

**THE POLITICS OF PEACEKEEPING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA:
*A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S
ENGAGEMENT IN REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES.***

THESIS

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NEVER IN ANY CASE IS THOUGHT DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH PRACTICE. ITS BUSINESS IS THEORY, AND THE CONFLICTS THAT IT CAN SETTLE ARE THEORETICAL CONFLICTS ONLY. BUT SINCE WE CAN REACH NO END WHATEVER WITHOUT TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE NATURE OF THINGS, AND THOUGHT ALONE CAN TELL US WHAT THE NATURE OF THINGS IS LIKE, WE MUST CALL IT INTO SERVICE CONTINUALLY, REGARDLESS OF WHAT WE ARE SEEKING (BLANSHARD).

DEDICATED TO MY MOTHER, 'MANTSOILI KHOBOTLO

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ABSTRACT

International peacekeeping has gained a high profile in international relations and more so, in the post cold war era. The profound increase in the occurrence of civil wars globally and the consequent high demand for the UN to intervene has compelled the world body to delegate its peacekeeping powers to regional organisations. SADC is one of many regional organisations around the world which are faced with the challenge of developing peacekeeping capacities to resolve local conflicts.

This thesis endeavours to investigate the prospects of peacekeeping in Southern Africa with specific reference to the involvement of South Africa as a regional power with the wherewithal to play a leadership role in this regard. This is done within the theoretical framework that is provided by the Realist school of thought in international relations. Furthermore, the concept of national interest as defined by Realism will be utilised to explain why countries in Southern Africa in general and South Africa in particular become involved in regional peacekeeping initiatives. The issue of whether the Republic should be involved and how much it should be involved has provoked an intense debate within the country. This debate will therefore be instructive in understanding the dynamics that influence the country's foreign policy behaviour towards the region in relation to playing a leadership role in regional peacekeeping initiatives.

The central issue implicit in the debate is the fact that most of the SADC member states that are expected to contribute towards these initiatives have weak economies. This economic weakness in turn leads to the thorny issue of having to seek foreign assistance from western countries from which the region is trying to gain greater independence. This presents the region with a paradox because foreign assistance has serious implications for the SADC countries' sovereignty. It is in this context therefore, that this thesis examines economic development in individual SADC countries and in the region as a whole to establish whether they are in a position to develop a sustainable regional peacekeeping capacity. The contention of the thesis is that economic development is closely related to peacekeeping because without a sound economic base Southern Africa or any other region for that matter, will not be able to develop a viable peacekeeping capacity. On the other hand, keeping the peace in the region is itself important for economic development because it is only in a peaceful environment that economic development can take root.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The end of the cold war and the subsequent introduction of democracy in South Africa after many years of apartheid changed the political thinking in Southern Africa as a whole. The former Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) member countries abandoned their old policy of isolation towards Pretoria, and embraced the Republic into the regional fold. This was underpinned by the move to transform SADCC into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992 as South Africa was preparing for its first multiracial elections. SADC differs from its predecessor in that it goes beyond just economic co-operation to a higher level of economic integration and security co-operation in the region.

Political changes in South Africa also brought an end to cross-border military confrontations between Pretoria and its neighbours, thereby bringing all countries in the region together in a way never seen before. However, this does not mean that the region is now going to live in complete bliss. Instead it has awakened SADC to internal problems within individual countries which could be a threat to regional security. It has also helped the region come to terms with the economic and security needs of the post apartheid and post cold war era such as the need to strengthen regional ties through economic development and the development of a regional peacekeeping capacity to deal with threats to regional peace and security. The profound increase in the frequency of civil wars throughout the world and the resultant need for the United Nations (UN) to intervene, have

compelled the world body to call upon regional organisations to assist in preserving world peace by resolving local conflicts before they become a threat to international peace. Hence the emergence of regional peacekeeping initiatives in the SADC region and many other regions throughout the world.

1.1 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION: PEACEKEEPING, PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND PEACE-ENFORCEMENT

Peace support operations entail a range of activities including peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy and peace-enforcement. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and the distinctions between them are often unclear (Cilliers et al, 1995). As Goulding points out, peacekeeping as a conflict management technique has been developed mainly by the UN to help manage and resolve armed conflicts among nations. Nevertheless, the UN does not have an established definition of peacekeeping (1993: 452). The International Peacekeeping Academy defines peacekeeping as, “The prevention, containment, moderation or termination of hostilities between states through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organised and directed internationally using multilateral forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain order” (Mackinelay, 1989:1).

International peacekeeping can usefully be understood in two categories, namely traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping. Under traditional peacekeeping, operations of unarmed or lightly armed forces are stationed between warring factions to police cease-fires while political settlements are negotiated. Multidimensional peacekeeping on the other hand goes beyond the policing and

monitoring of buffer zones to include such activities as post war state-building, organising and monitoring elections (Doyle et al. 1997).

The distinction between peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations is clear in theory but it has proven difficult to maintain in practice. Peacekeepers have fallen into the trap of shifting from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement on a number of occasions. Somalia, Liberia and Bosnia are just a few such cases. As Thakur argues, once peacekeepers take sides in a conflict they lose their political usefulness as mechanisms of confidence building between warring factions (1987).

Preventive deployment normally consists of civilians and/or military forces being deployed to avert a crisis. Preventive diplomacy is diplomacy which is specifically directed towards conflict resolution (Pahad, 1995: 58). For preventive diplomacy to be effective an elaborate early warning system and confidence building measures need to be in place. Following from this, preventive deployment of observers and/or peacekeeping troops may be necessary in some cases to support diplomatic initiatives.

Peace-enforcement involves using military means to restore peace in an area of conflict. A peace-enforcement operation does not require consent from a host state because it is an act of war (Utunnu, 1995). Peace-enforcement operations range from low-level military missions to protect buffer zones, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance among other things, to full fledged enforcement action to roll back aggression (Doyle, 1997). The US and allies' intervention in the Korean war of 1950 on the side of South Korea, and the intervention in the Kuwait-Iraqi war of 1990 under the auspices of

the UN are cases in point.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the prospects of peacekeeping in Southern Africa, with specific reference to South Africa's involvement in these initiatives. The wisdom of a decision to be involved despite a great demand on the new democracy to address socio-economic disparities between the traditionally disadvantaged and advantaged sectors of the population which were caused by apartheid, will be critically discussed. The clash between this demand and the need to be involved in regional peacekeeping initiatives has triggered a fierce debate between those who resent greater involvement and those who advocate it. Should the country establish a middle path between the two extremes or should it choose between them? This is a very important debate because it is instrumental in shaping the Republic's foreign policy towards the region in this respect. This debate will therefore be used to provide insights into the reasons for the country's engagement.

What is implicit in the debate is the fear that South Africa might have to carry the peacekeeping burden by itself because most of the countries in the region have weak economies. For example, Mozambique, Tanzania, Malawi and Lesotho are some of the poorest countries in the world with GNP per capita of US\$80, US\$100, US\$220 and US\$660 respectively (Mcgowan, 1997). This, inter alia, is the problem that has provoked the "minimalist" response to the Republic's involvement in regional peacekeeping initiatives.

This investigation does not in any way suggest that Southern Africa is about to explode into a war, but rather that it is important for the region to be in a position to tackle such problems when they

arise, especially given the recent history of turbulence which was orchestrated by the former apartheid regime through its policies of destabilisation. The possibility of the region being invaded from outside is very remote. As Nathan observes, what seems to be a real threat to regional peace and security is national instabilities within the SADC member states, and such non-military sources of insecurity as illegal cross-border migration, small arms proliferation and drug trafficking (1995).

Paradigms provide a theoretical framework within which questions are asked and for the conceptualisation of the world from different perspectives. This thesis is conducted within a theoretical framework which is provided by the Realist theory of international relations. It will argue that despite criticisms, Realism is still a very important paradigm in understanding the foreign policy behaviour of countries towards each other and towards the international environment as a whole. The thesis also contends that the Realist paradigm is still relevant in the contemporary world despite the counter argument that economic interdependence, increased co-operation between countries, and the new expanded approach to security refute the assumptions upon which its conceptualisation of the international system is based.

With the elevation of non-military threats to peace and security to greater importance globally, and more so in the post cold war era, analyses of state security are increasingly shifting their focus away from military to non-military threats to peace and security. This shift covers all those aspects of security which Realism has been criticised for neglecting as will be shown in greater detail in the thesis. The basic reasons for countries throughout the world, and in Southern Africa in particular to co-operate will be examined with a view to explaining the importance of the notion of national

interest in this regard. In whose interest is the pursuit of national interests? Nation-states are involved in a continual struggle to satisfy their national societies. This in itself is an indication that, much as some states falter when it comes to serving the national society, it is, nevertheless the fundamental duty of the state to pursue this goal. All countries in Southern Africa acknowledge this fact by accepting that threats to national peace and security are multifaceted and have to be dealt with as such.

Chapter two spells out the theoretical framework of the thesis by looking at Realism, criticisms levelled against it and how its proponents have responded. The chapter also looks at how the concept of national interest as defined by Realism can be used to analyse the foreign policy behaviour of countries in the Southern African region. Specific reference will be made to the South African foreign policy behaviour towards the region with regard to the country's involvement in regional peacekeeping initiatives. The ongoing "minimalist-maximalist" debate within South Africa will be instructive in determining whether the country's interests in Southern Africa are so important as to warrant involvement in the region. The traditional conceptualisation of security and its relevance to contemporary realities will be examined. Furthermore, the Hegemonic Stability Theory and its relevance to the Southern African situation, given the Republic's overwhelming economic and military power relative to other countries in the region will also be taken into consideration.

The third chapter discusses the prospects of Southern Africa developing a viable peacekeeping capacity, firstly by looking at the historical background against which the region is attempting to achieve unity in economic and security concerns. The history of peacekeeping in Africa by the UN,

the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and sub-regional organisations such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) will be analysed with a view to providing a broad framework within which SADC can develop its peacekeeping initiatives. Moreover, South Africa's economic and security interests in the Southern African region which compel it to be involved in these initiatives will also be taken into account in great detail. Finally, the chapter examines the problems which relate to financing peacekeeping initiatives and the need for foreign assistance on the one hand, and its implications for the independence of SADC countries with regard to decision-making on deployment of peacekeeping forces on the other hand.

As the issues in chapter three suggest, the fact that most countries in the region have weak economies is most certainly an impediment to the development of a viable peacekeeping capacity. It is essential to examine the steps that individual SADC member states and the organisation as a whole are taking towards regional economic development, and the implications of development or lack of it for regional peacekeeping initiatives. Chapter four looks at this issue together with the problem of security in Southern Africa and how the state has incorporated the notion of security of individual citizens into its conceptualisation of national security. The questions which relate to the role of the state in development and whether there is a strong developmental state in the region are also taken into account. Furthermore, the chapter discusses SADC's Sectoral Coordination Unit system of development with a view to establishing whether this is the best route to regional economic development upon which a viable peacekeeping capacity can be built.

The contention of this thesis is that it is of crucial importance for the SADC countries to develop an

independent peacekeeping capacity in order to be able to tackle conflicts which could otherwise threaten regional peace and security, and thereby hamper economic development. It is equally important for South Africa as a regional hegemon to commit itself to this course, for without its full commitment the other SADC member states do not have the wherewithal to develop a sustainable peacekeeping capacity. The thesis also argues that the state is still very important as a guarantor of individual citizens' security and national security in general. Hence the use of the Realist paradigm as a theoretical framework for analysis.

CHAPTER TWO

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Both Realism and the Theory of Hegemonic Stability consider national interest an important factor in foreign policy analysis. Countries in the region have formed regional organisations through which they pursue common interests in an organised form. The tension between national and regional interests provide insights into the problems that confront the region with regard to developing a comprehensive regional security regime.

Scholars such as J. Rosenau have proposed a distinction between the use of national interest for the purpose of political analysis and that of political action. He argues that "...as an analytic tool national interest is employed to describe, explain, or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a nation's foreign policy. As an instrument of political action, it serves as a means of justifying, denouncing or proposing policies" (1968: 34). However, he goes further to point out that there is no clear-cut distinction between the two uses because they both refer to what is best for the national society.

