

**FROM CONFRONTATION TO CO-OPERATION: NEW
SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING POST-APARTHEID
SOUTHERN AFRICA.**

By

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ABSTRACT

Trite as it may sound, the end of the Cold War is a landmark event in the history of human-kind. As such, this thesis was motivated by some of the international and local events that have taken place since the end of the 1980s. At the international level, the end of the Cold War has encouraged the re-examination of the concept of security. In Southern Africa too, this process has been strengthened by the demise of apartheid in South Africa. Initially challenged by a few academics, the traditional conception of security which perceived the threat to 'national' security primarily in the form of external military aggression no longer enjoys the primacy it was accorded during the Cold War era.

A 'new' security discourse has emerged, and even though it has not yet made inroads into many governments' policy papers, there is some realisation that people's security concerns go beyond external military aggression to the state. Proponents of this 'new' thinking make reference to people-centred or human security - the notion that people and not the state, must be the objects of security. Arising from that, they point to the existence of many phenomena which should also be accorded security status especially in developing countries where people are confronted by life-threatening challenges such as disease, poverty, famine, and other challenges which do not necessarily threaten life, but if not tackled with urgency could transform themselves into the more conventional military threats. Here reference is made to the proliferation of small arms, political instability, mass migrations, and so on.

In a region besotted by many of the challenges mentioned above, a security conception informed by the 'new' approach seems more appropriate. The outcome of the traditional approach to security is well known to the region - many millions of lives were lost and it is estimated that billions of dollars in revenue were also lost, all in the name of maintaining the security of the South

African state. Seeing neighbouring states as threats to its security because they accommodated liberation movements who occasionally instigated military attacks against Pretoria, the former apartheid state through its policy of 'Total Strategy' terrorised the entire region, including the majority of citizens within South Africa.

However, since the end of apartheid in 1994, the new democratically elected South African government has committed itself to help build a politically stable, more secure, economically prosperous and integrated region. Through its accession to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a body which it once tried to undermine, South Africa has further demonstrated a commitment to tackle some of the region's problems in unison with its former adversaries. Throughout the Southern African region there is a realisation that there are more long-term benefits to be gained by working together to tackle the challenges that confront almost all the countries in the region than trying to solve problems independently.

Therefore through SADC, primarily a development-oriented body, Southern African states will also seek to address the region's security concerns. Many of the region's governments seem to show an understanding that security and development are intertwined - that they are two sides of the same coin whereby one cannot be attained without the other. Much as this understanding is laudable, in practice it does not seem as if it will translate to the prominence of so-called development issues or marginal security issues. Accepting the 'new' thinking on security also implies an acceptance of a wider range of security agents. It does not mean that by widening the agenda of security to include non-military threats, more tasks will follow for the 'men' in uniform. What it means is that, the military establishment should no longer be the sole agent of security. Instead, where there is no military threat, resources should be channeled to other establishments such as those of health and research in order to fight the

spread of AIDS. Furthermore, departments of water, environmental affairs, and so on, should be part of the security policy-making process. In addition, civil society should also be included in the policy-making process. Notwithstanding its limitations, and without undermining inter-governmental projects, civil society can at best promote security by serving as a watch-dog over policies adopted by governments. South Africa during the era of apartheid is a classic example of how governments cannot always be entrusted with the security of ordinary citizens.

However, an examination of the structure and terms of reference of the newly created SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (from henceforth referred to as the Organ) reflects a preponderance of the traditional/realist approach to addressing security concerns. It was conceived by, and is primarily constituted by the traditional establishments of security, that is, the military and the police. Some of the Organ's objectives include; security and defence co-operation through conflict prevention, management and resolution; and mediation of disputes and conflicts. Nowhere is it evident that others besides those from a military/police background were involved in the formation of this important body. There is also no indication as to how other dimensions of security will be attained through the Organ. All this casts doubt regarding SADC's actual commitment to a development-oriented, people-centred and people-driven security. Nonetheless, current debates on security give hope to the notion that in the future, people's overall security needs will be addressed.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 'New' World Order

The fall of the Berlin Wall, even though it occurred seven years ago (1989), will have equally far-reaching implications for the world as other watershed events such as the industrial revolution which began in England in the eighteenth century. Karl Marx's dream of a communist world was crushed by the former event and soon after that the winds of liberal multiparty democracy swept over Eastern Europe, much of Africa, South America, the Middle East and Asia in the early 1990s. Western triumphalism led former American president, George Bush to announce his vision of a 'new world order' where Western liberal democracy and economic prosperity would be the order of the day. The 'bipolar world' of the Cold War era has made way for a 'multipolar world'. New economic and regional groupings are being formed and some of those that existed prior to the end of the Cold War, such as the European Community (EC), have expanded. Each of the world's regions has developed powerful economic blocs as a counterweight to the European Union (EU), formerly known as the EC. There are at present economic formations in the Pacific Rim, North America, all the five sub-regions that make up Africa, and Central and South America. Unlike the previous global dispensation, which was characterised by competing perspectives between communism and democratic free-market economies, these regional economic groupings point towards a more interdependent and open global economy.

Furthermore, the information super-highway, even though it is not yet universally experienced, has given reality to the global village concept. Because of the widespread effects of technological innovation, the sanctity of national borders

and concepts such as sovereignty are no longer unequivocal. Facsimile machines, cellular communication and television networks such as CNN have compressed time and space. Solomon¹ argues that there is a nascent global culture taking shape. He observes that: "Denim jeans and Coca-Cola are universal. If Toshiba and Toyota are in New York, then McDonald's and Kentucky Fried Chicken will be found in Tokyo. If stewed lamb is being cooked in a New Delhi delicatessen, then you can bet that a posh London restaurant is serving a hot Indian curry. If Michael Jackson and Madonna are burning the airwaves in Montevideo, Maputo or Kuala Lumpur, then West African and Indian music represented by the likes of Manu Dibango and Babu Shegal, are sure to be found in a Parisian or Manchester discotheque."²

Flipping the 'new world order' coin one discovers an uglier side masked with many contradictions. The end of the Cold War has brought about increased competition for investment in the developing countries. Financial aid and investment which was used as bait by the competing blocs during the Cold War is dwindling. Investment is being redirected towards Eastern European states that promise a much better return on investments. While some academics and politicians allude to an interdependent world, 'oozing' with potential for global economic prosperity, certain countries are growing poorer. For most Third World countries, financial aid, whether it be provided by independent states or through the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), is accompanied by conditionalities of liberalisation of recipient economies. On the other hand, industrialised countries of the North are accused of protecting their industries and markets, making it difficult for the developing countries to gain access to crucial markets which hold enormous potential for the generation of foreign exchange. From a macro-economic perspective the crisis of many developing countries lingers. As a group, developing countries are still dependent on the 'North' for foreign capital and technology, and the

industrialised countries still determine the pricing of primary commodities which are mainly produced by developing countries.

The end of the Cold War was hailed as the beginning of an era of political stability and international peace, accompanied by economic and social progress. The adoption of Western-style liberal democracies by previously totalitarian states and the application of economic structural adjustment programmes by struggling economies were flaunted as the panacea. During the height of the Cold War, the world was preoccupied with the maintenance of international peace and stability between states. More specifically, a super-power nuclear confrontation was to be avoided at all costs, and the achievement of this objective was equated with 'security'. During this era, democracy in the developing world was not vigorously espoused by the West as it is now the case.

The Cold War, in so far as it was carried out in Africa and other Third World regions, featured permanent interference by the superpowers. For example, it was common practice for superpowers to provide weapons, moral support and financial rewards to undemocratic regimes if they propagated a desired ideology. The US-led Western states were happy if a client-state propagated free-market principles, whereas the Soviet Union sought their client-states to follow communism. Moreover the superpowers turned a blind eye to repressive regimes and instead provided them with all the necessary tools to quell 'dissent'. The United States' support of the Mobutu regime in Zaire is one example. Within such an environment the capacity of disaffected groups to engage in protest and challenge recognised authority was limited.

With the end of superpower antagonism the space for internal opposition to previously repressive customs was suddenly uncovered. Some of the strategic alliances carved during the height of the Cold War, like that between the United

States of America and Mobutu in Zaire, were weakened. Instead, former allies found themselves at the receiving end of Western domination as they were forced to democratise. Western nations, either through the guise of the Bretton Woods institutions or independently, pressurised other states to practice political pluralism and to adopt Western-style democracies. Indeed, since 1989 some thirty single-party or military governments in Africa have transferred power by means of multi-party elections, increasing the total number of multi-party democracies in Africa's 53 independent states to 36.³ However, democratic reforms were promoted in conjunction with structural adjustment programmes. The danger inherent in such a strategy is that the failure of structural adjustment programmes may in some cases result in the delegitimisation of democracy. Zambia provides a worthy example of this predicament. When the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) assumed power in 1991, it subjected Zambia's economy to some of the austerity measures prescribed by the World Bank and the IMF. Thus far structural adjustment programmes have not been able to curb Zambia's decline to poverty. Expectations of democracy after Chiluba won the first multiparty elections in Zambia have dissipated. Discontent with the government is growing, and the present administration has resorted to despotic measures in an attempt to hold on to power. Several journalists have been imprisoned for being critical of the government, and Chiluba was reportedly harassing opposition parties prior to the 1996 general elections.

Political pluralism has in certain cases exacerbated intra-state conflict on an unprecedented scale. Liberal democracy was developed over a long period and under specific conditions in Europe and North America. However, those specific conditions do not exist in many parts of the world. It is because of these factors that some countries have failed to 'absorb' the changes associated with liberal multiparty democracy and have continued to experience political instability and intra-state conflict. The underdevelopment of principles associated with democracy was revealed in Angola and Burundi. In both cases multiparty

elections neither brought about political stability nor an end to conflict within those societies. In Angola for example, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rejected the results of the 1992 elections and opted for a return to war, thereby reinforcing the tradition of expressing discontent through the bullet as opposed to the ballot.

Even though democracy has brought about positive changes in countries such as South Africa and Namibia, it has not recorded similar outcomes in other African countries. The impact of the 'new world order' has reduced both the risks of super-power nuclear confrontation on a global scale and the incidence of inter-state violence, but it has also exposed other forms of insecurity which are often of a more regional or domestic nature. Equally, the collapse of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 has had as profound an impact on regional relations as the end of the Cold War.

Most of the major historical conflicts in the Southern African region have either been resolved or are in the process of being settled. Relatively free and fair elections took place in Mozambique in 1994, and even though peace remains elusive in Angola there is hope for political stability. With the end of apartheid and South Africa's destabilisation policies, inter-state conflict in the Southern African region seems to be a remote possibility. Some politicians have confidently predicted that no country in the region will be threatened by external military aggression in the near future.

However, there are other important sources of insecurity in Southern Africa, some of which might have been unveiled by the political changes that have taken place over the last seven years. These changes in the emerging political and economic environment have prompted an examination of the security setting in Southern Africa. It is in this context that the thesis will identify some of the historical threats to Southern Africa's security before a discussion of the

contemporary threats is undertaken. The thesis will move from a premise that most of the threats to Southern Africa's security have changed since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of apartheid. Furthermore, the thesis will analyse whether the methods that were traditionally used to 'maintain' security in the past are suitable in the new environment. In addition, the thesis will examine some of the means through which Southern Africa's governments are trying to deal with the new security environment and make some recommendations as to how to provide security for the people of the region.

The second chapter of the thesis will explain what is generally understood by security in international affairs. Furthermore, it will highlight the influence of the theory of Realism in international relations and more particularly in the discourse on security and the way governments traditionally understand and promote security. Emerging alternative approaches which conceive security in a different manner will also be examined.

The third chapter will discuss the history of conflict in Southern Africa from the early 1980s until the end of the decade. This era was characterised by profound inter-state conflict, primarily initiated by South Africa in defence of its internal policy of apartheid. Most of the countries in Southern Africa that supported the liberation movements of South Africa, faced the wrath of Pretoria's military aggression. The extent of damage to Southern African countries which has been caused by South Africa's destabilisation tactics will also be discussed.

The fourth chapter serves as a warning. With the termination of most of the major historical conflicts in the region, most people seem to be overly optimistic about the future of the region. However, political tensions in Zambia, the ongoing political crisis in Angola, political violence in Kwazulu-Natal (South Africa), give an indication of the problems that must still be resolved before political stability and genuine peace can be achieved. Therefore, this chapter will

examine some of the domestic tensions that exist in all of the SADC states, some of which could easily lead to conflict within those states. Additionally, given the permeable nature of borders in Southern Africa, instability in one country may affect other neighbouring countries, turning what was originally a single-state problem into a regional problem. Furthermore, this chapter will investigate some of the non-military threats that confront almost all of Southern Africa's states. Most of these threats (AIDS, poverty, drug trafficking, small arms proliferation, environmental degradation, etc.), often referred to as the 'new' security challenges, have confronted the region and its people for a long time, but they were concealed by the strait-jacket of bi-polar politics and the understanding of security exclusively in military terms.

The fifth chapter will review the attempts that have been made at regional security co-operation. This chapter will look at some of the confidence-and-security-building measures that have been undertaken to promote trust and minimise conflict among Southern African states. Furthermore, it will discuss the institutions and frameworks that were identified as the most suitable to address some of the region's security concerns. Problems and prospects associated with these institutions, and how they will operate within an international environment will also be dealt with.

In the concluding chapter the thesis will consolidate the above arguments while suggesting a people-driven and development-oriented approach to the realisation of security in the region. Here the emphasis will be on the fact that security is inextricably linked to development, especially in Southern Africa. Finally, the thesis will recommend a more pro-active role for non-state actors in the promotion of security in Southern Africa.

1.2 Unit of Analysis: Is Southern Africa a Region?

The term 'region', referring to Southern Africa, is often used freely without an understanding of its precise meaning. "Is the region the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) states of South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland; or is it the twelve Southern African Development Community (SADC) states; or the twenty-two states constituting COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa)?"⁴ Solomon and Cilliers⁵ find the classification of Southern African states as forming a region, problematic. Their argument is inspired by Evans and Newnham⁶ who identify one of the important criteria for a region to be homogeneity between states at social, economic and political levels. Solomon and Cilliers⁷ cannot observe social homogeneity between states and instead, they argue that Southern Africa is characterised by a great deal of heterogeneity at the levels of religion and language. Furthermore, they profess that there is little political or economic homogeneity in Southern Africa. The argument propagated by Solomon and Cilliers⁸ raises some pertinent issues, some of which have been overlooked by 'regional' commentators. It might be true that the classification of Southern African states as a 'region' is somewhat arbitrary, but for the purposes of this thesis, the author will regard the twelve SADC states, that is, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe as constituting a region.

With the exception of Mauritius, the Southern African states that presently constitute SADC share a history of colonialism under British and Portuguese empires. As a result, English and Portuguese are widely spoken in the region. Additionally, there are some indigenous languages that are common to some countries in the region. For example, Setswana, which is spoken in Botswana and various parts of South Africa, is similar to Sesotho or a variation thereof, which is spoken in Lesotho and South Africa. Similarly, the Nguni population of

South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe tend to speak variations of the same language and observe the same culture. Furthermore, the history of struggle against colonialism and surrogate organisations that were intended to undermine the liberation of Southern Africa's people, and subsequently the struggle against apartheid policies of South Africa, imparts a deep bond amongst the SADC countries.

A related moot point that needs clarification is the distinction between 'region' and 'subregion'. These terms are often used interchangeably to refer to the same entity. For example, Southern Africa is commonly designated 'region' status while technically it is a subregion. Africa is a region, currently comprising of five subregions - Eastern Africa, Western Africa, Northern Africa, Central Africa and Southern Africa. Seeing that most of the literature on Southern Africa uses the term 'region', the thesis will adopt the same imprecision.

¹ H. Solomon, *Towards the 21st Century: A New Global Security Agenda?*, Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) Occasional Paper, No. 6, June 1996.

² *Ibid*, pp. 5 - 6.

³ G. Mills, *Inter-and Intra-State Conflict in Africa in the 1990s: Democracy as a Cure-All?*, *Strategic Review For Southern Africa*, XVIII (1), May 1996, p. 30.

⁴ H. Solomon and J. Cilliers, *Sources of Southern African Insecurity and the Quest for Regional Integration, People, Poverty and Peace: Human Security in Southern Africa*, Institute for Defence Policy, Midrand, 1996, p. 18.

⁵ *Ibid*.

⁶ G. Evans and J. Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions*, New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.

⁷ Solomon and Cilliers, *op. cit*.

⁸ *Ibid*.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL CONTEXT: THE 'NEW' SECURITY DEBATE AND ITS RELEVANCE TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

2.1 The Traditional Conception of Security: Realist Dominance

For many years international relations as an academic discipline and in practice has been dominated by the Realist paradigm. The ideas associated with political Realism can be traced to the ancient Greeks and Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* which was an attempt to explain the origins of international conflict in terms of the dynamics of power-politics. Sometimes referred to as the 'power-politics' school of thought, Realism sees international relations as the struggle for power between states. Among some of its prominent early adherents were E.H. Carr, R. Niebuhr, M. Wight and Hans Morgenthau whose *Politics Among Nations* has been very influential in its emphasis on the centrality of power in enhancing security in the anarchical structure of international relations.

Similarly, the nineteenth century Prussian strategist, Clausewitz, is associated with advancing the tradition of using military capabilities to achieve political goals. Therefore, it is evident that Realists place a high premium on the state's use of coercive instruments to achieve national objectives. As a set of propositions, the tradition also focuses on the nation-state as the principal actor in world politics and its proponents believe that since states operate in a hostile environment (anarchic arena of world politics) the acquisition of power is the proper, rational and inevitable goal of foreign policy. Power in this sense is conceptualised as both a means and an end in itself. It is seen as the ability to influence or change the behaviour of others in a desired direction, or alternatively, the ability to resist such influences on one's own behaviour. What

a state can do in world politics is therefore a function of the power it possesses.¹ It is the preponderance of this kind of thinking that brought about the nuclear armaments race and the general global militarisation. It is also this power-centred approach that led former South African policy-makers to the mistaken belief that coercive instruments of the state (e.g. the military) are the best method of achieving foreign policy objectives.

