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TITLE.

A Critical Study of the Evidence of Andries
Stockenström before the Aborigines Committee
in 1835, Viewed in the light of his State-
ments and Policies before 1835.

A Thesis for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by

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PREFACE.

In recent years, increasing interest has been taken in the career of Andries Stockenstrom. Detailed study of his policy as Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet, as Commissioner-general of the Eastern Districts, and as Lieutenant-Governor, has brought about a realization of the soundness and value of much of his work.

This appreciation of the sterling qualities of Stockenstrom's character - despite his undoubtedly difficult temperament - has led to the tacit assumption that the accusations which were levelled against him, and the odium in which he was held in Albany, after his evidence before the Aborigines Committee in 1835-1836, were largely the result of an unfortunate newspaper propaganda. That evidence, it is implied - coming, as it did, at a time when public opinion was peculiarly sensitive to criticism - was, in fact, not as black as it has been painted.

Yet the events of the period between the Commissioner-Generalship and the Lieutenant-Governorship have not only coloured the judgment upon Stockenstrom of almost every writer on South African history, but so influenced contemporary public opinion as materially to impair the efficiency of his Lieutenant-Governorship.

In writing this thesis, it has been my purpose to make a detailed study of such material as is available for the period 1833-1836, and to endeavour, by an analysis of the evidence more particularly in the light of the years before 1833, to set this significant period in Stockenstrom's career in its right perspective.

CHAPTER I.

The Historiography of the Question.

(i) The Contemporary Press:

The controversy about Stockenstrom, which raged among private individuals and writers on South African history for some seventy years, had its origins in the contemporary press and the battle of words between John Fairbairn, editor of the South African Commercial Advertiser, and Robert Godlonton, editor of the Graham's Town Journal. Indeed, had it not been for Godlonton's sensitiveness in all matters touching the honour of the Eastern Frontier, the question of Stockenstrom's evidence might have died a natural death long since. Fairbairn set the ball rolling when, on 2 December 1835, he published the first part of Stockenstrom's evidence, with the remark that it "requires no comment." The evidence of Aitchison, Stockenstrom and Phillips on frontier affairs, (1) he had said in November,

contains nothing new to us or to our readers. These three witnesses, the most competent as to matters of fact that could be found, confirm our statements down to the most minute particulars, and prove that the late war, so far from being an "unprovoked and treacherous" invasion on the part of the Caffers, was dragged down upon the heads of the colonists by a series of measures on the part of the late Colonial Governors and Frontier Authorities, so cruel, unjust, and preposterous, that we can scarcely believe them to be the acts of rational beings. Truth however, is at last triumphant...

In a scathing editorial on 17 December 1835, Godlonton took up the cudgels. Publishing the available sections of Stockenstrom's evidence, he wrote:

There are two or three reasons, and to our minds very cogent ones, why we should not attach that importance to this evidence which, from the position of the witness, it would otherwise seem to deserve. For instance we find the principle contended for, and the practice of the narrator at utter variance.

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- (1) South African Commercial Advertiser. (henceforth cited as SACA), 25.11.35.
 (2) Graham's Town Journal. (henceforth cited as GTJ.) 17.12.1835.

This became the increasingly acrid burthen of the Graham's Town Journal until the end of the Lieutenant-Governorship, and the proving of it the self-imposed task of Godlonton as publicity-agent-in-chief, of Jarvis, Norton, Thompson and other leading citizens of Grahams-town.

The change in the Journal's attitude to Stockenström is marked. Before the end of 1835, when he achieved notoriety through its pages, references to Stockenström are few and far between. But the inference to be drawn from them is, that although the Commissioner-Generalship was regarded as a useless sinecure, no stigma attached to Stockenström himself because of it. ⁽³⁾ The Kat River Settlement is quoted in several editorials as an example of successful policy, and notably in that of 17 April, 1835. Discussing the wisdom of a policy of a close settlement of Frontier villages as a means of defence, Godlonton quotes in full and with approval, Stockenström's regulations for the Kat River Settlement, adding:

All the experience and local knowledge of the Commissioner-General were brought into exercise in founding this settlement, and it is but just to that officer to say that his views were comprehensive and correct, and that subsequent events have shown the soundness of his opinions.

Apart from this, there are few direct references to Stockenström. Nevertheless, Godlonton early made it his policy frequently to bring the government's frontier policy under fire. And a general reading of his editorials,

(3) A reference to the Commissioner-Generalship in the editorial of 1 May 1835 seems to imply criticism of the government rather than of Stockenström: "...as a substitute ((i.e. for a Lieutenant-Governor)) and on the score of economy, a Commissioner-General was appointed, who appears to have been occupied almost exclusively during his brief authority by the formation of a Hottentot settlement and in galloping to and from Cape Town. Thanks to our rulers he before fixing his domicile amongst us, was also 'laid upon the shelf', and the colony is now called upon to pay a pension of £300 per annum for the benefits derived thereto from this gentleman's eminent services!"

from the middle of 1832 until the outbreak of the Frontier war of 1834 - 1835, reveals an interesting fact: there is scarcely a characteristic feature of Stockenstrom's view of the Frontier problem which does not appear in Godlonton's discussions.

(4) Even a random selection produces the following points: the necessity for a vagrant law (G.T.J. 1.11.32); the need to have "men of probity and sound judgment" amongst the farmers to ensure that "every proceeding is taken consonant to the rules of strict and impartial justice" in regard to the frontier, (G.T.J. 13.12.32); that the chiefs could be held responsible for thefts of cattle on the part of their subjects (G.T.J. 27.6.33); that there were chiefs ready and willing to co-operate in keeping the peace on the frontier e.g. Pato, Kama and Congo (G.T.J. 19.9.33); that it was unjust and unreasonable to expect innocent chiefs to pay for the crimes of those over whom they could exercise no control, or to embroil themselves with more remote fellow chiefs purely from a love of justice and affection to the colony, (G.T.J. 27.3.34).

When Cole revived Macartney's Commando ordinance of 1797, Godlonton had much of interest to say: (G.T.J. 27.6.33) Commandos were a retrograde measure and should only be undertaken as a last resort - "we do not now view the Caffers as a 'perpetual enemy', but rather as a people with whom it is greatly to our advantage to maintain friendly relations..." He quoted with warm approval from Lord Charles Somerset "That on his part he is prepared to punish any colonist who shall commit the most trifling offence against the Caffer people, and that it is but just in return that the Caffer chiefs should, on their parts, seek out and punish those who commit depredations and murders in our territory." And he suggested that immediate steps should be taken to "bind the chiefs in an equitable engagement to prohibit aggression and to punish delinquents." Since the integrity of a Kaffir was "at present, a mere matter of 'moonshine,'" "let an accredited agent be on the spot, and let him see that the stipulations of such an engagement are punctually fulfilled, and that the property of the Colonists is duly respected." In the event of contumacy or infringement of treaty, let them be dealt with as we should deal with any other state under such circumstances; and on every occasion let our motives be publicly avowed, and redress rigidly enforced."

The one major point of difference in Godlonton's and Stockenstrom's ideas here seems to be, that Godlonton insisted that confiscation of Caffer cattle was necessary in order to convince the chiefs that it was in their interest to check depredations.

In G.T.J. 20.2.34, there were further significant points, viz.: that necessity - drought, and shortage of milk in winter, drove the kaffirs to plunder, and that they were too often tempted to this by "the careless manner in which cattle are suffered to roam the country without being guarded by proper attendants;" and that the use of commandos and military force to overawe the kaffirs afforded only a temporary solution, and must eventually lead to retaliation. (This also in G.T.J. 13.2.34).

And in G.T.J. 15.5.34, Godlonton expressed the opinion that the commando system was full of defects and subject to flagrant abuses.

The general tenor of his comments is fairly summed up in an editorial in February 1834. ⁽⁵⁾ Having dealt witheringly with "A Frontier Farmer," who, breathed out fire and slaughter upon the treacherous Kaffirs, urging commandos and a policy of force as the only method of dealing with the Frontier problem, Godlonton wrote:

When we find a system radically bad we cannot expect it to work well... The system adopted towards the Caffers is radically bad, inasmuch as it is not based on admitted principles of mutual faith and of national policy. We have adopted a system of our own, but the Caffers are no party to it, nor do they understand it: make them a party - let a sound system be adopted with reciprocal advantages - and then let the terms of the engagement be punctually observed on both sides, or let a breach of it be promptly and rigidly punished. Were we to act upon well understood principles of this character, we have little doubt but the property of our farmers would be secure...

When, a propos of this editorial, the Commercial Advertiser professed to be "happy to find, from the tone lately assumed by the Graham's Town Journal, that the principles which it had always advocated, and the views which it had always endeavoured to enforce, were beginning to find a resting-place in the minds of the Frontier Colonists, ⁽⁶⁾ Godlonton was prompt to set his contemporary ⁽⁷⁾ right.

"...the very opinions now put forth by the Commercial Advertiser," he wrote, "have been precisely those from which we have never varied one jot or tittle."

This he proceeded to prove by quotations dating back to the 27th number of the Journal, concluding:

"It appears to us that the main point on which we differ with some others who have written on the subject is with regard to Caffer character."

All of which would seem to make the marked difference in the reaction of the Commercial Advertiser and the

(5) GTJ 13.2.34.

(6) See reference to SACA 22.2.34 in GTJ 6.3.34.

(7) GTJ 6.3.34.

Journal to Stockenström's evidence before the Aborigines Committee, and his subsequent policy as Lieutenant-Governor, somewhat odd.

At any rate, in December 1835, ⁽⁸⁾ Godlonton, confronted with Fairbairn's acceptance at its face value of Stockenström's evidence, took leave "on this subject, as on many others, to differ from him most essentially." Seizing first upon Stockenström's references to the "encroachments of the whites towards the East,"

"was it," Godlonton enquired, with delicate venom, "the compunctions twinges of conscience, or was it that waywardness of the human mind, which sometimes leads a man to kick down the stepping stone by which he has risen to a certain elevation, when it can be of no further service, that could induce him to denounce as unjust a system by which he and several members of his family ⁽⁹⁾ have been enriched by the colonial government?"

So much for the "practice of the narrator." The editor furthermore engaged "to demolish the objectionable part of the honourable Capt. Stockenström's Evidence, by his own recorded testimony, now in our possession."

This "recorded testimony" proved to be a despatch written by Stockenström on 14 September 1823, ⁽¹⁰⁾ extracts from which Godlonton published, together with Stockenström's answers to questions 525 and 595, in parallel columns. ⁽¹¹⁾

(8) GTJ 17.12.35.

(9) A reference to Stockenström's grant of land on the Kaga, described by Godlonton as "the most valuable grant of land ever made on this Frontier."

(10) It was quoted by "Observer" in the 23rd of his series of letters to the Journal. GTJ 24.12.35. "Observer" was Donald Moodie, who had for sometime been contributing letters on Frontier affairs, and in this one was engaged in demolishing certain assertions in Fringle's Narrative of a Residence in South Africa.

The parallel between the two sets of extracts is not startlingly apparent. More to the point are the comments (12) on the answer to question 595 in the following editorial, where Stockenstrom's despatches from the actual period (13) (1821) are quoted. These refer to disturbed conditions

(11) Question 525. Was it an arbitrary line, (boundary), or was it by any agreement or inquiry?

Answer actually given.

"It was the object of the govt. to control further encroachments on the part of the whites against the Kafirs and other native tribes."

In Terms of the Letter.

"To expect that men in respectable circumstances should tamely submit to being plundered DAY AFTER DAY, and to see their lives and those of their families in constant danger from savages whose existence almost depends on our forbearance, without one single effort to save themselves from beggary and destruction would be exacting too great a sacrifice of natural feeling."

Again: Question 595 is as follows:- Did any Kafir irruption take place during the two years (viz. 1820 and 1821) of Sir Rufane Donkin's Govt.?

Answer Actually given.

"I cannot answer that:- I was magistrate at Graaff-Reinet. I was upon the spot with Sir Rufane Donkin, and formerly with Lord Charles Somerset, but being at Graaff-Reinet in the interval, I had no connection with the frontier."

In Terms of the Letter.

"That we have something very serious to expect very soon on the part of the Kafirs no one will doubt, but that their attempts will be attributable to the late insignificant party and their proceedings might have been admitted, if the Kafirs had EVER SINCE THE TREATY of 1819 adhered strictly thereto, and we been the aggressors; but will not bear a moment's argument when the depredations and murders perpetrated FOR SUCH A LENGTH OF TIME BACK, the report of the deserters some time ago about the reconciliation of all parties in Kafirland and their concerted plans of operation, together with OUR LONG EXPERIENCE OF THE TREACHEROUS DISPOSITION OF THE KAFIRS, give every one the assurance that the massacres and plunderings of 1819 would be repeated the first opportunity."

For Theal's use of this passage, see infra p.19.

(12) CTJ 21.1.36.

(13) Stockenstrom's despatches to Bird 13.2.21, 28.2.21, 23.3.21, and 11.9.21 are quoted.

in the Tarka - Baviaans River area, and to investigations by Field-Cornet van Wyk into depredations committed by the Kaffirs in his division, showing that, apparently contrary to his statement in answer 595, Stockenstrom was, in fact, in contact with frontier conditions and aware of disturbances in the upper section of the frontier area.

From this time, Godlonton made the Journal the chief organ of the demand for an inquiry "on the spot" into the "injurious charges" made against the conduct and character of the colonists. (14) And he wielded tongue as well as pen in the interests of his compatriots. At the Public meeting on 23 January 1836, he proposed the second Resolution, to the effect that, while a "just and firm" policy ought to be adopted towards the neighbouring tribes, it should never be pursued at the expense of the best interests of "a peaceful and industrious community of British subjects;" and that "the evidence of a few persons who are casually in England, is not sufficient to enable the Committee to take that comprehensive and just view of the subject, to which the inhabitants of this frontier consider themselves to be entitled, and who can only be satisfied by the fullest and most ample investigation." (15)

This resolution, together with others, to the effect that the "most objectionable" part of the evidence was that of Captain Stockenstrom, and that, since public investigation had completely demolished the most serious

(14) See the notice of the Public meeting. GTJ 21.1.36.

(15) See account of meeting in GTJ 28.1.36. George Jarvis, the notary public, Edward Norton J.P., W.R. Thompson and Godlonton himself seem to have been the leading spirits.

(16)
charge in that evidence, a similar severe enquiry, carried on at the Cape by impartial persons appointed by the British Government, might be expected to produce similar satisfactory results, was duly embodied in a petition to Lord Glenelg. To this 700 signatures were appended, and the inhabitants of Graham's Town, with pleasing faith in the innate justice of the Home Government, sat down to await developments. (17)

Godlonton meanwhile stoked the fires of outraged patriotism with practised hand. Commenting on the Public meeting, he gave voice to the interpretation which rumour was already placing upon Stockenstrom's alleged change of face. The events of the week, he wrote, showed "that the inhabitants of this Frontier are fully on the alert to defend themselves against every opponent; that they are determined not to suffer anyone with impunity to elevate himself to worldly distinction on their ruin." (18)

Two weeks later, he published Stockenstrom's evidence of 28 August 1835, and openly challenged Captain Alexander to state whether his "first hasty and crude impressions" contained in the letters quoted in that evidence, were "borne out by his subsequent experience." Captain Alexander's reply, entirely disowning his former sentiments, Godlonton received gleefully in the issue of 3 March. For Captain Alexander had effectively disposed of the inadmissible evidence which Stockenstrom had deliberately used "in order to bolster up that fabrick of falsehood which had been constructed to answer the dishonest purpose of those to whom, in an evil day, he had imprudently lent himself." (19)

(16) This was a reference to Campbell's investigations into the charges against Erasmus and his party of the murder of Zeko in 1830. Jarvis, who proposed this resolution, had come to the meeting armed with the information gleaned at the inquiry, with which he refuted Stockenstrom's charges.

(17) See GTJ account, 4.2.36.

(18) GTJ 28.1.36.

(19) GTJ 11.2.36.

On 24 February, Godlonton disclosed that rumours from London had it that Stockenstrom's "ardent solici-
 tations for place" ⁽²⁰⁾ were to be complied with, but "we do not believe any thing so egregiously absurd will be ~~xxxxxx~~ ~~xxxx~~ ~~xx~~ attempted." When, late in April, the appointment of "Andrew Stockenstrom, the immaculate" as Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Province became known, the horror and indignation of the Journal knew no bounds. No colonist, Godlonton maintained, should ever have been appointed to such a position, much less "an individual whose public statements respecting them - though entirely at variance with his own official acts and correspondence - have been so detrimental to their present and future interests."

And then, explicitly, what was perhaps always the crux of the matter: "With Captain Stockenstrom for a Lieutenant-Governor, what right, we ask, have the inhabitants of this frontier to expect compensation for losses by the Kafir irruption?" ⁽²²⁾

"The inhabitants of this colony," Godlonton declaimed, "demand justice..."

Thus spurred on, the Graham's Town public was indeed stirred to action. Sixty-five inhabitants requested the holding of a public meeting to petition the government to suspend Stockenstrom from office until the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry on the spot. ⁽²³⁾

(20) In GTJ 7.4.36, Godlonton described Stockenstrom as a "confessed place-hunter clinging in the most ludicrous but pertinacious manner to the skirts of the representative of the philanthropists in England - Mr. Fowell Buxton."

(21) GTJ 28.4.36.

(22) W. Thompson, at the Public meeting, had expressed the same fear, that Stockenstrom's evidence, if accepted would mean the loss of all hope of compensation.

(23) GTJ 28.4.36. The petition was published in GTJ 12.5.36.

Correspondents aired their views on Stockenstrom in vituperative letters to the Journal.⁽²⁴⁾ And even in Graaff-Reinet an anti-Stockenstrom petition was said to be incirculation.⁽²⁵⁾

To the Governor's decision not to allow the Public Meeting, the Journal bowed, dutifully, albeit by no means silently.⁽²⁶⁾ But a note warned the Lieutenant-Governor of Godlonton's intention of affording him from time to time "such an opportunity of recalling past occurrences as will convince him of the necessity of affording such explanations on his late proceedings as the public have a right to expect and demand."

Godlonton was as good as his word. Demands for an inquiry into the charges against the colonists, references to Stockenstrom's earlier statements on frontier affairs and the character of the Kaffirs and colonists, and insinuations - subtle or otherwise - that Stockenstrom in 1835 toed the philanthropic line because he knew it would lead him to high office, recur constantly in the pages of the Journal during this period.⁽²⁷⁾ And in July, when Fairbairn finally charged into the lists as the champion of Stockenstrom, with the notorious editorial of 6 July,⁽²⁸⁾ Godlonton was scornfully explicit:

The twaddle about the abilities of our Lieutenant Governor, his public services, and the motives of the ministry in his appointment, is quite as deceptive as the rest of this production. Will anybody believe that any thing short of a coalition with Mr. Buxton, would have procured Capt. Stockenstrom the appointment he now holds?

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- (24) e.g. Miles in GTJ 9.5.36; A.B. in GTJ 16.5.36.
 (25) GTJ 26.5.36.
 (26) GTJ 26.5.36.
 (27) e.g. GTJ 6.6.36; 23.6.36; 6.7.36; 21.7.36; 4.8.36; 18.8.36.
 (28) Which led to the Chase and Moodie libel cases against Fairbairn.

A far cry indeed from the opinions of April 1835.

What, meanwhile, had Fairbairn had to say to all this? To the storm of indignation at Stockenstrom's "inconsistency" which broke forth in the Journal, he (29) replied, peacefully enough: "...when the whole of his Evidence comes before the public, his friends will see that their apprehensions for his reputation are groundless."

Fairbairn went on to point out that Stockenstrom had entered into public life at a very early age, shortly after his father had been murdered by Kaffirs. He knew them then only as "the Enemy." But, as he grew older, and came to study the frontier problem "with a view to practice," his opinions underwent "a material change" - a change which, said Fairbairn, Stockenstrom had "frankly avowed." And while he condemned former proceedings, he by no means refused to bear his own share of the blame. "In what other way could any man of honor be expected to act?" (30)

Indeed, throughout the first six months of 1836, the Commercial Advertiser entered hardly at all into the fury of the Journal. The Graham's Town Public meeting of 23 January did come in for a certain amount of sardonic comment. (31) Fairbairn contended that all the evidence condemned most pointedly "the system," and that the Graham's Town folk were, in fact, making a great ado about nothing at all.

It was not until July - after the arrival of Stockenstrom at the Cape - (32) that the Commercial Advertiser

(29) SACA 13.1.36.

(30) A letter from "A friend to Capt. Stockenstrom" in the same issue enlarges upon this point of view.

(31) SACA 6.2.36.

(32) The Lord William Bentinck docked on 3 July 1836, but Stockenstrom was quarantined for six weeks and did not land.

began to adopt anything approaching the indignant tones of the Journal. Then, indeed, Fairbairn sallied forth to the fray hurling insults in good earnest. His scarcely-veiled allusions to the machinations of Chase and Moodie, in the editorial of 6 July, led to the libel cases of 1837, both of which Fairbairn lost. (33) On 30 July came the first of the insinuations that Stockenstrom's "enemies" had an interest in keeping up a disturbance on the frontier and preventing the abolition of the old "system" - that, in fact, the investigations into the Zeko incident were part of a "criminal conspiracy" (34) against the "life and honor of the Lieutenant-Governor," organized by a pack of gun-runners and war profiteers on the Eastern Frontier. (35)

Meanwhile, the instalment of Stockenstrom's evidence in which he stated that British settlers, as well as Dutch Boers, "very often" served on commandos (36) had been received in Graham's Town with wrath and indignation. No sooner had Stockenstrom arrived there than he was presented by W. Thompson, on behalf of the inhabitants of Graham's Town, with an address, couched in suitably respectful terms, but demanding to know whether he had intended to create before the Committee the impression that the actions of the colonists as a whole had brought the war upon the colony, and whether he could prove any instances where the frontiersmen in general, and the British settlers of Albany in particular, had acted inconsistently with the British name and character as a community,

(33) Chase vs Fairbairn decided in favour of Chase, February 1837. Moodie vs Fairbairn decided in favour of Moodie, May 1837.

(34) See SACA 13.8.36.

(35) SACA 30.7.36 and 3.8.36. This was, of course, the "ocean of rascality" of Stockenstrom's irascible latter years.

(36) Q. 1090 -1094.

had justified the native tribes in attacking them, or had derived any advantage from frontier wars. (37)

Stockenstrom's refusal to accept this address was received by Fairbairn with approval, and in Graham's Town as usual, with a demand for a Public meeting. (38)

Godlonton was again to the fore. Together with E. Norton, W. Thompson and L.H. Meurant, he addressed a highly excited meeting, which denounced Stockenstrom's rejection of the address as unconstitutional, unequivocally denied that British settlers "very often" served in commandos or in any way participated in "those atrocities which he has described as being of frequent occurrence on such expeditions" (this was Godlonton's own contribution), (39) once again demanded a "full and impartial enquiry into every allegation" which had been made to their prejudice, and resolved to publish their address and resolutions in the leading London and Cape newspapers. (40)

Commenting on the Graham's Town address, Fairbairn gave an analysis of his interpretation of the evidence, the gist of which was that Stockenstrom, while roundly condemning the old Patrol system as naturally leading to violence, blood and retaliation, and pointing out the dangerous opportunities it offered for false assertions of theft in order to gain cattle (cases of which had been known), stated that "the great body of the colonists" were not included in this censure. (41) Stockenstrom's evidence, he asserted, had simply been made the pretext

(37) GTJ 8.9.36.

(38) On the grounds that the "indefeasible rights" of the colonists "do not create you judge and jury in a cause in which you are pleased to constitute yourself plaintiff, and me defendant." This reply appeared in GTJ 8.9.36.

(39) See account in GTJ 8.9.36.

(40) It was at this meeting that Godlonton received his crown of glory, in the form of a vote of thanks for the zeal he had manifested in "maintaining unsullied the character of the British settlers from the puny attempts of those who had busily and secretly endeavoured to cast odium on it."

(41) SACA 21.9.36.

(42) Fairbairn had made the same points, in less detail in SACA 16.7.36.

for "all this clamour and indecent outrage," under the influence of "the most disloyal and factious resentments."

Godlonton contented himself with facetious comments on the addresses in favour of Stockenstrom, drawn up by the inhabitants of Beaufort West, Graaff-Reinet and other areas. On 6 October he published "the real Graaff-Reinet address," and Stockenstrom's reply on 27 October. On this he commented:

(43)

We have seen it asserted that His Honor had been led to alter materially his former opinions, but we are glad to find it stated, under his own hand, that this is not founded in truth, and that he can still offer the principles upon which he formerly acted as a guarantee for the future.

This was by no means the end of the story. True to his promise, Godlonton let slip no opportunity of recalling Stockenstrom's earlier statements on frontier affairs. (44) On the whole, however, during 1837 the flames died down, or paled before matters of such vital moment as Stockenstrom's actual policies on the frontier, the prospects of compensation from England, and the enormities of Lord Glenelg's despatches. They flared up again in June 1837, when the case of Moodie vs Fairbairn - which Godlonton represented as, in fact, the case of "The Public versus Capt. Stockenstrom" (45) - was under discussion. And in March 1838, (46) when Stockenstrom lost his case against Campbell for conspiracy, they culminated in a triumphant blaze, round which the Journal executed intermittent waltzes until the Lieutenant-Governor's departure on leave of absence in August, 1838.

(43) Presumably a reference to SACA 13.1.36. Vide supra.

(44) e.g. GTJ 19.1.37.

(45) GTJ 15.6.1837.

(46) See GTJ 8.3.38: "Glorious Triumph of Truth!"

So much, then, for the contemporary Press. It is difficult to find a clear path through the maze of mutual recriminations which confuse the issue. However, the main features of the two opposing points of view emerge fairly distinctly.

Godlonton and his supporters maintained that Stockenstrom in his evidence not only refrained from disputing the Philip interpretation of frontier affairs and the causes of the war of 1835, but deliberately produced evidence which he must have known to be untrue or invalid, in order to lend colour to the philanthropist point of view and blacken the colonists in the eyes of the British Government. Not only could his statements on specific instances, such as the Zeko affair, be refuted, but his general statements of opinion on Frontier affairs could be shown to be utterly inconsistent with his previous opinions and policies - which was proved by constant comparison of his statements as Landdrost with the views expressed before the Committee. And this extraordinary change of face, they asserted, could be explained by the fact that Stockenstrom believed that in a Parliament dominated by Exeter Hall, where Philip and Buxton constantly had the ear of the Secretary for Colonies, his only hope of gratifying his ardent ambition for high office was to toe the philanthropic line.

Initially, Fairbairn took a more balanced view of the whole issue. He maintained that Stockenstrom's views on frontier policy had indeed undergone a material change - but not suddenly when he appeared before the Aborigines Committee. The change had occurred when he came into direct and continued contact with frontier affairs. From that time on, Fairbairn asserted, his

statements of opinion in regard to the old frontier system and his statements on specific incidents, were entirely consistent with those so fearlessly made before the Aborigines Committee, as was proved by the fact that Stockenstrom relied upon his despatches to back up his statements, and frequently referred the Committee to them. Moreover, Fairbairn contended that Stockenstrom, far from attempting to blacken his fellow-colonists, defended them as a body, while revealing the abuses to which the old system could and did give rise. His appointment to office, according to Fairbairn, was a natural result of his experience and acknowledged abilities. If there were any change of face involved, it was a most gratifying one on the part of the British Government, which could at last see fit to appoint to high office a colonist of liberal principles of long standing.

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(ii) The Verdict of the Historians:

What have the writers on South African history, confronted with these two diametrically opposed judgments on Stockenstrom, had to say? In general, where they refer to him, they fall into two main groups: either they accept Godlonton's interpretation, or they avoid all controversial points - presumably in order not to become involved, or because they do not consider wider issues to be materially affected. Only two make any real attempt at an independent understanding or explanation of Stockenstrom's position.

The war of 1846 caused Godlonton to burst into print with his pamphlet, The Case of the Colonists.⁽⁴⁷⁾ His references to Stockenstrom again strike the familiar note - and this despite the fact that Stockenstrom, by his services as Commandant of the burgher forces during the campaign, was said to have "reinstated himself" in the opinion of his compatriots.⁽⁴⁸⁾ Godlonton describes how Stockenstrom, "one on whom rested the hopes of the colonists", when called upon, through the influence of Buxton's philanthropist group, to answer certain queries in reference to the treatment of the native tribes, was induced, in an evil hour, to "make statements reflecting on the inhabitants, both Dutch and English, which he found subsequently could neither be defended on sound principles nor supported by admitted fact."⁽⁴⁹⁾ The outbreak of war, and his summons to appear before a Committee to give information on the subjects upon which

(47) Case of the Colonists of the Eastern Frontier of the Cape of Good Hope, in reference to the Kaffir wars of 1835-36 and 1846. Grahamstown, 1879. (First edition 1847.) pp. 22, 23. (Henceforth cited as Case of the Colonists.)

(48) See, for example, G.M. Theal: History of South Africa. London. 1908. (henceforth cited as Theal) Vol.III, 10 - 11.

he had written, "placed him in a dilemma." But Stockenstrom made his election, boldly fell back upon his written statements, and took his place among the philanthropists - whom Godlonton had described as afflicted with "a species of monomania." Thus Stockenstrom "persisted in advancing in that path of error upon which he had in an evil moment so rashly ventured."

This finds an echo in J.C. Chase's Annals of the Cape of Good Hope of 1869. (50) Stockenstrom is referred to as "a colonist of great natural ability, but who it was understood had of late given evidence against his fellow countrymen, although hitherto classed among their patriots." (51) And, later, there is a reference to Glenelg's appointment of Stockenstrom who "from some inexplicable, or perhaps explicable, causes had suddenly fallen into the extreme views of that statesman." (52) However, apart from these dark allusions, there is no discussion of Stockenstrom's evidence. (53)

The fullest exponent of Godlonton's interpretation, is George McCall Theal. His summing up of the situation, (54) being full of food for thought, is worth quoting verbatim:

(49) This refers, presumably, to Stockenstrom's letter to Spring-Rice dated 5 November 1834. Printed in the Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements); together with the minutes of Evidence Appendix and Index, ordered to be printed 5 August 1836. (henceforth cited as A.C. minutes) pp. 117 - 123.

(50) History of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope from its discovery to the year 1819 by A. Wilmot, Esc. From 1820 to 1868 by the Hon. John Centlivres Chase M.L.C. Cape Town. 1869. (Henceforth cited as Wilmot and Chase.)

(51) Loc. cit. p. 332.

(52) Ibid. p. 335.

(53) The charges made by Stockenstrom Chase sums up in a footnote (p.336) "No. 1092 - 3 - 4 to which may be added his opinion of the 'Frontier farmers', who have gone into Kafirland pretending to have lost cattle, and taken cattle from Kafirs: lose cattle intentionally; make fraudulent representations of their losses. Military force of no use but to those parties who wish to plunder the Kafirs of their cattle."

(54) Theal. II, 138 - 139.

If it were possible to cut out of his life that portion commencing with the day on which he first appeared before the committee of the commons and ending with the day on which he became a baronet, his claim to be regarded as one of the worthiest of South African colonists would be disputed by no one. Both before and after that period he served his country well and faithfully. But during that time a shadow rests upon him, which neither he himself nor any of those who have attempted to give a favourable colour to his conduct has ever been able to remove.

The evidence that he gave was at variance not only with his own previous acts, but with his official reports and correspondence. This is incontrovertible, as has been shown by the publication of both in parallel columns. A man may change his opinions without any one having a right to blame him, but the case is different when he opposes his own statements of occurrences that come under his personal observation. This is the position in which Captain Stockenstrom placed himself.

Much in this passage will be commented upon in due course. In passing, however, it may be noted that the only instance of the publication of both evidence and official reports "in parallel columns" has already been cited. (55)

Theal goes on to discuss the motives which led Stockenstrom so to contradict all that had gone before in his career. (56) His conclusions, though somewhat more charitably expressed, are those of Godlonton. First he places ambition: Stockenstrom well knew that he had only to say what would please the party in power in England, and there was no position, lower than that of governor in the colony, to which he might not aspire. (57) Secondly, there was "strong pique": his mind warped by jealousy of Colonel Somerset and his outlook embittered by his own disadvantages when opposed to a man with powerful family influence, Stockenstrom seized the opportunity of denouncing as unjust and oppressive all

(55) See Chap. I. Footnote(11).

(56) Theal. II, 139 - 140.

(57) In the 1893 edition (History of South Africa 1834 - 1854) p.55. this appears as: "revenge."

that Somerset, as chief executive officer on the Eastern Frontier, had done. And finally, there was what Theal terms "self-delusion": it was, he says "as certain as anything human could be" that great changes were about to be made in the relationship between European and Bantu, and "why should not he endeavour to be that one, he who would deal more tenderly with his countrymen than a stranger would?"⁽⁵⁸⁾

To give Theal his due, he endeavours to be fair to Stockenstrom: he says that these influences cannot be ignored, but that it would not be right - without other ground than the accusations of his opponents, to state that one or all of them caused Stockenstrom to "turn round on his past career." Unfortunately, however, Theal himself evidently based his whole interpretation upon no other source than that of Stockenstrom's chief accuser.

His version of Stockenstrom's evidence on the Zeko incident is interesting.⁽⁵⁹⁾ In Stockenstrom's account, says Theal, the colonial force was represented as a "band of robbers and murderers." This statement created great indignation, because it was regarded as certain that Stockenstrom knew it to be untrue. Because of his jealousy of Colonel Somerset, Theal goes on to explain, Stockenstrom shortly after the occurrence reported "certain idle tales of some Hottentots" concerning the Zeko affair, to the proper authorities. When the matter was inquired into, the stories were found to be so flimsy that it was generally wondered at that a man who "had long acted as landdrost of Graaff-Reinet with the strictest justice and impartiality" could have accepted them.

(58) Stockenstrom himself by no means thought this "as certain as anything could be." But of this more anon.

(59) Theal. II, 140.

But the "resulting testimony" was sent to Wade in England "too late to be of use except for historical purposes." The accuracy of Theal's account may be judged of when the Zeko incident has been discussed.

Theal selects three other features of Stockenstrom's evidence to illustrate its nature: his statement on 19 August 1835 that he believed there were civilized nations in which the proportion of thieves was greater than amongst the Kaffirs; his repeated reference to Kaffirs who owned no allegiance to any chief - Theal asserts that no such people existed at that time; and his opinion that arrangements could be made by means of treaties with the chiefs, whereby robbery could be suppressed. Theal admits that some of his evidence is capable of being construed to mean that only a small minority of the colonists acted towards the Kaffirs in defiance of justice and humanity, and adds that his "apologists" have always endeavoured to show that this was its true import. But, he says, this was not the impression which, in its entirety, it made upon the people and press in England. There it was regarded as condemning the colonists in general as guilty of the most atrocious deeds. And no evidence could have been more gratifying to Mr. Buxton or Lord Glenelg.

In other words, Theal appears to have accepted Godlonton's version more-or-less in its entirety, and to have judged Stockenstrom accordingly. This view has never been subjected to thorough criticism since Theal expressed it, though later writers have in some cases modified it. The problem of the assumed hiatus in Stockenstrom's career is still untouched. And Theal's version crops up again and again.

(60) Theal II, 140 - 141.

Preller, for instance, accepts it quite uncritically, even blackening the outlines a little more. (61) Indeed, it is perhaps scarcely to be expected that Piet Retief's fiery biographer should present an unbiassed portrait of the promoter of the Glenelg system. (62) To him, Stockenstrom was "'n verengelste Afrikaner" out of whom no good thing could come. (63) He thunders forth:

"Deur ambiesie, wraaksug en eiewaan gediewe het hy die Engelse negrofiele op die kommissie letterlik voorgepraat, en sy mede-Afrikaners in hul handelingte ten opsigte van die Kaffers, afgeskilder in die swartste kleure - as 'n 'bende/rowers en moordenaars!"

Whatever the expectations of the colonists that Stockenstrom's appointment would bring mitigation of their grievances, Preller finally abandons him as "die willose 'instrument' in hande van die Engelse Kaffer-vrinde, klaarblyklik self 'n naturelle-politiek toegedaan wat lynreg in stryd was met sy vorige houding, en wat ook strydig moes gewees het met sy innerlike oortuiging as Afrikaner en man van gesonde verstand, sodat van hom niks meer te hope was nie." (65)

Both Prof. Eric Stockenstrom and Dr. S.F.N. Gie accept the view that Glenelg was strengthened in his prejudice against the colonists especially by the evidence of Stockenstrom and of Philip. Nathan, (66) following Theal, has it that Stockenstrom represented the colonial force employed in military operations on the frontier in 1830 as "a band of robbers and murderers," (67)

(61) Gustav S. Preller: Piet Retief: Lewensgeskiedenis van die Grote Voortrekker. Kaapstad, 1920. (Henceforth cited as Preller.) Preller quotes Theal's summing up on p.69.

(62) But Prof. J.L.M. Francken Retief's most recent biographer, manages it. See later discussion.

(63) Preller, p.52. Contrasting Retief and Stockenstrom, he writes: "Die een was 'n verengelste Afrikaner: die ander getrou aan sy eie volksaard en land."

(64) Preller, p.39.

(65) Preller, p.68.

(66) Eric Stockenstrom: Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika. 1928. Deel II, (Henceforth cited as Eric Stockenstrom) p.200

(67) S.F.N. Gie: Geskiedenis vir Suid-Afrika. 1927.

(68) Manfred Nathan: The Voortrekkers of South Africa South Africa and London 1937. p.11 for what follows.

but does not apply the phrase generally, as Preller does. He, too, says that the general impression created in England by Stockenstrom's evidence was that "the colonists were guilty of the most atrocious misdeeds." And he describes the Lieutenant-Governor as "an enthusiastic supporter of the policy of Lord Glenelg," though "in early life he had entertained and given effect to views of a vastly different kind."

(69)

Gie's version, however, does represent some criticism of Theal. He points out that Stockenstrom had "filantropiese neigings begin openbaar" before 1835, although he only adduces his share in ordinance 50 as evidence of this. But he comments that "sy getuienis in Engeland was selfsvir sy nuwe vriende 'n aangename verrassing en vir sy oues meer as 'n pynlike ontugtering. Hy het saamgepraat met die mense wat die boere die skuld vir die onluste op die grens gee, en sommige van sy uitdrukkings was bereken om die hele Boerevolk nog meer verdag te maak."

Gie admits that Stockenstrom did not apply such expressions as "Robbers and murderers" to all the colonists - but omits to note that, in fact, Stockenstrom never applied the actual phrase 'robbers and murderers' to the Colonists at all. Wherever it is used by him, it is with reference to natives. (70) And Gie hastens to add that, in any case, the philanthropists in England were not very eager to use their powers of discrimination.

Edgar Brookes has, in passing, some comments to offer on the "veteran quibbler". (71) Reviewing D'Urban's

(69) Gie p.288.

(70) A point which Prof. Francken has not failed to note. vide infra p. 41. Stockenstrom used the phrase - in his letter to Spring Rice on 5.11.34, (answer to Q.5, where he refers to putting down any "gang of marauders.") and in answer to questions 1052 and 1384

(71) Edgar H. Brookes: The History of Native Policy in South Africa from 1830 to the Present Day. Cape Town, 1924. (Henceforth cited as Brookes.)

(72)
 experiment in frontier policy, Brookes says that it failed "through the machinations of a South African, who found a Baronetcy of the United Kingdom and a Lieutenant-Governorship better than the confidence and regard of his fellow-countrymen."⁽⁷³⁾ Stockenstrom, he goes on to say, having received his reward, was asked to outline his views on native policy before the Aborigines Committee in February 1836. He stated that, in a new colony, he would buy certain tracts for settlers, and reserve others for natives, appropriating the purchase money of the settlers' tracts to the improvement and protection of the natives.⁽⁷⁴⁾ This statement, Brookes comments, is entitled to very little respect, since Stockenstrom elsewhere in the evidence stated⁽⁷⁵⁾ "with cha^{ra}cteristic want of logical consistency" that he would mix the European colonists with the aborigines if it were practicable. There is, however, a certain want of logical consistency in Brookes' own argument at this point, since he apparently failed to observe that, in the first case, Stockenstrom was referring to natives in new colonies, and in the second to the Hottentots in the Ceded Territory locations. But he concludes, "the Commons Committee heard what it wanted

(72) Brookes. pp. 324 - 325.

(73) On this point, a kindred spirit is J.H. Malan. (Boeren Barbaar of Die Lotgevallen van die Voortrekkers viral tussen die jare 1835 en 1840. Potchefstroom, 1913.) During this time, he says, Stockenstrom (whom he regarded as having been a "langjarige straf" for the colony ever since the days of Slachter's nek) was on a visit to England, and "met behulp viral van Dr. Philip, Pringle en andere, werd van die nobele Sir Benjamin D'Urban 'n swarte skaap gemaak." pp.59 - 60. M.A.S. Grundlingh (Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika: onder redaksie van A.J.H. van der Walt, J.A. Wiid, en A.L. Geyer. Kaapstad. 1951. Deel I.) expresses the same opinion, but creates the erroneous impression that Philip's propaganda campaign and his evidence before the Committee were contemporaneous with Stockenstrom's and that the two together were the deciding factor in Glenelg's reversal of D'Urban's Popular policy. pp.256 - 257.

(74) Quoted from A.C. Minutes sp.185. 12.2.36.

(75) A.C. Minutes Q. 2365, p. 248.

to hear. It accepted the evidence of the newly-fledged Baronet, and rejected the evidence of the experienced frontiersman, who joined to form one of the most extraordinary characters of our history." (76)

(77)
P. van Biljon does not discuss Stockenstrom's evidence, (78) beyond pointing out that questions put to the witnesses before the Aborigines Committee were often carefully framed so that the answers should confirm the philanthropist point of view. Q. 557, with Stockenstrom's answer, is quoted as an example of questions of this type on the ceded Territory. But van Biljon's attitude to Stockenstrom may be inferred from his comments on Stockenstrom's pleas to Glenelg that the ceded territory should not be abandoned. (79) Van Biljon considers that Stockenstrom was here merely concerned to protect his own interests in the Ceded Territory. He accepts J.M. Bowker's view that Stockenstrom, one of the first to obtain a farm in the Ceded Territory, later warmly advocated the Kat River Settlement because "hy die neder-setting wou gebruik om sy plaas Maastroom teen die aanvalle van Makomo te beskerm." And, quoting Bowker in a footnote, van Biljon comments: "Daar was dus selfs geen altuisime by 'n filantro^op-renegaat nie!"

Among the ranks of contemporary commentators, one writer supported Fairbairn's contention that Stockenstrom's attitude to frontier and native policy did undergo a radical change, but some time before he ever went to England. This was one "Justus," an extreme philanthropist, whose

(76) It is unfortunate for Brookes' metaphor that he was evidently unaware that the Baronetcy was only conferred at the end of the Lieutenant-Governorship.

(77) P. van Biljon: Grensbakens tussen Blank en Swart in Suid Afrika. 'n Historiese Ontwikkeling van grensbeleid en beleid van grondtoekenning aan die naturel in Suid Afrika. Kaapstad. Johannesburg. 1947. (Henceforth cited as van Biljon.)

(78) van Biljon, p. 113.

(79) van Biljon, p. 160.

(80)

Wrongs of the Caffre Nation stank in the nostrils of colonial patriots with all the stench of Philip and Pringle. (81)

Justus, however, significantly enough, does not wax altogether enthusiastic over Stockenstrom's evidence. Quoting and reviewing his statements of the Gaika treaties and the expulsion of Macomo, he comments that Stockenstrom "never seemed, at that time, to have heard or known that justice is a stronger wall for a frontier than mountains and valleys gained by rapine." (82) It gives him, he avers, (83) real pain thus to have to reveal "the aberrations of mind of one who ... is now, at least, the friend of the oppressed." With reference to the Zeko incident, Justus observes that this marks a period in Kaffir history when Stockenstrom appears the friend and protector of the oppressed. In other words, Justus dates the change as having taken place between 1829 and 1831. With many critical remarks about Stockenstrom's evidence on the previous period, he concludes:

We need only peruse Captain Stockenstrom's evidence to see how impossible it is for an upright mind to support a bad cause with any effort of reasoning... we may safely come to the conclusion, that military habits of acting and thinking are not only inconsistent with the development of justice, but can so confuse the understanding as to make the noblest dispositions assent to the propositions of tyranny, as if they were were wise and virtuous maxims.

(80) Justus (i.e. Mackenzie Beverly. See Mendelssohn: South African Bibliography. I. 797): The Wrongs of the Caffre Nation. London. 1837. (Henceforth cited as Justus.)

(81) Indeed, the GTJ attributed the book to Philip, and commented accordingly. GTJ 21.12.37.

(82) Justus. p. 129.

(83) Ibid. Footnote on pp.129 - 130 for what follows.

All of which, of course, proves nothing - except that Godlonton's view of the evidence was not the only possible one. (84)

However, not all the historians have been partisan. From the very smoke of battle comes a remarkably fair account of events from the pen of Rev. W.B. Boyce. (85) Boyce considered Stockenstrom's treaties iniquitous. (86) Moreover, he claimed that the only satisfactory features in the treaties were directly culled from the scheme which he had himself proposed to D'Urban in 1834, and resented the fact that the promulgator of the treaties had never acknowledged this. (87) That he should, in 1839, have been prepared to make allowances for Stockenstrom is indeed surprising.

Boyce regarded Stockenstrom's personal unpopularity with a large section of the community as a major cause of the failure of his border policy. He attributed that unpopularity to three things: Stockenstrom's having made certain statements before the Aborigines Committee seriously affecting the colonial character; his refusal to receive an address from the British Colonists of Albany in which he was asked to explain these derogatory statements; and his imprudence in identifying himself with a party in Cape Town which the majority of colonists considered as directly opposed to their welfare - this

(84) Stockenstrom's only other supporter in the matter of the evidence appears to be Ian D. Colvin. (South Africa. London, 1909.) He is no pro-philanthropist, but on the whole approves of Stockenstrom: and, disapproving of Theal's historical works, (see Preface) despites his contention that Stockenstrom's statements on the Zeko incident were disproved. (p.246.) Of the fact that the Eastern Province looked upon Stockenstrom as a "traitor to their cause," Colvin says: "They had been called robbers and murderers, and Stockenstrom was hand-in-glove with their accusers." He therefore does not make Stockenstrom the accuser, but vouchsafes no further comment on how the situation and the animosity to Stockenstrom arose. (pp. 257 - 258).

(85) W.B. Boyce: Notes on South African Affairs, London, 1839. (Henceforth cited as Boyce.)

(86) Boyce. p. 94.

(87) Boyce. Note III, pp. 76 - 79.

being, of course, the Fairbairn circle. (88)

The nature of Stockenstrom's evidence, Boyce says, may be gathered from the address of the British Colonists, which Stockenstrom refused to receive at Grahamstown on 3 September 1836. From this it may be assumed that he considered this version of the evidence to be justified. (89) And he expresses regret that Stockenstrom did not feel himself at liberty to reply to the queries, or return a courteous and conciliatory answer to the address. (90) According to Boyce, there were many colonists who, with him, hoped that, despite the excitement aroused by the character of Stockenstrom's evidence before the Aborigines Committee, he would yet, as a result of his local knowledge and unquestionable ability, prove an able governor. But these hopes were not fulfilled. The reason, however, Boyce considered should be sought not so much in Stockenstrom's plans and intentions before he left England, as in "the execution of a baneful influence over his mind by a small party at the Cape, who (having certain ends to gain), unfortunately succeeded in involving him in a series of difficulties, personal and political, out of which it was impossible even for his sagacity to find a way of escape, whether with credit to himself, or with advantage to his country." (91)

Boyce avoids all the current derogatory allegations against Stockenstrom. Even when commenting on his having allowed the Kaffirs back into part of the neutral territory

(88) Boyce: pp. 72 - 73.

(89) Boyce: pp. 72 - 73. (Footnote). Vide supra, pp. 12, 13 for a resume of the address.

(90) Godlonton himself said that, if Stockenstrom had been prepared to offer some explanation of his evidence to the settlers, they might yet have waived their other objections and accepted him as Lieutenant-Governor. GTJ 16.6.36.

(91) Boyce: pp. 73 - 74, (Footnote.)

and removing boers from the Stormberg - Kraai River area in order to present it to the Tambookies, he merely observes that, with Captain Stockenstrom's views of the impolicy of this cession of territory, (i.e. neutral territory) his consenting to carry it into effect, "naturally excited surprise."⁽⁹²⁾

In the case of Stockenstrom's evidence on the expulsion of Macomo and the establishment of the Hottentot settlement on his lands, Boyce queries Stockenstrom's denial that Macomo was expelled primarily in order to seize the land for the Hottentots. He asserts that the rapidity with which the whole process was carried through is proof of its having been premeditated. His position is, in fact, that "the expulsion of Makomo would never have taken place, had not certain parties at that time been influenced by ulterior motives of a partially benevolent character," and that Macomo's attack on the Tambookies was merely made the pretext for putting the plan into effect. But he observes, fairly enough:

...without attempting to impeach Captain Stockenstrom's veracity, we may be allowed to suppose, that in narrating the thoughts and actions which occurred six years previously, his memory was not in all cases minutely faithful in reference to time, place, or circumstance. (93)

Considering Boyce's undoubted sympathy with the Colonists in the post-war period,⁽⁹⁴⁾ and his obvious dislike of the Fairbairn clique, his account is a very creditable attempt at unbiassed discussion.

(92) Boyce: p. 75. Footnote continued.

(93) Boyce: pp. 7 - 9. See later discussion of this point in Chap. III, (ii).

(94) See especially the Introduction to the Notes, passim. Significantly, throughout the discussion here on the most common charges against the colonists, (Boyce is attempting to dispel misconceptions prevailing among the English reading public) Stockenstrom's evidence is not once referred to specifically.

Sir George Cory, indefatigable historian of the Eastern Frontier, was no lover of Stockenstrom. But, to his credit be it said, that, whatever his private opinions of that extraordinary personality may have been -
 (95)
 and they were black indeed - he contrived to keep them out of his historical works. That Stockenstrom irritated him is evident from several asides. But, on the
 (96)
 whole, he is fair to him.

Elements of Godlonton's interpretation, however, do appear. Of all the witnesses before the Aborigines
 (97)
 Committee, says Cory, none created such an impression as Stockenstrom. His experience enabled him to speak with authority on many subjects. Cory's opinion is that it was Stockenstrom's evidence during the first session that convinced Glenelg that he was a fitting agent for carrying out his contemplated colonial policy. The same evidence, Cory adds, won for Stockenstrom distinction of a different order: it roused intense indignation and hatred against him in the Colony. And he implies that Stockenstrom expected this, when he quotes, from a letter written by Stockenstrom in 1835, the sentence: "that my evidence will make me a number of enemies
 (98)
 is no more than I expect."

As a background to the understanding of all that occurred during the Lieutenant-Governorship, Cory then gives an outline of the main features of Stockenstrom's

(95) See Cory's own annotated copy of Stockenstrom's Autobiography, in Cory Library, Rhodes University. His marginal comments are trenchant and, combined with the Autobiography a mine of delight for the student of personalities.

(96) G.E. Cory: The Rise of South Africa. London. 1919. (Henceforth cited as Cory.) vols. II and III.

(97) Cory: III, 286.

(98) For comment on this point, see pp.75-76 infra.

(99) evidence. On the whole, this is clear, concise, and fairly accurate. Where Cory summarizes Stockenstrom's criticisms of the frontier system, though, he is less faithful to the original. Granted that he was probably endeavouring to select the passages which explain the violent resentment aroused by Stockenstrom's evidence, (100) he presents a distorted outline, and quotes one sentence as part of the evidence ("peace upon the frontier would be a losing game") which actually appears in a letter written by Stockenstrom in 1831, which was delivered in (101) to the Committee. Cory quotes in full Stockenstrom's answers to Q. 1090 - 1094 as of importance in view of future proceedings in Albany, and italicizes the phrase "very often", given in answer to the questions (1092, 1014) as to whether Englishmen served on commando. But neither here, nor later in discussing the Grahamstown (102) address and public meeting of September 1836, does Cory produce any evidence to refute Stockenstrom's statement, though he evidently sympathizes with the Grahamstown indignation. Cory comments critically on only two features of the evidence - the Zeko incident, in which he shows how the affidavits sent to Wade controverted Stockenstrom's version, and considers that Stockenstrom's refutation of these did not amount to much; and the answer to Q. 2371. In this answer Stockenstrom acknowledged that under the circumstances of the Colony in these times the commando system was forced upon the Colonial Government as a measure of necessity. This, he says,

(99) Cory: III, 286 - 289.

(100) Cory's own copy of A.C. minutes has in most cases, only the 'objectionable' passages underlined and annotated.

(101) Ibid. p. 287.

(102) Ibid. pp. 343 - 344.

is curious, in view of the former part of Stockenstrom's
(103)
evidence.

An acceptance of the view that Stockenstrom's evidence in its entirety represented, and was intended to represent, a criticism of the colonists in general, is implicit - though nowhere explicit - in Cory's account. Commenting on Stockenstrom's refusal to accept the Grahamstown address, Cory expresses the opinion that, "assuming" the charges he had made were true and that he knew them to be true, the least that could have been expected of Stockenstrom was some explanation to the settlers, since he had made his accusations "under circumstances which precluded the accused from defending themselves." But he "appeared to be afraid to say to their faces what he had said behind their backs."
(104)

Like Boyce, however, Cory makes no reference to the current allegations about Stockenstrom, except in so far as they appear in his quotations from the Grahamstown address and petition. He does not imply a sudden and
(105-
unexpected change of opinion on the part of Stockenstrom. Nor, though he takes on the whole a very unfavourable
(106)
view of the Lieutenant-Governorship, does he attribute its failure, as Theal does, to a temporary and sinister digression into philanthropic paths.

Among the writers who adopt a more or less neutral attitude are, amongst the early historians, John Noble, and, in the modern group, Prof. E.A. Walker and C.F.J. Muller. They throw little new light on the subject.

(103) For comment on this, see later discussion of Stockenstrom's attitude to commandos. p. 120, *infra*.

(104) Cory: III, 342.

(105) In fact, elsewhere (Cory II, 403), pointing out that Stockenstrom did not change his opinion of the Erasmus case on seeing Campbell's affidavits, Cory remarks in parenthesis: "he probably never changed an opinion in all his life."

(106) See Cory: III, 446: "The only real satisfaction he gave the colonists was his resignation; all deploring his appointment as one of the greatest misfortunes which had befallen the country."

Writing in 1877 and thus removed from contemporary influences, John Noble, Clerk of the Cape House of Assembly, gives a straightforward, uncritical account. Stockenstrom's evidence he apparently accepts at face value, quoting in connection with it the peroration upon "I have the cause of truth to serve," (in which Stockenstrom disclaimed all partisan feelings), but making no comment. He says, indeed - concurring with Boyce and Cory - that "a slight explanation or modification" of the "injurious impressions so unfortunately created and existing" might have "conciliated all parties." Stockenstrom's reply to the Graaff-Reinet burghers that "he had done no action and spoken no word respecting the public interests of this country, in which, after close consideration, he did not rejoice," Noble remarks, gave offence, "as might have been expected," to his fellow-colonists. But he makes no allegations and studiously avoids discussion of the numerous controversial topics of the period.

Walker merely touches upon rumours that "Stockenstrom had been saying things tartly against Boers and English settlers "before the Aborigines Committee." And he expresses the view - upon what authority he does not say - that Stockenstrom's appointment as Lieutenant-Governor at first perturbed the Grahamstown men more than the Boers; the latter were inclined to hope that Stockenstrom, as an Afrikaner, would give them the kind of government they wanted, and to believe that his unpopularity with the British settlers was due to the

(107) John Noble: South Africa Past and Present. A short History of the European Settlement at the Cape. Cape Town. London. 1877.

(108) Ibid. pp.55 - 56.

(109) Ibid. pp. 58-59.

(110) E.A. Walker: The Great Trek. London. 1934. p. 98.

fact that he was an Afrikaner. It was the policy which he put into practice that disillusioned them. (111)

(112)
C.F.J. Muller is of the opinion that Philip's repeated representations on the subject of the commando system together with the introduction to Buxton which the aggrieved Stockenstrom took with him to England in March 1833, speedily made an impression upon British colonial administration. (113)
Buxton saw Stanley several times, the philanthropist press in England took up the anti-commando refrain, and in November Stanley threw the commando system overboard and instructed D'Urban to devise a new system. Muller, however, has no further observations to make, or new light to throw on Stockenstrom's part in the affair. He too, specifies only Stockenstrom's evidence. He does not explicitly connect this evidence with Glenelg's despatches of October and December 1835 to D'Urban, though he places it in the chain of events leading to the formulation of Glenelg's ideas. (114)
And the first step in a policy of systematically appointing confirmed philanthropists to responsible positions in the Cape Administration, he considers, was the appointment of Stockenstrom as Lieutenant-Governor. Muller here makes no specific reference to the influence of Stockenstrom's evidence upon his appointment - he says merely that Glenelg satisfied himself, in the course of a few interviews, that

(111) Ibid. p. 99. With Walker's view might be compared the comment of Frederick Rex in a letter to John Rex, written at Graaff-Reinet on 8 February 1836: "I really wonder that Capt. Stockenstrom after the improvements he is acknowledged to have made in Graaff-Reinet should have shewed himself such a turncoat he appears to be disliked in other parts of the country but Graaff Reinet has sworn vengeance against him & I think he will require a strong body guard if ever he intends visiting it again..." Una Long: Index to Unofficial Manuscripts. p. 184.

(112) C.F.J. Muller: Die Britse Owerheiden die Groot Trek. Cape Town. 1948.

(113) Loc. cit. pp. 45 - 46.

(114) Ibid. pp. 47 - 48.

Stockenstrom was wholly at one with him in his ideas
for a policy based on "a fixed course of Justice."⁽¹¹⁵⁾

No suggestion of Stockenstrom's having angled for his appointment appears anywhere in Muller's references - nor is the allegation refuted.

A new trend in what might be called Stockenstrom historiography has become apparent in recent years. Professor⁽¹¹⁶⁾ Reyburn and the students who worked under him have been pioneers in this field. Increasing interest in Stockenstrom's career has led to a careful study and revaluation of his work as Landdrost, Commissioner-general and Lieutenant-Governor. But the tendency now seems to be to ignore altogether the implications of the allegations about the period 1833 to 1838.

In his excellent survey Die noordwaartse Beweging van die Boere, voor die Groot Trek⁽¹¹⁷⁾ P.J. van der Merwe has a most valuable study of the Landdrostship of both the Stockenstroms. The question of Stockenstrom's evidence does not, of course, enter into his discussion at all. But in writing of the state of political feeling⁽¹¹⁸⁾ of the trekboere on the Northern borders in 1836, van der Merwe comments that they were little affected by clashes with the central government, living isolated as they did. "Hulle aardse vader," he says, "was eers Stockenstrom en later van Ryneveld, Afrikaners - soos hulleself -

(115) Ibid. pp. 217 - 218.

(116) H.A. Reyburn: Studies in Frontier History. Articles in The Critic, A South African Quarterly Journal Wynberg, January 1935; April 1935; July 1935; February 1936. Reyburn deals with Stockenstrom's part in earlier episodes such as Slachter's Nek, the missions of Smit. In an article entitled 'Pieter Retief to Duncan Campbell' (The Critic, March 1934) he refers to Duncan Campbell's part in the events of 1836 in a manner which suggests that his sympathies are entirely with Stockenstrom: Campbell he says: "Showed himself a strong partizan, violently/pro-colonist, hostile to the natives, and active in decrying and attacking the 'philanthropists' and their friends. He exerted himself to counteract the effects of the evidence given before the Aborigines Committee in London, and he used his ability and influence to harm and discredit Lieutenant Governor Stockenstrom... he was collecting material to bring a preposterous charge of murder against Stockenstrom, and Retief apparently had the same desire." pp. 180 - 181.

wat hulle vertrou het and wat altyd pliggetrou hulle belange behartig het." It is interesting that he makes this statement with no qualification at all.

J.D. Pitman, in his unpublished thesis on the Commissioner-Generalship, remarks of Stockenstrom's evidence before the Committee only that his "indictment of the system was striking, but it suffered from a lack of examples backed by proofs." (119) There is, however, evidence in the thesis of an uncritical acceptance of some of Stockenstrom's statements. Pitman says, for instance, that Stockenstrom "showed in his evidence" that he was unaware of Lieutenant-Governor Boukec's suspension of the Reprisal system from April 1826. (120) But this is, in fact, a point upon which - for whatever reason - Stockenstrom's statements, and the facts of the case, do not coincide. It is odd that Pitman was unaware of this. (121) Pitman also gives a very clear account of the Zeko incident, as far as it can be determined from available evidence. (122) But he mentions no discrepancy between Stockenstrom's statements in 1831 and 1835. And he bases his discussion of the failure of the Commissioner-Generalship largely upon Stockenstrom's own evidence for it. (123)

A point which bears materially upon the question of Stockenstrom's evidence on the frontier system in 1835, and which Pitman does not bring out clearly, is what appears to be a markedly new note in Stockenstrom's despatches on frontier affairs from about the middle of 1829 -

(117) P.J. van der Merwe: Die Noordwaartse Beweging van die Boere voor die Groot Trek (1770-1842). Den Haag. passim. (Henceforth cited as P.J. van der Merwe).

(118) P.J. van der Merwe. p. 373.

(119) J.D. Pitman: The Commissioner-Generalship of Andries Stockenstrom. M.A. Thesis. U.C.T. (Henceforth cited as Pitman.)

(120) Pitman. p. 25.

(121) Ibid. p. 37.

(122) Vide infra p. 269ff for discussion of this point.

(123) Pitman. pp. 102-103.

something more than the mere developing of a clear policy towards the problems of the Eastern Frontier, of which Pitman speaks. This will be discussed in detail later.

Pitman, moreover, is careful to avoid the controversial. He notes, in his discussion of Stockenstrom's frontier policy, what he interprets as a marked difference in the plans proposed by Stockenstrom in his letter to Spring-Rice on 5 November 1834, and that to Glenelg on 7 January 1836. But he makes no reference at all to the construction placed by Stockenstrom's opponents upon the alleged change of policy between 1834 and 1836, in his tentative explanation of it. (124)

P.J. Smuts, in his thesis on the Lieutenant-Governorship of course refers only in passing to the evidence. (125) He says that Stockenstrom "spoke his mind" on the frontier system, knowing that it would make him enemies, and that his criticism was ill-timed and aroused the antagonism of the settlers. (126) But he does not discuss the pros and cons of the evidence in any detail. He does, however, comment in a footnote that Stockenstrom's evidence "contained much unpleasant truth" but was "inaccurate in parts." Smuts points out that Stockenstrom's assertion in evidence, in connection with the Zeko incident, that he had given orders that no Kaffir cattle were to be taken, does not appear to be borne out by the facts of the case. He refers also to Wade's evidence which further proved Stockenstrom wrong. And he avers that Stockenstrom's

(124) Pitman. p. 112.

(125) P.J. Smuts: The Lieutenant-Governorship of Andries Stockenstrom. M.A. Thesis. U.C.T. (Henceforth cited as Smuts.)

(126) Smuts: p. 35. Smuts evidently follows Cory in assuming that it was his criticism of frontier-policy that Stockenstrom expected to make him enemies, and that the 'enemies' he expected were in the colony.

statements on the reprisal system were, if not exaggerated, then at least unproved. But Smuts adds that he has found no ground for Theal's contention that Stockenstrom's evidence was "at variance not only with his own previous acts but with his official reports and correspondence." He concludes: "In respect of the two main charges... the Zeko affair and the reprisal system (Cf. Autob. Vol I, p. 322), his evidence was fully consistent with his previous reports." The grounds for this assertion are, however, not made quite clear, since Smuts earlier refers to an apparent discrepancy between Stockenstrom's 1831, and later reports of the Zeko affair. Smuts does not probe the question of the alleged change in Stockenstrom's policy, or his attitude towards frontier (127) affairs during the Lieutenant-Governorship.

Among modern historians, two only have not been frightened off by the problems surrounding Stockenstrom's evidence, and have attempted to throw more light upon (128) the subject. They are Prof. W.M. Macmillan, and Prof. (129) J.L.M. Francken.

Prof. Macmillan's most important contribution to the understanding of this period has been the information which, from his access to the Philip papers, he has been able to supply on the subject of the background to the Aborigines (130) Committee. His is also the only modern attempt to (131) offer an explanation of the Stockenstrom "enigma."

(127) Smuts: p. 21.

In the biography of Stockenstrom upon which Mr. Smuts is now engaged, we may presumably look forward to a clarification of many obscure and perplexing features of Stockenstrom's career.

(128) W.M. Macmillan: Bantu, Boer and Briton: The Making of the South African Native Problem. London, 1929. (Henceforth cited as Macmillan: B.B and B.)

