REGIONALISM AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: THE ROLE OF INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE SUDANESE CIVIL WAR.

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MOSES ONYANGO

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Abstract

This thesis expounds the theoretical underpinnings of problem-solving approach to conflict resolution. It also criticizes the traditional state-centric approach to conflict resolution being followed by the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Sudanese civil war. IGAD was initially known as Inter Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD), but was renamed IGAD in 1996. Its objectives were reformulated to give priority to conflict prevention, resolution, and management, and humanitarian affairs.

It is stipulated in the thesis that IGAD faces problems that need attention if the Sudanese civil war is to be resolved. A key problem is that while IGAD's objectives were reformulated to give priority to conflict resolution, IGAD's management structure has remained the same. The management structure is state-centric and lacks neutrality, which is a very important ingredient in deep-rooted social conflict resolution. The management structure, which was initially based on combating drought and desertification, was not restructured to conform to the realities of a problem solving approach to conflict resolution. The committee that was formed to look into the Sudanese conflict is composed of states in dispute with Sudan.

The other structural problem cited in the thesis is that the IGAD peace process is cumbersome and does not include all aggrieved parties. The meetings involve heads of state, ministers, ambassadors and other government representatives. The peace process is not inclusive of other important players such as other rebel movements.

This thesis concludes that: 1. there is a need for peace keeping forces from neutral African Union (AU) member states; 2. conflict resolution specialists are deployed in the region whose main task would be to assist the belligerent groups to reach a common understanding of their problems; 3. the United Nations (UN) acts proactively to create international awareness to the Sudanese problem.

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Acronyms

AU	African Union
CNPC	National Petroleum Company
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EIJ	Eritrea Islamic Jihad
EU	European Union
GNOP	Greater Nile Oil Project
IPC	International Petroleum Company
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
NIF	National Islamic Front
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSCC	New Sudan Council of Churches
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
RD	Relative Deprivation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SSIM/A	Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army
STAR	Sudan Transition Assistance Rehabilitation
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VC	Value Capacity
VE	Value Expectation
WNBF	West Nile Bank Front

Chapter One

Introduction: The Nature of the Problem.

According to Burton (1993) deep-rooted conflicts, such as the long standing conflict in Sudan which is the subject of this thesis, cannot be resolved through traditional judicial means or coercion, because such conflicts are ontological and need a problem solving analytical approach.

> "...Conflicts are concerned with issues that are not negotiable, issues that relate to ontological human needs that cannot be compromised. Resolution refers to the outcomes of a conflict situation that must satisfy the inherent needs of all..." (Burton 1993: 55).

Burton (Ibid) thus makes a distinction between disputes and conflicts. Disputes can be settled through judicial means, whereas conflicts cannot be settled, only resolved. He goes on to differentiate between settlement and resolution by arguing that resolution comes about with the satisfaction of both of the belligerents' needs, whereas settlement could leave one party unsatisfied with the outcome.

Although the theoretical underpinnings of conflict resolution are discussed in detail in Chapter Two, it is important to note at this point that the approach to conflict resolution studied in this thesis takes into consideration the importance of a third party. The third party should be a professional individual, group or institution, whose main purpose is to facilitate the analytical process in assisting the belligerent parties to gain a common understanding of their problems and the importance of resolving them (Burton 1993 and Kelman 1993:xi).

This thesis argues that the traditional method of conflict resolution used by IGAD is state-centric and appropriate for disputes. It is argued that IGAD provides an appropriate forum for the resolution of the Sudanese conflict so long as its current state-centric approach is altered to a problem solving approach. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about changes in international thinking on conflict resolution. One of these changes was the importance of regionalism in resolving regional conflicts, and this change was embraced by IGAD. Originally, the regional states comprising Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti formed the Inter Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD). IGADD was initially formed to help alleviate ecological problems and was reformulated in 1996 into IGAD with its objectives expanded to encompass conflict resolution. Eritrea became a contracting party to IGADD in 1993 after its independence from Ethiopia. IGAD was formed following a proliferation of conflicts in the region.

The end of the ideological rivalry between the former USSR and the USA was the start of a new era in the global understanding of security. The perception of security has now been expanded from one focussing on national security to one encompassing human security (Boutros-Ghali 1992/3). Factors in human security such as the environment, drug trafficking, terrorism, refugees and diseases, amongst others, are more intense at the sub-regional level (MacLean 1998: 32; Ayoob 1995; Bush 1997; Baldwin 1995; Keyman 1997; Boutros-Ghali 1992/3). There has therefore been a shift in how these factors should be managed from the global institutional level such as the United Nations (UN) to the sub-regional institutional level such as the IGAD.

This shift can be understood in the context of the end of the superpower ideological rivalry because there has been a change in how states relate to one another in the international system. Whereas the relations between these two superpowers was once characterized by the realist power perspective in which both states looked at each other through the perspective of ideological competition, this perspective has now changed to that of economic competition. In this paradigm, the United States and what is now Russia consider each other as cooperating partners in matters of security. This means that instead of each of them backing civil wars in other countries, they resort to cooperating in resolving these civil wars. Both the US and Russia cooperated in resolving the conflict in South Africa, for example.

However, because the task of committing US and Russian forces to conflict-prone regions is expensive, the mantle of making sure that peace prevails in troubled states has fallen under regional and sub-regional organisations. It is now a famous adage to speak about African solutions to African problems. Regionalism has become more important than ever. We can now witness the military involvement of regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the internal affairs of member countries. The involvement of IGAD in conflict resolution in Sudan can also be understood in this context.

The Sudanese Civil War first broke out in 1955 following an army mutiny. The army was disgruntled with the Sudanization[1] process in Sudan. In this policy, the expatriates in Sudan were to be replaced by indigenous Sudanese. However, of the 800 posts to be indigenised, only six went to the southern Sudanese. The southerners took this as discrimination against them (Woodward 1990; Holt and Daly 1988). The conflict intensified in the 1960s with the formation of the Anya Nya guerrilla group in southern Sudan. This group was founded by ex-soldiers from southern Sudan who had fled the country after the 1955 army mutiny. The war came to an end with the signing of the Addis Ababa peace accord of 1972, which granted autonomy to southern Sudan. A period of peace then prevailed until 1983 when Jaafar Nimeiri introduced Sharia laws, which led to the formation of SPLM/A under the leadership of John Garang. Nimeiri introduced Sharia laws because he was faced with economic problems and opposition from Islamic fundamentalists. He thought that if he introduced Sharia laws, he would appease the opposition. Garang and other rebel movements argued that these laws were exclusive. Fighting in Sudan intensified from 1989 onwards when Omar al- Bashir took power with the assistance of the National Islamic Front (NIF) (Woodward 1990).

The war dynamics in Sudan can best be understood within the domestic, regional and extra-regional contexts. At the core of the conflict is the adoption of Islamization and Arabization as the guiding principles of the Sudanese domestic and foreign policy. Arabization and Islamization policies have been implemented by successive Sudanese administrations since independence. Islamization means adherence to Islam as one's religion and Arabization means the adoption of Arabic culture as manifested in the use of

Arabic language (Adar 2000b). Oil has been used to support the structures of Islamization and Arabization (Field 2000). The oil revenue received by the Government of Sudan totals US $ 1 million per day, equal to the amount spent on arms per day (Adar 2000a).

Successive regimes have had different approaches in implementing the Islamization and Arabization policies. Abboud's military regime, for example, which came into power in 1958, favoured northerners and took the Islamization and Arabization agenda seriously. The regime appointed northerners to provincial and district positions. Southerners were bypassed or transferred to the north. In the related areas of educational and religious affairs Abboud's government showed great ineptitude.[2] During his rule, six intermediate Islamic institutes were opened, mosques were constructed and subsidized, missions were prohibited from opening new schools and the day of rest was changed from Sunday to Friday. Missionaries going on leave were denied re-entry to Sudan. Religious activities of missionaries outside of church activities were prohibited. On 22 February 1964 the government ordered the expulsion of all foreign missionaries working in southern Sudan (Holt and Daly 1988: 178-179).

The issue of oil is very important as a cause of war in Sudan. The southerners were disgruntled at the beginning of the conflict when they were denied access to the benefits of oil. Successive regimes in Sudan have sought to exploit these resources regardless of the southern Sudanese interests. In 1979, after the US based Chevron company discovered significant oil reserves estimated at 5 million barrels in Bentiu district of the Upper Nile, the Nimeiri government attempted to deny the southerners this resource

(Mawson, 1984: 522; Kebbede 1999:17). In the issue of the control of the Upper Nile water, the Nimeiri government neither invited the participation of southerners in the decision-making process nor considered the ramification of the project on the livelihood of the inhabitants of the region. The project was to conduct a 360 mile canal between Jonglei and Malakal (both in the Upper Nile province), bypassing the Sudd swamp, where an estimated 60 percent of the water (about 31,000 million cubic meters per year is lost through evaporation) (Kebbede: 1999 18-19).

