

**Negotiating marginalisation: A socio-economic history of the Kalanga of
Mangwe, Zimbabwe, 1940-2015.**

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Abstract

The thesis explores the relationship between ethnicity, marginalisation, and survival mechanisms amongst the Kalanga people of Mangwe (southwestern Zimbabwe) from the 1940s up until the turn of the 21st century. The study showed how the Kalanga of Mangwe have used ethnicity as a concept to not only claim access to resources but also develop alternative survival strategies that help them seek to navigate their experiences of marginalisation by both the state and the hegemonic position of the Ndebele who dominate the region politically and linguistically. Using evidence from activities such as cross border migration and the mopane economy, I showed how the Kalanga express their displeasure at being dominated through engagement, as was shown in their attempt to fight for their language, for example in the 1940s through regionalised Kalanga organisations as the Kalanga Language and Cultural Development Society (KLCDS), to disengagement such as migration and illegal informal cross border trade. Using ‘conviviality’ and ‘the everyday’, as well as borrowing from the Race Relations Theory (RRT) of Robert Ezra Park as theoretical underpinnings, I demonstrated how amongst the Kalanga of Mangwe ethnic identity can lead to competition for resources, which in turn leads to marginalisation and discrimination which influences their social, political and economic choices that may in turn reinforce ethnic identity in a cycle like scenario. Everyday economic and social activities amongst the Kalanga of Mangwe that appear mundane and ordinary to an uninterested observer, help shape the everyday discourse of the Kalanga as they navigate marginalisation.

Declaration

I, Innocent Nyathi declare that this is a product of my own unaided research, submitted at Rhodes University in the Faculty of Humanities. Where I used other people's published work, I fully acknowledged it in the footnotes and bibliography. This work has not been submitted in any other University/Faculty.

Dedication

This work is dedicated to my family, both immediate and extended whose valuable support and patience helped me endure long periods of isolation and loneliness during fieldwork as well as in the actual writing of the thesis.

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Glossary of terms

Kalanga/BaKalanga/Makalaka.... used here to refer to a Bantu people inhabiting southwestern Zimbabwe

Tjikalanga.... language spoken by the Kalanga people

Hole.....a caste group in the Ndebele kingdom made of the groupings that the Ndebele found and purportedly absorbed upon their settlement in Zimbabwe.

Madeluka.... a group of people of Kalanga extraction who were moved from northern Mangwe to southern in settler evictions

Amampande...a group of people of Ndebele extraction who were moved from northern Mangwe to southern Mangwe during settler evictions.

Intaka.....qualia birds notorious for destroying small grain crops in Mangwe

tjidaka.....fertile alluvial soils deposited after rains at valleys and are popular with cultivators of maize

Kutenela.....hunting in bands

Amafemu.....firms

Madumba.....poorly built huts usually found in poor rural households

Dabulaphu..... fabled migration trips from Zimbabwe to South Africa.

Omalayitsha... ..Informal cross border couriers

mijibha/miranda.....migrant workers plying their trade
in Johannesburg

mesilane.... the construction industry in
Johannesburg

bakadliwa/migewu/migulugudu individuals who migrated to,
have become untraceable once they settled in Johannesburg

homu/inkelu..... dry marula nuts, in TjiKalanga and IsiNdebele
respectively

mtopi.....a wild nut-like fruit.

CHAPTER 1

Negotiating marginalisation: The Kalanga and Mangwe, 1940-2015.¹

1.1 Introduction

Kalanga communities of Mangwe have experiences of profound change since the 1940s. Most of these changes have been observed in the economic activities found in the area such as the rise in importance of unregulated cross border trade and the mopane worm economy. These changes can be explained in two ways. Firstly, they were in response to changing economic patterns in Zimbabwe characterised by crisis and uncertainty, as well as the vagaries of nature such as droughts and floods. Secondly these changes also reflect the manner of relations that exist between the Kalanga of Mangwe and the colonial and post-colonial state in Zimbabwe. The colonial and post-colonial state in Zimbabwe has through their policy and practises created conditions for unequal development that have led to the marginalisation of Mangwe as a region and the Kalanga as a people. The marginalisation of the Kalanga of Mangwe is manifested in several ways. Firstly, the Kalanga face/d the danger of losing their language (TjiKalanga) as successive governments have tended to promote the use of IsiNdebele in schools and at community fora in Mangwe at the expense of TjiKalanga.² The efforts to redress this have been slow and characterised by fits and starts as shown by the continued dominance of the IsiNdebele in the local language curriculum.

¹ The research was funded from Professor Enocent Msindo's National Research Foundation Competitive funding for Rated Researchers Grant (Grant Number CPRRI50626121419). The NRF and ProfMsindo are not responsible for views expressed in this thesis.

² T. Dube, 'Shifting Identities and the Transformation of the Kalanga People of Bulilimamangwe District c.1946-2005', (unpublished PhD thesis, 2005), C. Mabheba, 'Ethnicity, Development and the Dynamics of Rural Development in Matabeleland,' IOSR, Journal of Humanities and Social Science, vol 19, issue 4, (2014)

The marginalisation of the Kalanga is also seen in the lack of social amenities in the area. For example, the district has a very few schools and clinics and all the roads in the district are not tarred. The inadequacy of social amenities sees residents travelling long distances to access health and educational services. In some instances, especially for school going children, the distances pose a major challenge and lead to high incidences of school dropout. Armed with little or no education, the children cannot compete favourably in the ever-shrinking job market. As a result, they resort to cross border migration and gold panning. Finally, except for the ailing cattle economy, there are no known productive primary and secondary industries in the entire district. This has resulted in the emergence of informal economic activities such as the harvesting and selling of mopane worms, unregulated cross-border trade, and gold panning. The recourse to alluvial gold panning will most probably put severe strains on the already fragile Mangwe physical environment, accentuating the already dire water crisis and the agricultural sector.

The scarcity of economic options in Mangwe is linked to the policies of the state which has over the years placed little priority on minority ethnic groups. As a result, the scarcity of economic options has raised the importance of the economic activities mentioned above as the Kalanga of Mangwe try to negotiate marginalisation. Though the thesis acknowledges that the Kalanga are not the only group marginalised in Zimbabwe, the attempt to historicise these economic activities will help us understand the different mechanisms employed by marginalised groups to mitigate the effects of marginalisation, as well as the interplay between resource distribution and ethnicity in developing countries such as Zimbabwe. In the pre-colonial and colonial periods, Kalanga elites contended with the expansion of Ndebele political power into areas that Kalanga communities had long occupied. The Ndebele state, for example created and placed their *amabutho* (military regiments) and

chiefdoms in areas that had been traditionally occupied by the Kalanga especially in Izimnyama and Empandeni areas.³ The Kalanga who were subjugated by Ndebele were given the lowest rank in the Ndebele caste system, being called *amahole*. The caste system placed the Kalanga as third-class citizens in the land they considered themselves autochthonous to. There is reason to suspect that the marginalisation of the Kalanga has its roots in the Ndebele caste system because not only did it lower the status of Kalanga traditional authority, but it also led to the gradual erosion of Kalanga culture, ethos, values and language which inadvertently entrenched their marginal status in the state.

The colonial state accelerated this Ndebele dominance over BaKalanga by imposing Ndebele chiefs and language in Kalanga communities, mainly for administrative expediency.⁴ The commoners and political elite played an important role in highlighting marginalisation.⁵ Kalanga elites responded to these developments in various ways, chief of which was the formation in 1946, of the Kalanga Cultural Promotion Society, whose main goal was to restore pride in everything that was assumed to be Kalanga.⁶ This study will examine the different economic activities they have engaged in over the years. The radicalisation of the Kalanga elite in the 1940s is an important indicator of the simmering levels of discontent against policies put in place by the colonial regime at the peak of colonial rule. In *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, Msindo observed that key African nationalists such as Jason Moyo, Joshua Nkomo and George Silundika came from Kalanga communities.⁷ These nationalists simultaneously fought for African and Kalanga rights, even though the

³ E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe: Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies 1860-1990*(New York: Rochester, 2012), p65

⁴ Ibid, chapter 3

⁵ ibid, chapters 2 and 3

⁶ Dube, *Shifting Identities*, p34.

⁷ Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, p 190.

overarching ‘national’ grievances appeared to be more important. After independence (1980), some Kalanga elite were co-opted into the state as civil servants. A similar process happened in Botswana where anthropologist Richard Werbner examined the ways in which Kalanga elites tried to integrate themselves into a predominantly Tswana controlled state.⁸

The early years of independence in Zimbabwe were characterised by a period of deadly violence in Matabeleland South (inhabited also by the Kalanga). From the perspective of the Kalanga in Mangwe, this episode magnified the ethnic tensions that set the tone for state policy in Zimbabwe, where minority group interest became heavily compromised as evidenced in the apparent lack of economic, social and politico-cultural development in their communities. The Kalanga elite were caught in limbo. Their continued presence in the new government was placed under threat, with some losing their cabinet posts.⁹ At this stage however, leaders such as Joshua Nkomo were not pushing a narrow selfish agenda focusing only on their Kalanga roots but espoused a national project that continued to project ZAPU as a victim of state sponsored annihilation. It is however important to add here that people such as Joshua Nkomo, despite being raised amongst the Kalanga and professing a nationalistic outlook were seen as pursuing a ‘Ndebele’ agenda in the eyes of the ‘Shona’ dominated state, for one reason or another. However, through observation the period of instability from 1983-87 further compounded the marginalisation of the Kalanga, because resources and time were devoted to ‘pacifying’ the dissident problem at the expense of development. In the same vein, the disturbances led to the polarisation of ethnicity in Zimbabwe into Shona Ndebele. This has been used by some scholars and

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Chief among those expelled was Joshua Nkomo, a towering figure in nationalist politics in Zimbabwe, and raised among the Kalanga.

Kalanga activists and politicians to explain what they perceive as the continued marginalisation of their communities.¹⁰

The thesis attempts to examine the relationship between the marginalisation of the Kalanga of Mangwe and the economic activities being carried out in the area. This thesis concurs with Ilorah in positing that treating citizens unequally based on ethnicity is anti-developmental and a major problem in Africa.¹¹ It has caused resentment among marginalised ethnic groups, fuelled conflicts and sometimes wars, and discouraged investments, retarding growth and development prospects.¹² Ilorah further argues that since independence (I will argue that even during the colonial period), the political leadership in most African states put in place and perpetuated the politics of divide and rule, followed along the fissures of ethnicities.¹³ Kamunyi argues that marginalisation in Africa is a result of the leadership's failure to provide a leadership that is not based on patronage, but on a strong motivation and deep desire to serve all citizens without special political favours or prejudice to any group on the basis of ethnicity.¹⁴

In most cases, recourse to ethnicity by the political leadership leads to the development of what is called 'factionalism', where one group within a ruling system mobilises power around an interest group. Factionalism retards development because the leadership spends most of its energy engaged in political gamesmanship. It is important to stress, however,

¹⁰ Newsday, 'MPs raise tribal land war spectre', November 22, 2016. See also N G Ndhlovu, The Ethnicity of Development: *Discourses shaping Developmental Politics in rural Matabeleland*, in the African Journal of Social Work, p37.

¹¹ R. Ilorah, *Ethnic Bias, Favouritism and Development in Africa*, in Development Southern Africa, 25:5(2009), pp 345

¹² Ibid.

¹³ ibid

¹⁴ W. F. Kumuyi, *The Case for Servant Leadership*, New African, 467 : (2007), 19–20.

that in most cases, factionalism is a result of ‘temporary’ political alliances which cut across ethnic lines though the ethnic card remains an important tool. There is direct relationship between interest-based politics and marginalisation because interest-based politics promote parochial policies which promote sectarian agendas at the expense of broad-based development.

The study, being an investigation into the marginalisation and coping strategies of a minority group, contributes to our broader understanding of ethnic relations in developing countries, and how these relations shape the social, economic, and political development of different communities in those countries. Firstly, the study seeks to broaden our understanding of the Kalanga as an ethnic group. Similar studies in that direction have been carried out on identifying this group.

Secondly, the power of everyday discourses viz a vis the economic and social activity that the Kalanga people partake in will be discussed with a desire to provide an insight into how the Kalanga have devised strategies meant to mitigate the effects of marginalisation. The everyday activities reflect Kalanga experiences and help inform on their attempts to navigate their ‘marginal’ existence. Thus, the study hopes to debunk the myth that marginalised groups such as the Kalanga are passive recipients of their marginal existence and wallow in it without response. Because the socio-economic activities to be discussed below were found to be widespread and cutting across gender and age-groups as well as economic status of the villagers, I argue that they are representative enough of the Kalanga and their deployment is an attempt to navigate marginalisation though I concur with views that some of the activities are not confined to the Kalanga only.

1.2 Theoretical underpinnings of the study

The following section provides an explanation of the main theories underpinning the study; ethnicity, marginalisation and survival mechanisms, and how everyday discourses of the Kalanga of Mangwe are interwoven around those issues. Because of the protean nature of these parameters, a more nuanced approach is applied where the three main issues are treated as overlapping and not existing in isolation, and in the case of the survival strategies a breakdown on some theories to help explain the economic choices of the Kalanga in Mangwe is given. The study is thematic and expansive in its approach thus justifying a detailed discussion

To fully understand the discussion, I borrow on the Race Relations Theory propounded by Parker, et al in the early 21st century. Though primarily a race theory, the study benefited a lot from applying some of its concepts as it expands into relations between ethnicities and races. Parker focused on two diametrically opposite variables called triggers and calmers in trying to explain interactions between ethnicities and races. Triggers are mostly negative and include competition, conflict and parasitic relations. On the other hand, the calmers are peaceful relations characterised by assimilation and accommodation. Using Park's theory, I attempted a presentation of how the 'triggers' would normally play out in our understanding of Kalanga identity in the last hundred or so years.

But to put the illustration in the context of the Kalanga of Mangwe as well as try to supplement the Race Relations Theory, I use the relatively recent concepts of conviviality and the everyday. Conviviality describes the way human beings in a society relate with each other to meet their needs. Apart from social interactions, conviviality has been expanded to include localised means of production and how they engender survival

strategies in constrained spaces.¹⁵ In addition to conviviality, the ‘everyday’ can be viewed in more simpler terms as the daily routine of life of a people as they negotiate their everyday existence or the different forms of challenges that life presents to them. As Msindo and Nyachega observed in a rural community during the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, the ‘everyday’ can be ‘mediated by forms of conviviality or what they call congenial rapport.’¹⁶ For purposes of this study, I argue that conviviality is reinforced by an identity(Kalanga), and the everyday activities of this identity assist in negotiating relations between ‘hard power’ (as exerted by political or economic forces) and ‘soft power(as radiated by the marginalised communities in this case the Kalanga). For Homi Bhabha, minorities continually negotiate their identity as a way of ‘locating’ their place in societies characterised by multiculturalism, violence, colonial influences, amongst other influences.¹⁷

Ethnicity has been mobilised for claims to not only resources but also cultural and social space. However, because of the domineering and hegemonic tendencies of both the Ndebele and the state, this has led to feelings of marginalisation of the Kalanga as shown by their continuous demands for recognition. As a result of the competition for scarce resources, and the marginalisation and discrimination of the Kalanga over the years I contend that the Kalanga have been compelled to make choices such ‘*ukulayitsha*’ (cross border courier services) because of their marginal existence. These activities have in turn assisted in accentuating Kalanga ethnic identity and calling for further recognition by this group.

¹⁵ E. Msindo and Nyachega. N, *Zimbabwe’s Liberation War and the Everyday in Honde Valley, 1975 to 1975*, South African Historical Journal, 71.1(2019), pp 70-93.

¹⁶ Ibid, p 74.

¹⁷ H. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (Routledge, London: 1994), pp 1-6.

Amongst the ‘triggers’ in Mangwe, one may identify precolonial, colonial, and post-colonial marginalisation, the violence of early independence Zimbabwe, alleged nepotism, language prejudice in mainstream media and formal education, as well as lack of economic development as having shaped the identity of the Kalanga over the decades. However, as Parker demonstrated on the race relations theory, this is not to say that there has been a total lack of calmness amongst the marginalised groups. Amongst the Kalanga, we have witnessed both the Ndebele and the state attempting to placate the demands of the Kalanga in several ways, for example through incorporating some influential Kalanga elite into the state structures such as District Administrators and Members of Parliament, or the Ndebele subtly using their hegemonic tendencies to seek to incorporate the Kalanga in regionalised if not secessionist movements such as Umthwakazi Republic Party.

1.3 Ethnicity as a concept

There have been numerous debates on the concept of ethnicity in general.¹⁸ The prevalent use of the term is quite recent. However, it gained greater significance in the post second world war literature as an escape from the term ‘race’ which had gained notoriety in the Nazi regime in Germany.¹⁹ The debates on ethnicity have focused on number of issues such

¹⁸ The debates are generally divided into three broad strands namely primordialists, instrumentalists and constructivists. In the primordialists fold one finds scholars such as W. Connor, *Beyond Reason: Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 16(3), (1993); D.L Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (California: University of California Press, 1985); Geertz(ed), *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia* (New York: Free Press, 1967); E. Shils, *Primordial, Personal, Sacred, and Civil Ties*, British Journal of Sociology, 8(1957); A.D Smith, *The Nation in History* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000); Instrumentalist see ethnicity as a manipulative instrument of social negotiation, for example P. L.van den Berghe, *The Ethnic Phenomenon* (New York: Elsevier, 1981); J Lonsdale, ‘Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism’, Wissensensschaftliche Tagung Vereinigung der Afrikanisten in Deutschland, (Duisburg, April 1995.); There are others who see ethnicity as a social construct or a case of individual discretion, such as F Barth (Ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969); R Jenkins, ‘Categorisation: Identity, Social Progress and Epistemology’, *Current Sociology*, 48, 3, (2000); E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe: Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies 1860/1990* (New York: Rochester, 2012).

¹⁹ E. Wan and Vanderwerf. M., ‘A Review of the Literature on Ethnicity, National Identity and Related Missiological Studies’, in www. GlobalMissiology.org, (2009), p3.

as the originality and durability of ethnicity as an identity. Because the study of ethnicity is a recent phenomenon, scholars have continuously cast and recast their debates on the issue, some seeking to portray it as a given, some as imagined and constructed, whilst some have sought to fuse the different approaches into one model with varying degrees of success.

Basically, three broad theoretical perspectives, ‘primordialism’, ‘instrumentalism’ and ‘constructivism’ have been used to define and study the concept of ethnicity. Instrumentalism and constructivism are closely related because they entail the manipulation of ethnicity to satisfy individual interests. Instrumentalism, for example sees ethnicity as based on people’s historical and symbolic memory, as sometimes created and used and exploited by leaders and others in the pragmatic pursuit of their own interests.¹⁹ Constructivists, on the other hand argue that while ethnicity is not something people ‘possess’, it is constructed in special social and historical contexts to pursue self-interests, as something fluid and subjective.²⁰ However, as Hale argues none of these have proved accurate or sufficient to recast the debate to the microlevel of understanding ethnicity.²¹ For the purposes of this study, the constructivist approach appears most appropriate in articulating Kalanga identity and ethnicity in the period under study because it focuses on the fluidity of ethnicity, which I believe is evident amongst the Kalanga people. The study thus hopes to use the constructivist approach in analysing the response of the Kalanga to marginalisation especially in the economic sphere, something that scholarship on the Kalanga has barely touched on.

1.4 Indigeneity and autochthones

Indigeneity and autochthone studies continue to provide scholars with a genuine paradigm to analyse interethnic relations in Arica.²⁰ In recent years, the discourse of autochthony has not limited itself to Africa but has palpably sprung up in European countries such as Denmark where the Right has attempted to use it to repulse forces promoting free immigration and globalisation.²¹ Closer to home Mujere showed how minority groups settling on new territories develop special attachments to those areas as they continuously struggle with balancing their own identities with integrating to other groups that come into contact with them.²² At its core is the understanding that groups existing in geographic space (contested or not) are prone to view themselves as ‘us’ and ‘others’ basing on amongst other things myths about who came ‘first’ and ‘how.’ Whilst the colonial experience assisted in entrenching these connotations about ‘citizens’ and ‘subjects’, the agency of the African themselves cannot be denied especially when the question of resources became focal for everyday survival. In the thesis I show that the Kalanga, by virtue of claiming a measure of indigeneity to areas in Matabeleland South in Zimbabwe, have found themselves at odds with people from other regions in the exploitation of resources in the region. As Zenker rightly observes, autochthony can rightly be attributed as a causal variable to ethnic identity. However, it is imperative to stress at this stage that the concepts of indigeneity and autochthony have not escaped the ‘sceptic’s’ eye. For example, Adam Kuper and Allan Barnard argued that the terms have essentially been

²⁰ M Pelican, *Complexities of Indigeneity and Autochthony in Africa: An African Example*, in JSTOR, vol 36, no. 1 (February 2009), pp52-65.

²¹ O Zenker, *Autochthony, ethnicity, indigeneity, and nationalism: Time-honouring and state-oriented modes of rooting individual-territory-group triads in a globalizing world*, *Critique of Anthropology*, 31(1), p 69.

²² J Mujere, *Land, Migration and Belonging: A History of the Basotho in Southern Rhodesia. c.1890-1960s* (London: James Currey, 2019).

politicised and are based on obsolete anthropological considerations.²³ And as I try to show throughout the thesis, and as Mujere showed in his work on the Basotho it is practically impossible to maintain identity particularism. Despite some of the limitations suggested above, I nonetheless contend that indigeneity and ‘autochthony’ have been important identity framers in the struggle for survival in Mangwe. The efforts by the Kalanga to resist firstly, Ndebele encroachment into their territories in the precolonial period by creating large self-governing chiefdoms on the margins of Ndebele power and secondly their resistance of colonial policies was embedded in the belief that they were the true owners of the land. In the case of the Kalanga, activities such as unregulated cross border trade, illegal cross border migration, and others, have a long history.

1.5 Marginalisation

Sentiments on Kalanga marginalisation are not new. Studies have shown that the group has experienced various forms of marginalisation in its history of interaction with the Ndebele, colonial forces, and the modern state of Zimbabwe. The study reinforces that notion of Kalanga marginalisation by going further and adopting a thematic approach on Kalanga response to marginalisation. To that end the concept of marginalisation is explored. For example, it involves the interplay of class, status and political power and serves the interests of the dominant group.²⁴ The concept of marginalisation has been defined by Gale as

comprising those processes by which individuals and groups are ignored or relegated to the side-lines of political debate, social negotiation, and economic bargaining—and kept there.²⁵

²³ Ibid, p 64.

²⁴ M. Burton and C. Kagan, *Marginalization*, in I. Prilleltensky and G. Nelson (Eds), *Community Psychology: In pursuit of wellness and liberation* (London: Macmillan, 2003), pp1-19.

²⁵ T Gale, *Marginalisation*, in *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, (2008), p24

Marxist leaning sociologists such as Tilly view marginalisation as a structural phenomenon endemic to capitalism, emphasising the importance of social networks to marginalisation.²⁶ The structure and modus operandi of capitalism encourages the skewed distribution of resources. In such a scenario, groups with access to political power also monopolise the economic sector. Groups on the margins are left with little option but to devise survival strategies. Importantly, marginalisation is not a static phenomenon, for example individuals and groups may enjoy a high social status at one point in time, but as social change takes place, lose it.²⁷ So marginalisation should not be viewed as entirely negative, and as my study shows marginalised groups may devise survival strategies that enable them to attain decent living standards. In terms of using the term marginalisation, I try to emphasise its negative connotations in the case of the Kalanga on the one hand, and on the other to show that it has in a way promoted a measure of self-reliance on this group of people if their coping strategies are anything to go. So, the study goes beyond the simplistic interpretation of marginalisation as an overly negative phenomenon by appreciating the innovativeness that it engenders on the ‘victim’ as evidenced by the numerous economic activities that the Kalanga partake in.

Scholars generally view marginalisation as falling under three categories. These are cultural, social role and structural marginalisation.²⁶ Cultural marginalisation happens when an individual’s cultural practises are given less emphasis in a social setting leading to cultural assimilation and acculturation. A good example is the colonial experience in Africa where European culture, to a large extent supplanted African culture (as evidenced

²⁶ C Tilly, *Durable Inequality*, (Berkeley: University of California, 1999), p 23.

²⁷ Burton and Kagan, *Marginalisation*, p9

by proliferation of Christianity, food tastes, European dress, and the European education system in Africa). In some instances, the culture of a dominant ethnic group, through policies deliberately put in place by the state (such as the caste system in the Ndebele state), is put above that of the minority group. The populace in the minority ethnic group is forced to adopt the cultural traits of the dominant group assiduously, yet insidiously.

Social role marginalisation describes the tensions which occur when an individual or community is restricted from belonging to a group of their choice. Society may deliberately choose to frown upon a certain pocket of people in their midst because they ascribe to behaviour society considers unbecoming. In as much as society may have perceptions over one group bordering on the negative, this type of marginalisation ignores the social intricacies and relations that develop between two groups of people. Among the Kalanga and the aMaMpande for example, despite the palpable animosity between the two groups they still developed other ties on a social level such as cooperating on work parties (*amalima*) and so forth. Lastly, structural marginalisation refers to political, social, and economic powerlessness and disadvantage because of structures that are put in place by those in positions of power.²⁸ Structural marginalisation may be identified through economic indicators such as lack of industry or infrastructure in an area as well as policy formulation. One of the enduring grievances of the Kalanga was that the district lacks industry and has deteriorating infrastructure, for example bridges are collapsing and schools and health facilities have remained quite far apart. Again, this type of marginalisation though the most pervasive also ignores the fact that dominant groups may be compelled to put up structures in marginalised areas intending to maximise their exploitation of that

²⁸ J M Billson, *No Owners of Soil. Redefining the Concept of Marginality*, In: Dennis M Rutledge (ed.): *Marginality, Power and Social Structure: Issues in Race, Class and Gender Analysis*, (Oxford: Routledge, 2005) pp 29-47.

group but unwittingly opening avenues to the marginalised. In Mangwe the Mphoengs border post acts an important outlet for illicit trade and smuggling amongst the locals for goods such as fuel and food.

The relationship between ethnicity, marginalisation and survival strategies of marginalised rural communities requires that we understand ethnicity as an identity. In the 1950s, modernists viewed ethnicity as a residue of the past which would fall away with the increasing levels of modernity.²⁹ In that regard, its importance in explaining the apparent lack of development in some sections of newly independent society was downplayed. At most it was regarded as a secessionist's refuge and was publicly denounced at political rallies by the new leadership of independent African nations.³⁰ However due to the deteriorating economies in African nations, as well as the high incidences of ethnic wars most notably the Biafra war in Nigeria and the genocide in Rwanda, numerous studies have now been carried out to understand the relationship between ethnicity and marginalisation. Ilorah gives a very persuasive argument on the relationship between ethnicity and marginalisation in Africa, where he argues that the

leadership in many African countries, with their ethnic diversities, is characterised by ethnic bias and favouritism, and citizens are thus treated unequally in many respects, particularly when it comes to national resource allocation and political representation. This breeds resentment and creates conditions for an ultimate rejection of the state by the frustrated and politically conscious masses. It is also tantamount to corruption, weakening the ability of the state to function efficiently,

²⁹ J Coleman and C G Roseberg(eds), *Political Parties and Integration* (Berkeley: Berkeley University Press, 1964).

³⁰ Bulawayo 24, 'Enos Nkala the 'mass murderer who died a pauper' 9 October 2014; CCJPZ, p 11.

