 288) note, “site specificity might be established through formal aesthetic links or through historical and cultural reference”. However, there are also those artworks created first in an artist’s *oeuvre* that have no particularity of place but come in only later “as an adaptation for the site” (Miles, 1999:5). Because of the perceived lack of specificity at conception, such artwork, according to Miles (1999: 5), may be referred to as a ‘site-general’ type of public art. This conception is applicable to Benhura’s *Leapfrog*.

While most public art is commissioned and paid for by the patron or sponsors (Senie 1992), sometimes, as is the case with *Leapfrog*, public art may be donated by the artist or artists. Donated public artwork may be problematic in that the beneficiary may not place equal value and importance to the work’s site let alone its upkeep within that ‘chosen’ site.

²⁵⁵Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010, Harare.

²⁵⁶Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010, Harare.

²⁵⁷Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010, Harare.

²⁵⁸Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010, Harare.

Questions have been raised whether ‘site’ in public art discourse refers to physical space or to something else within the public realm (Miles, 1997; Deutsche, 1996; Senie, 1992). Miles (1997:14) observes that “publicness” as a concept referring to site had operated unchallenged until Patricia Phillips disputed the notion that public art gets its ‘publicness’ from where it is located. Phillips argues that the notion of ‘public’ is “a difficult, mutable and perhaps somewhat atrophied one” (Phillips in Miles, 1997: 14). She posits that “the dimension of public was psychological and not necessarily a physical or environmental construct” (Phillips in Miles, 1997:14). In essence she suggests that public art does not need to be visual but “can be expressed in terms of soundscapes, media (non-) places such as the Internet, television, as well as in the material spaces of the inhabited landscapes” (Sharp et al, 2004: 1004). Hilde Heine, in referring to public sculpture, similarly postulates that, “the object, artwork, or animal does not derive its identity from the character of the place in which it is found” (Heine, 2001:4). She concedes, however, that an artwork’s placement in public certainly makes it “available to more people than might otherwise experience it” (Heine, 2001: 4). Commenting on the same subject of site is Senie (2003) who asserts that “in public art, the site is the content”. Implicit is that, even before a site is transformed by an artwork, that site is latently imbued with content. Senie further argues that, each “public space has an evolving history of multiple uses, visual, social, and political that directly or indirectly influence, if not determine, both artistic and audience response” (Senie). It is thus not just the artwork that the audience responds to. Location or site is also part of the viewing matrix.

In real life, children play almost anywhere as long as they can find space. However, the space in the Town House garden where *Leapfrog* is placed arguably does not make it adequately visible to the public. While the artwork is placed directly on the ground making it stand at the same level as viewers, the sculptural units rest somewhat precariously on their own low bases which are an integral part of the stone artwork. Also, although there is inter-sculptural space within each piece, this is lacking around the set. This prompts Benhura to comment that the artwork would have been better presented where there is a lot of space for the “children to run and play”.²⁵⁹ His comment may indicate a realisation that extensive space around each of the sculptural children would allow movement by the viewers as well as give the sculptural composition an open environment as background (see Figs. 78, 80 up to 83). The space

²⁵⁹Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010, Harare.

around each unit is compromised by the ornamental shrubbery and flower beds. The hose pipe that almost always lies unused on the ground nearby also impacts negatively on the presentation. To the right of the sculptures is a boundary hedge and fountain that further screen some units of the *Leapfrog* set from potential beholders. This confirms Senie's (2003) assertion of a place as having its own multiple uses prior to an artwork is put on it, as noted earlier.

When he offered to install the artwork upon donating it, Benhura was told that installation would be done by City engineers and architects.²⁶⁰ The fact that this was not done is reason enough for him to be disappointed. One feels that he had perhaps expected that engineers and architects, as professionals, would seek his counsel upon installation. It proved to be misplaced trust. The sculptor feels that the City Council “just crammed the *Leapfrog* at Town House gardens because they wanted the artwork, when unfortunately, they did not have the space for installing it properly”.²⁶¹ Considering that “installation is the art form that takes note of the perimeters of that space and reconfigures it” (Suderburg, 1999: 4) for the artwork, the concern that Benhura has for having failed to ensure that his sculptures would be properly installed is justifiable. It is also possible that the dearth of open space at Town House might account for why the City Council would not allow the sculptor to assist in installing the artwork. But given that the *Leapfrog* sculpture pieces are merely placed in the garden and not fixed into the ground, the indication is that due consideration to aspects of stability were also not taken.²⁶² This exposed the artwork to damage. Further, given the weight of stone, the sculptures may pose a very real danger to garden attendants and visitors.

According to Albert E. Elsen, “[t]he mutilation and destruction of public art has not always been the work of angry and irresponsible persons” (Elsen, 1989: 296). This statement is true in the case of *Leapfrog*. A sentry policing the entrance to Town House (see stationed at the guardhouse in Fig. 78) revealed that people employed to work in the gardens would sometimes dislodge the sculptures then quickly reposition them.²⁶³ This happened several times due to the movement of the lawn-mower cable or the hose-pipe. One day the worst happened and they had to notify the authorities.²⁶⁴ He explains:

²⁶⁰Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010, Harare.

²⁶¹Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010, Harare.

²⁶²Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010, Harare.

²⁶³Interview with Anonymous Guard, December 20 2008, Town House, Harare.

²⁶⁴Interview with Anonymous Guard, 20 December 2008, Town House, Harare.

It was during one such an incident that those sculptures fell and the hands dislodged [...] They had to sit the jumping kid on the back of the bending child and for a while they stayed like that, but when it accidentally fell again people decided to let it stay on the ground so that no further damage is done to it. The authorities were made aware of the breakage incident [...] but nothing has been done to repair it.²⁶⁵

When the sculpture was damaged in 2008, Benhura came close to rescinding his donation to the Harare City Council.²⁶⁶ He only relented when he realised that it was not only negligence that resulted in the damage but also that most people at Town House “probably know very little about [public] art”, let alone appreciating it.²⁶⁷ He is now exploring other avenues, which he did not reveal, for getting the artwork repaired without creating what he termed “unnecessary antagonisms”.²⁶⁸ Nonetheless, the sculptor regrets that he did not have the foresight to have first explored possible sites with the city officials or to have entered into a written agreement which would have given him the right to install and if necessary repair his work.²⁶⁹ While Benhura may have failed in his hope to afford the Harare City a way to enhance its public environs, one can also deduce that he did not fail to learn from his experience.

In a discussion of public art and its reception by audiences, Borden and Rendell (2002: 267) write that, “in public art discourse ‘public’ refers to ‘site’ in both its physical state, as it is represented, and as it is understood conceptually as a terrain for interventions”. They further state that “‘public’ also refers to ‘the public’ as audience, viewer and user” (Borden & Rendell, 2002: 267). Borden and Rendell (2002: 267) point out that “this public audience is rarely considered in terms of difference or heterogeneity, passive and active, initiated, and coming-in cold, viewer and user or in terms of public’s various classes, gender race, age and so on.” Yet, as they stress, public artworks are not in fact simply a creation of the artist, but

²⁶⁵Interview with Anonymous Guard, 20 December 2008 Town House, Harare.

²⁶⁶Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010 Harare.

²⁶⁷Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010 Harare.

²⁶⁸Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010, Harare. Note also that the modern sculptor in some countries is fortunate enough to have “unprecedented rights in the form of law protecting public as well as private art. Under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Creative Artistic Works, artists have rights to claim authorship of work and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or any other modification that would be prejudicial to their honour and reputation” according to Elsen (1989: 294). This convention, however, does not apply to Zimbabwe as it is not a signatory.

²⁶⁹Interview with Dominic Benhura, 19 January 2010, Harare.

also of the many viewers who encounter them as they construct their own meanings (Borden & Rendell, 2002: 267; North, 1992: 11).

It is not only Benhura who sees the space of the *Leapfrog* artwork as crowded. Other artists and community members who have encountered the work share similar observations. Pfungwa Moyo, a graphic designer who passes by the Town House on a daily basis remarked that when the sculptures fell and no one picked them up it demonstrated that the children in *Leapfrog* did not have space in which to play.²⁷⁰ He argued that the pieces were in reality crying out that they needed another ~~place~~ to play and the City authorities should give them that opportunity”.²⁷¹ Moyo also perceives the sculpture’s act of ~~erying~~ out to the city fathers for attention by breaking” as unfortunate. He has come to the conclusion that no one seems to take any notice despite the fact that the sculptures have fallen ~~on~~ the door step” of the City Council.²⁷² He deduces that the city authorities probably did not regard the artwork as important,²⁷³ and thus mirrors Benhura’s opinion about the reason for inaction on the part of the Council authorities.

Thomas Pasirayi, an artist and assistant curator at Harare’s National Gallery of Zimbabwe (NGZ), views the artwork as a ~~memory~~ shaker” that reminds him of his childhood, but is quick to express that the sculptures are secluded from public view.²⁷⁴ Pasirayi argues that because *Leapfrog* ~~is~~ placed between the fountain, shrubs and the hedges, [...] it is hidden from the public and even those who pass nearby it”.²⁷⁵ He further observes that it is the fountain which comes out as a public art feature particularly when the water jets are functional as they invite attention, even from passers-by on the other side of the hedge, by virtue of having a kinetic element.²⁷⁶

Another Harare artist, Cosmos Shiridzinomwa, feels that the site chosen by the City Council suits only those entering or leaving the Town House (see Fig. 85).²⁷⁷ Thus he implies that the location limits viewership, suggesting that the artwork has been appropriated and in some

²⁷⁰Interview with Pfungwa Moyo, 18 December 2008, Harare.

²⁷¹Interview with Pfungwa Moyo, 18 December 2008, Harare.

²⁷²Interview with Pfungwa Moyo, 18 December 2008, Harare.

²⁷³Interview with Pfungwa Moyo, 18 December 2008, Harare.

²⁷⁴Interview with Thomas Pasirayi, 15 January 2009, Harare.

²⁷⁵Interview with Thomas Pasirayi, 15 January 2009, Harare.

²⁷⁶Interview with Thomas Pasirayi, 15 January 2009, Harare.

²⁷⁷Interview with Cosmos Shiridzinomwa, 18 December 2008, Harare.

sense ~~privatised~~” by the City Council. Shiridzinomwa believes that, while ~~not~~ all public art may be seen by everyone and that is the reason [why] some art is in the foyer, some in the park or outside buildings”, *Leapfrog* is the kind of public art that is designed for the enjoyment of all age groups, even in its semi-abstracted form, and that the restriction of viewership is thus highly unfortunate.²⁷⁸ He explains:

The Town House is not a place meant for children [...] that place is only accessed by adults who go there on business. As the work is meant for children as well, it would have been good if it were put at a place accessible to all, the young and old, like in an open park.²⁷⁹

A group of nurses who wait for their daily transport to work on Julius Nyerere Way next to the Town House, behind the hedges that divide them from the *Leapfrog* in the Town House garden, indicated that they had witnessed and discussed the sculptures since their original placement. One of the nurses, Tsitsi Gurura, acknowledged that the first time she saw the *Leapfrog* she was immediately reminded of her childhood days at primary school where leapfrog was a popular game during physical education.²⁸⁰ Gurura further observes that when one of the sculptures was damaged, their narrative was ~~somehow~~ lost, especially to someone discovering them for the first time”.²⁸¹ Gurura also wondered why the sculptures were not being ~~restored~~”.²⁸² Another nurse, Nester Nezazu, remarked that the sculptures were placed away from people’s view. She felt that an open area would have been ideal.²⁸³

While it was difficult to get the official views of the City Engineer and the City Architect at Harare’s Town House, Samuel Nyabeza, the City Council’s Chief Planning Officer, gave insightful information on the city’s policy regarding public art which shed light on the site allocated to Benhura’s *Leapfrog* sculpture. It seems that the Harare City Council has jurisdiction over only a few public spaces while most open land is in private hands - even though it is the Council that sanctions all public art installations in Harare. He commented:

One can donate art or a piece of art, but we also would want to consider where to erect it if it happens to be sculpture.[...] it is always ok when we install it [...] in a

²⁷⁸Interview with Cosmos Shiridzinomwa, 18 December 2008, Harare.

²⁷⁹Interview with Cosmos Shiridzinomwa, 18 December 2008, Harare.

²⁸⁰Interview with Tsitsi Gurura, 17 December 2008, Town House, Harare.

²⁸¹Interview with Tsitsi Gurura, 17 December 2008, Town House, Harare.

²⁸²Interview with Tsitsi Gurura, 17 December 2008, Town House, Harare.

²⁸³Interview with Nester Nezazu, 17 December 2008, Town House, Harare.

public place like the Africa Unity Square or at Town House. Those are public places [and so] it is not going to be a problem. But we cannot install it anywhere within the city because much of the city comprises private land. We no longer have council or government land which is vacant in the City Council because most of the city belongs to private business persons. So it is up to them to put up artwork, but still they would have to seek approval from the City Council first.²⁸⁴

This may explain why the City Council chose to locate *Leapfrog* in the Town House precincts; they own and administer the gardens. It also accounts for why there is not much public art in Harare's Central Business District (CBD). Private business cannot be compelled to put up art work even on new structures unless the architects have deemed so because local government by-laws on the construction of buildings are silent on the matter.²⁸⁵ This is unlike in western countries where the setting aside of a token budget for art, as in the 1% for art practiced in the United Kingdom, is legislated.

It is noteworthy that the *Leapfrog* is being judged based on its site in the Town House garden as much as it is being judged on its own terms as a narrative sculpture. In this regard Senie (2003) makes the relevant observation that in order to be perceived as public art, “a work requires a site where this experience is possible, where people can literally see and possibly stop for a brief or extended encounter”. From the sentiments expressed above by those exposed to *Leapfrog*, one can posit that the artwork is not properly sited at Town House. This in turn implies that the artwork is not *noticeable*, a characteristic regarded by Lippard (cited in Knight, 2008: 31) as “a necessary prerequisite for public art”.

The site of *Leapfrog*, in its dismembered state and inadequate installation, tends to discredit the city council. Furthermore, it has a particularly negative effect on the image of the artist and the art community. Suggesting that art is of little worth and does not warrant being treated with care, the unprofessional display of the work and the disregard for the damage it has suffered make understandable “the frustrations encountered by both art organisations and the sculptors in trying to exert influence and maintain consistent official recognition” (Bogart 1992: 178).

²⁸⁴ Interview with Samuel Nyabeza, 6 January 2011, City of Harare.

²⁸⁵ Interview with Samuel Nyabeza, 6 January 2011, City of Harare.

***Leapfrog* as social commentary and a narrative of urban exclusions**

In viewing *Leapfrog*, it is evident that the components of the sculpture offer a narrative, and this implies a process. A process entails a continuous unfolding of actions or events with minimal or no interruptions in the realm of time and in this case, space. The fallen sculpture can be taken as a disruption to the flow of the leapfrog game and which in fact renders it dysfunctional. If the process were to be seen as linked metaphorically to social processes and delivery (and the fact that Benhura's work is outside the headquarters of a building falling under the auspices of the City Council might very well encourage such a reading), *Leapfrog* ceases to refer only to the act of play. Cosmos Shiridzinomwa acknowledges this:

Considering that one of the pieces depicting the most potent moment fell down because the sculpture was vandalised [i.e. damaged] and no action was taken to restore it, the falling may be symbolic of a state of decay in our service delivery system as a city [...] Perhaps the breaking of the work symbolises the breaking of things in our lives as citizens that are not supposed to break down. The piece that fell has not been picked up for close to a year, it means failure somewhere in the City's system of service delivery for its citizens.²⁸⁶

Implicit also in Shiridzinomwa's statement is that the City Council is pre-occupied with other 'important' issues, so that attending to *Leapfrog* becomes what Senie and Webster (1992b: xi) terms "a luxury incompatible" with matters that are its more immediate focus.

An official from the Combined Harare Rate Payers Association (CHRA), who chose to be anonymous, perceives the *Leapfrog* sculpture's neglect as emanating from the present state of the economy where lack of capacity seems to militate against certain aspects of service delivery, like beautifying the city. Her observation also brings into focus the dimension of the city's streets as public spaces where some citizens are excluded. She explains;

Perhaps the state of our economy may be the cause for the general neglect of things; you can see that a lot of things are actually run down like in that fallen stone sculpture representing children. It needs repair [...] but it is just not happening. Perhaps the City Council is prioritising other services, like refuse collection and providing water, but then we also wonder when we see that the fountain at their doorstep is dry [...] just as good as some taps in our suburbs. Beautifying the city and keeping it attractive does not only mean just removing

²⁸⁶Interview with Cosmos Shiridzinomwa, 18 December 2008, Harare.

street vendors and getting rid of street kids and vagrants from the city centre [...] it goes beyond that.²⁸⁷

Accordingly, one can suggest that the *Leapfrog*'s neglect at Town House is interwoven with economic and social issues induced by the economic crisis that the country has been experiencing since 2000. Economic hardships have meant that some urban families have had to supplement income by street vending, an exercise that is illegal in the city.²⁸⁸ Further, the HIV/AIDS scourge has affected bread winners leading to some families becoming child-headed.²⁸⁹ All this was partly aggravated by the state's clean-up operation in 2005 known as *'Murambatsvina'* where illegal urban structures were demolished rendering thousands destitute (see Tibaijuka, 2005; Sexton, 2005). While most of these victims were relocated to their rural areas by the state with assistance from the United Nations and other humanitarian non-governmental organisations, because of widespread poverty within the rural areas due to recurrent drought and little social welfare support from the state, some have since found their way back into the city.²⁹⁰ Since then some of these people, particularly the school-age going children who are now formal-school drop-outs, routinely walk into the city to either vend, beg or scavenge for food and others even end up living on the streets as a survival measure.²⁹¹ While Benhura gives aesthetic importance to children's gregariousness and their pleasure of play in *Leapfrog*, an artwork that the City of Harare now owns and exhibits in its Town House garden, it is paradoxically those same city authorities who are in fact "dreaded by street children" and street vendors.²⁹² In the case of 'street kids', they are often rounded-up for rehabilitation away from the confines of the city therefore making streets free for the bourgeois enterprises.²⁹³ On the other hand, street vendors' wares are often confiscated and they are made to pay fines by City authorities (NGO Report, 2005: 13).

²⁸⁷ Interview with Anonymous, Combined Harare Rate Payers Association official, 20 January 2009. Harare.

²⁸⁸ Vendors exist "on the margins of formal economy, their informal commerce supplements income, rather than constituting an occupation, or else supports only the most marginal of existence" (Crawford, 1995: 6).

²⁸⁹ Interview with Shaibu Chitsiku, 4 January 2011, Harare.

²⁹⁰ Interview with Shaibu Chitsiku, 4 January 2011, Harare.

²⁹¹ Interview with Shaibu Chitsiku, 4 January 2011, Harare. Fay Chung, a former government Minister of Education had this to say regarding street kids, "In the education sector, I managed as minister to stop the introduction of primary school fees [...] but they were introduced [during ESAP]. This eventually led to the problems of 'street kids' without schooling, a problem that had existed in colonial days but had disappeared during the first decade of independence" (Chung, 2006: 266).

²⁹² Interview with Shaibu Chitsiku, 4 January 2011, Harare.

²⁹³ Interview with Shaibu Chitsiku, 4 January 2011, Harare. In one such a campaign called "Operation Snow, young people living on the streets aged below 16 were taken to children's homes, which are battling to look after them because of limited budgets," observed Tsiko (2004).

In its current state of neglect, *Leapfrog* seems to speak of the feeling of being unwanted by the world, an aspect experienced by persons in the modern world where everyone else is pre-occupied in his /her own concerns. The capture of transitory movement in *Leapfrog* arguably represents a desire for continuity and normalcy. In its current state, the leapfrog game could be seen as having been temporarily disrupted. One can still argue further, that the initially symbolised idiom of transitory movement still continues to apply in that the broken sculpture continually remains on the ground anticipating restoration. Implicitly, when one reverts to social commentary symbolism, the urbanite citizen also awaits in anticipation for service delivery that is yet to come from the city authorities.

Conclusion

While most artworks found in public places have been commissioned, *Leapfrog* (1996) by Dominic Benhura is an exception in that it was donated to the City Council by the artist. *Leapfrog*, in its semi-abstracted figural form, depicts a narrative that seriously engages the importance of what is involved in children's play. The motif that the sculptor employs arguably has resonance and appeal to a wide audience - young and old, male and female, black and white. The artist sculpturally depicts that most potent moment of movement when one child vaults over another in the leapfrog game. This act was however curtailed by damage to the sculpture. Never fixed and remounted, the work remains in a state of neglect.

Causey (1998: 24), writes that sculpture presents "itself to scrutiny in a different way from painting: a work of art occupying public space is expected to address itself to the public". I have contended that Benhura's *Leapfrog* sculptural site within the Harare Town House gardens, where it is obscured by ornamental plants, a water fountain and a boundary-fence of plants that are above waist-height, lacks visibility and this tends to affect its 'address' to the public. I have also argued that the sculpture, in its damaged state, would seem to be making social commentary, albeit contrary to the artist's intention, on the lack of service delivery as well as the exclusion of the less fortunate in the city. However, even when it appears to be in a rather secluded public space, *Leapfrog* still maintains some form of *presence* within the Town House garden. It will, arguably, continue to solicit attention from those members of the public who happen to encounter it.

CHAPTER FIVE

Ploughman: A sculpture's signification of the peasant in the land struggles of Zimbabwe.

Introduction

Ploughman (1992) is a sculpture in welded steel by Adam Madebe which represents a male peasant farmer with a plough.²⁹⁴ The work is mounted on a pedestal located at the corner of Nelson Mandela Avenue and Park Street in Harare (see street map in Fig. 94).²⁹⁵ The figure in *Ploughman* is depicted without a shirt or work-boots (Fig. 95). He wears only a pair of shorts and a round-brimmed hat. Clearly, he is a peasant farmer who works communal lands using the animal-drawn plough; the representation also appears to make reference to the poverty associated with working “the arid, overused and unproductive rural land”.²⁹⁶ Nevertheless, the sculpture was commissioned by Pearce and Partner Architects who installed it in 1993 “to enhance Hurudza House”, according to McCartney (2001: 4).²⁹⁷ Hurudza House is the head office of Agribank, a quasi-government bank that specialises in underwriting mostly communal and small-scale commercial agriculture in Zimbabwe.²⁹⁸

Farming activities have been associated with land struggles for over a century in Zimbabwean history. The 1893 Anglo-Ndebele war, the 1896/7 war or First Chimurenga/Umvekelwa and the Liberation War or Second Chimurenga of 1966 to 1979 took place as confrontations of the indigenous Africans with settler Europeans, mostly but not only over land ownership (see Appendix 3). Even in the Lancaster House Conference Agreement of 1979, which brought independence in 1980, land was a contentious issue.

The invasion of white-owned Large Scale Commercial Farms (LSCFs) by peasants, war veterans, unemployed youths and urbanites from 1999 to 2002 was a postcolonial

²⁹⁴Born in 1954 in Bulawayo, Madebe studied at Mzilikazi Art and Craft Training Centre in the same city. After graduation in 1974, he worked at the centre as an art instructor for 17 years while practising his art.

²⁹⁵Interview with Adam Madebe, 3 April 2010, Krugersdorp, South Africa.

²⁹⁶Interview with Anonymous war veteran, 7 June 2008, Harare.

²⁹⁷*Hurudza*, incidentally, is a Shona word that refers to a successful farmer, irrespective of gender.

²⁹⁸Before it became Agribank, the financial institution in question was known as the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC). AFC was the name adopted after the merging, by an act of parliament in 1971, of the Land and Agriculture Bank formed in 1924 with the Agricultural Assistant Board, to cater for White commercial farmers. Currently, the Ministries of Finance and Agriculture all have a 50% stake in Agribank.

manifestation of violence over land. These invasions, now known as the ‘Third Chimurenga’ or ‘Third Liberation War’, compelled the state to enact laws legalising the occupation and take-over of LSCFs in an exercise officially called the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) of 2002 (see Appendix 3). Most of the land was then divided into A1 and A2 types of resettlements.

An enormous amount of research on the land question has been undertaken before and after the ‘Third Chimurenga’. Perspectives on this question revolve around the political economy (Moyo, 1986, 2000, 2005); gender (Gaidzanwa, 1994 and Bhatasara, 2011); theology (Bakare, 1993); law (Tshuma, 1997); social history (Chitiyo, 2003); and the agrarian point of view (Scoones et al, 2009). Despite the centrality of land as an issue, Murray McCartney’s (2001) review article entitled ‘Beyond the gallery walls: art in public’, which appears in a gallery periodical, considers the *Ploughman* sculpture only as an artwork that embellishes the Hurudza House architecture, and fails to consider the *Ploughman* as a sign, shaped by political ideology, patriarchy and African mythology, in the context of land struggles. I, by contrast, view the *Ploughman* sculpture as a socio-semiotic sign which assumes the mythical status of ‘child of the soil’²⁹⁹ in its association with land use, land rights, and identity in Zimbabwe.

In order to develop my argument, I begin by assessing the relationship between art and architecture in post-independent Zimbabwe, using particular examples from Harare’s Central Business District (CBD) since this assists in framing my discussion. I then consider *Ploughman*’s sculptural form and its presentation as a welded work outside Agribank’s Hurudza Building, and how it has been received since 1993. I also examine how the *Ploughman*’s signification of ‘child of the soil’ derives from an African belief system rooted in the relationship with land, highlighting how this ‘myth’ resonates with significance for many Zimbabwean people. Thereafter, I consider how significations of ‘child of the soil’ are informed and transformed by patriarchy and the politics of colonialism. Through this, I indicate how *Ploughman*’s construction as ‘son of the soil’ marginalises women – yet it is females who in fact are the primary workers of the land. Finally, I consider *Ploughman*’s significations in light of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) of 2002.

²⁹⁹Interview with Anonymous war veteran, 7 June 2008, Harare.

Art and architecture in Harare

Harare, as is the case with many other Zimbabwean cities, has more than “95% of the Central Business District (CBD) [...] laid out on a grid pattern” so that its roads (that is, streets and avenues) run “in a north to south and an east to west direction, respectively” (Munzwa and Wellington, 2010: 137). It is on this grid pattern that architectural structures sprout up in glass, concrete and steel with a wide scale the size of a city block on the ground and loftiness in height. This trend, seen elsewhere in the world, appears to underline the fact that architects, while prioritising functionality, have simultaneously had a negative effect on sculpture and painting as traditional components of architectural design. Senie (1992), Gottdiener (1995) and Lum (1999) all agree that this International Style of high-rise steel and glass buildings has been hostile to even the prospect of including sculptures which are figurative or with content which is emotive. This prompts Hills (2005:89) to observe that modernist architecture tends to shy away from the “emotional, seeking refuge in the technical, the quantifiable, and a social carefully drained of feeling”.

However, painting, sculpture and architecture have been seen together as complementary in the composition of edifices, a tradition that became popular in Renaissance Italy. The relationship between sculpture and architecture exists “in a fixed and determined space becoming more or less permanent features of the environment” (Carter, 2010: 162). It is also true that craftsmen in both media manipulate form and volume that have structure and plastic relationships. Even if the shape and form of a building is determined mainly by function “there exists an aesthetic spectrum, at one end of which a building can itself become a work of art, can have an iconic power to transform the way a place is seen and the way we regard it” (*Gallery*, 2001: 10).

In Harare, the hope and promise of a new future associated with the birth of a new nation at independence in 1980 spurred architectural and construction activities. In the first and second decades, modern architectural structures were put up by both the new government and private business. Buildings of architectural note within Harare’s CBD include, but are not limited to, Hurudza House, the Karigamombe Centre, Angwa Centre, the Construction House, the Corner House, Megawatt building, Century Towers, Eastgate Complex, Causeway building, the Harare Sheraton and the new Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). While some of these structures cater for office complexes, shopping space and parking arcades, others comprise

mostly accommodation and conference facilities. It is probably the emphasis on utilitarianism or functionality that creates a dearth of sculpture and paintings in and on some of these structures.

However, while some of these modernist structures appear to be mostly 'high-rise steel and glasses', some of them assume an expressive sculptural design in themselves. That is, some architectural structures can be seen as sculptures, where the sculptural form makes the building in the same manner that the building becomes the sculpture. This probably accounts partly for the lack of standalone sculptures outside the edifices or as incorporated designs usually experienced, for example in caryatids, on some colonial buildings.

In his postulations on methods to restore the integration of painting, sculpture and architecture, Sert (Lum, 1999: 73-4) suggests three ways – namely, the 'integral' approach, the 'applied' approach, and the approach without a name which I shall call the 'independent' approach because it upholds "the independent tendencies of art and architecture". In the 'integral' approach the architecture is conceived of as a sculptural form "subsuming painting and sculpture under architecture for a singular artistic goal" (Lum, 1999: 73-4). In other words, the building itself can take up a sculptural appearance in its design concept with two-dimensional imagery such as mosaics and or murals on its outside or inside walls. With the 'applied' approach, both painting and sculpture are co-opted as "secondary decorative elements" to the building (Lum, 1999: 73-4). In the 'independent' approach Sert concedes that it is difficult to faithfully bring architecture, painting and sculpture in a "crafts-based unity" which would allow each to stand alone such that "the whole becomes greater than parts" (Lum, 1999: 4). In other words, in the 'independent' approach, each element functions autonomously and has its own meaning and significance.

Relating Sert's logic to structures in Harare, it seems that the 'integrated' and 'applied' approaches tend to dominate. Architectural edifices that have marble and glass mostly on their outward elevations tend to have sculptures and paintings within them. This is common to buildings like the Karigamombe Centre, Megawatt, Century and Trust Towers, which house mostly banks and corporate offices. Shah and Kesan (2011: 4) write that the "use of marble and grand spaces to provide a monumental feeling", as often seen on the architecture of buildings associated with banks, "is meant to express the values of security, trust and reliability". However, there are buildings that appear to be sculptural in themselves as they

use the ‘integrated’ approach. Examples of these include the Runhare House and the Eastgate complex.

Runhare House, situated at the corner of Fourth Street and Union Avenue in Harare, was designed by Fleet Utria Architects for the Posts and Tele-communications company (Fig. 96). Victor Utria explains its sculptural form:

[T]he ends of the building are round [...] the column heads are sculptural, they have light fittings to make it look as if the whole [building] is floating on top of the columns; the shutters that we had to do for these mushroom-headed columns, to follow the curve of the building, were very complicated [...] The whole building is, in a way, a sculpture (Utria in *Gallery*, 2001: 12-13).

Even the mushroom columns outside the building on what looks like a meeting arena include two concrete shutters that resemble abstracted mushrooms. One shutter is deliberately fallen to give a playful effect to an otherwise serious sculptural grouping.

However, in Mick Pearce’s Eastgate Building Complex, situated at the corner of Second Street and Robert Mugabe Road in the eastern part of the CBD, concern for the environment receives due attention as the architecture employs the *integrated* concept. In what could be referred to as architectural bionics, the Eastgate takes its architectural-cum-sculptural shape from nature’s termite mounds. Its concrete shell-like structures (Fig. 97) are engineered with openings on the sides and at the top with no central air-conditioning equipment (Lefaivre and Tzonis, 2003). These openings and the concrete structures regulate temperatures in the complex, reducing electricity consumption, thus, “the Eastgate Centre uses less than 10% of the energy of a conventional building its size” (Doan, 2002). The architectural complex has been hailed as a “truly innovative and successful alternative to the all-glass high rise that tropical countries tend to import from the north”, according to Lefaivre and Tzonis (2003).

Some edifices, like the Causeway Post Office Building in Central Avenue, make use of both the ‘integrated’ and the ‘applied’ visions in one building. This building’s south elevation features a four storey-square ‘picture frame’ sculpture with a landscape decoration which, however is not visible to most people (Fig. 98). It is the post boxes outside the building painted by the artist Richard Jack in blue, black, red, yellow and white, suggesting grid-like and columnar designs that give the building an identity (Fig. 99). These appear to be late

addition decorative ideas synonymous with the ‘_applied approach’ which, besides making the post boxes visible –from a distance” (Utria in *Gallery*, 2001: 12) also causes the not-so-impressive building to be noticeable from the street. However, it is the abstract mural done as a repeat motif on the inside walls of the banking hall, derived from a Thakor Patel painting, which appears to be more successful embellishment of the architecture (Fig.100).