The state's acquisition of land in the south is also a cause of war in Sudan. The state of Sudan promoted the expansion of large-scale mechanised farming in the southern region particularly in the northern parts of the Upper Nile province and in the Nuba country of southern Kordofan. Land belonging to the indigenous farming and pastoralist population was expropriated and the introduction of mechanised farming in these regions was increased (Kebbede 1999:19).

The unemployed and homeless, mainly from rural areas such as Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and the south who escaped to the city from deteriorating living conditions, became victims of Nimeiri's Islamic code and were targets of his other infamous policy known as *Kasha* (the forceful eviction of rural immigrants from their own national capital and return to their place of origin) (Kebbede 1999:19). In 1984 thousands of poor immigrants were indiscriminately picked up from the streets of Khartoum by security forces and sent back to where they were presumed to have come from, dropped off on the

outskirts of the capital or relocated to several sites near major mechanized agricultural schemes in the eastern and central regions (Kebbede 1999: 21-22).

Sudan suffered drought and famine in the 1980s. The signs of impending disaster in these regions were seen after the poor harvests of 1982 and 1983. However, the initial response of the Nimeiri government was that of indifference. The government felt that acknowledging the existence of famine would be politically damaging and would possibly undermine its effort to entice foreign investors. It was only after tens of thousands of refugees converged on the capital, and in response to internal and external pressure, that the government was forced to disclose the disaster and to deliver relief supplies to the famine stricken regions and initiate rehabilitation programmes for those displaced by famine (Kebbede 1999: 22).

The ruling NIF government's violation of political and civil rights is not confined to the non-Muslims region of the south. The regime is also oppressing Muslim minorities in the north. One of them is the Beja, a tribe of about 1.5 million. The Beja are Muslims but practice a more tolerant variety of Islam blended with their traditional beliefs. They are traditionally pastoral people whose territory spreads over 100,000 square miles in the extreme North-Eastern Sudan. The NIF government confiscates tribal land and cattle from those opposed to it, including the Beja, and hands them over to its supporters.

The Nuba nation is another victim of Khartoum's political suppression. The Nuba live in the mountainous areas of central Sudan's south Kordofan province. They are sedentary

agriculturalists and cattle breeders. Their number in 1984 was estimated at about 1.5 million. Whereas majority of the Nuba are Muslims, there are many who are adherents of Christianity and different traditional religions. The Nuba belong to many ethnic groups and speak a number of languages. The total population of Sudan is estimated at 32 million (Kebbede 1999: 28-29). From these examples alone, it is clear that a substantial proportion of the population experiences oppression.

The Sudanese civil war resembles earlier medieval wars in Europe in its lack of differentiation between state and society, soldier and civilian, internal and external transactions across frontiers as well as between war and organized crime (Van Creveld 1991). For example, Arab militias called *Muraheleen* conduct military style raids on civilian villages and cattle camps. They descend on horseback, armed with government issued automatic weapons and capture hundreds of civilians at a time for sale into slavery. With the complicity of the government and military authorities in Sudan, women are abducted and forced to satisfy the sexual need of forces (*Human Rights Watch* 1996: 2).

The critical factor in this protracted war is that it represents the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation (Azar 1991: 93; 1990: 10-12). At the heart of the problem lies the relationship between groups with differing religious identities. Since individual interests and needs are mediated through membership of social groups (Azar 1990: 7 and 1986:31) conflict has arisen. The

disjunction between state and society in Sudan is a result of the colonial legacy, which initially imposed the southern policy and later statehood onto the Sudanese.[3] As a result, Arabic speaking Muslims, who are not responsive to the needs of southern Sudanese dominate the state machinery in Sudan. For example, the NIF[4] has been represented in government almost continuously since 1978. Since June 1989 it has controlled central government. The NIF is led by a group of intellectuals, including academics, lawyers, and doctors. Its finance comes largely from Islamic banks and trading companies, and ultimately from the oil-rich Arab states. Its membership is drawn from wealthy traders and financiers, some land-owners and military officers, but largely from marginal urban groups including students, lower-ranking officers, lower-grade salaried employees in the public sector, shopkeepers and petty traders. Since 1978 the NIF has come to control, partly or completely, a number of important sectors of the economy, including media, banking, building materials, and transport. Much of this economic manipulation has taken place through the Islamic banking system (de Waal 1990: 6). Since individual needs come to be articulated through a process of socialization and group identity, themselves culturally conditioned, this has eventually strained the social fabric and has eventually led to a protracted civil war (Azar 1990: 7; Lewin 1948; Kelly 1955; Sherif 1966; Tajfel 1978; Deutsch 1973).

Deprivation of human needs is the underlying source of the protracted civil war in Sudan. Failure to redress these needs by the Khartoum government has perpetuated the conflict (Azar 1990: 9). Unlike interests, needs are ontological and non-negotiable, so that if conflict comes, it is likely to be intense, vicious and irrational. According to Azar (1990:

155), reducing overt conflict requires reduction in levels of underdevelopment. Groups which seek to satisfy their identity and security needs through conflict are in effect seeking change in the structure of their society. For example, the SPLA is calling for a radical "New Sudan", in which the social and economic basis of the state is restructured (de Waal 1990: 18).

Successive Khartoum governments have continued with Arabization and Islamization policies. Whereas in Western liberal theory the state is an aggregate of individuals entrusted to govern effectively and to act as an impartial arbiter of conflicts among the constituent parts, treating all members of the political community as legally equal citizens, this is not the situation in Sudan. Political authority is monopolized by the Arabic speaking Muslims who use the state to maximize their interests at the expense of the southern Sudanese. Monopolization of power by the NIF and the limiting of access to power to southern Sudanese precipitate the crisis of legitimacy. The civil war is exacerbated by the restricted capacity of some participatory institutions, hierarchical traditions of imposed bureaucratic rule from the central government and instruments of political oppression.

The NIF regime persists in its attempt to make Sudan a fundamentalist Islamic state with virtually no regard for the more than 8 million Sudanese who neither profess Islam nor speak Arabic. The regime believes in keeping Sudan as a unitary state by force, as well as by preaching the virtues of Islam and Arabism to the most ethnically, linguistically and geographically diverse populations in the country. The NIF government is neither willing

to compromise to end the war that has lasted more than three decades, nor has it been able to defeat even a divided SPLM/A in spite of its costly war. The regime has been reluctant or unable to put a peace proposal on the negotiating table that would interest the SPLM/A. All attempts at mediation have been futile. Several attempts have been made by the SPLM/A for peaceful resolution of the conflict. For example, the two sides conducted peace talks in Nairobi and Addis Ababa in 1989 and Abuja in1992 and 1993. Throughout 1994 mediators from IGAD, consisting of representatives from Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, attempted to negotiate a peace agreement between the government and the SPLM/A. However, these efforts bore no fruit largely because of the government's unwillingness to compromise (Kebbede 41-42).

How does one resolve a problem of governance? Can the state that sponsors acts of terrorism against its own people be capable of resolving its problems under its own judicial system? How are these problems to be resolved if and when the judicial system fails? These questions are the focus of this thesis. Ontological issues cannot be resolved in court neither can they be resolved through the use of force. If either of these ways is followed there is bound to be resistance from one of the opposing groups because neither of them is willing to forego what they consider to be very dear to them. Hence IGAD is very important in resolving such conflicts.

Regional Environment

Some regional organisations are known to escalate conflicts rather than resolve them. This makes it difficult to trust them completely when they act as third parties in conflict resolution. The regional environment in question is commonly known as the Horn of Africa, and is under the auspices of IGAD. This region, as noted before, is comprised of Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea. There are two contentious issues in this region: the first is Islamic fundamentalism and the second is poverty.

All the countries in the region are concerned about Islamic fundamentalism and the Sudanese quest to spread it in the whole region. In light of this policy, Uganda gives support to the SPLM/A. According to Adar (1998), Uganda is being used as a transit zone for arms to be used by the SPLM/A in the Sudanese civil war. In turn the Sudanese government has supported the Uganda rebel movements, the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF). The tension between Sudan and Ethiopia can be traced to Mengistu's regime. Mengistu supported the SPLM/A for many years in its quest to effect changes in the governance of Sudan. Ethiopia's current main concern is the NIF's support for the Oromo Islamic parties (Adar 1998:47). The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has exchanged fire with NIF forces (Prendergast, 1997: 65). Eritrea's relationship with Sudan is also poor. Eritrea has accused Sudan of spreading Islamic fundamentalism. Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda received over $20 million worth of arms from the US on behalf of the liberation

movements in Sudan in 1996 (*Africa Confidential*, 1996:1). Among the countries that constitute the committee that has been delegated by IGAD to resolve the conflict in Sudan, none can be said to be neutral since Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia are in dispute with Sudan.