*and is therefore antidevelopmental. This paper argues that the socio-economic crises in many African countries are aggravated by practices of ethnic bias and favouritism that have consistently violated the principle of the impersonality of economic agents, caused resentment among the marginalised ethnic groups, fuelled conflicts, and retarded development on the continent.*³¹

According to Ilorah, the root causes of ethnic bias and favouritism can be traced back to the colonial period.³² This assumption however may be considered limited in the sense that even precolonial African societies were broken down into different classes enjoying differing levels of privilege and power. For example, the Ndebele society was divided into three subgroups: the Hole, the Enhla and the Zansi. I argue that these divisions were ‘tribal’ in nature and led to the ‘minoritisation’ of groups such as the Kalanga. In the same vein, access to privilege in the state was also tribal based, meaning that groups such as the Kalanga existed on the margins of the state and had unequal access to state power or the levers of the economy beyond provided the manpower or expertise necessary to support the running of the broader economy of the Ndebele society. The colonial period exploited these ethnic differences to create arbitrary boundaries and confer and deny privileges as and when it suited them. The colonial period cultivated an ‘extractive’ mentality on the African elite, where those in power are mostly concerned with creating patronage systems rather than a developmental agenda, and this invariably assumes ethnic undertones. In such an instance, ethnicity becomes a negative force. Ethnicity in its negative form negates development. It becomes a powerful force that leads to the vices that in turn defines the redistribution of a

³¹ R Ilorah, *Ethnic Bias, Favouritism and Development in Africa*, in *Development Southern Africa*, 26:5(2009), pp 695-707.

³² Ibid

country's resources.³³ For purposes of this debate colonial marginalisation was as perverse and anti-developmental as is in the postcolonial period in that it lowered the standards of living of groups at the receiving end. The problem of marginalisation leads to and aggravates the problem of income inequality and leads to resource scrambles harmful to growth.³⁴

Whilst most view marginalisation as creating conditions for an ultimate rejection of the state by large numbers of frustrated and politically conscious people, especially those with considerable education, I proffer a different view that amongst the Kalanga of Mangwe, the state has not been explicitly rejected, or has there been the creation of secessionist militancy, but rather that activities such as mass migration represent a form of 'disengagement' and protest particularly when one observes the manner in which the Kalanga handle their citizenship identity in Zimbabwe.³⁵ Marginalisation in Mangwe has not necessarily bred downtrodden masses, but in some instances, marginalisation has also promoted amongst these people vices such as corruption as they try to cultivate explicit and implicit reciprocal obligations among the favoured groups, depending on whether the beneficiaries are business associates and acquaintances or friends and loved ones.³⁶

³³ N. Noyoo, '*Ethnicity and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*,' in *Journal of Social Development in Africa* vol 15, no 2(2000), pp58-60.

³⁴ A. Alesina and D. Rodrik, '*Distributive politics and economic growth*', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 109(1994), pp465-9.

³⁵ Dube, *Shifting Identities*, on the fluid nature of Kalanga identity in Zimbabwe.

³⁶ Ilorah, '*Ethnic Bias*., p 703.

What appears true though in most literature on marginalisation is that it weakens the ability of the state to function efficiently and pursue growth-promoting policies because of lack of consensus on issues favourable to all ethnic groups.³⁷ Accountability to the public is compromised since those in power often misuse public trust and the power entrusted to them for private gain.³⁸ Lack of consensus means that there is disharmony and disagreement on what must be done, and how it is to be done, amongst different ethnic groups. This situation results in distorted regional development as certain regions are designated for development schemes and projects, even when such places offer no comparative advantages; the sole criterion being that the region is inhabited by the dominant ethnic group.³⁹ For example (as is the case in Mangwe) a road servicing a busy border post in an area within a marginalised region may remain untarred, or with no electricity and running water whilst a farm road in an area where the dominant ethnic group resides is tarred and has electricity and running water.⁴⁰ The lack of proper accountability, coupled with the sometimes passive response from intimidated and manipulated citizens, many of whom lack the willpower to speak out for fear of harassment, results in monopolisation of power, abuse of privileges, arrogance and waste of resources by the political leadership.⁴¹

Studies by scholars such as Dube and Msindo have demonstrated that amongst the Kalanga successive marginalisation by the different of the group has failed to develop an element of

³⁷ P. Mauro, 1995. *Corruption and Growth*, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110: 681–712; W. Easterly and Levine, R, 1997. *Africa's growth tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions*, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112: 1203–50

³⁸ Ilorah, 'Ethnic Bias.', p 703.

³⁹ Noyoo, *Ethnicity and Development*, pp58-60.

⁴⁰ Mphoengs border post has gone for years now with no tarred road or electricity.

⁴¹ Ilorah, *Ethnic Bias.*, p20.

inferiority in the long term. I concur that the resilience of the Kalanga language, and their religion, the Mwali cult even at the height of Ndebele power is testimony to that. However, it is sometimes exaggerated that those who do not come from the ruling ethnic group are always neglected by the state.⁴² Amongst the Kalanga I try and debunk this myth by showing that some Kalanga elite have benefited from the patronage of the state as chiefs, members of parliament or local runners and enforcers. This however is on a low scale. In this way though ethnicity does not always 'emerge as a primary agent of accumulation, both of wealth and political power.'⁴³

1.6 Survival strategies

Studies on survival strategies are mostly confined to development studies or livelihood studies.⁴⁴ Little has been done to link ethnicity to choices made to survive. In that regard this study seeks to fill that gap by showing how the Kalanga have adopted numerous ways to navigate marginalisation. Burton and Kagan for example offer an excellent analysis on how marginalised groups may combine or move between different economic activities in their struggle for survival.⁴⁵ Survival strategies may be defined as the informal and formal activities that marginalised groups adopt to mitigate the socio-economic and political effects of marginalisation.⁴⁶ Generally, survival strategies may encompass conscious

⁴² J F Bayart, *"Civil Society in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power"* in P. Chabal (ed.) *Political Domination in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ P. A. Hobane (1994), *The Effects of the Commercialisation of the Mopane Worms: Natural Resources Management Project*. USAID Project no. 690 0251; by the same author (1995), *'Amacimbi: the gathering, processing, consumption and trade of edible caterpillars in Bulilimamangwe District'*, Centre for Applied Social Studies Occasional Paper 67, Harare, Zimbabwe. See also W. Kozanayi and Frost P (2002), *Marketing of Mopane Worm in Southern Zimbabwe*, unpublished report, Institute of Environmental studies, University of Zimbabwe, pp 17.

⁴⁵ Burton and Kagan, *Marginalisation*, pp1-19.

⁴⁶ P Valent, *Introduction to Survival Strategies*, in *From Survival to Fulfilment: A Framework of Life-trauma Dialect*, (Philadelphia: Brunner, 1998), pp115.

choices such as migration and cross border trade. Bayart argues that groups which feel dissatisfied with the state may develop alternative economic activities that literally ‘bypass’ the state through differing forms of ‘disengagement’ and ‘exit’.⁴⁷ Exit and disengagement are used to describe the actions by groups and individuals whereby state institutions and legal frameworks are manipulated or ignored with the goal of achieving an economic, social or even political end. Exit strategies are survival strategies and they also constitute protest against the excesses of the state. In some instances, the rejection of the state may be witnessed in the marginalised groups developing alternatives for survival that are subtle yet symbolic. The symbolism in that particular action helps cement or construct group identity. They constitute the exit strategies that Bayart refers to. In the case of the Kalanga activities such as unregulated cross border trade, illegal cross border migration, and others, have a long history, and may constitute the subtler forms of exiting a marginalising society.

In some instances, marginalised groups may exercise a form of ‘passive’ political score-settling such as a ‘protest vote’, where the candidates ‘imposed’ by the state are wholesomely rejected by the electorate.⁴⁸ In most cases these candidates do not have a clear developmental agenda to the electorate but are nonetheless voted in because of their opposition to the state. Such actions by marginalised have in the past produced two results. On the hand the central government may be forced to act on half-hearted promises, for example adding a kilometre or two of tar on a road, or deliberately ‘fix’ the erstwhile tribe by further blocking or limiting aid and developmental incentives. The score settling

⁴⁷ Bayart, *"Civil Society in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power,"* p12.

⁴⁸ The 2008 elections in Zimbabwe are a case in point, where voters overwhelmingly embraced opposition politics even though they did not have much in terms of policy rather than merely preaching the gospel of change.

inevitably brings more harm to the marginalised group than to the state because the state controls the levers of power and may not necessarily need the vote of the minority group for legitimisation.

Studies in some African countries, however, have shown that these victims of ethnic bias and favouritism have been transformed from passive non-beneficiaries to active political adversaries and have threatened political stability and the governments concerned through rebellion and conflicts⁴⁹. In some case as noted by Ilorah, in a patrimonial state where a specific interest group is heavily dependent on state patronage, the ensuing corruption holds back economic growth, and development in general.⁵⁰ Critics argue that such societies will find it difficult to develop large-scale business enterprises or support active cross border trade, thus depriving themselves of sustainable economic independence, and will also find it difficult to establish modern bureaucracies where skills are the main prerequisites for hiring civil servants, and where civil servants are expected to keep their roles as officials distinct from their roles as friends or relatives.⁵¹ Concurring with the above observations the study adds to the growing body of knowledge that marginalisation is in the long term inimical to the broader goals of development to many societies.

Building upon the notion of hegemonic exchange this study buttresses the view that in some cases the marginalised groups negotiate their status. Citizens in such a state may ignore the

⁴⁹ R Ilorah, *Ethnic Bias*, pp 695-707.

⁵⁰ S A Kochanek, *Patron-Client Politics and Business in Bangladesh*, (New Delhi: SAGE Publishers, 1993), p387.

⁵¹ S. Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption and Government (causes, consequences, and reform*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

importance of the market and public-sector efficiency, and rather endorse the idea, albeit implicitly, that the only way to get anything done is to establish personal ties with those in power. They will also consider it appropriate to reciprocate with gifts to such powerful officials.⁵² Hegemonic exchange can be defined as a scenario where a dominant ethnic group offers incentives and favours to a minority group as a way of placating ethnic based conflict.⁵³ The ruling elite allows for a limited participation in government and some low threshold competition in order to achieve stability.⁵⁴ In the majority of cases the leaders of minority ethnic groups advance demands upon the state which ‘forces’ the state to accept competition and cooperation. Ethnicity acts as a pole around which group members can mobilise and compete effectively for state-controlled power, economic resources, positions, contracts, awards and constitutional protection.⁵⁵ In Africa, due to the ethnic plurality found in the continent, there is a concerted effort to balance the state’s and community interests, and as Rothchilds argues through hegemonic systems and several partial or full power-sharing schemes.⁵⁶ The elite become the spokespersons and the face of the attempts to negotiate power or incentives with the state.

In most cases, the state will give in and accede some measure of regional autonomy or federation. However, in some cases the state may adopt the ‘carrot and stick’ approach where apart from acceding to regional or ethnic demands, a certain amount of force is applied to regulate state-community relations. In such a situation, conflict may ensue. The study seeks to differ from this view by suggesting that the elite in Mangwe, because of the leverage associated with their positions within their groupings, may act to promote the interests of their communities

⁵² *ibid.*

⁵³ D. Rothchilds, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressure and Incentive for Cooperation* (Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp13-14.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

without upsetting the operation of the state. These are the ‘reasonable’ radicals that Richard Werbner talks of in Botswana. The elite however do not always act to the good of their communities. For example, they may fail to effectively pursue the agenda of their communities as they become part and parcel of what is commonly referred to as the ‘gravy train’ in African politics, or what Bayart calls the ‘politics of the belly’. Among the Kalanga, as I argued elsewhere the elite have been incorporated into the ruling party structures as Members of Parliament or councillors. When that happens, the elite are driven by self-interest for enrichment and abandon the community. Hegemonic exchange thus fails to assist the marginalised community accrue any meaningful benefit from its interaction with the state.

1.7 Migration: some theoretical background.

As there is a chapter wholly devoted to migration in Mangwe, it is necessary to provide an assessment of the main theories that will inform my interrogation of the subject in chapter four. The dominant explanation in the study of migration over the years has been the neoclassical theory. This theory is traced to the work of geographer Ravenstein in 1885. Ravenstein formulated his ‘Laws of Migration’ and concluded that economic factors are the primary reasons for migration.⁵⁷ According to Ravenstein people move because they are desirous of improving their economic status. In that respect, people will tend to move from a low income to a high-income area. The underlying notion in this theory is that the movement follows the simple law of economics of demand and supply of labour. The importance of economic factors as a factor in migration in rural Zimbabwe can be traced back to the onset of colonial rule. In the case of Mangwe, economic factors have indeed

⁵⁷ M. P. Todaro and S Smith., *Economic Development* (Boston: Addison Wesley, 2006), p342. See also an article by Hein da Hass, ‘*Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective*’, Paper presented at a conference on ‘Transnationalisation and Development(s): Towards a North –South Perspective, Centre for Interdisciplinary Research, Bielefeld, Germany, 2007.

played a crucial role in the decision to migrate especially after the colonial economy began to unsettle the traditional economic setup of the Africans through land alienation and systematic destocking. Most of the interviewees buttressed the view that the primary reason for migrating to Botswana or South Africa has been economic.⁵⁸ Interestingly, they highlighted the same reasons to explain the migration of their fore bearers to these countries. However, in the discussions one could feel a measure of distress and hopelessness that suggested the people felt neglected or marginalised in the mainstream economy hence resorted to extreme measures such as border jumping. To demonstrate the level of desperation on the youth the movement of people from Mangwe to either Botswana or South Africa is not only influenced by the ‘actual’ jobs in those destination but by also the ‘possibility’ of getting a job. Reports of high levels of unemployment in South Africa or Botswana amongst the immigrant populations hardly deter the youth of Mangwe from moving to those countries.⁵⁹ The Harris –Todaro model of migration has been used to explain this apparent contradiction. It shows us that people still migrate even against the background of rising unemployment in the urban areas.⁶⁰ However, recent economic data in South Africa also shows that the levels of unemployment levels are rising even amongst the migrant populations in cities such as Johannesburg, in both formal and non-formal areas.⁶¹ That coupled with intermittent outbursts of xenophobic violence has failed to dampen or slow the migration trends to South Africa, so this model aptly demonstrates the extent to which people are prepared to go to satisfy their desire to migrate.

⁵⁸ Interview with William ‘Borman’ Ncube, Ndabambi village, 21 April 2017.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Da Haas, ‘*Migration and Development*’ p5.

⁶¹ Statistics South Africa, 20 July 2018, see also S Peberdy, Crush J and Msibi N., *Migration in the City of Johannesburg: A Report for the City of Johannesburg*, 2004, p 6; S Peberdy, *International Migration in Johannesburg’s Informal Economy*, Immigration Policy Series No: 71, SAMP, 2016, p 8.

The neoclassical theory of migration has played an important role in formulation of migration policies and laws across the world. According to Kurekova, the neoclassical theory has remained largely popular.

owing to its analytical rigor and its ability to propose a set of testable hypotheses and useful tools for analysing not only the causes but also the effects of migration, and as a result it occupies a prominent position in current academic and policy-related research.⁶²

The neoclassical theory of migration has not escaped criticism. Some of the criticisms are demonstrable in Mangwe. Firstly, it places too much emphasis on economic factors and does not adequately address the complex socio-economic conditions that influence people to migrate. For example, for people experiencing marginalisation in their areas, access to markets, loans or insurance may be difficult. As a result of this deficiency, the motivation to migrate may increase in an individual. As Hass sums it up, migration does not take place in an 'in a social, cultural, political and institutional void'.⁶³ The socio-economic and political conditions obtaining in a particular society certainly play a major role in influencing people to migrate. This may be in the form of what that society went through or is going through or even perceptions of the future. Therefore, the neoclassical theory does not seem to capture in detail these salient socially embedded motivations to migrate besides the obvious economic stimuli. In its most basic form, the neoclassical theory of migration is a-historical and Eurocentric as it does not show us how migration can be woven into historical processes and it does not clearly explain the historically contingent nature of

⁶² L. Kurekova, '*Theories of Migration: Conceptual Review and Empirical Testing in the Context of the EU East West flows*', paper prepared for the Interdisciplinary Conference on Migration: Economic Change, Social Challenge, (University College London, 2011), p4.

⁶³ Da Hass, '*Migration and Development*', p6.

migration as it were.⁶⁴ It treats migration as an inevitability, whereas it is contingent or dependent upon a mix of variables that are not necessarily push and pull only. Apart from that it is also largely premised on the European experiences of migration thus limiting its applicability to, say African situations. The neoclassical theory is essentially a functionalist perspective that sees migration as fulfilling a function that is economic needs. However, the neoclassical theory presupposes those individuals have the freedom to choose to migrate or not. This is usually not the case especially for marginalised groups such as those found in Mangwe. The theory over-emphasises the rationality of the human being in deciding to migrate thus ignoring:

their material and social base because the significance of labour migration does not lie simplistically in behavioural or rational choices and preferences of the individuals, or in the spatial mobility per se, but in the position in the social relations of production occupied before and after such spatial movements, within one social formation and or state or between different social formations.⁶⁵

In Mangwe, labour migrations are ‘therefore embedded in social relations and must be explained in a transitory and historical manner.’⁶⁶ That kind of approach therefore emphasises the agency of individuals to migrate. As already alluded to, the last couple of years of the 19th century and the first three decades of the 20th century saw the integration into the capitalist system the African populations in southern Africa.⁶⁷ The area under discussion was obviously not spared the alterations that the new capitalist system brought

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ R. Miles, *Capitalism and Unfree Labour: Anomaly or Necessity*, (London: Tavistock Publications, 1987), p 12

⁶⁶ R. C. Bush and Martinello G., ‘*Migrant Labour in Southern Africa: an Historical and Theoretical Perspective*’, retrieved from <https://www.inventati.org/ababilonia/migrantlaboursouthafrica.pdf> accessed on the 18th of October 2017.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

with it. African societies were ensnared in the capitalist system through several connections including but not limited to migration.⁶⁸ This process not only led to the destruction of the Africans' means of production but also to the restructuring of their political institutions and the marginalisation of certain groups. According to Arrighi, the productive autonomy of the African was destroyed.⁶⁹ With their political and productive autonomy destroyed the Africans were forced to look for alternative sources of survival. These included selling their labour to the capitalist system, hence the emergence of labour migration in some parts of southern Africa. The Kalanga as Bush and Martinello argue for communities in southern Africa, 'thus substituted (their new position in the capitalist system) by a more dynamic concept of articulation of strategies of subsistence according to the changing historical conditions.'⁷⁰

The above theory is important as it incorporates a variety of explanations to migration, particularly its emphasis on 'group' mentality in influencing the decision to migrate. The community and its characteristic are analysed in the quest to understand behaviour such as migration. However, it has been criticised for not taking adequate attention to gender roles and being too future oriented.⁷¹ This chapter seeks to provide a broad-based understanding of migration in Mangwe that also incorporates the ever-changing roles of women in that regard.

Another 'new' theory that has been put forward to explain migration is the historical-structural approach. It is also called the asymmetric growth theory. It has its roots in the

⁶⁸ See I Phimister, cited elsewhere.

⁶⁹ G. Arrighi, '*Peripherisation in Southern Rhodesia, I, Changes in Production Processes*', Review, iii, 2, p161-191.

⁷⁰ Bush and Martinello, '*Migrant Labour in Southern Africa: An Historical and Theoretical Perspective*', p3.

⁷¹ T. Faist, *The Volumes and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Marxist tradition. In the case of Mangwe, this theory would surmise that migration is a product of unequal 'development' that is rooted in capitalistic inefficiencies and marginalisation. According to da Haas, historical- structuralists postulate that economic and political power is unequally distributed amongst communities in the developed and developing world, that people have unequal access to resources and that capitalist expansion has the tendency to reinforce inequalities.⁷² Haas adds that instead of modernizing and gradually progressing towards economic development, underdeveloped countries are trapped by their disadvantaged position within the global geopolitical structure.⁷³

To rephrase the above view, one could argue that on a local scale, the undeveloped areas are trapped by their position in the uneven allocation and distribution of resources in a country. The core-periphery relationship that developing countries have over the decades experienced with the developed world replicates itself within the developing countries. In this relationship developing countries acted as the source of labour and raw materials. Profits remained within the core or developed countries creating an unbalanced global trade network. Communities such as Mangwe in Zimbabwe supply raw materials such as gold and cattle to the urban areas and the central government through taxes yet receive little in return thus leading to their lack of development and complaints of marginalisation. In some cases, they also provide labour, in the rural-urban drift that has been widely experienced in

⁷² Stark, *The Migration of Labour*, p8.

⁷³ Haas, 'Migration and Development,' p5.

developing countries. As a result, such communities devise strategies such as migration to survive that reality.

1.8 Theorising the informal trade as a survival mechanism.

Various theories have been proffered to explain the emergence of informal economies worldwide. One of these is the structuralist theory which posits that the emergence of the informal economy is technically a symptom of a dualised economy: one formal and the other informal.⁷⁴ Structuralists argue that the informal economy is essentially a part of the global capitalist economy functioning to keep the labour costs down through an unfair relationship between the large and small businesses.⁷⁵ The informal economy is thus a by-product of the exploitative capitalist economy.⁷⁶ The structuralist approach apparently borrows heavily from the neo-Marxist school of thought that emphasises on the exploitative nature of class relations in the society, and in that vein sees the informal economy as an unwelcome symptom of the failures of the capitalist experience.

⁷⁴ S. Gardener, *Exploring informality: An empirical analysis of the informal economy*, Unpublished honours dissertation, William and Marry College, 2008, p33.

⁷⁵ T. Jamela (2013), *Experiences and coping strategies of Women informal women traders in unstable political and economic conditions: The case of Bulawayo (Zimbabwe) traders*, Unpublished MA thesis, University of Johannesburg, pp22-28.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p23.

Another theory that has been put forward to analyse the informalisation of the economy is the legalist theory, a neo liberal theory that suggests that the emergence of the informal economy is a result of excessive bureaucracy that impedes participation in the formal economy.⁷⁷ Because of the many hurdles and regulations placed in the formal economy, people prefer to subvert those and go informal.⁷⁸ Legalists believe that a more open or liberalised economy will lead to the gradual disappearance of the informal sector, and to that end encourage governments to open economies. This argument, by extension will implicate that the incidences of smuggling that are associated with the informal cross border trade will go down drastically if there were less restrictions at the borders. To justify their standpoint, legalists believe that a restrictive economy creates conditions for evasive practises such as smuggling that do not contribute to the overall growth of the economy, that it stalls economic growth as there is little revenue accrued to the government.

A more recent theory, one that focuses on the agency of individuals to make decisions known as the rational choice theory has been used to explain the emergence of the informal economy. This theory presupposes that actions of individual people are primarily influenced by surrounding circumstances and the primary goal is to accrue maximum benefit out of the circumstances.⁷⁹ To that end, it is not only economic factors that influence decision making, but personal issues such as motivation, to enter or not enter the informal economy.⁸⁰ In simpler terms, the decision to enter the informal economy is purely a rational

⁷⁷ J. Kirshner, *City of rings: Migration, Information and the Public space in Santa Cruz*, Bolivia, paper presented at the Sociology, Anthropology and Development Studies Seminar, 2 October 2009, Johannesburg; University of Johannesburg.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Gardener, *Exploring informality*, p38.

⁸⁰ F. Schneider and D. H. Enste, *The Shadow Economy: An International Survey*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p 35.

decision arrived at by the participants after careful examination of the cost implications and other non-economic issues such as how it fits into gender stereotypes and societal roles as ascribed in day to day realities, for example Jamela believes that women dominate the informal economy in Zimbabwe because it fits well into their social roles.⁸¹ The study seek to synthesise these theories by placing both economic factors and human agency at the centre of the desire to engage in informal economic activities. More relevant to this study, I posit that the Kalanga, because of their historical existence as a marginalised group have a well-developed informal economy that encompasses both the desire to accrue economic benefit from that activity as well as mitigate the effects of marginalisation.

The above section provided a cross sectional examination of some of the main themes that inform the study, and how I intend to weave those scholarly dimensions into my analysis of Mangwe with the aim of broadening on existing knowledge of filling gaps wherever possible. The next section discusses the making of Kalanga ethnicity in Zimbabwe.

1.8 Kalanga ethnic identity problematised-pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods

The academic study of the Kalanga of Zimbabwe is a relatively recent phenomenon. Early studies by researchers such as Wentzel and Ketumile Masola were ethnographic in nature and though providing useful insights on the Kalanga did not go deeper in analysing inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic Kalanga relations. The most prominent scholarship on this subject has come from Enocent Msindo, whose pioneering work in the early 2000s has in a way provided the

⁸¹ Jamela, *Experiences and coping strategies of women informal cross border traders*, p 34.

groundwork for further research. Msindo, provided a detailed examination of the interactions of the Kalanga and the Ndebele, and the resultant identities formed.⁸² Following closely on the footsteps of Msindo, Thembanani Dube has also tried to reconfigure Kalanga ethnic identity and show how it dealt with issues such as colonial rule and colonial land policies such as the Native Land Husbandry Act in the 1950s.⁸³ However, the impetus was on ‘ethnically’ identifying and showing the resilience of their identity and or its shifting patterns. This study thus tries to give an overview of Kalanga economic activities under the lenses of marginalisation, though a bold attempt shall be made to contribute to identifying the Kalanga as an ethnicity.

In as much as the term identity is used liberally in this thesis, scholars such as Brubaker and Cooper contend that it is a term that needs careful handling in its practical and theoretical applications. They identify several ways identity is crystallised into powerful realities including identity to achieve self-interest, or denoting a collective phenomenon, selfhood (individual or at group level), as a ‘contingency’ measure or as a product of multiple or competing discourses.⁸⁴

This section will attempt to examine the development of Kalanga ethnicity from the precolonial to the post-colonial period. In the recent past, sensational claims on who the Kalanga are and their exploits on the Zimbabwean plateau have been made and they have not helped explain who this group are until the recent emergence of Msindo and Dube as avid researchers on these people.⁸⁵ To understand the Kalanga two important issues emerge: their indigeneity to present day Zimbabwe, and secondly their supposedly Ndebele-ised existence as part of the so-called Mthwakazi nation. Msindo and Dube have

⁸² Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, is an excellent analysis of identity formation amongst the Kalanga in a period spanning over a hundred years.

⁸³ Dube, ‘*Shifting Identities*’, p55.

⁸⁴ R Brubaker and Cooper F, ‘*Beyond Identity*’, *Theory and Society*, vol 29(2000), p1-6.

⁸⁵ Works by Emmanuel Moyo, for example tend to posit an overly exaggerated history of the Kalanga that borders on sensationalism.

seemingly answered to these two concerns, both affirming that the Kalanga are one of the oldest inhabitants of the Zimbabwean plateau and that they certainly were not ‘obliterated’ or ‘totally’ assimilated into the Ndebele ‘nation’ as espoused by scholars such as Gatsheni-Ndlovu. Now who the Kalanga are, and how their ethnicity be projected amongst the different ethnicities in Matabeleland and Zimbabwe offers an interesting study of an ethnicity exhibiting fluidity and resilience in the face of sustained marginalisation and discrimination. To answer to these questions, I borrow on the constructivist view on the nature of ethnicity. The main argument of this school of thought was that ethnicity like all other forms of identity is protean in nature, and continually cast and recast as and when necessary. However, it does not imply the primordial ties that bound a people together are easily wished away, and as the study will show the shared blood and cultural ties as well as the shared experiences of the Kalanga, of marginalisation and so forth, have indeed ensured that this group has remained relatively intact, culturally and to a large extent with its language preserved.

The Kalanga appear to have been influenced by several factors in adopting whatever identity they did in their history in Zimbabwe. Msindo identifies two major events that shaped Kalanga identity: the Ndebele invasion in the late 1830s, and the colonial invasion towards the end of the same century.⁸⁶ I suggested elsewhere that, using the naming practises in the area reflect a Kalanga habitus (a large swathe of Matabeleland bears Kalanga names). Msindo adds that in what became known as Matabeleland, the Kalanga appeared to have had a long history and there is little evidence to suggest that the Ndebele

⁸⁶ Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, p 11.

ever had total control of the different groups they found in the area.⁸⁷ What is important here is to understand that though the arrival of the Ndebele had profound effects on Kalanga language and culture, this was not uniformly felt across the whole Kalanga population. In far flung areas, away from Ndebele centres of power Kalanga chiefs retained a measure of independence that certainly acted as a vanguard against total assimilation into the Ndebele system, especially within the creation of larger chieftainships on the fringes of Ndebele power.⁸⁸ It is clear that for those communities, identity was not necessarily espoused by the chiefs or those genuinely fearing loss of power to the expanding Ndebele, but the commoners who wanted to safeguard economic interests and cultural capital for their own public good.⁸⁹ In light of this, it is therefore clear that Kalanga commoners played a big part in building Kalanga ethnic consciousness in scenarios where there they felt their common interests were in danger, hence their agency in the scheme that constructivists have identified. This view places the agency of the commoners at an integral point in identity formation, something that earlier views on ethnicity tended to ignore and had unjustifiably ignored.⁹⁰ However, as Msindo rightly observes, some Kalanga commoners appropriated Ndebele identity as and when necessary, thus showing the protean and malleable nature of ethnicity.⁹¹

With the Ndebele now comfortably settled, their relations with the Kalanga vacillated from cooperation to antagonism. Raiding had certainly played an important part as part of

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ See L Vail, *The Creation of Tribalism in Africa*, (London: James Currey, 1989); T Ranger, 'The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,' in E Hobsbawm and T Ranger(eds), *The Invention of Tradition*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). The invention of tradition school of thought is usually accused of ignoring the agency of commoners in identity formation. See also Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, Chapter 1.