The Causeway building is a working example of the subservience of painting and sculpture to architecture, a notion concerning the relationship of these plastic arts that some view as problematical. Harriet Senie indicates that an ‘_applied approach’, which may involve artwork being brought in at the end to serve a largely ornamental function, tends to create ‘_hostility’ between artist and architect. The artist may be co-opted only to rescue –what was already considered a failing architecture” (Senie 1992: 65) but if the artwork fails to impress, it becomes the artist who is castigated instead of the –failing architecture”.

Of the buildings that appear to apply the ‘_independent’ concept in Harare are Construction House and the new RBZ buildings. These have sculptural embellishments outside their structures, with the latter also bearing two-dimensional art on their marble-wall surfaces. On ground level and immediately outside, Construction House - designed by architects Mwamuka Mercuri and Associates and on Leopold Takawira Street - are huge figures made through welded metal (Fig. 101) by Adam Madebe which are known as the *Construction Workers* (1993: see McCartney, 2001: 6). The new RBZ building, designed by Clinton and Evans Architects, along Samora Machel Avenue, has a bronze Zimbabwe Bird sculpture perching on a water-fountain plinth (Fig. 102).³⁰⁰ Besides this, high up on the marble surfaces of the structure are engravings of chevron patterns that surround the circumference of the building, while engravings by David Mutasa of women pounding grain while some men work in the fields and others work on iron appear on the front elevation.³⁰¹ Hurudza House, situated at the corner of Nelson Mandela Avenue and Park Street (see map in Fig. 94) might be understood as another example of the ‘_independent’ concept in the use of sculpture and architecture.

³⁰⁰It was difficult to get images of engraved artwork on this new RBZ building because it is a security building. The Zimbabwe Bird in Fig.102 was taken from afar using a cell phone camera.

³⁰¹Interview with David Mutasa. 28 April 2010, Harare.

Hurudza House, the *Ploughman* and its presentation

Hurudza House (Fig. 103) is a sixteen-storey building located at the corner of Park Lane and Nelson Mandela Avenue, opposite Coal House comprising basement parking, a ground floor banking hall and 15 storeys of office space. Designed by architect Mick Pearce of Pearce Partnership (who also designed Eastgate), Hurudza House was commissioned by the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) (now known as Agribank) to house their new headquarters in the western part of Harare's CBD. This building project began in July 1989, with the work being completed in November 1991. The edifice is composed of a reinforced concrete frame in-filled with natural yellow ochre bricks. Every three floors there is landscaped balcony. Like Eastgate, the building is naturally ventilated and has no central air-conditioning. Hurudza House is distinct in that it does not adhere to the stylistic norm of a granite-box with mirror-glass and steel, a somewhat clichéd style prevailing in most projects built around the first two decades of independence. Its co-option of a sculpture on a plinth outside its precinct also makes it different from other modernist designed structures around it, as is discussed below.

When Madebe first received the commission, he conceived of a peasant farmer with two yoked oxen pulling the mould-board plough implement on a patch of land at ground level.³⁰² However, in 1992, before he commenced work on the commission, he visited Harare to view the site and only then was he informed that the sculpture would be mounted on a plinth. Armed with this crucial knowledge and with the exact measurements of the already existing plinth, he reconceptualised the work.³⁰³

It is clear that the sculpture was commissioned to give modern architecture what Senie (1992: 65) terms a human dimension. It was the architects who conceived from the beginning how the artwork would be installed so that its design would cohere with that of the building, even though it came in as an 'independent' artwork with a complementary role in the scheme of the design. It is this unfortunate lack of seeking input from the artist/sculptor at the planning phase which makes most artists and their artwork subservient to architects and architecture, respectively (Senie, 1992; Plum, 1999).

³⁰²Interview with Adam Madebe, 3 April 2010, Krugersdorp, South Africa.

³⁰³Interview with Adam Madebe, 3 April 2010, Krugersdorp, South Africa.

The *Ploughman* (Fig. 104) depicts the farmer with his shoulders hunched forward as he manoeuvres an animal-drawn mould board plough used to till the land. The farmer; shirt-less and bare-foot, is dressed in a pair of shorts and a round-brimmed hat - apparel that identify him as a peasant. The sculpture is crafted out of two-millimetre thick industrial metal with a veneer of fading grey monochrome that is also stained by rust. The figure perches on a metal strip that is welded on a pyramidal metal base, which in turn is mounted on a five-metre high yellow ochre brick plinth. This places the *Ploughman* figure well above pedestrians and traffic below. The sculpture was probably given a coat of colour by the commissioning parties before it was installed, for the purpose of protecting it from the weather. Apparently Madebe does not paint his welded works because he considers the colours that usually result from the iron rusting as integral to the artwork.³⁰⁴ One also senses that the artist is very much aware of the impermanence of iron as a medium, particularly when it is exhibited in outdoor public spaces. Therefore the artist would be happy to participate in or undertake maintenance and rehabilitation of the artwork, so that his work remains publicly visible and possibly attracts more commissions.³⁰⁵

In creating the *Ploughman* sculpture, the artist welded together slabs of steel, creating three-dimensional forms that are rougher in their finish than bronze castings. It may be the challenges associated with this medium that cause the *Ploughman*'s proportions to seem awkward in the artist's mimesis of the human figure. This is particularly evident in the hands, which seem too long and lacking in the subtle muscle tension that would be produced through the act of manoeuvring a moving implement. What is lacking in the hands appears to be compensated for in the legs where proportions are more naturalistic and there is a convincing suggestion of the stress and flexing of muscles. Madebe begins by making a clay prototype to the intended size and posture of his envisioned sculpture. At this stage he works by observing a human model. After the clay model, he shapes metal pieces that replicate the form of the clay prototype and then welds these together. In the progression of welding Madebe puts cocoons in some parts which he will later break once the sculpture is fully welded. Thereafter he removes the clay and closes the figure up with the final welding, rendering his sculpture hollow as a finished piece. Clearly, it demands particular skill to produce a welded figure and

³⁰⁴Interview with Adam Madebe 3 April 2010, Krugersdorp, South Africa.

³⁰⁵In Western countries an artist has moral rights to his /her public art as the author (see Elsen, 1989: 294), to the extent that he/she may be contractually obligated to repair the artwork. However, such law is lacking in Zimbabwe, where once the artist has handed over the work, it becomes the responsibility of the commissioning agents or property managers, according to Dominic Benhura (Interviewed 19 January, 2010, Harare).

this would explain some of the departures from naturalism in the work, such as the exaggerated bulge where the arms join the shoulders (Fig. 95).

There were clearly fewer challenges in rendering the plough which was simply a replication of an industrially made one. The fabrication of the plough involved welding planar surfaces, an activity that can be likened to assembling pieces of a known object. But whereas the plough was simply a replication of an existent implement, for the figure Madebe attempted illusionism – albeit that his material is intractable and unsympathetic to such an approach. Although the work demonstrates phenomenal facility, the deployment of steel was in all probability motivated by economic rather than aesthetic considerations. Casting *Ploughman* in bronze – a more obvious choice for a figurative sculpture placed outdoors - would have been prohibitively expensive.

Despite the figure's lack of naturalistic proportions, the expression of movement appears to demonstrate Adam Madebe's "awareness that sculpture is a medium peculiarly located at the juncture between stillness and motion, time arrested and time passed" (Krauss, 1977: 5). Movement in the sculpture is suggested first by the hunched figure that appears to rest most of its weight on the left foot, which is touching the supposed ground of a protruding metal footrest from the main horizontal supporting strip metal base (Fig.104). At the same time, the left shoulder of the figure appears raised as if to bring the weight of the torso to its side and to assist the right leg to come forward. The whole posture ensures that as the plough inclines to the left as is suggested by the slight raising of the right hand, the left hand gets slightly lowered and this makes the weight of the plough's handles to rest more on the left leg. The rest of the plough's weight is carried by a side piece of metal that juts out from the main strip-metal base. The drapery of the sculpture, in the folds of the shorts worn by the farmer, assists the suggestion of movement in the figure, as is also actively implied by the figure's diagonal body-thrust forward. Thus the postural composition is suggestive of effective control of motion on the part of the peasant farmer in his simulation of ploughing.

It seems curious that the plinth removes the sculpture from the ground to which the farmer is supposed to have not only physical but also a type of psychic attachment as the purported 'child of the soil'. Thus the sculpture's positioning in the cityscape arguably "violates the street's golden rule of the street's visual text; the obligatory placement of the object at – or

slightly above – the passerby’s eye level, a rule that advertisements invariably follow” (Yampolsky, 1995: 93). Even though the five-metre pedestal matches the Hurudza Building in that all structures use yellow-ochre construction brick, the Ploughman sculpture is partly obscured from view because of its high pedestal (Figs.105 and 106). When viewed from a distance and from some angles, the *Ploughman* can be seen as retaining its identity as a representation of the human form within the visual space. However, as one gets closer, the pedestal begins to block parts of that human shape to the point of rendering it unclear from close by (Figs.105 and 106).

In this regard, one can argue that the placement of *Ploughman* on a five-metre plinth removes it from its association with the soil as well as from identification with ordinary things at ground level. Causey points out that, when supersized pedestals are used, the support becomes a –sign of [the] sculpture’s privilege, the primary sign of the difference from other things” (Causey, 1998: 87). The pedestal thus appears to elevate the *Ploughman* sculpture’s depiction of the peasant to that of the realm seen in the Eastern communist-bloc’s monumental portrayals of the proletariat or worker and this goes against the artist’s intention. These types of sculpture are more often than not gigantic and on very high pedestals within the cityscapes (Elsen, 1989; Yampolsky, 1995; Bonnell, 1997; DPRK Studies, 2000-2007). One such example is Vera Mukhina’s *Worker and Collective farm woman*, 1937 (Fig.107) meant for the top of a Soviet pavilion (which also doubled as the pedestal) at Paris’s International Exhibition of Arts and Crafts, and Sciences.³⁰⁶ While Mukhina’s sculpture is an exception in this respect, in Soviet visual propaganda the imagery of the worker was predominantly male and this tended to imply male dominance within the worker class or proletariat (Bonnell, 1997: 23). Analogously, when it comes to the ownership of most of Zimbabwe’s communal land (and even the commercial land), the *Ploughman* carries the same signification as experienced in most Soviet visuals, that it is men who tend to dominate land ownership rights, as will be discussed below.³⁰⁷ It has to be noted though, that in the communist bloc, art was mostly didactic propaganda. This is not the case with the *Ploughman* even though it would have political connotations for many Zimbabwean viewers.

³⁰⁶In this socialist realist sculpture, the male worker, holding high the industrial mallet in a forward thrust diagonal of his left arm, is juxtaposed with the peasant woman whose right hand is similarly thrust forward holding a sickle. The subjects are in step, the exaggerated portrayal of their drapery animating their forward moving posture in what Bonnell (1997: 43) terms –a gesture of triumph”.

³⁰⁷Statistics of those who benefited from the Third Chimurenga show that of those who got A1 Farms 18% were women, while of those who were allocated A2 farms, 12% were women, despite a government FTLRP target quota of 20% (see Chingarande, 2009).

Relating to the concept of sculpture and monument, Rosalind Krauss, in her essay entitled “Sculpture in an expanded field”, defines sculpture before the advent of modernism. She places it in the realm of the traditional monument with its known characterisations. She writes:

The logic of sculpture, it would seem, is inseparable from the logic of the monument. By virtue of this logic a sculpture is a commemorative representation. It sits in a particular place and speaks in a symbolic tongue about the meaning and the use of that place. [...] Because they thus function in relation to the logic of representation and marking, sculptures are normally figurative and vertical, their pedestals an important part of the structure since they mediate between actual site and representational sign (Krauss, 1979: 33).

In the context of this perception of sculpture, one can argue that Madebe’s *Ploughman*, with its realistic depiction of a peasant farmer, can be likened to a traditional monument in that it marks the site of Hurudza House (Agribank’s Head Offices) as a building whose business is principally to finance communal and small-scale commercial agriculture in Zimbabwe. In addition, and following the same argument, the *Ploughman* can also be said to be figurative and vertical, with a pedestal that connects the representation with the particular site.

Interpreting the *Ploughman*

Ploughman can be viewed as a semiotic sign whose meanings can perhaps be best interpreted by reading the encoded values that members of society assign to it. For that reason it is helpful to consider what semiotics as an analytical tool offers when interpreting art as a cultural product.

According to semiotics, culture is a “constant process of producing meanings” from a series of social practices and shared experiences (Fiske cited in Hopkins, 1998: 68). Given that culture acts as an intermediary as well as a medium of social communication, creations of culture can be read semiotically as sets of signs or text (Gottdiener, 1995; Howells, 2003). Semiotics refers to the relationship that exists between ‘_sign’, ‘_signifier’ and ‘_signified’, as proposed by the Swiss author, Ferdinand de Saussure. In his lexicon, the ‘_signifier’ is something that stands for something else; the ‘_signified’ is the idea of the thing it stands for; and the ‘_sign’ is the union of the two (Howells, 2003: 95). In semiotics, a community agrees

to a convention whereby it uses varied signifiers to embody the meaning of a given signified. So the relationship of signifier and signified is ‘arbitrary’ as the meaning of a sign is the product of society and a social process (Howells, 2003: 96).

Roland Barthes widened the use of semiotics to include visual art and popular culture. He used semiotics not only to reveal text but also expose the underlying ideological assumptions of the society in which it was created” (Howells, 2003: 196). For Barthes, when a signifier directly names a particular object that it is referring to, then that sign, as in Saussure’s conception, makes a denotation (Gottdiener, 1995: 15). Thus when one says the *Ploughman* represents the male peasant farmer, this becomes a denotative reference in terms of Barthes’ logic.

On the other hand a sign can attain a “second order” meaning (Howells, 2003: 101) when the combined sign of ‘signified and signifier’ becomes a signifier of another sign, a connotation, or a *second order* sign, which signifies a cultural value, such as status” (Gottdiener, 1995: 15, emphasis in original text). In effect, a second and higher order sign tends to connote something else so that “every object of use becomes encoded with its social function”; thus the object attains a sign function (Gottdiener, 1995: 22). The layering in meaning assumed by the second and higher order sign function is what Barthes calls “myth” (Howells, 2003: 100, Gottdiener, 1995: 22). While Saussure’s sign is considered as arbitrary,³⁰⁸ the “myth” is never without motivation because its main purpose is to convert meaning into form, which makes it “a repository of value” (Howells, 2003: 101). In his comparison of semiotics to anthropology, Howells observes that, “it is in myths that societies [...] encode their hopes, dreams, needs and cultural values even though they may take the overt form of other things” (Howells, 2003: 101-2). Fundamentally, a sign assumes the same mythical functions. Analogously, when liberation veterans consider the *Ploughman* to be depicting a ‘son of the soil’ one can contend that they are encoding ‘mythical’ values to the artwork and that these values have basis in society’s cultural codes. It is these societal contexts that require appreciation in order to understand the significations of Madebe’s sculpture as a semiotic sign.

³⁰⁸ It should be noted that in the visual arts the notion of the sign being ‘arbitrary’ at the denotative level does not actually hold weight. The figure in Madebe’s sculpture *looks like* a peasant ploughing the field whereas Saussure is talking about words which do not have any qualities which would link them to what they represent – as is implied in his use of the term ‘arbitrary’.

Thus socio-semiotics is useful, as an aspect of semiotics that deals specifically with signs and social contexts and focuses on ~~the~~ connection between ideologically charged sign systems and the material culture of everyday life” (Gottdiener in Hopkins, 1998: 68). Ideology in socio-semiotics is viewed in a non-totalising way as ~~the~~ value systems of social groups” (Gottdiener 1995: 27). Value systems connect to the content of the sign while materiality connects to the expression of the sign (Gottdiener, 1995: 27). It is with this understanding that the *Ploughman* is referred to as ~~the~~ child of the soil” by most of Zimbabwe’s social groups amongst which liberation veterans are the most vocal.³⁰⁹

With the excitement of independence, most indigenous Africans addressed each other as child of the soil in the first decade while the new government implemented land resettlement programmes (see Appendix 3) in an exercise that sought to address land imbalances in the young Zimbabwean nation.³¹⁰ Thus when the *Ploughman* was installed at Hurudza House building in 1993, it was quickly noticed by the public as not only a signifier of the peasant farmer but also as a marker for a place within the CBD. Thus semiotically, the *Ploughman*’s first meaning, which was also probably most widely recognised by the public, was that the peasant farmer sculpture signified a building ~~where~~ loans for communal and small-scale commercial farming could be accessed in town”.³¹¹ This essentially means that the sculpture, in its early years after installation (and perhaps up to today), was appreciated by the audience in its signpost status of a geographical location. Not only did it mark out, visually, the function of Hurudza House, it also described it in that it provided Agribank (AFC then) with its corporate identity (see Marshall, 2009). The sculpture thus complemented the building and as Sert (Lum, 1999: 73) would argue, with artwork a building becomes ~~an~~ architecture”.

On another level, the unveiling of the *Ploughman* and the occupation of Hurudza House by Agribank in 1993 happened just after the Lancaster House³¹² clause forbidding state expropriation of land had lapsed in 1990. The Land Acquisition Act of 1992, which

³⁰⁹Interview with Anonymous war veteran, 7 June 2008, Harare.

³¹⁰Interview with Anonymous war veteran, 7 June 2008, Harare.

³¹¹Interview with Anonymous war veteran, 7 June 2008, Harare. / Interview with Chirandu Sithole, 25 April 2010, Harare.

³¹²The constitutional provision was as follows, in Section 16: (1) A ten-year limitation on the future government’s power to acquire land compulsorily for state purposes; and (2) Payment for adequate compensation for any land acquired under the willing buyer, willing seller scheme (Kagoro, 2004: 238).

sanctioned state expropriation of White-owned land, had also been recently enacted.³¹³ Because the installation of *Ploughman* coincided with these historic events, it is probable that the sculpture was perceived by many people as a signifier of –serious intentions, on the part of government, to tackle the land issue decisively now that the Lancaster constitutional hold-up had been cleared”.³¹⁴ Installed visibly at a government-related institution, the sculpture may well have been perceived as imploring and reminding them to take farming seriously.³¹⁵ Kudzanai Nyarumwe explains:

In the Lancaster House Agreement, Zimbabwean political leaders and the British had agreed to start raising issues on land after ten years of independence, that is, in 1990. So the *Ploughman* most likely signals [...] that the African man was ready to [...] seriously take over land and farming [...] people took the sculpture as a cue of things to come on the land question.³¹⁶

Despite the legislative instrument and the sense of anticipation to which *Ploughman* may be connected, Spierenburg (2004: 38) observes that little happened between 1992 and 1997. A mere hundred farms were acquired with just a few confiscated for redistribution to the peasantry (Spierenburg, 2004: 38). However, there was rising unemployment, retrenchment induced by the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and increased poverty within both the urban and rural areas in the mid-1990s (see Ndlela 2003: 139, African Institute for Agrarian Studies Document, 2009: 72).³¹⁷ With the advent of these social difficulties, *Ploughman* started to attain new significations as a social sign within the cityscape. Government’s land resettlement for the landless had stalled by 1994 (Appendix 3) yet land hunger continued to increase as those who were retrenched saw farming as an alternative way to provide sustenance. Nationalistic nostalgia began to foment as –social groups” (Gottdiener, 1995: 27) like war veterans and peasants branded themselves as the landless ‘children of the soil’, and began to agitate for the acquisition of more land from LSCFs.³¹⁸ Thus after 1995, it seems that Madebe’s figure began to be recognised as ‘child of the soil’ making it a cultural object –of use in a social system with a generative history and

³¹³It has been argued that the Lancaster House Conference was a British means of ensuring that White Land rights and economic status were protected upon independence besides pre-empting a march into Harare by nationalist guerrillas of ZANLA and ZIPRA which, if it had happened, would have meant instant and radical change on the issue of land for Blacks (see Muzondidya, 2004: 219).

³¹⁴Interview with Kudzanai Nyarumwe, 25 April 2010, Harare.

³¹⁵Interview with Kudzanai Nyarumwe, 25 April 2010, Harare.

³¹⁶Interview with Kudzanai Nyarumwe, 25 April 2010, Harare.

³¹⁷The incidence of poverty shot from 40.4% in 1990 to 63.3% in 1996, –showing that poverty rose during the adjustment period in Zimbabwe” according to Ndlela (2003: 139).

³¹⁸Interview with Chirandu Sithole. 25 April 2010, Harare.

social context, and also [as] a component in a system of signification” (Gottdiener, 1995: 29) for the land struggles.

Accordingly, the *Ploughman*, in its presentation as a monument on a plinth, embodies the imagery of ‘child of the soil’, an identity that is semiotically ‘mythical’ in that it derives from memory and cultural associations among indigenous Africans of Zimbabwe. This is in accord with Gillis’ (1994: 3) postulation that the mainstay of any individual or group identity, namely a sense of sameness over time and space, is sustained by remembering; and what is remembered is defined by the assumed identity”. This assumed identity of ‘child of the soil’ is what some veterans of the Second Chimurenga attach to the *Ploughman* sculpture’s symbolism as a monument. As alluded to earlier, the installation of the sculpture in 1992 at a critical juncture in Zimbabwean history became a monument that triggered memories of indigenous nationalism³¹⁹ which had become dormant in the first years of independence when the government appeared to be addressing the land issue through earlier resettlement programmes.³²⁰

³¹⁹Extreme nationalism usually results in “Afro-radicalism” or “nativism” (Mbembe in Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2009: 264) According to Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2009: 265) nativism as an ideology “is pre-occupied with identity and authenticity” while “Afro-radicalism is concerned with finding a way of breaking away from imperialism, neo-colonialism, dependence and neo-liberal cultural imperialism.” Mbembe writes that “Nativist and Afro-radical discourses of the self are both projects of re-generation, self knowledge and self-rule” thus he argues that “self-rule and self-knowledge are justified in the name of autochthony” (Mbembe in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009b: 71). He contends that in the “argument of autochthony, each spatio-racial formation has its own culture, its own historicity, its own way of being, its own relationship with the future and with the past. Each has, as it were, its own certificate of origin and its own telos” (Mbembe in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009b: 71). Mbembe tells us that in all instances “the idea is that the encounter between African and the West resulted in a deep wound: a wound that cannot heal until the ex-colonised re-discover their own being and their own past (Mbembe in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009b: 71). It is within this framework that citizenship in Zimbabwe appears to be “redefined in nativist terms that excluded white races”, according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009: 276). This is where the ‘Africa for Africans’ and ‘Europe for Europeans’ rhetoric espoused in the Third Chimurenga and the Fast Tracked Land Resettlement project is arguably anchored (see Mugabe, 2001).

³²⁰According to the interview conducted with Chirandu Sithole on the 25th of April 2010 in Harare, every year that passed, after independence, without the state attending decisively to the land issue served not only to exhaust the patience of the landless among the indigenous population who included liberation veterans, but was also instrumental in invoking nostalgic sentiments of being ‘indigenous to Africa’ which have always been dormant. These feelings verged on extremes that dated back to colonial history.

‘Child of the soil’ and ancestral lands

Deploying a semiotic approach, the *Ploughman* sculpture as a sign denotes or makes direct reference to a male peasant farmer. However, *Ploughman* does not simply represent a farmer or worker of the soil but, as I have suggested, it also connotes the idea of an individual with fundamental links to the land – or, in the words of one struggle veteran, “being a child of the soil”.³²¹ This becomes clearer if one considers social and cultural understandings of working the land.

In their definition of culture, Jordan and Weedon (1995: 8) claim that it “is a set of material practices which constitute meanings, values and subjectivities”. Apparently these practices are acted by a set of people who constitute a community or society. This is shared by Spradley and McCurdy (cited in Vansina, 1984: 121) who view culture as “the sum total of ideas, aspirations, values and beliefs in the mind of people living in a given community”. Importantly, culture not only includes “ideas or beliefs” but also incorporates “emotional stance” and “this can be rendered by the expression ‘collective representation’ and people’s patterned response to them” (Vansina, 1984: 121). This makes culture a societal behaviour rooted in shared mores and values that can be traced to a specific community or society and time.

Culturally for most indigenous people of Zimbabwe, the farmer is cast in an indivisible relationship with the land. In this belief system, the soil denotes the earth or *pasi/umhlaba* and is seen as feminine in that it sustains all forms of life.³²² This makes the soil, in semiotics, a signifier of fertility, which in its secondary sense connotes sustenance that ensures human survival. African human existence is dependent on land. This is associated with a cyclic cultural phenomenon. As the ethno-historian, Pathisa Nyathi explains:

You always start with the soil, then you get to the woman who gives birth to life; the child that would be developing in the womb is a child of the soil, when it is weaned from the mother, it goes on to feed directly from the soil. The soil is sterile and it must be fertilised because it is likened to a woman without a man. This explains why Africans hold rituals calculated at fertilising the soil, and [so] the soil is fertilised by rain [...] and we grow crops and our livestock get pastures. Besides that, our structures actually stand on the soil, but most importantly, our

³²¹Interview with Anonymous June 2008, Harare.

³²²Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

sustenance [as human beings] come from the soil without which there would be no life.³²³

Since the soil gives life, African belief systems maintain that upon death it will be the land in which the ancestors' physicality in the afterlife has its abode.³²⁴ This prompts Bourdillon (cited in Chitando, 1998:57) to observe that land glues an enduring union between the living and the dead. This union is reified in that the land is home to the ancestors who "passed it on [...] to the living generation" and that this generation not only remembers those ancestors, but also invokes and consults them through ritual (Owomoyela, 2002:40). Arguably, it is this bond with the ancestors who bequeathed the land that causes the living autochthons to lay claim of ownership beyond that of the perceived 'stranger'. Owomoyela appositely explains that:

The people's close connection with the land, and thus with the ancestors, finds expression in the practice of referring to a person who lives on ancestral land as a child of the soil, a designation that sets him or her apart from a sojourner who lacks the psychic connection (Owomoyela, 2002:40).

Implicitly, God (*Mwari* in Shona) is experienced through the natural world, where people co-exist with an environment that is imbued by the divine (Dickson cited in African Anglican Theological Commission, 1995:13). Thus "most [...] natural features had a powerful historical, emotional and spiritual content and significance, and delineated current and ancestral territories and spiritual realms" (Garlake, 2002: 155). In this way, land, to the indigenous people, is not merely provider and bearer of life, it forms "the basis of people's identity and group consciousness" (Dickson cited in African Anglican Theological Commission, 1995:13).

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, Africans were not only expelled from their land by means of colonially legislated expropriation and coerced relocation to "Native Reserves" (Chitiyo, 2003),³²⁵ but were also systematically pushed into the settler's wage economy in mines, farms, and the emerging urban industries (Moyo, 1986; Chimedza, 1987). Consequently, not only were they cut off from their group identity and families, but

³²³Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo.

³²⁴Interview with Professor Claude Mararike, 6 January 2011, Harare.

³²⁵Native commissioners, white men in charge of creating reserves and administering districts in Rhodesia believed that no good land should ever be reserved for Africans as they could always adapt themselves to any poor or rocky soil (Palmer, 1977: 255).

they were also alienated from land and sacred shrines with which they, as “children of the soil”, identified.³²⁶ This would seem to imbue the *Ploughman* sculpture with particular levels of resonance, enabling it to speak not only of people’s aspirations for the future but also of dispossession and loss they hope to see remedied.

Land, patriarchy and significations

Given that *Ploughman* depicts a male farmer; there is also a direct implication that it is men who work the land. This, however, reflects a factual inaccuracy, since subsistence farming and food production in Zimbabwe, as in Rhodesia, is done mostly by women, who make up about “75%” (Chimedza, 1987:139) or “80%” (Mushunje, 2001: 6) of the rural population. This situation has its origins in land expropriation policies; the Land Apportionment Act (1931) designated land along racial lines while the Land Husbandry Act (1951) only gave land title to males residing in ‘native reserves’ (Chigwedere cited in Mushunje, 2001: 5).

Notably, it is land classified as ‘native reserves’ which gave birth to the challenges experienced in the colonial and the postcolonial eras.³²⁷ Given that the ‘native reserves’ were arid, unproductive, overgrazed and overcrowded, they induced and exacerbated poverty among Africans (Palmer, 1977; Gaidzanwa, 1994; Mushunje, 2001). The direct effect of this was that African men began to fail to provide for their families, let alone pay the currency-based mandatory hut tax and land tax introduced by settler administration in 1894 (Arrighi, 1969/2002; Palmer, 1977; Schmidt, 1992; Mushunje, 2001; Chitiyo, 2003). The immediate involuntary reaction was for most African men to join wage employment (Mushunje, 2001). This systematically induced migration of African men to work places, which accounts for the higher percentage of women in rural areas to the present day. The wages paid to men could not sustain families and so producing food became women’s responsibility (Gaidzanwa, 1994; Mushunje, 2001).³²⁸ This certainly makes the African woman the ‘child of the soil’ by virtue of being the worker of the land.

³²⁶Chirandu Sithole, interview, Harare. See Appendix 3 for legislative instruments that were employed. Moyo (1986) and Machingaidze (1991) examine these acts in greater depth.

³²⁷At first reserves were called African Native Reserves but would change names twice; first to Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) in 1930 (Moyo et al, 2000) and later to Communal Areas in 1981. Also see Nyamapfene (1989).

³²⁸I quote extensively from Brenda Schmähmann whose writing to this effect is enlightening, she says: “The introduction of an assortment of regulations that prevented Shona women from taking up residence in the towns and from establishing effective markets for agricultural produce or brewed beer there, served to keep them in rural areas and to limit their entrance into a money market. These regulations suited Shona men; rural lands assigned to a man needed to be cultivated if his ownership of them was to be retained, and this tenure was

The suggestion that ownership of land in the pre-colonial era was not gendered stems from the understanding that land belonged to the ancestors, and was therefore owned by the entire community. Everybody benefited because “customary usufruct operated” (Gaidzanwa, 1994: 12). Land was allocated mostly, but not exclusively, to male heads of families by the traditional leaders who were duly entrusted as land custodians on the behalf of their patrilineal communities, for both Ndebele and Shona speaking groups (Palmer, 1977: 18, Owomoyela, 2002: 40, Garlake, 2002: 155, Chitiyo, 2003: 161).³²⁹ Inasmuch as Black women were not allocated land in their own right, they controlled and worked land on behalf of their husbands or families. In the event of death of the male spouse, women would have land rights but would hold them in trust for their male children who would inherit land as prospective heads of families. Then came Section 14 of the British Charter granted to the British South Africa Company (BSAC) to colonise Zimbabwe. This recognised African customs and law as follows:

In the administration of justice to the said peoples or inhabitants, careful regard shall always be to laws and customs of the class or tribe or nation to which the parties belong, especially to the holding, possession, transfer and deposition of land and goods, testate and intestate succession thereto and marriage, divorce, legitimacy and other rights of property and personal rights but subject to British law [...] (May in Kazembe, 1986: 381).

These customary exclusions of women from land ownership were complicated further through the passing of the Land Husbandry Act (1951). Giving land title *only* to African men in the ‘reserves’, the act excluded even widows and divorced women from ownership of land (Kazembe, 1986; Mushunje, 2001; Gaidzanwa, 1994). Even in situations where unmarried women had access to land from their family lines and widowed women could still work their

ensured through the labour of this rurally-based and economically dependent wife or wives. Previously, women had undertaken more time-consuming aspects of agricultural production, such as weeding, but had been able to rely on men to assist with the preparation of fields for planting, the harvesting of crops and the building of new huts and granaries. The drawing of men into wage labour meant that this assistance was no longer available. Women were faced with agricultural and domestic tasks that far exceeded those they had undertaken in the nineteenth century” (Schmahmann, 2000: 67).