The prominence of Realism in the analysis of the foreign policy behaviour of countries can be traced as far back as the period of the Greek city states of Sparta and Athens. It has prevailed through the changes and developments that the international system has gone through ever since. As Morgenthau

observes, Realism defines national interest in terms of power capabilities and influence in international relations. It assumes that these interests and the power to achieve them provide national discipline in action, and create continuity in foreign policy (1966). There is a form of “society” in international relations despite the lack of central government. This is underpinned by the fact that countries respect each others’ interests. In Morgenthau's words,

If we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests, we are able to do justice to all of them. And we are able to judge them in a dual sense; we are able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, having judged them in this fashion, we are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own (1966: 10).

According to Realism national interest is the main driving force behind foreign policy decisions. Thus, decision makers have to take it into account in order to make rational foreign policies. The concept of national interest is also useful as an academic tool for understanding the behaviour of nation states in international relations.

Realism has been challenged from many fronts and has been dismissed by some schools of thought as obsolete and irrelevant in the contemporary international system which is characterised by technological transformation, complex economic interdependence and co-operation among countries. “Scholars have offered trenchant criticisms of the Realist tradition ... challenging the assumptions and world views upon which it is based” (Holsti, 1985: 1). The purpose of using national interest as defined by Realism in this thesis is to show that, criticisms notwithstanding, Realism is still a very important paradigm for analysing the foreign policy behaviour of nation states in international politics. Furthermore, this thesis will argue that contrary to the purported shift of focus away from

the state as the key referent of security, the new security agenda can still be understood within the Realist paradigm.

2.2 REALISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In its most basic outline, the Realist picture of the world begins with a pessimistic view of human nature. Realists assume that “evil is inevitably a part of all of us which no social arrangement can eradicate: men and women are not perfectible” (Smith, 1986: 1). Realism places heavy emphasis on the state as the primary actor in international relations because no structure of power or authority stands above it to mediate conflicts. The international system is perceived as anarchic because of the absence of an order-enforcing power, and this, Realism assumes, leads countries to define their interests in terms of their power relative to others, and fear for their security (Smith, 1986). As Solomon points out, Realism’s central proposition is that the acquisition of power is proper, rational and an inevitable goal of foreign policy (1996: 3). Thus, states pursue foreign policies which maximise their interests in relation to their power capabilities. However, the national interests of different countries clash at times. In such cases the interests of a more powerful country will prevail because it has the power to influence the behaviour of others without necessarily becoming involved in a physical confrontation. The United States’ cancellation of Egypt’s US \$7 billion arms debt in exchange for its co-operation with the coalition fighting Iraq in the Gulf war in 1990 is a good example of this (Hey, 1995).

Realism acknowledges the anarchic nature of the international system, and proposes the balance of power system as a technique to keep conflict under control. Balance of power is a system in which stability and order are brought about by the manipulation of alliances between states (Solomon, 1996: 4). This system has a deterrent effect on possible aggressors, and thus, prevents or at least minimises the occurrence of conflict in international relations.

Following from the assumption that the international environment is anarchic, Realists argue that international conditions compel states to defend their interests because, as Forde notes, no power prevents a resort to arms whenever states find it advantageous, and no power protects the victims of aggression except the victims themselves (1993: 63). In the Realist view the state has responsibility over people under its care. This interpretation firmly establishes the state as the object of security in international relations.

Classical Realism defines security in political and military terms because it maintains that the survival of the state in the hostile, anarchic international environment is the most important thing in international relations. Hobbes argues that the fact that the international system may be at peace at times does not make any difference because international harmony may be broken at any time and thereby threaten the existence of those countries which continue to behave morally. It is due to these conditions therefore, that Realists believe that countries are forced to conquer other countries in self-defence. As Machiavelli writes:

Though war may seem remote at any given moment, it is inevitable because threats are always forming on the horizon. A state faces only two choices: fighting at its own initiative or awaiting attack at a moment favoured by the opponent (1952: 43).

This is the only way for classical Realists in which states can respond rationally to the hostile international environment.

2.3 CRITIQUE OF REALISM

The critics of Realism have argued that the Realists' interpretation of the dynamics of the international system is too state-centric and therefore obsolete as an explanation for developments in world politics. For example, Post-modernism maintains that "Realism has increasingly become irrelevant to policy-makers and ordinary people" (Hussein, 1996: 6). Pluralists support this perception by pointing to the fast-growing importance of non-state actors as players in world politics, contrary to the Realist conceptualisation of nation states as the only major players in international relations. Indeed, some transnational corporations such as BP, Coca Cola and car companies among others are more powerful than many states in financial terms and negotiating capabilities, and thus in influence, in the international arena.

This is a direct challenge to the Realist assumption that states are the only major players in international relations. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, Pluralists agree that contrary to the Realist perception of the international environment as anarchic and dangerous, the system is characterised by a complicated web of relationships between states, transnational corporations and other international non-governmental organisations. In their view the system is far more complicated than the Realists portray it as being. Following from the interconnectedness of the international system, they point out that instead of anarchy and strife for survival, the system is characterised by interdependence between various actors, and this encourages co-operation between them (Viotti,

1993).

The Realist notion of the state as the object of security has also come under attack. The critics argue that the Realists' conception of security is too narrow and thus leaves important aspects of the international system out in favour of a state-centric and politico-military based definition of security. For instance, according to Realism the state is a mechanism through which people can achieve security against social threats. However, as Buzan observes, "the paradox is that the state also becomes a source of social threat against the individual" (1983: 20). In an attempt to address the paradox some scholars such as Booth (1994) have argued that security has to be "emancipated" from the state in order for people to be secure from threats that originate from the state.

This paradox has led to the expansion of the security agenda from the traditional definition which perceives military threats to national security as more important than non-military threats. The expanded security agenda includes social, economic, political, environmental and military threats to security as will be shown in detail in the following pages. This agenda puts greater emphasis on the fact that the transnational nature of problems that cause insecurity necessitates co-operation between states in world politics.

As Van Aardt points out, changing conditions and circumstances in international relations influence the content given to the notion of security (1993). In Southern Africa the ending of the cold war and the apartheid system have resulted in the elevation of non-military threats to peace and security to a higher political profile. Nathan et al. observe that many of the domestic threats to the countries of the region are political, social and economic rather than military in character (1995: 5). Problems

such as small arms proliferation, drug-trafficking and illegal immigrants are shared in that they go beyond national borders, thus, though they may originate in one country, they undermine the security of neighbouring countries, and thereby impinge upon the security of the region as a whole.

However, there is a fundamental problem in the relationship between individual security, national security and regional security. Regional security in Southern Africa is addressed within the context of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as a regional organisation. The question is whether SADC as an inter-governmental body can provide individual security. "Can the region play a part in maintaining individual security, or does the state play this role?" (Van Aardt, 1993: 23). This is an important question especially to those who argue that the state should be ruled out as a referent of security in favour of the individual.

These developments have influenced the way in which countries in Southern Africa perceive national as well as regional security in the new dispensation. These countries acknowledge the importance of looking at regional security, through fresh eyes in Southern Africa, because "...changing times have opened promising avenues for attending to the region's immediate and future security needs" (Vale et al, 1995: 281). For the first time all countries in the region agree that regional security involves the promotion of peace, not through the accumulation of weaponry and the primacy of deterrence, but through reciprocity and restraint based on a shared sense of security interdependence (Booth, 1994: 15).

On the question of the paradox between the state and the individual as independent referents of security, Realists defend their position by showing that the state is the lesser of the two evils because

it assumes that whatever threats come from the state will be of a lower order of magnitude than those which would arise in its absence (Buzan, 1983: 20). The total collapse of the state in Somalia in 1994 and the subsequent chaos and insecurity which confronted the Somali people is a case in point. It is well and good to say that people are the referents of security, but the state also has to be given credit in this regard because in the contemporary world, it remains responsible for the security of 'human collectivities' (to borrow Van Aardt's phrase) security in the ultimate analysis. And if the state is to provide and maintain security it has to be secure itself. In Van Aardt's words "It has to be a strong state in the sense that it exhibits a strong measure of socio-political cohesion" (1993: 24). It is true that non-state actors have become international players to be reckoned with, but they still need the state's protection. For example, transnational corporations need a stable and secure environment within which to operate, and this can only be provided by the state because of its authority and command over the instruments of force.

2.4 REALISM REDEFINED

A more subtle criticism of Realism is that the paradigm falls short of explaining the dynamics of global interactions characterised by complex interdependence because it concentrates on states as individual actors. In this way it fails to encompass the broader setting of the international system which plays an important role in influencing the behaviour of states as units (Jervis, 1988: 319). In response to this limitation Neo-Realism has broadened the horizons of Realism. Neo-Realists explain co-operation between states in terms of national self-interest. And more importantly, contrary to classical Realism, Neo-Realists focus more on the structural features of the international system

rather than on its component units (Waltz, 1979). The concept of structure in this view refers to the hierarchical ordering of the system in which power capabilities are the major determinants of positions on the hierarchy. For Waltz international structure is the ordering principle underlying the way in which the units relate to, and are functionally different from each other. He perceives states to be both units of the international system and the foundation of its structure (1979). On the other hand many of the basic assumptions of classical Realism are retained, for example, power and anarchy remain central analytical concepts (Solomon, 1996: 4).

Neo-Realism responds to the criticisms levelled against Realism by showing that at times the structure of the international system affects the foreign policy behaviour of countries regardless of their power and status. International institutions such as the UN and regional organisations are significant in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of states because they provide for an exchange of information and help define areas of common interest. However, they can also constrain the foreign policy objectives of countries. For instance, powerful countries may not always achieve their foreign policy goals if they fail to influence other countries to support their points of view in international regimes. The fact that five nuclear weapons countries, namely the United States, Britain, Russia, China and France were compelled to agree to reduce their nuclear stockpiles by small powers at the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty conference in 1996 is a case in point. This demonstrates that even the most powerful countries can be forced to compromise on their foreign policy goals because of the international structure which compels them to co-operate with other states instead of forcing their way through. This to some extent gives all states in international relations a chance to express their national interests regardless of their power. Thus, in multilateral

organisations even the weak countries do not just co-operate for the sake of it. They co-operate when it is in their national interest to do so, especially because in most cases they are in the majority.

2.5 THE MINIMALISTS AND MAXIMALISTS: A DEBATE

Scholars of Southern African politics such as Booth (1995) and Vale (1994), who have been influenced by the Realist school of thought argue that there are benefits to be had if South Africa participates in regional peacekeeping. While many analysts in and around the region agree with it, the suggestion has been met with mixed feelings in the country itself. There are two main approaches or points of view in relation to this suggestion. The first, which may be termed the “minimalist” view, is premised on the assertion that the domestic imperatives of reconstruction and development should supersede all regional engagements (Marias, 1994: 30). Proponents of this view further contend that South Africa should focus on solving her own economic problems since resource limitations do not allow her to engage in costly regional endeavours (Mills, 1994: 231). Contrary to the minimalist tendency, the “maximalist” approach assumes that the Republic occupies a position of power within the Southern African region, and therefore, should assume the responsibilities that flow from this position (Keet, 1993: 5). These responsibilities include providing leadership in the areas of security and economic co-operation in the region.

One of the assumptions of Realism is that states are unitary rational actors engaged in the pursuit of national interests (Gilpin, 1982). However, as pointed out above this rationality and the self-help system do not prevent states from collaborating when cooperation is in their best interest. This applies to the Southern African region where it is advantageous for countries to co-operate as

members of a subordinate international system in pursuit of their national self-interests.

Immediately after taking office in 1994, the Government of National Unity (GNU) enunciated a policy towards the region which saw South Africa more as a champion of regional development than as a recipient of its fruits (Booth, 1995). This has provoked heated debate around the country with regard to how much the country should be involved in regional affairs. The maximalist tendency notwithstanding, the government has indicated very strongly that a democratic South Africa should explicitly renounce all hegemonic ambitions. It should resist all pressure to become a regional power and, instead, should seek to become part of a movement to create a new form of economic interaction in the region based on principles of mutual benefit and interdependence (Booth et al. 1995).

