

**Regional thickening as game-changing:
Examining transnational activities of
gender and women-focused civil society
actors for region-building in Southern
Africa**

By

Cecilia Lwiindi Nedziwe

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DEDICATION

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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that norms, in general, have proliferated in a neo-liberalising context since the 1990s, in particular norms on gender, and how they have changed to indicate new agency and influence, amounts to game change. Despite growing transnational activities, regionalisation and the increasing interface between state and non-state regionalism in a transnational context since the advent of liberalisation and democratisation, analyses in regional International Relations (IR) studies, so far, largely maintain linear logic. The increasing non-state processes, and their connection to state processes in norm creation, norm adaptation, norm diffusion and implementation around broad questions of security including in the area of gender, amount to regional thickening. Regional thickening revealed in terms of increasing regionalisation, regionalism, and region-ness whose effect is game-changing challenges mainstream linear approaches in regional IR studies. Game-changing here, refers to, processes promoting the development of norms mentioned above in the interest of contributing to improved security across a region. This study is focused on Southern Africa, defined here, as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. This study's analytical approach is informed by alternatives to mainstream approaches, emphasising processes, rather than linearity inherent in regional IR studies. By privileging the actual game-changing processes, interactions, and agency around the norm development cycle, this study examines how regional thickening in a transnational context promotes game-changing activities, promoting the development of the norm cycle, seeking to have improved security. A mixed method approach involving gathering of information from multiple primary and secondary sources are used. The study found transnational activities and regionalisation of gender and women-focused civil society actors, game-changing. These civil society actors organised in two ways. First, by way of advocacy and in seeking representation within intergovernmental policymaking structures at a regional level. Second, by way of organising around transnational communities in a transnational context in the interest of addressing gendered insecurities at localised levels. Regional thickening as game-changing here pointed to a growing recognition and participation of civil society actors in intergovernmental policymaking spaces as having created a groundswell for game change at localised levels. This led to policy development, adaptation, diffusion, and implementation by both state and non-state actors contributing to norm changes, improved social policies, and to greater security. The actual changes emerging from these actors' activities on the ground are in terms of unlearning patriarchal behaviours, opening up development for women, and increasing their living standards, education, health, and their freedom. In assessing the transnational environment on gendered insecurity in Southern Africa, this thesis developed an innovative framework of regional thickening as game-changing. This framework plots how game-changing developed, evolved, and its importance in addressing gendered insecurity. The thesis has proposed that game-changing transnational activities and regionalisation that change, and diffuse norms to break learnt behaviour, have helped disrupt rigid institutionalisation, and are aiding to bring non-linear discourses to the fore.

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

ACHPR	African Commission on Human and People's Rights
AFRODAD	Africa Forum and Network on Debt and Development
AIC	African Instituted Churches
ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
AWID	Association for Women's Rights
BOCONGO	Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organisations
BDPfA	Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action
BOCISCOZ	Botswana Civil Society Solidarity Coalition for Zimbabwe
CAF	Central African Federation
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women
CNC	Continental Non-State Actors Coalition
COE	Centre of Excellence
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CONSAS	Constellation of Southern African States
CPIA	Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSW	Commission on the Status of Women
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union

FBO	Faith-Based Organisations
FEMNET	African Women's Development and Communication Network
FLS	Front-Line States
FPFE	Federation Pour la Promotion Feminine et Enfante
FTA	Free Trade Area
GEMAG	Global Alliance on Media and Gender
GEMSA	Gender and Media Southern Africa
GEPPF	Gender, Economic Policies and Public Finance
GL	Gender Links
HBI	Historically Black Institutions
ICU	Industrial and Commercial Workers Union
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IR	International Relations
ISDSC	Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
LGBTI	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIC	Middle Income Country
MOU	Memoranda of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NGOCC	Non-Governmental Organisations Coordinating Council
NRA	New Regionalism Approach
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OP	Optional Protocol
OPDS	The Organ for Peace, Defence and Security

PTA	Preferential Trade Area
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategy Development Plan
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADC-CNGO	SADC Council of NGOs
SADC-PF	SADC Parliamentary Forum
SAfAIDS	The Southern Africa HIV/AIDS Information and Dissemination Service
SAHO	South African History Online
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SAT	Southern African Trust
SATUCC	Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SDI	Strategic Development Initiatives
SERG	Social Economic Research Group
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
SRHR	Sexual Reproductive Health Rights
SGP	SADC Gender Policy
The Alliance	The Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance
UBLS	University of Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho
UBS	University of Botswana and Swaziland
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
VSO	Voluntary Services Overseas

WARESA	Women and Resources Eastern and Southern Africa
WiLDAF	Women in Law and Development in Africa
WLSA	Women and Law in Southern Africa
WTO	World Trade Organisation
YWCA	Young Women's Christian Association
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZARD	Zambia Association for Research and Development
ZCC	Zion Christian Church
ZWRCN	Zimbabwe Women's Resource Centre and Network

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

1.1 General introduction

Since the 1990s, the opening up of democratic spaces has been characterised by growing transnational activities and regionalisation of non-state actors. In Southern Africa, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) began to recognise civil society actors and to integrate and prioritise gender and women issues within its policymaking structures.¹ This was helped by the formulation of norms at a global level which could be diffused back in regional and national policies, leading to greater non-state activity in the SADC area. This was done firstly, through the establishment of an eminent group of commissioners in the early 1990s, to review the situation of women across the region. Secondly, there was the creation of a task force in the post-1995 Beijing International Women's Conference, to draft a Regional Plan of Action, to begin to address gendered insecurities across Southern Africa. Finally, the holding of the first meeting of the SADC Ministers Responsible for Women and Gender Affairs in 1997 (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:34). The changing character and move to recognise non-state actors in region-building – as encapsulated in the 1992 Windhoek Treaty – further opened up space for civil society groupings with gender and women focus, to begin to participate within SADC's inter-state policymaking architecture, as well as towards a growing gender transnationalism (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:34). This was contrary to the 1980s, after Zimbabwe's independence characterised by inward nationalistic tendencies, whereby, regional women's organisations efforts to push for a regional gender desk to be established within the policy structures of SADC's predecessor – the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) – went unnoticed (Geisler, 2004).

¹ Here the conception of Southern Africa refers to the socially constructed and evolving Southern African Development Community (SADC) region constituting 15-member states namely: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Transnational activities here are constituted by multiple processes and interactions of non-state actors from more than one society across national boundaries seeking to address common (social) insecurities across a region. These transnational processes and interactions are either planned (structured or organised), or unplanned (less structured or organised) in an issue area, or in a particular field. Further, these are carried by non-state actors coming from civil society actors, individuals, and markets. Non-state actors in a transnational context have organised in complex transnational communities outside state formal policymaking frameworks, or they have engaged with state actors and their regional organisations. States primarily participate in transnational activities by engaging with non-state actors or through promoting and funding non-state actors, thereby creating a non-state actor framework, provided for, by IGOs.

The evolving transnational activities amount to regional thickening in terms of growing regionalisation, regionalism, and region-ness whose effect is game-changing. Game-changing, in turn, constitutes growing transnational processes and interactions promoting norm development, adaptation, diffusion and implementation leading to changed behaviours, social change, norm changes, development, and to greater (social) security across a region (Bach 2012; Brosig 2013; Bøås, Marchand, and Shaw, 2003). Regional thickening as game-changing points to growing recognition and participation of non-state actors outside and in formal inter-state policymaking structures. While the notion of security in IR discourses has generally been rooted in a logic of traditional state-centrism since the 1990s, alternatives have emerged bringing aspects of the non-military discourse to the fore. This study adopts the expanded notion of security, defining gender security from states and/or non-state actors processes from efforts to seek to minimise social, political, economic, and cultural inequalities, marginalisation, and differences (Tickner, 1992; 2001; Brosig, 2013).

The growing transnational activities outside formal inter-state processes, have increasingly fed into non-state participation in IGOs, challenge persistent state-centrism narratives in regional IR studies. The map of transnational activities and regionalisation, for example, reveals increasing interface between state and non-state regionalism pursuing gender security within SADC's policymaking structures since the 1990s. These processes and interactions gradually culminated in the development of three key regional policies on gender that all sought to address gendered insecurities in Southern Africa: the first regional gender policy – the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development – which sought to contribute to security through fostering closer regional cooperation, and collective action to ensure gender equality in the region (SADC Declaration 1997). Through this regional document, member states committed to establish regional advisory structures with governments and Non-governmental

organisations (NGOs) to monitor gender and women-related concerns across the region, as well as to establish a Gender Unit within the SADC Secretariat (SADC Declaration Addendum, 1998). In 1998, an Addendum, which formed a central part of the 1997 Declaration, was developed. The 1998 Addendum among others committed to the prevention and eradication of violence against women and children. Article 26 of the Addendum pointed to the critical need of urgently putting in place a legally binding SADC gender instrument to prevent violence against women and children (SADC Declaration Addendum, 1998).

Over time, the growing interface between non-state and state regionalism have thus resulted in increasing norms within the SADC. For example, after their inclusion by the Botswana-based SADC Secretariat to participate in the 2003 review process of the 1997 Declaration and its Addendum, civil society groupings began to play multiple advocacy roles. The organisation of civil society actors within and outside formal inter-state structures led to the development and adoption of SADC's first legally binding policy, the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development of 2008 (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:12-13). Like the 1997 Declaration and its Addendum of 1998, the 2008 Protocol on Gender emerged from a combination of non-state processes outside formal structures, and from their interface with state regionalism within SADC's policymaking structures in the interest of reducing gendered insecurities in Southern Africa (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:14-20). To promote greater security across the region, the 2008 Protocol on Gender sought to integrate gender in all SADC's policymaking and implementation (SADC Gender Protocol, 2008).

The 2008 Gender Protocol provided for steps to increase gender security through the empowerment of women, the elimination of all forms of discrimination in order to achieve gender equality, and to diffuse its content into legislation, programmes and projects, particularly at the national level (SADC Gender Protocol 2008). Further, the norm cycle on gender issues involving norm development, norm adaptation, norm diffusion and norm implementation, points to its link to evolving global, regional, and local policies. The 2008 SADC Gender Protocol was aligned to the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of 1979, and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2000, including its targets and timeframes up to 2015. As the expiration date of the MDGs was approaching 2015, regional gender and women-focused civil society groups began to push for a review of the 2008 Gender Protocol, to be in line with the changing global, continental, and regional norms (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:14).

In the aftermath of the 2008 regional policy, the Post-2015 Protocol on Gender and Development emerged from processes and interactions both within and outside inter-state policy structuring spaces. Similar, to the 2008 Gender Protocol, SADC's Post-2015 gender policy is equally shaped by global and continental norms, such as the 2015-2030 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Beijing Plus 20 of 2015, the African Union's Agenda 2063, as well as, by SADC's 27 protocols (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016: 11-14). In line with the evolving norms, the Post-2015 Gender Protocol embraced a spirit of the SDGs of "Leaving No One Behind". This Protocol committed to the values of including within processes and interactions, those often neglected issues and/or communities, such as, those advanced by the transnational queer movement on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) rights.

While not widely spread, there is a notable shift in the conception of gender within the evolving norm architecture globally that goes beyond the rigid binaries dominant in feminist scholarship (see Amadiume, 1987b). In addition, new issue areas, such as a provision on gender and climate change were included in the Post-2015 Gender Protocol. There was further a notable softening of the regions gendered structures, resulting in growing non-state regionalisation, and the increasing interface between non-state-state regionalism stabilising gendered insecurities, as well as, to the impressive growth of gender transnationalism. Yet, while the norm cycle on gender has thickened over time since democratisation and liberalisation of the 1990s, the implementation of these norms from some African governments have been lamentably slow, rendering the process meaningless in some cases.

Since 2016, nationalistic hegemonic tendencies in terms of state relation with non-state relations within SADC's policymaking structures began to re-surface in the region. The drawback towards nationalistic tendencies seemingly point to retrogressive changes. They seek to roll-back as regards to non-state participation within SADC's policymaking structures, developed since the 1990s that have been rooted in a collective region-building, particularly in the area of gender (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer. 2017:335). If left unchecked, these tendencies may potentially impact negatively on the efficacy around collective efforts to promote greater security in various issue areas across Southern Africa. In a seeming contradiction to these developments, the counter-tendencies remain strong and alive. For example, a process towards re-engagement with civil society by the SADC Secretariat was commissioned in 2016 (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2017:335; Interview with R, Senior Officer, SADC Gender Unit, 6.09.2016, Gaborone, Botswana). The re-engagement

process seeks to consult widely with various stakeholders within, and outside Southern Africa, in order to develop a legal framework agreement to guide non-state participation within SADC's structuring sites (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2017:336.) The need for clear modalities for non-state participation within inter-governmental structures is also stressed in civil society policy research reports and academic discourse (CCR, 2013:16; Mbuende, 2012). The legal framework being developed is necessary, because it indicates game-changing (qualitative change), as it relates to non-state relations with states.

1.2 Research problem and aim of the study

Academic scholarship in regional IR studies is broadly embedded in mainstream Eurocentric and state-centric linear approaches to neo-functionalism and neo-institutionalism (Belassa, B. 1961; Nye, 1965). Since the advent of democratisation and liberalisation, with the end of the Cold War, changes have taken place in discourse in regional IR studies pointing to some shift from traditional state-centric logic, as well as, their territorial and economic elements. Seeking to move beyond state-centrism, the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) emerged in the 1990s, focusing on regionalisation and regionalism by non-state civil society actors (see Hettne 1999; Söderbaum, 2007; and Mittelman, 2000). The new regionalism scholars, such as, Boas, Marchand, and Shaw (1999) are, however, critical of the NRA in terms of its underlying linear approach to regionalism and regionalisation. The NRA scholarship has nevertheless shaped much of the research in regional IR studies, including analyses on Southern Africa (Söderbaum, 2007; Tsie, 1996; 1999; Mulaudzi, 2009; Blaauw, 2007).

Despite the growing transnational activities and regionalisation involving non-state actors that fed into formal inter-state norm development processes, and the interface between non-state and state regionalism in transnational environments at a regional level, analyses in regional IR studies, so far, largely maintain state-centric linearity (Khadiagala, 2012; Landsberg, 2012) or their economic elements (Amin, Chitala, and Mandaza, 1987; Nagar, 2012; Gibb, 2012; Lee, 2003) or on their state security frameworks (Bischoff, 2014). Where civil society transnational activities are noted, for example, on Southern Africa, analyses largely only locate these processes within the parameters of IGOs, or to the extent of their counter-resistance functions (Landsberg, 2012:33-34; Mbuende, 2012:56-57; Blaauw, 2007; Söderbaum, 2007). Yet, transnational activities and regionalisation take place regardless of formal regionalism, or formal intergovernmental organisations. These evolving non-state transnational processes, and their connection to state regionalism in norm creation, and their diffusion around broad

questions of security, including, in the area of gender, amounting to regional thickening, challenges rigid approaches. In Southern Africa, transnational activities and regionalisation of civil society actors take place, regardless of formal regionalism or their regional organisation. Their functions and roles have also been multiple and not limited to the dualistic narrative of hegemony, or counter-hegemony dominant in academic discourse on civil society.

Further, while gender and the political economy form part of the evolving global norm architecture, the scholarship mapping the actual processes, including the internal and external factors shaping the evolving norm cycle on gender remain overlooked. Furthermore, while civil society actors with a gender and women focus are participating in international relations, they, however, remain generally marginalised in much of the academic discourses in regional IR studies. There exist studies on regionalisation on Southern Africa that mention processes of gender and women civil society groupings, but these studies are not sufficient (Landsberg, 2006; Mbuende, 2012; Godsäter, 2009; 2012; 2015). One of the few studies of its kind looks at norms on gender as it relates to peace-building within the SADC gender norm architecture (Otitodun and Porter, 2012:107-121). This study, however, does not describe the actual processes that help develop these norms and the manner in which these contribute to greater security and development. While civil society groups with gender and women focus organise both outside and within inter-state policymaking structures, in a transnational environment are initiating and developing norms, and policies seeking to address gendered insecurities, there remains a dearth in analytical frameworks for examining these processes and interactions, and their game-changing effects.

By making visible transnational processes with gender and women focus, and developing a game-changing analytical framework, this study attempts to transcend linearity inherent in regional IR studies. The study's analytical approach is informed by alternatives to mainstream (neo-realism) and functionalism (neo-functionalism), emphasising processes rather than linearity. By privileging the actual game-changing processes and agency around the norm development cycle, overall, this study examines how regional thickening in a transnational context promotes game-changing activities, promoting the development of the norm cycle, seeking to have improved security. It argues that norms, in general, have proliferated in a neo-liberalising context since the 1990s, in particular norms on gender, and how they have changed to indicate new agency and influence, amounts to game change.

1.3 Research questions

By looking at the wider SADC regime, the following four research questions are addressed: -

- First, what drives transnational processes in Southern Africa's IR, in order to provide conceptual clarity and to develop an analytical framework for examining regional thickening as game-changing?
- Second, how have transnational activities evolved over time in the latter and better part of the 20th century in Southern Africa? This question is posed in order to draw attention to specific historical examples, regarding transnational communities in the colonial and post-colonial eras, how they organised, and the manner in which these promoted a regional thickening and game change that have influenced today's region-building.
- Third, how has regional thickening introduced the possibilities for game-change in order to show the multiple layers of non-state and/or state regionalisation and organisation taking place in a transnational environment around gendered questions?
- Fourth, how have transnational communities organised around gendered insecurities under the wider SADC regime in order to contribute to development and stabilisation at localised levels?

1.4 The objectives of the study

The study has four objectives which include:

- To create an innovative analytical framework for examining regional thickening as game-changing. Such a framework seeks to reveal how it developed, evolved and its growing importance in contributing to change and in addressing (social) insecurities. Further, such a framework aims to show in great detail how regional thickening introduced possibilities for game-change in which the stage is set for the processes and interactions to change from rigid institutionalisation, and to an increasing regionalisation, regionalisms and region-ness promoting development and stabilisation across a region.
- To map out regional thickening as game-changing, particularly by those of non-state actors with gender and women focus in terms of how they have organised in the interest of addressing (social) insecurities in a transnational context. Such a mapping point seeks to make visible often neglected transnational processes around gender in regional IR studies and academic discourse.

- To map out game-changing of transnational communities of gender and women-focus civil society actors around gendered insecurities under the wider SADC regime in order to show the way in which they are stabilisers at localised levels. This mapping may constitute an important tool for policymakers and practitioners to isolate how game-changing contributes to norm changes, social change, development, regional cohesion and to reduced gendered insecurity across Southern Africa and beyond.

1.5 The significance of the study

While existing scholarship in regional IR studies is significant as a basis to begin to understand regional thickening promoting game change, there remain gaps in analytical frameworks as it relates to these transnational practices and their consequences. Equally, while global structural transformations have taken place since the 1990s characterised by increasing transnational activities and regionalisation among non-state actors feeding into inter-state policymaking frameworks, and a growing interface between state and non-state regionalism within IGOs, there remain gaps. No analytical framework to examine these practices and their effect as important, and game-changing, exists.

This thesis, by highlighting regional thickening and game-changing transnational activities and regionalisation, contributes to the gaps in regional IR studies. This study develops an analytical framework for examining how regional thickening introduces possibilities for game change, in which the stage is set for the interactions between non-state and state actors to change, and, where non-state actors meaningfully begin to affect the main role players as stabilisers contributing to improved security – and in so doing, aid the protection of women across the region that can in future research, be “tested” and refined.

Further, this study foregrounds the often neglected transnational activities with gender and women focus as game-changing at a regional level of analysis on Southern Africa, something that has not been done before. This is done by mapping out the geography of how these processes organised, and the manner in which they contributed to greater (gender) security across the region. A map of transnational activities and regionalisation of non-state actors, and as it relates to the interface between state and non-state actors can be relevant to policymakers working to review, learn and draw lessons to improve on effective implementation, execution and greater impact in the area of gender in Southern Africa and beyond.

1.6 Research methods and methodology of the study

A mixed method approach, which involved gathering information from multiple primary and secondary sources, was used. The purpose of obtaining information from various sources aimed at pinning down regional thickening as game-changing in a transnational environment on Southern Africa, mostly around gender. The primary sources of information were obtained from semi-structure interviews, policy observation seminars, NGO annual and evaluation reports, NGO policy seminar briefs, policy instruments, yearly NGO barometers reports, NGO financial statements, from instruments on gender, relevant online archives and document, and from NGO websites. This study also relied on secondary sources gathered from relevant journals, books, book reviews, book chapters in the field of IR and regional IR studies, online sources and from newspaper articles.

A total of 24 semi-structured interviews of which, 17 females and seven males were conducted in six SADC countries: Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, South Africa, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe, with mostly senior civil society representatives and policymakers. The informants were selected based on their senior positions, as well as, their experience working in a transnational environment of more than two to three years within the civil society and/or inter-governmental sectors. These informants were also selected based on their experiences in addressing the concerns of the people in Southern Africa, particularly, women, through advocacy within and outside formal policymaking structures at a regional level in addressing gendered insecurities. The positions ranged from board member, board chair, executive director, to programme, media and communication to regional officers (see Appendix 1 for details of the informants). Two sets of interview guidelines were used in order to obtain multiple views about game-changing in the context of Southern Africa around gender. The questions differed in the two sets of guidelines in that while one set was crafted to get information on regional thickening and game change outside and inside formal inter-state frameworks from non-state actors, the other set was aimed at state actors (see Appendix II for the two sets of interview questions). The questions targeted at the latter sought to obtain information that would give insight into intergovernmental policymaking spaces and processes, and the interface between states and non-state regionalism around gender insecurities. The two sets of questions were also important in providing more detailed information about structural transformation, social change, state-society complexities, as well as on the consequences of transnational activities and regionalisation (Hettne, 1999: xvii; Mittelman, 1999: 25-26).

The policy seminars were used as important spaces for obtaining first-hand information on regional thickening and game change on Southern Africa and beyond. These seminars provided avenues to engage with the academics, policymakers and practitioners from intergovernmental bodies such as SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the African Union (AU), and the United Nations (UN). Civil society representatives from the Botswana-based SADC Council of NGOs (SADC-NGOs), and from gender and women-focused NGOs were also key informants for the study. The participants at these seminars provided further lead to other possible informants that would be relevant for the study.

1.7 Chapter outline

Following this introduction, Chapter two provides conceptual clarity and the analytical framework for the study. It argues that drivers of processes and interactions are multiple, and not limited to the material logics inherent in dominant scholarship in IR. Drawing from existing literature in the field, and from the primary sources, this chapter develops an analytical framework of regional thickening as game-changing. The elements of regional thickening include increasing regionalisation, regionalisms and region-ness, while game-changing points to increasing processes leading to the development of the norm cycle, contributing to change, development and stabilisation. This chapter further outlines the ‘necessary’ conditions for regional thickening as game-changing.

Chapter three explores the history of game-changing in Southern Africa, as a backdrop to map out how these processes organised, and the way in which they promoted norm changes, social change, regional cohesion and minimised (social) insecurities. Examples of game-changing of transnational communities emerging in the colonial and post-colonial eras in Southern Africa in the latter, and part of the 20th century are discussed here. These examples include: the transnational trade union organisation; transnational educational organisation; transnational faith-based organisation; and transnational women’s groupings. The chapter suggests that despite colonisation that buttressed the physical territorial logic, a web of transnational relations and transnational organisation evolved side by side or underneath state-centric IR and international organisation.

Chapter four argues that civil society functions leading to game change are multiple and not limited to fixed roles inherent in dominant IR discourse. It examines broadly transnational activities of civil society actors, particularly those with gender and women focus in the context

of globalisation and regionalisation. The chapter maps out regional thickening as game-changing in two ways, showing the manner in which civil society actors have differently organised outside and within formal intergovernmental policymaking spaces.

Having mapped out broadly civil society's game-changing processes in the two ways, Chapter five examines in detail how civil society groupings with gender and women focus promote game-changing within intergovernmental policymaking structures at a regional level. It argues that game change is where non-state-state regionalism interlock, overlap or complement each other in the interest of increasing gender security. This chapter uncovers how the interface between states and non-state regionalism, promotes regional thickening, leading to a game change in terms of changing policies, improved security, regional cohesion, and stabilisation.

Chapter six examines how civil society organisations address gender insecurity at a localised level. Transnational communities operating in a transnational context such as, the "Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust (WLSA)"; "Gender Links (GL)"; the "Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Information Dissemination Service (SAfAIDS)"; the "Voluntary Services Overseas-Regional AIDS Initiative of Southern Africa (VSO-RHAISA)"; "Women and Resources Eastern and Southern Africa (WARESA)"; the "Zimbabwe Women's Resource Centre and Network (ZWR CN)"; and "DITSHWANELO-The Botswana Centre for Human Rights" are examined in detail to show how they have evolved and addressed gender insecurity. This chapter argues that as stabilisers, transnational communities organise transnationally in the interest of addressing gendered insecurities at localised levels across Southern Africa. It also argues that there exists a correlation between gendered insecurities and what constitutes non-state identities, their organisation, reach, functions, and actions.

As part of summing up the study, the Chapter seven addresses the answers to the research questions of the study, discusses the extent to which the objectives of the study were achieved, outlines the key findings, the elements for game change, and lastly, discusses the contribution of the study in policymaking and in the field of IR.

CHAPTER 2:

Conceptual clarification and analytical framework

2.1. Defining Southern Africa

Common conceptions in regional International Relations (IR) studies have premised analyses on linear neorealism and neo-functionalism state-centric approaches, to define a region, regionalisation, regionalism, and region-ness. Nye (1965:vii), for example, has defined a region as “a limited number of states linked together by geographical relationships and by a degree of mutual interdependence”. The state-centric territorial logic to defining a region has, in turn, influenced much of the thinking in regional IR studies about transnational activities and regionalisation as state-centric, or as connected to their geographical and economic elements (Asante, 1997:21-44; Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994; Lee, 2003:20). Writing on regionalisation on Southern Africa within the context of a globalising world, Odén notes that,

A ‘minimalist definition’ of Southern Africa includes South Africa and the neighbouring areas, then called Bechuanaland (Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho), Swaziland, and the South West Africa (Namibia) – the present SACU member states – while geographically the Zambezi river was sometimes used as the border line, which meant the inclusion of Zimbabwe, and the southern part of Mozambique as well. Angola and Tanzania can trace their belonging to their role as Front-line States (FLS) and as SADCC/SADC members... Previously, Tanzania clearly formed part of East Africa and Angola of West or Central Africa. The main historical and regional economic links of the most recent members, Mauritius, the DRC and Seychelles, have been with East and Central Africa (Odén, 2001:21).

The geographical mapping points of Southern Africa, in academic discourse, broadly point to this region as a physical territorial entity of SADC’s 15-member states. These include: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.




Figure 1: Geographical mapping points of Southern Africa

The linear territorial logic of a region has further shaped similar conceptions as reflected in the SADC key policy document. Article 1 of the Windhoek Treaty of 1992 (Treaty) that established the SADC, for example, defines Southern Africa as the “geographical area of the member states of SADC” (SADC Treaty 1992). The geographical area as defined in the Treaty covers the 15-member state countries noted above. Yet, what has become commonly held as Southern Africa to refer to the geographical area of the SADC region covering 15 countries, contrasts with the very territorial logic of what constitutes this map in a conventional sense (Nye, 1965:vii). In reality, the idea of Southern Africa as covering the 15-member states of the SADC region, instead, reveals the socially constructed nature of this region, rather, than the attempts that confine it to state territorial logic stressed in dominant regional IR discourses.

This disjuncture in the conception of Southern Africa, in a physical territorial sense, is further found in key policies of inter-state organisations. Article 5 of the SADC Treaty highlights one of its objectives as that of enhancing “the standard and quality of life of the people of the region”, which could potentially be achieved outside a territorial logic. More often, the territorial view has presented analytical, as well as policy challenges aiming at limitations to better the lives of Southern Africa’s population of over 260 million people.

Critical scholarship on regional studies argues for the deconstruction of state territorial logic in favour of a region-ness without borders and states (Vale, 2003:140). Providing a regional dimension of security and politics, Vale (2003:17) points out that the history of Southern Africa “predates, and, perforce defies the fragmentation represented by colonial borders”. The state

territorial notions are, therefore, seen as having instead created “alien routes” and, as a result, contemporary Southern Africa, is perceived as being a captive of “preordained limits of a state system that is partial, lopsided, and entirely inappropriate to the needs of the region’s people” (Vale, 2003:17). What is today commonly conceived as the SADC region in a state-centric territorial sense – before colonisation – was a vision of a borderless region characterised by intertwined cross-border practices, the movement, and overlapping of people, ideas, values, identities, and cultures (Adepoju, 1995:89; Bauer and Taylor, 2005:5). The crisscrossing of people, ideas, values, identities, and cultures have been partly shaped by social, political, and economic insecurities, around issues of access to land, for the purposes of securing sustainable livelihoods, pasture, water, food, and shelter (Adepoju, 1995:89). The movement of people, as such, equally constituted an important dynamic of transnational activities, partly contributing to reduced insecurities. The regional colonial migrant system, characterised by cross-border movements, particularly by men from across Southern Africa to work in the mines and agricultural plantations, contributed largely to the economic development of the receiving countries of South Africa, and Zimbabwe (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:5; Odén, 2001:84-85).

The migrant workers also moved across national boundaries to work in the mines of the countries of Namibia, Botswana, and Zambia (Chitala, 1987). Bauer and Taylor (2005:5) have pointed out that transnational activities shaped by the regional colonial migrant labour system also facilitated the “cross-fertilisation of ideas and experiences across national borders, leading, in some cases, to early organisations of workers or the rise of nationalist movements”. Within these transnational working spaces, the unfolding of common political and labour-related economic insecurities influenced workers to begin to collectively organise in trade, and resistance movements (Mamdani, 1996; Bauer and Taylor, 2005:5; Wickins, 1974:391). Over time, the ideas around collective organising, specifically politically, socially, and economically also spread across the region, as well as, gradually began to create a sense of cohesion among Southern Africa’s population.

Academic discourse and policy documents on migration further underscore the need to recognise the potential benefits of human transnational practices and their contributions to poverty reduction and development (Nshimbi, 2018:14 -15; Knoll and Cascone, 2018:35-37; Gallina, 2011:62-63; Knoll, 2017; Nurse and Ruggeri, 2017). The 2018 Migration and Development brief compiled by the World Bank Group and Knomad, estimates the current remittance flows to low and middle-income countries at \$466 billion. Today, the remittance flow from migrants abroad is now more than three times the size of Official Development Assistance (ODA) –excluding China – more than the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to these

countries (World Bank Group and Knomad Report, 2018). According to the United Nations Special Representative for International Migration, Louise Arbour, the increasing remittance flows to developing countries is “one of the most tangible contributions migrants make to [the realisation of] the SDGs in their countries of origin” (Arbour, 2018:5). In 2017, for example, high-income countries played host to 64 percent of the nearly 165 million migrants across the globe, of which 74 percent were of working age between 20 and 64 years old. Migrants are, therefore, not only contributing substantial growth and prosperity to their countries of origin, they are also doing so in their countries of destination in the form of tax contributions, housing, goods and services (Arbour, 2018:5).

Pointing to these transnational activities, Vale (2003:140) has suggested region-ness as offered more “by the local, the immediate, even the personal”. Yet, while the critical view is significant in transcending rigid state centred territorial logic by redirecting discourse towards an emancipatory logic of the individual as the key driver of regionalisation, this argument, at the same time presents incomplete understandings. The SADC region is constituted not only by transnational activities of the local, the personal or individual non-state actors, but also involves multiple and intertwined processes of non-state, state, and international organisations. For example, state-non-state regionalism within earlier intergovernmental structures of the Front-line States (FLS) informal structures, consequently played a key role in achieving independence, as well as in ending minority rule across Southern Africa (ISS, 1999).

2.2. Common conceptions of transnationalism and regionalisation

The early conceptualisation of transnationalism related to state-led integration premised on Eurocentric linear approaches from economic to political cooperation (Balassa, 1961).² Balassa (1961) for example, proposed a gradual process, starting with the establishment of a free trade area, followed by a customs union, a common market, and a political community. This gradual logic was shaped by the dynamics of early organising of transnational processes of the then

² Mainstream approaches include the neo-functionalism, a version of institutionalism, neorealism, and conventional constructivism.

inter-governmental European Economic Community (EEC) of the 1960s, now a 28-member European Union (EU). Early transnational processes among states were perceived as important strategies to create economic linkages, and to establish customs unions between protective national economies. In turn, the earlier notion of transnationalism has influenced most of the thinking of regionalisation. Regionalisation has referred to state-driven processes and interactions across national boundaries, happening within IGOs, for mutual benefit in the economic field, or as an outcome of state regionalism. Regionalisation and region-ness in this sense are perceived along state-centric logic, or their economic elements for mutual benefit. Additionally, regionalisation is seen as a process coming from below, and driven by economic actors. For example, Van der Vleuten and Van Eerdewijk (2014:18) define regionalisation as, “a bottom-up economic and societal process, which primarily involves economic actors”. However, transnational processes and interactions involve multiple actors, socially and politically, including, civil society and not confined to those in the economic sector.

Lorenz-Carl and Rempe (2013:2) stress that the Eurocentric linear model has commonly been viewed as an “institutional role model” for intergovernmental regional organisations operating at the regional level. Europe’s earlier model was premised on a linear logic from economic to political cooperation. While Europe’s linear approach was largely borrowed, the Southern African state model has, nevertheless, its own characteristics, which makes allowance for non-state involvement in contributing to regional thickening, and to game-changing. This is partly because of the role played by non-state actors in the national resistance war, as well as, in the formation of Africa’s state model. In Southern Africa, intergovernmental regional organisations have emerged and evolved from as far back as – South Africa’s oldest customs union of 1910 – the SACU; the Central African Federation (CAF) of the 1950s; the FLS of the mid-1970s; to the SADCC of the 1980s; and to today’s SADC; and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern Africa of 1981, to the evolved 1994 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

Writing on Southern Africa, Lee (2003:8) defines region-building, as the “the adoption of a regional project by a formal regional economic organisation designed to enhance the political, economic, social, cultural, and security integration and or cooperation of member states”. The notion of region-building is confined to a regional project by IGOs, as well as to regionalisation among SADC’s member states. Yet, in the context of Southern Africa, traceable transnational practices across the region point to region-ness, as taking place beyond the confines of the member states, and their regional projects. Regionalisation and region-ness of non-state actors equally form a part of the norm structuring, and restructuring architecture within transnational

spaces (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009; Van der Westhuizen, 2005; Marchand 1996a). Dzinesa, Saunders, and Nagar (2012:1), for example, define region-building as, “a process in which states and/or non-state actors cooperate in some way in a given region”. In this definition, state and/or non-state, are perceived as region-builders drive processes and interactions in a given region, in this case, Southern Africa. In the evolving context of globalisation and regionalisation, the region-building process by states and non-state actors cuts across political, social and cultural fields, and address a wide range of insecurities in the areas of gender and women, HIV/AIDS, human rights, peace-building, conflict resolution and education. Region-building here refers to processes emerging and re-emerging from non-state and/or state activities.

Yet, regionalisation and region-building in the actual sense are constituted by top-down and/or bottom-up processes that involve not only economic actors, but also social and political actors in the different fields, and around multiple issue areas. In turn, regionalisation is not perceived as static, but as a process structured, or unstructured, organised, or unorganised through cooperation around common issue areas by state and/or non-state societies across national boundaries. In turn, non-state centred regionalisation denotes processes structured, or unstructured, organised, or unorganised through cooperation around common issue areas by civil society, private business, youth, the church, women groups and trade unions. Region-ness, here, constitutes outcomes of regionalisation in terms of the development of norms or policies, their adaptation and diffusion, promoting a regional sense or regional cohesion and consciousness; while regionalism refers to norms, ideas, and policies influencing change, development and stabilising (gendered) insecurities.

2.3. The New Regionalism Approach (NRA)

Since the 1990s, alternative approaches seeking to transcend mainstream linear state centred territorial emerged in regional IR studies. NRA scholars, Hettne and Söderbaum (2000:461) argue that, “There are no ‘natural’ regions or ‘given’ regions, but that these are created and re-created in the process of global transformation”. NRA scholars, as such, argue that regions and regionalisation are not static or given, but are always in the making, defined, and redefined through processes and interactions (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000:461). In this sense, drivers of regionalisation are not limited to state territorial logic, or their economic elements, but as constituted by processes and interactions of states and/or non-state actors. As such, unlike the

physical geographical elements, regions here are conceived as sites of production promoting regional thickening and game change leading to the development of a norm cycle contributing to reduced insecurities at a regional level.

Most notable, the NRA scholars make a distinction between what they refer to as “old” and “new” regionalism, suggesting that while the former was exclusive and imposed from above by states, the latter is inclusive and more often emerging from “below”, and involves expanded transnational networks of associations, institutions, organisations and movements (Hettne, 1999:8). The claims about the “old” and “new” regionalism, however, do not neatly map out what have constituted broader transnational activities and regionalisation that are emerging, and evolving in the Southern African region. For instance, regionalisation and its outcome region-ness as practised by the FLS, was inclusive in terms of non-state actor participation, as well as representatives from the Nigerian government (as observers) during its summit meetings (ISS, 1999; Adebajo, 2018:189). Writing on Southern Africa’s regionalism in the context of colonisation, Khadiagala (2012) points “decolonisation-driven regionalism” as emerging from state processes, and interactions within inter-governmental policy structures from the FLS to the SADCC processes and interactions. Yet, the decolonisation-driven regionalism as it relates to the context of Southern Africa was equally pushed for, by non-state actors, both within, and outside formal intergovernmental policy structures.

In order to reduce dependence from South Africa, the SADCC engaged multiple external donors to financially support its sectoral programmes in the various fields (Amin, Mandaza, and Chitala, 1987). Yet, while the SADCC mandate was broad, the funding received was mainly aimed at the transport sector, an area of interest for a number of donors. Within the SADCC, while regionalisation and organisation were concentrated in the transport sector, it was low in other sectoral programme areas. As such, arguments about the “old” and “new” regionalism are insufficient to uncover the actual realities of how regionalisation and the organisation in a transnational context have evolved, as Southern Africa has its own peculiarities and context.

Grant and Söderbaum, (2003:8) pointed out that,

the purposes of the NRA is to understand (and contribute to) structural transformation and social change, with particular emphasis on the impact and consequences of asymmetric power relations and various forms of hegemony and domination.

The NRA also pays particular attention to state-society complexities, and on the consequences of transnational activities and regionalisation (Hettne, 1999: xvii; Mittelman 1999: 25-6). This

thesis, examines how regional thickening in a transnational context promotes game-changing activities, promoting the development of the norm cycle, seeking to have improved security.

The state-centric conception defines regionalism (norms, ideas or policies) as “a conscious policy of nation-states for the management of regionalisation in a broad array of security and economic challenges” (Hanggi et al., 2000:4). This definition perceives norms as coming from states to manage regionalisation in areas of security and economic development. Yet, regional thickening and game-changing transnational activities at a regional level stabilising insecurity have not only been limited to states, but also involve those of non-state actors. In a generic sense, alternative conceptions have defined regionalism as, “a body of ideas, values and concrete objectives that are aimed at transforming a geographical area into a clearly identified regional social space... it is the urge by any set of actors to reorganise along lines in any given issue area” (Grant and Söderbaum, 2003:7).³ More specifically, regionalism is defined as “a body of ideas, values and concrete objectives creating, maintaining or modifying the provision of security and wealth, peace and development within a region” (Schultz, Söderbaum and Öjendal, 2001:5).

However, unlike the linear logic assumed by the NRA scholars, norms have not always had transformative functions, including those emerging within the SADC intergovernmental policy structures. For example, member states have either tended to be inward-looking, or they have not implemented the very norms that they adopt. Providing an insider perspective of SADC processes and regionalisms, Mbuende (2012:52) points out that, “Inasmuch as [SADC] governments are committed to regional integration, line ministers are preoccupied with the day-to-day operations of government business and national priorities. They have little time for regional issues except in cases where there are projects to be implemented in their respective countries”. Game-changing regionalism should, however, move beyond the development of norms and their adoption, but to their diffusion and implementation, as well as contribute to

³ NRA scholars have also defined regionalism as “a body of ideas, values and concrete objectives creating, maintaining or modifying the provision of security and wealth, peace and development within a region” (Schultz, Söderbaum and Öjendal, 2001:5).

improving security and development. Despite these contradictions, there are also examples pointing to the growing buy-in of states to develop norms, as well as in implementing them (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer 2016, 2017).

Further, while much of the academic discourse has privileged state actors and international organisations, game-changing processes in a transnational context have not been linear, but have involved those activities of civil society actors. As Neumann (2003:161) has pointed out that, “[t]he existence of regions is preceded by the existence of region-builders”. In a transnational context, region-builders, have included processes and interactions by states and/or non-state actors amounting to regional thickening to address regional insecurities. In a context of an African security complex, Brosig (2013) points to growing regionalisation and a complex security management when actors come together to address common goals. An increasing regionalisation, regionalism and region-ness in a transnational context by states and/or non-state actors, whose effect is game-changing, challenges mainstream state-centric and linear conceptions dominant in regional IR studies.

2.4. Defining civil society

Like most concepts in IR, the notion of civil society has evolved in academic scholarship over time. The early definition of civil society was limited to the boundaries of the nation-state, and to performing protectionist functions based on individual consent.⁴ These conceptions have evolved from those of Hegel, Marx, and Engels works, with a narrow state centred focus, to Ferguson and De Tocqueville, who focus on the organisational features of this society. Since the 1990s, the concept of civil society has expanded from performing protectionist hegemonic functions, to counter-resistance roles for good governance in the different issue areas, or

⁴ Young (1994:227) cites Hegel’s definition of civil society as “a differentia existing between family and state, though civil society development comes later than state development”. In this definition, civil society is perceived as having emerged with the development of a state. However, prior to the emergency of a Westphalian state system, forms of civil society have existed across the globe. Other conceptions limited to state territorial logic have perceived civil society as “a kind of empty space, protected by formal state guarantees of individual liberty and social order, and open to multiple uses by free and equal citizens” (Glaser, 1997:5-6).

particular fields, socially, politically, and economically (O'Brien, 2005:219). This society has assumed different labels and functions as a global civil society (Kaldor, 2003; Scholte, 2000; Keane, 2003; O'Brien, 2005), as transnational civil society (Risse-Kappen, 1995), transnational networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), or as NGOs (Charnovitz, 1997; Nelson, 1995a). Landsberg (2006:42) has defined civil society as, "a more structured and organised set of activities and actions by actors outside the state but in relation to the state. Civil society [is perceived as a] set of associational interactions by the actors between state and family to put the interests and concerns of the poor and the broader public on the agenda and to try and persuade the government to address the concerns of the people".⁵ Civil society's game-changing transnational activities addressing insecurities across the region have limited their operation to fixed spaces between the state and the family. At a transnational level, civil society actions to address the concerns of the people of Southern Africa, have involved pushing for their participation in the development of the norm cycle within SADC's policymaking structures to contribute to greater security and development.

Critical scholars stress the emancipatory functions of civil society. Kaldor (2003:142) notes civil society processes as pointing to "globalisation from below", and suggesting, "the new meaning of civil society offers expanded possibilities of human emancipation". Equally, Rosenau (1992:285) notes that with globalisation, "citizens now have many more avenues along which to pursue their interests" and "a multitude of new points of access to the course of events". Kaldor (2013:3-10) has highlighted two types of civil society as either being territorially bounded or global. According to this typology, civil society actors, among others, include activist, neo-liberal, and post-modern types confined within the territorial bounds, or operating at a global level. Kaldor's typology at a global level equally, is related to those civil society actors operating at a regional level of analysis. There are, however, more types of civil society organisations found elsewhere. For example, during the national resistance struggle,

⁵ Elsewhere, civil society is defined as "an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities – economic cultural production, voluntary associations and household life – and who in this way preserve and transform their identity by exercising all sorts of pressures or controls upon state institutions" (Keane, 1988:18).

women across Southern Africa played multiple liberatory, complementary, activist, advocacy, and supportive roles to end the white minority rule across the region.