(129) J.L.M. Francken: Piet Retief se lewe in die Kolonie. Pretoria, 1949. (Henceforth cited as Francken.)

(130) To which I am indebted for such information used in Chap II.

(131) Macmillan: B.B and B. pp. 153 - 155 for what follows.

Macmillan shows that Stockenstrom's twenty years' previous service, in virtually unchecked control of the vast Graaff-Reinet district, largely explains his later attitude. Though in origin a colonial frontiersman, he was brought in the course of his official duties to realise, increasingly clearly, that "the interests of Bantu, Hottentots and even Bushmen, did not always get full justice where they clashed with those of their conquerors, the white colonists." Macmillan speaks, too, of a slowly developing intimacy between Stockenstrom and Philip, commencing in the early eighteen-twenties - but he points out that Stockenstrom was, nevertheless, never an "Evangelical Philanthropist."

Macmillan deals briefly with the evidence. He points out that it was given in the summer of 1835, before ever his new appointment was in question. He suggests that Stockenstrom, now freed from the cares of office, conscious that he had much valuable information to offer, and perhaps nursing a grievance that he was no longer an official, "let himself go." Macmillan sums up the evidence as, in the main, a critical review of frontier policy: Stockenstrom's impression that the prevalence of cattle-stealing was largely due to the carelessness of the farmers themselves, and that "punishment in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred falls upon the innocent", had led him to a round condemnation of the commando system.

Appreciating the fact that the Eastern Province in 1835 was more than usually sensitive to any sort of criticism, Macmillan quite lightly dismisses the various manifestations of "civic rage." Of the investigations into

(132) On this point it is possible to argue that Stockenstrom's relations with Philip were, in fact, far more erratic than is here suggested. See Chap. II for discussion.

the Zeko incident, he says that, quite characteristically, the leaders in Grahamstown, ignoring Stockenstrom's comprehensive criticisms of the frontier system and fastening on "incidentals," furnished Colonel Wade with affidavits proving Stockenstrom's "exaggerations in the details of one particular episode of five years back."

Macmillan points out Stockenstrom's embittered view of the failure of his Commissioner-Generalship, when he had been simply the 'fifth wheel to a waggon.' Of his appointment to the Lieutenant-Governorship, he says that "being a proud man with absolute confidence in his own capacity as an administrator, he was all too ready, when consulted, to support Glenelg in the view that, for the control of colonists and natives, annexation of territory was superfluous. (133) If only he could have a free hand, he was confident of his own ability to bring order out of chaos;..." But Stockenstrom's hopes were doomed to disappointment; and his chief difficulties, Macmillan seems to think, were D'Urban's unco-operative attitude, and the Albany opposition with which he had to contend and as a result of which he spent so much valuable time in personal wrangling and strife.

In his account, Macmillan makes four important points: that Stockenstrom's views on frontier policy were the product of a gradual development over years of practical experience; that his philanthropist sympathies were of long standing; that the most significant aspect of his evidence was its critical review of frontier policy as a whole rather than its reference to incidentals; and that it was given before his new appointment was ever in

(133) Macmillan has a note to this, suggesting that "Stockenstrom seems to have believed, not unwarrantably, that while, in the end, annexation was desirable, it might, if applied without such a period of preparation as 'treaties' would make, lead to opposition and open resistance." See Chap. III for a discussion of this.

question. In fact, implicit in Macmillan's discussion is the suggestion that the evidence and the appointment were not closely interrelated.

Macmillan thus provides the most significant counter-ⁿblast so far to the Theal school of thought. In the nature of things, however, his comments are made virtually in passing, and with little or no reference to any authorities for his conclusions. His sympathies are obviously with Stockenstrom. And the reader might perhaps draw the conclusion that he is merely rebutting conjecture with conjecture.

Prof Francken provides a most refreshing contrast to Freller. In an excellent chapter on Stockenstrom's evidence and principles, he tackles the question of what Stockenstrom really did say about the frontier system and the colonists in 1835. ⁽¹³⁴⁾ Prof. Francken's digest of ⁽¹³⁵⁾ the evidence on frontier policy is the first clear and completely undistorted version of Stockenstrom's statements to appear in South African historiography. He makes it quite plain that Stockenstrom nowhere in his evidence condemned the colonists as a whole, though he criticized the frontier system sharply. Only once did Stockenstrom speak of murder and plunder with reference to the colonists, and this was in connection with the Zeko incident. Where he used the phrase "murderers and plunderers" at all, Francken points out, it was with reference, not to colonists, but to bands of Kaffir depredators - and one cannot help feeling that a knowledge of this fact would have spared Freller much heartburning.

(134) Francken: Chap. XXV. pp. 365 - 385. passim.

(135) Ibid. pp. 367 - 373.

It was, says Francken, the distorted version of what Stockenstrom had said of the colonists in evidence, coupled with his association with Glenelg's frontier policy and the identification of his views with those of the negrophiles, that gave rise to the violent opposition which he experienced as Lieutenant-Governor. (136) It was natural, according to Francken, for the colonial public, duly enlightened by the anti-Philip press, to read into Stockenstrom's evidence the same spirit that they found in Glenelg's despatch of 26 December 1835, and to believe Stockenstrom the chief exponent of that conception. And so, where Stockenstrom had, in fact, only condemned, in connection with the reprisal system, the debased individuals who sought personal gain from its abuse, it was easily believed that he had charged the frontiersmen in general with cruelty and inhumanity towards the Kaffirs, and considered that they had only themselves to thank for the disasters which had befallen them. (137)

In so far as this explains the attitude of the frontiersmen, and more particularly the Boers, during Stockenstrom's Lieutenant-Governorship, Francken is undoubtedly correct. It might be contended, however, that this is, to a certain extent, to over-simplify the position and to burke the issue of the allegations against Stockenstrom. For Francken does not afford an explanation for the wrath which flamed in Albany before ever either Glenelg's policy and his December despatch, or the appointment of Stockenstrom as Lieutenant-Governor, became known. It is, in fact, not quite clear from Francken's chapter that there was such excitement over Stockenstrom's evidence before his appointment was announced. He mentions

(136) Ibid. p. 365.
 (137) Ibid. pp. 366 - 367.

the Grahamstown Public meeting of 23 January 1836 and its demand for a commission of inquiry, but omits any specific reference to Stockenstrom. And the references to the Journal and its criticism of Stockenstrom, and to other evidence of the state of public opinion, are all from after 28 April 1836. (138)

Francken is of the opinion that there can be no doubt at all about the close connection between Stockenstrom's evidence, in which his mature experience as frontier official was revealed, and his appointment as Lieutenant-Governor by Glenelg. The evidence must have been the deciding factor in the creation of the new position and his appointment to it. (139) Francken asserts further that it is "so goed as seker" that Stockenstrom's evidence, "afgesien van ander getuienisse", contributed much to Glenelg's despatch of December 1835. (140) But it is difficult to decide precisely what Francken's view is of the connection between Stockenstrom's opinion of colonial frontier history and that of Glenelg. Francken, of course, throughout emphasizes the comparatively moderate views Stockenstrom actually expressed before the Committee, as contrasted with the general impression of them prevailing in the colony, and with the impression created by Glenelg's remark in the December despatch. But, quoting a passage from Stockenstrom's reply to the Graaff-Reinet address, (141)

(138) Ibid. pp. 373 - 377. In connection with this, Francken has one curious minor inaccuracy. Recounting (p.377) Godlonton's speech in the Public meeting on 6 September 1836, he says that Godlonton correctly asserted that Stockenstrom repeatedly referred to the evils of the commando and reprisal system, and "hy vra of die bewuste passasies nie miskien slaan op die Hollandse Boere en nie op die 'Settlers' nie." By stopping there, Francken gives the impression that Godlonton suggested that this was the case. In fact, he went on to point out firmly that there could be no doubt that Stockenstrom did intend his remarks to apply also to settlers. See GTJ 8.9.36.

(139) Ibid. p. 365.

(140) Ibid. p.366.

(141) Ibid. p. 379. Francken's translation is: "Ek het verskeie van hulle (ou Graaff-Reinetse boere) geken wat getreur en geweeklaag het oor die tonele wat voor

he comments that here Stockenstrom was "waarskynlik onbewus daarvan dat hy indirek die stelling van sy voog, Lord Glenelg, beaam en koring 'laai' op die meul van sy teenstanders." Francken goes on to say that, in Stockenstrom's despatches as Lieutenant-Governor there are repeatedly passages such as this one, which lend themselves to the interpretation put upon his evidence by the men of Albany - namely, that all blame rested with the frontiersmen in general. Apart from the fact that it is a moot point whether the passage quoted (see footnote 141) wholly bears that interpretation, is Francken aware to what extent it does represent an opinion Stockenstrom had long held and expressed? (142)

Having shown the way in which propagandists distorted Stockenstrom's evidence, Francken adds that it is quite understandable that, under these circumstances, Stockenstrom should have displayed such bitter virulence towards his opponents - "disaffected, insidious men"; "a set of miscreants" and so forth. And he considers that the tone of the Albany address - as contrasted with that from Graaff-Reinet, for instance - justified Stockenstrom's attitude towards it - upon which point, of course, Sir George Cory begs to differ. (143)

Francken's account does very great service in clearing the air in regard to Stockenstrom's evidence, more

hulle oë afgespeel is in die dae van hulle jeug. - Hulle het nie om tydelik in die guns te kom sulke tonele vergoelik en verdedig nie. Ek het hulle met afkeer en afskrik sien wys op die dade van bloed, onreg en bedrog, waardeur die enkele verryk is, terwyl hulle met die grote hoop weggeleef is van hulle huise tot 'n afstand van honderde van myle tot hul eie ondergang in die van die land teneinde die euwels goed te maak wat veroorsaak is deur die reaksie teen sulke barbaarshede." The italics are Francken's. The quotation is from the reply to the Graaff-Reinet address 3.10.36, published in GTJ 27.10.36.

(142) See later discussion of the evidence in Chap. III in connection with this point.

(143) Francken: p. 378 for this and next point.

specifically that concerned with the Frontier system. But he, too, leaves a number of problems connected with the period still untouched.

No one has subjected the whole vexed question of the evidence to critical examination. It has not been proved to what extent, if any, Stockenstrom contradicted his former statements and policies. The nature of his relations with the philanthropist group in London is still not clear. The charge that he deliberately played to the Exeter Hall gallery and was an ambitious and unscrupulous place-seeker has been neither proved nor refuted. If, as Francken shows, his evidence was more moderate than was generally supposed, how account for the "enemies" which it made? Did Stockenstrom really consent to promote a policy disastrous to his countrymen, and directly opposed to all he had previously advocated, simply in order to become Lieutenant-Governor? These and other problems the historians have not finally solved for us.

And so the bogey of 1835 still lingers: neither wholly accepted, nor yet wholly exorcised. Can the true facts now be established? It is the task of this thesis to attempt, at any rate, a fuller clarification of the position.

CHAPTER II.

The Background to the Evidence.

On 7 March 1833, Andries Stockenstrom left the Cape Colony for England, filled, as he wrote some twenty-seven years afterwards, "with aggrieved and acrimonious feelings, and a thorough contempt for the whole system of colonial administration."⁽¹⁾ The three years which he spent out of the Cape at this time have coloured the recollection of his career more than all the thirty - odd years he spent in the active service of his country. In view of the allegations which surround this period, it is necessary to do some clearing of the ground, and to examine the circumstances in which Stockenstrom's evidence was given.

W.M. Macmillan, in his Bantu, Boer and Briton, has made a very thorough study of the origins of the so-called "Aborigines Committee," and there is no need to go over that ground in any detail. What concerns us is Stockenstrom's connection with that Committee, his relations with its initiators, and his attitude towards it.

To recapitulate briefly: it was alleged, by those to whom Stockenstrom was not persona grata, that he went to England, filled with chagrin at the limited powers he had found himself able to exercise as Commissioner-General, and determined to find for himself a position of high office in which he could wield the power he desired. With this end in view, and aware of the powerful influence of Exeter Hall in the British Parliament, Stockenstrom deliberately cultivated the acquaintance of Buxton and the philanthropic circle in London. In order to ingratiate himself with them, he made statements and expressed opinions, both in written documents and in his

(1) The Autobiography of the late Sir Andries Stockenstrom, Bart. edited by his son-in-law The Honourable C.W. Hutton, M.E.C. Cape Town. 1887. (Henceforth cited as Auto.) I. 417.

evidence before Buxton's Aborigines Committee, which were not only intended to support the philanthropist view of frontier policy, but were a flat contradiction of his previous statements, policies and principles. Moreover, Stockenstrom took pains to represent himself as "the very Beau Ideal" ⁽²⁾ of an administrator. And, in order to consummate his ambition, professed himself the advocate of a policy diametrically opposed in principle to anything which he had previously advocated. And all this from a man known to have been the friend of the ⁽³⁾ frontier colonists, their advocate against calumniators, for years the beloved Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet, a capable administrator and a popular choice for the Commissioner-Generalship of the Eastern Districts. It is an unpleasant picture. To what extent is it a just one?

Stockenstrom certainly left the Cape in a mood of bitter disappointment and frustration. From his point of view, an office which had augured well for the culmination of a career of useful service had proved in the end a ⁽⁴⁾ sinecure. He was convinced, moreover, that the cause of this was the misinterpretation of the Commissioner-Generalship by the colonial authorities, rather than any ⁽⁵⁾ inherent flaws in the terms of the office itself.

(2) Godlonton's expression. GTJ 28.4.36.

(3) And, Theal implies, again their friend and supporter after 1838. Theal II, 138. Vide supra, p 19.

(4) See Pitman, passim. The measure of its ineffectiveness is, perhaps, the fact that scarcely anywhere in the GTJ of 1831 to 1833 is there a reference to the Commissioner-General, yet, during those years, its columns were pleading, very often, for precisely the things for which Stockenstrom stood. See Chap. I. Footnote (4) and discussion.

(5) See Stockenstrom's evidence on 26 February 1836, Passim. Q. 1946 - 2095. A.C. minutes pp. 219 ff. Hence his remark quoted (1) supra, and others of a similar nature in letters, etc.

His later assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, however, it does not seem that, at first, Stockenstrom contemplated a permanent absence. ⁽⁶⁾ So far was he from winding up his affairs at the Cape that he later estimated that it would take him at least three months to do so, should he decide to remain in Sweden. ⁽⁷⁾ And, bitter though he was on the subject of the Commissioner-Generalship, Stockenstrom had evidently not wholly made up his mind to resign. For he acted upon the advice of an old friend, the Earl of Caledon, who called soon after his arrival in London, that he should "not act rashly," but ask for an extension of leave of absence to have time to consider. ⁽⁸⁾ Caledon, who had known Stockenstrom for many years, and who also knew that he stood well at the Colonial Office, seems to have thought him inclined to be too sensitive and to exaggerate or even imagine slights that were not intended. He was therefore anxious that Stockenstrom's impetuosity should not lose the frontier a good man. ⁽⁹⁾ Indeed, at the beginning of 1834 he wrote to the Colonial Office quite explicitly that he had determined from the beginning to go back whenever the government should have it in its power to place him in ⁽¹⁰⁾ a position in which he could be efficiently employed. But there was retrenchment as well as reform in the air, and little hope in 1833 of such a reorganization as Stockenstrom hoped for. The office of Commissioner-

(6) Godlonton (Case of the Colonists p. 23) says it was understood that Stockenstrom's intention was not to return to the Colony.

(7) In a letter dated 31.8.35. Auto. II, 24.

(8) Auto. I, 427.

(9) See Stockenstrom's account in Auto. I, 429 - 431.

(10) Stockenstrom to Colonial Secretary. 16.1.34. A.C. minutes. p. 99.

General had, after all, been created because the Colonial Office was not prepared for the expense of the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Eastern Districts proposed by the Commissioners of Inquiry.

On 6 July 1833, Stockenstrom left for the continent with his wife and baby. During the four months which he spent travelling in Holland, Germany, Switzerland and France, he found time for voluminous correspondence with his friends. ⁽¹¹⁾ From the tone of some of these letters, it is evident that Stockenstrom's resentment at his treatment and his animus against the Cape authorities, were by no means softened by the passage of time. He returned to London in October 1833, still seething with indignation.

On 20 October 1833, despite Caledon's disapproval, Stockenstrom wrote to the Colonial Secretary, to the effect that he would return to the Cape as Commissioner-General only if steps were taken to render the office which he held effective. ⁽¹²⁾ By 23 November he had still heard nothing from the Colonial Office. His agitated state of mind is apparent from a letter written on that day, ⁽¹³⁾ in which he airs his feelings on the subject of being kept waiting so long to hear whether "their, ((i.e. government's)) own orders, with reference to the duties of the Commissioner-General shall be complied with, or whether that situation shall be a sinecure." Apart from the anger which he felt at what he regarded as a slight, it is evident that Stockenstrom, having a wife and child to support, was concerned also about his financial position. He had refused to hold his office under the existing conditions - but, if they were not to

(11) Auto. I, 428. Hutton has extracts in Auto. II, 1 ff.

(12) Referred to in a letter written 23.11.33. Auto

II, 18.

(13) Ibid.

be remedied, some other plan would have to be made, and he was anxious to know how he stood.

By 26 November, Stockenstrom could bear the suspense no longer, and called at the Colonial Office in search of information. In an interview with Kay ((Hay?)) he satisfied himself that the situation of Commissioner-General was to be abolished completely, as the colonial government would not be able to afford to institute it on the basis which Stockenstrom considered essential for its efficiency. ⁽¹⁴⁾ The tactful Hay hastened to assure Stockenstrom that this was the only reason for his exertions not having been more fully called into action. "Dismiss from your mind," Stockenstrom quotes him as saying, "every suspicion of any unfavourable impression, with reference to yourself, existing in this department." Stockenstrom himself evidently suggested that he should be allowed to retire until the Government could give him "an appointment equivalent to that which I have had and in which I can be efficient." ⁽¹⁵⁾ Hay insisted that he must have a retirement allowance. And he confirmed that Stockenstrom would be called upon to serve the government again should a proper opportunity offer, assuring him that "I did not exactly hear Mr. Stanley say so, but I know it is his wish, and I am sure it is mine, to employ those of whom we have such favourable accounts; and, indeed, we are obliged from economy to do so. If you leave England, therefore, you must let us know where you are."

(14) Stockenstrom gives the interview more-or-less verbatim in a letter of 26.11.33. Auto. II, 20. This, incidentally, seems to confirm the fact that Stockenstrom was wrong in his interpretation of his instructions. Clearly the Colonial Office considered a drastic and expensive reorganization of the office necessary to meet Stockenstrom's interpretation and not merely insistence on a proper interpretation by the colonial authorities.

(15) Ibid. p. 21.

Stockenstrom's immense relief is obvious from the tone of the letter - not at the prospect that he would be again employed so much as because "my conduct stands unimpeached." Evidently, honestly conscientious soul that he was, underlying his other reasons for agitation at the delay in the Colonial Office's decision was an anxiety lest fault should have been found with his own execution of his duties. Apparently he half expected an inquiry to take place as a result of his representations to the Colonial Office. (16)

And so, Stockenstrom wrote, "I am fairly quit of the Colony for a long time at least." At the end of that November week, eager to rejoin his family, he sailed for Ostend.

But that Stockenstrom, throughout this period, was ready, and even anxious, to hold office again at the Cape, provided it were in a satisfactory capacity, is abundantly clear. Nor did he leave the Colonial Office in any doubt of it. On 11 December 1833 and 7 January 1834, he received letters informing him officially of the abolition of his office and the pension which had been granted to him, and offering him a seat on the newly-constituted Legislative Council at the Cape when he should return. (17) (18) Replying, Stockenstrom expressed gratification at this "convincing proof of the absence of all doubt of my active and conscientious discharge of my duty," and professed his willingness to serve on the Council.

(16) Ibid. p. 21 - 22. "Why, in the name of good nature, could not they communicate their decisions at once, since there is to be no inquiry and everything is to be quietly hushed up?" - the latter expression suggesting how strongly he still felt on the subject of the attitude of the colonial authorities.

(17) See references in Stockenstrom's reply, 16.1.34. A.C. minutes. pp. 98 - 99.

(18) Ibid.

He added: "As to the question of my return to the Cape, I have respectfully to observe, that I consider it an imperious duty, as it has always been my most anxious wish and the height of my ambition, to avail myself of every opportunity to be of use to my countrymen, and to continue as long as I am able to devote my exertions to the land of my birth..."

A series of hints culminates in the hope that, despite his disadvantage of being without friends, interest or patronage in the country, none but superior claims will be allowed to supersede his, and "that those native colonists who devote themselves with honesty and assiduity to the public service of their country will not see their best efforts discouraged, and all their energies paralyzed, in finding powerful influence indispensable to success in that service."⁽¹⁹⁾

It would, indeed, have been most unnatural had Stockenstrom not continued to be eager for a post. He had a family to support - by the end of 1835 there was a second child. He had probably spent a considerable sum of money on his extensive travels in Europe. And his income at the end of 1833 dropped from £800 p.a. to £300 p.a., the amount of his retiring pension.⁽²⁰⁾

(19) This was a shot, perhaps, at the Somerset influence about which Stockenstrom waxed so bitter in the Autobiography. See e.g. his account of a conversation with Caledon, Auto. I, 429.

(20) Auto. I, 431. Stockenstrom knew that the Cape treasury could ill afford pensions at that time - he wrote in November 1833: "They are bold fellows if they add to the pension list just now, I think." (Auto. II, 21.) But he accepted the amount somewhat caustically: "The amount of the retired allowance...I consider (uncontrasted with others) extremely satisfactory and am certain that it will be hailed by the Cape Colonists as a most consolatory proof, that whilst unfortunately they are still debarred from all participation in the management of their public affairs, you, to whose acknowledged wisdom they must trust, are so well aware of the depressed state of the colonial finances, and of the absolute necessity of reducing the expenditure to the lowest possible standard." See Godlonton's comment. Chap. I. Footnote (3).

Nevertheless, he was, not unnaturally, not prepared to accept a position lower than that to which he had already attained, or one equally unsuitable for the exercise of his abilities. He had already, during his Commissioner-Generalship, turned down Sir Lowry Cole's various well-meant but somewhat unintelligent suggestions as to useful positions he might fill. (21) And in 1834 he refused the suggestion of his friends that he should apply for Stoll's vacant position - that of Landdrost of the Cape district and Receiver-General. (22)

So much, for the moment, for "that gentleman's ardent solicitations for place." What, meanwhile, of Stockenstrom's "collusion" with Buxton and his circle?

Quite shortly after Philip's arrival in South Africa, Stockenstrom had realized that there were points upon which he and the evangelical philanthropist could meet on common ground. (23) In speaking of an intimacy which slowly developed between them, however, Macmillan tends to slur over the somewhat erratic course which their relations actually followed. For, in matters where he differed from Philip, Stockenstrom never hesitated to express himself with vigour - nor, for that matter, did Philip fail to respond with equal vigour. (24) Nevertheless, Dr. Philip learnt to respect the sterling qualities of the frontiers-

(21) See for example Q. 2003. A.C. minutes, pp. 224 -225.

(22) Auto. II, 27. Stoll: Hon. J.W. Stoll.

(23) Macmillan, B.B and B p. 153.

(24) See, for instance, Stockenstrom's reply to Rev. Andrew Murray's letter (which enclosed a copy of his memorandum to Somerset on Philip's statements to the Commissioners of Inquiry about Stockenstrom, for which see Theal: Records of the Cape Colony, XIX, 483 ff.) in 1824: "I am sorry Doctor Philip should have thought proper to commence this attack, for I really thought we might have done the Hottentots much good by going all of us hand in hand, and he must recollect that it is not very long since he thought me a very tolerable sort of animal." Auto. I, 233 - 254. Also Stockenstrom's Remarks on Philip's return of missions, in 1830. Vide infra, p.54.

man. And in 1825, when Philip and Fringle were the guests of the Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet during Philip's tour of the Northern districts, Fringle wrote enthusiastically to Fairbairn: "...here Philip and Stockenstrom have met and learned to appreciate each other. They are two of the ablest men in South Africa - and in place of finding foes in each other, are delighted with each other's talents and sentiments. Stockenstrom is hearty in the good cause and in the great cause of humanity." (25)

Before Fringle left the Cape, there was a personal break between him and Stockenstrom, which was not healed until after Stockenstrom's arrival in London in 1833. (26) But there was intermittent contact between Philip and Stockenstrom throughout the years, except in 1831, when there was a decided rupture in the relationship. On 7 December 1830, Dr. Philip submitted to the Secretary to Government his return of missions in South Africa belonging to the London Missionary Society. On 31 December, Stockenstrom sent in a comprehensive report, severely criticizing Philip's statements in regard to the mission house at Graaff-Reinet, the right of the Griquas to the area round Philippolis and the behaviour of the colonists in that area. (27) As Stockenstrom had evidently anticipated, (28) Philip took decided umbrage, and in January 1831

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- (25) Fringle to Fairbairn, 5.8.25. Fairbairn Correspondence. (Parliamentary Library). Fringle records in his Narrative of a Residence in South Africa that it had long been his wish to "bring these two meritorious and remarkable men, who had previously been not a little jealous of each other's views in regard to the native tribes, to a better mutual understanding." (Narrative of a Residence in South Africa, London, 1835.) pp. 227 - 228. (Henceforth cited as Fringle: Narrative.)
- (26) See A.C. minutes Q. 1382. p. 149. 28.8.35.
- (27) Remarks of the Commissioner-General of the Eastern Province Cape of Good Hope, on the "return of missions in South Africa belonging to the London Missionary Society" with "accompanying documents" forwarded to the Secretary to Government by the Revd. Dr. Philip under cover of his letter of the 7th December 1830. 31.12.30. C.O. 373. (Henceforth cited as Remarks of the Commissioner General on Philip's return of missions.)

(29)
wrote to Pringle, warning him against Stockenstrom.

Towards the end of 1832, Stockenstrom, with a sense of complete frustration as a result of his inability to get his views on frontier policy to prevail over those of Somerset, the military commandant, was contemplating a trip to England and resignation. It seems that he must have written to Philip suggesting an introduction to Buxton. For in October, Philip replied that "an introduction to Mr. Buxton would be undesirable. In England he should be independent." (30) Ever since his tour of the frontier districts in 1830, of course, Philip had been aware both of Stockenstrom's attitude to the frontier system and of his opinion of Colonel Somerset and the frontier authorities. (31) His tour of 1832 had provided him with a host of data on the "horrors" of the commando system, and convinced him of the necessity for driving the facts home to the government in England. (32)

(28) Stockenstrom's introductory paragraph to the Remarks of the Commissioner-General is characteristic: "I am well aware that in making the following observations I am placing myself in a very delicate position, in as much as Experience has too well taught, that independent of the ignorant, prejudiced and deluded part of the community in England, (whose opinion we might contemn) even extensive circles - among the truly worthy and respectable, whose approbation and support are in every respect desirable, will at once set down, as a narrow minded and oppressive Enemy of the Aborigines and other coloured classes - and as hostile to every attempt at their amelioration, - any man who shall presume in the least to differ with those from whom they have accustomed themselves to borrow their own notions as to the measures by which that desideration is to be attained and to whose views they have made their own reasoning powers entirely subservient." He wrote to Philip telling him that he thought he should see this report - (See A.C. minutes Q. 2354. p. 247. 4.3.36.

(29) Quoted by Macmillan: B. B and B. p.82, footnote.

(30) Ibid.

(31) As appears from a passage in Philip's journal of the 1830 tour. "Stockenstrom stated that he could mention fifty cases when Boers had gone on commando having lost no cattle... says, too, it is exceedingly difficult to trace spoor, but Somerset and others can do it in any quantity when they lead to a kraal that has good cattle in it." (Philip was quoting from a private letter from Stockenstrom). Quoted in Macmillan: B. B and B. p.79. ((It should be noted that Philip here speaks of Boers going "on commando" when he is almost certainly referring to patrols.))

(32) See a letter to Priscilla Buxton, 11.10.32. Quoted in Macmillan: B. B and B. p. 80.

But he was still biding his time and considering the best method of achieving his objects. As usual, he was keeping the Buxton family well informed. He knew that Stockenstrom and Buxton would find themselves in agreement on many points, just as did Stockenstrom and himself. But he probably felt that, at that stage, it would be wise to avoid any appearance of "collusion" between them for the defeat of their enemies. This, at any rate, was the interpretation which Stockenstrom put upon Philip's hint, and in November he replied agreeing with him. (33)

Meanwhile, however, public discussion of the frontier system was precipitated by the appearance of the notorious Bruce letters in the Commercial Advertiser during October November, and December 1832. The Graham's Town Journal, seething with indignation at Bruce's charges, demanded a "full investigation," to which demand Philip gave his wholehearted support. (34) Sir Lowry Cole, however, apparently decided that, coming from such a source, the case scarcely called for an investigation. (35)

This evidently convinced Philip that he would get little support from Cole for an investigation into the frontier system. The only course seemed to be to get the ear of the Secretary of State in England. Accordingly Philip turned, as he had done before, to Buxton - and he changed his mind with regard to Stockenstrom. On 13 January 1833, he wrote to him, saying that he hoped to

(33) Macmillan: B.B. and B. p. 82. Footnote.

Philip may have hesitated to connect Buxton and Stockenstrom, perhaps because he knew the source of Stockenstrom's dissatisfaction to be largely a personal matter - the antagonism between himself and Somerset - and feared the effect this might have on the prospects of a successful campaign against the frontier system in England. Or, as Macmillan implies (*ibid.*), perhaps the breach of 1831 still rankled. It is perhaps also significant in this connection that Philip himself rarely corresponded directly with Buxton, but mainly with members of his family. (*vide* Macmillan's quotes.)

(34) Though doubtless from motives quite other than those of the GTJ. for ref. see Macmillan B.B. and B. pp.80 -81.

(35) Cory II, 424.

return from his Northern trip in time to talk things over. And finally, Stockenstrom left for England with an introduction to Buxton and a bundle of letters for him. (36)

He seems, however, to have thought it wiser to adhere to the original decision. Arrived in London, he delivered the packet of letters at 55 Devonshire Street, but did not leave his address or ask to see Buxton. "For," as he said afterwards, "I was determined to connect myself with no party whatever, but as a public servant to adhere to my duty to the Government." (37) Stockenstrom, realizing that Philip's criticisms would be directed against the colonial government, probably felt that, as an official, he could hardly associate himself with them, coming as they did from a private individual, although he may have been in agreement with Philip on many points.

Somewhat to Stockenstrom's surprise, one of his first visitors was no less a person than Thomas Fringle, with whom he had not been on speaking terms for some years. The sincerity of his former friendship with Fringle notwithstanding, Stockenstrom had felt that, after the manner in which Fringle had mentioned his name in a representation to the Colonial Office on one occasion, the friendship could never be renewed. However, as he told the Aborigines Committee afterwards, "on seeing him come forward, all feeling on my part dwindled into air, and our intimacy was renewed." (38)

It was not really very surprising that Fringle should have sought out Stockenstrom. He knew that his friend Philip was turning his attention to the Cape frontier system, and possibly knew too, the turn events (39)

(36) Macmillan: B. B and B. pp. 82 - 83. Text and footnote.

(37) A.C. minutes. Q. 1382. p. 149. 28.3.35.

(38) Q. 1382. A.C. minutes. p. 149. 28.3.35.

(39) See, for instance, Philip to Fringle January 1831 in which 'the bloody commandos' are mentioned - Quoted Macmillan: B. B and B. p. 80.

had taken and that Stockenstrom had recently seen and discussed matters with Philip. Pringle's interest in the frontier, his anxiety for first-hand news and his long-standing respect for Stockenstrom's humanitarian principles, would all combine to make him eager to renew his acquaintance with Stockenstrom on the old terms.

Through Pringle, Stockenstrom was soon introduced to the Buxton circle - Buxton himself, Zachary Macaulay, William Allen and others. ⁽⁴⁰⁾ Discussion on matters South African and controversial was, of course, inevitable. The Emancipation Bill was then before the House of Commons. Philip was sending over evidence about the commando system, and Stockenstrom no doubt was plied with questions. ⁽⁴¹⁾ He records in his memoirs that discussions on the "aborigines" were frequent. ⁽⁴²⁾

Stockenstrom left for his tour of the Continent in July 1833, ⁽⁴³⁾ and was out of England when Buxton began seriously to turn his attention to the question of the commando system. ⁽⁴⁴⁾ Cole's Commando Ordinance created considerable agitation in philanthropic circles at the Cape during June and July, and Philip was diligently bombarding Buxton with evidence. In mid-October, Stockenstrom returned to England for a few weeks to settle the matter of his resignation, and he was evidently in London again during late December, and January 1834. ⁽⁴⁵⁾ During this time, he probably saw Pringle and perhaps Buxton several times. Buxton was engaged in convincing Stanley, then Secretary for Colonies, of the necessity for investigating the Cape Frontier System, and Pringle was at

(40) Auto. I, 422. Also A.C. Minutes Q. 1382, p.149, 1, in 28.8.35. the library

(41) Auto. I, 426.

(42) Ibid.

(43) Auto. I, 428.

(44) This was evidently in September 1833, according to a letter from Priscilla Buxton to Philip 21.9.33, Quoted Macmillan: B. B and B, p. 83.

(45) Auto. I, 429 - Stockenstrom refers to dining with the Earl of Caledon on 1 January 1834.

last inspired to start a book on the Cape. ⁽⁴⁶⁾ Probably, therefore, Stockenstrom discussed little else than the frontier system with them. That much of what he then said was to their taste is clear. Just after the publication of his book in May 1834, Pringle wrote to Fairbairn:

"Stockenstrom has rendered valuable service to Buxton and me, and I have consequently brought his merits ⁽⁴⁷⁾ prominently forward in my book."

But that there were still points on which Stockenstrom and his philanthropist friends did not see eye to eye, and that Stockenstrom by no means attempted to mould his version to fit in with theirs, is equally clear. For instance, Pringle has a footnote to his account of the expulsion of Makomo, in which he says:

"I am aware that Captain Stockenstrom, who had a principal hand in Makomo's expulsion from the Kat River, considers that step to have been both just and expedient. But with all my sincere respect for that gentleman's opinion, I cannot concur with him. I regard it, on the contrary, as a measure in itself alike iniquitous and impolitic, though, in one point of view, amply atoned ⁽⁴⁸⁾ for by the Hottentot settlements."

(46) Pringle to Fairbairn 4.11.33. Fairbairn Correspondence. Pringle's book was what first appeared as African Sketches, and later in a revised form as Narrative of a Residence in South Africa.

(47) Pringle to Fairbairn 22.5.34. Fairbairn Correspondence. This fact caused Donald Moodie, wrathfully reviewing Pringle's Narrative, to comment: "If any one of the colonial witnesses who have suffered mutilation at the hands of Mr. Pringle is entitled more than others to the entire confidence of his readers it is Captain Stockenstrom, who is never mentioned without a laudatory dose which would turn the gorge of most men. It would seem that Mr. Pringle could never mention this gentleman, without in this manner trying to slaver him into silence." (See letter from "Observer" to GTJ 24.12.35). "Observer", incidentally, was here engaged in proving that the sentiments imputed by Pringle, by implication, to Stockenstrom, could never have been expressed by this frontier official as the frontiersmen knew him. (See also "Observer's" letter in GTJ. 13.8.35.).

(48) Pringle: Narrative. p. 332.

That Stockenstrom expressed himself openly on all other points of difference between himself and the philanthropists at this time is most likely. And this is suggested by the tone of his letters written during 1833. (49) Therein Stockenstrom refers with obviously sincere respect on several occasions to the philanthropists, and specifically to Fairbairn and Philip. But he makes not the slightest attempt to evade the points upon which he differed from them in the topics under discussion in his letters. (50) The respect for the principles which guided the philanthropists, together with a readiness to defend the point of view of the colonists where the philanthropists censured them unjustly, which - as will appear clearly in later discussion - had always been characteristic of Stockenstrom, are marked in these letters. One passage in particular may be quoted as being both typical and significant: (51)

In short, if I continue to have anything to do with the public administration, I see no cause to deviate from what my conduct has hitherto been. Injustice to whites - English or Dutch - to blacks, Kaffir, Hottentot or Bushman, I will still consider injustice and deal with it accordingly. To see the white man persecuted and libelled because it has pleased Providence that he should be a slave-holder or, because he defends his life, family and property against thieves, robbers and murderers, when the Government cannot or will not do so - is to me as cruel and abominable as the tearing asunder of man and wife, mother and babe, for filthy lucre's sake, or the extermination of tribes, the plundering of nations; a country kept in a ferment, and the weak driven to desperation and war, merely to

(49) G.W. Hutton has printed extracts from these in Auto. II, 1 - 18. It is most unfortunate that he has given no clear indication as to their dates or their recipients. Whether the date 16 September 1833 heading the first extract is intended to apply to all that follow is not apparent. The whole content is most significant in relation to our discussion.

(50) For instance, writing of Fairbairn and his influence for good in the Colony, Stockenstrom adds (Auto. II, 8) "But he cannot, and I believe does not, pretend to be always right. With reference to the Hottentots, I believe our ultimate views agree, but on the vagrancy question we differ decidedly." (See later discussion of Stockenstrom's views, Chap. III) On p. 10 again, Stockenstrom refers to the existence of points of difference between himself and Philip, but adds that he saw no reason on that score to join in the colonial "hue and cry" against him.

afford some here the glory of conquering peace; to create patronage for some corrupt feat, or to advance or aggrandize some sycophant or favourite. (52) ... it is most unjust to charge the colonists en masse as cut-throats, and as being averse to the amelioration of, and good understanding with, the aboriginal tribes. It is the fashion to associate everything that is barbarous, brutal and cruel with the idea "African-Boer" ... if a wise and efficient system had been adopted, so in this respect (as I have formerly said on the slave and Hottentot questions) - the majority of Colonists, English and Dutch, would have given that their most cordial co-operation. I never found them, in the aggregate, hostile to any plan which would ensure protection to themselves, as well as their black neighbours. There is but a small section interested in the disturbances on the Frontier, and the acquisition of the cattle of the natives, but mismanagement makes the good suffer with the bad, and embitters the feelings of all ... I have often found more humane feeling and good sense in these men and the like, than I am disposed to give some of their defamers credit for; and I have never known an instance when the people from the inner parts have been dragged from their houses and avocations to assist in the protection of the Frontier, that every man who could reason on the subject did not curse the iniquities by which so much inconvenience, loss and suffering were brought on themselves and the country. But how can they help their situation? Then where lies the blame? Is it not your system which compels them to be butchers today, and would have them submit to be hutchered without resistance tomorrow? I am sick of the business. God grant that this were the last line I ever have to write about it.

The tone of the letter suggests that, in his discussions with the English philanthropists, Stockenstrom felt all the old intense irritation and anger at the way in which they referred to the colonists as a whole. (53)

(51) Auto. II, 10 - 12.

(52) Is this the Somerset influence again?

(53) As for instance, Buxton to Philip, 30.9.34.

Memoirs of Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, Baronet, with Selections from his Correspondence. Edited by his son, Charles Buxton, Esq. London, 1848. (Henceforth cited as Memoirs of Sir T.F. Buxton.) p.362, referring to the right principles of Spring-Rice: "Power would make great changes indeed, if it were to give him any fellowship in feeling with West India planters, or your boers." And Buxton to Z. Macaulay, October 1835 (Ibid. p.367) "Oh! we Englishmen are, by our own account, fine fellows at home! ... but such a set of miscreants and wolves as we prove when we escape from the range of the laws, the earth does not contain." (this was with reference to the Kaffir frontier). Stockenstrom wrote in his memoirs, many years later, of the time when, in 1825, Pringle and Philip visited him: "There was... little to be disputed between my guests and myself as to the past; but they certainly tried my temper by the virulence with which they persisted in denouncing the present generation of the Colonists, and refused to make any allowance for their actual position, which rendered self-defence often absolutely necessary for the preservation of both parties -

But, at the end of 1833, the fact that the philanthropists found many points to criticize in Stockenstrom's policy, and the acts which he had countenanced, assumed a new significance. Buxton was getting under weigh with his preparations for the campaign against the commendo system. He had seen Stanley, the Colonial Secretary, several times, and what he had had to say had carried weight - Stanley instructed D'Urban, the new governor, to devise an improved policy. But Buxton began to realize that "little will be done without open war, and public opinion -" that is to say, evidently, an enquiry. Public opinion was, indeed, already being aroused. Bruce's letters to the Commercial Advertiser, Barnister's "Humane Policy," and Kay's "Researches," had recently appeared and been reviewed in various newspapers, and their criticisms of Cape Frontier policy came under discussion in Stockenstrom's presence. And Stockenstrom was evidently "candidly warned" by his friends in the philanthropist circle, that representations on the subject of frontier

invariably cutting the Gordian knot by the maxim, which no people on earth have ever violated one hundredth part as much as the English themselves, viz., "You have no business here at all." (Auto. I, 244).

(54) Priscilla Buxton to Philip in a letter begun 21.9.33, completed 5.12.33. Quoted Macmillan: B, B and B, p. 83.

(55) Macmillan: B, B and B, p. 84.

(56) Priscilla Buxton to Philip. Quoted Macmillan, B, B and B, p. 83.

(57) A.F. Bruce: series of letters to SACA October - December 1832. Saxe Barnister: Humane Policy; or, Justice to the Aborigines of New Settlements, essential to a due Expenditure of British Money, and to the best Interests of the Settlers. With Suggestions how to Civilize the Natives by an improved Administration of existing means. London. 1830. ((Mendelssohn I, 77.))
 Rev. S. Kay: Travels and Researches in Caffraria: describing the character, customs, and moral condition of the tribes inhabiting that portion of Southern Africa: with historical and topographical remarks illustrative of the state and prospects of the British settlement in its borders, the introduction of Christianity, and the progress of civilization. London. 1833. ((See Mendelssohn I, 805)).

policy were to be made to the Colonial Secretary, and that it was likely that some of his measures, too, would be called in question. (58)

The significance of this for Stockenström was twofold. On the one hand - and this mattered a great deal to Stockenström - the philanthropists might well, as experience had taught him, distort completely both the policy he had followed and the motives behind it. He had - as the letter quoted above reveals - always prided himself that he had tried to follow a policy of strict justice to black and white alike. Justice was a sacred virtue. And Stockenström would permit no man lightly to commit the sacrilege of calling his own in question. On the other hand - more material but very essential - a misrepresentation of his policy to a Colonial Office attuned to the philanthropic key might destroy his chances of holding office at the Cape again. Stockenström had offered his resignation because he considered the Commissioner-Generalship to be a sinecure and because he found himself unable to enforce the frontier policy he regarded as essential. He did not want an appointment on the old terms and was prepared to make a very considerable material sacrifice of both money and position for his principles. But he was not going to have his prospects of reappointment ruined by philanthropist misrepresentations.

Therefore, towards the end of November, or early in December, Stockenström drew up a quite comprehensive

(58) Letter from Stockenström to Stanley 16.1.34. Concluding paragraph. A.C. minutes p. 99. And introductory paragraph of Memoir appended. Ibid.

(59)

Memoir, designed clearly to elucidate the policy he had followed as Commissioner-General, and to prove that he could not, under the existing circumstances, have done justice to his post (and therefore presumably could not be blamed for anything disastrous that might have been done).

It must be borne in mind that it was written while Stockenstrom was in a state of considerable mental agitation and was much concerned about the view that might be taken of his role as Commissioner-General. And above all, perhaps, he was designing a counterblast to "those attacks of which threats have been held out."⁽⁶⁰⁾ Accordingly, Stockenstrom started from the position of his opponents.⁽⁶¹⁾

"It is impossible to deny," he admitted, "that the oppressions of the European colonists and their descendants, is the cause of the degradation of most of the natives, and the hostile feeling existing between the colony and its black neighbours. The conviction of this fact alone, is sufficient to induce the government to make those amends which are still within its power, by protecting those natives against further persecution, and exerting every possible means to improve their condition and civilize them: but ..."

And he went on to give an exposition, of the sum of his experience: that "there is as much danger in the one extreme as the other:" that there was as little philanthropy in exposing the colonists to the unchecked fury of bands of robbers and murderers, as in allowing the punishment of innocent kraals of Kaffirs by seizing their cattle and even - as he considered Colonel Somerset to have recommended in one of his despatches - firing

(59) Memoir drawn up by the Commissioner-General of the Cape of Good Hope, in reply to certain Strictures upon the frontier Policy of said Colony, contained in "Bannister's Humane Policy," "Bruce's Letters" "Kay's

upon them upon suspicion of theft. The degree to which Stockenstrom's statements in this document coincide with his former views and policies will be proved in more detailed discussion in the next chapter. The theme, however, may be compared with that in the private letter of 1833 quoted earlier in this chapter. ⁽⁶²⁾ Concluding his strong condemnation of the policy he supposed Colonel Somerset to have put forward, i.e. that of firing upon Kaffirs to whose kraals the spoor of stolen cattle led - he had already shown why this must lead to the slaughter of the innocent "in ninety nine cases out of a hundred," Stockenstrom stated that he had resolved rather to quit his station than see such a proposed system acted upon. ⁽⁶³⁾ But he added a characteristic parenthesis: "though I would, as long as I had continued to hold any share in the management of frontier affairs, have persisted in putting down murderers and determined irreclaimable plunderers, however much I may thereby have exposed myself to the censure of very worthy though ill-informed mistaken men." His opposition to the existing and the proposed frontier policy, he went on, did "not proceed from any desire to make a display of independence, or to lay claim to any refinement of philanthropy. I would thereby only make myself ridiculous; for my utter dependence on circumstances is too well known, and my whole official history, as well as this document, shows that I see no humanity in encouraging crime by the extreme of forbearance."

Before Stockenstrom sent in this Memoir, with its appended documents covering the correspondence in connection with the commandos of 1830 and 1831, he received the

Researches, and some reviews on those publications. (Henceforth cited as Memoir of 1833.) A.C., minutes, pp. 99 - 102. The memoir is dated 31 December 1833, but the second last paragraph (p. 102) shows that it was written before 7 December 1833, when he received confirmation of the abolition of the Commissioner-Generalship.

(60) See Memoir of 1833, introductory paragraph. A.C., minutes, p. 99.

(61) Ibid.

(62) Vide supra, p. 60 .

official information that the Commissioner- Generalship was to be abolished and that the Secretary of State had not any doubt of his active and conscientious discharge of his duty and was prepared to recommend him as one of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council. Stockenstrom accordingly added a somewhat naive paragraph to his Memoir, saying that he might now "safely abstain from any farther justification" of his proceedings. And in acknowledging the letters of 11 December 1833 and 7 January 1834 from the Secretary of State, he nevertheless forwarded the Memoir to him. The conclusion Stanley might come to in his absence, (Stockenstrom was about to leave for Europe again) where, he wrote (significantly enough) there would be no one on the spot to defend him "may be of importance to my character, whether I ever reappear on any official theatre or not." He would be prepared to offer any further explanations which might be required, and left his address should he be needed. (64)

Meanwhile, Buxton was storing up ammunition for the campaign against the commando system. He seems to have been interested in the Cape as part of the whole system - one facet of the native policy of the British Empire. He was concerned with the principles upon which the government should act towards the aborigines in "all countries where we make settlements." (65) And in these matters he apparently looked to Dr. Philip as his

(63) Ibid. p. 101 - 102.

(64) See concluding paragraph of Stockenstrom to Stanley, 16.1.34. A.C. minutes. p. 99.

(65) Buxton wrote to Philip on 17 January 1834:
 "It appears to me that we ought to fix and enforce certain regulations and laws, with regard to the natives of all countries where we make settlements." He added that it would be necessary to enquire in how far, in countries already settled, the government has violated the principles of justice and humanity, what reparation had been made and what could still be done. (Memoirs of Sir T.F. Buxton. p. 361.)

"chief informant and adviser."⁽⁶⁶⁾ It was probably Pringle, and not Buxton himself, who was so eager to enlist Stockenstrom's open support in the campaign against the Cape frontier system, and who tried to get information from him for Buxton's use.⁽⁶⁷⁾ But, it is evident that Stockenstrom adhered staunchly to his policy of allying himself with no "party." He asserted to the Aborigines Committee that, notwithstanding repeated requests - even being written to three or four times while on the Continent - he refused to "assist in bringing forward the colonial and frontier system;" and that his answer was uniformly that "I had stated my sentiments to the Government; that as a government servant I had candidly given my opinions when I agreed and also when I differed with that Government; that to that Government I was responsible, and that when officially called upon I should most undoubtedly not shrink from repeating those sentiments, but should never lend myself to any party of any kind against either the Government or anybody else."⁽⁶⁸⁾

One thing in particular at this time seems to bear out this assertion. This is the very curious, indirect way in which, in his Narrative of a Residence in South Africa, Pringle refers to and criticizes the Commissioner-Generalship. His informant on these points can have been no other than Stockenstrom himself. Yet Pringle makes no direct reference to him as the author of any criticisms.⁽⁶⁹⁾

Even if, as Pringle contrives to imply, he was basing what he had to say upon the general opinion at Cape Town, gathered from his colonial correspondents, it is,

(66) Buxton to Philip. 30.9.34. Memoirs of Sir T.G. Buxton. p. 362.

(67) See A.C. minutes. Q. 1381, 1382, p. 149. 28.8.35.

(68) A.C. minutes. Q. 1381, p. 149. 28.8.35.

(69) Pringle: Narrative, pp. 329 - 330.

of course, fairly certain that he had had all this confirmed by Stockenstrom and his statements, if backed up by references to the Commissioner-General himself, would have carried very much more weight. It is a very fair conjecture that Fringle was here acting in accordance with Stockenstrom's wishes, and that Stockenstrom had told him that he did not want his authority introduced for these criticisms of the "useless and invidious sinecure."⁽⁷⁰⁾ For where Stockenstrom supported a government measure, as in the case of Macomo's expulsion, Fringle mentions his views quite explicitly.⁽⁷¹⁾

Stockenstrom returned to Sweden, probably in mid-January 1834. Throughout this period, Philip continued to ply Buxton with voluminous documents.⁽⁷²⁾ Philip's representations having roused Stanley to an awareness of the need for enquiring into Eastern Frontier affairs,⁽⁷³⁾ he was taking an active interest in the preparations for the parliamentary committee which Buxton planned to get appointed on 4 June 1834.⁽⁷⁴⁾ Stockenstrom, naturally, was to be a principal witness, and he was sent for by parliamentary summons at the end of May.⁽⁷⁵⁾ Fringle exulted, and looked forward with unconcealed delight to the way in which Stockenstrom's evidence would "overhaul your frontier transactions" and how "Col. Bell and that poor sumphSir Lowry," not to mention Col. Wade, would be entangled by the evidence before the committee.⁽⁷⁶⁾

The resignation of Stanley in June, however, evidently put Buxton off his stroke completely. His motion had to be postponed until 1 July 1834. And then he called, not for a Committee, but merely for an Address to His

(70) Ibid. p. 330.

(71) See Narrative, p. 332, Footnote. Quoted supra, p. 59.

(72) Macmillan B, B and B, pp. 86 - 88.

(73) Macmillan B, B and B, p. 84.

(74) Fringle to Fairbairn, 22.5.34. Fairbairn Correspondence

(75) Ibid.

(76) Fringle to Fairbairn, 4.11.33 and 22.5.34.

Majesty, praying him to take such measures and give such instructions to the officers in the British colonies as would "secure to the natives the due observance of justice, and the protection of their rights, promote the spread of civilization amongst them, and lead them to the peaceful and voluntary reception of the Christian Religion." The Committee which he had intended to get appointed, he told the House, he now deemed unnecessary, for he believed the Secretary for the Colonies to be "alive to the importance of this subject" and "willing to introduce any practical amelioration of the condition of these people." On the understanding that Spring-Rice would call for the necessary papers before the next session of parliament and do all in his power to draw the attention of government to the question of native policy, Buxton waived his motion for a Committee, and substituted one for addresses for the masses of documents relevant to the treatment of the aborigines in Britain's various possessions. (77)

Spring-Rice, the new Colonial Secretary, was, of course, not primed by Philip, as Stanley had been. He professed, indeed, no objection to any investigation of colonial policy, or to a Committee during the next session, should Buxton wish it. But he pointed out that the principles for which Buxton was pleading were those "on which the British Government has for a considerable time been disposed to act." And he questioned whether many of Buxton's statements were "relevant to the actual conditions of those tribes at the present moment." He made these observations, he said, since some of Buxton's statements "might otherwise have been calculated to mislead the House, and to produce an impression unjust

(77) See, for all the above, the Supplement to the GTJ, 24.11.34.

towards our Colonial Administration, which I am sure it could not be his object to create or to extend." (78)

The attitude of Spring-Rice was a decided disappointment to Fringle. (79) "But of course," as he wrote to Fairbairn, "he knew nothing earthly about the matter ... (80) it shall not rest so if God grant me life a little longer." Stockenström left for Sweden again in mid-July, and it seems that he may have shared Fringle's disappointment (81) in the attitude of the Colonial Office.

Buxton, that "most excellent man, but dilatory," tended now to shelve the whole question of a parliamentary committee, and trust to the "good intentions" of Spring-Rice. (82) Philip was much occupied with practical problems at the Cape and had written little for some time. (83) Pringle became agitated, "Buxton is not firm enough," he wrote to Fairbairn, "he must have a committee (84) . And to Philip he wrote in August: "... you should stir up Buxton." (85) Philip accordingly began once more to keep Buxton very fully posted on frontier affairs. (86)

It was probably during this period that Stockenström was "repeatedly" told of Buxton's desire to have information about the frontier system, (87)

(78) Ibid.

(79) See Fringle to Fairbairn, 16.7.34. Fairbairn Correspondence.

(80) Ibid. Pringle was then already seriously ill, and did not live to see the Committee.

(81) On 31.8.35, he wrote bitterly: "Nor have I the same confidence which you have in the Reformers. Spring-Rice has shown by the manner in which he disposed of the Treasurership at the Cape, "that the reign of Patronage, favouritism, and jobbery has ceased for ever," meant nothing else than that the power of misrule has changed hands." Auto. II, 23.

(82) Pringle to Philip. August 1835. Quoted Macmillan B, B and B, pp. 102 - 103.

(83) Ibid.

(84) Fringle to Fairbairn. 16.7.34. Fairbairn Correspondence.

(85) Pringle to Philip, Quoted Macmillan, B, B and B, p. 102.

(86) Macmillan, B, B and B, p. 103.

(87) A.C. minutes, Q. 1382 - p. 149.

Finally, a questionnaire on the relations of the Cape Colony with the native tribes was sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to be forwarded to Stockenstrom. ⁽⁸⁸⁾ This suggests that probably Buxton, realizing that the only way to make Stockenstrom's information available was to seek it through official channels, had asked the Secretary for Colonies to forward the questionnaire. ⁽⁸⁹⁾ Stockenstrom was in Russia when the letter arrived, and did not reply until 5 November. But he then complied with the request in as full and careful a statement as he could make without any reference ⁽⁹⁰⁾ to documents, of which, of course, he had none with him. The thoroughness and evident eagerness with which he dealt with the whole problem of the Cape frontier, and the measures he would propose to effect improvements, suggests that he believed that a new outlook, and one more in accordance with his own, might now be influencing the Colonial Office. This is suggested, too, by a passage in which, commenting on the cases of Scheepers, Erasmus and Bezuidenhout, about which his former representations to the Colonial Government had been ignored, Stockenstrom wrote: "I have been severely judged for feeling hurt at such proceedings, ⁽⁹¹⁾ whereas now I may, perhaps, be placed on the defensive for having been too passive." ⁽⁹²⁾ But, he added, he trusted that everything that might in any way reflect upon his conduct while in office would be "sifted to the bottom." He possessed

(88) A.C. minutes, p. 117. See the preamble.

(89) The suggestion that this should be the procedure could, of course, have come from Stockenstrom himself.

(90) Stockenstrom to Spring-Rice. 5.11.34. A.C. minutes, pp. 117 - 123. The significance of this document will also come under discussion in the next chapter.

(91) A reference, probably, to Caledon's disapproval of his resignation. Stockenstrom records in the Autobiography (Auto. I, 432.) that Fringle and his friends were equally disapproving.

(92) A.C. minutes, p. 122.

nothing more dear than the admission of all those under whom he ever served that he had done his duty honestly and zealously during a long public service; and he hoped that "in my retirement, to which I have been forced by the most unwarrantable, arbitrary treatment, which remains to this hour unexplained, no advantage, with you at least, will be allowed to be taken of my distance from Downing-street and the colony."

(93)

The passage above, and others in the letter, reveal that the Commissioner-Generalship was still a very sore point with Stockenstrom. And there is just a hint that he did hope for redress and for a position of trust in the carrying out of a new frontier policy. For at the conclusion of his suggestions as to what that policy should be, Stockenstrom wrote: ⁽⁹⁴⁾ "Whether such an undertaking would require the immediate supervision of some high authority on the spot, I hardly consider myself competent to judge, for, as I must admit that I feel strongly on the subject, I may not be totally free from bias." He pointed out that the office for the control of the Eastern division, recommended by the Commissioners of Inquiry, had "dwindled into a perfect sinecure" and that no useful purpose would be served by its re-establishment on the old basis. Stockenstrom would hardly have been human had he not permitted himself to hope for an office in which he could be usefully employed in the service of the country he knew so well and whose problems were still a source of tremendous interest to him. The months went by, however, and nothing happened. Stockenstrom heard no more from the Colonial Office.

(93) e.g. A.C. minutes, p. 122.

(94) Ibid. p. 121.

Buxton, however, was pressing on. At the end of September he wrote to Philip, telling him of his deep interest in the commando system (on which, together with much material on the proposed Vagrancy Law, Philip had evidently sent him a note.) and demanding "facts about commandos." "I will," he promised, "if alive and in Parliament, aim an effectual blow at them."⁽⁹⁵⁾

The outbreak of war on the Eastern frontier accelerated matters at last. The news reached Buxton by 12 March 1835, and he gave notice at once to move for a committee on 19 May.⁽⁹⁶⁾ Philip's letters became concerned chiefly with the causes of the war and the policy that should be followed, and he urged a committee of the House of Commons "to take into consideration the whole of the frontier system."⁽⁹⁷⁾ In April, Charles Grant, (created Lord Glenelg in May), well known as an Exeter Hall man of definite humanitarian sympathies, became Colonial Secretary. And on 31 July 1835, Buxton's "capital good Committee" of fifteen members held its first sitting⁽⁹⁸⁾

It seems probable that Stockenstrom knew very little of all this, for Fringle, who might have kept him informed, had died. The news of the outbreak of war on the Eastern Frontier apparently reached him only in July, via the London papers. This finally decided him to settle in Sweden and give up all idea of returning to the Cape. In August, he wrote to a friend: "We saw enough from the extracts in the London papers to be satisfied that there is no prospect of peace on the Frontier as long as war continues so profitable a game. My property is too

(95) Buxton to Philip, 30.9.34. Memoirs of Sir T.F. Buxton, p. 362.

(96) Macmillan: B, B and B, p. 120.

(97) Ibid. p. 119, -120.

(98) Ibid. p. 120.

near the scene of glory to afford a peaceable retreat. In Cape Town I have no occupation." ⁽⁹⁹⁾ Under the circumstances, Sweden seemed to offer the best solution to the Stockenströms. They liked the country, and could live there quietly and independently.

Accordingly, in July, Stockenström left for London, planning to spend three months settling his affairs at the Cape. But he was evidently chafing to get back to Sweden as soon as possible. At the end of August he wrote that he had left his wife "in such circumstances that only the necessity of saving something out of the clutches of the belligerents could justify the separation." ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

On his arrival in London, Stockenström applied at once to his agent, Borradaile, for a passage, only to be informed that a summons had just been sent to Stockenström for him to appear before a committee of the House of Commons. A visit to Hay confirmed this. Stockenström was considerably irritated. "This unhinges my arrangements altogether," he wrote, "as I am anxious to go and dispose of my property as soon as possible if there be anything left after the scramble." ⁽¹⁰¹⁾

About the Committee itself Stockenström was scarcely enthusiastic. "I neither wish to be heard by the Committee nor to avoid them", he wrote, "perfect indifference has succeeded loathsome disgust. If they will send to Downing Street they will find everything that I have to say on record, and if they call me before them I shall just refer them to those records, and have done with the matter." Nor had he any hope that the Committee would effect any radical change in frontier policy at the Cape. "The whole affair will terminate in the consummation

(99) 3.8.35. Auto. II, 22. See this letter for what follows
 (100) 31.8.35. Auto. II, 24. Mrs. Stockenström was then about five months pregnant.
 (101) 3.8.35. Auto. II, 22.

of what was intended - a strong Hottentot regiment and a military Lieutenant-Governor."⁽¹⁰²⁾

It was in this mood of indifference, and of general irritation at the unexpected delaying of his plans, that Stockenstrom first appeared before the Committee. He was called five times in all during August. Nothing occurred during that period, evidently, to alter his attitude, although he had, of course, to change his plans.

He had not expected to have to appear so often. "I was in hopes," he wrote at the end of August, "that the Committee would have been satisfied with a mere reference to the official documents, but they seemed determined to squeeze the very marrow out of me, and my memory, in the absence of records, has been dreadfully put to the stretch."⁽¹⁰³⁾

Stockenstrom took a gloomy view of the whole proceedings. In his disappointment at the "Reformers," he had no hope of the Committee's having any influence on colonial policy. Perhaps the fact that he was still without office, despite the hopes of November 1834, had embittered him still more. Although he had decided not to return to the Cape, there was probably - though he disclaimed it - an element of personal bitterness in his tirade, in this same letter, against Spring-Rice and the Reformers, who had persisted in the old policy of overlooking the claims of the colonists in making appointments.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾

About the effect of his own evidence, Stockenstrom was no more optimistic. He wrote:⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ "That my evidence will make me a number of enemies is no more than I expect, but they must be a precious pack of rascals... if they

(102) Ibid.

(103) 31.8.35. Auto. II, 26.

(104) His anger in this case was specifically connected with the [appointment to the Treasureship.e])

(105) 31.8.35. Auto. II, 25.

expect me to deceive the Committee in order to serve their views... I am neither glad nor sorry for having thus been dragged forward. Not glad, because I expect nothing good for that devoted, that doomed Colony..."

That Stockenstrom expected these "enemies" to be amongst the ex-Cape officials then in England is fairly certain. Though he never failed to express the highest personal respect for the character of the ex-governor, Cole, and the secretary to government, Bell, his own quarrel was with the colonial administration, and much of his evidence told against that administration. He expected some sort of counterblast from this quarter. Accordingly, Stockenstrom decided to postpone his return to Sweden until October and to travel in Scotland and Ireland meanwhile.

"My opponents will thus have ample time to act," he wrote, "I shall keep you advised of my movements, and can come over as soon as self-defence renders my presence necessary."⁽¹⁰⁶⁾

Nor did Stockenstrom expect his evidence to have made him wholly persona grata with Philip and his associates (though Buxton was evidently "delighted" with Stockenstrom's evidence,⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ for he wrote:⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ "I see no harm in Philip, Reed and Fairbairn coming over. They may disapprove of some of my acts, and abuse me accordingly, but I defy them to charge me with one single intentional act of oppression. At least, if the Committee do its duty, I will have the means of defence..."

(106) 31.8.35. Auto. II, 24. This clearly shows that Stockenstrom expected opposition from sources in England - there was not "ample time" for any contact with Cape sources.

(107) Macmillan, B. B and B. p. 136.

(108) 31.8.35. Auto. II, 26.

Stockenstrom's whole attitude to the Committee was evidently that he was there in defence of himself and his former policies. (109) It seems very clear from the letter written just afterwards, that he had no idea of the enquiry having any effect either upon colonial policy or upon his own future prospects. For, in reply to some suggestion from his correspondent involving a visit to (110) the Colonial Office, Stockenstrom wrote:

"I have no business in the Colonial Office, and nothing to ask of the Secretary of State. He does not know me, nor I him, and I do not see that I can do any good by calling. On the contrary, I should only give rise to a suspicion that I am anxious to resume my office. This no consideration on earth will induce me to do as long as the Governor and Colonial Secretary can alternately supersede me or make accats paw or football of me at pleasure. Besides, my mind has been sufficiently harassed for the public, and much have I got for it. I can live quietly and independently in Sweden, and look with calm contempt upon all the plots and tricks which are performing." (111)

(109) A.C. minutes, Q. 1382, p. 149. 28.8.35.

"I am no volunteer here, I am dragged into this business. I may be said almost to be on my defence, but I have no cause to shun the contest."

(110) 31.8.35. Auto. II, 23. The letter does not specify, and Hutton does not say, either who the correspondent was, or what his suggestion was. References in the letter suggest that it was someone present at the Committee sessions.

