

VERE DEUS VERE HOMO

A Critical Assessment of Christological Discourse
Concluding with a Brief Appraisal of
Selected Christological Hymns

by

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Thesis submitted in part-fulfilment
of the requirements for the Degree of
BACHELOR OF DIVINITY
at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa.

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, BACKGROUND AND METHOD

"We preach Christ crucified, a stumbling-block to Jews and folly to Gentiles" (1). In so writing, St. Paul stated in its briefest form the scandal of the Christian faith. To human reason it is nonsense to suppose that a man who grew up and lived like other men, and who ultimately died on a cross, could at the same time be the Son of God, equal to God, eternal like God, and Creator of the world with Him.

Contrary to the painfully-evolved and carefully formulated conclusion reached by philosophers, that God is one, and diametrically opposed to the monotheistic divine revelation given to Israel, the belief that Jesus was Son of God and equal to His Father seemed, when it was first postulated, to imply some kind of flaw in the indivisibility of God. Men were being asked to believe that they could see God incarnate, that is, in a being of flesh and blood. Yet all our faith hovers around this precise point.

In Karl Barth's analogy, Jesus Christ is the sheer perpendicular from on high, descending directly to touch our world as a tangent at a single point. In Him two planes intersect, one of which is known, the other unknown. The known plane is God's creation, fallen out of harmony and union with Him. The unknown plane, now gradually revealing itself, is the realm of the Father, the world of grace for sinners. But, as Barth remarks, "the line of intersection is not self-evident". Jesus of Nazareth is the point on that line at which the relation between God and us becomes observable and observed. This single point is most definite

(1) I Corinthians 1:23 (R.S.V.).

and unique. "The years A.D. 1-30 are the era of revelation and disclosure". (1) Then it was that the coming of the Word happened once and for all. But what could have prompted belief in such apparent folly, and what sort of power did Jesus possess over His followers to impel them to proclaim this "stumbling-block" to the world? (2)

The stage on which the divine drama was enacted was the Jewish world. The One God impressed Himself upon the faith of the Jews predominantly as a revealed moral religious value. His Name was "Yahweh", "the One who is"; and any claim to "the Name" or any presumption to divine dignity, was a blasphemy punishable only by death. It was in such surroundings that a Man appeared who very gradually made a claim to be God. Around Him were grouped certain individuals who remained united after His Death and Resurrection, willing to sacrifice their lives for their new faith. What brought this about? How did these disciples bring themselves to believe in the mystery? How did they express it? How did they preserve their native Hebrew monotheism and at the same time declare the Godhood of their Lord? These and related questions are of crucial contemporary importance, and will form part of our discussion in this thesis.

We are able from the New Testament writings to perceive an outline of the development of the disciples' faith. Such majesty and power were apparent in the Man from Nazareth that the disciples could not but be strikingly aware of moving in the presence of a living mystery. Jesus taught them slowly. The complete revelation of His true nature was kept for much later, held in abeyance until He had undergone the agony of Golgotha and had been raised from the dead. Only then were their eyes opened to their Master's exaltation and

(1) Karl Barth: The Epistle to the Romans, p. 29.
(2) II Corinthians 5:20,21; Eph. 2:8-10 (R.S.V.).

glory. The coming of the Holy Spirit brought to their remembrance all that they had been taught. They reflected with fresh understanding upon the words they had heard and the miracles they had seen. The Law and the Prophets became lucid and began to abound in rich presentiments. A radical challenge now presented itself to them, and a complete upheaval of their deeply-ingrained religious attitude started to take place. They admitted openly that God had a Son who was this same Jesus, and that the Jesus they had known as a man was God Himself "from whom are all things". (1) Few acts of faith have been more momentous than theirs.

It is not possible for any concept to be clearly known until a medium has been found through which it can be discussed. Thus it was that the faith received by the apostles as a living seed had of necessity to find a vocabulary so that it could be made explicit and be nurtured. The only conceivable terminology was one which arose from the disciples' normal turn of mind and from the ways of expression and thought to which they were accustomed. This was so of all early attempted statements of the Person of our Lord, from the days of the apostles to the Council of Chalcedon in A.D. 451, and beyond. The apostles expressed the astounding new-found fact in terms borrowed from the Law, the Prophets, and the Wisdom literature. This content, although fulfilling the immediate need, was later to prove inadequate as the small Church grew and began to embrace peoples from different backgrounds and cultures.

This thesis begins with a review of the classical statements regarding the doctrine of the Person of our Lord, His perfect Godhood and His perfect manhood, as they are formulated in the great ecumenical creeds of Nicea and Chalcedon.

(1) I Corinthians 8:6 (R.S.V.).

The ensuing discussion will bear particular reference to the linguistic, philosophical and psychological terminology in which the doctrine has come to be couched. Christology progressed from the impact made upon the disciples by a distinguished Rabbi, and from the recognition of divine mystery living in their very midst, to their acceptance of the Lord as risen from the dead, as existing before all creation, as Son of God, and as God Himself. God's method of instructing His children was such as to lead them from the mere hint of a mystery to the clear statement of faith in Jesus, the Son of God.

The phrase "Son of God" means the ontological sonship of someone possessing the divine nature because of his eternal generation from the Father. The doctrine had a long and turbulent history before it arrived at this stage of precision, however, during which process of evolution the sonship to which it makes reference was understood in the looser sense of a sonship in the moral, not metaphysical, order of reality. The title "Son of God" was applied in such passages as Job 1:6; 2:1; 38:7 and Psalm 29:1 to the angels, but this cannot mean a share in God's nature, as that would have been thoroughly distasteful to Jewish monotheism. The phrase here pointed rather to an intimacy of a special kind between the heavenly beings and the God whose "court" they constitute. Elsewhere the phrase is applied to men, as where Yahweh called Israel His "first-born son". (1) Apparently this is a matter of adoptive or moral sonship, the effect of the loving choice by which God singled out His people. The choice was, moreover, one which the Hebrews were called upon to honour by behaving as sons of God.

What is the difference in connotation when the title

(1) Exodus 4:22.

"Son of God" is applied to our Lord? This will comprise a major section of our discussion in chapter two. The title itself does not suggest the source of the peculiar intimacy between the Son and God. It could well be a relationship of knowledge, of loving obedience, of service, or of nature. We should be careful to take account here of this literary tradition in the Bible if we are to appreciate the term "Son of God" when it occurs in the Gospel. Certain scholars would look for the key of its meaning in other Eastern religions or in Greco-Roman culture; but they do this at the risk of sacrificing the authority of the Gospel tradition, taking it as the creation of the Hellenistic Christian communities.

Our Lord revealed a relationship between His Father and Himself so extraordinary and unique as to have the effect of placing Him on the same divine level as the Father. Herein lies the impact of those sayings wherein He asserted that He was not only "a son" but "the Son". In comparing Himself to the Son of Man in the book of Daniel, He gave the title "Son of God" a new, transcendental, and non-metaphorical meaning which the strict monotheism of the Jews found intolerable.

St. Paul certainly believed in the pre-existence of Christ as Son of God and as God. In his zeal to assert Christ's complete superiority over all the orders of heaven, Paul brings himself to state specifically our Lord's transcendent origin. Christ, he says, transcends the created order, for that order was His own creation: "He exists before all things". (1) This is a sentence which implies a temporal, but an even more important ontological priority. The entire world was of the created order, but Christ was no "creature"; He was "begotten before every creature". In Colossians, Paul repeatedly asserts that everything was created through

(1) Colossians 1:17.

Christ: hence he cannot possibly be saying that Christ is the first of creatures. The genitive, πάσης κτίσεως, must in this phrase be a genitive of comparison, governed implicitly by the word πρώτος (first) in Πρωτόκος (firstborn), and this word "first" must then have a temporal sense, namely, "before". Thus Christ is the uncreated Son through whom all creation came to be. Clearly then, this Son, begotten of God before all ages, can be none other than God Himself. Paul asserts this with force in the hymn in Philippians. Christ was "of divine condition"; (1) or, to use a phrase even closer to the Greek, He was "in the form of God": yet He emptied Himself, taking the form of a slave, becoming like men, humbly refusing to cling to or depend upon that "equality with God" which was His nature and His right, and which could never be discarded.

It is convenient to quote here in summary some words of M. Cerfaux: (2) "Outside His humanity Christ has no other state of being than a divine state of being. He has His being in God; this means that He has a state of being like God, equal to God; consequently, He has a strict right, a natural right to the privileges of God - majesty, glory, power over the universe". His humility, says Cerfaux, consists in the fact that He refused to make manifest these divine attributes other than by the way of submission and obedience.

We have started above to outline the biblical basis from which it is imperative that any Christological discussion must begin. The writers of the New Testament bear witness both to our Lord's human life and to His divine authority. The authors of the Synoptic Gospels imply the conviction of St. Paul regarding the divine authority of Christ. St. Mark's

(1) Philippians 2:6.

(2) M. Cerfaux: Le Christ dans le théologie de S. Paul, p. 291 (in Gelin: Son and Saviour).

Gospel, for example, indicates that "the whole ministry of Jesus is the advent precisely of those things which were sighed for in the Messianic hope". (1) And what holds true of the Gospel of Mark applies also to the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. But this high Christology is obviously already in their sources, the individual stories which may well have circulated separately.

The Fourth Gospel in particular brings our Lord's humanity and divinity into sharp relief, and together with the writings of St. Paul and the Epistle to the Hebrews, it depicts Jesus as God in His self-revelation. St. John's Gospel presents what is probably the most exalted picture of Jesus the Christ to be found anywhere in the New Testament. It is therefore to a brief consideration of the Christology of the Fourth Gospel that we now turn as we conclude this introductory examination of the biblical foundation to our subject.

St. John employs the Father-Son terminology with far greater frequency than the Synoptists, whose usage he develops. His Gospel shows unmistakably that Father and Son possess the oneness of mutual indwelling and mutual presence. Vision of one unavoidably entails vision of both. To see Jesus is to see His Father. (2) They are both the object of a single act of faith: "He who believes in me believes not in me but in him who sent me ... the Father and I are one". (3) F. Godet has remarked (4) that the "we" in this phrase is in itself an unprecedented claim which is matched by an astounding promise: "If a man loves me ... my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our home with

(1) Hoskyns and Davey: The Riddle of the New Testament, p. 119.
(2) John 14:9.
(3) John 12:44; 10:30.
(4) F. Godet Commentaire sur l'Evangile de saint Jean, ad. loc.
(quoted in Gelin: Son and Saviour.)

him". (1) Many efforts have been made to explain away these phrases as formularies drawn from Greek mystical thought, and to regard them as declarations made by our Lord about His mission. But the message and the work of the Son are inseparable from His being. The message of Jesus lay primarily in the revelation of what He was, the Son of God, and in the manifestation of "the glory as of the only Son from the Father". (2)

John's Gospel did not, of course, define our Lord's nature any more than did the other writings of the New Testament. The title "Son of God", with its concomitant privileges, seems to refer globally to the man Jesus, without any sharp distinction of natures in Him. The bond of transcendent unity between the Father and Jesus is described, rather than defined, in terms of a relationship of mutual knowledge and love. It would be entirely arbitrary to deny this description the force of a true revelation about His being. To speak of "the Word" as applied to our Lord is not purely functional, telling us nothing about the divine personality of Him who bears it, for this would lead to a false distinction between our Lord's mission and His being. M.E. Boismard (3) ably states the climax to which St. John's Gospel rises: Christ's work, he says, "is to reveal God to men, but this is itself founded upon the very nature of Christ; before all revelation He was already in a certain sense the Word of God".

The Gospel of John is faithful to the earliest Christian tradition, and therefore cannot be called a new creation. But John's work certainly does represent a most advanced stage of reflection upon all the material it has in

(1) John 14:23.

(2) John 1:14.

(3) M.E. Boismard: St. John's Prologue, p. 94.

common with his predecessors. This is proved by the fact that the Gospel contains elements of a very primitive Christology. Alongside the most sublime declarations concerning our Lord's Nature, John uses titles of comparatively great humility; these too bear the imprint of reality. Jesus is, for example, not only the divine Word, but also "the chosen of God", "the Messiah", "the prophet". Finally, Jesus was "the Lord and Master". Such titles show up as a misrepresentation such statements as that made by A. Loisy (1) who says of John's Gospel: "The author knows only a liturgical Christ, object of Christian worship."

From the very beginning, then, all New Testament Christology shows the aspects both of the Person and the Work of Jesus. It is from His nature that He is known in His work. The early Christians achieved their perception through the life of Jesus, through the presence of the Kyrios, and through reflection. These were the sources of early Christian Christological conviction, and for the modern man too there are and can be no others.

The various types of Jewish and Hellenistic speculations and myths which influenced the expression and the progress of the early Church's Christology were all subordinated to a Christological framework which derived its character from a Heilsgeschichte. This structure centres from the very start in history. The Christology of the early Church is based upon the words and deeds, the self-consciousness and vocation, the passion and death of the historical Jesus, although it was only in the light of the Easter experience and of the power of the Spirit in the Church that the New Testament understanding of the Person and Work of Jesus was finally formulated.

(1) A. Loisy: Le Quatrième Evangile, p. 56.

We are now ready to proceed, in chapter one, to an objective examination of the great Councils of Nicea and Chalcedon, and in the second chapter to a critical analysis of the Nicene and Chalcedonian phraseology concerning the Person of Christ. Chapter three will show the influence on twentieth-century Christological thought of certain recent philosophical and psychological trends which are playing an increasingly important rôle in contemporary doctrinal reformulations of our Lord's Person. In the fourth chapter I shall state some considerations which seem to me to be of profound significance for a modern restatement of Christology; and chapter five will contain discussion, on the foregoing basis, of selected Christological hymns to be found in the Revised Church Hymnary of the Church of Scotland.

CHAPTER ONE

Nicea and Chalcedon : a Survey

The Council of Nicea (A.D. 325) heralded the reconciliation between Church and Empire which took place under Constantine I.

Nicea attempted to articulate in theological terms a faith which had been held from the beginning, and in so doing laid bare the problem inherent in all Christological debates, namely:

What is the relation of the divine and the human in Christ? Giving rise to this basic problem was the widely-held belief that the Word shares the same divine nature with the Father. The primary issue before the Council was not, however, the unity of the Godhead, but the co-eternity of the Son with the Father.

During the preceding centuries it had been the general Christian belief that Jesus Christ was divine as well as human. The New Testament writers had considered Christ as pre-existent, and had attributed to Him a two-fold order of being, "according to the flesh" (κατὰ σάρκα), that is, as man, and "according to the spirit" (κατὰ πνεῦμα), that is, as God. The Creed explicitly states that the Son is begotten, not made. Neither is He made from nothing, as is a creature, nor is He liable to development or moral change; and the Father did not precede the Son as in a time series. The Son, as begotten, is "out of the Father's substance" and is "of the same substance as the Father". The second of these phrases owed its inclusion to Constantine's express wish; but both caused a good deal of embarrassment to the Origenistic majority at the Council.

Most of the bishops present came from Syria and Asia Minor. They found in Eusebius of Caesarea (A.D. 260-340) a trusty leader and spokesman. Although Eusebius came to the

Council with a somewhat equivocal character, his teaching may justly be taken as representative of the prevailing doctrine of the Person of Christ and of the Trinity.

But from whence did Nicea derive its Christological terminology? What was the history of Christological dogma which lay behind the Council? Of necessity we must first turn to a brief discussion of this development.

With Origen (A.D. c. 130-c. 200) belief in Christ is placed in a cosmic setting. The influence of Origen was felt strongly until the time of Nicea, and for that reason it is imperative to undertake a detailed account of his Christology. His teaching appears to be of even greater moment when it is remembered that the significant Christological controversy in which Eusebius was involved at Nicea flared up in the context of Alexandrian theology, still dominated by Origen more than fifty years after his death. Moreover, the symbol formulated by Eusebius for use in his own church and presented by him at the Council was that upon which the Nicene Creed finally came to be based.

In the first book of De Principiis Origen begins from the words of Proverbs 8 : 22ff on the Wisdom of God, which he then equates with the Second Person of the Trinity. The Wisdom of God is not an impersonal attribute of God, but exists hypostatically. God could never have existed without His Wisdom. Hence it was ridiculous to suppose that there was a point at which the Wisdom, or Son, came into existence. Origen thus approaches his conception of the Son as eternally begotten of the Father, and yet as having independent being, "different from and inferior to the Father", (1) to the extent

(1) De Orat. xv.1. Ουσία and its synonym ὑπόστασις are here taken by Origen in Aristotle's first sense of "concrete, individual being".

of being a "second God". (1)

Despite this strong subordination of Son to Father, the Son, as begotten, is of the same essence as the Father.

Origen was willing to use the word *ἑμoόvυριoς*, as a large number of his disciples were not, in Aristotle's second sense of a generic existence which was capable of being shared by many. It is plain that Christian categories are here being used to clothe what is essentially the Neo-platonic conception of a *δεύτερος θεός* whose function was to bridge the gap between God and creation. "It remains for us", writes Origen, "to seek a mediator between God and creation". (2) To pose the problem in this form presupposes that the solution will be ditheistic. Origen's failure to achieve a conception of God which was in the long run wholly acceptable lay in his insistence on the objective existence of the divine Persons, while he placed "their point of unity only at one end of a line of transmission". (3) So it was that "a debased and misunderstood Origenism of a strongly binitarian character became for nearly a century the orthodoxy of Greek Christianity". (4)

(1) In Contra Celsum, v.39, Origen calls the Son of God a "second God" (*δεύτερος θεός*), as Justin did; and elsewhere, Commentary on John, Book x, chapter XXXVII (21), distinguishes him numerically (*τῷ ἀριθμῷ*) from the Father, and insists that while He is of the same substance (*οὐσίᾳ*) as the Father, He is another than He *ὑποκειμένῳ* (by being subject or subordinate to Him) and *κατὰ ὑπόστασιν* (by virtue of His Person).

(2) De Princ., ii.6.1; c. Cels. iii.34

(3) Prestige: Fathers and Heretics, p. 86f.

(4) Green in Rawlinson: Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation, p. 252.

Some have seen in Origen's teaching one of the sources of Arianism; and we find Origenism of a sort also in the early Athanasius and his bishop Alexander, and in the middle party of Eusebius of Caesarea. Origen's influence extended in three directions which it is important for us to consider. Each played a distinct rôle at Nicea.

First, Arianism was an extreme left-wing development of Origenism, (1) and was transmitted through the rationalising teacher Lucian of Antioch. (2) The theology developed the subordination of the Son to the point at which His divinity was denied. Arius explicitly rejected an οὐσίαν common to Father and Son not simply in the sense of concrete existence, but in Origen's sense of denying a common generic nature. The Son, Arius held, was not begotten of the substance of the Father, but was created ex nihilo, and was thus a creature, however superior He might be to all other existing creatures. Furthermore, the Son's existence was not considered necessary to the full conception of Godhead, for He was begotten as an act of will by the Father. Yet this could not be described as an act in time, because that would compromise the extra-temporal isolation and pure spirituality of the Father. And so Arius found himself unable to say "there was a time when the Son was not", but only "there was when the Son was not". The phrase ἦν ποτὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἔν in fact does not contain or imply the word χρόνος. (3) It follows that in such a system only the Father can properly be designated "God".

(1) Loofs: Leitfaden, p. 234 (quoted in Wallace-Hadrill: Eusebius of Caesarea, p. 125.)

(2) It is possible that Arius was further "left than the Lucian school. Cf. G. Bardy: Récherches sur Lucien d' Antioche et son école (quoted in Wallace-Hadrill: Op. cit., p. 125.)

(3) Athanasius: Contra. Ar. 1.14 Cf. Gwatkin: Studies of Arianism, p. 24, cited by Stevenson: Studies, p. 76.

This attempt to defend the conception of divine purity by emptying it of all Trinitarian associations was an exaggeration of one aspect of Origen's thought. The emphatic statement in the Nicene Creed that the Son "was made flesh, becoming man", was later interpreted by such men as Theodore of Mopsuestia (1) as a device to rebut the Arian notion that our Lord possessed a defective humanity. It would appear, however, that Theodore missed the point. The basic purpose of the Arians seems to have been to stress the reality of our Lord's Incarnation against Docetism and Gnosticism.

Secondly, the right wing of fourth-century Origenism is represented by Alexander of Antioch. The Son is still the intermediary deus ex machina of Origen and is a separate ὑπόστασις from the Father. "In regard to His οὐσία" however, "He is like the Father", (2) and may not be spoken of as a creature insofar as eternity may be posited of Him. This was roughly the position from which Athanasius began, and which underlay his early De Incarnatione.

A third line of descent from Origen is to be traced through Dionysius of Alexandria, who was probably the chief Alexandrian influence on Eusebius of Caesarea. Our scant evidence suggests that it was the insistence of Dionysius on the three distinct οὐσίαι within the Trinity which brought him into sharp conflict with Dionysius of Rome, laying him open to the charge of tritheism. The Sabellian connotations of προσῶπα made this word distasteful to him because it could indicate that the Persons of the Trinity were little more than disguises assumed by God at various times. Dionysius refused to use the term ὁμοούσιος on the ground that it was unscriptural. As a stream is to its source, he says, so is the Son

(1) Hom. cat. 5, 17.

(2) Ep. 1.12.

to the Father, and yet He was not eternally begotten in the Origenist sense. This is the view to which Eusebius' theology most closely approximates.

The doctrinal system of Eusebius has been described by Dorner as "chameleon-hued", a mirror of the unresolved problems of the contemporary Church. He was avidly anti-Arian on the main points of discussion at Nicea. Eusebius never lost sight of the Father's transcendent purity, and he describes Him as "the supreme God". The divine Person who addressed the patriarchs, however, was the Son not the Father. This attitude prevails throughout the work of Eusebius and reflects the Platonic emphasis of any writer standing in the Alexandrian tradition. Intermediate between God and the world is the Λόγος, who takes so marked a place of subordination to the Father as to give substance to Marcellus' accusations of ditheism. (1) Eusebius subsequently tried hard to raise the Λόγος to a place resembling that held by the Son in the Nicene Definition; but he was not altogether successful.