³²⁹In the Makoni, Mutasa and Nyanga areas of the Manyika (a Shona dialect) people, vast territories of land close to half of the present day administrative district in Zimbabwe are culturally allocated to an appointed woman, usually a sister of the paramount chief, who is addressed always with the honorific *Muzvare* before her name as in *Princess Jane*. She has the powers to allocate land and preside over the concerns of her subjects within her jurisdiction, according to the interview held with Robert Makoni on 26 April 2010 in Chinhoyi.

deceased husbands' land, ~~women~~ had no land-use rights in their individual capacity" (Kazembe, 1986: 382).³³⁰

Although government amended the constitution in 2000 and 2001 for the purposes of acquiring more land for resettlement, Bhatasara (2001: 324) observes that Sections 23 (3) b' and i' were not revised and so they continue to uphold customary law. She also notes that while inheritance laws are legally acceptable, they are apparently not socially enforceable in a largely patrilineal society. Therefore, even when women inherit land from their deceased husbands, they may still ~~lose~~ land to their spouses' kin members" (Bhatasara, 2011: 324). It is against this background that women have had to stand up for their own rights to own land in the post-colonial era.³³¹

Inasmuch as the notion of son of the soil' came to reflect a ~~society~~ which is predominantly paternalistic in its cultural inclination", one can also argue that this shift was further advanced by the subjugation of the African male during colonialism.³³² In the colonial context male identity was besieged by colonial masters, making it preferable for Black men to adopt the slogan of son of the soil' instead of child of the soil'. In this vein, Epprecht's statement that ~~the~~ land Husbandry Act of 1951 and the population control, in particular, were perceived by many Africans as an intolerable assault on the rural and sexual base of indigenous masculinity" (Epprecht cited in Chitando, 1998: 58), is revealing. It implies that the masculine self-image of the African was put under severe psychological strain by successive colonial legislation that expropriated and controlled not only the land and his cattle (features critical in African social and political economic history) but also the African male's labour. Furthermore, the African man was subjected to corporal punishment at the work place (Moyo et al, 2000: 191).³³³ All this cumulatively had an effect on African men's sense of identity.

³³⁰To glean more on cultural inheritance where women and their children are victims of unfair treatment by the would-be male guardian and relatives of the deceased husband, who sometimes are only after the estate of the deceased and not the widow and her children's welfare, see Schmammann (2000: 75-75). *Neria* (1992) is a locally produced Zimbabwean feminist-inspired feature film which showcases a widow's abuse by a brother-in-law but is redeemed by seeking legal recourse to uphold her rights to the estate.

³³¹In the FTLRP, of the group who were allocated A1 Farms, about 18% were women, while a mere 12% were included in the A2 scheme. This reflects that despite the state's 20% quota for them it is evident that ~~women's~~ land rights are still marginalised in both models" (Chingarande, 2009: 289). This imbalance is being challenged by organisations like the Women Land Lobby Group (WLLG) and Women and Land in Zimbabwe (WLZ), Women Farmers Associations (WFA) and Woman of Zimbabwe Association (WOZA) among many (see Chingarande, 2009).

³³²Interview with Robert Makoni, 26 April 2010, Chinhoyi.

³³³Forced labour in both Matebeleland and Mashonaland was the norm beginning in the early 1890s, as European settlers would often raid natives before dawn and compel them to work under feudal conditions

Arguably, by labelling himself as and also desiring to be ‘son of the soil’, the African male was attempting to reclaim his masculinity. *Ploughman*, one might thus argue, can be seen in light of this impetus. Not only speaking of an ambition to restore ownership of the land, the sculpture’s representation of a *male* peasant farmer specifically (and despite the fact that it is primarily women who work the land in contemporary Zimbabwe) might also be interpreted as tied into a drive to resist an emasculation associated with colonial rule.

FTLRP and new meanings of the *Ploughman*

With the attainment of majority rule in 1980, the alienation of ancestral land by colonialism remained in collective memory. This is seen in the emotions stirred by war veterans and the state every time the land and ‘child of the soil’ issues are mentioned (see Chitando, 1998:56). This might be understood in light of the point by Jordan that “any landscape of memory also exists with a shadow landscape of forgetting” (Jordan cited in Saunders, 2010: 442).³³⁴ According to Saunders, “when the shadow landscapes resist amnesia [...] they may become sites of conflict” (Saunders, 2010: 442). One might see Zimbabwe’s violent invasions of formerly White-owned LSCFs between 1999 and 2002 – ones conducted by mostly peasants, war veterans, jobless urbanites and school leavers (see Moyo and Yeros 2005; Chitiyo, 2003; Scoones et al, 2010) – in light of this idea that there are collective memory ‘shadow landscapes’ in the country. One might argue that these ‘shadow landscapes of memory’ endured for years in the sense that the populace ‘resisted’ forgetting land injustices, and the result was that White-owned farmlands, the LSCFs, became “sites of conflict” (Saunders, 2010: 442) associated with the Third Chimurenga and the resultant FTLRP.

(Palmer, 1977). Traditional leadership was not spared either. Robert Palmer writes: “Not only was there frequent recourse to the *sjambok* or *chikoti*, the hide whip, both by employers and the young inexperienced Native Commissioners [...] many employers were not above picking quarrels with their workers towards the end of the month, with the predictable, and intended, result that workers fled their employment unpaid. Severe punishments were also handed out to recalcitrants; one headman who failed to deliver the required quota of labourers was given fifty lashes, fined six goats and three herd of cattle, and had his rifle confiscated” (Palmer, 1977: 43). See also Van Onselen (1976).

³³⁴Saunders cites an article by Jordan (2005) which explores how officially chosen memorial sites of resistance and persecution during Nazi-German changed after the war. She suggests that memorial content, like political and official means through which landscapes of memory are enacted and presented as collective memory by states (in this instance Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic), inasmuch as this bears elements of continuity, it also reveals change over time. According to Jordan (2005) change not only registers in form and content as designated by state but also in the rapport involving the nation, its state and whatever items are given on the city’s landscape as official symbols of a past for the country.

Even when the portrayal of the human figure in the *Ploughman* sculpture carries elements of awkwardness in its proportions, this does not affect the sculpture's significations of the peasant farmer. However, the connotations in *Ploughman* have become complex and multi-layered in the sense that, from 1999 to the period after the FTLRP of 2002, the 'farmer' in Zimbabwe has become a persona with numerous potential identities. The 'peasant' presently is not only the *bona fide* peasant who always worked the communal land before independence and a number of years thereafter. The 'peasant' also now comprises the demobilised war-veteran-cum-peasant, the retrenched worker-turned-peasant, the unemployed school leaver and the former farm worker, as they now all own and work their own A1 farms.³³⁵ Then there is a host of those who go by the name of 'new farmer'. These include the civil servants (the army and police included), the urban worker, the indigenous business person and the politicians who farm A2 farms.³³⁶

Conclusion

The *Ploughman* as a sculpture-in-architecture that embellishes Hurudza House, a building known for supporting communal and small scale agriculture in Zimbabwe, is layered with meanings that derive from colonial and postcolonial histories and experiences. The sculpture, as a socio-semiotic sign, is imbued with meanings to do with the idea of the 'child of the soil' and the resonances and associations of this construct in light of struggles associated with land in Zimbabwe.

The sculpture, in its depiction of the 'child of the soil', prompts both surface and deeper readings. These readings derive from historical and social contexts of land use and ownership which are influenced by a patrilineal culture that was promoted by a settler/colonial wage economy, systematically alienating African men from the land while simultaneously disempowering African women. Thus the *Ploughman's* significations of 'child of the soil' continue to assume new socially constructed meanings for as long as events relating to the

³³⁵Interview with Robert Makoni, 26 April 2010, Chinhoyi.

³³⁶In the FTLRP the concept of 'property rights', law and land tenure ceased forthwith as occupation translated to ownership until a 'permit' was issued in the case of the A1 scheme and a 'lease tenure' certificate for the A2 scheme. The A1 scheme sought to quickly relieve pressure from communal lands where as A2 farmers had to apply for state land. The latter scheme was meant primarily to set up African commercial farmers on larger farm lands. These were mostly allocated to city dwellers (Chitiyo, 2003: 164, African Institute for Agrarian Studies Document, 2009: 28) National statistics indicate that about 15% of former farm workers were resettled in the A1 scheme while some repatriated themselves or simply engaged themselves as casual workers in the resettlement schemes (see Chambati and Magaramombe, 2009: 225).

land question in Zimbabwe keep unfolding. After the FTLRP, the *Ploughman*'s appropriation of 'child of the soil' came to connote a complex and bloated 'peasantry' that took in school leavers, former farm workers, war veterans, civil servants and other working urban dwellers who took to farming on A1 and A2 land.

Despite displaying some awkward proportions and being presented on a five-metre pedestal, the *Ploughman* captures well the process of movement in its imitation of a peasant farmer engaged in ploughing. In this depiction of the peasant farmer, coupled with the mythical meanings associated with land use and ownership in Zimbabwe, the *Ploughman* sculpture seemingly assists in giving meaning to the architecture as well as the business of Hurudza House's Agribank.

CHAPTER SIX

Adam Madebe's *Looking into the future*: A controversy in public art

Introduction

Looking into the future is another of Adam Madebe's sculptures made from welded metal. Five metres in height, the work represents a nude male figure who, mid-step, raises his right hand to his forehead to shade his eyes while looking resolutely ahead (Figs. 108 to 110). The sculpture is welded together from small circular rusted metal pieces salvaged from Bulawayo's industrial site. A work commissioned with the assistance of Bulawayo's arm of the National Gallery of Zimbabwe (NGZ), it was installed in April 1985 in the Tower Block Offices garden of the Bulawayo City Council.³³⁷ The figure's nudity (Fig. 111) and the sculpture's position in public space received unprecedented attention from the public, sectors of whom called for the statue to be either 'dressed' or removed from public space. The sculpture was removed on 1 May 1985, just one month after its installation, in response to a ministerial order, and the sculpture then went into storage at Bulawayo's NGZ for close to nine years.³³⁸ In 1994, the sculpture was quietly installed in the courtyard of Bulawayo's NGZ's new premises at Douslin House (McCartney, 2001: 3) where it stood for 16 years until, on 31 August 2010, a second pronouncement from the state resulted in it being once again removed from public access (see Figs. 112 and 113).

This second banning was effected by the Secretary for Home Affairs, Melusi Matshiya, who quoted the Board of Censors, in terms of Sections 12(1) and (2), 13(1) and (2), and 14(3) of the Censorship and Entertainment Control Act. He asserted that: "The male statue showing genital organs standing at the opening in the Gallery [is] proof of [an] indecent nature and as such is prohibited from public exhibition" (Matshiya, 2010).³³⁹ In this chapter, I consider the implications of the sentiments expressed by the minister and others as I trace public debates

³³⁷The Bulawayo City Council offices, at the corner of Selbourne Avenue and Grey Street, are in the twelve-storey Tower Block building. On the ground level of this building is an open garden dotted with an array of rusty-looking scrap metal sculptures. These either stand on the ground or on plinths. It is in this garden that the sculpture by Madebe once stood. The sculpture was purchased from the artist for on the behalf of Bulawayo residents by C. H. Naake (Pvt) Ltd Company of Gweru, a city approximately 130km from Bulawayo.

³³⁸This was because the Bulawayo City Council had no storage space of its own away from public view (Interview with Voti Thebe, Bulawayo NGZ, April 2010).

³³⁹<http://www1.herald.co.zw/inside.aspx?sectid=1425&cat=1>

about the sculpture's commission and its first and second banning and subsequent removal from public view. I argue that the flawed process of commissioning the work and the resultant debates in the counter-public spheres partly contributed to the removal of the statue. I also contend that the Zimbabwean 'art world' should have taken greater cognisance of the fact that, since public art generally operates outside the gallery system (Senie, 2003), *Looking to the future* would be seen by a wider audience than that usual in galleries or museums, and that the 'art world' should have engaged more with the public who voiced their dissent. I posit that the artist might well have agreed to a request to 'dress' the statue if Bulawayo City Council had tasked the 'art world' to intervene before the minister censored the sculpture. I also argue that the two acts of forbidding the sculpture from public space were not without symbolic capital for central government. Therefore assessing *Looking into the future* in terms of the work, context and viewership will assist in exploring how public space in Zimbabwe was, and continues to be, a contested arena.

To develop these arguments, I begin by historically tracking the idea of the 'nude' and the 'naked' when used in regard to the body in the West - a construction which derives from classical Greece and Italian Renaissance art. In discussing notions of nudity and nakedness, I draw mostly, but not only, from the conceptions of Bonfante, (1989), Clark (1956) and Berger (1977). Their ideas shape the interpretative context for my analysis of a Zimbabwean public's reading of Madebe's sculpture. I then proceed to systematically look at the commission, installation and the various reactions to the sculpture by sections of the public, which included Bulawayo's counter-publics, the art world and the Bulawayo City Council. Thus I examine the reception of the sculpture by a widened public sphere before government's intervention. Finally, I discuss the first and second banning of *Looking into the future* by governmental agents and propose that the sculpture, as a source of contention in the public sphere, reflects the on-going struggles for power, influence, acceptance and symbolic cultural capital in Zimbabwean public life.

The 'naked' and the 'nude' in Western Art

The sudden unveiling of a male nude sculpture within the city of Bulawayo's Tower Block public garden was unlikely to go unnoticed, and unsurprisingly it sparked controversy based on nudity and nakedness within a public domain. The nude is a loaded subject in not only Africa but also the West. In an exhibition catalogue entitled *Nude in Contemporary Art*, Philbrick (1999: 18) observes:

The nude has embodied many things in the history of art in Western culture, from the Greek notion of the body asymmetry and balance representing the ideal upon which architectural order and proportion were based to surrealists' use of the body- primarily female –as the sight of desire, fear, and mystery (Philbrick, 1999: 18.)

Given that the 'nude' and the 'naked' tend to refer to "a body bereft of clothing", as Postle and Vaughan (1999: 109) put it, the division between them seem superficial. Yet, Postle and Vaughan (1999: 109) point out that, in the last 150 years a distinction between the two terms has been stubbornly upheld in Britain. When writing a 1910 treatise entitled "The naked and the nude" Sickert (cited by Postle and Vaughan, 1999: 109) lamented the causal intentions behind the insistence in differentiating the two terms. He argued that it was in fact directed at dignifying private lustful intentions. He wrote; "An inconsistent and prurient puritanism has succeeded in evolving an ideal which it seeks to dignify by calling it Nude, with a capital N, and placing it in opposition to the naked", implying that the term 'naked' should never again mean the same as 'nude' (Sickert cited by Postle and Vaughan, 1999: 109). The 'nude' began to symbolise elements that are to be extolled and thus associated with respectable intentions whereas nakedness had the stigma of disgrace or shame attached to it.

In her survey of the nude in Greece, Bonfante (1989: 546) observes that nakedness denoted poverty, shame, slavery and humiliation in the Old Testament. In most ancient cultures and in the Near East, nakedness implied defeat as was seen in the cases of prisoners of war who, in victory carnivals, would be paraded naked, while men slain in battle were stripped of their armour (Bonfante, 1989: 546). However, it was the Greeks who invented the concept of the nude in that they saw "beauty and pride of the male body, without cover or adornment", writes Bonfante (1989: 546). What Bonfante makes clear in her study is that accepting nudity did not just happen. In pre-history Greece male athletes, like their Roman male counter-parts

who have often put on shorts, wore a form of *perizoma* or *diazona* (loincloth) at Olympic Games (Bonfante, 1989: 547) and complete nudity then was, as with the barbarians, shameful. Nudity was initially acceptable only in religious practices. In religion, male nudes denoted gods, and fertility was symbolised by female goddesses and consequently even priests and women who served in temples did this in the nude (Bonfante, 1989: 545-6). Subsequently, when young men and young women performed rites of passage into manhood as “warriors or soldiers” and womanhood as “women for child-bearing and family” (Bonfante, 1989: 554), nudity in ritualism succeeded religious use. In classical Greece, male nudity became acceptable in a more general sense. Youths as athletes training to be citizen-soldiers did so in the nude primarily because male nudity now epitomised the beautiful and symmetrical balance of the body and it was argued that, even in death, the young male body retained its beauty unlike that of an old man (Bonfante, 1989: 556).³⁴⁰ As it evolved and became associated with culture, nudity gradually moved from the closed space of sacred worship in temples, to the public realm of civic society as a mass activity exclusively partaken of by males. But while nudity became a form of costume for males in Classical Greece, it remained shameful for women (Bonfante, 1989: 559). It is from this historical gender-typing, one might argue, that duality on the implied meaning of being without clothing was derived.

According to Kenneth Clark (1956: 3), the term ‘naked’ means being divested of clothing. He qualifies this explanation by postulating nakedness as an act which is associated with awkwardness and shame. This, Clark contrasts with the case of being ‘nude’ which he argues is based on a positive judgment. In his own words Clark advances that,

whereas to be naked is to be deprived of our clothes and the word implies some of the embarrassment which most of us feel in that condition. The word nude, on the other hand, carries, in educated usage, no uncomfortable overtone. The vague image it projects into the mind is not of a huddled and defenceless body, but of a balanced, prosperous and confident body: the body re-formed (Clark, 1956: 1).

From here Clark argues that this distinction makes the nude “a form of art” and not simply “the subject of art” and he maintains that this has seen the nude enduring as a genre for centuries (Clark, 1956: 2). Influencing the world’s greatest works of art, even with the advent

³⁴⁰For instance in a bid to deter female suicides in the city of Miletus a decree was passed that any females who killed themselves would be carried to their graves naked. “So the maidens ceased to seek a voluntary death, deterred by mere shame of so disgraceful a burial” according to Gell (in Bonfante 1989:559).

of abstraction, the nude has sustained its presence in academia and as an expression of the mastery of the human form (Clark, 1956: 2).

What stands out in Clark's analysis of classical Greece is that he sees the youthful male body as the ideal (Clark, 1956: 34). Clark does not, however, view the female body in the same terms, indicating that it was mostly those that were ~~draped~~ that were considered representative of feminine beauty (Clark, 1956: 71). It is implied that, culturally, in Classical and Hellenistic Greece a woman without clothes would be regarded as *naked*. Instances where the idealised beauty of the female nude appeared without drapery were mostly in Italian Renaissance paintings. Thus the male nude as youthful, heroic, divine and athletic, better represented symmetrical balance of the ideal form or ideal art than did the female figure. For drawing the attributes of the male from the female body, Clark is seen as establishing a male *'gaze'* and duality most common in western philosophy that is ingrained with patriarchy.³⁴¹

The dialogue between *'nudity'* and *'nakedness'* assumes another dimension when it is taken on by Berger (1977: 53). Berger shares Clark's observation that a nude is not the starting point in a painting but a way of seeing made successful in painting. For him ~~to~~ be naked is to be oneself", whereas ~~to~~ be nude" implies ~~being~~ seen as naked by others" (Berger, 1977: 54). In essence, Berger sees the undressed body as an object when it is converted to a nude. Whereas nakedness would disclose itself, nudity ~~is~~ placed on display" (Berger, 1977: 53). Essentially, to be naked is to be shown without disguise whereas nudity becomes ~~a~~ form of dress" (Berger 1977: 54) or a ~~costume~~" (Bonfante, 1989: 554). Effectively, Berger inverts the terms naked and the nude, making nakedness positive and nudity negative but retaining the dichotomous relation between the two.

Writing on the nude in contemporary art, McCarthy (1999: 53) has acknowledged that the nude has not served only as a topic or theme in Western art but also as a metaphor. Thus,

³⁴¹Lynda Nead notes that Clark sets forth an opposing binary in making nude the *'clothed'* body in art while its *'other'* in naked is always there. Notably, dualism is common in Western philosophy binarised models and in this case Nead (1992: 14) sees Clark as broadening on the mind/body model. In summary this dualism is also based on other dualisms like; culture/nature; reason/passion; subject/object; mind linked to culture/ reason and subject and the body linked to nature, passion and objecthood. In the binaries, highly regarded values of the mind assume masculine characterisation while those perceived as embodying lesser and or negative values assume femininity. Implicitly, the *'naked'* in Clark becomes inferior and is ascribed to the female body unlike the absolute art form of *'nude'* symbolising an elevated male which becomes associated with the mind (see Nead, 1992: 14).

we have to ask whether any given nude represents, a specific person, humanity in general, or perhaps an emotion or abstraction. Depending on the additional information with which artists surround it with, the nude can stand for the beautiful, the grotesque, desire or repulsion, the embodied or the external, or the concrete or the abstract. How we read specific nudes will thus depend on the historical examples we identify as well as the subjects they illustrate (McCarthy 1999: 53).

Essentially, it is implied that the reading of the nude should be framed within a given culture. Applied to the topic under exploration here, McCarthy's comment emphasises that it becomes essential to take cognisance of the socio-cultural context in which *Looking into the future* was produced in order to arrive at an interpretation about what nudity/lack of dress in that artwork might connote or imply.

The commission of the sculpture and the birth of controversy

In 1985, Mayor Enos Mdlongwa headed a largely PF-ZAPU City Council, while Mrs Clarks was the Director of the Bulawayo NGZ and Marjory Locke was the curator. The City of Bulawayo wanted "a large artwork suitable for display in the garden in front of the Tower Block offices."³⁴² The responsibility of tendering was given to Bulawayo NGZ. The two institutions set up an organising committee led by Stephen Williams³⁴³ and charged it to co-ordinate the competition. The committee therefore invited artwork for the Tower Block by placing adverts in the local press and promising to give three prizes for the sculptures in any media presented by any artist.³⁴⁴ The sculptures dotted in the Tower Block garden today appear to imply that the impetus for a sculpture in this area was to 'beautify' the Tower Block and the City of Bulawayo. The committee also appointed a three-person panel of judges: these were Jill Kaufman, a well-known and respected Zimbabwean sculptor, Gordon Metz, curator of the National Museum and Art Gallery of Botswana, and L.C. Shah, Bulawayo's Principal Architect (*The Chronicle*, 1 April 1985). Metz's presence as an outsider on the panel was envisaged as a means of moderating the adjudication process and ensuring that it was transparent.

³⁴²Interview with Voti Thebe, April 2010, NGZ, Bulawayo.

³⁴³He was the manager of Mzilikazi Art and Craft Centre, a vocational training centre in visual art situated in Bulawayo, founded in 1963 and named after the founder of the Ndebele state in 1838. The centre has trained most of Zimbabwe's well-known artists, of which Adam Madebe is one.

³⁴⁴Interview with Adam Madebe, 3 April, 2010, Krugersdorp, South Africa.

Eleven entries were received and, in March 1985, the first prize and commission was awarded to Adam Madebe for his sculpture, *Looking into the future*. Although selected by the art circles who had now commissioned it, this acceptance did not extend to public support for the sculpture. Rather, the triumvirate group - comprised of the organising committee, the Bulawayo NGZ and some members of the City Council - presided over the commission and selection of public sculptures for the good of the Bulawayo public. The process of commission completely excluded the views of the ordinary people of Bulawayo and their subaltern publics. This therefore compromised the competition.

While it is challenging to involve all interested parties meaningfully when commissioning public art, it is another thing not to involve sections of the public completely. Thus when the commission of Bulawayo public sculptures (*Looking into the future* included) for the Tower Block failed to involve the local citizenry in any way; it became synonymous with imposing the sculptures on them. After all, Bulawayo is inhabited by people of various cultural backgrounds and beliefs and not involving them created fertile ground for the unforeseen problems that would later haunt *Looking into the future*. Members of the public will interact with artwork in public spaces that they use. The unforeseen nature of such interaction leads Senie (2003) to claim that “there is no public or community in general for public art specifically”. She goes on to suggest that there are two categories of public art audience: those who experience the artwork every day and those who hear and read about it in the media once the artwork “become[s] famous or infamous” (Senie, 2003). It is the “immediate audience - those who pass it sporadically or on a daily basis” (Senie, 2003) at Tower Block gardens whose opinion ought to have been sought regarding the intended public art commission. Representatives from Bulawayo suburbs and civic groups could have been asked to bring forward their expectations for a public sculpture to be placed in the Tower Block gardens. Ideas from these public groups could have been used to craft guidelines for participation in the public sculpture competition (Sharp, 2007). Ultimately, the decision about which sculpture won the commission would still have rested with the three judges. Involving the public audience would not necessarily have mollified public opinion and debate upon the installation of the sculpture, but such a gesture would have set a more amicable tone. As Sharp et al (2005: 1006) point out: “the processes in which discussion and deliberation amongst multiple groups and communities comprising the city afford equal status to each and that debate becomes the means of exposing and being more responsive to difference.”

Conceivably, if public groups had been brought into the commissioning process, the storm of controversy that followed its installation, outlined below, could have been avoided.

Seeing the sculpture through the eyes of the public art audience.

The tale that Madebe's sculpture tells, as Sharp et al (2005: 1001) observes, ~~is~~ one repeated elsewhere, that public art can be read in different ways and that its uses to beautify the city or celebrate its re-imagineering do not necessarily enjoy universal consensus". Issues of preference and taste common to both gallery and outdoor public art suddenly assume prominence when it comes to the latter. In the case of *Looking into the future*, the statue's exposed male genitalia (Fig.111) quickly provoked opinions about nudity and nakedness, taste and acceptability and the local press took notice. This, as Sharp et al (2005: 1001) put it, ~~became~~ magnified precisely because of its visibility" at the Tower Block gardens. Apart from receiving letters from the general public, *The Chronicle* newspaper courted public opinion by conducting a random survey for a week on the streets of Bulawayo. The survey suggests that the majority of supporters for the statue were women but it does not give the statistics to substantiate the claim nor does the newspaper speculate on the reasons. It announced:

An interesting feature of the controversy about the statue at the Municipal Tower Block garden is that the majority of people who support the City Council to put it there are women. Of the 22 people interviewed in *The Chronicle* survey, six opposed retaining the statue, 12 were in favour and four said they would have no objection if the statue was displayed in a gallery or had its private parts covered. The majority of letters received by *The Chronicle* in support of retaining the sculpture were also from women (*The Chronicle*, 27 April 1985).

According to the newspaper survey, most women accused men opposed to Madebe's sculpture of double standards. They argued that the very same men would have flocked to view the statue without saying anything against it if it had been a female nude (*The Chronicle*, 27 April 1985). *The Chronicle* article quoted the spokeswoman for the Women of Zimbabwe Association as saying that, as women, they were not going to hide their children under their dresses so as to prevent them from being exposed to the outside world and its varied ideas. Another woman surveyed, Mazvita Hove, remarked that the statue was not erotic in any way and it could not therefore corrupt anyone's mind. She underscored the fact

that it was just a statue and it would not “leap up and molest anyone” (*The Chronicle*, 27 April 1985). This view was shared by the artist, Adam Madebe, who underlined the fact that, as human beings, we are all aware of what an undressed human body looks like. At the same time, he reasoned, a nude as an artwork is completely different from an actual naked man in public (*The Chronicle*, 27 April 1985). At the same time, Madebe argued that as an artwork the nude statue was supposed to be enjoyed on its own terms.³⁴⁵ Thus Madebe’s conception of nudity and nakedness, would seem to fit into Clark’s (1956) postulations discussed earlier, especially when one notes that the artist also brings in the issue of ‘embarrassment’ associated with nakedness in public.

Reflecting on the sculpture’s apparent reception by most women, Madebe was not surprised that they were neither offended nor embarrassed by his sculpture.³⁴⁶ His logic was that “women know a man’s body in and out, from their experience of caring for him as a baby”.³⁴⁷ For the men surveyed by *The Chronicle*, what was offensive about the sculpture was the idea of male genitals in public view and this to them probably implied nakedness in Clark’s (1956) conception of the term. Males, it should also be noted, tended to invoke conceptions of ‘culture’ to support their arguments. Thus, for example, Mr Fred Waniwa, a teacher and a Vice Chairperson of ZANU-PF in Matebeleland North³⁴⁸ found the statue to be abhorrent because it was ostensibly totally opposed to the cultural values of indigenous people, according to *The Chronicle* of 27 April 1985. Waniwa implored the City Council to remove the sculpture from public view in preparation for the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair (ZITF) as he felt that the sculpture would be an embarrassment to dignitaries like the President and the Prime Minister³⁴⁹ who would pass by the Tower Block. He proceeded to attack the site of the sculpture in the public garden, indicating that, while pupils discussed

³⁴⁵Interview with Adam Madebe, 3 April 2010, Krugersdorp, South Africa.

³⁴⁶While the majority of surveyed women in Bulawayo supported the retention of *Looking into the future* at Tower Block garden unconditionally, Mrs Loveness Madebe, wife to the artist thought otherwise, according to *The Chronicle* of 27 April 1985. She found the statue embarrassing and felt that it should have been covered strategically. Mrs Madebe admitted knowing that her husband was working on a sculpture but only saw it when it was completed. She is, arguably, a woman who has her own views about her husband’s artworks. Taking her and others’ opinions into account gives weight to the arguments advanced by Negt and Kluge (1981) and Fraser (1990) for the recognition of counter discourse that comes from counter publics of subordinated social groups in society. In this instance, it is that coming from women.

³⁴⁷Interview with Adam Madebe, 3 April 2010, Krugersdorp, South Africa.

³⁴⁸Matebeleland was administratively one province after independence, but for the purposes of party politics in the mid 1990s it was divided into Matebeleland North and Matebeleland South. This division continues today.

³⁴⁹Zimbabwe then had a titular Head of state, the late President Canaan Sodindo Banana, and an executive Prime Minister, Robert Gabriel Mugabe. Since attaining independence in 1980, the ZITF has always been officially opened by an African Head of state (except for once in 2005 when President Mugabe himself performed the ceremony).

reproductive organs in subjects like anatomy and biology, this was done in the confines of a special environment, the classroom (*The Chronicle*, 27 April 1985). Waniwa's objections to the sculpture were thus motivated by his understanding of cultural indecency; what he objected to was not Madebe's statue in and of itself, but rather its location in a public space. His analogy to biology lessons in the classroom could be taken to mean that placing the undressed figure in the public domain was indeed imposing "nudity" onto it, if one takes Berger's (1977: 53) conception where nudity is to be placed on display. Thus Mr Waniwa most likely saw it as taking away the dignity of being *oneself*.

A different view was expressed by Sam Moyo, the secretary of Bulawayo United Residents' Association, albeit one that was also rooted in conceptions of appropriateness to Africa and its cultural traditions. He dismissed the idea that there had historically been a tradition of concealing male genitals in local cultures (*The Chronicle*, 27 April 1985). He argued that the cultural history of Zimbabweans showed that for a long time people wore animal skins: while men wore *mwando* (a sort of sheath that was used to protect the tip of the penis: see Fig. 72) most of the body was exposed and the genitals were in view (*The Chronicle*, 27 April 1985). This assertion, however, was dismissed by others, such as Mr Dabga, a former artist and now a manager of TM Hypermarket in the city. He argued that, while it had been a norm to show women's breasts,³⁵⁰ there had never been a time in African cultural history when the exposing of genitalia had been accepted (*The Chronicle*, 27 April 1985). Mr Dabga recognised Madebe's prowess as an artist but focused his objections to the sculpture by referring to the timing of the sculpture's installation. He felt that it was necessary to take into account the fact that Zimbabwe was in a transitional period and observed that not all of its people were artists (*The Chronicle*, 27 April 1985). By implication, he was acknowledging that the public audience for the sculpture and the participants in the controversies raging about it were drawn from a citizenry of diverse opinions and that this diversity materially influenced the reception of a public artwork, in this specific case, negatively. The fact that Mr Dabga observed that not all people were artists could also be understood to imply that the audience for *Looking into the future* was not sophisticated enough to understand and appreciate the sculpture's nudity.

³⁵⁰Note that public showing of a woman's breasts in Namibia is culturally unacceptable, according to Fairweather (2006).

