

**INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA IN THE FEDERATION OF
RHODESIA AND NYASALAND WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
PRINT AND RADIO PROPAGANDA FOR AFRICANS, 1953-1963.**

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Abstract

This thesis contributes to the history of the information and propaganda policy and practice of the government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland by examining this government's pro-Federation print and radio propaganda for Africans in the Federation. Using a multi-theoretical approach, it analyses the character of this propaganda, highlighting its main methods and themes as well as the policy considerations, plus political and economic circumstances that gave rise to it. It also discusses how Africans in the Federation reacted to this propaganda and assesses its effectiveness in gaining the support of these Africans for Federation and the policies of the Federal government.

The thesis argues that Federal government propaganda aimed at gaining the support of Africans for Federation was predominantly panic-driven propaganda and was the product of an information panic that lay at the heart of the very idea of Federation itself. This information panic arose out of the Federal government's belated recognition of the strength of African opposition to Federation and of how this opposition seriously threatened the continued survival of the Federation. It is also argued that this panic-driven pro-Federation propaganda elicited largely hostile reactions from the majority of Africans in the Federation and failed to persuade them to support Federation.

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List of Abbreviations

BBC-British Broadcasting Corporation

FBC-Federal Broadcasting Corporation

MCP-Malawi Congress Party

RIAC-Regional Information Advisory Committee

SRANC-Southern Rhodesia African National Congress

TBC-Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation

UFP-United Federal Party

UNIP-United Independence Party

ZANU-Zimbabwe African National Union

ZAPU-Zimbabwe African People's Union

CHAPTER 1: Introduction to the Thesis

Introduction

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which comprised three territories, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi) was established by the British government in 1953 and dissolved by the same government in 1963. The creation of the Federation was the culmination of a long campaign for closer association by the white inhabitants of three territories that later came to comprise the Federation. This campaign, which dated back to 1915 and which went through numerous phases culminating in the establishment of the Federation in 1953, also had the support of Britain, the colonial power of these three territories.¹

Why and how the Federation was created and later collapsed has been well documented in numerous scholarly studies. The evidence presented in this thesis emphasises that the movement for closer association that resulted in establishment of the Federation was essentially panic-driven. It was a product of the panic of the minority European populations of what later became the Federal territories and the British government over what they believed were serious threats to their future political and economic interests in Central Africa.²

The European settlers in the Central African territories were primarily worried about the threat to the continuation of European minority rule in Central Africa posed by the Africans in their territories who vastly outnumbered them. At its inception in 1953, the Federation had a population of about 8 million Africans and only 200,000 whites.³ In particular, they were concerned that the application of the British Colonial Office doctrine of “trusteeship and paramountcy of African interests” in the British Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would facilitate rapid African nationalist-led progress to African self-rule in these territories.⁴ Europeans in Southern Rhodesia, which was a self-governing colony and had the largest white population were particularly fearful that if they did not establish a larger white ruled territory in Central Africa, the spread of African nationalism from the Northern

¹ A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 119-122; A.S. Mlambo, “From the Second World War to UDI, 1940-1965”, in B. Raftopoulos and A.S. Mlambo (eds), *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History From the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008*, Johannesburg, Jacana Media, 2009, pp.86-90; C. Leys, “How the Federation was Made”, in C. Leys & C. Pratt (Eds.) *A New Deal in Central Africa*, London, Heinemann, 1960, pp. 1-19.

² R. I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1965, pp. 93-94.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94, 253.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.102 & p.110.

territories would make it “difficult for Southern Rhodesia to maintain its position in a world surrounded by black states on all sides, except where it bordered with South Africa.”⁵

Added to these political fears which were the primary source of the panic that led to the establishment of the Federation were settler European anxieties over the future economic viability of their territories. Europeans in Nyasaland, economically the poorest of the three territories under discussion, were concerned about the economic future of Nyasaland. They believed that without entering into a union with its more economically prosperous neighbours, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland’s chances of achieving substantial and swift economic development were very poor. Southern Rhodesian Europeans were concerned about the implications for their future economic development of remaining a landlocked country which could end up being almost totally surrounded by black-ruled states. They therefore sought union with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in order “to ensure a duty free market for Southern goods, a continued supply of African labour, and a similarity of racial policy.”⁶

The leaders of the minority European settler communities in all three territories, therefore, came to see establishment of some form of closer association among their territories as the most effective way of safeguarding European minority rule against future challenge by the Africans in their territories. They increasingly viewed closer association as the “political answer to their perennial anxieties about the white man’s fate in Africa.”⁷ Their willingness to override overwhelming African opposition to the idea of closer association and the urgency with which they sought to achieve such closer association was directly related to their growing fears and anxieties over the prospect of black rule in Central Africa. These fears were heightened by the rapid spread of African nationalism after the Second World War.⁸ Many of these Europeans, as A.S. Mlambo has shown, were also relatively newcomers to Southern Rhodesia.⁹ They feared that the establishment of black rule in the African territories could compel them to emigrate from Southern Rhodesia when they had just started settling in the country.

In their campaign for the establishment of closer association among the Central African territories, the white settler proponents of closer association played upon long-standing British government fears and anxieties over the security of their imperial interests in Central Africa. These fears centred on the potential threat that Afrikaner nationalism posed to

⁵ NAZ, *Oral/GR2*, Julius Macdonald Greenfield interviewed on 3 November 1970, Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, p. 35.

⁶ R. I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 105.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁸ H. M. Nkumbula, untitled lecture in O. Prescott (ed), *Constitutional Development in the Federation: Proceedings of Study Conference No.4*, Lusaka, The United Northern Rhodesia Association, 1959, p. 2.

⁹ A.S. Mlambo, *White Immigration into Rhodesia: From Occupation to Federation*, Harare, UZ Publications, 2002, pp. 60-66.

British geo-strategic interests in Central Africa. The British government and “financial and industrial circles” in Britain, therefore, came to support the establishment of closer association among the British colonial territories in Central Africa as a way of safeguarding their interests from the potential threat of Afrikaner expansionism from the North.¹⁰ Apart from these geo-political considerations, Britain also supported closer association among its central African territories because it believed this would create a larger economic market from which Britain could obtain significant economic benefits.¹¹ There is also evidence that Britain was determined to have Nyasaland enter into a Federation with Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia because it saw Federation as a convenient way to free itself of legal responsibility for Nyasaland’s debts by passing on the financial liability for these debts to the government of such a Federation.¹²

The idea of closer association among three territories out of which the Federation was later constituted divided opinion between and among supporters and opponents of closer association. The principal and most conspicuous line of cleavage was along racial lines with most whites in the Federation supporting closer association and the majority of Africans strongly opposing it. Some European settlers in Southern Rhodesia opposed closer association because they believed it could facilitate rapid African movement towards self-rule by bringing Southern Rhodesia, which had become a self-governing colony in 1927, back under the direct control of the British Colonial Office which was committed to granting Africans in the Northern territories eventual self-rule. They also believed that union with the northern territories would dilute the power of the already greatly outnumbered white settler community in that territory by bringing in millions of Africans from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.¹³

Settler European advocates of closer association were also divided over what precise form any closer association among the three territories should take, with some supporting amalgamation, others a confederation or league and yet others a Federation.¹⁴

Amalgamation under the Southern Rhodesian constitution or one similar to it was the form of union originally sought by many of the leading supporters of closer association. This was because they strongly believed that amalgamation rather than confederation or federation would provide a strong type of union which could more effectively counter African

¹⁰ R. Weiss & J. L. Parpart, *Sir Garfield Todd and the Making of Zimbabwe*, London, British Academic Press, 1999, p. 67; P. Short, *Banda*, London and Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974, p. 63.

¹¹ A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*, p. 119.

¹² J. McCracken, *A History of Malawi, 1855-1966*, Rochester, NY, James Currey, 2012, pp. 274-277.

¹³ NAZ, Oral/240, Noel Allison Hunt, interviewed in Fanborough, Hants, England, 27 December 1983, pp.31-32; NAZ, Oral/240, Frederick James Barry, interviewed in Umtali, Southern Rhodesia, 28 April, 1973, p. 17, stated that the main reason for his opposition to Federation was that he feared that “the [black masses] would overrun” the white settler minority in Southern Rhodesia.

¹⁴ NAZ, S3684/3/3, *Report of the Conference on Closer Association in Central Africa*, London & Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia Government, 1951, pp. 13-15.

nationalist challenges to European minority rule. Those white settlers who favoured amalgamation also believed that this form of union would also enable them to more quickly achieve total freedom from British imperial control.¹⁵ Settler European opponents of amalgamation were concerned that such a close form of association would result in greater dominance of the white communities of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland by the whites in Southern Rhodesia.¹⁶

The British government opposed amalgamation because of concerns that it would negate the interests of Africans in the northern Territories by enabling the European settlers to remove these Africans from the under the “protection” of the British Colonial Office. Opposition to amalgamation on these and other grounds ultimately led to the advocates of amalgamation being compelled to settle for federation as the second best, but in the circumstances only form of achieving closer association between the three territories.¹⁷

From the outset, the overwhelming majority of Africans were solidly against the establishment of any form of closer association among the three territories. However, some Africans in these territories supported the idea of Federation and the establishment of the Federal state. Africans in the Northern Territories, especially Nyasaland, were strongly opposed to closer association mainly because their strong conviction that it would entrench white minority rule in Central Africa. They argued that any form of closer association among the three territories would be dominated by Southern Rhodesia whose native policy in contrast to that of the British Colonial office was very illiberal and against the granting of self-rule to Africans. Any union with Southern Rhodesia, they maintained, would inevitably stop the movement of Africans from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland toward self-rule by depriving them of the protection of the British Colonial Office and facilitating the extension of Southern Rhodesia’s racially discriminatory political system and native policy to their territories.¹⁸ Some Southern Rhodesian Africans, however, hoped that “the northern territories would act as a liberal influence upon their Southern Rhodesia, and so make Federation acceptable in African eyes.”¹⁹

Of the minority of Africans who supported closer association, most were from the educated African middle-class and business community. They did so with the expectation that the scheme of association to be adopted would end racial discrimination in the Federation and

¹⁵ R. I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa*, pp. 93-114.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ J.R.T. Wood, *The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Durban, Graham Publishing, 1983, pp. 35-66 & 90-122; NAZ, *Oral/GR2*, Julius Macdonald Greenfield, 3 November 1970, p. 33; NAZ, *Oral/ST6*, Albert Rubidge Washington Stumbles, interviewed in early 1973

¹⁸ P. Short, *Banda*, pp. 56-60.

¹⁹ C. Sanger, *Central African Emergency*, London, Heinemann, 1960, p. 19.

guarantee Africans of rapid and substantial political and economic advancement.²⁰ Unlike, amalgamation which did not offer Africans any political and economic rights, Federation with its promises of multi-racial partnership and African advancement, was viewed by some Africans as worth trying out.²¹ The majority of Africans, especially in the Northern territories, however, persisted with their opposition to any form of close association and rejected the proposed Federation as “amalgamation under the guise of Federation.”²²

Divisions among Africans over Federation seem to have been most conspicuous and nuanced among Southern Rhodesian Africans. The Chief Native Commissioner of that territory noted that the opinions of Southern Rhodesian Africans to proposals for the establishment of a Federation were “so diverse and contradictory that it [was] difficult to generalise” about African attitudes to Federation.²³ Three major types of reactions to the Federation proposals were, however, noticeable among Africans in Southern Rhodesia. These were: first, the uncompromising and nearly unanimous opposition of most of the “politically-minded” and organised urban Africans. Second, the mild opposition of some of “the more educated and progressive rural people” and third, the total passivity and indifference of “the conservative elements”.²⁴

This lack of consensus over the idea of closer association and the eventual establishment and maintenance of the Federation against the wishes of the majority of Africans had one important consequence. It meant that from the time of the campaign for Federation until the break-up of the Federation, the Federal concept and state needed to be defended by its advocates. The campaign that led to the establishment of the Federation was accompanied by a propaganda war between the supporters and opponents of Federation. In response to African nationalist propaganda against the proposed Federation, the governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland instructed the European administrators in their territories “to use every opportunity to forward the idea of federation” to Africans.²⁵ The governments of the two northern territories also distributed pro-Federation propaganda pamphlets to Africans in their territories.²⁶

In this propaganda war, white settler and British government proponents of Federation deliberately sought to both downplay and override the strong African opposition to Federation. White settler supporters of Federation regularly dismissed African anti-

²⁰ NAZ, *Oral/233*, Lawrence Vambe interviewed in Willowvale, Harare, 8 June 1983, p. 28; N.M. Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia*, London, Andre Deutsch, 1965, p. 16.

²¹ T. Ranger, *Are We Not Also Men: The Samkange Family and African Politics in Zimbabwe, 1920-64*, London, James Currey, 1995, p. 149.

²² P. Short, *Banda*, p. 58.

²³ NAZ, *S3684/3/3*, Memorandum by Chief Native Commissioner, Southern Rhodesia on “African Attitudes Towards the Federation Proposals”, 1 September, 1951, p.1.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

²⁵ R. I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 243.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

Federation opinion as misguided and ill-informed. They argued that the majority of African people in the Federation lacked the knowledge and education required to make an independent and well-informed decision about the merits of Federation. A Southern Rhodesia Native Commissioner who was involved in presenting the proposals for the creation of the Federation to Africans in that territory observed: "What does a tribal peasant know about economic advantages of cooperation with [Northern Rhodesia]? I ask you! You can't even say it ["Federation"] in his own language, let alone make him understand it."²⁷ Many of these mistaken white settler assumptions about the nature of African opposition to Federation continued to inform the pro-Federation propaganda put out to Africans by the Federal government after establishment of the Federation.

White settler disdain for African opinion on the proposed Federation was also shown by the fact that Africans were not properly consulted and represented in all of the key British government commissions, conferences and other processes that led to the establishment of the Federation. These included the Hilton Young Commission of 1927 and the Bledisloe Commission of 1938. Africans also boycotted some of the conferences on Federation that they were invited to. They did so in protest against the British and white settler governments' deliberate disregard of the overwhelming African opposition to the proposed establishment of a Federation.²⁸ Despite strong African opposition, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was officially inaugurated on 3 September 1953.²⁹

Unrelenting African opposition to the creation and continued existence of the Federation played a key role in its demise. This opposition, which was always present from the time that the idea of closer association was first put forward gained additional momentum as a result of the tidal wave of African nationalism that swept through the African continent in the 1950s. Numerous African countries achieved independence from colonial rule during this period. Partly as a result of this development, opposition to Federation among Africans in all the Federal territories grew in scale and intensity as they also demanded the right to self-government. Ultimately, the British government realised that African opposition to Federation was so intense and unrelenting that Federation could not continue to be maintained except through armed force. This realisation was a significant contributory factor to the British government's decision to dissolve the Federation in December 1963.³⁰

²⁷ NAZ, *Oral/240*, Noel Allison Hunt, 27 November, 1983, p. 50.

²⁸ P. Mason, *Year of Decision: Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1960*, London, Oxford University Press, 1960, pp. 15-50.

²⁹ R. Welensky, *Welensky's 4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, London, Collins, 1964, p. 65.

³⁰ R. Blake, "Foreword" to J.R.T. Wood, *The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Durban, Graham Publishing, 1983, pp. 31-32.

Numerous scholarly studies have devoted special attention to specific aspects of the Federation such as its origins,³¹ its political principle of multi-racial partnership,³² its economic organisation³³, its contribution to the emergence and development of African nationalism in Central Africa³⁴ and its failure and disintegration.³⁵ Despite widespread agreement among scholars that the vast majority of Africans in the Federation were strongly opposed to the creation and continued existence of Federation, the use of Federal government propaganda to try and get these Africans to support the Federal concept and state has received little scholarly attention in the numerous studies on Federation.

Of the existing studies that focus on or make reference to Federal government propaganda, several have focused on the Federal government's pro-Federation propaganda campaign in Britain which was not targeted at Africans in the Federation.³⁶ Those works which cover Federal government propaganda activities, which were directed at Africans in the Federation have overlooked Federal government print propaganda and focused predominantly on either film propaganda³⁷ or radio propaganda.³⁸ None of these studies

³¹ M. Collins, "Decolonisation and the 'Federal Moment'", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 24, 1, 2013, pp. 21-40; P. Murphy, "'Government by Blackmail': The Origins of the Central African Federation Reconsidered", in M. Lynn (Ed.), *The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival?* Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 53-76; R. Hyam, "The Geopolitical Origins of the Central African Federation: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1948-1953", *The Historical Journal*, 30, 1, 1987, pp. 145-172; P. Gifford, "Misconceived Dominion: The Creation and Disintegration of the Federation in British Central Africa", in P. Gifford and W.M. Roger Louis (Eds.), *The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization 1940-1960*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982, pp. 387-416; B.F. White, "Political and Business Interests and the Creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland", Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Manchester, 1964.

³² P. Keatly, *The Politics of Partnership*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1963; E. M. Clegg, *Race and Politics: Partnership in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1960; T.R. M. Creighton, *The Anatomy of Partnership: Southern Rhodesia and the Central African Federation*, London, Faber and Faber, 1960; H.S. Albinski, "The Concept of Partnership in the Central African Federation", *Review of Politics*, 19, 2, April 1957, pp. 186-204.

³³ R.A. Sowelem, *Towards Financial Independence in a Developing Economy: An Analysis of the Monetary Experience of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1952-1963*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1967; J. Tischler, *Light and Power for a Multiracial Nation: The Kariba Scheme in the Central African Federation*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

³⁴ Z.R. Groves, "Malawians in Colonial Salisbury: A Social History of Migration in Central Africa, c., 1920s-1960s", PhD Thesis, Keele University, 2011, pp. 194-240; Z. Groves, "Transnational Networks and Regional Solidarity: The Case of the Central African Federation, 1953-1963", *African Studies*, 72, 2, August 2013, pp. 155-175.

³⁵ A. Cohen, *The Politics and Economics of Decolonization in Africa: The Failed Experiment of the Central African Federation*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2013; H. Franklin, *Unholy Wedlock: The Failure of the Central African Federation*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1963.

³⁶ A. Cohen, "'Voice and Vision'- The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland's Public Relations Campaign in Britain: 1960-1963", *Historia*, 54, 2, November 2009, pp. 113-132; P. Murphy, *Party Politics and Decolonization*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 73-87.

³⁷ J. Burns, *Flickering Shadows: Cinema and Identity in Colonial Zimbabwe*, Athens, Ohio University Press, 2002.

³⁸ M. Chikowero, "Is Propaganda Modernity? Press and Radio for 'Africans' in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi During World War II and its Aftermath", in P.J. Bloom et al (eds), *Modernization as Spectacle in Africa*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2014, pp. 112-135; J.J. Zaffiro, "Broadcasting and Political Change in Zimbabwe 1931-1984", PhD Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1984.

are strongly situated within the context of the Federal government's overall information and propaganda policy toward Africans in the Federation. They also either ignore or make little reference to two important aspects of the Federal government's information policy. These are first, the roles played by Africans in the production and dissemination of Federal government propaganda and second, the contestations between the Federal and the Territorial governments over information and propaganda policy in relation to Africans. In addition, African reactions to especially pro-Federation propaganda from the Federal government are not given in depth treatment in these studies.

This thesis focuses on Federal government print and radio propaganda targeted at Africans in the Federation by situating its analysis of this propaganda within the overall context in which that propaganda emerged. It also examines the responses of Africans in the Federation to this propaganda and also evaluates its effectiveness in gaining the support of these Africans for Federation. The thesis contributes in several specific ways to the scholarship on Federal government information and propaganda policy for Africans in the Federation.

First, it provides a detailed and systematic analysis of Federal government print and radio propaganda in support of Federation, which was targeted at Africans in the Federation. It analyses the nature of this propaganda bringing to light its central themes and methods within the context of the Federal government's information and propaganda policy for Africans as well as the political and economic circumstances in which the propaganda was generated.

Federal government print and radio propaganda for Africans deserves serious scholarly attention not only because it has been neglected in previous studies, but also as this thesis will show, because it best exemplifies the principal propaganda strategies, themes and methods used by the Federal government on Africans in the Federation. An analysis of these two media of propaganda helps to highlight how Federal government policy for Africans was applied across two different types of media and how Africans reacted to Federal government propaganda channelled through these media. It is also crucial to an informed assessment of how successful Federal government print and radio propaganda was in gaining African support for Federation.

Second, situating our analysis of Federal propaganda within the overall context of the emergence and development of the Federal government's information and propaganda policy for Africans is helpful as it enables us to analyse another facet of Federal government information and propaganda policy which has been neglected in previous studies. This is the contestations between the Federal government and the Territorial governments over information dissemination responsibilities to Africans in the Federation. The thesis will demonstrate that these contestations had a significant influence on the development and

effectiveness of Federal government propaganda structures and policy, especially in relation to Africans.

Third, whereas previous studies have predominantly focused on Africans as recipients of government propaganda, this thesis goes beyond the scope of those studies by also examining the roles of Africans as producers and disseminators of Federal government propaganda in support of Federation. The thesis also gives a much broader analysis of African reactions to Federal government propaganda for Africans by analysing in detail their reactions to this propaganda through two different types of mass communication media, namely print and radio broadcasting. It also gives an assessment of the overall effectiveness of this propaganda in gaining African support for Federation.

Two central arguments are put forward in the thesis. First, that pro-Federation Federal government print and radio propaganda targeted at Africans in the Federation was primarily panic-driven propaganda generated by an information panic rooted in contestations over the idea of Federation, its establishment and continued existence. This information panic grew out of the Federal government's belated recognition of the potency of African opposition to Federation and the serious threat that it posed to the continued existence of the Federation. Opposition to Federation by Africans within the Federal territories was given further impetus by the achievement of independence from colonial rule by African nationalist movements in other parts of the African continent.

The demands for African self-rule generated by this broader African nationalist movement for independence from European colonial rule exacerbated the Federal government's sense of panic about the threat posed by African nationalism to the survival of the Federation. The thesis highlights how Federal government propaganda aimed at gaining African support for Federation developed from a stage where it was largely neglected by the Federal government to one in which it came to be regarded as central to the survival of the Federation by this government as it belatedly woke up from its earlier complacency about African opposition to Federation.

Second, the thesis argues that Federal government print and radio propaganda aimed at gaining African support for Federation attracted predominantly hostile reactions from the majority of Africans in the Federations. It was not successful in influencing these Africans into supporting Federation.

Literature Review

A number of studies have focused on Africans and state propaganda in colonial Africa. Most of these studies have focused on wartime government propaganda, but not many have provided a detailed analysis of its reception by Africans. Fay Gadsen has examined British

Colonial government propaganda for Africans and other audiences in Kenya during the Second World War, but does not give a detailed account of the responses of Africans to this propaganda.³⁹ Other scholars, have, however, examined in detail the responses of Africans to colonial government war propaganda.

In his study of the British colonial government's Second World War propaganda for Africans, Bonny Ibhawoh has argued against the widely accepted notion that war propaganda in the colonies "was simply an extension or replication of the propaganda war in Europe, to which colonised people made minimal input and over which they had no control."⁴⁰ Ibhawoh has shown how Africans in the British colonies in West Africa were not passive recipients and duplicators of imperial war propaganda. They played an important role in "the making of war propaganda" and were able to take advantage of the opportunities that this role offered them "to articulate their nationalist demands drawing on the same discourses about freedom and self-determination that underlined imperial war propaganda."⁴¹

A similar study by Emmanuel Nwafor Mordi has also highlighted the agency shown by Africans in responding to British colonial government war propaganda, but has differed with Ibhawoh and others over the effects on Africans of this propaganda. Mordi, in his study of the Second World War propaganda of the British colonial state in Nigeria has called into question "the conventional wisdom that war propaganda in Africa profoundly affected the elite who appropriated British propaganda as a weapon to undermine the colonial state."⁴² He argues that the influence of war propaganda on the direction which African nationalism in colonial Nigeria assumed was "practically nil" as the anti-colonial orientation of African nationalists in Nigeria was informed not by British war propaganda, but by "local role models, newspapers and other sources of propaganda which reflected local realities."⁴³

Mordi also emphasises that crediting British wartime propaganda with having created anti-colonial opinion and activism among African elites in Nigeria overestimates its influence. It downplays African agency by putting forward the mistaken idea that Africans in Nigeria did not desire independence from colonial rule until British war propaganda created an anti-colonial political consciousness in them. It also fails to acknowledge the initiative shown by Africans in independently rallying African support for Britain's war effort before and when the war broke out.⁴⁴

³⁹ F. Gadsen, "Wartime Propaganda in Kenya: The Kenya Information Office, 1939-1945", *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 19, 3, 1986, pp. 401-420.

⁴⁰ B. Ibhawoh, "Second World War Propaganda, Imperial Idealism and Anti-Colonial Nationalism in British West Africa", *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 16, 2, 2007, p. 221.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² E. N. Mordi, "Wartime Propaganda, Devious Officialdom, and the Challenge of Nationalism during the Second World War in Nigeria", *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 16, 2, 2007, p. 235.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Though this study focuses on Africans and colonial government propaganda during the post-Second World War era, it shares the emphasis that both Ibhawoh and Mordi place on the agency shown by Africans in their various reactions to colonial government war propaganda. Their focus on the ways in which African reactions to this propaganda served to limit and frustrate its intended effects upon them is particularly relevant for this study which highlights how Africans were able to actively and successfully resist the pro-Federation propaganda directed at them by the Federal government.

Regarding the study area which is the main focus of this thesis, only a small number of studies have focused on the information and propaganda activities of the Federal government, particularly in relation to Africans in the Federation. Of these studies, most have focused primarily on the information and propaganda activities of the individual territorial governments during the Federal era rather than on those of the government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The print and radio propaganda activities of the Federal government have received little or no attention in most of these studies which have focused predominantly on the Federal government's film propaganda.

Among the numerous studies that examine the Federal government's film propaganda, James Burns's book, *Flickering Shadows: Cinema and Identity in Colonial Zimbabwe*, provides the most detailed study of Federal government mobile film propaganda for Africans. In this study which includes an in-depth examination of the activities of the Central African Film Unit (CAFU) which was established in 1948 and taken over by the Federal Information Department in 1954, Burns shows how the colonial state tried unsuccessfully "to use film as an instrument of social and cultural hegemony."⁴⁵

CAFU film policy and practice for African audiences as well as the reactions of African audiences to these films has also been examined by, among other scholars, Rosaleen Smyth and David Kerr. Smyth's examination of CAFU's activities mainly focused on the Second World War period.⁴⁶ David Kerr has focused on film policy and practice in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland from the 1930s to the 1960s.⁴⁷ Kerr argues that "African audiences for colonial cinema did not blindly absorb colonial culture" but showed their agency in various ways. He notes that "any CAFU films which were clearly identifiable as government propaganda were reinterpreted from a nationalist viewpoint by the most vocal elements in the audience."⁴⁸ Kerr also shows that some of the African film commentators who worked

⁴⁵ J.M. Burns, *Flickering Shadows*, p. xiv; J.M. Burns, "Watching Africans Watch Films: Theories of Spectatorship in British Colonial Africa", *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, 2, 2, 2000, pp. 197-211.

⁴⁶ R. Smyth, "The Central African Film Unit's Images of Empire", *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, 3, 2, 1983, pp. 131-147; "The Post-War Career of the Colonial Film Unit in Africa, 1946-1955", *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, 12, 2, 1992, pp. 163-177.

⁴⁷ D. Kerr, "The Best of Both Worlds? Colonial Film Policy and Practice in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland", *Critical Arts: A South-North Journal of Cultural and Media Studies*, 7, 1, 1993, pp. 11-32.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

for CAFU exhibited an ability to give “a different emphasis to the films from the one intended by the film-makers.”⁴⁹

Other scholars who have focused on film and filmography during the Federal era showing some of the ways in which colonial film was used to disseminate Southern Rhodesia government propaganda to Africans on agricultural and other issues include Kedmon Hungwe⁵⁰ and Maurice Vambe, Kelvin Chikongo and Katy Khan.⁵¹

Although these studies focus on the propaganda disseminated to Africans by the Federal and territorial governments through a single medium, mobile film or cinema, they provide information on African responses to this propaganda which is helpful in providing a broader context for this study’s focus on Federal government print and radio propaganda for Africans.

Among the few studies that focus on the Federal government’s pro-Federation print propaganda is an article by Andrew Cohen which focuses on the pro-Federation propaganda campaign conducted in Britain on behalf of the Federal government by Voice and Vision, a London-based public relations firm which had been engaged by the Federal government to handle its pro-Federation campaign in the United Kingdom.⁵² Although this article provides some valuable insights on the nature of the Federal government’s pro-Federation campaign in Britain, it does not focus on the Federal government’s internal pro-Federation propaganda activities which are the main focus of this thesis. Due to its primary focus on external pro-Federation propaganda aimed at a predominantly European audience, Cohen’s article says very little about Africans and pro-Federation propaganda.

A recent study by Rosalind Coffey has examined the role played by British press coverage of African nationalist agitation against Federation in Nyasaland. Coffey argues that this press coverage had “important effects” on “sections of the white settler communities of the Federation, and the British government” and played a vital role in shaping their attitudes to the dissolution of Britain’s colonial empire in Africa.⁵³ Also demonstrated in Coffey’s study is how African nationalist parties in the Federation were able to take advantage of the

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ K. Hungwe, “Southern Rhodesia Propaganda and Education Films for Africans for Peasant Farmers, 1948-1955”, *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, 11, 3, 1991, pp.229-241; K. Hungwe “Narrative and Ideology: Fifty Years of Film-Making in Zimbabwe”, in M. T. Vambe (ed), *Orality and Cultural Identities in Zimbabwe*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 2001, pp. 73-85.

⁵¹ M.T. Vambe, K. Chikongo and K. Khan, “The Portrayal of Africans in Agricultural Films of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe): 1940s-1950s”, *Communicatio: South African Journal for Communication Theory and Research*, 33, 1, 2007, pp. 113-135.

⁵² A. Cohen, “‘Voice and Vision’-The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland’s Public Relations Campaign in Britain: 1960-1963”, *Historia*, 54, 2, 2009, pp. 113-132.

⁵³ R. Coffey, “‘Does the Daily Paper rule Britannia’: British Press Coverage of a Malawi Youth League Demonstration in Blantyre, Nyasaland, in January 1960”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 41, 6, 2015, p.1 & pp. 1255-1277.

presence of the British press in the Federation to gain favourable international as well as local publicity of their struggle against the continued existence of the Federation. Despite the important contributions that Coffey makes to scholarly understanding of the role played by the British press in the disbanding of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, her study primarily focuses on the British and not the Federal press and on the reactions to this press of its White readership in Britain and in the Federation.

Sylvester Dombo's recent PhD thesis examines the role played in "the struggle for democracy" in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe by two privately owned newspapers, the *African Daily News* during the years 1956-1964 and the *Daily News* during the years 1999-2003.⁵⁴ Though this thesis makes an important contribution to scholarship on the role played by the private press in democratisation processes in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe, its main focus is not government print propaganda. Its discussion of Federal government propaganda activities is also limited as its examination of the role played by the private press during the Federal era is centred on Southern Rhodesia and not the Federation as a whole.

Other studies that focus on the role played by the private press in the Federal era include Anthony King's article on the history and impact of the *Central African Examiner*, a liberal journal of "comment and opinion" owned by white liberals in the Federation and targeted at European and African elites in the Federation.⁵⁵ King shows that white Rhodesian mining interests established the journal in 1957 for the specific purpose of applying gentle pressure on the Federal and Territorial governments to make multi-racial partnership, the policy upon which the Federation claimed to be founded, a practical reality. These mining interests shared the Federal government's belief in the policy of multi-racial partnership and believed that they stood to gain much economically from the full implementation of this policy. Their primary concern, which was reflected in the journal they established, centred on the apparent reluctance of both the Federal and Territorial governments to fully and rapidly implement the policy of multi-racial partnership.⁵⁶

King reveals the key role played by the *Central African Examiner* in exerting pressure on these governments to quickly and fully implement the policy of multi-racial partnership. He highlights how the platform that this journal provided for the expression of African nationalist views grew in scope and importance as it became "an increasingly outspoken

⁵⁴ S. Dombo, "Daily Struggles: Private Print Media, the State and Democratic Governance in Zimbabwe in the Case of the *African Daily News* (1956-1964) and the *Daily News* (1999-2003)", PhD Thesis, School of Social Sciences, University of Kwazulu-Natal, Durban, 2014.

⁵⁵ A. King, "The Central African Examiner, 1957-1965", *Zambezia*, 33, 2, 1996, p. 133-134.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-151.

critic” of the European governments’ failure to fully implement the policy of multi-racial partnership.⁵⁷

Though King’s article on the Central African Examiner provides important insights on the role played by the white liberal press in the politics of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, it also does not focus on Federal government print propaganda.

There have also been some works which have provided some insights on print propaganda put out by white liberals in the Federation to challenge the racially discriminatory political and economic policies of the Federal and Territorial governments. This print propaganda included the pro-African nationalist broadsheet *Dissent*, which was jointly edited and published by Terence Ranger, John Reed and the Reverend Whitfield Foy. Ranger and Reed, both lecturers at the multi-racial University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland were strongly pro-African nationalist as was their co-editor, the Methodist Minister, Whitfield Foy.⁵⁸ Though these works provide some valuable information on white liberal responses to Federal government propaganda as exemplified through *Dissent*, their primary focus is not on Federal government propaganda and the African responses to this propaganda.

Many of the works on state propaganda in Colonial Zimbabwe have also focused on state propaganda relating to the Zimbabwean war of liberation, (1960s -1980). They do not pay much attention to the Federal period and to Federal government propaganda. These include Elaine Windrich and Julie Frederikse’s well known pioneering studies of the role played by state propaganda in this liberation war.⁵⁹

E. Msindo’s seminal article on state propaganda in Southern Rhodesia under the Rhodesia Front government does not primarily focus on the Federal period but makes a significant contribution to the scholarship on Rhodesian state propaganda by challenging previous assumptions about the effects of this propaganda on Africa. Msindo demonstrates that the influence of this propaganda on Africans has been overestimated.⁶⁰ The significance for this study of the conceptual approach that he uses to analyse the nature and influence of state propaganda under the Rhodesian Front government is discussed in the next section of this chapter that that deals with the theoretical perspectives that inform this study.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 154.

⁵⁸ T. Ranger, *Writing Revolt: An Engagement with African Nationalism, 1957-1967*, Harare, Weaver Press, 2013, pp. 48-59; T. Ranger, “Memories of an Emergency”, in K.M. Phiri, J. McCracken and W.O. Mulwafu (eds), *Malawi in Crisis: The 1959/60 State of Emergency and its Legacy*, Zomba, Kachere Books, 2012, pp. 338-348; D. Jeater, “Stuff Happens, and People Make it Happen: Theory and Practice in the Work of Terence Ranger”, *History Workshop Journal*, 73, 1, 2012, pp. 193-210; J. McCracken, “Terry Ranger: A Personal Appreciation”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 23, 2, 1997, pp. 175-185.

⁵⁹ Elaine Windrich, *The Mass Media in the Struggle for Zimbabwe: Censorship and Propaganda under Rhodesian Front Rule*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1981; J. Frederikse, *None But Ourselves: Masses vs. Media in the Making of Zimbabwe*, Harare, ZPH, 1982.

⁶⁰ E. Msindo, “‘Winning Hearts and Minds’: Crisis and Propaganda in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1960-1970”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 35, 3, 2009, pp. 663-681.

The role played by radio and television broadcasting in government propaganda in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is still an under-researched subject. Most scholars who have written on radio and television broadcasting have examined the issue at Territorial rather than Federal level and have also concentrated on the post-Federal period. James Zaffiro's PhD thesis on government broadcasting policy in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe examines the broadcast use policies of different Zimbabwean governments between 1931 and 1984. It interrogates the official claims of these governments that broadcasting was free from government influence and control. The study concludes that these claims were essentially false as all these regimes used supposedly independent public broadcasting organisations to serve their political interests, chief among them the construction of political legitimacy.⁶¹

Zaffiro's study provides many important insights concerning the relationship between government broadcast use policy and political transformation and legitimacy in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe, it lacks detailed treatment of the broadcast use policy of the government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Its focus is "more on political motives, strategies and experiences of regimes in their use of broadcasting, than with demonstrating actual impact" of broadcasting audiences in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe.⁶² Consequently, it lacks any substantial discussion of the reactions of both African and European listeners to the programmes broadcast to them by the Federal Broadcasting Corporation.

Mhoze Chikowero's work on broadcasting in colonial Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi has made an important contribution to the scholarship on colonial radio propaganda for Africans and their reactions to this propaganda. Chikowero examines the history of radio broadcasting to Africans in these three countries during "the formative years of colonial radio", that is from the Second World War to the early post-war period. His work mainly focuses on colonial perceptions of the role of radio in "civilising" or modernising Africans and on how these perceptions shed light on colonial mentalities about Africans.⁶³

Chikowero argues that "British colonial broadcasting to Africans was a crucial tool for building the British Empire" because colonial policymakers strongly believed that radio as a medium constituted "a novel vehicle for "civilising" Africans" and radically transforming

⁶¹ J. J. Zaffiro, "Broadcasting and Political Change in Zimbabwe", pp. X-19. This thesis was later published with very marginal changes as *Media and Democracy in Zimbabwe, 1931-2002*, Colorado Springs, International Academic Publishers, 2002.

⁶² J.J. Zaffiro, "Broadcasting and Political Change in Zimbabwe", p. 16.

⁶³ M. Chikowero, "Is Propaganda Modernity? Press and Radio for "Africans" in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi during World War II and its Aftermath", in P.J. Bloom et al. (Eds.), *Modernization as Spectacle in Africa*, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2014, p.112-135.

their social lives.⁶⁴ He highlights how British colonial broadcasters sought to use radio propaganda to “civilise” Africans by “educating” them on issues such as “proper hygiene, agriculture, housing and sanitation” while at the same time “depoliticising them” with the expectation that this would make the majority of Africans who were illiterate less susceptible to being influenced by the small number of educated Africans.⁶⁵

One of the key strengths of Chikowero’s work is that it demonstrates that Africans were not passive subjects of the British colonial state’s efforts to use radio to “engineer Africans into loyal subjects of British colonialism” radio propaganda broadcast to them by the colonial state during the Second World War period and afterwards, but “contested its use, meaning and power as both a symbol of modernity and tool of the state.”⁶⁶

This study examines many aspects of African broadcasting policy and practice under the Federal government that are either overlooked or not given detailed treatment in the works already reviewed. These include, the struggle between the Federal and Territorial governments over control of broadcasting to Africans and how it influenced the Federal and Territorial governments’ decision to place all broadcasting in the Federation under the control of an independent broadcasting corporation; the relationship between the Federal government and the FBC and what this relationship reflects about claims by both that the FBC was an independent and impartial broadcaster free of government influence.

Theoretical Perspectives

There is no single theory that explains all the aspects relevant to this study. Different aspects of what may be termed the “propaganda process”, which include its formulation, dissemination and reception by the target audience/s require different theories which address these and other specific aspects of the same propaganda process. The study, therefore, adopts a multi-theoretical perspective that draws on several theories and concepts considered relevant here.

The genesis and historical evolution of the meaning of the term “propaganda” has been well-documented in numerous scholarly studies. These studies have highlighted how in its original limited usage the term “propaganda” which in Latin means “to propagate” did not

⁶⁴ M. Chikowero, “Is Propaganda Modernity? Press and Radio for ‘Africans’ in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi during World War II and its Aftermath”, in P.J. Bloom et al. (eds), *Modernization as Spectacle in Africa*, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2014, p. 113.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ M. Chikowero, “‘Broadcasting to Africans’: Constructing Subjects, Contesting Colonial Radio in Colonial Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi, 1939-1963”, Paper Presented to the African Studies Association Conference, San Francisco, 2010, pp. 27, 1-27; M. Chikowero, “Guerilla Radio: Statecrafting Zimbabwe”, *NEWSA*, October 2011.

carry the widespread negative connotations that it is largely associated with today.⁶⁷ Its first usage has been dated back to 1622, the year in which Pope Gregory XV created a missionary organisation known as the *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide*, (The Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith). This organisation, which was under the direction of the Vatican, was intended to defend the authority of the Roman Catholic Church against the challenge presented by the Protestant Reformation by winning hearts and minds rather than through armed coercion. It sought to counter Protestant Reformation precepts by openly and proudly propagating Roman Catholic doctrines with the intention of persuading people to voluntarily accept these doctrines. In Catholic countries the term “propaganda”, therefore, originally had positive connotations.⁶⁸

It was during the 20th Century that the term “propaganda” came to be used very widely and assumed negative connotations mainly as a result of the massive government propaganda campaigns of the First World War and afterwards. The First World War (1914-1919) and the Second World War (1939-1945) both witnessed the extensive use of mass propaganda by the governments engaged in these wars as they sought to mobilise domestic and international public opinion in support of their war efforts against each other. During these wars, the word “propaganda” assumed largely negative connotations as it came to be predominantly defined and viewed as “the dissemination of biased ideas and opinions, often through the use of lies and deception.”⁶⁹ It also came to be used by Britain and her allies to delegitimise the mass persuasion methods of their opponents by describing them as “propaganda” while characterising their own similar efforts as factual information.⁷⁰

This labelling of the mass persuasion efforts of the “enemy” as propaganda was carried over into the Cold War (1946-1990) which pitted the authoritarian and Communist Soviet Union and its allies against the democracies of the United States of America and Europe.⁷¹ However, as scholarly understanding of propaganda developed in the post-Second World War period, many scholars eventually came to acknowledge that propaganda was not the preserve of dictatorial regimes, but was also used by democratic governments. Scholars also came to realise that propaganda was not inherently evil and was not necessarily premised on falsehoods but could be founded on claims that were factually true.⁷²

⁶⁷ G.S. Jowett and V. O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion* (5th Edition), London, Sage Publications, 2012, pp. 2-6.

⁶⁸ A.R. Pratkanis and E. Aronson, *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion* (2nd Edition), New York, Freeman, 2001, p. 8.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-10.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*

Numerous definitions of propaganda based on this revised view of the nature of propaganda have been put forward.⁷³ This study adopts the definition put forward by Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell who define propaganda as follows:

Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a result that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.⁷⁴

The strength of this definition lies in its lucid and succinct description of what constitutes propaganda, particularly in its emphasis on how propaganda is purposeful and organised and is intended to benefit the propagandist by influencing to his/her advantage the thinking and behaviour of those at whom it is targeted.

Jowett and O'Donnell's also argue that as a form of communication, propaganda is clearly distinguishable from persuasion on the basis of its purpose and means.⁷⁵ Propaganda, they argue, "has a selfish purpose weighted in favour of the propagandist and not necessarily in the best interest of the receiver."⁷⁶ Its key characteristic as a form of communication is that it deliberately seeks to manipulate rather than voluntarily persuade its target audience/s into embracing viewpoints and behaviour that further the interests of the propagandist.⁷⁷

Though Jowett and O'Donnell admit that propaganda often employs some of the techniques of persuasion and informative communication, they maintain that this does not make it synonymous with persuasion. This is because the ultimate purpose of the propagandist in utilising these techniques is to further his/her interests and not promote the welfare of his/her target audience/s or to promote a better understanding of the issues that are the subject of his/her propaganda. Indeed, propagandists may seek to further their interests by masquerading as persuaders with the intention of manipulating their target audience/s into embracing their viewpoints without the audience being aware that they are propagandists and not persuaders.⁷⁸

In contrast, persuasion, according to Jowett and O'Donnell, is a form of communication that is not tilted to the advantage of the persuader because its ultimate purpose is to serve the openly declared and mutually interdependent interests of both the persuader and the persuadee. It accomplishes this through an open exchange of viewpoints in which the persuader does not seek to manipulate but to convince the persuadee into voluntarily accepting viewpoints and behaviour that serve their mutual interests. As Jowett and

⁷³ G.S. Jowett and V. O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 5th Edition, London, Sage Publications, 2012, p. 7.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.30-49.

⁷⁶ V. O'Donnell and G.S. Jowett, "Propaganda as a form of Communication" in T.J. Smith III (ed), *Propaganda: A Pluralistic Perspective*, New York, Praeger, 1989, p. 53.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 59-60.

O'Donnell emphasise: "Mutual reciprocity, persuader sensitivity to the persuadee's needs, and voluntary compliance by the persuadee are the essential characteristics of the persuasion process that differentiate it from the propaganda process."⁷⁹

Jowett and O'Donnell's elaborate effort to establish a clear distinction between propaganda and persuasion is, however, not convincing as it fails to recognise that persuasion can also make use of the manipulative methods of communication that they ascribe only to propaganda. They also greatly underplay the extent to which what they characterise as persuasion can be motivated by the self-interest of the persuader. For these reasons, the study while it accepts Jowett and O'Donnell's definition of propaganda does not subscribe to their argument that a clear distinction can be drawn between propaganda and persuasion. It instead identifies itself with those explanations of propaganda which characterise it as a specific form of mass persuasion which employs multiple methods including manipulation. Among the scholars who characterise propaganda in this way are Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson who have described propaganda as the "abuse of persuasion"⁸⁰

The study, however, makes use of the distinctions between various forms of propaganda which are highlighted by Jowett and O'Donnell. They draw a distinction between *integrative* propaganda and *agitative* propaganda. *Integrative* propaganda is propaganda whose main purpose is to defend the legitimacy and actions of an institution. *Agitative* propaganda is mainly designed to "stimulate the masses to act, to overthrow an old order, or to bring about significant change."⁸¹ This study draws upon this distinction in its analysis of the nature of the propaganda disseminated by the Federal government to its target audiences as well as the uses of propaganda made by African nationalist movements that were opposed to the existence of the Federation. Federal government propaganda sought to defend the legitimacy of Federation as an idea and as a state while African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda sought the to mobilise Africans to fight to end Federation and European colonial rule and replace it with a new political order in which Africans would rule themselves.

The other forms of propaganda identified by Jowett and O'Donnell are *white*, *gray* and *black* propaganda. The differences between these forms of propaganda are based on whether and how honestly the source or originator of the propaganda is declared and on the accuracy of the information conveyed in that propaganda. *White* propaganda also referred to as *overt* propaganda is propaganda emanating from a source that is openly and truthfully identified and which conveys information that is accurate. In contrast, *black* propaganda also known

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 59-60.

⁸⁰ A. Pratkanis and E. Aronson, *Age of Propaganda*, pp. xv-11.

⁸¹ V. O'Donnell and G.S. Jowett, "Propaganda as a Form of Communication", p. 53; G.S. Jowett and V. O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, p. 17.

as *covert* propaganda or *disinformation* is propaganda in which the true of the source of the propaganda is hidden or attributed to a bogus source. Black propaganda does not convey information which is truthful, but disseminates “lies, fabrications, and deceptions.”⁸² Jowett and O’Donnell note that because of its deceptive methods and untruthful content, *black* propaganda “is the form of propaganda that the general public most commonly understands as being ‘true’ propaganda.”⁸³ *Gray* propaganda, according to Jowett and O’Donnell occupies a middle ground between *white* and *black* propaganda in which “the source may or may not be correctly identified, and the accuracy of the information is uncertain.”⁸⁴

The distinctions between various forms of propaganda highlighted by Jowett and O’Donnell show that propaganda in terms of its techniques can make use of both truth and/or falsehood, “but the ends are always predetermined to favour the propagandist.”⁸⁵ This study applies the distinction between white and black propaganda that Jowett and O’Donnell make in its analysis of the methods and character of Federal government propaganda in support of Federation. It shows how the Federal government’s dominant propaganda approach, the factual propaganda approach, was largely consistent with the character and methods of *white* propaganda. This factual propaganda openly and correctly identified the Federal government as the source of the propaganda and conveyed factually accurate information about Federation.

The study also explores the internal debate among Federal government officials over the effectiveness of its *white* propaganda in gaining African support for Federation. It examines the Federal government’s reactions to the pressure exerted upon it by some of its own propagandists and by others to adopt some of the propaganda methods associated with *black* propaganda. These propagandists believed that the adoption of such methods was the only way the Federal government could effectively counter African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda which they essentially characterised as *black* propaganda as they persistently claimed that it was founded on deliberate falsehoods about Federation and the policies of the Federal government.

A key concept that informs one of the central arguments put forward in this thesis is that of information panic. This study utilises the conceptualisation of information panic given by the historian Christopher Bayley in his study of British political intelligence in British colonial India between the late 18th Century and the late 19th Century. Bayley’s explanation of information panic is relevant for this study as it provides an explanatory framework of one of the significant ways in which political regimes think about and use information. The term

⁸² G.S. Jowett and V. O’Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, pp. 18, 17-27.

⁸³ V. O’Donnell and G.S. Jowett, “Propaganda as a Form of Communication”, p. 56.

⁸⁴ G.S. Jowett and V. O’Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, p. 20.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

“information panic” is used by Bayley to refer to the British colonial state’s anxieties and fears about its lack of information or knowledge about certain aspects of indigenous Indian society in particular areas of British ruled India.⁸⁶ Bayley argues that the information panics of the British colonial administration in India were a “reflection of the weakness and ignorance of the coloniser rather than a gauge of hegemony.”⁸⁷ They were “the evidence of the limitations of colonial power and knowledge, not the effectiveness of its projection on society.”⁸⁸

Drawing upon Bayley’s conception of information panic, the study argues that the Federal government’s information and propaganda was informed by an information panic in which it exhibited similar anxieties and fears about its lack of knowledge of African opinion on Federation. The study shows that the Federal government came to believe that its lack of knowledge about African opinion on Federation was hindering its efforts to counter anti-Federation propaganda, especially from African nationalist movements within the Federation. Using Bayley’s notion of information panic, the study also argues that despite its efforts to use its pro-Federation propaganda to project itself as a strong government that was in control of the future of the Federation, the Federal government’s propaganda was actually a reflection of its weakness and lack of control over the future of the Federation.

In this study the notion of information panic is used to refer not only to the Federal government’s fears and anxieties about its ignorance of African opinion on Federation, but also to the Federal Information Services’ belated and panicked response to the strength of African opposition to Federation and the serious threat that it posed to the continued survival of the Federation. Using this conceptual framework of information panic, the study highlights how the Federal government’s information panic was rooted in contestations over the idea of Federation. It shows that it was triggered by the Federal government’s belated recognition that African nationalist opposition to Federation could bring about the very situation that the Federal government was most fearful of and determined to prevent, that is the break-up and collapse of the Federation.

The study demonstrates that this late recognition of the potency of African opposition to Federation combined with related major political crises that pointed to the imminent collapse of the Federation generated an atmosphere of heightened panic among Federal government propagandists and other officials. In this crisis-ridden and panic-ridden environment, these Federal government officials laboured under the belief that they had very little time in which to try and save the Federation from collapse by using propaganda to quickly gain support for Federation among Africans and other opponents of Federation. The

⁸⁶ C.A. Bayley, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1980*, Cambridge, CUP, 1996, p. 174.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p.171.

Federal government, which prior to encountering these major crises did not have a well formulated and well developed information and propaganda policy, especially for Africans, had to develop such a policy in the midst of crisis. It was in this context that panic-driven propaganda emerged as the most dominant form of Federal government pro-Federation propaganda targeted at Africans in the Federation as well as at audiences outside the Federation.

In coming up with the concept of panic-driven propaganda the study draws upon and attempts to extend the conceptual approach used by a Zimbabwean historian, E. Msindo in his analysis of the development of Southern Rhodesian government propaganda under the Rhodesian Front government between 1962 and 1970. Challenging “the dominant view that political regimes resort to propaganda to consolidate their already strong political positions”, Msindo shows that the Rhodesian Front government, faced with a political and economic crisis that made the continuation of white minority rule in Southern Rhodesia uncertain became politically paranoid and insecure and “resorted to propaganda to shore up a weak position.”⁸⁹

Msindo’s conceptual approach also encompasses the idea of an information panic as it successfully demonstrates how political regimes can use propaganda to give the impression of being in control when in reality they have no control and are in a state of panic.⁹⁰ It is highly applicable to the study’s analysis of the propaganda policy and practice of the white minority government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which was confronted by political and economic crises similar to those later faced by the Rhodesian Front government after the break-up of the Federation.

The study defines *panic-driven propaganda* as propaganda generated and sustained by the propagandist’s panic over a given situation which he believes poses a serious threat to his interests, but over which he has very little or no control. It is, therefore, generated from a position of weakness and vulnerability on the part of the panic-stricken propagandist and deliberately seeks to conceal this reality by intentionally projecting to its audience a false impression of the propagandist’s strength and control over the panic-generating situation. This strategy, aimed at influencing to the propagandist’s advantage, public perceptions and attitudes to the panic-generating situation is one of the defining characteristics of panic-driven propaganda. Another key feature of panic-driven propaganda is that it is largely *reactive* rather than *offensive* as it driven by a panicked *response* to a perceived threat facing the propagandist.

Utilising this definition of panic-driven propaganda, the study identifies and analyses the main characteristics of the Federal government’s panic-driven propaganda as manifested in

⁸⁹ E. Msindo, “‘Winning Hearts and Minds’”, pp. 681, 663-681.

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 663-681.

its pro-Federation print and radio propaganda for Africans. It shows how this propaganda was rooted in and reflected the Federal government's panic over the imminent break-up of the Federation and the advent of African nationalist rule in Central Africa. The study also illustrates how this propaganda was predominantly reactive rather than offensive in character. It highlights how in a panicked response to the dominant African nationalist propaganda narrative that Federation had failed and was doomed to collapse, it sought to purposely construct and entrench a counter-narrative of Federation and the Federal government as successful, strong and destined to become permanently established. This, the study emphasises, was a reflection not of the strength of the Federal government, but of its panic, weakness and inability to ensure the continued existence of the Federation.

The study uses specific mass media effects theories to analyse the reactions of Africans to Federal government propaganda in support of Federation and to assess the effectiveness of this propaganda in gaining African support for Federation. It has been frequently noted that while there is widespread consensus among scholars that communications transmitted through the mass media have some effects on their target audiences, scholars remain divided in their opinion of what precisely these effects are and if and how they can be accurately measured.⁹¹ Detailed explanations of the main media effects theories, the historical context in which they evolved, their central claims and their major strengths and limitations have been given in numerous studies, among them, Denis McQuail's seminal work on mass communication theory.⁹²

McQuail and most other mass communication scholars identify four major phases through which media effects research and theory has progressed.⁹³ The trajectory of the development of this media effects research and theory was not linear. Its first phase, which covered the period 1900 to the 1930s, commenced with the emergence and entrenchment of the idea that the mass media had immense power to influence and change public opinion and behaviour in accordance with the wishes of those who owned and controlled such media. This viewpoint was not based on scientific research regarding mass media effects, but on what seemed to be the evident effects of mass media on society.⁹⁴

During this time, film and radio, which were new media, and the press, were becoming immensely popular. They were viewed as exerting a powerful, pervasive and often corrupting influence on both private and public life. In addition, the apparent success that First World War propagandists and inter-war European dictatorships, such as that of Nazi

⁹¹ D. McQuail, *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory* (5th Edition), London, Sage Publications, 2005, pp. 456-457.

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 453-533.

⁹³ D. McQuail, *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory*, pp. 457-462; S.J. Baran, *Introduction to Mass Communication: Media Literacy and Culture* (5th Edition), New York, McGraw-Hill, 2009, pp. 415-432.

⁹⁴ D. McQuail, *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory*, p. 458; S. J. Baran, *Introduction to Mass Communication*, pp. 415-416.

Germany, had enjoyed in using propaganda tended to confirm the pre-existing and widely held notion of an all-powerful media.⁹⁵ Proponents of this viewpoint also believed that ordinary people who constituted the majority of the mass media audience and whose education was limited were the group which was most susceptible to the pernicious influence of the mass media. Their limited education was regarded as a severe hindrance to their capacity to resist negative mass media propaganda, thus, rendering them virtually defenceless against its dangerous influence.⁹⁶

A theory which emerged during this phase and which came to be commonly known as the magic bullet theory or hypodermic needle theory is widely regarded as the classic example of the key theoretical assumptions about mass media effects which dominated this first phase. The theory views the mass media and the propaganda messages disseminated through them by propagandists as having enormous power to shape people's opinions and behaviour. The target audience is perceived as homogenous and as passively accepting the propaganda messages aimed at them by responding directly, uniformly and in the desired way when hit by the 'magic bullet' or injected by the "hypodermic needle" of the propagandist. The theory emphasise a direct causal relationship between mass media messages and the opinions and behaviour of the audience at which these messages are targeted.⁹⁷

The second phase in the development of media effects research and theory covered the period from the late 1930s to the 1960s. It witnessed a transition to an era of scientific investigation of mass media effects. This new approach to media effects research resulted in the rejection of the dominant theoretical perspective that mass media messages had very powerful and far-reaching effects upon their audiences. A new theoretical paradigm, the limited effects theory emerged as the dominant media effects theory. Essentially a reaction to and a critique of the magic bullet theory, the central claim of this theoretical perspective is that the effects of the mass media are not all-powerful, but limited.⁹⁸

It argues that contrary to the claims of the magic bullet theory which were not based on empirical research, there is no direct stimulus-response relationship between mass media messages and the recipients of these messages. Mass media audiences are heterogeneous and do not react passively and uniformly to mass media messages. They have the capacity to resist being manipulated or controlled through mass media propaganda because the power of the mass media propaganda to shape people's opinions and behaviour is limited by numerous critical factors. These include the following: the audience members' individual

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ S.J. Baran, *Introduction to Mass Communication*, p. 416.

⁹⁷ D. McQuail, *Mass Communication Theory*, pp.325-351; M. Honey, *Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender and Propaganda during World War II*, Amherst, the University of Massachusetts Press, 2003, pp. 9-10.

⁹⁸ S.J. Baran, *Introduction to Mass Communication*, pp. 417-426.

pre-existing opinions, attitudes, values, needs and experiences which determine whether and to what extent they can be influenced by mass media propaganda; the individual audience members' selective attention to and selective retention and perception of mass media messages. This selectivity limits the impact and influence of mass media propaganda upon them.⁹⁹

In the third phase of the development of media effects research and theory, there was a return to the dominance of the theoretical perspective that mass media messages had powerful effects upon their audiences. This change, which took place from the 1950s to the 1960s was due to, among other factors, the enormous popularity and noticeable impact that television as a new mass medium was having on mass media audiences. This apparent influence of television, which was introduced in the 1950s and 1960s as well as the growing power and influence of media organisations made some media effects theorists reluctant to accept the prevailing view that the media had limited effects.¹⁰⁰ The rise of new left critical theory during this time also significantly contributed to the revival of the concept of powerful media effects "by crediting the media with powerful legitimating and controlling effects in the interests of capitalist or bureaucratic states."¹⁰¹

The fourth phase in the development of media effects research and theory commenced in the early 1970s and witnessed the adoption of a 'social constructivist' approach to media effects. The central claim of this theoretical approach is that the most important effects of the mass media derive from their power to construct meanings which are systematically transmitted to audiences. These audiences either use or don't use these meanings to construct their own version of social reality. In this way, the meaning and influence of mass media messages is the product of continuous negotiation between the mass media and its audiences. This, theoretical paradigm like the limited effects paradigm "allows both for the power of media and for the power of people to choose."¹⁰²

All four media effects paradigms can be said to fall into two broad theoretical traditions. The first is the powerful media effects theoretical tradition, exemplified by the magic bullet theory. This tradition adopts a hegemonic perspective which credits the mass media with enormous power to influence the opinions and behaviour of its audiences. Its fundamental weakness lies in its oversimplified perspective of how mass media messages influence the recipients of these messages and especially in its failure to acknowledge the agency of audiences in reacting to mass media messages.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 426.

¹⁰¹ D. McQuail, *MacQuail's Mass Communication Theory*, p. 460.

¹⁰² Ibid.

The second is the limited media effects theoretical tradition, which is exemplified by the limited media effects and other related theories. This tradition adopts a counter-hegemonic perspective which assigns far less weight to the power of mass media propaganda to shape its audiences' opinions and behaviour. It emphasises the capacity of these audiences to shape and limit the effects that mass media messages have upon them. The fundamental strength of this theoretical tradition is that, unlike the first, it acknowledges both the power and limitations of the mass media and adopts what has been termed an "active audience" paradigm. The latter "gives more weight to the ability of the [audience] to select, screen, and judge media information."¹⁰³ It emphasises that the audience "is not a passive sponge soaking up media messages but an active, thinking... [audience] capable of ignoring or resisting media messages."¹⁰⁴

Though it provides a more convincing and nuanced explanation of how media audiences respond to mass media messages, the limited effects theoretical tradition has been subjected to criticism. Some scholars have criticised it for adopting what they believe are approaches that discount the possibility of powerful media effects by focusing too much on the structural and other factors that limit the effects of the mass media on audiences at the expense of those which help to bring out their powerful effects on audiences. It has also been criticised for failing to consider that what it concludes are limited or minimal media effects may cumulatively and over a long period of time have powerful effects on audiences.¹⁰⁵

In considering the strengths and limitations of these media effects theories, it is essential to take into account the following important considerations: The powerful effects versus limited effects theoretical dichotomy has been criticised by some scholars as not constituting an accurate representation of the historical development of media effects theory and as a major hindrance to more advances in theorising about media effects.¹⁰⁶ Some scholars have also emphasised that though "academics tend to present the range of approaches...[representative of these theoretical traditions] as mutually exclusive...there are considerable overlaps between the approaches."¹⁰⁷

It has also been recognised that a huge gulf continues to exist between scholarly empirically-based perceptions of the mass media as having limited effects and continuing popular perceptions of the media as having powerful effects. The persistent popular belief in powerful media effects may, as suggested by some scholars, be largely due to the long-

¹⁰³ D. Croteau and W. Hoynes, *Media/Society: Industries, Images, and Audiences*, Thousand Oaks, California, 1997, p. 208.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ D. McQuail, *MacQuail's Mass Communication Theory*, pp. 459-464.

¹⁰⁶ W. R. Neuman and L. Guggenheim, "The Evolution of Media Effects Theory: A Six-Stage Model of Cumulative Research", *Communication Theory*, 21, 2, May 2011, pp. 169-196.

¹⁰⁷ K. Williams, *Understanding Media Theory*, London, Arnold, 2003, p. 67.

standing public conviction that if mass media did not have powerful effects, then governments, advertisers and other organisations would not invest so much time and effort in formulating and disseminating mass media propaganda aimed at influencing to their own advantage public thinking and behaviour.¹⁰⁸ Some scholars have also emphasised the need to acknowledge that “media power can vary with times” and have suggested that that changes in the social, economic and political environment in which media audiences are situated may account for these “variations in belief in the power of mass communications.”¹⁰⁹ Perceptions of the media as having powerful effects have tended to be strongest during times of conflict and crises and to be much weaker during more stable periods.¹¹⁰

This study makes use of specific media effects theories drawn from both traditions. The hypothesis that mass media have very powerful effects is relevant to the study’s analysis of the mind of Federal government propagandists. It helps to explain their assumptions about the potential and actual effects of mass media propaganda and the reactions of Africans to this propaganda. The thesis shows that in consonance with the fundamental assumptions of the magic bullet theory, which include its direct stimulus-response model of media effects, the Federal government’s panic-driven pro-Federation propaganda was intended to have a powerful, direct and quick effect on African opinion and behaviour towards Federation. It was premised on Federal propagandists’ belief that propaganda had the power to convert Africans from being anti-Federation to being pro-Federation. The study also shows that the Federal government’s initial assumption that Africans were very impressionable and acquiescent recipients of the propaganda directed at them was consistent with the magic bullet’s main assumptions about how audiences reacted to mass media propaganda.

From the theoretical tradition that recognises both the power and limitations of mass media propaganda as well as the agency of its audiences, the study draws upon two theories that emerged during the era of the dominance of limited effects theory. These are the agenda-setting theory and reinforcement theory. Agenda-setting theory argues that mass media exert considerable influence on their audiences not by telling them what to think, but by telling them what to think about, thus, selecting, in accordance with the interests of the mass media controllers, the issues upon which public opinion is formed. It achieves this by focusing the audience’s attention towards those issues rather than others by according those greater media prominence and coverage than others.¹¹¹ As one media scholar has stated: “When the media make events seem important, politicians are likely to comment about them and to take action. This enhances the perceived importance of these events and

¹⁰⁸ D. McQuail, *MacQuail’s Mass Communication Theory*, p. 456.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 462.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 462-463.

¹¹¹ D. Croteau and W. Hoynes, *Media/Society*, pp. 208-210.

ensures even more public attention.”¹¹² The assumption that “people tend to include or exclude from their cognitions what the media include or exclude from their content” is therefore central to agenda-setting.¹¹³

Agenda-setting should not, however, be understood in a way that presumes that the one setting the agenda will always be successful. The effectiveness or power of agenda-setting is variable as it is limited by numerous factors. These include the existence of rival mass media controllers who attempt to set competing agendas and, perhaps, most significant of all, the ability of media audiences to resist the agenda-setting influence of the media. Numerous studies on agenda-setting have demonstrated that media audiences do not unquestioningly follow the media direction provided by the media through agenda-setting. The “past and present experiences, conversations with others, and independent reasoning” of audience members offer them “alternatives to media guidance.”¹¹⁴

The study shows how the Federal government engaged in agenda-setting as part of its effort to counter the pre-existing and dominant anti-Federation agenda of African nationalist propaganda. It illustrates how its pro-Federation propaganda for Africans sought to establish multi-racial partnership and the economic success of the Federation as the most important themes that Africans should focus on. It highlights how these two subjects upon which Federation claimed to be founded and which were used to legitimise its continued existence, were the dominant themes in Federal government propaganda for Africans. They were given greater prominence and coverage in this propaganda than other issues such as self-rule and secession which were the dominant themes in African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda.

They were also framed in ways that were intended to influence how Africans thought about them. The Federal government’s pro-Federation propaganda for Africans, the study shows, was dominated by the legitimising narrative of Federation as a success story in multi-racial partnership and economic progress, one which showed that Federation was destined to become permanently established. This legitimising narrative, the study demonstrates, was intended to counter the dominant and delegitimising narrative of African nationalist propaganda which depicted Federation as a failure whose collapse was inevitable.

Agenda-setting, the study shows, was also used by Federal government propagandists to try and focus African attention on Federal as opposed to Territorial issues. This was intended to foster among Africans a shared sense of identity with and loyalty to Federation that would transcend Territorial loyalties and identities. It was also intended to remedy what the

¹¹² D.A. Graber, *Mass Media and American Politics*, Washington D.C., CQ Press, 1993, p. 216.

¹¹³ E.F. Shaw, “Agenda-Setting and Mass Communication Theory”, *International Communication Gazette*, 25, 96, 1979, p. 96.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 216.

Federal government believed was the inadequate coverage that Federation and Federal issues received in Territorial information and propaganda for Africans. In particular, the Federal government believed that African ignorance of especially the constitutional division of government functions between the Federal and territorial governments often led them to blame the Federal government concerning issues which were in fact the sole constitutional responsibility of the Territorial governments. It, therefore, hoped that focusing African attention on what Federation stood for and how it worked would promote African appreciation of and support for Federation.

Reinforcement theory, which constitutes the central component of the limited effects paradigm, argues that mass media messages influence their audiences by reinforcing rather than radically changing pre-existing opinions, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour. It emphasises that the effects of mass media messages upon audiences are neither direct nor very powerful as they are filtered through the audience's pre-existing political, social cultural values and context which serve to limit the effects of these messages on the audience. These intervening factors play an important role in the formation of the audience members' opinions and attitudes and in shaping the selective nature of their responses to mass media messages.¹¹⁵

This study uses reinforcement theory to highlight the agency of Africans in responding to Federal government propaganda and to analyse the effectiveness of this propaganda in securing African support for Federation. It shows how African reactions to the Federal government's pro-Federation propaganda were strongly influenced by their pre-existing anti-Federation opinions, attitudes and behaviour as well as by the broader context of the achievement of independence from colonial rule by numerous African nationalist movements in other parts of Africa. These factors limited the effects of pro-Federation government propaganda upon Africans and help to explain their predominantly hostile reactions to Federal government propaganda in support of Federation.