Like Origen, Eusebius distinguishes the οὐσία of the Son from that of the Father, in that they are separate individual existences. But unlike Origen and following Dionysius of Alexandria, he does not use the word ὁμοούσιος, as it postulates too great a relationship between Persons. Eusebius rejects outright the Arian term κτίζειν and insists instead that the Son is γεννητός. The Λόγος, he said, was not a κτίσμα like the other creatures, and there was never a time when He was not, although he speaks of the Father as pre-existent before the Son, and the Son as a second cause and second existence. (2) Eusebius regards the Son as "subsisting through Him (that is, the Father), being in truth His Son, God from God, light from light, and life from life,

(1) Eusebius: C. Marc. 1.4.

(2) De Eccl. Theol. 1.8.

begotten ($\chi\epsilon\upsilon\nu\eta\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$) of the Father according to His purposes..., not subsisting in the same way as the other creatures, nor living a life comparable to theirs who were created by Him, but alone begotten of the Father Himself". (1) This is distinctively Nicene. He was as concerned as were the Monists to make provision for the unity of the Godhead: but whereas they started from the Unity and refused to let it be impaired by the plurality of Persons, so Eusebius, as a pluralist, began from the point of clear differentiation of Persons and conceived the Unity as one of derivation or as an identity of will. Eusebius did not follow the Arian use of the preposition $\epsilon\upsilon\pi\acute{o}$ (by), but merely uses $\epsilon\kappa$ (from) in order to make clear that the Son was not merely created by the Father, but was begotten from Him.

What then is the relationship of Son to Father? Nicea forced Eusebius to accept the term $\delta\mu\omicron\delta\omicron\tau\iota\omega\varsigma$, although he had never employed it in his own work: he would make use of no term nearer than the Pauline word "image". Marcellus, however, later took Eusebius to task by pointing out that the image of God is one thing, God Himself another. If God be the infinite, transcendent, unutterable, how can He have an image? The emperor's image is not in fact the emperor, and the analogy renders the Son wholly different from the Father in respect of $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$. In rejecting $\delta\mu\omicron\delta\omicron\tau\iota\omega\varsigma$ because of its Sabellian overtones, Eusebius was forsaking Origen to follow Dionysius of Alexandria. He again follows Dionysius and forsakes Origen on the question of the mode of the begetting of the Son. Origen had said that the eternal generation of the $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ was a process, but Eusebius saw it as an act of the Father's will: it was to him an event rather than a process.

(1) Ibid.

Eusebius was again to echo Nicea in writing later that the Son was "begotten of the Father before all ages". (1) But we might ask how he could conceive of a single act of will which occurred apart from time.

At Nicea, therefore, Arianism was confronted not merely by another form of Origenism, but by something far stronger and more primitive. What Arius met at Nicea was the combined forces of the theological traditions of Asia Minor and the West. In Asia Minor the tradition went back through Paul of Samosata, Irenaeus, and Ignatius, in the West through Hippolytus, Novatian, and Tertullian. This line of teaching held as its basis the conception of the Trinity as being unius substantiae, ὁμοούσιος, whose Persons comprised the Trinity from eternity, the Son eternally present in the Father and the Spirit eternally present in the Son. Alexandrian minds, schooled in the three ὑποστάσεις of Origen, looked upon this as tantamount to an identification of Persons. Paul of Samosata had been condemned in 286 for asserting that the Son had no independent οὐσία apart from the Father, nor the Spirit apart from the Son, and he used the term ὁμοούσιος to describe the relationship. It was this conception, held in part by the East and in toto by the West, which defeated Arius at Nicea when it was expounded by the Western Hosius of Cordova.

The writings of other second-century Apologists indicate that the assimilation of the notion of the divine Λόγος with the religious ideal of Sonship, as shown forth in the Person of the incarnate Christ, had come to be of prime importance for Christian thought.

(1) De Eccl. Theol. 1.8.

For Irenaeus, "the Father is the invisible of the Son, as the Son is the invisible of the Father". "God makes all things by measure and order: the infinite Father God reveals His Measure in the Son, for the Son is the Measure of the Father". Shortly after Irenaeus' death, however, Monarchianism began to seep into Rome. The basic idea on which this theology rested was the sole deity of the one and only God the Father. To speak of "one God" meant not only the exclusion of polytheism, but the absolute unity of the divine nature. In the light of this conception, the Monarchians required a clear statement of what was meant by the assertions: (i) Jesus is God; (ii) Jesus is the Son of God.

The Adoptionists believed that Jesus began life with an entirely human personality. The divine $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ was the divine activity in relation to the man Jesus, who thus became Son of God by "adoption".

According to the Adoptionist Monarchians, whose chief exponent had been Paul of Samosata, the divine $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ was a rational and spiritual energy, issuing from God and acting on the human Jesus from the beginning of His personal existence with increasing power, raising Him to be Christ and Son of God and Saviour of the world.

Modalist Monarchianism had lasting effects. Probably its most prominent advocate had been Sabellius, the cardinal principle of whose Christology was that during His earthly life Jesus was the direct embodiment of God. But his doctrine went further. He believed that the three manifestations of Deity were in some way subject to succession in time. Hence the absolute "unity" of God admitted diversity of action in relation to finite or created beings, but it excluded any difference, within the divine nature, of the kind which the Church later called "personal".

In the pre-Nicene era the West was quicker in formulating a mature Christology than the East. Hippolytus, like his teacher Irenaeus, took as his model the Johannine "Word made flesh". The Λόγος "became man really, not in appearance or in a manner of speaking." (1) Hippolytus had a firmer grasp than most of his predecessors of the duality of natures in our Lord as attested by the difference of manifestation and operation. Furthermore, he has an interesting text (2) in which he states: "Neither the Λόγος without flesh and by Himself was Son in the full sense...nor could the flesh exist (ὑποστάναι) by itself apart from the Λόγος, since it has its support (σύστασιν) in the Λόγος". Hippolytus is here stressing his view that the Sonship, properly speaking, dated from the Incarnation, and he adds that the Λόγος was the Creator of His own flesh. But the introduction of the fateful term ὑποστάναι (cognitive ἐπέστασις) into Christological discussion merits notice as does also the implied suggestion that the Person of the Word is the basis of the God-Man.

Tertullian used the term substantia to refer to a mode of concrete existence. He therefore affirmed, as between the Father and the Son, the distinctions of their Persons in the unity of their substance. By this he was endeavouring to formulate a conception of unity which would avoid the extremes either of absolute identity or no real unity at all.

Clement of Alexandria concluded that Christ, the divine Λόγος, was in the world before He appeared in the

(1) C. Noet. 4; 17.

(2) C. Noet. 18.

human person of Jesus. (1)

The Christological section of Eusebius' creed states:

"And we believe in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Λόγος of God, God from God, Light from Light, Life from Life, Son only-begotten, first-born of every creature, before all ages begotten from the Father, by whom also all things were made, who for our salvation was made flesh and lived as a citizen among men".

The Arians would have accepted this formula, knowing that they could have put their own interpretation on its terms. But the Athanasius-group insisted on drawing up a new creed containing terms which would categorically exclude Arianism.

When the Creed of Nicea was compiled from that of Eusebius, the following phrases were eliminated:

1. λόγον. This represented what the Council felt to be the confused and nebulous Eusebian Christology. Instead of this it was considered better to stress the Sonship of our Lord.
2. πρωτότοκον πάτης κτίσεως and πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων ἔκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεγεννημένον. It was possible to interpret these phrases along Arian lines.
3. ἐν ἀνθρώποις πολιτευόμενον. This phrase was correctly thought to be too vague, and does not express explicitly the true manhood of Jesus.

There was modification of several phrases:

1. τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ.

(1) Tertullian: Exhortation to the Greeks (Preface).

2. γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενῆ (instead of λόγον, and later in the Creed υἱὸν μονογενῆ).
3. ἐνανθρωπήσαντα.

Only three phrases proved to be completely new additions:

1. τούτεστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς.
2. γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα.
3. ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί.

It is clear that to Eusebius the Son did indeed derive His being from the Father as the image does from its object; but the orthodox bishops at Nicea would have pushed the analogy much further than this. What the Council proposed was, in fact, not a creed founded upon Eusebian theology plus ὁμοούσιος, but a theology which to Eusebius was entirely foreign and very distasteful. Eusebius had only the verbal assurance of the Council that ὁμοούσιος was not to be forced to a Sabellian extreme; and it was what seemed to him the realisation of this fear which provoked his violent opposition to Marcellus a decade after Nicea. The fact that so many wavered between Sabellianism and Subordinationism had made it imperative even before the Council that fuller and precise definitions should be formulated. It is Martin Werner's contention that every significant theologian in the pre-Nicene period had actually presented a Subordinationist Christology. (1)

The position adopted at the Council by Athanasius of Alexandria and the Nicene party which he led, is of great

(1) M. Werner: The Formation of Christian Dogma, p. 234.

Christological moment. Arius and his followers treated the two orders of existence, the merely created and the absolutely uncreated, as together exhaustive of all being. This, said Athanasius, was to miss the essence of Christianity. The introduction of the idea and ideal of Sonship to God is the first principle of the Christian religion, historically realised only in the Incarnation. Against both moderate and extreme Arians, Athanasius insisted that Father, Son, and Spirit possess one and the same nature. (1) In reference to the words "I and my Father are one", (2) Athanasius affirms that they are one, not as one Being twice named, as if the same Being were at one time Father and at another time Son (as according to Sabellius). "They are One, because their nature is One; and they are two, because the Father is Father and the Son is Son, not as a Being external to the Father, but as sharing His characteristic nature". (3) In the Fourth Oration Against the Arians he says: "The Son is one with the Father because He is from the Father: the inseparable union consists not in two things being the same, as this is that, but through the Son being in the Father and the Father in the Son". Athanasius evidently believed that this affirmation, rightly understood, excluded Sabellianism in stating, not that "I am the Father", but that "I am the Son of God"; and that it excluded Arianism in saying that "I and the Father are one". (4)

It is clear that Athanasius was concerned to avoid either of two opposite extremes: on one side, that there is no difference between God and Christ: the Incarnation was God em-

(1) Athanasius: De Synodis.

(2) John 10:30.

(3) Athanasius: Third Oration Against the Arians, XIII. iv.

(4) The reference here is apparently to the words which follow John 10:30 as compared with John 10:36.

bodied; and on the other side, that between God and Christ there is all the difference between the absolutely uncreate and the "creature".

Athanasius was aware that even the idea of "sonship" in reference to Deity is an ideal symbol. He argued that in human experience the ideas which find rational expression themselves become more clear and distinct. All finite spiritual beings increase only by self-giving. Since Deity is not the finite but the perfect and complete, in Deity there is the eternal completion of the Being of the Father in the Son.

The Cappadocian Fathers were largely responsible for making the Nicene terminology acceptable and for paving the way for Chalcedonian Christology. With their work the main lines of classical Christian theology were laid down. It is especially in the letters of Gregory Nazianzen that the terms for later Christological discussion were set forth. "What was not assumed (by Christ)," he stresses, "was not redeemed". Few of the Nicene Fathers had any difficulty in the idea of God the Word appearing on earth and taking to Himself a human body. Their problem was rather in seeing how the divine manifestation, in which manhood was added to Godhood, could have occurred in a complete human nature. In this connection, the term Θεοτόκος is first formally used with a reverse emphasis from that which it carried later. To say that Mary bore the incarnate God is a way of saying that Christ was really divine. It is also a way of saying that God, in becoming man, really submitted to the experience of birth. This appears to be Gregory's purpose in using in dogmatic statement a phrase which probably already had devotional associations.

The Cappadocians employed the formula *μία οὐσία κατὰ τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις* which made it possible, as it had not been before, to stress equally both the oneness of nature and the

distinction of Persons in the Trinity. The words οὐσία, ὑπόστασις had hitherto been used as synonyms. They were used in the Nicene Creed, and Athanasius drew no distinction between them. The Cappadocians, however, following usage current among the later Platonists, distinguished them sharply, taking οὐσία to indicate the common nature or substance shared by Father and Son, and ὑπόστασις the individual. (1) Athanasius had said that Father, Son, and Spirit are the same Being living in a three-fold form, or in three relationships, as a man may be simultaneously a father, a son, and a brother. The Cappadocians affirmed, on the contrary, that Father, Son, and Spirit are three like or equal Beings sharing in a common nature, as different individuals share in the common nature of man.

The objective of the theology of Nicea was more limited than is commonly supposed. There was never any direct discussion, for example, on the problem of the divine unity, which was closely related to the Son's full divinity and equality with the Father. The West displayed more concern than most for the unity of the Godhead, and they must gladly have received ὁμοούσιος as an apt translation of the formula unius substantiae which Tertullian and Novatian had bequeathed to them. Different groups read various theologies into the Nicene Definition and its key-word: but Constantine was willing to grant them peace while they agreed to his Creed and tolerated each other.

Towards the end of the fifth century the Nicene Creed began to supplant all local creeds in the East, and it was introduced into the Eucharistic liturgy. The Western

(1) Basil: Epistle 38:3 to his brother Gregory of Nyssa. Also Epistle 210:4; and Gregory of Nyssa: On Not Three Gods.

Church, however, retained the old Roman Creed (expanded in our time to form the Apostles' Creed) for its original purpose as a baptismal confession. But both East and West witnessed the passing of many centuries before the "Nicene" Creed everywhere found its place in the central act of Christian worship.

The Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) is often spoken of as the triumph of Western, and with it of the Antiochene, Christology. Without the strong support of Rome the Antiochene formula "two natures" would never have gained such a significant position.

Dominant in Alexandrian theology was the theme of "One Christ and He Divine". Antiochene theology stressed the permanence and the reality of our Lord's complete manhood. These truths are both preserved in the Chalcedonian Definition. Eutyches would have sacrificed the completeness to the permanence; Nestorius would have done the reverse. The Definition sacrifices neither but retains both. This antagonism between the Alexandrian and Antiochene schools on Christology, of course, reflects the duality of the New Testament writers, and in particular of the Gospel portrait of our Lord. The "two nature" theory was an invention of the philosophical theologians, but it was intended to safeguard the clear witness of the New Testament.

The imperial interest in Chalcedon centred mainly around the establishment of a single faith throughout the Empire. Most of the bishops present objected on principle to the compilation of another Creed. They deemed it sufficient to hold to the faith expressed at Nicea and to recognise the binding powers of Cyril's Dogmatic Letters and Leo's Tome. The imperial commissioners, however, made their intention quite clear. It was their duty to draw up a formulary which

everyone could be induced to sign. These commissioners had to exert an inordinate amount of pressure before harmony was reached.

The Council strongly opposed those who imagined that there was a duality of Sons or that the Godhood of the Only-begotten is capable of suffering. It set itself against any who presumed a confusion or mixture of the two natures of our Lord. Moreover, the Council condemned those who held that the form of a servant which was assumed from sinful men is of a heavenly origin, or is of any essence other than our own; and it anathematized those who, like Dioscorus, asserted two natures of Christ before the Incarnation and only one after it. Our Lord's perfect obedience involves a sharing of our very nature and His unique sacrifice in making expiation for us. This is precisely what Chalcedon asserted against any suggestion that His human nature was on a higher ontological plane than ours. The Chalcedonian Fathers would neither have a Christ who is perfect man united to God, nor a Christ whose human nature is not as ours, except for disobedience and sin.

In his Tome Pope Leo expounded the doctrine of two natures in one Person as follows:

"The essential qualities of the two Natures continued and co-existed in one Person... And to make good what was needed owing to our condition, an inviolable Nature was united to a nature capable of suffering: so that, as was needed for our salvation, there was one and the same Mediator between God and man, the Man Jesus Christ, who was capable of death in the one nature and incapable of it in the other... Thus, in the complete and perfect nature of real manhood, the very God was born, complete in His own (nature and attributes) and complete in ours...in order that the unchanging God...

might perfect His original design of mercy towards us by a more wonderful mystery (the Incarnation, sacramento occultiore)".

Two things must be noted about this statement.

First, there were three passages in the Tome (c.3: ut...et mori posset ex uno et mori non posset ex altero; c.4: agit enim utraque forma ...; and c. 4: quamvis...una persona sit, aliud tamen est unde...contumelia, aliud unde...gloria ...) which aroused the hostilities of the Illyrian and Palestinian delegations. Special explanations were required of the Roman legates and Cyril to convince them that the Pope was not dividing Christ as Nestorius had done, but was merely emphasising and drawing out the practical implications of the distinction of natures.

Secondly, it appears evident that the first draft of the formal confession, which had been produced at the Fifth Session, lacked the extracts from Leo's Tome which stand in the final version. It also seems to have read "from two natures" ($\epsilon\kappa\ \delta\upsilon\omicron\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\omega\nu$) instead of "in two natures" ($\epsilon\nu\ \delta\upsilon\omicron\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\sigma\iota\nu$). (1) This follows the pattern of Flavian's confession of faith at the Standing Synod of Constantinople; but it does not lucidly affirm the subsistence of two natures after the union. In the light of Eutyches' position, it was tantamount to a denial of it.

Chalcedon's peculiar theology is made explicit in the equal recognition which it gives to unity and duality in

(1) The Greek text reads $\epsilon\kappa\ \delta\upsilon\omicron\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\omega\nu$; the Latin in duabus naturis. The second is without doubt correct, the Greek text having been altered by some scribe to bring it into line with Cyril's teaching.

our Lord. In addition to the formula "one προσῶπον and one ὑπόστασις", which came direct from the profession of Flavian, there is an untiring repetition of the words "the same", coupled with a dogmatic assertion that, despite the two natures, Christ remains "without division, without separation". It becomes clear from this that the divine Word is treated as the distinctive subject of the Incarnate, which is given further force by the sanction granted to the controversial title Θεοτόκος. Herein lies the fundamental truth at which Antiochene theology has arrived. But the Antiochene Christology was victorious at Chalcedon only after it had absorbed the basic truths contained in the Alexandrian formulation, and had itself been modified by them.

It became plain, on the other hand, that this truth could not be allowed to stand on its own merit. The Antiochene theological intuition was most stable at the point where it explicitly affirmed the reality of Christ's human life. Without a corresponding acknowledgement of this fact in the Definition, therefore, the gate would be flung wide open to many dangerous forms of Monophysitism. Hence, side by side with the unity, the Definition expresses the fact that the Word, as incarnate, exists "in two natures". Each of these natures is complete, and each retains its own characteristic operation and properties, quite unimpaired by the union. The terms ὑπόστασις and προσῶπον are chosen to express the oneness of the Person. Φύσις is reserved expressly for the natures, and the phrase "natural union" is rejected because of its Monophysite implications.

Loyalty to the Council of Chalcedon in the West was countered by a long-lasting and hostile reaction in the East. The Council had failed to bring about a permanent settlement. All that had been done was to set forth the problem in its right terms.

It is hardly correct to believe, as do some to-day, that our Lord's Person was constituted by the Word, for this seems to suggest an agreement with the enhypostatic Christology which is a distortion of Chalcedon's intention. This aberration came about through the use of a later theory, namely, the enhypostasia of Leontius of Byzantium, who propagated the idea of a human nature which in itself is impersonal and had its personality only in the divine *Λόγος*.

Alan Richardson remarks that Chalcedon enunciated a "principle" rather than a "theory", and that it therefore permitted "the formulation of theories provided that the principle is safeguarded in them". (1) And Dr W. Telfer (2) says that it was the "Antiochene" school alone which protested against "anhypostatic manhood", and it was Theodore of Mopsuestia who clearly perceived that unless "the Man" in Christ was to such an extent human as to experience the temptation to pride, the soteriological canon remained unsatisfied. It was for this reason that Chalcedon failed to prevent a modified Apollinarianism from evolving into the recognised orthodoxy of the Middle Ages. "It is", submits Dr Telfer, "just because this problem (of the human ego) is for us inevitable that Chalcedon has had so many critics".

As we review our examination of the Council of Chalcedon, a number of truths become apparent. First, the Council and its problems were overshadowed by the fear of Apollinarianism. Just as the West feared Arianism, so the East lived in dread of Apollinarianism. Secondly, the trepidation caused by Apollinarianism led to Eutychianism and

(1) A. Richardson: Creeds in the Making, pp. 84-85.

(2) Journal of Theological Studies (April, 1954) pp. 110-111.

Nestorianism. Both heresies were the result of the same difficulty which Apollinaris had attempted to solve, namely: How is it possible for two complete natures to be united in one Person? Eutychianism eliminates the difficulty by ridding itself of one of the natures and by securing the unity of the Person. Nestorianism states that there are two Persons as the result of the union.

Nevertheless, the Chalcedonian Definition was at last the Church's verdict on both extremes of Christological opinion. It repudiated the Apollinarian and Eutychian mixture and confusion, together with Nestorian division, and in a few words it presented positively the relation between the two natures in the one Person. It did not attempt to explain how the divine and the human are united. It rather affirmed that there is one Lord Jesus Christ, one *πρόσωπον*, one *ὑπόστασις*, in two natures. The same Person is really God and really man, but how this is so is beyond all human explanation.

Dogmatic statement can fail in two possible ways. It can fail both in its substance and in its conceptual form. An example of the first failure is the half-monophysitic changes in the Chalcedonian Creed since the mid-sixth century. In this instance it was not the use of Greek philosophical concepts which caused a distortion of the original message; it was the influence on the councils of a very powerful stream of magic superstitious piety. An example of the inadequacy of the conceptual form is the formula of Chalcedon itself. By intent and design it was true to the genuine meaning of the Christian message. "It saved Christianity", says Tillich, "from a complete elimination of Jesus as the Christ, in so far as the participation of the New Being in the state of estrange-

ment is concerned". (1) But this it did - and it could not have done otherwise in the conceptual frame employed - through an accumulation of powerful paradoxes. The formula failed to give a constructive interpretation, although this was precisely the reason for the original introduction of the philosophical concepts.

Each of the Definitions we have discussed has a certain air of paradox about it. The assertion of a simple answer to all questions is one of the best indications of a heresy, and of this truth Chalcedon is an outstanding instance. The Chalcedonian Decree states the apparently opposing truths of Christian faith in Christ and affirms their harmony without attempting to show what kind of harmony it is. It marks the beginning rather than the end of sound speculation on the subject, while indicating (as Nicea did on the broader question) the lines within which Christian speculation should proceed. "The formula did exactly what an authoritative formula ought to do: it stated the fact". (2)

It is easy to see that the Christology of the Antiochenes admirably met the ethical motive that dominated them: but it was entirely unsatisfactory to those who accepted the realistic theory of redemption, for it failed to provide for the deification of human nature required by that theory. It proved offensive to many because the dual personality which it asserted seemed little less than a monstrosity. The Antiochene theologians were widely distrusted not alone on account of their Christology, but in general because they represented the

(1) P. Tillich: Systematic Theology, Vol II, p. 163.