Extra-Regional Environment

The name *Bilad al-Sudan,* which means, 'the land of the blacks' was given to Sudan by medieval Muslim geographers. This is an indicator that Sudan had contacts with the international world even in the medieval ages. The Arabs went into Sudan as traders in ivory and slaves. Sudan then had contact with the British who colonised it from 1898 to 1956. The British had strategic interests in Sudan, as they were interested in the Nile. After the independence, the international community's interest in Sudan revolved around the threats and opportunities afforded by the Cold War. Current interest in Sudan has focused on the discovery of oil in the country, and concern about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.

Oil and Islamic fundamentalism has drawn several countries into the Sudanese civil war. These countries are Russia, Canada, Iran, Malaysia and some former Soviet Union countries. The activities of these states in Sudan escalate the Sudanese civil war. Iran is known to have supported Islamic fundamentalism in Sudan. The Sudanese government receives weapons from various sources. These include China, Iran, Iraq the Russian Federation, former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact members (Belarus, Ukraine,

Tajikstan, Kazakhstan), Libya, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Yemen, Belgian, Saudi Arabia and Chile (Adar 2000a; Lowry 1992).

Iran has been a major supplier of light arms and artillery, with Iranian experts coming to Sudan to provide special training for these weapons (Ploughshares 1999). Iraq for its part provided the Sudanese with Soviet model T-55 tanks and 130mm artillery before the Gulf War. Iraq provided Sudan with the kits to adapt Antonov cargo planes to carry three 500-pound bombs on each side of the fuselages, turning them into medium range bombers. Russia supplied two squadrons (sixteen in each squadron) of Sukhoi bombers, which were delivered in April and May 1996 (*UN* 1997).

Belarus reported in 1997 that it supplied Sudan with six Russian-made Mi-24B attack helicopters and nine Russian made T-55 battle tanks in 1996. The government of the Ukraine reported selling Sudan six BMP-2 armoured personnel carriers in 1996. Ukraine has also supplied the government of Sudan with Mi-24s. Both Kazakhastan and Kyrgyzstan have been cited as sources of Soviet-era weapons to Sudan. Romania has also been cited as a source of Soviet-made weapons to Sudan. The South African government and South African nationals have sold or serviced arms to Sudan since 1994. Libya provided Sudan with heavy artillery in 1995 (UN 1997; *Daily Mail & Guardian* 1998).

Qatar provided equipment for the Sudanese Army Signal Corps and for the air force. Jordan and Yemen sent small shipments to the Sudanese government in January and February 1997. Human Rights Watch found numerous Belgian PRB M3 plastic antitank

mines in SPLA-held areas in Southern Sudan. In 1995, a U.S. company owned by an unnamed Saudi, was said to have shipped to Sudan $120 million worth of arms, including howitzers, mortars and tank ammunition. In October 1997, Human Rights Watch photographed Chilean cluster antipersonnel bomb-lets in Yei, Sudan. Ethiopia provided the Sudanese government with a fleet of T-54 and T-55 Soviet-model tanks and other equipment in 1992. On 31st August 1999, it was reported that 20 T-55 tanks from Poland were illegally diverted to Sudan. The tanks were part of 50 second-hand tanks sold to Yemen earlier for $1.2 million dollars (*UN* 1997).

China is believed to have sold SCUD missiles to the government of Sudan at the end of 1996 in a deal underwritten by a $200 million Malaysian government loan against future oil extraction. Since 1995, China has delivered ammunition, tanks, helicopters, and fighter aircraft to Sudan. In late 1995, China supplied the government of Sudan with fifty Z-6 helicopters, a hundred 82mm and 120mm mortars, and other equipment. Sudan also reportedly bought six Chengdu F-7s (MiG-21s) financed by Iran. In 1997, the government of Sudan was reported to have acquired a new type of Chinese-made, lightweight antitank weapon. G-3 rifle, mortars (60mm and 82mm) and ammunition from Iran were unloaded at the Khartoum airport in 1996 (*UN* 1997).

Table One: Key allies of the belligerents.

Regime	Allies	Reasons for Alliance
Khartoum government	Russia, Canada, Malaysia, Iran, Iraq	Oil, Religion, other trade
SPLM/A	USA, Israel, Uganda, Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia	Fear of spread of Islamic fundamentalism

Table one shows that the Khartoum government's main allies are Canada, Malaysia, Iran and Iraq and SPLM/A's main allies are USA, Israel, Uganda, Kenya, Eritrea and Ethiopia. These allies are supporting either party on the basis of oil, religion or other trade. It is important to note that there are other allies who are not listed in this table, as it only shows the main allies of two belligerent forces.

Structure of the Thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of IGAD in the Sudanese civil war. It is postulated in this thesis that IGAD remains an appropriate body to resolve the Sudanese civil war. Chapter two explores the theoretical underpinnings of conflict and conflict resolution. In this chapter the terms regionalism, conflict and conflict resolution are analysed. Chapter three is the core of this thesis and it deals with IGAD's attempts to resolve the Sudanese civil war. A critical examination of IGAD structure as a conflict resolution body is made in the chapter. It is noted in the chapter that IGAD faces a myriad of problems. Chapter four concludes that IGAD still remains the appropriate body to resolve the conflict regardless of the problems that it faces given the changes in the international system in the aftermath of the Cold War and the advent of regionalism in terms of importance. This chapter also recommends that the UN and the AU be more proactive in the resolution of the conflict.

Notes

1. Sudanization here means the handover of administrative posts filled by expatriates to the Sudanese.

2. Religious policy during the Wingate (a governor-general) years was determined largely by considerations of the political security of Britain. Mahdism was suppressed. The *Tariqas,* long the focal point of popular Islam, were viewed with suspicion and were not officially recognized, although the Khartmiyya *Tariqa* and its hereditary leaders, the Mighani family, received special consideration in consequence of their long record of loyalty. Risking controversy in Britain, the government strongly opposed Christian missionary activities in northern Sudan (Holt and Daly 1988: 124). Religious policy in the South differed markedly from that pursued in the Muslim North. Obsessed with the dangers posed to internal security by fanatical Islam, Wingate and his sub-ordinates sought to exclude Muslim influence altogether from the southern provinces. Christian missionary organizations, frustrated by government policy in the north, were allotted spheres for proselytization in the south. This was the conscious beginning of a southern policy aiming at political separation of the southern provinces from Sudan (Holt and Daly 1988:125). The outbreak of the Egyptian revolution made the support of the influential religious leaders (tariqas ansars) more imperative. Abboud on his part was not sensitive to these political dynamics.

3. The southern policy came with the adoption of indirect rule, which had a greater significance in the southern Sudan than in the North. In 1922, the South was classified as closed districts; resulting in the progressive exclusion of northern traders and the limitation of southerners travelling to the North to find work. Everything possible was done to encourage tribal consciousness (Holt and Daly 1988: 138). The basis for a broad cultural unity, provided throughout the North by Islam and Arabic, was lacking in southern Sudan. Pacification and the establishment of administration in the South had been much more slowly accomplished than in the North, where the Sudan government was heir to a well-rooted tradition of centralized government derived from its Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist predecessors. (Holt and Daly 1988: 151).

4. The Muslim Brothers, (re-named the National Islamic Front (NIF)), was founded in Egypt in 1928. The brotherhood is a militant organization with a fundamentalist Islamic ideology. It was suppressed in Egypt in the 1952 revolution. During the closing days of Abboud's regime the brotherhood was led in Khartoum by Hassan al-Turabi (Holt and Daly 1988: 176).

Chapter Two

Regionalism, Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Theoretical Framework for Analysis.

Introduction

Conflict means the presence of contradictions that cannot be resolved by normal judicial mechanisms (Burton 1987, 1993). For Burton, conflict is based on ontological issues. This chapter will begin by looking at the theory behind this approach. Sandole (1993) argues that learning tends to reflect the work of psychologists and others who have attempted to measure or otherwise systematically observe aspects of human nature. Theorists such as Sandole consider causes of conflicts to be structural.

The Pluralist/Structural/Societal Perspective of Conflict

Johan Galtung (1969) defined the discrepancy between actual and potential stages of somatic and mental well-being as structurally based. By this he meant that those at the bottom of some hierarchically structured relational system cannot by reason of involuntary membership to certain ethnic, class, religious and/or other group obtain fair access to the social, economic, political, educational, legal and/or other resources typically enjoyed and presided over by the mainstream. This means those at the bottom have less access to the means to close the gap between their actual situation and their potential one. When those who are suffering, or who are about to suffer, from the inability to make the transition between the objective and the subjective realms realise their situation, they resort to structural violence. The limbic system then comes into

force, pushing actors toward violent reactions against those who have been oppressing them, or are about to attempt to oppress them. This is known as perceived structural violence theory.