In line with the central premise of reinforcement theory, the study argues that the Federal government's pro-Federation propaganda was not effective in mobilising African opinion in support of Federation because it did not reflect their pre-existing opinions, beliefs and experiences regarding Federation. It suggests that most Africans in the Federation were highly receptive to African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda not because it was necessarily better devised and delivered than pro-Federation government propaganda, but because it reinforced their pre-existing opinions and experiences of Federation and also reflected their political aspirations. This contrasted sharply with the Federal government's pro-Federation propaganda for Africans which sought to bring about a radical change in their pre-existing African opinions, attitudes and behaviour regarding Federation. Federal

¹¹⁵ D. McQuail, *MacQuail's Mass Communication Theory*, p. 459.

government efforts to radically alter African opinion and behaviour toward Federation seem only to have unwittingly hardened anti-Federation opinion and behaviour among Africans.

In its analysis of the reception of pro-Federation Federal government propaganda by Africans in the Federation, the study also makes use of the concept of communicator credibility put forward by Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson. These two scholars use the term “communicator credibility” to refer to the level of trustworthiness attached to the source of information or the communicator by the audience or recipients of that information.¹¹⁶

Pratkanis and Aronson argue that the integrity/ “good character” or lack thereof of a given communicator influences the degree of credibility attached to the information from that communicator by its recipients. They emphasise that “not all people are equally influenced by the same communicator...the same communicator may be regarded by some people as possessing high credibility and by others as possessing low credibility.”¹¹⁷ Audience perceptions of the trustworthiness of a given communicator can therefore make “a given communicator either remarkably effective or remarkably ineffective.”¹¹⁸ Messages from “the trustworthy communicator” receive more acceptance than those from a communicator regarded as “deceitful and untrustworthy”. The, race, class and professional background or expertise of a given communicator are among the attributes that influence audience perceptions of the credibility of that communicator.¹¹⁹

Communicator credibility, Pratkanis and Aronson argue, can be either “real” or “manufactured”. Aware of the vital role that communicator credibility plays in guiding audiences on whether to accept or reject the propaganda messages directed at them, propagandists can seek to manipulate these audiences into accepting their messages by attempting to feign or manufacture communicator credibility for themselves. This is done through, among other methods, pretending not to be a propagandist, paid for celebrity endorsements of their messages and the “manufacture of source credibility”.¹²⁰ In this context, Pratkanis and Aronson argue that “[communicator] credibility has become a commodity not only to be feigned but also to be bought and sold on the open market.”¹²¹ The two scholars, however, emphasise that “it is often easier to *feign* credibility than to

¹¹⁶ A.R. Pratkanis and E. Aronson, *Age of Propaganda*, p. 52.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-61.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

achieve it.”¹²² They also point out the main methods which can be used to “recognise when a communicator is merely feigning credibility as opposed to actually possessing it.”¹²³

Pratkanis and Aronson also discuss two major propaganda strategies that communicators already known by most people to be untrustworthy and deceitful use to try and improve audience perceptions of their credibility in order to be effective in their communication with their audiences.¹²⁴ First, these propagandists can pretend to argue and act against their own self-interest by deliberately conveying through their messages viewpoints which seem to go against their interests in an effort to come across as more trustworthy and less biased communicators to their audiences. This strategy is premised on the belief that audiences are likely to improve their perception of the credibility of communicators they already know to be untrustworthy and biased if they “are led to believe that [these] communicators have nothing to gain and perhaps even something to lose by convincing them” to embrace viewpoints which seem to go against the self-interests of these propagandists.¹²⁵

Second, these propagandists may seek to overcome audience perceptions of their low level of trustworthiness, by making a deliberate effort to appear not to be propagandists. This strategy is based on awareness of the fact that audiences tend to accord higher levels of credibility to messages from communicators who do not seem to be trying to use their messages to influence the beliefs and behaviour of these audiences.¹²⁶ As Pratkanis and Aronson state, “the apparent trustworthiness of a person can be *increased* and the apparent bias of their message *decreased* if the audience is absolutely certain the person is not trying to influence them.”¹²⁷

Using Pratkanis and Aronson’s concept of communicator credibility the study highlights how the negative perceptions of Africans in the Federation concerning the communicator credibility of the Federal government contributed significantly to their rejection of Federal government propaganda in support of Federation. In analysing African reactions to this pro-Federation propaganda the study draws attention to the propaganda tactics employed by both Federal government propagandists and African nationalist opponents of Federation to attack and undermine each other’s communicator credibility.

The study also examines some of the methods used by Federal government propagandists to try and enhance the Federal government’s communicator credibility among Africans in the Federation. These included the use of prominent African sports stars, singers, politicians and other African high achievers to deliver and endorse Federal government propaganda for

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid., pp. 53-54.

¹²⁴ Ibid., pp. 57-58.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 56.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 58.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

Africans on salient pro-Federation propaganda themes such as multi-racialism and African advancement. They also involved Federal government propagandists sometimes attributing pro-Federation propaganda originating from the Federal government to other sources which the Federal government believed would be considered by their target audiences as more trustworthy and less biased than the Federal government. Federal government propagandists also sought to enhance the credibility of Federal government propaganda in support of Federation by appealing to scholarly authority or expert opinion to support their factual and statistical claims about how Africans had benefited from Federation.

Methodology and Sources

The study is primarily based on a critical analysis of primary and secondary sources relating to Federal government propaganda and on oral interviews with relevant informants. It will utilise Jowett and O'Donnell's methodological framework for analysing propaganda, which, among other key things, emphasises the context in which propaganda is generated, the ideological and other purposes it serves and the responses of the target audience/s to the propaganda.¹²⁸

There are a number of methodological challengers which arise from aspects of the study. The first relates to the sources upon which this study is principally based. While these archival documents provide valuable insights into official regime thinking on information and propaganda policy and practice, they are dominated by official Federal government and Territorial government voices. African voices are largely absent from these sources and in the instances in which they emerge they are mostly mediated through the voices of the European officials of the Federal and Territorial governments.

This limitation is mitigated through a critical reading of these archival records and through the use of other types of primary sources such as contemporaneous newspapers which better reflect the voices and opinions of Africans who were opposed to the continued existence of the Federation.

Another important consideration relating to the sources upon which this study is based relates to oral interviews. Most of the people who were closely involved in Federal government information and propaganda activities are now dead. Of the very few that the researcher identified who are still alive, none could be interviewed. Some possibly because of the continued use in post-colonial Zimbabwean politics of labels such as "sell-outs" to delegitimise and stigmatise all those Africans alleged or believed to have co-operated with Zimbabwe's pre-independence white minority colonial governments were unwilling to

¹²⁸ G. S. Jowett and V. O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, pp. 153-170.

admit to and talk about their work for the Federal Information Services. Others proved to be unreachable physically and by telephone and e-mail. The study, therefore, made use of oral interviews with Federal government officials and others closely involved with the Federal Information Services which were conducted by the National Archives of Zimbabwe and are deposited in its oral history archive. The information contained in these interviews proved to be very relevant to this study as it addresses some of the issues that are the main focus of the study.

The second methodological challenge relates to the problems of measuring the effects of propaganda on target audiences. These problems, which have been highlighted by numerous scholars, include the problem of separating the effects of propaganda from those of other political, economic and social trends, the problem of lack of definitive source material or evidence with which to measure the precise effects of propaganda on target audiences as well as the methods used to measure these effects.¹²⁹ Some scholars have even argued that it is impossible and therefore not advisable to attempt to measure the actual effects of propaganda on audiences.

This study rejects this viewpoint on the grounds that the power of propaganda rests not so much on its actual effects on audiences, however precisely these can or cannot be measured, but rather on assumptions and perceptions about these effects. It is these assumptions and perceptions that lie at the heart of propaganda and which motivate people to formulate and disseminate propaganda. It is only by attempting to establish the assumed effects of propaganda on audiences that scholars can get to know the extent to which such propaganda was subjected to question. Any study of propaganda that precludes an assessment of its effects on audiences on methodological and other grounds therefore, overlooks, the main significance of propaganda studies.

Another important methodological consideration is what effects will be measured in this study. In his influential book on mass communication theory, Denis McQuail's draws an important distinction between *media effects* and *media effectiveness* which is relevant for this study. He defines media effects as "simply the consequences of what the mass media do, whether intended or not" and media effectiveness as "a statement about the *efficiency* of the media in achieving a given aim...or some planned communication goal."¹³⁰

This study does not focus on all the possible media effects that Federal government print and radio propaganda in support of Federation had on Africans in the Federation. It focuses only on the effect of this propaganda on African opinions of and attitudes to Federation

¹²⁹ P. M. Taylor, "Propaganda from Thucydides to Thatcher: Some Problems, Perspectives and Pitfalls", Opening Address to the Social History Society of Great Britain, 1992, <http://www.ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm>. (Accessed 7 August 2011).

¹³⁰ D. McQuail, *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory*, p. 465.

with the greater emphasis being laid on assessing the effectiveness of this propaganda in gaining African support for Federation.

It also acknowledges the existence of the methodological challenges entailed in measuring the reactions of Africans in the Federation to Federal government print and radio propaganda in support of Federation. These include how to retrospectively and reliably establish what these reactions were without the benefit of being able to directly observe and measure audience reactions to this propaganda at the time that it was transmitted to them. To overcome this limitation, this study does not focus on precisely measuring the effects of Federal government print and radio propaganda on African audiences in the Federation, but on using the available evidence of these reactions to make value judgements about the supposed impact of this pro-Federation propaganda on these Africans.

In making these value judgements about African reactions to Federal government propaganda and about the effectiveness of this propaganda in gaining African support for Federation, the study relies on a critical and qualitative analysis of the archival and other evidence relating to this issue. Archival documents relating to Federal government information and propaganda policy and practice contain many assessments by Federal information officials about the reactions of Africans to Federal government propaganda in support of Federation. The question that arises is how much credibility should be attached to these assessments in which the official Federal government voice is predominant?

There is one main reason why some of these assessments can be viewed as providing a fairly reliable record of not only the views of Federal government propagandists on African reactions to Federal government propaganda, but of the general nature of these reactions. Many of these assessments were largely internal confidential assessments often made in contexts in which Federal government propagandists and other officials were being actively encouraged by their government to give frank evaluations of the reactions of Africans to its pro-Federation propaganda in order to identify its shortcomings and improve its effectiveness. Highlighting the utility of this internal colonial state archive on radio broadcasting to Africans in the three territories that comprised the Federation, Mhoze Chikowero has stated that it “gives us a keen peek into the official, ‘confidential’ mind, wherein we can decipher the nervousness of colonial authorities and the messiness of the inflated egos of colonial ‘experts’ and their ‘expertise’.”¹³¹

This does not mean these officials assessments are to be accepted at face value. This study combines critical use of these official assessments with critical reliance on other types of primary sources which include contemporaneous African nationalist party newspapers as

¹³¹ M. Chikowero, “Is Propaganda Modernity?”, p. 132.

well as other privately owned newspapers which though owned by Europeans were specifically targeted at Africans within the Federation. The latter newspapers though owned by Europeans who were sympathetic to Federation, provided a platform for the expression by Africans of views which could be critical of Federation and of Federal government propaganda targeted at Africans. Privately owned newspapers primarily targeted at Europeans within the Federation and either sympathetic to or opposed to Federation also carried reports and opinion pieces which drew attention to the limitations of Federal government approaches to propagandising Africans in support of Federation. The study also uses the evidence from these written sources in conjunction with evidence from oral interviews conducted with Africans who had personal experience of Federal government propaganda in support of Federation.

Another important methodological consideration relating to the effects of propaganda on a target audience is how its success or failure in terms of achieving the results desired by the propagandist is to be measured. This criterion used by this study to judge the effectiveness of pro-Federation Federal government propaganda for Africans is whether it was successful in achieving its declared objective, namely to gain African support for Federation as a key element of a broader Federal government effort prevent the break-up of the Federation.

Chapter Synopsis

In terms of its structure, the thesis is divided into seven chapters of which the present chapter is the first.

Chapter two of the thesis provides the broader context for the study's analysis of Federal government print and radio propaganda for Africans by giving a survey of the emergence and development of the information and propaganda structures and policy of the Federal government from its establishment in 1953 to its dissolution in 1963. It identifies and analyses the two major phases through which Federal government information and propaganda policy progressed highlighting the principal characteristics of each phase.

The chapter argues that Federal government information and propaganda policy developed belatedly in response to two factors. First, the Federal government's late recognition of the strength of African opposition to the formation and continued existence of Federation and how this opposition could cause the break-up of the Federation. Second, the prolonged struggles between the Federal government and the Territorial governments over control of information and propaganda policy in relation to Africans. The chapter also argues that the Federal government's information panic emerged mainly during the second phase of the development of its information and propaganda policy and resulted in the emergence of panic driven propaganda as the most dominant form of pro-Federation Federal government

propaganda targeted at Africans in the Federation as well as external opponents of Federation.

The third chapter of the thesis examines the role of Africans in producing and disseminating Federal government propaganda in support of Federation. It argues that the belated appointment of Africans to higher level positions in the Federal government's information services was part of the Federal government's panicked effort to contain growing internal and external pressure for it to practically demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment to multi-racial partnership. It also represented a desperate effort by the Federal government and its information services to overcome the crisis of poor communication that they faced among Africans and other external opponents of Federation by giving its pro-Federation propaganda a more African face. The chapter also argues that this attempt by the Federal government to make its opponents more receptive to its pro-Federation propaganda was largely a failure as African salesmen of Federation were viewed as stooges by their fellow Africans in the Federation and by opponents of Federation abroad.

Chapter four of the thesis examines Federal-Territorial contestations over information and propaganda policy for Africans. It examines the form that these contestations assumed in each of the three Federal territories highlighting how they influenced the development of Federal government information and propaganda policy for Africans. The central argument advanced in the chapter is that these Federal-Territorial contestations were rooted in the problematic manner in which the Federal constitution divided information and propaganda functions between the Federal government and the Territorial governments. This constitutional division of information and propaganda functions severely limited the Federal government's ability to propagandise Africans in support of Federation as it made information and propaganda policy for Africans and virtually all issues relating to 'native policy' and its administration an exclusive Territorial responsibility.

The fifth chapter of the thesis examines the character and effects of pro-Federation Federal government print propaganda for Africans using *Fact*, a monthly newspaper for Africans as a case study. It discusses the policy considerations that led to the establishment of *Fact*, its propaganda content and techniques as well as the reactions of Africans to the pro-Federation propaganda carried in *Fact*. The chapter argues that the establishment of *Fact* newspaper was the result of an information panic rooted in the Federal government's belated realisation of the true scale of African opposition to Federation and its potential to cause the break-up of the Federation. It also argues that in terms of the character of its propaganda and the propaganda techniques that it employed, *Fact* typified the panic driven pro-Federation propaganda that dominated the last phase in the development of the Federal government's information and propaganda policy. The chapter also argues that *Fact* attracted predominantly hostile responses from Africans in the Federation and was not successful in gaining African support for Federation.

Chapter six of the thesis focuses on the role played by radio propaganda put out by the African Service of the Federal Broadcasting Corporation (FBC) in mobilising African support for Federation. It locates the establishment of the FBC as well as the nature of its pro-Federation propaganda for Africans within the context of Federal-territorial contestations over information and propaganda policy for Africans as well as the Federal government's information panic over the future of the Federation. The chapter argues that the establishment of the FBC as an 'independent' broadcasting corporation many years after the formation of the Federation was mainly the result of prolonged Federal-Territorial struggles over control of broadcasting to Africans.

It also argues that in terms of its broadcast use policy, the Federal government originally wanted and fought for broadcasting to Africans in the Federation to be put under direct Federal government control so that it could be used in conjunction with Federal government print and film propaganda to more effectively mobilise Africans in support of Federation. The study shows that despite the FBC being ultimately established as an 'independent' broadcasting corporation, it was not independent of Federal government influence control and served the propaganda interests of the Federal government. Also highlighted in the chapter are the ways in which Federal broadcast use policy reflected its information panic over continued African opposition to Federation and its potential to bring about the collapse of the Federation.

The seventh chapter of the thesis analyses the reactions of Africans in the Federation to FBC African Service radio broadcasts. It argues that these broadcasts failed to convince Africans to support Federation and that this failure was largely a product of negative African perceptions of the FBC's communicator credibility. The chapter shows that despite the efforts of both the FBC and the Federal government to project the FBC as an independent and impartial broadcaster that was free of Federal government control and influence, it was perceived by the majority of Africans as a Federal government propaganda mouthpiece whose main purpose was to legitimise Federation and the policies of the Federal government. It also highlights the agency of Africans in their engagement with the FBC showing how they were able to compel the FBC to rethink some aspects of its policy in relation to African broadcasting.

Chapter eight constitutes the conclusion to the thesis.

CHAPTER 2:

The Emergence and Development of Federal Information and Propaganda Structures and Policy, 1953-1963

Introduction

This chapter provides the historical context in which the case studies of Federal government propaganda presented in this study are situated by giving an analytical survey of the emergence and development of the information and propaganda structures and policy of the Federal government from its inception in 1953 to its dissolution in 1963. Furthermore, the chapter identifies and examines the two major phases through which Federal government information and propaganda policy and practice especially as it related to print propaganda targeted at Africans within the Federation, progressed during this period.

The first phase in the evolution of Federal government propaganda policy covered the years 1953-1958 and the second and final phase covered the years 1959 to 1963. The chapter highlights the principal characteristics of each of these phases emphasising that there was no clean and decisive break between them as many elements of Federal government information and propaganda policy and practice which developed in the first phase were carried over with some modifications into the second phase.

Two fundamental arguments concerning the emergence and development of Federal government information and propaganda policy are put forward in the chapter.

First, it will be argued that Federal government information and propaganda policy developed belatedly in response to two salient factors. The first factor was the growing opposition to both the inception of and the continued existence of the Federation by the majority of Africans in the Federation and the Federal government's slowness in realising the true scale of this opposition and the need to urgently counter it through, among other measures, far-reaching internal and external pro-Federation propaganda campaigns. The second factor was the contestations between the Federal and Territorial governments over control of information and propaganda policy in the Federation. These contestations influenced the pace at which Federal government information and propaganda structures were established, the character of the structures and the form, content and even reception of the pro-Federation propaganda generated by these structures.

Second, it will be argued that the panic-driven propaganda that emerged during the last of the two phases referred to above was largely a product of the Federal government's belated recognition of the serious threat that African nationalism posed to the continued existence

of the Federation. This panic driven propaganda came to dominate the bulk of the Federal government's internal and external propaganda in support of Federation.

The chapter is divided into two major sections each of which examine respectively the first and second phases in the emergence and development of the Federal government's information and propaganda apparatus and policy.

Advertising the New Federal State: Federal Information and Propaganda Policy in the First Phase, 1953-1958

The swift establishment of information and propaganda services under the centralised control of the Federal government was one of the goals that the Federal government prioritised and devoted its attention to soon after its establishment in 1953. This had to be achieved within the framework of the Federal constitution which divided government functions and powers between the Federal and three Territorial governments through two types of legislative lists, namely the Exclusive list and the Concurrent list. The former listed those government functions which were to be the exclusive responsibility of either the Federal government or Territorial governments whilst the latter listed those government functions which were to be shared between the Federal and Territorial governments.¹

The Federal constitution was a compromise constitution which sought to balance the Federal government's desire for strong centralised powers and institutions with the Territorial governments' wish to retain a considerable measure of influence over their own affairs, especially those relating to Africans who were the majority of the population in all Federal territories. As part of this compromise one of the key principles which informed the overall division of government functions between the Federal and Territorial governments under the Federal constitution was the need to ensure that "broad economic matters were in the control of the Federal government while the territorial governments continued to exercise powers over matters which affected the day-to-day life of the African."² This principle, which made virtually all issues relating to "native" policy and administration of native affairs, a territorial preserve, was evident in the division of information functions between the Federal and Territorial governments under the Federal constitution.

In terms of this constitution, "Federal Public Relations" that is information on Federal issues for the entire Federation was specifically assigned as a Federal responsibility through the Exclusive legislative list. However, under the same constitution, information for Africans on Territorial issues was a Territorial responsibility and specific aspects of the information

¹ *Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Survey of Developments since 1953*, London, 1960, p. 217.

² R. Welensky, "Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland" in F.S. Joelson (ed), *Rhodesia and East Africa*, London, East Africa and Rhodesia, 1958, p. 12.

services such as broadcasting was designated as a Concurrent subject and was, therefore, a shared responsibility between the Federal and Territorial governments. The allocation of “Public Relations” at Federal level as a Federal responsibility, therefore, did not prohibit the Territorial governments from maintaining their own information services to meet their own territorial needs.³

This constitutional division of information functions between the Federal and Territorial governments had a number of important consequences for the development of Federal information and propaganda policy.

The constitutional stipulation that information for Africans on Territorial affairs was an exclusive Territorial responsibility deprived the Federal government of a potentially powerful propaganda platform by denying it direct access to Africans. The lack of direct contact with Africans made it difficult for the Federal government to effectively propagandise them in support of Federation by making many Federal government propaganda activities targeted at Africans in these territories heavily dependent on the cooperation of the Territorial governments. The latter often severely limited or totally withheld this cooperation because of continuous Federal-Territorial rivalries over control of information and propaganda policy for Africans. These contestations, which will be examined in detail in the next chapter of this thesis, were mainly encouraged by the constitutional division of information functions between the Federal and territorial governments and the way it was interpreted by these governments.

Apart from preventing it from having direct contact with Africans, the Federal constitution’s allocation of predominantly economic functions to the Federal government was believed by this government to be an additional significant hindrance to its efforts to gain African support for Federation.⁴ The Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, argued that the Federal government was unable to put forward any creative policy which would make a positive impression on Africans in the Federation. This was because the government functions assigned to it under the Federal constitution lacked any strong appeal to these Africans as they were primarily economic, with long-term impacts and benefits which were not instantly noticeable to Africans. Explaining the failure of Africans to recognise the economic benefits of Federation and to credit the economic policies of the Federal government for these benefits, Sir Roy stated that:

This is due to the situation whereby the Federal government is divorced from contact with the Africans. If constituents are out of touch with their government, the

³ *Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Survey of Developments Since 1953*, p. 217.

⁴ R. Welensky, “Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland”, p. 13.

natural tendency is to believe that their government is doing nothing for them or is working contrary to their interests.⁵

The Federal Information Department was also critical of how what it described as the “clumsiness of the Federal constitution” hindered it from effectively countering the influence of African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda among Africans in the Federation. In an internal report on its propaganda activities written in 1959 the Federal Information Department noted that: “The basic disadvantage is that African Affairs are Territorial and the Federal government is therefore precluded from getting to grips with its main opponents except from long range.”⁶ The report also stressed that since many of the factors such as land issues which could influence Africans in favour of the Federation were under the control of the Territorial governments the main challenge facing the Federal Information Department was how to formulate and implement various methods which it could use to get at the African from long range.⁷

In addition, the Federal government and its information services were unhappy that the complex constitutional division of government functions between the Federal and Territorial governments created confusion in the minds of the majority of Africans about whether it was the Federal government or Territorial governments that had responsibility for certain government functions. The Federal Information Department was unhappy that African public opinion often blamed the Federal government for perceived and actual government failures over issues that were in terms of the Federal constitution not the responsibility of the Federal government. A Federal government propaganda pamphlet published in 1960 stated:

It is quite clear that much of the criticism directed at the Federal government since 1953 has sprung from ignorance of that government’s responsibilities, as distinct from those reserved to the three Territorial governments or, in a relatively small number of cases, shared with those governments.⁸

The Federal government also believed that the negative effects arising from the complicated division of government functions between the Federal and Territorial governments were exacerbated by another major defect related to the nature of the Federal political system. Southern Rhodesia as a self-governing British colony had a political system and native policy which was different from that of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland which were Protectorates administered by the British Colonial Office. The lack of uniformity in the

⁵ Ibid., p. 18.

⁶ National Archives of Zimbabwe (hereafter NAZ), *F121/H3/10, Vol.1*, “Steps Taken by the Federal Information Department to Put Over Federation and to Allay Fears”, [nd] but probably from 1959 or 1960.

⁷ NAZ, *F121/H3/10, Vol.1*, “Steps Taken by the Federal Information Department to Put Over Federation.”

⁸ *Further Facts on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Salisbury, Federal Information Department, March 1960, p. 2.

political systems and native policies of Southern Rhodesia on the one hand and the two northern territories meant the Federation had a dual political system. The native policy of the two northern territories was different from that of Southern Rhodesia. As a result of this duality, Africans in the Federation tended “to regard the Federal government on the one hand and the colonial governments and H.M. government in the United Kingdom on the other as rival governments with opposed policies.”⁹

The sense of grievance and dissatisfaction engendered among Federal government information officials by the problematic constitutional division of government functions, including information functions, was considerable. Sir Albert Robinson, the Federal High Commissioner in London from 1961 to 1963, was unhappy that though it was the Federal government which had “ultimate responsibility for harmonious race relations” in the Federation, the Federal constitution denied this government any “real say in the formulation of native policies” in the Federal territories.¹⁰ The unhappiness of the Federal government over this matter was also regularly reflected in Federal government print propaganda publications for Africans in the Federation and for audiences outside the Federation. In these publications, the Federal government drew the attention of its readers to the fundamental unfairness of the Federal constitutional provisions excluding the Federal government from involvement in native affairs.¹¹

Mainly as a result of the constitutional considerations discussed above, the first phase in the emergence and development of the Federal government’s information and propaganda apparatus was largely dominated by two issues. First, the prolonged discussions between the Federal and Territorial governments about the extent to which the information and propaganda functions exercised by the Territorial governments prior to Federation were to be federalised in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Federal constitution. Second, the transfer of some of the Territorial information and propaganda functions and infrastructure to Federal government control. This was part of the process of reorganising the information services in the Federal territories in order to establish and develop a Federal level government information and propaganda machinery and policy.

The importance that the Federal government attached to the need to create a Federal information and propaganda machinery was shown by its creation of a Federal Information office in August 1953, almost two months before the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was legally inaugurated. This Federal Information office was effectively the first Federal government department to be set up and its early formation was intended “to ensure that a full and authoritative flow of information concerning the creation of the new Federal state

⁹ R. Welensky, “Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland”, p. 13.

¹⁰ NAZ, *Oral/262*, Sir Albert Edward Phineas Robinson, written responses to questions, 14 May 1987, p. 9.

¹¹ *Further Facts on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, p. 3; “Get this Straight”, *Fact*, Vol. 1, No. 2, May 1960, p. 2.

should be given to the world.”¹² The core of this Information office created in 1953 evolved into the Federal Information Department which was established on 1 July 1954.¹³ This Department, which fell under the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs and which subsequently, emerged as the main information and propaganda arm of the Federal government within and outside the Federation comprised three major sections. These were:

First, the Headquarters which included a press and photographic division and had overall responsibility for the internal and external publicity activities carried out by the Department in support of Federation and the Federal government. It was tasked with ensuring that the Federal government’s foreign missions, which were the principal structures used by the Federal Information Department to publicise and defend the Federation abroad were regularly given the information and publicity material they needed to perform these functions. This information and publicity material included pro-Federation publications, films and photographs. Some of these foreign missions, for instance, those of the High Commissioner for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in London and in Pretoria had an information attaché who was given the specific responsibility of overseeing the performance of their information and propaganda functions.¹⁴

Second, the film section which comprised the Central African Film Unit which had been established by the Central African Council in 1948 and was taken over by the Federal Information Services in October 1953. Among the key functions of the film section was the production of pro-Federation films including a newsreel film for African audiences in the Federation. The film section also produced pro-Federation films for European audiences in the Federation and for use in the Federal government’s external propaganda campaigns.¹⁵

Third, the European broadcasting section which was named the Federal Broadcasting Service (FBS) after it was federalised and transferred from the control of the Southern Rhodesia to the Federal information Department on 1 July 1954.¹⁶ As will be discussed in greater detail in chapter six of this thesis, the federalisation of African Broadcasting only took place in 1958 after a prolonged struggle between the Federal and Territorial governments over control of African Broadcasting in the Federation. This federalisation resulted in both European and African broadcasting being brought under the control of a statutory ‘independent’ corporation known as the Federal Broadcasting Corporation (FBC)

¹² NAZ, *FG3/PUB 3*, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Report of the Director of Information for the Year Ending 31st December, 1954, p.1.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁴ NAZ, *FG3/PUB 3*, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Report of the Director of Information for the Year Ending 31st December, 1954, p.1

¹⁵ J. M. Burns, *Flickering Shadows: Cinema and Identity in Colonial Zimbabwe*, Athens, Ohio University Press, pp. 75-105, 106-150.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.11.

which did not fall under the control of the Federal Information Department and was not subject to direct control by the Federal government.¹⁷

The Federal Information Department was throughout its existence headed by William Vernon Brelsford. At the end of 1954 it had an Information Officer stationed in each of the three Federal territories as well as an Information Attaché at the Offices of the High Commissioner for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in London and Pretoria.¹⁸

Federal-Territorial negotiations over the “the extent and the date from which Information Services might become a Federal responsibility” seriously got underway in early 1954.¹⁹ In these negotiations, the Federal government sought to secure the concurrence of the Territorial governments for the creation of a unified information and propaganda machinery which would be under the single and centralised control of the Federal government. In support of this goal, the Federal government put forward arguments which it would reiterate throughout the course of all Federal-Territorial negotiations on the federalisation of the information services.²⁰

It emphasised to the Territorial governments the benefits which it believed would arise from bringing all the different government information and propaganda media (namely print, film and broadcasting) under the centralised control of the Federal government.²¹ These advantages included the ability to pursue a single and consistent information and propaganda policy which would simultaneously use print, film and broadcasting media to complement each other with “a strong combined effect” and with no conflict of opinion in the messages put out through these different media. Centralised media control, the Federal government argued, was vital to the public relations and security requirements of the Federation and would also make possible the rapid and effective deployment of the media during emergency situations in the Federation. It would also be cost-effective as the centralised control of information technical services such as photography would make it possible to provide such services to other Federal and Territorial government departments at a lower cost.²²

¹⁷ See Chapter 4 of this thesis.

¹⁸ NAZ, FG3/PUB 3, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Report of the Director of Information for the Year Ending 31st December, 1954, Appendix 1.

¹⁹ Cory Library, Rhodes University, (hereafter, Cory), *Smith Papers, Box 003, S.R.C. (54)93*, Memorandum on “Federal Information Services” from Federal Prime Minister’s Office dated 31 March, 1954 and circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 22 April 1954.

²⁰ Cory, *Smith Papers, Box 003, S.R.C. (54)93*, Memorandum on “Federal Information Services”, 31 March, 1954.

²¹ Cory, *Smith Papers, Box 003, S.R.C. (54)93*, Memorandum on “Federal Information Services”, 31 March, 1954.

²² Cory, *Smith Papers, Box 003, S.R.C. (54)93*, Memorandum on “Federal Information Services”, 31 March, 1954.

During these negotiations, the Federal government was careful to state that it understood and recognised the constitutional right of the Territorial governments to maintain their own African Information Services for the purposes of disseminating to their African populations information on Territorial issues. It, however, maintained that:

The principle must be accepted that the Federal government has an absolute right to put out information on all Federal subjects, whether to Africans or Europeans, but in doing so it is clearly desirable that the Territorial African Services should be used.²³

The Federal government also stressed that in order to advance the cause of public relations in the Federation as a whole it was necessary that in the dissemination of information, there be a high level of co-ordination between Federal and Territorial Information Services. To this end, and also to facilitate the federalisation of all information other than information for Africans on Territorial subjects, the Federal made two proposals. First, it proposed that the responsibilities of the Press Section of the Federal Information Department be expanded to cover all Territorial information except information to Africans on Territorial issues. The Federal government also recommended that a Federal Press officer be based in each of the Territorial capitals to facilitate Federal-Territorial coordination in the dissemination of information.²⁴

The response of the Territorial governments, especially Southern Rhodesia, to the Federal government's proposals was to resist any push by the Federal government for a high degree of federalisation of Territorial information functions, policies and services. Of the three constituent territories of the Federation, Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia had established their own Information Departments before the creation of the Federation in 1953. Nyasaland only established an Information Department in 1957, long after the creation of the Federation.²⁵

It's important to note that apart from a small information branch in the Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department which was used to put out information and propaganda to Africans in that territory, Southern Rhodesia like the two other Federal territories did not have a highly developed information department. In September 1955, Southern Rhodesia had established a Public Relations Office and appointed a Public Relations Officer. Its stated purpose was primarily to advise government ministers and departments on public relations matters and not to disseminate information and propaganda. There is, however, evidence that the Southern Rhodesia government would have wanted to develop this office into an extensive information department but was prevented from doing so by financial constraints.

²³ Cory, *Smith Papers, Box 003, S.R.C. (54)93*, Memorandum on "Federal Information Services", 31 March, 1954.

²⁴ Cory, *Smith Papers, Box 003, S.R.C. (54)93*, Memorandum on "Federal Information Services", 31 March, 1954.

²⁵ *Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Survey of Developments since 1953*, p. 217.

In September 1958, the activities of this Public Relations Office were discontinued because the Southern Rhodesia government did not have funds to renew the contract of the Public Relations Officer.²⁶

Despite the clear limitations of its own information services, the Southern Rhodesia government was unwilling to have its internal and external Territorial information needs subsumed within those of the Federal government. It was anxious to avoid any extensive surrender to the Federal government of its information functions. Throughout the Federal period, Southern Rhodesia continued with efforts to develop its own information services and information policy. This was deliberately intended to demonstrate to the Federal government that Federal-Territorial co-operation on information issues did not mean “that the Southern Rhodesia government would be precluded from pursuing publicity and other information services as it thought best.”²⁷ Efforts by Southern Rhodesia government to establish its own Ministry of Information were in 1961 criticised by the Federal government as “a retrograde step” that did not take into account that “what is required for efficiency, effectiveness and continuity is a single policy directing unit and this should clearly be the responsibility of the Federal government.”²⁸

The Territorial governments’ resistance to a high level of federalisation of their information structures and functions limited the pace and scope of the federalisation of these structures and functions. Only some of the Territorial information and propaganda functions and infrastructure were transferred to Federal government control as part of the process of establishing a Federal government information and propaganda machinery and policy. In July 1954, the Federal Information Department took over the photographic units of Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and part of the photographic unit of Northern Rhodesia. It also took over the Northern Rhodesia press section and the Southern Rhodesia film unit.²⁹

There were, however some instances where the Territorial governments readily agreed to the federalisation of some aspects of their information services and functions. This only happened in cases where these governments believed they stood to benefit financially by passing on the cost of maintaining certain Territorial information structures and functions to the Federal government on terms which did not compromise their ability to determine their own Territorial information policy and practice. It is these considerations that explain why Southern Rhodesia did not oppose the federalisation of film production and willingly agreed

²⁶ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 007, S.R.C. (58)67, Cabinet Note on “Public Relations Office” by G.B. Clarke, Secretary to the Southern Rhodesia Cabinet, 26th March, 1958.

²⁷ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 004, S.R.C. (55), Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting of the Southern Rhodesia Government held on Tuesday 18 October, 1955 at 10 a.m. in the Prime Minister’s Office, p. 4.

²⁸ NAZ, F121/H3/50, Note on “The Iswana Proposals” from J. Foot, Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to A.C. Izod, Director, Technical and Planning Services, Federal Public Relations Division, [n.d. but probably from June/July 1961].

²⁹ NAZ, Federal Inventory Vol.1, “Federal Information Department”

to the takeover of its film unit by the Federal Information Department. The Central African Film Unit, which had been controlled by the Central African Council, had been federalised in October 1953.³⁰

Though Southern Rhodesia agreed to hand over its control of European broadcasting to the Federal government in July 1954, the federalisation of African broadcasting took many years as it was strenuously resisted by Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia. Ultimately, broadcasting was federalised through the establishment in 1958 of an 'independent' broadcasting corporation, the Federal Broadcasting Corporation, which was not under the direct control of the Federal government. This represented a triumph for Southern and Northern Rhodesia, which had strongly opposed placing African broadcasting under the direct control of the Federal government.³¹

The timeframe (1953-1958) covered by the first phase in the development of Federal information and propaganda policy has been characterised by most historians as one of relative political stability and economic prosperity for the Federation. One of the prominent historians of the Federation has referred to the years 1953-1958 in the Federation as the "halcyon years" differentiating them from the "crisis years" of 1959-1963 which resulted in the break-up and dissolution of the Federation.³² This positive outlook on the first five years of Federation, though arguably not shared by the majority of Africans in the Federation, was reflected in the character of the pro-Federation propaganda put out by the Federal government at this time.

This propaganda was informed by the Federal government's belief that the Federation had a very bright future as it was economically strong and politically stable. The propaganda mainly focused on introducing the Federation to internal and external audiences by explaining the workings of its complex political and administrative system and highlighting to potential investors, immigrants and tourists the favourable economic and political conditions in the Federation. Numerous propaganda pamphlets produced by the Federal Information Department between 1954 and 1957 exemplify this type of propaganda. These included, *The New Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*,³³ *Opportunity in Rhodesia and*

³⁰ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 003, S.R.C. (54) 107, G. R. Ross, Chairman, Territorial Committee on Federal Planning, "Assumption by the Federal Government of Responsibility for Film Production", 5th May, 1954.

³¹ Cory, *Smith Papers* Box 005, S.R.C. (56)183, "Memorandum on African Broadcasting" circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 31st October, 1956.

³² J.R.T. Wood, *The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Durban, Graham Publishing, 1983.

³³ *The New Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Salisbury, Federal Information Services, 1954.

Nyasaland,³⁴ *A New Life in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*³⁵ and *Rhodesia and Nyasaland: A Travel Guide in Pictures*.³⁶

Immigration promotion propaganda aimed at attracting European immigrants to the Federation figured prominently in the propaganda put out by the Federal government during the first phase of the development of its propaganda policy. The Federal government produced numerous revised editions of its main immigration promotion booklet, *A New Life in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Facts and Figures for the Immigrant*.³⁷ African opposition to white immigration into the Federation ensured that it was an issue that the Federal government also had to address in its pro-Federation propaganda targeted at Africans in the Federation.

This early and subsequent Federal government immigration propaganda must be viewed within the context of the role played by demographic factors in the establishment and maintenance of a white ruled Federation. The preceding chapter has already noted that whites were vastly outnumbered by blacks in all the Federal territories. It has also highlighted that the increasing vulnerability and fear which the white settlers felt as a result of their numerical inferiority had been one of the central aspects of the white settler panic which had resulted in the creation of the Federation. Federation represented an attempt by these minority white settler populations to ensure the continued viability of white rule in Central Africa by creating a consolidated and enlarged white community. These white settlers strongly believed a numerically bigger white community would have a greater capacity to defend their political and economic interests against the rising tide of African nationalism.³⁸

Encouraging white immigration into their territories was the principal method which Rhodesian white settler minority governments before during and after the Federal era used to try to quickly and substantially increase the number of whites in these colonial territories. Studies by Alois Mlambo³⁹ and Josiah Brownell⁴⁰ have provided valuable insights into the immigration policies of the white settler governments of Southern Rhodesia, which had the

³⁴ *Opportunity in Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Salisbury, Federal Information Department, 1955.

³⁵ *A New Life in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Salisbury, Federal Information Department, 1955.

³⁶ *Rhodesia and Nyasaland: A Travel Guide in Pictures*, Salisbury, Federal Information Department, 1957.

³⁷ *A New Life in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Facts and Figures for the Immigrant*, Revised Edition, Salisbury, Ministry of Home Affairs, Press and Publications Department, 1961.

³⁸ See Chapter 1 of this thesis.

³⁹ A.S. Mlambo, *White Immigration into Rhodesia: From Occupation to Federation*, Harare, University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2002; A. S. Mlambo, " 'Some are More White than Others': Racial Chauvinism as a Factor in Rhodesian Immigration Policy, 1890 to 1963", *Zambezia*, 27, 2, 2000, pp. 139-160; A.S. Mlambo, "Building a White Man's country: Aspects of White Immigration into Rhodesia up to World War II", *Zambezia*, 25, 2, 1998, pp. 123-146.

⁴⁰ J. Brownell, *The Collapse of Rhodesia: Population Demographics and the Politics of Race*, London, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2011.

largest white population and was economically and politically the most dominant member of the Federation.

Mlambo has examined the major patterns and nature of white immigration into Southern Rhodesia from the inception of colonial rule in 1890 up to the end of the Federal era in 1963. He has highlighted how the white minority governments which governed Southern Rhodesia during this period all sought to develop Southern Rhodesia as “a white man’s country” by attracting white immigrants into the colony.⁴¹ Mlambo has also demonstrated that the maintenance of “a discriminatory political and economic system which ensured that whites enjoyed all the best that the country could offer” was an essential part of the numerous incentives which these administrations offered to Europeans to encourage them to immigrate to Southern Rhodesia.⁴² Largely as result of immigration rather than natural increase, the white population in Southern Rhodesia increased from 68, 954 in 1941 to 218, 000 in 1960.⁴³

Mlambo, however, argues that the number of whites who immigrated to Southern Rhodesia was never substantial enough to enable white Southern Rhodesians to realise their goal of making Southern Rhodesia “a white man’s country.” Frequent fluctuations in the flows of white immigrants into Southern due to a combination of local and global factors which either hindered or aided immigration meant that whites remained a minority in Southern Rhodesia before, during and after the Federal era.⁴⁴ These circumstances included the following: the highly selective nature of Southern Rhodesian immigration policy which was reflected in “the British settler community’s reluctance to admit whites of non-British stock” into Southern Rhodesia;⁴⁵ the high turnover rate among white immigrants to Southern Rhodesia and periods of economic decline and political instability in Southern Rhodesia and the Federation which discouraged white immigration into these territories.⁴⁶

Josiah Brownell has focused on the role played by population demographics in the collapse of white minority rule in Southern Rhodesia in the post-Federal period. Brownell’s study has demonstrated that white immigration and emigration patterns were a fundamental component of what he characterises as “a hidden war of numbers” between the minority white settler colonial state and Africans in Southern Rhodesia.⁴⁷ Also highlighted in Brownell’s study is how “racial population issues” were a regular subject of both African nationalist propaganda and white settler colonial propaganda during the 1960s and 1970s. Public debates on racial demographics in Southern Rhodesia also influenced public

⁴¹ A. S. Mlambo, “Building a White Man’s Country”, p. 123.

⁴² Ibid., p. 123.

⁴³ A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 64.

⁴⁴ A.S. Mlambo, “Building a White Man’s Country”, p. 146.

⁴⁵ A. S. Mlambo, “White Chauvinism”, p. 139.

⁴⁶ A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*, pp. 79-82.

⁴⁷ J. Brownell, *The Collapse of Rhodesia*, pp. 1-7.

perceptions of the domestic and international legitimacy of white minority rule in Southern Rhodesia. Brownell shows how African nationalist parties in Southern Rhodesia put out print and verbal propaganda which expressed their opposition to the colonial state's promotion of white immigration into Southern Rhodesia. African nationalist propaganda also frequently cited the huge disparity between white and African population figures "as evidence of African strength and white weakness" and political illegitimacy.⁴⁸

Similar dynamics and considerations influenced the Federal government's initial and later propaganda in support of white immigration into the Federation. How Federal government propaganda sought to defend white immigration into the Federation in the face of growing African opposition to such immigration is discussed in the fifth chapter of this thesis.

Another important feature of Federal government propaganda policy during this second phase was that no strong and comprehensive effort was made by the Federal government to mobilise African opinion in the Federation in support of Federation. The "halcyon years" of Federation were characterised by the Federal government's failure to appreciate the true scale and strength of African opposition to the continued existence of the Federation. As a result this government failed to develop from the very beginning a comprehensive, systematic, long-term policy to propagandise Africans in support of Federation. It has been suggested that one of the reasons for the Federal government's neglect of African opinion at this time was its belief that the economic success of the Federation would in of itself win the allegiance of most Africans to Federation.⁴⁹

One of the indications of the Federal government's initial neglect of African opinion was the fact that the Federal Information Department only started producing print information and propaganda material specifically intended for African audiences in 1958. It would greatly intensify its production of this material from 1959 onwards as its awareness of the scale of African opposition to Federation continued to grow. One of the early print propaganda booklets produced by the Federal Information Department specifically for African audiences was *Our Country: The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* which was first published in 1958. Written in simple English and intended for mass distribution to literate Africans, the booklet provided basic facts about the economic conditions and political and administrative system of the Federation. A revised edition of the booklet was published in both English and Chinyanja in 1959. The Federal Information Department claimed that the booklet was very

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 143, 141-146.

⁴⁹ R. Blake, "Foreword" to J.R.T. Wood, *The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Durban, Graham, Publishing, 1983, p. 29.

popular with African readers in the Federation and that by the end of 1959 the Federal government claimed that 300,000 copies of it had been distributed among these readers.⁵⁰

Some of the propaganda approaches and methods that were to later become a key feature of Federal government propaganda policy and practice began to take root during this phase. Among the most notable of these was the 'factual' propaganda approach which came to occupy centre stage in Federal government propaganda in support of Federation. It would be extensively developed during the second phase of the development of the Federal government's information and propaganda policy. The factual approach to propaganda predated the establishment of the Federation. Its specific roots and place in the pre-Federal information and propaganda culture of what later became the Federal territories is examined in a forthcoming study by E. Msindo, a Zimbabwean historian.⁵¹

It can, however, be said that the factual propaganda model used in Federal government propaganda in support of Federation appears to have had its roots in Britain's Second World War propaganda campaign against Nazi Germany. This wartime propaganda, which Britain also used to mobilise the inhabitants of Britain's African colonies to support its war effort, sought to legitimise Allied propaganda whilst simultaneously delegitimising that of Nazi Germany. It did so by deliberately projecting German propaganda as morally unacceptable as it was based on falsehoods whilst simultaneously portraying Allied propaganda as morally acceptable as it was not based on falsehoods, but on 'facts'.

Federal propagandists adopted a similar rationalisation in their use of the factual propaganda model. They characterised the anti-Federation propaganda put out by African nationalist movements in the Federation as "sensational... often based on emotion rather than realism, and with scant regard for facts...about alleged conditions in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland."⁵² Federal government propaganda in support of Federation was in contrast characterised by Federal government propagandists as more credible because it was based on 'facts' and reason.⁵³ A key element of the factual propaganda approach as applied in Federal government propaganda in support of Federation was the selective use of 'facts' to portray Federation and the policies of the Federal government favourably and to answer the critics and opponents of Federation.

The eminence of the factual approach in Federal government propaganda was also reflected in the prominence given to the words "Fact" and "Facts" in Federal government propaganda

⁵⁰ NAZ, *FG3/PUB 3*, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Report of the Director of Information for the Year Ending 31st December, 1959, pp. 3, 6.

⁵¹ E. Msindo, forthcoming book provisionally titled, "The State, Information Policy and Media in Zimbabwe, 1890-2015."

⁵² *Further Facts on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Salisbury, Federal Information Department, March, 1960, p. 6.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

campaigns and publications. These words became synonymous with the Federal Information Services' overall pro-Federation propaganda campaigns conducted through all the major mass communication media. The Federal government's mobile cinema vans which travelled in many areas of the Federation showing Pro-Federation propaganda films and newsreels to Africans were called "Fact Vans". "Fact Offices" which served as "combined exhibition and propaganda centres" for displaying and distributing pro-Federation propaganda were opened by the Federal government in the cities of Salisbury and Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia.⁵⁴ Numerous widely circulated Federal government pamphlets in support of Federation contained the words "Fact" or "Facts" on their cover titles.⁵⁵ The first and only monthly newspaper for Africans established by the Federal government in 1960 was called *Fact*.⁵⁶

The emphasis on a factual approach in Federal government propaganda was also reflected in the question and answer format adopted in many of its print propaganda publications. In these publications a selection of questions about economic and political conditions in the Federation was presented and answered by putting forward 'facts' which sought to refute the 'falsehoods' about such conditions contained in anti-Federation propaganda, especially from African nationalist movements in the Federation.⁵⁷

In its early form during the "halcyon" years of Federation, factual propaganda, as used in Federal government print propaganda in support of Federation focused on presenting 'facts' about the history, geography, political and administrative organisation and economic conditions of the Federation. These 'facts' were aimed at educating internal and external audiences about the Federation as a new state in Africa. Above all, by highlighting the economic potential of the Federation, these 'facts' were intended to project the Federation as "a land of great opportunity" to potential investors and immigrants.⁵⁸ This factual approach was never abandoned, but instead further developed during the second phase of the development of the Federal government's information and propaganda policy.

⁵⁴ NAZ, F121/H1/74, Minute on " 'Fact' Office in Salisbury" from A.C. Izod, Controller, Federal Public Relations Division to W. H. Hammond, 7 September, 1962; Letter on "'Fact' Offices" from A.C. Izod, Controller, Public Relations Division to E.G.G. Marsh, 26 September 1962.

⁵⁵ For instance, *The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: The Facts*, Salisbury, Press and Publications Department, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, 1960 and *Further Facts on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Salisbury, Federal Information Department, 1960.

⁵⁶ *Fact* Vol. 1, No.1, April, 1960.

⁵⁷ *Straight Answers on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Salisbury, Federal Public Relations Division, 1961.

⁵⁸ *The New Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Salisbury, Federal Information Services, 1954, p. 3; *Opportunity in Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Salisbury, Federal Information Department, 1955.

“Federation is Dead” Versus “Federation is Your Future”: Federal Information and Propaganda Policy in the Second Phase, 1959-1963

The years covered by the second phase in the development of the Federal government's information and propaganda policy were crisis-ridden years characterised by political and economic instability which generated serious uncertainty about the continued existence of the Federation and ultimately led to its breakup and dissolution. In the late 1950s, there was growing African opposition to Federation from African nationalist movements in all three Federal territories. Africans, who vastly outnumbered Europeans throughout the Federation, increasingly believed their future political rights could not be secured within the political framework of the European-dominated Federation. Multi-racial partnership, the principle which Federation claimed to be based upon in its propaganda at home and abroad, was viewed as having largely failed even by some Africans who had initially supported Federation. As A.S. Mlambo has stated:

The multi-racial enterprise eventually collapsed when the African elite became frustrated by the unwillingness of the establishment to advance their interests beyond a certain point and they realised that they were being taken for walk down the proverbial garden path.⁵⁹

The growing African nationalist opposition to Federation led to violent African nationalist-led anti-government protests in Nyasaland in 1959. The protests resulted in the declaration of states of emergency in all the Federal territories.⁶⁰ In 1960, the British government appointed a Commission of Inquiry known as the Monckton Commission to review the progress of the Federation and make non-binding recommendations about its future ahead of a Federal Constitutional Review Conference held in the same year. Among the major recommendations of the Commission was that after some time each of the three Federal territories should be given the right to secede from the Federation.⁶¹ This recommendation was viewed by the Federal government with anger and alarm as it opened the door to the break-up of the Federation and went against pledges to preserve the Federation which the Federal government claimed it had earlier been given by the British government.⁶²

The Monckton Commission Report increased uncertainty about the political and economic future of the Federation. European supporters of the Federation both at home and abroad

⁵⁹ A.S. Mlambo, “From the Second World War to UDI, 1940-1965”, in Raftopoulos, B. and Mlambo, A.S. (eds), *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History From the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008*, Johannesburg, Jacana Media, 2009, p. 95.

⁶⁰ C. Leys, “The Growth of Police Powers and the 1959 Emergencies”, in C. Leys & C. Pratt (eds) *A New Deal in Central Africa*, London, Heinemann, 1960, pp. 126-137.

⁶¹ *Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1960, pp. 101-105.

⁶² R. Welensky, *Welensky's 4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, London, Collins, 1964, pp. 267-283.

were uncertain about whether the Federation could withstand the political challenge posed to its existence by the African nationalist movements. Ian Phimister has observed that uncertainty over the political future of the Federation combined with the enormous fall in the price of copper that occurred after 1956 resulted in a significant slowdown in the growth of the Federal economy.⁶³ This economic slowdown exacerbated the uncertainty about the future of the Federation and affected its economic prospects as potential investors became hesitant to invest in a country whose continued existence was doubtful.

By 1960, the Federal government was, therefore, politically and economically on the defensive. The African nationalist led anti-government protests which rocked the Federation in 1959 compelled the Federal government to belatedly recognise the wide scale and deeply entrenched nature of African opposition to Federation as well as the serious danger that this opposition posed to the continued existence of the Federation. The Federal government was also forced to recognise that it had underestimated the power of African nationalists to mobilise African opinion against Federation and had largely neglected African opinion during the early years of Federation.

A Federal government propaganda pamphlet published in 1960 admitted that during the initial years of Federation, the Federal government had been too preoccupied with “the many difficult problems arising from the development of the new Federal state” and had paid inadequate attention to the need for an information campaign to convince especially Nyasaland Africans of the economic and political benefits of Federation.⁶⁴ The Federal Ministry of Home Affairs also admitted that the Federal government “was too slow off the mark” especially in relation to countering anti-Federation propaganda within the Federation.⁶⁵ A Northern Rhodesia government official likened the challenge facing the Federal government in countering anti-Federation propaganda as similar to that of a cricketer who had been “put in to bat very late [when] the wicket [was] now pretty difficult.”⁶⁶ The Federal government also admitted in its propaganda publications that: “It is a fact that the hopes and faith expressed at the time of Federation that its benefits would be self-evident to the majority of Africans, particularly those in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia have not been realised.”⁶⁷

⁶³ I. Phimister, “From Preference Towards Protection: Manufacturing in Southern Rhodesia, 1940-1965”, in A. S. Mlambo, E.S. Pangeti and I. Phimister, *Zimbabwe: A History of Manufacturing 1890-1995*, Harare, University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2000, p. 44.

⁶⁴ *Further Facts on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, p. 14.

⁶⁵ NAZ, F121/H3/50, Memorandum on “Publicity Campaign: (Second Phase)” from E.G.G. Marsh, Acting Secretary to the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to the Federal Minister of Home Affairs, 8 March, 1961, p.2.

⁶⁶ NAZ, F121/H3/50, M.O. Wray, The Secretariat, Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia to J. Foot, Parliamentary Secretary, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, 7 June 1961.

⁶⁷ *Further Facts on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, p. 14.

During this period, the Federal government sought to remedy its earlier neglect of African opinion in the Federation by way of reformulating and reorganising its information and propaganda policy. In reassessing its propaganda structures and effort, the Federal government came to believe more strongly than before that deliberate misinformation spread by African nationalists about what Federation stood for and what it had achieved for Africans since its inception was largely responsible for the growing opposition to Federation at home and abroad. The Federal government also noted that African nationalist movements in the Federation had seized the initiative in the propaganda war over the continued existence of Federation and that there was an urgent need to formulate and implement a propaganda strategy that would enable the Federal government to retake the initiative from them.⁶⁸

This late realisation of the scale and potency of African opposition to Federation together with the rapid pace at which events within and outside the Federation seemed to be gravitating towards the disintegration of the Federation, contributed significantly to the emergence of a panic mentality in the Federal Information Services. It's important to discuss the ways in which this information panic was manifested in the Federal government's information policy before examining how the Federal Information Department was reorganised in 1960. This information panic was manifested in the Federal government's information policy in the following ways:

First, in the Federal government's belief that the Federation was being misunderstood and misrepresented by its opponents inside and outside the Federation, principally African nationalists in the Federation and their foreign allies. The latter were often accused by the Federal government and its propagandists of having either wrong or no understanding of the racial problems in the Federation and Africa as they were far-removed from the daily realities of life in these areas.⁶⁹

Second, in the Federal government's belief that many Federal government officials, including Federal propagandists lacked sufficient information about African opinion on Federation and that this lack of information about African opinion on Federation was hindering efforts to effectively counter African nationalist propaganda against Federation. In an attempt to end this "information famine" concerning African opinion on Federation, encouraged all its white information officials and Federal government politicians to subscribe to newspapers for Africans such as the *African Daily News*. The Federal government also prepared confidential internal press digests and commentaries on African opinion in the Federation. These were mainly circulated to white Federal government

⁶⁸ NAZ, F121/202, Vol. II, Record of Meeting of the Northern Nyasaland Regional Information Committee held at 4:15 p.m. at the Lilongwe Hotel, Lilongwe on Tuesday, November 1st, 1960, pp. 1-3.

⁶⁹ "Welensky Slams Adlai Stevenson", *African Daily News*, 17 April, 1962.

officials and propagandists and were aimed at keeping them well informed about African opinion on Federation.⁷⁰

Third and most significant was the emergence of panic-driven propaganda as the most dominant form of Federal government propaganda. In its state of panic, the Federal government and its information services laboured under the pressure of their belief that they had very little time in which to launch an effective counter-propaganda campaign to save the Federation from collapse. Consequently, one of the ways in which the Federal government's panic-driven propaganda approach manifested itself was in its preoccupation with devising and implementing propaganda campaigns that it believed would have the greatest impact in the shortest possible time.

From 1960 onwards, the Federal Home Affairs Ministry placed great emphasis on the need for Federal government propaganda campaigns not to be rigid, but to assume flexible forms in terms of their focus and content. This flexibility was intended to allow for swift changes in the thrust and length of Federal government propaganda campaigns, changes which the panic-stricken Federal government felt impelled to make in effort to ensure that its propaganda campaigns remained relevant to the fast unfolding political and other events relating to the fate of the Federation.⁷¹ In consonance with this approach, the Federal Public Relations Division embarked on numerous propaganda campaigns and initiatives which were rapidly dropped or altered in favour of similarly short-lived propaganda campaigns.

The panic-driven element that permeated the Federal government's propaganda in support of Federation was also evident in the language used by Federal information officials in their correspondence with each other and with other Federal and Territorial government officials within and beyond the Federation. There were increasingly frequent references in this correspondence to the need for "urgent action" in initiating "quick impact" pro-Federation propaganda campaigns in and outside the Federation as time was rapidly running out to make the case for Federation and save it from collapse.⁷² Federal government propaganda policy in relation to Africans within the Federation increasingly emphasised the urgent need "to get a [pro-Federation] message across to Africans in the shortest possible time."⁷³ There was also greater emphasis on the need to mount internal and external pro-Federation propaganda campaigns which would force all the opponents of Federation "to sit up and

⁷⁰ NAZ, *F128/L15*, "Commentary" by J.Z. Savanhu, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Home Affairs, August 1960; *F128/L15*, African Opinion-Weekly Commentaries, 1960-1963.

⁷¹ NAZ, *F121/H3/60*, Memorandum by E.G.G. Marsh entitled "Proposal for Increased Public Relations Effort" sent to W. H. Hammond, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs and A.C. Izod, Federal Public Relations Division, 7 December 1961.

⁷² NAZ, *F121/H3/47*, "Report to the Federal Government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on an Information Programme in the US" by S.E.R. Wynne, Managing Director, Voice and Vision Ltd, London, 23 October 1962.

⁷³ NAZ, *F121/H3/46*, S.E.R. Wynne, Managing Director, Voice and Vision Ltd, London to A.D. Evans, Ministry of Home Affairs, Salisbury, 26 January 1962.

take notice” by employing “shock tactics in all the conventional media of communication and in lots of unconventional ones too.”⁷⁴

This panic-driven propaganda can be said to have gone through three interrelated phases between 1960 and 1963. It was fundamentally reactive rather than proactive in nature as it was primarily a defensive reaction to the political and economic crises that threatened the survival of the Federation. In response to the anti-Federation African nationalist narrative that Federation had failed Africans politically and economically and was doomed to collapse, it sought to construct a counter-narrative of Federation as a success which had benefited Africans economically and politically and had a bright-future.⁷⁵ This success story motif became an integral part of all three phases of the Federal government’s panic-driven propaganda.

Acutely aware of how the African nationalist-led political protests that took place in the Federation in 1959 had created serious doubts about the continued existence of the Federation, the initial focus of the Federal government’s panic-driven propaganda was restoring internal and external faith in the future of the Federation. This was done through Federal government propaganda which stressed how despite the political disturbances that had taken place in 1959 the Federation continued to enjoy political stability and the confidence of external investors.⁷⁶

The break-up of the Federation became increasingly imminent from 1961 onwards after Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s Malawi Congress Party (MCP) became the majority party in the Nyasaland Legislative Council after winning a general election held under a new Nyasaland constitution on 15 August 1961. Dr Banda intentionally made the election a referendum on Federation by campaigning on a platform in which he presented the electoral choice facing Nyasaland Africans as one between “Slavery within the Federation and independence outside the Federation.”⁷⁷ Consequently, Dr Banda argued that his party’s election victory was a mandate for Nyasaland to secede from the Federation and strengthened his calls for Nyasaland to be allowed to do so.⁷⁸ The MCP’s electoral success was also welcomed by the majority of Africans in Southern and Northern Rhodesia “as a clear victory for African nationalism [and] a signal heralding the first stage in the break-up of the Federation.”⁷⁹

All these developments made the Federal government progressively more anxious as it feared that if Nyasaland was permitted to secede from the Federation, this would trigger

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ For example, *Success Stories: African Achievement in Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Salisbury, Federal Information Department, 1960.

⁷⁶ “Industries Support Federation”, *Fact*, Vol. 1, No. 6, September, 1960, p. 1.

⁷⁷ P. Short, *Banda*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974, p.151.

⁷⁸ “Victory a Mandate to Leave Federation Declares Dr. Banda”, *African Daily News*, 16 August, 1961.

⁷⁹ “Malawi Victory is welcomed by many in S.R.”, *African Daily News*, 16 August, 1961.

the disintegration of the whole Federation. It would also encourage Africans in all the Federal territories-who already inspired by the achievement of African self-government in several African countries outside the Federation- to become more emboldened in their demands for immediate self-rule.⁸⁰ The tremendous advances that African nationalist movements were making in their fight to end European colonial rule in Africa had by 1961 resulted in what Bill Schwarz has characterised as a “crisis not only of colonial policy but of colonial liberalism itself.”⁸¹ Galvanised by the rapid movement towards independence from colonial rule in other parts of Africa, the African nationalist movements in the Federation demanded immediate self-rule and rejected the paternalistic multi-racial partnership and gradual movement towards self-rule closely associated with colonial liberalism.

The Federal government’s panic driven propaganda entered its second phase at this time. It assumed a pronounced anti-secessionist and anti-African nationalist thrust aimed at discouraging Africans in Nyasaland from supporting calls by African nationalist leaders in that territory for Nyasaland to secede from the Federation and achieve self-rule for Nyasaland Africans outside Federation. Among the main arguments repeatedly put forward in this propaganda was that Nyasaland, economically the poorest of the three Federal territories, had benefited tremendously from its membership of the Federation and faced a future of great economic hardships and political repression under African nationalist rule if it seceded from the Federation.⁸²

To discourage Africans throughout the Federation from demanding immediate self-rule this propaganda also sought to persuade Africans in the Federation that gradual movement towards African self-rule within the Federation was better than immediate self-rule outside the Federation and under African nationalist leadership. In a reflection of the Federal government’s heightened panic about the prospect of African nationalist rule in the Federal territories and the break-up of the Federation, Federal government propaganda during this phase made extensive use of scare-mongering propaganda tactics. These methods were aimed at frightening Africans in the Federation into abandoning their demands for self-government and for Nyasaland’s secession from the Federation.⁸³

In a desperate bid to legitimise the continued existence of the Federation and prevent its disintegration, the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky held an early Federal general election on 27 April 1962 “to seek a mandate to prevent the break-up of the Federation.”⁸⁴ Though the snap election was resoundingly won by Sir Roy’s United Federal Party (UFP), it failed to bring the Federation out of its crisis of legitimacy and to stop its rapid progression

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ B. Schwarz, *The White Man’s World*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 349.

⁸² *Federation and Nyasaland: The Facts*, Salisbury, Federal Public Relations Division, 1962.

⁸³ Ibid., pp.29-31.

⁸⁴ P. Short, *Banda*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974, p. 165.

to disintegration. The election was boycotted by all the major African nationalist parties in the Federation as well as the principal European opposition parties. This poll boycott was widely viewed as a strong expression of these parties' disapproval of Federation and left the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky "alone in the field to support a falling Federation structure."⁸⁵

Three key events in December 1962 added to the Federal government's anxiety and panic about an imminent collapse of the Federation. Following a general election held on 30 October under an amended Northern Rhodesia constitution, a coalition government comprising the two major Northern Rhodesia African nationalist parties, UNIP and ANC, came to power in that territory. The main aims of this coalition government were to pull Northern Rhodesia out of the Federation and draft a new "one man, one vote constitution" under which new elections would be held.⁸⁶

On 14 December, the anti-Federation European right-wing Rhodesia Front Party which was strongly opposed to multi-racialism and African advancement came to power in Southern Rhodesia after defeating the pro-Federation UFP in the Southern Rhodesia general election. The Rhodesian Front's electoral victory was "at once interpreted as the prelude to the complete collapse of the Federation."⁸⁷

On 19 December, the British government accepted in principle the right of Nyasaland to secede from the Federation.⁸⁸ In addition to a new European-led government in Southern Rhodesia whose commitment to the continuation of Federation was doubtful, the Federal government was "faced with African-controlled governments in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, both of which [were] pledged to pull their countries out of the Federation as soon as possible."⁸⁹ This greatly contributed to growing internal and external public perceptions that the Federation was "on the verge of dissolution"⁹⁰

In reassessing the future direction of its information and propaganda policy in light of these developments, the Federal government's heightened panic and desperation to save the Federation drove it to rule out stopping or scaling down on its pro-Federation propaganda campaign. The Federal government continued with its information and propaganda activities arguing that any break in these activities would only serve to "lend weight to

⁸⁵ "Sir Roy's Victory", *African Daily News*, 28 April, 1962.

⁸⁶ R. Welensky, *Welensky's 4000 Days*, pp. 347-348.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p.354.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p.355.

⁸⁹ NAZ, F121/H3/47, O. Bennett, Minister for Rhodesia and Nyasaland Affairs, British Embassy, Washington DC, "Public Relations Policy", 4 January, 1963.

⁹⁰ NAZ, F121/H3/47, O. Bennett, Minister for Rhodesia and Nyasaland Affairs, British Embassy, Washington DC to Sir Roy Welensky, Federal Prime Minister, 11 January, 1963.

rumours that Federation is finished.”⁹¹ It argued that any interruption of its information and propaganda activities was also inadvisable “because of the shortage of time available for [the Federal government] to tell the ‘Federal story’.”⁹²

The panic-stricken Federal government, therefore, began laying greater emphasis on using government propaganda to deliberately deny the unfolding reality of the disintegration of the Federation. This was an extension of the policy of generating internal and external public confidence in the future of the Federation, which had been the principal feature of the first phase of the Federal government’s panic-driven propaganda in 1960-61. It entailed creating and maintaining the appearance that the Federation had a long-term future and that the Federal government was in control of the destiny of the Federation.⁹³

To this end, the Federal government had in 1961 made plans to embark on a “loyalty drive” targeted at both European and African Federal civil servants. This “loyalty drive” would seek to generate confidence in the future of the Federation by using internal pro-Federation brochures and newsletters targeted at these civil servants and aimed at making them “salesmen for Federation.” It would also emphasise that it was important for European civil servants to avoid engaging in any “loose talk” in “the sight and hearing” of African civil servants, which suggested that the collapse of Federation was imminent or inevitable.⁹⁴

Despite the widespread belief among most people in and outside the Federation that the Federation had no chance of survival, the Federal government continued to put out propaganda and also make frequent verbal statements expressing its optimism and confidence in the future of the Federation. In one such statement made in August 1962, the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, claimed that the Federal concept and state were strong and were continuing to grow in strength.⁹⁵ However, the frequency with which the Federal government and its information services found themselves compelled to give public assurances that the Federation was not going to disintegrate betrayed the uncertainty that surrounded the future of the Federation.

Even after the decision taken by the British government on 19 December 1962 to in principle grant Nyasaland the right to secede from the Federation, the Federal government did not give up trying to save the Federation. In a desperate bid to continue with Federation in another shape or form the Federal government sought to persuade the British

⁹¹ NAZ, F121/H3/47, O. Bennett, Minister for Rhodesia and Nyasaland Affairs, British Embassy, Washington, DC to Sir Roy Welensky, Federal Prime Minister, 11 January, 1963.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ NAZ, F121/H202, Vol. II, Record of Meeting of the Southern Nyasaland Regional Information Committee held in the Publicity Association Office, Blantyre at 4:15 pm on Monday, October 31st, 1960, p. 1.