2.1.1 What Does Security Mean in International Relations?

The conceptual arena of security has remained impoverished by the reluctance of international relations scholars to subject it to thorough scrutiny and sustained examination.² In the realm of international relations security is normally equated with the absence of military threats or with the nation's protection from external overthrow or attack. For many years security studies was seen as "the study of threat, use, and control of military force."³ This approach, was concerned with defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, either through the use of force or the threat thereof. However, in its broadest sense, security can be defined as the pursuit of freedom from threat.⁴ Similarly, security in an objective sense measures the absence of threats to acquired values and, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.⁵ This broader understanding of security, when applied to international relations, recognises that the concept is essentially contested and can cover a wide range of issues and contexts.

2.1.2 Who are the Objects of Security?

Another way to pose this question is to ask who is being made secure, and what are they being secured from? Historically, states were the object of security and states maintained security. National security policies were primarily concerned with the protection of the state from external military aggression. This

understanding of security as the counteraction of external military threats, confines security to the domain of states. The relevance of this approach has to be questioned. How applicable is it to the millions of 'Third World' residents who are threatened by other phenomena such as poverty and disease? Should the concept of security and the policies that derive from this conceptualisation not encompass a wider range of threats than threats to the state? Should this not necessitate a reorientation of the objects of security? Given the changing socio-political-economic international environment which encompasses a broad spectrum of threats, should people not be regarded as the objects of security?

2.1.3 What Constitutes Threats to Security?

This is the question that policy makers have to grapple with when formulating national security policy. Traditionally it has been easy to offer an answer to this question - military threats, such as invasions which undermine the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state, were seen as threats to national security. However, the index of threats to security has to be extended. In addition to the external and military threats, there are also less apparent, internal, and non-military threats to states such as poverty, food scarcity and environmental degradation.

In this chapter an attempt will be made to highlight the inadequacy of the conventional concept of security which tends to focus on the military-political dimensions exclusively. Arguments put forward by prominent analysts such as Buzan⁶ and Booth⁷ who expand the concept of security beyond the military to include economic, societal, and environmental dimensions will also be examined.

Realism's lopsided emphasis on power, the nation-state and military prowess was first challenged by John Herz.⁸ In his challenge to the traditional power-

centred model of using military capabilities to achieve political goals, Herz attempts to place security at the heart of analysis. According to Herz "rising spirals of power are associated with falling spirals of security."⁹ Even though Herz tries to develop security as a core concept, he fails to transcend the Realist paradigm due to his concern with national security or the nature of states and not the international system.¹⁰ This state-centric analysis of security treats it (security) as a consequence of power relations, and not as a direct motive of state conduct. It is this kind of analysis that drove Buzan to argue that: "In this subordinate role, security has never been seen as a major concept capable of encompassing the field of international relations as a whole".¹¹

This undertreatment of the concept of security has been overridden by the attention given to the more central organising concept of power. Buzan identifies five reasons for the conceptual underdevelopment of security. Firstly, the idea of security is perceived to be too complex. Secondly, he notes an overlap between the concept of security and that of power. In Realist orthodoxy power dominates both as end and as means, therefore security necessarily shrinks conceptually to being a way of saying either how well any particular state or allied group of states is doing in the struggle for power, or how stable the balance of power overall appears to be. Thirdly, Buzan notes that the assortment of revolts against the Realist tradition have tended to shy away from the concept of security. Fourthly, the nature of strategic studies as a sub-field has contributed towards the conceptual underdevelopment of security. Buzan notes that strategic studies has conventionally offered a shorter-term policy-oriented perspective, which has been linked directly to Anglo-American defence needs, and has a primary concern with military matters. Finally, Buzan is of the opinion that the symbolic ambiguity of security has been used to the benefit of certain sectors of society. In other words, security is better off defined as it is because in this way, by invoking 'national security', political and military elites are justified in pursuing power-maximising strategies.¹² For Buzan the struggle for security is the

essence of international relations. He rejects the treatment of security as a mere product of power relations and formulates security as a broader behavioural motive for states. He therefore rephrases Morgenthau's axiom of 'interest defined as power' as 'interest defined as security'.¹³

The conventional concept of security is undergoing a revolution. Some analysts attribute the revitalised debate on security to the cessation of the bi-polar conflict which underlined the inadequacy of the Realist paradigm. (However, the present trend towards a broader definition of security began in the early 1980s with Buzan's influential work¹⁴ and the work of the Palme Commission which promoted 'common security' and influenced European thought even before the end of the Cold War.) As changes related to the disintegration of the Soviet bloc unfolded, it became apparent that security means more than the military capacity to repel external military aggression. Some of the issues that are now encompassed in the 'new' security agenda, such as environmental degradation (and many others which will be discussed in detail later), have threatened humanity for many years. However, the AIDS epidemic, the growing visibility of environmental problems and the growth of ethnic nationalism, which manifested itself in internal conflict in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, invigorated the view that threats to security can be experienced in various forms and from diverse sources. The violence between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi, and between Serbs, Croats and Muslims in the former Yugoslavia did not fit within the classical understanding of threats to security emanating from external sources. Additionally, these conflicts were not confined to the countries in which they were being waged. Victims of these conflicts fled to neighbouring countries in large numbers, often placing a heavy burden on those states and fostering insecurity. Tanzania for example, has had to play host to over a million refugees from Rwanda and Burundi. Early in 1996 Tanzania finally shut its border with Burundi, complaining of the heavy pressure refugees were exerting on its impoverished economy.¹⁵ Likewise, Zairian authorities forcibly repatriated

refugees from Rwanda and Burundi in February 1996. Southern Africa has a high population of internally displaced people and refugees from the ethnic and civil strifes that have recently been occurring either within the region or on its borders. The number of refugees from war is so great as to undermine the stability, as well as the economies of many Southern African states. As these disconcerting trends emerged, the realisation dawned among academics and policy-makers that new ways of understanding and identifying potential sources of threats were needed, and that innovative thinking was required on how to deal with these threats.

2.2 A Broader Understanding of Security: The Holistic Approach

Until the end of the Cold War security was synonymous with defence, and more specifically the defence of the state. Governments assumed that national security was their main goal. The nation was the primary object to be protected, and the armed forces in a war-fighting role was the primary means of protection. Various definitions of security share the unitary conception of national security in terms of the high politics strategic dimension where the emphasis is on coercive power as the instrument to preserve national security. This results in the primacy of high politics based on the assumption that threats are mostly external and military in form.¹⁶ The underlying assumption from this (Realist) approach is that security is confined primarily to inter-state relations. Threats to security are therefore identified as war, border conflicts or terrorism, and much emphasis is placed on the principles of territoriality and state sovereignty.

Many analysts are beginning to question the perception that security means the absence of external military threats or the protection of the nation-state from external attack. Commentators such as Buzan and Booth propose a more holistic approach that goes beyond military-political concerns, and has the

needs of the people as its point of departure. Such an approach would be more suitable for Southern Africa which is beset by a range of critical problems that do not necessarily fit within the conventional paradigm. Realism has always focused on the protection of the 'abstract' state as opposed to the threats which are affecting human beings directly.

In response to this narrow concept of security, the Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues - under the auspices of the UN) revitalised the debate on security issues in 1980, especially those confronting the 'Third World' states. As the narrow conception of security came under increasing attack, many analysts started favouring an expansion of the concept both horizontally and vertically. For Buzan the horizontal expansion of security involves the creation of a wider agenda which includes five sectors: political, economic, societal and environmental as well as military.¹⁷ To agree to broaden the concept of security in this way is not simply an intellectual act; it also involves a shift from a status quo political perspective to one that conceives security in terms of change, it is to accept - perhaps without realising it - that human security is ultimately more important than state security.¹⁸ The augmentation of a wider security agenda was echoed in the Human Development Report of 1993, which emphasised that security should be interpreted as security for people, not security for land, state or regime.¹⁹ In contrast to traditional Cold War security thinking, the emerging discourse dislodges the state as the primary object of security, and instead sees states merely as a means and not ends of security.

The vertical expansion of security involves conceiving it as a levels-of-analysis problem. This means that if security is conceived in terms of a wide variety of threats to human life and well-being, then it is necessary to consider not just the threats which are relevant at state level, but at all the levels appropriate for individual and group living, for example, ethnic, regional and global. Security

must be conceptualised within the broader international system. An understanding of the linkages between global, regional, and national security concerns must be developed.

In his assessment of the concept of security, Richard Ullman²⁰ argues that the dangers inherent in the utility of the narrow and excessively militaristic notion of national security are that while political leaders may use this notion as a guideline, it may cause them to miss potentially even more harmful dangers, such as environmental threats. Ullman and other proponents of the 'new' security thinking demand that the traditional definition be expanded to include more than military threats and responses. Even militarily capable states such as the USA do not guarantee their citizens security; people feel threatened by a host of threats which include pollution and other non-military threats. Therefore, a more comprehensive conception of security must be accompanied by an expanded notion of threat. The overwhelmingly military approach to security is based on the assumption that the principal security threat comes from other states. Within a wider approach, security is seen to arise less from the relationship between states and more, for example, from the relationship between people and nature. Therefore, attention needs to be focused on the less apparent, non-military threats which include among others environmental degradation.

In her critique of the conventional approach to security, van Aardt²¹ is of the opinion that the Realist perspective does not paint a true reflection of the threats facing Southern Africa nor does it offer the best alternative for enhancing the security needs of Southern Africa's people. She argues that: "Judging by the crisis of civil unrest, migration, diseases, drought, famine, environmental degradation, debt and unemployment, to name but a few, it is clear that Southern Africa is wrestling with the very problem of the survival of human collectives. A one-dimensional focus on the military-political dimension of

security does not therefore take account for the full range of security issues facing the sub-continent".²² The experiences of most people in the developing world come close to the Hobbesian state of nature. There is conflict, deprivation, greed and despair and for the most part, life is indeed nasty, brutish and short, characterised by an everlasting struggle for survival. van Aardt emphasises that anything that seriously threatens the well-being or the collective survival of human beings should be accorded security status and this should not only be restricted to those threats that are external and military in form. For example, many have argued that disease, famine and other similar threats are developmental problems and as such do not deserve security status.

Widening the security agenda by including and classifying phenomena such as unemployment as security threats obviously has implications. It implies that security status can be accorded to issues outside the normal run of politics or economics, and that special measures need to be taken by the state to deal with these issues.²³ Critics often point out that broadening the security agenda may lead to unmanageability. It is obvious that no government or political system can deal with all conceivable threats, either in the military or non-military security fields. As such these arguments point to a defence of the status quo, of identifying security strictly with defence in a military sense. Booth retorts by asking 'so what' if the agenda is broadened? Is that not what the political process is all about - making choices between competing demands?²⁴ The widening security agenda should not imply that the military apparatus of the state will be overburdened. The implementation of solutions to security problems does not have to be dealt with only by the military. This does not mean that the input of the military will no longer be required in security matters, but it does mean that their expertise and contribution will be limited to those moments when there are military threats.

By expanding the security agenda and adding items that were previously not regarded as security issues, a higher profile is accorded to these items. Booth strongly argues that: "If we are serious about human rights, economic development, the lot of women and so on - all security problems for somebody, and for many people their most serious - then we must simply accept the problems of an expanded agenda and of the need to settle the question of priorities in the political process".²⁵ But perhaps certain sectors of society may derive benefits from a restricted security agenda - when issues such as human rights are kept off the agenda these sectors of society will continue to be privileged. Such a restriction reinforces existing power relations because prevalent ideas in society are linked to dominant classes. A broadened agenda recognises that subordinate classes or women may have fundamentally different conceptions of security to those held by the dominant class. It is important to ask who is being made secure and what are they being made secure from? Along similar lines of thought Booth asks whose security we seek to address when we refer to security in Southern Africa? Furthermore, who or what is our priority concern?

The traditional approach also lacks an ethic of care and responsibility with regard to both the marginalised groups in society and to the earth and its resources. A security agenda that solely reflects military concerns perpetuates the high expenditures on armaments and the maintenance of exorbitant military budgets. As a result of the dominance of this approach we have witnessed large-scale militarisation in the 'Third World', often at the expense of other values necessary for survival and progress, such as welfare, economic efficiency and environmentally sound development.²⁶ 'Development problems' are often pushed to the background of government priorities and are not addressed with the urgency they require. This leads to another weakness that has been identified with the traditional approach. It is often argued that the traditional approach places too much emphasis on the immediacy of a threat. Only crises that arise

from short-term threats are accorded security status. This insistence upon a strong link between security threats and immediacy obscures the environmental, economic and developmental dimensions of security which can only be attended to through long-term responsibility and care.²⁷ The AIDS pandemic, for example, poses a serious existential threat to many African people. However, because it requires a long-term strategy governments have not committed adequate resources to combating AIDS.

The conventional doctrine is inappropriate to addressing the region's security problems in another respect - its focus is more on the maintenance of security as opposed to providing security. van Aardt adds a fresh dimension to the 'new' security debate with the following argument: If we perceive the primary objective of security as being the provision of security, then it is important to distinguish between needs and threats. She argues that although these two (needs and threats) are interwoven in the Southern African context, both being different sides of the same coin, needs refer to those security concerns which have to be provided.²⁸ She makes this distinction by stating that the people of Southern Africa need, for instance, food, access to clean water, health services, economic opportunities and energy in order to be secure. On the other hand, they are confronted by threats such as drought, ecological disaster, failed development ventures, AIDS, international debt, competition for scarce resources and ever increasing population numbers. This distinction is van Aardt's attempt to offset the criticism levelled at proponents of the widening agenda. Among other things the 'new' security approach is said to lend security a normative value - making it lose its significance. Therefore, van Aardt adds a measure of caution to the widening process. By distinguishing between needs and threats, van Aardt recognises that some form of prioritisation is required in dealing with problems that confront the people of Southern Africa. For example, if people are not provided with clean water and if they lack food, their immune systems will be weakened and this may make them vulnerable to disease such as AIDS which is

a threat to their existence. Similarly, governments should strive to provide economic opportunities through employment. The high rate of unemployment in the region may not be seen as a life-threatening problem at present, but the desperation for a means of livelihood may lead people to resort to criminal activities such as drug trafficking and gun racketeering which threaten life. It is evident that widening the security agenda may imply the securitisation of almost every problem. However, one must understand that in most 'Third World' societies, the line between so-called development issues (needs) and existential threats is very thin. The failure to realise that Southern Africa's security concerns extend beyond military threats is to reinforce the parochial nature of the dominant paradigm. The military-oriented and state-centric understanding of security, which is limited to issues such as defence, nuclear proliferation and deterrence, reflects the security concerns of the superpowers during the Cold War era.

Since the end of the Cold War one of the discernible trends in the international system has been a tendency towards greater interdependence, regionalism and internationalism. This trend is not only restricted to the 'positive' formations of regional economic blocs and other international organisations. The rigid overlay of national security has diminished and this has provided a challenge to the notion of the sanctity of state sovereignty and national borders. The impact of developed communications systems and the role of the global media in bringing to the fore concerns that were previously submerged by superpower rivalry, have compelled states to define their own security in a very fluid regional and international arena.²⁹ Southern Africa is not exempt from these emerging trends - it is a closely integrated region, where welfare and security depends on a complex set of relationships both within and among its states. The insight demonstrated by, among others, General Georg Meiring (Chief of the South African National Defence Force) when he said that "the national security of the RSA cannot be separated from that of other states on the subcontinent, nor from

regional realities....”³⁰, reflects a shift within South Africa’s military establishment from the narrow state-centric concept of security to a more holistic conception which takes into account that security should be sought at various levels including regional formations. Furthermore, it is encouraging that Meiring seems to understand the link between the socio-economic development and security concerns of those who are threatened by disease, hunger, and general poor living conditions.³¹ Accordingly, shifting the focus of security towards the ‘ordinary citizens’ as objects of security implies the possibility that their general well-being, rather than that of the state, might be served. In the developing world the ordinary citizens form a majority of the poor and the absolute poor who are in desperate need of protection from poverty and inequality which pose more immediate threats than any direct threat of military attack.³²

Prior to the demise of apartheid, the South African government and the white minority group who kept it in power perceived the ANC and other liberation movements as a threat to the state of South Africa. Additionally, neighbouring countries who supported organisations which fought for the liberation of the majority of South Africans were also perceived as a threat. It is well known what the repercussions of such perceptions for the majority of South Africans and the people of the region were. In many instances governments have not represented reliable custodians of security over all the interests of all their populations. This was more pronounced in South Africa during the apartheid era. The security of the state, which the South African government sought to protect, was not the security of everyone living in South Africa. Additionally, South Africa’s ‘Total Strategy’ security was maintained at the expense of other Southern African countries’ security. This analogy is applicable to many countries where there have been civil wars. The primary source of insecurity has often been the country’s own government, through the military apparatus and not the armed forces of a neighbouring country. Therefore, the Realist doctrine which assumes that the state is at all times poised as guardian over the security of people living

in that state is erroneous. Despite strong military forces and secure borders, the chief security threat for many people and groups in the world, is the very government under whose sovereignty they live, either through its power and oppressive policies, or as a result of its incapacity to sustain the infrastructure of life for everybody.³³

There is thus a need for a revision of power-centred, Realist-dominated and state-centric approaches to security in Southern Africa. This revision is necessary to bring the governments more in touch with the realities of the post-Cold War and post-apartheid era. National security policies of the past did not enhance the security of respective states, nor did they enhance the region's overall security. South Africa's security policy in particular, which was based on military responses to perceived external aggression from neighbouring states, only fostered instability and insecurity in the region.