(111) This letter, incidentally, throws new light on Stockenstrom's alleged attempts to represent himself to the committee as "the very Beau Ideal" of an administrator. He comments: "The Committee's enquiries on the 21st about certificates as to my conduct in office surprised me as much as they did you. Mr. Lushington assured me that they were by no means meant ~~to reflect~~ to reflect upon me. Major Dundas, though differing with me in opinion, said that he would bring me a letter of Colonel Graham's in my favour. Perhaps he did not find it, or perhaps he saw that I was sufficiently well provided. I gave the Committee such testimonials as I could find among my papers. They seemed tolerably satisfied." Auto. II, 25.

Stockenstrom knew at the end of August that he would have to appear before the Committee again in March 1836, and had therefore to set aside all plans for going to the Cape in 1835. He considered doing so after the 1836 session, however, and in August 1835 was already planning that Mrs. Stockenstrom, who would not be fit to travel during the winter, should be left in Paris while he went to the Cape. (112)

Contrary to his expectations, Stockenstrom was not called upon to appear in London again in 1835, and in October, according to plan, he returned to Sweden, to be with his wife when their third child was born. (113)

Meanwhile, the unfortunate Glenelg, well-meaning and honestly anxious to do the right thing, was trying to sort out his South African policy. Glenelg found himself in a deplorable position. Just before he took office, news had come through from the Cape of the outbreak of war on the Eastern Frontier in January. Since then, with the exception of two short notes, written in February and March, Glenelg had heard nothing from D'Urban. Then came Capt. Beresford, in August, fresh from the scene of action, with D'Urban's despatch of 19 June 1835, reporting the frontier settlement which he had commenced in May. After this, Glenelg was left high and dry until the arrival, in January 1836, of D'Urban's despatch, dated 7 November 1835, detailing the modified policy which he applied in September. (114)

On receipt of the June despatch from the Cape in August, Glenelg realized that the war was apparently to end, "not in the repulse of the invaders, but in the acquisition of a new and extensive province." (115)

(112) Ibid.

(113) The eldest child had died at the Cape in 1832.

(114) Macmillan: B. B and B., p. 135, for all the above.

(115) Quoted ibid. Footnote.

Upon him largely rested the onus of sanctioning such an extension of colonial territory. In the face of this, Glenelg could not possibly sit back and wait for information from D'Urban. If official information was not to be had, he would have to seek it from any available source. Initially, however, Glenelg evidently did not react to the news of the policy of "extermination" as Philip and Buxton did. His opinion of the causes of the war throughout August and September was based upon what little information he could glean from D'Urban's dispatches, the verbal account of Capt. Beresford, and, apparently, ironically enough, Part I of Godlonton's Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes into the Eastern Province of the Cape of Good Hope. (116) His first intimation of another version came evidently when Buxton and Ellis, Secretary of the L.M.S., called upon him on 26 September 1835. (117)

If Glenelg had no information, a prolific source was at hand in the shape of these two men who were in receipt of voluminous papers from Philip at the Cape. Some time during August, letters from Philip arrived in connection with D'Urban's May policy. Buxton did not rush to the Colonial office with his information. His interest still centred round his Committee. At the end of August, Buxton's secretary, Miss Gurney, wrote to Philip that Buxton had spent much time studying his letters and planned to make a thorough study of the subject during the recess. He thought it might be a good idea for Philip and Fairbairn to come over in person

(116) For this see the letter from Ellis to Philip, 26.9.35. quoted in full in Macmillan: B. B and B, pp. 137 - 139.

This says that Glenelg referred to a pamphlet entitled, he thought "Narrative of events which preceded the irruption of the Caffers," published in Grahamstown. Ellis and Buxton did not know it at all. It is more than likely to have been Godlonton's pamphlet, part I of which was published in 1835. ((See Mendelssohn I, 610))

(117) Ibid. and Macmillan: B. B and B, p. 136.

during the next session to give their "important evidence." And he was contemplating going to the Government and urging them to suspend the ratification of the arrangements with respect to the new Province of Caffreland till the origin and cause of the war had been investigated. (118)

Slow to act, as usual, however, Buxton did nothing until, on 23 September, a mass of letters from Philip arrived at L.M.S. headquarters, just in time for one of the Society's regular Committee meetings, where they made an immediate impression, with their detailed criticisms of D'Urban's proposed policy. Ellis at once got in touch with Buxton, and three days later, on 26 September, they had their first interview with Glenelg. (119) From Ellis's account, it seems quite clear that this was the first evidence of Philip's version of the causes of the war that came to Glenelg's hearing. (120) Buxton proceeded at once, and with vigour, to disabuse Glenelg's mind of erroneous impressions. Philip was, of course, quoted extensively on all points connected with the causes of the war, as also were Ross and other missionaries from the frontier areas. And various arguments were used against the extension of the Frontier in order to protect the Colony: the good understanding between the Hottentots at the Kat River Settlement and the Kaffirs, until the former were brought under the Commando system, ((this must have been part of Philip's material: it did not appear in Stockenstrom's evidence)) "together with Capt. Stockenstrom's evidence that for this purpose no

(118) Gurney to Philip. 28.3.35. Macmillan: B. B and B. p. 136.

(119) Ibid.

(120) Ellis to Philip. 26.9.35. Macmillan: B. B and B. pp. 138 - 139. "The conduct of Macomo in refusing to withdraw his cattle from the prohibited territory, the great increase of the depredations of the Caffers, which occasioned the more urgent complaints of the Colonists, appeared to be regarded by Lord Glenelg as the causes of the war, not the increased aggressions of the Colonists."

extension of the boundary was necessary."⁽¹²¹⁾

This would appear to be the only aspect of Stockenstrom's evidence, or, indeed, any of the evidence, brought up at this stage. The chief concern of Buxton, Ellis and Glenelg was the causes of the war. About the immediate causes and the conditions prevailing just before the outbreak not one of the witnesses examined in August was in a position to give first-hand information, although many of them were asked for their opinions about what had occurred and the policy that was being followed by D'Urban.⁽¹²²⁾

Buxton's own account of the interview with Glenelg presents a pleasing picture:

I gave our new Colonial Secretary a disquisition to my heart's content, on the treatment of savages, the death of Hintza, the atrocities of white men, and above all, on the responsibilities of a Secretary of State; and I assured him that I knew there was a corner in the next world hotter than the rest, for such of them as tolerate the abominations which we practise abroad.

No wonder the unhappy Glenelg gave Buxton to understand that he felt "both soundly and warmly" on matters South African!⁽¹²³⁾

The upshot of the interview was that Glenelg requested Buxton to supply him with all the information he could lay hands on.⁽¹²⁴⁾ Buxton at once directed his

(121) *Ibid.* p. 138. This was, presumably, a reference to Stockenstrom's opinion that independent tribes should be left to themselves as far as possible. He was not actually questioned directly on the subject of D'Urban's extension of the colonial boundary.

(122) e.g. Questions about the expulsion of the Kaffirs put to Shaw. Q. 749 - 757. *A.C. minutes* pp. 64 - 65. 7.3.35; and to Stockenstrom about the death of Hintza. Q. 1401 - 1407. *A.C. minutes* p. 156. 28.8.25. The pressing of these questions, despite Stockenstrom's obvious reluctance to commit himself in any way on a matter of which he had no personal knowledge, suggests that the Committee - or Buxton at any rate, - was seeking support for the information he had from Philip.

(123) Buxton to Miss Buxton, 28.9.35. *Memoirs of Sir T.F. Buxton*, pp. 366 - 367.

(124) Ellis to Philip, 26.9.35. Macmillan: *B, B and B*, p. 138.

secretary, Anna Gurney, to prepare a digest of Philip's letters, because "I do believe, that an able digest of these letters, sticking close to the text, might save a nation of 100,000 beings, and several flourishing missions, from destruction." (125) On his own initiative, and with the sanction of one or two of the directors of the London Missionary Society, Secretary Ellis maintained the contact with Glenelg, forwarding communications and letters from Philip and others, and seeking repeated personal interviews. (126) The probable emphasis of his discussions is suggested by his request to Philip to send him "the fullest and strongest evidence" particularly on the death of Hintza, and the aggressions of the Colonists as a cause of the war. (127) The evidence supplied through Ellis constituted the bulk of the information laid before Glenelg. (128)

On 10 October 1835, Buxton sent to Glenelg "various documents relative to the commando system, the Caffre inroad, and Hintza's death," which, he considered, established that "the colonists, or at least some of them" had long been eager to get possession of the Kaffir territory; that the commando system was the real cause of the war; and that the facts stated about the death of Hintza threw a deep reflection on the colonial authorities and demanded a close inquiry. (129) This was presumably the digest of Philip's papers which he had asked Anna Gurney to prepare a fortnight before. What other papers, or extracts from the evidence before the Committee, Buxton may have included is not clear. Possibly, however, he sent only the digest of Philip's papers, since,

(125) Buxton to Miss Buxton. 23.9.35. Memoirs of Sir J.F. Buxton. pp. 366 - 367.

(126) Macmillan: B. B and B. p. 139.

(127) Ellis to Philip. 26.9.35. Macmillan: B. B and B. p.139.

(128) Macmillan: B. B and B. p. 139. Footnote on the volume, C.o. 48/165, in which Glenelg had all his sources collected.

(129) Buxton to Glenelg. 10.10.35. Memoirs of Sir J.F. Buxton. p. 367.

from the earliest letter to his daughter quoted above, he seems to have relied upon that to carry the necessary weight.

Glenelg does seem to have tried to keep an open mind. But evidently the information which he received in October had the effect Buxton anticipated. By 20 October, Glenelg had swung over to the Ellis - Buxton views on the justice of D'Urban's May policy. He wrote to D'Urban, warning him that the existing inclination was to doubt "the justice, and in a larger degree the necessity or the policy, of that acquisition," and instructing him not to commit the government any further either way. (130)

By December, there was still no further information from D'Urban, and Glenelg "reluctantly compelled to draw many conclusions from less authentic sources of information," drew up the notorious despatch of 26 December 1835. (131)

The documents upon which he had based his conclusions, Glenelg informed D'Urban, had been "carefully recorded in this office... to remain here in vindication of the opinions deduced from them" - presumably those contained in Papers relating to the War of 1835, the bulk of which, as has been noted, were supplied from London Missionary Society sources. Macmillan considers that the immediately decisive criticism of D'Urban's policy came from Ellis. (132) And he very pertinently observes that, although the Committee took evidence throughout August, (133) on 26 September Glenelg still had, apparently, only one version of the causes of the war. (134) Anxiously awaiting further

(130) Glenelg to D'Urban. 20.10.35. Quoted in Macmillan: B. B and B, p. 141.

(131) Macmillan: B. B and B, p. 147.

(132) C.o. 48/165. See Macmillan: B. B and B, p. 147, footnote.

(133) Macmillan: B. B and B, p. 141.

(134) Macmillan has it "all the Summer" which is an exaggeration - the Committee sat from 31 July 1835 to 31 August 1835.

first-hand news from the Cape, Glenelg was unlikely to have displayed much interest in what was being said before the Committee. In Macmillan's opinion, Stockenström's evidence told against D'Urban's plans, his emphasis being "all on the shortcomings of the old frontier system and generally in favour of greater leniency."⁽¹³⁵⁾ But he considers that beyond this, the Committee had little serious influence on the course of events. On the other hand, in December 1835, Buxton wrote, full of enthusiasm,⁽¹³⁶⁾ to Zachary Macaulay, telling him of the "most noble despatch" which Glenelg had sent to the Cape "restoring the territory we lately stole, to the Caffres, and laying down the soundest principles, with respect to future intercourse with them." He had lain awake almost all night, he wrote "the image rising before me of the hunted people restored to their land; of Macomo, now so dejected, soon amazed with unlooked-for relief" - a passage which reads much like Buxton, and little like any Stockenström influence.⁽¹³⁷⁾ But Buxton also writes:

How glad am I that I did not give way to the difficulties of obtaining a Committee! ... The events of the war, Hintza's death, and the clamours of the settlers for permission once more to spoil these "irreclaimable savages," have called the attention of the Government to our evidence, and coming at the very nick of time, I have reason to know it affected the decision of the question.

Now this may indicate that the influence of the evidence was more decisive than Macmillan seems to think. On the other hand, Buxton may simply have been taking more credit than was justified for the influence of what was, after all, his pet project for 1835. It seems

(135) Ibid. One should, however, be cautious in using, without qualification, the expression 'greater leniency' in connection with Stockenström's opinions. He never hesitated, as will appear, to recommend the utmost severity when necessity demanded.

(136) Buxton to Z. Macaulay. Dec. 1835. Memoirs of Sir T.F. Buxton. p. 368.

(137) Ibid.

probable that the Philip material played the major part in convincing Glenelg, by mid-October, that there was a very strong opposing version of the war, very different from the one he had originally been disposed to accept. He then wrote a warning letter to D'Urban, indicating that he inclined to a different view, but not actually recommending any change of policy as yet. Under further urgent pressure, mainly from Ellis - who on 25 November, for instance, had a four-hour interview with the Colonial Secretary - ⁽¹³⁸⁾ Glenelg was won over to a definite change of policy. And, in making his decision, he was probably influenced by such salient features of the evidence of 1835 as would be pointed out by Buxton - as he had done on 26 September, for instance - bearing out the views expressed by Philip, Ellis and himself. Glenelg, it must be remembered had apparently initially been cautious about the Philip version of affairs and had not swallowed it at once. Such points of confirmation as could be got from the evidence of other witnesses acquainted with the Cape would naturally have aided Buxton in urging action upon Glenelg. And it is very possible that, as on 26 September, so again later, Buxton referred specifically to points in Stockenstrom's evidence, with which he had ⁽¹³⁹⁾ professed himself "delighted." There are, however, features of Glenelg's December despatch, which will be indicated in Chapter III, which suggest that he had by no means of his own accord made any very intensive study of Stockenstrom's evidence. It seems, therefore, that one should perhaps be wary of over-emphasizing the specific influence of this evidence upon Glenelg in the drawing

(138) Macmillan: B. B and B, p. 139.

(139) Macmillan: B. B and B, p. 136.

up of the December despatch.

The question arises then; what influence can Stockenstrom's evidence in 1835 be said to have had upon his appointment as Lieutenant-Governor? That he himself anticipated no such result has been made clear. Was his evidence a major factor in deciding Glenelg to send for him?

In fact, the appointment of Stockenstrom represented the execution of a recommendation which had come from Philip as early as January 1835. In his earliest letters to Buxton after the outbreak of the war, Philip emphasized the essential of all reform: "The affairs of the frontier must be consigned entirely to a civil agency; exclude the military in all ordinary circumstances from meddling with the affairs of the Caffres."⁽¹⁴¹⁾ And he urged then - long before Stockenstrom gave evidence, or Philip could have known of his recommendations in the letter of 5 November 1834 to Spring-Rice, be it noted - the return of Stockenstrom, a capable civilian whose removal in 1833⁽¹⁴²⁾ he held to be a main cause of the war. These letters were amongst the mass of letters from Philip to which⁽¹⁴³⁾ Glenelg's attention had been called.

When Glenelg finally made up his mind that a new policy would have to be followed on the frontier, and decided to appoint a Lieutenant-Governor to carry it out, he must naturally, at once have turned his mind to the possible candidates. He was basing his proposed policy on principles, arguments and information supplied mainly by Dr. Philip. It was therefore natural that he

(140) Stockenstrom received Glenelg's letter summoning him to London on 4 December 1835. Auto. II, 28.

(141) Quoted Macmillan: B. B and B, p. 119. Philip evidently urged this point in all his letters.

(142) Macmillan: B. B and B, p. 119. The reference is evidently to Philip's letters of 23 and 27 January and 17 February - see footnote.

(143) Macmillan: B. B and B, p. 151. Footnote.

should consider Philip's recommendation of Stockenstrom as the right man for the Eastern Frontier. Such potential candidates as Colonel Wade, an able man who had already held the position of Acting-Governor, would, of course, not have been taken into consideration, since Philip was so insistent that a civil authority was required.

It is probable that Glenelg knew nothing at all of Stockenstrom - he knew little enough of any Cape affairs when he took over the Colonial Office, apparently. He had had no contact with him during the time that Stockenstrom was giving evidence. (144) If he questioned the Under-Secretaries, however, or consulted the files, he would have found Stockenstrom to be by no means unknown in the Colonial Office. As Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet for many years, he had had a reputation for humanity, justice and successful administration which had made him an obvious and popular choice for the position of Commissioner-General in 1827 - a position, incidentally, recommended by the Commissioners of Inquiry for very much the same purposes as the Lieutenant-Governorship contemplated by Glenelg. Stockenstrom had quitted that office in 1833 with the assurances of the Colonial Office that no stigma attached to him and that he would be employed again if ever a suitable office became available. Stockenstrom's readiness so to serve the Cape again was on record in his letter of 16 January 1834. (145) Quite apart therefore, from any evidence before the Committee, or recommendation from Philip, it would not have been wholly surprising or unnatural for Glenelg to contemplate Stockenstrom as Lieutenant-Governor. But it seems more than likely that Philip's suggestion was the deciding factor.

(144) Letter of Stockenstrom. 31.8.35. Auto. II, 23.

(145) Stockenstrom to Stanley. A.C. minutes. p. 98.

Stockenstrom received Glenelg's summons, which gave no hint of motive, on 4 December 1835. He left Stockholm on the 11th, taking his family with him, because, he recorded in his memoirs later, "my pecuniary means were by this time pretty well ebbd, and I saw no chance of keeping up a decent establishment for my family in the Northern Capital whilst I was travelling backwards and forwards." (146) This, no doubt, was true. But, at the same time, it is likely that Stockenstrom had a fairly shrewd idea why the Colonial Secretary should be sending for him specially, when he must have known that Stockenstrom was due to be in London by March 1836 in any case. Stockenstrom left his family in Holland, and arrived in London during the first week in January. By this time, Glenelg had heard of D'Urban's revised September policy. His first step was therefore to ask for Stockenstrom's opinion on the general state of the Eastern Frontier and particularly D'Urban's new treaty with the chiefs, and for his suggestions as to the policy to be adopted. In a long letter, dated 7 January 1835, Stockenstrom complied, with a comprehensive criticism of D'Urban's policy, and his own recommendations for the settlement (147) of the frontier problem.

If Glenelg had looked at Stockenstrom's evidence previously, he had apparently not found it sufficient in itself to convince him that Stockenstrom was the right man. For it was only after several interviews, during the course of which Glenelg presumably confirmed that Stockenstrom was at one with the principles upon which he wished to base his frontier policy, that he offered Stockenstrom the position of Lieutenant-Governor.

(146) Auto. II, 28.

(147) Auto. II, pp. 30 ff. In this case too the implications of Stockenstrom's recommendations will be discussed fully in Chap III.

Stockenstrom records in his memoirs that he hesitated at first to accept, because he was doubtful about the practicability of Glenelg's principles after all the years of mistaken policy. (148) But his own eagerness to hold office in a useful position, the importunities of his friends, and probably also pecuniary considerations, "backed, as I must confess, by ambition and pride, if not by a higher motive, as I trust" made him "readily consent to become the instrument of one of the most upright, benevolent statesmen that has ever been connected with the Colonies." (149) Stockenstrom had the highest hopes of being able to turn his administrative abilities to good use at last. His interviews with Glenelg evidently satisfied him that the terms of the Lieutenant-Governorship would enable him to do so. (150)

The Committee resumed its sittings in February, and Stockenstrom appeared three times in February, twice in March, and once on 18 April. That is to say, all the evidence given during this session was after his appointment as Lieutenant-Governor. And on 21 April 1836, Stockenstrom and his family sailed for South Africa in the Lord William Bentinck.

(148) Auto. II, 29.

(149) Ibid.

(150) A.C. minutes, Q. 2009 - 2011. p. 225. 26.2.36.

Interestingly enough, Philip evidently was not in favour of the creation of a Lieutenant-Governorship. He wrote to Buxton on 17 December (and therefore, of course, too late to affect the issue): "The proposal of Phillips (a "Settler") to send out a Lieutenant-Governor is a Grahamstown opinion and one that should not be acted upon ((and)) which is likely to make things worse. The people on the Frontier want a little court among themselves, and a man whom they hope to influence by having him in their midst. The only public man fit for the introduction of the New System that I know personally is Stockenstrom, and it would be sufficient in the meantime to send him back as Commissioner-General with full and well-defined powers to introduce the new system and watch over its workings for a time." Macmillan: B. B and E, p. 151. Footnote.

In the light of the allegations against Stockenstrom, what facts can be regarded as established about this period of his career? It is clear that Stockenstrom left South Africa embittered by the failure of the Commissioner-Generalship, as a result of what he regarded as arbitrary mismanagement on the part of the colonial authorities. He was determined to resign rather than continue to hold the office as a sinecure. But he was by no means anxious to shake the dust of the colony from his feet. He had a wife and family to support, he knew his own capabilities as an administrator, he was deeply interested in the Cape and all its problems. He represented his grievances forcibly to the Colonial Office, possibly with the hope that his office might yet be reinstated upon an efficient basis. This the Colonial Office could not do, and the Commissioner-Generalship was abolished. Stockenstrom continued to hope that an office, equivalent to that which he had held, but on a satisfactory basis, would be created, and the Colonial Secretary's promise, that he would again be employed, fulfilled. It seems that his hopes were high when Spring-Rice came to office and when he received the questionnaire on frontier reform at the end of 1834. His hope gave place to disappointment and bitterness when nothing was done, and the Commissioner-Generalship still rankled. It was not until the news arrived of the outbreak of war on the Eastern Frontier - i.e. in July 1835 - that Stockenstrom finally decided to settle in Sweden and give up all idea of going to the Cape. He was therefore evidently eager, right until July 1835 at any rate, to hold office.

To speak of his "ardent solicitations for place," however, is to exaggerate - perhaps even completely to

distort. He certainly gave the Colonial Office very clearly to understand that he was prepared and anxious to serve at the Cape. He may even have hinted at an appointment in his letter to Spring-Rice of 5 November 1834. But he cannot with justice be said to have solicited for office. When he gave evidence in 1835, it is clear that nothing was further from his thoughts than that his evidence would lead him to high office. Stockenstrom appeared before the Committee in a mood of indifference, disillusionment and considerable irritation at an unexpected delay in his private arrangements. He was actually on his way to settle up his affairs at the Cape, preparatory to settling in Sweden, when he was called to the Committee. Stockenstrom did not expect the findings of the Committee to influence colonial policy, and the only result he foresaw from his own evidence was opposition from certain quarters. He made no attempt to make Glenelg's acquaintance and, in fact, avoided the Colonial Office. It was not voluntarily that he supplied the Committee with all the evidence he could muster as to his past character in office - he was evidently surprised even that it was requested. He was, of course, only too ready to comply; he was proud of his record, and always ready to defend his character.

Neither can it be asserted with finality, quite apart from Stockenstrom's own attitude, that his evidence was the major stepping-stone to his appointment as Lieutenant-Governor. During the period that evidence was being taken, Buxton was not, apparently, much in contact with Glenelg except in connection with the business of the Committee. Glenelg was not, at first, vitally interested in the findings of the Committee, and Buxton's

closest contact with him, and his use of the evidence to support various contentions, only commenced nearly a month after Stockenstrom had finished his evidence. Even then, it seems probable that it was Philip's recommendation, rather than Stockenstrom's evidence that was the decisive factor in the summoning of Stockenstrom.

Philip's recommendation of Stockenstrom had nothing whatever to do with any statements made by Stockenstrom during the time he was in England, since it was made at a time when he could not have known what Stockenstrom had said or was going to say. It was based upon what he knew of Stockenstrom and his policy through long years of acquaintance at the Cape.

There, too, began Stockenstrom's supposed "collusion" with the London philanthropist group. His connection with Buxton and his circle came about through very normal channels. Philip he had known for many years, and had much in common with him, despite their various heated differences on points of expediency and policy. Pringle had been, and became again of his own volition, an intimate friend. Far from seeking "collusion" with the Buxton circle, Stockenstrom studiously avoided it. He did not even make use of the opportunity of contact with Buxton afforded by Philip's letter of introduction. Through Pringle, he made normal social contact with Buxton and other well-known philanthropists, with whom he discussed the matters that were of deep and vital interest to them all. He knew that they were planning a campaign against the Cape frontier system, which would involve the administration of it by the colonial authorities. Where that campaign would touch other colonial authorities, Stockenstrom refused his official support, and made his own criticisms only through govern-

ment channels. Where the campaign seemed likely to touch himself, he was quick to defend himself, and his principles, and his policy, as he did in the memoir of 1833 and the evidence of 1835 and 1836. From the general tone of that defence, from remarks in private letters, and from some evidence in Fringle's Narrative, it does not seem that Stockenstrom in any way attempted to slur over the fact that definite differences did exist between his views and those of the philanthropists, or that he tried, from any motives whatever, to mould his ideas to suit their opinions.

Yet it has been asserted that the statements he made during these years, the principles he supported and the policies he put forward, were a complete turning back upon and denial of his past career. It remains now to see what truth there may have been in this assertion. To do this, a careful comparison must be made, of the documents relating to his policies before 1833 with all that he had to say and suggest while he was in England.

CHAPTER III.

A Critical Study of the Evidence:

The Eastern Frontier.

In his first interview with the Committee, on 12 August 1835, Stockenstrom prefaced his evidence by stating that he knew nothing directly of what had been happening at the Cape since he had left, nearly two and a half years before. He explained that he had been doing a considerable amount of travelling, and that he had no communication, direct or indirect, with anybody "belonging to any party whatever" at the Cape, his correspondence being entirely with his family and private friends. Stockenstrom professed himself ready, and indeed anxious, to give any information which the Committee might require; for, he said, "I see nothing in it that I cannot state with perfect fairness; I belong to no party, have no views to gratify, and I am now unconnected with the service." But he suggested that it would be best for the Committee to have reference to the letters which he had already submitted to the Secretary of State. These embraced all his views on the frontier, the natives and the office which he had held, and without them he felt that the Committee could not proceed regularly.

At his own suggestion, therefore, the questions put to Stockenstrom were based, to a large extent, upon the documents to which he had referred. Those delivered in to the Committee were the Memoir submitted to the Colonial Secretary in January 1834 (it was written in December 1833), the correspondence connected with the commandos of 1830 and 1831 which was appended to it, and the reply to a questionnaire from the Colonial Office, written in November 1834. The views expressed in these papers must, therefore, be taken in conjunction with the evidence actually given before the Committee.

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- (1) Q. 451, 452. A.C. minutes p. 59. 12.8.35.
 (2) In Q. 452, Stockenstrom repeated this in two places.
 (3) A.C. minutes, pp. 99 - 102.
 (4) A.C. minutes, pp. 102 - 117.
 (5) A.C. minutes, pp. 117 - 123.

Stockenstrom's evident sensitiveness to any criticism, wither open or implied, of his policy as Commissioner-General, has been pointed out.⁽⁶⁾ That he regarded his evidence as in the nature of a defence of himself is clear.⁽⁷⁾ Indeed, he said as much to the Committee. This probably accounts for the apparent eagerness with which Stockenstrom sought out all the testimonials to his character which he could lay hands on, when these were requested by the Committee.⁽⁸⁾ It also offers a possible explanation for several other aspects of the evidence, as will appear in the sequel.

Into the correctness or otherwise of Stockenstrom's view of the Commissioner-Generalship it is unnecessary to enter in detail: the pros and cons have been discussed by J.D. Pitman in his thesis on that period of Stockenstrom's career.

The evidence which caused most discussion, and proved most obnoxious to Moral Bob and his associates in the City of Saints was, of course, that concerning the causes of frontier dissensions, the commando system and the behaviour of the frontier colonists, with special reference to the Erasmus case. Was there any validity in their allegations concerning what Stockenstrom had to say of all these things in 1835?

(6) See Chap. II.

(7) Q. 1382. A.C. minutes, p. 150. 28.8.35.

"I am no volunteer here, I am dragged into this business. I may be said almost to be on my defence, but I have no cause to shun the contest."

(8) Q. 1380 - 1385. A.C. minutes, pp. 148 - 152. 28.8.35.

(9) A nickname for Godlonton, used by Dr. A. Campbell. See an undated letter to Jardine, in the Parliamentary Library (Mendelssohn Library).

(1) The Causes of the Frontier Dissensions: The Early Expansion of the Colony, the Commandos of 1818 and 1819, and the Gaika Treaties.

Asked for his opinion with regard to "the remote and proximate causes of the frontier dissensions" Stockenström proceeded to give a resume of his interpretation of the relations of the colonists with the various native tribes, from the earliest days of the settlement. (10)

He described the trouble as having originated with the gradual "encroachment in African territory" since the middle of the seventeenth century. The natives at first resisted as much as they could, and there was "a great deal of mutual slaughter and bloodshed." The Hottentots gradually "became servile among the white colonists" or retreated into the deserts beyond the borders, and "being persecuted by all classes, degenerated into the state in which the remains of them exist at the present moment." Similar migrations of the white colonists took place along the coast towards the South-east; "the Caffres encroached towards the West as the whites encroached towards the East;" the Hottentots disappeared between them, and at last, the two groups came into contact. For a time they lived peaceably. But at last disputes commenced amongst them and again "much bloodshed took place." The government at last fixed a boundary, in 1778 and again in Macartney's time, "to control further encroachments on the part of the whites against the Caffres and other native tribes." (11) This was a restrictive boundary line to prevent the whites from going (12) further, and the territory it enclosed was in possession (13) of the whites. But the colonists did not succeed at

(10) Q. 523 ff. A.C. minutes, pp. 43 - 50. 14.8.35.

(11) Q. 525. A.C. minutes, p. 44.

(12) Q. 526. Ibid.

(13) Q. 527. Ibid.

once in clearing the area west of the Fish River as far as the Sundays River of the Kaffirs, and "after many aggressions on both sides," the Kaffirs retained possession of the Suurveld. ⁽¹⁴⁾ This territory remained a bone of contention between the two groups until finally the government decided to expel the Kaffirs altogether. On Galedon's instructions, Collins toured the frontier in 1809, accompanied by Stockenstrom himself, and made preliminary enquiries. Towards the close of 1811, a military and Burgher Force under Colonel Graham expelled the Kaffirs, and the Dutch farmers immediately partially occupied the territory. In 1817, Lord Charles Somerset visited the frontier, assembled the Kaffir chiefs and, after a long discussion, it was decided for the first time that the local government should regard Gaika as the responsible chief in Kaffirland. On this occasion, too, ⁽¹⁵⁾ Somerset introduced the patrol and reprisal system, whereby "a great door to irregularities was opened." "...subsequent experience has proved," said Stockenstrom, "that, in nine cases out of ten it is impossible to find the guilty party, and of course generally the innocent suffer." The Kaffirs, he explained, were very attached to their cattle, milk forming their staple food, and were apt to resist the taking of their cattle. This resistance could easily be construed into a hostile feeling, and "any unscrupulous leader who chooses will then proceed to the last extremity in the execution of his orders, and bring off their cattle." Stockenstrom considered this system to have given rise to "great irritation" on the part of the Kaffirs.

(14) Q. 528. Ibid. for this and what follows.

(15) Whereby the patrol could enter Kaffirland on the spoor of stolen cattle, and seize from the first kraal the number of cattle stolen from the colonists.

In 1818, Stockenström continued, Gaika quarrelled with the tribes near the coast. "The Government then, as I think, unfortunately, considered it was the business of the colony, from motives of precaution, I should suppose, to interfere in that quarrel."

Stockenström was insistent that the purpose of government interference was to support Gaika against his enemies. He asserted that, as far as he knew, seizures of cattle belonging to Gaika or the colonists formed no part of the cause of the commando.⁽¹⁶⁾ A force under Colonel Brereton was sent into Kaffirland. A number of Kaffirs were killed, and the commando brought out "an immense drove" of cattle from Kaffirland, from the tribe with which Gaika was at war, part of which was left with Gaika, and part brought into the colony, on the strength of the 1817 regulations, and "distributed in various ways as compensation for colonial losses by Caffre inroads."

This, Stockenström contended, led directly to the attacks of the Kaffirs on the Suurveld in 1819.⁽¹⁷⁾ "Dreadful ravages" were committed and the Suurveld was cleared with considerable difficulty.⁽¹⁸⁾ The campaign of 1819 was then an "unavoidable necessity," for "it would have been impossible for the colonial government to have kept possession of any part of that district if matters had been allowed then to rest as they were." The Kaffirs were driven back into Kaffirland, and the result of the expedition was the seizure of the territory between the Great Fish River and the Keiskamma. The Fish River, with its impenetrable jungle, was considered totally untenable "while the Kaffirs were brought to that state of hostility against the Colony."

(16) See Q. 528, 533, 534.

(17) Q. 529. A.C. minutes, p. 45.

(18) Q. 538, 539. for what follows.

Somerset accordingly fixed a boundary running along the ridge between the Kat and the Chumie and thence down the Keiskamma to the sea. Stockenstrom gave it as his opinion that Gaika assented to the new boundary, but (19) unwillingly, because he was "under such an apprehension, (20) that he could not avoid it," though he could not say it was a "forcible" possession:

"... it would be contrary to reason to suppose that any people, under such circumstances as the Caffres, would willingly part with such country. I do not think any people would; but when he saw there were no other means, he acquiesced in it, and after much consultation with the other chiefs, he consented, provided that the Chumie Basin was included in Caffreland. (21)

Stockenstrom again indicated that the Kaffirs' right to this country was only that of possession - it (22) had originally been Hottentot country. Asked whether Gaika had, in fact, the right to cede the territory, Stockenstrom pointed out that, although it was now (23) realized that Gaika was not the chief of all the tribes, "the impression at that time on the minds of most people was that he had that power," and the government had (25) constituted him the supreme authority. He could not say whether or not the other chiefs had acquiesced - they had consulted among themselves, but had not been (26) consulted. Asked whether he was aware that Gaika had since remonstrated strongly and said that in consequence of his having united with the colony in the expedition against the other tribes, he had been dispossessed of his territory, Stockenstrom mentioned, without any particular emphasis, that he had heard Macomo and Tyali say this, as a sort of reproach, but could not recollect (27) ever hearing it from Gaika.

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- (19) Q. 541. A.C. minutes, p. 46.
 (20) Q. 543. Ibid.
 (21) Q. 549. Ibid.
 (22) Q. 548, 550. Ibid.
 (23) Q. 553. A.C. minutes, p. 47.
 (24) Q. 552. Ibid.
 (25) Q. 551. Ibid.
 (26) Q. 555, 556. Ibid.
 (27) Q. 573, 574. Ibid. p. 48.

(28)

After the cession, he continued, it was decided (in discussion with Gaika) that the ceded territory was to be a neutral belt. Consulted by the Cape Government authorities as to whether the ceded Territory could be regarded as available for the settlement of the numbers of immigrants who were expected, Stockenstrom had referred both Somerset and later Donkin to the terms of this agreement with Gaika. In 1820, Donkin decided to consult Gaika. Gaika consented to Donkin's proposed occupation, of a sort that "people should not go un-armed, and allow their cattle to run wild."⁽²⁹⁾

Donkin had had a long discussion with Stockenstrom as to the "best mode of securing the frontier, to prevent the necessity of hostile aggressions against the Caffres, and consistently at the same time with the protection of the colonists."⁽³⁰⁾ His plan had been to have two strong posts, at Fredericksburgh and on the Kat River, and to fill up the intervening territory with as dense a population as the country would allow.⁽³¹⁾ The settlers were to be "a civil body but subject to being called out on military service."⁽³²⁾ Gaika was not consulted as to whether or not Dutch settlers should be admitted, for Donkin had already decided that there should be no Dutch settlers.⁽³³⁾

As to whether any Kaffir irruption took place during Donkin's administration, Stockenstrom said he could not answer, since he had had no further connection with the frontier at that time.⁽³⁴⁾

This account was received by Fairbairn in Cape Town with considerable complacency, and by Godlonton in

(28) Q. 574. Ibid.
 (29) Q. 594. Ibid. p. 50.
 (30) Q. 574. Ibid. p. 48.
 (31) Q. 576. Ibid. p. 49.
 (32) Q. 585. Ibid. p. 50.
 (33) Q. 593. Ibid.
 (34) Q. 595. Ibid.

Graham's Town with horrified indignation. ⁽³⁵⁾ Yet these were views by no means new to Stockenstrom.

Few single words were more calculated to rouse the ire of Cape patriots in the 1830s than the word "encroachments." With fury Godlonton seized upon it, asserting that this was a new attitude to frontier relations in one who had himself been enriched by the very process of encroachment. ⁽³⁶⁾ Yet it is quite clear that the encroachment referred to by Stockenstrom was that of the whites upon country originally occupied by Hottentots. Indeed, in describing the same process of encroachment and bloodshed, in his answer to question two of the Colonial Office questionnaire, Stockenstrom emphasized this. ⁽³⁷⁾ Nor was the interpretation of colonial relations with the Hottentots, expressed by Stockenstrom in 1834 and 1835, of recent origin. His acute consciousness of the facts of 17th and 18th century frontier history as he saw them, seems to have been at the root of his whole Hottentot and Bushman policy.

As early as 1822, in reporting to the Secretary to Government his refusal to sanction a commando designed to persuade Bushman marauders, by amicable means, and, if these failed, by force, to abandon their thieving ways, Stockenstrom wrote: ⁽³⁸⁾ "It is unnecessary for me to defend the Principles which guided me in the case in question, before a government, well aware of the Blood with which the Colony has to charge itself as the result of the earlier Bushman Campaigns." Later in the same year, Stockenstrom commented in passing, in a despatch, that a review of the origin of Bushman commandos "would

(35) See Chap. I.

(36) See Chap. I. A reference to Stockenstrom's grant of land on the Kaga.

(37) Stockenstrom to Colonial Secretary - 5.11.34. A.C. minutes, p.113: "It will be at once perceived that I am here alluding to a period of the colonial history not long previous to the close of the last

reflect but little credit on those who first rendered those cruel expeditions necessary by being the first aggressors, and thereby exciting the revenge of those savages." (39)

On the other hand, Stockenstrom had always resented any suggestion that his own generation of colonists were responsible for the effects of such bloodshed and encroachments. In 1826, for instance, defending his extension of the colonial boundary to the north over a large tract of what had been Bushman country, Stockenstrom maintained that anyone who dated the excesses committed against the Bushmen, their reciprocal atrocities and the encroachments on their territory, from the crossing of the old boundary was either ignorant of the history of the Colony, or "desirous of stigmatising the (present?) generation" or had some other "deceitful object" in view.

"The encroachments on the Aborigines," he wrote, "began at Cape Town, and never ceased to extend by degrees until the colonists had got to where they are now." (40)

That Stockenstrom saw in the earlier history of the colony the origin also of the degradation of the Hottentots and the discriminatory legislation applied to them, is clear from his memorandum on the position of the Hottentots in 1828. He wrote:

The policy of this distinction and these partialities seems to have originated in the necessity felt by the earliest migrators into the interior, to prevent the possibility of retaliation on the part of the natives for the aggressions and outrages committed against them, by crushing their power and securing their unlimited submission. (41)

It is not, therefore, altogether surprising to find Stockenstrom, in the memoir of 1833, expressing the opinion that the oppressions of the European colonists

last century, and that the Aborigines spoken of and the Bushmen and some tribes of Hottentots, for our relations with the Caffres and others are somewhat of a different nature..." (38) Stockenstrom to Bird. 14.2.22. C.o. 2641. This appears to be the earliest reference in an official document.

and their descendants was the cause of the degradation of most of the natives and of the enmity between the colony and its black neighbours. The consciousness of that fact alone, Stockenstrom maintained, was enough to induce the government to make all possible amends by protecting the natives against further persecution, and doing all in its power to improve their condition and to civilize them. (42)

It was characteristic of him to add that this would not be obtained by allowing the natives to murder and plunder with impunity.

Let the sincere philanthropist but for a moment contemplate what would be the result of a government being altogether passive under the excesses which savages and barbarians are capable of perpetrating, not only against those by whose ancestors (43) they feel themselves to have been wronged, and against whom they harbour a feeling of implacable revenge, but against their own fellow-sufferers...

he wrote. And further on, he stressed the same point:

Whilst the voice of humanity is justly raised in favour of the long and cruelly oppressed blacks, that of justice and prudence reminds us that the whites also have a claim to protection.

But here there is a new note. The passage quoted appears in a context in which Stockenstrom was referring only to Kaffirs and to the necessity for the expulsion of Macomo from the Ceded Territory. Apparently the "Blacks" he here had in mind were the Kaffirs. This is borne out by a passage in the answer to the questionnaire of 1834. Writing of the jealousies that sprang up between white and Kaffir when their mutual encroachments on the Hottentots had brought them into contact, (44)

Stockenstrom said:

(39) Stockenstrom to Bird. 5.6.22. Theal. Records, XIV, 384.

(40) Stockenstrom to Commissioners of Inquiry, 9.8.26. Auto. I, 224. Stockenstrom and Lieut. Bonamy had surveyed the revised boundary in 1822.

(41) Stockenstrom to Bowker. 3.4.28. Auto. I, 286.

(42) Memoir. 31.12.33. A.C. minutes, p. 99.

(43) My italics. Stockenstrom never stigmatized the contemporary generation of colonists in this connection.

(44) Stockenstrom to Colonial Secretary. 5.11.34. A.C. minutes, p. 118.

We were unfortunately again the first aggressors, but the Caffres being a better organized, more warlike and more numerous people than the Hottentots, did not so easily give way...

In his evidence, Stockenstrom did not accuse the eighteenth-century Eastern frontiersmen of the first aggressions in so many words. But he said that the governments of the time had not the power to control these excesses, since the interior was sometimes openly in arms against the government. (45) And he referred to a boundary line to control further encroachments on the part of the whites against Kaffirs and other tribes. (46) By implication, therefore, Stockenstrom charged the early Eastern frontiersmen, rather than the Kaffirs, with aggressions.

This had definitely not been Stockenstrom's original attitude. In 1811, as a lad of nineteen, he was out on the campaign in Kaffirland in which his father was murdered by a group of Kaffirs, after being decoyed by them into apparently friendly colloquy. (47) The impression of the cruelty and treachery of the Kaffirs, left by that campaign, remained with Stockenstrom for many years. (48) Nor was it lessened by his later experience of them. The Eastern frontier and the Kaffirs engaged comparatively little of Stockenstrom's attention during his years as Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet, and after the formation of district of Somerset, in 1826, none at all. During these years, he referred more often than not to the Kaffirs as "the Enemy." They were the aggressors, against whom the colony must always act on the defensive. In the

(45) Q. 523. A.C. minutes, p.44. 14.8.35.

(46) Q. 526. Ibid.

(47) Private communication from Lieut. Col. Graham to Sir John Cradock. 2.1.12. Theal. Records, VIII, 235 - 237.

(48) See references to the cruelty and treachery of Kaffirs e.g. in S. to Bird 16.6.16 C.o. 2603; S. to Bird C.o. 2612. (the first page is missing therefore no date, but it must be during or after September 1818.); S. to Harding 14.8.23 C.o. 2649; S. to Harding 25.11.24. Theal. Records XIX, 167.

Addendum: To appear after the words: "vigorous role"
on page 105:

This changed attitude probably had its origin in the view of Eastern frontier affairs and policy which Stockenstrom came to hold as Commissioner-General. The question is dealt with in more detail in later discussions on the reprisal system.

(49) (50) (51) (52)
 campaigns of 1811 - 12, 1813, 1818 and 1819,
 Stockenstrom played a vigorous role.

In his evidence, Stockenstrom did not mention Fraser's
 commando into Kaffirland in January 1818, although he and
 the burgher force co-operated in that campaign. (53) But
 he had severe criticism to offer on the subject of Brereton's
 commando later in the same year, both in his evi- (54) (55)
 dence of 14 August 1835, and in the Memoir of 1833 (56)
 and the letter to the Colonial Secretary in 1834, where
 he used it to illustrate the evils resulting from the
 seizure of Kaffir cattle. Giving evidence in 1836,
 Colonel Wade pointed out that Stockenstrom's statements
 as to the causes of Brereton's commando differed material- (57)
 ly from that of Lord Charles Somerset as he had quoted
 him. (58) Wade endeavoured to show that Stockenstrom was
 wrong in asserting that the expedition went "purposely to
 support Gaika on his complaint that the other chiefs
 were going to attack him," and that, as far as he knew,
 the commando had nothing to do with any quarrel of the
 colonists, nor with any complaint of Gaika that his
 cattle had been seized. (59) By implication, of course -

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- (49) Lieut. Col Graham to Cradock 2.1.12. Theal Records
 VIII, 237.
 (50) Col. Vicars to Col. Reynell 8.12.13. Theal Records.
 IX, 277.
 (51) Stockenstrom to Bird 22.11.18. Cory Transcripts, Vol. I.
 (52) Somerset to Bathurst 15.10.19. Theal. Records.
 XII, 341.
 (53) See reference in Major Rogers to Lieut-Col. Brereton
 1.11.18. Theal. Records. XII, 53.
 (54) Q. 528 - 537. A.C. minutes, p. 44 - 45. 14.8.35.
 (55) A.C. Minutes, p.100.
 (56) A.C. minutes, p.120.
 (57) Vide supra. p.
 (58) Evidence of Wade. 25.4.36. A.C. minutes, p. 397.
 (59) Wade represents Stockenstrom as saying that the cattle
 captured by the commando "were not taken in consequence
 of any seizures that had been made by the Caffres upon
 any cattle belonging to the colonists, or belonging to
 Gaika." This actually occurred in the form:
 Q. 533. Were these cattle taken in consequence of any
 seizures that had been made by the Caffres upon any
 cattle belonging to the colonists or belonging to Gaika?
 - No, the expedition went purposely to support Gaika,
 on his complaint that the other chiefs were going to
 attack him. ((see foot of p.106))

it was during this same interview that he produced the affidavits to prove Stockenstrom's allegations in the Erasmus case untrue. Wade was probably suggesting that Stockenstrom had deliberately presented a false picture of Brereton's commando. In point of fact, however, Stockenstrom's version of the immediate cause of Brereton's commando seems to have been correct, as a reference to the instructions given Brereton at the time - to which Wade stated that he had not had access - will show. (60) And he did not deny that the colonists had suffered depredations - he stated that the cattle captured were used partly to compensate the colonists for losses - but insisted that this was not the immediate reason for interference.

Q. 534. No part of that complaint was, that they had seized his cattle? - No; it had nothing to do with any quarrel of the colonists, that I know of.

As was often the case, neither of these was actually a direct answer to the question put.

(60) Major Rogers (Military Secretary) to Lieut.-Col. Brereton. 1.11.18. Theal. Records, XII, 52.

"His Excellency desires me in reply to acquaint you that he has no doubt that the uneasiness which has been created in Cafferland by the steps which have been taken to check their system of depredation has had the effect of causing that jealousy among them which appears to be manifesting itself in hostilities against the only chief, Gaika, who has given the Colonists so many marks of good faith and friendship.

His Excellency had at a former period (as you know) proffered to Gaika assistance in the event of his being attacked by those chiefs who should deviate from the engagements entered into at the Kat River when the conference between the Governor and Caffer chiefs was held in April 1817, and His Excellency considers the application which you have forwarded to come within the meaning of the arrangements made with Gaika. The bad faith TSambi has always evinced, the constant protection he has afforded to the plunderers of Colonial property, his refusal to restore the Colonial cattle seen in his kraals and demanded by Major Frazer, and finally his murder of the two privates of the 72nd Regiment now traced to him, certainly warrant any measure of active hostilities being taken against him.

His Excellency therefore has no difficulty in sanctioning your acting against TSambie and his adherents in conjunction or with the cognizance of Gaika to such extent as you may feel prudent under all the circumstances of the Frontiers. But His Excellency recommends to you the strictest caution, not only that you should take measures whilst making Gaika acquainted with the interest His Excellency takes in his affairs to ascertain the real sentiments and views of that chief and the actual position of TSambie and those leagued with him, but that you should be perfectly clear that there is no bad faith in the message brought you by Hendrik Nootka.

((see foot of p.107.))

It appears clear that the primary reason for Somerset's sanctioning the commando was that the attitude of the confederate chiefs justified intervention on behalf of Gaika, in terms of the understanding with him, although recent depredations on the Colony on the part of Ndhlabi were regarded as further warranting hostilities against him, and Gaika's complaint as affording a good opportunity for punishing him. Brereton was clearly given to understand that he was not to act until he was certain that the reports of a hostile confederation of chiefs under Ndhlabi against Gaika were correct.

Stockenstrom himself was at the time of the commando clear on the point of its main object being to render assistance to Gaika against the enemies attacking him. In fact, on two occasions he criticized the plan of campaign, in so far as it affected the burgher forces, as being badly matured for the attaining of that end. ⁽⁶¹⁾ Whether or not he disapproved of the principle of the campaign at that time it is, of course, impossible to determine from his official despatches, since it was merely his duty to put the burgher force of the district at the disposal of the military authorities and to report on their movements to the Secretary to Government. He appears, however, to have regarded

The sentence "His Excellency thinks your plan of taking the present opportunity to punish Tsambie a very good one;..." (p.53) suggests too, that this was a subsidiary reason for the commando.

(61) Stockenstrom to Bird. 13.11.18 and 9.12.18. quoted from Cory Transcripts Vol. I, 362, 367. Fraser's instructions to Stockenstrom stated that the burgher force under him "is to be employed against the Caffer chiefs Hynsa, Tsambie and such other chiefs with their people as have joined in a body against Gaika."
Ibid. p. 364.

the requisitioning of the burgher force as a necessary measure for the protection of the frontier, and to have effected it without delay, although he somewhat resented Brereton's ordering him to requisition it, since the military had no such authority over the civil powers. (62)

Shortly after the commando, however, Stockenstrom voiced the severe criticism of the seizure of enormous quantities of cattle, and the opinion that it led to the disasters of 1819, which he repeated in 1833, 1834 and 1835. In a letter to Bird on 12 February 1819, (63) quoted by Wade, he wrote that what he had anticipated from the extensive seizure of cattle by Brereton's commando had been realized. He continued:

How many lives have not been lost since the last commando? What determined and successful attempts upon our armed parties and guarded flocks have not lately been made by a race who formerly fled at sight of a musket? And what else could be expected from a populous tribe driven to desperation by being deprived of all their cattle, their only means of subsistence, left to choose between starvation and retaliation? (64)

The strong tone of the passage which follows is indicative of the anger Stockenstrom felt that an ill-planned campaign had endangered the lives and security of the whole frontier. He wrote:

God forbid that I should plead the cause of cruel barbarians, who have given me too much cause for revenge. On the contrary, I think it absolutely necessary for the safety even of a strong post, that they be most effectually set down. But could not that end have been obtained when we had about 900 men in Caffreland? Might not a camp have been established at some favourable distance near enough to the Fish River to keep open a communication with the colony, and prevent the Caffres from getting in our rear? Could not these headquarters, under the protection of the military, have served as a rallying point, or rendezvous, and a place of safety for the provisions and baggage, whence strong detachments of mounted men might have been sent out to harass and destroy the Caffres in all directions, until you had made the survivors feel your authority and power, invoke your clemency, give up your deserters, and compensate your ally (Gaika) for the injury done him?

(62) Stockenstrom to Fraser, 8.11.18. Ibid. p. 360.

(63) A.C. minutes, p. 399.

(64) In his instructions to Willshire for the 1819 campaign, Somerset did in fact express disapproval of Brereton's policy. See letter from Military Secretary to Willshire, 25.2.19. Quoted by Wade. A.C. minutes, p. 398 - 399.

If there was a thing Stockenstrom loathed, once strong measures had been decided upon, it was an ill-matured or indecisive campaign. That seems to be the main inference to be drawn from this passage, written as it was in the light of the disastrous results of Brereton's campaign. Wade, however, interpreted it as proving that Stockenstrom was "very far from disapproving of the commando for the purposes the governor had in view when he sanctioned it; viz. to chastise the confederate chiefs, and compensate our ally." And if Stockenstrom did fully approve of the commando as a measure necessary for the security of the frontier, it is true that he did not make this point clear in his evidence. His only reference to this aspect was when he said that the government "from motives of precaution, I should suppose" decided to intervene in Gaika's quarrel. (65)

Neither in 1819 nor at any time afterwards, however, did Stockenstrom express any doubts as to the necessity of the 1819 campaign, after the ghastly depredations which had taken place and the attitude which the Kaffirs had assumed. In the letter of 12 February 1819, he went on to recommend the strongest possible measures for dealing with the Kaffirs. "I even think," he wrote, "that things have come to that crisis, that nothing less than a repetition of the commando of 1812, on the other side of the Fish River, will bring the Caffres to peace."

On the 18 February, Stockenstrom wrote again on the subject of the proposed commando, submitting several urgent practical suggestions as to its organization. (66) His letter contains a characteristic passage, which finds an echo in the memoir of 1833, and indeed recurs constantly in his evidence:

(65) A. 528. A.C. minutes, p.45. 14.8.35.
 (66) Stockenstrom to Bird 18.2.19. Quoted by Wade, A.C. minutes, p. 400.

My motives may be considered to proceed from revenge, or from imaginary apprehensions; but to refute the former, I have only to ask whether false notions of philanthropy are to lead us to waste the blood of those who have a claim to our protection, from a wish to have it to say, that we brought about civilization by lenient measures, when those very measures are a stimulus to the most savage barbarity, by allowing the greatest cruelties to go unpunished. And as to the latter charge, experience will soon enough prove the truth of what I have advanced, were even my own conduct not a sufficient check to such an insinuation, should it exist.

Accordingly, in his evidence in 1835, Stockenstrom stressed the "unavoidable necessity" of Willshire's campaign in 1819, and the practical advantages of shifting the boundary line from the untenable Fish River jungle to the line of the Chumie ridge and the Keiskamma River. (67)

Upon the absolute necessity of maintaining the boundary line of 1819 once it had been established, and the unwisdom of ever allowing the Kaffirs to recross it into the Ceded Territory, Stockenstrom had always insisted. In 1822, for instance, he agreed to the sending of a commando patrol of 150 burghers round the Winterberg, despite the inconvenience it would cause to the burghers, since "the keeping the Caffres beyond the limits fixed for the Colony in 1819 is a point of great moment;" and the inconvenience would be counterbalanced by "the good which must result from convincing the Caffres that under no circumstances, they will be allowed to establish themselves in the ceded Territory." (68) In 1823, an inquiry into the proceedings of a patrol headed by Field Cornet van der Nest revealed that, owing to a misunderstanding of the boundary line on the part of the military authorities, the Kaffirs had been allowed to establish themselves on the upper branches of the Kat River. (69) When Somerset enquired whether he considered the boundary as laid down

(67) Q. 539. A.C. minutes, p. 45.

(68) Stockenstrom to Bird. 5.7.22. C.o. 2641.

(69) Stockenstrom to Bird. 14.9.23. C.o. 2649.

by the Surveying Engineer to be preferable to that originally laid down in 1819, Stockenstrom replied that that of 1819 was "unquestionably the best and most natural." And he stressed most forcibly the dangers of allowing the Kaffirs to remain on the higher branches of the Kat and Gonappe, whence they could so easily attack the Tarka and Baviaan's River Divisions. (70)

The substance of these two despatches Stockenstrom repeated in evidence on 19 August 1835, in detail and accurately, (except that he gave the date as 1822). And in the memoir of 1833, defending the attacks made on the Colonial Government for the expulsion of Macomo, he wrote:

If any fault was committed on this head, it was the permitting the Caffres to return to that territory after they were expelled in 1819, (to whatever criticism the treaties of which that expulsion was the consequence may be open,) and I maintain that the Government could not, without displaying the greatest possible weakness, have allowed those Caffres to remain within the colonial territory after their wanton attack on the Tambookies.. (72)

Godlonton devoted considerable attention to the last point in this section of Stockenstrom's evidence, viz. his stating, in answer to Q. 595, that he could not say whether there had been any Kaffir irruption during Donkin's administration, since he had had no further connection with the frontier at that time. This Godlonton interpreted as a deliberate evasion of the truth, and an attempt to cover up the aggressions of the Kaffirs and emphasize those of the Europeans. This was the passage with which, in parallel columns, he compared despatches of Stockenstrom written shortly after the period of Donkin's administration. (73) Admittedly, those despatches indicated that Stockenstrom was, in fact, aware of aggressions on the part of the Kaffirs about 1820.

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- (70) Stockenstrom to Bird. 21.11.23. C.o. 2649.
 (71) Q. 965. A.C. minutes, p. 81. 19.8.35.
 (72) A.C. minutes, p. 100.
 (73) Vide Chap I, supra. pp. 5, 6 and footnote (11).

And here it is relevant to remark that, in the next session of evidence, Stockenstrom laid stress on the depredations committed by Macomo and his people ever since they had been allowed to establish themselves on the Kat, although he indicated that, not being in constant contact with the military during that period, he had no direct knowledge of the depredations. This does lend colour to the suggestion that Stockenstrom was evading the point in his answer to Q. 595. It was, naturally, in the interests of Stockenstrom's own defence to emphasize the depredations committed by Macomo and his people prior to their expulsion. It was equally in his own interest not to emphasize depredations during Donkin's administration, since he was a known and consistent advocate of the policy favoured by Donkin, as a solution to the frontier problem. Stockenstrom's answer to Q. 595 may, therefore, have been given in the interests of his own defence. But in the light of the fact that he had not elsewhere in his evidence denied aggressions or cruelty on the part of the Kaffirs, it does not seem to merit the attention it received at the hands of the Graham's Town Journal.

This first section of Stockenstrom's evidence was the cause of much indignation in the columns of the Graham's Town Journal. On the whole, however, it seems to have been unwarranted. The encroachments to which Stockenstrom referred were those of Europeans and Bantu upon Hottentot territory, and not those of Eastern Frontier colonists upon Kaffir territory. Stockenstrom had, moreover, since the early years of his landdrostship given expression to the opinion that the degradation of the Hottentots and the problems of the Bushman frontier

were the inevitable result of those encroachments by former generations of colonists. With regard to the commandos of 1818 and 1819, Stockenstrom did not deviate materially from his own earlier opinions. Colonel Wade evidently considered that Stockenstrom had distorted the causes of the 1818 campaign by insisting that the major reason for undertaking the commando was the protection of Gaika against the confederate chiefs. While it is true that, at the time of the campaign, Stockenstrom considered it necessary for the defence of the colony, his own comments and the instructions to Brereton bear out his assertion that the action of the confederate chiefs against Gaika, rather than any quarrel of the colony with the chiefs, precipitated the commando. Stockenstrom remained completely consistent in his attitude to the 1819 campaign: he asserted that, while it had been absolutely essential for the protection of the colony, it was in the first instance rendered necessary by the inevitable retaliation of the Kaffirs after the seizure of enormous quantities of Kaffir cattle in 1818. About Stockenstrom's evidence in connection with the frontier arrangements of 1819, too, Godlonton was indignant. But he saw in Stockenstrom's remarks about Gaika's "unwilling" cession of the neutral Territory the salient feature of his evidence. This was entirely to obscure the significance of the fact that Stockenstrom did insist that the campaign of 1819 had been absolutely necessary and that the new boundary was fixed because the Fish River was unsuitable and untenable, and that he expressed no disapproval of Donkin's subsequent policy of settlement of the Ceded Territory. The most significant deviation from Stockenstrom's earlier views appears in

the implied censure of the Eastern Frontier colonists as the first aggressors against the Kaffirs, and in the criticism of Somerset's reprisal system. The origin of this, however, merits detailed attention and will be discussed more fully in the section on the reprisal system.

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(ii) The Expulsion of Macomo and the Settling of the Ceded Territory.

Holding, as he had always done, such strong views as to the impolicy of allowing the Kaffirs to settle anywhere in the Ceded Territory, Stockenstrom naturally saw with concern the establishment of Macomo and his followers on the upper branches of the Kat and Gonappe Rivers, which Somerset sanctioned conditionally in 1823. And when, during his first tour of the Eastern Frontier as Commissioner-General at the end of 1828, he found also Botman's kraals established on the Barooka, and Kaffirs scattered and wandering all over the Ceded Territory, availing themselves of every opportunity to plunder, he again reported in strong terms to the Governor. ⁽⁷⁴⁾ Pointing out the insecurity of life on the frontier in these circumstances, Stockenstrom reiterated what he had said in 1823: that, despite the good opinion Lieut.-Colonel Somerset at that time apparently entertained of Macomo and Botman, the "total expulsion of the Caffer Hordes from the Ceded Territory" for the prevention of "severe measures and bloodshed ultimately" and the attainment

(74) Stockenstrom to Bell. 22.11.28. C.o. 536. He commenced the tour on 23 October 1828.

of tranquility on the frontier, was essential. As things were, the farmers complained of "incessant Depredations" on the part of stragglers; and, wrote Stockenstrom "I am by no means satisfied that all the... chiefs do not encourage the aggression of their followers and participate in the spoil when they think they can do so without detection." In this report, Stockenstrom recommended as "absolutely indispensable" the close settlement of the Ceded Territory in order to prevent such depredations. (75) This recommendation he repeated in December, ~~and again~~ (76) and again in February 1829, and in his Hints for the (77) Consideration of the Secretary to Government.

When the news of Maqomo's attack on the Tambookies reached Cape Town, Stockenstrom gave it as his firm opinion that this called for "the most peremptory exemplary measures on the part of Government in order to maintain its dignity and respect among the Native Tribes." He asserted that Maqomo was perfectly aware that the Tambookies had always been on the best of terms with the colony and enjoyed its protection. But, he said, under any circumstances, Maqomo's pursuing the Tambookies into the Colony and there murdering and plundering them in the midst of the colonists, merited resolute punishment by expulsion, and a demand on the part of the Government for compensation to the Tambookies. Stockenstrom prefaced his remarks by a reference to the "impolicy" of Somerset's "connivance at the breach of the Treaties" in sanctioning any conditional re-occupation of the territory by Kaffirs, and to "the many acts

(75) Stockenstrom to Bell. 13.12.28. C.o. 336. For details re his suggestions for Nottentot settlements, see later discussion on the Kat River Settlement.
 (76) Stockenstrom to Cole. 6.2.29. C.o. 367.
 (77) For discussion of which see the section on the Kat River Settlement.

of aggression by which Makomo and his Followers have provoked the execution of the threat which accompanied the Governor's act of indulgence." And concluded by saying that the expulsion alone would not produce an immediate cessation of depredations. This would only be achieved by the close settlement of the territory which he had already recommended. (77)

To all these points Stockenstrom referred in his evidence. (78) And here it is perhaps relevant to point out that Stockenstrom naturally made no attempt to whitewash Macomo. In his evidence in 1835 he emphasized the depredations committed by that chief and his people, and the treachery of their attack upon the Tambookies, although he could not but have been aware of Buxton's views on the expulsion of Macomo. In the light of this fact, there does not seem to be much point in Godlonton's sarcastic comments on Stockenstrom's negative replies to questions 2385 and 2386, relative to Macomo's reliability, given on 4 March 1836. Godlonton wrote: (80) "The appointment of the Lieutenant-Governor has had a most salutary effect in clearing away those mists which at one period so evidently obscured the mental faculties and perceptions of the officer recently appointed to that responsible office, and respecting which we have had such just and cogent reason for complaint."

In describing how the idea of the Kat River Settlement originated, he mentioned that it had occurred to him as a means of executing Sir Rufane Donkin's plan of settling the ceded Territory - a plan which he had described in some detail in earlier evidence, and of (81) (82)

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- (78) Stockenstrom to Cole. 6.2.29. C.o. 367.
 (79) Q. 965 - 969. A.C. minutes, pp. 81 - 82. 19.8.35.
 (80) GTJ 23.6.36.
 (81) This will be discussed in greater detail later.
 (82) Q. 574 - 594. A.C. minutes, pp. 49 - 50. 14.8.35.

(83)
 which he had always approved. Furthermore, Stockenstrom went on, since the ceded territory was entirely at the disposal of government, which was therefore justified in laying down any restrictions which it saw fit for the people who should take land there, he had adopted definite regulations for the proposed establishments. He recalled that the principal feature of his order was that upon every location i.e. every farm, there should be at least four men capable of bearing arms; two of these should guard the flocks, one should remain for the protection of the family and premises, and the fourth should be prepared at all times to go out in defence of the frontier in case of invasion. If twenty-four hours had elapsed after the loss of cattle, no pursuit was to be allowed. And no kaffir cattle were to be taken under any circumstances.
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In the Suggestions for the settlement of the Ceded Territory, which Stockenstrom drew up in September 1829, the instructions do not in fact appear precisely in this form. He there recommended that each applicant should be entitled to one plot of arable land, of 2 to 3 morgen, for each man capable of bearing arms, "which such applicant will bind himself permanently to keep upon such land well armed." Nothing is here said of the 24 - hour period, but there are strict regulations to ensure that Kaffir cattle should on no account be taken in lieu of stolen cattle, except where special orders had been given. On 5 May 1829, however, Stockenstrom had recommended that no cattle should be followed up "if the
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(83) See, for example, the confidential despatch to Bell 24.4.29. C.o. 367.

(84) Q. 984. A.C. minutes, p. 85. 19.8.35.

