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13M6937

Master of Arts in Philosophy

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To Fail at Becoming South African:

Moral Blindness, Liminality, and Rainbowism

Full Thesis

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15 March 2021

DECLARATION

I, Dimpho Moletsane, declare that this thesis is the result of my own investigation and that it has not been submitted in part or full for any other degree or to any other university. All sources used and quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

DIMPHO MOLETSANE

PREFACE

This thesis, broadly speaking, concerns personal & national moral transformation and being-becoming. It draws generally from multiple disciplines that I have gained insights from throughout my undergraduate experience, including discourse theories in journalism, postcolonial theories in literature, and nationalism in political theory, among others. In particular, it follows done work by the Rhodes University Allan Gray Centre for Leadership Ethics (AGCLE) and aims to take a place among research conducted as part of a broader project entitled 'Understanding and Overcoming Moral Blindness: the impact of IiNtetho zoBomi—Conversations about Life' (hereafter 'ZoBomi').

The goal of ZoBomi is to foster ethical agency among its participants. This work involves developing an awareness of the psychosocial realities of our lives that can work to interrupt our ability to function in ways that we would most truly want to upon reflection, as well as the stake we have in controlling the impact of these realities on our lives. And thus questions such as 'How do we want to live?', 'What kinds of people do we want to be?'; 'What gets in our way of being the kinds of people we most truly want to be upon reflection?' are engaged and addressed throughout the course.

The aim of ZoBomi is not to merely *tell* participants (from a position of authority or expertise[1]) that they are such ethical agents who care about who they are and how they live and act in the world; about the importance of coming to a better understanding of the human predicament, of themselves, one another, and their social reality. Instead, ZoBomi aims to *show* to its participants the extent to which "organising and taking responsibility for our lives is something that we want to do once we have given the matter considered attention, even though doing so may be (and typically is) emotionally taxing"[2].

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[1] ZoBomi promotes a radical, 'horizontal' teaching approach — where the academic hierarchy between lecturer and student is flattened as much as practicable -- and so calls back to the pedagogical models of student-teachers and teacher-students envisioned by Paulo Freire.

[2] Practicing Freedom Reflections on 'IiNtetho zoBomi: Conversations About Life' - AGCLE (unpublished draft).

Through reflections and testimonials of undergraduate students who have participated in ZoBomi, it was discovered that a large portion of participants ostensibly against rape culture, racism, sexism, heteronormativity, and the like, have since come to realise various ways that they have unwittingly been part of and continue to contribute to the very behaviours that they identify as problematic. This phenomenon was identified by participants across varying demographic lines of race, class, gender, and sexuality, appearing just as common in members of so-called 'marginalised' groups as it is in members of so-called 'privileged' groups. Moreover, there is little reason to hold that this phenomenon of moral blindness only exists in students, which suggests that it may be a widespread, perhaps even *default*, socio-epistemological setting in post-Apartheid South Africa.

This often 'unwitting' participation or contribution to social practices and ideas that individuals find morally objectionable has come to be understood as 'moral blindness'. Moral blindness, this thesis argues, is both an epistemic and ethical concern that allows socially unjust systems to perpetuate themselves. This work aims to understand and account for this phenomenon. To this effect, questions of 'what is moral blindness'? 'What contributes to it'? And 'how can institutions such as universities work to overcome it'? — form the basis of this research project.

As a contribution to work done by ZoBomi, this thesis works to account in particular for society-wide moral blindness with reference to a *shared* moral framework. While investigation into moral blindness as expressed without such an assumption of a shared moral framework remains relevant and vital, this thesis seeks to establish moral blindness that can be found in -- and thus implicates -- society at large. The shared moral framework that this work shall consider is the post-Apartheid South African Rainbow Nation project. This work, then, is about post-Apartheid South African being and its transition towards its rainbow nation becoming. More specifically, this thesis is about a particular disruption that happens in the process of being-becoming; thus, this thesis is concerned with the liminal space in nation-building.

The post-Apartheid South African society, I shall argue, is the product of a moral commitment (or a set of moral commitments that combine into one larger commitment) that aims toward the holistic transformation of the state, geography, and the people. A commitment -- or promise -- that, taken seriously, has profound implications for the kind of society South Africa can and ought to be. A commitment that over time has shown itself to have further-reaching implications and ramifications than it first appeared to have when the more obvious target was the state-sponsored crime against humanity that was Apartheid and its racism – but

now expresses itself as a call to take seriously our commitment towards equality, inclusivity and unity, entailing a renewed focus on sexism, homophobia, classism and even xenophobia. A promise -- dating back to at least the 1955 Congress of The People, where the people of this society, in recognition of the moral untenability of a society founded on injustice, exclusion, separation, and inequality -- to create a wholly new and different society, one based on principles of equality, inclusivity and unity, which came to be christened by the late Desmond Tutu as The Rainbow Nation[3]. A promise that even now, in 2021, we as a society have failed to keep. This thesis is thus concerned with a particular discongruity between our society's moral aspirations and the practices and behaviours that members of our society may engage and participate in that do not align with our moral commitments.

While this discongruity may be attributable to larger systemic forces, such as capitalism, patriarchy, and uncritical liberalism, among others; for this work, particular focus is placed on the members of society themselves. While indeed, the task of rainbowist nation-building must operate at the structural level of social policy and institutional change, the personal duty of civic virtue, self-transformation and character-building forms a critical facet of rainbowism as a moral project -- and it is on this facet that this work is focused. This shift from systemic forces and environmental factors to focus on individual transformation should not be taken as eschewing accountability to the former two causes[4]. It is also essential to understand that this inquiry into "obscured awareness" and "unwitting complicity" cannot offer a ready excuse for moral complacency. Regardless of why one is led to failing their moral commitments, be it moral blindness or simple negligence, failure to live up to the rainbowist call is, ultimately, a failure to become South African. This calls for an examination of just how much we, as society at large, in fact identify with and are committed to the national project[5].

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[3] While I take rainbowism (understood as a joint commitment towards inclusivity, unity, and equality) to be the moral good for South Africa, I do not mean this in a prescriptive sense. To be clear, the 'good' of rainbowism is reactionary, that is, it is borne out of a rejection of Apartheid (and colonialism) and what it represents to the people themselves. I therefore do not take rainbowism to necessarily be an objective good that all societies ought to strive towards. And while I personally do often relate to and identify with rainbowism as outlined in this work, I acknowledge that this is largely a product of having been born into the post-apartheid rainbow nation building project; thus, I struggle to conceive of South Africa and South Africans in ways that outright contradict or reject the rainbowist world view. I do, however, acknowledge that rainbowism does not represent the only possible orientation and future that South Africa can or may take.

[4] As can be said of the petrochemical industries -- where responsibility for pollution is shifted from structural and institutional forces and onto consumers for inadequate disposal of plastic waste.

[5] The socio-epistemological account of moral blindness only extends as far as facts beyond an individual's control that have led to their unwilling participation in unjust systems. Once these are revealed, however, moral blindness can no longer serve as an account and another explanation, e.g., 'the individual simply does not care,' would then apply.

While I agree with ZoBomi that people are morally oriented beings, the desire to be moral can often be far outweighed by much stronger desires to be comfortable, wealthy, entertained; to eat well, and to experience fun, intimacy, pleasure, and creativity, to avoid pain, boredom, sickness, exposure to polluting toxins and other discomforts. In many ways (particularly considering mass poverty and deprivation), the robust inclusivity that I argue Rainbowism calls for would invariably stand in conflict with many of our desires for comfort and personal wealth, among other things. It may be materially far more accessible for some (rather than others) to prioritise and practice rainbowism and its ideals. All this sits at the core of what this thesis aims to examine: to what extent have we failed to create the conditions conducive to our national transformation and the creation of rainbow citizens? Given rainbowism as the commitment towards radical inclusivity as I articulate it, and considering its social costs and personal demands, is it something that South Africans indeed wish to pursue?

How we rank our conflicting desires is one way we come to terms with how much we truly prioritise our commitments, and it is precisely in moments such as this that we have the opportunity to recommit and actualise ourselves as Rainbowists. Moreover, if being South African is taken as a matter of commitment to radical inclusivity, as I discuss, then my identity as a Rainbowist South African indeed would have to factor in my other desires and commitments. If anything, inquiry into our commitments to the post-Apartheid South African project is precisely the goal for this project. Ethics are costly; if rainbowism were easy and could fall in line with our other desires, then becoming a rainbow nation would have been much easier and more straightforward than it has proved to be.

And so, the questions I wish to leave with my readers, many of whom, like myself, were raised in a society that declared itself The Rainbow Nation, are, do we really want to be Rainbow Citizens? And if so, are we prepared to take responsibility in our lives for making the Rainbow Nation dream a reality.

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Abstract

In an effort to move away from Apartheid and its evils - South Africa and South Africans have committed to a shared moral project - the Rainbow Nation-Building Project (RNP); a project that confers certain moral duties and responsibilities upon its citizens, including a joint commitment to robust inclusivity, equality, and unity. Importantly, however, our environments – be they physical, social, or psychological – are such that they (actively or passively) obscure our awareness of some morally relevant facts about our society, and thereby hinder us as moral agents and therefore threaten our abilities to fulfil our moral project and commitment.

What does it mean for us - a society ostensibly committed to the RNP - to be plagued by racism, sexism, queerphobia and xenophobia? What is it that contributes to our complicity regarding social practices and ideas that we would otherwise find morally objectionable? What does it say about our commitment to our publicly-exalted ideals and values (of inclusivity, diversity, reconciliation, justice, and unity) when we are unwittingly complicit in the marginalisation and social exclusion of members of our society? And how can institutions such as universities work to overcome this?

In this work, I argue that the obscuring of, and failure to perceive, morally relevant facts that call on us for ethical attention and/or action - a phenomenon I refer to as 'moral blindness' - is responsible for at least some of our behaviours and practices that run contrary to our moral ambitions; and therefore has profound implications for us as moral agents and our ability to succeed in our moral goals. Moral blindness, then, is both an epistemic and ethical concern that enables socially unjust systems to perpetuate themselves; and is thus a threat to *all* moral projects.

I argue that, for South Africa, much of what can be identified as moral blindness is the direct result of the shifting and conflicting socio-cultural conditions the nation finds itself liminally caught amidst in its transition from its Apartheid past and towards its promised inclusive Rainbow Nation future. Commitment to the RNP, I argue, involves a self-transformation and habituation of certain supportive virtues on the part of South Africans to become the kinds of people who are compatible with the Rainbowist society - whom I call Rainbow Citizens. But this self-transformation itself is also a moral project, and therefore subject to the threat that moral blindness presents, and so too can be failed. If all this is true, then it seems that if we do not take moral blindness seriously, we could ultimately fail to become South African.

Section 1: Moral Blindness and South Africa

Introduction: The State of Our Nation

Over the past three decades, South African society has been engaged in a national project of transformation. This project, as I will argue in the coming sections of this work, is a *moral* project. A project that comes out of a moral rejection of the Apartheid and Colonial administrations that came before it, and a project that seeks to transform South Africa into "a truly united, democratic and prosperous [...] society based on equality, nonracialism and non-sexism"– commonly referred to as 'The Rainbow Nation' (Government of South Africa, 2014).

South Africa, then, is engaged in a transformative nation-building project. According to Vasti Roodt (2019), nation-building is a term used to name a process whereby a collection of people organise themselves into a "cooperative venture involving a large-scale exchange of skills, labour, services and goods in accordance with established laws and regulations" (Roodt, 2019). For Bruno Bosteels:

> such a political process involves a prolonged act or series of acts in which a substantial yet immanent transformation takes hold of a collective body. This is the strange magic whereby the whole becomes more than the sum of its parts (Bosteels, 2016, p. 5).

The post-Apartheid democratic Republic of South Africa is engaged in such a multi-generational nation-building project in the hope of leading to the transformation of society from one based on exclusion and division on the basis of perceived difference to a society of people who feel a commonality of interests and goals such that they 'would not wish to be made separate from each other'. The project of South Africa, then, is the creation of a society and state without oppression or unjust discrimination, and for this work, I will refer to this as 'rainbowism'.

The idea behind this 'Rainbow Nation' represents a recognition that "[the] country will never be prosperous or free until all our people live in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities"[1]. Which is to say that (unlike the regimes of the past) it is only within a framework that is tolerant and accepting of the diverse range of being that exists within humanity that all who live in post-colonial and multicultural societies can achieve their full potential as human beings. This view was affirmed by President Nelson Mandela in his

[1] Preamble of The Freedom Charter

inaugural speech in 1994, promising that "never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another". And the South African people thus entered into a commitment to becoming "United in Diversity!".

This 'rainbowist' worldview, particularly its orientation towards equality, inclusivity, and unity of the people in this land, is set at the core of what it means to be a South African in the post-Apartheid context. One of the implications of the Rainbow Nation Project (RNP) is a duty placed on South African society to transform (themselves) into a people who are compatible with such a society. This work will argue that this self-transformation required of rainbow citizens entails nationwide cultivation of character traits or virtues conducive to the RNP. But, like all projects, this national moral project carries with it the possibility of failure. And this potential of failure - the failure of us as South Africans to transform ourselves into Rainbow Citizens - forms the core of my interest in this thesis.

Born in 1994, my early life was marked by a society in transition. My generation is that of the so-called '*born-frees*', the nation's hope of a youth that would grow up with almost no direct experience of Apartheid laws. Everywhere I went, and everywhere I looked, there were signs of rapid change. I was among the first cohorts of integrated pupils in my primary school. And every year since, the student body became increasingly racially diverse and multicultural. We were raised to value and promote our nation's unity, diversity, equality, inclusivity, justice, and reconciliation. We were told that our skin colours would not bar us from success and taught that overall, and especially when it comes to race, our differences are only skin deep. We were told to learn from, respect and embrace each other's different religions and cultures. Taught that our sex and gender do not determine who we can be in our lives. Though not quite conscious of it happening, growing up in that era (especially in the aspiring upwardly mobile lower-middle-class farming town I was raised in) inculcated in us a particularly open social orientation towards difference, a comfort with inclusivity, a promotion of equality, and a desire for unity.

Despite all these efforts from the early 1990s until today, South Africa remains a troubled nation. Although ostensibly committed to creating a just, inclusive, and united society, the reality on the ground – rife with flares of xenophobia, homophobia, sexism, ableism, and indeed racism – tells a different story. Our media is inundated with stories of a failed moral condition, depicting various acts of human cruelty and moral failures such as rampant gender-based violence, murder, theft, trafficking, racial discrimination, fraud, class apathy and more.

Given our national project to create a society based on "equality, nonracialism and non-sexism", why does our society continue to be plagued by passive forms of racism, sexism, discrimination, and inequality? What happens in our social and moral landscapes that can account for how we so often become unwittingly complicit in social ills such as rape culture, racism, sexism, and other morally problematic behaviours; despite our wanting to be overall ethical and moral persons? These are some of the questions I aim to engage in this thesis.

To briefly answer some of them, I would say that there exist many obstacles which get in the way of us behaving as the moral agents we want to be. A non-exhaustive list would include psychological distancing, group conformity and status anxiety, as well as uncritical obedience to authority. Alongside these obstacles is a primitive and tribalistic tendency to categorise others and distinguish between an 'us' and 'them', as well as a human desire to see oneself as right, good and just. These 'internal' obstacles also interact with structural and systemic forces, which often reinforce them. These obstacles (in part or in combination) can result in situations where we may find ourselves in states of *insensitivity to* or *unawareness of* morally or ethically salient facts regarding oneself and one's relations to others or the larger social environment. That is, they get in the way of lucid perception of the self, others, and the world; and by so doing, work to interfere with our ethical agency and lead to a failure to act or behave according to our own moral standards. This desensitised 'state' – what I will refer to as Moral Blindness – is at the core of the concern of this work. Moral blindness, I will argue, offers an account for how we often find ourselves unwittingly complicit in perpetuating systems and norms we would reject upon reflection; and can be found at every level of society and across the intersecting demographic lines of race, class, gender, and sexuality; and is thus as likely to obtain in members of so-called 'marginalised' groups as it is in members of so-called 'privileged' groups.

This mass moral failure to recognise morally relevant facts about ourselves and our environments that call on us for ethical attention and action, I argue, may exist as an epistemic default setting in post-conflictual South Africa stemming from our liminal state of being 'inbetwixt and inbetween' a past society we morally reject and the society we wish for ourselves that has yet to be made real. This state of liminality allows socially unjust systems, practices and views to perpetuate themselves not because we are lacking in moral virtues or have defective basic moral principles, but instead because we possess truncated moral virtues or systematically misapply moral principles due to the society itself obscuring morally-relevant

facts, or holding certain false beliefs, beliefs that may be more likely to be fostered by certain kinds of social practices, institutions and environments than others. I believe that 'Moral Blindness' can stand to account for some of our moral failings, particularly our failure to recognise the potential ways we may be contributing to systems of injustice, thereby failing to act ethically despite us valuing being ethical.

Borrowing terms from design and architecture (concepts such as 'hostile design' and 'defensive architecture'), I shall explicate the contrasts and similarities in the ways we construct physical structures with how we 'construct' our societies and normative modes of interaction with each other and use the metaphor of design to explicate a method of social and moral inquiry understood as social-moral epistemology. In the same way that our cities may have architecture or design elements that can work to disable our capacity to know about our society; I argue that our societies themselves may be set up in such a way that we are similarly disabled from detecting and responding appropriately to certain moral facts in our communities. In so doing, I aim to provide an account for how social institutions can work to disable moral and epistemic virtues, even in individuals who have undergone successful primary moral education. If true, this could have important ramifications for how we create inclusive and morally conscious environments. I argue that certain forms of pedagogical methods, particularly postmodernist approaches to education, are suited to combat such a vicious epistemic setting and thus must be considered for adoption if we are to overcome these issues. I will discuss Margret Gilbert's 'robust inclusivity' as an example of the sort of behavioural complexes that would be propitious towards establishing the Rainbow Nation. This thesis, therefore, calls for social intervention.

This work will argue that (a) identifying as South African - that is, identifying as a member of the Rainbow Nation - is a commitment that (b) entails being bound by certain moral duties and responsibilities. (c) Moral blindness can prevent people from acting according to their moral duties and responsibilities. Thus, (d) moral blindness can prevent South Africans from acting according to their moral duties and thus their moral ambitions as rainbow citizens. (e) Overcoming moral blindness requires transformative work on the self to make one less susceptible to social and environmental features that trigger it, and (f) it is the duty of South Africans to work towards this self-transformation in order not to fail in their moral commitment and ambitions to become rainbow citizens. To this end, this thesis will be divided into four parts:

Section 1 will briefly introduce the aims of this work and establish the conception of Moral Blindness and Liminality used in the rest of this work.

Section 2 will look at the ideological and political histories that informed South Africa's transition from Apartheid, and begin investigating the relevance of liminality and moral blindness in our understanding the South African condition of transition. **Chapter 1** will work to establish the rejection of and movement away from Apartheid as stemming from a fundamental moral objection to core tenets of Apartheid and Colonialism, namely segregation, inequality, and exclusion. **Chapter 2** will discuss the prefiguration of the Rainbow Nation, arguing that it is the continuation of a commitment made by the Congress of The People and its Charter to the creation of a South African society based on unity, equality, and inclusivity. **Chapter 3** will discuss some alternative paradigms and how they fail to adequately answer the moral rejection of Apartheid and Colonialism. **Chapter 4** will then discuss the 'new dispensation of South Africa, its core tenets and how they are expressed through constitutionalism.

Section 3 is where I work to show how moral blindness is related to phronesis, a concept in virtue ethics, then discuss civic virtues and how they may be useful in combatting moral blindness. In **Chapter 1,** I discuss identity formation and social character. In **Chapter 2,** I discuss moral blindness and link it to virtue ethics through the concept of phronesis. In **Chapter 3,** I discuss socio-moral epistemology and its relevance to the South African project. In **Chapter 4,** I work to more explicitly link moral blindness with the state of liminality in which South Africa and its society are found to be. **Chapter 5** is a discussion of how moral blindness can be considered a threat to our identities as South Africans.

Finally, for **Section 4**, I discuss what we are to do with our state of liminality and moral blindness. **Chapter 1** will link the works of Paulo Freire and Steve Biko and show how their insights are essential for understanding and working against liminal permanence and moral blindness. **Chapter 2** will recontextualise some contemporary South African social problems and show how they stem from our liminal moral blindness.

Chapter 1: What is Moral Blindness?

'Moral blindness' can broadly be described as a failure to see or recognise aspects of one's personal and social realities that call for ethical action or attention, such that the agent may be led to behave in ways that run contrary to their moral projects. Moral blindness is an epistemic and moral phenomenon that relates to a failure in people's ability to act like the moral persons they perceive themselves to be.

What is most salient and relevant for this work is the notion of environmentally-induced moral blindness being applied to an individual's moral expression; that is, to account for how the social environment can lead to people failing to meet or live up to their own moral standards, specifically by rendering us unable to appreciate -- and thus appropriately respond to -- morally relevant facts of our environment. Moral blindness, then, can help us to explain and understand how, in specific contexts and under particular circumstances, certain individuals (and indeed whole communities and societies) can unknowingly contribute to systems and structures that they and their society at large are ostensibly opposed.

In my view, moral blindness requires two aspects or conditions:

(1) The moral agent has some moral axiom or commitment, be it a project, goal, or ambition.
(2) There are some things that obscure or conceal to the agent which behaviours are conducive or contrariant to their moral projects, goals, and ambitions.

Firstly, it is my view that an agent without an active moral project or commitment cannot be said to be morally blind, even when behaving in ways otherwise recognisable or understood as morally abhorrent. While indeed, the 'blindness' in moral blindness may imply there being something that *ought* to be 'perceived' by the agent, the concept does not mean to imply that there is some 'objective' moral standard to which all moral agents must ascribe (or that contrary behaviour must necessarily be considered 'morally blind' by all). In my view, ascribing moral blindness to a morally apathetic agent would be a misdiagnosis and seems to only amount to some other agent imposing their moral views onto the first and judging them accordingly. Other alternative prognoses may be offered to explain the morally apathetic or the like, a project that can be explored in another work at a later point, not in this current work.

Secondly, for moral blindness to apply, behaviours that run contrary to the agent's moral commitments must be the result of internally, socially, or environmentally causative factors.

That is, the agent must in some way be made unaware of the impropriety of their behaviour given their own moral commitments. An agent that, in full knowledge, *chooses* to act in ways contrary to their moral commitment (or chooses to fail to behave in ways conducive to their moral commitments) would put to the question their commitment to their moral axiom. However, such an agent would not be in a state that would qualify as moral blindness according to the strict definition that is to be used here. Concepts such as akrasia and incontinence seem to map onto this sort of behaviour more distinctly. For moral blindness, as I define it for this work, the agent must be acting at least in the *belief* that they are still behaving well in accordance with their moral project or commitments.

Moral blindness is also different from something like *moral inconsistency*. Agents randomly vacillating between various moral frameworks is not what is to be considered here. While this may also be in some ways related, I wish to focus only on situations where there is a straightforward or concrete moral project at hand, and the factors that work to get in the way of this moral project are things about the environment, society, or the agent's habituated ways of thinking. To illustrate an example of what I would count as an instance of moral blindness, I will present The Story of Andy.

The Story of Andy

Let us suppose there is an individual, Andy, who moves into a new city. Andy - who comes from a decent home upbringing and background and has had a good basic moral education - is someone who wants to be a charitable person. Now, in her previous hometown, Andy would encounter situations, pick out morally-relevant information and proceed to respond in a morally appropriate manner. For example, were Andy to notice a homeless person sleeping in the cold in the winter, she would remember she owns a blanket she no longer uses and donate it to the homeless person or a shelter[2].

Andy's new city, while for the most part no different from her hometown, is different in the following important respects: while the new town has the same (perhaps even slightly more) homeless people, the city has been designed in ways which obscure this: For instance, shop

[2] In this city (her hometown), Andy's relationship with the social environment is such that she can feel relatively assured that she is able to rely on her noticing signals of poverty and deprivation such that her desire to engage in charitable actions and behaviours is reliably activated.

windows are steeply angled to prevent idle sitting and walkways are fenced to keep away street beggars; benches and seating are divided with armrests to prevent what is known as 'rough sleeping'; and police regularly patrol for and remove loitering street kids.

In this city in the winter, Andy never encounters any information on the status of homeless individuals in the city. In fact, the very existence of homelessness in the new city is something that has not quite occurred to Andy since, for the most part, most opportunities to encounter this information have been eliminated. And so, even as someone who readily wants to be charitable towards the homeless and has cultivated herself to be charitable in her hometown, Andy does not give to charities for the homeless in her new city.

It seems, in this case, that the design or organisation of the physical environment around Andy may work to account for the different expressions (or activation) of her virtues or moral attitudes. The story of Andy can thus serve as a hypothetical example of ways our society can be designed which disable or desensitise our ability to be aware of, and thereby appropriately respond to, morally relevant features of our environments.

To reiterate, moral blindness is an epistemic and moral phenomenon that I describe as a failure to perceive or recognise aspects of one's personal and social realities that call for ethical action or attention, leading to behaviours that run contrary to an agent's moral projects or commitments. A failure to meet one's own moral standards should be thought of as a moral failure; therefore, blindness to how this happens is moral blindness. Moral blindness interacts with structural and systemic forces, often working to reinforce them and thereby getting in the way of lucid perception of self, others, and the world. It is in this way that moral blindness thus interferes with our ethical agency. Moral blindness, therefore, exists as a threat to all moral projects.

Moral Blindness and Moral Responsibility

Moral blindness is a phenomenon that helps us to explain and understand how, in specific contexts and under particular circumstances, certain individuals (and indeed whole communities such as our society) can unknowingly contribute to systems and structures to which they and their society at large are ostensibly opposed. Particularly of interest concerning moral blindness is how much responsibility, if any, an agent wishing to be moral can or must assume for their condition.

For Alexandra Trofimov (Should Have Known Better: Responsibility, Ignorance and Reasons, 2016), “persons are responsible for their ignorant wrongdoing if and only if they are responsible for their ignorance” (Trofimov, 2016, p. 3). And persons are responsible for their ignorance if, and only if:

> (a) They possess the rational capacity to appreciate the relevant reasons accurately.
>
> (b) There are no limitations in their circumstances that make it unreasonably difficult for them to appreciate the relevant reasons accurately.

Only if conditions (a) and (b) are both met, is it reasonable to claim that a person should have known better[3] because they would have had a fair opportunity to avoid both their ignorance and the wrongdoing that results (Trofimov, 2016, p. ibid). While this is relevant and important, this is not quite the conception of ‘responsibility’ I am interested in for the moment (I will return to this idea in a later section). For the present concern, however, what I am looking at is responsibility as understood, for instance, in corporate settings such as in a business, where the entire workforce can be held responsible for failure to achieve corporate targets (such as profit, revenue, or public relations targets) irrespective of the performance of any individuals or teams.

In South Africa, we have a national project: to build a Rainbow Nation; that is, a nation-state that is founded on inclusivity, diversity, and unity. The success of this Rainbow Nation-building project (RNP) necessitates the transformation of South Africa’s people to being *a people* compatible with this Rainbow Nation (Rainbow Citizens), lest we suffer social conflict and the collapse of the nation-building project.

The RNP then has two aspects:

(1) the creation of the Rainbow Nation-state
(2) the transformation of people into Rainbow Citizens

One major complication for this RNP is the ‘matter’ from which we would construct this Rainbow Nation. From its colonial inception up to its Apartheid peak, South Africa had taken on a form that is profoundly contradicting of the RNP, a South Africa founded on separation, exclusion, and inequality. This ‘contradiction’ or ‘conflict’ between the form of what South

[3] This ‘duty to be informed’ seems imperfect. How are we to know someone’s rational capacity to appreciate relevant reasons? What limitations are we to seriously consider when making this judgment? It is not clear how much effort one is expected to invest, nor at what point one would have sufficiently met this duty. Yet being informed seems like it would be necessary for just participation in any contemporary society.

Africa *was* and what South Africans want it to *become* is at the heart of this work. To return to the question of responsibility, then, what I am asking is, knowing that the success of the RNP depends on the collective effort of all South Africans, what responsibilities do I as a South African individual have in making myself aware of and working against aspects of myself, my environment and society at large that continue to promote separation, inequality and exclusion in order to make good on my personal and national commitment towards inclusivity, diversity and unity? Suppose the private (individual) and public (social) moral ambitions are indeed aligned such that we do want to create a Rainbow Nation and transform into Rainbow Citizens. How actively vigilant must I and society be to potential local or widespread moral blindness? I believe the answers to these questions could have ramifications for understanding rampant moral blindness in South Africa and how we ought to work to create increasingly inclusive and morally conscious environments.

In this work, I will argue that in South Africa (and possibly other places), much of what can be identified as 'moral blindness' is, in fact, the consequence of conflicting socio-cultural conditions that South Africa finds itself caught amidst in its liminal transformation from its Colonial and Apartheid past and towards its promised Rainbow Nation future. Assuming we remain committed to our RNP, our moral failures should be read as more than just acts, behaviours, or practices of immorality by disparate individuals, but instead as socially- and environmentally-cued behaviours or responses that ultimately undermine our collective standing as moral agents with our world and each other and lead to a failure to live up to our own moral ambitions. The next chapter will explore why I believe moral blindness is the correct account of the South African moral predicament.

Chapter 2: Moral Blindness and South Africa

> Crime and other costly forms of irresponsible behaviour are increasing with alarming rapidity and have permeated all aspects of our daily life and social fabric. Our society is staggering under the burden of violence, vandalism, street crime, street gangs, truancy, teenage pregnancy, business fraud, and political corruption, deterioration of family life, lack of respect for others, and lack of a work ethic.
>
> (Brooks, 1996, p. 3)

For most other nations comparable to South Africa, I do not think it would be incorrect to characterise the situation of moral conflict as simply being the result of a complex interaction of millions of individuals expressing their conflicting moral views and values, versus being as due to a broader phenomenon of moral blindness. I do, however, think that the unique history of South Africa and its people lends itself to an interpretation of the moral situation as being one best described as a state of moral blindness. South Africa's (still incomplete) transition away from Colonialism and Apartheid, I argue, is a moral project that is so wholly encompassing and fundamentally contradictory to its previous dispensation that I believe that certain moral failures in our practices and behaviours must be seen as stemming from or at least influenced and informed by this contradiction, conflict or tension between the previous way of doing things and the way things are to be done now if we are to make good on our post-Apartheid Rainbow Nation ambitions. I will be getting into a much more detailed discussion on these points in later chapters, but this chapter serves as an introductory discussion on why I believe moral blindness to be a good account of the South African moral situation.