¹ G. Evans, and J. Newnham, The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992, p. 277.

² T. Workman, *Amplifying the Social Dimensions of Security*, Centre for International Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 17, November, 1993, p. 1.

³ Quoted in E. Kolodziej, *Renaissance in Security Studies?*, International Studies Quarterly, No. 36, 1992, p. 422.

⁴ H. Hafterndorn, *The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security*, International Studies Quarterly, No. 35, 1991.

⁵ Quoted in X. Carim, *Strategic Perspectives for Southern Africa in the 1990s: Theoretical and Practical Considerations*, Southern African Perspectives, No. 23, 1993, p. 7.

⁶ B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983.

⁷ K. Booth, *A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations*, Southern African Perspectives, No. 30, 1994.

⁸ J. Herz, *Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma*, World Politics 2, 1950

⁹ Quoted in T. Workman, *Amplifying the Social Dimensions of Security*, Occasional Paper No. 17, Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Toronto, 1993, p. 4.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ B. Buzan, *op. cit.*, pp. 110 -111.

¹² B. Buzan, *op. cit.*

¹³ Quoted in Workman, *op. cit.*, pp. 5 - 7.

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- ¹⁴ B. Buzan, *op. cit.*
- ¹⁵ The Star, 23 January 1996.
- ¹⁶ M. van Aardt, *In Search of a more adequate concept of security for Southern Africa*, South African Journal of International Affairs, 1(1), 1993, p. 84.
- ¹⁷ Booth, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹ United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 1.
- ²⁰ R. Ullman, *Redefining Security*, International Security, 8(1), 1983.
- ²¹ M. van Aardt, *op. cit.*
- ²² van Aardt, *op. cit.*, p. 84.
- ²³ G. Cawthra, *An Alternative Approach To Security*, Salvo, February 1996, p. 13.
- ²⁴ Booth, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
- ²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 7.
- ²⁶ van Aardt, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
- ²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 86.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*
- ²⁹ R. Kasrils, *The Value of Our Defence Industry*, Salvo, February 1996, p. 9.
- ³⁰ G. Meiring, *Taking the South African Army into the Future*, African Defence Review, No. 14, 1994, p. 2.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*
- ³² van Aardt, *op. cit.*
- ³³ *Ibid*, p. 5.

CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: CONFLICT IN THE REGION AND THE COSTS THEREOF

The aim of this chapter is to trace the roots of the conflict that characterised Southern African relations from the 1970s until the end of the 1980s. Most of the discussion will focus on South Africa's foreign policy during this era, illustrating how the policy of apartheid inflicted as much violence and oppression on the people of neighbouring countries as it did internally, bringing about untold social and economic destruction in the region. It is important to trace the history of conflict in the region, not only to measure the extent of damage brought about by this conflict, but also to show the effects of power-centred, state-centric and military-oriented security conceptualisation.

3.1 South Africa's Foreign Policy Initiatives Prior to Destabilisation

Several countries in Southern Africa (Angola, Mozambique, (then)Rhodesia and South Africa) remained unaffected by, or rather resisted 'the winds of change' that swept most of the African continent to majority rule in the 1960s. The result was bitter struggles between liberation movements inspired by the victories of others, and colonialists trying to hold on to power. However, it was not long until Angola and Mozambique achieved independence in 1975. These were to be significant events in the conflict that would erupt in the region from that period until the end of the 1980s. The independence of Angola and Mozambique removed the 'ring of colonial buffer states' around South Africa and left the apartheid state insecure. For the first time self-proclaimed Marxist states emerged on South Africa's borders and Pretoria felt cramped by this 'communist' presence. It was from this period onwards that South Africa's regional policy started taking on an aggressive posture.

Prior to 1974, especially during Verwoerd's reign, South Africa's regional policy centred on an 'outward movement' directed primarily at Africa. It was hoped that improving relations with 'black' Africa would enhance Pretoria's international stature. Attempts were made to directly incorporate former British protectorates namely Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. It was only when it became clear to Verwoerd that Britain would not acquiesce to these demands that South Africa's strategy changed to that of seeking amicable relations with these countries based on their tolerance of apartheid in return for material benefits. In 1963 Verwoerd's regime had proposed the establishment of a 'common market/commonwealth' in Southern Africa. Davies and O'Meara argue that the 'common market' idea "envisaged as a first step, the establishment of a free trade zone in the region. Once this was established it was hoped that the economic links between territories would be so strong that the basis would be laid for the establishment of a regional political institution....with South Africa as the 'mother country'".¹ By seeking to maintain close economic co-operation among all the countries in the region, South Africa believed that this approach would 'spill over' into the political and diplomatic spheres, thereby acquiring tacit acceptance of its internal policy of separate development.

The 'outward movement' or 'dialogue initiative' did achieve limited success. For example, South Africa established diplomatic relations with Malawi and by the early 1970s, Pretoria had developed closer relations with Mauritius, Gabon and the Ivory Coast. However, most African states condemned Pretoria's dialogue proposals and perceived them as a manoeuvre designed to divide African states and confuse public opinion in order to end the isolation of South Africa, and thus to maintain the status quo in South Africa.² Despite the fact that most African countries had different agendas, South Africa nevertheless persisted in its attempts to convince African states to establish closer ties with the pariah state.

When Vorster came into power in the early 1970s he also launched a new diplomatic/political initiative known as 'detente'. However, this time it was accompanied by a military build-up which confirmed the insecurity of South Africa. One of the objectives of 'detente' was the formation of a constellation of completely independent states that would form a strong bloc and present a united front against common enemies.³ This vaguely conceptualised objective was to be achieved through bribing and making secret diplomatic contacts with influential members of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). 'Detente' achieved initial success. For example, Vorster met President Kaunda of Zambia in 1975, but the abortive South African invasion of Angola in the same year brought about its immediate collapse.

Embarrassed by a humiliating withdrawal from Angola in 1976, South Africa began to reformulate its regional policy. Top military strategists were critical of past regional policies, and they henceforth played a more influential role in formulating foreign policy. The adoption of the 1977 Defence White Paper which called for the adoption of 'Total Strategy' as official state policy, was evidence of this emerging trend. "Perceiving the threat to its safety in terms of an externally organised 'total onslaught' conceived by the Soviet Union, rather than in terms of democratic opposition to Apartheid,....'Total Strategy' drawn from the ideas of a French General, Andre Baufre, based on his experiences in wars in Europe, Algeria and IndoChina,....encompasses economic, military, political and diplomatic tactics towards the region, and uses military means to achieve economic ends."⁴ These pronouncements, encompassed in the Defence White Paper, left no doubt that South Africa would henceforth adopt a more offensive posture towards other Southern African states. This all-encompassing policy (co-ordinated action in all fields - military, psychological, economic, technological, and diplomatic) had as its goal the extension of South African hegemony over the subcontinent through the creation and maintenance of a dependence that was economically lucrative for Pretoria and politically submissive.⁵ The military

aspect of 'Total Strategy' was to play a central role in regional policy. The military budget increase and the rigorous development of the armaments industry to counter international arms embargoes signaled clear intentions of utilising the military as a foreign policy tool. The 1977 Defence White Paper made it clear that there was a need to maintain a strong military balance relative to neighbouring states and other states in Southern Africa.

However, South Africa did not immediately pursue an interventionist policy in the region. When P.W. Botha (former Minister of Defence) became Prime Minister of South Africa in 1978, he revived some of Vorster's ideas. He proposed the creation of a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) which would have included South Africa; the "homelands" of Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda, and Ciskei, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) under Bishop Abel Muzorewa, South West Africa (Namibia) under the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), the BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland), Malawi, Zaire and possibly Zambia. Davies and O'Meara argue that "the need to bring about such a constellation was seen as being partly derived from the worsening situation for the apartheid regime in Southern Africa, and partly from South Africa's then deteriorating relations with major western powers".⁶ South African 'think-tanks' felt that such a 'constellation' would depend on Pretoria economically, militarily and technologically. They were also of the opinion that by creating this 'constellation', South Africa's global position would be enhanced as countries in the region would be seen to give tacit approval to South Africa's internal policies.

The CONSAS initiative failed to get off the ground as Zimbabwe attained its independence in 1980 and pioneered the formation of a counter organisation, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). The latter organisation's primary objective was the strengthening of regional co-operation and the reduction of economic dependence on South Africa. Zimbabwe was very central to the success of CONSAS since it occupies an

important position on South Africa's northern border, commanding trade and transportation routes to the hinterland.⁷ The triumph of Zanu-PF (the South African government had financed Abel Muzorewa's campaign), and the subsequent formation of the SADCC served as a major setback for Pretoria.

3.2 The Economic Environment

A broader understanding of Southern Africa's economic environment is required in order to appreciate the context in which the SADCC was formed, as well as to appreciate why the relationship between politics and economics became very pronounced during this period. Clough accurately captures the economic environment in the following assertion: "Nowhere else in the world is the fate of a region more closely and inextricably linked to the fate of a single country than in Southern Africa".⁸ In his analysis of South Africa's economic stature relative to other countries in the region, Sullivan argues that "it remains the regional hegemon, the most developed infrastructure and industrial plant, and a highly efficient transportation system that serves the entire region".⁹

In contrast to its neighbours, South Africa has a comparatively developed economy, an economy which exerts strong influence on the region. More than a million legal and illegal workers from neighbouring and surrounding states are employed in South Africa (mostly on the mines). Their earnings serve as a vital source of foreign exchange for their home countries. Clough points out that in 1983 - 1984 migrant workers legally employed in South Africa represented approximately 74 percent of the wage labour force for Lesotho and 20 percent for Botswana and Mozambique.¹⁰ South Africa (through the private and public sectors) has also invested heavily in Southern African states. For example, about 60 percent of Botswana's mining sector, 90 percent of Zimbabwe's mining sector and 60 percent of its manufacturing sector, and 25 percent of total foreign investment in Swaziland is controlled by South African interests.¹¹

A critical area of South African dominance lies in the transport sector. The development of this sector was regarded as a top priority by the SADCC in its attempt to 'unshackle the chains of dependency' on South Africa. In 1981, 50 percent of the extra-regional trade of the five land-locked members of the nine-nation SADCC organisation flowed through South Africa.¹² Johnson and Martin argue that the transportation routes that bind the region together are a legacy of the economic planning of a century ago.¹³ The main road and rail network were affixed to the South African hub. Cilliers illustrates South Africa's near monopoly of the transportation network with the following figures: "It has 23 000 of Southern Africa's 42 000 kilometres of railway lines, 58 000 of 87 000 kilometres of paved roads and South Africa handled nearly 16 times more tonnage of goods through its harbours than those of the rest of the region".¹⁴

This economic context needs to be borne in mind for the forthcoming examination of Southern Africa's political and military relations that emerged during the 1980s. It was because of the frailty of SADCC economies that they were more vulnerable to South Africa's destabilisation tactics. The failure of the CONSAS initiative, coupled with rising political instability within South Africa in the early 1980s, marked the beginning of a decade of terror in the region. It was a decade characterised by a brutal war of destabilisation - heavy use of disruptive economic pressure, armed attacks and cultivation of proxy groups - against South Africa's neighbouring countries and frontline states.¹⁵

3.3 Change of Tactics: Enter Destabilisation

'Total Strategy', encompassed within the framework of South Africa's regional policy was generally experienced (by most the region's countries) as total destabilisation. Davies and O'Meara argue that the first phase of South Africa's concerted offensive against neighbouring countries was launched roughly from

mid-1980 and lasted until the end of 1981.¹⁶ This period involved the application of destabilisation tactics in a fairly generalised and indiscriminate manner. There were a number of large-scale invasions of Angolan territory, a raid against ANC residences in Matola near Maputo, a substantial increase in the level of activity by South African-sponsored dissident groups, in particular the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) and the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), and assassinations of ANC personnel in a number of countries.¹⁷

During the early stages of destabilisation the immediate objective encompassed within 'Total Strategy' was to curb neighbouring states being used as 'springboards' for 'terrorist attacks' on South Africa. An interrelated motive behind South Africa's policy of destabilisation involved the destruction of ANC power bases in neighbouring countries. The mere suspicion of harbouring ANC 'terrorists' resulted in punitive measures from South Africa. During the early 1980s the Botswana government expressed concern that Pretoria was fabricating evidence of cross-border incursions as a way of justifying attacks by the South African Defence Force (SADF).¹⁸

As previously mentioned, South Africa's think-tanks envisaged 'Total Strategy' as involving co-ordinated and interdependent action in all fields - the military, the diplomatic sector, areas related to the economy, etc. Neighbouring states and other states in the region witnessed the first major attempts to apply economic 'techniques of coercion' in the early 1980s. In mid-1981 the South African Transport Services withdrew over 20 locomotives on hire to the National Railway of Zimbabwe, at the time of record demand in Zimbabwe.¹⁹ Mozambique received similar treatment in 1981 when the South African Transport Services refused to send railway wagons into Mozambique.²⁰ At the same time Pretoria also threatened to cancel a long-standing trade preference agreement through which Zimbabwean manufactured goods were admitted to the South African market on favourable terms. Apartheid strategists devised very effective means

through which South Africa could wield its economic strength. Tactics that were applied or threatened for example included:

- limiting or prohibiting the use of South Africa's railway and harbour facilities for the export of goods from black states;
- limiting or banning the importation of labour from black states;
- regulating the access to and movement through South Africa of nationals from black states;
- placing curbs on the imports of goods from black states or regulating the export of goods to black states; and
- curtailing or terminating the provision of technical expertise to these states, for example, in the operation of Maputo harbour.²¹

When these ploys were used, various justifications were often offered in an attempt to conceal the true nature of these actions. However, it was obvious that these actions were employed as 'disincentive levers' to gain political concessions from states in the region.

From 1982 onwards a new phase of intensified destabilisation measures was initiated. The South African regime developed a strategy encompassing tactics that would be most effective against particular states.²² Apart from minimising the activities of the liberation movements in neighbouring countries, South Africa became obsessed with rooting out communism in the region. By vociferously condemning communism, South Africa hoped to garner the support of major western powers and draw them into a more open defence of apartheid. Therefore, South Africa's racist policies attained a Cold War dimension. The defence of the South African state was equated with the defence of free-market principles. Internally, the South African government conducted an effective propaganda campaign. Black people's struggle for liberation was reduced to a communist ploy to take over the South African state. Linked to this, South Africa

wanted to demonstrate the superiority of apartheid-capitalism by maintaining existing economic links and frustrating SADCC efforts to reduce dependence on Pretoria. If neighbouring states gave any assistance to liberation movements and their respective armies, or showed any signs of pursuing alternative (socialist) paths of development, they would be thwarted by the 'mighty' SADF or by the application of economic 'techniques of coercion'.

By 1982 South Africa had developed strategies that were to be employed in different countries in the region. Johnson and Martin argue that: "The combination of tactics that South Africa has used against each of its neighbours depended on their individual political, economic and military vulnerabilities, from open military aggression against Angola and surrogate war in Mozambique to sabotage of regional transportation routes, customs delays and tariffs manipulation as well as direct attacks, incursions, sabotage, and car bombs in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia, economic pressure and assassinations in Lesotho and Swaziland".²³ Davies and O'Meara add that "apartheid strategists appeared to have divided these states into three broad categories. The first consisted of the more conservative states, seen as vulnerable to pressure, whilst the third embraced states whose political systems and development strategies were seen to constitute the most fundamental challenge to apartheid capitalism".²⁴ Therefore, it is not surprising that Mozambique and Angola were the primary targets of destabilisation, even though no country in the region remained immune from SADF cross-border raids.²⁵

The states in the first category (of Davies and O'Meara's model), for example Swaziland, were offered greater concessions for their 'good behaviour'. Swaziland was assisted with the erection of a railway line through Swazi territory, linking the Eastern Transvaal with the port of Richards Bay. In return Swaziland signed a secret Non-Aggression Pact with South Africa in 1982 which

jointly bound both governments to combat and eliminate terrorist elements (particularly ANC members) in Swaziland.

States in the second and third categories, namely Lesotho (second), and Mozambique and Angola (third), faced the brunt of South Africa's intensified destabilisation measures. In one of the most brutal attacks against a neighbouring state, a South African reconnaissance commando destroyed ANC headquarters in Maseru in December 1982. It was estimated that over forty people (including civilians and children) were killed in the night raid aimed at the ANC.²⁶ Additionally, Lesotho was also subjected to economic coercion. In May 1983 South Africa imposed restrictions on the movement of goods and people across the Lesotho border. Furthermore, South Africa threatened to repatriate Basotho migrant workers. As previously mentioned, about 75 percent of Lesotho's labour force is employed in South Africa, and their remitted earnings make up the largest single source of foreign exchange for the tiny Kingdom. Therefore, the calculated pressure tactics were meant to undermine the economic sovereignty of Lesotho. Due to both military and economic pressures, the Lesotho government decided to evacuate South African refugees in 1983.

Tactics against Angola and Mozambique were carried out with more venom. Apart from rendering support to the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) and the ANC, these two former Portuguese colonies were committed to a process of socialist transformation within their countries. As such, they posed a direct ideological challenge to apartheid-capitalism. To bolster its destabilisation efforts in Mozambique, South Africa used the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR or Renamo) to great effect. This dissident organisation was originally created by Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Organisation, but was later inherited by South Africa after the Lancaster House Conference.²⁷ Under South African tutelage, accompanied by better equipment and closer co-ordination, the MNR became an important vehicle in Pretoria's

regional policy. The South African adoption of Renamo coincided with the organisation's deviation from its earlier objective of creating 'liberated' zones, and trying to win popular support in Mozambique. Instead, the MNR engaged in maximum disruption to local life in the seven provinces in which it was active.²⁸ The Renamo-SADF alliance was, for example, responsible for the sabotage of the railway line from Zimbabwe to Maputo and Beira, the road and rail bridges near Beira, and the oil pipeline from Beira to Mutare which opened six months behind schedule because of guerrilla attacks.²⁹

Similar to Lesotho these attacks were accompanied by 'economic disincentives' aimed at crippling the Mozambican socialist-oriented economy. In addition to the guerrilla attacks South Africa withdrew its technical personnel from the Maputo port and slowed down traffic towards that destination. According to official Mozambican sources Renamo and SADF attacks accounted for the destruction of 140 villages together with 840 schools, 900 rural shops, and over 200 public health institutions.³⁰ The total cost of MNR destruction in the early 1980s was estimated at US\$3.8 billion.³¹ In most cases there was evidence of SADF involvement.