Building on earlier discourses, the neo-Gramscian scholars equally, transcends material physical logic, to stress the ideological aspects. They have defined civil society as a “realm of contesting ideas in which the intersubjective meanings upon which people's sense of ‘reality’ are based can become transformed and new concepts of the natural order of society ... emerge” (Cox, 1999:10). In seeking to transcend conceptions of civil society, as limited to the national boundaries, the evolved notions perceive this society as a part of the transnational and transformational processes (Cox, 1996). In this sense, transnational communities emerging and re-emerging at a transnational level are not only confined to those of the state, but also involve those on non-state actors and international organisations. This study applies the notion of transnational communities to refer to more structured and organised non-state groupings, that come together from more than one society across boundaries to address common goals.

The conventional and linear logic assigned to the concept of civil society as playing hegemonic (regulatory), or counter-hegemonic functions, have received criticism from African scholars, as well as, those scholars writing on Africa (Mamdani, 1996:13; Obadare, 2014; Nkwanchuku, 2003:4; Willem, 2014:47; Söderbaum, 2007:323). These scholars, many themselves African, have argued that the dominant normative discourse about civil society is exclusive, and not representative of the multiplicity of roles and functions of African organisations, and associational life whose activities have not fitted in neatly with these narratives and binaries (Mamdani, 1996:13; Willem, 2014:47). Cited in Noyoo’s report on civil society and poverty reduction on South Africa, Nkwanchuku (2003:4), for example, has pointed out that:

The problem with the ‘conventional’ notions of civil society are numerous. First, it is normatively tendentious, carrying the assumption that all societies – no matter how diverse in cultural, social and political orientation – are destined to follow a specific path of political organisation – liberalism. Second, if one accepts this notion of civil society and attempts to apply it to analysis of actual civil societies, it may lead one into an invidious and empirically difficult exercise of deciding which civic organisations are truly ‘civil’ as opposed to those who may be dismissed as ‘pre-civil’, ‘uncivil’, ‘anti-civil’. Third, because many in African social formations do not meet the ‘civility’ criteria set by this notion, it excludes for the most part Africa’s rich associational life from the civil society. Fourth, the view that organisations in the civil society must

institutionalise their functions in order to secure autonomy for their members and from the state may not be realistic in Africa.

The binaries dominant in conventional approaches, also present challenges in seeking to explain regional thickening and game-changing civil society processes, and interactions at a transnational level, as well as, how non-state processes have evolved in the colonial and post-colonial era in Southern Africa. This study shows that the functions of a civil society have evolved over time and have been shaped by the context within which they have evolved, including insecurities.

2.5. Arguments against civil society activities

There are scholars that have described Africa's civil society as "conflict-ridden" and marred with contradictions (Fatton, 1995:4), as well as those, that have contested the "civility" criteria in respect of Africa's resistance movements - noting the difficulty of distinguishing these formations from the more liberal IGOs (Willems, 1982:7). Willems (1982:7) questions the "civility" criteria of Africa's national liberation movements, due to their linkages to socialist movements from Europe, as well as through lobbying various IGOs, such as the United Nations (Willems, 1982:7). The "civility" discourse, as it relates to understanding Africa's civil society is, however limiting, as this society has assumed various identities and functions shaped by the changing insecurities and context. For example, Weldes, Laffey, Gustersen and Raymond (1999:13) have argued, that identities are a product of emerging and evolving insecurities. This study also reveals that not only are identities a product of insecurities, but also the evolving norm cycle in the context of Southern Africa has been shaped by changing insecurities.

There is, further scholarship that suggests civil society as having minimum influence, or impact due to a lack of funding, being donor dependent, or that it is still in its infancy. The other reason is moral bankruptcy that renders civil society indistinguishable from the state when it comes to norms such as corruption, authoritarianism, primordialism (tribal, religious and regional politics). It projects excesses undermining the state that it projects as its polar opposite. (Risse-Kappen, 1995; Fatton, 1995; Katzenstein, 2005; Matlosa and Lotshwao, 2010; Landsberg, 2012).

Referring to civil society regionalising in a transnational context within the structures of the intergovernmental regional organisation – the SADC – Landsberg (2012:74) points out that civil society is "too weak to challenge governments and play an important countervailing role

in the region". While this contention may not completely be dismissed, it, however, provides an incomplete picture of the diverse functions and complexity of Southern Africa's civil society, not only limited to inter-state structuring and restructuring spaces. Civil society regionalisation and organisation also takes place outside formal state processes and international organisations. This perception about civil society, for example, overlooks at the interface between state and non-state regionalism in other issue areas taking place within SADC's wider regime, particularly on gender since the 1990s. While SADC has been framed in regional IR studies as a club of Heads of States, there have been at the same time contradictions and paradoxes. The opening of space since the 1990s, point to growing civil society recognition and participation in policy development within IGOs and implementation.

The multiple functions played by civil society actors, have been shaped by the changing context within which they have evolved, as well as from emerging (social) insecurities. For example, in Zambia, a coalition of civil society actors was formed in resistance against a third, unconstitutional term bid by the former President Fredrick Chiluba (allAfrica, 2002). At the same time, and what presented a contradiction, an NGO was created to push for, and support Chiluba's attempts to change the constitution and to facilitate a presidential third term (CCR, 2005). The conception of civil society as synonymous to counter-resistance to bad governance and neo-liberal policies, in this era of transformation, points to the romanticisation of this society. In the context of Southern Africa, civil society has constituted multiple types. This thesis is, however, more interested in how transnational civil society processes are organised and promoting a norm cycle contributing to greater security across a region. While earlier conceptions are useful to begin to map out how the notion of civil society has evolved over time, gaps remain in terms of the various dimensions of civil society's game-changing processes and interactions.

Some scholars writing on regionalism and regionalisation on Southern Africa have noted methodological limitations in terms of how civil society is understood and projected. For example, Söderbaum (2007:323) has argued that "one of the reasons civil society is misunderstood is because conventional Western political thought has dominated academic discourse on the matter". Conventional methodologies for studying civil society, instead premise on fixed binaries, have only provided incomplete understandings so far. In order to explain the multiplicity of regional thickening and game change processes and interactions, this thesis moves away from linear conceptions of this society to uncover the empirical realities about regionalisation.

2.6. Civil society regionalisation

Unlike neo-functionalist approaches in regional IR studies that prioritise interactions of state actors in the economic field, the NRA discourse pays particular attention to the neglected non-state processes, and interaction of civil society actors. Mittelman (1999:48) has pointed out the transformative potential of norms to their ability to recognise civil society actors, arguing that “At the end of the day, the possibilities and limitations of transformative regionalism rests on the strength of its links to civil society”. However, while this argument may not altogether be dismissed, the transformative nature of norms not only points to its link to civil society. The norms emerging in a transnational level have not only been limited to state regionalism, but also of non-state and/or state-non-state regionalism. As such, civil society regionalisation constitutes a part of regional thickening as game-changing in terms of the activities and functions outside and within inter-state policymaking spaces, to the development of the normal cycle and diffusion, which in turn contributes to improved security.

Söderbaum (2007:321) cites Hettne and Mittelman, who point out “the political role of civil society as ... a means for the weak and the poor to protect themselves against often exploitative market forces”. The counter-resistance functions played by civil society in the context of democratisation and liberalisation since the early 1990s, has not only been limited to guarding against neo-liberal norms reinforcing divisions and exclusion. The insecurities characterised by exclusion and division over time have evolved not only from market forces, but also from political, cultural and social forces. In the context of Southern Africa, the roles of civil society actors have not only been limited to the neo-liberal norm discourse. For example, Southern Africa’s national resistance movements regionalisation (discussed in Chapter 3) were shaped by what Khadiagala (2012) has referred to as “decolonisation regionalism”, shaped by multiple political, social, economic, and cultural related insecurities.

The NRA of earlier scholars have since been criticised by other new regionalism scholars for their retention of the underlying linear approach to regionalisation and regionalism (Boas, Marchand, and Shaw, 1999) Despite its limitations, much of the analyses seeking to transcend conventional approaches have been shaped by the NRA. Writing on Southern Africa, Blaauw (2007:vi) argues that “the new regionalism and its variant: developmental regionalism, pay attention to the role that civil society actor and those marginalised by globalisation play in promoting regionalism in a transnational context”. Yet, while norms emerging from intergovernmental interactions acknowledge the role played by civil society actors in the

context of global transformations, regionalisation and region-ness take place regardless of formal regionalisms. As Bach (2003:22) has pointed out, “regionalisation can occur unintentionally, without actors necessarily being conscious of or dedicated to regionalism”. In this sense, transnational activities may be planned (structured), or unplanned (unstructured) in a transnational context of globalisation. Here, this study and its game-changing framework are written within the NRA, because of its broader approach to actors and regionalisation. However, this study attempts to move away from the linear logic inherent in the field, to explain game change in the context of growing regionalisation and thickening globalisation.

2.7. Regionalisation, globalisation and regional thickening

Based on the protectionist inward approaches, neo-functionalism overlooks the external factors. Filling in these gaps in analyses, the NRA has paid attention to processes of regionalisation and organisation in the context of globalisation. Tsie (2001) has argued that the context neo-liberalisms require considerable managing through counter-hegemonic strategies. Scholte (2000:47) points out that globalisation “necessitates a proliferation of social connections that are at least partly and often quite substantially detached from a territorial logic”.

Equally, Keohane and Nye (1989:6) have made a distinction in what they describe as “thin” and “thick” globalisation. They argue that while “thin” globalisation is characterised by earlier, less complex interactions in a transnational context, “thick” globalisation embodies present day “complex interdependencies”, particularly in the economic field. According to neo-institutionalists, the context of “thick” globalisation mainly emerges from the economic field. Yet, “thick” globalisation since the 1990s has been characterised by “complex interdependencies”, as well as growing regionalisation, region-ness and regionalisms, not only from the economic field, but also from the social, political and cultural fields.

2.8. The New Regionalism and regional thickening

New regionalism scholars have noted that the context of regional thickening from globalisation, and regionalisation characterised by “thick” regionalisms emerge, and re-emerge from multiple processes and actors (Bach, 2003:22). As such, regional thickening that has led to game-changing in terms of developing and diffusing of norms, not only emerges in the economic

sector as advanced in mainstream thinking, but also in multiple social, political and cultural sectors. The development of norms in IR has not limited to states alone, but has involved non-state actors operating in a transnational context within, or outside formal state processes at multiple levels. In this sense, and as Acharya (2013:466) has argued, “many new norms have multiple sources and contexts”. This argument also points to the existence of multiple processes and actors contributing to the norm cycle in a transnational context.

The argument on norm circulation helps shift thinking of transnational activities as linear, as well as, limiting the norm discourse to “their final point of articulation” (Acharya, 2013:466). In the context of the new regionalism, the argument on the norm cycle provides scope to explore transnational activities and regionalisation in detail and how norms have changed over time, and are being diffused and adapted around broad questions of security, including pushing for their implementation amounting to regional thickening as game changing.




Figure 2: Representation of a norm cycle

Non-state actors operating in a transnational environment have contributed to the development of the norm cycle in IR. Developing the norm circle has involved norm formulation within inter-state policymaking structures, adaptation/diffusion these norms or diffusion/adaptation of

these norms, and pushing for their implementation at localised levels in the interest of having development and stabilisation. Acharya's work is important here to expand on game-changing processes and interactions that are contributing to the development of the normal cycle, and to increased (social) security. Regional thickening here in terms of increasing regionalisation, regionalism, and region-ness. The effect of this being game-changing and challenges mainstream linear approaches in regional IR studies. In the context of the SADC region, regional thickening leading to game-changing point in the development of a norm cycle as inter-connected to all the various levels. The local norms have found their way in global norms. Game-changing here, refers to, processes promoting the development of norms in a transnational context in the interest of contributing to greater security across a region.

The norms that emerge and re-emerge at a global level, particularly in the area of gender have, in turn, been diffused in regional, and back into local norms. For example, as a counter-response to women's exclusion from governance structures in the immediate post-independent era from the 1960s, to the end of the 1980s, from participating in politics at home and within formal regional organisations, they turned to the global level (Van der Westhuizen, 2005). In the evolving context of globalisation and neo-liberalism, women have participated in norm development, and their diffusion in their own right, and in interactions with states at a global, regional and local levels.

2.9. Globalisation and neo-liberalism

The evolving context of "thick" globalisation, and emerging, and changing neo-liberalism has shaped analyses in academic discourse (Smith and Baylis, 2005:1-13). Mittelman (2000:44) points out that neo-liberalism,

Concerned as it is with purportedly universal laws of development, the neo-liberal theory posits that, in principle, the same rules of economic development can be applied across the board from the most developed to the least developed countries. As such, the theory is overly mechanical and represents a slot machine approach to regionalism. Taking an individualistic approach, it is silent about deep structural inequalities, especially the qualitative aspects of underdevelopment lodged in the blockage of highly in egalitarian social systems" (Mittelman, 2000:44).

For example, since the emergence of neo-liberal norms in the mid-1980s onwards – perceived as constituting sets of economic rules for developing countries, by the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) and World Bank – new forms of global governance beyond state boundaries. Poku and Edge (2001:45) have suggested that, “in the context of globalisation, there is a blurring of international and domestic realms that realists have reinforced”. In the changing context, the neo-liberal policies are perceived as having opened up new centres of governance outside the commonly pursued traditional state system (O’Brien, 2005:219; Cerny, 1995; 2010). Armstrong, Bello, Gilson and Spini (2011:1) define governance as a set of “rules, structures, and processes providing some measure of regulation by various actors, over specific areas of activity and working towards certain objectives”. In this conception, neo-liberal governance or norms have regulatory functions pointing actors to specific economic goals and agendas. Other neo-liberal institutions that have emerged include: The World Trade Organisation (WTO) on trade law; the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on corporate codes of conduct; the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on labour law; as well as multiple global rating agencies (O’Brien, 2005:219). The emerging global governance structures that appear to have been ear-marked towards regulating economic activities for particular goals by the IMF and World Bank within developing countries have, in most cases, been linked to their role in the emerging new insecurities.

Writing on regionalisation in Africa, Bach (2003) points out that the emergence of the IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) aimed to reduce the fiscal, excise, and monetary disparities among African states. These neo-liberal policies have been characterised by stringent measures resulting in the devaluation of national currencies, the increase in prices, high levels of poverty and growing inequalities (Shah, 1998). Writing about Southern Africa, Tsie (2001:143), for example, argues that neo-liberal policies perpetuate dominant relations that reinforce unevenness within regions and between nations. Neo-liberal policies in the context of a globalising world seen as perpetuating deep divisions, exclusion, and marginalisation within regions, and between states. The factors that have perpetuated deep divisions within societies are, however, multiple, including the deep-seated patriarchal system in the SADC region.

In Southern Africa, countries that implemented the SAPs include: Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Tanzania. Countries such as Nigeria, Venezuela, and Ecuador were seen as experiencing reduced state capacities and increasing insecurities. Grant and Söderbaum (2003:11) suggest that neo-liberalisation mirrors the “erosion of policymaking capacity of states in the context of globalisation”. As such, Tsie (2001:143) points out that neo-liberalism requires considerable monitoring. Contrary to the linear logic inherent in NRA thinking in the

context of the SADC region, the state remains influential in enabling conducive transnational environments for non-state engagement with state actors.

The growing insecurities, as a result of liberalisation, have equally influenced new thinking around the conception of security in practice, and in the academe.

2.10. Defining security and gender security

While the notion of security in IR studies has generally been rooted in a traditional state-centric logic of the member states, since the era of the 1990s an alternative conception emerged bringing into discourse the human security element, or what has also been referred to as non-military threats. The 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development report (1994:3), notes, “a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime, these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world”. Human insecurities, particularly gendered insecurities are highlighted in academic scholarship (Tickner, 1992; 2001; Grant and Söderbaum, 2003:10; Martinussen, 1997:44). In Southern Africa, human insecurities have ranged from deep poverty, divisions, and inequalities, to threatening diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and to environmental degradation, migration, and warlordism (Dzinesa, 2012; Nyamnjoh and Mususa, 2012; MacLean, 2003; Vale, Swatuk, and Odén, 2001). The thesis adopts the evolved conception of security as non-military, and defines gender security as an outcome from processes and efforts seeking to minimise the social economic mores, and inequalities and differences based on gender.

The notion of security, regional thickening as game-changing, is not only confined to state processes here, but also point to wider definitions which include those of non-state actors. For example, historically and in present day, women have shown agency in terms of addressing gendered insecurities including in pre-colonial and colonial era (Amadiume, 1987a; 1987b; Magadla, 2016; Chung, 2006; Giesler, 2005), and post-colonial African societies (Van der Westhuizen, 2005). Amadiume (1987a) notes that through solidarity networks, women groups pushed for justice for their local communities by staging resistance protests against brutal colonial policies. Gender and women’s movements have constituted a part of global norm structuring, and restructuring spaces that have participated in the development of key global norms on gender, such as the Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination

against Women (CEDAW) of 1979, the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, and most recently, in 2015, the development of the goal and targets of gender in the Post-2015 UN-SDGs (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009; Van der Westhuizen, 2005; Govender, 2005). As such, it is not that African agency to address insecurities does not exist in Africa's IR. (Bischoff, Aning and Acharya, 2016). It, however, remains undeservedly marginalised in much of the academic discourse in regional studies.

In Southern Africa, women and gender civil society groupings are participating within global restructuring spaces, and addressing various gendered insecurities such as: physical and sexual violence, human (women) trafficking, gender inequalities, femicide, rape, child marriages, HIV/AIDS, and poverty (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer. 2016:71, 73). This study examines the game-changing activities of the gender and women-focused civil society transnational communities that include, the "Women and Law in Southern Africa", the "Gender Links", the "Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Information and Dissemination Service", the "Voluntary Services Overseas-RHAISA", "Women and Resources Eastern and Southern Africa (WARESA)"; "DITSHWANELO-The Botswana Centre for Human Rights", and the "Zimbabwe Women's Resources Centre and Network". This study shows how these transnational communities have organised, and the manner in which they are game-changing, and stabilisers in order to have improved gender security. The gender insecurities that these non-state gender-based organisations seek to address in a transnational context are entrenched in a system of patriarchy, characterised by persistent drawbacks of inequalities, social economic marginalisation, minimum representation in governance structures at all levels, divisions and exclusion.

Pankhurst (2000:10) defines gender as "all the qualities of what it is to be a man or a woman which are socially and culturally, rather than biologically. Gender includes the way in which society differentiates appropriate behaviour and access to power for women and men, and, in practice, this refers to patterns in which women are generally disadvantaged over men". While the binaries are re-enforced in academic discourse, and through norms in conceptualising the notion of gender (Lober, 1994; Amadiume (1987b:27-33) reveals a dual-sex society that transcends fixed gender binaries, as well as those, of functions and roles in terms of access to resources, power, and connections. Uncovering the actual experiences, functions and roles of women in the Nnobi society in West Africa, Amadiume reveals the limitations of fixed notions on gender. Notions of gender have evolved further as also reflected in the growing scholarship on transnational queer movement (Lind, 2011). The study here adopts a non-linear conception of gender to examine game-changing processes and interactions in a transnational context. In

this thesis, gendered insecurities – perceived as a sub-section of broader human insecurities – refers to the mores, practices, and developmental questions that gender and women-focused civil society grouping seek to address at multiple levels (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009). In the context of the SADC region, non-state gender-based actors organise around transnational communities in transnational a transnational context to address the way people live, how they address each other along gender lines, the development of women and raising women’s social, political and economic status. The insecurities that gender and women-focused civil society actors seek to stabilise are embedded in patriarchal structures of persistent gender difference, marginalisation, exclusion, and inequalities (Tickner, 1992; 2001:283-7; Amadiume, 1987b). As game-changers and stabilisers, non-state actors should be developing and adopting norms at the regional level, as well as ensuring their adaptation, diffusion, and implementation in order to have improved (gender) security.

2.11. Regional thickening as game-changing

There are scholars in the field of regional IR studies that discuss elements of regional thickening in a transnational context (Brosig 2013; Bach, 2012). For example, Brosig (2013) has pointed to an evolving African security complex as characterised by growing regionalisation and increasing security management by actors at a transnational level. Bach (2012) points to the context of globalisation and regionalisation as characterised by “thick” regionalisms. This study’s definition of regional thickening and game change leans towards these scholars’ conceptualisations of increasing regionalisation and regionalisms in a context of globalisation to map out in detail transnational processes developing the norm cycle, contributing to improved security across a region.

An analytical framework of regional thickening as game changing will aid to map out transnational processes, particularly those of civil society actors with gender focus within and outside formal state-led frameworks. While this study has adopted the NRA analytical framework, it, however, transcends the linearity inherent in regional IR studies. It privileges the actual game-changing processes and agency around the norm development cycle, by examining how regional thickening in a transnational context promotes game-changing activities, promoting the development of the norm cycle, seeking to have improved security. In this study, the analytical framework is explained by pointing to how game changing evolved, developed, and its growing importance in contributing to norm changes, improved policies,

and to greater security. In the area of gender, real change points to the breaking of patriarchal behaviours, opening up of spaces for women participation in development and politics; and the general improvement of the lives of women in areas of health, care, and fundamental freedoms.

The elements of regional thickening here point to increasing regionalisation, regionalisms, and region-ness within and outside formal state structures whose effect is game-changing. Game-changing, in turn, reveals processes of norm development, norm adaptation, norm diffusion and norm implementation by both state and/or non-state actors in the interest of promoting regional cohesion, norm change, social change, development, and contributing to greater security across a region.




Figure 3: Analytical framework of regional thickening as game-changing.

Drawing from the reviewed literature and information from the primary sources, seven “necessary” conditions for game change were derived to include:




Figure 4: The ‘necessary’ conditions of regional thickening as game-changing

There are exists conditions that affect regional thickening and game change. From the primary and secondary sources of information gathered, these factors constitute the ‘necessary’ conditions of regional thickening as game-changing. These include first, the existence a conducive operating and policy environment to create norms, their diffusion, adaptation and implementation around broad security questions in a transnational context. Second, the recognition and participation of non-state actors within intergovernmental policymaking structures. The recognition of no-state actors within intergovernmental policymaking structures, and their participation in the development of the norm cycle is important in addressing (social) insecurities. The good relations between state and non-state actors are further important to facilitate buy-in, as well as political will to participate in norm development, diffusion and implementation. Third, the existence of strong individuals driving transnational activities and regionalisation both within and outside formal processes is equally significant to sustain the game. Fourth, a growing interface between state and non-state

regionalism as key to ensuring regional thickening and game change. Fifth, the existence of organised non-state transnational communities outside and inside formal processes driving processes and activities point to the possibilities of regional thickening as game-changing. Sixth, the availability of funding to sustain game-changing processes and interactions is crucial; and lastly, the buy-in and political will from all stakeholders to develop, diffuse, adapt and implement the norms plays an important role in facilitating regional thickening and game change. All in all, the outlined ‘necessary’ conditions are significant for regional thickening as game-changing, and to contributing to stabilisation in a region.

2.12. Conclusion

This chapter has provided conceptual clarification and an analytical framework for the study. It has defined the key concepts of the study, as well as mapped out a framework of game change, which plots the changing processes and interactions by states and/or non-state actors in a transnational environment. The conceptual landscape in the field of IR was revealed as persisting in linearity. This, in terms of the definition of key concepts in the field such as: a region, regionalism, regionalisation, and region-ness, as well as to broader concepts, such as, gender, security and civil society. The conception of Southern Africa along geographical conventional logics was revealed as limiting as the idea of a region goes beyond the confines of the member states, their territorial and economic projects. A region instead has pointed to its non-rigid nature that is in the making, emerging and disintegrating, and in some cases re-emerging again in different fields and issue areas. Regionalisation and region-ness of non-state actors equally forms a part of a region. While dominant scholarship has pointed to the state territorial logics or their economic elements, and actors as drivers of processes and interactions at a regional level, the empirical reality has not limited to linearity. It has been argued here that drivers of transnational activities and regionalisation are multiple, and not limited to state-centric material or linear logic inherent in mainstream and conventional scholarship in regional IR studies. In the context of Southern Africa, it was found that drivers of processes and interactions in a transnational context point to regionalisms, to ideas or norms, as well as to the actors. In this case, drivers of regionalisation have not limited to rigid logics or binaries. For example, since the 1990s, ideas around common regional insecurities have influenced increasing non-state regionalisation, as well as a growing interface between non-state and state regionalism, amounting to game change. Non-state actors have equally played key functions

that have not limited to the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourse dominant in IR discourse.

This chapter also clarified the evolving definition of key concepts such gender, civil society and security as having evolved in IR discourse to transcend inherent fixed binaries or linearity. As such, growing regionalisation, regionalism and region-ness have not limited to states alone, but have involved non-state actors operating in a transnational context within, or outside formal intergovernmental structures, leading to the development of a norm cycle in IR contributing to change, development and stabilisation.

The linear map was, however, useful to provide a conceptual clarity for this study, as well as in developing the analytical framework of regional thickening as game-changing. Despite the limitation of the NRA that has maintained linear logics, it, however, offers an alternative to state-centrism by bringing into analyses often neglected processes and interactions, particularly of civil society actors, to structural transformation, change, state-society complexes, and to the consequences of transnational activities and regionalisation, power relations and dominant relation at a regional level. This study and the analytical framework of regional thickening as game-changing developed here are written within the NRA framework, however, transcending linearity. The analytical framework has suggested regional thickening as pointing to increasing regionalisation, regionalism and region-ness of states and/or non-state actors, whose outcome is game-changing, promoting the development of a norm cycle, (that is norm development, norm adaptation, norm diffusion and norm implementation), contributing to change, development and stabilisation. This chapter has further outlined the ‘necessary’ conditions for regional thickening as game-changing as pointing to the existence of a policy conducive and operating environment to develop, adapt, diffuse and implement norms; the recognition and participation of non-state actors in norm development processes; buy-in from local and regional stakeholders; the interface between state and non-state regionalism; availability of resources; and key individuals to driving processes and interactions for change and stabilisation. This chapter has proposed that drivers of processes and interactions in a transnational context transcends linearity, pointing to multiple regionalisms, to ideas or norms, as well as to the actors. In the following chapters, the evolving and developing game-changing framework, as well as its relevance, shows regional thickening in terms of increasing regionalisation, growing interface between state and non-state actors, growing (gender) transnationalism and region-ness, and its outcome, softening of regional (gendered) structures, promoting change, regional cohesion and stabilisation.

CHAPTER 3:

The history of game-changing in Southern Africa

3.1. Introduction

The preceding chapter provided conceptual clarity for the study and outlined an analytical framework for regional thickening as game-changing. This framework was important to begin to plot regional thickening as game-changing in the Southern African context, particularly around gender. Despite growing transnational processes and interactions of non-state actors and a shift in analysis since the early 1990s, analyses in the field of regional IR studies, so far, largely maintained state-centric linear logics. This thesis and the game-changing framework are written within the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) but transcend rigid logics. While regional thickening refers to increasing regionalisation, regionalism and region-ness, amounting to game-change; game-changing points to processes and interactions that promote the development of a norm cycle contributing to regional cohesion and improved social security. Finally, the necessary conditions of regional thickening as game-changing were singled out from IR scholarship and from the study's primary sources. The 'necessary' conditions for game-changing included: the existence of a conducive operating and policy environment; recognition and participation of non-state actors within inter-governmental structures; strong individuals leading game-changing; organised transnational communities outside and inside formal state policy framework; buy-in from local and regional stakeholders; and the availability of resources.

This chapter provides the history of regional thickening as game-changing in Southern Africa. It explores the broader context of transnational activities in Southern Africa, as a backdrop to map out how these processes organised, and the way in which they promoted game-change and minimised (social) insecurities. The intention here is not to provide a detailed historical account, but to draw in general, appropriate, and illuminating examples of transnational processes and interactions taking place at a transnational level, particularly in the colonial and post-colonial eras in Southern Africa. This chapter shows that early transnational processes and interactions were gendered in nature in terms of exclusive policies, and the marginalisation of women in formal politics, and within governance structures. It further reveals the counter-

responses by women at various levels that promoted norms to overcome gendered approaches, and insecurities. Furthermore, patriarchal structures and nationalistic tendencies that characterised post-independent Southern Africa, resulted in counter-resistance to gendered formal politics, and to push for change in gendered mores and attitudes.

Despite colonisation that buttressed the physical territorial logic, this chapter argues that an evolving web of transnational relations and transnational organisation developed side by side, or underneath state-centric IR and international organisation. It is suggested that the evolving history of game-changing in Southern Africa, has helped the present scenario of regional thickening, and influential sets of transnational relations.

3.2. Transnational communities and game-changing

The movement of people across national boundaries in Southern Africa is not a new phenomenon that emerged only with colonialism. The political economy of the colonial era in South Africa, and consequently Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), produced early organised transnational communities that evolved over time. The emergence of the early transnational communities was partly enabled by the colonial regional migrant system, characterised by the movement of people across Southern Africa's to work in the mines, or on agricultural plantations, particularly in South Africa and Zimbabwe (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:5). Migrants were seen as transitional, and could not obtain permanent residence, or citizenship rights. The colonial regional migrant system was gendered. Only men were recruited to work in the mines and agriculture plantations in what characterised transnational spaces, while women were pushed to private spaces. This colonial migrant system, that was characterised by marginalisation and gendered differences were met with resistance. As discussed in the previous chapter, women counter-resisted the colonial policies of discrimination and marginalisation, and many crossed Southern Africa's borders despite harsh conditions and treatment, including being denied permits. As such, the insecurities presented by colonialism largely shaped the actions, roles, reach and functions of early transnational communities.

This chapter discusses the examples of evolving regional thickening as game-changing of non-state actors, including those of their transnational activities that emerged along-side states in the colonial and post-colonial eras in Southern Africa in the latter, and part of the 20th century. As building blocks towards an early regionalism, the examples explored here include, the transnational trade union organisation; the transnational educational organisation; the transnational religious organisation; and the transnational women's organisations. It is revealed

here that regional thickening and game-changing developed in a commonly evolving context by ways of thinking, the assimilation of cultures, common identities, and through the forging of life-long contacts and relations.

3.2.1. Transnational trade union organisation

In the colonial Southern Africa, early organised transnational communities that emerged around economic insecurities as a result of low wages, influenced the formation of Africa's first Black workers' trade union organisation in 1919, the Industrial and the Commercial Workers Union of Africa (ICU) (Mamdani, 1996:71; Bonner, 1978:114). The migrant labour system, the way it was organised by the colonial settler, and apartheid regimes, created systems of exploitation and with it, new insecurities which resulted in counter-resistance. The key functions played by the leadership of the ICU involved pointing workers to protest against their exploitation in the mines and plantations. As such, the deep-seated insecurities that characterised much of Southern Africa of exploitation, differences and marginalisation and experienced by the local communities as a result of colonialism shaped the functions, roles and actions or emerging and evolving transnational communities. A strong link between evolving insecurities and emerging identities was visible in the case of the ICU.

Early regional thickening and game-changing of the ICU was shaped by trade unionism, and rights-based wing norms drawn from Garveyism that preached the unity of all black people (SAHO, 2011; Saasha.net, 2012). The ICU's early organisation around ideas of trade unionism involved mobilising the black and coloured dockworkers in South Africa's Cape Town, to stage strikes against low wages (Wickins, 1974:394; Gutkind, 1981). For the early part, economic insecurities that characterised colonial South Africa shaped the actions and functions of the ICU. However, the ICU's organisation only around economic issues quickly changed in light of the prevailing political condition. As such, while the ICU game-change was initially organised around economic concerns faced by the poor workers, over time with the growing social, and political insecurities in South Africa, its activities expanded to both economic and political activism (SAHO, 2011). Justifying the expansion from a pure orientation of trade unionism to include political activities, Bonner (1978:118) points out that the leaders of the ICU "could and did claim that political and economic issues were inseparable: that in the face of measures like the Pass Laws and the Industrial Conciliation Act, both had to be confronted at the same time". The expansion in terms of the insecurities that the ICU addressed resulted in the growth in membership. The ICU ideas also spread beyond the national boundaries of

South Africa, to attract a growing transnational membership. It has been pointed out that, “A number of Swazi chiefs in the Nelspruit area, for example, went so far as to lead thousands of their followers into becoming members” of the ICU (SAHO, 2011). Through its membership, the ICU as such characterised a transnational community. The ideas of the ICU were further spread across Southern Africa, promoting similar ways of organising and thinking around economic and political activism in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), and South West Africa (now Namibia) (Saasha.net, 2012). As the first ever Black trade union on the African continent, the ICU’s norms around economic and political activism and organisation against colonialism, further spread to the rest of Africa (Bonner, 1978:114).

Thickening and game-changing in terms of growing activities and ideas, as well as the membership of the ICU were seen as having been enabled by the charismatic and strong leadership of Clements Kadalie and George Champion. Under the leadership of Kadalie and Champion, the ICU is believed to have constituted fast-growing resistance and emancipatory features (Mamdani, 1996:71). These two figures possessed the abilities to organise and mobilise broad sets of members from many racial divides, and to a greater focus on grassroots mobilisation around economic and political issues. The organising strategies of the ICU combined mobilising grassroots communities around political and economic insecurities, informed by the context that surrounded colonial societies. The ICU pinned down on issues around land repossession and liberation that resonated well with societies within and beyond South Africa (SAHO, 2011; Mamdani, 1996:71). It has been noted that “at its peak from 1927-1928, the ICU claimed more than 150 000 members” (SAHO, 2011). The ICU was constituted by a membership and leadership from across Southern Africa, and as such represented a transnational community. For example, the founder and first Secretary-General, Clements Kadalie was originally from Nyasaland (now Malawi) (SAHO, 2011).

Due to the marginalisation and discrimination that characterised colonial migrant system, the emerging transnational trade union organisation were gendered. For example, the ICU leadership structures were predominately male-dominated (SAHO, 2011; Wickins 1974), and until today, Southern Africa’s trade union movements that have emerged and evolved have maintained male dominance in its top leadership structures (Interview with Q, Senior Director, DITSHWANELO, 16.09.2016, Gaborone, Botswana).

The ICU's game-changing revealed mixed results. While it emerged as Africa's first black trade union that sought to address the economic and political insecurities as a result of colonialism, the ICU, only lasted for a decade (SAHO, 2011; Wickins, 1974:392; Bonner, 1978:119; Kadalie, 1970; Mamdani, 1996:71). Its short life span is alluded as having been caused by the lack of buy-in from other leadership structures, particularly in the Eastern Cape that over time deepened internal divisions and tensions, particularly among its key leadership (SAHO, 2011). However, the ICU's regionalisms around trade unionism and political activism against exploitation by the colonial regimes for liberation influenced the development of similar thinking in terms of the issue areas and organisation beyond South Africa's national boundaries (Bonner, 1978:119; Saasha.net, 2012). The ICU's history of regional thickening as game-changing is significant herein, as it reveals the development of a transnational community whose counter-resistance norms, and ideas pushed for change and reduced insecurities politically, and economically. The ICU's ideas and organisation to address insecurities that surrounded colonised societies spread to countries across Africa. As such, game-changing transnational activities and regionalisation of non-state actors that has promoted norm changes, social change, development, and contribute to regional cohesion and to addressing various insecurities, challenge dominant state-centric linear representations in IR and regional IR academic discourses.

3.2.2. Transnational educational organisation

The early independence era in Southern Africa opened up an opportunity for students, particularly among the elite students, to pursue a higher education degree beyond their national boundaries. The preeminent example for this, a transnational university, the UBLS, previously the University of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland was created in 1964, to address the insecurities in the area of education faced by the three countries (Mangagula, 1978:47). Previously, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland relied on colonial and apartheid South Africa's institutions of higher learning (Mokopakgosi, 2013:468). A few elite Black students from across the region enrolled at the Fort Hare College in South Africa to pursue higher education (Thompson, 2006:191-192; Interview with V).

The dearth of institutions of higher learning was a common feature across Southern Africa, of post-colonial independent states had to address, in order to promote higher educational opportunities that, in turn, would be useful to their growth and development. The idea to establish a transnational university – the UBLS – was also shaped by the insecurity presented

by South Africa's apartheid regime that tended to be exclusive, and no longer admitted black students from across Southern Africa to study at historically black institutions (HBIs) such as the Fort Hare College (Thompson, 2006:191-192; Interview with V, Former Lecturer at UBLS, 09.09.2017, Johannesburg, South Africa). Dissatisfied with the apartheid regime's exclusive policies, it has been pointed out that some academic staff members from Fort Hare College consequently resigned to join the newly established UBLS (Thompson, 2006:191-192).

The establishment of the UBLS, as such, was a strong response by Southern Africa's three countries, both to the common internal and external insecurities they faced in the area of advancing higher education in the immediate post-independence era. The UBLS can also be seen as a counter-resistance transnational university, against a racially embedded educational system that characterised colonial Southern Africa. A collective regional approach to establish a transnational educational institution that accommodated the values and culture of the majority black marginalised students was seen as more cost-effective in terms of pooling resources together, and to address the common challenges in the area of higher education (Interview with V). Furthermore, given the small number of students in the three countries that qualified to enter university, a collective transnational educational institution was more cost-effective, rather than to go for individualistic approaches (Mokopakgosi, 2013:468; Interview with V). The idea of establishing a regional university was also key to addressing the gaps in the area of education and to the development of skills relevant for the growth of newly independent Southern African countries.

Game-changing activities of the UBLS relied heavily on the availability of adequate funding. As former protectorates,⁶ Britain played a key role in the immediate independence era in supporting the development of the UBLS. The British government pooled resources together to support the UBLS, as opposed to funding individual national universities in the three countries (Interview with V). Equally, the building that housed the UBLS Roma campus in

⁶ Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are former British Protectorates that were administered as High Commission Territories.

Lesotho, formerly known as Pius XII College, was procured by the British government (Interview with V).

In the early years following its establishment, the game-changing priority of the UBLS sought to reorganise and ensure that the regional university strategies and actions of the ground reflected its transnational representation, in terms of spreading out the teaching courses and learning across the three campuses to also include, Swaziland and Botswana (Interview with V). The university's model was to be restructured in a manner that would reveal its transnational nature in terms of teaching and learning, and spreading it out among the three countries. Since inception, the learning, teaching and physicality of the university was at the Roma campus in Lesotho. As such, the teaching and learning were to be shared among the three countries in this order: While the Part I undergraduate courses were to be offered at the campuses of Swaziland and Botswana, the Part II courses were to be offered at the Roma campus in Lesotho. Over time, it was envisaged that all the three campuses would offer both part I and II undergraduate courses (Mokopakgosi, 2013:473-474).

3.2.2.1. The politics of game-changing

Regional thickening and game-changing of the UBLS faced mixed challenges and results. Similar to the ICU, the UBLS only lasted for close to a decade. The factors that led to the disintegration of the UBLS were multiple, both internally and externally, ranging from parochial national interest, interference by national governments in the university governance structure, disagreements and an unbalanced regional partnership in favour of Lesotho. As such, the narrow state centred policies towards nationalistic tendencies endangered game-changing. The differences in approaches and interests over time, contributed to the disintegration of this regional institution. While the governments appeared to have had a common vision about what a transnational university would entail, in terms of the model of course distribution across the three countries, this shared vision changed over time. On the one hand, growing dissatisfaction at the slow pace to implement a transnational model emerged from Botswana and Swaziland, while on the other hand the Lesotho government opted for a regional higher education institution that would only be centrally located at its Roma campus (Mokopakgosi, 2013:473-474). The lack of buy-in by all the stakeholders on the initial model, as well as the narrow nationalistic interests, as such, prevailed over implementing a successful game-changing transnational educational project that would be acceptable by all three parties. It was noted that, while there had initially been a general agreement that Part II of the programme teaching would also be introduced in Botswana and Swaziland, steps towards levelling the partnership

did not sit well with the Government of Lesotho (Mokopakgosi, 2013:471). In addition, the disagreement over the renewal of the vice-chancellor's contract and the refusal of Lesotho to a devolution plan that would allow Swaziland and Botswana to also offer Part II learning programme, resulted in the abrupt disintegration of the UBLS (Mokopakgosi, 2013:471). It was relayed that the Lesotho government feared that extending the learning programme to Botswana and Swaziland would result in the loss of benefits such as the financial resources initially channelled to the Roma campus. Further, there was a sense that the Government of Lesotho was against the extension of Part I and II of the undergraduate courses as it would result in reduced budgets, and negatively impact and lead into job losses for locals.¹ Further, factors that facilitated dis-integration were linked to political activism at the Roma campus and perceptions that staff members influenced students and others – a concern to the governments of Botswana and Swaziland (Mokopakgosi, 2013:477). The spreading out of the courses and teaching across the three countries, as well as, regional representation of students and lecturers would have further thickened regionalism and regional cohesion across this region.

This UBLS offered a unique type of transnational teaching and learning that brought together both female and male elite students and lecturers from across Southern Africa, to pursue a higher education degree programme (Interview with V). In addition to the learning, inter-regional campus sport was a big part of the academic curricula that is said to have deepened transnational linkages, and regional cohesion among the students and lecturers from the three countries and from the rest of Southern Africa (Mokopakgosi, 2013:466). In this sense, regional thickening as game-changing of the UBLS characterised deepening transnational relations, cultural links, and exchanges among the students, and lecturers from across Southern African. The transnational higher education university helped to consolidate a sense of region-ness and self-determination in the face of the insecurity, control, and destabilisation promoted by the apartheid state of South Africa.

All in all, the actions and functions of the UBLS not only promoted game-changing that resulted in the development of similar values and ways of thinking. While the UBLS had a short lifespan, its game-changing activities equally increased cultural linkages, cross-learning and interactions among the elite students and lecturers across Southern Africa. Today, regionalisation, regionalism and region-ness have been reinforced among the peoples of these three countries. For example, despite that the disintegration of the UBLS, the three universities have organised inter-varsity sports and games, student exchanges, shared a system of external examination, and meetings of vice-chancellors. A UBLS Alumni Association was further

created to deepen the relations and interactions among the former students (Mokopakgosi, 2013:465; Interview with V). The integration and disintegration and re-emergence of new regional identities in terms of the individual universities in the three countries point to the non-rigid character of regional formations or identities.

Since the early 1990s, transnational universities have spread across Southern Africa. For example, the Women's University in Africa (WUA), is a Harare-based private institution established in 2002, and headed by Zimbabwe's feminist Hope Sadza. The WUA has facilitated a transnational education and cultural linkages among the students from across the Southern Africa region and continent, particularly, women. WUA's game-changing activities targets mostly women from across Southern Africa, to promote education, and minimise their marginalisation through their increased enrolment in institutions of higher learning. WUA has also offered scholarships to women from across Southern Africa, to pursue undergraduate degree courses in various fields. Transnational universities, have, however, not only offered counter-responses to the exclusive higher education structures and policies, but they also contributed to developing a crop of regional citizens with common values and ways of thinking. Game-changing that has evolved from transnational educational organisation has further promoted regional cohesion in the area of education and among the peoples of the region, creating region-ness. Adequate funding for transnational organising and regionalisation has been vital to ensure regional thickening and game-changing. For example, due to shrinking budgets, the number of students that WUA supports financially today, in terms of offering scholarships, has gradually reduced over the years (Interview with T, Former Student at WUA). Game-changing activities at a transnational level in Southern Africa are also re-enforced by transnational religious movements.