⁹⁴ NAZ, F121/H202, Vol. II, Record of Meeting of the Central Province Regional Information Committee held at the Lilongwe Hotel at 4:30 pm on Thursday, March 16th, 1961, p. 1.

⁹⁵ “One-sided Optimism”, *African Daily News*, 31 August, 1962.

government to support the continuation of a Federation of the two *Rhodesias* in the event that Nyasaland seceded from the Federation.⁹⁶ Consequently, the Federal government's panic-driven propaganda during this second phase also sought to mobilise the support of Africans in Northern Rhodesia for this idea by highlighting how Northern Rhodesia had benefited from Federation and stood to benefit from maintaining close association with Southern Rhodesia.⁹⁷

The Federal government's propaganda entered its third and final phase in 1963 during which Sir Roy continued with his efforts to mobilise public support for the continuation of a Federation involving only the two *Rhodesias*. In a "belligerent radio and TV speech" delivered on 4 March 1963 "Sir Roy once again reiterated his determination to see that the Rhodesias [were] kept together-despite the departure of Nyasaland from the family."⁹⁸ There is also credible evidence that having engaged in an unsuccessful campaign to get the British government to grant the Federation dominion status, the Federal government in a desperate effort to prevent the British government from sanctioning the break-up of the Federation considered unilaterally declaring the Federation independent of British rule.⁹⁹ It, however, ultimately decided against this course of action on the grounds it would not be sustainable as the Federal government had no control over the police forces of the Territorial governments which had not been federalised.¹⁰⁰

Despite the Federal government's determined efforts to prevent the disintegration of the Federation and to sustain the counter-narrative that it was alive and destined to become permanently established, the African nationalist narrative of Federation as dead continued to gain strength and credibility. Statements about the Federation from African nationalists and others also increasingly emphasised the narrative of the inevitability of the collapse and death of the Federation. These statements also characterised Sir Roy's speech of 4 March as "reminiscent of a drowning man" and a speech that would "go down in history as the Federation's funeral oration."¹⁰¹ An editorial in the *African Daily News* stated that: "All agree that the Federation as a political unit is dead and only awaits its death certificate."¹⁰²

Federal government propaganda in this third and final phase focused on blaming the British government for the disintegration of the Federation. This propaganda highlighted how the British government had "betrayed" the Federation by deliberately reneging on promises and

⁹⁶ R. Welensky, *Welensky's 4000 Days*, pp.356-357.

⁹⁷ *Federation and Northern Rhodesia: The Facts*, Salisbury, Federal Public Relations Division, 1962.

⁹⁸ "Keeping Together", *African Daily News*, 6 March, 1963.

⁹⁹ T.T. Dawson, "Welensky Should Give Up Now", *African Daily News*, 15 January, 1963.

¹⁰⁰ NAZ, Oral/GR2, Julius Macdonald Greenfield, interviewed on 6 September, 1971, Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia.

¹⁰¹ "Sir Roy Told the Funeral Bell", Letter to the Editor by Gibson Magorimbo, New Highfield, Salisbury, *African Daily News*, 7 March, 1963.

¹⁰² "Economic Links", *African Daily News*, 8 March, 1963.

pledges to preserve the Federation which it had earlier given to the Federal government. It also highlighted what the Federal government claimed would be the very negative economic effects of the break-up of the Federation on all the three Federal territories.¹⁰³

In this propaganda, the success story and factual approach perspectives on Federation was retained by emphasising through the use of 'facts' and figures what the Federal government claimed was the extraordinary economic and political progress made under Federation-progress which the Federal government argued had been prematurely ended by the British government's decision to dissolve the Federation.¹⁰⁴ The anti-African nationalist posture in the Federal government's panic-driven propaganda was also retained by continuing to portray Nyasaland under an MCP-led government as an economic and political failure characterised by widespread poverty and political repression.¹⁰⁵

On 29 March 1963, the British government conceded the right of Northern Rhodesia to secede from the Federation.¹⁰⁶ A conference held in Victoria Falls in July 1963 "dealt the final coup de grace to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland" by establishing the machinery for the dissolution of the Federation and agreeing on the mechanisms for the restoration of Federal government powers to the Territorial governments.¹⁰⁷ The participants of the conference set 31 December 1963 as the date for the dissolution of the Federation.

In a propaganda exercise meant to draw public attention to the triumph of the African nationalist propaganda narrative that "Federation was dead", Dr. Banda's MCP on 29 December 1963 staged a mock funeral to mark the death of the Federation and "celebrate the achievement of secession by Nyasaland."¹⁰⁸ A funeral procession carrying a coffin containing the Federal flag and covered with black cloth marched from the MCP's Headquarters in Limbe to Blantyre where the coffin was buried in the yard of Dr. Banda's residence with MCP government ministers acting as pall-bearers.¹⁰⁹

The emergence of panic-driven propaganda as the most dominant form of Federal government propaganda in support of Federation was, therefore, one of the major manifestations of the information panic of the Federal government and its information

¹⁰³ NAZ/F121/H1/400/1, *Federation and Nyasaland: The British Government's Broken Pledges and the Consequences*, Federal Government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, January, 1963.

¹⁰⁴ *Legacy of Progress: Achievements of the Years of Federation 1953-1963: Presented to the Federal Assembly on 9th December, 1963 by the Prime Minister.*

¹⁰⁵ F121/H1/413, *The Erosion of the Rule of Law in Nyasaland*, Reprint of a Statement made by the Hon. J.M. Greenfield, Minister of Law in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, to the Federal Assembly, July 30, 1963.

¹⁰⁶ B.J. Phiri, *A Political History of Zambia: From the Colonial Period to the 3rd Republic*, Trenton, NJ, Africa World Press, 2006, p.114.

¹⁰⁷ T.T. Dawson, "Welensky's Policies Have Caused His Downfall", *African Daily News*, 7 August, 1963.

¹⁰⁸ "Banda's Federal Hate Shown in Mock Funeral", *African Daily News*, 31 December, 1963.

¹⁰⁹ "Federal Flag will Lie at Dr. Banda's House", *African Daily News*, 28 December, 1963.

services. It reflected a belated, desperate and ultimately unsuccessful bid by the Federal government to save the Federation from collapse by winning the hearts and minds of Africans and other important internal and external opponents of Federation.

Reorganisation of the Federal Information Services 1960-1963

In September 1960, the Federal Information Department was completely restructured and renamed the Federal Public Relations Division. The new division which remained under the authority of the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, comprised four Departments, namely Press and Publications, Planning and Technical Services, National Parks and the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Tourist Board. Of these four Departments, the first two were the most well known, influential and active. The new Division comprised two departments, the Press and Publications Department and the Planning and Technical Services Department.¹¹⁰

This reorganisation of the Federal Information Department was primarily intended to enable the Federal government to regain the propaganda initiative from African nationalist and other opponents of Federation by adopting more proactive rather than defensive propaganda methods. It involved many aspects, of which the following three were among the most significant: first, the engagement by the Federal government of the London-based public Relations firm, Voice and Vision Limited as the public relations consultants for the Federal government; second, the establishment by the Federal government of Regional Information Advisory Committees in all the major centres of the Federation and third, an effort by the Federal government to assign Africans greater roles in the formulation and implementation of its information and propaganda policy, especially for Africans. The third component of this reorganisation deserves detailed discussion in its own right. It is, therefore, the focus of the next chapter of the thesis. This section of the thesis will predominantly focus on the first two elements of this reorganisation.

Voice and Vision Limited was first hired by the Federal government as its public relations consultants on a 2 year contract which ran from the 1st May 1960 to May 1962 at which time it was renewed to run until 30 June 1963.¹¹¹ The Federal government's decision to engage the services of Voice and Vision was largely a product of its acute panic over the future of the Federation. It took place just months before the Monckton Commission Report on the Federation was due to be published and before the British Parliament was

¹¹⁰ NAZ, *FG3/PUB3*, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Annual Report of the Public Relations Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1960-1961, p.5; NAZ, *F121/H202*, Vol. II, Record of Meeting of the Fort Victoria Regional Information Committee held in the Council Chamber, Fort Victoria, at 2:30 pm on Thursday, October 20th 1960, p. 1.

¹¹¹ NAZ, *F121/H3/47*, W.E. Arnold, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to Mr. Penrose, 1st November, 1962.

due to debate and decide on the constitutional future of the Federation in late 1960 and early 1961. Writing in 1960, Federal government propagandists stated that:

The role of British public opinion in the [British] government's decision about the future of the Federation will be crucial...it is therefore urgently necessary to present the favourable story about Federation during the short time left before a political decision is taken.¹¹²

The panic-stricken Federal government, therefore, believed that a vastly expanded, powerful and quick impact pro-Federation propaganda campaign in the United Kingdom was required because it was British Members of Parliament and the British government who would ultimately decide the future fate of the Federation.¹¹³ It had also come to realise that countering anti-Federation propaganda, in the United Kingdom required the services of people with highly specialised knowledge in handling external public relations on behalf of governments. Voice and Vision was, therefore, engaged by the Federal government with the primary intention that it devise and conduct a massive pro-Federation propaganda campaign in the United Kingdom on behalf of the Federal government.¹¹⁴

Mobilising British public opinion in support of Federation ahead of the debate on the future of the Federation was also regarded by the Federal government as particularly urgent. This was because the Nyasaland Emergency of 1959 had generated much adverse publicity which had "brought home to British public opinion the apparent strength of African opposition to Federation, and [had] spotlighted the grievances of the most backward territory in the Federation, Nyasaland."¹¹⁵

In contrast, the Federal government noted, little publicity had been given in the United Kingdom about the numerous positive achievements of Federation. These included bringing about significant economic growth in all the Federal territories and facilitating African advancement. British public opinion, the Federal government stated, was also ignorant of the support that Federation enjoyed among many Africans in Southern Rhodesia and of the full extent of the political intimidation of Africans in all three Federal territories by African nationalist leaders and their supporters. In addition, the British public was uninformed about the difficulties faced by the Federal government "in implementing Federal policies in collaboration with the three Territorial governments."¹¹⁶ The Federal government believed

¹¹² NAZ, F121/H3/25, "Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Proposal for an Advertising Campaign, September 1960-January 1961", 1960, p. 3.

¹¹³ NAZ, F121/H3/25, "Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Proposal for an Advertising Campaign, September 1960-January 1961", 1960, p. 3.

¹¹⁴ "PR Director Praises Voice and Vision", *Rhodesia Herald*, 23 March, 1962.

¹¹⁵ NAZ, F121/H3/25, "Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Proposal for an Advertising Campaign, September 1960-January 1961", 1960, p. 2.

¹¹⁶ NAZ, F121/H3/25, "Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Proposal for an Advertising Campaign, September 1960-January 1961", 1960, pp. 2-3.

that British public opinion was so ignorant or ill-informed about Federal affairs that “the majority of British people [had] no valid basis for holding an intelligent opinion about Federation.”¹¹⁷

As part of its propaganda campaign to influence British public opinion and British MPs in support of Federation and the Federal government, Voice and Vision ran an extensive pro-Federation advertising campaign in the United Kingdom which it claimed had successfully achieved a “sledge-hammer impact” that had compelled all the opponents of Federation “to sit-up and take notice”.¹¹⁸ Voice and Vision also organised tours of the Federation by groups of British Members of Parliament (MPs) whom they believed were sympathetic to the Federation and would give it favourable publicity upon their return to the United Kingdom.¹¹⁹

Though Voice and Vision was not part of the Federal Public Relations Division and was mostly active in the Federal government’s propaganda campaign in the UK, it played a crucial role in reorganising the Federal Information Services and in influencing the direction of the Federal government’s propaganda policy in the Federation and abroad. In April 1960, Mr. Sydney Wynne, the Managing Director of Voice and Vision and another representative from his company had visited Southern Rhodesia to discuss the Federal Information Services with the Federal Prime Minister, the Federal Minister of Home Affairs and the Federal Parliamentary Secretary for Information Affairs. They also conducted a preliminary investigation of the structure and workings of the Federal Information Services.¹²⁰

They subsequently recommended that the Federal government need to urgently carry out an “extensive realignment” of its information and propaganda policy in order to ensure that Federation was more effectively put across inside and outside the Federation, particularly in the United Kingdom. Voice and Vision emphasised that it was particularly important that the Federal information Services be reorganised to ensure that “an adequate and comprehensive flow of information was to be maintained to all government sources within the Federation, to all External Missions and in particular to the consultants in London.”¹²¹

The outline plan for the reorganisation of the Federal Information Services which was drawn up by the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs was agreed upon with Voice and Vision. In order

¹¹⁷ NAZ, F121/H3/25, “Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Proposal for an Advertising Campaign, September 1960-January 1961”, 1960, pp. 2-3.

¹¹⁸ NAZ, F121/H3/46, S.E.R. Wynne, Managing Director, Voice and Vision, Ltd, London to A.D. Evans, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, Salisbury, 26 January, 1962.

¹¹⁹ NAZ, F121/H3/25, Draft Document on “Re-organisation of Information and Propaganda Services of the Federal Government”, Rhodesia House, London, 6th May, 1960.

¹²⁰ NAZ, F121/H3/25, Draft Document on “Re-organisation of Information and Propaganda Services of the Federal Government”, 6th May, 1960.

¹²¹ NAZ, F121/H3/25, Draft Document on “Re-organisation of Information and Propaganda Services of the Federal Government”, 6th May, 1960.

to facilitate efficient information and propaganda liaison links within and outside the Federation, a representative of Voice and Vision was sent to Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia to work within the Federal Public Relations Division under the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs.¹²² The Information section of the Office of the High Commissioner of Rhodesia and Nyasaland at Rhodesia House in London was also reorganised to facilitate co-operation and coordination between Rhodesia House and Voice and Vision, especially in relation to the pro-Federation campaign in the United Kingdom.¹²³

Voice and Vision was publicly credited by the Federal government with advancing the cause of Federation in the United Kingdom in several ways that the Federal government admitted it would not have been able to achieve through its own efforts.¹²⁴ These included the following: first, establishing contacts with and creating interest in the Federation among influential opinion formers in the United Kingdom within a much shorter timeframe than the Federal government could have done on its own. Second, helping the Federal government to adopt more modern standards in its information and propaganda publications and advertising.¹²⁵ Third and most significant according to the Federal government, bringing about a favourable shift in British public opinion toward Federation mainly through the success of its scheme of organising visits to the Federation by teams of British MPs.¹²⁶

There were, however, two major problems associated with Voice and Vision's work on behalf of the Federal government which arguably limited the effectiveness of its propaganda campaigns in support of Federation and the Federal government. First, serious tensions and differences emerged between Voice and Vision and the Office of the High Commissioner for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in London, which was also commonly referred to as Rhodesia House. These differences centred on Rhodesia House's objections to Voice and Vision's handling of its pro-Federation propaganda campaign in the UK on behalf of the Federal government.

Prior to the engagement of Voice and Vision as the Federal government's public relations consultants in 1960, Rhodesia House working in close liaison with the Federal Information Department's Headquarters in Salisbury was largely responsible for publicising and defending the Federation in the UK. When Voice and Vision assumed primary responsibility

¹²² NAZ, F121/H3/25, Draft Document on "Re-organisation of Information and Propaganda Services of the Federal Government", 6th May, 1960.

¹²³ NAZ, F121/H3/25, Draft Document on "Re-organisation of Information and Propaganda Services of the Federal Government", 6th May, 1960.

¹²⁴ "PR Director Praises Voice and Vision", *Rhodesia Herald*, 28 March, 1962.

¹²⁵ NAZ, F121/H82, Confidential Report by J. Foot on his Visit to London During the Period January 5th to 13th, 1961, p. 2.

¹²⁶ NAZ, F121/H3/25, Minutes of a Meeting of the London Advisory Committee Held in Rhodesia House at 10:30 a.m. on 4th January, 1961, p. 1.; "PR Director Praises Voice and Vision", *Rhodesia Herald*, 28 March, 1962.

for the Federal government's information and propaganda campaign in the UK from 1960 onwards, it was had to work in close co-operation with Rhodesia House which played a key role in facilitating its liaison with the Public Relations Division Headquarters in Salisbury.

Rhodesia House was, however, from the beginning distrustful and critical of Voice and Vision's pro-Federation propaganda effort in the UK. About two months after the Federal government had engaged Voice and Vision as its public relations consultants, Rhodesia House, in a reflection of the panic mentality that had gripped the Federal government information and propaganda machinery and which Voice and Vision would later come to share, "warned Salisbury of [its] doubts concerning consultants [Voice and Vision's] approach which lacks sense of urgency essential to obtain best possible propaganda results for our cause."¹²⁷ Rhodesia House also questioned whether Voice and Vision could "honestly and enthusiastically support the Federal cause" since in their capacity as public relations consultants for the whole Federation they were in principle simultaneously working for the Federal government and the Territorial governments.¹²⁸

Relations between Rhodesia House and Voice and Vision had by 1961 deteriorated so much that John Foot, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs responsible for information affairs, made improving these relations one of his major priorities during his visit to London in January 1961. John Foot later informed the Federal Minister of Home Affairs that though some improvement in relations between Rhodesia House and Voice and Vision had occurred during his visit there was still a "need for further improvement and change."¹²⁹

Second, Voice and Vision's "absolute identification" with the Federal government significantly undermined its communicator credibility among opponents of Federation both in the UK and in the Federation.¹³⁰ To critics of the Federal government's information and propaganda policy, Voice and Vision became a symbol of what they viewed as the Federal government's misdirected propaganda effort which committed too much government resources to external propaganda at the expense of propaganda on the home-front.

Numerous newspapers in the Federation carried editorials and articles which were highly critical of both the Federal government and Voice and Vision. The *Rhodesia Herald* criticised the Federal government's decision to engage public relations consultants to handle its

¹²⁷ NAZ, F121/H3/25, Note for Discussion with High Commissioner on Advisory Committee Affairs dated 25th July 1960 and written by H.T.B. Matthews, Immigration Adviser to the High Commissioner for Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Rhodesia House, London.

¹²⁸ NAZ, F121/H3/25, Note for Discussion with High Commissioner on Advisory Committee Affairs, 25th July 1960.

¹²⁹ NAZ, F121/H82, Confidential Report by John Foot on his "Visit to London during the Period January 5th to 13th, 1961", pp. 1, 3.

¹³⁰ NAZ, F121/H82, Confidential Report by John Foot on his "Visit to London during the Period January 5th to 13th, 1961", pp. 1, 3.

information and propaganda campaigns arguing that the use of public relations consultants was ineffective as audiences across all the major types of media namely, newspapers, radio and television had a “built-in resistance” to information and propaganda conveyed to them through public relations consultants.¹³¹

The newspaper also argued that despite spending £200,000 on its pro-Federation campaign in the UK which was conducted through Voice and Vision, the Federal government had together with Voice and Vision lost its two decisive battles with the government of the United Kingdom. The pro-Federation propaganda campaign conducted by Voice and Vision on behalf of the Federal government had failed to stop the United Kingdom government from approving new constitutions for both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. These new constitutions threatened the continued existence of the Federation by greatly strengthening the political position of the anti-Federation African nationalist parties in those territories.¹³² The *Chronicle*, a Southern Rhodesian newspaper, also carried an article which described the Federation as having “the worst public relations in the world” as Voice and Vision’s work on behalf of the Federal government had been financially very costly to that government and had not helped the cause of Federation.¹³³

African nationalist parties in the Federation used the visits by British MPs to the Federation which were organised by Voice and Vision to draw internal and external public attention to their strong opposition to their continued existence of the Federation. The leaders of these parties refused to meet the teams of British MPS brought to the Federation by Voice and Vision. They justified their refusal to meet the MPs by arguing that the MPs’ visits were not genuine visits, but were sponsored and stage-managed by the Federal government in order to deliberately mislead public opinion in the UK into believing that there was considerable African support for the continued existence of the Federation.¹³⁴

African nationalists and their supporters in the Federation also strongly criticised these Voice and Vision organised “fact-finding” visits by teams of British MPs to the Federation on the grounds that such “fact-finding” visits were superfluous because the strong and widespread African opposition to Federation was already known to these MPS. In addition, this African opposition to Federation had already been clearly communicated to various senior British government officials concerned with Federal affairs. As one African nationalist party supporter stated in an open letter addressed to a team of British MPs who came to the Federation on a visit organised by Voice and Vision:

¹³¹ “More Vision, Less Voice?”, *The Rhodesia Herald*, 29 March, 1962.

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ John Creasy, “The Worst Public Relations in the World?”, *The Chronicle*, 26 October, 1962.

¹³⁴ “UNIP Refuses in Outspoken Terms to Meet Four Touring British MPs”, *Central African Post*, 18 August, 1961.

“We have had enough of telling visitors we don’t want Federation. We have told Macmillan, Maudling, Monckton, Butler and countless others...Do we need to tell you?...The fact is that Federation is a corpse. Can’t you smell it? What more do you want to know?”¹³⁵

Some of the groups of visiting British MPs also made public statements calling on the Federal government to put out more pro-Federation propaganda to Africans as they believed the amount of Federal government propaganda aimed at explaining Federation to Africans was insufficient. These calls attracted strong disapproval from some critics of the Federal government’s pro-Federation propaganda for Africans. The latter argued that Africans in the Federation should “not have to suffer any more Federal propaganda” as they were already being subjected too much Federal government propaganda, which was proving to be largely ineffective in countering African opposition to Federation.¹³⁶

Another fundamental component of the Federal government’s reorganisation of its Information Services was its establishment starting in October 1960 of over ten Federal government Regional Information Advisory Committees (RIACs) in all the major centres of all the Federal territories. By Mid-1961, there were fifteen RIACs. Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia each had six RIACs while Nyasaland had three.¹³⁷ The Federal government claimed that the Committees were in terms of their composition non-party-political and multiracial and included 200 members of managerial rank.¹³⁸

However, Southern Rhodesia was the only territory which had Africans as members of some of its RIACs. The main reason for this was that the Federal government believed that Africans in Southern Rhodesia were markedly less opposed to Federation than Africans in the northern territories and were, therefore, more willing to assist with the Federal government’s pro-Federation propaganda effort. As a result of the militant African opposition to Federation in the northern territories, the Federal government feared that if any Africans became members of the RIACs in those territories, they would be rendered ineffective by being quickly labelled as ‘stooges’ by their fellow-Africans. This concern helps to explain why not long after the establishment of the RIACs, a decision was made to keep the names of the members of these committees confidential.¹³⁹

Prior to the establishment of these RIACs, the Federal government had in early 1960 established a Propaganda Committee under its Ministry of Home Affairs. This Committee

¹³⁵ “To the Six British MPs in Rhodesia: The Open Letter”, *Central African Mail*, 16 March, 1963.

¹³⁶ “Too Much Already”, *The African Mail*, 29 August 1961.

¹³⁷ “Visits by MPs to Rhodesia commended”, *Rhodesia Herald*, 20 December, 1961.

¹³⁸ NAZ, F121/H3/25, Minutes of a Meeting of the London Advisory Committee held in Rhodesia House at 10:30 a.m. on 4th January, 1961, p. 1.

¹³⁹ NAZ, F121/H202/2, Record of the Northern Nyasaland Regional Information Committee held at 4:30 p.m. at the Home of S.G. B. Williams, Mzuzu, on Thursday, 2 February, 1961, p. 1.

was chaired by Mr. John Foot. It was intended to help the Federal government to more effectively co-ordinate its pro-Federation information and propaganda effort by discussing and agreeing upon various suggestions on how to formulate and disseminate pro-Federation propaganda. This Home Affairs Propaganda Committee was dissolved in June 1961. Its continued existence was no longer considered necessary because the principal purpose for which it had been established was now being performed by the RIACs.¹⁴⁰

RIACs had two main interrelated functions. First, to make comments, suggestions and criticisms about how the Federal government's information campaigns, both within and outside the Federation could be made more effective. Second, to keep the Federal government informed about the state of public opinion among ordinary people and voluntary organisations in the various local areas from which the Committee members were drawn.¹⁴¹ As W.H. Hammond of the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs stated: "The Committees were a useful contact with the public and they provided a new kind of intelligence service."¹⁴²

The Federal, Home Affairs Minister, Sir Malcolm Barrow, noted that the establishment of the RIACs represented "a new development in [Federal] government [information policy] practice and thinking."¹⁴³ As part of this new approach, the Federal government now wanted to ensure popular participation in its propaganda effort and not restrict it to the government and civil service. The establishment of the RIACs was, therefore, intended by the Federal government to be primarily "a means of bringing the man in the street in touch with the Government's information machine."¹⁴⁴

In this context, the establishment of the RIACs can be said to be another manifestation of the information panic that the Federal government was experiencing. It reflected the Federal government's anxieties about its lack of adequate information on the opinion on Federation of ordinary people throughout the Federation, especially Africans. The establishment of the RIACs was also a major indicator of the Federal government's efforts to more directly and aggressively sell the idea of Federation to Africans within the Federation and to external audiences by adopting more offensive rather than defensive propaganda methods. The Federal Minister of Home affairs, Sir Malcolm Barrow, stated in his inaugural meeting with the Bulawayo RIAC: "We [the Federal government] have learned that

¹⁴⁰ NAZ, F121/H3/3, Home Affairs Propaganda Committee: Minutes of the Meeting Held on 21st June 1961, Item 374.

¹⁴¹ NAZ, F121/H202, Vol. II, Record of Meeting of the Bulawayo Regional Information Committee Held in the Conference Room, Victoria Hotel, Bulawayo, at 8:15 pm on Wednesday, October 19th, 1960, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴² NAZ, F121/H3/25, Minutes of a Meeting of the London Advisory Committee held in Rhodesia House at 10:30 a.m. on 4th January, 1961, p.1.

¹⁴³ NAZ, F121/H202, Vol. II, Record of Meeting of the Bulawayo Regional Information Committee Held in the Conference Room, Victoria Hotel, Bulawayo, at 8:15 pm on Wednesday, October 19th, 1960, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴⁴ NAZ, F121/H202, Vol. II, Record of Meeting of the Bulawayo Regional Information Committee, Wednesday, October 19th, 1960, pp. 1-2.

nowadays one cannot merely tell the facts and the truth-one has to hammer them home with the utmost vigour.”¹⁴⁵

RIACs became important forums in which the progress that Federal government print, radio, and film propaganda was making in winning over Africans to Federation was regularly discussed and evaluated. The RIACs also played an important role in applying constant pressure on the Federal government to prioritise information campaigns targeted at the inhabitants of the Federation, especially Africans.¹⁴⁶ Many members of the RIACs felt that the Federal government was through its public relations consultants Voice and Vision-expending too much of its propaganda effort and resources on propaganda campaigns in the United Kingdom at the expense of propaganda campaigns within the Federation.¹⁴⁷

These RIAC members argued that the Federal government should concentrate its propaganda effort and resources on the home front rather than the overseas front because winning over African opinion in the Federation to the cause of Federation was the key to securing the future of the Federation.¹⁴⁸ This viewpoint was shared by some officials in the Federal Home Affairs Ministry, one of whom similarly argued that the Federal government had to make propaganda on the home front its “first priority” because all its propaganda efforts overseas would be wasted if the Federal government failed to maintain stability in the Federation. The official emphasised that “if we persuade the great majority of people at home that Federation is a good thing, our problems overseas will largely disappear.”¹⁴⁹

Some of the RIACs also exerted pressure on the Federal government to adopt the use of underhand propaganda methods associated with black and grey propaganda. They argued that deploying what they claimed were the underhand propaganda methods used by African nationalist opponents of Federation was the only effective way of beating these opponents of Federation at their own game. Between 1960 and 1961, the Northern Nyasaland RIAC urged the Federal government to “to play on tribalism among Africans to bring Banda [the leader of Nyasaland African Congress] down.”¹⁵⁰ This counterpropaganda scheme would entail identifying leading African politicians from each tribe in Malawi and using propaganda to build them up as rivals to Dr. Banda’s leadership of the main African nationalist in

¹⁴⁵ NAZ, *F121/H202, Vol. II*, Record of Meeting of Bulawayo Regional Information Committee held in the Conference Room, Victoria Hotel, Bulawayo, at 8:15 p.m. on Wednesday, October 19th, 1960, p. 1.

¹⁴⁶ NAZ, *F121/202, Vol. II*, Record of Meeting of the Northern Nyasaland Regional Information Committee held at 4:15 p.m. at the Lilongwe Hotel, Lilongwe on Tuesday, November 1st, 1960, p. 2.

¹⁴⁷ NAZ, *F121/H3/50*, Memorandum on “Need for Local Propaganda Campaign” from W.E. Arnold, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to Secretary for Home Affairs, 7 February 1961, p. 1.

¹⁴⁸ NAZ, *F121/H3/50*, Memorandum on “Need for Local Propaganda Campaign” from W.E. Arnold, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to Secretary for Home Affairs, 7 February 1961, p. 2.

¹⁴⁹ NAZ, *F121/H3/50*, Memorandum on “Publicity Campaign: (Second Phase)” from E.G.G. Marsh, Acting Secretary to the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to the Federal Minister of Home Affairs, 8 March, 1961, p. 1.

¹⁵⁰ NAZ, *F121/H202/2*, Record of Meeting of the Northern Nyasaland Regional Information Committee held at 4:15 p.m. at the Lilongwe Hotel, Lilongwe on Tuesday, November 1st, 1960, p. 3.

Nyasaland.¹⁵¹ It would involve a smear campaign aimed at discrediting African nationalist political parties and politicians opposed to Federation by among other methods publicising their criminal records through newspaper advertisements.¹⁵²

The Northern Nyasaland RIAC also strongly proposed that in order to more quickly and effectively counter the anti-Federation propaganda spread verbally by African nationalist politicians in Nyasaland, the Federal government should engage the services of about 200 Africans to serve as Federal government propagandists. These paid African “partisans” would “be trained to go about the country spreading Federal propaganda” and it could “also be necessary to employ a similar number of supporters to accompany the propagandists.”¹⁵³

Some members of the Federal public Relations Division were willing to consider funding and employing these schemes on condition that that extra care was taken to ensure that they were conducted through ‘private’ organisations, which could not be directly associated with the Federal government.¹⁵⁴ However, the proposed use of underhand propaganda tactics by the Federal government was strongly opposed by the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky. Sir Roy argued that there was a high risk that any use of such methods by the Federal government could backfire and seriously damage the standing of the Federal government among Africans once they discovered that it was the Federal government that was behind the use of such methods.¹⁵⁵

The RIACs also sought to influence the direction of Federal information and propaganda policy in relation to Africans by encouraging the Federal government to adopt a personal approach to propagandising Africans in support of Federation. They emphasised the need to counteract African nationalist propaganda against Federation in especially the outlying areas of the Federation through increased tours by Federal and Territorial government officials to these areas. These tours would not only serve to increase personal contacts between government officials and Africans in these areas, but were also expected to make it possible for government officials to use their speeches to the African audiences they would

¹⁵¹ NAZ, F121/H202/2, Record of Meeting of the Northern Nyasaland Regional Information Committee, November, 1st, 1960, p. 3.

¹⁵² NAZ, F121/H202/2, Record of Meeting of the Northern Nyasaland Regional Information Committee held at 4:30 p.m. at the Home of S.G.B. Williams, Mzuzu, on Thursday, February, 2, 1961, pp. 2-3.

¹⁵³ NAZ, F121/H202/2, Record of Meeting of the Northern Nyasaland Regional Information Committee, November, 1st, 1960, p. 3.

¹⁵⁴ NAZ, F121/H202/2, Record of Meeting of the Northern Nyasaland Regional Information Committee, November, 1st, 1960, p. 3.

¹⁵⁵ NAZ, F121/H202/2, Record of Meeting of the Central Nyasaland Regional Information Committee held at the Lilongwe Motel at 5.p.m. on Wednesday, February 1, 1961, p. 2.

address on these tours to refute nationalist claims about Federation more quickly than was possible through print and radio propaganda.¹⁵⁶

The effectiveness of the RIACs was, however, limited by two major factors. First, the extremely limited representation of Africans on these European dominated RIACs meant that the formulation and implementation of Federal government propaganda policy for Africans remained a largely European preserve and did not reflect the multi-racial partnership which the Federal government consistently sought to project in its pro-Federation propaganda for Africans.

Second, the Federal government's resistance to and slowness in taking up some of the recommendations made by the RIACs led to frustration and anger among some of the RIACs. These RIACs came to believe that the Federal government did not take their recommendations seriously. This belief was not without foundation. Evidence shows that because the Federal government valued the intelligence function performed by the RIACs in providing it with information on public reception of Federal government propaganda, it was "anxious to keep these committees in an amiable frame of mind."¹⁵⁷ However, in private, the Federal government admitted that it felt justified in rejecting some of their recommendations because it believed that "the people on these committees [were] sometimes inclined to use their positions on these committees to air their pet grievances" about the Federal Information Services.¹⁵⁸

Another important aspect of the Federal government's reorganisation of its information services was the extension of its propaganda activities beyond its two traditional main centres of the Federation and the United Kingdom. While Voice and Vision greatly expanded the scope and scale of the Federal government's pro-Federation propaganda campaign in the United Kingdom, it also successfully persuaded the Federal government to extend its pro-Federation propaganda activities to the United States of America and to the newly independent states in Africa. Voice and Vision argued that the need to challenge "utter lies" about the Federation which were being spread by the Federation's opponents at the United Nations in New York and to counter "alarmingly widespread ignorance of the Federation among Americans" made it imperative for the Federal government to extend its pro-Federation propaganda to the USA.¹⁵⁹ In late 1962, the Federal government embarked on an intensified pro-Federation propaganda campaign in the USA sending a senior Federal

¹⁵⁶ NAZ, *F121/H3/50*, Memorandum on "Need for Local Propaganda Campaign" from W.E. Arnold, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to Secretary for Home Affairs, 7 February 1961, p. 1.

¹⁵⁷ *F121/H1/20*, E.G.G. Marsh, Acting Secretary for Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to J.M. McClurg, Director-General, FBC, 25 February 1961.

¹⁵⁸ *F121/H1/20*, E.G.G. Marsh, Acting Secretary for Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to J.M. McClurg, Director-General, FBC, 25 February 1961.

¹⁵⁹ NAZ, *F121/H3/47*, S.E. R. Wynne, Managing Director, Voice and Vision Ltd, London, "Report to the Federal government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on an Information Programme in the U.S.", 23 October, 1962.

government official to oversee the campaign. However, the slowness of the Federal government in extending its propaganda campaign to the USA was criticised by some newspapers in the Federation which argued that Federal government should have acted sooner as “anti-Federation propagandists have been busy for years now.”¹⁶⁰

By 1962, two years after the reorganisation of the Federal Information Services and the accompanying reformulation of Federal information and propaganda policy, it was evident that the Federal government had not succeeded in regaining the initiative from African nationalist and other opponents of Federation. In an effort to persuade the Federal government to once again rethink and make changes to its information and propaganda policy, A.J.A. Peck, a member of the Salisbury RIAC produced a detailed critique of the effectiveness of the propaganda machinery and effort of the Federal government and allied groups in the Federation. The critique sought to explain why the Federal government and its supporters had lost the propaganda initiative or “propaganda dominance” to the African nationalists and their sympathisers and how it could regain it.¹⁶¹ It did so through a detailed comparison of the effectiveness of the mainly integrative and defensive propaganda ideas and methods of the Federal government and the predominantly agitative propaganda tactics of its African nationalist opponents.¹⁶²

In a continued effort to regain the initiative from African nationalists, the Federal Public Relations Division was in early 1962 reorganised and expanded in order to further rationalise and coordinate its information and propaganda functions. The three major features of this second restructuring of the Federal Information Services were: first, the division of the Press and Publications Department into two distinct departments in order to separate press work from publications work. Second, the creation of a new department, the Department of Graphic Services to meet the growing need for the provision of creative and artistic services by the Public Relations Division. Third, the establishment of a Department of Regional Services whose primary responsibility was the management of the Federal Public Relations Division’s greatly increased information and propaganda activities in the northern territories where African opposition to Federation continued to be most pronounced and most militant.¹⁶³

Despite all its efforts discussed in this chapter, the Federal government had by 1963 still not succeeded in regaining the propaganda initiative from its African nationalist and other opponents and remained largely reactive in nature. Bemoaning the failure of the Federal

¹⁶⁰ “Federation to Conduct its Defence”, *Northern News*, 10 October, 1962; “Federal Publicity Drive in the US”, *Northern News*, 23 November, 1962.

¹⁶¹ NAZ, F121/H201/1, A.J.A. Peck, “Memorandum on Propaganda Dominance”, 13 July, 1962.

¹⁶² NAZ, F121/H201/1, A.J.A. Peck, “Memorandum on Propaganda Dominance”, 13 July, 1962.

¹⁶³ “The Federal Public Relations Division Expands”, *Central African Daily News*, 27 March, 1962.

propaganda machinery to regain the propaganda initiative from its opponents, Sidney Wynne, the Managing Director of Voice and Vision in 1963 stated:

We are obviously being manoeuvred into a position where we appear to be on the defensive all the time and it is the Fields and the Kaundas who seem to have all the initiative...this is likely to continue to be so until we have some new cards to play and I realise they are likely to be pretty scarce.¹⁶⁴

The same year saw the break-up and dissolution of the Federation. The information and propaganda functions which had been transferred to the Federal government were restored to the Territorial governments. The Working Party on the dissolution of the Federal Information Services recommended that the information assets of the Federal Information Services be shared among the Territorial governments by 31st October 1963, 'the date on which the function of Federal Public Relations would cease to exist.'¹⁶⁵

Conclusion

This chapter has examined how Federal government information and propaganda structures, especially regarding Africans, emerged and developed from the establishment of Federation in 1953 to its dissolution in 1963. It has highlighted the two major phases through which the development of Federal propaganda progressed highlighting the main characteristics of each phase. The chapter has demonstrated that Federal government propaganda policy especially for Africans developed belatedly in response to two major factors.

First, mounting African opposition to the establishment and continued existence of Federation and the Federal government's slowness in fully appreciating the true extent of this opposition and the serious threat that it posed to the continued survival of the Federation. Second, Federal-Territorial struggles over control of information and propaganda policy for Africans, which as noted in this chapter, not only delayed the establishment of Federal level propaganda structures and the development of a Federal level propaganda policy for Africans, but also influenced the character and effectiveness of the Federal government propaganda machinery and policy that emerged.

The chapter has revealed that the first phase in the development of Federal government information and propaganda policy was dominated by protracted and contentious negotiations between the Federal and Territorial governments about the extent to which

¹⁶⁴ NAZ, F121/H3/47, S.E.R. Wynne, Managing Director, Voice and Vision Ltd, London to Sir Athol Evans, Federal Secretary for Home Affairs, 11 March, 1963.

¹⁶⁵ NAZ, F266/E/145/A17/25, "Dissolution of the Federation: Sub-Committee III-Departmental Transfers: Information Services", 5 September 1963.

Territorial information functions and assets were to be federalised as part of the process of enabling the Federal government to assume its constitutional responsibility for Federal public relations. This phase, which covered the years in which the Federation enjoyed relative economic prosperity and political stability, saw the Federal government neglecting to make any strong and sustained effort to propagandise Africans in support of Federation. It also witnessed the adoption by the Federal government of the factual propaganda approach as one of the distinctive approaches of Federal government propaganda in support of Federation.

Among the main underlying assumptions of this factual propaganda approach, the chapter has shown, was the Federal government's belief that African opposition to Federation was primarily the product of African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda which intentionally distorted or kept them ignorant of what the Federal government claimed were the 'facts' concerning how Federation had immensely benefited Africans and continued to do so. This 'factual' propaganda approach, the chapter has established, sought to simultaneously legitimise Federal government propaganda in support of Federation and delegitimise anti-Federation propaganda especially from African nationalists by contrasting what it claimed were the lies and manipulative emotional appeals on which the latter was based with what it maintained were the "facts" and appeals to reason upon which its own claims about Federation were based.

Also highlighted in this chapter was how the second phase in the development of Federal government propaganda system unfolded at a time of political and economic crises in the Federation and was largely shaped by an information panic on the part of the Federal government. The chapter has shown that this information panic resulted in the reorganisation of the Federal Information Services and the emergence of panic-driven propaganda as the most dominant form of Federal government propaganda in support of Federation. It has also outlined the main phases and characteristics of this panic-driven propaganda emphasising, among others, two defining traits of this propaganda. First, how it was largely reactive rather than offensive in character. Second, how drawing extensively on the success story motif, it primarily focused on challenging the dominant African nationalist narrative of the Federation as a failure which would inevitably collapse by constructing a counter-narrative of the Federation as a successful and strong country which had a bright and long-term future.

The chapter has also shown how Federal-Territorial contestations over control of information and propaganda policy in the Federation were essentially rooted in the manner in which the Federal constitution divided information functions between the Federal and Territorial governments. The specific forms which these Federal-Territorial struggles over information and propaganda policy for Africans assumed in each of the three Federal

territories and their influence on the Federal government's efforts to propagandise Africans in support of Federation is examined in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

Chapter 3:

The Role of Africans in Federal Government Information and Propaganda Policy

Introduction

Previous studies on Federal government propaganda for Africans have focused largely on Africans as recipients of Federal government propaganda and have paid little or no attention to their roles in the formulation and implementation of Federal government propaganda. However, the available evidence shows that Africans in the Federation were not only the target of Federal government propaganda in support of Federation, but also participated in the formulation and implementation of Federal government propaganda that was targeted at Africans.

This chapter examines the role of Africans in Federal government information and propaganda policymaking and implementation. It focuses particularly on the Federal government's efforts to give Africans greater and higher level roles in the formulation and implementation of its African targeted pro-Federation propaganda policy. This was one of the central features of the development of Federal government propaganda policy between 1959 and 1963. The chapter examines the considerations that lay behind the Federal government's efforts to give Africans a bigger role in its information and propaganda policy. It also discusses how this approach affected the Federal government's effort to generate support for Federation, especially among Africans.

Two main arguments are put forward in the chapter. First, that the ways in which the Federal government sought to secure increased African involvement in its pro-Federation propaganda policy and practice for Africans as well as the timing of this move reflected its panic mentality in several ways. It reflected its panic over the greatly intensified African opposition to Federation and over its lack of adequate information about African opinion on Federation. The Federal government had become particularly worried that Federal government politicians and civil servants who were overwhelmingly European were not sufficiently knowledgeable of African opinion on Federation to enable them to effectively counter African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda.

Also reflected in the nature and timing of the Federal government's initiative was its anxious attempts to counter the widespread negative perceptions of the communicator credibility of the Federal Information Services. One of the major indicators of this crisis of poor communicator credibility was the intense pressure which was being exerted on the Federal government to practically demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment to multi-racial partnership. This pressure, which was both internal and external came not only from opponents of Federation, but also from supporters of Federation who believed the Federal

government should do more to make multi-racial partnership a practical reality. The Federal government sought to counter this pressure by for the first time appointing Africans to higher positions in the Federal Information Services and other branches of the Federal Civil Service.

Second, the chapter argues that the Federal government efforts to overcome its crisis of communicator credibility by according Africans more higher level roles in the formulation and implementation Federal government propaganda policy for Africans were unsuccessful. This failure, the chapter will argue, was partly due to the limited scope of the Federal government's 'elevation' of Africans to higher positions in the Federal Information Services and other branches of the Federal Civil Service. It was also due to the apparent success of African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda in undermining the communicator credibility of all African spokesmen for Federation. This was especially true of those Africans who held positions in the Federal government, parliament and the UFP and who were involved in putting out pro-Federation propaganda to their fellow-Africans. African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda continuously portrayed these Africans as 'stooges' of the Federal government who were 'selling-out' or betraying the anti-Federation cause of the majority of their fellow Africans.

The chapter is divided into two sections the first of which focuses on the nature of the roles assigned to Africans in the formulation and implementation of Federal government information and propaganda policy. It also discusses the Federal government's motivations in assigning Africans these roles. The second section examines why the Federal government's efforts to appoint Africans to higher level positions within its information services failed to make African and other opponents of Federation more receptive to its pro-Federation propaganda.

"Panic Multi-racial Partnership": African Participation in the Formulation and Implementation of Federal Government Propaganda Policy

African participation in information and propaganda activities in support of Federation can be traced back to the Federal information and propaganda campaigns that immediately preceded the establishment of the Federation in 1953. In these campaigns, some Africans had acted as interpreters at public meetings in which pro-Federation European officials were seeking to explain the Federal concept to African audiences and had also played a role in translating pro-Federation propaganda booklets into vernacular languages.¹ After the establishment of the Federation, Africans continued to participate in Federal government

¹ R. I. Rotberg, *The Rise of African Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1965, p. 243.

information and propaganda activities. However, their level of participation in Federal government information and propaganda policy during the first phase in the development of this policy was limited.

The main reasons for this was that during this first phase, the Federal government as demonstrated in the previous chapter, largely neglected to mobilise African opinion in support of Federation. This disregard of African anti-Federation sentiment was based on the Federal government's mistaken belief that African opposition to Federation would gradually disappear as the economic and political benefits of Federation to Africans became self-evident. The Federal regime believed that Africans did not yet pose any visible and immediate threats to the continued existence of the Federation. During this first phase, Africans were restricted to low-level positions in the Federal Information Services and their roles were mainly confined to assisting European Federal government information and propaganda personnel in putting across Federal information and propaganda to Africans. They were not accorded any meaningful role in the formulation of Federal government policy for Africans.

Increased and higher level African involvement in the formulation and implementation of Federal government propaganda policy, especially for Africans was predominantly a feature of the second phase of the development of Federal information policy. However, the scope of the higher level information and propaganda roles, which the Federal government accorded to Africans during this phase, was limited. Africans were restricted to the following two major functions: first, an advisory function which entailed providing the Federal government with information on the state of African opinion on Federation and their reactions to Federal government propaganda in support of Federation. This also encompassed making recommendations to the Federal government on how to best mobilise African opinion in favour of Federation. Second, a practical function of assisting in putting across Federal government propaganda to their fellow Africans under the direction and supervision of European the Federal government officials. The latter could not avoid relying on Africans to assist them in translating Federal government print, mobile cinema and radio propaganda into the indigenous African languages and putting it across to African audiences.

The Federal government first seriously considered appointing African Information Officers to the Federal Information Services in late 1956 largely as a result of political developments in Nyasaland, where African opposition to Federation was most virulent. Following mass demonstrations by Nyasaland Africans in 1956, anti-Federation sentiment among Nyasaland Africans remained very high. Inspectors of the Interim Federal Public Service Commission who visited Nyasaland in the wake of these anti-government demonstrations were "shocked

at the anti-Federal attitude of the African civil servants and African members of Parliament.”²

In an effort to counter the strong anti-Federation sentiment among Nyasaland Africans, the Federal Information Department had made financial provisions for the appointment in 1957 of an African Information Officer who would be based at the Regional Headquarters of the Federal Information Department in Zomba, Nyasaland. Two factors compelled the Federal Information Department to make an effort to bring forward its planned appointment of an African Information Officer for Nyasaland. First, the Governor of Nyasaland advised the Federal Information Department to proceed with the appointment as a matter of urgency because if this was not done both the Federal and Territorial governments would lose ground to anti-Federation African nationalists “that they [the Federal government] would never be able to make up.”³

Second, in early 1957, the Federal Home Affairs Ministry became aware that the Nyasaland government intended to soon appoint an African Information Officer to its Territorial Information Service. In order to avoid being perceived by Africans in the Federation as being less committed to African advancement in comparison with the Nyasaland government, the Federal government sought to more urgently proceed with its own appointment of a Federal African Information Officer for Nyasaland.⁴ Despite, the call made by the Governor of Nyasaland in 1956 for the urgent appointment of a Federal Information Officer for Nyasaland, the Federal government only made the appointment in mid-1957.⁵

The advertisement for the post of Federal African Information Assistant in Nyasaland attracted 156 applicants. This was a reflection that despite the overwhelming African opposition to Federation in Nyasaland and the hostility and stigma directed at African supporters of Federation in that territory, there were still some Africans who were willing to work for the Federal Information Services. Of these applicants, Mr. Ellis Oscar Mwasi was in June 1957 appointed to the post of Federal African Information Assistant in Nyasaland.⁶ The criterion upon which Mwasi’s selection and appointment was based as well as the duties he was expected to perform by the Federal Information Department was largely representative of the selection criterion and expected duties of African Information Officers later recruited by the Federal government.

² NAZ, *F121/H3*, Memorandum on “African Information Officers: Nyasaland” from W.V. Brelsford, Director, Federal Information Department to the Federal Secretary for Home Affairs, 23 November, 1956.

³ Ibid.

⁴ NAZ, *F121/H3*, Memorandum on “Appointment of African Officer: Nyasaland” from W.H. Hammond for Federal Secretary for Home Affairs to the Secretary to the Interim Federal Public Service Commission, 3 January, 1957.

⁵ NAZ, *F121/H3*, Memorandum on “Appointment of an African Information Assistant in Nyasaland” from Secretary, Federal Interim Public Service Commission to the Secretary, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, 1st June, 1957.

⁶ Ibid.

Mwasi was described by the Federal Information Department as “very pro-Federation in outlook” and as having “stuck to his guns [in defending his pro-Federation views] both in writing and in speech in spite of attacks by [the Nyasaland African] Congress and other bodies.”⁷ He had also prior to his appointment as Federal Information Assistant been editor of the Nyasaland newspaper, *Bwalo la Nyasaland* (the Nyasaland Forum) which was owned by Paver’s African Newspapers Limited.⁸ Mwasi was also very well educated and in addition to having very good command of written and spoken English could also speak and write in two major vernaculars, Nyanja and Tumbuka.⁹

The profiles of Africans who were later recruited by the Federal Information Department to serve as Federal Information Assistants were similar to Mwasi’s. All of them were well educated and strongly pro-Federation in their views. Most had been formerly employed by African Newspapers Limited as journalists and editors of its newspapers for Africans. Some of them had also been first approached to consider working for the Federal information Services partly on the strength of recommendations about their suitability for such service made to the Federal government by Paver, the Managing Director of African Newspapers Limited.

The Newspapers for Africans that were owned by African Newspapers Limited in all three Federal territories generally maintained a Pro-Federation editorial line, which, however, did not exclude criticism of certain aspects of Federation and coverage of the anti-Federation activities of the African nationalist movements in the Federation. Among the most well-known and widely circulated of these newspapers for Africans was the *Central African Daily News* which was based in Salisbury, the Federal and Southern Rhodesia capital. The Paver brothers’ support for Federation made them willing to allow the *Central African Daily News* and other newspapers for Africans under their stable to be used to publicise Federation and the Federal Information Department’s propaganda for Africans. Paver also informally advised the Federal government on issues relating to pro-Federation information and propaganda, especially for Africans.

In terms of his expected duties as Federal Information Officer for Nyasaland, Mwasi was principally expected to “influence African opinion in...[Nyasaland] towards favouring Federation” by writing, talking and broadcasting in support of Federation.¹⁰ He was also expected to “increase the flow of Information about Federal African activities to the

⁷ NAZ, F121/H3, W.V. Brelsford, Director, Federal Information Department to Secretary for Federal Home Affairs, 23 November, 1956.

⁸ NAZ, F121/H3, W.V. Brelsford, Director, Federal Information Department to the Federal Secretary for Home Affairs, 28 May, 1957.

⁹ NAZ, F121/H3, W.V. Brelsford, Director, Federal Information Department to Secretary for Federal Home Affairs, 23 November, 1956.

¹⁰ NAZ, F121/H3, Memorandum by Director, Federal Information Department, W.V. Brelsford on “African Information Assistant (Nyasaland): How to use him and what his Duties and Functions are”, 23 July, 1957.

European press and to Rhodesia House”.¹¹ However, because of the intense hostility of Nyasaland Africans to Federation, the Director of the Federal Information Department, W. V. Brelsford advised against instructing Mwasi to immediately begin delivering pro-Federation talks to the general African public as he would “he would only be beaten up or made to look like a fool” by African nationalist opponents of Federation.¹²

The years 1958 to 1963 which covered the second phase in the development of the Federal government’s information and propaganda policy were characterised by intensified opposition to Federation from Africans in the Federation as well as external opponents of Federation. Internal and external criticism of the Federal government’s policy of multi-racial partnership as mere window-dressing meant to disguise continued European dominance of Africans in the Federation greatly increased with Federal government coming under enormous pressure to practically demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment to multi-racial partnership. The Federal government which had earlier stated that it was determined to “resist any tendency to resort to what have been called measures of panic partnership in the face of pressure being put upon us”¹³ ultimately adopted such panic partnership measures.

In what was part of a broader panicked reaction to the strength of opposition to Federation from Africans in the Federation as well external opponents of Federation, the Federal government for the first time began appointing Africans to serve in its external missions.¹⁴ It also appointed Africans to serve as Federal government Information Assistants in Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia.¹⁵ The appointments were primarily intended to counter growing criticism that as with many other Federal political, economic and social structures, the racial composition of the Federal government’s public relations representatives both at home and abroad did not reflect the multi-racial partnership that the Federal government claimed to stand for.¹⁶

As had been the case with the appointment of the first African Information Assistant, Edward Mwasi in 1957, applicants for these Federal public relations posts within and outside the Federation were required to have “a real belief in Federation”, be well educated and articulate and be prepared to publicly promote and defend the Federation in speech

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., p. 2.

¹³ R.I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1965, p. 307.

¹⁴ NAZ, F121/H3, Memorandum on “African Information Officer: London” from Secretary for Federal Home Affairs to Secretary, Interim Federal Public Service Commission, 13 February, 1959.

¹⁵ NAZ, F121/H3, Memorandum on “African Information Assistants: Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia” from W.V. Brelsford, Director, Federal Information Department to Federal Secretary for Home Affairs, 26th September, 1958.

¹⁶ NAZ, F121/H3, Memorandum on “African Information Officer: London” from Secretary for Federal Home Affairs to Secretary, Interim Federal Public Service Commission, 13 February, 1959.

and in writing.¹⁷ Mr. Lawrence C. Vambe, a Southern Rhodesian African who had worked for African Newspapers Limited as Editor-in-Chief of its newspapers for Africans in April 1959 became the first African to be appointed serve in the external section of the Federal Civil Service. Vambe was appointed to the post of Assistant Information Attaché at Rhodesia House in London, becoming the first African to hold this post.¹⁸ In early 1960, Mr. J.Z. Gumede another Southern Rhodesian African was appointed to serve as an additional African Assistant Information Attaché at Rhodesia House in London.¹⁹ Mr. Mike Masotsha Hove, a Southern Rhodesia African in 1962 became the first African to head a Federal government external mission when he was appointed the Federation's High Commissioner in Lagos, Nigeria.²⁰ In the Federation, Mr. E.W. Chamba was in January 1959 appointed Federal African Information Assistant for Southern Rhodesia. A Federal Information Assistant for Northern Rhodesia was also appointed around the same time.²¹

The internal and public contestations surrounding the appointment of these African Information Officers provide some insights on the Federal Information Department's views about the place of African information and propaganda practitioners in Federal government information policy. From 1957, the year in which the Federal government first started recruiting African Information Officers to serve in the Federation and abroad right up to the break-up of the Federation in 1963, the Federal Information Department constantly complained that it was experiencing "the greatest difficulty in attracting Africans of a suitable calibre" to fill these posts, particularly in relation to the Federal government's external missions.²²

This stance brought the Federal Information Department into conflict with Sir Albert Robinson the Federation's High Commissioner in London. Sir Albert wanted to have more African Assistant Information Attachés quickly appointed to work at Rhodesia House as a way of countering the enormous pressure he was facing to provide the world with practical evidence that Rhodesia House and the Federal government that it represented were committed to multi-racial partnership.²³ Rejecting the claims of the Federal Information Department that it was extremely difficult to find suitably qualified Africans to serve as

¹⁷ NAZ, F121/H3, Secretary for Local Government and Social Services, Zomba, Nyasaland to F.L. Finnie, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, 15th October, 1959.

¹⁸ "Vambe appointed to Federal Post in London", *African Daily News*, 17 April, 1959.

¹⁹ "Federation has no Need to Feel Inferior-Gumede", *African Daily News*, 4 June, 1960.

²⁰ "Hove is Appointed High Commissioner in Nigeria", *African Daily News*, 22 march, 1962.

²¹ NAZ, F121/H3, Secretary, Interim Federal Public Service Commission to Director, Federal Information Department,

²² NAZ, F121/H3, Confidential from A.D. Evans, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to Sir A.E. P. Robinson, High Commissioner for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to London, Rhodesia House, London, 22 November, 1962.

²³ NAZ, F121/H3, Confidential letter from A.E. P. Robinson, High Commissioner for Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Rhodesia House, London to H.N. Parry, Office of the Federal Prime Minister and External Affairs, 8th November, 1962.

Assistant Information Attachés at Rhodesia House, Sir Albert wrote: "I do not accept the views of the Ministry of Home Affairs that suitable Africans are not available."²⁴

Despite this challenge from Sir Albert, the Federal Information Department and the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs under which it fell continued to insist that the low standard of African applicants made it very difficult for them to find and appoint suitably qualified Africans to serve as Assistant Information Attachés in the Federal government's external missions.²⁵ Evidence from the Federal Home Affairs Ministry's internal records indicates that Sir Albert was correct to reject this Ministry's claims that there were hardly any Africans who were suitably qualified to serve as African Information Officers in the Federal government's external missions.

This evidence shows that contrary to the Federal Home Affairs Ministry's assertions, there were many educated and capable Africans who wanted to serve as African Information Officers in the Federal government's external missions. The vast majority of these Africans were, however, never seriously considered for appointment to such posts because of the Federal government's long-standing gradualist approach to multi-racial partnership and African advancement. This approach was premised on the Federal government's belief that Africans still had very a long way to go before they acquired the education, skills and experience that would entitle them to be treated as equal partners with Europeans.

The Federal government's negative attitude to African advancement was exhibited in 1962 when the Federal Home Affairs Ministry received a total of 95 applications from Africans who wanted to be considered for appointment to 5 vacant posts of African Information Officers. The latter were to be posted to Federal government external missions in the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Kenya and Nigeria. Of these 95 applicants, the Federal Home Affairs Ministry found only 16 to be suitable to be interviewed for the vacant posts. After interviewing these 16 applicants, the Federal Home Affairs Ministry recommended 5 of them for appointment.²⁶

George Payne Kahari a Southern Rhodesian school headmaster who held a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of South Africa²⁷ and a post-graduate education diploma from Leeds University emerged as the "outstanding candidate in the application list"²⁸. Before going to England to study for his post-graduate diploma in education, Kahari had served as a

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ NAZ, F121/H3, Memorandum on "Applicants/Information Officers (Africans)" from Colin Black, Director, Press and Public Relations, Federal Public Relations Division to Mr. G. D. Brunette, Federal Ministry of Home, 26 March, 1963.

²⁶ NAZ, F121/H3, Memorandum on "African Information Officer Vacancies" from W. E. Arnold, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to Federal Minister of Home Affairs, 8 October, 1962.

²⁷ "Rhodesian obtains BA Degree", *African Daily News*, 15 February 1958.

²⁸ NAZ, F121/H3, Memorandum on "African Information Officer Vacancies" from W. E. Arnold, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to Federal Minister of Home Affairs, 8 October, 1962.

member of the Federal government's Regional Information Advisory Committee for the Eastern Districts in Southern Rhodesia.²⁹ While studying at Leeds Kahari had also spoken to English audiences in support of Federation. Of the 5 Africans who were ultimately recommended for appointment, Kahari was the only who was "was very strongly recommended" by the Federal Home Affairs Ministry while the others were deemed satisfactory. In strongly recommending Kahari for appointment, the Federal Home Affairs Ministry described him as "a ready speaker" who had a "good appearance" and "attractive personality" and was above all "strongly pro-Federation."³⁰

Ultimately, Kahari declined to take up the post which he had been so strongly recommended for because it offered him a significantly lower salary than he was earning as a school headmaster.³¹ However, the selection process in which Kahari had emerged as the only outstanding African applicant highlights the strength of the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs's belief that most Africans were not qualified to be appointed to high level positions in the Federal Information Services.

These views on the poor suitability of Africans for service as public relations representatives in the Federal government's foreign missions was a reflection of a broader Federal government belief that Africans were not sufficiently educated and experienced to serve competently in high-level Federal government posts. Commenting on the calibre of Africans such as Jasper Savanhu, who in 1959 became the first African in the Federation to be appointed to a ministerial in the Federal government, Julius Greenfield who was Federal Home Affairs Minister for several years stated that these:

Junior African Ministers...never came anywhere near being really suitable for the posts into which they were put, but ...were put there from the standpoint that a beginning had to be made somewhere and some sort of training had to be given, but the headaches we went through in the process of giving this training and the disappointments we had were tremendous.³²

Greenfield also maintained that there was a "lack of good quality African politicians within the Federal Party" in all three territories and that there were "none whatsoever" of the calibre that the Federal government felt they could work with.³³ The Federal government's belief that Africans still had a very long way to go before they could be considered to have

²⁹ NAZ, *F121/H202/2*, Record of Meeting of the Eastern Districts Regional Information Committee, held in the Conference Room, Government Buildings, Umtali at 3 p.m. on Friday December 2nd, 1960.

³⁰ NAZ, *F121/H3*, Memorandum on "African Information Officer Vacancies" from W. E. Arnold, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to Federal Minister of Home Affairs, 8 October, 1962.

³¹ NAZ, *F121/H3*, Memorandum on "African Information Officer Vacancies" from W. E. Arnold, 8 October, 1962.

³² NAZ, *Oral/GR2*, Julius Macdonald Greenfield interviewed at High Court, Lobengula Street, Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, 5 November, 1970, p. 60.

³³ NAZ, *Oral/GR2*, Julius Macdonald Greenfield, 6 September, 1971, p. 92.

acquired the knowledge and skills needed to make them equal partners with Europeans in government and other spheres of life was shared by the majority of Europeans in the Federation.

In particular, the reactions of European Federal Public Relations Division staff to the appointment of Africans to serve as information attachés in the Federal government's external missions shows that the Federal Public Relations Division was not seriously committed to the multi-racial partnership and African advancement which it sought to project in its internal and external pro-Federation propaganda. The appointment of Africans to serve as information officers in Federal government external missions was by the 1960s attracting much anger and jealousy from many European Federal Information Officers who felt that Africans lacked the qualifications and experience to be appointed to such posts ahead of Europeans or an equal footing with them.³⁴

In early 1963, Colin Black, the Director of the Press and Publications Division of the Federal Public Relations Division, sent a memorandum to the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs in which he complained about how the low standard of African applicants was making it difficult to find suitably qualified Africans to serve in the Federal government's foreign missions. He also strongly protested against the posting of Mr. Somkence, a Southern Rhodesian African to Lagos, Nigeria to serve as the Federal government's public relations representative in the Office of the Federal High Commissioner to Nigeria. Black wrote:

It should be noted that considerable resentment is growing among the members of my Department, because Africans with scant qualifications are being posted to external missions at what appear to be inflated salaries and reasonably lavish allowances. A case in point is the move of Mr. Somkence to Lagos, where, it is understood, he will have a round figure income of £2,000 while the European officer from External Affairs who has gone to Lagos with him will be pegged at about £1,000 a year. Mr. Somkence's work in my Department was far from satisfactory. Despite widespread criticism he was still posted to Nigeria.³⁵

This protest over the posting of Somkence should not be viewed as reflecting any serious divisions among Europeans in the Federal government over the nature and pace of African advancement. In fact, the Territorial governments as well as the vast majority of Europeans in the Federal and Territorial civil services and society shared and supported the Federal government's gradualist approach to multi-racial partnership and African advancement. The Nyasaland Civil Service, for instance, was divided into a senior and junior section with the

³⁴ NAZ, F121/H3, Memorandum on "Applicants/Information Officers (Africans)" from Colin Black, Director, Press and Public Relations Division, Federal Public Relations Division to Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, 26 March, 1963.

³⁵ Ibid.

former being predominantly reserved for Europeans while the overwhelming majority Africans were relegated to the latter. In its anti-Federation propaganda the Nyasaland African Congress was strongly critical of this division of the Nyasaland civil service along racial lines and of the fact that when 38 Africans were admitted into the senior section “all the Europeans in their grade were [immediately] upgraded or given other posts.”³⁶

The Federal government’s belated and limited appointments of Africans into relatively “senior” positions in its information services and other sections of the Federal Civil Service, therefore, did not reflect any serious commitment to multi-racial partnership and African advancement. Instead, it represented a panic-driven reaction to intensified internal and external pressure for it to practically demonstrate the multi-racial partnership which it claimed the Federation was founded on. It was a resort by the Federal government to the “panic partnership” it had earlier stated it was determined to resist.

Virtually all these appointments of Africans were made between 1958 and 1963 the crisis-ridden years in which the Federation itself was experiencing acute opposition locally and globally. The appointment during this time of Africans into the internal information and propaganda structures of the Federal government and the roles assigned to them within those structures reflected the Federal government’s panic about its lack of sufficient information about African opinion on Federation. As highlighted in the preceding chapter of this thesis, in the wake of its belated realisation of the strength of African opposition to Federation, the Federal government came to believe that widespread ignorance of African opinion on Federation among European civil servants and politicians was undermining Federal government efforts to effectively counter anti-Federation African nationalist propaganda.

The production from late 1960 onwards of a weekly digest called “Opinion in African Newspapers” which was mainly circulated among Federal government European civil servants and politicians was part of the Federal government’s panic-driven reaction to its lack of adequate knowledge about African opinion on Federation. Prepared by the Federal government’s office of Race Affairs and the Press and Publications Department of the Federal Public Relations Division, the digest was a summary with comments of African opinion on Federation and Federal issues as reflected in newspapers for Africans such as the *African Daily News*, *African Weekly* and *African Eagle*.³⁷

Another key aspect of the Federal government’s response to its lack of adequate information about African opinion on Federation was reflected in the new information and propaganda role that it assigned to Jasper Savanhu, an African Federal MP of the UFP who

³⁶ K. Chiume, *Nyasaland Demands Secession and Independence*, Cairo, Middle-East Publications, 1960, p. 21-22.

³⁷ NAZ, F128/L15, Opinion in African Newspapers, February 22-28, 1961, No. 27

was from Southern Rhodesia. In a reflection of the Federal government's resort to "panic partnership", which was primarily intended to persuade its critics both at home and abroad that it was committed to multi-racial partnership and African advancement, Savanhu was in March 1959 appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs with special responsibility for race affairs thus becoming the first African to be appointed to a ministerial position in the Federal government.³⁸

At the time of his appointment as Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, Savanhu already enjoyed extensive coverage in Federal government propaganda for Africans as part of its effort to counter what it characterised as the "extremist" voices and positions of anti-Federation African nationalists. The Federal government sought to do this by using its propaganda for Africans to build up the voices and profiles of prominent Africans such as Savanhu who strongly supported Federation. Savanhu and other prominent pro-Federation Africans were portrayed in this propaganda as "moderate" and "responsible" Africans whose rise to prominent political and economic positions demonstrated how Federation was a "success story" of multi-racial partnership and economic progress which had and continued to benefit Africans.³⁹

In August 1960, the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs tasked Savanhu with the production for the first time of "a [confidential] weekly commentary or 'editorial' on matters of moment discussed in the African press."⁴⁰ The commentary was mainly circulated to white Federal government civil servants and politicians alongside the weekly digest of opinion in African newspapers. Its primary purpose was to enable the Federal government to more effectively counter African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda by "giving the background to certain views or solutions advanced by Africans and...throwing some light on the African's thought processes" concerning Federation and related issues.⁴¹

The Federal government's efforts to improve its knowledge of African opinion on Federation as way of enhancing its capacity to counter anti-Federation African nationalist propaganda was also reflected in its appointment of Africans as members of some of the Regional Information Advisory Committees (RIACs) that it established in 1960. Africans had previously not been granted membership to any Federal government information and propaganda committees. In Southern Rhodesia, the African members of the RIACs were Mr. K.D. Dube

³⁸ "Savanhu's Elevation", *The African Home News*, 4 April, 1959; "Savanhu's Appointment", *African Daily News*, 25 March, 1959.

³⁹ *Success Stories: African Achievement in Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Salisbury, Federal Information Department, 1960.

⁴⁰ NAZ, F128/L15, "Confidential Commentary" by J.Z. Savanhu, Federal M.P. and Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Minister of Home Affairs, August, 1960.

