# CHARTING FREEDOM:
## INEQUALITY BELIEFS, PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION, AND DISTRIBUTIVE SOCIAL POLICY IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

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By

**BENJAMIN JAMES ROBERTS**

Student number: 13r8112

Supervisor: Professor Robert van Niekerk
Co-supervisor: Professor Michael Noble

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# Dedication

To Pranitha for her love, guidance, patience and fortitude over the years; to Samir and Anjali, my pride and joy, for whom I dream of a more equal, caring society.

## Abstract

While the transition to democracy in South Africa extended civil and political rights and freedoms to all South Africans, there has been disagreement over the preferred nature and scope of social rights within post-apartheid society, reflecting debates over the trajectory of economic policy. Appreciable developmental gains have been made by the state over the last quarter-century, yet the challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality persist, coupled with mounting popular discontent with the pace of transformation and political accountability. This has led to fundamental questions about social justice, restitution, and the kind of society we wish to promote. Appeals for a more inclusive, transformative social policy have also emerged, arguing that a wider vision of society is required involving multiple government responsibilities and informed by an ethic of equality and social solidarity.

Against this background, in this thesis I study the views of the South African public towards economic inequality, general preferences for government-led redistribution, as well as support for social policies intended to promote racial and economic transformation. The research has been guided by several overarching questions: To what extent do South Africans share common general beliefs about material inequality? Does the public exhibit a preference for government redistribution in principle? And how unified or polarised are South Africans in their support for specific redress policies in the country? Responding to these questions has been achieved by drawing on unique, nationally representative data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), which has enabled me to chart social attitudes over a period of almost fifteen years between late 2003 and early 2017. Use has also been made of social citizenship as a guiding conceptual framework to understanding social policy predispositions and analysing attitudinal change.

The results demonstrate that the public is united in its awareness of and deep concern about economic inequality. Since the early 2000s, a significant majority has consistently expressed the view that the income gap in the country is too large, articulated a strong preference for a more equitable social structure, and acknowledged the class and social tensions that economic inequality has produced. There is also a preference for a narrowing of earnings disparities, a more generous minimum wage, and regulatory limits on executive pay. While this suggests a desire for fair and legitimate remuneration, the analysis also reveals that South

Africans are willing to tolerate fairly high levels of inequality. Nonetheless, these beliefs are generally interpreted as a desire for a more equitable and fair society.

This preference for change is reflected in a fairly strong belief that government should assume responsibility for reducing material disparities. One's social position, mobility history, awareness of inequality, political leaning and racial attitudes all have a bearing on how weak and strong this predisposition is, but the normative demand for political redistribution remains fairly widely shared irrespective of these individual traits. Greater polarisation is however evident with respect to redistributive social policy, especially measures designed to overcome historical racial injustice (affirmative action, sports quotas, and land reform). These intergroup differences converge considerably when referring to class-based policy measures. One surprising finding is the evidence that South Africa's youngest generation, the so-called 'Born Frees', tend to adopt a similar predisposition to redress policy as older generations, thus confounding expectations of a post-apartheid value change.

I conclude by arguing that there seems to be a firmer basis for a social compact about preferences for interventions designed to produce a more just society than is typically assumed. Intractably high levels of economic inequality during the country's first quarter-century of democracy is resulting in a growing recognition of the need for a stronger policy emphasis on economic inequality in South Africa over coming decades if the vision enshrined in the Freedom Charter and the Constitution is to be realised. South Africans may not be able to fully agree about the specific elements that constitute a socially just response to economic inequality. Yet, the common identification of and concern with redressable injustice, coupled with a broad-based commitment to government redistribution and class-based social policies, could serve as a foundation on which to rekindle the solidaristic spirit of 1994 and forge progress towards a more equitable society.

## Declaration

I declare that "Charting Freedom: Inequality beliefs, preferences for redistribution, and distributive social policy in contemporary South Africa" is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

Full name: Benjamin J. Roberts

Date: January 2018

Signed:

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# Chapter 1
## *Introduction: Economic inequality, public policy and the people's voice in South Africa from Xuma to Zuma*

*"We want the government and the people of South Africa to know the full aspirations of the African peoples….This is our way of conveying to them our undisputed claim to full citizenship. We desire them to realise once and for all that a just and permanent peace will be possible only if the claims of all classes, colours and races for sharing and for full participation in the educational, political and economic activities are granted and recognised…The goal is one, namely, freedom for all. It should be the central and only aim or objective of all true African nationals. Divisions and gratification of personal ambitions under the circumstances will be a betrayal of this great cause"* – Dr Alfred Bitini Xuma, former ANC President-General (1940-49) in his introduction to *Africans' Claims in South Africa (1943)*.

*"The first 18 years [of democracy] have been characterised as the first transition of primarily a political nature …. Having scored many achievements …, there is also widespread consensus that we have been unable to reach the goal of a truly prosperous, inclusive, non-racial and non-sexist society. The triple challenge of poverty, inequality and unemployment persists, affecting Africans, women and the youth in particular. We are therefore calling for a dramatic shift or giant leap, to economic and social transformation, so that we can be able to deal decisively with the triple challenge."* – President Jacob G. Zuma, Opening Address at the ANC National Policy Conference (June 2012)

### 1.1 Introduction

Following the Second World War, there emerged an increasing research interest, predominantly in the United Kingdom and United States, in the motivating role that views on justice play in people's lives and levels of support for social policy measures at the macro level. Notable developments included the emergence of theories relating to people's belief in a just world (Lerner, 1965, 1971, 1980; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Rubin & Peplau, 1973, 1975; Lerner & Miller, 1978), inequality aversion (Glejser et al., 1977, Gevers et al., 1979; Shorrocks, 1980), system justification (Jost & Banaji 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), social dominance orientation (SDO) (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) as well as conservatism (Wilson & Patterson, 1968; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003b). Building on this early conceptual and theoretical work, there has been a rapid expansion over the last few decades of national and cross-national inquiry into attitudes about economic inequality and deprivation. As inequality and distributional issues came back onto the research agenda in the 1990s after a decade or more of relative neglect (Atkinson, 1997; Atkinson & Bourguinon, 2000; Kanbur & Lustig, 1999), so too did the parallel interest in public values concerning inequalities in their society, social security provision, progressive taxation and other redistributive policies and programmes (for example, Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Piketty, 1995; Bromley, 2003; Hills, 2004; Sefton, 2005, 2009; Orton & Rowlingson, 2007; McCall & Kenworthy, 2009). While similar evidence from developing and high-

inequality societies has tended to lag behind in this field of endeavour, changes in the availability of national and cross-national data has been to open up new lines of inquiry.

Internationally, South Africa has been lauded for the relatively peaceful transition to democracy that occurred in 1994 after more than three centuries of exploitation, dispossession and disenfranchisement of black South Africans under colonial, segregationist and apartheid rule (Terreblanche, 2002). By equal measure, the South African Constitution, which was adopted in 1996, is considered progressive for the guaranteeing of socio-economic rights alongside more conventional civil and political rights. However, the existence of a legislative framework upholding the social rights of citizenship are, as Van Niekerk (2008) maintains, "a necessary but not a sufficient condition for implementing inclusive social policy" in the country. He contends that what is additionally required are "fiscal arrangements, governance institutions and economic policies which are aligned with the egalitarian intentions of inclusive social policies". This is an important observation given that, after two decades of democratic rule, economic inequality remains an intractable feature of the socio-economic structure of South African society, with the country ranked alongside select Latin American and southern African states as the world's most unequal nations. Although census and household survey data have demonstrated that incomes have been growing for all race groups in the country, income inequality has not exhibited a declining trend since the early 1990s. In fact, aggregate inequality estimates have shown that the post-*apartheid* period has been characterised by a moderate rise in inequality, with income increasingly concentrated in the richest income decile (Leibbrandt et al., 2010, 2011; Finn et al., 2015).

As the country entered its third decade of democracy in 2014, there was mounting reflection by policymakers, social scientists and the informed public alike on the state of the nation and social change – the achievements, the disappointments, as well as aspirations and plans for the future. Escalating social unrest over the distribution of resources in recent years has also prompted concerns about living conditions, quality of life and the pace and effectiveness of the development and redress agenda. At the political level, it has been contended that the African National Congress (ANC) government has placed greater emphasis on addressing poverty and deprivation than reducing inequalities, with income disparities being regarded a "necessary price for economic growth", but that the 2007 ANC conference in Polokwane significantly altered this position (Habib, 2012, 2013). This ANC conference effectively

"brought inequality in from the cold" (Atkinson 2003) in the domestic political context and, since 2009, the Zuma administration has placed a strong emphasis (at least at the level of political rhetoric) on tackling inequality alongside poverty and unemployment as three core economic challenges facing the country's development. The ANC's 2009 Election manifesto lamented the persistence of and rising trend in inequality in South African society, making reference to labour market disparities, the stark spatial concentration of wealth, and the skewed distribution of the gains from economic growth, while also appealing to the principle articulated in the 1955 Freedom Charter that "the people shall share in the country's wealth" as the basis for a renewed commitment to economic transformation (ANC, 2009).

This emphasis on creating a more equitable society in coming decades has been reaffirmed by the recent publication of two notable policy documents, namely the *New Growth Path* (NGP) (Republic of South Africa, 2010) by the Ministry of Economic Development and the Presidency's *National Development Plan 2030: Our Future - Make it Work* (NDP) (Republic of South Africa, 2012). Both documents adopt inequality reduction as a core priority. The NDP, which provides a detailed long-term strategy for the country, makes no fewer than 165 direct references to inequality and explicitly targets the elimination of income poverty between 2010 and 2030 alongside a decline in the Gini coefficient from 0.69 to 0.60, with the share of income accruing to the bottom 40 percent of income earners expected to rise moderately from 6 to 10 percent (Republic of South Africa, 2012). Alongside this ambitious developmental agenda, there has also emerged mounting scepticism and crisis talk in relation to the trajectory and ideological underpinnings of economic and social policy during the post-apartheid period.

Fundamental questions and concerns are being raised about the nature, extent and acceptability of social exclusion and polarisation. This has included critical references to an intensification of poverty, unemployment and inequality among the poor majority, the reconnection of domestic corporate capital to the global economy and associated capital flight, as well as increasing flexibility and insecurity of wage labour in a context of market liberalisation and economic uncertainty. Reference is also made to the neoliberal turn in government policy, an erosion of political accountability and leadership, as well as a tendency to prioritise inequality reduction in rhetoric rather than practice (Terreblanche, 2012; Barchiesi, 2011; Habib, 2013; Hart, 2013; Saul & Bond, 2014; Mangcu, 2014). Such sentiment has prompted the rise of opinion in favour of more radical measures to achieve

reductions in poverty and inequality to ensure a dignified life for all that informed the model of inclusive, rights-based form of social citizenship reminiscent of African nationalism in the 1940s, the adoption of the Freedom Charter of 1955, and the crafting of the Bill of Rights in the South African constitution in early to mid-1990s (Dubow & Jeeves, 2005; Van Niekerk, 2008, 2013). It is evident in the renewed calls by unions and other non-state actors for a 'living wage', as well as the vigorous debates concerning French economist Thomas Piketty's suggestion of a wealth tax for the country alongside wage minima across sectors (Piketty, 2015).

A recent account by Ravi Kanbur claims that while the policy challenges facing the nation are readily apparent, there is considerable polarisation about the appropriate policy mix required, which needs to be better understood:

> "The problematic is very clear: high unemployment, high inequality and low growth, combined with a lack of consensus on what to do. The last point is important. There is no shortage of specific actual policies and interventions, as well as specific further proposals for policies and interventions, and there is no shortage of detailed debate and discussion around each of them. But perhaps we should first investigate why there is such a lack of consensus. Is the matter purely a technical one to do with disagreements on design of policies and interventions, or is it more holistic than that, related to broader vision? Is it to do with which political constraints are taken as binding, and which are not?" (Kanbur, 2015: 1)

The sentiments expressed by Kanbur resonate well with the underlying rationale and arguments of this thesis. Although he refers primarily to debate and contestation in the political and academic realms, I argue that his reflections apply equally as well to the mass public in the country as they do to elite discourse on inequality and distributive policy.

### 1.2 Why attitudes to economic inequality and redistributive policy matter?

Set against this context and recognising the intensifying emphasis by the state and other non-state actors on the need for a more inclusive and transformative social policy approach, a central argument I advance in this thesis is that there is a fundamental need for a nuanced understanding of popular beliefs regarding income inequality, preferences for redistribution as well as support for specific redress policies, and how these are changing over time. A number of reasons have been offered as to why public attitudes towards inequality and

redistribution matter fundamentally, many of which have strong resonance with the South African context. Such attitudes and the direction they follow over time have been shown to exert some influence on the adoption of certain legislation and public policies, especially those bearing on social security and socioeconomic redress (Kluegel & Smith, 1986). There is also the effect such beliefs may have on political behaviour or action, including electoral participation and choice as well as joining social movements and engaging in protest action, while the perceived fairness of policies may facilitate or impede their effective implementation. Examining and better understanding of recent trends in public attitudes about inequality may further serve as a firm basis for predicting and monitoring likely changes in the medium- to long-term (Rowlingson et al., 2010).

Many domestic examples exist that speak to the potential political and policy importance of inequality attitudes. For instance, around the time of the 2011 local government elections, grassroots movements and civil society groups discontent with the pace and nature of the state's provision of basic services and redistribution interventions lobbied for an electoral boycott, with the Poor People's Alliance using the slogan "no land, no house, no vote". During 2012, widespread opposition was registered in relation to the introduction of electronic tolling system (e-tolling) on the freeways of the country's most populous province, Gauteng, and was labelled by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) as a form of "economic *apartheid*" that would adversely impact the poor and perpetuate social inequality and exclusion. The violence associated with protest action by farmworkers in De Doorns in the Western Cape and mineworkers in Marikana in North West province during 2012 and early 2013 in demand of a living wage suggested not only to a growing concern over an acceptable basic standard of living but also to a growing awareness and frustration with persisting inequalities. This was evident during mass demonstrations about the social consequences of proposed electricity tariff increases during public hearings in 2013, as well as the university student protests in October 2015 regarding proposed fee increments for the 2016 academic year.

In spite of such examples and the nature of the country's income distribution, it seems somewhat incongruous that there is not a rich empirical literature on the *beliefs* of South Africans about the unequal distribution of poverty and deprivation and the policy measures that have been introduced to address the situation since the fall of *apartheid* in 1994. Work in the late 1990s explored the understanding of poverty and differential notions of social

solidarity among elites (especially between ANC- and non-ANC elites) in the country (Kalati & Manor, 1999, 2005). Using nationally representative data, Roberts (2006) explored public perceptions of inequality aversion, relative deprivation and support for various compensatory and preferential redistributive measures, while Wegner and Pellicer (2011) examine changes in the demand for redistribution in the country. At a more micro level, Seekings (2008b) also examined racial differences in perceptions of distributive justice using representative data for Cape Town. There is also a small but growing body of evidence on beliefs about specific redistributive measures, such as affirmative action (Dixon et al., 2007; Durrheim, 2010; Durrheim et al., 2011; Roberts et al., 2011), land reform (Gibson, 2009, 2010) and social grants (Noble, Ntshongwana & Surender, 2008a; Surender et al., 2010).

Half a century ago, in his influential book *Income Distribution and Social Change* (1962), the social policy scholar Richard Titmuss conveyed the importance of moving beyond the distributional picture offered by official income statistics to provide a fuller account of the reality of widening divisions between social classes in relation not only to command over income but in other domains too. Accordingly, in this thesis I will contribute towards providing a different perspective on inequality in South Africa, extending beyond the typical examination of Gini coefficients and Theil indices to provide a fuller understanding of the nature and distribution of public attitudes towards economic inequality and government redistribution inequality in contemporary South African society. This will include, where possible, evidence on the extent to which there has been continuity or change in these social values over the last decade. In approaching the study, it is hypothesised that the economically disadvantaged in South Africa will tend to exhibit greater awareness of and aversion for the current social structure in the country relative to wealthier citizens. Moreover, a similar negative association is anticipated between social class and support for state-led redistribution, and specific social policies pursued by the post-apartheid developmental state to foster redress.

### 1.3 Aims of the study and research questions

My overall aim in the study presented in this thesis is to contribute to and engage with social policy discourse on inequality, social citizenship and redistributive public policy by offering new insights derived from the views and preferences of representative samples of South African adults. The intention is therefore to focus on the application of subjective measures

of inequality to complement conventional money-metric measures to understanding and monitoring this social phenomenon in the country. Using recent cross-sectional evidence, the proposed study aims to provide direct tests for beliefs about income inequality, preferences for state-led redistribution, and support for specific redress policies in South Africa. The following questions will be specifically examined in the thesis:

**First, to what extent do South Africans share common general beliefs about material inequality in the country?** Responding to this question will entail an examination of changes in levels of aversion to income inequality, as well as views on current and ideal social stratification, perceived class tensions, and attitudes towards legitimate earnings differentials. Attention will be devoted to exploring sub-group differences in such beliefs, and their determinants. Some of the specific questions that will be explored under this theme include: (i) how do people's general views on inequality vary by individual, household and area-level attributes?; (ii) what is the relationship between subjective measures of welfare and so-called 'objective' measures of poverty?; and (iii) how have patterns of subjective views on inequality been changing over the last decade, and for whom?

**Second, to what extent do South Africans exhibit a preference for government redistribution?** Redistribution represents one of the core, traditional roles assumed by the state (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005). Given the persistently high level of income inequality that remains in South African society, it is therefore important to better understand and reflect on public perceptions of the government in redistributing income between wealthier and more deprived citizens. The study will attempt to address the following: (i) how do people's preferences for state-led redress vary by individual, household and area-level attributes?; (ii) what is the relationship between general beliefs about inequality and preferences for government redistribution?; (iii) have preferences for government redistribution altered over the last decade, and if so, what is the basis for this change?

**Third, to what extent are South Africans unified or polarised in their support for specific redress policies in the country?** The limited empirical evidence on support for redress policies in South Africa that exists suggest that South Africans tend to be relatively divided in their opinion about the implementation of specific redress policies in the country. Related to this is the increasingly common suggestion emanating from the academic community for a paradigmatic change in policy with the focus more on a class-based redress

agenda rather than one primarily focused on racial redress (Goldstone, 1992; Adam, 1997; Alexander, 2007; Hammett, 2008; Habib & Bentley, 2008; Durrheim, 2010). In this component of the doctoral study I will examine this in more detail, to determine the extent to which a principle-implementation gap exists, the latter referring to an attitudinal contradiction between high support for equality in principle but significant resistance to specific policies aimed at fostering such equality (Tuch & Hughes, 1996; Durrheim & Dixon, 2004; Dixon et al., 2007, 2017). I will also investigate whether differential support exists based on the design of redress measures, depending on whether it is predicated on class rather than race criteria. Subsidiary research questions that will be thus be explored under this theme include: (i) To what extent is support for specific redress policies associated with the individual characteristics of the attitude-holder? (ii) How have such attitudes changed over time? Are there signs that the generation of South Africans that are growing up in post-apartheid South Africa are appreciably different from older cohorts in their views on redress policy?

**Fourth, how should South African policymakers take subjective measurement into account?** While analysing attitudes towards inequality in the South African context will make for interesting reading, an obvious question is how to apply such assessments to policy questions. International evidence suggests that a significant proportion of individual differences in subjective welfare assessments can be attributed to genetic and constitutional factors, numerous social, economic and institutional factors have also been found to exert a considerable influence on well-being. By extension, certain core government activities are likely to have direct impacts on individual perceptions towards inequality and support for redress. Therefore, attitudinal research may help governments frame the longer-term redress policies that aim to address the disparities between the rich and poor in society. Understanding social attitudes may help policymakers to assess, frame and navigate their political economy contexts as they attempt to craft social policies that are part of a fiscally sustainable social contract (Graham, 2002:6).

## 1.4 Outline of the thesis

In **Chapter 2** I begin with a discussion of how understandings of poverty and inequality were reconceptualised following the end of World War II, beyond an absolutist focus to embrace relative and subjective approaches, and how redistribution came to be guaranteed as an integral part of the social rights of citizenship. In pursuing inclusive social policy that takes

into account social citizenship and social rights, the views of citizens regarding inequality and redress assume critical importance both from a legitimacy and sustainability perspective. Recognising this, I will also provide an overview of international and domestic literature concerning the nature and determinants of inequality beliefs and preferences. These conceptual and empirical strands will then be applied to the subsequent empirical chapters, which focus on general beliefs about inequality, redistribution and social policy preferences since the turn of the century.

The methodology underpinning the study is described in **Chapter 3**. I provide an outline of the design, coverage and limitations of the survey data employed in the subsequent chapters. The focus being primarily on measures of inequality beliefs and policy preferences included in the annual, repeat cross-sectional South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) series, which I have coordinated at the Human Sciences Research Council since its inception in 2003. As will be described trend analysis and comparative analysis will be performed, where possible, in order to provide insight into the relative stability of inequality attitudes and preferences, identify whether any notable group-based patterns of difference have emerged or converged, and determine whether the views of South Africans are exceptional or not relative to citizens from countries across a number of world regions. The latter is achieved by use of data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), a comparative series that was established in 1984 and administers a detailed module on predefined rotating theme across (as of the 2010s) close to 50 member nations. South Africa has been a member since 2003, with the ISSP module embedded in each annual round of the SASAS series. The principal focus will be the 2009 ISSP module, which focused on social inequalities. The chapter will also introduce the core measures used for analysis and describe the analytical approach adopted for the study, which will consist of a mix of bivariate and multivariate techniques.

In **Chapter 4**, which represents the first of three empirical chapters, general beliefs about the nature and extent of income inequality in the country are explored. Particular attention is focused on inequality aversion, which refers to individual resistance to inequalities that are perceived to be unfair, thus involving processes of both recognition and rejection (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). It is reasoned that basic awareness of economic inequality in South Africa is critical to redistributive preferences and distributive policy support, an assertion that will be tested in subsequent chapters. Fortunately, a classic inequality aversion measure has been included in each annual round of SASAS conducted since 2003 as well as the 2009 ISSP

round, which allows for longitudinal and comparative analysis to be undertaken. Related to this, preferences for changes in the class structure, perceived class tensions, as well as views on wage inequality are also examined using the 2009 data. These results will be used to reflect on whether South Africans are uniformly aware of patterns of economic inequality in the country, whether such disparities are seen as legitimate or not, and if there exists an appetite for change.

**Chapters 5 and 6** move the analysis from general beliefs concerning the structuring of inequality in the country towards a focus on preferences for redistribution in principle. More specifically, in **Chapter 5** I examine the extent to which South Africans believe it is a responsibility of the state to pursue income redistribution as part of a redress agenda. Again the socio-demographic patterning of these preferences is examined, together with an outline of how South Africans compare cross-nationally, in addition to the extent and possible explanations for dynamics in support and opposition since the early 2000s. Preferences for state intervention in income redistribution will also juxtaposed against perceptions of other government social welfare responsibilities to determine broader preferences for the role of the state. This leads into **Chapter 6**, in which multivariate analysis is performed to provide additional insight into the determinants of preferences for state-led redistribution. In so doing, attention is paid to testing the relative contribution of notable hypothesised factors in the international literature, such as self-interest, mobility history and prospects for upward mobility, as well as beliefs about societal inequality, ideology and fairness.

The purpose of **Chapter 7** is to broaden the scope of analysis beyond an in-principle commitment to redistribution to encompass levels of support for specific redistributive social policies. These will include affirmative action, land reform, sports quotas, low cost housing, social grants, and redress in access to tertiary education. Since 1994, South Africa has not seen the materialisation of an all-out 'war on poverty, unemployment and inequality' that has often been promised in political rhetoric. Many citizens expressed considerable hope that the ANC government would progressively bring about a more equal and inclusive society, and to this end a wide-ranging social policy programme has been implemented. Some policies, such as affirmative action, land reform and sports quotas have been highly contested and oft-discussed, while others have been the site of ideological challenge, such as child support grants. This chapter will seek to establish just how unified or polarised South Africans are regarding distributive policies, whether public opinion has become more or less progressive

over the last decade and across generations, and if there is empirical evidence favouring the suggestion by certain political scientists that there is greater interest in a class-based than race-based redress. In addition, multivariate modelling will be performed to examine the determinants of redistributive preferences.

Lastly, **Chapter 8** revisits the questions which the thesis set out to answer, drawing on theory chapter as well as the empirical findings presented in chapters four through seven. In particular, it will reflect on the implications of public opinion on inequality and redistribution for the continued pursuit of inclusive social policy that aims to produce a more equal and caring society.

# Chapter 2
# Minding the Gap: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Evidence on Attitudes towards Inequality and Redistribution

*"Distribution is a central issue in the appraisal of social policies; for some, it is the central issue. Much of the justification advanced for social policy is in terms of distribution"*
John Hills, *The Distribution of Welfare* (2012:187)

"*If we want to describe what social justice means in contemporary political debate, then sooner rather than later we must look at what the people think themselve*s"
David Miller, *Principles of Social Justice* (1999: ix)

*"And the obstacle to the progress of equality is . . . the habit of mind which thinks it, not regrettable, but natural and desirable, that different sections of a community should be distinguished from each other by sharp differences of economic status, of environment, of education and culture and habit of Life. It is the temper which regards with approval the social institutions and economic arrangements by which such differences are emphasized and enhanced, and feels distrust and apprehension at all attempts to diminish them"*
R.H. Tawney, *Equality* (1931: 63)

## 2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the emphasis will be on providing a theoretical perspective on the factors that are likely to exert an influence on the beliefs and attitudes of South Africans concerning inequality and preferences for distributive change in principle as well as in practice through social policy interventions. The roots of contemporary theoretical and empirical scholarship on public opinion concerning inequality, opportunity and redistribution lie in a number of pioneering studies across a diverse range of disciplines, including sociology, social psychology, social policy, political science, and economics, that were conducted as part of the growing interest in research on stratification following World War II. This field of endeavour gained particular momentum in the 1970s and 1980s, and has been increasingly enriched and consolidated over the last quarter century, coinciding with the availability of new cross-national and national survey data series.[1] The latter enabled an empirical tradition to grow alongside the rich theoretical literature (Pease et al., 1970).

Nonetheless, in spite of this rich and expanding body of scholarship, there has been a surprising lack of overlapping influence of these disparate literatures. This has prompted

[1] In this regard, the in-depth comparative data on attitudes towards (in)equality and justice collected by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and International Social Justice Project (ISJP) have been especially influential. The former included detailed modules on inequality in 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009 while aspects of state responsibility for redress are captured in the role of government modules fielded 1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006. A more detailed description of the ISSP survey series and the contents of these modules will be provided in the Methodology chapter. The ISJP was conducted in 1991, 1996, 2000 and 2006, and included more detailed content that the ISSP, even though it was conducted among a smaller set of nations (12, 6, 2 and 5 in each round respectively).

attempts at encouraging cross-fertilisation of different traditions. For instance, scholars such as Elster (1995) and Miller (1991, 1992, 1999) proposed a theory of justice that is sensitive not only to research on popular beliefs but also the contexts in which citizens apply principles of justice to shape evaluations and by extension their behavioural consequences. Other contextual events are also contributing to this more integrated, plural perspective, such as the return of inequality onto the economics agenda (Atkinson, 1997; Kanbur & Lustig, 1999), and more recently the surging attention to distributional concerns following the marked economic decline associated with the Great Recession of the late 2000s.[2] Yet, notable gaps remain. One is the relative underrepresentation of attitudinal insight from high inequality, developing country contexts, most especially in southern Africa. The literature which engages social policy perspectives on attitudes is also relatively sparse when compared with the broader sociological and social psychological approaches and evidence. It is for instance quite striking that all but a marginal share of the literature in the latter traditions makes reference to R.H. Tawney's seminal *Equality* (1931), including the introduction by Richard Titmuss in the revised version (1964). Additionally under-represented is social policy research on attitudes to inequality and the welfare state, such as Peter Townsend, Peter Gooby-Taylor, Hartley Dean, John Hills, Stefan Svallfors and Tom Sefton. This chapter, and by extension the survey-based evidence that I present in subsequent chapters, aims to address some of these omissions by engaging questions of attitudes to inequality from a social policy perspective. .

The chapter will begin by discussing social policy approaches and debates in relation to social rights and social citizenship. In particular, I will draw on Thomas H. Marshall's theorisation of social citizenship, and the subsequent social policy perspectives that have evolved thereupon, which centre on the interface between the social rights of citizens and government social policies, as well as the broader economic and political contextual factors that facilitate or inhibit the ability of individuals and groups to fully participate in society. As such, it becomes a useful lens through which to examine different ideological approaches to

[2] In the last few years alone, there have been major books released by notable scholars, such as '*The Killing Fields of Inequality*' (Therborn, 2014), '*Capital in the Twenty-First Century*' (Piketty, 2014), '*Inequality and the 1%',* and '*Injustice: Why Social Inequality Persists'* (both by Dorling in 2014 and 2015 respectively), '*Good Times, Bad Times: The welfare myth of them and us*' (Hills, 2014), '*Handbook of Social Psychology of Inequality*' (McLeod et al., 2014), '*The Handbook of Economic Inequality'* (Atkinson & Bourguignon. 2015), '*Inequality: What Can be done*' (Atkinson, 2015),'*The Globalisation of Inequality'* (Bourguignon, 2015), '*The Great Divide: Unequal societies and what we can do with them*' (Stiglitz, 2015), and '*Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis*' (Putnam, 2015).

the issue of inequality and social justice. By extension, it also enables the effective incorporation of citizen opinion into debates about the nature and trajectory of the developmental state and inclusive, transformative social policy. In so doing, the growing empirical social citizenship tradition, as exemplified in the work of Peter Taylor-Gooby (1985, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2009) and Hartley Dean (2012, 2015), will be critically examined and reflected upon. This positioning is critical to this thesis, which will explore in subsequent empirical chapters the perceptions and preferences of South African adults, as the basis for reflecting in the concluding chapter how public opinion adds to contemporary debates about the type of 'good society' and quality of social citizenship we collectively aspire to and the values which inform this vision (Mouffe 1988, Dwyer, 2002). By so doing, the attempt will be to move to dialogue and discourse beyond one that is almost exclusively driven by expert and elite voices.

In the second part of the chapter, I briefly consider the role of social citizenship and its role in informing social policy debates in the South African context, most especially in relation to discussion of the redistributive role of the state and the role of distributive social policy. Finally, the third section of the chapter examines the role of public opinion in relation to social citizenship by reviewing international and South African empirical evidence on public attitudes towards inequality and redistribution more specifically. Determining the minimum living standards that citizens are entitled to in different societies is recognised as a fundamental aspect of social citizenship. Through the influence of British sociologist Peter Townsend (1979), research has increasingly been undertaken that moves beyond absolutist approaches to determining living standard thresholds to those that emphasise relative, subjective and consensual perspectives. These developments give greater primacy to societal norms and preferences, and as such have been deemed by certain scholars as more democratic in character. A common aspect of these approaches is their focus on the subjective, incorporating the citizen's voice into decisions regarding what constitutes a minimum quality of life.

## 2.2 The social policy perspective: Social citizenship, equality and distribution

The examination of attitudes to inequality and redistribution in the South African context would be incomplete without due consideration being afforded to social policy in both theory

and practice. Of particular significance is the concept of *social citizenship*[3] which lies at the core of the social policy tradition of academic inquiry. As Dean (2012:12) maintains, social citizenship quintessentially involves theoretical and definitional debates about 'what constitutes the good life and the fundamental nature of human need'. As will be outlined in this section, this is a concept that has at its heart issues of distribution and human interdependency. It involves competing perspectives on the extent to which social resources are distributed as a means of preventing poverty and inhibiting social inequality, and as a way of addressing pre-existing social need and disadvantage (Dean, 2001). At the same, it has also been the subject of significant and on-going contestation within social policy discourse, partly due to competing ideological preferences over the size and roles of the state, as well as individual beliefs about the basis and character of poverty and inequality. All these have collectively shaped social attitudes to the scope and breadth of re-distributive social policies aimed at overcoming inequality and establishing an egalitarian 'good society'.

Within the social policy tradition there exist three general ideological approaches to the social rights of citizenship that have developed since the 1940s. The first combines traditional liberal and social democratic perspectives as initially articulated by T.H. Marshall in his influential 1950 text *Citizenship and Social Class*. The other two approaches by contrast are framed respectively around a neoliberal, pro-market philosophy and variations of socialist and Left social democratic views which privilege the role of the state (Van Niekerk, 2008). Each of these ideological perspectives to social citizenship embraces a particular normative vision of what constitutes a good society and, by extension, advocates specific forms of social policy provision as a means of progressively realising it (Dwyer, 2004/2010). With the rise of new risks, vulnerabilities and socio-economic challenges emerging since the turn of the century, there have also emerged growing appeals for a new social citizenship paradigm. This aims to move beyond the politics associated with neoliberalism and austerity associated originally with the Washington Consensus and argues for a more inclusive and transformative form of social policy. These approaches and trends have an institutional and policy bearing that in practice has significantly affected the range and nature of social rights that are

[3] Through the Fabian influence, the Department of Social Sciences and Administration was established in 1912 at the London School of Economics. Not only did the department administer the first taught courses in social policy, but it also served as an important intellectual home for action-oriented research in the discipline. Influential contributions that came from staff include William Beveridge on social security and the welfare state, Richard Tawney on poverty and (in)equality, T.H. Marshall on social citizenship, Richard Titmuss and his pioneering work on social policy, Peter Townsend on relative poverty and deprivation, and Brian Abel-Smith on health and social welfare.

available to citizens. As such, understanding public attitudes and preferences towards distributive social policy and social citizenship, including the degree of consensus underlying such views, patterns of change, and their determinants, represent an important evidential input into the policy process.

### *2.2.1 Marshallian roots: Origins and core themes associated with the concept of social citizenship*

Contemporary social policy discussions about equality, redistribution, inclusive policies and the obligations of the state to individuals and groups tend to focus on social rights and citizenship (Klausen, 1995). The theoretical starting point is often the classic essay on citizenship by sociologist T. H. Marshall (1950), '*Citizenship and Social Class'*, which contended that social rights represented the unique contribution of the twentieth century capitalist welfare state. Reflecting on the British historical case, Marshall suggested that citizenship involved firstly the development of civil rights (civil liberties and property/legal rights) in the eighteenth century, followed in turn by progress in the struggle over political rights (voting and democratic rights) in the nineteenth century. Lastly, associated with the rise of the modern welfare state in the aftermath of the Second World War, there emerged a new set of social rights to education, health care, housing, social security and income maintenance, which emphasised entitlements to basic living standards ranging "from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised *(sic)* being according to the standards prevailing in the society" (Marshall, 1950:11 / 1992:8; Dean, 2015:4). These rights therefore can be seen to refer to 'the right of citizens to enjoy decent living conditions, and the establishment of a social security system that aims to guarantee these conditions' (Oser & Hooghe, 2017:2-3). They combine a normative vision of the good society with the institutional architecture by which to progressively achieve it.

It needs to be considered that the conceptual development of the social rights of citizenship occurred during a time of great social optimism which shaped attitudes on the desirable post-war society. The exercise of their political rights by the enfranchised working class led to the landslide electoral victory of a Labour government under Clement Attlee in 1945, and was secured on the basis of a comparatively radical political manifesto that pledged to replace the partial and piecemeal provision that typified pre-war Britain with comprehensive state

provision in order to meet the welfare needs of the nation. This was grounded in the extensive social security reforms recommended by William Beveridge in his 1942 report in order to address what he termed 'five giant social evils' that afflicted British society in the lead-up to the war, namely ignorance, disease, idleness, squalor and want. Influenced by Keynesian economic thinking, a strong state role was envisaged in addressing these societal challenges in the interests of all citizens (Alcock, 2012; Fraser & Gordon, 1994). Marshall's writing on social citizenship therefore came during a period of a major attitudinal shift in public opinion induced by the hardships and sacrifices of the war against fascism and Nazism, and undergirded by working class electoral support for major social reforms in favour of expanded state expenditure and the development of major government services, such as a state-run comprehensive education system and National Health Service (NHS).

This theoretical linking of civil, political and social rights subsequently led to citizenship being referred to as a 'three-legged stool' (Twine, 1994: 104). Although some may dispute the accuracy and general applicability of this portrayal of the historical evolution of rights – most certainly in a context such as South Africa - the singular contribution of Marshall lies in his conceptual insight that the emergence of the welfare state in the context of a capitalist democracy lead to the establishment of new social rights of citizenship that could realise the goals of a new economic and social order (Dean, 2015).

The approach to social citizenship and social policy articulated by Marshall is best conceived of as 'a hybrid of traditional liberal and social democratic views' (Van Niekerk, 2008: 25-26). This characterisation rests upon differing interpretations of the ambiguity present in his work. On the one hand, the position expressed by Marshall that social citizenship was compatible with class inequalities and capitalism within a democratic context has led to him being viewed by some as an advocate of the liberal view of citizenship. Based on his historical analysis, T.H. Marshall maintained that the development and institutionalisation of social rights would serve to 'abate' class-based inequality and tensions that are generated by the operation of the market in capitalist economies. A core contention therefore is that class conflict can be mitigated or restrained and solidarity promoted by the extension of citizenship entitlements and through the redistribution of resources generated from economic growth (Turner, 1997). Yet, apart from this tendency towards social liberalism, Marshall also embraced certain social democratic elements. This is most apparent in his argument regarding the centrality of state intervention to guarantee social rights to health, education and welfare,

as well as his endorsement of collective bargaining as a means of negotiating improved worker conditions in the labour market. In essence, the Marshallian account signifies the point at which 'a social dimension and questions of social equality were finally brought into the citizenship agenda' (Dean, 2012:15). Furthermore, Marshall's conception of social citizenship was maximalist or expansive in character. He emphasised the universal right of citizens to a wide-ranging set of state-guaranteed social and economic benefits or services as a means of ensuring the full participation of all citizens in society, irrespective of economic status (Dwyer, 2004: 6).

While the importance, influence and relevance of Marshall's conceptualisation of social citizenship and social rights are widely acknowledged, his theoretical approach has been the subject of wide-ranging critique in the decades since its publication. This is partly due to changes in social context and dominant ideology, in addition to attempts to address analytical oversights. Intellectuals from the political left and right alike have expressed reservations with the liberal egalitarian/social democratic positioning of Marshall's theory of citizenship. This has included claims of limited universality, characterised by a rather exclusive treatment of issues such as gender, race and disability, as well as that it is intrinsically Anglocentric in character, especially in the description of the historical evolution of the three forms of citizenship rights. Some have expressed concern that it fails to address the tensions between capitalism and the extension of social rights to poor citizens and women subjected to the subordinating and exploitative vagaries of the domestic economy, while more conservative critics judge that the account privileges unconditional citizen rights over duty and responsibilities which encourages a passive rather than an active citizenry (Dwyer, 2010; Alcock, 1989; Bottomore, 1992; Roche, 1992; Etzioni, 1996).

#### *2.2.1.1 Social citizenship, claims and societal attitudes*

For all the criticisms levelled at social citizenship, one of the most salient and arguably undiminished uses of social citizenship as a concept remains its ability to serve as a tool for a multidimensional examination of social fault-lines and marginalisation within any given society and the prevailing attitudes in society on what is considered an adequate state of wellbeing . As Dwyer (2004:6) observes:

> This notion of social citizenship … has the potential to provide a benchmark against which it is possible to assess the status of certain individuals or groups in relation to

> access to the agreed welfare rights and resources that are generally available to all those who are regarded as citizens within a specific community. Social citizenship, therefore, offers the capacity for an exploration of the dynamics of social divisions/exclusion to take in a number of important dimensions (for example, class, gender, 'race', disability, age) when assessing both the levels and causes of inequality within a society.

In terms of the nature of social rights, Dean (2001: 1) maintains that their fundamental attribute is that they are 'distributional', since they involve the issue of the social redistribution of resources in society. Specifically, he contends that social rights 'are concerned either to prevent poverty by limiting the extent of social inequality, or to relieve poverty after it has struck'. The granting of social rights to all citizens through the development of the welfare state was regarded by Marshall as the means to reducing social tensions and divisions (themselves an arguably attitudinal phenomenon linked to structural inequalities, as argued later in the thesis), by addressing risk and insecurity and promoting 'an equalisation between the more and less fortunate at all levels' (Marshall, 1950:56 / Marshall & Bottomore, 1992:33). Therefore, as with Tawney (1931) before him, Marshall considered the guaranteeing of the social rights of citizenship as a policy action through which the state could reduce inequality within society (Alcock, 1997:256). The manner in which resources are in practice redistributed by social rights is nonetheless a matter of some contention, as is the interpretation of what Marshall meant by 'equality'.

One of the important conceptual approaches to the historical development of welfare rights suggested in the work of Dean (2001, 2002, 2013, 2015) and others (Dwyer, 2010; Van Niekerk, 2008) is the distinction between a classical liberalist perspective on 'doctrinal' rights and a social democratic emphasis on 'claims-based' rights. These are underscored by differential interpretations of the meaning of *equal* rights. From a liberal citizenship standpoint, the social rights concept is framed around a formal or procedural approach to equality, emphasising equality before the law and acknowledging the inherent equal human worth of individuals. Conceding that free markets have the potential to maintain rather than address deprivation, this perspective incorporates a substantive concern with ensuring equality of opportunity by removing barriers to getting ahead in society based on individual ability (Dean, 2015). In line with the Marshallian theoretical view, this implies that all citizens are entitled to a 'doctrinal' package of rights, and that the extension of such rights entails a redistribution of opportunities. It is important to note that the distributional concern underlying this tradition concentrates on opportunity as opposed to outcomes or conditions.

By contrast, the 'claims-based' view of social rights adopts a more substantive view of equality that centres on the struggles of poor and socially disadvantaged groups to ensure that their specific needs or claims are addressed. In this tradition, social rights represent a particular challenge to social inequality through the demands not only equality of status but additionally equality of belonging, inclusion and respect in the case of communitarians and the actual redistribution of material resources for those with a more social democratic leaning (Dean 2001, 2015; Dwyer 2010). One of the central challenges facing the claims-based rights approach is that the redistribution of resources requires considerable political will, especially in the face of a diverse electorate, and that this coupled with the competition over scarce resources often dictates that the needs of certain citizens remain unmet (Dwyer 2004: 7). As will be shown in Chapter 7 of the thesis, this is especially true in the South African context, where significant race and class-based variation exists in levels of support for different types of social policy design to address societal inequalities. One of the inherent sources of contention relating to social rights is therefore which types of social protection and services should be provided to citizens as the basis for securing a decent quality of life, and at what level or standard.

#### *2.2.1.2 Social needs and rights*

Understanding and addressing social needs represents a central aspect in debates regarding social citizenship and the role of the state and other actors in promoting human wellbeing. By extension, it is a particularly useful concept when approaching the study of attitudes towards inequality and preferences for redistribution. There is a fairly extensive and evolving social policy scholarship pertaining to the definition of need and its relationship to the social rights of citizenship (Doyal & Gough, 1991). Yet, as with social rights, the subject of need is highly contested and ideologically charged, most especially in relation to questions of identifying which needs have to be met and the extent to which unmet need should be responded to (Dean 2010). According to Dean (2015:18), social rights can in effect be considered as 'articulations of human need'. This is based on the understanding that citizenship is an inclusive process by which needs are identified, demanded, recognised and responded to through the distribution of resources. In the case of T.H. Marshall's explanation of the evolution of social citizenship, the welfare state was conceived as an overarching institutional response to unmet human needs in the spheres of health, employment, education, adequate housing and basic subsistence. As the meeting of needs have a relationship to the quality of social rights and are informed by attitudes on what needs are a societial as opposed to an

individual responsibility, it is essential to have a better theoretical understanding of what constitutes needs.

Three theoretical social policy contributions are of particular note. Two of these are classic texts that are frequently cited in discussions of human need, namely Bradshaw's taxonomy of social needs (1972a,b) and Doyal and Gough's theory of human need (1984, 1991). Thirdly, and more recently, the contributions of Hartley Dean (2010, 2013, 2015) are noteworthy for the attempts to distil and integrate lessons and insights from recent decades and provide a way of approaching social needs and social rights of citizenship that resonates with the social policy debates of the 21st century.

**Table 1: Bradshaw's (1972) taxonomy of needs**

| Type of need | Basis of needs interpretation | Manner through which need is determined | Considerations and contestations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Normative need | Expert judgement | By professionals | Paternalism; conflicting expert opinion; solely dependent on expert values |
| Felt need | What people feel | By opinion surveys / qualitative research | Whether 'felt need' adequately reflects of 'real need'. Need identified on this basis has provoked debates about bounded rationality, the stigma of disclosing need, and desert. |
| Expressed need | What people demand | By elections / petitions / participatory assessment | The issue of how well behaviour or actions really map onto 'real need' in practice |
| Comparative need | What everybody else has | By social condition surveys and / or service evaluations | Challenge of determining a standard level of supply for comparative or relative purposes. The definition to assess eligibility for services is often based on arbitrary thresholds. The issues of rising expectations and finite fiscal resources are often invoked. |

Source: Adapted from Dean (2010) table 3.1; Bradshaw (1972a, b).

In Bradshaw's conception (Table 1), four predominant ways are differentiated through which policy makers and researchers could define and thereby determine the social needs of citizens. He termed these normative need, felt need, expressed need and comparative need. *Normative need* involves expert judgement by public administration, policy or social sciences professionals in determining what standards are deemed 'desirable'. This could for instance involve specifying a dietary calorific minimum standard in order to calculate a food poverty line as the basis for a national, consumption-based poverty line, or establishing minima in relation to daily water needs or other essential services. *Felt need* focuses on the particular needs for social services that individual members of the public feel they require. This is most

often captured through social attitudes surveys or through in-depth qualitative research. The democratic basis informing this approach has prompted the development of what has been called the consensual or socially perceived necessities approach to defining and measuring poverty (Magasela, 2006; Noble, Wright, Magasela & Ratcliffe, 2008b; Wright et al., 2010). This has expanded the scope from individual need to collective need by asking the public what the basic needs of all citizens should be. It therefore bridges felt and normative need, but places value in the evaluations of the mass public rather than the professional elite.

Thirdly, *expressed need* reflects the revealed preferences of individuals based on the actions they take stemming from a felt need. Need in this instance is evaluated through demands for services as reflected through placing one's name on a waiting list (such as for low-cost housing), signing up to a petition, or casting one's vote in an election or referendum. The assumption is that one would not engage in such behaviour if there was not a strong underlying recognition or feeling of need, though in practice questions are often raised about the strength of attitudinal-behavioural association when it comes to defining need. Finally, *comparative need* emerges when individuals, groups or geographic areas are found to be lacking the services that are being received by others with similar attributes. Comparisons of this nature are typically conducted by means of living conditions surveys and service provision evaluations. The inherent challenge lies in identifying levels of resources or services that all should have in order to identify unmet need based on inequalities in access or uptake forms.

In practice, Bradshaw recognised that the classification of an individual or group as being 'in need' would probably involve some form of overlap between the different categories of need, ranging from need according to all four definitions to the absence of need in all four cases. Dean (2010:178) regards this taxonomy as 'a pragmatic interpretation of the different ways in which policy makers can interpret needs', while Bradshaw himself and others have drawn attention to the various methodological and theoretical difficulties in applying such a taxonomy in practice (Clayton, 1983; Bradshaw, 1994). However, I would contend that Clayton (1983) was correct in her conclusion that the fundamental contribution of the Bradshaw model lies in its ability to make us acknowledge conceptually that the assessment of human needs involves a range of different dimensions. It is also notable, given the focus of this thesis on social attitudes, that the issue of felt need is accommodated in the classification of need. As will be discussed in subsequent empirical chapters, an important precondition for

supporting measures to address inequality is the recognition that there is a social need that warrants attention and action.

The second seminal social policy contribution on social need was Doyal and Gough's theory of human need (1984, 1991), which was initially articulated in a *Critical Social Policy* article and published in an expanded and refined form in a 1991 book. The argument forwarded in these texts is that human beings have basic needs that are characteristically objective and universally experienced. The theory critiques relativist and subjectivist perspectives in favour or a more absolutist stance, and goes further by proposing two categorical human needs. These are the need for health and the need for an element of autonomy or the freedom and capability to choose. As the authors maintain:

> "… in order to act successfully, people again need physically to survive and need enough sense of their own identity or autonomy to initiate actions on the basis of their deliberations. Survival and autonomy are therefore basic needs: they are both conceptual and empirical preconditions for the achievement of other goals." (Doyal & Gough, 1984: 15).

The authors asserted that governments have a duty to ensure that these needs are met, while taking into account the prevailing level of development within the given society. In order to realise these two universal human needs, the authors also argued that certain amounts of food, shelter and clothing are required as intermediate needs that are essential for all citizens to have. They however acknowledged that the means by which the basic needs would vary from society to society and over time based on broader contextual factors. In the context of mounting tensions within social policy between universal versus more selectivist or targeted approaches to addressing need, this has led to critical questions being posed about whether this might result in a progressive inclination towards more minimalistic forms of social citizenship being provided by governments. In the face of such arguments, Doyal and Gough have nonetheless advocated for the state provision of extensive rather than residual, narrow conceptions of social rights (Dwyer, 2010).

#### *2.2.1.3 Meeting needs*

Provision is another important issue emanating from discussions of social need, focusing in particular on how needs ought to be met and by whom. The definition of need inevitably raises questions of social relationships, and the manner in which one conceives of need is

likely to have a bearing on the preferences for how such needs might effectively be addressed (Clarke & Langan, 1998). Social policy often draws on the simple heuristic distinction between the family, market and the state as sectors of society through which such provision can occur. This is done as a basis for reflecting on the differential and often politically- and ideologically-charged discussion of the locus of responsibility for responding to claims over need. Since the middle of the twentieth century, the relative influencing role of the state and the market as the dominant institutional apparatus for responding to human wellbeing has tended to alternate based on deeply emotive and fiercely-contested struggles. Langan (1998) has suggested that the post-war welfare state was premised on the assumption that *publicly recognised or 'legitimate' needs* would be best served through the efforts of government departments and agencies.

Accordingly, the post-1945 Keynesian welfare state arrangements came to represent a particular configuration whereby the needs of citizens for services such as insurance, health care and pensions came to be provided by the state as entitlements rather than as commodities procured in the market-place (Esping-Andersen, 1990). During the 1980s and 1990s in particular, the rise of neoliberal social policy reforms under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, as well as structural adjustment in the African context, precipitated a time of re-commodification. This involved the scaling back of public services and the rise again of market-driven provision. Since then, there has been mounting ideological contestation between contemporary perspectives and approaches to social citizenship. These have ranged from social democratic and Leftist positions to new communitarianism, the New Right (sometimes referred to as the 'alt-Right' in the Trump era), Third Way approaches and even populist politics. The result of this dynamic, involving classic, revived and hybrid perspectives on social rights and social needs, is that competing ideas over the relative role of the state and market as the basis for servicing needs continues to exist as a core element in social policy discourse. By extension, I would contend that perspectives on the relative role of state-market-family in responding to what is perceived to be legitimate need represents an important construct in understanding public and elite attitudes to social citizenship and redistributive preferences, especially in a high-inequality, developing country context such as South Africa.

#### *2.2.1.4 Deserting need: The question of deservingness*

In deliberations on the social rights of citizenship and social need, the issue of the deservingness of support (the principle of *desert*) has become increasingly salient, especially with the growing global tendency in recent decades towards welfare reforms that have rendered social protection systems less universal and more selective and conditional. The role of deservingness in determining 'who should get what, and why' in terms of public social assistance has a long history. It featured in early legislative efforts designed to alleviate poverty, including the British Poor Law of 1834 and Dutch *Armenwet* of 1854. These laws involved the identification of categories of deprived people that were regarded as most deserving of social support, such as the elderly, the sick and infirm, and children, and differentiating these from those perceived as underserving, examples being the unemployed or the 'idle poor' (Golding & Middleton, 1982). The distributive principle underlying this approach to needs satisfaction is founded on equity, with its focus on equivalence of rewards based on merit or desert (Dean, 2014). Desert-based claims tend to be based on the view that certain qualities or types of activities associated with a particular group are regarded as essential for maintaining society, and in return for fulfilling these responsibilities, society has a reciprocal obligation to provide certain services in return (Taylor-Gooby, 2003:44).

The concept of deservingness has also featured as a subject of research in studies of welfare-related public opinion (Coughlin, 1980; Van Oorschot, 2000). The focus has tended to be on understanding the nature and strength of patterns of solidarity between different groups in society in terms of the criteria they employ in making evaluations of deservingness. This addresses the principles and norms people regard as crucial in considering a fair distribution of life chances, and the degree of conviction with which these are applied to situations involving individuals and groups of people in need of assistance. In a particular context, such lines of inquiry help provide insight into whether societal legitimacy tends to be vested more in universal and unconditional forms of solidarity in responding to need, or if there is greater consensus for conditional, selective forms of provisioning. Based on a systematic review of the extant empirical literature on welfare states and notions of deservingness, Van Oorschot (2000: 36) was able to identify five criteria *Control, Need, Identity, Attitude, Reciprocity* that appear to inform public evaluations of whose claims are deserving or undeserving.

The normative debates around who deserves access to support and on what basis continues to be a factor informing social policy and social citizenship debates. It also continues to be a

growing area of interest in public opinion research about welfare futures including in South Africa, especially in understanding social representations of poverty and in challenging myths regarding perverse incentives and dependency culture associated with the provision of social grants (Noble & Ntshongwana, 2008; Surender et al., 2010; Seekings, 2007, 2008a,b; Møller, 2010; Davids & Gouws, 2013).

### *2.2.2 The conservative challenge: the neo-liberal approach to citizenship*

In the decades since Marshall outlined his concept of social citizenship, this rights-based model has been aggressively challenged by a conservative or 'neo-liberal' discourse which developed in the late 1960s and gained traction following the onset of economic recession of the mid-1970s (Offe, 1982). This approach draws inspiration from classical liberalist beliefs in 'individual liberty, the free market, and the minimal state' (Ellison, 2012: 58) that were popularised in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, most especially through the work of Adam Smith (1776). Prominent neo-liberal thinkers include Hayek (1944; 1976) and Friedman (1962/2002), while Murray (1984, 2016) and Mead (1986) represent more radical New Right positions.

The general position favoured within this ideological perspective advocates that the role of the government should primarily, if not exclusively, be confined to recognising and upholding a legal framework of civil and political rights as a basis for defending individual liberties. These so-called *negative rights* involve protecting the freedoms of citizens from coercive or wilfully harmful actions by government or other individuals (Hayek, 1944; George & Wilding, 1996; Van Niekerk, 2008). Beyond this, any effort by the state to intervene in the workings of the market and respond to the social needs of individuals is regarded as undermining of individual liberties and the right to pursue individual interests in and through an unfettered market. As such, the *positive freedoms* associated with Marshallian social rights tend to be characterised as promoting social policy interventions that would interfere in the operations of the free market, reduce individual freedom, and produce costly and inefficient institutional arrangements (Dwyer, 2004/2010; Ellison, 2012).

The conservative approach to social citizenship is not only informed by the embracing of values such as unencumbered freedom, liberty and individualism, but also by a particular view of inequality and social justice (Friedman 1962/2002:195). Advocates within this tradition tend to regard inequality as both an acceptable and necessary precondition in the

pursuit of societal progress and development (King, 1987; George & Wilding, 1996; Dwyer, 2004/2010). The pursuit of an egalitarian policy agenda premised on extending the range of citizenship rights and reducing inequality would thus be considered as inherently incompatible with a commitment to the principle of freedom. At the heart of this objection lies a rejection of efforts to actively influence or facilitate a particular distributive preference regarding the structuring of society, which would interfere with the natural order, whether it be one of equality or unequal distribution. For Hayek (1960/2011: 148), equality emanating from the extension of civil and political rights is regarded as "the only kind of equality conducive to liberty and the only equality which we can secure without destroying liberty". The expansion of the welfare state and its essentially redistributive character was accordingly viewed as inimical to efforts to attain 'a free society' that is predicated on the maximisation of individual liberty through the market system under a democratic polity.

As Dean (2015: 59-60) observes, "the neo-liberal objection is that rights involving the redistribution of income or property are corrupting. They are not rights at all; on the contrary, they are an infringement of real (i.e. property) rights or a distraction from properly enforceable (i.e. civil and political) human rights". Inequalities in market outcomes are seen as just or legitimate, reflecting individual differences in ability and effort.

### *2.2.3 Expansion not severing: Critiques of Marshall from the Left*

While Marshall's conception of the social rights of citizenship has been vigorously challenged by scholars from the Right, it has by no means been regarded in an uncritical fashion by neo-Marxists and democratic socialists of the Centre-Left. The socialist response has tended centre on a deep-rooted scepticism of the extension of guaranteed social rights by capitalist states. Neo-Marxist scholars, such as Claus Offe and Tom Bottomore, have drawn attention to the ambiguities and contradictions associated with social citizenship and welfare rights. While there is acknowledgment that social welfare policies may, to some degree, assist in easing the suffering of the working class, the overriding consideration is that the adoption and institutionalisation of social rights does not effectively confront societal inequalities, and occurs within the framework of the capitalist market system (Offe, 1982; Bottomore 1992). In a seminal essay on the welfare state, Offe (1982: 7, 12-13) contends that that the Leftist critique centres on the claims that the welfare state is inherently ineffective, repressive, and tends to fulfil a political ideological control function.

Criticism of the social citizenship framework in the Marshallian tradition has by equal measure been questioned in both citizenship and identity research. As already mentioned, one strand of criticism of the Marshallian account relates to its intrinsically Anglocentric character. Questions have been raised about the accuracy and cross-national applicability of the sequential framing of the development of civic, political and social rights. Feminist scholars have expressed concern that Marshall's analysis did not adequately account for the social divisions beyond class that characterise society. For this reason, it is argued that the conception of social citizenship that he proposed essentially did not incorporate the needs of women and other vulnerable social groups, such as disabled people and immigrants (Bottomore, 1992; Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Pascall, 1997; Lister, 1991, 1997, 2003; Powell, 2009; Dean, 2015). Related to the feminist argument is the view that Marshall's account of citizenship characterises modern societies as relatively homogenous, with no real attempts to address ethic, linguistic, religious or cultural diversity (Turner, 1997). More than six decades after Marshall wrote his essay, patterns of labour mobility, migration and globalisation have produced more heterogeneous and multicultural societies. The implication of this is that the class divisions that Marshall focused his classic essay on represent but one of a series of possible fault lines.

### *2.2.4 Appeals for a new paradigm of social citizenship*

Concerns about the human impact of the neoliberal turn in social policy, coupled with the far-reaching consequences of the market crisis of 2008-2009 and associated austerity politics (Farnsworth & Irving, 2015), have led to a resurgence of critical debate about social citizenship, rights and goals amid uncertain and more unequal times. It has further led to various suggestions for an alternative approach that draws on the spirit and ideological foundations of early social policy thinking but, taking into account the criticisms of elements of the Marshallian conceptualisation, reshapes it for contemporary times. Of especial relevance for this thesis, with its emphasis on public recognition of inequality and social need and the attendant conceptions of the roles of the state in pursuing a redress agenda, is the emergence of an appeal for a social citizenship approach that recognises the *social interdependence* of individuals within a society as a proposed way forward (Twine, 1994; Dwyer, 2004/10; Dean & Taylor-Gooby, 2013). As Dean and Taylor-Gooby (2013: ix)

motivate, such an approach would serve to "situate the role of the welfare state in relation to a broader appreciation of human interdependency".

In what could be considered one of the fullest attempts to date to take the idea of interdependency further and weave it into a new conceptual approach to social citizenship, Hartley Dean (2010, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016) develops what he terms 'modes of social citizenship' that describe the manner in which social rights may evolve and secure popular support in different contexts. This model is structured around two overarching and intersecting dimensions, namely sociality and negotiation, and has been described by the author as a 'post-Marshallian theory of social rights'. This is due to its emphasis on accommodating a more global, cosmopolitan perspective, and recognition that such rights are socially-constructed or socially negotiated articulations of need rather than merely a product of the institution of the modern welfare state. According to the model, 'sociality' is considered to be an intrinsically human trait that has a bearing on interpersonal recognition and communication, and whose particular character and intensity has the potential to fluctuate both across geographic and social contexts and over time. The sociality dimension ranges from weaker forms of sociality, which tend to place greater emphasis on individual self-sufficiency, to stronger forms, with a predisposition for mutual support. The 'negotiation' dimension is premised on the idea that social rights are the outcome of a negotiated process over recognition of needs (Dean 2016; Fraser, 1989).

## 2.3 The exceptional state? Social policy and social citizenship in South Africa

The nature and trajectory of public policy has been a recurrent theme in post-apartheid scholarship. It builds upon a strong and long-standing tradition of critical reflection on the role of the state during the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. A recent contribution by Seekings (2016) acknowledges the inherent importance in understanding the various forms of exclusion and subjugation that intractably shaped the course of South African economic and political history of the last century-and-a-half, but also suggests that there remains a notable omission in these accounts. Specifically, he contends that this body of work "generally neglected…the study of citizenship itself, i.e. of what it was that 'insiders' enjoyed and from what 'outsiders' were excluded" (ibid., p.193). This section of the chapter therefore aims to provide a review of South African social policy literature, with the purpose of reflecting in particular on the manner in which the concepts and principles, issues and

debates associated with social citizenship and social rights find expression in local context. While the literature directly dealing with social citizenship in the South African case remains relatively scant (Van Niekerk, 2008, 2013, 2016, 2017), there is nonetheless a broader social policy tradition that engages with the character and trajectory of developmental welfare in the country, touching on themes such as 'the development state' and 'transformative social policy' and the dominant economic ideology and policy choices that have shaped the first quarter-century of democratic experience.