3.2.3. Transnational religious movement

The Zion Christian Church (ZCC) – conceived in 1910 – is one of most populist transnational religious movement in the Southern African region that actively promotes a regional thickening across boundaries in terms of cultural linkages, norms, interactions, as well as regional

cohesion (Moripe, 1996:154; Radebe, 2008:53).⁷ The ZCC constitute a part of a broader transnational continental religious community of the AICs that broke away from dominant Christian missionary patriarchy that was premised on what Oosthuizen (1996:2) has been regarded as “over Europeanised, over-institutionalised and over-intellectualised churches in Africa”. The Christian missionary churches introduced with colonialism were perceived by the local communities as exclusive in nature, in terms of their lacking in accommodating African spiritual agency, as well as, their exclusion of women and young people from assuming important roles in the church structures (Adogame and Jafta, 2005:327). The Christian missionary church was instead viewed as supporting the broader colonial agenda that encouraged exclusion, divisions, and marginalisation leading itself to growing insecurities among the local communities.

The ZCC emerged to counter the inadequacies associated with Western practices of Christianity that did not resonate with the spiritual agency, and on the ground realities of African societies. Pointing to its significance, Radebe (2008:52) suggests that the “ZCC and the entire AIC community can be seen as the vanguard of an indigenous expression of African Christianity and an alternative to the mainstream” Eurocentric churches. Mashabela (2017:2) also notes that the emergence of the ZCC was “a strong challenge against the white missionary and government dominant policies which undermined and destroyed African spirituality, culture and heritage”. The emergence of the ZCC was, as such, shaped by Christian missionary structures that were in themselves perceived as insecurity among the local communities.

Like the ICU and UBLS, the ZCC from inception constituted transnational elements. The ZCC has membership with broader transnational religious movements at a continental and global levels. Adogame and Jafta (2005:327) have pointed out that the African Instituted Churches (AICs) over time “began to transcend the immediate geo-ethnic and cultural boundaries within which they were born and nurtured”. Having emerged from a localised context in South Africa, the ZCC’s norms, values, as well as, its style of worship spread to other parts of Southern Africa in countries such as Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and Zambia. The ZCC was founded in South

⁷ For a detailed history of the ZCC, see Oosthuizen, 1996; Nchabeleng 1983; Comaroff, 1985; and Moripe, 1996.

Africa by Engenas Lekganyane who was originally from Swaziland (Lukhaimane, 1991:227–228). It is headquartered at a place called Moria or Zion city, in Limpopo Province, South Africa, where its members from across Southern Africa congregate annually during the Easter season (Radebe, 2008:52). According to Radebe (2008:53), “the ZCC is the only grassroots, transnational community that can independently host millions of people from all over Southern Africa irrespective of state boundaries – and it has been done so for a significant period of time”.

The ZCC’s membership equally expanded over time growing grew rapidly between 1925 and 1954, from 926 to 80 000 members (Oosthuizen, 1996:126). Radebe (2008:52) has pointed out that, the ZCC membership over the years swelled to over six million. The increasing membership of the ZCC points to the growing transnational activities and regionalisms through the spreading of its values and beliefs across the region. Pointing to the growth of the ZCC members, it has been suggested that “the main reason for this remarkable growth [was] due to the leadership of the church, its dogma, internal organisation and management and their religious practices” (Nchabeleng, 1983:107). Similar to the ICU, the role of strong individuals within the ZCC was and still is regarded as pivotal, in appealing to grassroots communities. Radebe (2008:52) notes that the majority of ZCC members are drawn from grassroots communities from townships, and rural areas with a few from urban areas. In contrast to mainstream discourses, regional thickening as game-changing by transnational religious communities point to growing regionalisation, regionalisms among the non-elitist and non-state actors.

3.2.3.1. Power relations

The AICs are constituted by complex hierarchical power structures within which the individual leader is seen as, “charismatic in nature and hereditary” (Nchabeleng, 1983:29). According to Adogame and Jafta (2005:328), the AIC head of the Church is “central in... ritual spaces as they ‘explain, predict and control’ events... [and] are a constant reference point... pivotal force for order and rapprochement between the human and the sensible cosmos... [and]... has unchallengeable authority through his/her personal charisma”. However, it has been noted that “despite major secession [in the ZCC in recent years], the leadership has always devolved to the Lekganyane descendants” (Comaroff, 1985:240). Despite the hereditary factor as a prerequisite in the continuity of the leadership line of the ZCC, membership of the Church has

continued to expand over the years (Comaroff, 1985:240). Until his recent death in 2017, the ZCC was headed by the third-generation Bishop Barnabus Lekganyane.

Another factor driving a growing membership of the ZCC is that of healing and prophetic ministry (Moripe, 1996:158; Mashabela, 2017:5). The prophetic ministry of the ZCC centres on African religious cultural revival expressed through charismatic activities (Comaroff, 1985). Yet, while African cultural revival is central to the ZCC, it has, however, retained Christian Old Testament beliefs, including adopting forms of worship, places of worship, the dress code, the use of holy sticks, as well as being barefooted during worship (Adogame and Jafta, 2005:316, 325). However, while the ZCC transnational community has shared a common belief and practices, it has at the same time, expressed distinctions in terms of uniforms worn by its members across the region (Adogame and Jafta, 2005:316, 325). As such, the identities as expressed by its members have varied across Southern Africa and have not revealed linearity.

3.2.3.2. The ZCC's political functions

The history of the AICs game-changing points to its political and liberatory roles, as was the case during the national resistance war (Shankar, 2014:33; Pace, 1995; Sundkler, 1976). Over time, the ZCC shifted from secessionist to non-secessionist functions during the liberation war in Southern Africa (Shankar, 2014:33; Kiernana, 1990; Sundkler, 1976). It was pointed out that the ZCC in South Africa – having initially participated in the national resistance politics – withdrew from organising against colonial governments in order to preserve their autonomy (Ranger, 1996 cited in Shankar, 2014:33). In the case of South Africa, the move by the ZCC to withdraw invited criticism for being “too soft and a good propaganda machine for the apartheid government” (Pace, 1995:22). In Zimbabwe, the ZCC “actively excommunicated adherents from organisations to promote political nonparticipation during Zimbabwe’s independence struggle led by the likes of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU)” (Shoffeleers, 1991). The changes in roles and functions of the ZCC then were shaped by the colonial context, and the traditional roles prescribed to the church. As such, game-changing within the ZCC faced mixed outcomes due to the differences among its members that did not buy-into the non-secessionist role amidst growing insecurities from colonialism and the apartheid system.

In the period towards South Africa’s independence, the ZCC in South Africa began to play political functions that aimed at contributing to a peace first democratic election. Particularly, the ZCC encouraged political leaders to participate at its largest annual gathering in Moria,

during the negotiated settlement phase of South Africa's transition, and towards its first democratic elections in 1994 (Kealotswe, 2005:214). The shift in the political role points to the non-rigid nature of identities. The ZCC roles and functions have dovetailed between political and non-political spaces. The roles and functions of non-state actors, as such, have not been fixed and have criss-crossed with changing contexts and dynamics. Further, the interactions between the Church and the state, points to growing non-state-state regionalism in promoting norms that change behaviours and, in turn, promote greater security and stabilisation. As was the case in South Africa, and across the region, game-changing to end colonialism was promoted by both states and non-state actors. The interface between non-state and state regionalism in promoting greater security challenges the linearity in IR mainstream discourses. The roles played by non-state actors transcend the political field, to social and economic functions.

3.2.3.3. Social and economic roles

The ZCC game-changing activities have demonstrated a particular commitment towards promoting self-sufficiency values for its members that ultimately contribute to economic development within their communities. For example, the ZCC encourages its members to venture into a variety of income generating activities ranging from small-scale informal cross-border trading, to managing big businesses (Moripe, 1997:130).⁸ The ZCC has sought to empower its grassroots members as a self-sustaining strategy to address varying social insecurities such as poverty. In this sense, the ZCC activities are not only driven by the social-spiritual needs of local communities, but also economic ones. There exists, however, contradictions in the ZCC's values, particularly as it relates to the question of women.

Despite the AIC's break away from Christian missionary patriarchy that was seen as not in line with Africa's spiritual needs, and exclusive of women and the youth, the reality in practice has revealed the ZCC's retention of the Old Testament practices as it relates to the women and

⁸ It has been noted that the ZCC also promotes education and offers bursaries to university and college students in South Africa (Nchabeleng, 1983:9).

girls. Referring to the ZCC's exclusive practices, Mashabela (2017:7) points out, "[w]omen are not allowed to attend prophecy services if they are menstruating as they are regarded as unclean". In reality, while the ZCC broke away from the exclusive structures of Christian missionary patriarchy, at the same time, they have seemingly perpetuated gender biased structures. However, unlike mainstream discourse that have romanticised non-state spaces, critical discourses have pointed to their contradictions and paradoxes. As such, while the traditional role of the church has been romanticised, the reality, as revealed various contradictions. For example, in the 1950 and 1960s, the Lumpa Mission Church in Zambia headed by a female Prophetess Alice Leshina mobilised not only against the colonial government, but also fought against the national resistance movement – United National Independence Party (UNIP) – led by Kenneth Kaunda. Today, the uncovering of abuses in both traditional churches, such as the Catholic church and in emerging charismatic churches have revealed the contradictory role of the church. Despite the paradoxes, the ZCC's transnational activities, however, have played a role in norm creation and diffusion, as well as to growing region-ness across Southern African.

Due to their persistent exclusion and marginalisation, transnational women's organisation emerged as a counter-response to push for change in the region's rigid social, economic, cultural political structures in the colonial and post-colonial era.

3.2.4. Transnational women's organisation

Women's political organisation and participation in public life, both in the colonial and post-colonial African societies have promoted the development of norms and values, addressing societal and gendered insecurities. These public functions predate signs of matriarchy. For example, among the people of Swaziland, the king's mother has shared power with the king and is called "the Elephant, the Earth, the Beautiful, and the Mother of the Country" (Lebeuf, 1963:100, cited in Amadiume, 1987b:187).⁹ The Swazi queen mother co-governs and helps

⁹ In other African societies, for example in West Africa, women participated actively in public life. For example, the Yoruba and Igbo women in Nigeria, and in Ghana's Asante Kingdom, the queen mother was and still a key role in selecting kings (Amadiume, 1987b; Fallon, 2008; Sklar, 1963).

preside over a state that is a constituent part of the region. Another notable political function of women in pre-colonial Southern Africa is reflected in accounts pointing to the influential role of the rain queen Modjadji of the Limpopo province in South Africa, who is believed to have played, and still plays important roles as the custodian of knowledge, and in presiding over rain-making ceremonies (The Rain Queen, <http://rainqueensofafrica.com/2011/03/-queen/>). Queen Modjadji, the knowledge and rain-making ceremonies are believed to have originated from Zimbabwe, and spread into South Africa's, Limpopo province and into Mozambique The Rain Queen, <http://rainqueensofafrica.com/2011/03/-queen/>). As such, before the existence of states, straddling boundaries across (political) communities through knowledge and ceremonies were viewed as beneficial, in contributing to reducing insecurities. The rain-making ceremonies were and still are significant in securing bumper harvests for the local communities. Similarly, pre-colonial accounts in West Africa also point to the gendered nature within local communities that were a source of insecurity for women, and encouraged their organisation in solidarity networks, aimed at bringing men to account for the social ills taking place in communities (Amadiume, 1987a). The manner in which women groups organised in the pre-colonial and over time points to game-changing activities that sought to address gender and women-related insecurities.

3.2.4.1. The gendered nature of colonial Southern Africa

The gendered nature of colonial Southern African politics is a source of insecurity to women. For example, the colonial migrant law system mostly catered for the male labour to work across the region in the mines and agricultural fields, while the women were pushed into the private spaces. However, the exclusive colonial policies were met with counter-resistance and to growing transnational feminism across Southern Africa. Crush, Williams and Peberdy (2005:5) note that the “[c]olonial regulations and the formal contract systems for labour migrants as gendered. Female migrants could not migrate legally across borders for work. They, therefore, had to migrate illegally, which many did”. Yet, as pointed out by Giesler (2004), the more women were pushed from the public into the private spaces by the colonisers, the more they re-grouped to counter the exclusive divisive colonial regimes.

In present day Southern Africa, border regulations across the SADC region remain restrictive, particularly for women. While informal cross border trading is highly feminised, with close to 70 percent of women in Southern Africa contributing to 30-40 percent intra-regional trade, women continue to face harsh conditions to earn a living and end poverty (Ndlovu, 2017). For example, the 90-day visitor's permit rule that cuts across the Southern Africa region, applies

for every calendar year of 12 months. Each visitor has a calendar year determined by the very first stamp that that person gets when entering a particular country for the first time. However, once the 90 days lapse, a visitor can apply for a visiting permit valid for six months, and is given in three months. Those that conduct transnational commercial activities are only entitled to 30 days, after which they have to apply for a cross-border permit, which is valid for six months, but given first for three months and then extended for another three months (Interview with W). The key SADC Protocols on Trade have made no reference to informal cross-border traders. So far, no major steps have been achieved to address the plight of these women, as well as the gendered human security challenges they face. Yet, transnational activities, particularly of women informal cross-border traders have been singled out by the SADC governments as a security challenge associated with overcrowding, the spread of diseases, illegal migration, smuggling of goods and human trafficking (CCR, 2013:41; Interview with W).

3.2.4.2. Women's participation in resistance politics

Women's participation in the resistance politics was largely a response to the consistent gendered politics that were exclusive and divisive. It has been noted that due to the hostile and gendered nature of the colonial machinery, women across Southern Africa opted to participate in the national resistance politics (Walsh and Scully, 2006; Shaw, 2008; Giesler, 2006). The national liberation movements that emerged to play liberatory functions to end colonialism across Southern Africa were equally gendered. For example, while the African National Congress (ANC) was established in 1912, it took over 30 years, in 1943, to begin to admit women in its structures (SAHO, 2016). Despite their initial exclusion from the ANC's formal structures, women in South Africa organised and participated in the national resistance politics, from as far back as 1913, against the apartheid Pass Laws (SAHO, 2016; Hassim, 2004). Particularly, the August 9 1956, country-wide protest, a culmination of years of growing agitation and organisation against the pass law system, is revealed in academic discourse as a turning point in South Africa's women's movement (SAHO, 2016). The period leading to the August 9 protest, within which women from urban townships, and rural communities mobilised throughout the country to participate in activities, ranging from demonstrations, to the signing of petitions, is well-documented in feminist discourse (Hassim, 2004). The insecurities that characterised, initially the British, and then the apartheid system, largely shaped resistance roles of and women's participation and organisation during the liberation war.

The bulk of academic discourse on women's resistance politics has, however, focused on their role within national liberation movements. Not much attention has been paid to those individual women activists, mothers and trained guerrilla girl fighters who acted operated in a transnational context through what Magadla (2016:31) refers to as "clandestine activities". Pointing to their neglect in academic discourse, Magadla's (2016:31) argues, "the transnational guerrilla girl does not represent the dominant mode of women's participation in the armed struggle." According to Magadla (2016), women participating in the armed struggle transcended the traditional liberation resistance movements, to those women with transnational functions involving women activists, mothers carrying babies, as well as to trained guerrilla girls. A shift from a linear focus inherent in IR discourse opens up a possibility of exploring transnational political roles of women, as not only limited to the traditional political spaces, but their transnational activities also happened in non-traditional spaces.

There are further feminist accounts of women's participation in national resistance politics on Zimbabwe, as a mechanism aimed at fighting the gendered colonial system of marginalisation and exclusion. For example, women's participation in Zimbabwe's African National Unity-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), since its inception in 1975, is well noted (Chung, 2006; Giesler, 2006). However, despite their inclusion since the ZANU-PF was formed, Siedman (1984:420) notes that the ZANU-PF was gendered from inception. Women are said to have resisted against the ZANU-PF gendered policies and structures through a strategy of organising, both from within and outside the bounds of the movement (Giesler, 2006:5). Chung (2006) points out that initially, women were delegated traditional feminine roles within the movement, but over time began to take up masculine roles, performed by their male counterparts. The gendered structures were as such, not only reinforced by the colonisers, but also internally within male-dominated national resistance movements. The gendered nature of Southern Africa's politics, further, has not only been a source of insecurity. It has also been accompanied by counter-responses, particularly by women's groupings organising whose game-changing has pointed to changing norms and behaviours and to improving gender security.

3.2.4.3. Women's organisation in the post-colonial era

In the immediate independence era, the majority of newly formed African governments reinforced gendered politics, leaving women behind in the new governance structure. This was despite women's active organisation and participation in the national resistance politics.

Siedman (1984:420) observes that, “in retrospect, it appears possible that... party leaders only paid lip service to women’s rights in order to mobilise women for the war”. After the war, there was limited space for women’s participation (Britton and Price, 2014:301; Siedman, 1984:420). Instead, the newly male-dominated post-colonial governance structures tended to be hostile towards women (Mama, 2001; Britton and Price, 2014; Interview with B, Member: FEMNET, GL, WLSA and WILDAF, 29.06.2016, Lusaka, Zambia). As such, after the cessation of the conflicts and emergence of a black majority-led government, gendered insecurities for women re-surfaced. While some women opted to enter the new gendered governance structure by limiting their political activities to the traditional women’s league movement (Mama, 2001), others began organising beyond the male-dominated post-colonial governance structures (Interview with B; Britton and Price, 2014).

In countries such as Zambia, the new governance structures were characterised by limited space for women’s organisation. For example, the UNIP’s Women’s League was integrated into the ruling party’s governing structure. The Women’s League character changed to reinforce patriarchy through overseeing all women’s political formations across the country. Any emerging women’s group or network had to be affiliated to the UNIP Women’s League or risked being shut down (Interview with B). These changing roles of the women’s movement to reinforce patriarchy and nationalistic tendencies was seen as drawbacks, in terms of women’s push for their liberation from oppression, and to open up space for their participation in national politics. As Britton and Price (2014:301) have pointed out, instead, “women’s political participation and agitation for representation were regarded as threatening and unpatriotic”. However, it is important to note that women’s experiences in the immediate independence period differed from those countries that got their independence in the later years, such as in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa – where women proactively fought to be included in newly formed governance structures (Chung, 2006). As such, with independence, also emerged new challenges to organise independently to address gendered state politics.

The gendered intra-and inter-state politics in the context of Southern Africa, have been a source of insecurity that has, in turn, resulted in counter-responses from non-state actors. These actors have mobilised across the region in order to develop, and adapt norms to push for change as it relates to gendered differences and divisions. Due to the hostile environment in the early independence era in Zambia, it has been noted that women’s groups that wanted to organise outside the bounds of the new governance structures omitted the word ‘women’ in the naming of their organisation. It was relayed that, while some women’s groups could bear the name of

the global women's transnational community – Association for Women's Rights (AWID) – as their regional chapter brand name, others could not.

The Zambian Chapter, for example, was established in 1976 under the name, the Social Economic Research Group (SERG) with its primary focus being research on the retention of girls within schools and to promote women's access to economic justice. In this case, the AWID name could not be used to avoid being shut down by the UNIP Women's League. In 1984, the SERG changed its name to the Zambian Association for Research and Development (ZARD) (Interview with B).

The policy and operating environment in the immediate independence was hostile and shaped the nature of women's groups and their identities. In the Zambian example, while non-state organisation around women's insecurities sought to promote norm development, change and improved security, challenges remained. In order to pursue their game-changing activities, women developed survival strategies such as omitting word "women" to get around the oppressive and restrictive policies of the UNIP government. Due to the growing nationalistic tendencies that characterised the immediate independence era, women's game-changing efforts turned to inter-governmental global structuring and restructuring spaces, as a strategy to contribute to norm creation that they would adapt and diffuse back into national norms and policies.

3.2.4.4. Women's participation in global inter-state spaces

Despite being neglected in analyses in academic discourse, women's agency around gendered insecurities has been present in global IR (Marchand, 1996a; Van der Westhuizen, 2005; Interview with B). Due to the gendered nature that characterised the early post-independent Southern Africa, it has been pointed out that women suspended their political activism temporarily from within their local communities and turned to the United Nations (UN) women's structuring and restructuring spaces, where they advocated and participated in norm development (Van der Westhuizen, 2005:10; Lowe-Morna, 2004; Interview with B). There recognition and participation in inter-state global spaces empowered them to diffuse the very norms that emerged at a global level into national policies and norms. As such, the women's groups game-changing strategy yielded results at a global level to begin to push for norm changes, social change and to addressing gender insecurities. The global spaces also

empowered them on how to engage national governments at localised levels – a way of game-changing — in getting formal politics to unlearn their gendered ways.

Further, the ideas by African women to begin to organise in more organised transnational solidarity communities at a continental and regional level, to address common insecurities and marginalisation, emerged within the UN global restructuring spaces. For example, discussions to establish the first transnational women-focused solidarity network was born at the UN's Second Women's Conference in 1980, in Copenhagen, Denmark (Interview with B). Eight years after the UN Copenhagen meeting, a continental transnational community – the African Women's Development Communication Network (FEMNET) – was established in 1988 (Interview with B). The idea to establish FEMNET was shaped by the differences in perspectives between the West, and African women around cultural issues, in this case, on female genital mutilation practices in West Africa. It has been pointed out that the tensions that emerged at the Copenhagen conference between women from the African continent with those from the West, also revealed the gaps in knowledge, among the women from the African continent about their own gendered issues and contexts (Interview with B). As such, the FEMNET was established as a mechanism to mobilise collectively common gendered issues, as well as, a vehicle for learning and sharing experiences through communication (Interview with B).

Since democratisation and liberalisation, there has also been growing non-state-state regionalism within inter-governmental policy structures, particularly of gender and women-focused civil society. The SADC region, however, has not been sufficiently analysed in terms the game-changing activities of civil society groupings with a gender and women focus, within and outside formal frameworks, and the ways in which they have addressed gendered insecurities.

3.3. The interface between state and non-state regionalism

The history of the interface of state and non-state regionalism within SADC's inter-governmental policy structure may be traced as far as the colonial to the pre-colonial era. The idea to establish the FLS of 1975, began with the informal talks of the Mulungushi club, initiated by key two heads of states, Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, and Tanzania's, Julius Nyerere (ISS, 1999; Vale and Matlosa, 1996:53; CCR, 2013:36; Bischoff, 2014:61). The idea to form the FLS was driven by the insecurities that surrounded the liberation war, as well as the brutal nature of the apartheid regime of South Africa. Due to the nature of colonial policies that were

exclusive on many fronts, the FLS's game-change involved the engagement of non-state actors in norm development and implementation.

Over time, these two leaders were joined by Botswana's, Sir Seretse Khama (Bischoff, 2014:61). Bischoff (2014:61) notes, "the FLS was driven by the good relationship among its founding leaders... in opposition to an apartheid South Africa". As such, game-changing transnational activities and regionalisation, as epitomised by the FLS, were driven by good relations among the three key individuals. Further, the FLS was also shaped by the continental ideals of Pan-Africanism as propagated by the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963, to decolonise the continent. Khadiagala (2012:33) has pointed out that "The FLS ...epitomised a decolonisation-driven regionalism that combined both a security... dimension. Unlike functionalist approaches that suggest a linear approach to regional integration, the FLS began with a political dimension and consequently combined to with the economic aspects as a response to the multiple insecurities presented by the apartheid system".

The nature of the conflict during colonialism, characterised by military insecurities, presented by apartheid South Africa, shaped the game-changing strategies of the FLS. To address the insecurities that surrounded the region, the FLS invited the representatives of the national liberation movements to participate in its policy discussions and formulation. At the FLS summit level, as such, the debates and decisions emerged were not only limited to those coming from the heads of state, but they also included ideas from the representatives of the various national liberation movements (ISS, 1999). The interface of non-state-state regionalism within the FLS, in turn, resulted in the development of norms, what Khadiagala (2012) has referred to as "decolonisation-driven regionalism".

Non-state actors not only contributed to the development of regional security strategies within the FLS, but they also presided over the structures of the FLS. For example, as a non-state actor, Robert Mugabe sat on the FLS's Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) put in place in 1976, as well as chairing it (CCR, 2013:36). The norms and structures that emerged from processes and interactions within the FLS to address military security were as such, constituted by both state and non-state civil society actors. There is, however, no literature that gives an indication of women's participation within the FLS policy structures.

With the attainment of independence in Zimbabwe in 1980, non-state liberation movements such as the ZANU-PF evolved from a non-state national liberation movement, into a governing political party. Similar to the immediate post-independent context, the SADCC's game-processes of norm development and implementation around its sectoral programme were

gendered and exclusive of non-state participation. For example, it has been noted that efforts to push for the creation of a gender desk within the SADCC structures by women's organisations were left unnoticed (Giesler, 2004; Interview with B).

3.4. The gendered politics of the SADCC

Southern Africa's post-colonial states were confronted with an urgent need to develop their economies. The economic objective of the SADCC as such, was driven by the desire of the newly independent states to industrialise their economies. Khadiagala (2012:25) points out that, "Through the sector-led coordination approach to integration, SADCC was an attempt to transcend the post-colonial approaches to regionalism by emphasising trade and market integration". Unlike the mainstream linear and fixed progression assigned to regional integration, from economic to political cooperation, game-changing activities of the FLS to the SADCC began with the political to economic dimension. Given the political agenda and the military insecurities that surrounded the region, the FLS transnational activities were inclusive of non-state actors, while SADCC adopted an exclusive state-centric approach to region-ness. Khadiagala (2012:25) notes that the SADCC "adopted... [a] state-centric and highly individualised regionalism, owing to the circumstances surrounding Southern Africa's decolonisation processes". The insecurities that surrounded the region, and desire to industrialise newly independent states shaped the SADCC's highly state-centric approach to game-changing. Mandaza (1987:214) has pointed out that SADCC's state-centric approach was inevitable, noting, "It is a natural and legitimate desire of any young state to strengthen itself. The SADCC states' wish [ed] to promote a regional industrial strategy, however, narrow nationalism present[ed]... a problem". As a result, Mandaza (1987:218) noted that the "SADCC... remain[ed] quite divorced from the very masses that could provide the political basis and framework for economic disengagement from South Africa".

The gendered nature of inter-governmental processes and interactions over time resulted in the development of a framework of non-state participation, as a counter-response to post-independent political structures of exclusion and marginalisation in Southern Africa.

3.4.1. Recognition of non-state actors in state regionalisms

The context of democratisation and liberalisation since the 1990s, as well as, the shifting dynamics from the SADCC to the SADC in 1992, began to further open up space for non-state interface with state regionalism within inter-governmental regional structures. The Windhoek Treaty of 1992, establishing the SADC, redefined previously non-legal forms of cooperation of the SADCC into a legally-binding regional framework of the SADC.¹⁰ Unlike the SADCC that was based on a highly exclusive state-centric and individualised regionalism (Khadiagala, 2012:25), the SADC recognised the game-changing role of non-state actors in community-building (Mbuende, 2012:57). Paragraph 23 of the 1994 SADC Windhoek Treaty provided that,

SADC shall seek to involve fully the peoples of the region and non-governmental organisations in the process of regional integration...SADC shall cooperate with and support the initiatives of the peoples of the region and non-governmental organisations, contributing to the objectives of this Treaty in the areas of cooperation in order to foster closer relations among communities, associations and the peoples of the region (SADC Treaty 1992).

Providing an inside perspective, SADC's former executive secretary, Mbuende (2012:56) notes that,

There [was] a recognition that the legitimacy of regional integration depend[ed] on [the] support from the peoples of the region. Regional integration by its very nature

¹⁰ The SADC Treaty was further amended in 2001, restructuring the SADC according to a new institutional framework and governing structure that includes the SADC Summit, the supreme policy making institute led by Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministers that oversees functioning of the SADC, a Standing Committee of Officials as technical advisory committee of the Council of Ministers, and the Executive Secretariat that provides secretariat services. [http:// www.sadc.int>files>Agreement_Amending_the_Treaty- 2001.pdf](http://www.sadc.int/files/Agreement_Amending_the_Treaty-2001.pdf) Accessed 10.12.2016.

encroaches on the space of ordinary citizens in different ways and must therefore be acceptable to the citizens of member states... the peoples of the region can make a significant contribution to the formulation of policies based on their experiences from their various walks of life. It is against this background that provisions were made for the participation of non-state actors in community-building.

With the shift to the SADC, the community space was opened up for non-state-state-based regionalism, regionalisation, and region-ness. Game-changing activities within the SADC inter-governmental structures as such, not only confined to state-based, as advanced in mainstream regional IR studies, but the development of norms would equally involve the interface of state and non-state regionalism. Unlike earlier non-legally binding norms, the 1992, SADC Treaty recognised non-state actors as important actors in community-building. The Treaty's engagement with non-state actors as such, neutralises narratives that have suggested SADC as merely a club of heads of states. Landsberg (2012:75), for example, argues, "At best, SADC is an implementation body, but it is the heads of state and government that call the proverbial shots in the region". While the above observation may not altogether be dismissed, it is important to also note, the sometimes lack of political will by the SADC member states to implement the very policies that they have adopted. Further, the SADC's 2003 blueprint – the RISDP – prioritises the non-state private sector as key to realising community-building agenda in the context of liberalisation. The evolving context of neo-liberalism, as well as the internal factors to industrialise, has shaped the SADC's strategic focus as it relates to non-state engagement in community-building. The SADC has prioritised non-state private actors in the RISDP.

Yet, NGOs have equally organised and participated in community-building at regional and local levels through norm development and contributed to improves security across the region, not only in the economic area, but also socially and politically. Mbuende (2012:56) has pointed out that non-state actors possess expertise, and knowledge in the various issue areas of the SADC's programme of action that seeks to address persistent (gendered) insecurities.

3.5. Globalisation, democratisation and game-changing

The context of globalisation and the opening up of democratic spaces, characterised by growing transnational non-state actors, have been perceived as a security threat to nation-states. There are some scholars who have suggested the context of globalisation and neo-liberalisation as

having reduced state capacity, and in turn, promoted non-state actors in governance issues. This changing context in the 1990s was characterised by the channelling of resources by donors directly to NGO. As such, non-state activities, particularly those of NGOs, are perceived as donor-funded, thereby, seen as a national security threat by some SADC member states, such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, and Swaziland (CCR, 2013:17). In his experience as the SADC Executive Secretary, Mbuende (2012:56) relates that,

There has been apprehension among SADC governments about foreign-funded NGOs in a number of countries. NGOs are seen either as pursuing a foreign agenda or as opposition in disguise. One of the liveliest debates that I witnessed at SADC summits was when the Secretariat tabled a report on SADC cooperation with NGOs. Most of the heads of state who participated in the meeting expressed apprehension about the role of NGOs.

As such, while the context of liberalisation and opening up of democratic spaces has shaped increased donor-funding, governments perceived it as a threat to national security, thereby, the reservations by SADC member states to engage non-state actors. The SADC member state's very exclusive approaches have in themselves posed as insecurities for non-state actors. For example, SADC states have been said as practicing exclusive forms of regionalisation, in that they mostly interact with their preferred non-state actors that correspond with their interests (Landsberg, 2012:12; Söderbaum, 2007:331; Interview with Q, Senior Director, DITSHWANELO, 16.09.2016, Gaborone, Botswana). Further, while there have existed an active non-state transnational community in Southern Africa, including on gender, there, however, is lack of "clarity on the modalities for civil society participation in SADC's activities" (CCR 2013:16). Mbuende (2012:57) notes:

There is no doubt that various non-state actors can add value to the process of regional integration in Southern Africa. It is important to underscore the differential roles of NGOs and governments. NGOs cannot substitute for governments even in areas where government institutions are weak. The challenge is to work towards strengthening such institutions. There are functions that can be carried out effectively by civil society, while others remain the preserve of the state. What is of cardinal importance, however, is to design appropriate mechanisms to institutionalise the involvement of non-state actors in the process of regional integration. Thus far, this involvement has been sporadic and unpredictable.

As such, while the SADC has recognised non-state actors as vital partners in community-building, there is at the same time some persisting degree of their marginalisation in game-changing activities at a transnational level. Furthermore, while SADC policy frameworks recognise non-state actors within its broader regional community-building agenda, in reality, there is a sense that these norms have done little to improve non-state-state interactions (CCR 2013:16). Game-changing within the SADC policy structures has revealed mixed results, including the power dynamics.

3.6. Power dynamics and game-changing

After the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa joined the SADC. This new development also entailed the SADC redefining its game-changing strategies, objectives and the role it was to play in the post-apartheid era. However, the redefinition of SADC was marred by tensions and disagreements (CCR 2013:36). The damage caused by the apartheid regime, during the war of destabilisation, remains fresh in the minds of Southern Africa's leaders. The SADC's decision to reject the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) in the early 1980s had resulted in the waging of a destabilisation war by South Africa on several fronts across Southern Africa (Adedeji, 1996:9). This war is said to have cost the region an estimated one million lives and about \$60-billion in losses in the 1980s (Adedeji, 1996: 9). South Africa's government took up even more coercive measures to destabilise the regional's industrialisation programme by engaging and trading with the individual countries (Chitala, 1987:31). As such, destabilisation war became another insecurity that preoccupied SADC's regional governments. While the SADC's mandate in the 1980s (under the SADCC) constituted an economic sectoral programme on industrialisation, the growing insecurities presented by South Africa's apartheid destabilisation policy and proxy wars within the region, occupied much of its game-changing activities and strategies (Khadiagala, 2012; CCR, 2013; Bischoff, 2014). SADC's the initial security architecture of the FLS, the ISDSC, was retained within the new organisational structures under the SADCC, and Zimbabwe maintained its chair (CCR, 2013; Bischoff, 2014). As such, due to the nature of the liberation war and the operating environment, military security concerns and narrow personal interests preoccupied most newly independent states (CCR, 2013; Bischoff, 2014).

However, the coming on board by South Africa, which was previously the region's enemy, was not without challenges. Adedeji (1996:9) notes that levels of distrust, even towards the new black majority government as the inheritor of a democratic state in South Africa, were

high. This distrust manifested itself in various forms. The re-conceptualisation of the notion of security under the new SADC resulted in serious differences between the two strong Heads of States: Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, and South Africa's Nelson Mandela (CCR, 2013:36). Zimbabwe's Mugabe had a conservative reactionary position, pushing for a conventional, narrow and patriarchal kind of security with a view that the ISDSC be maintained as a separate security wing with its own summit (CCR 2013:36). In contrast, South Africa's Mandela was pushing for a broader notion of peace that included non-military elements. In the latter, the security organ was to be integrated into the new SADC structures and report to the summit of Heads of States (CCR 2013:36). In the post-apartheid era, South Africa was tagged a "norm entrepreneur" and its external policy as anchored on pushing for a liberal-human rights agenda across Southern Africa and the Great Lakes region, in countries such as, the DRC and Burundi (Nel and Van der Westhuizen, 2004; Louw-Vaudran, 2016:1-4).

Given the tensions between the two strong individuals – Mugabe and Mandela – it took close to five years to put a new security architecture in place. For example, while the decision to establish the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) was reached in 1996, it only came into force in 2001 (CCR, 2013:37; Adebajo, 2010:40-44). However, unlike the ISDSC under the FLS and the SADCC that focused on military state security, the notion of security under the SADC has evolved over time, to include non-military security. As such, regional thickening in terms of the evolving security notion was reflected in the OPDSC of 1996, the Mutual Defence Pact of 2003, the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) of 2004 and its revised version of 2012. For example, the OPDSC as outlined in the SIPO notes an expanded regional programme in the political, defence, public security sector and state security spheres (SADC-SIPO, 2012). Thickening regionalisms around security issues is further reflected in the SIPO policy framework to include, human trafficking, organised crime, illegal migration, maritime piracy, economic threats, foreign interference, HIV/AIDS, and the smuggling of goods. Further, within the evolved SIPO of 2012, security areas noted include, "providing and ensuring services in law enforcement, public safety, corrections/prisons, immigration, parks and wildlife, customs and refugees" (SADC-SIPO, 2012).

The SIPO, like the SADC Treaty of 1992, and the 2003 SADC RISDP accommodated for non-state participation within the broader SADC policy strategy, in order to ensure their contribution to community-building, as well as in addressing issues around security and governance (CCR, 2013:37). The SIPO further calls for collaboration with non-state actors in areas of research, public debates, seminars, as well as, in conflict prevention, management, and

resolution (SADC-SIPO, 2012). This emergent thickening regionalism has constituted non-state-state actors collaborating within SADC's inter-governmental structures.

In terms of growing policies, the SADC (unlike other state-led regional organisations) has made progress since the 1990s to acknowledge, and also recognise the role of non-state actors in region-building. SADC's region-building approaches have differed from those of SACU and COMESA, due to the different contexts within which all these emerged. The SADC has not only recognised civil society actors in its key regional policy documents, but it has invited them to participate and contribute to norm changes, norm development, in the interest of addressing regional (social) insecurities. The following chapters discuss in detail game-changing of civil society actors, particularly those with a gender and women focus at a global level, and within the context of the SADC region.

3.7. Conclusion

This chapter has suggested that an evolving web of transnational relations and transnational organisation developed side by side, or underneath state-centric IR and their international organisation. It has discussed the history of regional thickening and game change in the colonial and post-colonial Southern Africa in the latter and part of the 20th century. The map of regional thickening as game-changing plotted has pointed to how early regionalism of transnational communities such as, the transnational trade union organisation; the transnational educational organisation; the transnational religious organisation; and the transnational women's organisations developed and thickened over time. Regional thickening as game-changing of these transnational communities also revealed how increasing transnational activities, regionalisation, regionalism, and region-ness, facilitated common ways of thinking, the assimilation of cultures, the forging of common identities, and life-long contacts and relations.

Early transnational activities have revealed their gendered nature in terms of exclusive policies, and the persistent marginalisation of women in formal politics, and within governance structures. Furthermore, the history of game-changing revealed the patriarchal structures and nationalistic tendencies that characterised post-independent Southern Africa, and the counter-resistance to formal politics, to push for change in gendered mores and attitudes. Further, while African women's agency has existed in intergovernmental global structuring and restructuring policymaking spaces in IR, and in developing the norm cycle, they remained overlooked in academic discourse. In the context of Southern Africa, women's agency has involved pushing for localised norms to form part of global policy, adapting these norms, and diffusing them

back into localised contexts for norm changes, changes in behaviour, and for improved gender security.

The earlier intergovernmental policymaking structures of the SADC in the colonial and post-colonial era have revealed some inconsistency in terms their approach to non-state engagement in game-changing. This was evident in the way in which non-state actors were engaged in the policymaking structures. While the interface between non-state and state regionalism was evident in the FLS military security policymaking discussions, policy development, adaptation and implementation by both state and non-state actors, the same was non-existent in the SADCC's sectoral programme to region-building. This chapter has pointed to the highly state-centric nature of the SADCC, and how to the prevailing insecurities of newly independent states and the apartheid's destabilisation strategies shaped its game-changing strategies.

Early game-changing of within intergovernmental policymaking was gendered until the 1990s. Since democratisation and liberalisation, norms that have emerged from within SADC's intergovernmental structures have recognised the game-changing role of non-state actors. The recognition and participation of non-state actors in evolving inter-state policymaking frameworks and practice has promoted game-changing in terms of a growing interface between state-non-state regionalism, contributing to norm development, norms changes and to improved insecurities. This chapter has also revealed the politics of game-changing within intergovernmental spaces as it relates to member states or those of states towards non-state actors as mixed.

The lack of buy-in, tensions, exclusion and marginalisation, however, presented mixed game-changing results. Transnational communities in Southern Africa have integrated, disintegrated and in some cases, re-emerged over time, pointing to the non-fixed nature of identities, thereby challenging the persistent linearity in IR studies. All in all, this chapter has suggested that the evolving history of game-changing in Southern Africa has helped shape the current dynamics of regional thickening, as well as influential sets of transnational relations and transnational organisation.

CHAPTER 4:

Gender Focused Civil Society Organisations in Southern Africa

4.1. Introduction

Despite increasing transnational activities of civil society actors in the context of globalisation and regionalisation, these processes and interactions have, so far, remained relatively neglected in the field of IR analyses, particularly, as it relates to gender. Much of the academic discourse has narrowed down on transnational processes and interactions of civil society actors operating at a global level (Kaldor, 2003; Keohane and Nye, 1972; Scholte, 2000, Keane, 2003; O'Brien, 2005; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Yet, civil society actors have equally participated in transnational processes and practices at a regional level. Those who write on civil society processes at a regional level of analysis, find that it is accompanied by growth and points, to norms seeking, and to reduced social insecurities. Jusu-Sheriff (2004:270-278), for example, has noted civil society interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Mali, where women civil society groupings organised outside formal state structures, helped to minimise violent conflict, contributed to more stabilisation, and reducing insecurities in the four West African countries. As such, an explanation depicting a mosaic of transnational activities of civil society and their game-changing, should not only limit analyses at the global level, but should equally reflect on the empirical realities at the regional level. The context of global transformations since the 1990s allows for a shift in analyses from linear logics to give weight to neglected processes at a regional level addressing (gendered) insecurities (Vaerynen, 2003:26).

The regional level of analysis of the way civil society actors differently organise themselves, their functions, their interface with different types of actors, and how they contribute to societal change, therefore, requires attention. Analyses at a regional level further provide insight about transnational processes which can be seen as game-changing in regional IR. In the context of Southern Africa, civil society actors have often been constituted by groups that range from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), faith-based organisations (FBOs), community-based organisations (CBOs), professional associations, social movements, trade unions, business associations, advocacy and lobby groups, women's organisations, interest groups, self-help groups and coalitions that are not reflected in dominant understandings (Landsberg, 2006; 2012; Söderbaum, 2007). It shows that civil society processes and interactions, since liberalisation have amounted to a regional thickening in terms of growing regionalisation,

regionalism, and region-ness whose effect is game-changing in the form of norm development, norm-adoption, norm-adaptation, and norm diffusion contributing to greater (gendered) security across Southern Africa.

Gendered insecurities here constitute a part of broader social insecurities, combining aspects of social mores, development, and practices (Tickner, 1992; 2001). These gendered insecurities are entrenched in a system of patriarchy, characterised by persistent drawbacks of inequalities, social economic marginalisation, minimum representation of women in governance structures at all levels, divisions and exclusion. The gendered mores that gender and women-focused civil society actors address are multiple. These have included gender-based violence (GBV) – in the form of physical and sexual violence, femicide, women trafficking – child marriages; HIV/AIDS and poverty; gender and patriarchy. Regional thickening and game-changing of civil society actors with a gender and women focus have addressed gendered insecurities in issue areas ranging from, gender and governance; gender and media; women and law; gender, health-care and HIV/AIDS; gender and sexual reproductive health rights; women and human rights, women and economic justice; gender and education; and gender and climate change (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016; 2017; Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009).

The previous chapter examined the history of regional thickening and game-changing in Southern Africa in the past 20th century, and pointed to the beginnings of transnational activities within the context of Southern Africa. Focusing on historical example of game-changing of transnational communities, pointed to the origins of regional transnationalism that contributes to change, and region-ness. Regional thickening as game-changing of transnational communities revealed how increasing transnational activities, regionalisation, regionalism, and region-ness, facilitated common ways of thinking, the assimilation of cultures, the forging of common identities, and of life-long contacts and relations. The chapter suggested that despite colonialism, there was an evolving web of transnational relations and transnational organisation that evolved side by side, or underneath state-centric IR and international organisation. It proposed that the evolving historical context of state and/or non-state interactions in Southern Africa had helped the present scenario of regional thickening and influential sets of transnational relations.

This chapter broadly maps out transnational activities of civil society actors and game-changing, particularly those with a gender and women focus to show the manner in which they have differently organised, and their interface with different types of actors. This chapter also examines how transnational processes of civil society actors have cumulatively all contribute

to norm development, norm diffusion, societal change, security, policy change and implementation. Here, the concept of civil society is not limited to the fixed hegemonic and counter-hegemonic binaries common in mainstream IR academic discourse, but builds on the existing critical scholarship that perceives this society as constituting complexities, contradictions, limitations, as well as fluidity and dynamism (Cox, 1996). This study also draws from African scholarship that argues that civil society emerging on the continent should be understood in the actual context within which it has evolved, in order to reflect its actual empirical functions and roles (Mamdani, 1996; Jusu-Sheriff, 2004).