⁹¹ ibid

Ndebele foreign policy. There is little doubting that the Ndebele used this tactic to project a powerful, warlike image to not only instil fear or accrue economic gain but also to attract young susceptible Kalanga boys to their regimental structures.⁹² The ‘dancing and singing’ Ndebele warriors certainly had an impressionable effect on young Kalanga boys.⁹³ However, what emerged from their interaction with the Ndebele was certainly not a vanquished people, but a society whose cultures and identity indicators such as religion remained visible enabling future researchers to manage to conjure a Kalanga identity within the different identities in Matabeleland.

With the advent of British colonialism, Kalanga ethnic identity received yet another shock. Having been subjected to the Ndebele domineering attitudes, and to an extent having come out with a measure of identity still intact, the Kalanga expectantly hoped that the new masters would offer them sufficient space to ‘revitalise’. However, at this stage some Kalanga commoners had been sufficiently assimilated into the Ndebele culture and identity that they found it difficult to integrate smoothly into their old families, but it must be emphasised that there were in the minority. However, through the goodwill and assistance of their old families, they gradually began to wean off some of the traits absorbed in their years of captivity in the Ndebele communities.⁹⁴ This demonstrated the protean nature of identity, whereby a former identity can be remoulded into a new one depending on the obtaining circumstances, thus challenging the primordialism of identity in ethnic studies.

⁹² The author’s mother narrated how his grandfather proudly held Ndebele regimental dances in high esteem, showing how young boys were susceptible to be swayed by Ndebele war theatrics

⁹³ Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, quoting Robert Moffat briefly describes the graphics of such a raid, p42.

However, the colonial period appears to have been a double-edged sword for the Kalanga. The collapse of Ndebele certainly brought a feeling of relief on those Kalanga who had lived under Ndebele bondage. But as colonialism set in the Kalanga found themselves having to deal with imposed Ndebele power in the form of chiefs. Colonial authorities found it convenient to continue with ‘old’ Ndebele political structures for administrative and financial expediency.⁹⁵ For the Kalanga, these impositions of Ndebele chiefs hit at the core of their desire to reassert themselves in the areas they felt were legitimately theirs prior to Ndebele arrival, and in order to make their feelings felt some Kalanga people resisted colonial projects such as field terracing or ‘*magandiwa*’.⁹⁶ The Kalanga colonial encounter was worsened by the fact that apart from the marginalisation of Kalanga traditional authority, their language was also side-lined. Save for some selected examples, such as the London Missionary Society most churches and educational facilities preferred to use Ndebele and Zulu in their communication and instruction. In the Empandeni and Izimnyama areas, isiNdebele was more pronounced than the TjiKalanga owing to the long history of Ndebele presence in the area (as traditional outposts of Ndebele garrisons at the height of Ndebele power). This had profound effects in Kalanga identity as their language was treated as second class, and by extension the Kalanga. However, it is important that even though the Kalanga found themselves in the receiving end of the colonial language policy, Kalanga language activism persevered in the colonial period such that by the 1950s educated Kalanga elite were forming associations calling for the recognition of Kalanga culture and language.⁹⁷ In as far as the colonial period was concerned, the Kalanga experienced periods of gain and loss, suffice to say that it did emerge stronger and more

⁹⁵ Ibid, p74.

⁹⁶ Dube, *Shifting Identities*, p 34.

⁹⁷ Dube, *Shifting Identities*, p 37.

resilient as most colonial policies of land and African political power galvanised the Kalanga into rallying behind one another.

In the post-colonial period, Kalanga ethnicity was to be violently intertwined with that of the Ndebele in a period now generally referred to as Gukurahundi, which lasted from 1983 and 1987. The Kalanga it appears were lumped together in the receiving of a brutal ethnic campaign orchestrated by the Shona dominated state. This period, on the surface appeared to momentarily blur ethnic cleavages in areas where the Kalanga and the Ndebele existed, such as Kezi and the Matobo districts. What emerged was a magnified 'Ndebele' victim identity which as Msindo observes has been used by federalist and 'secessionists' to further the agenda of Umthwakazi.⁹⁸ For the Kalanga, like other smaller ethnic groups, the Gukurahundi phenomenon certainly altered their struggle for recognition but did not blow out the flames as evidenced by the recent drive towards elevating minority languages in Zimbabwe. In a nutshell Kalanga ethnicity has undergone profound change over the years because of the different groups they encountered in the different periods mentioned above.

1.1.0 Summary of Chapters

The first chapter provides an introduction. It highlights the main issues to be addressed in the thesis. The main purpose of this chapter is therefore to cast and recast the debates on the relationship between ethnicity, marginalisation, and survival strategies of marginalised groups. It is essentially a breakdown of the main issues to be discussed. The first section of the chapter will try to contextualise the debates relating to ethnicity, marginalisation, and survival strategies. There will be an attempt to locate the problem statement and reinforce

⁹⁸ Msindo, *Ethnicity in Matabeleland*, p228.

the argument that there is a negative relationship between ethnicity and marginalisation in the area under study. This chapter will discuss how the researcher seek to address the issues identified for research, and that will include the methodology, feasibility and ethical issues surrounding the research. For example, there will be a brief discussion on the concept of critical ethnography as examined by such scholars as Soyin Madison.

The last sections of the chapter discuss the major themes that inform on the thesis. These are marginalisation and survival strategies of marginalised groups, as well indigeneity and autochthones. The argument here is to show that marginalised groups devise strategies that assist them to negotiate their marginal status through incorporating the concept of 'everyday discourse'. Apart from that, the concepts of indigeneity and autochthony are touched and will be used to explain how the Kalanga of Mangwe interact with other groups in as far as the exploitation of resources found in their vicinity is concerned. The various strategies are mentioned and will be discussed in detail in the appropriate chapter. However, the thrust of the argument is to show that ethnicity and marginalisation are phenomenon that inform on each other in most African states.

In summary Chapter One seeks to provide the conceptual and theoretical basis upon which subsequent chapters would be founded upon. It illuminates the hypothesis and gives useful theoretical underpinnings to the whole study.

Chapter Two traces the history of the Kalanga who are the subjects of discussion in the thesis. They will be an attempt to examine the different sub-group that constitute the broader Kalanga identity in Mangwe. The malleable and transient nature of Kalanga identity will be discussed.

Tenets of the constructivist approach to ethnicity were used to show that Kalanga was moulded by the different experiences that the Kalanga went through in the different periods

in history, transcending the precolonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. A geographical survey of the area will be given in this chapter. The geographical setup of the area is important in answering to some of the economic choices in the area. For example, the dry acacia veldt and the mopane woodlands provide an explanation to cattle ranching and the mopane worm economy, and limited rains have rendered the practise of crop cultivation meaningless if not fruitless. The geographical location of the Kalanga under study will be an important reference point in understanding the evolution of the economic activities in the area, for example its proximity to the border with Botswana and South Africa will be important in explaining the prevalence of regulated and unregulated cross border trade in the area under study.

The chapter will also try and map the movement of the Kalanga throughout the area with a view of demarcating and understanding their economic patterns. This movement helps to explain the tensions and contestations that are discussed in the later chapters, for such resources as land and mining claims. The chapter will attempt to show that that the ‘scattering’ of the Kalanga was a result of their forcible removal from communities they had traditionally occupied, a decision that further attests to their marginalisation.

Chapter Two will seek to explain why the study begins in 1940 by arguing that it was around that period that the Kalanga elite began to pose questions regarding their marginalisation. This section investigates the relationship between the radicalisation of Kalanga politics in the 1940s and their marginalisation, to find out if one fed into the other or not. Kalanga nationalist politics will be discussed, and an attempt shall be made to show how these activities together with the formation of Kalanga cultural revival associations such as the Kalanga Language and Cultural Protection Society of 1946 represented an attempt by the Kalanga to deal with marginalisation at a cultural and nationalistic level.

This chapter also deals with the genesis of Kalanga marginalisation. It will be broken down into three categories: pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial marginalisation. In the precolonial period, I shall further expand and examine the relationship between the Kalanga and the Ndebele as they settled in present day Matabeleland. Tracing the origins of Kalanga marginalisation helps the reader to be able to contextualise the activities to be discussed in the subsequent chapters and helps also to ‘ethnically’ construct the Kalanga in Mangwe and Zimbabwe in general. The socio-economic impact of this relationship will be scrutinised and the various assumptions of historians (such as that the Ndebele created a nation state) shall be put to test. Most importantly this section will examine the how the socio-economic and political relationship of the Ndebele and the Kalanga set in motion the marginalisation of the Kalanga. A small part of the chapter will be devoted to the precolonial history of the Kalanga as a way of linking their contemporary marginalisation to that period. This part will show that the marginalisation of the Kalanga as an ethnic group was offset in the precolonial period with the arrival of the Ndebele. The Ndebele, through a ‘tribal’ setup known as the caste system created conditions that led to the lowering of the status of other ethnic groups, the Kalanga included. The chapter will seek to prove that the caste system laid the foundation for the Kalanga marginalisation by successive regimes.

In the colonial period, the researcher will show how the relationship between the colonial state and the Kalanga perpetuated the marginalisation of the later, especially in the economic sphere. The same approach shall be used to understand how the post-colonial state though its policies has also marginalised the Kalanga of Mangwe.

The subsequent chapters, Three, Four and Five make the core of the thesis. They provide an examination of the survival mechanisms or strategies that have been employed by the Kalanga of Mangwe to mitigate the effects of marginalisation. These chapters will attempt to highlight the perilous economic situation in Mangwe by positing that, except for the

ailing cattle economy, there are no known productive primary and secondary industries in the entire district. This has resulted in the emergence of informal economic activities such as the harvesting and selling of mopane worms, unregulated cross-border trade, and gold panning. The chapters will provide an in-depth analysis of different economic activities practised in the area. The theory of 'exit' as espoused by Bayart will be used to try and understand the different strategies used to mitigate marginalisation in Mangwe. The relationship between the practise of these activities and the state (colonial and post-colonial) will be examined.

The chapters will stress that the economic activities mentioned above may also be found in so-called majority groups such as the Ndebele and other borderline communities such as the Venda, but amongst the Kalanga of Mangwe they appear to assume greater significance because of the scarcity of economic options and their entrenchment prior to the current Zimbabwean economic crisis. Historicising these economic activities of the ordinary people in Mangwe helps us to understand how the communities on the geographical margins of the state have tried to deal with various forms of marginalisation.

The economic history of Mangwe from the 1940s to 2015 will be investigated in the chapters mentioned. This will show how Kalanga economic activities evolved since the 1940s. The chapter will demonstrate how these activities can be explained as a response to the marginalisation of the Kalanga of Mangwe. Economic activities such as cross border trade, mopane worm harvesting as well as gold panning will be discussed and placed in the context of diminishing economic options experienced by the people of Mangwe. The discussion will also show how these activities assume 'sentimental' meaning to the people

of Mangwe and how they ‘define’ the people in the region where they are as seen as ‘ours,’ hence the ethnic slant of the thesis.

The salient argument in these chapters is that there is palpable evidence of tensions and conflicts between ethnicity and resource competition in Mangwe. The discussions will try to explain the often-tense struggles for mine claim ownership in the area. These chapters will seek to explain that resources in the region are heavily politicised. The ‘locals’ and ‘immigrants’ exist in a tense relationship characterised by mistrust and suspicion. The chapters will discuss how resource competition sometimes assumes ethnic undertones in communities, and how communities mobilise themselves around ethnic identities to try and ‘protect’ resources within their regions.

The chapters will try to counter the modernist view that viewed ethnicity as a relic of the past that would wither away with modernisation. Instead, the chapter will seek to prove that Horowitz’s (1985) view that early modernization theorists wrongfully assumed that traditional ethnic categories would rapidly disappear as the state grew in political importance; particularly within the context of decolonization, is true. However, as Glazer and Moynihan note, not only did ethnic groups fail to assimilate, rather they have proliferated, and ethnic conflict appear to have increased since the end of World War II and particularly since the end of the Cold War. The discussion in these chapters explains the apparent rise of ‘anti-immigrant’ tendencies of the Kalanga of Mangwe, where economic immigrants such as gold panners are generally loathed.

Chapter six links the activities of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Mangwe with the politics of marginalisation. The role of non-governmental organisations in the socio-economic lives of the people in the area under study will be scrutinised. On their own, non-governmental organisations continue to stir considerable debate in Africa. Some see their

roles as progressive, whilst some believe they act to undermine the efforts of the state. This chapter will seek to prove that in the case of Mangwe, NGOs act to placate the hole or void created by the state's incapacity to provide meaningful economic opportunities in Mangwe.

The chapter will look at how the projects created or initiated by NGOs are perceived by the people of Mangwe. The chapter will seek to prove that NGOs are viewed favourably in the area as opposed to the state because most of their projects have had a direct impact on the lives of the ordinary people. The chapter will also examine the relationship between the NGO community and the local elite, particularly the political elite. In some instances, the relationship is mutually respectful with the local elite presiding over the handover of projects, but in some cases, there is an element of mistrust between the two. Broadly speaking the chapter is an attempt to investigate NGO politics in marginalised communities and how these affect the marginalised people's relations with the state.

Chapter seven examines one of the most controversial topics in Mangwe in recent years: gold mining. Both informal (illegal) and formal (legal) gold mining will be addressed, but with much emphasis on the former as it answers to the main debates in the thesis. The chapter will make a deliberate attempt to interrogate the politics of gold mining in the district with a view assessing how issues of resource ownership and environment come together to create tensions that are inevitably extended to the ethnicity debate in Mangwe. To link to the broader aims of the research, I will examine how the gold business in the district has been intertwined with both marginalisation (in ownership) as well as its being a survival mechanism especially considering rampant unemployment in the district. A section on the chapter gives the reader an examination of the history of gold mining in the district. I will argue that the activity, through oral interviews and examination of abandoned

diggings in the district has a long history. There shall be an attempt to underscore the environmental effects of these activities, how the recourse to alluvial gold panning will most probably puts severe strains on the already fragile Mangwe physical environment, accentuating the already dire water crisis and the agricultural sector.

The final chapter (eight) gives us a summary of the main discussions in the thesis and will try to inform on the basic argument that the Kalanga of Mangwe have devised strategies to mitigate the effects of marginalisation as an ethnic group.

1.1.0 Methodology

Studying groups existing on the margins of society is problematic to many a researcher. The gathering of information requires a careful balance between objective analysis and empathy. The problem of marginalisation is a relative term, and its applicability varies from community to community. As such the use of the term in this study will be purely dialectical.

The study seeks to examine the historical experiences of marginalisation by, and the different survival strategies across generations of, the Kalanga communities of Mangwe. Secondly, the study investigated the changing nature of economic activities of the Kalanga as they try to deal with marginalisation. Lastly, the study evaluated the effectiveness of their coping mechanisms in the face of increasing rural poverty. The above questions require a multi – faceted research design that combines different research instruments such as oral interview, observation to name just a few.

The study was based on a critical analysis of secondary and primary sources. Primary sources such as archival articles (native commissioners reports, delineation reports, annual reports as well as colonial correspondence such as court reports) on the Kalanga as well as government and nongovernmental records in the area will be made use of. It is important to note here that owing to their marginal existence the Kalanga, like the Tonga or Sotho are under researched and as such the author had to deal with interpreting archival or newspaper articles containing tiny bits of evidence. Kalanga activists have used the platform provided by newspapers to air some of their grievances, and they generally captured the ‘feelings’ of the moment. Newspapers are in their nature relatively biased depending on their ownership with state owned newspapers generally refraining from overtly highlighting marginalisation issues, whilst privately owned newspapers appear the most explicit in that regard. I therefore had to carefully sieve through the articles and corroborate their claims with findings from interviews and other sources be they archival or secondary sources. Non-governmental organisations collect important demographic and economic data. Most importantly, non-governmental organisations also document the projects that they carry out in the communities. These projects are a mirror to the socio-economic gaps that are found in the respective communities and in that respect provide useful data on marginalisation. The demographic data collected by non-governmental organisations also assist in illuminating socio-economic patterns such as migration, where households are asked to provide data on their sources of income. Such data not only shows the trends of migration, but also the magnitude as well as the demographic composition of the migrant population. This data becomes useful in feeding into the questions asked in this study.

The study is primarily qualitative research, and as such employed methods such as oral interviews to answer research questions. Oral interviews are an important data gathering technique in qualitative studies. Oral interviews provide lived experiences and make it easy for the researcher to glean the emotions of the participants. In such a study, emotion provides an important backdrop to understand the broader issue of marginalisation. I targeted a wide range of informants ranging from the ordinary people to the elite to get views from a wider spectrum.

The study used semi-structured interviews for oral research. Semi-structured interviews occur when the interviewer and respondents engage in a formal interview. The researcher chose to use semi-structured interviews because questions can be prepared ahead of time. This allowed the interviewer to be prepared and appear competent during the interview. The questions were open ended in nature to extract as much information as possible from the informants. Semi-structured interviews also allowed informants the freedom to express their views in their own terms, thereby providing reliable, comparable qualitative data.⁹⁹

The targeted population included local elderly who have seen and lived through the experiences in the area since the 1940s. Other targeted informants included officials from the district council, rural development committees, non-governmental organisations, traditional leadership as well as stamp mill operators, artisanal miners, mopane worm harvesters, migrant workers (both active and non-active) and cross border traders. Conducting interviews required that the author samples the population given the fact it is impossible to engage everyone. To that end, the purposive sampling technique was employed. Purposive sampling involved identifying informants using the discretion of the author. Here I imply that I used my own judgement to

⁹⁹ R S Weis, *Learning from Strangers: The Art and Method of Qualitative Interview Studies*, (New York: Free Press, 1995).

select the units of the population to interview because purposive sampling is in its nature selective and judgemental. The advantage of this method was that it allowed for flexibility in terms of informant numbers contacted. However, the researcher realised that purposive sampling led to some form of bias, for example the subjective nature of the choice of informants cannot totally escape bias. To eliminate that bias, the researcher relied on the adoption of a clear theoretical framework and sought broad assistance from community members to identify relevant informants. To further strengthen the methodology, an ethnographic slant was employed to understand the day-to-day experiences of the Kalanga. Ethnography is a research methodology whereby the researcher immerses his/herself through prolonged participation and observation of a particular community.¹⁰⁰ In ethnography the researcher observes, describes and explains and in the process new knowledge is produced.¹⁰¹ To the author, the approach came with the added advantage of having lived with the community for over a decade and a half (and continued interactions thereafter), so was fully immersed in the day to day experiences of some of the Kalanga communities. However, because of that experience the author had to grapple with navigating falling into what Soyin Madison called activist ethnography (explained under the rubric of critical ethnography-where I tried to remain as impartial as possible to avoid being labelled a Kalanga activist). That challenge was neutralised by the a priori experience of the region having undertaken similar research at undergraduate and master's level. This being an oral research project to a large measure, some of the participants were sceptical of the intentions of the author and may have withheld some information. Generally, people who have experienced years of marginalisation and in some instances, such as happened during the Gukurahundi may find it difficult to air their views thus exposing some of the challenges of oral

¹⁰⁰ L Naidoo, *Ethnography: An Introduction to Definition and Method, an ethnography of global landscapes and Corridors*, p1.

¹⁰¹ S. Reeves, Kuper A and Hodges B D, *Qualitative Research Methodologies: Ethnography*, in the British Medical Journal, 2008, p 13.

research especially. In one village in Mphoengs, people appeared sceptical to share experiences some citing the recent *Manuqonde* (stand upright) campaign that the ruling party had instituted in the 2008 elections. The manuqonde campaign was a strategy employed by the activists from the ruling party to remind people of ‘political correctness’, that is total allegiance to the ruling party. It is only after making lengthy introductions of oneself did some of the respondents feel comfortable and open on various aspects enquired upon by the researcher. that as it may, I relied more on the Madison approach of critical ethnography and ethical responsibility, to discourses that are emancipatory to the communities under study.

CHAPTER 2

Examining the socio-politico and economic landscape of Mangwe.

2.1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to identify and describe the different ethnic groups that are found in Mangwe district, as well as its social and economic geography. Primarily this study focuses on the generic Kalanga group but tries to highlight the different subgroups that inform on the Kalanga population found in Mangwe. The Kalanga people in this region are thought to be the majority as they constitute 85% of the population.¹⁰² An attempt shall be made to trace the social, economic and political history of the area. The different groups found in the area shall be examined and the history of their settlement and the creation, side-lining and destruction of chieftaincies highlighted. Despite that, the study is not oblivious of the movement in and out of the region by groups not necessarily Kalanga, and because of that fact an attempt shall be made to incorporate the experiences of these other groups together with the Kalanga to obtain a holistic picture. The environment or ecology of the district will be put into perspective to understand the nature of the economic activities taking place in the region, for example the types of crops grown and the reasons for that amongst other activities. In a nutshell, this chapter traces the history of the Kalanga as well as the different subgroups found in the area, and how they spread across Mangwe, the area under study.

¹⁰² Dube, *Shifting Identities*, p 5.




Fig 1. The precolonial map of Matabeleland, showing in the shaded areas Kalanga and Ndebele locations, adapted from E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe: The Transformation in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860-1990* (The University of Rochester Press, New York, 2012), p46.




Fig 2, Map showing the combined Kalanga districts of Bulilima and Mangwe before their separation in 2004, adapted from the internet, <http://www.maplandia.com> accessed on the 23 May 2020.




Fig 3, the current map of Mangwe district (click to view map.), adapted from the internet, <http://www.maplandia.com> 23 May 2020.

2.2 Literature on Kalanga presence in Mangwe, and Zimbabwe. A historical survey

The Kalanga are an ethnic group found in the southwestern part of Zimbabwe and are generally thought to be one of the earliest Bantu groups to settle on the Zimbabwean plateau.¹⁰³ Although they are fairly numerically inferior when compared to the ‘northern’ and ‘eastern’ Shona subgroupings, the Kalanga constitute the largest group in what is now generally accepted as Matabeleland.¹⁰⁴ Kalanga activists such as the Kalanga Language and

¹⁰³ Dube, *Shifting Identities*, p34.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, *Shifting Identities*, p5. Dube acknowledges the presence of other groups such as the Ndebele who therefore make the district reasonably cosmopolitan in nature.

Cultural Promotion Society (KLCPS) stress that the name Matabeleland is as much a misnomer as it is contested and prefer a more inclusive name that represents what they feel is the 'true' demographic picture of the area. It appears that the term 'Matabeleland' was coined by early 19th century explorers, traders and fortune seekers and was 'legitimised' by colonial administrators after the conquest of the Ndebele for administrative expediency and it has led to the distortion of the history of the area as it accords the minority Ndebele speaking a status that has little historical justification besides the conquest politics of the 1830s. The Kalanga speaking people are generously distributed in the Mangwe and more intensely in the northern Kalanga frontier known as Bulilima. This huge proportion of the Kalanga population in the area includes groups which speak languages similar to TjiKalanga such as the Nambya. The spatial distribution of the Kalanga in Matabeleland offers an interesting historical insight. Most importantly, the naming patterns of the province demonstrate that historically, the region was occupied by people speaking a similar or closely related language, or derivatives of a similar language. To support this view, the names of places found in Matabeleland reflect a Kalanga presence, or Kalanga influence. For example, one finds Msilahobe and Dimbamiwa in Nkayi district to the north of Matabeleland, and Shale and Shanyawugwe, or Sibundule to the south. This distribution of Kalanga names shows that the group was probably spread over large swathes of land in southwestern Zimbabwe over a long period of time, from Matabeleland North to Matabeleland South.¹⁰⁵ However, this is largely assumptive or peripheral evidence and more research particularly archaeological needs to be done to support the above claims.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Butholezwe Mguni, Esigodini, 17 October 2017. It is common to find TjiKalanga sounding names such as Tjanyawugwe, Shale, Mhalibwe and the famous archaeological site of Mapela in Matabeleland.

Archaeologically excavated places like Mapela and Khami as well as Naletale demonstrate a rich Kalanga heritage.

A survey of existing literature reveals that the Kalanga have a long history on the Zimbabwean plateau.¹⁰⁶ Most of these works trace the settlement of the Kalanga on the Zimbabwean plateau to the early centuries, around the 600 to 900 AD.¹⁰⁷ It is thought that the Kalanga belonged to the early wave of Bantu migrations from north and central Africa. The early settlers brought iron technology and established an economic system that transcended centuries up to the present day. This was an agro-based economy which was continuously and gradually diversified to incorporate other activities such as mining, trade, and hunting. Whether the Kalanga belonged to the prototype 'Shona' or not has eluded many a historian. The same applies to their exact date of arrival in Zimbabwe.¹⁰⁸ 'Archaeological' evidence on the Kalanga affirms they had settled in the Zimbabwean tableland by 900 AD, or even earlier around the sixth century though speculative and sometimes exaggerated, credible in the absence of alternative evidence. T. N. Huffman, an archaeologist supports this view of an early settlement of the Kalanga by linking the group to early sites such as Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe.¹⁰⁸ Hall echoes similar

¹⁰⁶ E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe: The Transformation in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860-1990* (The University of Rochester Press, New York, 2012) Nyathi, I. "Ndebele Kalanga ethnic relations in Bulilimangwe South: Integration or Assimilation? A case study of the colonial and post-colonial Bulilimangwe", unpublished Honours dissertation, History Department, University of Zimbabwe, 2004, Mazarire, G. C. "Who are the Ndebele and Kalanga in Zimbabwe?" Unpublished seminar paper presented in the History Department, University of Zimbabwe, 2004; Beach, D. N. *The Shona and their Neighbours* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1994). D.N. Beach, *The Shona and Zimbabwe 900-1850: An Outline of Shona History* (Mambo Press, Gweru, 1984) Beach, D. N., *Zimbabwe before 1900* (Mambo Press, Gweru, 1984), K. Masola. *Nhau Dzaba Kalanga: A History of the Kalanga*, volume 1 (University of South Africa Press, Pretoria, 1983); T. Dube, *Shifting Identities and the Transformation of the Kalanga People of Bulilimangwe District, Matabeleland South, Zimbabwe: C19462005*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2015.

¹⁰⁷ N. E. Moyo, BuKalanga, *The Re-birth of BuKalanga: A Manifesto for the Liberation of a Great People with a Proud History Part 1* (Mapungubwe News Corporation, Plumtree, 2012) T.N. Huffman, *The Leopard Kopje Tradition* (National Museums and Monuments of Rhodesia, Salisbury, 1974).

¹⁰⁸ Huffman *ibid*, Dube, *Shifting Identities*, p34.

sentiments on the connection between Mapungubwe and nascent Kalanga communities.¹⁰⁹ Recently, scholars such Msindo have stressed that the Kalanga had strong links to the Torwa and Rozvi states which are seen as successor states to Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe. From linguistic and ethnographic studies, the Kalanga and modern day ‘Shona’ groups share similarities in some aspects of their language, culture and economic activities to justify the conclusion that they represented the early Bantu population of Zimbabwe.