⁴¹ NAZ, F128/L15, "Confidential Commentary" by J.Z. Savanhu, August, 1960.

and Mr. C.C. Ngcebetsha who were members of the Bulawayo RIAC,⁴² Mr. George Payne Kahari who briefly served as a member of the Eastern Districts RIAC before proceeding to Leeds University in the United Kingdom to further his academic studies,⁴³ Mr. V.M. Gwinyai, who was also a member of the Eastern Districts RIAC,⁴⁴ Mr. Aaron Jacha, Mr. C. Mzingeli and Reverend M.J. Rusike who were members of the Salisbury RIAC.⁴⁵ Most of these African members of the RIACs were members of the UFP and one, Mr. C.C. Ngcebetsha, the UFP Chairman for Bulawayo African Township, owned a newspaper, the *African Home News*, which was strongly pro-Federation.

These African members of the RIACs were expected to advise the Federal government on the state of African opinion on Federation in their areas, the reception of Federal government propaganda by these Africans and the strategies which the Federal government could adopt to more effectively mobilise African opinion in support of Federation.⁴⁶

‘Stooges’ and ‘Sell-outs’? African Salesmen of Federation and the Crisis of Communicator Credibility in the Federal Information Services

Federal government efforts to appoint Africans into positions formerly held by Europeans in its internal and external information propaganda structures, however, proved to be of limited value in helping the Federal government to improve its knowledge of African opinion on Federation and to formulate and implement more effective strategies to gain African support for Federation. There were several reasons for this.

First, it intensified the crisis of poor communicator credibility faced by this government and its information services among Africans in the Federation. Almost all the African appointees to higher posts in the Federal Information Services and other branches of the Federal Civil were Southern Rhodesian. This served to highlight the Southern Rhodesia-centric nature of Federation, thus, reinforcing the widely held belief of Africans in Northern Rhodesia and

⁴² NAZ, F121/H202/2, Vol. II, Record of the Meeting of the Bulawayo Regional Information Committee Held in the Conference Room, Victoria Hotel, Bulawayo, at 8:15 pm on Wednesday, 19th October, 1960, p. 1.

⁴³ NAZ, F121/H202/2, Vol. II, Record of Meeting of the Eastern Districts Regional Information Committee Held in the Conference Room, Government Buildings, Umtali at 5 p.m. on Friday, 21st October, 1960, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁴ NAZ, F121/H202/2, Vol. II, Record of Meeting of the Eastern Districts Regional Information Committee Held in the Conference Room, Government Buildings, Umtali at 3 p.m. on Friday, 2nd December, 1960, p. 1.

⁴⁵ NAZ, F121/H202/2, Vol. II, Record of Meeting of the Salisbury Regional Information Committee Held in the Conference Room, Ministry of Home Affairs, Salisbury at 5 p.m. on Friday 14th July, 1961, p. 1.

⁴⁶ NAZ, F121/H202/2, Vol. II, Record of the Meeting of the Bulawayo Regional Information Committee Held in the Conference Room, Victoria Hotel, Bulawayo, at 8:15 pm on Wednesday, 19th October, 1960, p. 1.

Nyasaland that Federation existed only to serve the interests of Southern Rhodesia at the expense of the two Northern territories.⁴⁷

The appointment in February 1960 of Josiah Gumede, a Southern Rhodesian African, as an additional Federal African Assistant Information Attaché at Rhodesia House triggered strong criticism from I. H. Samuriwo, an African MP in the Federal Parliament. Samuriwo described Gumede's appointment as "a clear indication of the Federal government's failure to get popular support from Africans in the two northern territories."⁴⁸ Demanding the immediate withdrawal of Gumede's appointment and his replacement by an African appointee from Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland, Samuriwo emphasised that it was crucial that the Federal government "allow for fair representation of all three [Federal] territories out in London, rather than pack and cram Rhodesia House with people from Southern Rhodesia."⁴⁹ "Rhodesia House", Samuriwo stated, "now deserves to be called Southern Rhodesia House, which, in fact, it is."⁵⁰

Second, these efforts because they were fundamentally a belated reaction to the strength of African opposition to Federation came too late and did not go far enough. Africans appointed to higher Federal government information and propaganda posts were not allowed to exercise the independence of action that may have enabled them to more effectively contribute to the Federal government propaganda effort. They were compelled to continue working under the close supervision of their European superiors who continued to dominate the formulation and implementation of Federal government information and propaganda policy for Africans.

For instance, as one of his main duties the Federal African Information Assistant for Nyasaland was required by the Federal Information Department to carefully study the African press and compile press cuttings of "any comments of Federal import."⁵¹ He had to bring "these press cuttings whether in English or vernacular...to the attention of the [European] Information Officer who [was the one who had the power to] to decide whether any action [was] necessary, and if so, what."⁵² In order to build up the profile of the African

⁴⁷ That Southern Rhodesia was the major economic beneficiary of Federation at the expense of its two northern partners has been confirmed by numerous scholarly studies, for instance, A. S. Mlambo, "From the Second World War to UDI", in B. Raftopoulos and A.S. Mlambo (eds), *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History From the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008*, Johannesburg, Jacana Media, 2009, p. 91; P.S. Nyambara, "The Economics of Partnership: The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: 1953-1963", Paper Presented to the Tenth International Economic History Congress, Leuven, Belgium, 19-27 August, 1990; Hazlewood, A. and Henderson, P.D. *Nyasaland: The Economics of Federation*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1960, p. 16.

⁴⁸ "Gumede is a Wrong Choice-Samuriwo", *African Daily News*, 18 February, 1960.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ NAZ, F121/H3, Memorandum by Director, Federal Information Department, W.V. Brelsford on "African Information Assistant (Nyasaland): How to use him and what his Duties and Functions are", 23 July, 1957.

⁵² NAZ, F121/H3, Memorandum by Director, Federal Information Department, W.V. Brelsford on "African Information Assistant (Nyasaland)", 23 July, 1957.

Information Assistant as a spokesman for Federation in the eyes of his fellow-Africans, the Federal Information Department also instructed that every letter or comment which was sent to the African press carry the signature of the African Information Assistant even if the authors of such letters or comments were European Information Officers of the Federal Information Department.⁵³

This requirement showed that the Federal Information Department was essentially pursuing a policy of seeking to change negative African perceptions of its communicator credibility by exploiting the racial identity of its African information assistants and other prominent pro-Federation Africans without giving them any meaningful say in the formulation and implementation of Federal government information and propaganda policy for Africans. In the Federal government RIACs, deliberations and decision-making concerning Federal government information and propaganda policy for Africans continued to be dominated by European members of the RIACs who greatly outnumbered their African counterparts.

The Federal government's intolerance of any African information assistants who publicly exhibited independent-mindedness and frankness in the course of carrying out their duties was reflected in the troubled relationship it had with Lawrence Vambe, its first African Assistant Information Attaché at Rhodesia House in London. At Rhodesia House, Vambe worked as part of a Federal government information team that included two European information officers, Mr. Anthony, the Chief Information Attaché and Mr. Williams, an Assistant Information Attaché.⁵⁴ Vambe was aware that his appointment was primarily intended to enable the Federal government to overcome the obvious communicator credibility problem that its exclusively European information officials at Rhodesia House were facing. Their racial identity as whites was proving to be a major handicap in their efforts to change the anti-Federal perceptions of British people who believed the African nationalist narrative that the Federation had to be immediately dissolved as it had dismally failed to implement the multi-racial partnership that it claimed to be founded upon.⁵⁵

Upon his arrival at Rhodesia House, Vambe because of the assumed advantages of his identity as an African Federal government information official "found himself taking on the main burden of arguing in favour of the merits of Federation" to European audiences in the United Kingdom.⁵⁶ Vambe believed that the Federal government was very fortunate to have found in him "an African...who had the courage of his conviction to speak in favour of the [Federal] scheme at a time when all [African] nationalists in the three territories said

⁵³ NAZ, *F121/H3*, Memorandum by Director, Federal Information Department, W.V. Brelsford on "African Information Assistant (Nyasaland)", 23 July, 1957.

⁵⁴ NAZ, *Oral/233*, Lawrence Vambe interviewed by I. Johnstone, Brockhouse Ltd, Barking Road, Willowvale, Harare, 8 June 1983, p. 33.

⁵⁵ NAZ, *Oral/233*, Lawrence Vambe, 8 June 1983, p. 33.

⁵⁶ NAZ, *Oral/233*, Lawrence Vambe, 8 June 1983, p. 33.

they were dead against it.”⁵⁷ He, therefore, expected that the Federal government would grant him a considerable measurable of autonomy in his efforts to speak and act in defence of Federation.

However, Vambe’s independent-mindedness and bluntness in publicly expressing to white audiences in the United Kingdom some of his views on Federation soon became a source of constant friction between him and the Federal government.⁵⁸ In January 1960, Vambe made public remarks in the United Kingdom in which he stated that it was not in the best interests of the Federation to lobby the British government to grant it Dominion status before it had fully implemented its declared policy of multi-racial partnership. In January 1961, Vambe made a speech to thousands of European schoolchildren in the United Kingdom in which he was widely reported in the United Kingdom and Federal Press as having expressed his support for inter-racial marriages as one of the solutions to the problems of multi-racial communities such as the Federation.⁵⁹

In both instances, Vambe’s comments triggered hostile reactions from the majority of Europeans in Southern Rhodesia, which had the most racially discriminatory laws and practices in the Federation and where the campaign to secure Dominion status for the Federation as a means of entrenching white rule in the Federal territories enjoyed strong support. There were calls by some European MPs in both the Territorial and Federal Parliaments for Vambe to be immediately recalled from London and be effectively dismissed from his post. These MPs argued that the Federal government should not allow Vambe to continue in his post as his indiscreet utterances and conduct were highly improper for an African information official entrusted with presenting to Europeans in the UK a positive image of image of race relations in the Federation. Vambe’s indiscretions, they claimed, were attracting negative internal and external publicity of the Federation’s race policies.⁶⁰

In public, Sir Malcolm Barrow, the Federal Minister of Home Affairs, sought to quickly suppress European protests over Vambe’s remarks by claiming that Vambe had been misquoted by the press. He also stated that since joining Rhodesia House as an information attaché Vambe’s “sincerity and frankness [had] been a considerable asset to the Federation and that he [had] created a most favourable impression among the audiences he [had] addressed.”⁶¹ However, in private the Federal government had come to view Vambe’s sincerity and frankness as a serious liability in its efforts to win public support for Federation among Europeans in the United Kingdom as well as among Africans in the Federation. The

⁵⁷ NAZ, *Oral/233*, Lawrence Vambe, 8 June 1983, p. 33.

⁵⁸ NAZ, *Oral/233*, Lawrence Vambe, 8 June 1983, p. 33.

⁵⁹ “The African Diplomat”, *African Daily News*, 9 January, 1961.

⁶⁰ “Vambe is being Intimidated”, *African Daily News*, 19 January, 1961; NAZ, *Oral/233*, Lawrence Vambe, 8 June 1983, p. 35; Examples of the Federal government’s pro-Dominion status propaganda include *Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: A Note on Dominion Status*, Salisbury, Federal Information Department, 1958.

⁶¹ “Barrow Support for Vambe”, *African Daily News*, 14 January, 1961.

Federal government was highly concerned that Vambe's utterances and actions were serving to bring into question the Federal and Territorial governments' commitment to multi-racial partnership. Vambe was, therefore, duly reprimanded by his employer after being privately questioned over his utterances and insisting that he had not been misquoted and refusing to retract his remarks, which he maintained had been made in his personal capacity and not as a representative of the Federal government.⁶²

In February 1961, Vambe resigned from his post, but withdrew his resignation in early March. This happened after Vambe had in January 1961 gotten married to a European woman, Miss Kathleen Boyer who was a private secretary in London. Vambe emphasised that political reasons and not his marriage to Miss Boyer were behind his initial resignation and that he had not faced any criticism from his employer or any prejudice from his colleagues at Rhodesia House as a result of his marriage to a European woman.⁶³ However, the available evidence suggests that the Federal government was already contemplating removing Vambe from his post and replacing him with a less independent and less outspoken African Assistant Information Attaché.⁶⁴ It, however, sought to do so in a way that would not attract adverse publicity about race relations and the Federal government's commitment to multi-racial partnership.

Another major reason why the Federal government failed to benefit from elevating Africans to higher level positions in its information services was that this government failed to seriously consider and implement some frank and constructive recommendations from these Africans about how the Federal government could improve its knowledge of African opinion and more effectively mobilise Africans in support of Federation.

African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda successfully cultivated a negative stereotype of all Africans who were employed by the Federal government to sell the Federal concept and state to their fellow Africans and other opponents of Federations. This stereotype which proved to be very resilient and which rapidly gained widespread acceptance among Africans in the Federation portrayed these pro-Federation Africans as obsequious collaborationists who never gave their European masters honest assessments of the true state of African opinion on Federation. However, the evidence as already demonstrated in the case of Lawrence Vambe shows that role played by these pro-Federation Africans was more complex than conveyed by the one-sided claims of African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda.

⁶² NAZ, *Oral/233*, Lawrence Vambe, 8 June 1983, p. 35; "Barrow Support for Vambe", *African Daily News*, 14 January, 1961.

⁶³ "Vambe Keeps his Job", *African Daily News*, 3 March, 1961.

⁶⁴ NAZ, *Oral/233*, Lawrence Vambe, 8 June 1983.

In taking on the task of producing a weekly editorial on African viewpoints concerning important political and related developments in the Federation, Jasper Savanhu was quick to advise the Federal government that: "The only really effective method of becoming better informed on African opinion is by Federal politicians and civil servants achieving closer contact with Africans and by regular reading of African newspapers."⁶⁵ The Federal government can be said to have made a noticeable effort to improve its knowledge of African opinion on Federation by, among other measures, preparing and circulating among its European civil servants internal news summaries and digests of African opinion on Federation as reflected in the major newspapers for Africans in the Federation. It, however, failed to make a serious and sustained effort to implement Savanhu's recommendation that it seek closer personal contacts with Africans.

Savanhu also strongly recommended that the Federal government significantly accelerate the implementation of its scheme of African advancement as the failure of educated Africans to secure higher posts in the Federal and Territorial civil services was generating considerable frustration and anti-Federation sentiment among these Africans. African nationalist opponents of Federation, Savanhu argued, were taking advantage of the slow pace of African advancement as well as the general lack of equal employment and educational opportunities for Africans in the Federation to devise and disseminate anti-Federation propaganda. This anti-Federation propaganda resonated with most of these Africans because it promised them massive and speedy economic and political benefits if they supported the African nationalist campaign to break up the Federation and achieve African self-rule.⁶⁶

That the Federal government's ability to establish greater personal contact with Africans and end racial discrimination in land ownership and other spheres of life was limited by the Federal constitution was readily acknowledged by Savanhu. This constraint mainly arose from the fact this constitution made most of the issues relating to the day-to-day lives of Africans the exclusive constitutional responsibility of the Territorial governments. However, Savanhu still felt that these constitutional constraints could not excuse the Federal government's failure to make rapid and substantial progress in implementing multi-racial partnership and African advancement at Federal level.⁶⁷ So concerned was Savanhu that the candid tone of his confidential commentaries could ruffle the feathers of his European superiors that he found it necessary to reassure them that:

⁶⁵ NAZ, *F128/L15*, Confidential Commentary" by J.Z. Savanhu, Federal M.P. and Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Minister of Home Affairs, August, 1960.

⁶⁶ NAZ, *F128/L15*, "Confidential Commentary, No. 10" by J.Z. Savanhu, Federal M.P. and Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, 2 November, 1960.

⁶⁷ NAZ, *AOH/5*, Jasper Zengeza Savanhu, interviewed by Dawson Munjeri, Mayambarara, Southern Rhodesia, 28th February, 1977, p.50.

...these commentaries are not meant to be an expression of the writer's personal views, but merely an attempt at a genuine reflection of the African people's attitude to certain aspects of government policy and, in particular the reasons[for this]. If the language used should appear sometimes to be very strong it is not intentional; it is merely the interpretation of the African's strong feelings on the [matters discussed.]⁶⁸

Savanhu's recommendations were consistent with those regularly made by newspapers for Africans such as the *African Daily News*, which pursued an editorial line that was generally supportive of Federation. *The African Daily News* consistently called on the Federal government to speed up the rate of African advancement as providing tangible proof of its commitment to multi-racial partnership and African advancement was the only way that the Federal government could get Africans to be receptive to its pro-Federation propaganda and particularly to African salesmen of Federation.

Despite these recommendations, the Federal government did not depart from its gradualist approach to African advancement. This was evidenced by the very slow rate at which it appointed Africans to higher posts in the Federal Information Services and other sections of the Federal Civil Service, the circumstances of their appointments and the roles assigned to them in their posts.

The effectiveness of African nationalist opponents of Federation in undermining the communicator credibility of African salesmen and spokesmen of Federation was arguably the most significant factor in limiting their capacity to enhance the effectiveness of the Federal government's internal and external pro-Federation propaganda campaigns. African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda was able to severely undermine the communicator credibility of African salesmen and spokesmen of Federation such as Jasper Svanhu, Lawrence Vambe and the UFP African MPs in the Federal parliament. It did so by continually and successfully portraying them as 'stooges' who did not represent or speak for the majority of Africans in the Federation because they had been elected by a predominantly European electorate in political system in which the vast majority of Africans were denied the right to vote.⁶⁹

Other derogatory terms which were commonly used by African nationalist propagandists to refer to African supporters and salesmen of Federation were 'sell-outs', 'Tshombes' (in reference to Moise Tshombe who tried to secede from the newly independent Congo), and 'Capricornists' (referring to predominantly white liberals and some African intellectuals who

⁶⁸ NAZ, F128/L15, "Confidential Commentary, No. 10" by J.Z. Svanhu, Federal M.P. and Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, 2 November, 1960.

⁶⁹ "Nyasa African MPs Represent Nobody-Dr. Banda", *African Daily News*, 1 November, 1958.

supported the idea of multi-racial partnership under the Federal regime).⁷⁰ These negative labels were intended to stigmatise all African supporters of Federation and delegitimise their pro-Federation activities by depicting them as people who were selling-out their fellow Africans by supporting the Federal idea and state, which was strongly opposed by the vast majority of Africans.

African salesmen of Federation were ostracised by their fellow Africans for allowing themselves to be used as “window dressing” by the Federal government in order to legitimise the continuation of Federation as a successful experiment in multi-racial partnership. This ostracism as well as the Federal government’s reluctance to bring about rapid and substantial Africa advancement made their job of selling Federation to their fellow Africans and to external opponents of Federation an extremely difficult one. Faced with stigma from his fellow Africans who perceived him as a sell-out and disillusioned with the Federal government’s attitude to multi-racial partnership, Vambe realised that he was “supporting the wrong cause” and in July 1962 again resigned from his post as an Assistant Information Attaché at Rhodesia House.⁷¹ Similarly affected by the stigma he was subjected to by the majority of his fellow Africans and disenchanted by the Federal government’s failure to fully implement multi-racial partnership, Savanhu on 14 August 1962, also resigned from the Federal government stating that it had “failed miserably to implement partnership.”⁷²

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the roles of Africans in the formulation and implementation of Federal government propaganda policy, particularly for Africans. The chapter has demonstrated that almost all of the Federal government’s appointments of Africans to higher-level positions within the Federal Information Services were made between 1959 and 1963 in a panic-driven response to intensified internal and external opposition to Federation during this period. The nature and timing of these appointments, the chapter has argued, also reflected the Federal government’s panic over the growing pressure that it was facing to practically demonstrate that its commitment to multi-racial partnership was sincere. Also reflected in the nature and timing of the appointments were the Federal government’s fears

⁷⁰ For a detailed historical analysis of how the ‘sell-out’ label was used in African nationalist politics in the early 1960s see T. Scarnecchia, “The ‘Sellout Logic’ in the Formation of Zimbabwean Nationalist Politics, 1961-1964”, in Chiumbu, S. and Musemwa, M. (eds), *Crisis! What Crisis? The Multiple Dimensions of the Zimbabwean Crisis*, Cape Town, HSRC Press, 2012, pp. 225-240.

⁷¹ “The African Diplomat”, *African Daily News*, 9 January, 1961; “Barrow Support for Vambe”, *African Daily News*, 14 January, 1961; NAZ, *Oral/233*, Lawrence Vambe interviewed by I. J. Johnstone, Brockhouse Ltd, Barking Road, Willowvale, Harare, 8, June, 1983, p.34.

⁷² NAZ, *AOH/5*, Jasper Zengeza Savanhu, interviewed by Dawson Munjeri, Mayambarara, Southern Rhodesia, 28th February, 1977, p.50.

and anxieties about how insufficient knowledge of African opinion on Federation among white Federal government politicians and civil servants was hindering the Federal government's efforts to effectively counter African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda.

The Federal government's adoption of "panic multi-racial partnership", the chapter has revealed, was, therefore, a logical outcome of this government's panic over the specific issues referred to above and was intended to counter the multiple pressures, which were being exerted upon it by opponents of Federation. "Panic multi-racial partnership", the chapter has noted, was the Federal government's appointment of a small number of Africans to high level positions in Federal government structures in a panic-driven effort to create the false semblance that it was genuinely committed to multi-racial partnership and African advancement. The Federal government, the chapter has argued, also believed that giving Africans higher level roles in selling Federation to African audiences inside the Federation and to external audiences would make these audiences more receptive to Federal government propaganda in support of Federation.

However, as this chapter has demonstrated, the higher level roles which the Federal government assigned to Africans in the formulation and implementation of its propaganda policy for Africans failed to make Africans more receptive to Federal government propaganda. This, the chapter has shown, was partly because the Federal government continued to deny Africans any meaningful say in how Federal government propaganda policy for Africans was devised and implemented. The Federal government did so by deliberately limiting the scope of the roles that it assigned to the few Africans that it appointed to higher level positions in its information and propaganda machinery. In addition, the Federal government also disregarded sound advice from these Africans that might have helped it to more effectively mobilise African opinion in support of Federation.

The chapter has also revealed that European staff members of the Federal Public Relations Division were opposed to the appointment of Africans to higher level Federal government information and propaganda positions, which had been formerly reserved for Europeans. This was ironic given that these were the same officials who were mainly responsible for devising and putting out propaganda aimed at convincing Africans that the Federal government was fully committed to making African advancement and multi-racial partnership a practical reality. The tensions and disagreements which characterised the relationship between the Federal government and some of its independent-minded salesmen of Federation were, as this chapter has demonstrated, mainly due to the Federal government's opposition to substantial and rapid African advancement.

This failure to fully implement multi-racial partnership made it difficult for the Federal government's African salesmen of Federation to persuade their fellow Africans to support Federation. It also made it much easier for African nationalist opponents of Federation to delegitimise their pro-Federation propaganda activities by consistently portraying them as

'stooges' of the Federal government. As this chapter has demonstrated, this stigmatisation by their fellow Africans combined with disillusionment with the Federal government's insincerity over African advancement and multi-racial partnership resulted in many of these Africans resigning from Federal government service and becoming vocal critics of the Federal government.

CHAPTER 4:

Federal-Territorial Contestations over Information and Propaganda for Africans

Introduction

Federal-Territorial struggles over control of information and propaganda policy for Africans within the Federation were, as briefly alluded to in Chapter two, largely rooted in the problematic manner in which the Federal constitution divided information functions between the Federal and Territorial governments. These struggles were inherent to the nature of Federation and were part of a broader pattern of Federal-Territorial struggles over delimiting the new Federal government's powers in relation to those of the Territorial governments. The contestations which took root during the first phase in the development of the Federal government's information and propaganda policy continued until the breakup of the Federation in 1963.

This chapter examines Federal-Territorial contestations over the nature information and propaganda to be prepared for Africans in the three constituent territories of the Federation highlighting how these contestations influenced the manner and extent to which previously Territorial information and propaganda functions and structures were federalised. It also focuses on the major forms which these struggles assumed in each of these territories and on how they influenced the formulation and application Federal information and propaganda policy in those individual territories and in the entire Federation.

The chapter argues that these Federal-Territorial contestations were primarily responsible for the belated and limited federalisation of Territorial information and propaganda structures and functions, especially for Africans. It also argues that the contestations hindered the Federal government's efforts to formulate and implement a unified and well-coordinated propaganda policy for Africans. The chapter highlights how the relationship between the Federal and Territorial Information Services was characterised by serious disagreements relating to Federal government propaganda intended to mobilise Africans in support of Federation.

These disagreements mainly centred on three specific issues. First, the type of propaganda and propaganda methods required to successfully win over Africans to Federation. Second, the depiction in Federal government propaganda of the level of economic progress in especially the Northern territories prior to Federation and of the degree to which the Federal territories had individually benefited from Federation. Third, the extent to which the Federal government which had responsibility for information and propaganda for the Federation abroad was able to serve the external information and publicity needs of

Southern Rhodesia, the most influential and only self-governing colony within the Federation.

The chapter also argues that the problem of poor Federal-Territorial co-operation regarding Federal government propaganda for Africans was further compounded by the poor communicator credibility that the Federal Information Services had among Africans in the Federation. This unfavourable communicator credibility which stemmed from the widespread opposition to Federation among Africans, contributed to a further breakdown in Federal-Territorial co-operation regarding pro-Federation propaganda for Africans. As intensified African opposition to Federation led to markedly more hostile African responses to the Federal Information Services, the Territorial Information Services came to regard any close association with the Federal Information Services as a serious threat to the reasonably good communicator credibility that they believed the Territorial Information Services still had among Africans. Consequently, the Territorial Information Services in an effort to avoid being perceived by Africans in their territories as an extension of the Federal propaganda machinery and its pro-Federation message sought to further limit their cooperation and association with the Federal Information Services.

Also highlighted in this chapter were the efforts made by the Federal government to circumvent and overcome the limitations that its troubled relationship with the Territorial Information Services placed upon its efforts to propagandise Africans in support of Federation.

The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section examines how Federal-Territorial-Territorial contestation over information and propaganda policy for Africans influenced the nature and degree of the federalisation of formerly Territorial information and propaganda functions and structures. The second section focuses on the character of Federal-Territorial struggles over information and propaganda policy for Africans in each of the Federal territories showing how they affected the Federal government's efforts to put out pro-Federation propaganda to Africans in those territories.

Contestations over Policy, Functions and Structures

From the outset, the Federal government was aware of the territorial bias of the information services in the federation, especially the press and believed that only a Federal level information machinery and policy under the centralised control of the Federal government could serve its information and propaganda needs. Between 1953 and 1955, Sir Roy Welensky, then the Federal Minister of Transport and Communications, had unsuccessfully tried to secure sponsorship from companies and individuals in the Federation for the establishment of a Federal level newspaper that would support Federation and Federal government policies. This was because the Federal government believed that the

territorial bias of the existing newspapers in the Federation “would foster rather than discourage inter-territorial rivalry.”¹

Federal-Territorial negotiations over the “the extent and the date from which Information Services might become a Federal responsibility” seriously got underway in early 1954.² In these negotiations, the Federal government sought to secure the concurrence of the Territorial governments for the creation of a unified information and propaganda machinery which would be under the single and centralised control of the Federal government. In support of this goal, the Federal government put forward arguments which it would reiterate throughout the course of all Federal-Territorial negotiations on the federalisation of the information services.³

It emphasised to the Territorial governments the benefits which it believed would arise from bringing all the different government information and propaganda media (namely print, film and broadcasting) under the centralised control of the Federal government.⁴ These advantages included the ability to pursue a single and consistent information and propaganda policy which would simultaneously use print, film and broadcasting media to complement each other with “a strong combined effect” and with no conflict of opinion in the messages put out through these different media. Centralised media control, the Federal government argued, was vital to the public relations and security requirements of the Federation and would also make possible the rapid and effective deployment of the media during emergency situations in the Federation. It would also be cost-effective as the centralised control of information technical services such as photography would make it possible to provide at a lower cost such services to other government departments at both Federal and Territorial levels.⁵

During these negotiations, the Federal government was careful to state that it understood and recognised the constitutional right of the Territorial governments to maintain their own African Information Services for the purposes of disseminating to their African populations information on Territorial issues. It, however, maintained that:

¹ J.R.T. Wood, *The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Durban, Graham Publishing, 1983, p. 414; L. J. Butler, *Copper Empire: Mining and the Colonial State in Northern Rhodesia, c. 1930-1964*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 208.

² Cory Library, Rhodes University, (hereafter, Cory), *Smith Papers, Box 003, S.R.C. (54)93*, Memorandum on “Federal Information Services” from Federal Prime Minister’s Office dated 31 March, 1954 and circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 22 April 1954.

³ Cory, *Smith Papers, Box 003, S.R.C. (54)93*, Memorandum on “Federal Information Services” from Federal Prime Minister’s Office, 31 March, 1954.

⁴ Cory, *Smith Papers, Box 003, S.R.C. (54)93*, Memorandum on “Federal Information Services” from Federal Prime Minister’s Office, 31 March, 1954, pp. 1-2.

⁵ Cory, *Smith Papers, Box 003, S.R.C. (54)93*, Memorandum on “Federal Information Services” from Federal Prime Minister’s Office, 31 March, 1954, pp. 1-2.

The principle must be accepted that the Federal government has an absolute right to put out information on all Federal subjects, whether to Africans or Europeans, but in doing so it is clearly desirable that the Territorial African Services should be used.⁶

The Federal government also stressed that in order to advance the cause of public relations in the Federation as a whole it was necessary that in the dissemination of information, there be a high level of co-ordination between Federal and Territorial Information Services. To this end, and also to facilitate the federalisation of all information other than information for Africans on Territorial subjects, the Federal government proposed the expansion of the responsibilities of the Press Section of the Federal Information Department to cover all Territorial information except information to Africans on Territorial issues. It also recommended that a Federal Press officer be based in each of the Territorial capitals to facilitate coordination in the dissemination of information between the Federal and Territorial Information Services.⁷

The response of the Territorial governments, especially Southern Rhodesia, to the Federal government's proposals was to resist any push by the Federal government for a high degree of federalisation of Territorial information functions, policies and services. Of the three constituent territories of the Federation, Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia had established their own Information Departments before the creation of the Federation in 1953. Nyasaland only established an Information Department in 1957, long after the creation of the Federation.⁸

It's important to note that apart from a small information branch in the Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department which was used to put out information and propaganda to Africans in that territory, Southern Rhodesia did not have a highly developed information department. In September 1955, Southern Rhodesia had established a Public Relations Office and appointed a Public Relations Officer. Its stated purpose was primarily to advise government ministers and departments on public relations matters and not to disseminate information and propaganda. There is, however, evidence that the Southern Rhodesia government would have wanted to develop this office into an extensive information department but was prevented from doing so by financial constraints. In September 1958, the activities of this Public Relations Office were discontinued because the Southern

⁶ Cory, *Smith Papers, Box 003, S.R.C. (54)93*, Memorandum on "Federal Information Services" from Federal Prime Minister's Office, 31 March, 1954, p. 2.

⁷ Cory, *Smith Papers, Box 003, S.R.C. (54)93*, Memorandum on "Federal Information Services" from Federal Prime Minister's Office, 31 March, 1954, pp. 1-2.

⁸ Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Survey of Developments since 1953, p. 217.

Rhodesia government did not have funds to renew the contract of the Public Relations Officer.⁹

Despite the clear limitations of its own information services, the Southern Rhodesia government was unwilling to have its internal and external Territorial information needs subsumed within those of the Federal government. It was, therefore, anxious to avoid any extensive surrender to the Federal government of its information functions. Throughout the Federal period, it continued with efforts to develop its own information services and policy as a way of demonstrating to the Federal government that Federal-Territorial co-operation on information issues did not mean “that the Southern Rhodesia government would be precluded from pursuing publicity and other information services as it thought best.”¹⁰ Efforts by Southern Rhodesia government to establish its own Ministry of Information were in 1961 criticised by the Federal government as “a retrograde step” that did not take into account that “what is required for efficiency, effectiveness and continuity is a single policy directing unit and this should clearly be the responsibility of the Federal government.”¹¹

As a result of this resistance by the Territorial governments to a high level of federalisation of their information services only some of the Territorial information and propaganda functions and infrastructure were transferred to Federal government control as part of the process of reorganising the information services in the Federal territories in order to establish and develop a Federal level government information and propaganda machinery and policy. In July 1954, the Federal Information Department took over the Photographic Units of Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and part of the Photographic Unit of Northern Rhodesia. It also took over the Northern Rhodesia Press Section and the Southern Rhodesia Film Unit.¹²

The Territorial governments readily agreed to the federalisation of some aspects of their information services and functions in cases where they believed they stood to benefit financially by passing on the cost of maintaining these to the Federal Information Department without any adverse impact on their ability to determine their own information policy and practice. It was primarily for this reason that Southern Rhodesia did not oppose the federalisation of film production and willingly agreed to the takeover of its film unit by

⁹ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 007, S.R.C. (58)67, Cabinet Note on “Public Relations Office” by G.B. Clarke, Secretary to the Southern Rhodesia Cabinet, 26th March, 1958.

¹⁰ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 004, S.R.C. (55), Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting of the Southern Rhodesia Government held on Tuesday 18 October, 1955 at 10 a.m. in the Prime Minister’s Office, p. 4.

¹¹ NAZ, F121/H3/50, Note on “The Iswana Proposals” from J. Foot, Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to A.C. Izod, Director, Technical and Planning Services, Federal Public Relations Division, [n.d. but probably from June/July 1961].

¹² NAZ, Federal Inventory Vol.1, “Federal Information Department”

the Federal Information Department. The Central African Film Unit, which had been controlled by the Central African Council, had been federalised in October 1953.¹³

Though Southern Rhodesia agreed to hand over its control of European broadcasting to the Federal government in July 1954, the federalisation of African broadcasting took many years as it was strenuously resisted by Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia. Ultimately, broadcasting was federalised through the establishment in 1958 of an 'independent' broadcasting corporation, the Federal Broadcasting Corporation, which was not under the direct control of the Federal government. This represented a triumph for Southern and Northern Rhodesia, which had strongly opposed placing African broadcasting under the direct control of the Federal government.¹⁴

The issue of Federal-territorial co-operation on information and propaganda, especially in relation to putting across pro-Federation propaganda to Africans in the Federation was one on which the Federal government felt it never received full co-operation from each of the three territorial governments. All the territorial information services to varying degrees resisted what they believed were attempts by the Federal Information Services to usurp their information and propaganda functions and powers. There was concern among Federal government propagandists that the Territorial governments "were not particularly strong supporters of the Federal concept" because in their information and propaganda campaigns they seemed to focus on the problems of their territories at the expense of Federal problems.¹⁵

Federal-Territorial Contestations: Southern Rhodesia

It has been persuasively argued that Federation and all its various aspects including the development of the Federal government's information and propaganda policy and practice cannot be fully understood outside of the context of the Federal government's relationship with Southern Rhodesia. This is because of the three constituent territories of the Federation, Southern Rhodesia, was justifiably referred to by many contemporaneous observers of Federal politics as the "senior partner" of the Federation because it was "undoubtedly the dominant influence in the Federation".¹⁶ As a self-governing colony, it had greater political experience and a constitutional status more superior than that of Northern

¹³ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 003, S.R.C. (54) 107, G. R. Ross, Chairman, Territorial Committee on Federal Planning, "Assumption by the Federal Government of Responsibility for Film Production", 5th May 1954.

¹⁴ Cory, *Smith Papers* Box 005, S.R.C. (56)183, "Memorandum on African Broadcasting" circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 31st October, 1956.

¹⁵ NAZ, F121/H3/50, Draft letter on "Iswana" prepared by E.G.G. Marsh and directed to the Federal Minister of Home Affairs, 28 June 1961.

¹⁶ T. Ranger, *Crisis in Southern Rhodesia*, London, Fabian Commonwealth Bureau, 1960, p. 19 & pp. 3-4.

Rhodesia and Nyasaland which were protectorates. Southern Rhodesia also had the biggest white population and the strongest and most broad-based economy in the Federation.¹⁷

The economic strength and greater political experience of Southern Rhodesia in comparison with that of the two Northern territories meant that “the form in which Federal political [and economic] institutions...developed [was largely] shaped by Southern Rhodesian influences.”¹⁸ The first Federal Prime Minister, Sir Godfrey Huggins, came from Southern Rhodesia whose capital city, Salisbury, also served as the capital city of the Federation. The Federal parliament and civil service were dominated by Southern Rhodesians and the Federal franchise was largely modelled on the Southern Rhodesian franchise. Even the Federal government’s political philosophies, most notably multi-racial partnership and the preservation of ‘civilised standards’ were derived from Southern Rhodesian political culture. The maintenance of law and order in the Federation and its national defence was largely reliant on Southern Rhodesia’s territorial forces. Southern Rhodesia also dominated the Federal economy and was the biggest beneficiary of this economy.¹⁹

Southern Rhodesia’s dominance in the political and economic structures of the Federation was reflected in the organisation of the Federal Information Services and had a profound influence on the development of the Federal government’s information and propaganda policy and practice.

As the most politically and economically powerful territory in the Federation, Southern Rhodesia was well placed to offer the strongest resistance to the Federal government’s efforts to create a unified information and propaganda machinery and policy under the control of the Federal government. The major contestations between the Federal and South Rhodesian governments over information policy centred on Southern Rhodesia’s determination to retain full control over its information and propaganda policy, especially in relation to the African population in its territory.

This resistance to giving up control of its information policy and functions towards Africans in its territory pre-dated the establishment of the Federation and was an integral part of Southern Rhodesia’s long-standing policy of maintaining firm control over its ‘native’ policy and the administration of ‘native’ affairs in its territory. As a self-governing colony, Southern Rhodesia had a ‘Native’ policy which had higher levels of racial discrimination against Africans than that which existed in the British Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It was opposed to any liberalisation of its ‘native’ policy and was determined to prevent Africans in Southern Rhodesia from being exposed to any viewpoints and influences

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 3-4.

which could result in these Africans demanding change in the status-quo in Southern Rhodesia.

For these reasons, Southern Rhodesia had prior to the institution of the Federation opposed the creation of a unified African broadcasting organisation and the adoption of a common African broadcasting policy for all the three countries that later came to comprise the Federation. After the establishment of the Federation, Southern Rhodesia had strenuously opposed placing African broadcasting in the Federation under the control of the Federal government or an independent broadcasting corporation arguing that both lacked personnel who were knowledgeable and experienced in 'native' policy and the administration of 'native' affairs.

Southern Rhodesia also continuously resisted what it believed were efforts by the Federal government to circumvent the constitutional prohibition on Federal involvement in issues relating to 'native' policy and its administration in the territories. In 1955 Southern Rhodesia successfully resisted efforts initiated by the Federal government to bring about an alignment in the 'native' policy of all three Federal territories. The Southern government argued that it was "quite impossible politically to achieve an alignment in [native] policies."²⁰ It also stressed that it was important to guard against creating any public perception that the attempt by the three territories to align their 'native' policies "was an exercise designed to align Southern Rhodesia ['native'] policy with that of the Colonial Office."²¹

Rhodesia's dominant political and economic position in the Federation also influenced the thrust and content of Federal government propaganda targeted at Africans in the Federation. From the very beginning of Federation African opinion in especially the two Northern territories was aware of the Southern Rhodesia-centric nature of Federation. African opposition to Federation in these territories was fundamentally rooted in their fear that Federation would result in the extension of the highly racist 'native' policy of Southern Rhodesia to their own territories. Resentment of Federation among Africans in the Northern territories was also sustained by the widespread belief among Africans in these territories that Southern Rhodesia was-at the expense of the two Northern territories-the major economic beneficiary of Federation.²² As the fifth and seventh chapter of this thesis will demonstrate, Africans in the Northern territories also regularly complained about the excessive coverage given to Southern Rhodesia in Federal government print publications and FBC African service broadcasts to Africans.

²⁰ Cory, *Smith Papers, Box 004, S.R.C. (55)*, Minutes of a Meeting of the Southern Rhodesia Cabinet held on Tuesday 16th August, 1955 at 11 a.m. in the Prime Minister's Office, p. 3.

²¹ Ibid.

²² "S.R. Has Milked Us'-Nkumbula", *African Daily News*, 7 February, 1963.

Primarily because of the reasons given above, there is considerable evidence that African opposition to Federation in the Northern territories, especially Nyasaland was significantly greater than in Southern Rhodesia. However, it can also be argued that both the Federal and Southern Rhodesia governments excessively downplayed the scale of African opposition to Federation in Southern Rhodesia, so much that all the four governments of the Federation came to believe that African opposition to Federation was “confined almost entirely to the two northern territories (including Africans from northern territories working in Southern Rhodesia).”²³

This perception of the nature of African opposition to Federation had two important effects on the evolution of Federal government information and propaganda policy. First, it resulted in most of the Federal government’s pro-Federation propaganda targeted at Africans in the Federation being directed at Africans in the northern territories, especially Nyasaland. In 1959, the Federal Information Department noted that since opposition to Federation was strongest in the northern territories, there was “no need for special pro-Federation propaganda in Southern Rhodesia” as leading Africans and African newspapers in that territory accepted the existence of the Federation.²⁴

Second, the Federal government came to believe that Southern Rhodesia was not doing enough to assist it in putting across pro-Federation propaganda to Africans in the Federation not only because of its concern with preventing the Federal government from interfering in Territorial issues relating to Africans, but also because it did not have to face the high level of African opposition to Federation that existed in the northern territories. Southern Rhodesia, in the Federal government’s view, therefore, lacked adequate appreciation of the nature of African opposition to Federation and did not share the Federal government’s sense of urgency about the need to overcome this African opposition to Federation.²⁵

Southern Rhodesia, on its part blamed the Federal government for the high levels of African opposition to Federation in the northern territories. It criticised the Federal government for having failed to seize the propaganda initiative at the time the Federation was established by taking “some positive action” to sell “the idea of Federation to the African population, especially in the northern territories.”²⁶ Southern Rhodesia, ignoring its own role in hindering the Federal government’s efforts to effectively propagandise Africans in support

²³ Cory, *Smith Papers, Box 007, S.R.C. (58) 150*, G.C.D. Hodgson, “Office of Race Affairs”, 23rd June, 1958, p. 1.

²⁴ NAZ, *F121/H3/10, Vol.1*, “Steps Taken by the Federal Information Department to Put Over Federation and to Allay Fears” [n.d.]

²⁵ NAZ, *F121/H3/10, Vol.1*, “Steps Taken by the Federal Information Department to Put Over Federation and to Allay Fears” [n.d.].

²⁶ Cory, *Smith Papers, Box 007, S.R.C. (58) 59*, Memorandum on “Federal Office of Race Affairs” from B. Spurling, Commissioner of Police, British South Africa Police General Headquarters, Southern Rhodesia to Secretary, Southern Rhodesia Department of Justice, 16th April, 1958, pp.1-2.

of Federation, would also become increasingly critical of what it characterised as the Federal government's "gentlemanly" and ineffectual approach to countering African nationalist propaganda against Federation and European rule in all the Federal territories.

The Southern Rhodesia-centric nature of Federation also influenced the manner in which Southern Rhodesia was projected in Federal government propaganda targeted at Africans in the Federation. In order to counter the widespread perceptions among Africans in the Northern territories that Southern Rhodesia was the major economic beneficiary of Federation and that it received too much coverage in Federal government mass communication media, it was recommended by some members of the RICs that Southern Rhodesia be deliberately given less visibility in Federal government propaganda intended for Africans in the Federation.

Other strategies used by Federal propagandists to try and shift the attention of Africans away from Southern Rhodesia's status as the principal economic beneficiary of Federation included the following. First, they tried unsuccessfully to sweep under the carpet the question of which territory had derived the most economic benefits from Federation by arguing that: "The Federation was created less than a decade ago, and it is [too] early to argue about who has gained or lost [through Federation.]"²⁷ Second, they extensively highlighted Nyasaland, economically the poorest of the three constituent territories of the Federation, as a clear example of the territory that had benefited most from its inclusion in a Federation with its "wealthier and industrialised neighbours".²⁸

The widespread existence and practice of racial discrimination against non-Europeans, especially Africans, in Southern Rhodesia was also another factor which generated tensions between the Federal and Southern Rhodesia governments. These tensions centred on how the extensive application of Southern Rhodesia's colour bar laws, which were a territorial matter and outside the control of the Federal government, was undermining the credibility of one of the central claims of Federal government propaganda directed at both Africans in the Federation and external audiences. This was the claim that the Federation stood for multi-racial partnership and that the Federal government was fully committed to and was succeeding in building up such a multi-racial partnership.²⁹

Numerous highly publicised incidents arising out of the application of Southern Rhodesia's colour bar laws, some involving prominent non-European visitors to the Federation continuously undermined the sincerity of the Federal government's pronouncements about

²⁷ *Straight Answers on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Salisbury, Federal Public Relations Division, 1961, p. 10.

²⁸ *Federation and Nyasaland: The Facts*, Salisbury, Federal Public Relations Division, 1962, p. 1.

²⁹ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 007, S.R.C. (58) 78, Confidential Memorandum by Hodgson on "Need for a Multi-Racial Hotel in the Capital of the Federation" circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 11 April, 1958.

its commitment to multi-racial partnership. These incidents, most of which occurred in Salisbury, the capital city of both Southern Rhodesia and the Federation, also generated adverse internal and external publicity mostly directed at the Federal government. The colour bar incidents also put the Federal government under increased pressure to disprove the claims by its internal and external critics that multi-racial partnership was a policy that existed only in Federal government propaganda and not in reality.³⁰

The Federal government was angered and frustrated by the fact that it had to bear the brunt of adverse public opinion generated by the application of race policies that were constitutionally the responsibility of the Southern Rhodesia government. It sought to exonerate itself from public blame for the racial discrimination in Southern Rhodesia by using its print propaganda publications to dissociate the Federal government from Southern Rhodesia's racially discriminatory laws. In these publications, it was emphasised that the introduction and enforcement of racially discriminatory legislation in the territories was constitutionally a Territorial responsibility and "the Federal government has no direct power to intervene."³¹ It was also stressed that the sincerity of the Federal government's commitment to implementing multi-racial partnership in the Federation was evidenced by the fact that there was no racially discriminatory Federal legislation. The Federal government, these propaganda publications argued, had "done everything possible within its [constitutional] sphere of responsibility to promote the spirit of partnership."³²

In response to continuous pressure to demonstrate the sincerity of the claims about its commitment to multi-racial partnership conveyed in its propaganda, the Federal government also sought to persuade the Southern Rhodesia government to urgently establish multi-racial hotels and restaurants in Salisbury, the Federal capital. In a letter sent to the Southern Rhodesia government in 1958, the Federal government argued that the racial discrimination that non-Europeans were subjected to in the Federal capital due to the absence of such facilities had become "one of the most bitter criticisms of the Federation."³³ It argued that this lack of multi-racial facilities in the Federal capital was primarily responsible for the occurrence there of the numerous racial incidents that were creating adverse press coverage of the Federation. These incidents were lending credibility to claims

³⁰ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 007, S.R.C. (58) 78, Confidential Memorandum by Hodgson on "Need for a Multi-Racial Hotel in the Capital of the Federation" circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 11 April, 1958.

³¹ *Further Facts on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Salisbury, Federal Information Department, March 1960, p .2.

³² Ibid.

³³ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 007, S.R.C. (58) 78, Confidential Memorandum by Hodgson on "Need for a Multi-Racial Hotel in the Capital of the Federation" circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 11 April, 1958.

by critics of the Federation that there was “no substance or sincerity in the [Federal government’s] oft repeated policy of multi-racial partnership.”³⁴

The measures taken by the Federal government to try and dispel public doubts about its commitment to multi-racial partnership must be understood in the context of what the Federal government believed was the unhelpful role being played by Southern Rhodesia in the Federal Information and propaganda system. The Federal government believed that Southern Rhodesia was not doing enough to foster a climate in which Federal government propaganda in support of Federation would be well received by Africans in the Federation and by target audiences outside the Federation. In fact, in the Federal government’s view, the Southern Rhodesia government’s insistence on rigidly and “wrongly” applying the constitutional proscription on Federal government involvement in Territorial issues relating to Africans in the Federation did much to hinder the Federal government’s efforts to effectively put over pro-Federation propaganda to Africans in the Federation.

What the Federal government believed was Southern Rhodesia’s deliberately obstructionist attitude to its efforts to win over African opinion to Federation was reflected in, among other ways, the position taken by Southern Rhodesia to co-operating with Federal Office of Race Affairs created by the Federal government in 1957. The Federal government was aware of the Southern Rhodesia government’s sensitivity to any action that could be perceived as constituting an attempt by the Federal government to encroach upon the Territorial governments’ constitutional powers over African affairs. Mainly because of this the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, was prior to the establishment of the Race Affairs Office careful to stress that it was not intended to be “another Native Affairs Department under the Federal government.”³⁵ Consequently, the Federal government emphasised that the main purpose of the Race Affairs Office was to advise the Federal government on race relations in the Federation, particularly with a view to bringing about an improvement in these relations as one of the major ways of overcoming African opposition to Federation.³⁶

Recommendations on the scope and functions of the new Office were endorsed by the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky. It was recommended that the new Office should indirectly support Federation in two major ways. First, through personal contacts with people of all races in the Federation, especially non-Europeans and second, through advising the established information services on race relations issues in situations where it was

³⁴ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 007, S.R.C. (58) 78, Confidential Memorandum by Hodgson on “Need for a Multi-Racial Hotel in the Capital of the Federation” circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 11 April, 1958.

³⁵ “600 Told: Exercise Moderation”, *Bantu Mirror*, 25 January, 1958.

³⁶ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 007, S.R.C. (58) 79, Memorandum from the Federal Prime Minister’s Office on “Establishment of the New Federal Office of Race Affairs” circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 11th April, 1958.

proper to do so. To this end, the Race Relations Adviser, the Head of the new organisation, could be allowed to attend Federal Cabinet information Committee meetings, but without having membership to the Committee.³⁷

However, the same recommendations emphasised that in order to gain the confidence of Africans in the Federation, “on no account should the new office become associated in any way with propaganda.”³⁸ It can, however, be argued that despite this recommendation, the Race Relations Office was actually meant to serve a propaganda function on behalf of the Federal government. This is because the idea of Federation as a successful experiment in multi-racial partnership was one of the most prominent themes through which Federal government propaganda sought to mobilise both internal and external public opinion in support of Federation. By establishing a Federal Race Affairs Office, the Federal government intended to contribute to the creation of a climate conducive to the favourable reception of Federal government propaganda on multi-racial partnership.

The Federal government was unhappy that despite the fact that the two northern territories had quickly agreed to its proposals for cooperation between the Territorial governments the newly created Federal Office of Race Affairs, Southern Rhodesia adopted an obstructionist stance to the Federal government’s proposals. It raised objections concerning the intended purpose and functions of the new Office which prevented the new Office from commencing its operations as quickly as the Federal government wanted it to.³⁹

Southern Rhodesia made its co-operation with the newly established Office conditional upon the role of the new Office being strictly confined to “preaching the advantages of Federation to the unconverted among the African population”⁴⁰ and working under the guidance and supervision of Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department officials. The new Office, Southern Rhodesia emphasised, was not to “deal with racial incidents” and involve itself in trying to influence the formulation and application of Territorial laws relating to race and any other Territorial matters.⁴¹ Southern Rhodesia argued that without these restrictions on the functions of the new Office, there was serious danger that it would be

³⁷ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 007, S.R.C. (58) 79, Memorandum from the Federal Prime Minister’s Office on “Establishment of the New Federal Office of Race Affairs” circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 11th April, 1958.

³⁸ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 007, S.R.C. (58) 79, Memorandum from the Federal Prime Minister’s Office on “Establishment of the New Federal Office of Race Affairs” circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 11th April, 1958.

³⁹ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 007, S.R.C. (58) 107, Draft of a Proposed Reply to the Federal Prime Minister on the issue of “Race-Affairs-Federal Office” circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 28th May, 1958.

⁴⁰ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 007, S.R.C. (58) 107, Draft of a Proposed Reply to the Federal Prime Minister on the issue of “Race-Affairs-Federal Office” circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 28th May, 1958, p. 2.

⁴¹ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 007, S.R.C. (58) 107, Draft of a Proposed Reply to the Federal Prime Minister on the issue of “Race-Affairs-Federal Office” circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 28th May, 1958, p. 2.

used by “extremist” Africans for anti-government propaganda “as a complaints bureau, undermining the authority of the Territorial governments in native affairs.”⁴²

In its response to the objections raised by Southern Rhodesia, the Federal government argued that it was unclear “how the advantages of Federation [could] be preached unless, and until, the points on which opposition to Federation are based, are first investigated and dealt with.”⁴³ It stressed that it, was, therefore, crucial that “the proposed Office should interest itself directly in all matters which are hampering the acceptance of Federation and its policies by Africans.”⁴⁴ Ironically, while it dissociated itself from Southern Rhodesia’s racially discriminatory policies in its propaganda publications, the Federal government in seeking Southern Rhodesia’s full co-operation with its Race Affairs Office drew attention to the close interrelation between Territorial and Federal race problems.⁴⁵

Contestations between Southern Rhodesia and the Federal government over the former’s resistance to the deployment of Federal government Fact vans in Southern Rhodesia were also viewed by the Federal government as another major indication of Southern Rhodesia’s deliberate obstruction of its efforts to put across its pro-Federation propaganda to Africans in that territory.

In these contestations which reached their peak in the 1960s, the two governments firmly defended their own interpretations of the powers relating to information matters accorded to them by the Federal constitution. The Southern Rhodesian government strongly stated its objection to any information and propaganda activities, including the deployment of Fact vans, undertaken by the Federal Information Services among Africans in its territory without its prior sanction. It argued that any such activities constituted a serious breach by the Federal government of Southern Rhodesia’s Territorial jurisdiction over African affairs. The Federal government maintained its long-standing position that the Federal constitution gave it the right to disseminate information on Federal subjects to Africans in all the Federal territories without the prior consent of the Territorial governments.

In a meeting between Ministers of the two governments held in June 1962 to discuss and resolve their differences over the deployment of Fact vans in Southern Rhodesia, Julian Greenfield, the Federal Home Affairs Minister maintained that: “the Federal government could hardly be expected to be excluded from contact with the people of the Federation.”⁴⁶

⁴² Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 006, S.R.C. (58), Minutes of a Meeting of the Southern Rhodesia Cabinet held on Friday, 16th May, 1958, at 11 a.m. in the Cabinet Room, p. 5

⁴³ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 007, S.R.C. (58) 150, G.C.D. Hodgson, “Office of Race Affairs”, 23rd June, 1958, p. 2.

⁴⁴ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 007, S.R.C. (58) 150, G.C.D. Hodgson, “Office of Race Affairs”, 23rd June, 1958, p. 2.

⁴⁵ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 007, S.R.C. (58) 79, Memorandum from the Federal Prime Minister’s Office on “Establishment of the New Federal Office of Race Affairs” circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 11th April, 1958.

⁴⁶ NAZ, F121/H3/32/2, A.C. Izod, Controller, Federal Public Relations Division to W. H. Hammond, 1st April, 1963.

Alan Izod, the Controller of the Federal Public Relations Division also strongly advised that in all future discussions with the Southern Rhodesia government on the same issue the Federal Home Affairs Minister, “should take a firm line, standing on our constitutional right to operate in any part and to any people of the Federation, but offering to do so in consultation and co-operation with the government.”⁴⁷ Right up to the dissolution of the Federation in 1963, the Southern Rhodesia government continued to insist that Federal Fact vans could be deployed in Southern Rhodesia only “with the prior knowledge and consent of the Director of Information S.R.G.”⁴⁸ The Federal government also continued to react to this by defending what it described as “our absolute right subject to any special considerations in the case of Native Reserves to operate our information vans wherever we [see] fit.”⁴⁹

A Southern Rhodesia proposal that Federal Fact vans and Southern Rhodesia information vans be jointly deployed in Native Reserves in South Rhodesia, but with all the vans being under the direction and supervision of Southern Rhodesia Information Service officials, was turned down by the Federal Public Relations Division.

The tensions in the relationship between the Federal Information Services and the Southern Rhodesia Information Services only eased when it became evident that the Federation would be dissolved. This was because at that time the Southern Rhodesia Information Services began to focus their efforts on putting forward plans for the takeover by the Southern Rhodesia government of some of the key elements of the Federal propaganda machinery and personnel.⁵⁰ The confirmation of the dissolution of the Federation also made some Federal information officials feel at liberty to share with their Southern Rhodesian counterparts what they believed were the major lessons that could be learnt from the failure of Federal propaganda. This was meant to assist the Southern Rhodesia Information Services to formulate an effective post-Federal propaganda strategy for Southern Rhodesia that would not repeat the same mistakes that had resulted in the failure of Federal government propaganda.⁵¹

Two main conclusions can be drawn about the ways in which the Federal-Territorial contestations discussed in this section influenced the application of Federal Information and propaganda policy in relation to Africans. First, it can be argued that the Federal government sought to deal with the problems that Southern Rhodesia presented to its pro-

⁴⁷ NAZ, F121/H3/32/2, A.C. Izod to W. H. Hammond, 1st April, 1963.

⁴⁸ NAZ, F121/H3/32/2, Secretary to the Federal Minister of Home Affairs to the Federal Minister of Home Affairs, 8 April 1963.

⁴⁹ NAZ, F121/H3/32/2, Secretary to the Federal Minister of Home Affairs to the Federal Minister of Home Affairs, 8 April 1963.

⁵⁰ NAZ, F121/H3/32/2, Aide Memoire on “S.R.I.S./Federal P.R.D. Co-operation” by B. Hutton-Williams, Director of Information, S.R.G., 7 May 1963.

⁵¹ NAZ, F121/H3/32/2, P.V. Bridgman, “Memorandum for the Employment of Fact Vans in S.R.G. Campaign”, 20 May, 1963.

Federation print propaganda targeted at Africans by according it a lower profile in such propaganda and by projecting it in a way that it believed least undermined the effectiveness its pro-Federation propaganda for Africans in the Federation. The Federal government also sought to create a better climate for the reception of its propaganda on multi-racialism partnership through the establishment of a Federal Race Affairs Office and by encouraging Southern Rhodesia to make changes to certain aspects of its race policies.

Second, it can also be argued that the resistance to directly accessing and propagandising Africans which the Federal government encountered from the Southern Rhodesia government and from the other Territorial governments led it to consider ways of overcoming this limitation imposed on it by the Territorial governments. *Fact* newspaper, the first monthly newspaper for Africans established by the Federal government in 1960, was directly distributed to its African readers through the post and not indirectly through the Territorial Information Services. This represented a significant attempt by the Federal government to employ a propaganda strategy that would enable it to more directly propagandise Africans in the Federation by circumventing some of the Territorial governments' limitations on its access to Africans in their territories.⁵²

Federal-Territorial Contestations: Nyasaland

As already established in an earlier section of this chapter, Nyasaland was given the highest priority in Federal government propaganda targeted at Africans because it was the Federal territory where African opposition to Federation was the strongest and most militant. It was also the Federal territory which because of strong African nationalist demands for Nyasaland's secession from the Federation posed the greatest danger to the continued existence of the Federation.

The most influential African nationalist party in Nyasaland, the Malawi Congress Party (hereafter MCP) led by Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, adopted a policy of delegitimising Federation and the Federal government by boycotting and attacking all government services and policies linked with the Federal government. The MCP's attacks on the legitimacy of the Federal government extended to the Federal Information Services which were the subject of frequent criticism by MCP leaders, especially Dr. Banda who was described by some supporters of the Federal government as "pathologically opposed to anything that smacks of Federation."⁵³

The Federal Information services were frequently denounced by the MCP as settler colonialist information services which through the use of "vile and vicious propaganda"

⁵² NAZ, F128/HAF/25/7/1, Federal Information Department Newsletter, No. 35, August 1960, p. 1.

⁵³ "The Kamuzu's Loofah goes into Action", *The Chronicle*, 6 September, 1963.

were bent on “brainwashing” Africans into accepting Federation and European rule by calling into doubt their ability to rule themselves.⁵⁴ Attacks on Federal Fact vans and crews by MCP supporters were also more intense in Nyasaland than in the other Federal territories.

Although the Federal government established a Nyasaland Office of the Federal Information Department as early as November 1954, co-operation between the Federal Information Services and the Nyasaland government was from the beginning severely undermined by what Federal Information Officers in Nyasaland believed was the anti-Federal attitude of the British Colonial Office administrators in Nyasaland. In 1955, R.T.M. Williams, a Federal Information Officer stationed in Nyasaland complained that the anti-Federal attitude of these administrators was greatly hindering the Federal government’s pro-Federation propaganda campaign among Nyasaland Africans as the latter tended to follow the anti or pro-Federal lead set by the European administrators who were in authority over them.⁵⁵

Williams also claimed in a 1956 confidential report that he had learnt through John Ingham, the Nyasaland Secretary for African Affairs, that Sir Geoffrey Colby, the Governor of Nyasaland, had been “very anti-Federation and [had] deliberately let slip the opportunity of winning sympathy for the [Federation among Nyasaland Africans] at the time it was first introduced.”⁵⁶ Sir Geoffrey had done by this through written memoranda “informing the Administration throughout Nyasaland that Federation was to be played down.”⁵⁷ Commenting on the significance of the role played by British Colonial Office administrators in Nyasaland in fostering hostile attitudes to Federation among Africans, Williams stated:

I am more than ever inclined to say that, if ever Federation is unsuccessful in Nyasaland, we will have no one to blame other than the British administrators [in Nyasaland]. Their whole attitude is anathema to our aspirations.⁵⁸

The intense hostility to Federation and everything associated with it among Nyasaland Africans also made the Nyasaland Information Services reluctant to be closely associated with the pro-Federation propaganda campaigns of the Federal government. In order to maintain the credibility of their own Territorial Information Services in the eyes of Nyasaland Africans, they avoided being too closely associated with the Federal Information Services.

⁵⁴ “The Nation Welcomes Radio Malawi”, *Malawi News*, 30 August, 1963.

⁵⁵ NAZ, F128/INFORM/44/8, Confidential Public Opinion Report: April/May, 1955 by D.T.M. Williams, Federal Information Officer, Nyasaland, 24 May, 1955, p. 3.

⁵⁶ NAZ, F128/INFORM/44/8, Confidential Public Opinion Report for March 1956 by D.T.M Williams, Federal Information Officer, Nyasaland, 30 March, 1956, p. 1.

⁵⁷ NAZ, F128/INFORM/44/8, Confidential Public Opinion Report for March 1956 by D.T.M Williams, Federal Information Officer, Nyasaland, 30 March, 1956, p. 1.

⁵⁸ NAZ, F128/INFORM/44/8, Confidential Public Opinion Report: April/May, 1955 by D.T.M. Williams, Federal Information Officer, Nyasaland, 24 May, 1955, p. 3.

It was the Nyasaland Emergency of 1959 and the re-appraisal of Federal information and propaganda policy which followed it that brought to the forefront the differences between the Nyasaland government and the Federal government over policy in relation to pro-Federation propaganda targeted at Nyasaland Africans. These differences centred on two major issues. First, on conflicting opinions about whether Africans in Nyasaland could be won over to Federation and second, on how Nyasaland was projected in Federal government propaganda targeted at Africans in the Federation.

The Federal government strongly believed that intense African opposition to Federation in Nyasaland was essentially a product of the manipulation of the unsophisticated minds of the majority of Nyasaland Africans by anti-Federation African nationalist propaganda. It believed that a more forceful approach to countering this African nationalist propaganda would succeed in securing support for Federation among Africans in Nyasaland and the other Federal territories. The Nyasaland government, however, had a different view of the roots of the strong opposition to Federation among Nyasaland Africans and the extent to which this opposition could be overcome.

A document produced in 1959 by the Nyasaland government spelt out that government's detailed views on the causes of and solutions to strong African opposition to Federation in that territory. This document was produced in response to criticism by the Federal government that the Nyasaland government had not done enough to counter anti-Federation sentiment among Nyasaland Africans and needed to adopt a more aggressive approach in this regard.⁵⁹ In that document the Nyasaland government argued that the intense opposition to Federation by Africans in Nyasaland was not "an illusion created by [the Nyasaland African] Congress."⁶⁰ Instead, it was rooted in a deeply held and long-standing conviction of Africans in Nyasaland that the racially discriminatory laws they had been subjected to as migrant workers in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa would be extended to Nyasaland if Nyasaland became part of any scheme of union or Federation with Southern Rhodesia. It was the main reason why Africans in Nyasaland had consistently and strongly opposed all proposals for closer association between Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia from 1938 right up to the creation of the Federation in 1953.⁶¹

After detailing why opposition to Federation among Nyasaland Africans was very intense, the Nyasaland government concluded that this opposition was too deeply entrenched to ever be eliminated through the use of propaganda. The Nyasaland government emphasised

⁵⁹ NAZ, F121/H1/20, "A Note on the use of Propaganda to Combat Opposition to Federation", Nyasaland Secretariat, 1959.

⁶⁰ NAZ, F121/H1/20, "A Note on the use of Propaganda to Combat Opposition to Federation", Nyasaland Secretariat, 1959, p. 1.

⁶¹ NAZ, F121/H1/20, "A Note on the use of Propaganda to Combat Opposition to Federation", Nyasaland Secretariat, 1959, p. 1.

that in relation to pro-Federation propaganda for Africans, the past and future performance of the Nyasaland Information Services needed to be evaluated in light of the fact that it was not a realistic and achievable goal to seek to change African minds on Federation through propaganda. The Nyasaland government stated:

It is accordingly not unreasonable to contend that the failure of our Information Services to convert a hatred of Federation into a trust of it does not necessarily imply, as many of our critics appear inclined to believe, that there is either something radically wrong with our propaganda policy, or alternatively that greatly increased expenditure on propaganda would cause Africans to take a different outlook on the Federation.⁶²

In putting forward this strong defence of its policy regarding pro-Federation propaganda for Africans in Nyasaland, the Nyasaland government was, however, careful to state that its viewpoint did not mean that it was opposed to improving its propaganda techniques or expanding its Information services for Africans. It, however, stressed that all that had been and could be achieved by means of pro-Federation propaganda was to significantly moderate the force of African opposition to Federation.⁶³

The Federal government was highly concerned about and critical of the Nyasaland government's propaganda policy position that it was "impossible to persuade African public opinion in favour of Federation and the most which can be done is to reduce opposition."⁶⁴ This position was taken by the Federal government as an indication that the Nyasaland government did not share its sense of urgency about the need to counter anti-Federation propaganda from African nationalist movements in Nyasaland and other parts of the Federation.

How Nyasaland was portrayed in Federal government propaganda for Africans was another source of disagreement between the Nyasaland government and the Federal government. The Nyasaland government and its information services came to resent the manner in which Nyasaland was depicted in Federal government propaganda aimed at persuading Africans in Nyasaland to support Federation and to oppose persistent African nationalist calls for Nyasaland's secession from the Federation. The Nyasaland Information services felt that this propaganda often greatly exaggerated the extent of Nyasaland's economic backwardness prior to Federation, the extent to which it had benefited from Federation and the extent of

⁶² NAZ, F121/H1/20, "A Note on the use of Propaganda to Combat Opposition to Federation", Nyasaland Secretariat, 1959, p. 2.

⁶³ NAZ, F121/H1/20, "A Note on the use of Propaganda to Combat Opposition to Federation", Nyasaland Secretariat, 1959, p. 2.