The 1990s political transition from Apartheid to Democratic South Africa must be understood as just one part of a larger moral project. An *ongoing* project to build an inclusive and equal society that began at least in the 1950s, and perhaps even earlier. The Post-Apartheid South African society is (still) engaged in this same moral project, but this time through state-sponsored nation-building. Nation-building can be understood as a process of taking disparate communities and bestowing a unified national identity upon them, forming them into *a people*.

This is the RNP: the transforming of South Africa from a divided and unequal society into a united nation-state characterised by equality and inclusivity[4].

To be sure, moral blindness, as I have described it, would certainly not be a phenomenon exclusively found in South Africa. It may indeed be a generally relevant concept in any analysis of post-conflict societies and communities — that is, societies that have recently begun reconstruction after civil unrest between some previously dominant and marginalised groups. Post-conflict societies, such as post-colonial states generally, or post-Apartheid South Africa in particular, are societies where the moral landscapes of the society have seen a significant transformation. Yet many of these post-conflict societies (and South Africa in particular) still maintain certain elements (whether it is in city design, or our worldviews, etc.) that carry with them elements of how the society was organised before the commencement of transformation and thus work passively to maintain some now-rejected aspects of how things were done in the past.

The particular moral conflicts and immoral behaviours and practices that I point out in South Africa (and are relevant for our present discussion on moral blindness) should then be seen as conflicts that stand directly opposed to our grander nation-building project. Also of interest are the environmental design, dominant discourses, norms, and ways of being and how they may contain or create elements and factors that can prevent community members from being lucidly aware of certain morally-relevant facts and thus become capable of inducing moral blindness.

Societies and Organisation

A society can be loosely defined as an 'agglomeration of people who live together in an organised community' (Cambridge Dictionary, 2021). A more complete definition may be "a social, cultural and economic, infrastructure, composed by, yet distinct from, a collection of individual people"[5]. Societies are fundamental human constructs that serve to create conditions for human thriving and excellence beyond that which can be reasonably attained by individuals

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[4] The South African Department of Arts and Culture defines nation-building as: the process whereby a society of people with diverse origins, histories, languages, cultures and religions come together within the boundaries of a sovereign state with a unified constitutional and legal dispensation, a national public education system, an integrated national economy, shared symbols and values, as equals, to work towards eradicating the divisions and injustices of the past; to foster unity; and promote a countrywide conscious sense of being proudly South African, committed to the country and open to the continent and the world. (FAQ: What is nation-building?, 2020)

[5] See Clutton-Brock, T, et al. "The evolution of society". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences (2009) 364 (1533): 3127–3131

or immediate family groups alone. In this way, society can be considered a tool meant to serve human needs.

Societies are organised in different ways depending on the particular needs set out to be served, and thus many different types of societies have been constructed throughout history. For any society which aims towards a given end (whether it be to maximise economic output, ensure freedom, or any other determined goal), there exists some possible arrangement of its constituent parts that is best suited for that given goal. One common interest that sociologists and anthropologists have regarding societies is stratification, which is the degree to which various groups and members of society come to attain unequal access to privileges and advantages such as resources, prestige, or power[6]. How resources, power, and prestige are distributed in a society can significantly impact what the society can do for itself and its members. That is, a society's goals inform what formation best maximises the attainment of its goals.

A society can be organised such that it creates the appropriate conditions for the maximisation of economic profit. But such an organisation may not be one that is concerned with the ethical status of the interactions of its members. In such a profit-oriented society, something like slavery (the non-consensual often unilaterally forced profiteering from another's labour) would not necessarily be out of the question. Another society can be organised such that it maximises consensual and equal interactions between members of that society. Such a society that focuses primarily on human rights and consent might find itself having to make various economic sacrifices, such as outlawing exploitative labour (and perhaps situations that arguably mirror slavery such as wage slavery and other forms of exploitation). It seems then that the success of a society depends on how the organisation of its constituent parts contribute to the society's overall goals.

I do not mean to imply that such organisation towards particular goals happens to the complete exclusion of all others. A society that primarily aims to maximise profits may also take on the ethical goal of somehow redistributing its profits towards ethical outcomes. Hybrid societies - those that, for whatever reason, take on some combination of these and other goals – certainly exist. However, they too would inevitably have to compromise some other factor once pressed

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[6] See Grusky D. B (The Past, Present and Future of Social Inequality." In Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective, 2011) and (Theories of Stratification and Inequality, 2011)

by circumstance. What I mean by all this is simply that (firstly) there are diverse ways of organising a society, (secondly) different formations or organisation can result in different outcomes, and (finally) optimisation or disposition towards any given outcome may adversely affect other outcomes.

Hybrid societies, in general, are pretty interesting in that they are societies attempting to merge two different and potentially conflicting social goals. But for this work on moral blindness, a specific form of conflicted, *temporarily* hybrid society is in mind: a society that was once organised in a specific manner for a specific social output that is now reorganising itself towards a different, potentially opposing, goal. Having previously been in a state of conflict that is now being replaced by an alternative society through reconstruction, the legal, social, and ethical standing of such a society would be in a state of change and re-calibration into its new post-conflict status quo. In this period of reconstruction, much of the vestigial ideologies, systems and structures of the past can continue as potential avenues for social harm, as this transitional period itself, in its ambiguities, allows for the potential of unperceived but genuine harms.

Moral Blindness

Moral blindness is, in my view, a specific charge. More than just claiming that South Africa is in a state characterised by rampant immoral behaviour, I believe that South Africans are behaving in ways contrary to their own moral commitments. If the shared goal of South Africans is indeed to create an inclusive, equal, and united society, then there are certain behaviours and practices that South Africans must engage in or refrain from *as a matter of duty* or responsibility towards that commitment or goal. Therefore, without a particular moral commitment to make reference to, what I call 'moral blindness' could simply be accounted for as '60-million individuals acting out their moral standards', some of which many would find acceptable and others not so much. The charge of moral blindness, then, at least on the part of South Africa and South Africans, assumes at least some moral framework shared by the relevant parties. This shared moral framework, I will more fully explicate in the next section, is a moral project to create a united, equal, and inclusive society founded on the rejection of Apartheid evils. This 'rejection of Apartheid' and 'commitment to a Rainbow Nation' serve as

moral anchor points that can inform how we are best to live in this strange place[7]. Yet despite our commitment, the 'matter' with which we are working to create this Rainbow Nation is the same matter that once was made to serve as elements of the Apartheid State – a completely contradictory society. That is, we built this society on the foundations of the old society, and in this way, the past has inevitably come to inform our present and may continue to influence our future.

I want it to be clear that despite my use of moralising language ("good" and "bad"), I do not mean to imply that the particular current project of South Africa, the RNP, is objectively or uncontroversially 'good'. Indeed, while I must admit to sharing a great amount of moral agreement with the Rainbow Nation project, I cannot claim that this is the best or only way to organise human society morally in general or even South African society in particular. But I still feel this exercise to be overall worthwhile regardless: while it seems clear that without an objective moral standard or framework (or perhaps privileging my own views), I would struggle to demonstrate either exclusion and segregation as wholly bad or inclusivity and equality as necessarily good, for the purposes of this work, I do not need such an objective standard. Without going as far as to make morally absolute claims, it seems reasonable to say that some (if not most) things that would be 'good' for a segregated Apartheid state could, in this more narrowed sense, be 'bad' for an inclusive Rainbow Nation. Thus, for this work, moral blindness will only apply to societies (or individuals) who behave in contradiction to *their own* moral commitments.

Reproduction of Apartheid

It is understandable, amid hopeful optimism, to declare that 'Apartheid is over!' since 1994 when South Africa held its first genuinely representative and democratic election and abolished Apartheid legislation; but in many subtle ways, that was certainly not the end of the story of Apartheid. The truth is that many South African institutions, systems, organisations, and practices are those carried forward from their establishment and implementation to serve the Apartheid State. These were then retrofitted to exist in post-Apartheid South Africa. Importantly for this work is how many of these institutions continue to reproduce the Apartheid experience, even without the dispensation being in effect.

[7] Samantha Vice's "How Do I Live in this Strange Place" is an instance of the sort of internal reflection on how we are to exist in this 'new' South Africa that I think will be shown as important as this work progresses.

One hyper-visible example of this being how the Group Areas Act has resulted in de facto segregated urban areas, which I describe as 'White suburbs, Indian neighbourhoods, Coloured areas and Black townships'. Indeed, there is no longer any *legal* explanation for this segregation (and, in fact, there has been some change and diversification of population groups, particularly in suburban areas). Yet, on the whole, even without the laws in place, there seem to be certain facts about how our society is organised that reproduce, though at a far less overwhelming rate, the very same Apartheid-like segregation of people across racial and class lines. In this way, *de jure*[8] Apartheid may indeed be over, but *de facto*[9] Apartheid persists. Segregated living areas is just *one* way that behaviours and practices that were conducive to the Apartheid project of segregation have been carried over to post-Apartheid South Africa, a society that is ostensibly opposed to Apartheid and aimed at inclusivity and integration.

As discussed previously, in some ways, the moral standing of particular institutions or practices - whether they are good or bad - depends on the society under discussion. As much as I would not agree much at all with the worldview, segregated living areas can and without contradiction be considered 'good', only that 'goodness' is only valid in that it is the goal of the society to create an environment of segregation in order to facilitate the social exclusion of different groups of people. For a society aimed at something like unity and inclusivity of all its people, such segregation may indeed be considered 'harmful' or 'bad'. Good or bad in the way being used here merely means something like 'positively supports the proper functioning of something'[10].

On a more individuated level, raising people in segregated communities would contribute to a community designed for exclusion and inequality. For one, growing up and living in mono-cultural or mono-ethnic communities ensures fewer opportunities to humanise and identify with people from other groups. Thus, segregated communities can be designed to engender a sense of racialised loyalty among segregated communities, thereby creating a passive reinforcement of in-group biases and out-group prejudice. Segregated communities, therefore, are 'good' for an Apartheid State. For a nation founded upon the rejection of Apartheid, however, this is certainly the opposite. For a South Africa that aims to be a Rainbow Nation (a

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[8] Translated: "in terms of the law".

[9] Translated: "in fact of reality".

[10] i.e., eating apples can be considered good for Hitler (even though he is considered a bad person).

nation built upon equality, inclusivity, and unity), segregated communities and living spaces work contrary to its goals.

For the case of South Africa and the example of Group Areas, a contradiction arises when we ostensibly praise diversity and inclusivity yet continue to live in deeply segregated and unequal communities[11]. This contradiction festers and manifests itself at various times in our collective life. Charles Villet finds a "juxtaposition of incompatible spaces" in South African society that manifests in two ways:

> first, in terms of the heterotopian and incompatible experience of the same space by suburban whites and the black poor and, second, in terms of the paradoxical experience that both groups have of their own dwelling spaces due to the stark contrast between immense wealth and utter poverty within the same city limits, and sometimes even within a stone's throw of each other. (Villet, 2018, p. 22)

And so, with conditions such as these, it should be of little wonder that we continue to find social media abuzz with the latest racist tirade or examples of cultural insensitivity. This is the sort of factor endemic to South African society that, in my view, lends credence to the idea of moral blindness being an accurate account. How are we to begin to truly humanise each other if we are so isolated from each other?

For most other societies, this would be a personal and individual issue. In societies such as the USA, despite the fact that most of the neighbourhoods and communities are segregated in class and racial groupings, so long as there is no explicit law preventing integration, then it is up to the individual citizens and members of society to engage with people outside of their grouped area. In such liberal societies, changing the de jure status of society is sufficient, and so changing the de facto status of society would be considered supererogatory. But because South Africa rejected Apartheid on a moral basis, and because the construction of an inclusive and diverse rainbow nation has been set as a national project, the situation here, I argue, is appreciably different: segregation of our communities cannot be considered a matter for the individual citizen to deal with alone, but rather as a matter of importance for society at large,

[11] For Charles Villet, the key about South Africa as heterotopia is that "the daily experience of place by many whites is located in an actual place that is the (mostly white) suburbs, a place that contrasts sharply with the actual place of the (mostly black) townships" (Villet, 2018, p. 13). That is, we do not only have class and cultural differences, but they are exacerbated by the physical and geographic segregation that make natural social diffusion and interaction all the more difficult and unlikely.

for it not only threatens our moral commitment, it puts to question the basis for our rejection of Apartheid[12].

As I previously explained, moral blindness -- at least how I wish to discuss it -- requires two aspects: A moral agent having some moral axiom or commitment, and things that obscure or conceal to the agent which behaviours are conducive or counter to their moral commitment. Moral blindness is thus a threat to all moral projects. In the case of South Africa, the moral rejection of Apartheid and commitment towards the creation of a Rainbow nation serve as our moral commitment; and – as I will clarify later – there exist elements in our society (such as the physical environment, social discourse and ways of thinking and being) that obscure certain morally-relevant facts about our society from us, thereby preventing the lucid moral perception of ourselves, our environments and societies at large such that we often find ourselves contributing to practices and behaviours that run contrary to our moral project. Moral blindness, then, presents an existential threat to the very project of South Africa's Rainbow Nation. To take this further, if I am right about the South African post-Apartheid moral project and how engaging in this project has become fundamental and essential to what it means to be South African, then our very identities as South Africans may hang in the balance.

At most then, at present, all we can say thus far is that we have *begun* a period of change from Apartheid that is aimed towards the Rainbow Nation. Whether we have, in fact, achieved our Rainbow Nation ambition is an entirely different story. Just as moving from one room and into another requires passing through a threshold in between the two rooms that contains elements of both rooms, the change from what South Africa was before (a state of essentialist exclusion and inequality, Apartheid, and Colonialism) and what it is being constructed to be (the inclusive and equal society promised by the Rainbow Nation) can be described as containing a *liminal* or transitionary period where both meet. The concept of *liminality,* I argue, is deeply relevant to this understanding of the South African situation.

[12] And colonialism as well, as Fanon notes "By its very structure, colonialism is separatist and regionalist." (Franz Fanon, On Violence, p. 51)

Chapter 3: A State of Liminality

> Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial [sic]. As such, their ambiguous and indeterminate attributes are expressed by a rich variety of symbols in the many societies that ritualize social and cultural transitions. Thus, liminality is frequently likened to death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to bisexuality, to the wilderness, and to an eclipse of the sun or moon.
> (Turner, 1991, p. 95)

A central idea in the concept of liminality (being in-betwixt and in-between) is the *threshold*, or cusp, of transition and change. When moving through one room and into another, there is a moment - the doorway - that exists as the threshold delineating your being in either one room or the other. The liminal threshold can be conceived of as a boundary, where on one end is where you were before, and on the other end is where you will arrive. This threshold, this liminal cusp, is of key interest for this work, as it describes the condition in which I consider South Africa and South Africans to be.

Imagine a boundary between a mountain range and an ocean - typically something like a beach. While it is possible to stand on a mountain and look out into the sea, it is also possible to swim in the ocean and look up at the looming mountain. In this case, it is impossible to do both simultaneously, for swimming in the ocean means that you are not on a mountain and vice versa. In this way, a mountain creature cannot, of its own accord, understand being in the ocean; nor can a creature of the sea understand life on the mountain. The beach, however, serves as a sort of boundary between the two radically different places of ocean and mountain. By being on the beach, we experience standing on somewhat solid ground while also having waves splashing at our feet. While neither is fully encompassing of the true gestalt or phenomenological experience of being in the ocean or on a mountain, in this boundary zone, we find ourselves able to see and understand something of both—understanding one in light of the other.

In the same way, liminal experience can create conditions that allow for a confrontation of experience with being outside of and beyond the limits of our established identities and place

in society. Anthropologist Arnold van Gennep (Rites of Passage, 1960) describes ritual as a liminal moment in which the usual limits that apply to recognisable social identities, positions, and offices - including rights and responsibilities – are temporarily removed. Gennep divides the process of ritual into three stages, namely separation, transition, and re-aggregation, each of these stages in themselves entail a liminal experience. Such moments or episodes of liminal exposure are often highly affectively charged, and for Victor Turner (Liminality and Commutas, 1991), they can be deeply valuable formative experiences for a person. If the usual way of being, position or status that a person occupies imposes a limit on what they can experience and understand (a goat living on a mountain versus a fish in the ocean) - then a liminal experience can be considered as a (temporary) removal of those limits.

Liminal periods allow for contexts where previously established social hierarchies can be reversed or temporarily dissolved. Here, future outcomes once assumed certain can be cast into doubt, as the taken-for-grated assurance of continuity of tradition is undermined, creating uncertainty and anxiety. When people are pushed to the "limit" by the force of events, they cannot take old structures for granted and need new or different models to follow or "imitate". On a more social level, the dissolution of order that happens in liminal moments generates a fluid and malleable situation that allows for the possibility of new and different institutions and customs to become established.

An important point for van Gennep is that the transformations at stake in rites of passage "bring into play a relationship with the sacred in contrast to the profane, a relationship which is always relative" (Stenner, 2018).

> Whoever passes through the various positions of a lifetime one day sees the sacred where before he has seen the profane, or vice versa. Such changes of condition do not occur without disturbing the life of society and the individual, and it is the function of rites of passage to reduce their harmful effects (Gennep, 1960, p. 13).

It is in the suspension of these limits where those involved find the space to 'pass-through' and transition towards a new, different, set of limits. So, for example, in liminal ceremonies such as a coronation or inauguration, a princess who is soon-to-be coronated to queenhood may be treated 'as a servant' and asked to perform various tasks by those who – in the process of the ritual – are granted such power and authority over them. For Homi Bhabha (Nation and Narration, 1990), liminality indeed produces threats of weakness (or vulnerability) in its displacement of our ability to rely on our previous statuses or knowledge in the contexts of our

new realities. Just as a terrestrial creature can find unknown dangers at the beach (being taken into the ocean by crashing waves), an ocean creature may similarly find itself at risk of being deposited onto dry land as the tide wanes, leaving them behind. The dissolution of known limits and boundaries in the liminal space can entail a loss of certainty about what a person knows or can take for granted.

However, Bhaba recognises that liminal moments may also be an opportunity for strength and growth and change as: "It is in this space of liminality, in the 'unbearable ordeal of the collapse of certainty' that we encounter … the narcissistic neuroses of … discourse" (Bhaba, 1990, p. 300). This is what Arpad Szakolczai (Reflexive Historical Sociology, 2000) refers to as the "rupture; a breach, or even a clean break from the orientations and grand narratives which undergird societies" found in the first stage of 'separation' in a rite of passage (Szakolczai, 2000, p. 21). In this stage, separated from the 'what we once were' (but not quite yet 'what we will become'), we are made to recognise the arbitrariness of distinctions we once held, and how they construct our lived realities. And it is for this reason that Turner suggests that liminal experiences can give rise to a 'sentiment of human kindness' (Turner, 1991, p. 105). Liminality can be related to Charles Villet's conception of 'heterotopia'. In his paper *South Africa as postcolonial heterotopia: The racialized experience of place and space* (2018), Villet describes heterotopia as "a space of transgression where processes of normalisation are suspended," as well as "the way in which radically different social spaces can come into connection with one another". Villet offers an analysis of the South-African postcolonial context that "calls for an expansion of heterotopia as not merely a specific place or a type of space within society, but in phenomenological terms – in terms, that is, of people's experiences of and within place and space" (Villet, 2018, p. 12). In this way heterotopia is closely linked to the liminal state I argue that South Africans exist in.

Recall that moral blindness, as I have discussed it, can broadly be described as a failure to see, or recognise aspects of one's personal and social realities that call on one for ethical action or attention; it is an epistemic and moral phenomenon, relating to the failure to perceive morally-relevant facts that cause people to fail at acting like moral agents. Liminal conditions, I now want to suggest, seem to constantly threaten this experience. That is: by rendering us unable to appreciate and thus appropriately respond to morally-relevant facts of our environment. What is most salient and relevant for this work is the notion of liminal transitions creating space for environmentally-induced moral blindness that hinders an individual's moral expression; that

is, how a liminal social environment can lead people to fail to meet or live up to their own moral standards. Moral blindness, I also suggested, helps us explain and understand how, in specific contexts and under particular circumstances, certain individuals and whole communities can unknowingly contribute to systems and structures that they and their society at large are ostensibly opposed to. The idea here is that moral blindness exists as a threat to all moral projects; thus, a grand national moral project like the RNP, as well as personal projects to transform oneself into a Rainbow Citizen, are both threatened. Even if we solve all other de jure problems, there still exist social and environmental factors that lead to slippages that undermine our moral ambitions.

The ticking "moral time-bomb" analogy highlights not only that we have not begun to do what we ought to have begun decades ago but also that if appropriate action is not taken seriously, we may see a catastrophic end. Later, I will argue that by looking to virtue ethics, we might finally arrive at something that could provide us with the beginnings of a solution to the threat to our moral projects that is moral blindness. I believe that the answer to our problem of moral blindness could have ramifications for how we both understand and combat some of the moral failures we find in South Africa and give us insight into how we may work to create increasingly inclusive and morally conscious environments.

What is Post-Apartheid/Post-Colonial about South Africa?

Colonialism and Apartheid refer - almost simultaneously - to periods of time marked by certain modes of politics as well as the modes of power that underpinned them. But their temporal extension -- when they began and when they ended -- can be somewhat ambiguous. As this thesis is concerned with South Africa's moral condition being the result of the society being in *transition* from one order to another, it is, therefore, important to establish precisely what is meant in this work by 'Post-Apartheid".

Determining "Post-" seems easy enough, as similar conceptual prefixing can be found in other terms such as "post-revolution" or "post-modernity". If we follow these similar instances of prefixing, we arrive at "Post-" to mean something along the lines of "beyond" or "after". So then, without unpacking what is referred to by "Apartheid", we have the suggestion of the meaning of something beyond- or after- Apartheid. If we take this "Post-" (as in "beyond", or "after") when referring to South Africa as 'Post-Apartheid' South Africa, is the notion being advanced by that phrase that the South Africa in question is one that 'exists after Apartheid', or one that has 'gone beyond Apartheid? If it is the former that is being advanced, that South

Africa today is one that has formally abolished Apartheid, then I suppose there is really not too much of an issue there. Indeed, post-1994 South Africa has taken great pains to eliminate Apartheid legislation from law and public policy. And so there does seem to be some utility in having a term of phrase to distinguish between South Africa before and after this occurred. But if the notion being advanced is the latter claim that South Africa is now 'beyond', or has surpassed, Apartheid – meaning that it has no meaningful relevance in South Africa today – then we may find ourselves on more contested ground. This will be discussed further later.

Our understanding of what 'post-Apartheid' means could also be furthered by reference to another (similar if not related) concept: post-colonial. Discussing a related term, Professor of Cultural Studies, Ella Shohat (Shohat, Notes on the "Post-Colonial", 1992) describes "postcolonialism" as a "convenient designation" (Shohat & Stam, 2012, p. 23), a view author Anthony R. Guneratne (The Virtual Spaces of Postcoloniality, 1997) further explains as "colonialism attached to a "post-" ... and straining at its tether to reassert its modes of thought" (Guneratne, 1997, p. 1).

Shohat, along with Judith Hayem (What do we call post-apartheid?, 2017) and Anne McClintock (The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term "Post-Colonialism", 1992), raise questions about the theoretically ambiguous, historically universalising and potentially depoliticising implications of the prefix "post-" when applied to (geo-)political epochs such as "post-independence", or "post-liberation". The issues found in the use of the term "post-Apartheid" run parallel with some of the issues found in the term "post-colonial" when applied to South Africa, and so I will be taking them together in this discussion.

"Post"

The question of when post-Apartheid South Africa began (related to when Apartheid ended) is not exactly a matter of fact without dispute. The election of Nelson Mandela in 1994, his release from Robben Island and the beginning of negotiations in 1990, the legal abolition of Apartheid in 1991, and the national referendum in 1992 have all been suggested as candidates. It is also not clear if the end of Apartheid and the beginning of 'post-Apartheid' are necessarily simultaneous[13].

[13] Hayem provides a translation of historian Christopher Lee (Between the street and the museum: The problem of "the now" in South Africa, 2006) reminding us that this debate "is not a new one and also impacts the way one situates the 'beginning of post-apartheid or post-colony.'

The European Colonialism of South Africa is similarly difficult to date by consensus[14]. What makes colonialism so much more difficult to date (or Apartheid relatively more straightforward) is that there is no specific 'colonial law' to pick out as the beginning of colonialism, and also no specific date when it ended (if indeed it has at all). Anthropologist Robert Thornton ('The Potentials of Boundaries in South Africa: Steps Towards a Theory of the Social Edge', 1994) suggests that South Africa became a post-colony in 1910, when it became a Union, left the British Empire and entered the Commonwealth. Others, like Achille Mbembe (2001) or Mahmood Mamdani (1996) assert that the "South African postcolonial phase" can only be considered to have commenced in 1994 (Hayem, 2017, p. 392). That said, it seems that many would vaguely agree on its beginning roughly in the 15th century and lasting up to the end of the 20th century at the latest.

Another oft-undiscussed factor to consider is which region is to be privileged in naming such a beginning[15]? What are the relationships between these various beginnings? An example of a complication would be Namibia, formerly known as German South-West Africa, which is another country that has undergone both colonialism and Apartheid in the nation's past, though in very different ways (for one, its Apartheid was externally imposed by the South African administration).

For this project, I will invariably be privileging the South African colonial history in my location of the colonial and thus post-colonial moment. But let us not pretend that makes this project any less contested. Which South African perspective am I privileging? The colonial histories of Bechuanaland, The Cape Colony and Transvaal, among other territories, all had quite different beginning and end points. Deciding when these periods began and ended remain important questions; however, I will not go into that history much further in this work. The difficulty in dating Apartheid and Colonialism is only the first and most minor in terms of the difficulties of non-specificity and ambiguity of understanding what is meant by "post-" in the

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A remark which questions both the sense of the chronological marker 'post' and the paradigm to be used behind it in order to think the present, the 'now.'" (Hayem, 2017, p. 392)

[14] And that with 'South Africa' as a specific region. Aijaz Ahmad complains, for instance, that when the term 'colonialism' can be pushed back to the Incas and forward to the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, then it becomes 'a transhistorical thing, always present and always in process of dissolution in one part of the world or another' (Ahmad A., 1995, p. 9)

[15] The perspective being considered when using "post-colonial" can have meaningful consequences. Shohat asks rather pointedly, "does the "post" indicate the perspective and location of the ex-colonized (Algerian), the ex-colonizer (French), the ex-colonial-settler (Pied Noir), or the displaced hybrid in First World metropolitans (Algerian in France)"? (Shohat, Notes on the "Post-Colonial", 1992, p. 103)

context of Apartheid/Colonialism, which the rest of this chapter will spend some time unpacking.

"Post" + "Apartheid" / "Colonial"

For Anne McClintock (The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term "Post-Colonialism", 1992), colonisation is defined as the "territorial appropriation of another geo-political entity, combined with forthright exploitation of its resources and labour, and systematic interference in the capacity of the appropriated cultures in organising this dispensation" (McClintock, 1992, p. 88)[16]. Colonialism, then, encompasses the worldviews and perspectives that inform such an enterprise, and 'colonial' is the mode of being of society once Colonisation and colonialism have taken root[17]. 'Post-colonial', then, could refer to the end of a colonial period and the commencement and propagation of whatever it is that happens after.

When used as a synonym for "post-independence", the term "post-colonial" conveys a "departure" of the coloniser, leaving the colonised population to reorganise itself outside of the ambitions of the former colonising power. However, this more analytic understanding of the term can be very shallow and betrayed, in many ways, by the continued modes of control that still 'tether' the "post-" colony (i.e., in the form of 'neo-colonialism') (Guneratne, 1997, p. 1). Furthermore, break-away settler colonies can complicate this notion of the 'post-colonial' state. Having formally left the British Empire and its commonwealth of nations, South Africa gained formal independence from imperial colonialism; however, given the continued control over the appropriated colony by the settler population and its descendants, this form of 'post-colonial' only seems to account for a displacement of colonial control from the Empire to the colonial state itself. Thus, the term 'post-colonial' can have depoliticising implications, obfuscating the continued de facto networks of power and injustice amongst and within former colonial territories. The issue with "post" signifying *after,* is in how it can imply that 'colonialism' and

[16] See also: *Key Concepts*, which provides a good synopses of the multitudes of reaches of the broad term to include the "study and analysis of European territorial conquests, the various institutions of European colonialisms, the discursive operations of empire, the subtleties of subject construction in colonial discourse and the resistance of those subjects, and, most importantly perhaps, the differing responses to such incursions and their contemporary colonial legacies in both pre- and post-independence nations and communities." (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001, p. 187)

[17] Colonialism is an enormously problematic category: it is definitionally transhistorical and unspecific, and it is used in relation to diverse kinds of historical oppression and economic control, "[nevertheless] like the term 'patriarchy', which shares similar problems in definition, the concept of colonialism […] remains crucial to a critique of past and present power relations in world affairs." (Slemon, 1990)

its related concerns are over, thereby potentially inhibiting forceful criticism of continued modes of injustice and oppression.

The prefix "post-" groups the "post-colonial" and “post-Apartheid” with similar "posts", such as "post-independence" or “post-war”. These concepts share an allusion to a new period following the end of another historical event or age. For Doug Hindson (as quoted in (Hayem, 2017), Post-Apartheid South Africa is a “complex reality [...] which mixes a segregationist heritage and the social dynamic of the end of apartheid that local authorities must face as well as those who seek to analyse the dynamics of post-apartheid” (Hayem, 2017, p. 389)[18]. The abolition of Apartheid in 1994 put an end to a particular racialised mode of politics organised through segregation and discrimination. It opened the possibility of a new period, the post-Apartheid world. Just as in “post-colonial” above, then, “post” here is primarily given a chronological understanding, referring to what is to come consecutively ‘after’ Apartheid. Interestingly, the expression “post-apartheid” is older than the epoch it represents, with one of the oldest documents written about it being dated in the mid-1980s[19].

“Post” + “Apartheid” / “Colonialism”

Another understanding of “post-” colonial is that it refers to the experiences, politics and discourses that happen “after” colonialism, not in the sense that the societies have moved “past” or “beyond” colonialism, but that they are situated in a global context that has been created by or at least informed by colonialism. This understanding makes no claim of colonialism having ended (in any meaningful way) but only holds that colonialism began and had global hegemonic consequences, which still have ramifications or influence today. Indeed, post-colonialism, as it has been deployed in most recent accounts, has been used in analysing the processes and effects of (as well as *reactions* to) European colonialism throughout its history up to and including its contemporary iteration of neo-colonialism. Similar to "post-modernity", "post-coloniality" works to mark or designate a contemporary epoch, state, or condition.

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[18] Hayem translating from Hindson, D. 1999. “Fragmentation et intégration dans une ville de l’après-apartheid: l’exemple de Durban.” Tiers-Monde 40 (159): 551–578.

[19] Symposium: Post-Apartheid South Africa (1986).