There is need for further research on the relationship between the ‘Shona’ and the Kalanga, particularly their settlement in the Zimbabwean plateau between the Limpopo and the Zambezi for so many centuries. What emerges, however is that the socio-economic history of the Kalanga over the centuries has been shaped by their interaction with the ‘Shona, Ndebele, and the colonising British settlers.’¹¹⁰ In their relationship with these three groups, the Kalanga have experienced various forms of marginalisation and they have adopted various activities to counter this. Such activities include cross territorial trade and mopane worm harvesting. The naming patterns in Matabeleland offer us a glimpse that the Kalanga occupied a large swathe of land in what is now known as Matabeleland. There is consensus that the Kalanga occupied the southernmost parts of the country after the collapse of the Torwa, probably in the 15th century.¹¹¹ Whether the Kalanga emerged as an offshoot of the Mutapa, or were part of the Rozvi confederacy remains unclear, though there is no denying that Tjibundule, a famous Kalanga chief was widely regarded as the ‘father’ of modern-day

¹⁰⁹ M. Hall and Steffo R., *Great Zimbabwe* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2006), p35.

¹¹⁰ T. Dube, *The Kalanga in Historical Perspective*, an online publication, May 2020, p1.

¹¹¹ Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, p 35.

Kalanga.¹¹² What happened after the arrival of the Ndebele has been discussed elsewhere in the thesis.

What appears problematic though is the actual linkage of the Kalanga speakers to old archaeological traditions excavated in Zimbabwe, notwithstanding the familiarity of their names to the Kalanga language. New evidence premised on archaeological findings has emerged to challenge previous ideas on the Leopard's Kopje tradition. This questions the widely held view that Mapungubwe and the Leopard's Kopje traditions were the progenitor of subsequent cultures on the Zimbabwean plateau, more important than Mapela for example which recent research shows could have predated the Leopard's kopje, or that was it even bigger.¹¹³ Archaeological research at Mapela for example has put to doubt the view that the Zimbabwean culture was centred at Mapungubwe or the Leopards kopje. In some instances, researchers have even questioned whether there was contact between the two sites: Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe, as even the pottery does not match.¹¹⁴ In light of these recent challenges to the Mapungubwe-Leopard's Kopje orthodoxy, debates on Kalanga origins have been thrown wide open.

The link between the Kalanga speakers and Great Zimbabwe is deductive. If Mapungubwe, a Kalanga kingdom was succeeded by Great Zimbabwe, bearing similar architectural designs, it follows that the inhabitants of Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe were the same people, or at least shared a similar social, economic, and political

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ S. Chirikure, Manyanga M, Pollard AM, Bandama F, Mahachi G, Pikirayi I (2014) *Zimbabwe Culture before Mapungubwe: New Evidence from Mapela Hill*, South-Western Zimbabwe.

¹¹⁴ C. van Waarden, *The Origin of the Zimbabwe Tradition walling*, Merope Research, Zimbabwe Prehistory, 29, 2011, p13.

background and ancestry. Great Zimbabwe collapsed around 1450, and from its shadows emerged two important states, Mutapa and Butua. There is limited evidence to show if these two successor states existed contemporaneously to, or in competition with each other.

Archaeologists have managed to identify a continuous pattern of settlement stretching from the Leopard's Kopje tradition to Butua, and the Kalanga group appears prominently in this narrative. Kalanga websites and oral traditions are fraught with generalisations and assumptions that need to be carefully handled to avoid otherwise legitimising them. Kalanga oral traditions refer to Kalanga chiefs and kings as Mambos, and these Mambos certainly ruled in states such as Great Zimbabwe, Mutapa and Torwa.¹¹⁵ From this narrative, the Kalanga are an important component of the different polities that shared similar social, economic and political structures and are certainly an outgrowth of the same, and their expansion to the south was purely for survival in an era of shifting frontiers.

2.3 The Kalanga after the arrival of the Nguni

Perhaps more relevant to this study is how the Kalanga people fared after the collapse of the Rozvi state, of which we may assume they were part of. The Rozvi dynasty collapsed because of internal squabbles as well as the debilitating effects of Rozvi-Portuguese wars and most importantly, the effects of the Nguni incursions triggered by *Mfecane* wars in Zululand. The Nguni found an empire already fraught with challenges mentioned above. Consequently, the Rozvi resistance to the Nguni was minimal if not insignificant. The Kalanga were scattered further south to such areas as Bulilima and Mangwe, where they

¹¹⁵ Interview with Assah Khuphe, Makhubu Village, 23 April 2017, carried out by Innocent Nyathi.

continued their way of life until the establishment of colonial rule. In their interaction with the Ndebele, the Kalanga became culturally, linguistically, and politically absorbed into the Ndebele system during the more than fifty years of Ndebele independence.¹¹⁶ For example some of the Kalanga commoners, particularly those in captivity or in proximity or mixed with the Ndebele began to wear the Ndebele headdress.¹¹⁷ One Kalanga is cited saying

*Where I grew up my parents wore amabhethu, slit their ears in the fashion of the Ndebele and even put on izidlodlo.*¹¹⁸

There is evidence to suggest that the Ndebele made efforts to neutralise centres of Kalanga resistance, such as religious figures. The Ndebele systematically killed off key Kalanga religious figures to remove centres of Kalanga ‘identity’ that threatened the survival of the young Ndebele nation.¹¹⁹ However, as time went on, Ndebele adopted the Mlimo religious cult, and religious figures known as ‘amawosana’ were restored. Matter of fact, the Kalanga religion became a key feature of the Ndebele religion and remained so even after the demise of the state. Below I try to locate the origins of the marginalisation of the Kalanga in the Ndebele caste system.

Historians, including Gatsheni-Ndlovu have discussed extensively the Ndebele caste system.¹²⁰ Usually, scholars (with a Ndebele elitist slant) portray the system as a fluid, mutually beneficial arrangement that allowed for social, economic and political intercourse.

¹¹⁶ I. Nyathi, *Dynamics of political Power in a Multi-ethnic Community, Mangwe District*, Unpublished Master’s thesis, p 26.

¹¹⁷ Msindo, 71

¹¹⁸ Ibid, quoting a Kalanga elderly informant.

¹¹⁹ J. B. Richards, ‘*The Mlimo Belief and practise of the Kalanga*’, in NADA Vol 19, 1942, 54.

¹²⁰ S.J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *The Dynamics of Democracy and Human Rights among the Ndebele of Zimbabwe*, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, (University of Zimbabwe: 2004); S.J Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Rethinking the Colonial Encounter in Zimbabwe in the Early Twentieth Century’ *Journal of Southern African Studies* 33 (1)c, 2007, pp 173-191; S.J Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *The Ndebele Nation: Reflections on Hegemony, Memory, and Historiography*. (Amsterdam: SAVUSA/Rosenberg Press/UNISA Press, 2009).

The system is thus portrayed as a progressive innovation that facilitated the growth and stability of the Ndebele 'state' or 'nation'. The Ndebele 'nation', they argue, was founded based on the melting pot of 'tribes' such as the Nguni, Sotho, Tswana, Kalanga, Rozvi, and the 'Shona'.¹²¹ Kings Mzilikazi and Lobengula are depicted as brilliant political leaders and empire builders who set in motion the creation of a sophisticated 'state', starting in Zululand as a 'migrant' kingdom until settlement in Zimbabwe as a Ndebele 'nation'. Ndebele power was 'constructed' and broadcasted across different ethnic groups with such efficiency and tact that Mzilikazi and Lobengula are seen as geniuses in 'statecraft' or 'nation-building'. Such a view presupposes that the emphasis on the caste system in the Ndebele society is an old-fashioned residue of colonial historiography that ignores the embracing characteristic of this system. The colonial view of the Ndebele emphasised their war-like assimilationist image and the rigidity of the caste system. For Gatsheni-Ndlovu, however, the discourse of castes just like that of *izibongo*(totems) ignores historical factors and social fluidities within the Ndebele state. For instance, the term Zansi literally meant the South in geographic sense while *Enhla* literally means the North.¹²² However, few historians have attempted to debunk this myth.¹²³ The Ndebele caste system was, like all caste systems not all embracing. In essence it purveyed on the 'minority' a sense of inferiority that effectively led to their marginalisation and assimilation.

The assimilation and marginalisation of the Kalanga people in the Ndebele society was synonymous. In fact, their marginalisation preceded their assimilation. The caste system

¹²¹ S. J. Gatsheni-Ndlovu, *Who Ruled by the Spear? Rethinking the Form of Governance in the Ndebele State*, African Studies Quarterly 1, Volume 10, Issues 2&3, (2008), pp71-94. ¹²³ Ibid.

¹²² S.J Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 'Nation Building in Zimbabwe and the Challenges of Ndebele Particularism', in African Journal of Conflict Resolution (AJCR), Vol 3(2008), p1.

¹²³ Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, p49.

remained a bone of serious contention between the Ndebele and the Kalanga. The institutionalisation of the caste system in the Ndebele state thus marked the beginning of the marginalisation of the Kalanga as an ethnic group. In as much as it would be an overstatement to say the essence of the creation of the so-called Ndebele 'nation' was nothing beyond mere 'warlordism', it would be a distortion to underplay the role of force in that experience. Mzilikazi was one of the premier military commanders in the Zulu state. His open defiance of Shaka attests to his military prowess as Shaka was a notorious military ruler himself.

An important question on the various methods by the Ndebele aristocracy to create a Ndebele 'nation' has been debated by scholars such as Gatsheni-Ndlovu. The role of force and coercion as part and parcel of the early stages of Ndebele existence needs a closer look. However, Gatsheni-Ndlovu rightly observed, the use of force is hardly enough a tool for nation building.¹²⁴ In its conception, the Ndebele society was centred on Mzilikazi's military genius, but the 'assimilation' of other groups into that 'nation' remains shrouded in generalisations and some dangerous assumption especially the uncritical acceptance of the caste system as a unifying ideology.

During their northward migration, the Ndebele expanded and defended itself though military might. There is little evidence to suggest that the Ndebele leadership was engaged in some form of diplomacy in the period of migration or early settlement, with the African populations they encountered. Certainly, the people who were incorporated into the Ndebele state along the way, such as the Sotho, did not always do so willingly because it is generally agreed that at this stage the Ndebele were primarily a raiding group. The same

¹²⁴ Gatsheni-Ndlovu, *Who Ruled by the Spear*, pp71-94.

should apply to the groups such as the Kalanga that the Ndebele encountered upon their arrival in Zimbabwe.

It would be impossible to expect a ‘conquered’ people to become part and parcel of their conquerors without a measure of force or deliberate deculturation exerted on them. In that regard the caste system played a part. It is possible that groups absorbed along the way, and those incorporated in Zimbabwe did so because of the compelling need for security for their kith and kin, not as willing participants. The consent of the governed was not in any way made with a universal admission amongst the different groups that the Ndebele found in Zimbabwe, but rather through limited coercion¹²⁵. If we are to borrow Anderson’s term of an ‘imagined community’, it is hard to believe that the different groups found within the Ndebele ‘state’ imagined themselves as a ‘Ndebele’ community, sufficient to constitute or build a nation, particularly considering the relatively short period of lifespan of the Ndebele ‘state’ before its destruction by the colonial forces. Everyday experiences of the Kalanga within the Ndebele state have been demonstrated to have been resilient.¹²⁶ For example Kalanga chiefs such as Nswazwi retained bigger chieftaincies that outrivalled their Ndebele contemporaries.¹²⁷ That in the 1940s the Kalanga were able to form a Kalanga cultural association shows that Kalanga ethnic identity remained strong despite the group’s association with the Ndebele. These ethnic associations were in a way an indicator that the Kalanga were aware of the erosion of their space, hence they can be interpreted as an ‘imagination’ of their Kalanga identity. They also are a potent marker of Kalanga discontent

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Dube, *Shifting Identities*, chapters 2 and 3.

¹²⁷ Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, p 72.

with their marginal status. In the 1890s, during the uprisings in Matabeleland, we are told of the lack of enthusiasm amongst the southwestern Kalanga to fight on the side of the Ndebele, thus contributing to the poor defence of the Plumtree-Mafikeng route and leading to the defeat of the Ndebele. These indicators amongst other things call for a reinterpretation of the history of the Ndebele state with the goal of exposing the assumptions and presumptions of Ndebele statehood or nationhood.

In addition, whilst constructivists argue that ethnicity is something that is created in specific historical and social contexts, it is hard to believe that the Ndebele simultaneously created a particularistic identity (buttressed by the caste system) and yet still found space to mould an 'inclusive' nation. The Ndebele caste system militated against the creation of a nation by its own nature. The Zansi identity was not a mere geographic expression, but an internalised identity which buttressed the particularistic identity of the Ndebele - first as identifying the aristocracy and secondly as providing the parameters for legitimacy in a society that struggled with internal and external ambiguities (the legitimacy of the Ndebele as a conquering force was heavily dependent on the complicity of the invaded. Even the legitimacy of Ndebele kings such as Lobengula was contested). This is not to suggest that the Ndebele Khumalo were a rigid group.

Lonsdale's studies on the Kikuyu demonstrate the malleability of identities. He argues that before the advent of colonialism, African identities were very fluid, permeated by complex processes of assimilation, incorporation, conquest, inter- and intra-marriage, alliances, and fragmentation and characterised by constant human movement across social and assumed

geographical boundaries.¹²⁸ This is applicable to the Ndebele, and suits well with the protagonists of the Mthwakazi 'nation' notion. Lonsdale identified two key concepts, which he considered as crucial in understanding the changing Kikuyu social and political identities. These are 'moral ethnicity' which he defined as 'that contested internal standard of civic virtue against which we measure our personal esteem,' and 'political tribalism' in which people mobilise ethnicity for political ends, usually for purposes of gaining political power and access to other resources. The social fluidity of the Zansi-Enhla-Hole dynamic remains shrouded in assumptions. Ndebele nationhood was a contested issue.¹²⁹ The Kalanga in Matabeleland did not necessarily see themselves as 'part' of the Ndebele, as was shown by the continued existence of numerous big and small Kalanga chieftaincies such as the Nswazwi, Malalume, Hikwa, Bango, Solusi etc chieftaincies in the vast expanses of Kalanga country.

Some commentators and historians emphasise that intermarriages were not formally allowed amongst the different caste groups, though some 'mischievous' men found ways of starting illicit but blossoming inter-caste affairs¹³⁰. Children born out of these affairs were not accorded the status of their fathers but were derogatorily referred to as *incukubili*. The Ndebele caste system was therefore 'tribal' and not 'ethnic' if the concept of moral ethnicity as espoused by Lonsdale is applied (ethnicity is good, tribalism is bad). The mobilisation of ethnicity in the caste system was done to entrench Ndebele dominance, which exposes the political uses of ethnicity. This gives credence to the view that that the

¹²⁸ Lonsdale, 'Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism', Wissenschaftliche Tagung Vereinigung der Afrikanisten in Deutschland, (Duisburg, April 1995.), pp138-148.

¹²⁹ Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, p49.

¹³⁰ Gatsheni-Ndlovu, *Who Ruled by the Spear?*, pp71-94.

Ndebele society, through its caste system created conditions for the marginalisation of other groups such as the Kalanga. In any event, intermarriages alone were not sufficient to promote inter-ethnic cordiality, or a yardstick of intra and inter-ethnic symbiosis. Dube, and others have emphasised that Kalanga language was effectively ‘neutralised’ as the Kalanga adopted IsiNdebele and even Ndebele-ised their names to suit their new status as members of the Mthwakazi ‘nation’.¹³¹ There is little evidence to suggest that this was voluntary, or how it legitimised the Mthwakazi ‘project’ in the psyche of the assimilated and marginalised groups. This seems to be a tacit assumption that by ‘adopting’ the IsiNdebele language or Ndebele-sing their surnames, the Kalanga had ceded their ‘ownness’ or ‘codified’ their ethnic identity in line with the broader Mthwakazi ‘nation’ project. However, the resilience and revival of Kalanga ethnicity as demonstrated by Msindo and others shows that this was not the case.

In that respect, Ndebele political legitimacy amongst the groups that they found in Zimbabwe or absorbed along the way remained superficial. It is also imperative to stress that by categorisation, and the limited political participation for other groups in the Ndebele state institutionalised marginalisation, which successive governments inherited and buttressed. An attempt to sidestep the caste system in the Ndebele society ignores the fundamental role it played in the creation of a ‘tribal’ society. Whilst there is evidence to suggest that elements of the Kalanga, Venda, Sotho and Nambya were absorbed into the social, economic, and political structures of the Ndebele society, it will be preposterous to suggest that the process led to the creation of a ‘Ndebele’ nation. Or the obliteration of ethnic consciousness amongst the Kalanga or the Venda in the quest for ‘Mthwakazism.’

¹³¹ Dube, *Shifting Identities*, p204.

Despite its position as a ‘minority’ group in the Ndebele socio-political structure as depicted in the caste system, Kalanga ethnic identity remained alive in the whole period of interaction with the Ndebele. This was shown by Kalanga silence in the Ndebele revival politics of the early years of colonial rule led by Nyamanda Khumalo, or their purported complicity in the 1896-97 risings in Matabeleland.¹³² The exaggeration of Ndebele political power in the Zimbabwean plateau was as self-serving for the Ndebele as it was destructive to the history of marginalised groups in general and that of the Ndebele in particular. There is general assumption that after their arrival in the 1830s, the Ndebele conquered the Rozvi and the rest of the disintegrating empire was made satellite territory to the Ndebele.¹³³ This myth ignores the basic assumptions of the Rozvi ‘state’ or ‘empire’- that its limits and stretch were never clearly defined. In the 1890s this myth was ‘cleverly’ used by the settlers to justify colonial occupation of both Mashonaland and Matabeleland in the treacherous treaties Lobengula was made to sign. The Treaties signed by Lobengula perpetuated the myth that the Ndebele exercised overlordship over the Shona and other groups such as the Kalanga. This myth suited well the designs of the colonialists. It eliminated the need to have to negotiate with various chiefs. The extent of Ndebele power and its assimilationist thrust must be viewed using the lens of the politics of exclusion and inclusion.

In a nutshell, the Ndebele caste system laid the foundation for the marginalisation and assimilation of the Kalanga. Ndebele historians have found it convenient to portray a picture of Kalanga ‘minoritisation’-which would suggest some positives, at the expense of marginalisation which evidently is the lived experience of the Kalanga since the arrival of

¹³² NAZ 18/18/5-6 on the Uprisings in Matabeleland, 1897.

¹³³ The Zimstar, ‘*Ndebele Kingdom Question on Constitution*’, 23-29 September 2016.

the Ndebele.¹³⁴ As will be demonstrated, whatever emerged after that was a systematic entrenchment of the marginalisation of the Kalanga by successive regimes. However, as already suggested the caste system did not destroy Kalanga ethnic identity.

2.4 Ethnic groups in Mangwe

2.4.1 The Kalanga

Granted, archaeological evidence and oral traditions have suggested with a measure of authority that the Kalanga have a long history on the Zimbabwean plateau. However, as already alluded to in the earlier sections, the exact date for their settlement in this region remains heavily contested though some like those under the Sangulube headmanship claim that they settled as early as the days of Mambo and Mzilikazi.¹³⁵ According to one informant, they intermingled with/and or were part of the different Shona groups that have inhabited Zimbabwe for centuries. After the Nguni incursions, some of their men were integrated into the military structures of the Ndebele where they served with distinction.¹³⁶ An interviewee stressed that her maternal grandfather, a Moyo by totem and a subject of the Mambo was incorporated into the Ndebele regimental system at a young age. His integration into the system was something that he held with great pride as demonstrated by his mastery of Ndebele war routines such ‘*ukugiya*’ (war dance). The interviewee remembered fondly how he would do the Ndebele war dances to entertain them. Relevant to this study, he represented a breed of young Kalanga men who were absorbed into the Ndebele regimental system and their linguistic and cultural assimilation was thus easier than their female counterparts. Their common totem was *moyo* (the heart). The *moyo* totem

¹³⁴ For more on the concept of ‘minoritisation’ see R P Werbner, *Reasonable Radicals and Citizenship in Botswana: The Public Anthropology of Kalanga Elites* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp63-67.

¹³⁵ NAZ 2929/6/2-6 Description of Mangwe chieftaincies by area and ethnic composition, 1956.

¹³⁶ Interview with Assah Khuphe, villager, Makhubu, 22 April 2017.

was not the only Kalanga totem, however. The list below, by Dube provides some of the totems found in Mangwe. These totems have changed over the course of history, especially with the arrival of economic ‘refugees’ such as gold panners and herd-boys, or even civil servants such as teachers who have married into the group. Because of that, these Kalanga totems are not necessarily a stable and enduring marker of identity. Their mention here serves to highlight that unlike the Ndebele most Kalanga totems are related to animals.

KALANGA TOTEM	NDEBELE EQUIVALENT
<i>Mbizi</i>	<i>Dube</i>
<i>Nhembwe</i>	<i>Mpunzi</i>
<i>Nungu</i>	<i>Inungu</i>
<i>Hungwe</i>	<i>Nyoni</i>
<i>Shili</i>	<i>Nyoni</i>
<i>Howu</i>	<i>Ndlovu</i>
<i>Tjibelu</i>	<i>Ndebele</i>
<i>Moyo</i>	<i>Mthunzi</i>
<i>Maposa</i>	<i>Maphosa</i>
<i>Moyo</i>	<i>Mthunzi</i>
<i>Moyo</i>	<i>Nhliziyo</i>
<i>Moyo</i>	<i>Dewa</i>
<i>Ngwena</i>	<i>Ngwenya</i>
<i>Hulo</i>	<i>Vundla</i>
<i>Bepe</i>	<i>Bhebhe</i>
<i>Wudo</i>	<i>Ncube</i>

<i>Hoko</i>	<i>Ncube</i>
<i>Mhofu</i>	<i>Ncube</i>

Table 1. *List of Kalanga totems and Ndebele equivalents.* Source: Dube, *Shifting Identities*, p 204.

2.4.2 Ndebelised Kalanga (also called *amaMpande*).

‘*AmaMpande*’ are the group of people that ‘left’ Empanjeni area at the height of colonial rule and settled in the broader mopane woodlands around the Makhubu and Brunapeg areas. This group is believed to have left eMpandeni in the 1940-50s.¹³⁷ On scrutiny the *AmaMpande* were Ndebelised Kalanga who had been absorbed into the Ndebele regimental system. In its essence the *AmaMpande* term is a label and not necessarily a clan or ethnic name, but with time it became ‘ethnicised’ by being attached to symbolic and ‘enduring’ characterisation that gives it an ‘ethnic’ outlook. Unwillingness to abandon their age-old practise of polygamy is alleged to have triggered their relocation from the eMpandeni area.¹³⁸ This practise was being discouraged by the Roman Catholic Church which had established itself at eMpandeni Mission.

A proclamation by the Roman Catholic Church prohibited ‘marriage’ without a ‘proper wedding’.¹³⁹ By a proper wedding the missionaries meant the formal ‘white’ wedding which was not yet popular amongst the indigenous ethnic groups such as the Ndebele and the Kalanga as they were generally polygamous.

¹³⁷ Interview with Assah Khuphe, villager, Makhubu village, 22 April 2017.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

The restriction on the number of wives extended to all African groups under the ambit of missionary influence, not only the Ndebele and the Kalanga. One of the core characteristics of the missionary wedding was that it limited the number of wives one could marry to only one, and that struck a blow at the heart of the Ndebele traditional marriage custom of polygamy. Such grievances added to the already simmering tensions between the Africans and the Europeans over land and cattle because polygamy itself was taxed by the colonial regime (hut tax). The people had lost their land to white farmers and missions and were relocated to the reserves against their will. Most of them were settled in an area that is now called 'Madelukeni' to symbolise their '*deluka*' - Kalanga word for 'alighting' - from a vehicle such as a bus or lorry. Prior to their arrival, the area was a mopane woodland dotted with Kalanga villages and variously referred to as now generally referred to as Mphoengs, but comprising villages such as Makhubu, Brunapeg, Maninji and so forth.

Their relocation to Makhubu, village with a generous sprinkling of Ndebele and Kalanga speaking villagers, especially the *Ndebele-Tjibelu* clan) and to areas bordering the Brunapeg mission hospital, significantly altered the socio-economic and political geography of the area. Their arrival stirred considerable tension between them, and the Kalanga population dotted in the area up to Brunapeg and the surrounding areas. The AmaMpande were Ndebele, and they were so called because they came from Empandeni, where a regiment belonging to the Ndebele (Mpande) had been stationed in the area at the height of Ndebele power. They were derogatively referred to as *MaMpande* - and the term carried with it crude negative connotations such as backwardness, refusal to attend school, loose morals amongst other things that were ascribed amaMpande by the Kalanga. The term 'amaMpande' stuck as a label and became socially acceptable as an 'othering'

instrument amongst the Kalanga and the Tswana in and around the Mphoeng area. For a long time, the Kalanga and Tswana in and around the Mphoeng-Brunapeg stretch treated the AmaMpande with contempt and could not even intermarry with them.¹⁴⁰ The Kalanga populations particularly despised the AmaMpande's failure to learn their language, or the crudeness with which they pronounced some Kalanga terms.¹⁴¹ This was because the AmaMpande had been *Ndebelised* due to their long interaction with the Ndebele immigrant group at eMpandeni area. However, in the recent past the tensions have waned considerably and the groups are now intermingling than before. This is partly due to the 'advancement' of the *AmaMpande* as they now embrace education.

Politically, the amaMpande were unable to reclaim whatever power or clout they had possessed in their original area, and they were dominated by the local chieftaincies of Mphoeng (Tswana) and Sangulube (Kalanga). Even the ascendancy of Chief Tshitshi to power has not in any way strengthened the political claims of the AmaMpande although Tshitshi is Ndebele.

2.4.3 The Mphoeng Tswana

Another group that has played an important role in the socio-economic and political history of Mangwe is the Tswana of Mphoeng. Their entry into Zimbabwe dates to the early years of colonial rule. Archival records show that Chiefs Mphoeng and Ratitladi originated from Bechuanaland (now Botswana) and moved into the area with the early colonial settlers.¹⁴² They are the descendants of the Ngwato of Botswana. The two, Mphoeng and Ratitladi were part and parcel of the royalty of this Tswana polity. The paramount chief of

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Miriam Moyo, a Kalanga teacher, Esigodini, 22 June 2017.

¹⁴² NAZ S2929/6/2-6 Bulilimamangwe chieftaincies, 1956.

Bechuanaland (now Botswana), Khama had an uneasy relationship with his half-brother, Mphoeng. The movement of Mphoeng and Ratitladi to Zimbabwe is fraught with inconsistencies especially whether it was voluntary or forced. However, there appears to have been a conflict of interest between him and his brother Khama the over the adoption of Christianity as the official religion in the whole of Bechuanaland.¹⁴³ Upon his arrival in Zimbabwe, Mphoeng established a chieftaincy in the area bestriding the Ingwizi River.¹⁴⁴ Upon his death (around 1925), he was succeeded by his brother Raharasi who acted for the eldest son of Mphoeng, a man named Hansiti. The Tswana who settled in the Mphoeng area a century ago were followers of Ratitladi and Mphoeng, half-brothers to Khama the 3rd, the paramount chief of the Ngwato.¹⁴⁵

The settlement of the Tswana amongst the Kalanga and Ndebele in the Mphoeng Tribal Trust Lands has significantly shaped inter and intra ethnic relationships in the area so much that it would be an injustice to ignore this important group. In the 1940s, the Tswana chieftaincies began to lose authority. The death of the founding chief, Mphoeng weakened the chieftaincies as his successor Raharasi quarrelled with the whites, ostensibly over drought relief distribution after the famine of 1947.¹⁴⁶ After this 'scam', he was stripped of his chieftaincy and a regency was set up headed by Tshitshi, an Ndebele from Embakwe around the Makuzeze area.¹⁴⁷ Tshitshi became a *de facto* chief and Phahlane became headman over the whole of Mphoeng.¹⁴⁸ The Tswana effectively lost the struggle for power

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with Alfred Dingani SaDove, villager, Makhubu Village, 20 April 2008, carried out by the author for a master's dissertation.

¹⁴⁵ Mmegi online 'Bangwato in Zim seek repatriation' accessed online 18 May 2017.