(85) Suggestions of the Commissioner-General relative to the Policy to be adopted with respect to the Caffres and the occupation of the Ceded Territory beyond the Gonappe, submitted to his Excellency the Governor. 28.9.29. A.C. minutes, p. 212 - 213. (Henceforth cited as Suggestions of the Commissioner-General)

robbery be not known at the time it happens," and, should this be at night, then pursuit should commence not later than daybreak the next day. ⁽⁸⁶⁾ In his orders to the field-cornets in charge of the groups of migratory farmers who were moving into the Gonappe after the expulsion of the Kaffirs, Stockenstrom actually stipulated that no party should consist of less than twenty armed men, and that there should never be less than ten men left armed to guard the homes when the others went in pursuit of cattle. The same regulations insisting on immediate pursuit, forbidding patrols to go out after cattle which had been left unguarded during the day or exposed at night, and forbidding the taking of Kaffir cattle, are here repeated. ⁽⁸⁷⁾ It seems that Stockenstrom later relaxed the regulations to allow locations to have four ⁽⁸⁸⁾ armed men each.

Before outlining the policy of settlement which he had followed in the Ceded Territory, Stockenstrom asked ⁽⁸⁹⁾ leave to explain his reasons for adopting such a policy. These comprised his major criticisms of the reprisal system, instituted by Somerset in 1817, as it operated on the Eastern Frontier. It must here be emphasized that, in the course of insisting on the need for the severest checks on the carelessness of the farmers, Stockenstrom quite clearly had the occupants of the newly Ceded Territory in mind. It was here, he said, that the Government had a perfect right to lay down "a system of preventive measures which would have effectually

(86) Stockenstrom to Bell. 5.5.29. C.o. 367.

(87) Instructions to Field-Cornets. 19.5.29. C.o. 367.

These were issued verbally on 30.4.29.

(88) See GTJ Editorial. 17.5.35.

(89) Q. 969. A.C. minutes, p. 83. 19.3.35.

protected the frontier, provided the farmers were forced to guard their cattle. But, Stockenstrom said - and he twice made this point:

it must be understood that the people who lived within the old boundary of the colony - that is, that part not belonging to the ceded territory - might perhaps have a right to say to the Government, "you must protect us, and we have a right on our lands to let our cattle run free as we please... we came here under your promise of protection, and you must protect us without imposing such obnoxious restraints." In the Ceded Territory, however, the government could have made stricter rules than perhaps it would have been able to do on the Western side of the old boundary. (90)

The expulsion of Macomo was, of course, a policy which Stockenstrom had expected to meet with criticism. Pringle and Buxton openly disagreed with him as to the justice of the course he had followed. From another quarter, the missionary Shaw had virtually accused him of making Macomo's attack on the Tambookies the pretext for expelling him in order to provide a site for a Hottentot Settlement. (91) With this, W.B. Boyce was later to agree. (92) It is quite evident, however, that the eventual expulsion of Macomo was, as Stockenstrom stated in his evidence, the logical outcome of his views on the impolicy of allowing the Kaffirs to return to that strategic sector of the Ceded Territory. It is significant, moreover, that, whereas Rev. Shaw's version of the motive behind the expulsion of Macomo might have served, had Stockenstrom acknowledged it, to soften to a certain extent the philanthropists' criticisms of his policy, he made no attempt in his evidence to shelter behind such an interpretation of his actions. On the contrary, he adhered consistently to his contention that Macomo should never have been allowed on the upper waters of the Kat, and that the maintenance of the security of the frontier justified his expulsion.

(90) Q. 975. A.C. minutes, p. 84. 19.8.35.

(91) Q. 965. A.C. minutes, p. 81.

(92) Vide supra p. 29

It was after the expulsion of Macomo that Stockenstrom became fully aware of the abuses of the reprisal system on the Eastern frontier. And it was this knowledge that led him to develop a scheme of frontier settlement, the essential features of which, as outlined in his Suggestions, remained the basis both of his policy throughout his Commissioner-Generalship and of his suggestions to the Aborigines Committee. The origin of Stockenstrom's criticism of the reprisal system and the significance of his frontier policy must now be examined.

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(iii) The Reprisal System.

(a) Stockenstrom's Earlier Views on the Reprisal System.

For a fair valuation of Stockenstrom's evidence on the reprisal system, some understanding of the development of his ideas on frontier policy from the earliest years of his landdrostship is essential. A comparatively small section of the extensive frontier for which Stockenstrom was responsible bordered on the Kaffir frontier. This area was under the immediate charge of the Deputy-Landdrost at Cradock, and with the creation of the district of Somerset in 1826, Stockenstrom ceased to have any connection with this part of the frontier. Consequently, he was chiefly concerned with the Bushman frontier, and there are in his despatches for the period of his Landdrostship, comparatively few direct references to policy on the Kaffir frontier.

Stockenstrom was never, at any time, averse to giving his opinions fully and freely on all topics with which he was connected; and particularly when he was not in agreement with the authorities. The absence, therefore, of an expressed criticism of a policy is, in Stockenstrom's case, usually an indication that he had none to make. And there are, at any rate, two instances in which, had he had any criticism of the reprisal system and the abuses to which it gave rise, Stockenstrom might have been expected to make it.

In 1823, Field-Cornet van der Nest was reported by Lieut.-Colonel Scott for irregular conduct on an excursion in pursuit of stolen cattle. ⁽⁹³⁾ Stockenstrom investigated the case, and completely exculpated van der Nest. His grounds for this, as he reported to the Deputy Landdrost of Cradock, were threefold. In the first place, van der Nest had found the kraal of Kaffirs where he had every right to treat them as enemies viz. on one of the upper branches of the Kat River, which was undoubtedly part of the colony according to the 1819 boundary. ⁽⁹⁴⁾ Secondly, even had the kraal been in Kaffir territory, van der Nest would only have been doing his duty in seizing cattle there, according to the orders laid down in 1817, whereby, if restitution of the stolen cattle or discovery of the perpetrators were refused at the first kraal to which the spoor led, the patrol was to seize the number stolen, from the first herd found. In taking only 63, Stockenstrom pointed out, he had not even taken the number to

(93) For what follows, see Stockenstrom to Harding (Deputy Landdrost at Cradock) 14.9.23. C.o. 2649. This is the despatch of which Godlonton made so much. See Chap I.

(94) This was the incident which led to the discovery of a misunderstanding as to the boundary line on the part of the military. Vide supra, p. 110 .

which he was entitled, since he had gone not only to indemnify himself, but also two other farmers in his division, who had lost 52. And, added Stockenstrom, had the field-cornet allowed them to be retaken from him, he would have considered him guilty of indecision. But since he did bring them through the bushy country, thus showing the Kaffirs that they did not dare to attack him, though they outnumbered him, and abandoned the cattle only because he saw that the Kaffirs "were going to resort to their cowardly practice of taking Revenge on the women and children," his conduct was in no way to be criticized.

There is no comment at all upon the reprisal system referred to. But what Stockenstrom did have to say is significant:

That we have something serious to expect very soon on the part of the Caffers no one will doubt, but that their attempts will be attributable to the late insignificant Party and their Proceedings might have been admitted if the Caffers had ever since the Treaty of 1819 adhered strictly thereto, and we been the aggressors, but will not bear a moment's argument when the Depredations and Murders perpetrated for such a length of time back; the Reports of the Deserters some time ago about the Reconciliation of all Parties in Cafferland and their concerted Plan of Operation, together with the long Experience of the treacherous dispositions of the Caffers, give every one the assurance that the Massacres, Fires, and Flundering of 1819 would be repeated the first favourable opportunity...

The second instance concerns the suspension of the reprisal system by Bourke in April, 1826. After studying various documents in the Colonial Office and other papers on Kaffir affairs, Bourke formed strong opinions on the subject of the evils arising from the reprisal system on the frontier. Finding these opinions confirmed by "many persons upon whose judgment and experience I place great reliance," and particularly the Commissioners of Inquiry, Bourke decided altogether to put a stop to

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 the patrol and reprisal system. Not only were no Kaffir cattle to be seized, but no commando or armed body of burghers was to cross the frontier without the express orders of government, or in the case of a hostile invasion, when the commandant might call out the burgher force to aid the military. The inhabitants were, however, permitted to form patrols to protect their property, and to pursue the marauders as far as the boundary, provided they did not cross it. (96)

When these orders were promulgated, the district of Somerset had already been created. Stockenström was therefore concerned with the new system only in so far as it applied to the Bushman frontier. Under the conditions which prevailed on that frontier, he disapproved strongly of it. And he made no bones about expressing his disapproval in a letter to the Commissioners of Inquiry in August 1826. (97) The system of prohibiting the Boers from crossing the frontier in pursuit of murderers and plunderers, he said, laid the firmest foundation for just that thing which it was designed to prevent - a new frontier petty war. Once the government order became generally known, which was inevitable if it was to be executed at all, "one night will be sufficient for the destruction of half the Families on the extreme Borders, by those who know that the Crossing of a River and a Ridge ensures a safe retreat." By the time government permission to enter the native territory could be obtained

(95) Bourke to Bathurst. 21.4.26. Theal. Records XXVI, 282 - 283.

(96) Military Secretary to Commandant on the Frontier. 11.4.26, and Secretary to Government to Landdrosts of Albany, Graaff-Reinet and Somerset 20.4.26. Ibid. 283 - 285. The order to the landdrosts merely forbade the crossing of the boundary and made no mention of seizure of Kaffir cattle. Both orders were confidential, and Somerset was expressly told to keep them secret as far as possible.

(97) Stockenström to Commissioners of Inquiry. 9.8.26. Auto. I, 231 ff.

from Cape Town, the gang responsible would probably be miles away. Bushman society was not like Kaffir society, where there were chiefs with authority to be found, and where the community could be held responsible for the acts of its members. The Bushmen were divided into hundreds of small independent groups; and unless the depredations were followed up immediately, it was impossible to trace them again. "Could we then take indiscriminate vengeance on all kraals?" said Stockenstrom. Yet, if the marauders found they could steal with impunity, one group after another would be tempted to raid the colony. And "the flame once kindled, the scenes of Blood of earlier days will be acted over again." His own system of checking the pursuers of marauders, he said, was to make "every individual employed on such a Party particularly Blacks,"⁽⁹⁸⁾ report at the Drostdy as soon as they returned to give a deposition of their proceedings, "by which it is easily discovered whether the pursuit was wanton or necessary or whether any extremities which could be avoided were resorted to - No Boor" Stockenstrom added, "will inconsiderately run the risk of such Inquiry if his cause be not just, but to check one Evil by the substitution of a still greater one I humbly beg leave to dissent from."

With these views, as reiterated by Stockenstrom in a despatch in November 1826,⁽⁹⁹⁾ to which he appended the extract quoted above, Bourke disagreed entirely, as his pencilled marginal annotations show. On Stockenstrom's assertion that no Boor would run the risk of enquiry if his cause were not just, Bourke commented: "The evidence

(98) These two words Stockenstrom underlined in an extract copy of this letter which he sent to Bourke on 2.11.26. C.o. 2678.

(99) Stockenstrom to Flasket. 2.11.26. C.o. 2678.

of facts decidedly contradicts this assertion." Of Stockenstrom's reference to 'indiscriminate vengeance' he said: "This is what occurs usually in pursuits, and indiscriminate plunder into the bargain..."

In this despatch, in which Stockenstrom had been asked to comment on the policy to be pursued towards the newly-arrived *Fetconies* on the borders of the Colony, he pointed out that these tribes were probably like the Mantatees - very warlike and brave among themselves, but no match for the colonial forces with their firearms. It should be easy, he contended, to put down any attempt on their part to commit depredations "Preventive measures," said Stockenstrom, "would therefore be the best, and I fully agree with Col. Somerset and Mr. Mackay as to the Expediency, nay absolute necessity of following up marauders across the Boundary immediately after the Commission of any Depredation. One or two small Parties would be made an example of, our superior strength would be seen, the Mass of the People would take the Lesson, and perhaps never be heard of again, at least be happy of our friendship."

To which Bourke noted: "This may be true as to strangers lately arrived on our borders & c. But it has been tried on the Caffres for years without effect - and why - because in these pursuits the Colonists became plunderers in their turn."

On the policy to be adopted in dealing with depredations on the borders of the Somerset district, complained of by Somerset and Mackay, and presumed to be committed by isolated Mantatees and deserters from the colony, Stockenstrom commented:

I cannot consider them of much importance unless we allow there ((sic)) Insults to be continued with Impunity by not following them on the Spur. - All I am anxious about is that we should prevent the indiscriminate Slaughter of the whole which must result from a mistaken leniety, and too much forbearance.

Bourke was not convinced. And Stockenstrom continued to point out the evils to which he believed Bourke's system would lead. In April 1827 he wrote:

...tho' I honored the feelings which dictated those Instructions and caused them to be strictly adhered to, (100) I considered it my duty to take every opportunity to show that they were in many respects likely to defeat the humane object of their originator, and to accelerate the extermination which His Honor so justly deprecates & which I believe there is no one now base enough secretly to wish much less so devoid of shame as openly to recommend. (101).

Had Stockenstrom been aware of the existence of abuses of the type Bourke had in mind and wished to prevent when he introduced his system, it seems more than likely that he would have made some reference to them in these communications. But nothing of the kind appears.

It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that, during his Landdrostship, Stockenstrom was not unduly concerned about abuses of the reprisal system. Indeed, abuses of the type he later described as being of all too frequent occurrence in the Ceded Territory would not have come to his notice on the Bushman Frontier, since, unlike the Kaffirs, the Bushmen seldom if ever had any stock in their possession beyond what they stole from the Colony.

This, however, is not to say that Stockenstrom was unaware of the dangers inherent in the system, necessitated by the shortage of regular troops and the extent of the frontier, of allowing parties of burghers headed by their own officers (the Field-cornets) to go in pursuit of marauders. On the contrary, he was acutely aware of the position. He knew his frontiersmen too well to idealize them. The fear that the smouldering fires of resentment against the natives would lead to "unnecessary

(100) See, for instance, Stockenstrom's letter to Harding on the subject of representations from the inhabitants against Bourke's law. 19.6.27. C.o. 2694.

(101) Stockenstrom to Flasket. 7.4.27. C.o. 2694.
See also Stockenstrom to Flasket 20.2.27. C.o. 2694.

bloodshed" obsessed him. Hardly a communication to his Field-cornets authorizing an armed party into Bushman country closed without an exhortation to use the utmost caution and avoid all unnecessary bloodshed. Writing to Baird in 1822, on the subject of a recent expedition by Field-cornet Forie, in pursuit of Bushmen, Stockenstrom expressed his relief that "whilst the utmost Severity seems to have been indispensable, and was resorted to, we have the indubitable Proofs that the disaster has fallen on the Guilty, as appears from the manner in which the Field Cornet had ascertained the retreat of the real Robbers by following their traces according to the Spirit of my Instructions." But, he continues later, "the fury which the Field Cornet describes as having possessed his men shows how imprudent it would be to send a strong force with orders or Authority generally, to reduce the Bosjesmen by amicable and if those fail, by hostile measures: for all which Reasons I trust you will keep a steadfast eye and constant check on all such operations." (102)

This fear of the "revenge motive" is a constantly recurring theme in Stockenstrom's despatches. In 1816, for instance, shortly after he became Landdrost, he reported the incidence of repeated and serious depredations in the Tarka area, which induced him to hurry to the area to make up a party of armed inhabitants to punish the offenders. But he was careful to place at their head two reliable Field-cornets, carefully instructed in writing as to their procedure, for, "tho' I was well aware of the precarious and unsafe Situation to which the Inhabitants on the Frontier would be reduced, if the neighbouring Savage tribes should continue to molest

(102) Stockenstrom to Baird (Deputy Landdrost of Beaufort) 7.3.22. Copy in C.o. 2641.

them with impunity, yet I thought necessary to act with the greatest precaution, to prevent that the assistance which should be granted in this instance, be turned into a weapon of revenge, which when carried to too great an extent would counteract its real object." (103) Even when writing to Deputy Landdrost Harding in 1827 on the subject of representations against Bourke's law forbidding the pursuit of thieves across the borders without Government sanction, - and it must be remembered that he agreed in principle with those representations - Stockenstrom stated firmly:

"...tho' I shall ever regard it as a sacred duty to lay the Interests and Grievances of the Inhabitants before their Rulers in their true light, it must never be expected that I shall deviate from the principle which the whole District is aware I have hitherto adhered to, of checking by all means in my power, every disposition to indiscriminate retaliation and revenge for the most inconsiderable aggressions sometimes generated by the most heart-rending causes of starvation and misery; as every farmer knows, and which the majority admit and make allowances for..." (104)

That this was indeed his policy is fully borne out by the despatches of his Landdrostship. (105) Nor was his fear based upon theoretical principles. Of the existence of "irregularities" among the frontiersmen Stockenstrom was well aware, though they do not appear to have been the general rule. (106) As early as 1817, the "irregularities" which took place among the farmers in the outlying frontier districts of the Koup, Newveld and Swarteberg led Stockenstrom to recommend the establishment of a deputy landdrost in that division. His attempts to establish among these

(103) Stockenstrom to Bird. 16.6.16. C.o. 2603.

(104) Stockenstrom to Harding. 19.6.27. C.o. 2694.

(105) See, for example, Stockenstrom to Baird 7.2.22. and 14.2.22. Copies in S. to Sec. to Govt. 14.2.22. C.o. 2641; Stockenstrom to v.d. Graaff 10.1.17 C.o. 2606; Stockenstrom to Harding 20.9.20 - C.o. 2625.; Stockenstrom to Harding 11.9.21 - C.o. 2633; Stockenstrom to Brink 24.11.24. C.o. 2658.

(106) e.g. Stockenstrom to Plasket 18.8.27. C.o. 2695.

farmers "the same system, which is daily gaining ground in other parts," were "but slowly successful." And he felt that "a person in full authority so near the most exposed parts of the Northern Boundary would secure to the Inhabitants all necessary support in cases of inroads, and on the other hand deprive them of false pretences for wanton attacks upon Borderers."⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

Cases of such "wanton attacks" upon the natives certainly did come under Stockenstrom's notice and were carefully investigated and forcibly commented upon by him in his despatches.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ On the whole, however, the system which he adopted of requiring every patrol that went out to report on its proceedings, and of questioning both the Europeans and non-Europeans in the party, seems to have acted as an effective check on irregularities in his own district.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾

Nevertheless, Stockenstrom's knowledge that cases of cruelty could and did occur made him exercise the utmost caution in the employment of the burgher patrols. He fully acknowledged their necessity as a means of protection for the frontier farmers, but was always deeply concerned about the authority which had to be given to Field-cornets on these occasions.⁽¹¹⁰⁾

This was one of the chief reasons for Stockenstrom's insistence upon the absolute necessity for immediate pursuit of robbers. It was, as he wrote to Baird in 1822, "the only way to make sure that we are punishing the Guilty and not butchering the Innocent."⁽¹¹¹⁾ And in 1827, explaining to Flasket the reasons for his opposition to Bourke's law, Stockenstrom asserted that any commando

(107) Stockenstrom to Bird. 24.4.17. C.o. 2606.

(108) For example; Stockenstrom to Baird 6.6.22. Theal. Records. XIV, 387; Stockenstrom to Harding 2.10.22 C.o. 2641.

(109) Stockenstrom to Commissioners of Inquiry. 9.8.26. Auto. I. 232.

(110) For example: Stockenstrom to Baird 7.2.22. Copy in S. to Sec. to Govt. 14.2.22 C.o. 2641; Stockenstrom to Harding 11.9.21 C.o. 2633; Stockenstrom to Flasket 7.4.27 C.o. 2694.

sent against the Bushmen some time after a robbery would be either unjust or useless, for it was virtually impossible to be certain then which was the guilty kraal. "Thus," he wrote, "an imprudent or cruel leader will nine times out of ten spill innocent Blood and a Conscientious one will do nothing or rather a great deal of mischief by harassing his Party and encouraging a renewal of aggression. It is dreadful to reflect," he went on, "what horrible deeds these Commandos sent by Government or the Landdrost against the Bosjesmen, after the traces by which the real Criminals can be discovered have disappeared, may perpetrate and bring upon the Colony by way of retaliation, and it is still more dreadful to know what they have done heretofore." ⁽¹¹²⁾ But he acknowledged that the Field-cornets, properly supervised, acted as a check on the patrols and on pursuit "on the Spur", for he could never advocate the allowing every individual farmer to take a force across the frontier.

The carelessness of the farmers, and their tendency to exaggerate petty depredations on the part of scattered bands of marauders into frontier alarms, gave Stockenstrom as landdrost considerable cause for concern. He never neglected to investigate rumours of alarms along the frontier, but time and again he reports that he found ⁽¹¹³⁾ "everything perfectly quiet," which tended to make him very sceptical of frontier alarms. For instance, on an occasion when Baird requested authorization for a strong commando of 150 men against Bushmen marauders, Stockenstrom questioned whether affairs had really come to such a pass as to require such a commando. All the evidence, he said, seemed to show that the depredations were caused

(111) Stockenstrom to Baird 14.2.22. Copy enclosed in S. to Sec. to Govt. 14.2.22. C.o. 2641.

(112) Stockenstrom to Flasket. 7.4.27. C.o. 2694.

(113) e.g. Stockenstrom to Bird, 29.4.22. C.o. 2641.

by the usual hards of starving stragglers. He admitted the case of Jourdaan and his companions, who had been attacked, to be an exception; but then, he pointed out, they had most imprudently exposed themselves, and, in any case "I for my own part must make the necessary allowances for the exaggeration usual in similar cases." (114)

When, in March 1822, Baird reported that a patrol under a Field-cornet had successfully dealt with a band of the marauders by following up the traces of cattle to the guilty kraal, Stockenstrom commented:

...I hope it is now evident to you that on that principle alone our repulsive measures can in any degree be countenanced when called for by the utmost necessity... for if you only reflect on the easy defeat and Dispersion of an Enemy which has been cried up as endangering the District, combined with the fortunate circumstance of no one of our party having been in the slightest degree hurt I think you will allow it rather to be an Execution of Criminals than any thing like a dangerous Contest... (115)

Stockenstrom was concerned that even patrols should not be called out unnecessarily. For instance, in 1817 he wrote to van der Graaff, recommending that the Field-cornets should always have a certain number of men ready in case of an attack on a certain district, but cautioning him:

...it must be clearly stated that the people thus kept in readiness must not be called out merely for a few stragglers, or on account of some few cattle plundered through carelessness - for against such each distinct family is obliged to watch. (116)

And on several occasions he criticized Field-cornets severely for apparently unnecessary action. (117)

Throughout Stockenstrom's despatches in regard to both Kaffirs and Bushmen, there appears, side by side with his determination to take severe and decisive action

(114) Stockenstrom to Baird 7.2.22. C.o. 2641.

For further remarks on the imprudence of frontier families in exposing themselves to dangers by trekking to isolated spots, and the impossibility of putting the whole country in motion to save such families from the consequences of their own imprudence see an early despatch of the Commissioner-General to van Ryneveld 22.10.28. C.o. 336.

(115) Stockenstrom to Baird 7.3.22. C.o. 2641.

against genuine habitual marauders, an immense compassion for those driven to theft by need. It was his conviction that desperate need, rather than wanton or organized aggression on the colony, lay at the root of most, if not all, depredation, that made him so extremely cautious about sanctioning drastic action unless the proofs of guilt were indisputable. And even then he urged lenity as far as was consonant with the protection and safety of the frontier colonists. (118)

Even when, among the Kaffirs on the North-Eastern borders, groups of proved marauders were discovered, Stockenstrom, while sanctioning their punishment, seems always to have inclined to the view that these were isolated banditti over whom the chiefs had little control, and that their depredations should not be allowed to alarm the whole frontier into the fear of wholesale aggression on the part of the Kaffirs, or into consequent action against the whole Kaffir community. (119)

Before the adoption of Somerset's reprisal policy in 1817, Stockenstrom followed the same policy towards the Kaffir kraals as towards the Bushman kraals: no kraal was to be in any way interfered with unless there were incontestable proofs of its guilt. (120) And even after the introduction of Somerset's system, Stockenstrom evidently preferred the seizure only of cattle known to have been

(116) Stockenstrom to v.d. Graaff. 10.1.17. Quoted from Cory Transcripts p.294.

(117) e.g. Stockenstrom to Harding 11.9.21. C.o. 2633; Stockenstrom to Mackay 10.11.24. C.O. 2658; Stockenstrom to Mackay 25.11.24. Theal. Records.

(118) e.g. (1) Stockenstrom to Major Fraser 23.8.18. CO 2613

(2) Stockenstrom to Harding 20.9.20 CO 2625.

(3) Stockenstrom to Baird 7.2.22. CO 2641.

(4) Stockenstrom to Bird 5.6.22. Theal. Records XLV, 385.

(5) Stockenstrom to Mackay 4.11.24. CO 2658.

(6) Stockenstrom to Flasket 3.11.25. CO 2667.

(7) Stockenstrom to Flasket 1.12.25. CO 2667.

(8) Stockenstrom to Harding 19.6.27. CO 2667.

(119) e.g. Stockenstrom to Bird 19.1.16. (in Cory Transcripts Vol. I, 256). Stockenstrom to Bird 31.5.16 (Ibid p.260.)

Stockenstrom to Bird 6.12.20. C.o. 2625.

(120) Stockenstrom to Bird 16.6.16. C.o. 2603.

stolen by Kaffir kraals. In 1818, for instance, a band of marauding Kaffirs under Gola were surprised in their hideout in the Sneeubergen. A number of the Kaffirs were taken prisoners and 2800 sheep and 550 cattle seized. The sheep Stockenstrom suggested should be distributed among the Bushmen from whom they had originally been stolen. "With respect to the cattle," he added, "I should conceive equitable, that such as can be proved to have been taken from the Colonists, be returned to the lawful owners and the remainder left to the Kaffirs for their subsistence." (121) His strong disapproval of the seizure of thousands of cattle during Brereton's commando has already been discussed. And, of course, the very fact of his insistence on the necessity for immediate pursuit, and his horror at the thought of the innocent being punished implies a disapproval of measures which would lead to the taking of cattle from innocent kraals. That Stockenstrom was aware that the farmers might be guilty of misrepresentation of the extent of their losses is apparent from a letter to Mackay in 1824, warning him that the cattle taken from the Kaffirs "must not be delivered to Erasmus before it be clearly proved to your satisfaction that that number were actually taken from him by the Caffers." (122)

All of this seems to indicate very clearly that, while Stockenstrom as landdrost may not have been alive to any extensive abuse of the patrol and reprisal system as it existed on the Eastern frontier, his experience of the frontiersmen may in some measure have prepared him for what he evidently found there during his Commissioner-Generalship. And the general principles upon which he appears to have based his policy as landdrost prepare us

(121) Stockenstrom to Bird. 29.7.18. C.o. 2612.
 (122) Stockenstrom to Mackay. 22.10.24. C.o. 2658.
 (123) Stockenstrom to Bell. 22.11.28. C.o. 336.

to find him very strongly disapproving of many things which came to his notice on the Eastern Frontier.

During his first tour of the Eastern Frontier as Commissioner-General - when, for the first time for two years he came into direct contact with the Kaffir frontier again - Stockenstrom seems to have found nothing in any way to alter his ideas on the frontier system. In his report to Bell in November 1828, ⁽¹²³⁾ he noted the recurrent depredations complained of by the inhabitants and confirmed by Lieutenant-Colonel Somerset, and expressed his suspicions that some of the chiefs connived at these aggressions. He pointed out that, since it was too dangerous to allow the Colonists to pursue and shoot robbers on all occasions - the only measure which could keep the Kaffirs in awe under the circumstances - the depredations were likely to continue. And he therefore urged again the necessity of expelling the Kaffirs from the ceded territory and establishing a dense settlement of colonists there. This, he felt assured, would bring tranquility, by effectively checking marauders, for "the Caffers as a nation we have nothing to dread from."

(124)

In February 1829, in writing to Sir Lowry Cole, to recommend the expulsion of Macomo from the Ceded Territory, Stockenstrom reiterated his opinion that "the great mistake committed in our policy of frontier defence consisted in the sudden transition from measures of too great severity and sometimes wanton Cruelty, to the opposite extreme of sacrificing the safety of His Majesty's subjects on the Borders by paralyzing their Efforts even in Defence of their lands and their Property; and the Vigour with which this System of supposed

(123) Stockenstrom to Bell. 22.11.28. C.o. 336.

(124) Stockenstrom to Cole. 6.2.29. C.o. 367.

conciliation was enforced, generated the Idea, which caused so much discontent, Clamour and confusion; - that it was criminal to resist any attack made by Savages. -"

Stockenstrom's attitude towards the Kaffirs had not changed. He was convinced that the chiefs would participate in plunder and encourage it whenever they could do so without fear of detection. In the state of civilization of the Kaffirs, inroads must be expected. Nor was the practice of stealing hundreds of cattle, and the thieves themselves returning tens, under pretence of having recovered them, a new trick, as Colonel Somerset apparently thought. "The only way therefore of dealing with such People," Stockenstrom insisted, "is to pursue them on the 'spoor' immediately after they have committed a crime." As in the pursuit of Bushman marauders, Stockenstrom emphasized that firing should never be tolerated unless resistance on the part of the guilty party made it imperative; and that a party should never pursue marauders across the borders unless headed by some responsible military officer or field-cornet, of which there should be a sufficient number all along the frontier. The head of the party should then be held responsible for preventing unnecessary bloodshed or the punishing of the innocent.

"To this Point," Stockenstrom added, significantly, "I must beg leave to call your Excellency's particular attention. I should be the last person to exaggerate in the eyes of Government the unfriendly feeling of the Colonists towards the native Tribes. - I am aware that the ferociousness with which that feeling was given vent to has in a great measure given way to the dictates of

that humanity which proceeds hand in hand with the moral Improvement of our remoter bretheren and I know numbers whose disposition in regard to those natives does them honor; - but that a most powerful check upon the Parties pursuing marauders is absolutely necessary is equally true. - "

Stockenstrom urged the utmost caution in the selection of those persons "who must unavoidably be intrusted with a great deal of discretionary power on the said Expeditions" - it is again a familiar touch.

He wrote to good purpose, for on the same day Cole notified Somerset of the abolition of Bourke's system and the reversion to the system of pursuit "on the spoor" into Kaffir territory if necessary, and instructed him to see to the appointment of suitable burgher officials to take responsibility on the frontier. (125)

At the end of April 1829, Stockenstrom left Graham's Town and went up to the scene of action on the Kat River, whence Macomo and his people had been expelled. There he supervised the proceedings of the commando, had an interview with Macomo and Botman, and reported on the situation. (126) And now, quite suddenly, Stockenstrom launched for the first time that criticism of the "reprisal" system on the frontier which, six years later, was to be a stench in the nostrils of the men of Albany. After warning Cole that, without strict precautions, Kaffir depredations were likely to be severe as a result of the expulsion, he went on, in a passage sufficiently significant to be quoted in full:

(125) Bell to Somerset. 6.2.29. (from Cory Rescripts: Colonial Office Letters vol. 2, 111.) This was in reply to representations against Bourke's system from Somerset himself.

(126) Stockenstrom to Bell. 5.5.29. C.o. 367.

... however unpopular it may be, Duty and truth compel me to assert that the plundering of the Caffers is greatly facilitated by the carelessness of our own people confirmed by the existing System of Recapture, or more properly "retaliation."- If a Farmer chooses to let his cattle out at night, or to leave them without proper guard in the day time he can often not know when and by whom they are stolen, in such cases a Patrol follows them up, on what the loser calls the "Spoor" into some Caffer kraal where if even one of the cattle claimed by the same loser, be found the number declared by this interested Person to have been lost is taken from that Kraal. - It is not impossible that the real plunderers drove the Stolen Cattle through, and left one behind, in this Kraal on purpose to prevent himself being pursued farther, or that one or more may have there knocked up. The innocent Caffer is thus robbed of his only means of subsistence and must starve or come into the Colony to plunder the first flock he meets with. - Nor can we ever say that there may not be people so depraved as under the above circumstances to claim a greater number than they have lost, or to leave their bad Cattle exposed in order to get better back. (I am sorry to say I argue from experience.) Therefore I am humbly of opinion that no cattle should be followed up if the robbery be not known at the time it happens, and then it should be done immediately. - If this be at night out of the Kraals the pursuit should commence at furthest at day break next morning. - If the same Cattle be not overtaken it is a proof of neglect, except in peculiar cases and no Caffer cattle should be taken in lieu: or if in any particular Case this alternative should be unavoidable the Cattle should not be delivered to the claimant but to the Civil Commissioner who should enquire as to the number actually lost, and the guilt of the Kraal thus taxed.-

I am aware that this mode of reasoning will not be relished by some Farmers who may have unfortunately become too fond of "Patrolling" and consider it a pastime; but I see nothing in the Caffer that makes me despair of these exploits (equally injurious to the improvement of both parties) being rendered much less necessary by due vigilance and caution on the part of the Farmers and a firm but humane policy with regard to the Savages. (127)

This was the beginning of a perfect spate of similar representations against the reprisal system. Four days later, on the request of Field-Cornet Erasmus, and at Somerset's suggestion, Stockenstrom authorized the assembling of a party of burghers to go in pursuit of
(128)
cattle stolen by the Kaffirs. The number of "volunteers" for the expedition apparently aroused his suspicions,

(127) It is interesting to note that Stockenstrom himself here speaks of the Kaffirs as "Savages." (cf. Q. 1045, discussed ~~later~~ p. 154. Probably this was because he was so accustomed to referring to Savages - the Bushmen were such, according to his definition."

(128) Stockenstrom to Bell. 9.5.29. C.o. 367.

(129)

and he issued some emphatic written orders to Erasmus: the patrol was on no account to meddle with any kraals except those to which the spoor led; only cattle known to be colonial property were to be removed, and any one taking Kaffir cattle would be punished - but if cattle recognized as Tambookie property were found, they were to be brought out and delivered at once to the military commandant or to Stockenstrom himself; not a shot was to be fired except in the case of violence on the part of the Kaffirs; and the proceedings of the patrol were to be reported to Stockenstrom immediately on its return, the burgher officials being held responsible for the observance of the instructions.

(130)

Commenting on these proceedings, Stockenstrom wrote:

If the Boers be allowed to take Caffer cattle for what they lose, or what some say they lose, that is no inducement for them to take care of what they have, and we make Flunderers by degrees of all the Caffers, for the guilty will escape by the ease with which the Innocent can be made to suffer on their account, and the latter, deprived of their means of subsistence must become plunderers from necessity.

He hoped the Governor would approve of the checks he wished to establish, "which I understand are likely to generate Remonstrance." The farmers would appeal to "the many late depredations" - but "I repeat that these are mainly attributable to the facility afforded to the Perpetrators (generally needy and hungry) by the negligence of some farmers."

(131)

Reporting some days later on rumours received by Somerset of the murder of a farmer and his servant by Kaffirs in the Gonappe, and of an alliance between ^(Koenap) Makomo, Mapassa and Hintza, about both of which he was sceptical, Stockenstrom said:

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- (129) Copy enclosed in above - orders to F.-C. Erasmus, 9.5.29.
 (130) S. to Bell. 9.5.29. C.o. 367.
 (131) Stockenstrom to Bell. 19.5.29. C.o. 367.

There is a decided predilection among the People here to spread alarming reports, or exaggerate trifling occurrences; - And if all things were brought to the authorities as they really happen the frontier would soon cease to excite much attention in a belligerent point of view.

And he went on to mention the incident of a man who stated his cattle to have been seized by a party of Kaffirs, but fortunately to have been retaken "by an unarmed Mantatee," to prove his position that "a number of those Stories amassed and appearing in an official form at a distance, cause the Frontier to be considered in a state of danger, whilst those who originate them think their property quite secure in charge of an unarmed savage."

Stockenstrom was no fool. He was perfectly well aware of the danger of retaliatory expeditions from the Kaffirs, especially during the winter months after the expulsion of Macomo. He approved Somerset's military arrangements on the Kat, and went ahead with his plans for the settling of the ceded territory, issuing regulations for the parties who were entering the territory, and rounding up Hottentots for the temporary Kat River Settlement. The very strictness of his regulations for the guarding of the cattle of parties in the Ceded Territory is the measure of his awareness of the danger of depredations.
(132)

But his attitude towards the Frontier situation definitely changed during that month (April - May 1829) - the first he had ever spent on that sector of the frontier during a period of frontier alarm.
(133) Of course, his experience as Landdrost had taught him how often wild

(132) Stockenstrom to Field-Cornets 19.5.29. C.o 367.

Stockenstrom to Bell 28.5.29. C.o. 367.

(133) As has already been pointed out, (vide supra p.36 ff.) Pitman, in his thesis on the Commissioner-Generalship, does not emphasize this apparent change in Stockenstrom's attitude. He writes merely of the developing of a clear policy towards Eastern frontier problems.

alarms would flare up on the frontier, which on investigation proved to be false. And he had always been aware of the necessity for watching the burgher patrols carefully to prevent punishment of innocent kraals, or unnecessary bloodshed on the frontiers. Nor had he been blind to the fact that irregularities did exist on the frontier, and that carelessness often led to depredations. But on the whole, his experience of the Northern frontiersmen led him to defend the colonists against charges of injustice, and to support their pleas for the pursuit of marauders. It seems a fair supposition that the influence which both Stockenstrom and his father had over the Graaff-Reinet frontiersmen justified Stockenstrom's attitude. The tone of Stockenstrom's despatches in May 1829 and afterwards is something new. To suggest that his criticism of the reprisal system in the hands of the colonists proceeded from a sudden mysterious "change of heart" - as was done when that criticism became public six years later - is nonsense. His attitude towards all aspects of Northern frontier policy remained fundamentally unaltered throughout - that is to say, he had not suddenly succumbed to the views of Philip and the philanthropist group. His attitude to this group as late as the end of 1830 makes that clear. (134) Nor did Stockenstrom now lose the realism which had always characterized his policy towards the savages: as his continuance of his proposed measures for frontier defence shows. It seems quite evident that in 1829, when Bourke's system was suspended, Stockenstrom realized fully, for the first time, exactly what Bourke had realized about the Eastern frontier three years before, when

(134) For an illustration of all this, see Stockenstrom's Remarks on Philip's Return of Missions, in December 1830, which is discussed later, P. 273^{ff.} 31.12.30. C.o. 373. For his Northern frontier views, see S. to Bell, 22.11.28. C.o. 336, and instructions to Field Commandants 13.3.30. C.o. 373.

he insisted on putting a stop to the system of pursuit "on the spoor." Bourke's ideas were very likely largely influenced by Philip's views. But if they were preconceived, they were apparently confirmed by what he saw in official reports from the frontier. ⁽¹³⁵⁾ If Stockenstrom were ever to have his opinions changed by Philip, surely this period - 1826 - when his relations with Philip were comparatively friendly, and when he had recently discussed ⁽¹³⁶⁾ frontier affairs with him, would have been the time for it. In fact, no such thing occurred. And, although Stockenstrom came to understand the reason for Bourke's policy, he did not agree with him as to the means he had adopted to check the abuses. The utmost vigilance on the part of the colonists, and the immediate pursuit and punishment of marauders, across the boundaries when necessary, remained the bases of his policy. He regarded the appointment of responsible Field-cornets to supervise the patrols, and the prohibition of "reprisals" of Kaffir cattle, as the safest checks upon abuses of the patrol system.

(135) Bourke to Hay. 29.11.26. Theal: Records: XXVIII, 353.

(136) Bourke to Bathurst 21.4.26. Theal: Records: XXVI, 282. ⁽¹³⁶⁾ See Chap. II for discussion on Stockenstrom's relations with Philip.

(iii) The Reprisal System.(b) Stockenstrom's Attitude Towards the Colonists as
Landdrost and Commissioner-General.

Notwithstanding Stockenstrom's evident awareness of the faults of the colonists, perhaps the most striking fact which emerges from a study of his papers is his complete sympathy with the point of view of the frontiersmen. Though of Swedish stock and born in Cape Town, Stockenstrom, whose mother tongue was Dutch, never regarded himself as anything other than a Dutch frontiersman. (137) In the autobiographical notes which he wrote towards the end of his life, when the men of the frontier district of Graaff-Reinet were mentioned, it was still often as "we colonists" and "my countrymen." (138) It was, during the first part of his career, a reciprocal loyalty. When, after thirteen years as Landdrost, Stockenstrom left Graaff-Reinet to become Commissioner-General, communities all over his extensive district sent up little addresses expressing the deepest regret at his departure. (139) On the other hand, the news that Stockenstrom had been chosen to fill the newly created office of Commissioner-General of the Eastern Districts was evidently received with general satisfaction. (140) In November 1827, Plasket wrote to Hay, suggesting that Stockenstrom should be given a seat in Council, for, "from his well known character he would be looked upon, although a Government servant, as the popular member of Council." (141) And Plasket and

(137) Auto. I, 28 - 29.(138) e.g. Auto. I, 213: "Here I wish it to be particularly noticed and remembered, how as early as 1823, we colonists were desirous of migrating across the Orange River and possessing ourselves of that part of Bushman or Hottentot Land as we and our fathers had done with the more southern parts..."(139) Auto. I, 274 - 277. Stockenstrom treasured eight of these addresses all his life.

(140) Plasket to Hay 22.11.27. Theal: Records: XXXIV, 133

(141) Plasket to Hay. Ibid.

Dundas both commented on the fact that English settlers and Dutch colonists were equally elated at the appointment. (142) It is as well to emphasize these points. The later picture of Stockenström as the touchy, irascible older man, an impossible colleague always battling against imaginary oceans of rascality, has tended to obscure this picture of the young man (Stockenström was barely twenty-three when he became Landdrost) who, almost incredibly, seems to have managed to retain the loyalty and affection of the hardbitten boers of what was notoriously the most turbulent district in all the Cape.

Stockenström was always ready to put the colonists' case. Confronted, for instance, with the problem of the seasonal migrations of the frontier farmers across the Orange River, Stockenström was at one with the government in its disapproval of the practice. Nevertheless, he pointed out very strongly the inhumanity of forbidding men, faced with the loss of their stock and with complete ruin, through drought, from trekking to the well-watered areas which spelt salvation. He followed the policy of permitting migrations during periods of severe drought, but forbidding any permanent settlement beyond the borders, and insisting on the return of all the farmers as soon as conditions rendered it possible. (143)

(142) Ibid. And Dundas to Flasket 13.11.27. Theal: Records: XXXIV, 135.

(143) Stockenström to Flasket 1.12.25. C.o. 2667 for reasons for his disapproval of farmers settling and grazing beyond the Orange - which correspond to Philip's in that he does not want the colonists to encroach on more Bushman country; Stockenström also said nomadic life was bad for the colonists; and extension of boundaries was only permissible if real overpopulation prevailed - which in 1825, he said, was not the case - overstocking was the trouble.
 Stockenström to Bell. 26.2.29. C.o. 367.
 Memorandum of Stockenström on periodical migrations, commenting on memorial of inhabitants of Lower Sea Cow River. 30.11.30. C.o. 373.
Remarks on Philip's Return of Missions. 31.12.30. C.o.373.

Again, while he was a consistent and whole-hearted supporter of Philip's ideas on Hottentot emancipation, Stockenstrom was equally strongly a supporter of the colonists' desire for a check on vagabondizing. ⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ The returns of the Graaff-Reinet Court of Landdrost and Heemraden show with what severity cases of theft and vagabondizing were treated. ⁽¹⁴⁵⁾

Stockenstrom was keenly alive to the sufferings of the frontier farmers at the hands of Bushmen and Kaffir depredators on the wide unprotected borders of his district. He never neglected to investigate reports of depredations, and when necessary to sanction measures of reparation, or to provide for the defence of the farmers. One of his first thoughts, after the Slachter's Nek disturbances, was to provide a strong force on the Baviaan's River to protect the farmers there from any possible attacks from the Kaffirs who might be disposed ⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ to take advantage of the unsettled state of the country. Again, in 1820, when Fringle's party in the same area requested some protection, for, "we confess we do feel alarmed, for the safety of ourselves, our families and our property, unaccustomed as we are to such a situation and unacquainted with the arts of the enemies we have to apprehend," ⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ Stockenstrom was prompt to order "ten Hottentots of good character, well armed and equipped", to be sent in relays each month for the defence of the party, until the Governor's orders should arrive. ⁽¹⁴⁸⁾

(144) Stockenstrom to Rev. Andrew Murray. Quoted in Auto. I, 253.

(145) See Papers of Landdrost in Archives. e.g. Statement of Criminal Cases... before Landdrost and Heemraden of Graaff-Reinet. 12.12.20. C.o. 2625.

(146) Proclamation of Stockenstrom to Burghers of District of Baviaans River. 18.11.15. Quoted from Cory Transcripts Vol. I, 253.

(147) Harding to Stockenstrom 5.7.20. C.o. 2625.

(148) Stockenstrom to Harding. 11.7.20. C.o. 2625.

Writing to Harding in 1823 of the possibility of a repetition of the 1819 irruption of the Kaffirs into the colony, Stockenstrom commented: "...to expect that men in respectable circumstances should tamely submit to being plundered day after day, to see their lives and those of their families in constant danger from Savages whose existence almost depends on our forbearance, without one single effort to save themselves from Beggary and destruction, would be exacting too great a sacrifice of natural feeling." (149) and Stockenstrom's concern for the adequate protection of the frontier during his Commissioner-Generalship has already been pointed out.

Stockenstrom was eager whenever possible to praise the Colonists, and to point out instances of humanity, justice and moderation in their behaviour towards the Bushmen particularly. During the severe drought of 1818, for instance, Stockenstrom toured the Northern parts of his district, and was horrified at the sufferings of the Bushmen from drought and Kaffir raids. "It was, therefore," he reported, "the more agreeable to me, when I arrived in the Division of the Sea Cow River, to see with what good nature and generosity the farmers treated those who came to them for support." He spoke particularly of the example of Field-Cornet van der Walt, who had procured many hundreds of refugees shelter, and food in his district. And he commented on how cheerfully the farmers seemed to submit to this burden, evidently surprised that excessive want had not driven the Bushmen to even greater plunder than they had of late committed. These circumstances, Stockenstrom concluded, he had thought

(149) Stockenstrom to Harding. 14.9.23. C.o. 2649.

it his duty to report to the Governor, "especially what I have been able to say to the credit of the colonists."⁽¹⁵⁰⁾

In 1822, again, he wrote to Bird:

Experience has taught us that prudence, forbearance, and kindness are the best means of keeping the mass of those savages, not only on peaceable terms with, but also very useful to us, and every impartial observer will acknowledge that the present generation of colonists (with some exceptions indeed) show by their conduct to the Bosjesmen their conviction of this truth and of the inhumanity of destroying them on every slight provocation.

And he instanced a party under Field Commandant van Wyk and Field-Cornet Steenkamp, which, surprising a kraal harbouring stolen cattle and two well-known robbers, confined itself to the capture of the ringleaders, without taking revenge. Stockenstrom recommended that Steenkamp should be rewarded and made an example of.⁽¹⁵¹⁾

And in 1830, after reporting on his investigations into charges made by the Griquas against the farmers, and stating that these had proved totally unsubstantiated, Stockenstrom characteristically concluded his report with an account of two cases of disinterested kindness to wounded Bushmen on the part of two indigent colonists, old Fiet du Pre and his wife. This, he thought, called for "the marked notice of Government," for, "as this happened when no inquiry was expected ever to follow, such conduct could only flow from the true and proper feeling and will, I hope, for the sake of example, be duly appreciated."⁽¹⁵²⁾

Stockenstrom refused to countenance the assertion that his own generation of colonists had brought their sufferings at the hands of the Bushmen upon themselves.

(150) Despatch in C.o. 2612. - the first page is evidently missing, therefore it is undated, but must be in 1818.
 (151) Stockenstrom to Bird. 5.6.22. Theal: Records: XIV, 385.
 (152) Stockenstrom to Bell. 2.8.30. Auto. I, 389 - 390.

During the late eighteen-twenties and the years of Stockenstrom's Commissioner-Generalship, there was a marked increase in Griqua aggressions against the Bushmen, and a decided tendency on the part of the Griquas to lay the charges of aggression at the feet of the emigrant farmers. (153) Moreover, they found in Dr. Philip a strong supporter. Nothing was more calculated to rouse the ire of the colonist in Stockenstrom. (154) He was, of course, well aware of the danger of aggressions on the part of the emigrants, and took care to take steps as far as possible to check them, and to investigate charges made against the farmers thoroughly. (155) But he never hesitated most forcibly to repudiate false charges. A pertinent example is his comment on the report of Field-Commandant van Wyk in July 1830, on an expedition undertaken against the Bushmen:

(153) See e.g. Stockenstrom to Flasket 18.8.27. C.o. 2695. Stockenstrom, having been unable to get any information about allegations of a farmer having ill-treated a Griqua, puts it down to Waterboer's attempts "to make the Colonists responsible for the consequences of his own madness."

(154) See e.g. Stockenstrom's Remarks on Philip's Return of Missions. 31.12.30. C.o. 373.

(155) Stockenstrom to Flasket 18.8.27 C.o. 2695: "Not that I can maintain that irregularities are not occasionally committed on this open Frontier; - the knowledge of their existence made me anxious to find out the person accused..." ((see (191) supra)). Stockenstrom to Bell. 26.2.29. C.o. 367: "The only effective measure that can be adopted for the present is, that the field-cornets who have migrated with the Inhabitants be directed to order back into the Colony any one molesting the natives in any way, or encroaching on their cultivated lands or pasturage, and upon non-compliance with such order the offender should be left to the native Chiefs to be dealt with according to the laws and customs existing amongst them, in which case the Colonists should understand that Government will not interfere in their behalf."

I trust that the conduct of the Burgers (after one of their number had been killed by the gang of Desperadoes, by whom they found their property most wantonly destroyed, and amongst whom they knew murderers to be) toward those men, women and children who were taken prisoners will make a due impression on His Excellency the Governor as to the disposition of their leader, and will serve to contrast well with those Statements by which the Frontier Boers in general, and van Wyk in particular, have been represented as monsters of cruelty and bloodthirst - whilst it confirms my opinion, so strongly animadverted on, "that occasional examples of severity are indispensable to render the Frontier at all habitable." (156).

If, then, it was possible for Stockenström, as Landdrost and Commissioner-General, on the one hand to be fully aware that irregularities could be and were committed by the colonists, and on the other to defend them as a whole and bear in mind their point of view, the same could surely be the case while he was in England?

He was not afraid to admit his sympathies with the colonists to the Colonial Secretary: in 1834 he wrote: (157)

I know that my views generally... are not popular. I am aware that many friends of humanity and civilization think them not sufficiently liberal and enlightened with reference to the blacks, whilst, on the other hand, some of my countrymen charge me with abandoning the cause of the whites. No man can feel more respect than I do for the principles and objects of the former party, amongst whom I have the pleasure of counting some of my most valuable and intimate acquaintance, however much I may differ with them on particular points of expediency; and birth, education, prejudices and ties of affection warmly attach me to the other, who, though thrown by the course of particular events into unhappy circumstances in regard to some of the lower classes in their midst, constitute, nevertheless, under a sound system of policy and just treatment, in the aggregate, the best disposed and easiest managed people in His Majesty's dominions. But I am not called upon to please either; I have the cause of truth to serve; I am to call "murder, murder," and "plunder, plunder," whatever be the colour of the perpetrator's skin, or the power and influence of the man who countenances the same, in order (by stating facts as they are) to enable you (as you are known to have the wish) to apply such remedies as will render the Cape Colony what it is capable of being made, one of the most prosperous and happy communities on the face of the globe.

(156) See also Stockenström to Bell 19.1.30. C.o. 373; 24.3.30. Auto. I, 373 ff. ; 4.8.30 Ibid. 383 ff. Stockenström to Bell. 13.7.30. C.o. 373. See also Stockenström to Bell 19.1.30. C.o. 373;
 (157) Stockenström to Colonial Secretary. 5.11.34. A.C. minutes. p. 123.

And the documents of his Landdrostship and Commissioner-Generalship surely justify Stockenstrom's saying,
(158)
towards the end of his evidence in 1836:

It has always been and ever will be the most agreeable part of my duty to espouse the cause of the mass of my countrymen, and those individuals amongst them who may be falsely accused. The Colonial Office contains ample proofs of my zeal on that head; but to justify, deny or connive at crimes which some of them commit I considered inconsistent both with my public and private duty, as the judicial records at the Cape can testify. So likewise the protection and civilization of the native tribes are among my most anxious wishes: but I see no philanthropy in encouraging their their murders and plunder by impunity. Consistent with these views, I have tried to do my duty to all parties...

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(158) Q. 2392. A.G. minutes, p. 251. 11.3.36.

(iii) The Reprisal System.

(c) The Reprisal system: Stockenstrom's Statements 1833 - 1835.

Stockenstrom's criticism of the reprisal system - which did not, in fact, occupy a major place in his evidence - has aroused more comment, both favourable and unfavourable, than any other single aspect of that evidence. The dangers which could arise from this system he had already outlined, both before the Committee on
(159) (160)
14 August 1835, and in the memoir of 1833 and the
(161)
letter of 1834.

The system established by Lord Charles Somerset in 1817 allowed a patrol in pursuit of stolen cattle to

Reprisal system

(159) Q. 528. A.C. minutes, p. 44. 14.8.35.
(160) A.C. minutes, p. 100.
(161) A.C. minutes, p. 119.

follow the traces into Kaffirland, as far as the nearest kraal to which they led. There the cattle could be demanded, and, if they were not to be found, an equivalent number could be seized from that kraal. (162) It was based on the idea that the Kaffir Chiefs had a system by which they finally made the loss fall upon the guilty party and forced them to compensate the innocent kraals. But, said Stockenstrom, though "very conscientious men, acquainted with Caffre land" believed this to be the case, it still did not obviate the injustice ultimately done to the Kaffirs. For he pointed out that, when it became necessary to send a commando into Kaffirland, all the colonial cattle found were in any case brought out, so that the colony still obtained a double compensation. And this, he said, would be "too great a bounty on patrols and carelessness." (163)

Stockenstrom's main criticism of Somerset's system was that the prospect of being able to get Kaffir cattle, if one's own were not discovered, not only set a bounty upon carelessness, but provided an irresistible temptation to some people to misrepresent their losses. Carelessness and a tendency to blame all losses upon the Kaffirs, he contended, led to continual taking of Kaffir cattle, and consequently, retaliatory raids by the Kaffirs, which kept the frontier in a constant state of alarm.

Stockenstrom gave instances of the sort of thing that could take place under the reprisal system. (164) Unless a man kept very careful guard over his cattle, so that he could immediately collect a force and pursue the plunderers should a robbery take place, he could very

(162) Q. 528. A.C. minutes, p. 44.

(163) Q. 1058. A.C. minutes, p. 92. 19.3.35.

(164) Q. 969. A.C. minutes, p. 83, for what follows.

seldom find the actual perpetrators again. When once the plunderers were out of sight, the patrol going into Kaffirland was at the mercy of the statements made by the farmers, who might pretend they were on the trace of the stolen cattle, whereas these might be the trace of any cattle. When the patrol approached the first kraal, the Kaffirs, knowing that cattle would be seized, would probably try to hide their cattle, or resist the taking of them. The patrol would collect "the number said to be stolen, or more," and, if there was resistance, which could easily be construed into hostility, it was "almost impossible then to prevent innocent bloodshed." It also often happened that a patrol on the spoor of cattle really stolen would find an individual head of the stolen cattle, either knocked up, or purposely left near a kraal by the real perpetrators. This would be taken as a positive proof of guilt and the same injustice was likely to follow. There had been instances, Stockenstrom added, where farmers had gone into Kaffirland with a patrol, pretending to be on the spoor of stolen cattle, and cattle had been taken from the Kaffirs on the strength of the supposed theft. On returning, the farmer had found his cattle strayed through his own neglect, or in another direction, or eaten by wolves. "And thus," he concluded, "men, not losing cattle at all, but coveting Caffre's cattle, have nothing more to do but to lead the patrol to a kraal and commit the outrages above described."

The Kaffirs, Stockenstrom said, had often said to him: "We do not care how many Caffres you shoot if they come into your country, and you catch them stealing, but for every cow you take from your country you make a thief." Therefore he had laid down that, in the ceded territory, a portion of the armed men on each location should at all

times guard the cattle, and where it was proved that a man had left his cattle unguarded, or not seen them for a whole day, whatever his loss, no hostile measures should be taken against the Kaffirs, and no patrol be allowed to cross the frontier in search of cattle.

The carelessness of the farmers about the proper guarding of their cattle prevailed, according to Stockenstrom, even when commandos were actually assembling as a result of alleged depredations. He had himself been through the country at such times and had to reprimand the Field-cornets and people for their neglect. (165)

Asked whether there were any other measures by which the flocks and property of the colonists could be secured, except by preventive and precautionary measures on the part of the owners, Stockenstrom replied: "I decidedly say that one-tenth part of the cattle that are lost would not be lost if our people were cautious." But circumstances might arise where a man, with all the precautions in the world, might lose his cattle; "though I am sure," he added, "if he is on his guard, he will be immediately able to collect a force so as always to find out the actual perpetrators and his own lost property." (166)

The exact proportion of losses due to negligence seems to have worried Stockenstrom's questioners, and Stockenstrom's final answer certainly worried his critics. The question was as to whether, in nine cases out of ten, losses could have been avoided by precaution on the part of the colonists. And as was quite often the case, it was repeated three times before Stockenstrom answered it directly. He had a habit of answering a question (167)

(165) Q. 970, 971, 976. A.C. minutes, p. 83, 84. 19.8.35.
 (166) Q. 972. Ibid.
 (167) Q. 973, 975, 976. Ibid.

quite perfunctorily and proceeding at once with whatever point he was concerned to make, Finally, pinned down, he said: "I should say the greatest part of it, at least, if not nine times out of ten, which I believe would be no exaggeration."⁽¹⁶⁸⁾

Stockenstrom was then further asked whether he considered that, when an expedition went into Kaffirland for the purpose of recovering cattle when some time had elapsed since the theft, the punishment in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred fell upon the innocent. His reply was actually: "Yes. It is taking great latitude to say 99 cases out of 100, yet I think I may safely say so; at any rate I may say in most cases decidedly."⁽¹⁶⁹⁾

This proportion Stockenstrom had himself mentioned, in the Memoir of 1833. But the context there was Somerset's alleged proposal to shoot the Kaffirs into whose kraals the spoor of cattle led; and, in giving forcible expression to his horror at the very thought of such a procedure and all that it must lead to if adopted, Stockenstrom had said that "In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the slaughter must fall on the innocent."⁽¹⁷⁰⁾

Stockenstrom was further asked whether, the majority of stock being lost by negligence when actually taken, there were often "fraudulent representations" of robberies which had in fact never been perpetrated. To which he replied, "Undoubtedly." These fraudulent representations misled the troops on the frontier, and led to patrols

(168) Q. 976. Ibid. Initially (Q. 972 supra.) Stockenstrom had spoken of "one-tenth." Either his questioner had misunderstood, or perhaps was confused by the phrase in Stockenstrom's letter of 1834 in which he stated that "unless you find the plunderers in the fact, in nine cases out of ten you punish the innocent."
A.C. minutes. p.121.

(169) Q. 978. Ibid.

(170) A.C. minutes. p.101.

on the principle he had depicted, "which patrols decidedly
are the main cause of the misfortunes of the frontier."⁽¹⁷¹⁾

"...while this system of taking their cattle prevails,"
Stockenstrom said, "it is impossible that the Caffres
can remain quiet, and all the measures we may adopt for
the improvement of them will be totally useless, as I
have often said."⁽¹⁷²⁾ It was in vain to attempt to civil-
ize and Christianize, if people had nothing to eat.⁽¹⁷³⁾

He went so far as to say that, if the system of
taking Kaffir cattle continued, the process of annexing
one portion after another of Kaffir territory would also
continue. That had happened as a result of the seizure
of cattle by the 1818 commando, and would happen again,
and continue until the colony reached to Delagoa Bay.⁽¹⁷⁴⁾

The patrolling system could benefit nobody but those
who wished to plunder the Kaffirs of their cattle, and
even those not permanently, since the Kaffirs would be
sure to attempt to seize their cattle again.⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ And the
system of military coercion which it necessitated had been
utterly ineffectual for the object of preserving peace
on the frontier.⁽¹⁷⁶⁾

Stockenstrom maintained that, despite the presence
of the military, there was no tranquility on the frontier.
Depredations continued. And false alarms only too fre-
quently led to unnecessary commandos. As an example he
described the conditions prevailing before the 1831 com-
mando, when he had found the Kaffirs in "the most perfect
state of tranquility." Yet there had been reports

(171) Q. 977, 978. A.C. minutes, p. 84. See also
Q. 2205. p. 238. 1.3.36. "I know the thing constantly
to take place; pretended losses; and that is the mischief."

(172) Q. 1012. A.C. minutes, p. 87.

(173) Q. 1014. Ibid.

(174) Q. 1015. Ibid. Stockenstrom said that he had made
this same representation of the position to Government,
long before the war broke out, and that it would be
found in "both my statements which are before the Commit-
tee." Actually, however, reference to the inevitability
of annexing Kaffirland and a 'regular war of extermination

that the country was in "the utmost state of agitation."
 "Thus had the commandant been deceived by these reports,"
 (177)
 said Stockenstrom. He quoted also the instance of
 Bezuidenhout, a man "of the most degraded character per-
 haps in the whole colony," who had come out of Kaffirland
 with a rumour of a combination of all the chiefs against
 the colony - a rumour which caused much disturbance on the
 frontier, but was subsequently proved quite false. (178)

For all these reasons, Stockenstrom had determined
 to put a stop to the taking of Kaffir cattle upon the
 frontier. In illustration both of his reasons for wish-
 ing his system adhered to, and of the violation of it on
 the frontier during the latter years of his Commissioner-
 Generalship, Stockenstrom quoted the cases of Erasmus,
 (179)
 Scheepers and Dreyer. The two former had already been
 referred to in the Memoir of 1833 and the papers con-
 nected with it. And in the latter case, Stockenstrom
 purposely quoted names "in order that it may be enquired
 into if necessary."

When the affidavits collected by Civil Commissioner
 Campbell in 1836 were found entirely to contradict
 Stockenstrom's version of the Erasmus case, it was in-
 sinuated that he had deliberately used a charge based on
 the flimsiest Kaffir and Hottentot evidence and one

appears only in the Memoir of 1833, with reference to
 Somerset's proposal. (A.C. minutes, p.101).
 (175) Q. 1017. A.C. minutes, p. 88.
 (176) Q. 1041 - 1044. A.C. minutes, pp. 90 - 91.
 (177) Q. 1021. A.C. Minutes, p. 89.
 (178) Q. 1019. Ibid.
 (179) The first two will be discussed in detail later.
 The case of Dreyer (Drier) concerned a man whose cattle
 had continually trespassed on the land of Rensburg,
 (Hansburg) until at last he had refused to look after
 them and they had strayed away. Dreyer some time
 afterwards claimed and got compensation out of Kaffir
 stock; and subsequently was notified by a man living
 living some 30 miles away that his cattle were there.
 But he retained what he got from the Kaffirs, "under the
 plea that his ancestors had also been plundered by
 Caffres."

which he probably knew to be untrue, in order to blacken the reputation of a respectable frontier colonist. Whether such an act can be regarded as in keeping with Stockenstrom's character, the reader may judge hereafter. But in this connection it is, perhaps, relevant to observe that, just prior to his statements in connection with the Erasmus case, Stockenstrom was asked whether he recollected a case in which a son of Enno was murdered by one of the patrolling expeditions. He replied that he did remember Yoyo, a chief known to Major Dundas, who was present, stating to him, in confirmation of what Enno had said, that the patrol came early in the morning in pursuit of cattle and the man, aroused from sleep by the galloping of the horses, was shot just as he was getting out of the hut to see what was going on. To this Stockenstrom had rejoined that it was impossible, it could not have been so. Asked by the Committee whether he had found out, not only that it was possible, but that it was an actual fact, he replied: "not a fact that this Caffre had been shot innocently; I did not find this statement confirmed; I have only the statement of the chiefs Yoyo and Enno." And when it was asked whether he believed it was the fact, Stockenstrom replied again that he had no authority but the Kaffir chiefs, adding that Yoyo was known to Major Dundas to be a superior man and a very trustworthy Kaffir. (180)

Had Stockenstrom indeed been seeking ways and means of making statements derogatory to the character of the colonists, could he not well have used this incident as he was alleged to have used the case of the death of Zeko?