The term "post-independence," on the other hand, communicates a history of political resistance that was met with success, and thus moves the analytical focus away from the colonial administration and shifts it towards the emergent nation-state itself.

> “In this sense, the term "post-independence," precisely because it implies a nation-state telos, provides expanded analytical space for confronting such explosive issues as religion, ethnicity, patriarchy, gender, and sexual orientation, none of which are reducible to epiphenomena of colonialism and neo-colonialism.” (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001, p. 328)

For Shohat, “Post-structuralism” and “post Marxism”, among others, all share the notion of “a movement beyond […] which implies both going beyond anti-colonial nationalist theory as well as a movement beyond a specific point in history, that of colonialism and ‘Third World’ nationalist struggles” (Shohat, 1992, p. 323). The use of the prefix “post,” here like in post-communist or post-authoritarian, implies the idea of transition. However long the transition may take, from a transitionist perspective, the goal is fixed a priori and generally considered as ideal. Whereas "post-colonial" suggests a distance from colonialism, something like "post-independence" celebrates the nation-state; but in attributing power to the nation-state, it allows us to hold new ‘Third World’ regimes accountable.

In some instances, using the notion of post-apartheid points to assessing the current changes and transformations with regards, on the one hand, to what characterised the previous political regime in the author’s view; and on the other, how they problematise their vision of the present. Considering the impact of Apartheid engineering on space through spatial segregation and racial discrimination, one key issue has been to assess how much the South African physical environment (e.g., its towns and cities) has been transformed in the post-apartheid era. In her *City Forms and Writing the 'Now' in South Africa,* Sarah Nuttall (2004) acknowledges that “Apartheid social engineering did and still does fix spaces that are difficult to break down in the present” (Nuttall, 2004, p. 732)[20].

Most inclusively, "post-colonial" is the “designation for critical discourses and theorising thematised by issues and concerns emerging from colonial relations and their aftermath,

[20] Nuttall, however, also insists that “there are also enough configurations in various spheres of contemporary South African life to warrant new kinds of explorations with new tools of analyses, new archives and new ethnographies” that go ‘beyond’ post-Apartheid/Colonial. (Nuttall, 2004, p. 732)

covering a long historical span" (Shohat, 1992, p. 128). And while it is widely used to signify political, linguistic, and cultural experiences of societies that were former European colonies, it gives no insight on the relationship between the colony and empire in the present. McClintock thus suggests that perhaps "neo-colonialism" would be more appropriate. Just as with "post-colonial", it indicates a change from the de jure colonial era. However, unlike "post-colonialism", it does not lend itself to confusion regarding its lasting effects in our modern-day experience. Instead, it calls for examining how colonial influence can have mutated in response to the changed global consciousness and mores. Like the "post-colonial", *neo-colonial* also invokes continuities and discontinuities with a colonial past. However, emphasis is now shifted away from any sense of a "beyond" and instead brings into focus the new modes and forms that colonial modes of power have taken. When examined in relation to "neo-colonialism," the term "post-colonialism" seems to offset and undermine relevant critiques of persistent structures of domination, which are more readily accessible in the "neo-" discursive framework.

The South African Post-Apartheid/Colonial Project

When I speak of "post-colonial South Africa" in this work, I do indeed refer to South Africa as having achieved in some meaningful way an independence from the colonising powers of the Dutch and English Empires. However, I also hold that there are continuing and lasting effects of colonialism today, and so the "post-" in my understanding of "post-colonial South Africa" does not mean to indicate a clear and definite severance of colonial influence.

For one, while South Africa is by analytical means a sovereign state, its borders are inherited from the colonial order that birthed it; its mode of participation in a global society is also one that is mediated through a tradition that was introduced by colonialism. I write this very paper in the language of those who fused the many different societies and communities into South Africa. The notion of post-Apartheid transition is also synonymous with a transition towards democracy, which is seen as an ideal in the Western model: access to formal democratic rights and its corollaries, multiracial/cultural, free, and fair elections.

What I sometimes find concerning, however, is when the second understanding is advanced, that we have 'moved away' from Apartheid[21]. Any casual look into South African society at large would surely disabuse one of such a foolish notion. Yet far too many have had the experience of being told that "Apartheid is over" and that we should now "move on"[22]. This is because, in this transitional period of ours, we are at once beset with the cultural habits of our segregated past as well as a pull/push towards our destined polity of inclusivity which has not quite yet been realised.

Post-colonial and Post-Apartheid, I argue, are best considered, at least with respect to South Africa at present, as epochs of transition and transformation. They signal periods marked by domination, foreign (colonialism) and domestic (apartheid), having ended, and mark an in-between phase for South Africa en route to its succeeding form. The generally ambiguous structure of this change is not unique and could be found in other societies having undergone such a change.

Post-Apartheid and post-colonialism, then, will take on this dual meaning—of an epoch that occurs after Apartheid and Colonialism but is also informed by its colonial and Apartheid history, and, as I have argued, defined by the fundamental rejection of what came before. From a subjective perspective, the legal, institutional, and political end of the racist regime and the emergence of a new polity do not (entirely) determine the way people think in the post-apartheid period[23].

An Axial Age?

In his *The Origin and Goal of History*, Karl Jaspers (1953) coined the term 'Axial Age' to refer to a 'pivotal period' he identifies stretching from the 8th to the 3rd century BCE. According to Jaspers, this age marks a period of parallel discoveries of new religious and philosophical ways of thinking happening in Persia, India, China, and the Greco-Roman world. Jaspers conceptualised this Axial Age as being "an interregnum between two ages of great empire, a pause for liberty, a deep breath bringing the most lucid consciousness" (Jaspers, 1953, p.

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[21] Doug Hindson (1999) wrote that post-Apartheid restructuring "has to erase the legacy of apartheid and the consequences of years of violence". I am not sure how much the legacy of Apartheid can be "erased", but it is certainly something I think we need to continue grappling with. (Hayem, 2017, p. 389)

[22] See (Maneli, 2019)

[23] And so, it can be said that the end of apartheid opened up an episteme that does not allow for an immediate understanding of the following episteme, to borrow Michel Foucault's terminology.

51). This is exceedingly true too for South Africa, as it is a nation deeply caught between the institutions, systems, and practices of a South Africa of the past and the promised South Africa of the future that we are in the process of constructing. Just as many different societies across Eurasia found themselves in the grips of an age-defining period about 2500 years ago, I argue that an analogous paradigm shift happened in South Africa in the 20th Century. I argue that in the mid-1900s, South Africa entered its own pivotal moment, a moment marked by a shared rejection of the unjust ways things had been done in the past, a humanist recognition of our shared vulnerabilities and injustices and a collective commitment towards a mass program of action to achieve justice and equality for all was entered. These are the beginnings of what I elsewhere refer to as *rainbowism*. This Rainbowism saw its first formative sparks in the early 1900s, culminating in the drafting of the Freedom Charter by The Congress, eventually leading to the drafting of a Constitution inspired by what we might call 'rainbow ideals', and ushered in what would be called "the Rainbow Nation".

For South Africa, one of the central questions for our society has always been how all these disparate groups come to live together as one society. The colonial administration worked to establish a clear hierarchical distinction, with ethnic and cultural proximity to the colonial centre of Britain being what distinguishes between colonists and natives. Apartheid, founded partly on a rejection of British Imperialism, sought to give its people of concern—Afrikaners—a sense of nativity as a source of legitimacy to rule. Here, racial difference became more central to social hierarchy. Seeking a 'way out' of the injustices of colonial administration and the Apartheid order, South Africans (particularly those from groups excluded from the previously established nexus of power - Europeanness specifically or whiteness generally) looked outside the very signification of race and culture and began to articulate a desire for an inclusive society of equals.

The notion of an age defined by a paradigm shift in ways of thinking about the self and the world is not exclusive to Jaspers. A similar idea was captured by John Stuart-Glennie in 1873, who termed it "the moral revolution". I engage a much looser and certainly less expansive use of the concept. What is interesting is how both Stuart-Glennie and Jaspers view the 'Axial Age' or 'Moral Revolution' as objective empirical facts of history, independently of religious considerations, and profoundly influential on the societies that were born of them. It is in this way that I think we should think of and conceive of the formative years of our Rainbow Nation. Importantly, this Axial Age has also been described as a historically liminal period - caught in

a moment of change and transition, when old certainties have lost their validity, and new ones are still not ready. As established previously, liminal periods can be moments of strength and opportunity for growth; they also represent moments of weakness and can be rather threatening. I argue that South Africa's current state of liminality - being caught in-between and in-betwixt the old ways of thinking and being and the new - is at least partially responsible for our modern crisis.

The 'post'' in post-Apartheid does not seem to entail that we have moved away from all effects of Apartheid as a society. The end of official Apartheid did not spell the end of Apartheid discourse, nor of the material conditions informed by its material reality. The poorest are still black. Similarly, even in 'post-colonial' South Africa, the logic of race continues to reverberate through society as a purveyor of inequality, locally and globally. 'Post-Apartheid South Africa', at present, refers only to a South Africa that is in a transitionary phase between what it used to be and what it aims to be; and not, as the name may sometimes imply, a South Africa that is 'beyond' Apartheid'. But this 'post-Apartheid' South Africa seems to be aimed at some end, to form a *nation* of a *people*.

Michel Seymour (On Redefining the Nation, 2000) combines the idea of cultural-based community membership with a political leadership formation and offers a "socio-cultural definition" of nationhood; thus, more than just a cultural group, nations are culture groups that endow civic ties and responsibilities on the community (Seymour, 2000, p. 36). The Rainbow Nation is such a nationalist project; the taking of disparate communities and bestowing upon them a unified national tradition. That is, transforming South Africa from a multinational society into a nation-state characterised by diversity. But why did or should this "transcending social divisions of Apartheid" take place in the form of the Rainbow Nation? That is, South African society could 'simply' just become a state that is "culturally diverse but with equality based on citizenship". Therefore, where comes the need for nationalism? What goods or benefits are there to be found in nationhood?

It seems then that the case for nationalism, without any other obvious prompt, depends on at least some benefits of nationhood, whatever those may be. The question then is, how does nationalism help to achieve the goals set out by the post-Apartheid dispensation? What benefits could nationalism confer to South Africans at large? This discussion on 'why nationalism?' is important and shall be engaged in the following section.

Section 2: The Great South African Nation-Building Project

Introduction: Dispensationalism and Hegemonic Discourse

> Democratic South Africa was born of a leadership with a vision for a people struggling to lift themselves out of the quagmire of apartheid, a people pitted against one another brought into the unifying streams of democracy and nation building. Here was born an idea, a South African idea, of moulding a people from diverse origins, cultural practices, languages, into one, within a framework democratic in character, that can absorb, accommodate and mediate conflicts and adversarial interests without oppression and injustice.
>
> Kader Asmal (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001)

As a geopolitical entity, South Africa has existed for much longer than the 'South Africa' that I and many others call home. The specific South Africa that I was born into is commonly considered a creation of the mid-1990s democratic era, but somewhere baked into this conception is an acknowledgement that other 'South Africas' had existed before it. That is to say that while my South Africa shares features with and is a successor to the previous South Africa(s), there are essential features that make them distinct enough to consider them as different South Africas.

Comparing this to a similar situation in France may help to elucidate my point here. Since the establishment of the French Republic in 1789 following the end of the monarchy after the French Revolution, France has seen at least five Republics, each of which is constitutionally distinct from the others. By having different constitutions, each French republic reconstituted and reorganised itself into a new and distinct national entity, continuous to the one that came before it but not identical to it[24]. For an analogy, if a person were to take clay to form a cup, and if I were to take their cup, render it back to clay and then also create a cup, we would have had two different or distinct cups that only share continuity through the matter that made them up. If we think of the matter here as the people, then it is the people themselves who are formed and transformed into the French society of the given republic. While maintaining continuity and sameness in some sense, the constitutional distinction of each French Republic, I argue, makes each republic essentially distinct and different from what was before or to come after it.

[24] See: Boissoneault, L. "The Fifth Republic", *A History of France.* Smithsonian (2017)

But the French division of its different eras into 'Republics' is where the similarities to what I have in mind about South Africa begin to drift apart.

Instead of looking into constitutional continuity to distinguish between them—as with the various instances of the French Republics—the usual way to demarcate or distinguish between different South African socio-political eras is by using what has been referred to as 'dispensations'. Under the dispensation framework, the focus is placed more on the leadership style, its aims, and how it functions to achieve those aims. In South Africa, a *dispensation* is a system of government. This system of government establishes and assumes a dominant consensus position on important goals and essential values such as territorial expansion, resource exploitation, cultural advancement, or racial and cultural purity; and is held together by a grand narrative that excludes competing value systems. Under this definition, South Africa has had at least three dispensations:

(a) The first dispensation is Colonial South Africa. Formed in 1910, this South Africa was known more formally as the Union of South Africa and was characterised by its imperialistic connection to England as its mother country. Its formation was mainly in the hands of Cecil John Rhodes and Jan Smuts.
(b) The second dispensation is Apartheid South Africa. Formally established in 1948, this South Africa was characterised by Afrikaner nationalism and Apartheid policies, which were based on racial exclusion and segregation.
(c) The third dispensation, our current state, is that of the Democratic Republic of South Africa, known sometimes as 'The Rainbow Nation' (though the positive sentiment behind this name has been dwindling over the years). This South Africa is characterised by the abandonment of Apartheid and the promotion of inclusion as a multiracial and multicultural society.

Unlike France, which can trace a much longer history than the five republics may lead one to believe (i.e., there was also a long-reigning French monarchy before the revolution), South Africa, at least as the geopolitical entity we know it as today, only began at earliest the moment its various colonies were unified into its first dispensation. Before that, it was a collection of African chiefdoms and feudal states, some later conquered into Boer republics which later became British colonial possessions, and possibly a bunch of other social permutates that were not politically united into the 'South Africa' we know today, that only happened in May 1910. While it is possible and even important to discuss social and political issues of Pre-Union South

Africa, discussing them as 'South African' events could be anachronistic. When we decide our South Africa to have begun, its origins and founding can have deep implications for whom we look to for our national heroes and symbols, where we source our values and what the national project of our society is. There are certainly more things that can be said to make the dispensations I listed above more distinct, but for now, 'Colonial', 'Apartheid', and 'New' shall serve as useful enough to discuss them further without getting too lost in the weeds. For this work, I mean to interrogate the 'New' dispensation. What is it? Why is it what it is? Have its goals been achieved? If so, how? And if not, why?

To understand our New Dispensation, I think it serves us well to look into why we are here in the first place; why it is that instead of continuing in the second dispensation, the socio-political conditions and dispositions of South Africa today are such that they warrant a fissure into a new dispensation altogether. My suspicion going in, as suggested in the first section of this thesis, is that the new dispensation should be conceived of as currently existing in a liminal 'axial age' and that the conceptual metaphor of the 'Rainbow Nation' is something that ought to be taken seriously as the characteristic aim of this new dispensation. And thus, I will use it as a guiding light to make sense of this new dispensation.

How Did We Get Here?

This 'New South Africa' is one that emerges from a social context defined and informed by its colonial and Apartheid history. Colonial and Apartheid South African societies were fragmented. The country was divided by race, gender, class, and other identities of segregation, going so far as to map onto geography in urban and rural settings.

Being characterised by conditions of severe poverty, poor living conditions, and landlessness, the rural areas lacked opportunities for improvement. In contrast, the urban environment provided these opportunities, but only for a select few in a deeply racialized caste system. The systems of colonialism and apartheid worked to fragment the country into enclaves designed to foster ethnic, linguistic, and tribal divisions and separation. Participation in all aspects of civic life was reserved for a minority of the population, an example of this is the denial of representation in national government for the majority of the people.

Apartheid was met with resistance, both from within, as its majority population found it oppressive; and without, as the international community learned of its human rights abuses, making it a 'pariah' to the world. Mass action and protests happened throughout the country,

with the Sharpeville Massacre, the 1976 Student Uprisings, and the Women's March being among many demonstrations of resistance to Apartheid. The banned African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-African Congress (PAC), among others, went 'underground' and formed military wings. But surprisingly, this did not quite escalate to full-blown conflict in the form of civil war.

For Aletta Norval (Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse, 1996), Apartheid's discursive hegemony of exclusion and segregation came undone through an "organic crisis" that occurred around the 1970s-80s; when Apartheid's political grammar became "manifestly unable to adequately represent significant sections of the population" and failed to provide "moral and intellectual cohesion for a growing number of competing identities" required to function in the contemporary capitalist international political climate (Norval, 1996, p. 388). This 'organic crisis' made space for 'non-racialism' and anti-racialism to emerge as viable alternative 'horizons of intelligibility', with which our society began to see itself liberated from the hegemony of Apartheid.

I suggest that it is helpful to think of Apartheid as rejected on a fundamentally moral basis because doing so allows us to highlight the particularly moral aims of the Rainbow Nation-Building Project and Rainbow Citizens. By segregating people racially, the Apartheid government was able to institute social exclusion and engineer policy and structures that worked to maintain and reinforce inequality between different groups in society. Existing as a state of exclusion, segregation, and inequality, South Africans, for the most part, identified the core tenets of Apartheid and Colonialism as responsible for most of its evils. This, I believe, is key to understanding the post-Apartheid state of mind, which involves not only a rejection of colonialism and Apartheid due to their unjust nature, but a recognition that by separating people we create injustice that prevents people from leading full and flourishing lives.

On this view, the post-Apartheid South African dispensation also came to reject nativism, for, in nativism, there is an inherent prioritisation of some groups (those identified as 'the natives') and a resulting marginalisation of others, and so represents a simple reversal of the colonial hierarchy. Separatism was also deemed untenable, as it is based on seeing each other as different and needing to be kept separate, both of which lie at the heart of the very Apartheid logic that is rejected. Engaging in separatism, that is, would in many ways reify Apartheid thought.

Instead of promoting either separatism or nativism history, the post-apartheid national government has undertaken a nation-building programme in pursuit of "a truly united, democratic, and prosperous South Africa" (Chaka, 2013, p. 1), meaning a "society based on equality, nonracialism and non-sexism" (Bhagwat, 2009, p. 102). What we are trying to create in South Africa is a dispensation that builds a national identity, but specifically one that explicitely "makes provision for people of different ethnicities, cultures, religions, and languages, to be secure in the new South Africa in the knowledge that their languages, religions, and cultures will be protected"[25]. As captured by former President Nelson Mandela in his inaugural speech: "Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another" (Mandela, 1994).

For Norval, to genuinely move beyond Apartheid will require both 'the protection and fostering of difference' and 'the eradication of material inequalities' (Norval, 1996, p. 305). Norval recommends the adoption of multicultural non-racialism as a means to transcend the social divisions of the past. And for many South Africans, 'non-racialism' offers this in the form of recognising social difference without constructing or relegating these differences to the status of 'other' while also promising just attention to and care for the material conditions of the impoverished and underprivileged.

I believe that it is only within such a framework – that of sustained promotion of multiculturalism across all the many different areas and communities in which people operate – that all who live in multicultural societies can achieve their full potential as humans in a just society. To achieve this, a 'two-pronged' approach must be taken: state-sponsored political and socio-economic transformation coupled with the socio-psychological project of forging a broad and inclusive national consciousness (Alexander, 2001). The success of the Rainbow Nation Project depends on the success of both.

In the previous section, I made a few references to South Africa being 'post-Apartheid'. A major claim I am making in this work is that post-Apartheid South African society is engaged in a moral project, a project marked by the moral rejection of Apartheid and a commitment to build an equal and inclusive society in its place. The following few chapters aim to explicate precisely what I mean by this and provide a clearer picture of the Rainbow Nation-Building Project, what I understand as its history, and what this means for South African identity going

[25] The late Dr A. M. Omar, former minister of justice expressed this view in an address at the opening of the International Conference on National Identity and Democracy in 1997.

forward. The first chapter of this section argues that Apartheid was rejected on a moral basis. To do this, I will begin by situating Apartheid as an extension of colonialism as exclusionary discourse; and will suggest that it is helpful for our purposes to think of Apartheid as rejected as an immoral way of living and organising society. In Chapter 2, I discuss a pre-1994 prefigurative expression of the tenets of the Rainbow Nation, i.e., the Congress of The People and its Freedom Charter. Chapter 3 will discuss alternative paradigms and why, understood as products of a rejection of Apartheid and Colonialism, they do not quite measure up to the task. I will then attempt to establish to what extent South Africa today is, in fact, 'post-Apartheid' or 'post-colonial' in Chapter 4; and will discuss the ramifications of the answers to this question in the new dispensation. Finally, in Chapter 5, I discuss some of the more interesting (and, for this work, relevant) ramifications of the New Dispensation's Rainbow Nation Project for its people and society at large.

Chapter 1: The Rejection of Apartheid (and Colonialism)

> The dehumanization of man may be historically ever-present, but since different unjust social orders are bound by their concrete and precise historic referents, what was peculiarly specific about the historic epoch that South Africa was in [,] that distinguished it from other epochs [,] and accounts for the unjustness of that social order?
>
> -Herb Addo (Addo, 1981, p. 21)

For some, democratisation into the 'new' South Africa signalled the end to Apartheid. While this is not exactly inaccurate, as I briefly mentioned in the previous section, I find this view to be deeply shallow when it comes to explaining the post-Apartheid state of mind. The 'end' of something as wholly encompassing of society as Apartheid (and Colonialism) is not so easily achieved as through a simple rewriting of the constitution; it is something that requires not only a great deal of time but immense effort as well. The 'ending' of Apartheid and Colonialism, I argue, should be conceived of in broader terms, that is, as a humanist rejection of discourses of exclusion. (It is important to note that I am not interested in the question of "what led to Apartheid ending?" but more "why *should* Apartheid have ended".) To explicate and articulate my view, I will be looking into the concepts of discourse and social exclusion as considered in the social sciences, following the works of Michel Foucault (Foucault, 1971) and Antonio Gramsci (1988), who offer particularly interesting (and relevant) perspectives on social exclusion in their work on discourse and hegemony. In linking Apartheid and Colonialism through the discourses they advance, I show not only that the two are inextricably linked but also how the moral rejection of Apartheid entails a rejection of colonialism.

For Foucault, 'discourse' refers to a set of social constructs by which dominant groups in society create and impose specific knowledge systems, disciplines, and values upon dominated groups, which work to support their imposed and alleged superiority[26]. As a social phenomenon, then, discourse refers to the conceptual framework used to understand the world and works to "constitute reality not only for the objects it appears to represent but also for the

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[26] See also Weedon: "Ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern" (Weedon, 1997, p. 108)

subjects who form the community" (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001, p. 42) on which the discourse depends. An important insight in Foucault's discourse theory is how information is never *just* recorded, it is co-created to serve some purpose or agenda. Epistemology is concerned with how we acquire knowledge, and a major problem in epistemology since at least the era of the Sophists has been the question of how we can know something to be true. One possible response is to say that, since we do not seem able to transcend our language and cultural systems in our thinking, we cannot obtain any absolute viewpoint. Thus, knowledge cannot be defined or verified objectively and therefore, what counts as 'knowledge' is asserted: knowledge, in this view, is about power. For Rudy Hirschheim (Information Systems Epistemology: A historical Perspective, 1985), for example,

> Knowledge is not infallible but conditional; it is a societal convention and is relative to both time and place. Knowledge is a matter of societal (or group) acceptance. The criteria for acceptance are an agreed set of conventions which must be followed if the knowledge is to be accepted by society. (Hirschheim, 1985, p. 10)

An important and relevant feature of discourse is that, once established, it can become 'hegemonic', a related concept that will be discussed momentarily. Colonial discourse, for now, can be understood as a system of statements[27] that can be made about colonies and colonial peoples, as well as about colonising powers and the relationship between the two (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001).

On Discourse, Apartheid, and Exclusion

With an abundance of unearned charity, one may conceive of Apartheid as based on the idea of 'separate but equal' development. However, a more cynical view – which I will be assuming for this work – would be that Apartheid's aim was the upliftment of Afrikaners specifically and white people generally to the exclusion of all other groups of people. In pursuit of this end, institutions found it necessary to be able to sort out who the members of the privileged group(s) (whites and Afrikaner people) were, as only then would it be possible to tailor social policy to prioritise these groups. To this effect, Apartheid's social infrastructure – that is, its systems (for instance, laws), discourse (categories with which people were to be viewed and view

[27] "Statements" here could be misleading, since for Foucault, discourse is neither a statement nor a proposition, but is rather a matter of power and knowledge.

themselves) and physical design (townships and Homelands) – was organised to be appropriately exclusionary and thus instrumental for its goals.

The 'social infrastructure' of Apartheid remains vital for understanding South Africa, not only because, like all systems, the organisation of its components informs its function, but also because even today, the specific post-Apartheid default social setting is built upon this infrastructure, and thus contradicts, opposes, or is antithetical to its end of social unity[28]. Thus, for the success of the new dispensation (to achieve its ends), its 'social infrastructure' had to be reorganised and redesigned to ensure that it would be appropriate for and conducive to its national project.

In this chapter, I argue that understanding the rejection of Apartheid as based on moral reasons allows us to see the post-Apartheid Rainbow Nation-Building Project as founded on a moral commitment stemming from this rejection. To this end, it is crucial to establish an understanding of social exclusion and the diverse ways it can manifest and why it is found so morally abhorrent by the people of South Africa as a social policy in the new dispensation. The project of post-Apartheid South Africa, I will argue, aims to be antithetical to the project of Apartheid. This democratic dispensation of South Africa can be characterised by its transformation towards inclusivity, diversity, and unity. The remainder of this chapter will look at exclusion as a social phenomenon and trace its mutations through colonial and Apartheid history as well as into the post-Apartheid paradigm.

Social Exclusion

Social exclusion "refers to the dynamic process of being shut out, fully or partially, from any of the social, economic, political or cultural systems which determine the social integration of a person in society" (Walker & Walker, 1997, p. 8). Groups can be considered excluded or marginalised when their ability to "participate in the activities, conditions and amenities which are customary, encouraged or at least widely approved, in the societies to which they belong" is statistically and unjustly undermined in comparison to that of more 'central' groups (Townsend, 1979, p. 31). Social exclusion can be either the result of deliberate attempts by those in positions of social and political power who seek to improve the conditions of their constituents or themselves by depriving certain other groups of people of opportunities; or, more passively, the outcome of more subtle everyday social practices embedded in local

[28] As discussed in the previous section.

relations of power, or a myriad of other factors. Exclusion, then, may be either active or passive, which partly explains why talk of social exclusion can quickly become complicated. Social exclusion can be seen in terms of its opposition to its corollary -- inclusion, and for Peter Townsend (Poverty in the United Kingdom, 1979), it can be helpful to think of social exclusion/inclusion as contradictory social processes that dominate different social orders and time frames (Townsend, 1979, p. 32)[29]. For Kathinka Frøystad (2013), social exclusion and inclusion "often go hand in hand" (Frøystad, 2013, p. 35). People may also be unfavourably excluded or unfavourably included, that is, included on considerably unfavourable terms or conditions. Policies of affirmative action and economic empowerment, for instance, have certainly contributed to the inclusion of marginalised groups in the formal employment sector and positions of leadership and power, but at the same time, have also raised resentments that can marginalise them in other ways. Thus, social exclusion and inclusion should not be thought of as mutually exclusive phenomena as they can coexist and co-inform each other.

Apartheid, more so than anything in South Africa today, or even during imperial colonialism[30], was a state of *de jure*[31] social exclusion. Social exclusion during Apartheid worked as a networked hierarchy that began at the 'centre' with white, cis-gender, straight, Afrikaner, Christian males, and expanded out to the 'margins' populated by those who were considered (based on hegemonic discursive frameworks) to deviate from this category in often complex and hyper-specific ways[32]. Social goods required for an individual's flourishing in society were concentrated around this central group and were often made exclusively available to certain designated groups while most other groups were denied access to these same social goods[33].

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[29] Interestingly, as Mehta notes, if the opposite of social exclusion is integration, then the countries of the 'Global South' have always been integrated – whether through colonialism, neo-colonialism, or the economic dependency created by globalization. The very creation of townships, and the dependency on black labour they represent, are certainly instances of some form of integration. But it is important to acknowledge that integration alone does not necessarily entail inclusion or unity.

[30] The Union of South Africa did introduce some 'Apartheid-like' policies and legislation, but they are overshadowed by the massive efforts of the Apartheid State.

[31] *De jure* describes practices that are legally recognised, regardless of whether the practice exists in reality. Examples of Apartheid laws include: the Population Registration Act, which designated people into racial groups; the Mixed Amenities Act, which segregated public facilities (such as public transport, public seats, beaches, and many other facilities by race); the Group Areas Act, which created the segregated residential areas of white suburbs, coloured areas, Indian neighbourhoods and black townships, which continue to exist today; the Immorality Act, which made marriages across racial groups illegal; and the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act, which stripped Black people of South African citizenship and established the so-called Bantustans or native homelands.

[32] The Immorality Act and the creation of categories such as 'honorary whites' are examples of this complexity and hyper-specificity.

[33] One notable exception being the so-called "honorary whites".

Examples of such social goods included voting rights, education, healthcare, economic participation, and property ownership.

Exclusion often has a clear spatial dimension that develops along with its social dimension. It is often in the more impoverished neighbourhoods of the modern megacities that we can see the economic, political, and cultural effects of social exclusion most clearly. Those excluded under globalized capitalism and other systems are generally not only on the social margins of society but also on the spatial margins, whether in inner-city ghettoes or peripheral societies that do not fully participate in the global economy (Short, 2018). What has changed in recent years is the recognition of the extent to which the urban ghetto has become not just a space of exploitation and domination but also a place of exclusion, and is no longer perceived simply as a linear continuum between the included and the excluded in society. As Massey and Denton (2001) note in their research on poverty in urban black neighbourhoods in the United States of America:

> The ghetto has been the paradigmatic residential configuration for at least eighty years […this…] did not happen as a chance by-product of other socioeconomic processes. Rather, white American society made a series of deliberate decisions to deny blacks access to urban housing markets and reinforce their spatial segregation. Through its actions and inactions, white America built and maintained the residential structure of the ghetto (Massey & Denton, 2001, p. 19)

Racial discrimination and spatial segregation thus go hand in hand to produce the ghetto of the excluded. Today's black and Latino ghettos in the United States and black and coloured townships in South Africa are characterized by a profoundly structural form of social exclusion that manifests economically, politically, and culturally. This is "the abandoned city" that Marcuse speaks of, "the city of the victims, left for the poor, the unemployed, the excluded" (Marcuse, 1996, p. 196). With upwardly mobile black workers and employees moving out of the township, it has become an even more concentrated expression of poverty and social exclusion. As Anne Power puts it, more generally, "we have not just created poor neighbourhoods, but whole swathes of cities dominated by exclusionary problems" (Power 2000, p. 4).