¹⁴⁶ NAZ S2929/6/2-6 Bulilimamangwe chieftaincies, 1956.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

during this period and have existed on the margins of political control in the region up to this day. However, though the Tshitshi chieftaincy is yet to enjoy full legitimacy amongst the Tswana of Mphoeng, it appears to have weathered the storm as the Mphoeng heirs to the chieftaincies have since passed on.¹⁴⁹

2.5 Some prominent Mangwe chieftaincies/headmanships.

2.5.1 The Tshitshi chieftaincy

Another important chieftaincy in the area is that of Tshitshi found in the Tshitshi area, sometimes called *EMpandeni*. According to archival sources, the origins of the chieftaincy can be traced to the times of Mzilikazi the founder of the migrant kingdom of the Ndebele. Sindisa was the founder of the chieftaincy, having been appointed by Mzilikazi as a chief because of his prowess in battle. He was placed in charge of the Mpande regiment, which together with the Izimnyama regiment looked after the king's cattle in the southwest of the country.¹⁵⁰ Sindisa was succeeded by Ndlalambi, a left handed man who was to lose the chieftaincy because of that 'handicap', a bone of contention that has transcended generations. A number of headman fall under the Tshitshi chieftaincy. One of them is Nganunu, whose traditional name is Phahlane.¹⁵¹ Phahlane presides over the Mphoeng area. The main groups under his jurisdiction are Ndebele, Kalanga and Tswana. Archival records are not clear on the exact date of his appointment though a Mr Lane (Msoso), the district commissioner was responsible for the process of his appointment in consultation with the *amahlabezulu*-the people.¹⁵² It is important to stress here that even though the district commissioners were becoming important players in the selection of chiefs in

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Assah Khuphe, villager, Makhubu village, 22 April 2017.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

African areas, they still consulted the local populations where necessary to get the best candidates. This minimised conflicts and power struggles but in the same vein allowed the colonial authorities the much-needed leverage in as far as presiding over local politics was concerned. In other words, it gave them the ‘legitimising’ rights which were surreptitiously hidden behind the *amahlabezulu*.

Nganunu’s area of jurisdiction is quite big and covers villages such as Ndabambi, Sikwana, Sakubama, Fuwani, Rasejwa, Madliso, Pugen, Rasiboroyi, Madunusa and many more.¹⁵³ The names of the villages are a mixture of Setswana, TjiKalanga and IsiNdebele. This attests to the cosmopolitan nature of the area which I believe provides a fascinating social history.

Another important headmanship is that of Madimabi. The headman is of the Moyo totem and in the 1960s the headman was one Madimabi Moyo, hence the name.¹⁵⁴ The headmanship is of the Dalawunda tribe, a variation of the Kalanga. This headmanship is rather complex because it has oscillated between chieftaincy and headmanship, having had an uneasy relationship with the colonial authorities over land and related issues. The traditional name of the headmanship is Sangulube, and the original Sangulube was appointed in 1946. The people in the area claim that they have been settled in the area for a long time, tracing their stay to the times of Mambo and Lobengula.¹⁵⁵ They claim that they were never incorporated into the Ndebele regiments or in any way influenced by that group. However, that is clearly not true as they are several Ndebele in the area with a long

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

history of settlement. The Sangulube headmanship is a very important one in the Nganunu area.

Further south there is the Telo-Obodo community. Here the headman is Obodo. Archival records point out that Obodo (also known as Wobodo) was appointed by Chief Malaba Ntelela of Kezi in the Matobo district.¹⁵⁶ The Obodo was originally a chieftaincy but was abolished by the colonial government in the 1960s, for reasons similar to those of Sangulube. Interestingly, Obodo originally got the chieftaincy on account of his proficiency as a *n'anga* (*traditional healer*), something which was highly unusually in the traditional set up. Such appointments help to shed light on the various ways in which chieftaincies were established in the district, and how that has a bearing on the present status of chiefs or headman as they tussle for power. Also, it validates the view that religious and political authority formed an important basis for Kalanga ethnic mobilisation.

Further south there is the Maninji headmanship, of Maninji. However, this headmanship has remained vacant since the death of Maninji in 1958.¹⁵⁷ The heir apparent Mtongana was reluctant to take over the headmanship as he was gainfully employed in the Native Commissioners' offices in Plumtree thus leading to his brother, Station acting on his behalf.¹⁵⁸ The area is predominated by IsiNdebele speaking Kalanga people, and the people moved into the area in the 1930s from Tshitshi's area.¹⁵⁹ It is this Ndebele connection that sees most of the people speaking IsiNdebele instead of TjiKalanga even though they profess

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

to be Kalanga. I argue that this disposition by the Kalanga to speak isiNdebele as opposed to TjiKalanga is a product of years of marginalisation.

To the north of Mangwe is an equally important chieftaincy, that of Wasi Ndiweni. The traditional name of the Chieftaincy is Kondwane, though Wasi is now generally used.¹⁶⁰

Judging by the surname, this is an original Zansi chieftaincy with all the ‘royalty’ of the original Ndebele. The chieftaincy oversees the Izimnyama area, where the Ndebele regiment of Izimnyama was garrisoned.¹⁶¹ The Chief is of Sotho extraction though most of his people speak IsiNdebele, and some bit of TjiKalanga. The Wasi chieftaincy appears to enjoy considerable support amongst the people as fewer squabbles have been recorded in its history. In fact, is one of the longest established chieftaincies in the region, dating back to the pre-colonial period.¹⁶² Importantly it was one of the Mangwe chiefs that survived demotion in the colonial period because they cooperated with the colonial regime especially on native development and rural councils’ issues.¹⁶³ In fact, some chiefs were able to manipulate the colonial system to extend and consolidate their frontiers and land claims.¹⁶⁴

Though the above description of the chiefs and headman is not exhaustive, the main aim is to show the different social groups that are found in Mangwe. Important to note is that in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s the demographic composition of the area was mostly Kalanga and Ndebele, with a generous sprinkling of Tswana in and around Mphoeng. However, that demographic trend has been altered significantly because of the influx of immigrants

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Dube, *Shifting Identities*, p124.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, see also NAZ40/1/9F-Letter from Mr Taylor, Plumtree District Commissioner, 21 January 1971.

attracted by gold panning and the menial jobs at Ingwizi estate. Identifying these groups enables us to properly examine their social, economic and political activities. Armed with the generic knowledge of the chiefs and their areas of jurisdiction, it enables the reader to clearly contextualise the politics of intra and inter group marginalisation that define the region, as well as the coping mechanisms of the people under the different chieftaincies.

2.6 Economic and Social geography of Mangwe.

Mangwe district is located to the southwestern part of Zimbabwe. The district lies on a strip of land bordering Zimbabwe and Botswana. Originally, it was part of a bigger district known as Bulilima-Mangwe until it was broken down into Mangwe and Bulilima districts. The breakup of the district occurred in 2005 and one could be forgiven for assuming that the sheer size of the district prior to breakup was the prime reason, for administrative expediency. The position of Mangwe as a borderline district provides convenience for such activities as cross border trade and cross border labour migration. The district stretches from the cattle rich plains of Marula down to the dry acacia veldt of Mphoeng, and further to the mopane woodlands of Brunapeg, to the confluences of the Shashi and Thuli rivers. All these divergent ecosystems have assisted in building the rich socio-economic history of Mangwe. For example, the mopane woodlands have for generations provided a thriving mopane worm economy and other nontimber products such as wild honey, game and fruits that have sustained livelihoods for the inhabitants of the area. The mopane worm has not only sustained locals economically but has attracted economic immigrants from other parts of the country leading to the creation of a vibrant monetised and batter trading economy.

The sweet grass found in and around Marula allowed for the development of cattle ranching as the economic mainstay for generations. Apart from being used as draught power, cattle

also derive esteemed social value and locals are reluctant to dispose them in the face of intermittent droughts. As in common in African culture ownership of a large head of cattle brings about a high social status to an individual, particularly men as the society is still highly patriarchal. However, through personal observation the ownership of many cattle no longer leads to activities such as polygamy or large families. This is notwithstanding the fact that successive droughts have tremendously reduced livestock heads amongst the inhabitants of Mangwe, so fewer families own large herds of cattle nowadays. Apart from the drought induced dwindling capacity for large families, the impact of Christianity, prevalence of, and access to birth control measures as well the impact western education in the area is also largely responsible for the changing attitudes in that regard. The cultivation of crops such as millet, sorghum and rapoko is carried out in most of the areas.

Traditionally, the three crops-millet, sorghum and rapoko have been grown for generations. The area has historically experienced intermittent droughts hence the choice of these small grain, drought resistant crops. Maize was also a popular crop, though the recurrent droughts make the cultivation of maize particularly difficult. The small grain crops such as millet are labour intensive, particularly towards harvest time as they are also food to '*intaka*' (qualia birds) birds. Cultivation is carried out on the banks of the Ingwizi River, producing the unintended result of the river silting. Cultivation of the maize is usually carried out in areas known as *tjidaka* (rich alluvium soil deposits), situated at the bottom of hills where water and fertile soils collect during the rainy season. However, over the years the rapid spread of acacia woodlands in Mangwe and surrounding due to scarcity of rain has made crop cultivation near impossible to carry out. This has further compounded the lack of food

security in the area, compelling residents to devise methods to survive which are discussed in the broader thesis.

The proximate location of the Botswana and South Africa borders has thus made both regulated and unregulated cross border trade a lucrative option for the communities as they grapple with challenges associated with existing on the margins of the mainstream economy as well as the harsh and dry climate. In the earlier years of settlement, residents claim that the area was also rich in wild game, and the population carried out a thriving hunting economy. Hunting was mostly carried out in the surrounding bushlands by men, acting as bands or lone hunters (*kutenela*).¹⁶⁵ Apart from crop cultivating, trading and collecting mopane worms, owing to growing popularity of illegal and legal/semi-legal mining the people of Mangwe have recently ventured into gold panning. Small mine claims are worked individually or collectively, and the gold is sold to local buyers or to the central bank in Bulawayo.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with Malaki Nkomo, Esigodini, 10 May 2017. *Kutenela* is some communities was carried with the other intended purpose of ridding the area of animals regarded as destructive to domestic animals, such as eagles and jackals.



Fig 4. The dense acacia woodlands on the banks of Ingwizi River. In the older days locals used to hunt along the banks of the river and it provided a rich natural habitat for wild game.



Fig 5. *Electricity pylons navigating their way through the acacia shrubs in Makhubu. The electricity is one of the few innovations seen in the area for decades. Regrettably it only services a few mines. Locals do access it for simpler tasks like charging cell phone batteries. At its current cost it is safe to say that most of the locals would not be able to purchase it for domestic use.*



Fig 6. *Brick making along the Ingwizi River. Note the uncovered pits that pose danger to animals during the*

rainy season. The activity also contributes to the siltation of the river. However, as continuously referred to by locals, the activity has been eclipsed by illegal mining as a major driver of the siltation of the Ingwizi River in the recent times.

2.7 Significance of the spatial and social description of Mangwe to the thesis.

The geography of Mangwe provides an interesting interface between nature and human beings, because most of their economic activities reflect an attempt to balance their existence in those communities to the geographical margins of the state and the desire to exploit whatever resources the environment avails. Interestingly, I observed that there is little migration of locals into nearby urban areas such as Plumtree and Bulawayo. Most locals interviewed know Johannesburg (South Africa) and Francistown (Botswana) more than they do Plumtree or Bulawayo, both of which are the nearest Zimbabwean towns. This is because as soon as they reach the late teens, the local youth are most likely to go to either South Africa or Botswana for their first urban experience. The exodus of the youth is testimony to the lack of faith they have in their own urban areas as potential job markets. Most of the youth interviewed (mostly returnees during holidays), claimed to have left straight after O'level, or even before completing it. Some only went to Bulawayo once or twice to sell mopane worms but never thought of settling down for a job in that city.¹⁶⁶ The reasons for this mind-set will be interrogated in succeeding chapters of the thesis.

Despite the seemingly low levels of interest for local cities or towns as sources of employment, it is important to note that there was nonetheless a sizeable number of Kalanga people who

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

migrated to Bulawayo during colonial rule as well as in the early years of independence, particularly those seeking work and education.¹⁶⁷ There is reasonable evidence to suggest that some of Kalanga took part in the Bulawayo faction fights of 1929 which could suggest an even earlier sustained migration to Bulawayo.¹⁶⁸ Ranger suggests that some Kalanga youths were members of ‘gangs’ in Bulawayo.¹⁶⁹ Inadvertently these Kalanga ‘gangs’ aligned themselves with the Ndebele speakers in the clashes with the ‘Shona’. However, the larger chunk of the migrations was Johannesburg, South Africa bound.

The social history of Mangwe is equally diverse. The area has experienced social changes occasioned by both external and internal factors. In the pre-colonial era, Ndebele power extended southwards and westwards, and in areas such as Empandeni Ndebele chiefs were installed.¹⁷⁰ As emphasised elsewhere in the thesis, these areas were traditionally occupied by the Kalanga. In that respect, the extension of Ndebele political power into Kalanga areas brought with it profound social and political changes. In some instances, the arrival of the Ndebele marked the beginning of the ascendancy of IsiNdebele language over the tjiKalanga. The Ndebele and the Kalanga existed in an uneasy alliance, partly because the Ndebele regarded the Kalanga as an inferior ‘hole’ group.¹⁷¹ However, there is no evidence of a major social or political upheaval in the period of co-existence between the Ndebele and the Kalanga in Mangwe district. What appears are minor social tensions occasioned by petty ‘tribal’ politics in social activities such as marriages and traditional ceremonies such

¹⁶⁷ The author’s father was one of the many who decided to migrate to Bulawayo to seek work, apparently doing a few menial jobs in the city.

¹⁶⁸ For more on the faction fights see their reinterpretation by E Msindo, *Ethnicity, not Class? The 1929 Bulawayo Faction Fights Reconsidered*, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol 32, 3, 2006, pp 429-447.

¹⁶⁹ T Ranger, *Urban Violence and the Colonial Experience in Southern Rhodesia*, accessed from http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/opin/tr_urban_violence_byo_050414.pdf, on the 18 January 2018.

¹⁷⁰ Dube, *Shifting Identities*, p 123-24.

¹⁷¹ NAZ NB 6/1/1 NC Campbell to CNC Bulawayo, 1 April 1898.

as rain making, or noncompliance with divergent ritual activities practised in the day to day lives of people living in the district.

It is important to discuss the consequences for the collapse of Ndebele power in Matabeleland in general and Mangwe, in particular. The final defeat of the Ndebele (as a ‘state’) occurred in 1896, and the colonial project was promptly put up by Cecil John Rhodes, a British imperialist. The effects of the defeat of the Ndebele are rather complex. Firstly, though Ndebele political figures were largely curtailed in their activities, symbolic institutions such as chiefly authority remained alive though latent and largely contained by the colonial administration. Princes such as Nyamanda hoped that they could still salvage their pre-colonial power, and to that end formed an association aptly calling for the restoration of Ndebele lands or homeland. The gradual collapse of Ndebele power, and its replacement with colonial authority meant that society in the whole of Matabeleland was transformed. In the colonial period, the TjiKalanga language was not given much attention, a move that successive governments seemed to tacitly approve for administrative expedience. Missionaries used IsiNdebele in their catechism at Empandeni. The missionaries were not in a position of financing the development of a Kalanga orthography and were therefore compelled to use either IsiNdebele or IsiZulu in their activities.¹⁷² Missionaries were useful in establishing language standardisation in Zimbabwe, and in the process minority languages were marginalised leading to the social, political and economic exclusion of their speakers.¹⁷³ Importantly, however, is that despite this marginalisation and

¹⁷² Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, chapter 2; I Nyathi, “*Ndebele Kalanga ethnic relations in Bulilimamangwe South: Integration or Assimilation? A case study of the colonial and post-colonial Bulilimamangwe*”, unpublished Honours dissertation, History Department, University of Zimbabwe, 2004.

¹⁷³ F Ndhlovu, *The Politics of Language and Nation Building in Zimbabwe*, (Peter Lang International

exclusion, groups such as the Kalanga mobilised themselves around ethnic associations such as KLCDS which were used as bulwarks against perceived cultural and linguistic ‘imperialism’.

In that schema, missionaries contributed, inadvertently to the growth of ‘ethnic’ consciousness because of their language policies.¹⁷⁴ Mission schools such as Embakwe and Empandeni were set up, and their thrust promoted the ascendancy of the Ndebele over the Kalanga.¹⁷⁵ Msindo has demonstrated how ethnic groups formed associations, amongst other avenues, that acted to preserve ethnic identity, and how they were used as resistance to the merging Kalanga and Ndebele identities into one, adding that both the Ndebele and the Kalanga used language as an instrument to anchor ethnic identity in Bulilimamangwe.¹⁷⁶ This, coupled with the generous sprinklings of Tswana speaking villages at Mphoeng, Nkedile, Kweneng and Mkgampo, has provided a rich social milieu. Politically, the Tswana factor has been important in Mangwe as well. Their influence in the area date back to the time of conquest and pacification of Matabeleland in the 1890s. Upon their arrival in Zimbabwe the focal point of Tswana political power was centred in the Mphoeng area. This area acted as de facto capital of the now defunct chieftaincies of Mphoeng and Ratitladi. The settlement of the Tswana chieftaincies in that area certainly altered the political, social, and economic landscape of the area. There is evidence that the influence of this immigrant group extended further south to Shashi River.¹⁷⁷ In fact one of

Publishers: Bern, Switzerland, 2009), pp22-31. See also Elizabeth MacConagle, *Creating Identity in Zimbabwe and Mozambique*, (University of Rochester Press: New York, 2007); A. J. Dachs and W. F. S. J Rea, *The Catholic Church and Zimbabwe*, (Mambo Press: Gwelo, 1979), p. 13.²⁷² Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, p 34.

¹⁷⁴ Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, chapter 2.

¹⁷⁵ Nyathi, *Dynamics of Political Power*, p 32.3. The reasons for this mind-set will be interrogated in succeeding chapters of the thesis.

¹⁷⁶ Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, pp115-135.

¹⁷⁷ Interview with Assah Khuphe, cited above; see also NAZ S2929/6/2 Delineation Report, Bulilimamangwe District 1965.

the designated chiefs, Hansiti resided at Chief Bidi's area in the Matobo district as a 'guest' and returned upon the disposition of his uncle Raharasi in an ill-fated attempt to take over the vacant chieftaincy. Hansiti died a commoner.¹⁷⁸ Tswana influence remains an important social, economic, and political factor in the history of Mangwe. Economically, the Tswana in the area have helped to start and maintain the various trade and cross border networks over the decades. These networks have benefited the Kalanga as well.

Over the decades, the district of Mangwe has become a melting pot of cultures due to the gradual immigration of different groups into the area. For example, there has been a steady trickle of economic 'refugees' from other regions such as Nkayi, Binga and even parts of Mashonaland.¹⁷⁹ These immigrants are usually attracted by the gold mining activities in the area (both legal and illegal). Mangwe also act as a transit point to Botswana and South Africa. Local cattle ranchers employ some of these immigrants as herd boys. Attending social gatherings such as funerals show a diverse demographic picture as the new arrivals bring with them different cultures and infuse with the local communities to continuously evolve the social geography of Mangwe.

As stated in the preceding section, the marginalisation of the Kalanga and their subsequent 'assimilation' into the Ndebele 'nation' was further entrenched during the colonial period from 1894 to 1980 in Matabeleland. The colonial social, economic, and political policies shaped the history of the Kalanga in several ways. Economically, the settlers introduced a

¹⁷⁸ NAZS2929/6/2 Mangwe chieftaincies.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with William 'Borman' Ncube, villager, Makhubu village, 23 April 2017.

capitalist economy which changed the economic geography of Mangwe and further isolated the Kalanga from the mainstream economy leading to their marginalisation. In 1894, an Order-in-Council was issued creating reserves in Matabeleland.¹⁸⁰ This was after the defeat of the Ndebele in the Anglo-Ndebele War of 1893-4. This order removed the Kalanga and the Ndebele from their traditional fertile lands and provided for their resettlement in the newly created reserves. The movement of the Kalanga from their ancestral lands was done without due regard to the psychological and spiritual attachment that they had to the land because they had lived on it for centuries. The reserves policy altered the economic fabric of the Kalanga in several ways.

Firstly, their agricultural productivity was severely curtailed.¹⁸¹ Crop production was particularly hard hit, as the reserves were poorly watered and not fertile. Livestock rearing was equally affected as the grazing areas were continuously being reduced in size and quality. What Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons call the 'roots of rural poverty' effectively removed the Africans from the mainstream economy and created conditions for the marginalisation of African groups such as the Kalanga. Colonial marginalisation transcended the economy and affected the social fabric of the African groups. Colonial administration effectively lumped the Kalanga together with the Ndebele for administrative expediency.¹⁸² TjiKalanga a language was accorded a second-class status by both the colonial administrators and the missionaries.¹⁸³ Remarkably, in the colonial period some of

¹⁸⁰ S.J Gatsheni-Ndlovu, '*Nation Building in Zimbabwe and the Challenges of Ndebele Particularism*', in African Journal of Conflict Resolution (AJCR), VOL3 (2008), p1. Gatsheni-Ndlovu quotes a letter written by former governor of Matabeleland North, the late Welshman Mabheba on land dispossession in Matabeleland and the need to redress that.

¹⁸¹ R. Palmer and Parsons N(eds), *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa* (Heinemann: London, 1977).

¹⁸² Native Commissioners' reports and Delineation Reports produced in the colonial period do not pay much attention on other groups in Matabeleland. Their focus is on the Ndebele.

¹⁸³ Dube, *Shifting Identities...*

the languages such as the Isi-Kalanga were taught up to Standard Six. However, this was mostly due to the ‘benevolence’ of missionaries in their respective areas.¹⁸⁴ The marginalisation of the Kalanga during the colonial period saw the creation of pro-Kalanga associations such as Kalanga Language and Culture Protection Society in 1946.

The post-colonial period has seen limited reprieve for the Kalanga in general and those of Mangwe in particular. In as far as the promotion of the Kalanga language is concerned, the post-colonial government has tried to finally take a practical policy position regarding the previously marginalised language groups. Firstly, the TjiKalanga language is now recognised in the Constitution of Zimbabwe as one of the 16 official languages.¹⁸⁵ As Beatrice Lantern observes, prior to the 2013 Constitution, English was the only officially recognised language in Zimbabwe.¹⁸⁶ The government also gazetted that a state university, Great Zimbabwe as well as Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo Polytechnic teach indigenous languages as part and parcel of their curriculum. It is envisaged that this development will result in the use of these languages as medium of instruction in schools and colleges. However, a cursory survey of the area of Mangwe reveals that the damage to the TjiKalanga as a language will take a lot of time and effort to be corrected.¹⁸⁷ In fact, most of the TjiKalanga that is spoken is now heavily laced with Ndebele words and phrases, especially amongst the youth as they were made to learn IsiNdebele at school thus it is common to find Kalanga youths struggling with TjiKalanga as compared to their parents.

¹⁸⁴ B. Lantern, *From Marginalisation to Elevation: The Use of Marginalised Languages as a Medium of Instruction (MOI) in Selected Institutions of Higher Learning in Zimbabwe*, Canadian Open Educational Research Journal vol 1, no.2, July 2014, p1-15.

¹⁸⁵ Amended Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ The main language of communication is IsiNdebele. It is common for people to greet you in IsiNdebele first and only change to TjiKalanga when they realise you are fluent in it.

2.8 Mangwe as a case study

The choice of Mangwe as a case study was deliberate. It was influenced by several factors. The first major factor is the demographic composition of the area. The group under discussion, the Kalanga are the main inhabitants of this area.¹⁸⁸ Because the thesis looks at the social, political and economic history of the Kalanga it was inevitable that Mangwe would offer an ideal case study because of its demography. Though the area is one of the districts in Zimbabwe with a considerably large Kalanga population, there is cognisance of the fact that there has been a significant influx of people from different parts of the country attracted by the economic opportunities in Mangwe such as gold panning and the mopane worm. As a result of these influxes the social and economic history of Mangwe offers an interesting interface between marginalisation and survival politics. The population and its composition are sufficient to provide a grounded examination of the subject at hand, which is a social and economic history of a society existing on the margins.

Apart from the demographic considerations Mangwe fitted well the theoretical perspectives raised in the discussion: ethnicity, marginalisation, and livelihoods. The district of Mangwe remains one of the least developed in Zimbabwe, with a poor road network, few schools, and hospitals as well as few primary and secondary industries. Local newspapers continuously bemoan the lack of investment capital in the area.¹⁸⁹ As a result, the economy of the area has experienced limited growth since the 1940s. People in the area have survived through 'informal' economic activities such as cross border trade and the harvesting of the mopane worm for decades. Admittedly, it is not the only district in Zimbabwe experiencing

¹⁸⁸ Parliamentary report 2015, p5; see Dube, *Shifting Identities*, p 34.

¹⁸⁹ The Sunday News, '*Mangwe RDC courts investors*', 28 May 2017.

low levels of economic activity. However, it provides a good case study for the discussion between marginalisation and ethnicity in multi-ethnic societies

In as far as marginalisation is concerned, the area has experienced various forms. These can be divided into three categories: structural, cultural, and social role marginalisation. The first two are the most prominent. Cultural marginalisation happens when an individual's cultural practises are given less emphasis in a social setting leading to cultural assimilation and acculturation. In this regard, the assimilationist nature of the Ndebele society, grounded on the Ndebele caste system provides fertile grounds for cultural marginalisation. Culturally, the Kalanga of Mangwe have inadvertently adopted Ndebele surnames and in some cases the Ndebele language is used in various fora even where Kalanga communities are dominant. The cultural marginalisation of the Kalanga saw the emergence of Kalanga cultural revival associations of the 1940s as well in the post-independence period. The interface between those three main aspects could provide an interesting discussion on the Kalanga of Mangwe.

2.9 Why the 1940s to 2015?

The study is in the period between 1940 and 2015. However, the study makes a deliberate effort to factor in the pre-colonial period as it provides the background to the marginalisation of the Kalanga. Of particular importance in the pre-colonial period is how the caste system in the Ndebele state offset the marginalisation of the Kalanga as an ethnic group, as discussed in the earlier parts of the chapter. The discussion on the pre-colonial period helps lay the background to issues that affect the Kalanga people in the later years. The 1940s are an important period in the political and economic history of Zimbabwe.

Firstly, as Dube rightly observed it was the decade where Kalanga elites formed associations that explicitly focused on the needs of the Kalanga, such as restoration of Kalanga culture and language¹⁹⁰. More precisely, it was the period when broad based African nationalism was beginning to expand across the country. The beginnings of African nationalism in Zimbabwe has its roots in the early wars of resistance such as the Anglo-Ndebele War and Umvukela 1/Chimurenga 1, in the 1890s. However, by the turn of the 20th century African grievances became crystallised around embryonic nationalist parties such as the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association of Benjamin Burombo. In the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s the embryonic political parties developed further into fully fledged mass parties mobilising across ethnicities and geographical boundaries. However, as history was to show, these parties were simmering with ethnic discontent and claims of marginalisation which continuously ruptured them leading to splits. From the embryonic elitist political parties emerged ‘mass’ nationalist parties. On the surface these new parties appeared to cut across ethnic boundaries, yet in fact they were far from an ethnically harmonious movement.¹⁹¹

Amongst the Kalanga of Mangwe, Msindo observed that key African nationalists such as Jason Moyo, Joshua Nkomo and George Silundika came from Kalanga communities.¹⁹² In the same period, Kalanga elites formed the Kalanga Cultural Promotion Society in 1946, whose main goal was to restore pride in everything that was assumed to be Kalanga.¹⁹³ The two scenarios need further explanation. Kalanga nationalists such as Joshua Nkomo did not espouse an

¹⁹⁰ Dube, *Shifting Identities*, p6.

¹⁹¹ On the tensions and challenges in the liberation discourse, see M. Sithole, *Zimbabwe: Struggles within Struggles* (Rujeko: Harare, 1999).

¹⁹² Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, p24.