⁶⁴ NAZ, F121/H1/20, Handwritten note from W.H. Morris to Mr. Foot, 15 July 1959.

the adverse economic and political consequences which would befall it if it seceded from the Federation.⁶⁵

These differences eventually led to a serious breakdown of co-operation between the Nyasaland and Federal information services in putting out Federal government propaganda to Africans in Nyasaland. Offended by the Federal government's complaints that it was not doing enough to "boost Federation", the Nyasaland government in 1960 apparently decided to stop co-operating with the Federal Information Services in putting out pro-Federation propaganda to Africans in Nyasaland.⁶⁶ In late 1960, Federal Fact vans which had been showing pro-Federation films and distributing pro-Federation literature in the rural areas of Nyasaland had to be withdrawn after the Nyasaland government objected to their continued deployment "on the grounds that the Territory's own information services were being damaged by the association."⁶⁷

By January 1961, it had become apparent that the breakdown in co-operation between the Federal and Nyasaland information services was having adverse impacts on the Federal government's efforts to put out pro-Federation propaganda to Africans in Nyasaland. It was making it difficult for Federal information officials to formulate and implement a comprehensive pro-Federation campaign for Africans in Nyasaland.⁶⁸ One of these Federal government information officials recommended that the Federal government consider immediately appointing a Federal Political Minister to Nyasaland to establish "an authoritative link with the Nyasaland" and ensure that the Federal government propaganda campaign for Nyasaland could be implemented without delay.⁶⁹

Relations between the Federal and Nyasaland information services further deteriorated as African hatred of Federation and all its institutions, including the Federal Information Services, greatly increased. In the period leading up to the August 1961 Nyasaland general election which brought it to power, the MCP intensified its attacks on the legitimacy of the Federal Information Services. It refused an invitation to participate in FBC pre-election campaign broadcasts. Instead it chose to make its pre and post-election campaign broadcasts through the Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation located in Tanganyika, an African ruled country which was sympathetic to the African nationalist movements in the Federation.⁷⁰ The increasing unpopularity of Federation and the persistent African

⁶⁵ One such Federal government propaganda booklet which depicted Nyasaland in this way was, *Federation and Nyasaland: The Facts*, Salisbury, Federal Public Relations Division, 1962.

⁶⁶ NAZ, F121/H3/53, John Foot, Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Minister of Home Affairs to Federal Minister of Home Affairs, 11th January, 1960.

⁶⁷ "Visits by MPs to Rhodesia Commended", *Rhodesia Herald*, 20 December, 1961.

⁶⁸ NAZ, F121/H82, Confidential Letter from John Foot, Parliamentary Secretary for Information Affairs, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to Federal Minister of Home Affairs, 16th January, 1961.

⁶⁹ NAZ, F121/H82, Confidential Letter from John Foot to Federal Minister of Home Affairs, 16th January, 1961.

⁷⁰ "Malawi Rejects Offer of Air Time by FBC", *Rhodesia Herald*, 24 June, 1961.

nationalist attacks on the communicator credibility of the Federal Information Services made the Nyasaland Information Services even more reluctant to be associated with these services.

After assuming control of government in Malawi following its election victory in August 1961, Dr. Banda moved as quickly as he could to totally expel the Federal Information Services from Nyasaland. After a negotiated takeover of FBC facilities in Nyasaland, the Nyasaland government in September 1963 established its own radio station, Radio Malawi. In a speech marking the opening of the new radio station, Dr. Banda described the opening of Radio Malawi as “concrete, clear and definite evidence that Welensky’s Federation is dead.”⁷¹

It can be concluded that the disagreements between the Federal and Nyasaland governments over information and propaganda policy for Africans highlight yet again the extent to which the successful implementation of Federal propaganda policy in the territories and by extension in the whole Federation was dependent on the co-operation of the Territorial governments and their information services.

Federal-Territorial Contestations: Northern Rhodesia

As in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, there were also disagreements between the Federal and Northern Rhodesia governments over Federal government propaganda for Africans in that territory. These contestations also centred on differing approaches on how to propagandise Africans in Northern Rhodesia in support of Federation and on how Northern Rhodesia was depicted in Federal government propaganda in support of Federation. Similarly, the struggles resulted in the Federal government accusing the Northern Rhodesia Information Services of not doing enough to help the Federal Information Services mobilise Africans in Northern Rhodesia in support of Federation.

Not long after the establishment of the Federation, the Federal government, which had always doubted the commitment of British colonial officials in Northern Rhodesia to Federation, came to believe that the Northern Rhodesia government was dominated by government officials who were covertly opposed to Federation and wanted to see it fail. This belief was founded on the contents of a secret despatch which Sir Arthur Benson, the Governor of Northern Rhodesia had sent to the British Secretary of State for colonies in June 1956. In the despatch, Sir Arthur had strongly criticised the policies of the Federal government as well individual Federal politicians. He had accused the Federal government of not being interested in making Federation successful as all of its policies “had been

⁷¹ “Banda Ushers in New Radio Era for Nyasaland”, *Rhodesia Herald*, 2 September, 1963.

directed towards converting Federation into amalgamation” and were characterised by “‘attacks’ on Territorial jurisdiction [that were] ambitious and sinister, subtle and insidious.”⁷²

Mainly because it was given no official notification by the Northern Rhodesia government of the existence of the despatch, but managed to get hold of it through its own undisclosed means, the Federal government saw the despatch as evidence of the determination of Sir Arthur and the Northern Rhodesia government to sabotage Federation.⁷³ The perception that Northern Rhodesia government officials were bent on sabotaging Federation was also shared by Federal Information Services officials engaged in pro-Federation propaganda campaigns among Africans in Northern Rhodesia. These officials produced detailed complaints about the lack of co-operation they were receiving from Northern Rhodesia district officials in their propaganda campaigns in rural Northern Rhodesia.⁷⁴

Differences between the Federal government and the Northern Rhodesia government over Federal government propaganda for Africans in Northern Rhodesia became more marked from 1960 onwards. In August 1960, the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky strongly criticised the Northern Rhodesia Information Department for not doing enough to mobilise African opinion in that territory in support of Federation. Others sympathetic to the Federal government also condemned what they described as the “propaganda silence in Northern Rhodesia” and argued that this silence showed that Northern Rhodesia had “little or no appreciation of how important it is to succeed in the propaganda war.”⁷⁵

The tensions between the two governments over propaganda for Africans were exacerbated by serious disagreements over what propaganda approach should be used in putting across pro-Federation propaganda to Africans in Northern Rhodesia. Following the reorganisation its information services and the reformulation of its information and propaganda policy in 1960, the Federal government, as already highlighted in previous chapters of this thesis, wanted to adopt a more direct and offensive approach to propagandising Africans in support of Federation. The Federal government believed that this more direct approach was what was now required in order to seize the initiative from African nationalist propagandists in the propaganda war over the future of the Federation.

This direct and overtly pro-Federation approach was, however, strongly opposed by the Northern Rhodesia government. The latter argued that indirect propaganda which restricted itself to explaining the Federal government’s policies and services and correcting public

⁷² R. Welensky, *Welensky’s 4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, London, Collins, 1964, pp.70-71.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁷⁴ NAZ, F121/H3/35, Confidential Memorandum by V.J. Lewis on “Impact of Fact Units in Northern Rhodesia”, 16th July, 1962.

⁷⁵ NAZ, S3269/61/19, Confidential News Report, No.47, Friday 26 August 1960.

misperceptions about these was the most effective form of pro-Federation propaganda for Africans and people of all races in Northern Rhodesia and the Federation as whole.

Defending the use of indirect propaganda, the Northern Rhodesia government stated:

the only way of achieving a better understanding of Federal government policy...is an indirect way, in our view the only way...We don't see any future in what could be called the political approach of direct propaganda in favour of Federation or the Federal government as such. The time is unfavourable and the people you want to get at-your critics not your friends-are not conditioned as yet for the direct approach. Such propaganda would...have the opposite effect to that which you desire.⁷⁶

The Northern Rhodesia government also made it clear that it was only willing to co-operate with the Federal government in putting over pro-Federation propaganda to Africans in its territory if this propaganda was not of a direct political nature.⁷⁷

It can be argued that Northern Rhodesia's opposition to the direct propaganda approach espoused by the Federal government was based less on the supposed ineffectiveness of this approach and more on its concern with avoiding any close association between its information services and those of the Federal government. The Northern Rhodesia Information Services were aware of the intense loathing for Federation among the majority of Africans in their territories and consequently sought to limit their association with the Federal Information Services as way of making their own information services credible in the eyes of Africans in Northern Rhodesia.

The Northern Rhodesian government's reluctance to fully cooperate with the Federal government in putting over pro-Federation propaganda to Africans in its territory increased as African opposition to Federation intensified between 1960 and 1963. In 1962, Federal Fact mobile cinema teams engaged in an intensified pro-Federation propaganda campaign targeted at Africans in rural Northern Rhodesia reported that they could no longer rely on the Northern Rhodesia government and information services to assist them in putting out pro-Federation propaganda to Northern Rhodesian Africans. They noted that Northern Rhodesia district administrators were unwilling to do anything to stop the intimidation of Fact mobile cinema teams by African nationalist opponents of Federation.⁷⁸

Like its counterpart in Nyasaland, the Northern Rhodesia Information Department was unhappy with the way Federal government print propaganda for Africans underplayed

⁷⁶ NAZ, F121/H3/50, M.O. Wray, The Secretariat, Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia to J. Foot, Parliamentary Secretary, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, 7 June 1961.

⁷⁷ NAZ, F121/H3/50, M.O. Wray to J. Foot, 7 June 1961.

⁷⁸ NAZ, F121/H3/35, Confidential Memorandum by V.J. Lewis on "Impact of Fact Units in Northern Rhodesia", 16 July 1962.

Northern Rhodesia's pre-Federation economic achievements and embellished the extent to which it had benefited economically and politically from Federation. The differences between the two governments over the depiction of Northern Rhodesia in Federal government propaganda are best illustrated by a controversy which occurred in 1962 and which brought these differences into the public domain to an extent not witnessed before.

In 1962, the Federal Public Relations Division published a pamphlet entitled *Federation and Northern Rhodesia: The Facts*. The pamphlet, which sought to highlight how Northern Rhodesia had benefited from Federation by comparing its pre-Federal and post-Federal conditions was essentially a reprint of a series of articles which had been published in the *Northern News* between 19 October 1962 and 27 October 1962.⁷⁹ The publication and issue of the pamphlet attracted immediate and "strong protest" from the Northern Rhodesia government which claimed that the pamphlet contained "tendentious and inaccurate statements" about the conditions in Northern Rhodesia before Federation. It also deliberately belittled the achievements of Northern Rhodesia in the pre-Federation period by unfairly giving the Federal government sole credit for the economic development that had taken place in Northern Rhodesia since the creation of the Federation in 1953.⁸⁰ In addition, the Northern Rhodesia government complained that it had not been consulted by the Federal Public Relations Division prior to the publication of the pamphlet.⁸¹

The Director of the Federal Public Relations Division's Publications Department, Michael Newman, rejected the complaints of the Northern Rhodesia government. In a letter sent to the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, Newman insisted that the pamphlet was factually accurate in all its claims about conditions in Northern Rhodesia before and after Federation. He stated that: "The tone of the N.R.G. complaint indicates the justification for saying there is nothing that hurts as much as the truth."⁸² Newman also questioned the motivation behind the Northern Rhodesia government's complaints about the contents of the pamphlet. He argued that since the pamphlet was a compilation of articles on the Federation and Northern Rhodesia which had previously appeared in the *Northern News*, the Northern Rhodesia government if it really had any legitimate complaints should have expressed its objections to the contents of those articles at the time they were published.⁸³

⁷⁹ NAZ, F121/H1/200/1, M.C. Newman, Director, Publications Department, Federal Public Relations Division to Federal Secretary for Home Affairs, 13 December, 1962.

⁸⁰ NAZ, F121/H1/200/1, E.G.G. Marsh, Secretary for Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to Secretary, Office of the Federal Prime Minister and External Affairs, 14 December, 1962; A. J. Saich, Secretary, Office of the Federal Prime Minister and External Affairs to the Administrative Secretary, Northern Rhodesia Government, 18 December, 1962.

⁸¹ NAZ, F121/H1/200/1, M.C. Newman, Director, Publications Department, Federal Public Relations Division to Federal Secretary for Home Affairs, 13 December, 1962.

⁸² NAZ, F121/H1/200/1, M.C. Newman Director, Publications Department, Federal Public Relations Division to Federal Secretary for Home Affairs, 13 December, 1962.

⁸³ NAZ, F121/H1/200/1, M.C. Newman to Federal Secretary for Home Affairs, 13 December, 1962.

Disagreements between the two governments over the claims contained in the pamphlet spilled over into the press with the *Central African Post* criticising the manner in which pamphlet had portrayed Northern Rhodesia in its efforts to make a case for the Federation. Referring to Federal government propagandists as “Sir Roy’s salesmen” it accused them of never having “done enough to sell the Federation concept to Northern Rhodesia” and condemned their effort to do so through the pamphlet as an “insult to dignity” which would do nothing to improve the chances of survival of a Federation which was already under serious threat of breaking up.⁸⁴

The *Northern News* openly declared that “our sympathies lie with the Northern Rhodesia government in its protest over the Federal pamphlet, *Federation and Northern Rhodesia-The Facts*.”⁸⁵ The newspaper noted that the pamphlet gave sole credit to the Federal government for all the improvements that had occurred in Northern Rhodesia since Federation, but was totally silent about the “disabilities” which Federation had imposed on Northern Rhodesia and about Northern Rhodesia’s contribution to its own economic development. It proceeded to argue that though Northern Rhodesia had made an enormous contribution to the Federal treasury, it was Southern Rhodesia and not Northern Rhodesia that had benefited most from Federation. That Northern Rhodesia had not benefited significantly from Federation was evidenced by, among other factors, higher taxation since 1953 and widespread discontent with the inefficiency of Federal government departments such as health and education. Federation, the *Northern News* concluded, “has been nothing like as beneficial to Northern Rhodesia as the pamphlet would have us believe.”⁸⁶

Some readers, however, wrote to the Editor of the *Northern News* supporting the position taken by the Federal government in the dispute with Northern Rhodesia over the propaganda pamphlet. One such reader dismissed the complaints of the Northern Rhodesia government about the contents of the pamphlet as “pathetic” and maintained that the claims made in the pamphlet about Northern Rhodesia’s economic backwardness prior to Federation and how it had greatly benefited from Federation were “perfectly correct”.⁸⁷

Tensions between the two governments over the claims contained in the pamphlet were further heightened by the Federal government’s continuous public defence of the ‘accuracy’ of the claims of the pamphlet.⁸⁸ The Federal government also refused to accept the Northern Rhodesia government’s demand that it should not continue distributing the contentious pamphlet without first addressing the Northern Rhodesia government’s complaints about

⁸⁴ “Sir Roy’s Salesmen”, *Central African Post*, 14 December, 1962.

⁸⁵ “Before and After”, *Northern News*, 17 December, 1962.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ “Pamphlet was True”, *Northern News*, 17 December 1962.

⁸⁸ “Federals Firm on Booklet Facts”, *Central African Post*, 16 January, 1963; “Federal Government Reply on ‘That Booklet’”, *Central African Post*, 16 January, 1963.

the numerous “unauthenticated claims” contained in the pamphlet.⁸⁹ The pamphlet continued to be distributed in Northern Rhodesia. An official of the Federal Public Relations Division based in Lusaka claimed that the pamphlet had “gained considerable popularity among people of all races and political opinions in Northern Rhodesia.”⁹⁰

By the end of January 1963 some newspapers in the Federation were reporting that the row between the Federal government and the Northern Rhodesia government had come to an end after the Northern Rhodesia government issued a brief public statement saying that it had considered the matter and did not intend “to pursue it any further”.⁹¹ However, the fallout between the Federal government and the Northern Rhodesia government over the claims made in the pamphlet continued away from the glare of the press. The Federal government maintained that the Northern Rhodesia government had been unable to provide evidence of any specific inaccuracies in the booklet. This government, therefore, proceeded to make plans to translate the propaganda pamphlet into the vernacular. However, in a reflection of the continued differences between the two governments over Federal government propaganda for Africans, the Federal government made a decision not to notify the Northern Rhodesia government of its plans. This was because it believed that the Northern Rhodesia government would “certainly create difficulties and demand to see the translated booklet before publication.”⁹²

These contestations between the Federal and Northern Rhodesian governments provide another illustration of how the Territorial governments could influence the type of Federal government propaganda put out to Africans in their territories. They mainly did so by withholding or threatening to withhold their co-operation in disseminating Federal government propaganda to Africans in their territories if this propaganda did not assume a form which they approved of.

Conclusion

The chapter has examined the contestations between the Federal government and the Territorial governments over the formulation and dissemination of information and propaganda for Africans in the Federation. It has shown how these struggles shaped the nature and degree of the federalisation of Territorial information and propaganda functions and structures after the establishment of the Federation in 1953. The chapter has also

⁸⁹ “That Offending Booklet-Salisbury Still Silent”, *Central African Mail*, 8 January 1963.

⁹⁰ “Federal Booklet is Still Going Strong”, *African Daily News*, 28 December, 1963.

⁹¹ “Pamphlet Row is Over”, *Central African Post*, 30 January 1963.

⁹² NAZ, F121/H1/200/1, confidential letter on “Federation and Northern Rhodesia: The Facts” from E.G.G. Marsh for Secretary for Home Affairs to Acting Secretary, Office of the Federal Prime Minister and External Affairs, 31st January, 1963.

analysed the principal forms which these struggles assumed in each of the three Federal territories, highlighting how they influenced the formulation and implementation of Federal propaganda policy for Africans in those individual territories.

Southern Rhodesia, the chapter has revealed, presented numerous problems to Federal government propagandists, which undermined their efforts to win over Africans to Federation. It was the main economic beneficiary and most dominant member of the Federation. This served to reinforce the anger of Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland Africans over the Southern Rhodesia-centric nature of Federation and the unequal distribution of the economic benefits of Federation. In addition, Southern Rhodesia's comparatively more racist laws and practices hardened the anti-Federation attitudes of especially northern Rhodesian Africans who believed that Federation would result in the extension of these laws and practices to their own territories. Southern Rhodesia's racially discriminatory laws and practices also generated adverse publicity for the Federation and seriously undermined the credibility of the Federal government's claims to being committed to the full implementation of multi-racial partnership.

The chapter has also highlighted the major strategies adopted by the Federal government propagandists in response to the challenges which Southern Rhodesia presented to their efforts to gain African support for Federation. Federal government print propaganda for Africans, the study has shown, projected Southern Rhodesia in ways that sought to suppress the inconvenient facts about Federation highlighted by that territory. This propaganda deliberately sought to significantly downplay the extent to which Southern Rhodesia dominated the Federation and had economically gained most from it at the expense of its two northern partners. Federal government print propaganda for Africans also tried to dissociate the Federal government from Southern Rhodesia's racially discriminatory laws and practices. This propaganda, the chapter has demonstrated, mainly did so by arguing that the Federal government had no constitutional power over territorial race laws and practices and had ended racial discrimination in all areas over which it had constitutional responsibility.

Also demonstrated in the chapter was how the struggles between the Federal and Nyasaland governments over propaganda for Africans were essentially rooted in the two governments' conflicting views on the causes of and remedies to the intense opposition to Federation among Nyasaland Africans. The Federal government viewed Nyasaland Africans' fierce opposition to Federation as essentially a product of African-nationalist anti-Federation propaganda. It believed that a vigorous Federal government propaganda campaign which had the full co-operation of the Nyasaland Information Department could successfully transform the militant anti-Federation sentiment of Nyasaland Africans into pro-Federation sentiment. In contrast, the Nyasaland government attributed the strong anti-Federation attitudes of Nyasaland Africans to their long-standing opposition to any

form of closer association with Southern Rhodesia whose brand of racially discriminatory laws and practises they highly resented and did not want to see extended to their own territory. The Nyasaland government also viewed Nyasaland Africans' opposition to Federation as too deeply entrenched to be significantly reduced or ended by any pro-Federation propaganda.

The chapter's analysis of the contestations between the Federal government and the Northern Rhodesia government over propaganda for Africans has shown that these also centred on disagreements over two major issues. The first was how Federal government print propaganda for Africans depicted the contribution that Federation had made to the economic development of Northern Rhodesia. As the evidence presented in the chapter has shown, in their pro-Federation print propaganda for Africans, Federal government propagandists tended to significantly downplay the level of economic development that had taken place in the two northern territories during the pre-Federal era and to greatly exaggerate the extent to which they had greatly benefited from Federation. Though this practice angered the governments of both northern territories, this anger was far more pronounced and more overtly expressed in the case of Northern Rhodesia. This was because this Federal government propaganda failed to show that Northern Rhodesia through the sale of its copper had made an enormous contribution to the Federal treasury but did not benefit economically from Federation as much as Southern Rhodesia did.

The second issue over which the two governments seriously disagreed was what form the pro-Federation propaganda to be put out to Africans should take. The Federal government after the panic-driven reorganisation of its Information Services in 1960 wanted to adopt a more offensive propaganda approach, which would entail putting out more direct and more clearly political pro-Federation propaganda to Africans. Northern Rhodesia's government, however, strongly opposed this approach arguing that indirect, less political and strictly factual propaganda would be more effective in gaining African support for Federation.

These divergent viewpoints on and approaches to Federal government propaganda for Africans contributed significantly to the eventual breakdown of co-operation between the Federal Information Services and the Territorial Information Services. The chapter has revealed that the Territorial governments' opposition to the Federal government's preferred methods of propagandising Africans was not really based on the presumed or proven ineffectiveness of these methods. Rather, it was based on their desire to protect the credibility of the Territorial Information Services among Africans in their territories by dissociating them from those of the Federal state which was resented and opposed by most Africans. It was also motivated by the Territorial governments' determination to resist what they believed were the Federal government's efforts to encroach on their Territorial powers, particularly over Africans.

The breakdown of co-operation between the Federal and Territorial governments in relation to pro-Federation propaganda for Africans had another important consequence. It compelled the Federal government to try and find ways of overcoming the constitutional and Territorial restrictions on its ability to directly and more effectively put out pro-Federation propaganda to Africans. The establishment of *Fact*, a monthly newspaper for Africans was one way in which the Federal government sought to achieve this and is the subject of the next chapter of this thesis.

CHAPTER 5:

Federal Print Propaganda and African Reactions: A Case Study of *Fact* Newspaper 1960-1963

Introduction

This chapter analyses the character of Federal government print propaganda for Africans and African reactions to this propaganda using *Fact*, a monthly newspaper for Africans as a case study. *Fact* was published from the year 1960 to 1963. The chapter also examines the policy considerations behind the establishment of *Fact* publication, its propaganda content and techniques and its reception by African readers in the Federation. *Fact* was regarded by the Public Relations Division of the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs as its “most important and successful venture among government publications”¹ and “the biggest single weapon the Ministry possessed in putting across Federation to Africans.”² It’s important to study the nature and impacts of the propaganda carried in *Fact*, not only because it represented the Federal government’s most ambitious effort to mobilise African opinion in support of Federation, but also for the following important reasons:

First, in terms of its propaganda content, themes and techniques, *Fact* typified the panic driven pro-Federation propaganda for Africans that dominated the second phase of the development of the Federal government’s information and propaganda structures. Studying the nature of the propaganda carried in *Fact*, therefore, contributes to scholarly understanding of how Federal government print propaganda policy for Africans related to actual practice as exemplified in *Fact*. Second, an analysis of African reactions to *Fact* makes it possible to highlight the agency of Africans in their engagement with Federal government print propaganda. It also illustrates the apparent failure of panic-driven Federal government propaganda to gain African support for Federation.

The chapter puts forward three key arguments relating to the reasons for the establishment of *Fact* newspaper, the character of the propaganda in it and the reactions of Africans in the Federation to that propaganda.

First, the chapter argues that the establishment of *Fact* newspaper was mainly the product of an information panic on the part of the Federal government and its information services. This information panic, which was rooted in long-standing contestations over the Federal concept and state, was triggered by the Federal government’s belated recognition of the potency of African nationalist opposition to Federation. The chapter’s conceptualisation of

¹ NAZ, FG3/PUB 3, Annual Report of the Public Relations Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1960-1961, p. 11.

² NAZ, F121/202, Vol. II, Record of Meeting of the Central Province Information Advisory Committee Held at the Lilongwe Hotel on Wednesday, May 31st, 1961 at 4:30 pm, p. 3.

information panic is largely based on that of C.A. Bayley who uses the term “information panic” to refer to the British colonial state’s anxieties and fears about its lack of information or knowledge about indigenous Indian society. Bayley argues that the information panics that occurred in Colonial India were not a reflection of the British colonial state’s hegemony over its Indian subjects, but of “the limitations of [British] colonial power and knowledge.”³ The chapter draws upon this conceptualisation of information panic to argue that the establishment of *Fact* newspaper by the Federal government was rooted in similar fears and anxieties about its lack of knowledge of African opinion, which it believed was hindering the effectiveness of its efforts to counter anti-Federation propaganda especially from African nationalist movements in the Federation.

Second, the chapter argues that in terms of its character, the pro-Federation propaganda put out to Africans through *Fact* newspaper was largely panic-driven propaganda. It was informed by the Federal government’s mistaken assumptions about the reasons for African opposition to Federation and the potential of propaganda to transform widespread African anti-Federation sentiment into pro-Federation sentiment. This propaganda, which extensively utilised the factual propaganda approach and the success story motif, was primarily reactive rather than offensive in nature. It sought to counter the dominant African nationalist anti-Federation narrative of Federation as a failure that was doomed to collapse with a counter-narrative of Federation as a success which had a bright and long-term future.

In putting forward this argument, the chapter draws upon and attempts to extend the conceptual approach used by Msindo in his seminal article on the development of Southern Rhodesian propaganda under the Rhodesian Front government between 1962 and 1970. Challenging “the dominant view that political regimes resort to propaganda to consolidate their already strong political positions”, Msindo shows that the Rhodesian Front government, faced with a political and economic crisis that made the continuation of white minority rule in Southern Rhodesia uncertain became politically paranoid and insecure and “resorted to propaganda to shore up a weak position.”⁴ Msindo’s conceptual approach also encompasses the idea of an information panic as it successfully demonstrates how political regimes can in times of political and economic crises use propaganda to give the impression of being in control when in reality they have no control and are in a state of panic.⁵

Similarly, this chapter will argue that Federal government propaganda as exemplified in *Fact* newspaper, was an attempt by a panic-stricken, crisis ridden and insecure political regime to mask its weakness and vulnerability and to bolster its weak position by projecting an image

³ C. A. Bayley, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in Britain, 1780-1870*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 171.

⁴ E. Msindo, “‘Winning Hearts and Minds’: Crisis and Propaganda in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1962-1970”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 35, 3, September 2009, p. 681, 663-681.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 663-681.

of Federation and its government as strong, successful and destined to have a bright long-term future. Its projection of success, strength, control and permanence was, therefore, a deliberate propaganda strategy aimed at gaining African support for Federation by highlighting what it claimed were the Federation's economic and political successes, the many ways in which Africans had and continued to benefit from these successes and the economic and political hardships that would befall them if Federation ceased to exist.

The third argument put forward in the chapter is that *Fact* elicited largely hostile responses from Africans in the Federal territories and was not successful in gaining African support for Federation. It represented a belated, inadequate and ineffective response by the Federal government to anti-Federation African nationalist propaganda. The chapter identifies and analyses the specific forms which hostile African reactions to *Fact* assumed, emphasising that they are an illustration of the agency shown by Africans in responding to the Federal government's pro-Federation propaganda for Africans. It also shows that *Fact's* attempts to conceal and downplay this African opposition to its pro-Federation propaganda were ultimately unsuccessful.

In analysing African responses to *Fact* and its ineffectiveness in persuading Africans to support Federation, the chapter utilises Pratkanis and Aronson's concept of communicator credibility. These two scholars have defined communicator credibility as the level of trustworthiness that recipients of a communication or information attach to the communicator or source of that information. This communicator credibility can be either real or contrived. It has an important influence on the effectiveness of propaganda as audiences tend to respond either positively or negatively to propaganda from a given propagandist in consonance with whether they hold a favourable or unfavourable view of the communicator credibility of that propagandist. It will be shown in this chapter that as was the case with all the information and propaganda services organs associated with the Federal government, Africans in the Federation had an unfavourable view of the communicator credibility of *Fact*. This poor communicator credibility greatly reduced the effectiveness of *Fact's* attempts to obtain African support for Federation.

The Establishment of *Fact* Newspaper

Fact commenced publishing in April 1960 and ceased publication in July 1963, five months before the formal dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It was published by the Federal Information Department, which in September 1960 was renamed the Public Relations Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs following the reorganisation of the Federal Information Services in the same year. Its target audience was Africans within the Federation who could read and write in English and Chinyanja and were of "'middle' level or

average intelligence.”⁶ It was edited by Mr. Michael Newman of the Federal Public Relations Division and was distributed free of charge to all readers who requested copies of it. *Fact* had two editions, an English edition and a Chinyanja edition. Both editions carried the same articles.⁷ This chapter is based on an analysis of the English edition of *Fact* as it is the language that the researcher is conversant with.

The establishment of *Fact* was largely a product of the second phase of the development the Federal government’s information and propaganda policy. As already shown in the second chapter of this thesis, this second phase was in comparison with the first phase, a crisis-ridden phase in which the Federal government faced numerous political and economic challenges which seriously threatened the continued existence of the Federation. By 1960 heightened African opposition to the continued existence of the Federation combined with a slowdown in the economic growth of the Federation had generated serious doubt about its future. African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda had by that time succeeded in creating a dominant narrative of Federation as a political and economic failure which was of no benefit to Africans and was destined to collapse.

The slogan “Federation is dead” had by 1960 become one of the most popular anti-Federation slogans among the African nationalist movements in the Federation. It triggered a state of panic on the part of the Federal regime as they belatedly realised the power and potency of African political opposition to the Federation. The Federal regime, therefore, needed an instrument they would use to counter criticisms of the Federation by Africans and to prove that the Federation was a success with a bright and long-term future. *Fact* was specifically established to serve this purpose and was a prime example of the panic-driven propaganda characteristic of the second phase of the development of Federal government propaganda policy for Africans.

As demonstrated in the second chapter of this thesis, in reappraising and reformulating its information and propaganda policy in 1960, the year in which *Fact* was established, the Federal government had arrived at a number of erroneous conclusions concerning the causes of intensified African opposition to Federation and the information and propaganda strategy that was required to effectively counter this opposition. It had concluded that the primary cause of intensified African opposition to Federation was deliberate misinformation spread by African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda about what Federation stood for and what it had achieved for Africans since its inception. The Federal government had also noted that African nationalist movements in the Federation had succeeded in seizing the initiative in the propaganda war over the continued existence of the Federation. Among the principal measures that the Federal government decided it urgently needed to adopt in

⁶ NAZ, FG3/PUB 3, Annual Report of the Public Relations Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1960-1961, p. 11.

⁷ NAZ, F128/HAF/25/7/1, Federal Information Department Newsletter, No. 35, August 1960, p. 1.

order to retake the initiative from these movements were the following: first, the need to prioritise pro-Federation information and propaganda campaigns to Africans within the Federation.⁸ Second, the need to more directly and aggressively sell the idea of Federation to Africans within the Federation by adopting more offensive rather than defensive propaganda methods.⁹

Fact publication in many ways reflected this new orientation in Federal propaganda. As the first Federal government monthly news publication targeted at an African audience, *Fact* represented the most significant attempt by the Federal government to employ a propaganda strategy that would enable it to more directly propagandise Africans in the Federation by circumventing some of the Territorial governments' limitations on its access to Africans. *Fact* was directly sent by mail to most of its African readers in the Federation. Its distribution was, therefore, not primarily dependent on the Territorial Information Services.¹⁰

The Regional Information Advisory Committees (RIACs) established by the Federal government in 1960 as part of the process of reorganising its information and propaganda services became important forums in which the progress *Fact* was making in winning over Africans to Federation was regularly discussed. The RIACs also became important sources of suggestions and recommendations on how to increase the circulation of *Fact* and to come up with propaganda content and methods that it could use in order to more effectively deliver pro-Federal propaganda to its African readers. The RIACs also provided feedback on African reception of Federal propaganda, including *Fact*.

***Fact* Propaganda Techniques and Content**

Fact's choice of propaganda techniques and themes was largely conditioned by the Federal government's need to counter the dominant African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda narrative that Federation had failed Africans economically and politically and was, therefore, doomed to collapse. According to this narrative, economically, Federation had mainly benefited Europeans and failed to bring about significant improvements in the economic status of the majority of Africans in the Federation. The narrative was also highly critical of the Southern Rhodesia-centric nature of Federation as it argued that only Southern Rhodesia and its inhabitants were benefiting economically from Federation at the expense of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland whose resources were being used to develop

⁸ NAZ, *F121/202, Vol.II*, Record of Meeting of the Northern Nyasaland Regional Information Committee held at 4:15 p.m. at the Lilongwe Hotel, Lilongwe on Tuesday, November 1st, 1960, pp. 1-3.

⁹ NAZ, *F121/202, Vol.II*, Record of Meeting of the Bulawayo Regional Information Committee held in the Conference Room, Victoria Hotel, Bulawayo, at 8:15 p.m. on Wednesday, October 19th, 1960, p. 1.

¹⁰ NAZ, *F128/HAF/25/7/1*, Federal Information Department Newsletter, No. 35, August 1960, p. 1.

Southern Rhodesia. It highlighted how the major economic projects of Federation were centred in Southern Rhodesia and also criticised Europeans in the Federation for taking sole credit for the economic growth in the Federation and ignoring the contributions of Africans to this economic growth.¹¹

Also, highlighted in this African nationalist anti-Federation narrative was how Federation had failed Africans politically. This narrative repeatedly argued that Federation had facilitated the consolidation of white rule in the Federal territories by frustrating African political advancement and by resisting their demands to be quickly granted the right to self-rule. It had failed to end racial discrimination against Africans and to fully implement multi-racial partnership.¹²

The propaganda techniques and themes adopted by *Fact* were meant to provide counter-arguments to these central claims of African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda by constructing a supposedly 'Fact-ual' counter-narrative of Federation as an economic and political success, which had brought immense benefits to Africans and had a bright long-term future. *Fact* drew on and further developed the 'factual' propaganda approach which from the inception of Federation had characterised the broader multi-media "Fact" propaganda campaign. The Federal Information Department after considering 40 other possible names chose the name *Fact* for their new monthly news publication for Africans. *Fact*, therefore, adopted not only the factual approach but also the name of the broader "Fact" propaganda campaign. It, however, added to this factual technique an 'educational' and pictorial approach aimed at making the propaganda in *Fact* more appealing to Africans.¹³ *Fact* also employed and refined the 'success story' perspective which had been earlier used by the Federal government in its pro-Federation propaganda booklets for Africans such as the booklet, *Success Stories: African Achievement in Rhodesia and Nyasaland*.¹⁴

Both the factual and success story propaganda methods adopted by *Fact* were premised on the Federal government's belief that African opposition to Federation was based on a lack of factual information and wrong information about the achievements of the Federation that they received from the opponents of the Federation, particularly African nationalists. In consonance with the factual propaganda and success story propaganda methods, *Fact* set

¹¹ Record of the Meeting of the Bulawayo Regional Information Committee held in the Conference Room of Victoria Hotel, Bulawayo at 8 p.m. on Thursday 2nd February 1961, p. 3; W. J. Barber, "Federation and the Distribution of Economic Benefits" in C. Leys & C. Pratt (Eds.) *A New Deal in Central Africa*, London, Heinemann, 1960, pp. 81-97.

¹² M. West, *The Rise of An African Middle Class: Colonial Zimbabwe, 1898-1965*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2002, pp. 192-202.

¹³ NAZ, F128/HAF/25/7/1, Federal Information Department Newsletter, No. 35, August 1960, p. 1.

¹⁴ *Success Stories: African Achievement in Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Salisbury, Federal Information Department, 1960.

out to counter the African nationalist anti-Federation narrative by refuting what it characterised as the falsehoods of anti-Federation propaganda directed at Africans. This entailed presenting pro-Federation propaganda to Africans as 'factual' information and 'education' about the economic and political advantages of Federation. *Fact* presented 'facts' and figures to support its claims about how Africans had and continued to benefit from Federation. However, the 'facts' and figures chosen for presentation to its readers by *Fact* were only those which presented a positive view of the policies and achievements of the Federal government. The propaganda effect of this factual propaganda technique was, therefore, based not on apparent falsehoods, but on the choice of 'facts' about the Federation which were presented to Africans.

The editorial commentary of the first issue of *Fact* published in April 1960 underscored the centrality to *Fact* propaganda of the factual propaganda technique and the success story motif by stating that:

In this publication we shall show you some of the things about Federation that are good. We shall give you the FACTS. There are already too many people spreading stories which are not true. We shall answer them with FACTS...Don't listen to lies. Read *Fact* and learn the facts.¹⁵

In the same editorial, *Fact* also encouraged its readers to read, write and speak about everything they wanted concerning Federation, but to always ensure that what they were saying about Federation was based on "facts" and not lies. It also urged its readers to use 'facts' to counter the lies about Federation that were supposedly spread by African nationalists.¹⁶

As a propaganda technique, the success story motif operated at two interrelated levels in *Fact*. The first entailed the portrayal of Federation as a success story at the Federal level by showcasing its major economic and political achievements. The second focused on highlighting the individual success stories of Africans who had risen from humble beginnings and managed to become economically successful and to be appointed to important political and other positions formerly held by Europeans. *Fact's* focus on the success stories of individual Africans was intended to encourage, middle-class Africans, many of whom felt frustrated by the inability of multiracial partnership to bring about rapid and substantial African advancement, to believe that Federation was still capable of delivering such advancement.

This extensive use of the success story motif in *Fact* newspaper propaganda also reflected the intensification of the Federal government's efforts at agenda-setting. These efforts were

¹⁵ "Learn the Facts", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 1, April 1960, p. 1.

¹⁶ Ibid.

intended to counter the agenda of African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda. The latter, as shown in the second chapter of this thesis, centred on demanding the immediate break-up of the Federation and the granting of self-rule to Africans by focusing the minds of Africans on how Federation had dismally failed to bring about their political and economic advancement.

Fact attempted to establish a counter-agenda to this African nationalist agenda by making a deliberate and sustained effort to direct African attention to what it claimed was the success of Federation in advancing Africans economically and politically. The newspaper gave the highest prominence to news items and other types of information which reflected what the Federal government believed were the economic and political successes of Federation. *Fact's* agenda-setting, therefore, represented an attempt by Federal government propagandists to shift the focus of discourses on Federation away from its failures towards its successes as a way of undermining the basis of African nationalist claims for the dissolution of the Federation and the granting of independence to Africans.

Another element of the propaganda techniques adopted by *Fact*, included efforts to get Africans to buy into its propaganda of Federation as a success story by using popular African personalities to put across to its readers propaganda about the achievements of Federation and its benefits for Africans. Pratkanis and Aronson have referred to this type of propaganda strategy as “celebrity endorsement” and have argued that it is one of the methods used by propagandists to try and enhance their communicator credibility in order to make their target audiences more receptive to their propaganda.¹⁷

In clear effort to use such “celebrity endorsement” to get its African readers to buy into its pro-Federation propaganda, the first issue of *Fact* carried an illustrated feature article on a guided tour of a Federal post office undertaken by Frederick Gotor, popularly known as “Dusty King”. He was a well-known African football star who played for the Yellow Peril football team, which was one of the popular African football teams in the Federation. *Fact* newspaper organised and photographed the football star’s tour of the Federal post office. The newspaper’s feature article on the tour sought to project the postal services, which were a Federal responsibility as one of the numerous notable achievements of Federation from which Africans were significantly benefiting. It also sought to persuade *Fact's* readers that the postal services were facilitating African advancement by emphasising how during his tour of a Federal post office “Dusty King” had seen “Africans doing jobs that were formerly done by Europeans.”¹⁸

¹⁷A.R. Pratkanis and E. Aronson, *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion* (2nd Edition), New York, Freeman, 2001, p. 53-61.

¹⁸ “‘Dusty King’ Looks at the Federal Post Office” *Fact*, Vol.1, No.1, April, 1960.

Another notable example of *Fact's* use of "celebrity endorsement" in putting over pro-Federation propaganda to its readers was shown in its third issue, which had an illustrated feature article on "leading [African] singer, recorder and stage star" Dorothy Masuka's visit to Mpilo Federal Hospital for Africans. The hospital located in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia had been constructed using funds provided by the Federal government which had constitutional responsibility for health for Africans. *Fact* portrayed Mpilo Hospital as a good example of how Federation was benefiting Africans by providing them with free health services and facilitating their advancement by training them to become nurses and doctors.¹⁹

The decision to give pictorial propaganda and later strip cartoons a role in *Fact* newspaper propaganda was based on Federal propagandists' belief that Africans would be more receptive to their pro-Federation propaganda if it was packaged and delivered to them in certain ways. In their continuous efforts to develop new methods of packaging and delivering their pro-Federation propaganda for Africans, Federal government propagandists were particularly concerned with devising methods that would be able to attract and sustain African interest in this propaganda. Federal propagandists believed that Africans were more receptive to ordinary photographs and drawings rather than to other types of visual aids such as ideographs which were considered too complex for Africans.²⁰ *Fact* made extensive use of photographs to reinforce its propaganda on a number of themes relating to Federation, especially multi-racial partnership. It routinely carried photographs which were intended to help Africans visualise the considerable progress which *Fact* claimed the Federal government was making in implementing multi-racial partnership. These photographs usually depicted Africans and Europeans engaged in multi-racial economic, sporting and other activities.

Fact's use of pictorial propaganda also reflected Federal propagandists' preoccupation with packaging and delivering their propaganda for Africans in ways that they believed would make it easier for Africans understand the Federal concept and state, which they mistakenly believed were too complex for the vast majority of Africans to understand and appreciate. The Federal Information Department's very first print propaganda publication for a specifically African audience had tried to translate the Federal concept into an indigenous form which they believed would be more easily understood and appreciated by the vast majority of Africans. This propaganda pamphlet first published in 1958 sought to illustrate the idea of Federation and the complementary nature of the economies of the three countries that comprised the Federation by describing it in the following way:

¹⁹ "Dorothy Masuka Looks at Mpilo Federal Hospital", *Fact*, Vol.1, No.3, June, 1960.

²⁰ NAZ, F121/H3/10, W. V. Brelsford, Director, Federal Information Department to Chief Information Officer, Zomba, 7 July 1959.

Federation has been described as three big kraals. The first kraal has many ploughs, the second one has many oxen and the third one has only a large number of menfolk. Separately and on their own, they cannot till the wide fields and produce wealth, but by agreeing to work together they can unite, sharing each other's benefits. The practice is common to all African life. We have the mutual work party-the 'Msonkano wa nchito' or 'nhimbe' where people pool their resources without losing their independent identity.²¹

Building on these previous efforts to translate the Federal concept into a form which Federal propagandists believed would be easily understood by the majority of Africans, *Fact* made a deliberate and sustained effort to explain the workings of the Federal government in a simplified way which it believed would help its African readers to understand and appreciate Federation.

The other salient propaganda techniques employed by *Fact* were repetition, stereotyping and scaremongering. Members of the Bulawayo RIC in Southern Rhodesia had highlighted the importance of repetition as a propaganda technique by stating that it was "vitally important for Africans to be repeatedly informed" about the benefits of Federation to them and to their individual territories.²²

In terms of its propaganda content, *Fact* carried predominantly political propaganda which, however, included elements of economic, health and educational propaganda. The overarching propaganda theme of this propaganda was the economic and political success of the Federation and the numerous ways in which it had and continued to benefit Africans in the Federation. Built around this overriding propaganda theme were other closely related themes such as multi-racial partnership, African advancement and the dangers of African nationalist agitation against Federation.

In terms of its structure, *Fact* was an eight page newspaper with feature articles and various regular pages all of which carried content which reinforced the dominant propaganda themes of the Federation. One of these regular pages was the "*Fact* Answers Your Questions" page, a question and answer page in which *Fact* answered a selection of written questions which it had invited from its African readers. Although *Fact* invited its readers to send it written questions on "any subject", almost all the questions and answers published in the "*Fact* Answers Your Questions" page focused on the propaganda themes referred to earlier.²³

²¹ *Our Country: The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Salisbury, Federal Information Department, 1958, p. 5.

²² Record of the Meeting of the Bulawayo Regional Information Committee held in the Conference Room of Victoria Hotel, Bulawayo at 8 p.m. on Thursday 2nd February 1961, p. 3.

²³ "*Fact* Answers Your Questions", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 1, April 1960, p. 2.

Another regular page in *Fact* which was used to focus the attention of its readers on the positive policies and achievements of the Federal government was the “You Write to *Fact*” page. This was a page where a selection of readers’ letters to the editor of *Fact* was published, some with comments from the editor. Almost all the letters chosen for publication on this page were those which highlighted the positive policies and achievements of the Federal government and which agreed with *Fact*’s viewpoints on issues relating to Federation. Readers’ letters praising *Fact* as a good and informative publication were also regularly published on this page.²⁴

Fact also had a general knowledge quiz page “Test Your Knowledge” where the choice of questions presented also served to focus attention on the workings and achievements of the Federal government under the guise that this was a way of educating *Fact* readers about Federation and other issues by testing their general knowledge. Some of the questions presented on this page in the inaugural issue of *Fact* included the following: “How many Africans are there in the Federal Parliament?” and “Who is the President of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, where both African and European students work together?”²⁵

On the basis of the major thrust of these regular pages, *Fact* proudly announced to its readers that: “*Fact* publishes your views, answers your questions, tests your knowledge, gives you good advice.”²⁶ *Fact* increased its size to twelve pages in February 1962, but never managed to bring out any editions in languages other than English and Chinyanja due to financial constraints.²⁷

Two other major regular columns were introduced by *Fact* sometime after it started publishing. The first, introduced in May 1961, was a column entitled “Let’s Talk” written by a writer using the pseudonym “Fundu” who claimed to be an African. It was an opinion column in which Fundu commented on recent political, economic and other developments in the Federation.²⁸ The second, introduced in February 1962 and entitled “House Hints”, was a column on women’s issues targeted at *Fact*’s female readers.²⁹

In order to encourage its readers to engage with its viewpoints on various issues about Federation, *Fact* from the beginning offered readers cash prizes for the best questions and letters sent to *Fact* and for the first correct answers to its general knowledge quiz. Cash prizes were also offered for several other individual competitions run by *Fact* between 1960 and 1963.

²⁴ “You Write to *Fact*”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 3, June 1960, pp. 6-7.

²⁵ “Puzzles for Pleasure”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 1, April 1960, p. 7.

²⁶ “Reading *Fact*”, *Fact*, Vol. II, No.1, April 1961, p. 2.

²⁷ “A Bigger, Better *Fact*”, *Fact* Vol. II, No. 12, February 1962, p. 1.

²⁸ “Let’s Talk”, *Fact*, Vol. II, No.2, May 1961, p. 3.

²⁹ “House Hints”, *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 12, February 1962, p. 9.

The following section of this chapter analyses the propaganda content and techniques of *Fact* propaganda on the following interrelated propaganda themes: economic progress, multi-racial partnership and African advancement as well as African nationalism in the Federation. The section will also examine the depiction of African women in *Fact*.

Economic Progress in *Fact* Propaganda

Fact started publishing at a time when the Federation was experiencing slower economic growth and continued political instability which created doubts over its continued existence. This uncertainty over the future of the Federation had negative economic consequences for the Federation as it reduced its attractiveness to foreign investors and potential skilled immigrants. *Fact* propaganda on economic development in the Federation, therefore, sought not only to highlight the economic successes of Federation and how Africans had benefited from these successes, but to also to generate confidence in the future of the Federation. It tried to achieve this by emphasising that, contrary to the assertions of African nationalists and other sceptics, the Federation was still politically stable and continued to attract considerable foreign investment.

In order to counter African nationalist claims about the Southern Rhodesia-centric nature of Federation and the unequal distribution of the economic benefits of the Federation, *Fact* also tried to show how Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and not just Southern Rhodesia had benefited economically from Federation. It also aimed to mobilise African support for Federal economic policies and to discourage the breakup of the Federation by stressing how under Federation the economies of the three constituent territories had become complementary such that any break-up of the Federation would have adverse economic effects on all of them.

In its propaganda on economic progress, *Fact* utilised the success story propaganda technique with particular emphasis on development that was supposedly taking place in all the three territories. It also made use of Federal propagandists' own version of African pre-colonial history to portray white settler rule and Federation as agents of modernisation and civilization to the otherwise hopeless Africans. White settler rule and Federation were portrayed as having brought an end to the economic backwardness, ignorance, superstition, tyranny and tribal warfare that it claimed characterised pre-colonial Africa. The potential breakup of Federation was portrayed as being synonymous with reversion to savagery and economic backwardness by Africans in the Federation.

Fact published numerous stories repeatedly highlighting the main achievements of the Federation in areas such as industry, mining, communications infrastructure such as roads, railways and post-offices, health and educational facilities. The Kariba Hydro-electric scheme figured prominently in *Fact* propaganda as one of the outstanding achievements of

Federation and as example of how the establishment of Federation had enabled the three Federal territories to mobilise sufficient financial resources to collectively undertake massive development schemes which none of the three Federal territories could by itself have been able to afford.³⁰ It tried to play down the massive discontent resulting from the eviction of thousands of African villagers from their homes as a result of the project. *Fact* credited the hydro-electric scheme with encouraging industrial growth in the Federation by supplying power to industries in the Federation. This industrial growth in turn raised the living standards of Africans in the Federation by providing more employment opportunities for them.³¹

Numerous *Fact* articles also focused on industrial growth and the benefits that it brought to Africans in the two northern territories. For instance, the September 1960 issue of *Fact* carried a story on the opening of a new one and half million pound cement factory in Nyasaland emphasising that Africans were expected to benefit enormously from the new factory.³² The same issue of *Fact* also published an article claiming that the mining industry in the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt provided employment for 140, 000 Africans and that African mineworkers on the Copperbelt were “more highly paid than any other Africans engaged in comparable industries in the whole of Southern Africa, including the gold mines of South Africa.”³³

In an effort to counter African nationalist claims that overseas investors were quickly losing confidence in the economic and political future of the Federation, *Fact* in September 1960 published an article that tried to show how international companies still had confidence in the future of the Federation. The article drew attention to the millions of pounds that the Federal government was still able to obtain from the London money market and also gave examples of international industrial companies which had opened factories in the Federation or had plans to do so.³⁴ The announcement in 1961 of plans by the Federation to construct its own oil refinery was described by *Fact* as “the biggest development since Kariba” and a sign of the continued confidence of overseas investors in the Federation.³⁵

Fact propaganda was also used to defend the Federal government government’s policies such as the promotion of European immigration into the Federation. White immigration had by 1960 had attracted growing criticism and opposition from Africans in the Federation who believed that it was depriving them of employment opportunities and having other adverse economic effects on them. A.S. Mlambo has highlighted some of these adverse effects by

³⁰ “Federation”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No.11, February 1961, p. 3

³¹ “Teamwork Built Kariba”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 2, May 1960, p. 3.

³² “New Industry for Nyasaland”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 6, September 1960, p. 3.

³³ “The Copperbelt”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No.6, September 1960, pp. 4-5.

³⁴ “Industries Support Federation”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 6, September 1960, p. 1.

³⁵ “A Big Step Forward”, *Fact*, Vol. II, No.5, August 1961, p. 1.

showing how significant flows of European immigrants into Southern Rhodesia after the Second World War had a negative impact on African agriculture. In order to create room for this increased number of white immigrants and to remunerate white Southern Rhodesians who had fought in the Second World War, the Southern Rhodesia government “forcibly removed thousands of Africans from their traditional home under the 1944 Land Settlement Act and relocated them in remote, arid and tsetse-infested reserves...on the northern edges of the country.”³⁶

White immigration into the Federation also had a negative impact on African artisans by decreasing the employment opportunities available to them. In 1958, the Southern Rhodesia African Artisans’ Union had decided to “take positive action” against the Federal government policy of importing white labour into the Federation by formally protesting against this policy to the British Trade Union Congress, the British government and the governments of other countries in which the Federation had labour recruitment bureaus.³⁷ Apart from this African opposition to Federation, there was also growing concern among Federal government propagandists about the need to counter African nationalist claims that huge numbers of whites and significant amounts of capital were leaving the Federation because they had no confidence in its future.³⁸

Fact sought to counter African opposition to the Federal government’s promotion of white immigration by emphasising the highly selective nature of the Federal government’s immigration policy and what it claimed were the economic benefits that it brought to Africans. The newspaper argued that the Federal government immigration policy encouraged skilled rather than unskilled European immigration into the Federation. As a result of this, white immigration into the Federation was creating more employment opportunities for Africans by contributing to the establishment of new industries and the expansion of those already in existence.³⁹ *Fact* also sought to counter claims of a massive flight of whites and capital from the Federation by arguing that despite the political disturbances that had taken place in the Federation, the country was still able to attract significant levels of foreign investment and high numbers of white immigrants.⁴⁰

Another example of the use of *Fact* propaganda to try and generate African support for Federal government economic policies were its articles in support of Federal government

³⁶ A. S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 64.

³⁷ “African Artisans to Protest Overseas over Immigration to Federation”, *African Daily News*, 25 November, 1958.

³⁸ NAZ, F121/H202/2, Record of Meeting of the Fort Victoria Regional Information Committee Held in the Council Chamber, Fort Victoria, at 2:30 p.m. on Thursday, October 20th, 1960, p. 4.

³⁹ “Immigration”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 6, September 1960, p. 2.

⁴⁰ “Industries Support Federation”, *Fact*, Vol.1, No. 6, September 1960, p. 1.

protectionist measures such as the “buy home products” campaign and imposition of higher customs duties on imported products which could be produced in the Federation.⁴¹

Educational institutions and services available in the Federation and how they were benefiting Africans in the Federation also received extensive coverage in *Fact*. The newspaper also highlighted the financial and other contributions of the Federal government to the establishment and maintenance of these institutions and services. These institutions included the multi-racial University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland established in 1957, the Chibhero College of Agriculture, which was the first African agricultural college in Southern Africa and was established in 1960.

In the area of Health Services, *Fact* repeatedly highlighted what it claimed were the significant contributions of the Federal government in the provision of what it characterised as ‘free health services’ to the eight million Africans in the Federation.⁴² Making extensive use of statistics to try and convey to its readers that there had been tremendous progress in the provision of healthcare for Africans, *Fact* noted that the Federal Ministry of Health had responsibility for over 60 government hospitals in which 8, 400 beds were reserved for Africans. This Ministry had constructed 4 major hospitals for Africans at a total cost of four million pounds. These were the Harare Hospital, in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, the Mpilo Hospital in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, the Queen Elizabeth Group Hospital in Blantyre, Nyasaland and the Llewellyn Hospital in Kitwe, Northern Rhodesia. It provided training facilities for Africans, especially African girls who wanted to take up careers in the health services as nurses. The Federal Ministry of Health also employed about 6, 500 Africans, among them six African doctors.⁴³

Fact also presented increased African use of and access to Federal health services as representing the triumph of the modern medical knowledge and services brought by the white man and Federation over the “primitive” and ineffective medical knowledge and practices of Africans before the establishment of European rule in the Federal territories.⁴⁴

Propaganda on health services for Africans put out by *Fact* also included health warnings against diseases such as smallpox, malaria and tuberculosis and drew attention to the efforts by the Federal government to fight these diseases through, among other measures, vaccination campaigns and tuberculosis screening among Africans in the Federation. This propaganda often utilised scaremongering methods aimed at undermining the effectiveness

⁴¹ “Big Boost for Home Industry”, *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 6, September 1962, p. 1; “Buy Home Products”, *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 7, October 1962, p. 1.

⁴² “Better Health for All”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 2, May 1960, p. 2.

⁴³ “Federal Health Services Offers Good Careers”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 5, August 1960, p. 5; “Hospitals”, *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 8, November 1961, p. 2.

⁴⁴ “Better Health for All”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 2, May 1960, p. 2.

of African nationalist-organised boycotts of Federal vaccination and other health campaigns, especially in Nyasaland's Central Province.

The October 1960 issue of *Fact* carried a special supplement on smallpox warning Africans of the dangers of the disease and encouraging them to be vaccinated against it. One of the articles in the supplement headlined "This Could Be You" was accompanied by photographs showing the hideous physical effects of smallpox on an African girl and an African man suffering from the disease. The article described vaccination from smallpox as painless and free and stated that it was "one of the first benefits Europeans brought to Africa." The article also blamed continued outbreaks of smallpox in some areas of the Federation on African nationalist-led boycotts, intimidation and other disturbances which *Fact* propaganda presented as the major threats to economic progress in the Federation.⁴⁵

The resentment that Africans, especially in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, felt over Southern-Rhodesia centric nature of Federation was reflected in letters sent to *Fact* by some of its readers. These letters asked why Salisbury had been chosen as the capital of the Federation and why the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had been built in Salisbury.⁴⁶ The letters presented *Fact* with the problem of how to dispel the strong belief among its African readers that economic and political development in the Federation was highly biased in favour of Southern Rhodesia. Members of the Bulawayo RIAC had argued that since Southern Rhodesia was more economically advanced than the other Federal territories, frequent mention in *Fact* of the services available in Southern Rhodesia was to be avoided as it would cause Africans in the northern territories to draw comparisons between the services available in their own territories and those available in Southern Rhodesia. Such comparisons, the Bulawayo RIAC argued, would only serve to reinforce their existing belief that Southern Rhodesia was the major beneficiary of economic development in the Federation.⁴⁷

However, since some of the major institutions and services that *Fact* claimed Africans were benefiting from were located in Southern Rhodesia, *Fact* found that it could not totally avoid focusing on some of the services available in Southern Rhodesia. In such cases it focused on putting forward arguments justifying the location of these institutions in Southern Rhodesia. It defended the location of the Federal capital in Salisbury on the grounds that Salisbury "was centrally situated...and was the centre of banking, business and commerce."⁴⁸ The establishment of an agricultural college for Africans, Chibhero College of Agriculture, in Southern Rhodesia rather than in Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland was

⁴⁵ "This Could Be You", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 7, October, 1960, p. 3.

⁴⁶ "Federal Capital", *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 12, February 1962, p. 2.

⁴⁷ NAZ, F121/H202/2, Record of the Meeting of the Bulawayo Regional Information Committee held in the Conference Room of Victoria Hotel, Bulawayo at 8 p.m. on Thursday 2nd February, 1961, p. 3.

⁴⁸ "Federal Capital", *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 12, February 1962, p. 2.

justified on, among other grounds, that for the benefit of its students, it needed to be near agricultural research stations as well as an area in which the Southern Rhodesia Native Land Husbandry Act was being applied.⁴⁹

Among the major issues relating to Southern Rhodesia addressed in *Fact's* propaganda on economic development in the Federation was the issue of land tenure. The Southern Rhodesia Land Apportionment Act of 1930 had divided agricultural land in that country along racial lines. The European minority was allocated most of the productive land whilst Africans who were numerically the majority were restricted to inferior land in communal reserves and Native Purchase Areas. This unjust allocation of land as well as the enforcement of legislation such as the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951, which, among other unpopular measures, made the destocking of African cattle mandatory in the name of environmental conservation, lay at the heart of Africans' grievances against the colonial state long before and after the establishment of the Federation. These grievances were a powerful tool used by African nationalists to mobilise African opinion in rural Southern Rhodesia against colonial rule and to validate their claims that the main goal of Federation was not to build genuine multiracial partnership, but to maintain white economic and political privileges.⁵⁰

The centrality of the land issue, especially to Africans in Southern Rhodesia, was also reflected in the numerous questions that *Fact* received from its African readers in Southern Rhodesia relating to allocation of land along racial lines.⁵¹ In its propaganda on land tenure and land use in Southern Rhodesia, *Fact* sought to justify the introduction of the Land Apportionment Act the Native Land Husbandry Act whilst simultaneously highlighting the steps that were being taken to end racial discrimination in land ownership. It argued that the establishment in Southern Rhodesia of African communal reserves and Native Purchase areas as places where Europeans were forbidden to own land had been necessary in order to protect Africans until such time as they had developed the agricultural skills that would enable them to compete with Europeans in agricultural production.⁵²

In response to persistent claims by some African readers that Africans in Southern Rhodesia had been settled on inferior and unproductive land whilst Europeans had been allocated the most fertile land, *Fact* argued that these claims were untrue because almost half of the African areas allocated to Africans under the Land Apportionment Act were in high rainfall regions while the other half was good for cattle rearing and sorghum production. According

⁴⁹ "Farming College for Africans", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 1, April 1960, p. 8.

⁵⁰ J. Alexander, *The Unsettled Land: State Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe 1893-2003*, Oxford, James Currey, 2006, pp. 44-62.

⁵¹ "Land Tenure", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 3, June 1960, p. 2.

⁵² "What the Quinton Report Says", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 7, October 1960, pp. 3 & 7; "Points from the Report", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 7, October 1960, p. 3.

to *Fact*, Africans occupied a lot of sandy soil areas because they had since ancient times chosen to settle in those areas because sandy soils rather than red soils were much easier to cultivate with their “primitive tools” and also had other advantages such as the ability to rapidly recover from being overworked and to retain water during lengthy periods of drought.⁵³

At the same time, *Fact* also praised the recommendations of a report of a Southern Rhodesia Parliamentary Select Committee headed by Mr. H.J. Quinton, the Southern Rhodesian Minister of Native Affairs, which in August 1960 recommended the quick abolition of the Land Apportionment Act to enable people of every race in Southern Rhodesia to purchase agricultural land as well as urban land anywhere in Southern Rhodesia.⁵⁴ *Fact* also regularly published “success stories” of African farmers in African purchase areas who had become economically successful through farming in order to create the impression that African purchase areas were agriculturally productive, especially if African farmers followed the advice of government agriculture Department officers and adhered to the requirements of the Native Land Husbandry Act which *Fact* claimed had “been praised in other parts of the world as a model of its kind.”⁵⁵ It also highlighted the increasing contribution of African Purchase Area farmers to the total agricultural productivity of Southern Rhodesia and the Federation. Also highlighted in *Fact* was the aid that the Federal government was giving to African farmers in the Native Purchase Areas.⁵⁶

Fact devoted considerable space in its pages to a propaganda campaign aimed at discouraging Nyasaland’s secession from the Federation. This was mainly because the publication of *Fact* started at a time when the campaign by Dr. Kamuzu Banda’s Malawi Congress Party to have Nyasaland secede from the Federation was gaining strength. Preventing Nyasaland from leaving the Federation was a key priority for the Federal government which believed that Nyasaland’s departure from the Federation would trigger the breakup of the entire Federation.⁵⁷ This campaign began with an effort by *Fact* to present what it claimed were compelling economic arguments against Nyasaland seceding from the Federation. It, however, later descended into a scaremongering propaganda campaign as the likelihood of Nyasaland seceding from the Federation grew.

⁵³ “Poor Soils”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 11, February 1961, p. 2.

⁵⁴ “Dramatic New Land Proposals in Southern Rhodesia”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 7, October 1960, p. 1; “What the Quinton Report Says”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 7, October 1960, pp. 3 & 7; “Points from the Report”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 7, October 1960, p. 3.

⁵⁵ “Land Tenure”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 3, June 1960, p. 2; “Wise Farmer Grows Wealthy”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 5, August 1960, p. 8.

⁵⁶ “African Farmers Help Country to Prosper”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 9, December 1960, p. 3; “Federal Aid for African Farmers”, *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 7, October 1962, p. 7.

⁵⁷ R. Welensky, *Welensky’s 4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, London, Collins, 1964, pp. 267-283.

In its propaganda against Nyasaland breaking way from the Federation, *Fact* focused on refuting the two major arguments repeatedly put forward by African nationalist leaders and their supporters in support of Nyasaland seceding from the Federation. The first of these arguments was that Nyasaland had not benefited economically and politically from its membership of the Federation. The second was that Nyasaland had sufficient mineral wealth and other economic resources to enable it to do well economically if it left the Federation.⁵⁸ *Fact*, therefore, sought to highlight how Nyasaland had benefited immensely from Federation and how as a poor country lacking commercially viable mineral resources as well as industrial development, it faced a very bleak economic and political future it chose to or was permitted to secede from the Federation.

Fact emphasised how prior to its entry into the Federation, Nyasaland had been one of the poorest and economically backward countries in the Federation with no mining and manufacturing industry, poor communications infrastructure, educational facilities and other health services. Its entry into the Federation had resulted in its economic status being considerably transformed through the millions of pounds which had been injected into Nyasaland by the two other territories of the Federation, Southern and Northern Rhodesia. *Fact*, however, emphasised that Nyasaland was not economically self-sufficient and remained highly dependent on the other two Federal territories for its economic welfare. It was, therefore, essential that Nyasaland remain in the Federation if it wanted to continue its economic progress.⁵⁹

Articles such as one with the headline, "Nyasaland's Mineral Riches-The Truth" published in May 1960 by *Fact* emphasised Nyasaland's "geological poverty" as a way of refuting assertions by African nationalist politicians about Nyasaland's ability to be economically self-supporting outside of Federation. The article, citing an economic survey of Nyasaland known as the Jack Report, which had concluded that Nyasaland was a poor country whose mineral deposits and other natural resources were too small to enable it to sustain a viable mining industry, dismissed claims by African nationalists and their sympathisers that Nyasaland had a lot of untapped mineral wealth which it could use to support itself outside of Federation.⁶⁰

As the likelihood of Nyasaland seceding from the Federation became stronger, *Fact* resorted to alarmist propaganda in which it painted a very grim picture of Nyasaland's probable economic and political fate outside of Federation. According to *Fact*, outside of Federation, "Nyasaland would degenerate into a rural slum"⁶¹ and "would be a beggar".⁶² *Fact* also warned Africans who supported Nyasaland's secession from the Federation that the post-

⁵⁸ "You are Wrong Mr. Chiume!", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 4, July 1960, pp. 1-3.

⁵⁹ "Nyasaland", *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 2, May, 1961, p. 2.

⁶⁰ "Nyasaland's Mineral Riches-The Truth", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 2, May 1960, p. 2.

⁶¹ "Nyasaland", *Fact*, Vol. I, No.4, July 1960, p. 2.

⁶² "Achievements", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 5, August 1960, p. 3.

Federal government in Nyasaland would raise taxes significantly and lower wages as it would no longer be able to access the financial assistance it had previously received from the Federal government and Britain.⁶³

In August 1962, under the headline, "Do not Let Nyasaland Secede, Pleads Malawi Party Man" *Fact* published, under a pseudonym, a long letter purportedly from a disillusioned Malawi Congress Party member. The writer of the letter strongly opposed Nyasaland's secession from the Federation on the grounds that outside of Federation, Africans in Nyasaland would be subjected to economic hardships and political repression by Dr. Banda's Malawi Congress Party.⁶⁴

Once the British government had officially granted Nyasaland the right to secede from the Federation, *Fact* in January 1963 published a special supplement on the "Nyasaland Secession". The supplement argued that the main reason for Nyasaland's secession from the Federation was the betrayal of the Federal government by the British government which had reneged on all previous promises that it had made to the Federal government not to allow the breakup of the Federation.⁶⁵

The *Fact* supplement also gave an account of what it claimed was "the truth about Nyasaland's debt to the Federation"⁶⁶. It argued that it was the British government that had forced the two Rhodesias to include Nyasaland in the Federation when it was formed and that once in the Federation, Nyasaland had become an economic liability to the two Rhodesias as it received millions of pounds in federal funds annually and contributed very little to the Federal treasury. Reiterating its forecast of a future characterised by "mass unemployment", "higher taxes" and "financial ruin" for Nyasaland outside Federation, the *Fact* supplement maintained that without the massive economic assistance given by the two Rhodesias, "Nyasaland would have been one of the most backward and underdeveloped countries on the continent of Africa."⁶⁷

As late as October 1962, long after it had become evident that Federation was doomed to collapse, *Fact* was still putting out propaganda aimed at convincing its African readers that Federation had a bright long-term future.⁶⁸ Even after the Federal government had been forced to accept the reality of the breakup of the Federation, *Fact* never abandoned the success story narrative in its propaganda on economic progress in the Federation. It continued up to its very last issue to remind its African readers of the economic success and

⁶³ "Independence", *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 8, November 1962, p. 2.

⁶⁴ "Do not Nyasaland Secede, Pleads Malawi Party Man", *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 5, August 1962, p. 5.

⁶⁵ "The Broken Promises", *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 10, January 1963.

⁶⁶ "The Heavy Cost of Being in Isolation: Future is Bleak for Nyasaland", *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 10, January 1963.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ "Federation Faces a Fine Future", *Fact*, Vol. III, No.8, November 1962, p. 8.

benefits of Federation and to warn them of the adverse economic impact that the break-up of the Federation was going to have on all three Federal territories.⁶⁹

Multi-racial Partnership and African Advancement in *Fact* Propaganda

Apart from economic propaganda, the supporters of Federation had also lobbied the British government and public to support the establishment of the Federation on the grounds that it was to be a “great experiment in multi-racial partnership” and not something designed to entrench European domination in Central Africa. As Cranford Pratt notes: “The belief and faith that the federation would become a genuine multi-racial partnership was central to the support which the Federation received in Britain.”⁷⁰ The Federal government was, therefore, from the beginning aware of the propaganda value of justifying the foundation and continued existence of Federation in terms of multi-racial partnership—a theme which became dominant in all forms of Federal propaganda, including *Fact*.