Just as not everyone in society is not an artist, neither is everyone destined to understand artwork, be it in a gallery or public space. Madebe believes that if he had to court public opinion, his creativity would be compromised.³⁵¹ While he anticipated that the sculpture would generate controversy, he insists that it was misinterpreted:

I would say that from [about] two thirds to three quarters of the public approved of the work. This [includes] the different age groups, especially the traditionalists – the custodians of our culture, and old people [...] were happy with it [...]. Those who complained said that [the sculpture] was not from our African culture. Probably they did not experience that culture. The grown-ups were comfortable with it; they [saw] how generations were growing and changing. It's the middle age group of about 25 to 40 years [that did not agree]. I know what worried them; the sculpture is called *Young man looking into the future* [...] a young man with nothing, but then, the sculpture was a big sculpture.³⁵²

Madebe is suggesting that, given the scale of his sculpture, males could not see that it depicted a young man or youth, and they tended to miss the fact that its promise of better things to come is normally associated with the optimism of youth. Rather, all they could see was a huge man divested of clothing within the public sphere. Perhaps most of the male audience reacted negatively because, as Michael Warner (2002: 24) observes, “men often feel their masculinity challenged when their bodies are on display”.³⁵³ It is possible that the roles

³⁵¹Interview with Adam Madebe, 3 April 2010, Krugersdorp, South Africa.

³⁵²Interview with Adam Madebe, 3 April 2010, Krugersdorp, South Africa.

³⁵³This observation by Warner would appear to be pertinent in a Southern African context. For example, in May 2012, South African artist, Brett Murray's painting *The Spear* (2012), featuring President Jacob Zuma in a Lenin-like pose with his penis exposed, sparked controversy and mass protests. *The Spear* painting was defaced soon after it was exhibited at the Goodman Gallery, Johannesburg, and a South African newspaper had to remove an online image of the painting from its website after receiving threats from the ruling African National Congress party, according to Erin Conway-Smith (2012). *The Spear* led to a national debate on art and censorship, race, dignity and culture with the Film and Publication Board imposing a no under 16 rating for viewers of the painting, which it later removed after a tribunal ruling. Referring to the painting, President Zuma is reported to have said, “I thought it was rather vulgar,” (Zuma, 2012). On a different but related case, an article by Brenda Schmahmann on the American artist Tom Wesselmann, which had been accepted for publication by the University of South Africa (UNISA)'s art journal *De Arte* in 1986, was censored while on line for lay-out in the production department (Ivor Powell, 1986: 23). This delay affected the journal's publication. A man in the production department took exception to the fact that the article discussed artwork that represented the male phallus. The university rector, Professor Theo Van Vijk, ultimately withdrew the article purportedly to “protect” the university's image (Powell, 1986:23). These men felt disturbed by the image of an erect penis in Tom Wesselmann's *Bedroom Number 18* (1970) (Schmahmann, 1989: 271). Yet Wesselmann also represented women in suggestive poses and with exposed genitalia, and these works were not considered disturbing enough to warrant censorship. As Powell (1986: 23) highlighted, such censorship was despite the knowledge that *De arte*, and other journals like it, are specialist periodicals with a readership that is not likely to have found the images morally offensive or sexually arousing. Therefore such publications are not to be compared with non-academic pornographic magazines readily available in bookshops. Nonetheless, the reason given for censoring the article was the protection of the youth against inappropriate imagery (Powell, 1986).

of the ‘viewer and the viewed’ unsettles most men when they view an image of another male in the nude: they may perhaps feel that their manliness is being undermined and experience a strong urge to defend it. In a study of how heterosexual men and women respond to and discuss opposite and same-sex nude images, Eck (2003: 706) concludes that “because men are used to being [in] the subject [position] in the viewer-viewed relationship, they reactively construct a hypermasculine heterosexuality when the viewed object is male”. Drawing from the above, the young man in the sculpture by Madebe evinces, arguably, an aura of the everyday that may have led men to identify with it and to feel threatened by that verisimilitude.

Madebe explains his choice to make the male figure nude by emphasising both the common denominator of nudity and a literal rendition of every man starting from nothing and anticipating much:

Young man looking into the future shows a young man with nothing [...]. My artwork depicted a lot of different things; education wise, farmers, the working class, even the politicians - everyone looks into one’s future. Eventually, that guy [referring to the sculpture] would buy a shirt and trouser, a bicycle, a house. He would get married and have kids. He would prosper.³⁵⁴

The sculpture’s title was ‘shortened’ by the press to just *Looking into the future*, omitting the words ‘young man’, perhaps in a bid to mollify its critics.

Due to the influence of patriarchal views entrenched and expressed as orthodox Christian fundamentalism, showing male genitals in art can be seen as culturally offensive in some parts of southern Africa. In his bid to understand the impact that religious teachings have on people, Spiro (in Schudson 1989: 172) formulated a five stage hierarchical effects model. In the lowest, most people learn about an ideological concept only very superficially, whether through formal teaching or gossip, but at the next level they glean understanding of an aspect of the meaning of that concept through a text or explanation by a key informant. At a third level people believe the concept to be true and right, while at a fourth it informs how they organise their lives – that is, their behaviour becomes contingent upon what they believe in. In the highest and fifth level, they internalise the belief such that it is not only an aspect of

³⁵⁴Interview with Adam Madebe, 3 April 2010, Krugersdorp, South Africa.

their cognitive system but also of their motivational system, and as a result it actively directs and ~~instigates~~ their behaviour” (Spiro cited in Schudson 1989: 172). I would argue that the fifth level in this concept conveys some sense of how ideas about the shamefulness of male nudity is a deeply rooted understanding amongst Africans who hold conservative Christian values and one which motivates their behaviour and responses.

Court observes how people in conservative African communities may also not necessarily distinguish a *representation* of a naked body from *actual* nudity, and how this may elicit a morally outraged response:

Nudity in art is problematic in many eastern and central African countries. Artists and society are frequently at odds on this issue, and the artist sometimes takes the offensive. Portrayals of nudes tend to be taken literally when people have little experience with visual or optical representation. The objection that is most often stated, however, is made on moral grounds: the nude figure is an affront to communal ethnic and conservative Christian traditions (Court, 1992: 47).

While Court’s commentary is in regard to central and eastern Africa, it is also applicable to Zimbabwe. The attitude about which she is speaking may be seen, for example, in Reverend Stephen Manguni’s objections to the sculpture. He saw it as an obscene object that should not have been displayed in a public space (*The Chronicle*, 27 April 1985). The Reverend professed that he would have felt the same if it were a female nude: ~~“If~~ we allow this statue to remain [...] next time the artist will bring in a woman, unless we take a stand” (*The Chronicle*, 27 April 1985). The inference to be drawn here is that the audience must register their dissent or risk the public arena being host to countless nudes by unscrupulous artists whose work will affect the moral stability of the community.

The banning of the sculpture and its ramifications.

1985, The first ban

Avowed concerns about immorality mask the reality that the banning and removal of the statue was politically motivated. The political struggles in Bulawayo, whose City Council was wholly controlled by PF-ZAPU, were brought to the fore by controversies that *Looking into the future* had inadvertently presented.

The lack of response to the brewing controversy about Madebe's sculpture by the PF-ZAPU-controlled Bulawayo City Council arguably provided the opportunity for the ZANU-PF Minister of Local Government, Enos Chikowore, to intervene and order the removal of the sculpture at a press conference at the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair grounds in Bulawayo. The Minister made it known that he had not talked to the City Council but declared that he had received overwhelming written and verbal complaints from ~~disgusted~~ members of the public who wanted the statue removed (*The Chronicle*, 2 May 1985). He had waited until he had visited the location of the statue accompanied by the Governor and had listened to remarks of ~~utter disgust~~ voiced by passers-by (*The Chronicle*, 2 May 1985). The claims to be interested in *'upholding morality'* that some observers dismissed as politically self-serving are demonstrably relied upon by the ZANU-PF Minister of Local Government in his speech to give authority to his actions:

My immediate reaction, therefore, cannot be different from the popular views that the statue is nothing more than a personification of permissiveness, corruption and perversion of Zimbabwean culture [...] the Bulawayo City Council may have its reasons for constructing that monumental and ghastly statue [...] but whatever their reasons and motives, they seem to be outweighed by the outrage expressed by the people of Bulawayo. [...]. It's instructive to note here and now, that Zimbabwe upholds the dignity, decency and preservation of culture. It's too early and unthinkable to attempt to pervert the sacredness of our culture as such. I would like to appeal to the Bulawayo City Council to remove the two sculptures as soon as is possible before I unfold my machinery to do that exercise for them. (*The Chronicle*, 2 May 1985).³⁵⁵

³⁵⁵The other statue being referred to and was seen as less offensive was Voti Thebe's concrete cast which depicted a man and a woman seated on a garden bench, the woman had one of her breasts exposed and it was entitled *'When will I see you again?'* It got broken during the process of removal by the minister's *'machinery'*

In demonstrating his political authority, the Minister made a press statement without issuing an official memorandum to the City Council and followed this up by offering to lease his own machinery to remove the sculpture from Tower Block Building into the safe hands of the Bulawayo NGZ. This goes against public administration etiquette in a liberal democracy. The Mayor of Bulawayo, Councillor Enos Mdlongwa, told *The Chronicle* of 3 May 1985 that he only learnt of the minister's statement from the press. Thus *Looking into the future's* envisaged popularity designed to enhance the city centre and in the process cultivate recognition for the Bulawayo City Council achieved the opposite effect: the figure's nudity provoked public moral outrage which was exploited by central governmental agents to undermine the authority of a city council that was run by their political opponents. This may be seen as an enactment of what Bourdieu (1989: 23) calls "symbolic power":

Symbolic power has to be based on the possession of symbolic capital [...] to impose upon other minds a vision, old or new, of social divisions depends on the social authority acquired in previous struggles. Symbolic capital is credit; it is the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition [...]. Symbolic power is the power to make things with words (Bourdieu, 1989: 23).

The minister's speech and the ban of Madebe's statue wrestled symbolic capital away from the PF-ZAPU led Bulawayo City Council. The press release and the publicity worked cumulatively in favour of the minister of local government. It also had consequences for sections of Bulawayo's social groups which were already in battle with the local authority, rather than those who were solely opposed to Madebe's sculpture.

Commenting on the ministerial stance, the chairman of the National Arts Foundation, John Mapondera, said that artists were supposed to offer a mirror image of society which took full account of national history and the sacrifice people's heroes had made for the country to be what it was (*The Chronicle*, 3 May, 1985). It may be inferred that Mr Mapondera was advocating for a social-realist sculpture of the type common in the communist bloc, as discussed in Chapter Two regarding the NHA monument, ones which celebrated the deeds of leaders such as Lenin, Stalin, Kim Ill Sung and Moa Zedong. Considering the fact that these

and was thus lost as an artwork, according to the interview with Voti Thebe conducted at NGZ in Bulawayo on 15 April 2010.

were the early years after independence, his comments can be read as saying that Madebe's work had nothing *patriotic* about it. Mapondera asserted that once an artwork was put before the public, it became a public statement and a mode of public behaviour, which could be rejected if the public found it offensive (*The Chronicle*, 3 May 1985). He implored artists to learn from the controversy that, while art could be *avant garde*, it had to be undertaken with sensitivity to the norms of society.

Pathisa Nyathi, ethno-historian on Ndebele culture, sees the removal as politically motivated. He considers the claims that to remove it was to uphold public morality as hypocritical, expedient and self-serving:

It's a piece of art which was a victim of politics, because it was removed in 1985. A beautiful piece which I think is visionary, that is what we need [...]. The quarrel then was [the result of an impetus to] *apply morality* [his emphasis] by people who are not qualified to apply standards of morality. What we saw on TV - they say family viewing, family television [...] But we saw Pius Ncube do [compromising] things on television. So we are not qualified to talk about morality. No, it's politics. This is why you find this public art you are talking about [...] it's a victim of politics. We give too much emphasis to politics, and then art as a result suffers.³⁵⁶

Another Bulawayo resident corroborates Nyathi's opinion:

It appears the ruling party, ZANU-PF, has always wanted to exercise its authority over the city; because the banning of that naked sculpture was taken without consulting the local authority who were its owners [...] That council was dominated and run by councillors from PF-ZAPU and it was the only one in the country as the rest of the cities were ZANU-PF run. Bulawayo City Council was therefore seen as a political affront and opponent by a ZANU-PF led government.³⁵⁷

The survey conducted by *The Chronicle* on the views of the Bulawayo citizens did not report from PF-ZAPU Matebeleland North party representatives, only soliciting views from a ZANU-PF's Matebeleland North Vice-Chairperson. This presents the government minister in

³⁵⁶Interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 13 April 2010, Bulawayo. Pius Ncube was a Roman Catholic Arch-Bishop and fiery critic of President Mugabe. He resigned after being filmed by state agents in compromising acts with a woman and the clip became a political tool to silence him as it was splashed on prime-time viewing television on ZBC-TV.

³⁵⁷Interview with Anonymous, 23 April, 2010, Bulawayo.

a more favourable light. Some members of the public saw this as a calculated political move. The sculpture can therefore be interpreted as a victim of political machinations between supporters of ZANU-PF and those of PF-ZAPU.

The order to proscribe was not issued before attempts were made to engage in dialogue with the artist. Madebe would not, however, compromise. When asked if he would ‘dress’ the statue, he refused. Voti Thebe, the current Acting Director of the Bulawayo NGZ who was a general hand at the gallery when the statue was first banned in 1985, recalls:

I remember Adam Madebe’s piece [and when] we were told that either we remove that piece or we [talk to] the artist to cover the sculpture [its] nudity. As the gallery [we] did that; [we] asked the artist to cover the nudity. [But] the Artist said, –No! That is the piece I have done [and] if I [had intended] to cover it I would have covered it. Its either you take it [as it is] or you leave it”.³⁵⁸

Madebe insisted that his work –was not about people without clothes; my subject was looking into the future”.³⁵⁹ Godfrey Moyo, a journalist from *The Chronicle*, offered to mediate between Madebe and the government minister but Madebe rebuffed this overture. Madebe remembers that –Moyo asked me if I would like to meet Minister Chikowore for a dialogue so that he could arrange it. I turned him down because that was how I wanted my work, I did not want to compromise anything”.³⁶⁰

Madebe’s hard-line position unfortunately overlooked how once an artwork is brought before an audience, especially a public artwork intended for a broad-based reception, the artist ceases to have sole possession of how it may be read. As such, public art is –not just produced by artists, but is reproduced by viewers and audiences” (Borden and Rendell, 2002: 278) too. Madebe never engaged with the public in an attempt to engage in dialogue about possible ways of understanding his work and this created a scenario in which understandings of the sculpture could be focused exclusively or overwhelmingly on its nudity.

Madebe’s reluctance to alter his sculpture may have been bolstered by the support and recognition that he and his art had received from the award and its attendant acclaim bestowed upon them both by the Zimbabwean art world. The publicity that accompanied the

³⁵⁸Interview with Voti Thebe, 15 April 2010, NGZ, Bulawayo.

³⁵⁹Interview with Adam Madebe, 3 April 2010, Krugersdorp, South Africa.

³⁶⁰Interview with Adam Madebe, 3 April 2010, Krugersdorp, South Africa.

competition and unveiling of the sculpture may also have been seen by Madebe as affirmation of his work. He may have felt that criticism of his work from other sections of the public, especially those unfamiliar with art, was not worth responding to. Arguably, he misunderstood how the outlook of the audience for a sculpture in a public space differs to that of habitual gallery visitors. Thus, it can be argued that Madebe's stance was modernist in orientation. Madebe could have mediated in the controversy by appearing at organised community meetings and giving public lectures about his art. Bulawayo City council and the Bulawayo NGZ could have assisted in the organisation of such exercises. In the process the press could have joined in to give these forums publicity. With time, perhaps *Looking into the future* could have become acceptable and even popular.³⁶¹ The risk that Madebe would not take could have probably helped his sculpture. Albert Elsen (1989: 295) observes that, "Public acceptance of modern sculpture even of the highest quality has always involved risk for the artists, but recent history has taught that the public's education, including that by commissioners and artists, helps to reduce those risks".

In the unlikely event that the public audience had remained resolute that the sculpture receives a *bechu* or loincloth in order to remain in public space, people in the art world could have been approached and be persuaded to assist. The City Council was well placed to initiate such intervention as the *art world*³⁶² had adjudicated competing submissions for the commission and were likely to have the symbolic authority to convince the artist to 'dress' the figure. Apart from this, symbolic social capital would come the artist's way. Sections of the public may well have perceived such a gesture as magnanimous and by association this would rub off onto the City Council and the Bulawayo NGZ. Hypothetically, the sculpture could still be looking-into-the-future. But a 'dressing' of the statue would only have been acceptable if the negotiations to persuade Madebe to do so were handled by the art world, who had credibility, and if this happened without the artist and the Bulawayo City Council being censured in the press. (It is of course possible that, had Madebe altered *Looking into the future*, he would have disappointed those who supported the sculpture staying in the public

³⁶¹In 1977 Carl Andre's *Stone Field Sculpture* in the centre of Hartford, Connecticut, USA was problematic with the public and only gained acceptance after the artist gave several lectures to the community (See Elsen, 1989).

³⁶²The 'art world' in this case refers to the people whom society generally defers respect to and regards them as cultured in the visual art. Such personalities like Gallery directors, art curators, city architects, art historians and art critics and possibly art journalists tend to shape and influence public opinion in discourses around an artwork and its meaning and sometimes government listens to them because they can articulate societal issues. This is how they gain respect or 'social capital' from the general public. It is association with this social capital that politicians in government want to transform into symbolic power that they exercise in politics (see Bourdieu, 1989).

space in its original form, and he may well have been perceived as spinelessly caving in to pressure from sections of the public who did not wish to understand or accept his work.)

If the minister had not interfered, in light of the artist's steadfastness and given the City Council's inaction, the sculpture would presumably have remained in public space. It would have taken time before the sculpture could become acceptable to its audience. While it is probable that, eventually, little negative attention would have been given to it by the public, the work could also have attracted what Sharp et al (2005: 1015) term "expressions of resistance" such as vandalism and graffiti *in situ*.

The local press's editorial ventured into analysis of the ministerial action. The paper felt that the government minister had not dealt with the matter discreetly. Minister Chikowore should have met in private with the council, suggested *The Chronicle* of 3 May 1985, "to sound out its views and proposed mode of action before making his public condemnation". It also reasoned that in making reference to a blanket 'outrage' coming from the citizens of Bulawayo, the government minister had not sought information or input from a sufficient range of citizens – including those who wanted the statue to stay. The editorial noted that, according to public opinion surveys that the newspaper had conducted and the letters it had received from the public, there were apparently as many in favour of retaining the sculpture, as those calling for its removal (*The Chronicle*, 3 May 1985).

According to the editor's observations, the Minister's order for the removal of the sculpture unintentionally worked in the City Council's favour for two reasons. Firstly, the Bulawayo Council would no longer have to take public action either to admit that it had erred or to ignore the controversy. Secondly, the Council was saved the embarrassment of taking responsibility for a move which would have been unpopular with some sections of the public (*The Chronicle*, 3 May 1985).

Madebe's sculpture stood for a month in Tower Block gardens. Why then did it take this long for central government to intervene and uphold the moral uprightness it so much vaunted? It was surely not because government had not heard about the sculpture when it was commissioned and installed. Municipalities then had autonomy to run their own affairs, and central government only advised on matters of policy and issues deemed to be of national importance. Thus in commissioning *Looking into the future*, Bulawayo City Council acted

within its rights. Consequently, the time taken by government before intervening could only mean that it was either giving time for City Council to address the problem or it was investigating how it might intervene without overstepping its authority if there was in fact no action on the part of the City of Bulawayo.

Even while in the confines of a storeroom, the spirit of wanting to ‘look into the future’, a future implicitly characterised by a spirit of greater freedom of expression, meant that the statue remained a matter of concern to both central and local government. While on tour of Mzilikazi Art and Craft Centre in 1989, four years after the sculpture’s removal, David Kwidini, the new Minister of Youth, Sport and Culture, hinted that the statue could be reinstalled at Tower Block gardens. He was quoted in *The Chronicle* of 24 June 1989 as having said that the statue had been made at a time “when we were still blinkered” (*The Chronicle*, 24 June 1989). He was not more explicit, perhaps for fear of antagonising central government colleagues, but his comment may be taken as possible evidence of changing political and social discourse within the country.³⁶³ In 1994, the City of Bulawayo also expressed a desire to re-install the sculpture in the Tower Block municipal gardens (*Sunday News*, 22 April 1994) and this probably insinuates thawing relations with a ‘new’ central government. Such expressed wishes remained unfulfilled, however, until later in 1994 when the Bulawayo NGZ moved into the renovated Douslin House which became its new home. It was then that “*Looking into the future*” was brought into light and given pride of place in the gallery courtyard” according to McCartney (2001: 3). He also remarks that not a single “visitor to this sanctuary have reported their morals corrupted or either sensibilities offended, but the person outside remains insured against the risk of either” (McCartney, 2001:3-4).

³⁶³Minister Kwidini was a product of a new ZANU-PF party and unity government ushered in by the Unity Accord of 22 December 1987 between the liberation movements of the old ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU. The new government though still nationalistic in nature, was now more broad-based and some cabinet ministers even came from the City of Bulawayo and so could articulate the citizens’ views better at the highest level in the country. Given this, it was possible that there could have been wider consultation regarding the sculpture and decision on it would have to be based on consensus for the ‘common good’ and not on unilateralism as was done when the sculpture was firstly removed from the public space. Besides this was 10 years down the line and people were bound to have different opinion. This is not to say that the sculpture would have been more acceptable.

2010, The second ban

In 1994, the sculpture was taken out of storage and installed in the Bulawayo NGZ's courtyard, where it remained for 16 years until it was banned for a second time in August 2010 (see Matshiya, 2010). *Looking into the future* was then once again brought down from its half a metre high plinth (see Figs. 112 and 113) and placed in the storeroom of the Bulawayo NGZ, where it will presumably remain permanently in sanctuary among the museum's collection.

While its reinstallation was appreciated by Madebe, the sculpture's new position, ironically enough, meant that the young man was able to look 'into the future' no further than five metres. Its new position, in immediate proximity to Bulawayo's National Gallery, can be seen as a move to define more clearly the parameters of the viewing of male nudity in *Looking into the future*. Although on display in a public place, it was by implication associated with Bulawayo's NGZ and indeed it was seen primarily by an audience who were visiting the museum and hence, one assumes, were more receptive to the work. Any attempt to involve the broader community in a dialogue about the issues of male nudity in public art had presumably been abandoned.

The second banning did not receive as much attention in public spheres such as newspapers as it did in 1985. This could be largely due to the censorship of counter-publics' ideas in state-run media houses because of the enactment in 2002 of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). This legislation ensured that electronic and print media outlets became state-controlled propaganda vehicles (Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2004: 367). The same editor of *The Chronicle* who in his editorial analysed the removal of the sculpture in 1985 and attributed its causes to political manoeuvring would not have dared, in 2010, to assess again the political opportunism that seems to have motivated the minister's banning of the statue. However, in 2010, the contemporary Zimbabwean version of free-thinking counter forums or publics had begun to take root and came in the form of independent newspapers, satellite news broadcasts, on-line newspapers, bloggers and social network sites like 'Facebook' and 'YouTube' among others. These became alternative public forums that took on the authorities following the second banning of *Looking into the future* and they rued the curtailing of artistic freedom!

The Coalition Against Censorship in Zimbabwe, a group of visual and performance artists protested against the second ban of the sculpture, this time from the precincts of the NGZ Bulawayo courtyard. On their hosting website,³⁶⁴ they attacked the Censorship Board's heavy-handedness, pointing out that the statue had become a part of the Bulawayo NGZ's permanent collection for 16 years because of its artistic worth. The Coalition Against Censorship also viewed the second ban of Madebe's statue as infringing on the fundamental right to freedom of expression. They argued:

We believe it is not the role of politicians or government officials to shield the eyes of the public from [art] work because they subjectively decide [that] it is not family-friendly. As a public space, the National Gallery in Bulawayo is governed by the free speech provided for in the constitution of Zimbabwe [...].The arbitrary, subjective, and vague determination of what might be appropriate for the venue has led, in this case, to the impermissible imposition of an individual's viewpoint on the whole community and is a clear [...] violation of human rights and fundamental of freedoms.³⁶⁵

Another internet blog despised the trammelling of artistic freedoms by the state. Posting an article titled *When I write who can shut me up?... of art, obscenity, and the blurry divide*,³⁶⁶ its author noted that there was a thin line that separated what some would see as art and what others would view as vulgar. Further, the writer wondered where art work deemed unacceptable in the precincts of a National Gallery could be exhibited. One queries where *Looking into the future* may in fact be exhibited *at all*, now that it has been banned within the gallery space. In view of this, the second banning may be seen by some as tantamount to condemning the sculpture to annihilation.

David Coltart, the Government of National Unity Minister of Education, Sport and Culture and an elected Senator for Bulawayo constituencies under the banner of the smaller MDC-M party, commented on the banning in the local independent daily, the *Newsday*, and in on-line newspapers. While delivering the Queen Lozikeyi Lecture³⁶⁷ entitled "Art and the law in Zimbabwe" at the NGZ Bulawayo, the minister assessed the infringements on the right to freedom of expression, as it pertained to the "vision of artists" in Zimbabwe (Coltart, 2010).

³⁶⁴<http://www.mobilityhubafrica.org/en/posts/373>

³⁶⁵<http://www.mobilityhubafrica.org/en/posts/373>

³⁶⁶<http://.wordpress.com/2010/09/18/of-art-obscenity-the-blurry-divide/>

³⁶⁷An annual lecture in its 13th year, introduced to honour one of King Lobengula's queens, it took place on 29 October 2010.

He suggested, reasonably so, that the second banning in 2010 of *Looking into the future* was likely meant to circumvent attention that would have obviously accompanied an equally heavy-handed banning of a one-man-exhibition of *Gukurahundi* inspired artwork by Owen Maseko, a Bulawayo based artist. Anything that seeks to revisit these 1980s atrocities always tends to rattle the nerves of an already embattled ZANU-PF establishment. Thus in that lecture, the Senator suggests one plausible, politically motivated reason for the second banning of Madebe's sculpture:

It is my belief that this banning was simply a foil – designed to divert attention away from the political banning of Owen Maseko's works which has nothing to do with the maintenance [of] public morality. In short, my view is that the banning of "Looking to the future" was solely designed to give the politically motivated banning a veneer of moral respectability. It was designed to cast the National Art Gallery as some sort of illicit, immoral organisation which of course it is not (Coltart, 2010).³⁶⁸

Another possible reason for the second banning of Madebe's sculpture may have been its perceived challenge to a government-sponsored sculpture planned for installation on a site only a few metres away from the Bulawayo NGZ.³⁶⁹ The Ministry of Home Affairs planned to install a sculpture of Joshua Nkomo, the late Vice-president and nationalist, in the city of Bulawayo. It was likely that the people of Bulawayo would compare the two sculptures and comment that Madebe's sculpture was larger. Madebe's *Looking into the future* is 5m in height and stood on a plinth of 0.5m in the Bulawayo NGZ courtyard; in contrast, a mere 2m statue of a supposedly imposing political figure of Joshua Nkomo would be seen as needing

³⁶⁸His lecture did not draw a governmental response in the consensus-building public sphere dominated mostly by state media, except to attract criticism from a faction of the war veterans of the liberation struggle. These veterans felt that Minister Coltart's assessment of the Gukurahundi atrocities as "politicide or genocide" was unwarranted and so demanded that he apologise within seven days (*Newsday* 2010). Coltart arguably, as an opposition MDC senator, demonstrated the exercising of one of his constitutional freedoms and also acquired political capital for himself in the eyes of the voting public.

³⁶⁹The Bulawayo statue was installed for one day and then removed because the Nkomo family and the opposition PF-ZAPU felt that it did not meet several of their expectations. In addition, it had been made in North Korea (the country that trained the 5th Brigade, soldiers responsible for the Gukurahundi massacres in Matebeleland). The Nkomo statue was therefore soiled by association. A second, similar statue planned for Harare next to Karigamombe Building could not materialise as the site was also in disputed and controversial. The name Karigamombe (Shona for 'one who falls the bull') is politically pregnant as it is perceived to be extolling President Mugabe, as Karigamombe, for handling Dr Nkomo in the 1997 Unity Accord that stopped the Gukurahundi operations in Midlands and Matebeleland. A charging bull was PF ZAPU's Party symbol in 1995 elections, besides *inkomo* refers to cattle in *isiNdebele*. Of essence, though, is the fact that owners of the Karigamombe open space also won a court interdict stopping the government from erecting the statue on their property which they intended to develop into a food court.

to ‘perch’ on its 2m plinth to artificially enhance its size and presence (Fig. 114).³⁷⁰ The inference would be that size literally matters, that a statue erected to honour the memory of the “Hero of heroes” or “*qawe lama qawe* [in *isiNdebele*]” (Mugabe on ZBCTV, 2001) Joshua Nkomo could not compete with Madebe’s sculpture. Through such comparison, the state would not attract the symbolic capital that it intended to accumulate.

Those contesting the second banning of *Looking into the future* framed their opposition to the sculpture’s removal by emphasising the motivations as political opportunism rather than as a concern for ‘public morality’ and the results as the erosion of freedom of expression for artists, with implications for the broader community. Those supporting its removal have been suggested as acting not through knowledge about or concern for issues of public art but rather to acquire symbolic or cultural capital in governmental circles (Bourdieu, 1989). The installation and removal of this piece of public art became a visible symbol in what Karppinen (2008: 33) calls the “continued contestation” of identity values within public spheres. It is therefore not unlikely that, in Zimbabwe’s on-going process of self-definition, Madebe’s sculpture *Looking into the future* will reappear again in a public space in Bulawayo.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have analysed the issues that surround Adam Madebe’s public sculpture, *Looking into the future*, in a timeframe spanning from the processes of its commission to its final days in a public space.

Drawing mostly from the Western conceptions of ‘the nude’ and ‘the naked’ as configured by Clark (1956) and Berger (1977) as well as aspects of debate in the public sphere (Habermas 1989; Fraser, 1992) and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1989), I explored how the processes of commission, installation and the debates leading to the removal of the statue were not well

³⁷⁰The sculpture was later installed and unveiled to the public on 15 September 2010 for only one day in a low key address by the GNU Minister of Home Affairs, Kembo Mohadi. The following day it was removed and taken to the NMMZ, Bulawayo. The PF-ZAPU party and its cadres and members of the Nkomo family were allegedly against the sculpture because; it was thought to have been made by North Koreans who are said to have trained the 5th Brigade which perpetrated atrocities in the Gukurahundi era and so would have preferred a local artist: they regarded it as a small statue and; that the Nkomo family was not consulted and or involved in the process where they would have wanted to conduct traditional rites before the statue was mounted (see Moyo, 2010; *The Chronicle*, 2010).

handled by most of the players in the various public spheres. Similarly, the state's intervention in the controversy was calculated to accumulate symbolic social capital rather than engage in a productive manner about the role of public art. The Censorship and Entertainment Control Act was invoked to relegate *Looking into the future* to the darkness of a storeroom in Bulawayo's NGZ. From there it will in all likelihood continue to be a touchstone for current and future debate on the function and appearance of public art in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER SEVEN: **CONCLUSION**

In this Chapter I reflect on how the research was conducted as well as summarise the findings and arguments in the chapters of the study. To begin with I re-look at the objectives of the research, and put forth the contribution that the dissertation makes. This is followed by a short discussion on the research methodology that I employed. From here, I summarise and assess the main issues raised in my chapters. I end with a brief outline of further potential areas of research arising from this study.

In my attempt to critically understand the iconography and social meanings given to monuments and public sculptures in postcolonial Zimbabwe's contemporary visual landscape, I had four main objectives: first, I wanted to examine how post-colonial monuments and public sculpture relate to, and play a part in, constructing concepts of national identity and, secondly, to identify ways in which public sculptures might be bound up with political imperatives. Exploring the reception of public art in contemporary Zimbabwe, focusing specifically on controversies relating to particular artworks and how these controversies assist in the shaping of perceptions was the third objective, while my fourth was to investigate the interpretations of selected public artworks in light of their relationship to contemporary social and cultural issues in Zimbabwe.