¹⁹³ Dube, *Shifting identities*, p45.

explicit Kalanga identity but coalesced their grievances with those of the Ndebele. Ranger explains how Nkomo (widely regarded as a leading Zimbabwean nationalist) became fascinated with identities to the extent of becoming ‘a leading member’ of the Kalanga Cultural Promotion Society and of the Matabeleland Home Society (MHS) as well as of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC). His identity at home was Kalanga; in Bulawayo it was Ndebele; in Rhodesia it was nationalist.¹⁹⁴ In fact, nationalists such as Joshua Nkomo fronted their nationalist rhetoric with a mixture of Ndebele-Kalanga traditional-spiritual leaning as shown by their connection with Matobo shrines.¹⁹⁵ Nkomo represented a cross ethnic political symbol, yet nationalists such as George Silundika belonged to Kalanga associations in the early years of mass nationalism. Still, one needs to add that the grievances of the African populations in the 1940s tended to overlap and synthesise thus glossing over ‘sectarian’ interests defined by tribal or ethnic cleavages. This was because the colonial authorities tended to lump the African populations into seemingly seamless categories as was shown by the aims and objectives of their ‘native’ policies throughout the colonial period. After independence, however *buKalanga* born nationalists such as Silundika were less enthusiastic about pursuing a ‘narrow’ sectional agenda of the Kalanga.¹⁹⁶

The formation of associations calling for the recognition of the Kalanga in the 1940s attests to the consciousness of the Kalanga to their marginalisation by both the pre-colonial and colonial governments. It is important to examine whether Kalanga feelings of marginalisation were instrumental in the formation of these associations in the 1940s. Such associations may put to doubt claims that the Ndebele and the Kalanga had come together

¹⁹⁴ T. O. Ranger, *Voices from the Rocks: Nature, Culture and History of the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe* (Baobab: Baobab, 1999), pp 210-11.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ The Chronicle, ‘*Kalanga Launch Culture Society*,’ 10 November 1980, (NAZ MS 938)

into a 'nation' if the concept of 'nationhood' is thoroughly interrogated. In that respect this could lead to new avenues of research on the 'Mthwakazi' issue. It is important to interrogate the interplay between ethnicity and the nationalist parties in the liberation war to understand post-colonial marginalisation of groups such as the Kalanga, or issues of ethnic based violence and economic development in areas such as Mangwe.

The 1940s were an important economic watershed in as far as settler policy was concerned. The colonial government had just passed the landmark racist land policy known as the Land Apportionment Act in 1930. Two decades later the colonial government passed yet another segregating legislation, the Native Land Husbandry Act in 1951.¹⁹⁷ Earlier, in 1929 the colonial government passed the Native Development Act. The concept of Native Development was developed as a way of trying to decentralise 'development' in the colony-where Africans were ostensibly given agency in formulating and implementing their developmental agenda. The role of the central government was to provide technical assistance in the form of officers and experts. Its other aim was to placate African nationalism through mobilising local enthusiasm for development. Its origins were in the United States of America. In southern Rhodesia the policy was popular in the 1960s. The period between 1940 and 1960 was the time when the colonial government was seized with the question of 'native development'.¹⁹⁸ Policies passed by the colonial government during this period further pushed Africans to the margins of the economy, the Kalanga included.

The 1960s and 1970s were also characterised by the liberation war, which further compounded ethnic tensions in the country. The tensions in the liberation movements

¹⁹⁷ The Land Husbandry Act of 1951 was passed as a measure to control land use amongst the African people against the alarming background of 'scientifically unsustainable' grazing patterns of the Africans. For more on the Act see V. E. M. Machingaidze "Agrarian Change from above: The Southern Rhodesia Native Land Husbandry Act and African Response", *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, vol 24, no 3 (1991) pp. 557-588.

¹⁹⁸ See also NAZ File number MS823/2

exposed ethnic fissures which laid the foundation for ethnic tensions in postcolonial Zimbabwe.¹⁹⁹ In the independence period, perhaps the most important example of ethnic based conflict was the *Gukurahundi* violence of the 1980s which is widely believed to have targeted the Ndebele (and the groups that the Ndebele had ostensibly absorbed such as the Kalanga). The disturbances in Matabeleland have been magnified to incorporate issues of development or lack thereof in the region. Invariably, the ethnic card has been used to examine the distribution of resources in the post-colonial state. The study drags up to 2015 partly because the issues of marginalisation that were raised in the 1940s by associations representing the Kalanga have not been adequately addressed. These include language as well as general economic development in Kalanga areas. The economic activities that the Kalanga of Mangwe have practised for generations are still being practised or have been expanded well into the contemporary period.

2.10 Conclusion

The chapter gives a brief background on the groups as well as the area under study. The main ethnic subgroups found in the area are briefly described. The socio-economic and political history of the area is contextualised and juxtaposed with the physical environment to set a tone for a critical discussion of the main issues of the thesis in the following chapters. Various chieftaincies were discussed, and their ethnic composition highlighted as a way of showing how the district has and is being peopled. Of critical importance is the examination of the roots of Kalanga marginalisation which are in the early Ndebele society in Zimbabwe, and the response of the Kalanga to those experiences of marginalisation which will be discussed in the later stages

¹⁹⁹ J Muzondidya and S Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 'Echoing Silences: Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2007, *Africa Journal on Conflict Resolutions* (7) pp275-297; S Gatsheni-Ndlovu, *The Zimbabwean Nation State Project. A Historical Diagnosis of Identity and Power Based Conflicts in a Post-colonial State*, (Uppsala: Nordiska Institute, 2011).

of the thesis as part and parcel of the survival strategies and the socio-economic history of a group existing on the margins. The following chapter starts the thematic discussion of some of the methods adopted and adapted by the Kalanga to circumvent marginalisation: perceived or real.

CHAPTER THREE

The mopane worm economy in Mangwe, since the 1940s

3.1 Introduction.

Having talked at length about the nature of Kalanga ethnicity and the roots of its marginalisation, this chapter is the first in a series of chapters that seeks to explore the mechanisms that have been adopted by the Kalanga over the years to mitigate the effects of marginalisation. The chapter starts by addressing history of the harvesting and utilisation of the mopane worm in Mangwe since 1940s. Because it is largely a seasonal economic activity, mopane worm harvesting is portrayed as a ‘voluntary’ or an ‘alternative’ exercise mostly done on the fringes of other traditionally important economic activities such as livestock rearing and crop cultivation. On the surface that appears so. However, the populations in the mopane worm endowed areas attach so much importance to it that it can no longer be easily dismissed as just another activity. Most studies, such as that of Hobane (1994; 1995) and Opong (2013) have focused on the economic and nutritional value of the mopane worm with little emphasis on the intricacies of the politics of this business. To answer to that, the central argument in this chapter is that this economy not only plays a pivotal role in sustaining rural households in the face of rising levels of poverty and unemployment, but also gets entangled in the rural politics of entitlement to certain resources. There is room to juxtapose the mopane economy with the broader debates on marginalisation and survival strategies or coping mechanisms of groups experiencing social, political and economic marginalisation.

Historically the mopane worm has been an important source of food for rural households but has over the years permeated urban households because of its rapid commercialisation in response to demands for so called ‘natural’ foods as well changing economic realities

characterised by high unemployment and poverty in both rural and urban areas, since the 1950s.

In a very informative article, Stack *et al* have provided a comprehensive study of mopane harvesting and utilisation in Botswana and Zimbabwe.²⁰⁰ The study asserts that the worm provides not only a healthy food source but plays a huge role in supplementing the incomes of the families involved.²⁰¹ Harvesting and dealing in the mopane worm serves as an important economic activity in rural areas where there are limited prospects for formal employment.²⁰² Since the 1980s, the harvesting of mopane worms has become an important cushion to those returning from South Africa or Botswana due to old age or as Stack observed frustrations over scarce job opportunities in those countries and the attractive income generated by the harvest of the worm.²⁰³ In the face of climate change, droughts and marginalisation households manage diversified livelihood portfolios to ensure availability of alternative resources in times of need as a buffer against uncertainty of natural resource availability or as a coping strategy.²⁰⁴

It is plausible to argue, on empirical evidence provided by researchers such as Hobane *et al*,²⁰⁵ that in so far as the mopane worm business has been one of the avenues for enhancing livelihoods and food security in Matabeleland South (where Mangwe the area under study is located) it has also been as a source of ethnically motivated resource contestation and

²⁰⁰ Stack, et al, *Mopane worm utilisation and household livelihoods in Southern Africa*, pp1-48.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² P. Vedeld, Angelsen A, Bojo A, Sjastaad E and Berg G.K(2007), *Forest Environmental Incomes and the Rural Poor*, in *Forest Policy and Economics*, vol. 9, no. 7, pp869-879.

²⁰³ Stack et al, *Mopane Worm Utilisation and Rural Livelihoods*, p1.

²⁰⁴ P Kamanga, et al (2009), *Forest Incomes and Rural Livelihoods in Chiadzulu District, Malawi*, in *Ecological Economics*, vol 68. No. 3, pp 613-624.

²⁰⁵ P. A. Hobane (1994), *The Effects of the Commercialisation of the Mopane Worms: Natural Resources Management Project*. USAID Project no. 690 0251; by the same author (1995), 'Amacimbi: the gathering, processing, consumption and trade of edible caterpillars in Bulilimangwe District', Centre for Applied Social Studies Occasional Paper 67, Harare, Zimbabwe. See also W. Kozanayi and Frost P (2002), *Marketing of Mopane Worm in Southern Zimbabwe*, unpublished report, Institute of Environmental studies, University of Zimbabwe, pp 17.

competition.²⁰⁶ The mopane worm, like other naturally occurring resources found in the area under study has not escaped the enduring debates on resource expropriation ascribed to the ‘Shona’ by minority groups such as the Kalanga of Mangwe, as well the broader debate on the marginalisation of Matabeleland as a region.²⁰⁷

Studies on rural livelihoods especially in southern Zimbabwe and parts of South Africa and Botswana emphasise the role of non-timber forest products in sustaining these livelihoods. According to the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources), and activities required for a means of living.²⁰⁸

The importance of the mopane worm to the socio-economic history of Mangwe offers an insight to how locals harvest or harness local resources to circumvent poverty and marginalisation, and how the exploitation of local resources can be magnified to mirror the bigger picture of resource competition in rural communities in developing countries. A Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation (ZBC) report underscored the importance of the mopane worm economy when it estimated that it had the potential to generate hundreds of thousands of dollars.²⁰⁹ Its significance shall be juxtaposed with other activities in Mangwe

²⁰⁶ *The Herald*, ‘Bulilima hard hit by amacimbi extinction’, 20 December 2016.

²⁰⁷ A. Sibanda (2013), *Striving for Broad Based Economic empowerment in Zimbabwe: Localisation of Policies and Programmes to Matabeleland and Midlands*, a working paper submitted to Ruzivo Trust (Knowledge for Growth, Prosperity and Life; see also S N Magadza (2006), *Empowerment, Mobilisation and Initiation of a Community Driven Project: Women and the Marula*, vol. 7. No. 7; E Mtetwa, et al (2013), Poverty and Rural Development; Tapping from the Grassroots, in *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention*, vol. 2. Issue 5, pp 21-35.

²⁰⁸ I Scoones (2009), ‘Livelihood Perspectives and Rural Development,’ in the *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 36:1, pp 171-196.

²⁰⁹ Zbc news online, ‘Mopane worm expected to rack in US\$500, 000,’ 7 April 2017.

such as migration and cross border trade with the goal of showing how these activities assist in placating poverty and negotiating marginalisation.

The importance of the mopane worm does not only end in the economic sector, but also transcends the social and political fault lines in a community that is easily ‘irritable’ especially when ‘foreigners’ come to harvest the worm. The chapter thus interrogates an important aspect of the mopane worm economy in the district: resource competition and ethnicity. People from Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe and other regions of the country are seen as outsiders when they come to join in the harvesting of the worm. As a result of their perceived lack of attachment to the area and the fact that they are from the capital (which is held with hostility as some derogatorily call it *Bambazonke*- (grab all), locals feel they are deliberately ‘overharvesting’ their resource.²¹⁰ This apparent inability to control the harvesting patterns and behaviour of ‘outsiders’ mirrors the general feelings of marginalisation in the area.

The debates on who owns and controls resources in rural areas continues to fascinate policy makers in the world as shown by the United Nations Report on Marginalised Minorities in Development Programmes (2010). Marginalisation and resource utilisation as well as coping mechanisms go hand in hand.²¹¹ Minority groups (such as the Kalanga of Mangwe) who are marginalised economically and/or otherwise are often poorer and have less access to governance mechanisms, and usually live in regions that suffer from high levels of environmental degradation.²¹² Understanding clearly the link between marginalisation and the economic activities of marginalised groups can lead to better solutions to their exclusion

²¹⁰ The Herald, *Bulilima hard hit by amacimbi extinction*, 20 December 2016.

²¹¹ UNDP Report, *Marginalised Minorities in Development Programming* (2010), p2.

²¹² Ibid.

and inequality and improve the productivity of their livelihood strategies. Some of the solutions may include formulating community based natural resource management policies in developing countries.²¹³ The policies emphasise amongst other things, sustainable and equitable use of natural resources as well as the management of natural resources at community level. The chapter thus examines the deeper meanings of the mopane worm economy in Mangwe, seen through the lens of the participants, who view themselves as existing on the margins of a 'Shona' dominated polity.

Another important dimension to the mopane economic activity is the gender aspect, where traditionally it was seen as a woman's work. However, over the years it has also incorporated men because of the limited job opportunities in Mangwe. The evolution of gender roles in the harvesting and utilisation of the mopane worm attests to the reassignment of these roles in the area and society in general. Historically, women's roles in the productive sector have been undervalued, particularly in the informal sector and subsistence.²¹⁴ This has led to the under researching or even ignorance of their contributions to rural livelihoods through activities such as harvesting mopane worms. In Mangwe, as is the case with most third world societies, women's labour and productivity is seen as 'elastic', providing fall back in times of crises.²¹⁵ Traditionally, the mopane worm economy had been one of the significantly female (and child) dominated industries.²¹⁶ However, noticeable changes have been reported with more men, especially returning migrants and

²¹³ N. Rozomoijer and van der Jagt C. (2000), *How Community based is CBNRM in Botswana?* USAID SADC NRM Project, p9.

²¹⁴ H. Reeves and Baden. S. (2000), Report No. 5, prepared for the Department of International Development (DFID), United Kingdom, p10.

²¹⁵ Interview with William Borman Ncube, villager, Makhubu village, 22 April 2017.

²¹⁶ Reeves and Baden, *Gender and Development: Concepts and Development*, p10.

the unemployed joining in.²¹⁷ This chapter will examine the changing patterns in the gender roles in the harvesting and utilisation of the mopane worm in Mangwe since the 1940s. To achieve that, it is imperative to start with examining the evolution of the mopane worm economy in Mangwe in that period.

3.2 Historicising the Mopane Worm Economy in Mangwe 1940 to 1980.

The harvesting and utilisation of the mopane worm in Mangwe is an age-old economic activity, whose origins cannot be ascribed a specific timeframe. Although there is little evidence to locate the origins of the economy, unconfirmed archaeological reports claim that a deposit of dried mopane worms was discovered at Pomongwe Cave in Zimbabwe, stretching way back to the Sone Age period.²¹⁸ Generations have partaken in this activity in Zimbabwe, Botswana, and South Africa. The mopane tree, which is the preferred habitat of the worm is generously found in the countries mentioned, especially in the drier fringes such as south-western Zimbabwe. Traditionally the worm was harvested for domestic use, but with time it become highly commercialised.

The harvesting of the worm in this period was usually done as a pastime, when people were taking a break from other activities such as cultivation.²¹⁹ From the information gleaned from the villagers, it appears that little commercial value, if any was attached to the worm. One villager claimed that the area used to be wetter than it is now hence crop cultivation was quite profitable and rewarding. Crops such as millet and sorghum as well as maize were cultivated in the area for decades. However, over the years climate change has resulted

²¹⁷ Interview with William Borman Ncube, Makhubu village, cited in 257 above.

²¹⁸ <https://theculturetrip.com/africa/zimbabwe/articles/a-brief-history-of-mopane-worms-a-famous-delicacy><https://theculturetrip.com/africa/zimbabwe/articles/a-brief-history-of-mopane-worms-a-famous-delicacy-from-zimbabwe/from-zimbabwe/>

²¹⁹ Interview with A Madabu, former civil servant Brunapeg shopping centre, 22 April 2017.

in erratic rainfall thus militating against the sustainable crop cultivation. Because of the abundance of rainfall and the centrality of agriculture in the livelihoods of the people in earlier decades, the harvesting of the worm was a peripheral job, done mostly by the youth and women (mostly elderly) as men and younger women cultivated crops or fenced fields or migrated to neighbouring countries. In areas such as Makubu and Brunapeg, the worm did not attract much attention as it was not yet important as a source of money²²⁰.

An interesting aspect though that emerged from the mopane economy in this period was the ritual associated with the harvesting of the worm. In a similar study on the people of Chishanga, Mazarire observed how water and water ownership was ritualised by the local Chishanga people.²²¹ Disturbances in the name of development occasioned by colonial authorities on local resources was seen as upsetting the mystic and mythical water flows of the rivers in the area. The case study by Mazarire helps highlight the ritualised and ceremonial ownership of resources and the clash between ‘traditionalism and modernity.’²²² It also raises the important issues of resource particularism and autochthonous entitlement in the rural areas of Zimbabwe. Part of the ritualisation of the resources is meant to ‘scare’ and discourage foreigners from partaking in their exploitation. Strikingly like Mangwe is the prominent role those traditional authorities in Mazarire’s case play in this ritualisation. The harvesting was ‘regulated’ by traditional authority and local rituals were observed quite strictly. For example, the preparation of the worm followed certain methods which it was believed would not result in its extinction. People were not encouraged to dig up the hibernating larvae as it was known that it was an important stage in the life cycle of the worm.³³² This shows that they possessed inert knowledge of the

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ G C Mazarire, ‘*The Chishanga Waters have their Owners:*’ Water Politics and Development in Southern Zimbabwe, in the *Journal of Southern African Studies* 34.4, pp 757-784

²²² Ibid.

workings of their natural environment because of generations of interacting with it. The ‘alien’ methods of preservation such as ‘baking’ the worm in heated sand were highly discouraged and frowned upon by the people as well as local leadership as it was believed they would result in the extinction of the worm.²²³ Methods such as sand baking the worm apparently were introduced by ‘foreigners’ whose main objective was to maximise on quantities collected. The baking of the worms was allegedly brought by the amaMpande people. To the local Kalanga, amaMpande represented an uncouth people and are generally referred to in bad taste. The ritualisation of the collection of the worm meant that the so-called foreigners have limited rights over the collection of the worms, and they rely on locals for the supply as well as the goodwill to stay in the area.

In this period, it is clear that ‘foreigners’ were not readily accepted in the harvesting of the worm. One of the reasons was that they did not understand the local cultures and methods for harvesting, hence their presence raised tensions with the locals. However, this palpable tension goes beyond that. It mirrors the deep feelings of ‘them’ and ‘our’ resources.²²⁴ However, what emerges is that the movement of different groups into the area was not necessarily for economic reasons but of the broader colonial scheme of resettling people to accommodate colonial farms.

In the 1970s, the security challenges because of the war meant that the mopane economy like other activities was limited. The curfews imposed on the people severely limited movements to mopane outbreak areas, and thus negatively affecting this source of livelihoods. In some instances, the mopane worm was the only available source of food.²²⁵

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ The Herald, ‘Kezi chief warns amacimbi harvesters.’ 13 April 2017.

²²⁵ Interview with Assah Khuphe, cited elsewhere.

3.3 Post-Independence mopane economy. 1980-2015

In Zimbabwe, the Kalanga and the Ndebele in Matabeleland have long complained about lack of development that they blame on the Shona-centric, centralised state.²²⁶ The scenario where ethnic groups compete for natural resources helps accentuate the feelings of marginalisation amongst minority groups, and resources become an important area of contestation amongst different ethnic groups as they seek to redress the reality or perceptions of marginalisation. An interesting and enduring attribute of this ethnic competition is that it is driven mostly by the common men and women. In Mangwe, the political elite has over the years seemingly abrogated its duties and responsibility of pioneering a developmental agenda and are generally held with suspicion by the locals as shown by the various sentiments expressed during fieldwork. Though traditional authorities are vocal in protecting local resources from outsiders, as shown by sentiments raised by the traditional chiefs, commoners also display a univocal disdain for ‘foreign’ intrusion into their economic space. In this schema, ethnicity and its mobilisation are not elite driven, but it inadvertently lends credence to political tribalism as espoused by Lonsdale amongst the Kikuyu.

In the harvesting of mopane worms, ethnicity is a salient feature that is mobilised to effectively draw lines of operation for ‘others.’ In most cases, ‘others’ are not allowed to go out to harvest but are allowed to buy the mopane worm or barter trade for it in the villages. The actual collection was usually a preserve of the locals partly because they knew the terrain well, and as said earlier it was a well-regulated activity anchored in traditional authority and local knowledge systems. This assiduous yet insidious resistance

²²⁶ Muzondidya and Gatsheni-Ndlovu, ‘*Echoing Silences.*’ *Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2007*, p276.

to foreign intrusion in the economic sphere of a group that largely perceives itself as marginalised, gives credence to the view that the social and economic history of the Kalanga is largely an attempt to negotiate marginalisation.

The typology of mopane worm harvesting since 1980 brings out important observations in the following areas: that most mopane worm collectors are women, that most collectors are from poor households though not exclusively so, that other factors besides those related to economic status determine who harvests mopane worms or not (such as religion). Importantly, the historically embedded conceptions about division of labour as shown in Mangwe show the gradual assuming of important economic roles in a society that traditionally placed men as major breadwinners. I discuss that briefly below.



Figure 7. A photograph showing a woman with a seemingly large harvest of mopane worms in the process of being dried. Courtesy of the Associated Press, January 25, 2013(Tsvangirai Mukwazhi/AP).

Most collectors of the mopane worm are women of different age groups.²²⁷ Historically, men and women had gendered roles in the society, with men partaking in more labour-intensive activities such as clearing fields or logging, while women did most of the domestic chores such as cooking. However, agricultural work was generally shared between men, women, and children. As mentioned elsewhere, the mopane economy initially started as a peripheral activity done when the women were coming from the fields. The outbreak of the mopane worm usually occurs in December and April, periods that coincide with the cultivation of fields and the onset of the harvesting period respectively. For some households, the collection of mopane worms conflicts with their agricultural activities. However, most interviewees contended that the low levels of rainfall that have made agriculture less attractive as a source of livelihood, hence a good mopane worm outbreak inadvertently leads to a temporary neglect of the fields.²²⁸ These tasks require the labour of all members of the household particularly women who remain at home.

Stack *et al*, studying a similar situation in Gwanda (Matabeleland South where the area under study falls also) concluded that the majority of the collectors of the mopane worm were women.²²⁹ Hobane also makes similar conclusions in her studies in Matabeleland South.²³⁰ A similar situation was also observed in Botswana.²³¹ Part of the answer to the massive involvement of women in the collection of the worm, apart from the traditionally stereotyped view that is a women's activity is the demographic reality of Mangwe. Over

²²⁷ Stack, *Mopane Worm Utilisation and Rural Livelihoods in Southern Africa*, p13.

²²⁸ As mentioned elsewhere, the practise of agriculture, particularly crop cultivation has become a near impossible because of ever increasing droughts. In some instance droughts have been reported after every two to three years.

²²⁹ Stack, *Mopane Worm Utilisation and Rural Livelihoods in Southern Africa*, p34.

²³⁰ Hobane, *Amacimbi: the gathering, processing, consumption and trade of edible caterpillars in Bulilimamangwe District* p 12.

²³¹ Stack, *Mopane Worm Utilisation and Rural Livelihoods in Southern Africa*, p34.

the years, most males migrated to South Africa and Botswana, leaving behind females who must anchor most of the economic activity to sustain household livelihoods. As poverty levels rises amongst the mostly female headed households, due to unemployment and lack of investment in the area which compounds these challenges, the mopane worm has greatly assisted many rural women in Mangwe to attain a measure of financial independence. Most interviewees bemoaned the low levels of remittances from husbands and other family members based in South Africa and Botswana, hence the mopane worm acts as an important, though temporary reprieve from poverty. The decline in remittances has been attributed in part to the broader macro-economic challenges that face source counties such as South Africa and Botswana where jobs are becoming scarcer and scarcer for foreigners. Apart from that, the dominance of women in the mopane economy marks an important feature in the changing gender roles in the society in general, where the commercialisation of the worm has allowed women the latitude to effectively stake a claim in the money economy through the selling of the worm. In essence, a good mopane worm season offers them a measure of economic independence from traditional sources of income such as remittances.

It is important to stress that over the years, the collection of mopane worms has evolved considerably from being female dominated to also include males, the children, and the youth. The main reason for noticeable change can be explained in two ways. Firstly, poverty levels have continued to rise not only in Mangwe but in Zimbabwe in general since the late 1950s.²³² In the 1950s, as newspaper clippings show, it was becoming more and more common sight of people queuing for work in the urban areas, as the country

²³² A. S. Mlambo, *The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in Zimbabwe, 1990-1995* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 1997).

experienced rapid urbanisation.²³³ In addition to that, the colonial labour policy discriminated against the employment of Africans for certain jobs, thus further compounding unemployment in the country.²³⁴ This led to increasing levels of desperation amongst the people and survival strategies are being expanded amongst households grappling with poverty. Coupled with that, no noticeable development or investment has taken place in the district in the last century or so, hence unemployment remains a huge challenge. It appears that the colonial and post-colonial governments failed to institute meaningful economic developments in the district over a long period of time. To refocus on the main arguments of the thesis regarding ethnicity and marginalisation, the increasing number of Kalanga men partaking in the mopane economy brings to the fore that economic neglect on the part of the government continues to haunt Mangwe.

In the postcolonial period, save for the creation of the Mphoengs border post to the southwestern part of the district. In 2005, there has been a near total absence of government led enterprise in the district. Locals bemoan the employment of foreigners in the most basic jobs at the border facility hence entrenching their perceptions of marginalisation. It is for this reason, amongst others that when resources such as the mopane worm are in season, locals feel they have a duty to protect them from outsiders who apparently have more access to government employment in the district, usually explained in ethnic terms.

²³³ The Daily News, 10 June 1959 '*Unemployment in city: No signs of improvement, firms worried by increasing number of job seekers*', (National Archives of Zimbabwe)

²³⁴ The Daily News, 21 March 1959, '*Council may be asked to open certain European jobs for Africans.*' (National Archives of Zimbabwe).

The second explanation to the increasing participation of men in the collection of mopane worms is the apparent decline in employment opportunities in South Africa and Botswana over the last two decades or so. The time taken to secure employment appears to have increased considerably for migrants in these countries, sometimes frustrating enough to lead them to return home.²³⁵ The returning migrants are left with little option but to join the mopane business for survival. This harsh economic climate, coupled with recurrent droughts has led to an increasing number of male and youth engaging in this activity.²³⁶ The harsh economic climate has also seen an increasing number of children engaging in the activity, especially those of school going age who collect and sell the worm to raise money to pay fees.

3.4 Typology of households partaking in mopane worm harvesting.

For most interviewees, traditionally the collection of the mopane worm was seen as a ‘poor’ villager’s job. The more stable and richer households generally frowned upon the activity because it is laborious. Economic historians have devised several models to determine poverty levels amongst households using variables such as the number of cattle, goats per household as well as the average monthly or yearly income from sources such as employment or remittances. Amongst the Kalanga of Mangwe, intermittent droughts as well as the decline in the quality of vegetation has seen a steady decline in the number of livestock possessed by families or households. As mentioned, the vagaries of nature combine with lack of palpable government investment into the area created acute levels of poverty. In such a situation, the number of households partaking in the mopane economy has increased considerably to include households previously considered rich.²³⁷ The

²³⁵ Interview with Lucky Khuphe, a returnee migrant and now a panner, ‘Makokoba ’gold panners’ settlement, 21 April 2017.

²³⁶ Stack, *Mopane Worm Utilisation and Rural Livelihoods in Southern Africa*, p45.