(2) W. Temple: Christ the Truth, p. 159n.

rationalistic and scientific tendency of the age as distinguished from the conservative and mystical trends of the Alexandrian school. That the Chalcedonian Definition preserved the humanity of Jesus was its great merit: but in so doing it failed to express the spirit of the Alexandrians which was becoming more and more predominant in the East.

The juncture of traditions at Nicea and Chalcedon revealed potentialities which did not exist in any single form taken in isolation. If the substance of the resultant solutions derived chiefly from the East, the balanced shape in which the problem was presented was the primary contribution, notably at Chalcedon, of the West.

CHAPTER TWO

An Analysis of Christological Language

Karl Barth believes that freedom from philosophical presuppositions is merely a relative matter, since "everyone has some sort of philosophy". (1) It is, however, essential for the theologian to recognise that his philosophical presuppositions are only tentative hypotheses, having no independent interest in themselves. For the theologian, philosophies are to be judged according to the help they render in understanding the Word of God in Scripture; and because of this there is no exclusive reason for preferring one philosophy to another. Barth sums up his position in an aphorism upon which it is well worth our while to reflect: "If we do not commit ourselves unreservedly and finally to any specific philosophy, we will not need totally or finally to fear any philosophy". (2) There is a clear distinction between religion and a philosophy of religion. The one is an experience, the other an interpretation: the second never completely covers the first, for a description is never an explanation. In this sense, the doctrine of the Person of Christ exposes the bankruptcy of human reasoning and expression.

The Greeks found the Kerygma almost meaningless. Was it possible that there could be one to whom the words "God" and "man" were simultaneously applicable? The Jews found it impossible to predicate "crucifixion" of the Messiah. To the Gentile philosopher the suggestion of a divine sufferer appeared completely absurd and a contradiction in terms. The Docetists and the Ebionites were the first to pass judgement on the Christian faith in the world of philosophy. Christianity was thus obliged to discuss the logical structure of the Kerygma, and the consequent analytical and didactic mode of preaching was the start of Christian doctrine. The Defini-

(1) Karl Barth: Church Dogmatics, I, 2, §21, 2, p. 728.

(2) Op. cit., p. 735.

tion of Chalcedon was thus the herald of relief to many troubled minds. It enabled the belief which hitherto had seemed nonsense to be stated as a reasonable tenet in the philosophical language of the time.

It had become imperative that some interpretative rule or rules should be brought alongside the medley of Christian phrases so as to bring about their logical co-ordination. The model of sonship and the metaphysical concept of the $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ were amongst the most famous of these interpretative ideas, and on some occasions both the model and the idea would be employed by the same theologian, as was done by Origen.

The Nicene Fathers had insisted upon the Homoousion as the true interpretation of the Person of Christ. In so doing, however, men like Athanasius virtually relinquished the element of "subordination" and so left the problem unsolved from another point of view. If we deny differences of nature, as Chalcedonian Christology did in its opposition to Arianism, and assert our Lord's perfect Godhood and manhood, we succeed in solving the problem of perfect mediation only by raising a further problem, namely, the precise sense in which we can talk of the deity of our Lord. This leads us unavoidably to the doctrine of the Trinity as well as to a Christological problem.

We are forced to confess that both give rise to "mystery", and we have, it appears, to postulate one mystery in order to elucidate another. Wicksteed has remarked that whereas in Christology the Church made an effort to find the unity in the "Person" and the distinctions in the "Natures", when we pass to the problem of the Trinity, the distinctions are looked for in the "Persons", whilst the unity is found in the "Nature", "One 'Person' in two Natures"; "three 'Persons' in One God". (1)

(1) Wicksteed: The Reactions Between Dogma and Philosophy.

During the nineteenth century, various attempts were made by certain theologians, orthodox and liberal alike, to explain how God can become man. The orthodox theologians tried to do it by assuming that there is a higher human nature capable of union with the divine as our own human nature is not. They have attributed such a human nature to Christ, who then bestows it upon His people. The liberal theologians attempted to explain how God became man by assuming that human nature at its best is divine. They have argued from this that our Lord had one nature, perfectly human and therefore divine.

H.M. Relton stresses the divergence between the Gospel presentation of our Lord's Person and any intellectual examination of it. Instead of the simplicity of life, we find the complexity of seeming antinomies and incompatibilities. (1) Such aberrations have been, one might think, unnecessarily multiplied. Being Very Man of the substance of the Virgin Mary, it is said, our Lord must needs grow in stature and wisdom and in favour with God and man. Being Very God of Very God, begotten, not made, how can He then pray for a divine grace of which He is Himself the Source, or plead in an agony for the execution of a divine will not His own and yet His very possession? The unity of Person in One who possesses two natures, two wills, and two souls seems to be the very peak of abnormality. From the intellectual standpoint, however, the Christological problem is of necessity a metaphysical problem. The Church claims for Christ that He is the clue to the nature of ultimate Reality: and this is a claim in the realm of philosophy. F.H. Bradley says: "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less than instinct". (2) Bradley is here issuing a warning

(1) H.M. Relton: Some Postulates of a Christian Philosophy, p. 225.

(2) Quoted by Lord Haldane in The Reign of Relativity, p. 417.

against pedantry and against the undue exaltation of the abstract mind. When the human reason falters before the mysterium tremendum, the "inner logic" of faith may carry us farther. This appeal to faith, far from being the abandonment of metaphysics, is rather an appeal to a "larger reason" than the merely logical.

The traditional Chalcedonian formula which speaks of our Lord being "two Natures in one Person" is seldom today regarded as a suitable starting-point for thought, and is itself the centre of controversy. Various other starting-points have been suggested.. The most obvious has seemed to be the Gospels. These, however, are records written after the Resurrection by men who, simply because of their faith in the Resurrection, believed in the divinity of their Lord, and because of that belief deeply treasured their memories of "the days of His flesh", during which period His "Godness" had, according to Dr. Henry Scott Holland, been so completely veiled that even they had not been able to apprehend it.

If we were resolved to approach Christology from the side of its historical origin, therefore, we should find ourselves beginning rather with the worship of the primitive Church than with the story of Jesus of Nazareth, and with the Epistles and Acts rather than with the Gospels.

Another and wholly different starting-point for Christological discussion is that of the philosophical and psychological presuppositions with which we approach the question. The Christological problem here assumes the form of asking what we exactly mean by the Incarnation, by "the union of two natures in one Person". This in turn gives rise to deeper questions: What do we mean by God and what by man? What is our conception of creation? Is it meaningful to speak of Godhead and manhood as uniting to form a single, unique, and personal being?

The term "Incarnation" attempts to express the

paradox that He who transcends the universe appears in it and under its conditions. But its connotation leads to ideas which seem hardly distinguishable from pagan transmutation myths. If the meaning of ἐγένετο in John 1:14 (ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο) is pressed, we find ourselves in the midst of a mythology of metamorphosis. It is natural, then, that the question should arise: How can something which becomes something else remain simultaneously what it is? Or did the Λόγος cease to be when Jesus of Nazareth was born? Here it would appear that reason is replaced by absurdity, and faith is called the acceptance of absurdities. But the incarnation of the Λόγος is not metamorphosis: it is His total manifestation in a personal life. Such manifestation involves dangers, risks, tensions, and, as Tillich says, "determination by freedom as well as by destiny". (1) Protestantism demands such a Christology of participation by the Christ in sinful existence, including, at the same time, its conquest. The Christological paradox and the paradox of the justification of the sinner are identical. "It is the paradox of God accepting a world which rejects Him". (2)

In the realm of Christological theory it is imperative that history and philosophy should meet. The Christological thinker may, however, embark on his quest from either shore. Although the Gospels be not the starting-point of Christological theory, they are its touchstone. We are always to be prepared to test ourselves by asking whether we can recognise the Christ of our thought in the Christ of history.

Are the technical terms used at Nicea and Chalcedon to be regarded as final and terminative? Modern attempts to replace what are thought to be out-dated concepts with contemporary scientific terms to describe our Lord's human nature

(1) P. Tillich: Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 172.

(2) Ibid.

are pregnant with the danger of tending towards an Adoptionism or a Monophysitism of the Eutychian kind. At present it seems impossible to go beyond the conclusion reached at Chalcedon: vere Deus, vere homo.

Nevertheless, the recent contributions made to theological discourse by linguistic philosophy in particular have proved of great value in blowing away many of the cobwebs which have clung persistently to a large number of traditional theological concepts and phrases. We may now engage, therefore, upon a brief examination of a selection of key-words and leading thoughts in the Christological sections of the Nicene and Chalcedonian Creeds, scrutinising them from the viewpoint of linguistic philosophy.

It may be remarked, by way of introduction, that a concept is today commonly held to be meaningless if it is not or cannot be verified by the senses. Concepts such as "cause", "essence" and "substance" are said to be without meaning because we do not experience anything which answers to these descriptions. Yet these words do have a sense; they do convey something to us although it is empirically impossible to point to samples. The verification argument must therefore be reformulated. A word is meaningless if it is logically impossible to point to "models" of the sort of thing which the expression ostensibly signifies. If "substance", for example, is defined as "that which underlies all the objects of experience", it follows logically that the metaphysician cannot point out a sample of "substance". Anything to which he draws our attention would automatically be a particular object of experience, not something which underlies such objects. A word like "substance" can be dropped only if there is a suitable substitute at hand. (1)

(1) Cf. P. Tillich: Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 128.

If metaphysics insists that it is superior to the merely experiential, that it is transcendent, then it is logically impossible to produce a sample. We can never assert "this is a transcendental being" as something we knew to be true because that would imply that we could have direct experience of the transcendental. But to say that one was immediately acquainted with a transcendental being would be self-contradictory. (1) It must be shown, however, that it is in fact logically impossible to produce appropriate samples; for instance, that the workings of the eye cannot serve as a sample of the creative work of a divine being, or that mystical phenomena cannot be samples of "communion with the Absolute".

The verification argument stresses that certain expressions, familiar though they may be in everyday language, cannot, when employed in other specific ways, serve as the key-expressions in sentences which are used to explain, predict or describe. Philosophers belonging to this school would say that to predicate anything of God does not imply anything, does not explain anything, predicts nothing and therefore does not describe.

Even the views of a logical positivist of A.J. Ayer's standing have changed with regard to the verifiability of metaphysical assertions. Ayer now supposes that the verifiability principle simply acts as a way of drawing a line of demarcation between the scientific and the non-scientific. "The most that has been proved", he says, "is that metaphysical statements do not fall into the same category as the laws of logic, or as scientific hypotheses, or as historical narra-

(1) In a weak moment even John Baillie seems to suggest that our experience of God is not altogether different from our experience of other people, and that He is experienced in the ordinary way. Baillie gives a stipulative though very misleading definition of "sense experience": The Sense of the Presence of God, chapter III, §14.

tives, or judgements of perception, or any other commonsense descriptions of the 'natural' world. Surely it does not follow that they are neither true nor false, still less that they are nonsensical". (1)

Origen, who was trained in the philosophies of the day, saw that "Son" and "Father" are connected by logical necessity. He assumed that the phrase "eternal generation of the Son" would express this logically necessary connection, although the phrase is misleading in the material sense. To Origen, the picture of Sonship, when qualified by the phrase "eternal generation", was able to avoid any charge of subordinationism. The doctrine is thus a logical safeguard and, as I.T. Ramsey insists, is not a "super-scientific assertion".(2) Ramsey says suggestively that "eternal generation of the Son" is in principle a "qualified model". (3) In other words, "Son's generation" simply offers a model situation which communicates the relationship inhering between a father and his son. The qualifier "eternal" then develops or elaborates this situation, so that we speak of closer and more intimate kinship, "until there is evoked a worshipful situation of disclosure, in relation to which the two terms 'God' and 'Son' find their usage". (4) It would now be claimed that such a "revelation-situation", as I should call it, is basically identical with and duplicates the type of "worshipful revelation" which presented itself to those in the presence of Jesus of Nazareth in the days of His flesh. The phrase "eternal generation" thus becomes a means of specifying the extremely complex logical make-up of a certain symbol, namely, "the Son".

Arius was one of the first to state openly what

(1) A.J. Ayer: Logical Positivism, pp. 15, 16.

(2) I.T. Ramsey: Religious Language, p. 158.

(3) Op. cit., p. 158.

(4) Op. cit., p. 158.

seemed to him the logical impropriety of the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son. It appeared obvious to him that in order to use the word "son" meaningfully, a certain though minimal degree of subordination was unavoidable. There must thus have been at least "once when He was not". Arius failed to recognise, however, that the words "son" and "father", as used in this particular context, only provided models, symbols, or types. The orthodox, on their side, were equally unclear as to what they were doing in qualifying such models. The orthodox Fathers claimed at Nicea, for example, that the Son is "of one substance with the Father". The word "substance" here is a traditional metaphysical category. It is what may be termed a "classical qualifier", whose aim is to point to something or other which, it claims, unites certain empirical criteria, but about which these criteria themselves do not tell the entire truth, although they present a significant part of it. "Substance" is a word which comes alongside other readily-understandable words, such as "son" and "father", to indicate what unites them in spite of their diversity. It was therefore used at Nicea as an appropriate qualification of the father-son picture when the purpose was to stress the inadequacy of the picture insofar as it implies separable terms.

"Of one substance" thus becomes a blood-brother of "eternal generation". Both phrases are intended to maintain a logically necessary connection between "God" and "Jesus" despite the use of the father-son symbol. Once more Homoousion orthodoxy was qualifying the father-son relationship in such a fashion that it became adequate currency for the relation between God and Jesus of Nazareth. Such qualification required words and phrases the logical behaviour of which was the same as that of "eternal generation" and "substance".

It appears from the above that it is essential first

to recognise the logical complexity of Christian claims before being entitled to argue about their truth or falsity or their inappropriateness to present-day Christological discussion. Orthodoxy insisted at Nicea that it was using the word "son" with fitting impropriety. "Son", it was asserted, could be used of Jesus if it were qualified. In this way, "son of God" becomes a précis of "Son of one substance with God", or "son eternally generated from God". In a similar fashion, the orthodox term *μονογενής* expresses the exclusive and unique claim which Christians wish to make for Jesus Christ if *μονογενής* is a logical impropriety, that is, if "only" is logically related to such phrases as "of one substance" and "eternally generated". The uniqueness which Christians have always desired to claim for Jesus therefore does not disappear even if He did have brothers or sisters, that is, if He was not in a straightforward sense an "only child".

Μονογενής began to be translated by the Latin unicus and unigenitus, which render the English alternatives "Only Son" and "Only-begotten Son". Christians speaking of an "Only-begotten Son" would probably recall that they had also spoken of an "eternally begotten Son", and the risk of literalism regarding "only son" would thus be avoided. When they proceed to call Jesus God's "only Son", they would be unlikely to think of Jesus as an "only child", but would think of Him rather as an "only-begotten Son", which might then be equally translated "eternally generated Son". In these phrases it must be noticed that the words "only" and "eternally" would be of the same logical type. Then, although we might write in an abbreviated way of Jesus as "God's Only Son", we would not suppose that the phrase "Only Son", because simple in grammar, is necessarily also simple in logical behaviour. "Eternally begotten Son", "Eternally generated Son", "Only begotten Son", "Only Son", and "Only Son of God" are all of intense complexity: yet in each instance the same symbol has been given various qualifications, none of

which are straightforward.

Similarly, Λόγος was used by the early Church as a metaphysical idea to consolidate and systematise the hybrid conglomeration of phrases employed in early preaching. What people longed to be able to do was to speak philosophically of both difference and similarity between God and Jesus. The great merit of the term Λόγος was that it enabled them to do this.

Two distinct phrases were used to express the double standpoint of Λόγος. There was an ἐνδιάθετος, or immanent Λόγος, in which speaker and word were intimately connected; and there was a προφορικός, where speaker and word were quite distinct and separate. To guard against the danger of the second aspect of Λόγος leading its adherents into as unsatisfactory a subordinationism as did sonship, it became necessary to make use of qualifying phrases such as "inseparable union" and "co-eternity", and within this same logical framework comes the traditional phrases "eternal procession" as used of the Λόγος. Here once more there is what logical empiricists like Ramsey would call a "qualified model". What is being asserted on this occasion is that the "going-forth" which quite plainly characterises words as they are uttered, must, when this symbol is used of the relation of Jesus to God, be so qualified (as it is by "eternal") as to make it equally clear that in this instance, "going-forth" does not indicate any kind of separation or subordination. On this basis, "eternal" will qualify "procession" in much the same way as "continuous" is able to qualify specific mathematical functions.

To speak of "eternal procession" does not deny the terms of the sequence. It does not deny that the Λόγος is now here and now there. Ramsey notes that "eternal", however, "tells such a story about the positionings that there is evoked a disclosure situation, when there dawns on us also a

'sense of unity', a 'kinship', a 'togetherness': everything indeed what we mean by the $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ as immanent". (1) Thus the two aspects of $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ are bound together. The "eternal procession of the $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ " expresses in a completely different logical mode what otherwise can be expressed as the "eternal generation of the Son". This makes it evident that when theologians have put forward both the symbol of "sonship" and the idea of the $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ in order to comprehend the relationship of God and Jesus, two quite different logical languages have been involved.

The language of the general corpus of Christian doctrine teems with improprieties and logical oddities of this sort. What Ramsey would call "logical qualifiers" are not further descriptions, but are words which qualify models "so as to do justice to what is 'disclosed' in worship". (2) Unnecessary confusion has been caused in Christian doctrines by supposing that such qualifiers are in some way descriptive, and by a needless refusal to attribute to qualifiers their correct logical status.

Reference to Nestorianism and Cyril will furnish us with some examples. In its early days, the Nestorian controversy was concentrated largely upon the phrase $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\tau\acute{o}\kappa\omicron\varsigma$, popularly translated "Mother of God". Insofar as Anastasius and the Nestorians were stressing the fact that the phrase is logically odd, they rendered a useful service. Everyone knows what "mother of Jack" means; but "Mother of God", although of similar grammatical formation, cannot possess anything resembling the same logical structure. The worst criticism which could be made of $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\tau\acute{o}\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ from a philosophical point of view is to be found in the fact that orthodox utterly failed to recognise the logical impropriety of the phrase. Had the orthodox been able to defend $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\tau\acute{o}\kappa\omicron\varsigma$

(1) Op. cit., p. 163.

(2) Op. cit., p. 164.

as a qualified symbol which is justified in worship, they could have made an ample defence of their position. Similarly, it is unfortunate for the Nestorians that they fought for the removal of the logical impropriety of Θεοτόκος. If, after the elimination of its oddity, Θεοτόκος is given a purely logical translation, it can never mean more than that Mary was "the bearer of one who was to become God", for by definition the unbegotten God, in the completeness of His being, cannot be "born" of a human mother. This is what the Nestorians assumed the phrase to signify when they laid emphasis on our Lord's humanity.

Cyril began to speak against this of "hypostatic unity" between God and Jesus: but the value of orthodoxy's claim for "hypostatic" unity must, as Ramsey indicates, "always be proportionate to its refusal to model it". (1) In his "Second", or "dogmatic" Letter of A.D. 430, Cyril speaks properly of hypostatic unity as "indescribable and inconceivable". "The Godhead and the manhood", he continues, "by means of their inexpressible and mysterious concurrence to form a union, have produced for us the one Lord and Son Jesus Christ". This is disconcertingly misleading. Cast in the material mode it appears to be an equation in a kind of "psychological chemistry", that is "Godhead+manhood=Jesus Christ". Cyril is, however, saying something far more complex:

1. For early Christians, our Lord was the object and occasion of God's self-revelation (what some would call "disclosure" situations) for which the word "God" would normally have been adequate. Yet a great deal could be said of our Lord which was entirely empirical, for example, that He wept and that He was tired. Two logically different languages seem here to be competing as descriptions of the object of revelation. How can these two languages be reconciled, especially since

(1) Op. cit., p. 166.

in the Christian revelation only one object is revealed?

2. Thus there arises the notion of "hypostatic" unity, which may be interpreted from a linguistic and from a "factual" point of view.

a. Linguistically, the doctrine of "hypostatic unity" claims that to treat properly the sort of disclosure-situation which is the foundation of Christian revelation, human language and language about God have both to be qualified "hypostatically". When this has been done, both languages can then justifiably be used by Christians. The doctrine of communicatio idiomatum thus becomes the logical claim that two languages of different logical status can be applied to the one object of the Christian revelation when once they have been suitably qualified: ὑπόστασις is put forward as a word which is of sufficient logical uniqueness to bind these two languages together and to provide a consistent language-system for the Christian disclosure. The doctrine of communicatio idiomatum and the term ὑπόστασις, in other words, may both be regarded as an early attempt to deal with what in the present day would be called the problem of complementary languages and their unity. This problem has been raised particularly by recent developments in scientific method.

It is worth-while to stress that ὑπόστασις would be successful in unifying two different types of language if it is of a sufficiently unique or unusual nature never to be given except by reference to a Christian revelation-situation. If it is in effect to be the logical bond which Christian doctrine intends it to be, it is logically quite impossible to produce a model for it.

We need also to be especially careful of the logical peculiarities of the statement that "there is one Person (ὑπόστασις) and there are two natures". What we mean by "one Person" can be qualified, but it can never be described or modelled. It can be given only in reference to a Christian revelation-situation. The only language which

suits such a situation is either the language of human nature once it has been adequately qualified to become Christological language; or language about God when this has been properly qualified to become Trinitarian language.

When we assert that "there is one Person and there are two natures", therefore, we are always to recognise that the "is" of this statement has an entirely different logical functioning from the "are". The "is" must have logical value identical to ὑπόστασις. The "are" has two logical values, one relating to assertions concerning "human nature", and the other to assertions about "God".

b. In order to know what "hypostatic unity" is in fact, there must be presented a Christian revelation-situation having Jesus Christ as its object and occasion. This would have to be a situation in which we wish to discuss the object as "Jesus Christ" and yet also as "God". This is the exclusive sine qua non for knowing what "hypostatic unity" means.