This chapter finds that civil society actors with gender and women focus organise in two ways: first, by way of advocacy and in seeking representation within inter-governmental policy structures; and second, by way of organising in structured transnational communities, in order to promote the development of the norm cycle, and contribute to stabilising (social) insecurities at a localised level. It argues that the regional level of analysis helps to map out neglected regional thickening and game-changing of civil society actors in regional IR studies.

4.2. Civil society actors and game-changing at a globalised level

Globally, there has emerged an increasing regionalisation, particularly by non-state actors in various issues areas that are no longer confined to national borders. This has meant growing civil society processes and interactions, and the linking up in complexly organised transnational spaces within and outside state-led frameworks. These changing dynamics have shaped the academic discourse on civil society from the early 1990s. This transnationalism has been labelled differently and studied from different angles (Peterson 1992; Colas, 2002; Keohane and Nye, 1972; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Nelson, 1995; Charnovitz, 1997; Scholte, 2000; Keane, 2003; O'Brien et al., 2000; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Many analyses at the global level, however, have not focused on the social and political impact transnational actors demonstrate, the extent to which they can be seen to be role players and game-changers contributing to security and development.

Kaldor (2013:3) has highlighted five types of civil society as either being territorially bounded or global, as shown in the table below.

Table 1: The five versions of civil society

Types of society	Territorially bounded	Global
Societas civilis	Rule of law/civility	Cosmopolitan order
Buergerliche Gesellschaft	All organised social life Between the state and the Family	Economic social cultural globalisation
Activist	Social movements, civic activities	Global public sphere
Neo-liberal	Charities, voluntary associations, democracy building, Humanitarianism	Privatisation of third sector
Post-modern	Nationalist fundamentalists...	Plurality of global networks

(Table 1: Kaldor, 2013:10).

According to Kaldor's typology of civil society that include: *societas civilis*, *Buergerliche Gesellschaft*, activist, neo-liberal and post-modern, operate within the national territorial bounds, or at a global level of analysis (Kaldor, 2013:10). There are, however, expanded types of civil society found elsewhere that transcend the two levels. Expanding on Kaldor's typology, this chapter examines how civil society actors organise and regionalise, and promote regional thickening leading to development and security. It will be shown that the evolving context of global transformation since the 1990s is characterised by a growing game-changing processes and interactions of civil society outside formal inter-governmental spaces, as well as, the interface between civil society, governments, and international organisations. It will be further demonstrated that limiting analyses to the global level, renders incomplete discourses as civil society processes taking place in a transnational context also happens at a regional level of analysis. In Southern Africa, there are examples of women that played multiple liberatory, complementary, activist, advocacy and supportive functions in a transnational context, at a regional level during the national resistance war. Magadla's (2016) study points to the multiple supportive and activism functions played by mothers with babies on their backs at one end, at

another, the “transnational guerrilla girl”; and the in-betweeners – who were transnational messengers and activists across Southern Africa. Jusu-Sheriff (2004:272) equally notes the role played by women in Sierra Leone, in West Africa in the mid-1990s ranging from medical, legal, and educational professions, to female church groups in the interest of contributing to peace-building efforts, and in addressing protracted conflicts. Civil society activities in Africa as such point to agency in organising around various issues areas to address (gendered) insecurities.

4.2.1. Civil society game-changing in global structuring spaces

Since the 1990s, types of civil society actors operating in a transnational environment have expanded with actions and functions not limited traditional to the global level, but have further spread out to the regional level. Civil society actors’ game-changing has involved organising in transnational communities to collectively counter resist global neo-liberal policies. Neo-liberal policies are perceived as unjust, and perpetuate deep poverty, and social differences between the rich and poor countries of the world (Tsie, 1999).

Civil society groupings have organised at a global level to push for an alternative world order, through championing counter-hegemonic norms against the neo-liberalism. At the 1999 Seattle World Trade Organisation (WTO) meeting in the United States (US), civil society protests – also referred to as the “Battle of Seattle” – were staged alongside the global inter-governmental meeting to protest and agitate against the neo-liberal trade policies that were seen as anti-poor (Hertel, 2005:104-105). Following the “Battle of Seattle,” civil society transnational communities, linkages and networks against the neo-liberal order expanded. At the Fifth WTO ministerial conference in Cancun, Mexico in 2003, civil society actors organised to oppose neo-liberal policies that they deemed as devastating to global poor communities. They also advocated for a world trade system that had a human, and not a profit-oriented face (EQUATION, 2003:69). At the Mexico meeting, civil society actors’ functions included collaborative efforts in terms of distributing in-depth information on trade; gender and trade; women and the environment; environmental law; human rights; sustainable development; environment; and others. At this Cancun meeting, civil society actors warned:

Against the negative effects of the WTO and profit-oriented growth and globalisation on the world’s poor, above all on women and children, and argued for the urgent need for radical reform of the WTO system based on the development of ecologically

sustainable, gender-sensitive and human rights-oriented trade policies. They expressed their concern at the destruction and exploitation of nature and the environment by the WTO's trade related policies and they campaigned for the priority of human and environmental rights over trade agreements and submitted a declaration of the Right to Food (EQUATION, 2003:69).

At Cancun, civil society's game-changing activities equally involved advocating for global policies on gender that were ecologically sustainable, gender-sensitive, based on human rights-oriented trade policies, and against the destruction and exploitation of nature, and the environment that has negatively impacted on humans, the environment and food security (EQUATION, 2003:69). Civil society actors in Mexico sought to promote global policies that would ultimately contribute to increased security, particularly for the poor across the world. Their functions, since liberalisation, have pointed to a thickening in terms of increasing regionalisation, regionalism, and region-ness, and to game-changing, through pushing for norms that have contributed to norm changes, social change, development, and in minimising social insecurities.

Since the 1990s, there have been notable efforts to recognise and include civil society actors in inter-governmental policymaking spaces. At the Mexico meeting, civil society groupings played multiple functions, including working side by side in solidarity with leaders from the developing world to oppose the draft WTO ministerial text on trade (EQUATION, 2003:6-7). The WTO ministerial text was rejected, because it was seen as advancing those interests of a few rich countries globally. It was also viewed as an economic model that "favoured exclusively the rich and transnational corporations" (EQUATION, 2003:6-7). The interface between state and non-state regionalism within inter-governmental global spaces to support and develop common norms, point to the potential of regional thickening and game-changing in promoting cohesion, and in eliminating global social insecurities, such as, food shortages, poverty, and environmental degradation. At the 2003 Cancun meeting, civil society groups organised side by side with government representatives, and outside inter-governmental policy spaces to push for global trade policies that were responsive to the human social needs and security (EQUATION, 2003: 69).

In 2007, civil society groupings created a peoples World Social Forum (WSF) – an anti-Davos movement – against the World Economic Forum (WEF)'s neo-liberal state-centred group.

Civil society actors argued that the neo-liberal world order was designed to put profits before human needs and rights. Tsie (1999) has argued that neo-liberal policies deepen divisions, promote exclusion and differences, hence, they require close monitoring. The neo-liberal policies have as such been seen as perpetuating deep poverty and inequalities between the rich and poor countries of the world. Global civil society identities that have also emerged have been shaped by the very insecurities that they seek to address around various issue areas.

4.2.2. Identities, insecurities and civil society groupings

A strong link exists between evolving civil society identities and the insecurities they seek to address at various levels. Civil society transnational communities represented at the Cancun meeting, for example, included : “Our World is not for Sale”; “Third World Network”; “International Gender and Trade Network”; “Women Environment Development Organisation”; “Women Edge Coalition”; “Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and Negotiation”; “South Asian Civil Society Network in International Trade and Sustainable Development”; “Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations”; “Food First Information and Action Network”; “International Centre for Cultural Diversity”; “Green Peace”; “World Wildlife Fund”; “Friends for Earth”; “Public Citizen”; “International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development”; and the “Centre for International Environmental Law” (EQUATION, 2003:6-7). These civil society groupings, including their labels, point to the insecurities or specific issue areas they seek to address.

Empirically, civil society identities are fluid and float between the local-global-regional-local levels, where they have tended to address multiple social insecurities. For example, the transnational community, “Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and Negotiation” not only participated in global meetings within and outside inter-governmental spaces, but its game-changing also point to issues of trade, information and negotiation within a regional context. In Southern Africa, bigger civil society transnational communities with a gender and women focus, such as the “Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance (The Alliance)” conceived in 2003, have promoted regional thickening and game-changing at the regional and global levels, as well as back into localised spaces. In 2014 and 2015, the Alliance was invited to participate at the UN level, in the development of the Sustainable Development Goal 5 on gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls by 2030 (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016; 2017). The Alliance has also played a key role in diffusing SDG 5 in SADC’s regional policy frameworks on gender, and at a localised level (SADC Gender Protocol

Barometer, 2017:12-35). As such, civil society actors with regional identities contribute to norm development and norm diffusion through linking the local issues to the global and back into regional, and local norms. Civil society actors' game-changing activities have contributed to an evolving norm cycle on that break rigid institutionalisation, change norms, social change, development, and to improved security across Southern Africa and beyond.




Figure 5: Civil society game-changing cycle

4.2.3. Gender and women-focused civil society actors at a global level

Despite their relative neglect in academic discourse in regional IR studies, gender and women-focused civil society actors have parallel to, or side by side state actors, organised and participated within global inter-governmental restructuring spaces (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016; 2017; EQUATION, 2003; Marchand, 1996a). The report on the Cancun ministerial meeting, for example, notes that gender and women-focused civil society actors

were constituted as a part of broader non-state actors that opposed the WTO Ministerial draft policy on trade, as well as, in actively highlighting the impact of such a policy on women and children. Further at this meeting, gender and women-focused civil society actors' game-changing activities involved pushing for a shift, from neo-liberal profit-oriented growth, to human and gender-sensitive trade policies (EQUATION, 2003:69). The Cancun report reveals a mixed representation of gender and women-focused civil society groups ranging from the, "feminist economists, gender and trade analysts, and women's advocates analys[ing] WTO policies from a gender and human rights perspective and [drawing] attention to the situation of women in the context of existing and emerging WTO agreements in the areas of agriculture, intellectual property rights, service, and investment" (EQUATION, 2003:67). The Cancun meeting points to growing transnational feminism addressing a wide range of gendered insecurities in various issue-areas. It also points to regional thickening in terms of regionalisation and region-ness contributing to change, development and stabilisation of gendered insecurities.

However, while transnational activities of gender and women-focused civil society actors take place within global structuring and restructuring spaces in opposing neo-liberal policies, or in promoting the development and revision of global policy, these civil society processes and interactions remain understudied. They are undeservedly marginalised in scholarship in the field of IR. Regional thickening and game-changing of civil society actors with a gender and women focus at a global level, however, point to their agency around gendered insecurities in IR (Bischoff, Aning and Acharya, 2016:1-3). The game-changing roles and function of gender and women-focused civil society actors at a global level has a potential to contribute to change in terms of reducing socially gendered insecurities within localised contexts. The transnational activities by these civil society actors operating at a global level, and then feed back into regional and local norms, contribute to the growth of the norm cycle and to improved gender security.

In the era of neo-liberalisation, civil society actors have played multiple game-changing functions, ranging from advocacy, to neo-liberal solidarity, to those promoting activism. For example, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) – designed to service the debt accumulated by developing countries – contributed to deepening poverty, exclusion, and division in countries across Latin America, and in Africa, such as, Zambia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. The devastating effects of the SAPs on developing countries, contributed to greater economic and social insecurity. This

encouraged opposition and resistance which came from networks advocating for debt cancellation, starting in the 1990s. For example, headed by a female director, Ann Pettifor in the late 1990s, a global movement of civil society actors – “Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign” present in over 40 countries – emerged as a global transnational community to conduct public advocacy for justice around the cancellation of the debt owed by the poor countries around the world (Jubilee 2000). The Jubilee 2000 campaign process was significant in lobbying and pushing for debt cancellation, in order to minimise economic and social insecurities experienced in most developing countries. This campaign was not only organised alongside global inter-governmental meetings such as those of the G7, the IMF, World Bank and the Paris club, but it also resulted in the mobilisation of national organisations to campaign for debt cancellation in over 60 countries. In actual terms, the Jubilee 2000 campaign resulted in the cancellation of more than “\$100 billion of debt owed by 35 of the poorest countries” (Jubilee 2000). The effect of Jubilee 2000’s efforts in having the debt cancelled points to their game-changing role of civil society actors, as well as, including those with a gender and women focus pushing for policy changes and actions that seek to end the insecurities and suffering of the global poor.

4.3. Civil society actors and game-changing at a regional level

In the immediate independence era, the space to participate in SADC’s intergovernmental policy structures at a regional level was not there, and in some cases limited to a few (Interview with K, Programme Officer, GL, 06.09.2016, Johannesburg, South Africa). But with democratisation and changing policies and conception around security, political spaces began to open up for sets of gender and women-focused civil society groups to organise outside formal processes as a strategy to feed into SADC’s policy structures. Civil society activities within IGOs involved developing norms, pushing for their adoption, as well as adapting and diffusing these policies at a localised level (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016; 2017). The information gathered for this study pointed to a growing interface of non-state and state regionalisms within inter-governmental spaces, addressing social change, norm changes, development and security.

Game-changing of civil society actors have involved, multiple levels of organising, in order to contribute to the development of the norm cycle and its diffusion. The norm cycle that has emerged from civil society activities reveal non-state actors as taking local norms to the global

level, and bringing back global norms to the regional structuring and restructuring spaces. At a regional level, global norms are reformulated in line with regional insecurities specific to that region. All this in order to contribute to increased security at a localised level.

In Southern Africa, non-state transnational communities have formulated their campaigns to push for debt cancellation, as well as, to feed into global policy have included, the “Africa Forum and Network on Debt and Development”; “the Economic –in Malawi Economic Justice Network”; and “the Swaziland Solidarity Network” (Landsberg, 2006). In addition, the “Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council” – a movement of national trade unions and federations throughout Southern Africa established in 1983 – mobilised trade unions in the 1990s across the region to oppose the SAPs (Landsberg, 2006:53; CCR Policy Report. 2017:4). As such, game-changing to change or oppose norms not only takes place within inter-governmental structures, but more often than not, takes place outside formal state structures.

Some of the civil society transnational communities that have emerged since the 1990s, include the “Inter-African Network for Human Development”; the “Southern African Human Rights NGO Network”; the “Human Rights Research and Documentation Trust of Southern Africa”; and the “Media Institute of Southern Africa”. These transnational communities have linked their activities and functions to the insecurities they seek to address within localised contexts. Civil society actors have addressed insecurities in the areas of human rights, peace-building, research and documentation, the environment, health-care, HIV/AIDS, gender, economic justice, development and trade, religion and student-related concerns, as well as, those of a mixed type at a transnational level. Particularly notable is the link between civil society identities and the insecurities they wish to reduce.

Table 2: Types of civil society identities and issues areas (insecurities)

Types of civil society actors	Issues areas
Advocacy, neo-liberal, activism (E.g. Inter-African Network for Human Rights and Development and Democracy (AFRONET) Southern African Human Rights NGO Network (SAHRINGON), Human Rights Research and Documentation Trust of Southern Africa.	Human Rights

Advocacy, activism, neo-liberal

Justice/Development/Trade

Southern African Network on Debt and Development, Jubilee 2000 Southern Africa, African Forum on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), Economic Justice Network (EJN), Ecumenical Service for Socio-economic Transformation (ESSET), Southern Africa's Peoples Solidarity Network (SAPSN), Alternative Information and Development Centre (AIDC), Southern and Eastern African Trade Information Negotiations Institute (SEATINI), Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN) and Swaziland Solidarity Network.

Economic**Advocacy, activism**

Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF), ZERO, Empowerment for African Sustainable Development (EASD), Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (WESSA).

Environment**Advocacy, activism**

Southern African Network of AIDS Service Organisations (SANASO), AIDS Rights Alliance of Southern Africa (ARASA).

Health-care/HIV/AIDS/gender**Advocacy, activism**

Gender Links (GL), Women and Law in Southern Africa (WLSA), Women and Resources Eastern and Southern Africa (WARESA),

Gender and women

Advocacy, advocacy

Southern African Trade Union Coordination Conference Unions (SATUCC), Southern African Students' Union (SASU).

Advocacy, neo-liberal

African Business Forum, Southern African Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (SAACCI), Federation of Clearing and Forwarding Associations of Southern Africa (FCFASA), Small Enterprises Promotion Advisory Council (SEPAC).

Charity, advocacy, liberatory

Southern African Council of Churches (SACC), Southern African Catholic Development Association (SACDA).

Research, advocacy

Economic Research Consortium (AERC), African Energy Policy Research Network (AFREPREN), Southern African Political Series (SAPES), Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA), Marine Science Cooperation Programme (MARINE), Regional Research Collaboration in Reproductive Health in Africa (REPH).

Advocacy, policy research

Ceasefire Campaign, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation

Workers and student issues**Economic development****Spirituality/multiple****Social issues****Research****Peace-building**

(CSVR), Centre for Conflict and Resolution (CCR),
Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa (CPIA).

Advocacy/ policy research

Southern African Research and Documentation
Information Centre (SARDC), Media Institute of
Southern Africa (MISA), Africa Information Afrique (AIA).

Press freedom

Advocacy/activism

Southern African Non-Governmental Organisation
(SANGONET), SADC Council of NGOs (SADC-CNGO),
Reflection and Development Centre for Eastern
and Southern Africa (MWENGO).

Multiple social insecurities

As shown in the table above, the functions of civil society actors in Southern Africa are wider than those constituting Kaldor's typology. Civil society identities and the insecurities they seek to address are also connected. These insecurities have ranged from those on human rights, freedom of the press, economic justice, trade, development, workers and students related issues, gender, business, spirituality, conflicts, research, and those of mixed forms. Civil society groups, including those with gender and women focus, promote advocacy and push for norms to address specific social insecurities.

4.3.1. Gender and women-focused civil society actors

A number of transnational communities with a gender and women focus have emerged since the 1990s in Southern Africa, (see below Table 3).¹¹ These civil society groups have organised

¹¹ The information gathered to develop this table was obtained from the 2016 and 2017 SADC Gender Protocol Barometers, and from the interviews with the informants.

around various issue areas in the interest of addressing gendered insecurities. Civil society identities have also revealed a link to the (gendered) insecurities they seek to address. A mix of these non-state identities, their actions and functions, together amount to reduced gendered insecurities, thereby, contributing to the improvement of the lives of mostly women across a region. While a number of civil society organisations have addressed women’s issues, there are those that have addressed men’s issues, such as, “Sonke Gender Justice” in South Africa and “Men for Gender Equality Now” in Malawi.

Table 3: Civil society identities and gendered insecurities

Gender/women civil society group	Gendered insecurities
Gender Links; Women in Politics Support Unit (WIPSU) Western Cape Network on Violence against Women; Gender and Media Southern Africa (GEMSA); Southern African Research and Documentation Centre.	Gender-based violence (GBV) research, gender and media
Women in Law Southern Africa (WLSA), Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF).	Women and law Development, child marriages
Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Information Tuberculosis, Sexual Reproductive Health Dissemination Service (SAfAIDS); Voluntary Rights (SRHRs) Services Overseas-Regional HIV and AIDS Initiative of Southern Africa (VSO-RHAISA).	Gender/health-care, and HIV/AIDS
Education of Girls and Women in Africa (EGWA); Southern African Network of Higher Educational Institutions, Challenging Sexual Harassment and Sexual Violence.	Gender and education
Women and Resources Southern and Eastern Africa (WARESA); Gender Climate Change Southern Africa	Gender/Climate Change/Agriculture

-Women for Environment; Gender, Urbanisation and Environment (GUE).

Sonke Gender Justice (South Africa);
Men for Gender Equality Now (MEGEN).

Men's issues

Zimbabwe Women's Resource Centre and Network (ZWRCN), South African Women in Dialogue (SAWID).

Women and Economic Justice

The Botswana Centre for Human Rights.

Women and Human Rights

Botswana Council of NGOs (BOCONGO)
Platforma da Mulheres Accao (PMA)-Angola;
Union Congolaise des Femmes des Media (UCOFEM)-DRC;
FFPE (Fédération Pour la Promotion Féminine at
Enfantine-Madagascar; NGO Gender Coordination Network
– Malawi Forum Mulher -Mozambique; Namibian
Non-Governmental Organisations Forum (NANGOF)
Coordinating Assembly of NGOs-Swaziland;
Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP);
Women's Coalition, Zimbabwe; Non-Governmental
Organisation Coordination Council (NGOCC), Zambia.

**Multiple gender issues
at the national level**

Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance Network
(The Alliance), The AIDS and Rights Alliance for
Southern Africa (ARASA); Southern African
Network of AIDS Service Organisations (SANASO).

**Multiple gender issues at
a regional level**

4.3.2. Regional thickening and game-changing around gender and women issues

The context of evolving global transformations of norms and growing transnational activities have pointed to their recognition within inter-governmental spaces. For example, Article 5 (2b), 16A and 23 of the SADC Treaty, and the revised SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (2015-2020), recognises the role of gender civil society actors in region-building in Southern Africa (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2017:336). Governments are also increasingly consulting gender and women-focused civil society actors on related projects, as well as, organising dialogue platforms in which they invite them to participate in norm development (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:34-35; Also noted in Interview with M, Regional Programme Officer, VSO-RHAISA, 07.09.2016, Pretoria, South Africa).

Since the opening up of space in 1990s, gender and women-focused civil society groupings have increasingly organised outside, and side by side with states within SADC's formal policy structures (Interview with K).

In Southern Africa, civil society groupings with gender and women focus have organised through bigger transnational communities to influence policy development in inter-state policymaking spaces. For example, the Alliance (mentioned above), constituted by 15 national networks and ten regional gender and women-focused NGOs from across the SADC region, was established in 2005 to push for the development of the SADC's first legally binding gender regional policy (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2017:336). Outside the formal state frameworks, game-changing of the Alliance is spread out around varying thematic gendered insecurities that it seeks to address (see appendix 3 and 4). Its strategic organisation in a transnational context aims to feed into jointly produced norms within SADC's gender policymaking structures. As will be argued in the next chapter, regional thickening as game-changing points to the intersection of state and non-state regionalism in the interest of reducing the gendered insecurities cutting across a region.

The bulk of information obtained on transnational communities with gender and women focus operating in a transnational context in Southern Africa pointed to game-changing. These transnational communities include, the Women and Law in Southern Africa's (WLSA), whose game-changing activities address gendered insecurities as it relates to women and law, including legislature around child marriages; Gender Links (GL), addressing gendered insecurities in the media, around governance issues, and GBV; the Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Information and Dissemination (SAfAIDS) whose game focuses on HIV/AIDS related

insecurities; the Voluntary Services Overseas-RHAISA (VSO-RHAISA) on health-care related insecurities; Women and Resources Eastern and Southern Africa (WARESA), addressing gender and women issues on climate change, the environment and agriculture in three countries; the DITSHWANELO-The Botswana Centre for Human Rights, on gender insecurities around women and human rights; and the Zimbabwe Women’s Resources Centre and Network (ZWRCN) on women and economic justice (Interview with A, Programme Officer-GL, 28.06.2016, Lusaka, Zambia; B, Board Chair: FEMNET, 29.06.2016 Lusaka, Zambia; C, Programme Officer, ZWRCN, 07.07.2016, Harare, Zimbabwe; K, Programme Office-The Alliance, GL, 06.09.2016, Johannesburg, South Africa; L, Senior Executive Officer, WLSA, 06.09.2016 Harare, Zimbabwe; N, Senior Director, WARESA, 08.09.2016, Harare, Zimbabwe). The functions of these transnational communities have ranged from those promoting advocacy, political activism, solidarity, liberatory, watchdog, complimentary, to those providing support functions within and outside intergovernmental policy spaces. The evolving functions of civil society groupings in Southern Africa were found as more expansive than those proposed by Kaldor.

Regional thickening and game-changing of civil society actors with gender and women focus was found as happening in two ways. First, through advocacy and in seeking representation within formal intergovernmental spaces. Second, through organising in transnational communities outside formal state frameworks.




Figure 6: Two ways of regional thickening as game-changing

As will further be shown in the next chapters, there is a link between norms jointly developed by states and non-state actors within inter-governmental spaces, and those specific norms that civil society groups have adapted in their strategies. Civil society actors make use of the very norms they have developed, through adapting them, and pushing for their implementation at a localised level in order to address gendered insecurities.

4.4. External and internal factors shaping game-change

There are external and internal factors that have shaped game-changing activities of civil society actors. For example, the changing donor funding politics have promoted the need for stronger partnerships between governments, and civil society groupings in addressing gender insecurities (Interview with K). The emerging tendencies from Southern Africa's governments if not well managed may begin to point to drawbacks in state and non-state relations, as well as, to game-changing. Despite the challenges, there are also counter-responses to emerging nationalistic tendencies. The on-going state-non-state dialogue since 2016, to develop a legal framework, to provide clear guidelines for non-state participation within SADC's policy structures, will allow for their consistent engagement in regional governance. Critical instruments such as the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, did not provide for state engagement with non-state civil society actors (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2017:335). The lack of still clear guidelines on the modalities of non-state participation within the SADC policy framework have been noted in NGO policy research briefs. The CCR (2013:16) policy brief notes that,

Although SADC's policy instruments reflect an awareness of the key role that non-state actors can have in fostering genuinely participatory governance... [there] lacks clarity on the modalities for civil society participation in SADC activities... NGOs have remained by and large uncertain about which SADC Secretariat directorate to engage, and often meet with resistance and political caution in their efforts to assist the Secretariat".

As discussed in the following chapters, having clear institutionalised modalities on non-state engagement in intergovernmental structures may aid promote game-changing, as well as to address common regional (social) insecurities.

4.5. Conclusion

Before the 1990s, the space to organise within intergovernmental structuring and restructuring spaces was limited to a few, and in some cases totally absent. But with democratisation and policy changes around the definition of security, political spaces began to open up for sets of civil society groupings, particularly those with gender and women focus to participate within inter-governmental policymaking frameworks. This was done through state international organisations inviting civil society actors to participate in norm development processes. This chapter has found that since democratisation and liberalisation, there was a growing feature to involve civil society actors in intergovernmental policy structuring and restructuring spaces, as well as, an increasing interface between state and non-state regionalism that was collectively promoting norm changes, social change and minimising social insecurities. The changing context characterised by an increasing interface between non-state and state regionalism within global and regional inter-governmental structures in the interest of all, has jointly promoted norms, and contributed to social change, and to increase security in various issues areas.

The different ways in which civil society groupings have organised outside formal state spaces to address multiple insecurities, including those of gender and women have amounted to game-changing. Game-changing was revealed in terms of civil society counter-resistance organisation and regionalisation against global neo-liberal policies, perceived as exclusive and anti-poor. Within global structuring and restructuring policymaking spaces, civil society actors participated in opposing neo-liberal norms, or promoting norm development in order to contribute to norm changes and to reduce insecurities such as poverty, end debt crises, social difference, and deep inequalities.

Furthermore, the way in which civil society actors interfaced with states, and their international organisations within policymaking spaces has pointed to game-changing, in terms of their efforts that have promoted the development of the norm cycle in terms of policy development, adaptation, diffusion and implementation. Game change has further involved civil society processes and interactions feeding into the norm development cycle globally, that in turn, was adapted and diffused within regional and local norms to address gendered insecurities. As such, the game-changing cycle that has emerged from state and non-state regionalism has corresponded with the evolving norm cycle, particularly in the area of gender.

In the context of Southern Africa, the map has revealed that transnational activities with gender and women focus have organised in two ways. First, by way of advocacy and in seeking

representation within intergovernmental policymaking structures. Second, by way of organising around transnational communities in the interest of addressing gendered insecurities at a localised level. Regional thickening as game-changing has pointed to growing regionalisation, regionalism and region-ness, leading to norm development and contributing to policy change, security, social change, and implementation. It was found that civil society actors organise outside formal frameworks as a strategy to feed into policymaking spaces of the SADC intergovernmental structures.

While it was noted that the function of civil society has been limited to the national and global levels, civil society activities and functions also played out at a regional level, as such deserved attention. In Southern Africa, the roles of civil society actors were found as wide-ranging from those promoting advocacy, political activism, solidarity, liberatory, watchdog, complimentary, to those providing support functions within and outside intergovernmental policy spaces. While civil society actors, particularly those with gender and women focus, remain neglected in regional IR analyses, it was shown here that regional thickening as game-changing in a transnational context, also takes place at a regional level of analysis, therefore, deserving attention. In all this, this chapter has mapped broadly transnational activities, regionalisation and organisation of civil society actors, their types, roles and functions, and how they have differently contributed to the development of the norm cycle, to policy change, and to reduced social insecurities. The forthcoming chapters examine in detail regional thickening as game-changing of civil society groupings with gender and women focus in Southern Africa, in the above-mentioned two ways.

CHAPTER 5:

Regional thickening as game-changing: gender and women civil society actors

5.1. Introduction

Game-changing activities seeking to address gender and women-related insecurities are not a new phenomenon before the 1990s in Southern Africa, and the African continent at large. Feminist discourse on pre-colonial and colonial societies in West Africa, point to women's organisation around what Amadiume refers to as "oaths of solidarity" networks that brought men to account for the social ills in societies (1987b:195-197). In colonial Southern Africa, women, and what Magadla (2016) refers to as a range of women actors from the "transnational guerrilla girl", to mothers with babies on their backs, participated in the national resistance war against colonial and minority regime policies that disadvantaged women. The exclusive policies that targeted women led to counter-resistance measures, in which women across Southern Africa organised and participated, in game-changing activities against the exclusive colonial system as a strategy to address gendered insecurities. For example, while the colonial migrant labour system was gendered, and aimed to exclude women from work, and get them to retreat to private spaces, women resisted, and migrated illegally.

The immediate post-independent Southern Africa did very little to minimise gendered insecurities. Newly independent governments instead implemented narrow nationalistic policies that were discriminatory towards women. Despite their active participation in the national resistance movements, most women in the post-independent era were left outside the new governance structures (Interview with B, Member: FEMNET, GL, WLSA and WILDAF, 29.06.2016, Lusaka, Zambia; Giesler, 2006). Because of the exclusive policies back home, while some women remained to fight from within the new governance structures, others turned to the global levels, particularly to the United Nations (UN), where they regularly participated in norm development (Interview with B).

Van der Westhuizen (2005:10) points out the evolution of transnational activities of women's groupings within the UN intergovernmental spaces from 1975. Today, game-changing processes of civil society groupings with gender and women focus within intergovernmental

global policy structures, have evolved, and resulted in thickening non-state-state regionalism addressing gendered insecurities (Van der Westhuizen, 2005:10; Pettman, 2005:682-3; Interview with B).

The local norms that have found their way in global structuring spaces, have then been repackaged together with norms from multiple contexts, and sources to constitute global norms on gender. Women from Southern Africa have not only taken up their own norms to the global level, but they have also participated in policy development and norm diffusion around gender in order to minimise mostly women's insecurities. As such, women organisations from the African continent have not only contributed to policy formulation, but they have played major roles in initiating norms on gender. This is traceable from the first UN international women's conference in Mexico in 1975; to the Copenhagen in the 1980s, to Cairo; and Nairobi in 1985; and the Beijing in 1995 (Van der Westhuizen, 2005; CEDAW, 1979). The women's organisations participation in developing global policy on gender is highlighted in their efforts in putting together the SDGs 5 on gender equality. Marchand (1996a:585) has observed that while women constitute a part of global structuring and restructuring processes at the level of global and/or regional governance, these activities, however, remain invisible in IR discourse (also see Marchand and Runyan, 2011). The organisation and participation of gender and women-focused civil society actors, in breathing life to the norm cycle, through norm development and diffusion nonetheless point to the existence of African women's agency in global IR. As such, the norms that have emerged at a global level are constituted by multiple contexts and sources, including those experiences of women at localised levels.

At a global level, civil society's relevance is influenced by its contribution to the norm cycle, and the diffusion of these norms at a regional level. The local context and its gendered insecurities have enabled gender and women-based organisation to generate their own norms in line with their realities and challenges, and not simply to adapt norms emerging from the global level (Interview with N, Director: WARESA, 08.09.2016, Harare, Zimbabwe; and M, Programme Officer, VSO-RHAISA, 07.09.2016, Pretoria, South Africa). Further, women's participation in global norm development sharpened their organisation abilities and solidarity networks to begin to mobilise around gendered issues at a regional level (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2017:335; also noted in interview with B).

The previous chapter argued the regional level of analysis as helping map out often neglected thickening and game change of non-state processes in regional IR studies. It mapped broader transnational activities of civil society actors and game-changing particularly, those with a

gender and women focus at a regional level in Southern Africa. The other major finding was that game-changing civil society processes with gender and women focus organised in two ways: first, by way of advocacy and in seeking representation within intergovernmental policy structures; and second, by way of organising in structured transnational communities, in order to promote the development of the norm cycle, and contribute to stabilising gendered insecurities at localised levels.

Having mapped out broadly the two ways, this chapter examines in detail game-changing of gender and women-focused civil society groupings within the SADC policymaking structures. This explanation is necessary in order to show how the interface between states, or their international organisations and non-state regionalism promotes regional thickening, leading to game change contributing to changing policies, improved security, and to regional cohesion among these actors. Ultimately, this study, maps out a framework of transnational activities and regionalisation that may be conceived as generative of innovative regional thickening as game-changing for development and improved security. Such a framework points to organisation and regionalisation around the development of the norm cycle and its diffusion, all of which promotes regional cohesion around gender security. It is argued here that game-changing happens at the point where non-state and state regionalism interlock, overlap, or complement each other around a common interest to enhance gender security.

As noted in the earlier chapter, the concept of civil society here builds upon critical neo-Gramscian definitions (Cox, 1999), and those emerging from African scholarship in the field of IR (Jusu-Sheriff, 2005; Mamdani, 1996) that attempt to transcend hegemonic and counter-hegemonic rigid binaries associated with the conventional description of realism and neo-institutionalism. Civil society, in this study, is constituted by multiple types of roles and functions that promote a thickening and game change in terms of growing regionalisation and regionalism, and to contribute to norm change and improved security. Civil society is further conceived as a site characterised by conflicts, contradictions, and paradoxes, as well as fluid and dynamic production spaces (Cox, 1999:10; Jusu-Sheriff, 2005:269). This study reveals game-changing of civil society actors with gender and women focus, their actions and functions, as shaped by the changing environment within which they have evolved, and the gendered insecurities they address. Gendered insecurities refer to the mores, practices and developmental questions that gender and women-focused civil society actors seek to diminish. The activities of these women and gender-based actors address the way people live, means of addressing each other along gender lines, development of women, and raising their social, political, cultural and economic status. The study adopts a flexible conception of gender, in

order to reflect the actual realities of the insecurities addressed by civil society actors, in a transnational context that transcend the rigid dualistic conceptions of what it entails to be a man and/or a woman (Amadiume, 1987b:17; Lind, 2011).

5.2. Civil society actors and the game-changing cycle

Civil society actors organising around gendered questions come together to identify common regional insecurities, and to craft strategies of how to organise themselves through advocacy in order to constructively engage policymakers within intergovernmental frameworks, as well as to contribute to policy development. As noted by one informant for this study, regional civil society groupings are grounded in local gendered insecurities.

We strive to know what is happening at a local and national level and what the common issues in the area of gender and women across Southern Africa. We then bring these local issues and challenges to the regional level because that is where regional commonalities are identified (Interview with N and M).




Figure 7: Defining common regional gendered insecurities

There exists a strong link between what constitutes local gendered insecurities and the norms that civil society groupings push for in global and regional policies. Through their knowledge of the local issues, gender and women groupings have organised and pushed for norm changes and participated in the development of the gender norm cycle within inter-state structuring and restructuring spaces. The information gathered further revealed the existence of a connections between the insecurities around gender, with those of the emerging and evolving norms from non-state-state regionalism and interfaced within the SADC policy structures.

At a regional level, regional thickening and game-changing of civil society actors with a gender and women focus is notable in the manner in which these actors organise in bigger transnational communities. They organise in bigger transnational communities in order to collectively initiate, strategise, and push for space for their participation in norm development within the SADC intergovernmental policy structures. In terms of the how these civil society groups have organised and promoted game-changing within the wider SADC regime, it was summed up as follows:

Most of the time, civil society actors initiate regional policy issues on gender. We go to the SADC with like-minded organisations to say how we can change this policy. We bring our evidence from our primary actors or community-based organisations and take these issues to the SADC and say - can you please change this policy or protocol on gender! We go to the SADC because it is a political kind of structure, which brings all the government ministries and heads of states together. We work with the SADC because we want to influence policy around gender. SADC is critical if you want to influence policy. We want to work with the SADC because that is where the decision-making process is. We work with the SADC because we believe it is the best approach to work as a regional organisation. The benefits of working on the regional project are to solve problems collectively to address problems like migration, HIV/AIDS, culture and patriarchy (Interview with M).

As such, formal regional policies on gender that have emerged within the SADC policy framework, have not only come from state regionalism, but have more often than not, been pushed for by civil society groups with a gender and women focus (Interview with K, Programme Office-The Alliance, GL, 06.09.2016, Johannesburg, South Africa; Interview with M). In this case, civil society groupings are not only putting forward policy proposals, but they also apply the knowledge they possess from the local context, to push for particular norm

changes, as well as, participate within SADC's already existing structuring frameworks to contribute to the development of the norm cycle that addresses gender security.

Gender and women's organisations have been instrumental in pushing for these norms in global structuring spaces. Gendered norms derived from the local contexts have found their way into global policies on gender. At a global level, local norms are repackaged, adapted, and diffused back into regional and national legislative frameworks (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009: 12-13). The evolving global norms, as such, are inter-connected to emerging and evolving gendered insecurities at a localised level. For example, the increasing human rights concerns of LGBTI communities have largely shaped the growing involvement of the global queer movement, and scholarship within and outside formal state processes to push for norm changes in global policies, and the diffusion of norms back in regional and local policies (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:19). In the SADC region, legislature from countries such as, South Africa, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has recognised the rights of LGBTI communities (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:19).

The conception of gender in feminist scholarship has equally evolved, and no longer limits to the rigid dualism of roles about what it entails to be a man or woman. The evolved conception of gender that this study, adopts, accommodates for the multiplicity of gender roles that go beyond the conventional dualism dominant in mainstream thinking (Lind, 2011:49-50; Amadiume, 1987b:17). While the SADC region remains generally homophobic, there are at the same time civil society actors whose game has addressed gendered insecurities, including those of LGBTI communities.

Game-changing transnational activities of civil society actors with gender and women focus since the 1990s points to their contribution to the development of norm cycles, contributing to minimising gendered insecurities. Further, the game-changing cycle has emerged and re-emerged from processes and interactions that are fluid, and cut across multiple levels, globally, regionally, and locally. In the context of Southern Africa, the game-changing cycle from transnational activities and regionalisation with a gender and women focus point to a growing norm cycle on gender. Figure 8 below shows multiple representations of game-changing cycles at various levels addressing gendered insecurities.




Figure 8: Multiple representations of game-changing cycles

5.3. Civil society’s game in the SADC policymaking spaces

Since the opening up of democratic spaces in the 1990s, changes have also taken place within the SADC’s policy structures as it relates to non-state participation in community-building. While early of regional organising by states in the post-independence era such as those of the SADCC of the 1980s were closed up to non-state participation, including women’s groups, the evolved SADC, in its 1992 Windhoek Treaty, provided for non-state actor participation in building SADC as a community (SADC Treaty, 1992).

Game-changing as practiced by SADCC was exclusive to states, highly personalised, and centred on state-based regionalism and regionalisation (Khadiagala, 2012:25; Mandaza, 1987:218). The opening up of space for non-state participation in the SADC policies since democratisation allowed for gender and women-focused civil society groupings, to begin to participate in policy development within SADC’s formal intergovernmental spaces. Previously, calls and appeals to the SADCC in the 1980s on the idea of establishing a regional gender desk went unnoticed. The Gender Unit as encapsulated in the 1997 SADC Declaration

on Gender and Development only came into existence in 1998, and has ever since occupied a pivotal role in ensuring civil society actors' continued participation within SADC's policymaking structures (SADC Declaration on Gender, 1997; Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009).

The growing involvement of civil society actors in norm development within global intergovernmental structuring and restructuring spaces on gender, also paved the way for their participation within regional intergovernmental policymaking spaces. For example, in the aftermath of the UN Beijing International Conference on Women of 1995, there was growing regional thickening among gender and women-focused civil society groups both outside formal inter-state structures, as well as, their participation within the SADC policymaking framework (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:34). A task force to draft a Regional Plan of Action post-the Beijing International Conference was set up, and the first meeting of the SADC ministers responsible for women and gender was held in 1997 (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:34). Since the 1997 meeting, the space for participation within the SADC policymaking spaces, opened up between regional civil society actors, the SADC Secretariat, the SADC governments, and the SADC Gender Unit.

The opening up of this space is revealed in a three-phase process (discussed below), within which gender and women-focused civil society groupings participated in the SADC processes, to formulate and contribute to policies seeking to address gender security across Southern Africa. Gender and women's organisations have pushed for their participation in inter-state frameworks, as a strategy to get national governments to adopt and implement the norms that they have adopted and ratified, in order to ultimately eliminate rigid behaviours and gendered insecurities.

Regional thickening as game-changing is revealed through women's actions and functions that organised in multiple membership and solidarity networks. In Southern Africa, game-changing was achieved through organising in bigger transnational communities that pooled resources together in order to collectively engage state actors within the SADC policymaking structures on gender. For example, the Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance (The Alliance) came into existence in 2005, and was and still is structured as a broad transnational community of mostly gender and women-based organisations that advocated for legally binding norms on gender. The Alliance began with six NGOs, but by 2009, the membership had swelled to over 41 organisations (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:24). Today, the Alliance has been consolidated into a transnational community of 15 national gender networks, and ten regional

NGOs that cover various themes constituting the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2017:336).

The varying gendered identities that constitute the Alliance transnational community covers specific women and gender-related issues they seek to address within the broader umbrella of the norms emerging within the SADC context. The individual transnational communities making up the Alliance (discussed in detail in the next chapter) include: the “Gender Links”, which serves as the Alliance Secretariat; the “Women and Law in Southern Africa”; “WARESA”; the “Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Information and Dissemination Service”; the “Voluntary Services Overseas-RHAISA”; the DITSHWANELO- The Botswana Centre for Human Rights, and the “Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre and Network”. Through the Alliance, civil society groupings, such as these collectively advocated, pushed for, and participated in the formulation of policies on gender within the SADC’s policy framework. By participating in norm development, these civil society actors further advocated for a better policy alignment of gendered insecurities to the evolving policies on gender. Such a collective regional approach by transnational communities with a gender and women focus was, furthermore significant in advocating for the “implementation and monitoring of the region’s gender agenda, so that gender equality and women’s empowerment bec[a]me a living reality for the millions of SADC women and girls” (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:33).

The organisation and regionalisation in dense transnational communities involving national and regional NGOs point to a regional thickening and game change achieved through their advocacy related activities and strategies, as well as, their participation within inter-governmental policymaking structures. The SADC member states have then approved policies that gender advocates have pushed for.

While the information reviewed indicate that a number of the SADC countries have adopted the norms that women and gender-based NGOs have helped to create, implementation is slow on what has been agreed at the SADC level. As shown in the sections below, civil society actors have played multiple functions. For example, the watchdog role has involved pressuring national governments to adopt and implement what has been agreed to at the SADC level that ultimately has the potential at reducing gendered insecurities across the region. To minimise gendered insecurities, civil society groupings have pushed for the development, adoption, and implementation of agreed upon regional policies covering issue areas such as: “gender and governance”; “gender and HIV/AIDS”; “gender and patriarchy”; “sexual reproduction and health rights”; “women, land, and climate change”; “gender-based violence”; and “child

marriages” (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:19). These issue areas are linked to the to the very gendered insecurities that civil society groupings have addressed.