²³⁷ Interview with Lucky Khuphe, cited above.

commercialisation of the worm over the years has thus seen an increase in the number of cultivators from a wide range of classes attracted by the cash accrued.²³⁸ The table below explains the above:

Village	Number sampled	Cattle	Goats	Number of households harvesters
Sikwana	10	5	8	8
Ndabambi	10	4	7	8
Makubu	10	6	6	9
Nkedile	10	6	7	7
Patse	10	6	8	8

Table 2. Number of mopane worm cultivators against ownership of cattle and goats in selected villages.

What emerges from the above table is that households which normally would be regarded as economically stable by rural standards, that is those with both cattle and goats all partake in the mopane worm economy showing the growth of its significance on one hand and of course the depletion of the cattle or goat economy because of drought and dwindling pastures. In Makubu village for example, the respondents observed that almost everyone had one or two members of the household harvesting the worm and the primary reason was that poverty levels were on an increase because of rising unemployment, drought, dwindling pastures as result of illegal gold panning amongst several factors. What is

²³⁸ Stack et al, *Mopane Worm Utilisation and Rural Livelihoods in Southern Africa*, p 46.

observable though is that the economy has gradually evolved and moved away from being seen as a ‘poor villager’s’ job. In relation to this thesis the economy has grown tremendously because it is now seen as one of the ways in which the people can escape not only poverty, but joblessness attributed to amongst other things, marginalisation.

Village	No of households sampled	Estimated kgs
Ndabambi	10	250
Nkedile	10	355
Makubu	10	280
Sikwana	10	200

Table 4: Number of households and estimated amounts of mopane worm harvested in the 2016-2017 outbreak, in kgs per ten households.

Other dynamics, such as religion have been observed to affect mopane worm harvesting and trade in the district. For example, the local Zion church members traditionally do not consume the worm or are discouraged by their religion from even touching the worm. However, such limitations have not hindered the growth and increasing importance of the mopane worm industry as a source of livelihood for this community.

3.5 Quantity analysis of the mopane worm economy and its significance in the marginalisation debate.

The thrust of this section is to show how the mopane economy has assisted in alleviating some of the challenges faced by the Kalanga as a minority group. Over the years, the Zimbabwean economy has experienced considerable shrinkage due to several factors. For groups experiencing marginalisation, the effects have been pervasive. In the context of the

mopane worm economy, the post-independence period has seen an unprecedented expansion of the activity. For Hobane et al, this shows that the business is assuming a central role in the livelihoods of the community. Perhaps more relevant to this study, the increase in the volumes of the worm harvested and the extension of the reach of its trade networks attests to its centrality in these communities.

On average, families collect up to 15 twenty litre buckets of mopane worms in a good outbreak.²³⁹ In the last three decade the average selling price per bucket has been between 25-30 US dollars.²⁴⁰ To maximise on profits, the worm is sometimes sold in small quantities.²⁴¹ This could be as small as a tea cup, or even a lid of a beer calabash.²⁴² In some instances, the worm is exported to Zambia and South Africa. In the last two decades, the average outbreak has been two to three times per decade. This has had both negative and positive results. Negatively it has taken away an important source of livelihood for a people already grappling with high levels of poverty and marginalisation, and an important source of food and income. In the event of an unexpected outbreak, it has led to overharvesting as communities scramble for the now unpredictable outbreaks. Positively though, the scarcity of the worm because of irregular outbreaks means that the price has remained relatively high.

The importance of the mopane worm, therefore, in as far as this thesis is concerned is to show how proceeds from the activity assist in negotiating poverty and marginalisation. For

²³⁹ Interview with Namavuka, villager, Ndabambi, 21 April 2017; same sentiments concurred by Mr Madabu in an interview cited elsewhere in the thesis.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ W Kozanayi and Frost P., Marketing of Mopane Worm in Southwestern Zimbabwe, Mopane worm marketing Survey, 2002, p2.

²⁴² Ibid.

most of the people, the proceeds assist in providing cash for the payment of school fees for their children, especially against the background of high unemployment. Some of it is spent on travelling to Plumtree town for documentation such as national identities, a source of great discomfort amongst the locals who feel that it should be decentralised to local level. In its entirety, mopane worm harvesting, and trade has evolved over the years, leading to concerns that its commercialisation has led to overharvesting which may lead to the extinction of the worm.

3.6 Negative effects of mopane worm commercialisation

In as much as the mopane worm economy has assisted poor rural communities in Mangwe to sustain livelihoods to a certain extent, it has also created centres of conflict and tensions. In a way it has also exacerbated and accentuated ethnic tensions in an area still scarred by the violence of the 1980s largely blamed on the Shona dominated government. As mentioned elsewhere it has not escaped the politics of resource nationalism associated with multi-ethnic communities in Africa. Apart from raising ethnic tensions, the commercialisation of the worm has attracted the eye of environmentalist who argue that harvesters, in a bid to maximise on quantities collected destroy trees and vegetation.²⁴³ Also, there is a negative correlation between the increased commercialisation of the worm and the harvesting patterns, which has led to overexploitation and overharvesting thus disrupting the life cycle of the worm.²⁴⁴ That, coupled with declining patterns of rainfall

²⁴³ M Ditlhogo et al (1996), *Interaction between the mopane caterpillar, Imbrasia Beilina, and its host Colophospermum mopane in Botswana*, in C. Flower, G. Wardell-Johnson, and A. Jamieson(eds), *Management of Mopane in Southern Africa*, pp 46-49; 'The Herald, Kezi chief warns amacimbi harvesters.' 13 April 2017.

²⁴⁴ J. Ghazoul, *Mopane woodland and the mopane worm: Enhancing rural livelihoods and resource sustainability*, Final Technical Report, Division of Biology, (Imperial College Press: London, 2006)., as well as P.J Gullan, Cranston P.S, and McInnes K.H, *The Insects*, (Wiley-Blackwell Press: London).

have led to erratic outbreaks of the worm, have negatively affected the mopane worm economy in Mangwe.

3.7 Conclusion

The chapter attempted to historicise the mopane worm economy in Mangwe from the colonial to the post-colonial period. The major thrust was, however on the post-colonial period. The chapter attempted to contextualise the mopane worm economy in the ethnic marginalisation debate, where in Mangwe it is seen as largely informing on the choice of the economic activities undertaken in the district. As mentioned, the mopane industry has raised issues of resource competition, where ethnicity is mobilised to counter what is perceived as ‘theft’ of resources by groups not belonging to Mangwe, that is, not Kalanga or Ndebele.²⁴⁵ That, and other manifestations of tensions are used to magnify the broader debate of resource competition in Africa. Gender dynamics and poverty issues are also raised, where I posit that the commercialisation of the worm has seen an improvement in the economic status of women, and a measure of economic independence as well as the blurring of lines as to what social class partakes in the industry. Centrally to this chapter, is how the mopane worm industry has assisted local communities in their struggle for survival in an environment of little opportunity and bad climate. Historically, the mopane worm has been an important source of food for rural households but has over the years permeated urban households because of its rapid commercialisation in response to demands for so called ‘natural’ foods as well changing economic realities characterised by high unemployment and poverty in both rural and urban areas, since the 1980s. In a very informative article, Stack et al have provided a comprehensive study of mopane harvesting

²⁴⁵ The Herald, ‘*Kezi chief warns amacimbi harvesters.*’ 13 April 2017.

and utilisation in Botswana and Zimbabwe.²⁴⁶ The study asserts that the worm is not only a very good source of proteins but plays a huge role in supplementing the incomes of the families involved.²⁴⁷ The mopane economy has for generations played an important role not in only supplementing the dietary requirements of the people of Mangwe, but has also been a useful source of income in the face of rising levels of poverty and rampant unemployment in the district. Harvesting and dealing in the mopane worm serves as an important economic activity in rural areas where there are limited prospects for formal employment.²⁴⁸ Since the 1980s, the harvesting of mopane worms has become an important cushion to those returning from South Africa or Botswana due to old age or as Stack observed frustrations over scarce job opportunities in those countries and the attractive income generated by the harvest of the worm.²⁴⁹ In the face of climate change, droughts and marginalisation, households manage diversified livelihood portfolios to ensure availability of alternative resources in times of need as a buffer against uncertainty of natural resource availability or as a coping strategy.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁶ Stack, et al, *Mopane worm utilisation and household livelihoods in Southern Africa*, pp1-48.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ P. Vedeld, Angelsen A, Bojo A, Sjastaad E and Berg G.K(2007), *Forest Environmental Incomes and the Rural Poor*, in *Forest Policy and Economics*, vol. 9, no. 7, pp869-879.

²⁴⁹ Stack et al, *Mopane Worm Utilisation and Rural Livelihoods*, p1.

²⁵⁰ P Kamanga, et al (2009), *Forest Incomes and Rural Livelihoods in Chiadzulu District, Malawi*, in *Ecological Economics*, vol 68. No. 3, pp 613-624.

CHAPTER 4

Cross border migration as a survival mechanism in Mangwe, 1940 -2015.

4.1 Introduction

Since the discovery of minerals (diamonds at Kimberley in 1867 and gold in Witwatersrand in 1886) in South Africa, the people of Mangwe have engaged in cross border migration specially to partake in the booming mining and manufacturing industry, as well as a thriving domestic work industry. As early as 1873, there were reports of reports of Shona and Makalaka (Kalanga) people going and returning from the diamond mines in Kimberly.²⁵¹ By 1949, the issue of migrant labour migrations and its implications across the territories of Southern and Northern Rhodesia as well as South Africa was still being discussed.²⁵² Much of the talk bordered on the challenges of immigration into South Africa. The central issue was controlling the clandestine movements of Rhodesian and Nyasaland nationals into South Africa.²⁵³ As Makina observed, the episodes of migration in Zimbabwe can be broken down into five broad categories, firstly the WNLA movements, secondly liberation war movements, thirdly the Gukurahundi migrations, fourthly the migrations offset by the effects of structural adjustment programmes and lastly the mass migrations triggered by the unprecedented post 2000 economic crisis.²⁵⁴ Migration, despite being a fairly well

²⁵¹ I. Phimister, 'African Worker Consciousness: Origins and Aspects to 1953', paper presented at the Conference of Southern African Labour History, University of Witwatersrand,

²⁵² NAZ F137/186: Migrant Labour. Discussions with Union Government, 1949-52; NAZ Memorandum no. 6/50 Central African Committee: Standing Committee on African Labour; NAZ 666/186 E/52-A, Letter from the High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa to Southern Rhodesian Secretary to Southern Rhodesia's secretary to the Prime Minister; NAZ 603/28 Central African Councils discussions on migrant labour, Memo from W.W.M Eilsen Secretary of Native Affairs, South Africa; NAZ Conference at Pretoria, Clandestine Migration to Union of South Africa, Department of Native Labour 15 August 1947; NAZ F 138/20 Migrant Labour Working Papers, Discussions, Memorandum, Minutes of Meetings, Draft Statement for Publication 1950-52; NAZ F137/186C Migrant Labour Report, 1946-47.

²⁵³ *The Rhodesian Herald*, 6 September 1950.

²⁵⁴ D.Makina, *South Africa's Migration Policies. A regional Perspective*, CDE Workshop no 8, Centre for Development and Enterprise, (2011), p21-24.

researched area has hardly been understood in ethnic or marginalisation lenses, hence the over-emphasis on economic stimuli of the activity.

The key argument of this chapter is to try and explain the prevalence of migration of the Kalanga of Mangwe in the ambits of ethnicity and marginalisation. This line of argument is cognisant of the fact that those two aspects do not wholly explain the migration of the Kalanga as there were other compelling needs to emigrate, nor that migration is synonymous with the Kalanga only. However, colonial racial marginalisation and postcolonial ethnic marginalisation have provided a viable avenue to explore the migration of the Kalanga in southwestern Zimbabwe. In that regard, the chapter seeks to portray the migration of the Kalanga as probably one of the many activities that these people have adopted over the years to deal with their experiences of marginalisation under successive regimes. This chapter will attempt to do the following: examine the historical roots of migration to South Africa, (and other destinations) describe the nature of the migration; assess its social and economic impact in Mangwe and finally, show how marginalisation and ethnicity help to explain this phenomenon. In answering to the broader goals of the thesis, migration amongst the Kalanga helps explain my central argument that years of existing on the margins of economic, social and political mainstream has necessitated the development of this rather vibrant activity.

A section in chapter one offers a theoretical background to the concept of migration, where I seek to apply the major theories that have been put forward understanding this activity. This it is hoped will help in grounding the thrust of the chapter on a solid theoretical framework to allow for a robust analysis. Though not intending to exhaust the vast array of

theories related to migration, it is hoped that the selected theories will provide sufficient grounding for analytical purposes.

The first section of this chapter attempts to trace the history of the migration of the Africans in Zimbabwe in general and the Kalanga in the colonial period. An attempt shall be made to juxtapose the phenomenon of migration within with the perception of marginalisation as expressed by the Kalanga. Examples of migration phenomena such as WNLA are thus explained in this section because the WNLA migration represented the earliest forms of migration from the Zimbabwean plateau. The colonial period witnessed migration from the rural areas to the sprouting urban areas and mines.²⁵⁵ Amongst the Kalanga of Mangwe, Bulawayo became an important destination for labour related migration as well as an important setting for their 'ethnicisation' viz a viz the Ndebele and the Shona in that particular city.²⁵⁶ However, South Africa was also growing in popularity in the entire duration of the colonial period, and amongst this group of people it gradually overtook Bulawayo as the preferred choice destination.

The penultimate section deals with the migration of the Kalanga people in the first decade of independence, where violence occasioned by the Gukurahundi offsets a different wave of migration which assumes ethnic undertones. Was fear for political persecution a more compelling reason for migration during this period or economic factors still overrode everything else? Such questions will be answered in this section.

²⁵⁵ G. T Ncube, *The Early History of Wage Labour and Worker Consciousness in North-Western Zimbabwe, 1898-1940*, The Dyke, vol 6: 3, 2013, pp155-177.

²⁵⁶ Msindo, *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Urban Zimbabwe*, p 2

The last section, up to 2015 gives an overview of the pattern of migrations in Mangwe in the wake of structural adjustments and economic turmoil. In all the sections the themes of marginalisation and ethnicity shall be used to buttress analysis of the whole gamut of migration in that district. Because migration probably formed the most visible form of Kalanga attempts to deal with marginalisation, this chapter is inadvertently long.

4.2 The history of cross border migration in Mangwe (and Zimbabwe).

The migration of the Kalanga of Mangwe is closely intertwined with the history of the migration of Africans from Zimbabwe to South Africa that transcended the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial periods. Major trends in migration to South Africa began with the discovery of gold and diamonds in that country in the 19th century. As suggested earlier Phimister attests to the prevalence of cross border migration as early as the 1870s at the onset of the South African mineral revolution²⁵⁷. He adds that it was not unusual as early as 1877 for white travellers to come across former Kimberley labourers in Zimbabwe. In 1884 for example it was estimated that at least 120 Ndebele men were working in the Kimberley diamond mines.²⁵⁸ In 1898 in Bulilima District, quite a large number of young men were reported to be at work in the Rand area.²⁵⁹ The migration of people between Zimbabwe and South Africa has over the years inputted on government policy since the onset of colonial rule in Zimbabwe.²⁶⁰ Archival records attest to the prevalence of outmigration to the Union of South Africa in search of employment and how the colonial administration was seized with the urgency of the matter.²⁶¹ The first waves of migration

²⁵⁷ Phimister, *'African Worker Consciousness: Origins and Aspects to 1953'*, p 23.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid, p27.

²⁶⁰ NAZ F119/IMM 5/ Immigration files: Home affairs-African Immigration Policy, 1952.

²⁶¹ NAZ F137/186 E: Migrant Labour. Discussions with the Union Government, 1949-52. A letter to the chief secretary, 8 September 1952.

were typically of young men who were escaping the harsh working conditions and low pay in the then BSA Company administered Rhodesia, in the farms and mines, to the better paying mines, farms and ‘kitchens’ in South Africa.²⁶² Phimister and Pilosof argue that though Arrighi’s assertion that the Rhodesian (Zimbabwean) economy absorbed a sizeable number of Africans into waged labour in the 1960s, in the later years it continuously contracted to a point of effectively de-proletarianization of the Africans in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).²⁶³

Most of the migration to South Africa was fuelled by the prevalence of higher wages and better working conditions in that country as compared to Southern Rhodesia, generally moving down south and not vice versa. South Africans were subtly discouraged from migrating into Rhodesia by the seemingly unfavourable migration policies put up in Southern Rhodesia.²⁶⁴ Most industries in Southern Rhodesia offered what Ncube called ‘bachelor’ wages as opposed to the high wages offered by South Africa in the Transvaal region.²⁶⁵ Apart from the higher wages offered in South Africa as compared to those in Southern Rhodesia, the development of worker consciousness also fuelled the desire to migrate particularly the physical welfare of workers in the mines of Southern Rhodesia.²⁶⁶ By worker consciousness, the labour force in southern Rhodesia was becoming more and

²⁶² NAZ F143/4-Report of the Central African council; NAZ F119/1MM/5/: Immigration file: Home Affairs African Immigrants policy, 1952.

²⁶³ I. Phimister and R. Polisofo, *Wage labour in historical perspective: a study of the de-proletarianization of the African working class in Zimbabwe, 1960-2010*, *Wage Labour and Capital in Africa: Issue 2* Volume 58, 2017, pp 215-227.

²⁶⁴ NAZ F143/4-Report of the Central African council, 1953; NAZ F119/1MM/5/: Immigration file: Home Affairs-African Immigrants policy, 1952.

²⁶⁵ G T Ncube, *The Early History of Wage Labour and Worker Consciousness in North-Western Zimbabwe, 1898-1940*, *The Dyke*, vol 6: 3, 2013, p160.

²⁶⁶ C. van Onselen, *Worker Consciousness in black mines: Southern Rhodesia 1900-1920*, *Journal of African history*, vol, no, 1973, p234.

more concerned by the terrible working conditions and the need for them to be improved. It was observed that workers adopted different strategies to deliberately frustrate the smooth running of mines as a way of airing their grievances, and these did not necessarily entail migrating. Some of these methods including go-slows, feigning sickness, or even destroying company assets or abusing animals in the farms.²⁶⁷ However, the Southern Rhodesian labour force remained very fluid for the better part of the colonial period owing to its failure to match the standards in South Africa. For example, the working conditions in the mines in Southern Rhodesia were so appalling that workers experienced severe health problems in the influenza outbreak of 1918.²⁶⁸ Monthly reports of Native Commissioners in some parts of Matabeleland show that African labourers were fleeing to South Africa on account of health risks in Southern Rhodesian mines.²⁶⁹

Despite its relatively less favourable position as a labour destination as compared to South Africa, Southern Rhodesia acted as an important labour market for the greater part of the colonial period in Southern Africa. Economic historians such as Mlambo and Phimister have written extensively on the movement of people between Zimbabwe and her neighbours, highlighting a more neoclassical view of this movement as being mostly pushed by economic factors. After 1900, Salisbury the capital of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was experiencing expansion because of its being home to emerging industries as well as being an administrative capital, and an emerging hub of transport networks.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁷ Phimister, *African Worker Consciousness: Origins and Aspects to 1953*, p38.

²⁶⁸ Phimister, *African Labour Conditions and Health in the Southern Rhodesian Mining Industry 1898-1953, Part 1*, Central African Journal of Medicine, Vol 21N, No 4, 1975; see also by the same author *African Labour Conditions and Health in the Southern Rhodesian Mining Industry 1898-1953, Part 2*, Central African Journal of Medicine, 1976.; Van Onselen, 1974,

²⁶⁹ NAZ S235/512-515, Annual Reports, NC Wankie, 1934-1936.

²⁷⁰ T. Yoshikuni, *African Harare, 1890-1925: Labour migrancy and an Emerging Urban Community*, African Study monographs, 12(3): pp133-138.

Because of that expansion of industry in this colony, Southern Rhodesia experienced a flow of people from the less economically diverse colonies to the north of it, Zambia and Malawi. There is evidence to show that most of the workers employed by companies such as Wankie Colliery were coming from Malawi and Zambia.²⁷¹ However, Phimister and Pilosof have sought to show that the economic stability of Rhodesia continued to show severe structural weaknesses characterised by shrinkage, as an anti-thesis to the Arrighi view that overstated the stability and longevity of the proletarianisation process in Southern Rhodesia.²⁷² Hence the popularity of migration to South Africa in the entire duration of the colonial period and beyond.

4.3 WNLA labour migrations and Mangwe.

Perhaps the most well-known form of migration in Southern Africa is the WNLA (Witwatersrand Native Labour Association) movement. In some instances, it is colloquially referred to as Wenela. In fact, the migration has come to assume a folkloric tradition amongst the people.²⁷³ Some of the tales paint a graphic image:

‘so important did the WNLA (Witwatersrand Native Labour Association) experience and anticipated economic rewards become that the young man risked their lives, walking for weeks through lion infested country, spending nights tied to

²⁷¹ G. T Ncube, *The Early History of Wage Labour and Worker Consciousness in North-Western Zimbabwe*, p 154.

²⁷² I Phimister and R Pilosof, *Wage Labour in Historical Perspective: A Study in the De-Proletarianization of the African Working Class in Zimbabwe, 1960-2010*, *Labour History*, 58, Issue 2, 2017, pp 215-227.

²⁷³ Interview with William Borman Ncube, Makhubu village, 22 April 2017.

branches to escape the ravages of wildlife, and braving the crocodile infested Limpopo River, to get to the mines.²⁷⁴

The above description of WNLA experiences have been passed down generations and were echoed by many interviewees privy to that form of migration across the borders. Tales are told of the migration into Botswana and South Africa, especially by returning migrants. Most of these tales describe the migrants' valour as they make the journey across the borders. Some describe their encounters with dangerous wild animals and law enforcement agents. In most cases one can sense a measure of exaggeration in the accounts as the migrants try to recreate the graphic images of their journey. However, what emerges from these descriptions is that the migration was not easy.

The great trek to South Africa organised by *WNLA* started off as a 'formal' labour transaction or agreement between the governments of South Africa and other southern African states.²⁷⁵ It was formed in 1901 owing to labour challenges caused by the Anglo-Boer War which restricted the flow of labour between colonies in South Africa. Its sole purpose was to regulate labour supplies into the mines in South Africa. According to Mlambo, migration of labour to South Africa was made possible by *WNLA*.²⁷⁶ This labour was recruited from countries such as Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, and Angola. The principal supplier of labour over the period of *WNLA* was Mozambique. Over time, labour migration to the mines became entrenched in parts of Zimbabwe, particularly in Matabeleland.²⁷⁷ This trend continues up to this day, due to proximity to the borders with South Africa and Botswana, amongst other reasons. The geographical location of

²⁷⁴ A S Mlambo, 'History of Migration in Zimbabwe', www.academia.edu, accessed on the 3rd of July 2017; Interview with Godfrey Ndebele, migrant worker, Sikwana Village. The same sentiments were echoed in a separate interview with William Borman Ncube, cited elsewhere.

²⁷⁵ NAZ GEN-P/CLA: Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, Working Papers, 1958.

²⁷⁶ A. S Mlambo, 'History of Migration in Zimbabwe', p11.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

Zimbabwe viz a viz Malawi and Zambia meant that it became a vibrant transit point for migrants en route to South Africa.

In Zimbabwe, *WNL*A recruitments began around 1911 and continued to around 1980s when relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe were soured by the apartheid policies practised by the former (where South Africa was accused of sponsoring dissident elements in Zimbabwe in its so-called Super ZAPU project).²⁷⁸ The *WNL*A migration was a product of the rapidly changing economic landscape in Southern Rhodesia and the whole of southern Africa, especially in the ever expanding mines and farms as the capitalist economy began to take root. In that scenario, the economy was monetised, and the traditional forms of African subsistence were side-lined or made less profitable. For example, African agriculture was gradual destroyed by the settler land as well as grazing policies between 1894 and 1951. These included the creation of the reserves from 1894 as well laws such as the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 all negatively affected the productivity of Africans. As Arrighi observed on the monetisation of the economy and its effects on Africans:

As cash payments became an increasingly essential part of African society, traditional transactions such as marriage custom, began to assume a cash value.....wage employment became more and more a source of subsistence.²⁷⁹

The discrepancies in the produce market weakened the Africans' competitive edge and handed the momentum to the European producers. That does not necessarily imply that African productivity was eliminated completely during the colonial period. In some areas,

²⁷⁸ C.C.J.P Report, p41.

²⁷⁹ G Arrighi, *Labour Supplies in Historical perspective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasants in Rhodesia*, Journal of Development Studies, 6, 3, 1970, pp194-238.

such as the Matopos Africans were able to establish a thriving agricultural economy in the small but well-watered hillside fields despite the limitations imposed by land alienation or other egregious colonial policies²⁸⁰. The same levels of African agricultural and entrepreneurial prosperity were witnessed in other areas such as Charter District in south-eastern Zimbabwe.²⁸¹ In Kezi the Bango store was a shining model of an African owned business initiative and has a long history, dating back to the colonial period. Therefore, apart from notable success in rural farming there is ample evidence that African enterprise actually grew in the entire duration of colonial rule with the emergence of African businessmen.²⁸² In Mangwe, locals talk of a thriving rural life characterised by much drinking, dancing and festivity as well as the emergence of petty traders who in the later years of colonial rule sold machinery and even car spares.²⁸³ In Mangwe the Nde/Nyathi family of Brunapeg has a long history of running a business, as the Tjalebgwa family in Makubu.²⁸⁴ These operated small trader stores which stood the test of time thus demonstrating the African's astuteness in running businesses in an environment that was unforgiving to them. For most Africans though, the colonial experience was overly negative.

Colonial land and labour policies tried with a measure of success to curtail African prosperity. As early as 1903, Native Commissioners were suggesting that Africans be deprived of their ability to achieve self-sustenance.²⁸⁵ On top of that the settlers introduced

²⁸⁰ T.O. Ranger, *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930* (North-western University Press: Evanston, 1970), see also by the same author, *Voices from the Rocks: Nature, Culture, and History in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe*, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999), as well as R. Palmer and Parsons N.(eds), *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa* (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press, 199)

²⁸¹ D.B. Mugodzwa, *Labour Appropriation in Buhera District, South-eastern Zimbabwe 1890-1930: The Accidental Proletarianisation of an African Peasantry by a Foreign Capitalist Oligarchic Enterprise*, in the *European Journal of Sustainable Development*, 2, 4, (2013), p 76.

²⁸² V. Wild (1992), *An Outline of African Business History in Colonial Zimbabwe, Zambezia*, xix, I, pp19-46.

²⁸³ Interview with William Borman Ncube (villager), Ndabambi village, 23 April 2018.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ NAZ N9/1/8; Annual Report, 31 March 1903.

taxes which were payable through cash, and the African was forced to seek employment to meet the ever-expanding bracket of cash demands. But in the long term, more and more Africans got employed, European enterprise prospered. Arrighi stresses that in the early years of the 20th century European profits were mostly derived from their trade with Africans, as the Africans' needs were modified, when they moved from traditional 'necessities' to include other industrially manufactured luxuries such as corned beef and bicycles.²⁸⁶ Considering improved African productivity, the monetisation of the economy did not produce the desired results as Africans found ways of paying European taxes without resorting to wage labour. Despite relative prosperity especially in the rural areas, urbanisation induced Africans to work.

Though Arrighi's study centred on Southern Rhodesia, the response of the Africans to the monetisation of the economy was also manifested in their migration to South Africa. For example, the stifling of African agriculture in Southern Rhodesia worsened after the creation of the Department of Agriculture in 1903. The policies introduced by this department effectively rendered the practise of agriculture unprofitable to the African, hence they resorted to wage employment.²⁸⁷ In the first two decades after its establishment, the department deliberately promoted European agriculture by introducing hugely biased policies, such as the two-tier pricing system separating European and African agricultural produce. The policies of the settlers thus marginalised the African groups such as the

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ I. Phimister, *African Worker Consciousness: Origins and Aspects to 1953*, p 27.

Kalanga from profiting in the mainstream economy and they responded by migrating to South Africa.