However, it would not be easy for South Africa as an undisputed de facto regional power in all respects to down-play its dominance. The Republic commands the region by every conventional indicator. For instance, it has a domestic defence industry, the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armcor) with assets of approximately R4 billion (nearly US\$ 1.1 billion) (Reichardt et al. 1995: 249). Furthermore, Cilliers shows that,

In 1992, South Africa exported some R17,35 billion (US \$4,42 bn) worth of goods to its neighbours, but imported only R4,12 billion (US \$1,14bn) from them; it has 23 000 of Southern Africa's 42 000 kilometres of railway lines; 58 000 of 87 000 kilometres of paved roads and over 5,1 million of the region's six million motor vehicles; and it creates 75% of sub-Equatorial Africa's total electricity capacity (1995: 195).

The total combined Gross National Product (GNP) of the ten members of the former SADCC

namely, Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Zambia was US \$28 billion in 1992, and that of the Republic was US \$106 billion. Given its towering dominance as the figures show, the Republic has the capability of making significant contributions towards the establishment of a regional security regime in Southern Africa.

2.6 THE HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY

According to Brawley, political, economic and military power is necessary for successful political leadership. The ends to which a state exercises its power depend on national interests developed within the domestic political economy (1995: 95). Hence the extrapolation of the minimalist-maximalist debate in South Africa with regard to involvement in regional affairs. The Hegemonic Stability Theory complements Realism in that it perceives power and national interest as important variables in determining the foreign policy behaviour of countries which have the potential to provide leadership in a regional setting or in the international system as a whole.

In the light of the overwhelming economic and military power that the Republic has in the region, the Hegemonic Stability Theory offers insights into the pattern of interaction between South Africa and its fellow SADC members. This theory assumes that the presence of a single strongly dominant hegemon in international relations leads to collectively desirable outcomes for all states in a sub-international system (Snidal, 1985: 589). Conversely, the absence of an effective hegemon is associated with disorder and undesirable outcomes for individual states. Different strands of this theory can be distinguished according to whether they conceive hegemonic leadership as more “benevolent” or “coercive” and by how they relate hegemony to interest and capability (Snidal, 1985:

589). Needless to say, effective hegemonic leadership requires an interest in providing public goods such as peace and security as well as the capability to do so. Public goods are those common interests which individual unorganised action is either not able to advance at all, or is not able to advance adequately (Olson, 1965). Organisations such as SADC can therefore perform a function with a view to achieving a common good when there are common or group interests.

Gilpin observes that the presence of a hegemonic power is central to the preservation of stability and peace in the international system (1982). By providing a stable regional order the hegemon furthers its own interests, and provides for those of the region at the same time. It is arguable therefore, that hegemonic power curbs the anarchic state of the international system, because it has the effect of creating a quasi-government which is able to provide security and stability. In this way the international relations of the region no longer resemble the state of anarchy envisaged from the Hobbesian perspective. Security and stability are public goods, that is they are non-excludable and therefore should suffer from the traditional collective action problem, but because of its clout with its neighbours, the hegemon can easily persuade them to contribute towards their attainment.

South Africa was a coercive hegemon in Southern Africa in the past, as will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. In the new dispensation the international community in general and Southern Africa in particular expect her to provide regional leadership as a benevolent hegemon. Groenewald defines the Republic's national interest in a nutshell as national and regional peace and prosperity (1995: 7). The South African government like any other government has a responsibility to ensure the safety and welfare of its people and the security of the state in international relations.

However, this cannot be realised if there is chaos in the region because peace and stability are prerequisites for economic development. As Groenewald puts it, “maintaining stability is essential for development, while development will enhance stability” (1995: 41). This points to the fact that there are benefits to be reaped if the Republic provides leadership in regional peacekeeping initiatives.

2.7 CAN STATES CO-OPERATE WHEN THEY PURSUE NATIONAL INTERESTS?

If regional peacekeeping initiatives are to have any viability, it is important to establish whether countries in the region can co-operate in their pursuit of common interests despite having national interest as the primary motor of their foreign policies. How do classical Realists perceive co-operation between states in this regard, given their perception of national interest as the main driving force behind foreign policy? Smith echoes Thucydides' words and observes that states' interests are conditioned by their relative power and fear for their security. However, unlike Thucydides, he argues that because of the growing interdependence between states in the international system, and the transnational nature of non-military threats to security, states find it increasingly helpful to create a collaborative approach to security, rather than rely on unilateral responses (1986: 9).

The existence of mutual national interests is a crucial factor for regional co-operation because states can only co-operate if it serves their national interests better than going it alone. The Hobbesian view in this respect is that co-operation between states cannot take place because international politics

precludes any real justice, or even simple harmony among nations. Spinoza parts ways with this view and argues that treaties among states are very useful, and that allied states are no longer enemies. But he cautions that states only have obligations to their subjects and the advancement of their interests. Much as their interpretation of different issues differ, most Realists share the notion that the pursuit and advancement of the national interest is the driving force behind foreign policy decisions. As Morgenthau notes, “the idea of national interest is indeed of essence in international relations, and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and space” (1966: 8).

Rousseau, another classical scholar, observes that the anarchic nature of the international system makes it difficult to establish a comprehensive and fully developed collaborative approach to security in international relations because of the jealousy with which states guard their sovereignty. Consequently, this renders policies more national-centred. This in turn makes them less attuned to long term regional security concerns, and thereby causes tensions between national and regional interests (Nathan, 1995: 5). This is one of the major problems that confront the Southern African region as it embarks upon initiatives to create and keep peace in the new dispensation.

2.8 CONCLUSION

National interest remains one of the most important factors in determining the Republic’s foreign policy behaviour towards the Southern African region. Much as some scholars dismiss it as inadequate, Realism is still a very important paradigm in international relations. It is applied by decision-makers and by analysts alike in defining and interpreting the foreign policies of nation states

in a complex international environment characterised by economic interdependence.

The minimalist-maximalist debate in South Africa informs the foreign policy line that the country will adopt towards the region with regard to the leadership role that is envisaged for the Republic by the international community and the region. It is the contention of this thesis that South Africa's greater involvement and resource commitment to the region need not be seen as an act of naive benevolence as some in the minimalist camp seem to believe. Instead it is possible to argue for such involvement from a straightforward Realist perspective. It is in the country's national interest to contribute towards the development of a comprehensive regional security regime and particularly a viable regional peacekeeping capacity as will be argued in the following chapters.

The Realist theory will therefore, be used in this thesis to gain insights into the chances of the region developing a collaborative security regime. This depends on countries' national interests in Southern Africa, as will be evident in the following chapters. The joint pursuit of common national interests has resulted in regional interests which are sometimes independent from, and contradictory to those of the individual countries' national interests. This has in turn led to the tension between the two. The Realist conception of national interest will be instructive in examining the paradox that is caused by the tension between national interest on the one hand and regional interest on the other. The question as to how this tension affects the Realist position will also be analysed. Is the region gaining importance as a new referent of security or is the nation state still the main referent? Where does the individual as a referent of security feature in this equation? These are pertinent questions in the discussion of the development of a collaborative regional security regime in general and

peacekeeping in particular in Southern Africa.

CHAPTER THREE

SOUTHERN AFRICA: DOES IT HAVE A VIABLE PEACEKEEPING CAPACITY?

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Regional organisations throughout the world are under increasing pressure from the United Nations and the traditional peacekeeping countries to take responsibility for managing and resolving conflicts in their regions. This chapter discusses the viability of the Southern African region developing a peacekeeping capacity. This will be achieved by looking at the historical background against which the region has attempted to achieve unity in dealing with security concerns. An overview of the historical development and prospects of peacekeeping by Africans in Africa will also be taken into account. Furthermore, the motives behind South Africa's involvement in regional peacekeeping initiatives will be analysed in relation to its national interests in the region. Finally, the problems that confront the region as it moves towards a collaborative approach towards regional security will be examined.

3.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The liberation struggle against apartheid in South Africa affected neighbouring countries very profoundly. For instance, to countries such as Mozambique and Angola the cost of this liberation

struggle was crushing, and almost paralysed the economic machinery of these countries. In an attempt to stop the neighbouring countries from harbouring South African refugees who fled apartheid, the South African government used proxy forces which claimed to be fighting for legitimate political rights in their respective countries. It supported the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR/RENAMO), the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (Ajulu et al. 1986). These surrogate armies were used not only to track down the South African guerilla forces fighting apartheid, but also to destroy these countries' social and economic infrastructure.

Not only did Pretoria defend the apartheid system by force but it displayed a readiness and penchant for invading neighbouring countries. There were several direct attacks on a number of these countries by the South African Defence Force (SADF). For instance, the SADF raided Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, on the 9th of December 1982, killing forty two people of whom ten were Lesotho nationals (Makoa, 1994). Angola and Mozambique bore the greatest brunt of the Republic's destabilization policy, with the former experiencing a full blown war with the SADF from 1976 to 1978. However, the end of this war did not mean the end of Pretoria's military involvement in Angola. "Between 1981 and 1985 the SADF carried out two hundred and thirty airborne raids, ninety strafing missions, seventy four ground attacks and four naval landings in Angola" (Ncube, 1991: 62). The Mozambican railway lines and the mining industry upon which the country's economy depends were destroyed by MNR and the SADF. The twenty year civil war in this country which was fuelled by the destabilisation policy shattered the country's economy. The greater part of the fertile agricultural land in Mozambique cannot be utilised to date because of land mines which were planted during the

war.

3.3 FROM DESTABILISATION TO CO-OPERATION

What happens in South Africa with regard to political and military developments can have significant consequences for the Southern African region as a whole because the Republic holds the regional balance of power as was evident from the destabilisation policy. Because of the recent history of destabilisation in the region, security defined in military terms was of great importance. However, now that the apartheid system has been dismantled in South Africa, the countries of the region have changed their perception of security from accumulating weaponry to co-operation in regional security matters through peacekeeping initiatives. Thus more than ever before, countries of the region are united under one organisation, SADC. It is against this backdrop of war and turmoil in Southern Africa therefore, that the region has embarked on building a peacekeeping capacity and integrating the region through economic development so as to avoid a repetition of the destruction that was caused by the destabilisation policy.

The experience that most of the Southern African countries gained from the former SADCC with regard to co-operation is of crucial importance in the new era. The Republic's smooth political transition from the apartheid system to the new political dispensation and the country's subsequent joining of SADC in 1994 have complemented the spirit of regional co-operation that was established through SADCC in the 1980s. This unity has come at the right time, especially with regard to the new phase that international peacekeeping by the UN has entered as will be seen below.

UN peacekeeping has grown into a big and very important institution in international relations. The increasing demand for UN peacekeepers and humanitarian assistance around the world has put pressure on the world body (Groenewald, 1995: 7). The organisation has been confronted by political problems, which have resulted in extreme financial crisis related to peacekeeping (Monnakgotla 1996: 9). For example, unpaid arrears to troop contributing countries stood at over US \$800 million in 1992, while the cost of approved peacekeeping operations were estimated at US \$3,5 billion. What makes matters even worse is the fact that member states increasingly fail to contribute financially to the UN peace support operations. From the 30th of June 1994 unpaid assessments for UN peacekeeping operations exceeded US \$2,1 billion (Gumbi, 1995: 42). There is only one mechanism through which the UN can exert pressure on its members to pay, and this is a two year suspension of voting rights in the General Assembly as provided by Article nineteen of the UN Charter.

This has compelled the UN to delegate its peacekeeping powers to regional organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity and SADC to assist in maintaining international peace and security by taking the initiative to procure peaceful settlements to local disputes within their regions. This has to be done in consultation with the UN Security Council.

The UN financial crisis is coupled with “peacekeeping fatigue” on the part of the traditional troop contributing nations to UN peace support operations. This changed attitude has resulted in a direct call for African regional organisations to work towards preventing and managing conflicts which originally would be left for the UN to deal with. This has very serious implications for SADC as a regional organisation in Southern Africa and for South Africa in particular as a country that is

capable in all respects, of providing leadership in the region.

However, whether or not South Africa will play this role greatly depends on whether or not the Republic perceives itself as having interests in playing a leadership role in this way. The national interests of the Republic have clashed with those of neighbouring countries in the past. This conditioned the security calculus negatively in the region (Booth, 1995). The Government of National Unity has shown interest in working towards a fully developed regional security regime. For instance, it acknowledges in the *White Paper on Defence* that the country has a common destiny with the region. Thus, “Domestic peace and stability will not be achieved in a context of regional instability and poverty. It is therefore in South Africa’s long-term security interests to pursue mutually beneficial relations with other SADC states” (*White Paper on Defence*, chapter 4).