Post-Apartheid South Africa is ostensibly aimed towards ideals such as integration, inclusivity, and unity – ideals that are pretty antithetical to the aims and goals of the previous dispensation. Yet South Africa today continues to have elements that you would expect from Apartheid, not

a society aiming to be its opposite. As already mentioned, the Group Areas Act has left South Africa in a state of de facto segregation and exclusion, with most urban settlements throughout the country being divided into white suburbs, Indian neighbourhoods, coloured areas, and black townships. The Homelands Act has also separated and concentrated members of different South African cultural groups in various segregated parts of our urban environments and distant parts of the country. In his analysis of South African heterotopia, Charles Villet finds that:

> The black poor can still be said to be "placed" in townships, informal settlements and squatter camps away from suburban whites, although this now happens due to existential demands, social sanction, and the capitalist economic ordering of society rather than explicit governmental decisions and control, as was the case during Apartheid. The black poor do venture out to white suburbia, often as menial workers, security guards or as beggars. (Villet, 2018, p. 20)

Somehow, while we are ostensibly a 'free', 'multiracial' and 'integrated' society, meaningful 'inclusivity' remains elusive[34]. By dividing and isolating people from each other (physically through design, zoning, or outright segregation or even through establishing discourse that alienates them from each other), they are rendered unable to see their issues as mutually related and thus become prevented from organising collectively as an oppressed society towards their liberation. Therefore, it is not merely integration into a system but the *nature* of that integration that is at stake.

So how did social exclusion find itself so deeply embedded in the social fabric of South Africa? To answer this question, we need to engage with the hegemonic establishment of colonial and apartheid discourses of exclusion.

Hegemonic Discourse

In Post-Colonial Theory, hegemony refers to domination through means of manufactured consent through the power of the ruling class to mobilise the powers of rhetoric and social representation to convince other classes that their interests (those of the ruling class) are the interests of all (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001, p. 116). Through hegemony, domination is

[34] For plural societies, Nussbaum (Frontiers of Justice, 2006) argues, unlimited freedom of expression – something typically associated with modern multicultural societies - may reinforce social marginalization. If your social community is regularly mocked and demeaned in public, it creates a 'chilling climate of subtle discrimination'. Growing up in such conditions tends to produce fear, isolation, and social alienation, which in turn may foster low self-esteem and even radical resistance. In both cases, the result is a marginalization of the already marginalised, which eventually undermines the kind of society in which a democracy based on equal participation can flourish.

not exerted solely or even primarily through active force and physical violence (threatened or otherwise), but also through the more subtle powers of discourse—of ways of thinking—that inform the economy, education, the media, and other state apparatuses of social organisation and present the unjust status quo as natural and inevitable, rather than socially constructed and open to change. In this regard, hegemony is related to the concept of 'false consciousness'-- a false view of one's 'true' social condition that keeps the dominant groups from recognising and resisting their oppression[35].

Thinking of colonial discourse as hegemonic can be helpful for understanding the success of imperial and colonial powers in maintaining dominance over colonised peoples, particularly in societies where the natives may far outnumber the occupying force (such as in colonial and Apartheid South Africa, but also elsewhere in Africa and Asia). Hegemonic colonial discourse works by suppressing the desire for self-determination through the internalisation of Eurocentric values, beliefs, and ambitions as the most natural or most valuable, or for 'the greater good'[36]. In this way, hegemonic colonial discourse gains its "capacity to influence the thought of the colonised", which has shown itself as the "most sustained and potent operation of imperial power" (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001, p. 116).[37]

Oppressed people, who by necessity of survival often come to adapt to structures of domination, can become resigned to their condition. Biko recognised this, arguing that the oppressed become a psychologically damaged people suffering from a despondent fatalism - or the perception of injustice as inevitable or unchanging. Once Eurocentric colonial discourse had become so deeply entrenched in their psyches, it "inhibited [them] from waging the struggle for freedom so long as they feel incapable of taking the risks it requires" (Khoapa, n.d.). The transition from passive acceptance of the status quo to active participation in changing it is an important and necessary step in the struggle for liberation, as in order "to overcome oppression, Black people first had to critically recognise its causes. Then, through transforming action, they [could] create a new situation, which would permit the pursuit of a

[35] Antonio Gramsci develops the concept of hegemonic discourse in *The Prison Notebooks* where he discusses the 'manufacture of consent'.

[36] Most colonial regimes were generally established and maintained through military force. However, by providing Eurocentric education and thus creating an elite whose interests were more connected to those of the colonizers, the privileged within the colonised class became increasingly incentivised to work 'within the system' to either stabilize or incrementally change it as opposed to more radical and revolutionary approaches which threatened the relatively comfortable status quo.

[37] Biko can be said to articulate a similar sentiment in his *I Write What I Like*, writing that "the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed" (Biko, 2005, p. 85).

fuller humanity" (Khoapa, n.d.). Paulo Freire too was keenly aware of how when oppressed peoples are convinced that their experiences of injustice are products of fixed and unchanging facts of life or nature, they can become despondent, believing that change to a better alternative is impossible. Achieving liberation and freedom, for both Biko and Freire, requires that oppressed people not only realise that this is not true, that injustice and dehumanisation are neither natural nor inevitable, but also critically examine why they had been led to believe this falsehood in the first place. This process aids oppressed people in seeing their condition as not simply one of individual suffering, but rather as suffering qua members of an oppressed group who have been alienated into viewing their issues as unchanging. In this way, both Biko and Freire reject fatalism as it can work to maintain an oppressive society by framing oppressive systems and unjust inequality as the product of things outside of or beyond human control.

It is in propagating the centrality of that which is 'white' and the dislocation to the margins of that which is native, that the colonised subject is led to find and understand themselves in hegemonic colonial discourse[38]. Hegemonic colonial discourse thus works to delegitimise their own positive self-conceptions by creating a deep conflict in the consciousness of the colonised resulting from its clash with knowledge claims that colonial discourse makes about the world. Hegemonic discourse is dynamic in nature and can be internalised by all members of society, though not in the same ways and not always equally. Colonising people growing up in or encountering the colonised also have their identities mediated through this discourse of exclusion[39], preventing people from being able to see their participation in the colonial relationship for what it is: an exercise of violence[40]. Such is the power of hegemonic colonial discourse that individual colonising subjects are not often consciously aware of the duplicity of their position, for "colonial discourse constructs the colonising subject as much as the colonised" (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001, p. 43). Even though generated by the colonisers for their own purposes, colonial discourse disseminates and eventually becomes the primary discourse within which the colonised may also come to see and understand themselves. It is in

[38] Hendrick Verwoerd, now infamously referred to as one of the 'Architects of Apartheid', had the following to say about Africans in education: "[…] there is no place for him (blacks) in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour. Until now he has been subjected to a school system which drew him away from his community and misled him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he was not allowed to graze. Who will do the manual labour if you give the Natives an academic education? Education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in life." (Byrnes, 1996. p.32).

[39] Though, obviously, in more favourable terms.

[40] This too is an instance of moral blindness.

this internalisation of the status quo as normative that the morally blinding effects of hegemonic discourse can obtain in both oppressed and oppressor groups alike.

While South Africa formally moved away from British imperialism, much of this colonial discourse remained, serving as the bedrock from which Apartheid was built. As Aletta Norval notes, Apartheid embodied 'Gramscian hegemony'; by successfully instituting and maintaining such a constricted 'horizon of intelligibility' that reinforced its segregatory and exclusionary discourse among the populous. That is, similar to how colonial discourse worked, Apartheid discourse set limits on what was intelligible, thinkable, or legitimate. Norval discusses the transformation of Apartheid from a 'myth', concerned with the experiences of a particular group, to a broad and expansive 'imaginary horizon' that was meant to order all social relations in South Africa. In so doing, Apartheid discourse established the parameters of "what was possible, what could be said and done," and thus effectively "[drew] the boundaries which delineated sense from non-sense" for society at large (Norval, 1996, p. 16). Hegemony, then, concerns the pervasive powers of ideology, values, and beliefs in the reproduction of relations of oppression and dominance while concealing contradictions that arise therefrom. Cultural hegemony "operates through an invisible network of affiliative connections, psychological internalisations, and unconsciously complicit associations" (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001, p. 207), and over centuries, became enmeshed in various seemingly independent but inextricable and entangled concepts; all of which co-inform and support one another in various ways to form the hegemonic phenomena that have normalised colonial power relations of domination and exclusion. And, while structures of power often present themselves in terms of unchanging unities, the power that they yield does not operate in a simple vertical ('top-down') way but instead "operates dynamically, laterally and intermittently" (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001, p. ibid).

Three Pillars of Hegemonic Colonial Discourse

An important pillar of hegemonic colonial discourse is binary logic—understanding various aspects of ourselves and our world in terms of polarities or theoretical opposites. The binary logic of imperialism expressed itself in the tendency of colonial discourse to see the world in terms of racialised binary oppositions (e.g., civilised/barbaric); this tendency came to form part of the framework of colonial dominance. Phenotypical and cultural similarities between colonised and coloniser societies were minimised, while differences were emphasised. This allowed for the racialised categorisation of people as white and yellow/brown/black (depending

on the colonised indigenous peoples), thereby allowing for the simplistic reductive binary of white/non-white (where 'white' is the ideal, and all other races present a deviation from this ideal in various degrees). In so doing, "[colonialism] draws the concept of race into a simple binary that reflects its own logic of power" by obfuscating the vast continuum of ethnic variation and racial mixture to simply European and *other* (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001, p. 26). It is through such 'simplistic' distinctions made between the coloniser/colonised, civilised/primitive, etc. that hegemonic colonial discourse constructed binary oppositions to be structurally mapped onto one another in a way that allows for various seemingly arbitrary (though socially significant) features to be clustered according to colonial hegemonic discourse, creating a neat world view that, on first brush, may seem 'common sense' for many. To illustrate: You have the 'coloniser' who is taken as essentially distinct from the 'colonised'. This is justified, dismissively, because the coloniser is 'advanced' whereas the colonised is 'primitive'. Advanced cultures are 'civilised', whereas primitive cultures are 'barbaric'. Civilisation is 'good', and barbarism is 'evil'. That which is good is 'beautiful', and evil is 'ugly'. And this, the hegemonic colonial discourse would have us believe, is the difference between those who are 'white' and those who are 'black' (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001, p. 24).

Another critical pillar of colonial hegemonic discourse, related to binary logic, is essentialism. Essentialism here refers to the idea that groups, categories, or classes of people share specific essential properties in virtue of belonging to these groups, etc. In adopting both essentialism and binary logic, colonialism was able to "create the idea of the inferiority of the colonial subject", thus allowing for "hegemonic control over them through control of the dominant modes of public and private representation" (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001, p. 78). Hegemonic colonial discourse depends on (often mystical and pseudo-scientific) notions of race that began to emerge at the advent of European imperialism to create representations of the colonised – regardless of their actual social structures and cultural histories – as 'primitive' in comparison to the 'civilised' colonisers[41]. From this, colonialism as we know it could only

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[41] In Fanon's analysis of this Manichean nature of the colonial world,

> "It is not enough for the settler to delimit physically, [...] with the help of the army and the police force, the place of the native. [T]he settler [also] paints the native as a sort of quintessence of evil. Native society is not simply described as a society lacking in values [...] the native is declared insensible to ethics; [representing] not only the absence of values, but also the negation of values. He is, [...] the enemy of values, and in this sense he is the absolute evil." (Fanon, On Violence, p. 6)

exist at all by postulating that there existed an essential binary opposition into which people could be divided, or as Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin (2001) explain it:

> [The] gradual establishment of an empire depended upon a stable hierarchical relationship in which the colonised existed as the other of the colonising culture. Thus, the idea of the savage could only occur if there was a concept of the civilised to oppose it (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001, p. 36).

The third pillar I wish to discuss is related to these essentialist ways of thinking and also related to the first—namely, the binary concepts of the centre and periphery/margin as utilised in hegemonic colonial discourse. These concepts can be understood in terms of physical geography but can also be understood along more metaphysical lines. For Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, colonial discourse allowed for imperial Europe to be imaginatively defined as the 'centre' and everything that lay outside that centre to be defined as at the margin or on the periphery of culture, power, and civilisation[42]. It was upon this binary, essentialist, and Eurocentric worldview that the Colonial and later the Apartheid State organised every aspect of society.

It is crucial, then, to note that on this account the repressive power structures of colonialism and Apartheid operate as an enmeshed network of social interactions, rather than a monolithic force (as perhaps the term 'pillars' may suggest). It is also important to understand that there is no real 'master-plan' of imperialism, and its advance is not always or only secured through violence and oppression (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001, p. 207).

Apartheid as a Colonial Discourse of Exclusion and Exploitation

To return to social exclusion, Apartheid was built upon the previously established hegemonic colonial discourse to reinforce and maintain a deeply racialised social order. For Bennie Khoapa, twin cornerstones emerging from Apartheid discourse are (1) the supposed racial superiority of whites and (2) the need to safeguard the political and economic supremacy of whites. In proliferation of this ideology, several supporting myths were created over time:

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[42] This is related to modernism, see Habermas 'the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity' (1985).

> [These myths] were intended not only to condition the white population to accept the 'truth' of the special, superior place they were supposed to have, but also to condition the black population to believe the myth that they were inferior beings. (Khoapa, n.d., p. 2)

The history and historiography of South Africa itself was also engaged to justify Apartheid. For instance:

> That Whites and Blacks arrived in South Africa at the same time. This served to delegitimise claims of black indigeneity. That the Voortrekkers moved into an uninhabited land that belonged to no one. This served to legitimise claims to conquered land and territories for whites. That Afrikaners were victims of British imperialism and were not colonists. That the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts were to protect black land against the whites. That the homelands corresponded to the areas historically occupied by each black 'nation' and their fragmentation was the result of tribal wars and succession disputes. (Khoapa, n.d., p. 3)

State power was also instrumental in establishing and propagating the internalisation of Apartheid discourse by the masses. In 'Education for Barbarism', I.B. Tabata (1958) argues that the "primary purpose" of Bantu Education was "not only to produce a docile black labour force, but also a labour force unable to perceive the social, political and economic contradictions" inherent in society (Tabata, 1958, p. 4). The quality of Bantu Education was therefore instrumental in achieving its ends. Apartheid education was not only separate, it was also unequal, with government spending heavily biased towards white learners; such that the average white child's education was valued at about four times that of the average black child[43]. This was Apartheid's "wicked formula of providing the best for those who already had and the worst for those who had little" (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001). By separating different social groups, it becomes far easier to institute unequal treatment of the people by prioritising some groups and marginalising others.

As an institution, Apartheid also relied on the obfuscation of any ambiguity in the interstitial spaces between the opposed categories, such that any overlapping region may appear unreal or impossible according to the colonial binary logic, thus creating a region of taboo in social

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[43] Until 1994, the pre-democracy government was spending R5 403 a year on every white learner in contrast to R1 043 on every black learner in the Transkei (Department of Education, 2001, p. 4).

experience. An example of such taboo was ever-present with the spectre of interracial relationships and miscegenation: if racial groups are to live and exist separately, what is to be done with multiracial, or 'mixed', children from a white and a black parent? Where are they to live? Thus, came the need for the 1949 Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, followed by the Population Registration and Immorality Acts in the following year, and further supported by the Pass system and Group Areas Acts. Along with systemic inequality and structural poverty, these laws ensured that 'separate living' was the typical experience for most of the next generations of South Africans. Segregation of residential areas, as already discussed, continues as de facto Apartheid today.

In his *Pedagogy of The Oppressed*, Paulo Freire identifies a "central problem" facing humanity, which he describes as a struggle between two opposing forces: humanisation and dehumanisation. While people naturally strive to become more humanized, this attempt is often met with resistance from "injustice, exploitation, and…violence" (Freire, 1970, p. 44), which work to dehumanise them. If we take social exclusion seriously, as well as its effects of injustice and inequality, we find that altogether these are issues of dehumanisation. In this view, dehumanisation cannot be the natural state for humanity but is instead the result of an unjust society. Thus, for Freire, striving for humanisation and freedom is an "indispensable condition" for the human project. For Freire, "freedom" is related to the ability to critically question, understand and change the world. By masking its contradictions and restricting the horizon of intelligibility to only allowing views that reinforce the status quo, I argue that hegemonic discourse works to undermine people's ability to critically question and understand their society, and therefore also their ability to change it. In this way, hegemonic discourse can induce moral blindness as it works to render the causes of oppression invisible (through linguistic obfuscation, among other methods). Overcoming oppression, again, requires that people are able to recognise its causes.

All this can explain why so much work is put into dismantling and deconstructing colonial discourse[44], often accounting for the alleged range of difference within socially constructed

[44] Biko believed that historically there were several negative myths about black people propagated by white society. These myths served to justify the dehumanisation of black people not only in South Africa but all over the world. For Biko the destruction of these myths was a precondition for the psychological liberation of black people. In his *I Write What I Like,* Biko gives a series of speeches and articles set out systematically to articulate ideas, values and issues that affirmed black people and that attacked those whom he believed impeded black people's full humanisation in South Africa.

categories such as race as a matter of social misrepresentation, discursive construction and historical deception, debunking binary, essentialist and Eurocentric worldviews by showing them to be not only fallacious and simplistic but also dangerous for the human condition by preventing the flourishing of people in society. Questioning the dominant social order is particularly important for Freire, as oppressive institutions can work to present unjust systems as unchanging facts of nature rather than the result of arguably arbitrary ideas and choices throughout history that continue to affect people's lives today. It became necessary, then, to conscientize and mobilise the people to act in pursuit of their freedom:

> domination is the fundamental theme of the South African Apartheid epoch and that domination implies its opposite – liberation – it was necessary to explicitly expose the character of oppression and underdevelopment that characterised South African apartheid society (Khoapa, n.d., p. 2).

Beyond the Hegemonic Discourses of Colonialism and Apartheid

The reasons often given for the fall of Apartheid vary. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this work, I will be dividing them into two broad strands: arguments from unsustainability and arguments from immorality. The abolition of Apartheid, I argue, was based on a moral objection. That is, the mode of the Anti-Apartheid movement was not concerned with its unsustainability but rather with its immorality. I believe that understanding this as the reason for the abolition of Apartheid is vital because it helps us understand some of the concerns that inform and characterise the dispensation that would follow it. From this perspective, the goal of post-Apartheid state building is to create a better system morally speaking; post-Apartheid South African reconstruction is, therefore, a moral project. Importantly, I am not so much interested in the question of "what led to Apartheid ending?" but rather of "why Apartheid *should* have ended". In what follows, I will offer a few different arguments from sustainability and discuss why they do not work to answer the question of interest (why *should* Apartheid have ended?), then show how arguments from morality are more appropriate as a response.

Arguments from unsustainability take many forms, so I will just broadly outline and discuss a few of them to give a general sense of their general form. One kind of argument from

unsustainability may work to show that the international political or economic climate was such that Apartheid policies in South Africa were deemed unacceptable; thus, South Africa found itself pressured to abolish Apartheid. Specific reasons for this can be numerous, but what is often pointed out is increased international scrutiny and sanctions, as well as the fall of the Soviet Union displacing South Africa's self-appointed role as Africa's "Bulwark against Communism" (U.S. Department of State, 2001); Apartheid, then, ended because it was unsuitable given the geopolitical landscape at the time.

Another argument from unsustainability can be constructed by suggesting that Apartheid policies themselves were unsustainable, either by being contradictory or virtually impossible to police in a serious capacity. The race-obsessed policy of Population Registration resulted in many families being torn apart. Those who happened to phenotypically present differently from their family members were designated as belonging to a different racial group and therefore were relocated to a different area due to the Group Areas Act[45]. Another related example is in how South African rural and urban centres depended country-wide on black labour. The very fact that the country depended on a common economy proved to undermine the Apartheid project: The Homeland Act, which was supposedly promulgated to facilitate 'Separate Development', was a failure because white-reserved urban and suburban areas were economically dependent on access to black townships nearby. The separation proved much more difficult and economically threatening to enforce than was initially expected. Apartheid was abolished, in this view, because the specific laws in place were unenforceable.

A third argument from unsustainability concerns the threat or fear of civil war. The late 1960s to early 1980s proved to be a violent period in South African history. The banning of political parties involved in the Mass Democratic Movement's demonstrations over the previous decade forced activists to operate covertly or "go underground", forming military wings such as the ANC's 'uMkhonto we Sizwe' and PAC's 'Poqo' who engaged in escalating efforts to destabilise the state[46]. Along with events such as the 1976 Student Protests and the Sharpeville

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[45] The Population Registration Act of 1950 is a good example of this, which defined a "white person" as one who "in appearance is obviously a white person who is generally not accepted as a Coloured person; or is generally accepted as a white person and is not in appearance obviously a white person." Because some aspects of the profile were of a social nature, reclassification was not uncommon, and a board was established to conduct that process. This phenomenon is used as the basis for Zoe Wycomb's 'Playing in The Light', where Marion Campbell discovers her family's biracial ancestry as having been suppressed in favour of a more beneficial white identity.

[46] Nelson Mandela outlined the motivations behind the formation of uMkhonto we Sizwe in his famous "I Am Prepared to Die" speech: "At the beginning of June 1961, after a long and anxious assessment of the South African situation, I, and some colleagues, came to the conclusion that as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-

Massacre proving township unrest to be pervasive, the threat of a protracted civil war between a small but well-armed minority and the majority was believed to loom on the horizon. And so, Apartheid was abolished because it could (or would) lead to civil war.

The general form of these arguments is that some contingent reality prevented Apartheid from continuing. I am not interested in defending the historical veracity of these claims. It may indeed be true that the end of the Cold War, international politics and sanctions, certain policies and the threat of civil war may (in combination or alone) have been the reason why FW De Klerk opened the floor for negotiating Apartheid's end in the 1990s. However, while persuasive in terms of affecting policy change, these reasons leave much to be desired, I believe, as reasons for why Apartheid *should have ended*; they leave open the possibility of continuing Apartheid were it in fact sustainable. Arguments from unsustainability, that is, only work to explain why Apartheid ended given the particular political climate or its specific legislation or the resistance it faced, not why it should have ended.[47] So, given that I am not interested in the historical question of why Apartheid ended, but rather in the normative question of why it should have ended, I will abandon these arguments in favour of a different type of argument, specifically, an argument from immorality.

The argument from immorality is basic in structure. Apartheid was an unjust system of governance, and therefore it was the moral thing to do to abolish it. Justifying its being unjust may be to point at some of its most glaring policies: not only did it tear families apart in pursuit of racial purity, it also used the power of the state to create social conditions of exclusion and inclusion in which the lives and opportunities of groups of people were determined by their race, thus restricting the ability of people to flourish.

The argument from immorality is more useful for our present purposes as it provides us with a reason to oppose Apartheid—regardless of its sustainability—namely, on the basis of its immoral nature. The core tenets of Apartheid, that is, were deemed to be immoral and were

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violence at a time when the government met our peaceful demands with force. […] The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices – submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit, and we have no choice but to hit back by all means in our power in defence of our people, our future, and our freedom."

[47] It is not inconceivable that the global geopolitical configuration could have been entirely different (suppose the Axis powers had won WWII and racialised prejudice had become more acceptable internationally), or that the laws were written to be less obviously contradictory or that resistance to Apartheid was more effectively clamped down upon (something which was possible given that South Africa's expensive and protracted border wars had come to an end with the fall of the Soviet Union, allowing the state to focus on redeploying its far better-armed soldiers into quelling domestic unrest in townships, etc.). Importantly, such reasoning leaves open the possible reality of those who were Anti-Apartheid suddenly to find themselves accepting of Apartheid were it to happen under more favourable circumstances.

thus done away with. The reason I want to look at this reason for the rejection of Apartheid is that I believe that the dispensation that followed it had within itself the mission to oppose Apartheid as a core moral tenet. The idea was not merely that Apartheid was unsustainable and could be replaced by a similarly immoral but more sustainable state. Opposition to Apartheid then, must be articulated in a manner more severe than would be the case were the only issues motivating its abolition determined solely by certain facts that surround its implementation. Such an argument may not be the *actual* historic reason for why Apartheid did end. But that is not its strength. This argument instead offers us a view as to why Apartheid *ought to have ended* that has much less to do with the context of where and when Apartheid actually took place in reality and more to do with the very nature of what Apartheid was.

To return to Freire's "central problem", where people strive to be(come) humanized but are met with resistance from the dehumanising forces of "injustice, exploitation, and…violence", I want to suggest that the rejection of Apartheid, as a rejection of hegemonic colonial discourse, is an expression of this human striving for freedom and humanity, and against those forces that would work to dehumanise us, exemplified in Apartheid. This view of why Apartheid had to end, I argue, helps us to understand some of the decisions made about its abolition, South Africa's transition and the commitments made by the new democratic dispensation that succeeded it.

If we understand the abolition of Apartheid as founded on moral grounds, then the post-Apartheid zeitgeist can be seen to take on a moral character - one founded on the desire to have in place of Apartheid a more ethical and morally just social order. A social order that rejects the tenets of Apartheid: that we are better off divided and apart from one another, that each of the groups are to be given different and (in some cases) preferential treatment. Understanding Apartheid as rejected on moral grounds also allows us to understand much of post-Apartheid reality, including decisions made in the 1990s to base the new social order on the following core moral tenets: freedom from state interference with the liberty of individuals without reasonable justification, inclusivity in that the state would commit to accommodating all groups of people as much as is feasibly possible, and reconciliation in that the state would work to develop a new national consciousness that embraces all and is not vulnerable to divisions based on past injustices.

This anti-Apartheid sentiment is, I argue, the theme of the new Democratic Dispensation. The adoption of the one-vote-per-person electoral policy, as well as the promulgation of a

constitution lauded as one of the most progressive are two ways in which this theme has been made manifest in the state formation process. In empowering society at large through a universal franchise and a progressive constitution, the state simultaneously gave each individual the political power to undo minority rule, while also granting protection of the rights of all, including those of the minority. For reconciliation, the Nuremberg 'prosecutory model' of retributive justice was set aside in favour of Ubuntu-inspired reparative justice in the form of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission which became seen as "a necessary exercise to enable South Africans to come to terms with their past on a morally accepted basis and to advance the cause of reconciliation."[48] The intuition of Rainbowism is that the more inclusive, integrated and united our society is, the more moral it is. The goal, then, became to transform this strange place into a dispensation that would help to build and foster a national identity that is welcoming of and makes provisions for people of different races, religions, languages, and cultures and guarantees equality, justice, and fairness to all. The idea is that the only way for this diverse society to achieve its full potential is not just to be tolerant but welcoming and supportive of all who live in it.

[48] Mr Dullah Omar, former Minister of Justice, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, (retrieved at https://www.justice.gov.za/trc)

Chapter 2: Prefiguration of the Rainbow Nation

> A nation's existence is (please excuse the metaphor) a daily plebiscite, just as an individual's existence is a perpetual affirmation of life. Yes, I know, that is less metaphysical than divine right and less brutal than so-called law of history. [...] Man is a slave neither of his race, his language, his religion, the course of his rivers, nor the direction of his mountain ranges. A great aggregation of men, in sane mind and warm heart, created a moral conscience that calls itself a nation. As long as this moral conscience proves its strength by sacrifices that require the subordination of the individual to the communal good, it is legitimate and has the right to exist.
> -Earnest Renan (Renan, 1882, p. 10)

The Congress of The People

In *What is a Nation*, Ernest Renan (1882) picks out what he finds to be essential conditions for being a people: "having common glories in the past and a will to continue them in the present; having made great things together and wishing to make them again" (Renan, 1882, p. 19). This, he says, is the soul of a nation or its 'spiritual principle'[49]. A people*,* for Renan, is "a community that shares a common heritage as well as a joint program to realise. Having suffered [...] together is worth more than standardised taxes or frontiers that conform to strategic ideas and is independent of racial or linguistic considerations" (Renan, 1882, p. ibid). Suffering, Renan argues, unites people more readily than joy, pointing out that "in fact, periods of mourning are worth more to national memory than triumphs because they impose duties and require a common effort" (Renan, 1882, p. 10). If Apartheid is considered to be the material and moral suffering that the people of South Africa have in common in that it mutually robbed us of our humanity, then The Congress of The People's Freedom Charter was an articulation of the joint program that the people of this nation would invest themselves in for an alternative future society and became for almost 40 years the "impressionistic template of the dispensation that would succeed Apartheid" (Levy, 2011, p. 17).

The Congress of the People of Kliptown 1955 (or 'COP') and its Freedom Charter (or 'the Charter') represented a drastic departure from the previous modes of resistance and liberation

[49] For Renan, this 'soul' is dual natured: "One is the past, the other is the present." (Renan, 1882, p. 19)

struggle in South Africa. Of course, there was resistance to Apartheid and colonial administration before the Charter; however, this was mostly sporadic and not mass organised. Before the COP commenced in 1955, any conceivable national democratic movement would have been a construction premised on what the particular people were against (colonialism, Apartheid, racism, sexism etc.) and not on any united nationally articulated end. For Norman Levy, the Freedom Charter changed this state of affairs permanently. Operating in direct rejection of the government of the day, and mainly through volunteers, the organisation advanced into urban as well as rural areas, collecting wishes and demands and the support of influential people in rural areas such as chiefs, priests, teachers, and activists, among others. The *Call to the Congress of the People*, the first of the major documents of the campaign, reached out "to brothers without land and children without schooling," to the "farmers in the reserves; to the miners in the dark shafts and cold compounds, far from their families; and to the farm workers and workers in the factories." (Levy, 2011, p. 5) and ended with the refrain:

> Let us speak together, all of us together – African and European, Indian and Coloured. Voter and voteless. Privileged and rightless. The happy and the homeless … Let us speak of freedom! (Levy, 2011, p. 5).

The *Call* is an open call for dialogue, for members of society from all levels of society to give voice to their hopes and ambitions for society. For Paulo Freire, dialogue is a critical element in liberation movements because it mirrors the opposite of what oppressive structures require to perpetuate themselves. Dialogue is contrasted with 'narration', which is one-sided and hierarchical in nature. Apartheid and Colonial South Africa did not come about through dialogue but were imposed either by colonial empires or their settler communities. For Freire, because oppressors organise themselves apart from the people, revolutionary leaders or freedom fighters must instead organise themselves 'with the people'. Dialogical organisation is the opposite of conquest and manipulation and can only come from a position of common goals. The Congress of the People offered South Africans, from all levels of society, a new opportunity to co-author a collective narrative.

The Congress served to consolidate and unify loosely associated political organisations into a "principled alliance based on a coherent political programme" (Levy, 2011, p. 12) under the Freedom Charter, enabling a structured relationship between the different factions of South African anti-Apartheid groups with a unified vision towards a radically different alternative social order. But the COP went even further than this. The COP crossed not only lines of colour

but also (and importantly) lines of class and gender, consulting a wide range of people, including township dwellers, feminists, student groups, and advisory board members. In this way, the COP informed the tone and posture that the Mass Democratic Movement, the most significant coalition of anti-Apartheid activist groups and individuals, would assume throughout the decades leading up to liberation in 1994. The COP and its Charter represented a rejection of the fundamental tenets of Apartheid: segregation, inequality, and exclusion, and thus was instrumental in the drafting and adoption of the interim and final Constitutions of South Africa (particularly Section 2 of the Constitution, known as 'The Bill of Rights').