While there has been a growing body of literature on monuments and public sculpture, particularly in the West, little work in this regard has been done on Zimbabwe. In this dissertation I have sought to address this gap, using theories about symbolic conflict and symbolic power in the social public spheres as well as collective memory and identity within postcolonial discourse. In terms of approach, I have used a multi-disciplinary approach of a qualitative research design in gathering data (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998:3. See also Lincoln and Guba, 1985:39-43) that involved in-depth interviews, observation, content and document analysis, and photography. In using a range of methods, I ensured that the data collected was validated and/or triangulated. Other than fieldwork, my data gathering has included my gleaning information and insights from secondary sources in the library, electronic and print media as well as the internet – a process that has been ongoing since the commencement of my research. I have also sought to follow up on matters which remained unresolved after fieldwork or to verify facts by re-establishing contact with informants through email and telephonic communication.

Chapter One of my dissertation lays down in theory and history the development of public art in western societies, and in it I explore the concept of the public and how this relates to public art and its associated tenets in society. Chapter One also assesses problematic topics associated with public art, such as the issue of motives and involvement of stakeholders in the commissioning and installation of works, the loaded meanings of sites, and the debate associated with sites once artworks are in the public domain. Gleaning from these ideas gave insights to the framing and analysis of issues that emerged in my dissertation. Furthermore, issues discussed in Chapter One, such as the historical developments of public art in the West as it relates to purposes of monuments and public sculpture, informed notions of identity, nostalgia, and the resultant desire to nurture heritage for cultural tourism in the postcolonial - concerns that I discuss in my dissertation.

In Chapter Two I reveal that the socialist realist art style of visuals served as propaganda to reach out to a once largely illiterate population soon after independence. The NHA monument is modelled on the shape of two AK 47 rifles that face in opposite directions, I point out. I reveal that, while the design and artwork is signed and credited to North Koreans, local artists, David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo, were co-opted to work with the Korean artists, Sung Phil *et al.*, and that the Zimbabwean sculptors gave the figures represented as statuary African facial features (features that had initially been rendered Asian). The locals also put up the eastern relief and assisted the North Koreans on the western one.

In proving to be polysemic, the NHA's sculpture and reliefs have been read in different ways. My findings show that the statuary of the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* (Fig. 11) not only signifies ZANU PF and PF ZAPU as participants in the liberation war, but also connotes, correctly or wrongly, the roles of men and women in the liberation struggle and in the postcolonial. I also established that the *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* as a cenotaph bears soils taken from mass graves of cadres in neighbouring countries which are symbolically interred in it. While this symbolic act fulfils the desire of the living to institute "proper burial" for the dead (Verdery, 1999: 33), my findings point to the fact that this commitment also benefits political elites, particularly on National Heroes Day when they are able to use these rituals to rally the nation behind them.

I argue in Chapter Two, that in a mono-chromed visual, any black or white person passes as being a coloured person. The NHA's eastern mural casts historical events in Rhodesia where civil strife pitted mostly white people against their black counterparts. Thus the mono-chromed mural does not insinuate, in its rendering of identity, as Werbner (1998:84) suggests, that "Coloureds in Zimbabwe have no place in the murals". Instead, I argue that it is on economic empowerment issues that the coloured people and other minority races seem to be side-line in post-independence Zimbabwe. In the celebratory mural, I suggest that the open palm signifies freedom and that upon formation in 1999, the MDC adopted it as their party and sloganeering symbol and this gave the open palm a new iconography. This, I also argue, perturbs ZANU PF who used to wave in greetings but uses the clenched fist in its slogans. On the other hand, I suggest, using Taylor's (1987)'s conceptions that the western mural's realistic depiction of Robert Mugabe as an icon at NHA was not only ZANU PF and its state's way of legitimising him as Zimbabwe's leader, but that it was also a means of legitimising themselves as his ruling colleagues.

My findings in Chapter Two also bring to the fore the fact that the activities that take place at the NHA - namely, the ritual of burying the dead on high ground, conducting the burial activities before it is noon, and the performances associated with the National Heroes Day commemorations every August - are all conducted in deference to indigenous African culture. This, I also argue, is the modern state's recognition of the potency of indigenous knowledge systems as a potential mechanism for rallying ethnic groups into a nation. The various activities conducted at the site also sustain Johnson's (2003:293) conclusion that monuments as places of ritual carry both "political and cultural meaning".

While all political and civil stakeholders concur on the importance of the shrine and the honouring of exceptional citizens, they differ fundamentally with ZANU PF and its state on the currently hegemonic process and standards in use to identify and declare a hero/heroine. The MDC formations, the resuscitated PF ZAPU and civic organisation in "associational activity" (Woods, 1992:83) are demanding that a non-partisan body whose guiding principles for determining a hero/heroine are agreed upon by all stakeholders be instituted, and that these functions no longer be monopolised by ZANU PF's politburo and the instruments of presidential powers as is currently legislated. I found out that the contested nature of the current system has spurred boycotts of burial activities at the NHA by some in the GNU, in civic society, from amongst cadres of the Second Chimurenga and even some

ZANU PF inclined elites. Essentially, my findings in Chapter Two underscore the fact that the sacredness of the NHA has been diminishing in the second and third decades after independence.

It is clear from my findings in Chapter Two that the NHA monument cannot be extricated from the political and social-cultural influences which draw from ancient indigenous civilisations, colonialism and the postcolonial experiences. Most importantly Chapter Two reveals that debates on the NHA and the institution of hero/heroine should continually engage Zimbabweans in honest public conversations about issues of identity, heroism and violence, dissent and authority, and loss and grief, without stigmatising one another (as unfortunately currently occurs).

In Chapter Three I established that, while the reconstruction of Old Bulawayo's royal enclosure in the 21st-Century almost replicated King Lobengula's 20th-Century original site, erecting the beehive huts with entrances facing west, as what obtains in Ndebele rural communities today, was and remains controversial and unresolved. All structures with thatch grass were razed by a veld fire in August 2010, and it remains to be seen if matters that are controversial are resolved when the NMMZ re-embarks on another reconstruction exercise at the site.

Apart from the setback of the August 2010 fire, efforts to revive human activity at Old Bulawayo have been thwarted because only a third of the recommended 6 000 hectares of land meant for settling ten to fifteen families – the scheme suggested by Ndoro and Pwiti in about 1993 – have been secured. Complicating matters further is the fact that the royal Khumalo clan are not in agreement about which families should re-settle at Old Bulawayo possibly because of a perceived stigma associated with it. I argue that, while the notion of living at Old Bulawayo's cultural monument and theme park may be ennobling to some cultural enthusiasts, others may see this as potentially reinforcing stereotypes, and would thus rather shun it. In the event that the cultural theme monument comes to fruition, I argue that the NMMZ would have succeeded in lessening the burden of managing the site; the Khumalo clan would run the traditional component while the NMMZ assumes only an oversight role. I also suggest that this could be realisable if the NMMZ signs a MOU with the Old Bulawayo stakeholders or better still, if the 1992 NMMZ Act is amended to allow communities to become co-participants with the NMMZ as custodians of heritage management.

My findings also indicate that there is a perceived lack of involvement of *bona fide* Ndebele people in re-imagining their culture in activities associated with Old Bulawayo's re/construction. Given that the NMMZ almost always second Shona speakers to manage the implementation of projects, some Ndebele speakers view themselves as being excluded from their collective memory. I found out that reviving ritual ceremonies like the first fruits (*inxwala*) requires the state's recognition of an Ndebele monarchy to lead proceedings and *not* perform a simulation, as is envisaged by the NMMZ in their current concept of a *themed* cultural heritage monument. I therefore suggest, in Chapter Three, that, if the royal Khumalo clan put forward their ideas to COPAC and ensure that these proposals are accepted in the drafted constitution, then a ceremonial Ndebele monarch could be crowned and attendant activities would be considered as given. (Such arrangements are not accommodated in the current Traditional Leaders Act of 2000 which, like colonial legislation, does not recognise even a ceremonial Ndebele King.)

Inasmuch as the entire Old Bulawayo Site Museum's material culture has been condemned as not representing an Ndebele material culture by Pathisa Nyathi and Langa ka Zwile Khumalo, they have only identified the *Tonga* spiked fishing spears and the decorated figurines (see Figs. 73 and 74) as non-Ndebele. Thus they implicitly *pass* the other items in the museum. I argue in Chapter Three that, the hybrid nation of the 20th-century Ndebele state comprising those from *ebezansi* (mostly the Khumalo clan), *ebehla* (Tswana and Sotho groups absorbed on the northward trekking), and *amahole* (those already domiciled in present-day Zimbabwe - the Shona tribes, Kalanga, BaTonga and Venda amongst others) - makes it tricky to identify and circumscribe an *authentic* material culture in the present. In light of this I suggest that focus might be placed on giving more attention on what is perceived by Ndebele of *ebezansi* (Khumalo descent) and *ebehla* (Sotho/Tswana descent) but that it is also important for the museum to make some reference to *amahole* (Kalanga/Shona/Venda) artefacts.

Important to Chapter Three is the fact that the single cultural performance on the occasion of the official opening of Old Bulawayo mirrors a rehearsal of what the culturally-themed monument would reify once it becomes functional. Other than being a theme park and a tourist resort, it could become an educational resource. Used for the purposes of education, I

suggest, it might be used to communicate how aggregate ethnicities in Zimbabwe have contributed to a national culture.

Another essential finding in Chapter Three is that elites amass symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1989) by not just critiquing perceived inconsistencies in the Old Bulawayo project but also by attending and identifying with its activities. Attendance of the official opening ritual by the late Vice President Msika, the royal Khumalo clan, government ministers, the Mayor of Bulawayo, academics, cultural enthusiasts, officials of NMMZ and political parties, for instance, signifies an act of manipulating cultural discourse by politicians and elites [which] legitimates and reinforces their own power” (Chaney, 2002: 159). I therefore conclude that Old Bulawayo will potentially be one of the new ritual spaces” (Connerton, 1989:51) for the elites once it is fully functional.

As I reveal in Chapter Four, Dominic Benhura donated his *Leapfrog* (1996) to the City of Harare in 2003 because he wished to add more public sculpture to the city. I established that the Harare City Council accepted the sculpture without giving due consideration to how the work might be installed and located. Rather than involving the artist in these processes, they were simply left up to the city engineers. What prevailed, however, was that Harare City placed the work in an unsuitable venue and it was broken. I established that the City Council’s failure to react to the damage almost led to a withdrawal of the work by the artist in 2008. A key point was that the choice of an unsuitable venue – the Town House garden – had much to do with lack of council or government land in the CBD and the fact that most of the city belongs in fact to private businesses.³⁷¹ Another point I made concerned the lack of value afforded donated artworks in comparison to commissioned ones, and the complications that can result when recipients of a donation do not make provision for the upkeep of a work.

I also cite reactions from the public in their varying capacities as audience, viewer, and user” (Borden & Rendell, 2002: 267) when they encountered *Leapfrog* before and after it was broken. What emerged in my chapter was that the work rekindles memories of childhood but it needed a site with more space around it that would also render its visibility. The sculpture’s restoration was also insisted upon. Basing on findings, I also argued that in its broken state, *Leapfrog* is taken by some in the audience as social commentary, albeit contrary to the artist’s

³⁷¹Interview with Samuel Nyabeza, 6 January 2011, City of Harare.

intention, on the lack of service delivery and on the exclusion of the street children from the CBD by Harare City Council. Therefore findings in Chapter Four assert what Senie (1992b: 243) underscores in her statement that –Art embodies values, an intangible content that represents a tangible reality which may or may not have been the intent of the artist”. To this effect, the audience who encounter *Leapfrog* as public art create their own meanings unimagined by the artist (Borden and Rendell, 2002:267; North, 1992:11). I propose that, in its current state, *Leapfrog* discredits the city council for its dereliction. Furthermore, it may be interpreted as speaking of the lack of value afforded art and the absence of respect afforded artists.

In Chapter Five I explored Adam Madebe’s *Ploughman* (1992), a sculpture that complements the architecture of Agribank’s Hurudza House and refers to that organisation as an underwriter of communal and small scale farming in Zimbabwe. In my chapter, I suggested that *Ploughman* embodies the imagery of ‘child of the soil’, a fabled identity that derives from the memory and cultural association of the indigenous people with land as giver of life, and land as home to the dead who spiritually superintend over the living. The work has, however, taken on different connotations since it was installed in 1993. Its installation, I indicate, was not long after the lapsing, in 1990, of a Lancaster constitutional clause forbidding government from expropriating land, and the subsequent enactment of the Land Acquisition Act in 1992. It is probable that, in this period, *Ploughman* became as a signifier of government intention to decisively tackle the land issue and seriously prop up indigenous farming. But when change failed to materialise, the sculpture may have been viewed by local people in light of their frustrations with their ongoing landlessness, encouraging a growing impetus to agitate for radical land reform.³⁷²

I also suggest in this chapter that the significations of the *Ploughman* are diverse. Findings reveal that about 80% of workers on communal land are women but, despite this, legislation regarding land and the rights to use it in Zimbabwe has sidelined females. Madebe’s *Ploughman* might be seen to perpetuate the myth of the productive peasant as a male. A shift from the cultural and communal ‘child of the soil’ to the idea of a ‘son of the soil’ might be viewed in light of a history in which the self-image of the African male had tended to be damaged by a colonial legislation that expropriated and controlled not only the land but also

³⁷²Interview with Chirandu Sithole. 25 April 2010, Harare.

his labour and masculinity. I propose that by labelling himself as and also desiring to be ‘son of the soil’, the African male was in some sense attempting to recoup his masculinity.

I also see *Ploughman* in relation to invasions of White-owned farms, suggesting that the figure whose known denotative meaning is that of a peasant farmer in communal areas, transforms to connotatively include the liberation war veterans, retrenched workers, unemployed school leavers and the ex-farm workers, as social groups who now own and work their own A1 farms.³⁷³ Also built-in in the symbolism are civil servants, the urban workers, the indigenous business persons and politicians who also ventured into farming in A2-type farms for the first time in their lives. It emerges in my chapter that the *Ploughman* is indeed a socio-semiotic sign of the land struggles in Zimbabwean history.

My Chapter Six illuminates the controversy associated with another of Adam Madebe’s works – in this instance with *Looking into the future* (1985), a male nude commissioned by the Bulawayo City Council with assistance from the Bulawayo NGZ in 1985. Intended for the City Council’s Tower Block Offices Building in Bulawayo and later shown in the vicinity of the Bulawayo NGZ, it was in fact twice removed from public view.

Conflicted readings of nudity in art prompted public debate about the work when it was being installed. My findings show that women tended not to be offended and were generally in favour of *Looking into the future* staying in the public garden. It was in fact primarily men who claimed that the nudity of the figure was offensive and insisted that it should be removed or, at the very least, dressed in a loincloth (*The Chronicle*, 3 May 1985). Cultural and religious explanations are primary factors underpinning readings which see adult male genitals in a public sculpture as offensive but, as I indicate, Madebe’s sculpture also became a victim of politics. The failure of a PF-ZAPU-led City Council to act on the controversy prompted a ZANU PF Minister of Local Government to intervene, albeit after a month, and proscribe as well as remove the sculpture. While there is some sincerity in the minister’s claim that he wished to uphold public morality, also at play, it seems, was an impetus to undermine the PF-ZAPU party in Bulawayo. My findings in Chapter Six point out that Bulawayo City Council in fact acted within its rights in commissioning *Looking into the future* since municipalities then could run their own affairs with central government playing

³⁷³Interview with Robert Makoni, 26 April 2010, Chinhoyi.

only an overseeing role. I suggest that the month the sculpture spent in public space was actually time the government allocated the City Council to resolve the problem while it (government) explored how to intervene without overstepping the bound of its own authority if inaction on the part of the City of Bulawayo persisted, as ultimately happened.

As I reveal, Minister Chikowore's action was preceded by the Bulawayo NGZ asking Madebe to 'dress' his sculpture, while others urged him to engage with his detractors about their difficulties with the work – actions which the artist refused to take. Albert Elsen is one of a number of commentators who have argued that "recent history has taught that the public's education, including that by commissioners and artists" is important to negotiate negative responses to challenging artworks (Elsen, 1989: 295). Drawing from Elsen's experience, I advance that Madebe should have mediated in the controversy about his sculpture as this could have salvaged his work. I also suggest that motivation to the artist to 'dress' his work should have been handled by the same body that awarded the commission.

When the Bulawayo NGZ reinstalled *Looking into the future* in its courtyard in 1994 they presumably deduced it would be encountered only by an audience visiting the premises who would consider the work uncontentious. But the second statutory banning of the sculpture in August 2010 proved otherwise. Public opinion did not receive as much attention and coverage as in 1985, and I attribute this to state's censorship of the media (Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2004: 367). Nevertheless, findings in the Chapter also indicate that counter-public forums lambasted central government for curtailing freedom of expression. Results also insinuate that the second banning aimed at diverting publicity from another banning meted out Owen Maseko's Gukurahundi inspired one-man-exhibition that had opened at the Bulawayo NGZ. Besides this, there were also subtle intentions to cast the Bulawayo NGZ "as some sort of illicit, immoral organisation" (Minister David Coltart 2010).³⁷⁴ Furthermore, I suggest that government feared criticism about the unveiling of a state-commissioned statue of Joshua Nkomo a few blocks away. The monumentality of a 5m *Looking into the future* compared to that of the revered late statesman's 3.5m statue and plinth was almost inevitable and so condemning the Madebe work into oblivion could serve as pre-emptive action on the part of government.

³⁷⁴ <http://www.newzimbabwe.com/opinion-3679-Art+and+the+law+in+Zimbabwe/opinion.aspx>

Emerging in my dissertation is the fact that monuments and public sculpture are public visual texts intertwined with politics and culture. Understanding them cannot be separated from considering the attendant and overarching social contexts from which they originate as well as those informing the actions and perspectives of the people occupying the public spaces in which such works are placed. In every Chapter of my dissertation, politics and cultural standpoints have had a bearing on the understanding of issues and symbolisms associated with a monument or a sculpture. Clearly, public art in postcolonial Zimbabwe is informed in crucial ways by issues of ethnicity, identity and collective memory.

The content of my dissertation suggests that there is a need to explore how current and future public art in Zimbabwean cities can be maintained, and that there is a need for formal processes that involve as well as clarify the roles of artists, city authorities and sponsors. Further research might also be done to establish why the NMMZ, on the behalf of the state, has continued to commission the North Korean Mansudae Overseas Projects' company to undertake public art projects in Zimbabwe in spite of local artists' request to be considered first (see Chapter Two). An immediate case in point is the controversy around the commissioning of two public statues of the nationalist leader and Vice President of Zimbabwe, the late Dr Joshua Nkomo, which resulted in their installation in Harare and Bulawayo being halted. It would also be enlightening to examine why the NMMZ and government did not consult stakeholders, such as the Nkomo family and property owners of targeted sites for installation, before choosing to erect the statues in locales that are pregnant with their own meanings and significance. The attention I gave to the Namibian Heroes Acre also suggests how there is potential value in further developing comparative work on monuments and public sculptures in postcolonial countries. It is thus hoped that this study not only addresses a topic that has hitherto not received sustained and in-depth attention but that it may also prompt further research.

REFERENCES

Please note: In some instances published material I located in archives excluded page numbers. It is for this reason that references to pages are absent in a few of the citations below.

African Anglican Theological Commission., 1995. The land and its use in Southern Africa: Report of African Anglican Theological Commission, 26 January, 1995. In: J.A. Draper, ed., 1995. *Bulletin of contextual theology*. University of Natal, pp. 6-16.

African Institute for Agrarian Studies Document., 2009. Fast track land reform survey: Trends and tendencies, Inter-district analysis; Frequencies. 29 October.

Alder, P.A. & Alder, P., 1998. Observational techniques. In: N. K. Denzin & Y.V. Lincoln, eds., 1998. *Collecting and interpreting qualitative materials*. London: Sage Publications, pp.78-109.

Alley, K.D., 1997. Gandhiji on the Central Vista: A postcolonial refiguring. *Modern Asian Studies*, 31 (4), pp. 967-994.

Araujo, L. A., 2007. Political use of memories of slavery in the Republic of Benin (1). [internet] Available at: www.history.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/Slavery/articles/araujo.html [Accessed 23 July 2008].

Arendt, H., 1958. *The Human Condition*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Armstrong, E., The *Indaba* Bas relief plaque artwork [Online] Available at: http://www.google.co.zw/imgres?imgurl=http://digitaljournal.com/img/3/4/5/1/7/1/i/1/0/7/o/matopos.jpg&imgrefurl=http://digitaljournal.com/image/107982&usq=__BNafs3xd1OcYYj0h2htBh36RKRI=&h=356&w=634&sz=69&hl=en&start=0&zoom=1&tbnid=b0PrS5zZjZCUQM:&tbnh=83&tbnw=147&ei=2EVLUP-ZNJGyhAfx4YGwCQ&itbs=1&iact=hc&vpx=82&vpy=180&dur=148&hovh=168&hovw=300&tx=76&ty=98&sig=109997305016550301596&page=1&ndsp=11&ved=1t:429,r:0,s:0,i:51 [Accessed 12 December 2011].

Arnold, M. I., 1981. *Zimbabwe stone sculpture*. Bulawayo: Books of Zimbabwe.

Arnold, M., 1989. A change of regime: Art and ideology in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe. In: A. Nettleton & D. Hammond-Tooke, eds., 1989. *African art in southern Africa\from tradition to township*. Johannesburg: AD. Donker, pp. 172-190.

Arnoldi, M.J., 2003. Symbolically inscribing the city; Public monuments in Mali, 1995-2002. *African Arts*, pp. 56-66, 95-96.

Arrighi, G., 1969/2002. Labour supplies in historical perspective: A study of the proletarianisation of the African peasantry in Rhodesia. *Journal of Development Studies*, EBSCO Publishing, pp. 197-234.

Art Plus., 2005. Public art and the public realm: Study tour of Southampton, 23rd May. (Online). Available: www.artscouncil.org.uk/artplusawrds. (Accessed: 10/03/08.)

Bahrani, Z., 1996. The Hellenisation of Ishtar: Nudity, fetishism and the production of cultural differentiation in ancient art. *The Oxford Art Journal*, 19 (2), pp. 2-17.

Bakare, S., 1993. *My right to land - in the bible and in Zimbabwe: A theology of Land in Zimbabwe*. Harare: Zimbabwe Council of Churches.

Barthes, R., 1972/1962. The Eiffel Tower. In: *Mythologies*. Translated by Annette Lavers. New York: Hill and Wang. pp. 236-50.

Barthes, R., 1977. *Image, music, text*. Translated by S. Heath, Fontana Communications. London: Fontana.

Beier, U., 1968. *Contemporary art in Africa*. New York: Praeger.

Belagamba, A., 2006. Before it is too late; Constructing an archive of oral sources and national museum in independent Gambia. *Africa Today*, (52) 4, pp. 29 - 52.

Berg, B. L., 2001. *Qualitative research methods for social sciences*. London: Allyn and Bacon.

Berger, J., 1977. *Ways of seeing*. London: British Broadcasting Corporation and Penguin Books.

Bhatasara, S., 2011. Women, land and poverty in Zimbabwe: Deconstructing the effects of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 13 (1), pp. 316-330.

Bogart, M. H., 1992. The rise and demise of civic virtue. In: H. F. Senie & S. Webster, eds., 1992. *Critical issues in public art: Content, context and controversy*. Washington/ London: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp. 175-188.

Bogdan, R. C. & Biklen, S. K., 1992. *Qualitative research for education: An introduction to theory and methods*. London: Allyn and Bacon.

Bonfante, L., 1989. Nudity as a costume in classical art. *American Journal of Archaeology*, 93 (4), pp. 543-570.

Bonnell, V. E., 1997. *Iconography of power: Soviet political poster under Lenin and Stalin*. Los Angeles/London: University of California Press.

Borden, I. & Rendell, J., 2002. Private reflections/ public matters: Public art in the city. In: R.C. Smith, ed., 2002. *Text and Image: Art and the performance of memory*. New Brunswick (USA) and London: Transaction Publishers, pp. 266-283.

Bourdieu, P., 1989. Social space and symbolic power. *Sociological Theory*, 7(1), pp. 14-25.

Bourdieu, P., 1990. *The logic of practice*. Translated by R. Nice. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdillon, M.F.C., 1993. *Where are the ancestors? Changing culture in Zimbabwe*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.

Bourgois, G. G., 1997. Twentieth-Century stone sculpture in Zimbabwe. In: G. G. Bourgois, ed., 1997. *Legacies of stone: Zimbabwe past and present, Volume 11*. Tervuren: Royal Museum of Central Africa, pp. 41-58.

Bourne, S., & Douglas, A., 2007. Analysis of a visual art practice: Artist as author of an inclusive creative method waterfront. *Interdisciplinary And Social Perspectives. Waterfronts of Art III*. [internet] Available: <http://www.ub.es/escult/epolis/WaterIII.pdf> [Accessed 30 March 2008].

Calhoun, C., 2005. Presentation to the Ford Foundation. February.[Internet]Available: www.ssrc.org/program_areas/ps/Rethinking_the_Public_Sphere_05_speech.pdf [Accessed: 5 July 2008.]

Caillois, R., 1959. *Man and the sacred*. New York: Free Press.

Carmmearts, B., 2007. Citizenship, the public and media. In: Carmmearts, B., ed. 2007. *Reclaiming the media*. Chicago: Chicago University Press. pp.1-8.

Carter, C. L., 2010. Towards an understanding of sculpture as public art.[internet] Available at: epublications.marquette.edu [Accessed 8 October 2011].

Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace., 1997. Report on the 1980s disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands. Compiled by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe.

Causey, A., 1998. *Sculpture since 1945*. Oxford/ New York: Oxford University Press.

Chagaka, Z., 2010. Edison Sithole's remains found: Decades-long mystery resolved as...*The Financial Gazette*, Friday 27 August, 11:31. [internet]Available: <http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/top-stories/5339-edison-sitholes-remains-found.html> [Accessed on 28 August 2010].

Chambati, W. & Magaramombe, G., 2009. The abandoned question: Farm workers. In: S. Moyo, K. Helliker & T. Murisa, eds., 2009. *Contested terrain: Land reform and civil society in contemporary Zimbabwe*. Pietermaritzburg: S & S Publishers, pp. 207-238.

Chamberlain, W., 1972. *The Thames and Hudson manual of etching and engraving*. London: Thames and Hudson.

Charney, D., 2002. Cosmopolitan art, cultural citizenship. *Theory, Culture & Society* 19, 1-2:157-174.

Chingarande, S.D., 2009. Gender and the struggle for land equity. In: S. Moyo, K. Helliker & T. Murisa, eds., 2009. *Contested terrain: Land reform and civil society in contemporary Zimbabwe*. Pietermaritzburg: S & S Publishers, pp. 275-304.

Chiremba, T., 2008. Heroes' splash kicks off. *The Herald*, 10 August.

Chirikure, S., 2007. Metals and society: Iron production and its position in Iron Age communities of southern Africa. *SAGE publications*, 7 (1), pp.74-103.

Chitando, E., 1998. Towards land answers? Spirituality, reconciliation and resettlement in Zimbabwe. *Bulletin of contextual theology*, 5 (3), pp.55-60.

Chitiyo, K., 2003. Harvest of tongues: Zimbabwe's Third Chimurenga and the making of an agrarian revolution. In: M.C. Lee & K. Colvard, eds., 2003. *Unfinished business: The land crisis in Southern Africa*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, pp.159-193.

Chiwanga, S., 2010. Desecration of Old Bulawayo condemned. *Sunday News*. [internet] Available at :<http://www.sundaynews.co.zw/inside.aspx?sectid=6946&cat=1> [Accessed 7 September 2010].

Choay, F., 2001. *The invention of the historic monument*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chung, F., 2006. *Re-living the second Chimurenga; memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation struggle*. Stockholm: The Nordic Africa Institute/Weaver Press.

Clark, K., 1956. *The Nude: A study of ideal art*. London : John Murray.

Coalition Against Censorship In Zimbabwe., 2010. Coalition Against Censorship in Zimbabwe protests ban of the metal sculpture 'Looking Into the Future'. [internet] Available at: <http://www.mobilityhubafrica.org/en/posts/373> [Accessed 24 November 2010].

Cobbing, J., 1974. The evolution of Ndebele amabutho. *Journal of African History*, XV(4), pp. 607-631.

Collier, J. Jr., & Collier, M., 1986/1996. *Visual anthropology: Photography as a research method*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico (Original work published 1986).

Coltart, D., 2010. Lozikeyi Lecture: Art and the law in Zimbabwe. [Internet] Available: <http://www.newzimbabwe.com/opinion-3679-Art+and+the+law+in+Zimbabwe/opinion.aspx> [Accessed 31 October 2010].

Connerton, P., 1989. *How societies remember*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Conway-Smith, E., 2012 South African President Jacob Zuma's genitals exposed in another painting (VIDEO) [internet] Available: <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/south-africa/120828/south-african-president-jacob-zuma-genitals-exposed-another-painting> [Accessed on 20 January 2012].

Coombes, E. A., 1994. *Re-inventing Africa, museum, material culture and popular imagination in the late Victorian and Edwardian England*. London: Yale University Press.

Coombes, E. A., 2003. *History after apartheid: Visual culture and public memory in a democratic South Africa*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Court, E., 1992. Pachipamwe 11: The avant garden in Africa? *African Arts*, 25(1), pp. 38-98.

Crawford, M., 1995. Contesting the public realm: struggles over public space in Los Angeles. *Journal of Architectural Education* 49 (1), pp. 4-9.

Crawford, M., 1995. Contesting the public realm: Struggle over public space in Los Angeles. *Journal of Architectural Education*, 49 (1), pp. 4-9.

Curtis, P., 1999. *Sculpture 1900-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Dahlgren, P., 2004. The internet, public spheres and political communications: Dispersion and deliberation. *Political Communications*, 22, pp. 147-162.

De Jong, F., 2008. Recycling recognition: the monument as Object Trouve' of the postcolony. *Journal of Material Culture*, 13, pp. 195-214.

Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y.V., eds. 1998. *Collecting and interpreting qualitative materials*. London: Sage Publications.

Denzin, N. K., 1998. *Handbook of qualitative research*. London: Sage Publications.

Deutsche, R., 1992. Public art and its uses. In: H. F. Senie & S. Webster, eds., 1992. *Critical Issues in public art: Content, context and controversy*. Washington/ London: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp. 158-170.

Deutsche, R., 1992. Art and public space: Questions of democracy. *Social Text*.33, pp. 34-53.

Deutsche, R., 1995. *Evictions: Art and spatial politics*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Doan, A., 2002. Green building in Zimbabwe modeled after termite mounds. [internet] Available at: <http://inhabitat.com/building-modelled-on-termites-eastgate-centre-in-zimbabwe/> [Accessed 12 February 2011].

Doss, E., 2002. Death, art and memory in the public sphere: the visual and material culture of grief in contemporary America. *Mortality*, 7 (1), pp. 63-82.

Douglas, A., Fremantle, C. & Delday, H., 2007. "Visual arts on the edge: Marginality and regeneration" In: *Public Art & Design: Interdisciplinary and social perspectives. Waterfronts of Art III*. [Internet] Available: <http://www.ub.es/escult/epolis/WaterIII.pdf> [Accessed 30 March 2008]

DPRK Studies., 2000-2007. The art of propaganda: Nationalistic themes in the art of North Korean. [internet] Available at: www.dprkstudies.org/documents/dprk003.html [Accessed 6 July 2008].

Eck, B. A., 2003. Men are much harder: Gender viewing of nude images. *Gender and Society*, 17 (5), pp 691-710.

Efimova, E., 1997. To touch on the raw: The aesthetic affections of socialist realism. *Art Journal*. 56 (1). *Aesthetics and the Body Politic*, pp. 712-80.

Elsen, A., 1989. What we have learned about modern public sculpture; Ten propositions. *Art Journal*, 48 (4), pp. 291-297.

Emmison, M. & Smith, P., 2000. *Researching the visual*. London/Thousand Oaks/ New Delhi: Sage.