Van Niekerk (2017) maintains that *African Claims* (ANC, 1943) and the *Freedom Charter* (1955), both foundational policy documents of the African National Congress (ANC), embody a particular perspective on 'the good society' and the provision of public goods; one that was formulated within the specific context of the struggle to address the racial and class inequalities of apartheid South Africa. His argument is that the National Question in the country, which involves the historical struggle for a united, democratic nation, involved not only the fight to end white domination but also fundamentally the conception of an alternative 'good society'. According to his understanding, this can be defined as "a society planned and organised with particular social and economic arrangements to meet the needs of its citizens" (p.42). These policy documents articulated the vision of a society whereby the state assumes a strong interventionist position in relation to the market as the basis for ensuring the social rights of citizenship not for the few but for all citizens. This entailed the extension of rights to healthcare, education, welfare and decent housing, premised on a neo-Keynesian, social democratic tradition of comprehensive provisioning of public goods through universal healthcare and education, and a national welfare system. A second notable point made by Van Niekerk is that the documents represent a distinct 'strategy of equality' in their concern with using tax revenue as the basis guaranteeing a decent standard of living for all, irrespective of class, race or social position. While these ideological strands certainly find expression in the general ANC policy trajectory since the early 1940s, the particular institutional arrangements adopted by the post-apartheid state did not fully embrace these propositions. While acknowledging this, Van Niekerk also appeals that the principles informing this vision should be taken seriously in order to address the persisting inequalities, social differentiation and class tensions confronting contemporary South Africa:

> Had it been implemented [the 'strategy of equality'] it would have led to the establishment of a social democratic welfare state. If we are to take these foundational ANC policy documents seriously, the resolution of the 'National Question' is thus the establishment of a constitutional democracy in a non-racial, unitary state based on a

> universal franchise, where public goods such as health, education and welfare are provided by the state as an entitlement of citizenship (and not dependent on the financial means of the citizen) (p.43)

From a broader African postcolonial perspective, Mkandawire (2009), in his Harold Wolpe memorial lecture, suggests that many national liberation movements consciously subsumed the social question in order to build a class coalition framed around a nationalist agenda that could overthrow colonialism. Nonetheless, the shortcomings of the prevailing development model, the continuing challenge of old and new social inequalities, and growing ethno-nationalism lead him to conclude that possibilities are emerging for new coalitions and agendas focused on egalitarian, redistributive social policies. Nonetheless, for this to succeed would in his estimation require 'decoupling struggles for recognition (Black Empowerment) from struggles for redistribution and equality' (ibid., p154).

## 2.4 Empirical research traditions and evidence on public attitudes towards economic inequality

### 2.4.1 Early foundations: Dominant ideology, tolerance of inequality and ambivalence

The roots of contemporary theoretical and empirical scholarship on public opinion concerning inequality, opportunity and redistribution lie in a number of pioneering studies across a diverse range of disciplines, including social policy, sociology, social psychology, political science and economics, that were conducted as part of the growing interest in research on stratification following World War II, and gained particular momentum in the 1970s and 1980s (Pease et al., 1970).

In their influential 1986 volume, *Beliefs about Inequality*, sociologist James Kluegel and psychologist Eliot Smith presented what remains one of the most detailed, nationally representative studies on beliefs and attitudes regarding inequality. Drawing on equally pioneering texts across various disciplines that were published in the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Lane, 1962; Free & Cantril, 1968; Huber & Form 1973; Alves & Rossi, 1978; Hochschild, 1981; Walzer, 1983; Verba & Orren, 1985), they developed a general theoretical perspective that contends that attitudes concerning inequality and distributive social policy are essentially informed by three core elements of the social, economic and political context. The first of these draws on the notion of the "dominant ideology", which was a term originally designed

to encompass a "stable, widely held set of beliefs involving the availability of opportunity, individualistic explanations for achievement, and acceptance of unequal distributions of rewards" (Kluegel and Smith, 1986: 11) that are said to typify American culture and effectively legitimise economic and social inequality in the country. [4] More specifically, it is argued that, in the American context, the dominant ideology tends to portray inequality in the country as fair and legitimate due to underlying beliefs that there exists ample opportunity for individuals to achieve economically success and that individuals should be considered personally responsible for their position in society (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1992). In turn, it was conjectured that this individualistic perspective would translate into a conservative orientation towards inequality-related social policy. Based on this supposition, one could conversely reason that in a society unlike the United States where economic opportunity is seen to be constrained for the average citizen and where economic outcomes are seen to be unfair, one might intuitively expect greater mass support for redistributive policies.

Beyond dominant stratification ideology, Kluegel and Smith's second proposition was that beliefs about inequality are shaped by positional factors. An individual's social and economic position in society, based on factors income, sex, race, age, educational attainment and occupation status was examined. Accordingly, people in different positions were envisaged to respond in a differential manner to social inequalities in society as a consequence of having different life experiences and self-interest motivations.[5] The third influence on inequality beliefs articulated by Kluegel and Smith were beliefs associated with "social liberalism", precipitated in particular by political events and societal-level patterns of social change. In the decades prior to the conducting of the study, views on race relations, gender roles and poverty had demonstrated a discernible liberal shift, reflecting the broader contestations and subsequent change in this regard.

Apart from inequality-related tolerance and ambivalence, McCall (2013) identifies in the literature what she terms the ignorance perspective on attitudes towards inequality. The underlying argument is that reactions to inequality are likely to be shaped by the extent to which citizens are actually aware of social inequality in their society. In their conceptual framework, Kluegel and Smith (1986:21) maintain that "because social inequality is such a

[4] The term "dominant stratification ideology" was initially used by Huber and Form (1973).
[5] The role of self-interest has been critical in the economic literature on redistributive preferences, and will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

salient feature of the social world and a critically important influence on individual lives, we assume it to be a frequent target of individual attention and thought". Based on this premise, they discount the possibility that the disadvantaged are broadly accepting of inequality because they lack an appreciation of the magnitude of economic and social disparities. Other more recent American studies lend credence to this point of view. Page and Jacobs (2009: 49) for instance conclude their analysis of public opinion data by stating that "Americans turn out to be aware of and concerned about economic inequality. They are not ignorant, unconcerned, or acquiescent". This does not however imply that such awareness is necessary detailed or precise. Indeed, as recent cross-national research of perceptions of occupational earnings by Kiatpongsan and Norton (2014) reaffirms, there is a tendency for people to generally underestimate the actual level of income inequality in their country by a considerable margin. Citizens therefore are more inclined to possess a broad sense of inequality, informed not only by personal exposure to inequality but by messaging regarding the status of the rich and poor from the mass media, prevailing political discourse, and other informal information channels.

A recent contribution to the theoretical debate on inequality beliefs comes from Leslie McCall, who in her volume *The Undeserving Rich* (2013), argues that the beliefs about economic inequality starts on the premise that they are "contextually specific with the potential to vary across historical and social conditions" (McCall, 2013:22).

Building on these ideas, there is a growing academic interest in competing theories of rational economic self-interest versus those of false consciousness, adaptive preferences and system justification (Bradshaw & Finch, 2003; Wright & Noble, 2013; Newman et al., 2015). At the heart of this theoretical and empirical debate lie concerns about the validity of expressed opinions and preferences on critical social issues such as poverty and inequality due to the influencing effect that the daily lived reality of one's socioeconomic circumstances might have on an individual's perceptions and judgements (Wright & Noble, 2013). Rational choice and economic self-interest models presuppose that materially advantaged individuals would be more inclined to defend the prevailing economic system than those experiencing material deprivation. The latter would be expected to display system-challenging beliefs and a greater demand for redistributive policies. By contrast, neo-Marxist theories such as false consciousness contend that poorer citizens, despite their societal status and self-interest in challenging inequalities, may internalise beliefs that conceal their oppression and support the favour the interests of dominant or elite classes. Furthermore, system justification theory (Jost

& Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2003) argues that poor citizens may rationalise current socio-economic arrangements as legitimate due to a psychological need to see the world as predictable, just and fair. Internationally, there remains conflicting evidence in response to, which is prompting attempts at further theorisation and survey-based experimentation.

In the South African case, the evidence still remains fairly limited, but there are early indications from published studies that the scale of effect may not be especially pronounced or consequential. For example, based on nationally representative South African data, Wright and Noble (2013) examine definitions of socially perceived necessities, based on the consensual approach to defining an acceptable standard of living. They find a positive association between the possession of items and a preference for classifying items as essential, but conclude that the scale of this effect does not undermine the effectiveness of the approach. Similarly, Posel and Rogan (2014) compare subjective and money-metric measures of poverty and also find an appreciable degree of overlap between these definitional approaches. There are instances where the money-metric and subjective poverty classifications diverge, but they are ultimately unable to determine the relative influence of conditioned expectations (adaptive preferences) given the cross-sectional nature of the data used. These examples focus on definitions of poverty and living standards, but as will be shown in the subsequent empirical chapters of this thesis, similar conclusions are arrived at in the context of prevailing inequality beliefs and preferences in the country. In terms of inequality aversion, it will be shown that there is a surprising degree of class-invariance in terms of concern over the scale of income inequality in the country and the need for interventions to promote change. Attitudinal polarisation is apparent mainly in relation to preferred social policies rather than broader evaluations of the economic fairness of the system itself. This is likely to stimulate further research in the South African context on the relative influence of self-interest versus false consciousness, adaptation and system justification, and the consistency of attitudinal evidence across different social issues and policies.

### 2.4.2 Evidence on beliefs about inequality in South Africa (mass and elites): Legitimacy and contestation

Empirical evidence concerning public attitudes and beliefs about economic inequality and opportunity in South Africa is surprisingly sparse relative to the considerable attention

devoted to its "objective" measurement and the robust political desire expressed in many policy documents and party statements for greater equality. The implication is that, unlike well-researched country contexts such as North America and Europe, we cannot confidently make reference to the notion of a "dominant stratification ideology", as we have comparatively limited information about the character and content of beliefs about such phenomena, whether there is a dominant perspective or alternatively whether there is a plurality of viewpoints, or even how stable or variant these positions are. There is nonetheless a growing body of information across various disciplines that, taken collectively, has begun to flesh out the nature of responses of South Africans to the context of high inequality in which they have been brought up and continue to live. The survey-based evidence that I present in the chapters to follow will hopefully serve as a further contribution to our understanding of how citizens, both the mass and elite alike, interpret and explain prevailing economic disparities in the country, and how in turn this shapes support for or opposition to the ideal of redistribution as well as the social policies that have been adopted in practice in pursuance of this goal. The remainder of this section will provide a review of the extant South African inequality attitudes research together with incipient areas of investigation.

#### *2.4.2.1 Mass opinion*

The story of public opinion research in South Africa has a surprisingly rich and varied history, dating back to early experimental work on race attitudes during the late 1930s and early 1940s, at a time when survey-based attitudinal research was in its relative infancy internationally (MacCrone, 1937, 1938; Malherbe, 1946).[6] This foundational work, as well as attitudinal research in the country over the subsequent quarter century, was characterised by samples that were not predominantly representative of the populations being studied. Many involved interviews with relatively small numbers of students at tertiary institutions to elicit the attitudes of white South Africans, raising questions over the reliability and socio-economic bias of these studies (MacCrone, 1937; Pettigrew, 1958, 1960; Lever, 1981).

The transition to democracy brought increased interest in citizen perspectives on distributive justice and associated social policy preferences. For instance, a few months after the April

[6] To put this in perspective, Louis L. Thurstone produced his well-known paper 'attitudes can be measured' in 1928, which contained his eponymous scale which was the first technique employed to measure attitudes in the psychological and sociological tradition. In 1932, Rensis Likert developed and published what soon became the famous "Likert scale", while the influential journal *Public Opinion Quarterly* was only established in 1937.

1994 election, a nationally representative survey consisting of 4003 respondents was commissioned by the International Republic Institute (IRI, 1994) to examine popular expectations of the voting age population. From an inequality point of view, there are a number of questions that relate to redress policy and responsibility for redistribution. Descriptive results indicate that employment creation was the top ranked national priority cited by the adult public, a finding that persists in national surveys more than two decades later. The creation of these job opportunities was seen primarily as a government responsibility (69%), followed by private sector companies (19%), while modest shares mentioned the role of individual entrepreneurship (7%) and trade unions (4%). This robust demand for state intervention extended to various other forms of development activity, with a near universal consensus across the socio-economic, demographic and political spectrum that the state should take the lead in improving living standards, facilitating race and gender equality, promoting access to education and training as well as housing. In spite of these considerable expectations on the state, many citizens recognised the role of business as well as individuals in bringing about societal change. Between two fifths and half believed business has a role in promoting living standards, equality, education and training, while an even higher share (61%) believed the business sector should be involved in access to housing. Approximately half of those surveyed also believed that individuals needed to assume some responsibility for their living standards, educational attainment and skills acquisition, in addition to addressing social inequalities.

In terms of specific redress policies, the IRI (1994) study showed that affirmative action employment policies were regarded with a certain amount of circumspection. On average, people were more than 1.5 times more likely to support merit-based employment than affirmative action if the policy impedes efficiency (60% vs 38%), though considerable racial differences underlie this preference.[7] In terms of educational opportunity, a majority (58%) supported providing children with equal education rather than maintaining standards and (in so doing) perpetuating educational inequalities, though citizen voices were again polarised on this matter.[8] With respect to the financing of development and redistribution, the most

[7] The meritocratic perspective was nearly universally preferred by white and Indian respondents (93% and 83% respectively) and by around two-thirds (64%) of coloured respondents. Greater ambivalence was evident among black African respondents, with 52% supporting merit-based employment compared to 48% supporting affirmative action.

[8] Black African respondents were more than twice as likely to prefer immediately equalising education than maintaining standards (69% vs 31%), while white respondents conversely opted almost exclusively (88%) for

favoured approach included cutting certain forms of government expenditure (30%), increased sin taxes (21%) and corporate taxes (20%), as well as raising personal income tax on the wealthy (18%). Raising the cost of basic foodstuffs, increasing value added tax (VAT) and increasing personal taxes were the least preferred options (38%, 32% and 20% respectively).

Appendix 2-1 provides further details of sub-national quantitative studies.

#### *2.4.2.2 Elite perspectives*

A few qualitative studies have also focused on the attitudes of elites in South Africa. One well-known study conducted in 1998 by Noushin Kalati and James Manor (1999, 2005) explored understandings of poverty and inequality as well as differential notions of social solidarity between ANC and non-ANC elites in the country.[9] The findings are illuminating, and are particularly important for juxtaposing against mass opinion on inequality. A sizable majority of the elites interviewed tended to misperceive the extent of economic inequality in the country, viewing societies such as Brazil and India as considerably more unequal. Consequently, many believed (especially but not exclusively among white elites) that the material disparities should be regarded as acceptable, in that as long as the basic needs of poorer citizens are addressed then the existence of a thin layer of wealthy citizens is justifiable. In fact, the existence of a "First world" economy, infrastructure, education and skills was cited as a basis of pride, since it was seen as a source for optimism regarding the prospects of addressing poverty and ensuring that South Africa's poor were not as poor as in other parts of the continent. Apart from misperceiving the level of inequality, the research also found the elites to possess a surprising lack of awareness of rural deprivation, with a tendency to characterise poverty as urban-centric and suggest that impoverished rural dwellers could get by on subsistence agriculture. Those with familial or other connections to

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maintaining educational standards. The preferences of coloured and Indian respondents fall in-between these positions.

[9] Kalati and Manor interviewed 108 elites spread across four cities, namely Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban and Cape Town. The definition of an 'ANC elite' employed in the study was taken to broadly encompass members of the tripartite alliance. The elites were purposively selected to ensure representation across 11 different categories, as follows: "(1) politicians in power; (2) politicians in opposition; (3) people working in the media; (4) influential academics and professionals; (5) union leaders (in both blue and white collar unions); (6) business executives, large-scale entrepreneurs; (7) leaders of voluntary associations (including those which exist to serve the needs of the poor); (8) civil servants in the upper ranks; (9) high ranking military and police officers; (10) large landowners; (11) religious leaders" (Kalati & Manor, 1999: 118).

rural areas were more cognisant of the scale of deprivation, but did not give it particular attention.

With regard to redistributive programmes, there emerged appreciable scepticism among most of the elites. A range of reasons were proffered. Of lesser importance and mentioned by small shares of respondents was a lack of financial resources in the country to exert a substantive effect on the high level of poverty in the country and a view of the state bureaucracy as inflexible and inefficient. Greater apprehension was evident in respect of the tax implications of redistributive policies over and above what they perceived as an already high tax burden on the rich. Two reasons seemed to predominate and were commonly mentioned by a majority of respondents. Firstly, most voiced concerns that corruption both within the state and beyond would ultimately constrain the ability to successfully implement distributive social policies. Secondly, the elites interviewed professed a resolute belief in economic growth as the solution to economic disadvantage rather than targeted policy interventions. The position on redistributive policy among the elites was however not uniform, with members of the ruling ANC elite tended to exhibit on average a greater social consciousness than non-ANC elites. However, even the former exhibited some ambivalence regarding redistribution, most especially whether solutions to poverty and inequality should be addressed by a market-led approach or not.

Despite the importance of this research in providing insight into elite perceptions of inequality and redistribution, the Kalati and Manor study was conducted nearly a generation ago. It was also undertaken only a few years after the transition to democracy, by which stage redistributive policies were only beginning to be rolled out in earnest. Furthermore, the study preceded the mounting protest action, stagnating economic growth and the repercussions of the Great Recession, high profile corruption scandals, and changing political mood that have come to characterise the last decade. What other evidence therefore exists to provide a sense of continuity or change in the views of South African elites?

Møller and Dickow (2001) report on the views of in-depth interviews were conducted with 25 opinion leaders during the first half of 1999, with the purpose of helping to inform the questionnaire content for that year's round of the longitudinal South African Quality of Life

Trends Project (SAQoL).[10] The elite interviews included representation of all race groups, as well as political and institutional diversity. The emphasis in the interviews was on evaluations of democratic performance, government policy and programme effectiveness on the quality of life of South Africans, as well as personal experiences during the five years since the transition to democracy. The study pointed to dissent among the elites regarding the character of economic transformation in the country. Some offered praise of the country's economic growth record, the government's economic restraint in the face of multiple, populist demands and viewed the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (Republic of South Africa, 1996) macro-economic strategy as a noteworthy policy development that would send encouraging signals to prospective investors. Others raised concerns over the slower than anticipated pace of government delivery in addressing the considerable needs of disadvantaged citizens, and provided a trenchant critique of GEAR for its Thatcherite, neoliberal approach (p.16). Despite this disagreement, there was broad consensus that the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) (ANC, 1994) included overambitious targets and led to the introduction of programmes without due consideration to processes of implementation.

The Møller and Dickow (2001) study also contained some discussion of redress policy, in particular affirmative action. The need for affirmative action was generally acknowledged, due to a belief that "the playing fields need to be levelled … otherwise nothing will change. Or it will take so long we'll have a sort of revolution on our hands" (p.31). Those with a more liberal ideological leaning believed affirmative action and equal opportunities policies were having an appreciable effect by creating the reforms by which the redistribution of income could occur.

As with the Kalati and Manor study, the elite interviews undertaken by Møller and Dickow (2001) were conducted during the first few years of democracy, leaving lingering questions about whether the extent of change in outlook and attitude that may have occurred in the decade-and-a-half that have since passed. In 2013/14, the University of Johannesburg has

[10] SAQoL represents the country's (and indeed the world's) longest standing, nationally representative longitudinal series on quality of life and well-being. Through this series, there is repeat, cross-sectional data covering slightly more than three decades (for an overview, see Møller 2013 as well as Møller & Roberts 2014).

been undertaking a modest set of elite interviews on poverty and inequality in the tradition of Kalati and Manor as part of a broader cross-national examination of elite perceptions.[11]

One feasible rationale may be self-interest among South Africa's elites. For these individuals, inequality may be seen to breed crime and pose threats to property rights, hence the strong concern about the extreme income inequality in the country. Social consciousness among elites could also explain this phenomenon, but the research conducted by Kalati and Manor (1999) suggests that this social solidarity is poorly developed in most elites in South Africa, a situation complicated by the geographical, social, educational, economic, and psychological distances that exist between elites and the impoverished masses. The perception of poverty may negatively affect the welfare of the rich and their sense of fairness. Resistance to redistributive policies may come from the fact that most elites have not benefited from such interventions, but may also be a consequence of the fact that the redistribution process has been tainted by poor delivery, corruption, nepotism (and possibly a fear of Zimbabwe-type redistribution of assets).

Work in the late 1990s explored the understanding of poverty and differential notions of social solidarity among elites (especially between ANC- and non-ANC elites) in the country (Kalati and Manor 1999, 2005). Using nationally representative data, Roberts (2006) explored public perceptions of inequality aversion, relative deprivation and support for various compensatory and preferential redistributive measures, while Wegner and Pellicer (2011) examine changes in the demand for redistribution in the country. At a more micro level, Seekings (2008a,b) also examined racial differences in perceptions of distributive justice using representative data for Cape Town. There is also a small but growing body of evidence on beliefs about specific redistributive measures, such as affirmative action (Dixon et al. 2007; Durrheim 2010; Durrheim et al. 2011; Roberts et al. 2011), land reform (Gibson 2010) and social grants (Noble et al. 2008a; Surender et al. 2010).

In spite of such examples and the nature of the country's income distribution, it seems somewhat incongruous that there is not a rich empirical literature on the beliefs of South Africans about the unequal distribution of poverty and deprivation and the policy measures

[11] This new comparative study has been championed by Elisa Reis, who was also one of the principal investigators on the cross-national programme of work that included the Kalati and Manor study. The lead investigator at the University of Johannesburg is Kammila Naidoo, Head of the Department of Sociology.

that have been introduced to address the situation since the fall of *apartheid* in 1994. The thesis aims to address this lacuna by applying the theoretical understandings and conceptual insights on social citizenship and related literature on claims and needs to the South African case, thereby assessing the robustness of these frameworks for explaining receptivity to social policies which aim to address inequality through re-distributive mechanisms.

# Chapter 3
# Data and Methodology

*"One of the most significant of modern advances toward realism in the study of political and social problems is the rise of polls of public opinion"* – Floyd H. Allport, *Polls and the Science of Public Opinion (1940, p.249)*

"*The importance to social science of rigorous comparative research is incontestable. It helps to reveal not only intriguing differences between countries and cultures, but also aspects of one's own country and culture that would be difficult or impossible to detect from domestic data alone*" – R. Jowell, C. Roberts, R. Fitzgerald & G. Eva, *Measuring Attitudes Cross-Nationally* (2007, p.1)

In this chapter, the focus is on providing an overview of the data used to examine attitudes towards inequality and redistributive preferences in the country. The quantitative data that form the basis of the empirical analysis that will be presented in the four chapters to follow derive primarily from two sources. The first and predominant source is the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), a repeated, cross-sectional survey series that has been administered by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) every year since 2003. The second is the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which is a cross-national social survey series that has been operating for three decades and of which South Africa is a member through SASAS. This chapter will provide a description of these two survey initiatives, including an outline of the history, purpose, methodology and content of each. This is followed by an overview of the measures employed for the study.

## 3.1 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS)

The *South African Social Attitudes Survey* (SASAS, www.hsrc.ac.za/sasas) is a nationally representative, repeated cross-sectional survey that has been conducted annually by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) since 2003. Designed as a time series, SASAS is increasingly providing a unique, long-term account of the speed and direction of change in underlying public values and the social fabric of modern South Africa. SASAS thus represents a notable tool for monitoring evolving social, economic and political values among South Africans, but it also demonstrates utility as an anticipatory, or predictive, mechanism that can inform decision- and policy-making processes. This survey series forms the core source of repeat cross-sectional data that is used to gain an understanding of the nature and trends in relation to the public's beliefs regarding inequality, redistribution and transformative social policy. In terms of my own role in relation to the series, I was appointed

in 2002 to help design and administer the survey, and I have subsequently served as the Coordinator of SASAS over the 15 years since its inception.

### 3.1.1 Sample design and methods

***Survey population***. Each SASAS round is designed to yield a representative sample of South African adults aged 16 years and older (with no upper age limit), residing in private households and hostels geographically spread across the country's nine provinces. The sampling frame used for the survey is based on the most recently conducted official Population Census at the time of each round, i.e. the 2001 Census for the 2003 to 2011 survey rounds and the 2011 Census for all rounds thereafter. In this sampling frame, special institutions (such as hospitals, military camps, old-age homes, educational institutions and correctional facilities), recreational areas, industrial areas, and vacant areas are excluded prior to the drawing of the sample. Homeless persons are also not included in the survey. The SASAS survey employs a household definition that is equivalent to StatSA's *General Household Survey* series, drawing on criteria relating to residency and shared resources. Specifically, household membership is determined by whether an individual lives in a common dwelling unit for a minimum of four nights per week (15 days per month) in the month prior to interviewing, and cooks and eats together 'from the same pot'. The SASAS series uses a split sample design, with two to three different questionnaire versions each being administered to 3,500 target respondents every year in order to accommodate increased rotating thematic content.[12]

***Sampling***. The sample selection procedure involves a three-stage process. Firstly, using the Census sampling frame, a series of 500 small area layers (SALs) are drawn with probability proportional to size as primary sampling units (PSUs), using the estimated number of dwelling units in an SAL as a measure of size. Three explicit stratification variables are used, namely province (n=9), geographic sub-type (n=4) and majority population group (n=4). The dwelling units, as secondary sampling units, are defined as "separate (non-vacant) residential stands, addresses, structures, flats, homesteads, etc.". Between 2003 and 2012, enumerator

[12] The first instrument typically contains the core survey content that is perennially fielded, together with a few select rotating modules designed to be repeated every 3-5 years. The second questionnaire consists mostly of client-commissioned modules, alongside the ISSP thematic module. In most years two instruments are fielded. In cases where a third questionnaire is administered, this is usually focused on a single core theme (SASAS 2011 financial literacy questionnaire and the SASAS 2013 and 2015 pre-election questionnaires) or nested set of themes (e.g., SASAS 2012 family questionnaire).

areas (EAs) were the statistical geography employed as PSUs, with the change-over to SALs occurring with the 2013 round. This change was due an increasing emphasis by StatsSA on using SALs as a geography used for collecting and disseminating census data while overcoming confidentiality concerns associated with EA geography (Verhoef & Grobbelaar, 2005; Mokhele et al., 2016). In the second sampling stage, a predetermined number of individual dwelling units (or visiting points) were drawn with equal probability in each of the drawn PSUs. Multiples of seven dwelling units are selected in each PSU for each questionnaire version that is administered.[13] Finally, in the third sampling stage, a single person is drawn with equal probability from all eligible persons older than 15 years in the selected dwelling units using a Kish grid (Kish, 1949).

**Figure 1: Graphical representation of the 500 selected small area layers, SASAS 2015, and an example of a SAL locality map**




A list of the 500 drawn PSUs is provided to geographic information specialists (GIS) and maps were then created for each area, indicating key locational features such as schools, roads, religious institutions, etc. Examples of the PSU distribution map and an individual PSU locality map are presented in Figure 1. These maps form part of a navigational toolkit designed to assist the field teams in navigating to sampled areas, and are accompanied by GPS coordinates of the centroids of PSUs as well as route descriptions.

In each round, we draw a sample of 3,500 potential respondents for each questionnaire version, and aim for a minimum effective achieved sample size of 2,500. This is a realisation target that is usually met and exceeded (see Table 2). A key principle governing the survey is

[13] Therefore, 14 visiting points are selected in the case of two questionnaire versions being fielded in a given survey year, 21 visiting points in instances where three questionnaire versions are employed, and so on.

that substitution of non-responding households or individuals (whether due to 'refusal', 'non-contact' or 'ineligibility') is not permitted at any stage.

**Table 2: SASAS sample size and realisation rates, 2003-2016 (n, %)**

| Survey year | Realised sample (N) | Realisation rate (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 2003 | 2,497 | 71.3 |
| 2004 | 2,799 | 80.0 |
| 2005 | 2,850 | 81.4 |
| 2006 | 2,904 | 83.0 |
| 2007 | 3,164 | 90.4 |
| 2008 | 3,321 | 94.9 |
| 2009 | 3,305 | 94.4 |
| 2010 | 3,183 | 90.9 |
| 2011 | 3,057 | 87.3 |
| 2012 | 2,521 | 72.0 |
| 2013 | 2,885 | 82.4 |
| 2014 | 3,124 | 89.3 |
| 2015 | 3,115 | 89.0 |
| 2016 | 3,079 | 88.0 |
| Total | 41,804 | … |

***Translation.*** Questionnaires are piloted to test the functioning of questions and sequencing of modules. As for translation protocols, SASAS aims to achieve a principle of equivalence. The source question is designed in English and then translated into other official languages. Translations are reviewed, adjudicated and pretested before finalisation. All instruments, protocols and forms are reviewed by the HSRC's Research Ethics Committee. As a multilingual society, with 11 official languages, translation has been identified as an area for future methodological collaboration, drawing on international standards for cross-national and cross-cultural surveys.

***Data collection.*** For SASAS, data are collected via face-to-face interviews using a paper-and-pencil instrument (PAPI). For each round, the HSRC draws on a team of Provincial Coordinators and interviewers to implement the survey according to specifications governing the series. Some of the key data collection standards include:

- Response rate: target 70% as a general rule;
- Fieldwork period: at least 1 month during the last quarter of the year;
- Detailed briefing of interviewers in face-to-face sessions;
- Interviewer schedule: 3 contact attempts as a minimum;
- Strict ethical protocols (discussed below);
- Quality control: close monitoring of fieldwork progress, and physical and telephonic back-checks are conducted on completed interviews and non-respondents.

***Weighting of data.*** Data are weighted to reflect the relative selection probabilities of the individual at the three main stages of selection, and benchmarked to the latest mid-year population estimate published by Statistics South Africa.

### 3.1.2 Ethical procedures

The HSRC adheres to a strict internal Code of Ethics. As a standard annual requirement associated with each round of interviewing, the survey protocol and research tools (questionnaires, consent and assent forms, training manuals, etc.) are submitted for approval by the HSRC's Research Ethics Committee (REC). Each questionnaire conducted by the HSRC is fielded only if the REC has issued final approval. At all times we will keep in mind the confidentiality of information that we may have at our disposal.

HSRC protocol requires that the relevant authority be informed of the research in the area. It is reassuring for elderly or suspicious respondents to be told that the local councillor / local police know about the survey and that they can check with them. Moreover, notifying relevant authorities is important for the safety of fieldworkers. A copy of the Survey Notification Form (giving details of the research organization, interviewer number, area to be worked in, car registration, start and end date of fieldwork etc.) will be issued to all fieldworkers prior to the commencement of fieldwork.

***Informed consent procedure***

All persons who agree to participate in the survey are required to provide either written or verbal consent for both the interview. Verbal consent was applied where the respondent was illiterate. Where such situations arise, field staff sign on behalf of the respondent certifying that informed consent had been given verbally by the respondent. In addition, a witness signs to certify that informed consent had been given verbally by the respondent. Field staff are trained in informed consent procedures to ensure that voluntary informed consent is obtained from all respondents.

*Adult respondents and informed consent (older than 18 years)*: All respondents aged 18 years and older are asked for written informed consent. The consent form explains the purpose of the study, emphasises that participation is voluntary, and explains the likely duration of the

interview and how confidentiality will be preserved. It also offers an earnest appraisal of the risks/discomforts and benefits associated with participation in the study, and provides details of the HSRC's tollfree ethics hotline and survey coordinator contacts.

*Minors and Written Informed Consent (Persons under the age of 18 years)*: The reason for the inclusion of respondents younger than 18 years in the study design is to ensure that there are sufficient numbers of youth (16-24 years) in the survey sample. The SASAS series places a strong emphasis on generational differences in underlying social values and intends to track changes in the cross-sectional data over time. In instances where the selected research participant is a minor aged 16-18 years, the informed consent process followed adheres to the HSRC's Guidelines on Research with orphans and vulnerable children (OVC). A dual consent process is required, both from the minors and their parent/guardian.

***Ensuring confidentiality of information***

Individual interviews are held in a private setting either inside or outside of the household with each respondent. Every effort is made by interviewers to ensure that interference from other members of the household is avoided. All personal information relating to the respondent is removed when the data is captured and analysed. Anonymised codes identifying respondents are used instead. Information is stored electronically with password-protection at the HSRC.

***Training of staff***

Formal training sessions are held each year in order to ensure that all survey related staff is well versed in the questionnaire content and survey protocols. The training team consists of HSRC researchers and administrative staff. A training manual is used to guide the training. An initial training session is held in Pretoria, where field staff from four provinces are trained (Gauteng, North West, Limpopo and Mpumalanga). Subsequent training sessions are held individually in each of the other five provinces. The scope of the training includes ethical issue including informed consent procedures, interviewing skills, completion of survey questionnaires, confidentiality protocols, as well as community entry and quality control procedures. Supervisors receive additional training to identify the sampled areas using maps, aerial photographs and GPS coordinates, in addition to household and respondent selection protocols.

### 3.1.3 Thematic content

Apart from standard demographic and background variables, the questionnaires contain a core module, which is repeated each round to monitor change and continuity in a variety of socio-economic and socio-political variables over time. In addition, each round of interviewing accommodates rotating modules on specific themes to provide detailed attitudinal and behavioural evidence to inform policy and academic debate. The latter have included international partnerships in providing a comparative perspective, most notably through collaboration with the European Social Survey (ESS), the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the International Wellbeing Group (IWbG).

In determining the survey's thematic content, attempts are made to identify key perennial topics that would provide reliable and robust measures to shape our understanding of present-day South Africa and the processes of change within it. SASAS focuses on variations in culture and social structure within the country and aspires to be an instrument for identifying and interpreting long-term shifts in social circumstances and values, rather than simply monitoring short-term changes.

## 3.2 Cross-national data

### 3.2.1 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)

The empirical chapters in this thesis also include a cross-national element in order to provide a clear picture of the extent to which the predispositions of the South African public are similar or divergent and in what way from a selection of countries covering most world regions. Through SASAS, the country has become a formal member of the *International Social Survey Programme* (ISSP). The ISSP (http://www.issp.org/) is run by a group of national research organisations, each of which undertakes to annually field an agreed module of questions on a chosen topic area in their survey infrastructure. Each module is chosen for repetition at intervals to allow comparisons both between countries and over time. In 2015, membership stands at 48 countries. By being a member of this long-standing, cross-national collaborative programme, we have been able to add an international perspective to the national study of South African attitudes. This allows us to continually question whether our society is exceptional by identifying commonalities and differences in values with other nations. Before outlining the specific ISSP data employed for analytical purposes in this

thesis, I will provide an overview of the background to this unique and pioneering comparative survey series.

***Background***. The origins of the ISSP series date back 30 years to the early 1980s. In 1982, a bilateral partnership was formed between the General Social Survey (GSS, est. 1972) of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), University of Chicago, and the Allgemeinen Bevolkerungsumfragen der Socialwissenschaftern (ALLBUS, est. 1980) of the Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden, und Analysen (ZUMA) in Mannheim, Germany. The two survey organisations agreed to field a discrete set of common measures on specific research themes in the GSS and ALLBUS national survey infrastructures. In the following year, as the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) was setting up the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA), funding was secured to explore possibilities for broadening the cross-national collaboration. In mid-1984, the ISSP was established at planning meetings in London with representatives from NORC, ZUMA and NatCen in addition to the Research School Social Sciences (RSSS) at Australian National University (ANU). During these deliberations, the four national institutions agreed on the primary ISSP design parameters: self-administered questionnaires, equivalent in length to a 15 minute personal interview, focused in-depth on a single theme each year, and designed for periodic repeat fielding to facilitate trend analysis (Davis & Jowell, 1989).

A set of Working Principles was developed and ratified in order to govern the ISSP, focusing on organisational goals and structural principles. The ISSP is a democratic institution, with an annual general meeting of member countries serving as the primary decision-making forum for the organisation. The function of the general meeting is to decide on administrative matters in addition to collective deliberation on the design of the annual ISSP module. A Secretariat provides overall coordination, which a single member country is elected to lead on a three-year term of office for a maximum of two consecutive terms. To date, five countries have been voted to serve as the ISSP Secretariat, namely Great Britain (1985-91), Germany (1991-97), the United States (1997-2003), Norway (2003-09) and, most recently, Israel (2009-15) (Smith, 2009). Two other core committees were also established – a Standing Committee which comprises the Secretariat and five of other countries and provides leadership to the ISSP between annual meetings, and a Methodology Committee. Over the three decades since its inception, the ISSP has grown appreciably from the four initial member countries to nearly 50 nations across five continents, and today the series in widely

recognised as "the longest running cross-national academic survey programme" (Mohler & Johnson, 2010).

***Thematic focus of ISSP modules***. At the formative meeting in London in June 1984, the initial four-country planning group identified and approved three basic criteria for determining the topics for ISSP modules and the specific variables for inclusion. Specifically, the modules and dependent variables would: (i) reflect fundamental themes in the social sciences; (ii) in likelihood be correlated with social structures within a post-industrial society; and (iii) be expected to vary across countries and times (Davis & Jowell, 1989). The meeting resolved that the 'role of government' would serve as the first ISSP module in the series, and this was included in the 1985 rounds of the general surveys in Britain, Germany, the United States and in 1996 in Australia. Italy and Austria also agreed to field the module in national surveys in both countries. Since the first fielding on this government module, eleven different themes have been developed and administered cross-nationally on at least one occasion (Table 3).

**Table 3: Overview of ISSP thematic coverage, 1985-2017**

| | ISSP Module theme | I | II | III | IV | V |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Role of government | 1985 | 1990 | 1996 | 2006 | 2016 |
| 2 | Social networks and support systems | 1986 | 2001 | 2017 | … | … |
| 3 | Social inequality | 1987 | 1992 | 1999 | 2009 | … |
| 4 | Family and changing gender roles | 1988 | 1994 | 2002 | 2012 | … |
| 5 | Work orientation | 1989 | 1997 | 2005 | 2015 | … |
| 6 | Religion | 1991 | 1998 | 2008 | … | … |
| 7 | Environment | 1993 | 2000 | 2010 | … | … |
| 8 | National identity | 1995 | 2003 | 2013 | … | … |
| 9 | Citizenship | 2004 | 2014 | … | … | … |
| 10 | Leisure time and sports | 2007 | … | … | … | … |
| 11 | Health | 2011 | … | … | … | … |

As previously mentioned, South Africa has been an official ISSP member since 2003, and, at the time of writing, had included fourteen annual ISSP modules as part of the annual SASAS field rounds conducted between 2003 and 2017. The first module to be included in SASAS was *National Identity II* in 2003[14] and the most recently completed was *Role of Government*

[14] In 2001 the HSRC included the 2001 *Social Networks and Support Systems* module in its SASAS predecessor, the Evaluation of Public Opinion Programme (EPOP) survey series, even though at that juncture it was not an official ISSP member. This represented the first engagement of an African nation in the ISSP and South Africa has not only since become an official member nation, but has remained on the more consistent participants in the series in the intervening period. One of the disappointing aspects of ISSP is that the representation of African nations has not grown commensurately with the rising ISSP membership and proliferation of survey infrastructure across the continent over the last 15 years. The *Religion III* module in 2008 did however include Kenya and Tanzania due to the efforts of Dr. Tom W. Smith, the Director of the American *General Social Survey*, to secure funding from the Templeton Foundation to include data collection in these

*V,* which was administered as part of the 2016 SASAS round. Of the ISSP modules, the most directly relevant to the subject matter of this thesis is the 2009 *Social Inequality IV* module as well as elements of the 2006/2016 *Role of Government* modules. An overview of the content of these two modules and the extent to which they will be employed for the purposes of analysis presented in subsequent chapters is outlined below.

***The ISSP Social Inequality IV module (2009)***. The social inequality module was one of the earliest ISSP topics approved for inclusion in the ISSP series. It was first fielded in 1987 by ten participating countries, with the module convened by Australia (Jonathan Kelley and MDR Evans). It was subsequently included as the modular theme in three subsequent rounds, namely 1992, 1999 and most recently in 2009. This makes inequality one of the most common themes of ISSP alongside the role of government, family and changing gender roles, and work orientations. Kelley and Evans chaired the Design Committee for the first three rounds of the social inequality module, thus having a strong imprint of the selection of measures. Themes included in the modules are as follows: attitudes towards income inequalities; factors affect one's chances for social mobility; views on earnings and income; social cleavages and conflict among groups; and social position

***The ISSP Role of Government modules (2006 and 2016)***. This initial module contained four key themes, namely civil liberties, government and the family, government and social inequality, and economic intervention. From a social citizenship and social policy perspective, this module is important as it is designed to assess citizens' opinions on the perceived functions of their national governments, This includes government's role in creating and correcting inequalities.

***Methodological considerations***. Since its inception, the ISSP has placed considerable emphasis on promoting high technical standards and protocols in an attempt to enhance the degree of comparability across the multinational, multiregional and multicultural contexts (3MC) that form part of the survey series. It must be considered that attaining such functional equivalence in close to fifty nations is an exceptionally challenging undertaking. To this end, the ISSP has for instance insisted on probability sampling and international pretesting of

African countries together with Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The choice of these countries was informed by the desire to capture contexts involving religious traditions that are typically underrepresented by ISSP member nations.

instrumentation, while also continuously drawing on evolving knowledge and insight in relation to comparative survey methodology in recent years to ensure that high quality data is generated (Smith, 2009).

The ISSP has made an enduring contribution to comparative survey design and implementation. Not only has the cross-national collaboration between member organisations been a constant and regular feature of the series, resulting in an impressive amount of data comprising in excess of a million respondents, but the series has also made comparative analysis an intrinsic component of each member country's programme of survey-based research. The survey programme has also incorporated a time series aspect alongside the cross-national, by repeat fielding the modules on a periodic (increasingly decennial) basis, which allows for an intensive examination of societal change. South Africa repeated its first ISSP module in 2013, when the *National Identity* module was replicated, has since refielded the *Citizenship, Work Orientation* and *Role of Government* modules. The HSRC also hosted the ISSP Plenary in Cape Town in May 2015, where the 2016 *Role of Government* module was finalised. South Africa (SASAS) is currently chairing the drafting group for the ISSP 2019 Social Inequality module, and a full pilot version was fielded in the latest SASAS round in late 2017, though the data was not available at the time of completing the thesis. This constrains the ability to examine changing beliefs about inequality in the country in a comparative, longitudinal manner. Nonetheless, the longitudinal dimension on select ISSP inequality attitudes measures is addressed by their repeat inclusion in the SASAS series, in particular in relation to inequality aversion and support for state-led redistribution.

As a long-standing cross-national time series characterised by broad and growing membership, democratic governance structures and collective decision-making processes, as well as a commitment to rigorous empirical standards and open data access, the ISSP infrastructure has served as a notable inspiration for new multinational series such as the European Social Survey (ESS), which in its own right has advanced comparative methodology and understanding. To a study such as the one presented in this thesis, locating South African attitudes in international context brings certain intrinsic benefits. It will intuitively allow for the examination of South African society in relative perspective, as the basis for determining the extent and nature of patterns of variation (or similarity) with citizens across a wide ranging set of countries. Comparative analysis will further allow for an investigation of whether explanatory factors for key measures of interest apply consistently in

South Africa and other countries alike, and whether cross-national explanations for key observations need to be included alongside country-specific ones to better account for beliefs about inequality and their dynamics.

### 3.2.2 European Social Survey (ESS)

In addition to ISSP data, selective use is made of European Social Survey (ESS) rotating modules that have been fielded in the SASAS series. Of particular note is the ESS on attitudes towards democracy included in the 2014 SASAS round and the welfare attitudes module fielded in the 2016 round. The European Social Survey (ESS, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org), which is a European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC), is an academically driven cross-national survey that has been conducted every two years across Europe since 2001. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty nations.

## 3.3 Measurement and variables

In order to explore and test key hypotheses relating to beliefs about inequality and support for redistribution and transformative social policies in the four empirical chapters that follow, a variety of different measures of core constructs was used. Some of these have been regularly included as core SASAS indicators, while others have been fielded on a periodic basis as part of specific thematic modules or due to a decision by the SASAS Core Team to introduce items to fill conceptual gaps or reinforce existing items.

### 3.3.1 Core measures

**Beliefs about inequality**

Forming the basis for Chapter 4, the empirical focus is mainly on aversion to income inequality, together with supplementary items on the perceived image of society, views on the level of social conflict in the country, as well as assessments of legitimate earnings (current vs. preferred earnings for different occupations).

**Table 4: Overview of core measures used for empirical analysis**

| | Source | Years | Scaling |
|---|---|---|---|
| **(A) Beliefs about inequality** | | | |
| ***Inequality aversion***: "Income differences are too large" | ISSP/SASAS | 2005-2016 | Agreement (1-5) |
| ***Image of society***:<br>(i) First, what type of society is South Africa today?<br>(ii) What do you think South Africa ought to be like? | ISSP/SASAS | 2009 | Pictorial representation of 5 types of societal structure (Type A-E) |
| ***Perceived social conflict***:<br>In your opinion, in South Africa how much conflict is there between…<br>… poor people and rich people?<br>… the working class and the middle class?<br>… management and workers<br>… people at the top of society and people at the bottom? | ISSP/SASAS | 2009 | 4-point scale, where 1=very strong conflicts and 4=not very strong conflicts |
| Legitimate earnings<br>(i) Perceived actual and ethical wages<br>(ii) Preferred minimum wage amount<br>(iii) Support for legislated limits on executive pay | <br>ISSP/SASAS<br>SASAS<br>SASAS | <br>2009<br>2016<br>2016 | <br>Rand amounts<br>Rand amount<br>Agreement (1-5) |
| **(B) Attitudes towards government redistribution in principle** | | | |
| "It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes" | ISSP/SASAS | ISSP 2006, 2009, 2016<br>SASAS 2005-16 | Agreement (1-5) |
| **(C) Support for race- and class-based redress policies** | | | |
| ***Race-based redress*** | | | |
| 1. Land reform | SASAS | 2003-2016 | Agreement (1-5) |
| 3. Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) | SASAS | 2003-2016 | Agreement (1-5) |
| 4. Sports quotas | SASAS | 2003-2016 | Agreement (1-5) |
| 5a. Apartheid compensation | SASAS | 2003-2006 | Agreement (1-5) |
| 5b. Restitution Fund | SASAS | 2016 | Agreement (1-5) |
| 5c. Restitution Tax: | SASAS | 2016 | Agreement (1-5) |
| ***Class-based redress*** | | | |
| 6. Support for unemployed | ISSP/SASAS | 2009-2016 | Agreement (1-5) |
| 7. School integration: | SASAS | 2003-2016 | Agreement (1-5) |
| 8.Tertiary opportunities for disadvantaged | SASAS | 2009 | Agreement (1-5) |
| 9. Continued social grant provision | | | |
| 10. Increased social grant spending | SASAS | 2016 | Agreement (1-5) |
| 11. Universal Basic Income (UBI)/ Basic Income Grant (BIG) | SASAS | 2006, 2009 | Agreement (1-5) |
| 12. Progressive taxation | ESS/SASAS | 2016 | Favour/oppose (1-4) |
| 13. Government social spending (health, education, old age pension, unemployment benefits) | SASAS<br>ISSP/SASAS | 2009,'15,'16<br>2006, 2016 | More/less (1-4)<br>More/less (1-4) |

## Support for state-led redistribution in principle

In Chapters 5 and 6, preferences relating to support for political redistribution in principle are examined mainly through the use of a single indicator that derives originally from the ISSP series. The question asks respondents to express their level of agreement or disagreement with the statement that "It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes". This item has been included in SASAS on an annual basis since 2005. It also forms part of the 2009 ISSP social inequality module, enabling a comparative perspective to be gained based on this measure. More importantly, it is included as one of a fuller battery of items in the 2006 and 2016 ISSP

Role of Government modules, thus allowing one to determine the relative strength of demand for redistribution relative to other roles and responsibilities of the state.

**Support for race- and class-based redistribution policies**

In moving from support for the principle of redistribution to support for specific redistributive social policies, Chapter 7 draws on a variety of indicators across the fourteen survey rounds conducted from 2003 to 2017. These have been inconsistently fielded across the years, but they have been selected to impart a sense of the extent to which there exists differential support for race-preferential and class-based, compensatory measures. The five race-based redress measures focus on affirmative action, sports quotas, land reform, apartheid compensation, and a restitution fund and tax. The class-based policies cover support for the unemployed, school integration, tertiary opportunities for those from disadvantaged backgrounds, views of social grants, progressive taxation, and support for social spending.

### 3.3.2 Independent measures

**Racial attitudes**

In order to test the relative influence of racial attitudes on the core measures outlined above, a number of core measures were identified. These relate to out-group prejudice, racial threat, racial distrust, the frequency and quality of inter-racial contact, and in-group identification. These measures were mostly introduced as core measures from the 2010 SASAS round onwards, the main exceptions being racial distrust and certain in-group identification measures.

**Political identification, ideology and trust**

Three basic measures were identified for modelling purposes. In terms of *political identification*, use was made of a question asking respondents which political party they feel closest to. Taking into account the problem of the small number of respondents opting for certain parties, a derived measure was constructed with the following categories: ANC supporter; Democratic Alliance (DA) supporter; supporter of another party; supporter of no party; and undeclared support (refusals and 'do not know' responses). *Political ideology* is based on a standard left-right scale that has been collapsed into four codes, namely liberal, moderate, conservative and uncertain. Finally, *political trust* was tested in two forms. The first measure is a combination of trust in national and local government, parliament, political

parties and politicians. The second measure uses the single item on trust in national government. In both instances, a five-point trust scale is used, ranging from strongly distrust to strongly trust.

**Socio-demographic indicators**

The bivariate and multivariate analysis included in the empirical chapters that follow make use of a set of basic socio-demographic traits with which to examine the relative influence of individual self-interest in informing inequality beliefs and redistributive preferences. Apart from *age* (in years), use is also made of *birth cohorts* in order to differentiate between lifecycle and cohort effects. *Marital status* is captured using a four-category scale (never married, married, widowed and separated / divorced). A detailed *labour force status* variable is included, ranging from the unemployed to full-time employees and pensioners to students and leaners. *Educational attainment* is classified according to a four-point scale (primary or no formal schooling, incomplete secondary, matric or equivalent, and tertiary). Other standard inclusions are gender, population group and household size. The primary socioeconomic measure that has been chosen is *self-rated poverty status*, which is collapsed into a three-category scale (poor, just getting by, non-poor). The reported frequency of personal and collective *racial discrimination* is included as a measure of social exclusion. Two *geographic measures* are included, namely province and geographic type (urban formal, urban informal, rural traditional authority areas, and rural farms).

### 3.3.3 Evaluating changing attitudinal patterns

In examining and assessing trends in key inequality related attitudes over time, use has been made of a basic classificatory approach employed by Page and Shapiro (1992), and put to effective use by Humpage (2015) in examining attitudinal change in New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom. As outlined in Table 5, evaluations are based on different time periods, ranging from short-term, 3-year cycles to intermediate periods covering between 3 and 14 years, and lastly time periods exceeding 15 years. The percentage change values reported in the table refer to absolute percentage point increases or decreases in support for particular statements in each time period. Relative to the South African context, the smallest three-year period of evaluation is shorter than five-year election cycles, but it does correspond to rolling three-year medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) cycles, which determine the priorities for government spending.

**Table 5: Indicators of change in public support over three time periods**

| | 3 year period | 3-14 year period | 15 year *+ period |
|---|---|---|---|
| Significant (%) | 5.0 + | 10.0 + | 15.0 + |
| Moderate (%) | 3.0 – 4.9 | 5.0 – 9.9 | 10.0 – 14.9 |
| Slight (%) | 2.0 – 2.9 | 3.0 – 4.9 | 5.0 – 9.9 |
| Steady | Fluctuations of less than 2% across entire period | Fluctuations of less than 2% across entire period | Fluctuations of less than 2% across entire period |

Source: Humpage (2015) Table 1.1, based on Page and Shapiro (1992)

### 3.3.4 Use of apartheid-era race categories in analysis

In the empirical chapters that follow, the analysis makes use of apartheid-era race categories. For studies of this type, due consideration needs to be given to the appropriateness of such categorisations and terminology in a democratic dispensation, especially one that is explicitly informed by constitutionally-entrenched non-racialism (Habib & Bentley, 2008; Seekings, 2008b; Lefko-Everatt et al., 2017). As Foster and Wale (2017:69) passionately assert, "there is no such thing as 'race' in biological or physical terms. There is no underlying biological essence which permits a grouping called 'race'. There is no measurement device or criterion to mark off difference by 'race'". Yet, at the same time, it must be recognised that race continues to play a salient factor in many aspects of South African society, whether it be in contemporary political debates over social change, through daily discourse (including social media), in the enduring patterns or residential segregation and the lived experiences of many citizens, and in the complex realities of individual and group cultural identity.

Furthermore, and in relation to the topic of this thesis, race continues to inform discussions of historical injustices, the associated legacies of social and material inequalities, as well as policies intended to promote restitution and redress. As Foster and Wale (2017:69-70) themselves acknowledge, through the long history of processes of classification, segregation, oppression, and persecution, the social construction of 'race' has come to assume meaning and purpose, and have a bearing on everyday life. At the level of public opinion, it is plausible that people treated in the manner described above may adopt a common sense of outrage or motivational desire to challenge the societal status quo, or alternatively adopt system justifying beliefs that tend to serve a psychologically palliative function by helping to rationalize and bear prevailing social, economic, and political circumstances (Jost & Andrews, 2011). Similarly, people favourably treated under the colonial, segregationist and apartheid periods may conversely show signs of entitlement, privilege or superiority in responding to questions of inequality, redistribution and social justice.

In sum, in engaging with survey-based evidence on the nature and changing character of beliefs about inequality, the demand for state intervention to address material inequality, and levels of support for redistributive social policies, it is important in this thesis to attempt to discern whether these 'racialised' constructions of reality hold any particular salience. Past research by the author and others (Roberts 2006, 2014; Seekings 2008b; Durrheim, 2010) has suggested that social preferences are influenced by 'race', but the extent of available evidence remains still fairly limited. The use of the apartheid racial classifications is therefore not done lightly and in an uncritical manner. Where possible, an intersectional perspective has been adopted, in order to convey the inherent interconnectedness and ways in which 'race', class, gender and generational experiences interact to shape the attitudes of interest that are studied in the thesis.

### 3.3.5 A note on goodness-of-fit in regression models with ordinal dependent variables

In many instances where multivariate analysis is conducted in the empirical chapters that follow, the dependent variables are ordinal variables based on Likert-type scales. Accordingly, ordered logistic regression models are estimated, with examples found in Tables 19, 20, 21, 27, 28 and Appendix Tables 6-.1 and 7.1. In linear, ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression models, the coefficient of determination or $R^2$ is widely employed as a way of gaining information about the goodness-of-fit of the model. This is a statistical measure that indicates the percentage of the variance in the dependent variable that is collectively explained by the independent variables. It therefore evaluates how closely the data points are to a fitted regression line. Larger $R^2$ values mean that more of the variation is explained by model, up to a maximum of 1.

In the case of the class of logistic regression models (binary, ordinal, multinomial), a number of pseudo-$R^2$ indices have been proposed as measures that are intended as the logistic equivalent of the $R^2$ statistic in assessing the predictive capacity or explanatory power of models. Well-known examples of the different pseudo- $R^2$ measures include, *inter alia*, the Cox and Snell (Cox & Snell, 1989; Cragg & Uhler, 1970; Maddala,1983), Nagelkerke (1991), McFadden (1974), and Tjur (2009) indices. The two methods that are most frequently reported in statistical software is the one proposed by McFadden as well as the Cox and Snell R2 (both corrected and uncorrected versions). For instance, the default coefficient calculated in Stata is the McFadden Pseudo-$R^2$, and this is what is reported in the tables throughout the

thesis.[15] Similarly, SPSS reports the McFadden Pseudo-$R^2$ measure for multinomial and ordered logit and the Cox-Snell measures for binary logistic regression.

It must however be noted that there does not remain an academic consensus on which of the pseudo-$R^2$ approaches is preferred, and a scan of the statistical literature tends to reveal quite wide-ranging opinions. Acock (2014: 340), for instance, observes that the Pseudo- $R^2$ is "often a small value, and it should not be confused with $R^2$ for OLS regression" and, as such, "many researchers do not report this measure." In a review of different indices, Allison (2014: 2) concludes that "for years, I've been recommending the Cox-Snell $R^2$ over the McFadden $R^2$, but I've recently concluded that that was a mistake. I now believe that McFadden's $R^2$ is a better choice. However, I've also learned about another $R^2$ [Tjur (2009)] that has good properties, a lot of intuitive appeal, and is easily calculated". As a final example, and in contrast, Long and Freese (2014: 325) advocate for the use of McKelvey and Zavoina's Pseudo- $R^2$ (1975) for ordinal response outcomes as a counterpart to the $R^2$ from the OLS models. Given this lack of agreement, and the generally low values that the pseudo-$R^2$ indices yield, in interpreting the fit of the logistic models in this thesis I have tended to err on the side of caution. Specifically, I regard these statistics as indicative of fit rather than definitive estimations of explained variance, and as a means of suggesting whether, in a crude sense, the inclusion of additional independent variables has any discernible effect.

[15] Although the McFadden measure is the default statistics produced by Stata, J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese published a programme file in 2000 called fitstat.ado that calculates a fuller set of pseudo- $R^2$ indices for logistic models. This draws on the measures discussed in Long (1997).

# Chapter 4
# *Your Place or Mine?* Beliefs about Inequality and in South Africa

"*I was told that an impassable gulf divided the Rich from the Poor; I was told that the Privileged and the People formed Two Nations, governed by different laws, influenced by different manners, with no thoughts or sympathies in common; with an innate inability of mutual comprehension. I believed that if this were indeed the case, the ruin of our common country was at hand; I would have endeavoured … to resist such a catastrophe*" – Benjamin Disraeli *Sybil* (1845)

"*Few things have been more productive of controversy over the ages than the suggestion that the rich should, by one device or another, share their wealth with those who are not. With comparatively rare and unusually eccentric exceptions, the rich have been opposed….The poor have generally been in favour of greater equality*" John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (1958:61)

Do South Africans fundamentally care about the income inequality that characterises their society? While many might feel the answer to such as question is self-evident, in reality what the public feels about income inequality is unlikely to be particularly straightforward. Attitudes can be diffuse, ambivalent or even contradictory, while deeply-held perspectives, normative expectations and justice-related beliefs are likely to be slow to change (Svallfors, 2010:241). They are also likely to interact with and be shaped by broader contextual developments. These would include the country's economic position and outlook, the dynamics of poverty, unemployment and inequality, as well as high-level policy choices. With regard to the latter, of especial consideration are the vigorous debates that have raged for more than two decades regarding the ideological basis and trajectory of social and economic policy in the country, and whether we approximate and aspire to be a neoliberal, a developmental, or some other form of state. Despite the many achievements of the post-apartheid state in addressing disadvantage, delivering basic services, and extending social protection, from the early to mid-2000s onwards it became increasingly apparent that the economic challenges facing the country were not being overcome, that the economy was not growing as envisaged, and that South Africans faced increasing and new vulnerabilities in relation to the labour market. This was accompanied by a rising tide of protest action that has come to symbolise citizen frustrations over the pace of transformation and concerns over accountability and governance. Set against these more uncertain, economically fragile times, it is important to determine the extent to which the public demonstrates tolerance of inequality and a tendency towards individualism, or whether the solidaristic spirit of 1955 and 1994 remains present in a collective, civic-minded preference for a fairer, more just and humane structuring of society.

While volumes have been written over the last quarter-century about the objective patterns and trends of income inequality in South Africa (see, for instance, May, 2000; Terreblanche, 2002; Seekings & Nattrass, 2008; Leibbrandt et al., 2010, 2012; Noble et al, 2010; Noble & Wright, 2013a,b; Finn & Leibbrandt, 2013; Bhorat et al., 2014; Finn et al., 2015; McLennan et al., 2016), similar evidence on attitudes to inequality has tended to lag behind and many knowledge gaps remain. Where research on attitudes towards inequality has been conducted, it has tended to focus more on support for redistribution, restitution, reconciliation and related transformative policies. These are critically important themes and issues for a country such as South Africa with a traumatic and painful history and sizeable level of social need, and indeed they form the heart of the chapters to follow. The scope of the present chapter is however concerned more exclusively with beliefs about income inequality. In common with McCall (2013) and Kim et al. (2017), I have chosen for the purposes of this thesis to draw a conceptual distinction between these beliefs and those concerned with redistribution in principle and practice. The latter are an essential part of a composite view of the way in which South Africans think about inequality, but the focus here is more on awareness of income inequality and a general preference for change as a possible determinant of more resolute support for government intervention. This builds on past international studies that have offered some indication that individuals who regard their societies as inherently unfair are more predisposed towards expressing a demand for state-led redistribution (Fong, 2001; Corneo & Grüner, 2002; Kuhn, 2005: Bjørnskov et al., 2013; Roberts, 2014; Schokkaert & Truyts, 2017; Tóth & Keller, 2014; Yamamura, 2017). This is likely to be partly attributable to recognition of the various adverse effects that inequality could have at both the personal and national levels if left unchecked (Page and Jacobs, 2009). Apart from perceptions of material inequalities, attitudes on the factors that shape opportunity for upward mobility are also thought to influence one's redistributive preferences (Alesina & Giuliano, 2011). Although a profile of such attitudes is not presented as part of the present chapter, they are examined as potential determinants of preferences in relation to state-led redistribution and distributive social policy in the empirical chapters that follow.