The western coast state of Angola was one of the other primary targets of Pretoria's destabilisation tactics. South African involvement in that area stretches back to 1976 when South African troops were defeated by Angolan forces assisted by Cuba. Angola was perceived as a great threat, not only because of the support it rendered to SWAPO and the ANC, but because it was also the country least economically dependent on South Africa. However, continuous pressure from South Africa's destabilisation tactics led to Angola's increased dependence on Pretoria. This primarily came about as a result of the disruption of the Benguela railway - the main artery for the Angolan interior and an important artery for trade with Zambia and Zaire. In August 1981 the SADF launched one of its biggest military operations when it attacked Angola

(Operation Protea). This led to the occupation of southern Angola, and from the end of 1982 the southern part of the country was under full-time South African occupation.³² During that period South Africa also rendered financial and personnel support to another dissident group, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), under Jonas Savimbi. This support, which was supplemented by the United States of America, resulted in a long drawn out civil war. In financial terms it is believed that Angola suffered more than any other country from South Africa's destabilisation. The Angolan government estimates the costs of South African-inflicted destruction to over US\$10 billion.³³

While the energies of military destabilisation were concentrated on Angola and Mozambique at this stage, other countries were subjected to lower levels of destabilisation. Towards Angola, 'Total Strategy' meant almost continuous use of military force while against Botswana, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, the South African government mixed relatively low-cost military efforts (primarily sabotage and raids) with economic incentives and economic coercion.³⁴ By 1984 South Africa had adopted a diplomatic tactic in its 'Total Strategy' policy. This was not an indication that South Africa was softening up, but rather that most of the countries in the region were devastated by the wrath of South African tactics. The crowning glory for this new phase of 'Total Strategy' was the signing of the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique on the 6th of March 1984. "The Accord committed both states to prohibit the use of their respective territories by any state, government, foreign military forces, organisations or individuals which plan to prepare to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its inhabitants."³⁵ This agreement resulted in ANC guerrillas being expelled from Mozambique with only a few diplomatic officials retained. A diplomatic agreement was signed with Angola during the same period. Under this pact South Africa agreed to withdraw its troops from the southern part of Angola. A non-aggression pact had apparently been signed with Swaziland in

1982. These pacts represented a breakthrough in South Africa's regional and foreign policy. For the first time in many years, it appeared as though South Africa was breaking out of the isolation mold that had characterised its international relations for a quarter of a century.

While Mozambique implemented its side of the accord, South Africa continued to give support to the MNR. In Angola, UNITA also enjoyed the continued support of South Africa. Initially it seemed as though South Africa's diplomatic offensive represented the suspension of Pretoria's use of the military, but a consistent increase in military expenditure gave a clear indication that this option would be kept in reserve. When it became evident that no other non-aggression pacts with Southern Africa's states were forthcoming, South Africa resorted to economic and military pressure in an attempt to gain further concessions. The triple raids of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe in 1985 demonstrated South Africa's disapproval of 'dissent'. A strong message was sent which indicated that South Africa was prepared to use any means at its disposal to achieve a 'terrorist-free' Southern Africa. In Botswana, an ANC transit camp was bombed and fired at; ten houses and an office block were destroyed, and several people were killed. Pamphlets were distributed prior to the attack warning that the raid was aimed at the ANC and not the Botswana people. However, three Botswana soldiers were wounded during the attack. In Zambia, SADF jet fighters attacked the ANC operational headquarters and information offices at the Makeni plots, southwest of Lusaka, killing two people. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees gave evidence that the target of the attack was a centre for refugees from Southern Africa and not an ANC base. In Zimbabwe, the SADF attacked the operations centre of the ANC in Harare, as well as a transit base in Ashdown Park, a suburb of Harare.

This mixture of military action and economic disincentives continued until the end of the decade. Between 1986 - 1988, an immense escalation of military

action took place across the region, either directly or through surrogates.³⁶ In Lesotho, South Africa used its economic leverage to expose the landlocked kingdom's vulnerability. When Leabua Jonathan (Pretoria's former lackey) voiced criticism concerning South Africa's foreign and domestic policies, South Africa closed its borders and prevented the movement of migrant workers, food and other essential supplies between the two countries. The economic strain caused by this operation eventually led to the downfall of Leabua Jonathan, who was toppled by the military. Further north, the SADF raided and attacked villages and towns in Zambia and Zimbabwe. These military operations continued until 1988, and no country in the region was unaffected. An escalation in the military activities of the SADF occurred in 1987 and Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique experienced commando attacks and bombings. In May 1987 South Africa staged Iron Eagle, its largest ever airborne commando exercise, on the Botswana border, delivering a message of military power not dissimilar to that of a year later, in September 1988, when it staged its largest ever naval exercise off the coast of Walvis Bay.³⁷

By the end of the decade South Africa had no option but to rethink its foreign policy. South Africa had succeeded in dominating Southern African countries on the economic and military terrain. However, it failed to control the region politically, largely because of the unwavering opposition of the Frontline States to apartheid. South African strategists could no longer downplay the economic costs of the war. The government felt the stranglehold of sanctions compounded by the economic recession. Furthermore, there was a growing international and domestic opposition to apartheid. The United Democratic Front (UDF) and other anti-apartheid forces were growing in magnitude, and the political lull that existed in the early 1970s was replaced by a more militant youth of the 1980s. All these factors (although not exhaustive) led to the unbanning of the ANC, SACP, PAC and other political organisations. Subsequently president F.W. de

Klerk's famous 2nd February 1990 speech resulted in Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners' release.

3.4 The Economic Costs of Destabilisation

De Klerk's reforms came too late for most Southern African states. In a report to the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government Meeting held in Vancouver in 1987, the then president of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, estimated that 1.3 million people belonging to the Frontline States had been killed due to war-related apartheid policies since 1980.³⁸ In the same vein he added that the total economic cost to the Frontline States has been at least US\$45 billion over the same period.³⁹ The costs of apartheid within South Africa are well documented and have received substantial international attention and condemnation. However, the costs of South Africa's aggression against its neighbours have rarely been subjected to the same kind of scrutiny. This lack of scrutiny implies that much of the world does not fully comprehend the enormous costs that South Africa has imposed on its neighbours. The work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission which has uncovered many of the damages caused by apartheid in South Africa, will hopefully lead to similar details of the costs and damage incurred by Southern African states. Lone⁴⁰ conducted a study detailing the costs of apartheid to neighbouring states. He estimates that from 1980 to 1988, South Africa's military aggression cost the region over \$60 billion and 1.5 million lives. The human costs include some 750 000 children under the age of five years, 1.5 million people who have been forced to flee to other countries for refuge, and about six million who have been internally displaced.⁴¹

With the 'death' of apartheid in April 1994 the new South African government has abandoned the policy of aggression against its neighbouring states. The suffering experienced by the people of the region as a result of South Africa's

power-centred, military-oriented approach to security cannot be repeated. However, unilateral initiatives from South Africa will not suffice; all the SADC states need to make a commitment to peace and take concrete steps towards the reduction of instability in the region.

¹ R. Davies and D. O'Meara, *Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy Since 1978*, Journal of Southern African Studies, (11)2, 1985, pp. 183 - 184.

² *Ibid*, pp. 184 - 185.

³ *Ibid*, p. 185.

⁴ M. Johnson and D. Martin, Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilisation Report, The Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1989, p. 1.

⁵ *Ibid*.

⁶ Davies and O'Meara, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

⁷ Johnson and Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁸ M. Clough, *Southern Africa: Descent into Chaos?* in Blechman and Luttwak ed(s), Global Security: A Review of Strategic and Economic Issues, Westview Press, Colorado, 1987, p. 187.

⁹ J. Sullivan, *Southern Africa in Conflict: Problems Enough to Share*, in Keller and Picard ed(s) South Africa in Southern Africa: Domestic Change and International Conflict, Lynne Reiner Publishers, New York, 1989, p. 203.

¹⁰ Clough, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

¹¹ *Ibid*.

¹² *Ibid*.

¹³ Johnson and Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

¹⁴ J. Cilliers, *The Evolving Security Architecture in Southern Africa*, African Security Review, 4(5), 1995, p. 5.

¹⁵ E. Tjonneland, Pax Pretoriana: The Fall of Apartheid and the Politics of Regional Destabilisation, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1989, p. 16.

¹⁶ Davies and O'Meara, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

¹⁷ *Ibid*.

¹⁸ C. Coker, *South Africa: A New Military Role in Southern Africa 1969 - 1982*, in Jaster (ed), South Africa: Regional Security Problems and Prospects, Gower Publishing Co., 1985, p. 146.

¹⁹ Davies and O'Meara, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 198.

²¹ Quoted in Davies and O'Meara, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

²² Davies and O'Meara, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

²³ Johnson and Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

²⁴ Davies and O'Meara, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

²⁵ Sullivan, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

²⁶ Interview with one of the Lesotho civilians that survived the attack.

²⁷ Johnson and Martin, *op. cit.*

²⁸ Coker, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

²⁹ *Ibid*.

³⁰ Davies and O'Meara, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

³¹ *Ibid*.

³² F. Bridgland, *The War for Africa*, Ashanti Publishers, 1990.

³³ Davies and O'Meara, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

³⁴ N. Crawford, *The Domestic Sources and Consequences of Aggressive Foreign Policies: The Folly of South Africa's 'Total Strategy'*, Southern African Perspectives: A Working Paper Series, No. 41, 1995, p. 9.

³⁵ Quoted in Davies and O'Meara, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

³⁶ Johnson and Martin, *op. cit.*

³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 8.

³⁸ Quoted in Johnson and Martin, *op. cit.*

³⁹ *Ibid*.

⁴⁰ S. Lone, *South African Destabilisation: The Economic Cost of Fronline Resistance to Apartheid*, Africa Recovery, United Nations, New York, 1989.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 2.

CHAPTER FOUR

DESPAIR AMIDST HOPE: POTENTIAL THREATS IN POST-APARTHEID, POST-COLD WAR SOUTHERN AFRICA

Even though Southern Africa is experiencing a period of relative stability, there still exist a diverse range of issues that may threaten the security of the region. The following serve as examples. The fact that the recently renewed UN peacekeeping mandate in Angola (UNAVEM III) is currently the largest United Nations operation in the world, should serve as an indication that everything is not well in the region.¹

Tension between Lesotho and South Africa's Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal provinces is rising as a result of protracted stock theft. Delegations of the two respective governments were forced to intervene in an attempt to defuse tension after Basotho men were killed in the Eastern Cape in March 1996. Those living in the area fear that a border war is looming.

Mozambique is awash with weapons from many years of war. Some of these arms are used by disaffected ex-soldiers to gain a source of income through crime, violent banditry or smuggling. Many of the weapons from the war in Mozambique are in the streets of Johannesburg and other major cities in the region. The proliferation of these weapons and the disaffected soldiers are in their possession not only threatens the stability of Mozambique, but has become a problem in the entire region.

Two years after a 'miraculous' transition towards democratic rule, South Africa, as the darling nation of the moment is confronted with many actual and potential sources of conflict. One of the major headaches confronting the government of national unity is the unresolved political tension between the ANC and the IFP

which continues to be a major source of conflict and instability particularly in Kwazulu-Natal.

What is probably the greatest source of tension to the northern countries of the region such as Tanzania, are the effects of spill-over violence from Rwanda and Burundi. Despite its socio-economic hardships, Tanzania presently hosts millions of refugees from these war-torn societies. All of the above-mentioned scenarios have the potential to turn into military related confrontations, resulting in the loss of many lives in the region.

There are also tensions between some of the states which will require diplomatic mediation in order to avoid direct inter-state conflict. For example, the quadripoint between Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe is in disagreement; there is also a dispute between Botswana and Namibia over the uninhabited Kasikili (Sidudu) Island in Chobe River and the matter has been referred to the International Court of Justice; Lesotho has claimed parts of the Free State in South Africa; there is a dispute between Malawi and Tanzania over the boundary in Lake Nyasa (Lake Malawi); and Swaziland has asked South Africa to open negotiations on reincorporating some nearby South African territories that are populated by ethnic Swazis or that were previously part of the Swazi Kingdom. What is worrying is that even though it is estimated that Southern Africa's defence expenditure has declined over the past few years (from some \$8.6 billion, 3% of gross domestic product in 1993, to about \$8 billion, or 2.6% of gross domestic product in 1994)², Botswana's military expenditure is presently higher than the regional average.³ Some of the issues discussed above should serve as a rejoinder to those optimists who are under the impression that the demise of apartheid and the Soviet Union will automatically bring stability and peace in Southern Africa. The road to peace and stability in the region is likely to remain a long and tortuous one.

4.1 Non-military Challenges Facing Southern African States

With all this in mind the author will discuss some of the non-military challenges (needs and threats) facing Southern Africa. The author will take into cognisance the fact that threats are not only military and external in nature, but can originate internally. Given the interdependent world we live in, these threats can easily transcend national boundaries. A conference held at the University of the Western Cape in June 1994 (*Sources of Domestic Insecurity in Southern African States*) identified six broad categories of security threats confronting the region. The threats identified by the academics and politicians who participated in the conference are not exhaustive and there was a general understanding that isolating threats into categories was for analytical purposes because in reality these threats normally interfuse. Additionally, the categorisation of security threats did not take into account the levels of severity and intensity, and actual versus potential threats. In differentiating the security threats, the conference attempted to adopt a holistic perspective, situating the region in a complex global context. Threats identified therefore included the impact of global events both on a regional and national level and vice versa. The significance of including global factors into the category of threats confronting the region cannot be overstated. Security must be contextualised within the broader international system. Even though universal patterns of behaviour (global security community) may seem far-fetched in a state-based international system, an understanding of the link between global, regional, and national security concerns will contribute to overall international security. These are the six broad categories of threats identified at the conference on *Sources of Domestic Insecurity in Southern African States*.⁴

Global

- Concentration and utilisation of economic power in transnational corporations.
- Concentration and polarisation of wealth between North and South.
- Contradictory effects of the ending of the Cold War and the emergence of a new international order (resolving some threats while creating new sources of tension).
- Impact of structural adjustment policies of IMF and World Bank.
- The spread of religious fundamentalism, both Christian and Islamic, and the role and purpose of international funding for this spread.

Regional

- Border disputes and land claims.
- Conflicts over water and energy.
- Conflicts associated with border economies, and cross-border smuggling (especially of drugs and weapons).
- Tensions over movements of people across borders.
- Tensions over popular pressure for integration with South Africa.
- Tensions over uncertainties as to South Africa's future regional role.

Economic

- Growing poverty, unemployment and competition for resources and jobs.
- Polarisation through market forces, leading to widening inequality.
- Impact of structural adjustment on economic self-sufficiency, food security and environmental degradation.
- Effects of the adoption of alternative survival strategies outside the formal system.

Political/Ideological

- The absence, to varying degrees, of a democratic tradition and culture, strong capable states, respect for law and human rights, and professional norms of public service.
- Tensions created by nepotism, corruption and power plays by political elites.
- Crisis of political legitimacy.
- Inappropriateness of Western constitutional models.

Social

- Impact of population growth, increasing pressure on the land and the rapid increase in urbanisation in many Southern African countries.
- Tensions relating to population movement and migration (including migrant labour), both skilled and unskilled.
- Effects of polarisation along ethnic, religious, regional and class lines.

Military

- Problems associated with war termination and the integration of the armed forces.
- Threats posed by covert operations and the role of mercenaries (e.g. in Angola).
- Impact of war profiteering and the illegal trade in arms.
- Problems associated with the effects of war and violence, ranging from the existence of large numbers of unexploded land-mines in countries such as Mozambique to the impact of psychological trauma and the emergence of a culture of violence.

The conference on *Sources of Domestic Insecurity in Southern African States* offers a useful general outline of some of the transnational threats confronting the region. However, a more specific account of regional sources of insecurity is

required, not only to demonstrate the inadequacy of the traditional approach to security in Southern Africa, but also to cast doubt on the ability of Southern African governments to unilaterally manage some of these colossal problems that equally confront all the states.