Such a Christian revelation-situation can never be described, nor can its occurrence be guaranteed by any sort of formula. Ian Ramsey would say that it can only be "evoked". (1) Should we wish to "evoke" it, we may employ various models with a greater or less likelihood of success; and if we look to the history of Christian doctrine we may be enlightened as to which models would probably be the more helpful.

The model of conjunction (συνάφεια), for example, is of little value in producing the type of "unitary object" for which the phrase "hypostatic unity" is apt. The conjunction, for instance, may be suggestive of no greater unity than that of cup and saucer. It was most likely the possibility that "conjunction" might give rise to such a crude model as this which induced Theodore of Mopsuestia to advocate "union" (ἕνωσις) instead of "conjunction", and to offer as his model for such "union" the example of husband and wife in marriage. Yet even this example is unable to

(1) Op. cit., p. 167.

assure us of the type of unitary object which the Christian perceives at the very heart of his revelation-situation. As a symbol of even greater unity than that of husband and wife in marriage, we may offer such a picture as that of a fast-moving motor-cyclist. A model of this sort would be fairest at least to the Nestorians. If this model is still felt to be unfair to the "unitary object", we may next postulate the figure of a mermaid. At this stage, however, our particular symbol-game is over; for while we have succeeded in producing a symbol which supersedes all its predecessors in signifying unity, it is highly probable that it will lead us either to mix the "natures" (woman and fish), or to have only one *προσῶπον* (mermaid-like appearance) left. We shall, in other words, be hovering on the brink of Eutychianism or Nestorianism. It becomes plain from what we have said that all symbols tend sooner or later to lose their adequacy. No symbol, for example, will ever "describe" or "explain" that which its use betokens, or that with which "hypostatic unity" was originally intended to deal.

Heretics and orthodox alike in the early Church took delight in forcing each of the many symbols at their disposal into rendering the maximum possible service. The orthodoxy of one era often came so near to being the heresy of the next chiefly because any symbol, pressed to such limits, could not but crack under the strain and subsequently prove inadequate. Orthodoxy began ultimately to support such terms as, *ὑπόστασις*, which by its very nature resisted all efforts at modelling. A word like this would, however, be sure to preserve the necessary element of mystery. Theology spends every philosophical model; it must necessarily in this sense manifest a "Chalcedonian bankruptcy". "Like many other people's banking accounts at the present time", says Ian Ramsay, "it will only show an active healthy con-

dition when its store of empirical models is overdrawn. For it has invisible assets - mystery - of which the models take no account". (1)

It is not in the nature of Christian doctrine to give a verbal description of God, and it is solely upon the basis of an epistemology radically different from that which lay behind traditional views of metaphysics that Christian doctrine can be validated.

The philosophical difficulties which we have encountered in our examination of a very limited area of Christological phraseology are typical of all theological discourse. In many instances, as we all know, the barriers between philosophy and theology seem prima facie to be insuperable. What then is the theological value of the above discussion? The purpose of the above discussion has been to give indications as to how traditional Christian phrases might otherwise be elucidated and justified. If they are grounded in situations which focus directly on the revelation made in Jesus of Nazareth and are partially elusive or mysterious, only then shall traditional Christian terminology be given a logical complexity fitting to its theme. By an empirical approach to philosophical theology we are able to see what logical place the age-old phrases of Christian doctrine must have in order to be significant in the present day. It is impossible that a sufficient account of their logical structure can be presented in an ordinary view of "facts" accompanied by the notion that language provides a type of verbal portrait which is in precise correspondence with that about which it speaks. It is plain, then, that doctrine merely "fences a mystery", as Augustine expressed it. "We speak (doctrinally) in order that we may not be reduced to silence". Logical mapping is an essential prerequisite of doctrinal discussion and Christian controversy.

There is, as Professor L.A. Reid has mentioned in

(1) Op. cit., pp. 170-171.

his Rediscovery of Belief (p. 176), a paradoxical truth that "the closer and more intimate (man's) relation to God, the sharper he realises the distinction between himself and God to be". Here is plainly part of the truth which Chalcedon ventured to assert in the dogmatic emphasis it laid upon the "distinction" between the natures of Godhood and manhood in our Lord. The fault, as Norman Pittenger sees it, is that the Chalcedonian insistence is widely associated with a kind of personal union which did not bear for the Fathers the connotation which it is now taken to mean by contemporary orthodoxy.

The phrases "of one substance with the Father" and "two natures and one Person" have led in the present day to the problem of the knowledge of the incarnate Christ which is at the centre of contemporary discussion. How are we to think of one person with two consciousnesses, with divine omniscience and human limitation of knowledge blended in perfect unity? Is it possible for orthodox believers in the divinity of our Lord to allow any interpretation of the Gospels which may imply ignorance on the part of our Lord?

Are we to believe, with Ritschl, that the metaphysics of the Chalcedonian doctrine of "substance" and "natures" is an alien intrusion into Christian thought; or with Harnack that the general use of Greek concepts by the early Church, and especially the metaphysics concerning our Lord's divine "nature", culminating in the Definition of Chalcedon, was the unfortunate result of the intellectualistic Hellenisation of the simple Galilean Gospel? With this as his foundation, Harnack would go on to say that the earliest "Christianity" was essentially a theology devoid of a Christology; thus we arrive at the classic Liberal Protestant distinction between the pure "religion of Jesus" and the "religion about Jesus" with which St. Paul and the Hellenisers are thought to have beclouded it. In this un-



fortunate development we see the final and logical effect of the presuppositions of Schleiermacher and his descendents. Harnack, it is said, "remained fundamentally Ritschlian to the last". (1)

It is, however, not the purport of this thesis to trace the process of evolution in Christological thought by examining in detail its particular phases. Suffice it to conclude this chapter by saying that, as the early Church held tenaciously to faith in her divine Lord, upholding her belief in the historic memories of His Passion, and arrived untimately at Chalcedon; so we today have good reason to rest assured that if we are both faithful to our belief in His divinity and accept the evidence of the Gospels concerning the history of His Incarnation, we too shall eventually reach a satisfactory formulation of our belief. The main outlines have already been worked out for us. Should we come to a gap, we know why it is a gap, and we know that in time it is sure to be bridged. We need patience; and faith is the mother of patience.

The peculiar and unique use of language which we have examined above need not be permitted to prove fatal to the validity of Christian tenets. All it need mean is that the richness of content in the Christian conceptions made it difficult, if not impossible, to express such content within the categories of finite human thought.

(1) J.M. Creed: The Divinity of Jesus Christ, p. 101.

CHAPTER THREE

Selected Examples of the Influence on Christological Thought of Recent Philosophical and Psychological Trends

Martin Werner, of the "Bern" school, stated in 1935 that the dogmatic Christology of the primitive Church, which culminated at Chalcedon, was an effort to compensate, by means of mythological invention, for the disappointment of the early Christian community's parousia expectations. Werner maintains that a "Christ-concept", symbolising amongst other things a reverence for life, should therefore now be substituted for the mythology of the Chalcedonian Definition.

(1) Karl Barth was one of those who similarly shifted the foundation of the theological outlook. He emphasised the fact that Christian faith is not based on the fickle sands of the attempted reconstructions of the Jesus of history, but upon the in-breaking of the divine revelation, God's Word in Jesus Christ, attested by the Holy Spirit in the heart of the believer. In his early days Barth rejoiced that the quest of the historical Jesus had ended in confusion, disillusionment, and scepticism, since Christians had thereby been driven back to the recognition that faith has no foundation other than the Word of God revealed primarily in Jesus Christ and secondarily in the Holy Scriptures; and the Holy Spirit bears witness to both. (2) Whether, in the light of succeeding developments, Barth's rejoicing was or was not justified is entirely a different matter.

Here, in the views of Werner and Barth, we have basically the two opposing outlooks which still prevail to-

(1) M. Werner: The Formation of Christian Dogma.

(2) Karl Barth: Gesammelte Vorträge, III, 1957, Theologische Fragen und Antworten, 'Ein Briefwechsel mit Adolf von Harnack', 7-31.

day. On the one hand, restatements of Christology have been attempted by means of criticising classical and traditional formulations of our Lord's Person; and on the other hand it has been held that the only truth regarding the Person of Christ can come from faith in the witness of Holy Scripture. Neither of the two attempts, in all their varieties, is entirely satisfactory. The first appears to ignore the Gospel records while the second seems to disregard the need to examine and possibly to reformulate the definitions in which the Church necessarily had to couch her Christological doctrine.

Recent philosophical and psychological trends have had a profound influence upon Christological statement since the beginning of the twentieth century. It will be the function of this chapter to discuss some of these tendencies and their effects.

The Christological problem has been propounded for us in contemporary terms by H.R. Mackintosh. He submits that for modern thought the main defect in strictly traditional Christology has been the insistence, not accidentally, but on principle, on the doctrine of the two natures. This doctrine, he claims, fails to satisfy the majority of evangelical theologians.

First, he says, the doctrine of the two natures, in its traditional form at least, introduces into the life of Christ a thorough-going dualism. Instead of that complete unity which one feels in every representation of Him, He now seems to be divided against Himself. "The whole is bisected sharply by the fissure of distinction". (1) If the doctrine

(1) H.R. Mackintosh: The Person of Jesus Christ, p. 294.

is taken seriously, it confronts us with two abstractions instead of one reality.

Secondly, there is a problem concerned with the Person in which the two natures are stated to be "inseparably joined together". The ancient dogma assumes that, in both God and man, there exists a complex whole of attributes and qualities, which can be understood and spoken of as a "nature" having some real being apart from the basic focal and unifying Ego, whereas it is manifestly only within personal experience that all the varied factors of human life, emotional, intellectual, moral, and social, have any reality at all.

This dilemma of a duplex personality and an impersonal manhood has usually proved fatal to the doctrine of the two natures. If it takes our Lord's manhood seriously, as the New Testament does by instinct, it annihilates the notion of the double self. But if it insists on the unity of the Person, the unavoidable result is to curtail the integrity of the manhood and postulate a Figure whom it is difficult to reconcile with the Jesus of the Synoptic Gospels.

Such are the criticisms lodged by Mackintosh against the terminology of the Chalcedonian Definition. If we ask about the way in which contemporary thought is able to come to terms with the problem under better conditions than were the lot of those responsible for the ancient Christology we shall, I think, find a preliminary answer in the following considerations:

1. It is a well-worn criticism which asserts that the ancient theologians were held back in their enterprises by a defective and inadequate idea of "personality". It is a claim of modern research to have given to the word "personality" a much richer content than it ever had for the Fathers whose task it was to

attempt to interpret the one unique Personality which has ever appeared in the world's history. Present-day psychology is having a powerful effect on Christological restatement, and "personality" is put forward as the supreme and ultimate fact, the ideal centre of consciousness.

2. The scientific hypothesis of evolution has of late been applied not only to the material universe, but also to the realms of the moral, spiritual, and metaphysical. It has therefore to be reckoned with as a factor in the re-assertion of the Creeds, and not least in a modern statement of Christology.

W.D. McLaren, for example, posits four factors as being in his opinion the most significant in the process of re-moulding the Creed:

- (a) The doctrine of the universal Fatherhood of God;
- (b) The doctrine of evolution;
- (c) The spirit of collectivism;
- (d) The spirit of historical criticism.

The most revolutionary of these is without doubt the second.

(1)

3. The modern trend in philosophy and theology has brought into sharp relief the doctrine of the immanence and transcendence of God. One of the great needs of theology to-day is a comprehensive survey of the entire problem of the being of God in the light of the changed outlook suggested by (i) the philosophy of the Absolute and (ii) the philosophy of change. Bergson postulated Change as the Absolute principle, and it would now seem that the old theological conception of the changelessness of God will have to be re-thought and re-stated in such a way as to conserve this new truth to which philosophy appears to be leading.

(1) See W.D. McLaren: Our Growing Creed.

We turn first, then, to certain important philosophical considerations.

For each of the so-called "process-philosophers" the concept of change or "becoming", and especially the epigenetic change which has been demonstrated by the study of evolution, is regarded as a basic ingredient in the metaphysical enterprise. This is a philosophy of dynamism, life and movement. But insistence on the fact of "becoming" as metaphysically central does not mean that the concept of being is ignored. On the contrary, it suggests a necessary re-thinking of this concept in the light of the knowledge we now possess.

The dynamic philosophy of change has led in turn to a re-interpretation of the meaning of "perfection". To be perfect is not only to be oneself in all the integrity of selfhood; to be perfect is also, and very much more significantly, to be oneself in the fullest and richest kind of relationship with everything else, operating in it, penetrating it, securing its free response for the accomplishment of the highest ends. This philosophy clearly implies a living and vital process, and leads us on to see the world as the object of the divine love and compassion as it is also the field for the accomplishment of the divine purpose.

Furthermore, since God is so completely related to all things, by being "in" them, He knows and participates in their various states and stages. This He does not by "losing Himself" metaphysically in them, but because of that deep relationship with them which is supremely His. (1)

(1) Hartshorne and Reese: Philosophers Speak of God, pp. 1-15.

Another penetrating philosophical insight lies in the "emergent-evolutionary" interpretation of the world-order. This suggests that each higher level "emerges" with a genuine element of novelty about it. Life, for instance, is not merely a re-arrangement of the elements comprising it, but has an organic character of its own. It possesses qualities of organisation, adjustment and reproduction which are distinctly different from its constituents: hence it is emergent. So it is with the other levels in the order of creation. Thus the novelty and freshness of the "new" is protected from mere reduction to the status of the "old" simply re-arranged in a different way.

A supreme instance of emergence appears when we reach the highest level of man's life and the highest level known to us in the world, namely, man's capacity for moral judgement, for the discernment of values, for the appreciation of beauty, for the power to give himself in love, and above all for a consciousness of a transcendent Reality whom he may worship.

What is required by this philosophy is the grounding of the whole process in a Reality more basically real than the process itself. If it is true that there is a nisus such as Dr Lloyd-Morgan posited, that nisus must be the manifestation of a "supra-natural" Reality (in the sense of a Reality not confined to or exhausted in the "natural" order), who is the final explanation of the process, from whom it derives, whose purpose it actualises, and upon whom it "depends" for its continuance in every moment of its existence.

The truth is that God is at work in the whole order of creation, in history and in nature, although in different ways and with what we may call various "sub-purposes" in view. Our Lord is therefore not an intruder into the creation, but

is integrally related to and expressive of the entire God-world and God-man complex, even while He is also genuinely new and the Saviour from sin.

B.H. Streeter was one of the first to recognise the apologetic possibilities of this new approach. Reality, or God, he maintains, though in itself transcending our comprehension, has its most adequate analogue or symbol in the ideal of human life. Consequently, the ideal man would be the man whose life most fully manifested creative love. Streeter claims that Jesus Christ was such a Man. Hence the Church sees in Him the Image and revelation of God; and "if life instinct with love is the dynamic essence of reality, then to describe Him we shall find no words more true than 'Son of God'". (1)

The philosophical concepts of emergence, organism, and process are prominent also in the realist metaphysical theology of L.S. Thornton. He finds particular interest in the parallel between the ideas of "creation" and "incarnation". Irenaeus interprets this line of thought in terms of "recapitulation": the divine $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$, who at the beginning was the creative agent, becomes incarnate to restore the sum of His work in a new creation. Thornton maintains that man is a type of microcosm who includes in himself all the levels of the universal process but who sums them up in the new unity of his spiritual being. But man is not the end of the process. "As the series is taken up into the human organism, so in Christ the human organism is taken up on to the level of deity". (2) Thus from man we go on to God. The "deification"

(1) B.H. Streeter: Reality, p. 215

(2) L.S. Thornton: The Incarnate Lord, p. 255.

of man is again a common patristic conception, to which Athanasius gives expression in his famous statement about Christ: "He was made man that we might be made God". (1) Thornton submits that "Christ sanctified and deified all human nature", (2) and he perceives the emergence of a new kind of society in the "Body of Christ".

Thornton thus places the Incarnation at the heart of the universal process: but he does not regard Christ as a product of the process. God is not only the end to which the process moves, but also its beginning. There is a transcendent order over against the created order, and it is to the transcendent order that Christ belongs in His creative and redemptive work. But this reformulation of the doctrine of Christ in terms of organismic philosophy falls short of categorical adequacy.

Like Thornton, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin thinks of Christ as the Centre of the evolutionary process. Christ is, as it were, the reflection into the heart of the process of the omega-point which stands at its end. Christ assures us of its reality by making it actual in our midst; and in the Christian society of self-transcending love the end is already being realised. (3)

So far we have discussed the conception of Deity as perfect Being in infinitely varied relationships. This is the view suggested by Professor Hartshorne. And we have seen the background of this philosophical approach in the metaphysic

(1) Athanasius: De Incarnatione, 54, 3.

(2) L.S. Thornton: Revelation and the Modern World, p. 129

(3) Cf. P. Teilhard de Chardin: The Phenomenon of Man, p. 71.

of "emergent evolution", or "organism", and "process".

There are two other philosophical developments which it is worth while to discuss. One is the existentialist understanding of man's experience, especially as this bears on life as essentially "encounter" or "meeting", with the demand it makes for "decision". The other is the philosophy of history suggested by R.G. Collingwood and some other writers. This is a philosophy in which the events that have occurred in the past are seen as living and vital factors in the contemporary experience of those who live in the community in which such events are "remembered".

First, the particular emphasis in the existentialist movement is the practical insistence on "decision" or "engagement". Its corollary is to be found in the stress on personal participation, immediate experience, or "meeting". It is not sufficient to state that in the Christian faith authentic existence is believed to be manifested in the Man from Nazareth and that it is presented in Him as what Kierkegaard called "the Pattern" for our "imitation". Much more important than this is the insistence that no understanding of the meaning of human existence can be reached in a cold objective way. Any metaphysic is in fact a vision of Reality and of "my place" in respect to that Reality; and I can hold to it only as I give it a decisive and effectual place at the centre of my concrete living. I must decide; I must be committed or engaged. Thus, if Jesus Christ is what Christian faith declares Him to be, namely, the clue to the significance of life, divine and human, He can never be One who is looked at from a distance. He must become for me One who makes demands upon me, to whom I respond, whose human life is made "the Pattern" for me by my own choice. He is what man is, the existential embodiment of the essential manhood which rightly belongs to each of us. For the Christian theist

this is to say that in Him the divine Image is embodied in concrete and actual humanity and in historical existence.

This existential emphasis needs to be supplemented for the Christian by an awareness of the community. As it stands, it is far too individualistic. We come to faith in Christ through the fact of Christ; and that fact is conveyed to us by means of the communal life in faith which we share as members of the Body of Christ which is the Church. The individual believer then, in making his decision, is in reality making his decision for Christ in His Church.

Secondly, it is submitted by some recent forms of the philosophy of history that our Lord is not cut off from the whole movement of God in and to His world, as if He were a visitor from an entirely different sphere. On the other hand, He is genuinely "new" in that this event, in this place, associated with this particular Person in all His particularity, and with these concrete results in men's lives, has never happened before (for no event, person or result anywhere has ever "happened before") and it will never happen again for the same reason. Jesus Christ is both universal and unique: He is universal in that He embodies that which God is everywhere purposing and in some way achieving in the affairs of men. He is unique, because it is He, Jesus Christ, who decisively embodies this purpose and action. In the concrete and indisputable results of His appearing He has made a real and unmistakable difference in the lives of men and in their understanding of God and of the world.

Our Lord can thus legitimately, even though not demonstrably, be seen as the decisive expression of the Eternal Reality in human nature, deitas sub specie humanitatis. In Christian faith He has often been called the "God-Man" as distinct from other men in whom God dwells. But Jesus is divine in that He actualises in human nature that transcenden-

tal divine principle which is at the root of every man's being. If in the whole cosmic order the work of the $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ is prevenient on every level to whatever response may be given, we shall say that Christ is not man-become-God but God-become-man; not man-God, but God-man. Here Christian experience is both datum and proof. Classically, that experience has always been a new life with God, who "reaches down" to man in Christ.

This is paradox: and it is by means of this paradox, well vouched-for in Christian experience, that D.M. Baillie makes his contribution to Christological discourse. His view is designed to hold the balance between theories which either stress the humanity of our Lord at the expense of His divinity, or His divinity at the expense of His humanity. Baillie appeals to the paradox of grace, the existential experience of action which is truly free and personal, yet action which the Christian ascribes to God. For the Christian the word "God" is said actually to mean "the one who at the same time makes absolute demands upon us and offers freely to give us all that he demands". (1) This paradox of grace, itself mediated by Christ, reflects, albeit in fragmentary form, the perfect union of God and man in the Incarnation, and may, suggests Baillie, be our best clue for understanding the Person of Christ in a way which acknowledges both His full divinity and true humanity.

There has been much criticism of D.M. Baillie's Christology. J.H. Hick (2) argues that, while on such a view

(1) D.M. Baillie: God Was In Christ, p. 121.

(2) The Christology of D.M. Baillie (Scottish Journal of Theology, 1958, pp. 1-12).

as Baillie's God was indeed in Christ "in a far higher degree" than in other men and "to a far greater extent"; on the other hand the Nicene and Chalcedonian position is that God was in Christ in a unique sense which is not approximated or paralleled in any other human life. Hick now confronts Baillie with a dilemma. On the one hand, the paradox of grace might be viewed as a vehicle of predestination, by which God determines man's choices while such choices remain, from a human standpoint, free and responsible action. On the other hand, if all predestinarianism is avoided, Baillie's line of argument would land him in some form of Adoptionism. John Baillie replies to this charge that he thinks his brother would have subscribed to a predestinarian view. (1) The only prevenience entailed is that God offers His grace to man prior to man's being able to use it. Only by God's grace are we enabled to respond existentially to His gift of salvation. Faith is the Christian name for that response; and herein lies the true paradox.

We may begin our survey of recent psychological trends by noting the very significant part which the unconscious has come to play in the realm of modern psychology. By doing so it has in turn raised a variety of philosophical questions: How can we understand the existence of the mind, of psychical events, which are not presented to consciousness? The unconscious is thus seen to be the correlative of the self-conscious. Consciousness seems to be the minute aspect of a much larger whole which has been illuminated by

(1) J. Baillie: Some Comments on Professor Hick's Article on "The Christology of D.M. Baillie" (Scottish Journal of Theology, 1958, p. 269).

the unconscious. For Freud, the unconscious has a definite and exclusive individual reference. Its content is the repressed material of the individual life. Jung believed that the scope of the unconscious is much wider. Not only is there an individual, but a racial unconscious which interpenetrates the individual unconscious.