Gurr (1970) has a variation on the perceived structural violence theme, known as relative deprivation (RD). This he describes as a perceived discrepancy between value expectations (VE) (resources to which one feels entitled) and value capabilities (VC) (resources which one feels capable of acquiring and keeping). The greater the degree of perceived discrepancy between VE and VC, the greater is the RD. The greater the RD is felt to be by members of a collective, the greater the potential for collective violence, including political violence (Gurr 1970).

Galtung's rank equilibrium (1964) refers to how people are measured socially, and what rank they hold on various social indicators. One may for example, be high on some indicators (e.g., educational) but low on others (employment, income, housing). It is not the actor who is low across all indicators, but one who is mixed between the high status and the low status who is most likely to respond violently to the perceived source of the imbalance (Galtung 1964; Smith 1971:275). Aggression-frustration may be involved when perceived structural violence, whether conceptualised as relative deprivation or rank equilibrium, leads to the contemplation or manifestation of violence as a means to change.

According to Galtung (1969:72) conflict could be viewed as a triangle, with contradiction (C), attitude (A) and behaviour (B) at its vertices. Here the contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation, which includes the actual or perceived 'incompatibility of goals' between the conflicting parties. This is generated by what Mitchel (1981: 18) calls: "...a miss-match between social values and social structure...". In an asymmetric conflict, the parties, their relationship and the conflict of interests inherent in the relationship define the contradiction. Attitude, on the other hand, includes the parties' perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of themselves. These can be positive or negative, but in violent conflicts parties tend to develop demeaning stereotypes of each other, and attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred. Attitude includes emotive (feelings), cognitive (belief) and motivational (will) elements. Lastly, behaviour can include cooperation by means of coercion, or gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. Violent conflict behaviour is characterised by threats, coercion and destructive attacks. According to Galtung all three components have to be present together in a full conflict. A conflict structure without conflict attitudes or behaviour is a latent (or structural) conflict. Galtung sees conflict as a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one another. Figure one over the page shows how this theory could be applied to the Sudanese conflicts.

Figure One: Conflict Dynamics and Resolution



(Source: Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 14)

As a conflict emerges, it becomes a conflict formation. The interests of the parties come into conflict or the relationship between them becomes oppressive (for example the NIF oppressive regime). Conflicting parties then organize around this conflict formation structure to pursue their own interests. They develop hostile attitudes and conflict behaviour (for example the SPLM/A). Conflict behaviour then starts to develop. As it does so, it may widen, drawing in other parties, and possibly generating secondary conflicts within the main parties or among outsiders who get sucked in. For example, the war in Sudan has witnessed a proliferation of several liberation movements and the involvement of foreign states such as Iran among others. This often considerably complicates the task of addressing the original core conflict. Eventually however,

resolving the conflict must involve a de-escalation of conflict behaviour, a change in attitudes, and transforming the relationships or clashing interests that are at the core of the conflict structure. In the Sudanese conflict, this task falls to IGAD.

Conflict formations therefore arise out of social change, leading to a process of violent or non-violent conflict transformation. This results in further social change in which hitherto suppressed or marginalized individuals or groups come to articulate their interests and challenge existing norms and power structures. Progression can be from peaceful social change to conflict formation to violent conflict and then to conflict transformation and back to peaceful social change. The sequence can also go from conflict formation to conflict transformation and back to social change, avoiding violence, or it can go from conflict formation to violent conflict back to the creation of fresh conflicts.

According to John Dollard and his colleagues (1939), frustration occurs when a particular state in one of the behaviour sequences mentioned above cannot be achieved at its proper time. (Dollard et al., 1939;7). Frustration is both a necessary and sufficient condition of aggression (Dollard 1939:1). Aggression can be overt (for example the confrontation between SPLM/A and the government of Sudan) or non-overt. It can also be direct or indirect, in the latter case, involving object-and / or response-displacement), physical or ideological, conscious or unconscious, external or internal.

James Chowning Davies (1962; 1973; 1986) for his part argues that frustration of substantive needs, (such as physical, self-esteem, and self-actualisation), or implemental needs, (security, knowledge, and power), facilitates the transition from a manifest conflict process[1] to an aggressive manifest conflict process[2]: violence is produced when certain innate needs or demands are not fulfilled, for example SPLM/A's demands for fair distribution of economic resources have not been met by the Sudanese government (Davies: 1973: 251). Davies theory is a modification of Abraham Maslow's (1987) hierarchy of needs and it has a connection to Dollard's group formulation of frustration-aggression.

According to Laue (1986) and Avruch and Black (1991), values lie at an even deeper level of conflict manifestation than interests, with human needs such as identity (Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey 1988) and security representing the foundation of deep-rooted conflict (*See figure two*).

Figure Two: Conflict Theory Pyramid



Level one: Needs; Basic and Human-Bio-genetic paradigm

Level two: Values; Learned and socialized-Non-rational choice paradigm

Level three: Interests: Desires and Wants-Rational choice paradigm

Level four: Political and Strategic-Political choice paradigm

(Source: Sandole and van der Merwe 1993: 186)

Groups at the political and interest levels, (three and four), would be most likely to use rational methods to establish strategies and tactics in case of a conflict. However, when conflict features cultural values, these methods may turn out to be less rational (e.g. implementation of Islamization and Arabization policies against the will of others such as the southern Sudanese) (Babbie 1992: 28). Individuals or groups are often guided by affective histories that largely determine reactions to conflict. These affective histories

are often the basis for cultural values. For this reason, actors may not engage in rational choice forms of decision-making that attempt to weigh and objectify bargaining alternatives to arrive at optimal solutions (Mitchell 1978).

At the biogenetically driven level of human needs, one responds intuitively. (Level one in Figure Two above.) The values that complicate understanding of conflict and its potential for resolution are the unique epistemologies shaped by experiences of who we are, how we identify ourselves in the social universe and how others have responded to us in that universe (Warfield 1993: 187). Disputants who use value-based conflict-framings tend to be non-rational in their perception of the origins, processes, and outcomes of conflict: they look to history to inform their views of real time-events and future behaviour of opposing parties. For example, successive regimes in Sudan have sought to implement Islamization and Arabization policies since independence regardless of resistance (Warfield 1993:187).

John Burton (1979, 1990a, 1990b) hypothesised a link between frustration and the basic needs of identity, security, recognition, autonomy, dignity and bonding. He argued that there are certain ontological and generic needs that will always be pursued. Socialisation processes, if not compatible with these human needs, will lead to frustration, and then to anti-social individual or group behaviour. This behaviour in turn is destructive to personal or collective identity. Those whose behaviour is thus affected by 'socialisation' processes feel compelled to react against the instigators of these processes (Burton 1990a; 33-34).

One common feature of all pluralist/cooperationist theories is learning. Learning is seen as the central element underpinning the technique of problem-solving, which in turn is key to successful conflict resolution.

The Cooperative/Problem-solving/Conflict Resolution Approach

The biggest question facing those involved in conflict resolution is how to resolve protracted conflicts. The debate ranges from solutions put forward by the traditionalists, who view conflict from the realist perspective of power competition, to those who view conflict from the perspective of cooperation. This thesis is mainly concerned with the perspective of cooperation/third party intervention in regard to IGAD in the Sudanese civil war. This cooperation ideal is appropriate for the deep-rooted conflict in Sudan. Third party intervention techniques have variably been called problem-solving workshops, interactive problem solving, third party consultation or collaborative analytical problem solving (Burton 1969; 1987; Fisher 1983; Kelman 1986; Banks and Mitchell 1991).

In these processes, a third party without vested interests in the process can affect the course of protracted and deep-rooted conflict. This is done by providing the conflicting parties with opportunities to interact in an analytical rather than a coercive manner, and giving each party insights into the other parties' predicaments. Third party intervention aims to bring about a reduction in overall conflict between conflicting parties, without

resorting to the more traditional methods of force, formal negotiations, mediation or conciliation which were found during the Cold War era (Mitchell 1993: 78).

The problem-solving technique initially involves the representatives of the parties involved in protracted conflict attending a series of informal meetings. These are structured in such a way that the parties can move towards a re-analysis of the conflict as a shared problem. The meetings also allow for the generation of some alternatives to continued coercion, and proposals for sustainable resolutions aimed at building new power relationships. The first objective of this technique is not to change the viewpoint of the individuals within the meetings, but to achieve a complete analysis of the conflict. The main objective is then to affect the broader adversarial relationship (Burton 1987).

The meetings are structured like a workshop. Two or more parties who are in conflict with each other sit with a third party, who acts as a convener, facilitator and source of ideas for the adversaries. The third party normally consists of a panel rather than an individual or pair of intermediaries. It assists participants to step out of the role of combative representative to that of an analyst of a shared problem. The exercises can gradually take on the appearance of a negotiating session, but one characterised by considerably more openness and willingness to examine radical solutions. The exercises often produce an output that is to be communicated back to others outside the workshop (Foltz 1977:203).