Focusing on racial discrimination but also, importantly, inviting feminists, queer activists, and the poor to voice their own wishes for the future of South Africa allowed for the Mass Democratic Movement to position itself as opposed to the oppression of all South Africans. Borrowing from Freire, I find this approach to be critical in two ways. Firstly, as Freire notes,

> one cannot reduce the analysis of racism to social class, one cannot understand racism fully without a class analysis, for to do one at the expense of the other is to fall prey into a sectarianist position, which is as despicable as the racism that we need to reject (Freire, 1970, p. 15).

This I take to be a recognition of how complexes of oppressions cannot and should not be assumed to be reducible to one another. While indeed, many experiences of racism (poor healthcare, living conditions and opportunities) could theoretically be mitigated were the victim much wealthier or occupied a different class position in society, there are elements of racism exclusively found or caused by racialisation that even the wealthiest person may not escape[50]. Secondly, the liberation of society from systems of injustice is a task that must be completed with, and not simply for, the oppressed people in society. A reason he gives for this is that "the oppressor, who is himself dehumanized because he dehumanizes others, is unable to lead this struggle" (Freire, 1970, p. 47). Oppressed people, for Freire, would also have the most direct experience with the oppressive forces and structures of the society and so can better contextualise and give insight to those who may not have experienced such oppression[51]. Importantly, by centring the knowledge and experiences of the oppressed - including,

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[50] At best one would only be tokenised as the exception to the group at large.

[51] It is important to note that it is not the case that Freire believes the oppressed to have been made 'noble' by their state of oppression. In fact, an important aspect of Freire's pedagogy is the acknowledgement of how the oppressed too can sometimes, if not often, behave in ways not unlike those of oppressors themselves. I will discuss this in more detail in Section 4.

importantly, those not initially self-assured of their knowledge or value – the Congress would work to provide the opportunity for the oppressed both to discover themselves as creators of knowledge and to practice critical evaluation of topics that were relevant to their own lives. This centring of marginalised voices and decentring of the hegemonic discourse also has other benefits, especially in mixed groups (composed of people from oppressor and oppressed groups alike), by giving people from oppressor groups an opportunity to experience and engage with world views that do not assume them as normative.

The COP thus became the very first mass movement to assume a fully non-racial and non-sexist character and composition, thereby making it broadly representative of the South African population from whom it would track its legitimacy. In a speech given at the adoption of a draft of the Charter, Albert Luthuli (as quoted by Levy) wrote that the day "will go down in history as a significant landmark, a turning point for the better, in the struggle to make South Africa a paradise for freedom for all its peoples" (Levy, 2011, p. 20). In this way, the COP and its Charter served as a foundational declaration of a commitment towards a new, fundamentally different polity and social dispensation.

The Congress of The People, in my view, represents a formal act of expression of the moral rejection of Apartheid that I propose as the reason that Apartheid *should* have ended. Not only did its diverse, structurally integrated, and morally united nature contradict Apartheid, it produced the founding document of a movement that would work to upend and replace Apartheid as a system of moral and social governance. Given the extent to which the social fabric of the time was informed by its racialised colonial discourse, many people did not have any personal or first-hand experience with such an organisation based on anti- racist, sexist and classist ideals; the COP then was an opportunity for South Africans to live and experience what such a society would be like. The COP and the Charter can thus be said to be a prefigurative moment in South African history. Where, by 'prefiguration', I mean to refer to the "attempted construction of alternative social relations in the present, either in parallel with or in the course of, adversarial social movement protest" (Yates, 2015, p. 1). The COP, that is, organised itself in such a way that it practised, in its limited capacity, the very sort of social establishment it wished to create.

Unlike appeals in the past, the COP was not just "a civil rights movement seeking to be accommodated in the existing socio-economic and political structures of society" (South African History Online, 2012). Instead, it took up a posture more resembling a revolutionary

movement, calling for a fundamental restructuring of all aspects of South African society -- an outright rejection of and departure from the status quo: "the Charter does not propose merely a reform of the present system … but a complete change of state form" (Levy, 2011, p. 27). The Charter, therefore served as a prefigurative vision of a post-Apartheid South Africa. Recounting his experiences through his involvement in the drafting of the Charter, Norman Levy remembers:

> In retrospect, I think it was the novelty of the approach to the campaign for the Congress that appealed to the people's imagination; its emphasis on hearing rather than telling people what was important to them; the spontaneity of its style; its insistence that everything that touched their lives – whether it was education, employment, shelter or the ordinary freedoms associated with speech, movement, justice or equity – were human rights and proper subjects for a freedom charter (Levy, 2011, p. 4).

It was a fundamental rejection of the status quo, and pre-figuratively embodied the restructuring of all aspects of South African society that it would aim to enact by including as many groups of South Africans as possible in the drafting process. It is in this way that the COP was a pre-figurative moment, or "the embodiment, within the ongoing political practise of a movement, of those forms of social relations, decision-making, culture, and human experience that are the ultimate goal" (Yates, 2015, p. 2).

The Congress of the People and its Charter represented a social prefiguration of the ideals envisioned by the post-Apartheid society. They formed a blueprint for the sort of political rights expected for all South Africans post-Apartheid. The Congress of the People and its Charter represented a commitment on the part of South African people from all walks of life to the creation of a society based on the Rainbowist ideals of equality, unity, and inclusivity for all, and therefore embodied the ideals of post-Apartheid South African society and served as a blueprint for the sort of political rights expected for and by all South Africans. But to whom are these Rainbowist ideals and commitments binding? Surely some South African individuals do not in whole or in part agree with the tenets of the post-Apartheid Rainbowist Project? The next section of this chapter will look at the scope of social binding that such a commitment entails, and the next chapter will deal with how, if my assessment of Apartheid and Colonialism being rejected on the moral basis I have argued for is correct, then we could be left with only Rainbowism as a possible post-Apartheid social paradigm.

The Joint Commitment of South Africanhood

The Rainbow Nation project, understood as a nation-building exercise, did not begin until the 1990s with the dawn of the democratic dispensation of South Africa. But understood as a collective personal project to commit to transforming ourselves into citizens of a society characterised by diversity, inclusivity, and unity, it seems we have had Rainbow Citizens since at least the 1955 Congress of the People. Recall that for Renan, a *people* is "a community that shares a common heritage as well as a joint program to realise. Having suffered […] together is worth more than standardised taxes or frontiers that conform to strategic ideas and is independent of racial or linguistic considerations" (Renan, 1882, p. 2). Again, if Apartheid is considered to represent the material and moral suffering that the people of South Africa have in common, in that it mutually robbed us of our humanity, then The Congress of The People's Freedom Charter was an articulation of the common program that the people of this nation would invest themselves in for an alternative future society. This section will look at the scope of this commitment towards the creation of the Rainbow Nation and articulate why I think it could be considered a necessary condition for post-Apartheid South African identity. But first, what are 'commitments'?

A 'Commitment' can refer to many different things. Merriam-Webster defines 'commitment' as "an agreement or pledge to do something in the future" or "the state or an instance of being obligated or emotionally impelled", the term, then, is used broadly to refer to intentions, convictions and promises (among other things). Commitments come in various forms; they can be either explicit or implicit, held publicly or privately, and made consciously or otherwise. Commitments can also range from arguably unimportant or superficial (such as when to meet for coffee) to deep and profound (such as marriage). Commitments, then, are obligations that we dedicate ourselves to and that restrict or compel our behaviours.

As we go through our everyday lives, we find ourselves making and taking on all manner of commitments. A person may find themself committed in various degrees to many different things, including causes, principles, traditions, customs, projects, institutions, and ideals, among others. Due to this diversity in our commitments, it is no surprise that some of them may come into conflict, forcing us to choose those we care about most.

Another concept that is related to commitments is that of integrity. Integrity can perhaps naively be understood as the act or practice of holding (unwaveringly or unyieldingly) to one's commitments - regardless of how inconvenient this may become. However, depending on how

strictly we are to apply this understanding of integrity to humanity at large, we may find precious few humans who would meet this standard of having perfectly kept all their commitments (something like being late to a meeting at an agreed upon time, for instance, is a failure to meet a promised commitment). Another issue for this uncompromising conception of integrity is that our commitments seem able to change over time or when new information is presented. Understanding integrity in this naive conception seems rather untenable and uninteresting. In his 1973 paper 'Personal Identity and Individuation', Bernard Williams (1973) offers a different conception of integrity.

For Bernard Williams, integrity is only relevant for commitments that people identify with *the most*. Commitments to be considered when judging for integrity are those that have deeper implications on one's identity such that they can be seen as *representing what an agent considers themselves and their lives to be about.* Such *identity-conferring* commitments are referred to by Williams as 'ground projects':

> A man may have, for a lot of his life or even just for some part of it, a ground project or set of projects which are closely related to his existence and which to a significant degree give a meaning to his life. (Williams, 1973, p. 12)

To abandon an identity-conferring commitment, then, is to let go of what gives one's life its identity or character. For Williams, an identity-conferring commitment is: "the condition of my existence, in the sense that unless I am propelled forward by the conatus of desire, project and interest, it is unclear why I should go on at all" (p. ibid). Individuals have and act with integrity when they act on such commitments that amount to who they are most fundamentally. Identity-conferring commitments, then, are commitments made to oneself or to others that are inextricable to convictions one has about who one is. Such commitments are those in consideration for this thesis. My inquiry, however, expands this idea to cover commitments made collectively as a group and specifically as a society.

Following the work of Margaret Gilbert (2013) and Vesco Paskalev (2011), a joint commitment is when two or more people jointly commit to doing something as a single body or unit. "Doing something as a body", in the relevant sense, "is not a matter of each member involved all doing something together; but instead, is "more about all the members acting and behaving in such a way as to constitute a body that does something" (Gilbert, 2013, p. 147). A joint commitment is a commitment of the will in such a way that "the wills of two or more people impose obligations on the same two or more people – as one" (Gilbert, 2013, p. 135). To explain joint

commitment, consider how two people may come to an arrangement. For instance, Theo and Tumelo may agree to meet at a pub after a weekend seminar. They may agree to play the board game Monopoly under house rules. They may also agree about what toppings to get for a pizza they are about to share. These arrangements rely on explicit consent to do something -- each individual is consenting to commit to the arrangement and is individually responsible for the success of the arrangement. Each arrangement has varying requirements of consent to nullify the arrangement (i.e., it is easier to change your mind about pizza toppings than it is to change house rules mid-game). Joint commitments are a bit different.

Like other social arrangements, joint commitments may come into being in various ways; however, unlike others, the consent of individual members of the plural subject is not always present. Theo, Tumelo and Tlaago may agree to form a musical band, with all three giving joint commitment to this cooperative activity. Each member is assigned a different role depending on their skill set and in accordance with the best arrangements for the success of the endeavour, and each member is obligated to play their part. Importantly for this concept, these obligations arise from being part of a 'plural subject' (the band) committed to performing a common activity as a body. However, this is a minimal, uncontroversial, and uninteresting case. The existence of this sort of joint commitment is based on the explicit and wilful consent of each individual member.

An example of a joint commitment that begins to let go of active consent can be found in romantic relationships such as marriage, wherein people may find themselves bound to do things that they had neither considered nor ever intended when entering into this arrangement. As Gilbert writes, "Once the plural subject is established, its further commitments may arise in different ways – "democratic" or "authoritarian"" (Paskalev, 2011, p. 5). A couple may have to move to a different restaurant if the one they are currently in serves no vegetarian options, even if one of the partners fancies the current restaurant. Another example within marriage, is the assumption of medical guardianship over a hospitalised spouse. The hospitalised spouse may be unable to give active consent (suppose they are incapacitated in some way), and the guardian spouse may not want to take on responsibility for another life. Nevertheless, under the joint commitment created through their marriage, these duties and responsibilities arise. Paskalev writes, "once we have a commitment to do something together, in this case, to live together, this necessarily includes making decisions together, with the decision-making mechanism being democratic or authoritarian or whatever comes about" (Paskalev, 2011, p. 5).

If these expressions are made openly and their having been so made is common knowledge among the parties involved, that is sufficient to create a joint commitment.

An even more interesting example, for the purposes of this work, is that of a squad of soldiers.[52] Even if drafted against their will, once a squadron begins behaving as such -- that is, as a single combat unit -- they construct and thereby constitute the plural subject of a ‘squad’. In doing so, they create obligations to act in accordance with their joint commitment. Indeed, if one of the soldiers fails in their duties -- by not following the instructions of their commander or responding appropriately in some other way -- they will have to face rebuke not only from their superiors but also from their squad; even though other members of the squad may be equally unhappy about being in the squad in the first place. Moreover, according to Gilbert and Paskalev, the squad has every right to rebuke this soldier. For Scott Shapiro (one of Gilbert’s interlocutors), a joint commitment is one where “each participant is committed to meshing his or her sub plans with the others, not only in order to ensure his or her own successful completion of the task, but also to ensure the completion of each other’s contributions.”[53]

Paskalev constructs the creation of a plural subject and the duties associated with this subject as follows:

> 1. There is such a thing – the plural subject -- which is a group of people who may become jointly committed to doing something. Such a group is distinct from and may exist independently of its individual members.
>
> 2. Plural subjects commit themselves to *jointly* perform certain activities like walking together, dancing, being a nation.
>
> 3. When a plural subject is committed, all of its members are committed.
>
> 4. This joint commitment remains in force until (jointly) rescinded; members cannot individually change the group's joint commitment(s).
>
> 5. Individual members of a plural subject are obliged to perform what is required of them by the joint commitment for no other reason than the fact of the commitment, for its own sake. Indeed, it seems that whenever the commitment of the whole exists, such

[52] Example taken from Paskalev.

[53] Paskalev referencing Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Plans, And Practical Reason in Legal Theory, Volume 8, Issue 04 (2002), pp. 387-441 p. 398

> that its parts cannot change it alone, they should be considered to be bound by it. (Paskalev, 2011)

Gilbert argues that the concept of a joint commitment is able to explain the construction of many cooperative enterprises, political organisations and existing social rules. The people of a country, for example, are jointly committed to upholding the rule of recognition (i.e., to treat whatever its constitution is as binding), in many ways disregarding the way in which this joint commitment has historically come into being. Of particular interest for this work is that, for Gilbert, the state is such a cooperative enterprise. In accepting themselves as members of a state, as well as heeding the law, a population can become jointly committed to the cooperative action they would refer to as their country. In addition to the above explication, the duties and responsibilities created under a plural subject can obtain when people organise themselves into a society:

> 6. Sometimes people consider themselves citizens of a state which is "their" state. In other words, they consider themselves jointly committed to following certain rules of said state.
>
> 7. As this law itself has universal claim, everybody in the plural subject has an obligation to abide by it. (Paskalev, 2011)

It is thus that the concept of a joint commitment offers a conception of the state as a 'plural subject consisting of its citizens who are jointly committed to maintaining its institutions'[54]. And it is in this way, I argue, that all who identify as South Africans are roped into the grand Rainbow Nation-building project as one of their 'grounding projects', to use Williams' terminology.

The Rainbow Nation, this work submits, constitutes a plural subject that is formed upon the achievement of the goals of the Freedom Charter (and Constitution), which serve as the joint commitment upon which the plural subject is based and ordered. Rainbow citizens, then, on my account, are individuals of the Rainbow Nation society who are bound by the duties and responsibilities required for the proper functioning of the society and moral flourishing of its

[54] This provides us with an interesting response to the 'no agreement' objection to contractarian accounts of the state. The contractarian objection is essentially that, since people are born into a country they did not choose, they are under no obligations to the state as they did not give consent as required in contractarianism. This concern is sidestepped here because joint commitments do not always require explicit individual consent, as discussed above.

citizens. In this way, Rainbowism, as a nationalist project, eschews ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and most other traditional requirements for membership. Instead, the most crucial requisite element for membership is moral identification with the moral project of Rainbow Nation-building.

For the Rainbowist South African dispensation, citizens have the duty and responsibility to transform into Rainbow Citizens; that is, individuals with the virtues and dispositions necessary for the proper functioning of South Africa as a Rainbow Nation and the moral flourishing of its citizens. This duty and responsibility exists as the product of a joint commitment that applies to all who would identify as South Africans[55].

Disparate peoples from various backgrounds with vastly different moral and political outlooks cannot exactly transform into Rainbow citizens overnight. But since membership in South African nationhood is not a matter of personal identification, but instead a matter of commitment to and engagement with its moral project, the RNP, and if moral projects can be undermined by factors such as moral blindness; then it seems as though potential implications follow for our identities as South Africans or moral citizens of the Rainbow Nation from such moral failure. The people who are to become Rainbow citizens are, among others, primarily the general public of South Africans. But who are South Africans if not Rainbow Citizens?

If the project of South Africa is the RNP, and the RNP requires the creation of Rainbow Citizens; and if being a Rainbow Citizen is essential for membership in the plural subject of South African, and if all projects can be failed, then it seems possible that one could *fail* to be South African.

At the heart of the RNP is a call, one that echoes the drawing up of the Freedom Charter; a call for us "to speak together" as the plural subject of a nation, and "to speak of freedom" (Levy, 2011, p. 19). A call for recognition of each other as fundamentally all people, and thereby deserving of rights, dignity, and the means to flourish. By couching the movement in terms of 'freedom for all', by including women and prominent feminists in the movement and by referencing the "voteless", "underprivileged", and "rightless" so broadly, the COP and its Freedom Charter did something remarkable: they opened up the discourse of 'freedom' to refer

[55] The rejection of Rainbowism is the rejection of the moral project of the RNP, and under the Rainbowist dispensation, identification as South African becomes undermined: what is it then that you are identifying with as a non-Rainbowist South African in this current dispensation?

to the rejection of more than just racial segregation and colonialism: if ‘freedom for one’ is predicated on ‘freedom for all’, then it seems that the struggle is broader, and must also give attention to other forms of oppression.

Beyond Apartheid

Movement from Apartheid and towards something like Rainbowism is not necessarily the natural next step for a country and people as divided as ours, certainly not in the same way that a larva will become a moth. In many ways, we are actively fighting against our nature in order to change it.

As people, we can create synthetic constructs which carry our intent. A knife is simply a sharpened piece of metal meant and used for cutting or slicing. A knife can be formed of many kinds of metals, but a sharp piece of metal on its own is not a knife. Further, different knives are meant for different purposes (telos) and must be formed differently if they are to achieve their various goals. We are humans, and therefore we are beings capable of imbuing telos. We can also use this ability both on ourselves and on society at large, as has been done many times before in history. I can choose to become a bodybuilder and thus work to form my body appropriately, or I could want to be an educator and work to become one. I could also combine my powers with those of others in order to create a plural subject that merges our telos to form a group, or a team, or a whole nation. How we choose to transform ourselves and the world around us depends on what it is that we want and are aiming at. And the success of our transformations depends largely on how committed we are to any particular project.

There are other countries like ours; in fact, there are many other multi-cultural post-colonial “melting-pot” societies like the nation that we hope to transform ours into. If what sets this country, South Africa, apart from the others, is some telos that is unique to us as the purpose of *this* society, then what is this end? What is our goal? I argue that the creation of the Rainbow Nation depends on a collective effort from all those who would wish to become members as Rainbow Citizens, and, further, that this is entailed by identifying as South African in the current dispensation.

The Congress of The People was significant mainly for how it gave the oppressed a platform in society, giving voice to the marginalised as well as the opportunity to lead the way towards collective liberation and humanisation.

Recall that for Freire, the liberation of society from systems of injustice is a task that can only be completed with, and not for, the oppressed people in society. A reason he gives for this is that "the oppressor, who is himself dehumanized because he dehumanizes others, is unable to lead this struggle" (Freire, 1970, p. 47). It is important to note that it is not the case that Freire believes the oppressed to have been made 'noble' by their state of oppression. In fact, an important aspect of Freire's pedagogy is the acknowledgement of how the oppressed too can sometimes, if not often, behave in ways not unlike that of oppressors themselves. Freire, however, accounts for this 'role reversal' (of the oppressed becoming oppressors themselves) as a product of the oppressive society having created a hegemonic discourse that necessitates power imbalance and hierarchies. Recall that through hegemonic discourse, oppressors are able to impose their own beliefs and values onto oppressed people in ways that position and frame the oppressor's culture as superior or more advanced; pushing the oppressed to imitate or replicate their oppressors, which adds to the view of the oppressor role as desirable. In turn, this shapes the worldviews and attitudes of the oppressed, leading them to think that the only way out of their situation involves 'turning the tables' of the oppressor-oppressed relationship and installing themselves as the oppressor class.

Even with this in mind, Freire and Biko seem in agreement that liberation movements must be led by the oppressed. Another reason is that it is oppressed people who have the most direct experience with the oppressive forces and structures of the society. And so, the oppressed have thrust upon them a double duty of liberating their oppressors as well as themselves.

In taking seriously the knowledge and experiences of marginalised people, particularly those unsure of their knowledge or value, such a pedagogy would provide an opportunity for the oppressed to discover themselves as creators of knowledge and to practice critical evaluation using topics that would be relevant to their own lives; as well as giving people from oppressor groups an opportunity to experience and engage with worldviews that do not assume them as normative. This yields a third reason for why the liberation movement ought to be led by the oppressed: by having the oppressed groups practising an alternative framework from the typical situation of oppressor class people in positions of leadership, they at once demonstrate the capacity to lead their own lives, as well as present to the oppressor group the experience of being decentred from assumed positions of authority. This is important because, for Freire, true liberation does not only entail the removal of the oppressor class from power, but also the creation of a society in which the role of 'oppressor' does not exist. Freire, therefore, argues

for more fundamental change than mere incrementalist efforts towards change and ‘progress’, which often depend on maintaining existing systems of oppression to function. Such reformism is rejected by Freire, who considers reformism to fail due to its inability to see traditional society and its institutions as oppressive. Given this, Freire considers such reformist action to be ‘false generosity’.

This is why, for Freire and Biko, a genuine liberation movement must begin with the oppressed working to liberate themselves from internalised, hegemonic conceptions of themselves and their freedom. Recall that on accounts of hegemony, oppressed people, through passive socialisation, come to perceive hierarchy as the natural and inevitable way of organising society. Similarly, the oppressed come to harbour various myths about themselves, their oppressors and society at large. For the oppressed, then, the struggle against dehumanisation is “located in the great humanistic and historical task of liberating both themselves and their oppressors” (Khoapa, n.d., p. 2). For the struggle of humanity, the goal and aim is the creation of a social order that dehumanises no one.

But this would prove easier in theory than in practice. What happens when, after securing freedom from racial oppression, we still encounter sexism? What happens when the society that was so ready to fight in the name of freedom, is confronted with a majority that refuses to see the same freedom granted to the LGBTQIAP+ community? What would it tell us about our commitment to fight oppression if we ourselves are sometimes its source? These questions will be discussed in the final chapter of this section. The next chapter will look at the opposition to Rainbowism, specifically in alternative paradigms advanced to define post-Apartheid South Africa. And why, in light of the rejection of Apartheid being based on a moral rejection of its pillars of binarism, essentialism and exclusion, they fail at delivering a genuinely post-Apartheid dispensation in the way Rainbowism promises to do.

Chapter 3: Alternative Paradigms or 'To Reject Being South African'

As a post-Apartheid paradigm, Rainbowism did not find itself unopposed. For many critics of the Congress of The People and its Charter, such as Steve Biko and Nkutsoeu Raboroko, the bilateral (non-racial) approach advanced by Rainbowism illustrates the "arrogance" of the liberal ideology in which blacks were made to "fit into a pattern largely and often wholly, determined by white[s]" (Biko, 2005, p. 18). For these critics, liberals "made it a political dogma that all groups opposing the status quo must necessarily be non-racial in structure" (Biko, 2005, p. 64). Commenting on the adoption of a non-racial approach in the Freedom Charter, Biko argued that "the liberals are playing their old game of claiming a "monopoly on intelligence and moral judgement" (Biko, 2005, p. 65) and setting the "pattern and pace for the realisation of the black man's aspirations" (Biko, 2005, p. 66). For Biko, bilateral liberation movements, even taken most charitably, were premature; in his view, "what is necessary as a prelude to anything else that may come is a very strong grass-roots build-up of black consciousness such that blacks can learn to assert themselves and stake their rightful claim" (Biko, 2005, p. 21). Critics of Rainbowism often see it as a liberal fiction, a pulling of the wool over the people's eyes to have them believing that the deeper issues of South Africa have been solved or at least can be solved incrementally without a genuine revolution.

While there are many possible contenders for what the South African post-Apartheid paradigm could look like, I wish to focus on two specific contenders, discussing their pitfalls and how Rainbowism is advantageous over them. The two contenders I will discuss have been given many names and articulated by different people across different times, but are in some specific ways similar. These similarities make it difficult for me to confidently point to them as two different alternatives instead of variations of one. And it is these similarities, I believe, that are at the root of why they fail when compared to the option of Rainbowism.

For the purposes of this work, I will give these two alternative paradigms names—'separatism' and 'nativism'. If Rainbowism is the promotion of "unity in diversity", then 'separatism' would refer to approaches that emphasise the separation of society into different groups, and thus would take issue with Rainbowist attempts at unity across all social groups; and 'nativism' would take issue with Rainbowism's commitment towards inclusivity at the expense of prioritising those considered to be 'native'.

This chapter will take a broad look at separatist and nativist perspectives and approaches and will articulate why the Rainbowist approach is preferred by South Africans with a specific moral orientation.

Separatism

For the separatists, the Rainbowist order is undesirable as it represents its ideological opposite in its call that “united we shall stand" (as proclaimed in the national anthem). A well-known controversial example/instance of separatism is the Afrikaner enclave ‘Orania’ situated in the Karoo region of the Northern Cape. While, in reality, the town itself is little different from many other exclusively white towns in South Africa, most of these are primarily due to economic inaccessibility, among other reasons. Orania sets itself apart by being the only explicitly separatist enclave. Another example of separatist thought in South African politics can be seen in Biko’s Black Consciousness Movement, which can be interpreted as a call for a temporary separation between black and white people. Unlike the case of Orania, the separatism advocated for by Black Consciousness is temporary and is aimed at working towards eventual integration. That is, it is only supposed to last as long as it takes for black people to reach material self-sufficiency and spiritual self-consciousness and for whites to have an opportunity to introspect on their racism.

The example of Orania helps to get at one of the critical issues facing post-Apartheid separatists (those who would see South Africa balkanised permanently): it resembles the posture of apartheid too closely. To what extent can a society claim to be anti-Apartheid if the paradigm brought in to replace it upholds the segregation of peoples in society (with, perhaps, more serious attention to the “but equal” part?). More critically, policies of social separatism are complicated by the realities of social hybridity, that is, that people can often carry multiple identities. Since what divides different groups, particularly race or culture, can often be arbitrary and loosely defined, for the separatists, the ‘solution’ may be something amounting to even further divisions of people. In my view, this indicates a failure to identify the actual problem at hand: taking contingent and otherwise meaningless differences between people to be meaningful and signifying them to the point that they have a measurable impact on people's lives.

Nativism

Nativism, on the other hand, is to be understood as the call for the prioritisation of the native in society. Again, what this means, and why, will differ depending on whom you ask. However, the general idea is that South Africa has become too Eurocentric and thus that all colonial elements must be done away with to achieve a more moral order.

It is important then for nativists – particularly those who reject Rainbowism on the basis that it does not prioritise or privilege black South Africans sufficiently - to recognise *who* is making what calls for non-racial liberation movements or policies and why.

Nativism is a rhetoric of decolonisation which calls for a society to return to its pre-colonial (often understood to mean 'indigenous') practices and cultural forms. For many nativists, therefore, Rainbowism is an unacceptable affair, as it is necessarily a *post*-colonial construct. For Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin (2001), nativism is the position that cultures, institutions, and modes of being associated with colonialism need to be "replaced by the recovery and promotion of pre-colonial, indigenous ways" (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001, p. 159). As an approach to decolonisation, nativism reverses the typical colonial legitimation of national identity which prioritised the colonists over the natives, it thus "interpreted the whole struggle" of decolonisation in imported racial terms; in the South African case, the seeking and recovery of the African past in terms of African culture being an important facet of the restoration of African dignity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008, p. 58).

One major flaw with nativism is that it is often the source of another social ill: xenophobia. The very process of identifying and reifying certain limited groups as 'the people', immediately results in the exclusion of those outside that group. Moreover, ironically, the very borders that nativists would protect from 'outsiders' are the creation of the very colonial orders they supposedly reject. The very borders used to delineate who belongs and who does not are, that is, the product of the colonial 'Scramble for Africa'. For post-Apartheid South Africans, the issue that arises is that we abandon a programme of arbitrary racial exclusion only to create and uphold arbitrary social categories of exclusion that in many ways work in the same way as what we would say we have abandoned.

One obvious challenge to nativism is its idea that pre-colonial cultures can be recovered in any meaningfully accurate way. For Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha, such attempts at nativist reconstructions are futile as the processes of cultural intermixing that the modern world is

constructed from is such that no simple retreat is possible (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001, p. 159). There is no way to turn back time to achieve this retrieval. And while difficulty alone is not always a sufficient reason to abandon a project, such a retrieval of native culture and ways of being is made near impossible because such a project will invariably be contaminated by cultural hybridity.

Ethnic and racial hybridity is also a potential issue for nativists, who often trade on colonial essentialist binaries, particularly in their concern with locating the legitimacy of people's national identity in their ethnic origin. The South African legacy of colonialism includes the lives and histories of diasporic communities from various ethnic groups, including large East Asian communities. South Africa also has a sizable multi-, mixed-, and creolized ethnic people and culture; therefore, it is possible that defining those 'Africans' that are to be prioritised may itself present an intractable problem.

Problems of Essentialist Discourse and Conceptions of Identity

Beyond the issues of hybridity and xenophobia that underpin my concerns with *Nativism* and *Separatism*, there are also further issues that they share, and which result in my struggling to view them as meaningfully different without further discussion.

To be specific, my issue with both Separatism and Nativism lies in their commitment to essentialism—to the idea that groups, categories, or classes of people necessarily share one or several defining features in virtue of being members of that category. Some conceptualisations of race and gender, for instance, assume the presence of essential characteristics or traits that work to distinguish one group from another.[56]

The problem with essentialism is that it seems to be merely taking a fundamental pillar of colonial hegemonic discourse as fact, that we are fundamentally and unchangeably different from each other, only with the relatively minor change of swapping out *who* is considered superior/inferior. The injustice of Apartheid, for the separatist, is that it was done 'incorrectly', and for the nativist, it lies not in the fact that some people are being reduced to subservient roles or inferior status to be dominated by others, but instead with *which* particular groups of people are given which position in a seemingly otherwise acceptable social hierarchy.