Recognition of the fact of the unconscious raises two basic questions with regard to the Person of Christ. The first concerns the Libido which is, according to psycho-analytical theory, the "sub-terranean stream" carrying man forward through life. In general terms, the Libido is sexual, and from it is derived the motive force of the personality. Assuming the validity of the doctrine of the Libido, are we then to deny its existence in the Person of Christ? Schleiermacher perhaps came closer than anyone else to an answer. He contended that the sensuous material presented to our Lord through His physical nature was, at every stage of His development, controlled and subordinated by His "God-consciousness". (1) What Schleiermacher means is that in our Lord, the instinctive material and impulses welling up from the unconscious were all perfectly controlled, directed and integrated in accordance with the demands of each stage in His life.

Jung's theory of the racial unconscious, on the other hand, opens a line of thought which may elucidate an aspect of the Incarnation that presents special perplexities to the modern mind. In the New Testament as in traditional theology the Person of Christ is said to have a racial significance. He is not only the representative Man, but He

(1) F. Schleiermacher: The Christian Faith, passim.

sums up all things. Athanasius held that the eternal Son of God, through His creative activity and abiding influence, has an inherent relation to the human race; and as we have mentioned, Irenaeus said that our Lord "recapitulates" humanity. If the hypothesis of the racial unconscious is confirmed by psychological investigation, there will be a strong indication, on empirical evidence, that the usual way in which we think about humanity is too individualistic, and that our separateness is true chiefly on the level of consciousness, while in actuality the unconscious links us together at a much deeper level than that.

W.R. Matthews similarly suggests in the light of modern psychical research that the phenomena of telepathy give strong support to the conclusion that the absolute separateness of our selves is true only at the level of consciousness and that, below that level, there is a linking of selves of such a kind that emotions, memories, and thoughts may pass from one mind to another without conscious communication. (1) All these thoughts are present and are part of the total individual experience. The conscious self in Christ knows them all, (2) not from the outside, but from within. Yet insofar as they are disintegrated and evil, His conscious self repudiates and overcomes them. Here we have, I believe, an insight into our Lord's nature as the One who "bore the sin of many" (3) and who had "laid on him the iniquity of us all". (4)

Furthermore, the existence of extra-sensory perception as a human faculty tends to support the view held in

(1) W.R. Matthews: The Problem of Christ in the Twentieth Century, pp. 52, 53.

(2) John 2:25: "Jesus knew what was in man"; cf. Matthew 12:25; Luke 6:8.

(3) Isaiah 53:12.

(4) Isaiah 53:6.

modern psychology that the self is, in the unconscious, not limited by the boundaries which seem to confine our conscious egos. Empirical observation indicates that there is a facet of human personality which is not restricted to the present moment and may possibly transcend time. This would certainly appear to be true of the personalities of all great men. Could this aspect of personality not have been fully actualised in our Lord? (1)

The evidence provided by observed development leads W.R. Matthews to look for the core of personality in the will, including in that term "the striving, desiring, conative life which is the matrix out of which the conscious will emerges".

(2) When we consider the events which constitute personality we discover among them a high proportion of those which we describe as acts of conscious will, although these are, of course, never the only components: and the more definitely personal a self is the more certain we can be of the sort of behaviour to expect. We normally accept the highest types of personality as being most truly free. The personality-pattern in such types is a moving pattern of growth, and because the pattern which we see is not our own pattern, we cannot tell in detail what it may become. New acts will be coherent with the pattern so far evolved, but they will not be a

(1) Cf. the Transfiguration narratives (Matthew 17:1,2; Mark 9:2,3; Luke 9:28,29) where our Lord, still living in the temporal and spatial context, shows that He is able at any moment to transcend both time and space.

(2) Op. cit., p. 65.

mere repetition of the old.

Up to the present point this chapter has dealt in separate sections with selected examples of the influence on Christological thought of recent philosophical and psychological trends. In the remainder of the chapter we shall endeavour, again by means of selected examples, briefly to show the manner in which new developments in philosophy have affected modern psychology, and vice versa, and the effect which both have had on contemporary Christology.

We may proceed by considering the personal life of Jesus as a moving pattern of behaviour-events, which means primarily a moving pattern of willed actions. Should we wish to express the crucial problem of the Incarnation in its most abstract terms, it would probably assume the following form: How can we conceive that the Universal of universals, God, is fully manifested and present, not in an entire class of individuals, but in one Individual? The problem takes on new meaning when we remember that the universal in modern philosophy is the "pattern of events". Hence, a personal life of which it could be said that it is of the same pattern as the temporal will of God would be the supreme revelation of God: it would be "God manifest in the flesh". On this hypothesis, the pattern of the Father's will is the essential reality of the temporal personality of the Son. It was His life, and without it, or deviating from it, He would cease to be Himself. The pattern, like the temporal will of God, is a moving pattern; the work is not yet completed.

One of the consequences of the evolution by modern thought of such dynamic concepts as we have mentioned has been a corresponding fading in the significance of the word "substance". Substitution of contemporary categories may help to

elucidate the problem of substance and universals, but does not eliminate it. The category of "substance" appears in another form, however, when we attempt to penetrate the inner mystery of personality, for in their timeless aspects, persons are substances. They are permanent constituents of reality. Philosophy and mysticism both converge to bear witness to this eternal facet of human personality.

Philosophy has always held that there is a supra-temporal basis for the human self. This is proved by reflecting upon the implications of any act of full self-consciousness. Thus there is, at the centre of what I call "myself" a subject which can never be an object and hence never a part of that objective world which comes into being and passes away. Mysticism affirms with Clement of Alexandria that if a man knew himself he would know God; and with Augustine that if one would find God, one must look within.

We may progress even further by mentioning the difference between the two possible psychological views of the status of the transcendental ego. The first view assumes that the timeless subject is ultimately one and the same in all rational beings. From this it follows that there is a sense in which my own reality is to be found only in God. But the Christological doctrine which would ensue from the conception of the unitary Subject in all personal experience would be imperilled, for we should have to say of every person that he "came down from heaven and was incarnate". We are therefore led to prefer the second, or pluralistic conception of the metaphysical basis of personality. According to this hypothesis, there are many subjects which transcend time and space. We must think of the ultimate subject in each person, not as absolutely timeless, but as created. The finite self would have a conferred timelessness which distinguishes it from the changing empirical ego. The Incarnation

would then be the taking of a created subject by the divine $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ and intimate union with it so that the human subject, while never ceasing to be human and created, was so ultimately conjoined with the divine that they comprised one Person in the sphere of history.

A more concrete situation now arises: How could this union of divine and human subjects manifest itself in the life-experience of the God-Man? Many opinions have been put forward in answer to this question. One of the latest is based upon the fact that the psychological reality of "inspiration" has an important bearing on the Incarnation, which has always been said to be "through the operation of the Spirit"; and the interpretation of the Person of Christ as the supreme example of inspiration is not a new one. Matthews states that our Lord was the "completely inspired" Man. By the "completely inspired person" he means "one for whom the power of the indwelling Spirit was always and certainly available". (1) This reply is unsatisfactory in its superficiality. Nels Ferré has achieved a far deeper insight into the problem by perceiving that Jesus was unique (2) in that His every response to God's will was the correct and perfect response. (3) Here existentialism and the "pattern-psychology meet in a most useful way. "There was a full response of one integrated personality who conclusively enacted the Agape life of God, by participating in the life of God at the centre of his personality, while also having and ever retaining his human nature". (4) Ferré has here spoken a valid word; but at other points

(1) Op. cit., p. 82.

(2) I would prefer to say with Pittenger that our Lord is "definitive" rather than "unique".

(3) N.F.S. Ferré: Christ and the Christian.

(4) Ferré: Op. cit., p. 109.

his Christology is open to criticism.

A sound doctrine of the Person of Christ should, he maintains, begin with Christ as Agape. The relation between Christ and the Jesus of history presents a complicated problem. The Jesus of history put into the world the pattern of God as Agape. But Jesus transcends both life and process as such only because God was at the centre of His being and teaching. Thus, in starting with this pattern of Jesus Christ as Agape, the "Event-Meaning", the "selective most high of history", Ferré holds that we have an historical approach which is nevertheless free of the detailed problems of the historical Jesus, and that will eventuate in a different kind of theology from that which makes the historical Jesus central. "Although we cannot know the historic Jesus, then, we can know the historic Christ". (1)

Quite apart from the difficulty of knowing what Ferré purports to convey through the phrases "Event-Meaning" and "selective most high of history", there is a distinct lack of clarity in the purpose of his division of our Lord's Person into "historic Jesus" and "historic Christ", the second of which seems to him far more significant than the first. A complete Christology must take both into account, for neither can be known without the other. Ferré suggests that we start "not with the historical Jesus..., but with the Agape pattern that is the Spirit". (2) He does not tell us where the "Agape pattern" is to be found. In relegating both Bible and creeds to a position of minimal authority, he robs Christianity of its historical roots, and his substitution of the fanciful

(1) Op. cit., p. 59.

(2) Op. cit., p. 64.

"Agape pattern" leads him into a subjectivism of the most dangerous kind to Christian theology.

Our discussion has covered a very limited area of recent philosophical and psychological thought, and the respective fields are by no means exhausted by the aspects we have examined. I have, however, selected for comment those trends which seem most pertinent to the purport of this thesis; and in the next chapter we shall see how some of these elements may find their place in a modern Christological re-statement.

CHAPTER FOUR

Some Considerations to be Taken into
Account in a Modern Restatement of Christology

We have now reached a point in this discussion where a Christological restatement must be attempted.

Most of us would agree that the establishment of the historicity of the New Testament is the vindication of the Christ of the Creeds. The root of Nicene and Chalcedonian Christology rests in the historical accuracy of the New Testament portrait of our Lord. The starting-point for an investigation of the relation between the human and divine natures in our Lord must therefore be the historical fact, supplied by the New Testament data, of their indissoluble union within our Lord's Person. All New Testament accounts of the Incarnation reveal a common element shared by the two natures in Jesus Christ as well as a necessary affinity between them. This truth alone makes such a union conceivable and meaningful. Because it indicates affinity and not identity, it ensures that the difference between the two is not destroyed by their union.

Every sound Christological discussion will necessarily begin not only with an explanation of the vere Deus which declares the equality of Jesus Christ with God, but with an explanation of the vere homo which declares His equality with us. Christology cannot and must not take as its starting-point a knowledge of man-in-general. On the contrary, a genuine knowledge of man-in-general, a theological anthropology, and therefore a theological doctrine of the sin and misery of man, can be based only on the particular Man Jesus Christ, and hence on Christology. (1)

(1) Cf. K. Barth; Church Dogmatics III, 2, §43, 2, and Passim; and Church Dogmatics IV, 2, §64, 2, pp. 25-27.

If a contemporary Christological restatement is to find its roots in the Bible, as it must, some further preliminary remarks have first to be made.

Some of the richest suggestions for a twentieth-century Christology are to be found in the New Testament account of Jesus as the revelation of God's glory. Jesus is related to the glory of God in a three-fold way:

- A. The "inner glory" of Jesus is equated with the "inner glory" of God Himself. (1)
- B. Jesus is in a unique fashion the observable expression of God's inner glory, the divine "effulgence" (2) by which men are enabled to "know" (3) this glory.
- C. Jesus is also the Man who renders perfect acknowledgement of God's glory, the "perfect obedience which alone is perfect worship". (4)

It is also as well at the outset to consider three fundamental Christian claims for our Lord. The remarks made about these claims will shed fresh light on our twentieth-century apprehension of His Person.

Christians claim that Jesus is irreplaceable, that He is unique, and that He is divine. We shall briefly discuss each of these in order, making use of philosophical analogies as we do so.

First, since our Lord is an expression of the divine nature, He is not replaceable by a mere report of the divine nature. He is not simply a code-sign connected by arbitrary

(1) Cf. John 12:41 in relation to John 1:14 and 2:11. See also A.M. Ramsey: The Glory of God and the Transfiguration of Christ, p. 28: "Such is the place of Jesus Christ in relation to the divine glory that it is possible to speak of the glory of Christ, and by those words to mean no less than the glory of God Himself".

(2) Heb. 1:3; cf. V. Taylor: The Names of Jesus, pp. 129-130.

(3) II Cor. 4:6.

(4) E.G. Selwyn: The First Epistle of Peter, p. 255; cf. John 12:23-28.

conventions with the divine nature. Just as specific expressions of feeling-Z have an intrinsic connection with feeling-Z and are thus indispensably part of what is meant by "Z", so particular expressions of the divine nature are intrinsically connected with the divine nature itself. As particular expressions of feeling-Z may be given a peculiar self-referring reportive use, so with the particular expressions of the divine nature. It is as if in Jesus God said to men: "I am like this". Reports of feeling cannot replace expressions of feeling. It is possible, however, to substitute one expression of feeling for another: the feelings expressed are sufficiently like each other for the same feeling-word to be applied. Is it not therefore possible to substitute one expression of the divine nature for another? The Christian's answer is "No", for Jesus is irreplaceable in relation to other expressions of the divine nature. He is not merely an expression of the divine nature: He is the expression. And Christians thus make a second claim for Jesus: He is in some sense "unique".

Secondly then, Jesus is unique because He is the standard expression of the divine nature, and provides the criterion by which all other expressions of the divine nature are to be judged. Our Lord manifests the standard because the correspondence between Himself and God's inner glory is perfect. No other observable event, person or thing could be a more adequate expression. Just as we may compare two expressions of a feeling in terms of their adequacy, so we may compare two expressions of the divine nature. In each instance the notion of "correspondence" is involved; and in each instance two different expressions may vary in their adequacy, so that one is "perfect" and the other "imperfect". A difference such as this is neither a "difference in degree" nor a "difference in kind". The degree/kind distinction is unsatisfactory as a way of interpreting the uniqueness of Jesus. He is unique in that He is the normative and perfect

expression of God's nature. All other expressions of God's glory are inadequate in their degree of correspondence to the divine nature as revealed in Christ. (1)

Thirdly, if a Christian says "Jesus is divine", he may be faced with a dilemma: "In judging that Jesus is divine, either you already have an idea of divinity or you do not. If you already possess such an idea, and find that Jesus merely conforms to it, then Jesus is not necessary as a revelation of God, for you already know what 'divinity' is. If you do not already have a notion of divinity, you are not entitled to make the claim 'Jesus is divine' ". The dilemma may be seen to be false once we think of "divinity" in terms of glory and holiness, recognising that these are expressive qualities, logically similar to artistic expressions of feeling. When I have grasped and have been grasped by a new expression of feeling-Z, what I mean by "Z" is slightly altered. Previously I had not thought of this particular expression of "Z": my apprehension of the inner feeling-Z had not been extended to include the specific feeling which has now been expressed. Neither is the particular expression of feeling unnecessary, nor is my previous understanding of "Z" irrelevant. Similarly, when I begin to understand the expression of God's nature, His glory and holiness, in Jesus, and come to perceive that it is the expression, I confess: "He is divine". This involves a new and definitive meaning for the word "divine": observables are "divine" in so far as they resemble Jesus as the expression of God's glory and holiness, and thus correspond to a certain extent to His inner nature. We conclude, therefore, that the specific revelation of divinity in Jesus is necessary; yet other revelations are not irrelevant.

Now we may ask what it is that has made Christians claim such special attributes for their Lord? What is the mode of the Christian understanding of irreplaceability, uniqueness, and divinity in the Person of Christ? How ob-

(1) Cf. Romans 8:18-22.

jective or subjective is a Christian permitted to become in his apprehension of the divine nature? An interesting, though partial solution lies, I think, in the following postulate. Revelation of the divine nature is an impressive and an expressive quality. This revelation in Jesus is therefore understood only insofar as one becomes like Jesus, and hence like God.

The divine glory in Jesus is understood insofar as one is impressed. When I am genuinely "impressed", I do not merely have a "feeling-response". Like Jesus, on the contrary, I manifest God's glory in a way of life which reveals that glory to others. In a real sense, that is, I need to become like Jesus in order to understand the nature of God as revealed in Him.

This revelation lies largely in the "existential impact" made by Jesus, not exclusively in such biographical details as the Virgin Birth, His miracles, or even His Resurrection. These details are not of primary importance. It is the impact of confrontation with the Christ, conveyed perhaps by the accounts of His words and deeds, which lays hold on us existentially, and makes an "impression" on us as it did on the first disciples. The impression is such that we are brought into communion with God and are constrained to acknowledge that Christ Himself is God. (1) It is claimed, however, that we have two objective grounds for the faith built upon this impression. The first is "the historical fact of the person of Christ". (2) We arrive at God not through doubtful speculation but through Christ as an historical fact within the range of human experience. This fact is sufficiently attested in the New Testament, at least as far as the impact made by Jesus is concerned; and further, this impact possesses an enduring quality, so that

(1) See W. Hermann: The Communion of the Christian with God,

(2) Ibid., p. 102.

we can experience its power today as did the first disciples. The second objective ground is that "we hear within ourselves the demand of the moral law". (1) Our inner moral convictions are realised in Christ. He is the Founder of the Kingdom of God, to be understood as the universal moral community which claims our consciences. These ethical valuations also find expression in the confession of Christ as God.

The reality of God which metaphysics may fail to establish is thus assured on the ground of the communion which we have with Him in Christ. This communion is not mystical, for it is based on the historical Jesus. "We do not merely come through Christ to God. It is truer to say that we find in God himself nothing but Christ". (2)

The revelation of God's nature in Jesus is also an expressive action. The "inner nature" of God is therefore understood to the degree that one's own "inner nature" has been transformed into His likeness.

Since the self-revelation of God is both impressive and expressive, only those who are "being changed into his (Jesus's) likeness ($\epsilon\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu\alpha$) from one degree of glory to another" (3) can have the "light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ". (4) Christians have "put on the new nature, which is being constantly renewed in the image ($\epsilon\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu\alpha$) of its Creator and brought to know God". (5) This notion, that only like knows or understands like, is evident also in the First Epistle of John: "Beloved, we are God's children now; it does not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when he appears, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is". (6)

(1) Ibid., p. 103.

(2) Ibid., p. 32.

(3) II Cor. 3:18.

(4) II Cor. 4:6.

(5) Col. 3:10. (N.E.B.)

(6) I John 3:2; cf. I John 4:7-8.

Not the least difficult task in a modern re-interpretation of Christology would be the fullest possible analysis of the divine nature and the being of God both in Himself and in His relations with His creation. An examination of this sort is a basic requirement simply because most of the problems created for Christology over the centuries have been owing to an inadequate and superficial perception of the being and nature not only of man but of God. Such an investigation would, of course, have to begin without preconceptions and with the New Testament. St. Paul, for instance, had a lucid understanding of the fundamental truth which would have saved much confusion if men had always given heed to it: "Of him and through him and unto him are all things". (1) This fact permits of a sure foundation for an Incarnation and a right intuition of God in His relationship to the finite order. Such a fact secures also the two polar truths of God's immanence and transcendence: an undue stress on either gives rise to Christological bankruptcy.

We have seen that modern psychology has done away with the ancient Christological vocabulary of "nature", "substance", "person" and "essence". We are confronted instead by such terms as "consciousness", "personality", "ego", and "pattern". The subject of greatest concern for Christology is the unity, continuity, and discontinuity of consciousness. In the copious vocabulary of psychology we receive a sharp reminder that a modern Christology, if it is to be in any sense a re-interpretation of the old, must be an attempt to propound some series of equations between the old terms and the new. The substitution of new terms for old does not, however, make the Christological problem less easy, and it does not dispose of the dualism of natures in the Person of Christ against which the modern mind rebels.

Even present-day psychologists have found it im-

(1) Romans 11:36.

possible to eliminate a concept such as "substance" from the metaphysical vocabulary. "Substance" stands for something which is permanently self-identical, that which subsists in itself. Precisely the same false dualism which is supposed to exist between "body" and "soul", "mind" and "matter", as two distinct "substances", with nothing in common, and in some sense capable of independent subsistence, has in the past been applied to the question of the two natures in our Lord.

There is great danger in attempting to disintegrate the human nature of our Lord in the interests of any specific theory. No theory, disintegrating His human "body" and "soul", and substituting for what we understand by "soul" an alien element or principle, can be sound except upon one condition, namely, that the substitute, in taking the place of "soul", is able to perform for the human body every function which would naturally have been performed by a human soul, and of existing in such a relationship to the human body as would have existed in the instance of a human soul. The objection lodged by some is that a substitute-notion such as that of the divine Λόγος already abounds in theological pre-suppositions. Is it possible to use any other term which would signify that the Λόγος performed in our Lord precisely those functions that are performed by the ordinary human soul?

Apollinarianism could never have been propounded had the indissoluble union of body and soul in human nature been fully realised. The heresy was the result of a false dualism which looked upon "body" and "soul" as in some way separate and distinct "substances". Origen's doctrine concerning the "pre-existence" of the soul hints at just such a conception, since this theory inevitably regards the "soul" as a nature complete in itself, and without the need to subsist in a "body" in order to reach its completeness. But if modern psychology bids us speak in terms of "consciousness" and

"personality", we cannot be too cautious in applying such terms to the Person of Christ. The work of H.M. Relton, for example, shows what is liable to follow when there is failure to take such care. He asks, for instance, whether we can venture to penetrate deeper into the mystery of the relationship between the human and the divine in our Lord's Person from our knowledge of this relationship as revealed in the Christian life. He states that an affirmative reply is justified by the fact that the same Jesus "who was incarnate in His own Person as the Son of Man is now imparting Himself to us as the Head of a new humanity, which receives its life and is becoming what it is only in virtue of its living and vital union with Him". (1) What this "new humanity" is, or what form it takes, is left totally undisclosed. It is a concept equally as mystifying as Relton claims the $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ to be.

The main point of these remarks is that in any modern Christological restatement we are to be keenly aware of the implications of contemporary substitutions for classical concepts. For example, does not the replacement of the two-nature theory even by dynamic-relational concepts remove the important idea of "Incarnation"? Is not a relational concept a return from a Christology of Incarnation to a Christology of adoption? First, one may answer that both the incarnational and adoptionist Christologies have biblical roots and, for this and other reasons, a genuine standing in Christian thought. Beyond this, however, one must insist that neither of them can be carried out without the other.