4.1.1 Problems associated with Democratisation

The 'second liberation' of some of the Southern African states pose a serious threat. Transitions towards democratic forms of rule seem to be just as 'painful' as liberation struggles from colonialism. Political pluralism is a relatively new phenomenon in Southern Africa, only Botswana has a strong democratic history. Mozambique, Malawi, South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Lesotho are some of the fledging democracies in the region. Democracy still eludes Swaziland which remains the only country in the region under despotic rule. Angola had a bitter taste of democracy. After many years of civil war, UNITA and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) agreed to a cease-fire in May 1991 which terminated in multi-party elections the following year. However, UNITA refused to accept defeat in the internationally monitored elections and fighting resumed throughout much of the countryside. The democratic process which came into force in October 1991 was confronted by many difficulties in the 1996 Zambian general elections. President Frederick Chiluba reportedly harassed opposition parties and everyone who was critical of the government and the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Similarly, opposition parties in Zimbabwe were reportedly intimidated prior to the 1996 general elections and two presidential candidates withdrew because of this. In addition, several newspapers have been banned and journalists who are critical of the ruling party have been imprisoned. In Malawi, the fragility of the democratic process was underlined by an attempted coup less than a year after the United Democratic Front (UDF) won the inaugural democratic elections. South Africa and Namibia give hope to a rather untenable state of affairs. However, even these two

fledgling democracies are experiencing problems related to democratic transition and, given the centrality of South Africa in regional affairs, the failure of democracy in the former apartheid state will certainly have negative repercussions for all the Southern African states. The region cannot hope to escape from its current economic *malaise* if there is no democracy.⁵ Ever since the end of the Cold War, international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have been relentless in attaching democracy as a requirement for any form of economic assistance. But the surge towards democratisation and the medicine inherent in structural alterations to the economy will inevitably mean a painful and extended period of adjustment with parallel problems relating to domestic and regional security.⁶

4.1.2 The Ongoing Economic Crisis

The economic crisis confronting Africa is serious, but it is most severe in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is estimated that Africa's annual economic growth rate is 1.5 percent - the world's lowest.⁷ A recent World Bank report estimated that, at the present growth rates, it will take forty years before the impoverished African states south of the Sahara regain the level of income *per capita* of the mid-1970s.⁸ These states also experience rising unemployment, steadily worsening terms of trade and an increasing debt burden. Sub-Saharan Africa's debt amounts to 110 percent of GNP.⁹ The debt crisis and the high interest rates involved in servicing debts have further aggravated the indebtedness of some African countries. Economic structural adjustment programmes, which have been prescribed to alleviate some of the problems, have only worsened things. These programmes have forced African economies to prioritise on export commodities as a way of earning foreign exchange. These commodities include raw materials and cash crops such as rubber and coffee. However, African countries have not been able to generate the required foreign exchange from this process because industrialised countries of the North still determine the prices of such

commodities. On another note, the attention accorded to cash crop production is often at the expense of food production. This emphasis on production for export has resulted in most economies of the region being food-importers.¹⁰ As a result food prices have gone up due to imports and the removal of subsidies on staple foods. This has fomented dissatisfaction and has given rise to food riots in countries such as Zambia which further undermine political stability. The economic reconstruction of Southern Africa must be a priority for everyone in the region. It will not only curtail some of the current political instability, but will also serve as a base for providing resources to achieve overall security. Post-World War II peace and security in Europe was founded on similar principles. The Marshall Plan, for example, argued for "the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace".¹¹

Africa also seems to be getting cut-backs from an important source of foreign exchange - foreign aid. Since the end of the Cold War, Africa is increasingly getting marginalised. There is 'donor fatigue' among the industrialised countries, and the widespread notion seems to be that Africa is a lost cause. Given such bleak circumstances, it is probable that there will be greater competition for aid, and countries that cannot demonstrate the effective use of aid, implying good management coupled with sensible economic policy, will lose it.¹² The consequences for most of Africa's inhabitants will be detrimental. Most governments rely on aid to import food as they cannot generate enough foreign exchange nor grow their own food.

4.1.3 Food Insecurity

Early in 1995 the Southern African Development Community (SADC) made an appeal to the international community for aid to avert the effects of drought

which threatens food security.¹³ It was estimated that nine million people were directly affected by the 1994 drought which resulted in a 42 percent decline in the harvest of the region's predominant food crop, maize, and an overall harvest 35 percent less than 1993.¹⁴ This SADC appeal highlights the reality of continuing food crises in the region. Out of the SADC member-states, the only exceptions to requested assistance were Tanzania and South Africa. Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland were reportedly the most affected by the drought. More recently, it has been reported that the number of poor people with no food reserves who depend on subsistence farming in ten SADC countries has almost doubled from 22 million in 1980 to 39 million in 1995.¹⁵ Furthermore, it is estimated that every second person does not have enough to eat and every fourth child is malnourished.¹⁶ Food insecurity is likely to affect more people in the future given the threat of *El Nino*, the inability of the region to produce food, and the projected population growth.

Although drought and population growth are undoubtedly contributing factors to the incidence of food insecurity, they do not constitute sufficient explanation. The root causes of hunger can be traced back to colonial intervention whereby colonising powers transformed subsistence modes of production to commodity-based production. This pattern of intervention is continuing. The present global agricultural division of labour assigns most developing countries to produce cash crops and raw materials for export to the industrialised countries of the North. International financial institutions have aggravated the situation by encouraging export-led growth in order to generate foreign exchange for the purposes of repaying or servicing existing debts. Therefore, the production of food crops for nutritional purposes becomes secondary. Export-led strategies of development have also devastated the environment. The continuing emphasis on these strategies has accelerated the pace of deforestation, soil erosion and desertification which now hampers the capacity of Africa to feed itself.¹⁷ In Botswana, for example, the World Bank-financed cattle project has transformed

fragile land in the Kalahari Desert and the Okavango Delta into desert wasteland. The emphasis on beef export is encouraged in a country that produces barely five percent of its food requirements.¹⁸ Such strategies have increasingly made developing countries more vulnerable to forces of nature.

War in the region has also exacerbated food insecurity. In Mozambique and Angola, two of the most affected countries, hunger derives primarily from war-related disruption. For years ongoing civil wars prevented not only the growing of crops, but also restricted the rural distribution of food aid. The problem with distribution is not restricted to war-torn societies. In some cases people starve not only because of non-availability, but due to the underdeveloped infrastructure of their countries. For example, in 1993 Zimbabwe experienced a bumper crop, but the government did not have the necessary transport to distribute it within the country. Some of the crop went to waste while people continued starving. What is of great concern for the region is that more people in Southern Africa are experiencing this phenomenon which was previously associated with countries experiencing civil wars or those that are drought stricken. The list of countries that today face extreme food emergencies is by no means confined to those already mentioned, and in recent years it has included nations once considered virtually immune to famine, such as Botswana and Malawi.¹⁹

4.1.4 Population Growth

As indicated earlier, food insecurity is aggravated by rising population growth rates. Food production is 20 percent lower than it was in 1970, when the population was half its current size, while the population continues to grow at a rate of 3,2 per cent annually.²⁰ At present SADC's population is estimated at 120 million people, while projections for the year 2020 are estimated at 260 million.

Population growth is certainly one of Southern Africa's biggest problems and, given the inability of governments to feed present populations, the relevant question is how they will cope with greater numbers. The magnitude of this problem must be seen in the context of the young age of the present population. Therefore, it is possible that by the next century the region could be confronted by higher levels of unemployment, food shortages and many other related problems which are an outgrowth of this phenomenon. Birth control measures have not been successful in areas where they have been implemented. This is perhaps due to inadequate education in most African societies and the perception that large family sizes offer more opportunities of wealth. Additionally, modern birth control measures are confined to urban areas. This is largely a reflection of the rural-urban imbalance, especially the traditional bias of African governments to spend more resources on urban areas.²¹ This explains why Africa's urban population growth is the fastest in the world despite the fact that Africa is the least urbanised of the world's continents.²²

4.1.5 Urbanisation

Under normal circumstances urbanisation can be a positive agent which contributes towards the economic growth of a country. However, Africa defies many theories and has unique features and historical conditions that are remarkably different from many parts of the world where some of these theories were developed. Those that have been to Johannesburg, Durban, Harare, Nairobi and other main urban centres will state that urban growth in Africa is more of a threat to the quality of life in the cities than anything else. Johannesburg central, for example, is no longer that clean beautiful city where whites took peaceful Sunday walks and watched their children play in well-maintained garden parks. It is now occupied mostly by desperate blacks some of whom have come from as far as Nigeria and Kenya to search for 'gold'. It is dirty,

overcrowded, crime-infested and bears only a slight resemblance to the Johannesburg of former days. With an estimated African urban population of 804 million by the year 2025, things are destined to get worse and it is unlikely that African countries will be able to cope.²³ Urban infrastructures are already under great stress. Shrinking budgets for social services have left schools overcrowded and ill-equipped, medical services under-stocked and overburdened, transport less reliable and basic electricity and water supplies increasingly intermittent.²⁴ Most African cities lack the structural capacity to deal with further urbanisation. They were developed as colonial administrative and trading centres rather than industrial and commercial centres equipped to support large populations.²⁵ Governments' continued urban-rural bias and the inability of capital to relocate some industries to secondary cities or rural areas will necessitate further migration by people in search of work.

4.1.6 Natural Resource Concerns: Water and Land

Population growth also contributes towards the straining of land and other natural resources. Perhaps the most critical challenge in Southern Africa relates to the shortage of water. The number of sporadic droughts and highly skewed patterns of resource access and distribution in the region have certainly aggravated the problem.²⁶ The African Development Bank estimates that "by 2000, South Africa will suffer water stress, and Malawi will have moved into absolute water scarcity. By 2025, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe will suffer water stress, Lesotho and South Africa will have moved into absolute water scarcity, and Malawi will be living beyond the present water barrier."²⁷ Because of its importance to almost every sphere of life, water scarcity will impact on countries' food security, industrial capacity etc. Therefore, it is highly likely that competition for water at national and regional level will increase as this resource dwindles. If anything, future wars in the region will be related to

water. Water-related conflicts have already taken place among for example, Turkey, Syria and Iraq around the waters of the Euphrates river; and Egypt and Ethiopia have had confrontations over the waters of the river Nile.²⁸ Accordingly, one of the most urgent needs in Southern Africa is a regional water regime which provides for the heavy demands on water.

Although Southern Africa faces environmental problems similar to those challenging the global community at large, such as ozone layer depletion, and air pollution, land degradation is seen as a more significant threat because of its relationship with agriculture and food security. There are several factors that aggravate land degradation, some of which the author has already pointed out, such as misguided development strategies that have compelled both Botswana and Lesotho to dedicate land to livestock farming. However, the large refugee problem in the region has also caused many people to settle anywhere regardless of whether the land is suitable for agriculture or not.

4.1.7 Mass Migrations

One of the other issues related to population growth is mass migrations. When poverty and hunger are no longer bearable, people do not restrict migration within the confines of their own country. In Southern Africa the legacy of colonialism and the skewed development of capitalism have contributed to the current pattern of migration in the region which poses a threat, especially to South Africa. Poverty, famine, war and other problems have forced many destitute people to migrate to South Africa in search of a better life. South Africa's re-entry into the world community, and its relatively developed economy and infrastructure have made it a magnet for those fleeing famine, drought, economic deprivation, environmental degradation, conflict, persecution and human rights abuse in Southern Africa and, indeed Africa.²⁹ The number of illegal immigrants in South Africa varies between two million and eight million

according to diverse press reports.³⁰ Without economic growth, food security, jobs and political stability in their mother countries, new waves of immigrants will flow southwards, undermining the Republic's relative stability. Similar to the strains that refugees have placed on the Tanzanian economy, the implications of a large illegal immigrant population in South Africa will be as harmful. The South African Police Service claims that illegals cost the country an estimated four billion rands a year to clothe, educate, feed and house.³¹ Additionally, there are widespread (mis)perceptions that illegal immigrants are stealing jobs from ordinary South Africans. Illegal immigrants are also accused of straining the implementation of the RDP, claims that have been echoed by the Home Affairs Minister³² and COSATU.³³ It is no wonder that xenophobia in South Africa is growing.

Outside South Africa, Zimbabweans, Zambians and others are beginning to express resentment at the way Pretoria is turning against those who stood by them (exiled South Africans) in times of their struggle against apartheid. The South African government has stationed SANDF troops along its borders to curb the influx of illegals, arrested millions of those already in the country, and spent millions of rands deporting them. Botswana and Namibia have also experienced the problem of illegal immigrants (although to a lesser extent) and have adopted similar 'get-tough' approaches. These approaches have proved not only to be futile and ineffective, but also contradict the vision of regional integration that is being mooted at intergovernmental level. The author is not trying to dismiss the threat that this problem poses. There is credibility to the argument that rising rates of criminality, availability of small arms and drug-trafficking in South Africa coincided with the influx of illegals. The AK-47 assault rifle, used predominantly by criminals, only became a feature of South African life with the increase of illegal immigrants and refugees from war-torn Mozambique and Angola. Additionally, there are severe health risks associated with illegal immigrants.

The detection and control of such diseases as AIDS, cholera and malaria among this sector of the population are almost impossible.

4.1.8 Small Arms Proliferation

The resolution of internal conflict in Mozambique and similar prospects in Angola have uncovered a regional problem of small arms proliferation. Africa in general is littered with light weapons which were supplied by competing power blocs during the Cold War struggle. The largest concentration of these weapons is in Sub-Saharan Africa and especially Southern Africa which had become an important area of Cold War confrontation by proxy.³⁴ In Mozambique alone there are an estimated 1,5 million automatic weapons which freely move among the population,³⁵ while estimates stand at two million in Angola.³⁶ Most of these light weapons (pistols, rifles, assault rifles, sub-machine guns, light and medium machine guns, anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, light mortars, mines and grenades) were distributed to soldiers indiscriminately and without records. This factor posed problems for the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) when integration, demobilisation and disarmament was supposed to take place after a peace settlement had been agreed upon by Frelimo and Renamo combatants. Only 163 535 weapons were returned out of an estimated 1,5 million.³⁷ Most of these weapons are still in the possession of former combatants, serving as an important source of income for hungry demobilised soldiers. They are no longer used to wage war, but have become tradable commodities which can be exchanged for a bottle of whisky or items of clothing.

A similar trend is emerging in Angola where the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) is experiencing problems with demobilising and disarming combatants. Out of an estimate of two million weapons, only 12 144 have been recovered.³⁸ This raises questions about peacekeeping as an

instrument capable of bringing about longer-term stability to conflict ravaged societies. A peacekeeping mission is regarded successful upon the achievement of a cease-fire between warring factions and the staging of elections. As important as these linkages are to the final resolution of conflict, they tend to overlook a major source of instability - the existence of vast amounts of weapons widely distributed among combatants and non-combatant elements in societies which are emerging from long periods of internal conflict.³⁹ It is assumed that 'peace' takes away the reason for using weapons, and therefore renders them harmless for the post-conflict reconstruction process. And yet, easy availability of weapons can and does militarise societies in general. It also destabilises regions that are affected by unrestricted trade of light weapons between borders.⁴⁰ The easy availability of arms is not only threatening the stability of Mozambique and Angola, but that of South Africa and other neighbouring countries. Swaziland has become an important transit route for arms destined for Kwazulu-Natal. Botswana, which previously prided itself on strict weapons control measures, is also being used as a transit route for weapons headed for South Africa from Angola. Namibia is also experiencing an influx of weapons from the former Portuguese colony of Angola. Zambia, which served as the 'operations centre' for several liberation movements, also has an abundance of 'left over' arms caches circulating the community.

Ineffective border control measures have laid the foundation for illegal trade to thrive. In Mozambique, for example, border control measures are reportedly non-existent. Trading is no longer the preserve of hungry soldiers, organised syndicates have taken advantage of lax border controls in exploiting markets. The political instability in Kwazulu-Natal and criminal opportunities in Gauteng provide an outlet for the abundance of weapons from war-torn societies. An AK-47 can be bought for as little as two hundred rands in the townships of Soweto and Tembisa. These weapons do not only pose a threat to ordinary citizens who live in fear of being robbed with an AK-47, but also to states. In Colombia, for

example, the easy availability of arms has changed the balance of power between the state and drug-traffickers. In Africa the concern relates to insurgent groups. The fragility of most African states has diffused their monopoly over instruments of force. In Sudan and Liberia this has manifested itself in the struggle for power between various well-armed warlords. Although the pattern has not emerged yet in Southern Africa, the availability of arms offers opportunities for any insurgent group which is dissatisfied with the political process to 'resort to the bullet', especially in a region that is still 'grappling' with democracy.

4.1.9 Drug Trafficking and Drug Use

Drug trafficking and drug use, two of the most recent threats to the people of Southern Africa, are interconnected with the small arms trade. Drugs and arms are the main source of income for criminal organisations and once a route for the trafficking of one commodity has been established, the other is almost certain to follow. There is a symbiotic relation between drugs and arms, in fact the two reinforce each other. It is rare to find single commodity syndicates - over the years they have developed into sophisticated, highly diversified and flexible organisations.⁴¹ The currency used in smuggling networks ranges from drugs to stolen cars and weapons. Mandrax is bartered for stolen motor vehicles or spare parts from South Africa, dagga grown in Kwazulu-Natal is bartered for weapons in Mozambique, and so the smuggling continues.

Recently the amount of drugs that have been found, and the number of 'dealers' that have been arrested in South Africa, indicate that the country has become a crucial transit point for the lucrative market here, and those in the rest of Southern Africa. Drugs that are produced in South America such as cocaine are found in Luanda, Windhoek, Harare, Maputo, Johannesburg and Mbabane. The

poverty-stricken areas serve as transit points to the East, while the more affluent areas such as Johannesburg also serve as markets. The same pattern applies to mandrax produced in India, LSD in the Netherlands and 'XTC' in the UK. They either pass through Southern Africa destined for the USA and Canada or remain for consumption. Southern Africa presents an excellent transit facility because of inadequate border controls. What should be of concern is that Zambia currently heads the list of drug-trafficking countries in Africa. However, South Africa is fast catching up because it has the added bonus of a good infrastructure, including roads, communication facilities, air and seaports. Additionally, factors such as unemployment and the poor state of drug enforcement agencies provide conducive opportunities for drug syndicates to establish manufacturing bases in the region.

Although Southern Africa has not reached the level of drug abuse as is the case in Europe and the Americas, it faces the same problems and dangers.⁴² Drug experts estimate that the overall use of illegal substances has increased since 1992. In 1995 the South African Police Service arrested 7 995 people for either dealing in or possession of drugs, and confiscated 886 959 tablets and 237 722 kilograms of illegal substances.⁴³ The abuse of narcotics has a devastatingly negative effect on Third World regions where it is estimated up to 20 percent of the world's 40 million illicit-drug users live.⁴⁴ This phenomenon needs to be addressed with great urgency, not only because of its detrimental effect on people's lives, but also because the people of the region cannot afford this expensive habit. Cocaine and other new drugs on the market are expensive and very addictive, and it will not be long before they destroy family structures like they have in other parts of the world. As they penetrate our societies, limited family resources will be redirected towards feeding the addiction and many more homes will be left with insufficient food, and without money for schooling. Children will be forced to fend for themselves, probably by selling the same drugs that destroyed their families. As well as causing widespread suffering and

deaths among addicts, the drug trade engenders corruption and violence, and many addicts resort to theft and prostitution to support their habit.⁴⁵ Drug trafficking has already torn some Western Cape communities apart. In 1996, violence erupted there when a group of anti-drug Muslim militants killed one of the druglords in the presence of the police.⁴⁶ Drug abuse also tends to undermine development initiatives within communities. State resources that could have been used elsewhere have to be diverted to the rehabilitation of drug addicts. Productivity levels at the workplace are also influenced negatively.