Eppel, S., 2004. Gukurahundi; the need for truth and reparation. In: B. Raftopoulos & T. Savage, eds., 2004. *Zimbabwe; injustice and political reconciliation*. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, pp. 43-62.

Errington, S., 1998. *The death of authentic primitive art and other tales of progress*. California: University of California Press.

Everyculture., [n.d.] Culture of Zimbabwe. [internet] Available at: <http://www.everyculture.com/To-Z/Zimbabwe.html> [Accessed 7 October 2010].

Fairweather, I., 2006. Heritage, identity and youth in post-colonial Namibia. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 32 (4), pp. 719-736.

Farmer, T., Robinson, K., Elliot, S. J. & Eyles J., 2006. Developing and implementing a triangulation protocol for qualitative health research. *Quality Health Research*, 16 (3), pp. 377-394.

- Fenton, N., 2010. Re-imagining democracy; new media, young people, participation and politics. In: T. Olson & P. Dahlgren, eds., 2010. *Young people, ICTs and democracy; Theories, policies, identities and websites*. Goteborg: Nordicom, pp. 19-34.
- Festead, A., Jenson, N. & Walters, S., 2004. Images, interviews and interpretations: Making connections in visual research. In: Pole, C., ed. 2004. *Studies in qualitative methodology Volume 7: Seeing is believing? Approaches to visual research*. London: Elsevier. Pp.105-121.
- Finkelpearl, T., 2001. *Dialogues in public art*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Fisher, J.L., 1998. *Pioneers, settlers, aliens, exiles. The decolonisation of white identity in Zimbabwe*. J. L. Fisher. The Australian National University. E Press [Online] Available <http://epress.anu.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Ch05.pdf> [Accessed on 10/10/12].
- Flanagan, E.M., 2008. The Millennium Park effect: A tale of two cities. In: Cartier, C. & Willis, S., eds. 2008. *The practice of public art*. Routledge: New York/London. pp.133-151.
- Forest, B. & Johnson, J., 2002. Unravelling threads of history: Soviet-era monuments and post-Soviet national identity in Moscow. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 91 (3), pp. 524-547.
- Foss, K. S., 1986. Ambiguity as persuasion: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial. *Communication Quarterly*, 34 (3), pp 326-340.
- Fraser, N., 1990. Re-thinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy. *Social Text*, 25/26, pp. 56-80.
- Friedman, D.S., 1995. Public things in modern city: Belated notes on "Filted Arc" and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. *Journal of Architectural Education*, 49 (2), pp. 62-78.
- G.W.P., 1850. Lessing's "Laocoon". *Bulletin of the American Art Union*, 5, pp. 73-75.
- Gagare, O. & Murima, C., 2011. Hero Tekere dies. *Newsday*, Tuesday 7 June.
- Gaidzanwa, R., 1992. Bourgeois theories of gender and feminism and their shortcomings with reference to southern African countries. In: R. Meena, ed., 1992. *Gender in Southern Africa; Conceptual and theoretical issues*. Harare: SAPES Trust, pp. 92-125.
- Gaidzanwa, R., 1994. Women's land rights in Zimbabwe. Issues: *A Journal of Opinion*, 22 (2), pp. 12-16.
- Gallery Publications., 2001. Art and architecture; Victor Atria discusses the practice of the integrated vision. *Gallery*, 27, pp. 10-15.
- Garlake, P., 2002. *Early African art and architecture of Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gelfand, M., 1959. *Shona ritual, with special reference to the Chaminuka cult*. Cape Town/Wynberg/Johannesburg: Juta and Company.

Gillis, J., 1994. Memory and identity: The history of a relationship. In: J. Gillis, ed., 1994. *Commemorations: The politics of national identity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Golafshani, N., 2003. Understanding reliability and validity in qualitative research. *The Qualitative Report*, 8 (4), pp.597-606. [Online ejournal] Available: <http://nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR8-4/golafshani.pdf> [Accessed 9 November 2010].

Gombrich, E. H., 1964. Moment and movement in art. *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, pp. 293-306.

Gonda, V., 2010. Interview: Mutambara on dearth of leadership. [internet] Available at: <http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-3246Interview%20Mutambara%20on%20leaders,%20heroes/news.aspx> [Accessed 15 March 2011].

Google-Map/Tracks4Africa., 2011. Harare Street Map showing Hurudza House. [internet] Available: http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&source=s_q&hl=en&geocode=&q=Hurudza+house [Accessed 20 October 2011].

Google- Map., 2012. Satellite map of Zimbabwe, Southern Africa. [Internet] Available <https://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=ml/zimbabwe/100mi/200km> [Accessed 20 September 2012].

Gottdiener, M., 1995. *Postmodern semiotics: Material culture and forms of postmodern life*. Oxford UK and Cambridge USA: Blackwell.

Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement. [internet] Available at: http://www.lands.gov.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6&Itemid=3 [Accessed 20 June 2011].

Griswold, C. L., 1992. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial and the Washington Mall; Philosophical thoughts on political iconography. In: Mitchell, W. J. T., ed. 1992. *Art and Public Sphere*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 79-112.

Habermas, J., 1989. *The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into the category of the bourgeois society*. Translated by T. Burger & Fredrick Lawrence. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Habermas, J., 1991. *Critique in the public sphere*. Translated by Robert C. Holub. London : Routledge.

Halbwachs, M., 1992. *On collective memory*. Edited and Translated by. L. Coser. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hamlish, T., 2000. Re-membering Chinese imperial collections. In: A. S. Crane, ed., 2000. *Museums and Memory*. California: Stanford University Press, pp. 137 - 158.

Hammar, A. & Raftopoulos, B., 2003. Zimbabwe's unfinished business: Rethinking land, state and nation. In: A. Hammar, B. Raftopoulos, & J. Jensen, eds., 2003. *Zimbabwe's unfinished business: Rethinking land, state and nation in the context of crises*. Harare: Weaver press, pp. 1-48.

Harding, A., 2010. Of Dakar's odd hotels and statues. [internet] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/andrewharding/2010/07/of_dakars_odd_hotels_andstatu.html [Accessed 2 August 2010].

Harrison, D., 2005. Introduction: Contested narratives in the domain of heritage. In: D. Harrison & M. Hitchcock, eds., 2005. *The politics of world heritage: Negotiating tourism and conservation*. Cromwell Press: New York/London. Pp. 2-9

Harrison, R., 2013. *Heritage: Critical approaches*. London/New York: Routledge.

Harrison, S., 1995. Four types of symbolic conflict. *The Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute*, 1(2), pp. 255-275.

Hartley, J., 1999. *Uses of television*. London: Routledge.

Heine, H., 1996. What is public art? Time, place and meaning. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 54(1), pp. 1-7.

Hermes, J., 1998. Cultural citizenship and popular culture. In; K. Brants, J. Hermes, & L. Van Zoonen, eds., 1998. *The Media in question: Popular cultures and public interests*. London: Sage, pp. 157-168.

Hess, J., 2006. Spectacular nation; Nkrumahist art and resistance iconography in the Ghanaian independence era. *African Arts. City/ volume?* MIT Press. pp16-25, 91-92.

Hills, H., 2005. Architecture and affect: Leon Battista Alberti and edification. In: P. Gouk & H. Hills, eds., 2005. *Representing emotions: New connections in the Histories of Art, Music and Medicine*. Aldershot/ Burlington: Ashgate, pp. 89-108.

Hobsbawm, E., 1983. Mass producing traditions. Europe 1879-1914. In: E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger, eds., 1993. *The invention of tradition in colonial Africa. The invention of tradition*. Anonymous veterans, 2008. Interview with war veterans of the Second Chimurenga, Harare. 7 June.

Hoepfl M. C., 1997. Choosing Qualitative Research: A Primer for Technology Education Researchers. *Journal of Technology Education*, 9 (1). [Online ejournal] Available: www.scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/JTE/v9n1/hoepfl.html - 61k [Accessed 4 March 2008].

- Hoffman, B., 1991. Law for art's sake in the public realm. *Critical Inquiry*, 17, pp 540- 573
- Hopkins, J., 1998. Signs of the post-rural: Marketing myths of a symbolic countryside. *Geografiska Annaler. Series, Human Geography*, 80 (2), pp. 65-81.
- Howard, S., 1959. On the reconstruction of the Laocoon Vatican Group. *American Journal of Archaeology*, 63 (4), pp. 365-369
- Howells, R., 2003. *Visual culture*. Malden: Blackwell Publishers.
- Huberman, A. M. & Miles, M., 1983. Drawing valid meaning from qualitative data: Some techniques of data reduction and display. *Quality and quantity*, 17, pp. 281-339.
- Hughes, G., 2005. Discussion. In: G. Hughes, ed., 2005. Survey and excavation at KoBulawayo, 1996-2000. (Unpublished Draft Document). pp. 3-24.
- Hutton, P. H., 1993. *History as an art of memory*. Hanover and London: University Press of New England.
- Illuminationsmedia., (n.d.) Photograph of Soviet worker and woman peasant. [internet] Available at: http://www.illuminationsmedia.co.uk/blog/index.cfm?start=136&news_id=951 [Accessed 10 October 2010].
- Intatheli., 2006. Khumalos cry foul over Old Bulawayo. *The Mthwakazian*, Friday 13 October. [internet] Available: http://www.mthwakazian.com/print_article.asp?aid=457&iid=91&sud=29 [Accessed 23 April 2008].
- Itsdelta In Art., 2010. When I write – who can shut me up? ...of art, obscenity & the blurry divide. [internet] Available at: <http://itsdelta.wordpress.com/2010/09/18/of-art-obscenity-the-blurry-divide/> [Accessed 24 November 2010].
- Janoski, T., 1998. *Citizenship and civil society: A framework of rights and obligations in liberal traditional and social democratic regimes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Johnson, C.N., 1994. Sculpting heroic histories: Celebrating the century of the 1898 rebellion in Ireland. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 19 (1), pp. 78-93.
- Johnson, N.C., 2002. Mapping monuments: The shaping of public space and cultural identities. *Visual Communication*, 1, pp. 293-298.
- Jordan, J. A., 2005. A matter of time: Examining collective memory in historical perspective in post-war Berlin. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 18 (1/2), pp. 37-71.
- Jordan. & Weedon, C., 1995. *Cultural politics: Class, gender, race and the postmodern world*. Cambridge, Mass: B. Blackwell.

- June, R., 2010. Photograph of Celebrating Namibian independence. Bronze mural. 2010. [internet] Available at <http://www.flickr.com/photos/raymondjune/5140355583/> [Accessed on 15 September 2012]
- June, R., 2010. Photograph of Namibian people fighting colonial occupation. Bronze mural. 2010. [internet] Available at: http://farm2.static.flickr.com/1175/5140968976_a809f19ac2.jpg [Accessed on 15 September 2012.]
- Kagoro, B., 2004. Constitutional reform as a social movement: A critical narrative of the constitution making debate in Zimbabwe, 1997-2000. In: B. Raftopoulos & T. Savage, eds., 2004. *Zimbabwe: Injustice and political reconciliation*. Cape Town: Institute for justice and reconciliation, pp. 236-256.
- Kahari, G., 1997. Foreword. In: Bourgois, G. G., ed. 1997. *Legacies of stone: Zimbabwe past and present, Volume 11*. Tervuren: Royal Museum of Central Africa, pp. 16-17.
- Karppinen, K., 2008. Media and the paradoxes of pluralism. In: D. Hesmondhalgh & J. Toynbee, eds., 2008. *The media and social theory*. London: Routledge, pp. 27-42.
- Katsamudanga, S., 2003. The dilemma of preserving intangible heritage in Zimbabwe.[internet]. Available at: www.international.icomos.org/victoriafalls2003/Papers/c3-1%20%katsamudanga.pdf [Accessed 15 July 2008].
- Kazembe, J. L., 1986. The women issue. In: Mandaza, I., ed. 1986. *Zimbabwe, the political economy of transition, 1980-1986*. Dakar: CODESRIA. Pp. 165-201.
- Kellas, J. G., 1991. *The politics of nationalism and ethnicity*. London: MacMillan.
- Kellner, D., 1989. *Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Kelly, M., 1996. Public art controversy: the Sera Lin cases. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 54(1), pp. 15-22.
- Kester, G., 2006. Crowds and connoisseurs: art and the public sphere in America. In: Jones. E., ed., 2006. *A companion to contemporary art issues since 1945*. Blackwell: Oxford. pp. 249-268.
- Kjarm., 2011. Photograph of Leap Frog Play children. [internet] Available at: http://zoisrus.smugmug.com/Travel/Zimbabwe-sculpture-Atlanta/704694_Kjarm#30734947_ptTn4-A-LB [Accessed 20 September 2011].
- Klein, L. K., 2000. On the emergency of memory in historical discourse. *Representations*, 69, pp. 127-150.
- Knight, C. K., 2008. Public art: Theory, practice and populism. Malden/ Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

- Krauss, R., 1977. *Passages in modern sculpture*. London: Thames and Hudson.
- Krauss, R., 1979. Sculpture in the expanded field. *October*, 8, pp. 30-44.
- Kruger, J. N., 1995. The politics of creating national heroes: The search for political legitimacy and national identity. In: N. Bhebe & T. Ranger, eds., 1995. *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation war*. London/Portsmouth/Harare: James Currey/Heinemann/University of Zimbabwe Publication, pp. 139-162.
- Kruger, J. N., 2003. *Guerrilla veterans in post-war Zimbabwe; symbolic violent politics, 1980-1987*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Krippendorff, K., 2004. *Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology*. London: Sage Publications.
- Kruk, S., 2008. Semiotics of a visual iconicity in Leninist 'monumental' propaganda. *Visual Communication*, 7 (27), pp. 27-57.
- Kultermann, U., (1967). *The new sculpture: Environment and assemblages*. London: Thames Hudson.
- Kwon, M., 2002. Public art as publicity. [internet] Available at: <http://www.republicart.net> [Accessed 22 January 2009].
- Kwon, M., 2004. *One place after another: Site-specific art and locational identity*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Leavy, P., 2009. *Method meets art: Arts-based research practice*. New York/London: The Guilford Press.
- Lefavre, L. & Tzonis, A., 2003. The 2003 Prince Claus Award presented to Mick Pearce on 10 Dec 2003 [internet] Available at: <http://www.architectsforpeace.org/mickprofile.php> [Accessed 5 October 2011].
- Liestyna, P. & Woodrum, A., eds. 1999. *Breaking free: The transformative power of critical pedagogy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Educational Review.
- Lincoln, Y. S. and Guba, E.G., 1985. *Naturalistic inquiry*. Beverly Hills, California: Sage.
- Lodge, T., 1998. The southern African post-colonial state. *Commonwealth and comparative politics*, 36 (1), pp.20-47.
- Lowenthal, D., 2005. Natural and cultural heritage. *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 11 (1), pp 81-92.

- Lum, E., 1999. Pollock's promise: Towards an abstract expressionist architecture. *Assemblage*, 39, pp. 62-93.
- Lyons, T., 2004. *Guns and guerrilla girls: Women in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle*. African World Press: Trenton/Asmara, Eritrea.
- Macdonald, G. F., & Alsford, S., 2007. Canadian museums and the representation of culture in a multicultural nation. In: S. Watson, ed., 2007. *Museums and other communities*. London; Routledge, pp. 276-291.
- Machingaidze, V. E. M., 1991. Agrarian change from above: The Southern Rhodesia Native Land Husbandry Act and African response. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 24 (3), pp. 557-588.
- Madanhire, N., 2010. From the Editor's desk: Time is nigh for a true people's. *The Sunday Standard* [internet] Available at: <http://www.thestandard.co.zw/opinion/26209-from-the-editors-desk-time-is-nigh-for-a-true-peoples.html> [Accessed on 29 August 2010].
- Mafirakurewa, M., 2011. MDCs boycott Nyashanu burial at Heroes Acre. *Newsday*, 3 January. p3.
- Magure, B., 2008. The state, labour and politics of social dialogue in Zimbabwe 1996-2007: Issues resolved or matters arising? *African and Asian Studies*, 1 (7), pp. 19-48.
- Maisiri, T., 2010. Nationhood of our heroes. *The Financial Gazette* of Thursday, 14 October.
- Makuwaza, S., 2002. Towards a new type of 'Ethnographic' Museum in Africa. Paper presented at the conference High Expectations, but Low Funding: How do poor museums meet their targets? Lusaka and Livingstone, Zambia. July 28 - August 2. Zambia. [internet]. Available at: www.kunst.no/alias/HJEMMESIDE/icme/icme2002/makuvaza.html. [Accessed 28 February 2008].
- Manyathi, O., 2012. Using heritage to construct a South African identity. *Conversations with leaders*. pp.20-21 & pp.23-4. September.
- Manwa, H. A., 2007. Is Zimbabwe ready to venture into the cultural tourism market? *Development Southern Africa*, 24 (3), pp. 467-474.
- Mar, H., 2000. Phantasies of the public sphere: Rethinking Habermas of historians. *The Journal of Modern History*, 72(1), pp. 153-182.
- Mararike, C.G., 1999. *Survival strategies in rural Zimbabwe: The role of asserts, indigenous knowledge and organisations*. Harare: Mond Books.
- Marschall, H. W., 1977. Folklore and the rise of American Folklore Museums", *Journal of American Folklore*, 90 (358), pp. 391-413.

Marschall, S., 2009. The integration of art and architecture and its relevance in the new South Africa. [internet] Available at http://www.unisa.ac.za/default.asp?Cmd=ViewContent&ContentID=7235&P_XSLFile=unisa/accessibility.xsl [Accessed 14 June 2011].

Marschall, S., 2010. *Landscape of memory: Commemorative monuments, memorials and public statuary in post-apartheid South Africa*. Boston/Leiden: Brill.

Marshall, C. & Rossman, G. B., 1999. 3rd Ed. *Designing Qualitative Research*. London: Sage Publications.

Martin J. & Martin R., 2004. History through the lens: Every picture tells a story. In: Pole, C. J., ed. 2004. *Seeing is believing? Approaches to visual research*. London/Boston/Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Matenga, E., 2005. The clay figurines from the palisade gully (Area K). In; Hughes, G., ed. 2005. *Survey and Excavations at koBulawayo 1996-2000*. (Draft Document; March), pp. 35-37.

Matshazi, N., 2010. Son wants Nkomo remains exhumed. *The Standard*. [internet] Available at; <http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/25455-son-wants-nkomo-remains-exhumed.html> [Accessed 4 July 2010].

Matshiya, M., 2010. Govt bans artiste's films, paintings. *The Herald*. [Internet] Available at: <http://www1.herald.co.zw/inside.aspx?sectid=1425&cat=1> [Accessed 28 August 2010].

Mayo, M. J., 1988. *War memorials as political landscape; The American experience and beyond*. Praeger: New York, Westport, Connecticut and London.

Mayo, J., 1988b. War memorials as political memory. *Geographical Review*, 78 (1), 62-75

Meringolo, D. D., 1999. Negotiating the concepts of state coercion and community agency in the practice of public history. *American Studies International*, October, XXXVII, (3), pp.100-106.

McCarthy, D., 1999. The nude: That darling of the artist, that necessary element of success. In; *The nude in contemporary art catalogue*. 6 June - 12 September. Connecticut: The Aldrich Museum of Contemporary Art.

McCartney, M., 2001. Beyond gallery walls: Art in public. *Gallery*, 27, pp. 3-7.

McMorrow J. B., 1999/2010. Heroes' Acre Namibia. Aerial photograph. 1999-2010. Source: [internet] Available on <http://www.pbase.com/bmcmorrow/image/125830293> [Accessed 12 March 2012].

McNealy, M. S., 1999. *Strategies for empirical writing*. New York: Longman.

MDC on Monday., 2001. The power of the open hand. MDC on Monday, 26th March.

Mhonda, T., 2004a. The rise of the independent sculptor. In: D. Sibanda, compiler., 2004. *Zimbabwe stone sculpture: A retrospective, 1957-2004*. Harare: Embassy of France/ Weaver Press, pp. 37-39.

Mhonda, T., 2004b. The role of the extended family in Zimbabwean stone sculpture. In: D. Sibanda, compiler., 2004. *Zimbabwe stone sculpture: A retrospective, 1957-2004*. Harare: Embassy of France/ Weaver Press, pp.41-42.

Miles, M., 1997. *Art, space and the city: Public art and urban futures*. London/ New York: Routledge.

Miles, M., 2006. Reclaiming the public sphere. Paper for "Art and the city" Conference, 10-12 May. University of Amsterdam.

Milman, A., 2001. Future of the theme park and attraction industry: A management perspective. *Journal of Travel Research*, 40, pp139-147.

Mitchell, W.J.T., 1990. The violence of public art; "Do the right thing". *Critical inquiry*, 6 (4), pp. 880-89.

Mitchell, W. J. T., 1990. The violence of public art. In: W. J. T. Mitchell, ed., 1990. *Art and the public sphere*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp.29-48.

Mlambo, E., 1972. *Rhodesia: the struggle for a birthright*. London: Hurst and Company.

Mlotshwa, K., 2011. Zipra angry over heroes. *Newsday*, 15 May.

Mlotshwa, K., and Ndlovu, N., 2011. ANC says Lesabe a heroine. *The Standard*, 20 February. [internet] Available at: <http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/28601-anc-says-lesabe-a-heroine.html> [Accessed 21 February 2011].

Moore, D., 2008. Coercion, consent, context: Operation Murambatsvina and ZANU PF's illusory quest for hegemony. In: L. Vambe, ed., 2008. *The hidden dimensions of Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe*. Harare and Pretoria: Weaver Press and African Institute of South Africa, Chapter 2.

Moyo, F., 2011. Zapu snubs state-assisted funeral for Lesabe. *Newsday*, 15 February.

Moyo, L., 2010. Confusion as Nkomo statue is unveiled. 16 September [internet] Available at: <http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/zimbabwe/6107.html> [Accessed 27 November 2010].

Moyo, S. & Yeros, P., 2005. Land occupation and land reform in Zimbabwe: Towards a national democratic revolution. In: S. Moyo & P. Yeros, eds., 2005. *Reclaiming Land*. London, New York, Cape Town: Zed Books, David Phillip, pp. 165-205.

- Moyo, S., 1986. The land question. In: I. Mandaza, ed., 1986. *Zimbabwe, the political economy of transition 1980-1986*. Dakar: CODESRIA, pp.165-201.
- Moyo, S., Makumbe, J. & Raftopoulos, B., 2000. *NGOs, the state and politics in Zimbabwe*. Harare: Zimbabwe.
- Moyo, S., Rutherford, B. & Amanor-Wilks, D., 2000. Land reform and changing social relations of farm workers in Zimbabwe. *Review of African Political Economy*, 84, pp. 101-202.
- Morton, S., 2007. Post structuralist formulations. In; McLeod, J., ed. 2007. *The Routledge companion to post colonial studies*. London: Routledge. Pp. 161-172
- Msindo, E., 2007. Ethnicity and nationalism in urban colonial Zimbabwe: Bulawayo 1950-1963., *Journal of African History*, 48, pp. 167 -190.
- Msindo, E., 2011. Towards a new understanding of nationalism in Zimbabwe: Ideologies, Alternative Platforms, and the Place of Violence. Draft paper presented at Rhodes University, Sociology Seminar, 30 March. South Africa. Pp.1-17.
- Mudimbe, V. Y. & Jewsiewicki, B., 1993. Africans' memories and contemporary history in Africa. *History and Theory*, 4 (32), pp. 1-11.
- Mugabe , R., 2001. *Inside the Third Chimurenga*. Government of Zimbabwe, Harare.
- Mugabe, T., 2011. National hero Nhloko laid to rest in Silobela. *The Herald*, Thursday 17 February.
- Mugari, S. & Zulu, B., 2008. \$15b for Heroes Acre. *Zimbabwe Independent*, Friday 20 February. Harare.
- Munzwa, K. M. & Wellington, J., 2010. Urban development in Zimbabwe: A human settlement perspective. *Theoretical and Empirical Researches in Urban Management*. 5 (14), pp,120-146.
- Muringaniza, S. J., 1998. Community participation in archaeological heritage management in Zimbabwe; The case of Old Bulawayo. Master of Philosophy Thesis. Cambridge University (Unpublished).
- Mushekwe, I., 2006. Youths force-march Mbare residents to National Heroes' Acre. *The Zimbabwe Independent*, Friday 18 August.
- Mushohwe, K., 2012. Sculpture and maintenance. *The Herald* , Wednesday 1 August. p6.
- Mushunje, M. T., 2001. *Women's land rights in Zimbabwe*. Madison: BASIS Management Entity.

- Muzondidya, J., 2004. Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans; invisible subject minorities and the quest for justice and reconciliation in post-colonial Zimbabwe. In: B. Raftopoulos & T. Savage. eds., 2004. *Zimbabwe; injustice and political reconciliation*. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation: Cape Town, pp. 218-235.
- Namibia Heroes Acre., 2002. Statement by His Excellency, the President Sam Nujoma on the occasion of the official inauguration of the Namibian Heroes' Acre, 26 August 2002. [online] Available at <http://www.namibia-1on1.com/a-central/heroes-acre-2.html> [Accessed 9 November 2011].
- Namibia-1on1., 2012. Heroes Acre Windhoek Namibia (Part 1) [internet] Available at; <http://www.namibia-1on1.com/heroes-acre.html> [Accessed on 15] September 2012].
- National Monuments in Windhoek., (n.d). National Monuments in Windhoek. [internet] Available at; <http://www.windhoekcc.org.na/default.aspx?page=51> [Accessed 12 June 2011].
- Ndlela, D. B., 2003. Zimbabwe's economy since 1990. In: M.C. Lee & K. Colvard, eds. 2003. *Unfinished business: The land crisis in Southern Africa*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, pp. 133-158.
- Ndlela, D., 2010. Who wants to be buried at heroes' acre? *The Financial Gazette*, 14-20 October, p.7.
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, J. S., 2007. Fatherhood and nationhood: Joshua Nkomo and the re-imagination of the nation of Zimbabwe. In: K. Muchemwa & R. Muponde, eds. 2007. *Manning the Nation; Father figures in Zimbabwean literature and society*. Harare/Johannesburg: Weaver Press/Jacana, pp. 73-87.
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, J. S., 2009. *'Do Zimbabweans exist? Trajectories of nationalism, national identity formation and crises in a postcolonial state*. Oxford/New York/ Bern/Berlin/ Bruxelles: Peter Lang.
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J., 2009b. Africa for Africans or Africa for ~~non~~atives"? ~~New~~ Nationalism" and nativism in Zimbabwe and South Africa. *Africa Spectrum*, 44 (1), pp. 61-78.
- Ndoro, W. & Pwiti, G., c1993. Old Bulawayo and environs; Environmental impact assessment. Final Report. Project Consultants, University of Zimbabwe, Harare. (Unpublished).
- Nead, L., 1992. *The female nude: Art, obscenity and sexuality*. London: Routledge.
- Neria., 1992. [Film] Directed by G. Mawuru. Harare: UNESCO Film Project.
- Newsday., 2010. Time to break out of national hero straitjacket. *Newsday*, 27 August.

Newsday., 2010. War veterans threaten Coltart. [internet] Available at: <http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-3794-War+veterans+threaten+Coltart/news.aspx> [Accessed 13 November 2010].

Newzimbabwe.com., 2006. Msika: 'They think I'm mad' [internet] Available at: http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/oct20b_2006.html [Accessed 14 July 2008].

NGZ Art Forum Report., 2005. The stone sculpture of Zimbabwe as a growth industry. An Art Forum: 2005. Held on 13th and 14th September at the National Gallery of Zimbabwe's East Gallery, Harare.

Nkatanzo, L., 2011. Zanu face new Heroes' Acre snub [internet] Available at: <http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-4500-Zanu+PF+suffers+new+Heroes+Acre+snub/news.aspx> [Accessed 18 February 2011].

Nkomo, J., 1984. *The story of my life*. Harare: SAPES Books.

Nora, P., 1989. Between memory and history: Les lieux de memoire. *Representations*, 26, pp.7-24.

Nora, P., 1989. Between memory and history: les lieux de memoire. Translated by Marc Roudebush. *Representations. Special Issue: Memory and Counter-memory*, 6, pp. 7-24.

Nora, P., 1992. *Realism of memory: the construction of French past. Vol:111*. Translated by A. Goldhammer. New York: Columbia University Press.

North, M., 1992. The public as sculpture. In: W., J., T. Mitchell, ed., 1992. *Art and the Public sphere*. Chicago: The University of Chicago, pp. 9-28.

Norton, A., 1993. Ruling memory. *Political Theory*, 21 (3), pp. 452-463.

Nyamapfene, K. W., 1989. Adaptation to marginal land amongst the peasant farmers of Zimbabwe. *Journal of Southern Africa Studies*, 15 (2), pp. 384-389.

Nyamukondiwa, W., 2010. Sikanyika laid to rest. [internet] Available at: http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8265:sikanyika-laid-to-rest&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130 [Accessed 22 April 2011].

Nyanga, T., Mudhovozi, P., Zirima, H. & Kasayira, J., 2011. Youth culture: a melting pot in Zimbabwe. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 13: 2, pp. 352-365.

Nyangove, P. & Chimhete, C., 2011. Mugabe changes tact, calls for calm. [internet] Available at: <http://zw.thestandard.co.zw/local/31164-mugabe-changes-tact-calls-for-calm.html> [Accessed 21 August 2011].

Nyathi, K., 2006. Old Bulawayo to be opened on Saturday. *The Mthwakazian*. Thursday 12 October. [internet] Available at

:http://www.mthwakazian.com/print_article.asp?aid=454&iid=91&sud=29 [Accessed 26 March 2008].

Nyathi, K., 2010. Sibanda snub: Zanu PF discredits hero status. [internet] Available at: <http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/26215-sibanda-snub-zanu-pf-discredits-hero-status.html> [Accessed on 29 August 2010.]

Nyathi, K., 2011. Zanu PF unperturbed by war veterans snub of Heroes Acre. *Newsday*, Sunday 20 February.

Nyathi, K., 2008. Cracks widen in Zanu PF as ex-Zapu agitates for split. *The Zimbabwe Standard*, Saturday 4 October. [internet] Available at: <http://www.thezimbabwestandard.com/local/19049-cracks-widen-in-zanu-pf-as-ex-zapu-agitates-for-split.html> [Accessed 6 October 2008].

Nyathi, P., 2000. *Lawo magugu: Material culture of the AmaNdebele of Zimbabwe*. Pietermaritzburg: Reach Out Publishers.

Nyathi, P., 2009. *Changing material culture of the AmaNdebele 1829-1945*. Bulawayo: Amagugu Arts.

Nyathi, P., 2010. Cultural heritage: Understanding the use of the chevron motif. *The Sunday News*, 5 September.

Osborne, B. S., 2001. Landscape, memory, monuments, and commemorations: Putting identity in its place. [internet] Available at: www.metropolis.net [Accessed 26 June 2008].

Olivier, W., 2010. Mandume ya Ndemufayo - The last independent Kwanyama King [internet] Available at: <http://www.tournamibia.net/content/mandume-ya-ndemufayo-last-independent-kwanyama-king> [Accessed on 6 May September 2012].

Olivier, W., 2010/2012. Photography of Mandume ya Ndemufayo's symbolic grave . Namibia Heroes Acre. [internet] Available at: <http://www.tournamibia.net/content/mandume-ya-ndemufayo-last-independent-kwanyama-king> [Accessed on 6 May 2012].

Owomoyela, O., 2002. *Culture and customs of Zimbabwe*. Greenwood Press: London.

Palmer, R., 1977. *Land and racial domination in Rhodesia*. Berkeley and New York: University of California Press.

Parekhu, B., 2008. *A new politics of identity; political principles for an interdependent world*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Parpart, L. J., 2007. Masculinities, race and violence in the making of Zimbabwe. In: K. Muchemwa, & R. Muponde, eds., *Manning the nation; Father figures in Zimbabwean literature and society*. Harare/Johannesburg: Weaver Press/Jacana, pp. 102-114.