3.4 HISTORY OF PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

The UN has carried out many peacekeeping operations in Africa. The first one of them was the 1956 First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) in Egypt, which was assigned to settle the dispute between Britain and France, and Egypt over president Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The second UN peacekeeping mission in Africa was in the Congo in 1960. This was in response to political problems that arose after independence.

There was no regional organisation in Africa when these operations started because many of the African countries were still colonies. So, the subsequent formation of the OAU in 1963 brought hope

that peace on the continent would be provided by Africans themselves. However, as May et al. (1997) point out, this has remained an unfulfilled ambition. The OAU has mostly remained passive due to lack of cohesion within the organisation. It has dealt with conflicts on an ad hoc basis at the preventive diplomacy level. For example, it dealt with boundary disputes between Algeria and Morocco, and Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. It also mediated in interstate conflicts including those between Ghana and Guinea, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. Furthermore, it contributed in attempts at peace settlement of internal conflicts such as the Nigerian civil war of 1967 - 1970; the civil war in the Congo in 1960 - 1962 after the withdrawal of the UN forces, and in Burundi in 1995 (Nhara, 1995: 103).

The OAU has carried out only one significant peacekeeping operation so far, and this was in 1981 during the civil war in Chad. A peacekeeping force named Inter-African Force (IAF) was dispatched to Chad in 1981. This move was widely applauded on the continent, especially because the idea that Africa should take the lead in resolving its conflicts has been an African dream since the inception of the OAU (May et al. 1997: 2). Nevertheless, the operation was not very successful. Countries which contributed troops for this mission were accused of having hidden agendas and therefore, furthering their own interests. For instance, Zaire was accused of being a United States proxy, while Senegal was sponsored by France and thus was said to be serving French interests. The third party was Nigeria which was believed to have interests of its own as Chad's biggest neighbour.

The UN continues to play an active role in peacekeeping in Africa, because of the financial and logistical problems that impede the OAU from fulfilling this obligation effectively. In the 1990s

alone the UN has carried out six peacekeeping operations in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi. Only two of these operations succeeded, those in Namibia and Mozambique. Somalia and Rwanda were declared complete failures. The main reason for failure, especially in Rwanda, was that the UN Security Council took too long to assemble troops from the member states. The massacre in Rwanda began in April 1994 and went on until July. But it took the expanded UN peacekeeping force until February 1995 to fully deploy its troops (Anyidoho, 1995: 90). Needless to say, the force arrived too late, and its effectiveness was lost as a result. This inability to respond quickly is one of the major weaknesses of the UN.

In spite of Africa's poor track record in keeping its own peace, the UN's own weaknesses and financial problems as indicated earlier, and the increasing reluctance by the traditional peacekeeping troop contributing countries to UN peace support operations have compelled the UN to exert more pressure on regional and sub-regional organisations such as the OAU, ECOWAS and SADC to maintain regional peace and security by taking the initiative to procure the peaceful settlement of local disputes within their regions. ECOWAS was the first sub-regional organisation on the continent to respond to this call by assembling and deploying a peacekeeping force in Liberia in 1990 amid divisions between its member states.

Formed in 1975, ECOWAS is comprised of sixteen countries, namely, Nigeria, Togo, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Gambia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Cameroon, Benin, Guinea and Guinea Bissau. Most of these countries were colonies of Britain and France. This colonial legacy of Francophone-Anglophone division makes difficult the smooth functioning of

ECOWAS (Asante, 1989). For instance, most of the Francophone members of ECOWAS do not approve of Nigeria as a regional power, because, for them it is an Anglophone country that threatens the French power in the region.

However, ECOWAS was the first regional organisation in Africa to formalise a mechanism for conflict resolution in the region in 1980. Its defence protocol provides for a collective security arrangement in West Africa. ECOWAS invoked this security arrangement in 1990 and formed and deployed a peacekeeping force, Ecomog Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in response to the Liberian civil war. (Da Costa, 1990). Ecomog encountered problems of lack of impartiality, an unclear mandate and a lack of unity of purpose among its members. Nevertheless, this was a noble endeavour and the first of its kind on the continent. ECOWAS' experiences in Liberia will most certainly provide valuable lessons for SADC in its efforts at developing a regional peacekeeping capacity in Southern Africa.

SADCC was formed in 1980 by nine countries namely, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland with Namibia joining in 1990 as the tenth member. Its primary objective was to reduce the economic dependency of these countries on apartheid South Africa with a view to isolating it, while promoting development among themselves. However, SADCC had very limited success in this regard, in fact, it actually increased its members' dependency on foreign donors (Newson, 1989). Nevertheless, as Cilliers argues "despite the criticism, SADCC has been a qualified success in one important respect: Of all its contributions to regional development, the great has been the forging of a regional identity and a sense of common

destiny among the countries and peoples of the region” (1996: 18). Indeed, SADCC represented a positive intervention to end apartheid in South Africa. It was a great attempt towards concerted diplomacy. Despite their economic and military weaknesses relative to the Republic, the SADCC countries enjoyed a unity of purpose which was lacking in other regional organisations. This unity of purpose would later be crucial for SADC’s attempts at peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy in the region as will be argued in the following pages.

3.5 PROTOCOL ON REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The institutional framework for peacekeeping in Southern Africa is provided by SADC’s Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (commonly known as the Organ), and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) (Cilliers & Malan, 1996). The protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation states that member states are convinced that the Organ constitutes an appropriate institutional framework in which they can coordinate their policies and activities in the areas of politics and security. It further stipulates as the functions of the Organ among others, “to promote peace-making and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security; and to develop a collective security capacity for responding to external threats, and a regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies that could be called upon within the region or elsewhere on the continent” (Protocol; 1996: 3). Article five of the protocol provides for the formation of two committees, namely, the Minutes of Foreign Affairs Committee (MFAC) and the SADC Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) for the smooth implementation of the protocol.

The protocol is very impressive on paper, but the main question is whether SADC has the capacity to put it to work. An argument that is usually put forward for regional organisations is that they are well situated to monitor conflict situations in their regions and thus, better placed than the far removed UN to perform this function. Regional organisations, it is argued, can respond faster than the world body to crisis situations within their regions. However, the problem that regional organisations frequently encounter is that they lack the financial means to undertake peacekeeping operations. Besides, they tend to lack the necessary impartiality that is required for effective peacekeeping, because their proximity to the flash-points renders them interested in the conflict and potentially biased as a result. This often leads peacekeepers to shift from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement. A good example is what happened to Ecomog in the Liberian civil war. Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) which was the strongest of the three warring factions in the conflict did not approve of the operation. It argued that Nigeria was not impartial because it favoured the Liberian government. But Ecomog was deployed in Monrovia nevertheless. As a result, the peacekeepers had to fight the NPFL to create a buffer zone. The other faction, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) took advantage of the situation and fought Taylor's NPFL alongside Ecomog (Da Costa, 1991). SADC is not immune to these problems. Thus, it faces a great challenge of translating its security protocol into practice amid big problems of lack of funds, possible lack of impartiality and inadequate resources.

3.6 SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: AN INQUIRY

South Africa rejoined the international community after the historic democratic elections of April 1994 from a high moral position because of its peaceful transition to democracy. As indicated above, the Republic was admitted to SADC in the same year. This move has brought great hope because all the countries in the region are now united under one regional organisation. And more importantly, they acknowledge the status of the Republic as a regional power. Because of its strong military and economic position in the region, the Republic is under pressure from the region and the international community as a whole to play a leading role in developing regional institutions necessary for peacekeeping.

The South African government for its part has made it clear that it will only take part in operations that have been sanctioned by SADC. Thus, the Republic, like all other members of SADC works within the regional security framework provided by the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation . This gesture of co-operation is significant in that it marks the important distinction between the present government's policy towards the region and its predecessor's policy of confrontation. South Africa is also a member of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution which was formed in 1994 (Mills, Shaw & Cilliers, 1995).

The Republic is expected by the international community in general and the Southern African region in particular to assume leadership in the region. But it is caught between a rock and a hard place in that, because of its history of destabilisation it has to be careful not to frighten its neighbours with

hegemonic tendencies. However, being the most powerful country in the region it also needs to balance these concerns with the need to assume the responsibilities which flow from this position. It is understandable therefore, why the Republic has so far chosen to adopt a cautious foreign policy towards the region. But it will not be able to hide behind its history for long. As Malan points out, because of its overwhelming military and economic power relative to its neighbours, South Africa has a strong international voice and can exert a decisive influence on the destiny of the region (1996).

However, the idea that South Africa should play a leading role in regional peacekeeping initiatives is not shared by all. There are those who argue that the country cannot engage in expensive regional operations before addressing social and economic issues internally, such as the need to narrow the gap between the traditionally disadvantaged and advantaged sectors of the South African population. This comes out very clearly in the disappointment that was expressed by Ina Perlman, the founder and former director of South Africa's "Operation Hunger", when he said;

It is ... unfortunate that the first government democratically elected by all South Africans; the first government which one hoped had been elected to serve all our people, should be looking beyond our borders before it deals with the plight of our own wretched part of the earth (Sunday Times, June 1994: 19)

Those who resent the country's involvement in regional peacekeeping initiatives also point out that the Republic has its own domestic peacekeeping problems to attend to. The violence stricken province of Kwazulu-Natal is often the example used in support of this view.

This school of thought compels one to ask whether South Africa's participation in regional

peacekeeping is of any short or long term benefit to its people. Does the Republic engage in regional peacekeeping initiatives because it equates it with good international citizenship and national prestige or because there are concrete benefits to be had? To answer this question the chapter will now look at the motives for the country's involvement in regional affairs, keeping in mind that foreign policy is driven by national interest as pointed out in the preceding chapter.

Realists argue that a good and rational foreign policy is one that serves national interests (Morgenthau, 1966). Following from this logic, if the Republic's foreign policy towards the region in relation to peacekeeping is good, it must be serving an important national purpose. As an integral part of the Southern African region the country automatically interacts with neighbouring countries. This inevitably leads to the formulation of a foreign policy to monitor and influence the pattern of interaction, be it at political, economic, social, defence or cultural level.

The interaction between South Africa and the region can be traced as far back as the inception of the nation state in the region. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU), is the oldest economic arrangement in the region which was formed to coordinate trade between South Africa and its neighbours, namely, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and later, Namibia (BLNS) (Newson, 1989). Because of the historically lopsided trading relationships between South Africa and these countries, the Republic benefits more from them than they do from it. For instance, in 1995 the country exported R16 532 994 worth of goods to these countries and imported goods worth R3 226 597, thereby generating a trade surplus of R13 306 397 (McGowan, 1997).

This trading pattern does not only apply to the South Africa-BLNS relations, it is also the case with regard to the whole of the SADC region. Davies shows that the Southern African region is the most important part of Africa to South Africa. He points to the fact that in 1995 SADC countries purchased 89,5% of South Africa's exports to Africa and the country made a trade surplus of R21 524 million (1997: 4). Clearly, the Southern African region provides an important market for South African manufactured goods. Furthermore, contrary to its trade with the developed western countries, the country achieves a trade surplus when trading with the region. For instance, United States, Germany and Japan imported R26.2 billion worth of goods from South Africa and exported R49,4 billion worth of goods, leaving the Republic with a negative balance of trade of R23,2 billion (McGowan, 1997). It goes without saying therefore, that South Africa needs to protect its market in the region from disturbances that could be caused by war within or between states in Southern Africa.

Southern Africa does not only provide a market for South African products, it is also increasingly becoming an important site for the Republic's investments in minerals, tourism, and low-cost, labour intensive manufacturing. The country has mining/mineral exploration, banking, hotels/resorts and industries in almost all the other eleven SADC member countries (McGowan, 1997), and these are just a few of the country's investments in these countries. For example, "South Africa's giant mining houses are expected to spend up to US \$100 million in 1997 in mineral exploration in the rest of Africa" (Laxton, 1997: 1).