5.4. Civil society’s game in a three- phased process

From the 1990s to the mid-2010s, gender and women-focused civil society groupings increasingly participated in the SADC policymaking framework. The growth of recognition and participation can be categorised into three phases, each of which was accompanied by policy development. These three phases are discussed here as they point to regional thickening in terms of non-state-state regionalism and region-ness, that amounted to game-changing. The first game-changing phase was initiated as a response to calls from the women’s movement regionally, and in the post-Beijing 1995 period to have a regional policy on gender that addressed collective gender insecurities, and development related concerns. The first game-changing phase, on the one hand, marked the beginning of a growing interface between non-state and state regionalism around gender security within the SADC structuring spaces. On the other hand, this game-changing phase culminated in the development of the regional first policy on gender, the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development, and its Addendum of 1998. After an evaluation of the 1997 Declaration and its 1998 Addendum in 2003, to which the SADC Secretariat had invited gender and women-focused civil society actors to participate, women’s organisations realised that there was an urgent need to begin to push for a legally-binding gender policy (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009). A legally binding instrument would further open up space to begin to effectively address collective gender insecurities at a regional level.

In the second game-changing phase, civil society’s actions and functions, including their participation in the SADC policymaking processes, culminated in the development of the first legally-binding regional policy, the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009). One of the key features of the 2008 SADC Gender Protocol was its alignment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2000 to 2015. As the expiring date was approaching in 2015, civil society actor’s third game-changing phase involved mobilising local communities across the region to review the gaps in the 2008 Gender Policy, as well as to identify issue areas of significance in pushing for norm changes in the aftermath of the MDGs agenda. The third game-changing phase in 2016 involved civil society groupings organising both outside and within the SADC policymaking spaces. The third phase

resulted in the development of the Post-2015 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development. See illustration in the figure 9 below on the growth of recognition and participation of civil society in state policy frameworks can be categorised into three phases.




Figure 9: Three game-changing phases pointing to non-state-state regionalism

The information gathered of the three game-changing phases from the 1990s to 2015 points to deepening participation of gender and women-based civil society actors within the SADC policy framework, as well as, to thickening norms covering multiple gendered insecurities. While thickening in terms of increasing regionalisation, regionalism and region-ness varied, the three-phased processes all culminated in the development of three key regional policies addressing gendered insecurities. These phases evolved from less structured to more organised transnational activities involving the interface of state and non-state regionalism within the SADC policymaking structures. From 2015, nationalistic tendencies began to emerge on the part of some the SADC member states such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa pointing to drawbacks in terms of the degree of involvement of civil society groupings in SADC's policy formulation processes (Interview with, R Senior Officer, SADC Gender Unit, 16.09.2016, Gaborone, Botswana). In a spirit of resistance, there are steps being undertaken to cushion drawback tendencies to minimise non-state actor participation in structuring and restructuring processes in SADC's inter-state policymaking frameworks. Since 2015, there is a dialogue process headed by the SADC Secretariat, including its legal team, and regional civil society groupings underway to develop a structured legal framework for non-state actor participation

in SADC's region-building processes. The process to develop a legal framework that clearly stipulates the manner of non-state actor participation in inter-state policymaking structures, points to the growth in recognition of the key functions played by these actors in a transnational context. Once finalised, such a legal framework may provide a guaranteed space for uninterrupted participation of non-state actors in game-changing within SADC's policymaking structures to address common regional insecurities.

The evolution of the three game-changing phases further point to the growth and thickening of non-state processes around gender in a transnational context, as well as, their interface with state actors in the interest of developing and diffusing norms that address gender insecurities. The three phases furthermore point to norms on gender as having thickened over time in terms of content covering significant areas of concern, and gaps in the policies as a mechanism to effectively address gender insecurities.

5.4.1. Phase one regional thickening and game-changing

As noted above, the first game-changing phase was initiated as a response to calls from the women's movement regionally, and in the post-Beijing 1995 period to have a regional policy on gender that would address collective gender insecurities and development related concerns at localised levels. On the one hand, the first phase marked the beginning of a growing interface between non-state and state regionalism around gender security in Southern Africa. On the other hand, this game-changing phase resulted in the development of a first regional policy on gender, the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development.

The organisation and participation of individual women, or gender and women focused groups in SADC's policymaking framework towards the development of the first regional gender policy, were largely energised by the Beijing International Women's gathering of 1995, and its Declaration and Platform of Action (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:12). This was the Fourth Women's International gathering that provided for the interface of non-state-state regionalism at a global level, and culminated in the development of a global policy on gender, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPfA). Game-changing at the Beijing gathering and the global policy on gender, the BDPfA that emerged from it, were critical for women in Southern Africa, to begin to mobilise effectively and push for their recognition and participation in SADC's policymaking structures on gender (Lowe-Morna, 2004:13-14; Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:12,34) The participation of women in global structuring

and restructuring spaces developing global gender norms was significant to begin to build solidarity networks, and strengthen personal their relations with government officials (Interview with B; Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009). As is revealed in the following discussions, the personal relations developed by individual women with the SADC Ministers responsible for women, and gender, became key in advocating for the 1997 regional policy on gender and development, including pushing for the institutionalisation, and the establishment of a gender unit.

In the development of the 1997 SADC Declaration of Gender and Development, individual women, and gender and women's groups played key functions in lobbying government representatives to rally behind this regional policy on gender in the post-Beijing era. Having garnered enough support, a small group of women began to mobilise leaders of women organisations across the region, as a strategy to begin to push for the development of the first regional policy on gender in Southern Africa, as well as, the establishment of the SADC Gender Unit through this policy document (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:12-15).As pointed above, earlier attempts in the 1980s by the women of the region to participate within SADC's predecessor, the SADCC policymaking structures, and to push for the establishment of a regional gender desk, fell on deaf ears. From the information reviewed, the first game-changing phase marked the beginning of growing regionalism on gendered insecurities. The information also revealed signs of emerging regionalisation around gender involving gender and women-focused civil society actors seeking to promote and change norms and to addressing gendered insecurities.

The texts reviewed on the process leading to the development of SADC's 1997 Declaration on Gender and Development further point to the key role played by women from the region in pushing for the first regional gender policy (Lowe-Morna, 2004:13-14; Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009). The information further revealed that the history of exclusion and marginalisation of women in the male-dominated inter-governmental structures, particularly, in the early post-independence era from the mid-1960s to the 1980s, point to some of the difficulties that gender and women-focused civil society groups have faced in seeking recognition, and participation in regional inter-state structures.

While the doors opened up for women's participation within SADC's policymaking frameworks in the 1990s, pointing to the softening of rigid institutionalisation, patriarchal attitudes at the same time remained rife. While there is growing interface between state and non-state regionalism, at the same time civil society actors have had to counter-resist their

marginalisation, and exclusion to participate in norm development within SADC's policymaking structures. Pointing to the difficult policymaking environment, and women's forms of resilience to push for norms and their participation within SADC's intergovernmental spaces, Lowe-Morna (2004:14) noted that, "most of the women had been up through the night... putting the final touches to the draft Declaration on Gender and Development that the heads of state would be asked to sign". The information reviewed shows that non-state actors that participated in the first game-changing phase, were fewer in comparison to the other two phases to be discussed below. The initial contact with state actors around gender insecurity concerns affecting the region, led to the signing and adoption of the SADC 1997 Declaration on Gender and Development and its Addendum of 1998.

The opening up of democratic spaces since the 1990s marked the beginning of effective non-state participation within SADC's regional policymaking framework on gender, and to thickening of norms. The spirit of resilience and solidarity displayed by women's organisations from the region, to ensure that their voices were heard, including, their key role in developing SADC's policy on gender, is well noted. Lowe-Morna's (2004:14) narration points out that,

As the presidents lifted their pens to sign [the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development], something unusual happened. The twenty-odd activists who had slipped into the room broke out in an impromptu song – "o-signa" – with Chichewa lyrics made up by the Malawian women now leading a dance around the room, but a refrain and step that every Southern African woman present could sing and dance to. This was not the usual singing and dancing of women at election rallies common in the region. It was a new song, a new dance for an equal say in the running of the affairs of Southern Africa. This was the call of history. There would be no turning back.

Since the development of the first regional policy of gender, the SADC policymaking process is no longer dominated by state regionalism, or by a club of Heads of States, as advanced in dominant analyses (Khadiagala, 2012; Landsberg, 2012). The ideas, policies, or norms on gender are not only emerging from states, but more often than not, these are pushed for by non-state actors with gender and women focus. The 1997 Malawi Summit of Heads of States that adopted the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development was successful in opening up space for gender and women groupings across the region, to begin to organise and participate more in inter-state policymaking processes on gender.

The organisation and participation of non-state actors across multiple spaces are significant as an influence on policy. It is also one of the ways in which non-state regionalisation and regionalism around gendered insecurities, is an indication of game-changing at a regional level.

5.4.1.1. The interconnection of the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development to global norms

The 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development was shaped by multiple external and internal factors and contexts. Highlighting the factors that have shaped the growth of the norm cycle, Acharya (2013:466) has argued, “norms have multiple sources and contexts, yet there is a tendency to credit them to their final point of articulation”. The policies on gender that have evolved since the 1990s to the evolving gender norm cycle at different levels, from local contexts, to the global, regional, and back to localised contexts. The 1997 SADC Declaration was shaped by the norms and insecurities emerging from localised context, as well as norms on gender emerging at a global level. As such, the 1997 gender policy is not a stand-alone document, but rather linked to the norms on gender shaped by multiple local and global sources and contexts. The norms emerging at a global level have then been diffused back into regional, and localised policies, as well as, adapted to push for behavioural changes to minimise gender insecurities (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:42).

The sticking points in the 1997 SADC Declaration was its strong link to the Convention on the Elimination of All form of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) of 1979. The 1997 Declaration committed SADC member states to address gendered insecurities to achieve gender equality, and to prevent and eradicate of all forms of violence against women (SADC Declaration on Gender and Development, 1997). The provision in the 1995 BDPfA on affirmative action calling for a 30 percent quota for women representatives in areas of governance was taken seriously in the development of the SADC 1997 Declaration. In the 1997 Declaration, SADC member states commit to “ensuring the equal representation of women and men in the decision-making of Member States and SADC structures at all levels, and the achievement of at least 30 percent target of women in political decision-making by the year 2005” (SADC Declaration on Gender and Development, 1997). The gendered issues that are contained in global norms that have found themselves in regional norms have evolved, from the local to the global, then back to the regional. As such, the norms being repackaged and emerging at a global, and then at a regional level have their roots in the local issues.

5.4.1.2. Link to non-state regionalism

The initiatives emerging from women and gender-focused groups equally shaped the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development. For example, the idea to establish a gender desk pushed for in the 1980s, eventually found its way in the 1997 Declaration, and was institutionalised and put in place in 1998. Since then, the SADC Gender Unit has facilitated for the participation of gender and women focused civil society groupings within SADC's policymaking frameworks. Civil society actor's participation in the development of the 1997 Declaration and its Addendum of 1998 further opened up space for a growing interface between non-state-state regionalism within SADC's policymaking framework, as well as, to all subsequent revisions of SADC's regional policy on gender. This has had an important knock-on effect in that emerging, and evolving gender norms have been linked to broader SADC policies and protocols. For example, in developing the 1997 SADC Declaration, effort was made to align this policy with already existing regional policy frameworks on the agenda of the Programme of Action and Community-Building Initiative (SADC Declaration, 1997). The 1997 regional norms are equally linked to SADC's broader regional policies.

5.4.1.3. Increasing regionalisation

The growing recognition of civil society actors as key players in region-building opened up space for their increased participation in inter-state policy structures. In 2003, representatives of the SADC Gender Unit invited gender and women-focused civil society actors, to participate in the audit process of the 1997 SADC Declaration, and its Addendum of 1998 (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:34). In terms of the SADC structures, the directives, such as, the audit process is sanctioned by the SADC ministers or Heads of Government. The audit process aimed to ascertain how SADC member states had implemented these two policy documents.

The involvement of civil society actors to review the 1997 gender policy and its addendum, by the SADC Secretariat, points their recognition as important players in the norm development processes to reduce gendered insecurities across Southern Africa. The participation of civil society actors in intergovernmental structuring and restructuring spaces have further enabled a growing interface between state and non-state regionalism in the interest to aid women to have improved, and decent lives across the region through lessening insecurities. The participation of civil society groupings with gender and women focus to review the region's first gender

policy further opened up space for learning, sharing of experiences, and a sense of region-ness pointing to improved relations among state and non-state actors (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001:407). For example, it was pointed out that the audit process of 2003 reviewing the 1997 SADC Declaration “gave civil society organisations that conducted it hands-on education on how to develop frameworks and tools”. The audit process also gave women’s groups skills and knowledge “to begin to track and monitor governments and the SADC Secretariat in order to make them more accountable to women” (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:13). Game-changing is enabled by having buy-in from the all the stakeholders. The 1997 Declaration was not a legally binding document, as such, did very little to compel regional governments in its implementation.

Due to their acquired knowledge about content of SADC existing gender policies, particularly article 26 of the 1998 Addendum to the 1997 SADC Declaration, gender and women’s organisations were able to initiate and advocate for the development of a legally binding gender policy (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:34). This policy was to facilitate accountability measures for states to honour the commitments that they had signed up for to address gender insecurity. Gender and women-focused civil society actors played multiple functions, not only in advocating and participating in norm development within intergovernmental structures, but they also played watchdog roles to track and monitor the implementation of the very norms that governments have committed to.

The participation of civil society actors in the audit process further provided them with additional knowledge about the politics of game-changing, and the bureaucracy of intergovernmental policymaking spaces (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:34). Understanding the internal dynamics and the rigidities of the SADC member states, or their representatives became important for civil society actors to develop strategies, as well as to ensure their participation in policymaking spaces. These strategies included, building relations with government ministries, SADC Ministers Responsible for Gender, the SADC parliamentarians, and the key staff of the SADC Gender Unit (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:34). Game-changing within inter-state policymaking spaces that changes norm, promotes social change, and addresses gendered insecurities across a region is enabled by the good relations between states and non-state actors.

The evolution of non-state-state regionalism, the growing recognition and participation of non-state actors in SADC’s intergovernmental policymaking spaces, and the results from these activities, growing norms, all point to game-changing. For example, game-changing has

revealed a growing interface between state and non-state regionalism leading to thickening norms that address gender insecurity. Over time, game-changing around gendered insecurities within SADC's intergovernmental structures thickened. This was revealed in terms of growing regionalisation and regionalism around the gender norm cycle.

5.5.2. Phase two regional thickening and game-changing

Civil society actors have mobilised outside state frameworks in order to consolidate their position, and begin to advocate for policies on gender within inter-state frameworks. In the aftermath of the audit era, before talks began to happen with the SADC representatives, gender and women's organisations came together and created a bigger transnational community, highlighted earlier, called the Alliance. Ever since it was created in 2005, the Alliance became a key vehicle through which women and gender-based civil society actors organised and advocated for norm development, social and policy change, and pushed for the implementation of regional gender policies. The game-changing action of civil society actors was driven by a need to develop and revise norms of gender that contributed to improving the lives of many women across the SADC region. In the formation of the Alliance, regional women and gender-focused civil society groupings "agreed to come together to say this is what we stand for, we want a protocol, we want an instrument, an all-encompassing instrument, and not just a simple instrument" (Interview with K).

Non-state actors have participated in SADC's policy formulation spaces by invitation. From the time the SADC Gender Unit was created in 1998, it has played a role to involve gender and women's organisations in regional efforts aimed at addressing gender insecurity. The growing recognition given to the non-state actors was important for them to continue to initiate and influence norm development and contribute to improving the lives of women across Southern Africa. While the 1992 Windhoek SADC Treaty establishing the SADC recognised non-state actors as key partners in the area of region-building, in practice, this was not always the case (Interview with C, Programme Officer, ZWRCN, 07.07.2016, Harare, Zimbabwe). In some cases, gender and women-focused civil society groupings had to oppose push-backs by devising counter-hegemonic strategies to put pressure and ensure their participation within the highly male-dominated SADC policymaking structures. The SADC Gender Unit, as well as the Gender Ministers Responsible for Gender and women affairs, played important interventions to underscore the significant functions played by regional gender and women's

organisations, in developing norms on gender and contributing to reduced gendered insecurities (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:9).

While civil society organisations with a gender and women focus initiated the changes to have a legally binding policy, there was some degree of reluctance from the male-dominated governmental SADC representatives to naturally involve them. Magdeline Mathiba-Madibela (then head of the SADC Gender Unit) played a vital role in convincing governments to grant civil society actors' space to participate in the process leading up to the development of the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:9). The Gender Unit, as such, became an important instrument for gender and women's organisation to push for norm changes and development with the SADC intergovernmental policymaking structure. The Alliance enabled non-state participation in the norm development cycle on gender at a regional level that culminated in the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development. It has been noted that,

From the very beginning of the movement towards a Gender Protocol, women civil society groups and the SADC Gender Unit became instrumental allies to each other... This relationship between civil society organisations and the SADC Gender Unit began in 2005 when hands were joined in a collaborative effort to put gender equality in the spotlight in the run-up to, and during, the SADC Heads of State Summit in Botswana that year. The SADC Gender Unit had plans to put two key commendations before the Summit: (a) that the target of women in decision-making is increased from 30% to 50% in line with the African Union's decision; and (b) to elevate the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development to a protocol (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:34-35).

The good relations developed between non-state actors, and the Gender Unit was crucial in promoting a regional thickening leading to game-changing norm cycle addressing gender.

Similar to the first game-changing phase discussed above, the role of strong women figures was key in securing non-state participation in norm development in SADC's inter-state processes. Having influential individuals within the SADC policymaking structures that involved good relations, and linking up with the SADC Secretariat, and the representatives of various government portfolios related to gender was important for game-changing. The representatives from the governments that civil society actors have engaged includes those from the Ministry of Justice, Foreign Affairs, the SADC Parliamentary Forum, and the Ministry Responsible for Gender and Women's Affairs (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:24,35). The

coming together of non-state-state regionalism, in the development of regional policy, in the area of gender to address common insecurities neutralises dominant arguments that suggest the SADC as merely a club of Heads of States (Landsberg, 2012).

The evolving norms that have emerged from state and non-state interactions point to game change attempting to address gendered insecurities across the region.

5.5.2.1. Thickening regionalism

As the norms on gender have evolved at a global level, they have also shaped the changing norm landscape at a regional level. The changing norms at a global and regional level have also been shaped by the gendered realities at a local level that has, in turn, been reflected in these norms. In developing the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, care was given to align this regional policy document to the global development goal, the UN MDGs of 2000-2015; the women's evolved global declaration, the Beijing Plus 10 of 2005; and the African Union's (AU) Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (The Women's Rights Protocol) of 2003 (SADC Gender Protocol, 2008). At a regional level, norms on gender that shaped the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender included, the 2007 SADC Gender Policy, the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development, and the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:40). For example, a bulk of gender issues contained in the RISDP's Women Empowerment Programme were used to inform the drafting process and provisions of the 2008 Protocol on Gender and Development (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:40).

The multiple norms shaping gender policies points to thickening. The 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development was shaped by various norms and policies emerging and a regional and global levels. Further, the local realities of Southern Africa's history illuminating injustice, persistent gender inequalities, gender differences, as well as the exclusion of women from participating meaningfully, in both the public and private spheres of life was reflected in this policy (SADC Gender Protocol, 2008). To eliminate gendered insecurities, some of the sticking points in the 2008 Protocol included, committing SADC member states to adopt measures that guaranteed equal participation and representation of women. These, in terms of ensuring that women occupied leadership positions that "provide[ed] for the empowerment of women, to eliminate discrimination and to achieve gender equality and equity through development and implementation of gender-responsive legislation, policies, programmes and projects" (SADC

Gender Protocol, 2008). To eliminate discrimination, the articles in the SADC's 2008 Gender Protocol recognised "women's empowerment as a central strategy for achieving gender equality".

The local gendered insecurities around constitutional and legal rights, governance, HIV/AIDS, care work, health, men's sector and economic justice are reflected in the articles of the 2008 SADC Gender Protocol. As will be revealed in detail in the following chapter, gender and women-focused civil society groupings diffused the SADC 2008 Gender Protocol in their regional programmes at a localised level across the SADC region (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009). SADC's norms on gender continue to evolve with the changing global, continental, and local norm landscape. In contrast with linear academic discourse advanced in mainstream thinking, the changing policies on gender at multiple levels, point to their non-rigid nature. The evolving and increasing norms of gender from non-state-state regionalism emerging from within intergovernmental policymaking spaces, instead, point to a regional thickening and game-changing regionalism contributing to efforts seeking to end gendered insecurities.

5.5.3. Phase three regional thickening and game-changing

Since the 1990s and up to now, global norms have influenced changes, or revisions of regional policies on gender. Civil society actors with a gender and women focus in Southern Africa, have played an important function to constantly participate in updating policies on gender, to be in line with evolving global norms, and to addressing gendered insecurities. Gender and women-focused NGOs have played an important role in initiating norm changes or revisions. For example, the Alliance played an important role not only in initiating the development of the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, but also in its revision (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009; SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016; 2017). Further, the Alliance not only organised local communities to review the 2008 SADC Gender Protocol, but it also identified the key weaknesses and strengths of this regional policy.

The participation of civil society groupings in developing global policy on gender has paved a way for civil society groupings to feed these norms into regional and local policies. For example, as the UN MDGs were to expire in 2015, gender and women's organisations began to mobilise, and participate in norm changes outside and within global intergovernmental structuring and restructuring spaces. The participation of civil society with a gender and women

focus led to their contribution to the UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5 on gender (Interview with K; SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016; 2017).

Emma Kaliya, the chairperson of the Alliance pointed out that, “We cannot afford to be caught flatfooted. Globally, we are moving from the MDGs to the SDGs. The SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, aligned to the MDGs, needs to move apace” (SADC Protocol and the Post 2015 Agenda Brochure). The 2008 Gender Protocol was revised in the period 2014 to 2015, in the wake of the SDGs. Important to note, the Post-2015 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, was not only shaped by the global norms that also include the Beijing Plus 20 Twenty Review of 2015, but also by continental norms such as the AU’s Agenda 2063 (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:14; Interview with K).

Transnational communities that have emerged on gender in Southern Africa are linked to global gender communities through membership. For example, the Alliance is a member of civil society global group of women called the “Women’s Major Group” (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:12-14). Through its membership with this global women’s group, the Alliance participated at the 2016 UN High Level Political Forum on the SDGs. It has been pointed out that the Alliance “played a major role in influencing the over thirty gender targets and indicators in the SDGs” (GL. 2016-2030: A Period of Action and Results). According to regional civil society, the SDGs were regarded as

a powerful action and results framework that the Southern African Gender Alliance lobbied for globally, leveraging off the SADC Gender Protocol, with the aim of using this international instrument to strengthen implementation in the region - the weakest link in the chain (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:12).

Speaking at the UN General Assembly in 2015, Bhekinkosi Moyo, the executive director of a regional transnational community, the “Southern African Trust” (SAT) noted that,

We supported the Gender Protocol Alliance - an advocacy coalition for gender equality. The SADC region has the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development as an example of a sub-regional instrument developed through lobbying and technical expertise from civil society, political buy-in from governments, monitoring of implementation by both civil society and the SADC Secretariat, and resourcing of implementation by funding partners. The Protocol is an example of a one-stop-shop for global, continental and regional development instruments. It is also an example of an iterative process from regional to global... This network of regional networks is now using the SDGs to lobby

for the update and upgrade of the Protocol in line with the SDGs (GL, A Period of Action and Results, 2016-2030).

Gender and women's civil society groups from Southern Africa have constituted a part of global transnational communities promoting game change, and to addressing gender insecurity. The recognition and participation of women organisations in IR to influence policy globally and regionally further gives credence to the observation that Africa's agency around gender exists in global IR (Bischoff, Aning and Acharya, 2016:1-3).

The transnational activities of civil society groups in Southern Africa, their interface with regional governments to get buy-in, their experiences in pushing for, and participating in the development of the norm cycle, all combined, point to a growing non-state agency in addressing gendered insecurities. The policies on gender, emerging from these civil society transnational activities and regionalisation reveal that they are shaped by the global, continental, and regional context. The norm cycle further points to its link to the game-changing cycle from local – global – regional and back at the localised level. The thickening norms on gender, are not a stand-alone, but these have been shaped and reshaped by multiple norms, factors and contexts (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:13).

5.6. Thickening norms on gender

Three gender policies have emerged from the three-phase game-changing process since the 1990s. These policies form part of the evolving gender norm cycle in Southern Africa. These three gender policies are connected, and combined, point to thick regionalisms (Bach, 2003). For example, the non-binding 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender evolved to the legally binding 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, and the latter, into the Post-2015 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development. There are other SADC regional policies that speak to gender, such as, the 2007 SADC Gender Policy and the RISDP.

The evolution of the three policies point to a thickening that happened over time corresponding with changing local, regional, continental and global norms on gender. While the 1997 SADC Declaration was a non-binding document, the 2008 SADC Gender Protocol replacing it, was legally binding with time frames aligned to the MDGs that expired in 2015. With the expiring of the MDGs of 2015, the 2008 SADC Gender Protocol was revised to be in line with the SDGs, as well as, other global norms (such as Beijing Plus 20), and continental norms (see AU

Agenda 2063). The 2008 Gender Protocol evolved into the Post-2015 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development.

The Post-2015 Gender Protocol reveals thickening in terms of the content of the policy document. For example, the Post-2015 gender agenda referenced all of SADC's 26 Protocols such as Education; Culture and Sports; Environmental Management; Health; Employment; and Labour (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:11). The SADC Protocol on the Environment, which covers, among others, gender analysis and gender mainstreaming, gender-responsive policies, inclusive and participatory consultations of all stakeholders, including men and women, and gender disaggregated data on environmental management was equally aligned to the provision on gender and climate change (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:15-16). As such, multiple norms have shaped emerging and evolving regional policies on gender in Southern Africa. Civil society actors through advocacy and participating in inter-governmental norm production spaces have taken up the local norms and issues up to the global and continental level.

The three SADC policies are also embedded in the gendered insecurities specific to Southern Africa. The local norms together with those emerging from different sources and contexts have converged at a global level, and have been repackaged and diffused back into regional and national policies on gender.

Important to highlight, while the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development was not legally binding, it, however, constituted an important document, having been the first regional policy on gender. Participating for the first time within SADC's policymaking structures, the process of developing the 1997 Declaration was also significant for the women in the region. This game-changing process allowed civil society actors with a gender and women focus a framework to begin to organise more effectively and to participate in SADC intergovernmental structuring and restructuring policy spaces, in order to push for the institutionalisation of the Gender Unit, and norms that addressed gendered insecurities (Lowe-Morna, 2004; Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009). The 1997 SADC Declaration, and its Addendum of 1998 formed the basis for which the other two consequent regional gender policies were crafted.

The 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender was strong in terms of being legally binding, as well as, aligning its goals to those of the MDGs. This policy also strengthened the position of 50/50 gender representation in line with the AU's Women's Protocol, a shift from the 30 percent representation of the 1997 SADC Declaration that was in line with the BDPfA. While the 2008

SADC Protocol on Gender and Development was less-stronger on the language, the Post-2015 SADC Gender Protocol appears stronger. As opposed to the numbers, such as 50/50 representation, it points to “equal and effective” participation in political decision-making; commitment to “eliminating” rather than “reducing” traditional harmful practices; reducing maternal mortality; “ending” child forced marriages; “ending” female genital mutilation and slavery; and a commitment to “ending” rather than “halving” gender-based violence (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:15). It was pointed out that,

The reviewed SADC Protocol on Gender and Development attempts to cover some gaps that were in the old Protocol... Before it was reviewed, the old protocol did not have provisions for gender and climate change, or anything about sexual minorities. Initially, the Protocol talked about health, but now it brings in a rights approach in terms of sexual reproductive health and reproductive rights. The old Protocol did not talk about the ‘effectiveness’ of women’s participation, but now the new Protocol moves beyond numbers (Interview with K).

Unlike the 2008 Gender Protocol that had time-bound targets that were in line with the MDGs, the Post-2015 Protocol has a monitoring, evaluation and reporting framework that is also a common feature in the AU’s Agenda 2063 (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:16). In the revision process, the specific timeframes were removed in order to accommodate concerns previously raised by Botswana in the 2008 Gender Protocol (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:15). However, while it was anticipated that the Government of Botswana would sign the Post-2015 Gender Protocol at the Swaziland SADC Summit in 2016, given that all the contentious issues had been addressed in the revised protocol, they only eventually did so close to eight months after the Summit, in May 2017 (The Southern Times. Bots finally signs SADC Gender Protocol).

The Post-2015 Gender Protocol points to regional thickening and game change, in terms of “effecting change”, however, there are some areas where this policy remained weak (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:15-16). For example, while the revised protocol was thick on constitutional and legal rights, providing for equal recognition of widows and widowers’ rights (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:15), it has, at the same time, been weakened as it removed the clause that guarantees widows’ employment, one of the contentious issues that resulted in Botswana not signing the 2008 Protocol on Gender (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:15). “The Government of Botswana never signed the 2008 Protocol on Gender and Development, as they were not happy with some of the prescriptive texts therein”

(Interview with P; Interview with S, Project Coordinator, GL-Botswana 14.09.2016 Gaborone, Botswana).

The Post-2015 Gender Protocol also had a strong provision to prevent child marriages, in that it removed the qualification that the minimum age of 18 for marriage is subject to the law (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:15). The article on child marriages in the Post-2015 Gender Protocol was aligned to the 2016 SADC Model Law on ending child marriages that calls for member states to ensure their national laws prevent child marriages.¹²

As such, the minimum age of marriage in the Post-2015 Protocol is 18.¹³ Evolving norms, however, present challenges to those countries that still have anachronistic laws. To accommodate the concerns raised by Mauritius, the wording “affirmative action” in the 2008 protocol was changed to “special measures” in the revised protocol (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:15). However, in terms of the marriage clause, Mauritius submitted that the article in the Post-2015 Protocol was still in conflict with its national laws, therefore, abstained from signing in 2016.

With the changing global norms that have in turn been diffused in regional norms, gendered issue areas on gender have equally thickened. Civil society actors adapt the evolving regional norms in their activities and programmes. One of the informants pointed out that,

Since the Post-2015 Gender Protocol and the SDGs, we are no longer talking about “eradicating” HIV/AIDS. We are no longer talking about “equal enrolment” of boys and girls. Today, we are talking about “ending” HIV/AIDS. We are talking about “enrolment”, as well as “completion of boys and girls” at school. We are talking about

¹² The SADC Model Law on Ending Child Marriage was adopted in Johannesburg in 2016 by the SADC-PF. The SADC-PF constitutes national parliaments from 14-member states of the SADC region. See SADC Parliamentarians adopt model law on eradicating child marriages. <http://girlsnotbrides.org/sadc-mode-lawlchild-marriage/>

¹³ The explanatory notes of the model law note that “In at least five countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), almost 40% of children are married before they are 18 years of age. Malawi and Mozambique are amongst the 10 countries in the world with the highest rates of child marriage. In both countries over 50% of children are married before they are 18 years of age...In Zambia and Madagascar, the prevalence of child marriage is 40% (SADC Model Law, 2016:v).

inclusivity, “Leaving No One Behind” as per the motto of the SDGs” (Interview with E, Head of Programmes, SAfAIDS, 08.07.2016, Harare, Zimbabwe).

In line with the thickening norms, gender and women’s organisation began to seriously engage men in conversations about gendered insecurities at localised levels.

Now when we are talking about gender equality, we are saying, even men have a role to play in all the interventions around gender and women empowerment. We mainly look at how women are affected by HIV/AIDS. Our gender programmes involve working with traditional leaders at community levels. Bringing men into these conversations has been important to come up with solutions from both men and women rather than prescribing solutions. We are also seeing under the Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission programme that men are heavily being involved in the different countries in Southern Africa (Interview with E).

Further, when we are talking about women, we do not parcel them in one box. We have to reach out to all different kinds of women, indigenous, urban, rural, women in business and politicians. We are looking at that holistic approach about women because there was this... trend of parcelling women in one box. Yet, women are different. Now we are talking about lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex communities because the SDGs says, ‘Leave No One Behind’ (Interview with K).

5.7. Challenges around game-changing

While on paper, spaces opened up for non-state participation within SADC’s broader policymaking frameworks, in reality, the participation of gender and women’s organisations in these spaces has not been without difficulties. While the three game-changing phases discussed above, point to major milestones in promoting thickening of norms that break the boundaries of state-centrism, gender differences and marginalisation since the 1990s, challenges remain. To bring about social change, the region has done well in terms of producing thick gender policies to lessen patriarchy, and address women’s insecurities. However, the implementation of these norms has remained the weakest link in the game-changing chain (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:218). From the information gathered, it was noted that,

On paper, the SADC region looks strong, but the statistics on issues of representation are horrifying (Interview with B).

What is on the ground and what is on paper are two different things (Interview with F, Project Coordinator-GL, 11.07.2016, Harare, Zimbabwe).

We have come a long way in trying to dismantle patriarchy, but really in this region, it is still deeply entrenched. We still have very low numbers of women in politics and low numbers of women in economic decision-making (Interview with K).

Patriarchy still exists particularly in the area of decision-making (Interview with D, Director, Federation Pour la Promotion Feminine et Enfante 07.07.2016 Madagascar).

Patriarchy is re-grouping in response to what it perceives as an onslaught and what it has done successfully is to recruit women in its ranks. Patriarchy ensures that whenever women make significant gains, it is there to dilute them. For example, Zimbabwe has sixty seats reserved for women in Parliament. But patriarchy countered this by expanding the number of constituencies in the country meaning that the 60 seats make little difference in terms of percentages (Interview with L, Chief Director: WLSA, 06.09.2016, Harare, Zimbabwe).

There are areas where the SADC region has done well. Globally, for example, the region has exceeded the global average of 23 percent in terms of women's representation in key governance structures. Yet, the SADC region failed to meet the 2015 target of 50 percent of women in all areas of decision-making. It was strongly pointed out that there are no benefits associated with excluding over 50 percent of the region's population from key decision-making processes in as far as development and stabilisation are concerned (Interview with A, Programme Officer, Gender Links-Zambia 28.06.28 Lusaka, Zambia).

Further gendered insecurities have persisted. For example, the SADC Gender Protocol Barometer of 2017 noted that gender-based violence had increased across the region. While challenges remain, there have been at the same time diffuse practices that have disrupted formerly rigid institutionalisation around gendered issues. For example, in January 2016, the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court passed a landmark judgement that ruled Section 22 (1) of the Marriage Act as unconstitutional, and declared 18 years as the legal minimum age of marriage. Article 22(1) was unconstitutional in the sense that it does not provide for a minimum age limit of 18 years in respect of any marriage contract. Most countries in the region have 18 as their legal minimum age of marriage. In some countries, the minimum legal age is between 16 and 18 with parental consent, and in countries such as Mauritius and Seychelles, without parental consent. In the context of Mauritius, "the minimum legal age of marriage, the Civil

Code provides that a person in Mauritius can get married at the age of 18 years. However, a person aged 16 years can get married with the consent of their parents, or in the absence of the consent of parents, by the judge of chambers if the latter considers that it would be in the interest of the minor to get married” (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:61). In Botswana, while the legal age is 21 years of age, the “legal age limit does not apply to marriages contracted under the customary or religious law according to which there is no limit” (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:61). This points to the tensions that exist between codified and uncoded laws.

There are also efforts to make visible LGBTI communities in the evolving norms on gender and in the national laws, in some countries across Southern Africa. For example, countries such as South Africa, the DRC, and Mozambique have decriminalised homosexuality. There, however, remain differences across the region in terms of sexual orientation (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:61). As such, while LGBTI individuals and gendered issues are becoming visible in the three countries, they remain invisible in the majority of Southern African countries. In countries such as Zambia, Malawi, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe, LGBTIs are not tolerated (Interview with A).

Another notable change related to that is, in 2016, the first LGBTI organisation, “LEGABIBO”, after a long battle, was legally registered in Botswana. “The Botswana Court of Appeal ruled that the refusal by the government to register LEGABIBO, an organisation of LGBTI people, was unconstitutional. In its ruling, the Court of Appeal highlighted the potential role of LGBTI organisations in public health and HIV efforts and ordered the Registrar of Societies to register it” (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:218). However, while the levels of buy-in reveal some thickening and are slowly breaking the formerly rigid, state-based, patriarchal and formal institutionalisation, challenges remain in addressing social insecurities for the region’s more than 50 percent of the population who are women.

5.8. The politics of game-changing

In the process of developing norms on gender, tensions, conflicts, and contradictions have emerged between states and non-state actors. For example, in crafting the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, differences emerged around the issue of the language used in the Protocol. The SADC Council of Ministers were of the view that the language in the draft 2008 Protocol was too prescriptive and pointed out that governments did not want to be prescribed

to. This led to the initial draft of the 2008 Protocol being significantly changed. The Roadmap to Equality Report (2009:40) points out that,

the 2007 Council of Ministers in Lusaka, Zambia watered-down the Protocol tabled before them into a toothless document by deleting some articles and changing the language in others to make states' compliance almost optional.

The differences emerging in the wording of the text in the policy documents reveals the nature of the power dynamics that have played out within intergovernmental policymaking spaces.

While civil society groups have a voice within inter-state policymaking spaces, patriarchal tendencies, have in some instances remained rife. Referring to the state-non-state process that developed the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, Mathiba-Madibela, quoted in the report on the *Roadmap to Equality Report*, narrated that,

...when we reached the 2007 summit held in Lusaka, Zambia, the senior officials presented us with the first serious challenge since the process inception. It was tough! The draft [2008 SADC Gender] Protocol was interrogated thoroughly; page by page, line by line. I was subjected to questions that were often meant to embarrass the process and me as an individual. I became worried. I witnessed all the hard work the women of the region had selflessly given being reversed. It was indeed an 'Aha Moment'! Shock waves and worry over the quality of the document going forward turned into relief when the Heads of states and Government differed the protocol to 2008. This was time to take a deep breath, strategise and refocus on the way forward (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:9-10).

Mathiba-Madibela further narrated that,

When the senior officials from the national gender machineries, civil society and development partners convened in Livingstone, Zambia in December 2007 to re-open discussions and strategically re-strengthen the draft Protocol, it was a tough meeting for all of us. We differed, yet agreed in principle. The liberals clashed with the radicals. But a common purpose brought us together, so we worked long hours day and night to improve the document and prepared it for the second round. A revised roadmap was developed and a new draft (now the ninth one) was taken back to Member States for further consultations. There was immense resistance from some quarters during the negotiation process. And, a lot of work still needs to be done to raise awareness of

gender equality, especially among decision-makers in the SADC member states (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:10).

Amadiume (1987b:47) has observed that individuals who have privileged positions in society, tend to influence processes and interactions in societies. The power to sign and adopt the policies that have emerged from state-non-state regionalism have resided with the Heads of States. Ministers Responsible for Gender and Women's Affairs have also played key functions that supported and redirected the norm development processes. For example, when the Council of Ministers rejected some provisions of the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, the Ministers Responsible for Gender and Women's Affairs did not abort the process. They instead worked with civil society actors to reach a compromise on the content of the Protocol. The report on the roadmap to equality points out that,

the Ministers Responsible for Gender and Women's Affairs quickly re-grouped and engaged with civil society to salvage their last agreed version of the document, before the 2007 [Head of State] summit, putting the process back on track... the Ministers Responsible for Gender and Women's Affairs became not only key stakeholders in the Protocol process at the national level and regionally as the Committee of Ministers responsible for gender in the SADC region, but also champions for the Protocol's adoption as the process progressed. These ministers became the primary lobbyists among their colleagues in the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, the SADC Council of Ministers, and national Cabinets chaired by Heads of States (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:40).

As evidenced by the influential position and commitment of state actors in addressing gendered insecurities, buy-in from key stakeholders in the norm development cycle is crucial for game-changing.

The process of developing policies within the SADC intergovernmental policymaking framework brings to the fore multiple power dynamics. While non-state actors have initiated the need to develop norms on gender, SADC decision-makers may approve, or reject the proposed policies. As such, the individuals with privileged state identities are in a more influential positions to sign, ratify and implement the emerging and evolving policies of gender.

The power dynamics and tensions between state and non-state actors were further evident in the revision of the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development in 2015. As noted earlier, at the time, while gender and women-based organisations had been invited to participate in the 2015 process to review the 2008 SADC Gender Protocol, they already had in their pocket a

draft Post-2015 document (Interview with K; SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:12,41). This document emerged from the game-changing transnational activities of civil society actors at a global, regional, and local level.

In addition to regional gender and women civil society actors, the SADC Gender Unit also invited the “UN WOMEN” – a UN organisation committed to gender equality and empowerment of women – to guide the review process (Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:12, 41; Interview with K). The UN WOMEN’s task included the need to align the proposed Post-2015 SADC Protocol to global and continental norms such as the SDGs, the Beijing Plus 20, the AU’s Agenda 2063, as well as, at a regional level, to all SADC Protocols (Interview with K). From the information obtained, there was a sense from gender and women’s civil society organisations of having been marginalised, given that they had already been working on the review process since 2014, including lobbying regional governments to review the 2008 SADC Gender Protocol (Interview with K). On the side of the SADC Secretariat, there was a sense that individuals, through the Alliance network, were becoming too powerful, and as such, pushing for a civil society version of the revised Gender Protocol. As a result of the tensions that ensued in the wake of the process of revising the 2008 SADC Gender Protocol, the Alliance was consequently left out of the SADC Gender Ministerial meetings of 2016 in Swaziland that endorsed the Post-2015 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2017:335; also in Interview with R, Senior Officer, SADC Gender Unit 16.09.2016 Gaborone, Botswana). It was pointed out that this was the first time gender and women’s groups had been excluded from SADC policy structures since the late 1990s (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2017:335). At the 2016 Swaziland meeting, the gender ministers were of the view that “there had been an anomaly to equate civil society actors with UN entities. The meeting decided that going forward civil society groups or representatives attending the Gender Ministers’ meetings would be invited by their member state countries” (Interview with R).

The information gathered revealed various layers of power dynamics between states and non-state actors within the SADC intergovernmental policymaking space. It was pointed out that regional governments “pull the card of sovereignty whenever they are uncomfortable with a particular issue” (Interview with Q). There was a sense that this was done in order to reinforce their dominant positions whenever they feel that their power is being threatened within production spaces. It was echoed that

there are a lot of sensitivities emanating from countries like South Africa, Zambia, the DRC, and Zimbabwe who believe that partnering with civil society actors is tantamount

to co-governing with civil society actors... SADC member states are of the view that SADC is a state-run organisation just like the AU and cannot be mortgaged to civil society actors (Interview with R).

The differences emanating from intergovernmental structuring and re-structuring spaces were also seen as linked to the various labels attached to the actors participating in the norm development process. For example, it was pointed out,

when civil society actors interact with UN organisations, they, [the UN organisations] want to dominate and push civil society groups around and sometimes invite only a few members... sometimes as civil society actors, we force ourselves in these meetings, even if we are not wanted so that our voices are heard (Interview with M).

Highlighting the changing context of non-state participation within SADC's policymaking structures, one of the informants pointed out that "while before that space was there within the SADC, now civil society women's organisations have had to push through the chimney in order to get this space" (Interview with K).

The pattern of exclusion or marginalisation in inter-governmental policymaking spaces is not a new phenomenon for the women's organisation in Southern Africa. Forms of exclusion have been met with counter-resistance. For example, the exclusion of gender and women-focused civil society groupings from the 2016 SADC Gender Minister's meeting in Swaziland triggered a counter-response from the former. Civil society groupings with a gender and women focus organised a press briefing alongside the Swaziland Gender Ministers meeting. In the press brief, "the Alliance called upon member states to recognise and acknowledge the role of civil society so that the work being done can be harmonised and built upon" (Alliance Press Statement, 2016).