The problem-solving workshops may be designed in order to have a direct effect upon key decision-makers and the immediate course of the conflict. They may also be set up to have a medium-term effect by developing new insights for advisors and consultants to decision makers and leaders. In this way, the workshops can prepare the way for the successful launch of more extensive conflict reduction procedures. Workshops can also be aimed at the longer term. They can be structured to develop conflict resolution skills and techniques within one or two communities so that in the long term, opposing sides can form expectations and relationships with each other that are not based on conflict and coercion (Mitchell 1993:81).

The success of problem-solving workshops often plays a major part in the final resolution of a conflict, or in preparing the ground for more formal negotiations (Mitchell 1993:82). All practitioners aim at affecting the conflict. They only differ in whether they propose to do so directly or indirectly, and whether they do so in the short or long term. A problem-solving workshop is expected to have an impact on the actual participants in the exercise in the sense that it alters the perceptions, images, and attitudes of those taking part. It can change their expectations, produce new options and opportunities, and in some cases wholly alter the manner in which they view the situation facing them.

Each problem-solving workshop is expected to conclude with a specific output. Some sessions will end with participants taking specific ideas or proposals, agreed principles, or some type of report back with them to their leaders or to key members of their party for consideration and future action. Outputs from a session could take the form of a set of

notes on possible courses of action for the future, or go as far as a detailed plan for an intercommunity arts and crafts exhibition. The latter example might be proposed as an initial confidence-building measure between parties (Azar 1986; Mitchell 1993: 82). Clearly, the overall outcome of any problem-solving workshop is a positive long-term effect on the actual conflict itself.

Regionalism and Conflict Resolution

Regionalism has become an important factor in many conflicts and contexts since the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States would support opposing forces in conflicts outside of their countries, thus fighting each other by proxy. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States' strategic interests in Africa have become minimal in comparison to other issues such as its economy. The United States has made it clear that it will only intervene in conflicts where it considers its national interests to be at stake. With the proliferation of intra-state wars in Africa, conflict resolution has now become the domain of regional organisations.

According to Hettne and Söderbaum (1998:7), regionalism is a comprehensive, multifaceted and multidimensional process, implying the change of a particular region from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity mainly in terms of culture, security, economic policies and politics. States decide to cooperate on issues that demand collective action, and aim to resolve them multilaterally. In the case of Sudan, the main

issue is that of security. Here, the problems are ontological and cannot be resolved through state mechanisms like the use of force or the judicial system.

> "...The practice of dealing with conflicts by employing non-legitimised force may be a form of conflict management, but it does not lead to conflict resolution..." (Burton 1987:13).

Third parties are required in order to resolve conflicts based on ontological issues. The third party could use a problem-solving approach, which presupposes that conflict resolution is achieved by a facilitated analysis of the underlying sources of conflicts by the parties in conflict. The term also encompasses the process whereby institutional policy options are discussed and arrived at to meet the needs of the parties, thus establishing the basis for a resolution of the conflict (Burton 1987:7). The process aims to avoid power bargaining from stated positions, but rather to be exploratory in nature. It requires a thorough analysis of the conflict, so that the goals and objectives of all sides can be revealed.

The process requires a neutral and skilled third party. The third party is actively involved in the discussion by providing references and other data, and in keeping discussions within an analytical structure. The third party would always avoid putting forward normative or judgemental views about the specific conflict at issue (Burton 1987:15). The major role of the third party in facilitated conflict resolution is to be innovative in guiding the translation of discovered shared values into political structures and institutions that will promote their fulfilment (Burton 1987: 17). Needs of security, identity and human development are universal, and because their fulfilment is not

dependent on limited resources, it follows that conflict resolution with win-win outcomes is possible (Burton 1987: 16).

The methodology of third party facilitation of communication between groups or nations in conflict is least effective on the eve of or in the midst of violent combat. In such a case, a process of gradual confidence building between representatives of the groups in conflict would most likely be swamped by the passions of the moment. Far more appropriate would be third party states or international organisations such as the UN, AU or IGAD arranging a cease-fire or separation of combatants and backing this up with a neutral peace keeping force. When emotions have cooled down and parties are ready to proceed, a conflict resolution process could get under way. Long-standing or protracted ethnic and sectarian conflict such as the Sudanese civil war is appropriate for third party facilitation provided valid representatives of the adversarial groups request help or agree to participate (Montville 1993).

According to Avruch and Black (1993: 143), there are three possible scenarios for third parties such as IGAD in intercultural conflict: (1) the parties to the conflict come from different cultures, and the third party is from yet another culture. In this case, IGAD would have to function as an interpreter. Being separate from both cultures, there is the possibility that IGAD will not be aware of some elements of the conflicting cultures. In this case, the parties can chose to inform IGAD where necessary. However, this could clearly lead to bias. The conflicting parties may share very little outside the notion that IGAD is a valuable and relevant resource in the resolution of the conflict. Third parties

must take care to perform thorough cultural analyses of both cultures before entering into an interpreting role. (2) The parties to the conflict share the same culture, but the third party does not. In this case, IGAD should be careful not to get in the way or complicate matters by imposing his or her own cultural views on the parties. IGAD must be careful not to be hoodwinked either or otherwise used by the parties. (3) The parties to the conflict come from different cultures, but the third party shares a culture with one of them. In this case the issue of neutrality comes to the fore. IGAD must worry especially about under-interpreting the views of his or her own group, while perhaps over-interpreting the views of the other.

The goals of the conflict resolution are to assist severely alienated parties who find themselves in conflict to analyse the causes of their conflict, and to imagine methods of reconstructing or replacing the systems that are generating it. This includes costing various conflict resolving options, and implementing the decisions made. Unlike a mediator in dispute settlement who assists parties to agreement within an existing framework of social norms and institutions, IGAD would have to assume the task of helping the contestants to create a new social contract capable of satisfying long-term human needs. The aim is to facilitate social transformation with the minimum amount of violence (Rubenstein 1993: 153).

Traditional concepts such as law and order, the common good, majority decision-making, democracy, the right to rule and expected obedience are often at the root of conflict situations. The authorities that deny people identity and development, and attempt to

impose the norms of the powerful are in themselves a source of conflict. Conflicts persist not only because of the inadequate methods that are adopted in dealing with them, but the traditional processes of power bargaining and mediation are themselves an additional reason for some conflicts to be protracted. Such processes often lead to temporary settlements without tackling the underlying issue. In the absence of a concomitant analytical conflict resolution, peace via force then becomes part of the way of life and makes any resolution all the more difficult (Burton 1987: 18).

According to Weeks (1992: 10), there are three levels in conflict. Level three is reached when parties in conflict come to a resolution that meets some individual and shared needs, results in mutual benefits and strengthens the relationship between the parties. Level two is reached when parties at odds come to some mutually acceptable agreements that settle a particular conflict for the time being, but do little to enhance the relationship beyond immediate concerns. Traditional, negotiating, mediation and arbitration patterns tend to reach this middle level of conflict resolution. Level one is reached when one party conquers the other, when one party submits to the demands of the other party, or when the relationship is dissolved with mutual damage (*See Figure Three*).

Figure Three: Conflict Resolution Theory Pyramid



Level Three: analytical, problem-solving

Level Two: negotiation, arbitration, mediation

Level One: force, domination

(Source: Weeks 1992:10)

The evolution and the survival of civilisations has always required the ability to adapt when changes occur. Many civilisations had built-in mechanisms for resistance to change. These worked well until the existing structures could no longer meet the challenge of competing ones. In the same way, leadership and elites seek to conserve existing roles and institutions by whatever power means are at their disposal until overcome by more powerful forces. It is important to know that the NIF government will not accept change easily. Societies have always been in potential conflict because some sections drive towards change to fulfil their human needs, while others fear this change

and see it as a threat to their interests. Change has traditionally been regarded as malign and anti-social (Burton 1987:19).

The conflict resolution processes can often only be effective when parties to disputes are helped to accurately cost the consequences of their resistance to change. In this sense, the processes of facilitated conflict resolution are designed to cut down the delays and upheavals that occur in change, and to speed up the evolutionary process toward greater fulfilment of societal needs (Burton 1987:19).

If peaceful and predictable means of bringing about change are seen as realistic, many areas of conflict in the world would no longer need the intervention of large foreign powers to resolve them. Furthermore, if the large foreign powers in the world helped each other to change without picking on each other's weaknesses, none would feel the need to crush another, which might lead to a desperate act of survival on the part of one power.