- Patsanza, A. J., 2002. Good thing to pay tribute to our heroes. *The Sunday Mail*, 11 August.
- Patton, M. Q., 2002. 3rd ed. *Qualitative evaluation and research methods*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Patton, M. Q., 2002. *Quantitative research and evaluation methods*. London: Sage Publications.
- Peters, J. D., 1995. Historical tensions in the concept of public opinion. In: T. L. Glasser, & C. T. Salmon, eds. 1995. *Public Opinion and the communication of consent*. New York: Guilford Press. Pp.1-37.
- Philbrick, H., 1999. The nude in our time: A brief rumination on the nude in contemporary art. In: *The nude in contemporary art catalogue*. 6 June - 12 September. Connecticut: The Aldrich Museum of Contemporary Art.
- Philip, G., 2000. Public art: avant-garde practice and the possibilities of critical articulation. *High Beam Encyclopaedia*. [Online] Available: www.encyclopaedia.com/printable.aspx?1G1:69660258 [Accessed: 15/03/08].
- Piehler, K. G., 1994. The war dead and the gold star: American commemoration of the First World War. In: J.R. Gillis, ed., 1994. *Commemorations: The politics of national identity*. Princeton University press: Princeton/New Jersey, pp. 168-185.
- Pinder, D., 2005; Arts of urban exploration. *Cultural Geographies*. 12, pp. 383-411.
- Poell, I., 1986. Oh dear. Little brother is watching. *Weekly Mail*, 11-17 July, p. 23.
- Postle, M. & Vaughan, W., 1999. *The artist's model: from Etty to Spencer*. London: Merrell Holberton Publishers.
- Prime Minister.*, 2009. Government to assist farmers. *Prime Minister*, 5 August. p2.
- Radio VOP., 2011. I will not be buried at the Heroes Acre –Dabengwa. 13 April, 2011 07:15hrs Radio VOP [internet] Available at; <http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/zimbabwe/7819.html> [Accessed 14 April 2011].
- Raftopoulos, B. & Mlambo, A., 2009. *Becoming Zimbabwe: A history from pre-colonial period to 2008*. Harare: Weaver Press.
- Raftopoulos, B. & Phimister, I., 2004. Zimbabwe now: The political economy and the crisis of coercion. *Historical Materialism*, 12 (4), pp. 355-382.
- Randles, E., 1997. Mission Art in Zimbabwe. In: G. G. Bourgois, ed., 1997. *Legacies of stone: Zimbabwe past and present, Volume II*. Tervuren: Royal Museum of Central Africa, pp.71-83.

Ranger, T., 1980. The Changing of the old guard; Robert Mugabe and the revival of Zanu. *Journal for Southern African studies*, 7 (1). pp. 71-90.

Ranger, T., 1993. The invention of tradition in colonial Africa. In; E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger, eds. 1993. *The invention of tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 211-262.

Ranger, T., 2010. *Bulawayo burning: The social history of a southern African City 1893-1960*. Harare: Weaver Press.

Reid, E.S., 2001. Socialist realism during the Stalinist terror: The industry of socialism art exhibition, 1935-1941. *Russian Review*, 60(2), pp. 153-184.

Ring, T., Salkin, R. M., Berney, K. A. & Schellinger, P. E., [n. d.] *International dictionary of Historic places. Volume 4, Middle East and Africa*. Google books
[Internet] Available: http://books.google.com/books?id=2aOpeBnbxvsC&pg=PA416&lpg=PA416&dq=Khami+ruinsZimbabwe&source=bl&ots=jiYuFOR2Wu&sig=ljtQ7vPw7DrbuEMdqPDtyXpAw&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result#PPA419,M1. [Accessed 19 November 2008].

Robins, S., 1996. Heroes, heretics and historians of the Zimbabwe revolution : A review article of Norma Krieger's Peasant Voices-1992. *Zambezia*, XXIII (i), pp. 72-92.

Rogers, T., 2000. Photograph of David Livingstone's bronze cast statue at Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe. [Online] Available:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:David_Livingstone_memorial_at_Victoria_Falls,_Zimbabwe.jpg Accessed on 12 December 2011.

Rose-Redwood, S. R., 2008. From number to name: symbolic capital, palaces of memory and politics of street renaming in New York. *Social and Cultural Geography*, 9 (4), pp. 431-450.

Ross, H. M., (n. d.). Museums, monuments memorial and the politics of memory in post apartheid South Africa. Draft paper (Unpublished). Citing permission granted by the author via email communication on 28/10/10.

Salgueiro, V., 2006. Visual culture in Brazil's First Republic (1889-1930): Allegories and elite discourses. *Nations and Nationalism*, 12 (2), pp. 241-260.

Sandler, I., 1996. 190. *Art of the post modern era: From the late 1960s to early 1990s*. Colorado: Westview Press.

Saunders, A., 2010. The ghost of Lenin, Thalmann and Marx in post-socialist city. *German Life and Letters*, 63 (4), pp. 441-457.

Senie, H. F., 1992. Contemporary public sculpture: Tradition, transformation and controversy. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Senie, H. & Webster, S., 1989. Critical issues in public art. *Art Journal*, 48 (4), pp. 287-290.

Senie, H. F., 1992b. Baboons pet rocks and bomb threats: Public art and perceptions. In: H. F. Senie & S. Webster, eds., 1992. *Critical issues in public art: Content, context and controversy*. Washington/ London: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp. 237-2246.

Senie, H. F., 2003. *Responsible criticism: Evaluating public art*. 22, 10. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.sculpture.org/documents/scmag03/dec03/senie/senie.shtml> [Accessed 13 November 2008].

Sexton, A., 2005. Street children: The situation in east and southern Africa and need for a global strategic response. Statement by International Director for Children at Risk, September 13th. [internet] Available at: [street%20children;%20The%20Situation in Eas and Souther Africa.pdf](#) [Accessed 5 January 2011].

Sharp, J., Pollock, V. & Paddison, R., 2005. Art for a just city: Public art and Social inclusion in urban regeneration. *Urban Studies Journal*, 42pp. 1001-1023.

Schmahmann, B., 1989. Tom Wesselmann's post-collage works: Acting in the gap between art and life. *South African Journal of Cultural and Art History*, 3(3), pp. 268-273.

Schmahmann, B., 2000. Representational strategies in Weya appliqués. In: B. Schmahmann, ed., 2000. *Material matters*, pp.59-81.

Schroeder, I., 2002. Official art, Official publics; Public sculpture under the Federal Art-in-Architecture Programme since 1972. In: Smith, R., ed. 2002. *Text, image and the performance of memory*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. Pp. 251-265.

Schmidt, E., 1992. *Peasants, traders and wives: Shona women in the history of Zimbabwe*. 1870-1939. Harare: Baobab.

Scoones, I., Marongwe, N., Mavedzenge, B., Mahenehene, J., Murimbarimba, F. & Sukume, C., 2010. *Zimbabwe's land reform: Myths and realities*. James Carrey/ Weaver Press/ Jacana Media: Suffolk/Harare/Auckland Park.

Sibanda, T., 2012. New radio stations miss six month broadcast deadline. [internet] Available at: <http://www.thezimbabwemail.net/zimbabwe/11708-new-radio-groups-miss-six-month-broadcast-deadline.html> [Accessed 18 May 2012].

Shah, R. C. & Kesan, J. P., 2011. How architecture regulates. [internet] Available at: <http://ebookbrowse.com/architectural-journalism-pdf-d127969832> [Accessed 18 September 2011].

Shanken, A. M., 2004. Research on memorials and monuments. *Anales Del Instituto De Investigaciones Esteticas*, 84, pp. 163-172.

Sharp, A., 2005. Monuments of Pyongyang (Part 3) [internet] Available at: <http://ariontheweb.blogspot.com/2005/03/monuments-of-pyongyang-part-3.html> [Accessed 4 June 2008].

Sharp, J., 2007. The life and death of five spaces: Public art and community regeneration in Glasgow. *Cultural Geographies*, 14, pp. 274-292.

Sharp, J., Pollock, V. & Paddison, R., 2005. Just art for just city: Public art and social inclusion in urban regeneration. *Urban Studies*. 42 (5/6), pp.1001-1023.

Sheik, S., 2006. In the place of the public sphere? Or, the world in fragments. [internet]. Available at: <http://www.republicart.net> [Accessed 10 April 2008].

Sibanda, D., 2004. A brief history of stone sculpture in Zimbabwe. In: D. Sibanda, compiler., 2004. *Zimbabwe stone sculpture: A retrospective, 1957-2004*. Harare: Embassy of France/ Weaver Press, pp. 21-27.

Sibanda, D., 2010. Zanu PF hijacked by turncoats-Nkala. *Newsday*, Friday 18 February. p4.

Sibanda, K., 2010. Mabhena family embarrass Zanu PF. [internet] Available at: <http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2010-10-08-mabhena-family-embarrass-zanu-pf> [Accessed 9 October 2010].

Sibanda, M. & Moyana, H., 1999. *African Heritage: Book 3*. Harare: ZPB.

Sibanda, N., 2010. Fire destroys Old Bulawayo. *Newsday*, Harare. 28August.

Simpson, M. G., 2001. *Making representations; Museums and post-colonial era*. London : Routledge.

Sithole, M., 1979. *The struggles within a struggle*. Salisbury: Rujeko Publishers.

Skogh, E., 2001. Questioning authenticity- The case of contemporary Zimbabwean stone sculpture. In: M. E. Baaz & M. Palmberg, eds., 2001. *Same and other; Negotiating African identity in cultural production*. Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet

Spencer, P. & Wollman, H., 2002. *Nationalism: A critical introduction*. London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Spierenburg, M., 2004. *Strangers, spirits and land reforms: Conflicts about land in Dande, northern Zimbabwe*. Leiden/Boston: Brill.

Stake, R., 1994. Case studies. In: Denzin, K. D. & Lincoln, Y. S., eds. 1994. *A handbook of qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks / London/ New Delhi: Sage. pp.236-247.

Stankovic, N., 2006. The case of exploited modernism: How Yugoslav communists used the idea of modern art to promote political agendas. *Third Text*, 20(2), pp.151-159.

Sturken, M., 1988. The wall, the screen and the image. In ; Mirzoeff, N., ed. 1988. *The Visual Culture Reader*. Routledge: London. Pp. 163-178.

Stewart, S., 1993. *On longing: Narrative of miniature, the gigantic, the souvenir* London: Duke University Press.

Strauss, A., 1987. *Qualitative analysis for social scientist*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Suderburg, E., ed. 1999. *Space, site, intervention: Situating installation art*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.

Tibaijuka, A., 2005. Report of the fact finding mission to Zimbabwe to assess the scope and impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the United Nations Special Envoy on Human Settlements in Zimbabwe. United Nations.

Tendi, B., 2010. *Making history in Mugabe's Zimbabwe: Politics, intellectuals and the media*. Oxford/ Bern/ Frankfurt/ New York/Wien: Peter Lang.

Terdiman, R., 1993. *Present past; Modernity and the memory crisis*. Cornell University Press: London.

The Chronicle., 1985. City sculptor wins top prizes. *The Chronicle*. 1 April.

The Chronicle., 1985. Women support decision to keep statue. *The Chronicle*. 27 April.

The Chronicle., 1985. Artist defends his statue: "I'm shy but..." *The Chronicle*. 27 April.

The Chronicle., 1985. Statues must go, orders Minister. *The Chronicle*. 2 May.

The Chronicle., 1985. Doing council's dirty job. *The Chronicle*. 3 May.

The Chronicle., 1985. Statue order not given. *The Chronicle*. 3 May.

The Chronicle., 1989. Nude statue to be re-erected. *The Chronicle*. 24 June.

The Chronicle., 2010. Nkomo statue pulled down. [internet] Available at: <http://www1.chronicle.co.zw/inside.aspx?sectid=12161&cat=1> [Accessed 17 September 2010].

The Daily News., 2001. Church retracts on open palm symbol. *The Daily News*, Wednesday 21 February.

The Herald., 2009. AK 47 inventor, Kalashnikov turns 90. *The Herald*, 11 November. p8.

The Herald., 2010. Destroyed King Lobengula's capital to be reconstructed. *The Herald*, 26 August.

The Herald., 2004. Harare Acting Mayor Makwawarara joins ZANU PF. *The Herald*, 10 August.

The Herald., 2008. Let's look at the future with hope. *The Herald*, 12 August. p7.

The Herald., 2010. Volunteers, youths in Heroes solidarity march. *The Herald*, 7 August.

The *Indaba* photograph.,[n.d]Rhodes makes peace with AmaNdebele [Online] Available at: http://www.google.co.zw/imgres?imgurl=http://digitaljournal.com/img/3/4/5/1/7/1/i/1/0/7/o/matopos.jpg&imgrefurl=http://digitaljournal.com/image/107982&usq=__BNafs3xd1OcYYj0h2htBh36RKRI=&h=356&w=634&sz=69&hl=en&start=0&zoom=1&tbnid=b0PrS5zZjZCUQM:&tbnh=83&tbnw=147&ei=2EVLUP-ZNJGyhAfx4YGwCQ&itbs=1&iact=hc&vpx=82&vpy=180&dur=148&hovh=168&hovw=300&tx=76&ty=98&sig=109997305016550301596&page=1&ndsp=11&ved=1t:429,r:0,s:0,i:51 [Accessed 12/06/12].

–They think I'm mad”., 2006. Msika: –They think I'm mad”. [internet]. Available at: http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/oct20b_2006.html [Accessed 14 July 2008].

Till, E. K., 2005. *The New Berlin; Memory, politics, place*. Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press.

Till, K. E., 1999. Staging the past: Landscape designs, cultural identity and erinnerungspolitik at Berlin's Neue Wache. *Ecumene*. 6 (3), pp. 252-283.

Tshuma, L., 1997. *Mater of (in) justice: Law and the agrarian question in Zimbabwe*. Harare: SAPPHO.

Usherwood, P., 2007. Public Art and Pseudo-History. In: *Public Art & Design: Interdisciplinary and Social Perspectives. Waterfronts of Art III*. (Online). Available: <http://www.ub.es/escult/epolis/WaterIII.pdf> (Accessed 30/03/08).

Tshuma, N., 2011. Minister's arrest linked to CIO exposé. *Newsday*, 19 April [internet] Available at: <http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-04-19-ministers-arrest-linked-to-cio-expoe> [Accessed 19April 2011]

Tsiko, S., 2004. Street kids outwit authorities. *The Herald*, 6 April 2004. [internet] Available at: http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/mar7_2004.html#link11 [Accessed 1 August 2008.]

Tungamirai, J., 1995. Recruitment to ZANLA: Building up a war machine. In: N. Bhebe & T. Ranger, eds. 1995. *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation war*. London/Portsmouth/Harare: James Currey/ Heinemann/University of Zimbabwe Publication. pp. 36-45.

The Sunday News., 1994. Lobengula's statue. *Sunday News*. 22 April.

UNESCO., 2004. International conference on safeguarding of tangible and intangible heritage. Japan. 20-23 October 2004, Nara Japan.p1.[Online]Available at; [UNESCO.org/Heritage Declaration Japan.pdf](http://UNESCO.org/Heritage%20Declaration%20Japan.pdf) [Accessed on 02 June 2010]

- Urry, J., 1990. *The Tourist gaze: Leisure and travel in contemporary societies*. California/London/New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Urry, J., 1995. *Consuming Places*. London: Routledge.
- Van Den Bosch, A., 2007. Museums; Constructing a public culture in the global Age. In: S. Watson, ed., 2007. *Museums and other communities*. London; Routledge, pp. 501-509.
- Van Eeden, J., 2004. The Colonial gaze: Imperialism, myths and South African popular culture. *Design Issues*, 20 (22), pp. 18-33.
- Van Eeden, J., 2005. 'All the mall stage': The shopping mall as visual culture. In: J. Van Eeden & A. Du Preez, eds. 2005. *South African visual culture*. Van Schaik: Pretoria, pp. 39-68.
- Van Onselen, C., 1976. Chibaro: African mine labour in southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933. London: Pluto Press.
- Vansina, J., 1984. *Art history in Africa: An introduction to method*. London/New York: Longman.
- Verdery, K., 1999. *The political lives of dead bodies: Reburial and post-socialist change*. New: York Columbia University press.
- Wade, P., 1997. Contemporary art in Zimbabwe. In: Bourgois, G. G., ed. 1997. *Legacies of stone: Zimbabwe past and present, Volume 11*. Tervuren: Royal Museum of Central Africa. pp. 25-28.
- Wagner-Pacifi, R. & Schwartz, B., 1991. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial: Commemorating a difficult past. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 97 (2), pp. 376-420.
- Wallenstein, S. O., 2010. Space, time, and the arts: rewriting the Laocoon. *Journal of Aesthetics & Culture*, 2, 2010 DOI: 10.3402/jac.v2i0.2155 [Online journal] Available at: <http://www.aestheticsandculture.net/coaction/index.php/jac/article/viewArticle/2155/5310> [Accessed 20 September 2011].
- Walton, J., 1960. Patterned walling in African folk building. *The Journal of African History*, 1(1), pp. 19-30.
- Ward, F., 1995. The Haunted Museum: Institutional Critique and Publicity. *October*, 73, pp. 71-89.
- Warner, M., 2002. *Publics and counterpublics*. Zone Books: New York.
- Webb, J., Schirato, T & Danaher, G., 2002. *Understanding Bourdieu*. London: Sage.

Webber, S., 2008. Visual images in research. In: Knowels, J. G. & Cole, A. L., eds. 2008. *Handbook of the arts in qualitative research: Perspectives, methodologies, examples and issues*. London: Sage. pp.41-53.

Werbner, R., 1995. Human rights and moral knowledge: Arguments of accountability in Zimbabwe. In: Strathern, M., ed. 1995. *Shifting context*. London: Routledge, pp.71-102.

Werbner, R., 1998. Smoke from the barrel of a gun: Post wars of the dead, memory and reinscription in Zimbabwe. In: R. Werbner, ed. 1998. *Memory and post-colony: An anthropology and critique of power*. London: ZED Books, pp.71-102.

Werbner, R., 1995. Human rights and moral knowledge: Arguments of accountability in Zimbabwe. In: Strathern, M., ed. *Shifting context*. London: Routledge.

White, L., 2003. *The assassination of Herbert Chitepo, texts and politics in Zimbabwe*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Williams, R., 1961. Communications and community. In: Gable, R. 1989. *Resources of hope*. London: Veso.

Winter-Irving, C., 2004. The early period: The role of Tengenenge. In: D. Sibanda, compiler., 2004. *Zimbabwe stone sculpture: A retrospective, 1957-2004*. Harare: Embassy of France/ Weaver Press, pp. 33-34.

Wollheim, R., 1980. The Institutional Theory of Art. In: R. Wollheim, ed., 1980. *Art and its objects*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 157-166.

Woods, K., 2008. *The Kevin Woods story*. Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South.

Yampolsky, M., 1995. In the shadow of monuments: Notes on iconoclasm and time. Translated by John Kachur. In: N. Condee, ed., 1995. *Soviet hieroglyphics: Visual culture in late twentieth century Russia*. London: Indiana University press, pp. 93-112.

Yeoh, B. S.A. and Teo, P., 1996. From Tiger balm gardens to dragon world: Philanthropy and profit in the making of Singapore's first Cultural Theme Park. *Geografiska Annaler*, 78 (1), pp. 27-42.

Young, J.E., 1990. The counter-monument: Memory itself in Germany today. In: Mitchell, W.T.L. ed. *Art and the public sphere*. Chicago: Chicago University. pp.49-78.

ZBCTV., 2001. Live broadcast of the burial of the late Vice President of Zimbabwe, Joshua Nkomo at the National Heroes Acre, Harare. 3 July.

ZBC TV., 2009. Chimurenga Files Programme, Harare. Sunday 12 July.

ZBC TV., 2010. Live broadcast of Heroes Splash from Gwanzura Stadium, Harare. 13 August.

Zilberg, J., 1997. The case of a Zimbabwean stone sculpture: The Western reception of a modern African art. In: G. G. Bourgois, ed., 1997. *Legacies of stone: Zimbabwe past and present, Volume 11*. Tervuren: Royal Museum of Central Africa, pp.29- 39.

Zilberg, J., 2002. Shona sculpture and documenta 1: Reflections on exclusions. In: T. Doring, ed., 2002. *African cultures, visual arts, and the museum; sights/sites of creativity and conflict*. Amsterdam/New York: Matatu. pp.103-123.

Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum., 2005. The Aftermath of a disastrous venture, a follow-up report on the “Operation Murambatsvina”. [internet] Available at: [HRF Murambatsvina. pdf](#) [Accessed 5 January 2011].

Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates., 1981. *Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, The Senate, Second session: First Parliament*. Comprising periods from 23 June -23 July and 7 august 1981, 18 August – 4 September, Volume 2. Harare: Government of Zimbabwe. Presidential address, pp. 2-23.

Zimbabwe Quarterly Digest of Statistics., 1989. Educational Expansion in Zimbabwe (1979-1989): Primary and Secondary Enrolment. December, 1989. Harare: Central Statistics Office.

Zuma, J., 2012. Spear painting was ‘rather vulgar’ – Zuma [internet] Available <http://www.citypress.co.za/news/spear-painting-was-rather-vulgar-zuma/> [Accessed on 19 January 2010].

Unpublished Sources

Anonymous Resident., 2010. Bulawayo. Interview. 23 April.

Anonymous veterans, 2008. Interview with war veterans of the Second Chimurenga, Harare. 7 June.

Anonymous Guard., 2008. Municipal Police Officer, Town House Harare. Interview. 20 December.

Anonymous Official., 2009. Official of Harare Rate Payers Association. Interview, 20 January.

Anonymous War veteran., 2008. Veteran of the Second Chimurenga. Interview. Harare, 7 June.

Benhura, D., 2010. Stone sculptor, Harare. Interview, 19 January.

Chipunza, K., 2010. Chief Curator NMMZ Head Office, Harare. Interview 28 April.

Chipunza, K., 2011. Chief Curator NMMZ Head Office, Harare. Interview 4 January.

Chitsiku, S., 2011. Programme co-ordinator, Streets Ahead Non Governmental Organisation. Harare. Interview, 6 January.

Kazambara, K., 2009. Military Colonel and Veteran of Second Chimurenga. National Heroes' Acre, Harare. Interview 16 January.

Gurura, T., 2008. Harare Nursing Sister, Harare. Interview, 17 December.

Madebe, Ad., 2010. Sculptor. Krugersdorp, South Africa. Interview. 3 April.

Mararike, C., 2011. Author and Professor of Sociology, University of Zimbabwe. Harare. Interview. 6 January.

Msindo, E., 2011. History lecturer, Rhodes University. Personal communication. 12 April.

Makoni, R., 2010. War veteran of Second Chimurenga and academic. Chinhoyi. Interview, 26 April.

Mandima, L., 2009. Curator of Military Museum and the National Heroes Acre, Harare. Interview, 15 January.

Mararike, G.C., 2011. Professor of Sociology and author. University of Zimbabwe, Harare. Interview, 6 January 2011.

Matenga, E., 2010. Archaeologist, historian and Heritage management consultant. Interview, Randburg, South Africa. 4 April.

Moyo, P., 2008. Graphic designer, Harare. Interview, 18 December.

Mutasa, D., 2011. Sculptor. Harare. Interview, 28 April 2010.

Mutasa, D., 2011. Sculptor. Telephone interview, 15 April.

Mutasa, D., 2011. Sculptor. Telephone interview, 18 June.

Mukwende, T., 2010. Assistant Curator- Monuments, NMMZ Bulawayo. Interview. 14 April.

Mukwende, T., 2012. Assistant Curator- Monuments, NMMZ, Old Bulawayo. Interview. 21 July.

Muringaniza S.J., 2009. Director of Human Sciences Museum, Harare. Interview. 28 January.

Muringaniza, S. J., 2011. Director of Human Sciences Museum, Harare. email communication. 8 June.

Nezazu, N., 2008. Harare Nursing Sister, Harare. Interview, 17 December.

Nhliziyo, O., 2008. Artist and Consultant: Old Bulawayo, Harare. Interview. 28 December.

Nyathi, P., 2010. Historian and Author, Bulawayo. Interview, 13 April.

Nyabeza, S., 2011. Chief Town Planning Officer City of Harare. Interview. Harare. 6 January.

Nyarumwe, K., 2010. Artist and Art Teacher. Harare. Interview. 25 April.

Pasirayi, T., 2009. Fine Artist and Curator, National Gallery of Zimbabwe, Harare. Interview, 15 January.

Shiridzinomwa, C., 2008. Fine Artist, Harare. Interview, 18 December.

Sithole, C., 2010. War veteran of the Second Chimurenga and A1 farmer. Interview. Harare, 25 April.

Thebe, V., 2010. Acting Bulawayo, Director National of Gallery of Zimbabwe, Bulawayo, Interview. 15 April.

Tambaoga *aka* Chiyangwa, L., 2010. Mbira Musician. Personal communication, Harare. 26 April.

Yun Kyong Chol., 2012. Mansudae Overseas Projects artist. Interview. NMMZ Head Offices, Harare 9 February.

Other Sources

National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe (NMMZ) Heroes Acre Records File, (Undated).

List of Bills

1. The Land Apportionment Act 1930.
2. The Land Apportionment Amendment Act of 1941.
3. The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951.
4. The Land Tenure Act of 1969.
5. The Tribal Trust Land Act of 1965.
6. The Rural Land Act of 1979.
7. The Communal Areas Act 1981.
8. The National Museums and Monuments Act of 1992.
9. Land Acquisition Act of 1992.

10. The Traditional Leaders Act of 2000.

11. The Censorship and Entertainment Control Act of 1990.

Illustrations




Figure 1: Map of Zimbabwe showing research's focus areas, Harare and Bulawayo. (Source: <https://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=ml/zimbabwe/100mi/200km>).



Figure 2: John Tweed. *Cecil John Rhodes*. 1904. Bronze. Approximately 250 x 100 x 60cm. National Archives of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 3: John Tweed. *Statue of Sir Alfred Beit*. 1906. Bronze. Approximately 150 x 170 x 65cm. National Archives of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 4a: E. Armstrong. *The Shangani Memorial*. 1935. Bronze. Artwork approximately 180 x 310 x 30cm. Matopos Hills, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.



Figure 4b: E. Armstrong. The *Shangani Memorial* detail. 1935. Bronze. Artwork approximately 180 x 310 x 30cm. Matopos Hills, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.



Figure 5: E. Armstrong. The *Indaba*. c1935. Approximately 600 x 140cm. Bronze bas relief on plaque. Bulawayo City Hall. Zimbabwe. Bulawayo. [Photography by Resta Nyamwanza-Chikomo]



Figure 6: William Reid Dick. *David Livingstone*. c1930s. Bronze. Approximately 400 x 600 x 60cm. Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe. [Photography: Tim Rogers, 5 October 2000].
(Source:http://upload.wikimedia.org/Wikipedia/commons/c/c8/David_Livingstone_memorial_at_Victoria_falls,_Zimbabwe.jpg).




Figure 7: Google map. Location of the National Heroes Acre, Harare. Zimbabwe. (Source: <https://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=ml>)




Figure 8: Google-earth satellite map of the National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe. (Source: <https://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=ml>)



Figure 9: The National Heroes Acre cemetery side when viewed from the public arena. Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 10: The public arena for sitting at least 5000 people. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 11: Jin Sung Phil *et al* /David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* statuary. 1984. Bronze. Approximately 745 cm in height. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 12: Jin Sung Phil *et al*/ David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. Detail of the female combatant. 1984. Bronze. Approximately 745cm in height. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 13: Jin Sung Phil *et al* /David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* statuary, 1984. Bronze. Approximately 745 cm in height. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 14: Jin Sung Phil *et al* /David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* statuary, 1984. Bronze. Approximately 745 cm in height. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 15: Graves standing for the AK 47 rifle's bullets on the eastern wing platforms. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.




Figure 16: The western wing's curving platforms that signify the AK47 rifle's magazine. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 17: Part of the revellers at the National Heroes Acre viewed from the public sitting arena when facing southwards. Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 18: Part of the crowd who sat in the 5000 capacity arena on Monday 13 August 2012. NHA, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 19: David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo, NHA reliefs and the Zimbabwe Bird, 1984. Bronze. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 20: Jin Sung Phil *et al* /David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. *The Zimbabwe Bird* (1984). Bronze. Approximately 100 x 100 x 50cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 21: The Zimbabwe Police Band sitting on the middle ground Monday 13 August 2012. NHA, Harare Zimbabwe.




Figure 22: The *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier's* epitaph. Engraving on polished granite panel. 160 x 105cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 23: The catafalque in use. National Heroes Day, Monday 13 August 2012. NHA, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 24: The catafalque-like platform marking the south point immediately behind the statuary. National Heroes Acre, NMMZ. Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 25: The south marking catafalque-like platform in use on Monday 13 August 2012. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 26: The coat of arms. c2000. Bronze and oil paint. Approximately 155 x 135 x 5cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 27: Yun Kyong Chol. *Name list of National heroes/heroines in 2010 before portraits were added. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.*



a

Figure 28: Yun Kyong Chol .*Portraits of National Heroes*, 2011. Stipple engraving on polished black dolerite stone plates. 6 x 5cm. NHA, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 29: Revellers and relatives take photographs of names and portraits of national heroes/heroines. NHA Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 30. The grave of Amai Sally Mugabe, first wife of President Robert Mugabe. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 31: Yun Kyong Chol. *Portrait of the late Vice-President Dr Simon Vengai Muzenda.* c2010. Stipple engraving on polished dolerite stone panel. 25 x 20cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 32: New ZANU PF and Zimbabwe's co-Vice President (and former PF ZAPU Leader) Dr Joshua Nkomo's grave. National Heroes Acre, Harare Zimbabwe.



Figure 33: Three of four symbolic graves of Edison Sithole, Ethan Dube and Guy Clutton-Brook (Right to Left). National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 34: Figurines carved from black serpentine stone mostly used in contemporary stone sculpture. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 35: The chevron and dry masonry appropriated from the ancient city of Great Zimbabwe and Khami. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 36: Part of the walkway that leads to the tower bearing the 'eternal flame of independence'. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 37a: David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. *Scenes during colonial times in Rhodesia*, 1984. Bronze. 450 x 1179cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 37b: David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. Detail of *Township scenes*. 1984. Bronze. 486 x 307cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 37c: David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. *Discussing political events*. 1984. Bronze. 390 x 486cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare.



Figure 37d: David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. *Weapons distribution in the training camp*. 1984. Bronze. 360 x 280 cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe .



Figure 37e: David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndudzo. *The traditional beer clay pot and the drinking gourd underneath a makeshift wooden table*. 1984. Bronze. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.




Figure 38a: Jin Sung Phil *et al.* *The Western reliefs*. 1984. Bronze. 508 x 1274cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 38b: Jin Sung Phil *et al.* *Battle scene*, 1984. Bronze. 371 x 483cm. National Heroes Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 38c: Jin Sung Phil *et al.* *The celebration*. 1984. Bronze. 382 x 394 cm. NHA, Harare, Zimbabwe.




Figure 38d: Jin Sung Phil *et al.* *Celebration time with leader, Robert Mugabe*, 1984. Bronze. 508 x 597cm. National Heroes' Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe.




Figure 39: Government of Zimbabwe. *Black and white poster*. 1983. Ink on card. Approximately 100 x 45cm. (Courtesy of National Archives of Zimbabwe, Harare).