The manner in which inequality, class and opportunities for getting ahead are perceived in the country is therefore considered to be of particular socio-political relevance for several reasons. As Evans and Kelley (2016: 2) assert, a *lack* of recognition of societal inequalities may have *no* political bearing, but in instances where real or imagined inequalities are recognised, the political ramifications could be far-reaching. Not only do inequality beliefs

speak to the level of legitimacy vested in prevailing social arrangements, but also convey information about whether and by degree the policy agenda aligns with the public agenda (Castillo, 2011; Van Oorschot, 2010). From a social citizenship perspective, these attitudes matter in that they provide insight into whether there exists a significant consensus on the overarching ends of society and, if so, what form this vision of the good society assumes (Almond & Verba, 1963). As such, the starting point for the empirical component of this dissertation is to gain insight into how South Africans understand their society, including a fundamental awareness of the material disparities that continue to characterise it, and the level and nature of demand for a different, fairer distributional structure.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides descriptive evidence on the nature and trends in attitudes towards income inequality in the country, including aversion for inequality, preferences for changes in the class structure, perceived class tensions as well as views on wage inequality. In undertaking the analysis, emphasis will be placed on situating the views of the South African public in comparative perspective. I conclude by discussing the social policy implications of the results.

## 4.1 General beliefs about economic inequality

It could be argued that, in tackling pervasive income and other social inequalities in South African society, one of the fundamental prerequisites would be for a broad-based recognition or awareness that income inequality is detrimental to developmental progress. Several measures are present in SASAS generally and the ISSP specifically that enable us to explore the extent of inequality aversion in the country and income distribution preferences, and we explore these in detail below. The first of these items is a common question included in both SASAS and ISSP to provide an indicative sense of awareness of income inequality. It involves asking respondents to state using a five-point agreement scale the extent to which they support or reject the notion that "Differences in income in South Africa are too large". Kenworthy and McCall (2008: 38) note that this measure combines individual awareness of the scale of inequality together with judgements about the fairness of this perceived level of inequality.

**Table 6: Aversion to income inequality in South Africa, 2003-2016 (row percentages and mean score)**

**Statement: "Income differences in South Africa are too large"**

| Survey year | Strongly agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly disagree | (Don't know) | Total | % strongly agree / agree | Mean score * | Base N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2003** | 38 | 44 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 100 | 83 | 4.12 | 2462 |
| **2004** | 39 | 42 | 7 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 100 | 81 | 4.06 | 2781 |
| **2005** | 36 | 38 | 8 | 9 | 4 | 6 | 100 | 73 | 3.92 | 2844 |
| **2006** | 41 | 42 | 5 | 6 | 1 | 5 | 100 | 84 | 4.18 | 2934 |
| **2007** | 43 | 44 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 100 | 87 | 4.26 | 3164 |
| **2008** | 40 | 45 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 100 | 84 | 4.20 | 3310 |
| **2009** | 41 | 48 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 100 | 90 | 4.28 | 3284 |
| **2010** | 38 | 50 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 100 | 89 | 4.22 | 3155 |
| **2011** | 41 | 45 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 100 | 86 | 4.21 | 3016 |
| **2012** | 46 | 44 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 100 | 91 | 4.33 | 2473 |
| **2013** | 38 | 47 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 100 | 86 | 4.17 | 2832 |
| **2014** | 42 | 46 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 100 | 88 | 4.24 | 3106 |
| **2015** | 44 | 46 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 100 | 90 | 4.28 | 3077 |
| **2016** | 34 | 52 | 8 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 100 | 86 | 4.14 | 3042 |
| **All years** | 40 | 45 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 100 | 85 | 4.18 | 44365 |

Source: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) Rounds 1-14, 2003-2016.
Note: * The mean scores are based on a reversed scale, where 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree. 'Do not know' responses were combined with neutral responses. The data is weighted.

As shown in Table 6, in late 2016, a considerable majority of South Africans (86%) agreed that "differences in income in South Africa are too large", with approximately a third (34%) expressing strong support with the statement. The table also shows the pattern of responses over the last decade-and-a-half, revealing a modest decline in aversion between 2003 and 2005, after which there was a steady increase as the effects of the global economic crisis set in during the late 2000s, followed by broader stability with modest fluctuations during the 2010s. One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted, with the results indicating a statistically significant difference in the average level of inequality aversion between survey years [$F(13,44351)=43.83$, $p < 0.001$]. Post-hoc Scheffe tests reveal that there is virtually no significant difference in the mean scores between the 2007-2016 survey rounds, with the 2004 and 2005 scores significantly lower than all subsequent years. The main exception is in 2012, where the mean aversion score is significantly higher than the 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2016 rounds. A slight upswing in aversion in 2015 also meant that the scores exceeded those registered in the 2013 and 2016 rounds. By contrast, there has been a modest drop in aversion between 2015 and 2016, which is attributable to a swing from 'strongly agree' to 'agree' category. It is however too soon to tell whether this is a short-lived fluctuation or the beginning of a more enduring change. In sum, based on this measure, general aversion or disapproval of income inequality in South Africa appears to be relatively stable and widely felt, demonstrating only minor episodic fluctuations over the fourteen year period examined.

**Figure 2: Aversion to income inequality in comparative perspective, 2009**




Note: Bars represent the weighted percentage of respondents that agree or strongly agree to the statement "Income differences in [COUNTRY] are too large", based on a distribution with 'do not know' responses omitted.
Source: own analysis based on International Social Survey Programme 2009 data.

Are South Africans exceptional in this stance, and does this reflect the acute, persisting level of income inequality in the country? Since this inequality aversion measure was included as an item in the 2009 ISSP social inequality module, we are able to examine the extent to which South Africans approximate or differ from citizens across a range of countries in their professed level of aversion.[16] From Figure 2, it is apparent that South Africa is ranked ninth out of 38 countries in terms of the total percentage expressing an aversion to inequality. This ranges from a low in the Philippines, Norway and Denmark (51%, 61% and 62% respectively) to a high in Hungary and the Ukraine (96% and 97% respectively). Mean score differences were again examined using One-Way ANOVA [$F(37, 52810)=222.29$, $p < 0.001$], with post-hoc Scheffe tests demonstrating that South Africa is *not* significantly different from countries such as Turkey, Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Argentina, Spain, China, Taiwan, South Korea, Germany and Chile.

[16] As described in Chapter 3, ISSP membership is voluntary though countries have to meet certain requirements in order to be admitted and remain a member. These criteria include the sample design used in the national survey infrastructure, self-funding of modules, as well as regular fielding of the ISSP module (if two consecutive rounds of interviewing are missed, membership is terminated). The 2009 inequality module was fielded in 40 countries. While this was the first round China participated as an ISSP member, other notable countries that would have been useful for comparative purposes are excluded, such as India and Brazil. India has recently become a member, while Brazil was a member but had to drop out due to funding constraints.

**Figure 3: The association between inequality aversion and national inequality and income, 2009**

**(a) Inequality aversion by Gini Index** **(b) Inequality aversion by GNI per capita**




Source: Own analysis based on International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2009 data. The Gini Index and GNI per capita data were sourced from the World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/; https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD)

These findings suggest that while inequality aversion is high in South Africa, from a relative perspective the country is by no means unique in this predisposition. In fact, in 26 of the 38 countries included in the ISSP sample, 80 percent or more of the population responded affirmatively to the statement. By extension, at a contextual level, the absolute level of income inequality does not appear to shape citizens' aversion for inequality (Figure 3a). Among the ISSP member countries, those with relatively low levels of income inequality were equally as likely to demonstrate a high degree of aversion as a high inequality society such as South Africa. Examples include the Ukraine (Gini=25.5; aversion=96%) and Slovenia (Gini=25.7; aversion=95%). Conversely, other countries with relatively high Gini index values have among the lowest inequality aversion levels, such as Venezuela (Gini=46.7; aversion=69%), the United States (Gini=41.0; aversion=65%) and the Philippines (Gini=40.1; aversion=51%). Instead of inequality levels, the average national income of a country's citizens, as measured by gross national income per capita, has a more instrumental role in shaping views on whether income differences in the country are considered too large. From Figure 3b, an inverse association between aversion to income inequality and average national income per capita, suggesting that poorer countries are more inclined to exhibit concern over income disparities than citizens in economically better-off

societies. Unfortunately, more recent comparative ISSP data is not available for this measure, though the forthcoming 2017 social networks and 2019 social inequality modules will in future provide us with a sense of whether growing economic uncertainty in the world since the late 2000s has altered the relative ranking of South Africans in the aversion to inequality.

Apart from examining the degree to which inequality aversion in the country is exceptional or not from a cross-national perspective, it is also important to determine how unified or differentiated South Africans are in this belief. Given the emphasis of transformative social policy and social citizenship on redistribution as the basis for realising the collective vision of the good society, the existence of a common concern over income disparities across socio-economic, demographic and political lines forms would represent a crucial foundation around which to frame a long-term social policy agenda. To test for the existence of socio-demographic di□erences between the mean inequality aversion scores, One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and post hoc Scheffe tests were again performed using the pooled 2003-2016 data. The ANOVA results (not shown) revealed that significant differences are evident based upon birth cohort, race, educational attainment, employment status.[17] The post hoc tests indicate that significantly lower mean inequality aversion scores are observed for: those born before 1940 relative to all other cohorts; white South Africans compared with other population groups; the non-poor vis-à-vis the poor and vulnerable; and the labour inactive (pensioners, students and discouraged work-seekers) in comparison with full time employees and unemployed work-seekers. While these findings seem to suggest that a race and class gradient underlies inequality aversion, some caution needs to be exercised. If one examines the extent to which different groups agree that the income gap is too large, we find that more than three-quarters of the pre-1940 cohort, white South Africans, the non-poor, and the labour inactive express concern about the high level of income inequality that continues to characterise South Africa. Therefore, the statistical tests seem to be identifying significant subgroup differences at the upper margins of the measurement scale..

Multivariate analysis was conducted based on pooled SASAS data from the 2003 to 2016 rounds in order to further determine whether there are any sub-group differences in expressed inequality aversion. Given the skewed nature of the distribution on the "income differences

[17] The ANOVA test results for the socio-demographic variables are as follows: birth cohort [$F(6, 41423)= 12.81$, $p < 0.001$]; race [$F(3, 41461)= 47.72$, $p < 0.001$]; educational attainment [$F(4, 40488)= 5.97$ , $p < 0.001$]; employment status [$F(5, 38447)= 24.90$, $p < 0.001$]; and geographic location [$F(3, 41476)= 2.31$, $p < 0.001$].

are too large" measure, I adopted the analytical approach employed by McCall (2007) of using binary logistic regression models that focus exclusively on the "strongly agree" category. According to McCall (2007: 23) the appeal of this approach includes firstly the fact that this may be considered "the most valid measure of the intensity of concern or opposition" and secondly that it essentially provides a "conservative estimate of the share of people who oppose inequality, since it does not include those who simply 'agree' that income differences are too large". On average, 40% of adult respondents across the fourteen SASAS rounds conducted between 2003 and 2016 strongly agreed that income differences are too large in the country, ranging from a period low of 34% in 2016 to a high of 46% in 2012. The regression results, which are presented in Appendix Table 4-1 indicate that demographic, economic and subjective attributes do not serve as robust predictors of strong aversion to inequality. Socio-demographic characteristics such as gender, race, educational attainment and employment status all have little (or at best a modest) association with general attitudes towards inequality (Model I). When other indicators are added to the models, such as perceived social mobility (past and future), relative income, and party identification in Models 2a-c, and subjective societal position and group discrimination in Model 3,[18] we find that they also do not yield a particularly strong effect on the whole. Again, a few variables do emerge as statistically significant determinants of strong aversion to inequality, but their explanatory power is not particularly noteworthy. Where significant differences exist, they point more to variations in degree of emphasis rather than deep-rooted cleavages, especially when one takes into account that the percentage point differences in strong inequality aversion across these attributes varies in a 10-15% range at their highest.

These findings indicate that the professed aversion for inequality is widespread and common across socio-economic groups in South African society. In this instance, the broad lack of statistical significance at the multivariate level is notable in that, together with the bivariate findings, it conveys a positive message that South Africans are united in principle in their awareness of and opposition to persisting income inequalities.

[18] In model 3, the period covered is 2007-2016, due to the fact that the discrimination and subjective societal position variables were not fielded in the 2003-2006 rounds.

## 4.2 Perceived stratification realities and aspirations

While the preceding longitudinal and cross-national analysis presents key information regarding levels of disapproval versus tolerance of income inequality in the country, it is limited by virtue of reliance on a single question on this topic. Admittedly, the broad stability in the patterning of responses over more than a decade, and its longer repeat usage in cross-national research, suggests that it is a fairly reliable measure. Nonetheless, it is important to look to other survey questions to provide corroborating evidence. Another ISSP measure that aims to capture public views towards economic inequality and which was included in the 2009 SASAS round draws on an approach based on pictorial and verbal representations of societal stratification. Initial experimentation with this item was undertaken in the late 1970s and extended to cross-national research from the 1990s onwards (Evans et al., 1992; Kenworthy & McCall, 2008; Sachweh and Olafsdottir, 2012; Evans & Kelley, 2016). Respondents were presented with five diagrams portraying possible class distributions, each with labels depicting those possible societies, as follows: (i) Type A: a society with a small group of rich people at the top, very few people in the middle and the great majority of people at the bottom; (ii) Type B: a society with a small group of rich people at the top, more people in the middle, and most at the bottom; (iii) Type C: a similar society except that just a few people are at the bottom; (iv) Type D: a society with most people in the middle; and (v) Type E: many people near the top, and only a few near the bottom. The respondents were then asked to decide firstly which image they believed most closely depicts South Africa today, and secondly their preference for what the country should ideally look like.

It must be observed that although the question makes no explicit mention of an ordering of the five societal images from most to least unequal, it is implicit between at least certain of the categories. Each diagram contains different relative proportions in top, middle and lower societal positions. Those images with fewer people in the lower echelons are assumed to be more equal than instances where larger shares are located towards the bottom. It is apparent, for example, that Type A with a small elite and the majority at the bottom of society is characterised by higher levels of inequality than Type D, where most people are located in the middle of the distribution. Nonetheless, as Sachweh and Olafsdottir (2012: 154) observe, ‘the ordering of some adjacent categories is not entirely unambiguous’. This is especially true of Types D and E, where it is not entirely evident which distribution is more unequal. Despite

this, for analytical purposes I treat there as being at least basic ordinality underlying the typology, even if the difference between one or two examples is somewhat indistinct.

**Table 7: Perceived stratification realities and aspirations in South Africa, 2009 (column percent and mean scores)**

| | | Type of society South Africa is today (Perceived stratification realities) | Type of society South Africa ought to be like (Stratification aspirations) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Type A | A small group of rich people at the top, very few people in the middle and the great majority of people at the bottom. | 50 | 3 |
| Type B | A society with a small group of rich people at the top, more people in the middle, and most at the bottom. | 29 | 8 |
| Type C | Similar to Type B except that just a few people are at the bottom | 8 | 9 |
| Type D | A society with most people in the middle. | 8 | 45 |
| Type E | Many people near the top, and only a few near the bottom. | 3 | 32 |
| (Can't choose) | | 3 | 4 |
| Total | | 100 | 100 |
| Mean* | | 30.9 | 87.6 |

*Mean level of inequality in the social structure, scored using Evans et al (1992)

From Table 7, it is again apparent that South Africans perceive the country as highly unequal. Half the population (50%) viewed the society as consisting of a small class of elites with a significant mass at the bottom of the distribution (Type A), with a further 29 percent stating the social structure has a more pyramidal shape, with a small elite on top, larger intermediate classes and a sizable class at the base of the structure (Type B). Around a fifth (19%) chose one of the three more equalitarian society types (C through E). Turning to preferences regarding what the ideal type of stratification in the country ought to be, there was robust support for a more equalitarian structure. Slightly more than three-quarters (77 percent) expressed a desire for South African society to be characterised by a situation where most are either in middle or upper classes (Types D or E). Using the scoring system proposed by Evans et al. (1992), which assigns values ranging from 0 for Type A to 100 for Type E,[19] I find that this preference signifies a shift from an average of 31 to an ideal of 88. Therefore, as with the case of the inequality aversion indicator, South Africans are cognisant of the extreme

[19] More specifically, the Evans et al. scoring system is as follows: Type A is assigned a value of 0, B is scored as 47, C as 80, D as 93, and finally the equalitarian Type E is given a value of 100.

class-based inequalities that exist in the country and there is a stark disparity between this view of present reality and the type of society citizens ideally envision.

**Figure 4: Type of society country is currently perceived to be, compared with ideal structure of society (ranked by mean current image score, n=40)**




Note: The Evans et al. (1992) scoring system implies that the most unequal image of society (Type A) is assigned a value of 0, while the most equalitarian image (Type E) is given a value of 100. The intermediate images are given values of 47 for Type B, 80 for Type C, and 93 for Type D. Interpretive caution needs to be exercised, as (unlike the Gini coefficient) higher scores denote a characterisation of society as more equal not unequal.
Sources: ISSP 2009 Social Inequality module; HSRC SASAS 2009

The perceived gap between current social stratification and ideal societal structure in South Africa emerges as one of the most sizable when examining the results in cross-country comparison (Figure 4). In evaluating the current structure, South Africa's average score ranked sixth out of the 40 nations, with only certain former socialist and communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Latvia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Croatia) perceiving a more inequitable stratification reality. This comparative view therefore lends further credence to the argument that South Africans are keenly aware of the class divide in the country. It could be contended that one would have expected South Africa to be even higher up the rank order given the relatively higher level of income inequality (Gini Index) in South Africa relative to that present in Central and Eastern European countries. While there may be some merit to this point of view, I would argue that this does not detract from the overall message about the general acknowledgement of social inequality in the country and the broad-based preference for a fairer, more equitable society.

In relation to this ideal image of society, there is a broad consistency in mass opinion across the set of nations included in the 2009 ISSP round, with mean scores ranging from 78 to 94 and an all-country average of 89. It is also worth observing that even among the Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland), all of which are clustered at the top end of the league table in respect of the current structure measure, there still remains a desire for greater egalitarianism. It thus appears that South Africans are not alone in their preference for a more equitable structuring of society; the data suggest that this is a fairly common predisposition. The considerable size of the gap between the perceived stratification reality and ideal in the country does nonetheless position us among a more discrete set of countries.

In common with the inequality aversion measure, I again find that in 2009 there was on average limited generational, race and class-based variation in respect of perceived stratification realities and aspirations in the country (Table 8). Examining age cohort, gender, race, educational attainment, employment status, self-rated poverty status, asset quintiles, and geographic location, the mean score values on the stratification realities variable have a narrow range between 23 and 37, while the mean scores for stratification aspirations fluctuate within an even more restricted band between 86 and 90.

The results of ANOVA tests further reveal that there are no gender or race differences in perceived stratification realities or aspirations, and fairly marginal differences based on education, employment status, and asset quintile. Signs of a class effect were observed in terms of self-rated poverty status, where the poor and vulnerable rated South Africa as more unequal than the non-poor and expressed a greater preference for a more equal society, Similarly, from a spatial perspective, residents in former homeland areas tended to regard the country as more polarised and demanded a more egalitarian structure than residents in formal urban localities. Yet, irrespective of these statistically significant patterns, the differences in mean scores still do not overturn the principal message – that a majority of citizens openly acknowledge the profound inequalities that characterise their society and are unambiguous and broadly uniform in their desire for a more equal distributional structure.

**Table 8: Perceived stratification realities and aspirations between different social classes (mean scores, standard deviations and ANOVA tests), 2009**

| | Type of society South Africa is today (Perceived stratification realities) | Type of society South Africa ought to be like (Stratification aspirations) | Difference (image gap) | Base N |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | 31 (*35*) | 88 (*21*) | 57 | 3202 |
| Born 1990 and after | 31 (*36*)* | 91 (*16*)*** | 60 | 283 |
| 1980s | 32 (*35*) | 88 (*21*) | 56 | 797 |
| 1970s | 32 (*36*) | 86 (*21*) | 55 | 690 |
| 1960s | 28 (*33*) | 86 (*24*) | 58 | 627 |
| 1950s | 33 (*36*) | 88 (*19*) | 56 | 419 |
| 1940s | 32 (*34*) | 85 (*23*) | 53 | 260 |
| Born before 1940 | 23 (*29*) | 90 (*15*) | 67 | 126 |
| Male | 31 (*35*)$^{n.s.}$ | 88 (*21*) $^{n.s.}$ | 57 | 1301 |
| Female | 31 (*34*) | 87 (*21*) | 56 | 1868 |
| African | 31 (*35*)$^{n.s.}$ | 88 (*21*) $^{n.s.}$ | 56 | 1881 |
| Coloured | 28 (*31*) | 86 (*22*) | 58 | 566 |
| Indian | 34 (*35*) | 89 (*17*) | 55 | 364 |
| White | 29 (*33*) | 88 (*20*) | 59 | 358 |
| No schooling | 30 (*36*) $^{n.s.}$ | 83 (*26*)* | 53 | 145 |
| Primary | 32 (*35*) | 87 (*19*) | 56 | 499 |
| Incomplete secondary | 31 (*34*) | 88 (*21*) | 57 | 1106 |
| Complete secondary | 31 (*35*) | 87 (*22*) | 57 | 966 |
| Tertiary | 30 (*34*) | 90 (*18*) | 60 | 466 |
| Employed | 32 (*35*) $^{n.s.}$ | 87 (*21*)* | 55 | 1275 |
| Unemployed | 29 (*35*) | 87 (*22*) | 57 | 844 |
| Pensioner | 30 (*33*) | 88 (*20*) | 58 | 322 |
| Student | 30 (*35*) | 90 (*18*) | 59 | 334 |
| Other labour inactive | 33 (*34*) | 89 (*19*) | 56 | 358 |
| Poor | 27 (*34*)*** | 90 (*18*)*** | 63 | 850 |
| Just getting by | 29 (*32*) | 87 (*21*) | 58 | 1184 |
| Non-poor | 37 (*37*) | 86 (*23*) | 49 | 1166 |
| Richest asset quintile | 34 (*35*)* | 88 (*21*)* | 54 | 750 |
| Quintile 2 | 31 (*34*) | 88 (*22*) | 57 | 712 |
| Quintile 3 | 31 (*35*) | 87 (*21*) | 57 | 501 |
| Quintile 4 | 28 (*34*) | 87 (*21*) | 60 | 516 |
| Poorest asset quintile | 30 (*35*) | 89 (*19*) | 58 | 589 |
| Urban formal | 32 (*35*)** | 85 (*24*)** | 53 | 1993 |
| Urban informal | 31 (*34*) | 89 (*20*) | 58 | 296 |
| Rural traditional authority areas | 28 (*34*) | 91 (*14*) | 64 | 573 |
| Rural farms | 33 (*35*) | 89 (*18*) | 57 | 340 |

Note: Statistical significance is represented as follows: $^{n.s.}$ not significant * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Italicised figures in brackets alongside point estimates represent standard deviations.
Source: Own analysis based on HSRC SASAS 2009, ISSP inequality module.

Multivariate analysis based on the perceived stratification realities and aspirations variables was also undertaken, using multinominal logistic regressions with measures of age, gender, race, education level, relative income, employment status and geographic location included as predictors. In the case of perceived realities (see Appendix Table 4-2), Type A was selected as the reference category. Overall, the model fit is poor, with a pseudo-$R^2$ equal to 0.026, though the independent variables are jointly statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Compared to those choosing Type A as best representing the current structuring of South

Africa society, those who were relatively more affluent were more inclined to select Type B or Type D. Those living in a former homeland area were more likely than those in formal urban areas to choose Type A than Types B, C or D. There is weak and inconsistent evidence favouring age, race, educational and employment status effects, while there was no gender effect present in the model. As for perceived stratification aspirations, regression analysis was undertaken with Type E as the reference category and the same predictors (see Appendix Table 4-3). A similarly weak overall fit (pseudo-R2 = 0.034) was found though the model was again statistically significant. There was no significant difference on any of the predictors when comparing those responding Type D with those opting for Type E. Those expressing a preference for a more unequal society (Types A, B) were less inclined to be living in rural, former homeland areas or on rural farms. Little else was of significance in the model.

Moving from questions that are purely verbal in nature (the "income differences are too large" item) to an approach that uses visual imagery of different types of societal income distributions has served to provide broadly confirmatory evidence on inequality perceptions in the South African case. Importantly, given concerns raised by certain commentators about the standard inequality aversion item (Kenworthy & McCall, 2008), the inequality images questions have established that across a wide range of demographic and socio-economic groups there is not only a keen and shared sense of the skewed nature of the South African income distribution, but also an accompanying desire for a more egalitarian order. Yet, in spite of such characterisations and preferences, this only provides a very basic account of the way in which the society is structured. In an attempt to offer a little more nuance to this perceptual account, the following sub-sections turn to several other available indicators that address public representations of the social fabric.

### 4.3 Perceived class tensions

One measure that has been used in cross-national and cross-cultural surveys as an indication of the quality of society concerns views on the presence and extent of distributional conflict, since this may exert an influence on individual welfare (Delhey et al., 2001). In each iteration of the ISSP Social Inequality module since its first fielding in 1987, a set of social conflict measures have been included as a core design component. A total of seven different forms of inter-group conflict have been experimented with over the four occasions that the module has

been cross-nationally fielded to date, with only three items common to all years. In the 2009 ISSP Social Inequality round, the phrasing and items asked of respondents were as follows: "In all countries, there are differences or even conflicts between different social groups. In your opinion, in South Africa how much conflict is there between… (i) ...poor people and rich people?; (ii) ...the working class and the middle class; (iii) management and workers; and (iv) ...people at the top of society and people at the bottom?". Answers were captured on a four-point scale ranging from "very strong conflicts" to "no conflicts at all". Items (i)-(iii) above have featured consistently over the last thirty years, while item (iv) was fielded only in 1999 and 2009 but not the two prior rounds in 1987 and 1992. The three remaining items that have been tested are conflicts between "the unemployed and people with jobs", "farmers and city people" and "young people and older people". The labour market status and generational conflict items were included in the first round of SASAS in 2003, together with the poor/rich and management/workers items. Therefore, although there is no data since 2009 with which to determine the stability or level of variance in such perceptions, at least it is possible for me to gain an impression of social change.

The analysis based on these measures is presented in Table 9. From the top half of the table, which contains the results from the 2009 SASAS/ISSP round, it is apparent that the aggregate pattern of responses for the first and fourth cases (rich/poor and top/bottom) is virtually indistinguishable, with 55 percent of South Africans perceiving strong or very strong class tensions, close to a quarter (23% and 25% respectively) reporting only slight tensions and slightly under a fifth reporting no tensions. Slightly lower perceived tensions were cited between the working and middle classes, though strong or very strong class tensions were nonetheless referred to by close to half the adult population (44 percent). Yet, the most acutely felt societal tensions appear to be among management and workers, with approximately two-thirds (67 percent) referring to strong or very strong conflict. This finding is consistent with the increasing social discontent evident in the South African workplace and in specific sectors of the economy in particular over issues such as a living wage for low-skilled employees and associated concerns over executive pay and the so-called "undeserving rich" (McCall, 2013). This is a theme that will be revisited in a later section of the chapter on perceptions of pay differentials.

**Table 9: Perceived level of tension between different social classes, 2009 and 2003 (row % and mean scores)**

| Perceived level of conflict between social groups | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SASAS 2009** | **Very strong conflicts** | **Strong conflicts** | **Not very strong conflicts** | **There are no conflicts** | **(Can't choose)** | **Total** | **% strong / very strong** | **Mean score** |
| Poor people and rich people | 23 | 32 | 23 | 18 | 5 | 100 | 55 | 2.63 |
| Working class and middle class | 14 | 30 | 33 | 17 | 5 | 100 | 44 | 2.43 |
| Management and workers | 32 | 35 | 21 | 8 | 5 | 100 | 67 | 2.96 |
| People at top and bottom of society | 22 | 33 | 24 | 17 | 5 | 100 | 55 | 2.63 |
| **SASAS 2003** | **Strong tension** | **Some tension** | **Not much tension** | **No tension** | **(Do not know)** | **Total** | **% strong / some** | **Mean score** |
| Poor people and rich people | 41 | 36 | 12 | 7 | 4 | 100 | 77 | 3.15 |
| Employed and unemployed | 34 | 42 | 14 | 7 | 3 | 100 | 75 | 3.05 |
| Management and workers | 29 | 42 | 15 | 6 | 8 | 100 | 71 | 3.03 |
| Young people and older people | 21 | 34 | 23 | 19 | 4 | 100 | 55 | 2.59 |
| People of different races | 44 | 35 | 11 | 6 | 3 | 100 | 79 | 3.22 |

*Source*: Own analysis based on HSRC SASAS 2003 and 2009; ISSP 2009.
Note: Mean scores are based on a reversed four-point conflict scale, where 1=no conflicts / no tension and 4=Very strong conflicts / strong tension. 'Do not know' / 'can't choose' values are omitted.

The 2003 survey results are contained in the lower half of the table. In this instance the patterning deviates somewhat from what was described based on the 2009 data, with perceived tensions the strongest among people of different races and between rich and poor. The views on tensions between the employed and unemployed as well as management and workers are also high and display similar distributions. By comparison, the reported tension was appreciably lower in relation to young and older people, but considerable generational divisions are still referred to. The results raise concern about the ability to compare 2003 to 2009, as the distributions on the two common social groups (rich/poor and management/workers) are quite discrepant. Rather than being a reflection of actual contextual change over the six-year period, these differences in perceived tensions are likely to attributable to methodological design. The semantic difference between the usage of the term 'conflicts' (ISSP) and 'tensions' (SASAS) is probably not the principal explanation. Instead, a more plausible factor is the variance in labelling on the four-point scales. Are the categories 'very strong conflicts' and 'strong conflicts' combined equivalent to the 'strong tension' category? Is 'not very strong conflict' the same as 'not much tension'? These are difficult

questions to answer, which a comparison of the basic distributional patterns across the categories cannot resolve.

Recognising these difficulties, perhaps the main benefit of including the 2003 results is not to facilitate the analysis of changes over time but to give a sense as to whether perceived tensions between the employed and unemployed and across generations are ranked in comparison to the other items. In this regard it seems that South Africans feel that there is fairly high conflict between those that have managed to secure employment and those that have not. The fact the inter-racial tensions were marginally higher than for the other social groups is also of note, as such tensions are likely to play a role in discussions around race-based redress and restitution measures, which is a theme that is addressed in some detail in Chapter 7 .

As with the previous inequality attitudes measures examined, locating South Africa in comparative perspective in relation to perceived class conflict offers important additional insight about domestic mass opinion. In Figure 5, the ranked mean class tension score is presented for all four measures for each of the 40 countries included in the ISSP 2009 survey round. This is based on a reversed scale, where 1 represents “no conflicts at all” and 4 indicates “very strong conflicts”. For ease of interpretation, the all-country average is highlighted together with South Africa’s mean score, while the five top and bottom ranked countries are listed in each case. The results depicted in the graphs show that South Africans are generally more inclined than average to perceive different forms of class tensions. This is especially pronounced in relation to conflict between management and workers as well as between the working and middle classes. In both instances, South Africa has the fifth highest level of perceived class tension. Although more than half the adult population believes there to be a considerable degree of conflict between rich and poor in the country, the mean professed level of conflict places South Africa in eleventh highest position, just outside the top quartile. Compared with other countries, South Africans are even less likely to recognise tensions between people at the top and bottom of society (ranked 18$^{th}$ and below the all-country average), even though again a majority believes that such conflict exists.

**Figure 5: Perceived class tensions in comparative perspective, 2009 (ranked mean scores, n=40)**




Source: ISSP 2009 (own analysis)
Note: Mean scores are based on a reversed four-point conflict scale, where 1=no conflicts; 2=Not very strong conflicts; 3=Strong conflicts; 4=Very strong conflicts.

Having established the general level of perceived class conflict in the country and how this compares internationally, the focus now turns to the question of whether there are distinct group-based differences present within the country. Table 10 provides mean scores for the four indicators of class tension disaggregated by a select set of demographic and socio-economic attributes. In addition, a composite class conflict index is constructed based on a simple averaging of the four measures and the analysis of variance in the mean scores for the various societal groupings is again performed.[20]

Across all measures, bivariate testing shows that there is no discernible gender-based difference in evaluations of class conflict, while cohort differences are also negligible. By contrast, there are statistically significant race-based differences for all indicators of class conflict. In most instances coloured respondents exhibited the highest mean conflict scores (the only exception is in relation to workers and management), while Indian respondents consistently demonstrated the lowest mean scores. ANOVA Post-hoc Scheffe tests show that

[20] The class conflict index based on the four items has a high reliability, with Cronbach's α= 0.82.

the most recurrent findings across the different indicators is a significantly higher awareness of conflict among black South Africans relative to Indian citizens. Similarly, a significantly higher awareness was observed among coloured respondents relative to Indian respondents in all instances barring perceived tensions between management and workers.

**Table 10: Perceived level of tension between different social classes, 2009 (mean scores, standard deviations and ANOVA tests)**

| | Poor and rich people | Working and middle class | Management and workers | Top & bottom of society | Class Conflict Index | **Base N** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | 2.63 (1.04) | 2.43 (0.96) | 2.96 (0.93) | 2.63 (1.02) | 2.65 (0.79) | 3277 |
| Born 1990 and after | 2.65 (*1.00*)* | 2.45 (0.89) n.s. | 2.90 (0.91) n.s. | 2.61 (1.03) n.s. | 2.64 (0.77) n.s. | 288 |
| 1980s | 2.72 (*1.02*) | 2.47 (0.93) | 2.95 (0.93) | 2.70 (1.02) | 2.70 (0.78) | 804 |
| 1970s | 2.63 (*1.04*) | 2.43 (0.97) | 3.01 (0.95) | 2.66 (1.02) | 2.67 (0.78) | 709 |
| 1960s | 2.52 (*1.09*) | 2.38 (0.98) | 3.02 (0.92) | 2.54 (1.00) | 2.61 (0.77) | 643 |
| 1950s | 2.58 (*1.04*) | 2.36 (0.98) | 2.91 (0.96) | 2.56 (1.09) | 2.59 (0.83) | 433 |
| 1940s | 2.66 (*1.07*) | 2.50 (1.05) | 2.92 (0.95) | 2.61 (1.01) | 2.66 (0.81) | 275 |
| Born before 1940 | 2.65 (*0.94*) | 2.45 (0.96) | 2.87 (0.91) | 2.66 (0.98) | 2.63 (0.76) | 132 |
| Male | 2.63 (1.04) n.s. | 2.47 (0.95) n.s. | 2.98 (0.92) n.s. | 2.65 (1.02) n.s. | 2.68 (0.79) n.s. | 1321 |
| Female | 2.64 (1.04) | 2.41 (0.96) | 2.94 (0.95) | 2.61 (1.02) | 2.63 (0.79) | 1963 |
| African | 2.63 (1.06)*** | 2.46 (0.98)*** | 2.99 (0.96)** | 2.62 (1.05)* | 2.66 (0.81)*** | 1964 |
| Coloured | 2.85 (0.91) | 2.53 (0.85) | 2.92 (0.80) | 2.76 (0.86) | 2.76 (0.67) | 578 |
| Indian | 2.44 (1.04) | 2.11 (0.90) | 2.75 (0.94) | 2.39 (0.94) | 2.43 (0.75) | 375 |
| White | 2.49 (0.95) | 2.28 (0.86) | 2.86 (0.84) | 2.66 (0.97) | 2.56 (0.70) | 367 |
| No schooling | 2.85 (1.04)*** | 2.61 (1.00)* | 2.94 (0.98) n.s. | 2.65 (1.00)** | 2.74 (0.80)** | 159 |
| Primary | 2.63 (1.11) | 2.45 (1.03) | 3.03 (0.97) | 2.59 (1.07) | 2.65 (0.83) | 524 |
| Incomplete secondary | 2.62 (1.02) | 2.44 (0.96) | 2.91 (0.97) | 2.60 (1.03) | 2.63 (0.82) | 1136 |
| Complete secondary | 2.71 (1.02) | 2.44 (0.92) | 2.98 (0.89) | 2.72 (0.99) | 2.71 (0.74) | 973 |
| Tertiary | 2.41 (1.01) | 2.32 (0.94) | 2.97 (0.88) | 2.52 (1.02) | 2.55 (0.75) | 472 |
| Employed | 2.59 (1.04)** | 2.43 (0.96) n.s | 3.05 (0.90)** | 2.65 (1.04) n.s. | 2.67 (0.78)* | 1289 |
| Unemployed | 2.70 (104) | 2.47 (0.97) | 2.95 (0.96) | 2.66 (1.01) | 2.67 (0.79) | 874 |
| Pensioner | 2.62 (1.01) | 2.37 (0.98) | 2.94 (0.98) | 2.62 (1.01) | 2.63 (0.83) | 340 |
| Student | 2.65 (1.02) | 2.48 (0.89) | 2.83 (0.89) | 2.62 (1.03) | 2.63 (0.76) | 338 |
| Other labour inactive | 2.40 (1.07) | 2.32 (0.98) | 2.83 (0.90) | 2.42 (0.98) | 2.49 (0.78) | 373 |
| Poor | 2.77 (1.11)*** | 2.60 (1.00)*** | 3.05 (1.00)*** | 2.72 (1.06)*** | 2.76 (0.85)*** | 898 |
| Just getting by | 2.61 (1.01) | 2.37 (0.92) | 2.89 (0.91) | 2.55 (0.98) | 2.60 (0.76) | 1202 |
| Non-poor | 2.55 (1.00) | 2.37 (0.94) | 2.97 (0.90) | 2.65 (1.03) | 2.63 (0.74) | 1182 |
| Poorest asset quintile | 2.56 (1.12) n.s. | 2.49 (1.02)*** | 2.89 (1.06) n.s. | 2.46 (1.07)*** | 2.58 (0.89)* | 760 |
| Quintile 2 | 2.68 (1.07) | 2.45 (0.98) | 3.03 (0.92) | 2.64 (1.02) | 2.67 (0.80) | 718 |
| Quintile 3 | 2.69 (1.05) | 2.47 (0.98) | 2.97 (2.94) | 2.63 (1.05) | 2.69 (0.80) | 507 |
| Quintile 4 | 2.66 (0.97) | 2.48 (0.92) | 2.97 (0.86) | 2.70 (0.95) | 2.71 (0.72) | 530 |
| Richest asset quintile | 2.57 (1.00) | 2.26 (0.87) | 2.91 (0.86) | 2.69 (1.01) | 2.60 (0.73) | 634 |
| Urban formal | 2.64 (0.99) n.s. | 2.41 (0.91)* | 2.99 (0.88) n.s. | 2.71 (0.97)*** | 2.68 (0.72)*** | 2022 |
| Urban informal | 2.69 (1.07) | 2.60 (0.98) | 3.02 (0.92) | 2.81 (1.05) | 2.79 (0.82) | 305 |
| Rural traditional authority areas | 2.60 (1.12) | 2.43 (1.04) | 2.89 (1.02) | 2.44 (1.09) | 2.57 (0.88) | 605 |
| Rural farms | 2.61 (1.06) | 2.50 (0.97) | 2.92 (1.00) | 2.51 (1.04) | 2.63 (0.83) | 352 |

Source: SASAS 2009

Note: The mean scores are based on a reversed scale, where 1=no conflicts; 2=not very strong conflicts; 3=strong conflicts; 4=very strong conflicts. n.s=not significant; *=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001. Italicised figures in brackets alongside point estimates represent standard deviations.

In the cases of perceived tensions between rich and poor and the top and bottom in society, the range of values across social groups believing there is strong or very strong conflict is approximately 20 percentage points (from slightly over two-fifths to around two-thirds)

(Appendix Table 4-4). A comparable range is evident in relation to working and middle class tensions, though the share perceiving strong or very strong conflict tends to be lower overall, varying from 28% to 50%. Finally, the range is considerably smaller for perceived worker-management conflict (12 percentage points), varying from 58% among coloured respondents to a high of 70% among black African respondents.

To provide a sense of the scale of the class differences one would anticipate in relation to these measures, Table 10 also examines mean conflict scores based on educational attainment, employment status, self-rated poverty status, and asset index quintiles. Given the spatial patterning to deprivation in South Africa as a consequence of colonial and apartheid policies, we also examine differences in perceived class conflict by geographic location. Perceived conflict is again a relatively common feature across social classes. While significant differences in mean conflict scores are present in a number of cases, considerable shares report conflict irrespective of whether one lacks formal education or has a degree from a tertiary institution, is employed or unemployed, rates oneself as poor or non-poor, or belongs to the poorest or wealthiest asset quintile. These results further convey the image of South Africans as being keenly aware of the economic inequality in South African society and its consequences from a social cohesion perspective. The extent to which perceived class tensions inform the desire for redistribution to maintain social order is a theme that will be explored in Chapters five through seven.

## 4.4 Perceptions of pay differentials

Leibbrandt et al. (2010, 2012) and demonstrate that the level of overall income inequality in the country increased between 1993 and 2008, with income become increasingly concentrated in the top decile and the Gini coefficient rising by four percentage points from 0.66 to 0.70 over the period. Decomposition analysis shows that wage income accounts for approximately 85% of income inequality in the country, signifying that the labour market has a predominant role in driving persisting income disparities, with educational disparities a key underlying factor (Van der Berg, 2011).[21] This economic situation has assumed increasing importance in the aftermath of the Marikana massacre of August 2012, in which 34 Lonmin

[21] Leibbrandt et al. (2010, 2012), Finn and Leibbrandt (2013) and Hundenborn et al.. (2016) decompose income into four main sources, specifically (i) remittances; (ii) wage income (including self-employment); (iii) social assistance in the form of social grants; and (iv) capital income (e.g. dividends, interest, rent income, imputed rent from residing in own dwelling and private pensions).

platinum mine workers were fatally shot by police officers while striking in relation to demands for fair remuneration (Alexander et al. 2012). This event has provoked vigorous economic policy debate about wage inequality, standard of living and quality of life in the country. President Zuma himself made the symbolic proposal at an emergency economic summit in October 2012 that CEOs and executive directors in both the public and private sectors institute a freeze in salaries and bonuses during 2013 as the gesture to lay the basis for a commitment to building an "equitable economy". This was followed by the announcement in November of that year that Cabinet and directors-general had agreed to the one-year pay freeze to "demonstrate seriousness with regards to dealing with inequality and income disparities" (Zuma 2012), with the South African Reserve Bank following suit in early December. Issues of inequality and redistributive economic policies also featured at the 2012 African National Congress (ANC) 53rd national elective conference in Mangaung in late December 2012.

The issue of executive pay has continued to be a source of considerable scrutiny and debate during the course of the decade, and questions have been asked about whether there is a need for regulatory rules in the pay packages of the country's top corporate leaders, much in the vein of what has been introduced in other country contexts such as the UK and United States.[22] This has been spurred on by recent reports documenting executive pay practices and the disparities between this and average worker remuneration in the country and in cross-national perspective. For instance, during the 2016-17 financial year, the CEOs of the top JSE-listed companies received an average total guaranteed package (TGP) of R24,6-million per annum, while the median TGP for all CEOs of JSE-listed companies was R4.8-million (PwC, 2017).[23] In late 2016, an analysis undertaken by Bloomberg found that South African chief executives ranked seventh globally based on their average pay, but possessed the highest ratio between executive pay and the average income of workers – a ratio of 500:1.[24] High profile scandals involving exit payments made to company directors have also

[22] In 2013, the UK put into effect tougher legislative rules regarding executive pay packages, with measures including public disclosure of the director's remuneration policy for listed companies, which is voted upon by shareholders once every three years.
[23] The top-10 JSE listed companies collectively account for approximately 60% of the total market capital invested in the stock exchange. The TGP refers to those elements of remuneration that are guaranteed, and include a base salary and benefits that are received monthly. Not accounted for are short-term performance-related cash incentives (STI) based on a company's performance over a one-year period and long-term cash and equity-based incentives (LTI) that are paid based on company performance exceeding a one-year period.
[24] These figures have been contested by industry stakeholders to some degree due to the inclusion of TGP as well as STI and LTI components. Irrespective of such criticism, the disparities are nonetheless appreciable.

generated widespread criticism from shareholders and the broad public. Set against this context, the current King IV Report Corporate Governance™ for South Africa (IODSA, 2016) framework includes provisions regarding the ethics of pay, such as improved remuneration reporting and shareholder engagement practices, as well as the implementation of fair, responsible and transparent remuneration policies by organisations. It is however not yet clear whether such regulatory guidelines will lead to a fundamental restructuring of executive pay packages, and determinations on what is 'fair' and 'responsible' are furthermore open to wide-ranging subjective interpretation.

Alongside these developments, there has been a sustained push since the early 2010s for a national minimum wage to be established as the basis for progressively realising a living wage for all in the country. The ANC's 2014 national election manifesto made explicit reference to the need for a national minimum wage (NMW) as part of a comprehensive suite of interventions designed to promote decent wages and work and address wage inequality and working poverty. Subsequently, the President mentioned in the June 2014 State of the Nation Address that he had requested the National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac) social partners under the oversight of Deputy President Ramaphosa to address low wages, wage inequalities and the possibility of a national minimum wage. In November 2014 the Nedlac Indaba was convened, and adopted the Ekurhuleni Declaration. Signed by all social partners, this document made a firm commitment to the adoption of a national minimum wage. Terms of Reference for the negotiations were adopted in February 2015, and a Task Team on Wage Inequality was established to negotiate the National Minimum Wage, as well as a Task Team on Labour Relations. Following the reaching of a broad consensus among the Nedlac partners to effect the NMW agenda, in mid-2016, a seven-person panel of advisors was appointed by the Deputy President to advise on an appropriate level at which the national minimum wage could be set. The NMW Panel handed over their final report containing recommendations on minimum wage policy and implementation to the Deputy President in late November 2016.

The political negotiations between government, business, labour and community constituencies over the NMW were protracted (two years) and often characterised by disagreement and impasse As Frye (2016) has observed, labour and community representatives interpreted the Ekurhuleni Declaration as heralding a radical new plan to address the effects of apartheid era wage policies for low- and unskilled workers, whereas

business and government at times expressed clear reservations about the possible wage dampening effects of the policy. These ideological perspectives and contestations were also reflected in academic debate on the matter (Isaacs & Fine, 2015; Nattrass & Seekings, 2014; Seekings & Nattrass, 2015, 2016). Despite the delicate nature of these extensive negotiations and consultations with different sectors and stakeholders, in February 2017, representatives of government, business, the community sector and two of the three labour federations represented at Nedlac signed the national minimum wage agreement. This agreement made provision for workers to receive a minimum of R20 per hour or a monthly wage of R3,500 for a 40-hour week, and approximately R3,900 for those working 45 hours a week. This was followed by Cabinet approval of the National Minimum Wage Bill in November 2017. This will now be referred to Parliament for further deliberation, after which the President will be required to sign it into law ahead of the envisaged date implementation date in May 2018.

While discussion about such proposals have been occurring in policymaking and academic circles, limited empirical evidence exists on the public view regarding pay differentials. It is therefore instructive to examine the measures included in the 2009 ISSP module on legitimate pay earnings. Respondents were initially asked to estimate the gross monthly income of five different occupations, ranging from an unskilled worker to a Cabinet minister, after which they were requested to specify what they thought people in these occupations ought to be earning. As Kuhn (2010: 219) cautions, what the real wages of the different occupations are is not of interest here, as misperceptions of wage rates may explain why different individuals express varying levels of support for redistribution.

In Table 11, I present for each of the five chosen occupations the mean perceived actual monthly wage, the preferred ethical wage, as well as the wage ratio between the unskilled factory worker and each of the other occupations. The final column in the table also indicates the percentage difference between the perceived actual and ethical wages. Based on the descriptive statistics in the table, several observations can be made. Firstly, South Africans perceive sizable differences in earnings between occupations, with doctors seen as earning 14 times more than a unskilled worker, a company chairperson 18 times higher and a Cabinet minister 38 times more. Secondly, there is a strong preference for the wages of unskilled or low-skilled workers to increase significantly, with a concomitant desire for the wages of higher occupational categories to be lower than current perceived levels. At the time of interviewing in late 2009, South Africans on average support a 45 percent rise in the gross

monthly earnings of an unskilled worker from about R2 300 to R3 330, and a 40 percent increase in the wages of a shop assistant from approximately R2 880 to R4 020. At the other end of the occupational spectrum, there is a particularly strong demand for the salaries of Cabinet ministers to be reduced (by 28 percent), followed to a lesser degree by a reduction in wages of general practitioners (by 13%), with only a modest preferred reduction in the wages of company chairpersons (4%). Thirdly, the ranking of occupations based on ethical wages remains unchanged relative to perceived actual earnings, with South Africans on the whole appearing rather tolerant of large earnings differentials despite the recognition of the need for a narrowing the gap between lower and higher occupational classes. These findings are all broadly consistent with other analyses of subjective wage inequality using ISSP data (Taylor-Gooby 2005; Scalon & Cano, 2008; Kuhn 2010; Castillo, 2011, 2012).

**Table 11: Individuals subjective estimates of actual and preferred occupational earnings, 2009 (Rands and ratios)**

| | Perceived actual monthly wage | | Preferred ethical wage | | Difference between perceived actual and ethical wages (percent) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Rands | Ratio | Rands | Ratio | |
| Unskilled worker in a factory | R 2 308 | 1.0 | R 3 334 | 1.0 | 44.5 |
| Shop assistant | R 2 882 | 1.2 | R 4 023 | 1.2 | 39.6 |
| Doctor in general practice | R 33 287 | 14.4 | R 28 918 | 8.7 | -13.1 |
| Chairman (sic) of a large national company | R 41 809 | 18.1 | R 39 974 | 12.0 | -4.4 |
| Cabinet minister | R 86 745 | 37.6 | R 62 755 | 18.8 | -27.7 |

Source: Own analysis based on HSRC SASAS 2009.
Notes: the table provides average estimates of actual and preferred wages (in ZAR, gross per month). The ratio in the third and fifth columns is a simple division of the mean earnings of different job categories by that of an unskilled worker, so that the latter takes on a value of 1. The values in the final column are the percentage differences between the perceived ethical and actual wages.

In order to provide an indication of whether this overall finding holds true across social groups, the mean perceived actual and preferred ethical monthly wages, as well as the occupational wage ratios are presented based on race and class. In this case, the chosen class measure is an asset index, which has been categorised into quintiles, from the poorest 20% to the richest 20%. If one examines the percentage change in the ethical relative to the perceived actual wages for the five occupations, it is apparent that there is broad agreement that those in the low skilled occupations (unskilled factory workers and shop assistants) ought to earn more than is currently the case. By contrast, there is a common and distinct preference for the wages of political elites (Cabinet ministers) to be reduced – by a margin of between 23% to 44% across population groups, and between 14% and 37% based on asset quintiles. There is far less uniformity in relation to the doctor in general practice and the chairperson of the large

national company. For instance, white adults on average advocate for a 5% increase in the wages of the chairpersons of large national companies, black African adults expect only a marginal (2%) decrease on average, while both coloured and Indian adults advocate for a decrease of around a fifth. Similar variations are evident based on the class measure.

**Figure 6: Difference between perceived actual and ethical wages (percent) by race and class, 2009**




Source: Own analysis based on HSRC SASAS 2009.

Given the preference for increasing the wages of those in lower occupational categories, and either reducing or retaining broadly similar wage levels among higher skilled occupations, I find that the overall national findings continue to apply at the subgroup level. In Appendix Table 4-5, the perceived current and preferred ethical wage amounts and ratios are presented for the five occupational categories, disaggregated again by race and class. A comparison of the perceived actual and ethical wage ratios continues to convey the public desire for a diminution of earnings gaps, irrespective of race or class. Admittedly, there are differences in the scale to which the ratios converge based on the expressed preferences, and fairly generous levels of wage inequality are deemed legitimate based on social position, but this does not detract from the general inclination for a somewhat fairer structuring of earnings. Future research will need to test these assertions against other socio-demographic attributes but also against more up-to-date data once it becomes available.

As a final empirical input on wage-related preferences in the country, I make use of two measures included in an experimental module on attitudes to restitution that was fielded as part of the 2016 SASAS round, one relating to the minimum wage and the other dealing with executive remuneration. The minimum wage item relates to the perceptions regarding what a minimum wage value for workers should be in the country. Respondents were asked the following: "What do you think is a fair minimum amount that all South African workers should earn each month? (No worker should earn less than this a month). Please give an amount in Rands." The national results presented in Table 12 reveal that the median monthly minimum wage amount that South Africans deemed as fair was R5,000, with a corresponding mean value of R6,953 per month. This is considerably higher than the proposal contained in the National Minimum Wage Bill (R3,500 per month based on a 40-hour week). For most of the individual attributes examined in the table, there is tendency towards a median value of R5,000 per month. Far greater dispersion is nonetheless observed when comparing the mean minimum wage scores, with values for those ranging from R5707 per month in the case of rural farm dwellers to highs of R9,678 for students and R10,121 among adolescents.

There is a significant age effect on reported minimum wage amounts, $F(4, 2975)=6.24$, $p=.0001$, with 16-24 year-olds offering higher average values than those aged 25-34 years, 35-49 years and 50-64 years. Women tended to provide slightly higher scores than men, though this barely achieves statistical significance. Although Indian respondents report a visibly higher preferred minimum wage level, the ANOVA results do not produce a significant finding. As for a class effect, the evidence is more ambiguous. On the one hand, there is some evidence pointing to a positive association between class and reported minimum wage values, with those with a high education level, self-rated poverty status generally favouring a moderately higher guaranteed basic wage level. On the other hand, employment status does not exhibit the same pattern, with the unemployed, employed and pensioners all providing statistically indistinct average responses. Students have a higher mean score that all other categories, which is likely a reflection of the age effect described above. Geographic location also matters, but again runs counter to the educational and subjective poverty effects, with those residing in rural, former homeland areas tending to demand a higher minimum wage compared to those in other types of area. These subtleties notwithstanding, multivariate analysis using OLS regression indicates that the ability of these variables to collectively explain variance in preferred minimum wages is fairly nominal, with

an $R^2$ of .046 (Appendix Table 4-6). Gender, age, education level, employment status and subjective poverty status all did not significantly predict minimum wage. Instead, Indian adults (and to a lesser degree white adults) were more likely to report higher values than black African adults. Those living in former homeland areas also desired a higher minimum wage amount than those in urban areas or based on rural farms.

**Table 12: Individuals preferred minimum wage amount, 2016 (in Rands, mean, median and SD)**

| | Preferred minimum wage value (Rands) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Mean** | **Median** | **Std Dev** | **Base N** |
| South Africa | 6,953 | 5,000 | 8,212 | 2986 |
| ***Age group*** | | | | |
| 16-24 | 8,257 | 5,000 | 10,393 | 448 |
| (16-19) | (10,121) | (5,000) | (14,733) | 152 |
| (20-24) | (6,879) | (5,000) | (4,858) | 296 |
| 25-34 | 6,380 | 5,000 | 7,422 | 656 |
| 35-49 | 6,618 | 5,000 | 6,964 | 760 |
| 50-64 | 6,597 | 5,000 | 7,068 | 670 |
| 65+ | 6,604 | 5,000 | 8,611 | 446 |
| ***Gender*** | | | | |
| Male | 6,629 | 5,000 | 6,614 | 1221 |
| Female | 7,256 | 5,000 | 9,457 | 1765 |
| ***Population group*** | | | | |
| Black African | 6,878 | 5,000 | 8,703 | 1807 |
| Coloured | 6,463 | 5,000 | 5,697 | 460 |
| Indian/Asian | 8,837 | 6,000 | 7,572 | 352 |
| White | 7,475 | 6,000 | 5,830 | 367 |
| ***Educational attainment*** | | | | |
| Primary or no schooling | 6,469 | 5,000 | 8,270 | 540 |
| Grades 8-11 or equivalent | 6,892 | 5,000 | 9,299 | 1037 |
| Matric or equivalent | 6,924 | 5,000 | 6,873 | 1013 |
| Tertiary | 8,990 | 6,000 | 10,485 | 176 |
| ***Employment status*** | | | | |
| Employed | 6,412 | 5,000 | 5,369 | 838 |
| Unemployed | 6,607 | 5,000 | 7,914 | 1023 |
| Pensioner | 6,662 | 5,000 | 8,565 | 582 |
| Student | 9,678 | 5,000 | 13,062 | 220 |
| Other labour inactive | 6,047 | 5,000 | 4,187 | 244 |
| ***Subjective poverty status*** | | | | |
| Poor | 6,231 | 5,000 | 6,875 | 682 |
| Just getting by | 7,045 | 5,000 | 8,837 | 1216 |
| Non-poor | 7,543 | 5,000 | 8,394 | 1082 |
| ***Geographic location*** | | | | |
| Urban formal | 6,576 | 5,000 | 6,737 | 2056 |
| Urban informal | 5,844 | 5,000 | 5,756 | 207 |
| Rural trad auth areas | 8,314 | 5,000 | 11,304 | 558 |
| Rural farms | 5,707 | 4,000 | 5,473 | 165 |

Source: HSRC SASAS 2016

There has been contestation about the R3,500 per month minimum wage amount stipulated in the draft legislation. The expert panel and the Deputy President have maintained that, even at this amount, the legislation would have the potential to make a considerable difference given that official labour force statistics estimate that more than half of workers in the country

continue to earn less than this amount.[25] Trade unions have also been vocal about a desire for a higher minimum threshold. For instance, while the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) has accepted the proposed R20 per hour / R3,500 per month minimum wage agreement, it has also indicated that it would continue to campaign for R4,500 per month, a proposal that was reiterated by opposition party, The Economic Freedom Fighters.[26] The Food and Allied Workers Union, which is a body representing farm workers, has argued for an higher amount of R5,700 per month.[27] The public preferences revealed by the 2016 survey results show that there is support, both nationally and across a range of social groups, for an amount exceeding the initial amount contained in the Bill. This therefore reinforces the earlier finding of a broad-based aspiration for low paid employees in the country to receive higher earnings than is currently the case in the pursuit of fair and legitimate remuneration.

Returning to the theme of executive pay, respondents to the 2016 survey were asked about their level of support for or opposition to the following statement: "To what extent do you agree or disagree that a law should be introduced in South Africa that limits the amount that a person in charge of a large national company can earn?". To my knowledge, this item represents a rare instance where data has been collected that addresses attitudes towards a policy that would restrict maximum compensation levels in the country. Responses were captured using a standard five-point agreement scale. On aggregate, slightly more than half the adult population (53%) favoured limits on executive remuneration, with 15% in disagreement with such action, with a fifth (22%) adopting a neutral stance and the remaining tenth uncertain (Figure 7). While comparative data on the desire for regulation of executive pay practices in other countries is equally hard to come by, McCall (2013:211) does show from the best available evidence that around three-fifths to two quarters of Americans favour more regulatory policies of this type. So, on average, South Africans would seem to have reasonably strong, but somewhat cautious,[28] views on pay practices among top corporate executives, much like the United States with its highly stratified pay structure. This again

[25] The Panel has maintained that 6-million people (35% of all employed people) earn less than R2,000 p.m.; 5.5 million (42%) earn less than R3,000; 6.2 million (47%) earn less than R3,500, and 6.7 million (51%) earn less than R4,000. Low salaries are especially concentrated in certain sectors, notably domestic, agriculture, construction, and trade.
[26] https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1445547/cosatu-accepts-r3500-minimum-wage/; https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2016-11-21-why-the-eff-is-unhappy-about-the-minimum-wage/
[27] https://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-21-treasury-warns-national-minimum-wage-will-lead-to-715-000-job-losses
[28] This is based on my interpretation that the fact that the statement was favoured by just over half the population, and strongly supported by around a fifth (18%), speaks more to a 'cautious willingness' (McCall, 2013) for such policy interventions rather than emphatic endorsement.

helps add weight to the earlier finding of a desire for a moderate lowering in the remuneration received by those in mid-level to high-paying positions. There is clearly a need for more regular inclusion of these kind of policy-relevant questions in future rounds of national survey research series in the country in order gain a firmer appreciation of public preferences, especially given the mounting contextual significance of these issues in the face of persisting wage disparities and high levels of unemployment.

**Figure 7: Support for legislation to impose limits on executive pay (percent), 2016**




Source: HSRC SASAS 2016

The spread in support for regulation of this type across different social groups falls within a fairly narrow range for the most part, within a band that extends 5 percentage points above and below the average level of agreement (53%) (Figure 8). Yet, as can be seen from the line graph, there are nonetheless distinct outliers, especially in terms of geographic location, self-rated poverty, race and employment status. Black African adults demonstrated a significantly higher preference for change, while white and Indian adults exhibited the lowest levels of support based on all the attributes examined. Unemployed South Africans tend to be more resolute in their support for restrictions on executive compensation in comparison to the employed, pensioners and other labour inactive adults. This effect is mirrored in the pattern of responses based on subjective poverty status and geographic location. It would appear that socio-economic status and vulnerability have a bearing, with those that are poor or just getting by more inclined to support restrictive policy than the non-poor, while those in informal urban settlements and rural, former homeland areas are more in favour of this proposal than those in formal urban areas and on rural farms. As for the other variables, those in their fifties or of pensionable age were less partial to regulating executive pay than those aged 16-24, 25-34 and 35-49 years. No distinct variation was present based on gender, while

there was also negligible variation based on educational attainment.[29] Apart from these associations, an individual's expressed level of inequality aversion has a modest but significant bearing. Of those agreeing that income differences are too large in the country in 2016, 53% favoured executive compensation policies, compared to 34% not expressing such aversion.[30] Therefore, an element of privilege, position and inequality knowledge have an influence on views on the need for policy to promote a just level of executive compensation

**Figure 8: Support for legislation to impose limits on executive pay by socio-demographic attributes (% total agreement, ranked highest to lower), 2016**




Source: HSRC SASAS 2016

In sum, the preceding analysis offers a fairly consistent and convincing portrayal of the concern expressed by the South African public over the extent of income and wage inequality in the country and the general preference that exists for a reduction in such differences. The SASAS data series shows that a sizable majority (exceeding 80 percent) of the adult population believe that income differences are too large. Furthermore, the results suggest that the public feels that such inequalities may have compromised efforts at promoting a socially

[29] Based on One-Way ANOVA testing based on a reversed scale with 'don't know' and 'no answer' responses omitted, I do however find that the mean score for those with a tertiary education just misses out at the 95% confidence level of being lower than those with an incomplete secondary education.
[30] The correlation coefficient between inequality aversion and support for restrictions on executive pay was $r$=.0123, $p$<.001. The skewness of the inequality aversion measure may partly explain the lack of a higher association.

cohesive society, with a significant share stating that there exist strong class tensions in the country. Since the labour market in South Africa represents the predominant source of income inequality in the country, it is also important to observe that the public is keenly aware of and favours a narrowing in wage inequality between different occupations, through both an increase of incomes among the low paid and a reduction at the top end. The fact that these findings are evident across the class spectrum is important for South African democracy, as it suggests that in principle there exists a relatively broad consensus about income and wage inequalities in the country, both in terms of awareness and preferences for change. In the next section, attention is directed away from awareness of inequality to personal experiences and expectations of social mobility as well as views on what it takes to get ahead in South African society.