An incorrect definition of the cause of a serious conflict leads to the adoption of measures to manage that conflict that are inconsistent with its realities. The measures are therefore likely to be unsuccessful. If a conflict is caused by an irrepressible need for identity and cultural security, but defined and treated as one stemming from aggressiveness, the likely outcome will be protracted and escalating conflict (Burton 1987:21).

The war in Sudan involves fragmented decision-makers and disorganised forces directed against civilian populations (Miall 1999: 16). This internal conflict reflects a breakdown

in the state of Sudan, which implies the disappearance of structures through which internal power balances are organised. Whereas classical conflict resolution was mainly concerned with entry into the conflict itself and with how to enable the parties involved in violent conflict to resolve the issues between them in non-violent ways, the contemporary approach is to take a wider view of the timing of the intervention. It suggests that efforts to resolve conflict should be maintained even in the heat of battle. These efforts are also relevant right until the post-settlement phase, when peace building must address the continuing issues arising from the conflict.

Notes

1. Manifest conflict process is a situation in which at least two actors, (or their representatives), try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by undermining either directly or indirectly, the goal-seeking capability of the other (Sandole 1980;1986).

2. Aggressive manifest conflict process is a situation in which at least two actors, (or their representatives), try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by physically damaging or destroying the property and high value symbols of one another (Sandole 1980; 1986).

Chapter Three
Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Sudan: The Role of IGAD.

Introduction

Several theories have been put forward to explain the causes of conflicts and how conflicts could be resolved. The theoretical explanations for the causes of conflict in Sudan are structural. This chapter will elaborate on the role of the third party in conflict resolution. The main role of the third party in an analytical problem solving process is that of facilitator. In the case of IGAD, a sub-committee comprising Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea were delegated to resolve the conflict.

The IGAD Objectives and Structure

In April 1996, IGAD council of ministers identified three priority areas of cooperation: conflict prevention, resolution and management, and humanitarian affairs. The latter included infrastructure, development (transportation and communication) food security and environmental protection. IGAD's vision is based on government resolutions to tackle the present and future challenges of the region more efficiently, and enable the sub-region to interact and compete in the global economy. The sub-region has abundant natural and human resources that could be developed and exploited to propel the sub-region to collective self-reliance where peace and security prevails.

The IGAD structure is composed of four main organs. These are the Assembly of Heads of State, the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors and the Secretariat.

(See Figure four).

Figure Four: The IGAD Structure



(Source: IGAD 1999)

The Assembly of Heads of State and government meet at least once a year and is the supreme organ of the assembly. The Council of Ministers is composed of ministers of foreign affairs and one other focal minister designated by each member state and meets at least twice a year. A sub-committee was formed by this council in 1999 to resolve the Sudanese conflict. It has representatives from Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Committee of Ambassadors, comprising IGAD member states' ambassadors or plenipotentiaries for the country of IGAD's headquarters, advises and guides the secretariat on realizing the work plan approved by the Council of Ministers and on the interpretation of policies and guidelines which may require further elaboration. The

Secretariat is the executive appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and government for a term of four years. This term is renewable once. The Secretariat, in addition to the office of the Executive Secretary, has three divisions, namely economic cooperation, agriculture and environment and political/ humanitarian affairs (IGAD 1999).

IGAD Partners

The IGAD Partner's Forum is chaired by Italy and Norway. This is a body of developed countries that have focused international attention on the peace process and provide support. Peace talks have continued for years but there has been little appreciable progress beyond agreement to aim to preserve the unity of the country, the adoption of the federal system of government and the correction of past inequalities in economic and social development (Field 2000).

IGAD partners include the international financial institutions, the UN agencies, the European Union (EU), bilateral colleagues, for example the United States and NGOs (*USAID* 1999). The United States government provides significant technical assistance to IGAD. It has donated $300,000 to the IGAD emergency fund, which was set up to cope with wars and disasters. The US also earmarked $ 7.4 million over five years for the development of regional capacity for conflict management (*The Monthly Review* 1998).

Other US government funding is directed towards humanitarian affairs, which has increased significantly each year since 1991(USAID, 1999). USAID/OFDA assistance is channelled through 35 NGOs that address humanitarian needs such as health,

water/sanitation, food security, food distribution, agriculture, humanitarian transport and general relief support. These NGOs play an important role in the Sudanese conflict. The IGAD region has one of the highest proliferation of NGOs in Africa.

US policy in Sudan aims to combat terrorism and regional extremism, and support means to end the civil war. It also calls for respect for human rights, and ending the humanitarian crisis (US Department of State, 1995:6). The August 1998 US bombing of a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum suspected of producing chemical weapons was carried out within the context of this policy (Adar, 1999:4). The bombing was a response to the terrorist attacks on American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Tanzania, which killed nearly 300 people and injured over 5,000.

The EU covers twelve projects, which are at different levels of formulation or implementation. The projects at the implementation stage are: publication of technical documents relating to food security and environmental protection, training in grain marketing, early warning for food security, natural disaster early warning systems, and awareness raising projects for household energy conservation. At the formulation stage are: the creation of trans-boundary livestock disease control systems, and capacity building projects in conflict prevention, resolution and management. Other projects are in the infrastructure development sector.

In addition to the EU funded projects, there are other projects funded bilaterally or multilaterally by countries in the EU. These include:

- strengthening of documentation and information services in IGAD region (the Netherlands)
- promoting environmental education (Sweden and the Netherlands)
- creating integrated regional information systems (Italy and the United States)
- human resource capacity building with technical assistance from Germany.

There is also a resident EU technical advisor at the IGAD secretariat.

The Peace Process

Several steps have been taken by IGAD to resolve the conflict in Sudan. These are: (1) Establishment of an IGAD committee on Sudan under the chairmanship of Kenya; (2) Organisation of peace negotiations between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A;(3) Launching shuttle diplomacy for peace talks sessions. The mediators' objective has largely been to bring the parties together to talk without getting too involved in the issues dividing them. The assumption is that once the parties begin to talk, they will identify the issues, clarify their positions and eventually compromise (Deng 1997:13).

There was some hope for the peace process in May 1994 when the government, the SPLM/A and the SPLM/A-United signed a declaration of principles that would constitute the basis for resolving the conflict. The declaration covered issues of self-determination, recognition of racial, ethnic, cultural and religious diversity, legal political and social

equality, a secular and democratic state, freedom of belief and worship, independence of the judiciary and a guarantee of human rights. Although the accord was signed, the peace talks stalled because the NIF government was unwilling to compromise. The IGAD attempts at conflict resolution again failed in 1999 for the same reason: the NIF refused to compromise on fundamental issues such as separation of religion from state, and self-determination among others (Field 2000:29). In July 19-23, 1999, members of the IGAD ministerial sub-committee agreed to establish a permanent secretariat to facilitate issues and continue negotiations to resolve the conflict (Godana 1999).

Many mediators have worked hard to bring peace to Sudan. In 1992 and 1993, the then Nigerian president Ibrahim Babangida, as head of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), attempted to broker an agreement between the belligerents. However, fundamental differences prevented any agreement from being realised. The presidents of Egypt, Libya and East Africa assumed a mediation role. They felt obliged to resolve the conflict because it had become regional and threatened to destabilise their own regimes. Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi chaired the standing committee on peace in Sudan. The committee, which was created in 1993, included the presidents of Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda. Unfortunately, the committee made no breakthrough to peace.

Other efforts to resolve the conflict are conducted by churches from the US in conjunction with the New Sudan Council of Churches in Sudan. These conflict resolution strategies encompass "people-to-people" peace initiatives. One of the more successful of these initiatives occurred following the 1991 split within the ranks of the SPLM/A. This

involved John Garang and Riek Machar, and led to frequent serious conflicts involving Garang's SPLA and Machar's Southern Sudanese Independence Movement/ Southern Sudanese Independence Army (SSIM/SSIA)[1]. The most serious confrontation between the two movements which occurred in 1992-1993 claimed over 20,000 lives and displaced more than 300,000 Nuers and Dinkas, particularly around Ayod, Kongor and Waat (Jonglei Province). Traditional chiefs along the borders of the Nuers and Dinkas have played important roles in resolving conflicts between the two communities, the most notable one being the 1986-1987 SPLA/ Anya Nya 11 union (Adar, 2000:21). This "people-to-people" initiative involving chiefs, women and religious bodies, particularly the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), brought together the warring factions in the 1990s. Some of the incentives of the "people-to-people" conflict resolution initiatives are that it has increased access to fishing sites, farmland, grazing areas and trade as well as facilitated the establishment of border courts and the return of captured women and children.