We must be quite clear that our Lord's "consciousness" was definitively and qualitatively different from ours. (2) We can have no knowledge of a perfectly pure and

(1) H.M. Relton: A Study in Christology, p. 190.

(2) Cf. K. Barth: Church Dogmatics IV, 2, §64, 2, p. 64.

sinless consciousness. Moreover, His "personality" was distinct from ours. To us it is sheer mystery that there can have been an Ego which, because it was eternal, gave the incarnate Lord a knowledge of Himself as He was prior to His Advent in the flesh. Again, to speak of the Man Jesus as the "alternative personality" of the Second Person of the Trinity, or as "a dissociated section of the divine consciousness" which maintains itself in full divinity by His side, is to use language which, even if justified by the certain results of investigation into the obscure regions of human nature, can scarcely be considered valid or adequate when applied to the Person of Christ. When we consider our Lord's Person we consider the union of perfect God with perfect man, not the union of an imperfect human personality with even the fullest measure of divine life. Our Lord was divine first and human afterwards. He was eternally the Image of the invisible God.

Therefore the starting-point for consideration of the relationship between the human and the divine in His Person is not, as with us, an imperfect human being into whom the divine flows from above. It is rather a perfect divine personality entering into and absorbing our human nature. The difference is crucial for a sound Christology. Failure clearly to perceive this distinction is the basis of much recent Christological confusion founded on psychological data supplied from an analysis of imperfect human personality. It is not simply a difference in the standpoint from which we view the relationship between the two natures, that is, whether we are to begin from the Alexandrian or Antiochene point of view. The difference is more vital. The great emphasis upon the manhood and truly human life of Christ in our day, owing to the influence of the Liberal school, has made theologians reluctant to face the New Testament portrait of the God-Man who, however truly human His earthly life might have been, was none the less God Incarnate. As such

He presents us with a unique phenomenon of psychology, namely, a unique consciousness and a unique, sinless personality, perfectly obedient and responsive to His Father's will.

But to dwell exclusively on the truly human life of the God-Man results in our faith accepting Him as the sinless Son of God whilst our psychology tempts us to reduce Him to our level and to endow Him with a "human personality" such as we possess, but such as He never had. His personality, human and divine, was and is unique.

Karl Barth has clearly perceived that the first part of the Chalcedonian Definition was intended to be a safeguard against the excesses of Alexandrian theology. One and the same Christ, the only-begotten Son and Lord, is to be confessed in two natures ἀσυγχύτως (inconfuse) and ἀτρέπτως (immutabiliter), and thus without any idea of commixture of the two or a changing of the one into the other.

The positive meaning of the Definition here is that the divine essence and the human essence were not changed and self-alienated in their union in our Lord. "The divine is neither changed nor self-alienated from below in the exaltation which it experiences to participate in the divine". (1) In this union and mutual participation both the humiliation of the divine and the exaltation of the human are real enough; but the one does not cease to be divine in its humiliation and the other human in its exaltation. The mystery of the Incarnation lies in the fact that Jesus Christ is "in a real simultaneity of genuinely divine and human essence, and that it is on this presupposition that the mutual participation is also genuine". (2)

The second part of the Chalcedonian Definition is

(1) K. Barth: Church Dogmatics IV, 2, §64, 2, p.64.

(2) Ibid.

seen by Barth to guard against Antiochene excesses. Jesus Christ, Son of God and Son of Man, is to be confessed in His two natures ἀδιαίρετως (indivisē) and ἀχωρίστως (inseparabiliter), and thus without any idea of a divisibility of one or the other, or a separability of the one from the other.

Here the positive meaning of the Definition is that even in their distinctiveness the divine and human essences were and are united in our Lord, not in appearance only, but in fact, "not merely partially but totally, not merely temporarily but definitively". The humiliation which comes to the divine essence in its participation in the human and the exaltation which comes to the human in its participation in the divine, cannot be separated in all their distinctiveness. "They are a single event and being. If we believe in Jesus Christ, in this One, we do not decide for one element in this history to the obscuring or even exclusion of the other, but we accompany the whole course of the history in its unity and totality. The mystery of the Incarnation consists in the fact that the simultaneity of divine and human essence in Jesus Christ is real, and therefore their mutual participation is also real". (1)

From this we see that a contemporary Christological restatement may take as its basic principle the unique single consciousness, human and divine, in the Person of the God-Man. The dualism of "two consciousnesses" is open to just as severe criticism as is the "two natures" doctrine. Modern theologians are seeking to overcome this dualism by speaking instead of a single consciousness, simultaneously human and divine. H.M. Relton claims that no other theory than the doctrine of the enhypostasia of Leontius of Byzantium can meet this difficulty. If there is to be neither a duplex personality nor an impersonal manhood, no solution other than the enhypostasia can give us a single consciousness human and divine indissolubly united in the unity of the one Person.

(1) K. Barth: Church Dogmatics IV, 2, §64, 2, pp. 64, 65.

"The presupposition of the doctrine of the enhypostasia", says Relton, "is the existence of such an affinity between the human and the divine as to make the advent of the divine into the human not the advent of some alien element, but the advent of something which by its very constitution and nature could coalesce with the divine, and by its union with, and subsistence in the human give to the divine a completeness and perfection which it could receive in no other way". (1)

There is value in this disinterment of the enhypostasia hypothesis. It ensures that the particular is contained in the universal. The divine Ego "contains" the human, and yet in essence is not altered or restricted by that fact. Any limitation of the divine is imposed from within, not from without. The divine, unique and single self-consciousness of the incarnate Christ is the universal, revealed in and through the particular, which is man.

Chief among the problems raised by the theory is the question of how the particular can perfectly embody its own universal. Is it possible that the particular man, Jesus Christ, could nevertheless be the Universal Man, not belonging to any specific age, but claimed as the perfect One in every age? (2)

These considerations lead us on to related questions. Are we to regard the Incarnation as God becoming incarnate in the Person of Christ so as to achieve the redemption of mankind; or is He merely the man Jesus, whose human consciousness was a channel through which God might exercise a maximum of control in human life? Did the divine Λόγος Himself become incarnate; or are we to think of the human personality of Jesus receiving the divine beyond measure? Is it true that

(1) Op. cit., pp. 147-148.

(2) Cf. Kierkegaard's idea of contemporaneity in his "Training in Christianity". This faith-relationship to Jesus Christ Kierkegaard calls "contemporaneousness". The man who knows Christ by faith is contemporaneous with Him, no matter in what age he lives.

"in Him dwelt all the fullness of the Godhead bodily" (πᾶν τὸ πλῆρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς) (1) or are we to regard Him simply as the One in whom the Spirit dwelt εἰς ἐν οὐδένι ἄλλω?

As a further possible key to the relationship between the divine and human in Christ, Dr. W. Sanday points to the relations of the subconscious and "subliminal" self to the whole self. The "larger self", he says, is made up of the conscious part of experience and that other part which is subconscious or unconscious. This second part is the more important of the two, as we have noted before. Sanday quotes passages from Myer's work, and also from the writings of William James and other psychologists, to show the importance of this "subliminal" self and the part played by it as a well-accredited psychological category. He tentatively suggests two propositions:

1. "That the proper seat or locus of all divine indwelling, or divine action upon the human soul, is the subliminal consciousness".
2. "That the same, or a corresponding, subliminal consciousness is the proper seat or locus of the Deity of the incarnate Christ". (2)

Sanday thinks that if we can somehow locate the divine in us we shall have the key to the problem of the relations between divine and human in our Lord. But where in man is the divine to be "located"? Sanday would answer: "In the subliminal self", where it is found working at the roots of our being, far beneath the surface of our normal life, whilst the results of this working are seen in their effects as these make themselves felt from time to time in our consciousness. We see the result and infer the cause.

But it is surely preferable to believe that the

(1) Col. 2:9.

(2) W. Sanday: Christologies Ancient and Modern, p. 159.

whole human personality, not merely a part of it, is the proper "locus" of the divine indwelling. (1) The divine Spirit influences and gives vitality to each part. The divine immanence, which is love, is able to permeate our entire nature, and the extent to which this is actually effected in our lives will determine how truly human we are. It is incorrect to speak of "locating" an influence. It is still worse to talk of localising a divine presence. But a valid Christology must start not so much with our resemblance to our Lord because we are men in whom His Spirit dwells as in His difference from us because He was Son of God in a generic sense in His own right and Son of Man in a unique sense in virtue of His sinless and perfect manhood.

The most interesting feature of Sanday's theory for our purposes is that it represented a brilliant though premature attempt to overcome the dualism presented by the "two natures" doctrine and the "two consciousnesses" suggested by certain forms of kenotic Christology. Sanday is plainly feeling his way towards a single consciousness, divine and human, as the only sound basis for a unity of Person in the one Christ.

Much has been written of late about kenoticism, and it is doubtful whether any contemporary Christological re-statement can be regarded as complete without giving serious consideration to its importance.

In the New Testament the kenotic motif is expressed through an idiom shaped by the Jewish-apocalyptic and Hellenistic-Gnostic thought of late antiquity. This motif was unsystematic in form. It was based on the dynamic and personalistic conceptions of God common in biblical thought.

As early as the fourth century Apollinaris had perceived that complete and perfect Deity, limited by nothing

(1) Cf. I Cor. 6:19.

but Himself, whose activity is therefore beyond all limitations of time and space, cannot be completely manifested in a human nature which, though perfect, is nevertheless embodied, and therefore subject to the limitations of time and space. (1) It is clear throughout the history of revelation, however, that the very nature of God is to be personal Spirit who as personal Spirit remains invariably Himself while as personal Spirit He condescends to the nature of the creature. Such condescension is the mystery of kenosis, the divine self-emptying.

The corner-stone of kenotic Christology is thus the great truth of the divine condescension shown in the humiliation of the Son of God. (2) In Philippians 2 the idea of the subjection of the self is expressed by Paul in mythical terms. The pre-existent Christ humbled Himself, became a servant, and experienced the death of a slave. Pre-existence and self-surrender are combined in this symbolism. It corroborates the central symbolism of the Cross, but it cannot be taken literally as an event which happened at some time in some heavenly place.

The second truth which kenotic Christology asserts is the reality of our Lord's manhood. The problem is therefore to determine what limitations the Divine must undergo in order that He may live a truly human life as a Man amongst men.

As the Church brought its message into relation with the intellectual world of Greco-Roman antiquity, the kenotic motif was modified in the process of assimilation. It was formulated into a systematic doctrine so as to accord with the new orthodoxy that emerged in the anti-Arian controversy. The flexible and unsystematic conception of divine self-emptying found in the New Testament was re-interpreted through the abstract, static ontology derived from Greek philosophical

(1) Apollinaris: Fragment 138.

(2) Philippians 2:5-9.

monotheism. The Christ was declared to be fully and unchangeably divine in His pre-existent, earthly and exalted states.

It soon became plain in the patristic theology, however, that this assimilation of the motif into a static conception of God placed it beyond the pale in intelligibility. Since God cannot change, how then is a divine self-emptying to be explained? The best answer the patristic theologians had was that the $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ assumed a human body. Yet even this assertion was hedged about to protect the deity of Christ.

As the deity of our Lord was conceived by the Fathers, it tended to deny the reality of His human psychic functions. While avoiding docetism in relation to Jesus's physical life, the Fathers did not avoid the docetic psychology.

During the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, the question of Christ's nature had been re-opened in a manner more comprehensive than at any time since the fifth century. With this re-opening, the kenotic motif came back into formal theological thought. It was used by theologians of the mediating tradition to act as a bridge between the traditional doctrines of Christ's divinity and the new picture of His humanity. God was no longer regarded as changeless Being; He had really limited Himself.

In many respects the Hegelians stated a far more convincing kenosis doctrine than most. They saw that kenosis could not be employed to perform a "repair-job" on the sagging structure of orthodoxy. It implied an entirely new doctrine of God. So they developed a doctrine of God in which self-limitation is integral to the divine life. By doing this, however, they undercut the independence of God.

By the end of the nineteenth century the interpre-

tations of kenosis by both the mediating and left-wing theologians had been shown to be inadequate.

The kenotic motif was introduced into contemporary theology through the writings of Kierkegaard, who stressed its paradoxical nature. Kenosis is the absolute paradox which reduces to naught all attempts at giving the faith rational coherence. Since this is so, a new method is required to formulate the doctrine of kenosis. Thought about it must proceed a posteriori and not a priori. The question to be asked is: Given the divine self-emptying in Christ, what does this say about the nature of God and man? Against this background, kenosis has been interpreted as the expression of God's freedom for man. Barth, for example, has given new systematic statement to kenosis through his personalistic doctrine of God. God, he submits, is a free Person who in expressing His will of love for man can accept the limitations of human life without ceasing to be God.

Gess advocated the most thoroughgoing and consistent form of kenoticism. He thought it essential for the divine $\Lambda\acute{\omicron}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ to cease from the exercise of His operations as the Second Person of the Trinity, and to deprive Himself even of His consciousness as the $\Lambda\acute{\omicron}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ in order that He might be able to submit to the process of a human birth in time and space. Kenosis was thus extended to the immanent divine attributes. Besides the theories of Gess and Thomasius, which give us two leading sorts of kenotic theology, there are the later and richer contributions of the British kenotic theologians. F.J. Hall, however, offers a valid criticism when he says that any Christological theory involving the surrender on the part of the God-Man of any divine attribute essential to the validity and perfection of His divine work as Saviour stands before us self-condemned. (1) But on the other hand, we need not necessarily be tied to an "attribute" theology.

(1) See F.J. Hall: The Kenotic Theory.

Kenoticism is integrally related to the type of Christology which we have been discussing in this chapter. It will be of value at this juncture briefly to state this relationship, and to see where links may be made between the two. We may begin by reviving the older notion of the $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ functioning through two centres of personal activity. According to this view, the $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ in some sense leads a kind of double life as the eternal pre-existent $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ which upholds all creation. As the incarnate $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ He performs His mediatorial work within the limits of His manhood. "We are to see in Christ", says Dr. H.L. Martensen, "not the attributes of the divine nature in their unbounded infinitude, but the divine attributes embodied in the attributes of the divine nature (communicatio idiomatum)". (1)

As we have noticed, the theory of the "two consciousnesses", common to many forms of kenoticism, is confronted with the formidable danger that it almost necessarily involves a duplex personality. To escape this dilemma we are forced to resort to yet another theory of a self-consciousness composite in character, partly human, partly divine. This renders one self-consciousness belonging to neither nature by itself, but fitting to both because it is the centre of a divine-human personality. It is, as we have seen, essential for a balanced Christology to have as a starting-point the conception of a single consciousness of the Christ; but, as B.S. Weston warns us, "the process may be dual, since two natures are (our Lord's) media of knowledge; but the self-knowledge of the Incarnate, through His manhood, is a single knowledge of Himself as God-in-manhood. And any such knowledge independent of His manhood is outside the Incarnation". (2) Weston's chief assumption is that the self-limitation of the Word of God was an act consummated prior to the Incarnation. It was

(1) H.L. Martensen: Christian Dogmatics, p. 267.

(2) B.S. Weston: The One Christ, p. 174n.

an act of will in the sphere of His divine activities, which He made as the unlimited Word of the Father. Perfect harmony within the Godhead becomes in human terms perfect obedience.

From history emerge three prime factors in the construction of a contemporary statement of kenosis:

1. The methodology for such a constructive restatement is a posteriori. Thought can proceed most fruitfully from the assumption of a kenosis in Christ to the construction of a doctrine of God and Christology. The starting-point must not be some pre-conceived ontology within which kenosis is to be fitted. Kenosis must be understood in its own terms rather than in those foreign to it.
2. Kenosis can become intelligible only in terms of personalistic, dynamic categories of thought. Kenosis is the free act of a personal God and can only be understood in these terms.
3. The kenotic motif cannot be used in the construction of a Christology alone. Kenosis has of necessity to form an integral part of the doctrine of God. It is essentially an account of how God acts and what He is like. Therefore kenosis must first be intelligible in the doctrine of God before it can be applied to the Person and Work of Christ.

Our original question was: How can God accept the limitations of humanity and still remain God? Traditionally, the answer to this has been sought in finding how the presence of God in Christ was scaled to a point where it did not vitiate the reality of His humanity. But to look in this direction for the answer is to ignore certain important factors.

First, God is already in a self-limiting relation with the whole created order. A self-limiting relation to man and the world is not a unique event in the life of God; it is a basic quality of His life. Kenosis is not something

which occurred only once in Christ; it is a process which has marked the entire dealing of God with men. The kenosis in Christ is the ultimate expression of God's kenotic love for man, but it is not an example isolated from the rest.

Secondly, to say that God has become incarnate in the life of a particular Man does not mean that God has entered an alien realm. Human finitude, as such, does not exclude God from it. Man, not finitude, excludes God from his life through his sin.

Thirdly, kenosis is the highest expression of the divine absoluteness. Thomasius perceived this when he said: "Self-limitation is self-determination". He argued from the grounds that self-determination is the highest expression of personal life. The most perfect personal freedom is the freedom of complete self-determination. If self-determination is to be complete, it must include the power to accept limitation. Hence, the self-limitation of God in Christ is the vindication of God's self-determining power. Limitation is not the embarrassment or frustration of the divine absoluteness and power, but its highest expression. Thomasius and the other mediating theologians tried to justify this seemingly paradoxical assertion by predicating certain changes among the Members of the Trinity to make self-limitation possible. Such efforts were foredoomed to failure. The creative possibility lies rather in a thorough redefinition of the divine absoluteness in dynamic terms.

Kenosis is thus the most adequate and most radical expression of the divine freedom because it is the means whereby God fulfills His will of love for man.

There remains yet another aspect of the divine kenosis beside those revealed in creation and Incarnation. This is the divine kenosis in human history. The whole of human existence represents a continuation of the act of self-

limitation seen in creation and redemption. For inasmuch as human history is a realm of finite but real freedom, it represents a "limitation" upon the divine life.

This kenotic understanding of God's relation to history leads in turn to a new understanding of the divine being. If God is involved in human history, the realm of change and incompleteness, then He is, as we have said, in some strange way subject to change and limitation, although these are always self-imposed. God's interaction with the world is partly determinative of His being.

Most kenotic doctrine has, however, been one-sided in stressing the divine self-limitation without referring to the subsequent exaltation of our Lord which is a dominant theme in the Philippians hymn and in the New Testament generally. Because of His free sharing in human life, even to the point of sharing death, the Christ was, as it were, granted a new and higher status than He had in His pre-existent state. "Through a relation with mankind," writes D.G. Dawe, "the divine being was enriched". (1)

A kenotic Christology follows two general lines in dealing with the question of Christ's divinity:

- a. His divinity is to be described in terms of God's freedom.
- b. His divinity is to be described in terms of His power to save.

We have touched above on the question of God's freedom. About our Lord's saving power we may say that He is the Source of transforming power that issues in new life. Jesus Christ is the One through whom God creates new fellowship with men who have alienated themselves from Him by their sin. This line of approach to the question of Christ's divinity is indi-

(1) D.G. Dawe: The Form of a Servant, p. 199.

cated by St. Paul. He speaks to the Corinthians of God's presence in Christ in terms of His reconciling work. (1) Our Lord's divinity is not described in terms of static divine being but of divine reconciling activity: "God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself". (2)

Only insofar as our Lord was at every moment truly divine could He have been at any moment truly human. Far from His transcendence destroying the possibility of His living a truly human life, it is the necessary presupposition without which His humanity would be an impossibility. It is only because He was the unlimited $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ in His incarnate condition that He could be the Ego of a perfect manhood in every conceivable relationship between that manhood and those with whom He came into contact.

The very fact of an Incarnation leads us to accept some form of kenosis, as also that the unlimited $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ was circumscribed in some way in the exercise of His divine powers and activities within the sphere of His incarnate state. Indeed, His divinity is manifest in His power to limit Himself without self-destruction or change of identity. We are nevertheless reluctant to proceed further than this by defining more closely the limitations under which the eternal Son worked during His earthly ministry. The Alexandrian and Cyrilline Christology both leave us with the eternal, unlimited $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ as the Subject of our Lord's manhood. Both, however, recognise on the part of the incarnate $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ some form of self-limitation whereby the divine nature is "restrained" and whereby the manhood is thus allowed to act humanly. This makes it possible for the $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ to exercise His divine powers and prerogatives to the full.

(1) II Corinthians 5: 17-19.

(2) II Corinthians 5:19.

This chapter is best concluded with a brief summary of its main points. We began by saying that the historicity of the New Testament is the basis of the Creeds of Nicea and Chalcedon and of all Christological statement. Although there are elements of value in such Christologies as that of W. Hermann, the historical fact presented by the New Testament of the indissoluble union of divine and human natures within our Lord's Person must nevertheless be our undisputed starting-point. We then went deeper into the biblical portrait of Jesus Christ by examining philosophically the New Testament account of His three-fold relationship to God's glory. We found in the New Testament:

- (i) that the "inner glory" of Jesus is equated with the "inner glory" of God Himself;
- (ii) that Jesus is in a unique way the observable expression of God's glory; and
- (iii) that Jesus is the only Man who perfectly acknowledges the glory of God by His perfect obedience.

Discussion of the three Christian claims concerning our Lord's irreplaceability, His uniqueness and His divinity showed:

- (i) that Jesus is irreplaceable in relation to other expressions of the divine nature;
- (ii) that He is unique because all other expressions of God's glory are inadequate in their degree of correspondence to the divine nature as revealed in Him; and
- (iii) that His divinity consists of His being the ultimate expression of God's glory and holiness.

This entails a new, definitive meaning for the word "divine".

Furthermore, the revelation of God's nature in Jesus is an impressive and an expressive quality. It is impressive because it confronts the individual existentially and is convincing: it is expressive because it leads the believer to grow into the likeness of Christ and to manifest God's glory in a way of life which reveals that glory to others.

We saw in passing that although Christology must begin with the New Testament, there is also the need to conduct the fullest possible analysis of the nature, not only of man, but of God. Examination of the revelation of the divine nature must necessarily have the New Testament as its touchstone. Undue stress on God's immanence or transcendence gives rise to Christological bankruptcy.