[56] And more often than not, 'the other.' That is, essentialism often reinforces binary logic.

This appeal to essentialism, I argue, makes nativism and separatism incompatible with a post-Apartheid dispensation that morally rejects Apartheid based on its modes of essentialist, hegemonic, exclusion. For separatists and nativists, rejection of Apartheid would certainly not be based on something as *fundamental* as Apartheid's essentialism or exclusion, but perhaps something like its *unsustainability* ('it didn't go far enough' for the separatists, or 'it didn't prioritise the right people' for nativists).

I do, however, recognise that essentialism can sometimes play an important role in the liberation of a people, particularly when the process of dismantling essentialist modes of identity can run counter to the pragmatic use of such concepts to recover a sense of self-worth and difference.

'Strategic' Essentialism

Fanon (1963) recognized that for new national leaders, "the passionate search for a national culture which existed before the colonial era finds its legitimate reason in the anxiety shared by many indigenous intellectuals to shrink away from that western culture in which they all risk being swamped" and to "renew contact once more with the oldest and most pre-colonial springs of their people" (Fanon, National Culture, 1963, p. 209). But importantly he also acknowledged the danger in how easily mythologized the past can be, allowing it to be used to create and serve a new social elite that masquerades as liberators. Thus, some criticisms of nativists see nativism as a mobilising strategy meant to win the support of the poor for "the elitist struggles of emerging black intellectuals who are in fact wining and dining with the so-called 'white neo-liberals' within the academy" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008). And although Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin (2001) criticise how Fanon is often "recruited to the banner of a naive form of nativism," they argue that Fanon in actuality "took a more complicated view of tradition and the pre-colonial as well as of its role in the construction of the modern post-colonial state" (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2001, p. 100).

Biko's Black Consciousness Movement could also be seen as taking on such strategic essentialism. Biko evokes essentialist rhetoric when describing the differences between African people and Europeans, speaking of the "easiness with which Africans communicate with each other ... that is inherent in the make-up of African people" (Biko, 2005, p. 30). This can be more charitably

interpreted to refer to culture rather than race, but this does little to escape my main contention with this essentialist approach to descriptions of people. Black Consciousness called for "the realization by the black man of the need to rally together with his brothers around the cause of their oppression – the blackness of their skin – and to operate as a group in order to rid themselves of the shackles that bind them to perpetual servitude" (Biko, 2005, p. 92). For Biko, liberation requires a transformation of the system by completely neutralising all elements of white supremacy. But despite this, he maintained a very inclusive outlook into the future:

> Let us march forth with courage and determination, drawing strength from our common plight and our brotherhood. In time we shall be in a position to bestow upon South Africa the greatest gift possible---a more human face. (Biko, 2005, p. 97)

Spivak also recognised the need to sometimes employ essentialist-argumentation strategically, acknowledging the "utility of essentialist formulations in many struggles for liberation from the effects of colonial and neo-colonial oppression" (Spivak, 1984). She remarks that:

> I think we have to choose again strategically, not universal discourse but essentialist discourse. I think that since as a deconstructivist […] I cannot in fact clean my hands and say I'm specific. In fact I must say I am an essentialist from time to time. (Spivak, 1984, p. 183).

And, again in the same interview, she remarks: "I think it's absolutely on target . . . to stand against the discourses of essentialism, . . . [but] strategically we cannot" (ibid, 184).

In this chapter, we looked at some of the potential post-Apartheid realities that South Africa had possible, namely separatism and nativism. I have also demonstrated why, if indeed Apartheid was rejected on a moral basis against its unjust systems of essentialised discrimination, exclusion, inequality; then both nativism and separatism also ought to be rejected on those same bases. The next chapter will look at the succeeding ideology and national project of the post-Apartheid dispensation: The Rainbow Nation.

Chapter 4: The New Dispensation

> South Africans have been engaged in a new struggle, not a contest of political opposites so much as a striving for a unity of purpose, creating bonds where before there were fractures, and easing the tension of past conflicts. These goals are encapsulated in the values enshrined in the Constitution and in the Bill of Rights, as inspiring a beacon as any divided people could wish for. Yet, in many ways, this new struggle has been no less daunting than the old, bitter contest of the past.
> -Author unnamed (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001)

Rainbow Nationalism

While I have argued that Rainbowism saw its first expressions in the 1950s with the Congress and its Charter, South Africa's transition to the new dispensation only began in earnest with the adoption of the Interim Constitution of 1993, which was authored "to create a new order based on equality in which there is equality between […] people of all races so that all citizens should be able to enjoy and exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms (Voermans, Stremler, & Cliteu, 2017, p. 142). This commitment to the transformation of South African society was affirmed and reinforced when the final Constitution came into effect in 1997. On paper, the moral project of South Africa can be found articulated in its founding documents such as the Charter and, more relevant for the current dispensation, the Constitution.

The Constitution is a product of negotiation and compromise. It is a consequence of the nature of the transition (no single conclusive victor) and a divided society. Part of the compromise concerns the creation of a new system of government. Constitutional nation-building is when the political values of a political community are set out in a constitutional document that is to become the focus of nation-building initiatives (Weinstock, 2004, p. 56). The constitutional model of nation-building is the general approach taken in establishing a united society when historical, cultural, and ethnic differences among the people exist — making the constitutional model of nation-building appropriate for a country that is in transition from a place of segregated minority rule to a place of "unity in diversity".

This project can be seen as a response to or a rejection of the previous South African state's national project of Apartheid ('Apart-hood'), where people were segregated into different

groups that were made to live and work separately. This separation helped to foster the belief in 'difference' as reprehensibly 'other'. In contrast to and rejection of this previous regime, a multiracial and multicultural society was envisioned for South Africa's 'bright future' as the 'Rainbow Nation'. The Department of Higher Education and Training (2001) identifies several values that I find to be deeply entailed by the RNP: Democracy, Social Justice, Equality, Non-Racism/Sexism, Respect, Reconciliation and Ubuntu (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001). For Kader Asmal, out of this "new patriotism",

> stems the very opposite of chauvinism and xenophobia: out of the new patriotism stem the values of tolerance and acceptance, of equality and democracy, of dialogue and negotiation and conflict resolution that make us uniquely South African; uniquely South African in the uniquely global universe that is the 21st Century. (Asmal, 2001)

For Bhaba, the advancement of nationhood is done through narrative, and so in his *Nation and Narration,* he explores the concept of 'nation' by "[drawing] attention to [its] language and rhetoric" in order to "examine the conceptual object itself" (Bhaba, 1990, p. 3)[57]. More than merely "acts of affiliation and establishment", for Bhaba, nationhood is the collective stitching together of the cultural fabrics of historically segmented individuals into a unity. (Bhaba, 1990, p. 5). That is, the people who are engaged with the nation, how they talk about it in private and the media that disseminates it to the public are all part and parcel of the idea of the Nation. Nations, as narration, tell the story of a people's shared experience of "disavowal, displacement, exclusion, and cultural contestation" (Bhaba, 1990, p. ibid). For Bhaba, the nation as a narrative construct is always ambivalent; that is, it is caught in its being and non-being because it is frozen, uncertainly, in the act of 'composing' itself, and so "its meanings may only ever be partial and constructed in medias res; and its history may be half-made because it is in the process of being made" (Bhaba, 1990, p. 3). Nations, in this sense, are grand narratives that we are told, come to accept and in turn tell (to others) ourselves. Such a grand narrative serves as the connective tissue binding each member of a society's personal narrative into a single narrative in which all members can locate themselves, and their place in the world, thus transforming disparate individuals into "imagined communities" of loyalties and obligation (Bhaba, 1990, p. 308).

[57] "What I want to emphasize in that large and liminal image of the nation with which I began is a particular ambivalence that haunts the idea of the nation, the language of those who write of it and the lives of those who live it" (Bhaba, Nation and Narration p.3).

Recall that in *What is a Nation*, Ernest Renan (1882) articulates important conditions for being a people, what he considers the soul of a nation, or its spiritual principle as: "having common glories [or suffering] in the past and a will to continue [or avoid] them in the present […] sharing a common heritage as well as a joint program to realise" (Renan, 1882, p. 10). Constructing a national narrative for post-Apartheid South Africa would be an enormous task, not only would this effort seek to unite 'white' and 'black' people, but there are also intergroup narratives e.g., English/Afrikaner/Coloured/Asian/Zulu/Pedi that would also need to be negotiated.

The metaphor of the 'Rainbow Nation' is layered. In his '*Identity and nation building in post-Apartheid South-Africa'*, Gary Baines (1998) offers a theological interpretation which references the Great Flood of Abrahamic religious lore (Christianity in particular, given the country's demographics) in which God presents a rainbow as a symbol or covenant to never pass further judgement on humanity, thereby representing a chance to build a nation from which the "evil of Apartheid" has been washed away (by the metaphorical flood). Baines also finds that the metaphor can also be situated in some Nguni symbology, where the rainbow "signifies hope and the assurance of a bright future" (Baines, 1998, p. 1)[58], and also offers the mythic narrative of the elusive pot of gold at the end of the rainbow as a positive and life-affirming interpretation. "The Rainbow Nation metaphor", Baines says, "both informs and reinforces the vision of nation building" (Baines, 1998, p. ibid).

A teacher participating in a focus group on patriotism was quoted by Kader Asmal (2001) as having said that:

> Apartheid had one good thing. It kept us together. We had a common enemy to fight. We helped each other. When the common enemy went, we were suddenly left alone and [now we] can't find the same powerful thing to hold us together. Each one for himself. And this has ruined a sense of community (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 8).

For Asmal, Rainbowism serves to "weld her community of Mamelodi into the larger, national fraternity of South Africans - not in a battle against a common enemy, but in the quest for a common destiny" (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 10). And in a

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[58] In this function of national history as *Entstellung*, the forces of social antagonism or contradiction cannot be transcended or dialectically surmounted.

Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy, Thabo Mbeki reiterated the importance of the Rainbowist project saying:

> The new patriotism requires us to proceed from common positions about the nature of the problems our country faces. We must share a common recognition of the fact that all of us stand to gain from the transformation of SA into a non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous country. No people is predestined to succeed or to fail. No child is born hating. Our neighbours, whether black or white, are as human as we all are and as South African as we all are (Mbeki, 2001).

For the South African post-Apartheid project, the intuition is that the more inclusive, integrated and united our society is, the more moral it is. The goal, then, became to transform this strange place into a dispensation that would help to build and foster a national identity that is welcoming of and makes provisions for people of different religions, languages, cultures, and racial histories; guaranteeing equality, justice and fairness to all without unjust favour to any particular group. The idea being that the only way for this diverse society to achieve its full potential is not just to be tolerant but instead positively welcoming to all who live in it. To this end, the Constitution that would usher South African transformation into the Rainbow Nation was drafted.

Constitutionalism in the Dawn of The South African Republic

> I was just amazed that all these judges were promoting same-sex marriage. I mean, you could hear it in the way they were speaking, before they made a decision ... I never thought I'd see the day when mainly black, heterosexual judges were having no problem whatsoever with the concept of same-sex marriage, because of our history, because of Apartheid. They were equating it to all the repressive legislation against mixed marriages during Apartheid. And they did not have an issue with it at all, it was only Home Affairs that was having an issue ... it was very obvious, you know, that they would not even ever consider another arrangement.
>
> -Ruth Morgan[59]

The political shift that has occurred in South Africa since the democratic elections of April 1994 has been "seismic". Roger Southall (1999) described the new South African Constitution as 'one of the most luxuriously democratic instruments in the world':

> … a democratic constitution, democratic institutions and substantially democratic practice have replaced the racial dictatorship of apartheid. South Africa's system of parliamentary government, if it works correctly, entrenches an advanced array of political, social and economic rights, is controlled by an extensive separation of powers (between legislature, executive and judiciary and between different levels of government), and is buttressed by an array of democracy-supporting institutions such as a Human Rights Commission, a Gender Commission, an Ombudsperson, and an Auditor-General's office. - (Southall, 1999, p. 18)

As previously established, South African dispensations exist to organise South African political history as defined by their key goals and the exclusion of alternative frameworks. But for a moment, let us imaginatively step outside the confines of this restricted space and imagine alternatives.

The Preamble to the Constitution makes clear that the commitment to establishing "a society based on democratic values, social justice as well as guaranteed fundamental rights" comes from a "[recognition of] the injustices of our past" and commits the State, and importantly, its people, to "restore and protect the equal worth of everyone; to heal the divisions of the past

[59] Ruth Morgan as quoted in Thoreson, 2008, p. 692

and to establish a caring and socially just society […] to improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person"[60]. As rights, with regards to the state, are typically a judicial matter, this section will look at how the South African judiciary has changed to adapt to the moral demands of the Rainbow Nation Project.

The post-Apartheid transitional South African judiciary set out with extraordinarily little in terms of public confidence, as the courts were seen as complicit in the execution of Apartheid laws and the failure to serve the ends of justice. Pre-1994, the South African legal establishment upheld what is understood in Legal Theory as 'the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty', under which only parliament may enact laws[61]. This view is closely linked with another concept, *legal positivism*, which is the view that interpretation of the law is an almost mechanical process in which the judge exercises neither value judgements nor discretion in their rulings.[62] The courts thus regarded the judiciary's function as one of analysing and interpreting the will of Parliament "but not to 'reason why'" (Singh & Bhero, 2016, p. 7).

Together, these concepts combine to create a scenario in which morality becomes "completely separated from law"[63] as an emphasis was placed more on "procedural fairness rather than substantive fairness" (Singh & Bhero, 2016, p. ibid). A judge, then, could be forced to give a judgement on a case which, while strictly following the 'letter of the law', they still find to be unjust. Thus, in upholding the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, the judiciary gave the Apartheid government the means to use it as a tool to achieve its political goals. The result of this adoption of literal interpretation of legislature as policy, forgoing intent and meaning in favour of strict reading, was that the courts were able to give effect to harsh, unjust Apartheid legislation, thus "leading to the gross infringements of human rights, which subsequently led

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[60] Constitutional Court of South Africa, case CCT 63/03 (Minister of Finance and Another v. Van Heerden), judgment of 29 February 2004, available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2004/3.pdf para. 23.

[61] "Neither more nor less than this, namely that Parliament has under the English Constitution the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever, and further that no person or body is recognised by the Law of England as having a right to override or set aside the Legislation of Parliament." South Africa inherits its common law from English Law, in accordance with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Thus, during the Apartheid era, the South African courts generally applied a strict, literal, and textual approach when interpreting the law and deciding on cases (Dicey, Introduction to the Study of Law p. 70.).

[62] Herbert Hart, an acclaimed positivist supplies us with the oft-quoted phrase: "law is not morality; do not let it supplant morality" (Hart 1958 Harv L Rev pp. 593-621).

[63] Dugard Human Rights, p. 372

to a loss of confidence in the judiciary inherited from the Apartheid era" (Singh & Bhero, 2016, p. ibid).[64]

This approach to the law began to change with the introduction of the Constitution of South Africa, beginning with the introduction of the Interim Constitution,[65] which, in its preamble, sets out the moral project of post-1994 South Africa. For post-Apartheid South Africa, "the very essence of judicial duty is the delivery of justice" (Singh & Bhero, 2016 p. 6). For former Chief Justice Mahomed, the judiciary "neither has the power of the purse nor the sword" and derives its power from "within the psyche and soul of a nation."[66] Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides that:

> When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.[67]

Therefore, in any matter that comes before the Court, the mandate of the judiciary is to ensure that they "enforce and protect the values embodied in the Constitution", and "give due consideration to the social, political and economic factors" informing the case (Voermans, Stremler, & Cliteu, 2017).

For legal scholars Annie Singh and Moreblessing Bhero, the power of the judiciary can only be genuinely realised when acting "boldly and decisively to enforce both the letter and the spirit of the law"[68] and using its powers to negate the authoritarian impulses of elected politicians and, importantly, members of society. Thus, delivering judgements "must be done with a forward-looking mindset with the aim of promoting equality and freedom" as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and "historical and political factors must be taken into account" in order to ensure that the process is in accordance with the values and principles enshrined in the Constitution.

[64] 'In Re: Dube' is an interesting case in this regard because it serves as an exception to this rule.

[65] (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (Interim Constitution)).

[66] Mahomed 1999 SALJ p. 112.

[67] From the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The Bill of Rights is a direct descendant of the Congress of the People's Freedom Charter of 1955.

[68] Quansah and Fombad 2009 http://bit.ly/24E8Ffj

> The values that must suffuse the whole process (of interpretation) are derived from the concept of an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality, several times referred to in the Constitution. The notion of an open and democratic society is thus not merely aspirational or decorative, it is normative furnishing the matrix of ideals within which we work, the source from which we derive the principles and rules we apply, and the final measure we use for testing the legitimacy of impugned norms and conduct. - Justice Albie Sachs[69]

In this way, the South African legal establishment was empowered into being instrumental in achieving the post-Apartheid promise of the pursuit of justice. This gives us one example of how a structure that was useful for the machinations of Apartheid can be transformed towards being appropriate for the moral ambitions of the Rainbow Nation. The Constitution, I argue, is a call to action for South Africans to make good on their commitment to building a society based on equality, unity, and inclusivity; a place in which each person's potential is freed. While not quite a description of our society's ethos as it exists, for Constitutional Court Justice Kate O'Regan, the Constitution is a document "that compels transformation", representing "a bright and shining vision of a different society based on equity, justice and freedom for all" (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 12).

> [The Constitution] recognises that for its vision to be attained the deep patterns of inequality which scar our society and which are the legacy of apartheid and colonialism need urgently to be addressed. (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. ibid).

But unfortunately, unlike an institution such as the judiciary, people cannot so simply be changed practically overnight and through force of the Constitution alone. So, what happens when the lofty ideals of inclusivity and integration held by the Rainbow Nation Project come into conflict with the mores of some or most of society?

Counter-Majoritarian Difficulties

Another potential issue raised with the constitutionalised approach to Rainbow Nation building is what Alexander Bickel (1962) describes as the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" the argument being that when the Supreme Court strikes down a legislative act as unconstitutional,

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[69] Justice Albie Sachs in Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa, Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1995 10 BCLR 1382 (CC) para 46.

it can end up upholding the values of the Constitution at the expense of "thwarting the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now" (Bickel, 1962, p. 16). That is, if the South African public votes in a parliament which enacts some legislation in the interests of its constituents, but the legislation is struck down due to conflict with the 'spirit' of the Constitution, we would have ourselves a situation in which a constitution which ostensibly exists to serve and express the will of the people, goes against their wishes.

In such a situation, the Court could be seen as having usurped the position of the lawmaker, acting in disregard of the "intentions" of the democratically-elected parliament. For Annie Singh, this conflict is to be expected given that for decades the judiciary was mostly conservative and subscribed to positivist views (Singh & Bhero, 2016); the new judicial order allows for, and even encourages, interpretation of the Constitution and applying it to any promulgated legislature. However, given that a constitutional republic is one that commits itself to upholding its Constitution as a matter of national legitimacy, this counter-majoritarian difficulty is not obviously problematic. The very ability of the courts to protect the values of the Constitution – even *in spite* of the majority's wishes – may, in fact, actually be what gives the modern approach to South African law its advantage, as it may be the case that while the new constitution may guarantee a much more ethical society than the previous one, the society at large may not yet have reached the desired and necessary moral transformation to fully or appropriately engage in its moral project.

Consider the case of Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs.[70] In that case section 30(1) of the Marriage Act was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, as it failed to recognise the right of gay couples to marry. This brought forth controversy as many South Africans, often on religious or 'cultural' grounds, rejected granting marriage rights to homosexuals. In fulfilling its mandate to protect fundamental rights against majority opposition, the court found itself beset with a "counter-majoritarian difficulty".[71]

In giving this judgment, the Court considered South Africa's history of inequality and the prejudicial treatment of certain groups, as well as "the values that underlie the Constitution and the purpose and objectives of the Constitution thereof." Using S39, the judiciary officers gave the following *ratio decidendi*: "the law is […] for the benefit of each and every member of the

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[70] Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC).

[71] Ibid, p. 12

community […] the whole community - which at times may not be represented by the majority."[72] Thus, although minority groups are usually not well represented in the relevant decision-making forums and are, therefore, fundamentally disempowered, their fundamental rights are still to be protected constitutionally.

For Justice Sachs, The Preamble of the Constitution should not be dismissed as "merely an aspirational platitude of little interpretive value", as it actually serves as "the connective tissue underlying all its parts," and works to "indicate its fundamental purposes."[73] This view is also shared by other justices in the Constitutional Court:

> In the context of unfair discrimination, the interests of the community lie in the recognition of the inherent dignity of every human being and the elimination of all forms of discrimination. This aspect of the interests of the community can be gathered from the preamble to the Constitution, in which the people of this country declared [that they want to] heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.[74]

The post-Apartheid Constitution and Judiciary have thus played an essential role in securing the legal framework necessary for the achievement of the South African moral project. Nevertheless, despite the efforts of the judiciary and the Constitution, South Africa remains a morally problematic society.

However, for Singh and Bhero, the development of a just and coherent constitutional jurisprudence and the fostering of public confidence in the judiciary does not lie solely with the judiciary (Singh & Bhero, 2016, p. 3). This duty has to be regarded as a shared responsibility amongst legal experts and practitioners, academics and scholars, as well as ordinary citizens who must participate in "constructive dialogue with the courts, other persons and institutions about which interpretations of the Constitution will best realise its transformative purpose."[75] In an opening address for a conference in Cape Town, Nelson

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[72] Kenny 1999 Monash U L Rev 2

[73] Constitutional Court of South Africa, case CCT25/94 (Mhlungu and Others v. The State), judgment of 8 June 1995, available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ ZACC/1995/4.pdf, para. 112

[74] Justice Ngcobo in Constitutional Court of South Africa, case CCT 17/00 (Hoffmann v. South African Airways), judgment of 28 September 2000, available at http://www.saflii. org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/17.pdf.

[75] Cornell and Friedman 2002 https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/19623

Mandela (2001) reminded South Africans that the values enshrined in the Constitution would still take effort to internalise. Stating:

> We cannot assume that because we conducted our struggle on the foundations of those values, continued adherence to them is automatic in the changed circumstances. Adults have to be reminded of their importance and children must acquire them in our homes, schools and churches. Simply, it is about our younger generation making values a part of themselves, in their innermost being. (Mandela, 2001)

For the South African moral project to succeed, the moral orientation of the people in society too, then, must be transformed, or this tension may serve to tear it all apart.

Conclusion

In this section, I have argued that South Africa is engaged in a moral project. A moral project that has taken the form of nation-building with the goal being to create a more moral society based on the ideals of inclusivity, equality, and unity. This nation-building project, I have argued, finds its roots in the drafting of the Freedom Charter, which serves as a founding document along with[76] our National Constitution. The South African moral project, I have also argued, explicitly rejects Apartheid and Colonialism, finding them both guilty of engaging in hegemonic discourses of essentialism and exclusion. If I am correct, then the future configuration of South African society would do well to be informed by this and take more critical stances against alternative post-Apartheid South African paradigms, such as Separatism or Nativism. South African society, I have argued, is jointly committed to the creation of a Rainbow society, a society where racialisation does not determine one's destiny; but more than just racism, I have shown that the South African Rainbow Nation-building project can only be truly achieved by rejecting oppression simpliciter, by expanding beyond a focus on racism into gender and LGBTQIAP++ discrimination, xenophobia and other areas where unjust social exclusion is identified.

In the Saamtrek Conference on Education, Edward Said celebrated South Africa for "having come through the liberation struggle into a new society" as "a light unto the nations" (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 10). The Saamtrek Manifesto on

[76] (Though legally subordinate to)

Education, Values and Democracy, concurs characterising South Africa as, “the global benchmark for dialogue, for crafting a condition of freedom and equality from a conflict that seemed fatally irreconcilable, for talking ourselves out of the dead end of despair” (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. ibid). And “if we take pride in the values that led us to this, we will come, naturally, to what President Thabo Mbeki calls "The New Patriotism"[77], or what Asmal describes as "the glue that will hold us together” (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 1).

[77] (what I have called “Rainbowism”)

Section 3: Robust Inclusivity: Virtue, Liminality & Moral Blindness

Introduction: The Duty to Transform

> When we embarked on the path towards freedom, the goal was to create a different society from the one we knew – a moral one.
>
> - (Department of Education, 2000)

Our history is marked by the decisions of the youth to take the responsibility of liberating the country upon themselves. Youth from the 1960s to the 1980s, amidst surviving the brutal conditions of Apartheid, fought for the creation of a democratic non-racial and non-sexist society. But perhaps the very tools used to liberate us from past oppression work against our moral ambitions in our new state. For instance, while hostility towards the state may have been instrumental towards our liberation from Apartheid, we may have internalised certain modes of engagement in politics that may actually work to undermine governance in post-Apartheid society. Part of what made Apartheid untenable (in the sense of *unsustainable*) was an active effort on the part of activists, which spilt over into the education system where students began taking an actively antagonistic attitude towards the education system, which they perceived as a tool of the State; this attitude, while 'good' during Apartheid in fighting an unjust government, may not be so 'good' in the context of South Africa today. Yet, at least some of the antagonistic attitudes seen during apartheid often continue to manifest in schools today. In this chapter, I want to suggest that, coming from Apartheid (and Colonialism), we have inherited a state characterised by rampant moral blindness as an epistemic and ethical default setting, and furthermore, that without appropriate intervention, moral blindness could continue unimpeded as the status quo.

The advent of the Moral Regeneration movement brought along with it the discussion of a need to revive traditional Afro-communitarian values, broadly understood as *Ubuntu*. The idea is that we, as South Africans, should recover long lost pre-colonial socio-economic values relevant to the sort of society imagined in the founding of our 'new' South Africa. Several components of Ubuntu are appealing, particularly when contrasted with typical western systems. Take justice for example; in 'The West', justice is often seen and articulated in retributive language, whereas Afro-communitarianism tends to take a restorative justice approach. For a vivid example, compare the Nuremberg Trials to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. However, perhaps appeal to traditionalism may not quite be the panacea that

some may hope it to be, the need to establish common values with the aim of creating a unified South African culture would likely require the abandoning of our own cultures or transforming them. In as much as I believe that it is important to look into how the past has shaped our modern situation, a common critique, often posed as a question tends to follow these discussions: are we to dwell on the past or are we to move on into a better future? Taken charitably, this is a relevant question because many social radicals justify anti-social behaviour by claiming to it be the product of an oppressive system and now feel entitled to whatever they were not able to have before (Department of Education, 2000, p. 6). Taken uncharitably, though, it can expose reluctance to acknowledging both complicity in and benefits accrued from continuing systems of oppression. As Rainbowism has yet to reach the hegemonic heights of the established Apartheid or Colonial hegemonic discourses; conflict, contradiction and slippages are expected. It is these slippages and conflicts that allow the conditions of moral blindness to take root. We must be vigilant.

Issues of moral damage, from both oppressor and oppressed alike, need to be taken into account. For both oppressed and oppressor groups, the struggle for liberation requires an internal struggle revolving around challenging, critically analysing and, sometimes, rejecting ideals and behaviours that have been socially ingrained in us since birth. It is a lifetime effort and cannot ever be finally achieved, since our subconsciously internalised beliefs from the past can continue to inform our views and actions in the present. Commitment to human liberation, then, is an interminable project because there is never an endpoint, and we must constantly work on reflecting on our pre-existing beliefs and biases.

Moral blindness exists as a threat to all individuals in all moral projects. So, even if we solve all other de jure problems, there can still exist social factors that lead to slippages that undermine our moral ambitions. Awareness of this should not be taken as fatalistic inevitability, but a constant possibility that it is in our best interests, as people who aim towards some represented self-image (we cast our moral identity ahead of ourselves, just as we do when naming ourselves as a people) to work against the force of moral blindness. The South African heterotopia consists of strong contradictions -- more specifically, "contradictions between what society should be like and what society actually is." (Villet, 2018, p. 16) For Villet, the experience of heterotopia - a space of transgression and the suspension of normalisation are suspended - has paradoxically become the norm. And it is in these contradictory places or spaces, where people are meant to find themselves, and shape their experience.

The ticking "moral time-bomb" analogy points out not only that we have not begun to do what we ought to have begun decades ago, but also that if appropriate action is not taken seriously, we may see a catastrophic end. That is partially what this thesis is about, it is a call to action, not merely a reaction to the moral failures of the day, but one concerned with the direction we find ourselves heading in if we do not address these issues promptly.

This section will give an account of moral blindness that links it to social phronesis and socio-moral epistemology. Chapter 1 will work to understand the role of our physical environment and how the design of our spaces can inform our behaviours. This will then be followed by a discussion on virtue theory and phronesis and its role in the cultivation of social virtues in our citizenry and the broader South African nation building project. And Chapter 2 will establish robust inclusivity specifically as one example of a civic virtue for South Africans to cultivate that would be conducive to the Rainbow Nation.

Chapter 1: Moral Blindness as a lack in Phronesis

While, indeed, we have succeeded as a nation in the abolition of Apartheid, it seems we have yet to attain the promised Rainbow Nation. Conflict, division, and inequalities abound, and while perhaps nowhere near the levels experienced during Apartheid about three decades ago, South Africa and South Africans, in general, seem to have failed to achieve the ambitious project that is 'The Rainbow Nation'. Our media is inundated with stories of our failed moral condition, depicting various acts of human cruelty and moral evils (such as rampant gender-based violence, murder, theft, trafficking, racial discrimination, fraud, class apathy and more).

Evaluation of moral status can often be less about single actions in relation to some given rule or even the outcomes they produce. Instead, we usually find what we are *really* concerned about to be something more long-term: the enduring moral characteristics, or simply, the *character* of a people or a nation. Richard Knowles and George McLean (1990) define character as:

> that aspect of a person that exerts a directive or dynamic influence on behaviour. That is, character is thought to be comprised of, but not equivalent to, dispositions, traits, habits, and tendencies, all of which are elements that define an individual's identity. In other words, character is considered to be a relatively stable feature of an individual that determines, at least in part, a person's behaviour across a wide variety of times and places. (Knowles and McLean, 1990, p. 34)

Virtue theory is a framework concerned with character, specifically the *perfection* of one's character. For virtue theory, a person's character amounts to the totality of their character *traits.* Character traits are deeply entrenched or ingrained dispositions or habit-like tendencies; with admirable character traits being called 'virtues', and their opposites called 'vices'. Character traits are dispositions, but they are dispositions to act in certain ways. So, what happens when our dispositions to behave in certain ways, become no longer dependable for producing the outcomes we consider to be good? As shown in the case of 'The Story of Andy' in the introduction to Section 1, the organisation of one's environment can account for different expressions of virtue or moral attitudes.