### 4.5 Dancing to the same tune? Lay explanations of the causes of poverty

While we saw earlier that there exists a fairly strong consensus regarding the view that 'income differences are too large" in South African society, we nonetheless find more varied public responses when it comes to the explanations for poverty over the 2010 to 2016 period. As Table 13 demonstrates, there is a significant minority share, accounting for around a fifth of the adult population, which tends to regard poverty or social need as attributable to the personal failings of the poor, i.e. to their laziness or lack of willpower. The share expressing this position has remained stable over the seven survey rounds examined. A further 22 per cent ascribe poverty to personal misfortune or bad luck, though by contrast in this instance no special judgment is passed on the socially disadvantaged individuals involved (Gallie & Paugam, 2002: 32). This means that around two-fifths of South Africans (41%) believe that poverty is due to 'personal causes' on average over the period. The 'laziness' explanation involves strong moral arguments about deservingness, individual agency, and an active citizenship that emphasises civic duty and responsibilities, and can lead to neoliberal arguments for greater individual self-sufficiency and a diminished role of the state in providing social support.

A marginally higher share (46% on aggregate over the period) tends to regard poverty as attributable to 'social causes'. This includes the predominant response that poverty is a manifestation of there being "much injustice in our society" (33%). Such feelings of societal unfairness is unsurprising given the far-reaching and lingering impact of the colonial and

apartheid experiences on the country's social structure and social fabric. In common with the 'laziness' explanation, this option involves a clear ideological judgment on the part of the respondent, in this case focusing on the shortcomings of society rather than poor individuals. Accordingly, poor South Africans are regarded as victims of an unfair system, who are likely to require government social assistance in order to promote social justice (Gallie & Paugam, 2002: 33). A far smaller share (13%) tends to regard poverty in a fatalistic manner, reflecting "an inevitable part of modern progress".

**Table 13: Perceptions of the causes of poverty in South Africa, 2010-2016 (%)**

| | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | Avg |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Because they have been unlucky | 21 | 20 | 19 | 24 | 22 | 24 | 22 | 22 |
| (2) Because of laziness and lack of willpower | 18 | 18 | 17 | 22 | 18 | 20 | 20 | 19 |
| (3) Because there is much injustice in our society | 33 | 31 | 37 | 29 | 33 | 34 | 32 | 33 |
| (4) It's an inevitable part of modern progress | 14 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 17 | 13 |
| (None of these) | 9 | 14 | 11 | 7 | 9 | 5 | 5 | 9 |
| (Do not know) | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 3151 | 2990 | 2462 | 2843 | 3069 | 3078 | 3034 | 20627 |
| Personal causes (1-2) | 38 | 38 | 36 | 46 | 40 | 44 | 42 | 41 |
| Social causes (3-4) | 47 | 42 | 49 | 41 | 46 | 46 | 49 | 46 |

Source: HSRC SASAS 2010-2016

Note: The question is phrased as follows: "Why, in your opinion, are there people who live in poverty? Here are four options - which one is the closest to your opinion?. It has featured in Eurostat (1977), the Breadline Britain 1983 study as well as the British Social Attitudes Survey series since the mid-1980s. The categorisation of the explanations into personal and social causes derives from Gallie & Paugam (2002).

The level of stability or fluctuation for the different lay explanations of poverty is therefore important from a social citizenship perspective, especially in relation to the 'personal laziness' and 'societal injustice' arguments. Monitoring trends in such beliefs can give insight into the extent to which citizens demand a more social democratic form of societal structuring, one that is more conservative and neoliberal in character, or alternatively whether there is substantive division among the public about the ideal form that the good society ought to assume. This, in turn, is likely to be evident from the expressed preferences for state-led redistribution, as well as the support for specific redistributive social policies designed to promote restorative justice and bring about a fairer, more caring society.

## 4.6 Summary

In this chapter I have aimed to explore the views of the South African public towards economic inequality. The results suggest that there exists considerable public concern about economic inequality in the country. South Africans are acutely aware of how unequal their society is. Over the last decade, a significant majority of the population across social groups has consistently expressed the view that the income gap in the country is too large, articulated a strong preference for a more equitable social structure, and acknowledged the class tensions and social divisions that economic inequality has produced. In a context where the labour market is the predominant source of economic inequality and set against legislative developments in relation to a national minimum wage and mounting calls for more generous, decent living wage, it is also apparent that there is a preference for a narrowing of disparities in earnings. This is characterised by a demand for a moderate rise in earnings for those on low salaries and a reduction for those in high-paying occupations. The survey findings do however suggest that South Africans are willing to tolerate fairly high levels of inequality in spite of their general aversion for inequality, which is consistent with what has been found in other high inequality societies such as Brazil (Scalon & Cano, 2008). Nonetheless, from a social justice perspective, these beliefs about inequality could be regarded positively as a desire for a more equitable and fair society.

# Chapter 5
# *State of Change*: Preferences for Government-Led Redistribution in South Africa

"*In so far as the opportunity to lead a life worthy of human beings is needlessly confined to a minority, not a few of the conditions applauded as freedom would more properly be denounced as privilege. Action which causes such opportunities to be more widely shared is, therefore, twice blessed. It not only subtracts from inequality, but adds to freedom*"- R.H. Tawney, Equality (1964 Ed., p.235).

"*I think there is no running away from the fact that now in South Africa there is such an ill distribution of wealth that any form of political freedom which does not touch on the proper distribution of wealth will be meaningless*" – Steve Biko, I Write What I Like (1987, p.149).

"*During the difficult days of Apartheid, millions of ordinary South Africans understood that they needed to be their own collective emancipators. The liberation struggle was grounded in community activism, solidarity struggles and neighbourhood organisation. These traditions have not disappeared in many poor communities through voluntary work, home-based care and participation in community safety forums. This resourcefulness of South Africans is a remarkable asset, but these strengths and traditions have become somewhat weakened by a message that* 'the state will deliver'. *While public resources must play a major part, a different relationship between state and communities must be fostered. Our grassroots organisational structures must play a leading role in mobilising communities to appreciate that freedom comes with rights and responsibilities*" – Alliance Summit Declaration, 1 July 2015.

## 5.1 Introduction

Redistribution represents one of the core, traditional roles assumed by the state (Alesina & La Ferrara 2005). Given both the persistently high level of income inequality that remains in South African society, and the finding from the previous chapter that the South African public tends to express a consistent and robust view that the income differences between rich and poor are excessive, it is important to better understand and reflect on public perceptions towards the government in redistributing income between wealthier and more deprived citizens. One might argue that broad interest in and concern with economic inequality in a country context such as South Africa could possibly be motivated by an intrinsic desire to effect change (Boadway & Keen, 2000). Yet, as Hills (2004: 201) observes, a broad-based concern with inequality in society does not automatically translate into a belief that anything can be done to alter the situation or whether specific forms of redistribution should be pursued. Is this the case in South Africa? Although considerable scholarly attention and policy debate has been devoted to inequality, redress and the role of the state in South Africa over the last two decades, the availability of data and empirical investigation on public preferences regarding government redistribution remains by comparison relatively circumscribed (cf. Seekings, 2008a; Roberts, 2006, 2014; Dixon et al., 2010a,b; Durrheim, 2010; Wegner & Pellicer, 2011; Dixon et al., 2017). In this chapter I therefore intend to

provide evidence that will contribute towards a better understanding of the extent of public support for the view that governments have a duty to reduce material disparities, and the relative stability of such beliefs over time. This will be followed in Chapter 6 by the examination of the factors associated with such redistribution preferences.

The idea of redistribution as an essential responsibility of the state – especially in a divided society – has a relatively long history in South Africa, predating the transition to democracy by at least a half-century. Redistribution was central to the conception of a social democratic welfare state that emerged and evolved within the country's democratic liberation movement (Van Niekerk, 2013; Dubow, 2014). This vision of the state and its attendant social responsibilities was oriented towards addressing the extreme inequalities borne by colonial, segregation and apartheid policies and practices. The crafting of the Atlantic Charter (1941) during the Second World War served as a catalyst for reflection and discussion on inclusive social policy and resulted in the ANC producing the *Africans' Claims* (1943) report, under the leadership of Dr. AB Xuma. The Bill of Rights included in the document called for universal political, civil and social rights to *all* citizens in the country. Although it was ultimately rejected by the Smuts government, the redistributive social policy proposals contained in the report marked the rise of social citizenship and welfare state discourse within the opposition liberation movement.

With the 1948 National Party electoral victory and the rise of apartheid policies and social engineering in the late 1940s and early 1950s, mounting campaigning and resistance saw an increasing emphasis on political rights relative to social policies. The adoption of the *Freedom Charter* by the ANC and its Congress Alliance partners,[31] at the Congress of the People that was convened in June 1955 in Kliptown, Johannesburg, following a process of widespread consultation was another pivotal development. The Charter articulated a vision of a non-racial, democratic society characterised by equal opportunities for all people and some redistribution of wealth. Although It remained the manifesto "at the heart of Congress campaigning" in subsequent decades (Beinart 2001:155) that, taken together with the *Africans' Claims*, has arguably had an appreciable influence on the ANC government's post-apartheid policy and planning, as well as the bill, of rights in the Constitution of South Africa (Asmal et al., 2005; Dubow, 2014). As Hirsch (2005: 32) emphasises, "the Freedom Charter

[31] These allies were the Coloured People's Organisation, the Indian Congress, and the Congress of Democrats.

remained the ANC's only broad statement of social and economic policy until May 1992 when a huge, representative ANC conference in Johannesburg endorsed the 'Ready to Govern' policy" (ANC, 1992).

In the early 1990s, following the unbanning of the ANC and SACP and parallel to the political negotiations that paved the way for the historic 1994 elections, attention increasingly focused on the policy framework that would govern the transition to a democratic society. Redistribution remained a notable element in these deliberations on the appropriate role of the state in a democratic South Africa. In May 1990, members of the ANC met at a conference in Harare to develop recommendations on post-apartheid economic policy. The resulting Harare Declaration - effectively a preliminary discussion document - suggested that the democratic, non-racial state in the country pursue an economic strategy that would strive to "achieve economic growth through a process of increasing equality in the distribution of incomes, wealth and economic power" as a basis for addressing the basic needs of the population (Harare Declaration, 1990; Hirsch 2005; Freund, 2013). This principle of economic growth through redistribution was again reflected in the ANC's *Ready to Govern* document (ANC, 1992), in which the government was seen as instrumental in implementing redistribution programmes focused on *inter alia* basic service provision, low-cost housing and infrastructure, in addition to restructuring the economy to ensure sustainable growth and development. Concerns about the economic capacity within the ANC led to the establishment in late 1991 of the Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG), an institute designed to coordinate the party's economic research and offer the training required to produce a new generation of black African economists (Gumede 2007). The MERG report (MERG, 1993) and the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (ANC, 1994), provided for a range of socio-democratic, post-Keynesian proposals for bringing about redress and transformation in order to ensure that the government's core strategic priority remained the "rapid improvement in the quality of life of the poorest, most oppressed and disadvantaged people" (MERG, 1993: 2; ANC, 1994: 7).

Following the ANC government's election into power following the first democratic elections in 1994, the trajectory of economic policy in the country took a decidedly different turn. Despite the state-driven programme of development directed at alleviating the legacy of poverty and inequality, the ANC government formulated a fairly orthodox neo-liberal macroeconomic policy package. Some have contended that the tensions were already present

in the RDP manifesto document, which attempted to blend the ANC's traditional social democratic and socialist values, such as redistribution and basic needs provision, with certain newer neoliberal policies such as trade and financial liberalization (Padayachee, 2005). The adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) in 1996 – which differed substantively from the original developmental ethos of the RDP – entailed stringent measures to maintain fiscal discipline as a means to deficit reduction and stimulating economic growth. While the rationale for this policy shift continues to be vigorously debated, the emphasis on economic growth laying the basis for the reduction of unemployment and a more equitable distribution of income and wealth came to be increasingly challenged. These decisions have defined the character of economic and social policy in the country over the two decades, as well as the ensuing tensions and debates around the vision of society that is desired by the public and elites alike (MERG, 1993; Adelzadeh, 1996; Habib & Padayachee, 2000; Hirsch, 2005; Magasela, 2006; Marais, 2013; Padayachee, 2016; Fine, 2010, 2012; Van Niekerk, 2008, 2013; Padayachee & Van Niekerk, 2017; Gumede, 2017).

Against this background, this chapter focuses explicitly on the level of support among the South African mass public for the principle of government-led intervention to redistribute income as the basis for bringing about reductions in inequality in the country. In the next section, the conceptual and empirical literature pertaining to preferences for political redistribution is reviewed. This includes a discussion of the relative contribution of rational choice and economic self-interest, social mobility, justice beliefs, ideology and social identity, as well as political trust in informing individual preferences for the government assuming the responsibility of reducing societal inequality and promoting justice. A number of hypotheses are subsequently articulated as a basis for guiding the analysis of the South African case that is presented both in this chapter and chapter 6. The chapter then moves from theoretical expectations to patterns of support for political redistribution since the early 2000s, focusing on aggregate patterns of stability or attitudinal change, the cross-national positioning of South African beliefs in this regard, and the extent to which South Africans are united in their preferences for redistribution in principle. This leads into an examination of evidence concerning the relative placement of redistribution among other roles and responsibilities that the public expects government to fulfil as an integral part of its mandate. The chapter concludes with a summary of the main findings from the analysis of the repeat cross-sectional and comparative data, thus providing a firm empirical basis for the

multivariate testing of individual determinants of support for government-led redistribution in Chapter 6.

## 5.2 Individual determinants of redistribution preferences: A review

### 5.2.1 Rational choice and economic self-interest

Over the last two decades, there has emerged a considerable body of empirical work, most especially in the sociological and economics fields, focusing on the nature of public demand for government redistribution in addition to the individual-level predictors that shape such preferences. The theoretical starting point for many studies in this tradition draws on the 'median-voter' model of redistributive taxation, as developed by Romer (1975) and Roberts (1977) and subsequently refined by Meltzer and Richard (1981). According to the Meltzer-Richard redistribution model, the extent of government taxation and redistributive public spending are positively related to level of income inequality. In a context of majority rule, citizens vote for the policy that would ultimately serve to maximise their own welfare, signifying that societies where median income falls considerably below the national average are expected to display a greater desire for redress. As such, one would expect individuals with a below-average income to opt for higher levels of taxation and greater redistribution, since this would yield direct benefits in the form of greater social spending. Conversely, wealthy citizens are likely to be less inclined to express support for redistribution relative to poor and middle-class constituencies, since from a self-interested perspective they are likely to disproportionately bear the cost associated with such interventions. The logic of this rational choice approach also dictates that in times of rising inequality, the desire for redistributive social policy would also display a commensurate increase, which in liberal democracies would in turn yield greater redistribution in response to the median voter's demands (Georgiadis & Manning, 2012).

Empirical testing has however tended to demonstrate limited or inconclusive support in practice for the median voter or self-interest argument. An inconsistent or insignificant relationship between individual socioeconomic position and preferences for redistribution has been found in a variety of contexts, ranging from the United States (Fong, 2001), to samples of affluent OECD countries (Kenworthy & McCall, 2008) and developing nations (Haggard et al, 2013). Some support for the self-interest hypothesis can be found in examples from

cross-national studies in Latin America (Gaviria, 2007; Cramer & Kaufman, 2011) and Europe (Kenworthy & Pontusson, 2005; Finseraas, 2009), as well as individual country case studies such as the UK (Georgiadis & Manning, 2012). However, in spite of this so-called 'paradox of redistribution, the general message emanating from this growing body of research is that people do not draw appreciably on material self-interest in making personal evaluations about redistribution. This has prompted the identification and testing of a variety of other attitudes and beliefs to determine their relative explanatory power in shaping the demand for redistribution in societies.

> *H1: In the South African context, it is envisaged that individual material circumstances will not demonstrate a significant association with preferences for political redistribution.*

### 5.2.2 Past mobility and future expectations

One of the theoretical developments that emerged as an extension of the self-interested median voter model concentrates on the role of social mobility in informing views of the costs of redistribution (Hirschman & Rothschild, 1973; Piketty, 1999). Conceptual work in this tradition has typically assumed two predominant forms, namely the influence of mobility history or experience and expectations of future mobility. As Piketty (1995) contends in his construction of a rational learning theory, a person's mobility experience is seen to play an indelible role in communicating information and lessons about the relative significance of individual effort versus predetermined factors in driving individual economic progress. This, in turn, is expected to engender differential perspectives on political attitudes such as redistribution. Over the last two decades, increasing attention has been devoted to the role of inter-temporal dynamics and, in practice, subjective measures of intergenerational mobility have tended to be employed as proxies to assess the effect on redistribution (e.g. Corneo & Grüner, 2002; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005). The literature has not however exclusively focused on retrospective evaluations, with attention also being afforded to perceptions of future social mobility. Of particular note, Bénabou and Ok (2001) departed from the conventional self-interest model by developing the 'prospect of upward mobility' (POUM) hypothesis. Drawing on Hirschman and Rothschild's (1973) notion of the 'tunnel effect', the POUM hypothesis formalises the idea that citizens with below-average income may not support a high degree of redistribution due to a resolute belief that they or their children may

achieve success and rise up the income distribution. Conversely, if poor citizens do not anticipate upward prospects, then they would be expected to display a more favourable position on governmental redistribution.

How well has social mobility held up to empirical scrutiny? Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) found evidence for the POUM hypothesis in Russia in the mid-1990s, where demand for redistribution was strongest among those anticipating their economic wellbeing to decline over time, whereas those who reported experiencing material gains and expected further improvement in future were least supportive. Further credence for the mobility prospects hypothesis comes from individual country studies conducted in the Unites States (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina & Giuliano, 2009), experimental studies (Checchi & Filippin, 2004; Neudstadt & Zweifel, 2010), as well as cross-country investigations (Cojocaru, 2012, 2014).[32] A more nuanced view comes from Latin America, where Silva & Figueiredo (2013) use 2007 Latinobarómetro data to reveal that demand for redistribution is informed by past mobility together with self-interest and perceptions of fairness, but that the POUM hypothesis does not hold in this regional context.[33] Similar lack of support for mobility prospects combined with the significance of mobility experience is evident from two recent German studies (Pfarr, 2012; Siedler & Sonnenberg, 2012).[34] The salience of mobility history was further verified in a number of other national and comparative examinations (e.g. Gaviria, 2007; Guillaud, 2013; Dabalen et al., 2015) but inconsistent or refuted in others (e.g. Corneo, 2001). In general, despite some of the inconsistencies evident across the burgeoning empirical literature testing the relevance of social mobility, there exists fairly wide-ranging support for the contributory role of past and future mobility in shaping redistribution preferences.

[32] The analysis undertaken by Cojocaru (2012, 2014) utilises data for a large sample of countries that allows for one of the best direct tests to date of the POUM hypothesis as originally articulated by Bénabou and Ok (2001). Interestingly, the results demonstrate that the theoretical expectations hold for EU member states but not for non-EU former Socialist countries.

[33] These results find confirmation in the Latinobarómetro work by Daude and Melguizo (2010), which indicates that the POUM hypothesis does not emerge as a notable factor in determining willingness to pay taxes. Gaviria (2007) also finds that strong self-interest motives underlie support for redistribution in the region, as well as the presence of a significant relationship with past mobility (but not future prospects).

[34] In these cases, the evidence also did not support the Meltzer-Richard self-interest hypothesis in predicting redistribution preferences.

*H2: Both mobility experience and expectations of future mobility will significantly interact with preferences for state-led redistribution in South Africa.*

### 5.2.3 Beliefs about inequality and fairness

Apart from the economic self-interest and social mobility arguments, a third cluster of motivational factors that have been examined in the literature concentrate on measures relating to personal beliefs about inequality and the structuring of society. Of particular note are the perceived awareness of and aversion to inequality (Lübker, 2007; Kenworthy & McCall, 2008), as well as beliefs about the factors that govern economic achievement and associated considerations of fairness (Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Fong, 2001; Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Alesina & Angeletos, 2005; Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Gaviria, 2007; Pittau et al., 2013; Guillard, 2013). An influential study by Fong (2001) tests a range of values and beliefs about distributive justice on preferences for redistribution in the US. Her analysis included items on the salience of effort versus luck as causes of poverty and inequality, views on the level of opportunity to work hard and succeed in society, questions on the importance of various factors in getting ahead in life, as well as beliefs about the prevalence of poverty in the country. The modelling results revealed that the effect of these beliefs was almost equivalent in size to the effect of measures of self-interest. Specifically, individuals expressed greater support for redistribution if they believed opportunity for economic achievement was influenced particularly by family background, such as wealth, education and parental character, or other factors beyond personal control, such as luck. Awareness of poverty was positively associated with demand for redistribution, while a conviction that there is plenty of opportunity to get ahead and that hard work, initiative and risk-taking is instrumental to success in life were inversely related.

A number of other studies have also produced similar findings about beliefs pertaining to equality of opportunities, with greater aversion to governmental redistribution among those viewing effort and merit as decisive factors informing life chances and higher support for intervention in cases where people perceive unfairness in the distribution of opportunity due to ascription and other related factors. These include corroborative evidence in America (Corneo & Gruner, 2002; Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005), while a number of comparative studies have been undertaken that cover a variety of world regions

and further confirm the relevance of values and beliefs to public preferences for redistribution (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Alesina & Angeletos, 2005; Gaviria, 2007). In addition, Lübker (2007) finds measures of inequality aversion, which was discussed in detail in Chapter 3, are a strong predictor of views of government-led redistribution.

*H3(a): Awareness of inequality and beliefs about its adverse effects on South Africa society will create a stronger demand for state-led redress.*

*H3(b): Those believing that effort and ability determine socioeconomic success in South Africa will be less partial to government redistribution, while those believing that exogenous factors (such as family background, connections, and luck) will display a more favourable attitude towards redistribution.*

### 5.2.4 Ideology and social identity

Despite a certain amount of academic scepticism regarding the relative influence of ideology in people's lives, survey evidence is increasingly demonstrating that ideology can serve as a predictor of individual beliefs, attitudes and behaviours (Jost et al., 2003a,b; Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2008). One of the most noteworthy findings of recent political ideology studies that have examined the left-right (or liberal-conservative) distinction is the salience of differences in two core dimensions, namely attitudes towards inequality and attitudes towards social change versus tradition. Accordingly, conservatives tend to resist social change, voicing preference for tradition, conformity, order, stability, traditional values, hierarchy, and justification of the status quo. By contrast, liberals tend to emphasise social progress, equality, flexibility, and feminism.

A number of studies have also demonstrated sizable differences in the economic attitudes of the supporters of different political parties. Such political polarization in social values has, for instance, been identified in the United States, with Republicans tending to be considerably and persistently more opposed to a state role in redistributing income than Democrats (Fuller & Geide-Stevenson, 2007; Bartels, 2008). However, a contrasting picture emerges from recent studies conducted in the European context, where partisanship seems to be losing its salience as a factor informing preferences regarding inequality and redistribution. This certainly appears to be the case in the UK (Adams et al., 2012b; Evans & Tilley, 2012; Evans

& Neundorf, 2013), the Netherlands (Adams et al., 2012a) and Germany (Munzert & Bauer, 2013). In the South African context, redistribution has served as one of the core policy principles of the African National Congress since it came to power in 1994.[35] The majority of opposition parties tend, on average, to be more centrist or right in policy outlook.[36] As such, the expectation would be for ANC supporters to voice greater support for state-led redistribution that opposition party supporters.

> *H4(a): Ideological self-placement on a left-right (liberalism-conservatism) scale will inform support for political redistribution, with greater liberalism associated with more accepting views for this principle compared with those reporting conservative tendencies.*

> *H4(b): Political identification will matter for redistributive preferences, with ANC supporters expressing more favourable views than those identifying with other parties.*

Apart from the potential role of ideological factors, resistance to the idea of redistribution by the government in South Africa could also be motivated by social identity and racial attitudes. One of the core tenets of social identity theory is that individuals tend to categorise other people into in-groups ("us") and out-groups ("them"). The act of classifying people as belonging to such groups has been shown to produce various effects, most notably in-group favouritism, which influences the manner in which people are treated (Taylor, Peplau & Sears, 2006). Accordingly, people are likely to be more greatly inclined to redistribute to groups that they identify with, and conversely place lesser emphasis on redistribution in situations where the majority of recipients are perceived as out-group members (Costa-Font & Cowell, 2015). Research on opposition to racial policies has, for instance, tended to demonstrate that while individual self-interest has relatively limited explanatory power, collective self-interest exerts a greater influence (Bobo, 1983; Bobo & Tuan, 2006; Durrheim, 2010). The expectation would be that out-group prejudice, in-group identification and favouritism, a sense of racial threat and distrust, as well as feeling personally and collectively racially discriminated against would all play a role in deciding on whether or not

[35] Although, as previously discussed, the post-apartheid economic policy in practice has been critiqued for being neoliberal in character, a trait described by Bond (2004) as 'talking left' while 'walking right'.
[36] One notable exception is the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which contested a national election for the first time since formation in May 2013 and espouses strong support for more expansive redistributive policy.

government should implement redistributive interventions. In addition, in line with contact theory, it is hypothesised that greater interracial contact might shape views on redistribution. It is probably not just the frequency of contact but also the nature of contact that is relevant, as hierarchical power relations are likely to have a bearing on many forms of interracial contact. As such, the expectation is that having more friends across racial lines and reporting that the interaction with other race groups tends be positive in general would result in greater support for redistribution, especially for economic and power elites.

> *H4(c): Racial attitudes and contact (out-group prejudice, in-group identification, racial threat, racial discrimination, racial distrust, extent and quality of racial contact) will matter for redistributive preferences. An inverse effect is expected for out-group prejudice, in-group identification and racial threat, while a positive association is envisaged for racial discrimination, extent and quality of racial contact.*

### 5.2.5 Confidence in government

One relatively under-examined aspect in the literature on attitudes towards government-led redistribution is the effect of confidence (or distrust) in government. It has been claimed that the functioning of the political system and its core institutions matters fundamentally for individual support or opposition to distributive social policies pursued by the state (e.g. Steinmo, 1994; Edlund, 1999). So the question remains whether citizens that are more distrusting of government possess views on redistribution that are appreciably different from those vesting confidence in the state? This line of questioning is arguably important in a country such as South Africa, where a number of core attitudinal indicators on democracy and governance have displayed a discernible downward trend over the last decade alongside growing concerns over state corruption and its effect on efficiency and accountability (Roberts et al, 2014, 2017; Struwig et al, 2014).

The available body of research on the link between political trust and redistribution preferences is somewhat inconsistent in nature, though on balance the evidence suggests that such an association is present. Edlund (1999) examines data from Norway and the USA and finds rather unconvincing evidence for the political trust argument, according to which the effectiveness of political decision-making institutions inspires trust in the government and, in

turn, individual preferences for state responsibilities. Several years later, a similarly weak effect was observed in the case of Sweden (Edlund, 2006). By contrast, Chanley et al. (2000) examine times series data from the U.S. covering 1980 to 1997 and find a positive relationship between trust in the government and public willingness to support additional government spending and activity in policy domains such education, health care, and social security. Recent research by Algan et al (2011, 2016) using European Social Survey (ESS) data found that trust in political institutions (parliament, politicians and the legal system) exhibited a distinct positive association with the demand for redistribution[37], with the size of the coefficient similar to that of social trust.

> *H5: Trust in government will demonstrate a positive relationship with preferences for redistribution.*

### 5.3 Data and methods

The analysis that will be presented in this chapter derives primarily from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The ISSP was established in 1984 by a consortium initially consisting of four member countries, namely Britain, the United States, Germany and Australia, but with membership increasing incrementally to 48 countries by 2013. Although the majority of the member nations in ISSP are either from Europe and Central Asia or are high income OECD countries, other world regions as well as newly industrialised and developing countries are increasingly being included.[38] South Africa remains the only representative from the African continent. As a longitudinal programme of voluntary cross-national collaboration, the programme administers annual surveys on topics deemed to be of significance to the social sciences, with modules designed to be replicated on a periodic basis (typically decennial) to allow for the examination of processes of underlying value change. The ISSP is one of the more reliable and widely-employed data series for analysis pertaining to redistribution preferences, especially the *Social Inequality* module, which to date has been

[37] The dependent variable aimed to capture support for government redistribution is based on a question that asks respondents to indicate whether they would prefer government to increase taxes and spend more on social benefits and services, or alternatively decrease taxes and spend less on social benefits and services.
[38] For instance China, Philippines and Taiwan are members from East Asia and the Pacific, while six participating countries are from Latin America and the Caribbean – Argentina, Chile, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela.

fielded in four annual rounds, namely in 1987, 1992, 1999 and most recently in 2009.[39] South Africa became a formal member of the ISSP in 2003, with each of the cross-national modules being fielded as part of the annual round of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) by the Human Sciences Research Council. Given that the country only participated in the 2009 round of the ISSP Social Inequality module, data corresponding to this single cross-section will be the focus of this chapter.

The ISSP module fielded in the 2009 SASAS round included several items that relate to redistribution preferences. The most commonly used indicator in the literature on redistribution preferences (e.g. Corneo & Grüner, 2000, 2002; Linos & West, 2003; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005) asks respondents whether they support or oppose the view that "it is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes", and this is employed as the main dependent variable for the analysis presented in this chapter. Responses to this item are captured using a standard five-point agreement scale, ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". Apart from being included in the 2009 ISSP module, this measure has been a core indicator in every annual round of SASAS since 2006, allowing us to again see how stable preferences have remained over more than a decade.[40] To further contextualise the views on the role of government in redistributing income in the country, we will also analyse data from the 2006 ISSP module *Role of Government IV*, which included questions on whether respondents favoured state responsibility or intervention in ten notable policy areas. A fuller outline of these measures will be provided in the next section.

With regard to testing the determinants of attitudes towards government redistribution in South Africa against the theoretical approaches and hypotheses outlined earlier, the ISSP/SASAS 2009 data contain a fairly wide range of indicators to draw on. Several measures were identified for modelling purposes as the basis for testing the importance of *individual material self-interest* in informing such beliefs. Age is included to capture position in the life-cycle, and both age in years and age-squared will be used since a non-linear

[39] The number of participating countries in each of these four Social Inequality modules was 10, 18, 27 and 40 respectively. South Africa is currently chairing the drafting team preparing the module for the 2019 ISSP replication.

[40] Based on a review of the literature using this ISSP item as a dependent variable, this appears to be one of the few developing country contexts where it has been included annually over such a long time period. A functionally equivalent measure has been included in each biennial round of the European Social Survey since 2002.

relationship is anticipated whereby young and old respondents are expected to be in a more vulnerable market position and thus express more favourable views on redistribution. A dummy variable for female respondents is included to capture possible gender-based differences in the pattern of responses. As Svallfors (1999:249) asserts, the experiences of women may have socialised them to be more likely to exhibit a 'rationality of caring' that emphasises concern for the wellbeing of others, as well as devotion.

## 5.4 Support for state led redress in principle

The statistics presented in Table 14 provide convincing evidence that, on average, South Africans exhibit a strong preference for redistribution and vest support in the government to reduce material differences between the rich and poor. In 2016, slightly over two-thirds (69%) reported a preference for government-led income redistribution with less than a fifth (15%) opposing it. Over the full 2006-2016 interval, an average of 70 per cent favoured state-led redress compared with only 16 per cent expressing unfavourable views. There are nonetheless signs that shifts in preference have occurred over the period, but such fluctuation has not altered the normative viewpoint. In 2006 there was an overwhelming demand for redistribution, common to nearly eight in ten (78%) South Africans, but by 2011 this had dropped by approximately 17 percentage points.

**Table 14: Attitudes towards government redistribution of income (2006-2016, column % and mean scores)**

| **"Responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes"** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **2006** | **2007** | **2008** | **2009** | **2010** | **2011** | **2012** | **2013** | **2014** | **2015** | **2016** | **All years** |
| Strongly agree | 35 | 31 | 28 | 26 | 25 | 23 | 26 | 24 | 27 | 32 | 25 | 27 |
| Agree | 43 | 39 | 37 | 44 | 45 | 38 | 40 | 45 | 43 | 44 | 44 | 42 |
| Neutral | 7 | 12 | 13 | 12 | 11 | 15 | 15 | 10 | 14 | 9 | 15 | 12 |
| Disagree | 9 | 11 | 13 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 13 | 15 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| Strongly disagree | 2 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (Do not know) | 3 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| % total agreement | 78 | 70 | 65 | 70 | 70 | 61 | 66 | 69 | 70 | 76 | 69 | 70 |
| Mean score * | 4.00 | 3.83 | 3.73 | 3.78 | 3.74 | 3.58 | 3.70 | 3.72 | 3.81 | 3.90 | 3.76 | 3.78 |
| Base N | 2934 | 3162 | 3307 | 3286 | 3156 | 3014 | 2471 | 2829 | 3103 | 3077 | 3044 | 33383 |

Source: HSRC SASAS 2003-2016

Note: * The mean scores are based on a reversed scale, where 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree, such that higher values represent greater support for government-led redistribution. 'Do not know' responses were combined with neutral responses.

Furthermore, if we look at the "strong agreement" category, we find that the share of the adult population that professes a strong preference for political redistribution also fell from 35 to 23 per cent between 2006 and 2011. After 2011, a rise in support for state-led redistribution is nonetheless observed, increasing on aggregate from 61% in 2011 to 76% in 2015. Lastly, it seems that there has been a relative tapering off in support between 2015 and 2016, though it is not yet clear whether this is the start of a new declining tendency, a short-lived downturn, or the onset of less stability in attitudes towards the role of the state in relation to redress policies. Certainly, it is an indicator to monitor closely in coming years.

Additional empirical evidence suggests that views on state-led redistribution may have fallen from an even higher level since the early 2000s, if one factors in results covering the period between 2003 and 2006. Unfortunately, the identical redistribution preference measure was not employed in the SASAS survey rounds conducted during this interval, hence the need for a degree of caution in drawing direct comparisons and interpreting trends. The specific statement posed to respondents was as follows: "Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for", with the same five-point agreement scale used. This is a more diffuse measure that does not explicitly mention reducing income disparities, and instead refers to a heightened state role in ensuring that the basic needs of all citizens, irrespective of societal position, are addressed. In late 2003, nine in ten South Africans believed the state ought to assume a greater role in basic needs provisioning (Figure 9).

Between 2003 and 2005 the share of the adult population holding this perspective began to fall, dropping ten per cent in two years before a slight reversal in 2006. This was the year that the new government redistribution measure was introduced. Assuming there is a reasonable association between the two different measures,[41] then it would appear that support for state-led redistribution may have fallen by as much as 25 percentage points in the five years between 2003 and 2008, before levelling off and fluctuating in a more narrow range over the 2009 to 2014 period. Since 2011, support for government redistribution score (based on percentage agreement and mean scores) has started to swing upwards again, though these differences over the 2012-2014 interval are not large enough to achieve statistical

[41] It is not possible to definitively comment on how heroic an assumption this is, given that the measures were fielded in separate versions of the SASAS questionnaire that were administered in late 2006. At a more superficial level, the weighted frequency distributions for each of the two measures are relatively similar. The share reporting total agreement is 83% versus 78%, while the share disagreeing with an expanded state role was 8% compared with 11%. Neutral views were held by 8% and 7% respectively, while 1% and 3% said they did not know how to respond.

significance. Significance was achieved in 2015, but fell away again with the 2016 survey round. The finding that support for redistribution has shown a declining trend while aversion to inequality has remained at consistently high levels is particularly noteworthy and is likely to be the subject of robust debate and analysis, most especially in relation to the possible determinants of this change.

**Figure 9: Support for state-led redistribution, 2003-2016 (% total agreement and mean scores)**




Source: Own analysis based on HSRC SASAS 2003-2016
Note: The mean scores in (b) are based on a reversed scale, where 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree, such that higher values represent greater support for government-led redistribution. 'Do not know' responses were combined with neutral responses.

### 5.4.1 South Africa in relative perspective

How similar or discrepant are the preferences of South Africans in relation to government-led income redistribution compared to citizens from other societies? Since the question on government responsibility for reducing income disparities formed part of the 2009 International Social Survey Programme *Social Inequality IV* module, it is possible to examine South African inequality attitudes in comparative perspective. Of the forty countries participating in the ISSP survey round, South Africa was ranked 25$^{th}$ based on its political redistribution score (3.78), placing it alongside countries such as Belgium, Chile and the Czech Republic (Table 15).

**Table 15: Cross-national comparison of attitudes towards government redistribution of income (ISSP 2009), ranked from highest to lowest mean score**

| Country | Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly disagree | Total | Mean | Country rank | Obs. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ukraine | 64 | 26 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 100 | 4.45 | 1 | 2012 |
| Portugal | 52 | 40 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 100 | 4.38 | 2 | 1000 |
| Italy | 58 | 30 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 100 | 4.36 | 3 | 1065 |
| Hungary | 55 | 29 | 13 | 2 | 1 | 100 | 4.35 | 4 | 1009 |
| Turkey | 45 | 47 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 100 | 4.34 | 5 | 1534 |
| Russia | 54 | 34 | 8 | 3 | 0 | 100 | 4.34 | 6 | 1603 |
| Slovenia | 48 | 43 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 100 | 4.33 | 7 | 1060 |
| Croatia | 46 | 42 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 100 | 4.26 | 8 | 1192 |
| Latvia | 45 | 41 | 10 | 4 | 0 | 100 | 4.24 | 9 | 1069 |
| France | 52 | 27 | 13 | 7 | 2 | 100 | 4.17 | 10 | 2799 |
| Israel | 45 | 33 | 13 | 7 | 2 | 100 | 4.12 | 11 | 1189 |
| Bulgaria | 45 | 37 | 12 | 5 | 2 | 100 | 4.07 | 12 | 1000 |
| Slovakia | 39 | 38 | 15 | 6 | 2 | 100 | 4.03 | 13 | 1155 |
| Estonia | 42 | 35 | 12 | 9 | 3 | 100 | 4.03 | 14 | 1005 |
| Argentina | 30 | 55 | 8 | 6 | 1 | 100 | 4.02 | 15 | 1133 |
| Poland | 39 | 40 | 10 | 9 | 2 | 100 | 4.02 | 16 | 1263 |
| Spain | 26 | 53 | 12 | 7 | 1 | 100 | 3.96 | 17 | 1194 |
| China | 25 | 55 | 13 | 7 | 0 | 100 | 3.95 | 18 | 3008 |
| South Korea | 29 | 46 | 15 | 8 | 2 | 100 | 3.91 | 19 | 1599 |
| Austria | 33 | 43 | 12 | 10 | 3 | 100 | 3.88 | 20 | 1019 |
| Finland | 32 | 42 | 12 | 11 | 3 | 100 | 3.86 | 21 | 865 |
| Iceland | 27 | 45 | 15 | 11 | 2 | 100 | 3.84 | 22 | 946 |
| Chile | 20 | 52 | 18 | 8 | 2 | 100 | 3.81 | 23 | 1500 |
| Belgium | 24 | 50 | 13 | 10 | 4 | 100 | 3.79 | 24 | 1099 |
| South Africa | 27 | 45 | 12 | 13 | 3 | 100 | 3.78 | 25 | 3286 |
| Czech Rep. | 31 | 34 | 16 | 14 | 5 | 100 | 3.71 | 26 | 1205 |
| Cyprus | 20 | 48 | 18 | 11 | 4 | 100 | 3.67 | 27 | 1000 |
| Germany | 28 | 37 | 14 | 15 | 5 | 100 | 3.66 | 28 | 1383 |
| Taiwan | 18 | 48 | 12 | 20 | 2 | 100 | 3.60 | 29 | 2026 |
| Great Britain | 18 | 42 | 22 | 14 | 4 | 100 | 3.57 | 30 | 945 |
| Switzerland | 18 | 47 | 12 | 18 | 5 | 100 | 3.53 | 31 | 1229 |
| Sweden | 21 | 37 | 24 | 12 | 6 | 100 | 3.52 | 32 | 1121 |
| Japan | 25 | 29 | 29 | 8 | 8 | 100 | 3.51 | 33 | 1291 |
| Venezuela | 18 | 38 | 22 | 17 | 6 | 100 | 3.44 | 34 | 994 |
| Philippines | 20 | 32 | 22 | 19 | 8 | 100 | 3.36 | 35 | 1200 |
| Australia | 20 | 32 | 20 | 21 | 7 | 100 | 3.36 | 36 | 1472 |
| Norway | 9 | 43 | 24 | 20 | 4 | 100 | 3.33 | 37 | 1430 |
| Denmark | 24 | 29 | 14 | 16 | 16 | 100 | 3.29 | 38 | 1491 |
| New Zealand | 12 | 29 | 24 | 25 | 10 | 100 | 3.08 | 39 | 915 |
| USA | 7 | 24 | 16 | 32 | 21 | 100 | 2.67 | 40 | 1578 |
| All countries | 32 | 40 | 14 | 11 | 4 | 100 | 3.85 | | 54884 |

Source: ISSP 2009, Social Inequality IV.

At the top end of the distribution, we find Ukraine with a mean of 4.45 on the five-point scale and 90 per cent of citizens agreeing that government should reduce income disparities in the country. Of the top ten ranked countries, a further four are from Eastern Europe (Hungary, Russia, Slovenia and Croatia), with the southern European states of Portugal and Italy ranked second and third. The only Western European country to feature in the top ten ranked countries is France, which is placed considerably higher than the next highest country from this subregion, namely Austria in 20$^{th}$ position. As with South Africa, the three Latin American nations included in the sample also do not rank as highly as one might anticipate. Argentina is placed 15$^{th}$, followed by Chile in 23$^{rd}$ position and Venezuela in 34$^{th}$ place. At

the other end of the league table, we find the lowest public support for state-led redistribution in the United States (31 per cent, mean=2.67). The three Scandinavian kingdoms of Denmark, Norway and Sweden are all represented in the bottom ten countries, as are the Oceanic nations of New Zealand (39th) and Australia (36th). Countries with relatively high levels of income inequality such as the Philippines and Venezuela are also found in this cluster.

**Figure 10: Support for state-led redistribution and inequality in comparative perspective, 2009**




Source: ISSP 2009; World Bank World Development Indicators
Note: Mean support for redistribution is measured using a reversed agreement scale, ranging from 1=strong disagreement and 5=strong agreement.

These findings raise a fundamental question: Do more unequal societies such as South Africa generally have a stronger appetite for redistribution? Using the 2009 ISSP data, Figure 10 confirms that support for redistribution in principle is unrelated to the level of income inequality in countries. Therefore countries like South Africa or Chile have mean redistribution preference scores that are not significantly different from low inequality Nordic countries such as Finland or Iceland, while countries such as Venezuela and the Philippines with GINI Index values exceeding 40 are towards the bottom of the league table in terms of level of support. The USA which also possesses one of the higher GINI Index values in the ISSP sample has the lowest mean redistribution support score (2.67).

If income inequality does not appear to have a strong relationship with views on government redistribution, what about the country's level of economic development? Using 2009

estimates of per capita gross national income (GNI, Atlas method) as the preferred measure of a society's level of economic development, we find a more distinct relationship with redistribution support (Figure 11). The downward slope of the regression line clearly shows that a preference for redistribution is more commonplace in less developed countries relative to those with a higher national income, confirming the finding by Roller (1995) in Western Europe that concern with the state's redistributive function and socio-economic inequality diminishes proportionately as national wealth and living standards rise. Nonetheless, the fairly wide scatter of the points on the graph nonetheless signifies that other factors beyond national income shape redress preferences (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009: xx-xxi).

**Figure 11: Support for state-led redistribution and levels of wealth in comparative perspective, 2009**




Source: ISSP 2009; World Bank World Development Indicators
Note: Mean support for redistribution is measured using a reversed agreement scale, ranging from 1=strong disagreement and 5=strong agreement.

Returning to the theme of changing preferences for political redistribution over time, it is important to examine whether the South African tendency towards lower support is reflected in the recent experiences of other countries. There are 23 countries with equivalent data in both 1999 and 2009 for the redistribution support measure. In Figure 12, the 1999 and 2009 mean redistribution scores are presented for these countries. Based on the classification approach detailed in Chapter 3, drawing upon the work of Page and Shapiro (1992) and Humpage (2015), redistribution preferences in eight countries remained in a steady range over the decade, while a further four demonstrated only slight changes (two falling and two

rising).[42] Of the remaining eleven cases, 9 experienced a moderate change in support, with seven showing a declining tendency and two an upswing.[43] Significant changes over the decade were only observed in France and Cyprus, and in both instances this entailed a rise in redistribution support by 11 percentage points.

**Figure 12: Changes in levels of support for state-led redistribution among select ISSP member states between 1999 and 2009 (mean scores, ranked highest to lowest based on 2009 results)**




Source: ISSP 1999 and 2009
Note: Mean support for redistribution is measured using a reversed agreement scale, ranging from 1=strong disagreement and 5=strong agreement.

If we compare the ISSP 1999-2009 patterns of change to that recorded in the biennial European Social Survey (ESS) series over the 2002-2016 period, we find that many of the assessed patterns of change between the two series are fully or broadly consistent (Appendix Table 5-1).[44] Only in a few instances can changes of a similar scale to South Africa be observed. In the case of Russia, there was a marked decline in support for redistribution between 1999 and 2016 (a fall of 20 percentage points from 86 to 66%), and this case most closely approximates the South African pattern. The Czech Republic is a similar example, with support falling close to 30 percentage points (from 72% to 44% between 1999 and

[42] The countries that displayed a steady trend were Australia, Israel, Japan, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden, while minor variations were present in Austria and Hungary (rising) as well as Bulgaria and the USA (falling).
[43] The moderate increases in support for government-led redistribution were observed in Slovenia and Latvia, while the countries with reduced support were Chile, Czech Republic, Great Britain, New Zealand Norway, Philippines, and Poland.
[44] The main exceptions to this were Austria and the UK.

2016).[45] In Cyprus and Germany, there were conversely significant increases in support (22% and 18% respectively).[46] Drawing together these findings, the change in support for redistribution in South Africa does appear noteworthy and places us among a select number of nations that have observed attitudinal change of this scale over an equivalent fifteen year time period.

### 5.4.2 Within-country variation in preferences for state-led redistribution in South Africa

Taking into account the observed pattern of change in levels of support for state-led redistribution since the early to mid-2000s, and the country's relative positioning in this regard, a key question that needs to be addressed is how consistent opinion is within the country and whether the aggregate change has been broadly or narrowly experienced. Unlike inequality aversion, the analysis in this section will demonstrate that South Africans tend to display less uniformity in their preferences relating to the role of government in redistributing income.

In Table 16, the percentage that support state-led redress over the 2006-2016 period across different social groups is presented, together with mean scores based on the full (reversed) five-point scale. The figures are based on the pooled or combined results for all eleven rounds of surveying conducted between 2006 and 2016, implying that the numbers represent the all-year averages for the different social groups. Analysing the data in this way, support for government redress is found to vary significantly on the basis of race, gender, educational attainment, employment status, self-rated poverty status, and geographic type.

The existence of distinct race and class differences is confirmed by means of Oneway ANOVA and post hoc Scheffe tests. Strong racial differences emerge, with black African and coloured South Africans reporting the highest support and white South Africans the greatest opposition to government redistribution. In terms of class, the poor are significantly more

[45] The full scale of change in the Czech Republic is not captured if one examines the two data series independently. This is because of fluctuations across years. Between the ISSP 1999 and 2009, the fall was by 7% while between 2002 and 2016 it was 6%. These moderate changes however become the more significant 28% decline when looking over the full 1999-2016 period.

[46] In Germany the increase is from 53% in 2002 to 71% in 2016, with a consistent upward trajectory over this interval. In Cyprus, the increase is from 57% in 1999 to 80% in 2014, though there have been ebbs and flows in this sentiment over time.

likely than the non-poor to voice support, with similar entrenched positions evident among those with primary or no schooling, the unemployed, and those in informal urban settlements and rural traditional authority areas. Despite these attitudinal disparities, it is nonetheless important to note that, on average, more than half of white, tertiary educated and non-poor South Africans are supportive of government redistribution in principle. While the results provide a sense of the scale of group-based variation on average over the full eleven-year interval, they fail to capture patterns of within-group change.

**Table 16: Attitudes towards government redistribution of income by socio-demographic attributes, pooled 2006-2016 data (% and mean)**

| | Total agreement (%) | Mean redress support score (1-5 scale) | ANOVA F | ANOVA P | Post hoc Scheffe | Base N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | 70 | 3.78 (*1.08*) | .... | .... | .... | 33383 |
| Born 1990 and after | 69 | 3.76 (*1.07*) | 1.18 | 0.3154 | .... | 3927 |
| 1980s | 70 | 3.78 (*1.08*) | | | | 7707 |
| 1970s | 70 | 3.80 (*1.10*) | | | | 6657 |
| 1960s | 69 | 3.77 (*1.08*) | | | | 5772 |
| 1950s | 68 | 3.76 (*1.08*) | | | | 4560 |
| 1940s | 71 | 3.78 (*1.10*) | | | | 3164 |
| Born before 1940 | 67 | 3.76 (*1.09*) | | | | 1557 |
| Male | 69 | 3.75 (*1.11*) | 16.75 | 0.0000 | Female> male | 13480 |
| Female | 70 | 3.80 (*1.06*) | | | | 19902 |
| African | 72 | 3.85 (*1.05*) | 264.02 | 0.0000 | Black African, coloured > | 19783 |
| Coloured | 70 | 3.81 (*1.04*) | | | Indian, white | 5666 |
| Indian | 58 | 3.46 (*1.20*) | | | | 3532 |
| White | 52 | 3.34 (*1.19*) | | | | 4394 |
| No schooling | 73 | 3.90 (*1.02*) | 117.59 | 0.0000 | Tertiary, matric < all other | 8471 |
| Primary | 73 | 3.89 (*1.01*) | | | categories | 12260 |
| Incomplete secondary | 73 | 3.85 (*1.05*) | | | | 12574 |
| Complete secondary | 68 | 3.72 (*1.09*) | | | | 1472 |
| Tertiary | 57 | 3.44 (*1.25*) | | | | 5475 |
| Employed | 67 | 3.69 (*1.13*) | 43.30 | 0.0000 | Unemployed > all; | 12140 |
| Unemployed | 73 | 3.87 (*1.04*) | | | Pensioners > employed, | 9823 |
| Pensioner | 70 | 3.79 (*1.08*) | | | students; | 3564 |
| Student | 67 | 3.71 (*1.10*) | | | Other labour inactive > | 11179 |
| Other labour inactive | 70 | 3.79 (*1.08*) | | | employed | 10150 |
| Poor | 78 | 3.99 (*0.98*) | 393.44 | 0.0000 | All differences are | 4622 |
| Just getting by | 71 | 3.80 (*1.05*) | | | significantly different | 2974 |
| Non-poor | 61 | 3.57 (*1.16*) | | | | 3377 |
| Urban formal | 67 | 3.72 (*1.11*) | 58.91 | 0.0000 | Rural traditional authority areas, informal urban settlements > formal urban areas, rural farms | 21425 |
| Urban informal | 74 | 3.88 (*1.04*) | | | | 2672 |
| Rural traditional authority areas | 74 | 3.89 (*1.03*) | | | | 6552 |
| Rural farms | 68 | 3.73 (*1.13*) | | | | 2734 |

Source: HSRC SASAS 2006-2016
Note: The mean scores are based on a reversed scale, where 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree, such that higher values represent greater support for government-led redistribution. Italicised figures in brackets alongside point estimates represent standard deviations.

In order to convey the spread of within-group attitudinal change over the time period, Figure 13 graphs the average level of support for government-led redistribution (the values

contained in the first column of Table 16), and then overlays this with: (i) the highest and lowest levels of agreement reported for each group over the 11-year period; and (ii) the total level of support recorded in the 2016 survey round. The decision to represent levels of agreement in percentages rather than mean scores is for interpretive ease, though the mean score version is presented in Appendix Figure 5-1. The minimum and maximum values show that there is a relatively significant degree of spread around the mean across years. The range of values nationally between 2006 and 2016 was 17 percentage points, with higher than average variance among Indian and white adults, those with a tertiary education, students and other labour inactive,[47] those born before 1940 (the eldest age cohort), and those residing on rural farms. We can also see from the graph that in many cases the 2016 mean scores approximate the all-year average. This is due to the observed u-shaped pattern in redistribution preferences over the period, which is present across many of the social groups examined (see Appendix Figure 5-2 for more detailed graphs). This u-curve is again characterised by an initial decline in support over the 2000s, followed by a relative upswing until around 2014, after which there is been an apparent tapering off in support. Whether this latter recent tendency is attributable to recent political developments and uncertainty in the country will have to be explored by others taking forward the present analysis. Certainly the recent downturn is shared by many social groups, which suggests a period effect emanating from general events of processes.[48]

There are clear exceptions to this general pattern. For instance, those with a tertiary education had distinctly higher than average redistribution score in 2016, which is a result of a fairly distinct upswing in support between 2012 and 2015. Similar, the 2016 redistribution scores for Indian adults and those born before 1940 were noticeably below their group means, which is due to the cumulative effect of the recent downswing in support. For instance, the level of support for government-led redistribution among Indian adults in 2014 was 3 percentage points higher than in 2006, but this support fell 18 percentage points between 2014 and 2016. Similarly, the 2015 level of support among those born before 1940 was virtually identical to that observed in 2006, but there was a precipitous 25 percentage point decline in support between 2015 and 2016. The fact that these outliers seem to be concentrated more among

[47] The category 'other labour inactive' mostly includes the sick and disabled, and those looking after the household.
[48] The period effect can be distinguished from age effects, which result from more specific processes related to aging or life-cycle status, and cohort effects, which involve differences that emerge due to the shared experiences or reactions of a particular cohort (Firebaugh, 1997).

older, better educated and materially better-off minorities is intriguing. It suggests that country's middle classes and elites may be particularly sensitive to changing contextual events that serve as cues that shape their attitudinal preferences. These are not always in a consistent manner – for some it seems to promote a tendency to lower appetite for a state role in redistribution and for others support seems to have been bolstered. The underlying causes are unfortunately not evident, but it does raise hypotheses regarding constraints on the size of government in the face of perceived corruption and inefficiency as well as possibility of elites voicing support for redistribution among elites as a means of class amelioration and promoting stability.

**Figure 13: Changes in levels of support for state-led redistribution by select socio-demographic attributes, 2006-2016 (average total agreement 2003-16 (%), lowest and highest values over the period, and 2016 total agreement (%), ranked from lowest to highest support based on pooled results)**




Source: HSRC SASAS 2006-2016
Note: Total agreement represents the percentage that either agreed to strongly agreed to the statement on support for government-led redistribution. The total agreement 2006-2016 values represent the average across the 11-year period for the different social groups. The vertical line denotes the South African average.

### 5.4.3 Beliefs about the scope of government: Income redistribution compared to other perceived state responsibilities

Another consideration in relation to preferences for state-led redistribution is how resolute public support for this role is relative to other possible responsibilities, both in South Africa

and cross-nationally. To achieve this, use can be made of data from the 2006 International Social Survey Programme's *Role of Government IV* module, which asked respondents from 33 countries including South Africa to indicate their support for ten different welfare responsibilities, including income redistribution. In addition, the South African replication of the module in 2016 will be examined to provide insight into the stability of attitudes over time.[49] The ISSP measure was phrased as follows: "On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to…"

(a.) ... provide a job for everyone who wants one

(b.) ... keep prices under control

(c.) ... provide health care for the sick

(d.) ... provide a decent standard of living for the old

(e.) ... provide industry with the help it needs to grow

(f.) ... provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed

(g.) ... reduce income differences between the rich and the poor

(h.) ... give financial help to university students from low-income families

(i.) ... provide decent housing for those who can't afford it

(j.) ... impose strict laws to make industry do less damage to the environment

For each of these statements, the response categories were "definitely should be", "probably should be", "probably should not be" and "definitely should not be".

These measures correspond to what Roller (1995) termed the 'range' of the role of government, which encompasses whether the state should assume certain developmental or welfare responsibilities and in specific in a number of policy areas (cf. van Oorschot, 2010). These data were examined with the purpose of: (i) gauging how the level of support for income redistribution among the South African public compares with opinion about other forms of state intervention in the country concerning social security and social justice; (ii) determining whether a similar pattern is evident internationally; and (iii) how South Africans' preferences for redistribution and other core services traditionally associated with the welfare state rank against opinion about the scope of government in other societies.

[49] The cross-national ISSP data for the 2016 round of the ISSP Role of Government module was not available at the time of completion of this chapter. It is likely that this data will become available during the course of 2018.

**Figure 14: Support for different government responsibilities in South Africa and ISSP member states, ranked from highest to lowest reported item averages for South Africa, 2006 (mean scores)**




Source: Own calculations based on ISSP 2006 Role of Government; HSRC SASAS 2006
Note: the mean scores are based on a reversed 4-point scale, where 1=”definitely should not be (government’s responsibility)”, 2=”probably should not be”, 3=”probably should be” and 4=”definitely should be”. The 2006 ISSP round involved 33 participating countries, including South Africa. The highest and lowest scores refer to the maximum and minimum reported country-level values on each areas of responsibility, in order to convey a sense of the upper and lower bounds and where South African fits in relation to these.

In Figure 14, the mean responses across the ten government responsibility areas are presented for South Africa together with the all-country average for the participating ISSP nations in the 2006 round of the series. For interpretive ease, the scale codes have been reversed so that large values represent greater support for a state role. In addition, the mean scores have been ranked from highest to lowest based on the responses from the South African adult public. The first observation of note from the graph concerns the relative strength and ordering of preferences for state responsibilities in the domestic context. The mean scores are all high, ranging from 3.64 out of a maximum of four with respect to health care for the sick to a low of 3.18 for reducing income differences between the rich and poor. This suggests that, in general, there exists broad-based support for the core responsibilities and services associated with the developmental welfare state, such as health, education, housing and social security for vulnerable groups such as the elderly, unemployed and sick. The lowest support in the South African case is observed for a government role in income redistribution, providing a decent standard of living for the unemployed, as well as environmental protection. Yet, even in these instances, the share of the public stating that these should ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’

constitute responsibilities of the government approaches 90 per cent (84%, 88% and 89% respectively).

While in the South African case, support for the principle of government redistribution is ranked lowest of the ten responsibility items, among the ISSP countries in general, providing a decent living standard for the unemployed and providing employment for unemployed work-seekers were rated lowermost among the state concerns. State-led redistribution nonetheless ranked eighth for ISSP member countries on average, with a mean score (3.11) that differs only marginally from that reported domestically (3.18). At the other end of the spectrum, the provision of health care remains the most widely supported of the government roles mentioned in South Africa and the ISSP member countries alike, with the mean score again virtually indistinguishable. The greatest rank order differences are observed in relation to: (i) job creation, which is ranked fourth highest in South Africa and second lowest among ISSP countries in general; and (ii) environmental protection, which ranks as the third highest supported state role among the ISSP sample but third lowest in South Africa. This is likely, at least in part, to reflect postmaterialist values in the case of more developed nations versus more material concerns in South African society, which continues to be characterised by significant levels of poverty, inequality and unemployment (Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). South Africans also tend to voice greater support than average for government responsibilities in terms of low-cost housing and assisting the unemployed.

To provide further insight into the strength of citizens' views regarding state responsibilities for redistribution and other welfarist roles, one can examine the share specifying that each of the items 'definitely should' form an integral part of the remit of the state. Analytically, such responses will be treated as representing unequivocal support for state intervention. From Figure 15, it is apparent that, among the listed items, health care and education feature in the top three most supported government activities by South Africans, while ensuring decent living standard for the unemployed, income redistribution and environmental protection all remain the least supported items. Six of the items were deemed core state functions by at least half the adult population in the country (health care, employment creation, education, decent living standard for the elderly, and keeping inflation under control), while health care was the only item seen as a socially perceived duty by more than two-thirds of the public. By comparison, five items on average were deemed core state responsibilities by at least 50 per cent of ISSP participants. In common with South Africa, this includes health, education,

social protection for the elderly, and inflation control, but employment creation has been replaced by environmental protection. The largest margins of difference between South African and ISSP averages were again evident for the employment, housing and environment items. In the first two instances, South Africans were respectively 24 and 19 per cent more likely than the average ISSP participant to believe that the state should unambiguously assume responsibility for providing jobs and low-cost housing to all those in need, and 15 per cent less likely to cite the need for the state to institute strict environmental laws to prevent environmental degradation.