4.1.10 AIDS

One thing that will certainly kill most of Southern Africa's people is AIDS. Some have even suggested that Southern Africa will not need a population policy in ten years time because AIDS will do the job instead.⁴⁷ According to World Health Organisation researchers, Sub-Saharan Africa remained the area of the world hardest hit by AIDS.⁴⁸ The impact of the spread of AIDS could have very serious economic consequences for the region. AIDS-related deaths are already affecting production in the rural areas which account for a very high proportion of GDP in Africa.⁴⁹ If the spread of AIDS goes unchecked in the region the virus will not only place enormous strains on an already fragile health-care system, but will reduce the available labour force. With the high level of illiteracy and other so-called cultural-barriers that serve as destabilising factors in the battle against AIDS, the situation looks bleak for Southern Africa.

It can be deduced from the above discussion that the conventional approach to security, which views security exclusively in military terms and relating to inter-state conflict, is inadequate in the context of the challenges that face Southern Africa. The traditional conception of security, which was primarily concerned with defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state by the use of force

or the threat thereof, has limitations in terms of addressing some of these challenges.

In Southern Africa most threats emanate from internal as opposed to external sources. However, these are not easily restricted within the confines of the originating country and can undermine stability in neighbouring states. Nearly all the critical issues, such as refugees, environmental degradation and the proliferation of small arms, are common to many countries in the region and transcend borders.⁵⁰ It is due to this strategic environment that many 'new' security thinkers have suggested a broad-based 'development-oriented' approach to security in Southern Africa. Presenting an argument for a multi-dimensional approach to security should in no way imply that the military should be scrapped from the security agenda. There may be times when military considerations are a more suitable option. Recent intra-state conflicts in Angola and Rwanda and tensions such as those between Botswana and Namibia over the Sidudu Islands serve as indications that the military and political dimensions of security are still very important. Besides, these 'new' security challenges have the potential for transforming themselves into more conventional threats which may have to be dealt with by the military establishments. A more nuanced conception of security places the social, economic and environmental dimensions of security on par with the military dimension. Given the present strategic environment in the region with predominantly non-military challenges, and the relative confidence between former adversarial countries, there is a compelling argument for co-operation in the pursuit of democracy, sustainable economic development and the establishment of common security arrangements. Increasing military budgets and fencing off borders are no solutions.

¹ The Citizen, 19 February 1996.

² The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance: 1995/1996*, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 232.

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- ⁴ J. Bardill, Sources of Domestic Insecurity in Southern Africa, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1994, p. 10.
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- ⁶ S. Baynham, *Prospects for Peace and Stability in Africa*, African Security Review, 4(1), 1995, p. 6.
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- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁷ F. Cheru, The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development and Democracy, Zed Books Ltd, London, 1989, p. 4.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹ M. Lofchie, *Food Deficits in Africa: Causes and Remedies, Agenda for Action: African-Soviet-U.S. Cooperation*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990, p. 14.
- ²⁰ Baynham, *op. cit.*
- ²¹ Solomon and Cilliers, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
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- ²³ D. Davies, *Dangerous Cities, West Africa*, 3 - 9 June 1996, p. 869.
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- ³⁰ Cape Times, 23 August 1994, reported that 'Illegals pass 2 million mark' while Business Day, 31 August 1994, reported that 'SA has 8 million illegal immigrants'.
- ³¹ The Star, 9 June 1995.
- ³² The Star, 10 October 1994.
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- ³⁴ Institute for Defence Policy, Towards Collaborative Peace Project Proposal, 1995, p. 8.
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³⁶ G. Oosthuysen, *Weapons Control Measures in Southern African States*, International Update, No. 12, 1996, p. 1.

³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 2.

³⁸ *Ibid*.

³⁹ United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, United Nations, Geneva, 1995.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*.

⁴¹ C. Venter, *The Extent of Drug Abuse and Drug Smuggling in South Africa*, paper presented at War and Peace in Southern Africa conference, Jan Smuts House, Johannesburg, 4 - 6 August 1996.

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⁴³ *Ibid*.

⁴⁴ S. Baynham, *From Cold War to Detente: Security and Politico-Economic Scenarios for Southern Africa (Part 2)*, South African Defence Review, No. 6, 1992.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*.

⁴⁶ The Star, 6 August 1996.

⁴⁷ Baynham *op. cit.*, 1992, p. 9.

⁴⁸ Weekly Mail, 21 -27 June 1991.

⁴⁹ Baynham, *op. cit.*, 1992, p. 10.

⁵⁰ L. Nathan and J. Honwana, After the Storm: Common Security and Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa, Paper presented at the Eighth International Conference on Peace and Security in Eastern and Southern Africa, Centre for Foreign Relations, Arusha, August 1994, p. 6.

CHAPTER FIVE

PROSPECTS FOR CO-OPERATION: ADDRESSING SECURITY CHALLENGES AS A REGION

Having concluded that the conventional approach to security is too limited given the myriad of challenges confronting Southern Africa, the thesis will now examine the ways in which the region is dealing with some of these issues. This chapter departs from the premise that the range of threats/needs knows no borders or principles of territoriality - they are problems that do confront, or if not jointly tackled will confront all the states in the region. As the founding document of the SADC posits, "...war and insecurity are the enemy of economic progress and social welfare. Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region, and peace and mutual security, are critical components of the total environment for regional co-operation and integration. The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and security..." In this chapter the author will examine some of the attempts that have been made thus far or those that are still unfolding in order to achieve regional security co-operation. There have been positive but rather limited efforts in this direction.

Contemporary global relations are characterised by greater interdependence and the tendency for states to seek ways to deepen economic and political co-operation. In a paper prepared for the '*South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa*' Conference (1995), deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad warned of the contradictory nature of this process as it relates to developing countries. He expressed concern that, while industrialised states yield some sovereign prerogatives to larger, common political associations, in developing countries the unity and stability of states are being thwarted by ethnic, cultural and religious conflicts.¹

There is general fear that the consolidation of advanced industrialised countries into economic and political blocs will have grave consequences for Africa and other 'Third World' regions. Some of the fears concern greater trade barriers and increased marginalisation for Africa. It is argued that, because of the millions living in poverty, and the insurmountable debt trap that most African states are stuck in, the consolidation of advanced industrialised countries will spell disaster for the continent. As governments find themselves in a position where they are unable to provide even the most basic of needs, social conflicts will surely arise.

Given such an environment, Southern Africa needs to enhance the prospects of regional co-operation in all spheres, thereby minimising the potential for conflict. Like other parts of the world, Southern Africa is increasingly becoming interdependent and one of the consequences thereof relates to the difficulties that respective governments are experiencing with containing problems within national boundaries. Therefore, there is an urgent need for the nurturing of regional collaborative schemes aimed at tackling the myriad of problems in Southern Africa. However, these should not be restricted to regional military arrangements, there is also an urgent need for collaborative socio-economic development in Southern Africa. It should be borne in mind that without regional security (in all its dimensions), both economic development and political stability will be hard to achieve. In this regard, organisations such as the SADC also have a crucial role in the regional security matrix even though they are primarily concerned with what is termed developmental issues.

In pursuit of peace and stability for the region, some attempts have already been made to create common security mechanisms. A recent African initiative in 1990 brought the African Leadership Forum, the secretaries of the Organisation of African Unity and the UN Economic Commission on Africa to debate the possible formation of a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation

in Africa (CSSDCA). This debate arose from the realisation and the concern that Africa is becoming increasingly marginalised and that its social and economic woes needed urgent and a continent-wide effort to address them. Nathan argues that "the objectives of the CSSDA would be to address Africa's problems in a co-ordinated and systematic way, and create mechanisms for the growing marginalisation and regulate inter-and intra-African relations. The overriding goal would be to promote democracy and respect for human rights as necessary prerequisites for political stability and socio-economic development."²

This initiative was modelled along the same lines as which, for the past 20 years, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), now the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has provided a forum for the United States, the Soviet Union and 33 West and East European countries to formulate guidelines on inter-state relations and a range of other issues. Among some of the guiding principles for the CSSDCA was the adoption of an all encompassing concept of security that goes beyond the normal state-centric conception. An attempt was made to distinguish between the security of the people and that of states. The former, it was felt, meant that people's social, political and economic needs should be met, which would as a result bring about the latter (state security). Another guiding principle emanating from CSSDCA was the adoption of a common security approach, given that most of the problems are shared by many countries in Africa. Furthermore, it was felt that conflicts should be resolved in a peaceful manner through negotiations, mediation, arbitration and, where necessary, the deployment of armed troops in peace-keeping operations.

These kinds of initiatives have led to further attempts at establishing somewhat more practical regional co-operation mechanisms. Given the changing political environment in Southern Africa, states in the region have seized the opportunity created by this new environment to try to create a security regime envisaged by

the CSSDCA, but on a somewhat smaller and more manageable scale with Southern Africa as the primary focus.

5. 1 Is a Security Community Conceivable in Southern Africa?

Groups of states seek collective security for a number of reasons, among them being that they occupy a certain geographical area that encourages trade links or that there is easy movement between the different countries. Additionally, one might find that people of that region share common values and interests that need to be preserved. NATO for example was a common (military) security regime between Western European states and North America based on a shared ideology of free-market principles and democratic forms of government. It was essentially established to protect Western democracies against what they perceived as the communist threat of the Soviet Union and its allies.

Karl Deutsch is renowned for having conceived the concept of 'security community'. According to him a 'security community' exists between a group of states when peace is predictable between them.³ Countries that comprise the OSCE realised that security had to be achieved with others, not against them. Using the experience of the 'north Atlantic' as the unit of analysis, Deutsch believes that a security community can only be created under the following conditions: mutual compatibility of values; strong economic ties and the expectation of more; multifaceted social, political and cultural transactions; a growing number of institutionalised relationships; mutual responsiveness; and mutual predictability of behaviour.⁴ Southern Africa does not meet many of the criteria set out in Deutsch's model, but this should not imply that the region cannot form a 'security community' or something similar. Through SADC and the recently signed protocol on free trade in the region, economic ties between Southern African countries are likely to be strengthened. Additionally, transnational links are already in place to combat issues such as drug-trafficking

and weapons smuggling. Furthermore, the preventive diplomacy exercise by Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa regarding Lesotho's political instability in 1994, demonstrates an emerging value compatibility in terms of resolving potential conflict. But, most importantly, Southern African states are all aware of the security challenges that confront the region as a whole.

One of the features essential in any 'security community' is confidence-building measures. In the Southern African context, confidence building is crucial for the purpose of avoiding the recurrence of conflicts that plagued the region in the past. Although confidence-and-security-building measures (CSBMs) are generally associated with Europe, they are increasingly incorporated into the emerging new discourse on security in Africa. Nathan points out that in Europe CSBMs comprise of agreements between two or more states, the purpose of which has been defined as follows:

- to improve trust or conversely, to eliminate mistrust and uncertainty among military adversaries;
- to reduce misperceptions about specific military threats and concerns by communicating adequately verifiable evidence of acceptable reliability to the effect that those fears and concerns are groundless; and
- to reduce the risks of armed conflict resulting from misunderstanding or miscalculation by providing clear and timely information about military activities.⁵

The 1995 Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa envisages appropriate regional CSBMs as including "the annual exchange of information on defence budgets and troop deployment, notification and on-site observation of specified military activities, verification procedures, a communications network, and means of dealing with unusual or unscheduled military incidents."⁶ Regarding this list, Nathan argues that SADC countries can also engage in joint activities involving military training at senior and rank-and-

file levels, intelligence gathering, patrols of national boundaries by border guards and maintenance and procurement of weapons systems.⁷ Indeed, some of these activities have taken place, for example, in March 1996 the Defence sub-committee of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) made recommendations for joint training exercises of their respective armed forces.⁸ However, confidence-building measures should not be restricted to the military establishments. They can be extended to include cultural interaction etc. A regional consciousness among the broader populations of Southern Africa must also be given the opportunity to develop so as to limit the likelihood of conflict between neighbouring states.

South Africa has a crucial role to play in the process of confidence-building. Regardless of the new democratic government in power, South Africa's regional policy must be accompanied by atonement. The current crop of leaders should appreciate that as much as they were victims of the former South African government, they were not the only ones. A shared understanding of the troubled history in the region needs to be developed. Without this the confidence-building process will be undermined. It is instructive to compare the post-war history of the French and German nations with that of the Serbs and Croats. In the former case, acts of atonement were able to create the trust and confidence that currently exists between these former adversaries. In contrast, the recent brutal history of Serb-Croat relations was repressed during the communist era, and the bitter past was not mediated between the different national groups. It was instead nurtured in songs and poetry which produced the dangerous brew of paranoia, heroism, medieval violence and national identity which we see today.⁹

Some analysts have been critical on the exportability of CSBMs. The argument put forward is that the Stockholm and Vienna agreements (where CSBMs were adopted in Europe) were concluded by strong states, whereas Southern African

states are weak and have limited financial resources and infrastructural capacity to implement some of the measures. Given such limitations it would be unrealistic for the region to adopt the Stockholm and Vienna agreements as guidelines for setting up regional CSBMs, but priority should be given to those measures that are immediately feasible and of great importance. Some CSBMs have already been operative in the region, albeit to a limited extent. In the late 1970s the Frontline States responded to Pretoria's policy of regional destabilisation by establishing the Inter-State Committee on Security and Defence, a body of defence ministers, defence ministry officials and senior military officers.¹⁰ Regular meetings and co-ordinated action over fifteen years achieved a high level of trust among the participating armed forces and governments.¹¹

CSBMs should further be strengthened by the conclusion of multi-lateral treaties on disarmament and conventional arms control. A scenario whereby states engage in unchecked arms build-ups will only breed insecurity in the region. A significant offensive capability harboured by one state will invoke uncertainty and fear in other states which may counter this fear by engaging in an arms build-up in return. In a region characterised by fragile civil-military relations, the procurement of armaments heightens the dangers of those arms 'falling into the wrong hands'. Additionally, armaments divert scarce financial resources from more productive ends such as education and health-care. Governments' rationale for engaging in arms build-ups is often inconsistent with the population's needs and aspirations. The Botswana government, for example, claims that its arms build-up is aimed at strengthening the security of the country. However, this is being done at the expense of welfare services which are lacking. The result will probably be lowered standards of living which may be met with popular resistance which, in turn, will provide a motivation for the state to intensify its arms build-up in order to tackle the resistance.

With the exception of Botswana, Southern African countries seem to be committed to disarmament. This is reflected by reduced defence expenditures since the early 1990s. Furthermore, most of the militarised Southern African states have lowered their force levels. For example, between 1991 and 1994 full-time force levels dropped from 54 600 to 46 900 in Zimbabwe; from 58 000 to 30 000 in Mozambique; and from 70 000 (SWAPO guerrillas and South African-controlled troops) to 8 100 in Namibia.¹² There is no doubt that South Africa has to play an exemplary role in this regard. It's neighbours still deem the country as a threat, and without a concerted attempt to reduce the level of armed forces and to adopt a non-threatening force doctrine, the confidence and trust that is desired in the region will not be achieved. South Africa has a disproportionately high force level in comparison to other states in the region. However, it hopes to 'downsize' the force from a peak of approximately 125 000 soldiers, civilians and bureaucrats, to an affordable 90 000 or less.¹³ In terms of its aggregate conventional weaponry and equipment, it was estimated in 1993 that South Africa was five times superior to its immediate neighbours.¹⁴

However, disarmament and force level reductions have their own problems. As previously discussed, demobilisation of former guerrillas can release trained fighters into the society without any means of employment. This has taken place in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Namibia. Without any employment and the necessary skills required to earn a living in civilian society, many of these former soldiers have turned to banditry and other criminal activities. Defence cuts can also lead to lower wages and can invoke a crisis in morale which in South Africa has led many former SADF soldiers to transfer their skills to private security companies such as Executive Outcomes.

Regional security may also be enhanced by seriously considering a regional non-aggression pact which prohibits threat or the use of force. Some have even touted the idea of a mutual defence pact whereby Southern African states would

make a commitment to defend each other against external attack. The likelihood of this occurrence in the near-future is slim. To start with, collective regional security arrangements must be operational before undertaking such a grand scheme.