Figure 40: Namibia Heroes Acre. Windhoek, Namibia. Aerial photograph by Brian J. McMorrow, 1999 - 2010. (Source: <http://www.pbase.com/bmcmorrow/image/125830293>)



Figure 41: Mansudae Overseas Projects artists/Namibian government. *Statue and Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and the epitaph on the face of the plinth*. 2002. Bronze. 8m in height. Heroes' Acre, Windhoek, Namibia. (Source: http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Heroes_Acre_1.jpg)



Figure 42: Mansudae Overseas Projects artists/Namibian government. *Namibian people fighting colonial occupation*. 2002. Bronze relief. Namibia Heroes Acre, Windhoek, Namibia. Photography by Raymond June, 2010. (Source: http://farm2.static.flickr.com/1175/5140968976_a809f19ac2.jpg)



Figure 43: Mansudae Overseas Projects artists/Namibian government. *Celebrating Namibian independence*, 2002. Bronze relief. Namibia Heroes Acre, Windhoek, Namibia. Photography by Raymond June, 2010. (Source: <http://www.flickr.com/photos/raymondjune/5140355583/>)



Figure 44: Mansudae Overseas Projects artists/Namibian government, 2002. *Mandume ya Ndemufayo's symbolic grave*. Namibia Heroes Acre, Windhoek, Namibia. Photography by Willie Olivier (Source: <http://www.tournamibia.net/content/mandume-ya-ndemufayo-last-independent-kwanyama-king>)



Figure 45: NMMZ. *Memorial stone*. Approximately 40 x 35 x 28cm. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. [15 April 2010]



Figure 46: NMMZ. Plaque on *The foundation stone*. 100 x 65cm. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. [15 April 2010]



Figure 47: NMMZ. *The Old Bulawayo palisade* from a distance. Wooden poles. Approximately 2m high. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. [15 April 2010]



Figure 48: NMMZ. *The palisade* from outside. Wooden poles. Approximately 2m high. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. [15 April 2010]



Figure 49: NMMZ. *The Mopani tree palisade* that surround Old Bulawayo's royal enclosure. Wooden poles. Approximately 2m high. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. [15 April 2010]



Figure 50: NMMZ. *Sign post at the cattle kraal, Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.* [15 April 2010]



Figure 51: NMMZ. *One of King Lobengula's two brick on thatch houses. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.* [15 April 2010]



Figure 52: NMMZ. *King Lobengula's house* in brick and thatch (L) and his wagon shed in stone and thatch (R). Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. [15 April 2010]



Figure 53: NMMZ. *Bee-hive hut structures*. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. [15 April 2010]



Figure 54: NMMZ. *Bee-hive hut entrance*. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. [15 April 2010]



Figure 55: *A contemporary Ndebele rondavel with entrance facing west, just before reaching Gwanda Town along the Beit Bridge - Bulawayo road. Matebeleland South, Zimbabwe.*



Figure 56: NMMZ. *Old Bulawayo palisade burns.* Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. [Photography by Kudzai Chikomo, 23 August 2010].



Figure 57: NMMZ. *Firemen try to rescue Old Bulawayo.* Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. [Photography by Kudzai Chikomo, 23 August 2010].



Figure 58: NMMZ. *Lobengula's Palace, Old Bulawayo.* Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. [Photography by Kudzai Chikomo, 23 August 2010].



Figure 59: NMMZ. *A beehive hut in ashes.* Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. [Photography by Kudzai Chikomo, 23 August 2010].



Figure 60: NMMZ. *The state of King Lobengula's Old Bulawayo palace in July 2012. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.*



Figure 61: NMMZ. *Old Bulawayo's interpretive centre or site museum. Old Bulawayo Zimbabwe.*



Figure 62: NMMZ. *An attendant at Old Bulawayo's site museum. Old Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.*



Figure 63: NMMZ. *Interpretive text for baskets or izitsha in Ndebele. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe.*



Figure 64: NMMZ. Part of the inside of Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe.



Figure 65: NMMZ. *Historical text on the migrations of Nguni people due to Mfecane.* Approximately 75 x 50cm. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe.




Figure 66: NMMZ. Historical text on the *Inxwala* rituals. Approximately 100 x 60cm. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe.



Figure 67: NMMZ. Artist's impression of King Mzilikazi, founder of the Ndebele state. Approximately 180 x 65cm. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe.



Figure 68a: Tafadzwa Gwetai. An impression of King Lobengula's sitting statue. 2005. Painted plaster of Paris. Approximately 170 x 75 x 50. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe.




Figure 68b: Tafadzwa Gwetai. Close-up on the statue of King Lobengula. 2005. Painted plaster of Paris. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe.



Figure 68c: Tafadzwa Gwetai. Close-up on *King Lobengula's* left leg. 2005. Plaster of Paris and oil paint. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe.



Figure 68d: Tafadzwa Gwetai. Detail of *King Lobengula's* left hand, 2005. Plaster of Paris and oil paint. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe.



Figure 69: NMMZ. Artist's impression of King Lobengula. Black and white photograph. Approximately 180 x 65cm. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe.



Figure 70: NMMZ. *Insignia for City of Bulawayo*. Wood, brass and oil. Approximately 25 x 3 x 20cm. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe.



Figure 71: NMMZ. *Wooden mortars*. Approximately 60cm in height. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe.



Figure 72: NMMZ. *Penis sheath /Umcwado* (isiNdebele). Tree bark fibre. Approximately 15 x 5 x 4cm. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe.



Figure 73: NMMZ. Winnowing basket or *inhlungulo* in isiNdebele. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe.



Figure 74: NMMZ. *A drawing of spears.* Drawing on vinyl. Approximately 65 x 45cm. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe.



Figure 75: NMMZ. A close up on two of the *decorated* clay pots. Old Bulawayo Site Museum, Zimbabwe.



Figure 76: NMMZ. Different types of handmade *ilala* and bamboo baskets. Old Bulawayo, Site Museum, Zimbabwe.



Figure 77: Compare these coiled baskets with those in Figures 76 (Source: Nyathi, 2000: 58 & 9).



Figure 78: Dominic Benhura. *Leapfrog*, 1996. Black serpentine stone. Town House garden. Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 79: Map of Harare's Town House, next to State Lottery Hall, along Julius Nyerere Way corner Jason Moyo, Harare, Zimbabwe. (Source: http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&source=s_q&hl=en&geocode=&q=Town+hou...)



Figure 80: Dominic Benhura. *Leapfrog's child running*. 1996. Black serpentine rock. 125 x 50 x 25cm. Town House. Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 81: Dominic Benhura. *Leapfrog*. 1996. Black serpentine stone. 110 x 45 x 70cm. Town House garden. Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 82: Dominic Benhura. *Leapfrog's leaping moment broken* 1996. Black serpentine stone. 112 x 130 x 45cm. Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 83: Dominic Benhura. *Leapfrog*. 1996. Black serpentine stone. 112 x 130 x 45cm. Town House garden. Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 84: Dominic Benhura. *Leapfrog*. 1997. Black serpentine stone. Atlanta Airport Gallery, Georgia, USA. (Source: http://zoisrus.smugmug.com/Travel/Zimbabwe-sculpture-Atlanta/704694_Kjarm#30734947_ptTn4-A-LB)



Figure 85: Dominic Benhura. *Leapfrog*. 1996. Black serpentine rock. 112 x 130 x 45cm. Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 86: Dominic Benhura. *Leapfrog*. 1996. Black serpentine stone. Approximately 110 x 130 x 35cm. Town House garden, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 87: John Takawira. *Look at my mirror*. 1980, Black serpentine, 75 x 58 x 42cm. NGZ Permanent Collection. Harare, Zimbabwe. [Photography by Alice Tavaya]. (Source: Sibanda, 2004: 84).



Figure 88: Brighton Sango. *Beer drinker*. 1996. Fruit serpentine. 80 x 80 x 60cm. [Photography by D. Weinberg]. Cafmeyer Gallery, Knokke, Belgium. (Source: Bourgois, 1997: 148).



Figure 89: Gladman Zinyeka. *Too much in my head*. 1996. Springstone, 72 x 56 x 45cm, Cafmeyer Gallery collection, Knokke, Belgium. [Photography by L. Cafmeyer]. (Source: Bourgois, 1997:149).



Figure 90: Dominic Benhura. *Joy*. 2001. 200 x 80 x 50cm. Springstone, Dominic Studio, Harare, Zimbabwe. [Photography by Alice Tavaya]. (Source: Sibanda, 2004: 107).



Figure 91: Agnes Nyanhongo. *Woman of Authority*. 2002. Opal. 276 x 155 x 101cm. Artist's Collection, Harare, Zimbabwe. [Photography by Alice Tavaya]. (Source: Sibanda, 2004: 123)



Figure 92: Samkele Malaba. *Bird and chick*. 2004. Springstone, granite, opal and paint. 47 x 29 x 61cm, Dominic Studio, Harare, Zimbabwe. [Photography by Alice Tavaya]. (Source: Sibanda, 2004: 84).



Figure 93: Victor Nyakauru. *Zongororo*. 2008. Black serpentine, bones and wire. 15 x 10 x 120cm, NGZ's BAT Art school, Harare, Zimbabwe.




Figure 94: Hurudza House, Nelson Mandela Ave corner Park Street, Harare, Zimbabwe.
 (Source: http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&source=s_q&hl=en&geocode=&q=Hurudza+hou
[S...](#))



Figure 95: Adam Madebe. *Ploughman*. 1992. Welded 2mm steel. Approximately 200 x 315 x 60cm. Hurudza House, Agribank, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 96: Fleet Utria Architects. *Runhare House*, c1990s. Second Street/ Union Avenue, Harare, Zimbabwe. [Photography by Jane Stillwell]. (Source: Gallery, 2001: 13).



Figure 97: Pearce and Partners Architects. *Eastgate building complex*. c2002/3. Harare CBD Zimbabwe. [Photography by Shay Chandomba].




Figure 98: Fleet Utria Architects. *Causeway Post Office*. c1992. Note the landscaped 'picture frame'. Harare CBD, Zimbabwe. [Photography by Jane Stillwell] (Source: Gallery, 2001:10).



Figure 99: Richard Jack. *Painted post boxes*.c1991. Oil on metal. Causeway Post office, Harare, Zimbabwe. [Photography by Jane Stillwell]. (Source, Gallery, 2001: 12).




Figure 100: Thakor Patel. *Mural*. c1991.Oil on wall. Inside Causeway Post Office, Harare, Zimbabwe. [Photography by Jane Stillwell]. (Source: Gallery, 2001:11).



Figure 101: Adam Madebe. *Construction workers*.1993. Welded steel. Approximately 375cm in height. Construction House, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 102: David Mutasa. *The Zimbabwe Bird*.2000. Bronze Approximately 235cm in height. New Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Building, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 103: Pearce and Partners Architects. *Hurudza Building*, 1993 Corner Nelson Mandela and Park Street, Harare, Zimbabwe. (Source: [xnormal_2005_02_Hurudza_House.jpeg_pagespeed_ic_KWhsWiHmYo](#))



Figure 104: Madebe's *Ploughman*. 1992. Welded 2mm steel. Approximately 200 x 300 x 60cm. Hurudza House, Agribank, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 105: Adam Madebe. *Ploughman*. 1992. Welded 2mm steel. Approximately 200 x 300 x 60cm. Hurudza House, Agribank, Harare, Zimbabwe.



Figure 106: Madebe's *Ploughman*, 1992. Welded 2mm steel. Approximately 200 x 315 x 60cm. Hurudza House, Agribank, Harare, Zimbabwe.




Figure 107: Vera Mukhina. *Worker and Collective farm woman*. 1937. Bronze. (source: http://www.illuminationsmedia.co.uk/blog/index.cfm?start=136&news_id=951)



Figure 108: Adam Madebe. *Looking into the future*. 1985. Welded iron pieces. Approximately 500 x 100 x 45cm. NGZ, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.



Figure 109: Adam Madebe. *Looking into the future*. 1985. Welded iron pieces. Approximately 500 x 100 x 45cm. NGZ, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.



Figure 110: Adam Madebe. *Looking into the future*. 1985. Welded iron pieces. Approximately 500 x 100 x 45cm. NGZ, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.



Figure 111: Detail. Adam Madebe. *Looking into the future*.1985.Welded iron pieces. NGZ, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.



Figure112: Adam Madebe. *Looking into the future*.1985.Welded iron pieces. Approximately 500 x 100 x 45cm. NGZ, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. [Photography by Resta Nyamwanza-Chikomo].



Figure 113: Adam Madebe. *Looking into the future*. 1985. Approximately 500 x 100 x 45cm. NGZ, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Photography by Resta Nyamwanza-Chikomo.



Figure 114: North Korean Mansudae Overseas Projects Artists. *Joshua Nkomo statue*, 2010. Bronze. Approximately 200x55x45cm. Intersection of Main Street and 8th Avenue, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. [Photography by Resta Nyamwanza-Chikomo].

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

A Brief Political History of Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2012

Zimbabwean independence and majority rule came about on 18 April, 1980 after the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference signed a ceasefire agreement in London in 1979. Prior to this, Zimbabwe had been the British colony known as Rhodesia, where Ian Smith had made the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain in 1963 to save the interests of a largely white minority community. The black majority, who had been agitating for majority rule before the UDI, went on to launch a sixteen-year liberation war, led by mainly two liberation movements, Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (PF-ZAPU). The Lancaster House ceasefire agreement was signed by the coalition of the Patriotic Front (PF), Ian Smith, and those Africans who were in the internal settlement.ⁱ

In the first one-man-one vote elections of March 1980, supervised by the United Nations (UN), ZANU-PF attained a majority of 57 seats from mostly the Shona speaking provinces, PF-ZAPU gained 23 seats from mostly Matebeleland and Midlands provinces that mainly speak Ndebele. People appeared to have voted on the basis of language and region from which the liberation movements mostly operated from as well as where the political leaders of the liberation movements came from. The Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ) led by Ian Smith got all the constitutionally reserved 20 seats for the white people. Smith's internal settlement partners got nothing and this made them moribund, politically. Voters had preferred the liberation war parties to those involved with internal settlement.ⁱ

At independence, Robert Mugabe as Prime Minister appointed ministers from both Joshua Nkomo's PF-ZAPU and Ian Smith's CAZ to form a broad-based government that did not last long due to mistrust. In February 1982 discoveries of arms caches on farms owned by former ZIPRA guerrillas in Matebeleland led to the expulsion of PF-ZAPU from the government (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Report, 1997: 7). Prior to these arms discoveries,

dissident activities in Matebeleland and Midlands provinces, where ZAPU had won most of its parliamentary and local government elections, had started and became more pronounced as a result of the arms fallout (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Report, 1997). A civil war was taking place and most affected was the southern region of the country where mostly Ndebele speaking people are concentrated. Confirmed reports of government security agents' brutality on unarmed civilians meted out by the North Korean trained 5th Brigade decimated close to 20 000 people in a military campaign known as Operation Clean up Chaff or *Gukurahundi* in Shona (see Krieger, 1995). Anarchy in the Matebeleland and Midlands provinces only stopped after the Unity Accord of December 22, 1987 was signed between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU. This purportedly ushered in a new ZANU-PF political party. The insurgents and those behind atrocities were granted a blanket amnesty (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Report, 1997:10) therefore protecting the ruling elite's own. A government of national unity involving the two nationalist liberation parties as ZANU-PF meant that one party governed Zimbabwe up to the twilight years of the 1990s.

Opposition politics to a united ZANU-PF was very weak at first in the 1980s but gained momentum and weight in the late 1990s. Earlier on, the likes of the UANC and ZANU of the internal settlement era had joined groups pressuring the government with the latter always winning a single seat in every plebiscite.ⁱ It was Edgar Tekere's Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) formed in 1989 that brought in some semblance of challenge to ZANU-PF.ⁱ However it was the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirayi, a trade unionist, in 1999 that brought shockwaves to the rank and file of ZANU-PF as a party and sitting government.ⁱ In the 2002 presidential elections and the 2005 general elections the opposition MDC continued to gain ground against the ruling party as unemployment, an untenable cost of living, and the poor handling of the land issue by the government drove up inflation and invited international isolation of Zimbabwe. In the 2008 harmonised elections the now divided MDCⁱ beat the ruling ZANU-PF party in parliamentary and the disputed presidential elections. This culminated in a negotiated Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009 brokered by SADC leaders. In 2009, the PF-ZAPU party, led by Dr Dumiso Dabengwa, officially pulled out of the new ZANU-PF due to unfulfilled issues from the Unity Accord of 1987 'marriage'. However some PF-ZAPU stalwarts remained in ZANU-PF, possibly because they have influential posts. Today in Zimbabwe, the opposition's rank has a liberation party among them, which has a shared

history of liberation with ZANU-PF. This is apart from having another ZANU-PF cadre in Dr Simba Makoni, who pulled out to form another opposition party, Mavambo/New Dawn, which also participated in the inconclusive 2008 presidential elections.

In the GNU the two MDC formations and ZANU-PF share responsibilities in a transitional government that is tasked to come up with a new constitution before fresh elections are held. Mugabe (ZANU PF) is the president, Tsvangirai (MDC-M) the Prime Minister with Mutambara of (MDC-M) taking one of the two Deputy Prime Minister posts shared with MDC-M. For the first time since independence, an opposition Speaker of Parliament was appointed in MDC-T's Lovemore Moyo. In 2010, information gathering from the ordinary people and interest groups for a new constitution were done by a Constitutional Parliamentary Committee (COPAC) which has already held an all stake holders meeting to discuss a compiled Draft Constitution which is now a subject of debate and contestation on some clauses among the GNU partners. Once there is agreement on the Draft, a referendum will be held sometime in 2012/13 to pass or fail it. Once passed, Parliament will ratify it as the new operational Constitution and possibly conclusive elections will be held to end the GNU any time between 2012 and 2013.

Appendix 2

A trace of the binaries in Zimbabwe's socio-political community

In order to understand the symbolic conflicts associated with the National Heroes Acre and its rituals, this appendix briefly traces the history of Zimbabwe's general socio-politics, which is largely an opposing binary with origins from pre-colonial and colonial codification of society. In previous times, society in pre-colonial Zimbabwe had a simple duality; that of the *mambo* (king) and his subjects among the various Shona-speaking groups (Sibanda & Moyana, 1999). In the 1830s the Ndebele people came from the south and occupied mostly the south-west of present day Zimbabwe. This created a binary based primarily on language and culture: the Ndebele and Shona speaking cultures. With the advent of the colonising Pioneer Column (made up of mostly British fortune seekers, Boers and mercenaries) from South Africa in 1890 and their subsequent rule of the country they named Rhodesia, a new duality emerged, that of the settler whites and the indigenous blacks. This quickly transformed into other loathed binaries; the master and servant, the oppressor and the oppressed, the land-owning white settlers and the dispossessed indigenous Africans, the minority racist white rulers and the subjugated majority blacks.

The first Chimurenga of 1896-7, which pitted the Shona together with the Ndebele on one side against the white settlers, was a direct result of these increasing opposing binaries. This became the genesis of what would shape nationalist politics against Rhodesia's rulers. In Rhodesia, it meant that one nationalist party after another became outlawed by the regime in a duel between it and the nationalists (Nkomo, 1984).ⁱ Among nationalists themselves, ethnicity led to a split in ZAPU in 1962, resulting in the formation of ZANU in 1963 (Nkomo, 1984; Tekere, 2006). The ZANU breakaway group was comprised of Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe, Leopold Takawira, Enos Nkala, and Morton Malianga amongst others, while Joshua Nkomo, Joseph Msika and George Nyandoro remained with ZAPU. ZAPU was perceived as mostly Ndebele, while ZANU, its off-shoot, was seen as mostly Shona. Supporters were therefore polarised along ethnic lines, resulting in violent clashes in the townships between the two rival groups (Tendi, 2010: 55). The ZANU elements were condemned by the Nkomo-led ZAPU, and labelled as 'stooges' who were selling the country to the Americans (Tendi, 2010: 55). In his assessment of 'political labelling' or

‘othering’ in Zimbabwean politics, Masipula Sithole (in Tendi, 2010: 55) contends that it has origins in the early days of the struggle and that this has spilled into the postcolonial era. Labelling and ‘othering’, which is also instrumental in furthering the binaries, often becomes intensified in Zimbabwean politics, particularly when one political entity perceives a threat to its power and influence. Masipula Sithole instructively explains it beginning from the pre-independence to the post-independence political party rivalry:

A ‘stooge’ or ‘puppet’ is one who forms or belongs to a party in competition with yours. It has nothing to do with being a stooge or selling out in the real meaning of the word. The more threatening the competition from the new party, the more vicious the response. Witness ZAPU’s response to the formation of ZANU in 1963; Witness the Patriotic Front’s response to the internal settlement politicians in the 1970s; now witness ZANU PF’s response to the formation of the MDC. The greater the stakes the wilder the allegations. Just as Sithole, Takawira, Mugabe et al wanted to sell the country to America in 1963 then Tsvangirayi and the MDC want the British and the Rhodesians to rule this country once more in 2000 (Masipula Sithole cited by Tendi, 2010: 55.)

Thus rivalry emanating from the 1962 ZAPU split filtered through the liberation war years into independence in 1980 (Hastings, 1979; Sithole, 1979, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Even when the two rival political formations were forced to unite as the Patriotic Front (PF) in 1975 by African heads of states, PF-ZAPU would largely align itself with the Soviet Union, while ZANU-PF leaned on China, Cuba and North Korea for munitions and military training (Gaidzanwa, 1992; Tekere, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).

Similarly, in his tracing of the history of nationalism in Zimbabwe from the 1950s to 1960s, Msindo (2011: 7) acknowledges the important role played by African newspapers like the *Bantu Mirror*, the *Daily News*, and the *African Home News* in fostering debate on the issues affecting their communities, spanning from ethnicity, language, the Federation and local governance. He notes that when the Rhodesian Front led by Ian Smith won a whites-only election in 1962, it not only banned these newspapers, but also in 1963 proceeded to outlaw both ZAPU and its splinter group ZANU, detaining most of the leadership in the process. Those leaders who had not been detained escaped into exile in Zambia and Tanzania where they began a “twin pronged campaign” (Msindo, 2011: 7), which focused on nationalist ideology and military action directed at winning the majority blacks and the country, with support from some of those in detention. Msindo (2011: 7) also posits that the advent of

broadcasting on shortwave radio by nationalists into the then Rhodesia from neighbouring Zambia, Tanzania and later on from Mozambique in the 1970s, aided by political party magazines and pamphlets that filtered into Rhodesia, resulted in less meaningful debate on nationalism; ideas and information came from nationalist leadership to the people only, without dissemination of alternative opinions. This, Msindo (2011: 10) argues, meant that Zimbabweans as targeted audience had their ~~political~~ psyche [...] corrupted” as they became mostly receptors or consumers of political thinking during this phase. Because the nationalist leadership sought to control the pulse of the liberation war they promoted their ideology in order to arouse and sustain nationalist emotions that would fuel the liberation war. As such, nationalist propaganda assumed what Msindo (2011: 10) termed ~~the~~ binaries common in fundamentalist ideologies such as: “You are with us or without us”; “Comrade and sell-out”; “Nationalist or tribalist”; “White or black”; “Zimbabwean or Rhodesian”, and so on.”

At independence the policy of reconciliation on the part of the Prime Minister Robert Mugabe’s ZANU PF-led government temporarily clouded the binaries of the two liberation movements, albeit only on the surface. On the other hand the blacks and whites binary remained visible in terms of those who controlled the economic power and those who controlled political power, even when some whites from Rhodesia gained positions in government (Nkomo, 1984). What emerged was a new softer binary, in the form of the liberators (war veterans, war collaborators, ex-detainees/ restrictees of both ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU), and on the other hand the so-called “liberated”- the ordinary people or “masses”. The ZAPU/ZANU PF duality resurfaced with the insurrection of dissidents and the subsequent expulsion of PF-ZAPU from a ZANU-PF led government in 1982 (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Report, 1997).ⁱ ZANU-PF’s government forces offensive known as Operation Gukurahundi against dissidents and those ordinary people who were seen as their supporters in Matebeleland and Midlands provinces, (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Report, 1997) reconfigured the *Shona* speakers/*isiNdebele* speakers binary as the mirror images of a ZANU PF/PF-ZAPU dichotomy in the postcolonial era. Their rivalry then ceased (on the surface) for years as a new ZANU-PF elite emerged when the “old” ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU formed a unity government after signing their Unity Accord on 22 December 1987. The situation in the country reverted to two poles, the liberators and the liberated, as a one party state era began to be entrenched in the country (Tekere, 2007:

156). One-party state governance for ZANU PF meant that the separation of party and government increasingly became blurred. The country became ~~–ZANU PF and ZANU PF~~ the country” meaning that disloyalty to the party was interpreted as disloyalty to the country (Ndlela, 2010:7) and vice versa.

With the emergence in the 1990s of opposition political parties challenging ZANU PF hegemony, the liberation party projected Edgar Tekere’s Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), which allied itself with elements of the Rhodesian Front (RF), as misdirected former ruling party members who were ~~–disgruntled”~~ and sought to gain ground using ~~–reactionary”~~ whites, and as a party sponsored not by Zimbabweans but by those with ~~–outside interest”~~ (Kriger, 2005: 15). With the advent of the MDC formed in 1999, the opposition MDC party, and later the two MDC factions in contest for power with ZANU PF were seen as counter-revolutionary, unpatriotic and an extension of the imperial West bent on re-colonising Zimbabwe (Epel, 2004: 48-9). This judgement extended to individuals, civil society organisations and political parties critical of ZANU PF. Incidentally, this –patriotic perception is said to have invoked some kind of ZANU PF ~~–state of emergency”~~ which translates as ~~–extra legal means and political violence”~~ meted out to those perceived as –unpatriotic and –counter-revolutionary, as well as removing rights associated with citizenship and the right to one’s heritage (Tendi 2010: 154).ⁱ Therefore, Tendi (2010: 154) contends that to be classified in this narrative of patriotic history as –patriots or –sell outs divides Zimbabweans, Africans and the wider black Diaspora into patriots and sell outs, with ZANU PF and its supporters as the ~~–patriots”~~. The Government of National Unity (GNU), brought about by the inconclusive election of 2008, coupled with ZAPU’s revival in May 2009 when it pulled out of the Unity Accord of 1987ⁱ and its subsequent, have all created discord in ZANU PF’s rhetoric of –othering and –labelling of opposition parties as –counter-revolutionary and –unpatriotic.

Understanding of this historiography is core to unpacking the symbolic competition associated with the NHA, the liberation war memory and its attendant narratives in Zimbabwe’s postcolonial state.

Appendix 3

Historical Background on the land issue

The land issue in Zimbabwe has been at the heart of many struggles from pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial times. Among the indigenous people, loose alliances were forged within the Shona ethnic groups as they engaged in battles with each other. The arrival of the Ndebele people from Zululand in the 1830s saw struggles between the Ndebele and the Shona speaking groups over land (Chitiyo, 2003: 161). However, even more violent clashes over land rights were to be experienced from the 1890s upon the settlement of Europeans. Cecil John Rhodes' Pioneer Column and British South Africa Company (BSAC) fought with the Ndebele and Shona groups. This began with the Anglo-Ndebele war of 1893 followed by the 1896-7 First Chimurenga/Umvekelwa war, in which the indigenous Ndebele and Shona uprising was subdued by the European settlers. Thereafter land expropriation and proletarianisation of the indigenous people (Arrighi, 1969) by the White bourgeois nationalists of Rhodesian took place. This was reinforced by a well-orchestrated legislative system enforceable by coercion. African nationalist movements of ZANU PF, PF ZAPU and FROLIZ waged war from 1966 with the aim of restoring Africans' land rights upon achievement of majority rule. Even when the war ended in 1979 after the Lancaster House Constitutional agreement, the land issue remained an area of grave concern for the Patriotic Front negotiators led by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe.

At independence in 1980 the land situation was distorted along racial lines as shown in the government statement below:

[W]hite large-scale commercial farmers, consisting of less than 1% of the population occupied 45% of agricultural land. Seventy-five (75) percent of this is in the high rainfall areas of Zimbabwe, where the potential for agricultural production is high. Equally significant, 60% of this large-scale commercial land was not merely under-utilised but wholly unutilised (Government of Zimbabwe).ⁱ

On average a Large Scale Commercial Farm (LSCF) occupied an area of 10,000 hectares as compared to the 10 hectares used for a communal farm (UNDP in Africa All Party Parliamentary Group Report, 2009: 27). Efforts to address imbalances and ease pressure on communal lands between 1980 and 1989 saw about 52 000 families being resettled on about

16% of acquired Large Scale Commercial Farms (LSCFs). By 1996 the figure had increased to 71 000 households (Bratton/Moyo in Scoones 2010: 15). Land was bought on a ‘willing buyer willing seller’ basis as laid down in the Lancaster House Constitution using British donor funds and government acquired loans from African Development Bank and Kuwait. Thereafter, not much was done to address the land issue until peasants started invading LSCFs in 1999. Between 2000 and 2002 the ‘Third Chimurenga’ or land war involving peasants, war veterans and urbanites with state support invaded LSCFs resulting in the launch of the Fast Track Land Redistribution Programme (FTLRP) in July 2002. This FTLRP settled farm occupiers into pegged and surveyed A1 and A2 farming schemes (see Moyo et al 2009; Scoones et al 2010). The A1 scheme was intended to relieve pressure on communal lands and therefore allocates about 37 hectares inclusive of grazing land, while the A2 scheme sought to set up indigenous small scale commercial farmers in plots of about 318 hectares.

Below is a chronological summation of the historical process leading to the present status of land redistribution in Zimbabwe:

1889	Occupation of present day Zimbabwe by the Pioneer Column and the British South Africa Company (BSAC).
1893	Anglo-Ndebele war. The BSAC defeats and confiscates Ndebele land and cattle.
1894	Native Reserves are established and Customary Law is enacted by the BSAC administration.
1896/7	First Chimurenga/Umvekelwa. It ends with the defeat of the Shona and Ndebele groups by BSAC troops aided by mercenaries.
1901	Settler regime allots 8.4 million hectares of mostly arid land to 700 000 Blacks and allocates 32 million hectares of prime land to 12 600 settlers.
1923	Inter-capitalist strife between agrarian capital, mining capital and London finance results in settlers establishing a ‘self-rule government’ to administer their own political leadership and seek compromise with outside capital.
1930	The Land Apportionment Act is put in place after the recommendations of the Morris Carter Commission codifying racial division of land in Rhodesia, but also slightly increasing the amount of land meant for the Africans. Africans can now opt to buy land in the African Purchase Areas (APAs) disparagingly referred to by Africans as “ <i>Fenganyika</i> ” (Shona for buying our country’s land). ⁱ

1945	More land appropriation in favour of returning World War 2 White servicemen as veterans while the Black Serviceman who fought side by side with Whites are not rewarded.
1951	Native Land Husbandry Act ensures that at least some indigenous people's hectareage of land is increased and methods of land use and conservation are observed and enforced.
1965	Tribal Trust Land Act is passed, increasing land allocated to Africans in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) which were side by side the APAs. Farm workers from neighbouring countries had no land rights either in TTLs or APAs
1969	Ian Smith's regime institutes a new constitution in which both Coloured people and Asians are re-classified as 'Europeans' and are given land rights in the amended Land Apportionment Act of 1941 and the subsequent Land Tenure Act of 1969. Both the Coloureds and Indians cannot, however, buy land or immovable property next to 'stridly White land' because both these acts contain clauses forbidding sale, renting or otherwise of land to any person who is not considered 'wholly of European descent' (Muzondidya, 2004: 216-217).
1979	Rural Land Act becomes legal basis to start resettlement for Blacks.
1981	Communal Areas Act is passed and provides classification of formerly Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) as communal in accordance with Communal law.
1992	Land Acquisition Act is passed allowing government to identify, acquire and buy farmland, determine what price to pay for that land, and utilise it for resettlement.
1993	Rukuni Land Commission is established to study land tenure systems and make recommendations of best resettlement means to central government.
1998	Government launches the Second Land Reform and Resettlement Programme.
1999	The National Land Policy Framework Paper is developed to ensure that at least 20% of acquired land is given to women as a means to enhance their land-owning rights in their own capacity.
1999	Peasants in Svosve Communal lands, Mashonaland East Province start farm occupations.
2000	The Traditional Leaders Act is passed. The Act provisions the appointment of Chiefs, headmen and other village leaders and spells out their duties, functions and powers.

2000	Government launches Accelerated or Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) where land is surveyed and pegged as A1 and A2 farming Plots.
2003	Utete Land Commission is set to investigate land occupancy and use.
2007	Government launches Farm Mechanisation Programme designed to ensure both A1, A2 and small scale commercial farmers are equipped.