**Figure 15: Percentage strongly supporting government responsibility for differing roles, ranked from highest to lowest reported percentages for South Africa, 2006 (% that believe it 'definitely should be government responsibility')**




Source: Own calculations based on ISSP 2006 Role of Government; HSRC SASAS 2006
Note: the percentages are based on a 4-point scale, where 1="definitely should not be (government's responsibility)", 2="probably should not be", 3="probably should be" and 4="definitely should be". The highest and lowest scores refer to the maximum and minimum reported country-level values on each areas of responsibility, in order to convey a sense of the upper and lower bounds and where South African fits in relation to these.

### *Changes in views on government responsibilities in South Africa since the mid-2000s*

The comparative analysis of support for various government roles and responsibilities presented above provides critical information from which inferences can begin to be drawn on *whether* and *how* South African citizens differ in their expectations of the state. One residual concern though is that the data are now more than a decade old. A range of international and domestic developments have occurred during this time which may have had a bearing on economic, institutional and social realities, including the Great Recession of the

late 2000s and subsequent austerity measures and welfare retrenchment, the rise of populism, and, more specific to the local case, the growth of protest politics, high-profile government corruption scandals, political factionalism, and economic fragility. Taken together, such developments may, in turn, have altered or further entrenched attitudes towards what constitute the core responsibilities of government. They may also have had a polarizing effect, by fraying the relations of solidarity among the public between generations, genders, rich and poor, the working and unemployed, and other notable social groups. The ISSP generally replicates the fielding of survey modules on a decennial basis, and in 2016/17 the role of government module was conducted. At the time of writing, the cross-national data was not publicly available for cross-national analysis, though the corresponding South African data is. This therefore enables a comparison of changing support for the government responsibilities in the country over the 2006 to 2016 period.

**Table 17: Changes in support for government responsibility for differing roles in South Africa, 2006 and 2016, ranked from highest to lowest reported mean scores 2016**

| | Total support | | | Strong support | | | Mean scores | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2006 | 2016 | Δ | 2006 | 2016 | Δ | 2006 | 2016 | Δ |
| Provide health care for sick | 96 | 97 | +1 | 69 | 71 | +2 | 3.64 | 3.68 | +0.03 |
| Provide living standard for the old | 94 | 95 | +1 | 58 | 62 | +3 | 3.53 | 3.55 | +0.02 |
| Financial help to students | 93 | 93 | +1 | 61 | 62 | +1 | 3.54 | 3.55 | +0.01 |
| Control prices | 93 | 94 | +1 | 58 | 59 | +2 | 3.50 | 3.52 | +0.02 |
| Provide decent housing | 93 | 91 | -2 | 59 | 56 | -3 | 3.52 | 3.46 | -0.05 |
| Provide job for everyone | 91 | 88 | -3 | 63 | 57 | -6 | 3.52 | 3.42 | -0.10 |
| Help industry grow | 91 | 91 | 0 | 47 | 50 | +2 | 3.39 | 3.40 | +0.01 |
| Promote gender equality | … | 94 | … | … | 49 | … | … | 3.36 | ... |
| Laws to protect environment | 86 | 89 | +3 | 40 | 47 | +7 | 3.26 | 3.36 | +0.09 |
| Provide living standard for unemployed | 87 | 85 | -2 | 40 | 50 | +1<br>0 | 3.25 | 3.33 | +0.07 |
| Reduce income differences betw. rich/ poor | 82 | 79 | -3 | 40 | 44 | +4 | 3.18 | 3.18 | +0.00 |

Source: HSRC SASAS 2006 and 2016 ISSP Role of Government data
Note: the mean scores are based on a reversed 4-point scale, where 1=”definitely should not be (government’s responsibility)”, 2=”probably should not be”, 3=”probably should be” and 4=”definitely should be”. ‘Don’t know’ responses were excluded.

In Table 17, for each of the various roles listed in the two survey years, I report on the total levels of support, strong support, the mean responsibility scores, as well as the absolute changes in each indicator over the period. The different responsibilities are ranked in descending order based on the 2016 mean scores. The overall picture that emerges is one of relative consistency and stability. The aggregate level of support for government involvement in each the eleven areas of responsibility[50] remain resolutely high in 2016, varying between

[50] For the 2016 ISSP round, a single additional item was added to the battery, focusing on the promotion of gender equality.

79% and 97%. The percentage point changes between the two survey years are negligible to slight. While the variation is larger across the roles in terms of the share reporting strong support, the range of values in 2016 is almost equivalent to that observed in 2006, the result being that the scale of change remains nominal for most cases. Three exceptions are worth noting, each exhibited moderate changes. The share strongly believing that government has a duty to provide everyone with employment fell 6 percentage points, in contrast to rise of 10 percentage points in strong support for unemployed adults being provided with a basic standard of living. This change is interesting as it suggests subtle shifts are occurring among the public concerning values relating to the labour market and social protection, with some accommodation of the view that the state cannot provide everyone with a job, but a growing recognition that basic social protection is required to maintain the quality of life of the significant numbers of unemployed in the country.[51] The other government responsibility for which there has been moderate growth in support over time is in relation to tightening laws governing environmental protection.

In terms of the rank order of the different government responsibilities in the mind of the public, the reduction of income inequalities continues to feature as the bottom ranked policy goal. It needs to be reiterated that this does not signify that the public feels that the state must leave aside efforts to tackle inequality, for 82% expect the state to fulfil this as part of their mandate and nearly half (44%) express strong sentiment in this regard. Instead, the results suggest that certain items relating more to basic socio-economic security than socio-economic equality are deemed to be more pressing, in particular health care and social protection for the elderly.[52] The consistently high relative positioning of financial assistance to students from disadvantaged backgrounds is however of note for two principal reasons. Firstly, it signals that an element of redistribution features among the top-rated perceived government responsibilities, even if the goal of reducing income inequality ranks much

[51] The same 2016 SASAS questionnaire included the European Social Survey (ESS) Round 8 rotating module on welfare. One of the items was on support for a universal basic income (UBI). A cross-tabulation of the ISSP item on government responsibility to provide a decent living standard for the unemployed and support for the UBI showed that the measure was correlated. Stronger support for a government role in this area translated into higher support for the UBI, vice versa. Also, relative to Europe, South Africans have the highest level of support for the UBI, which attests to the strong desire for social protection for the unemployed.

[52] Roller (199) clusters the set of expectations regarding the role of government according into their underlying policy goals, namely: (i) socio-economic security (responsibility for the sick, elderly, low-cost housing provision, the unemployed and job security); (ii) socio-economic equality (responsibility for reducing income differences and educational opportunities for students from low-income families); and (iii) wealth (responsibility for prices and growth). The environmental protection goal could be considered an additional post-materialist dimension.

lower. Secondly, set against the emergence of the Fees Must Fall movement over the last few years, with its emphasis on the affordability of tertiary education, it is important to observe that there is robust support for some measure of state intervention in this area, even though the survey question is generally phrased and does not speak to various tertiary education financing models. Control prices increased two places in the rank order (based on all three indicators), which is likely a reflection of deep concern about the far-reaching effects of unforeseen price shocks and the consequences of inflation generally on the ability of individuals and households to make ends meet (Knight et al, 2013).

A final point regarding the changes between the 2006 and 2016 government responsibility measures relates to the degree of consensus or inequality in belief among the South African public. As a summary indicator of the level of dispersion of values from the national average, I make use of standard deviations for each of the government roles, and examine whether there are signs of divergence or convergence over time. The use of standard deviations as an indicator of inequality has been used to good effect in other survey-based attitudinal research, in particular in the field of happiness studies since the mid-2000s (Veehoven, 2005; Kalmijn & Veenhoven, 2005, 2014). From Figure 16, it is evident that while the standard deviations are generally low, indicating that the spread of response values are fairly closely arranged around the mean. Certain government roles tended to show more variance, which is most apparent in the items on inequality reduction, providing a living standard for the unemployed, as well as securing employment for all. Not only is a wider range of values present for these roles, but the standard deviation has increased the most in these cases since 2006. Providing health care, protecting the standard of living of pensioners, and assisting disadvantaged students financially tended to receive a lower standard deviation and thus there exists a more common public position on these items. The results also reveal that a more unified public view of the state's responsibility for health care has emerged over the decade, a characteristic that is only shared with respect to the environmental protection role.

The preceding examination of the relative importance attached to different government roles and responsibilities portrays South Africans as having considerable expectations of what activities fall within the mandate of the state. This is in spite of the declining satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and confidence in core political institutions that has occurred in

the country over the 2006-2016 period.[53] This confirms the finding by Huseby (1995:117) using earlier rounds of ISSP data that demand for the big state is not necessarily inversely related to dissatisfaction with government, in that 'it seems that demands for big government and negative feelings about government exist side by side'. It is important to note that the ISSP indicators do not constitute a full account of ideas about the preferred size of government, as the activities asked about focus mainly on elements traditionally associated with the welfare state, to the exclusion of other activities. The counter-argument, especially for a country like South Africa (and indeed many others), is that these activities typically represent a considerable share of government activity. They also relate fundamentally to the driving question underlying this dissertation regarding the predominant mode of social citizenship South Africans prefer and whether this rests on a wider or narrower conception of government responsibility.

**Figure 16: Trend in dispersion of support for government responsibilities, 2006 and 2016 (Standard deviations from the mean).**




Source: HSRC SASAS 2006 and 2016 ISSP Role of Government data
Note: The standard deviations are based on mean scores are based on a reversed 4-point scale, where 1="definitely should not be (government's responsibility)", 2="probably should not be", 3="probably should be" and 4="definitely should be". 'Don't know' responses were excluded.

[53] This is particular true of trust in national government and Parliament. My own analysis of data from the SASAS series has shown that trust in national government fell from 59% in 2006 to 32% in 2016, while confidence in Parliament fell from 55% to 28% over the same period. Local government, as the face of service delivery in the country, has always tended to be harshly evaluated, but even for this level of government trust declined from 44% to 34%. At a more diffuse level of political support, satisfaction with democracy dropped from 45% to 32%, while discontentment rose from 33% to 54%.

The expansive view of the scope or range of government's duties that emerges from the data is reflected in the views of citizens in other countries, most especially in certain former communist states in Eastern Europe (Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Croatia), Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal) as well as parts of Latin America (Venezuela, Chile, and Uruguay).[54] It also mirrors the broad, multidimensional conception of democracy that is common among South Africans, which extends beyond the basic liberal democracy model to include elements of social and deliberate democracy (Roberts et al., 2016). Addressing inequality through various forms of redistribution clearly forms part of this expectation of democracy and government, even though there are activities that receive generally higher support. The broad consistency of public opinion in South Africa over time in this regard tends to points to an enduring belief in a transformative, developmental state as the basis for promoting the wellbeing of South Africans.

## 5.5 Summary

This chapter has examined support for state-led redistribution in principle in the country since the early-to-mid-2000s using what represents one of the most widely used international indicators. The South African time series represents one of the longest continuous time series based on this measure in a developing country, and indeed globally. The national results suggest that the South African public on average holds a fairly robust preference for redistribution, with more than two-thirds (70%) agreeing that this falls within the remit of the state, with only a nominal share rejecting this idea (16%). There has however not been broad stability in preferences for redistribution over time, with a declining tendency from 2003 through to the early 2010s, after which it displayed an upward swing until 2016. Despite such fluctuations, the normative ideology remains one that favours political intervention to help address the pressing societal challenges posed by persistently high levels of income inequality. While race- and class-based disparities underlie such support, it is nonetheless apparent that more than half of white adults, the tertiary educated, and the non-poor lend their support to government redistribution in principle.

[54] For a fuller discussion of the conceptual basis for approaching attitudes towards the size of government, including the *range* of areas of government responsibility as well as the *degree* of government involvement or intervention in any given area, a useful starting point is the chapter by Huseby (1995) in the influential *Beliefs in Government* series.

In terms of the place of redistribution among other government roles and responsibilities, the chapter confirmed that the public believes the scope and size of government to be fairly expansive in character, involving a range of responsibilities across different domains. This has remained a consistent finding even after repeat fielding the same set of measures a decade apart. While reducing income inequality remains lower down the priority list in the public agenda, especially relative to health care and social protection for the elderly, the reality is that these are rank order differences occurring within a high margin of general support across various responsibilities. So the enduring message is that South Africans expect redistributive measures aimed at reducing income inequality to form part of the overall set of activities that the government pursues as its core mandate.

# Chapter 6
# *State of Mind*: Individual Determinants of Support for Government-Led Redistribution

*"Since government must alter the distribution of income if it is to solve our economic problems, we have to have a government that is capable of making equity decisions. Whose income ought to go up and whose income ought to go down? To do this, however, we need to know what is equitable. What is a fair or just distribution of economic resources?"*
Lester C. Thurow, *The Zero-Sum Society* (1980: 17)

*"What thoughtful rich people call the problem of poverty, thoughtful poor people call with equal justice a problem of riches"*
R.H. Tawney (1913: 10)

## 6.1 Introduction

Having described the aggregate trends and basic group-based differences in support for government redistribution in principle, in this chapter I direct attention towards modelling the individual determinants of such preferences in the country. The core focus of the analysis will be on providing empirical evidence with which to test the validity of the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 5, and which are summarised in Table 18. It should be noted that the analytical focus remains on individual predictors of support for government-led redistribution, and macro-level relationships are excluded from consideration. In line with the preceding analysis, I will make use of data from the eleven annual SASAS rounds from 2006 through 2016, thus excluding the 2003-2005 rounds due to the differential phrasing of the dependent opinion variable. The repeated cross-sectional design of the survey series is well suited for estimating aggregate opinion change, and includes an array of items with which to provide South African evidence on some of the theoretical explanations that have internationally been offered and tested as factors informing support for redistribution. In certain instances, due the availability of measures, data corresponding to a specific survey year or more limited set of years will be used. The unique contribution of the analysis presented in the chapter lies in the application and testing of a range of hypotheses developed mostly in Europe and North America in the developing country, high-inequality context and using an original time series covering more than decade in South Africa's contemporary history.

**Table 18: Summary of hypotheses regarding the determinants of support for government-led redistribution**

| Hypotheses |
|---|
| **Rational choice and economic self-interest**<br>H1: In the South African context, it is envisaged that individual material circumstances will not demonstrate a significant association with preferences for political redistribution. |
| **Past mobility and future expectations**<br>H2: Both mobility experience and expectations of future mobility will significantly interact with preferences for state-led redistribution in South Africa. |
| **Beliefs about inequality and fairness**<br>H3(a): Awareness of inequality and beliefs about its adverse effects on South Africa society will create a stronger demand for state-led redress.<br><br>H3(b): Those believing that effort and ability determine socioeconomic success in South Africa will be less partial to government redistribution, while those believing that exogenous factors (such as family background, connections, and luck) will display a more favourable attitude towards redistribution. |
| **Ideology and social identity**<br>H4(a): Ideological self-placement on a left-right (liberalism-conservatism) scale will inform support for political redistribution, with greater liberalism associated with more accepting views for this principle compared with those reporting conservative tendencies.<br><br>H4(b): Political identification will matter for redistributive preferences, with ANC supporters expressing more favourable views than those identifying with other parties.<br><br>H4(c): Racial attitudes and contact (out-group prejudice, in-group identification, racial threat, racial discrimination, racial distrust, extent and quality of racial contact) will matter for redistributive preferences. An inverse effect is expected for out-group prejudice, in-group identification and racial threat, while a positive association is envisaged for racial discrimination, extent and quality of racial contact. |
| **Confidence in government**<br>H5: Trust in government will demonstrate a positive relationship with preferences for redistribution. |

## 6.2 Modelling individual determinants of support for redistribution

In Table 19, I present the multivariate results for the series of regressions conducted using the 2009 SASAS data and an ordered logit estimation technique. In column [1], preferences for government redistribution is regressed on a set of common socio-demographic attributes (gender, age, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status), together with dummy variables controlling for province and geographic type. Column [2] extends this baseline model by adding in explanatory variables that would help examine the self-interest argument, namely asset quintiles, self-rated poverty status, and perceived group discrimination. In columns [3] and [4] several variables are introduced that aim to explore the relative contribution of subjective social mobility to support for redistribution. These include two indicators of mobility experience in the form of personal mobility history and intergenerational mobility (column [3]), as well as one indicator aiming to test the argument relating to prospects for upward mobility (column [4]). The effects of certain of the general inequality beliefs explored in the previous chapter are investigated in column [5], in particular inequality aversion and perceived class conflict, in addition to subjective societal

position, while in column [6] the role of additional ideological measures regarding beliefs about how individuals achieve success and wealth in the country. This draws on the theoretical literature on notions of 'fair' and 'unfair' inequality, which focuses on whether getting ahead is attributed to a self-determined or merit-based factors such as effort or ability, or alternatively to exogenous factors such as luck, connections or corruption (Linos & West 2003; Alesina & La Ferrara 2005; Alesina & Giuliano 2009; Alesina et al. 2012).

### 6.2.1 Cohort, period and ageing effects

The base model presented in column [1] exclusively measures the effects of period on support for government redistribution, using a series of dummy variables corresponding to survey year. The findings point to statistically significant year-to-year variability in expressed attitudes based on the timing of the different survey rounds. This effect does not diminish once other factors are introduced to the model, which suggests the influence of context to a certain degree in shaping these particular attitudes. While significant, the scale of this effect on redistribution preferences is fairly small, meaning that other potential determinants will need to be identified and tested. In Model [2], covariates of cohort are added, based on a common measure from the literature on cohort effects that employs a series of dummy variables corresponding to 10-year intervals based on birth year (Firebaugh & Chen, 1995; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004). As can be seen, the virtual absence of statistical significance among these variables and the unimproved model fit (based on change to the *Pseudo-$R^2$* statistic) imply that cohort effects are not informing such beliefs.

To check the sensitivity and robustness of this finding to alternate specifications of the cohort measure, I tested a typology that uses a 20-year interval[55] as well as a scheme where cohort was entered as a linear, continuous variable for year of birth. A third alternate categorisation of cohort draws on the one proposed by Mattes (2012) that distinguishes between five generations based on particular defining periods in South African history.[56] Based on a comparison of regression findings using these alternate cohort measures, the overall lack of

[55] The categories for the 20-year interval measure were: 'born 1980 and after', 'born 1960-79', 'born 1940-1959' and 'born before 1940'.

[56] Mattes defines these cohorts as: the *Pre-apartheid generation* (born before 1932 and turning 16 before 1948); the *Early apartheid generation* (born 1932-44 and turned 16 between 1948-60; the *Grand Apartheid generation* (born 1945-59 and turned 16 between 1961 and 1975); the *Struggle Generation* (born 1960-79 and turned 16 between 1976 and 1996); and the *Born Free generation* (born after 1980).

**Table 19: Ordered logistic models of individual support for government redistribution, 2006-2016**

| Ordered logit (Depvar=govredr) | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | [8b] | [9] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period effects (reference=2006) | | | | | | | | | (Ref=2010) | (Ref=2008) |
| 2007 | -0.297*** | -0.298*** | -0.327*** | -0.326*** | -0.337*** | -0.321*** | -0.329*** | -0.357*** | ... | ... |
| 2008 | -0.475*** | -0.474*** | -0.496*** | -0.495*** | -0.496*** | -0.491*** | -0.508*** | -0.493*** | ... | ... |
| 2009 | -0.402*** | -0.401*** | -0.430*** | -0.429*** | -0.439*** | -0.429*** | -0.441*** | -0.506*** | ... | -0.025 |
| 2010 | -0.452*** | -0.452*** | -0.478*** | -0.476*** | -0.488*** | -0.506*** | -0.517*** | -0.532*** | ... | -0.056 |
| 2011 | -0.721*** | -0.722*** | -0.766*** | -0.764*** | -0.785*** | -0.773*** | -0.790*** | -0.815*** | -0.286*** | -0.332*** |
| 2012 | -0.527*** | -0.528*** | -0.559*** | -0.557*** | -0.543*** | -0.551*** | -0.562*** | -0.654*** | -0.120* | -0.173** |
| 2013 | -0.500*** | -0.501*** | -0.552*** | -0.549*** | -0.550*** | -0.554*** | -0.572*** | -0.560*** | -0.031 | -0.062 |
| 2014 | -0.370*** | -0.370*** | -0.415*** | -0.412*** | -0.430*** | -0.451*** | -0.463*** | -0.464*** | 0.052 | ... |
| 2015 | -0.164** | -0.165** | -0.211*** | -0.208*** | -0.225*** | -0.221*** | -0.238*** | -0.275*** | 0.244*** | 0.198** |
| 2016 | -0.452*** | -0.453*** | -0.521*** | -0.517*** | -0.490*** | -0.498*** | -0.511*** | -0.452*** | 0.051 | 0.012 |
| Cohort effects (reference=born <1940) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Born 1990 and after | ... | 0.070 | 0.083 | 0.058 | 0.046 | 0.004 | 0.004 | -0.130 | 0.173 | 0.121 |
| 1980s | ... | 0.080 | 0.045 | 0.024 | 0.005 | -0.048 | -0.056 | -0.175 | 0.025 | -0.028 |
| 1970s | ... | 0.122* | 0.146 | 0.129 | 0.079 | 0.019 | 0.011 | -0.091 | 0.020 | 0.063 |
| 1960s | ... | 0.054 | 0.133 | 0.120 | 0.083 | 0.038 | 0.028 | -0.089 | 0.035 | 0.066 |
| 1950s | ... | 0.021 | 0.093 | 0.084 | 0.038 | -0.001 | -0.008 | -0.078 | -0.007 | 0.050 |
| 1940s | ... | 0.093 | 0.106 | 0.101 | 0.102 | 0.099 | 0.092 | 0.021 | -0.035 | 0.035 |
| Age effects (age in years) | ... | ... | ... | 0.000 | -0.001 | -0.002 | -0.002 | -0.005 | 0.001 | -0.003 |
| Marital status (Ref=never married) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Married | ... | ... | -0.122*** | -0.122*** | 0.006 | 0.026 | 0.028 | 0.024 | 0.090* | 0.052 |
| Widowed | ... | ... | 0.026 | 0.026 | -0.004 | -0.008 | -0.005 | 0.014 | 0.149* | 0.097 |
| Separated / divorced | ... | ... | -0.128* | -0.127 | -0.064 | -0.062 | -0.057 | -0.041 | 0.062 | 0.069 |
| Household size | ... | ... | 0.011** | 0.011** | -0.006 | -0.006 | -0.006 | 0.000 | 0.007 | -0.004 |
| Employment status (Ref= Employed full time) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Employed part time | ... | ... | 0.370*** | 0.370*** | 0.226*** | 0.188*** | 0.186*** | 0.184*** | 0.247*** | 0.157** |
| Unemployed looking for work | ... | ... | 0.355*** | 0.355*** | 0.172*** | 0.114*** | 0.109** | 0.075* | 0.098* | 0.075 |
| Unemployed not looking for work | ... | ... | 0.311*** | 0.311*** | 0.115* | 0.064 | 0.061 | 0.087 | 0.073 | 0.097 |
| Homemaker | ... | ... | 0.268*** | 0.268*** | 0.153 | 0.123 | 0.116* | 0.144** | 0.144* | 0.159* |
| Pensioner | ... | ... | 0.270*** | 0.271*** | 0.161* | 0.138 | 0.136* | 0.171** | 0.188* | 0.236** |
| Student/learner | ... | ... | 0.077 | 0.076 | -0.071 | -0.065 | -0.076 | -0.024 | -0.100 | -0.110 |
| Other labour inactive | ... | ... | 0.179** | 0.179** | 0.097* | 0.045 | 0.048 | 0.038 | 0.007 | -0.037 |
| Female | ... | ... | -0.009 | -0.009 | -0.028 | -0.021 | -0.018 | -0.007 | -0.024 | -0.011 |
| Population group (Ref=Black African) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Coloured | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.118** | -0.109** | -0.107* | -0.052 | -0.002 | 0.027 |
| Indian/Asian | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.537*** | -0.468*** | -0.477*** | -0.381*** | -0.313*** | -0.328*** |
| White | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.729*** | -0.673*** | -0.686*** | -0.529*** | -0.479*** | -0.433*** |
| Education level (Ref=Primary or no schooling) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Grades 8-11 or equivalent | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.037 | 0.075* | 0.074* | 0.069* | 0.147** | 0.117** |
| Matric or equivalent | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.098** | -0.018 | -0.022 | -0.019 | 0.036 | 0.011 |
| Tertiary | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.344*** | -0.247*** | -0.248*** | -0.257*** | -0.144* | -0.184** |

| (Continued): - | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | [8b] | [9] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Self-rated poverty status (Ref=poor) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Just getting by | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.233*** | -0.226*** | -0.165*** | -0.234*** | -0.209*** |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Non-poor | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.406*** | -0.400*** | -0.252*** | -0.337*** | -0.314*** |
| Perceived group discrimination | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.169*** | 0.168*** | 0.066** | 0.093** | 0.069* |
| Perceived mobility history last 5 yrs (Ref=improved) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Stayed the same | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.020 | -0.033 | -0.023 | -0.085** |
| Worsened | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.016 | -0.002 | -0.019 | -0.019 |
| (Uncertain) | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.084 | 0.000 | 0.229 | 0.115 |
| Perceived mobility next 5 years (Ref=improve) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Stay the same | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.070* | 0.094** | 0.071 | 0.098** |
| Worsen | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.037 | 0.032 | 0.004 | 0.056 |
| (Uncertain) | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.004 | 0.032 | -0.065 | 0.046 |
| Inequality aversion | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.707*** | 0.636*** | 0.659*** |
| Perceived societal position (1=bottom; 10=top) | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.042*** | -0.038*** | -0.036*** |
| Attribution for poverty (Ref=because of laziness and lack of willpower) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Because they have been unlucky | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.048 | ... |
| Because there is much injustice in our society | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.176*** | ... |
| It's an inevitable part of modern progress | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.063 | ... |
| None of these | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.124* | ... |
| (Do not know) | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.039 | ... |
| Party identification (Ref=DA) | | | | | | | | | | |
| ANC | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.186*** |
| Other party | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.106 |
| No party | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.087 |
| Undeclared | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.037 |
| Left-right ideology (Ref=Conservative) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Liberal | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.223*** |
| Moderate | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.168*** |
| Uncertain | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.113*** |
| Controls for province and geographic type | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| /cut1 | -3.739 | -3.665 | -3.482 | -3.513 | -4.313 | -4.500 | -4.513 | -2.011 | -1.270 | -1.227 |
| /cut2 | -2.083 | -2.009 | -1.811 | -1.842 | -2.620 | -2.804 | -2.816 | -0.261 | 0.483 | 0.520 |
| /cut3 | -1.233 | -1.159 | -0.961 | -0.992 | -1.751 | -1.931 | -1.945 | 0.658 | 1.367 | 1.408 |
| /cut4 | 0.583 | 0.658 | 0.863 | 0.832 | 0.112 | -0.055 | -0.067 | 2.680 | 3.418 | 3.426 |
| No. obs | 33,383 | 33,344 | 32,411 | 32,411 | 31,617 | 31,499 | 31,423 | 31,187 | 18,884 | 22,290 |
| LR chi2 | 309.62 | 327.05 | 652.79 | 653.04 | 1548.9 | 1785.44 | 1785.95 | 4896.48 | 2629.60 | 3120.79 |
| Prob > chi2 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.0033 | 0.0035 | 0.0072 | 0.0072 | 0.0175 | 0.0203 | 0.0204 | 0.0563 | 0.0498 | 0.0499 |
| Log likelihood | -46549.19 | -46488.59 | -45011.95 | -45011.82 | -43381.99 | -43095.86 | -42981.41 | -41070.91 | -25083.67 | -29731.91 |

significance and failure to contribute to the model fit remain. This is an interesting result, as one of the implications is that the so-called 'Born-Free' generation[57] are not on average distinctive in their predisposition towards state-led redistribution compared to older cohorts, which is something that socialisation and democratic habituation theories would lead one to expect (Mattes, 2012:135-37).

The models also show that age does not have a bearing on views regarding government redistribution. As one gets older, there is not a tendency for South Africans to demonstrate greater partiality or opposition towards to the idea of redistribution by the state. In line with the approach adopted by Brooks & Bolzendahl (2004), age is only entered from Model [4] onwards after select major transitions to adulthood have been taken into account (the transitions to marriage and work in this instance) in Model [3] (Lloyd, 2005).[58] This is due to an underlying ageing hypothesis from the literature that maintains that the attitudes that are formed during childhood and adolescent years will remain stable unless altered by the experiences of major life transitions. After these transitions, the effect of aging on opinion change among individuals is expected to be negligible (Glenn, 1980, 2005; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004). In line with the theory, the results confirm the position of no significant age effect after cohort and life transitions have been measured.[59]

### 6.2.2 Individual attributes and self-interest

From the models presented in columns [3] through [6], it is evident that other individual demographic attributes do not emerge as especially salient predictors of preferences for state-led redress. As with age, support for redistribution is not significantly different according to gender. The absence of differences between men and women stands in contrast to a number of other American and European studies that found that women on average exhibit a more pro-redistribution stance (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Corneo & Grüner, 2002; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina & Giuliano, 2009; Dion & Birchfield, 2010; Guillaud, 2013; Blekesaune, 2013). It is nonetheless consistent with other survey-based analyses from

[57] For the purposes of this study, I define this cohort as those who grew up in or were born in democratic South Africa, based on whether individuals were born in 1990 or after.
[58] Lloyd (2005) also points to the transitions to parenthood and to citizenship as important, though these were not included in the modeling for this chapter.
[59] The age effect is however not even present when included on it a restricted form model containing only the dependent variable and age (in years). So, this effect was not evident even before cohort and major life transitions are factored in.

Australia (Linos & West, 2003), as well as developing country contexts in Latin America (Morgan & Kelley, 2013; Merola, 2012), China (Han, 2012), Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Junisbai, 2010), and to some degree South Africa (Wegner & Pellicer, 2011).[60] In model [3], the coefficients on the marital status variables are negative and statistically significant for those that are married and either separated or divorced in comparison to those who have never been married. The only exception is for those who are widowed, where the regression coefficient remains negative but insignificant. However, this marital status effect tends not to be robust to alternative model specifications.

One notable result from the models is the salience of race. White and Indian South Africans are less supportive of government-led redistribution than black South Africans, even after controlling for gender, age, marital status, education, employment status, and socio-economic status.[61] This finding holds even after controlling for a range of other subjective and ideological variables in other models in Table 5. However, in spite of this effect, it is important to consider that a majority of white and Indian adults still support redistribution, with just over half (white = 52%; Indian = 51%) on average favouring the view that it is the state's responsibility to reduce income disparities in the country based on the 2016 survey round. Admittedly, this is nearly 20 percentage points lower than the support expressed by black African (72%) or coloured (68%) South Africans, but it does still represent the existence to some degree of a social compact about preferences for interventions designed to produce a more equitable society. If one adopts an intersectional perspective and unpacks class variation in attitudes within population groups, it is immediately clear that white and Indian adults are far from homogeneous in their position on redistribution. In Figure 17(a), I show that a strong class gradient in support exists among white and Indian adults. While barely half of those in the top asset wealth category (LSM 10) support government redistribution, this rises progressively to more than three-quarters of those in living standard category six and lower. A similar class-based pattern is also observed among black African adults (Figure 17(b)), with 60% of those in the top asset wealth category supporting

[60] The study by Wegner and Pellicer examines 1996 and 2001 South African data on redistributive preferences from the World Values Survey (WVS). They find no significant gender-based effect in 1996, though in 2001, women were more pro-redistribution than men. A similar pattern is found when they restricted their models to black South Africans exclusively.

[61] An ordered logit model was also estimated including only the dependent variable and race, and the findings showed that while there was no significant difference between black and coloured South Africans, like white South Africans, Indian adults were less favourable towards redistribution. This effect does not hold once other controls are entered into the models.

government-led redistribution, compared to 88% among those with the poorest living standard level. These figures are important as a cautionary note against drawing simple group-based conclusions based on the significant inter-racial differences emerging from the bivariate and multivariate analysis.

**Figure 17: On the importance of intersectionality - support for government responsibilities by living standard levels *among* certain population groups (%, pooled 2006-2016 data).**

**(a) Redistributive preferences by living standard level for white and Indian adults (N=4720 for white adults and 3813 for Indian adults)**




**(b) Redistributive preferences by living standard level among black African adults (N=21,480, ranging from 737 in LSM 1 to 4,636 in LSM 6)**




Note: The sample sizes for LSM1-5 categories for white (n=27) and Indian (n=66) adults are particularly small and the distributions are included for indicative purposes.
Source: HSRC SASAS 2006-2016

Returning to the regression results, preferences for redistribution do appear to vary to some degree on the basis of educational attainment. It has been argued by Linos and West (2003: 400) that it is difficult to conceive how education will influence redistribution attitudes in any given context. Theoretically, education is supposed to confer higher status and better economic prospects that according to self-interest would reduce redress support, yet education is also supposed to socialise the individual in democratic values, which one would

expect to translate into a greater preference for equality. Studies in developed countries have found education to yield a significant negative association with support for redistribution (Andreß & Heien 2001; Linos & West 2003; Alesina & Giuliano 2009; Dion & Birchfield 2010; Yamamura 2012). Based on the regression results, there appears to be some support for a similar educational pattern in South Africa, with those with a tertiary or completed secondary education generally exhibiting a greater aversion for a redress agenda than those with primary or no formal schooling (Model [3]). As other variables are added to the subsequent models, the negative effect of tertiary education on support for government redistribution remains, though the effect of a matric or equivalent level education washes out. If separate models are run for each survey round (results not shown), it becomes more apparent that a clear educational gradient is not manifest, with the patterns of statistical significance and coefficients are quite changeable. For example, there is a significant effect on tertiary education in only three of the eleven year-specific models while in six of the eleven years there is not educational effect at all.

With regard to employment status, the models provide some confirmation of the theoretical expectations of self-interest. As shown in Model [3], compared to full-time employees, those in part-time employment, the unemployed, homemakers, pensioners and the sick and disabled all displayed a higher degree of support for redistribution. Only students were not generally more inclined than full-time workers to support government redistribution. Greater degrees of vulnerability and precarity among the unemployed and part-time workers have the potential to translate into demands for government assistance. In addition, many pensioners and the permanently sick and disabled would be in receipt of grants and state-provided health care, which would also lead to an expectation that they would tend to adopt an ideological stance that would ensure the continued receipt of such benefits. The fact that the results point to a pro-redistribution stance being present for these social groups implies that the South African data offer support for what a number of other cross-sectional studies have found, especially that the unemployed tend to be more favourable towards redistribution (e.g. Bean & Papadakis, 1998; Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Linos & West, 2003; Svallfors, 2004). At the same time, it is important not to overstate the extent to which employment status informs redistribution preferences, for, as discussed above, the combined explanatory power of the socio-demographic attributes included in the modelling is not particularly large. The negative effect of household size on support for government redistribution in models [3] and [4] is interesting, and may be reflective of greater risk-sharing and social support functions

being performed by larger families. However, once other variables are added in the subsequent models, this effect falls away.

Turning to other measures of socioeconomic status, in Model [6] both subjective poverty status and self-reported discrimination are included in order to provide a sense of the role of deprivation and marginalisation in informing views of redistribution. Self-rated poverty status seems to affect the level of support, with those who regard themselves as 'poor' generally more pro-redistribution than those indicating that they are 'just getting by' or 'non-poor'.[62] A sense that one belongs to a group that is discriminated against (irrespective of grounds) also tends to increase support for redistribution. Two additional 'objective' economic indicators were experimented with, namely household income per capita and a living standard measure based on household asset ownership (results not shown). When these items are added, in turn, to the variable set in Model 6, they have a significant inverse effect on preferences for redistribution. They also do not dampen the association between the subjective measures and the dependent variable. Therefore, feelings of marginalisation or social exclusion contribute to an individual's position on the redistributive role of government, over and above the influence of income and asset wealth. The observations in Model [6] remain uniform across the other models presented in the table, and provide additional evidence favouring the Meltzer-Richard paradigm of self-interest.

Controls for province and geographic type are included from Model [5] onwards. The analysis reveals that those residing in formal urban areas are less in favour of state-led redress those in rural, traditional authority areas, though this difference falls away in the models presented in the remaining columns. More robust are provincial differences, with those in the Eastern Cape more supportive of redistribution than those in all other provinces, especially residents in North West province, Limpopo and Mpumalanga.

[62] The subjective poverty status variable used in the modeling is a truncated version of the original six-point scale fielded. The response categories 'wealthy', 'very comfortable', and 'reasonably comfortable' have been combined into a 'non-poor' classification, while the 'poor' and 'very poor' response codes have been combined into a general 'poor' category. This finding holds even if the full six-category measure is included with 'very poor' as the reference category.

### 6.2.3 Perceived social mobility

While, counter to my original hypothesis, self-interest does seem to serve as part of the underlying explanation for public opinion on the principle of redistribution, it is also important to test alternative accounts of preferences for redistribution in the South African context. Perceptions of mobility have become a theoretical explanation of increasing scholarly interest since the mid-1990s. As such, it is to the hypothesised influence of mobility experience and expected future mobility that I now turn. The 2009 SASAS/ISSP social inequality module data have a fuller set of indicators with which to examine mobility-related perceptions and its effect on the predisposition for redistribution. However, these measures have only been included at one time point since the inception of the SASAS series, and it is for this reason that I have additionally relied on certain core questions in the series to give a longer time series on perceived mobility history and prospects.

In terms of mobility experience, based on the 2009 data, two measures aimed to capture intergenerational mobility experience (Appendix Table 6-1). Since the SASAS/ISSP survey does not contain detailed current and retrospective questions on earnings, in line with Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) I rely on proxy measures, both of which are subjective assessments. The first indicator is the difference between one's current societal position and the evaluation of the position of the family he or she grew up in, and the second is a dummy variable for self-reported occupational prestige relative to one's father. The results (Model 7 in Appendix Table 6-1) show that those that believe they have experienced no mobility or downward mobility relative to the family they grew up in tend to be more supportive of government intervention to address income inequality compared to those reporting they have experienced upward mobility. However, having a higher perceived occupational prestige relative to one's father did not produce a significant effect on preferences, even though the coefficient in the model is again negative. This remains the case even when the first mobility measure is excluded from the model.[63]

The 2009 evidence therefore appears consistent with Piketty's (1995) rational learning theory, according to which an individual's intergenerational mobility has a bearing upon his

[63] While this is the case, a simple model including just the dependent variable and the perceived intergenerational occupational prestige measure was statistically significant ($p<.01$), though once socio-demographic controls are added this effect falls away.

or her attitudes towards government intervention to address income inequality. Generally speaking, I find that those having experienced downward intergenerational mobility are more likely to offer a more positive view of political redistribution, vice versa. However, the strength of this finding depends on the measure employed. As with Siedler and Sonnenberg (2012), I find that the estimates of the effect of intergenerational mobility on preferences are found to be fairly robust, even once expectations for future mobility as well as general beliefs about inequality are controlled for.

Mobility experience in the pooled 2006-2016 data relies on a measure that asks respondents whether "in the last five years, has life improved, stayed the same or worsened for people like you?". Unlike the 2009 intergenerational item, this question is capturing perceptions of fairly recent mobility experiences. In this instance, no significant effect is found, which raises the issue of the framing of the mobility questions, especially in terms of the reference period being referred, and the bearing this has on views regarding redistribution.

In model [7] in both the 2009 and 2006-2016 regression analyses, an identical subjective measure of upward mobility has also been alongside the measures of mobility history. This is in order to provide evidence relating to Bénabou and Ok's (2001) "Prospect of Upward Mobility (POUM) hypothesis" that preferences for redistribution will be associated with future expectations. The measure employed is a categorical variable capturing whether respondents believe that their standard of living will improve, remain unchanged or worsen during the next five years. In contrast to what the theory would lead one to expect, I do not find a strong negative relationship between evaluations of future mobility and demand for redistribution. Those believing their prospects will improve in coming years are not less supportive of redistribution than those who feel their position will remain unchanged or worsen. In certain cases in models [7] through [9] (in both the 2009 and 2006-16 modelling), those who believe their position will remain unchanged have a significant, but modestly higher level of support for redistribution relative to those expecting upward mobility. This effect is not present for those anticipating their quality of life to worsen. So the POUM hypothesis does not appear to be patently present in the views of South Africans towards government redistribution in principle.

### 6.2.4 Beliefs about societal inequality, ideology and fairness

In the previous chapter, I explored the South African public's position on a range of inequality beliefs. Determining whether these beliefs have any impact on the strength of support for redistribution is of particular relevance to scholarship on social citizenship, as it gives a sense of the relative weight of inequality knowledge and fairness evaluations on the core social policy question of the state's role in redistribution. To test the association, the 2006-2016 modelling includes variables on inequality aversion ('income differences too large') and perceived societal position (using a top-bottom ladder question). The 2009 modelling includes these measures plus an index of perceived class conflict in society.

From Model [8] in Table 19, it is apparent from the 2006-16 SASAS data that stronger aversion to inequality is significantly associated with a higher preference for government led redress. Subjective societal position does not emerge as a significant predictor of support for state-led redress when controlling for other factors.[64] The 2009 data (Model 8, Appendix Table 6-1) yield equivalent inequality aversion and subjective social position results to the fuller time series. In common with inequality aversion, there is a positive association between perceived societal tensions and support for redistribution. The more an individual believes South African society to be characterised by conflict between rich and poor, management and workers, and between the working and middle classes, the greater is the likelihood of expressing a favourable stance on government-led redistribution. Whether this is motivated by a desire to maintain peace and stability, a greater desire for restructuring the way society is stratified, or various other reasons is not clear. What the effects based on inequality aversion and perceived class tensions show is that an awareness of the unfair structuring of income and associated sense of conflictual social relations does encourage state action to bring about a fairer, more socially cohesive society.

In Model [8b] of both the 2009 and 2006-16 regression tables, I experiment with additional attitudinal variables related to inequality in society and factors associated with getting ahead. Firstly, using the 2009 data, I introduce in Model [8b] two indices to assess the effect of self-

[64] Subjective societal position is nonetheless significant, inverse association when it is included as the only independent variable in the redistribution preferences model (the higher up one places onself on the societal ladder, the lower the support for redistribution). This holds even once the inequality aversion and perceived class tension variables are added. When the other sociodemographic factors are introduced, the effect loses its salience.

determined and exogenous factors (effort versus luck) on support for government redistribution. Exogenous factors include having wealthy or well-educated parents or possessing the right connections (political or otherwise). The results suggest that the more one believes that exogenous factors matter in determining economic success and mobility in South African society, the more inclined one is to express support for redistribution. This is in line with international theory regarding the role of ideology in shaping redistribution preferences. What is rather unexpected is the finding that those attaching greater importance to self-determined factors, such as hard work and ambition, as the basis for getting ahead are also more supportive of redistribution. Moreover, the coefficient for the self-determined factors index is greater than the exogenous factors index, suggesting that those believing in the importance of merit are moderately more inclined to support redistribution than those emphasising luck or chance.

This would seem to suggest that strong views on both merit and chance as factors behind mobility translate into a more deeply-felt commitment to redistribution. One would have anticipated that those believing that hard work and ambition determines life chances would tend to advocate individual self-agency rather than a strong statist view. It may be that those maintaining that effort drives success in society may also be keenly aware of the inequalities and injustices in the country, which moderates the way they think of government redistribution. What is equally interesting from the results is that those that believe that a person's race is a determining factor in getting ahead in South Africa are significantly less supportive of redress. It is plausible that this may have a bearing on particular forms of redistribution policy, especially those that are framed around race-based redress as opposed to class-based redress. This forms part of the discussion in the next chapter of the thesis.

The modelling based on the 2006-16 data does not include the class conflict measures, which were exclusively fielded as part of the ISSP social inequality module. Instead, Model 8b includes a related item on the attribution or perceived reasons for why people live in need. Since this indicator was fielded in the SASAS series from 2010 onwards, the model is restricted to this time period. The reference category in the model is the response 'because of laziness and lack of willpower', since this has tended to feature prominently in the literature on moral repertories concerning poverty and inequality, notions of deservingness, and its consequence for welfare policy attitudes (Dean & Melrose, 1999). It is also the response option that most explicitly passes personal judgement on the poor for their social need, and is

consequently likely to be associated with lower support for distributive social policy. The results show that, in comparison to those favouring this 'lazy poor' argument, redistribution tends to be supported more when poverty is regarded as being attributable to structural injustice. There is no significant effect based on views regarding bad luck or the fatalistic view that 'it is inevitable', though it is worth noting that the regression coefficients are positive.[65] It would therefore seem that one of the ideological cleavages which shapes preferences for political redistribution depends on whether one is more inclined to draw on repertoires that blame the poor for their lot or alternatively on ones that critique the inherent unfairness and injustices of prevailing societal configurations.

### 6.2.5 Political ideology

To examine the effect of political ideology on preferences for redistribution, the political party affiliation and left-right scale variables are included in Model [9]. Party identification is based on responses to a question about the political party respondents felt closest to. The analyst immediately encounters a problem with small sample sizes for many opposition parties, even after having pooled data across survey rounds. For this reason I created a derived variable consisting of the following five categories: 'ANC supporter', 'DA supporter', 'supporter of another party', 'no party affiliation', and 'undeclared support' for those who remained ambivalent or refused to disclose their political affiliation. Some might argue that this becomes a rather blunt political identification measure, with its focus on the ruling party and the dominant opposition party, while clustering all other parties irrespective of ideological leaning into a single category. While there would be some merit in this claim, given sample design limitations, the distinction outlined about above is probably the most feasible for the present analysis, until such time as additional data rounds become available. The results confirm that supporters of the governing African National Congress (ANC) are moderately more likely to voice support for redistribution relative to those supporting the Democratic Alliance (DA). No other party identification differences attain statistical significance over in the pooled 2006-2016 model. The 2009 results show more distinctive patterns, both in terms of the size of effect based on the coefficients, as well as which categories differ from one another. In that year, it was not just ANC supporters who were

[65] An alternate model specification where 'because of injustice in our society' is treated as the reference category showed that those attributing poverty to bad luck or laziness or regard it as an inevitable feature of modern life all reported significantly lower government redistribution scores, with the strongest negative coefficient observable on the lazy poor option.

more inclined than DA supporters to back the principle of redistribution, but also those identifying with other political parties and those not firmly declaring an affiliation. The coefficients in all instances were noticeably larger, indicating that political identity had more influence in 2009 than was the case across the full period under examination.[66]

To explore the role of political ideology on attitudes to redistribution, use was made of a standard question capturing ideological self-placement on a left-right (liberalism-conservatism) scale. The version included in the SASAS series since 2008 employs a seven-point scale ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. For modelling purposes this has been abridged into a four-point scale with the codes 'liberal' 'moderate', 'conservative' and 'uncertain'. From Model 9, it emerges that those rating their political views as liberal or moderate were more supportive of government redistribution than those with a conservative political outlook. Even those unable to place their ideological values on the scale were more in favour of redistribution on average than self-rated conservatives. These are findings that are common to both the 2009 and 2008-2016 multivariate analysis.

### 6.2.6 The influence of social identity

There are many different conceivable ways of approaching the role that social identity serves in informing views on the government's responsibility for redistribution. The types of questions included in any survey series obviously impose clear and often appreciable constraints on such choice. In the South African case, with its colonial, segregationist and apartheid histories, one of the possible sources of collective self-interest that has been examined in quantitative studies of transformation both in principle and at a policy level focuses on racial identity and prejudice. This research has attempted to determine whether in-group favouritism and prejudice towards other racial out-groups holds any power in explaining the position and strength of belief that individuals adopt in thinking about redistribution and the policies that aim to tackle social need and promote broader social change. The principal focus of the social identity testing that was undertaken for the analysis in this chapter similarly concentrates on select racial attitudes, including measures of group threat, in-group (racial) favouritism and identification, prejudice towards other race groups, feelings of personal and collective racial discrimination, and the extent and quality of

[66] Individual models subsequently run independently for each survey year showed that the late 2000s (2008/09) were years where party affiliation mattered most, but since then this effect has fallen away.

interracial contact. These measures were mostly introduced from the 2010 round of SASAS onwards, following a review of the core racial attitudes measures fielded in the study.[67] As such, the analysis is confined to the 2010s, rather than extending backwards to the mid-2000s, despite the availability of support for state-led redistribution for the latter period.

The modelling approach I have favoured in undertaking this is to build directly from the models presented in Table 19 and do the following: (i) separately examine the effect of each indicator on support for government-led redistribution, while including basic period, cohort and age variables, personal socio-demographic attributes, as well as geographic controls; (ii) run a model where all these variables are jointly entered; and (iii) repeat the latter, but this time with the variables on subjective social mobility, inequality beliefs and political ideology. These regression results are presented in Table 20. In addition, the same models were repeated, but this time they were run separately for each population group in order to determine whether an averaging effect might be masking important racial variation in the effect of these attitudinal measures on redistribution preferences. A summary of these regression findings can be found in Appendix Table 6-2.

From Models [1] – [6] in Table 20, it can be seen that almost all of these variables has a statistically significant effect on opinion about redistribution. The nature of the findings though is quite complex and in instances somewhat paradoxical. Out-group prejudice is one such example, with more negative views of racial out-groups corresponding with higher support for redistribution. This is based on a composite 'feeling thermometer' measure where respondents are asked in turn about whether they feel other race groups tend to be positive/negative or hostile/friendly in their demeanour. The views on the different out-groups were then combined into a 0-10 index using an averaging method, with higher values representing a more prejudiced out-group perspective. The reason for this inverse association on aggregate may lie in the differential nature of this effect across population groups. From Model [1] in Appendix Table 6-2, it can be seen that out-group prejudice is only significant in the case of black South Africans but not other racial minorities. A more negative view of other race groups among black South Africans therefore appears to drive a stronger demand for state action to promote redistribution. Given the continued racialised character of

[67] This review was done in consultation with Prof. Kevin Durrheim of the University of KwaZulu-Natal and Prof. John Dixon of Open University, UK. Both are scholars with a specialism in the quantitative sociology of racism and policy-related attitudes.

inequality in South Africa, with levels of income and wealth among many white and Indian South Africans far exceeding that of black African and coloured adults, it may be that the perception of these elites as hostile and negative towards others leads to a recognition that state action will be needed to bring about changes to the social structure. In other words, it might possibly reflect latent scepticism about whether economic (racial) elites truly buy into a transformative agenda, which in turn is driving a greater desire for an institutional response to realise such change. In contrast with out-group prejudice, views on the character of one's racial in-group do not have a significant effect on attitudes towards redistribution.

Another surprising finding is that a greater sense of racial threat is also associated with a greater demand for government redistribution. This is based on an index constructed from four racial threat items that address perceived material and symbolic threats. This effect is common to all population groups, with the same positive association evident (Appendix Table 6-2, model 2). The reason as to why a racial threat elicits such a response across population groups is something that will have to be explored, probably using qualitative methodologies. It may be that racial threat serves to bolster support for redistribution due to different competing underlying reasons. For instance, among economic elites, it is possible that an awareness of risk or threat from other social groups might lead to support for a measure of change to the social structure in order to maintain stability and protect privilege. By contrast, for the economically vulnerable, racial threat might encourage feelings of unfairness and injustice, which also prompts a call for interventions that are designed to more fairly distribute resources.

**Table 20: Ordered logistic models of the influence of racial attitudes on individual support for government redistribution, 2010-2016**

| Ordered logit (Depvar=govredr) | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prejudice towards the out-group (0=low; 10=high) | 0.044*** | … | … | … | … | … | 0.013 | 0.009 |
| Views towards the in-group (0=positive; 10= negative) | -0.011 | … | … | … | … | … | -0.009 | 0.000 |
| Perceived racial threat (1=low; 5=high threat) | … | 0.279*** | … | … | … | … | 0.219*** | 0.187*** |
| Frequency of racial discrimination (1=none; 4=always) | … | … | 0.135*** | … | … | … | 0.084*** | 0.056* |
| Racial distrust (1=low; 5=high) | … | … | … | 0.162*** | … | … | 0.018 | 0.015 |
| Racial contact (1=none; 5=high) | … | … | … | … | -0.189*** | … | -0.173*** | -0.158*** |
| Quality of racial contact (1=negative; 5=positive) | … | … | … | … | 0.038* | … | 0.039* | 0.027 |
| In-group identification | | | | | | | | |
| Importance of belonging to one's race group (1-5) | … | … | … | … | … | 0.201*** | 0.185*** | 0.156*** |
| Ashamed of race group (1=strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree) | … | … | … | … | … | -0.106*** | -0.042** | -0.019 |
| Attachment to people of same race (1-5) | … | … | … | … | … | 0.132*** | 0.140*** | 0.107*** |
| Controls for cohort, period and ageing effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls for social structural covariates | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Additional controls for personal attributes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls for province and geographic type | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Socio-economic status variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Mobility variables | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Inequality-related beliefs | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Political identity measures | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| /cut1 | -3.723 | -2.665 | -2.975 | -3.126 | -3.568 | -2.588 | -1.082 | 0.134 |
| /cut2 | -1.991 | -0.908 | -1.278 | -1.419 | -1.871 | -0.870 | 0.670 | 1.932 |
| /cut3 | -1.174 | -0.104 | -0.459 | -0.590 | -1.050 | -0.026 | 1.411 | 2.699 |
| /cut4 | 0.770 | 1.869 | 1.473 | 1.354 | 0.877 | 1.924 | 3.405 | 4.811 |
| No. obs | 15150 | 18079 | 18432 | 18774 | 17935 | 19067 | 12860 | 12714 |
| LR chi2 | 961.13 | 1253.52 | 1089.63 | 1118.82 | 1111.42 | 1323.03 | 1026.23 | 1956.42 |
| Prob > chi2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.0228 | 0.0249 | 0.0211 | 0.0213 | 0.0221 | 0.0248 | 0.0288 | 0.0556 |
| Log likelihood | -20634.62 | -24551.73 | -25216.14 | -25690.40 | -24547.47 | -25973.98 | -17307.84 | -16628.47 |

Note: group discrimination has been omitted in favour of the more specific variable on self-reported personal and collective racial discrimination. The correlation between the two is fairly robust ($r$=0.60*).* The left-right scale has been excluded from the political ideology measures too, given that it would result in the omission of the 2014 survey round's data due to the non-inclusion of this variable.

*Source: HSRC SASAS 2010-2016.*

The reported frequency of racial discrimination displays the expected positive association with preferences for redistribution, and this effect is most distinct among black African and, to a lesser degree, coloured adults (Model [3]). Racial distrust is positively correlated with support for redistribution (Model [4]), a finding that holds true for all except Indian South Africans. This finding might reflect the specific framing of the two questions that inform the index, which focus on present and future evaluations of whether members of other race groups trust and like one another. So those who display more sceptical attitudes towards interracial trust might regard government redistribution as contributing to greater prospects for social cohesion. To what extent does inter-group contact matter for views regarding redistribution? One might argue that this is one potential way of encouraging a more tolerant, sympathetic and shared understanding of social need and the kinds of acts of restitution and redress required to promote a greater level of equality and restorative justice. The measure is based on a combination of questions on the number of acquaintances and friends one has across racial lines, with higher scores representing a greater number of friends one has of different population groups. In Model [5], the coefficient based on this measure is negative, suggesting that greater inter-racial contact and friendship tends to result in lower support for redistribution. An examination of the separate population group model findings in Appendix Table 6-2 (model [5]) reveals that this effect is only present among black African adults. Again, this is a counter-intuitive finding, and will need further investigation. Among racial minorities, it is the quality of contact that matters more than interracial contact itself, with more positive interracial encounters leading to a more favourable view of redistribution.

The final set of measures that were examined deal with in-group identification, and relate to the importance attached on racial belonging, one's actual sense of attachment to people of the same race, and also the presence or absence of a sense of shame about certain attributes of one's race group. They have been entered independently in Model [6] since Cronbach alphas tests indicated that they would not produce a reliable index (alpha= 0.2232). On average, the importance of racial belonging and feeling a sense of attachment are positively correlated with support for redistribution, while a sense of shame about one's race group encourages support for redistribution. This pattern is observed among black African and Indian adults. Among coloured adults, the main difference is that a greater sense of attachment to one's race group is in this instance associated with lower support for redistribution. For white adults, the importance and shame measures have no effect on preferences for redistribution, while stronger feelings of in-group racial attachment lead to greater support.

When all the measures are included together in model [7], prejudice, racial distrust lose their salience. Perceived racial threat, self-reported (personal and collective) racial discrimination, racial contact, and in-group identification all remain statistically significant. Once subjective social mobility, inequality beliefs and political ideology are added in model [8], the effect of racial discrimination is weakened, while the quality of racial contact and feelings of shame about one's race group become insignificant predictors.

### 6.2.7 Stating the obvious? The role of trust in government

To what extent does political trust matter for public opinion about redistribution? As discussed earlier in the chapter, it is hypothesised that confidence in government will have a demonstrable positive association with such preferences. In the South African case, the period being analysed (2006-2016) has been one in which the functioning and capacity of government has begun to be seriously questioned. Concerns over the pace of change, the responsiveness of office bearers, lacklustre economic growth and job creation, and a litany of high-profile scandals involving corruption have combined and resulted in a considerable loss of faith in government and other political institutions. In asking South Africans to voice their level of support or opposition for government assuming responsibility for reducing income differences between rich and poor, it is difficult to see at an intrapersonal level how such considerations could be overlooked in deciding how to respond. To capture the role of political trust, use is made of a core set of indicators on institutional trust that have featured annually in the SASAS series since its inception in 2003. Of relevance to this study are the items on trust in national government, local government, Parliament, as well as political parties and politicians. Answers to these questions are captured using a five-point trust scale, ranging from 'strongly trust' (1) to 'strongly distrust' (5). For modelling purposes, I have reversed the scale, so that higher values represent greater trust. Reliability testing confirms that an index based on these items would form a reliable scale (Cronbach alpha=0.8408), with no item suggested for dropping. The purpose of including an index based on these items is that it includes views on the executive and legislature, decentralised as well as centralised government, as well as the confidence the public has in political actors (both individually and collectively through the parties they represent). Two independent political variables are experimented with, the first being the index described above, and the second trust in national government.

**Table 21: Ordered logistic models of the influence of political trust on individual support for government redistribution, 2006-2016**

| Ordered logit (Depvar=govredr) | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Political trust index (1-lowest; 5=highest) | 0.018 | … | -0.015 | … | 0.007 | … |
| Trust in national government | … | 0.019* | … | -0.019* | … | -0.015 |
| Controls for cohort, period effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls for social structural covariates | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Additional controls for personal attributes | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls for province and geographic type | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Socio-economic status variables | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Mobility variables | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Inequality-related beliefs | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Political identity measures | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| /cut1 | -3.613 | -3.611 | -4.239 | -4.441 | -1.472 | -1.857 |
| /cut2 | -1.945 | -1.948 | -2.529 | -2.738 | 0.288 | -0.099 |
| /cut3 | -1.123 | -1.107 | -1.684 | -1.872 | 1.178 | 0.811 |
| /cut4 | 0.708 | 0.714 | 0.204 | 0.009 | 3.211 | 2.838 |
| No. obs | 31133 | 32894 | 29494 | 31088 | 29157 | 30788 |
| LR chi2 | 323.98 | 356.52 | 1686.12 | 1780.04 | 4536.75 | 4823.17 |
| Prob > chi2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.0037 | 0.0039 | 0.0205 | 0.0205 | 0.0559 | 0.0562 |
| Log likelihood | -43288.12 | -45817.19 | -40232.49 | -42498.04 | -38313.93 | -40530.72 |

Note: The model numbers in the table above correspond to the same as those presented in Table 20. All variables included in the earlier models were included in the separate population group models, though the coefficients for these other measures are not presented here. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001.
Source: HSRC SASAS 2006-2016.

A series of ordered logistic regression models were conducted to test the influence of political trust. The modelling sequence, which is presented in Table 21, is structured as follows: (i) models are run with just the political trust measure as well as period and cohort variable controls included as independent variables (Models [1] and [2]); (ii) the latter plus personal socio-demographic attributes, as well as geographic controls (Models [3] and [4]); (ii) the latter models, but this time with the variables on subjective social mobility, inequality beliefs and political ideology (Models [5] and [6]). The model results reveal that political trust fails to produce a strong effect on support for redistribution, irrespective of whether the composite index or the simple, single indicator of trust in national government is used.

The political trust index in base Model [I] does have a positive coefficient, but the size of effect is not large enough to achieve statistical significance. The inclusion of personal attributes and attitudinal measures in Models [3] and [5] does not alter the picture, with the index remaining insignificant and the sign of the coefficient even alternating from positive to negative and back again across the three models. Narrowing the scope of trust to just national government does little to change this empirical message. In Model [2], trust in national government has a nominally significant and positive effect on support for redistribution. This weak effect is still present in Model [4], but the coefficient switches from positive to

negative, while in Model [6] the statistical significance falls away and the coefficient is positive again.