Indeed, it seems very clear that Stockenstrom did not intend his criticism of the abuses to which the

(180) Q. 980 - 982. A.C. minutes, pp. 84 - 85.

reprisal system was subject to apply to the colonists in general. In the first place, it has already been indicated that, throughout this discussion, Stockenstrom had the Ceded Territory specifically in mind. Scheepers and Dreyer, the two other cases mentioned, were both settlers in the Ceded Territory. Moreover, in mentioning these two cases, after stating that one of Gaika's principal points in speaking to Donkin was about the Boors giving too great temptation to his people to plunder the farmers and "revenge earlier wrongs by murder" by going about unarmed and leaving their cattle running wild, Stockenstrom said quite explicitly:

Many farmers, both English settlers and Dutch have ~~have~~ often spoken to me about the injurious tendency of this system; the majority of those farmers wish for nothing but peace and the protection of themselves and their property; but it is impossible in such an extensive community as ours, living in the state as some of our people do, that there should not be among them unprincipled men, who would be glad to avail themselves of every opportunity of enriching themselves at the expense of their weaker neighbours; and it is cruel that a whole community shall suffer for the crimes of these few; nor is it reasonable to suppose, that in a nation of barbarians there should not be numbers addicted to plunder, but then again it is equally cruel to drive a whole nation to desperation for the aggressions of a part. (181)

And he repeated similar views in answer to question 1016, confirming that the system of reprisal was held in reprobation by hundreds of the settlers, because they were the losers by it. In the memoir of 1833, in recounting the events of 1830, he stated that he had been induced to sanction the commando of that year on the representations of the commandant and the "frontier Boors," and that subsequent events had led him to believe the reports of frontier disturbances to have been "utterly groundless." And in this connection he added:

(181) Q. 1004. A.C. minutes. p. 86.

(182) A.C. minutes. p. 101.

Now I beg that it be clearly understood, that in here speaking of Boors, I allude to those who are immediately interested in the reprisal system; the mass of those colonists who understand its effects hold it in abomination.

And he went on to outline the enormous inconvenience of frontier alarms to the colonists more to the interior, who could derive no possible advantage from them, and were often, on the contrary, called from their homes and business, for months at a time, at great expense, to serve on commando, without a chance of remuneration.

There is, furthermore, no attempt to idealize the Kaffir character - something which the philanthropists were very prone to do. Stockenstrom certainly denied that the Kaffirs were "a nation of thieves" and said he believed there were civilized nations in which the proportion of thieves was greater. ⁽¹⁸³⁾ But, in correcting the use of the word "Savages" in connection with them - on the grounds that they were an agricultural and pastoral people, - he said: "it is a mistake to call them savages, as much as to call them gentle and inoffensive, they are just as people in their circumstances can be expected to be." ⁽¹⁸⁴⁾ Elsewhere, in answer to Question 1391, he expressed a similar opinion. And in the Memoir of 1833, he made reference to "the excesses of which savages and barbarians are capable." ⁽¹⁸⁵⁾

The absolute necessity for protecting the colonists against these "excesses" was the first principle which Stockenstrom expounded in the 1833 Memoir. Any "gang of robbers, murderers and marauders" should be rooted out at once before the evil spread beyond control. He repeated ⁽¹⁸⁶⁾ the same opinion forcibly in his letter of 1834.

(183) Q. 1046, 1047. A.C. minutes, p. 91.

(184) Q. 1045. A.G. minutes, p. 91.

(185) A.C. minutes, p. 100.

(186) A.C. minutes, p. 120, 121.

And it recurs constantly in the evidence. In answer to question 1051, for instance, he said:

...very conscientious men have often criticized my system as too bloody; but I felt that I had also to protect the colonists against murderers and plunderers, and could not sacrifice those to conciliate my accusers. (187)

That Stockenstrom did not regard the war of 1834 - 35 as a treacherous and unprovoked invasion is clear. When (188) he was asked directly whether it had been a matter of surprise to him that the Kaffirs should have invaded British territory and "a system of war" have ensued, he replied that, if the Committee would read with attention his statement given in to the Secretary of State, they would see that "(though I admit I did not expect it to be so extensive and bloody so soon,) I expected most serious calamities to result from the plan which we were then adopting." This was, of course, the system of allowing the colonists to take Kaffir cattle by way of reprisal, in which, according to Stockenstrom, the Cape authorities were persisting, despite all his advice and instructions to the contrary. It seems from this that Stockenstrom considered that the fault lay with the authorities. Nevertheless, he insisted on the necessity for protecting the colonists and punishing marauders. The question was simply, what measures should be adopted to achieve that end.

Stockenstrom drew a distinction between "commandos" and "reprisal patrols." In all the evidence which has been under discussion, his criticism was levelled at the system which allowed every small patrol in search of cattle to indemnify itself at the first kraal by taking Kaffir cattle. On the other hand, he maintained that it was

(187) A.C. minutes, p. 91. See also e.g. Q. 1052; 1086; 1411; 2149; 2200; 2264; 2371 - 2372;

(188) Q. 1096 - 1097. A.C. minutes, p. 98. 21.8.35.

essential to punish, and protect the colonists against, any gang of marauders which persisted in depredations. For that purpose he believed commandos to be legitimate and necessary, though regrettable. And on such commandos, sanctioned by government, he conceded that, under the supervision of the proper authorities and by arrangement with the chiefs, Kaffir cattle might be taken to indemnify the colonists for their losses. ⁽¹⁸⁹⁾ "... that," he said, " is as different as possible from any man pretending to have lost cattle going in and taking Gaffre cattle. The one is necessary and legitimate protection, granted by government to the people under its protection; the other is making every man judge and avenger in his own cause; and, " Stockenstrom added, "the latter was continued long after the understanding between the Governor and the Gaffres, which I considered as binding... we violated them, and in consequence of that going on I saw no possibility of preventing the evils which appeared likely to follow." ⁽¹⁹⁰⁾ This seems to make it plain that it was the reprisal system, and not the commando system, to which Stockenstrom objected.

On the other hand, it can be argued, as Prof. J.L.M. Francken very ably does, ⁽¹⁹¹⁾ that, while Stockenstrom drew a distinction between commandos and reprisal patrols, and evidently approved the former, under certain conditions, while condemning the latter, there are statements in his evidence which definitely carry the implication that he condemned commandos in general. In support of his contention, Prof. Francken cites several statements, which he is undoubtedly correct in understanding as applicable

(189) Q. 2147 - 2149. A.C. Minutes pp. 233-234. 1.3.36.

(190) Q. 2149. Ibid.

(191) Francken: Piet Retief se lewe in die Kolonie.
pp. 370 - 371.

to commandos and not reprisal patrols, or reprisal
 (192) patrols only. And on the strength of these statements,
 he draws the conclusion that, in fact, Stockenstrom
 virtually condemned all commandos on the Eastern Frontier.

The issue is further confused by some evidence in
 1836, which Prof. Francken does not discuss. In answer
 (193) to Q. 2371, Stockenstrom agreed that the use of the
 "commando force" for the purpose of repelling attack or
 pursuing banditti had been forced on the colonial govern-
 ment as a measure of necessity. He further expressed
 (194) the opinion that, if from the earlier stages of the
 colony a system of settlements on the lines of Kat River
 had been established, and it had been notorious to the
 natives that the British government wished to follow
 towards them a policy of moderation, humanity and justice,
 the use of "commandos" might have been obviated; but he
 did not think that, after the colony had reached the
 stage it had about one hundred years after the founding

(192) The passages he refers to are:

(a) Letter to Spring-Rice 5.11.34. A.C. minutes, p. 121:
 "it ((i.e. a commando to seize cattle sent out some
 time after a raid.)) is the easiest and most lucrative
 mode of retaliation, yet at the same time the most
 demoralizing."

(b) Memoir of 1833. A.C. minutes, p. 101:

"...they ((the farmers)) know that when the Caffers are
 driven to desperation, and a war ensues, they may be
 called from their homes and business, at an enormous
 expense, for months, without a chance of remuneration.
 In fact, false alarms, in which the Cape Frontier is so
 prolific, are advantageous to none but those who covet
 the possession of Caffre cattle, or expect more benefit
 from military coercion and the increase of the forces
 than from conciliation and justice."

(c) Memoir of 1833. A.C. minutes, p. 102:

"Our system of military coercion has now been tried for
 a length of years without having brought about one single
 beneficial result; for even, according to the views of
 the military commandant...the frontier is in a much less
 tranquil state than before any troops were stationed
 near it; and though the reprisal system has been in
 operation ever since 1817, robberies are said to be as
 numerous as ever..."

(193) A.C. minutes, p. 248. 4.3.36.

(194) Q. 2372. A.C. minutes, p. 249. 4.3.36.

the people could have remained on the remote frontiers without occasionally resorting to "commandos" for the purpose of recovering lost property and repelling marauders.

(195)

He agreed that the abuse of the "commando system", where such had occurred, might generally speaking be attributed to the command of a force, composed of those whose habitations had been destroyed, cattle driven away and families slaughtered, being entrusted on all occasions of sudden irruption or depredation to all inferior magistrates indiscriminately - i.e. field-cornets and provisional field cornets.

(196)

And finally, he was asked whether it was not then desirable, in order to avoid the 'almost necessary consequence' of exposing the natives to 'the revenge of men exasperated by outrage,' that the means of "defence by commando" should be resorted to as seldom as possible, and, when absolutely necessary, should be entrusted only to "superior magistrates, selected for that special purpose." Stockenstrom agreed decidedly, "where the possibility exists." And he added: "that is one of the principal reasons for my suggesting that whenever cattle must be retaken, it should be done on the part of government, under the command of a proper trustworthy officer, and not by every patrol that goes into Caffreland."

This can scarcely be said to clarify the position at all. Questions 2371 and 2372 appear to have reference to conditions prevailing on the Northern borders. Question 2373 may refer to either the Northern or the Eastern frontier. And in Question 2377 (all in the same sequence - the intervening questions referred only to particulars about the status and type of field-cornets) Stockenstrom

(195) Q. 2373. A.C. minutes, p. 249.

(196) Q. 2377. A.C. minutes, p. 249.

is contemplating the Eastern frontier and the Kaffir borders.

The answer to Q 2377, of course, confirms the view that it was patrols, and not commandos to which Stockenstrom on the whole objected. Taken in juxtaposition to what precedes, however, this tends to leave one with the impression that, in general, Stockenstrom preferred commandos under government authority to the use of the burgher force - which, if applied to the Northern frontier, was not the case.

Part of the difficulty is, of course, the very loose way in which the terms commando, patrol, commando system and reprisal system were used. It is quite possible that, in the evidence, Stockenstrom and his questioners were sometimes using the same words for different conceptions, with the consequent lack of consistency. It would be advisable, perhaps, to attempt a statement of Stockenstrom's position, based not only upon his statements in evidence and in the documents of 1833 and 1834, but upon his practice as Landdrost and Commissioner-General, in order to clear the matter up.

On the extensive Bushman frontier, where there was no military force available, the only means of defence was the "commando force" - that is to say, the burgher force under its field-cornets. This force could act as a group undertaking a large-scale punitive commando against the Bushmen, or in small patrols engaged in dealing with individual depredations "on the spoor." In either case, the system of using the burgher force became known as the "commando system." In view of the vast extent of the Northern frontier, Stockenstrom accepted the "commando system" as inevitable if depredations were

to be checked, although he was aware of the danger that the field-cornets and burghers, being themselves the aggrieved parties, might abuse their power. But a large scale "burgher commando," sent out against the scattered bands of Bushmen by government authority probably some time after a series of depredations had been committed, had practically no means at all of knowing which Bushmen had committed the depredations. - for Bushmen usually consumed the stock they captured as rapidly as they could. A massacre of large numbers of innocent Bushmen, especially under the leadership of an unscrupulous or cruel field-cornet would thus be inevitable. Therefore here Stockenstrom infinitely preferred the burgher force to act in patrols under field-cornets, going out in immediate pursuit of depredators, so as to catch them in the act and punish only the guilty. This was the chief reason for his opposition to Bourke's system on the Northern frontier.

On the Eastern frontier, Stockenstrom was equally insistent on the necessity for immediate pursuit of robbers, in order to establish beyond doubt which was the guilty party. Therefore here, too, he approved of having an efficient and armed burgher force, carefully guarding its property and ready to pursue and check robbers at once. But on the Eastern frontier, to the dangers already inherent in the system of putting power into the hands of field-cornets and burghers who might be actuated by motives of revenge was added the fact that the Kaffirs themselves possessed cattle. A burgher patrol, consisting of aggrieved and plundered frontiersmen, had the right, under Somerset's "patrol and reprisal system," to indemnify itself by seizing cattle from the first kraal to which

the spoor led, if the stolen cattle were not discovered there. This fact could and did, in Stockenstrom's experience, prove too great a temptation for some frontiersmen to resist. The fact that burgher parties in the area where there were military posts had to act in conjunction with a disciplined military patrol considerably lessened the first danger inherent in the patrol system, but did not lessen the second, for frontiersmen could still deliberately make mis-statements of losses to the officers, or be mistaken in thinking their cattle stolen. To this "patrol and reprisal system," therefore, Stockenstrom was firmly opposed. However, provided that the burghers knew there was no possibility of their being able to seize any Kaffir cattle, such a burgher "patrol system" for pursuit of robbers on the spoor was permissible, as the best way of checking robbers in the act. For going into the Kaffir kraals, however, Stockenstrom preferred a disciplined military patrol to a burgher patrol. Stockenstrom realized the possibility that a chief and his whole kraal might become guilty of habitual depredations. Such a community was a danger to all parties, and should be severely punished and made to indemnify the colonists for their losses by having its own cattle seized. The punishment of such a group, Stockenstrom maintained, was then legitimate protection of the colonists, and a "commando" should be sent out to punish the kraal or kraals. Under the supervision of government authorities, after the chief had been made aware upon what grounds his people were to be punished, Kaffir cattle could be seized and distributed to the colonists. Such a "commando" consisted of the military force, and the burgher force acting in conjunction with it and under the orders of its officers. But even in the case of such

a commando, the prospect of being indemnified from Kaffir stock might prove a temptation to some frontier farmers to raise false alarms. Stockenstrom maintained that some of the frontiersmen were all too ready to spread frontier alarms and attempt to create the impression that a commando was necessary. More often than not, increased depredations were the crime of individual stragglers amongst the Kaffirs, and were encouraged by the carelessness of the farmers. For false alarms, or the depredations of individuals, Stockenstrom insisted, it was criminal to send a commando to punish a whole community. For this reason, rather than because of actual abuses which took place on such commandos, he was extremely cautious about sanctioning a commando on the Eastern frontier, even one run on lines of which he could approve. And he pointed out the expense, danger and inconvenience to the burghers as a whole, who were called out upon commando. Only extreme necessity could therefore justify the calling out of a commando on the Eastern frontier. For a commando not so justified was simply, to the few abandoned frontiersmen who hoped to derive benefit from it, an easy, lucrative, but most demoralizing form of retaliation, and to the mass of well-disposed farmers, a source of danger and annoyance.

If this be taken as the pattern of Stockenstrom's attitude towards commandos and patrols, the various statements which he made on the subject will be found to fit quite consistently into their places.

When, therefore, Stockenstrom told the Committee that Englishmen "very often" served on commando, and that the English settlers of Albany were liable to be called upon as well as the Dutch Boors, and often were, he was surely implying no slight upon the men of Albany.

It is quite obvious that Stockenstrom's evidence of 19th August 1835 applied to the reprisal system or patrol system. But he did not draw the distinction in so many words until he gave his answers on 1 March 1836.

Godlonton appears to have been confused in his mind when he read Stockenstrom's answers to questions 1092 - 1094, and to have thought that 'commando' and 'patrol and reprisal' system were the same thing. Hence, presumably, his wrath on the subject of this point in the evidence. (197)

The same confusion appears to have prevailed in the minds of J.C. Chase and Cory, whose sympathies were with the Albany settlers in these 'charges' brought against them. For Cory quotes the attitude of Grahamstown towards the Lieutenant-Governor on his arrival, and makes no comment on this matter. (198) And Chase, in a footnote to his discussion of the Albany address, (199) says that "the settlers were expressly exempted from serving on commandos." This, in fact, is incorrect. The patrol system as used in Graaff-Reinet, which was not in question here - definitely did not apply in the Albany district, where the military had been used for that purpose since 1813, though it did in the Ceded Territory. But the settlers were "expressly exempted from serving on commandos" only for the first three years after their respective arrivals. (201)

In saying that English settlers were "very often" called upon to serve on commando, Stockenstrom was very possibly giving the information in good faith. He had never been directly connected with the Albany district.

(197) See Chap I.

(198) Cory: Rise of South Africa. III, 288, 341 - 342.

(199) See History of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, p.338.

(200) Evidence of Shaw. Q. 739. A.C. minutes, p. 64.

(201) Bird to Pringle. 19.10.21. Theal: Records: XIV, 144. See also ref. to Somerset's Albany Levy in Report of Commissioners of Inquiry to Bathurst on address of Principal Settlers in the Albany District. 25.5.25. Theal: Records: XXI, 322 - 324.

But, as leader of the burgher forces, he would have been aware that there were often Englishmen among them, and probably assumed that they had been levied in the same way as the Dutch farmers. In fact, though the Albany settlers were liable to commando service, before 1835 they were apparently officially levied only for the commando sent out by the government in 1828 to protect Kaffirs on the borders from the Fetcani marauders. (202)

But it seems that English settlers were often in the habit, contrary to the general custom, of joining commandos sent out for defence - hence, probably, Stockenström's answer. (203)

This, then, is the evidence, the whole tenor of which, Stockenström's opponents asserted, was absolutely foreign to anything that might have been expected from the man as the colony knew him. Even if this were the case, one is, frankly, almost at a loss to know why the evidence should have been regarded as so heinous. Nevertheless, it was claimed, so contradictory to all that Stockenström had previously said and done were these statements, that the explanation could only be that he had suddenly, and for his own ends, decided to desert the cause of his fellow-colonists and cleave to that of Exeter Hall. Godlonton turned chiefly to extracts from Stockenström's papers as landdrost for

(202) Boyce: Introduction, p. viii.

(203) See evidence of Major Dundas. Q. 1244. A.C. minutes p. 140. "They never formed any part of the commandoes that entered their country, never: those commandoes when made were always composed of the Dutch and the military, and when the Caffres were attacked, it is very true a considerable number of Englishmen, young enterprising men, did break through the custom that is general there, ((i.e. it was from custom, not law)) of not joining the commandoes, and went to assist in their defence; the English settlers were not generally capable of entering upon the duties of commando - they were not armed, they had but few horses; ..."

proof of his assertions. But a study of Stockenström's papers as Landdrost and as Commissioner-General, together with his evidence in 1835, reveals that certain fundamental principles underlay his policy and views throughout these years. His attitude towards the frontier reprisal system does seem to have changed in 1829. But the change was a natural result of his practical experience of Eastern frontier conditions as contrasted with those to which he had been accustomed on the Northern frontier. And he cannot be said in this connection materially to have contradicted his previous statements.

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(iv) Stockenström's Plans for the Frontier:
Before and After 1835.

Having become fully aware of what he regarded as inherent weaknesses in the whole frontier policy, Stockenström as Commissioner-General developed a system designed to obviate the abuses which he believed to be the barrier to frontier tranquillity. His plan was based upon the knowledge of frontier affairs which his long experience as Landdrost gave him, worked out as an answer to the practical problems which confronted him after the expulsion of Macomo in 1829, and crystallized in the Suggestions of the Commissioner-General in September 1829.

The corollary to Stockenström's critical attitude towards the patrol and reprisal system as practised on the Kaffir frontier was a new sympathy with the point of view of the native chiefs. He had long realized, of course, that Kaffir society, unlike Bushman society, was

so constituted that the chiefs could be held responsible
for the acts of individual members of their tribes. (204)

But of the extent to which the active co-operation of the chiefs in the prevention of depredations might be enlisted he only became aware during the months he spent on the frontier after the expulsion of Makomo. The personal interviews with the various native chiefs, convinced him of their desire to remain on peaceable terms with the colony, and of the sincerity of their promises to co-operate in discovering plunderers. (205)

Stockenstrom found that the chiefs expressed themselves willing, and even eager, to see convicted plunderers severely punished under colonial law, in order to prevent their returning to cause havoc among their own people or bring further displeasure on the part of the colonial government upon their tribes. With Stockenstrom, apparently, the chiefs deplored a "mistaken lenity." (206).

Writing to Cole on 11 September 1829, Stockenstrom summarized the position on the frontier in familiar terms. (207) Depredations, from which the frontier had never been entirely free, had admittedly increased, he said. The cause of this was the recent drought, which had pressed equally hard upon colonists and Kaffirs, and had driven many of the latter to desperation. Their inroads were rendered successful "principally by the carelessness of

(204) His acting as interpreter at the interviews of both Somerset and Dänkin with the Kaffir chiefs would have suggested this, of course. See also Stockenstrom to Commissioners of Inquiry, 9.8.26. Auto. I, 231; and Stockenstrom to Flasket 7.4.27, C.o. 2694, where the above is quoted: "The Caffers may be called a nation; so much of social order exists amongst them; so much authority and subordination that the Community Can be held responsible for the acts of its members, - 'satisfaction' can therefore be demanded from the chiefs and in case of refusal war can be made upon the nation justly." He goes on to contrast Bushman society.

(205) Stockenstrom to Bell, 26.6.29, C.o. 367; and to Cole, 11.9.29, C.o. 367.

(206) Stockenstrom to Cole, 11.9.29. C.o. 367.

(207) Ibid.

the Farmers and their herds." And characteristically, Stockenstrom made no attempt to idealize the attitude of the chiefs.

Some of the chiefs, he admitted, did participate in the booty when they could do so without fear of detection, but dared not openly countenance acts of aggression, and knew it to be their interest, and were therefore anxious to keep on good terms with the colony. (208)

This attitude on the part of the chiefs, and their expressed readiness to assist in delivering up plunderers, Stockenstrom urged, should be encouraged. Plunderers captured in the colony should be strictly dealt with. (209)

On the other hand, Stockenstrom was very strongly opposed to the drastic measure of a general commando against any of the tribes. He had foreseen the continuance of petty depredations even after the expulsion of Macomo. (210) But he insisted repeatedly that, in the absence of any evidence of concerted action or open connivance at depredation on the part of the chiefs, these were not of a nature to justify a commando. Always wary of frontier alarms, Stockenstrom was now more sceptical than ever. (211) Indeed, despite repeated representations from Somerset and the Civil Commissioner of Albany on the need for drastic action, Stockenstrom only once sanctioned a commando into Kaffirland. This was the notorious commando of June 1830, which he permitted only after long hesitation, and then chiefly

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- (208) See also Stockenstrom to Côme, 26.6.29, C.o. 367. "the present Disposition of our barbarous neighbours... is only the result of fear and necessity," but they would soon realize that it was to their advantage to maintain friendly relations with the colony.
- (209) See Stockenstrom to Bell, 26.6.29, C.o. 367; and later, Stockenstrom to Bell, 11.1.30. C.o. 373.
- (210) See concluding paragraph of Stockenstrom to Cole, 6.2.29.
- (211) Stockenstrom to Cole. 5.9.29. C.o. 367; 11.9.29. C.o. 367.

because Somerset reported the chiefs as having displayed
 a defiant attitude. (212) In the periods of alarm in 1829,
 early 1830, and 1831, he refused to allow commandos, (213)
 and the commando of July 1831 acted without his sanction. (214)

Stockenstrom placed his full reliance for the event-
 ual tranquility of the frontier upon the plan of a close
 settlement of the Ceded Territory, the prevention of
 reprisals of Kaffir cattle and a careful check on the
 proceedings of all patrols. (215) When he left the outlying
 frontier in June 1829, he was optimistic about the future.
 The system he had imposed seemed to be having its effect
 upon the farmers. The Kat River Settlement was well
 under weigh. And as soon as the military posts were
 established and the territory settled, he was confident
 that a very small force would keep the country perfectly
 quiet, and the way would be open for friendly commercial
 relations with the Kaffirs. (216) Owing to the difficulty
 of moving the troops during the winter, Stockenstrom's
 plans were delayed, which accounted for the period of
 alarm in the middle of 1829. But he insisted on a policy
 of marking time, and constant vigilance against depred-
 ations without resorting to a commando, until the spring,
 when the settlement of the territory could be completed. (217)

Stockenstrom's original plan was on no account to
 allow the Kaffirs to enter and settle in the Ceded
 Territory; and to prevent this by means of military
 posts and a close settlement of Hottentots and Europeans. (218)
 But during his talks with the chiefs and captains -
 Enno, Botman, Tyali, Tishle and Machoane - in September

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- (212) Stockenstrom to Bell, 17.5.30. A.C. minutes, p.107.
 (213) Stockenstrom to Bell 5.9.29. C.o. 367 and 11.9.29.
 C.o. 367; Stockenstrom to Bell 12.5.30. A.C. minutes,
 p. 105.
 (214) Stockenstrom to Bell, 14.7.31. A.C. minutes, p.110.
 (215) Vide supra. pp. 114 ff.
 (216) Stockenstrom to Bell. 26.6.29. C.o. 367.
 (217) Stockenstrom to Cole. 5.9.29. C.o. 367.
 (218) Stockenstrom to Bell. 22.11.28. -C.o. 336
 Stockenstrom to Cole. 6.2.29. C.o. 367.

1829, they pleaded to be allowed to remain where they were, pointing out that there was neither room nor food for them beyond the Keiskamma, and that all their people must perforce become plunderers, if they were driven back. The chiefs suggested that, if they were allowed to remain under the protection of the colonial arms, they could act as auxiliaries in checking inroads and intercepting plunderers. "If this plan could be brought to bear," wrote Stockenstrom, "the advantages are obvious and the very precarious alternative of expulsion would be avoided." (219)

Accordingly, in his Suggestions, on 28 September 1829, (220) Stockenstrom pointed out the inexpediency of driving beyond the frontier those kraals which still occupied a part of the Ceded Territory. The territory from which Macomo had been expelled was on no account to be reoccupied by Kaffirs, and Stockenstrom recommended the extension of the Hottentot locations right up to the highest sources of the Kat. This was consistent with the view he had always held of the danger of allowing Kaffir settlements in this area. (221) He considered that the other groups within the Ceded Territory might be liberally dealt with. But on one point Stockenstrom was very firm: no part of the Territory was to be entirely ceded to any party of Kaffirs whatever. The Kaffirs were to be made to understand very clearly that any occupation of the Ceded Territory by any party of Kaffirs could only be tolerated as long as their conduct justified such indulgence. The title of the Colonial Government to the Territory must remain undisputed, he insisted, nor should any other boundary between the Colony and Kaffirland, except that agreed on in 1819 and

(219) Stockenstrom to Cole. 11.9.29. C.o. 367.

(220) Suggestions of the Commissioner-General 28.9.29. A.C. minutes, p. 211 ff.

(221) Vide supra pp. 114 ff. for discussion of Stockenstrom to Bird. 21.11.23. C.o. 2649.

1820, be acknowledged.

On that basis, and on that basis alone, Fato, Kama and Conga might be allowed to remain in their part of the Ceded Territory, as a reward for the way in which they had co-operated in checking depredations. Enno, Botman and the Kaffirs on the Markazana might be allowed to remain in their locations as a favour. But they should be made to understand that the complaints of depredations committed by them, and the suspicion that the chiefs had connived at these, would have justified their immediate expulsion. It was only lack of sufficient proof of the chiefs' connivance, and their recent exertions to recover stolen cattle, that disposed the government to try lenient measures. All the Kaffirs who were allowed to settle in the Ceded Territory were to be subject to certain definite restrictions and conditions.

These are significant. The chiefs in the Ceded Territory were to be expected to give every assistance to parties in pursuit of stolen cattle, whose spoor was traced through their kraals. If they discovered parties of plunderers passing through their territories, they were bound to deliver them up, with the plundered goods, to the nearest military post, accompanied by the necessary witnesses. Likewise, if native witnesses were required by the authorities for the proof of the guilt of plunderers, the chiefs were to enforce their appearance. Plunderers thus convicted should be sentenced to hard labour for long periods. (Stockenström suggested that they could be usefully employed on the roads.) Criminals of a different nature, such as murderers, incendiaries, or housebreakers, were to be delivered up and convicted in the same manner. And if any Kaffir kraal were in

any way disturbed or threatened in consequence of its assisting to check depredations, it should be protected by government. Parties from the colony, under an authorized officer in search of stolen cattle, were to be allowed free access to the kraals, and might use violence if they were in any way obstructed. But on no account were Kaffir cattle to be given or taken in lieu of the cattle stolen. Should Kaffir cattle be taken, contrary to orders, or any other aggressions be committed by these parties, complaint could be made to the nearest post, whence it should be forwarded to the proper quarter, so that satisfaction might be made. The chiefs were clearly to understand that, should they be found in any way to assist in depredations, or to obstruct parties searching for stolen cattle, or so far to have lost influence with their people as to be unable to check their depredations, they and their people would immediately be expelled from the Ceded Territory.

The boundaries of the territory which each group was to be allowed to occupy were to be clearly defined and pointed out. And no Kaffirs were to be allowed to cross the boundaries except with special permission. Those who received permission to cross their boundary were to go on the direct high road straight to their specified destination or to wherever they were employed in service according to law. Any Kaffir found in the Colony under any other circumstances than these would automatically be considered as an enemy, and arrested as a vagrant or fired upon if he did not surrender. And any Kaffir attempting to plunder or commit any other violence would be shot.

It is important to notice that Stockenström distinguished between the Chiefs in the Ceded Territory and those in Kaffirland. The latter, he said, should also have it explained to them that plunderers would invariably be followed, and that they would be expected to assist in tracing them in the same manner as was required from the chiefs within the Ceded Territory. If they did not do so, they would be regarded as encouraging the depredations and would accordingly be treated as enemies. A commando would be sent against them, their cattle taken in order to indemnify the sufferers in the colony, and every resistance punished with severity.

Stockenström went on to suggest complementary regulations for the colonists on locations in the Ceded Territory. Wherever the country would allow, it should be divided up into small portions of two to three morgen each. Applicants should be granted land at the rate of one such plot for each man capable of bearing arms, whom the applicant would have to undertake to keep permanently and well armed upon the land. For every 750 morgen of grazing land granted, there should also be one armed man. Stockenström also recommended the establishment of a village on the Kat River, with a minister and magistrate; and similar villages near the military posts and in other suitable localities in order to obtain the desired object of a dense settlement in the vicinity of the Kaffirs. The armed men were to be prepared to turn out as a burgher commando or patrol, or to co-operate with the military force, and the grants of land were to be revocable in case of non-compliance. The necessary burgher officers were to be appointed, and they were to see that the burgher force was kept effective. Parties entering Kaffirland were to be conducted

under their directions, according to regulations to be framed by the Commissioner-General, except when the burgher force acted under a military officer. Only in cases of actual and sudden invasion, could the commandant or any military officer call out the armed burghers.

Normally, they were to be requisitioned by the commissioner-General, or Civil Commissioner, or their own officers.

No cattle taken from the Kaffirs were to be returned to the claimant until the officer commanding the party had satisfied himself, by questioning the herds, other servants or witnesses, that those were the cattle actually lost. All cases of dispute or doubt were to be referred to the Civil Commissioner. And Kaffir cattle were under no circumstances to be taken except where special orders had been given. Individuals on the spoor of lost cattle could apply to the chiefs, but were not permitted to use any violence or threats. And any cattle recovered by an individual would first have to be delivered to his Field-cornet to whose satisfaction he would have to prove ownership.

Stockenstrom was as anxious to prevent undesirable characters from entering the native territories from the Colony as he was to check vagrants in the Colony. His suspicions of private traders who went into native territories were of long standing, and as Commissioner-General he still recommended that trade with the natives should take place only at regular fairs. But he recommended that these should be held frequently, in order to encourage commerce between the Colony and the native tribes.
(222)

In short, whatever his original plan for the Ceded Territory may have been, by the end of 1829 Stockenstrom

envisaged a policy which, by capitalizing the eagerness of the chiefs within the Ceded Territory to maintain friendly relations with the Colonial Government and retain their land, would enlist their co-operation in the defence of the frontier. The dense population, he considered essential for the Ceded Territory, was to consist of Colonists - Hottentot and European - on the one hand, and Kaffirs on the other, each group with its own clearly defined areas of settlement. For each group the Colonial Government reserved the right to lay down specific regulations, and to expel from the territory those who infringed the regulations. In the case of the Colonists, individuals would be expelled for non-compliance. In the case of the Kaffirs, the chiefs were to be held responsible for the community, ^{in that} ~~and~~ connivance at the infringement of the regulations on their part would lead to the expulsion of the whole community. The punishment of all individual offenders was in the hands of the Colonial Government. And, although the authority of the Kaffir chiefs in their own areas was recognized, all inhabitants of the Ceded Territory were bound to recognize the undisputed right of the Colonial Government to the whole area right up to the boundary of 1819.

To this last point Stockenstrom adhered very firmly. At the end of 1832, the chiefs Pato, Kama and Conga applied for permission to purchase the country between the Fish and Keiskamma rivers, on the strength of an understanding between Lord Charles Somerset and themselves. Of this Stockenstrom evidently was unaware. He advised the Governor that the claims of the chiefs would have to be carefully investigated. If it could be shown that the claim was valid, and that the chiefs had adhered to their part of the agreement, the redemption

of the pledge of the Colonial Government he considered unavoidable. But even then, he gave it as his decided opinion that no part of the Ceded Territory ought to be incorporated with Kaffirland or "entirely ceded to any party of Caffers as Caffers." If the cession had to take place, "the Caffers must be made amenable to our laws under certain modifications," as he had formerly
(223)
recommended.

Since the question of any further incorporation of Kaffir tribes beyond the 1819 boundary did not arise at all at this time, Stockenström of course made no reference to it. But it seems clear that he regarded the tribes beyond the Keiskamma as distinct from those incorporated in the Ceded Territory and as quite independent. There is no indication that he ever contemplated incorporating them.

The degree to which he was prepared to acknowledge the independence and sovereignty of the chiefs beyond the Colonial boundaries is suggested by Stockenström's policy towards the Griquas. While he acknowledged that, strictly speaking, the Griquas had no more right than the European colonists to the Bushman country North of the border, he believed that, where they did settle and establish themselves, they should be left undisturbed. It was, he considered, the best means of preventing their being a vagabond neighbour, dangerous to colonists
(224)
and Bushmen alike. And Stockenström accordingly warned the emigrant farmers that any one molesting the Griquas or encroaching on their cultivated lands would be ordered back into the colony by the Field-cornets. In the event

(223) Stockenström to Bell. 7.12.32. C.o. 402.

(224) Remarks of the Commissioner-General on Philip's Return of Missions. 31. 12. 30. C. O. 373

of non-compliance the offender should "be left to the native Chiefs to be dealt with according to the laws and customs existing amongst them," and the Government would not interfere on his behalf. (225)

The Northern frontier presented a complex problem. Stockenström, as has been pointed out, realized that necessity drove the farmers periodically to migrate across the borders, and he accepted the migrations as practically inevitable. But he was fully aware of the danger that the frontiersmen, removed from the restraints of law and government, might again be guilty of aggressions against the Bushmen. And it lay heavily on his conscience that the Northward movement was a movement into Bushman country. Stockenström envisaged a two-fold solution. The Bushmen should have tracts of land reserved for them and should be provided with stock and encouraged to settle to a pastoral and agricultural mode of life. (226) Missionaries should work amongst them, first to improve their standard of living, and then to introduce Christian principles into their society. And the co-operation of both Colonists and Griquas should be enlisted to protect them. Stockenström's attempt, in 1827, to put such a plan into practice was a conspicuous failure. The fault, however, lay, apparently, with neither Bushmen nor Colonists, but with the Griquas and Corannas who plundered and robbed the unfortunate

(225) Stockenström to Bell. 26.2.29. C.o. 367.

(226) In his discussion of Stockenström's Commissioner-Generalship, J.D. Pitman says: "Stockenström was alive to the land problem...Did he realize that native lands could be protected only by gradual 'incorporation' of the Bantu in the Colony and the setting aside of reserves within the boundaries? This is a question which I cannot solve." But, if Stockenström's policy towards the otherwise landless natives he allowed to settle in the Ceded Territory be considered in conjunction with the Bushman policy, it seems that he did realize this point - although he would not have extended it to include all the Bantu lands. Pitman p. III.

Bushmen without mercy, until Stockenstrom was forced to acknowledge that at that time he had been far too optimistic. The Government, he said in 1830, would have to take more decisive steps than before to protect the Bushmen against attack; but Philip's suggestion of taking the Griquas under colonial protection, unless by this incorporation were implied, would only create
(227)
confusion.

Stockenstrom's plan for the colonists was never put to the test, for it was at no time acceptable to the government. He would have allowed the migration of the farmers towards the North as inevitable, and have obviated its possible evil consequences by a scheme of "systematic colonization" under government supervision. But he realized that the British Government's rigid opposition to all extension of the colony made his
(228)
plan an unattainable dream. He was forced to fall back on the compromise of allowing periodic migration only in circumstances of absolute necessity, and attempting to force the farmers to return as soon as conditions
(229)
were again favourable.

Stockenstrom continued to dream of the fulfilment of his plans for the peace and security of the frontiers of the Colony long after he had relinquished the Commissioner-Generalship. It was with eagerness, and with evident care, despite the absence of any documents for reference, that he prepared his answers to the Questionnaire which
(230)
Spring-Rice sent him in September 1834. His review of the origin and nature of the existing evils of the

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- (227) Stockenstrom to Commissioners of Inquiry. 9.8.26. Auto. I, p. 231. Stockenstrom to Plasket, 14.5.27; 23.5.27; 11.8.27. C.o. 2695.
Remarks of the Commissioner-General, 31.12.30. C.o. 373.
(228) Memorandum of Stockenstrom on Periodical Migrations, 30.11.30. C.o. 373.
(229) Stockenstrom to Bell. 26.2.29. C.o. 367.
(230) Forwarded 18.9.34. Printed in A.C. minutes, p. 123.

Cape frontier system corresponds, in its main features, to what he said in evidence in 1835, and has already been discussed. ⁽²³¹⁾ The remedies he went on to suggest represent an amplification of the schemes which had occurred to him in the course of his attempts to find a practical solution to the problems which confronted him as Commissioner-General ⁽²³²⁾ - some of them schemes which, as an official bound to observe the Government's policy, he could not recommend before.

Stockenstrom said that he certainly considered it practicable to establish "amicable arrangements" with the Kaffir, Griqua and Coranna chiefs. ⁽²³³⁾ These three groups he regarded as neither "savages" nor "bands of marauders," ⁽²³⁴⁾ but nations able to control and protect themselves. ⁽²³⁵⁾ He made a point of distinguishing these groups from the uncontrolled and disorganized groups who might be taken under colonial protection, and stating that with the former he would "only maintain the most amicable treaties." The colonial borderers, who would be under the check of government, would then be watched most cautiously in their treatment of and dealings with such nations.

The basis of the arrangements with the chiefs of these nations should be essentially "strict justice." No aggressions on the part of the neighbouring tribes against the colonists should be allowed to go unpunished, provided that it had been ascertained beyond all doubt who the aggressors were, so that there was no danger that the innocent would suffer. Likewise, every injury done

(231) Stockenstrom to SpringRice. 5.11.34. A.C. minutes pp. 117 - 120. Vide supra pp. 96 ff.
 (232) Ibid. pp. 120 - 121.
 (233) Ibid. p. 120.
 (234) Ibid. p. 119.
 (235) Ibid. p. 121.

by the colonists to these neighbouring tribes should be punished with the utmost severity. And the tribes should be understood to have the right to deal with such aggressions according to their own laws, if they found them committed in their own country.

It is clear that all these are features which were foreshadowed in the policies of Stockenstrom's Commissioner-Generalship: treaties with the chiefs; reciprocal rights of punishment of aggression; and recognition of the complete and independent authority of the chiefs within their own territory.

Stockenstrom issued one very significant warning; which seems to have been lost sight of by those who accused him of expecting perfect tranquillity as the result of his treaty system: ⁽²³⁶⁾ "...the evils of a century and a half," he wrote, "are not to be remedied in a day." The arrangements with these chiefs will not all at once stop the inroads of independent gangs of marauders; and if on the first injury done by the latter, we charge the said chiefs with a breach of their engagement, and plunder their people, those arrangements will prove as fragile as all former ones."

This statement, together with that, a little further on, that "it is not always when the greatest clamour is made that there is real danger," recall Stockenstrom's attitude during the frontier alarms of 1829, 1830 and 1831. He wrote, indeed, that he had repeatedly resisted the "loudest cries for commandoes," whenever government had regarded a commando as indispensable - yet the predicted misfortunes had not followed. Stockenstrom evidently used the term "plunder their people," in the

(236) Ibid. p. 120.

quotation above, advisedly. A commando, by his own definition, meant a government-authorized armed expedition to punish a chief and his tribe convicted of deliberate organized depredations, connived at by the chief; and on a commando the cattle of the Kaffirs could be seized. (237) A commando sent out for any and every alarm that flared up on the frontier might, therefore, be "the easiest and most lucrative mode of retaliation, yet at the same time the most demoralizing." (238)

But, Stockenstrom said, in order to enable the Government to act steadily upon the principles he suggested, some steps must be taken to restore order beyond the limits of the Colony. (239) Here Stockenstrom had in mind the vast areas beyond the Northern borders, in which lived the Bushmen and other scattered remnants of tribes, who lived by hunting such food as they could find in the veld, and occasional plunder. (240) He described how these unfortunate men were so plundered by surrounding tribes that there was neither the possibility nor the incentive for them to settle down, grow crops or keep stock. Consequently many of them developed the habit of living by plunder, while others were driven by desperate hunger to do likewise. Stockenstrom pointed out that it was virtually impossible to distinguish between the two types and naturally the plundered party exercised his undeniable right of self-defence against both indiscriminately. A system of full military protection and a magistrate on the spot to exercise discrimination on all occasions might offer a solution, but it was in

(237) See the Suggestions of the Commissioner-General Vide supra p. 174 ff for discussion. Also discussion on evidence on commandos and patrols Vide supra p. 163 ff.
 (238) Stockenstrom to Spring-Rice. A.C. minutes, p. 121.
 (239) Ibid. p. 121.
 (240) Ibid. p. 119.

the nature of things, a wholly impracticable one. Unless the Government adopted a comprehensive plan embracing all these peoples on the Northern borders, Stockenstrom evidently saw no alternative but to continue the existing commando system of defence and see the weaker party gradually exterminated by the stronger - both colonial and native.

The plan Stockenstrom put forward was the one he had long since envisaged: ⁽²⁴¹⁾ that of taking the wandering hordes - and he now evidently included the Bushman and the remnants of the Kaffir tribes who had fled before their enemies in the far North (the Mantatee hordes) - under the protection of the Colonial Government. For all of them he suggested settlements, to be run on the same lines as the very successful experiment with the Hottentots on the Kat River. For this purpose, reserves should be set aside in the tracts adjoining the colony, as he had tried to do among the Bushmen in 1827. Stockenstrom prophesied that these establishments would "vie with the Kat River Settlement in improvement and in usefulness," and would eventually put an end to need or excuse for plunder. And he evidently hoped that the suggested plan of "amicable arrangements" with the Griquas, which would give the government the full right to punish their aggressions upon the settlements under its protection, would prevent a repetition of the disasters to the Bushmen which had been the result of his 1827 experiment.

When Stockenstrom stated in 1834 that one of his objects in setting on foot the Kat River Settlement was to make an experiment in "how far such a system of

(241) Ibid. p. 121.

colonization could be beneficially extended along our frontier, and even beyond it," it seems clear that he intended the latter phrase to refer to these Bushmen and unattached wandering Kaffirs to the North.

He had even hoped, he told the Secretary of State, that the success of the Kat River Settlement might have induced the government to allow him to adopt "the same measures, under certain modifications" towards the Kaffirs located within the colony near the coast, i.e. the Pato tribes between the Fish and the Keiskamma. These tribes, he explained, "pretend to have some claim to this territory" - based on a promise of Lord Charles Somerset. "At any rate" he went on - which seems to imply that he was still sceptical about this claim - sound policy dictated a liberal course towards them. They might be given a permanent title on terms which would be of incalculable benefit to the colony, themselves and the the Kaffir natives generally. Stockenström pointed out that these Kaffirs were "prepared to adopt many of our laws and customs" and "would be happy to enjoy our full protection."⁽²⁴²⁾ It is evident that Stockenström was still of the opinion that these tribes in the Ceded Territory were to remain there only on certain conditions laid down by the Colonial Government, even should they receive a "permanent title" to the land. He had made that point equally clear in the memoir of 1833, when he wrote that:

(242) Cf. on the use of the word "protection," what Stockenström said in connection with the Griquas in 1830: "a more decided interference (sic) than the Colonial Government has hitherto been able to exercise in that quarter, will be requisite to bring matters there to a proper bearing 'taking the Griquas under the protection of the colony' as suggested unless incorporation be meant, can only create confusion." Remarks of the Commissioner-General 31.12.30. C.o. 373.

...the land ought to be ceded to them altogether if they have, as they say, a promise to that effect, provided they consent to become amenable to the laws of the colony under certain modifications, as it would not be politic to allow that land to revert to Caffraria, particularly now when it affords such an excellent opportunity for making the experiment of incorporating (243) with ourselves its present tenants with their own consent.

It is quite clear that, as far as Stockenstrom was concerned, ceding the land which they occupied "altogether" to Fato, Kama and Conga, and giving them a "permanent title" to it, in no way affected his position that the area must nevertheless still be regarded as part of the Colony and the Colonial Government as having the right to lay down regulations there. Among the "certain modifications" would presumably have been the recognition of the authority of the chiefs over their own people within their own territory.

Stockenstrom went on to suggest the possibility that the same scheme might even in the future be applied to "other Caffre chiefs, who have hitherto been upon a less amicable footing with us, but have been occasionally allowed to reside in the ceded territory." This can only refer to Enno, Botman and the Kaffirs on the Man-kazana, who were the only Kaffirs at any time "allowed" by the colonial government to reside in the Ceded Territory after the establishment of the 1819 boundary. It can have no reference to chiefs beyond that boundary. Nor, accordingly, can the passage which follows:

...we might gradually have obtained a dense population of white colonists, caffres and Hottentots, from the Winterberg to the sea, all governed and protected by the same laws, and equally interested in the peace of the country. (244)

A misunderstanding of Stockenstrom's ideas as expressed here had led to several misconceptions in regard

(243) Memoir of 1833. A.C. minutes. p. 100

(244) Ibid.

to his policy as Lieutenant-Governor, as will appear
(245)
later.

To these observations, Stockenstrom added one significant point, founded, he said, upon long experience:

...it would be desirable for a long time to come to let a black rule blacks where such is practicable, and to let as few whites (middlemen, if I may use the term) as possible stand between such black authority and the higher functionaries who may have the management of the frontier. (246)

This is, of course, the principle of "indirect rule," and is consonant with his belief that the authority of the chiefs should be respected. It is interesting, though, that he does not appear to have regarded the rule of blacks by blacks as an end in itself, since he says only that it would be "desirable for a long time to come."

Stockenstrom acknowledged that the government's strong objection to the extension of the colony stood in the way of the scheme of settlements he proposed. But, practical as always, he pointed out that the population had been spreading since the middle of the seventeenth century, and would undoubtedly continue to do so. Nor could the Government check it, since there was no law to prevent the people from withdrawing from the country where they^{were} not comfortable or whence the exigencies of pastoral farming drove them. They could not be fetched back. To talk of "forcing them by means of the Griquas" (a reference to Philip, perhaps?) was to betray a complete ignorance of the situation, and certainly to be "not averse to scenes of bloodshed." Nor, added Stockenstrom, significantly, had he any desire to "shut

(245) Apparently as a consequence of such misunderstanding, for instance, Una Long, in her Introduction to Vol. II of the Chronicle of Jeremiah Goldswain, makes two statements about Stockenstrom which are, as they stand, erroneous. J.D. Pitman in his Commissioner-Generalship of Andries Stockenstrom also appears to have misunderstood the 1834 letter. Vide infra, pp. 193ff and footnotes on (246) S. to Spring Rice. A.C. minutes, p. 121. p. 197, 212.

up the whites within certain limits for the benefit of any particular class, whilst all equally encroach." (247)

The question was simply: was the expansion to take place in the old haphazard fashion, without control and with all the dangerous possibilities of a repetition of earlier aggressions on the aborigines who had rights to the land? Or was it to take place systematically, under government supervision, no land being taken from the natives but what they chose to part with, the natives being properly indemnified for it? The indemnification should be applied to the advantage of the natives, and extensive tracts reserved for their support. There they should be protected "on an equal footing with the most privileged classes."

A final point: Stockenstrom reiterated the conviction he had held as Commissioner-General, that the system he proposed might eventually dispense with the military force altogether. Its main benefit, in any case, was the moral one, since it was held in respect by colonists and natives alike. He maintained that "the Cape frontier defence has nothing military in it" - it was all a bush hunt, in which any Boer was as good as the trained soldier. Reliance upon troops had in any case, he argued, by no means lessened the depredations on the Eastern frontier. (248) And, if the old system were persisted in, not all the troops the government could supply would be sufficient to protect the frontiers.

(247) This is clearly a reference to Philip's view that the colonists were encroaching upon the land of the Griquas, and guilty of aggressions on the Griquas to boot - an argument which Stockenstrom had long since exploded, with considerable heat, in the Remarks of the Commissioner-General, 31.12.30. C.o. 373.

(248) As Commissioner-General, he had held the opinion that the presence of troops on the Eastern frontier had led to a want of vigilance on the part of the frontier farmers. Where formerly no flock was seen without the farmer with his saddled horse, the tendency developed to rely on a military patrol after the depredations. In consequence, he had maintained, the military were

In short, the solution to the frontier problem which Stockenstrom outlined to the Colonial Secretary in 1834 was based upon ideas which he had contemplated, and in some cases even begun to put into practice, during his Commissioner-Generalship and before. There is no point which can be claimed to be foreign to what he had previously thought or done. In other words, if at this time Stockenstrom was indeed attempting to ingratiate himself with a philanthropist-dominated Colonial Office, as was suggested, he did not deviate from any of the basic ideas he had previously held in order to do so.

In 1835, Stockenstrom was, of course, asked by the Committee to give a statement as to the policy he would suggest to be adopted on the frontiers. ⁽²⁴⁹⁾ The leading features of the plan which he outlined are those familiar from a study of his previous papers: the close line of settlements along the Eastern frontier, on the lines of the Kat River; the strict regulations to compel the colonists to protect their own property; the sparing use of the military force; the incorporation of the Pato tribes as allies - again subject to colonial rules and regulations under certain modifications; and the aim of severe punishment of aggressions and protection for all parties on both sides of the frontier.

Two variations appear. Where he had formerly included the Griquas in that group with which treaties would be made but which would not be incorporated in any way, Stockenstrom now appears to have viewed the matter in a slightly different light. For he stated that

harassed to death, the frontier kept in a state of ferment and there was an outcry for 'augmentation of the forces' which he considered quite unnecessary. Stockenstrom to Bell. 19.5.29. G.o. 367.
(249) Q. 1081. A.C. minutes, pp. 96 - 97. 21.8.35.

"it has now been shown that those people were in a fit state to be dealt with in the same manner as the Hottentots on the Kat River." But possibly this simply means that the Griquas had proved themselves capable of abandoning a vagrant life and settling down as agriculturists, which they had begun to do before he left the Cape. For, after describing the system he would apply to the Kaffir chiefs, Stockenstrom, as before, stated that he would deal with the Griquas upon the same principles.

The other variation is the possibility Stockenstrom suggested of an arrangement with the chiefs whereby compensation might be obtained, and the aggressors even brought to punishment, without using military violence on every occasion. This was to become a most significant feature of his treaty system. It had hitherto not been explicitly laid down as a policy in any of Stockenstrom's statements. In the Suggestions of the Commissioner-General, he stated, with regard to the chiefs in Kaffirland, that they should understand that plunderers would invariably be followed. The arrangement he suggested, more-or-less tentatively, in 1835, is, however, implicit in the obligation which rested upon all the Kaffir chiefs to capture and deliver up to the colonial authorities any plunderers or stolen property which they found within their territory, whether a colonial party had yet come in pursuit or not.

All the statements with regard to a general frontier policy which Stockenstrom gave in evidence in 1836 were made after his discussions with Glenelg and his appointment as Lieutenant-Governor. They should, therefore, properly be considered in the light of the policy

decided upon by Glenelg and Stockenström, and as statements made by an official responsible to the Colonial Secretary.

Stockenström's despatch to Glenelg on 7 January 1836 is a most significant document. ⁽²⁵⁰⁾ When he wrote it, Stockenström had not seen Glenelg's despatch to D'Urban of 26 December 1835, and - whatever inkling he may have had of Glenelg's intentions - he had had no official intimation that he was possibly to be appointed Lieutenant-Governor. ⁽²⁵¹⁾ Glenelg had requested him to give his opinion on the state of the Eastern Frontier and in particular on D'Urban's September policy.

In reply, Stockenström wrote that it was with "sincere regret" that, after "the most anxious and painful review of the question in all its bearings" he had not been able to come to the conclusion that the September treaty ⁽²⁵²⁾ would lead to the beneficial results which D'Urban had contemplated. Referring Glenelg to the letter of 5 November 1834, in which he had proposed a plan for "the gradual incorporation with the Colony of certain hordes," Stockenström went on to say that from this it was evident that he was "by no means opposed to the principle of incorporation, where the people to be disposed of cannot by any other means be rendered harmless to us and acquire the means of their own improvement." His original plan, he said, had been very similar to the one adopted by D'Urban, though less matured. But, "having only in view such communities as were wandering and unsettled, already in many ways dependent upon or closely allied with us," he had "specially excepted

(250) Auto. II, 30 ff.

(251) See Chap. II for discussion on these points.

(252) Which was printed in the supplement to G.T.J. 24.9.35.

those nations, who can control and protect themselves." He explained clearly that he would never advocate the rendering the colonial system of administration more complicated and expensive by conquest, or interference with the internal affairs of any tribes so far organized and consolidated as to need "only our example and justice, our commerce, and the free and friendly communication of those improvements which they would gradually become prepared to cultivate," in order to become civilized. He considered it indispensable to distinguish between the two classes described, in any measure of incorporation it might be deemed advisable to resort to. And "that I consider the Kaffirs beyond the Colonial Boundary as belonging to the latter class, my several communications with Government will plainly show." Stockenstrom then went on to explain very fully why he did not see in the situation in 1836 anything which disposed him to alter his former opinions with regard to the incorporation of the tribes beyond the colonial boundary.

There can be no question that Stockenstrom's attitude on this point in 1836 was precisely what it had been in 1834 and before. Yet J.D. Pitman, discussing Stockenstrom's frontier policy, apparently perceives a fundamental contrast between the views of 1834 and 1836, (253) and is considerably perplexed by it. He appears to have misunderstood the despatch of 1834, and to have thought Stockenstrom's plan then to have been to extend the Kat River system of colonization also to the Ganna- (254) kwebes and "the Caffre natives generally."

(253) See the concluding section of the chapter on Frontier Policy in J.D. Pitman: The Commissioner-Generalship of Andries Stockenstrom, p. 112.

(254) It is unfortunate that Pitman, in quoting this phrase, should have omitted to put it in its proper context. What Stockenstrom wrote was, that a permanent title to their lands might be given to the Fato tribes "on terms which would be of incalculable benefit to the colony, to themselves and to the Caffre natives generally" (Stockenstrom to Spring-Rice, 5.11.34. A.C. minutes, p. 121.

Consequently he says, discussing the letters of 1834 and 1836:

These two contrasting statements are most perplexing. How far that made in 1836 (and followed as practical policy during the Lieutenant-Governorship) was influenced by the special conditions which obtained at the end of the sixth Kaffir War and by the economic position of the Colonial Government, I shall not venture to say.

In suggesting that Stockenström's statements in 1836 were influenced by these two factors, Pitman is probably quite correct. But he had created for himself an unnecessary problem in supposing that they produced a change in Stockenström's attitude. Indeed they constituted a reason for his adhering to his original point of view.

Stockenström's reasons for believing that incorporation of all the tribes beyond the colonial boundary would not be beneficial, were wholly practical. ⁽²⁵⁵⁾ He fully approved the readmission of the Kaffirs into the territory between the Keiskamma and the Kei, from which they had been expelled; the step was unavoidable. But, he said, by readmitting them as British subjects, two boundaries instead of one would be created; and consequently two boundaries instead of one would have to be protected. For the new boundary of the Kei would have to be protected against the tribes beyond; and the old boundary would still have to be protected: "For it is not in the nature of things that the Kaffirs, after all that has now taken place, can be trusted so near the colonists, if these be unprotected." The cost of the military defence of the two boundary lines and the intermediate posts which would be needed to connect the two, would be very considerable. Moreover, Stockenström was evidently very sceptical of the sincerity of the chiefs'

(255) i.e. as given in the letter to Glenelg 7.1.36.

voluntary offer to become fellow-subjects. One of the principal features of the character of barbarians, he said, was the thirst for revenge. Would the Kaffirs be able to resist the temptation of a favourable opportunity to restore themselves to independence, and "Make us pay dearly for their temporary submission?" And if they did seize such an opportunity, the problem would be further complicated by the fact that the government would then be dealing with, not an enemy, but traitors and rebels. Furthermore, Stockenström went on, "hitherto we have found it impossible to prevent occasional aggressions on the part of some of the colonists against the native tribes, and we now make ourselves responsible for the outrages of a much more lawless set of men; for when they are our subjects we will have to check and redress the injustices they inflict on the tribes beyond."

* Stockenström added that he did not see how the introduction of English laws among the Kaffirs, in the manner proposed in the treaty, was at all practicable. One could not easily remove or disregard the prejudices of a nation, however absurd they might appear; and violent opposition often strengthened them. (256) And any measure tending to lower the importance of the chiefs he considered would weaken the hold of the government on the Kaffirs. The supersession of their authority by that of magistrates would constantly remind them of their fall from independent power, and breed discontent. The treaty, indeed, provided for the appointment of the chiefs themselves as magistrates where possible. But

(256) A point which, it is interesting to note, Sir Harry Smith in his frontier policy appears not to have appreciated, but which Sir George Grey fully realized.

that generation of chiefs could not administer colonial law. And "if they could, it appears to me they can serve our purpose and their own country better as chiefs." This was, of course, his policy of blacks ruling blacks, and one which he had always followed in practice.

It was, therefore, on a basis of very practical considerations, and on no philanthropic theory, that Stockenström criticized D'Urban's proceedings. (257)

In compliance with Glenelg's request, Stockenström then outlined the policy he would propose to be adopted on the frontier, prefacing his remarks by saying that "my views are founded upon the (perhaps unpopular) impression that the late attacks of the Kaffirs, though they have caused me more painful reflections than it is necessary to trouble your Lordship with, have not been altogether unprovoked." His feelings on this matter, he said, would be revealed by his earlier correspondence with the Colonial Office. Consequently, "not only sound policy but justice forbids that we should crush the prostrate enemy."

Quite characteristically, Stockenström put as the first object, "above all", the safety of the colony against future inroads, and the security of His Majesty's subjects; and secondly, "the improvement of the Kaffir nation, and its maintenance as an independent ally."

(257) It is interesting to observe that not only the Graham's Town Journal but also the Commercial Advertiser approved D'Urban's September policy and were optimistic about the prospects of his plans for the new province. Throughout the first six months of 1836, the SACA published favourable reports on frontier conditions, mostly quoted from the GTJ, and looked forward optimistically to security and progress on the frontier. See e.g. a note in SACA 9.7.36: "The new Province was tranquil. The new Caffir police is working excellently under Col. Smith. Nothing is required now but the presence of the Lt. Governor, to consolidate an efficient system of protection for the Colonists on the Border, and to terminate for ever the irregularities from which so many wars have sprung." This is perhaps significant too: Stockenström in criticizing D'Urban's policy, of which he had read in the colonial newspapers, was evidently expressing an independent opinion.

The frontier would have to be strengthened and he could not recommend it to be advanced beyond the Keiskamma permanently. Stockenstrom proposed four measures for the protection of the frontier: an efficient military force, which would have to be kept up for some time; the settlement in villages in the territory between the Keiskamma and the Kat and Fish Rivers of as dense a population as possible, upon the same principle as the new (258) Hottentot settlements, modified according to circumstances; the people in the Ceded Territory West of the Kat should be made to comply with the conditions upon which they accepted their grants, or relinquish them; and "the burgher force ought to be placed under strict regulations, and its assembling and operations narrowly defined or controlled, so as to keep it efficient for defence and prevent uncalled-for offence."

The Kaffirs living between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers, who had behaved so well during the war, should have that territory granted to them, on terms having for their object the safety of the colony and the welfare of the grantees. Significantly enough, Stockenstrom said that the details of these terms "may safely be left to the Governor" - which indicates, not only that he at that time expected the alterations in the frontier policy to be in the hands of D'Urban himself, but that he approved in general of D'Urban's principles of incorporation, provided they were not applied to tribes beyond the Keiskamma.

(258) It is presumably upon this passage that Una Long bases her statement (The Chronicle of Jeremiah Goldswain, Vol II, Introduction p. xvii): "In 1836 the majority of Hottentots were landless, and Stockenstrom would have liked to have established them as a barrier between European and African on the edge of Cape Colony from the Katberg to the sea." But "on the same principle as the new Hottentot settlements" need not imply that they were ~~all to~~ be Hottentot settlements, and, as later discussion of Stockenstrom's plans for the Hottentots will show (See pp. 281 ff.) the using of Hottentots as a "barrier between European and African" down to the coast was never contemplated by Stockenstrom. This is made clear even by what follows in the despatch itself. Vide infra.

He had, in fact, already stated at the beginning of his letter, that his own principles were not dissimilar.

The Fingoes - whom D'Urban had placed between the Keiskamma and the Fish in the vicinity of Peddie, - he "could wish safe a couple of hundred miles farther away westward from the reach of the Kaffirs, to whom they will long be a source of heart-burning."⁽²⁵⁹⁾ But, again characteristically, Stockenstrom accepted the status quo and recommended that Fingo villages should be intermixed with the other villages he had proposed to be established.

Agreements should be entered into with the Kaffir chiefs who returned to reside near the colonial borders, and some of the points contained in the Governor's treaty might, he considered, be included in the agreement. (He does not specify which points).

As one would expect, Stockenstrom emphasized that the reprisal system must not be allowed to continue. As always, he insisted that the colonists must be allowed to protect their property and lives against plunderers and murderers, and even if necessary to shoot the assailants - "this in the actual state of things cannot be prevented." "The vacillating and contradictory doctrine which has been held forth on this point," he added, "rushing from one extreme to another, has been one of the main causes of our misfortunes."⁽²⁶⁰⁾ It would be dangerous

(259) Had Stockenstrom then known that Glenelg himself, although unaware of what D'Urban had done at the time, had suggested placing the Fingoes west of the Keiskamma (see Glenelg to D'Urban, 26.12.35. Parliamentary papers. Caffre War 1836. Imp. Blue Book) he might have worded this passage a little less brusquely.

(260) If this passage be compared with that in Stockenstrom's letter to Cole on 6 February 1829 (quoted on p. 134) in which he commented on the prevailing system on the frontier, i.e. Bourke's, it will be apparent that this probably refers also to the application of Bourke's system. This becomes significant in view of the fact that, less than two months later, Stockenstrom professed no recollection of Bourke's system. Vide infra p. 269 ff. for discussion of his answers to Q. 2257 - 2262 on 1 March 1836).

for some time to come, to allow the Kaffirs free access to the colony, and where they were found armed they could be no other than enemies and should be treated as such. But, Stockenstrom said, as he had said before, the inhabitants near the Frontier knew they had the Kaffirs in their neighbourhood, and must be made to guard their cattle. If the cattle were stolen, the thief must be found out if possible, and punished according to law. But "no risk of a bloody war ought to be incurred for every cow which strays, or is destroyed by wild beasts, or may even be stolen."

The next passage is again significant, and the exact words are important:

No armed person or force ought to be allowed, except under peculiar clearly-defined circumstances, to enter Kaffirland; and private individuals, including traders, even unarmed, ought only to be allowed to do so upon terms to be agreed upon between the Governor, or other competent authority (261) and the Kaffir chiefs.

Stockenstrom does not here state that no armed force at all may enter Kaffirland. He gives no details as to the "peculiar clearly-defined circumstances," but one may presume that he had in mind arrangements such as he had outlined in the Suggestions of 1829.

If, after all this, the colonists were plundered, the Kaffirs could be proved the aggressors, and the chiefs refused redress and satisfaction, the Government might be justified in regularly going to war. But "to give every man who has a real or pretended grievance a military force to go and avenge his own cause, is enough to account for everything that has occurred."

(261) Here is the first suggestion in this despatch that another authority than the Governor might have the regulating of the frontier affairs. But Stockenstrom evidently did not yet know of the proposed appointment of a lieutenant-governor, which Glenelg had mentioned in his despatch to D'Urban of 26.12.35.