There are also resources that South Africa needs from the neighbouring countries. So, besides, being

markets and sites for investment, these countries are also suppliers or potential suppliers of such resources as water and agricultural products. As Conley observes, "increasing demands in the Gauteng area have required the construction of the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme whereby water will be rerouted under gravity from dams in the upper reaches of the Senqu River to the Vaal Dam catchment" (1996: 28). This water project, together with two big hydro-electric power schemes on lake Cahora Bassa in Mozambique, will also supply electricity to the region. These are not the only schemes that will supply the Republic with water. There are two other big dams which are being built in Namibia which will also supply water to the country. It is imperative therefore, that the country guarantees the safe flow of this precious resource at all times by playing a leadership role in regional peacekeeping initiatives to prevent any form of disturbance.

Several hundreds of South African farmers have moved to Mozambique and Uganda in the past year, ostensibly to help rejuvenate these countries' ailing economies. This was done under the May 1996 agreement between the South African government, the host governments and the farmers. These farmers have already taken over eight million hectares of farmland in Mozambique. So far five hundred farmers have settled in the Niassa province, the most fertile in Mozambique (ILRIG, 1997: 14). A question that automatically comes to mind is, why would the Republic care so much as to dispatch people to the region whose expertise and equipment could be used to make the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) a success at home? The main reason behind this move is that South Africa has realised that there is a great potential in these countries. With its population estimated at 37, 859 000, (Central Statistics, June 1997) South Africa is by far the most populous country in the region, and because of its fast growing population and high rate of

urbanisation, the Republic will need to import agricultural products from these countries in the near future. It has therefore sent its farmers to develop this potential.

Security is one of the most important aspects of international relations and it is also crucial for economic and social development. Lack of it could result in the destruction of all the achievements of a nation, be it lack of military security or otherwise. Despite the loose talk about military security being relegated to the periphery of the foreign policy agenda, it is still a very important factor in determining countries' influence in international relations. Economic and military leverage remain the most important factors in determining the direction of decision making and the ability to implement decisions in multilateral fora. Of course other aspects of security are also important. For example, if a country is not equipped to deal with such problems as the Aids or Ebola viruses it means that economically productive people will die, and thereby reduce its chances of development. Besides, development resources would have to be diverted to address this problem, and thus cause more socio-economic problems such as unemployment, crime and ultimately political instability.

As indicated in the preceding chapter, security as a holistic phenomenon that includes political, social, economic, and environmental issues implies security solutions which transcend national boundaries. This means that co-operation between all countries in the region is important for them to be able to deal with security problems effectively. As Cilliers points out, "South Africa shares more than a thousand kilometres of porous, unguarded, sometimes even unmarked borders with Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho, allowing easy transit for illegal immigrants, drugs, arms and stolen vehicles" (1996: 192). If South Africa, for instance,

decides not to work together with other countries in the region in this regard, it would still encounter problems from the spill-over effects which are manifest in refugees, illegal immigrants, proliferation of small arms and the transmission of deadly diseases such as Aids through the interaction of individuals. This serves to demonstrate that South Africa or any other country in the region cannot close its eyes to the problems of the region. The country's "... destiny is intertwined with that of the region" (Cilliers, 1996: 194), thus anything that happens in the region will affect South Africa in one way or another. In Gumbi's words "South Africa cannot be an island of prosperity in a region of poverty" (1996: 36).

In the light of this it could be argued that by engaging the region South Africa serves its security and economic interests. Groenewald supports this by showing that,

South African domestic reconstruction and development will face serious setbacks if instability and socio-economic problems persist in the Southern African region. Promoting and enabling stability and socio-economic reconstruction and development in Southern Africa is therefore, in the vital interest of South African security, and not merely charitable (1995: 45).

The examples of the South African farmers, and the water and hydro-electric projects of Lesotho Mozambique and Namibia referred to above can also be construed as the country's attempts at contributing to the development of the region, while pursuing its national interests. Moreover, there are planned investments of between US\$8 and US\$10 billion underway. For instance, there is a new road under construction which will link Johannesburg, in South Africa, with Maputo, Mozambique's capital. Another one, the Trans-Kalahari highway is due to open in 1998 and it will cut-short the road distance between Johannesburg and Windhoek, Namibia's capital, by four hundred kilometres (two

hundred and fifty miles) (*Economist*, 14 June, 1997: 53). These projects are financed by governments and private sectors in the countries concerned.

The contribution that South Africa is making towards regional development in this regard is very important, especially because, given its own developmental challenges, the Republic cannot become a financial donor to the region. As Evans argues "South Africa's contribution should be viewed as that of a country with the potential to take the lead in promoting regional co-operation, peace and development" (1995: 197). At the political level the country has so far been involved in regional institution building, in preventive diplomacy exercises in the Lesotho crises of 1994, and in Mozambique in 1995.

As a new participant in regional and international affairs the Republic has not gone beyond preventive diplomacy, which is the first stage of conflict resolution, but it is actively involved in regional peacekeeping initiatives such as institution building and participation in joint peacekeeping exercises. For instance, the country was actively involved in the establishment of the Association of Southern African States (ASAS) in 1995 as a primary mechanism for dealing with conflict prevention, management and resolution in the region (Mills et al. 1995). It also took part in the formation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation in 1996.

The regional security agreement provides for the development of a collaborative security regime in which countries will earmark troops for regional peacekeeping within their armies. The first step towards the realisation of this goal was taken early in 1997 when the Organ organised a three week

peacekeeping exercise, "Operation Blue Eagle" in Zimbabwe (Hartnack, 1997). Eight countries including South Africa sent their contingents which will henceforth be on standby in their respective armies to be called upon for peacekeeping operations in the region.

It is encouraging that the region is taking bold steps towards developing a regional peacekeeping capacity. However, funding for this initiative presents the region with a big problem. In fact, this is the central issue in the minimalist-maximalist debate in South Africa with regard to the country's involvement in regional peacekeeping initiatives. The problem is worsened by the fact that most of the countries in the region which are expected to contribute towards peacekeeping are some of the poorest countries in the world. For example, the total combined GNP of the ten members of the former SADCC in 1992 was US \$28 billion, and that of the Republic was US \$106 billion (Cilliers, 1996). The problem with this is that insisting on financial contributions to regional peacekeeping initiatives from these countries might force them to divert resources away from socio-economic development and thereby, exacerbate social and political problems at home.

The other problem in relation to peacekeeping is that countries are signatories to many organisations and are therefore expected to contribute financially to all of them. This spreads their resources thinly and makes them less effective. For instance; South Africa contributes R1,8 million per year to SADC, it is the second largest financial contributor to the OAU, and contributes R60 million annually to the UN (Malan, 1996). If the Republic takes the lead in the region as advocated by many, it will have to devote more resources than what it currently contributes to these organisations. Besides spreading resources thinly, this can also result in negative public opinion towards peacekeeping because social welfare is likely to be compromised.

Because of the uneven distribution of power and levels of development in the region, a hierarchical formation may develop among the SADC member states with the Republic at the top. It is in this scenario that the Hegemonic Stability Theory might apply in the region as indicated in the preceding chapter. However, this arrangement has its disadvantages. For instance, there is no guarantee that all countries in the region would be willing to surrender to the Republic's hegemony after their experiences under the country's destabilisation policies of the 1980s. Besides, South African tax payers would have to contribute more than their counter parts in the other SADC member countries. It is highly likely that this would be opposed very vigorously by the tax payers because it would affect domestic spending priorities. As Malan observes, it has already been stated that parliament will have to provide funds for peacekeeping initiatives because the departments of foreign affairs and defence's budgets are not enough for this purpose (1995).

These problems serve to demonstrate how important it is for South Africa to choose the right level of participation in regional peacekeeping initiatives on the one hand, while on the other hand they show that much as South Africa's involvement is important, it is not a panacea. Of course its involvement will help a great deal in facilitating the improvement and better functioning of regional institutions. But its efforts, together with meagre contributions from fellow SADC member states are still not enough for the region to be able to develop an independent peacekeeping capacity.

3.7 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE?

A thorny issue implicit in the regional initiatives towards a fully developed collaborative security regime is that it will be difficult for Southern Africa to sustain a substantial peacekeeping capacity without assistance from outside the region and the continent. The United States and France have expressed interest in helping African countries in this regard. The British have already assisted with R400 000 for the joint peacekeeping exercise in Zimbabwe in 1997 (Hartnack, 1997). The United States ambassador to South Africa has made it clear that his country is prepared to help (Joseph, 1997). At the same time, the ambassador and his compatriots are at pains to point out how modest their country's interest is in Africa. There is nothing inherently wrong with a country trying to help others overcome their problems, but the fact that a pursuit of national interest by nation states is the main driving force behind foreign policies makes one sceptical of foreign assistance.

It is however true that peacekeeping requires forces which are detached from the conflicts they are dealing with to avoid bias, as pointed out above. Thus, foreign support is one of the salient features of peacekeeping. But former colonial masters and countries such as the United States' involvement in the region is suspect because of their history of colonisation and their hegemonic tendencies in Africa in particular and in the South in general. It is arguable therefore that foreign assistance in this respect has got nothing to do with the principle of impartiality in peacekeeping because these countries do not send their troops but provide financial and logistical support to the region. Their assistance is very important, nevertheless.

This debate relates to a very important question of the independence of African countries to control their peacekeeping initiatives and to deploy peacekeeping troops where and when they see fit. The danger is that foreign assistance might lead to African peacekeepers being “remote-controlled” from where the money comes. Thus, African peacekeepers will be easily cajoled into pursuing hidden agendas for the donor countries, as happened in the OAU peacekeeping operation in Chad in 1981. Unfortunately, Southern African countries are caught between a rock and a hard place because they desperately need foreign assistance in this regard.

3.8 CONCLUSION

The signing of the SADC protocol on regional security by the member-states in 1996 was an important step towards a collaborative approach to regional security. The subsequent peacekeeping exercise which took place in Zimbabwe further underpins the region’s commitment to establish standby peacekeeping forces within armies of the SADC countries which can be called upon at short notice in the region. However, peacekeeping is an expensive endeavour that requires resources and equipment which the region does not have.

Financial problems have forced the region to seek foreign assistance even though it leads to compromises on sovereignty in decision-making with regard to deployment of peacekeepers. There are benefits to be had if South Africa participates in regional peacekeeping initiatives, but the cost of participation and especially, of playing a leadership role will most certainly be high. This presents the country and the region with a dilemma, because, much as it is expensive, participation is

inevitable, for, it is the only way to ensure regional security. The building of a comprehensive regional security regime is a long process, of which the Southern African region is only at the beginning.

Economic development is of crucial importance for the region to be able to engage in this long and tedious process of developing a peacekeeping capacity, because peacekeeping is not only about putting a peacekeeping force together. For instance, peacekeepers need equipment, food supply, remuneration and staying power in peacekeeping missions. It goes without saying therefore, that the whole process of peacekeeping should be predicated on a strong economic base. Besides, it is arguable that economic development in the SADC member-states can to a certain extent reduce threats to peace and security in the region. It is for these reasons therefore, that the next chapter explores economic development as a component of security and an important factor for peacekeeping initiatives in Southern Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS A COMPONENT OF SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping is an expensive and strenuous process which requires a sound economic base. Even the UN with all the financial, political and material support from its wide membership around the world is experiencing serious problems with regard to funding and marshalling troops for peacekeeping operations. Needless to say, this is a tall order for a regional organisation such as SADC which comprises a few poverty stricken countries which only have the will and unity of purpose to their name. Moreover, it could be argued that an expanded definition of security implies a broadened definition of peacekeeping or conflict prevention, in that, if such threats to peace and security as poverty and lack of economic development are dealt with timeously, the deployment of peacekeepers would not be necessary. So, providing for these needs through economic development and alleviation of poverty could be understood as an expanded form of peacekeeping. Economic development plays an important part in both aspects of peacekeeping because on the one hand its accomplishment enables countries to prevent conflict while on the other hand it makes it easy for them to afford peacekeeping operations when the need arises. Thus the investigation of peacekeeping in Southern Africa would not be complete without a thorough discussion of economic development in the region and how it relates to regional peacekeeping.