**Table 22: Support for government responsibility to reduce income differences between rich and poor, by (a) political trust and ideology (%), 2008-2016, and (b) political trust and race (%), 2006-2016**

| | Political trust index | | | Trust in Government | | | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Low trust | High trust | Diff. | Distrust | Trust | Diff. | |
| Liberals | 70.0 | 71.2 | +1.2 | 70.3 | 71.7 | +1.4 | 8121 |
| Moderates | 67.1 | 72.8 | +5.7 | 68.0 | 73.0 | +5.0 | 7039 |
| Conservatives | 64.1 | 68.4 | +4.3 | 63.4 | 68.0 | +4.6 | 4231 |
| Uncertain | 67.2 | 64.3 | -2.9 | 66.5 | 66.7 | +0.2 | 4431 |
| All | 67.6 | 69.8 | +2.2 | 67.8 | 70.4 | +2.6 | 23822 |
| Black African | 73.4 | 77.0 | +3.6 | 75.4 | 76.3 | +0.9 | 26661 |
| Coloured | 73.7 | 74.7 | +1.0 | 75.2 | 75.0 | -0.2 | 7385 |
| Indian | 61.7 | 67.2 | +5.5 | 64.0 | 67.4 | +3.4 | 4626 |
| White | 52.2 | 66.4 | +14.2 | 57.6 | 65.5 | +7.9 | 5668 |
| All | 69.9 | 75.7 | +5.8 | 71.6 | 75.6 | +4.0 | 44340 |

Note: Table entries represent the percentage of liberals, moderates or conservatives who agree that it is government's responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and poor in the country. For the political trust index, low and high levels of trust are determined by a simple median split, while the trust in government scale is split between those who express trust/strong trust and those voicing distrust/strong distrust..
Source: HSRC SASAS 2006-2016

Existing international evidence, most based on American studies, has demonstrated that political trust can play a role in explaining public support for redistributive policies (Hetherington & Globetti, 2002; Hetherington, 2005) and support for ideological principles such as areas of government responsibility and spending (Rudolph & Evans, 2005; Rudolph & Popp, 2009; Rudolph, 2009, 2017). From the initial evidence presented above, it would seem that political trust does not have the same level of influence in the South African case. There are modest signs of an asymmetric interaction effect, as shown in Table 22, though this appears more pronounced based on an interaction between political trust and race than political trust and ideology. The effects of political trust on support for redistribution appear larger than average among white adults, Indian adults to a lesser degree, and among conservatives and moderated (relative to conservatives). Yet, irrespective of these patterns, the overall scope of influence of political trust is mostly small. It may be that its influence will be more evident in relation to specific of race-targeted redress policies, such as affirmative action and sports quotas, rather than the ideological principle of government redistribution. This proposition will be examined in the next chapter of the thesis.

## 6.3 Summary

In this chapter, I have focused on providing a better understanding of some of the individual determinants of preferences for redistribution in South Africa. This has been the subject of

substantive academic interest over recent decades and has led to a number of theoretical propositions being made. The analysis in particular set out to examine hypotheses relating to the influence of economic self-interest, the experience and expectations of social mobility, general beliefs and inequality, fairness and justice, political ideology and social identity, as well as political trust. A summary of the findings from the multivariate analysis are provided in Table 23. Counter to expectations, there was some evidence for rational choice and self-interest playing a role in shaping redistribution beliefs among the public. Social mobility produces more mixed results, with mobility experience proving significant, while expectations of upward mobility failed to produce a clear effect. One of the most strongly supported hypotheses relates to beliefs about inequality and fairness. Those recognising that income inequality is too large in the country, that society is characterised by class conflict, and expressing a preference for a fairer social structure all tend to hold a more pro-redistribution stance on average. Less theoretical corroboration is found in relation to beliefs about getting ahead in society. While a belief that exogenous factors such as ascription, luck and connections inform social position tends to be positively correlated with support for redistribution (in line with theory), so too does a belief that merit (hard work, ambition) determines socioeconomic success in South Africa (counter to theory). Nonetheless other measures on attribution for poverty do show that those blaming the poor for their situation due to a perception of laziness and lack of willpower are less likely to favour redistribution than those believing that structural injustice or unfairness is the cause of poverty.

Political ideology seems to matter too, with self-declared liberals and moderates more inclined to favour redistribution than conservatives. Similarly, party identification matters too, with African National Congress supporters more likely to support government taking action to reduce income inequality than Democratic Alliance supporters. Other party differences could not be detected, mainly due to sample size limitations. The influence of social identity measures, in this instance in the form of racial attitudes, on redistributive preferences generated mixed evidence. Racial threat, reported racial discrimination, in-group identification and racial contact had a significant effect on redistribution preferences, even after controlling for a range of other attributional and attitudinal variables. However in a number of instances the direction of the relationship ran counter to what was theoretically expected. This basis for this finding appears due to complex and differential patterns evident across population groups, which, in turn, might reflect different motivational reasons for offering support for redistribution. Finally, despite current concerns about the politics of the

state, this does not appear to have translated into a robust political trust effect on redistribution. For those with a more conservative ideology and among white South Africans the level of trust or mistrust in government does mediate views on redistribution (more so than for other groups), yet the overall lack of significant effect remains the dominant message.

**Table 23: Summary of evidence relative to hypotheses tested in the chapter**

| Hypotheses | Assessment of evidence presented in chapter |
|---|---|
| **Rational choice and economic self-interest**<br>H1: In the South African context, it is envisaged that individual material circumstances will not demonstrate a significant association with preferences for political redistribution. | • H1: There is some support for rational choice and economic self-interest hypothesis, with modelling showing a weak but significant effect based on indicators of SES and vulnerability. |
| **Past mobility and future expectations**<br>H2: Both mobility experience and expectations of future mobility will significantly interact with preferences for state-led redistribution in South Africa. | • H2: Mixed support<br>• *Mobility experience* shows some effect, with those experiencing downward intergenerational mobility more likely to offer a more positive view of political redistribution, vice versa. This effect falls away with other measures focusing on recent mobility experience.<br>• *Future expectations* do not appear to have a bearing on government redistribution in principle, which go against the POUM hypothesis.<br>• Questions remain about the 5-year reference period used in the survey models. Alternative experimentation warranted. |
| **Beliefs about inequality and fairness**<br>H3(a): Awareness of inequality and beliefs about its adverse effects on South Africa society will create a stronger demand for state-led redress.<br><br>H3(b): Those believing that effort and ability determine socioeconomic success in South Africa will be less partial to government redistribution, while those believing that exogenous factors (such as family background, connections, and luck) will display a more favourable attitude towards redistribution. | • H3(a): Strongly supported<br>o Inequality aversion is positively associated with a higher preference for government led redress.<br>o A stronger belief that South African society is characterised by class conflict increases the likelihood of a pro- redistribution stance.<br>• H3(b): Mixed evidence<br>o Strong views on *both* merit and chance as factors behind mobility translate into a more deeply-felt commitment to redistribution<br>o Those believing poverty is due to laziness and lack of willpower among the poor less likely to favour redistribution than those recognising structural injustice as the cause. |
| **Ideology and social identity**<br>H4(a): Ideological self-placement on a left-right (liberalism-conservatism) scale will inform support for political redistribution, with greater liberalism associated with more accepting views for this principle compared with those reporting conservative tendencies.<br><br>H4(b): Political identification will matter for redistributive preferences, with ANC supporters expressing more favourable views than those identifying with other parties.<br><br>H4(c): Racial attitudes and contact (out-group prejudice, in-group identification, racial threat, racial discrimination, racial distrust, extent and quality of racial contact) will matter for redistributive preferences. An inverse effect is expected for out-group prejudice, in-group identification and racial threat, while a positive association is envisaged for racial discrimination, extent and quality of racial contact. | • H4(a): Supported: those rating their political views as liberal or moderate were more supportive of government redistribution than those with a conservative political outlook<br>• H4(b): Some support: Ruling party (ANC) supporters are moderately more likely to voice support for redistribution relative to Democratic Alliance (DA) supporters. The distinction between ANC and other opposition parties (grouped into a single category) is not significant.<br>• H4(c): Mixed evidence<br>o A number of the variables tested yield significant effects on redistribution preferences (racial threat, reported racial discrimination, racial contact, in-group identification) and remain present even after controlling for other variables.<br>o However in a number of instances the direction of the relationship goes against what was expected. This appears due to different patterns across population groups, and possibly different underlying motivational reasoning. |
| **Confidence in government**<br>H5: Trust in government will demonstrate a positive relationship with preferences for redistribution. | • H5: Weakly supported: On aggregate the effect of political trust is not significant; some evidence of an asymmetric interaction between trust x ideology and trust x race, though the overall conclusion holds |

Taken together with the empirical messages from the preceding two chapters, it can be concluded that South Africans are not only keenly aware of the inequality affecting their society, but the desire for change is reflecting in a fairly strong pattern of support for government to assume some measure of responsibility for reducing material disparities. One's social position, mobility history, awareness of inequality, political leaning and racial attitudes does affect how weak and strong this predisposition is, but the normative preference for redistribution remains fairly widely shared irrespective of these individual traits. What remains to be seen is the extent to which South African public's general views on inequality and favouring of political redistribution carry through into support for specific policy measures designed to promote a more equal society. This forms the basis of the chapter to follow.

# Chapter 7
# From *Principle* to *Practice*: Support for and Opposition to Redress Policies

"*South Africa, everyone agrees, is a profoundly unequal society. It is marked by inequality of power, of wealth, of access to the means for acquiring power and/or wealth, of education, and of status. This much is agreed upon. Disagreement arises, however, when the causes of this situation are sought*"
Rick Turner, *Eye of the Needle* (1980)

"*Perceptions of redistribution are neither simple nor uniform. You can't please all the people all the time. The question remains how many of the people you can please, how much of the time*."
Peter Taylor-Gooby (1985:406)

## 7.1 Introduction

The idea of the developmental or transformative state in the South African case draws on certain tenets of the social democratic welfare state regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990) as well as the African humanistic philosophy of *ubuntu*, with its emphasis on solidaristic social arrangements and taking responsibility for the fair distribution of life chances. As such, alongside the achievement of extending full and equal political citizenship to citizens through the universal franchise in 1994, considerable efforts were undertaken to forge progress towards greater economic freedom and the promotion of the social rights of citizenship, most especially through the deracialisation and expansion in the scope and reach of welfare and labour market policies (Nattrass & Seekings, 1997; Van Niekerk, 2013). Commendable social achievements have been achieved in the intervening quarter-century in an effort to ensure decent living standards across the population.[68] The promotion of reconstruction and development has nevertheless been accompanied by appreciable challenges. Income inequality in the post-apartheid period has continued to endure, economic conditions have become increasingly precarious, unemployment remains at an alarmingly high level, and issues of administrative efficiency and quality of service represent lingering concerns in the delivery of health care, education and basic household services.

Furthermore, on the international stage, the welfare state has also been experiencing far-reaching processes of change, due to a combination of long-term shifts in economic, technological, social and political context (Svallfors & Taylor-Gooby, 1999). Divisions have

[68] It should however be acknowledged that the government's performance remains a source of vigorous contestation, both in academic and political spheres. Given the prevailing somber political mood in recent years, as displayed through public opinion, the media and general political discourse, there has been a tendency towards skepticism in evaluating the post-apartheid record. I would maintain that the basis of disagreement centres more on what remains to be done and the capacities of the state as opposed to a fundamental denial of any progress , though again this is a position which is likely to be subject to much debate.

begun to emerge in the inter-class, post-war consensus regarding social welfare provision, driven by neoliberal pressures, globalisation and labour market transformations, population dynamics, as well as growing family diversity and changing gender roles. The new risks posed by such developments have been exacerbated more recently by a surge in populist nationalism and post-recession austerity politics, which is resulting in signs of welfare state futures involving greater selectivism and targeting, cut-backs and retrenchment, and welfare chauvinism in the face of burgeoning immigrant populations (Taylor-Gooby et al, 2017). This ideologically charged climate for reform and retrenchment has led to global uncertainty about whether a so-called 'hollowing out' of the state will prevail, leading to the ascendency of more minimalist forms of government, or alternatively whether countries will continue to forge ahead with interventionist and expansionist forms of social provision in the face of such constraints and pressures.

Against these contextual developments in state transformation, it is important to trace and understand evolving patterns of public opinion, as this has the potential to have a considerable bearing on the policy agenda in general and the successful implementation of specific interventions more narrowly. Citizens care about the outcomes of government policy, and are likely to pay particular attention to government performance and policy changes in relation to issues that feature prominently in the public agenda (Soroka & Wlezien 2010; Davids et al, 2016). For this reason, the reform of social policies is regarded as being politically risky (Pierson, 2001; Graham, 2002; Busemeyer & Garritzmann, 2017). Studies on welfare state attitudes since the 1990s have shown that mass opinion has tended to favour the retention of traditional forms of state interventionism, even in the face of pressures towards a retreat in transformative social policy. This has been interpreted as evidence suggesting that efforts to substantively rollback the social model, involving strong government responsibility for social protection and redistribution to those in need, are likely to be met with robust opposition (Taylor-Gooby, 1999).[69] Research has however shown that attitudes are not necessarily unwavering or homogenous in character, including concerns over sustainability, and new within-class cleavages that are starting to strain social solidarity relating to core aspects of social citizenship (Svallfors & Taylor-Gooby, 1999). Redistribution is essentially

[69] This certainly seems to be the case with the rise and continuance of anti-austerity protests across Europe during the last decade. In South Africa, with close to half of all households (46%) deriving their main source of income from social grants in 2016 (StatsSA, 2017) and a recorded 17.2-million beneficiaries of social assistance in 2016/17 (SASSA, 2017), it is certainly plausible that any form of retrenchment in benefits or problems with the efficient delivery of grant payments is likely to be met with broad disapproval and resistance.

collective action designed to promote wellbeing, with the required benefits and services being paid for by resources primarily collected by the state through taxation (Alcock, 2016: 83). Attitudes towards increased spending through tax revenue have however shown indications of hardening since the turn of the century, which has given rise to concerns about the degree of sway that neoliberal, individualistic ideology has had on mass opinion (ibid; Humpage, 2015).

In spite of broad acceptance of the principle of redress, as articulated in the preceding chapter, emerging research has tended to show that this is often accompanied by more polarized attitudes towards policies that have been designed to address societal injustice and facilitate economic and racial transformation in South Africa (Tuch and Hughes 1996; Durrheim and Dixon 2004; Dixon et al. 2007, 2010a,b, 2017; Durrheim 2010; Roberts et al. 2011; Durrheim et al. 2011). This has been termed the "principle-implementation gap" (Schuman et al., 1985), which in effect refers to the degree by which support for transformative social policies falls short of support for redistribution at an ideological level. Understanding the motivations that explain why people choose to disapprove of policies intended to achieve transformation has therefore become an important question for the social sciences. Three prevailing hypotheses have tended to dominate the local and international literature on opposition to policies that are implemented as the basis for promoting transformation. These relate to self-interest, racial attitudes and other ideological factors. As Durrheim (2010) observed, research in this tradition has tended to suggest that resistance to redistributive and transformative social policy is not influenced significantly by socioeconomic and demographic factors, such as income, age and educational attainment. While the South African evidence does point to the salience of race in relation to patterns of support and opposition, the evidence base on the predictors of such policy attitudes still remains relatively circumscribed (Friedman & Erasmus 2008). Furthermore, there is little South African empirical work on the relationship between inequality beliefs and support for redress policies. In this regard, this chapter aims to make an original contribution to the small, but growing evidence base.

This chapter aims to examine the extent to which social policies aimed at realising transformation in South Africa have been, and continue to be, opposed since the early 2000s. In particular, it aims to update and expand on experimental analysis conducted by Durrheim (2010), which used SASAS data from 2003 and 2004 to determine levels of support for three

key hypotheses relating to resistance to racial policies, namely individual and collective self-interest, racial attitudes, as well as political and economic ideology. In common with the three previous empirical chapters, the analysis presented will also aim to provide insight into who expresses more opposition to such policies and the manner in which patterns of opposition have remained consistent or changeable over time.

## 7.2 Affirmative (re)action: National trends in support for redress policies

I begin my analysis by examining how supportive South Africans are of various redistributive policy actions that the government has taken since the transition to democracy in order to promote redress and tackle high levels of inequality. In so doing, I aim to determine the extent of the "principle-implementation gap" in the country, chart its relative stability and change since the early 2000s, and profile the social cleavages that inform patterns of support and opposition. Based on a review of the SASAS survey questionnaires administered since 2003, a series of questions were identified relating to patterns of support for more than ten specific policies, covering the domains of land, employment, education, social security, culture and progressive taxation. Some of these items are race-targeted or race-preferential policies, while others are more income-targeted or class-based redress measures. This distinction is important, as it has been suggested that the former are likely to be more strongly opposed, due to the influence of racial attitudes (Habib & Bentley, 2008).

While some of these redistributive measures have been regularly fielded in SASAS, others have been included only in select rounds of interviewing. The inclusion of these less frequently fielded items is necessary in order to produce a fuller account of the degree of variation in support depending on the type of redress measure examined. It does however present certain analytical challenges and limitations, especially if the intention is to move beyond bivariate descriptions of these patterns to test hypotheses regarding the determinants of opposition to government redress policies. Of particular note is the problem that, in many cases, the measures are not jointly fielded in the same survey round. This makes it difficult to draw direct comparisons about whether there is shared opposition to certain policies, or produce composite transformation or redress indices. Fortunately, this is not universally the case, but it does shape the approach to the analysis. I begin by providing a national overview of support and opposition to these policies, after which I present these patterns by race and class, followed by an intersectional focus on within-group differences, most especially class,

cohort and gender differences within each population group. The remainder of the chapter is structured around race- versus class-based measures. In the former instance, I am able to construct a composite index based on opposition to land reform, affirmative action and sports quotas, and test the relative predictive power of the self-interest, racial attitudes and ideology hypotheses. I then proceed to examine bivariate and multivariate associations for each of the main policies separately. The examples of class-based redress policy available for the study are not able to be combined in an index, so the correlates of each policy will be examined separately.

In Table 24, I present the pattern of public attitudes towards select redress policies and how these have evolved over time. All measures are based on a standard five-point agreement scale, the only exception being one measure which asks about levels of satisfaction with the provision of social grants. While this may not be considered a good, direct measure of support for this form of social assistance, it has been retained as a reasonable proxy to enable a more detailed examination of group-based differences associated with this notable redistributive intervention. Several broad points are worth mentioning based on the observed results. Firstly, on aggregate, there appears to be wide range in levels of public support across the set of measures, ranging from a low of 37 per cent in the case of a compulsory restitution tax for white South Africans to a high of 90 per cent for the additional government spending on public health care. However, despite this spread in values, most measures were favoured by at least 60 per cent of the adult population on average, suggesting moderate to high support. The only instances where this was not the case was in relation to preferences for sports quotas and a restitution tax.

A second observation is that, where trend data is available, the results suggest a considerable degree of stability in attitudes towards redress policies over the 2003 to 2016 period. In most instances, policy attitudes have tended to fluctuate within a 5 to 10 percentage point range over the period. This assessment of steady support for redistributive policies is even more apparent if one discounts the 2016 survey results. There was a distinct downswing in support that occurred between 2015 and 2016 for a number of the measures with multiple data points. For instance, between these years, support for progressive taxation fell 22 percentage points, sports quotas fell 12 percentage points, land reform and support for the unemployed by 7

percentage points, and affirmative action by 5 percentage points.[70] I would contend that is in all likelihood a reflection of the significant political events that occurred within this window of time, which had an impact on the public's confidence in government. The 2015 round took place between October and early December 2015, while the 2016 round was undertaken between January and March 2017. Of particular note during this period was, the firing of Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene by the President on 9th December 2015, his replacement by the lesser experienced Des Van Rooyen, and the reinstatement of former Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan within a matter of days due to internal and external pressure. This had significant repercussions for the economy and political trust, which was compounded by the subsequent intensification of state capture allegations. This refers to claims of improper and unethical conduct by politicians and businesses, and included the release of the State of Capture report by former Public Protector Thuli Madonsela in November 2016. We see the downturn in support for redress measures reflected in other core political support measures, such as satisfaction with democracy and trust in national government and Parliament. Whether this remains a sombre political moment or a more enduring trend in political support will have to be determined once new rounds of SASAS data become available, though the role of political trust in relation to support for redress will be tested in the multivariate analysis that follows later in the chapter.

Thirdly, to a certain extent, attitudes seem moderately more favourable towards interventions focused on class-based redress, where the emphasis rests more on addressing material rather than racial disadvantage. Accordingly, somewhat higher general support for measures crafted to address employment deprivation and educational inequality in schools and tertiary institutions is evident compared to race preferential policy interventions such as sports quotas, land redistribution and affirmative action. A simple average of the share supporting the different sets of interventions across all years reveals that 56 per cent support the race preferential measures compared to 76 per cent for the class-based redress measures. A glance through the numbers in the table shows however that this finding does not universally apply, especially in relation to certain social grants questions, a proposed universal basic income, and progressive taxation.

[70] Despite the sizeable fall in trust in progressive taxation, trust in the South African Revenue Service remained fairly stable between the two years, standing at 62% in 2015 and 60% in 2016. The implication is that the fall in support for progressive taxation does not appear to be related to trust in the tax revenue body, even though the latter has been not been immune to political scandal over the last few years. Over the same period trust in national government fell from 43% to 32%), so it is more probable that this decline is support for progressive taxation is related to a growing scepticism about central government.

In the 2006 and 2009 SASAS rounds, an average of 65% supported greater monetary spending on social grants even if this did demand extra taxation. This is lower than overall support than for land reform. The question remains whether the framing of this question in terms of the higher tax requirements that may be needed to cover the additional social spending has resulted in slightly muted levels of support tends. Supporting this argument is the fact that the 2016 survey round revealed that 84 per cent agreed that the government should continue to provide social grants when no mention is made of the tax implications. However, there were grants related questions in the survey round that invoked the possibility of higher taxes, and these demonstrated that 83 per cent supported more spending on old age pensions and 74 per cent on unemployment benefits irrespective of the tax trade-off. These figures rose to around the 90 per cent for additional spending on education and health. These findings therefore do not provide outright confirmation of recent European survey findings by Busemeyer and Garritzmann (2017) that suggest that trade-offs between spending and taxation serve to reduce individual-level support for increasing social spending.[71]

Support for a universal basic income (UBI) scheme in South Africa stood at 63 per cent in 2016, which is again lower or equivalent to support expressed for some of the race-preferential policies. Yet, despite this fact, based on comparable data from the Round 8 of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2016), it is apparent that South Africans have a higher level of demand for this form of intervention than citizens across Europe.[72] The introduction of a Basic Income Grant (BIG) in South Africa was recommended by The Taylor Committee in 2002 as part of a comprehensive system of social protection focusing on eliminating extreme poverty, inequality reduction and job creation (Taylor Committee, 2002). Financing concerns have frustrated implementation, despite economic and broader social arguments favouring its affordability and social necessity (Samson et al., 2002; Standing & Samson, 2003; BIG Financing Reference Group, 2004; Meth, 2008). Therefore, although the level of support offered for UBI in the 2016 survey seems lower relative to other class-based measures

[71] The European findings went further to show that the fall in support is even more distinct when additional spending is framed in terms of cutbacks in other parts of the government budget or in terms of higher public debt.

[72] This is based on my own analysis of the ESS data. Across the 18 countries surveyed in 2016, the share supporting a UBI scheme ranged from 32% to 60%, with support the highest in Slovenia (60%), Russia (59%), and Israel (58%) and lowest in Sweden (35%), Switzerland (33%) and Norway (32%). South Africa (63%) therefore stands at the upper end of the league table.

examined, it does appear that South Africans have a relatively strong belief that everybody should have basic income security.

Support for progressive taxation has already been discussed, especially the sharp downturn in support between 2015 and 2016. This is based on a measure that asks directly whether wealthy South Africans should pay a greater, smaller or equal share of their income as poorer citizens on taxation. The 2006 and 2016 surveys also contained similar questions on the characterisation of taxation for those with high, medium and low incomes, with response categories ranging from much too high to much too low on a five-point scale. Comparing the attitudes towards taxation levels for those with high and low incomes across the two rounds, I find that a considerable share of the public (45% in 2016) believes that wealthy South Africans are overtaxed, a position which has remained unchanged since 2006 (43%). Furthermore, a growing share favours regressive taxation, with those stating that the poor are undertaxed rising from 8% in 2006 to 22% in 2016. It is probable that these beliefs constrain stronger support for progressive taxation being registered. As Bechert and Edlund (2015:336) observe, based on their analysis of the 2006 ISSP Role of Government module taxation questions, South Africans (like Venezuelans and Filipinos) appear atypical in their tax preferences, with a greater than average tendency to voice support for regressive taxation and a dominant preference for general tax cuts for rich and poor alike. They regard this as evidence of paradoxical support for "a prototypical neoliberal right-wing tax system" in the face of a high incidence of poverty. Based on methodological testing, they conclude that this is not due to sample coverage or translation considerations, but rather as a sign that the theoretical expectation that socioeconomic factors (income, education, occupational status) would determine demand for redistributive taxation seems not to apply as well to developing countries as to Western nations. The development of a highly progressive and efficient tax system is one of the great successes of the post-apartheid era, and the associated impact of fiscal redistribution in the country compares favourably in relation to other middle income countries (Lieberman, 2003; Lustig, 2016). Any sign of weakening in the public solidarity underlying this system is therefore cause for some concern, warranting further examination and monitoring.

**Table 24: Support for different types of redress measures, 2003-2016 (per cent and means)**

| | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | All years |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***(A) Race-based redress measures:*** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **1. Land reform: "Government should redistribute land to black South Africans"** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % strongly agree / agree | 67 | 69 | 64 | 68 | 69 | 69 | 68 | 64 | 65 | 64 | 63 | 68 | 72 | 65 | 67 |
| % opposed* | 32 | 31 | 36 | 32 | 31 | 31 | 32 | 36 | 35 | 36 | 38 | 32 | 28 | 35 | 33 |
| Mean* | 3.68 | 3.75 | 3.62 | 3.70 | 3.73 | 3.71 | 3.74 | 3.65 | 3.62 | 3.66 | 3.60 | 3.76 | 3.82 | 3.61 | 3.69 |
| **2. Affirmative action: "There should be preferential hiring and promotion of black South Africans in employment"** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % strongly agree / agree | 65 | 65 | 59 | 63 | 66 | 66 | 64 | 64 | 62 | 60 | 58 | 67 | 66 | 61 | 63 |
| % opposed* | 35 | 35 | 41 | 37 | 34 | 34 | 36 | 36 | 38 | 40 | 42 | 33 | 34 | 39 | 37 |
| Mean* | 3.66 | 3.68 | 3.49 | 3.50 | 3.62 | 3.64 | 3.61 | 3.57 | 3.62 | 3.51 | 3.49 | 3.70 | 3.66 | 3.53 | 3.60 |
| **3. Black Economic Empowerment (BEE): "Give preferential contracts and tax breaks to black businesses"** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % strongly agree / agree | 60 | 61 | 61 | 61 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 61 |
| % opposed* | 40 | 39 | 39 | 39 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 39 |
| Mean* | 3.51 | 3.55 | 3.55 | 3.43 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 3.52 |
| **4. Sports quotas: "There should be racial quotas in national sports teams"** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % strongly agree / agree | 61 | 54 | 54 | 51 | 62 | 62 | 53 | 55 | 52 | 54 | 58 | 59 | 63 | 51 | 56 |
| % opposed* | 39 | 46 | 46 | 49 | 38 | 38 | 47 | 45 | 48 | 46 | 42 | 41 | 37 | 49 | 44 |
| Mean score * | 3.58 | 3.38 | 3.26 | 3.27 | 3.53 | 3.52 | 3.33 | 3.37 | 3.36 | 3.37 | 3.41 | 3.48 | 3.55 | 3.25 | 3.41 |
| **5a. Apartheid compensation: "To what extent do you agree or disagree that government should…Pay money to the victims of apartheid as reparation for the history of discrimination?"** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % strongly agree / agree | 66 | 62 | 62 | 59 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 63 |
| % opposed* | 34 | 37 | 38 | 41 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | 37 |
| Mean* | 3.65 | 3.64 | 3.58 | 3.53 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 3.62 |
| **5b. Restitution Fund: "A restitution / compensation fund to which white people can <u>voluntarily</u> contribute should be set up"** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % strongly agree / agree | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 48 | 48 |
| % opposed* | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 52 | 52 |
| Mean* | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 3.19 | 3.19 |
| **5c. Restitution Tax: "A restitution / compensation fund should be set up by implementing an <u>extra tax</u> on white people"** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % strongly agree / agree | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 37 | 37 |
| % opposed* | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 63 | 63 |
| Mean* | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 2.90 | 2.90 |
| Unweighted base N | 4,980 | 5,583 | 2,879 | 2,939 | 3,164 | 3,321 | 3,305 | 3,183 | 3,057 | 2,521 | 2,885 | 3,124 | 3,115 | 3,079 | 47,135 |

**Table 24 continued: -**

| | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | All years |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***(B) Class-based redress measures:*** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **6. Support for unemployed: "The government should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed."** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % strongly agree / agree | … | … | … | … | … | … | 82 | 83 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 77 | 81 |
| % opposed* | … | … | … | … | … | … | 18 | 17 | 20 | 19 | 18 | 17 | 16 | 23 | 19 |
| Mean* | … | … | … | … | … | … | 4.05 | 4.15 | 4.06 | 4.08 | 4.08 | 4.09 | 4.10 | 3.97 | 4.07 |
| **7. School integration: "The children of the economically well-off and the poor should be educated together"** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % strongly agree / agree | 77 | 80 | 80 | 78 | 69 | 75 | 79 | 76 | 70 | 74 | 77 | 77 | 73 | 73 | 76 |
| % opposed* | 23 | 20 | 20 | 22 | 31 | 25 | 21 | 24 | 30 | 26 | 23 | 23 | 27 | 27 | 24 |
| Mean* | 3.94 | 4.01 | 3.99 | 3.97 | 3.76 | 3.89 | 4.00 | 3.94 | 3.82 | 3.89 | 3.91 | 3.99 | 3.86 | 3.82 | 3.92 |
| **8. "The government should provide more chances for children from poor families to go to university, even if it has to increase taxes"** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % strongly agree / agree | … | … | … | … | … | … | 75 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | 75 |
| % opposed* | … | … | … | … | … | … | 25 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | 25 |
| Mean* | … | … | … | … | … | … | 3.95 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | 3.95 |
| **9. Continued social grant provision: "The Government in South Africa should continue to provide social grants"** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % strongly agree / agree | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | 84 | 84 |
| % opposed* | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | 16 | 16 |
| Mean* | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | 4.20 | 4.20 |
| **10. Increased social grant spending: "The government should spend more money on social grants for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes"** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % strongly agree / agree | … | … | … | 66 | … | … | 65 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | 65 |
| % opposed* | … | … | … | 37 | … | … | 35 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | 35 |
| Mean* | … | … | … | 3.66 | … | … | 3.59 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | 3.62 |
| **11. Universal Basic Income (UBI)/ Basic Income Grant (BIG): "…"** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % strongly agree / agree | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | 63 | 63 |
| % opposed* | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | 37 | 37 |
| Mean* | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | | |
| **12. Progressive taxation: "Do you think people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller share?"** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % larger/m. larger share | … | … | … | … | … | … | 65 | … | … | … | … | … | 69 | 47 | 60 |
| Mean* | … | … | … | … | … | … | 3.83 | … | … | … | … | … | 3.94 | 3.54 | 3.77 |
| **13. "Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it" (% saying more / much more)** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Health | … | … | … | 91 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | 90 | … |
| Education | … | … | … | 88 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | 89 | … |
| Old age pensions | … | … | … | 79 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | 83 | |
| Unemployment benefits | … | … | … | 70 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | 74 | |

Note: * Opposition indicates the proportion of the sample that did not 'strongly agree' or 'agree' with the policies. The mean scores are based on reversed scales where 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither nor, 4=agree and 5=strongly agree. 'Do not know' responses were combined with neutral responses.
Source: authors' calculations based on HSRC SASAS (2003-2016)

## 7.3 A nation divided? Inter- and intra-racial, class and cohort solidarity

Race and class differences in attitudes towards policies for reducing inequality and addressing social disadvantage in South are presented in Table 25, based on pooled data for the various survey rounds. A stark racial gradient in policy attitudes emerges, which is most evident in relation to land reform, affirmative action, black economic empowerment, and compensation for the victims of *apartheid*. In these instances, black South Africans were appreciably more supportive than other population groups generally and white citizens in particular. On average over the interval, support for these measures was more than four times higher among black African respondents relative to white respondents. Furthermore, less than a third of coloured and Indian South Africans expressed positive views on these policies. A similar pattern is found in relation to the other race-preferential measures examined, such as sports quotas and specific types of restitution. The scale of inter-group variation is of a moderately lesser degree, due to lower overall support among black African adults, though the racialised hierarchy of support and opposition remains.

The table also reveals that there is less racial variability with regard to class-based redress measures, such as unemployment-related social policy, school integration, university opportunities for poor youth, increased spending on social grants and other social sectors, and progressive taxation. While a gradient in support continues to exist on a number of these measures, the range in values tends to be much narrower in nature. More than three-quarters of white adults favour greater social spending on health (86%), education (82%) and old age pensions (78%), with inter-racial variation at 10 percentage points or less. Furthermore, between three-fifths and two-thirds of white adults are partial to school integration, as well as state efforts at providing a basic standard of living for the unemployed, and expanding university opportunities for poor youth. Only a slim majority of white adults favoured progressive taxation, the continued provision of social grants, increased grant spending and the introduction new grants such as universal basic income. Similarly, black African, coloured and Indian adults for the most part voiced lower than average within-group support for these policy interventions.[73]

[73] The clear exception is in relation to agreement that the government should continue to provide social grants, with support remaining high among black African (88%), coloured (80%) and Indian (73%) adults while white adults demonstrate more polarized views (52%).

**Table 25: Race and class differences in support for different redress measures, cumulative data 2003-2016 (percentage agreeing)**

| | Race | | | | | Class (subjective poverty status) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Black African | Coloured | Indian | White | *Diff. high to low* | Poor | Just getting by | Non-poor | *Diff. high to low* | All |
| ***(A) Race-based redress measures:*** | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Land reform | 80 | 31 | 29 | 18 | *62* | 78 | 69 | 54 | *24* | 67 |
| 2. Affirmative action | 76 | 28 | 26 | 16 | *60* | 74 | 66 | 51 | *23* | 63 |
| 3. BEE | 73 | 25 | 24 | 14 | *59* | 71 | 63 | 48 | *22* | 61 |
| 4. Sports quotas | 64 | 39 | 44 | 23 | *41* | 61 | 58 | 49 | *12* | 56 |
| 5a Apartheid compensation | 74 | 37 | 24 | 20 | *54* | 74 | 65 | 48 | *25* | 63 |
| 5b Restitution fund | 55 | 34 | 22 | 14 | *41* | 53 | 53 | 37 | *16* | 48 |
| 5c Restitution tax | 44 | 19 | 15 | 8 | *36* | 42 | 41 | 26 | *16* | 37 |
| ***(B) Class-based redress measures:*** | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6. Support for unemployed | 84 | 80 | 80 | 63 | *21* | 89 | 82 | 74 | *15* | 81 |
| 7. School integration | 77 | 74 | 81 | 67 | *15* | 76 | 78 | 73 | *4* | 76 |
| 8. Tertiary education opportunities for poor | 78 | 78 | 45 | 62 | *33* | 85 | 75 | 67 | *18* | 75 |
| 9. Continued social grant provision | 88 | 80 | 73 | 52 | *37* | 91 | 84 | 75 | *17* | 84 |
| 10. Increased social grant spending | 68 | 67 | 53 | 50 | *18* | 76 | 65 | 57 | *19* | 65 |
| 11. Universal basic income | 63 | 73 | 65 | 52 | *21* | 65 | 64 | 59 | *6* | 63 |
| 12. Progressive taxation | 62 | 61 | 51 | 47 | *15* | 64 | 61 | 55 | *8* | 60 |
| 13. More social spending: | | | | | | | | | | |
| Health | 91 | 89 | 90 | 86 | *5* | 91 | 90 | 91 | *1* | 90 |
| Education | 91 | 81 | 90 | 82 | *10* | 90 | 89 | 88 | *2* | 89 |
| Old age pensions | 81 | 83 | 87 | 78 | *9* | 84 | 80 | 79 | *5* | 81 |
| Unemployment benefits | 75 | 67 | 76 | 55 | *20* | 80 | 73 | 64 | *17* | 72 |

Note: The percentages reported in the table are all-year averages across the round(s) in which specific measures were fielded.
Source: HSRC SASAS 2003-2016, pooled data.

The difference in support for varying forms of social spending is noteworthy. Spending on health education and pensions is widely endorsed, though there is more circumspection when assistance to the unemployed is discussed. There is recognition that government needs to assist in ensuring a basic living standard for unemployed citizens, though the idea of benefits or grants to achieve this is met with some resistance, even though the average position is a favourable one, irrespective of race. It does seem that the type of person being targeted matters, which suggests that a calculus of deservingness may be at play. Whether this is due to self-interest, unsympathetic social representations of the unemployed, or other factors is not immediately apparent. The difference between general support for the unemployed and grant/benefits based solutions produces a gap in support in a 10-15 percentage point range, which means that perhaps other types of interventions for the unemployed might be in mind (e.g. welfare-to-work type schemes).

The statistics presented in Table 25 are percentages based on all-year averages where an indicator was fielded more than once over the 2003-2016 period. To determine whether there are any conspicuous inter-group temporal dynamics that are masked due to an averaging effect, Appendix Figure 7-1 presents graphs showing population group trends for each indicator by year. Apart from the expected year-on-year fluctuations, for the most part there do not appear to be distinct signs of convergence or divergence. Support for increased spending on old age pensions and benefits for unemployed adults are cases where this does not necessarily hold true. The share favouring this social spend rose among black African and coloured adults between 2006 and 2016, but fell among both Indian and white adults. Similarly, support for increased spending on support for unemployed citizens fell among white adults but rose among black African adults over the period. These two examples are however somewhat exceptional. There are one or two other anomalous findings, such as the sudden downswing among Indian adults for increased spending on grants between 2006 and 2009, though in the absence of more data points, it is impossible to say whether this was a short-lived change. The same applies to the previously discussed decline in support for progressive taxation between 2015 and 2016, which appears to be a common trend across population groups. One other particular change are the views of Indian adults on sports quotas, which from 2005 and 2013 showed an upward tendency, but there has been a progressive fall since. These fluctuations do not detract from the overall message of large, enduring racial differences of opinion about race-based redress and narrower variation at much higher general level of support for class-based interventions.

To what extent are these racial cleavages mirrored in class differences towards redress policies? Using self-rated poverty status as a proxy indicator, it is apparent from the right half of Table 25 that class-based differences in redress policy attitudes are less pronounced than the previously discussed racial patterns of variation. Nonetheless, significant social cleavages still exist, again with greater variation present in respect of race preferential policies than those framed more in terms of addressing material disadvantage. Those classifying themselves as non-poor consistently registered lower levels of policy support compared to those identifying themselves as ‘just getting by’ or ‘poor’. Support among poor South Africans is between 1.4 and 1.5 times higher than the non-poor for all policies excepting sports quotas (1.2) and a restitution tax for white adults (1.6).

**Table 26: Class, cohort and gender differences within race groups for redress policy support (% agreeing)**

| | Land reform | Affirmative action | Sports quotas | Basic support for unemployed | School integration | Satisfied with social grants |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Class differences:** | | | | | | |
| **Black African** | | | | | | |
| Poor | 82 (38)*** | 78 (41)*** | 64 (48)** | 89 (31)*** | 77 (42)*** | 76 (43)*** |
| Just getting by | 80 (40) | 76 (43) | 64 (48) | 84 (37) | 78 (41) | 80 (40) |
| Non-poor | 76 (43) | 72 (45) | 62 (49) | 78 (42) | 75 (43) | 78 (42) |
| **Coloured** | | | | | | |
| Poor | 32 (47)$^{n.s.}$ | 30 (46)* | 36 (48)** | 85 (36)*** | 74 (44)$^{n.s.}$ | 56 (50)$^{n.s.}$ |
| Just getting by | 30 (46) | 28 (45) | 41 (49) | 82 (38) | 75 (43) | 58 (49) |
| Non-poor | 31 (46) | 26 (44) | 39 (49) | 75 (43) | 74 (44) | 56 (50) |
| **Indian** | | | | | | |
| Poor | 38 (49)** | 35 (48)*** | 47 (50) $^{n.s.}$ | 88 (33)*** | 75 (43)*** | 60 (49)*** |
| Just getting by | 31 (46) | 27 (45) | 43 (50) | 88 (32) | 85 (36) | 55 (50) |
| Non-poor | 25 (43) | 25 (43) | 43 (50) | 76 (42) | 80 (40) | 49 (50) |
| **White** | | | | | | |
| Poor | 22 (41)$^{n.s.}$ | 18 (39)$^{n.s.}$ | 25 (44) $^{n.s.}$ | 65 (48)$^{n.s.}$ | 56 (50)* | 30 (46)* |
| Just getting by | 18 (39) | 15 (36) | 22 (41) | 63 (48) | 68 (47) | 32 (47) |
| Non-poor | 18 (38) | 16 (37) | 23 (42) | 62 (48) | 67 (47) | 36 (48) |
| **Cohort differences:** | | | | | | |
| **Black African** | | | | | | |
| Born Free (1980+) | 78 (41)*** | 75 (43)** | 64 (48)* | 84 (36)* | 77 (42)$^{n.s.}$ | 78 (41)$^{n.s.}$ |
| Struggle (1960s-70s) | 81 (40) | 76 (43) | 63 (48) | 83 (37) | 77 (42) | 78 (41) |
| Grand apartheid ('45-59) | 82 (39) | 77 (42) | 63 (48) | 84 (37) | 78 (41) | 77 (42) |
| Pre/early apartheid | 81 (39) | 79 (41) | 61 (49) | 87 (33) | 76 (43) | 78 (41) |
| **Coloured** | | | | | | |
| Born Free (1980+) | 32 (47)$^{n.s.}$ | 31 (46)*** | 42 (49)** | 81 (40)$^{n.s.}$ | 75 (43)* | 61 (49)*** |
| Struggle (1960s-70s) | 31 (46) | 28 (45) | 40 (49) | 80 (40) | 74 (44) | 53 (50) |
| Grand apartheid ('45-59) | 30 (46) | 25 (43) | 37 (48) | 80 (40) | 73 (45) | 54 (50) |
| Pre/early apartheid | 29 (45) | 22 (42) | 36 (48) | 78 (41) | 70 (46) | 59 (49) |
| **Indian** | | | | | | |
| Born Free (1980+) | 29 (45)* | 27 (44)$^{n.s.}$ | 45 (50)* | 78 (41)** | 79 (41)* | 53 (50)** |
| Struggle (1960s-70s) | 26 (44) | 25 (43) | 45 (50) | 80 (40) | 83 (38) | 51 (50) |
| Grand apartheid ('45-59) | 31 (46) | 27 (45) | 43 (49) | 86 (35) | 82 (39) | 46 (50) |
| Pre/early apartheid | 31 (46) | 29 (46) | 37 (48) | 77 (42) | 84 (37) | 56 (50) |
| **White** | | | | | | |
| Born Free (1980+) | 14 (34)*** | 16 (37)* | 23 (42)** | 67 (47)** | 69 (46)$^{n.s.}$ | 37 (48)$^{n.s.}$ |
| Struggle (1960s-70s) | 19 (39) | 17 (38) | 25 (43) | 60 (49) | 66 (48) | 35 (48) |
| Grand apartheid ('45-59) | 20 (40) | 14 (34) | 20 (40) | 64 (48) | 66 (48) | 35 (48) |
| Pre/early apartheid | 19 (39) | 17 (38) | 24 (42) | 57 (50) | 68 (47) | 33 (47) |
| **Gender differences:** | | | | | | |
| **Black African** | | | | | | |
| Male | 80 (40)$^{n.s.}$ | 76 (43)$^{n.s.}$ | 65 (48)*** | 84 (37)$^{n.s.}$ | 77 (42)$^{n.s.}$ | 76 (42)*** |
| Female | 80 (40) | 76 (43) | 62 (48) | 84 (36) | 78 (42) | 80 (40) |
| **Coloured** | | | | | | |
| Male | 34 (47)*** | 30 (46)*** | 43 (49)*** | 80 (40)$^{n.s.}$ | 74 (44)$^{n.s.}$ | 56 (50)* |
| Female | 28 (45) | 26 (44) | 37 (48) | 81 (40) | 74 (44) | 58 (49) |
| **Indian** | | | | | | |
| Male | 30 (46)$^{n.s.}$ | 26 (44)$^{n.s.}$ | 45 (50)$^{n.s.}$ | 79 (40)$^{n.s.}$ | 80 (40)** | 52 (50)$^{n.s.}$ |
| Female | 27 (45) | 27 (44) | 43 (50) | 82 (39) | 83 (38) | 50 (50) |
| **White** | | | | | | |
| Male | 21 (40)*** | 17 (38)** | 23 (42)$^{n.s.}$ | 63 (48)$^{n.s.}$ | 65 (48)** | 35 (48)$^{n.s.}$ |
| Female | 15 (35) | 15 (35) | 24 (42) | 62 (48) | 68 (46) | 35 (48) |

Source: SASAS 2003-2016, pooled data. Note: One-way ANOVA tests were conducted, with n.s. = not significant; *=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<0.001. Figures in brackets are standard deviations of point estimates.

More convergent views emerge for policy support in relation to the class-based actions, with support among the poor between 1.0 and 1.2 times higher for all apart from tertiary education

opportunities for the poor, increasing grants spending, and additional spending on benefits for the unemployed. In the latter cases, the views will a little less uniform, with the ratio of 1.3 between the level of support offered by the poor relative to the non-poor.

Recognising that there is likely to be heterogeneity within population groups owing to different opportunities and aspirations, it is important to provide at least some preliminary within-group analysis of attitudes. To provide greater insight into patterns of support and opposition, class, cohort and gender differences within race groups were therefore examined and are presented in Table 26. This is intended to better understand whether discrepant levels of social solidarity exist among South Africa's elite, but also generate some preliminary evidence on the attitudinal (dis)similarity of the post-*apartheid* generation (the so-called 'Born Frees') to older cohorts. The focus is on a subset of the policy measures that have been more regularly included in SASAS to allow for sufficient sample sizes for the intersectional analysis. Unfortunately, none of the social grants measures included in the survey series have been fielded in sufficient rounds to achieve the required sample sizes at the subgroup level for the analysis.[74] To try and give a sense of the within-group differences in support in this regard, use has been made of satisfaction with government's handling of social grants. While this is not ideal, given the focus of the measure on performance evaluation rather than policy support, its regular inclusion in the survey series does allow at least for general inferences to be made regarding the degree of consensus within social groups in relation to attitudes towards social grants. The results are again based on pooled data across all years.

There is only a small class effect in attitudes among black South Africans, with around three-quarters of black African elites supporting five of the six measures examined. The biggest class difference is in relation to unemployment-related social policy (12 percentage points), though even in this instance a sizable majority of elites (78%) support the redress measure. Among coloured adults, there is not a statistically significant class effect for land reform, school integration and evaluations of social grants, and relatively small differences for land reform and sports quotas. Again, the largest socio-economic disparity is observed for efforts to provide the unemployed with a decent standard of living. There is a more distinct class gradient among Indian adults, with poorer adults more inclined to display a more favourable

[74] This is mostly true in relation to the sub-samples of coloured, Indian and white respondents. It is nonetheless possible to determine class, cohort and gender variation among black African adults. An indication of this will be discussed later in this section.

view of the policies than those that are materially better-off. This is apparent for land reform, support for the unemployed, affirmative action and satisfaction with social grants, though not in relation sports quotas and school integration across class lines. In the former instances, the broad positions are nonetheless similar irrespective of socio-economic position, with the margin of difference in a 10-13 percentage point range. Lastly, there is little sign of class-based variation in redress policy support among white South Africans. Irrespective of class position, lower support is registered among white adults in terms of all the policies tested except for those aimed at addressing the living standards of the unemployed and school integration. The low general support for race-based redress actions among coloured, Indian and white adults is thus common across social classes within population groups. As a consequence of this, the racial disparities in redress support continue to apply when comparing specific subgroups, such as the views of wealthier white adults to wealthier black African adults.

With regard to cohort differences within race groups, use is made of the categorisation proposed by Mattes (2012), as discussed in the previous chapter. Due to sample characteristics, I have collapsed the two eldest cohorts (the pre-apartheid and early apartheid generations) into a single, combined group. The definition used by Mattes for the 'Born Free' generation (born 1980 and after) is quite generous, so I have also tested whether there is any noteworthy attitudinal variation within this group based on whether respondents were born in the 1980s relative to those born 1990 and after. From the analysis, I find that in many instances young South Africans who were born or grew up in post-*apartheid* South Africa generally do not exhibit positions on redress policies that are vastly different from older generations. Therefore, when discussing policies such as land reform, affirmative action or sports quotas, young white South Africans appear almost equally as opposed as older cohorts, while young black South Africans report broadly similar levels of support as older cohorts. Although coloured teenagers appear slightly more supportive of affirmative action and sports quotas than older generations, they still tend to hold a fairly unfavourable perspective on these interventions. On class-based measures, the only notable cohort differences for unemployment related social policy is observed among white adults, where the Born Free generation were moderately more supportive than older cohorts. There are no significant cohort differences among black and white South Africans in terms of their attitudes on school integration and social grants. However, young coloured and Indian South Africans seem

slightly more sanguine about social grants compared to certain older generations, which may be a positive indication for continued support in the future for social security policies.

In common with the class and cohort analysis, I find that the inter-racial differences in redress attitudes far outweigh the gender-based variation within population groups. Across all of the measures, the scale of difference in level of support only ranges up to a maximum of six percentage points. So, for example, while coloured and white men (34%, 21%) are more partial to land reform than coloured and white women (28%, 15%), this does not alter the general predisposition on this policy (Figure 18). When looking across population groups, we find by comparison that the gender-based variation remains exceptionally large, most especially for the race-preferential measures. For instance, if one looks at attitudes towards race-based affirmative action, three-quarters of black African men and women (both 76%) support the implementation of this policy, compared to less than a fifth of white men and women (17%, 15%). What happens if one alters the framing of the question in such a way that it is likely to further invoke the element of collective self-interest? To test this, use is made of a SASAS question on support for gender-based affirmative action, according to which respondents are asked to rate their level of agreement with the statement that "There should be preferential hiring and promotion of women in employment."

**Figure 18: Support for race- and gender-based affirmative action policies, by race and gender, cumulative data 2003-2016 (% agreeing, pooled 2003-2016 data)**




Notes: BM=black African male; BF=black African female; CM=coloured male; CF=coloured female; IM=Indian male; IF=Indian female; WM=white male; and WF=white female.
Source: HSRC SASAS 2003-2016

As the graph on the right hand side of Figure 18 shows, this attitudinal gulf does narrow but it still quite sizeable in character. Although the figures for black African men and women did not alter appreciably, among the minority groups the effect is more distinctive. Among

coloured, Indian and white women, there was on average an increase of 28 percentage points relative to the support vested in race-based affirmative action. The effect was also apparent among coloured, Indian and white men, with an average increase of 17 percentage points. Despite these changes, the disparity between black African and white women remains at 41 percentage points, and at 39 percentage points when comparing black African and white men. Large gendered differences also continue to exist between black African adults and coloured and Indian adults. The vestiges of racial opposition to preferential policies therefore diminish but do not dissipate once race is removed as the basis for policy targeting.

The preceding descriptive, bivariate analysis of support for specific redress policy measures in South Africa has so far produced certain insights which confirm some of the extant literature on policy attitudes, as well as providing new insight into the dynamics of the South African case. It has for instance confirmed the theoretical assumption of differential support for race- and class-based redress (Habib & Bentley, 2008; Habib 2015), and shown that the 'stubborn kernel of opposition' to racial transformation policy (Dixon et al., 2007; Durrheim, 2010) continues to endure. It has provided new findings on how redress preferences are been reproduced intergenerationally within race groups, putting a damper on expectations of substantive change among the Born Free generation, and shown how, from an intersectional perspective, inter-racial cleavages in attitude appear to trump intra-group dissimilarities. The challenge of the principle-implementation gap has therefore not shown signs of any significant diminution over time, which is worrying in terms of advancing a policy agenda containing a strong redistributive element, especially one where overcoming apartheid injustices against the racial majority remains a core social priority. The remainder of the chapter turns to an examination of the predictors of opposition to transformative social policy. The focus on the factors dictating opposition (rather than support) stems from a desire to more fully understand the possible barriers to realising a social democratic model of social citizenship and transformative social policy in the country.

## 7.4 Modelling the determinants of opposition to race-based redress policy

For the purpose of examining the determinants of race-based redress in the country, I will make use of three indicators, namely preferences for land reform, race-based affirmative action, and sports quotas. These items have featured in every round of interviewing since 2003, and reliability testing indicates that they can be combined to produce an index of

acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach α=0. 755). All three indicators are based on a 5-point agreement scale, and have been coded so that higher numbers represent greater disapproval or opposition to the policy. The summative index on opposition to race-preferential redress was constructed by taking the mean of the three items, thus preserving the 1 (strong approval) to 5 (strong opposition) scaling. The modelling approach followed is similar to that presented in the previous chapter that examined the correlates of support for government-led redistribution in principle. So doing will allow for backward comparison to see whether there are clear differences in underlying factors that distinguish the public's views on the principle of redistribution from those relating to specific redress measures. It will also allow me to test the three core hypotheses relating to the role of self-interest, inequality beliefs, racial attitudes and ideology. The modelling results are presented in Table 27, and discussed in relation to key theoretically-informed hypothesis below.

### 7.4.1 Demographic dividend revisited: Cohort, period and ageing effects

The testing of period and cohort effects in Models [1] and [2] shows that, apart from the anticipated year-by-year fluctuations in opposition to race-based redress measures, there appears to be a modest, statistically significant cohort effect. Compared to the eldest cohort (those born before 1940), younger generations appear to be slightly less opposed to these forms of redistribution in the country. This is confirmed when other formulations of the cohort variable are experimented within the model (results not shown).[75] This is a finding that was conspicuously absent in relation to in-principle support for redistributive intervention by the state, though it is important not to overstate the explanatory power that cohort variation has in this instance, for the model fit based on the *Pseudo-$R^2$* statistic (and corresponding $R^2$ value based on OLS testing) remains weak. Furthermore, once education, race and region are added in Model [5], the cohort effect is substantially reduced, and with the subsequent addition of socioeconomic status, mobility and inequality belief measures in models [6] though [8], the influence of cohort on opposition to race-based redress all but disappears. The addition of age in Model [4] shows that there is a mild, inverse association with opposition to racial redress policy actions, even after taking into consideration major transitions to adulthood (marriage and employment) in Model [3]. Once other measures are

[75] As with the previous chapter, this included the testing of dummy variables corresponding to 20-year intervals based on birth year, the use of a linear, continuous variable for year of birth, and the Mattes (2012) cohort schema corresponding to distinct South African historical periods.

sequentially added to the model, this effect again largely falls away. In sum, while there is more evidence to suggest that a generation gain in support for race-preferential redress, this is not an especially robust or convincing finding. Signs of a life-cycle effect on such preferences are virtually non-existent. Hope of a demographic attitudinal dividend, by which a new generation of citizens display more solidaristic and ideologically liberal tendencies, thus seems a little premature, if not misplaced.

### 7.4.2 Number one: The weight of the instrumentalist, self-interest hypothesis

In the last chapter, it was found that individual demographic factors did not have a considerable degree of influence on one's predisposition towards the idea of state-led redress. Does this finding hold when applying it to evaluations of measures that attempt to promote greater equality of opportunity and wealth for black South Africans? As outlined below, the evidence in this respect is more mixed in nature. Women were found to be slightly more opposed to race-based redress measures than men, an effect that remains present in the models until the introduction of inequality beliefs and political ideology indictors in Models [8] and [9]. This again runs counter to theoretical expectations of women being more pro-redistribution. In models [3] and [4], those that are married and either separated or divorced tend to voice greater disapproval of racial redress than those who have never been married. However, this marital status effect fails to remain in all subsequent model specifications. Household size is inversely related to policy opposition, and remains significant in all the models even though the scale of effect does wash out to a certain extent. Larger households therefore tend to be more partial to race-preferential measures on average.

Relative to those with a full-time job, all other employment status categories demonstrated a lower level of opposition to race-based redress, in particular among unemployed work-seekers, and discouraged work-seekers. Once race and class measures are added, the employment effect falls away, a pattern that is maintained once mobility experience and expectations as well as other attitudinal factors subsequently included in the models. The regression results in Model [5] reveals that there is a mild educational gradient in views on policies such as affirmative action, sports quotas and land reform, with the tertiary educated and those with a matric education displaying slightly more opposition than those with

**Table 27: Ordered logistic models of individual opposition to race-preferential redress measures, 2006-2016**

| Ordered logit (Depvar=opposition to racial redress index) | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | [8b] | [9] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period effects (reference=2003) | | | | | | | | (Ref-2006) | (Ref=2010) | (Ref=2008) |
| 2004 | 0.071* | 0.081* | 0.089* | 0.099** | 0.104** | 0.104* | 0.175*** | ... | ... | ... |
| 2005 | 0.315*** | 0.335*** | 0.357*** | 0.379*** | 0.406*** | 0.404*** | 0.460*** | ... | ... | ... |
| 2006 | 0.256*** | 0.283*** | 0.274*** | 0.308*** | 0.326*** | 0.323*** | 0.362*** | ... | ... | ... |
| 2007 | -0.001 | 0.036 | -0.025 | 0.018 | 0.039 | 0.040 | 0.081 | -0.348*** | ... | ... |
| 2008 | 0.095* | 0.137** | 0.104* | 0.162*** | 0.100* | 0.098 | 0.115* | -0.328*** | ... | ... |
| 2009 | 0.179*** | 0.209*** | 0.149*** | 0.221*** | 0.164*** | 0.163* | 0.195*** | -0.217*** | ... | 0.116* |
| 2010 | 0.224*** | 0.283*** | 0.226*** | 0.310*** | 0.279*** | 0.277*** | 0.307*** | -0.111* | ... | 0.217*** |
| 2011 | 0.240*** | 0.306*** | 0.257*** | 0.351*** | 0.321*** | 0.309*** | 0.318*** | -0.154** | -0.015 | 0.186*** |
| 2012 | 0.235*** | 0.295*** | 0.192*** | 0.301*** | 0.244*** | 0.238*** | 0.259*** | -0.155** | -0.024 | 0.202*** |
| 2013 | 0.265*** | 0.326*** | 0.297*** | 0.413*** | 0.336*** | 0.334*** | 0.319*** | -0.101 | 0.031 | 0.233*** |
| 2014 | -0.003 | 0.064 | -0.059 | 0.068 | 0.062 | 0.058 | 0.058 | -0.329*** | -0.184*** | ... |
| 2015 | -0.112** | -0.035 | -0.101* | 0.041 | -0.026 | -0.042 | -0.050 | -0.464*** | -0.290*** | -0.102 |
| 2016 | 0.372*** | 0.456*** | 0.409*** | 0.558*** | 0.526*** | 0.530*** | 0.538*** | 0.081 | 0.239*** | 0.442*** |
| Cohort effects (reference=born <1940) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Born 1990 and after | ... | -0.483*** | -0.104 | -0.866*** | -0.339 | -0.385* | -0.318 | -0.295 | -0.513 | -0.538* |
| 1980s | ... | -0.569*** | -0.259*** | -0.920*** | -0.375* | -0.408* | -0.363* | -0.263 | -0.375 | -0.429 |
| 1970s | ... | -0.454*** | -0.338*** | -0.877*** | -0.296* | -0.314* | -0.280* | -0.223 | -0.319 | -0.342 |
| 1960s | ... | -0.282*** | -0.360*** | -0.768*** | -0.322** | -0.339** | -0.323** | -0.236 | -0.228 | -0.282 |
| 1950s | ... | -0.079 | -0.185** | -0.465*** | -0.173* | -0.160 | -0.145 | -0.090 | -0.098 | -0.160 |
| 1940s | ... | -0.053 | -0.081 | -0.239*** | -0.160* | -0.149* | -0.137* | -0.156* | -0.025 | -0.165 |
| Age effects (age in years) | ... | ... | ... | -0.014*** | -0.005 | -0.005 | -0.005 | -0.005 | -0.010* | -0.009* |
| Marital status (Ref=never married) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Married | ... | ... | 0.458*** | 0.470*** | 0.029 | 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.005 | -0.011 | 0.017 |
| Widowed | ... | ... | 0.039 | 0.059 | 0.009 | 0.023 | 0.019 | -0.021 | -0.093 | -0.019 |
| Separated / divorced | ... | ... | 0.343*** | 0.357*** | -0.014 | -0.020 | -0.036 | -0.074 | -0.055 | -0.060 |
| Household size | ... | ... | -0.053*** | -0.053*** | -0.004 | -0.007* | -0.008* | -0.008* | -0.014** | -0.010* |
| Employment status (Ref= Employed full time) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Employed part time | ... | ... | -0.451*** | -0.452*** | -0.085* | -0.034 | -0.049 | 0.010 | -0.028 | 0.026 |
| Unemployed looking for work | ... | ... | -0.554*** | -0.557*** | -0.079** | -0.033 | -0.056* | -0.028 | -0.043 | -0.051 |
| Unemployed not looking for work | ... | ... | -0.512*** | -0.511*** | -0.073 | -0.050 | -0.074 | -0.090 | -0.045 | -0.125* |
| Homemaker | ... | ... | 0.101* | 0.101* | 0.070 | 0.058 | 0.039 | 0.070 | 0.033 | 0.002 |
| Pensioner | ... | ... | -0.297*** | -0.273*** | -0.064 | -0.061 | -0.075 | 0.056 | 0.054 | 0.005 |
| Student/learner | ... | ... | -0.286*** | -0.315*** | 0.000 | 0.016 | 0.017 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.035 |
| Other labour inactive | ... | ... | -0.190*** | -0.185*** | 0.068 | 0.085 | 0.068 | 0.098 | 0.038 | -0.001 |
| Female | ... | ... | 0.059** | 0.059** | 0.085*** | 0.092*** | 0.088*** | 0.049* | 0.055* | 0.047 |
| Population group (Ref=Black African) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Coloured | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1.907*** | 1.884*** | 1.847*** | 1.727*** | 1.825*** | 1.488*** |
| Indian/Asian | ... | ... | ... | ... | 2.617*** | 2.616*** | 2.532*** | 2.267*** | 2.362*** | 2.028*** |
| White | ... | ... | ... | ... | 3.016*** | 2.972*** | 2.863*** | 2.575*** | 2.725*** | 2.303*** |
| Education level (Ref=Primary or no schooling) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Grades 8-11 or equivalent | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.031 | -0.036 | -0.033 | 0.018 | 0.008 | -0.002 |
| Matric or equivalent | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.092** | 0.073* | 0.074* | 0.047 | 0.002 | -0.027 |
| Tertiary | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.127** | 0.094* | 0.110** | 0.063 | 0.112 | 0.044 |

| (Continued): - | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | [8b] | [9] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Self-rated poverty status (Ref=poor) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Just getting by | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.156*** | 0.184*** | 0.032 | -0.036 | -0.017 |
| Non-poor | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.199*** | 0.244*** | -0.029 | -0.102* | -0.051 |
| Perceived group discrimination | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.064** | 0.037 | 0.084*** | 0.079** | 0.021 |
| Perceived mobility history last 5 yrs (Ref=improved) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Stayed the same | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.034 | 0.029 | -0.072* | -0.048 |
| Worsened | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.196*** | 0.237*** | 0.079* | 0.136*** |
| (Uncertain) | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.221* | 0.231 | 0.396* | 0.486** |
| Perceived mobility next 5 years (Ref=improve) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Stay the same | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.068** | 0.058* | 0.051 | 0.055 |
| Worsen | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.201*** | 0.188*** | 0.180*** | 0.138*** |
| (Uncertain) | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.153*** | 0.234*** | 0.260*** | 0.186*** |
| Inequality aversion | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.240*** | -0.249*** | -0.202*** |
| Perceived societal position (1=bottom; 10=top) | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.107*** | 0.087*** | 0.087*** |
| Support for government redistribution in principle | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.175*** | -0.164*** | -0.183*** |
| Attribution for poverty (Ref=because of laziness and lack of willpower) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Because they have been unlucky | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.193*** | ... |
| Because there is much injustice in our society | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.145*** | ... |
| It's an inevitable part of modern progress | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.056 | ... |
| None of these | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.106 | ... |
| (Do not know) | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.031 | ... |
| Party identification (Ref=DA) | | | | | | | | | | |
| ANC | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.571*** |
| Other party | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.483*** |
| No party | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.352*** |
| Undeclared | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.416*** |
| Left-right ideology (Ref=Conservative) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Liberal | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | -0.112*** |
| Moderate | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.000 |
| Uncertain | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.019 |
| Controls for province and geographic type | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| No. obs | 46969 | 46900 | 44967 | 44967 | 44068 | 41660 | 41535 | 31177 | 18876 | 22280 |
| LR chi2 | 186.27 | 907.23 | 3271.15 | 3278.67 | 18599.78 | 17833.16 | 18176.92 | 14325.23 | 8807.84 | 9803.5 |
| Prob > chi2 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.0008 | 0.0039 | 0.0148 | 0.0148 | 0.0857 | 0.0868 | 0.0888 | 0.0933 | 0.0947 | 0.0897 |
| Log likelihood | -115866.14 | -115333.87 | -109239.97 | -109236.21 | -99273.28 | -93790.99 | -93312.22 | -69625.65 | -42079.28 | -49766.41 |
| Adjusted R2 based on OLS version of model | 0.0048 | 0.0187 | 0.0684 | 0.0690 | 0.3668 | 0.3678 | 0.3716 | 0.3776 | 0.3803 | 0.3634 |

primary or no formal schooling. This finding remains even after controlling for other indicators of material disadvantage and mobility are accounted for (Models [6] and [7]), though falls away once inequality beliefs and political ideology are included in the models (Models [8], [8b] and [9]). So, the educational effect, modest though it may be, appears to be a reflection of differently held views on inequality in society and political values.