Stockenström next dealt with the problem of how the government was to withdraw its authority from the Kaffir tribes beyond the boundary without losing face. He outlined in some detail the line that should be adopted in telling the chiefs of the decision of government - a line which might be adopted "without even disapproving what the Governor has done." The chiefs should be told that the object of government was not conquest, but the peace and prosperity of the country and its independence under its chiefs. Since those chiefs had acknowledged the supremacy of the British Government, and had experienced what they might expect to get from war against it, the government was disposed to be lenient. Their country and their independence would be restored to them, but under certain conditions designed to save the peace of the colony as well as themselves. These terms the government would be prepared to discuss with the chiefs and any councillors or advisers they chose to consult. The government was prepared to be reasonable, conciliatory and liberal, and determined to ensure that the Kaffirs should have no excuse or provocation to renew hostilities. The tribes would be allowed, under these conditions, to reoccupy all their lands "up to the boundary fixed in 1819." But the government would reserve the right to establish and maintain in that territory such forts as it considered necessary, until it should be satisfied that the chiefs could and would fulfil their engagements. And it would retain the power to drive out the Kaffirs altogether and repossess the whole territory if their
(262)
conduct compelled it.

(262) With this whole passage should be compared the attitude which Stockenström suggested should be adopted towards the chiefs Enno and Botman when, in very similar circumstances, they were permitted to reoccupy parts of the Ceded Territory - The similarity of approach will be immediately apparent. (See discussion of Suggestions of the Commissioner-General supra p. 174)

A conference, Stockenstrom suggested, should then follow: it should be clearly understood how mutual aggressions were to be dealt with, and the chiefs should be allowed to exercise the same severity as the government exacted. And then, instead of magistrates, with the consent of the Kaffirs, Residents should be placed with the principal chiefs - men "cautiously selected," to act as "consuls" or "ministers." All communications with the chiefs could go through them; traders could appeal to them in cases of necessity and dispute; those who had been robbed of cattle could apply to them. For proof of the good which properly chosen men might do, Stockenstrom referred to the somewhat similar work performed by the missionaries Shaw, of the Wesleyan, and Wright, of the London Society.

"Civilization and the improvement of the code of the Kaffir laws," he asserted, "could be more easily brought about by their means than by the precipitate introduction of English law, or by means of the bayonet."

He went on enthusiastically to suggest that the Kaffirs might also have such a resident near the chief officer of the frontier - the son of a chief, perhaps. The position would at first be merely nominal, but "it would be a step" - he does not specify towards what.

It is unnecessary to labour the point of the basic consistency of the ideas, expressed in this letter, with those formerly expressed or acted upon by Stockenstrom. The only new feature which appears in the suggestion that Residents should be appointed to act as consuls on behalf of the Colonial Government. It was an idea of which his own practical experience of the value of the

missionaries amongst the native tribes naturally would
(263)
have led him to approve. But it was not, apparently,
an idea which had ever occurred to him before.

There are two possible sources for it, upon either
of which Stockenstrom may have drawn. In an article in
the Commercial Advertiser of 22 February 1834, Fairbairn
proposed a scheme for a new frontier policy, and suggested,
among many other things, the stationing of a British
resident or consul at some convenient spot in Kaffirland,
to protect British interests and keep open a constant
communication between the chiefs and the colonial
government. The traders should make all complaints
through him to the chiefs and it would be his business
to see strict justice done between them. When cattle
were stolen from the colony, or any outrage committed
by the Kaffirs, on the colonial side of the boundary,
notice should be transmitted to him, and by him to the
chiefs, who should then detect the thieves and make
(264)
redress.

Fairbairn's whole scheme was fully approved by Dr.
Philip, in a letter which he wrote to D'Urban on 13 March
1834 - in fact, many of the ideas, if not all, were
(265)
probably Philip's suggestions.

The suggestion of the appointment of consular agents
was, however condemned by the Rev. W. Boyce, whom the
Governor consulted at the end of March 1834. He approved,
indeed, of the principle, but pointed out that, in practice,
it would be very difficult to find suitable men, and
these civil agencies might well clash with the military

(263) Vide infrapp. 295 ff for discussion of his evidence
on missionaries.

(264) Printed in Appendix to A.C. minutes, p. 695. The
date of the extract is here given as 22.2.35, but this
is incorrect.

(265) See Philip to D'Urban 13.3.34. A.C. minutes,
Appendix, p. 693. Paper delivered in on 15 June 1836.

commandant. The missionaries were the ideal persons to act as such agents, but such duties would tend to secularize their position and could not be undertaken by them. (266)

The Rev. W. Shaw, on the other hand, made a suggestion for a resident agent, almost identical to that of Fairbairn, in a scheme for frontier settlement, in the form of an open letter to the Earl of Aberdeen, and which he quoted in his evidence on 7 August 1835. (267)

It seems probable that this last was the source of Stockenstrom's suggestion. For, if he had seen Fairbairn's article in 1834 - and he was as likely to have approved of his proposal then as in 1836 - he would surely have made such a suggestion in his letter to Spring-Rice on 5 November 1834.

It is very possible that Stockenstrom, in preparing his letter to Glenelg in January 1836, would have consulted various material, as indeed this new feature suggests that he had done. And there were of course, any number of people in the eighteen-twenties both qualified and unqualified, who were only too ready to tell the Cape Government what it should do about the Eastern frontier. (268) Many of these schemes have features in common with each other, and with the plan suggested by Stockenstrom. By any or all of them he may have

(266) See Remarks on the best means of preserving the peace of the Colonial Frontier, bordering on Caffraria; in a letter addressed to Sir Benjamin D'Urban, Governor of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, written at his Excellency's request March 31st 1834 by William B. Boyce, Wesleyan Missionary. A.C. minutes, p. 180. 31.8.35. (appendix to evidence of T. Philipps).

(267) Q. 664. A.C. minutes, p. 57. 7.8.35. No. 5.

(268) To recapitulate only those already elsewhere referred to: Philip, Fairbairn, Godlonton, Shaw, Boyce; also Saxe-Bannister (see his evidence Q. 1533, 31.8.35); and of course, any number of correspondents in newspapers: A.F. Bruce and others less notorious.

(269)
 been influenced. But it should be clear from the foregoing discussion that, except in the matter of the consular agents, Stockenstrom, in writing to Glenelg, was basing his plan upon those ideas which he had long believed, from his own experience, to be the best.

A detailed discussion of the statements of frontier policy made by Stockenstrom in evidence before the Committee in 1836 would lead to unnecessary recapitulation. No features appear there which he had not referred to and discussed, either in the letter to Spring-Rice in 1834, or in the plan which he outlined to Glenelg in January 1836.

During January, he had several interviews with Glenelg, during which the main features of the "Glenelg system" were probably discussed and worked out. On 5 February 1836, Stockenstrom was officially informed of his appointment as Lieutenant-Governor, and given a copy of Glenelg's despatch to D'Urban of 26 December 1835. (270)
 This contained an outline of the policy Glenelg intended the Lieutenant-Governor to follow. Upon his instructions

(269) Had Stockenstrom any idea that Philip had at one stage held this view on the question of incorporation: "I should have no objection to see the whole country, from the Keiskamma to the Kye, or even from the Keiskamma to Delagoa Bay, included within the limits of the colony, on the plan adopted by the ancient Romans, which led them to spread themselves and their institutions over the countries which submitted to their government.

The British Government might in this way prove a great blessing to Africa, as it has been to India; and nearly all the chiefs in Caffraria and all the people, and almost all the chiefs on our Northern frontier and the people would be rejoiced at the adoption of such a measure by the British Government..."

If he had, he does not seem ever to have allowed his views to be influenced by it. Philip to D'Urban. 13.3.34. appendix to A.C. minutes p. 693. Delivered in to Committee 15.6.1836.

(270) Glenelg to D'Urban. 26.12.35. In Parliamentary Papers on Caffre War. 1836. (Imperial Blue Book.)

as Lieutenant-Governor, Stockenstrom vouchsafed no comments in evidence, saying merely that he had seen them in such a form that he could not appeal to them, but that they were full and ample, and such as would render his office efficient for the purposes for which it was intended. ⁽²⁷¹⁾ Behind the scenes, however, Stockenstrom had much to say about the 9th clause of the proposed rules for the guidance of the Lieutenant-Governor - ⁽²⁷²⁾ a clause which in itself reveals the abysmal depths of poor Glenelg's ignorance of the state of the Eastern Frontier of the Cape. For he therein laid down that "no European or Hottentot, or any others but Caffres" - the Kat River Hottentots and all Christian teachers excepted - were to be allowed to settle "east of the Great Fish River" - a reversion, in other words, to the boundary of 1778. On 8 March 1836, Stockenstrom wrote ⁽²⁷³⁾ to set Glenelg right on this matter. He pointed out that the Fish River had at no time formed the boundary of the colony for any greater extent of its course than from its mouth to Esterhuize's Poort, down to which point it ran through the centre of the Somerset district. It had had a seat of magistracy (Cradock) on its east bank ever since 1813. And under the auspices of the Government, during the rule of both Lord Charles Somerset and Sir Lowry Cole, numbers of settlers had been granted land in the upper part of the Ceded

(271) Q. 2009 - 2011. A.C. minutes, p. 225. 26.2.36.

The question as to the nature of his instructions was asked a propos of his having claimed that much evil arose from the absence of specific instructions to himself as Commissioner-General.

(272) Glenelg to D'Urban. 26.12.35. -

(273) Stockenstrom to Glenelg. 8.3.36. Printed in Parl. Papers. Caffre War 1837, pp. 3 - 4. What follows is a brief resume of Stockenstrom's main points. These are supported by references to relevant despatches, and considerable detail, in the actual letter.

Territory. An attempt, by order of the Home Government, to have these settlers removed, during Bourke's administration, proved impossible, and they were afterwards confirmed in their grants. Stockenstrom went on to point out at length the complications which would arise should an attempt be made to dislodge any of these settlers, and left it for Glenelg to consider whether "encroachments upon the territory between the two said boundaries, which have been made with the sanction of the local government" would not simply have to be accepted as irremediable at that stage. (274) He added, however, that the same difficulties did not apply to that part of the Ceded Territory East of the Fish River, up to its junction with the Kat River, and East of the Kat up to Fort Beaufort, since up to that time, as far as he knew, no colonist of any class had obtained authority to settle in that area.

Stockenstrom's arguments appear to have convinced Glenelg. (275) On 29 March he forwarded a copy of Stockenstrom's

(274) Godlonton's comment on this, as late as 1855, is characteristic: "As this sweep of territory would have embraced his own extensive estate of Maasstrom, as well as the fertile districts of the Konap, Kat and Mancazana, it is no wonder that Capt. Stockenstrom was awakened to the inexpediency, not to say danger, of such a proceeding, or that he should make an effort to divert the Colonial Minister from carrying into effect a project so inimical to his own interests." (See R. Godlonton: Sunshine and Cloud...being an exposition of the reversal of the D'Urban System, by Lieut.-Gov. the Hon. Sir Andrees Stockenstrom, Bart. Grahamstown 1855.)

(275) The passage quoted in (274) supra, has a footnote quoting a letter from W. Southey, of Graaff-Reinet, on this point. According to Southey, Stockenstrom asserted that the only argument which had really carried weight with Glenelg and prevented him from abandoning the whole of the Ceded Territory, was Stockenstrom's pointing out that the boundary along the Kat was a shorter line of defence and would be less expensive to maintain. Stockenstrom had told Southey that he had "the greatest possible difficulty" in preventing the abandoning of the whole of the Ceded Territory. Southey queries Stockenstrom's assertion, in the light of the two despatches cited. But there does not seem any reason for doubting that Stockenstrom perhaps had to use other arguments beside those in the letter of 8.3.36, before Glenelg finally wrote to D'Urban on 29.3.36.

letter to D'Urban for his consideration, saying that he fully recognized the necessity of making due provision for the protection of all those settlements formed since 1819, of the existence of which he had not been apprized when he wrote on 26 December 1835. On the subject of Stockenström's proposed line of demarcation, Glenelg suggested that the question might be more readily determined by Stockenström and D'Urban in conjunction, after Stockenström's arrival at the Cape. (276)

Much emphasis is often laid upon the supposed influence of Stockenström and his evidence upon Lord Glenelg. (277) But the fact that, but for Stockenström's conclusive arguments and influence Glenelg in his ignorance might well have insisted upon the abandonment of the entire Ceded Territory, has seldom been emphasized, either by his contemporaries or by later historians.

The question of Stockenström's influence upon Glenelg needs closer examination. Stockenström and Philip are normally cited as having played the largest part in the moulding of Glenelg's ideas, particularly as expressed in the despatch of 26 December 1835. In the very first instance, to take a minor point, it is hardly credible that anyone who had paid the attention which Glenelg is alleged to have done to Stockenström's evidence could fail to be aware of the existence of large numbers of European settlers in the Ceded Territory on the

(276) Glenelg to D'Urban. No. 47. 29.3.36.

Parliamentary Papers. Caffre War, 1837. pp. 1 - 2.

In the light of these two despatches, one is at a loss to know upon what authority Una Long makes the statement, (a propos of Stockenström's alleged desire to place the Hottentots as a barrier between African and European from the Katberg to the sea) that "Lord Glenelg, refused to allow this, and insisted that neither Europeans nor Hottentots should live in the Neutral Territory."

(See Chronicle of Jeremiah Goldswain, II, Intro. xvii.)

(277) e.g. by J.H. Malan, E. Stockenström, Dr. S.F.N. Gie, Prof. J.L.M. Francken, M.A.S. Grundlingh. See Chap I for references.

Western side of the Kat. Nor would anyone strongly under the influence of Stockenstrom's ideas have proposed a boundary other than that of 1819 for the colony. On the other hand, assuming, as is usually done, that Glenelg brought to his study of the evidence certain preconceived ideas, and tended to select only those features which coincided with his opinions, there are several points which appear both in Stockenstrom's evidence and in Glenelg's despatch of 26 December 1835. These are, briefly: the belief that an unwise policy on the part of the government towards the Kaffirs on the Eastern Frontier, over a period of many years, had produced discontent among them; the conviction that the reprisal system of taking Kaffir cattle, with its attendant evils, was at the root of frontier disturbances; an objection - upon whatever grounds - to the extension of British authority over the chiefs beyond the colonial borders; the opinion that the authority of the Kaffir chiefs should be recognized, and that it was possible to come to arrangements with them by means of treaties; the idea that redress for depredations could be sought from the chiefs and that consequently the reprisal system established by Somerset could and should be abolished; the plan of embodying in clearly defined treaties the means of redress for grievances on both sides, the areas of land to which each of the Kaffir tribes were entitled, and the nature of the relations with and degree of responsibility to the British Government of chiefs allowed to reside within the colonial boundaries; and the need for a supervising authority on the frontier.

But to lay too much stress on the similarity of Stockenstrom's and Glenelg's ideas on these points, is to ignore the fact that they are points ^{many of} on which the

(278)

South African witnesses concurred. All those with whom the question of the taking over of the Ceded Territory is discussed, for instance, agree that the land was the possession of the Kaffirs (though it had not always been so) and that Gaika had no right to cede it. Most put the irritation on the part of the Kaffirs, and finally the irruption of 1834 - 35, down to the vacillating policy of the government with regard to their right to occupy the ceded territory. Shaw in particular considered D'Urban's May policy "a very injudicious and disadvantageous measure." All agree as to the unsuitability of the commando system and the danger of the innocent being punished for the guilty, as a result of the practices of the Kaffirs themselves; though not all agree as to the abuses of the system by the burghers, or the possibility of applying any other method. Most of the witnesses - Aitchison is an exception - agree that treaty arrangements with the Kaffir chiefs would be practicable and useful. And all concur as to the need for an authority on the spot to supervise frontier affairs, though they differ as to whether it should be civil or military.

The blame for Glenelg's unbalanced opinion of the enormities perpetrated by the colonists upon the aborigines cannot, however, be laid upon the witnesses before the Committee in 1835. For there is general agreement

(278) For this general impression of the evidence of 1835, see the evidence of the South African witnesses, passim:
 (1) Capt. R.S. Aitchison: Q. 1 - 207; 435 - 450.
 (2) Thomas Philipps: Q. 301 - 323; 324 - 434; 874 - 964; 1534 - 1546. (he submitted Boyce's scheme for frontier policy).
 (3) Rev. W. Shaw: Q. 596 - 762; 1062 - 1071; 1099 - 1129. (submitted frontier scheme).
 (4) William Parker: Q. 453 - 518.
 (5) Capt. Spiller: Q. 763 - 873.
 (6) Major W.B. Dundas: Q. 1130 - 1296.
 (7) Capt. R. Blakeman: Q. 1297 - 1379.
 (8) Capt. Charles Radford: Q. 1430 - 1514.
 (9) Saxe Bannister: Q. 1515 - 1533. (submitted frontier scheme.)
 (10) Stockenström.

with Stockenstrom's view that, though in a large community, unpleasant characters must be expected, the colonists as a whole were law-abiding and by no means all guilty of crimes against the natives. Philipps, Dundas and Shaw in particular, defend the colonists warmly. Some witnesses admit the possible existence of irregularities. But it is true that only Stockenstrom gives concrete instances. In this respect, Stockenstrom's evidence may be said to have lent more support to Philip's criticism of the reprisal system, which Buxton had brought to Glenelg's notice, than that of other witnesses. This was, of course, the kernel of the Graham's Town Journal's grievance against Stockenstrom. But it must be borne in mind that, as has already been demonstrated, there is ample proof in Stockenstrom's evidence that he did not deliberately set out to blacken the colonists in general, as the Journal implied. His strictures were not intended to apply to the frontier colonists as a whole. Had Glenelg made a thorough study of Stockenstrom's evidence when he wrote the December despatch, he must surely have been aware of this. It seems, therefore, that, while bearing in mind the possibility that Buxton used selected extracts from Stockenstrom's evidence to drive home Philip's ideas, one should be wary of exaggerating the general influence of Stockenstrom's own ideas upon Glenelg in 1835.

It will have become clear from the previous discussion that, prior to his appointment as Lieutenant-Governor, Stockenstrom did not voice any ideas which can with justification be regarded as utterly foreign to his previous statements or practice. The degree to

which those ideas may have coincided with the plans Glenelg would have wished to see carried out, is the measure of the sympathy which had always existed between Stockenström's views and those of the philanthropists. But, when it came to actual discussions as to the policy to be carried out on the Eastern Frontier, did Stockenström then prostitute his principles to serve Glenelg's purpose and retain his favour? This was certainly the opinion of those opposed to Stockenström's treaty system. (279) Without embarking upon a discussion of that system, (280) certain general deductions may perhaps be made. (281)

If the treaty with the Gaika tribes be taken as a basis for discussion, certain features, which one would expect to bear the stamp of Stockenström's approval, emerge clearly. These may be briefly summed up: the boundary of 1819, very clearly defined, marked with beacons, and pointed out to all the chiefs, was to be

(279) And, of course, of such later historians as Theal and Preller. See chap. I.

(280) A discussion of the actual working of the treaty system, ~~of course~~, falls outside the scope of this thesis. The question of the interpretation of the treaties is fraught with virtually insuperable difficulties, and remains one of the problems of South African history yet to be tackled in its entirety. To appreciate the difficulty, one has only to compare, for instance, the diametrically opposed opinions of two witnesses, both competent to judge: C.L. Stretch; (memorandum on the Stockenström Treaty System, Pretoria, published by permission of J.G. Gubbins), and W. Boyce (Notes on South African Affairs, London, 1839.)

(281) Treaty entered into between Andries Stockenström, Esquire, Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Division of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, on the part of His Britannic Majesty, and the Kafir Chiefs of the Tribe of Gaika...
See Kafir Tribes. "Copies or Extracts of Correspondence relative to the Kafir Tribes between the years 1837 and 1845." Ordered to be printed 23 June 1851, pp. 2 - 7. (Henceforth cited as Treaty with the Gaika tribes.)

acknowledged by all parties as the boundary between the Colony and Kaffirland. ⁽²⁸²⁾ The chiefs renounced all claims they may ever have had over territory West of the defined boundary, and accepted any territory which they might be allowed to occupy West of the boundary as a mark of favour on the part of His Majesty, and a loan held upon certain terms, incorporated in a treaty. ⁽²⁸³⁾ Upon this basis the chiefs were admitted to certain specified and defined areas in the Ceded Territory; their full and hereditary sovereignty over these areas was to be recognized; and the British Government would in no way exercise its right of dominion there, except in the case of hostility, war or breach of the treaties. ⁽²⁸⁴⁾ In this territory His Majesty reserved the right to build and man forts, and to appropriate the necessary land round these forts for their use, as also any necessary facilities or materials in the territory. The troops and others connected with the forts were to have free and untrammelled passage between the colony and the posts. ⁽²⁸⁵⁾ The area marked off for the colonists in the Ceded Territory embraced all the areas in which colonists had obtained any rights to settle prior to D'Urban's arrangements. ⁽²⁸⁶⁾ There were careful and strict regulations as to the conditions under which individuals, either colonists or Kaffirs, could cross the boundaries, and a clearly defined pass system. ⁽²⁸⁷⁾ No British subject thus obtaining permission to enter Kaffirland could do so armed, except with the consent of the amapakati or chief; and

(282) Treaty with the Gaika Tribes. Art. 2. (p.2.)

It is not clear what Una Long means when she says that Stockenstrom again made the Great Fish the Cape Frontier. (Chronicle of Jeremiah Goldswain, II, Intro. p. xviii.)

(283) Ibid. Arts 5 and 6. (p.3.)

(284) Ibid. Arts. 3 and 4 (p. 2 - 3.)

(285) Ibid. Art. 7. (p.3.), and Art. 15. (p.4.)

(286) Ibid. Art. 8.

(287) Ibid. Arts. 14, 15, 21, 22.

(288)
 no Kaffir could enter the colony armed. A British subject who entered Kaffirland under circumstances other than those defined in Articles 14 and 15, i.e. either with a proper pass or under the regulations for those connected with the military posts, did so at his own risk and was to be considered as under the laws of the Kaffirs as long as he remained in their territory. (289)
 If he committed a crime, and escaped out of Kaffir territory, the resident agent should exert himself to have the man punished by the British courts and redress obtained for the Kaffir aggrieved, in the same way as redress should be sought in the case of a British subject wronged by a Kaffir. (290) Any Kaffir found West of the boundary without a pass should, in the first offence, be delivered over to the nearest of the amapakati, who should send him to the chiefs, who were to pledge themselves to punish the offender and prevent such encroachments upon colonial territory; on the second offence, the offender should be seized and punished under the colonial vagrant laws. (291)

The clauses providing for the establishment of resident agents with the chiefs, and "amapakati" or native representatives on the borders, were, of course, new features which had been suggested by Stockenstrom in his letter of 7 January 1836. The "amapakati" developed presumably from his tentative suggestion that the chiefs should appoint residents near the chief officer on the frontier. Both the residents and the amapakati had an important role to play in the arrangements made for the

(288) Ibid. Arts. 14, 21.
 (289) Ibid. Art. 16.
 (290) Ibid. Art. 20.
 (291) Ibid. Art. 22.
 (292) Ibid. Arts. 10 and 11.

recovery of stolen cattle, contained in Articles 23, 24 and 25. The amapakati were to be responsible to their chiefs, and their duties were defined as: "to keep a good and constant understanding with the commanding officer of the military post on the colonial side of the boundary... nearest to their said residences, and to do everything in their power to prevent inroads or aggressions, either on the part of the Colonists against the Kafirs, or of the Kafirs against the Colonists."

The agents were to act purely in a diplomatic capacity, and all representations to or against the Kaffirs from colonial sources, or on the part of the Kaffirs to the colonial government, were to go through them. (293) They were to maintain the rights of both parties inviolate (294) and see to the redressing of wrongs on both sides.

And in the event of a British subject appearing before a Kaffir tribunal for trial, he could demand the presence of the agent, who could, if necessary, speak on behalf of the accused. (295) It seems that Stockenstrom adhered to the opinion that the work of the agents could well be (296) handled by missionaries - in practice, both as Landdrost and Commissioner-General, he had proved their value in that capacity. But Glenelg was evidently prepared to appoint separate secular agents, a principle which, of course, was acceptable to Stockenstrom.

Articles 23, 24 and 25, however, gave rise to most (297) of the unfavourable comment on Stockenstrom's system.

(293) Ibid. Art. 12.

(294) Ibid. Arts. 12, 20.

(295) Ibid. Art. 19.

(296) See his evidence Q. 1570, 1573. A.C. minutes. p. 186. 12.2.36.

(297) C.L. Stretch said of Stockenstrom's treaties that they "gave greater facilities to the colonists to recover stolen property" than D'Urban's system. (See Memorandum on the Stockenstrom Treaty System. Q. 1.)

But W. Boyce commented:

"If all the chicanery attributed to the most degraded branches of the legal profession had been put in requi-

((continued foot of p. 215.))

In these Articles, the familiar features of Stockenström's frontier policy appear: the clearly understood right to fire upon, disable or kill any Kaffir caught in the act of committing depredations in the colony, if he could in no other way be secured or prevented from completing his crime; the obligation on the part of colonists, to prove that their property was properly guarded by an armed herdsman and that pursuit of robbers had commenced immediately or, if the robbery took place at night, not later than dawn next day; the absolute prohibition upon the taking of Kaffir cattle as compensation, except under certain circumstances, and then with the authority of the chiefs; and the obligation resting upon individuals to prove before a frontier authority that the cattle retaken genuinely were their property.

The entirely new feature, though, is the prohibition upon the crossing of the boundaries by any patrol or armed party of any description. Article 23 as it stands is, in fact, precisely the instruction issued by Bouyke in 1826: that colonists were at liberty to defend their property and even, when no other means prevailed, to shoot and kill depredators caught in the act withⁱⁿ the colonial boundary; but that no party should cross the borders in pursuit of depredators. (298) Against this system Stockenström had protested very strongly, as has been shown. (299) It is, therefore, surprising, on the face of it, to find this provision in his treaties. And it

sition for the purpose of defeating the ends of justice, and of tempting the border Kaffers by tolerating a perfect impunity in theft, to become a nation of thieves, a better system for insuring such a result could hardly have been devised." (Notes on South African Affairs, p.94.)
 (298) See Military Secretary to Commandant on the Frontier, 11.4.26. Theal: Records. XXVI, 284; and Secretary to Government to Landdrost of Albany, Somerset and Graaff-Reinet. Ibid. p. 283.
 (299) Vide supra p. 122 ff.

is very likely that, in this respect, Stockenstrom relinquished one of his own ideas in order to meet Glenelg, for it is probable that the inclusion of this clause was at Glenelg's insistence. ⁽³⁰⁰⁾ In this connection, however, three points must be borne in mind. Stockenstrom approved wholeheartedly of the principle of recognizing the Kaffir tribes and their chiefs as sovereign and independent in their own territory, and to be treated with on a basis of accepted international law. In a plan based upon such a principle, an armed party unauthorized by government could not be allowed for every theft to make an incursion into the territory of another nation state. Secondly, even in the heat of his arguments against Bourke's system as it applied to his district, Stockenstrom had admitted that it might be applied to the Kaffir community, where there were chiefs who could be held responsible for the acts of their people. ⁽³⁰¹⁾ Finally, and most important; when Stockenstrom introduced this principle into his treaties, he went much further than Bourke had done. Bourke stopped short at preventing the border patrols from invading Kaffir territory to obtain redress. He made no provision for the punishing of depredators who managed to get across the borders, or the compensating of the colonists. ⁽³⁰²⁾ Stockenstrom, on the other hand, made definite arrangements for the further proceedings of a patrol in pursuit of stolen cattle. The party concerned was to approach the pakati nearest the spot where the traces crossed the border, and satisfy him that the charge was well-founded. This done, the pakati was

(300) Vide infra pp. 269 ff. for discussion on Stockenstrom's evidence on Bourke's system.

(301) See Stockenstrom to Commissioners of Inquiry, 9.8.26. Auto. I. 231 ff. and Stockenstrom to Plasket, 7.4.27. C.o. 2694.

(302) A fact upon which Bathurst commented. See Bathurst to Bourke 2.7.26. Theal: Records. XXVII, 20.

bound at once to continue the search into Kaffir territory and do everything in his power to check the depredators and restore the stolen property. The plundered parties could accompany the pakati on the search, provided they went unarmed and did not assist in violence of any kind. Should the cattle be recovered, the owner could take them to the nearest agent or military post, there give a statement of the proceedings - on oath if required - and then take his property, leaving the pakati and the chief to deal further with the depredators. The chiefs were bound by treaty to exert themselves to the utmost to seize and punish the criminals. The party in pursuit of stolen cattle also had the alternative, if he did not consider it safe to pursue the thieves at once, of asking for a policeman from the nearest military post, and then following the same procedure as explained above. If he did so and failed to recover the property, or if he did not consider it safe to follow the spoor through Kaffir territory, he could lay his case before the resident agent. The resident agent would then lay the case before the chief. If, after the lapse of one month, the depredators had not been discovered and the property returned, the chief would have to indemnify the person robbed to the full value of the property lost.

Into the merits or demerits of the treaty it is here unnecessary to enter. The significant point is, that all its basic features were entirely in accordance with the principles which Stockenstrom has been shown to have held. Even the fact of the prohibition of the crossing of the boundary by armed parties from the colony, when taken in conjunction with the further arrangements - whatever may be said of their practicability - loses the sinister significance which Stockenstrom's opponents read into it.

That Stockenstrom himself was not altogether sure of the practicability of the final scheme under the conditions prevailing in the colony, he himself admitted later. ⁽³⁰³⁾ But he approved whole-heartedly of the principles upon which Glenelg planned to base his policy, and of most of the details of it. He was confident of his administrative experience and ability, and probably relied upon his own undoubted personal influence with the chiefs to do much. And if, in the final arrangements which were worked out, there were features of which he may not, originally, have approved, one may, perhaps, without attempting to whitewash Stockenstrom, observe that there must be few people in government service in the happy position of approving every principle upon which they are expected to act.

In conclusion, one may say that there is a remarkable consistency in the fundamental principles of frontier policy to which Stockenstrom gave expression as Commissioner-General, during his stay in England, and as Lieutenant-Governor. Certain basic features have been found constantly to recur in his statements on frontier policy. J.D. Pitman has been shown to have been in error in assuming a fundamental difference in the policy towards the tribes beyond the Eastern border outlined in the letter to Spring-Rice in 1834 and that to Glenelg in 1836. The one major deviation from former principles which appears in the Gaiika Treaty viz. Article 23, while it may well have been a concession to Glenelg, was not as completely inconsistent with Stockenstrom's former views as might at first appear. It cannot, therefore, with any justification be claimed that Stockenstrom prostituted his fundamental principles in order to ingratiate himself with Exeter Hall or Glenelg.

CHAPTER IV.

The Zeko Incident and the Commoro of 1831.

Gladstone vs. Stockenström.

The Zeko Incident and the Commando of 1831:(1) The Contemporary Documents.

Because of the disproportionate importance which this episode assumed, both in Stockenstrom's evidence before the Aborigines Committee and in the contemporary press and public opinion ⁽¹⁾ it merits a fairly detailed discussion. The whole affair has been very clearly handled by J.D. Pitman in his thesis on the Commissioner-Generalship. ⁽²⁾ But it is necessary first to study this incident more specifically from the point of view of Stockenstrom's own interpretation of it in 1830 and 1831, and independently of the further statements and discussions of 1836.

On 30 April 1830, the Secretary to Government sent Stockenstrom two despatches from Somerset, relative to recent numerous depredations on the frontier. ⁽³⁾ Stockenstrom was asked to investigate and report, and if he considered it necessary, to meet Somerset and make plans for drastic action against the guilty kraals. Somerset ⁽⁴⁾ had written reporting increased thefts, particularly of horses, and expressed himself "altogether dissatisfied with the border chiefs," especially Enno and Botman, who persisted in trying to return to their old haunts (i.e. within the ceded territory.) He reported the frontier to be in a very unsettled condition. He wrote, in a passage which illustrates the fundamental difference between Stockenstrom's attitude and that of Somerset:

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- (1) See the account of Graham's Town public meeting. GTJ 28.1.36 and 4.2.36, and references in GTJ editorials e.g. 4.8.36.
 (2) J.D. Pitman: The Commissioner-Generalship of Andries Stockenstrom. (Unpublished M.A. thesis, U.C.T.)
 (3) Bell to Stockenstrom 30.4.30. A.C. minutes p. 102. (Enclosure No. 1 in Memoir of 1833.
 (4) Somerset to Wade 8.4.30 and 23.4.30. A.C. minutes p. 103 - 105. (Enclosures 2 and 3 in Memoir of 1833.)

It is evident that the Caffres generally are perfectly indifferent as to the terms they may be on with the colony, although the chiefs themselves are fully sensible of the great advantage they derive by the intimate footing they are now upon with us. They have, however, but little influence with the people, or if they have any, they know that their interference in checking depredations materially deprives them of their popularity and influence, as the moment a chief is severe with his people on account of depredations on the colonists, his Caffres immediately join a chief of more liberal principles. (5)

Stockenström accordingly met Somerset and discussed the position with him. On 12 May 1830 he reported to Bell from Fort Beaufort. (6) The depredations, he said, "as far as they are correctly stated," had been committed by Kaffirs beyond the Chumie and Keiskamma. (7) He denied that any of the chiefs had the slightest intention of disturbing the frontier, though Botman was certainly dissatisfied because he was not allowed to live on the Barooka. Enno had in fact lately been "of essential service" in the recovery of stolen cattle. The general unrest was to be attributed to two things: the prevailing distress in Kaffirland, and the carelessness of the colonists, which afforded to the Kaffirs "every temptation" to carry off cattle.

"The distress in Cafferland," Stockenström wrote, "is beyond belief, and the plundering of that tribe, among themselves, supasses by far any thing they do to the Colony." Somerset had described the country between Fort Beaufort and the Gonappe (Koonap) as "swarming with cattle without herds," and David de Lange, whom he had brought with him as authority, confirmed this. "This apathy and carelessness," said Stockenström, "neutralizes all the efforts, both of the colonial authorities and the Caffre chiefs." He pointed out that the inhabitants

(5) Somerset to Wade 8.4.30. loc. cit.

(6) Stockenström to Bell. 12.5.30. A.C. minutes, p. 105. (enclosure No. 4 in Memoir of 1833.)

(7) A typographical error (presumably) gives these as Chumie and Regskamma.

fully understood that the law did not forbid the use of firearms in defence of life and property when necessary. The colonists therefore had no excuse for leaving their cattle unguarded and then depending on military assistance for their recovery. Stockenstrom asserted that "not near the number of cattle reported as stolen by Caffres are actually so stolen; and of what is stolen, the greatest proportion is lost by neglect."

"I see more and more reason every day for adhering to those suggestions which I submitted to his Excellency in Graham's Town," Stockenstrom said. Under no circumstances should any cattle but such as were actually lost be taken from Kaffirland. And no cattle should be followed up if they could not be proved to have been properly guarded, or if they had been lost for more than a day, or the loser did not know the time of the loss. In the event of good proof of any kraal's persisting in plundering, a commando should suddenly be sent to punish that kraal severely. In the case of Tyali, if he were to be found guilty - "upon good proof, not mere suspicion" - of recent robberies, he might be driven out of the Mankazana as a warning to others. Somerset had seemed well-informed about a certain kraal in possession of a great number of stolen horses; it would have been desirable if there had been some authority to sanction a surprise attack on that kraal. But "great prudence would of course be necessary in judging of the proofs."

"I am so particular about proofs," Stockenstrom explained, "because we run the risk of adding to the number of plunderers, if we happen to make innocent parties suffer." He concluded by saying that he saw nothing in the state of the frontier to warrant any extraordinary

measures. Preventive measures alone could avail.

However, in consequence of Somerset's further report of the behaviour of the Kaffirs, on 16 May, and his urging the establishment of a military post between Fort Beaufort and Fort Wilshire, ⁽⁸⁾ Stockenström undertook to provide him with thirty or forty Kat River Hottentots for the post, and recommended the removal of the kraals on the Mankazam. ⁽⁹⁾ On 17 May he reported to Bell that the defiant manner which Somerset reported the chiefs to have assumed, when he had last entered their kraals, and the way in which they had harassed the Hottentot locations, induced him to recommend the immediate expulsion ⁽¹⁰⁾ of the Kaffirs on the Mankazana.

He undertook to supply Somerset with 150 men of the civil force, to enable him to punish any attempt at resistance or to rush upon any kraal known to have been guilty of aggression against the colony, or in which stolen cattle were known to be harboured.

This recommendation, Stockenström pointed out, was entirely consistent with the policy he had submitted to the Governor at Graham's Town, and in accordance with it also, he gave his "strongest advice (whatever may be the range of the commandant's operations) against any capture of Caffre cattle." "It is necessary," he said:

that the authority of the British Government be vindicated, and any attempt to set it at defiance visited with immediate punishment; but it would be the worst policy to encourage the carelessness of the colonists by indemnification for the consequences thereof.

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Stockenström and Somerset met on 14 June, and on 14 and 15 June a burgher force of about 250 assembled on

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- (8) Somerset to Stockenström 16.5.30. A.C. minutes, p.106
(Enclosure No. 5 in Memoir of 1833.)
(9) Stockenström to Somerset, 19.5.30. A.C. minutes p. 106.
(Enclosure No. 6 in Memoir of 1833.)
(10) Stockenström to Bell. 17.5.30. A.C. minutes, p. 107.
(Enclosure No 7. in Memoir of 1833.)
(11) Stockenström to Bell 17.6.30. A.C. minutes, p. 107 -
108, for what follows. (Enclosure No. 9 in Memoir of 1833.-)

the Mancazana and at Fort Beaufort. Tyali was sent for and arrived at sunrise on 15 June, when he was told that the late conduct of himself and his people had provoked the execution of the threat held out to him by the Governor. Tyali eventually admitted that he knew the whereabouts of a large proportion of the stolen cattle, and offered to guide the party to the guilty kraals. Pato made a similar offer, and it was decided to give the chiefs the opportunity of proving the sincerity of their friendly professions. This was deemed expedient, Stockenstrom added, as the force consisted principally of those who had been losers by Kaffir depredations, and who came forward so readily, in the hope that they would now have an opportunity of searching for what they had lost.

Somerset divided the force into three divisions to surprise the plundering kraals. Stockenstrom commented ⁽¹²⁾ that he hoped the cattle would be found, and an example made of those who had kept the frontier in a state of disturbance so long. But, at any rate, two things would be achieved: the Kaffirs would see with what little trouble and in how short a time a strong force could be brought against them, and the colonists would be convinced, not only of the anxiety of Government to protect and assist them, but also that nothing but their own watchfulness could effectually prevent the loss of their cattle, for if these were found to have been sent out of Kaffirland to the tribes beyond, as he anticipated, the farmers would realize that preventive measures alone could insure their stock against theft. He added, characteristically:

It is superfluous to add that there is a great desire among the farmers to procure Caffre cattle in lieu of their own, if the latter be not found; but we must resist any attempt at such indemnification.

(12) Ibid.

Accordingly, Stockenstrom issued orders warning the Burgher forces that he would have an oath exacted as to the cattle to be claimed, so that those possessing themselves of Kaffir cattle would have to answer for (13) perjury as well as theft.

On the 23 June, Stockenstrom reported on the aspects of the proceedings of the commando which fell within his province. (14) The chiefs principally concerned in the depredations were Gebeco, Geco, (Zeko), Magoogo and Jejane, and to surprise the kraals of those men became the principal object of the commandant. Jejane and Jebeco had fled Eastward; but Magoogo was taken by the division under Captain Lowen, guided by Congo. Captain Aitchison reported that his division had received little or no assistance from Tyali, but on the contrary had apparently been deliberately misled by him. The third division, the burghers under provisional Field-Commandant Erasmus, surprised Zeco's kraals, and "numbers of cattle taken from the colony (some being lately) were found therein."

Stockenstrom reported the incident of the death of Zeko, without comment, as follows:

Mr. Erasmus reports, that when he had collected the cattle of the said kraals, and was proceeding with them to Fort Wilshire where the colonial cattle were to be selected, he was furiously attacked by the Caffres, led on by Geco (sc. Zeko) in person, in a thick bush, the result of which was, that this chief and several of his people were killed.

(13) Stockenstrom quoted the order, given in writing to Field-Cornet Erasmus at Kat River on 15 June 1830, in the statement read to the Committee on 18 April 1836. A.C. minutes p. 320. It reads: "As it will be permitted to every one upon this commando to turn out such cattle as are found among the Caffres, and which he can swear to as having been stolen from the colony, I have to order you to make known to all under your directions, that in case of doubt the oath will actually be imposed; and that consequently those who appropriate to themselves Caffre cattle, expose themselves to be prosecuted as well for perjury as theft." This is Stockenstrom's own translation from the Dutch. A version with minor variation appears in Auto. I., 394.

(14) Stockenstrom to Bell. 23.6.30. A.C. minutes, pp. 108 - 109. (Enclosure No 11 in Memoir of 1833.)

Stockenstrom expressed himself satisfied "from every information I have been able to collect in Caffreland," that the accusations against Geco, Magoogo, Jejane and Gebeco were well founded; and the punishment of the former "justly merited."⁽¹⁵⁾ He reported that "great quantities of Caffre cattle were necessarily brought out with those recognized by the colonists as stolen, and sent out to Fort Wilshire, principally the property of Geco, but some claimed by Tyali."

Tyali's behaviour seems to have been most unsatisfactory throughout.⁽¹⁶⁾ At first he expressed great displeasure at Zeko's fate, and claimed his cattle as his due. Nor was he in the least put out of countenance by the query as to how, if this were the case, so many colonial cattle came to be in Zeko's kraals; but promptly asserted that he had only now found out the villainy of Zeko and his people, and would forthwith punish them and deprive them of all they possessed.

Stockenstrom told him that it was not the intention of Government to let him profit by the depredations which he had at least connived at, if not encouraged. Rather than leave Zeko's cattle at his mercy, Stockenstrom detained them, since it was evident that Tyali would possess himself of the cattle if they were allowed to recross the Keiskamma. "For reasons often repeated" and because it was impossible to make a fair distribution without the returns in Graham's Town, Stockenstrom refused to indemnify the farmers from this stock on the spot. But "as it is an object to make examples of the kraals so clearly convicted of systematic plunder, and it would be very bad policy to enrich Tyali by such an

(15) The "former" is presumably Zeko, although this may refer in general to Zeko and Magoogo, since the latter two escaped.

(16) Stockenstrom to Bell. 23.6.30. A.C. minutes. pp. 108 - 109.

aquisition," Stockenstrom ordered the cattle taken from Zeko's kraals to be turned over to the Civil Commissioners of Albany and Somerset. (17)

Tyali was ordered to evacuate the Mankazana, which was to be cleared by a patrol as soon as he had had reasonable time to remove his people and their property.

Stockenstrom expressed regret that he could not devise another form of punishment for the captured Magoogo, who admitted the charges against his people and had no other excuse than that he could not restrain them. But he had no alternative but to detain him for the Governor to decide upon the case, telling him at the same time that the cattle stolen by himself and his people, or an equivalent number, to be determined by government, would be insisted on before his release. Stockenstrom concluded by expressing his regret that the proceedings of the expedition appeared to be the only ones likely to keep the Kaffirs in check. The punishment of two notorious leaders of robbers might well act as a salutary check upon the thieving propensities of other chiefs, and confirm the majority of chiefs in their peaceable conduct. But, he added, he would not predict a diminution in the loss of cattle by the farmers. That they alone could bring about, for, even at the height of the campaign, the flocks of most of those living near the frontier were still left as unprotected as if they were in the safest part of the colony. (18)

(17) According to principles laid down in his letter to Cole on 8.5.29. and the Suggestions of the Commissioner-General, Sept. 29. Vide supra. p. 177.

(18) And according to the regulations, settlers in the ceded territory were bound always to keep armed men on the locations to guard the cattle. See Suggestions of the Commissioner-General, Sept. 1829.

It is clear from this despatch that, in 1830, Stockenstrom was perfectly satisfied with the proceedings of the Commando, and the justice of it, although, as before, he censured the carelessness of the colonists and was cautious about the dangers of indemnification. The removal by Erasmus's party of all the cattle from Zeko's kraals appears to have been in conformity with Somerset's instructions to the commando. ⁽¹⁹⁾ The actual order to bring out all the cattle, from which the colonial cattle could then be selected, would have been given by Somerset and not by Stockenstrom, since Stockenstrom had no authority to issue military instructions on commando ⁽²⁰⁾ to either the military or the burgher force. But that Stockenstrom knew of, and agreed with, this arrangement, is certainly suggested by the passage:

Mr. Erasmus reports that when he had collected the cattle of the said kraals, and was proceeding with them to Fort Wilshire where the Colonial cattle were to be selected...etc." ⁽²¹⁾

The plan was to surprise the kraals, seize all the cattle found there, and bring them to Fort Wilshire, where the colonial cattle were to be selected and the Kaffir cattle returned. The officers commanding the three divisions were instructed to explain this to the chiefs concerned. ⁽²²⁾

There was, when the commando set out, no question of the retention of any Kaffir cattle. Stockenstrom's views on this were clearly expressed in his correspondence with

(19) See Evidence of Capt. Aitchison. Q. 436. A.C. minutes p. 38.

(20) See Instructions for the Commissioner-General. 27.9.28. No. 10. Printed in A.C. minutes, p. 208.

(21) Quoted in full earlier, from Stockenstrom to Bell 23.6.30. A.C. minutes p. 108 - 109. Somerset, of course, stated definitely, in his deposition before Campbell in 1836, (see papers handed in in Wade's evidence, Q. 3543. A.C. minutes, p. 384.) that Stockenstrom explained this order in Dutch to the burghers after Somerset had decided on it, and the affidavits of the burghers questioned before Campbell confirm this, (See papers handed in in Wade's evidence, A. 2785 and 3543. A.C. minutes, pp. 300 - 305 and p. 384) But the main issue at this point is what can be deduced from Stockenstrom's own despatches at the time.

the Secretary to Government preceding the commando, and in his instruction to Field-Commandant Erasmus. (23) Only colonial cattle were to be kept by the burghers. But Stockenstrom's instructions to Erasmus seem quite clearly to refer to the actual claiming of cattle by the burghers, quite apart from the plan of campaign for the commando, and were, in fact, issued on the day previous (24) to the issuing of Somerset's final instructions. In accordance with his principles, (25) on hearing of the attack made by Zeko on the Erasmus party, Stockenstrom decided upon the confiscation of all the cattle, and held to this decision in order to prevent Tyali from seizing (26) the cattle he claimed from Zeko.

The whole affair, however, assumed for Stockenstrom a very different complexion in the middle of 1831. (27) While he was in Graham's Town in June, Somerset spoke to him about the necessity for an expedition into Kaffirland, to recover horses which had lately been stolen. Stockenstrom refused to approve any expedition which might endanger the apparent tranquility of the Kaffir borders without first conducting a careful investigation as to its necessity. Accordingly, he went up to the Kat to sound the feeling among the tribes. His enquiries produced not only confirmation of his opinion as to the tranquility of the frontier, but accounts of three incidents in particular, which seemed only too clearly to illustrate his argument that much of the frontier unrest was the result of abuse of the reprisal system. These were the cases of Scheepers and Gordon, (28) and a new version of the Zeko incident of the previous year.

(22) See Evidence of Aitchison Q. 436 A.C. minutes p.38 - he quoted this order, as an example of orders given on commando, not a propos of anything to do with the Zeko affair.

(23) Vide supra p.224 Footnote (13)

(24) viz. 15 June and 16 June.

(25) See Suggestions of the Commissioner General. Sept 1829. A.C. minutes, pp. 211 - 212. Vide supra p.176.

(26) Stockenstrom to Bell 23.6.30. Vide Supra p.225.

On 14 July, Stockenstrom received a note from the Secretary to Government, enclosing Somerset's request for authorization for a commando force to trace stolen horses, and notifying the Commissioner-General that the Governor had consented to the expedition. The Civil Commissioner, Bell added, would afford Somerset the necessary assistance, and "his Excellency is not desirous that you should be disturbed in this matter unless you shall deem your presence necessary."

Stockenstrom replied promptly, pointing out acidly that he was right on the spot, and that, moreover, the condition of the frontier by no means warranted the sending of a commando as he had in fact told Somerset. To illustrate his second contention, he used the cases of Schessers (Scheepers) and Gordon as illustrations.

Scheepers had a location between the Koonap and the Kat, and was therefore bound to have four armed men, two at least guarding his herds. He reported to the Brigade-Major a loss of 36 cattle - a figure which Field-Cornet Erasmus evidently queried - and, not finding his own cattle, took 63 from Botman's kraals to indemnify himself, according to the Brigade-Major's return of 3 June. Botman, it was reported, not being strong enough to attack the colony, indemnified himself in turn by attacking a weaker kraal. Stockenstrom pointed out that such a large number of cattle could only have been lost through neglect; and "the taking of Botman's cattle was as decidedly plunder as ever the Caffres were guilty of, the only difference is, that we being the

(27) For what follows, see Stockenstrom to Bell, 14.7.31. A.C. minutes, pp. 110 - 111.

(28) Stockenstrom mentions the two former in the despatch cited above, but not the latter, although he had heard of it on 13 July, as is shown in the extract from his journal in Auto. I, 399 ff. (also printed in A.C. minutes, pp. 321 - 323, being part of Stockenstrom's letter to the Committee 1.4.36. ibid.)

(29) Bell to Stockenstrom 1.7.31. A.C. minutes, p. 109. (Enclosure No. 12 in Stockenstrom's Memoir of 1833.)

stronger party can do by open violence what the Caffres must do by stealth."

In the second case, Gordon, also a settler in the Koonap, sent his brother-in-law S. de Beer on the spoor of stolen cattle. De Beer swore solemnly to Lieutenant Warden and Field-Cornet Groepe that 25 head were lost, though the spoor of only 11 could be found. Warden eventually overrode his protests and sent him back with "9 or 11." Of these de Beer only returned about half to Gordon, who promptly wrote to Warden, complaining that he had only received so few back when he had lost no less than 11.

"There," commented Stockenstrom, "is the assertion of the owner himself, and there are the traces counted, yet De Bear (sic) was ready to take all the oaths imaginable that there were 25 lost, for which (taking Schesser's case as a criterion) he could claim from the first Caffre kraal 43 $\frac{1}{2}$ head of Caffre cattle, thus gaining 300 per cent. by losing cattle."

Stockenstrom pointed out that it had been a positive understanding with the Kaffir chiefs and the settlers beyond the Koonap, that no Kaffir cattle should be taken to replace cattle lost by the colonists. He emphasized that this preventive measure would ensure "care, caution and honest industry" on the part of the colonists, and would at the same time give the Kaffirs security in the possession of their property. But he maintained that

(30) Somerset to Bell 24.6.31. A.C. minutes, pp. 110 - 111. (Enclosure No. 13 in Memoir of 1833.)

(31) Stockenstrom to Bell 14.7.31. A.C. minutes pp. 110 - 111 (Enclosure No. 14 in Memoir of 1833.)

(32) Ibid. for Scheepers and Gordon cases, and what follows.

the system being pursued on the frontier rendered his whole arrangement, of which the Government had so warmly approved, completely useless, by "giving to the bad a most powerful interest in sloth, false reports and perjury, and by harassing the good by an incessant warfare." Stockenstrom reiterated that he considered no punishment too severe for marauders and plunderers. But he would be able to prove to the Government that, in the existing backward state of improvement of ^{both} the border colonists and the Kaffirs, the difficulty in the way of reducing the military force, and any need for augmentation of it, were "attributable altogether to the ferment we keep up among the Caffres, by depriving them of the means of subsistence."⁽³³⁾

(33)

On 29 July, Bell wrote to inform Stockenstrom that, had the Governor known, before receiving Somerset's request for a commando, that Stockenstrom had already objected to it, he would certainly not have sanctioned it. Stockenstrom, the governor considered, should have reported Somerset's request and his objections at the time. But, under the circumstances, he would have considered Stockenstrom justified in forbidding the commando, even when it had government sanction. The governor, Bell, added, would not fail to communicate with Somerset respecting his proceedings on that occasion.

"In regard to the cases of Schessers and Gordon," Bell concluded, "particularly the former, if the representations you have made be substantiated in such a manner as to enable his Excellency to act upon them, he will most certainly deprive those persons of their promised grants of land."

(33) Bell to Stockenstrom 29.7.31. A.C. minutes, pp. 111-112. (Enclosure No. 15 in Memoir of 1833.)

(34)

Stockenstrom's reply revealed a growing tension in his relations with the military commandant:

If Lieut-Colonel Somerset had told me that he considered himself responsible for more than the military arrangements of frontier defence, and that he would appeal to higher authority, I would have troubled his Excellency with my opinions in detail, and convinced the commandant that he had mistaken his province.

But the conference was of such a nature that a report on it "could only have been construed into a desire to show that there did exist differences between the commandant and myself." Stockenstrom emphasized his surprise at the course events had taken: he had left Graham's Town under the impression that Somerset was prepared to leave the responsibility for not undertaking a commando to Stockenstrom himself.

Stockenstrom's reference to the cases of Schessers and Gordon in this letter is extremely puzzling. "...As to substantiating any thing I have advanced respecting the cases of Schessers or Gordon, or any body or thing else, I humbly beg leave to refer to the result of the crisis to which matters have been brought," he wrote.

Since he had at that time been representing the state of the frontier as sufficiently tranquil to require no extraordinary measures, one is at a loss to interpret his reference to a "crisis." It may refer to the increased depredations and unrest which Somerset reported on 5 August. (35) It is significant, in view of what he later said in evidence, that he apparently understood the governor to be requiring him to substantiate what he had said about Schessers and Gordon. Stockenstrom was normally prepared fully to investigate charges against

(34) Stockenstrom to Bell. 13.8.31. A.C. minutes, p. 112. (Enclosure No. 16 in Memoir of 1833.)

(35) Somerset to Wade. 5.8.31. A.C. minutes pp. 112 - 113. (Enclosure No. 18 in Memoir of 1833.)

the colonists which came to his notice, which makes his remark here seem rather strange.

A possible explanation suggests itself: since the facts of the actual taking of more cattle from the Kaffirs than he had lost, on the part of Schessers, and the false representation of losses, in an attempt to gain Kaffir cattle, made by de Beer, were evidently based on information from the Brigade-Major's returns and from Lieutenant Warden, that might have been considered sufficient substantiation of the statements Stockenstrom had made. He must have thought so, for he made them without further investigation, whereas he refrained from reporting anything concerning the Zeko incident, of which he was aware when he reported on Schessers and Gordon, until after he had enquired further. Stockenstrom was extremely sensitive to criticism, and in Bell's despatch his proceedings in connection with Somerset's commando had been criticized - in fact, it had been implied that he had not wholly done his duty in not reporting his objections when Somerset had first proposed the commando. Moreover, he was still extremely angry at what he considered to have been a complete disregard for his authority and his opinions as to the causes of the frontier unrest and the remedy for it. It seems likely that when Stockenstrom, his mind in a turmoil of angry emotions produced by all that had gone before, came to read the last sentence of Bell's despatch, asking for substantiation of his representations, he read into it a demand for a substantiation of what he had "advanced respecting the cases of Schessers or Gordon," i.e. the conclusions as to the causes of frontier unrest of which these cases

(36)
 were an illustration. This, coupled with a sensitiveness about the possible implications contained in the Governor's request for a substantiation of his charges, might account for Stockenström's answer.

Meanwhile, ever since 13 July 1831, Stockenström had been investigating the Zeko incident. (37) His first inkling that the episode might have been otherwise than Erasmus had reported it, came from Tyali, whom Stockenström found on 13 July, busily engaged, he stated, in recovering and restoring stolen horses. Tyali asserted that Zeko and six men were treacherously murdered, and one dangerously wounded, by Erasmus's party the previous year. Stockenström, he said, had told him that the commando would only seize cattle recognized as colonial property, and that no Kaffir cattle would be taken, or Kaffir molested, unless the commando met with resistance. He had accordingly given orders that no-one should interfere with the commando searching the flocks. Zeko, when he saw Erasmus rounding up all his cattle, asked him why he did so. Erasmus replied that he was ordered to do so, but told Zeko "he might accompany the cattle to Fort Wilshire, and there demand them of you" - but Zeko and his men were to leave their assagais behind. As a concession, Erasmus allowed Zeko first to pick out the milch cows and leave them behind. Then Zeko and several Kaffirs, armed only with kiveries, accompanied the party, assisting to drive the cattle. Suddenly, when the cattle were in the bush, some Kaffirs on a nearby hill shouted, the cattle made a rush, and the burghers commenced an indiscriminate fire in the midst of them,

(36) See the concluding two paragraphs of the despatch of 14.7.31 quoted supra pp. 230-231 for this.

(37) See extract from Commissioner-General's Journal, Auto. I, 399 ff. (or A.C. minutes, pp. 321 - 323) for what follows.

killing Zeko and six other men, and wounding an eighth, Tyali stated that he had not seen any of this himself, since he had been with Aitchison's group, but when Stockenstrom told him at Fort Wilshire that he would seize Zeko's cattle because the Kaffirs had attacked the Boors, he had enquired, and found the case as he had described. His informants were several Kaffirs who had been present.

On 14 July, Stockenstrom reached the location of Provisional Field-Cornet Groepe, where he was met by Macomo, who also came forward with a complaint about the murder of Zeko, differing from Tyali's only in that he had not been told the exact number of men killed. (38)

On 16 July, Stockenstrom sent unexpectedly for the Hottentot Boesak, who was Erasmus's servant and had been with him on the 1830 commando. The statement obtained from him proved to be substantially the same as Tyali's. (39) He described the events at the kraal as Tyali had done, saying that Erasmus told Zeko that he was taking all the cattle to Fort Wilshire "according to orders from the Commissioner-General and the commandant." And he appears to have been convinced that no Kaffirs among the cattle were armed when the shooting took place. Stockenstrom noted, however, that "it is necessary to observe that the witness prevaricated repeatedly, and that with difficulty the above answers were procured, so that his statement must be received with much suspicion."

(38) Macomo on the same occasion complained that a patrol in search of cattle had shot one of his men, but on being questioned he said that he had not been present and did not know the particulars. To which Stockenstrom replied that he must inquire; for "if he either stole the cattle, or threw or threatened to throw assagais at the patrol, he could not expect to be otherwise treated."

(39) A.C. minutes, p. 320.

On the same day, Stockenstrom sent Erasmus, who was about to set out on the 1831 commando, a note, advising him "to hear what is charged against you by the Caffres about the death of Geco, in order that you may defend yourself against it. I have heard your Hottentot Boezak, but he constantly prevaricates." (40)

Provisional Field-Cornet Groepe, questioned on 27 August, (41) said that he had not been of Erasmus's party, but that Lodewyk Peffer had, and had subsequently expressed the opinion that Zeko and his party had been "innocently shot." (Which, taken in relation to the rest of the context, presumably implies "shot without justification.") Groepe described a recent discussion of the incident at his house. One Johannes van der Merwe, who had said that he had himself begun by firing a loose charge among the cattle, justified the act; but he, van Rooyen, (another boor who had been on the commando) and Peffer agreed that the Kaffirs had been unarmed. Stockenstrom sent for Peffer to come to Groepe's that evening, and also sent a message to Tyali to assemble as many chiefs as possible at his kraal on 29 August, as well such Kaffirs as were present when Zeko lost his life.

Peffer's account confirmed what had been stated by the other witnesses. In the notes on his statement appear the words: "did not hear Erasmus order the people to fire."

(42)

On 29 August, Tyali produced three Kaffirs who

(40) Cited by Stockenstrom in his letter to the Committee 1.4.36. Quoted in A.C. minutes, p. 321.

(41) Noted in Commissioner-General's Journal for 27.8.31. A.C. minutes, p. 322.

(42) At a meeting of the chiefs "Macomo, Chale, Anta, Feshla and several others" to investigate the murder of a Hottentot herd, and depredations reported by Somerset to Wade on 5 August and submitted to Stockenstrom by Bell on 12 August. A.C. minutes, pp. 112 - 113. (Enclosures No. 17 and 18 in Memoir of 1833.)

had been with Zeko when he was killed. One of these gave a statement confirming Tyali's version of the death of Zeko, "with this difference, that as soon as the firing commenced Geco and the other Caffres tried to made their escape, and were pursued and shot in their flight."

At the same time, Stockenstrom found the chiefs apparently zealous in their search for stolen cattle, and for the second criminal implicated in the recent (43) Hottentot murder - one had already been traced and (44) delivered up, together with some of the cattle stolen. On 8 August, Chalmers had forwarded to Stockenstrom a complaint from Tyali that a patrol had seized 46 cattle from his Fort Beaufort kraals, but that only 20 had actually been stolen. He requested the return of 26, and complained further that his people were being expelled from the kraals near Fort Beaufort, though he was not (45) conscious of having forfeited the right to be there. At the meeting on 29 August, Tyali complained that only (46) 16 cattle had been returned to him. He and Makomo also complained that one of their people was lately seized by a patrol, held down over an ant-hill and severely flogged; while Macomo reported that the Kaffir recently shot by a patrol had neither stolen cattle, nor thrown, (47) nor threatened to throw an assagai.

Previously, on 22 August, Stockenstrom had had occasion to query a return of the Brigade-Major quoting Field-Cornet F. Erasmus as having lost 57 cattle and 3 horses, whereas Stockenstrom knew, he stated, that (48) Erasmus had lost nothing for some time. And, on 30

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- (43) Commissioner-General's Journal. Auto. I, 404.
 (44) Somerset to Wade 12.8.31. A.C. minutes, p. 114.
 (Enclosure 22 in Memoir of 1833.)
 (45) Chalmers to Stockenstrom 8.8.31. Enclosure in
 Stockenstrom to Bell 22.8.31. C.o. 390.
 (46) Commissioner-General's Journal. Auto. I. 405.
 (47) Ibid. The incident is noted in footnote (38).
 (48) Stockenstrom to Somerset 22.8.31. Enclosure in
 Stockenstrom to Bell 22.8.31. C.o. 390.

August, he recorded in his Journal the arrival of the Kaffir Plaatje with a message from chief Botman, explaining that sickness had kept him from the meeting the previous day, and promising every exertion to find the second murderer of the Hottentot. He complained, moreover, of the seizure of 63 cattle from his kraals to indemnify Gerrit Scheepers, and requested restitution (49)

Meanwhile, on 5 August, Somerset had written to Wade to report the seizure of van Rooyen's Hottentot and his cattle and "numerous depredations" (of which there were no details), of such a nature that "unless, however, a speedy change takes place, it will be necessary to resort to severe and coercive measures, or the farmers will be totally ruined." He pointed out the virtual impossibility of tracing the spoor of cattle beyond the first kraal in the Chumie-Keiskamma area; and complained that talking to the chiefs was in most cases useless, for "they do not exert themselves in the least; but make ten thousand excuses for their people." (52)

This letter, (together with one of 12 August reprimanding Somerset for his proceedings in regard to the July 1831 commando) Bell sent to Stockenstrom on 12 August

(49) Commissioner-General's Journal. Auto. I, 405.

(50) Somerset to Wade. 5.8.31. A.G. minutes, p. 112. (Enclosure No. 18 in Memoir of 1853.)

(51) See footnote (42).

(52) Stockenstrom's version of the same situation is in the Commissioner-General's Journal (Auto. I, 405) of 29 August 1831, commenting on his conversation with the chiefs: "The Chiefs unanimously request that the Colonists may be made to take better care of their cattle; that the cattle of innocent Kaffirs may no longer be taken away, as they feel convinced that all the murders and depredations are owing to the revenge, and want of those, who lose their property in this manner. they add that they always rejoice when they hear of Kaffir plunderers being shot in the Colony; that they are always ready to give up those whom they can find out; but complain that those whom they have delivered up invariably escape unpunished."

(53)
for his report.

(54)
On 12 August, Somerset reported that Makomo's people had sent out one of the murderers and part of the stolen cattle, and that Botman would be ordered to make every exertion to find out the rest of the party and restore the cattle. He described Botman's kraals as "a nest of the greatest vagabonds in Caffreland," and, being so near the borders, as having "the readiest means of committing depredations without detection." Without the exertion of Macomo's Kaffirs, considerable difficulty would have been experienced in getting any clue as to the perpetrators of the last murder. Somerset hoped for authorization to call upon the chiefs to bring the parties concerned to trial and "to cause summary justice to be executed upon them in presence of the troops and Caffres assembled for the purpose." He went on:

Should those depredations continue, (and the country is full of Caffres yet) it will be necessary that whenever a patrol headed by an officer distinctly carries the spoor of cattle into any kraal, that the Caffres should be fired upon; and unless this example is made, the Caffres will not leave their present daring conduct, the farmers will be ruined, and the whole country continue in a most unsettled state.