5.2 Collective Regional Security Arrangements

When formal security arrangements are finalised, it will not be the first time that such common security policies have been attempted in Southern Africa. Prior to the democratisation of South Africa, some independent Southern African countries united under the banner of Frontline States (FLS) to address mainly political issues such as the liberation of South Africa, and military co-operation against the destabilisation tactics of Pretoria. The FLS was formed in 1974 and at that stage it comprised Tanzania and Zambia. Subsequent to other states attaining independence, Angola, Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe joined. Goncalves argues that "the role played by the Frontline States in the decolonisation of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe was in essence an implicit recognition of the integrative nature of the political and security situation in the region".¹⁵ At other more bi-lateral levels, he points to the occasions when Tanzania and Zimbabwe committed troops to help the Mozambican government fight against Renamo. The Nkomati and Swazi Accords signed, respectively, by Mozambique and Swaziland with South Africa, are other bi-lateral agreements aimed at crisis resolution and prevention.¹⁶

Since 1990 there have been debates among politicians, diplomats and academics over the issue of diplomacy co-ordination in conflict resolution, common defence and all-encompassing terms of collective regional security in which multilateral arrangements would include non-military concerns.¹⁷ Before discussing some of the relevant multilateral arrangements that are in place, it is appropriate to provide a brief background on the organisation of the SADC from

which some of these present arrangements emanate. What is now known as SADC, started off as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980. This organisation, which had as its two main objectives the minimisation of dependence on South Africa and the promotion of development in the region, operated for the first twelve years without a legal framework, treaty or protocol. Cilliers argues that "because of the poor record of regional economic integration schemes in Africa and other developing countries, the founders opted for a loose organisation promoting co-operation and co-ordination rather than formal integration."¹⁸

As regards the realisation of its two primary objectives, SADCC recorded limited success. For example, trade with South Africa increased between 1980 and 1992.¹⁹ However, despite the criticism levelled at SADCC, one important contribution to regional development "...has been the forging of a regional identity and a sense of common destiny among the countries and peoples of Southern Africa."²⁰

SADC was formally established in 1992 after four years of deliberations that started in 1989 at the SADCC Heads of State and Government Summit in Harare. Upon its formation it was decided to formalise the organisation by giving it legal status. The Declaration and Treaty of the SADC was signed by Heads of State and Government in Windhoek in 1992. Even though it is not explicitly stated, there seems to be an attempt to mould the organisation along similar lines as comprehensively integrated organisations such as the European Union. Cilliers argues that "the true vision of SADC is in essence full economic integration of the Southern African region and trade liberalisation".²¹ With the signing of a free trade protocol at the Lesotho SADC Summit in August 1996, it seems that the region may achieve this objective early in the next century. However, SADC's vision extends further. The organisation envisages itself playing a political role and has sought ways to establish frameworks and

mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and to provide for mutual peace and security.

The organisation operates on a sector co-ordination basis. Each of the twelve countries is allocated a specific sector such as trade and industry or transport to co-ordinate and provide regional leadership. Member states co-ordinating a particular sector are expected to propose sector policies, strategies as well as priorities. This system has constantly been subjected to criticism and one of the concerns that have been raised relates to the incapacity of some countries to co-ordinate, never mind provide, regional leadership in a given sector.

Throughout its short history the SADC has never had a sector to deal with security-related issues. This role was left to the Frontline States. However, the international strategic environment unleashed by the termination of the Cold War and the death of apartheid provided opportunities for co-operation in this area. The SADC Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security, held in Windhoek in July 1994, was instrumental in 'setting the scene' for Southern African states to enter the areas of security co-ordination, conflict mediation and even military co-operation on a grand scale.²² One of the recommendations from this workshop was the establishment of a Conflict Resolution and Political Co-operation Sector. Proposals were put forward that an existing organisation such as the SADC should accommodate this new sector. It was also suggested that the FLS be disbanded and its functions taken over by the SADC under the new sector that would deal with politics; diplomacy; international relations; defence and security; peace; conflict prevention, management and resolution. The feasibility of such an arrangement was questioned by many, given that the sectoral framework of SADC had already come under fire for being inefficient and cumbersome. Maveneka outlines some of the problems envisaged by incorporating security and defence as a sector of the SADC: "As a sector, members appear worried that it would lose the informality and flexibility which the Frontline States prided

themselves on...SADC's current decision making processes start from sectoral meetings of officials, followed by standing committee of officials, who in turn report to the Council of Ministers, and finally to the Summit. The sector arrangement, it was argued, would make it difficult to react quickly to crisis situations."²³ The sector arrangement of SADC also operates in a way that sector co-ordinating countries are supposed to raise funds for a particular sector. Therefore, it was felt that this new sector would be the 'darling' of the donor community, especially with most western industrial powers no longer interested in getting directly involved in African conflicts. There was also fear that, if a country such as South Africa took over the sector, it would create greater insecurity in the region given Pretoria's history of destabilisation and its military superiority relative to other states in Southern Africa.

Realising the problems associated with a security sector, SADC's foreign ministers abandoned this idea at the Lilongwe meeting of January 1995 where the issue of allocating the sector should have been dealt with. Instead, the foreign ministers of SADC met on 3 March 1995 and "recommended that ASAS (the Association of Southern African States) be established as the political arm of the SADC, as its mechanism for dealing with conflict prevention, management and resolution in Southern Africa."²⁴ It was proposed that the political wing should preserve the key features of the now defunct Frontline States, in that it should be informal, and operate at heads-of-state level, and meet whenever necessary. Some of its guiding principles which were set out in the Ministers' July 1994 Windhoek Document are:

- the sovereign equality of all member states;
- respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence;
- peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation or arbitration; and

- military intervention of whatever nature shall be decided upon only after all possible remedies have been exhausted in accordance with the Charters of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN).²⁵

Amongst some of its objectives ASAS would seek to:

- protect people of the region against instability arising from the internal breakdown of law and order, interstate conflict and from external aggression;
- co-operate fully in regional security and defence, through conflict prevention, management and resolution;
- give maximum support to the organs and institutions of SADC;
- mediate in inter-state and intra-state disputes and conflicts;
- co-ordinate and harmonise, as far as possible, policy on international issues;
- promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within each member state, and to encourage each and every member state to observe universal human rights as provided for in the charters and conventions of the OAU and the UN;
- promote peace and stability; and
- promote peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security.²⁶

Contrary to expectations, this body was not ratified at the August 1995 Heads of State and Government Summit held in Johannesburg. The absence of consultation with various Ministers of Defence, Police, Safety and Security, Home Affairs etc., was cited as one of the 'stumbling blocks'. Additionally, there are suspicions that the delay in the formalisation of ASAS could be attributed to a disgruntled Zimbabwean Prime Minister. Cilliers argues that "Robert Mugabe felt that Zimbabwe had a right to a commanding position in any new grouping, similar to the role it played in the FLS, and was piqued at the increased dominance of South Africa".²⁷ Zimbabwe's proposal that the chairmanship of

ASAS be given to the longest serving SADC Head of State (Mugabe), was ruled out, instead there was preference for a two-yearly revolving chairmanship. It appears as though there was also discontent about the name ASAS. This was articulated by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs at a press briefing before the SADC Heads of State and Government Summit in Johannesburg. Because of these 'hiccups', a decision on a framework for security, political co-operation, and conflict mediation, management and resolution was delayed until the 1996 Maseru summit.

5.3 Enter the Organ

Extensive preparations were made for the Maseru Summit. A far broader spectrum of stakeholders were consulted prior to the establishment of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. A meeting held in Gaborone, Botswana, in January (1996) indicated that the SADC Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security agreed to recommend to their heads of state the creation of a SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security which, it was envisaged, would allow more flexibility and timely response, at the highest level, to sensitive and potentially explosive situations.²⁸ The Organ would be guided by principles of sovereign equality of all member states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the observance of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Some of the Organ's objectives include:

- safeguarding the region against instability from within or outside its borders;
- promoting political co-operation and common political values and institutions;
- developing a common foreign policy and a joint international lobby on issues of common interest;
- security and defence co-operation through conflict prevention, management and resolution;
- mediation of disputes and conflicts;

- preventive diplomacy and mechanisms, with punitive measures as a last resort;
- democratic institutions and practices, and promotion of human rights;
- sustainable peace and security through peacemaking and peacekeeping;
- give political, economic, social, and environmental dimensions of security;
- development of a collective security capacity and a mutual defence pact, and regional peacekeeping capacity;
- close co-operation between police and security services in addressing cross-border crime and promoting a community-based approach to matters of security;
- monitor ratification of relevant international conventions and treaties;
- co-ordinate participation of members in international and regional peacekeeping operations; and
- address extra-regional conflicts which impact on peace and security in Southern Africa²⁹

According to the proposed institutional framework, the Organ will operate at summit level (i.e. heads of state and government), as well as ministerial and technical levels, but will function separately from other SADC structures. To minimise bureaucracy, the Organ will operate in a flexible and informal manner. Rather than run as a sector, whereby one country has the responsibility over defence and security matters, it was decided to rotate the chairmanship on an annual and Troika basis. Zimbabwe has been accorded the inaugural chairmanship.

Some parties within SADC preferred the retention of a sector approach for the Organ because this would have allowed it to operate at a more technical level (i.e. that of bureaucrats and not politicians). However, Cilliers argues that allocating the Organ to a single country would have been very difficult due to the highly sensitive and political nature of the issues that the Organ deals with, such

as monitoring political stability in the various countries.³⁰ Another debate concerning the Organ relates to whether it requires a separate permanent secretariat or not. Some concern has been raised that without a permanent secretariat, the Organ will struggle to keep abreast of events it aims to address. The present SADC secretariat is small, staffed by about ten professional staff members and 20 administrative personnel. The SADC secretariat, as it is constituted, will surely not be able to cope with the expanded programme brought about by the formation of the Organ.

One of the Organ's proposed institutions is the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). This forum of Southern African Ministers of Defence, Home Affairs, Public Security and State Security, was formed in 1983 under the aegis of the FLS. It is an informal body without an executive secretary and permanent secretariat. The ISDSC consists of three sub-committees, namely defence, public security and state security. They are all aimed at the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and the enhancement of regional stability through co-operation. For example, the defence sub-committee has as its objective the sharing of defence-related information, exploring areas of multilateral co-operation, etc. The public security sub-committee and the state security sub-committee are guided by similar principles of sharing and exchanging information regarding drug-trafficking, weapons smuggling etc. These sub-committees also seek to encourage multilateral co-operation in order to improve the overall security in the region as well as to build confidence between SADC member states.

To achieve maximum impact in enhancing stability and security, the ISDSC adopted a principle of unrestricted bilateral defence co-operation between member states, as well as between states outside the confines of SADC. For example, South Africa and Mozambique have a working agreement to jointly counter the trade in small arms between the two countries. South Africa has a

similar agreement with Namibia aimed at combating drug and arms smuggling, and vehicle theft. The newly established Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO) will play an important role in curbing the wide-spread increase of crime in the region. It is envisaged that co-operation will extend beyond defence and policing functions. Naval co-operation and the protection of the region's marine resources was identified as a potential area for co-operation. A Standing Committee on Maritime Co-operation was formed in Zimbabwe in June 1995. An invitation was extended to non-SADC coastal states to join the standing committee which aims to address "the protection of marine resources (notably fishing) and the marine environment, ecological pollution control (including oil spills), disaster relief, combating piracy, drug and arms trafficking and illegal immigration, safety of life at sea (through search and rescue operations), hydrography and navigation aids and the support of scientific research."³¹

When the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security is fully operational, it will work in tandem with similar OAU and UN structures. The Organ will be guided by principles of international law as set out in the United Nation's Charter. Article 1 of the UN Charter commits members states to "maintain international peace and security, and to that end; to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace...". Article 2(3) of the Charter further requires that all member states "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered". Article 2(4) demands that all members states "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state...".

The charter of the United Nations also provides provisions for the creation of regional security arrangements which can contribute to the maintenance of

international peace or bring about peaceful settlements to local disputes within different regions in the world. It is in this vein and the fact that the UN is overburdened with tasks of trying to establish international peace that bodies such as the OAU will be forced to take a more active role in bringing about a stable security environment in Southern Africa. In the past no other regional organisation, with the exception of NATO, possessed adequate machinery to deal with conflict. It is pointed out, for example, that Asia has no organisational structure to deal with conflict. In the Middle East the League of Arab States has the Joint Defence Pact, but not the machinery of settling disputes, although it is contemplating the establishment of an Arab Court of Justice. In Latin America the Organisation of American States (OAS) played almost no role in settling disputes and conflicts.³²

With the world leading powers' increasing reluctance to participate directly in peace-keeping operations in Africa, the continent and its various regional organisations have been forced to establish the mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Even though the primary responsibility for peace-keeping in Africa still lies within the ambit of the UN, bodies such as the OAU will in future be entrusted with peace-keeping operations within the continent. Since the establishment of the OAU 32 years ago, a system of ad hoc arrangements has been used to deal with inter-state conflict, while intra-state conflict has mainly been left to each member state to handle in an appropriate manner. It is only in the 1990s that the OAU has moved towards a permanent mechanism that allows it to formalise and intensify its ability to assist in building peace in Africa.

The OAU Charter of 1964 provided for a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration to encourage members to settle their disputes peacefully. The commission remained unused due to factors related to the Cold War and out of fear of violating a clause in the OAU Charter that addresses territorial integrity

and sovereignty of member states. For almost three decades the OAU's sacrosanct doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states rendered the OAU ineffective in conflict resolution as most conflicts on the continent were civil wars.³³ A shift in this doctrine occurred with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peace-keeping operation in Liberia that began in 1990. Even though this intervention abounded with controversy, it demonstrated Africa's commitment to resolving conflict on the continent regardless of whether it was interstate or otherwise. By the early 1990s the OAU realised that its non-interference position and its previously dormant existence is more likely to drive Africa to further decline and stagnation.

The absence of an effective means of addressing the many conflicts that have plagued the continent led to an important decision. At the Dakar OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in July 1992 it was decided that a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution should be established. The mechanism was formally adopted at the twenty-ninth annual OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Cairo in June 1993. Consensus was reached that the mechanism will collectively manage conflicts within the African continent whether they be internal or between states. Furthermore, the mechanism committed the OAU to all aspects of conflict management including peacemaking and peacekeeping in Africa under the auspices of the UN and in co-operation with regional organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC.

Thus far the mechanism has not been successful. Its principal activities have centred around observing elections, preventive diplomacy, using the good offices of the secretary-general, eminent persons, special envoys and representatives of the secretary-general. The assistant secretary-general of the OAU identified the following two shortcomings of the mechanism:

The first one concerns the inadequacy of the OAU to fully operationalise the mechanism in preventing disputes or incipient conflicts from erupting into full-

blown conflicts. Secondly, the mechanism experienced operational problems due to the reluctance of the UN and other major powers to get more involved in peacekeeping.³⁴

Africans have likewise demonstrated a reluctance in involving themselves in peace-keeping activities, or establishing forces towards this end. The rationale seems to be derived from an understanding that peace-keeping is not only an expensive undertaking, but a very difficult and complex exercise, involving not only military as well as civilian components, but also heavy financial, logistical as well as technical input.³⁵

Peace-keeping does not count as one of the OAU's priority activities at present. This position is consistent with that of regional organisations such as the SADC which believes that eminence should be given to preventive diplomacy rather than peace-keeping. The former implies that Southern African states should strive to build confidence and trust among one another and give priority to solving problems through dialogue, mediation and arbitration. Thus, preventive diplomacy involves diplomacy that prevents conflicts from developing. The involvement of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe in recent disputes in Lesotho, which culminated in the restoration of democracy and the reinstatement of the previous monarchy, is a successful example of preventive diplomacy.

For preventive diplomacy to function properly, the Organ or the ISDSC will have to ensure that an 'early warning system' is established in the region. This is basically intended to assess whether a threat to peace exists, and to determine possible actions to prevent the outbreak of conflict. Before a crisis turns into conflict there is normally a period whereby signs of the impending conflict can be detected. 'Early warning systems' therefore require personnel who can provide timely information on potential conflict situations. However, the lack of efficient communication channels in Southern Africa could jeopardise the success of

such an 'early warning system' and the added costs of having full-time personnel for 'intelligence' work are not desirable. Cilliers proposes that "such a mechanism should not be a permanent structure (part of the ISDSC, for example) and that this role could be fulfilled through co-operation among members based on information provided by non-state actors like NGO's and academic institutions."³⁶ Vital information collected in the region can also be passed on to the OAU's Central Organ for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution which envisages establishing an early warning network to cover the entire continent.

The process of establishing regional security mechanisms is irreversible. It is admirable that politicians were able to overcome most of the hurdles that prevented the formalisation of ASAS. The importance of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security to long-term peace and stability in the region cannot be overstated. The stumbling blocks experienced with the formation of ASAS highlight the difficulties associated with collective security. It was perhaps a reflection of the absence of trust and confidence among SADC states. It is also certain that issues of national sovereignty and pride were at the heart of the problem, as well as the desire by nation states to take care of their own security affairs rather than place them in the hands of a supranational structure, which most fear they can have no control over.³⁷ This fear of a regional security body must be practically addressed by engaging in confidence-and-security-building measures such as disarmament programmes which may particularly allay the fears of weaker countries. The new Organ must not be seen as a body endowed with the power to usurp national sovereignty, but as a building block towards a more secure environment in the region which is a prerequisite of economic development and political stability - elements which Southern Africa so desperately need.

The formalisation of the Organ will no doubt send a positive signal to the international community about Africa's commitment to bring stability to the continent. This should also serve as an impetus for other African regional organisations to follow. However, the continued support of the international community and the OAU is essential to the success of this body. It is important that the Organ does not become a statistic of failed African attempts at enhancing peace and stability. When peace eventually prevails in Angola, the region has a favourable chance of improving Africa's tarnished image. The gateway to a more stable Africa in the twenty-first century lies in a strong and effective collective security regime in the South.

¹ A. Pahad, *South Africa and Preventive Diplomacy*, Peacekeeping in Africa, vol. 2, Institute for Defence Policy, Midrand, 1995, p. 153.

² L. Nathan, *Beyond Arms and Armed Forces: A New Approach to Security*, South African Defence Review, Issue No. 4, 1992, p. 15.

³ Quoted in K. Booth, *A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations*, Southern African Perspectives, No. 30, 1994, p. 14.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁵ Quoted in L. Nathan, *With Open Arms: Confidence-and-Security-Building Measures in Southern Africa*, South African Journal of International Affairs, 1(2), 1994, pp. 110-111.

⁶ Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, *op. cit.*

⁷ Nathan, *op. cit.*

⁸ Pretoria News, 13 March 1996.