At this press briefing, the Alliance further noted that,

The reason [civil society actors and the SADC governments] ha[d] come so far on gender in this region [was] because of the dynamic relationship between gender ministries and the women's rights organisations... These partnerships need to be concretised if [civil society actors and the SADC governments were] ... to deliver results in the next fifteen years (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:14).

From the foregoing, there appears to be an emerging scenario of push-backs towards nationalistic tendencies as it relates to non-state participation within intergovernmental structures (Mandaza, 1987; Mbuende, 2012). The emerging nationalistic tendencies, if not

contained, may lead to setbacks in terms of past gains, particularly as it relates to non-state-state relations interface developed within transnational spaces. Instead of perceiving civil society actors as a partner in the game, contributing to regional thickening and to stabilising gendered insecurities, their activities are in some instances perceived by SADC government as a threat and a matter of national security (Interview with C). Civil society groups have in some cases endured character assassination, marginalisation, exclusion, and being viewed with suspicion, or as not contributing to development and security, and labelled as foreign donor-funded and driven (Interviews with C; Interview with K).

Regional gender civil society actors have highlighted the shrinking space for their participation as “a cause for concern, given the dynamic relationship that ... existed between gender ministries and civil society that ... played a critical role in the adoption, review, and now implementation of the Protocol” (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2017:335). The counter-response emanating from civil society groups points to the significance that non-state actors, have attached to their game-changing functions within policymaking spaces to contribute to norm changes, norm development, and to greater security for the women across the region.

While non-state-state relations have not always been smooth in the region, there are actions that are being undertaken to minimise the tensions to allow for continued non-state participation within SADC’s policymaking spaces. For example, while emerging nationalistic tendencies have pointed towards shrinking non-state participation within SADC’s intergovernmental policy structures, there are at the same time re-engagement processes underway since 2016. The re-engagement process has been led by the SADC Secretariat, and involved the participation of the SADC Council of NGOs, to which the Alliance is a member, and constitutes a part of the re-engagement discussions. This state-non-state process seeks to develop a legal framework agreement that would provide clear modalities for non-state participation within SADC’s policy structures (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2017:335; Interview with R). The initial draft framework was presented at the SADC Head of Summit meeting of September 2016 in Swaziland. The Heads of States rejected the draft framework and referred it back to the drafters for further consultation with other IGOs and relevant actors outside the SADC region (Interview with R). The 2016 September Summit resolved that there was a need to expand on the content of the legal framework, to include examples of similar frameworks, from regional bodies across Africa that SADC could learn from and adapt (Interview with R). If implemented, a systematic legal framework may present a plausible tool

for managing non-state-state relations, as well as to minimise the blurred lines and conflicts, as it relates to non-state participation within SADC policymaking spaces.

5.9. Conclusion

This chapter has argued that regional thickening as game-changing happened at the point where state and non-state regionalism interlocked, overlapped, or complemented each other in the interest of addressing gendered insecurities. Regional thickening revealed a growing interface between states and non-states regionalism and actors, increasing regionalisation, thickening regionalism, and high degrees of region-ness. Game-changing pointed to a growing recognition of civil society actors in policies and their participation in norm development, working alongside states in intergovernmental policymaking spaces to promote gender equality, lessen patriarchy, and improve the lives of women across the SADC region. Game-changing also pointed to the degree of buy-in from the SADC member states to change norms, to develop and implement norms to have improved peace. It was found here that while there was buy-in developing norms, the implementation from states of the very norms they formulate remained weak. The buy-in from the SADC member states on game-changing process to change norms, develop norms and putting in place gender institutions as part of the SADC structures, initiated by non-state actors was evident. For example, the need to establish the SADC Gender Unit proposed by women's groups in the early 1980s – despite having taken long – was eventually put in place in 1998 under the evolved SADC. The SADC Gender Unit has played visible roles in getting gender and women-focused civil society groupings to participate in SADC's intergovernmental policymaking spaces on gender.

Regional thickening as game-changing that resulted in the development of a gender norm cycle for development and stabilisation was revealed in three phases. The first game-changing phase developed SADC's first regional policy on gender policy, the 1997 Declaration on Gender and Development and its Addendum of 1998. The second game-changing phase produced SADC's first legally binding regional gender policy, the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development. The last game-changing phase revised the latter Protocol and developed the Post-2015 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development. What was observed about the three phase-process was that regionalisation thickened over time in terms of a growing interface between states and non-state regionalism within intergovernmental policymaking spaces that culminated in the three regional policies addressing gendered insecurities. The game-changing

cycles, for example, from local-global-regional-local levels pointed to a thickening norm cycle, particularly in norm development and diffusion, and to growing gender transnationalism.

Game-changing activities have mapped the way in which civil society actors with gender and women focus have organised in transnational spaces, showing how common regional gendered insecurities were identified, how advocacy strategies were devised and norms on gender developed. As a strategy to influence policy development within intergovernmental spaces, civil society groupings organised in broad transnational communities of the Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance (The Alliance). The Alliance has participated in the development norms on gender at a global level. Norms on gender developed at a global level have then been diffused back in regional and national policies. This chapter has revealed the game-changing functions played by civil society actors in diffusing norms emerging at a global level in regional and national policies. Regional policies on gender that have emerged within SADC's intergovernmental policymaking spaces, involving state and non-state regionalism as such, have constituted by multiple sources and contexts. As shown in the next chapter, civil society groupings as stabilisers have also adapted the evolving norms on gender emerging from the game-changing cycle in their programmes and activities.

While growing transnational actions and functions of states and non-state actors, as well as the thickening norm cycle on gender in Southern Africa illuminate persisting patriarchal behaviours and deepening gendered inequalities on the one hand, on the other hand, it has pointed to increasing commitment by states and non-state actors to eliminate gendered insecurities and to have gender equality, and to better the lives of women. An examination of transnational activities and regionalisation on gender has also revealed the politics involved when seeking representation within the SADC's intergovernmental policymaking structures.

CHAPTER 6:

Stabilisers? Transnational communities in addressing gender insecurity

6.1. Introduction

The preceding chapter revealed how civil society groupings, as game-changers, organised in a transnational environment around gender and the politics involved when seeking representation within the SADC policymaking structures, created a groundswell for non-state mobilisation at the local level, all of which helped advocacy. This explanation was necessary in order to show how the interface of non-state and state regionalism and actors promoted regional thickening leading to game change in terms of changing policies, improving security, and regional cohesion around gender security. It was in the context of this thesis, in general, to map the parameters in practice of how transnational activities, and regionalisation may be conceived as contributing to game-changing for region-building. Game-changing was defined in terms of norm development adopted by key members or players in the region. It was contended that regional thickening as game-changing is where non-state-state regionalism interlocked, overlapped, or complemented each other in the interest of increasing gender security.

In this study, gender insecurities points to social mores, practices, and developmental questions that gender and women-focused civil society groupings seek to address. Through their functions and activities, civil society actors seek to address the way people live, means of addressing each other along gender lines, the development of women, and raising their social, political, cultural and economic status, to increase gender security. The study adopts a flexible conception of gender in order to reflect on the actual realities of the issue areas addressed by civil society actors (Amadiume, 1987b:17; Lind, 2011). As stabilisers, civil society actors organise and regionalise in a transnational context, in the interest of addressing (social) insecurities at a localised level. Transnational activities of these non-state actors involve developing the norm cycle, in terms of norm development, norm, adapting, norm diffusion and norm implementation on gender in order to contribute to change, development and stabilisation. As shown in the previous chapter, the norms that gender and women-focused civil society groupings have organised by to address gender insecurity have multiple sources and contexts (Acharya, 2013). Through non-state processes and interactions, the local norms have also found their way in regional and global norms on gender. Civil society groupings also seek accountability from governments on the implementation of the gender policies they commit to,

at the various levels – regionally, continentally, and globally (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:11-14). When governments and local communities genuinely implement these norms, and put in place national gender policies, and progressive gender equality and equity laws, such as, those of ending child marriages; policies promoting the equal representation of women in all areas of governance; mainstreaming gender in all sectors – there is a potential for improved security in Southern Africa. The implementation of policies on gender by states and non-state actors leads to changing norms, unlearning patriarchal behaviour, opening up development spaces for women, and increasing their living standards and freedoms of women, including those in rural areas. This is important for civil society's game as a way of contributing to more improved security, as well as, to neutralise patriarchal barriers embedded in the SADC region.

This chapter argues that there exists a correlation between gendered insecurities, and what constitutes civil society local organisation in terms of their reach, functions, and actions (Tickner, 1992; 2001; Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, and Raymond, 1999). In so doing, it examines how transnational communities address gender insecurity. The notion of transnational communities here points to organised (or unstructured) non-state groupings from more than one society across national boundaries pursuing game change in a transnational context. Transnational communities here include individual non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that organise outside and within formal state policymaking structures around broad questions of gender security, amounting to regional thickening. The transnational communities are examined in terms of how they have organised on the outside and are influencing norm change and norm development in intergovernmental state-led spaces on gender. Further, given the varying contexts within which civil society groupings have evolved in Southern Africa, one of their strengths has been their ability to adapt themselves to local circumstances, as such, flexible and responsive.

This chapter then sums up with the internal and external factors shaping civil society's game change on gender, and the politics involved of non-state regionalisation, those between state and non-states, and those around funding for gender and women civil society activities in the wake of the 2007-2008 global economic crisis and global humanitarian crises from wars in countries such as Syria. It will show here that since the 1990s, game-changing is aiding to change norms and behaviours to have improved gender security across Southern Africa.

6.2. Transnational communities in a transnational context

Transnational communities with gender and women focus vary in size, functions, reach and in capabilities. Two types of transnational communities are discussed. The first five transnational communities have a wider reach, are big in size and have a wide range of functions and capabilities. These include, the “Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust (WLSA)”; the “Gender Links (GL)”; the “SAfAIDS”; the “Voluntary Services Overseas: Regional AIDS Initiative of Southern Africa (VSO-RHAISA)”; the “Women and Resources Eastern and Southern Africa (WARESA)”. The last two transnational communities work through solidarity networks across the SADC region. These include: the “Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre (ZWRCN)”; and the “DITSHWANELO-The Botswana Centre for Human Rights”. The transnational communities were selected based on how they have organised, and regionalised in a transnational environment in the interest of addressing and stabilising gendered insecurities in Southern Africa. The activities of these civil society groupings have involved varying degrees of political mobilisation through having a multinational membership and a collective agenda in three to ten SADC countries. These civil society groups have also organised in solidarity networks across national boundaries to address common gendered challenges. The listed transnational communities are analysed in terms of how they have organised in a transnational context, as well as, their representation in terms of size, reach, functions, actions, impact, and their importance in addressing gendered insecurities.

6.2.1. *The Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust (WLSA)*

The Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust (WLSA) is an NGO created in 1989. In terms of size, the WLSA transnational community is spread out across seven countries under the labels: “WLSA-Zambia”; “WLSA-Zimbabwe”; “WLSA-Swaziland”; “WLSA-Lesotho”; “WLSA-Botswana”; “WLSA-Malawi”; and “WLSA-Mozambique”. The WLSA-Zimbabwe acts as the lead organisation, overseeing the coordination of the collective goals of the community, as well as, in terms of facilitating annual joint gatherings of its board members, and executive directors (Interview with I, Programme Officer, WLSA, 09.08.2016, Lusaka, Zambia). The WLSA community seeks to contribute to a collective goal of empowering women through the law in Southern Africa (About WLSA <http://www.wlsazambia.com>)

The transnational activities of the WLSA is constituted by a standardised goal adapted by its seven-member NGOs, who then adapt the common programmes to address gendered insecurities at a localised level, in their countries of operation (About WLSA <http://www.wlsazambia.com>). In seeking to address gendered insecurities through law, it was pointed out that WLSA aims to contribute to the:

sustainable well-being of women and girl children in Southern Africa through action-oriented research in social legal fields and advocating women's rights...action-oriented research which is intended to inform and influence action to improve the socio-legal situation of women and children. WLSA's work incorporates action into research by questioning and challenging the law and policies, educating women about their rights, providing legal advice and gender sensitising communities and leadership (About WLSA <http://www.wlsazambia.com>)

Since the 1990s, WLSA's actions and functions at a local level evolved with the changing character of the gendered insecurities across the region, from research-oriented activities, to increased advocacy, skills training, and civic education (Interview with I). In the next five to ten years, the WLSA-Zimbabwe seeks to expand learning activities by including short training courses on women empowerment and the law (Interview with L, Chief Director, WLSA, 06.09.2016, Harare, Zimbabwe).

WLSA's activities conducted in individual countries may, however, differ, as these are shaped by country-specific contexts and factors, such as, the operating and policy environment, availability of funding, buy-in from governments and communities, as well as, the nature of the gendered insecurities. The activities of transnational communities point to their flexible nature as they are adapted to suit the local circumstances. For example, there have been growing levels of Gender Based Violence (GBV) across Southern Africa, such as, physical and sexual violence, and femicide. Between January and September 2016, about 13, 092 cases were recorded in Zambia (Lusaka Times Newspaper). Given these increasing dynamics of GBV cases, WLSA-Zambia shifted from a previous focus on issues related to child maintenance cases, to prioritising and to addressing GBV-related cases and concerns (Interview with I). Put simply, while the overall goal of the WLSA transnational community remains the same, the nature of activities carried out by each member of the community has varied, and influenced by the context and the environment within which they have unfolded (Interview with I).

6.2.1. 1. Non-state functions in relation to norm development

Non-state actors have organised outside state formal policymaking frameworks in order to influence policy development within inter-state structures. The WLSA is a member of Southern Africa's broader and bigger transnational community with gender and women focus, the Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance (the Alliance). Through the Alliance, a broad range of NGOs have organised and mobilised outside formal state processes around key thematic areas, in order to systematically influence policy through advocacy, and in participating in norm development seeking to diminish gendered insecurities. For example, outside the state framework, WLSA's game-changing activities have involved mobilising like-minded gender and women-related NGOs in order to contribute to the discussions, and the draft provision on "constitutional and legal rights". Pointing to the NGOs that constitute the Alliance, it has been noted, "each cluster is expected to meet at least once a year and to hold a teleconference every quarter" (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:27). The drafted provision on constitutional and legal rights in turn found its way into the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, as well as, in its revision, the Post-2015 Gender Protocol (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2017). Appendix 4 shows the individual NGO members that make up the Alliance, and the issue areas that they have addressed. The issues area that individual Alliance members address are in line with the SADC Gender Protocol provisions. Norms that have emerged within the SADC policymaking structures have shaped the transnational activities of civil society actors. For example, in 2009, WLSA was responsible for,

Mobilising members and resources to implement priority activities..., namely a gender analysis of all SADC constitutions and selected laws and lobbying for legal and constitutional reforms so that they [were] aligned to Article 2-11 of the Gender Protocol (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:27).

As a member of the Alliance, WLSA's role in leading and influencing the norm cycle on constitutional and legal rights around gender and women-related issues, points to its game-changing strength as a transnational community at a regional level in Southern Africa.

Further, WLSA's interface with state regionalism has been critical in developing key SADC laws on gender. This transnational community has worked closely with key policymakers, such as the SADC parliamentarians in developing important norms seeking to address gendered insecurities (Interview with I). For example, in light of increasing child marriages across

Southern Africa and the African region, the WLSA was invited to be a part of broader civil society groupings that have worked closely with the SADC's parliamentarians to develop, and revise laws around child marriages, including pushing for their implementation. In 2016, WLSA participated in the development of SADC's first Model Law to end Child Marriages in Southern Africa. The SADC Model Law if implemented presents possibilities to end child marriages across the region. It also presents opportunities for young girls to go to school and to break the cycle of poverty in their societies. The SADC Model Law raised the minimum age of marriage to 18. The interface of state and non-state regionalism that develops norms to change behaviours and to minimise gendered insecurities points to game-changing. In inter-governmental spaces, non-state-state regionalism overlaps and complements each other in the interest of increasing regional cohesion around gender security.

The nature of activities of transnational communities outside state structures have also involved sharing of experiences and cross-learning. In the case of WLSA, the learning and sharing of experiences, also takes place, internally, among its staff members across its seven offices in Southern Africa. The national directors, board chairpersons and programme officers have interacted on a regular basis to share information and experiences (Interview with I). The transnational connections that have emerged from the interactions from within the WLSA have contributed to building a transnational community that organises and addresses gender insecurities. The WLSA transnational community shares similar methodologies and addresses common regional challenges. For example, the WLSA community share a common approach to addressing constitutional and legal rights issues around gender (Interview with I).

As a stabiliser, the WLSA community has played an important game-changing role to contribute to the development of key regional policies on gender addressing gendered insecurities at localised levels. For example, the provision on constitutional and legal rights in the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development and the Model Law to end Child Marriages have been diffused in a number of national laws across the region (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2017).

While WLSA's member organisations share a collective regional agenda –its efficacy as a game-changer – to increase women's and girls' security relies on external donor funding. As such, WLSA's game-changing activities have involved raising funds as a strategy to remain relevant as a key game-changer contributing to norm development and to stabilising gendered insecurities. Raising funding is important for the WLSA to sustain its game-changing activities and programmes that seek to contribute to the well-being of women and girls across Southern

Africa (About WLSA <http://www.wlsazambia.com>) However, the operating policy environment in the various SADC countries, as well as, the varying external funding policies (to be discussed in detail in this chapter), have shaped uneven patterns of regionalisation and region-ness among the WLSA community (Interview with I). Some of WLSA's key funders include the European Commission (EC), United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), Caritas, Wing of Justice, Care through Comic Relief, and the UNDP through the Swedish, Irish, and British governments.

The WLSA community is also linked to other broader regional, continental and global transnational communities. For example, the WLSA seeks membership with broader bigger bodies, such as the "AIDS Rights Alliance of Southern Africa" and works closely with other transnational communities such as, the "Southern Africa Litigation Centre", "Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF)", and the "Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA)". Globally, WLSA has membership with "GirlsNotBrides", a loose non-state global body which leads the campaign aimed at ending early child marriages (Interview with I).

6.2.2. The Gender Links (GL)

Similar to the WLSA, the GL, conceived in 2001, constitutes a transnational community operating in a transnational context. This transnational community is constituted by NGOs with collective goal, functions, common labels, and ideas seeking to minimise gendered insecurities across the SADC region. GL's functions around advocacy range, from addressing issues on media and governance, to those on gender and governance; gender justice; gender and climate change; and to offering entrepreneurship skills (Interview with S, Programme Officer, GL-Botswana, 16.09.2016, Gaborone, Botswana). Further, while GL activities and the issue areas it has addressed have expanded over time, its major functions have centred on minimising GBV. For example, GL's entrepreneurship programme, in particular, that targets women survivors of GBV seeks to equip them with entrepreneur skills and to empower women economically to be financially independent (Interview with S). The WLSA and GL activities complement each other through their varying functions and roles that all point to the goal to increase gender security across Southern Africa. Similarly, GL has representation in 10 countries that include: "GL-South Africa" (its Secretariat); "GL-Botswana"; "GL-Mauritius"; "GL-Mozambique"; "GL-Lesotho"; "GL-Madagascar"; "GL-Namibia"; "GL-Swaziland"; "GL-Zambia"; and "GL-Zimbabwe" (www.genderlink.org.za). The activities of the GL are also spread out to countries where it has no membership such as, Angola, Malawi, the

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Seychelles, and Tanzania (Interview with K, Programme Officer-The Alliance, GL, 06.09.2016, Johannesburg, South Africa).

6.2.2.1. Non-state processes as they relate to norm development

Like WLSA, the GL activities happen both outside and within formal inter-state processes. For example, annually, GL organises regional summits that bring together various members of societies from across national boundaries to learn, interact, and share knowledge and experiences. As such, there is cross-learning, cross-interactions, and building of cultural linkages among the societies promoting regional cohesion around addressing common gendered insecurities (Interview with K).

As a member of the Alliance network, where it also is its Secretariat, GL functions have involved coordinating all the activities of gender and women-focused civil society actors in Southern Africa at a regional level. GL coordinates the systematic and more organised non-state advocacy and norm development strategies, as well as non-state participation within SADC's policymaking structures (Interview with K). Within the Alliance, the GL's game-changing strength has included its ability to raise funding, and mobilised gender and women NGOs to rally behind the advocacy campaign and norm development processes of the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, and its revised version, the Post-2015 gender agenda (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:27).

As a key member of the Alliance, the GL director has directly been involved in the discussions around SADC's gender policies, including presenting draft norms emerging from civil society game-changing processes outside SADC's policymaking structures. In developing the 2008 SADC Gender Protocol, the "Alliance chose Colleen Lowe-Morna, [the] Executive Director of GL... and Lois Chingandu, [the] Executive Director of SAfAIDS" as the two strong women from the Alliance to participate in the SADC policymaking structures (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:37). Today, these two women continue to head their respective transnational communities, organising and regionalising in order to address gendered issues ranging from GBV, gender and governance, to women and HIV/AIDS.

As a lead network of the Alliance, the GL has also taken up advisory functions during SADC's annual meetings of the Ministers Responsible for Women and Gender Affairs. GL connection to broader civil society transnational communities and its participation in the SADC policymaking structures to develop norms, and to offer advice to gender ministers' points to its

game-changing functions. As such, unlike arguments that suggest civil society actors as too weak to play a counter-vailing role within intergovernmental structures (Landsberg, 2012), transnational communities with gender and women focus have influenced SADC's gender norm cycle in the interest of addressing gender insecurities. The participation of non-state actors in norm development within SADC's policymaking structures has, in turn, increased their understanding on how to effectively engage with state officials, particularly, around women and gender issues. Through their participation in inter-state processes, women have further increased their knowledge and capacity to effectively advocate for particular provisions on gender, and to steer changes in regional policy (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:37).

6.2.2.2. Norm development at a continental and global level

The activities of transnational communities have not only been limited to the regional level. The GL representatives, for example, have participated in processes and interactions outside formal state structures at continental and global levels. GL is a member of a continental transnational community, the "African Women's Development and Communication Network (FEMNET)" (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:336). Given its game-changing strengths in mobilising gender and women's groupings to contribute to the gender norm cycle, GL has also landed leadership roles at a continental and global level. For example, it is currently the chair, providing leadership guidance for FEMNET's advocacy campaign and financing programmes for gender equality, a continental effort, seeking to reduce gendered insecurities through advocacy and promoting effective communication among its members (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:12). In 2013, GL was also recognised by the African Union (AU) for being an outstanding contributor to women's rights during the tenth anniversary of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights of Women in Africa (Celebrating fifteen years of service, <http://www.genderlinks.org.za>).

The GL transnational activities go beyond the continental boundaries. At a global level, GL is a member, and has also chaired the Global Alliance on Media and Gender (GEMAG), a global transnational community comprising of over 800 media and media development organisations. The GEMAG seeks to promote gender in, and through the media across the globe in order to address gendered insecurities. GEMAG also played a key role in advocating for the inclusion of media and information and communications technology in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (SADC gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:12). Yet, while civil society groupings

have organised and participated in the development of the gender norm cycle in global structuring and restructuring spaces outside, and within inter-state policymaking sites, their game-changing activities remain invisible in academic discourse on regional IR studies.

6.2.2.3. Norm-adaptation

Transnational communities have not only participated in the development and diffusion of norms. They have also adapted these norms to constitute a part of their ideas, programmes, and activities. The GL, for example, works with about 108 centres of excellence (COEs) in the area of media and governance, 12 COEs at public broadcasting, and seven COEs in media education (Celebrating fifteen years of service, <http://www.genderlinks.org.za>). This is an effort to engage local actors, and to raise awareness about gender-related concerns such as GBV. These GL processes and interactions outside state processes point to expanding linkages and issues in the evolving norm cycle that has also been shaped by the local norms.

Non-state actor organisation and regionalisation, including their adaptation of the evolving norm cycle in their actions, have contributed to their increased interface between national governments and communities at localised levels. For example, GL has closely worked with local government structures in ten SADC countries where it is represented. With the growing insecurities, GL's reach to SADC's local governance structures at a community level has also expanded over time. When the GL was conceived, it worked with 100 local councils, but today GL works with 425 councils across the SADC region, in order to diffuse gender norms aligned to the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development in local government structures in ten SADC countries (Celebrating fifteen years of service, <http://www.genderlinks.org.za>).

GL has a list of memoranda of understandings (MOUs) with over 100 partners that range from the local councils, local government associations, and government ministries (Celebrating fifteen years of service, <http://www.genderlinks.org.za>). The growing MOUs on paper and in practice are an indication of a growing interface of state and non-state regionalism at localised levels in the interest of addressing gendered insecurities. In 2016, GL transnational activities reached to about 26 percent of over 266 million of the SADC population. Out of the 122, 611 direct beneficiaries of its activities, 39 percent were men, and 65 percent were women. A record of close to 60 staff members was recorded, 30 percent of whom are men. The transnational linkages, cultural linkages, and sharing of ideas also take place within transnational communities among civil society groupings. GL, for example, is constituted by a 12-member

advisory board from ten SADC countries – 25 percent of whom are men (Celebrating fifteen years of service, <http://www.genderlinks.org.za>).

Similar to the WLSA, GL has largely relied on foreign donor funding to successfully execute its game-changing strategies and activities. Raising and competing for funding constitutes an important component of non-state actors' game in seeking to address and stabilise social insecurities. However, with the shrinking budgets globally as a result of growing humanitarian and economic crises, there has generally been reduced funding for civil society activities, particularly in the area of gender (Interview with K). As a counter-response to the changing funding dynamics, gender and women-focused civil society actors, have turned to alternative funding sources, such as, the corporate sector, as well as to self-reliant initiatives in order to remain relevant and sustain their 'game' (Interview with K; Celebrating fifteen years of service, <http://www.genderlinks.org.za>). As part of its self-reliance game-changing activities, GL offers sells services such as resources (in the form of books, training manuals, DVDs and video footage), and advisory services (gender audits, policy/strategy development, evaluations, institutional and support systems, research and speaking engagements) (Celebrating fifteen years of service, <http://www.genderlinks.org.za>). GL also offers training, online shopping, self-catering, and conferencing facilities (Gender Links donor briefing, May 2016). GL has an endowment fund that has grown over time from about two million Rands in 2009, to eight million Rands in 2015 (GL donor briefing, May 2016). However, despite that gender and women civil society groupings have turned to alternative funding, 75-90 percent of the funding that they have received is donor-funded. For example, in 2015, while about 13 percent of the income was raised from sustainability activities, over 75 percent came from GL traditional donors (GL donor briefing, May 2016).

6.2.3. The Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Information Dissemination Service (SAfAIDS)

Similar to GL, the SAfAIDS has emerged as a transnational community established in 1994 to address emerging gendered insecurities. However, the SAfAIDS primary focus is to implement a collective regional agenda to reduce HIV/AIDS, particularly among women in Southern Africa. Like the GL, SAfAIDS is a transnational community represented in ten countries: "SAfAIDS-Zimbabwe" (as the Secretariat); "SAfAIDS-Swaziland"; "SAfAIDS-Lesotho", "SAfAIDS-Malawi"; "SAfAIDS-Mozambique"; "SAfAIDS-Namibia"; "SAfAIDS-South Africa"; "SAfAIDS-Botswana"; "SAfAIDS-Tanzania"; and "SAfAIDS-Zambia".

In the early 1990s, the SAfAIDS transnational activities focused on information and dissemination around HIV/AIDS, as a strategy to increase awareness of the pandemic, and in order to reduce deaths from HIV/AIDS. Over time, the SAfAIDS's activities have thickened. In addition to providing and disseminating information, the SAfAIDS game-changing activities, have involved promoting advocacy and participating in norm development within and outside the formal state policymaking structures.

The SAfAIDS activities are shaped by the gendered nature of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa. For example, women are SAfAIDS immediate target groups as they account for about 59 percent of people living with HIV/AIDS, as well as, carrying out the biggest burden of care (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:43). The SADC Gender Protocol Barometer (2016:216) – a yearly report produced by the Alliance – notes that Southern Africa remains the epicentre of the global HIV/AIDS pandemic, with about 15.3 million people in the SADC living with HIV – more than 40 percent of the 36 million people living with HIV globally.

6.2.3.1. SAfAIDS transnational activities outside formal frameworks

Like the WLSA and GL, the SAfAIDS's game-changing strength lies in its capacity to organise and regionalise outside, and as it relates to norm development within formal inter-state processes. The SAfAIDS is an equal founding member of the Alliance, and a lead NGO on HIV/AIDS and Sexual Reproductive and Health Rights (SRHRs) thematic cluster. The SAfAIDS mobilised financial resources and coordinated like-minded member organisations within the Alliance, in order to input into the provision on HIV/AIDS and health in the 2008 Gender Protocol, and the Post-2015 Gender Protocol. The SAfAIDS activities have also involved pushing for the implementation of the provision on HIV/AIDS and SRHRs in the Gender Protocol at a localised level.

Regionalisation and organisations outside formal frameworks have also provided spaces for learning and sharing of experiences (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001:407). For instance, it was relayed that,

at SAfAIDS we cross-learn from other countries when we have regional meetings; what we see in the different countries has helped shape and enrich our programmes and interventions. We also learn from our partners at the community level, coming together and sharing experiences” (About SAfAIDS. <http://www.saf aids.com>).

As such, civil society game-changing activities, as well as, the norms taken up to the regional level are thickened by the cross-learning and sharing of experiences taking place within these transnational communities across Southern Africa.

6.2.3.2. SAFAIDS participation in inter-governmental policymaking spaces

The SAfAIDS community has actively participated in the development of SADC's key policy of gender, such as, the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, and its revised version, the Post-2015 Gender Protocol. At a regional level, the SAfAIDS strength lies in its expertise around issues of HIV/AIDS, and as it relates to gender. As such, through its membership with the Alliance, the SAfAIDS has participated in norm development in SADC's policymaking structures. Beyond SADC's policy development structures and processes, the SAfAIDS works very closely with the SADC Secretariat to address HIV/AIDS-related issues (About SAfAIDS. <http://www.saf aids.com>). The SAfAIDS has a Memorandum of Understanding with the SADC Gender Unit and SADC's HIV/AIDS Unit. The MOU entails that whenever the SADC Gender and HIV/AIDS Unit are implementing a gender programme around HIV/AIDS, SAfAIDS would invited as a partner organisation (Interview with E). Between 2014 and 2016, the SAfAIDS worked with the SADC Secretariat to document best practices in Southern Africa, and to incorporate capacity building for member states in terms of HIV/AIDS, gender, and SRHRs (Interview with E).

The interface of non-state-state regionalism transcends the regional boundaries, to include those at the continental and global levels. For example, the SAfAIDS has been invited at the AU level, where it has taken up an advisory role around issues of ending child marriages on the continent. The SAfAIDS, in collaboration with other civil society transnational communities, has worked closely with African governments to develop African common positions on HIV/AIDS-related issues that have been delivered at the UN annual summits in New York (Interview with E). As such, there exists a strong interface of non-state-state regionalism promoting regional cohesion around addressing gender insecurities such as HIV/AIDS.

6.2.3.3. *Changing norms*

The evolving norms on gender at a global and regional level have shaped non-state transnational programmes and activities. For example, the United Nations AIDS (UNAIDS) campaign, the SDGs, and the Post-2015 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development have shaped current non-state actors' activities on HIV/AIDS. The SAfAIDS actions today collectively seek to end HIV/AIDS by 2030. The UNAIDS campaign to end HIV/AIDS by 2030 has targeted adolescent girls, young women, sex workers, men who have sex with men, prisoners, migrants, and women who have sex with women, has shaped the activities of the SAfAIDS (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:216). SAfAIDS has organised and adapted norms on HIV/AIDS emerging within global structuring and restructuring sites and has aligned them to its activities and programmes. The evolving norms on gender at a global and regional level are linked to local norms and insecurities that civil society actors seek to address. The HIV/AIDS-related insecurities, as per the UN campaign include: HIV and Tuberculosis prevention; Testing and HIV Treatment; HIV Treatment Literacy; and SRHRs (About SAfAIDS, <http://www.saf aids.com>). The UN-SDGs themed, "Leaving No One Behind" have shaped regional norms on gender, as well as, to SAfAIDS functions and activities. For example, one of the study's informant noted that,

We have been looking at advancing women's issues, but we were leaving the men behind. Now at SAfAIDS, we are changing the way things are being done and when we are talking about gender equality, we want the correct the gender story to be told. Men have a role to play in all the interventions. As such, SAfAIDS's gender programmes involve working with traditional leaders who are largely males at a community level. Bringing men in these conversations has been important to come up with solutions from them, as well as women rather than prescribing solutions to these communities. We are also seeing that under the Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission (PMTCT) programme, men have equally been involved in undergoing HIV testing in the different countries in Southern Africa (Interview with E).

The alignment of civil society's activities to norms emerging at a regional and global level in the area of gender, have revealed some softening of cultural practices that have previously, and still continue to put women and girls at risk of contracting HIV/AIDS (Interview with E). One of the informants pointed that "in Chief Seke's area in Wedza in Zimbabwe, women are no longer been inherited. The Chief has put a stop to inheritance practices. You cannot have child

brides in this community. The Chief is prosecuting people at a community level... There is further a ban on spirit appeasement using a girl child” (Interview with E).

6.2.3.4. Transnational communities as stabilisers

While HIV/AIDS remains a challenge in the SADC region, positive results have also been noted, such as reduced mortality rates from HIV/AIDS, and an increased lifespan of people living with HIV/AIDS. According to UNAIDS, the “rapid scale-up of treatment that has resulted in 8.1 million people receiving antiretroviral therapy, or 47.7% of the global total of 17 million. This has increased from 3.1 million which was then 42% of the global total in 2010” (UNAIDS, <http://www.aidsinfo.unaids.org>). There have further been reductions in mortality rates, as a result of HIV/AIDS deaths from a staggering high of 906, 400 in 2005 to 388, 200 people dying from HIV/AIDS-related causes in 2015 (UNAIDS, <http://www.aidsinfo.unaids.org>). The reduced mortality rates are also linked to adequate information reaching more women in the region. Women are now more empowered, as they can easily access services, go for HIV/AIDS testing and access treatment for the PMTCT (Interview with E). The SADC Gender Protocol Barometer of 2016 notes that,

Access to ARVs to prevent transmission of HIV from mothers to their babies continues to expand rapidly in seven countries (Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, and Swaziland) have achieved coverage of over 90% and a further 4 (Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) have coverage of between 80% and 90% (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:43).

However, while reductions have been noted in some countries and around particularly gender insecurities as it relates to HIV/AIDS, challenges remain. For example, the 2016 SADC Gender Protocol Barometer indicates, “HIV has contributed to high maternal mortality rates across the region... [the] ratio varies from 53 per 100 000 in Mauritius to 693 per 100 000 in the DRC” (2016:216). Countries such as “Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe still have adult prevalence rates of over 10%. Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana still have prevalence rates above 20%” (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:216). To reduce the insecurities affecting women, the barometer recommends the urgent need to increase access to four antenatal visits and delivery that is attended by a skilled health worker” (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:216).

In line with the changing norms, the SAfAIDS's game-changing activities have involved training and education programmes in the areas of HIV/AIDS, SRHRs, and in social and economic empowerment (BOND, 2015:1,3). The SAfAIDS activities initially focused on training young women, as they are the most affected across the region in terms of HIV/AIDS (BOND, 2015:1,3). To ensure that no one is left behind, since 2015, the SAfAIDS's Gender Leadership Academy also admits activities of young men from across the region. This leadership academy also provides cultural linkages, cross-learning, and sharing of experiences among the young men, and women who have participated in the programme from across the region (BOND, 2015:1,3). For example, through the academy, the SAfAIDS transnational activities seek "to nurture young advocates who are conversant, passionate and devoted to raising awareness of issues around gender equality, sexual and reproductive rights and sexual diversity in Africa" (BOND, 2015:2). SAfAIDS's activities have further developed leadership capacities of young people who are in turn heading emerging youth service organisations such as ROOTS – Real Open Opportunities for Transformation Support – based in Zimbabwe. Beatrice Savadye, the Director of ROOTS notes,

I have taken on all the skills we learned and find them essential in my role...the leadership programme helped me appreciate that women can be effective leaders who can make a change in society. The programme also trained me to train and groom other leaders. The SAfAIDS leadership training brought me inspiration, motivation, confidence and challenged me to pursue a purposeful life" (BOND, 2015:5).

The SAfAIDS, in so doing, is developing a transnational group of young people who have similar ways of thinking, and approaches to address, and confront gendered insecurities as it relates to HIV/AIDS and SRHRs.

To sum up, like GL and the WLSA transnational communities, the SAfAIDS funding for its game-changing activities is largely drawn from donors. The Global Fund on HIV/AIDS is SAfAIDS largest donor funder (Interview with E). The Global Fund on HIV/AIDS has focused on priority areas outlined in global norms, which have more often covered, or addressed the social insecurities around HIV/AIDS emerging from local contexts. These, given the link between local norms to those emerging at a regional and global level, have in turn shaped civil society activities. Further, given that HIV/AIDS constitutes a priority human security issue in global and regional policy, strong and well-structured transnational communities addressing this particular issue have faced fewer challenges to fund their game-changing activities. For example, while transnational communities such as the WLSA and GL have faced varying

challenges in the individual countries to raise and compete for funding, the SAfAIDS has received funding for its game-changing activities for all the ten country offices, where it is represented. As such, civil society's game-changing transnational activities and regionalisation, organisation, and the degree of region-ness around particular issue areas have varied across Southern Africa. While game-changing regionalisation and region-ness is high in some areas such as, HIV/AIDS, it is low for transnational communities, for example, seeking to address women's rights as human rights.

6.2.4. The Voluntary Services Overseas: Regional HIV and AIDS Initiative of Southern Africa (VSO-RHAISA)

Like the transnational communities discussed above, the “Voluntary Services Overseas-Regional HIV and AIDS Initiative of Southern Africa (VSO-RHAISA)”’s activities are organised around particular social insecurities, including those affecting women across Southern Africa. The VSO-RHAISA constitutes a regional component of the broader VSO – an international NGO – with a focus on development charity and fighting poverty through dedicated teams of volunteers. Similar to the SAfAIDS, the VSO-RHAISA’s game-changing activities emerged as a response to the HIV/AIDS crisis in the SADC region (Interview with M, Programme Officer, VSO-RHAISA, 07.09.2016, Pretoria, South Africa). With an initial focus on promoting advocacy as it relates to preventative measures, the changing needs of its primary target groups, mostly women, resulted in the expansion of the regional programme over time. The VSO-Malawi report points out that about,

80% of those living with HIV are being cared for at the household level rather than in hospitals or health-care centres. This burden is disproportionately borne by women who make up roughly 80% of these care providers

(VSO-Malawi, <https://www.vsointernational.org/fighting-poverty/malawi>).

The burden that women in the region face is not only linked to the high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates that affect them the most, but also the challenges they face associated with care for HIV/AIDS patients. The expanded VSO-RHAISA programme now covers game-changing activities ranging, from care and support for orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs), to home-based care (VSO-Malawi, <https://www.vsointernational.org/fighting-poverty/malawi>). Unlike the SAfAIDS that has a broader approach to addressing HIV/AIDS, the VSO-RHAISA

component focuses on health and care. Specifically, VSO-RHAISA addresses challenges that affect caregivers, or general health-care around HIV/AIDS issues.

The VSO-RHAISA is constituted by a collective regional goal spread out in the countries where it has offices. The transnational activities of VSO-RHAISA cover gendered related issues in areas of health, education, sustainable livelihoods, and governance.¹⁴ Like the WLSA, the VSO-RHAISA transnational community is represented in seven countries under the following names, “VSO-South Africa”, “VSO-Mozambique”, “VSO-Zimbabwe”, “VSO-Zambia”, “VSO-Swaziland”, “VSO-Lesotho”, and “VSO-Malawi” (Interview with M). Similar to the civil society transnational communities discussed above, while the VSO-RHAISA transnational community is constituted by similar goals and functions, the activities that have been adapted at localised levels in the different SADC countries have varied due to the different policy and operating environments (Interview with M). Game-changing in the context of Southern African has been enabled by conducive policy and operating environments.

6.2.4.1. Non-state and state regionalism within inter-governmental structures

VSO-RHAISA organises and participates in processes and interactions outside formal state policymaking frameworks before it pushes for policy changes within intergovernmental policy structures. Its participation within the SADC structures has been visible around norm development processes. Similar to the WLSA, GL, and the SAfAIDS, the VSO-RHAISA is a member of the Alliance that was created to mobilise civil society actors around the development of SADC’s first binding regional policy on gender, the 2008 Gender Protocol. As a member of the broad Alliance, the VSO-RHAISA mobilised like-minded civil society actors working on care, and health-related issues to contribute to push for a gender protocol (Interview with M).

¹⁴ Other international organisations that have a regional representation in terms of programmes and country offices include among other bodies such as ActionAid, Plan International and Young Women Christian Association (YWCA).

Due to the knowledge that civil society groupings possess and bring to intergovernmental policymaking spaces, some transnational communities have been recognised by the SADC Secretariat as the key civil society actors in developing the gender norm cycle. For example, the VSO-RHAISA, together with the SAfAIDS, the WLSA, and GL have been widely consulted by SADC governments, including being invited to participate in the development of key regional documents such as the 2016 SADC Model Law to end Child Marriages in the SADC region (Interview with M). The VSO-RHAISA in collaboration with other like-minded organisations such as Reepsy, World Vision, and Save the Children Norway were instrumental in advocating for the development of SADC’s Minimum Package of Services for Orphans and other Vulnerable Children and Youth (SADC-OVCY) (Interview with M).¹⁵

Civil society’s game-changing activities to initiate, and push for the development of norms within inter-state policy structures, at a regional and global level have been informed by the research it conducts on the status of gendered and women insecurities. For example, the research of the VSO-RHAISA into HIV/AIDS prisons across the region revealed that,

HIV positive prisoners are unable to access appropriate health-care...that health-care services in prisons are not adequate... sexual abuse of prisoners both by inmates and prison staff... poor nutrition means prisoners living with HIV are susceptible to opportunistic infections. Overcrowding results in the increased spread of Tuberculosis. Prison settings are particularly challenging to work in, and involvement of prison authorities in research countries was essential to ensure “buy-in”, and access to prison populations (<https://www.vsointernational.org/fighting-poverty/improving-access-to-hiv-and-health-services-for-prisoners>).

Over 30 million men and women annually spend time in prisons across Southern Africa and have received poor health-care services. Prisons across the region are generally poorly funded, understaffed and lack vital medicines (<https://www.vsointernational.org/fighting->

15 The SADC-OVCY is a “guide to facilitate harmonisation of service delivery for OVCY across the region. Member states can adopt or adapt these standards and guidelines at national level, and at the same time allowing for common comparison and monitoring of progress across the region. The Minimum Package of Service identifies the basic needs and services needed by children and youth, as well as other complimenting services that are necessary to support the attainment of these needs and services.”

poverty/improving-access-to-hiv-and-health-services-for-prisoners). The VSO-RHAISA, in turn, presented evidence-based research to the SADC, as well as, initiated and participated in norm development as a step to begin to address insecurities around gender. Through the prison's health activities, the VSO-RAISA seeks to improve access, and quality of health and HIV/AIDS services to the prison population through lobbying governments, prisons and the correctional facilities. These, also in order to develop, adopt, and implement policies on health reform that are in line with the SADC minimum standards (<https://www.vsointernational.org/fighting-poverty/improving-access-to-hiv-and-health-services-for-prisoners>). The SADC acknowledged the VSO-RHAISA's research, and invited them to participate in the development of the SADC Prison Minimum Standards (Interview with M).