This despatch also the Secretary to Government was careful to forward to Stockenstrom, with the request that he should co-operate with Somerset in carrying out whatever measures should be required for repressing the Kaffir inroads. (55) Stockenstrom, with all the Kaffir complaints which had recently come to his ears fresh in his mind, and confronted now with what must have seemed to him yet another proof of the complete incompatibility of Somerset's views on frontier policy with his own, was

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- (53) Bell to Stockenstrom 12.8.31. A.C. minutes, p. 112.
(Enclosure No. 17 in Memoir of 1833.)
(54) Somerset to Wade 12.8.31. A.C. minutes, p.
(Enclosure No. 22 in Memoir of 1833.)
(55) Bell to Stockenstrom 19.8.31. A.C. minutes, p.
(Enclosure No. 20 in Memoir of 1833.)

induced to write to the government in very strong terms
(56)
on the subject of the frontier.

Stockenstrom stated quite openly that, while he was prepared to co-operate to the utmost with Somerset towards the tranquility of the borders, he and the Commandant differed completely as to the policy to be adopted on the frontier. He reiterated his contention that the basis of all the frontier disturbances was the violation of the Governor's engagement with the chiefs that no Kaffir cattle would be allowed to be taken by parties in pursuit of stolen cattle. And again Stockenstrom insisted that the whole chain of plunder, murder and retaliation could be prevented simply by making the colonists look after their flocks. "The disgraceful neglect which takes place in this respect is well-known," he said, "and proves that the peace on the frontier would by many be considered a losing game."

Stockenstrom illustrated his point by quoting from Somerset's own despatches the instance of a man who, despite the supposedly disturbed state of the frontier, could leave an unarmed youth of sixteen to herd his
(57)
cattle - the lad was subsequently murdered by the Kaffirs. "I cannot better prove the mischief of our commandoes and patrols," Stockenstrom went on, "than by giving the history of one which took place last year." This was the commando of 1830, when the death of Zeko occurred, Tyali's version of which Stockenstrom now reported for the first time. After a brief resume of the affair as originally reported to the government, Stockenstrom proceeded to report Tyali's version.

(56) Stockenstrom to Bell, 31.8.31. A.C. minutes, pp. 115 - 116. (Enclosure No. 23 in Memoir of 1833.)

(57) See Somerset to Wade 12.8.31. A.C. minutes, p. 114 (Enclosure No. 21 in Memoir of 1833.)

"It now transpires," he wrote, "that Zeco and six of his men were murdered in cold blood," as they were proceeding, armed only with kiefies, to claim restitution of their own cattle from himself at Fort Wilshire. Stockenstrom represented the Caffres as "assisting the Boors in driving the cattle" when they were shot, but made no mention of the shouts of the Kaffirs on the hill, and the stampede of the cattle, which, according to the accounts of Tyali, Boesak and Peffer, seems to have precipitated the affray. He drew the conclusion that "there could be no other inducement for this brutal conduct but to have a plea for the confiscation of the Caffre cattle." Stockenstrom added that he had not been able to prove that Erasmus gave orders to fire, but "the confidence hitherto placed in him renders his false report the more unpardonable, and his dismissal I think a very necessary example." In this account, Stockenstrom stressed the fact that the Boors were told that any man taking Kaffir cattle would be severely punished, while the Kaffirs were threatened with confiscation of their cattle if they offered violence to the commando. But there is no indication that he considered Erasmus to have done wrong in bringing away all the cattle to Fort Wilshire in the first instance.

Stockenstrom went on to refer briefly to the various complaints of the Kaffir chiefs which had recently come to his notice, and referred, without specifying, to "several other complaints" which "cannot remain unnoticed." In the light of these circumstances, Stockenstrom wrote, it would be a miracle if Botman's Kaffirs

(58) These were the complaints cited in his Journal for 29 and 30 August (Auto. I, 404 - 405) and the complaint that, on the commando of July 1831 to recover stolen horses, every single horse worth having, whether colonial property or not, had been claimed by the Boors.

were "anything else than Lieutenant-Colonel Somerset represents them, 'a nest of the Greatest vagabonds in Caffreland.'" He concluded with a complaint that nothing had been reported to him directly concerning the commando of July 1831, or the patrols to which Somerset had referred in the despatches forwarded by Bell. The farmers, he said, should be left to guard their herds, and not given the excuse that cattle were seized while they were on patrol. As to Somerset's suggestion of "firing upon the Caffres of those kraals into which the patrol shall carry the spoor of stolen cattle," Stockenstrom dismissed it as impossible to be sanctioned - "the mere avowal of the intention would justify every outrage with which the Caffres could visit the colony."

In the face of all the confusing evidence which was later brought forward in connection with the events of the commando of 1830, it is difficult to arrive at a sound conclusion as to what really happened. The most probable explanation seems to be that the incidents took place as Tyali and the witnesses questioned by Stockenstrom described them and that the burgher party, possibly already excited and nervous, were panic-stricken when the shouting and cattle-stampeding occurred, and fired. Whether or not they were justified in assuming that the Kaffirs deliberately started the stampede with hostile intent it is impossible to say. Stockenstrom is open to criticism for reporting as he did on the strength only of the avowedly unsatisfactory evidence of Boesak, the evidence of one burgher, Peffer, and that of Tyali and his witness - especially as Tyali's own conduct during the 1830 campaign had been decidedly unsatisfactory, and he was known to have had an interest in Zeko's cattle

himself. Moreover, in making his report, Stockenstrom drew a very grave conclusion without mentioning the chief extenuating factor: the shouting of the Kaffirs and the stampede of the cattle.

It was unlike Stockenstrom to condemn a colonist lightly: and for Erasmus he had previously had considerable respect. What is the explanation? Stockenstrom at this time was avowedly anxious to prove his argument against the whole patrol and reprisal system, which Somerset saw as the only solution to the frontier problem. Throughout July and August 1831, he spoke in strong terms against that system, in order to prevent the Governor from being induced to allow another expedition such as that of July 1831. Stockenstrom's investigations just prior to his receiving Somerset's August despatches revealed several instances of the abuse of the patrol system and the violation of the governor's agreement with the Kaffirs, including, apparently, an instance of a false return of cattle stolen, submitted by the very P. Erasmus in whom he had previously had considerable confidence. It seems reasonable to suggest that all these elements combined to make Stockenstrom accept at its face value the revised version of the Zeko incident, and to report as strongly as he did.

The events of July and August 1831 seem to have convinced Stockenstrom that he was powerless to impose his views on frontier policy on the authorities, and that the patrol and reprisal system, of the dangers and abuses of which he was now more than ever assured, would continue to be applied at Somerset's hands. Whether or not he was justified in this interpretation of the situation is another question. The fact remains that Stockenstrom had found himself increasingly at variance with the military commandant, and that he became convinced after

August 1831, that the colonial government was in some way determined to prevent him from exerting any real influence on frontier policy.

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(ii) The Memoir of 1833 and the Evidence of 1835.

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When Stockenstrom drew up his Mémoire in 1833,
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 his avowed purpose was to explain and justify his policy as Commissioner-General, in order to meet any attacks which might arise from "certain strictures upon the frontier Policy of (the Cape) contained in 'Bannister's Humane Policy,' 'Bruce's Letters,' 'Kay's Researches,' and some reviews on those publications." It was to be expected, therefore, that he would phrase the memoir in terms calculated to meet the sort of criticism likely to come from philanthropist quarters. The general tenor of the memoir, however, as previous discussions of different aspects of it have shown, was consistent with the familiar features of Stockenstrom's views. As before, while urging the necessity for protecting the colonists against depredations, he roundly condemned the reprisal system as a means to that end. And, "I never was more confirmed in this view of the matter," he wrote, "than by a commando which I was induced to sanction in June 1830, upon the representation of the military commandant and the frontier Boors."

(59) Memoir of 1833. A.C. minutes, pp. 99 - 102.

(60) See his introductory paragraph.

Stockenstrom proceeded to give the following
(61)
account of the affair:

I accompanied one of the divisions of this commando, after having strictly forbid the Boors taking any Caffre cattle whatever, unless the Caffres should violently resist their taking such cattle as could be sworn to as colonial property. A division of Boors took a considerable number of colonial and Caffre cattle mixed, pretending that they had had a desperate fight for it, in which the Caffre chief Zeko and several of his men were killed; but I subsequently found out that these unfortunate men were murdered in cold blood and unarmed, for which atrocious act there could have been no reason except to find a plea for seizing the Caffre cattle, contrary to my orders. I therefore feel convinced that the commandant had been misinformed as to the state of the frontier, and that most of the reports about the numerous depredations and desperate intentions of the Caffres were utterly groundless."

This account agrees with the view Stockenstrom had come to hold of the 1830 commando, except in one significant feature: he here represents the Boors as having brought away all the cattle, colonial and Kaffir, contrary to his orders, on the strength of the pretended attack by Zeko and his men. This is a palpable misrepresentation of the facts, and one which certainly
(61a)
further blackens the proceedings of Erasmus's party.

(61) A.C. minutes, p. 101.

(61a) In discussion, Professor Roberts has suggested that this impression is possibly merely the result of the compression of Stockenstrom's narrative, and that it could be argued that what Stockenstrom implied was that, in order to circumvent his orders against taking Kaffir cattle, Erasmus and his party staged a pretended attack. Stockenstrom may have assumed that Erasmus's party staged the attack in order to provide a pretext for claiming Kaffir cattle, because they knew that they would be allowed to retain only the colonial cattle when they reached Fort Wilshire, unless the Kaffirs had attempted to resist the rounding up of the cattle.

Professor Roberts points out that this would be a natural, and not a particularly gross, distortion in Stockenstrom's mind.

However, in the light of Stockenstrom's insistence in evidence before the Committee (vide infra A.C. minutes Q. 986 - 1002) that he knew of no order to bring away Kaffir cattle from the kraals at all, unless the Kaffirs resisted the taking of colonial cattle, it seems that the original impression conveyed by the 1833 account is probably the correct one.

Was it deliberate? It can be said to have been so, in the sense that Stockenstrom regarded this incident as the strongest case of misrepresentation in order to gain Kaffir cattle in his experience - the case which most clearly justified his attitude towards Somerset's requests for commandos in July and August 1831 - and was therefore anxious to put it as forcibly as possible. To regard it as an attempt to support the philanthropists by further blackening the colonists is to do Stockenstrom an injustice; in his next paragraph he was emphatic:

Now I beg that it be clearly understood, that in here speaking of Boors, I allude to those who are immediately interested in the reprisal system; the mass of those colonists who understand its effects hold it in abomination;"

On the other hand, had Stockenstrom here intended, deliberately and unscrupulously, to misrepresent his part in that commando, and his orders to the burgher force, is it likely that he would have appended to his memoir, and constantly referred to, the very documents from which it could be argued that he had, in fact, originally sanctioned the taking of all the cattle from the kraals, prior to selection?

A possible explanation might be suggested: uppermost in Stockenstrom's mind, ever since 1831, had been the two facts of his own strong and continued opposition to the taking of Kaffir cattle, (except in particular circumstances as a just punishment meted out by government) and what he regarded as a deliberate disregard for his regulations on that point, on the part of the frontier military authorities. He recalled vividly his own repeated warnings in his despatches before the 1830 commando, against the seizure of any Kaffir cattle as compensation, and his written orders to Erasmus on 15 June 1830, the day before the commando went into action. And he remembered with equal clarity several

instances which had been brought to his notice during July - August 1831, where patrols had taken Kaffir cattle contrary to regulations. In juxtaposition to these complaints had come that against the commando of 1830, which Stockenstrom came to regard as having acted deceptively in order to provide an excuse for retaining Kaffir cattle. In the course of the two years in which Stockenstrom swept along in a rising tide of bitter resentment at the recollection of all these things, it may be that he remembered all that he had written before the commando of 1830, and, reading the events of 1830 by the light of 1831, actually did forget the tactical arrangement decided upon by Somerset on 16 June and verbally communicated by Stockenstrom to the burgher division just before it set out. Add to this Stockenstrom's natural distress at discovering that, by his authorization of the confiscation of the Kaffir cattle in 1830, he had himself apparently been guilty, albeit unwittingly, of precisely the injustice against which he had inveighed so strongly; and his desire in 1833 to justify himself in the eyes of the Colonial Secretary, and the 1833 version of the Zeko incident, ^{then} becomes understandable. (63)

(62) i.e. that all the cattle should first be assembled at Fort Wilshire, where the colonial cattle were to be selected.

(63) To what extent his conversations with Pringle may have coloured Stockenstrom's views it is impossible to say. Neither Pringle nor Bruce, it seems, based his account on direct information from Stockenstrom. Bruce quotes Chalmers, the missionary, as his authority. He gives an extract from Chalmers' Journal, describing the rumours at the death of Zeko which reached the Chumie, and the tales the commando excited among the natives. His account of the affair, he says, is that given by Capt. Stockenstrom to Chalmers. It makes no mention of events at Zeko's kraals, nor does it say that the Kaffirs were unarmed, but describes them as assisting the Boors to drive the captured cattle, and giving "a kind of whistle," that is customary with them, whereupon the Boors fired upon them. The Boors reported that they had fired because the Kaffirs had attempted to retake the cattle, but Peffer afterwards told Stockenstrom the true state of affairs.

It was, at any rate, the version to which Stockenstrom afterwards persistently adhered, all efforts to prove the contrary notwithstanding. In his evidence on 19 August 1835, ⁽⁶⁴⁾ he again insisted that "there were strict orders given that no cattle should be taken but what could be sworn to as colonial property, unless the Caffres should resist the taking of such colonial property." And he represented Erasmus as reporting that "in trying to select the colonial property the Caffres had resisted, and that his people were obliged in self-defence, and in order to execute his orders to fire on them," and recollected that "Colonel Somerset and myself said he had done very well." In giving a resumé of what he subsequently discovered, Stockenstrom omitted the point that Erasmus had told Zeko that, in seizing all the cattle, he was acting according to orders - a point which appeared in both Boesak's and Tyali's versions. But he stated that the Kaffirs had followed Erasmus "upon his saying that they might come and demand their cattle of the military commandant and me."

(see SACA 1.12.32.)

Pringle says his authority is not Bruce's letter, but "a source which has never yet deceived me, and which, in the present instance, I can rely upon to the letter." This may have been Stockenstrom, but Pringle's account differs from Stockenstrom's in saying that "no colonial cattle were discovered" in Zeko's possession, and that Erasmus at the kraal told Zeko that he was taking all the cattle as "reprisal for Caffre depredations." Further it follows the lines of Tyali's version. Pringle, too, has no discussion of the question of the orders given to the commando. "In regard to the proceedings of the two principal officers on this occasion," he says: "I have no particular information, nor am I aware of any complaint of their conduct." But, of Erasmus' report, he says: "this report was, as usual, but too readily credited and received."

One point which seems to indicate that Pringle's informant was not Stockenstrom is his describing Field-Cornet Peter Erasmus "the commander in this base and cowardly massacre" as "one of the principal leaders of the rebel Boors in 1815" In fact, P.R. Erasmus was not a leader and was acquitted. (See H.C.V. Leibbrandt: Slachter's Nek Rebellion. The Rebellion of 1815. p. 68 - 69 XLVI.) of which Stockenstrom would have been aware. (Pringle: Narrative of a Residence in South Africa. London. 1834 ch. XIV.)

((continued foot of p. 249))

Asked whether he had stated to Erasmus that he had made a communication to Government, Stockenstrom replied in the affirmative. In point of fact, of course, he had not done so. ⁽⁶⁵⁾ Asked then whether Erasmus had admitted the charge, Stockenstrom replied that he had not pressed him to that extent. But when asked whether Erasmus denied the charge, Stockenstrom explained: "I sent him a letter to let him know what the charge was; expecting his reply, I did not wish to push him to an admission, expecting an investigation to follow." "I must observe," Stockenstrom went on, after stating that Erasmus did not reply to the letter, "that this was connected with various other cases, in violation of the principles which I had established for the frontier protection."

This is the first actual statement that Stockenstrom expected a full-scale enquiry to follow upon the various charges he had made. That he did anticipate such action on the part of the government, however, may, perhaps, be inferred from his reference, without specifying, in the despatch of 31 August 1831, ⁽⁶⁶⁾ to "several other complaints" which "cannot remain unnoticed."

At this point, asked to state any other case of ⁽⁶⁷⁾ which he knew, Stockenstrom quoted the case of Scheepers, giving the facts as they appeared in the despatch of 14 July 1831. ⁽⁶⁸⁾ He also cited the case of Dreyer, presumably ⁽⁶⁹⁾

Neither of these two makes any reference to what orders may have been given to Erasmus, or implies any criticism of Stockenstrom. Therefore the reason for his misrepresentation does not seem to lie in this source.

(64) Q. 986 - 1002. A.C. minutes, pp. 85 - 86.

(65) See his note to Erasmus 16.7.31. Ref. in footnote (40).

(66) Stockenstrom to Bell 21.8.31. A.C. minutes, pp. 115- 116.

(67) Here printed (Q. 1003) as Schepers.

(68) Stockenstrom to Bell 14.7.31. A.C. minutes, pp. 110- 111.

(69) Q. 1004. Printed as Drier.

one of the "several other complaints," since it does not appear in earlier documents. Significantly, Stockenström says in this account, "I shall mention names, in order that it may be enquired into if necessary." And, equally significantly, it is in this context that Stockenström again digresses to point out how many farmers disapproved of the reprisal system; and how cruel it was that a whole community should suffer for "the crimes of those few." This seems again to indicate that Stockenström was not using these cases, suitably darkened in outline, to cast a slur upon the character of the colonists; and that he was prepared to have his facts investigated. Nevertheless, he persisted in the unsubstantiated version of the Zeko affair.

Stockenström's recollections of the 1830 - 1831 period appear to have been most confused. Discussing (70) the question of false alarms on the frontier, Stockenström was asked whether the commando of 1831 was not a case in point, and proceeded to explain his reasons for believing that it was so. Referring to Somerset's suggestion, made to him at Graham's Town on his arrival, that a commando should go into Kaffirland, Stockenström commented: "Now, the recollection of the commando the year before rested heavily on my mind. I then said I should look deeper into this." But it was only when he was engaged in looking deeper that the revised facts (71) of the commando of 1830 came to light. Yet a similar misplaced order of events appears in the memoir of 1833. Stockenström appears to have confused what preceded the July 1831 commando with his despatch after Somerset's recommendations for a commando in August 1831.

(70) Q. 1019 - 1021, A.C. minutes, p. 88.

(71) According to the despatch of 14.7.31, Stockenström and Somerset had the discussion on about 10 June; while according to Stockenström's Journal, he heard Tyali's version of the 1830 Commando on 13 July.

The rest of his evidence on 19 August 1835 was concerned chiefly with the grounds for his complaints about the ineffectiveness of his position as Commissioner-General, ⁽⁷²⁾ the continuance of the reprisal system and the evils to which that must inevitably lead.

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(iii) 1836: Gladstone vs. Stockenstrom:
The Zeko Incident.

This period did not come under discussion again until the sessions of the Committee in 1836. By that time, Lieutenant-Colonel Wade had already forwarded copies of the evidence of 1835 to the Cape - presumably to Somerset - and Campbell had commenced his investigations into the Erasmus case. ⁽⁷³⁾ When Stockenstrom appeared before the Committee on 26 February 1836, none of the information which emerged from Campbell's enquiry was yet available, of course. But Stockenstrom's evidence had already provoked criticism from certain quarters, which found a mouthpiece in the Committee in the person of W.H. Gladstone, a newcomer in the 1836 session. Prior to Stockenstrom's examination, Gladstone had evidently made a very thorough study of Stockenstrom's evidence during the previous session, and of the papers

(72) Stockenstrom, however, professed the highest personal respect for Sir Lowry Cole himself, (Pringle notwithstanding) although insisting that the governor appeared to have chosen not to employ him efficiently. See Q. 1043.

(73) See evidence of Wade. 25 March 1836. A.C. minutes. Q. 2785. p. 299.

delivered in in connection with it, (74) and had become aware of several discrepancies in the evidence concerning the Commissioner-Generalship. The lengthy cross-questioning to which he subjected Stockenstrom on 26 February and 1 March, (75) revealed not only that he wished to prove to Stockenstrom that he himself, and not the colonial government, had misinterpreted the instructions concerning the Commissioner-Generalship, but that there were several points upon which he considered him to have neglected his duty. (76)

Stockenstrom, however, persisted in his contention that the office had never been put upon a sound basis by the governor, so as to enable him fully to carry out his instructions. In connection with the papers delivered in on 19 February, Stockenstrom drew up a lengthy document, commenting upon these papers and amplifying his arguments, which he submitted to the Committee on 26 February. The Committee, however refused to accept it in the form in which it was submitted, (see Q 2391, A.C. minutes, for this) and it was not entered upon the minutes. His answers in evidence frequently were long and meandering, and by no means always to the point, a fact which caused the chairman (Mr Charles Lushington on that occasion) once to interrupt with evident irritation:

(74) On 19 February Stockenstrom was called before the Committee; and shown the following papers which had been delivered in:

1. Extract of a Despatch from Viscount Goderich to the officer administering the Government of the Cape, dated 14th June 1827.
2. Instructions for the Commissioner-General.
3. Remarks on the Instructions intended for the Commissioner-General, confidentially and by permission submitted to the consideration of his Honour the Lieutenant Governor by the undersigned Commissioner-General.

Stockenstrom was also asked to deliver in the following:

4. Suggestions of the Commissioner-General relative to the Policy to be adopted with respect to the Caffres and the occupation of the Ceded Territory beyond the Gonappe, submitted to his Excellency the Governor.
5. The instructions to the Commissary-General and Commandant relative to the expulsion of Macomo, dated 8th 10th of April 1829. A.C. minutes, p. 207 - 214.

"it is the wish of the Committee to confine their proceedings as strictly as possible to the primary object of their appointment; they hope, therefore, that in your answers you will observe conciseness as much as possible, consistent with what you consider to be the vindication of your character."

To which Stockenstrom replied with affronted dignity:

"Mine are merely answers resulting from the questions put to me. I have no wish to push matters beyond giving full and explicit answers."⁽⁷⁷⁾

Asked to specify the period beyond which he considered all his useful functions as Commissioner-General to have ceased, Stockenstrom dated it from 31 August 1831, when he had complained of the July 1831 commando and the fact that no notice had been taken of his representations.⁽⁷⁸⁾ After some discussion of this point, and then of the Bushman commando of 1829, Gladstone returned to the commando of 1830.

"The commando which took place in 1830," he said, "you have already stated, was sanctioned in the first instance by yourself?"

"Yes," replied Stockenstrom, "and it is one of those cases which I particularly refer to, to prove the difficulty of my position."⁽⁷⁹⁾

Gladstone proceeded to cross-examine Stockenstrom minutely on the subject of this commando.

On reading the correspondence of 1830 - 1831 which Stockenstrom had submitted to the Colonial Office, Gladstone had become aware of the two obvious flaws in his 1833 and 1835 versions: his assertion that Erasmus

(75) A.C. minutes, Q. 1946 - 2095; 2096 - 2253.

(76) e.g. in not examining the receipt accounts of the Civil-Commissioners, or making an annual tour.

Q. 2030 - 2039 A.C. minutes, pp. 226 - 227.

(77) Q. 2106. A.C. minutes, p. 232.

(78) Q. 2107 - 2108. A.C. minutes, p. 232.

(79) Q. 2145. A.C. minutes, p. 233.

had acted entirely contrary to orders in bringing away both colonial and Kaffir cattle in the first instance, and his representation of Erasmus as having reported that he was attacked while in process of selecting the colonial cattle to bring off. His questions were therefore carefully planned, to show that these two assertions of Stockenström were not consonant with the documents of 1830 and 1831.

To the first assertion Stockenström adhered very firmly under cross-examination. Asked to what arrangement his phrase "where the colonial cattle were to be selected" in the report of 23 June 1830, referred, he replied: "Erasmus said he had brought the cattle there in order to be selected by us; Erasmus had no orders from me to bring Caffre cattle."⁽⁸⁰⁾

"Do you conceive that it would have been practicable in such an expedition to distinguish colonial cattle from Caffre cattle?" Gladstone next enquired.

"We have always done so," replied Stockenström.

"But," said Gladstone, turning to another significant expression in the 1830 despatch, "you have said in that same letter great quantities of Caffre cattle were necessarily brought with those recognized by the colonists as stolen, and sent out to Fort Wilshire, principally the property of Guika ((Sic. Sc. Zeko)), but some claimed by Charlie."

"He drove them all before him," returned Stockenström, "That was his report. He said," (and here, extraordinarily, Stockenström reverted to the original 1830 version of Erasmus's report) "I went there, and I collected all the cattle, and brought them here for you to decide about the question, when this fight took place on the

(80) Q. 2156. A.C. minutes p. 234. Q. 2157 - 2172 for what follows. A.C. minutes, pp. 234 - 235.

road."

"But you have not said that they were brought in consequence of the man's choosing to bring them," Gladstone pointed out, "but that they were necessarily brought with those recognised by the colonists as stolen."

"Well," said Stockenstrom - and it is difficult to know whether to supply the adverb 'irritably,' 'evasively,' or 'irrelevantly,' - "I suppose if a man drives all the cattle he finds before him in a country, that necessarily must embrace everybody's cattle."

"But you do not mean it was necessary for him to drive all before him?" persisted Gladstone.

"I only know that as long as I have been on the frontier it has often occurred that commandos have gone in, when it was understood by the Caffre chiefs that they should just ride through the country and take what was known to be colonial cattle and leave the Caffre cattle unmolested."

"Did you at that time," enquired Gladstone, approaching from another angle, "when they brought out the colonial cattle and the Caffre cattle together, disapprove of their not having taken the distinction?"

"I should have disapproved of it," said Stockenstrom, (the 1853 version again in his mind, evidently) "if this report had not been made, that these Caffres had attacked them, and there was a fight in consequence."

"Then it was in consequence of the reported violence of the Caffres, as stated to you, that you sanctioned their having brought off both kinds of cattle together?"

"Yes," Stockenstrom replied, affirming also that this was the reason he had not thought fit to restore the Kaffir cattle, and that this was in accordance with the principles laid down in his suggestions.

At this point Lushington interposed from the chair with the suggestion that, as the colonial cattle were seized in Kaffir country, it was not unnatural that the Kaffirs should resist.

"The Caffre chiefs," explained Stockenström, "before we went in came and had a conference with Colonel Somerset and myself, and agreed that the Caffres should remain quiet, and that we should select the colonial cattle."

This corresponds to what Stockenström recorded Tyali as having said to him on 13 July 1831. That Somerset's orders of the 16 June 1830 represent a variation is suggested by the fact that Aitchison was explicitly instructed to explain his proceedings to the chiefs.

Gladstone, however, had not yet made his point.

"Now," he resumed, "the report made to you was, I understand, that the quarrel and the violence between the Caffres and the colonists had taken place at the kraal?"

"As they were driving the cattle on towards Fort Wilshire," Stockenström corrected him - the 1830 version again.

"Was it not reported to you that the Caffres resisted the taking of the cattle in the first instance?"

"Yes." (apparently the 1833 version is uppermost again).

"Well then, according to that representation of Mr. Erasmus, the cattle had been taken, and both kinds of cattle taken together, although no resistance had been made by the Caffres to their being taken?"

"Yes." (1830 again.)

Gladstone produced his trump card: "Then if it was represented to you at that period that both kinds of cattle had been taken from the kraal, and no representation was made to you of a violent resistance to their being taken, did you, under those circumstances,

not express your disapprobation of their having been taken indiscriminately?"

At this point Stockenstrom evidently became aware that something was wrong somewhere.

"I do not understand the question," he said.

"Mr. Erasmus did not report to you that the taking of the cattle was violently resisted by the Caffres?"

Stockenstrom took refuge in his former complaint: "If the Government had at the time that my representations were made, in 1831, immediately entered into the investigation, all these points would then have been explained, when I had the records at hand and the witnesses were on the spot."

"I wish to know," insisted Gladstone, "whether the report Mr. Erasmus made to you was, that the Caffres had resisted the taking of the cattle from the kraal, or that they had attacked the colonists as they were proceeding on their way to Fort Wilshire?"

"They had resisted, and he had fired; the exact spot where the resistance took place I cannot tell you, because I was not there."

This sort of thing went on for several questions more, until Gladstone, in an attempt to get back to something definite, referred Stockenstrom to the instructions to Aitchison. The first part of the arrangements, relating to Aitchison's acting under Tyali's guidance, Stockenstrom recollected. But he stated quite definitely, and affirmed again, that he "never knew of that order, that Captain Aitchison was ordered to bring cattle."⁽⁸³⁾

(81) Q. 2173 - 2177. A.C. minutes, pp. 235 - 236.
 (82) Q. 2178. A.C. minutes, p. 236.
 (83) Q. 2182 - 2187. A.C. minutes, p. 236.

Gladstone did not pursue the point further, but proceeded to question Stockenström as to the sequel to these events. ⁽⁸⁴⁾ Stockenström affirmed that he had reported the matter to Government and had recommended the dismissal of Erasmus; but that Erasmus had not been dismissed, since this could not be done without a "regular enquiry and proof." Asked whether he had recommended an enquiry, Stockenström replied: "You will find by the Governor's letter in answer to me when I complained of the cases of Botman &c. that an inquiry was to take place, and those cases would of course all come before the same court of inquiry, whatever that court might be. It would be of course a military court, for the commandos and patrols had been military." And to Buxton's enquiry whether he ever received any answer from the Government to his recommendation that Erasmus should be dismissed, Stockenström responded: "No; that is just the point."

At this point Buxton proceeded to gather up the threads after his usual fashion: ⁽⁸⁵⁾ "do I understand you aright that..." and then a long paraphrase, more or less coloured by his own interpretation, of what had been said in evidence. Most of it, Stockenström confirmed. He was particularly insistent on his determination to make the most of what he regarded as so glaring an instance of the abuse of the commando system in order "to show the Caffres that the understanding between Sir Lowry Cole and the Caffre chief was not to be a dead letter; and when I found no steps taken in consequence," he added, "I of course thought it was no use trying, at least through my medium, to bring things to that state, as I

(84) Q. 2182 - 2187. A.C. minutes. p. 236.

(85) Q. 2188 - 2197; 2199 - 2200; 2203 - 2204.
A.C. minutes, p.p. 236 - 238.

hope, through a strict adhesion to those suggestions,
might be done."⁽⁸⁶⁾

But when Buxton appeared to have understood that "when the Caffres were making no resistance, when they had laid their arms aside, and when they were peaceably going to the place where their cattle were assembled ((sic)) that then he ((Erasmus)) wilfully fired upon them, and that he was, in point of fact, the cause of that bloodshed," Stockenström pointed out that all this had been proved to his satisfaction "except as to Erasmus firing in person or ordering it." It seems that Buxton was drawing upon Pringle's version; for in question 2197 he asked: "And did you hear that these people, unarmed and inoffensive, made a request that their milk-cows might be restored to them, because they were their means of subsistence?"

"Yes," replied Stockenström, "but this happened at their kraals."

Gladstone pounced:⁽⁸⁷⁾ "When did you hear that?"

"In my letter in 1831 you will see."

He would have seen no such thing there, of course, nor in any other document except in the Commissioner-General's Journal; but Stockenström had previously referred to this fact in the evidence of 19 August 1835.

What is to be made of all the fascinating ramifications of this evidence? One would give much to have been present during that session, where gestures, expressions and tones of voice might have revealed a great deal that must now inevitably remain in the field of conjecture. (Certainly Stockenström appears in no very satisfactory light.)

(86) See also Q. 2199, 2200.

(87) Q. 2198. A.C. minutes, p. 237.

It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that, on some point, Stockenstrom had indeed tried, albeit not very successfully, to make out a case. From the charge of wilful misrepresentation of the basic elements of the Zeko story he must be expnerated. Whatever the weight to be attached to Tyali's evidence in 1831, there can be no doubt that by 31 August 1831 Stockenstrom was convinced of the truth of it, and so represented it in all the later evidence. The effect of the manner in which Stockenstrom described the affair in 1833 and 1835, however, was decidedly to worsen Erasmus's case. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that he deliberately denied the commandant's instructions and distorted Erasmus's report with that aim in view. Had Stockenstrom wished to blacken Erasmus and been prepared to go to such lengths to do so, it is not unlikely that he would have gone the whole length and left Buxton to his view that Erasmus himself wilfully fired on the unresisting Kaffirs, instead of pointing out, as he did, that he had not been able to prove this. The possibility that Stockenstrom really had forgotten Somerset's orders to the commando has already been developed, and it seems to be borne out by the evidence under discussion, where this is one fact about which Stockenstrom is consistent throughout. Stockenstrom's memory was not his strong point, and he had in this instance no explicit documentary evidence to help it along. There was, in any case, no need for him to suppress the fact of those orders, or his acquiescence in them, as a point of self-justification: Somerset's suggestion, provided it were explained to the chiefs, was, in fact, an added safeguard against indiscriminate seizure of cattle by the colonists, and therefore something of which Stockenstrom could well have approved; as indeed

he appears to have done. Might it not be that, going through the despatches of 1830 - 1831, preparatory to writing the memoir which was to justify all his proceedings against possible attacks, and having in his mind no recollection of Somerset's orders to the commando, Stockenstrom stumbled over just the point which Gladstone had made: why had Erasmus not in the first instance been reprimanded for bringing away Kaffir cattle with the colonial cattle? Seeking the explanation which justified a procedure about which, at the time, Stockenstrom knew his own conscience to have been clear, he found what he wanted; of course, it was because Erasmus had reported the Kaffirs to have resisted the taking of the cattle in the first instance, that he had countenanced the Caffre cattle being brought out and retained. To this version, in 1833 and 1835, Stockenstrom adhered. But it was not one which bore investigation, as he was to discover, to his cost, at Gladstone's hands.

Nevertheless, nothing could convince Stockenstrom that he had ever known of or given orders for the rounding up and bringing to Fort Wilshire of all cattle, least of all the affidavits from the Cape which Colonel Wade produced in the Committee as the colonial counterblast to Stockenstrom's evidence on the Zeko incident. A brief glance at these, shortly before he sailed for South Africa, led Stockenstrom to draw up a letter to the Committee, to prove that he could not possibly

(88) See evidence of Wade, 25 March 1836. Q. 2785 ff. A.C. minutes, pp. 299 - 305.

(89) Written 1 April 1836. Submitted to Committee 18 April 1836. Q. 2800 - 2809 for what follows. A.C. minutes, pp. 319 - 323.

According to the "private intelligence" of the Graham's Town Journal, the version finally minuted by the Committee was a "considerably softened" one. Stockenstrom had originally, according to this account, made use of several "violent epithets" which, on the advice of several members of the committee, he at last reluctantly withdrew. GTJ 21.7.36. Item.

have given any orders for the taking of Kaffir cattle, and to supply the evidence upon which he had based his accusations against Erasmus.

In proof of the former Stockenstrom cited his order to Erasmus of 15 June 1830, and referred to his letters to the Secretary of Government, dated 12 and 17 May, and 9 and 17 June; his letter to Somerset of 19 May; a letter to Campbell of 8 June and the letter ordering Erasmus to place himself under the orders of Somerset. (The latter two documents were not among those submitted to the Committee - he quotes from them). Moreover, he pointed out, on 15 June the burgher force were put under the command of Somerset, and he himself could consequently have given them no further orders.

In proof of the charges against Erasmus, Stockenstrom quoted the relevant record from his Journal in full. And concluded:

... if, instead of all correspondence on the subject with me being dropped from that moment, a court of inquiry had ensued, I am convinced it would have been clearly proved that the information which I had received, and upon which my report was founded, was correct.

Questioned again on the subject of the enquiry, Stockenstrom insisted that a statement such as he had made regarding the conduct of Erasmus, and the recommendation for his dismissal, could not appear in an official despatch without leading to an enquiry. This was what he had expected to follow:

...I never could fancy that such a statement would be made to any governor without leading to an investigation, and either showing me that I had been rather premature in writing too strongly upon that subject, by giving the accused party an opportunity of immediately clearing himself or giving the accusers (for I was not the accuser) a chance of proving their charge while the case was fresh in the memory of everyone.

Stockenstrom was of an obstinate breed. At no time would he readily have admitted himself to have been in the wrong. But this statement - the only one in

connection with the Erasmus case in which Stockenström even suggested that his judgment might have been hasty - seems to imply that his convictions had been a little shaken by the affidavits produced by Wade.

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(iv) Gladstone vs. Stockenström:

More Flaws in the Evidence about 1830 - 1831.

Gladstone, having found his mark in the Zeko affair, had by no means exhausted his shafts. It will be recalled that, in the memoir of 1833, Stockenström had drawn the conclusion, from what he afterwards believed to have occurred on the 1830 commando, that "the commandant had been misinformed as to the state of the frontier, and that most of the reports about the numerous ⁽⁹⁰⁾ depredations and desperate intentions of the Caffres were utterly groundless." Gladstone appears to have suspected a vulnerable spot here, too. He put the question as to whether Stockenström had ever seen cause to alter the opinion expressed in his despatch of 23 June 1830, that it had been ascertained that "these Caffres had been principally concerned with other troops in the depredations on the colony." Stockenström replied that he was very sceptical on the subject after what occurred and believed Colonel Somerset to have been ⁽⁹¹⁾ intentionally deceived. Nevertheless, pursued Gladstone, had he at the time been satisfied that the commando

(90) A.C. minutes, p. 101.

(91) Q. 2201 - 2202. A.C. minutes, p. 237.

(92)

and the proceedings were absolutely necessary?

"I acted on the report of Colonel Somerset and on the information I received on the spot; and I want to mention, as one instance of the total insufficiency of my situation, my receiving reports coming from Cape Town round to me on subjects of which I had no direct knowledge, and of which I was quite ignorant, and then being obliged to inquire on the spot and receive information from those very men who had sent the report."

"The Governor had directed you to satisfy yourself on the occasion?"

"Yes, and I did so as well as possible."

If Gladstone had prepared a shaft here, he withheld it, after this, for he merely asked whether Stockenström conceived that the Governor had relied upon his report as "a sufficient ground for warranting him to give his sanction to what had been done," without pursuing the subject.

Gladstone next directed Stockenström's attention to his statement in the memoir of 1833, that 'the basis of Colonel Somerset's suggestions was not ((only' presumably omitted in error. It appears in the passage Gladstone was paraphrasing.)) to continue the patrolling and reprisal system, but that it should be considered indispensable to shoot the Caffres whenever a patrol, headed by an officer, distinctly carries the spoor of cattle into any kraal,' and enquired what grounds he had for "ascribing to Colonel Somerset so horrible a deed."

"His own letter; nothing else," Stockenström replied. Nor was he at all convinced by Gladstone's suggestion

(92) Q. 2206. A.C. minutes, p. 238. Buxton had here interposed three questions, after which interruption, as usual, Gladstone pursued his point from where he had left off.

(93) Q. 2208.

(94) Q. 2209 - 2210. A.C. minutes, p. 238.

that Somerset's proposal must be related to its context, and that the term "those depredations" referred to depredations of the kind he was then reporting, where, in addition to robbery, a Hottantot herd had been (95) cruelly murdered.

"As I understand the things," Stockenstrom contended, "they have nothing to do with one another; it speaks of traces of cattle into kraals, and then firing upon people in the kraals into which those traces have led, moreover, whether the spoor be that of murderers or robbers, the act of shooting those found thereon is the same; and," he added, "the Committee will understand, if that investigation had taken place on the spot, the (96) explanation would have followed immediately."

Accepting that this had been Stockenstrom's interpretation of Somerset's words, Gladstone asked if this (97) had constituted the reason for his leaving the colony. This Stockenstrom twice denied. (98) As to whether he felt confident that such a proposal would not be sanctioned by the government; "I had no idea what would take place; nothing followed in consequence; I received no answer to that; but I had no reason to suppose the government would sanction it; on the contrary, I would believe it (99) impossible."

This view coincides with the concluding paragraph (100) of the despatch of 31 August 1831. But it is quite possible to construe Stockenstrom's statements in the memoir of 1833 into an assertion that he resigned because of the possibility that Somerset's scheme would be

(95) In which interpretation Gladstone was very probably correct. See the relevant despatch: Somerset to Wade, 12.3.31. A.C. minutes, p. 114.

(96) Q. 2217. A.C. minutes, p. 238.

(97) Q. 2220. A.C. minutes, p. 239.

(98) Q. 2220, 2221. A.C. minutes, p. 239.

(99) Q. 2222. A.C. minutes, p. 239.

(100) A.C. minutes, p. 116. "on Lieutenant-Colonel Somerset's suggestion of firing upon the Caffres of those kraals into which the patrol shall carry the (continued foot p.266.)"

carried into effect, which is evidently how Gladstone
 (101)
 read it. Stockenstrom's statements are typical of
 the strong views of the whole memoir, written in the
 heat of the moment, and certainly in this instance toned
 down in the evidence fifteen months later.

(102)
 Later Gladstone returned to the attack with the
 vexed question of the substantiation of the reports on
 the cases of Schessers and Gordon.

"Were you not desired to investigate the truth of
 the complaints that you had made?" Gladstone wished to
 know.

"No;" Stockenstrom replied. And then, "I know
 (103)
 what is alluded to, but I was not ordered." The
 relevant paragraph in Bell's letter of 29 July 1831,
 he said, he knew "by heart." On its being read to
 (105)
 him, he responded:

"That is just what I say, that an inquiry was
 threatened; that inquiry would have been a military one,
 because the patrol was a military patrol, and before that
 committee of inquiry all the other cases would have been
 brought forward, if I had only seen an investigation or
 only heard of it." That a government-authorized
 military enquiry had been threatened, before which he
 would be required to substantiate his charges, but which
 he could not institute, and which never took place,

spoor of stolen cattle, I shall not dwell, being too
 well satisfied of the impossibility of such a thing
 being ever sanctioned. The mere avowal of the intent-
 ion would justify every outrage with which the Caffres
 could visit the colony."

(101) A.C. minutes, p. 101. After a long discussion of
 the enormities of Somerset's proposals (a) to continue
 the reprisal system (b) to shoot those into whose kraal
 the spoor should be traced, Stockenstrom writes: "I
 therefore (though I would, as long as I had continued
 to hold my share in the management of frontier affairs,
 have persisted in putting down murderers and determined
 irreclaimable plunderers, however much I may thereby
 have exposed myself to the censure of very worthy al-
 though ill-informed mistaken men) resolved rather to
 quit my station than see the proposed system acted upon,
 much less sanction or act upon it myself."

Stockenstrom asserted throughout. ⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ Even when confronted by Gladstone with his own comment on Bell's concluding paragraph, ⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ (which also Stockenstrom said he recollected by heart) Stockenstrom said: "Well, of course, that is just what I meant; that I was prepared with evidence to substantiate them;" - a remarkable interpretation. But that the purport of Bell's letter may have been that Government required him to give a fuller statement of the grounds on which his opinion was founded, Stockenstrom persistently denied.

"If the Government had expected anything more from me," he argued, "they would have written to me, and they would have considered it a great neglect of duty my not bringing it forward." ⁽¹⁰⁸⁾

But he was never written to again on the subject.

"I was most anxious about it," he added, "because I thought that now was the time to bring about a new order of things, and to show that since the Governor had been on the frontier we would act on what we had engaged ourselves to do." ⁽¹⁰⁹⁾

"You were most anxious to furnish evidence," Bufton summed up at this point, ⁽¹¹⁰⁾ and to have the investigation take place, but you never was ((sic)) called upon to act in the business?"

"I was most anxious to do it, and the Government knew it." Stockenstrom asserted.

(102) Q. 2225. A.C. minutes, p. 239.

(103) Q. 2227. A.C. minutes, p. 239.

(104) Q. 2228.

(105) Q. 2229.

(106) See questions 2232 - 2242 A.C. minutes, p. 239 - 240.

This was a bone of contention of which Stockenstrom refused to let go, and he growled over it intermittently with cause and without, throughout the evidence of 1 March. See Q. 2171, 2175, 2184 - 2185 - 2187, 2191 2192, 2217, 2218.

(107) Q. 2235. See Stockenstrom to Bell 13.8.31. A.C. minutes, p. 112. "but as to substantiating any thing I have advanced respecting the cases of Schessers or Gordon, or any body or thing else, I humbly beg leave to refer to the result of the crisis to which matters have been brought."

"Did you ever intimate that anxiety to the Government in any other way than has been done in the letters now before the Committee?" enquired Gladstone, who obviously found no evidence of it there. (111)

Stockenstrom replied that in his letters he had been most anxious, but did not conceive it necessary to say any more.

"I thought I had written too strong as it was; I did not wish to persecute any man, or harass any man to extremities; I only wanted to do my duty, and to have the thing investigated."

Gladstone now abandoned this topic, and proceeded to clarify two more points. He asked whether Stockenstrom considered it true that Sir Lowry Cole authorized commandos to pursue stolen cattle and to take from any Kaffir's kraal cattle to an equal amount: to which Stockenstrom replied that he did not know, but that it was done. (112) And he ascertained that, of the three commandos against the Kaffirs during Stockenstrom's Commissioner-Generalship, two went with Stockenstrom's sanction, while the third was sanctioned by Sir Lowry Cole, on the supposition that Stockenstrom was absent from the spot at the time.

"That was said," commented Stockenstrom, "and I must take it for granted. I was on the frontier, mark me; where it was supposed I could be I do not know, but I was on the spot." (113)

(108) Q. 2241. A.C. minutes, p. 240.

(109) Q. 2242. A.C. minutes, p. 240.

(110) Q. 2243.

(111) Q. 2244. In point of fact, as was noted in the earlier discussion of the correspondence, there is only one sentence, in the despatch of 31.8.31, which indicates that Stockenstrom wanted an enquiry viz. "Several other complaints were made which cannot remain unnoticed." A.C. minutes, p. 116.

(112) Q. 2245. A.C. minutes, p. 240.

(113) Q. 2251 - 2253. A.C. minutes, p. 241.

(v.) Gladstone vs. Stockenstrom:
Bourke's Frontier System.

After this, Gladstone drew his final arrow. In the memoir of 1833, he pointed out, Stockenstrom had stated that the reprisal system had been ⁱⁿ operation ever since 1817. On reflection, would he not modify that statement at all? ⁽¹¹⁴⁾ Stockenstrom at first understood this to be a query as to the date 1817, and confirmed ⁽¹¹⁵⁾ that. Gladstone accordingly put his question directly: had there not been a suspension of the reprisal system during the administration of Bourke? Stockenstrom replied that he had had no direct connection with the Kaffir frontier during Bourke's administration; it was possible that the system had been suspended, but he did not recollect it. ⁽¹¹⁶⁾ Did he never hear of any difference during the administration of Bourke, relative ⁽¹¹⁷⁾ to the system of reprisals, persisted Gladstone.

"I should think that I did; I believe I have heard it; it must have been a very short period, though, not so as to affect the general frontier policy. I was not directly connected with the Caffre frontier under General Bourke."

In answer to further questions, Stockenstrom said that he had no clear recollection of any effect that followed from that suspension, and could not say whether there had been any diminution of depredation, though ⁽¹¹⁸⁾ that might be.

This was rather extraordinary; and so it appears

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- (114) Q. 2255, 2256. A.C. minutes, p. 241.
 (115) Q. 2256.
 (116) Q. 2257, 2258.
 (117) Q. 2260.
 (118) Q. 2261, 2262.

to have seemed to Gladstone, who was evidently not convinced that Stockenstrom had forgotten this. Three days later, ⁽¹¹⁹⁾ he approached the question from a different angle, and, in the midst of a series of questions on the subject of the Hottentots, he suddenly interpolated a question as to whether Stockenstrom recollected a proclamation of Sir Lowry Cole relative to a resumption of ⁽¹²⁰⁾ the system of commandos; or any document speaking of the resumption of a system which had been for a time ⁽¹²¹⁾ disused; or any instructions to the public officers on the frontier intimating a change of policy with ⁽¹²²⁾ reference to commandos. But, while he admitted the possibility of such a thing, Stockenstrom had no remembrance of it at all.

It is true that Stockenstrom had had no direct information on the subject of the suspension of the reprisal of Kaffir cattle on the Eastern frontier in 1826. Instructions were sent to Somerset, the Commandant on the Frontier, to the effect that no party was to enter Kaffirland to recover stolen cattle, and that no equivalent stock of Kaffir cattle was to be taken to indemnify colonists for losses. And he was explicitly instructed to regard these orders as quite confidential, "...and in giving any orders to the officers on the outposts that may be necessary for the purpose of preventing the invasion of the Caffre country, you are not to intimate that any change has been directed in the system ⁽¹²³⁾ hitherto adopted. The instructions to the landdrosts of Albany, Graaff-Reinet and Somerset, on the other hand, referred only to the prohibition of the crossing of the

(119) 4 March 1836. A.C. minutes, p. 247.

(120) Q. 2348.

(121) Q. 2349.

(122) Q. 2350.

(123) Military Secretary to Commandant on the Frontier. 11.4.26. Theal: Records. XXVI, 284 - 285.

Addendum: To be inserted as concluding paragraph on page 271:

The dangers arising from Bourne's system, as pointed out in the despatch just quoted, afforded, from Stockenström's point of view, a particularly good illustration of two points which he repeatedly emphasized in evidence: that pursuit "on the Spoor" was essential, and that it was suicidal to leave genuine depredations unpunished.

boundary, without stating explicitly that Kaffir cattle
 (124) were not to be taken. But Stockenstrom therefore
 knew of one part of Bourke's system in 1826. And not
 only had he been aware of it, but he had objected strongly
 to it, and had carried on a forceful correspondence with
 the Government on the subject in 1827. (125) And in 1829,
 in the very despatch in which he detailed his reasons
 for recommending the expulsion of Macomo from the Ceded
 Territory, Stockenstrom commented that "the great mistake
 committed in our policy of Frontier Defence consisted
 in the sudden transition from measures of too great
 severity and sometimes wanton cruelty, to the opposite
 extreme of sacrificing the safety of His Majesty's
 subjects on the borders by Paralyzing their efforts even
 in Defence of their lands and their property;..." And
 he went on to outline the bases of a border policy, upon
 which Cole must very probably have based his instructions
 to Somerset of the same date, by which he reinstated
 the patrol system of pursuit on the spoor. A compari-
 son of the two documents reveals a similarity even of
 (126) phraseology. It is, therefore, very strange indeed
 that Stockenstrom should have professed no recollection
 of any difference in the reprisal system during Bourke's
 (127) administration. But there does not seem to be any
 point in deliberate prevarication.

(124) Secretary to Government Landdrosts of Albany, Graaff-
 Reinet and Somerset. 20.4.26. Theal: Records. XXVI,
 283 - 284.

(125) Stockenstrom to Flasket (Sec. to Govt.) 2.11.26.-
 C.o. 2678. Stockenstrom to Flasket, 7.4.27. C.o. 2694.

(126) Stockenstrom to Cole. 6.2.29. C.o. 367 and Bell
 to Somerset, 6.2.29. Cory Transcripts, Colonial Office
 Letters 1824 - 1836. Vol. II, 111 - 115.

(127) Curiously enough, J.D. Pitman, in his thesis on
 the Commissioner-Generalship, accepts this evidence at
 its face value. Discussing why the office proved un-
 satisfactory, he says: "... Stockenstrom was in certain
 respects himself open to criticism. For instance, in-
 credible as it may seem, the Commissioner-General showed
 in his evidence that he was unaware of Lieutenant-
 Governor Bourke's suspension of the Reprisal System from
 April 1826." Pitman, p. 37.

It seems incredible that Stockenstrom had actually forgotten all this. Was it really a mental aberration, resulting from the unrelated context in which the questions appeared? Or was he deliberately evading a possible discussion of the views he had expressed on Bourke's system, because he knew that they would not meet with Glenelg's approval, and because, as Lieutenant-Governor, he was now bound to the support of a frontier policy approved by the Colonial Secretary? In admitting the possibility of such changes, Stockenstrom was in that case perhaps leaving himself a loophole - he does not categorically deny the facts, as he did in the case of the orders to the 1830 commando.

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(vi) Stockenstrom, Philip and the Philanthropist Press.

All of this, at any rate, probably convinced Gladstone that Stockenstrom was a most unreliable witness for the prosecution in the case against the government of Sir Lowry Cole. Moreover, there is some ground for supposing that the idea that Stockenstrom was deliberately contradicting himself in order, with some ulterior motive, to gain favour with Buxton and his philanthropic associates, found support in Gladstone's mind. It was he, for instance, who, on 19 February 1836, introduced the topic of Dr. Philip and the Griqua station at Philippolis, on which Stockenstrom was known to have differed strongly from Philip, and questioned

Stockenstrom minutely on the subject. It was Gladstone, too, who, on 4 March 1836, at the beginning of an interview evidently designed by Buxton, who was in the chair, to be wholly concerned with questions on the Hottentots, attempted to elicit from Stockenstrom an opinion on the writings of Bruce, Kaye and Pringle. (129) If Gladstone's motive was indeed to attempt to expose Stockenstrom on these points, he was not successful.

Stockenstrom was taken unawares by the questions on the London Missionary Society Griqua establishments, and admitted as much to the Committee. (130)

"I am obliged to depend for all this upon my memory," he said.

However, his memory in this instance served him well. (131) He corrected Lushington's impression that the colonists had encroached upon the Griquas, and pointed out that both Griquas and colonists had, in fact, encroached upon Bushman territory. He explained that Philipopolis had originally been a Bushman mission station under Mr. Clark, but that subsequently the Griquas had possessed themselves of the area. This was afterwards ceded to them by Dr. Philip, according to a paper which Mr. Melvill had shown Stockenstrom when he visited the place in 1830 or 1831. Stockenstrom recollected a "strong controversy" about this. He had made a "strong representation" to Government upon what he considered "improper conduct on the part of Dr. Philip," for he "disputed the right of Dr. Philip to dispose of that land at all," since the Bushmen had a right to be there.

(129) Q. 2295 - 2299. A.C. minutes, p. 244. It was during the same interview that he interpolated the questions about Cole's proclamation. Vide supra p. 270.

(130) Q. 1911. A.G. minutes, p. 216.

(131) For this account of the Griqua evidence, see Q. 1897 - 1920. A.C. minutes, pp. 215 - 217.

Stockenstrom recalled being asked to report on Philip's report on the Missions, which was accompanied by charges of cruelty and oppression on the part of the farmers on the Northern frontier towards the Griquas and other bordering tribes. (132) Asked for his opinion of those charges against the farmers, Stockenstrom replied:

"I thought the charges were extremely exaggerated."

There had been two or three charges brought by Philip, which he had got from the missionary Colby and others. Stockenstrom had himself gone across the Orange to inquire, "being determined to punish those who should be found guilty." And he "found that those charges, as far as the farmers were concerned, were altogether false."

As far as the civil officers of government were concerned, he had found, if he recollected rightly, that there also was no ground for a charge.

These statements are fully borne out by the relevant documents, (133) except that no direct reference to the "civil officers of government" appears. It is clear that Stockenstrom was making no attempt to parter to Philip's point of view here.

On 4 March, Gladstone opened the questioning by enquiring whether Stockenstrom was acquainted with the works on the condition of the Cape by Messrs Bruse, Kaye and Pringle, and whether he was prepared to give an opinion as to the general fidelity of their representations. (134)

(132) Remarks of the Commissioner-General on Philip's Return of Missions. 31.12.30. C.o. 373.

(133) i.e. the "Remarks of the Commissioner General" cited in (132); and the despatch reporting Stockenstrom's inquiries into the Griqua charges against the Boors: Stockenstrom to Bell. 4.8.30. C.o. 373.

(134) Q. 2295 - 2297. A.C. minutes, p. 244.

"There were statements in Mr. Bruce's letters which I know to be correct," Stockenstrom said. (135)

But he refused to commit himself as to whether these were incorrect statements, or whether there was any impression of serious misrepresentations on his mind. (136) He would have to refer to the works again before giving an opinion on them, he said - it was three or four years since he had seen the Bruce letters. He did recollect one particular instance in which Bruce was very incorrect: "he charged Colonel Somerset particularly, and I believe with great severity, on the subject of Macomo's expulsion; ... as far as the blame about Macomo's expulsion was concerned, I think myself as much to blame as anybody else." But even that instance, Stockenstrom said, he would possibly not have recalled, had it not been that he had recently come across a letter of his to Philip, (which he had exhibited to the Committee the previous Friday) criticizing Bruce on this very point.

There appear to be only two other references to these works in the papers of this period. Both occur in Stockenstroms answer to the Colonial Office questionnaire of 1834. Describing the encroachment upon the Hottentots by the colonists and Kaffirs in the early period of the Eastward migration, he said:

...here let me observe, that a late writer on the Cape Colony (Mr. T. Pringle) is decidedly mistaken, when in his African Sketches, page 415, he gives the impression that the conquests of the Caffres over the Hottentots were more merciful than those of the whites. It is but a poor comfort to us that we have not been more ferocious than Caffres, but that consolation cannot be denied us, and historical truth forbids the suppression of the fact." (137)

(135) He probably had the Erasmus case in mind. In writing his statement to the Committee on the subject of the affidavits submitted in connection with that case, he pointed out that Bruce had mentioned it in his letters and that it had then caused a stir at the Cape. See letter cited. 1.4.36. A.C. minutes. p. 244.

(136) Q. 2298, 2299. A.C. minutes. p. 244.

(137) Stockenstrom to Col. Sec. 5.11.34. A.C. minutes. p.117.

In the 6th question of the Questionnaire, Stockenstrom was informed that several persons who had recently published accounts of alleged outrages committed by the colonists upon the Kaffirs had referred to him as a public officer cognizant of the facts. The writers were Mr. A. Bruce and John T -, who had published letters in the Cape papers, and the Rev. S. Kay and Mr. Thomas Pringle, who had published books in England; and the cases cited were those of Erasmus, Schessers and Rezen wdenhout (presumably Bezuidenhout). Stockenstrom was asked to state what he knew of these cases and any others. (138) In the first two, Stockenstrom referred the Secretary to his memoir of 1833 with the documents, as containing a far more satisfactory account than he could give from mere memory. He gave details of the only Bezuidenhout case he could recall, but said he did not know if it was the one referred to. And he stated that, in the absence of records, he was at a loss to state any other cases of a similar description, though others might be found referred to in the memoir papers, and "you will find no difficulty in the Colony to obtain proofs."

"Messrs. Bruce, Kay and Pringle," he added, "are responsible for what they publish, and they can be compelled to give up their authorities. Some of the most heinous things they have said I know to be quite true, and I have never scrupled openly to give my sentiments on them." (139)

That Buxton was not altogether pleased by what Stockenstrom had had to say of Philip on 19 February 1836 is suggested by some questions he put, just after

(138) Queries for Captain Stockenstrom. A.C. minutes, p. 123.

(139) Stockenstrom to Col. Sec. 5.11.34. A.C. minutes, pp. 122 - 123.

Gladstone had pursued his enquiries about Cole's proclamation. Buxton had been absent from the meeting on that day, (140) and now asked Stockenström:

"Did you not make a report to government relative to some supposed misconduct upon the part of Dr. Philip?" (141)

Stockenström replied that he had reported on Philip's return of missionary stations, at the request of government. He had not the paper with him, but it had been exhibited at the time on the part of Mr. Gladstone.

"Was the answer of Dr. Philip, his justification of himself also, brought before this Committee at the same time that the charge against him was?" Buxton then asked meaningly - a tilt presumably at Gladstone.

Stockenström, however, did not know this, and did not know that Philip had sent in a reply to the charge of improper conduct - "but I told Dr. Philip that I had written very severely on his report, and that I thought he should see my report."

A similar series of references to Dr. Philip occurred during the 1835 session, on 28 August. (142) The questioner may again have been Buxton, who was in the chair, but this is not indicated. (143) Stockenström was asked whether he had had an opportunity of ascertaining whether the intercourse Dr. Philip held with the Kaffirs was likely to conduce to the good conduct of that race or not. Stockenström replied that he had never seen any intercourse between Dr. Philip and the natives; but that he had heard a report of a speech made by Dr. Philip to Botman, which was thought "extremely indiscreet and

(140) See list of members present. A.C. minutes, p. 207.

(141) Q. 2351 - 2354. A.C. minutes, p. 247, for what follows.

(142) Q. 1421 - 1425. A.C. minutes, p. 157. Here too, the questions are not directly related to anything in the previous context; but several questions, quite irrelevant, about the death of Hintza are interpolated in this context; and the questioner may have been seeking opinions of Dr. Philip's reputed share in the rising of the Kaffirs in 1834 - 35.

imprudent;" but he knew nothing of it except by hearsay.

"You say," his questioner went on, apparently irrelevantly, "that the Caffres represented to you their grievances, on the representation of those grievances did you sympathize with them, or appear to sympathize in those grievances, or remain perfectly silent?"

"I did not remain silent," Stockenstrom replied, "I told them if those things were true they should get satisfaction, and that the parties concerned should be punished."⁽¹⁴⁴⁾

"Was not that," enquired the questioner, "as far as you had an opportunity of judging of the speech, said to be made by Dr. Philip, the precise course he followed on their representing their grievances, is he not said to have told them that those grievances ought to be redressed?"

"I cannot exactly recollect," was Stockenstrom's reply, "for I never got or sought further evidence... I cannot at this moment state what the words were, but I must admit, that at the moment when I heard them stated, I was much displeased with the doctor."

Several significant points emerge from a study of these sections of the evidence. The most unsatisfactory evidence is undoubtedly that concerning the Zeko incident. Here Stockenstrom's statements in 1833, 1835 and 1836 were by no means always consistent with those in the earlier documents. That there was some confusion on several points in Stockenstrom's own mind is clear, and he contradicted himself under cross-questioning. It is

(143) Unfortunately, the minutes of the 1835 session

do not indicate the questioners, as do those of 1836.
 (144) The question and answer refer back to Q. 1384, some time before in the interview. Here Stockenstrom had mentioned that he had, at a meeting of the Kaffir chiefs, told them that if it could be proved that Erasmus had slaughtered Zeko and his people, he should not go unpunished; and that the cattle taken from them by Schessers would be restored, and every such instance should be punished with severity.

impossible to avoid the conclusion that he was attempting to make out a case, to a certain extent, in order to justify his own actions in 1831. But it is equally clear that a certain distortion in the account of the Zeko incident which Stockenstrom gave in 1833 and 1835, and the consequent blackening of Erasmus's case, were the result of an apparent confusion in Stockenstrom's own recollection of the events of 1830, rather than a deliberate attempt to malign the colonists.

In the case of the evidence concerning Bourke's frontier system, it appears to be incontrovertible that Stockenstrom was evading a direct answer, which might have led to a discussion of his own views on the subject. It is hardly credible that he actually had no recollection of Bourke's law. And since the reasons he had had for opposition to the law were precisely those which he had frequently emphasized before the Committee, there would appear to be little point in concealing them. The most probable explanation seems to be that Stockenstrom was by that time aware that Glenelg, whose views he had been appointed to carry out, approved of the principle upon which Bourke's law had been based.

The 1836 session reveals very clearly that, as Stockenstrom had anticipated, his evidence in 1835 had made him enemies. Those enemies, however, were not, initially, the colonial opposition, but the defenders of the administration of Sir Lowry Cole and Colonel Bell, whose mouthpiece in the Committee was Gladstone. The method of Gladstone's cross-examination, and the general trend of his questions, certainly suggest that he regarded Stockenstrom as in league with the Philip faction which was out to malign Cole's administration. (Pringle's joyful anticipation of the discomfiture of Cole and Bell, when the Committee should have begun its investigations, will be recalled.)

The examination certainly revealed Stockenström as, in several respects, a not very satisfactory witness for the prosecution. But it cannot fairly be said to have revealed him as a sycophant, attempting to ingratiate himself with the Philip faction or with Exeter Hall. Stockenström's criticism of the colonial administration, particularly as it had affected his own position as Commissioner-General, was of long standing. Whether Stockenström was justified in the attitude he adopted or not - and Gladstone's questions proved Stockenström's case in some respects decidedly weak - he certainly adhered consistently to his point of view. On two important points, *viz.* the London Missionary Society Griqua stations, and the speech Dr. Philip was alleged to have made to the Kaffir chieftains, Stockenström made no attempt to conceal the fact that he had differed strongly with Dr. Philip. Only in the matter of Bourke's frontier law does Stockenström seem deliberately to have evaded the issue. And here it must be remembered that he had already received his appointment as Lieutenant-Governor, which exonerated him from the charge of prevarication in order to gain favour with Glenelg.

CHAPTER V.

Some Other Aspects of the Evidence.

(i) Stockenstrom, Philip and the Hottentots.

The questions of London Missionary Society Griqua stations, Dr. Philip's return of missions, and his intercourse with the Kaffir chieftains were not the only points upon which (in the past) Stockenstrom had found himself at variance with Dr. Philip. The two men had diverged on the question of Hottentot emancipation. The extent of their differences Dr. Philip had at one time believed to be far greater than in fact it was. (1) He appears to have given the Commissioners of Inquiry to understand, in 1824, that he regarded Stockenstrom as "inimical to the freedom of the Hottentots." (2) Dr. Philip was to discover his mistake. His visit to Graaff-Reinet in the middle of 1825, and his conversations with Stockenstrom, whose guests he, Pringle and Wright were, revealed that they stood on common ground.