The January 1999 Wunlit Dinka-Nuer Covenant brokered by the NSCC and funded by the Sudan Transition Assistance Rehabilitation (STAR) programme is another example of a "people-to-people" conflict resolution initiative. The Wunlit Covenant was signed by over 300 chiefs from the Dinkas and Nuers in the presence of the SPLA commander Slava Kiir (a Dinka from Gogrial region) and Bishop Monsignor Caesar Mazzorali of the Catholic Diocese of Rumbek (*Horn of Africa Bulletin*, march-April 1999:23). The NSCC has since embarked on the mission of expanding the "people-to-people" peace process to

other areas, culminating in the Waat-Lou Nuer Covenant in November 1999 signed by Nuer leaders in Upper Nile region (Adar 2000a: 21).

Problems facing the IGAD peace process

Burton's (1987) theoretical considerations for successful conflict resolution suggest that the IGAD peace process faces several problems. Chief among them is the fact that the belligerents have not honoured the cease-fires. The belligerents have broken several cease-fires hence rendering many efforts to resolve the conflict futile. In normal resolution of hot conflicts, it is important to have a cease-fire in order that constructive analysis of the problems can proceed (Burton 1987). Figure five shows how the establishment of a cease-fire is key to the conflict resolution process.

Figure Five: Conflict Dynamics and Conflict Resolution

Source: Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 16

IGAD is at the conflict transformation stage of peacemaking. It is worth noting that peacekeeping has been ignored in the IGAD process. It is also important to note that belligerents have broken cease-fires. Therefore, IGAD's entry point needs to be re-examined. It would be appropriate for IGAD to be involved at all levels from peace building, conflict prevention, peace keeping, peacemaking back to peace building.

IGAD's lack of resources contravenes Burton's (1987) rule of sponsorship, which stipulates that a sponsor should not approach parties to a dispute with a view to facilitating a resolution, unless the sponsor can provide facilitators who possess the required training and skills. This rule also applies to availability of financial resources. According to Burton (1987), the sponsor should approach the parties in conflict when sure of the fact that it is possible to stay with the situation until the services offered are no longer required. There is lack of resources at national and donor levels in the case of IGAD. Some member states are unable to pay their annual contribution regularly, which in turn has an impact on the donor's support. There is also a lack of capacity both at the sub-regional and national levels at the IGAD secretariat. The secretariat is faced with financial constraints, making the hiring of consultants to assist the core staff difficult. The member states often do not have the capacity to implement sub-regional, regional and international peace initiatives to parallel their own.

There is a lack of coordination and transparency throughout attempts at achieving peace in Sudan. Overlapping policies and institutions both at the regional and national levels further complicates this. There is also lack of democratisation and grassroots-level

participation in project formulation and implementation. Lack of peace and security in the sub-region has greatly affected food security, environmental protection, and the overall sustainable development of the sub-region (*UNEP* 1999).

The structure of the peace process is cumbersome, requiring the simultaneous presence of five foreign ministers with the attending complications and time pressures this entails. The process has no functional secretariat to follow up results of the meetings and prepare for further rounds. With the ministers pressed for time, the sessions have been too brief, leaving little time for an in-depth exploration of positions, and the intervals between rounds too long.

The definition of borders is another issue blocking the peace progress. At the centre of controversy are the borders of the Nuba Mountains of Southern Kordofan, the Ingassana Hills of southern Blue Nile, and the Dinka area of Abyei now administered as part of southern Kordofan. The government insisted on the 1956 borders, which excluded these areas. The position of the Nuba has never been clarified within IGAD peace process or the Operation LifeLine Sudan (OLS). Although IGAD has a mandate to end the war, and the Nuba Mountains are a major war zone, attention to the Nuba issue has not been balanced (de Waal 1997).

According to SPLM/A, the unity of Sudan has to be based on the condition that the government of Sudan must separate religion from state. Complete equality of all people in Sudan must be guaranteed by law, a secular and democratic Sudan must be established

and the nation's wealth must be fairly shared. These are conditions that the government of Sudan is not ready to accept (Alor Kuol 1999). In the Juba conference of 1947, the parliamentary negotiations leading to unanimous agreement on the declaration of independence, the 1965 round table conference and the 1972 Addis Ababa negotiations, the North made promises, which appeared to effectively address the grievances of the South and therefore provide a basis for a lasting solution. In nearly all these situations the north never intended to honour the promises of the agreement (Deng 1997:1).

The centrality of Sudan, geographically, racially and culturally between Africa and the Middle East, widens the scope of linkages and interests, while at the same time, it places the country at the margins of spheres of influence. This raises complex issues of identity that are difficult to mediate or resolve (Deng; 1997: 1-2). For example, regional actors do not support the concept of self-determination that might lead to a partitioning of the country. Egypt has campaigned vigorously against self-determination because of its own strategic water interests, its desire to protect the Arab-Islamic identity of Sudan, and its historical ties with Sudan. Egypt also has geological interests in the country, and the region at large. The creation of a non- Arab state in the Upper Nile would clash with these interests.

Differences between the mediators on the pace, modalities and even the objectives of their mediation effort have contributed to the paralysis of the peace process. Recent conflicts between the mediators themselves have further undermined the efficacy and credibility of the process. Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda have sometimes engaged Sudan

in low intensity conflict, with Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda remaining the main military and logistical supporters of the SPLA (Adar 1998:46). The NIF policy of Jihad is targeting Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Somalia (*Africa Confidential, 1995*:2-3). Eritrea and Uganda have both severed diplomatic relations with Sudan (Adar 1998:47). Eritrea is unhappy with the Sudanese support of the Eritrea Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and Uganda blames Sudan for giving military and logistical support to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) fighting to topple Yoweri Museveni's government (Adar 1998:47). Uganda therefore, gives military and logistical support to SPLA, with Kampala functioning as transit zone for SPLA arms deliveries (Adar 1998:47). Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda received over $20 million worth of arms from the US on behalf of the liberation movements in Sudan in 1996 (*Africa Confidential*, 1996:1).

Regional instability is another obstacle to peace in Sudan. Eritrea, which emerged from 30 years of war in 1991, entered into independence with a potential for self-reliance and political stability but faces an enormous challenge as it attempts to conquer chronic poverty, introduce democratic institutions, and reintegrate refugees from abroad. Ethiopia's minority government faces economic and political challenges as well as localized instability in some regions of the country. Ethiopia also faces chronic food shortages. Djibouti faces the obstacles of a tradition of corruption. Kenya is beset by chronic corruption. Sudan, whose government is considered "terrorist" by much of the international community, has spent more years at war than at peace since its independence in 1956. Instability is seen as a direct threat to regional peace and

prosperity. Sudan is dependent on international food aid. Somalia has yet to establish a central authority after the collapse of its central government in 1991 and anarchy continues to be a major constraint to regional economic integration. Uganda is witnessing conflict in the North and on its border with Congo. Corruption, and the reluctance of the government to permit greater political pluralism have provoked considerable discontent. Among all these country-specific problems, there is the general problem of drought in the region.

The exclusive nature of IGAD is yet another major obstacle in the peace process. Among the multinational companies (MNCs) (Mwangi 1996). The latter are a formidable force. Investing in communication and infrastructure has a direct benefit to the private sector, yet organizations with interests in these areas are not involved in the peace process.

According to Mwangi (1996), the problems of IGAD are a reflection of what ails Africa. The private sector is denied the prospects of providing solutions to fight social problems. The opportunities and responsibilities open to NGOs to get involved in various development programmes, in particular among the poor and marginalized groups, are closed to the private sector. Governments assume they must provide everything, but in several instances have failed to do so. Even where the private sector is prepared to be self-regulated, governments still want to be the sole actors in economic development, yet they expect to be propped up by external forces like multinational companies (Mwangi 1996). This attitude fuels many wars in Africa, especially in Sudan.

Economic, political and strategic implications of the oil issue have seriously compounded and exacerbated the conflict and led to a deterioration of the overall situation of human rights and the respect for humanitarian law, as well as diminishing the already slim chances for peace in Sudan (Franco 1999). The role of multinational companies in exploiting the oil is an issue, which the peace process should address if tangible progress is to be realised. Oil was first discovered in Sudan in 1978 by Chevron (Sorenson 1995: 21-22). Since then, oil has been blamed for the escalation of the war (Franco 1999; Field 2000). The Greater Nile Oil Project (GNOP) is the main consortium responsible for oil production and exploration in Sudan. It is comprised of four companies that control 12.2 million acres of concession land. The stakeholders in this consortium are the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), which has the largest stake with 40 percent followed by Malaysia's Petronas Carigali with 30 percent, Canadian-based Talisman Energy with 25 percent and Sudan's National Oil Company, Sudapet with 5 percent. The consortium is committed to drilling 30 new development wells and 21 exploration wells. Approximately $1 billion was invested in building an oil pipeline and another $600 million in building an oil refinery 70 km north of Khartoum at al-Jayli. Other companies have also contributed money with a promise of a share in future oil revenues. The Chinese, the Germans, Argentineans and the British have been involved. The Chinese have been involved in supplying and laying of the pipeline, the Argentineans have been responsible for telecommunications, the Germans have provided equipment and the British have supplied power generators (Company News 1998).