In order to develop the SADC Prison Minimum Standards, the “Southern African Network on Prisons (SANOP)” – as a transnational community – that brings non-state and state actors together to address the plight of prisoners across the region was created (VSO-RHAISA, <http://pag.aids2014.org/Abstracts.aspx?AID1726>). As the coordinator for SANOP, the VSO-RHAISA has influenced the work of the SADC Parliamentary Forum and individual countries to begin to adopt the agreed upon SADC Minimum Standards on Prison Health (VSO-RHAISA, <http://pag.aids2014.org/Abstracts.aspx?AID1726>). Through the SANOP, the VSO also works with the ministries of health to establish Voluntary Counselling Training (VCT) centres in prisons, and with the ministries of justice to reduce the number of custodial sentences, as well as prison crowding (<https://www.vsointernational.org/fighting-poverty/improving-access-to-hiv-and-health-services-for-prisoners>). The buy-in of civil society initiatives to develop norms on prisoner's health, and their implementation is notable, from the steps taken by ministers of health of governments in the region to become members of SANOP (VSO-RHAISA, <http://pag.aids2014.org/Abstracts.aspx?AID1726>). The interface between the VSO-RHAISA and regional governments ensuring minimum health and care standards, points to game-changing transnational activities, regionalisation, and regionalism in the interest of improving human security across Southern Africa.

In terms of the norm cycle, transnational communities, in turn, adapt norms emerging within inter-state policy making structures from the interface between state-non-state regionalism. Outside the inter-governmental spaces, the VSO-RHAISA has further organised around the SADC Minimum Standards on Prison Health by adapting the standards in its functions and spreading these across the countries in the region (VSO-RHAISA, <http://pag.aids2014.org/Abstracts.aspx?AID1726>). The VSO-RHAISA activities further involved engaging directly

with prisoners, to establish prison farm nutrition projects, and reduce stigma against HIV positive prisoners (VSO-RHAISA, <http://pag.aids2014.org/Abstracts.aspx?AID1726>).

The VSO uses the expertise of its volunteers across the globe to conduct training for prisoners, and in raising awareness of their rights and access to health, and in building their capacities for correctional facilities (<https://www.vsointernational.org/fighting-poverty/improving-access-to-hiv-and-health-services-for-prisoners>). The VSO-RHAISA game-changing activities have not only played a critical role in norm development, but they have contributed to norm diffusion at a localised level in the interest of reducing social insecurities.

The VSO-RHAISA offers skills training and education in SRHRs that targets nurses, economic skills empowerment for women and girls, agriculture extension workers, peer educators, health-care training for prisoners and community leaders in schools targeting both boys and girls (Interview with M). The VSO-RHAISA makes use of a pool of multiple volunteers from within and outside Southern Africa, who have specific skills to train, and mentor the members of the VSO-RHAISA's constituency at a local level. Its reach has expanded over time with the changing norms on gender at a global level, as the changing character of the insecurities it seeks to address. For example, the VSO-RHAISA has involved men in its activities. While the intended target group for gender and women groupings are primarily women, the VSO-RHAISA has also included men to equally participate in its activities (Interview with M). There is, as such, a link between the changing norms, and civil society activities to address gendered insecurities around health, and care in the context of Southern Africa.

Equally, the VSO has relied on traditional donor funding for game-changing from organisations such as the United Kingdom DFID, and the Swiss Development Cooperation in Southern Africa for support for its game-changing transnational activities (Interview with M). However, with the global changing funding dynamics characterised by shrinking budgets, the VSO-RHAISA – like other transnational communities discussed above – has broadened its source of funding to include private donors, philanthropists, and embassies in the different countries across the region that support transnational programmes (Interview with M). All in all, having adequate and sustainable funding was vital, to ensure that non-state game-changing activities are sustainable.

6.2.5. *Women and Resources Eastern and Southern Africa (WARESA)*

Like the civil society groupings discussed above, the WARESA transnational community has organised around advocacy, research and training functions to address gendered insecurities. Initially labelled the “Women, Land, and Water Rights in Southern Africa (WLWRSA)” – when it was established in 2002 – this transnational community was renamed to WARESA in 2012. The rebranding from WLWRSA to WARESA was shaped by the evolving character of women’s insecurities, particularly as it related to issues of land, access, utilisation, and sustainable livelihoods. It was pointed out, “the change of name happened after the realisation that women’s land rights are not only dependent on access to land and water, but also by sustainable livelihoods that depend on the utilisation of land” (Interview with N, Senior Officer, WARESA, 08.09.2016, Harare, Zimbabwe). Access to land as such, has been linked to “access and control of other resources, such as knowledge enhancement, financial and insurance packages, especially in the context of climate change, and disaster risk reduction” (About WARESA, <http://www.waresa.org/aboutus>; also in interview with N).

WARESA transnational activities are designed to respond to the emerging and evolving gendered insecurities that negatively impact on ensuring a sustainable livelihood. WARESA’s transnational community has addressed gendered insecurities around land, agriculture, climate change, and food security (About WARESA, <http://www.waresa.org/aboutus>). Its functions have included research, training and developing practical measures that address the growing loss in biodiversity across the region, that have generally affected women the most, particularly those in rural areas. Women in the rural areas walk long distances to fetch firewood as their source of energy (Interview with N). Further, given that women constitute the majority population in the region, as well as, in the agricultural sector, they are the most affected by climate change (About WARESA, <http://www.waresa.org/aboutus>). In order to address these insecurities affecting women, WARESA’s transnational advocacy, research, and training roles centre have pushed not only for women’s access to land, but also for its utilisation, and providing adequate knowledge, skills, and financial resources.

Like other transnational communities with gender and women focus, WARESA is also constituted by collective goals spread out in the three countries where it is represented. In terms of representation, WARESA is present in few countries in comparison to the transnational communities discussed above. Its offices are present in three countries labelled as: “WARESA-Zimbabwe”; “WARESA-Malawi; and “WARESA-Zambia”. It was noted that plans were underway to expand WARESA’s organisation and functions to Botswana, Swaziland, and

Tanzania (About WARESA, <http://www.waresa.org/aboutus>). Further, WARESA's governance structure has a transnational representation that is comprised of a board of directors drawn from the latter three countries, including Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

6.2.5.1. Interface of non-state and state regionalism

Like the WLSA, GL, the SAfAIDS, and the VSO-RHAISA, WARESA is also a member of the Alliance transnational community. Through this bigger gender Alliance, WARESA has participated in civil society transnational spaces that have organised outside formal state policymaking frameworks in order to input into SADC's regional policy on gender. For example, WARESA participated in promoting advocacy, and contributed to developing the economic provision of the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009:5).

WARESA transnational activities and functions take place beyond the regional contours of the SADC region. WARESA, for example, forms part of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) of 2002 – Africa's policy on agriculture transformation, wealth creation, food security, nutrition, and economic growth on the continent. This policy framework brings states and non-state actors from the continent, to address issues of improving food security and nutrition, and to boost agricultural productivity in the mainly farming-based economies (CAADP. <http://www.waresa.org>).

Non-state actors have organised outside formal frameworks in order to input into formal policies within inter-state policymaking structures. WARESA is a member and focal point organisation of the CAADP-Continental Non-State Actors Coalition (CAADP-CNC) (CAADP. <http://www.waresa.org>). As a key point organisation, WARESA has mobilised other civil society actors outside formal processes in order to input into formal policy structures and contribute to policy related issues to have improved food security across the African continent. In 2014, WARESA participated and addressed a CAADP Partnership Platform in South Africa's city of Durban, as well as, in the agriculture minister's meetings organised by the AU in Ethiopia's city of Addis Ababa (<http://www.waresa.org/Pilot-Project-on-Building-Capacity-on-ZAIP-CAADP-and-Malabo>).

Despite their marginalisation in IR academic discourse, civil society groupings with gender and women focus have participated in game-changing in global restructuring spaces promoting the norm cycle in the interest of reducing gender insecurities. At the regional level of analysis,

transnational communities have initiated norm changes, and contributed to norm development, norm diffusion, and to minimising social insecurities.

6.2.5.2. Norm diffusion

Gender and women-focused civil society groupings have contributed to the development of the gender norm cycle. Not only has WARESA contributed to norm development, but it has also diffused these norms emerging at various levels from state-non-state processes and regionalisms. Like the above transnational communities, WARESA has then adapted these norms emerging at the regional, continental, and global levels to form a part of its activities and functions. For example, its advocacy functions and activities with a focus on women, and climate change are in line with the UN-SDGs, and the Post-2015 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:16). For example, WARESA's game-changing activities on women and climate change have involved training rural women to become solar engineers who would then share their knowledge acquired with the rest of the rural communities. WARESA's transnational activities on women's sustainable livelihoods aim to provide alternative sources of energy such as biofuel, solar energy, and biogas, in order to increase women's security, and to minimise their social burdens (Interview with N).

The ideas and initiatives to mitigate gendered insecurities are not only emerging from formal state policymaking frameworks, but they have also originated from indigenous knowledge from local communities. Non-state actors have then taken up these indigenous methods and infused them in regional and continental policies to address issues around climate change in localised contexts (Interview with N). As such, the local norms and solutions also constitute a part of regional and global norms on gender. Further, WARESA's functions also include research policy analysis that centres on an in-depth examination of existing policy frameworks that govern various resources using gender, and women's analytical lens (Interview with N). Civil society's functions are as such multiple and flexible, and not limited to particular binaries. These functions have also evolved with the changing norms at the local, regional, and global levels.

WARESA's functions and activities have also been aligned to continental norms such as, the CAADP policies. While its activities initially focused on building capacity for smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe, over time, WARESA's activities expanded, and sought not only to build the capacity for farmers at a household level, but also to contribute to initiatives and knowledge

promoting national food and nutrition security (<http://www.waresa.org/Pilot-Project-on-Building-Capacity-on-ZAIP-CAADP-and-Malabo>).

WARESA's game-changing activities in Zimbabwe have also been spread out to countries such as, Malawi and Zambia (<http://www.waresa.org/Pilot-Project-on-Building-Capacity-on-ZAIP-CAADP-and-Malabo>). At a local level, WARESA's activities have interacted with state regionalism. For example, WARESA has worked side by side with the Zambian government and has obtained relevant commitments for its participation at various government ministries and agencies (<http://www.waresa.org/WARESA-EPA-partnership-in-Zambia>). Equally, WARESA has collaborated with global intergovernmental organisations such as, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in the interest of addressing food security. In specific terms, WARESA's collaboration with FAO, involved conducting training programmes that brought together smallholder farmers, local authorities, government agencies at the community level, the private sector, traditional leaders, academia, women and youth to share ideas, monitor, and hold each other to account (<http://www.waresa.org/Pilot-Project-on-Building-Capacity-on-ZAIP-CAADP-and-Malabo>). WARESA's game-changing activities have involved working with organisations, such as the "Winrock International", on a four-year training programme on economic and social empowerment project that target vulnerable women, and girls in Zambia's five districts of Chadiza, Chipata, Lundazi, Katete, and Petauke (<http://www.waresa.org/empowerment-project>). As such, the actions and functions of civil society groupings with a gender and women focus suggest that they are at the epicentre of the norm cycle in linking norms from the local, up to the global, continental, and regional levels, back to localised contexts.

WARESA's game-changing activities equally rely on donor funding in order to contribute to the development of the norm cycle. As such, mobilising resources, writing proposals, and competing for funding constitute an important part of WARESA's game-changing activities. With the changing funding policies, in which there are reduced resources being channelled to women and gender-related projects, there has in turn been growing competition for funding among civil society groupings. Transnational communities addressing gender and women issues have taken different forms, such as through operating in solidarity networks.

6.3. Transnational communities operating in solidarity networks

Transnational communities have also organised their game-changing activities through solidarity partnerships across boundaries to address common regional gendered insecurities. The organisation of these transnational communities differs from those discussed above, in their approaches, size, and representation to game-changing. For example, while the former has a narrow approach in terms of its functions and reach, the latter, organised through having offices spread out in three to ten countries, thereby, having a wider constituency and representation across Southern Africa. However, the transnational activities emerging from both typologies both point to regional thickening in terms of increasing regionalisation among civil society actors and/or with state actors, and game-changing contributing to the development of the norm cycle changes that has resulted in social change and in addressing gendered insecurities. Two transnational communities operating through solidarity networks are discussed below.

6.3.1. The Zimbabwe Women Resources Centre and Network (ZWRCN)

The ZWRCN, created in 1990, constitutes transnational activities and functions that advocate for economic justice on women's related issues. Unlike the SAfAIDS and the WLSA, the ZWRCN transnational focus is narrow in terms of representation and reach. Its game-changing approach initially started with activities that generated valuable information about social and economic justice issues. To spread out this information, the ZWRCN created a library and resource centre that was open for public use. Due to diminishing funding, the ZWRCN library, and resource centre has since, been integrated into the library at the Women's University in Africa (WUA), a transnational university based in Harare, Zimbabwe. WUA has emerged as one of Africa's transnational universities whose approach to game-changing aims to develop the capacities of many women through advancing their higher education.

6.3.1.1 Working through solidarity networks

Similar to the transnational communities discussed above, the ZWRCN's activities have involved organising outside formal intergovernmental policymaking spaces frameworks in networks of civil society groupings. The game-changing activities of the ZWRCN seek to

promote increased knowledge around gender-related processes that ultimately have potential for improving gender security across Southern Africa. Civil society organisations have also come together at a local level to contribute to game-changing activities at a regional level. For example, the ZWRCN, the “Southern Africa Parliamentary Support Trust”, and the “Community Working Group on Health” constitute a localised community within transnational functions called the “Zimbabwe Learning Partnership (ZLP)”. Through this non-state grouping, the ZLP has organised in partnership with like-minded institutions across national boundaries in a transnational environment around common goals, that ultimately seek to contribute to greater social security. The ZLP community, for example, has collaborated with the “Public Service Accountability Monitor” of Rhodes University, collectively organising and conducting training workshops in the area of social accountability monitoring, and public resources management (Interview with C, Programme Officer: ZWRCN, 07.07.2016, Harare, Zimbabwe). Through this transnational approach, civil society groupings have also facilitated bringing region-ness by bringing together a transnational group of individuals from across Southern Africa to learn and to share experiences. These transnational learning spaces have promoted regional thickening and game-changing through promoting the establishment of bonds, cultural linkages, similar ways of thinking in addressing regional challenges at localised levels.

6.3.1.2. Norm development

Civil society groupings have organised outside formal state policymaking frameworks as a strategy to push, and initiate the development of norms within intergovernmental spaces, to address gendered insecurities. The ZWRCN is also a member of the Alliance. Through its membership with the Alliance, the ZWRCN game-changing functions involved heading the economic justice theme cluster, and mobilising gender and women-focused civil society groupings to advocate for economic justice-related concerns. For example, ZWRCN participated in the drafting process of the provision on economic justice pushed for in the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (Interview with C). Among others, the economic justice provision in the 2008 Gender Protocol committed to providing for

the empowerment of women, to eliminate discrimination and to achieve gender equality and equity through development and implementation of gender-responsive legislation, policies, programmes, and projects SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, 2008).

The ZWRCN, as such, has participated in norm development that feeds into SADC's regional policies on gender seeking to address gendered insecurities. The ZWRCN has then adapted these norms in its programmes and activities, and also diffused them at a localised level across communities and national policies for behaviour change, social change and norm changes around gender.

6.3.1.3. Norm adaptation

The gender norms that have emerged at a regional level have shaped game-changing civil society activities, actions, and functions. Previously, the game-changing activities of the ZWRCN to address gendered insecurities were aligned to the provision on economic justice of the 2008 SADC Gender Protocol, and over time to the Post-2015 Gender Protocol. Through its programme on Gender, Economic Policies and Public Finance (GEPPF), the ZWRCN advocacy functions have involved pushing for the diffusion of gender norms into local and national government policies, programmes, and budgets in order to have improved economic governance (<http://www.zwrcn.org.zw/index.php/our-work/geppf>). Before, the ZWRCN's game-changing activities on the GEPPF programme were spread out to countries such as Zambia. However, this programme was discontinued due to the shrinking budget on gender-related activities (Interview with C). It was also pointed out that,

the ZWRCN withdrew its activities due to the disparities in the policy environment and minimum interest from governments in other SADC countries. While the Zimbabwean government was seen as receptive to the GEPPF programme, others were not due to the different stages of gender mainstreaming in other countries in the region (Interview with C).

6.3.1.4. Norm diffusion

Through its participation in transnational intergovernmental policymaking, spaces opened up for civil society actors with a gender and women focus to begin to interface with state regionalism at localised levels in the interest of addressing gender insecurities. The ZWRCN has worked alongside with the Ministry of Finance in Zimbabwe to diffuse gender norms into the governments micro-economic framework, particularly as it relates to the budget process. It was noted that, "we do a lot of training of line ministries in terms of gender-responsive

budgeting giving stakeholders tools on gender mainstreaming” (Interview with C). Further, women have constituted the largest constituency of the ZWRCN. The ZWRCN has diffused norms it has adapted through facilitating skills and information training to capacitate women around the budgeting process. The content of the training has included, what their rights are in accessing budgeting information, what is required according to the constitution in order for them to have input in national budgets, as well as, why women’s issues must be prioritised. At a national level, while the ZWRCN still returned policy work as its major focus, there were plans to incorporate a component of economic empowerment and a livelihood programme in line with the changing norm developments regionally (<http://www.zwrcn.org.zw/index.php/geppf>).

The ZWRCN’s game-changing activities equally have largely depended on donor-funding from organisations such as: “Bread for the World”; “The German Government”; “Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa”, “UN-WOMEN”; and “Christian Aid”. The funding that ZWRCN has received from the donor community is aligned to its strategic areas of focus, also linked to the evolving regional and global norms seeking to address gendered insecurities (Interview with C). Due to the context within which the ZWRCN has evolved, including that of diminishing resources, the Centre’s game-changing activities have mostly been inward-looking. Under the GEPPF, the ZWRCN’s activities that involved training on gender-responsive budgeting (GRB) were viewed as context specific and relevant to implement in Zimbabwe, and idealistically possible due to the good policies on gender. Zimbabwe’s constitution, adopted in 2013, has been recognised as a progressive document, at least on paper, in terms of providing a roadmap for addressing gendered insecurities (Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (no.20) Act. 2013). In reality, putting in place a gender-responsive budget in Zimbabwe has been challenging due to the country’s under-resourced budget. For example, while conducting training on GRB was useful to begin to diffuse gender in all government ministries and activities, as well as, in having a gender-sensitive budget, in reality the national budget only exists on paper (Interview with C). As such, the operating environment has played a big role in shaping the ZWRCN’s game-changing activities, and the extent to which it has contributed to addressing women’s insecurities.

In the next five to ten years, the ZWRCN seeks to work more closely with local communities in the area of activism and training on issues related to gender as outlined in the constitution, national budgets, and on GRB. The activities of the ZWRCN have sought to have sensitised communities that can trace government policies, as well as, demand for their rights as it relates to gender to be addressed (Interview with C).

6.3.2. DITSHWANELO - The Botswana Centre for Human Rights

As a transnational community, DITSHWANELO or The Botswana Centre for Human Rights operates in a transnational context to address social insecurities, particularly those affecting women. While there are some similarities in terms of organisation with the ZWRCN, it differs significantly with those transnational communities with a broader reach, representation and brand labels such as, the WLSA, the SAfAIDS, GL, the VSO-RHAISA, and WARESA. What is, however, common among these transnational communities is that they all have organised outside state policymaking structures in norm development and norm diffusion at a localised level. What is further common among transnational communities is that they all interface with state regionalism within inter-governmental policy structures in the interest of addressing gendered insecurities.

Created in 1993, DITSHWANELO's game-changing activities in a transnational context only took off in 1996 when it initiated the establishment of a much broader transnational community, the "Southern Africa Human Rights NGO Network (SAHRINGON)" (Thematic Areas of Work. <http://www.ditshwanelo.org.zw>). The SAHRINGON community was put in place as a mechanism to strengthen regional solidarity among human rights civil society actors in Southern Africa (Thematic Areas of Work. <http://www.ditshwanelo.org.zw>). In 1997, the Botswana Centre for Human Rights became affiliated to another transnational community, the "Southern Africa Legal Assistance Centres Network" (Thematic Areas of Work. <http://www.ditshwanelo.org.zw>). As a human rights organisation, DITSHWANELO's game-changing strength has been in its ability to mobilise civil society groups, as well as, in creating bigger transnational communities that seek to address human rights-related insecurities. DITSHWANELO's strategies of organising and regionalising in a transnational environment has involved working with like-minded localised NGOs in solidarity networks, particularly in SADC's four countries of Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Botswana, and Malawi.

Non-state identities that have transnational functions that address gender insecurity have not been fixed. These identities have changed with the evolving context of globalisation, as well as, the changing nature of gendered insecurities. Regional thickening as game-changing to develop norms addressing gendered insecurities have taken place inside and outside formal state processes.

6.3.2.1. Game-changing in solidarity networks

For a while now, the political instability in Zimbabwe has shaped DITSHWANELO's game in a transnational context and has premised on solidarity. Zimbabwe's land reform programme of the late 1990s, the rejection of the draft constitution in 2000, largely mobilised by the opposition political parties, and the national election of 2000, which was marred with unprecedented levels of violence, initially informed DITSHWANELO's activities. In a spirit of solidarity, DITSHWANELO's activities focused on promoting advocacy and staging protests calling for the Government of Zimbabwe to end the human rights violations on its people (Interview with Q, Senior Director, DITSHWANELO, 16.09.2016 Gaborone, Botswana). Further, the deepening crisis in Zimbabwe resulted in mass migration to countries across Southern Africa. In an expression of solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe, the "Botswana Civil Society Solidarity Coalition for Zimbabwe (BOCISCOZ)" was created in 2006 (Thematic Areas of Work, <http://www.ditshwane.org.zw>). Through this Coalition, (to which DITSHWANELO is a member), Botswana's civil society groupings have come together to stage protests, including issuing press statements to urge the Government of Zimbabwe to uphold the rule of law (BOCISCOZ, <http://www.wacsi.org/en/site/newsroom/2925/>). Through this community, NGOs have further advocated for SADC, and its governments to intervene in the political situation of Zimbabwe (BOCISCOZ, <http://www.wacsi.org/en/newsroom/2925/>). These non-state transnational solidarity activities outside formal frameworks were a strategy to reach out to regional governments in order to push for improved security and human rights for all across the SADC region.

To address gendered insecurities, the Botswana Centre for Human Rights collaborates with like-minded NGOs. DITSHWANELO has worked in solidarity with Zimbabwe-based NGOs such as, "Women of Zimbabwe Arise", and "Men of Zimbabwe Arise". The game-changing among these NGOs take the form of workshops that bring together individuals to dialogue, share ideas, and to come up with policy recommendations seeking to address and contribute to women's greater security (Interview with Q). DITSHWANELO's game-changing seeks to address human rights related insecurities experienced by communities across boundaries. The solidarity efforts have in turn resulted in growing connections among the regionalising transnational communities. It was pointed, DITSHWANELO's solidarity efforts have earned the organisation regular invitation from broader civil society actors to facilitate regional dialogues in order to address and end the human rights violations in Zimbabwe.

DITSHWANELO has also mediated conflicts around self-determination of minority groups from Namibia and Zambia (Thematic Areas of Work. <http://www.ditshwanelo.org.zw>).

The Botswana Centre for Human Rights functions have equally involved extending solidarity to individuals who fled their countries for political reasons, or due to their strong stance on human rights violations. Further, DITSHWANELO's solidarity efforts have gone beyond the contours of Southern Africa. For example, the Botswana Centre housed human rights advocates from Kenya who participated in the gathering of evidence for the International Criminal Court against sitting government officials (Thematic Areas of Work. <http://www.ditshwanelo.org.zw>). DITSHWANELO furthermore supported court cases on the regional class action silicosis case of ex-gold miners who worked in South Africa during the apartheid era (Thematic Areas of Work. <http://www.ditshwanelo.org.zw>). Supported by DITSHWANELO, the Ex-Miner's Association was registered in 2015. Through the Ex-Miner's Association, the DITSHWANELO worked closely with a South African labour lawyer, to advocate for the compensation of Botswana's former miners employed in South Africa during the apartheid era (Thematic Areas of Work. <http://www.ditshwanelo.org.zw>).

Due to the DITSHWANELO's proximity to the Botswana-based SADC headquarters, it was often called upon to facilitate civil society's access into SADC's intergovernmental policymaking structures to address, for example, Zimbabwe's and Swaziland's human rights records (Thematic Areas of Work. <http://www.ditshwanelo.org.zw>). DITSHWANELO, however, has minimal interactions with the SADC, except through its membership with broad and bigger transnational community, the SADC Council of NGOs (SADC-CNGOs) (Interview with Q). In the context of Southern Africa, NGOs advocating for human rights have been regarded as a threat to state security, and seen as championing donor agendas. As such, while some civil society actors – particularly those focusing on shelter – have received more funding from their governments, those promoting human rights issues, governance, and democracy have not (Interview with Q). The information from the information gathered revealed that the degree of non-state-state interface is high in some issue areas, while at the same time remained low in other issue-areas. In this case, the interface of non-state-state regionalism has been low in the area of human rights.

6.3.2.2. *Interface between non-state-state regionalism*

Despite their neglect in academic discourse in IR studies, non-state actors have actively participated in game-change activities within global policymaking sites on gender in order to have improved security at localised levels. At a continental level, DITSHWANELO participated in the AU's intergovernmental policymaking structures such as, in the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR), where it has observer status (Thematic Areas of Work. <http://www.ditshwanelo.org.zw>). Important to note is that women from Southern Africa, have constituted key drivers influencing, and participating in norm development within these global structuring and restructuring spaces. For example, Alice Mogwe – a human rights advocate and executive director of DITSHWANELO – was a member of the Working Group of Experts on the Death Penalty which produced a Protocol for the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa in 2014 (Thematic Areas of Work. <http://www.ditshwanelo.org.zw>). DITSHWANELO also participated as an expert resource in the establishment of the ACHPR Working group on Indigenous Populations, and the working group of Experts on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in November 2011 (Thematic Areas of Work, <http://www.ditshwanelo.org.zw>). This continental Protocol was adopted by the AU member states in 2015. Since then, DITSHWANELO's work has involved lobbying continental governments to adopt and ratify the Protocol for the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa. The DITSHWANELO further made interventions before the ACHPR on the death penalty and indigenous peoples, and at a localised level staged campaigns on the abolition of the death penalty in Botswana (Thematic Areas of Work, <http://www.ditshwanelo.org.zw>). Women are as such interfacing with state actors, and contributing to the development of international policies seeking to improve the human rights record on the African continent.

Non-state civil society actors shape global norms through raising awareness of the gross human rights violations. For example, civil society actor's actions to address human rights issues have involved submitting shadow, or alternative reports about their countries to the African Commission, the UN Special Mechanisms Reporting Procedures, and the Human Rights Council (Thematic Areas of Work. <http://www.ditshwanelo.org.zw>). DITSHWANELO submitted reports to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2002-2006); the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (2004) in cooperation with the Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organisations; the UN Human Rights Committee (2008); and the Human Rights Council in 2012-2013. DITSHWANELO also coordinated the non-state

stakeholder submission before the UN Human Rights Council of 2012 to 2013 (Thematic Areas of Work. <http://www.ditshwanelo.org.zw>).

As such, non-state regionalism constitutes a critical voice in the norm adaptation and in pushing for the implementation of policies addressing social insecurities. Yet, despite the neglect in IR analyses of game-changing of a gender and women focus, the manner in which they have organised outside and within inter-state policymaking structures to minimise gendered insecurities, points to the existence of women's agency in global IR (Marchand 1996a; 1996b; Bischoff, Aning and Acharya, 2016).

6.3.2.3. Developing the norm cycle

Civil society groups with gender and women focus have adapted norms emerging at a global and regional level to their activities and functions. They then diffuse these norms at a localised level, targeting members of the community or the government at various ministerial levels, in order to change behaviours and norms that ultimately contribute to improved gender security. Notable, the Post-2015 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development has recognised domestic work and unpaid care for social protection and public services. The provisions that have constituted a part of regional norms have emerged from the norm cycle, from the local level, finding their way into global norms, and back into regional norms. For instance, the regional provision as it relates to domestic work was in line with article 5.4., of the SDGs on gender (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer 2016:13). The local norms pushed for by civil society actors have revealed the plight of domestic workers – whose majority are women. In line with the evolving norms and insecurities, DITSHWANELO game-changing actions created and registered the Botswana Domestic Workers Association, which seeks to raise awareness of the rights of domestic workers around labour-related issues, and payment packages (Ditshwanelo. <http://ditshwanelo.org.bw>). Through this Association, DITSHWANELO has influenced laws and policies relating to domestic workers. For example, while the law in Botswana previously provided for severance pay to domestic workers after the completion of a five-year term of continuous work for the same employer, now such a package can be accessed after one year of working with the same employer (Interview with Q). The actions of gender and women-focused civil society actors around the norms cycle, points to the gradual softening of rigid institutionalisation and to changes in behaviours.

Similar to the civil society actors discussed above, the Botswana Centre for Human Rights relies on donor funding for its game-changing activities. As such, raising funding constitutes

an important aspect in the game, and for the sustainability of its activities. The changing politics around donor funding within which development aid channelled to governments has presented real challenges for NGOs, particularly those addressing human rights issues. Human rights issues are not considered as a priority area for some regional governments. Instead, NGOs working in the human rights sector or those that are donor-funded around similar issue areas have been viewed with great suspicion, and a threat to national security (Interview with Q).

6.4. The politics of game-changing: non-state-state relations

The loosening of borders due to globalisation and growing transnational activities that bypass the state, have increased perception on reduced control on the state. The evolving context have shaped a growing narrative about civil society actors, and their activities as a threat to sovereignty in some countries in Southern Africa. Further, civil society actors and governments have not always had good relations, as the former's activities have, in some cases been perceived as a threat to national security. This is partly because civil society activities are donor-funded, and as such seen as donor-driven (Interview with K). As a result, civil society actors have trodden carefully in their interactions with governments. It was pointed out that "civil society actors always try to be politically savvy in order to avoid overriding the government, because governments do not like it when their job is being done by civil society" (Interview with K).

The changing dynamics in development aid, in which funding is increasingly being channelled through governments have altered the balance of forces. Since the 2008 global economic recession and shrinking donor funding, governments in the region are now having more influence in the distribution of development funding to civil society organisations, which was not the case in the past. So far, perceptions have emerged that governments often prefer particular civil society groupings whose activities are in line with their interests. For example, in Botswana, organisations that provide shelter, and work closely with the police are said to have received significant support from the government, unlike those with a human rights focus (Interviews with P; Interview with S, Programme Officer: GL, Botswana, 16.09.2016, Gaborone, Botswana) and Interview with Q, Senior Director: DITSHWANELO, The Botswana Centre for Human Rights 16.09.2016 Gaborone, Botswana). There were also instances where some civil society actors used their personal contacts with key individuals in government by inviting them as patrons, in a strategy to get funding (Interview with Q). The

operating environment and context as such, shapes the game-changing effects of civil society's work. In this case, the degree of regional thickening and game change varies around issues areas, and are shaped by the evolving structural changes, globally, and internally.

Civil society groups with gender and women focus in Southern Africa have not constituted a homogenous group. What binds these transnational communities is their commitment to the development of the norm cycle, and to contributing to regional cohesion and minimising gendered insecurities. As stabilisers, transnational communities discussed above have sought to contribute to game-changing efforts in order to have greater gender security. Game-changing pushed for by civil society actors around common gender concerns within and intergovernmental policymaking spaces, all point to an increased interface of non-state and/or state regionalism contributing to improved security.

Game-changing and regional thickening in terms of regionalisation and region-ness varied among civil society groups in terms of their representation, their actions and reach; their regionalised and localised activities; funding; link to intergovernmental policymaking structures, as well as to sustainability plans. While some transnational communities have a wider representation in more SADC countries with a larger outreach, others do not. The GL, for example, is represented in ten SADC countries, where it works has reached out to about 425 local government councils.

Transnational communities with larger representation appear to participate more within the SADC intergovernmental structures to develop norms. Transnational communities such as, the SAfAIDS, the VSO-RHAISA, the WLSA, and GL appear to have frequently participated in the development of regional policies on gender. Non-state groupings that have actively participated in intergovernmental policymaking frameworks have further connected more outside formal state frameworks. For example, when one of the transnational communities organised a training workshop on economic empowerment that required a component on HIV/AIDS and GBV awareness, it invited other NGOs working around similar issues to co-facilitate the meeting (Interview with M; Interview with N). At times, civil society groups connected more in cases where they had been awarded a joint donor-funded grant to address common gendered insecurities.

Strong individuals leading NGOs with gender and women focus are consulted more, and sometimes invited by SADC's Secretariat to input, to evaluate or to develop policies around gender. Influential NGOs driving processes are perceived by the SADC Secretariat as the "big

girls” or “big boys” in the NGO sector on gender-related issues (Interview with M). GL, the SAfAIDS, the WLSA, WARESA, and the VSO-RHAISA have participated in the development of norms within inter-governmental policy structures. The critical role played by these transnational communities has helped bring together national and regional civil society actors to organise around the 2008 Gender Protocol and the Post-2015 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development. Civil society’s actions have pointed to its strength in promoting the norm cycle and to addressing gendered insecurities.

However, concerns exist among civil society groups about the sustainability of the Alliance transnational community, in the event that the GL is no longer the coordinating NGO (Interview with K). At the same time, there are those that pointed that individual transnational communities, and their game have all contributed to the development of the norm circle and to addressing gender insecurity. Regional thickening and game change are sustained by a spirit of solidarity, agency, and a common purpose, among gender and women-focused groups across Southern Africa to address structural barriers embedded in a patriarchal system (Interview with K).

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6.5. The politics of game-changing: non-state relations

Tensions do exist among civil society groupings. These tensions have in some cases sprung from the harsh realities or changing contexts across the Southern African countries. While the operating environment has generally been conducive in some countries, difficulties have been experienced in others, such as, a general lack of democracy and tolerance of dissenting voices. For example, due to the unfavourable political environment in Zimbabwe, women's organisations such as WLSA-Zimbabwe at some point relocated their offices to Zambia. They have since moved back to Zimbabwe. In early 2017, WARESA equally relocated its Zimbabwe office to Zambia (Interview with N).

There was a sense among some civil society actors from Zimbabwe of being under constant attack from other regional non-state actors, in terms of being perceived as weak in overcoming the prolonged crisis (Interview with L). These perceptions are said to have impacted on the degree of involvement of some Zimbabwean NGOs in regional and global restructuring spaces (Interview with L). The localised context of Zimbabwe's deepening social, political and economic insecurities and changing global structures largely account for the emerging and evolving nature of civil society actors' activities and their impact. There is as such a strong connection between insecurities to the nature of the game-change.

There was equally unevenness in terms of governance around gender and women's issues across the region. While in some countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, Swaziland, Botswana and Malawi, civil society governance structures around gender were strong. In countries such as South Africa, governance structures have been weakened by internal fighting, poor corporate governance, and lack of funding. Since the "South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO)" disintegrated, the voices of local civil society actors in South Africa weakened, and resulted in the lack of information and communication about who was doing what, to date. There was further a sense of a need for convergence at the regional level. It was argued that this could happen if the SADC Gender Unit could reposition itself and its original connection to women's organisations and to addressing gendered insecurities (Interview with N). This could be done by way of bringing together gender and women-focused civil society groups to annual summits to reflect, learn and draw lessons for effective coordination, implementation and execution of transnational activities. This could be an important game-changing step to addressing gendered insecurities in Southern Africa (Interview with B, Member: FEMNET, NGOCC, ZARD, GL, WLSA and WILDAF, 29.06.2016, Lusaka, Zambia).

6.6. Challenges of game-changing

The context of globalisation of evolving and inclusive norms on gender, and a growing queer movement have brought to the fore varying positions among civil society groups on issues of sexual orientation (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:53-55). While homophobia runs in most countries in Southern Africa in which LGBTI people are not tolerated, a different scenario plays out in countries such as South Africa, the DRC, and Mozambique where the rights of these marginalised communities are protected (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:53). The SADC Barometer (2016:53) notes,

Mozambique has decriminalised homosexuality in its new Penal Code, making it one of a few African countries where same-sex relationships are legal. While not technically illegal, same-sex sexual activity can be prosecuted under existing criminal code if individuals are found to ‘habitually engage in vices against nature’. Mozambique civil society is engaging the government to observe human rights and dignity for all.

As such, while in some countries civil society actors have openly addressed gendered insecurities that affect LGBTI communities, similar issues remain neglected in other Southern African countries. There are notable successes and progress in bringing to light the challenges of LGBTI communities in some Southern African countries. For example, Botswana’s 2016 landmark ruling by the Court of Appeal “ruled that the refusal by the government to register LEGABIBO, an organisation of [LGBTI] people, was unconstitutional”. This court ruling points to softening of rigid institutionalisation and opening up of space to inclusive game-changing efforts to address insecurities faced by marginalised communities (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:218). Botswana’s civil society groups perceived the 2016 ruling as having “heightened the potential role of LGBTI organisations in public health and HIV/AIDS efforts” (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:218).

While Southern Africa’s civil society actors with gender and women focus have made some strides towards loosening patriarchal barriers and increasing gender security, challenges, however, remain. There exist contradictory laws in some countries in Southern Africa. For example,

in Madagascar, it is legal for two persons of the same sex to have sexual intercourse as long as they are 21 years old. The Penal Code prohibits such activity for persons below 21 years old and punishes perpetrators with two to five years of jail and fine. However,

marriage between persons of the same sex is forbidden (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:53).

As such, while civil society actors in some countries may address issues affected LGBTI communities, due to the conducive policy environment, others cannot. In this case, the degree of regional thickening on particular gender-related issues have varied across the SADC region.

In countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, Swaziland, and Botswana, civil society's participation in political life has been limited by restrictive legislation. Zimbabwe's Non-Governmental Organisations Bill of 2004 has, for instance, restricted the activities and independence of civil society. Further, the external factors shaping civil society transnational activities have included the changing global donor funding dynamics. The changing context points to uneven region-ness across Southern Africa, in particular issue areas on gender. For example, the SADC countries that fall within the World Bank as Middle-Income Countries (MICs), have increasingly faced shrinking development funding. The changing context is characterised by collective national, or regional funding pools (from multiple donors) to support civil society activities. Yet, while some countries have policy funding structures to support non-state game-changing transnational activities, other countries do not. While Zimbabwe, for example, has a regional donor funding pool, countries such as Zambia do not. As such, the degree of game-changing outcomes in addressing gendered insecurities differed from one country to another. While region-ness was high around particular issue areas, as well as, in terms of reach activities, it has been low on other issue areas. NGOs seen as aligning their activities to those of national priorities as articulated by government policy, such as shelter-related programmes, have received funding for their game-changing activities. Civil society actors addressing human rights issues have been perceived as a threat to national security by some regional governments. From the information gathered, while there is some progress in raising awareness and challenging gender stereotypes in the media and popular culture, as well as in engaging men as partners, the battle to change mind-sets is still far from being won (Interview with J, Senior Director, Gender and Social Division: COMESA, 29.08.2016, Lusaka, Zambia). Further, the attitude survey conducted by the Alliance equally revealed that,

76% of women and 75% of men strongly agree that people should be treated the same whether they are women or men. Yet, 73% of women and 78% of men said that a woman should obey her husband. 54% of men and 42% of women said that a man should have the final say in all family matters. 46% of men and 38% of women said

children belong to a man and his family. 68% of men and 61% of women said sisters should obey their brothers. These views reflect deeply ingrained patriarchal attitudes that often undermine the lofty provisions of Constitutions and laws (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016:230).

In terms of softening patriarchy, it was highlighted that, “there is some kind of change, but there is also some resistance that will take time to change. This particular issue is a battle; we have to continue fighting even if there is progress in some areas” (Interview with J).

There are other stereotypes that exist in local music like ‘*Belinda Nafwa*’. The song title, ‘*Belinda Nafwa*’ translated as ‘*Belinda has died*’, is a Zambian song that narrates a story of a lady who appeared healthy, but in fact had in fact contract HIV/AIDS and was on anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs). After her sudden death, one of the men she had intercourse with goes to her grave to demand that she rises from the dead and reverse his clean status. The message in this song points to the overriding that women are responsible for spreading HIV/AIDS. In the discussions, one of the informants pointed out that such songs perpetuated a culture of violence against women, discrimination, stigmatisation, and marginalisation of women (Interview with A). The game-changing map in addressing gendered insecurities has produced mixed results.

The alarming increase of GBV in the form of rape, child abuses, physical and sexual violence and femicide has corresponded with the emergence of transnational communities addressing these gendered insecurities through social media platforms. The social media spaces are increasingly being used to expose GBV happening in private spaces, stage virtual protests, or campaigns raising awareness on growing GBV unfolding at localised levels across Southern Africa. For example, in Botswana, a campaign under the hashtag, “IshallnotForgetComplaining” concerned a 36-year-old man who defiled three girls aged eight in the North-East District of Botswana (Interviewee with P, Executive Secretary: BOCONGO, 14.09.2016 Gaborone, Botswana).

In South Africa, the campaign with the hashtag “MenAreTrash” emerged as an anti-patriarchal and anti-femicide movement to end rape and femicide targeted at women. This campaign was started after the death of a young woman who was allegedly killed by her boyfriend in Johannesburg (Why the Hashtag Menaretrash is important <http://www.ewn.co.za/2017/05/12>). The campaign also raised awareness on the day-to-day challenges that confront women, in order to ultimately reduce GBV that is at a record high across Southern Africa (Why the Hashtag Menaretrash is important <http://www.ewn.co.za/2017/05/12>). While the impact of such movements and campaigns may be difficult to ascertain, what is, however, notable are

increasing conversations by a broad range of communities and individuals seeking to address deepening insecurities based on gender.

6.7. Conclusion

This chapter has argued that there exists a correlation between gendered insecurities, and what constitutes civil society local organisation in terms of their reach, functions, and actions. An examination of transnational communities operating in a transnational environment at a regional level has revealed the way in which they have organised as game-changers and have minimised gendered insecurities across Southern Africa. These transnational communities included: the WLSA; GL; the SAfAIDS; the VSO-RHAISA; WARESA; the ZWRCN; and DITSHWANELO. These civil society groups were selected based on their functions and activities of a transnational nature that have addressed gender and women's gendered insecurities across Southern Africa. These transnational communities have been examined based on how they organised outside, as well as fed into intergovernmental policymaking structures on gender. Non-state transnational activities to address gendered insecurities have involved varying degrees of political mobilisation and cross-learning. These gender and women-focused groups have come together in a transnational context to organise around common ideas in order to contribute to addressing specific gendered insecurities. The mapping of these processes and activities have revealed two types of transnational communities that have differed of representation and reach across Southern Africa, as well as the functions and capabilities in addressing gendered insecurities. While the first set is constituted by broader transnational communities operating in three to ten countries, the second set has a narrow regional focus organising through solidarity networks across boundaries. Despite this difference, it has been revealed the evolving activities and functions within these two sets of transnational communities all point to regional thickening as game-changing, which has sought to effectively promote the development of the norm cycle and to address gendered insecurities. It has shown that as stabilisers, transnational communities have abilities to influence the development of norms on gender, their adaptation, diffusion, and implementation. Through these transnational activities, civil society groups have contributed to actual social changes, in terms of unlearning patriarchal behaviour, opening up development spaces for women, and increasing the living standards and freedoms of (rural) women.

Non-state transnational activities are staged outside formal frameworks, in order to influence the development of a norm cycle within inter-state policymaking structures. This strategy has helped civil society women's groupings to penetrate and influence game change within global structuring and restructuring spaces at various levels, regionally, continentally, and globally. Particularly, game-changing is revealed in terms of the growing interface of non-state and state regionalism addressing gendered insecurities. Furthermore, civil society game-changing organisations have pushed for norm changes within inter-state policymaking structures point to real softening of patriarchal barriers. The softening of patriarchal barriers was shown in terms of unlearning patriarchal behaviours, opening up development spaces for women and increasing the living standards and freedoms of women in the SADC region.