Defensive Architecture and Hostile Design

Not only do people behave differently in different places; but we also seem to possess 'archetypes' of the 'sorts' of people we expect to see in different spaces: a pious praise singer at church; a happy consumerist at the mall; a student at a school or just a citizen in the park. It could perhaps be said that the architecture of a given space sets the interactions of those who share that space. The design of these structures is usually informed by a specific functional role that structure is to play. Architecture can be defined as "the art or practice of design and construction, especially of complex or carefully designed structures" (Merriam-Webster, 2018). In cities, for instance, cathedrals, malls, bridges, and monuments were each created with some social purpose in mind (and, hopefully, continue to serve at least some purpose).

Some urban architecture, however, is explicitly designed to exclude specific, often unwanted, groups of people from some locations; this is called Defensive Architecture (MacMillan Dictionary). Examples of defensive architecture include 'bumps' placed on certain barriers and railings to prevent skateboarding; or using water and oil-resistant paint to prevent graffiti and plants from growing on paved areas to prevent access to motor vehicles while still allowing pedestrian traffic. However, more extreme, arguably sinister, applications of defensive design exist; including spikes on the ground next to store windows and walls that cannot be stood on, the use of high frequency sounds that annoy juveniles to prevent them from gathering in certain areas, and benches with armrests added for the sole purpose of preventing people, particularly the homeless, from sleeping. This type of design is often referred to as "hostile" architecture (de Fine Licht, 2017).

Even assuming it was a good thing to implement defensive architecture to prevent homeless rough sleeping in this way; much of the implementation of it has resulted in people with disabilities and the elderly being negatively affected; some even finding it difficult to go about a normal life due to being unable to sit down at a train station or rest their backs in a public park. This is an unintended consequence of defensive architecture: though the explicit intent of the design was about 'dealing with' or excluding the homeless specifically from public space, other people, such as those with disabilities, can end up being negatively affected by this implementation of hostile architecture. It is this exclusionary feature of hostile architecture: ostensibly serving some good while annoying the general public, often causing some unseen or unacknowledged harms in the lives of more marginalised groups as in the case of people with disabilities – that I am particularly interested in here.

Defensive architecture, at least the relevant form discussed here, is distinct from overt laws or regulations specifically and explicitly excluding people from certain spaces or even “soft” policies of exclusion. For example, the culture in a particular area can become so hostile against certain groups of people such that they find it difficult to simply live there. But these are not instances of defensive or hostile design:

> Although this is an interesting line of discussion, and although defensive architecture might help to create such an environment, the permissibility of creating such a culture or enacting those kinds of laws is not at issue here. (Karl de Fine Licht, 2017, p. 28).

Instead, criticism of the ‘hostility’ of some implementations of defensive design is centred around the, often relatively small, cosmetic changes in design that work to encourage or discourage certain modes of behaviour and to alter and control how we interact within our environments (if we can even enter those spaces in the first place), specifically with regard to the homeless who are most directly affected by these designs (such as those meant to prevent sleeping in public spaces); it is, therefore a socio-ecological concern. Defensive architecture and hostile design, on their own, pose interesting ethical questions; however, those are not of concern to me in this particular project. Instead, I wish to turn our focus to the citizens of the city at large: If indeed hostile design is effective in its objectives, that is, excluding certain individuals or groups of individuals from what is ostensibly public space; what ramifications does this have for the citizenry’s moral and epistemic relation to the city?

‘The Story of Andy’ (in Section 1) serves as a hypothetical example of ways in which our society can be designed that disable or desensitise our ability to be aware of, and thereby respond appropriately to, morally-relevant features of ourselves and our environments. That is, if right action depends on an awareness of morally-relevant facts, as I suggest, then the ability for South Africans to be the kinds of people they wish to be can be undermined by factors which obfuscate these facts from them. To further help our understanding of moral blindness, it may help us to investigate another concept that I feel is deeply related to it, phronesis. But to get into that, we would be well served by a brief excursion into the Social-Moral Epistemology and the Virtue Theory of Ethics.

Social-Moral Epistemology

If the goal of applied ethics is right action, then it seems obvious that we cannot ignore the relationship between social virtues and practices and institutions. For this project, ‘social moral

epistemology' can be understood as "the study of the social practices and institutions that promote (or impede) the formation, preservation, and transmission of true beliefs so far as true beliefs facilitate right action or reduce the incidence of wrong action" (Buchanan, 2002, p. 126). For Allen Buchanan (2002):

> Social moral epistemology is epistemology because it focuses on the role of true beliefs in moral action. It is a normative enterprise, not a merely sociological one, because it evaluates the epistemic performance of social practices and institutions. It is social because it regards the moral agent as socially embedded, and focuses on the role of social practices and institutions in the proper functioning of moral virtues and in right action generally. It is a species of moral epistemology because its concern is not with true belief generally, but rather with true beliefs so far as they play a role in right action. (Buchanan, 2002, p. 126)

Socio-moral epistemology, then, is concerned with how we gather and interpret social information as we live in and perceive of the society itself; giving particular regard toward factors which enable socially unjust systems to perpetuate themselves by making otherwise moral agents unwittingly complicit in the harms the systems cause. We need to be able to account for how social institutions can work to disable moral and epistemic virtues, even in individuals who have undergone ostensibly successful primary moral education. For example, institutionalized inequalities may foster epistemic vices that can impair moral judgment. In certain situations, it seems that people only seem to exhibit feelings of sympathy towards "those whose suffering [they] can vividly imagine, and [they] can only vividly imagine the suffering of those whom [they] [recognize] as being like [themselves]" (Buchanan, 2002, p. 144). Extreme social inequality, then, can work to 'other' members of different social groups, rendering them unable to empathise with each other's suffering appropriately: this, in turn, works to truncate the virtue of sympathy.

For Buchanan, social moral epistemology gives credence to the critical theorist and feminist epistemologist's view that people in positions of subordination in racist or sexist social orders are 'epistemically privileged':

> if we suppose that social privileges and higher status can make one more vulnerable to certain epistemic vices […] then the idea that those who are socially disadvantaged by hierarchical institutions are epistemically privileged makes perfectly good sense (Buchanan, 2002, p. 146).

However, as Buchanan qualifies,

> a member of an oppressed group may be free of particular epistemic defects to which her oppressors are prone, but this is not to say that she, herself, is free of epistemic defects simpliciter (Buchanan, 2002, p. ibid).

Furthermore, just as our social frameworks may have 'architectural' elements which work to disable and truncate our capacity for moral or epistemic engagement, it may be exceedingly difficult (if not impossible) for a social moral epistemologist working within a defective socio-moral framework to identify this defectiveness. Social-moral epistemology, therefore, helps explore the effects of various forms and degrees of inequality, as well as perspectival considerations, on the functioning of moral agents.

By allowing varied expression of moral beliefs through the exercise of freedom of expression (thereby making it more difficult for those in positions of authority to use social institutions to foster approved beliefs), liberal societies in particular work to nurture virtue in important though indirect ways, "not by enforcing or privileging a particular conception of what the virtuous life is, but by reducing the risk that the moral virtues will be systematically disabled by false beliefs" (Buchanan, 2002, p. 142). For example, had Apartheid South Africa had a free press, it would have been more difficult for National Party propagandists to foster false beliefs about the black population with the implication of their not being entitled to respect or sympathy.

Virtue Theory

> Present day education develops the intellect and skills but does little to develop good qualities. Of what avail is all the knowledge in the world if one has no good character? It is like water going down the drain. There is no use if knowledge grows while desires multiply. It makes one a hero in words and a zero in action. - Sri Sathya Sai Baba (Baba 1986, p.43)

Virtue theory is a moral framework concerned with character, specifically the *perfection* of one's character. For virtue theory, a person's character amounts to the totality of their character *traits* -- deeply entrenched or ingrained dispositions or habit-like tendencies; with admirable character traits being called 'virtues and their opposites called 'vices'.

Though we are not born with our character traits, we are born with the capacity or disposition to acquire them. For Plato, we acquire them through character formation based on engaging in a particular sort of more or less freely chosen actions. For example, most of us are not born particularly brave but can become so by repeatedly engaging in behaviours that express that character trait. Infants, therefore, are born neither virtuous nor vicious; they become so by engaging in virtuous or vicious behaviour. For Jan Garret,

> an act or choice is morally right if one exercises, exhibits, or develops a morally virtuous character in carrying out the act. In contrast, it is morally wrong to the extent that by making the choice or doing the act, one exercises, exhibits, or develops a morally vicious character (Garret, 2005, p. 3).

An honest person will usually tell the truth and will do so because they understand honesty as a good trait for them to have and as the right thing to do; not because they fear the negative consequences of being found out or because 'tell the truth' is a prescriptive moral command. For Aristotle, a virtue lies at a mean between two opposing vices. The virtue of courage, for instance, lies between the vices of rashness and cowardice.[78] One who has habituated a disposition is not necessarily using it at any and all given moments; however, when prompted, the disposition should manifest itself immediately. A courageous person may not always feel confident, but in a risky situation, they express confidence appropriate to the situation. Moral virtues are admirable character traits that enable us to act in accordance with reason and contribute, among other things, to social harmony.

[78] The coward has too much fear, and the rash person has too little fear.

Phronesis

How cases of moral blindness negatively affect the expression of our virtues can be understood in terms of an essential element in traditional conceptions of virtue ethics referred to as phronesis. Phronesis, translated as "wisdom", is a specific doxastic or epistemic relation to one's particular context.

According to traditional western articulations of virtue ethics (the Aristotelian 'Golden Mean' in particular), in any given situation, there exist a range of possible responses to that situation, and the virtuous response is that which sits in the appropriate place between two vices at the extremes of excess and deficiency. The virtue of courage, again, sits between the vices of rashness and cowardice. However, the specific actions that would be courageous in one situation could be rash or cowardly in another situation. Thus, knowing what specific action would count as a courageous act would require one to be informed, at least at some level, of the particulars of the situation or context they find themselves in.

Phronesis is the practical wisdom relevant for good judgement in accordance with the excellences of character and virtuous action. Moral blindness, however, inhibits or prevents people from fulfilling their moral ambitions by disabling their ability to achieve or obtain a practical understanding of their situation or allowing them to habituate dispositions that may not have the same ethical status outside of the environments they have been exposed to before. A person's ability to rely on their own socialised situational awareness, that is, is limited by the possibility of them finding themselves in situations to which they are not accustomed, which, while potentially problematic for all people in all societies everywhere, is especially problematic for mixed or diverse societies. The more cultures and religions are incorporated into a nation-state, the more opportunities there are for individuals to find themselves in situations that are not normative for them. This limits their licence to take their ability to judge appropriate action for granted, as there may be contextual yet morally-relevant facts about themselves, the situation they are in, and others, of which they may not be aware. By giving us a false view of the moral status of our actions given our social environments, moral blindness allows for passive modes of oppression to self-perpetuate unabatedly, and, as all this is obscured from us, we may never find ourselves critically questioning the status quo.

Incorrect assumptions about one's context, and presumptions about other contexts, can cause us to fail to act according to our own moral standards, not only by leading us to engage in wrong action but also by rendering us unable to act ethically when the moral call to action goes

unheard or unnoticed. This means that the more varied the potential situational encounters one faces, the more they have to pay attention to the specific situations they find themselves in. For a country undergoing transformative change as extensive as our national project, it seems that failures in phronesis will be legion. The liminal state that we exist in - between Apartheid and our promised future state - is a space that we as the South African people are navigating without any guidance from the previous dispensation. Indeed, considering how totalising Apartheid social engineering was, it would perhaps be prudent for us all to be critical of how we live in this strange place.

Social Character and Virtuous Citizenry

It seems to be the case that we can find something similar or analogous to *character* in societies. Each society is structured to operate in certain ways as necessitated by various objective conditions the society may face. Though these social structures do undergo changes over time and in history, they can remain relatively stable at any given point in history, as society can only exist by operating within the framework of its particular structure and context. In this way members of society can be organised to behave in such a way that they function as required by the social system. This is what Erich Fromm discusses as "social character".

The social character of a society shapes the dispositions of its members in such a way that they do not need to consciously decide to follow the social pattern but instead find themselves acting and finding gratification in behaving per the requirements of the culture. For Fromm, "social character moulds and channels human energy within a given society for the purpose of the continued functioning of this society" (Fromm, 1955, p. 77). For Lawrence Hamilton (2009), the 'virtue' in 'virtuous citizenship' is "not a question of the nature of one's character or dispositions or the universal moral standing of an act one performs, but the political conditions that enable political agency of a specified kind" (Hamilton, 2009, p. 58).

Two competing models of virtuous citizenship emerge: Libertarian and Traditional (/Republican). Liberal conceptions of citizenship conceive of virtue and citizenship within the framework of a set of predetermined personal rights that are conceived as "the best means of guaranteeing legal impartiality, religious tolerance, freedom of discussion, personal security, private property, constitutional government, and the freedom individuals require to pursue their own goals and happiness" (Hamilton, 2009, p. 59). Citizenship involves every member of the

society in question having an equal entitlement to these rights—now called civil, political, and social rights (Marshall, 1950). Thus, to be a virtuous citizen, in Liberal terms, is "to act under a set of predetermined codes of conduct that are part and parcel of a set of institutions and practices whose primary function is to safeguard a set of pre-political goods" (Hamilton, 2009, p. 60).

The more 'traditional' Republican ideal, on the other hand, refers not only to legal status but also to "a distinct normative ideal—that the governed should be full and equal participants in the political process and that participation in self-rule is the essence of freedom" (Honderich, 1995). The Republican conception of citizenship is one based on a notion of civic virtue. To achieve the goals of our National Project, our republic has to be ordered (for instance, by a body of laws) in such a way that reflects the General Will, in which all individual interests are reconciled.

> To be virtuous in this sense requires a predisposition amongst citizens to concern themselves with public affairs and do so in a manner that displays justice, moderation, courage, and prudence (or practical wisdom). (Hamilton, 2009, p. 60)

I argue that South Africa has, thus far, taken the posture of more liberal forms of citizenry and political organisation. And I argue that this form is weaker in that while sufficient for many other states, particularly in the West, it may not actually be ideal for a national enterprise of the sort South Africa is working on. This is, in part, because liberal forms of citizenship do not often make the sorts of demands of duty and responsibility on the scope of Republican or more traditional forms of citizenry. For Justice Kate O'Regan:

> the concept of responsibility is a concept that determines the relationship between society and individual and in so doing it is central to our conception of both individual and society. It is a fundamental link that denies a rigid and blind individualism. Human beings are human beings because of other human beings, as the concept of ubuntu states. It is our responsibleness to ourselves, to others and to things that makes us human beings - Kate O'Regan (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001).

My interest in the virtue theory of ethics, at least with regards to this thesis, is to look at how virtue theory may help us to understand the project of nation-building. A distinctive feature of virtue ethics is its orientation toward the good. If we take it that the process of nation-building is teleological, that is, it is a project to organise South Africa into a particular sort of state,

namely a nation-state, then certain characteristics can be considered virtuous (or vicious) depending on how they orientate us towards that good (or National Project). However, given our potential to be morally blind, we can never be 'settled' in our understanding of what is good or bad in our lives or our societies—we cannot claim authoritative knowledge from our experiences alone, or from any single background. Given this, ongoing critical inquiry into one's society and what one can learn from other perspectives is essential not only for one's moral agency, but also to one's identity as South African.

South African Rainbow Nation-Building

Organisms and artefacts can be said to have purposes and goals that inform how they are organised and drive their behaviour; such as knives and televisions, which seem to have purposes built into them, usually by their designers, humans. This is teleology in action. *Eudaemonist* teleology understands *ethics* to "consist in some function or activity appropriate to man *as a human being"*, emphasising the "cultivation of virtue or excellence in the agent as the end of all actions" (Encyclopedia Britannica). For the Greeks, the 'classical' virtues are those which promote man as the "rational animal" such as courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom. However, for Christian theologians, man is a being created in the 'image' of an omnibenevolent God, giving rise to virtues such as faith, hope, and love.

If we take the formation of the Rainbow Nation as our teleological end goal, what characteristics ought South Africa to have in order to achieve this goal? What excellences ought its citizens to have? Can the basic principles of virtue ethics be used to describe and analyse nations and national projects such as that of South Africa? For most political orders of the past, the only way to ensure a reliably shared social context would be through supporting the existence of a monoculture; particularly in small and tightly knit communities in which just about all members are actively involved in the society—their roles and how they function as a collective whole is well understood. Menkiti's (1984) views on Afro-communitarian approaches to personhood speak to this view directly. For Menkiti, when one understands their community's culture, they are better able to understand where they fit into that community and the responsibilities and duties that their position in the community entails (Menkiti, 1984, p. 174). South Africa's multicultural reality entails that individuals can move from a known social context to one that is significantly different. The Rainbow Nation ideal is that all South African spaces are welcoming to all Rainbow Citizens.

For the Rainbow Nation project to have even the slightest hope of being realised, South Africa would need to organise society such that the kind of awareness required to produce behaviours conducive to its flourishing are engendered in its people. For my thesis, I propose that mere inclusivity as integration is not sufficient to ensure the flourishing of our imagined South Africa; something more robust is required.[79] What I am primarily interested in is inclusivity understood as an orientation, an openness to heterogeneity and a willingness to engage with those perceived as 'Other'.

If the Rainbow Nation project, the state-sponsored, 'we, the people'-endorsed establishment of a diverse and unified South African Republic is ever to be realised, we need to develop not only social virtues that contribute to that end but also corrective virtues that help us to avoid unwitting complicity in harm given the current transitive state of our society.

Chapter 2: Robust Inclusivity

> Social transformation towards the building of a culture of peace is not possible without inner change in the individual. This calls for values education starting with the development of values that enable the self to be a human being, a member of a family, a citizen of a country, a citizen of the world – Quisumbing, L. R. (1985)[80]

Robust Inclusivity: Inclusivity as a Civic Virtue

With the aim of uniting disparate people across different ethnic, religious, and cultural affiliations into a single people, The Rainbow Nation Project is often noted to be an ambitious nation-building exercise. In *Diverse Effects of Diversity on Democracy* (2018), Gerring, Hoffman and Zarecki note that diverse identities coexisting within the same society are often viewed as "problematic" for economic and/or political development, as they could be said to

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[79] "By tolerance we do not mean the shallow notion of putting up with people who are different, but a deeper and more meaningful concept of mutual understanding, reciprocal altruism and the active appreciation of the value of human difference. To reach that state of human consciousness requires not only a truthfulness about the failures and successes of the human past but the active and deliberate incorporation of differences in traditions, arts, culture, religions and sporting activity in the ethos and life on their own experience, but also to address and respond to the problems posed therein." (Department of Education, 2001)

[80] As quoted in (Changing Times, Changing Values: An Alchemy of Values Education, 2008)

"provide a potential focal point for conflict, poor governance, and poor economic performance" (Gerring, Hoffman, & Zarecki, 2018 p. 3). What qualities of character are appropriate to the flourishing of a democratic society that is characterised by racial, cultural, and other axes of social diversity? What excellences of character do citizens of a diverse democracy need in order to support that democracy's success? If the Rainbow Nation is to be realised, I argue that inclusivity should be taken as more than merely a means to an end; but in some way, as an end itself. I argue that for a nation as diverse as ours to thrive in celebration of its unity in diversity, the nation itself must organise itself to promote the transformation of its people into an *inclusive* people. For Shelley Burtt (Burtt, 2007), any legitimate commitment to what they define as 'robust inclusion' describes the structuring of a society's institutions so as to "maximize the integration of all persons", as well as the "welcoming mind-set that would accompany such restructuring" -- an openness to sharing space, public and private, and politics on equal terms (Burtt, 2007, p. 559).

To the extent that a regime is committed to sustaining a particular form of social diversity and securing the equal treatment and full integration of the diversity-giving group, it needs more than good laws and well-constructed social institutions to accomplish this goal: it needs willing and properly disposed citizens. The qualities we value in a citizenry, its civic virtues, will depend in part on the aims and purpose of the state in which the citizen finds herself. A state without a commitment to social diversity will not need to cultivate in its citizens qualities supportive of this end, nor will it necessarily consider such qualities civically virtuous. A state that, by its policies and public philosophy, seeks to minimize rather than embrace the range and variety of human capacities would not need nor value cosmopolitanism in its citizenry. But if we come to challenge the idea that some human lives are more worthy of being lived than others, if we come to believe that natality rather than capacity grounds our claim to civic and moral inclusion, then we have laid the foundation for a truly diverse society, one in which an openness to difference is valued and nurtured.

In discussing robust inclusivity, Burtt turns to our responses to disability. To meet "robust inclusion", they challenge the very way we conceive of disability and disabled people, bringing attention to the moral issues raised by efforts to reduce disabilities present in the human population. For Burtt, there is a substantial moral difference between what she refers to as correcting a disability and "correcting" a disability. The former would involve leaving the person who undergoes it less impaired than previously (restoring sight to a blinded person), the

latter involving procedures such as preventing the conception or birth of the potentially affected individual altogether. It is this latter case that Burtt brings up against inclusivity. Assuming the project is indeed inclusion (or at the very least, rejection of acts of unjustified exclusion), on what grounds do we judge that certain lives are less worthy of being lived than others?

The challenge stresses core beliefs of liberalism (which tends to privilege 'rational', 'independent', and 'able-bodied' humans over others). One major problem is the social contract tradition's conception of the primary purpose of society: "cooperation for mutual advantage", given that the disabled will always be asymmetrically dependent on those with fuller social functioning, they cannot claim that treating them justly will be a matter of mutual advantage (Burtt, 2007, p. 572). As such, the social contract tradition does not see the disabled as part of the group "for whom and in reciprocity with whom society's basic institutions are structured" (Burtt, 2007, p. ibid). It is difficult to imagine how -- within the dominant ideologies of the modern liberal state -- one could make a convincing case, instrumental or otherwise, for the 'robust inclusion' of disabled persons. Civic republicanism may offer us a different alternative, one that is compatible with engendering robust inclusivity into its social framework through civic virtues.

For Burtt's primary interlocutor, Hans Reinders, the alternative to liberal notions of obligation which are often grounded in contract and reciprocity, is a "more communitarian understanding of responsibility," in which people care for others because they "are part of the social relations that constitute the moral fabric of our society" (Reinders as quoted in Burtt, 2007 p.565). Some regimes aim to do well without much reliance on citizen virtues; others envision the demands of community life such that any active citizen will need to possess a range of demanding virtues, from martial courage to the willingness to sacrifice personal advantage for the public good and a disposition to form social relations which would make claims on our time, energy, and commitment regardless of the rational status of the agent, her ability to reciprocate, etc.

For Burtt, people are more benevolent than social contract theory assumes, and this benevolence will lead them to embrace a theory of justice that seeks to provide for everyone within the society, including the disabled, the essential tools and capabilities they need to flourish. More explicitly, the moral standing of people ought not depend on their individual capacities but instead "reflects a particular way of how we understand the relationships we share with them" (Burtt, 2007, p. 565). The implication of Reinders's argument is that if the aim is to create a polity friendly to all forms of social diversity, this aim cannot be achieved

without people possessing the sort of dispositions or qualities that might be called incidental civic virtues—qualities that serve civic ends (comprehensive social diversity) but are valued for their moral praiseworthiness (e.g., enabling quality care for the disabled). Without a substantial percentage of citizens possessing this willingness to remain open to difference, to appreciate and welcome a wide and even disturbing range of human capacity and dependency, it is difficult to see how today's liberal democracies can move towards truly robust inclusion of the kind envisioned by the Rainbow Nation.

It is important to note that the sorts of traits required for diverse democracies may not obtain in other kinds of societies. As Reinders notes, the qualities identified as 'robustly inclusive' of the disabled (to the point of 'sustaining the future of the disabled') would only count as virtuous if you are of a society that values an inclusive and egalitarian vision of humanity; they are morally indifferent otherwise (Burtt, 2007, p. 571). He writes,

> the appropriate motive for caring responsibility can be explained by reference to certain convictions and beliefs about ourselves, but these convictions and beliefs being absent, we cannot be argued forcefully into it on grounds of reason alone. (Burtt, 2007, p. 571).

For Burtt, even the 'progressive' observation and passive acknowledgement that "the disabled will always be with us," leaves open the response, "but wouldn't it be nice if they were not?" (Burtt, 2007, p. 561). If this is true, we would still harbour an implicit and hierarchical preference for the abled, and thus it seems would fail at 'robust inclusivity'.

Burtt understands the benevolence required for the genuine inclusion of people with impairments to be extensive and profound, as it needs more than just a willingness to sacrifice one's own advantage, but possibly also that of the group at large. It would mean cooperating with individuals or groups that it is both *possible* and *advantageous* to simply choose not to cooperate with at all. In demanding more than ordinary attentiveness, love, and compassion, it calls for virtue, an excellence of character that goes above and beyond the natural. The claim in the same passage that what is required is "willingness to sacrifice" is an outright echo of one of the traditional definitions of personal and civic virtue.

Here is where the virtue of cosmopolitanism becomes relevant. Without a cosmopolitan's openness to the full range and variety of human capacity, and without a willingness to appreciate the lives and experiences of those whose capacities fall outside the range of normal social functioning and an ability to take at least some pleasure in the fact of this difference, the

case for robust inclusion of the disabled will continue to be made primarily by those who through choice or fate have a lived experience of disability. As such, it will remain vulnerable to the argument that we are better off eliminating disability than accommodating it. Robust inclusivity thus introduces us to inclusivity of a specific sort, one that can be modelled as a civic virtue. If the Rainbow Nation Project, the state-sponsored, 'we, the people' endorsed establishment of a diverse and unified South African Republic is ever to be realised, these are the sorts of civic virtues we would need, assuming we still are, in fact, committed to the ambitions of the Rainbow Nation Project.

But perhaps I am right, and we do still overall agree with the goals and ambitions of the RNP. What then? How can we respond to the threat that moral blindness presents to us? How can we ensure that South Africans are given the opportunity to understand their world in its dynamicity, and empower them to be able to change their world to make it more in line with the RNP and ourselves to be more like the Rainbow Citizens we wish to be? The next section will discuss some contemporary social issues that I think lend themselves to a moral blindness analysis and investigate how a Rainbowist or Robustly Inclusive approach could help in solving them. I will also look at some radical approaches to moral education, borrowing largely from Paulo Freire.

Section 4: Transformation and Liberation in Education

Introduction: A Way Forward

South Africa is a society in transition, on the path away from a heritage of bigotry and injustice and of seeking new directions and ways of being toward full human recognition and socio-economic development of its citizens and the nation at large. The hope that we can overcome our circumstances is an important factor for the realisation of the Rainbow Nation. Hope can be found “rooted in men's incompletion, from which they move out in constant search—a search which can be carried out only in communion with others” (Pedagogy of The Oppressed, 1970, p. 71). In this section, I will chart one way for us as a society to begin working our way towards our moral and national ambitions. Chapter 1 will look at what is at stake for us if we do not take moral blindness seriously as a society. Chapter 2 will look at how education could potentially be leveraged to combat moral blindness.

Chapter 1: To Fail at Becoming South African

Moral blindness happens when morally-relevant facts are obscured from agents wishing to have particular moral relationships with their societies and environments. In giving us a false view of the moral status of our actions given our social environments by preventing us from being aware of morally-relevant features, moral blindness allows for various behaviours and practices that contradict our moral projects to perpetuate unabatedly. And, as all this is obscured from us, we may never find ourselves critically questioning our complicity in sustaining the status quo that we morally reject. Thus, as I have argued, moral blindness stands to threaten the RNP in particular, and all moral projects in general.

If the moral goal is to create a more just society, moral blindness can threaten our moral project by standing in the way of our awareness of our own complicity in perpetuating injustice in our society, and thus can hinder our ability to change our behaviours accordingly. In this way, by undermining our ability to critically understand and change the worlds we live in, moral blindness can get in the way of how we act in the world as moral agents.

Moral blindness is especially relevant in a post-conflict society such as ours that is working to transform into a more just society. If we are to make good on our national project, then we need to take on the responsibility of becoming socially aware of morally-relevant facts in the established social norms and in the environments we inhabit – as these norms were created to be compatible with the previous regime of this strange place, and thus many of them remain incompatible with our current national project. We must actively set out to reevaluate and deconstruct ourselves, our behaviour, and our environments in order to ensure that they indeed match up to the goals we have set for ourselves as a nation.

It would not be enough to simply outlaw and discourage harmful and unjust discrimination. The development of a culture and social ethos that actively includes all people of all backgrounds in all aspects of life is of at least equal importance. This will require an "enhanced degree of linguistic and cultural dexterity, tolerance and appreciation of difference" to be cultivated in members of society (Joubert, 2012). Freire (1970) and Biko (2005) understood that, for both oppressed and (formerly-)oppressor groups alike, the struggle for liberation requires an internal struggle that involves the critical analysis, challenging, and rejection of ideals and behaviours that have been socially ingrained into us (possibly) since birth. This is a

lifetime effort that, in truth, is a task that may never be entirely complete. This is because we can never be certain that some subconsciously internalised beliefs or worldviews of the *old society* are not continuing to passively shape our views and inform our actions in the present. Values are often the products of a people's culture and their way of life (Quisumbing, 2008). They are often informed by things such as religion, history, law, art and the natural and social environment. Value systems are critical in the forging of a group's identity, encouraging unity and stability, and thereby ensuring its continued existence and survival. On a longer time scale though, values are dynamic – constantly undergoing change as the society reorganises itself in response to changing needs and projects. Understood this way, values seem to hold similar roles to the civic virtues discussed in Section 3.

South African identity, understood this way, can never quite ever be 'settled'. Who is or counts as 'South African' is an ever-expanding circle that includes all citizens committed to the creation (or the sustenance) of the Rainbow Nation, a society built on the values of inclusivity, equality, and unity. In some ways then, South African identity is one that must be constantly open to and willing for change, and is, in this sense, an instance of the liminal permanence of the South African condition.

Commitment to human liberation in the form of Rainbowism, then, is an interminable project: there is never a determined endpoint, and thus we must constantly keep reflecting on our pre-existing values, beliefs, and biases. The Rainbow Nation Project, therefore, requires South Africans to not only work to create a new society built on the ideals and values of inclusivity, equality, and unity; but also, to *self-transform* into citizens who are compatible with such a society. This aspect of self-transformation is crucial for the RNP, as unless the people in society change meaningfully, any new structures, systems and strategies implemented to promote Rainbowism cannot work effectively. Creating a new society means cultivating a people with a new outlook, new values, and attitudes and, very importantly, changed behaviour.