Economic development is crucial for the Southern African region to be able to develop a viable capacity for regional peacekeeping. It was upon the realisation of this fact that countries of the region decided to disband the former SADCC in favour of SADC which involves higher levels of co-operation, inter alia, on economic, military and political fronts. This chapter will give an overview of security in general and how the state in the region has incorporated security of individual citizens into the broader national security with a view to highlighting the security problem in Southern Africa. The chapter also explores the system of economic development that SADC employs, and the question as to whether there is a strong developmental state in the region. The significance of the developmental state informs the broader argument of this thesis in that it shows that much as many different types of actors within countries and in world politics have gained prominence, the state is still the key actor, especially with regard to charting the way forward in relation to such issues as economic development, security and peacekeeping. Furthermore, the chapter will gauge SADC's performance in relation to the goals it has set for itself in its treaty and the associated declarations. The multifaceted form that SADC has taken will also be examined. Finally, the implications of economic development or lack of it in the region for regional peacekeeping initiatives will be discussed.

4.2 THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)

When SADC was established in 1992 many commentators applauded this as a major step forward for the region. SADC differs from its predecessor, SADCC, in that it involves deeper economic co-operation and integration and has a legal basis whereas SADCC was an economic coordination body

which was based on a memorandum of understanding between members. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, SADCC was designed to isolate apartheid South Africa, but SADC encompasses the Republic as an important member state.

SADC's primary objectives are to achieve development, economic growth, alleviate poverty and enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa through regional integration. However, the organisation has developed into a multi-purpose regional body in that it has incorporated peace and security into its mandate. As Cawthra points out, one of the most important questions to be asked about any multi-purpose organisation with both a security mandate and a mandate for economic integration and development is how the two issues are related (1997: 32). Are these issues mutually inclusive or are they mutually exclusive? It is also important to establish which process comes first between the two. Should economic co-operation and integration precede security coordination, or vice versa?

The position taken here is that these two processes are mutually inclusive even though some regional organisations have tried to treat them separately. For example, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the Middle East and the Organisation of American States (OAS) among others, place greater emphasis on collective security than on economic integration (Cawthra, 1997). But the main problem with treating these issues separately is that it is not clear which should come first. Besides, they both depend on each other for their success. For instance, effective economic co-operation and integration can only take place in a politically peaceful environment. This environment can be provided and maintained through security co-operation by countries in the region. It is for this reason therefore,

that the two processes are best seen as mutually inclusive. In any case, they are both encompassed within the new broadened security agenda which places greater emphasis on the security of the individual as will be evident in the following pages. A regional organisation that accepts the new, expanded definition of security automatically recognises the fact that the two processes are very closely related to each other.

SADC acknowledges the expanded definition of security, hence its multi-faceted nature. This has been provided for in its 1992 treaty. For instance, the treaty stipulates that, “the countries of the region will work out and adopt a framework of co-operation which provides for strengthened regional solidarity, peace and security in order for the people of the region to live and work together in peace and harmony” (SADC, 1992: 5). The adoption of the broader security agenda by SADC as a governmental organisation raises many questions as will be shown below.

4.3 CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF SECURITY

According to the Realist paradigm, the state is the primary referent of security because it is perceived as a guardian of its citizens' security from external and internal threats (Booth, 1991). Thus for Realism national security is the central issue in international relations, with greater emphasis usually placed on the power to influence and the military aspect of security. Military security is important for Realists because all the achievements of a society in all other fields can be undone by a military failure (Buzan, 1991). Indeed, the very destructive nature of military confrontation will ensure that it always occupies a special place in security thinking in international relations.

However, the elevation of such economic issues as development and international trade to great importance, and the closely knitted integration of the world economy have led to constraints on the use of military force as a foreign policy instrument in international relations. This is largely due to the fact that if a country goes to war it also stands to lose economically even if it wins the war, because war disturbs the international economic system upon which all countries depend. For instance, there is a foreign policy clash between the United States and the European Union with regard to the US companies' property which was nationalised in Cuba in 1959 when the Communist Party took over. The Cuban government has allowed European companies to buy this property, but the US disapproves. This could have warranted deployment of troops to protect national interests in the past. But it would not be prudent to follow that route today because there are too many other areas of mutual interest which could be affected if war broke out.

It is on the basis of these sorts of developments therefore, that the traditional understanding of security has been challenged. Furthermore, the challenge to the traditional perception of security also arises from the contention that there are many sources of insecurity which confront states, most of which cannot be regulated by national boundaries because of their non-military nature. Aids, the Ebola virus, international drug trafficking, acid rain caused by air pollution and ecological problems are but a few examples of non-military sources of insecurity which do not confine themselves to national borders.

4.4 THE NEW SECURITY AGENDA

The broader definition of security as suggested by Buzan (1988) includes five major sectors, namely, military, political, economic, and environmental issues. The first of these, military security, concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and states' perceptions of each other's intentions. The development of offensive and defensive weaponry by the US and the former USSR during the cold war is a good example of military security. Each bloc watched the other's moves very closely, and this intensified the arms race between them. This was very important for both camps because if one fell behind in the race its national security defined in military terms would be in jeopardy.

The second of Buzan's security concerns is political security which looks at the organisational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Here the fundamental question at stake concerns the form of government within a country, and the crucial point is whether a government provides social security and respects political and human rights of the individual. From this point of view multiparty democracy is now widely viewed as the best form of government to provide security (in the expanded sense) in the contemporary international system. The provision of welfare by a democratic government is believed to lead to economic development, which is another important area of security.

Economic security deals with access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Countries have varying economic capabilities in the

international arena, but not a single one is self sufficient in all spheres. They all need each other for various reasons, but degrees of dependency and vulnerability vary between different countries. Some countries provide markets for others, while others are sources of raw materials.

Societal security concerns the sustainability of the evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity. Social security follows automatically once the enabling environment is provided. Political stability and economic development are some of the most important factors for a population to reproduce itself and maintain its culture and national identity.

Finally, environmental security involves the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. For example, the destruction of the ozone layer could result in changes in climatic conditions throughout the world. This will affect all countries regardless of whether or not they contributed to the destruction.

Unlike the traditional conception of security, the new security agenda is more holistic in approach. It puts greater emphasis on the individual as the key referent of security instead of the state. This approach elevates the profile of such individual security issues as human rights, poverty and economic development (Booth, 1991). Andre du Pisani observes that for security to be meaningful, it has to some degree to be divorced from the state (1992). Booth supports this argument by showing that the emancipation of security from the state is of crucial importance for the individual to become key referent of security.

However, the new security agenda has been criticised for being too broad and unmanageable. Besides, it makes it difficult to draw the line between state security on the one hand and security of the individual on the other. According to John Locke people put themselves under government in a social contract to protect their property, lives, liberties and estates from the state of nature, which was very unsafe. Thus, the state becomes the mechanism through which people seek to achieve adequate levels of security against social threats.

This presents a paradox however, because the state can also become a source of insecurity to the individual instead of being a guarantor of security. Thus, "... security of the state is not always synonymous with security of everybody living within that state" (Booth, 1995: 5). The exclusion of the majority of South Africans from the decision making process by the former apartheid government, and mass imprisonment is a case in point. This example is multifaceted in that it can be used to show that a lack of democracy can lead the state to be an agent of insecurity for the individual at one level. At another level it demonstrates the problem of the perception of the state as a referent of security and how this fails to consider security of individual citizens.

Democracy is, nevertheless, not a reliable determinant of whether the state provides social security or not. Cuba, whose economy is centrally planned and highly dependent on the state, provides social security far better than many democratic countries. This was spelled out by a Joint Economic Committee of the US congress in 1982 when it acknowledged that "Cuba has achieved a highly egalitarian redistribution of wealth, ... a national health program that is superior in the third world and rivals that of numerous developed countries". The committee also admitted the "near total

elimination of illiteracy and highly developed multi-level education system” (Azicri, 1983: 120). These are good indicators of social security, despite a lack of democracy in that country. The state has successfully taken a centre stage in providing social security.

The Cuban case certainly counters Booth’s argument that security should be emancipated from the state. The involvement of the state as a guarantor of welfare and security is not confined to the state-controlled economies, it also applies to the western democracies. Somalia, Cambodia and Rwanda among others, reached a point where the state collapsed due to civil wars. Following from Booth’s argument this was the time for the citizens of these countries to enjoy freedom and security to the fullest in the absence of the state. On the contrary most of them felt more insecure than ever before. This further underpins the prominent role that is played by the state with regard to security concerns.

These examples serve to demonstrate how complex the security problem is. For instance, much as it has a good record in providing social security, the Cuban state still violates some human rights such as freedom of expression and association, and freedom to own private property by virtue of being a communist one party state. However, this does not in any way warrant the rolling back of the state from performing its security duties, for that can lead to devastating consequences as the Somali experience among others has shown.

The paradox clearly indicates that security of the state is very closely intertwined with that of the individual. It is arguable that security of the state takes precedence because the state represents the human collectivity within a given territory. The significant shift in focus from the traditional military

sources of threats to peace and security to non-military threats in international relations has had a great impact on the definition of security and its referents. This shift automatically compels the state to take security of the individual on board because failure to do so will most certainly result in the security of the state itself being jeopardised. For example, Aids starts with the individual but its spread is a very serious source of insecurity for the state as a whole, because ultimately it affects productive people in all spheres. Clearly, this has very serious implications, inter alia, for economic development. So the incorporation of the individual into state security is of crucial importance. This does not, however, mean that the state is being superseded by the individual as a key referent of security. Rather it means that seen in this way the state remains the central referent of security, even security in the new, expanded sense because it covers all non-military aspects of security, and therefore provides an expanded way of understanding security. Thus despite the perceptions which under-rate its role in providing security, the state is still and will continue to be a very important player in all aspects of security. Thus, the individual has to work with, not against the state in order to achieve comprehensive security.

4.5 THE SECURITY PROBLEM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

In Southern Africa, like in all other regions, security is no longer confined within the boundaries of one country as pointed out above. This is an important factor for regional co-operation because it spurs countries to work together towards achieving collaborative security. Regional security involves the promotion of peace, not through the accumulation of weaponry and the primacy of deterrence, but through reciprocity and restraint based on a shared sense of security interdependence (Booth,

1994). Indeed, given the closed nature of Southern Africa as a sub-international system, the region's welfare and security are highly dependent on good relationships both within and between countries in the region.

As indicated in the preceding chapter, the common consciousness which involves the belief that security has to be achieved with others and not against them is developing in the region. This came out very clearly in SADC's adoption of the broader security agenda in 1993 (Vale, 1995). Another important indicator was the intervention of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe under the auspices of the Front Line States in a preventive diplomacy exercise in the Lesotho crises of 1994 to curb a potential threat to regional peace and security. These are good examples of the development of the culture of security interdependence among the countries in the region.

SADC's adoption of the new approach to security means that the region acknowledges the security of the individual by incorporating it into the state security agenda without necessarily compromising the importance of the security of the state. However, some analysts of the new security agenda such as Andre du Pisani interpret the situation differently and argue that peace and security still presents Southern Africa with a paradox, because states are inevitably the ones which chart the way forward in security matters. Charting the way forward does not, nevertheless, mean that all states in the region do not violate human rights in their countries. Besides, according to the new security agenda, social peace goes beyond the state and the preservation of national sovereignty (1992). On the contrary, one would want to argue that SADC as an organisation of countries that have shown a penchant for dogged pursuit of their national interests which are, in the final analysis driven by the

desire to satisfy the national society, is properly positioned to pursue the common national interests of its member states, including security of the individual.

In the light of this it could be argued further that if it succeeds in its mandate of economic development and peacekeeping initiatives, SADC will most certainly be able to address the security needs of individual citizens as interpreted by the broad security agenda. However, the problem that the organisation still has to grapple with in this regard is that countries in the region guard their sovereignty very closely. This of course makes it difficult for a fully developed effective collaborative approach to regional security and for regional economic development to take root as will be argued below.

As pointed out earlier there is a dilemma between national security on the one hand and regional security on the other because of the strength of the sovereignty norm among the Southern African countries. This makes it difficult for these countries to commit themselves to regional endeavours. In most cases countries become involved in regional issues in order to enhance their national interests. The former SADCC's sectoral coordination unit system in which countries asked for foreign development assistance from the donor countries through SADCC and yet used it to advance their national projects is a good example of this.