The International Petroleum Company (IPC) of Canada and others have been operating in areas congruent to those of GNOP. The IPC is a subsidiary of the Swedish-based Lundian oil, and has a 40 percent stake. The other partners in this group are Petronas of Malaysia with 28 percent, OMV of Austria with 27 percent and Sudapet with 5 percent. The operations of the members of this group are largely confined to exploration. The Netherlands-based Trafigura Beheer BV won a three month marketing contract with the GNOP (Dow Jones Business News 1999).

The relationship between the GNOP and the NIF government has been symbiotic. The GNOP companies are interested in oil and the NIF government is interested in arms. The NIF government made sure that its choice of companies could fulfil its need for arms (Field 2000: 11). The Chinese, Malaysians and Canadian companies met this criterion. The Canadian-based company Talisman has the technology and the necessary financial backing that is needed to prospect for oil. Talisman also provided the technical and managerial skills needed to get the project underway. The project has turned out to be lucrative: industry forecasts predict that production from the project will increase from 32,000 barrels per day in 1999 to 150,000 barrels per day in 2000, 165,000 barrels per day in 2001 and 190,000 barrels per day in 2002 (Ollenberger 1999: 2). Sudan's oil and gas reserves are estimated at 700 million barrels and 86 billion cubic metres (0.06 % of the world's reserve) (Adar 2000a).

China appears to have become one of Khartoum's greatest allies. China is desperately in need of a secure source of oil in the long-term, while Sudan needs the external credit,

investment and market for oil. China has invested heavily in Sudan, and is thus keen to make sure the NIF stays in power. The Sudanese government is indebted to the Chinese government and has also brokered oil deals with the Chinese where they will be repaid for their substantial investment in the oil industry in the form of future oil deliveries. The SPLM/A on its part has made it clear that it would not honour these deals when it takes over Southern Sudan (Field 2000:15).

Petronas Carigali is a state owned company. Its operations essentially an extension of the Malaysian government's foreign economic policy (Field 2000:18). Sudan's Islamic banks have been involved in Malaysia since the NIF took power in 1989. In 1997, Malaysia paid $500 million to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on behalf of Sudan in order to cover some of Sudan's debt payments (Field 2000:18). Apart from the oil, Malaysia is venturing into the transportation system in Sudan. Other projects have also been initiated, for example, the Malaysian oil palm plantation project in Sudan and setting up of power generation plants (STAR 1999). Malaysia has also covertly transferred arms to Sudan (Field 2000: 19).

It is clear that the actors in the Sudanese conflict are not just the SPLM/A and the government as the IGAD-sponsored peace process would have us believe. The actors in this conflict are both internal and external. The problem with IGAD is its narrow perspective of who is to be included in the talks. This is a realist perspective of power play, which was very common during the Cold War era. Figure six over the page shows how narrow IGAD's concept of the situation in Sudan really is.

Figure Six: The IGAD Peace Perspective



The inner circle constitutes the key players in the IGAD peace process. Here, they are shown as the government of Sudan and SPLM/A. Not shown in this circle are the other important actors, such as the opposition parties in the North, namely the Umma party, the Democratic Unionist party, the Beja people or the Nuba people. The perspective does not include other rebel movements such as the Southern Sudan Independent Movement/Army (SSIM/A) among others. The outer circle shows those organisations that are peripheral, but nonetheless essential to sustainable conflict resolution. The role of religious institutions such as the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) would be very important in the IGAD peace process. Other important actors that have been neglected in this perspective are the multinational companies. The IGAD perspective is thus too narrow, both in terms of the inner circle of key participants, and the outer circle of peripheral organisations. To be more realistic, it needs to be bigger, and to include more of the parties mentioned in this chapter and the next.

Notes

1. Garang and Machar's differences emanate from the fact that Machar believes in the principle of secession of the South from the North, while Garang believes in the principle of a united Sudan in which all economic resources are fairly enjoyed by all Sudanese irrespective of which region they come from or what religion they follow. It has also been argued that their differences are ethnically related. Garang comes from the Dinka ethnic group while Machar comes from the Nuer. Machar feels that Garang's leadership is dictatorial and discriminatory against the Nuer.

Chapter Four
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

The Sudanese conflict revolves around the following superficial issues: the separation of religion from the state, the unity of Sudan, and the self-determination or independence of the South. Two core issues lie behind the superficial ones. The first is good governance, which should be representative and inclusive of all Sudanese regardless of religion or race. The second is the economic resources of the South, especially the oil. The conflict in Sudan is based mainly on the SPLM/A call for a united Sudan in which good governance prevails, and the Sudanese government's unwillingness to separate religion from the state. It is stipulated in this thesis that the Sudanese problem is a national problem and that the above-mentioned issues are ontological and need an analytical problem-solving approach rather than the state-centric approach being followed by IGAD. The Sudanese problem also requires the international community to take a more proactive role. War has raged in Sudan since 1955, and continues to this day apart from a brief interlude between 1972 and 1983. Approximately 2 million people have lost their lives and another 4 million people have been displaced.

Conflict resolution is a comprehensive term, which implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict, (such as the separation of religion from state in Sudan), are addressed and resolved. Conflict resolution implies that behaviour from all sides is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile and the structure of conflict has been changed. The term is used to refer both to the process (or intention) to bring about these changes and the completion of the process. It is in this regard that IGAD's efforts to date should be acknowledged. However, because IGAD follows a state-centric approach, it lacks the

capacity to handle the conflict alone. IGAD must be restructured to conform to the realities of the post-Cold War era and follow the Burtonian problem-solving approach. IGAD is a collection of states with attitudes towards one another reminiscent of those found in the power struggles of the Cold War. These attitudes need to be changed to ones of pluralistic thinking and cooperation.

Five problems facing IGAD have been raised in the thesis. These problems include, but are not limited to, the honouring of cease-fires, neutrality of IGAD member states, the inflexibility of the IGAD structure, finance and an inclusive peace process. All these problems can be solved and the peace process can still be under the auspices of IGAD since it still remains the most appropriate body to resolve the Sudanese conflict. This is because IGAD operates under a regionalist paradigm of conflict resolution, and regionalism is an effective way to approach conflicts like the Sudanese one for reasons stated in chapters one and two.

The issue of cease-fires is imperative for any analytical problem-solving process to proceed. It is extremely difficult to even discuss let alone resolve problems while fighting simultaneously. It is therefore imperative that a cease-fire be observed by the parties in conflict as a prelude to resolution of their problems. AU peace-keeping forces from countries other than IGAD member countries could monitor the cease-fires. This is because the IGAD member countries are themselves locked in disputes with Sudan. Forces from other African countries would be more likely to be seen as neutral. It is also important that the UN plays a proactive role at the international level by urging states that

are funding the belligerents to stop doing so, so that peace can be achieved and sustained in Sudan. It is equally important that these states and the multi-national companies involved are informed of the possible dividends of peace in Sudan.

The setting up of a sub-committee to resolve the Sudanese war, comprising Uganda, Kenya, Eritrea and Ethiopia would be a good step forward. Specialists in conflict resolution would be needed to run the sub-committee, and to ensure that issues are discussed in a professional manner without political prejudice. They would also need to ensure that all groups that have interests in Sudan are approached and included in the peace process. The specialists should be able to devote more time to their work unlike the politicians whose schedules are already tight. Conflict is best resolved by entrusting its resolution to experts. They operate with the intention of resolving conflict as an end in itself, as opposed to working towards maintaining power and assets for themselves.

The specialists will also have to get involved in fundraising. The international community has already shown interest in the Sudanese war therefore fundraising would not be a problem. In this case, the financial problem that IGAD is facing could be resolved. The specialists could also convince the international community to actively get involved in resolving the Sudanese conflict. The US and the EU have already devoted a lot of money into the region. What is needed is a more efficient, transparent and accountable system to give confidence to donors that money contributed to the peace process would not be misappropriated. Professional financial monitoring under the auspices of IGAD would be one way to secure this confidence. It is also important to try to bring the multi-national

corporations with interests in Sudan to fund the peace process. They would need to be shown that there is more to be gained in terms of investment in a peaceful rather than a turbulent Sudan. The need for restructuring the organs of the peace process is clear. Figure seven illustrates a possible model that a restructuring could work towards.

Figure Seven: A New Approach to the Sudanese Civil War



The UN would take a more proactive role in mobilising the international community to respond positively in encouraging peace to prevail in Sudan and the AU would provide peacekeeping forces. All the actors would act in conjunction with the sub-committee on Sudan, whose task would be to hold inclusive peace talks. With a restructuring of the peace process, and a firm commitment by the parties involved, it might finally be possible for all the peoples of Sudan to begin to enjoy the benefits of a lasting peace.

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