In August, Pringle wrote enthusiastically to Fairbairn: (3)

Stockenstrom is hearty in the good cause and in the great cause of humanity. He is a decided advocate for the extinction of Slavery, & for the full emancipation of the Hottentots. He is not a new convert neither to these opinions, but has reduced them to practice even much farther than I had anticipated.

This was, in fact, the case. Stockenstrom was averse to any measure that tended to bind the Hottentots in service for any length of time, thereby curtailing their liberty of movement. He disapproved of the

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- (1) See the Rev. A. Murray's account of a conversation with Dr. Philip in November 1824. Enclosure 2. in Somerset to Bathurst 27.1.25. Theal: Records. XIX, 484. "The Dr. mentioned further, that tho' Mr. Stockenstrom was a good fellow, and the best among them, yet notwithstanding his great mind, (being a Dutchman) was naturally prejudiced in favour of the Old System."
 (2) See Rev. A. Murray's account of a subsequent interview with the Commissioners of Inquiry. Ibid. Theal: Records. XIX, 486 Q. 4.
 (3) Pringle to Fairbairn. 5.8.25. Fairbairn Correspondence. (Parliamentary Library.)

principle of apprenticing Hottentot children, since, from the affection of parents for their children, it was a measure containing the possibility of binding a Hottentot family to a farmer for an indefinite period. Accordingly, Cradock's proclamation of 23 April 1812 did not meet with his approval, and, since the law did not actually make the apprenticing of Hottentot children incumbent upon him, he apprenticed as few as possible in his district. ⁽⁴⁾ Similarly, Stockenstrom objected to the Hottentots' being allowed to enter into long contracts of service with the farmers. He favoured monthly parole contracts, as being the type best understood by the Hottentots, least likely to give rise to disputes, and most likely to produce good work on the part of the Hottentot, in order to retain his job, and good treatment on the part of the master, in order to retain his servant. ⁽⁵⁾ In his own district, Stockenstrom did not allow field-cornets to witness contracts for a period of longer than one year, though this could be done before the landdrost.

On the other hand - and here Stockenstrom and Philip never agreed - Stockenstrom believed that strong checks upon vagrancy were essential. "I confess myself," wrote Stockenstrom in 1827, "equally remote from agreeing with those who maintain that the Hottentots are unfit to enjoy any extent of liberty, as with their opponents who consider them incapable of doing wrong provided they were emancipated from the restraints which bind the rest of the community. They should be made to work, unless they can prove that they can live without, and in this

(4) Stockenstrom to Commissioners of Enquiry. 5.1.24. Annexure 2 to Minutes of Council 27.6.27. Theal: Records XXXIV, 429.

(5) Stockenstrom to Flasket (Sec. to Govt.) 28.5.27. Annexure 1 to Minutes of Council 27.6.27. Theal: Records XXXIV, 426.

respect they should be closely watched, for in a Country where property, particularly large flocks of sheep and cattle, are so much exposed, it is easy to live by theft...⁽⁶⁾"

In the same letter, some of the views which Stockenstrom expressed more fully a year later, were foreshadowed.⁽⁷⁾ On 3 April, 1828, Stockenstrom submitted the suggestions⁽⁸⁾ upon which Ordinance 50, subsequently drawn up by Mr. Justice Burton, was largely based.

This document reveals that Stockenstrom's theory of the origins of the Hottentot problem was essentially in harmony with that of the Philip school of thought. He attributed the degradation of the Hottentots to the policy of discriminatory legislation, directed towards keeping them in submission; and the attitude which produced this policy, he traced to "the necessity felt by the earliest migrators into the interior, to prevent the possibility of retaliation on the part of the natives for the aggressions and outrages committed against them, by crushing their power and securing their unlimited submission." This degraded the Hottentots to such an extent that they became regarded as "too miserable and inferior a species, either to appreciate or to be benefited by a participation in the liberties and rights enjoyed by their more powerful and fortunate fellow-subjects, to which they had an equal title."

Stockenstrom recommended the enactment of a law, sweeping away all the earlier discriminatory legislation

(6) Stockenstrom to Flasket. 20.2.27. Annexure 1. to Minutes of Council 13.3.27. Theal: Records XXXIV, 381.

(7) i.e. "...provided they do work, to apprentice them or their children if they can maintain them, or to say where, with whom or for how much they shall work, or how apply their earnings, is as impolitic as it is unjust;" Ibid.

(8) Memorandum on the position of the free inhabitants of the Colony. Stockenstrom to Bourke, 3.4.28. Auto. I, 286 - 291.

and "placing every free inhabitant in the Colony on a level, in the eye of the law, as to the enjoyment of personal liberty and the security of his property..." As one would expect, he advised the abolition of the 1812 and 1823 apprenticeship proclamations and recommended an amendment in the 1819 proclamation; and recommended that no contracts of longer than one year should be allowed, and that all contracts of above one month should be formally entered into in writing, before a notary or clerk of the peace. But, characteristically, Stockenstrom placed first and foremost the necessity for the enactment of "strict prohibitions against such an abuse of the liberty generally conceded, as would endanger the peace of the community." Passes he considered to be "absolutely necessary" for persons traveling any distance from where they were known; or such a person would have to satisfy the local authorities that his purposes were legal. Any one suspected of vagrancy of any kind could be called to account before the nearest J.P. or field-cornet; but no one should be bound to account for his proceedings except to such an authority: that is to say, Europeans would not have the right of cross-questioning or demanding the pass of any Hottentot, merely because he was a Hottentot.

"The laws against vagrants," Stockenstrom insisted - and probably he had in mind the existing laws, and the law against vagrancy contained in Ord. 49, which, under the comprehensive law embracing "all free inhabitants without reference to colour or name of the tribe," would embrace Hottentots as well - relative to the Europeans, "would undoubtedly require to be rigorously enforced." The obligation under which Europeans then lay, of being registered in a definite district, would also necessarily

apply to coloured persons and "be insisted on with equal strictness."

In fact, when the 50th Ordinance was drafted by Burton, the pass system was not enforced. But if, as Cory says, ⁽⁹⁾ Section II of the ordinance carried the implication that, while Europeans could be punished for proved vagrancy, Hottentots and other free persons of colour were exempt, it was obviously a complete mis-
interpretation of Stockenström's proposal. ⁽¹⁰⁾ It seems that he intended the Hottentots in all respects to be on the same footing as Europeans before the law, and that, in respect of vagrants, he considered the existing laws to suffice, provided they were "rigorously enforced." In the spirit of Ordinance 50, no separate vagrancy law directed against Hottentot vagrants could be passed, naturally, since the ordinance was designed to do away with the idea of discriminatory laws.

Burton evidently concurred in Stockenström's interpretation of the existing laws. And, in answering the questionnaire on the Hottentots submitted to him by the Colonial Office in June 1833, ⁽¹¹⁾ Stockenström identified himself with the point of view that the laws against vagrancy, had they been rigorously enforced, would have sufficed to check vagrancy. "...a few trifling examples," he maintained, "would have convinced

(9) Cory: Rise of South Africa, II, 374.

(10) Section II reads:

And whereas by usage and custom of this Colony Hottentots and other free persons of colour have been subjected to certain restraints as to their residence, mode of life and employment, and to certain compulsory services to which others of His Majesty's subjects are not liable; be it therefore enacted, that from after the passing of this ordinance, no Hottentot or other free person of colour, lawfully residing in this Colony, shall be subject to any compulsory service to which other of His Majesty's subjects therein are not liable, nor to any hindrance, molestation, fine or imprisonment of any kind whatsoever, under the pretence that such person has been guilty of vagrancy or any other offence, unless after trial in due course of law, any custom or usage to the contrary in any wise notwithstanding.

Quoted ibid. 370 . 371.

(11) Printed in A.C. minutes, pp 153 - 154.

the Hottentots that the law did not authorize their roaming about without means of subsistence, and those who could not obtain land would necessarily have returned to or stayed in service, as a great proportion did, but of course upon a more liberal footing than before."

It is significant to note that Stockenstrom nowhere gives support to the idea that there should be no restraint upon the liberties of the coloured classes.

That the promulgation of the ordinance did give rise to vagrancy on a considerable scale, Stockenstrom admitted (12) (13) in the paper cited, and confirmed also in his evidence.

But, while he maintained that the laws of the colony would have sufficed to check vagrancy, even had no land (14) been available, he said, nevertheless, that only by making land available to the Hottentots could full (15) effect have been given to the spirit of ordinance 50.

This, as Stockenstrom pointed out, the government had realized. On 29 September 1828, Cole had sent Stockenstrom a memorandum on the question of the settlement of the Hottentots upon the land in which he suggested that (16) they might be assembled in villages near European towns.

To this Stockenstrom objected for two main reasons: such villages would lead inevitably to the development of the liquor trade, which would prove an irresistible temptation to the Hottentots to squander their money on drink; and the development of villages should not be artificially promoted: such development would come

(12) Answer to Q. 2.

(13) Q. 2301, 2303. A.C. minutes, p. 245.

(14) Answer to Q. 4 in questionnaire.

(15) Answer to Q. 3 in questionnaire. Section III of Ord. 50 acknowledged the right of Hottentots and other free persons of colour to own property. Quoted in Cory: Rise of South Africa, II, 371.

(16) Referred to in Stockenstrom to Bell, 13.12.28. C.o. 336.

naturally in areas where trade offered good prospects for the profits of industry, and would be useless where these prospects did not exist. (17)

The exact arguments he had used against Cole's proposal Stockenstrom could not recall, but he affirmed in his evidence that he had had objections. (18)

In reporting on the state of the Eastern frontier in November 1828, Stockenstrom had given it as his decided opinion that the safety of that frontier necessitated two lines of policy: the "total expulsion of the Caffre hordes from the whole of the Ceded Territory;" and the "occupation of said Territory by His Majesty's subjects as densely as its nature will admit." (19)

He now recommended that "in the granting of lands, the Hottentots be put upon an equal footing with the other colonists;" and that, in the Ceded Territory, "as many Hottentots (indiscriminately together with other Colonists) as can be found with sufficient character recommendation, and property, or assistance of others," should be set up as graziers or agriculturists, on grants as small as the water etc. would admit of "in order to secure a dense population and the greater strength." (20) This was the origin of the idea of settling Hottentots in the Ceded Territory. Stockenstrom's plan was clearly amalgamation, and not exclusive colonization. When he was asked by the Committee whether he considered that the Hottentots should continue to be made a separate people, by making permanent grants in certain tracts to people of colour, to the exclusion of other

(17) Stockenstrom to Bell. 13.12.28. C.o. 336. (also printed in Auto. II, 350 - 352.)

(18) Q. 2366 - 2367. A.C. minutes, P. 248.

(19) Stockenstrom to Bell. 22.11.28. C.o. 336.

(20) Stockenstrom to Bell. 13.12.28. C.o. 336.

colonists, Stockenstrom accordingly pointed out that the original idea had not been exclusive colonization. But, since the main object in the Ceded Territory was to obtain a dense population, and since English and Dutch settlers were not content with the small grants which satisfied Hottentots, there had been no alternative but exclusive colonies. He stated that he would certainly mix European and Hottentot colonies, if ^{it} were practicable. ⁽²¹⁾ But he considered that Cole's idea would, for the same reason, have proved impracticable ⁽²²⁾ for the promotion of amalgamation.

When, on 6 February 1829, Stockenstrom recommended the expulsion of Macomo from the upper branches of the Kat River, he again took the opportunity of pointing out that the expulsion of the Kaffirs, if not accompanied ^{of} by the dense population ^{of} the Ceded Territory, would not of itself produce tranquility on the frontier.

That entire tranquillity will be found (whatever may be said to the contrary) ultimately to be the result of the dense population of that Territory in the manner proposed... and the gradual improvement of the aborigines which the provisions of the 49 & 50 ordinances (I mean the leading Principles) will assuredly bring about.

Up to this time there was no hint of a separate Hottentot settlement anywhere in the Ceded Territory - Stockenstrom was mainly concerned with the problem of getting the Ceded Territory settled as soon and as densely as possible, in order to keep out the straggling ⁽²⁴⁾ bands of marauders which plagued the frontier.

(21) Q. 2364 - 2365. A.C. minutes, p. 248.

(22) Q. 2368. A.C. minutes, p. 248.

(23) Stockenstrom to Cole, 6.2.29. C.o. 367.

(24) See the despatch of 22.11.28. C.o. 336: "The Caffres as a nation we have nothing to dread from... but their straggling parties will never cease to take the advantage which our open frontier offers..."

In April 1829 on his way to the frontier, Stockenstrom submitted a plan, designed to facilitate the assembling of a civilian force to assist in the expulsion of Macomo, and also to consolidate and ensure that expulsion, by at once peopling with colonists the territory evacuated by Macomo and his people. This was, to raise a burgher force from among the Hottentots without fixed abodes, those at missionary stations who could not keep their flocks alive for lack of pasturage, and perhaps some whites anxious not to leave service before they knew where to settle. These were to advance with the troops and, as soon as the Kaffirs had been expelled and new military posts established, the men were to be provisionally located conveniently near to the military posts, in small parties. Their families could then follow with the flocks or other possessions and join them. Once again, Stockenstrom emphasized that "I do not think it advisable that permanent grants be made in particular tracts of country to Hottentots exclusively, as that would deprive them of the benefit of examples of industry and civilization which might be brought into the midst of them, by their being indiscriminately mixed with other settlers..."

(25) Hints for the Consideration of the Secretary to Government. 17.4.29. Printed in pamphlet Light and Shade. Light and Shade as shown in the character of the Hottentots of the Kat River Settlement, and in the conduct of the Colonial Government towards them; being the substance of a speech by the Hon'ble Sir Andries Stockenstrom, Bart., M.L.C., in the Legislative Council of the Cape of Good Hope. Cape Town. 1854. This, as Stockenstrom pointed out, both in his evidence (Q. 969) and in a confidential despatch to Bell in April 1829 (Stockenstrom to Bell 24.4.29. C.o. 367), was based on the same principles as those discussed by Sir Rufane Donkin and himself immediately after the right of occupying the Ceded Territory was ceded by Gaika, though not then put into effect.

Stockenstrom's original plan, then, as he said in evidence, ⁽²⁶⁾ was not an exclusively Hottentot settlement, though circumstances eventually made it so.

The Hottentots were the class which could most easily be used in such an experiment. Stockenstrom pointed out in his Hints, since the whites already had their homes and possessions to attend to. Moreover, he said, "their removal would put an end to the clamour about their wandering over the colony without residence or occupation; they would be deprived of their plea of having no place of refuge, and the way would be paved to their gradually becoming landholders more generally..." This latter point corresponds to what he wrote in the paper on the Hottentots in 1833. ⁽²⁷⁾

These documents connected with the history of the origin of the Kat River Settlement also show clearly that Stockenstrom was quite correct in asserting that the missionary Shaw, "who is incapable of an intentional misrepresentation," was wrong in stating that the Kaffirs were driven from the source of the Kat River in order to obtain land for the location of the Hottentots. ⁽²⁸⁾ The expulsion of the Kaffirs was a measure resorted to for the safety of the frontier, and necessitated by the depredations and the attack upon the Tambookies. ⁽²⁹⁾ The idea of settling the area thus evacuated with Hottentots and other settlers was an afterthought and a measure of expediency, as far as Stockenstrom was concerned - though from the beginning he had maintained that the safety of the frontier required the expulsion of the Kaffirs and a dense settlement of colonists.

(26) Q. 2364. A.C. minutes, p. 248.

(27) Answer to Q. 5. A.C. minutes, p. 154.

(28) Q. 965. A.C. minutes, p. 81.

(29) See Stockenstrom to Cole. 6.2.29. C.o. 367.

The evidence which Stockenstrom gave to prove Shaw
(30)
mistaken is fully supported by the documents of the
period, and in querying this point, W.B. Boyce was clearly
(31)
wrong.

That the Kat River settlement in its early stages
was beyond all expectations successful is an accepted
(32)
fact. In his evidence, Stockenstrom expressed his own
astonishment at the rapid improvement in the Hottentot
(33)
settlers there. And indeed, that he had personally
expected the improvement to be gradual is revealed by
his comments in documents already quoted.

This remarkable progress became to Dr. Philip
himself what Stockenstrom called "a matter of enthusiastic
(34)
panegyric." And in this connection, too, Stockenstrom
had come to blows with the doctor. There appears to
have been, in Dr. Philip and his supporters, a decided
predilection to regard Ordinance 50 as directly the
(35)
result of Philip's influence, the excellent effects of
the Kat River settlement upon its inhabitants as a direct
product of the liberty granted to the Hottentots by
(36)
that Ordinance, and the success of the Kat River
Settlement itself as primarily the result of the
influence of the London Missionary Society. Philip
went so far as to list the Kat River locations as a
London Missionary Society "station" in his Return of
(37)
Missions of December 1830.

(30) Q. 965 - 969. A.C. minutes, pp. 81. - 82.

(31) See Chap. I.

(32) See, for instance, the comment of Godlonton in GTJ
17.4.35. Quoted supra p.

(33) Q. 2330. A.C. minutes, p. 246.

(34) Remarks of the Commissioner-General on Philip's Return
of Missions. C.o. 373.

(35) R. Lovett: History of the London Missionary Society.
London. 1899. Vol. I, 550: Dr. Philip's book "excited
enormous influence upon the administration of affairs
in the Colony. One highly important result was the
promulgation, on July 17, 1828, of the famous order in
Council No. 50, by Sir R. Bourke."

(36) See also comments of Colonel Wade in evidence,
Q. 2781. A.C. Minutes, p. 287. Vide infra p. 293 for
discussion on the trend of the questions put to
Stockenstrom.

To this Stockenstrom took strong exception, and gave the government to understand, in no uncertain terms, that Philip had misrepresented the facts. ⁽³⁸⁾ He laid stress on the fact that Kat River was a government experiment, the result of the Governor's desire to give full effect to the provisions of Ordinance 50, and by no means a missionary institution. Mr. Read, the London Missionary stationed there, had only presented himself after the settlement had taken root, and when government was about to appoint Mr. Thompson as the official minister there. ⁽³⁹⁾ The inhabitants of Kat River had indeed applied to Dr. Philip for a minister, but this "originated entirely in an attempt to prejudice the ignorant people on the locations against any clergyman appointed by, or in the pay of, government, as not sufficiently independent to protect the Hottentots against oppression.

In the paper of 1833, Stockenstrom therefore naturally described the Kat River settlement as originating in the desire of government to give full effect to the provisions of Ordinance 50. ⁽⁴⁰⁾ That, of course, had not been the reason uppermost in Stockenstrom's mind, as has been shown, but he advanced it as a strong argument in gaining government approval for the experiment of settling Hottentots in the Ceded Territory.

On the matter of the success of the experiment, Stockenstrom in the paper of 1833 was most enthusiastic. He drew a strong picture of the utter degradation of the Hottentots prior to their being placed on the same footing

(37) Remarks of the Commissioner-General on Philip's Return of Missions. C.o. 373.

(38) Ibid.

(39) Stockenstrom to Bell. 30.6.30. C.o. 373.

Enclosing correspondence with Read on this matter.

Cited in Remarks of the Commissioner-General on Philip's Return of Missions. C.o. 373.

(40) Answer to Q. 3. A.C. minutes, p. 153.

as the other free subjects, pointing out that in many respects, their position was worse than that of slaves. Not being saleable, they were not of the same value to their employers as slaves and were often worse treated. The immediate result of Ordinance 50 was an increase in vagrancy, drunkenness and the breach of contracts of service. But, when the government experimented in giving full effect to the spirit of Ordinance 50 by establishing the Kat River Settlement, the results, contrary to most expectations, were remarkable. Stockenström painted a glowing picture of the thriving, industrious and respectable community.

All that he had said in this paper Stockenström confirmed, on being questioned by the Committee. (41) But it is notable that, when a question tended to trace all the beneficial results he had depicted simply to the granting of liberty to the Hottentots, or to apply them to the Hottentots generally, Stockenström was quick to point out that what he had said applied specifically to the Kat River Hottentots. (42)

Dr. Philip, in his Return of Missions, Stockenström considered, had tended to over-emphasize the good effect upon their fellow-settlers of the Hottentots who came from the London Mission stations of Theopolis and Bethelsdorp. (43) In 1830 Stockenström had written:

Many very respectable characters came among the settlers from Theopolis and Bethelsdorp; but it is a great deal too much to say that they 'were generally speaking the only Persons qualified to improve and civilize their countrymen,' - the families of the Eckhards, Groeps, Arendsos, Foxies, Grysmans, Bloks and many more... are at least their equals in acquirements, conduct, industry and property tho' they have never been away from among the Boors...

And when the Committee raised the question of whether the Hottentots from the London and Moravian

(41) Q. 1388 - 1397. A.C. minutes, pp. 155 - 156. 28.2.35.
Q. 2300 - 2345. A.C. minutes, pp. 244 - 246. 4.3.36.
(42) Q. 1391, 1392. A.C. minutes, p. 155.
(43) Remarks of the Commissioner-General on Philip's Return of Missions. C.o. 373.

missions had contributed a great deal to the improvement of the settlement, Stockenstrom replied that they had, but "not more so than many that came from farmers with property."⁽⁴⁴⁾

In 1836, Gladstone raised the question of the rights of property of Hottentots in the lands annexed to the missionary institutions.⁽⁴⁵⁾ Stockenstrom said he had only a vague impression of the proposal of the Commissioners of Inquiry to grant the Hottentots such rights,⁽⁴⁶⁾ and could not recollect whether he had approved of it or not at the time. But he expressed the opinion then that the Hottentots themselves, and not the Institutions, should have the right to the land.⁽⁴⁷⁾ And earlier in evidence he had said that the Kat River Settlement was a type preferable to that of the missionary institutions, since it afforded to the people the prospect of obtaining possession of the soil.⁽⁴⁸⁾ This coincided with what he had said in 1830, in the course of his remarks on Philip's return of missions.⁽⁴⁹⁾

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(44) Q. 1417. A.C. minutes, p. 157. 28.8.35. This question would not have arisen from the Remarks, however, for these were only exhibited to the Committee by Gladstone in 1836.

(45) Q. 2355 - 2363. A.C. minutes, pp. 247 - 248. 4.3.36.

(46) Theal: Records. XXXV, 300 - 303.

(47) Q. 2362. A.C. minutes, p. 248. 4.3.36.

(48) Q. 2338. A.C. minutes, p. 246. 4.3.36.

(49) Remarks of the Commissioner-General on Philip's Return of Missions. C.o. 373. "The Missionary Establishments (i.e. for the Hottentots) were heretofore indispensable as temporary asylums, but under the present state of the laws, the land belonging to them could not be better appropriated, than the said land on the Kat River has been, and is to be. - "

(ii) Stockenstrom and the Missionaries.

Upon the subject of the missionary institutions too, Stockenstrom and the missionaries, Dr. Philip in particular, had, in the past, not seen eye to eye. Stockenstrom acknowledged as much in his evidence. He told the Committee that there were missionaries who, he considered, were sometimes in the habit of making ill-founded representations on behalf of the natives, which he, as magistrate, had had to refute. (50) "In these controversies," he admitted, "often very angry feelings have been displayed, from which I myself have been by no means exempt, as the records will show."

The records do, indeed, reveal these controversies, though Stockenstrom specified no instances. Stockenstrom was never, at any time, an opponent of missionaries or missionary work as such - although Dr. Philip seems to have been under the impression that this was the case (51) in 1824. But his experience of the Northern border districts had taught him that the missionary institutions, run on the lines that most of them were, could be dangerous sources of mischief. As early as 1815, when the missionary E. Smit, having failed in his attempts to found a mission station for the Bushmen at Torenberg, asked to be allowed to establish one at Grootfontein, Stockenstrom was wholly averse to the project. He maintained that it was very likely that the Bushmen would flock to such a station, where they might find food without having to work for it. But the farmers would

(50) Q. 1074. A.C. minutes. p. 95. 21.8.35.

(51) See Rev. A. Murray's account of an interview with the Commissioners of Inquiry. Theal: Records. XIX, 486.

not long support an institution which deprived them of their essential labour force, and Smit would soon again find the Bushmen leaving him, as they had done at Torenberg, to return to a life of vagabondage and stealing. Nevertheless, being convinced of Smit's good intentions, he recommended that he could do excellent work by going from farm to farm, staying at each place for a few months, and instructing farmers and Hottentots as well as Bushmen. (52)

Stockenstrom had even stronger reasons for regarding with disfavour the missionary institutions beyond the borders. Early in 1816, he was considerably alarmed at rumours which reached him that Coenraad Buis was within three hours' ride of the Bethelsdorp institution, and that he was stirring up trouble amongst its inmates. Stockenstrom was terrified that Buis would succeed in winning over the inmates of the institution to join his group of bandits. And he wrote strongly to Bird:

With respect to the Institute at Klaar Water, the present instance obliges me to repeat that that place falls directly in the eye of every bad-intentioned person as a proper instrument to be used in a wicked design. Plausible and praiseworthy as are the objects of the missionaries, I fear they have too little control over their pupils... (53)

Stockenstrom had other occasions to write severely of this particular institution. Later in 1816, he wrote again to Bird:

...whatever Mr. Anderson may promise himself of the fidelity of those still remaining with him, Experience has too well taught, that where every man is guided by his own will only, Idleness will soon give way to mischief, and only requires an example to break into extravagance.

(55)

And in 1818 he wrote again in similar terms of Klaar Water.

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- (52) Stockenstrom to Bird. 30.5.15. C.o. 2598.
 (53) Stockenstrom to Bird. 22.3.16. Quoted in H.C.W. Leibbrandt: The Rebellion of 1815. p. 826.
 (54) Stockenstrom to Bird. 18.16. C.O. 2606.
 (55) Stockenstrom to Bird. 27.8.18. C.o. 2612.

"In spite of what all bigoted accounts may have imposed upon the credulous world, it is impossible for an un-biassed eye to travel through that country without perceiving an Institution for the propagation of sacred doctrines of Christianity degenerated into a cradle for the most serious mischief, for Mr. Anderson (I believe with the best intentions towards the deluded

((continued foot of p 297))

The fear that these institutions beyond the borders would become a prey to the lawless influence of bandits such as Coenraad Buis, and especially that the contact between the colonists and the inhabitants of the institutions might lead to the temptations of a traffic in arms, was one facet of Stockenstrom's opposition to the institutions. (56) To the other he gave strong expression in a letter to the Commissioners of Inquiry in 1826. Acknowledging the possibility that his prejudices as a colonist might have led him astray, he wrote: (57)

I can appeal to the government, my fellow-servants, the Boers, the savages themselves, as to how I have felt and acted with respect to the latter, and defy the minutest scrutiny; but I am far from running blindfold into the opposite extreme, and thinking that collecting them into schools and preaching to them while they are half-starved, through interpreters who do not understand us themselves, will do them the least good... if these institutions would be turned into receptacles of servants legally bound, who choose to desert their masters, as was the case at Torenberg; if the Bushmen are to be collected in numbers, to live in idleness under pretence of being taught religion, and subsisted on the flocks of those who might be seduced away from good farmers where they had earned those flocks, such institutions must become the focus of rapine and murder, and opposition of duty to society...(58)

All of which, of course, did not cause Dr. Philip and the London Society to love the Landroost of Graaff-Reinet. Moreover, Stockenstrom did have occasion to question the truth of allegations made by the missionaries against the colonists. The incident which he very probably had in mind, in giving evidence here, was that in 1830, when, in his Remarks on Philip's return of missions, he roundly and angrily refuted

people) acknowledges that his Church and School are almost entirely abandoned."

(56) See, for instance, Stockenstrom to Bird. 1.8.16. C.o. 2606.

(57) Stockenstrom to Commissioners of Inquiry. 9.8.26. Auto. I, 227, 230 - 231.

(58) See also Stockenstrom to Bell. 24.3.30. C.o. 373.

Philip's charges against the migrant farmers of
 "oppressing the Griquas in their own country." (59)

However, as has been pointed out, Stockenstrom was no bigoted opponent of missionary work. For the missionaries themselves he had a great respect. In his severest criticism of the institution at Klaar Water, Stockenstrom had never a word to say against the missionary Anderson personally, but believed him to be sincerely well-meaning. Smit's institution at Torenberg had been a failure, and Stockenstrom refused to allow him to found one on similar lines at Grootfontein. This, however, did not prevent him from suggesting that Smit should do itinerant missionary work in the Graaff-Reinet district. And, indeed, in 1837, under Stockenstrom's patronage, a scheme was brought under weigh along lines similar to those suggested two years earlier to Smit. (60) A Missionary Society was established to promote instruction among the heathen of every class. A chapel, ^{was built} for regular services on Sundays and during the week. Instruction in reading and religion was given gratis four evenings a week. And the Society employed a missionary to go from farm to farm and teach the heathen in the country.

Moreover, Stockenstrom was no opponent of missionary institutions run along sensible lines. "...if these Asylums be set on foot," he told the Commissioners of Inquiry, "the Bushmen left at full liberty to avail themselves of them, but not forced or enticed away from where they find themselves comfortable, they may be a

(59) Remarks of the Commissioner-General on Philip's Return of Missions. 31.12.30. C.o. 373.

There were other instances, as when, in 1828, he queried Moffat's assertions that the frontier inhabitants generally were supplying arms and ammunition to the borderers. (Stockenstrom to Bell, 28.2.28. C.o. 336). See also Stockenstrom to Bell, 13.7.30, C.o. 373: vindicating a commando of van Wyk, praising the field-commandant's moderation on the occasion, and saying that the incident "will serve to contrast well with those statements by which the Frontier Boers in general, and van Wyk in particular, have been represented as monsters of cruelty and bloodthirst - "

support to the Colony and the Colony to them." (61)

Kookfontein, where there was a missionary institution and where a regular "fair" was held for trade with the natives was evidently an institution of which Stockenstrom could approve, and in 1819 he recommended Smit as the most suitable person to be appointed as missionary there. (62) Later in the same year, in the midst of preparations for the 1819 campaign, Stockenstrom wrote hastily to Smit, outlining the points he would like him to make in speaking to the members of the Northerly inland tribes who might shortly be expected at Kookfontein - presumably to attend the market. He reminded him that the principal aim must be "the religious and moral civilization of all classes of our neighbours, as well as that of the Hottentots within the colony." And he suggested that this might be an opportune occasion for mentioning to the natives the proposed Government scheme for making temporary grants of erven to deserving characters, which might later become their permanent possession, "in order to give to your audience the clearest proofs how inseparable we deem moral improvement from religious Instructions, and what weight we attach to industry as the principal consequence of the best of civilization." (63)

Stockenstrom by no means disapproved of the presence of missionaries among the tribes beyond the borders. In 1826, when Melvill resigned the position of Government Agent at Griqua Town, Stockenstrom had agreed with him that if "good and prudent" missionaries could be stationed near the Northern frontier, who would keep in touch with Government authorities and, as far as was compatible

(60) Stockenstrom to Bird. 30.4.23. C.o. 2649.

(61) Stockenstrom to Commissioners of Inquiry 9.8.26. Auto. I, 231.

(62) Stockenstrom to Bird. 5.2.19. C.o. 2618.

(63) Stockenstrom to Smit. 19.7.19. Copy in C.o. 2618.

with their calling, assist in seeing that local regulations were carried out, there would be no need to replace the government agent. ⁽⁶⁴⁾ And in August, he told the Commissioners of Inquiry in 1826 that he strongly recommended Dr. Philip and the Rev. Mr. Whitworth to settle missionaries close on the borders, where their presence would act as a check on aggressions on the part of both colonists and native tribes: "but then I consider these worthy men in the outset more as protectors than as teachers," he added. ⁽⁶⁵⁾

As Commissioner-General in 1828 he recommended the employment of the missionaries in effecting a reconciliation among the various border chiefs and in urging them to maintain peace and order. ⁽⁶⁶⁾ And there is every evidence of his co-operating with, and using the services as agents of, the missionaries stationed with the Kaffir tribes beyond the borders. ⁽⁶⁷⁾

To the influence of Rev. Read upon the Hottentots Stockenström paid tribute even in the course of his Remarks, saying that he had initially favoured Read's taking up his residence among the Kat River locations. On the other hand, when Read, as Stockenström considered, very officiously, wrote announcing his intention of settling at Kat River in response to an official application from the inhabitants to Dr. Philip, and saying that, while he would confine himself as much as possible to their spiritual concerns, he would be at their service with advice in outward concerns as well, ⁽⁶⁸⁾ Stockenström

(64) Stockenström to Plasket, 5.6.26. Quoted from Cory Transcripts: Colonial Archives Vol. III, 27.

(65) Stockenström to Commissioners of Inquiry, 9.8.26. Auto. I, 228.

(66) Stockenström to Bell, 28.2.28. C.o. 336.

(67) See, for instance, references in Stockenström to Bell 24.11.28. C.o. 336; 19.5.29. C.o. 367; 19.1.30. C.o. 373; 22.8.31. C.o. 390, covering Chalmers to Stockenström 8.8.31.

(68) Read to Stockenström, 14.6.30. Copy enclosed in Stockenström to Bell, 30.6.30. C.o. 373.

promptly set him right. The Hottentots, he pointed out, had for the past fourteen months appeared very happy and contented under a system whereby they had direct access to himself with their representations. He proposed accordingly to adhere to that procedure, "and thus I trust save you a vast deal of unnecessary trouble."⁽⁶⁹⁾

In giving his evidence before the Committee, Stockenstrom must have run a mental eye over these many occasions when he had strongly criticized the missionaries, and recalled also the good that he knew them to do.

(70)

And so he said:

...upon calm reflection, I think we shall be disposed to look on missionaries as placed in a peculiar position, where they might feel themselves called upon to act more particularly as the guardians of the interests and pleaders of the cause of the coloured classes; therefore I always, in moments of sound reason, when the dictates of justice could have their full sway, thought that great allowance should be made for a very strong feeling on their part.

He added that that strong feeling had often been exercised with very great advantage in eliciting truth and bringing benefit to the natives. And if that feeling had sometimes led to so strong a bias as to lead individual missionaries to "shut their eyes and ears against every but their own side of the question,"⁽⁷¹⁾ it

(69) Stockenstrom to Read. 15.6.30. Ibid.

(70) Q. 1074. A.C. minutes, p. 95. 21.8.35.

(71) Compare the introductory paragraph of the Remarks of the Commissioner-General on Philip's Return of Missions. 31.12.30. C.o. 373: "I am well aware that in making the following observations, I am placing myself in a very delicate Position, in as much as Experience has too well taught, that independent of the ignorant, prejudiced and deluded part of the community in England (whose opinion we might contemn;) even extensive circles - among the truly worthy and respectable, whose approbation and support are in every respect desirable, will at once set down, as a narrow minded and oppressive Enemy of the Aborigines and other coloured classes, - and as hostile to every attempt at their amelioration, - any man who shall presume in the least to differ with those from whom they have accustomed themselves to borrow their own notions as to the means by which that desideration is to be attained, and to whose views they have made their own reasoning powers entirely subservient."

should not be forgotten that they regarded their clients as the weaker party, and that their opponents often displayed "an equal degree of partiality."

(72)
He went on briefly to indicate the excellent work in preserving the peace and checking depredations, done by the Wesleyan missionaries among the tribes such as that of Fato, by the London Missionaries among the Griquas, and by Read and Thompson on the Kat River.

It was in accordance with his experience, too, that Stockenstrom pointed out that the main value of missionary work beyond the borders lay, in the initial stages, not so much in their religious as in what he called their "political" influence, in restraining the natives amongst whom they worked, and in acting as a medium of communication between the government and the natives beyond the borders.

(73)
(74)
He was aware that this was not a popular view of the function of missionaries, but, notwithstanding several suggestions from Buxton that the roots of their influence lay in their Christian influence, it was a view to which Stockenstrom adhered. On the other hand, as might have been expected, Stockenstrom maintained that he could see no value at all in missionaries exercising any sort of "political" or "diplomatic" influence within the colony itself, where there were officials who could act in this capacity on behalf of the natives; "because," he said, "my view is, that it is the duty of every person employed by the government to protect the natives, and to prevent the mischief resulting from wars." But, on being asked whether there had not been instances

(72) Q. 1074 - 1075. A.C. minutes, p. 96. 21.8.35.

(73) Q. 1557. A.C. minutes, p. 184. 12.2.36.

(74) See also Q. 1568 - 1571. A.C. minutes, p. 186.

12.2.36.
(75) Q. 1560, 1561, 1562. A.C. minutes, p. 185. 12.2.36.

(76) Q. 1573 - 1576. A.C. minutes, pp. 186 - 187.

12.2.36.
(77) Q. 1577, 1578. A.C. minutes, p. 187. 12.2.36.

where the officers of government had not borne the character of "protectors of natives," Stockenstrom replied that in much of the evidence it had been clearly proved that there had been too strong a disposition on the part of some functionaries to resort to coercive measures against the natives - a number of men "conscientiously believed the coercive measures were indispensable. (78) Nevertheless, Stockenstrom said that, within the colony, he did not want missionaries to "interfere in any way:"

I wish the Government and the missionaries to be upon such terms that both will have one object in view, which is to keep the natives in peace, and that those men should use their influence over the natives in co-operating with the Government to maintain peace, and to (79) explain all misunderstandings that may arise between them.

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(iii) Stockenstrom Says his Say:

On 11 March 1836, his second-last appearance before the Committee, (80) Stockenstrom made a third attempt, and (81) again without success, to get the Committee to minute the paper on his Commissioner-Generalship which he had submitted on 26 February, and in which he had commented upon the documents exhibited "on the part, as I conceive, of the late Governor and present Government Secretary of the Cape of Good Hope." (82) He had reduced the document to

(78) Q. 1579. ibid.

(79) Q. 1580. ibid.

(80) His last appearance was on 18 April 1836, three days before he sailed for the Cape, when he submitted the paper upon the Erasmus Case already referred to.

(81) His second was on 4 March 1836, when he alluded to a reference in "that paper which I read to the Committee last Friday, and which I strongly requested, and now again request, being entered upon the minutes." Q. 2352, A.C. minutes, p. 247.

(82) Q. 2392 for what follows. A.C. minutes, p. 250. The documents are listed in Chap. IV, footnote (74).

about one-sixth of its former length, the Committee having found it "too lengthy." Asked to state the contents of the paper, he said that, finding it difficult to expunge any passage without weakening his arguments, he merely wished to state that, if the said documents were intended "in the slightest degree to militate against any statement" made to the Committee, he would pledge himself by those selfsame documents to prove his statements. Characteristically, Stockenstrom professed the highest personal respect for the governor and the secretary, but "I owe it to myself most firmly to persist in my view of those points in which I have had the misfortune to differ with them." And he trusted that, whenever any doubt should exist, he would be given the opportunity of proving his allegations to the letter.

The results of Campbell's investigations into the Erasmus case, and the copies of the Journal, with its acid comments on Stockenstrom's evidence, had not yet reached England. ⁽⁸³⁾ But that Godlonton's heated diatribes against Stockenstrom's ambition, had their origin in England, ⁽⁸⁴⁾ is revealed by what followed in Stockenstrom's evidence. What Philip had foreseen, when in 1832 he warned Stockenstrom that they should avoid the appearance of collusion for the defeat of those who differed from them, had, it seemed, come to pass. ⁽⁸⁵⁾ So Stockenstrom suspected, at any rate. Some indication of the type

(83) Wade submitted the first lot of affidavits on 25 March 1836. A.C. minutes, p. 299 ff.

(84) See Chap. I.

(85) See Chap. II. The statements made by Stockenstrom in 1835 (C. 1381, 1382. A.C. minutes, p. . 28.8.35.) to prove that he had never lent himself to "any dark or underhand manoeuvres against any power or individual" were possibly there introduced by Buxton and Stockenstrom by design, in order to forestall possible allegations. Allegations of "collusion," however, may already then have been made.

of criticism which Godlonton and others in the colony were levelling at him must surely have come to Stockenström's ears. But no rumours from the colony could possibly have reached him at this time. Hence his source of information must have been in England.

"The Committee is aware," he said, "that I neither courted nor shrunk from the position in which I was here placed;...."

He had been intercepted on his way from Sweden to the Cape and brought before the Committee as a witness; he had at once appealed to "public documents, every word of which was written under the impression that they would immediately reach the eye of the late governor;" and, though he had been dependent on a memory "much unhinged with respect to Cape affairs by several years' suspension of all connexion with them," he held himself strictly responsible for every syllable of his evidence.

And, his nose ever sensitive to the presence of rats, Stockenström smelt one in the questions on the report on Philip's return of missions.

"I can only state," he commented, "without being able to judge of the object of those questions, that the said report, if compared with everything which has come from me before this Committee - with my views entertained 12 or 15 years ago, as they appear in the first part of the papers printed by order of The House, and with all my other official acts - will prove that I never was either the champion or the instrument of any party; that when I found occasion to differ with the missionaries, I gave my sentiments without fearing for one moment the influence which these men were supposed to possess; and where I found their labours directed to the promotion of the public welfare, I have given them my most cordial support, without consulting the prejudices of their antagonists."

Stockenstrom concluded, in a passage that is worth quoting in full:

It has always been and ever will be the most agreeable part of my duty to espouse the cause of the mass of my countrymen, and those individuals amongst them who may be falsely accused. The Colonial Office contains ample proofs of my zeal on that head; but to justify, deny or connive at crimes which some of them may commit I considered inconsistent both with my public and private duty, as the judicial records at the Cape Can testify. So likewise the protection and civilization of the native tribes are among my most anxious wishes; but I see no philanthropy in encouraging their murders and plunder by impunity. Consistent with these views, I have tried to do my duty to all parties, without courting any, and I am consequently not under the influence of any man or set of men. If this be inconsistency, I am fully open to that charge; ...

Thus Stockenstrom himself. What, in the light of all the evidence, has history to say?

CHAPTER VI

Conclusion: The Ocean of Rescality.

In the Graham's Town Journal of 17 May 1864, the following notice appeared in the last column on page four:

The death of Sir Andreas Stockenstrom is reported by telegram. The Colony paid deceased a pension of £750, which will now be saved.

This was the only reference made by the Journal to the passing of Stockenstrom. It was the last flicker, the rather sordid petering out of one of the epic feuds of South African journalism.

Yet, after the analysis of all the evidence, very little remains of the "Stockenstrom enigma." The picture of Stockenstrom in London as the unscrupulous place - seeker stands exposed as the piece of journalistic licence that it was. Even Theal's somewhat kinder picture of him as a man, essentially human, yielding to an overwhelming temptation to throw aside his principles for the sake of an office in which he would have greater opportunities for service and influence, cannot be accepted as valid.

Stockenstrom's associations with the Buxton group appear to have come about in a completely natural manner. His long - standing connections with the Pringle and Philip dispel the need to seek any sinister implications. His attitude to the philanthropists at this time was precisely what it had been for many years past : sincere sympathy with their views on native policy, tempered by his own practical experience of frontier problems and the typical indignation of the frontiersman at any unwarranted casting of blame on the European farmers of the Cape. Neither in his private correspondence during this period , nor in his evidence in 1835 and 1836, does Stockenstrom appear to have attempted to disguise the existence of differences of opinion between himself and Philip and Fairbairn. His evidence

on the subject of the missionaries, Dr Philip's Return of Missions and Philip's visit to the Eastern frontier just before the outbreak of the Sixth Kaffir War, for instance, reveal the differences quite clearly. Prof. Macmillan is undoubtedly correct in seeing Stockenstrom's attitude towards native problems and the philanthropist point of view at this time as part of a process of development going back to the earliest years of his Landdrostship, although he does not emphasize sufficiently the erratic course of his relations with Philip.

Stockenstrom's tirades on the subject of the Commissionership-Generalship reveal a sense of bitterness and frustration which reached unbalanced proportions and probably distorted both his evidence and his judgment on the subject. Yet his reaction to the question of his re-appointment in the service of the Colonial Government was normal. As a man of slender private means, with family commitments, he was anxious to secure employment in the field in which he had most experience. As a proud man and a man of integrity, he refused to accept an appointment giving him lower status than he had held previously, or one in which he could not render his services to the full and according to the principles which he believed to be the best for the frontier.

The existence of a close connection between the appointment of Stockenstrom as Lieutenant-Governor, and the evidence he gave before the Aboigines Committee cannot be accepted without reservation. Most writers tend to ignore other factors which may have been equally instrumental, if not indeed more so, in the appointment of Stockenstrom. The events of 1835 are telescoped into an unnatural juxtaposition. It is apparently forgotten - for Prof. Macmillan notes but

does not fully emphasize - that, six months before Stockenstrom gave evidence, Philip recommended him for the position of civil authority on the frontier. Moreover, the Colonial Office records would have revealed him as an able administrator and a respected official.

Glenelg apparently took little interest in the proceedings of the Committee until Buxton brought them to his notice, some time after Stockenstrom had completed his evidence. It is possible that Glenelg was influenced by quotations from the evidence which Buxton may have made in the course of interviews towards the end of 1835. But there appears to be no verifiable proof of the accepted idea that Stockenstrom's evidence was a major factor influencing Glenelg. In fact, there are features of Glenelg's despatch of December 1835 which suggest that he could not possibly at that time have made any thorough study of what Stockenstrom had had to say. The corollary to this is that Stockenstrom's evidence as such could not have had any direct influence on the contents of the Glenelg despatch.

The adherents to the Theal school of thought are incorrect in supposing that Stockenstrom himself expected a new appointment to result from his evidence. His correspondence indicates quite clearly that, at the time, far from anticipating a new era in colonial policy, as Theal suggests, Stockenstrom was passing through a period of complete disillusionment. Moreover, he was on his way to settle his affairs at the Cape, preparatory to settling permanently in Sweden, when the summons came to appear before the Aborigines Committee. Stockenstrom knew little or nothing of Glenelg when he first appeared before the Committee. And Glenelg's decision to appoint a Lieutenant-Governor was made at the end of 1835.

It is difficult, as Mr P.J. Smuts has pointed out, to find any real justification for the allegation that, in his various statements during this period, Stockenström completely reversed all his former principles. The Stockenström controversy is, perhaps, the classic illustration in South African historiography of the danger of isolated quotation. The development of Stockenström's policy before 1833 must be studied as a whole. Its fundamental structure emerges very clearly. Stockenström himself re-iterated its basic principles many times. He was, first and foremost, a practical frontiersman and an essential realist. No policy at any time carried weight with him which ~~refused~~ did not recognize the existence of irresponsible elements on both sides of the frontier. In any frontier scheme, he sought a guarantee that the honest and the law-abiding would receive the protection against the lawless to which they were entitled. And he was as indignant at any unfair criticism of the frontiersmen in general as he was at the exposure of their non-European neighbours to injustice.

These are the threads which run right through Stockenström's statements of policy. A study of his statements from 1833 to 1836, both in documents and before the committee, produces no evidence of a fundamental deviation from these basic tenets.

With the philanthropists, Stockenström believed and, as the documents show, had long believed, that the European in South Africa must bear the responsibility for the plight of the Hottentots and the conditions on the frontier, since these were largely the product of the policy of former generations of white men. But at no time did he lay the blame at the door of his own generation as a whole. Prof. Brancken has ably illustrated this latter point in his survey of Stockenström's evidence on Eastern frontier policy.

There does not appear to be any valid support for the theory that Stockenstrom, in giving evidence, deliberately set out to blacken the colonists because tales of the horrors perpetrated by the frontiersmen were acceptable to the philanthropists. It is true that he was the only one of the colonial witnesses with any real authority to speak, who produced concrete instances of flagrant injustice towards the natives and dishonesty on the part of frontier colonists. But he evidently quoted these incidents in good good-faith, in the belief that the facts were true. He was prepared to have them investigated. The usual counter-argument to this is the notorious evidence on the Zeko episode. That Stockenstrom's evidence here abounds in discrepancies is ~~apparent~~. But it seems to be equally appatent that the reasons for Stockenstrom's unsatisfactory statements lay rather in his own confused recollection of the whole period from 1830 to 1831, than in any desire deliberately to blacken the case of a frontier colonist. Stockenstrom referred to the cases of abuse of the patrol and reprisal system primarily in order to support his indictment of the whole existing frontier system.

A fact which has never been sufficiently emphasized, though some later writers such as F.J.Smuts may have recognized it, is that no part of Stockenstrom's evidence, or of his written statements between 1833 and 1836, contains stronger criticism of the whole Eastern frontier system and of the injustices to which it led than that already made by Stockenstrom as early as 1829, when first he became Commissioner-General. It is possible, as the Graham's Town Journal showed, to select passages from Stockenstrom's papers as Landdrost which reveal an apparent contrast in tone to many passages in the papers of 1833-1836. But to accept that contrast as sufficient ground for calling in question Stockenstrom's consistency or his integrity, as the Theal school has done, is to fail to recognize two basic

points : the Commissioner-Generalship brought Stockenstrom into contact with a set of circumstances, the possibility of which in a frontier society he had always recognized, but of the existence of which he had not been acutely conscious on the Bushman frontier; and what he found on the Eastern frontier certainly seems to have led him to revise and modify opinions which he had previously held. The fundamental principles of Stockenstrom's policy remained demonstrably the same throughout the period under discussion, but the conditions under which they operated differed. The severity of Stockenstrom's censure of the patrol and reprisal system dates from the period of the Commissioner-Generalship and not from his stay-period out of office. To lose sight of this fact is to have a distorted conception of the development of Stockenstrom's Eastern frontier policy. J.D.Pitman has failed to bring out this point with sufficient clarity in his account of the Commissioner-Generalship. It is possible that the Graham's Town Journal did not have access to any papers which would have brought home these facts. But it is unfortunate that Theal and his followers probed no deeper.

When Stockenstrom's views on the frontier system and its abuses became public, they were regarded by his critics as proceeding from some sinister - or, as Fairbairn would have thought, salutary - change of heart. The fallacy of this interpretation, in the light of the fact that his attitude to Northern frontier problems and to the Philip school remained constant, has been demonstrated. A new sympathy with the native chiefs on the Eastern frontier was the natural consequence of his realization that abuses of the frontier reprisal system were more prevalent than he had been aware.

Perhaps the worst that can be said of Stockenstrom's

Criticisms is that they were probably coloured by the personal motive of his dislike of Colonel Somerset, the Military Commandant of the frontier. Theal considered this resentment of Somerset a primary motivating factor in Stockenstrom's indictment of the frontier system. Stockenstrom had long since frankly avowed his inability to co-operate with the Colonel, whose approach to the frontier problem he regarded as purely military and ipso facto abhorrent. Passages in his Autobiography, written many years after these events, reveal the almost unbalanced intensity of his dislike of Henry Somerset. But to see in this the origin of Stockenstrom's criticism of frontier policy is to ignore the fact that that criticism was born of principles long inherent in ~~Stee~~ his approach to frontier affairs.

The basic principles of the policy advocated by Stockenstrom in 1835 have been shown to be those implicit in his policy as Landdrost, and explicitly developed during the Commissioner-Generalship. Yet the existence of an absolutely fundamental difference between the policy pursued by Stockenstrom as Commissioner-General and that advocated by him in 1836, appears to have become accepted as axiomatic by many writers. The error lies in supposing Stockenstrom in 1834 to have envisaged gradual incorporation of all the tribes beyond the Eastern borders, and direct rule, as the solution to the frontier problem. That this was not the case is clear, not only from Stockenstrom's letter to the Colonial Office in 1834, but from his own explicit statement in his letter to Glenelg in 1836. Consequently, the assertion that the policy which he advocated in 1836 was fundamentally different from that which he practised as Commissioner-General, or that which he proposed in 1834, is seen to be incorrect. It has also been shown that the principles of the policy suggested by Stockenstrom to Glenelg in 1836, and that embodied in the treaties of the Lieutenant-Governorship, were by no means

wholly foreign to Stockenstrom's previous views.

In the light of these facts, it becomes difficult to accept the suggestion that Stockenstrom prostituted his principles to a mistaken philanthropy as the only means of gratifying his desire for place. It seems at once fairer and more accurate to claim that Stockenstrom accepted the high office offered to him primarily because he could approve the principles upon which was based the policy he would be expected to carry out. One may presume that there may have been aspects of the policy which did not have his entire approval. He himself admitted later that he had been doubtful of its practicability in the conditions on the frontier after the war. But, confident in his personal influence with both the frontiersmen and the Kaffirs, and in the wisdom of a policy he believed based upon justice, he was more than ready to undertake the task of giving the Glenelg system a trial.

In this connection, it is strange that Stockenstrom's critics have never referred to the one aspect of his evidence in which it is virtually impossible to avoid the conclusion that he was deliberately disavowing his previous statements : his denial in 1836 of any recollection of Bourke's frontier system or its revocation. What his motive may have been, one can only surmise. But it seems probable that it was because he knew that Glenelg fully approved that policy, and that one aspect of it was to be incorporated in the new system which he, as an officer of the government, would have to apply on the frontier. It is however, scarcely evidence of his unprincipled seeking to gain favour, since he had already been appointed Lieutenant-Governor and discussed his projected policy with the Colonial Secretary.

Not even his most biassed supporter could claim Stockenstrom to be the ideal witness. He is occasionally guilty - perhaps not entirely without justification - of being irritable and short-tempered. His answers are often rambling and not always relevant. In some instances he is vague and conveys the impression that he is evading the issue: his evidence on Bourke's frontier policy and on the Zeko incident are cases in point. His evidence, especially in connection with the Commissioner-Generalship, provides many examples of his obstinate refusal, or complete inability to revise an opinion or concede a point. Dr E.H. Brookes' description of him as the "veteran quibbler" is by no means wholly unjustified. And Stockenstrom sometimes conveys a misleading impression of his ideas by his habit of making a reply, which must obviously relate only to the beginning or the end of the long-winded summarizing questions frequently, and possibly deliberately, put by his interrogators.

A study of the evidence provides many illustrations of these weaknesses. Yet, when all is said and done, the facts are on the side of Stockenstrom's defenders. The events of 1833 to 1836, and the analysis of the evidence in the light of his former statements and policies, lend astonishingly little support to the allegations against him. And it cannot be denied that some of Stockenstrom's sternest critics have not been in possession of, or have not made use of, the full or correct facts. They accepted, apparently with little, if any, real further investigation, the interpretation of a single partisan newspaper, and presented it, stripped merely of its original deliberate malice. Prof. George Cory, Dr E.H. Brookes, ~~Van~~ Long, J.D. Pitman and others have been misled in that they have based opinions upon selections from Stockenstrom's statements, removed from their full context. And the later critics of

Stockenstrom, notably Dr Gustav Preller, have simply adapted Theal, with varying degrees of detail and venom.

In the final estimate, Stockenstrom stands vindicated. He may have been a man of many faults. But unscrupulous compromise, unprincipled and ambitious pandering to the influential, lack of integrity, cannot be counted among them at any period of his life. Those who have seen in Stockenstrom a man of principles and ideals, a capable and conscientious worker, an honest servant of the community, both European and non-European, have proved that opinion justified by their study of his terms of office before and after 1835. There is no need to except, in this evaluation of him, the period from 1833 to 1836.

This, however, is only one side of the picture. If the majority of the allegations against Stockenstrom cannot be regarded as valid, the question arises: why then all the violent opposition to him? It certainly did not begin and end with a newspaper controversy. Fostered throughout the Lieutenant-Governorship by the Graham's Town Journal, the opposition was sufficient, not only to interfere with Stockenstrom's personal attention to his duties, but materially to impair his relations with his subordinates on the frontier. Co-operation in some quarters became impossible. Whatever the merits or demerits of the system which Stockenstrom endeavoured to apply, it was never given a fair chance to prove itself. Why was this?

(1) C. L. Stretch, Resident Agent among the Gaiikas from 1835 to 1846, commented:

From the moment Sir A. Stockenstrom arrived in Grahamstown 1836 until he retired from the government of the Eastern Province in 1838, his mind was considerably diverted from the great object of his appointment owing to clamour, lawsuits and enquiries, which consequently in proportion deprived me of his able assistance in the direction of the arduous and responsible duty which this unfortunate event imposed on me. The treaties were in consequence imperfectly worked during his administration, and I may say without fear of contradiction they were not understood or worked by the

Tempting though it is to go back-stage on this drama of conflict, it is far beyond the scope of a thesis such as this. The "ocean of rascality"⁽³⁾ bristles with the rocks of dangerous conjecture, upon which one may all too easily founder.

officer who succeeded him.

Memorandum on the Stockenstrom Treaty System by C.L.S. Stretch, Resident Agent among the Gaikas: 1835-1846.

(Printed by the Caxton Printing Works, Pretoria, with the permission of J.G. Gubbins.)

(2) In this connection, a letter from J.M. Bowker, addressed to "C___" and written from a camp on the Lower Koonap, on 19 August, during the campaign of 1846, is most interesting:

You will perhaps wonder that I should have thrown up my cap for Stockenstrom..... I was certain Stockenstrom had a head, and I was quite as certain none of the others had. His Lieutenant-Governorship had been an unfortunate episode in his life, and few knew more about that than I did. That Lieut.-Governorship was offered him by the saints, on his pledging himself to carry out their measures, if he could.... The first salutations he received amongst us embittered the feelings on both sides, and opened his eyes to the difficulty and hopelessness of the undertaking. I believe what he told Boyce and me at Bathurst was the truth. "It was a great thing, he considered to be offered a Governorship under the British Crown, and he determined to take it under the stipulations and give them a fair trial," and he says to this day he never meant to do any more. But we upset him, bothered him from the first, and made him right down savage and careless. For myself, I know I thwarted him for ever, and that Governor Napier came riding with Stockenstrom to Fort Peddie, determined to turn me out, but I opened his eyes at that time, and showed him he had no plea for so doing; and then Stockenstrom, in disappointment, struck the table, and said, "Then Mr Bowker you must resign, for it is impossible for me to put my plans in execution unless my subordinates act with me."..... Stockenstrom could have turned me out with more show of justice and greater plausibility than ever Col. Hare could show for my dismissal, and I soon had the opportunity of comparing the forbearance of the one with the brutal revengeful unforgivingness of the other. Stockenstrom, unfettered by the saints, and freed from missionary Jesuitism, I firmly believe would make a good Lieut.-Governor or Governor.....

From Speeches, Letters and Selections from Important Papers of the late John Mitford Bowker, Graham's Town, 1864

(3) An expression used by Stockenstrom. Auto. II, 58.

Some landmarks along the route have already emerged fairly clearly. The opposition, which Stockenstrom apparently expected his evidence to arouse, came, as he had anticipated, from sources in England. That the reason for it was his criticism of the colonial government and its administration of frontier affairs during his Commissioner-Generalship seems clear: long before the Aborigines Committee ever met, Pringle had gloated over the anticipated discomfiture of Sir Lowry Cole, Colonel Wade and Colonel Bell as a result of what Stockenstrom would have to say. Stockenstrom's relations with Cole personally had always been cordial: he emphasized that point in giving evidence. But he made no attempt to deny the impossibility of co-operation between himself and Colonel Somerset after 1831. And he asserted throughout that the failure of the Commissioner-Generalship was the result of misinterpretation of it, whether deliberate or otherwise, on the part of the colonial authorities.

Colonel Wade was in London in 1835, and attended all the meetings of the Aborigines Committee in August. (4) He was not a member of the Committee, and was not called upon to give evidence in 1835. Whether he suspected that much would be said against the military system on the frontier, and proposed to keep Somerset informed so that he could meet any charges, or initially was merely interested in what would be brought forward, is not certain. However, immediately after the August session, Wade requested the Committee's permission to send copies of the evidence to the Cape. He evidently sent his information direct to Colonel Somerset. (5)

(4) Macmillan: E. Band B p. 136. Macmillan is presumably quoting from one of Buxton's letters.

(5) Evidence of Wade. Q. 2785. A.C. Minutes p. 299. 25/3/36.

Considerable criticism of Somerset's policies was implied in the evidence before the Committee. In particular, he came under fire in the matter of the 1831 commando, which was closely connected with the Zeko incident in Stockenstrom's evidence. It was, therefore, presumably for this reason that Wade forwarded copies of the evidence to him. Somerset was prevented from dealing immediately with possible charges against himself by an attack of erysipelas which confined him to bed for six weeks. (6) It seems probable that he did not mention the information Wade had sent him - not, at any rate, to Campbell, the Civil Commissioner of Albany - until he was up and about again at the beginning of January. Campbell commenced his inquiry into the alleged murder of Zeko on 6 January 1836. (7)

When the Aborigines Committee met again in 1836, the Cole administration had an obvious advocate for the defence in the person of W.H. Gladstone. And by the end of March, Wade was laying the first of the affidavits in connection with the Erasmus case before the Committee. Up to this point, the course of events seems fairly plain. The opposition to Stockenstrom came initially from certain official quarters. But from now on, fascinating cross-currents make their appearance.

By the end of November, 1835, the Commercial Advertiser was also in possession of copies of the evidence, from some other source, and had published parts of it, (8) which the Graham's Town Journal reprinted. (9)

(6) Ibid.

(7) This is the date of the first deposition.

(8) SACA 25.11.35. Editorial on the evidence of Aitchison, Phillips and Stockenstrom. The first part of Stockenstrom's evidence was published on 2.12.35.

(9) GTJ 17.12.35.

What was the connection between Wade and Gladstone and the anti-Stockenstrom campaign which developed in the Colony? (10) Why was George Jarvis so interested in the whole proceedings of the inquiry into the Zeko incident and in the allegations of murder against Stockenstrom himself? (11) Is any weight to be attached to the insinuations of the Commercial Advertiser that the opposition to Stockenstrom was organized by a pack of gun-runners and war profiteers on the frontier? (12)

- (10) It was insinuated that Wade himself aspired to the Lieutenant-Governorship and was behind the movement. See for instance the Editorial in SACA 20.8.36, and a letter, in SACA 1.2.37, from "M", dated 18.1.37 (reprinted in GJ 23.2.37.). This letter may have been written by Stockenstrom himself: the style suggests it.
- (11) The report of the Stockenstrom vs Campbell case provides many interesting side-lights on this period. See Report of the Trial, Stockenstrom v. Campbell, for Libel, in the Supreme Court, Cape of Good Hope, February 28, 1838, with notes from the South African Commercial Advertiser. To which is added report of the Trial, Hoodie v. Fairbairn, May 16, 1837. Second edition with some Additional Documents and Notes. Cape Town. 1838.
- (12) SACA 30.7.36. Fairbairn refers to the affidavits "so industriously taken by the Civil Commissioner and the JUSTICES OF THE PEACE and dealers in gun-powder and other combustibles at Graham's Town." SACA 3.8.36. Fairbairn comments on Cox's evidence about trade in arms with the Kaffirs on the part of "several Boors" and "the Graham's Town merchants, Traders and Smugglers" and enquires: "Was the Governor aware of these facts when he made certain persons JUSTICES OF THE PEACE?" Stockenstrom's comments on the "evil-disposed men" (who, as he constantly asserted, were primarily responsible for the frontier unrest during the early stages of the Trek,) also contain allusions to war profiteers. See, for instance, Stockenstrom to D'Urban. 15.2.37. G/H 8/2, and the despatches referred to therein.
- (13) Four private letters of Mrs Fairbairn written during this period (see Long: Index to Unofficial Manuscripts pp. 126, 128, 130, 130-131) abound in interesting allusions. On 8.9.36 she wrote to Mrs G. Christie: (p. 128) Stockenstrom entered into full explanations with Mr F about certain points on which he was strongly prejudiced against Ried ((sic)) and Pape. Some things were satisfactorily explained... others denied and what remained were points on which honest men may differ.

Was there, in fact, something more than an altruistic concern for the honour of the Colony, or even for the compensation of the Colony, behind the organized building up of public opinion against Stockenstrom on the part of such men as Jarvis, Thompson, the Norton brothers and others? Or was Boyce correct in seeing in Stockenstrom's association with the unpopular Fairbairn circle the primary reason for the opposition to him and the failure of his Lieutenant-Governorship? (13)

These and other intriguing questions spring to mind, inviting re-investigation. It is clear that to explain the opposition to Stockenstrom solely as the natural and spontaneous reaction of a sensitive and sorely tried frontier community to the man who came to represent the reversal of the D'Urban policy, the dashing of their hopes and the unjust criticism of the frontier colonists, is to over-simplify the situation. Public opinion is seldom, if ever, spontaneous. It must be fostered and led. And the campaign against Stockenstrom began some time before any one in the Colony was aware that a Lieutenant-Governor was to be appointed, that Stockenstrom was the chosen candidate, or that the D'Urban policy was to be reversed.

The whole question awaits the adventurous student who will chart the ocean of rascality and perhaps, in so doing, solve for us the Stockenstrom enigma in its entirety.

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- C.L.: Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown.
M.L.: Mendelssohn Library, Parliamentary Buildings, Cape Town.
S.A.P.L.: South African Public Library, Cape Town.
S.A.P.A.: South African Public Archives, Cape Town.