4.6 THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN DEVELOPMENT

States are not the only agents of change within countries as well as in world politics. Social movements and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for instance, play an important role at both local and international levels with regard to addressing people's needs at the grassroots level. This is one of the reasons why NGOs are often said to be "closer" to the people. This does not, nevertheless, mean that states can be dispensed with. On the contrary the broadened security agenda needs a strong state if it is to be implemented effectively. Holsti defines a strong state as that in which the ends of government are settled by consensus. Moreover, it is a state which practices participatory democracy in which all social groups are assimilated into the political system, and participate actively in political processes (1995: 330). This is the kind of state that is needed to provide comprehensive security in concert with various social groupings because it is geared towards the economic development of national society. It is important to note that a truly developmental state provides development without violating the rights of the individual. The East Asian states exhibit some features of the developmental state but they are not fit to provide an all encompassing form of security because they do not satisfy the participatory democracy aspect of a truly developmental state as will be argued below.

There is a debate about the relationship between a strong state and democracy. On one side of the debate are those who argue that there is no relationship between the two while those on the other side acknowledge the relationship. Those who do not see the relationship argue that strong states are authoritarian and thus put economic development before democracy. A popular example that is cited

to support this view is that of the authoritarian developmental states of East Asia, the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) whose governments directly intervened in their economies by subsidising firms which had a potential to grow (picking winners), and by regulating wages so that their exports could be cheap and competitive in the world market (Helen Hughes, 1993: 5). Of course, much as it promotes economic development and economic growth, this type of developmental state encourages inequitable income distribution because of its interest in a cheap and compliant labour force. Moreover, by picking “winners” inevitably the “losers” are left behind. Such a state encourages development at the expense of people’s rights. For many this is to compromise what is essential to democracy.

However, it remains possible to argue that there is a relationship between Holsti’s strong state and democracy where the state itself is democratic and thus provides the political space for different social groups to participate. Such a state encourages economic development without clamping down on labour movements nor does it regulate wages. This state protects human rights while the other variety violates them. It is to this kind of strong developmental state which provides economic development for the national society and practices participatory democracy, therefore, that one is referring as an important factor for implementing the new security agenda effectively.

4.7 IS THERE A STRONG DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA?

Do any of the Southern African countries meet the criteria of a strong state as suggested by Holsti? The region consists of countries which can be put into two categories. Those countries which have

recently become democracies after many years of either authoritarian or one party state could be termed “Young” democracies, while those which have dubious political systems such as Zimbabwe, Zambia and Lesotho could be referred to as “Semi-democracies”. Malawi, South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania and Namibia on the other hand are young democracies.

An important question to be asked in this regard is whether countries in both categories are in a position to become democratic developmental states. That is, are they fit to provide economic development without violating human rights, thus provide security for the state as well as the individual. This question is important for two reasons. Firstly, it is through economic development that a state is able to provide social welfare for its citizens, and thereby avoid the insecurity that is caused by hunger and poverty. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly for this thesis, Southern African countries can develop a viable peacekeeping capacity if and only if they are able to develop economically.

Given their strong attempts at economic development and the implementation of fully participatory democracy, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Mauritius are perhaps the only countries in the region which are close to Hosti’s developmental state. However, as young democracies, their development into the status of strong developmental states will be determined by political dynamics within each country, because different regimes have different policies.

Economic development will make it easy for such states to address fundamental social and political problems which could otherwise lead to the disturbance of peace. Besides, development will enable

them to deal with such problems when they arise. Otherwise the region's efforts at peacekeeping will come to nothing if fundamental problems are not dealt with. This relates to the point that was made earlier about the interdependence between security and economic co-operation. The chapter will now look at how SADC carries out its double mandate of economic development and regional security.

4.8 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE SADC REGION

For the first time in many years, the economies of the twelve members of SADC grew in 1996; in eight of them the growth was over five percent (*Economist*, 14 June, 1997: 53). However, this growth may be difficult to maintain mainly because most economies in the region are agrarian, and depend on weather conditions. Hence the claim that in Sub-Saharan Africa, rain alone can swell or shrink an economy. For example, the good rains of 1996 enabled Mozambique, a long-term recipient of food aid, to reap a record harvest, making it almost self-sufficient in grain. After a dry season and poor harvest, Zimbabwe's GDP shrank in 1995 by over three percent, a year later, after good rains, it had shot up six percent (*Economist*, 14 June, 1997).

Much as economic growth lacks consistency because of the influence by factors beyond their control, countries of the region are making headway in economic development in their individual capacities. Angola, the only country in the region still involved in civil strife has an inflation rate of 2,800 percent. Zimbabwe runs a government budget deficit of over eight percent of GDP. The positive side of this picture is that in 1996 seven of the other twelve SADC countries had inflation rates of ten percent or lower. This development is very encouraging indeed.

This, nevertheless, will take a long time before it translates into coherent regional development, because as the *Economist* argues, "...it is not possible to think of the region as one market. Despite a promise by SADC members to work towards regional integration, red tape continues to throttle the place" (14 June, 1997: 53). For instance, over and above bad communication systems, trade barriers are still very much in place, and most countries in the region still require visas even from fellow SADC members. Consequently, only ten percent of Southern Africa's trade takes place within the region; while in the European Union the figure is approximately sixty percent (*Economist*, 2nd Sep. v.336, 1995).

The SADC treaty commits member states to a set of principles including peace and security, human rights, democracy and peaceful settlements of disputes. It also provides for deeper economic co-operation on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit, providing for cross-border investment and trade. The associated declaration further calls for the establishment of a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security. The 1993 SADC Framework and Strategy for Building the Community declares SADC's adoption of a new security agenda (Cawthra, 1997: 6). Thus, SADC's framework puts greater emphasis on the non-military dimensions of security, and links democratisation and development to security (SADC, 1992). Furthermore, the SADC communique establishing the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation includes clauses which commit the organisation to assist in promoting the development of democratic institutions within member states and to encourage the observance of universal human rights.

Judging its performance by its efforts at regional development in terms of economic growth and human development in relation to its objectives, SADC as a regional organisation has not achieved much as will be shown below. The promotion of effective regional co-operation and community-building depends on the efforts of the states as well as civil society in the region. This in turn requires the promotion of regional consciousness among these actors (Black et al. 1997: 49). This in itself is not an easy task mainly because these actors have a wide range of interests, most of which are national in orientation.

4.9 THE SECTORAL COORDINATION UNIT SYSTEM

The former SADCC established a sectoral approach to regional development in which each country was assigned areas in which to pursue developmental projects which were supposed to be geared towards regional co-operation. The problem that SADCC encountered with this system was that member states used it to obtain funding from overseas donors and yet used the money for their own national projects (SADC Workshop, 1997).

In spite of the poor track record of its predecessor in implementing the Sectoral Coordination Unit System (SCU) SADC has adopted it as it is without any fundamental changes. It is still the same incremental, project-oriented regional co-operation approach. The organisation basically relies on member countries to coordinate sectors and clearly the success of the sectors highly depends on the institutional capacities of the countries entrusted with a particular responsibility. Countries are still allocated sectors, for instance, Swaziland is responsible for Human Resources Development,

Tanzania coordinates the trade and industry sector while food, agriculture and natural resources sector is coordinated by Zimbabwe, and South Africa is responsible for the sector of Finance and development (SADC Workshop, 1997).

The problems which plagued this system under SADCC still prevail and they have now been compounded by the fact that foreign aid, upon which they depended, has diminished considerably because of the political transformation that has taken place in South Africa. This was made clear by the Norwegian Assistant Development Co-operation Minister Asbjorn Mathieson, speaking for the Scandinavian countries which have donated over US\$ 1 billion in aid annually to SADC countries over the years, at the Lilongwe annual Consultative Conference in 1994 when he said "...it is time for SADC to raise its own funds, not wait for hand-outs" (Morna, 1995: 65). The Lilongwe communique subsequently acknowledged that one of SADC's major shortcomings is its inability to mobilise the region's own resources for the implementation of its projects and programmes.

Things have not changed much in this respect because the SCUs are still under funded, and staffed by poorly motivated officials who do not understand SADC's goals and objectives (Tsie, 1996: 85). It is not surprising therefore, that the coordination and implementation of SADC's policies have to date been ineffective. SADC has yet to reorient its member states' focus on national interest in managing these sectors.

Different levels of development among the SADC countries compounds this problem even further because some or most countries are given sectors which they are not able to develop. They are

allocated sectors just because they are members of SADC. The sector coordination strategy makes sense in theory but it has many problems when it comes to implementation especially in a region as plagued with economic imbalances as Southern Africa. For instance, South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius and Zimbabwe are the only countries in the region which could be in a position to implement SADC programmes and projects, even though there are profound economic imbalances even between these countries, especially between South Africa and the rest of them. As for the other SADC member countries their economies are too weak for the sector-coordination system to work effectively.

On the other hand it would not make sense for all sectors to be divided only between the countries that are capable of developing them, SADC programmes and projects would lose the essence of regionality that they are meant to have. Tanzania is one of the least developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and yet SADC has allocated it the trade and industry sector. This is one of the most important sectors for regional integration but its projects are still far from being implemented because the country responsible is still looking for funding (SADC, Workshop, 1997). Given the change in donor attitude as indicated above, it will be very difficult to obtain significant funding. This scenario threatens to turn the whole effort at regional development and integration into a mockery, and thus casts a shadow on regional peacekeeping initiatives. Should the region even consider building a peacekeeping capacity if its economic development projects cannot take off?

To make matters worse, the legal structure of SADC does not compel member states to enact laws at national level to facilitate the implementation of SADC projects. This is attributable to the loose

nature of the SADC treaty. It was left loose deliberately so that members could retain their sovereignty and decision-making functions under the treaty. As Tsie observes, decision making by consensus in SADC effectively points to the fact that countries in the region have reserved their positions as individual sovereign players (1996). In this way they have reserved the right to weigh regional obligations against their national interests and in most cases they subordinate the former to the latter. Hence the persistent conflict between regional and national interests.

The formation of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation has raised more questions along the same lines. It has been criticised for strengthening the notion of security as a state issue rather than as people oriented. Many commentators interpret it as a sign of unwillingness by member states to subject their national interest to the common good. This renders the organisation powerless when it comes to regional economic development. In almost all sectors the problem is a lack of capacity and will, in the country that coordinates. So far SADC has two regionally oriented development commissions - the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) and the Southern African Centre for Co-operation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR). They are the only ones throughout the region which seem to have a more regional focus (Tsie, 1996: 86).

SADC has begun to put greater emphasis on the private sector as the engine of economic development and regional integration. Much as it encourages cross-border investment, a private-sector led system of regional integration has its problems. The problem with it, is the same as the general problem with capitalism, that of selective development. Investors will not go where they

cannot make profit for the sake of regional development. SADC is basically hoping for a trickle down effect in which a few countries develop and foster development by investing in the rest of the region. As Dot Keet points out, however, prosperity does not trickle down, rather this system perpetuates the already existing economic imbalances in the region (1992: 13). For instance, according to the 1994 figures, the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of South Africa was \$US 121,9 billion, while that of all the other eleven SADC member countries was \$US 36.3 billion (McGowan, 1997: 35).

If economic development trickled down one might have expected Southern Africa to be a very prosperous region because South Africa has been a principal pole of accumulation since the discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand area in 1886. Instead of regional development, South Africa's dominance has resulted in the peripheralisation of the neighbouring countries through the migrant labour system and the introduction of tariff protection in South Africa in the 1920s which excluded a range of products from these countries. These developments, among others have contributed to a regional economy which is characterised by imbalances and disparities (Davies et al. 1993: 14). It is arguable therefore, that by following the same pattern of development, SADC is likely to enforce these economic imbalances between its member states.

This trickle down approach to development gives the state a reduced role in economic activities, leaving this terrain open for free-market forces. However market forces need to be regulated by political institutions of some sort otherwise they lead to the same problem of selective development which will ultimately result in instability because this system does not benefit less developed

countries within the region. The dangers which could result from this scenario are very real because many countries in the region are already under pressure to service their debt to international monetary institutions, as well as being under pressure from the IMF monitored Structural Adjustment Programmes which have their own conditionalities.

4.10 WHAT IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING?

Following from its lack of a coherent development strategy and lack of a strong structural base, SADC still has a long way to go with regard to economic development and regional integration. As indicated earlier, economic development is an important factor in relation to the organisation's capacity for regional peacekeeping because, needless to say, poor countries cannot afford peacekeeping. In the light of the foregoing discussion it could be argued that SADC needs to undergo fundamental structural change for it to be effective as a vehicle for economic development, regional integration and ultimately sustainable peacekeeping capacity.