It was then noted at greater length that abstract definitions of the nature of the unity of God and man in our Lord are basically as impossible as are psychological investigations into its character. One may say at most that it is a unity between God and the centre of a personal life and "resists the attempts within existential estrangement to disrupt it". (1) The point of commencement for a consideration of the relationship between the divine and human in our Lord's Person must not be an imperfect human being into whom flows the divine influence, but rather a perfect divine personality entering into and absorbing our human nature. There is a growing tendency in modern Christology to overcome the dualism of the "two consciousnesses" (implied by some forms of kenotic Christology), and the "two natures" of the Creeds by postulating a single consciousness in our Lord which is simultaneously human and divine. H.M. Reilton posits the doctrine of enhypostasia as best meeting this trend; and W. Sanday somewhat dubiously points to the relations of the subconscious and "subliminal" self to the whole self as a possible key to the understanding of the divine-human relationship in our Lord.

Finally, we paid detailed attention to kenoticism as being suggestive of some of the most fruitful lines along which a modern Christological restatement ought to run. We traced the development and progress of the kenotic motif from its first appearance in the New Testament to its logical im-

(1) P. Tillich: Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 171.

plications in the present day. All kenotic theories stress the difference between God and man. This presents a basic question which reaches its most acute form in the mystery of the Incarnation. The wheel has turned full circle, and we again find ourselves asking: What is the relation between the divine and human natures in our Lord? If God truly became man and was really in Christ, His infinite Being must have accepted limitations. The Jesus of the Gospels is plainly limited by His humanity. (1) He took upon Himself the conditions of finite existence under which all men have to live, and "allowed the measures of humanity to prevail over Him". (2)

Three basic factors in the construction of a contemporary statement of kenosis emerged from our considerations:

- (i) The methodology for such a constructive reformulation is a posteriori, not a priori.
- (ii) Kenosis becomes intelligible only by using dynamic and personalistic thought-forms.
- (iii) The kenotic motif must first be quite evident in the doctrine of God before it can be applied to the Person and Work of our Lord.

Certain other important factors must not be overlooked in a modern restatement of kenoticism. First, God is already in a self-limiting relation with the entire created order. All human existence represents a continuation of the act of divine self-limitation seen in creation and redemption. Secondly, the Incarnation does not imply that God has entered a realm foreign to Him. Thirdly, kenosis is the highest expression of the divine absoluteness. It is the most adequate and radical interpretation of divine freedom because it is the means whereby God fulfils His purpose of love for man.

Most kenotic doctrines have nevertheless been un-

(1) See P. Tillich: Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 150, 151.

(2) Aquinas: Summa Theologica, I, q. 27, a. 5; q. 29, a. 3 and 4.

satisfactorily one-sided in emphasising the divine self-limitation without referring to our Lord's subsequent exaltation: the divine being was mysteriously "enriched" or fulfilled through His relation with mankind in Jesus Christ. A kenotic Christology follows two broad lines in dealing with the question of our Lord's divinity. His divinity is to be described (i) in terms of God's freedom and (ii) in terms of His power to save.

The gist of our final paragraphs was that our Lord's transcendence, far from destroying the possibility of His living a real human life, is the essential presupposition without which His humanity would be impossible.

These, then, are some considerations to be taken into account in a modern restatement of Christology. It seems to me quite plain that of all present-day Christological theories, the kenotic theory is open to the fewest objections. It makes no pretence at showing how God could limit Himself. It does not violate the mysterium Christi.

CHAPTER FIVE

A Brief Appraisal of Selected Christological Hymns

In this chapter we turn to an important aspect of the practical effects of Christological study in the life of the worshipping community.

The theological insights gained by any congregation are largely formed and nourished by the hymns it sings. In the present chapter we shall examine a selection of bad and good Christological hymns, taking the Revised Church Hymnary of the Church of Scotland as the source from which our examples are drawn. Opinions expressed in this chapter about the hymns selected are entirely personal, and are intended to be constructive and objective. It is inevitable, however, that a subjective element should also enter, for hymns must be appraised both objectively and subjectively.

The chapter purports to indicate the type of hymn which offers to Christian laymen (as also to those outside the Church) a faulty conception of Christ. But it is also our intention to point out the general lines along which a more adequate Christology may be presented in the hymns we sing. All hymns contain some element of truth, and should thus not be roundly dismissed. Most bad hymns have been spoilt by one bad line or one bad stanza. I have chosen for scrutiny hymns which seem to me particularly poor or particularly good. This does not imply that hymns which have not been mentioned are entirely unsatisfactory or satisfactory, but simply that space limits the number of examples upon which we are able to comment. It should be clear, then, that not all the bad hymns in the Revised Church Hymnary have been condemned, and not all the good hymns have been commended. Notwithstanding these criticisms, full credit must be given to the catholic taste displayed in the selection of hymns for the Revised Church Hymnary. This chapter is not confined to any

specific section of the Hymnary, but is intended to review a representative cross-section of Christological hymns found throughout the book.

Occasional reference to the music is inevitable. Theologically unsound words are frequently popular in Church worship because they have been set to an appealing tune. Seldom is the reverse true. We shall therefore have reason to notice the relationship of words to music.

In the first four chapters it was found necessary to follow the distinction made in traditional theology between the Person and Work of our Lord, and to discuss only His Person. In a treatment of Christological hymns, however, it is unavoidable that we should touch also upon His Work, for the Person and Work of Christ are inseparably related. The present chapter is nevertheless based on the conclusions we have reached in the preceding chapters.

It is important to note first the marks of a good hymn. Generally it is agreed that (i) it should be scriptural both in character and expression; (ii) it should be devotional, dignified, and worshipful; (iii) it should be lyrical and generally-speaking metrical. The last point suggests not only that a certain set of words may but should be sung. Plainly, if a hymn fails to find its best expression in song it will never reach the heart of the people and therefore will not impress them. The qualities of a good hymn-tune are that (i) it should have clear-cut, definite, singable melody; (ii) it should be appropriate to the words; (iii) it should have stately, rhythmic flow and shape; and (iv) its harmony should be strong and chiefly diatonic. Many hymn-tunes, and especially those of the Victorian era, are bad either because the melody has too many tiresome re-iterations

of the same note and is therefore unvocal, or it is weak and sentimental. In such tunes the harmonisation is often dull and uninteresting, or it is too chromatic.

Are these characteristics prominent in our current Christological hymns? What kind of presentation of Christ do they offer? Can many hymns be said truly to proclaim Christ at all? To these pertinent questions we now turn. The chapter will be divided into three parts. First we shall consider bad Christological hymns, giving reasons for their non-acceptability; secondly, we shall examine good hymns, stating why they are good; and thirdly, we shall briefly suggest some of the many good modern Christological hymns, remembering that the Revised Church Hymnary was published before most of these hymns were well-known.

Hymn 43 ("In the field with their flocks abiding"), although written originally for the boys of Harrow School, is not a strong incarnational hymn. It is an example of the hymn-style which may be termed "nineteenth-century saccharine". Instead of firm, powerful references to our Lord's Birth we find:

An angel leaned from the glory,
And sang his song of love;
He sang, that first sweet Christmas,
The song that shall never cease,

and

O never hath sweeter message
Thrilled home to the souls of men.

The second stanza of "In the bleak mid-winter" (50) demonstrates a common form of "theological shorthand" which is apt to lead to misapprehension:

Our God, heaven cannot hold Him,
Nor earth sustain;
Heaven and earth shall flee away
When He comes to reign:

In the bleak mid-winter
A stable-place sufficed
The Lord God Almighty,
Jesus Christ.

It was not "the Lord God Almighty" (even although qualified by "Jesus Christ") who was incarnate in the "stable-place" (lines 6, 7), but His Son, the divine Λόγος, who is equal to His Father in essence, glory, operation and power yet not in status within the divine economy. This was the entire point of our discussion in chapter two of the Father-Son relationship and of the meaning of the phrase "Son of God" as applied to our Lord. It is also the intention of the kenotic theory posited in the previous chapter to stress the fact of a real divine self-limitation which accepts man, condescends to him, and is identified with him in his finite state of existence. Holst's tune "Cranham" is the saving grace of this hymn.

The same Trinitarian confusion occurs in stanza 2 of hymn 51 ("See! in yonder manger low"):

Lo! within a manger lies
He who built the starry skies,
He who, throned in height sublime,
Sits amid the cherubim.

This is really a children's Christmas hymn, although the last two lines of the stanza quoted above are inappropriately unchildlike! Such grandiose symbolism implies that the complete and unlimited Deity was incarnate in the infant Jesus; but we noted in chapter four that our Lord bore definite marks of finitude, as is evident from reflection upon the Synoptic accounts of His earthly life. Jesus Christ is pure being "under the conditions of existence, conquering the gap between essence and existence". (1) This qualification is important and necessary.

(1) P. Tillich: Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 136.

"From the eastern mountains" (66) is a missionary hymn of average merit. "There their Lord and Saviour" (stanza 2, line 1) and "All who've gone astray" (stanza 4, line 2), are bad elements in any hymn. It is more important to note that our Lord does not lead His followers by His "guiding star" (stanza 5, line 8) but by His Holy Spirit; and the Holy Spirit, in turn, always points to Christ. (1) The language, set in the style of Heber and the Romantic School of some fifty years earlier, is too ornate for modern taste.

Hymn 73 ("Who is this, so weak and helpless") is a Passion hymn in which the writer's enthusiasm to portray the sufferings of Jesus (in the first half of each stanza) leads him into the error of ascribing to our Lord (in the second half of each stanza) only a posthumous dignity and glory. But in employing spatial and temporal terms to define the Incarnation of the $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ the author is using the wrong categories. The divine $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ is eternal, and therefore always was, is, and shall be glorious. By definition He could never have "vacated His heavenly throne" during His Incarnation (as D.M. Baillie and others suggest He might have done). (2) Hence, even while incarnate and self-limited the $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ mysteriously retained the divine majesty and dignity which are his everlasting nature and right. In stanza 3 we read the almost cynical lines:

Who is this, despised, rejected,
Mocked, insulted, beaten, bound?
'Tis our God, who gifts and graces
Poureth on His Church below.

In stanza 4 a similar fault is evident:

Who is this who hangeth dying
While the rude world scoffs and scorns,
Numbered with the malefactors,
Pierced with nails and crowned with thorns?

(1) H.J. Wotherspoon: What Happened at Pentecost, p. 4.

(2) D.M. Baillie: God Was In Christ.

'Tis the God who ever liveth
'Mid the shining ones on high...

These two stanzas demonstrate patripassionism of the most blatant sort and can only add to the confusion already in the minds of most laymen concerning the Crucifixion of Jesus.

" 'Lord, when Thy Kingdom comes' " (98) is a poor hymn centred on the Cross. It has no reference whatsoever to our Lord's Resurrection but instead speaks of "the promised glory of far-off years" (stanza 1, line 4). A sanguinary element is prominent throughout:

A thorny crown surrounds Thy bleeding brow (stanza 2, line 3);
And thinking on Thy Cross and bleeding head (stanza 4, line 3);
Thy cleansing blood hath washed them all away (stanza 5, line 2);
Thy blood redeemed me in that awful day (stanza 5, line 4).

Even Charles Wesley's "And can it be" (110) is confusing. This hymn suggests, as does hymn 73, that God Himself died on the Cross:

That Thou, my God, shouldst die for me (stanza 1, line 6);
'Tis mystery all! The Immortal dies (stanza 2, line 1);
but by definition the Immortal cannot die.

The same weakness is to be seen in stanza 3 of hymn 114 ("By Jesus's grave on either hand"):

Deep in the rock's sepulchral shade
The Lord, by whom the worlds were made,
The Saviour of mankind, is laid.

God created the cosmos through the divine $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ (1) who is eternal with Him and therefore could not have been killed and laid in the tomb. Jesus Christ was crucified, dead

(1) John 1:1-3.

and buried, not God Almighty or His eternal Λόγος. The final stanza is vague and misleading:

So, when the dayspring from in high
Shall chase the night and fill the sky,
Then shall the Lord again draw nigh.

Hymn 133 ("Golden harps are sounding", based upon Ephesians 4:8) is weak in all respects. It makes the Ascension of our Lord a commemoration of departure and absence rather than a festival of presence. (1) The first stanza is perfectly expressive of so many of the "milk-and-water" Christological hymns which were abundantly produced in the nineteenth century:

Golden harps are sounding,
Angel voices ring,
Pearly gates are opened,
Opened for the King.
Christ, the King of Glory,
Jesus, King of Love,
Is gone up in triumph
To His throne above.

The chorus states triumphantly: "All His work is ended". This is a dangerous half-truth. If all our Lord's work were ended, the Church would have no place in the twentieth-century world. What the author intended to say was that our Lord's own earthly work is accomplished. This thought finds better expression in hymn 102 ("O perfect life of love") which, although naive, is valuable because of its emphasis on the completeness of Christ's earthly mission. Stanza 2 of hymn 133 states that our Lord is "never more to suffer". Here is another half-truth. Can we imagine a Saviour who has been made impassible by His Ascension? Can Christ be "crucified afresh" (2) without suffering? The dynamic philosophy of change, mentioned in chapter three, and the revised notion of the "changelessness" of God which was indicated by the Hegelian and other forms of kenoticism

(1) Cf. John 16:7.

(2) Hebrews 6:6.

(chapter four) all imply that God is not the static Being of Nicene and Chalcedonian terminology, but rather that He is active Love. (1)

"There is no sorrow, Lord, too light" (148) is a hymn suited more to private devotion than to public worship. The fourth stanza reads:

Life's ills without, sin's strife within,
The heart would overflow,
But for that love which died for sin,
That love which wept with woe.

Besides being childish, this verse demonstrates the same kind of mistaken concept of our Lord's Crucifixion and Death as we noted in hymns 73 and 114. God's love (even if spelt with an upper-case "L") did not die on the Cross, but on the contrary was there supremely shown forth.

Dies irae, dies illa (161) is a magnificent Latin hymn which appears in many English versions. One of the best is by W.J. Irons:

Day of wrath! O day of mourning!
See fulfilled the prophets' warning.

The Revised Church Hymnary unfortunately contains Sir Walter Scott's dubious translation, which is one of the worst and most radically-attenuated renderings. It is difficult to imagine that the terrible Judge depicted in his first two stanzas could at the same time be "the trembling sinner's stay" of stanza 3. From this error we learn that it is better to omit such a hymn from a hymnal than to include such a superficial treatment of it.

Stanzas 3 and 4 of hymn 279 ("The radiant morn hath passed away") are apt to prove misleading:

O by Thy soul-inspiring grace
Uplift our hearts to realms on high:
Help us to look to that bright place,
Beyond the sky,

(1) Cf. Luke 15:7,10.

Where light, and life, and joy, and peace
In undivided empire reign,
And thronging angels never cease
Their deathless strain.

The contemporary dynamic Christological emphasis requires, as we have seen in our discussion of Christian existentialism, that a man should live the Christian life in his present situation of "estrangement" (Tillich). No longer do Christians find it adequate to wait piously with folded hands for the bliss of the after-life, as the third stanza tends to suggest, but they pray rather for grace to live as true Christians in their immediate circumstances. Nor does our Lord lead us to a realm where light, life, joy and peace reign "in undivided empire", but where God alone is sole Ruler of all.

Hymn 302 ("O Saviour, bless us ere we go") is a weak dismissal hymn:

Grant us, dear Lord, from evil ways
True absolution and release;
And bless us, more than in past days,
With purity and inward peace.

Our Lord neither offered His disciples release from evil ways, nor did He promise them absolute purity in the present life. This type of hymn is unscriptural and looks upon the life in Christ as the possibility of escape from the challenges and demands of the world. On the contrary, it is after confrontation with Christ that the individual recognises more keenly that evil exists in the world and that he has a part to play in fighting it. (1)

The baptismal hymn "A little child the Saviour came" (305) applies to the infant Jesus the title "the Mighty God" (stanza 1, line 2). Such a tactless assertion gives rise to great perplexity in the mind of the Christian laity. We observed the same error in hymns 50 and 51.

(1) Cf. John 16:33.

Hymn 310 ("Gracious Saviour, gentle Shepherd") is another poor baptismal hymn which robs Christian life of its sense of adventure and its offer of the probability of existential encounter demanding choice. Stanza 2 reads:

Tender Shepherd, never leave them
From Thy fold to go astray;
By Thy look of love directed,
May they walk the narrow way;
Thus direct them and protect them,
Lest they fall an easy prey.

One cannot help feeling that children who follow this course will become examples of the most uninteresting and narrow kind of piety. The Christian life demands inclusion of the aspect of risk.

The element of adventure and vitality is similarly absent from hymn 395 ("Souls of men! why will ye scatter"). Stanzas 2 and 8 are quoted:

Was there ever kindest shepherd
Half so gentle, half so sweet,
As the Saviour who would have us
Come and gather round His feet?
If our love were but more simple,
We should take Him at His word;
And our lives would be all sunshine,
In the sweetness of our Lord.

The words "sweet" and "sweetness" always detract from the dignity of our Lord's Person. They are scarcely reverential and savour strongly and unattractively of the sentimental and feminine.

In hymn 397 ("O Jesus, Thou art standing") the Gospel call is clear, but its method of presentation is unsatisfactory. The third stanza runs:

O Jesus, Thou art pleading
In accents meek and low,
'I died for you, My children,
And will ye treat Me so?'
O Lord, with shame and sorrow
We open now the door;
Dear Saviour, enter, enter,
And leave us nevermore.

Is it possible in the twentieth century to believe

in the passive, pleading Saviour depicted in this stanza? Hymns of this kind understandably disillusion and repel the present teenage generation.

The fifth stanza of hymn 408 ("There is a holy sacrifice") implies that contrition can raise the penitent to the status of Christ:

Saviour, I cast my hopes on Thee;
Such as Thou art, I fain would be;
In mercy, Lord, bestow on me
The contrite heart.

Repentance is indeed a saving grace, but the most that may be hoped by its exercise is that the sinner should become the more obedient to his Lord, not raised to equality with Him. God grants His repentant children healing and salvation for the personality which sin has marred, and by His Holy Spirit He sends them grace which enables them to respond more perfectly to His will. This may carry with it the connotation of "likeness" to Christ, which we discussed in chapter four; but it certainly does not imply equality or identity with our Lord.

Hymns 413 ("Rock of Ages"), 414 ("Jesus, Lover of my soul"), 419 ("How sweet the Name of Jesus sounds"), 538 ("Brightly gleams our banner") and 707 ("Safe in the arms of Jesus"), although well-loved by most congregations, are nevertheless "escapist" hymns. In His own words, our Lord "came not to send peace on earth, but a sword"; (1) and it is in many respects when one comes to Christ that one's problems begin. But instead of the possibility of the offence, and in place of the awful and radical launching out into the unknown deep, which is the meaning of "faith in Christ", we read:

Rock of Ages, cleft for me,
Let me hide myself in Thee.
(Hymn 413, stanza 1, lines 1 and 2).

(1) Matthew 10:34.

Hide me, O my Saviour, hide,
Till the storm of life is past.
(Hymn 414, stanza 1, lines 5 and 6).

Dear Name! the rock on which I build,
My shield and hiding-place.
(Hymn 419, stanza 3, lines 1 and 2).

In the hour of danger
Whither can we flee,
Save to Thee, dear Saviour,
Only unto Thee?
(Hymn 538, stanza 3, lines 5 to 8).

Safe in the arms of Jesus,
Safe from corroding care,
Safe from the world's temptations,
Sin cannot harm me there.
(Hymn 707, stanza 2, lines 1 to 4).

Our Lord does not provide the believer with a refuge from the ills of the world, but rather entrenches him deeper and more truly in his earthly life, making him more of a man, yet giving him at the same time a new criterion and standard by which to live. By stepping into relation with men and mankind He brings them into complete existence as human beings and as particular men who have particular identities.

Hymn 418 ("Jesus, these eyes have never seen") would today play largely into the hands of linguistic philosophers. The language used in stanza 3 is dangerous for this reason:

Like some bright dream that comes unsought,
When slumbers o'er me roll,
Thine image ever fills my thought,
And charms my ravished soul.

In chapter two we discussed language which is "logically odd". The stanza quoted above does not teem with logical improprieties; it makes perfectly good sense, but only when applied to the dream-world. Its fault becomes clear when it is compared with the fact that the Christian faith is not based upon the wilful fantasies and myths of dreamers, but upon the concrete historical picture of Jesus Christ presented to us by the New Testament.

The Christian aspiration to grow into the likeness

of Christ (1) has issued in the writing of many weak and unacceptable hymns. Amongst those in the Revised Church Hymnary are 462 ("Jesus, meek and gentle"), 465 ("Blessed Jesus, high in glory") and 694 ("I lay my sins on Jesus"). In these hymns we find such superficial writing as the following:

Give us holy freedom,
Fill our hearts with love,
Draw us, holy Jesus,
To the realm above.

(Hymn 462, stanza 3).

Give us grace to trust Thee wholly;
Give us each a childlike heart;
Make us meek and pure and holy,
Meet to see Thee as Thou art.

(Hymn 465, stanza 3).

I long to be like Jesus,
Meek, loving, lowly, mild;
I long to be, like Jesus,
The Father's holy child.

(Hymn 694, stanza 4, lines 1 to 4).

This type of hymn found no place in the bold hymnody of the early Church, and is irrelevant also in the present day.

There is a danger in such hymns as 489 ("Eternal Ruler of the ceaseless round") and 493 ("Father of men, in whom are one"), 510 ("Teach me, O Lord, to follow Him who trod"), together with 142 ("Strong Son of God, immortal love") to place our Lord in a scale of ordinary human values and to fail to recognise the necessary distinction which exists between His holiness and our sinfulness. It seems in these hymns that Jesus is merely Primus inter pares and that He progressively became Son of God by His merit. This is clearly an Adoptionist tendency. Hymn 142 implies that our Lord is merely "the highest" and "the holiest" without being infinitely and qualitatively distinct from us. We noted in chapter four that this distinction is a cardinal ingredient of a sound Christology. But in hymn 489 we read:

(1) Romans 6:5; Ephesians 4:13.

We are of Thee, the children of Thy love,
The brothers of Thy well-beloved Son;
Descend, O Holy Spirit, like a dove,
Into our hearts, that we may be as one;
As one with Thee, to whom we ever tend;
As one with Him, our Brother and our Friend.

The fifth stanza of hymn 493 reads:

O Christ, our Elder Brother, who
By serving man God's will didst do,
Help us to serve our brethren too.