To sum up, the degree of regional thickening as game-changing from civil society transnational activities has varied across Southern Africa, largely shaped by internal and external forces. The internal factors shaping transnational activities pointed to the policy environment within which they unfold, the degree of recognition given to non-state actors, as well as, buy-in from regional governments and local communities as necessary for game-changing. For example, the information reviewed has pointed to some degree of hostility and suspicion towards civil society groupings from SADC governments, especially those they have pinned down as donor funded.

The chapter has further revealed that the changing dynamics characterised by limited resources encouraged high competition among civil society groupings and for them to constantly reinvent themselves as necessary in order to remain relevant in the game. This has pointed to growing fragmentation among civil society groupings and a move towards individualistic approaches, because of the shrinking donor budgets and growing competition for resources. There is as such a need to avoid fragmentation, to mobilise, and organise, because a weak civil society impacts on civil society's game-changing efficacy and to reducing gendered insecurities. Further, to avoid divisions, there is need for a strong link between civil society groups with regional identities to those with localised identities to coordinate more to allow for more cross-learning, increased interactions, and sharing of experiences in the interest of promoting regional cohesion and in addressing localised gendered insecurities. The next chapter sums up the study and key findings.

Chapter 7:

General conclusion

7.1. Introduction

This thesis argued that since the 1990s, norms, in general, proliferated in a neo-liberalising context, in particular on gender, and how they changed to indicate new agency and influence, amounted to game-change. The study focused on Southern Africa, defined as the socially constructed SADC region covering 15-member states. What interested this study the most were transnational civil society processes promoting the norm cycle, contributing to greater security across the SADC region. The analytical approach grounded analysis in the New Regionalism Approach (NRA), emphasised processes, rather than the linearity inherent in regional IR studies. By privileging processes, interactions, and agency around the norm development cycle, this study overall examined how regional thickening in a transnational context promoted game-changing activities, promoting the development of the norm cycle, and contributing to improved security. While regional thickening pointed to increasing regionalisation, regionalism and region-ness, game-changing referred to processes developing norms leading to change, development, and stabilisation.

Four key questions were addressed. First, the study examined drivers of transnational processes in Southern Africa's IR, in order to provide conceptual clarity, and to develop an analytical framework for explaining regional thickening as game-changing. Second, it discussed how the history of game-changing had evolved in the latter and better part of the 20th century in Southern Africa. Addressing this question was important in order to draw attention to specific historical examples regarding game-changing transnational activities and regionalisation in the colonial and post-colonial eras of Southern Africa. These examples were important to trace how game-changing of state and/non-state actors organised, and the manner in which they promoted norm changes, social change, development, and improved security. Third, the study examined in detail how regional thickening introduced the possibilities for game change of non-state and/or state organisation taking place in a transnational environment around gendered insecurities. Finally, the study discussed how transnational communities organised around gendered insecurities under the wider SADC regime in order to contribute to development and

stabilisation at localised levels. A map of civil society transnational communities and their processes promoting the development of the norm cycle, contributing to greater security across the SADC region was plotted. A map of non-state transnational activities and regionalisation that plots regional thickening could be useful for policymakers and practitioners to isolate regional thickening as game-changing.

In addressing these four questions, the study had three objectives. First, to develop an innovative analytical framework for examining regional thickening as game-changing. The game-changing framework revealed how it developed, evolved, and its importance in contributing to change, development, and to addressing (social) insecurities. Second, the study aimed to map out and make visible regional thickening as game-changing, particularly, those of non-state actors with gender and women focus. This study revealed how civil society groupings with gender and women focus organised and promoted game-changing activities, promoting the development of the norm cycle, in the interest of addressing gendered insecurities. Third, this study sought to map out regional thickening as game-changing of non-state transnational communities with gender and women focus at a local level. It found that despite increasing non-state game-changing processes happening in a transnational context, including their growing interface with state regionalism, analyses in the field largely maintained linearity. Pinning down on these three objectives aimed at contributing to the analytical gaps in regional IR studies, by creating an innovative framework for regional thickening as game-changing.

This study showed that the bulk of scholarship in regional IR studies premised analyses on regionalisms, regional organisation, their economic elements, and on military security. Where civil society activities were noted, analyses largely located these processes within the parameters of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). Yet, non-state processes and interactions in a transnational environment have taken place regardless of formal state regionalism, or their regional organisation. The study pointed that while analyses on civil society activities in a transnational context largely focused on the global level, regional thickening and game change by these actors also happen at a regional level of analysis. Further, while dominant conceptions limited the conception of civil society to fixed and/or dualistic logics of hegemonic, or counter-hegemonic discourse, the study revealed this society as more complex and dynamic than currently presented. This study argued that the regional level of analysis was also important to uncover structural transformations, social change, state-society complexities, consequences of transnational activities and regionalisation, as well as the power dynamics and hegemonic tendencies.

This study used a mixed method approach involving gathering multiple sets of primary and secondary information. This mixed method was important to obtain information from various sources aimed at pinning down regional thickening as game-changing in a transnational environment on Southern Africa, mostly around gender. Primary information was obtained from semi-structure interviews, policy observation seminars, NGO annual and evaluation reports, NGO policy seminar briefs, policy instruments, yearly NGO barometers reports, NGO financial statements, and from, global, continental, and regional instruments on gender and from relevant online archives, NGO websites and documents. This study also relied on secondary sources of information gathered from relevant journals, books, book reviews, book chapters in the field of IR and regional IR studies, online sources and from newspaper articles. Based on the information obtained, the study developed an analytical framework of regional thickening as game-changing. This framework plotted game-changing activities of non-state actors, including those with state actors within the SADC intergovernmental policymaking structures. The study revealed how the game-changing framework developed, evolved, and its importance to diminishing gendered insecurity.

7.2. Regional thickening and game change in IR studies

The conceptual landscape in the field of regional IR studies provided a rich basis for conceptualising regional thickening and game change taking place in a transnational environment. Conceptualisation, has, however, maintained linearity in defining regions, regionalism, regionalisation, and region-ness, including broader concepts such as norms, identities, gender, security, and civil society. While traditional neo-realist and neo-functionalists attach common conceptions about a region and regionalisation to state-territorial logics or their material economic elements as drivers of processes and interactions taking place in a transnational context, the realities on the ground revealed otherwise. Further, while conventional scholars have argued identities or individuals as driving processes and interactions in transnational contexts, they only address these questions partially. Relying on non-linear approaches, this study argued that drivers of transnational activities and regionalisation transcend linearity pointing to multiple regionalisms, to ideas or norms, as well as to the actors.

The study furthermore argued that conventional and mainstream conception of a region and regionalisation was limiting, thereby, presented analytical difficulties. For example, the study

pointed that the territorial conception of a region fails to capture unfolding complexities, including state-society intricacies, power relations or the consequences of transnational activities and regionalisation of the SADC region. The SADC region, defined as covering the 15-member states equally defies the state-centric territorial logic as it transcends the very conventional geographical boundaries of Southern Africa to include countries such as Madagascar, Seychelles, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). There are critical conceptions that have argued that it is actually the people of Southern Africa that define the region. However, a region is more than the geographical or linear logics. This study argued that regions are socially constructed and are always in the making, defined by multiple processes and interactions in different fields and around various issue areas.

Equally, norms and identities are not static as currently represented in dominant IR approaches. The history of regional thickening and game change in Southern Africa revealed that norms and identities evolved over time. For example, regional thickening and game-changing of the transnational trade union of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) began with activities in the economic field, and over time expanded to a political agenda to address the insecurities emerging from colonisation in South Africa and across the region. Similarly, while the ICU identities were aligned to the economic arena, over time, they constituted both economic and political identities. Further, the history of regional thickening and game-changing from the Frontline States (FLS) to today's evolved SADC pointed to the non-rigid nature of norms and identities. While the FLS began as a political-military security intergovernmental body, seeking to address the insecurities that surrounded Southern Africa's decolonisation project from apartheid South Africa, its identity changed over time to include economic, social, political and cultural functions from the SADCC to present-day SADC. Similarly, national liberation movements that participated under the umbrella of non-state actors in the FLS summit meetings over time evolved into post-colonial ruling parties and governments.

The study further suggested that norms and identities have been shaped by the evolving context of (gendered) insecurities. The identities that emerged to address (social) insecurities not only limited to state actors, but also involved non-state actors who participated outside and within formal or informal state frameworks, as evidenced in the FLS transnational processes that aimed at addressing military-related insecurities. The non-state and/or state identities that emerged in a transnational context to address gender insecurity were not fixed. These identities changed with the evolving context of globalisation, as well as, the changing nature of gendered insecurities.

The study showed that the nationalistic hegemonic tendencies in the immediate independence era in Southern Africa, encouraged gender and women groups to organise, and participate more in the development of the norm cycle from a global level. Women from the African continent took part in the development of norms that resulted in policies such as, the BDPfA of 1995, and the SDGs of 2015, among others. Women's organisation then played key functions of adapting and diffusing norms that emerged from global processes of structuring in regional and national norms on gender. The norm cycle involved non-state actors taking up local norms up to the global level, where they were repackaged with those norms emanating from different contexts and sources to develop global policies on gender. Women's participation in norm development at a global level, shaped their organisation at localised and regional levels. These norms from the global level were then adapted in their activities and diffused into the local and regional norms. The growing transnational activities and gender transnationalism all pointed to regional thickening as game-changing. Regional thickening in the context of global transformations pointed to a growing norm cycle from the local-global-regional-local levels addressing gender insecurity.

7.3. Conception of security, civil society and gender

The conception of security in IR studies has largely been dominated by military notions. Since the 1990s, the conceptual landscape shifted to include non-military definitions of security such as gender. In Southern Africa, regional thickening and game change to address gendered insecurities evolved over time. For example, the study revealed that norms on gender thickened since the development of the first regional gender policy, the 1997 Declaration on Gender and Development to today's evolved and more expansive Post-2015 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development. Other SADC regional policies that have contributed to thick regionalism on gender include, the Plan of Action on gender; the Regional Strategic Implementation Framework on Gender and Development, and SADC Gender Policy and the Regional Gender Policy Implementation Action Plan. As such, game-changing in the wider SADC regime pointed to thickening norms on gender as having contributed to changing behaviours, and improving the lives of its more the 50 percent population who are mostly women.

The dominant conceptions of civil society in the field of IR emphasise hegemonic or counter-hegemonic functions of understanding this society. The realities on the ground, however, show this society as more dynamic than represented pointing to its multiple functions that go beyond

the dualistic rigid typologies. The study revealed civil society functions to include, game-changing, both outside and alongside state actors within intergovernmental structuring and restructuring spaces. For example, civil society groupings with gender and women focus spread out their advocacy, watchdog, norm development, diffusion and implementation roles across non-state and formal spaces. In this study civil society's game-changing actions and functions ranged from those promoting advocacy, political activism, solidarity, liberatory, watchdog, complimentary and supportive roles both within and outside intergovernmental policymaking structures. This study found civil society identities as not rigid, but as shaped by changing contexts and insecurities.

The dualistic conceptions in academic discourse were also evident in common conceptions of gender. The evolving realities from pre-colonial African societies to-present-day, however, revealed the concept of gender as more flexible than currently represented in IR scholarship and dominant feminist studies. The gendered roles that have played out in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Africa debunks rigid conceptions of what it means to be a man or woman. While the biological differences exist, how the concept of gender has played out reveals its non-fixed nature. For example, the growing global funding, expanding global queer movement advancing the rights of Lesbians, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex (LGBTI) communities, and increasing global norms recognising the rights of marginalised LGBTI communities, including civil society and government actors championing LGBTI rights, challenges the dualistic and rigid notions on gender. Regional thickening as game-changing as such, not only limited to addressing traditional gender and women's issues but also involved gendered insecurities experienced by LGBTI communities. As such, the map plotting regional thickening as game-changing and the gendered issues addressed revealed a more complex mosaic that goes beyond linearity.

7.4. Mapping regional thickening as game-changing around gender

Regional thickening as game-changing of civil society actors with gender and women focus revealed how these activities evolved, developed, as well as their relevance to changing behaviours, norms, social change, development, and in addressing gendered insecurities. The map of regional thickening as game-changing advanced by these civil society actors happened in two ways. First, by way of advocacy and in seeking representation within inter-governmental policy structures. Second, by way of organising in transnational communities around specific

issue areas in the interest of developing, adapting, diffusing and implementing norms promoting norm changes, changed behaviour, development and improved gender security at a localised level.

The study found transnational activities and regionalisation of civil society groupings with gender and women focus game-changing. While regional thickening pointed to increasing regionalisation, regionalism, and region-ness, game-changing involved their recognition by states, and participation in the development of the norm cycle within and outside formal intergovernmental policymaking frameworks, contributing to change, development, and stabilisation. The study further found that the evolving transnational activities and regionalisation of non-state actors, and their connection to state intergovernmental structures around broad questions of security, including in the area of gender, amounted to regional thickening. It furthermore found that game change of gender and women-focused civil society actors on the ground contributed to change in areas of unlearning patriarchal behaviour, opening up development spaces for women and increasing the living standards, health, and freedoms of women, particularly, those in the rural areas.

Increasing regionalisation revealed how civil society actors mobilised and evolved in thick transnational communities addressing gendered insecurities in various issue areas. Through more structured transnational communities, the study revealed that civil society actors organised outside formal frameworks in order to participate and input into policy development inside formal frameworks. The study further revealed the manner in which transnational communities contributed to the development of a gender norm cycle and to mechanisms addressing gendered insecurities at localised levels. The overall effect of regional thickening as game-changing was found to be in the two ways at a regional and local levels. Game-changing in the two ways pointed to change on the ground in terms of unlearning patriarchal behaviour, opening up development spaces for women and increasing the living standards, health, and freedoms of women.

7.5. Increasing regionalism

Thickening regionalism pointed to increasing norms or policies on gender in the SADC region since the 1990s, and the 1995 Beijing World Conference that declared “Women’s Rights as Human Rights”. A three-phased process of regionalisation emerged in Southern Africa post-Beijing. It involved the interface between state and non-state regionalism around gendered insecurities. The three-phased process between 1997-2015 resulted in the development of

SADC's three key regional policies on gender, namely, the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development, the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, and the Post-2015 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development. These norms evolved gradually from the other, as such are inter-connected. The study found that the interface between states, and non-state regionalism increased over time, including the recognition of non-state actors as important partners in region-building. The norms that emerged from non-state-state regionalisms and regionalisation pointed to game-changing in terms of their championing efforts at addressing gendered challenges across Southern Africa.

These policies that emerged from the interface between states and non-state actors at a regional level are connected to the global-continental-local norms and contexts. As such, the well-packaged norms on gender that emerged at a regional level of analysis represented multiple contexts and sources. The study revealed that the process of developing a regional gender policy among others involved linking them to existing global, continental and regional norms on gender, as well as to the gendered insecurities at localised levels in Southern Africa. What constituted global norms emerged from localised norms and insecurities from various contexts that found their way in global policy on gender. Through the process of norm diffusion by civil society actors in transnational spaces, including their interface with state regionalism, these global norms found their way back into regional, and local policies and instruments. The study suggested that norms that civil society actors organised and planned by are inter-connected to an evolving and thickening norm cycle on gender from local-global-regional-local levels. The interface between state and non-state regionalism on the gender question that resulted in growing norms, changing norms, social changes and security point to Africa's agency, particularly civil society groupings with gender and women focus in global international relations at multiple levels. Yet, civil society transnational activities and regionalisation with gender and women focus remain marginalised in IR discourse. Emerging research that uncovers transnational processes and regional thickening in terms of growing regionalisation, regionalisms and region-ness, amounting to game-changing is helping to break the linearity and marginalisation in regional IR studies.

7.6. Transnational communities as stabilisers

The study further showed that the recognition and participation of civil society actors in transnational policymaking structuring and restructuring spaces created a groundswell for game change at localised levels. Regional thickening and game change of civil society actors

with gender and women focus revealed how transnational communities evolved over time and the manner in which they were stabilisers. As stabilisers, civil society actors organised and regionalised in a transnational context, in the interest of addressing gendered insecurities at a localised level. Transnational activities of these non-state actors involved developing, adapting, and diffusing norms on gender emerging at a regional and global level within localised contexts. Examples of transnational communities discussed included, the Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust (WLSA); Gender Links (GL); the Southern Africa HIV/AIDS Information and Dissemination Service SAfAIDS; the Voluntary Services Overseas- Regional AIDS Initiative of Southern Africa (VSO-RHAISA); and Women and Resources Eastern and Southern Africa (WARESA). Their game-changing activities revealed how they evolved from having a narrow focus to addressing gendered insecurities in their programme and in terms of their reach, size, actions and representation at a transnational level over time. Transnational communities organising around solidarity networks such as the Zimbabwe Women's Resources Centre and Network (ZWRCN) and DITSHWANELO-the Botswana Centre for Human Rights also revealed thickening in terms of the gendered issues they addressed, and in building solidarity networks across the region. While the mapping of the two typologies of transnational communities revealed differences in terms of their reach, size, actions and representation at a transnational level, their activities, however, both, pointed to game-changing activities, changing norms, changing behaviours, and contributing to improving gender security.

The study also revealed that transnational communities addressed different gendered insecurities. This diversity of the gender insecurities addressed by civil society actors pointed to their importance, particularly, in terms of organising in broader transnational communities to push for a common goal on gender that contributed to improving the lives of women across the region. For example, the civil society actors came together and formed the Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance as a vehicle for the women across the region to organise outside formal frameworks in order to push for the first legally binding gender policy. The study found a link between gendered insecurities and what constituted non-state identities. The labels, activities and functions of civil society groupings pointed to their connection to the very gendered insecurities that they have addressed.

The individual transnational communities were further examined in terms of how they contributed to the norm cycle in the interest of addressing gendered insecurities. The study revealed that individual transnational communities through their membership with various bigger and much broader gender networks such as, the Southern African Gender Alliance (The

Alliance), African Women's Development and Communication Network (FEMNET), the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), Global Alliance on Media and Gender (GEMAG), and Gender and Media Southern Africa (GEMSA) participated and contributed to norm development at various levels. For example, transnational communities through the Alliance participated in the development and diffusion of the global Sustainable Development Goal No.5 on gender into the regional policy, the Post-2015 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development and at a local level. Further, Other global and continental gender policies aligned to the SADC regional policies included, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women (CEDAW), Beijing Plus 20, African Union (AU) Agenda 2063 and its Women's Protocol. In order to mainstream gender in all SADC activities, the Post-2015 Protocol on Gender and Development was also aligned to all SADC's 27 protocols. The study found that individual transnational communities – through their connection to broader regional, continental and global non-state communities – took localised norms and gendered insecurities to global structuring and restructuring spaces, where they participated in repackaging these norms, and diffusing them back in regional and localised norms.

While transnational activities of these gender-based civil society groupings remain invisible in IR studies, the mapping in this study revealed their increasing recognition and participation in structuring and restructuring spaces at a global, regional, continental and localised levels. Further, while this study focused on more organised and structured forms of transnational activities and regionalisation, the information obtained also revealed emerging, but less-structured processes and interactions addressing gendered insecurities such as gender-based violence, femicide and child abuses through social media platforms. While the scope of this study paid more attention to organised and more structured activities in a transnational context, the increasing turn to social media may be opening up alternative and less expensive platforms that may be promoting regional thickening and game-change, require further examination. The study also found that organised civil society groupings used social media platforms as a medium for communicating their work, goals, activities and output.

7.7. External and internal factors and game-changing

The game-changing landscape addressing gendered insecurities at a regional level in Southern Africa revealed a mixed picture. The internal and external factors that shaped game-changing

around the development of the norm cycle did not always yield positive outcomes. For example, the growing global economic and humanitarian crises contributed to the reduced donor funding towards gender-related issues channelled to civil society organisations. The changing global dynamics influenced changes in donor funding mechanisms. For example, the study found that the shrinking in donor funding resulted in increased competition for resources among civil society actors. Further, the funding playing field revealed some degree of paradoxes. While funding for particular gendered insecurities such as, HIV/AIDS was more accessible, gender activities related to advocacy promoting women's rights as human rights received little attention and funding. Furthermore, while some countries had policy funding structures to support non-state game-changing transnational activities at a regional level, other countries did not. For example, while Botswana and Zimbabwe had a regional fund towards civil society activities, Zambia did not. Equally, while some individual transnational community members such as, "WLSA-Zambia" could access funding for its regional work from the local donor funding pool on gender, "GL-Zambia" could not. Finally, while donor funding was more accessible to some countries like Namibia, civil society actors in Zambia and Botswana faced challenges as these countries fall under the World Bank classification as Middle-Income Countries (MICs).

The changing norms further showed donor funding as increasingly being channelled directly to national governments. Given the tensions that existed among states and non-state actors – in which the activities of the latter were regarded as a threat to national security – shaped game-changing. NGOs seen as aligning their activities to those of national priorities areas articulated by government policy, such as shelter-related projects received more funding for their game-changing activities, and civil society actors addressing human rights issues were regarded as posing a threat to national security by regional governments such as Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. As such, the degree of region-ness in addressing gendered insecurities differed from one country to another, as well as from one issue area to the other. Regional thickening as game-changing revealed that region-ness was high around particular issue areas on gender, it was low on other issues areas. For example, gendered insecurities revealed reduced deaths from HIV/AIDS, while gender-based violence and child abuse cases continued to be on the rise across the region.

Buy-in from national governments in developing the gender norm cycle revealed challenges in the implementation stage process. The study showed that while some governments and their gender ministers demonstrated enormous commitment to game change, others did not. For example, while Botswana and Mauritius did not sign the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and

Development, pointing to its prescriptive nature, Mauritius, again, did not sign the Post-2015 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, citing that some of its provision, such as one on ending child marriages moving the age limit to 18 was in conflict with its religious cultural laws.

The study further revealed emerging nationalistic hegemonic tendencies in terms of non-state-state relations within SADC since 2016 seemingly pointed to retrogressive changes since the 1990s that rooted in a collective game-changing. If left unchecked, the growing nationalistic tendencies may potentially impact on the efficacy regional thickening and game change to promote improved social change, and to greater (gender) security across Southern Africa. In contradiction to these dominant tendencies, this study equally pointed to the counter-tendencies. A process towards re-engagement between civil society actors, the SADC Secretariat and member states underway at the time of writing this thesis aimed at developing a legal framework agreement, to guide non-state participation within SADC's policymaking structures. This legal framework being developed is important, because it indicates game-changing (qualitative change), as it relates to improving non-state relations with the SADC Secretariat, and member states.

The study showed that the changing dynamics characterised by limited resources influenced a constant need for civil society actors to constantly re-invent themselves. The process of re-invention entailed moving with changing dynamics in terms of priority issue areas, and to changing insecurities in order to remain relevant in the game. This also entailed the need for civil society groupings to continue to increase their abilities and skills to compete for resources, and to be innovative in terms of accessing new funding streams and donors that go beyond the traditional circle, such as corporate ones. While traditional donors funded activities such as advocacy, the corporate donors required more tangible and measurable deliverables, like building schools or distributing sanitary towels. Due to the shrinking budgets and growing competition for resources, the information from the study pointed to growing individualism among civil society groupings, thereby, causing fragmentation. There is, however, need to avoid fragmentation, in order to effectively mobilise, and organise, because of a weak civil society impacts negatively on the efficacy of regional thickening and game-changing, and contributes to gendered insecurities.

7.8. Limitations of the study and researcher's impressions

By focusing on regional thickening and game change taking place in the wider SADC regime, this thesis in no way claimed to be exhaustive. The researcher's journey to gather information involved travelling to six countries in the SADC region. The gathering of information through semi-structured interviews was not without difficulties. The context within which information is collected may shape the kind of information gathered, in terms of the ability of the informants to openly share their views. This was the case in Zimbabwe where civil society actors were generally viewed with great suspicion. For example, the researcher's scheduled interviews with the informants in Harare, Zimbabwe in July 2016 coincided with the nation-wide stay-away protest that resulted in a complete shut-down of all the businesses and official administration in the country. This nation-wide protest represented the first massive demonstration staged by the people's movements from below since 2000. At the time of collecting information for the study, the political environment revealed growing uncertainty in the country, characterised by strong police and military presence in most parts of Harare and across the country and a culture of violence. As a result of these uncertainties, the informants requested for the re-scheduling of the interviews, while other cancelled completely. The researcher arranged for skype interviews with some of the informants, while other sent email responses.

The researcher's overall impression of information gathering, particularly from the informants working for gender and women-focused NGOs, revealed their general open-ness and appreciation for having been invited to participate in the interview. Some informants from the NGO sector pointed that this was the first time a researcher had approached them to have open conversations about their transnational activities and its organisation in a transnational environment around gender and women challenges across Southern Africa. The informants from Madagascar, South Africa, Zambia, and Botswana further expressed that the findings of this study be shared widely. A map plotting gender and women-focused game-changing activities at a regional level, addressing the gendered concerns of the people of Southern Africa, particularly women, is important for region-building.

Due to the time frame required to conduct this study, and limited financial resources, the fieldwork carried out only limited to six out of SADC's 15-member countries. The information collected on regional thickening and game-change in a transnational context is, however, largely represented game-changing transnational activities and regionalisation of state and/or non-state-actors on Southern Africa.

7.9. Overall conclusion

Despite increasing transnational activities and regionalisation since the advent of democratisation and liberalisation of the 1990s, characterised by non-state groupings organising in a transnational context, seeking to address gender security, outside and inside intergovernmental policymaking spaces, no analytical framework to examine these practices, and outcome as important as game-changing, existed. By grounding this study in the NRA whose purpose prioritises civil society processes, seeks to understand state-society complexities, structural transformation and social change, this study examined how regional thickening in a transnational context promoted game-changing activities by states and/or non-state actors promoting the development of the norm cycle, and seeking to have improved security. The NRA narrative here was also important to uncover the consequences of transnational activities and regionalisation, including power relations, and the creeping forms of hegemonic and dominant nationalistic tendencies around gender regionalisation in Southern Africa. Transcending linearity, this study developed an innovative analytical framework, which examined how regional thickening introduced possibilities of game change, in which the stage was set for processes and interactions between non-state and state actors to change, and where non-state actors meaningfully effected their main role players as stabilisers, contributing to improved security. In so doing, non-state actors aided the protection of women across Southern Africa.

The innovative framework developed here pointed to softening of the regions gendered structures, resulting in growing non-state regionalisation, and the increasing interface between non-state-state regionalism stabilising gendered insecurities, as well as, to the impressive growth of gender transnationalism, challenges the linearity inherent in regional IR studies. Regional thickening also pointed to growing recognition of non-states actors in SADC's policies, as well as their participation in developing the norm cycle in intergovernmental policymaking spaces as having created a groundswell for game change at localised levels. Game-changing pointed to processes that developed policies, their diffusion, adaptation, and implementation by both state and non-state actors contributing to norm changes, improved social policies, and to greater security. The actual changes emerging from state and non-state activities on the ground were in terms of unlearning patriarchal behaviours, opening up development for women, and increasing their living standards, education, health, and their freedom.

All in all, this study proposes that norms have increased, particularly, since democratisation and liberalisation, and how they changed, including their agency, pointed to game changing. The study shows that game-changing transnational activities that change, and diffuse norms to break learnt behaviour, have helped disrupt rigid institutionalisation, and are aiding to bring non-linear discourses to the fore. To transcend the inherent linearity in regional IR studies, the innovative analytical framework of regional thickening as game-changing developed here may be tested on similar studies on transnational activities and regionalisation in the different fields and issue areas in Southern Africa and beyond. Such an analytical framework could be important in mapping out how game-changing develops, evolves, and its importance in addressing (social) insecurity in different contexts and around different issue areas. Further, such a framework could be useful in regional IR studies to uncover state-society complexities in transnational environments, as well as the consequences of non-state-state processes and interactions in promoting development and security.

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Appendix 1: Interviewee List

Interviewee	Position and Affiliation	Date	Location
Interviewee A	Programme Director: Gender Links-Zambia	28.06.2016	Lusaka, Zambia
Interviewee B	Executive Member: FEMNET, NGOCC, ZARD, Gender Links, WLSA, WILDAF	29.06.2016	Lusaka, Zambia
Interviewee C	Programmes Coordinator: Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre and Network	07.07.2016	Harare, Zimbabwe
Interviewee D	Director: Federation Pour la Promotion Feminine et Enfante	07.07.2016	E-mail responses from Madagascar
Interviewee E	Head of Programmes: SAfAIDS	08.07. 2016	Harare, Zimbabwe
Interviewee F	Programme Director: Gender Links-Zimbabwe	11.07.2016	Harare, Zimbabwe
Interviewee G	Gender Officer, Ministry of Gender	18.07.2016	Lusaka, Zambia
Interviewee H	Programme Officer, NGOCC	20.07. 2016	Lusaka, Zambia

Interviewee I	Programme Officer, Women and Law in Southern Africa	19.07.2016	Lusaka, Zambia
Interviewee J	Senior Director: Gender and Social Division: COMESA	29.08.2016	Lusaka, Zambia
Interviewee K	Programme Officer-The Alliance: Gender Links Johannesburg	06.09.2016	Johannesburg, South Africa
Interviewee L	Chief Director: Women and Law in Southern Africa	06.09.2016	E-mail responses, Harare, Zimbabwe
Interviewee M	Regional Programmer Officer: VSO-RHAISA	07.09.2016	Pretoria, South Africa
Interviewee N	Director: Women and Resources Eastern and Southern Africa	08.09.2016	Via Skype from Harare, Zimbabwe
Interviewee O	Programme Officer: GIZ Transboundary Water Management SADC	13.09.2016	Gaborone, Botswana
Interviewee P	Executive Secretary: BOCONGO	14.09.2016	Gaborone, Botswana
Interviewee Q	Senior Director: DITSHWANELO, The Botswana Centre for Human Rights	16.09.2016	Gaborone, Botswana
Interviewee R	Senior Officer SADC Gender Unit	16.09.2016	Gaborone, Botswana
Interviewee S	Programme: Gender Links-Botswana	16.09.2016	Gaborone, Botswana
Interviewee T	Former Student: Women University in Africa	15.10.2016	Lusaka, Zambia
Interviewee U	Gender and Governance Officer: UN-WOMEN	03.11.2016	Lilongwe, Malawi
Interviewee V	Former Lecturer: University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (UBLS)	09.09.2017	Via telephone, Johannesburg, South Africa
Interviewee W	Immigration Officer: Chirundu Border Post	10.09.2017	Via telephone from Chirundu, Zambia

Appendix 2. Interview Guide

Topic: Transnational activities and regionalisation of gender and women-focused civil society as game-changing for region-building in Southern Africa

Project description

This research project seeks to examine how regionalisation, particularly of gender and women-focused civil society in Southern Africa are organised, and the manner in which they are game-changing for region-building. Regionalisation here refers to interactive processes through cooperation and networking by states (formal/or from above) and/ or by non-state (informal/or from below) actors, contributing to region-building in terms of growth.

Overall objectives

To make visible often neglected processes of regionalisation of gender and women-focused civil society and the manner in which it contributes to gender security in Southern Africa; To map out and reveal how regionalisation of gender and women-focused civil society as game-changing are organised at multiple levels in Southern Africa. To develop an innovative analytical framework for examining transnational activities and regionalisation at a regional level as generative of potentially regional ‘thickness’ or game-changing contributing to increasing (gender) security for region-building;

Anonymity and confidentiality: Participants names and contact details will not be mentioned in the transcribed work and in the end product of the research study.

Recordings: A voice recorder to which research participants will give consent to will be used during the interview.

Feedback information: In order to ensure accuracy of information captured during the interview, the researcher will e-mail a summary of the data captured to the research participant immediately after participation.

Interview questions prepared for civil society representatives

July – December 2016

1. What do you do as an organisation, and how do you see and project yourself? Has this projection changed since the organisation was formed?
2. On the nature and scope of the organisation, how has this changed over the last 5 to 10 years?
3. Please expound on whether patriarchy and its structures are softening in the region. In what manner do your activities try to diminish patriarchy?
4. Who are you targeting in your work, and in what way are they involved?
5. What is the level of participation by communities and individuals in your organisation?
6. Where do you plan to be in the next 5 to 10 years?
7. How is the organisation networking regionally?
8. Is there politics involved when networking or partnering with others? Please describe the nature of the politics?
9. Do you interact with the government or inter-governmental structures of the SADC/and or COMESA?
10. Do you think the region can assist in the growth of your organisation? If so how?
11. Is there a greater buy-in of commitments from states and stakeholders in terms of your activities, and in prioritising gender and women-related issues?
12. What are your sources of funding, and do you think these sources affect the way you operate and draw up strategic and action plans?

Interview questions prepared for policymakers

July – December 2016

1. What do you do as a SADC Gender Unit, what is your staff component, and how do you see and project yourself? Has this projection changed since the Unit was established?
2. On the nature and scope of the Gender Unit – has this changed over the last 5 – 10 years? Please comment on the progress and setbacks.
3. Where do you plan to be in the next 5 to 10 years?

4. Please expound on whether patriarchy and its structures are softening in the region. In what manner do your activities try to diminish patriarchy?
5. Who are you targeting in your work?
6. How are your target groups involved in your work, and what is the level of participation of non-state actors, specifically civil society organisations in SADC processes?
7. How recognised is the SADC Gender Unit in the Southern African region?
8. What is working for the SADC Gender Unit?
9. Is there a greater buy-in from states and stakeholders in terms of the commitments, and in prioritising gender issues?
10. Is there a relationship with the African Union (AU) or other organisations on developing norms and principles which inform your work?

Appendix 3: Civil society regional cluster themes -SADC Protocol on Gender and Development

Cluster Theme (2008)	Lead country organisation
Constitutional and legal rights	Women and Law in Southern Africa based in Lusaka, Zambia with offices in Lesotho, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique
Governance	Gender Advocacy Programme, based in Cape Town, South Africa
Economic justice	Zimbabwe Women's Resource Centre Network Harare Zimbabwe
Sexual and reproductive rights, HIV and AIDS	Southern Africa AIDS Information and dissemination Service based in Harare, Zimbabwe and Johannesburg, South Africa
Gender violence	GL based in Johannesburg, South Africa with Satellite offices in Mauritius and Botswana
Media, Information and communication	Gender and Media Southern Africa based in Johannesburg, South Africa with the country chapters: GEMSA-Botswana Media Women's Association in Botswana; UCOFEM-GEMSA in the DRC; GEMSA Lesotho; Media Watch Organisation (MWO)-GEMSA in Mauritius; Federation for Women and Children

Promotion/GEMSA in Madagascar; Gender and Media Malawi; GEMSA Mozambique; GEMSA Namibia; Gender and Media Swaziland, Gender and Media Tanzania, GEM Plus Seychelles; South Africa Gender and Media, GEMSA Zambia and Media Zimbabwe

Adopted and modified: (Roadmap to Equality: Lessons Learned in the campaign for a SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, 2009: 27).

Appendix 4: Civil society regional cluster themes reorganised over time

Theme clusters	Organisation	Country focal points	Organisation
Constitutional and Legal Rights	Women and Law Southern Africa (WLSA Regional Office) – Lusaka	Angola	Platforma da Mulheres (PMA)
Governance	Women in Politics Support Unit (WIPSU) – Harare	Botswana	Botswana Council of NGOs (BOCONGO)
Education and Training	Botswana Council of NGOs (BOCONGO)	Democratic Republic of Congo	Union Congolaise des Femmes des Medias (UCOFEM)
Economic Justice	Zimbabwe Women Resource Centre Network (ZWRCN) - Harare	Lesotho	Women and Law in Southern Africa – Lesotho (WLSA-Lesotho) on behalf of Lesotho Council of NGOs
Gender-based Violence	Western Cape Network on Violence Against Women – Cape Town	Madagascar	Federation Pour la Promotion Feminine en Enfantine (FPFE)
Sexual Reproductive	SAfAIDS - Pretoria	Mauritius	Mauritius Media Watch Organisation – Gender and Media Southern Africa

Health, HIV/AIDS			
Care Work	Voluntary Services Overseas – Regional AIDS Initiative of Southern Africa (VSO)- RAISA – Pretoria	Mozambique	Forum Fulher
		Namibia	Namibian Non-Governmental Organisations forum (NANGOF) Trust
Women Peace and Security Cluster	Institute for Security Studies	Seychelles	Gender and Media Plus (GEM Plus)
Gender and Media	Gender and Media Southern Africa (GEMSA) Network – Johannesburg	South Africa	South African Women in Dialogue
Interest Groups		Swaziland	Coordinating Assembly of NGOs (CANGO)
		Tanzania	Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP)
Faith-Based Organisations	Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) Southern Africa – Pretoria Partners - Regional	Zambia	Women and Law in Southern Africa – (WLSA-Zambia) on behalf of Zambia NGO Coordinating Council (NGOCC)
Men’s Sector	Men for Gender Equality Now – (MEGEN) - Lilongwe	Zimbabwe	Women’s Coalition of Zimbabwe

Appendix 5: State and non-state meeting between 2005 – 2008 on gender

- 2005: SADC Gender Unit and SADC Parliamentary Forum commission audit of progress by SADC governments towards achieving commitments in regional and international instruments; audit information used as background information for August 17-18, 2005 SADC Summit, Gaborone, Botswana.
- 2005 August: SADC Summit adopts 50/50 in decision-making policy, and SADC Secretariat mandated to start developing SADC Protocol to elevate SADC Declaration on Gender and Development into a legally binding instrument.
- 6-9 December 2005: SADC Gender Unit convenes Consultative Conference on Gender and Development, Conference with the theme: Reflecting and Restrategising for Gender-based Regional Integration.
- 28-29 March 2006: first meeting of the Task Force to finalise terms of reference for the task force, adopt a roadmap for the development of the Protocol, and drafting instructions.
- 14-15 September 2006, Johannesburg South Africa: Review of first draft by technical Roundtable of Experts.
- 16-18 April 2007: SADC Gender and Development Stakeholders Consultative Conference to develop draft Protocol.
- May 2007. Maputo Mozambique: Draft Protocol reviewed by Ministers Responsible for Gender and Women's Affairs.
- June 2007, Maseru Lesotho: Draft Protocol reviewed by Ministers of Justice.

- SADC Summit August 2007 Lusaka Zambia: Draft Protocol deferred for further consultations.
- December 2007: SADC Senior Officials responsible for Gender Protocol review meeting, Livingstone Zambia.
- May 2008: SADC Gender/Women's Affairs Ministers review draft Protocol in Windhoek, Namibia.
- July 2008: SADC Justice Ministers/Attorney Generals review draft Protocol in Zambia
- August 2008: Protocol adopted by SADC Heads of State and Government at the SADC Summit held in South Africa.

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- Planning meeting 17-19 July 2005.
- Planning and review meeting (teleconference) 23 February 2007.
- Planning and strategy meeting 19-22 March 2007, Johannesburg, South Africa.
- Post-SADC Summit Alliance Strategy Meeting 9 November 2007, Willow Park Johannesburg South Africa to revisit campaign strategy to influence SADC Poverty Strategy Conference in April 2008.
- Strategy Meeting Parallel to SADC Summit August 2008, Johannesburg South Africa; to lobby SADC officials, develop a medium-term plan of action, restructure Alliance (six thematic clusters, new Steering Committee).
- March 2009, Strategy review IEC strategy, and work on a monitoring tool (SADC Protocol Barometer).

Appendix 6: Civil Society milestones around the SADC Protocol 2005 – 2015

<p>2005: Audit of Achievements against the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development leads to a paper: “Rationale for the Elevation of the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development to a Protocol” - the most legally binding of SADC instruments. Civil society organisations for the Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance</p>	<p>March-April 2013: Twelve summits and a regional summit lead to 672 case studies being gathered on the SADC Protocol@work form NGOs, CSOs, Faith-Based Organisations</p>
<p>2005-2008: Alliance members form part of a Task Team constituted by the SADC Gender Unit to prepare drafting notes for a legal team, comment on and canvass seven drafts of the protocol before its final presentation to the Heads of State</p>	<p>By June 2013: Lesotho, DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe learn from Seychelles, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Swaziland on aligning their policies and action plans to the SADC Protocol and costing implementation</p>
<p>August 2008: 13 out of 15 HOS sign the SADC Gender Protocol, a unique sub-regional instrument that brings together and enhances existing commitments to gender equality through 28, time-bound targets aligned to the 2015 deadline for MDG 3. Alliance members launch a campaign to get Mauritius and Botswana to sign-</p>	<p>August 2013: Alliance annual meeting ahead of the SADC Heads of States Summit in Malawi with a key focus on implementation, the 50/50 campaign, gender and climate change and Coalition Building. Roundtable meeting with the new Southern African head of UN Women, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. Study visit to the Gauteng <i>Women Demand Action Now</i> Alliance networking meeting sparks ideas for strengthening country, provincial and district-level networking.</p>
<p>August 2009: The Alliance launches the SADC Gender Protocol Baseline Barometer- a key tracking tool assessing progress of 15 countries against the 28 targets of the Protocol – http://www.genderlinks.org.za/page/sadc-research-</p>	<p>August 2013: Coalition building and networking at regional level through the SADC Heads of state summit held in Malawi in August 2013 and a think tank meeting held alongside the SADC HOS summit.</p>
<p>August 2009: Alliance launches the “Roadmap to Equality” – strategies and lessons learned in the</p>	<p>By October 2013: Strengthening the country focal networks through mapping of country thematic</p>

campaign; key provisions of the Protocol in 23 languages; radio spots; a DVD; knowledge and attitude quiz; village-level meetings to popularise the Protocol that have since reached 15, 000 citizens directly and thousands more indirectly	clusters and championing resulting in 11 country level meetings and 82 signed up champions.
2009/2010: Alliance devises a Citizens Score Card that is used to gauge citizen perceptions of government progress and is administered at village meetings	December 2013: 12 country barometer reports; nine launches. SADC Gender Protocol village-level workshops in 10 countries through the country networks resulting in 72 meetings
August 2010: Progress Barometer and Alliance annual meeting. Alliance gets better organised into country and theme clusters, each leading on a key issue, e.g. GBV, economic justice.	May 2014: SADC Gender Protocol@Work summit preceded by 12 national summits with a special category on the Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs).
August 2011: SADC Gender Protocol goes into force with South Africa becoming the ninth country to ratify the Protocol giving the two thirds critical mass required...	March 2014: Alliance participates in the 58 th Commission on the Status of Women.
2011/2012 Alliance networks in-country identify champions for the 28 targets of the Protocol, begin to collect case studies of the Protocol@work	July 2014: Gender ministers meeting in Malawi ahead of the 35 th HOS Summit in Harare in August, followed by the SADC-CNGO civil society forum in Harare. Alliance makes the case for a strong Post-2015 gender agenda.
September 2011: The Alliance collaborates with the SADC Gender Unit on a tool and process for aligning national gender action plans to the targets of the SADC Gender Protocol and costing their implementation. Namibia pilots this process-	August 2014: 35 th SADC heads of State Summit in Victoria Falls; Alliance lobbies for the review of the SADC Gender Protocol
	March 2015: The Alliance participate at CSW 59 with a focus on the targets and indicators for the SDGs and the SADC Gender Protocol Post-2015.
November 2011: Intense lobbying for an Addendum to the Protocol on Gender and Climate Change linked to COP 17	March 2015: The Alliance's input on the Global SDGs consultations is acknowledged.
February 2013: Gender ministers meeting in Maputo ahead of the 57 th meeting of the	May 2015: The SADC Executive Secretary requests the Alliance together with UN Women to

Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) commit to take forward the Addendum. Alliance releases a progressive statement on gender justice concerns in the region. Mounts a presence at the CSW and produces a daily newsletter; generates debate on the Post-2015 agenda

work with the SADC Secretariat as technical partners in the review process.