South Africa, the newest and most powerful member state of SADC is pushing for changes within the organisation despite problems of national sensitivities, especially between itself and Zimbabwe which has been accused of being stuck in the old SADCC mentality. Zimbabwe does not seem to have come to terms with the fact that SADC and its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation are meant to be more formal and more proactive than the former SADCC. Furthermore, because it was a big power in the SADCC arrangement, it is arguable that Zimbabwe feels threatened by the presence of South Africa in the regional fold. This is underpinned by the fact that during the

Great Lakes crisis in 1996, which affected one of the SADC member countries, Tanzania, South Africa as the chair of SADC called a meeting in response to the crisis, but Zimbabwe as the chair of the Organ did not approve. On the one hand this disapproval could be attributed to the fact that Zimbabwe felt that its authority as the chair of the Organ was undermined, while on the other hand it could have been related to an inferiority complex on Zimbabwe's part. One is inclined to believe that the latter played the greatest role especially given that it was in a crisis situation in which there was little time for thorough consultations.

As a de facto regional power and a middle power in world politics the Republic is seen by many in the region and internationally in benign terms, as it is thought that the interests of middle powers coincide more with general interests than those of the small powers or of great powers. Hence, it is thought that in pursuing its national interests the Republic also pursues general/regional interests which will ultimately lead to a more stable regional order (Hussein, 1997:54). Using the same logic, it can be argued that because South Africa has clout over its neighbours in the region and its interests are so closely related to those of the region as a middle power, the country is well positioned to rally support for regional peacekeeping in Southern Africa.

Because of its overwhelming economic and military might in the region, as argued in the preceding chapter, the Republic has the potential to play an important role in the region through the multilateralist approach that it has adopted towards the region so far. Black et al. support this view by pointing to the fact that without South African commitment and leadership, the prospects for a new era of co-operation and community in the region are grim (1997: 36). Nigeria occupies the same

position in ECOWAS in West Africa. This became evident when the organisation was faced with the challenge to intervene in the Liberian civil war in 1990 in accordance with its regional security protocol which provides for such intervention. Nigeria took the initiative of campaigning for the deployment of Ecomog in the UN Assembly and OAU when the ECOWAS member countries failed to reach a consensus in this regard. Because of their weight internationally, the UN and OAU's endorsement of the decision to intervene gave ECOWAS the necessary support to deploy peacekeepers in Liberia despite the disagreement. Many analysts have viewed Nigerian dominant involvement with suspicion, and argue that it was pursuing its own interests. The same accusations were levelled against it when it led a peace-enforcement operation into Sierra Leone in 1997 in response to a military coup in that country. The criticism notwithstanding, the country plays a vital role in enforcing the ECOWAS regional security protocol and peacekeeping in West Africa. It could therefore be argued that without its participation these important peace operations would not have taken off.

South Africa is a key player in Southern Africa. Arguably, the Republic has more advantages regionally and internationally than Nigeria because of the high moral standing that it has acquired through the peaceful transition from apartheid to multiracial and democratic rule which was effected in April 1994. Because of its important implications for peaceful settlement of disputes locally and internationally, this peaceful transition together with the country's voluntary abandonment of its nuclear weapons programme have elevated the Republic to a position of great diplomatic importance in international relations with regard to conflict resolution. This compliments the economic and military advantages that it enjoys over its fellow SADC member states. It is a

combination of these factors, inter alia, therefore, which provides a basis for the argument that the Republic should assume a leadership role in peacekeeping initiatives in Southern Africa. In other words, if Nigeria, which is ruled by a military junta, and lacks the moral clout of the Republic, plays a leadership role in West Africa, it is arguable that South Africa with its impeccable credentials can do it even better in Southern Africa.

Providing regional leadership does not in any way mean going it alone as has been implied by some commentators, rather, it means working in close consultation with other countries in the region. Healthy consultation requires a reliable communications system throughout the region. This system hinges on economic development in these countries. Economic development in individual countries within the Southern African region and increased international trade among SADC members are prerequisites for regional economic development and a sustainable peacekeeping initiative in the long run.

However, so far most of the intra-regional trade in the SADC region is in the form of a lopsided trade relationship between South Africa and the rest of the region. For instance, the Republic exported R15 405 325 worth of goods to the SACU countries in 1993, while these countries only exported R2 717 824 worth of goods to the Republic in the same year. In 1995 the country exported R9 692 917 worth of goods to the other non-SACU SADC countries, but only imported goods worth R1 475 653 from these countries (Mcgowan, 1997: 32). Trade between other SADC member states outside of South Africa is almost non-existent. This is one of the major problems that the region still has to grapple with in order to achieve comprehensive economic development which will, in turn facilitate effective

regional peacekeeping. However, the problems notwithstanding, most economies in the region show improvement. This is a good sign for future development with regard to peacekeeping, even though economic development in these countries fluctuates due to the effects of factors beyond their control.

4.11 CONCLUSION

It is important that SADC has committed itself to fully developed economic integration in ten years time from 1996. If successful, this will enable the region to develop a viable peacekeeping capacity. Furthermore, SADC will be in a better position to provide security in all respects to its member states, and ultimately to its regional citizens, because as argued above, the shift away from the perception that military sources of insecurity are the only serious threats to national security has automatically led to the incorporation of the threats to individual security into the state's conceptualisation of national security, and, by implication, the peacekeeping agenda. The non-military nature of security concerns in the new era renders both the state and individual citizens important referents of security. Thus the state is compelled to consider sources of insecurity to the individual because threats to peace and security of the individual can ultimately translate into threats to state security. In the final analysis, contrary to the interpretation of the new security approach by some commentators, this points to the fact that the state is still a key player as a guarantor of security, even or perhaps especially in the new security thinking.

There are some signs of economic development within individual countries in the region, even though coherent regional development and co-operation from the point of view of SADC as a

regional organisation has yet to be realised. The delay in regional economic development inevitably means that the region will take a long time to develop a viable regional peacekeeping capacity, because effective and independent peacekeeping cannot take root without a strong economic base. Developed economic integration and interdependence lay the basis for countries seeking solutions to security problems through co-operation because economic integration is in itself a form of confidence building and institution building mechanism. So once economically well integrated countries can easily advance to peacekeeping initiatives as a united front. As pointed out above, the reluctance of the SADC member states to relinquish sovereignty in some important decision-making areas and the resultant conflict between national and regional interests impede the region from implementing a fully developed collaborative approach to security and economic development.

CHAPTER FIVE

5. CONCLUSION

International Peacekeeping has grown in importance in the post-cold war era, not only as a task for the UN, but for regional organisations as well. Similar to many other regional organisations around the globe, SADC is confronted by the challenge of keeping peace in its domain as the UN is gradually delegating responsibilities in this regard. The solidarity that countries of Southern Africa demonstrated against apartheid under the former SADCC, and the emergence of South Africa as an important player in the region and internationally have raised hopes that SADC will succeed in conflict resolution where other organisations in Africa have failed. However, the region still has profound problems to overcome before achieving a comprehensive regional security regime.

Security is one of the most complex issues in international relations because it relates to almost all aspects of human life in one way or another. The different levels of security identified in this thesis include individual, national and regional security concerns. All these levels are closely related and interdependent, even though there are tensions between them. Tension between the individual and the state is based on the fact that much as the state is the guarantor of security, especially in relation to sources of insecurity which emanate from the international system, and those related to provision of welfare and protection through the maintenance of law and order, it can also be a threat to the security of individual citizens. This results in a paradox between individual and state security.

In the same way as the expanded definition of security points to the multifaceted nature of individual security including such features as potential environmental and economic threats to security, this investigation sees peacekeeping as closely connected to other components of security such as the alleviation of poverty, development of communication systems throughout the region, and economic development in general. These factors are important because without them independent and substantial peacekeeping may be difficult if not impossible. Peacekeeping is increasingly going beyond deployment of troops to include “law and order peacekeeping” which involves such activities as post war state-building due to a noticeable shift of frequency from international wars to intra-national wars (Doyle et al. 1997). This has further complicated peacekeeping, in that peacekeeping operations now have to combine police, military and civilian elements to be able to address problems of civil wars.

The thesis accepts the new security paradigm in that it concedes that economic development can be understood as a way of conflict prevention in Southern Africa, and as a basis for successful resolution of such conflicts as do occur. However, the thesis has argued that the new security agenda can be understood within the Realist paradigm because the increase of non-military sources of national security has closely bound individual security to that of the state. National interest as defined by Realism has been instructive in explaining why countries become involved in peacekeeping in Southern Africa. This points to the importance of maintaining the analytical utility of the state and of national interest in international relations. It is within this context therefore, that this thesis has attempted to spell out the political and economic context of South Africa's involvement in regional peacekeeping initiatives.

It is of great importance to the country itself and to the region as a whole for the Republic to strengthen its gradual but evident move towards a fully developed (maximalist) approach towards involvement in the region. The country's involvement in the institution-building processes in the region, its participation in resolving the Lesotho crises of 1994 and its call for SADC's response to the Great Lakes region crisis in 1996, inter alia, bear testimony to this fact. Perhaps a prominent event in which the Republic demonstrated its wherewithal to play a leadership role in the region was in its diplomatic attempts to end the former Zairean civil war through peaceful means in 1997, even though this was not directly connected to the SADC region as such.

The minimalist-maximalist debate in South Africa has informed this discussion in that, at one level it points to the internal concerns which restrain the country's foreign policy towards playing a leadership role in regional peacekeeping, while at another level it indicates that it is in the country's national interest to engage in regional affairs, particularly in peacekeeping initiatives in Southern Africa. It has also provided insights into the dynamics which influence the country's foreign policy decisions in this regard.

The fact that the Republic and other SADC countries engage in regional endeavours in their pursuit of various and at times differing national interests results in tension between national and regional concerns. This is underpinned by these countries' reluctance to relinquish sovereignty on some important decision-making areas. Future research could be directed into establishing the best way through which this tension can be addressed without upsetting the pursuit of national interest by individual countries on the one hand, and preservation and enrichment of regional development and

co-operation on the other.

The contention of this thesis is that South Africa has to be involved in regional peacekeeping initiatives as a matter of national interest. As pointed out above, the trading pattern between the Republic and all other SADC member countries favours Pretoria much more than its trade relationship with the developed countries in that it generates a trade surplus in its trade with the region and a negative balance of trade when trading with the countries of the North. This is not the only benefit in this field because Southern Africa serves as the investment site for South African firms and farmers. Furthermore, the Republic also imports important resources from neighbouring countries. Water is one of these resources and it is one of those which would be difficult and expensive to import from far afield. Clearly, if there was a major disturbance caused by either a civil war or a war between two countries in the region, it would most certainly disrupt the smooth flow of trade between the Republic and the region. Besides, as an integral part and centre of a region so closely intertwined in terms of geographical location, security concerns and transport communication systems, to name but a few, South African security is closely related to that of the region. Thus any disturbance of peace and security in the region can and does have a profound impact on the security of the country in one way or another. It is for these reasons among others therefore that the thesis has argued that it is imperative for South Africa to be in the forefront of the efforts to build a regional peacekeeping capacity to prevent any form of disturbance of peace and security in the region.

As a regional hegemon with ambitions to play a significant role in world politics, and a possible contender for a seat on the UN Security Council, South Africa should not just play a role but should

be seen to be playing a leadership role in its immediate region with regard to peacekeeping because outside of ensuring its own security, this will improve its image on the African continent and ultimately in the international system as a whole. This way it could launch itself into world politics as an African power enjoying support from other African countries across the continent. Involvement in regional peacekeeping initiatives in Southern Africa as argued in the preceding chapters, is one prominent way through which the Republic can stamp its authority in world politics. It is arguable therefore that the Southern African region is the gate-way to a more important role in international relations for the Republic.

A logical conclusion to the argument that has been presented in this thesis is that it is certainly in South Africa's interest to participate at a higher (maximal) level in regional peacekeeping initiatives. Of course, as pointed out in the preceding chapters, this will require compromises and sacrifices in order to achieve medium and long term political and economic goals. In short, the answer to the question that this thesis set to investigate, that, "Should South Africa be involved in regional peacekeeping initiatives, despite the urgent domestic demand to redress socio-economic disparities which were caused by apartheid?" is yes, it is of crucial importance for the Republic to become involved in the region because there are benefits to be had if it participates.

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