Of all the socio-demographic attributes tested in the model, race remains one of the strongest predictors informing opposition of race-based redress, with white, coloured and Indian adults all more likely to express opposition to such policy interventions than black African respondents. This result remains strongly evident even after controlling for socioeconomic status and the other subjective and ideological variables in Models [6] through [9]. The addition of the aforementioned variables does yield a slight reduction in the scale of effect on policy opposition, suggesting that such beliefs and predispositions do provide some explanation of why the racial pattern exists. However, the fact that a strong racial effect remains means that other factors beyond socioeconomic position, mobility history and prospects, inequality beliefs and political ideology and party support appear to be at play. The most obvious theoretical contender would be symbolic factors related to social identity, which has found some empirical support in the South African case (Gibson, 2009; Durrheim 2010; Dixon et al. 2007, 2010a,b, 2017), and this will be addressed in a section to follow. If the latter fails to explain away racial differences in redress policy opposition may suggest a particular form of egocentric self-interest, according to which the racial minorities do not vest support in policies that they feel they are unlikely to direct benefit from and which may bring about costs from them through taxation and in other ways (Skocpol, 1991; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993).

With the exception of race, other socio-demographic variables that were included point to mild but ultimately weak support for the role of individual self-interest. I now turn to a brief review of the multivariate results on mobility and inequality beliefs, before dealing with the strength of the social identity (racial attitudes) argument.

### 7.4.3 The mobility paradox

The main observed effect of perceived mobility history is that those who feel that their life has worsened in the last five years were more critical about race-based redress than those who feel their life has been improving. The runs counterfactually to rational choice theory and the self-interest hypothesis, which would anticipate that those who feel they have not been faring well would voice greater support for redistribution. Again this may have something to do with views on whether race-based redress would benefit or bypass them. It may also be due to the fact that those most likely to report that their lives had worsened in recent years were not the poorest and social marginalised, but actually those with a high living standard, white and Indian adults.[76] As such, in the face of a perceived erosion in living standards, economic elites may express more tepid or even antagonistic views of race-preferential redistribution as the costs might be deemed too steep.

As for mobility prospects, those envisaging that their life will worsen in coming years or who expressed uncertainty were more opposed to racial redress policies that those demonstrating a more optimistic outlook. This finding also tends to violate the Prospects of Upward Mobility (POUM) hypothesis, according to which expected personal or generational upward economic mobility would lead to lower support for redistribution due to concerns over the taxation required would hurt the pocket. From the regression results, those perceiving future gains are more pro-redistribution, not less. As with mobility history, one possible partial explanation lies in the intersection between race and mobility prospects, with black African adults decidedly more sanguine about future gains than white adults and to a lesser but still notable extent coloured and Indian adults. Overall, only 16% of black African adults believe their living standard will deteriorate in the next five years, compared to 27% of coloured adults, 34% of Indian adults and 42% of white adults. This speaks to the lofty expectations of positive social change among the historically disadvantaged, in contrast to the arguably unjustifiable pessimism among certain materially better-off groups. Such patterns may be confounding the presence of a theoretically aligned effect of mobility prospects on redistributive demand.

[76] On average across the years of observation, 46% of white South Africans regarded their life as having worsened in recent years, compared to 41% of Indian adults, 35% of coloured adults and 19% of black African adults. In terms of living standard level, 33% of those with a high living standard said their life had worsened in the 5 years prior to interviewing, relative to 22% of those with a medium living standard and 21% of those with a low living standard.

### 7.4.4 Inequality beliefs: The divide that binds

While the mobility results do not align with theoretical postulates, the findings pertaining to the role of beliefs about societal inequality appear to be more confirmatory in character. South Africans that are more inequality averse, in terms of an acknowledgment that income disparities in the country are too large, are on the whole are also less inclined to register opposition to race-based redress policies. So an awareness of the scale of economic inequality in the country coupled with an underlying preference for a change to way society is stratified has a direct bearing on support for race-preferential forms of redress. Like inequality aversion, support for the principle of government-led redistribution also yields a statistically significant inverse association with opposition to racial redress policy. This confirms the assumption that the more one identifies with the idea of political redistribution, the more this will carry over into support for related interventions. In addition, one's perceived relative social position has a bearing, independent of other socio-demographic traits, with those rating themselves higher in the social hierarchy generally expressing greater opposition to these forms of redress, vice versa. This conforms more to self-interest arguments than some of the other variables already examined.

Model [8b], based on data from 2010-2016, further tests the policy effect of additional measures on the attribution for poverty and social need in the country. Compared to the reference category, which blames poverty on the perceived 'laziness and lack of willpower' of the poor themselves, those who believe that social need is due to structural injustice as well as misfortune or bad luck are less opposed to racial redress. As with support for government-led redistribution, support for redress policy does appear to be informed by notions of deservingness, with structural explanations likely to promote support for redistributive social policy while those ascribing poverty to individual moral shortcomings demonstrating more antipathy for such political action.

### 7.4.5 Political ideology and trust

With respect to political ideology, two effects are of note from Model [9] in Table 27. Firstly, with regard to political identification, those supporting the Democratic Alliance tend to demonstrate greater opposition towards race-based redress measures than African National

Congress supporters, supporters of other opposition parties, those favouring no political party, and undeclared supporters. Therefore, controlling for all other factors in the model, party preferences do matter for these forms of redistributive policies.[77] The second notable finding is that those rating themselves as politically liberal tend to be less opposed to racial redress than those considering themselves as ideologically conservative. The strength of association is weaker than for party identification, and the lack of effect for political moderates and the ideologically uncertain needs to be recognised. Despite this, the existence of a liberal-conservative dynamic informing redress preferences is important. It implies that contextual factors that sway the public in a left-leaning or conservative direction - whether it be the rise of neoliberal, populist politics, the influence of the media, the state of the economy, the performance and image of core political institutions, or other variables - would have an indirect bearing on the normative mode of social citizenship in the country and the extent to which transformative social policy continues to be widely supported.

### 7.4.6 Racial attitudes

Given the race-preferential nature of the policies being examined, the theoretical expectation based on existing literature is that racial attitudes would be a salient factor contributing to the explanation of levels of opposition. The analysis that follows tends to lend credence to this claim of the salience of social identity factors, though the association varies for different sub-constructs and based on the race of respondents. The modelling approach adheres to that followed in Chapter 5, in investigating the association between racial attitudes and support for redistribution in principle. This firstly involves the sequential individual testing of the role of variables relating to prejudice, racial threat, racial discrimination, racial distrust, the frequency and quality of intergroup contact, and in-group identification (Table 20, models [1]-[6]). These ordered logistic models all include a range of controls covering cohort, period and ageing effects, a range of personal demographic and socio-economic attributes, as well as geographic markers (province and geographic type). Secondly, all the racial attitudes are entered jointly in model [7], after which model [8] is the final fully specified model that includes variables related to social mobility, inequality related beliefs, and political identity. In addition to the aggregate models presented Table 20, the modelling was repeated

[77] If the model is pared down to just the dependent variable and party identification, it remains strongly significant, with direction of effect remaining the same. An OLS version of this model produced an Adjusted R2 of 0.17 (i.e., party identification is able to explain 17% of variance in opposition to race preferential redress).

**Table 28: Ordered logistic models of the influence of racial attitudes on individual opposition to race-preferential redress measures, 2010-2016**

| Ordered logit (Depvar=govredr) | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prejudice towards the out-group (0=low; 10=high) | -0.047*** | … | … | … | … | … | -0.031*** | -0.029** |
| Views towards the in-group (0=positive; 10= negative) | 0.021** | … | … | … | … | … | 0.020** | 0.015* |
| Perceived racial threat (1=low; 5=high threat) | … | -0.345*** | … | … | … | … | -0.290*** | -0.277*** |
| Frequency of racial discrimination (1=none; 4=always) | … | … | 0.019 | … | … | … | 0.128*** | 0.134*** |
| Racial distrust (1=low; 5=high) | … | … | … | -0.192*** | … | … | -0.100*** | -0.087*** |
| Racial contact (1=none; 5=high) | … | … | … | … | 0.035* | … | 0.002 | -0.013 |
| Quality of racial contact (1=negative; 5=positive) | … | … | … | … | -0.004 | … | -0.032 | -0.026 |
| In-group identification | | | | | | | | |
| Importance of belonging to one's race group (1-5) | … | … | … | … | … | -0.190*** | -0.180*** | -0.144*** |
| Ashamed of race group (1=strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree) | … | … | … | … | … | 0.075*** | 0.032* | 0.026 |
| Attachment to people of same race (1-5) | … | … | … | … | … | -0.193*** | -0.141*** | -0.113*** |
| Controls for cohort, period and ageing effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls for social structural covariates | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Additional controls for personal attributes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls for province and geographic type | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Socio-economic status variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Mobility variables | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Inequality-related beliefs | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Political identity measures | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| No. obs | 15179 | 18115 | 18476 | 18816 | 17975 | 19110 | 12885 | 12714 |
| LR chi2 | 6549.99 | 7906.26 | 7995.47 | 8105.24 | 7878.89 | 8413.23 | 6131.51 | 6444.78 |
| Prob > chi2 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.0880 | 0.0886 | 0.0879 | 0.0875 | 0.0889 | 0.0894 | 0.0972 | 0.1035 |
| Log likelihood | -33933.35 | -40677.78 | -41506.53 | -42274.94 | -40368.06 | -42850.09 | -28485.66 | -27899.35 |
| Adjusted R2 based on OLS version of model | 0.3531 | 0.3706 | 0.3588 | 0.3627 | 0.3628 | 0.3662 | 0.3895 | 0.4074 |

Note: group discrimination has been omitted in favour of the more specific variable on self-reported personal and collective racial discrimination. The correlation between the two is fairly robust ($r$=0.60*).* The left-right scale has been excluded from the political ideology measures too, given that it would result in the omission of the 2014 survey round's data due to the non-inclusion of this variable. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *=p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

*Source: HSRC SASAS 2010-2016.*

separately for different population groups. A summary of the results of these race-specific models can be found in Appendix Table 7-2.

The results in model [1] convey that on average out-group prejudice tends to assuage opposition to race-based redress policies, a finding that continues to apply even in the final models where all racial attitudes variables are jointly included. Conversely, a prejudicial view of one's own race group tends to foster opposition to racial redress, though the size of effect is somewhat weaker (Appendix Table 7-2, model [1]). This pattern holds for black African adults, but not for other population groups. Among coloured adults, there is a statistically significant, inverse effect on both out-group and in-group prejudice, while there is no observable effect of prejudice on the views of Indian adults. Among white adults both prejudice measures are significant though the signs of the regression coefficients run in the opposite direction, i.e. out-group prejudice results in greater opposition to racial redress, while negative in-group perceptions serve to reduce opposition. The statistical significance on the prejudice measures however fall away in the fully specified models.

As a measure of group self-interest and intergroup competition, use is made of an index of racial threat, which includes four constituent items addressing realistic or material threat as well as symbolic threat. Group interest theory suggests that structural inequalities are closely associated with struggles for power and interest, which leads to opposition to policies designed to alter the status quo among those belonging to members of dominant social groups. (Blumer, 1958; Jackman, 1994; Esses et al., 2004; Dixon et al., 2017) Given the distribution of wealth, power and privilege in South Africa, the expectation would be that a sense of racial threat would reinforce support for race-targeted measures among black South Africans and further diminish support for such policies among white adults, with the attitudes of Indian and coloured adults falling in between. From Models [2] and [7-8], it is observed that a higher sense of racial threat results in lower opposition to racial redress. More detailed examination shows that this effect is significant for all population groups, with an inverse association present among for black African and coloured adults (higher threat leading to lower policy opposition) and a positive association among white and Indian adults (higher threat leading to greater policy opposition) (Appendix Table 7-2, model [2]). These findings are congruent with theory, though in the full models, the effect is insignificant for white adults.

The reported experience of personal and group-based racial discrimination does not yield a significant effect on policy opposition on aggregate (Model [3]). This is likely due to a cancellation effect, as the race-specific models show that a higher reported frequency of racial discrimination increases support for racial redress policies among black African adults, but encourages policy resistance among white, Indian and coloured adults. The effect of racial discrimination for racial minority groups is interesting, and possibly suggests that race-preferential policies may be regarded as forms of reverse racism and unfair treatment. Certainly these are arguments that tend to be invoked in debates about affirmative action, sports quotas and land reform (Dixon et al., 2017). In the fully specified models, the effect falls away for black African adults but remains strongly present for other population groups, resulting in the overall positive association on aggregate in Models [7] and [8]. Higher levels of racial distrust are correlated with lower opposition to race-targeted policies (Model [4]), though this relationship is only significant in the case of black African and coloured adults. However, one all variables are entered jointly into models [7] and [8], the effect for white adults becomes significant, with racial distrust again reducing policy opposition. This is an intriguing finding, which makes one wonder whether fears over the destabilising consequences of racial disunity may lead white adults to recognise the need for racial redress, other things being held constant.

Building on the pioneering work of Allport (1954), interracial contract has long been advocated as a means by which to reduce prejudice in South Africa, with evidence suggesting that it does yield positive outcomes. By extension, scholars have begun to question whether intergroup contact could also potentially encourage support for race-preferential redress policies. Experimental research on the potential role that intergroup contact may have in closing the principle-implementation gap has been undertaken in South Africa since the late 2000s. Based on small sample studies, Dixon et al. (2007 2010a) found support that positive interracial contact resulted in white adults voicing higher support for race-compensatory and race-preferential interventions, both directly and indirectly by reducing intergroup threat and perceived unfairness. This research has also suggested that interracial contact may also produce unanticipated effects on the attitudes of historically disadvantaged groups. Positive contact with white adults led black African adults to adopt more positive racial attitudes (feelings of warmth, trust), but at the same time also reduced a sense of racial discrimination and support for race-based redress policies such as affirmative action and land reform (Dixon

et al., 2007, 2010b). The latter has been dubbed an 'ironic' or 'sedative' effect of interracial contact (Cakal et al., 2011; Dixon et al., 2013, 2016).

From the SASAS modelling, interracial contact does not appear on average to have much influence on policy perspective. The measure on frequency of racial contact demonstrates a weak positive association (Model [5]), though this disappears in the final models, while quality of racial contact is not significant in any of the national models. Based on the race-specific models in Appendix Table 7-2, statistical significant associations on the frequency of contract measure for black African, coloured and white adults. For black African and coloured adults, greater interracial contract serves to promote greater opposition to racial redress policies, while for white adults this contract reduces resistance to these types of intervention. This tends to corroborate the idea of a prejudice reducing effect for white South Africans and a 'sedative effect' among black African adults. In Model [5], there is no effect on quality of contract in any of the race-specific models, a finding that did not alter even based on additional modelling (not shown) where frequency and quality of contact were tested separately. Once all the racial attitudes variables are entered jointly into the full model (Models [7-8]), no statistical effect is present on either contact measure for coloured and Indian adults. For black African adults, both frequency and quality of contact are significant, with frequency of contact still promoting greater opposition to racial redress policies, while the quality of contact reduces opposition. For white adults, the effect on frequency of contact falls away, and quality of contact increases policy opposition. The reason why quality of contact promotes lower policy opposition among black African adults but higher resistance among white adults in the full models is not readily clear and somewhat counter-intuitive, and will require further investigation following on from this thesis.

Finally, in terms of in-group identification, Model [6] shows that, on average, a belief in the importance of in-group racial belonging and feeling an actual sense of attachment both significantly reduce opposition to racial redress, while the absence of an emotional sense of shame regarding one's race group leads to greater opposition. This reflects the general pattern evident for black African adults, suggesting that collective interest promotes recognition of the needs for racial redress. For Indian and white adults, a heightened sense of the importance of group belonging promotes opposition to race-targeted measures, with a similar finding apparent on the absence of in-group shame. Lastly, among coloured adults, the main

significant effect is in relation to a sense of group attachment, which tends to reduce resistance to racial redress.

In sum, the effects that racial attitudes have on policy preferences are complex and varied, and best observed through individual race-specific models. Interpretation is further complicated by the fact that certain effects that are discerned when racial attitudes sub-construct items are individually modelled lose their salience once all the items are combined into a single model (Table 29). The multivariate analysis does nonetheless provide important confirmatory evidence in relation to theoretical hypotheses regarding prejudice and in-group identification, racial threat, racial discrimination, and to a certain extent interracial contact. Although a range of effects are present, based on the full model it was found racial threat had the largest (negative) effect on opposition to race-based redress for black African adults, while racial discrimination had the largest effect in the cases of coloured, Indian and white adults. The combined effect of racial attitudes on policy opposition was modest for all except white adults, where the explanatory power was considerably larger.[78]

**Table 29: Summary findings from race-specific ordered logistic models (Appendix Table 7-2) of the influence of racial attitudes on individual opposition to race-preferential redress measures, 2010-2016**

| | Individual testing of items | | | | Joint entry into full model | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | BA | C | I | W | BA | C | I | W |
| Prejudice towards the out-group (0=low; 10=high) | - | - | ns | + | - | ns | ns | ns |
| Views towards the in-group (0= positive; 10=negative) | + | - | ns | - | + | - | ns | ns |
| Perceived racial threat (1=low; 5=high threat) | - | - | + | + | - | - | + | ns |
| Frequency of racial discrimination (1=none; 4=always) | - | + | + | + | ns | + | + | + |
| Racial distrust (1=low; 5=high) | - | - | ns | ns | - | - | ns | - |
| Racial contact (1=none; 5=high) | + | + | ns | - | + | ns | ns | ns |
| Quality of racial contact (1=negative; 5=positive) | ns | ns | ns | ns | - | ns | ns | + |
| Importance of belonging to one's race group (1-5) | - | ns | + | + | - | ns | + | ns |
| Ashamed of race group (1=strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree) | + | ns | + | + | ns | ns | + | + |
| Attachment to people of same race (1-5) | - | - | - | ns | - | - | ns | ns |

Note: BA=Black African, C=Coloured, I=Indian and W=White. In addition, '-' denotes a statistically significant negative effect on opposition to race-targeted policies, '+' a statistically significant negative effect, and 'ns' means that the result is not statistically significant. From an interpretive point of view, a negative association implies that the factor reduces opposition to racial redress interventions (i.e. it bolsters support), while a positive association implies that the factor increases resistance or opposition to the policies.
Source: HSRC SASAS 2010-2016.

[78] This assessment is based on OLS versions of the race-specific models, with only the dependent variable and the full set of racial attitudes measures included and standardized Beta coefficients reported. Giving an indicative sense of the explanatory power of the racial attitudes measures collectively, the Adjusted R2 was 0.067 for the model for black African adults, 0.099 for model for coloured adults, 0.053 for the model for Indian adults, and 0.196 in the case of the model for white adults.

## 7.5 Summary

While the evidence emerging from the survey analysis provides further insight into South African attitudes towards redistributive social policy, it also conveys something of the inherent complexity of opinion in this regard. While certain overarching messages can be discerned, there is great subtlety and nuance underlying the results. The general finding, though, is that despite the broad support for the principles of redistribution, transformation and greater equality, as reflected in the results presented in Chapters 4 through 6, the analysis presented in this chapter has revealed clear signs of ambivalence within the South African public regarding the policies designed to address economic inequality and the legacy of apartheid. In particular, the chapter has served to highlight the manner in which opposition is more pronounced in relation to race-preferential policies than for a number of pro-poor, compensatory interventions. This therefore serves to validate the continued existence of a principle-implementation gap which earlier South African studies have pointed to, and also confirms policy type is likely to be an instrumental factor in determining support for transformative social policies (Seekings, 2008a,b; Dixon et al., 2007, 2017). These divisions in policy preferences have also displayed a remarkable degree of resilience over the last decade-and-a-half. These findings led into an examination of determinants of policy preferences, and the chapter has attempted to test the relative importance of different competing hypotheses, most notably individual and group self-interest, prejudice and other racial attitudes, as well as the influence of ideological factors. The results point to a modest role for individual self-interest but more dominant effects based on inequality beliefs, and symbolic factors such as racial attitudes, political ideology and political trust.

# Chapter 8
# *A Fair Way to Go:* Concluding reflections on the social policy significance of beliefs about inequality

"*There can be no effective response to poverty and inequality unless difference is recognised and negotiated, not dissolved in the search for an unattainable (and undemocratic) cohesion.*"
Steven Friedman, Race Class and Power: Harold Wolpe and the Radical Critique of Apartheid (2015: 235).

"For me the crucial thing now is to restore the dignity of everyone in our society. Real reconciliation will only come when we get rid of the terrible inequalities, with millions of people still living in shacks, without proper schools and hospitals. But now we can start moving forward as a nation to achieve that."
Albie Sachs, *The Free Diary of Albie Sachs* (2004:28)

"The political impediments to egalitarian redistribution are daunting. But there is nothing in human nature or the inexorable logic of the once-dismal science that now stands in the way of redistributing wealth more equally, giving citizens a more equal voice in their workplaces, neighbourhoods and nations, and taking a step in the direction of what radical egalitarians have dreamed of: a society of real freedom for all."
Sam Bowles (2012) The New Economics of Inequality and Redistribution, p.163.

"Redistributing resources also redistributes freedom and choice"
Fred Twine, *Citizenship and Social Rights* (1994:12)

## 8.1 Introduction

The study presented in this thesis has aimed to explore the views of the South African public towards economic inequality, general preferences for government redistribution in principle, as well as levels of support for social policies aimed to bring about racial and economic transformation. The research has been guided by several overarching questions: To what extent do South Africans share common general beliefs about material inequality in the country? To what extent does the public exhibit a preference for government redistribution in principle as an important element of democracy? How unified or polarised are South Africans in their support for specific redress policies in the country? And, lastly, how should South African policymakers effectively take subjective measurement into account? Responding to these questions has been achieved by drawing on unique, nationally representative survey data that has enabled me to chart social attitudes over a period of almost fifteen years between late 2003 and early 2017. Use has also been made of social citizenship as a guiding conceptual framework to understanding social policy predispositions in the country and analysing attitudinal change.

It is important to reflect that this study on public perceptions of inequality and redress in South African society has been undertaken and completed during an interesting and arguably defining historical moment. It has been a time during which there has been a confluence of a number of salient developments and milestones, each of which have a bearing on discourse

relating to inequality, social policy, social citizenship and, by further extension, the imperative for social change in the country. On the political front, the second term of office of the Zuma administration (2014- ) has been one that has been fraught with challenges, from the intensifying claims of corruption and maladministration, growing divisions within the 'broad church' of the ruling party, controversial cabinet reshuffles, and mounting disillusionment among the public about the functioning and direction of South African democracy. The latter is manifest in a declining margin of victory in elections, with opposition parties even claiming several metropolitan municipalities through coalition in the 2016 local government elections. It is also reflected in the continued escalation of protest action by citizens' discontent with the pace of transformation, perceived injustice and unfulfilled political promises. This has included the 2012 Marikana massacre, during which striking workers demanding fair remuneration were met with the lethal use of force by the police, and the #FeesMustFall movement, which, in the demand for free education, marked the most significant wave of student protest in decades. Broader economic difficulties have further complicated the situation. These include the continuing labour implications of processes of globalisation, modest economic growth experienced following the 2008/09 global economic recession, increasing volatility in the value of the Rand and the associated international ratings agency politics, as well as the persisting 'triple threat' of unemployment, poverty and inequality.

In responding to some of these challenges, there have also been notable developments in the social policy domain. One example is the passing of minimum wage legislation in 2017 and the broader emergence of living wage debates, which were originally discussed following the Wage Commissions of the early 1970s. There have also been National Health Insurance (NHI) pilot tests and the passing of the green paper as foundational steps towards universal health coverage, the establishment of a tax commission to review the tax system and make recommendations to promote inclusive economic growth. Nascent discussions have even taken place on the feasibility of a basic income grant, a social policy proposal that was last discussed in earnest in early to mid-2000s emanating from a recommendation proposed by the Taylor Committee. Lastly and symbolically, the country also commemorated sixty years of the Freedom Charter in June 2015 and the twenty year anniversary of the promulgation of the South African Constitution in December 2016. As the nation rapidly approaches a quarter century of democracy, both these milestones serve as a lens through which to reflect on the

accomplishments of post-apartheid society in relation to the vision articulated in these formative documents.

Examining attitudes to inequality within such a context of socio-political change leads one to questions that relate to social citizenship. It is an appropriate time for honest reflection on the achievements and disappointments of the last quarter-century, and for gaining new insight into the kind of society the South Africans want, the types of policies that are deemed appropriate, and the degree of uniformity or ambivalence in perspective.

This final chapter begins with a concise re-examination and synthesis of the principal findings emanating from the quantitative analysis presented in chapters four through six of the thesis. In so doing, reference is made to the key hypotheses that guided the study, as articulated in the introductory chapter. This is followed by an outline of the implications of the results of the study for social policy in South Africa. This includes theoretical reflections in relation to the prevailing mode(s) of social citizenship that can be inferred from public opinion, methodological contributions in terms of the role of public opinion data and comparative insight in promoting a more democratic view in relation to debates about inequality and redress, and policy-relevant messages relating to support and opposition to public policies designed to promote transformation and a more equal and caring society. The chapter then concludes with an outline of what are seen to be the key limitations of the empirical work undertaken, as well as suggestions regarding future directions for work concerning inequality beliefs and policy support.

## 8.2 Overview of key findings

### 8.2.1 Shared common beliefs about material inequality

The continuing salience of inequality in the country, combined with growing signs of popular discontent with the pace of transformation in addressing material disadvantage, has led to fundamental ideological questions being raised about social justice, social solidarity and restitution, and the kind of society we wish to promote. It is leading to high-profile public debate about the direction that public policy needs to take and the role of non-state actors as agents of change. In order to make sustained progress in reducing inequality in the country in coming years and decades, as a prerequisite South Africans need to recognise that a highly

skewed distribution of income and wealth constitutes a social problem requiring concerted action. As well-known French economist Thomas Piketty stated in the 2015 Nelson Mandela Annual Lecture, 'it is important to realise that issues of inequality, income, wealth, capital, and public debt are not technical issues – these are issues in which everybody must have an opinion because ultimately they are what determine political change' (Piketty, 2015: 2). In response to the fairly narrow evidence base that exists in the country with regard to inequality beliefs, one of the core guiding questions informing the study focused on the extent to which citizens share common beliefs about economic inequality. Do South Africans care about distributional issues? Is there an appetite for change? Furthermore, are such beliefs consistent across different socio-demographic groupings and over time?

The results presented in Chapter 4 suggest that there exists considerable public concern about economic inequality in the country. South Africans are acutely aware of how unequal their society is. Over the period between 2003 and 2016, a significant majority of the population across social groups has consistently expressed the view that the income gap in the country is too large. The average level of agreement with this perspective was 85% across the fourteen annual rounds of interviewing, while in the latest survey round conducted in the first quarter of 2017, 86% shared this view and a third (34%) voiced strong support. South Africans have also articulated a strong preference for a more equitable social structure. Based on the first national testing of pictorial representations of societal stratification, the normative view was that the country is highly (50%) or fairly (29%) unequal, while the preferred ideal social structure is where a majority is either in middle or upper classes (77%). Based on cross-national comparison, I was able to demonstrate that South Africans are not only acutely aware of the extreme class-based inequalities that exist in the country, but also possess one of the largest disparities between the ideal and present structuring of society, placing us alongside a number of former communist states in Eastern Europe. Apart from historical injustices and the lived daily experiences of inequality for many, part of the explanation for these stratification beliefs lies in an acknowledgement of the class tensions and social divisions that economic inequality has produced. More than half of the adult population (55%) perceived there to be strong conflicts between rich and poor people, while the sense of workplace conflict was even higher, with two-thirds (67%) believing there to be tensions between management and workers.

In a context where the labour market is the predominant source of economic inequality and set against mounting calls for a decent living wage, it is also apparent that there is a preference for a narrowing of disparities in earnings. The 2016 survey results pointed to support for a minimum wage amount that exceeds the amount proposed in national legislation by an appreciable margin, a finding that holds across a broad range of social groups. In addition, more than half (53%) favoured regulation of executive pay through legislative means, with less than a fifth (15%) opposing this. Furthermore, based on a set of questions about the actual and preferred earnings of different occupational categories in the 2009 survey, South Africans tended to support a moderate rise in earnings for those on low salaries and a concomitant reduction for those in high-paying occupations. While this suggests a broad-based aspiration for fair and legitimate remuneration in the country, the survey findings do however indicate that South Africans are willing to tolerate fairly high levels of inequality in spite of their general aversion for inequality. This is consistent with what has been found in other high inequality societies such as Brazil (Scalon and Cano 2008). Nonetheless, from a social justice perspective, these beliefs about inequality could be regarded positively as a desire for a more equitable and fair society.

This finding has prompted questioning about the extent to which citizens, especially better-off citizens, worry or care about inequality. One of the important findings from the study is that there is perhaps a greater degree of consensus among social groups than is typically assumed in relation to concerns over economic inequality and the preference for social change. Yet, it does not universally apply across all the measures examined. On the one hand, there is high general recognition across class, race and other social lines that income differences in the country are excessive. The same holds in relation to perceived stratification realities and aspirations. There is also broad approval for minimum wage thresholds that exceed legislated amounts, as well as a common preference for increasing the incomes of those on low pay while lowering to some extent the earnings of those in high-paying occupations. On the other hand, there is a lower tendency to register social conflict among economic elites and historically privileged groups, as well as a lower likelihood of supporting regulatory limits on executive pay. These findings suggest a greater basis of agreement in support for change in principle, but less consistent, more ambivalent views when specific policy options are raised. This is a theme that forms the core focus of chapters 5 and 6.

### 8.2.2 Preferences for government redistribution

It has been argued that the problem of inequality lies at the heart of social policy, for the redistribution of resources and the establishment of minimum standards represent core objectives and outcomes of government-provided social services and social protection (Alcock, 2016:24-25). The level of inequality that citizens and policymakers regard as legitimate and are willing to accept in society ultimately informs the particular mode of social citizenship that is adopted, and, by extension, the relative scope and scale of redistributive interventions pursued by the state (Dean, 2014, 2016; Alcock, 2016). Against this conceptual backdrop, Chapter 5 of the thesis constructed a profile of public preferences for government-led redistribution since the early- to mid-2000. It also tested a series of theoretically informed hypotheses regarding the determinants of such preferences, in particular the influence of economic self-interest, the experience and expectations of social mobility, general beliefs and inequality, fairness and justice, political ideology and social identity, as well as political trust.

The analysis revealed that a majority approve of the ideas that the state should assume responsibility for reducing economic inequality in the country. On aggregate, between 2006 and 2016, more than two-thirds (70%) of South Africans favoured the idea of state-led redistribution, with a minority share (16%) rejecting this principle. In contrast with the patterns of concern about income inequality observed in Chapter 4, the evidence suggests that there has been significant fluctuation in support for redistribution over time. This has charted a u-shaped rather than a unidirectional pattern over the period, with a hardening attitude emerging between 2003 and the early 2010s, followed by an increasingly pro-redistribution tendency lasting until 2016, when new signs of a possible redistributive backlash emerged. These are distinctive developments, especially when contrasted against the relatively stable and robust level of inequality aversion evident among the public. Nonetheless, despite these trends, the dominant ideology remains one that continues to favour redistributive intervention as part of a more inclusive form of social citizenship. This applies even to a majority of materially better-off South African (white, tertiary educated and non-poor citizens), even though clear race and class differences in support were found to exist. The chapter additionally confirmed that the public expects the size of government to be fairly expansive in nature, involving a range of responsibilities across different domains, a view that has not altered in the decade between 2006 and 2016. While inequality reduction is ranked lower compared to other government mandates, especially relative to the provision of health care

and social protection for the elderly, these competing mandates all receive high general support. So the enduring message is that South Africans expect redistributive measures aimed at reducing income inequality to form part of the overall set of activities that form the government core mandate. In line with what Oser and Hooghe (2017) found in Europe and the United States, this points to a social rights conception of democracy being a key characteristic of South African public opinion.

With regard to individual determinants of preferences for redistribution, the multivariate analysis I undertook in Chapter 5 revealed firstly that, counter to expectations, there is some evidence that self-interest plays a role in informing redistribution beliefs among the South African public, though the explanatory power of this effect is not especially large. Social mobility measures produced more mixed results, with mobility history proving significant, but expectations of future mobility failing to produce a clear effect. In contrast, one of the most strongly supported hypotheses emerging from the analysis relates to beliefs about inequality and fairness. Those recognising that income inequality is too large in the country, that society is characterised by class conflict, and expressing a preference for a fairer social structure all tend to hold a more pro- redistribution stance on average. Less theoretical corroboration is found in relation to beliefs about getting ahead in society. While a belief that exogenous factors such as ascription, luck and connections are factors informing social position is positively correlated with support for redistribution (in line with theory), so too is a belief that meritocratic factors such as hard work and ambition determines socioeconomic success in South Africa (counter to theory). Nonetheless other measures on attribution for poverty do show that those blaming the poor for their situation due to a perception of laziness and lack of willpower are less likely to favour redistribution than those believing that structural injustice or unfairness is the cause of poverty.

Political ideology and partisanship appears to exert some influence, with liberals and moderates more partial to redistribution than conservatives, and ruling party supporters more pro-redistribution than Democratic Alliance supporters. From a social identity perspective, there is mixed evidence on the contribution of racial attitudes in explaining redistributive preferences. Racial threat, reported racial discrimination, in-group identification and racial contact had a significant effect, though the direction of this relationship was counter-theoretical in certain instances. This seems to reflect complex, inter-racial variations, which may be due to different underlying motivational reasons for supporting redistribution.

Finally, the results did not provide evidence of a robust political trust effect on redistribution, even though confidence in government was found to shape views on redistribution among the politically conservative and white South Africans.

Taken together, the empirical findings presented in Chapter 5 reveal that South Africans demonstrate a fairly strong desire for the government to play a leading role in providing for the material needs of the vulnerable and socially excluded in society through redistributive policy interventions. Although an individual's social position, mobility history, awareness of inequality, political leaning and racial attitudes all affect how weak or strong this predisposition is, the normative preference for redistribution remains fairly widely shared irrespective of these individual traits.

### 8.2.3 Unity or polarisation around specific redress policies

In Chapter 6, the emphasis shifts from attitudes regarding the principle of state-led redistribution to an examination of the extent to which social policies intended to promote transformation in the country have been, and continue to be, opposed since the early 2000s. In particular, the analysis aimed to use the representative, repeat cross-sectional data to test three key hypotheses emerging from the international and domestic literature on resistance to racial policies, namely individual and collective self-interest, racial attitudes, in addition to political and economic ideology. In common with chapters 4 and 5, the analysis also endeavoured to understand who expresses more support and opposition to such policies, and chart the degree of relative stability or change in such patterns over time.

While Chapter 5 found that South Africans tend to exhibit broad acceptance of the principle of redress, a small but growing body of quantitative research has begun to show that this is often accompanied by more polarized attitudes towards public policies designed and implemented to effect such change (Durrheim & Dixon 2004; Dixon et al. 2007; Seekings, 2008a,b; Dixon et al. 2010a,b, 2017; Durrheim 2010; Roberts et al. 2011; Durrheim et al. 2011). This has been termed the "principle-implementation gap" (Schuman et al., 1985), which refers to the extent to which levels of support for transformative social policies fall short of general ideological support for redistribution. Understanding the motivations that explain why people choose to disapprove of policies intended to achieve transformation, and the uniformity in the size of the gap across different types of policy, has therefore become an

important line of inquiry. The aggregate, bivariate analysis presented in Chapter 6 offers confirmatory evidence for a significant principle-implementation gap, with support for a number of specific redress policies consistently lagging behind the general demand for social justice in the country. In those instances where trend data was available, the analysis results portrayed a surprising degree of stability in policy attitudes over the 2003 to 2016 period, at most fluctuating within a narrow 5 to 10 percentage point range.

My results also substantiate claims that the orientation or framing of a specific policy intervention will matter for levels of public support or opposition. At the national level, policies that are more race-preferential in nature are moderately less favoured than class-based policies that are designed more as anti-poverty measures. This observation was most evident for measures crafted to address employment deprivation and educational inequality in schools and tertiary institutions compared to preferential policy interventions such as sports quotas, land redistribution and affirmative action. There were instances where this finding did not hold true, most notably in relation to certain social grants questions, a proposed universal basic income, and progressive taxation, all of which tended to receive average levels of support that were in a similar aggregate range to certain policies aimed at addressing racial disadvantage. These patterns are more prominent based on the race group of the attitude-holder than his or her economic position in society. Black African adults were found to be more supportive of race-based redress policy than white adults and, to a lesser degree, coloured and Indian South Africans. Mirroring the national trend, these intergroup differences narrow considerably when referring to class-based policy measures. This lends further credence to the suggestion from the academic community in the country for a paradigmatic change in policy with the focus more on a class-based redress agenda rather than one primarily focused on racial redress (Adam, 1997; Alexander, 2007; Hammett, 2008; Habib & Bentley, 2008; Habib, 2013; Friedman & Erasmus, 2008; Durrheim 2010).

The study has also generated new insight on how redress preferences are been reproduced generationally within race groups, thus frustrating expectations of substantive change among the Born Free generation, a finding that seems to confirm comparable results on a generational examination of attitudes to politics, democracy and governance in the country (Mattes, 2012). Furthermore, from an intersectional perspective, it has shown how inter-racial cleavages in attitude appear to trump intra-group dissimilarities, resulting in a perpetuation rather than a progressive diminution in the 'stubborn core of opposition' to racial

transformation policy (Dixon et al., 2007; Durrheim, 2010). These signs of redistributive policy polarisation are concerning given growing recognition of the rising need for a social compact in relation to a strong, transformative policy agenda, especially one designed to forge greater progress in overcoming apartheid injustices (Habib, 2013).

Following on from these results and informed by the nature of the available data, the multivariate modelling was conducted in a two-stage process. Firstly, the chapter's key theoretical hypotheses were tested based on an index of opposition to three race-preferential policies (sports quotas, affirmative action, and land redistribution). This was followed, in the second instance, by a replication of this hypothesis testing based on select class-based policy measures. The latter have not featured regularly across multiple rounds of interviewing, so they had to be examined independently rather through the construction of a composite index. Based on this, the individual determinants of resistance to redress policies emerging from the two components were compared and contrasted in order to tease out key theoretical and policy-relevant inferences.

For the race-preferential analysis, there was some evidence of a generational gain in support for this form of redress policy, though ultimately this was deemed rather weak and unconvincing. This was reinforced by the practical absence of a life-cycle effect. This further confirms the bivariate finding that the hope of more altruistic, ideologically liberal tendencies among a post-apartheid generation of South Africans may have been premature. Self-interest again produced ambiguous evidence. Race did emerge as a strong, significant predictor of policy opposition, though the initial class effects observed in respect of employment status and educational attainment washed out in the fully specified models. From this I surmised that there is mild but weak support for the role of individual self-interest in shaping policy positions. Moving from a static to a dynamic perspective, measures on mobility history and prospects produced significant but counter-theoretical findings, with those reporting past gains and expressing expectations of future gains displaying *more favourable* views towards race-preferential redress. This is ascribed to the rather paradoxical and counter-factual racial and class-based pattern of responses to self-evaluated mobility measures.

The findings based on inequality beliefs are however more consistent with theory, with greater inequality aversion and greater support for the principle of government-led redistribution associated with a lower level of opposition to race-based redress policies. This

confirms the assumption that the more one is aware of social inequality and identifies with the idea of political redistribution, the greater the likelihood that this will carry over into support for related interventions. The perceived causes of inequality also matter, with structural explanations likely to promote support for redistributive social policy, while those ascribing poverty to individual shortcomings (laziness, lack of ambition) demonstrating more antipathy for such political action. Partisanship and, to a lesser degree, political ideology are again correlates of redistributive preferences. Democratic Alliance supporters demonstrated greater opposition than those with other political persuasions, while those rating themselves as politically liberal tend to be less opposed to racial redress than those considering themselves as ideologically conservative. Political trust also appears consequential for views on racial redress, with higher confidence in political institutions (national government, local government, parliament, political parties and politicians) generally reducing individual policy opposition. Basic models show that this applies for all population groups apart from black African adults. If the analysis is repeated with political trust restricted exclusively to confidence in national government, then this inverse association is present for all population groups, though in fully specified models its effect seems again influential only in the case of racial minorities

## 8.3 Key contributions to the literature

### 8.3.1 Methodological contributions

The study presented in this thesis represents one of the more comprehensive, national quantitative examinations of inequality beliefs, preferences for political redistribution, and support for specific redress policies that have been undertaken to date in the South African context. While other survey-based research has been conducted, many are micro-studies and have not been designed to yield nationally representative findings (e.g. Seekings, 2008a,b; Durrheim, 2010). Furthermore, among the fairly limited research that is based on national samples, there remains a tendency to address specific discrete areas of focus, such as the demand for redistribution in the country (Wegner & Pellicer, 2011) and the patterns and predictors of support for specific redistributive measures, including affirmative action (Dixon et al. 2007; Durrheim 2010; Durrheim et al. 2011; Roberts et al. 2011), land reform (Gibson 2010) and social grants (Noble et al. 2008a; Surender et al. 2010; Wright et al., 2014). In addition, relatively few representative South African attitudinal studies have provided in-

depth analysis based on repeat cross-sectional data covering a relatively lengthy period of time, with the most notable exception being Lefko-Everatt et al. (2017) based on the Institute of Justice and Reconciliation's *South African Reconciliation Barometer* series (2003 onwards).

The use of cumulated data covering fourteen surveys rounds period between late 2003 and early 2016 therefore forms a solid empirical basis for producing novel empirical and theoretical contributions. It offers much-needed evidence with which to confirm other studies and theoretical hypotheses, and moreover begins to fill empirical knowledge gaps on the determinants of redistributive demand and policy preferences in contexts other than North America and Europe. The uniqueness of the data used in the thesis extends to the inclusion and use of comparative measures based from two key sources. The first is the in-depth, conceptually grounded International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) modules on social inequality and the role of government, the former being embedded in the SASAS 2009 round and the latter in the 2006 and 2016 SASAS rounds. The availability of this data has not only enabled the conceptual testing of the interrelationship between different theoretical concepts, but it has broadened out the scope of the measures that can be employed to validate some of the key findings. It has also brought a comparative element to the thesis. This is critical in that it allows for the key question of how typical or discrepant South African attitudes are in relation to certain core measures and conceptual constructs.

One of the international contributions that the SASAS data series has made, and which is explored in the thesis, is how stable or volatile certain core ISSP inequality beliefs measures are over time. In most cases, ISSP modules are replicated on a decennial basis, meaning that it is difficult to gauge the nature of fluctuations that are occurring between survey rounds. After South Africa became an official ISSP member in 2003, the SASAS team identified as core indicators for repeat fielding both the ISSP 'income differences are too large' measure of inequality aversion and the redistributive demand measure on whether it is government's responsibility 'to reduce income differences between the rich and poor'. As a result of this, the country now has one of the longest standing time series on these measures, both internationally and particularly for a high-inequality developing country. This has enabled me to identify the pattern whereby inequality aversion has remained largely unchanged over the fourteen rounds of surveying, but the demand for redistribution has been subject of significant change.

The second source of comparative data comes from the South African fielding of rotating modules from the European Social Survey (ESS) on the meaning and evaluation of democracy (2014) as well as welfare attitudes (2016). This data has been used as supplemental source in order to provide insight into the extent to which South African attitudes favours a more inclusive, social democratic form of social citizenship in which social rights are supported and regarded as an integral component of locally-rooted conceptions of democracy. It has also provided additional data on support for specific possible future welfare options, such as a universal basic income, and enabled me to gain a comparative understanding of South African values in this regard.

### 8.3.2 Public opinion, social citizenship and transformative social policy: Theoretical and empirical contributions

It is my contention through this thesis that the Marshallian theoretical idea of social citizenship and social rights has particular heuristic relevance in approaching and understanding the dynamic relationship between public policy and public opinion in the South African case. Social citizenship refers to the government-provided guarantees of a basic level of economic and social security for all citizens, and typically involves responsibilities for minimum conditions in relation to education, healthcare, housing, income through social protection measures, and increasingly the right to decent employment (Humpage, 2015:2). Despite the extension of civil and political rights to all South Africans following the transition to democracy, there has been considerable contestation over the nature and scope of social rights within post-apartheid society. The question remains whether the policy trajectory at the macro level since the mid-1990s is reflected in public attitudes. Does the preferred mode of social citizenship in the public imagination align with the policy agenda advocated by the state, and how variant are these normative preferences among the public, in relation to different policy types, and over time? The survey analysis I conducted within this study has aimed to provide empirical evidence with which to begin to respond to such questions.

It has been argued that, during the 1940s and 1950s, the ANC under the leadership of AB Xuma and Albert Luthuli developed a social democratic, deracialised vision of the 'good society', as reflected in the African Claims (1943) document and Freedom Charter (1955)

(Van Niekerk, 2013, 2017; Padayachee & Van Niekerk, 2017). This tradition was predicated on a clear recognition of the centrality of the social rights of citizenship, encompassing comprehensive state provision in relation to health care, education, housing and social welfare. This historical vision of a fair social and economic order informed initial thinking on the post-apartheid society during the transition to democracy, as reflected in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) base document. However, the subsequent political compromises made during negotiations with the late apartheid regime in the early 1990s resulted in the pursuance of market-friendly, economically conservative policies. New evidence suggests that the extent of this neoliberal embrace even surprised the business sector, which had envisaged and was willing to make concessions to a more social democratic, redistributive policy (Padayachee & Van Niekerk, 2017).

In spite of the pro-market trajectory of economic policy over the two decades since the adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, the survey results presented in the thesis reveal that the public tend to display a commitment to inclusive social policy with a strong redistributive element. The finding that there is a deeply-felt and enduring public concern over the scale of income disparities in the country, together with a resolute sense that redistribution should fall firmly within the mandate of the state, seems to suggest that there is a demand for a more social democratic form of citizenship. This tends to align with an egalitarian notion of democracy, which emphasises strong social responsibilities, rather than a more narrowly defined conception of electoral democracy (Dworkin, 2002; Hooghe & Oser, 2017). Despite broad support for principles of redistribution, transformation and greater equality, the study has nonetheless revealed signs of ambivalence within the South African public, especially along racial lines, regarding the policies designed to address economic inequality and the legacy of apartheid. This observation, coupled with the finding that opposition is more pronounced in relation to race-preferential policies than pro-poor, compensatory interventions, serves to confirm the seeming existence of a principle-implementation gap and the relevance of policy type in determining support for transformative social policies (Seekings, 2008a,b; Dixon et al., 2007, 2017).

These divisions in policy preferences have also displayed a remarkable degree of temporal stability over the last 15 years. So unlike other contexts, such as New Zealand, Australia and the UK (Humpage, 2015), the findings do not support a strong neoliberal rollover in public

attitudes towards social citizenship in line with macro-level policy developments. The unchanging character of redress policy preferences has however led to assertions that white South Africans' expressed support for inclusive social policy 'does not run deep', given that an evident pro-poor ethic does not extend to policies that would potentially serve to reverse historically-derived white privilege (Dixon et al., 2017: 109). This leads into discussions about what might explain attitudes to social change policies in South Africa. To this end, the study has attempted to make a modest contribution to the steadily emerging local body of evidence in this regard, in particular by testing the relative importance of different competing hypotheses, such as individual and group self-interest, racism, and ideological factors.

Through the modelling, the study also contributed much-needed evidence for the role of intergroup contact as a possible basis for promoting support for race-preferential redress policies. Building on the pioneering work of Allport (1954), interracial contact has long been advocated as a means by which to reduce prejudice in South Africa, with evidence suggesting that it does yield positive outcomes. Experimental research on the potential role that intergroup contact may have in closing the principle-implementation gap has been undertaken since the late 2000s. Based on small sample studies, Dixon et al. (2007 2010a) found support that positive interracial contact resulted in white adults voicing higher support for race-compensatory and race-preferential interventions, both directly and indirectly by reducing intergroup threat and perceived unfairness. This research has also suggested that interracial contact may also produce effects on the attitudes of historically disadvantaged groups. Positive contact with white adults led black African adults to adopt more positive racial attitudes (feelings of warmth, trust), but also reduced support for race-based redress policies such as affirmative action and land reform, and produced a lower likelihood of regarding themselves or members of their group as targets of racial discrimination (Dixon et al., 2007, 2010b).

The findings based on inequality beliefs are however more consistent with theory, with greater inequality aversion and greater support for the principle of government-led redistribution associated with a lower level of opposition to race-based redress policies. This confirms the assumption that the more one is aware of social inequality and identifies with the idea of political redistribution, the greater the likelihood that this will carry over into support for related interventions. The perceived causes of inequality also matter, with structural explanations likely to promote support for redistributive social policy, while those

ascribing poverty to individual shortcomings (laziness, lack of ambition) demonstrating more antipathy for such political action.

## 8.4 Study limitations and directions for future investigation

### 8.4.1 Limitations

Although the survey series used for analytical purposes in this thesis represents an important source of time series data with which to explore the dynamics and factors associated with inequality beliefs and redistribution preferences, the survey is limited in a number of fundamental ways. To begin with, the indicators associated with key conceptual constructs examined in the thesis, such as inequality aversion and support for government-led redistribution, rely primarily on single survey items rather than multi-item scales derived by combining several items. In Chapters 4 and 5, such single-item measures have served as dependent variables in the multivariate analysis conducted. While this is an accepted practice in the self-reporting of factual information (age, years of education, etc.), for the measurement of psychological constructs there is a general preference for multi-item scales to be employed as, from a psychometric perspective, these are usually assumed to have higher construct validity and regarded as more reliable (Andrews, 1984; Wanous et al, 1997). Nonetheless, numerous examples exist where single-item measures of psychological constructs have been employed, such as life satisfaction or job satisfaction, and a general rule is that if the construct is narrow in scope and fairly unambiguous for respondents, then a single indicator may suffice (Wanous et al., 1997:247). The main reason why multi-topic survey series such as SASAS often include single indicators is that they are less space intensive in questionnaires and therefore more cost-effective in character (Nagy, 2002). Recognising this limitation, where possible I have relied on alternative indicators that relate to the same construct in order to determine whether similar conclusions are arrived at. The best example of this is inequality aversion, where apart from the "income differences are too large" measure, I also examined items on the image of social structure and views on the legitimacy of different occupational earnings in the analysis in Chapter 4. The latter were only included in one of the fourteen survey rounds (the ISSP inequality module in SASAS 2009), but they did help portray a consistent picture of the South African public as being relatively inequality averse in nature.

Due to the use of single item measures, the study in some instances could not test attitudes towards different facets or dimensions of core constructs. This was most notable in relation to the examination of redress policy attitudes in Chapter 6. In the absence of detailed modules on specific policies, I could not for example achieve what Gibson (2009, 2010) did in relation to land redistribution in the country, namely determine attitudes to a variety of different land policy options and test a variety of instrumental and symbolic hypotheses using additional topic specific indicators. Other similar, but rare examples of in-depth, national representative social policy analysis have been undertaken on socially perceived necessities for adults and children (Wright, 2008; Barnes & Wright, 2012; Wright & Noble, 2013), work and welfare (Surender et al., 2010), and the role of social grants in protecting the dignity of lone mothers (Wright et al., 2014). This is the perennial trade-off that the survey-based researcher faces in relation to breadth versus depth. What I have been able to achieve in my study is an examination of general support or opposition for specific redress policies of different types at a fairly diffuse level and draw conclusions about the nature of redress preferences on this basis.

A related constraint to the research was the fact that, even in relation to support for basic transformative social policies in the country, there remains some patchiness in the fielding of content. One clear example is in relation to social grants. While the SASAS series includes annually repeated measures on general evaluations of government performance in relation to the provision of social grants, there is little regular content on the demand for social grants and preferences for different forms of social security. Since social protection remains a central element of the social rights of citizenship and indeed the constitutionally mandated socio-economic rights in the South African case, this is a significant gap. In addition, certain long-standing core redress policy measures, such as attitudes towards affirmative action are complicated by phrasing that has potentially ambiguous meaning, which may affect the way certain social groups respond.[79] It is recommended that the core SASAS instrument be reviewed to determine whether a few choice indicators could be identified to address some of the key gaps, and these fielded every 3-5 years at a minimum. The testing of alternative

[79] This point was raised through personal communication with Dr. Greg Houston (HSRC), who suggested that coloured and Indian respondents may struggle with the term 'black South Africans' in the phrasing "To what extent do you agree or disagree that there should be… preferential hiring and promotion of black South Africans in employment". He indicated that these respondents may interpret differentially whether or not they are included definitionally among historically disadvantaged 'black South Africans'.

phrasing to items such as the affirmative action measure, possibly using a split-sample design, could assist in determining how well this indicator is working in practice.

A final limitation of note that is common to most survey-based quantitative research is that it suffers from a level of abstraction and structural rigidity, especially in contrast with qualitative research designs. Qualitative studies are more effectively able to explore behaviours, emotions, social needs and desires, as well as underlying motivations for certain attitudinal responses and predispositions. For this reason, mixed methods approaches are increasingly being advocated, as the basis for validating findings, to give further interpretive nuance to quantitative evidence, and to develop and refine survey instruments. Examples of this approach in the South African context include Adato et al. (2007) and Noble et al. (2008b). While beyond the scope of the present study, there are options for conducting cognitive interviewing based on some of the main indicators I use as the basis of my analysis. This would assist in providing a clear picture of the factors shaping inequality beliefs and the degree of similarity across different societal groups. This could then be used to inform future lines of survey-based attitudinal investigation.

### 8.4.2 Future research

There are number of possible ways that the empirical research contained in the thesis could be taken forward, covering data, methodological and analytical issues. These will be briefly outlined below. Starting on the data and methodological front, the preceding sub-section on limitations drew attention to a reliance on general measures of policy support for the purpose of this study, characterising them as essentially wide-but-thin in nature. Examples of more focused and detailed examinations that have been undertaken using nationally representative data remain scarce. It is recommended that some of the findings and assertions made in my study be further tested through more detailed studies that narrow in on specific policy themes, options and predictors. As part of this research agenda, it would be ideal if there could be an Africa-focused comparative element. The next iteration of the ISSP social inequality module is scheduled for 2019, though at present South African remains the only ISSP member country from sub-Saharan Africa. While other global and regional survey infrastructure such as the World Values Survey and Afrobarometer do contain certain indicators of relevance, they do not field in-depth modules of sufficient depth and singular focus on inequality and redistribution-related beliefs. Attempting to include even several African countries in the

fielding of the ISSP social inequality module would significantly enrich our understanding of inequality related-beliefs by facilitating cross-national analysis of patterns both within and between world regions.

There is also a need for additional research that focuses on collecting and triangulating mass opinion on inequality beliefs and redistributive social policy to equivalent research on the views of political, economic and other elites, along with analysis of media representations and debates on these and related social policy themes. The views of specific elite groups tend to be underrepresented in sample surveys, while media content analysis with an explicit focus on inequality, redistribution and social policy are rare. As described in Chapter 2, a number of elite studies have been conducted in South Africa during the 1990s and early 2000s in particular (Kalati & Manor, 1999, 2005; Møller & Dickow, 2001; Kotzé 1993a,b, 2003, 2011; Kotzé & du Toit 1995, 1996, 2011; Gouws & Kotzé 2007; Kotzé & Steenekamp 2009). The greater availability of representative public opinion data, the prevailing negative political mood, and growing demands for an accelerated pace of change in the country all suggest the need for additional, more coordinated and systematic studies of this type.

The study has relied on a detailed examination of measures included in the SASAS series that relate to beliefs concerning inequality and public policy to address it. Although this has yielded interesting insights and findings, there is a need for deeper qualitative insights into the manner in which South Africans think about issues of social citizenship and wellbeing. Much of the qualitative work in this regard has tended to focus, as outlined above, on the attitudes of elites. There have been a few exceptions, though more regular work in this tradition is required in order to develop new theoretical hypotheses than can be subsequently tested through new designed content that can be embedded in future iterations of repeat cross-sectional opinion surveys.

Regarding areas for future analysis, my study also points to additional related questions that might be further pursued in advancing our understanding of inequality beliefs and policy support. Firstly, given the nature of South Africa's youthful population structure, the values and attitudes that post-apartheid generations hold are of instrumental importance for the direction and content of social citizenship and social policy in the medium to longer-term. The lack of more distinctive cohort differences in beliefs about inequality and support for redistribution and associated policies was both surprising and intriguing, especially in relation

to the democratic context in which these young citizens have grown up, and taking into account the old and new vulnerabilities and risks they face in navigating the transition into adulthood. Further research is required to understand why attitudes seem largely to be reproducing generationally, both on aggregate and within race groups and social classes, and to carefully monitor attitudinal patterns over time.

Another question of note relates to the effect of changing patterns of political trust on the principle-implementation gap and the demand for institutional arrangements to promote inclusive social citizenship. The modelling undertaken in this thesis has shown this to be relevant factor in understanding the determinants of redistributive social policy, thus validating the (limited) findings emanating from international studies. More insight is however needed in this regard, both in terms of further efforts to replicate and generalise this finding, as well as in understanding the attitudinal influence of changing context. For instance, in a situation where confidence in the state has experienced a fairly rapid and significant decline, as has occurred in South Africa over the last decade, does the associated weakening in redistributive policy support tend to rebound with new terms of political office and leadership, or does it foster a more enduring focus on individualism and self-reliance? Does this also create particular views on the role of other non-state actors, such as the business and civil society sectors, to play a more decisive role in actions to address economic inequality? An additional line of investigation would be to provide more nuanced analysis of the role of partisanship on modes of social citizenship. The sample size limitations of the SASAS series at this stage warrants against a detailed testing of party effects. As more rounds of data become available and are added to the cumulative datafile, new analytical possibilities will open up, for instance discerning whether and in what way Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) supporters are different in their beliefs and preferences.