⁹ Quoted in Booth, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁰ Quoted in L. Nathan and J. Honwana, After the Storm: Common Security and Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa, paper presented at the Eighth International Conference on "Peace and Security in Eastern and Southern Africa", Centre for Foreign Relations, Arusha, August 1994, p. 6.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹³ M. Shaw, *Negotiating Defence For A New South Africa*, About Turn, Institute for Defence Policy, Midrand, 1995, p. 31.

¹⁴ Quoted in Nathan and Honwana, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁵ F. Goncalves, *Southern Africa: In Search of Common Security?*, Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly, 8(7), 1995, p. 6.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ G. Mills, *South Africa and Africa: Regional Integration and Security Co-operation*, African Security Review, 4(2), 1995, p. 8.

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- ¹⁸ J. Cilliers, *The Evolving Security Architecture in Southern Africa*, African Security Review, 4(5), 1995, p. 37.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 37 - 38.
- ²⁰ Quoted in Cilliers, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
- ²¹ Cilliers, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
- ²² *Ibid*, pp. 39 - 40.
- ²³ L. Maveneka, *The New Shape ASAS*, Southern African Economist, 8(2), 1995, p. 11.
- ²⁴ Pahad, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
- ²⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 156 - 157.
- ²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 157
- ²⁷ Cilliers, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
- ²⁸ Southern Africa News Features, 24 January 1996.
- ²⁹ *Ibid*.
- ³⁰ J. Cilliers, The SADC Organ for Defence, Politics and Security, Institute for Defence Policy Occasional Paper, No. 10, October 1996.
- ³¹ Cilliers, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
- ³² A. Haggag, *OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa*, paper presented at the ISDSC meeting in Cape Town, 7 September 1995, p. 2.
- ³³ H. Cohen, *Conflict Management in Africa*, Africa Notes, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), February 1996, p. 1.
- ³⁴ Haggag, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
- ³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 6.
- ³⁶ Cilliers, *op. cit.*, 1995, p. 12.
- ³⁷ Goncalves, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

6.1 A Development and People-Driven Approach to Security

The process of regional security co-operation should not stop at establishing frameworks to deal only with military and defence matters. Security in Southern African encompasses other dimensions and as such, there is a need for the development of other non-military regimes aimed at tackling the myriad of problems confronting the region. Most of the literature on security focuses primarily on military problems and military solutions. Even the latest Southern African initiative, the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security is fundamentally a military framework whose terms of reference are limited to so-called hard security issues. This is perhaps a reflection of the preponderance of Realism and the traditional approach which mostly equates security with hard military issues. However, even though the 'new' paradigm has not effectively transcended academic discourse to become government policy, it is encouraging to learn of politicians frequently making reference to the 'new' security challenges. If it is accepted that the existence of non-military threats outlined earlier should be considered as security issues, then what is required is a devolution of responsibility in addressing these security concerns. Within state confines the departments of water, environmental affairs, home affairs, health, etc., must increasingly be brought into the security agenda. Perhaps they are more apt to address some of the security concerns than the military establishment is. However, the state should not be the only agent for the security of people. NGOs, the private sector and civil society also have a role in enhancing regional security.

There is a growing recognition that non-state actors also have a role to play in the security enterprise. Real security in the Southern African context will come in the form of economic and social development which can also be fostered by NGOs, transnational corporations and other regional institutions. In a region such as

Southern Africa security cannot be divorced from development; the two are inextricably linked. Security is development, and without development there can be no security. However, development needs to cover the region in its entirety in order to bring peace and security to all Southern African states. Mandaza captures this line of thought by arguing that "peace and security on the one hand and regional co-operation and integration on the other, are two sides of the same coin. Clearly, without peace and security, there can be no co-operation and economic integration; and without a satisfactory degree of equitable economic development and co-operation among member states, there can be no peace and security."¹ Clearly then, post-apartheid collective security needs to be development-oriented. A collective security regime should not only be concerned with external threats or those threats that have military implications; strategies encompassing a wide spectrum of security agents should rather be formulated according to the conditions that permeate in the region at a given time.

The new SADC Organ has limitations in terms of addressing the security and development concerns encompassed in the broadened agenda. The SADC has on many occasions declared that it is aware of the broadened conceptualisation of security and the close link between security and development. However, the SADC as an organisation fails to answer several important questions. Its commitment to the various dimensions of security does not seem to include well-thought-out strategies on how other dimensions of security are to be incorporated into the SADC framework. How will the other dimensions of security be realised? Will they be addressed through the Organ or through some of the SADC's sectors? These other dimensions of security are listed among the Organ's objectives, but it is difficult to visualise how a forum such as the Organ will address them. Until some of these questions are addressed, the SADC's 'commitment' to a broadened security agenda will be regarded as another lip-service exercise.

The Organ for Politics, Defence and Security is basically a military framework whose capacity is limited to so-called hard security issues. The language used in the *communiqué* which established the SADC Organ confirms that its point of departure

still lies in a military-political dimension of security. For example, the *communiqué* is dominated by terminology such as: 'Security and defence co-operation', 'address extra-regional conflicts', 'development of a Mutual Defence Pact', etc.² Judging from the Organ's objectives it is obvious that the military establishments played a key role in the evolution of the Organ. Contributions from other 'stake-holders', such as those concerned with the environment, land management, water, agriculture and food, are not evident. Clearly if the SADC Organ is perceived as the appropriate forum to address Southern Africa's security needs, then more informed conceptual ideas on the implications of a widened security agenda should have been summoned from the above-mentioned 'stake-holders'.

Furthermore, there are doubts whether the SADC Organ can provide or maintain individual security for the people of the region. One of its guiding principles stipulates the sovereign equality of member states. If the Organ is guided by such a principle, one would not be far off the mark to conclude that individual states will be directed by national interests. They will seek to protect their citizens first, probably at the expense of others not belonging to the polity. Within such a scenario one can almost be certain that illegal immigrants and displaced people will not enjoy the individual security implied by the broadened agenda. These factors pose serious questions about the functioning of the SADC Organ. Is it really a regional security body? What does security co-operation entail? Does it mean co-operation in certain areas and not in others, or is the Organ just a framework by means of which individual states can co-ordinate their security, political and defence policies?³ These are some of the issues which could influence the efficacy of the Organ and consequently undermine the security that the body intended to provide and maintain.

One of the foundations of the 'new' security paradigm rests on an expanded index of security agents. The rationale behind a horizontal expansion of security necessarily requires a variety of agents. However, this should not be restricted primarily to providing previously peripheral government departments with a more pro-active role in security issues. Above all, non-state actors should be brought towards the centre

of security debates and decision-making processes. The ongoing security debate and the recent formalisation of the SADC Organ presuppose that the state is the only agent of security. In the case of the Organ there is an underlying assumption that regional security is best attained through an inter-governmental forum.

Indeed, for many years governments assumed the role of guardian over the state and its people. Ironically, in many cases such as the old South Africa, the government was the agent of insecurity for the majority of citizens. However, it is understandable why the status quo has prevailed for so long. Firstly, governments are usually in control of two of the most important levers of power - force and financial resources. Secondly, the Realist paradigm of international relations, underpinned by a narrow conception of security, reinforced the power of governments, especially the military establishments which played a prominent role during the era of inter-state rivalries.

6.2 Devolution of Responsibility: Enter Non-State Actors

In contrast to Realism, the 'new' security paradigm offers a dialectic which broadens the scope of security agents. Inspired by a school of thought often referred to as Post-Modernism, proponents of the 'new' security paradigm argue that civil society in its various formations can also contribute towards the provision, or at least the promotion of security. These proponents pose a challenge to the narrow, ethnocentric and macho world-view professed by Realist orthodoxy. They allude to a world predominantly populated by women and the poor, whose concerns have not been addressed by a Realist world-view. They paralyse the centrality of states in international relations and highlight the growing role of non-state actors. They foresee and indeed promote the development of new international relations based on a kind of 'detente from below' engendered by the gradual strengthening of a global civil society.⁴

In the past couple of years we have witnessed heightened activism from a broad spectrum of people all over the world fighting for democracy and human rights, for

equitable development and for a safer environment. Their actions have ranged from women in India hugging trees to save them from being felled, Polish workers challenging a totalitarian regime, and entire villages in Asia mobilising for self-governance and self-development⁵, to global environmental organisations such as Green Peace lobbying governments to come to terms with ecological imbalance and the dangers of nuclear testing.

Some of these citizen-action groups existed for many years in Western liberal democracies, but the end of the Cold War, as was demonstrated by the Green Peace opposition to French nuclear testing in 1995, has released their latent vigour to counter-balance governments' power. In Africa too, and in many other 'Third World' areas, there has been a proliferation of citizen-action groups. Understandably, their focus is concentrated on Third-World-specific issues such as poverty, hunger and literacy. Here too the end of the Cold War and the collapse of repressive military regimes provided opportunities for the emergence of a phenomenon previously concealed in the Third World. Dyani states that: "The significance of these movements is that while they are inevitably part of a global struggle in one (interdependent) world, they also represent a politics of difference, the articulation of the many levels of people's experiences and aspirations, which cannot and should not be constrained by the dictates of a particular 'meaning of humanity' as projected in the traditional discourse of International Relations".⁶

It is encouraging to note an emerging trend, informed by deepening interdependence and rapid globalisation, which realises that some universal challenges cannot be resolved at local and national levels. Regional coalitions and networks are being formed in many parts of the world to address specific themes and concerns such as protection of the environment, human rights, women, children, and indigenous peoples' rights and so on.⁷ The very fact that parts of the 'North' are also facing unemployment, urban violence, drugs, AIDS, and environmental degradation opens up new opportunities for more horizontal international linkages between geographic areas and nations.⁸ Without undermining the existence of

cultural differences and developmental disparities between different societies, somehow the idea of a global civil society does not seem far-fetched anymore.

There is a plethora of definitions on what constitutes civil society. These definitions vary from a collection of individuals, to an array of interest groups defined in many ways from economic to communal groups, to social classes and as a combination of the three.⁹ Therefore, civil society includes the groups of free press, independent universities, community-based organisations, non-governmental organisations with their various areas of interest, trade unions, banks, commercial firms and so on. In most of Africa, civil society and its associated institutions is still weak and Southern Africa is no exception. However, the author is confident that Southern Africa, more than any other region on the continent, harbours the best potential for the development of a strong civil society. The newly independent states of Namibia and South Africa have a strong history of civic action. The enduring strength of South Africa's civil society was demonstrated in 1995 when gay interest groups combined with 'sister' organisations in Zimbabwe to challenge Robert Mugabe's anti-homosexual policies. Apart from issues related to gay rights, civil society in individual countries is increasingly sharing interests and concerns.¹⁰ Building on the precedent set by gay interest groups, the region needs similar attempts by civil society from individual countries to link up and speak as one united voice on issues related to various dimensions of security.

6.3 Non-Governmental Co-operation

Southern Africa has a moderate history of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working within a regional framework. Besides the NGOs which have international affiliations, such as Red Cross and Amnesty International, regional NGO co-operation is restricted to a few endeavours such as BOLESWERA which is the Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland Educational Research Association.¹¹ However, there is a growing commitment to regional co-operation and some national-based organisations are forging regional links. The 'Social Charter on the Fundamental Rights of Workers in Southern Africa', signed in 1991 between national trade unions

of various countries, is one example. Needless to say, the move towards regional NGO co-operation will be anything but problem-free. Similar to certain obstacles that preceded the formation of the SADC Organ, NGO collaborative schemes are likely to experience their own set of hurdles. Textile trade unions in South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe have already had a 'tiff' regarding tariff regulations in the textile sector. Textile workers in the latter two countries have lobbied their respective governments to negotiate for the reduction of tariffs in South Africa. South African textile unions, threatened by the potential competition from Zambia and Zimbabwe's textile industry, have lobbied Pretoria to either maintain current tariff levels or make minimal reductions.

Compared to other developed regions such as Europe, non-governmental co-operation attempts in Southern Africa remain humble. However, there is no denying the usefulness of promoting regional co-operation through the mobilisation of non-governmental agencies. NGO co-operation can foster local initiatives and harness the vast source of experience and energy available at grassroots level. In various countries one is certain to find NGOs working on identical projects. This duplication of efforts is unnecessary and can be costly. One of the ways in which it can be overcome is through regional co-operation. Additionally, in responding to communities' needs, NGOs can be free from the formalities connected with protocol and related matters.¹² However, much as regional co-operation through NGOs has its advantages, there are limitations to contend with. Datta mentions the following: "NGO sponsored co-operation is likely to be fragmentary, its resources are limited; it may not be in a position to commit a country or its government to a particular course of action; it can be multi-directional and operate at cross purposes".¹³

Even though non-governmental co-operation is desirable, it should not undermine inter-governmental ventures aimed at sustainable development and the provision of security. There is often an erroneous perception of seeing the NGO sector as an alternative to the state. The perpetuation of such fallacies must be avoided, especially in a region such as Southern Africa where the NGO sector is still not strong. NGOs cannot unravel most of the challenges confronting governments.

Among other things, they do not have the structural capacity available to governments and are often plagued by financial burdens which undermine their capacity to provide a meaningful base for sustainable development. NGOs can at least complement and supplement the efforts made by governments.¹⁴ Furthermore, they can serve as pressure groups, playing a watchdog role over government policies. Their aim should be to challenge the exclusive, bureaucratic framework within which civil society is precluded from the decision-making processes.

One should also be aware of the character limitations of NGOs. There are quite often assumptions that NGOs and civil society by definition are agents of security or represent the best prospects for development needs, especially in weak states. This is not always the case. There are organisations, for example, whose character undermine any efforts towards the entrenchment of peace and stability, two of the vital prerequisites for sustainable development and over-all security in a region like Southern Africa. Right-wing separatist movements such as the AWB in South Africa are one example. Also, regional NGOs are heavily dependent on foreign funding. The implications thereof can result in NGOs being more accountable to their donors than the constituency they supposedly represent. Barring all these shortcomings, civil society, whether it be through formal organisations or simply as a collective of individuals, can shape national and regional politics, and eventually the decision-making process.

The Rio's Global Forum and Earth Summit in 1992, the Vienna Human Rights Conference in 1993, the Cairo Population Conference in 1994, the World Summit for Social Development in 1995 and the Beijing Conference on Women in 1995 are all landmark events which displayed the capacity of civil society to make governments conscious of issues related to the environment, human rights and so on. They were also landmark events in the sense that civil society, represented by various organisations, insisted on a shared responsibility with states for the governance of the planet.¹⁵

Some academics have suggested that as links between civil society in Southern Africa deepen, a central goal should be to create an independent voice in the affairs of the region.¹⁶ Booth makes reference to a Pan-Southern African Citizen's Assembly, something similar to the Helsinki Citizens Assembly.¹⁷ The latter, it is argued, arose from the concern of European citizens regarding the potential of the European Union to represent their interests within such a forum. The European Union was seen by the populations of its member states to be too inter-governmental, 'pushing' agendas that were not necessarily compatible with those of the great mass of people within the Union. Therefore, the question needs to be asked whether SADC as an inter-governmental forum will necessarily represent Southern Africa's peoples interests?

The decision by SADC member states to rush the adoption of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, thereby excluding NGOs from the process, casts doubt about the ability of SADC governments to embrace a broader spectrum of stake-holders in the security arena. Earlier agreements between SADC and regional NGOs to include a human rights monitoring mechanism into the Organ were discarded shortly before the formalisation of the body. A joint statement issued by regional NGOs after the adoption of the Organ expressed regret at "the lack of any consultation with Southern African civil society, including non-governmental organisations, in the discussions about the design, creation and implementation of the Organ."¹⁸ Furthermore, the statement added the following: "In developing the Organ, SADC appears to have made a serious departure from the meaningful dialogue and genuine partnership with civil society which characterised the 1994 Windhoek resolutions".¹⁹ During the 1994 Windhoek Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security, a mechanism that would have included a human rights commission with machinery to safeguard existing human rights was endorsed. Clearly the 'eleventh-hour' stance by SADC governments to subvert civil society initiatives does not bode well for a future inter-governmental and non-governmental partnership. Perhaps the most effective hope for a clear voice for regional civil society would be to secure a public platform at the very moment that the region's leaders gather.²⁰ But whatever happens, one thing is certain - civil society wants to be more involved in regional

issues, especially those concerned with security and development. Therefore, a structural link between government structures and civil society institutions is essential. The interaction between these partners probably offers the most effective manner in which the region's security concerns can be tackled.

¹ I. Mandaza, *Peace and Security: Regional Co-operation and Economic Integration*, Southern Africa Political & Economic Monthly, 8(7), 1995, p. 29.

² M. van Aardt, *Doing Battle with Security: A Southern African Approach*, The South African Journal of International Affairs, 3(2), 1996, p. 21.

³ *Ibid*, p. 23.

⁴ X. Carim, *An Outline of the Post-Modernist Contribution to International Relations Theory*, *forthcoming*, 1996.

⁵ M. de Oliveira and R. Tandon, *The Emergence of Global Society, Issues of Democracy*, 1(8), July 1996, p. 18.

⁶ P. Dyani, *Civil Society and Foreign Policy in a Post-Apartheid South Africa*, Research paper in partial fulfilment for the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) Research Internship Programme, Pretoria, 1995, p. 7.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 19.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 20.

⁹ *Ibid*, 8.

¹⁰ P. Vale, *Gay People Changed the Region*, Mail & Guardian, October 6 - 12, 1995.

¹¹ A. Datta, *Strategies for Regional Co-operation in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa - The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations*, Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa, Oden and Othman ed(s), Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1989, p. 92.

¹² *Ibid*, p. 95.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 96.

¹⁴ *Ibid*.

¹⁵ de Oliveira and Tandon, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

¹⁶ Vale, *op. cit.*, 1995.

¹⁷ K. Booth, *A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations*, Southern African Perspectives, No. 30, 1994, p. 18.

¹⁸ Mail & Guardian, June 28 to July 4, 1996.

¹⁹ *Ibid*.

²⁰ Vale, *op. cit.*, 1995.

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