According to Cambridge Dictionary, the definition of transformation is: "a complete change in the character of something or someone" (Cambridge Dictionary, 2021). While this definition is usually sufficient for most purposes, a more extensive definition is better suited for this project. According to the Kellogg Forum on Higher Education Transformation:

> Transformation (1) alters the culture of the institution by changing underlying assumptions and overt institutional behaviours, processes, and structures; (2) is deep

> and pervasive, affecting the whole institution; (3) is intentional; and (4) occurs over time. (The Kellogg Forum on Higher Education Transformation, 2001)

To be transformational, then, change must be *holistic*, that is, affecting all aspects of social functioning rather than a few or a single part of some institutions. Transformation then, must affect our values, views, and assumptions, as well as our institutions, structures, systems, and processes. *Intentionality* about the purpose and direction of change is also crucial.[81] Transformational change is also cultural, affecting deeply embedded values, assumptions, and meanings attached to what members do and believe about the society in question. This transformation is vital for our commitment towards the RNP and is precisely what moral blindness stands to undermine. *Because* of how moral blindness works (to undermine our moral projects), and the entwined nature of Rainbowism and South African identity, it seems that moral blindness stands not only to threaten our moral commitment and efforts towards constructing the Rainbow Nation, but also to threaten our efforts to become Rainbow Citizens. Thus, if not taken seriously, moral blindness may spell our failure to become South Africans.

The South African identity, then, finds itself in a complicated situation with regards to its liminal condition. On the one hand, being in-between and in-betwixt a radical transformation, presents the threat of moral blindness taking hold in members of society and thus undermining our moral project of self-transformation into Rainbow Citizens. But on the other hand, South African identity (being so oriented towards inclusivity and acceptance of an ever-expanding membership base and rejecting any identification based on essentialist groups) presents the constant possibility of change and a commitment towards self-transformation that seems to embrace a form of liminal permanence.

Although moral blindness is often the result of our social environments, it is not so easy to lay all the fault on the social environment alone. There still seems to be a personal responsibility for or duty to one's moral actions that remains. At the very least, there seems to be a duty for minimal knowledge of our community in order to participate in our social environments ethically in the first place. My aim here, going forward into the final chapters of this work, is to discuss how interventions that promote social conscientisation may help us through our personal, communal, and social transitions through our grander liminal process. In the next chapter, I briefly discuss the state of education in South Africa and discuss how Freirean

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[81] While the specific details of the change may evolve over time, a general idea of the direction of change seems important.

pedagogy can be used as a framework for negotiation of the social liminalities in our society, and a path forward against moral blindness.

Chapter 2: Values in Education

> [What better way] to teach this value than to teach the history of our negotiated settlement? And to teach that out of this negotiated settlement come the documents that form the foundation of our new, democratic value system - our Constitution and our Bill of Rights. Our values derive from these documents, and they are values we moulded, together, from our different heritages, our different positions in society. We cannot treat them as an afterthought - they should govern our lives and our relationships. They encapsulate what South Africans have desired for generations - a non-racial, non-sexist society based on equality, freedom and democracy.
> - Kader Asmal

The Duty to [be] Inform[ed]

Some years ago, international brand H&M was publicly criticised by the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation for posting an advert with a black child wearing a hoodie with the slogan "coolest monkey in the jungle." The foundation wrote: "It is of serious concern that your company published the advert without considering the historical context of how the word and image of a 'monkey' has been used to racially demean black people for generations" (Ahmed Kathrada Foundation, 2015). In another scandal, KZN estate agent Penny Sparrow came under fire for a controversial Facebook post. In her post, she complained about "monkeys" with "no education whatsoever" that are "allowed to be released" on beaches over the festive season "inviting huge dirt and troubles". She also complained that "all [she] saw was black on black skin" remarking "what a shame". She then praised "some wonderful and thoughtful black people", then lamented on "these monkeys" "being able to voice their opinions about statute" before vowing to "address black South Africans as monkeys" to whom their behaviour is compared (Nemakonde, 2016).

While the post itself is worth digging into, my interest for this project lies in the mode of critique against Sparrow and H&M. Specifically, the sort of moral responsibility brought up when the phrase '[they] should have known better' is deemed most appropriate. So, when can we be justified in claiming that a person 'should have known better', and by so meaning that they are responsible (in the sense of *blameworthy*) for their ignorant wrongdoing? For Bailey Kuklin (2000), the expression "should have known better" advances the following:

> 1. The antisocial consequences of a particular action are so evident that everyone (or at least everyone in the actor's position) should have foreseen them. Therefore, the actor, though personally ignorant, is not excused from responsibility.
>
> 2. The actor should have been aware that the chosen act runs contrary to her own interests.
>
> 3. Because the actor should have been aware of the antisocial or illegal consequences of her act, by choosing to act nevertheless, she acted reprehensibly in circumstances in which we would not blame others at all, or she acted more reprehensibly than we would judge others to have acted. (Kuklin, 2000, p. 545)

One could point out how Animalisation was historically used as a tool for dehumanisation as an important fact for Sparrow to have had considered. Simianisation, in particular, has a long history spanning over the age of colonial imperialism and expansion, with the depiction of black people as monkeys occupying a particular place in white imagination and eventually entered into different (pseudo-)sciences and humanities. The result of which being a pervasive psychic association of black people as sub-persons, perhaps even natural slaves, in global consciousness. Eventually reaching and spreading to South Africa during colonisation and Apartheid eras.[82]

Sparrow's public outburst, it could then be said, is an expression of these deeply entrenched racial prejudices and stereotypes. However, Sparrow said she did not know calling black South Africans monkeys was offensive as, to her, the animals were "cute". Yet critics are not satisfied: "Mr Hart and Ms Sparrow should have known better and should not be allowed to polarise our society," said ANC spokesperson Zizi Kodwa, adding that the remarks were reminiscent of Apartheid and were degrading and undermined democratic gains (Bernardo, 2016).

There seems then to be some duty to be informed in the post-conflictual South African society. A duty to be fulfilled in order not to fail as Sparrow did. Recall that for Alexandra Trofimov (2016), persons are responsible for their ignorant wrongdoing if and only if they are responsible for their ignorance. Trofimov sets the following test:

Persons are responsible for their ignorance if (and only if):

[82] See Section 2 on Eurocolonial Hegemonic Discourse

(a) They possess the rational capacity to appreciate the relevant reasons.

(b) There are no limitations in their circumstances that make it unreasonably difficult for them to accurately appreciate the relevant reasons.

It is only when conditions (a) and (b) are both met, that is it reasonable to claim that a person should have known better, as they would have had 'fair' opportunity to avoid both their ignorance and the wrongdoing that results (Trofimov, Should Have Known Better: Responsibility, Ignorance and Reasons, 2016).

This 'duty to be informed' seems imperfect. How are we to know of someone's rational capacity to appreciate the relevant reasons? What limitations are we to seriously consider when making this judgment? It is not clear how much effort one is expected to invest, nor at what point one would have sufficiently met that duty. Yet being informed seems like it would be necessary for participation in our current societies. It is also far from true that being simply informed confers some capacity/ability to effect meaningful change in our social environments. But it seems we must be careful about where we source our knowledge. The education system is an institution that exists to provide young members of society with the information, knowledge, and skills they require to be successful members of society. Perhaps we can leverage state resources and formal education to engage members of society in some form of moral education conducive to our national goals.

State of Education

In modern thinking, education is seen as having to do with more than a simple intellectual pursuit of scholastic achievement. Particularly within the South African context, there is a need to redress the social damage caused by the previous dispensation and help society prepare for the new society. Thus, education needs to engage all dimensions of healthy development that together contribute to whole-person transformation.[83] Unfortunately, South Africa's education system has inherited some significant problems that are undoubtedly related to its troubled past.

During Apartheid, education served only to prepare pupils for their predetermined place in society. To this end, the various racial groups and genders were educated separately. This allowed for the creation of unequal tiers of education where the vast majority of black people

[83] That includes cognitive, social, moral, as well as spiritual aspects of development, among others.

and girls were denied quality education.[84] The new dispensation brought along a period of rapid desegregation of formerly white, Indian, and coloured schools. While it is not surprising that South African schools are still largely segregated, many schools have committed themselves to enrolling learners from increasingly diverse backgrounds. As shown by the uptick in multiracial and multicultural student bodies:

> In 1997, 28% of all schools were racially integrated, and in 1996, for example, African children made up 27% of all students in Gauteng's formerly white schools, 31% in its formerly coloured schools, and 45% in its formerly Indian schools. Five years later, African students are the majority in all these schools. (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 42)

Yet, this tells only part of the story, particularly from the urban perspective. The report continues to point out that in rural areas and townships, where most black South African children still live, the buildings used for schools were often not purpose-built for that end. These rural schools generally lacked piped water, electricity, sanitary facilities, nor were they provided with reliable and affordable transport for learners and teachers (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 42). Many of these schools have remained segregated and under-resourced going into 2020 (Amnesty International, 2020).

It is important to note, however, as Dr Barney Pityana (Chairperson of the SA Human Rights Commission) does: "There is more to desegregation than black and white learners sitting next to each other,"

> there is that world of difference that has to be bridged. And my belief is that South Africa has not really begun to address that. We have not begun to interrogate some of the values of excellence, of right, of wrong, of culture, that we just continue to imbibe (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 42)

Along with racial segregation, class and gender discrimination are also issues facing South African education. Pityana (2001) explains how "in the classroom, girls are steered away from

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84 Hendrick Verwoerd, now infamously referred to as one of the 'Architects of Apartheid', had the following to say about Africans in education:

"[…] there is no place for him (blacks) in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour. Until now he has been subjected to a school system which drew him away from his community and misled him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he was not allowed to graze. Who will do the manual labour if you give the Natives an academic education? Education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in life." (in Byrnes, 1996. p.32).

the highly valued disciplines - specifically science, technology and business - and towards others", leading to inequalities and underrepresentation in the wealth and power of the workforce.

> Gender discrimination and stereotyping begin with the way schools are organised. Although women are significantly over-represented as teachers, they are radically under-represented in positions of authority, from heads of department upwards. Similarly, women tend to teach only younger children and "soft" subjects - the arts and social sciences - while men teach older children and the "hard", marketable subjects such as maths and science. (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 44)

Young girls also experience another layer of difficulty in education – violence and abuse. The Manifesto on Values Education and Democracy cites a report by Human Rights Watch, entitled "Scared at School" that notes how "acts of sexual violence and violence against girls at school remain unchallenged by school officials and exact a terrible cost to education quality and equality in South Africa - in addition to violating girls' rights to bodily integrity."[85]

Many former white and Indian schools also continued to practise a proxy "colour bar" hiking school fees up in order to "filter out poor or black students", particularly in the early years of the new Dispensation (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 45). Chairperson of the Council of Traditional Leaders of South Africa, Chief Pathekile Holomisa (2001) notes that this inequality poses a threat to the South African nation-building project:

> If this situation is not turned around as a matter of national urgency, our freedom will continue to be a mirage for the majority of our people, who, as some say, are the poorest of the poor (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 39)

But my concerns with education during Apartheid are to do with more than just the inequality, exclusion, and segregation it promoted. *What* was taught and how is similarly troubling. During Apartheid, Calvinist thinking became a core influence in the creation of Christian National Education, taking the view that "learners' achievement could only be realised through obedience" (Naidu, 2011, p. 20). This pedagogical approach sees the work of educators as

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[85] A poignant statement in the Manifesto on Values Education and Democracy: "When men and women look back on their lives, they see all the more clearly the paths they chose, and the paths that were, in different ways, chosen for them" (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 44) and "Perhaps the most direct way that girls are discriminated against within the education system is through violence and abuse - from highly sexualised verbal degradation, to physical harassment and rape." (2001, p. 45)

being to mould students into obedient subjects. Thus, the role of the educator was seen as "one of authority and who was not afraid to exert this authority over young children" (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001). This authoritarian style of teaching resulted in what, according to Pam Christie (1998), is a "breakdown of the culture of teaching and learning" that stands as the legacy of apartheid education in South Africa:

On one level, the reasons for the breakdown of black schooling are not hard to find. This crisis can be traced back to apartheid resistance waged by students within school settings and exemplified by the 1976 Youth Protest:

> The rejection of Bantu Education through protests and boycotts (often violent) and the unsuccessful attempts to forge an alternative People's Education have brought a legacy of contestation of authority. (Christie, 1998, p. 284)

Alongside this are the inadequate material provisioning of apartheid black schools and the conditions of poverty and disruption in black communities, contributing to the low value placed on schooling. Accounted for in this way, the breakdown of the culture of learning and teaching is understandable (though not necessarily excusable). As Christie notes,

> These conditions - both the tradition of opposition and disruption in schooling and the deprivation of schools and communities - have not simply disappeared with the replacement of the apartheid government with a new government. However, what is less clear is what may be done about it, particularly given the continuing shortage of resources for schooling. Thus, the transformation of these schools is a major challenge facing the post-apartheid national and provincial governments.[86] (Christie, 1998, p. 284)

For Freire, freedom is related to the ability to critically question, understand and change the world (Freire, 1970, p. 47). A key element of the postmodern[87] perspective is its explicitly critical approach. For Mark Tappan (1996) "most of the efforts to engage in explicit moral education over the past 25 years have fallen short, because instead of pushing toward genuine

[86] "Again, huge strides have been made since 1994: two thousand schools have been built, another one thousand renovated, and the Department of Education estimates that the inequality of spending per province has been reduced by half (50%). But South Africa is still nowhere near being able to say that there is equity in its provision of educational resources." (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 40)

[87] Postmodernism here is understood as a rejection of grand narratives of progress, a questioning of the view that universal reason is the primary foundation for human affairs and a celebration of pluralism and the reality of socio-cultural differences.

critique and authentic change they have simply perpetuated the status quo" (Tappan, 1996). Thus, for Tappan, the critique is not simply epistemological; rather "it is explicitly political and deeply moral, with profound implications for, among other things, the practice of moral education" (Tappan, 1996). Addressing the fundamental inter-relationship between language and power is important for Tappan, as is the adoption of a dialogical attitude that does not grant to the teacher exclusive access to legitimate knowledge and authority, but instead "seeks ways in which teachers and students can engage in genuine dialogue and mutual exchange" (Tappan, 1996).

Meeting this pedagogical responsibility would require the state to design an educational framework that is acceptable to all groups in South Africa, therefore one that is mindful of cultural, linguistic, and religious differences. This framework would have to be flexible enough to allow for and respect differences in culture, expression, and behaviour; while also strengthening recognition of commonalities and developing a "spirit of tolerance, appreciation and mutual acceptance" (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 3).

In its report, the Working Group on Values Education submitted recommendations to the Department of Education, chief among them, was "to develop the intellectual abilities and critical faculties of all the children and young adults in our schools," arguing that

> a democratic society flourishes when citizens are informed by a grasp of their history and of current affairs, where nothing is beyond question, where ideas are explored to their fullest extent possible and when there is an obligation on teachers to provide intelligent answers to questions. (Department of Education, 2001).

Our education system must serve as the basis for having an informed and thinking citizenry. Considering that pedagogical emphasis in the past was focused on conformity, obedience to rules and the suspension of intelligence, however, this is a great task. To this end, I believe the revolutionary liberatory pedagogy of Freire may help our cause.

Liberatory pedagogy

Paulo Freire was an educator and philosopher whose work was foundational for the movement of critical pedagogy. Again, for Freire, freedom is linked with the ability to critically understand and change the world. Education, he believed, should not be considered as merely a matter of personal development but also as a powerful tool for social change. In his *Pedagogy of The Oppressed*, Freire identifies a struggle between two opposing forces: humanisation and

dehumanisation as the "central problem" facing humanity. For Freire, dehumanisation cannot be the natural state for humanity but is rather the result of an unjust society. And while people naturally strive to achieve their humanity and freedom, they are often met with resistance from the dehumanising forces of "injustice, exploitation, and…violence" (Freire, 1970, p. 44). Injustice, exploitation, and violence, as I have argued, are the roots of inequality, exclusion, and segregation in South Africa.

Freire's solution to this central problem is outlined in his *Pedagogy,* where he argues that humanisation is the duty of the oppressed, who are tasked with conscientising themselves about the problems they face and issues affecting them in society and then working to use critical analysis and reflection to find ways to undo them and create a more just social order. Questioning the social order is especially important for Freire as the social institutions and conditions that dehumanise people are not unchanging facts of nature but the result of people acting on the world to create the conditions we live in. Oppression exists as a product of historical choices made by people that continue to affect the present. This is *absolutely* true for the Rainbow Nation project considered broadly - that is more than just about racial animus alone, but also about sexism, homophobia, and xenophobia among others.[88] For Freire, striving for humanisation and freedom is an "indispensable condition" for the human project. And his life's work was dedicated to constructing a pedagogy, or way of teaching and learning, that fosters and promotes freedom from systems of injustice.

Because oppressors organise themselves apart from the people, revolutionary leaders or freedom fighters must instead organise themselves 'with the people'. For Freire, dialogue is a key element for liberation movements because of how much it mirrors the opposite of what oppressive structures require to perpetuate themselves. Dialogical organisation is the opposite of conquest and manipulation and can only come from a position of common goals. In discussing the role of dialogue in liberation, Freire introduces two approaches or models of education, the "banking" model found in traditional western education and his alternative

[88] Though class analysis is important for Freire, the "material oppression ... that ties oppressed groups to the logic of domination cannot be grasped in all of their complexity within a singular logic of class struggle". It is interesting to note how Freire never quite accepted the "poststructuralist tendency" to "translate diverse forms of class, race, and gender-based oppression to the discursive space of subject positions." For Freire, "one cannot reduce the analysis of racism to social class, one cannot understand racism fully without a class analysis, for to do one at the expense of the other is to fall prey into a sectarianist position, which is as despicable as the racism that we need to reject." (Donaldo, 2000, p. 14)

“problem-posing” method which uses dialogue to empower participants to critically analyse and take action in their world.

Freire explains his issues with the “banking” model by discussing its posture of narration. In the banking model, the teacher assumes the role of a “narrating subject”, whereas the students take on the role of a ‘passive’ audience. In this model, the teacher’s role is seen as one of ‘depositing’ knowledge into the receptive minds of the students. This model of education aims to ensure that students become “integrated” into society, or at the very least, become economically productive. Thus, for Freire, this model not only works to stifle creativity and critical thinking; but directly perpetuates the view that those who are not in positions of power (the students in this case) are ignorant and have nothing to offer. Freire argues that the banking model recreates the oppressive social structure that many people live in: it positions one group of people as superior to another and allows the superior group to determine what is important. This kind of educational model typically only works to help oppressors, who want oppressed people to learn to accept and operate within hierarchical power structures and eventually find them to be the only way of doing things. Doing so makes it difficult to see the possibility of creating meaningful change in one’s life without them.

Freire introduces a “problem-posing” pedagogy as an alternative model. Based on dialogue and authentic communication, this pedagogy collapses ‘student’ and ‘teacher’ roles by merging them into ‘teacher-students’ and ‘student-teachers’, creating a paradigm where everyone is empowered to teach and encouraged to learn from each other. For Freire, a pedagogy that aims to promote freedom is one that recognises how our lived experiences and society at large are intimately connected and demonstrates how unjust society is actually the result of human choices and action, and so too can different choices and actions work to promote freedom and create a more just society. By engaging with issues and topics that are relevant to the students’ lives and experiences, this alternative model engages students in ways that challenge them to gain critical awareness of their lives and act against the issues they identify. Presenting social issues as “problems” immediately frames them as challenges that can, in fact, be solved. Unlike the “banking” model, problem-posing education works by demonstrating to students that they do actually have something to contribute with their lives and to society, that they can use their own knowledge and experiences to create meaningful change in the world they are in. Problem-posing education thus pushes oppressed people to stop seeing oppression as a permanent fact, and to begin to see it as a problem that can be changed and perhaps solved.

Freire argues for dialogical teaching and communication in the classroom, the teacher should not 'impose' their own views onto students; instead, education should be seen as a collaborative effort between both students and teachers, who take on the mixed roles of student-teachers and teacher-students. Dialogue here is contrasted with 'narration', which calls attention to the one-sided and hierarchical nature of traditional teaching. For Freire, dialogue is the *difference that matters* between the two models of education and liberation and is key to a successful liberation movement given that the methods of oppression are inherently "anti-dialogical".

Freire argues that holding on to the values and methods of the oppressors can sometimes hinder the struggle for freedom. Since oppressed people are taught to uncritically perceive hierarchy as the natural (and thereby moral) way to organize society, they often have to actively work to unlearn some long-held and deeply entrenched beliefs and attitudes toward society and each other. Frantz Fanon shared this mistrust of what he calls the 'national (ex-colonised) bourgeoise':

> The national bourgeoisie, with no misgivings and with great pride, revels in the role of agent in its dealings with the Western bourgeoisie. [...] At the core of the national bourgeoisie of the colonial countries a hedonistic mentality prevails—because on a psychological level it identifies with the Western bourgeoisie from which it has slurped every lesson. It mimics the Western bourgeoisie in its negative and decadent aspects [...] In its early days the national bourgeoisie of the colonial countries identifies with the last stages of the Western bourgeoisie. Don't believe it is taking short cuts. In fact, it starts at the end. It is already senile. (Fanon, The Trials and Tribulations of National Consciousness, p. 101)

Therefore, pedagogies organised by oppressors should be met with mistrust: traditional 'banking' education, which is the kind of education that was spread throughout the world through colonisation, works to replicate and reproduce the same oppressive systems that constructed it. The belief that useful knowledge can only be obtained from some people leads to the view that only some people can be rightfully in the position to lead others. A key role of the "problem-posing" educator, then, is to show how the issues affecting people's lives are not only contingent on human action, but indeed do have concrete solutions; and that we can reflect on our own life experiences to come up with ideas and solutions for an alternative.

Oppressive "anti-dialogical action" does not only work to prevent dialogue between oppressed and oppressor groups, but also works to limit dialogue between different oppressed groups. By

dividing and isolating people from each other (physically through design, zoning, or outright segregation or even through establishing discourse that alienates them from each other), they are rendered unable to see their issues as related. They thus are prevented from organising collectively as an oppressed society to work towards their mutual liberation. This strategy can even be effective for oppressors in dividing people within communities. By selectively propping up some members of marginalised groups into positions of leadership, these community leaders can become alienated from the people they are supposedly there to serve. And by owing their position of relative authority to oppressors and the oppressive system that empowers them, these leaders can often visit the same if not more violence on their own people. Freire links "anti-dialogical action" to the idea of conquest, where oppressors control people by conquering them to stifle any changes to the status quo that are not in their interests. Conquests, social myths, and hegemonic discourse all work to force oppressed people (and oppressors) to view the world in terms that serve to maintain the oppressive status quo. If, as in the banking model educational process, students are not able to engage with acquired knowledge and take from their own lived experiences to create and uncover new knowledge, then they may never find themselves able to participate in critical dialogue as a process of learning and knowledge creation.

The importance of dialogue in our fight against Moral Blindness

How we approach things like education, and the design of public space can be instrumental to our goals. For Asmal, "Values cannot simply be asserted; they must be put on the table, be debated, be negotiated, be synthesised, be modified, be earned" (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 18). As I have argued in the second chapter of Section 2, *prefiguration* can help us habituate certain virtues without having yet attained them by practicing them in our normal lives. Approaches to liberation such as that of Freire have a built-in recognition of liminality, as seen in its conceptions of student-teachers and teacher-students, which can give us some insight into how to create a pedagogy not only aimed at freedom, but also aimed at justice and unity. I argue that Freire's pedagogy works by taking advantage of the liminal space created through the process of dialogue, where each individual opens themselves up to the experiences of others and also allows one to translate themselves in self-communication to others.

South Africans wanting to be Rainbow Citizens—that is, those identifying *as South African*—must actively work towards creating a deeper understanding of the people, communities, and societies of the nation they would build. How testimony is approached is essential here: if the plan is to include, then we must assign perspectival insight some importance. However, the corollary here is that there comes a need for people to be willing to give testimony, and thus that along with *the duty to be informed* comes its twin: *a duty to inform*. Testimony is important for dialogical action, as how we experience the world and speak to that experience is invariably informed by our language, commitments, and our politics. It is through experience, then, that the "multi-layered registers of power and culture" that form and transform people's place in the world can be recognised and narrated (Giroux, 2012, p. 122). Testimony, then, is essential for ethically conscious identity formation, as culture and experience themselves can be viewed as "an ongoing site of struggle and power in contemporary society" (Giroux, 2012, p. ibid).

The reason it is important to give testimony is not that it would serve to better one's own ends (though, for sure, that is important too). Rather, it is because doing so works towards the project of inclusivity. Failure to give testimony, that is, hinders the capacity of others to make the community or society more legitimately inclusive of people like oneself and may actually perpetuate harm to people like oneself. This duty comes from consideration of how, by not doing so, one may leave open the potential or opportunity for some other person in future to be harmed. Particularly for group-based harms that this work is concerned with: one may be allowing harm to happen if they are presented with an opportunity to articulate the maltreatment of those socially signified to be like themself, and yet choose to not use the opportunity to provide relevant testimony.

The only way for us to experience society as such is through dialogical action and engaging in conversations which expose us to new social ideas and realities. By engaging with testimony and dialogue we are allowed the opportunity to both express our concerns and learn from members of society unlike ourselves and thus mutually work together towards establishing a new reality of shared humanity. There could be a dedicated space for that, a space where one engages with and learns from other people. A place where humans are made persons. Where experiences, often hidden through design in place or speech, are enquired after and accounted for. Where social problems can be laid bare, with each participant offering their own

knowledge, experience and understanding to the group, and potential remedies or recontextualisations are opened and discussed.[89]

For Asmal, “this process, this dialogue, is in and of itself a value - a South African value - to be cherished" (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 18). When students "author" their own moral narratives and share them both with other students and with teachers, they assume authority and responsibility for their thoughts, feelings, and actions, and by representing their experiences through narrative are encouraged to reflect critically. The purpose of this process is not to deposit a chain of new "values" into children's heads in the style of the schooling of Apartheid education. “We have learned, from the past, the dangers of legislating a value system and turning it into an ideology” (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. 9). Instead, this process aims to generate discussion and debate, acknowledging that discussion and debate – that is, dialogue – are values in themselves. For Kader Asmal, these are "defining values … that are at the core of our South African identity” (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2001, p. ibid). Indeed, as seen with the advent of the Congress and its Charter, and our negotiated liberation, the process of dialogue has shown itself to be an essential part of the South African project.

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[89] The *iiNthetho ZoBomi* project headed by the Allan Grey Centre for Leadership Ethics at Rhodes University is an example of what such a dedicated space and programme may look like.

Conclusion

South Africa is a nation caught amidst a liminal transition, from an Apartheid order of authoritarian exclusion, inequality, and injustice and towards a new society: The Rainbow Nation. A key idea behind the Rainbow Nation - a place of equality, diversity, and unity – is that it is a South Africa where everyone is free and, thus, one that everyone wants.

Freedom, as has been argued in this work, is related to the ability to critically understand and change the world. However, for societies of inequality, exclusion, and segregation, such as Apartheid, freedom is elusive for some, if not most, people. The moral intuition here is that inequality, exclusion, and segregation produce adverse social and moral outcomes, particularly by dividing and isolating people from each other (physically through design, zoning, or outright segregation or through establishing discourse that alienates each from others); they are rendered unable to notice morally-relevant facts about themselves and their environments that call on them for ethical attention and action. In this way, they can be made to fail to recognise each other's humanity and see their issues and concerns as mutually related and thus become prevented from organising collectively as an oppressed society towards their liberation.

As a response to the moral rejection of the South African dispensations that came before - Apartheid and Colonialism - the Rainbow Nation represents the hope and promise that "never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another" (Mandela, 1994). The RNP is a call for the recognition of all people as deserving of rights, dignity, and the means to flourish. By couching the movement in terms of 'freedom for all', by including black people, women and homosexuals among other marginalised groups, and by advocating for the "voteless", "underprivileged", and "rightless" so broadly, the RNP opens up the discourse of freedom to be more than just about the rejection of racial segregation, and colonialism: if 'freedom for one' is predicated on 'freedom for all', then it seems that the struggle is broader, and must give attention to (all) other forms of oppression:

> In the context of unfair discrimination, the interests of the community lie in the recognition of the inherent dignity of every human being and the elimination of all forms of discrimination. This aspect of the interests of the community can be gathered from the preamble to the Constitution, in which the people of this country declared [that

> they want to] heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.[90]

Being South African in the post-Apartheid dispensation, I have argued, means being engaged with the RNP, that is, standing morally opposed to segregation and inequality, as well as being committed as a society to the creation of a nation based on diversity, inclusivity, and unity. As previously established, moral blindness stands to threaten all moral projects. But given that our *moral* project is now our *national* project, then it seems we could in fact fail at both. In fact, we could fail as South Africans in two ways; firstly, as a society, we could fail to create a social environment that meets our moral aspirations of ensuring freedom and justice for all; and secondly, and importantly, we could fail at transforming ourselves into the sort of people that befit a society like the Rainbow Nation – Rainbow Citizens. South African identity, therefore, is just as caught in liminal transition as the nation we intend to build. And liminality exposes a space of uncertainty and precarity, where the knowledge and instincts that were learned before can no longer be relied on to produce good outcomes in the new situation. This, I have argued, is a space where moral blindness stands to take root and where it can most potently undermine our moral project. If this is so, then, if we are not careful, we stand not only to fail to create the South Africa we wish to live in but also to fail to become the South Africans we aim(ed) to be. It is in this way that moral blindness stands as a threat to national identity: we could fail to become South Africans.

The role that education has to play in the attainment of the Rainbow Nation dream is clear. In taking the experiences and testimony of marginalised people seriously, we create the possibility to engage in dialogue with each other as a society. By creating space for discursive exchange through dialogue, we can become better at relating to and humanising each other. And in so doing, we help overcome our moral blindness by cultivating our awareness of facts about our society that are relevant for our personal and national moral projects and how we can work to create the moral society that we desire.

The RNP, I have argued, has interesting implications for South African national identity. *Being* South African, in this view, entails membership in a plural subject connected by a joint commitment towards the creation of the Rainbow Nation, and not just simply being born in the

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[90] Hoffmann v South African Airways (CCT17/00) [2000] ZACC 17; 2001 (1) SA 1; 2000 (11) BCLR 1211; [2000] 12 BLLR 1365 (CC) (28 September 2000)

bordered territory of South Africa. For collective moral projects of the scope that South Africa has embarked on towards creating The Rainbow Nation, the self-transformation of each South African is essential. This is because the success of the grander national moral project depends primarily not on State or government efforts but on each of our individual commitments towards our own personal transformation into becoming people compatible with the Rainbow Nation – Rainbow Citizens.

This we must do both individually and collectively. For what is at stake is our moral selves, and our ever-growing nation at large. If we do not, we risk failing to become the moral people and society that we aspire to become, and thus, ultimately, fail to become South Africans.

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