It’s important to note that the Federal government never officially defined the concept of multi-racial partnership and it remained a contested concept which meant different things to different constituencies in the Federation.⁷¹ Though partnership was never officially defined by the Federal government, the available evidence makes it possible to show how the Federal government conceptualised multi-racial partnership and to demonstrate how this conceptualisation of multi-racial partnership was reflected in *Fact* propaganda on this issue.

Evidence shows that the Federal government did not view multi-racial partnership as entailing a partnership between equals. It had a gradualist or evolutionist approach to multi-racial partnership and African advancement often referring to what it termed “the political evolution” of the African. In this gradualist conception of multi-racial partnership, the Europeans, the Federal government argued, were the senior partner as they were at a more advanced stage of civilisation than the Africans in the Federation who “had only been in contact with Western civilisation for approximately 70 years...[thereby creating] a very wide gap between European and African cultural, educational, and economic standards.”⁷²

The gap in knowledge and skills between Europeans and Africans would take a long time to bridge and Africans, the Federal government argued, were not ‘civilised’ enough, ‘educated’ enough and ‘responsible’ enough to immediately become equals with Europeans in a multi-

⁶⁹ “Federation Raised over £235 Million”, *Fact*, Vol. IV, No. 4, July 1963, p. 2.

⁷⁰ “British Colonial Policy in Africa”, in C. Leys & C. Pratt (Eds.) *A New Deal in Central Africa*, London, Heinemann, 1960, p. 54.

⁷¹ M. West, *The Rise of An African Middle Class*, pp. 192-202.

⁷² NAZ, F120/L27, “Draft of Federal Prime Minister’s Address to United States African Seminar”, 1958, p. 1.

racial partnership. As Africans became more 'civilised', 'educated' and 'responsible' under European tutelage, the Europeans would progressively advance or promote them to political and economic positions which would enable them to eventually become equal partners with Europeans in the Federation. The Federal government emphasised that premature advancement of Africans to political and economic positions which been reserved for Europeans only would lead to a drastic fall in the high standards of economic and political administration that Europeans had established in the Federation.⁷³

African nationalists were divided in their response to multi-racial partnership in the Federation. They are those African nationalists who, at least in the first years of Federation, supported it because they believed that the Federal government was sincere in its claims to be building up a multi-racial partnership in the Federation. Other African nationalists from the beginning rejected multi-racial partnership, condemning its unequal basis and evolutionist premises, which they argued were meant to frustrate rapid African advancement and indefinitely delay the granting of self-rule to Africans.⁷⁴

By 1960, the viability of multi-racial partnership in the Federation as well the Federal government's sincerity in implementing it had come under serious attack from both the internal and external opponents of Federation. These opponents accused the Federal government of using the idea of multi-racial partnership as a propaganda slogan to justify the continued existence of the Federation while making no real effort to clearly articulate and implement it as a policy. The failure of multi-racial partnership to improve race relations in the Federation and to bring about meaningful African advancement was also increasingly put forward by the opponents of Federation as one of the major reasons why Federation should be dissolved.⁷⁵

In its propaganda on multi-racial partnership in the Federation, *Fact* sought to counter claims by African nationalists that multi-racial partnership in the Federation had failed. Aware that progress on the issue of multi-racial partnership was one of the yardsticks by which the success of the Federation was measured by public opinion both inside and outside the Federation, *Fact* focused on publishing stories aimed at highlighting how the Federal and Territorial governments were taking meaningful steps to advance Africans by ending racial discrimination and by progressively assigning them a greater role in the political and economic administration of the Federation.

To this end, *Fact* carried regular news and updates on the progress made in ending racial discrimination in the Federation and in advancing Africans politically and economically. The very first issue of *Fact* contained a feature story on the operations of the Federal post office

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ M. West, *The Rise of An African Middle Class*, pp. 192-202.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

which noted how Africans had been appointed to jobs formerly reserved for Europeans.⁷⁶ Subsequent issues of *Fact* carried reports on Federal government efforts to create a non-racial civil service and highlighted how Africans promoted to the same employment grades as Europeans were now receiving the same salaries and other employment benefits as their European counterparts. Such reports were given prominence in *Fact*.⁷⁷ The establishment of the multi-racial University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as well as the employment of Africans by the Federal Ministry of Health, especially the six African doctors in the Federation was celebrated by *Fact* as evidence of multi-racial partnership.⁷⁸

Pictorial propaganda, namely photographs depicting whites and blacks working together or engaging in sporting and other social activities together, often accompanied *Fact* stories on multi-racial partnership in the Federation. For instance, in May 1960, *Fact* published a story headlined "Teamwork Built Kariba", which portrayed the construction of the Kariba Hydro-Electric scheme as an example of multi-racial co-operation in developing the Federation economically. The story, which was accompanied by photographs of multi-racial work teams on the Kariba Dam wall construction site, described the Kariba scheme as "a tribute to black and white men who worked side by side to build this wonderful project... a tribute to partnership between men and between countries."⁷⁹

There was also an effort by *Fact* to mobilise its readers to engage in campaigns and other actions aimed at promoting multi-racial partnership in the Federation. *Fact* argued that ordinary African and European people and not just the Federal government and voluntary associations in the Federation could play an important role in facilitating multi-racial partnership by increasing their personal contacts and by learning about each other's culture and customs.⁸⁰

As part of its propaganda campaign to encourage good relations between the major races in the Federation, *Fact* in November 1960 launched what it figuratively described as a "Good Will Fund". The "'accounts' of the fund" were good will stories from the Federation, highlighting acts of good will across racial boundaries. *Fact* invited its readers to send it these good will stories, which were published in subsequent issues of *Fact*.⁸¹ A cash prize of 10s 6d was awarded to the writer of each good will story published by *Fact*.⁸² The theme of the campaign, good will between the races, was taken from the Monckton Commission

⁷⁶ " 'Dusty King' Looks at the Federal Post Office", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 1, April 1960, pp. 4-5.

⁷⁷ "Could have had a Film Career", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 4, July 1960, p. 2; "Governor-General has African Aide-de-Camp", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 10, January 1961, p. 7; "Olympic Runner", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 5, August 1960, p. 3.

⁷⁸ "Federal Health Services Offers Good Careers", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 5, August 1960, p. 5.

⁷⁹ "Teamwork Built Kariba", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 2, May 1960, p. 3.

⁸⁰ "Two-Way Traffic", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 6, September 1960, p. 1.

⁸¹ "Fact launches a 'Good Will' Fund", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 8, November 1960, p. 8.

⁸² "Five Stories of Good Will at Work", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 9, December 1960, p. 8; "Six Races Show Good Will", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 9, December 1960, p. 8.

Report, which had argued that the Federation could not continue or succeed without the good will and support of its inhabitants of all races.⁸³

The “Good Will Fund” was part of a broader *Fact* propaganda campaign to shape African perceptions of the recommendations of the Monckton Commission Report in way that was favourable to the Federal government. This government viewed many of the report’s recommendations as unfairly critical of the Federal concept and government. The “Good Will Fund” stories published by *Fact* were, therefore, intended to convince Africans that sufficient good will existed between Africans and Europeans to justify the continued existence of the Federation.

One of the issues of *Fact* published in 1961, gave prominence to quotation taken from a speech by the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky in which he had stated that: “There are only three choices...Domination by whites, domination by blacks-or partnership. Neither of the first two is wise or possible...partnership is the only answer.”⁸⁴

Fact propaganda on African political advancement defended the Federation’s franchise system, which was frequently accused by African nationalists of slowing down African advancement by giving voting rights to a very limited number of Africans who met the property and educational qualifications required to be granted the right to vote. *Fact* attacked the principle of one-man one-vote championed by the African nationalists and argued that tens of thousands of Africans in the Federation who were eligible to vote were slowing down their own political advancement by failing to register to vote.

The slow pace of racial integration in schools, hospitals and other public places was also defended by *Fact*, which argued that “most ‘discriminatory laws’ were introduced to protect the African” and were “being removed as the African people advance.”⁸⁵ *Fact* argued that “different social and cultural backgrounds [made] integration of schools [and hospitals] impractical on a large scale for the present.”⁸⁶

Also in defence of the Federal government’s gradualist approach to African advancement, *Fact* in July 1960 published a speech from the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, on multi-racial partnership under the headline, “Partnership is Not Meaningless”.⁸⁷ In his speech, Sir Roy emphasised that “the essence of partnership between Europeans and Africans is the transmission of skills and ability from the one to the other”, a process he emphasised would take a long time to accomplish.⁸⁸

⁸³ “The Most Important Thing”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 8, November 1960, p. 1.

⁸⁴ “The Only Answer”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 12, March 1961, p. 1.

⁸⁵ “Woman Reader takes up *Fact*’s Challenge”, *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 3, June 1961, p. 8.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ “Partnership is not Meaningless”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 4, July 1960, pp. 4-5.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p.4.

Rejecting accusations by African nationalists that the Federal government was only paying lip service to the idea of multi-racial partnership and that partnership had become “a meaningless term”, Sir Roy argued that the key to African political advancement in the Federation did not lie with the extreme African nationalists as they had failed to realize “that there is no short-cut to knowledge, ability and power, all of which must be gained the hard way.”⁸⁹ Instead, it lay in the entry into politics of greater numbers of moderate Africans of “substance”, who having worked “their way up the ladder of life” understood that there were no short-cuts to the acquisition of skills and power and were willing to use constitutional and peaceful means to advance African political interests.⁹⁰

The prominence given by *Fact* to these and other similar arguments about multi-racial partnership demonstrates highlights how Federal government propagandists sought to use the theme of multi-racial partnership to support what the Federal government and its information services regularly referred to as African ‘moderates’ and to discredit those that they described as African ‘extremists’. The former label was in reality a propagandistic term for African supporters of Federation and the Federal government while the latter referred to African nationalist opponents of Federation.

African Nationalism in *Fact* Propaganda

Apart from countering the dominant African nationalist narrative of Federation as a failure and doomed to collapse, *Fact* propaganda on African nationalism in the Federation also had two interrelated goals: First, to discredit African nationalism by exposing what the newspaper claimed were its selfish aims and violent and undemocratic methods of agitation. Second, to discourage demands for immediate self-rule by Africans in the Federation by exposing what *Fact* claimed was the emptiness of African nationalist promises about the benefits that Africans would derive from self-government.

As demonstrated in the second chapter of this thesis, the RIACs established by the Federal government in 1960 had strongly recommended that the Federal government adopt a more offensive and aggressive approach to countering anti-Federation African nationalist propaganda. These RIACs argued that this was the most effective way of regaining the initiative from African nationalists in the propaganda war over the future of the Federation.⁹¹

The content and methods of *Fact* propaganda on African nationalism mirrored this recommendation from the RIACs. This propaganda had a more direct anti-African nationalist

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ NAZ, F121/H201/1, A. J. A. Peck, “Memorandum on Propaganda Dominance”, 13 July 1962.

tone which progressively became more combative and aggressive as the African nationalist campaign to have the Federation broken-up and Africans in the Federation granted self-rule continued gaining ground. The confrontational tone which *Fact's* anti-nationalist propaganda assumed reflected the desperation and panic which increasingly characterised the Federal government's attempts to counter the growing influence of African nationalist propaganda against Federation. However, *Fact's* anti-nationalist propaganda did not repudiate the factual propaganda approach as it retained its focus on refuting what it claimed were the deliberate falsehoods of anti-Federal African nationalist propaganda.

Among the propaganda techniques mostly commonly used by *Fact* in its propaganda against African nationalists in the Federation were stereotyping, name-calling and fear mongering. African nationalists were repeatedly referred to in *Fact* as "extremists", "madmen", "wicked", "foolish", "dangerous", "troublemakers", "terrorists", "thugs" and "would-be dictators".⁹² A cartoon strip introduced by *Fact* in October 1961 and entitled "*Fact Fable*" was specifically used to ridicule African nationalist politicians in the Federation and to reinforce negative stereotypes about them.⁹³ Photographs depicting scenes of destruction and human suffering attributed to African nationalists were also used by *Fact* to reinforce its stereotype of African nationalist politicians and their supporters as violent and destructive.

In its depiction of the aims of African nationalist politicians in the Federation, *Fact* consistently portrayed African nationalists as "ambitious" and "power-hungry men" who, using violence and fear, wanted to gain political power as quickly as possible at any cost and for their own benefit and not that of the majority of the African people whom they falsely claimed to represent.⁹⁴ A commentary on this issue in *Fact* warned readers that: "... today in the Federation there are ambitious men looking for power. They are not interested in you. They are not interested in peace. They are interested only in using you for their own ends."⁹⁵

Fact also emphasized that African nationalist leaders in the Federation were dishonest politicians who could only offer Africans populist slogans and false promises about the economic benefits Africans would gain after achieving self-rule. They had no clear and detailed practical policies to address fundamental economic and political issues in the Federation if they were to assume power. Urging Africans not to listen to or support politicians who had no clear policies about how they would economically develop the country if they gained power, *Fact* stated:

⁹² "This Could Be You", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 7, October 1960, p. 3.

⁹³ "*Fact Fable*", *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 7, October 1961, p. 8.

⁹⁴ "Make Your Choice", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 12, March 1961, p. 1.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

The test of a good politician is in his policies. Shouted slogans mean nothing. Excited crowds mean nothing. There must be policies which can be explained and accepted by the people so that they know their liberty and progress will continue.⁹⁶

In a further effort to expose African nationalist politicians as leaders who lacked the policies and administrative skills required to competently administer the country if they achieved self-rule, *Fact* in April 1961 challenged African nationalist politicians to produce their specific policy plans for the future economic development of the Federation in, among other areas, the following: housing, social welfare, taxation, agriculture, health services and communications. *Fact* promised that it would publish any policy plans sent to it by political leaders in the Federation by devoting “a full page of any issue of *Fact* to any leader who wishes to make his views known to the people.”⁹⁷ In laying down this challenge, *Fact* deliberately portrayed African nationalist leaders as politicians whose aim was to destroy and not to build by stating that *Fact* was “not interested in their plans to end this, to kill that, to break the other”, but in “their plans for building up the country.”⁹⁸

In its propaganda against the methods of agitation used by African nationalists, *Fact* focused mainly on three interrelated methods that it continually associated with African nationalist agitation against Federation. These were lies, violence and intimidation and boycotts. It sought not only to expose the “evil” nature of these methods, but also to mobilize Africans to fight against them in order to undermine what it denounced as false claims by African nationalists that African nationalism was a force which could not be opposed.

Fact continually accused African nationalists of deliberately peddling numerous ‘falsehoods’ about Federation. These ‘falsehoods’ included the persistent claim that the collapse of the Federation was inevitable and imminent as Federation had failed to benefit Africans politically and economically. African nationalists were also accused by *Fact* of mobilising African support for the granting of self-government to Africans and the break-up of Federation by making false promises about the economic and political benefits that Africans would gain from independence under nationalist leadership. According to *Fact*, African nationalists were in the habit of promising Africans that under African self-rule they would, among other benefits, not have to pay taxes and everyone would have cars and good houses.⁹⁹

Fact sought to undermine African belief in these nationalist promises by, among other methods, consistently telling its African readers that it was better for them to accept the economic and political benefits that they were currently enjoying under the Federation

⁹⁶ “Politics and Honesty”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No.10, January 1961, p. 1.

⁹⁷ “*Fact* Challenges Politicians: Tell Us Your Plans”, *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 1, April 1961, p. 1.

⁹⁸ “We Believe...”, *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 1, April 1961, p. 1.

⁹⁹ “Poor People”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 8, November 1960, p. 6.

rather than to reject these benefits in favour of wild African nationalist promises about the benefits that Africans would enjoy under self-rule.

Fact propaganda on the use of violence and intimidation by African nationalist movements in the Federal territories should be viewed in the context of the reality that when the publication of *Fact* commenced in 1960, intimidation and violence were becoming established as one of the methods used by African nationalist movements in the Federation not only to mobilise Africans to challenge the power of the colonial state but to also resolve the political and ethnic struggles that existed within and among these nationalist movements.¹⁰⁰ Violence and intimidation had been one of the features of the African-led nationalist disturbances which occurred in the Federation in 1959 and which had culminated in the declaration of states of emergency in all the Federal territories in that year. This violence, which encompassed, among other tactics, petrol bomb attacks, beatings and killings, continued into the 1960s and was used to justify the banning African nationalist parties in the Federation, such as the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) of Southern Rhodesia, which was banned in 1962.¹⁰¹

The anti-African nationalist propaganda in *Fact* closely associated the use of violent tactics by African nationalists with undemocratic and unconstitutional means of trying to gain and maintain political power. This use of violence and intimidation, *Fact* argued, made African nationalists unfit to rule anyone and was a foretaste of the terror and intimidation that Africans would be routinely subjected to if African nationalists succeeded in gaining political power. A letter from a reader published by *Fact* commented: "How can Africans expect to rule themselves properly when they begin burning even their own people before they are given freedom."¹⁰²

African boycotts of the Federal health and other government services, especially in Nyasaland were attributed by *Fact* to the systematic use of violence and intimidation by African nationalist leaders to enforce these boycotts. Similarly, the reluctance of many eligible Africans to vote in Federal and Territorial elections was imputed by *Fact* to African nationalist intimidation of African voters mainly through false claims that they had supernatural means of discovering how every African had voted and would punish all those Africans who had voted the wrong way. *Fact* columnist, Fundi, who frequently ridiculed

¹⁰⁰ Detailed analyses of how ethnic, political and other factors interacted with African nationalism and contributed to the resort to political violence by Southern Rhodesian African nationalist leaders in their inter-party and intra-party struggles are given by, among other scholars, T. Scarnecchia, *The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940-1964*, New York, University of Rochester Press, 2013 & E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe: Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860-1990*, New York, University of Rochester Press, 2012.

¹⁰¹ R. Welensky, *Welensky's 4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, London, Collins, 1964, pp. 109-136.

¹⁰² "Who is to Blame?", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 5, August 1960, p. 6.

African-led nationalist boycotts as foolish and ineffectual, advised *Fact* readers that: "The man who gets on the Voters' Roll is worth ten politicians who tell him to boycott it. At least he is doing something positive towards his future."¹⁰³

Fact also attempted to mobilise Africans to actively support government efforts to suppress African nationalist agitation against Federation in the name of fighting violence and terror by African nationalist movements. The newspaper's most substantial and sustained effort to mobilise its African readers to actively oppose African nationalist agitation against Federation in the name of fighting violence and intimidation began with an editorial commentary headlined "Get Together to Fight Intimidation" which appeared in the August 1960 issue of *Fact*. The commentary condemned the intimidation in all three Federal territories of supporters of Federation by African nationalists whom it denounced as "wicked men", "thugs" and "would-be dictators". It appealed to *Fact* readers to unite and organize themselves to fight and defeat intimidation.¹⁰⁴

The propaganda campaign to mobilise *Fact*'s African readers to fight against political intimidation by African nationalists reached a high point in September 1962 when *Fact* launched a "How to Beat Intimidation Competition" which it also referred to as the "Bully" competition". In this competition, *Fact* offered its readers a total of £10 in cash prizes for the best letters sent to it on the topic: "The best way to stop intimidation". The letter which made the most practical and constructive suggestions about how to fight intimidation would be awarded the First Prize of £5 with five runners up each being awarded a cash prizes of £1. Readers were advised that letters sent to *Fact* for this competition had to be marked "Bully".¹⁰⁵

In launching the "Bully" competition, *Fact* told its readers that: "there are only a few of them [intimidators] against the many thousands of law-abiding citizens, and the time has come for the ordinary man to act."¹⁰⁶ It encouraged its readers to fight intimidators whom it referred as "bullies" and terrorists" by immediately reporting any cases of intimidation to the police, by joining the Police Reserve force and by forming self-defence associations in their residential areas in order to protect themselves and their property. Above all, *Fact* encouraged its readers to fight against intimidation by voting emphasising that: "The greatest weapon of all against the bully is the vote. The ballot box is secret and no one knows how you can vote."¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ "Let's Talk", *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 2, May 1961, p. 3.

¹⁰⁴ "Get Together to Fight Intimidation", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 5, August 1960, p. 1

¹⁰⁵ "Win Cash by Helping to Beat the Bullies", *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 6, September 1962, p. 6.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

The six prize winning letters in the “Bully” competition were published in the November 1962 issue of *Fact*. All these letters were in agreement with *Fact*’s viewpoints on the character of intimidators and the solutions to intimidation.¹⁰⁸

From the late 1950s onwards, African nationalist demands for immediate self-rule for Africans in the Federation became more strident, spurred on by the achievement of independence from colonial rule by African countries such as Ghana and Nigeria. In response to this development, *Fact* adopted an even more aggressive posture in its propaganda campaign against African nationalism and its demands for immediate self-rule for Africans. The method that *Fact* employed in this increasingly forceful phase of its propaganda war against African nationalism was to draw comparisons between the economic and political situation in the white ruled Federation and that in the black ruled newly independent African states, especially Ghana which was regarded as the leading state in championing African self-rule.

These comparisons had several interrelated aims. First, they were intended to project the Federation as a better alternative to the newly independent states by contrasting what *Fact* claimed was the stability, economic progress and political freedoms enjoyed by Africans in the European ruled Federation with the instability, economic hardships and political repression in the newly independent African states which were now ruled by African nationalists. In this way, *Fact* hoped to convince its African readership that since the Federation was better governed than the newly independent African states, gradual political evolution towards African self-rule within the European ruled Federation was better than immediate independence under African nationalist rule outside the Federation.

To reinforce its opinions against immediate granting of self-rule to Africans, *Fact* argued that the suffering experienced by Africans in the independent African states was not only a result of the false pre-independence promises made by African nationalist politicians. It was more importantly a logical and predictable consequence of the fact that African nationalist leaders in these states had been allowed to assume power and exercise self-rule before they had acquired the administrative skills and democratic political values required to successfully govern their countries. In a feature article with the alarmist headline “Freedom is Vanishing in Many African States” *Fact* highlighted the political repression and economic freedoms which it claimed were being experienced by millions of Africans in the newly independent African states. These Africans, *Fact* emphasised, “had previously enjoyed the protection and wisdom of experienced [European] governments.”¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ “Northern Rhodesia Man Wins Bully Competition”, *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 8, November, 1962, p. 6; “The Vote is Our Strongest Weapon”, *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 8, November, 1962, p. 6.

¹⁰⁹ “Freedom is Vanishing in Many African States”, *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 6, September 1962, p. 7.

Self-rule, *Fact* argued, was, therefore, not something that Africans were automatically entitled to. It was “something that had to be earned” and would only be granted once Africans had acquired the administrative skills and democratic values which were the requisites for independence. *Fact* stated: “To grant a child freedom to do whatever he wants would be completely unwise and bad for the child. Everything in the world that is worth having has to be earned.”¹¹⁰ For this reason, *Fact* maintained, the focus of the Federal government was on “preparing Africans to rule themselves” and not on prematurely granting them self-rule.

The manner in which British rule in Nigeria came to end was cited by *Fact* as a model example of the type of gradualist power transfer that it wanted to see in the Federation. Commenting on Nigeria’s achievement of independence from British rule on 1 October 1960, *Fact* stated: “Nigeria did not become self-governing overnight. For many years the British government has been training Nigerians for important jobs so that when the day of independence came they would be wise enough to deal with many problems of self-government.”¹¹¹ Nigeria, whose diplomatic support and friendship the Federal government constantly cultivated, partly because it also had a federal system of government, was conspicuously absent from the list of newly independent countries to which the Federation was compared. This was despite the fact that Nigeria exhibited many of the negative traits, such as corruption and political intolerance, which *Fact* identified with the newly independent African states. Only six years after achieving independence, Nigeria quickly gained international notoriety for the political corruption, military coups and civil war that came to dominate its post-colonial development.

Second, by highlighting the internal economic and political failures in the newly independent states, *Fact* sought to undermine the credibility of African nationalist notions of freedom by exposing what it claimed were the empty promises made by African nationalists regarding the economic and political benefits that political independence would bring to Africans. It emphasised how the political freedoms and economic benefits promised to Africans by nationalist politicians before the attainment of independence had not materialised after the achievement of independence.

In answer, to persistent criticism by the independent African states that the economic achievements of the Federation counted for nothing if Africans in the Federation were denied the most fundamental freedom—the right to rule themselves—*Fact* continuously characterised the freedom that existed in the independent African states as false freedom. *Fact* argued that this was because this freedom was devoid of economic prosperity and many fundamental rights such as the right to freedom of association and expression. The

¹¹⁰ “Freedom”, *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 4, July 1961, p. 6.

¹¹¹ “Nigeria Independent”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 7, October, 1960, p. 4.

newspaper contrasted the false freedom which it claimed existed in the independent African states with what it claimed was the “real freedom” that existed in the Federation. The most important component of this real freedom as defined by *Fact* was economic prosperity.¹¹²

Fact’s emphasis on economic prosperity as the key element of “real freedom” reflected the Federal government’s long-held belief that modernisation of Africans through economic progress should take precedence over granting them political rights. As early as 1949, in his speech in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council in support of establishing a Federation in Central Africa, Sir Roy Welensky, who later became the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, stated that:

Political rights, after all, mean very little to a man with an empty stomach. If we are genuinely concerned about the Africans let us give them economic development and political rights can come later. That [political rights] is a secondary consideration.¹¹³

This perspective of freedom in relation to Africans continued to inform the Federal government’s thinking on granting self-rule to Africans after the creation of the Federation and was useful in justifying its gradualist approach to granting political rights to Africans. The perspective was reflected in propaganda stories in which *Fact* argued that the freedom which existed in the Federation was the real and best type of freedom because it meant “freedom from ignorance, poverty and hunger.”¹¹⁴ *Fact* also published letters from African readers which tried to convey the impression that the majority of Africans valued economic progress and prosperity more than political independence.

Third, *Fact* sought to delegitimise the independent African states’ persistent criticisms of continued European rule in the Federation by arguing that the internal economic and political failures of the independent African states meant that these states had no moral basis upon which to pass judgment on the Federation, which according to *Fact*, was clearly better governed than them. Citing the English proverb that “People who live in glass houses should not throw stones”, *Fact* argued that: “In criticizing our country, Guinea, Ghana, Ethiopia and all other “freedom” states damage themselves...they have achieved little to benefit their people.”¹¹⁵ Attempts to delegitimise criticism of the Federation by the African independent states on this basis were expressed through *Fact* articles with headlines such as “How Dare they Criticise Us”. Criticism of the Federation by the newly independent African states was also characterised as constituting unwarranted interference in the

¹¹² “The Real Freedom”, *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 3, June 1962, p. 1.

¹¹³ R. Welensky, *Welensky’s 4000 Days*, p. 35.

¹¹⁴ “Freedom! The Federation’s Way is the Best”, *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 3, June 1962, pp. 6-7.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

internal affairs of a sovereign state by “sheep-like” African countries who were acting as the agents of Communist Russia while “doing so little for their own people.”¹¹⁶

Substantial articles devoted to comparing the political and economic conditions in the Federation with those in the independent African states first appeared in the January 1961 issue of *Fact* and continued until *Fact* ceased publishing in July 1963.¹¹⁷ However, the most wide-ranging comparisons that *Fact* drew between the economic and political conditions in the Federation and those in the newly independent African states appeared in the June 1962 issue of *Fact* which was largely devoted to making these comparisons. The independent African countries which were the focus of the comparisons with the Federation in this issue of *Fact* were Ghana, Ethiopia, Egypt and Morocco. Articles in this issue cited what *Fact* described as “hard facts” and statistics to prove that the Federation was far ahead of the independent African states in political freedoms and in the provision of educational, health, and other services for Africans.¹¹⁸

The statistics cited in these comparisons included those relating to government expenditure on healthcare, the number of hospital beds and doctors available to a given number of patients in the Federation and in the newly independent African countries.¹¹⁹ The statistical comparisons even included claims-accompanied by an illustration of an African man carrying his wife and child on a bicycle- that the Federation had a better ratio than the independent African countries of the number of bicycles available to a given number of people.¹²⁰

Feature articles in the September 1962 issue of *Fact* highlighted economic failure and political repression in six more independent African countries which had not been covered in the June 1962 issue of *Fact*. These were Tanganyika, Kenya, Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta and Niger. *Fact* in its effort to highlight that Africans in these countries had been prematurely granted self-rule before they were sufficiently ‘civilized’ emphasised that the majority of the African people in these states “have no idea of civilized government”.¹²¹ It also claimed that cannibalism was still practiced in the interior of Gabon.¹²²

The crisis which broke out in the Congo in 1960, soon after African nationalists in that country achieved independence from Belgian colonial rule was used by *Fact* to discredit African nationalist demands for the immediate granting of self-rule to Africans in the Federation. Congo achieved independence from Belgian colonial rule on 30 June 1960. Five days after this, a mutiny by the Congolese army against their Belgian commanding officers

¹¹⁶ “How Dare they Criticise Us”, *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 4, July 1962, p. 1.

¹¹⁷ “Federation leads in African Education”, *Fact*, Vol. 1, No. 10, January 1961, p. 5.

¹¹⁸ “The Real Freedom”, *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 3, June 1962, pp. 6-7.

¹¹⁹ “Health for All in the Federation”, *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 3, June 1962, p. 7.

¹²⁰ *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 3, June 1962, p. 6.

¹²¹ “Is this What Freedom Means?”, *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 6, September 1962, p. 7.

¹²² *Ibid.*

combined with serious disagreements among the new African rulers of the Congo sparked off serious civil strife which culminated in a 'civil war' in the Congo.¹²³ There is convincing evidence that shows that the disagreements that led to the war in the Congo were primarily the result of the United States of America's efforts to destabilise the African nationalist-led post-independence government of the Congo. This destabilisation was carried out with the collusion of Sir Roy Welensky whose government shared the American government's concern with preventing the spread of Pan-Africanism and Communism in Africa.¹²⁴ As the Federal territory of Northern Rhodesia shared a border with the Congo, the war in the Congo increased European panic over the threat that African nationalism posed to white rule in the Federation. Many European residents of the Congo who were caught up in the war in the Congo fled to the Federation as refugees and "[brought] with them lurid tales" of the violence and abuse they had been subjected to by the newly independent Africans of the Congo.¹²⁵

Injecting an alarmist element into its propaganda against African self-rule and African nationalism, *Fact* presented the Congo as an archetypal example of the dangers of prematurely transferring political and administrative power to African nationalists. The February 1961 issue of *Fact* published an editorial commentary on the crisis in the Congo which was accompanied by a graphic photograph of a Congolese child who was almost dying due to starvation. The commentary attributed the suffering of the child as well of millions other Africans in the Congo to what it characterised as the disappearance of good government under the new African nationalist rulers of the Congo. *Fact* contrasted the breakdown of law and order and the widespread suffering this was causing in the Congo with the stability, good government and access to food, health and educational services that existed in the Federation. The commentary ended by warning Africans in the Federation to be "watchful" and avoid being lured off the road to prosperity by "false promises".¹²⁶ Another article in the February 1961 issue of *Fact* with the alarmist headline "Freedom to Die!" characterised independence under nationalist rule in the Congo as synonymous with chaos, suffering and dying.¹²⁷

The comparisons, made by *Fact* between the economic and political conditions in the Federation were, therefore, aimed at striking fear in the hearts of Africans about the prospects of independence under African nationalist rule. In short, they were aimed at scaring Africans into dropping their demands immediate for self-rule.

¹²³ R. Welensky, *Welensky's 4000 Days*, pp. 209-240.

¹²⁴ B. Schwarz, *The White Man's World*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 371.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ "Think About This", *Fact*, Vol. 1, No.11, February 1961, p. 1.

¹²⁷ "Freedom to Die!", *Fact*, Vol. 1, No.11, February 1961, p. 1.

African Women in *Fact* Propaganda

The depiction of African women in *Fact* newspaper's pro-Federation propaganda largely reflected their marginalisation in Federal political, economic and social structures including the information and propaganda structures of the Federal government. African women were virtually denied representation on all the main Federal government information and propaganda structures and were not appointed to high level positions in the Federal Information Services. Only a few European women, most with links to the Federation of Women's Institutes, were members of the Regional Information Committees none of which had any female African members. The Federal Public Relations Department relied on these European women to come up with suggestions about how to mobilise domestic and overseas female opinion in support of Federation. Though a few African women were appointed as FBC African Service announcers, no African woman was ever appointed to membership of the FBC Board of Governors.

Throughout its existence, the Federal government never appointed an African female information officer. In December 1961, Mavis Gumede, a popular African female announcer on the FBC's African Service became the first African woman to be appointed to serve in the Federal government's external information and propaganda structures. She was appointed a receptionist in the Office of the High Commissioner for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland at Rhodesia House in London.¹²⁸ Ms. Gumede's appointment was largely a result of the Federal government's adoption of panic-multi-racial partnership. The latter as demonstrated in the third chapter of this thesis did not constitute a genuine commitment or effort by the Federal government to fully implement multi-racial partnership. Instead, it was a panicked reaction to the intense internal and external pressure that the Federal government was facing to provide tangible proof of the sincerity of its commitment to multi-racial partnership.

Early issues of *Fact* made no deliberate effort to cultivate a female readership or to report the activities of women who in comparison with men were not considered to be major newsmakers. When *Fact* finally started making a clear effort to report on the activities of women it largely depicted them in homemaking roles reflective of the then dominant male perceptions of the place that they wanted women to occupy in society.

The first significant effort by *Fact* to cultivate a specifically African female readership came with the introduction in February 1962 of a regular page entitled "House Hints". This page was aimed at what *Fact* claimed were the "thousands of housewives" in the Federation who were readers of *Fact* and who had for a long time wanted *Fact* to devote a section of the newspaper to them. The page focused on advising women on issues relating to "homecraft"

¹²⁸ "London Job for Radio Girl", *African Daily News*, 7 December, 1961.

such as recipes for cooking nutritious and cost-efficient meals, planning household budgets, caring for children and teaching them good manners.¹²⁹ *Fact*'s efforts to cultivate an African female readership through a page focusing on "women's issues" were consolidated in August 1962 when, Hilary Preston, a European woman, was appointed to the *Fact* staff to write specially for women. Hilary Preston had started her career in the information services in 1960 when she was appointed a junior information officer in the Southern Rhodesia Information Department.¹³⁰

The propaganda function of *Fact*'s articles on "homecraft" directed at African women was that they were meant to highlight how the Federal government's policies were benefiting African women by helping them to cope with the demands of the 'modern' society brought about by Federation. Articles focusing on homecraft issues and women's clubs were also used by *Fact* to put across its propaganda on multi-racialism in the Federation. In September 1962, *Fact* published an article written by Hilary Preston in which she argued that the common challenges faced by women of all races in the Federation as wives and mothers made them less colour conscious and more inclined than men to practice multi-racial partnership. *Fact*, through Hilary Preston, invited its readers to send in "Women in Partnership Stories" with the best stories received being published in *Fact*.¹³¹

Fact propaganda directed at African women was also aimed at highlighting how Federation had facilitated the rise of African women to important and responsible positions by, among other things, encouraging the education of African women through its opposition to the continued observance of patriarchal traditional African customary practices that opposed the education of female children.¹³² Using the success story perspective, *Fact* published numerous stories on African women who had become the first, among African women, to achieve specific milestones never before achieved by an African woman. These African women included, Dr. Viola Mungwira, who in July 1961 qualified as the First African female doctor in the Federation and Mrs Lassie Ndongdo, a young schoolteacher who was one of the first African women to publish a novel in Ndebele.¹³³

From 1962 onwards, with the aim of highlighting how the Federation was facilitating the rise of African women, *Fact* made a greater effort to project African women as newsmakers. The January 1962 issue of *Fact*, whose editorial commentary was entitled "Our Federal Women Make News" focused on some of these African female newsmakers. They included Mavis Gumede and Mutumba Mainga, a 21-year old student of the University College of Rhodesia

¹²⁹ "House Hints", *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 12, February 1962, p. 9.

¹³⁰ "Meet Hilary Preston", *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 5, August 1962, p.9.

¹³¹ Hilary Preston, "Partnership in Practice among Women", *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 6, September, 1962, p. 9.

¹³² "Educating African Women", *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 3, June 1963, p. 6.

¹³³ "Federation's First African Woman Doctor", *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 5, August 1961, p. 5; "Teacher Pioneers Book Writing by African Women", *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 5, August 1962, p. 3.

and Nyasaland, who had become the second African female university student from the Federation after Miss Sarah Chavunduka, to be awarded a travel grant to visit Britain for three months.¹³⁴ *Fact*, also gave extensive coverage of the visit to the United States of America of Auxilia Sagwette, a 20-year old lady who had been chosen to represent the Federation at a World Youth Forum held in New York.¹³⁵

Fact admitted that it rarely received letters from female readers, but welcomed such letters.¹³⁶ The few letters from female readers published by *Fact* were mostly letters praising *Fact* for being a good newspaper. *Fact*, published just one letter from an African woman focusing in detail on political issues relating to Federation. *Fact*'s primary motivation in publishing the letter seems to have been to take advantage of the potential interest that the publication of a letter on important political matters from a woman could arouse in *Fact*'s female readership to present to this readership its long-standing viewpoints in support of the Federal government's policies.¹³⁷

African Reactions to *Fact* Newspaper Propaganda

African reactions to *Fact* newspaper show that the newspaper attracted predominantly hostile responses from most Africans in the Federation and was not successful in gaining the support of these Africans for Federation. These negative African reactions to *Fact* as well as its evident failure to reverse the tide of anti-Federation opinion among Africans in the Federation can be largely attributed to the deeply entrenched nature of African opposition to Federation. The latter gave rise to unfavourable African perceptions of the communicator credibility of the Federal government and its information services. This was because the Federal concept and state did not have popular legitimacy and support among Africans in the Federation the majority of who were strongly opposed its inception and continued existence. As the chief proponents of Federation, the Federal government and its information and propaganda services were, therefore, from the inception of Federation regarded by these Africans as untrustworthy and biased sources of information on Federation.

This originally poor communicator credibility of the Federal Information Services was exacerbated by the measures taken by African nationalist movements in the Federation to further undermine the credibility of these services and their pro-Federation propaganda. Some of these measures and their effects on the communicator credibility of the Federal government and its information services are evident in the content of *Fact*. Though the

¹³⁴ "Our Federal Women Make News", *Fact*, Vol. II, No.11, January 1961, p. 1.

¹³⁵ "Harare Girl at World Forum", *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 12, February 1962, p. 2.

¹³⁶ "Not Afraid", *Fact*, Vol. II, No.2, May 1961, p. 1.

¹³⁷ "Woman Reader takes up *Fact*'s Challenge", *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 3, June 1961, p. 8.

Federal Information Department attempted through *Fact* and its other pro-Federation publications to counter African nationalist attacks on its communicator credibility, it was not successful in changing negative African perceptions of its communicator credibility. As African opposition to Federation intensified, the Federal Information Services' communicator credibility among the Africans in the Federation became correspondingly worse.

The methodological challenges of measuring the effects of propaganda on target audiences have already been discussed in the introduction to this thesis. This section of the chapter does not seek to measure the precise effects of *Fact* propaganda on Africans in the Federation. It instead uses evidence from *Fact* itself, from the Federal Information Department's own internal assessments of African reactions to *Fact* and from privately owned contemporaneous newspapers to make general observations about African reactions to *Fact* and on the basis of this to make a judgment about its impact on African public opinion on Federation. The yardstick used to assess the effectiveness of *Fact* propaganda is whether it was successful in achieving the main purpose for which it was established, namely to gain African support for Federation.

The Federal Information Department tended to measure the impact and success of *Fact* largely in terms of the total number of copies of *Fact* circulated among its readers as well as the extent to which these readers favourably engaged with *Fact* propaganda. Less than a year after it started publishing, *Fact* was already describing itself as "the Federation's most popular paper"¹³⁸ with "the biggest circulation in the history of the Federation."¹³⁹ It regularly cited ever increasing print runs and circulation figures for *Fact* among readers. By 1963, *Fact* claimed that its total circulation figures had over a three year period quickly risen from only 30, 000 copies when the first issue was published in April 1960 to 305, 000 copies by April 1963. Claiming a readership of more than one million people, *Fact* now asserted that it was the most widely circulated and read newspaper not only in all the three Federal territories, but in Central Africa.¹⁴⁰

It is difficult to verify the statistical accuracy of *Fact's* claims about its own popularity as these claims were never independently confirmed. These claims as will be shown in the subsequent paragraphs were also challenged by other contemporaneous newspapers. There is also the additional problem of how to gauge the genuine popularity of a publication that was distributed free of charge to its readers and whose manner of distribution meant that it could easily be "thrust upon" readers who may never have requested it on their own. Many Africans complained of having unwanted free copies of *Fact* and other pro-Federation print publications from the Federal government thrust upon them. Each copy of *Fact* sent out to

¹³⁸ "Fact Prints 100, 000 Copies, a Month", *Fact*, Vol. I, No.12, March 1961, p. 3.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ "We're Three Years Old this Month", *Fact*, Vol. IV, No. 1, April 1963, p. 5.

every reader contained an address card on which the reader could write the addresses of other people whom he thought would be interested in receiving *Fact*. *Fact* would subsequently be regularly sent to these other people by the *Fact* office, a method which *Fact* admitted sometimes resulted in double-mailing of copies of *Fact* to the same addresses. Though Federal government officials responsible for the production and distribution of *Fact* never indicated the extent of this double-mailing of *Fact* copies, it could have artificially inflated the newspaper's circulation figures.

Claiming a very high level of readership among Africans in the Federation was also one of the ways in which *Fact* sought to alter negative African perceptions of the communicator credibility of the Federal government and its information services. By constantly claiming that it enjoyed a huge and unprecedented measure of popularity among Africans, *Fact* hoped to get Africans to adopt a favourable view of its communicator credibility by creating the impression that its pro-Federation viewpoints enjoyed widespread acceptance among Africans. *Fact* imputed the high levels of popularity that it claimed among Africans in the Federation to two factors both of which were based on its factual approach to propaganda. The first and foremost, was what claimed it was its ability to tell Africans the 'truth' or the 'facts' about the political and economic situation obtaining in the Federation. The second was its educative and informative value. *Fact* regularly published letters from its African readers lavishing praise on *Fact* for informing and educating them by giving them the 'facts' about the benefits of Federation.¹⁴¹

Evidence from the Federal Information Services' own records, however, shows that there were varied reasons for the limited African interest in *Fact*, some of which were not related to its propaganda content. Some Africans were interested in reading *Fact* not because they found its pro-Federation propaganda attractive or convincing but because they wanted to keep themselves updated on the latest forms and content of Federal government propaganda in support of Federation. As one Northern Rhodesian African reader of *Fact* stated, "the demand [for *Fact* among some Africans] is big not because Africans expect good news from *Fact* but because they want to keep themselves abreast with any propaganda the Federal government may have for the public."¹⁴²

Many Africans in the Federation were primarily interested in the *Fact* calendar that came with the publication and not in its stories. Federal Information Officers on tour in various parts of the Federation frequently noted the popularity of the *Fact* calendar among Africans, especially those in rural districts of the Federation. Other Africans wanted *Fact* because they were putting it to other uses not intended by Federal propagandists. In 1963, a Federal Information Officer made the following observation about the growing demand for *Fact*

¹⁴¹ "The Truth is What Counts Say *Fact* Readers", *Fact* Vol. IV, No. 3, p. 1.

¹⁴² "*Fact* Propaganda will not Change African Attitude to Federation", Letter to the Editor by P. Mabilingane, Mpika, Northern Province, Northern Rhodesia, *African Daily News*, 4 January 1961.

among Africans in the Federation: “The *Fact* circulation is growing every month. We cannot hope to keep pace with the demand. It is accepted that a large number of copies are not read by Africans, but are used for other purposes.”¹⁴³

These other “purposes” included using the paper that *Fact* was printed on to wrap in their market goods, such as vegetables. This “abuse” of Federal propaganda materials was not new or restricted to *Fact* newspaper. Federal government propagandists had for long noted that it was common for Africans to remove glossy Federal government propaganda posters from trees in order to use them as wrapping paper. They observed that these “posters and the string with which they are tied up disappear within minutes of being posted.”¹⁴⁴ They also argued that the incentive for Africans to collect Federal government propaganda posters for use as wrapping paper was high because old newspapers were being profitably sold at the Zomba market for use as wrapping paper and for other purposes. For this reason, they argued “no villager is likely to pass up a piece of paper under these circumstances, especially when it comes with a bonus of two free pieces of good quality string.”¹⁴⁵

This evidence does not discount the possibility that there were some Africans who requested and read *Fact* because they agreed with its viewpoints on Federation. For the reasons given above, the exact numbers of these Africans cannot be reliably established. However, their number must have been quite small as much of the available evidence seems to indicate that most Africans in the Federal territories were markedly hostile to *Fact* and were not persuaded by its pro-Federation propaganda. Evidence also shows that the most hostile reactions to *Fact* and other forms of Federal government propaganda in support of Federation came from Africans in Nyasaland. The latter were viewed by the Federal government and its information services as being the most aggressively opposed to the Federation and to propaganda in support of Federation. In Nyasaland, African nationalist leaders such as Dr. Banda and their supporters conducted a systematic and militant campaign against the dissemination of Federal propaganda in its various forms, including print publications such as *Fact*.

Hostile African reactions to *Fact* took various forms and need to be located within the broader context of the general African reaction to Federal government propaganda for Africans through the three main forms of mass communication media, namely mobile cinema, the print media and radio broadcasting. This is because African hostility to *Fact* newspaper propaganda was a continuation of earlier African resistance to the Federal’s government’s broader pro-Federation multi-media “Fact” propaganda campaign which predated the establishment of *Fact* newspaper in 1960.

¹⁴³ NAZ, F121/H3/35, V.J. Lewis, “Fact Units: Progress Reports”, 20th March, 1963, p. 6.

¹⁴⁴ NAZ, F121/H3/3, Memorandum from Mr. Rhind on Federal Government Public Relations Campaign in Nyasaland, 12th June, 1961, p. 2.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 2.

The strategies used by Africans to express their rejection of *Fact* newspaper's pro-Federation propaganda and to attack the communicator credibility of the Federal government, therefore, drew upon and extended many of the strategies which they had earlier used to show their opposition to Federal government propaganda before the establishment of *Fact* newspaper. African rejection of *Fact* newspaper's pro-Federation propaganda is also illustrative of the apparent ineffectiveness of the factual propaganda approach which was extensively used by the Federal government in its propaganda in support of Federation.

Africans used a wide range of methods to express their disapproval of Federal government propaganda and to undermine the communicator credibility of the Federal government and its information services. This resistance to Federal government propaganda for Africans across all the major types of media that is print, mobile film and radio broadcasts was most pronounced in Nyasaland.

Among the tactics which were frequently used by Africans to express their disapproval of Federal government mobile film propaganda for Africans were the following: organising collective African boycotts of the film shows for Africans which were put on by the Federal government's mobile cinema vans which were commonly known as "Fact" vans and which also played an important role in helping to distribute *Fact* and other Federal government print propaganda publications to predominantly rural African film audiences; intimidating and sometimes even attacking "Fact" van staff as well as the African audiences who turned out to watch Federal government mobile cinema film shows; seeking to prevent the successful screening of Federal government mobile cinema film shows by among, other measures, cutting the audio speaker cables of "Fact" vans and dancing in front of the film projector beam while film shows were in progress in order to obscure the audience's view of the screen; jeering when film footage of the Federal Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky appeared on the film screen and cheering when film footage of nationalist leaders such as Dr. Banda was shown on the film screen.¹⁴⁶

Africans also adopted a variety of strategies to demonstrate their rejection of Federal government print propaganda for Africans and to undermine the communicator credibility of the Federal government. They either refused to accept Federal propaganda publications when they were handed out or soon after receiving them tore them up within view of Federal Information Officers while shouting anti-Federal statements such as "Sir Roy is dead", "Federation is dead".¹⁴⁷ Federal government "Fact" van mobile cinema teams that were involved in handing out pro-Federation booklets and pamphlets to Africans at film shows in the rural areas of Nyasaland's Southern province noted that the reluctant African

¹⁴⁶ NAZ, F121/H3/35, Reports on Mobile Cinemas, Nyasaland, 1 February 1962 to December 1963.

¹⁴⁷ NAZ, F121/H3/35, Reports on Mobile Cinemas, Nyasaland, 1 February 1962 to December 1963.

recipients of these booklets plainly told them that “if Sir Roy Welensky’s name is in them we will tear them up. We do not want Sir Roy’s pictures here nor the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.”¹⁴⁸

Hostile African reactions to Federal government print propaganda also extended to publicly burning such publications. In 1961 a local leader of National Democratic Party, then the major African nationalist party in Southern Rhodesia, cycled the long distance from his home to the centre of the Southern Rhodesian town of Gwelo in order to publicly burn a copy of the Federal government propaganda booklet, *Further Facts on the Federation*, which had been given to him to read. Speaking to the press after burning the booklet, the NDP official stated that he had burnt the booklet in order “to register my opposition to the facts contained therein.”¹⁴⁹ He also stated that “it does not pay us to continue reading about Federation because Federation to us is already dead and buried.”¹⁵⁰

From the time it commenced publishing, *Fact* attracted similarly hostile reactions from Africans in the Federation, especially those in Nyasaland. These reactions, some of which were described, ridiculed and condemned by *Fact* as part of its effort to counter African criticism of the newspaper, reflected the negative perceptions of the communicator credibility of *Fact* and of the Federal government held by the majority of Africans in the Federation. They also showed some of the methods employed by these Africans to further undermine that communicator credibility.

As early as its fifth issue which was published in August 1960, *Fact* showed that it was already being compelled to respond to strong and persistent hostile African reactions to its pro-Federation propaganda. In an effort to counter these responses, *Fact*, in its August 1960 published a reaction to the newspaper by one African which it stated typified the abusive reactions to the newspaper that it found totally objectionable. The reaction published by *Fact* was a picture of an address card which had been anonymously sent to its office with a rude message instead of the name and address of the person to whom *Fact* was to be sent. The message stated: “Away with Federation!!! From Nyasaland or Malawi. We are very sorry not to accept your news-we are not interested in Federal news.”¹⁵¹

Other hostile African reactions to *Fact* highlighted in the newspaper throughout its existence included the following: sending anonymous insulting letters to the *Fact* office in Salisbury;¹⁵² sending back to the *Fact* office copies of *Fact* which had been sent to them often after scratching out their names and addresses on the wrappers in which *Fact* was

¹⁴⁸ NAZ, F121/H3/35, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Mobile Cinema Van Report, Southern Province, Friday 23 February 1962, Mikolongwe Veterinary Station.

¹⁴⁹ “*Further Facts Burnt in Gwelo*” African Daily News, 15 February, 1961.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ “None So Blind”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 5, August 1960, p. 2.

¹⁵² “Letter Writers Please Note”, *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 10, December 1961, p. 6.

posted and writing rude messages on these wrappers;¹⁵³ stigmatisation by African nationalist supporters of all African readers of *Fact* by denouncing them as “Capricornists” and supporters of the United Federal Party, the political party which was the foremost exponent of Federation; intimidation of African readers of *Fact* by African nationalist supporters;¹⁵⁴ prevention by African nationalist school Headmasters allied to the Malawi Congress Party of the circulation of *Fact* in schools in Nyasaland by, among other methods, withholding it from its recipients upon delivery to the school and threatening to expel any school pupil found reading *Fact*.¹⁵⁵ *Fact* also published letters from African readers in Nyasaland who complained that: “We have not been able to receive our copies of *Fact*. They are torn at the local Malawi Congress Party Office when they come.”¹⁵⁶

The effectiveness of African efforts to further undermine the already poor communicator credibility of the Federal information services is evidenced by the reality that after it started publishing in April 1960, *Fact* quickly came to be regarded by the majority of Africans as an untrustworthy source of information on Federation and African opinion on Federation. In Nyasaland Africans came up with a nickname for *Fact* that was the direct opposite of what the paper’s name claimed it stood for. They commonly referred to *Fact* using the nickname “Unami” which meant “a lie” in the Yao language.¹⁵⁷

Africans in Southern Rhodesia also undermined *Fact*’s communicator credibility by continuously accusing it of being a newspaper that peddled falsehoods and by emphasising the ability of Africans to see through and reject its false claims. A letter from an African in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia published in the *African Daily News* in 1960 complained about *Fact*’s untruthfulness and advised its publishers to stop publishing lies and “stick to the truth” as Africans were not passive recipients of *Fact* propaganda but were “people who read and weighed what they read.”¹⁵⁸ It also stated that claims by the Federal government and by *Fact* that the newspaper was distributed to Africans free of charge were essentially untrue as *Fact* was published and distributed using public funds.¹⁵⁹

Similarly hostile reactions came from Africans in Northern Rhodesia. These Africans condemned the publication of *Fact* as “a waste of public money” and urged the Federal government to stop spending public money on pro-Federation propaganda and instead use it to fund projects aimed at improving the economic welfare of Africans in the Federation.

¹⁵³ “Send Your Wrapper”, *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 10, December 1961, p. 2.

¹⁵⁴ “He is Afraid”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 10, January 1961, p. 6.

¹⁵⁵ “Teaching Hatred”, *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 3, June 1962, p. 8; “Nyasa Children Get Around Ban”, *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 6, September 1962, p. 6.

¹⁵⁶ “Freedom”, *Fact*, Vol. IV, No. 2, May 1963, p. 10.

¹⁵⁷ “Truthful”, *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 13, March 1962, p. 6.

¹⁵⁸ “*Fact* did not Give the Real Truth”, Letter to the Editor by E.G. Dube, New Highfileds, Salisbury Southern Rhodesia, *African Daily News*, 28 September 1960.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

A letter written by an African from Mpika in the Northern Province of Northern Rhodesia which was published in the *African Daily News* in 1961 highlighted the rejection of *Fact's* pro-Federation propaganda by most Africans in Northern Rhodesia. The letter emphasised that: "We Africans do not want a free *Fact* together with its Federal government propaganda. A free *Fact* will have no effect on our attitude towards Federation. Federation is to us as useless today as it was before *Fact*."¹⁶⁰

That the majority of Africans resisted the Federal government's efforts to thrust *Fact* upon them and were not receptive to its pro-Federation propaganda is given further credence by an article that appeared in 1962 in the *Citizen*, a Southern Rhodesian rightwing newspaper for Europeans. This article which was entitled the "Sad Facts about *Fact*" seriously questioned *Fact's* claims about the popularity that it enjoyed among African readers in the Federation as well as its effectiveness in persuading these readers to support Federation. The article claimed that contrary to *Fact's* claims that it was the newspaper with the biggest circulation in the Federation, it was actually being overwhelmingly rejected by the majority of Africans in the Federation with the result that it was now "littering the basements of the Federal Information offices by the million copies."¹⁶¹ According to the article, of the 200,000 copies of *Fact* which the Federal government claimed it circulated to Africans "a great number of these free copies are returned by post to the senders-mostly with unprintable remarks scribbled on it."¹⁶²

Though the article described the propaganda for Africans carried in *Fact* as "in many cases good", it maintained that most Africans in the Federation strongly objected to this propaganda. Those Africans who were identified as subscribers to *Fact* were, the article noted, ostracised by their fellow Africans who labelled them supporters of Federation and the UFP. In order to avoid this stigma, the article stated, the vast majority of Africans went out of their way to avoid any association with *Fact* newspaper by resisting the Federal Information Department's efforts to add their names and addresses to the list of subscribers to whom *Fact* was regularly sent. The article noted how most Africans to whom *Fact* was sent made "a great show of returning their copies-much to the chagrin of the country's Post Offices which are flooded with them."¹⁶³ It also condemned the Federal government for ignoring Africans' rejection of *Fact* and continuing to make a determined effort to send the publication to them "at great expense to the taxpayer."¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁰ "Fact Propaganda will not Change African Attitude to Federation", Letter to the Editor by P. Mabilingane, Mpika, Northern Province, Northern Rhodesia, *African Daily News*, 4 January 1961.

¹⁶¹ "Sad Facts about Fact", *The Citizen*, 6 April 1962.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

Unsurprisingly, the Federal Public Relations Division reacted angrily to the *Citizen's* article on *Fact* and wanted to bring an action for libel against the newspaper. However, after being advised by the Federal Ministry of Law that there was no adequate legal basis for doing so, it restricted itself to sending a letter of protest to the editor of the *Citizen*.¹⁶⁵ In that letter, the Federal Public Relations Division rejected the claims about the refusal of *Fact* by Africans which were contained in the *Citizen's* article on *Fact*. It described them as "utterly untrue" and asserted that returns of *Fact* due to change of address, cancellation of subscription and other reasons accounted for only 0.1 % of the total circulation of 200,000 copies. It also invited the editor of the *Citizen* and its readers "to inspect, at any time, all of the offices of the Public Relations Division to see how many copies of *Fact* you will find, either returned or otherwise 'littering' the place."¹⁶⁶ Above all, the Federal PRD demanded that the *Citizen* publish another article correcting what it claimed were the numerous factual inaccuracies contained in its earlier article on *Fact*.¹⁶⁷

The *Citizen*, however, does not seem to have published any retraction or correction of its earlier claims about the hostile reactions of Africans in the Federation to *Fact* newspaper. In addition, its viewpoints about negative African reactions to Federal government print propaganda for Africans including *Fact* were shared by newspapers such as the *African Daily News*, which was arguably the most influential and widely read newspaper for Africans in the Federation. It was one of several newspapers for Africans in the Federation which were under the stable of African Newspapers Limited, a newspaper company owned by the Paver brothers who supported Federation and also unofficially advised the Federal government on issues relating to pro-Federation propaganda for Africans. Primarily because of the political sympathies of its European owners, the *African Daily News* generally followed a pro-Federation editorial line which however did not exclude what it described as "constructive criticism" of Federal government policies in relation to Africans. This included Federal government policy and practice regarding pro-Federation propaganda for Africans.

The *African Daily News* played an important role in publicising to its African readers, the Federal government's pro-Federation print propaganda publications for Africans including *Fact* newspaper.¹⁶⁸ However, it was also quite critical of some of the propaganda methods used by especially the Federal government to try and win over Africans to Federation. It never had a positive view of *Fact* newspaper because it was from the outset opposed to the

¹⁶⁵ F121/H1/37, Vol. IV, D.D. O'Donovan, Secretary, Federal Ministry of Law to W.E. Arnold, Secretary Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, 10th April, 1962.

¹⁶⁶ F121/H1/37, Vol. IV, M.C. Newman, Director, Publications Department, Federal Public Relations Division to the Editor, The *Citizen*, Salisbury, 14 April, 1962.

¹⁶⁷ F121/H1/37, Vol. IV, M.C. Newman, Director, Publications Department, Federal Public Relations Division to the Editor, The *Citizen*, Salisbury, 14 April, 1962.

¹⁶⁸ "Fact Will Put Federation's Case to Africans", *African Daily News*, 17 June 1960.

Federal government's decision to establish a government owned and government run newspaper. An editorial in one of the issues of the *African Daily News* stated that:

In our view the function of [government] Information Departments is to place factual news as it occurs before independently-owned newspapers like our own. If the news is good and fresh it will be published...To produce newspapers, therefore competing unfairly with private industry in the advertising field, is NOT the function of [government] Information Departments.¹⁶⁹

The *African Daily News* also highlighted how *Fact* newspaper propaganda was failing to convince Africans to support Federation by occasionally publishing letters from its African readers which were very critical of *Fact*. It also drew attention to the apparent ineffectiveness of virtually all forms of Federal government print propaganda for Africans. In one of its editorials, the *African Daily News* noted that most Africans made no effort to seriously read what it described as "a spate of...useless handouts" (booklets, broadsheets and other print publications) which were produced by the Federal government.¹⁷⁰ It argued that the main reason for this was that unlike the Nyasaland Information Department's print publications for Africans which really gave information to Africans, those of the Federal, Northern and Southern Rhodesia governments were "more of propaganda than means of dissipating information."¹⁷¹

Fact's panic-driven anti-secessionist propaganda failed to dissuade Nyasaland Africans from demanding and ultimately securing Nyasaland's secession from the Federation. It also reflected the limitations of the Federal government's factual propaganda approach. A key component of this approach was the extensive use of 'facts' and figures to support its claims that the benefits that Africans, especially from Nyasaland derived from Federation were so enormous that any breakup of the Federation would have catastrophic consequences for them. The numerous 'facts' used by *Fact* and other pro-Federation government publications in support of these claims failed to convince the majority of Africans, especially those in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to drop their demands for the dissolution of the Federation. As M.W.K. Chiume a prominent African nationalist advocate of Nyasaland's secession from the Federation stated:

The days are gone when it was thought that by picking up certain figures it will be enough to convince the Africans that Nyasaland as an "economic orphanage" has benefited from her forced association with "benevolent" Southern Rhodesia and those who temporarily hold the destiny of the Africans of Nyasaland must be

¹⁶⁹ "Spreading Information", *African Daily News*, 6 July 1962.

¹⁷⁰ "Nyasaland Information Service", *African Daily News*, 22 August 1961.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

adjusting themselves now to appreciate the inevitability and necessity of secession...¹⁷²

Similarly, *Fact's* anti-African nationalist propaganda failed to persuade Africans to seek gradual self-rule within the Federation instead of immediate self-government outside it. Its central claim that political repression and economic hardships would be the inevitable outcome of any premature granting of independence to Africans was intended to make Africans fear to be liberated from white colonial rule. It, however, did not have the desired effect and served only to make self-rule even more attractive to Africans in the Federation by highlighting the Federal government's desperation and panic over the possible disintegration of the Federation and the advent of black rule.

The propaganda on multi-racial partnership and African advancement put out by *Fact* newspaper also failed to convince the majority of Africans that any significant progress had been made in ending racial discrimination in the Federation or advancing Africans economically and politically. The continual subjection of Africans to various forms of racial discrimination as well as the very slow pace at which they were being advanced economically and politically meant that *Fact* propaganda on these issues failed to persuade most Africans to support Federation as it did not accurately reflect their actual experiences of Federation.

Attempts by *Fact* to manufacture a pro-Federation African consensus by publishing numerous pro-Federation letters which it claimed were representative of the type of letters that it received from most of its African readers were unsuccessful. These attempts only served to further undermine *Fact's* communicator credibility among Africans. The vast majority of Africans remained strongly opposed to Federation and viewed as a complete fabrication the pro-Federation letters regularly published by *Fact* to support its assertion that there was a huge African majority in favour of Federation. The following note which *Fact* directed to its readers in its October 1961 issue highlights the crisis of poor communicator credibility and poor communication strategy that it continued to face among Africans in the Federation:

Stories are going around that some of the letters appearing in *Fact* are not genuine. It is said that they are made up in the *Fact* office and signed with African names. THIS IS A LIE. Anyone, at any time, who wishes to see the originals of the letters published may do so. *Fact* does not print lies. Neither does *Fact* print letters which are not genuine. Every letter appearing on this page has genuinely come to the *Fact* office unsolicited. If you doubt it, come and see for yourself. The TRUTH is that there are

¹⁷² "Chiume Repeats Nyasaland Congress Call for Secession", *African Daily News*, 16 May 1958.

many foolish people who refuse to believe that anyone can support the ideals *FACT* stands for.¹⁷³

The sustained and ultimately unsuccessful effort made by *Fact* to counter especially African nationalist attacks on its communicator credibility also shows that there was strong and persistent African resistance to its pro-Federation propaganda. This effort, conducted mainly through the medium of *Fact* newspaper, entailed publicising and criticising some of the methods employed by Africans to express their resistance to *Fact*. The primary aim of *Fact* in adopting this strategy was to try and project this resistance to its African readers in a way that was advantageous to the newspaper. It was specifically aimed at undermining resistance to *Fact* among African readers in the Federation by claiming that the opposition to *Fact* had very little or no effect on the circulation and ‘popularity’ of *Fact* among Africans.

Fact claimed that school pupils in Nyasaland who had their copies of *Fact* withheld from them successfully circumvented this “ban” on *Fact* by having the newspaper sent to their home addresses instead of their school addresses.¹⁷⁴ *Fact* also downplayed the significance of the anonymous insulting letters and other expressions of African opposition to *Fact* by arguing that this opposition was actually a compliment as it demonstrated that *Fact* was actually hurting the opponents of the Federation with the ‘truth’ that was published in the newspaper. At the same time *Fact* told its readers that it would ignore all anonymous and abusive letters and would not publish them.¹⁷⁵

Some members of the RIACs and even some Federal propagandists also believed that *Fact* was having little effect in persuading Africans to support Federation for a variety of reasons which included the following: its audience was limited to only those Africans who were literate in the two languages in which it was published; its style of writing and presentation was “too sophisticated for the average rural African”;¹⁷⁶ it was issued only once a month, which made it difficult for the newspaper to be up-to-date with the fast unfolding political developments in the Federation and to quickly and regularly counter the flood of anti-Federal propaganda put out by African nationalists on a daily basis;¹⁷⁷ its contents were not given proper consideration by most Africans because “publications which were distributed free of charge were not taken as seriously by Africans as those for which they had to pay”,¹⁷⁸ it had been launched too late into the Federation’s existence to have any significant

¹⁷³ “This is a Lie”, *Fact*, Vol. II, No. 7, October 1961, p. 6.

¹⁷⁴ “Nyasa Children Get Around Ban”, *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 6, September 1962, p. 6.

¹⁷⁵ “Anonymous Letters”, *Fact*, Vol. I, No. 7, October, 1960, p.6; “The Truth Hurts”, *Fact*, Vol. III, No. 5, August 1962, p. 1.

¹⁷⁶ F121/H3/35, V.J. Lewis, “Fact Units: Progress Reports”, 20th March, 1963, p. 6.

¹⁷⁷ F128/HAF/25/7/1, Federal Information Department Newsletter, No. 35, August, 1960, p. 2.

¹⁷⁸ NAZ, F121/H202/2, Record of Meeting of the Bulawayo Regional Information Committee held in the Conference Room, Victoria Hotel, Bulawayo, at 8:15 p.m. on Wednesday, October 19th, 1960, p. 4.

effect in arresting and reversing the rising tide of anti-Federal sentiment among Africans in the Federation.

Overall the evidence of the numerous African responses to *Fact* examined in this section of the chapter show that the newspaper's counter-propaganda narrative of Federation as successful and destined to become permanently established failed to overcome the dominance of the African nationalist narrative of Federation as a failure that was doomed to collapse. *Fact's* use of agenda-setting to try and shift African attention away from the failures of Federation and refocus it on the "successes" of Federation was not successful. The failures of Federation continued to be the main focus of discourses on Federation among its African inhabitants. These numerous failures make it plausible to conclude that *Fact* newspaper failed to convince Africans in the Federation to support the Federal concept and state.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the nature and effects of Federal government print propaganda for Africans using *Fact*, the first Federal government newspaper for Africans as a case study. The establishment of *Fact*, the chapter has shown, was primarily the result of an information panic on the part of the Federal government and its information services. This information panic, which had its roots in the highly contested nature of the Federal concept, was triggered by the Federal government's late realisation of the power of African nationalist opposition to Federation. *Fact*, the chapter has shown, was established at a time when the Federation was in very weak political and economic position. It was facing numerous crises, which were mainly caused by intensified African opposition to Federation and which ultimately led to the disintegration of the Federation. *Fact*, the chapter has shown represented a desperate and belated effort by the Federal government to try and ensure the survival of the Federation and of white minority rule in Central Africa by winning over African opinion to Federation.

The chapter has also considered *Fact's* propaganda techniques and content and argued that these provide a good example of the panic-driven propaganda which dominated the second phase of the development of the Federal's propaganda policy. It has demonstrated how *Fact's* panic-driven propaganda drew upon and developed a variety of propaganda techniques and approaches that had been used in earlier Federal government print propaganda for Africans. The most notable of these were the factual propaganda approach and the success story narrative which were used in conjunction with each other by Federal government propagandists.