Hymn 510 begins:

Teach me, O Lord, to follow Him who trod
With loving zeal the pathway to His God.

The first and second lines of the third stanza of hymn 142 read:

Thou seemest human and divine,
The highest, holiest manhood, Thou.

It is difficult to imagine our Lord as the "eternal Image of the invisible God" or as "the Pattern" whom our lives ought to follow (Kierkegaard) if we are His "brothers" or if He is no more than "the highest, holiest manhood".

The hymn "Gentle Jesus, meek and mild" (662), although it teaches obedience, nevertheless reflects a diluted Christology of such a kind that should never be presented even to little children. The weakness of its picture of our Lord is exemplified by stanza 2:

Lamb of God, I look to Thee;
Thou shalt my example be;
Thou art gentle, meek, and mild;
Thou wast once a little child.

From the earliest Sunday School days a sound and masculine Christology should be presented to children. If not, the psychological transition from a weak Christological concept of the above sort to the strong perception of Christ which is demanded by adolescence and maturity could prove sufficient to elicit rebellion against the Faith.

From our discussion thus far we have noticed some of the marks of poor Christological hymns and in our criticisms

have implied the elements which ought to be present in a good Christological hymn. Fortunately, the better Christological hymns outweigh the worse in the Revised Church Hymnary, so that it now remains to examine in less detail a necessarily smaller selection of good Christological hymns. It is hoped that from our survey an impression will be gained as to the type of Christology which is proper for us to sing. It will be noticed that many of the examples are hymns of the early Church. The reason for this is one with the purport of this chapter. The chapter is not a chronological review but a constructive appraisal of good and bad hymns, and it appears plainly that the best Christological hymns are those of the early and Medieval Church. There is no reason why a greater selection of ancient hymns should not be sung today if set to appropriate tunes. Many of the most primitive and best Christological hymns have unfortunately been omitted from most hymnals in favour of later hymns of subordinate quality.

Newman's "Praise to the Holiest in the height" (32) is a hymn whose setting is Romish, but whose content is thoroughly and even dogmatically evangelical. The theology contained in it, indeed, is Pauline in relation to the fall and restoration of mankind:

O loving wisdom of our God!
When all was sin and shame,
A second Adam to the fight
And to the rescue came.

"Hark! the herald angels sing" (46) is a composite and has undergone many modifications, but in its present form it is one of the soundest Christological hymns we have. Its three stanzas preach in profound language an exceptionally complete theology of the Incarnation. Mendelssohn's tune, taken from his secular "Festgesang", is superbly competent to carry the majestic strains of triumph. In this hymn words and music are perfectly matched.

The popularity of the hymn "O come, all ye faithful" (55) is owing partly to its measure, its peculiar lilt, and in greater degree, to its fine musical setting. Such popularity bears testimony to its genuine worth. The method of presentation is dramatic. We are led with triumphant song to the manger, where we are shown the Babe, and we are bidden to adore. In the second stanza we are given an explanation of what we see: it is not merely a human infant, but God Incarnate. Here the language is taken directly from the ancient Greek creeds of the fourth century:

God of God,
Light of Light,
Lo! He abhors not the Virgin's womb;
Very God,
Begotten, not created;
O come, let us adore Him, Christ the Lord.

The third stanza depicts the exuberance of the heavenly host, and in the fourth we speak to the Child direct and make our own offering of praise. Both music and words are moving in their simplicity and any child is able to enter sympathetically into the experience of worship and joy.

"Of the Father's love begotten" (60) is a song to the glory of Christ in His coming amongst men. There are few verses in Latin hymnody which attain to greater height of elevated praise than that which explicitly celebrates this glory:

O ye heights of heaven, adore Him;
Angel hosts, His praises sing;
All Dominions, bow before Him,
And extol our God and King;
Let no tongue on earth be silent,
Every voice in concert ring,
Evermore and evermore.

The tune, Corde Natus, long associated with this hymn, is a fitting plainsong melody believed to have been in Church use as early as the thirteenth century. In this hymn, the mystery of our Lord's pre-existence is made by a genius the theme of a song of praise.

Hymn 68 ("There came a little Child to earth") de-

picts in simple language the efficacy of our Lord's sacrifice for children, by whom it is readily understandable:

They sing how the Lord of that world so fair
A Child was born,
And, that they might a crown of glory wear,
Wore a crown of thorn,
And in mortal weakness, in want and pain,
Came forth to die,
That the children of earth might for ever reign
With Him on high.

Lloyd's tune "Nadolig", written in D minor, admirably suits the sentiment of the words.

"We saw Thee not when Thou didst come" (72), although much different in its present setting from its original, is a hymn which establishes our Lord firmly in the history of the world. That which we have not seen we believe.

We saw Thee not when Thou didst come
To this poor world of sin and death,
Nor e'er beheld Thy cottage home
In that despised Nazareth;
But we believe Thy footsteps trod
Its streets and plains, Thou Son of God.

Hermann, Garvie, Tillich and Ferre are among those who have attempted to minimise the importance of the historical Jesus. Their stress on the existential impact made by the Christ upon the individual is not valueless but partial. The historicity of the New Testament must remain our foundation.

Hymn 84 (Ζοφερᾶς τρικυμίας, "Fierce was the wild billow") depicts the utter dependence of the believer on Christ. There is no "escapist" language here. The story told in Mark 4:37-41 is re-told in the hymn, and at each point of crisis or doubt the "God of God", "Light of Light", or "Truth of Truth" is heard to say "Peace! It is I".

"At the Cross, her station keeping" (99) is reminiscent of John 19:26-27. We are here contemplating not so much the theological doctrine of the Atonement as a sorrowful human spectacle. Yet, centering as it does in the pathos of Mary,

this hymn presents the Gospel of the Cross without sanguinity or sentiment. The piece is typical of the Franciscan brooding on Christ's sufferings as a human experience rather than a theological tenet. Caswell's rendering of the Latin is of great breadth and striking dignity:

O, how sad and sore distressed
Now was she, that mother blessed
Of the sole-begotten One;
Deep the woe of her affliction,
When she saw the crucifixion
Of her ever-glorious Son.

Another strong Latin hymn is 108 ("Sing, my tongue, how glorious battle"). It is almost pungent in its analogies and imagery:

His the nails, the spear, the spitting,
Reed and vinegar and gall;
From His patient body pierced
Blood and water streaming fall:
Earth and sea and stars and mankind
By that stream are cleansed all.

The ancient attitude of veneration of the literal wood of the Cross has probably prevented the more general use of such hymns in Reformed worship; but the sharp, concrete language nevertheless drives the poignancy of the Crucifixion deep into our minds.

Words and music are well blended in 111 ("O Saviour, where shall guilty man"). The hymn does not end with a purely objective treatment of the Cross, but shows how the results of the Crucifixion may be appropriated by the Christian. In the second stanza some important questions are asked:

How came the everlasting Son,
The Lord of life, to die?
Why didst Thou meet the tempter's power?
Why, Jesus, in Thy dying hour,
Endure such agony?

Stanza 3 supplies the answer:

To save us by Thy precious blood,
To make us one in Thee,
That ours might be Thy perfect life,
Thy thorny crown, Thy Cross, Thy strife,
And ours the victory.

In stanza 4, line 3, we read:

To Thy blest will our wills incline.

This mention of the will is in perfect accord with the dynamic personalistic philosophy which we outlined in chapter three. It is more adequate to contemporary Christological trends than are references to the "natures" of our Lord. We may re-iterate here, by way of elucidation, that the doctrine of the two natures in the Christ raises the right question but uses the wrong conceptual tools. The basic inadequacy lies in the term "nature". When applied to man it is ambiguous; when applied to God it is inappropriate. This accounts for the definitive failure of the Councils of Nicea and Chalcedon.

" 'welcome, happy morning!' " (115) is a fine Latin hymn of Fortunatus. He finds a symbol of the resurrection life in all the resurrected beauty of the natural world. Noticeable throughout the hymn are the varied descriptions or names of Christ from the theological viewpoint: God, Creator, King, Vanquisher of Darkness, Maker, Redeemer, Life, Health, Son, Author of Life, True and Faithful Lord. The joy of Easter as reflected in the springtime breathes through stanzas 2 and 3. Stanzas 4 and 5 sketch the story of the Incarnation and Atonement. Theological concepts of deliverance and redemption appear in stanzas 1 and 6.

"Loose the souls long prisoned, bound with Satan's chain" (stanza 4, line 1) is a reflection upon the ancient belief that between the time of the Crucifixion and the Resurrection our Lord "descended into hell", preached His Gospel to the righteous heroes of the Old Testament who had been confined in "Limbo", won their acceptance, and took them up to heaven. This act is known technically as the "Harrowing of Hell". Ignoring some of the crudities, we can still use and appreciate this hymn as an expression of the Christian

joy which is linked with Easter and its promise of life after death. One might, however, wish for a better tune than Sullivan's static "Fortunatus".

Hymn 122 ("The strife is o'er") similarly celebrates the triumph of Christ over death. Palestrina's joyous tune (named "Victory") has no doubt helped carry this hymn to its present popularity. Stripped of its Alleluias and the third line of each stanza, the words present the theological statement that the Crucifixion was a battle between Christ and Satan's legions, in which Christ won the victory. This is proved primarily by the fact that our Lord did not remain dead. The victory enabled Him to close hell and open heaven. Translated from cosmic to personal terms, the theme of the hymn would be that the punishment meted out to Christ because of our sins secures our freedom. Our sole purpose throughout eternity is to sing praises to Christ. The third line of each stanza gives the emotional reaction of the Christian to the victory of Christ: a song of triumph, a shout of joy, ascriptions of praise.

"Where high the heavenly temple stands" (140) is a paraphrase of Hebrews 4:14-16 which perfectly expresses, in elevation of thought and beauty of language, the faith and aspiration of Christian worshippers today. Jesus Christ, the great High Priest of Hebrews, bears our human nature before the throne of God and because of His mystical participation in our earthly frame is able to intercede on our behalf. Stanza 1, lines 3 and 4, read:

A great High Priest our nature wears,
The Guardian of mankind appears.

Lines 1 and 2 of stanza 4 are:

Our fellow-sufferer yet retains
A fellow-feeling of our pains.

And stanza 5 runs:

In every pang that rends the heart
The Man of Sorrows had a part;
He sympathises with our grief,
And to the sufferer sends relief.

Hymn 149 ("O come, O come, Immanuel") is a splendid Advent hymn whose entire spirit is primitive in thought and imagery, making it perhaps somewhat remote from modern approaches to Christology. The intriguing plainsong tune Veni Immanuel has a peculiar charm which appeals to the innate rhythmic instincts of most. The great merit of this hymn is that the key-words of all stanzas are thoroughly biblical in derivation. These key-words were typical of the short Sentences or Antiphons introduced into Advent services from the ninth century. Our Lord was addressed in each Sentence by a term which told of His Person, grace and Work in one and another of its aspects. The five Advent Antiphons, an adaptation of the seven Great Antiphons, have thus been brought collectively into Church use. In stanza 1, "Immanuel" is taken from Isaiah 7:14. The Church now separated from heaven is here compared with Israel separated in its Babylonian exile from God's Temple in Jerusalem. "Lord of Might" (Adonai) in stanza 2 is taken from Exodus 19:16. In stanza 3, "Rod of Jesse" is from Isaiah 11:1. By a mixture of metaphors, the Rod becomes David, who rescued a lamb out of the mouth of a lion (I Samuel 17:34-35), then Christ who saves the elect from an eternity in hell. The "Dayspring" of stanza 4 is from Luke 1:78, and the "Key of David" in the last stanza is a reference to Revelation 3:7-8.

St. Columba's "Christ is the world's Redeemer" (179) is a manly hymn depicting the majesty of the risen Christ and the efficacy of His sufferings and victory for believers. The doxology (stanza 4) is particularly splendid:

All glory to the Father,

The unbegotten One;
All honour be to Jesus,
His sole-begotten Son;
And to the Holy Spirit -
The Perfect Trinity.
Let all the worlds give answer,
'Amen - so let it be'.

"Mcville" is a sturdy tune which well matches the vigour of the words.

"At even, when the sun was set" (277) is based on Mark 1:32 (1) and expresses the value of our inner experiences with Christ and His power to meet the spiritual needs of all classes. The crowd of sick on Galilee's shore becomes ourselves, worshipping at eventide in our own church, and in stanzas 3 to 5 many of our own ills are listed: we are sick, sad, have failed to love, or our love has died; we are worldly, slighted, restless and conscience-smitten. But Christ (stanza 6), "tempted in all points like as we, is able to succour them that are tempted"; (2) and He has insight even into our hidden needs. (3) We therefore pray for Christ's healing touch, for though no longer on earth, He still has this power (stanza 7). This hymn perhaps lacks the emotion-conjuring imagery that is the vehicle of all true poetry; but it is nevertheless valuable as an expository sermon in rhyme.

"Hail, gladdening Light, of His pure glory pour'd" ($\Phi\omega\varsigma$ ἡλαρόδον ἑγίας δόξης, 281) is a hymn of praise to Christ as the Light of the World. Christians of early times sought to connect natural phenomena with their religion. Such phenomena offered occasions for thinking of God and Christ and for finding in such meditation some metaphor that would embrace both the physical and the spiritual. So here the poet is reminded of the Holy Trinity by the change from clear daylight to sunset to blue of night. The hymn may be summed up in a

(1) Cf. Luke 4:40.

(2) Hebrews 2:18.

(3) John 2:25.

literal translation of the Greek of the last stanza: "It becometh to praise Thee at all times with holy songs, Son of God, who hast given life; therefore the whole cosmos glorifies Thee".

Franck's "Deck thyself, my soul, with gladness" (324) is a hymn which illustrates the trend of his time to move from the objective hymn for corporate worship toward the individualistic and introspective type. With great dignity it portrays the solemnity of the Lord's Supper; yet the element of rejoicing and gratitude which comes of communion with Christ is not lacking, as the first part of the third stanza shows:

Sun, who all my life dost brighten;
Light, who dost my soul enlighten;
Joy, the sweetest man e'er knoweth;
Fount, whence all my being floweth.

In association with Crüger's impressive chorale, "Schmücke dich", it is the eucharistic hymn which is sung more often throughout Germany than any other.

Hymn 359 ("Son of God, eternal Saviour") is a more modern hymn with virile character. It proves that it is still possible today to write sound scriptural hymns. The first stanza is completely biblical:

Son of God, eternal Saviour,
Source of life and truth and grace,
Son of Man, whose birth incarnate
Hallows all our human race:
Thou, our Head, who, throned in glory,
For Thine own dost ever plead,
Fill us with Thy love and pity,
Heal our wrongs, and help our need.

"Thee will I love, my Strength, my Tower" (431) is another masculine German hymn depicting the healing and integration (as in stanza 2) which complete devotion to our Lord brings to the entire human personality. Pervading this hymn are elements of great contemplative beauty, reverence and love of Christ:

Thee will I love, my Joy, my Crown;
Thee will I love, my Lord, my God;
Thee will I love, beneath Thy frown
Or smile, Thy sceptre or Thy rod;
What though my flesh and heart decay,
Thee shall I love in endless day.

There are several other Christological hymns of exceptional merit in the Revised Church Hymnary. Space permits only the mention of twenty, many of which ought to become far better known than they are:

"Christians, awake, salute the happy morn" (54);
"'From heaven above to earth I come'" (56);
"Come, praise your Lord and Saviour" (70);
"All glory, laud, and honour" (91);
"O Sacred Head, sore wounded" (107);
"And didst Thou love the race that loved not Thee?" (144);
"Lo! He comes, with clouds descending" (160);
"'Wake, awake! for night is flying'" (162);
"Christ is made the sure foundation" (207);
"Light of the anxious heart" (249);
"Now that the daystar glimmers bright" (260);
"Now cheer our hearts this eventide" (278);
"Blessèd Jesus, here we stand" (307);
"Thee we adore, O hidden Saviour, Thee (319);
"By Christ redeemed, in Christ restored" (322);
"Jesus shall reign where'er the sun" (388);
"Jesus, Thou Joy of loving hearts" (420);
"O Jesus, King most wonderful" (423);
"Jesus, still lead on" (567);
"Lead, holy Shepherd, lead us" (569).

Finally, there are some twentieth-century Christological hymns which, although generally not as profound as those of the early Church, nevertheless warrant mention.

"In Christ there is no East and West" is a hymn which reflects the aims of the modern Ecumenical Movement. Our present situation of division, states the hymn, is a Christian scandal. It is a contradiction of Christ's ideal and command, and has been through the centuries the cause of martyrdoms and wars. Today it renders the Church impotent to shape legislation toward a more righteous social order. In its present condition the Church explicitly denies the doctrine of the unity of the Body of Christ. This hymn is a song of hope for

good will among the nations, and it is an arresting missionary hymn:

In Christ now meet both East and West,
In Him meet South and North,
All Christly souls are one in Him
Throughout the whole wide earth.

The same hope is given expression in the hymn of courage, conflict, and victory:

O Lord of Hosts, who didst upraise
Strong captains to defend the right.

Written in the midst of strife and turmoil, this hymn offers the prayer that under the guidance of Christ a better day may dawn:

As rains that sweep the clouds away,
As winds that leave a calm in heaven,
So let the slayer cease to slay:-
The passion healed, the wrath forgiven,
Draw nearer, bid the tumult cease,
Redeemer, Saviour, Prince of Peace!

"O Son of Man, our Hero strong and tender" (1) is a vital hymn which sets Jesus Christ before boys as boyhood's ideal and inspiration:

O Son of Man, our Hero strong and tender,
Whose servants are the brave in all the earth,
Our living sacrifice to Thee we render,
Who sharest all our sorrows, all our mirth.
O feet so strong to climb the path of duty,
O lips divine that taught the words of truth,
Kind eyes that marked the lilies in their beauty,
And heart that kindled at the zeal of youth.

This is as fine a hymn for boys as was ever written. It is a paean of praise to Christ, not as Son of God, or as Founder of the Apostolic Church, or as the Only-begotten of Nicene and Chalcedonian thinking, but as Son of Man, the One who embodies all the ideals that make a boy's hero. There is nothing here that an adolescent cannot understand, and no ideal to which he cannot aspire. Evans's "Charterhouse" is staid and unmelodious. It is singularly unsuited to the sweeping masculinity of the words.

(1) 146 in the Revised Church Hymnary.

"Jesus, Thou divine Companion" holds up the ideal of service in the Name of Christ:

Every task, however simple,
Sets the soul that does it free;
Every deed of love and kindness
Done to man is done to Thee.

This hymn expresses reaction to the growing social and economic problems of the twentieth century. It implies that true Christianity means following Jesus Christ who as Son of Man was the Carpenter of Nazareth. But Jesus is also the "divine" Companion, the "Bread of Heaven" broken for us in sacrifice. Then, to complete the mysticism, there appears in stanza 1 a quotation from the third-century Egyptian Oxyrhynchus Logia papyrus: "Jesus saith, 'Wherever there are two they are not without God, and if one is alone anywhere, I say I am with him. Raise the stone, there thou shalt find me; cleave the wood, and there I am' ". This Gnostic interpretation of Jesus as an emanation from God was one of the earliest attempts of the Church to account for His extraordinary personality. But it is doubtful whether the average stone-mason or lumberman could draw any comfort or help from this subtlety.

"Where cross the crowded ways of life" depicts our Lord's concern with the poor, and especially with those who live in contemporary city slums. The hymn may be outlined as follows:

- Stanza 1: Christ's voice is heard above the city's clamour and strife.
- Stanza 2: Even Christ weeps when He sees the misery of those who live in the slum areas of our cities.
- Stanza 3: The Gospel records of our Lord's ministry to such people are recalled.
- Stanza 4: What we do for others we do for Christ.
- Stanza 5: As our Lord came down from the Mount of Transfiguration to heal the epileptic (1) so may He again come down to heal man's wretchedness.
- Stanza 6: The motivating power behind sacrificial service is love, and love will some day establish the City of God where now there stands the city slum.

(1) Mark 9: 21-27.

The hymn "O Master-workman of the race" has a unique appeal to the idealism of youth. Its real theme is the lesson we may learn from the Carpenter of Nazareth, namely, the necessity of finding and doing God's will.

Stanza 1: As a Boy, Jesus perceived His spiritual mission. This is implied in the incident at the Temple in Jerusalem. (1)

Stanza 2: As the Boy grew, He fulfilled this divine mission and developed "in wisdom and stature and in favour with God and man" (2) in accordance with the divine plan for His life. We, His followers, need His insight and His breadth of vision in order that we too may accomplish the "Father's business". (3)

Stanza 3: May Christ, the Source of our hopes, our urges and our endurance, add also guidance to conscience and definite purpose to specific tasks.

The thesis of "Eternal God, whose power upholds" is that in the nature of God Himself we find the justification for missions. He is the Reality behind all phenomena, physical and spiritual.

Stanza 1: A missionary is Christ's ambassador of reconciliation to all the world.

Stanza 2: The method of reconciliation is to encourage and develop love, which exists potentially in every heart.

Stanza 3: Since man is given the ability to seek and find God, illumination and instruction are essentially missionary methods.

Stanza 4: Man's distorted view of Christ issues in ugliness, whereas a right apprehension of Him as the Inspirer of such things as art and music would make beauty the characteristic of all our being.

Stanza 5: The true missionary upholds Christ as the embodiment of God's ideal of human character. Therefore he should himself live the Christ-like life as an example, until all the races of the world have been transformed into His likeness.

The missionary hymn "Far round the world Thy children sing their song" (4) gives peculiar expression to the Christian aspiration which is especially poignant in the present time of tension between East and West. The last stanza

(1) Luke 2:41-49.

(2) Luke 2:52.

(3) Luke 2:49.

(4) 373 in the Revised Church Hymnary.

reads:

All round the world let children sing Thy song:
From East and West their voices sweetly blend,
Praising the Lord in whom young lives are strong,
Jesus, our Guide, our Hero, and our Friend.

Christology has perhaps found its most complete and far-reaching expression in the hymns of the Church. In them it has been enshrined and through them it is taught.

The singing of hymns through the ages has itself been a most effective witness to the essential unity in the Body of Christ which underlies all diversities.

Above all, it is the high privilege of the worshipping community to come before God with their best hymns, that they may offer, in gratitude and humility, their sacrifice of adoration and praise.

GLORIA IN EXCELSIS DEO

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