In a review of the state of comparative research on welfare attitudes, Svallfors (2010:250) argued that a notable gap requiring analytical and theoretical attention is the relative salience of personal evaluations of past mobility, present circumstances and expected future mobility on inequality and social policy attitudes. A better part of a decade on and this suggestion still holds relevance, especially in the South African case, where social mobility indicators yielded counter-intuitive findings. A better understanding of how individuals rate their mobility experience and outlook, and how this differentially affects social citizenship attitudes across different groups within a population would add real value.

# Appendices

## Appendix 2-1: South African sub-national, quantitative studies providing more in-depth explorations of distributive justice attitudes

Apart from national studies, a number of area-based surveys have also been undertaken that include measures focusing on inequality beliefs. Of particular note due to their content on attitudes towards distributive justice are the results of two Cape Town based studies. These are the Khayelitsha/Mitchell's Plain Survey (KMPS, 2000) and the 2003 Cape Area Survey (CAS 2003) (Seekings 2002, 2005a,b, 2008a,b).

***Cape Area Study***. The 2003 Cape Area Study (CAS) included a module of questions on perceptions of distributive justice, which was administered to 588 black African, coloured and white adults spread across the City of Cape Town metropolitan area in September and October of that year.[80] Analysing the data, Seekings (2005) finds foremost that there is resolute support for redistribution (at least among Capetonians). More than 80 percent supported pro-poor government policies such as assistance for the unemployed, ensuring that children from poor families have the same opportunities as children from wealthy families, and increasing the value of the state old age pension. A similar share stated that the government was not doing enough to assist the country's poor. Slimmer majorities (around 55%) expressed favourable views regarding the responsibility of the state to reduce income differences between rich and poor, and the provision of a basic income grant for all. This nuanced attitudinal patterning suggests 'wide but not unconditional support' for distributive policies (*ibid*, p.13).

The second notable finding from Seekings' analysis is the apparently salient role of judgements about the deservingness of different categories of poor people. The distribution of responses to the policy preference measures discussed offer an indication that South Africans tend to see the elderly children and the unemployed as deserving beneficiaries of social policy intervention. To provide further insight, the 2003 CAS made use of an experimental vignette about a retrenched worker, enquiring about whether they deserve government

[80] The survey sample and data collected do suffer from several limitations. For further information on these methodological considerations, see Seekings et al. (2004) and Seekings (2005).

financial assistance during their period of unemployment and, if so, to what value.[81] In these assessments of desert, 60 percent overall indicated that the person in the vignette deserved state support. The characteristics of the retrenched worker appeared to matter for whether they should receive support (with support for assistance ranging between 49 and 76%),[82] but more appreciably for the amount they should be awarded, with the highest rewarded scenario being allocated on average nearly three times that of the least deserving scenario (R993 vs R356 per month). Respondents could be swayed to change their attitude towards the scenario based on the provision of additional contextual information (drinking behaviour; spending behaviour; health need; child schooling decisions). South Africans therefore draw on the principle of equity (merit or desert) in justice decisions. Yet, the distributive principle of *need* also appears to play some bearing in allocative preferences. The retrenched worker scenarios deemed most deserving differed from the least deserving by the presence of children. Furthermore, the most deserving scenario involves a married man in his 40s with children to provide for, compared to the unmarried young, unmarried and childless man in his 20s that is regarded as least deserving of government financial assistance, leading Seekings to refer to the possible existence of a 'conservative, family-oriented conception of desert' (p.16).

The final observation of note from this important study pertains to the influence of tax considerations on redistributive preferences. Do South Africans demonstrate a lower appetite for redistribution when explicit mention is made of the costs in the form of additional taxation? The evidence from the 2003 CAS implies that it matters to some degree, but perhaps not to the extent that one might presuppose. Support for an increase in the value of the government old age pension fell 30 percentage points (from 84% to 54%) when it is additionally stipulated that that the implication may be that 'people like you have to pay higher taxes'. Similarly, general support for government financial assistance in the context of the scenarios provided in the vignette fell from 60 percent to 40 percent when the provision of a possible tax increase was mentioned. Yet, the relative effect of the prospect of higher taxes is not as acute as the response to negative cues about the behaviour of the disadvantaged (such as the spending of grant income on alcohol). Positively, and somewhat surprisingly, white or rich respondents were less inclined to change their attitudes towards

[81] Ten different permutations of the vignette were fielded, that varied based on sex, population group, age group, marital and parent status, perceived dependability as a worker and whether or not a job is actively being sought.
[82] Although Seekings (2005: 15) asserts that this 27 percentage point variation in the attribution of deservingness across the ten scenarios is 'relatively small', I would argue that this is nonetheless a fairly sizeable attitudinal cleavage.

pro-poor policies when confronted with the possibility of higher taxation. Taken together, these findings are seen as indicative of fairly resilient redistributive policy preferences in the country.

***Khayelitsha/Mitchell's Plain Survey***. The Khayelitsha/Mitchell's Plain Survey (KMPS) (SALDRU/CSSR 2000) surveyed 2498 urban poor, working- and middle-class African and coloured adults living in approximately one thousand households located in the Mitchell's Plain magisterial district of Cape Town. Conducted in late 2000 jointly by the South African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) and the Centre for Social Science Research (CSSR) at the University of Cape Town, the survey had a primary focus on labour market issues, but also included a module on distributive justice. This module consisted of 36 attitudinal measures that were derived primarily from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and International Social Justice Project (ISJP) (see chapter 3) and clustered around five core themes: views on how people become rich; views of redistributive government policy; attitudes to taxation; attitudes towards business; and general evaluations of life in South Africa. The module was complemented with a set of items on unemployment.

With regard to beliefs about inequality and opportunity, a large majority of respondents believed that many South Africans received less income than deserved (82%), and that economic inequality persists since it benefits the rich and powerful (76%). Securing a good education was seen as integral to economic success, though it was acknowledged (by 58%) that children from disadvantaged family contexts struggle to achieve such an education. There was greater ambivalence in levels of agreement with the meritocratic principle that wealth can be achieved through hard work (55% agreed; 34% disagreed and 11% were neutral). Also, participants in the study tended to reject the individualistic stereotype of the lazy poor. In the eyes of this sample of Capetonians, the country is clearly not perceived as a land of opportunity, even though educational achievement and to a lesser degree effort are seen as potential pathways to material reward.

The survey painted a resolutely favourable view of government's role in relation to social policies and public expenditure directed at addressing poverty and inequality. Approximately ninety percent of respondents agreed that the state should provide assistance to the unemployed, increase the value of the old age pension, spend more on education and health, and offer free health care. Lower though still impressive support (75%) was provided for the

idea of a basic income grant, a policy proposal which was much debated in the early to mid-2000s, though ultimately dismissed by the government owing to concerns about welfare dependency and a preference for workfare, especially in the form of job creation through expanded public works programmes. Three-quarters (77%) also believed in that the state should assume responsibility for reducing income inequality, and there was near universal agreement for egalitarian efforts aimed at equivalising school quality and improving education for children from disadvantaged backgrounds as the basis for achieving equality of opportunity. This unanimity did diminish somewhat when mention was made of possible tax consequences, with between 45 and 55 percent emerging as critical of current levels of taxation (for themselves and the poor alike) and suggestions of increased taxation to cover developmental social policy, such as increased social grant spending.

A unique contribution of the study was to probe views on the business sector alongside attitudes towards state responsibilities. The results displayed a fair degree of inconsistency. On the one hand, a majority of participants (at least 70%) acknowledged the fundamental need for businesses to make profits as the basis for securing investment and improve living standards in the country. Yet, around two-thirds agreed that South African companies wield too much power in the country and supported greater state involvement in companies. In addition, there were ambivalent views regarding workers, especially concerning their productivity levels in the absence of monetary reward, and their ability to effectively manage companies in the absence of executives. Divided opinion also extended to positions on workers and strike action. Broad recognition that workers are compelled to occasionally strike in order to secure a fair wage is juxtaposed against a view that strike action is detrimental to the economy and more polarised responses to the statement that "workers go on strike too often". The inherent tension in attitudes among residents of Khayelitsha and Mitchell's Plain between pro- and anti-business sentiment is interesting in light of the vigorous debates over labour market inequalities and fair living wages that have emerged a little more than a decade after the survey was conducted. Perhaps underlying this tension in values is a hope that a flourishing business sector might somehow translate into improved quality of life for workers and their families through the adoption of a more humane and equitable corporate ethos.

With regard to economic self-interest, unequivocal support for the hypothesis that labour market position would influence inequality related attitudes was *not* found. This was true

irrespective of whether occupational status of the respondents or other household members if their households was considered in multivariate analysis.

**Appendix Table 4-1: Binary logistic regression with strong agreement to the inequality aversion ('income differences too large') question as a dependent variable, 2003-2016.**

| Logistic regression | [1] | [2a] | [2b] | [2c] | [3] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | O.R. | O.R. | O.R. | O.R. | O.R. |
| ***Female*** | 0.890** | 0.898** | 0.899** | 0.898** | 0.899** |
| ***Age*** | 1.001 | 1.000 | 1.001 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| ***Age squared*** | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| ***Population Group (Ref=Black African)*** | | | | | |
| Coloured | 0.960 | 0.878* | 0.880* | 0.878* | 0.948 |
| Indian | 1.008 | 0.929 | 0.936 | 0.928 | 0.989 |
| White | 0.775*** | 0.674*** | 0.686*** | 0.676*** | 0.660*** |
| ***Marital status (Ref=never married)*** | | | | | |
| Married | 1.036 | 1.037 | 1.036 | 1.038 | 1.048 |
| Widowed | 1.012 | 1.026 | 1.029 | 1.030 | 1.055 |
| Separated / divorced | 0.960 | 0.988 | 0.993 | 0.981 | 1.044 |
| ***Educational attainment (Ref=No schooling)*** | | | | | |
| Primary | 1.043 | 1.028 | 1.025 | 1.027 | 1.002 |
| Grades 8-11 or equivalent | 1.097 | 1.097 | 1.096 | 1.098 | 1.109 |
| Matric or equivalent | 1.082 | 1.075 | 1.075 | 1.073 | 1.094 |
| Tertiary | 1.239* | 1.226* | 1.225* | 1.225* | 1.200 |
| Other | 1.494** | 1.600** | 1.589** | 1.594** | 1.609** |
| ***Employment status (Ref=unemployed, seeking work)*** | | | | | |
| Employed full time | 0.949 | 0.956 | 0.951 | 0.952 | 0.931 |
| Employed part time | 0.905 | 0.916 | 0.913 | 0.915 | 0.899 |
| Unemployed not looking for work | 0.856* | 0.880* | 0.882* | 0.879* | 0.840* |
| Pensioner | 0.840* | 0.832* | 0.825* | 0.829* | 0.812* |
| Student/learner | 0.868* | 0.859* | 0.855* | 0.856* | 0.820** |
| Permanently sick/disabled | 0.892 | 0.835 | 0.837 | 0.834 | 0.865 |
| Other employment status | 0.808* | 0.830 | 0.828* | 0.829* | 0.853 |
| ***Self-rated poverty status (Ref=poor)*** | | | | | |
| Just getting by | 0.868* | 0.965 | 0.966 | 0.968 | 0.999 |
| Non-poor | 0.707** | 0.741*** | 0.741*** | 0.741*** | 0.801** |
| ***Household size*** | 0.989 | 0.994 | 0.995 | 0.994 | 0.988 |
| ***Perceived mobility history (Ref=improved)*** | | | | | |
| Stayed the same | ... | 0.946 | ... | ... | ... |
| Worsened | ... | 1.122* | ... | ... | ... |
| (Don't know) | ... | 0.937 | ... | ... | ... |
| ***Perceived mobility next 5 years (Ref=Improve)*** | | | | | |
| Stay the same | ... | ... | 0.907* | ... | ... |
| Worsen | ... | ... | 1.098* | ... | ... |
| Uncertain | ... | ... | 1.077 | ... | ... |
| ***Perceived mobility experience and prospects*** | | | | | |
| ***(Ref=Downward mobility with expected worsening)*** | | | | | |
| Upward mobility with expected improvements | ... | ... | ... | 0.875* | 0.905 |
| Upward mobility with no expected change | ... | ... | ... | 0.863 | 0.940 |
| Upward mobility with expected worsening | ... | ... | ... | 0.819 | 0.849 |
| No mobility with expected improvements | ... | ... | ... | 0.850* | 0.864* |
| No mobility with no expected change | ... | ... | ... | 0.750*** | 0.778*** |
| No mobility with expected worsening | ... | ... | ... | 0.903 | 0.936 |
| Downward mobility with expected improvements | ... | ... | ... | 0.879 | 0.918 |
| Downward mobility with no expected change | ... | ... | ... | 0.872 | 0.991 |
| (Don't know) | ... | ... | ... | 0.928 | 0.947 |
| ***Relative income (ref=much above average)*** | | | | | |
| Much above average income | ... | 0.911 | 0.942 | 0.913 | 1.037 |
| Above average income | ... | 0.841* | 0.838* | 0.837* | 0.899 |
| Average income | ... | 0.971 | 0.970 | 0.966 | 0.974 |
| Below average income | ... | 0.976 | 0.974 | 0.973 | 0.989 |
| (Do not know) | ... | 0.773** | 0.769** | 0.767** | 0.826* |

| *(Continued.)* | [1] | [2a] | [2b] | [2c] | [3] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***Satisfaction with life (ref=very satisfied)*** | | | | | |
| Satisfied | ... | 0.642*** | 0.644*** | 0.641*** | 0.695*** |
| Neutral | ... | 0.549*** | 0.549*** | 0.548*** | 0.598*** |
| Dissatisfied | ... | 0.573*** | 0.571*** | 0.570*** | 0.609*** |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Very dissatisfied | ... | 1.021 | 1.026 | 1.017 | 1.025 |
| (Don't know) | ... | 0.375** | 0.369** | 0.368** | 0.394* |
| ***Party identification (ref=ANC)*** | | | | | |
| Democratic Alliance (DA) | ... | 1.174* | 1.176* | 1.172* | 1.131 |
| Other party | ... | 1.258*** | 1.261** | 1.261*** | 1.256** |
| No party | ... | 1.086 | 1.085 | 1.083 | 1.089 |
| Undeclared | ... | 0.934 | 0.929 | 0.930 | 0.916 |
| ***Perceived group discrimination*** | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1.532*** |
| ***Subjective societal position*** | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.965** |
| Controls: province, geographic type and survey year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| No. obs | 42,373 | 39363 | 39357 | 39322 | 29007 |
| Wald chi2(48) | 327.69 | 522.55 | 517.34 | 524.63 | 529.53 |
| Prob > chi2 | 0.0000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.0128 | 0.0234 | 0.0233 | 0.0237 | 0.0292 |
| Log pseudolikelihood | -314600000 | -289700000 | -289600000 | -289200000 | -215000000 |

***Note***: O.R. = Odds Ratio. The dependent variable is the percentage that strongly agree that "Differences in income in South Africa are too large"" (dummy variable where 1=strongly agree, and 0=do not strongly agree). Statistical significance is represented as follows: * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
***Source****:* HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2003-2016

**Appendix Table 4-2: Multinomial logistic regression of perceived stratification realities in South Africa, 2009.**

| | β (SE) | Lower | Odds Ratio | Upper |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Type B vs. Type A** | | | | |
| Age in years | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.01 |
| Female | 0.08 (0.10) | 0.89 | 1.08 | 1.31 |
| Coloured | 0.00 (0.17) | 0.72 | 1.00 | 1.38 |
| Indian/Asian | 0.03 (0.29) | 0.59 | 1.03 | 1.83 |
| White | -0.35 (0.19) | 0.49 | 0.70 | 1.02 |
| Matric or tertiary education | -0.07 (0.11) | 0.75 | 0.94 | 1.17 |
| Relative affluence (top 20%) | 0.35 (0.14)* | 1.07 | 1.42 | 1.88 |
| Relative poverty (lower 20%) | -0.02 (0.14) | 0.75 | 0.98 | 1.29 |
| Full time employment | 0.07 (0.15) | 0.80 | 1.08 | 1.44 |
| Part time employment | -0.06 (0.21) | 0.63 | 0.94 | 1.41 |
| Unemployed | -0.07 (0.13) | 0.72 | 0.93 | 1.21 |
| Retired | 0.17 (0.22) | 0.77 | 1.19 | 1.84 |
| Informal urban settlement | 0.13 (0.18) | 0.80 | 1.14 | 1.64 |
| Rural trad. authority areas | -0.40 (0.12)** | 0.53 | 0.67 | 0.85 |
| Rural farms | -0.10 (0.20) | 0.61 | 0.91 | 1.35 |
| Constant | -0.48 (0.19)* | 0.42 | 0.62 | 0.90 |
| **Type C vs. Type A** | | | | |
| Age in years | -0.04 (0.01)*** | 0.95 | 0.96 | 0.98 |
| Female | 0.19 (0.16) | 0.89 | 1.21 | 1.65 |
| Coloured | -0.23 (0.28) | 0.46 | 0.80 | 1.37 |
| Indian/Asian | -0.04 (0.45) | 0.40 | 0.97 | 2.32 |
| White | -0.61 (0.33) | 0.28 | 0.54 | 1.04 |
| Matric or tertiary education | -0.40 (0.18)* | 0.47 | 0.67 | 0.96 |
| Relative affluence (top 20%) | 0.20 (0.22) | 0.79 | 1.22 | 1.90 |
| Relative poverty (lower 20%) | -0.24 (0.25) | 0.49 | 0.79 | 1.28 |
| Full time employment | 0.64 (0.24)** | 1.18 | 1.89 | 3.04 |
| Part time employment | 0.29 (0.33) | 0.70 | 1.34 | 2.57 |
| Unemployed | -0.12 (0.23) | 0.57 | 0.89 | 1.38 |
| Retired | 1.59 (0.37)*** | 2.35 | 4.88 | 10.16 |
| Informal urban settlement | -0.52 (0.33) | 0.31 | 0.59 | 1.13 |
| Rural trad. authority areas | -0.58 (0.20)** | 0.38 | 0.56 | 0.82 |
| Rural farms | -0.31 (0.32) | 0.39 | 0.73 | 1.38 |
| Constant | -0.46 (0.29) | 0.36 | 0.63 | 1.11 |
| **Type D vs. Type A** | | | | |
| Age in years | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.98 | 0.99 | 1.01 |
| Female | 0.02 (0.16) | 0.75 | 1.02 | 1.40 |
| Coloured | -1.00 (0.36)** | 0.18 | 0.37 | 0.75 |
| Indian/Asian | -0.40 (0.49) | 0.26 | 0.67 | 1.76 |
| White | -0.75 (0.31)* | 0.26 | 0.47 | 0.87 |
| Matric or tertiary education | -0.35 (0.18) | 0.49 | 0.70 | 1.01 |
| Relative affluence (top 20%) | 1.02 (0.23)*** | 1.79 | 2.79 | 4.33 |
| Relative poverty (lower 20%) | -0.06 (0.24) | 0.60 | 0.94 | 1.50 |
| Full time employment | 0.27 (0.25) | 0.80 | 1.31 | 2.15 |
| Part time employment | -0.52 (0.45) | 0.25 | 0.60 | 1.43 |
| Unemployed | 0.46 (0.23)* | 1.02 | 1.59 | 2.47 |
| Retired | 0.21 (0.41) | 0.55 | 1.23 | 2.77 |
| Informal urban settlement | 0.07 (0.30) | 0.59 | 1.07 | 1.93 |
| Rural trad. authority areas | -0.42 (0.20)* | 0.44 | 0.66 | 0.97 |
| Rural farms | 0.08 (0.34) | 0.56 | 1.08 | 2.09 |
| Constant | -1.72 (0.32)*** | 0.10 | 0.18 | 0.34 |

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| **Type E vs. Type A** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age in years | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.98 | 1.00 | 1.02 |
| Female | -0.20 (0.25) | 0.51 | 0.82 | 1.33 |
| Coloured | -1.55 (0.77)* | 0.05 | 0.21 | 0.95 |
| Indian/Asian | -0.15 (0.73) | 0.21 | 0.86 | 3.58 |
| White | -0.64 (0.62) | 0.16 | 0.53 | 1.80 |
| Matric or tertiary education | -0.23 (0.28) | 0.46 | 0.79 | 1.37 |
| Relative affluence (top 20%) | -0.70 (0.42) | 0.22 | 0.49 | 1.14 |
| Relative poverty (lower 20%) | -0.34 (0.35) | 0.36 | 0.71 | 1.41 |
| Full time employment | -0.63 (0.35) | 0.27 | 0.53 | 1.06 |
| Part time employment | -1.98 (0.83)* | 0.03 | 0.14 | 0.70 |
| Unemployed | -0.99 (0.30)** | 0.21 | 0.37 | 0.67 |
| Retired | -1.79 (0.71)* | 0.04 | 0.17 | 0.68 |
| Informal urban settlement | -0.26 (0.47) | 0.31 | 0.77 | 1.92 |
| Rural trad. authority areas | -0.43 (0.28) | 0.38 | 0.65 | 1.11 |
| Rural farms | -0.49 (0.58) | 0.20 | 0.61 | 1.91 |
| Constant | -1.51 (0.41)*** | 0.10 | 0.22 | 0.49 |

*Note*: Pseudo $R2 = .026$. Model $\chi2(60) = 157.99$, $p < .001$. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p<.001$. The reference category for the dependent variable is Type A, while the reference categories for independent variables are male (gender), black African (race), less than matric (educational attainment), not in the labour force (employment status), and formal urban areas (geographic location).

**Appendix Table 4-3: Multinomial logistic regression of perceived stratification aspirations in South Africa, 2009.**

| | β (SE) | Lower | Odds Ratio | Upper |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Type A vs. Type E** | | | | |
| Age in years | 0.00 (0.02) | 0.97 | 1.00 | 1.03 |
| Female | -0.40 (0.39) | 0.31 | 0.67 | 1.45 |
| Coloured | -0.40 (0.54) | 0.23 | 0.67 | 1.92 |
| Indian/Asian | -0.95 (0.52) | 0.14 | 0.39 | 1.07 |
| White | -0.13 (0.75) | 0.20 | 0.88 | 3.84 |
| Matric or tertiary education | 0.03 (0.57) | 0.34 | 1.03 | 3.13 |
| Relative affluence (top 20%) | -0.84 (0.57) | 0.14 | 0.43 | 1.32 |
| Relative poverty (lower 20%) | 0.75 (0.61) | 0.64 | 2.11 | 6.97 |
| Full time employment | -0.14 (0.66) | 0.24 | 0.87 | 3.16 |
| Part time employment | 0.80 (0.70) | 0.56 | 2.23 | 8.86 |
| Unemployed | -0.20 (0.64) | 0.24 | 0.82 | 2.86 |
| Retired | 0.66 (0.97) | 0.29 | 1.94 | 12.91 |
| Informal urban settlement | -0.55 (0.51) | 0.21 | 0.58 | 1.56 |
| Rural trad. authority areas | -2.22 (0.68)*** | 0.03 | 0.11 | 0.41 |
| Rural farms | -1.46 (0.73)* | 0.06 | 0.23 | 0.98 |
| Constant | -1.63 (0.73)* | 0.05 | 0.20 | 0.83 |
| **Type B vs. Type E** | | | | |
| Age in years | 0.02 (0.01) | 1.00 | 1.02 | 1.04 |
| Female | 0.19 (0.31) | 0.66 | 1.21 | 2.22 |
| Coloured | -0.40 (0.32) | 0.36 | 0.67 | 1.27 |
| Indian/Asian | 0.18 (0.38) | 0.56 | 1.19 | 2.53 |
| White | 0.25 (0.46) | 0.52 | 1.28 | 3.17 |
| Matric or tertiary education | -0.41 (0.31) | 0.36 | 0.66 | 1.21 |
| Relative affluence (top 20%) | -1.15 (0.33)*** | 0.16 | 0.32 | 0.60 |
| Relative poverty (lower 20%) | 0.31 (0.35) | 0.69 | 1.37 | 2.71 |
| Full time employment | 0.95 (0.43)* | 1.10 | 2.58 | 6.03 |
| Part time employment | 0.77 (0.50) | 0.80 | 2.15 | 5.76 |
| Unemployed | 0.51 (0.39) | 0.77 | 1.67 | 3.60 |
| Retired | -0.39 (0.62) | 0.20 | 0.68 | 2.29 |
| Informal urban settlement | -0.55 (0.40) | 0.26 | 0.57 | 1.26 |
| Rural trad. authority areas | -0.73 (0.34)* | 0.25 | 0.48 | 0.93 |
| Rural farms | -0.82 (0.38)* | 0.21 | 0.44 | 0.93 |
| Constant | -2.19 (0.60)*** | 0.03 | 0.11 | 0.36 |
| **Type C vs. Type E** | | | | |
| Age in years | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.02 |
| Female | 0.24 (0.22) | 0.83 | 1.27 | 1.94 |
| Coloured | 0.62 (0.26)* | 1.11 | 1.86 | 3.11 |
| Indian/Asian | 0.13 (0.39) | 0.53 | 1.14 | 2.43 |
| White | 0.65 (0.42) | 0.84 | 1.91 | 4.39 |
| Matric or tertiary education | -0.42 (0.26) | 0.40 | 0.66 | 1.10 |
| Relative affluence (top 20%) | -0.51 (0.31) | 0.33 | 0.60 | 1.10 |
| Relative poverty (lower 20%) | -0.88 (0.38)* | 0.20 | 0.41 | 0.87 |
| Full time employment | 0.32 (0.30) | 0.77 | 1.38 | 2.49 |
| Part time employment | 0.2 (0.36)6 | 0.64 | 1.30 | 2.66 |
| Unemployed | -0.30 (0.29) | 0.42 | 0.74 | 1.30 |
| Retired | -0.33 (0.48) | 0.28 | 0.72 | 1.86 |
| Informal urban settlement | -1.33 (0.57)* | 0.09 | 0.26 | 0.80 |
| Rural trad. authority areas | -0.06 (0.28) | 0.54 | 0.94 | 1.64 |
| Rural farms | -0.51 (0.30) | 0.34 | 0.60 | 1.07 |
| Constant | -1.13 (0.39)** | 0.15 | 0.32 | 0.69 |

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(Continued)

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Type D vs. Type E** | | | | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age in years | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.02 |
| Female | -0.08 (0.14) | 0.70 | 0.93 | 1.22 |
| Coloured | -0.26 (0.20) | 0.51 | 0.77 | 1.15 |
| Indian/Asian | -0.06 (0.22) | 0.61 | 0.95 | 1.46 |
| White | 0.10 (0.27) | 0.65 | 1.10 | 1.87 |
| Matric or tertiary education | 0.23 (0.17) | 0.90 | 1.26 | 1.76 |
| Relative affluence (top 20%) | -0.21 (0.22) | 0.53 | 0.81 | 1.23 |
| Relative poverty (lower 20%) | 0.07 (0.20) | 0.72 | 1.07 | 1.59 |
| Full time employment | 0.05 (0.20) | 0.71 | 1.05 | 1.57 |
| Part time employment | 0.20 (0.29) | 0.69 | 1.22 | 2.17 |
| Unemployed | -0.05 (0.19) | 0.66 | 0.95 | 1.38 |
| Retired | 0.16 (0.32) | 0.63 | 1.17 | 2.18 |
| Informal urban settlement | -0.01 (0.24) | 0.61 | 0.99 | 1.59 |
| Rural trad. authority areas | -0.08 (0.19) | 0.63 | 0.92 | 1.34 |
| Rural farms | -0.30 (0.21) | 0.49 | 0.74 | 1.11 |
| Constant | 0.28 (0.29) | 0.74 | 1.32 | 2.34 |

*Note*: Pseudo $R2 = .034$. Model $\chi2(60) = 121.32$, $p < .001$. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p<.001$. The reference category for the dependent variable is Type E, while the reference categories for independent variables are male (gender), black African (race), less than matric (educational attainment), not in the labour force (employment status), and formal urban areas (geographic location).

**Appendix Table 4-4: Perceived level of tension between different social classes, 2009 (percentages that perceive strong or very strong conflicts)**

| | Poor and rich people | Working and middle class | Management and workers | Top & bottom of society | Base N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | 55 | 44 | 67 | 54 | 3277 |
| Born 1990 and after | 52 | 43 | 63 | 53 | 288 |
| 1980s | 59 | 47 | 68 | 59 | 804 |
| 1970s | 55 | 44 | 69 | 57 | 709 |
| 1960s | 51 | 43 | 70 | 52 | 643 |
| 1950s | 54 | 40 | 63 | 50 | 433 |
| 1940s | 56 | 44 | 64 | 47 | 275 |
| Born before 1940 | 53 | 43 | 62 | 52 | 132 |
| Male | 56 | 46 | 69 | 56 | 1321 |
| Female | 54 | 42 | 65 | 53 | 1963 |
| African | 55 | 46 | 67 | 54 | 1964 |
| Coloured | 66 | 50 | 70 | 62 | 578 |
| Indian | 44 | 28 | 58 | 42 | 375 |
| White | 48 | 31 | 64 | 54 | 367 |
| No schooling | 59 | 53 | 66 | 51 | 159 |
| Primary | 54 | 45 | 66 | 49 | 524 |
| Incomplete secondary | 54 | 44 | 64 | 53 | 1136 |
| Complete secondary | 60 | 45 | 70 | 60 | 973 |
| Tertiary | 47 | 39 | 70 | 53 | 472 |
| Employed | 53 | 43 | 71 | 55 | 1289 |
| Unemployed | 59 | 47 | 67 | 58 | 874 |
| Pensioner | 54 | 44 | 59 | 48 | 340 |
| Student | 54 | 42 | 67 | 56 | 338 |
| Other labour inactive | 55 | 40 | 62 | 47 | 373 |
| Poor | 58 | 51 | 68 | 56 | 898 |
| Just getting by | 54 | 41 | 65 | 51 | 1202 |
| Non-poor | 53 | 41 | 67 | 57 | 1182 |
| Poorest asset quintile | 54 | 35 | 67 | 58 | 760 |
| Quintile 2 | 56 | 48 | 67 | 57 | 718 |
| Quintile 3 | 61 | 45 | 69 | 56 | 507 |
| Quintile 4 | 55 | 46 | 71 | 54 | 530 |
| Richest asset quintile | 51 | 47 | 62 | 47 | 634 |
| Urban formal | 56 | 43 | 69 | 58 | 2022 |
| Urban informal | 56 | 54 | 70 | 59 | 305 |
| Rural traditional authority areas | 52 | 43 | 61 | 46 | 605 |
| Rural farms | 55 | 50 | 70 | 50 | 352 |
| Range of values across all social and demographic groups | 44-66% | 28-54% | 58-71% | 42-62% | … |

*Note*: The weighted percentages presented in the table above are based on combining the responses to the 'strong conflicts' and 'very strong conflicts' categories.
Source: HSRC SASAS / ISSP 2009.

**Appendix Table 4-5: Individuals subjective estimates of actual and preferred occupational earnings by race and class, 2009 (Rands and ratios)**

| | Population Group | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Black African | Coloured | Indian/ Asian | White | Black African | Coloured | Indian/ Asian | White |
| | Perceived actual monthly wage (mean, in 2009 Rands) | | | | Perceived actual monthly wage (Ratio to unskilled factory worker) | | | |
| Unskilled factory worker | 2,235 | 2,432 | 2,020 | 2,762 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Shop assistant | 2,727 | 3,112 | 2,886 | 3,716 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.3 |
| Doctor (GP) | 28,542 | 42,866 | 38,025 | 55,150 | 12.8 | 17.6 | 18.8 | 20.0 |
| Company chairperson | 35,618 | 68,613 | 54,917 | 56,718 | 15.9 | 28.2 | 27.2 | 20.5 |
| Cabinet minister | 81,078 | 102,621 | 100,467 | 106,598 | 36.3 | 42.2 | 49.7 | 38.6 |
| | Preferred ethical wage (mean, in 2009 Rands) | | | | Preferred ethical wage (Ratios) | | | |
| Unskilled factory worker | 3,174 | 3,800 | 3,935 | 3,851 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Shop assistant | 3,797 | 4,581 | 4,623 | 4,887 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| Doctor (GP) | 26,405 | 35,983 | 35,901 | 38,143 | 8.3 | 9.5 | 9.1 | 9.9 |
| Company chairperson | 34,938 | 53,755 | 44,891 | 59,747 | 11.0 | 14.1 | 11.4 | 15.5 |
| Cabinet minister | 62,635 | 62,628 | 55,976 | 65,349 | 19.7 | 16.5 | 14.2 | 17.0 |
| | Asset Index Quintiles | | | | | | | | | |
| | Richest | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Poorest | Richest | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Poorest |
| | Perceived actual monthly wage (mean, in 2009 Rands) | | | | | Perceived actual monthly wage (Ratio to unskilled factory worker) | | | | |
| Unskilled factory worker | 2,593 | 2,339 | 2,184 | 2,206 | 2,123 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Shop assistant | 3,448 | 2,836 | 2,692 | 2,740 | 2,637 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| Doctor (GP) | 48,412 | 31,140 | 27,168 | 31,700 | 28,118 | 18.7 | 13.3 | 12.4 | 14.4 | 13.2 |
| Company chairperson | 54,115 | 51,370 | 38,088 | 31,279 | 32,437 | 20.9 | 22.0 | 17.4 | 14.2 | 15.3 |
| Cabinet minister | 97,380 | 83,562 | 73,881 | 98,409 | 88,549 | 37.6 | 35.7 | 33.8 | 44.6 | 41.7 |
| | Preferred ethical wage (mean, in 2009 Rands) | | | | | Preferred ethical wage (Ratios) | | | | |
| Unskilled factory worker | 3,740 | 3,273 | 3,239 | 3,414 | 2,933 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Shop assistant | 4,615 | 4,013 | 3,902 | 4,083 | 3,457 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| Doctor (GP) | 35,675 | 30,359 | 27,779 | 25,499 | 25,237 | 9.5 | 9.3 | 8.6 | 7.5 | 8.6 |
| Company chairperson | 55,504 | 43,628 | 39,749 | 28,776 | 29,072 | 14.8 | 13.3 | 12.3 | 8.4 | 9.9 |
| Cabinet minister | 63,593 | 60,969 | 63,905 | 61,996 | 68,982 | 17.0 | 18.6 | 19.7 | 18.2 | 23.5 |

**Just earnings gap (natural logarithm) by income inequality, 2009 (n=40)**



Source: Own analysis based on International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2009 data. The Gini Index data were sourced from the World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/)

**Appendix Table 4-6: OLS Regression of preferred minimum wage amount (Rands), 2016**

| Logistic regression | Coef (β) | Std. Err. | t | P>t |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***Female*** | 704.3 | 469.5 | 1.50 | 0.134 |
| ***Age group (Ref.=16-19)*** | | | | |
| 20-24 | -2692.6 | 1453.4 | -1.85 | 0.064 |
| 25-34 | -2672.7 | 1486.1 | -1.80 | 0.072 |
| 35-49 | -2336.4 | 1471.6 | -1.59 | 0.112 |
| 50-64 | -2542.3 | 1517.8 | -1.68 | 0.094 |
| 65+ | -2549.3 | 2306.0 | -1.11 | 0.269 |
| ***Population Group (Ref=Black African)*** | | | | |
| Coloured | 790.27 | 399.9 | 1.98 | 0.048 |
| Indian | 2962.99 | 976.0 | 3.04 | 0.002 |
| White | 1145.36 | 594.4 | 1.93 | 0.054 |
| ***Educational attainment (Ref=No schooling)*** | | | | |
| Primary | 966.68 | 930.9 | 1.04 | 0.299 |
| Grades 8-11 or equivalent | 541.26 | 740.2 | 0.73 | 0.465 |
| Matric or equivalent | 964.04 | 859.0 | 1.12 | 0.262 |
| Tertiary | 2706.37 | 1562.4 | 1.73 | 0.083 |
| Other | 684.49 | 961.9 | 0.71 | 0.477 |
| ***Employment status (Ref=unemployed)*** | | | | |
| Employed | -356.9 | 408.9 | -0.87 | 0.383 |
| Pensioner | -124.9 | 1656.1 | -0.08 | 0.940 |
| Student/learner | 1495.9 | 1263.9 | 1.18 | 0.237 |
| Other labour inactive | -1068.3 | 540.8 | -1.98 | 0.048 |
| ***Self-rated poverty status (Ref=poor)*** | | | | |
| Just getting by | 1058.5 | 587.1 | 1.80 | 0.072 |
| Non-poor | 1148.7 | 641.6 | 1.79 | 0.074 |
| ***Geographic location (Ref=rural trad auth areas)*** | | | | |
| Urban formal | -2190.7 | 715.8 | -3.06 | 0.002 |
| Urban informal | -1966.6 | 833.3 | -2.36 | 0.018 |
| Rural farms | -3165.9 | 837.5 | -3.78 | 0.000 |
| Constant | 8473.8 | 1580.1 | 5.36 | 0.000 |
| No. obs | 2889 | | | |
| F( 23, 2865) | 2.48 | | | |
| Prob > F | 0.0001 | | | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.0459 | | | |

**Appendix Table 5-1: Assessing change in support for state-led redistribution, 1999-2016 (absolute percentage point differences)**

| Country | ISSP 1999-2009 | Assessment of change | ESS 2002-2016 | Assessment of change | ISSP vs ESS pattern of change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | +3.1 | Slight | +11.4 | Significant | Inconsistent |
| Bulgaria | -3.4 | Slight | +1.2 | Steady | Broadly consistent |
| Switzerland | … | … | +0.7 | Steady | No data |
| Cyprus | +10.8 | Significant | +22.5 | Significant | Fully consistent |
| Czech Republic | -7.0 | Moderate | -6.3 | Moderate | Fully consistent |
| Germany | … | … | +18.1 | Significant | No data |
| Denmark | … | … | -4.4 | Slight | No data |
| Estonia | … | … | -7.5 | Moderate | No data |
| Spain | +0.3 | Steady | +9.5 | Moderate | Inconsistent |
| Finland | … | … | -4.8 | Moderate | No data |
| France | +10.8 | Significant | -8.2 | Moderate | Broadly consistent |
| United Kingdom | -8.5 | Moderate | +3.0 | Slight | Not very consistent |
| Hungary | +4.0 | Slight | +4.0 | Slight | Fully consistent |
| Ireland | … | … | -4.7 | Moderate | No data |
| Israel | -2.8 | Steady | -8.1 | Moderate | Inconsistent |
| Latvia | +7.2 | Moderate | +7.2 | Moderate | Fully consistent |
| Netherlands | … | … | +1.8 | Steady | No data |
| Norway | -9.9 | Moderate | -9.6 | Moderate | Fully consistent |
| Poland | -6.1 | Moderate | -7.0 | Moderate | Fully consistent |
| Portugal | +2.0 | Steady | -1.9 | Steady | Fully consistent |
| Russian Federation | +2.3 | Steady | -19.8 | Significant | Inconsistent |
| Sweden | -1.5 | Steady | -4.1 | Slight | Broadly consistent |
| Slovenia | +5.9 | Moderate | +1.9 | Steady | Broadly consistent |
| Slovakia | +2.5 | Steady | -3.3 | Slight | Broadly consistent |
| South Africa | … | … | -21.1 | Significant | No data |

Sources: ISSP 1999 and 2009; ESS R1-R8; HSRC SASAS 2003-2016.
Note: The absolute percentage changes in support for government redistribution are, unless specified, for the period from 2002 to 2016 based on ESS data. The exceptions are as follows: 1999-2012: Bulgaria, Slovakia; Cyprus; 2002-2014: Denmark, Spain, Hungary, Portugal; 2004-2016: Estonia; 1999-2009: Latvia; 1999-2016: Russian Federation; South Africa. Where 1999 reference points are indicated, this refers to the ISSP 1999 round.



**Appendix Figure 5-1. Changes in levels of support for state-led redistribution by select socio-demographic attributes, 2006-2016 (average total agreement 2003-16 (%), lowest and highest values over the period, and 2016 total agreement (%), ranked from lowest to highest support based on pooled results)**




Source: HSRC SASAS 2006-2016
Note: The mean scores are based on a reversed scale, where 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree, such that higher values represent greater support for government-led redistribution. The 2006-2016 mean score is the average reported value over the 11-year period for the different social groups.

**Appendix Figure 5-2. Changes in levels of support for state-led redistribution by select socio-demographic attributes, 2006-2016 (mean scores)**

*(a) By gender*




*(b) By population group*




*(c) By educational attainment*




*(d) By employment status*




*(e) By subjective poverty status*



***(f) By type of geographic location***




Source: HSRC SASAS 2006-2016
Note: The mean scores are based on a reversed scale, where 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree, such that higher values represent greater support for government-led redistribution. The 2006-2016 mean score is the average reported value over the 11-year period for the different social groups.

**Appendix Table 6-1: Ordered logistic models of individual support for government redistribution, 2009**

| Ordered logit (Depvar=govredr) | [6] | [7] | [8] | [8b] | [9] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period effects | … | … | … | … | … |
| Cohort effects | … | … | … | … | … |
| Age effects (age in years) | -0.002 | -0.001 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Marital status (Ref=never married) | | | | | |
| Married | -0.096 | -0.090 | -0.081 | -0.074 | -0.091 |
| Widowed | -0.107 | -0.079 | -0.056 | -0.070 | -0.076 |
| Separated / divorced | -0.457** | -0.460* | -0.534** | -0.566** | -0.603** |
| Household size | -0.026* | -0.026* | -0.020 | -0.011 | -0.012 |
| Employment status (Ref=Employed full time) | | | | | |
| Employed part time | 0.041 | 0.027 | 0.092 | 0.232 | 0.254 |
| Unemployed looking for work | -0.113 | -0.152 | -0.126 | -0.057 | -0.047 |
| Unemployed not looking for work | 0.008 | -0.025 | -0.031 | 0.112 | 0.105 |
| Homemaker | 0.061 | 0.019 | 0.034 | 0.116 | 0.155 |
| Pensioner | 0.206 | 0.157 | 0.167 | 0.246 | 0.277 |
| Student/learner | 0.095 | 0.053 | 0.121 | 0.185 | 0.229 |
| Other labour inactive | -0.254 | -0.270 | -0.171 | -0.076 | -0.044 |
| Female | -0.059 | -0.082 | -0.089 | -0.073 | -0.071 |
| Education level (Ref=Primary or no schooling) | | | | | |
| Grades 8-11 or equivalent | 0.020 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.040 | 0.046 |
| Matric or equivalent | -0.002 | 0.015 | -0.002 | -0.025 | -0.019 |
| Tertiary | -0.192 | -0.142 | -0.183 | -0.179 | -0.123 |
| Population group (Ref=Black African) | | | | | |
| Coloured | -0.038 | -0.049 | -0.097 | -0.108 | 0.072 |
| Indian/Asian | -0.373 | -0.361 | -0.417 | -0.437 | -0.283 |
| White | -0.534*** | -0.584*** | -0.512*** | -0.502*** | -0.259 |
| Self-rated poverty status (Ref=upward mobility) | | | | | |
| Just getting by | -0.340*** | -0.319*** | -0.253** | -0.183 | -0.177 |
| Non-poor | -0.191 | -0.156 | -0.072 | -0.002 | -0.001 |
| Perceived group discrimination | 0.186* | 0.180* | 0.092 | 0.111 | 0.148 |
| Perceived mobility history (Ref=improved) | | | | | |
| No mobility compared to family grew up in | … | 0.182* | 0.206* | 0.241** | 0.257** |
| Downward mobility | … | 0.380*** | 0.372*** | 0.422*** | 0.419*** |
| Job prestige > father's | … | -0.042 | -0.067 | -0.074 | -0.048 |
| Perceived mobility next 5 years (Ref=improve) | | | | | |
| Stay the same | … | 0.121 | 0.158 | 0.194* | 0.213* |
| Worsen | … | 0.080 | 0.083 | 0.093 | 0.114 |
| (Uncertain) | … | 0.061 | 0.079 | 0.072 | 0.069 |
| Inequality aversion | … | ... | 0.519*** | 0.474*** | 0.507*** |
| Perceived class conflict (index of 4 items) | … | ... | 0.157*** | 0.205*** | 0.208*** |
| Perceived societal position | … | ... | 0.016 | 0.020 | 0.019 |
| Getting ahead: self-determined factors (merit) | … | ... | ... | 0.293*** | 0.297*** |
| Getting ahead: exogenous factors index (chance) | … | ... | ... | 0.195*** | 0.186*** |
| Getting ahead: importance of a person's race | … | ... | ... | -0.089** | -0.088** |
| Party identification (Ref=DA) | | | | | |
| ANC | … | ... | ... | … | 0.595*** |
| Other party | … | ... | ... | … | 0.608** |
| No party | … | ... | ... | … | 0.300 |
| Undeclared | … | ... | ... | … | 0.548** |
| ***Left-right ideology (Ref=conservative)*** | | | | | |
| Liberal | … | ... | ... | ... | 0.421*** |
| Moderate | … | ... | ... | ... | 0.273* |
| Uncertain | … | ... | ... | ... | 0.579*** |
| Controls for province and geographic type | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| /cut1 | -4.559 | -4.284 | -1.586 | 0.300 | 1.404 |
| /cut2 | -2.764 | -2.486 | 0.231 | 2.068 | 3.184 |
| /cut3 | -1.887 | -1.606 | 1.133 | 2.945 | 4.067 |
| /cut4 | 0.088 | 0.378 | 3.212 | 5.093 | 6.231 |
| No. obs | 3231 | 3223 | 3220.00 | 3036 | 3024 |
| LR chi2 | 149.51 | 158.69 | 352.32 | 386.20 | 403.77 |
| Prob > chi2 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.000 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.0168 | 0.0179 | 0.0398 | 0.0464 | 0.0487 |
| Log likelihood | -4366.59 | -4353.17 | -4251.76 | -3964.73 | -3942.07 |

**Appendix Table 6-2: Summary of the influence of racial attitudes on individual support for government redistribution based on separate ordered logistic models for each population group, 2010-2016**

| | Black African Coef. | Coloured Coef. | Indian Coef. | White Coef. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **MODEL 1** | | | | |
| Prejudice towards the out-group (0=low; 10=high) | 0.047*** | 0.042 | 0.063 | -0.002 |
| Views towards the in-group (0= positive; 10=negative) | -0.010 | -0.047 | -0.091** | -0.032 |
| **MODEL 2** | | | | |
| Perceived racial threat (1=low; 5=high threat) | 0.302*** | 0.278*** | 0.216*** | 0.183*** |
| **MODEL 3** | | | | |
| Frequency of racial discrimination (1=none; 4=always) | 0.152*** | 0.115* | 0.082 | 0.036 |
| **MODEL 4** | | | | |
| Racial distrust (1=low; 5=high) | 0.163*** | 0.077* | 0.069 | 0.261*** |
| **MODEL 5** | | | | |
| Racial contact (1=none; 5=high) | -0.254*** | 0.068 | 0.067 | -0.068 |
| Quality of racial contact (1=negative; 5=positive) | 0.020 | 0.097* | 0.182** | 0.158** |
| **MODEL 6** | | | | |
| Importance of belonging to one's race group (1-5) | 0.273*** | 0.125** | 0.126* | -0.035 |
| Ashamed of race group (1=strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree) | -0.108*** | -0.194*** | -0.224*** | 0.006 |
| Attachment to people of same race (1-5) | 0.152*** | -0.101* | 0.139* | 0.223*** |
| **MODEL 7** | | | | |
| Prejudice towards the out-group (0=low; 10=high) | 0.009 | 0.069 | 0.015 | -0.026 |
| Views towards the in-group (0= positive; 10=negative) | -0.004 | -0.057* | -0.020 | -0.012 |
| Perceived racial threat (1=low; 5=high threat) | 0.225*** | 0.442*** | 0.204* | 0.093 |
| Frequency of racial discrimination (1=none; 4=always) | 0.110*** | -0.070 | -0.035 | -0.019 |
| Racial distrust (1=low; 5=high) | 0.027 | -0.031 | -0.023 | 0.248*** |
| Racial contact (1=none; 5=high) | -0.231*** | 0.019 | 0.039 | -0.032 |
| Quality of racial contact (1=negative; 5=positive) | 0.017 | 0.174** | 0.168* | 0.212** |
| Importance of belonging to one's race group (1-5) | 0.265*** | 0.220*** | 0.305*** | -0.101 |
| Ashamed of race group (1=strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree) | -0.042* | -0.016 | -0.077 | 0.050 |
| Attachment to people of same race (1-5) | 0.172*** | -0.102 | 0.304*** | 0.112 |
| **MODEL 8** | | | | |
| Prejudice towards the out-group (0=low; 10=high) | 0.007 | 0.029 | -0.011 | 0.010 |
| Views towards the in-group (0= positive; 10=negative) | -0.002 | -0.043 | 0.005 | -0.008 |
| Perceived racial threat (1=low; 5=high threat) | 0.205*** | 0.354*** | 0.234** | 0.124 |
| Frequency of racial discrimination (1=none; 4=always) | 0.077* | -0.043 | 0.013 | -0.083 |
| Racial distrust (1=low; 5=high) | 0.002 | 0.022 | -0.080 | 0.168** |
| Racial contact (1=none; 5=high) | -0.214*** | -0.008 | 0.041 | 0.033 |
| Quality of racial contact (1=negative; 5=positive) | 0.014 | 0.172* | 0.058 | 0.126 |
| Importance of belonging to one's race group (1-5) | 0.210*** | 0.248*** | 0.305*** | -0.149** |
| Ashamed of race group (1=strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree) | -0.028 | 0.048 | -0.063 | 0.023 |
| Attachment to people of same race (1-5) | 0.145*** | -0.106 | 0.253** | 0.028 |

Note: The model numbers in the table above correspond to the same as those presented in Table 20. All variables included in the earlier models were included in the separate population group models, though the coefficients for these other measures are not presented here. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001.

Source: HSRC SASAS 2010-2016.

**Appendix Figure 7-1: Support for race-preferential and class-based redress 2003-2016, by population group and year (% favouring policy option)**

## (A) RACIAL REDRESS MEASURES









## (B) CLASS-BASED REDRESS MEASURES







Tertiary education opportunities for poor
100
80
60
40
20
0
2009 (% agree)
Black African
Coloured
Indian
White


Increased spending on social grants
100
80
60
40
20
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Black African
Coloured
Indian
White


Universal basic income (UBI)
100
80
60
40
20
0
2016
Black African
Coloured
Indian
White


Progressive taxation
100
80
60
40
20
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Black African
Coloured
Indian
White


Increased spending on healthcare
100
80
60
40
20
0
2006
2016
Black African
Coloured
Indian
White


Increased spending on education
100
80
60
40
20
0
2006
2016
Black African
Coloured
Indian
White


Increased spending on old age pensions
100
80
60
40
20
0
2006
2016
Black African
Coloured
Indian
White


Increased spending on unemployment benefits
100
80
60
40
20
0
2006
2016
Black African
Coloured
Indian
White

**Appendix Figure 7-2: Support for race-preferential and class-based redress 2003-2016, by subjective poverty status and year (% favouring policy)**

## (A) RACIAL REDRESS MEASURES




## (B) CLASS-BASED REDRESS MEASURES


Decent living standard for unemployed
100
80
60
40
20
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Poor
Just getting by
Non-poor
Class-based school integration
100
80
60
40
20
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Poor
Just getting by
Non-poor
Tertiary opportunties for poor
100
80
60
40
20
0
2009 (% agree)
Poor
Just getting by
Non-poor
Continued provision of social grants
100
80
60
40
20
0
2016 (% agree)
Poor
Just getting by
Non-poor
Increased spending on social grants
100
80
60
40
20
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Poor
Just getting by
Non-poor
Universal basic income
100
80
60
40
20
0
2016 (% agree)
Poor
Just getting by
Non-poor


Progressive taxation
100
80
60
40
20
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Poor
Just getting by
Non-poor


Increased spending on healthcare
100
80
60
40
20
0
2006
2016
Poor
Just getting by
Non-poor


Increased spending on education
100
80
60
40
20
0
2006
2016
Poor
Just getting by
Non-poor


Increased spending on pensions
100
80
60
40
20
0
2006
2016
Poor
Just getting by
Non-poor


Increased spending unemployed
100
80
60
40
20
0
2006
2016
Poor
Just getting by
Non-poor

**Appendix Table 7.1: Ordered logistic models of individual opposition to race-preferential redress measures, 2009**

| Ordered logit (Depvar=govredr) | [6] | [7] | [8] | [8b] | [9] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period effects | … | … | … | … | … |
| Cohort effects | … | … | … | … | … |
| Age effects (age in years) | -0.002 | -0.001 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Marital status (Ref=never married) | | | | | |
| Married | -0.096 | -0.090 | -0.081 | -0.074 | -0.091 |
| Widowed | -0.107 | -0.079 | -0.056 | -0.070 | -0.076 |
| Separated / divorced | -0.457** | -0.460* | -0.534** | -0.566** | -0.603** |
| Household size | -0.026* | -0.026* | -0.020 | -0.011 | -0.012 |
| Employment status (Ref=Employed full time) | | | | | |
| Employed part time | 0.041 | 0.027 | 0.092 | 0.232 | 0.254 |
| Unemployed looking for work | -0.113 | -0.152 | -0.126 | -0.057 | -0.047 |
| Unemployed not looking for work | 0.008 | -0.025 | -0.031 | 0.112 | 0.105 |
| Homemaker | 0.061 | 0.019 | 0.034 | 0.116 | 0.155 |
| Pensioner | 0.206 | 0.157 | 0.167 | 0.246 | 0.277 |
| Student/learner | 0.095 | 0.053 | 0.121 | 0.185 | 0.229 |
| Other labour inactive | -0.254 | -0.270 | -0.171 | -0.076 | -0.044 |
| Female | -0.059 | -0.082 | -0.089 | -0.073 | -0.071 |
| Education level (Ref=Primary or no schooling) | | | | | |
| Grades 8-11 or equivalent | 0.020 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.040 | 0.046 |
| Matric or equivalent | -0.002 | 0.015 | -0.002 | -0.025 | -0.019 |
| Tertiary | -0.192 | -0.142 | -0.183 | -0.179 | -0.123 |
| Population group (Ref=Black African) | | | | | |
| Coloured | -0.038 | -0.049 | -0.097 | -0.108 | 0.072 |
| Indian/Asian | -0.373 | -0.361 | -0.417 | -0.437 | -0.283 |
| White | -0.534*** | -0.584*** | -0.512*** | -0.502*** | -0.259 |
| Self-rated poverty status (Ref=upward mobility) | | | | | |
| Just getting by | -0.340*** | -0.319*** | -0.253** | -0.183 | -0.177 |
| Non-poor | -0.191 | -0.156 | -0.072 | -0.002 | -0.001 |
| Perceived group discrimination | 0.186* | 0.180* | 0.092 | 0.111 | 0.148 |
| Perceived mobility history (Ref=improved) | | | | | |
| No mobility compared to family grew up in | … | 0.182* | 0.206* | 0.241** | 0.257** |
| Downward mobility | … | 0.380*** | 0.372*** | 0.422*** | 0.419*** |
| Job prestige > father's | … | -0.042 | -0.067 | -0.074 | -0.048 |
| Perceived mobility next 5 years (Ref=improve) | | | | | |
| Stay the same | … | 0.121 | 0.158 | 0.194* | 0.213* |
| Worsen | … | 0.080 | 0.083 | 0.093 | 0.114 |
| (Uncertain) | … | 0.061 | 0.079 | 0.072 | 0.069 |
| Inequality aversion | … | ... | 0.519*** | 0.474*** | 0.507*** |
| Perceived class conflict (index of 4 items) | … | ... | 0.157*** | 0.205*** | 0.208*** |
| Perceived societal position | … | ... | 0.016 | 0.020 | 0.019 |
| Getting ahead: self-determined factors (merit) | … | ... | ... | 0.293*** | 0.297*** |
| Getting ahead: exogenous factors index (chance) | … | ... | ... | 0.195*** | 0.186*** |
| Getting ahead: importance of a person's race | … | ... | ... | -0.089** | -0.088** |
| Party identification (Ref=DA) | | | | | |
| ANC | … | ... | ... | … | 0.595*** |
| Other party | … | ... | ... | … | 0.608** |
| No party | … | ... | ... | … | 0.300 |
| Undeclared | … | ... | ... | … | 0.548** |
| ***Left-right ideology (Ref=conservative)*** | | | | | |
| Liberal | … | ... | ... | ... | 0.421*** |
| Moderate | … | ... | ... | ... | 0.273* |
| Uncertain | … | ... | ... | ... | 0.579*** |
| Controls for province and geographic type | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| /cut1 | -4.559 | -4.284 | -1.586 | 0.300 | 1.404 |
| /cut2 | -2.764 | -2.486 | 0.231 | 2.068 | 3.184 |
| /cut3 | -1.887 | -1.606 | 1.133 | 2.945 | 4.067 |
| /cut4 | 0.088 | 0.378 | 3.212 | 5.093 | 6.231 |
| No. obs | 3231 | 3223 | 3220.00 | 3036 | 3024 |
| LR chi2 | 149.51 | 158.69 | 352.32 | 386.20 | 403.77 |
| Prob > chi2 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.000 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.0168 | 0.0179 | 0.0398 | 0.0464 | 0.0487 |
| Log likelihood | -4366.59 | -4353.17 | -4251.76 | -3964.73 | -3942.07 |

**Appendix Table 7-2: Summary of the influence of racial attitudes on individual opposition to race-preferential redress measures based on separate ordered logistic models for each population group, 2010-2016**

| | Black African Coef. | Coloured Coef. | Indian Coef. | White Coef. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **MODEL 1** | | | | |
| Prejudice towards the out-group (0=low; 10=high) | -0.056*** | -0.064* | -0.006 | 0.075** |
| Views towards the in-group (0= positive; 10=negative) | 0.033*** | -0.070** | -0.024 | -0.045* |
| **MODEL 2** | | | | |
| Perceived racial threat (1=low; 5=high threat) | -0.506*** | -0.240*** | 0.184*** | 0.483*** |
| **MODEL 3** | | | | |
| Frequency of racial discrimination (1=none; 4=always) | -0.149*** | 0.186*** | 0.280*** | 0.866*** |
| **MODEL 4** | | | | |
| Racial distrust (1=low; 5=high) | -0.215*** | -0.259*** | 0.029 | 0.015 |
| **MODEL 5** | | | | |
| Racial contact (1=none; 5=high) | 0.070** | 0.148** | -0.044 | -0.147** |
| Quality of racial contact (1=negative; 5=positive) | -0.008 | 0.043 | -0.066 | 0.052 |
| **MODEL 6** | | | | |
| Importance of belonging to one's race group (1-5) | -0.308*** | -0.022 | 0.195*** | 0.149*** |
| Ashamed of race group (1=strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree) | 0.079*** | 0.007 | 0.136*** | 0.209*** |
| Attachment to people of same race (1-5) | -0.239*** | -0.336*** | -0.148** | 0.051 |
| **MODEL 7** | | | | |
| Prejudice towards the out-group (0=low; 10=high) | -0.036*** | -0.009 | 0.008 | 0.056 |
| Views towards the in-group (0= positive; 10=negative) | 0.029** | -0.082** | -0.002 | -0.024 |
| Perceived racial threat (1=low; 5=high threat) | -0.410*** | -0.324*** | 0.082 | 0.171* |
| Frequency of racial discrimination (1=none; 4=always) | -0.033 | 0.377*** | 0.468*** | 0.854*** |
| Racial distrust (1=low; 5=high) | -0.086*** | -0.136** | -0.020 | -0.241*** |
| Racial contact (1=none; 5=high) | 0.089** | 0.005 | -0.007 | -0.125* |
| Quality of racial contact (1=negative; 5=positive) | -0.064** | 0.003 | -0.049 | 0.179** |
| Importance of belonging to one's race group (1-5) | -0.265*** | 0.042 | 0.044 | 0.016 |
| Ashamed of race group (1=strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree) | 0.004 | 0.016 | 0.179*** | 0.235*** |
| Attachment to people of same race (1-5) | -0.209*** | -0.308*** | -0.091 | 0.064 |
| **MODEL 8** | | | | |
| Prejudice towards the out-group (0=low; 10=high) | -0.035** | -0.001 | -0.013 | 0.054 |
| Views towards the in-group (0= positive; 10=negative) | 0.029** | -0.073** | 0.027 | -0.034 |
| Perceived racial threat (1=low; 5=high threat) | -0.395*** | -0.227** | 0.214** | 0.120 |
| Frequency of racial discrimination (1=none; 4=always) | -0.011 | 0.310*** | 0.396*** | 0.808*** |
| Racial distrust (1=low; 5=high) | -0.075** | -0.131* | -0.077 | -0.195** |
| Racial contact (1=none; 5=high) | 0.057* | 0.028 | 0.000 | -0.083 |
| Quality of racial contact (1=negative; 5=positive) | -0.058** | -0.025 | -0.081 | 0.185** |
| Importance of belonging to one's race group (1-5) | -0.207*** | 0.065 | 0.184** | -0.016 |
| Ashamed of race group (1=strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree) | -0.005 | 0.007 | 0.158** | 0.246*** |
| Attachment to people of same race (1-5) | -0.178*** | -0.312*** | 0.076 | 0.057 |

Note: The model numbers in the table above correspond to the same as those presented in Table 20. All variables included in the earlier models were included in the separate population group models, though the coefficients for these other measures are not presented here. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001.

Source: HSRC SASAS 2010-2016.

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