Both approaches were aimed at countering the dominant African nationalist propaganda narrative that Federation was doomed to collapse as it had failed to live up to its promise to

make multi-racial partnership a practical reality by advancing Africans politically and economically. The chapter has illustrated how focusing on major Federal government propaganda themes such as the economic benefits of Federation, multi-racialism and African nationalism, *Fact* used the factual propaganda approach to construct a counter-narrative of Federation as successful and destined to become permanently established. *Fact*, the chapter has shown, focused on presenting to its African readers 'facts' and figures highlighting what it claimed were the numerous ways in which Africans had and continued to benefit from Federation. The chapter has also emphasised that in a reflection of one of the key characteristics of panic-driven propaganda, *Fact's* use of the success story narrative was intended cover up the Federal government's weakness and vulnerability by projecting an image of Federation and the Federal government as successful, strong and long-lasting.

Also examined in the chapter was how Africans reacted to *Fact's* pro-Federation propaganda and whether the newspaper was successful in achieving its aim of gaining African support for Federation. The chapter has demonstrated that Africans were not passive recipients of *Fact* propaganda. Among the predominantly hostile Africans reactions to *Fact* which this chapter has highlighted were the following: actively resisting the Federal Public Relations Division's efforts to put Africans on the subscription list for *Fact*, sending rude letters to the Editor of *Fact* denouncing its pro-Federation content and stigmatising and intimidating Africans who subscribed to *Fact*. Taking into consideration these widespread negative African reactions to *Fact*, the chapter has argued that the newspaper was not successful in gaining support for Federation.

CHAPTER 6: Federal Propaganda in FBC Radio Broadcasts Targeted at Africans 1953-1963

Introduction

This chapter examines the role played by radio propaganda put out by the Federal Broadcasting Corporation (FBC) and directed at Africans within the Federation in mobilising African support for Federation. It discusses the development of Federal government policy on radio broadcasting to Africans, highlighting the contestations between the Federal and Territorial governments over control of African broadcasting, the spuriousness of the FBC's claims of independence from Federal government control as well as its relationship with the Federal Information Department, which was in 1960 renamed the Federal Public Relations Division.

It is crucial to examine the role played radio propaganda in the Federal government's propaganda campaign to gain African support for Federation because of the great importance that both the Federal and territorial governments attached to it as a tool for propagandising Africans. These European governments believed that of all of the main propaganda media, which they could use to reach African audiences, it was radio rather than the print media or mobile cinema which possessed the potential to have the greatest propaganda effects on the African mind. This was because of, among other factors, its ability to relay messages more quickly than the print media or mobile cinema, its wider coverage and its greater accessibility to the majority of Africans in the Federation who were illiterate or semi-literate. Largely on the basis of these considerations, one FBC official expressed his conviction that "nowhere in the world could there be found a more enthusiastic [radio] listener than the African and his family."¹

The Federal Public Relations Division did not consider television to be an appropriate and effective tool for propagandising Africans. During the timeframe covered by this study (1953-1963), television was a relatively new mass medium, which was only beginning to be introduced to predominantly white audiences in the Federation. The high cost of television sets meant that the vast majority of Africans in the Federation could not afford to buy television sets. However, the most important reason why the Federal government propagandists were not interested in using television as a propaganda medium for Africans was that like most whites in the Federation, they believed it had harmful effects on Africans which outstripped its potential benefits as a tool for propagandising Africans.²

¹ NAZ, *F128/L72*, Memorandum on "Federal Broadcasting Corporation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland African Service", March, 1959.

² NAZ, *F198/6*, FBC "Report on Television" by James McClurg, Director-General, FBC, 20 August, 1959.

Three main arguments are advanced in this chapter. The first, is that though the Federal government from its inception recognized that radio broadcasts could be a potent propaganda medium in shaping African public opinion and attitudes toward Federation, the establishment of the FBC as an independent broadcasting corporation many years after the creation of the Federation was largely a product of protracted struggles between the Federal and Territorial governments over control of broadcasting to Africans.

Second, following the approach taken by Zaffiro in his study of broadcasting policy in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe, the chapter argues that the available evidence shows the falsity of claims by both the Federal government and the FBC that the latter was an independent and impartial public broadcaster which did not exist to serve the propaganda or other political interests of the Federal government. The chapter will argue that in terms of its broadcast use policy, the Federal government originally wanted and fought for broadcasting to Africans in the Federation to be put under direct Federal government control and to be used as a propaganda tool to defend Federation from its perceived internal and external opponents. However, having failed to put the FBC under its direct control, the Federal government was still able to get the FBC to serve its propaganda requirements by using several mechanisms to exert indirect control over FBC broadcast policy and programme content, especially in relation to radio broadcasts for Africans.

Third, the chapter argues the panic mentality that informed the Federal government's print propaganda for Africans also manifested itself in the way in which the Federal government sought to influence the FBC's broadcasting policy in relation to Africans.

Due to the inaccessibility to this researcher of audio recordings of FBC African Service programmes, the chapter does not in analysing the issues outlined above, focus strongly on the specific forms and content which FBC radio propaganda targeted at Africans assumed. It instead focuses more on FBC policy in relation to broadcasting to Africans.

Federal-Territorial Contestations over Broadcasting to Africans and the Establishment of the FBC

Though wireless radio broadcasting in British colonial territories in Africa was introduced as early as 1926, radio broadcasting targeted at Africans in these territories only developed during the Second World War period as part of Britain's efforts to mobilise Africans in these colonies in support of the Allied war effort against Nazi Germany and its allies. The establishment in 1941 of a broadcasting station in Lusaka by the Northern Rhodesia Information Department as well as the establishment of the Southern Rhodesia Broadcasting Service in the same year marked the beginning of serious efforts by the

colonial governments of these territories to develop broadcasting services aimed at Africans with the assistance of the British government.³

Broadcasting to Africans continued to expand in the post-war period. Under a 1946 tripartite agreement involving the three territories that later comprised the Federation, Northern Rhodesia's Central African Broadcasting station in Lusaka assumed responsibility for African broadcasting in all three territories, while the Southern Rhodesia Broadcasting Service became responsible for the provision of English programmes to all three territories. However, Southern Rhodesia did not have its own transmitting facilities and broadcasting of programmes for African and European listeners in Southern Rhodesia took place through the Central African Broadcasting Services (C.A.B.S.) in Lusaka. The Native Affairs Department of Southern Rhodesia contributed to the programmes which were broadcast to Africans in its territory by sending programme material in Shona and Ndebele to the C.A.B.S. for broadcasting. The Broadcasting services of Northern and Southern Rhodesia only came under unified control after the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953.⁴

Intergovernmental struggles over the establishment of a unified broadcasting organisation and over the development of a common African broadcasting policy in Central Africa predated the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953. These contestations continued even after the establishment in 1958 of the FBC as the first unified broadcasting organisation in the Federation.

In the late 1940s, the main impediment to the development of a common African broadcasting policy in the countries that later constituted the Federation was Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia, a self-governing colony, had a different 'native' policy from that which existed in the British protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The government of Southern Rhodesia did not want what it believed was the more liberal 'native' policy of these two northern territories to be extended to Southern Rhodesia. It believed that radio broadcasting was a powerful mass-communication medium that was very influential in shaping Southern Rhodesian Africans' perceptions of 'native' policy and the way it was administered in that territory. Primarily for this reason, Southern Rhodesia was determined not to surrender control over broadcasting to Africans in its territory to any external authority.⁵

³ J. J. Zaffiro, "Broadcasting and Political Change in Zimbabwe 1931-1984", PhD Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1984, pp. 47-60; Brelsford, W.V. (ed), *Handbook to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, London, Cassell and Company, 1960, pp. 551-553.

⁴ J. J. Zaffiro, "Broadcasting and Political Change in Zimbabwe 1931-1984", pp. 47-60.

⁵ NAZ, F128/HAF77, Draft Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Public Relations Committee of the Central African Council Held in the C.A.C. Secretarial Offices, Salisbury at 9 a.m. on Tuesday, 23rd November 1948, p. 3.

Southern Rhodesia resisted the full implementation of the provisions of the 1946 Tripartite Central African Agreement which had sought to create a Joint Central African Broadcasting Service and to develop a common African broadcasting policy. In 1948, Southern Rhodesia set up a Parliamentary Select Committee on Broadcasting “to investigate the possibility of setting up an organisation for broadcasting to the native population of Southern Rhodesia.”⁶ Southern Rhodesian broadcasting officials also repeatedly voiced their concerns that Northern Rhodesian radio broadcasts targeted at African listeners in Southern Rhodesia had the potential to undermine the Southern Rhodesia government’s ‘native’ policy. This was because Northern Rhodesia, a British protectorate, had a ‘native’ policy which was different from and considered to be more liberal than that of Northern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesian broadcasting officials feared that Africans in their territory could end up having a very negative view of Southern Rhodesia’s comparatively more illiberal ‘native’ policy if Northern Rhodesia was permitted to broadcast to Africans in Southern Rhodesia without the Southern Rhodesia government being given the power to exercise close control over the type and content of the radio programmes that were broadcast to these Africans. Permitting such unregulated radio broadcasts from Northern Rhodesia was, according to Southern Rhodesian broadcasting officials, to be avoided as it was tantamount to training Africans in Southern Rhodesia “to listen to Lusaka” rather than to their own government.⁷

In order to allay Southern Rhodesia’s fears about radio broadcasts to Africans in its territory from Lusaka, the Public Relations Committee of the Central African Council came up with various schemes to allow Southern Rhodesia to determine the type and content of the material which was broadcast to Africans in its territory.⁸ However, Southern Rhodesia’s determination to retain control over broadcasting to Africans in its territory and its willingness to formulate broadcasting schemes for its African population, which would not be subject to external control, continued into the Federal period.

Soon after the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953, the Federal government moved quickly to secure the federalisation of the Information Services, including broadcasting because “Public Relations” had been designated as a Federal responsibility under the Federal Constitution. This stipulation did not, however, preclude the Territorial governments from organising their own Territorial information services in proportion to their requirements.⁹ The manner and extent to which the Territorial Information Services, including broadcasting, were to be federalised had to be negotiated

⁶ NAZ, F128/HAF77, Draft Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Public Relations Committee of the Central African Council, Tuesday, 23rd November 1948, p. 3.

⁷ NAZ, F128/HAF77, Letter from A. H. Murrell, Postmaster-General, Government of Southern Rhodesia to the Chief Secretary, Central African Council, Salisbury, 29th September, 1948.

⁸ NAZ, F128/HAF77, Draft Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Public Relations Committee of the Central African Council, Tuesday, 23rd November 1948, p. 5.

⁹ *Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Survey of Developments Since 1953*, pp. 219-220.

between the Federal and Territorial governments a process, which in the case of broadcasting, brought out their divergent views on radio broadcasting to Africans.

In March 1954, the Federal government under the leadership of the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Godfrey Huggins, sent a memorandum to the Southern Rhodesia government in which it proposed that “both African and European broadcasting should become a Federal responsibility from the 1st July 1954, under the administrative control and direction of the Federal Director of Information.”¹⁰ This signalled the beginning of a concerted, but ultimately unsuccessful campaign by the Federal government to place African broadcasting under its direct control and with the intention of using it to mobilise African opinion in support of Federation. At various meetings between the Federal and Territorial governments which were called to discuss the federalisation of African broadcasting, the Federal government repeated its call for “broadcasting in all its aspects, both European and African” to “be centralised under the Federal government.”¹¹

Northern Rhodesia, which had invested heavily in the development of African broadcasting and whose executive control of radio broadcasting to Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia predated the establishment of the Federation in 1953, emerged as the most vocal and determined opponent of the Federal government’s plans to place African broadcasting directly under the control of the Federal government. Adopting what a Southern Rhodesia government official described as “an attitude of blunt uncompromising non-cooperation with the Federal government”, Northern Rhodesia insisted that control of African Broadcasting should remain a Territorial responsibility or be handed over to an independent broadcasting corporation and not to the Federal government.¹² It argued that placing African Broadcasting under the direct control of the Federal government went against accepted democratic practice and posed the risk that African Broadcasting would end up being used for party political purposes. Northern Rhodesia also called for the setting up of a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the state of broadcasting in the Federation and make recommendations on whether broadcasting throughout the Federation should come under the control of an independent broadcasting corporation.¹³

The main arguments put forward by the Federal government in support of placing African Broadcasting under its direct control rather than under an independent broadcasting

¹⁰ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 003, S.R.C. (54)129, Confidential Memorandum on “Broadcasting” from the Federal Prime Minister’s Office, 23 March, 1954.

¹¹ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 003, S.R.C. (54)207, Confidential “Note of a Meeting [Held on 9 September 1954] between the Prime Minister and the Federal Minister of Home Affairs”, dated 16 September, 1954 and written by G. B. Clarke, Secretary to the Southern Rhodesia Cabinet.

¹² Cory, *Smith Papers* Box 005, S.R.C. (56)183, “Memorandum on African Broadcasting” circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 31st October, 1956.

¹³ Cory, *Smith Papers* Box 003, S.R.C. (54) 281, “Report on a Joint Meeting [on African Broadcasting] convened by the Secretary for Home Affairs on Tuesday, October 12th, 1954, at Milton Buildings, Salisbury”, pp. 6-10.

corporation as demanded by the Northern Rhodesia government were given by Mr. A. D. Evans, the Federal Secretary for Home Affairs, at an inter-governmental meeting to discuss the Federalisation African Broadcasting held in October 1954. Mr Evans stated:

Broadcasting is a powerful propaganda weapon and I am very doubtful whether the time is ripe to allow an independent corporation to broadcast to Africans. In recent years we have heard some pernicious racial broadcasts emanating even from the BBC. It is clear, I think that in a multi-racial community broadcasting would have to be rigidly controlled for some time and it might just as well therefore be under Government control.¹⁴

Mr Evans also emphasised that “the newness of the Federation” as a country required that African Broadcasting be put under direct government control in order to provide security for everyone in the Federation. He also highlighted the financial disadvantages of placing control of African Broadcasting under an independent broadcasting corporation. The need for an independent broadcasting corporation to be financially self-supporting would necessitate the levying of high radio licence fees or the introduction of commercial broadcasting which had many risks, Mr Evans warned. In the event that an independent corporation had to be financed through a government subsidy, then government “might just as well retain control” of broadcasting, Mr Evans argued.¹⁵

Southern Rhodesia was willing to support the federalisation of African Broadcasting only on condition that “the right to broadcast to Natives and Europeans all matters concerning Natives [would] rest with the Territorial government.”¹⁶ It insisted on Territorial control of all African programmes by demanding that Territorial governments should be granted “full control, not only of the type of programme, but of its content, and particularly of what news is broadcast in Territorial programmes.”¹⁷ Southern Rhodesia emphasised that being granted control of “information broadcast to Natives and about Natives of Southern Rhodesia” was particularly important because the Federal Information Department lacked staff with experience of ‘native’ affairs and ‘native’ administration. It also argued that Southern Rhodesian control of information broadcast to Africans in Southern Rhodesia was

¹⁴ Cory, *Smith Papers Box 003, S.R.C. (54) 281*, “Report on a Joint Meeting [on African Broadcasting]”, Tuesday, October 12th, 1954, pp. 4-5.

¹⁵ Cory, *Smith Papers Box 003, S.R.C. (54) 281*, “Report on a Joint Meeting [on African Broadcasting]”, Tuesday, October 12th, 1954, pp. 5,10.

¹⁶ Cory, *Smith Papers, Box 003, S.R.C. (54) 281*, Memorandum on “African Broadcasting: Report on a Joint Meeting Convened by the [Federal] Secretary for Home Affairs on 12th October, 1954”, p. 1.

¹⁷ Cory, *Smith Papers, Box 003, S.R.C. (54) 129*, Memorandum on “Federalisation of Broadcasting” from Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department dated 10th May, 1954, p. 1.

essential in light of the differences between the 'native' Policy of Southern Rhodesia and that of the two Northern territories.¹⁸

The same arguments about the need to ensure that broadcasting to Africans was in the hands of men with knowledge and practical experience in 'native' affairs and 'native' administration were used by Southern Rhodesia to justify its opposition to any plan to hurriedly hand over African Broadcasting to an independent broadcasting corporation, which would be run by staff lacking experience in 'native' affairs.¹⁹ Guided by recommendations made to it on the issue, by its Minister of Native Affairs, Mr. P. B. Fletcher, Southern Rhodesia opposed handing over control of African broadcasting to an independent corporation before 1960. Southern Rhodesia hoped by that time to have established its own regional broadcasting station with transmission facilities which would enable it to retain, within the Federal set-up, considerable control over information and propaganda broadcast to Africans in its territory.²⁰

In April 1955, largely as a result of Northern Rhodesia's continued resistance to the federalisation of African Broadcasting, a four men Commission of Inquiry chaired by Mr. Hugh Carleton Green was appointed to investigate and make recommendations on the future organisation of broadcasting in the Federation.²¹ The Commission, which came to be referred to as the Broadcasting Commission of Inquiry or the Green Commission, presented its report on the 31st May, 1955. The Report recommended that both European and African Broadcasting throughout the Federation be placed under the control of an independent broadcasting corporation.²²

The Federal government tried to slow down the implementation of the Green Commission's recommendation to place broadcasting in the Federation under an independent corporation by maintaining that 1960 was the earliest date that it could afford to finance the establishment of an independent broadcasting corporation. This date given by the Federal government for the establishment of an independent corporation was later brought forward

¹⁸ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 003, S.R.C. (54) 281, Memorandum on "African Broadcasting: Report of a Joint Meeting Convened by the [Federal] Secretary for Home Affairs on 12th October, 1954", p.1.

¹⁹ Cory, *Smith Papers* Box 003, S.R.C. (54) 281, "Report on a Joint Meeting [on African Broadcasting] convened by the Secretary for Home Affairs on Tuesday, October 12th, 1954, at Milton Buildings, Salisbury", p.6; Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 004, S.R.C. (55) 157, Minute by the Southern Rhodesia, Secretary for Native Affairs dated 22nd July, 1955 and entitled "Report of the Broadcasting Commission of Inquiry".

²⁰ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 005, S.R.C. (56) 168, Cabinet Memorandum on "African Broadcasting" by R. S. Garfield Todd, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, 9th October, 1956, pp.1-2.

²¹ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 004, S.R.C. (55)157, "Report of the Broadcasting Commission of Inquiry", 31st May, 1955, pp. 1-2.

²² Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 004, S.R.C. (55)157, "Report of the Broadcasting Commission of Inquiry", 31st May, 1955, p. 8.

due to pressure from the Northern Rhodesia government and also due to the urgent need to defend the Federation from growing criticism and imminent collapse.²³

The Federal Broadcasting Corporation was established on the 1st February 1958. James Newton McClurg who had qualifications in radio and television studies obtained in Britain and Australia as well as many years of experience as a radio administrator in South Africa was appointed Director-General of the FBC.²⁴ According to J.M. Parry, the FBC Controller of European Broadcasting from 1958-1963, McClurg was a compromise appointee to the Director-Generalship of the FBC after serious disagreement between the Green Commission and the Southern Rhodesia government over who should be appointed FBC Director-General.²⁵

As an ex-employee of the BBC who wanted the FBC to follow the BBC model of public broadcasting, Hugh Carleton Green, the chairman of the Broadcasting Commission of Enquiry (Green Commission) strongly recommended that a BBC man be appointed FBC Director-General. However, the Southern Rhodesia government which had a long tradition of resisting any British proposals and policies that it believed were intended to undermine its autonomy as a self-governing colony “took very strong exception” to the Green Commission’s proposal emphasising that it was “not going to be dictated to from outside.”²⁶ Mainly because of his background as a former employee the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) which was controlled by the South African government with which the South Rhodesia government felt it shared some important values, McClurg emerged as a less objectionable appointee than anyone from the BBC.

In accordance with the provisions of the Broadcasting Act (1957) which provided the legal basis on which FBC was established, the FBC was headed by a government appointed six member Board of Governors to whom the Director-General of the FBC was answerable for his management of the Corporation. Sir Robert Hudson, a retired former judge of the Southern Rhodesia High Court, was the Chairman of the FBC Board of Governors from its inception in 1958 until his death in June 1963 after which he was succeeded by Mr. B.G. Paver who remained chairman until the dissolution of the FBC in 1963.²⁷ The Director-General and Controller-General of the FBC sat on this Board as ex-officio members.

²³ Cory, *Smith Papers Box 005, S.R.C. (56)183*, “Memorandum on African Broadcasting” circulated to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Ministers on 31st October, 1956, p. 4.

²⁴ “Director General Appointed to Launch Broadcasting Corporation”, *Radio Post*, Vol.2, No.2, February 1957, p. 3.

²⁵ NAZ, *Oral/234*, John Hywel Parry interviewed by E.G. Gibbons, Salisbury, 11 August, 1977, p. 9.

²⁶ NAZ, *Oral/234*, John Hywel Parry, 11 August, 1977, p. 9.

²⁷ NAZ, *F198/8, Vol. 2*, Minutes of the Fifty-Ninth Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors Held in Northern House, Salisbury on Friday, 28 June, 1963, at 9:15 am, p. 1.

Initially the FBC Board of Governors comprised only European men and had no female and African representation. About six months after its inception, a European woman, Mrs. M.E. Brett became the first and only woman to be appointed a member of the FBC Board of Governors.²⁸ Mr Elliot Dhlula, a Headmaster of St Columbus School in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, in January 1963 became the first African to be appointed to the FBC Board of Governors.²⁹ Dhlula's appointment which came five years after the inception of the FBC and in the last year of the Federation's existence was a product of the Federal government's embrace of the panic multi-racial partnership discussed in chapter three of this thesis.

Soon after the inception of the FBC in 1958, Africans in the Federation strongly criticised the all-white racial composition of its Board of Governors describing it as shameful and unacceptable, especially given that there was no shortage of highly educated Africans, among them, lawyers, journalists, businessmen, teachers and other professional men who were well qualified to be appointed onto the FBC Board of Governors. Africans in Southern Rhodesia also argued that in terms of appointing Africans to sit on its statutory boards, the Federal government was lagging behind the Southern Rhodesia government, which with positive results, "had shown the way by appointing Africans to Commissions and Labour Boards."³⁰ Despite these complaints from Africans, it was only the Federal government's panic-driven effort to counter growing African opposition to Federation by, among other measures, changing negative public perceptions of its commitment to multi-racial partnership, which led it to make a very belated effort to appoint an African onto the FBC Board of Governors.

Though the Broadcasting Act (1957) gave the FBC autonomy in the running of its affairs, it placed two important restrictions on this autonomy. The first was that the Federal Minister of Home Affairs had the power to direct the FBC to broadcast on behalf of the government statements on issues of public importance. The FBC had the right to announce that it was broadcasting such statements at the direction of the government. The second was that the Federal Minister of Home Affairs had the right to completely take control of the FBC during times of emergency.³¹

Though the Federal government rarely used the reserve powers on the FBC's autonomy granted to it through the Broadcasting Act (1957), the existence of these powers as Zaffiro observes "effectively placed final authority over broadcasting in the hands of government, thereby negating much of the autonomy of the FBC."³² It can also be argued that the

²⁸ NAZ, *F198/8, Vol. 1*, Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors Held in Travlos House on 25th June, 1958, at 9:15 am, p. 1.

²⁹ "African is Made FBC Governor", *Chronicle*, 17 January, 1963.

³⁰ "Composition of Broadcast Board Queried", *African Daily News*, 24 January, 1958.

³¹ J. J. Zaffiro, "Broadcasting and Political Change in Zimbabwe 1931-1984", PhD Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1984, p. 86.

³² J. J. Zaffiro, "Broadcasting and Political Change in Zimbabwe 1931-1984", p. 57.

Federal government's financial influence over the FBC and its powers to appoint the members of the FBC Board of Governors constituted other forms of government control over the affairs of the F.B.C. The composition of the FBC Board of Governors shows that Africans, despite being numerically the largest radio audience that the FBC had in the Federation were denied fair representation on this Board. In addition, the available evidence also shows that despite its later public pronouncements, after the formation of the FBC, about the political evils of putting public broadcasting under direct government control, the Federal government had fought unsuccessfully to do precisely this. The Federal government also had no qualms about establishing and running *Fact*, a monthly pro-Federation propaganda newspaper for Africans two years after the establishment of the FBC. *Fact* was published and distributed by the Federal Information Department.

FBC Policy on African Broadcasting and FBC African Service Programmes

At its inception in 1958 the FBC had two main programme Services, namely the African Service and the European Service. It later established two other programme Services, the Commercial Service and the News Service. The FBC also had two Programme Advisory Committees, namely the Advisory Committee on African Programmes and the Advisory Committee on Religious Programmes.³³ By 1962, the FBC claimed that its African Service had a total African listenership of about one and a half million Africans, over half of who were in Southern Rhodesia.³⁴

The official position adopted and constantly pronounced by both the Federal government and the FBC regarding the latter's broadcasting policy from 1958 onwards was that in consonance with the manner in which broadcasting was run in democratic countries, the FBC was an 'independent' and 'impartial' public broadcaster which did not exist to serve the propaganda needs of any political party or of the Federal and Territorial governments.³⁵ Disclaiming any propaganda function, the FBC told its African listeners that: "It is neither the function nor the object of the FBC to induce anyone to change his point of view on any subject."³⁶ It promised African listeners in the Federation that the programmes they would hear on the African Service of the FBC would "always be authoritative, sincere and unbiased."³⁷

It was also emphasised that unlike dictatorial governments in Europe and other parts of the world before and after the Second World War, which had used radio broadcasting as "a tool

³³ Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Survey of Developments since 1953, 1960, p.220.

³⁴ "FBC Heard by One and a Half Million Africans", *Chronicle*, 27 October, 1962.

³⁵ "The Responsibilities of our Broadcasters", *Radio Post*, Vol. 3, No. 11, November 1958, p.3.

³⁶ "Impartiality or the Other Point of View", *Radio Post*, Vol. 5, No. 2, February 1960, p. 3.

³⁷ "The Responsibilities of our Broadcasters", *Radio Post*, Vol. 3, No. 11, November 1958, p.3.

of hatred, violence and disinformation” radio broadcasting in the Federation would be “used in the interests of truth, integrity and goodwill.”³⁸ This rationalisation of the function of broadcasting in the Federation was similar to that given by the Federal Information Department in drawing a distinction between the purpose of the Federal Information Services and those of African nationalist organisations opposed to the Federation. It was consistent with the manner in which the factual propaganda approach sought to legitimise its propaganda to its target audience by claiming that it was giving them neutral, value-free and objective facts meant to counter the falsehoods and bias which it always identified with the propaganda of its opponents.

The disclaimers about the FBC’s impartiality and its freedom from Federal government control was one of the strategies through which both the Federal government and the FBC sought to establish favourable communicator credibility for the FBC among Africans, most of whom were strongly opposed to Federation. They were intended to convince these Africans, that the FBC was not as continuously alleged by African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda, an official propaganda mouthpiece for the Federal government. Faced with increasingly effective African nationalist attacks on the communicator credibility of its information services including the FBC, the Federal government moved away from its earlier and unsuccessful strategy of seeking to put African broadcasting under its direct control. It came to appreciate the necessity of improving the communicator credibility of the FBC by avoiding creating any public impression of government control and influence over its activities. In public, the Federal government portrayed itself as a liberal-minded government that fully respected the autonomy granted to the FBC by its charter whilst privately it exerted indirect control over the FBC’s African broadcasting policy and its programme content.

FBC Policy on Political Broadcasts

In explaining its policy on political broadcasts, the FBC stated that it had “given a great deal of thought...to the part which politics should play in broadcasting” and had decided that unlike in “totalitarian states” where only the voice of the government was allowed to be heard in such broadcasts, the FBC would follow the practice in democratic countries where “if one political party is given ‘time on the air’ to express its views, its opponents must be provided with an opportunity to reply.”³⁹ The meaning of “opponents” in this context was, however, restricted to those parties which were represented in parliament, with the

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ “News in Troubled Times”, *Radio Post*, Vol. 5, No. 11, November 1960, p. 3

broadcast time allocated to each party being assessed according to the number of parliamentary seats held by each party.⁴⁰

Since African nationalist parties in Southern Rhodesia did not have any parliamentary seats and never contested any parliamentary elections during the Federal period, the FBC's policy on political broadcasts effectively excluded African nationalist parties in Southern Rhodesia from making political broadcasts on the FBC. African nationalist parties in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were also largely excluded from making political broadcasts on the FBC until the early 1960s. It was during the 1960s that their efforts to overcome their exclusion from FBC political broadcasts by using the facilities of the Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation (TBC) to broadcast their election campaign propaganda into the Federation during general elections in the Northern territories compelled the FBC to offer them air time to make election campaign broadcasts.

The FBC's exclusion of African nationalists from making political broadcasts on the FBC reflected the limits of the FBC's autonomy and effectively made it a tool for the legitimisation of the political status-quo in the Federation. This policy benefited the Federal government as it prevented African politicians opposed to Federation from using the only available public broadcasting organisation in the Federation to put across their own viewpoints.

The Federal government's strong opposition to allowing the voices of African nationalist leaders to be heard on the FBC as well as the FBC's willingness to submit to Federal government direction on this issue is partly reflected in their reactions to what came to be referred to as the "Banda Broadcast". On 3 March 1959, hours after the Declaration of a state of Emergency in Nyasaland meant to suppress anti-government political disturbances spearheaded by the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), Dr. Hastings Banda, the President of the MCP had together with other leaders of the MCP been arrested and sent to prisons in Southern Rhodesia. On 1 April 1960, Dr. Hastings Banda and Mr Orton Chirwa also an official of the MCP, were released from prison and allowed to use FBC facilities at Government House, Zomba "to broadcast a special appeal for peace" alongside the Governor of Nyasaland, Sir Robert Armitage. This broadcast, which had the approval of the Governor of Nyasaland, attracted strong criticism from the Federal government and other quarters which was directed at the FBC.⁴¹

The FBC's defence against the criticism levelled against it was that it had been led to believe by the Nyasaland Government that it was only the Governor of that territory who intended to use its facilities to make a political broadcast. The Governor of Nyasaland had not as was

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ NAZ, F161/2040, R. J. Hudson, Chairman, FBC Board of Governors to Sir Malcolm Barrow, Acting Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 4th May, 1960.

expected, provided the FBC with a script of his broadcast prior to the broadcast. The FBC had only discovered that Dr. Banda and Mr Chirwa had been allowed to record a political broadcast together with the Governor when it received a recording of the broadcasts. This, the FBC argued, had given the FBC Director-General insufficient time to consider the full implications of the “Banda Broadcast” before it was put on air.⁴²

The “Banda Broadcast” had a number of important consequences for FBC policy on political broadcasts. First, the FBC in an effort to placate the Federal government, sought to enforce tighter controls on political broadcasts by Territorial governments by, among other measures, requiring these governments to give the FBC adequate notice of any political broadcasts they intended to make and also submit scripts of their political broadcasts to the FBC well before any proposed broadcast.⁴³

Second, the FBC argued that though the Broadcasting Act (1957) gave it the legal power to make judgments on whether or not any particular broadcast would be objectionable on the basis of its content, cases such as that of the “Banda Broadcast” were problematic to the Corporation. This was because in such cases judgements about whether a broadcast was disagreeable were based less on the content of the broadcast and more on whether it was politically desirable for a particular broadcast to be made. The FBC, therefore, argued that deciding whether a broadcast was objectionable in such cases was “more a matter for Governments than for the Broadcasting Corporation” given the powers that the Broadcasting Act conferred on the Federal Minister of Home Affairs to compel the FBC to make particular broadcasts under specific given circumstances.⁴⁴ The FBC, also argued that since the “Banda Broadcast” had taken place at the behest of the Governor of Nyasaland, but had attracted strong criticism from the Federal government, in future it wanted the Federal government and any Territorial government to resolve any differences they may have about the political desirability of any proposed political broadcast before approaching the FBC to arrange any such broadcast. This, the FBC argued would prevent the Corporation from later becoming the target of criticism from either government.⁴⁵

Third, and perhaps most important the “Banda Broadcast” forced both the FBC and the Federal and Territorial governments to start reconsidering the wisdom of continuing to exclude African politicians from making political broadcasts. In 1960, a meeting was held

⁴² NAZ, *F161/2040*, “Draft Memorandum: Broadcasts of Unusual Political Significance by Territorial Governments”, 12th May 1960.

⁴³ NAZ, *F161/2040*, Letter on “Political Broadcasts” from Sir Malcolm Barrow, Federal Minister of Home Affairs to Sir Edgar Whitehead, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, 26th July 1960.

⁴⁴ NAZ, *F161/2040*, “Draft Memorandum: Broadcasts of Unusual Political Significance by Territorial Governments”, 12th May 1960.

⁴⁴ NAZ, *F161/2040*, “Draft Memorandum: Broadcasts of Unusual Political Significance by Territorial Governments”, 12th May 1960.

⁴⁵ NAZ, *F161/2040*, Secret Memorandum from James McClurg, Director-General, FBC to Acting Secretary for Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, 20th May, 1960.

between the representatives of the FBC and those of the Northern Rhodesia government to consider this and other issues relating to broadcasting. Northern Rhodesia's Chief Information Officer, Mr. C.N. Lawrence, felt that the time had come to give African politicians, regardless of their political persuasion, more opportunities to broadcast, particularly by ensuring their participation in question and answer programmes and in news conferences. However, after it was acknowledged that this proposal posed the risk of building up the political profiles of African nationalist politicians, it was agreed by all present at the meeting that "a middle way would have to be chosen between political broadcasts as such and complete exclusion as at present."⁴⁶ In addition, it was also agreed that in order to provide a "very necessary safeguard", "any broadcasts to be made by African politicians should be recorded and not put across as live broadcasts."⁴⁷

FBC Policy on News Broadcasts

News bulletins were an important feature of FBC African Service programmes. News reports about political, economic and other developments in the Federation and elsewhere were viewed by both the Federal and Territorial governments as having an important role in shaping African attitudes to the Territorial governments and to Federation. The question of how news broadcasts to Africans would be handled under an independent broadcasting corporation had been one of the major concerns of the Southern Rhodesia government in the debate on whether African broadcasting should be put under the control of an independent corporation. Early in this debate, Southern Rhodesia had stated that it was "perturbed that news and comment about Native Affairs should be handed over too hurriedly to an independent body" that had no knowledge and experience of 'native' affairs and 'native' administration.⁴⁸ Southern Rhodesia had also been very critical of recommendations in the Green Commission Report that the independent broadcasting corporation it was proposing for the Federation should rely on an independent news agency rather than on a government news service for its news bulletins because the latter was likely to be viewed with suspicion by listeners.⁴⁹

The FBC largely relied on the South African Press Agency (SAPA) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) for its news bulletins. In late 1958, the FBC established its own news service headed by John Appleby, a former BBC broadcaster. Derek Wintle, who had worked

⁴⁶ NAZ, *F161/2040*, Record of Meeting Held in the [Northern Rhodesia] Chief Secretary's Office on the 27th September, 1960, to Discuss Regionalisation of Broadcasting, pp. 2-3.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 003, S.R.C. (54) 281, Memorandum on "African Broadcasting: Report on a Joint Meeting Convened by the [Federal] Secretary for Home Affairs on 12th October, 1954", p. 6.

⁴⁹ Cory, *Smith Papers*, Box 004, S.R.C. (55) 157, Minute by the Southern Rhodesia, Secretary for Native Affairs dated 22nd July, 1955 and entitled "Report of the Broadcasting Commission of Inquiry".

at the Lusaka studios of the FBC since 1955 was put in charge of the African section of the FBC News Service.⁵⁰ Trained African translators and newsreaders based at the Lusaka studios of the FBC and working under the supervision of Derek Wintle were responsible for news translation and presentation in all the vernaculars which were used in FBC African Service broadcasts.⁵¹

The proclaimed policy of the FBC in relation to news bulletins had two important elements. First, the FBC stated that it would seek to provide accurate and impartial news reports to its listeners in order to cultivate their trust in FBC news bulletins to such an extent that they would say, "I heard it on the FBC, it must be true."⁵² Second, the FBC stated that in assessing the merits of what news items should be reported in its news bulletins, it was going to adhere to its "general rule that a statement by the Prime Minister or any member of the Cabinet will be given priority over an equally interesting statement made on the same day by a person, whether a Member of Parliament or not, who is not a Minister."⁵³ The reason given by the FBC for adopting this policy was that as a "responsible organisation" it had an obligation to keep its listeners informed of government decisions. This, the FBC argued, was best done by according statements made by the Prime Minister and other government officials more importance in FBC newscasts than those made by people who did not shoulder the responsibilities of high office.⁵⁴ The FBC was careful to state that its policy did not mean that newsworthy speeches made by people who were not government officials would not be reported. However, the policy practically meant that coverage of news events was skewed in favour of government officials and against African nationalist leaders who were opposed to Federation and were not part of the governments of the Federation.

FBC broadcast language policy was informed by the considerable linguistic diversity that existed among the African radio audiences in the Federation. The African Service programmes of the FBC were broadcast in 9 vernaculars with English also being used as a language in which some of these programmes were broadcast.⁵⁵ These 9 vernaculars were Chinyanja, Chibemba, Silozi, Chitonga, Chilunda, Chiluvale, Sindebele, Chishona and Chitumbuka.⁵⁶ The FBC considered three of these vernaculars, Chibemba, Chinyanja and Chishona to be the most widely understood in the Federation.⁵⁷

⁵⁰ "New Year Message to Readers by James McClurg, Director-General of the FBC", *Radio Post*, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1959, p.4.

⁵¹ "How You Get Your News", *Radio Post*, Vol.4, No. 1, January 1959, p. 17.

⁵² "News in Troubled Times", *Radio Post*, Vol. 5, No. 11, November 1960, p. 3.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ NAZ, F128/L72, Record of the 1st Meeting of the FBC Advisory Committee on African Programmes, Held at Travlos House on Wednesday, 1st July 1959, p. 1.

⁵⁶ NAZ, F128/L72, "FBC Language Broadcasts", undated paper circulated for discussion by the FBC Advisory Committee on African Programmes at its Meeting of 17 May 1961.

⁵⁷ "Important Programme Changes", *Radio Post*, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 1960, p. 34.

The FBC adopted a policy of broadcasting to as many Africans as possible in as few African languages as possible. It opposed the introduction of more languages into the programme stream of its African Service for numerous reasons, which included its concern that doing so would place enormous strain on its financial and administrative resources. The FBC also feared that increasing the number of languages used on the African Service was likely to trigger endless representations by numerous minority language speaking African communities for the inclusion of their own languages in the African Service.⁵⁸ Indeed, the FBC's broadcast language policy was frequently criticised by Africans whose languages were excluded from FBC African Service broadcasts. In defence of its broadcast language policy, the FBC published propaganda articles in *Radio Post*, a magazine for African radio listeners which was financially supported by the FBC and which served as a channel of communication between the FBC and its educated African listeners. In this propaganda two main arguments were presented. First, that broadcasting in many languages would result in fewer listeners. Second, that the use of many different indigenous languages in the Federation was one of the major factors which was retarding African advancement because progress was achieved much more quickly if people used a single language.⁵⁹

FBC African Service Programmes

FBC African Service programmes were divided into numerous categories which included the following: Entertainment Programmes, Topical Events/News Programmes, Informative Programmes, Religious Programmes and Children's Programmes. Among the main entertainment programmes broadcast by the FBC were musical request programmes such as "Lucky Dip", serial plays such as the "The Mashona Family" and reports of sporting events in the Federation. Topical Events/News programmes comprised bulletins of World, Federal and District news broadcast in the vernaculars as well as English. They also included news-related programmes such as "Background to the News" and "In the News" which were broadcast only in English and were aimed at "the more sophisticated [African] listener".⁶⁰ Informative programmes on the FBC included programmes on health and hygiene, agriculture, road safety, adult education and women's programmes such as "Radio Homecraft Club" which was considered one of the most popular programmes on the FBC African Service. Religious programmes included the broadcast of a 25 minute church service on Sunday evenings as well as daily "Epilogues" presented by different church

⁵⁸ NAZ, F128/L72, "FBC Language Broadcasts", undated paper circulated for discussion by the FBC Advisory Committee on African Programmes at its Meeting of 17 May 1961.

⁵⁹ "Many Languages Mean Fewer Listeners", *Radio Post*, Vol. 4, No.5, May 1959, p. 28.

⁶⁰ NAZ, F128/L72, "A Summary of the Variety of Programmes Regularly Broadcast from Lusaka in the African Service" by C. Sapseid, Controller, FBC, African Service, 1st July, 1959, pp .1-2.

denominations. Children's programmes featured children's entertainment mixed with instruction from teachers.⁶¹

In terms of the Broadcasting Act (1957), the Federal "government had no power of veto or other control over FBC programmes."⁶² John Hywell Parry, the Controller of European Broadcasting throughout the existence of the FBC described the FBC Board of Governors led by former chief Justice, Sir Robert Hudson, as "a very, very strong Board which was prepared... to stand up and fight" government attempts to undermine its autonomy.⁶³ Parry recounted an incident he had personally witnessed in which Sir Robert had used the relevant sections of the Broadcasting Act to successfully resist an attempt by Malcolm Barrow, the Federal Minister of Internal Affairs, to get an FBC staff member to tow the Federal government line in relation to a specific news item. According to Parry, Sir Robert's bold defence of the FBC's autonomy generated a confidence in the FBC's ability to defend itself against government interference which "went right through the entire [FBC] staff."⁶⁴

There is, however, evidence which shows that in terms of its actual practice as contrasted with its pronouncements, the FBC was not opposed to the principle of performing a propaganda role on behalf of the Federal government. What it resisted were the efforts of the Federal government to dictate to it what the precise nature of that role should be and how FBC staff should perform it. Evidence also shows that the FBC's stated commitment to resisting government influence and control over its affairs was not, as claimed by John Parry, shared by all FBC staff.

That the FBC was not averse to performing on its own terms, a propaganda function on behalf of the Federal government is partly shown by the frequent meetings that were held between top FBC officials and officials from the Federal Information Department to discuss how Federation and the policies of the Federal government could be best projected in FBC programmes broadcast to Africans in the Federation. The limits of this collaboration with the Federal Information Department were circumscribed by concerns about the manner and extent to which the FBC felt it could perform this propaganda role on behalf of the Federal government without being seen to go against its declared policy of being an independent, impartial broadcaster free of government influence.

About two months after the establishment of the FBC, the Director of the Federal Information Department, Mr. W. V. Brelsford and Mr. R.B. Napier, an official from the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs under which Federal Information Department fell, met with the Director-General of the FBC, James McClurg and the Controller of the FBC African

⁶¹ NAZ, *F128/L72*, "A Summary of the Variety of Programmes Regularly Broadcast from Lusaka in the African Service" by C. Sapseid, Controller, FBC, African Service, 1st July, 1959, pp .1-2.

⁶² J. J. Zaffiro, "Broadcasting and Political Change in Zimbabwe 1931-1984", p. 86.

⁶³ NAZ, *Oral/234*, John Hywell Parry, 11 August 1977, p. 9.

⁶⁴ NAZ, *Oral/234*, John Hywell Parry, 11 August 1977, p. 9.

Service, C. Sapseid, to discuss African broadcasting. The suggestions made in the course of this meeting by Mr. Brelsford and Mr. Napier on how Federation could be best put across in FBC broadcasts to Africans show that the Federal Information Department wanted the FBC to complement its pro-Federation propaganda effort by adopting the same factual propaganda approach used in Federal government print and mobile cinema propaganda directed at Africans.⁶⁵

Among the suggestions made by Mr. Brelsford and Mr. Napier for consideration by the FBC were the following: First, developing a question and answer broadcast series on Federation based on the Federal Information Department's propaganda leaflets which used the same question and answer approach; Second, supplying the FBC, which already relied on various press sources (including Federal Information Department releases) for the compilation of its news bulletins for Africans, with additional "factual statements on the activities of the Federal government" for use in such news bulletins. Third, making maximum use of the words "Federal" and "Federation" in FBC African Service broadcasts, a suggestion which Mr. McClurg and Mr. Sapseid agreed with "provided the practice was not carried out to the extreme."⁶⁶

The response of the FBC Director-General to these and subsequent suggestions from the Federal Information Department show that the FBC was comfortable with the factual propaganda approach which was extensively used in Federal government propaganda in support of Federation. Its principal characteristics have already been described in previous chapters of this thesis. The FBC embraced this factual propaganda approach by declaring its willingness to favourably publicise Federation to Africans by broadcasting to them "any factual information about Federation which could be suitably used."⁶⁷ However, due to its concerns about cultivating among its listeners a public image of itself as an autonomous and impartial public broadcaster, the FBC was unwilling to broadcast to Africans the overtly pro-Federation and forceful type of propaganda which the Federal Information Department sought to put to out to Africans following the reformulation of Federal government information and propaganda policy in 1960. FBC managers were also resentful of attempts by Federal government politicians and information officials to have the FBC function as an extension of the Federal Information Department by trying to influence how it performed its day-to-day activities. These Federal government officials had tried to influence how FBC radio programmes on Federation were presented and even the choice of presenters for

⁶⁵ NAZ, *F121/H1/20*, Note on "African Broadcasting", by R.B. Napier, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, 27th February, 1959.

⁶⁶ NAZ, *F121/H1/20*, Note on "African Broadcasting", by R.B. Napier, 27th February, 1959.

⁶⁷ NAZ, *F121/H1/20*, Note on "African Broadcasting", by R.B. Napier, 27th February, 1959.

those programmes). John Parry emphasised his strong objection to having his “staff messed around and bullied by [government] Ministers.”⁶⁸

However, by 1961, the Federal government had developed what it believed to be an effective strategy to exert covert and indirect influence over FBC programming without being significantly hindered by FBC managers’ concerns about the need for the Corporation to publicly demonstrate that it was independent of government control and influence. A letter from the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs written in 1961 stated that:

We have also managed to establish a very good liaison both with the FBC and the RTV at the operational or programme level. These seem to me to be entirely the right tactics to follow since those who have the task of having constantly to think up new ideas for programmes are always open to receive suggestions, or even programme material, and there isn’t the same emphasis on demonstrating that the FBC is an independent organisation free from political influence there is at the top. For obvious reasons however we cannot publicise what we are doing in this sphere and it is perhaps not surprising that the public should get the idea that the government does not make nearly as much use of broadcasting and television as it should.⁶⁹

It is possible that the public’s lack of knowledge about the manner and extent to which the Federal government was able to influence FBC broadcasts on Federation may have been partly responsible for its belief that the Federal government was not making adequate use of broadcasting as a propaganda tool to mobilise Africans in support of Federation.

However, frequent criticism of what was believed to be the Federal government’s insufficient use of radio for propaganda purposes cannot be explained only in terms of its critics’ lack of knowledge of the nature and extent of the influence that it exercised over the FBC. This is because this criticism came not only from ordinary members of the public, but also from RAIC members who were part of the Federal government’s propaganda formulation machinery. Various Regional Information Advisory Committees made numerous broadcasting suggestions to the FBC about possible programmes on Federal subjects that could be broadcast to Africans. They also made suggestions about how Federal issues could be incorporated into pre-existing radio programmes for Africans.⁷⁰ These criticisms and suggestions were, therefore, fundamentally a reflection of the panic mentality that informed Federal government thinking and practice in relation to pro-Federation propaganda for Africans.

⁶⁸ NAZ, *Oral/234*, John Hywell Parry, 11 August 1977, p.10.

⁶⁹ NAZ, *F121/H3/50*, Draft Letter on “Iswana” from Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, 28th June 1961.

⁷⁰ NAZ, *F121/H202/2*, Record of Meeting of the Gwelo/Que Que Regional Information Advisory Committee Held in the Town Management Board Offices, Selukwe, at 9:30 a.m. on 1st August, 1961, p. 2.

The content of numerous FBC African Service programmes broadcast in vernaculars and in English reflected the major themes of pro-Federation propaganda, namely multi-racial partnership and the economic and other benefits of Federation to Africans. Health Programmes such as “Consulting Room” and “Health Matters” highlighted the free health services available to Africans in Federal hospitals. News and current affairs programmes such as “In the News” featured interviews with the Federal Prime Minister and with well-known African sympathisers with Federation such as Lawrence Vambe and Jasper Savanhu. There were also programmes on constitutional affairs relating to Federation such as the history of the three Federal territories and how the Federal government functioned. Programmes on sporting events such as the Federal Athletic Championships emphasised the multi-racial nature of these events.⁷¹

Conclusion

This chapter has examined how FBC radio propaganda targeted at Africans in the Federation was used to try and generate support for Federation among these Africans. It has shown how the belated establishment of the FBC as an independent broadcasting corporation was largely a result of prolonged contestations between the Federal and Territorial governments over control of broadcasting to Africans. In these struggles, the Federal government originally wanted and unsuccessfully fought for broadcasting to Africans in the Federation to be put under direct Federal government control. This centralised control of broadcasting, the Federal government believed, would enable it to more effectively deploy radio propaganda as a tool to defend Federation from its internal and external opponents. The Territorial governments’ opposition to giving the Federal government exclusive and direct control of broadcasting to Africans centred on their fears that doing so would facilitate Federal government encroachment upon their Territorial powers, particularly in relation to Africans.

The chapter has also demonstrated that contrary to its own claims and those made for it by the Federal government, the FBC was not an independent and impartial public broadcaster which was free of government control and influence. It was, the chapter has shown, subject to Federal government direction and influence in several ways. These included Federal government appointment of the FBC’s Board of Governors, Federal government influence over the FBC’s broadcasting policy and programmes and Federal government financial support for the FBC. The chapter has highlighted how FBC policy on political broadcasts virtually proscribed African nationalist leaders from making political broadcasts on the FBC. It has also shown that Africans were only given limited representation on the FBC’s Board of

⁷¹ NAZ, *F128/L72*, “FBC African Service: Details of Topical Events and Programmes Covered by Lusaka Since March, 1958,” 22 February, 1960.

Governors very late into the FBC's existence and largely in response to African criticism of the exclusively European composition of the FBC's Board of Governors.

Also highlighted in the chapter was how the FBC performed a propaganda function on behalf of the Federal government by collaborating with the Federal Information Department to broadcast to Africans radio programmes which portrayed Federation and the Federal government's policies favourably. The limits of this collaboration, the chapter has shown, were largely determined by the FBC's opposition to broadcasting direct and openly political pro-Federation propaganda to Africans. How Africans reacted to FBC African Service programmes and how they sought to overcome their exclusion from making political broadcasts on the FBC is the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER 7: AFRICAN RESPONSES TO FBC AFRICAN SERVICE BROADCASTS

Introduction

This chapter examines the responses of African listeners to FBC African Service radio broadcasts, highlighting the agency shown by Africans in responding to these broadcasts. It discusses the ways in which especially anti-Federation African nationalist leaders and their supporters were able to influence FBC policy regarding African broadcasting. It highlights the main strategies used by Africans to undermine the communicator credibility of the FBC and the Federal government. The chapter also assesses the effectiveness of FBC African Service broadcasts in gaining African support for Federation and for the Federal government's policies.

Three main interrelated arguments are put forward in the chapter. First, using the active audience paradigm (see introduction), the chapter argues that Africans were not passive recipients of the FBC African Service broadcasts directed at them. They showed agency in their responses to FBC broadcasts by, among numerous other measures, resisting the payment of FBC radio licences and by sometimes physically attacking its infrastructure and personnel. The chapter highlights how they were able to take advantage of the greater opportunities to resist pro-Federation radio propaganda that radio as a medium offered by tuning into external anti-Federation radio broadcasts, which they regarded as reflecting their political aspirations and as providing more reliable and trustworthy news and commentary about political and other developments in the Federation.

It also shows how African nationalist leaders in all three Federal territories were able to overcome the Federal government and FBC's efforts to suppress their voices by forbidding them from making political broadcasts on the FBC. Africans were able to overcome these restrictions by using external broadcasting facilities belonging to newly independent African countries, such as Tanganyika, which were supportive of African nationalist efforts to achieve independence from colonial rule. African nationalist leaders were also able to effectively undermine the communicator credibility of the FBC among Africans and other opponents of Federation by continuously portraying it as the mouthpiece of Federation and of the UFP.

Second, the chapter argues that the Federal and Territorial governments' concerns about the effects on Africans of these external anti-Federation broadcasts as well as their efforts to counter them was another manifestation of their panic over increasing African nationalist opposition to Federation. The chapter emphasises that the agency shown by Africans in listening to external anti-Federation broadcasts and in utilising external broadcasting facilities to themselves make such broadcasts served to heighten the Federal government's panic over intensified African opposition to Federation. It was a significant factor in moving

the FBC to alter its policy of totally excluding African nationalist leaders from making political broadcasts on the FBC.

Third, the chapter argues that the predominantly hostile reactions of African listeners in the Federation to FBC African Service broadcasts shows that these broadcasts failed to convince Africans to support Federation. It further argues that, in line with the main claims of limited effects theory (expounded earlier in the introduction to this thesis), these hostile African reactions to FBC broadcasts illustrate the central role played by pre-existing negative African perceptions of Federation in influencing their reactions to these broadcasts. Widespread and long-standing African opposition to Federation resulted in Africans having very negative perceptions of the communicator credibility of the FBC. Despite its strenuous efforts to portray itself as an independent broadcaster free from Federal government influence and control, the FBC came to be viewed by most Africans as an organisation that existed to legitimise Federation and Federal government policies. As was the case with the Federal government's print propaganda for Africans, the FBC was never able to overcome its crisis of poor community credibility among Africans in the Federation.

The chapter is divided into two major sections. The first examines how the FBC attempted to measure African reactions to its African Service programmes. Taking into account the methodological problems entailed in measuring audience reactions to radio as a medium, it highlights the limitations of the principal methods used by the FBC and the Federal government to measure African reactions to its programmes. The second section analyses African reactions to FBC African Service broadcasts and assesses the extent to which these broadcasts were successful in generating African support for Federation.

“What do our Listeners Like?” FBC Perceptions of African Reactions to its African Service Programmes

Before discussing how the FBC attempted to measure African responses to its African Service programmes, it is important to consider the methodological challenges involved in trying to measure the responses of audiences to radio as a medium. This is relevant for the study's analysis of the FBC's perceptions of African reactions to its programmes and for the observations that the study makes about these reactions.

The principal methodological difficulties of measuring audience responses to mass media messages have already been highlighted in the first chapter of this thesis. Andrew Crisell, a media studies scholar, has noted that these methodological problems “are in some respects greater in the case of radio” than other major types of mass media such as television.¹

¹ A. Crisell, *Understanding Radio*, London, Routledge, 1986, p. 200.

Crisell highlights several such methodological challenges regarding radio. These include the challenges of establishing the size and social identity of radio audiences and of how to define what constitutes a radio listener, the element out of which radio audiences are formed.²

The problems of defining a radio listener highlighted by Crisell largely centre on the question of whether a radio listener should be defined in terms of “someone who owns, or has access to, a radio set” or who conforms to a given pattern of radio listenership.³ According to Crisell, how to demarcate the pattern of listenership that qualifies one to be defined as a radio listener is also problematic in terms of whether it should be listenership “to a minimum proportion of a programme” or listenership “for a minimum amount of time in the day” that should be used as the basis for defining a radio listener.⁴ This problem is made more complex by the fact that the ability of radio listeners to tune in to different radio stations that they listen to means that a person can listen to the radio for a number of hours every day, but that person’s “listening span corresponds to no complete programme.”⁵

Efforts to try and overcome the challenges associated with defining radio audiences on the basis of given listenership patterns have, according to Crisell, resulted in the development of multiple concepts of such audiences. These concepts attempt to reflect the complex and diverse range of listenership patterns upon which different notions of audiences are based. For instance, they distinguish between the “average” audience of a programme and the “core” audience of a programme, with the former referring to the standard or usual audience of the duration of a programme while the latter refers an audience which listens to a programme for its entire duration. The concept of audience reach has also been used to refer to “the number of people who listen to at least part of...a sequence programme.”⁶ Similarly, efforts by researchers to establish the social identity of radio audiences have resulted in complex characterisations of the social identity of these audiences which emphasise their heterogeneous nature and which take into account numerous markers of their social identity which include the race, class, gender, ethnic, religious and political affiliation of the audience members.⁷

Another major methodological challenge regarding radio is the difficulty of establishing radio audiences’ thoughts and feelings about the programmes which are broadcast to them. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the nature of radio as a medium does not enable broadcasters of radio programmes to physically see their audiences and observe

² Ibid., p.202.

³ Ibid., p. 202.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., p.203.

their reactions to radio programmes. Correspondence from radio listeners and listenership surveys are among the main methods which radio broadcasters have relied on to try and establish what radio audiences think about the programmes which they broadcast to them. The major limitation of using correspondence from radio listeners to establish what they think about the radio programmes broadcast to them has been pointed out by Crisell. He notes that such correspondence "is an atypical reflection of audience attitudes because correspondents are atypically literate people...Correspondence thus tends to reflect not the audience as a whole, or rather only those more literate members with unusually strong feelings."⁸

Though they provide some useful information about the size and social identity of radio audiences, listenership surveys reveal very little about the listening experiences of these audiences. As Crisell states, "there is no virtue in audience size for its own sake, what matters is the measure of the audience's appreciation...the number of people listening to a programme is a poor guide to their feelings about it."⁹ The fact that a programme enjoys a huge audience does not necessarily mean that it is highly appreciated by that big audience as the latter can be dissatisfied with a programme while a small audience may be highly pleased with a programme.¹⁰ In addition, knowledge of the size and social identity of an audience "is not enough, if only because it gives broadcasters and advertisers no clue as to how such an audience may be retained, or preferably enlarged."¹¹

Apart from these methodological challenges, there is also with specific reference to this study the problem of inadequate source material which can be used to establish how Africans in the Federation reacted to the broadcasts of the African Service of the FBC. The inaccessibility to this researcher of the surviving recordings of FBC programmes makes it difficult to establish how African listeners in the Federation reacted to specific FBC African Service programmes. However, there exists some evidence (namely documents generated by the FBC and the Federal government as well as other non-FBC and non-government sources) that makes it possible to gain a general impression of African attitudes and reactions to FBC African Service radio broadcasts. This chapter mainly draws upon these sources in its discussion of African reactions to FBC African Service broadcasts.

The question of how to reliably gauge the responses of African listeners to its programmes was one which preoccupied the FBC throughout its existence and which highlights some of the difficulties it faced in trying to establish the precise reactions of Africans to its programmes. Three main methods were used by the FBC to try to measure African responses to its African Service programmes. First, the Corporation tried to use listenership

⁸ Ibid., p. 205.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 204-205.

surveys of varying scope and focus. Second, the FBC directly asked African listeners for their opinions on FBC programmes during recording tours conducted by FBC staff in various districts of the Federation.¹² Third, the “Letters to the Editor” column of the FBC radio magazine, *Radio Post* was also an important tool used by the FBC to gauge listener perceptions of its radio programs. This column, which was created in November 1958 and was titled “Your Letters Answered”, was used by the FBC to publish and respond to African listeners’ complaints and compliments on FBC African Service programmes.¹³ Another non-FBC source of information on African views of FBC African Service programmes, which the FBC kept a record of, was Tinos Guvi’s “Radio Review” Column which regularly appeared in the *African Daily News*.

However, all of these listener survey methods had limitations which made it difficult for the FBC to come up with an accurate and reliable picture of the attitudes of African listeners in the Federation to FBC African Service programmes. Listenership surveys, especially those of a comprehensive nature, were expensive to conduct. Financial constraints often prevented the FBC from frequently using them as a method of establishing the responses of Africans to African Service programmes.¹⁴ Most of these listenership surveys were very limited in scope. They were confined mostly to urban African radio audiences and focused largely on trying to establish African listenership numbers of specific FBC programmes for the purposes of marketing advertising time on the Commercial Service of the FBC. Following the establishment of a Commercial Service for Africans in 1961, the FBC Advisory Committee on African Programmes noted that many business firms were not willing to buy advertising time on this Service unless the FBC provided them with specific figures of the size of the African audiences of its African Service programmes.¹⁵ The majority of the FBC surveys, therefore, did not focus on how the actual content of these programmes was received by African listeners.

The results of the listenership and market research surveys conducted by the FBC and other private organisations gave estimates of the number of Africans in the Federation who listened to the FBC African Service. These estimates sometimes provided a breakdown of the total number of African listeners according to each individual territory and according to whether the listeners were resident in rural or urban areas. The general pattern shown by these estimates showed a steady increase in the total number of African listeners of the FBC African Service. They also showed that the majority of these listeners were concentrated in

¹² “Radio Post Goes Visiting”, *Radio Post*, Vol. 4, No.8, August 1959, p. 3; “Alick Nkhata On Tour”, *Radio Post*, Vol. 4, No. 8, August 1959, p. 24.

¹³ “Your Letters Answered”, *Radio Post*, Vol. 3, No. 11, November 1958, p. 7.

¹⁴ NAZ, F161/2040, Record of a Meeting Held in the Chief Secretary’s Office on the 27th September 1960, to Discuss Regionalisation of Broadcasting, p. 2.

¹⁵ NAZ, F128/L72, Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the FBC Advisory Committee on African Programmes Held in Northern House, Salisbury on Tuesday, 16 January, 1962, p. 1.

the urban areas of Southern Rhodesia. A market research survey conducted in 1962 had concluded that there were about 750, 000 African listeners of the FBC African Service in the entire Federation. The FBC had worked on the basis of this figure until another market research survey conducted in early 1963 showed that the total number of adult African listeners of the FBC African Service was “well over one and half million.”¹⁶ Of this total figure, Southern Rhodesia accounted for about 780, 000 listeners. The 1963 market research survey had also shown that in Southern Rhodesia, urban African listeners of the FBC African Service outnumbered rural listeners and male African listeners outnumbered female African listeners by 54% to 46%.¹⁷

While these listenership surveys provided some information about the size and social identity of FBC African Service audiences, they gave little indication about what these African audiences thought about FBC African Service programmes. This limitation made it difficult for the FBC to establish what it needed to do to retain or increase the numbers of African listeners identified through listenership surveys. The two principal methods, namely FBC recording tours and the listener feedback forum of *Radio Post*, which the FBC relied on to try and establish African attitudes to its FBC African Service programmes also had significant inadequacies. FBC recording tours were expensive to embark on and did not reach all districts of the Federation. Many African listeners often complained that FBC recording teams rarely visited their districts or never at all.¹⁸

The listener feedback forum of *Radio Post* was not representative of the views of the majority of FBC African listeners in the Federation. The latter could not read and write and were, therefore, unable to make use of this forum to express their feelings about FBC radio programmes. The *Radio Post* listener feedback forum, therefore, reflected only the views of a selection of literate African listeners of the FBC African Service. The nature of the complaints from African listeners which were published in the *Radio Post* listener feedback forum suggests that they were probably edited to reflect predominantly those complaints which did not focus attention on African listeners’ negative views on Federation and on the legitimacy of the FBC as a public broadcaster. Dominating this listener feedback forum were complaints about issues such as the choice of music played on FBC African Service programmes, the choice of African languages that it chose to broadcast in as well as the poor pronunciation of some FBC African Service announcers who broadcast programmes in these languages.¹⁹

Another limitation on *Radio Post*’s ability to accurately reflect the views of all the classes of African listeners of FBC African Service programmes was its Southern Rhodesia-centric

¹⁶ “Southern Rhodesia has most African Radio Listeners”, *Nhume*, May 1963.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ “Your Letters Answered”, *Radio Post*, Vol. 4, No. 6, June 1959, p. 7.

¹⁹ “That Difficult Sindebele Accent”, *Radio Post*, Vol. 5, No.3, March, 1960, p. 7.

nature. *Radio Post*, which commenced publishing in 1956, had originally started as a “Magazine of Southern Rhodesian African Broadcasting” with its coverage of African broadcasting issues restricted to Southern Rhodesia.²⁰ Following the federalisation of broadcasting in the Federation and the establishment of the FBC, which gave *Radio Post* a significant subsidy to cover its publication costs, it was rebranded as a “Magazine of African Broadcasting”.²¹ Although, it made a conscious effort to widen its appeal by appointing an African sub-editor, introducing a homecraft section for African women and extending its coverage of African broadcasting issues to include Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, it remained largely Southern Rhodesia-centric in its coverage of these issues. It was also considered by some to be too high-brow even for literate African readers and its circulation was mainly restricted to urban Africans.²²

Despite these limitations in the methods used by the FBC to gauge African reactions to its African Service programmes, it concluded that these reactions were generally favourable.²³ Some contemporaneous observers, such as A.S. Healing also believed that African radio audiences in the Federation had a very positive view of the FBC and of its programmes for Africans. Healing argued that despite the great transformation that was taking place in the political environment in Africa in the 1960s, Africans in the Federation continued to trust in the FBC “because of its honesty and objectivity”.²⁴ These claims are, however, not supported by other evidence. This evidence shows that due to its close association with Federation and not only because of its programme content, the FBC had very poor communicator credibility among Africans. As will be shown in the following section of this chapter, the FBC attracted largely negative and sometimes violent reactions from the majority of African listeners in the Federation.

“A Biased Mouthpiece of Federation”: African Perceptions of and Reactions to FBC Broadcasts

The hostile reactions of the majority of Africans in the Federation to FBC broadcasts need to be understood within the broader context of the crisis of poor community credibility among Africans faced by the FBC and the Federal Information Services. The main reasons for the poor African perceptions of the communicator credibility of the Federal government and its information services and some of the ways in which this poor communicator credibility was

²⁰ “Prime Minister’s Hope Realised Quickly”, *Radio Post*, Vol.1, No.2, July 1956, p .3.

²¹ *Radio Post*, Vol. 2, No.8, August 1957.

²² NAZ, F161/2040, Record of the First Meeting of the FBC Advisory Committee on African Programmes, Held at Travlos House on Wednesday, 1st July, 1959, p. 2.

²³ “What Do Our Listeners Like?”, *Radio Post*, Vol. 4, No. 9, September 1959.

²⁴ A. S. Healing, “Africans at the Microphone: The African Service of the FBC”, *Africa Calls*, 12, March-April, 1962, p. 9.

manifested have already been highlighted in chapter five of this thesis. These reasons revolved around strong and widespread African opposition to the establishment and continued existence of Federation. African nationalist leaders exploited this long-standing African opposition to Federation to undermine Federal government efforts to legitimise Federation through pro-Federation radio propaganda for Africans broadcast by the FBC.

As noted by Mhoze Chikowero, one of the most significant causes of the FBC's poor credibility among Africans was its close "identification ...with the hated Federation"²⁵ and its exclusion from its broadcasts of the voices of African opinion makers "who could not be co-opted easily to serve the state."²⁶ FBC African Service broadcasts were dominated by the voices of pro-Federation Africans such as Jasper Savanhu whose pro-Federation propaganda activities were rendered largely ineffective by the ability of African nationalist leaders to portray African supporters of Federation as "stooges" of the Federal government.²⁷

The Northern Rhodesia government, which prior to the establishment of Federation had been responsible for broadcasting to Africans strongly believed that before the FBC took over broadcasting in the Federation in 1958, radio "was, of all the means of mass communication among Africans, the only one that was implicitly trusted."²⁸ However, following the federalisation of all broadcasting under the FBC, Africans for the reasons already referred to in the paragraph above quickly came to view the FBC as primarily a propaganda mouthpiece of the Federal government.²⁹

An additional reason, which the Northern Rhodesia government put forward as having significantly contributed to this development was the adoption of the name "Federal Broadcasting Corporation" as the name of the Corporation. This name, which was repeated frequently in daily FBC African Service broadcasts as a way of identifying the Service to listeners had the effect of associating the FBC with Federation, which was extremely unpopular with the overwhelming majority of Africans. The Northern Rhodesia government's recommendation that the Corporation attempt to restore its credibility in African eyes by, among other measures, changing its name to the "Central African Broadcasting Corporation" was rejected by the Federal government on the grounds that the name "Federal Broadcasting Corporation" which had been personally chosen by Sir Roy

²⁵ M. Chikowero, "Is Propaganda Modernity? Press and Radio for "Africans" in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi during World War II and its Aftermath", in P.J. Bloom et al. (eds), *Modernization as Spectacle in Africa*, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2014, p. 131.

²⁶ M. Chikowero, "'Broadcasting to Africans': Constructing Subjects, Contesting Colonial Radio in Colonial Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi, 1939-1963", Paper Presented to the African Studies Association Conference, San Francisco, 2010, p.16.

²⁷ NAZ, F161/2040, Letter from M.O. Wray, Chief Secretary to the Northern Rhodesia government to H.A. Thom, Member of FBC Board of Governors, 17th August 1960.

²⁸ NAZ, F161/2040, Letter from M.O. Wray, Chief Secretary to the Northern Rhodesia government to H.A. Thom, Member of FBC Board of Governors, 17th August 1960.

²⁹ Ibid.

Welensky, the Federal Prime Minister, was established in the Broadcasting Act (1957) and it was too late to change it.³⁰

The Southern Rhodesia-centric nature of the FBC's news and other programmes also served to undermine its importance to African listeners in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. These listeners were angered by what they believed was the FBC's bias in favour reporting news and events in Southern Rhodesia at the expense of what was taking place in their own territories.³¹ African listeners in Nyasaland felt that the Southern Rhodesia-centric nature of the FBC's coverage of news events in the Federation meant that the news which was broadcast to them through the African Service of the FBC was often outdated and biased. This sentiment was conveyed in a letter from an African listener in Nyasaland celebrating the establishment of Radio Malawi and complaining about the manner in which the FBC, which he described as the "Fabricitious Broadcasting Corporation", had covered events in that territory. The listener stated that:

What was heard from Blantyre was nothing less than a monotonous nonsense of the news broadcast in English some days past. Even events happening in Malawi had first to go to Salisbury for exaggeration and "seasoning" thereby causing unnecessary delay and sometimes distortion of the truth.³²

It's also important to note that persistent African and to a lesser degree European complaints about the FBC's Southern Rhodesia-centric coverage of events in the Federation was an important factor in bringing about a limited change in the structure of the broadcasting service that it provided. The complaints had by 1960 resulted in the Corporation facing growing pressure from the two Northern Territorial governments to agree to "a greater degree of regionalisation of broadcasting" in the Federation in order to create "more room for a reflection of regional events" in its programmes.³³

Widespread African perceptions that the FBC was not a trustworthy source of news on events in the Federation and elsewhere were further solidified by an important change that the FBC made to its news programmes in 1958. This was the introduction of an FBC News Service and the subsequent primacy given to FBC news bulletins in FBC African Service programmes. By 1960, the FBC claimed that FBC news bulletins "enjoyed a very big audience" in the Federation and its news service had "built up an enviable reputation for

³⁰ NAZ, F161/2040, Record of a Meeting Held in the [Northern Rhodesia Government] Chief Secretary's Office on the 27th September, 1960, to Discuss the Regionalisation of Broadcasting, p. 2.

³¹ NAZ, F128/L15, Opinion in African Newspapers for the Period 8th-12th August 1960.

³² "Bravo! 'Voice of Malawi' on the Air", Letter to the Editor by Student from Limbe, Nyasaland, *Malawi News*, 30 August, 1963.

³³ NAZ, F161/2040, Untitled note from the Clerk to the FBC Board of Governors, 26 September, 1960.

the liveliness, accuracy and impartiality of its bulletins.”³⁴ In August 1960, the FBC moved the broadcasting of its own 15 minute FBC News bulletin to the prime time listening hour of 8 pm and rescheduled the relay of the BBC news bulletin which until then had occupied this prime time slot to 6 pm.³⁵ This change, which also, affected the European Service of the FBC angered especially African listeners most of whom found BBC news bulletins more trustworthy than those of the FBC.³⁶ It gave rise to allegations from African listeners that “whites in Rhodesia were becoming afraid of the truth” as the FBC was apparently censoring any news it considered contrary to the interests of the Federal and Territorial governments.³⁷

In addition to the problem of the perceived biases of its news and other broadcasts, the FBC was also accused of failing to promote the multiracialism that Federation claimed to stand for. The FBC was accused of doing this by racially classifying its two major Services into a European Service and an African Service with the latter service being, in the view of some African listeners, treated in an inferior manner.³⁸

African nationalist politicians were aware of the crisis of communicator credibility faced by the FBC and adopted propaganda methods aimed at further undermining the FBC’s credibility among Africans. These were part of the broader multiple strategies used by Africans to resist the Federal government’s pro-Federation propaganda. They centred on deliberately cultivating African perceptions of the FBC as the legitimising instrument of the Federal concept and state, which Africans had overwhelmingly rejected and which had been imposed upon them by the European minority in the Federation.

The most concerted effort to undermine the communicator credibility of the FBC came from Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the leader of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) which had long adopted a policy of delegitimising all institutions and services associated with Federation by boycotting them, attacking them and continually criticising them. Dr. Banda and other MCP leaders constantly denounced the FBC as a white settler radio service whose main purpose was to legitimise Federation and to discredit all those who were opposed to it.³⁹

Banda also constantly undermined the FBC’s claims of being an impartial and independent national broadcaster that served the interests of all the inhabitants of the Federation by

³⁴ NAZ, F121/H1/21, Aide-Memoire for the Federal Minister of Home Affairs on “FBC News Sources”, 27 July 1960.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ “Where is the FBC leading us to?” by Chilufya, *Leader*, 16, February, 1962.

³⁷ NAZ, F128/L15, Opinion in African Newspapers for the Period 8th-12th August 1960.

³⁸ Tinos Guvi, “Stop Calling it African Service”, *African Daily News*, 24 November, 1962.

³⁹ NAZ, F236/CX27/16, Letter on “Broadcasting: Nyasaland” from S.F. Brice, Secretary, Office of the Federal Prime Minister and External Affairs to A. D. Evans, Secretary for Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, 24th October, 1962.

repeatedly referring to it as “Welensky’s broadcasting system.”⁴⁰ Sir Roy Welensky, as already noted in chapter five of thesis, was highly resented by most Africans in the Federation because they viewed him as the public face and symbol of the Federal concept and state to which they were strongly opposed.

All MCP leaders also went out of their way to publicly distance themselves from any participation in FBC broadcasts and any use of the Blantyre studios of the FBC.⁴¹ The MCP also banned the FBC from attending and recording its press conferences.⁴² They accused it of deliberately misreporting their activities and fabricating stories against them in an effort to discredit them and cast doubt on the ability of Africans to rule themselves. MCP leaders also accused the FBC of seeking to “brainwash” Africans into accepting Federation by broadcasting “vile and vicious propaganda” aimed at dividing and ruling them.⁴³

In Northern Rhodesia, African nationalist politicians constantly denounced the FBC as not only the “instrument of Federation”, but also as a tool which was used to advance the party political interests of the United Federal Party. They also frequently claimed that the Federal government was through the FBC using radio as a medium to complement the pro-Federation propaganda effort of the Federal Information Services and Voice and Vision.⁴⁴

Deliberate non-payment of radio licence fees was one notable way in which Africans expressed their opposition to FBC radio broadcasts. Some media scholars have strongly defended the levying of radio and television licence fees by public service broadcasters such as the British Broadcasting Corporation. The main reason they have put forward in support their position is that “the licence fee...constitutes a central element of public service broadcasting, intended to guarantee the independence of broadcasters from economic (corporate/commercial) and political (especially government) interests and influences.”⁴⁵

Other scholars have, however, argued against the levying of radio and television licence fees by public service broadcasters for numerous reasons, chief among them that “it implies some degree of political control as the fee is set by the government.”⁴⁶ It also “makes it impossible to assess consumer satisfaction with the service” provided as consumers are obliged to pay the licence fee even if they are unhappy about the quality of service provided by the public service broadcaster.⁴⁷

⁴⁰ “Banda Opens Radio Malawi”, *African Daily News*, 2 September, 1963.

⁴¹ “Minister Denies Report”, *Malawi News*, 30 November, 1962.

⁴² NAZ, F198/4, FBC Director-General’s Meeting with Controllers, 29 May, 1962, 9. a.m., p.2.

⁴³ “The Nation Welcomes Radio Malawi”, *Malawi News*, 30 August, 1963.

⁴⁴ Northern Rhodesia Hansard No.109: Official Verbatim reports of the Debates of the First Session of the Twelfth Legislative Council, 22 November, 1963, pp. 382-383.

⁴⁵ B. Franklin et al, *Key Concepts in Journalism Studies*, London, Sage Publications, 2005, p.131.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

These considerations are relevant to the FBC whose administrative structure was closely modelled upon that of the BBC. The funding arrangements for the FBC were that it was to be subsidised by the Federal government until it managed to generate sufficient income to fund its operations on its own.⁴⁸ From the time that it commenced broadcasting in 1958 until it was disbanded in 1963, the FBC, therefore, prioritised the generation of its own income as a way of reducing and eventually ending its financial dependence on the Federal government. It saw this as being crucial to buttressing its claims of being free from government influence and control.⁴⁹

Levy and collecting radio licence fees from both European and African radio owners in the Federation was one of two main methods used by the FBC to try and fund its operations without relying on the Federal government.⁵⁰ The other was the establishment of two separate commercial radio services, one for the FBC European Service in 1960 and the other for the African Service in 1961. Both sought to raise revenue for the FBC by selling advertising time or “spots” to business companies which wanted to advertise their goods and services.⁵¹

Cognisant of the economic poverty of most Africans in the Federation, the FBC in 1958 came up with two different radio licence fee charges. Radio owners who earned less than £300 a year (of which Africans were the vast majority) were required to pay a radio licence fee of 10 shillings per annum. Those who earned more than £300 had to pay an annual radio licence fee of £2. The FBC believed that the radio licence fee of 10 shillings would not be an economic burden on African radio owners and would be a welcome relief to Southern Rhodesian Africans who prior to the establishment of the FBC had to pay an annual radio licence fee of £1.⁵²

Despite this, the FBC’s efforts to generate its own income through radio licence fees were unsuccessful as the vast majority of Africans, especially in the northern territories, refused to pay radio licence fees to the FBC because they believed it existed to legitimise Federation. In addition, Africans in the northern territories justified their refusal to pay FBC radio licence fees on the grounds that the fees were unjustifiably high in light of the limited coverage given to events in their areas in FBC radio broadcasts. Another reason why African resistance to payment of FBC radio licences was more pronounced in northern territories

⁴⁸ NAZ, *F198/5*, Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the FBC Finance Committee Held in Travlos House on Thursday, 19th June, 1958, p.1.

⁴⁹ “The FBC Balance Sheet”, *Radio Post*, Vol.4, No. 6, June 1959, p.1.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² “Radio Licence for Low Income Group”, *African Daily News*, 9 May, 1958.

was that prior to the establishment of the FBC, Africans in these territories had not been required to pay radio licence fees.⁵³

Africans also objected to the payment of FBC radio licence fees on economic grounds. In 1959, an African MP in the Federal Parliament complained about “the heavy burden of wireless taxation on the African” prompting suggestions by Federal government officials that the matter of taxation in the Federation be explained to Africans in its propaganda question and answer booklets.⁵⁴

The FBC sought to counter the non-payment of radio licence fees by Africans through a combination of legal action, the threat of legal action and gentle persuasion. FBC licence inspectors were appointed to track down radio licence defaulters in well publicised campaigns with intimidating names such as “operation dragnet”.⁵⁵ In what amounted to propaganda aimed at deterring Africans from resisting payment of radio licence fees, the FBC also publicised what it deliberately portrayed as the “terrific results” it was obtaining in “the war on unlicensed radios.”⁵⁶

Efforts by the FBC to gently persuade African radio owners to pay their radio licence fees centred on explaining to them why it was necessary to pay these fees and how they would benefit from the payment of such fees. In an article on its financial status published in the June 1959 issue of *Radio Post*, the FBC explained to African radio owners why it was vital for them to pay their radio licence fees. It argued that broadcasting required very expensive equipment such as transmitters each of which cost at least £10,000 or more. Large sums of money were also needed to pay the technical staff needed to operate this equipment. The FBC emphasised that “the better the equipment the better the reception will be.”⁵⁷ It also stressed that payment of radio licence fees by Africans would enable it to be financially self-supporting and to greatly improve the quality of the programmes that it broadcast to its African listeners.⁵⁸

Despite the FBC’s efforts, the numbers of licence defaulters among Africans continued to be high. The introduction of commercial radio for the African Service of the FBC also failed to generate any significant revenue for the FBC as only a small number of advertisers purchased advertising spots on the commercial radio service for Africans. About a year after the introduction of commercial radio into the FBC African Service, it was realising a gross

⁵³ “Radio Licence Fee Increased to £2 Per Year”, *African Daily News*, 9 May, 1958.

⁵⁴ NAZ, F121/H3/10, Vol.1, D.H. Towsey, Office of the Federal Prime Minister and External Affairs to R.B. Napier, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs, 30 June, 1959.

⁵⁵ “Hunt is on for North’s Licence-Dodgers”, *Northern News*, 6 June, 1961; NAZ, F198/5, Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Finance Committee Held in Travlos House, on Friday 27th February, 1959, p. 2; “Punish Radio Licence Offenders”, *Radio Post*, Vol. 4, No. 12, December, 1959, p. 7.

⁵⁶ “Midlands Radio Licences War Gets Good Results”, *The Chronicle*, 20 September, 1963.

⁵⁷ “The FBC Balance Sheet”, *Radio Post*, Vol.4, No. 6, June 1959.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

monthly income of £27, 000 in advertising revenue from commercial radio. However, this represented only about 30% of the potential sales from advertising on this Service.⁵⁹ By 1963, the FBC seems to have given up making any serious effort to prosecute African radio licence fees defaulters, especially in the Northern the territories. This development was partly a result of the anticipated breakup of the Federation and the expected restoration of the responsibility for broadcasting to the Territorial governments.

African disapproval of and resistance to the FBC and its broadcasts was sometimes expressed in aggressive ways which involved attacks on FBC vehicles and personnel. These attacks seem to have been most pronounced in Nyasaland and were part of the militant African nationalist protests against Federation that occurred during and after the Nyasaland Emergency. In June 1960, FBC African Service staff members in Nyasaland were temporarily forced to restrict their daily tours to Blantyre because of attacks on FBC vehicles by African nationalist supporters in numerous parts of Nyasaland.⁶⁰ Continued attacks on FBC vehicles resulted in the FBC Board of Governors making the decision in March 1961 that “the FBC markings on the Corporation’s touring vehicles should be removable when local political conditions made this advisable.”⁶¹ Members of the RIAC for the Southern Province in Nyasaland also noted the open hostility of African nationalist supporters in that province to any FCB radio broadcasts which they believed contained “anti-Malawi material.”⁶²

In Southern Rhodesia, FBC infrastructure was also attacked in African nationalist-led anti-government protests that occurred in that territory in 1962. In September of that year suspected African nationalist saboteurs “cut the telephone and Federal Broadcasting lines between Gwelo and Salisbury” in what one newspaper in the Federation described as “the most drastic development so far in the wave of sabotage, arson and civil disturbance now sweeping Southern Rhodesia.”⁶³ This act of sabotage forced the FBC transmission from Salisbury to Gwelo to go off the air for several hours before repairs were carried out to restore transmission.⁶⁴ It also forced the FBC to take measures to secure the safety of its installations and personnel.

Similar acts of hostility were also directed at the FBC personnel and property by Africans in Northern Rhodesia. Mhoze Chikowero, among other writers, has highlighted how African

⁵⁹ NAZ, *F161/2040*, Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Advisory Committee on African Programmes Held in Northern House, Salisbury, on Tuesday, 16 January, 1962, at 10:15 a.m., p.3., item 26.

⁶⁰ NAZ, *F198/8, Vol. 2*, Minutes of the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors, Held at Victoria Hotel, Bulawayo, at 9:35 a.m. on 21st June and on Adjournment at 11:50 a.m. on Wednesday 22nd June, 1960, p. 4.

⁶¹ NAZ, *F198/8, Vol.2*, Minutes of the Thirty-Fifth Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors, Held at Northern House on 27 March, 1961 at 9:15 a.m., p. 3.

⁶² NAZ, *F121/H202/2*, Record of Meeting of the Southern Province (Nyasaland) Regional Information Committee Held the Publicity Bureau Offices at Blantyre at 4:15 p.m. on Monday February, February 6th, 1961.

⁶³ “Saboteurs Cut Broadcasting Lines at Gwelo”, *Evening Standard*, 13 September, 1962.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

FBC announcers who worked at its Lusaka station received letters from some African listeners which threatened them with death and arson on account of the perceived support they were giving to Federation in their capacity as FBC announcers. These African listeners accused the FBC announcers of being “*banyama* (vampire-men) for wishing them “death” (preaching the hated Federation).”⁶⁵ Africans who viewed the FBC as the Propaganda mouthpiece of the Federal government also destroyed FBC recording equipment during recording tours by FBC staff in the rural areas of Northern Rhodesia.⁶⁶

The uses that African nationalist leaders and their supporters made of propaganda also constituted another significant means through which they expressed their disapproval of and resistance to FBC radio broadcasts in support of Federation. In this respect, it was again Dr. Banda’s MCP which showed the way to the other major African nationalist parties in the Federation. The MCP took the lead in helping the African nationalist parties in the Federation find an alternative to the FBC by securing the use of the facilities of the Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation (TBC) for MCP election campaign and other broadcasts.

In June 1961, the MCP rejected the FBC’s offer of air time to make election campaign broadcasts during Nyasaland’s election campaign. It chose instead to make all its election campaign broadcasts through the TBC. In rejecting the FBC’s offer, Mr. D. Chisiza, the Secretary-General of the MCP, denounced the FBC as Sir Roy Welensky’s “propaganda machine” and emphasised that the decision taken by the MCP’s was “a demonstration of [the MCP’s] total rejection, not only of the Federation, but of its instrument.”⁶⁷

In Northern Rhodesia, Nationalist Party leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda, the leader of the united Independence Party (UNIP) though also critical of the FBC’s exclusion of the voices of African nationalist politicians from its broadcasts, adopted a policy of selective engagement with the FBC. UNIP made use of the facilities of the Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation and when offered the opportunity to do so, also those of the FBC to broadcast its election campaign propaganda during the Northern Rhodesia General Elections in 1962. The major African nationalist parties in Southern Rhodesia did not contest any General Elections during the Federal period and were, therefore, never offered air time to make political broadcasts on the FBC. However, the leaders of these parties, such as Joshua Nkomo, the President of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, the President of the Zimbabwe African national Union (ZANU), also used the TBC to broadcast political speeches to Africans in Southern Rhodesia.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ M. Chikowero, “Guerrilla Radio: Statecrafting Zimbabwe”, *NEWSA*, October 2011, p. 1.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁶⁷ “Malawi Rejects Offer of Air Time by FBC”, *Rhodesia Herald*, 24 June, 1961.

⁶⁸ “The New Bill”, *African Daily News*, 11 March, 1963.

The FBC's decision to offer broadcast time to African nationalist parties in the Federation to enable them to make election campaign broadcasts must be understood in the broader context of the FBC and the Federal government's efforts to counter external anti-Federation radio broadcasts targeted at Africans in the Federation. The Federal and Territorial governments' reactions to these external radio broadcasts reflected their panic and fear over how the Pan-Africanist anti-colonial freedom movement that was sweeping through the African continent was encouraging more intense opposition to Federation and white rule among Africans in the Federation.

The problem of hostile external radio broadcasts from countries such as the Soviet Union, Egypt, Ghana and later Tanganyika which were sympathetic to the demands for self-rule of African nationalists in the Federation rose to prominence during the Nyasaland Emergency of 1959. Both the Federal government and the FBC strongly felt that the Emergency had shown that FBC radio broadcasts to Africans in the Federation could not effectively compete with the external anti-Federation radio propaganda that was being broadcast to Africans in the Federation. Africans in Nyasaland were viewed as being particularly vulnerable to being "misled" by these external broadcasts, as the coverage of Federal broadcasts to these Africans was limited by the fact that Nyasaland did not have a transmitter.⁶⁹ The lack of a radio station in Nyasaland had forced the Nyasaland government to rely on what came to be referred to as the Nyasaland "Blue Band Radio" to broadcast announcements to Africans during the Emergency. However, this "Blue Band Radio" was merely a police station transmitter whose range did not extend beyond Zomba, the administrative capital of Nyasaland.⁷⁰

The FBC with the support of the Federal government initially took two main measures to try and counter external anti-Federation radio broadcasts to Africans in the Federation. First, it sought to strengthen the coverage of FBC broadcasts to Africans in the Federation by installing transmitters in Nyasaland and in Southern Rhodesia. It also considered urgently purchasing transmitters with a signal strength that would be stronger than that of the anti-Federation broadcasts beamed at Africans in the Federation from countries such as Russia, Egypt and Ghana. In May 1959, the Director-General of the FBC, James McClurg, had stated that "ensuring African listeners throughout the Federation receive a better [radio] signal than can be radiated to them from abroad [was the] present absolute priority" of the FBC.⁷¹

⁶⁹ NAZ, F161/SA/01/31, Confidential Memorandum on "Proposed H.F. Coverage of the Federation in the English, African and Commercial Services", by J.M. Reeves, Chief Engineer, FBC, 6th June 1959, p. 4.

⁷⁰ NAZ, F121/H1/20, Extract of an article by Colin Reed entitled, "Information Must be Spread in Nyasaland: Lack of Communication Helps Mischief-Makers", *Daily Telegraph and Morning Post*, Monday, 10th August, 1959.

⁷¹ NAZ, F161/SA/01/31, Outward Telegram from J.M. McClurg, FBC Director-General to Dr. D.A. Shinn, 8 May, 1959.

However, the FBC, did not follow through with this plan after its Chief Engineer, J.M. Reeves advised that since even the most powerful transmitter could not guarantee that the FBC signal would “be better at all times and all places” than any external signal used to broadcast anti-Federation propaganda into the Federation, the most effective way of dealing with “hostile broadcasts from abroad” was to ensure that African listeners in the Federation were able to receive a regular and reliable signal from the FBC.⁷² The FBC Chief engineer also later told the FBC Director-General that in his opinion, the problem of Africans listening to external anti-Federation broadcasts was not “a technical problem of shortwave coverage” but of the programme content of FBC broadcasts to Africans. Reeves argued that Africans’ loss of interest in listening to FBC programmes was not due to the fact that the FBC radio signal was weaker than that of external radio broadcasts, but because Africans in the Federation found the programmes of these external broadcasters more attractive than those of the FBC.⁷³

The Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation’s decision to allow the MCP to use its facilities to broadcast its election campaign propaganda for the Nyasaland General Elections of 1961 elicited immediate protests from both the Federal government and the FBC. These protests, however, failed to get the TBC to change course.⁷⁴ Thereafter, the FBC with the support of the Federal government began progressively sanctioning the TBC for allowing first, the MCP in 1961 and later Kenneth Kaunda’s UNIP in 1962 to use TBC facilities to make political broadcasts before and after the General Elections that they were contesting in their respective territories. The FBC withdrew the use of facilities which it had previously availed to the TBC in the Federation. It also ceased extending any support to TBC personnel who visited the Federation to seek the FBC’s advice on how to develop their own broadcasting facilities.⁷⁵

The MCP was able to make maximum propaganda use of the TBC’s decision to allow it and other African nationalist parties in the Federation to use TBC facilities to make political broadcasts to their African supporters in the Federation. Following its victory in the Nyasaland General Elections of 1961, the MCP became the ruling party in the Nyasaland government and continued to boycott the FBC and instead use the TBC to publicise its policies and development plans to Africans in Nyasaland.⁷⁶ The MCP used its success in gaining broadcast time on the TBC to continue casting doubt on the legitimacy and

⁷² NAZ, F161/SA/01/31, Draft Letter[author and recipient unclear], 30 June, 1959.

⁷³ NAZ, F161/SA/01/31, Memorandum from J.M. Reeves, Chief Engineer, FBC to Director-General, FBC, 26 May, 1961.

⁷⁴ NAZ, F198/8, Vol. 2, Minutes of the Thirty-Ninth Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors, Held at the Northern House, Salisbury, on Monday 24th July, 1961, at 9:15 a.m., p. 1.

⁷⁵ NAZ, F198/4, FBC Director-General’s Meeting with Controllers: 19 July 1962:9 a.m., p. 2; “FBC Hits Back”, *Chronicle*, 31 August, 1962; “Tanganyika Radio Loses Use of FBC Facilities”, *Rhodesia Herald*, 31 August, 1962.

⁷⁶ “Nyasaland Ministers Use Radio as Policy Platform”, *Rhodesia Herald*, 24 April, 1963; “First Broadcast by Prime Minister of Nyasaland”, *Government Information Bulletin*, No. 9, 4th March, 1963, p. 2.

impartiality of the FBC as a public broadcaster and to promote the use of TBC facilities by other African nationalist parties in the Federation. All these measures were intended to challenge the FBC's monopoly on broadcasting in the Federation and its policy of excluding the voices of African nationalist leaders from FBC political broadcasts.⁷⁷

The FBC found itself having to take measures to dispel the MCP's allegations that it was a biased broadcaster that publicised only the views of those sympathetic to Federation. To this end, the Acting Director-General of the FBC had written to the editor of the *Malawi News*, the party newspaper of the MCP, denying "libellous" claims that the FBC was not an independent and impartial broadcaster that had been made in an article published in the *Malawi News*.⁷⁸ Moreover, the FBC decided that its plan to allow all three major political parties contesting the Nyasaland general election to make election campaign broadcasts on the FBC should proceed with or without the participation of the MCP. However, the Corporation also decided that the door to any possible participation by the MCP was to be left open as long as possible.⁷⁹

The more accommodative stance taken by the FBC was largely motivated by its desire to discourage African nationalist parties in the Federation from making use of the broadcasting facilities of countries considered hostile to the Federation. After UNIP followed the MCP's lead by making use of TBC facilities in the Northern Rhodesia General Elections of 1962, the FBC initially took an important decision, which it later reversed. It decided to make its offer of election campaign broadcast time to African nationalist parties in the Federation conditional upon these parties ending their use of TBC facilities or any other broadcasting facilities outside the Federation.⁸⁰ The FBC even considered taking legal action against UNIP to prevent it from using TBC facilities during the General Elections in Northern Rhodesia, but decided against doing so after being advised that there was no adequate legal basis for such action.⁸¹ Ultimately, UNIP was able to make use of both the facilities of the FBC and the TBC to broadcast its election campaign propaganda.

The FBC was also forced to react to TBC political broadcasts in other ways. It monitored the TBC's broadcasts to the Federation of the MCP's election campaign programmes and

⁷⁷ NAZ, *F198/8*, Vol. 2, Minutes of the Thirty-Ninth Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors, Held at the Northern House, Salisbury, on Monday 24th July, 1961, at 9:15 a.m., p. 1.

⁷⁸ NAZ, *F198/8*, Vol. 2, Minutes of the Thirty-Ninth Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors, Monday 24th July, 1961, p. 1.

⁷⁹ NAZ, *F198/8*, Vol. 2, Minutes of the Thirty-Seventh Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors Held at Northern House, Salisbury on 29 May, 1961 at 9:15 a.m., p. 2; *F198/8*, Vol. 2, Minutes of the Thirty-Ninth Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors, Held at the Northern House, Salisbury, on Monday 24th July, 1961, at 9:15 a.m., p. 2.

⁸⁰ NAZ, *F198/8*, Vol. 2, Minutes of the Forty-Ninth Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors, Held at the Northern House, Salisbury, on Tuesday 26 June, 1962, at 9:15 a.m., p.2; *F198/8*, Vol. 2, Minutes of the Fifty-First Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors, Held at the Northern House, Salisbury, on Tuesday 22 August, 1962, at 9:15 a.m., p. 2.

⁸¹ NAZ, *F198/4*, FBC Director-General's Meeting with Controllers: 8 May 1962: 9 a.m., p. 1.

concluded that “both the reception and the content of these transmissions were of poor quality.”⁸² Press reports from some newspapers in the Federation echoed this view, claiming that “Tanganyika’s ‘air invasion’ of political broadcasts to Central Africa [had] not had much effect” as only a small number of Africans in the Federation were able to tune into TBC broadcasts because of poor reception of these broadcasts.⁸³

However poor the reception of these TBC broadcasts may have been in the Federation, it is clear that, contrary to the claims of some newspapers in the Federation, the broadcasts quickly attracted a devoted and considerable listening audience among Africans in the Federation. This “wide field of listeners” included “thousands of radio owners in Salisbury’s African townships.”⁸⁴ In Southern Rhodesia, groups of Africans gathered together at shopping centres in their townships in order to collectively listen to TBC broadcasts. Other Africans who also didn’t own radio sets went to their neighbours’ homes in order to update themselves on the latest political developments in Southern Rhodesia and the rest of the Federation by listening to TBC broadcasts.⁸⁵

The TBC therefore seems to have been regarded by most Africans in the Federation as a more trustworthy source of information on the Federation than the FBC. It was successful in getting Africans who did not own radio sets to hear its programmes by engaging in corporate listenership of its broadcasts. With the same intention, the Federal government RIACs had tried and failed to encourage Africans to collectively listen to FBC African Service programmes by, among other measures, suggesting that African chiefs in rural areas be given radios by the Federal government so that they could summon their subjects to their kraals to communally listen to FBC broadcasts.

On the 25th of June 1962, the TBC began broadcasting news bulletins and other programmes with a Pan-Africanist perspective in English, Shona and Chinyanja which were directed at Africans in the Federation. These broadcasts which took place daily from 9 p.m. to 9:45 p.m. were strongly and publicly supported by African nationalist parties in the Federation.⁸⁶ The FBC also monitored these broadcasts. Its preliminary assessment of the broadcasts, given about a month after the broadcasts commenced was that “up to the present nothing inflammatory or even of a strongly propagandist nature had been broadcast.”⁸⁷ However, the FBC remained concerned about the possible negative long-term effects of these

⁸² NAZ, *F198/8, Vol. 2*, Minutes of the Fortieth Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors, Held at the Northern House, Salisbury, on Friday 25 August, 1961, at 9:15 a.m., p. 1.

⁸³ “Broadcast Offensive is Hardly Heard”, *Central African Post*, 20 July, 1962.

⁸⁴ “Tanganyika Broadcasts: Police Alert”, *Rhodesia Herald*, 14 June, 1963.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ “Malawi Party Hails Dar Radio Plan”, *African Daily News*, 23 June 1962; “Tanganyika to Start Anti-Federation Broadcasts”, *Northern News*, 26 June, 1962.

⁸⁷ NAZ, *F198/8, Vol. 2*, Minutes of the Fiftieth Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors, Held at the Northern House, Salisbury, on Tuesday 17 July, 1962, at 9:15 a.m., p. 1.

broadcasts not only on African opinion about Federation, but on African interest in FBC African Service programmes.

The FBC, therefore, decided to provide a counter-attraction for African listeners of TBC broadcasts to the Federation by extending its broadcasting hours from 9 p.m. to 10 p.m. daily from 25 June 1962-the very same day on which the TBC began its series of political broadcasts to the Federation.⁸⁸ As its main counter-attraction to TBC broadcasts, the FBC during this time broadcast competition programmes which were popular with the African listeners of the African Service.⁸⁹ Running competitions in its African Service programmes was one of the methods used by the FBC to encourage higher African listenership of these programmes. In this context, the levels of African listenership of these specific FBC African Service programmes was measured by the number of competition entry letters sent in to the FBC by Africans who listened to these programmes.

However, by November 1962, the Director-General of the FBC was reporting to the FBC Board of Governors that "there had been a disappointing response to the competitions broadcast [on the African Service] between 9 and 10 p.m., and there was reason to believe that this might be due to listening to Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation."⁹⁰ As a result of this development, the FBC had by 1963 concluded that there was an urgent need to introduce a vernacular news bulletin on the FBC African Service between 9 p.m. and 10 p.m. as a way of providing a more effective counter-attraction to TBC broadcasts to African listeners in the Federation. Financial constraints, however, forced the FBC to stick to the broadcast of competition programmes as the most effective and cost-efficient counter-attraction to TBC propaganda broadcasts to Africans in the Federation.⁹¹ The FBC was never able to ascertain the number of Africans in the Federation who listened to TBC broadcasts. However, contemporaneous reports suggest that these broadcasts were popular with many Africans in the Federation.⁹²

The evidence presented above, therefore, shows that African nationalist politicians and parties in the Federation were able to engage with the FBC in ways that compelled the FBC to reconsider and modify its policy to exclude them from FBC political broadcasts.

In his recent landmark study on the role of African music in African struggles for both political and cultural freedom in colonial Zimbabwe, Mhoze Chikowero has brought to the

⁸⁸ NAZ, *F198/8, Vol. 2*, Minutes of the Forty-Ninth Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors, Held at the Northern House, Salisbury, on Tuesday 26 June, 1962, at 9:15 a.m., p. 3.

⁸⁹ NAZ, *F198/8, Vol. 2*, Minutes of the Fifty-Seventh Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors, Held at the Northern House, Salisbury, on Tuesday 30 April, 1963, at 9:15 a.m., p. 3.

⁹⁰ NAZ, *F198/8, Vol. 2*, Minutes of the Fifty-Third Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors, Held at the Northern House, Salisbury, on Monday 26 April November, 1962, at 9:15 a.m., p. 3.

⁹¹ NAZ, *F198/8, Vol. 2*, Minutes of the Fifty-Seventh Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors, Held at the Northern House, Salisbury, on Tuesday 30 April, 1963, at 9:15 a.m., p. 3.

⁹² "Tanganyika Radio Popular", *Central African Mail*, 27 April, 1963.

fore another important aspect of African resistance to pro-Federation radio propaganda. Chikowero has shown how African announcers of the FBC African Service were able to subvert its pro-Federation agenda from within by playing African songs and singing over them in ways that were understood by their African audiences as a veiled expression of sympathy for the African nationalist struggle against Federation and white settler colonial rule.⁹³

This internal resistance to pro-Federation radio propaganda for Africans, however, needs to be located within the broader context of the Federal government's belated and panicked information and propaganda response to intensified African opposition to Federation. This multi-pronged response the main characteristics of which have already been analysed in previous chapters of this study also included an attempt to use African music to mobilise Africans in support of Federation. This attempt to use African music to promote Federation was specifically intended to counter the apparent success of African nationalist movements in using African anti-Federation songs to delegitimise Federation and marshal African opinion against it.

By 1958, the Federal government and its information services had become highly concerned that the singing of anti-Federation songs by African school children especially in Nyasaland was doing much to foster anti-Federation sentiment among Africans in the Federation. They also believed that the African school children were being instigated to sing these songs and to engage in other anti-Federation activities by the African nationalist parties in the Federation. In July 1958 a group of Nyasaland Africans gathered at Chileka airport to welcome Dr. Hastings Banda who was returning to Nyasaland to assume the presidency of the Nyasaland National Congress after being away from Nyasaland for many years. Among them was a choir of school children who were singing anti-Federation songs such as "We Hate Federation", "Take Away Federation", "Dispose of Sir Roy Welensky" and "Dr Banda Must Take His Place".⁹⁴

This incident generated much disquiet among Federal government officials and supporters. On 23 July 1958, L.M. Cullinan, the United Federal Party MP for Umniati constituency, moved a motion in the Federal Parliament strongly criticising the anti-Federation songs sung by African school children as "hate songs" and demanding that the Federal government "ask the government of Nyasaland to take all necessary action to prevent the African National Congress in that territory from 'trying to inculcate in African school children a hatred of the Federation.'" ⁹⁵

⁹³ M. Chikowero, *African Music, Power, and Being in Colonial Zimbabwe*, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2015, pp. 247-248.

⁹⁴ "Motion in Federal House Deplores Congress Activities", *African Daily News*, 24 July, 1958.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

Federal government concerns that African anti-Federation songs were inciting African hatred against Federation were heightened by another incident that transpired in September 1958. In that occurrence, a choir of school girls at a government funded secondary school in Blantyre, Nyasaland were quickly removed from a school concert stage after they had begun to sing an anti-Federation song. Their removal from the concert stage subsequently led to violent protests against the school authorities by their fellow students. This impelled the principal of the school to close the school two weeks before the official commencement of the school holidays.⁹⁶

The Nyasaland school girls' action was strongly criticised by the Federal government and its supporters who blamed the "choral mischief" of the school girls on African nationalist politicians in Nyasaland. An editorial in the *African Daily News* argued that: "the fact...that girls, for that matter-were bold enough to sing a song against the State from a public platform and in front of a presumably large audience" showed that they had been instigated to do so "by seasoned politicians" who wanted to "turn Nyasaland youth into human automatons to help them achieve their ambitions."⁹⁷

In an effort to counter the evident power of African song in harnessing African opinion against Federation, the Federal government's Home Affairs Propaganda Committee decided to hire popular African singers from within and outside the Federation to compose and record pro-Federation songs for African audiences. Dixie Kwanka, a popular African musician, recorded a pro-Federation song entitled "I left my heart in Rhodesia" at the request of and with the financial support of the Federal government.⁹⁸ In 1960, the Federal Home Affairs Propaganda Committee approached Augustine Musarurwa, a popular African singer from Southern Rhodesia, who had composed the hit song "Skokiaan" and asked him to "produce, if possible a 'hit' song bearing a Federal message."⁹⁹

Also approached by the Federal government to compose and record songs praising Federation was the popular African female singer, Dorothy Masuka and the Jairos Jiri choir. The FBC's African Service managed to make a recording of the Jairos Jiri choir singing a Ndebele song in praise of Federation which they had sung at the Bulawayo Trade Fair in 1960.¹⁰⁰ Though the Federal Public Relations Division, as shown in the fifth chapter of this thesis, had earlier managed to exploit Masuka's popularity among Africans to try and enhance the appeal and credibility of its print propaganda for Africans, it was unable to get

⁹⁶ "Harsh but Necessary", *African Daily News*, 26 September, 1958.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ NAZ, F121/H3/3, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs Propaganda Committee: Minutes of the Meeting Held on 21st June, 1961.

⁹⁹ NAZ, F121/H3/3, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs Propaganda Committee: Minutes of the Meeting Held on 21st June, 1961.

¹⁰⁰ NAZ, F121/H3/52, Memorandum on "Pro-Federation Song in Vernacular" from Secretary, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs to Director, Planning and Technical Services, Federal Public Relations Division, 24 July, 1961.

her to record a pro-Federation song. Both Masuka and Musarurwa were concerned that recording pro-Federation songs would affect their popularity among their African fans and also make them the target of intimidation by the African nationalist opponents of Federation.¹⁰¹

A letter sent by a Federal Public Relations Division official to Augustine Musarurwa tried to allay the African singer's fears about African nationalist intimidation by trying to convince him that the Federation had a bright future. Federation, the official claimed, was destined to become very popular among Africans and Musarurwa would benefit from that popularity. Part of the letter stated:

...Now you tell me that you are worried in case action is taken against you for being connected with the [pro-Federation] song. This, I understand, but there is also the point that when Federation is proved successful-as it will be-there will be a lot of people moving with the Federal tide, so any feelings you have about Federation and any threats of intimidation should be viewed in this light.¹⁰²

Ultimately, the Federal government's efforts to use African music to put across pro-Federation propaganda to Africans were largely a failure. The Federal Public Relations Division was compelled to abandon these efforts because of the unwillingness of popular African singers to record songs in support of Federation. Federal government efforts to disseminate pro-Federation songs recorded by Africans also encountered another major problem. The songs, which were played on the FBC African Service and on tape recorders at Federal mobile cinema shows, were not well-received by African listeners. In particular, the poor response by Africans to Dixie Kwanka's pro-Federation song "I left my heart in Rhodesia" forced Federal government propagandists to abandon their efforts to disseminate pro-Federation propaganda to Africans through song as they came to realise that "hit songs could not be made to order".¹⁰³

In addition to all the other factors which have been examined in this chapter, technical factors relating to radio broadcasting also had some influence on the receptiveness of African listeners to FBC African Service programmes. The degree of this influence is, however, not clear. These technical factors included the following: the availability to Africans of affordable wireless radio sets with low cost long-life batteries, the availability of facilities for radio repairs, especially for African wireless radio owners in rural areas and the difficulties of radio reception associated with the availability, power and distribution of

¹⁰¹ NAZ, F121/H3/52, M.C. Newman, Director, Press and Publications Department, Federal Public Relations Division to Mr. Augustine Masarurwa, 12 August, 1960. See also M. Chikowero, *African Music, Power and Being*, p. 148.

¹⁰² NAZ, F121/H3/52, M.C. Newman to Mr. Augustine Masarurwa, 12 August, 1960.

¹⁰³ NAZ, F121/H3/3, Federal Ministry of Home Affairs Propaganda Committee: Minutes of the Meeting Held on 21st June, 1961.

transmitters as well as meteorological factors such as the weather.¹⁰⁴ The FBC believed that these factors had a significant influence on the ability and willingness of African listeners to receive FBC broadcasts. A report compiled by Dr. D.H. Shinn, an acknowledged British expert on radio propagation who was engaged by the Federal government in 1959 to advise on the technical requirements of broadcasting in the Federation, noted that many wireless radio sets owned by Africans in the Federation were not being used because the cost of replacing the batteries for these sets was too high.¹⁰⁵

The poor reception of FBC programmes tended to be restricted to mostly the rural districts of the Federation because of their long distance from available transmitters.¹⁰⁶ In an effort to improve African reception of FBC programmes, a series of articles written by J.M. Reeves, the FBC Chief Engineer, on how listeners could get the best reception of FBC programmes on their wireless radio sets were published in *Radio Post* in 1959.¹⁰⁷ The FBC also published and distributed a pamphlet entitled *Tune in to Better Listening*.¹⁰⁸ It is not clear to what extent these efforts improved the reception of FBC programmes among Africans.

Similarly, the influence of FBC broadcast language policy on African listenership patterns and attitudes to FBC radio broadcasts cannot be clearly established. However, continuous complaints from some African listeners about either the exclusion of their languages from FBC broadcasts or the poor command of their languages shown by some African FBC announcers¹⁰⁹ suggest that some African listeners may have been discouraged from listening to FBC African Service broadcasts because of these problems.

On the basis of the evidence presented so far, it can be argued that the FBC failed to persuade Africans in the Federation to support Federation. As other scholars have noted, the FBC exhibited a “continuing inability to cultivate trust among [African] listeners.”¹¹⁰ It came to be regarded by the majority of Africans as the mouthpiece of an illegitimate political order which they were determined to remove.

Evidence of the ineffectiveness of the FBC in mobilising African opinion in support of the Federation comes not only from the reactions of Africans in the Federation to FBC African Service broadcasts, but from the reactions of some Europeans in the Federation to what

¹⁰⁴ NAZ, F128/L72, Record of First Meeting of the Advisory Committee on African Programmes, Held at Travlos House, on Wednesday, 1st July, 1959, pp. 3-4.

¹⁰⁵ NAZ, F161/SA/01/31, D.H. Shinn, “The Development of Broadcasting and Television in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland”, 1959, p. 16.

¹⁰⁶ NAZ, F128/HAF77, Vol.3, A letter on “Poor Radio Reception in Rural Areas” from W.E. Arnold to the Secretary for Home Affairs, Federal government, 22 February, 1961.

¹⁰⁷ “How to Choose a Wireless Set”, *Radio Post*, Vol. 4, No.2, February 1959, p.17; “How to Install a Wireless Set”, *Radio Post*, Vol. 4, No. 3, March 1959, p. 17.

¹⁰⁸ NAZ, F161/101, FBC Newsletter, No. 9, 12 June, 1962, p. 2.

¹⁰⁹ “That Difficult Sindebele Accent”, *Radio Post*, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 1960, p. 7.

¹¹⁰ J. J. Zaffiro, “Broadcasting and Political Change in Zimbabwe 1931-1984”, p. 55.

they believed was the Federal government's continued failure to use regular "propaganda broadcasts and transmissions" to mobilise African opinion in support of Federation.¹¹¹ This European criticism of the ineffectiveness of Federal government radio propaganda should be viewed in the context of the growing power of African nationalism from the 1950s onwards. The achievement of independence from European colonial rule by Africans in countries such as Ghana, Tanganyika and others from the 1950s onwards increased demands for self-rule by African nationalist movements in African countries, including the Federation that were still under white settler colonial rule.

It contributed significantly to the intensification of African opposition to Federation that occurred during this period and heightened the sense of panic among Europeans in the Federation over the possibility of African nationalist rule in the Federation. The Pan-Africanist stance of the external radio propaganda of the newly independent African countries combined with their readiness to allow African nationalist movements in the Federation to use their broadcasting facilities to make anti-Federation radio broadcasts to Africans in the Federation also added to European anxieties over the future of European rule in the Federation. European panic over the possible collapse of white rule in the Federation as well demands for the Federal government and the FBC to use radio propaganda to more effectively defend Federation and European rule in the Federation was strongest in Southern Rhodesia which had the biggest European population in the Federation.

The white-dominated Federal government RIACs regularly complained that Sir Roy Welensky was underutilising the potential of radio as a propaganda medium and that "FBC programmes were not sufficiently forceful to promote Federation."¹¹² A secret report written for the Southern Rhodesia Government in 1961 to advise it on how to reorganise and expand its information services noted that:

There seems to be hardly any attempt at present to use the African Services of the Federal Broadcasting Corporation as part of a co-ordinated information effort, although it is estimated that 40% of houses in urban locations now have sets.¹¹³

The report noted that although the FBC Charter limited the corporation to reporting "straight factual news", the FBC showed "insufficient understanding of the propaganda

¹¹¹ NAZ, *F121/H201*, Record of a Special Meeting of the Salisbury Information Advisory Committee Held in the Conference Room, Ministry of Home Affairs, at 5 p.m. on Tuesday, 17th July, 1962, p. 3.

¹¹² NAZ, *F121/H202*, Record of Meeting of the Southern Province (Nyasaland) Regional Information Committee Held at the Publicity Bureau Offices at Blantyre at 4:15 p.m. on Monday, February 6th, 1961, p. 2.

¹¹³ Cory, Smith Papers, *S.R.C. (61) 219*, A.D.C. Peterson, "Report on the Southern Rhodesia Information Services", July 1961, p. 10.

effect which [could] be achieved by the selection of good news stories”, intended to gain African support for the policies of the Federal and Territorial governments.¹¹⁴

Prominent Federal and Territorial Parliamentarians strongly criticised the failure of the FBC to convince Africans to support Federation and to counter external anti-Federation propaganda directed at Africans in the Federation. They called on the Federal government to put the FBC under direct Federal government control to enable the government to conduct an aggressive and effective propaganda campaign against the internal and external opponents of the Federation. One of the strong advocates of this position was the Federal MP for Salisbury South Constituency, Mr. H.D. Wightwick, who belonged to the United Federal Party. In a debate on Federal government expenditure held in the Federal parliament in August 1961, Mr. H.D. Wightwick robustly criticised the ineffectiveness of FBC broadcasts in defending the Federation against its enemies at home and abroad. He strongly condemned the Federal government’s “gentlemanly” approach to propaganda as “foolish”, especially in the face of the no-holds barred approach used by African nationalists and other opponents of the Federation in their propaganda campaign against Federation.¹¹⁵

Wightwick argued that the decision not to put broadcasting in the Federation under direct government control had been a mistake and that the Federal government was doomed to lose the propaganda war against the opponents of Federation if it continued to hand-cuff itself by failing to immediately introduce legislation that would empower it to use both radio and television in the Federation as vehicles for government propaganda in support of Federation.¹¹⁶ The Federal government responded to this criticism by stating its opposition to putting broadcasting under government control. However, Wightwick’s criticisms of the ineffectiveness of the FBC and his calls for the Federal government to take over radio and television for propaganda purposes were repeated by other Federal government backbenchers in debates in the Federal Assembly in 1962.¹¹⁷

The belief that FBC radio broadcasts to Africans were a failure was also reflected in moves by the Territorial governments to reclaim control of broadcasting from the FBC through various means which included demands for a greater degree of regionalisation of broadcasting and for Territorial governments to be given much more broadcast time on the FBC to put across government information and propaganda to Africans in their territories.¹¹⁸ Ultimately, the Territorial governments requested that they be allowed to set up their own broadcasting services as the broadcast time allotted to them by the FBC was too inadequate

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Parliamentary Debates: Federal Assembly: Vol. 15, 1961-62, Tuesday 29 August, 1961, pp. 1884-1885.

¹¹⁶ “FBC, RTV Should Play the Official Line says Wightwick”, *Evening Standard*, 31 August, 1961.

¹¹⁷ “Backbenchers attack broadcasting and TV”, *Northern News*, 27 July, 1962; “Radio Propaganda: Sir Roy Opposed by Backbenchers”, *Evening Standard*, 1 August, 1962.

¹¹⁸ NAZ, F161/2040, Letter from J. McClurg, Director-General, FBC to M. O. Wray, Chief Secretary

to meet their information and propaganda requirements, especially in relation to Africans in their territories.

In a speech delivered to the Southern Rhodesia Parliament on 17 July 1962 and in a subsequent meeting with the Chairman of the FBC Board of Governors and the FBC Director-General, the Southern Rhodesia Prime Minister, Sir Edgar Whitehead, "made it clear that he was entirely determined to obtain the use of radio in his "Cold War" against African extremism."¹¹⁹

The Northern Rhodesia government was equally determined to reclaim African broadcasting from the FBC in order to restore its credibility in the eyes of African listeners in that territory. Most of these Africans had come to view the FBC as a biased broadcaster that served as "a valuable propaganda medium for the United Federal Party" which was the party that led the Federal government.¹²⁰

Nyasaland, which prior to Dr Banda's MCP becoming the party in charge of government in 1961 already had a tense relationship with the Federal Information Services, decided in June 1962 to apply to the Federal government for a licence to establish its own commercial broadcasting station. This application was a requirement under Section 27 of the Broadcasting Act (1957).¹²¹ However, the application was turned down by the Federal government which feared that such a broadcasting station would be used by the MCP to disseminate anti-Federation propaganda.¹²²

The dissolution of the Federation in 1963 resulted in the restoration of broadcasting control and functions to the three individual territories that had comprised the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Prior to the dissolution of the Federation, the FBC made recommendations to the Territorial governments, outlining the economic and other advantages of retaining the FBC as a common broadcasting organisation serving all three independent territories after the dissolution of the Federation.¹²³ These recommendations were never seriously considered or accepted by the Territorial governments.¹²⁴ All these governments were eager to recover their broadcasting powers from the FBC whose radio broadcasts they believed had done much to alienate African opinion in their individual territories.

¹¹⁹ NAZ, F198/8, Vol.2, Minutes of the Fifty-First Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors, Held at Northern House, Salisbury, On Tuesday, 22 August 1962, at 9:15 a.m., p.2.

¹²⁰ "Territorial Radio", *Northern News*, 8 April, 1963.

¹²¹ NAZ, F236/CX27/16, Letter from Acting Deputy Chief Secretary, Nyasaland to Secretary, Office of the Federal Prime Minister and External Affairs, 7th June, 1962.

¹²² NAZ, F236/CX27/16, Secret Minute from Postmaster-General, Federal Ministry of Posts to Secretary, Office of the Federal Prime Minister and External Affairs, 20th June, 1962.

¹²³ NAZ, F264/E/138/10e/88, "Federal Broadcasting Corporation", 1963.

¹²⁴ NAZ, F198/8, Vol.2, Minutes of Fifty-Seventh Meeting of the FBC Board of Governors, Held in Northern House, Salisbury, on Tuesday 30 April, 1963 at 9 a.m., p. 2.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the responses of Africans to FBC radio propaganda, emphasising that they were active and not passive audiences of this pro-Federation propaganda. It has shown that among the notable expressions of African agency to FBC African Service radio broadcasts were the numerous ways in which African nationalist movements in the Federation were able to undermine the FBC's communicator credibility and to influence its policy regarding African broadcasting. Africans, the chapter has illustrated, were able to effectively undermine the FBC's concerted efforts to project itself as an independent and impartial broadcaster by continuously depicting it as the Federal government's propaganda mouthpiece. They were also able to counteract the FBC's policy of virtually excluding Africans from making any political broadcasts on the FBC by making use of the broadcasting facilities of newly independent countries such as Tanganyika, which were sympathetic to their cause. African nationalist leaders in the Federation were able to use the Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation (TBC) to make anti-Federation political broadcasts directed at Africans in the Federation.

Also highlighted in the chapter was how African listeners of the FBC were able to take advantage of the choices that radio as a medium offered them by turning to the TBC as an alternative and more reliable source of news and information on the Federation. These external anti-Federation radio broadcasts, the chapter has shown, served to heighten the Federal government's panic over how African nationalist movements and other anti-colonial movements outside the Federation were actively encouraging and assisting the anti-Federation activities of Africans in the Federation.

This panic was shared by the Southern Rhodesia government, which believed that the Federal government's overall propaganda approach was too tame to effectively counter what they increasingly viewed as a total propaganda onslaught against white rule in the Federation. Leading Southern Rhodesian MPs urged the Federal government to adopt a more robust approach to countering 'subversive' propaganda, especially from hostile external radio stations. The Federal government, however, refused to assume direct control of broadcasting in the Federation and instead implemented other measures aimed at discouraging Africans in the Federation from listening to hostile external radio broadcasts. These measures, the chapter has demonstrated, were largely ineffective.

The evidence presented in this chapter has also shown that FBC radio propaganda elicited largely unfavourable reactions from African audiences in the Federation and was not successful in generating African support for Federation. The numerous ways in which Africans expressed their disapproval of and resistance to FBC radio propaganda included refusal to pay FBC radio licences, internal subversion of the FBC's pro-Federation

propaganda, intimidation of FBC announcers and destruction of FBC equipment and infrastructure.

It should also be noted that the FBC's ultimately unsuccessful efforts to mobilise African support for the Federal concept and state had a significant long-term negative consequence on African perceptions of colonial radio. Despite its efforts to project itself as an independent and impartial public broadcaster, the FBC, as demonstrated by this chapter, continued to be closely associated with the "imposed and opposed Federation" by the majority of Africans in the Federation. These Africans developed an enduring perception of radio as a tool of colonial state propaganda. Mhoze Chikowero, among other scholars has observed that it was "the identification of radio with the hated Federation" which heralded the demise of colonial radio. "Federation", Chikowero states, "plunged colonial radio into a crisis from which it could only recover with the independence of Zambia and Malawi in 1964 and Zimbabwe in 1980."¹²⁵

¹²⁵ M. Chikowero, "Is Propaganda Modernity?", p. 131.

CHAPTER 8: THESIS CONCLUSION

This study has examined the propaganda policy and practice of the government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland with particular reference to its pro-Federation print and radio propaganda for Africans in the Federation. It has characterised this propaganda as panic-driven propaganda and highlighted the information policy considerations and the political and economic circumstances that gave rise to it. It has argued that this panic-driven propaganda was fundamentally the product of increasing paranoia on the part of the Federal government, particularly in the face of increasing opposition to the Federation. The roots of this information panic, the study has revealed, lay in the highly contested nature of the Federal concept and state both of which were essentially the outcome of white settler and British colonial government panic over various threats to their political, economic and strategic interests in Central Africa. The information panic was triggered by the Federal government's belated recognition of the potency of African opposition to Federation and its capacity to bring an end to European minority rule in Central Africa by causing the break-up of the Federation.

In its analysis of the evolution of the Federal government's information and propaganda policy for Africans, the study has highlighted the two major phases through which it progressed and the principal characteristics of each of these phases. It has emphasised how this Federal information and propaganda policy arose in the midst of a series of major crises which seriously threatened the continued existence of the Federation and eventually led to its disintegration.

The study has also shown that in the first phase of the development of its information and propaganda policy, the Federal government seriously underestimated the strength of African nationalist opposition to Federation and made little effort to mobilise African opinion in support of Federation. It was only in the second phase of the development of its information and propaganda policy that the Federal government belatedly recognised the power of African anti-Federation opinion and made a frantic and panicked effort to counter it. This late realisation of the strength of African anti-Federation sentiment triggered some measure of panic on the part of the Federal government, which manifested itself in numerous ways which have been highlighted in the study. These included the Federal government's extensive reorganisation of its information services, its noticeable effort to improve its knowledge of African opinion on Federation and its use of what this study has characterised as panic-driven pro-Federation propaganda.

The study's analysis of the evolution of the Federal government information and propaganda policy for Africans has also demonstrated that Africans were not merely recipients of Federal government propaganda, but were also active agents in subverting

Federal government propaganda. Some, however, also served in the Federal propaganda structures, usually for their own interests and had their own agenda. For this reason, some of them who served in these official structures tried hard to assert their own independence, especially in determining the ways by which they packaged information meant for both Africans and overseas consumers. The Federal government's belated appointment of Africans to higher level positions within its internal and external information and propaganda structures was largely the result of its effort to counter growing internal and external pressure by seeking to prove that the regime was committed to multiracial partnership. This was too little, too late.

This "panic multi-racial partnership" messaging, the study has shown, represented a desperate effort by the Federal government and its information services to overcome their crisis of poor communicator credibility. They hoped that giving their pro-Federation propaganda a more African face would make it more credible to African and European opponents of Federation within and outside the Federation. However, this strategy, as the study has shown, failed to change negative African perceptions of the communicator credibility of the Federal government and its information services. The ability of African "salesmen" of Federation to successfully sell the Federation to their fellow Africans was severely undermined by the effectiveness of African nationalist propaganda in portraying them as "stooges" of the Federal government who had sold out their fellow Africans for personal financial gain. It was also, as the study has demonstrated, seriously curtailed by the Federal government's refusal to give its African "salesmen" of Federation any meaningful role in devising Federal government propaganda for Africans.

Also demonstrated in the study was how contestations between the Federal government and the Territorial governments over information and propaganda policy, particularly in relation to Africans played an important role in shaping the nature of the Federal government propaganda structures that were established as well as the evolution of Federal government propaganda policy and practice for Africans. These contestations, as this study has shown, were to a considerable extent a product of the problematic manner in which the Federal constitution divided government functions including those relating to information and propaganda between the Federal and Territorial governments.

The study has drawn attention to the fact that this constitution reflected the wider struggle between the Federal and Territorial governments over the extent to which government powers and functions should be federalised. It excluded the Federal government from virtually all matters relating to the daily lives of Africans in the Federation by making 'native' policy and its administration a Territorial preserve. Though it made information and propaganda at Federal level an exclusive Federal responsibility, it stipulated that information for Africans on Territorial as opposed to Federal issues was to remain a Territorial responsibility. It also permitted the Territorial governments to maintain their own

Territorial information services in order to meet their own Territorial information and propaganda needs.

This problematic constitutional division of information and propaganda functions, the study has shown, was one of the factors which contributed to the Federal government's slowness in establishing Federal level propaganda structures and developing a propaganda policy for Africans. The study has highlighted how resistance by the Territorial governments to what they viewed as the Federal government's efforts to encroach upon their powers by seeking to federalise key government powers and functions resulted in the limited federalisation of information and propaganda structures and functions, most notably broadcasting for Africans.

These Federal-Territorial contestations as this study has illustrated also hindered the development and implementation of a unified and well-coordinated Federal government propaganda policy for Africans by encouraging mutual rivalry and distrust between the Federal Information Services and the Territorial Information Services. Among the salient indications of this mutual rivalry and mistrust that were analysed in this study were the following: the Federal and Territorial governments' rival interpretations of the powers accorded to them by the provisions of the Federal constitution pertaining to information and propaganda functions for Africans, Federal-Territorial disagreements over the type of propaganda and propaganda methods that were needed to successfully win over Africans to Federation and the Federal government's efforts to overcome the limitations that the Federal constitution imposed on its ability to effectively propagandise Africans in support of Federation.

The study's analysis of the form and content of the Federal government's panic-driven pro-Federation print propaganda for Africans has revealed several things regarding this propaganda. It has shown that it was based on the Federal government propagandists' mistaken assumption that African opposition to Federation was mainly a result of lack of information or misinformation about Federation spread by African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda. The study has also demonstrated that this propaganda was informed by many of the core assumptions identified with the powerful media effects theoretical paradigm. It was premised on and intended to realise the assumption of Federal government propagandists that their pro-Federation propaganda would have quick and direct effects on Africans by transforming them from opponents to supporters of Federation within the short time they believed was left to save the Federation from collapse. Underlying this assumption was another supposition consistent with the powerful media effects theoretical perspective. This was the erroneous assumption that Africans were easily swayed by propaganda and their opinions and behaviour toward Federation were, therefore, primarily a result of the information they received.

The study has also shown that though this propaganda was motivated by the Federal government's panic, weakness and vulnerability regarding the impending collapse of the Federation and of European rule in Central Africa, it deliberately sought to conceal this fact by projecting the Federal government as strong government which was presiding over a politically stable Federation which was destined to become permanently established.

Also demonstrated in the study was how the Federal government's pro-Federation print propaganda for Africans made extensive and combined use of the factual propaganda approach and the success story motif. It has shown how the Federal government used the factual propaganda approach to try and legitimise its pro-Federation propaganda for Africans by characterising it as information about Federation based on 'facts' and reason and intended to answer African nationalist anti-Federation propaganda which it claimed was based on lies and emotion.

The study has demonstrated that the success story motif which pervaded the Federal government's pro-Federation propaganda for Africans was used to construct a narrative of Federation as economically and politically successful and destined to become permanently established. This narrative, the study has shown, was intended to counter the dominant African nationalist propaganda narrative of Federation as a failure that was doomed to collapse. The success story counter-narrative was also reflective of the panic-driven nature of the Federal government's pro-Federation propaganda for Africans. It deliberately sought to conceal the Federal government's panic, weakness and vulnerability regarding the impending collapse of the Federation and of white rule in the Federal territories by projecting the Federal government as a strong government which was presiding over an economically prosperous and politically stable Federation that had a bright and long-term future.

In its analysis of the role played by radio propaganda in the Federal government's pro-Federation propaganda for Africans, the study has highlighted that the Federal government believed that radio was an important tool for propagandising Africans in support of Federation. It has shown that the federalisation of all broadcasting in the Federation under the control an 'independent' broadcasting corporation, the Federal Broadcasting Corporation, was the product of prolonged Federal-Territorial contestations over control of broadcasting for Africans. The study has shown that despite its subsequent posturing as a champion of 'independent' public service broadcasting, which was free of government control and interference, the Federal government had made a determined and ultimately unsuccessful effort to have broadcasting federalised under its direct control. It has also shown that the FBC was not free of government control and influence by highlighting the ways in which the Federal government was able to indirectly influence its policy and programming. The study has also illustrated how the Federal government's panic mentality was manifested in the pressure that it privately applied on the FBC to increase the pro-

Federation content of its programmes for Africans and in its reactions to the potential and actual uses of broadcasting by Africans.

The study's analysis of the reactions of Africans to Federal government print and radio propaganda in support of Federation has shown that the ways in which they reacted to this propaganda are largely consistent with the main claims of limited media effects theory. The latter has emphasised that mass media audiences are active and not passive audiences. It has emphasised how the agency of these audiences together with numerous other factors serves to limit the effects of propaganda upon them. The study has shown how the reactions of Africans to Federal government propaganda proved that Federal government propagandists had been wrong in their principal assumptions about the power of pro-Federation propaganda and how Africans would react to this propaganda.

Contrary to the initial assumptions of Federal government propagandists that Africans were largely passive mass media audiences who did not understand what Federation was and its political and economic significance for them, the vast majority Africans, especially those considered by the Federal government to be too simple-minded and 'uncivilised' to understand the complex nature of Federation, had long demonstrated that they understood what Federation was and that it was against their political and economic interests and aspirations. The opposition of these ordinary Africans to Federation was, therefore, not based on ignorance or the misinformation and emotional appeals of educated Africans who opposed Federation. Rather, it was based on sound knowledge of what Federation stood for and this knowledge was largely derived from their own lived experiences of Federation.

Africans, the study has shown, were able to put forward well reasoned arguments and 'facts' of their own to challenge the claims about how Africans had benefited from Federation which were contained in Federal government print and radio propaganda targeted at them. The study has also highlighted many other ways in which Africans expressed their disapproval of and resistance to Federal government print and radio propaganda in support of Federation. These included refusing to accept or tearing up Federal government print publications which supported Federation, refusing to pay FBC radio licence fees, opting to listen to foreign anti-Federation radio broadcasts rather than the FBC's pro-Federation radio broadcasts, threatening FBC personnel and vandalising their equipment and infrastructure, stigmatising and sometimes intimidating those Africans who accepted and read the pro-Federation print propaganda handed out or mailed to Africans by the Federal Information Services, and continuously attacking the communicator credibility of the Federal government and its information services.

The study's analysis of these diverse African reactions to Federal government print and radio propaganda for Africans in the Federation has shown that this propaganda elicited largely hostile responses from these Africans and was not successful in convincing them to support Federation. It has shown how the factual propaganda approach which centred on

presenting to Africans 'facts' and figures about how they had and were benefiting from Federation failed to convince Africans that they had realised any significant benefits from Federation. It has also demonstrated that the Federal government's success story propaganda narrative failed to effectively counter the dominant African nationalist propaganda narrative that Federation had dismally failed and was effectively dead. Africans were able to see through and reject the claims of the Federal government's success story narrative, which sought to mask its panic, weakness and uncertainty over the future of Federation by projecting strength, stability and permanence on the part of the Federation and its government.

Why Federal government propaganda failed to win over Africans to Federation and how this failure influenced government propaganda policy and practice for Africans in Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland after Federation is a subject that warrants a separate study. This study's analysis of the emergence and development of Federal government propaganda policy for Africans, the character of the pro-Federation print and radio propaganda that it gave rise to as well as the reactions of Africans to this propaganda, has, however, drawn attention to several factors that help to explain why Federal government propaganda was not successful in getting Africans to support Federation.

These factors were first, the limitations placed on the Federal government's ability to effectively propagandise Africans by the nature of the Federal constitution and the Federal-Territorial contestations over information and propaganda policy for Africans that it gave rise to. Second, the weaknesses inherent in panic-driven propaganda which because it entailed a belated, inadequate and panicked response to numerous fast moving events that pointed toward the imminent collapse of the Federation, was never able to break out of the defensive posture in which it was conceived.

It was premised on several mistaken assumptions which included the assumption that African opposition to Federation was primarily the product of misinformation about the past and present benefits of Federation to the African which was disseminated by anti-Federation African nationalist propaganda. Federal government propagandists also mistakenly assumed that their pro-Federation propaganda could be devised and deployed in a manner that would quickly and radically transform to the Federal government's advantage, African opinion and behaviour toward Federation. However, as reinforcement theory has emphasised, propaganda tends to reinforce rather than to change the existing opinions of its target audiences. Where it does succeed in radically altering the opinions and behaviour of its target audiences, it tends to do so cumulatively over a long period of time.

Soon before and after the disintegration of the Federation, some Federal government propagandists admitted that some their initial assumptions about how Africans would react to their pro-Federation propaganda were actually proven to be wrong by the actual reactions of Africans to this propaganda. Far from being impressionable target audiences of

propaganda, Africans proved to be highly critical and knowledgeable audiences of Federal government propaganda. In offering advice to the Southern Rhodesia government on how to devise its post-Federation radio propaganda for Africans, William Vernon Brelsford, the Director of the Federal Public Relations Division, in 1963 acknowledged what he characterised as the extreme sensitivity of the African to propaganda and his intelligence in engaging with propaganda. This, he argued, made it necessary for the Southern Rhodesia government to ensure that the radio propaganda programmes it intended to broadcast to Africans were of high quality. Other Federal government propagandists would also admit the error of initially assuming that Federal government propaganda could have quick and far-reaching effects on Africans by arguing that this propaganda might have been successful in winning over Africans to Federation if they had been able to put it out to Africans for a much longer period than they had been able to.

Third, it can be argued that the Federal government's pro-Federation print and radio propaganda for Africans failed to win over Africans to Federation because it did not accurately reflect the political and economic experiences and aspirations of Africans in the Federation. Far from legitimising Federation in the eyes of Africans and generating confidence in its future, the success story perspective by making claims about the benefits of Federation which were inconsistent with most Africans' daily experiences of Federation, served only to delegitimise Federation in the eyes of these Africans and to harden their resolve to bring about its collapse. Similarly, the success story narrative's frequent assertions that Federation was strong and had a bright future served only to highlight its weakness and vulnerability to Africans.

Fourth, the crisis of poor communicator credibility among Africans which the Federal Information Services faced from their inception and which worsened as Federation became more unpopular among Africans helps to explain the failure of Federal government propaganda to gain African support for Federation. As the study has shown, this poor communicator credibility which had its roots in pre-existing and long-standing African opposition to Federation, served to significantly limit the capacity of Federal government propaganda to influence Africans into supporting Federation.

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