As stated earlier, most of the young men migrating to South Africa since the discovery of gold and diamonds were going to work in the booming mining industry in that country. In Mangwe, particularly the area bordering Botswana and South Africa there is evidence that young man formed migrant bands which trekked down to South Africa via Botswana using the popular Mahekeng (Mafikeng) route. However, the mines were not the only thriving industry in South Africa. Downstream industry and domestic work also thrived. The manufacturing and textile sector was also recruiting large numbers of Africans. These industries were popularly referred to as *amafemu*-the firms.²⁸⁸ Some even worked in the 'kitchens' as 'boys'.²⁸⁹ Contrary to popular belief quite several men worked in the kitchens in the suburbs of Johannesburg, because at the height of colonialism women were generally discouraged and excluded from the capitalist labour system. Women were not allowed near or in the mine compounds thus the colonial period effectively delayed their proletarianization²⁹⁰. As mentioned earlier, wages in South Africa were higher than those offered in the then Southern Rhodesia.²⁹¹ For example, workers in southern Rhodesian farms and mines were earning an average of between ten and nineteen shillings a month (before deducting the annual one pound tax) whereas in the mines in South Africa,

²⁸⁸ The growth of the mining industry was accompanied by the corresponding growth in other industries, some directly linked to it whilst some were not. For more

²⁸⁹ Interview with Dumisani Ndebele, a former migrant labourer, Mphoeng, 21 April 2017. See also A. Daimon, 'Settling in Motion: Nyasa clandestine migration through Southern Rhodesia into the Union of South Africa.' p 13

²⁹⁰ D.B. Mugodzwa (2013), *Labour Appropriation in Buhera District, South-eastern Zimbabwe 1890-1930: The Accidental Proletarianisation of an African Peasantry by a Foreign Capitalist Oligarchic Enterprise*, in the European Journal of Sustainable Development, 2, 4, p 76.

²⁹¹ D. Johnson, *World War two and the Scramble for Labour in Southern Rhodesia in Colonial Rhodesia, 1939/1948*(Harare, University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2000).

specifically around the Messina area wages averaged five pounds per annum.²⁹² In 1949 wages in the Rand area ranged between 70 and a 100 shillings a month plus free rations and accommodation.²⁹³ As a result of earning higher wages in South Africa, the returning immigrants were given a higher status in their communities, usually because their economic well-being would have genuinely improved. For, example in Mangwe the first few African people to build 'modern' houses were the returning migrants. A typical rural home in Mangwe usually consists of a grass thatched kitchen and a big 'modern' house made of brick and roofed with corrugated sheets. For the more successful the houses are big, spacious and palatial. These houses were made of brick and had corrugated roofs as compared to the traditional grass thatched huts known derogatively as '*madumba*' or hovels. The high status given to returning migrants fuelled more migrations as the locals, particularly the youth were attracted by the apparent 'glitter' brought by their fore bearers. The migration patterns continued a similar pattern throughout the colonial period. In the 1940s and 1950s the settler economy in Southern Rhodesia was experiencing challenges associated with the post-war period of recovery. Strikes and demonstrations by workers were becoming common.²⁹⁴ These labour unrests demonstrated the volatility and lack of certainty in the Southern Rhodesian labour market, which further accelerated the rate of migration to South Africa. This volatility as Ranger and others have shown provided a nexus for capitalist exploitation and the emergent African nationalism, and the

²⁹² NAZ S138/22-Native Movements: 1923-1933, Correspondence between the office of the Native Commissioner Gwanda and the Superintendent of Natives, on natives proceeding to the Union, 15 February 1924.

²⁹³ J. McCracken, *A History of Malawi; 1859 -1966*, (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2012), p182.

²⁹⁴ NAZ S1215/1060/7-Imperial committee minerals, 1911. The 1948 general strike were one of the biggest ever experienced in Southern Rhodesia. Economically it shook the system to the core and represented a turning point in labour/nationalistic sentiment in the county. See Terrence Ranger, *Urban Violence and the Colonial Experience in Southern Rhodesia*, accessed from http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/opin/tr_urban_violence_byo_050414.pdf, on the 18 January 2018; D Johnson., *World War 11 and the Struggle for Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1939-1948*; B Raftopolous and I Phimister, eds., *Keep on Knocking. A History of the Labour Movement in Zimbabwe, 1900-97*.

recrudescence of ‘tribal’ animosity brought by competition for economic space in cities as Bulawayo. Outmigration was seen as a refuge in such trying times.

However, Ranger and Msindo have demonstrated that there was a sizeable number of youths from Kalanga areas who migrated to Bulawayo to look for work. Most of these ‘assumed’ a Ndebele ethnic identity as shown by their siding with the ‘broader’ Matabeleland ethnic identity in episodes such as the faction fights of 1929. It is arguable, from archival sources, interviews and secondary sources that most of the migrant labourers went to South Africa especial in the restive post 1940s years.²⁹⁵ For the youths of Mangwe, the Mafikeng train route was the most popular.²⁹⁶ The route inevitably passed through Botswana, and in some instances, migrants would stop over in Botswana for piece jobs.²⁹⁷ The ultimate target destination remained South Africa. In the Mafikeng route emerged the equally popular *dabulaphu* migration terminology.²⁹⁸

The popularity of the trek to South Africa continued well into the better part of the early 1960s. Zimbabwe was engaged in a war of Independence from the mid-1960s to 1979. The causes, course and results of this war have been widely documented that to repeat those here will serve no meaningful purpose. Suffice to say that the war exposed further the

²⁹⁵ Johnson, *World War 11, and the Struggle for Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe*.

²⁹⁶ Interview with Bekezela Mbulawa, Migrant worker, Johannesburg, 25 August 2017(via phone).

²⁹⁷ Dabulaphu, probably from the English phrase double-up, has come to mean the long journey by foot a across borders. On the movements during WNLA, sometimes colloquially referred to as WENELA or wenela see NAZ GEN-P/CLA: Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, Working Papers.

²⁹⁸ Interview with Bekezela Mbulawa, Migrant worker, Johannesburg, 25 August 2017(via phone).

complications inherent in the multi-ethnic society that Zimbabwe is. For example, liberation movements suffered numerous splits because of feelings of ‘marginalisation’ and ‘tribalism’, amongst many other reasons. The liberation war in Zimbabwe, particularly the composition of armies and their military and political command could not escape the historical undercurrents of ethnicity and tribalism. Authors such as Msindo, Masiphula Sithole, and nationalists such as Joshua Nkomo have attempted to show how ethnicity affected nationalism in Zimbabwe, and by extension nationalistic activities such as the liberation war.²⁹⁹ Migration patterns in Mangwe were affected by the ensuing war. The war naturally brought with it limitations to the movement of the people. The Batswana were also not interested in harbouring too many refugees especially in the bordering villages for fear of reprisals by the Smith regime. The area of Mangwe was not a major theatre of the liberation war as few skirmishes are recorded there. Locals talk of guerrilla movements into

²⁹⁹ For more on the reasons for the split in the liberation movements see M Sithole, *Struggle within Struggle*, J Muzondidya and S Gatsheni-Ndlovu, ‘Echoing Silences:’ *Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2007*, *Africa Journal on Conflict Resolutions* (7) pp275-297; S Gatsheni-Ndlovu, *The Zimbabwean Nation State Project. A Historical Diagnosis of Identity and Power Based Conflicts in a Post-colonial State*, (Uppsala: Nordiska Institute, 2011). S Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems, W., *Reinvoking the past in the present: changing identities and appropriations of Joshua Nkomo in post-colonial Zimbabwe*, in *African Identities* 8(3), 2010, 191-208; F, Chung., *Re-living the Second Chimurenga: memories from Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle*, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute 2006, C. S. Banana, (ed.) *Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990*, (Harare: The College Press,); N Bhebe., *The ZAPU and ZANU guerrilla warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1999), Alexander, J., et al., *Violence and Memory: one hundred years in the ‘dark forests’ of Matabeleland*, (Oxford: James Currey, 2000) N J Krieger., *The Zimbabwean war of liberation: struggles within the struggle*, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 14 (2), 1998, 304-322; J Nkomo., *Nkomo: the story of my life*, (London: Methunen., 1984) N Shamuvarira., *Crisis in Rhodesia*, (New York: Transatlantic Arts, 1966)

Botswana, but it appears no major battles were fought here.³⁰⁰ However, Mangwe acted as an important transit point to young men and women en route to join guerrilla armies via Botswana, as well as to the displacement or refugee camps in that country. Perhaps more relevant to this study, the situation during the war further placed the Kalanga in a perilous position. Their traditional economic activities such as cross border trade were affected by heightened tensions which increased security details at the border. Movement was therefore restricted, and a general ‘curfew’ was put in place. For example, it was illegal to be seen outdoors after six pm, and the curfew also applied to animal movement.³⁰¹ Patrol by white security details in their Jeeps along the so called ‘border road’ became frequent.³⁰² One notorious white man was referred to as ‘*Mlenzobomvu*’, apparently because of the Khaki shorts that exposed his thighs. Locals remember him as a trigger happy ‘enforcer’ of the curfews and restrictions on movement.³⁰³

The Kalanga people, already grappling with the impoverishing policies of the settler regime especially regarding agrarian issues, were badly affected by the war. During the war, a good number of young men and women crossed the border into Botswana and South Africa, but the trend still showed that the males were the ones doing most of the migration.³⁰⁴ Despite the tightening of borders, locals still found ways of crossing them.³⁰⁵ During this period some of the young men inadvertently found themselves being diverted to the armies fighting the liberation war, such ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army).³⁰⁶

³⁰⁰ Interview with Victor Nyathi, Manama, 23 Jan. 2018.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ NAZ F143/4-Report of the central African council- presented to the legislative assembly 1947.

³⁰⁵ Interview with William Borman Ncube, villager, Makhubu Village, 22 April 2017.

³⁰⁶ Interview with A Madabu, Brunapeg. Madabu also claimed that he was a war time recruiter for ZIPRA in Botswana and South Africa.

However, the war situation did not dampen cross border labour migration. Statics as well as evidence from interviews shows that large numbers of people migrated across the border into Botswana, or into the urban areas such as Bulawayo in Zimbabwe for economic as well as security reasons. For example, between 1974 and 1977, out of a total of 20 homesteads sampled 14 reported one or two family members skipping the border for one reason or the other. That represents about 70 percent of the households. These were mostly male aged between 20 and 40³⁰⁷. Economic reasons were the most compelling as evidenced by the negligible number who joined liberation forces (only 25 percent of the households had an accredited war veteran in their midst). However, archival records show that the war affected the recruitment patterns between Zimbabwe (then called Southern Rhodesia), and that the Salisbury office of WNLA was now reluctant to divulge information on the actual numbers being recruited from Zimbabwe.³⁰⁸ Men usually began the journey as a small group of a similar age group range, usually running away from school without the blessings of their parents.³⁰⁹ After crossing into Botswana they would break down into smaller groups of at least two to avoid detection by the Botswana police especially after the creation of the border fence.³¹⁰ In the process they would ‘double-up’ (break up in twos as people walk in small paths through forests) hence the name *dabulaphu*.³¹¹

Other interpretations of *dabulaphu* are that the term is derived from *ukudabula*-literally to tear (across forests or borders presumably).³¹² The *dabulaphu* was not an easy task and was

³⁰⁷ Interview with A Madabu, cited elsewhere.

³⁰⁸ NAZ GEN-P/CLA: Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, Working Papers.

³⁰⁹ The lure of South Africa and Botswana, and the few job prospects for those who go through school leads to high incidences of dropouts in the region. Interview with Methembe Ngole, schoolteacher, Plumtree, 23 January 2018.

³¹⁰ Interview with Assah Khuphe, cited elsewhere. The author’s late brother was one of such youth who dropped out of school and left for South Africa.

³¹¹ Ibid

³¹² F Maphosa, ‘Rural Livelihoods in Zimbabwe: Impact of Remittances from South Africa’, p26

usually carried out by those from poorer families who could not afford the fares charged by cross border transporters³¹³. In some cases it could mean very long kilometres on foot, with little food and water in the face of the vagaries of nature such as intense heat and cold, not to mention danger posed by wild animals and other less friendly human beings.³¹⁴ Only adult males partook in this form of migration known as *dabulaphu* because of the risks involved, but as time went on women too joined the system because of improved information on the routes and assurances of safety in the final destination.³¹⁵ Needless to say, those partaking in *dabulaphu* usually did not have travel documents such as passports and would carry 'bribe' money in case they met law enforcement agents along the way.³¹⁶ However, carrying bribe money did not guarantee safe passage as most would be apprehended and deported back home, the unfortunate ones having been conned of their money. The *dabulaphu* system has apparently been replaced by a more sophisticated system whereby cross border transport operators known as *omalayitsha* facilitate the crossing of borders at a cost that is usually triple the fare of a person in possession of proper travel documents. This is not only confined to *omalayitsha* as registered bus companies also routinely practise it.³¹⁷ Even though the travelling 'gang' usually comprised of young man of similar age groups, amongst them they will be a man with experience who would naturally be the leader of the party.

However, most of the times it was a blind leap of faith where young men would just organise themselves and go with little or no experience whatsoever. The journey was also

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Interview with Bekezela Mbulawa, Thembisa, Johannesburg, 25 August 2017.

³¹⁵ Maphosa, *Rural Live hoods in Zimbabwe*, p26.

³¹⁶ Ibid, p26.

³¹⁷ Interview with Qaphelani Moyo, Thembisa (SA), a former bus crew member, 25 August 2017.

accompanied by some rituals by the travelling party.³¹⁸ They would abstain from activities such as sexual relations. Or even a visit to the local prophets as well a way of allaying bad luck along the way.³¹⁹ Most of the migrants claimed that they left Zimbabwe as unskilled labourers. However, most returned with a variety of skills acquired from the South African mines and farms. Such skills included forging, blacksmithing, carpentry and especially bricklaying. These skills were imparted on generations and became useful in the community. Bricklaying has easily been most popular job amongst the Kalanga in South Africa over the decades. In Mangwe it is called *mesilane*.

4.4 Post-colonial migration since 1980.

Since the attainment of independence in 1980, cross border migration in Mangwe has continued unabated. The emigration has been influenced by political and economic reasons.³²⁰ In fact, statistics show that the emigration trends have gone up.³²¹ Outmigration trends across Zimbabwe generally showed a sharp increase especially in the third decade of independence. By 2009 for example, 49,3 percent sited lack of work opportunities as a primary reason for leaving Zimbabwe³²². 9,7 percent sited family reasons, while a significant portion about 18.3 percent migrated to increase family incomes. By 2010, over 1,5 million Zimbabweans had crossed the South African border legally for one reason or another.³²³ The number of ‘illegal’ crossings was difficult to determine but in 1997, over

³¹⁸ The Kalanga of Mangwe, like most African groups believe that travelling for long distances without properly cleansing oneself of bad luck usually ends in disaster. In extreme cases even close relatives and neighbours are not told of the impending journey as it is believed they might cast a bad spell on the traveller.

³¹⁹ Interview with Godfrey Ndebele sited elsewhere.

³²⁰ Migration in Zimbabwe: A Country Profile, International Organisation for Migration Report (2009).),

³²¹ Migration in Zimbabwe: A Country Profile, International Organisation for Migration Report (2010-2015,p 20.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ J Crush, Chikanda A and Tawodzera G, *The Third Wave: Mixed Migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa*, The Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP), 2012, p8

20 000 Zimbabweans were deported from South Africa alone.³²⁴ Between 1997 and 2005, males dominated the migration with over 61 percent of the total migrant population, while in both sexes the most affected age groups were between 15 and 44 years of age. By about 2016, South Africa's net immigration was peaking at around a million people.³²⁵ Currently it is estimated that 3 million Africans immigrants are officially in South Africa.³²⁶ Studies by economists such as Bloch showed that despite most migrants finding more rewarding jobs in South Africa across the sectors, the majority of them desired to return back home and settle permanently should conditions improve, about two thirds of respondents (over 60%).³²⁷ In Mangwe, between 1980 and 1987, the movement of people was restricted by the disturbances between the government and the so called 'dissidents'. In Mangwe these disturbances brought a lot of hardships as they interrupted the traditional way of life of the people.³²⁸ The curfews imposed on the movement of people severely curtailed activities such as migration, and others such as cross border trade and the harvesting of the mopane worm to be discussed in the later chapters. Apart from being unable to carry out the activities mentioned, crop cultivation was also disrupted and worsened by the droughts of the early 80s. As a result, widespread starvation and famine was experienced during this period. In some parts of Mangwe such as Makubu and Patse locals survived by eating a dried wild fruit known as *mtopi* and the dry *marula* nut known as *inkelu* in IsiNdebele and *homu* in TjiKalanga.³²⁹ However, as Ndlovu and others have demonstrated the disturbances recreated and entrenched the perception of marginalisation amongst the people that lingers

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ www.reliefweb.int accessed 23 July 2022.

³²⁶ www.migrationdataportal.org accessed 23 July 2022.

³²⁷ A. Bloch. 'Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant Perspectives' Social Policy and Administration 40(1) (2006), pp 67-87.

³²⁸ The disturbances are well documented in the report by the *Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace*, Jocelyne Alexander in *Violence and Memory* and in R P Werbner's *Tears of the Dead*.

³²⁹ Some survived on sheep or goat meat. In some instances, the diet was so bad that sporadic outbreaks of diseases, constipation and kwashiorkor were experienced in the region.

to this day. Locals devised other mechanisms to get supplies from neighbouring countries which marked the beginning of the phenomenon of ‘*ukulayitsha*’ (courier services-to be discussed later in a separate section).³³⁰ Those who could not migrate either due to age or any other reason tried casual labour at the local ARDA (Agricultural Rural Development Authority) estate where conditions of work were bad, such as long hours and little pay.

The curfews imposed on the people during the Matabeleland disturbances are etched in the collective memory of the people of Mangwe and are talked of with grimness and angst. They are interpreted as the precursor to the marginalisation of the people of Matabeleland in general, by the post-colonial government. In the same period, a lot of young men were forced to skip the borders because of being targeted by the security forces. Their crime was that they were of the ‘dissident’ age.³³¹ These migrations were essentially forced, and the trips were dangerous due the volatile security situation. Amongst the forced migrants were ex-guerrillas who had fought for the liberation of the country but were now being labelled ‘dissidents’.

The reintegration of ex-ZIPRA cadres into the post-independence army was complicated by the disturbances that rocked parts of the Midlands and Matabeleland. With little hope of being successfully re-integrated into the post-independence national army and with deep feelings of marginalisation, the ex-combatants joined the migrations across the borders and

³³⁰ F. Ndhlovu, “*Language politics in postcolonial Africa revisited: Minority agency and language imposition*”, *Language Matters*, vol 41, number 2 (2010) pp. 175-192, E. Ndlovu, “Mother tongue education in official minority languages in Zimbabwe”, *South African Journal of African languages*, vol 31, number 2 (2011) pp. 229-242.

³³¹ The age could be anything between 17 and the 50s, suspected to have connections or part of the ‘dissident’ army. Widespread and random beatings were common and some scars linger on even today. The author witnessed some of the beatings though the violence was subsidising then, in the mid-80s.

were absorbed into the job seeking populations in South Africa. Of fundamental importance was that the postcolonial government became embroiled in issues bordering on ‘tribalism’ and ethnic competition where the people of Matabeleland and some parts of Zimbabwe have decried an unfair distribution of resources along ethnic divisions. ZANU and ZAPU had experienced ethnic tensions during the war which had led to splits and failed attempts at unity.³³² The post-independence nation state was seen as a Shona take-over that would set the conditions for ethnic marginalisation especially of the Ndebele and the Kalanga, amongst other groups associated with the Ndebele ‘state’. Suffice to say that the period of disturbance not only delayed and derailed the implementation of economic programmes in parts of Mangwe but effectively entrenched their perceptions of marginalisation. In that regard it is possible to argue that the disturbances in the early years of independence form an important dimension in the economic and political marginalisation of the Kalanga of Mangwe.

On the other hand, the early period into independence was characterised by high expectations amongst the Zimbabwean citizenry, more so the educated elite, professionals and the skilled and semi-skilled. Workers, especially civil servants talk glowingly about ‘roaring’ eighties and nineties in Zimbabwe.³³³ The outmigration amongst this group was understandably low. As the International Organisation for Migration report (2009) suggests, Zimbabwe experienced considerable immigration trends as people either returned home to rebuild after the war or came back as professionals trained and educated outside the country, to take up careers in the civil service. Many professionals became urban dwellers and acquired properties in the towns such as Bulawayo and Plumtree. In the area

³³² Informal discussion with Mandla Ndlovu, PhD, University of Johannesburg, working on the demobilisation and integration experiences of Zimbabwean liberation struggle ex-combatants, 13 April 2018.

³³³ Interview with a Mr N Dube, long serving civil servant, Esigodini, 13 January 2017.

of Mangwe, education was still limited to very few families because of several reasons both in the colonial and post-colonial period. The schools were few and far apart, and only the dedicated could afford to travel those long distances to school daily. As a result, the number of educated Kalanga remained negligible. South Africa and Botswana remained attractive destination to the youth. Those parents with financial means such as the local business elite, teachers or other government employees enrolled their children in boarding schools locally or in the neighbouring districts. Some sent them to relatives in Bulawayo to attend school and only return home on holidays. Those who went to school formed the crust of the educated elite who became professionals such as teachers, nurses, doctors and even joined politics. A good number of them were absorbed into the Zimbabwean civil service, some becoming distinguished.

Post-independence Mangwe has seen little change in fortune in as far as the increase in the number of schools and industry is concerned. Local councils bemoan the lack of new investment in the area.³³⁴ According to the Chronicle newspaper the situation is so dire that in some circumstances children walk up to 36 km daily to and from school.³³⁵ Quoting one concerned villager the paper reports that

‘Our village does not have a secondary school so our children who finish primary education at Osabeni must attend secondary education at Ivimila which is situated

³³⁴ The Chronicle ‘*Rural Pupils Disadvantaged*’, February 11, 2013.

³³⁵ Ibid.

36 kilometres from our village...and if our children are going to endure a 36 km walk daily then attending school will eventually become a burden to them.³³⁶

Councillor Edward Ndlovu of Osabeni echoes the same sentiments in the same paper, that rural schools in some parts of Mangwe were isolated and did not have the same amenities available to schools in other areas. The dire situation in the education sector means that it is very difficult for parents to convince their children to stay at school as most find it more appealing to simply cross the border than endure the torture of travelling long distances to school. Such amenities include electricity which is important in a learning environment. Apart from the fact that the schools are far apart, some of them are not fully or properly staffed. For example, some do not have adequate science or mathematics teachers. That hinders the attainment of the so-called STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) goals initiated by the government of Zimbabwe.

Worryingly, the few professionals that have been produced in the struggling schools in Mangwe decided to join the mass exodus to Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, or South Africa at the height of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe. These are mostly teachers and that further exacerbated the already bad staffing situation in the district. The professionals struggled to establish a footing in their host countries and resorted to menial jobs.³³⁷ Some, like Obert Nyathi even worked as *daka boys* in the construction industry in South Africa.³³⁸ The process of acquiring a job and relevant documentation in a foreign country is usually very difficult.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Interview with Jefferson Ndimande, (University Lecturer), 3 October 2017.

³³⁸ Dakaboys are the least paid in the construction chain. They are unskilled in the actual bricklaying, so their job is to mix the mortar or carry tools around building sites. Interview with Obert Nyathi, Johannesburg, 6 October 2017.

Some fell victim to bogus recruitment agencies and lost their hard-earned money in the process. Most of the professionals migrating from Mangwe did so for economic reasons. Their status as an elite group in the communities had been severely battered by their ever-declining purchasing power especially in the era of the Zimbabwean dollar. In actual economic terms their education certificates had been rendered valueless and a source of great embarrassment.³³⁹ For the professionals in Mangwe, the situation was worsened by the lavish spending of their brothers and sisters coming from South Africa or Botswana, pushing them to migrate.

4.5 Remittances as a survival mechanism: migration and remittance in Mangwe up to 2015.

This section deals with the common corollary of migration, which is remittances. Over the decades the people of Mangwe have sustained their livelihoods from amongst other sources income sent back home by relatives in South Africa and Botswana. Studies by Maphosa and Makina in selected wards in Mangwe show that remittances play an important role in the sustenance of livelihoods in the district. Most of the studies on remittances, as Maphosa rightly observes have focused on official remittances sent back home by documented migrants. However, a significant percent is accrued from unofficial sources used by illegal migrants. These unofficial channels play a crucial part in cushioning households from

³³⁹ T. Dube (2014), 'The Socio-Economic Effects of Cross Border Migration on Zimbabwe's Border Lying Communities: A Case of Beitbridge and Plumtree', *International Journal of Development and Sustainability*, Vol 3, No 1, pp89-107.

poverty and marginalisation. These, together with the legal channels of remittances will be interrogated in this section.

4.6 Defining remittances

Defining the term ‘remittances’ is hardly an easy task because of the fluidity of the term. However, a few scholars have attempted to do so. Maphosa provides a very simple definition for remittances, which he sees as:

money or goods that are transmitted back home by people working away from the communities of their origins.³⁴⁰

Scholars like Maphosa (2007) and Dube (2014) emphasise the cash or monetary aspect of remittances, whereby they see them as any deposits or monetary transfers made by immigrants to their country of origin.³⁴¹ However these scholars also acknowledge the non-monetary transfers made to relatives in one’s country of origin, particularly goods such as food and clothing in times of need. Non-monetary remittances constitute the bulk of remittances to areas such as Mangwe since most of the people are undocumented migrants. This makes it difficult for them to approach registered financial institutions to effect monetary transfers. Nonmonetary remittances are also a result of the collapse of the productive or manufacturing economic sector in Zimbabwe, where goods are simply unavailable making it cheaper to purchase them in South Africa. Considering the above a more encompassing definition of remittances would be one that not only covers monetary and non-monetary goods, but also psycho-social support in the form of assurances and

³⁴⁰ F. Maphosa (2007), ‘Remittances and Development: The Impact of Migration to South Africa on Rural Livelihoods in Zimbabwe’, *Development Southern Africa*, 24(1) pp 123-136.

³⁴¹ Dube, *The Socio-Economic Effects of Cross Border Migration on Zimbabwe’s Border Lying Communities: A Case of Beitbridge and Plumtree*’ p89-107.

actual expressions of love and community expressed in solidarity associations by migrants from the same community. The forming of bereavement associations, for example is strengthened by shared historical ties of community and togetherness associated with years of perceived or real marginalisation-the 'let's do it ourselves' mentality which one notices in interactions with the people of Mangwe.

To support the foregoing, it is important for scholars on migrant remittances to understand the social, economic, and historical contexts of the migrants to properly explain the forms of remittances which are continuously evolving. As Maphosa observed, the skills and technology offered by the migrants form an important part of remittance.³⁴² I mention that the imparting of knowledge such as carpentry and bricklaying is an important form of remittance.

Associations such as bereavement groupings or 'stokvels' act as an important platform where migrants not only pool resources together but also discuss developmental issues concerning their areas of origin. In such platforms 'political' issues like marginalisation crop up and ways to deal with and address them are continuously being perfected, hence feeding into the survival strategies which are the backbone of this thesis.

Remittances in communities such as Mangwe, experiencing low economic activity and reeling under the effects of real or perceived marginalisation play a crucial role in their socio-economic history. Firstly, it is important to historicise the phenomenon of remittance

³⁴² Ibid.

to understand the contextual significance of the issue. In Mangwe, in the 1940s and 1950s the colonial settler agricultural policies had rendered African agriculture virtually unproductive.³⁴³ In such a situation migrants needed to supplement their cash income in the face of a highly monetising political economy, hence the need to send money back home to offset requirements of dip tank taxes amongst the many taxes demanded on the African. This presupposes those economic needs and considerations play a significant part on the desire to remit. During the liberation war period, remittances were crucial in placating artificial shortages caused by curfews and movement restrictions, hence the movement from cash remittances to also include foodstuffs and clothing to mention but a few. That trend continued in the first years of independence in the period of Gukurahundi. As already mentioned, palpable notions of marginalisation persistent in Mangwe do also influence the decision to remit back home.³⁴⁴ The migrant feels an obligation to cover the 'void' that central government cannot, and in the process the trends in migration and remittance follow a discernible pattern of trying to negotiate marginalisation across the various stages of violence, war and economic crisis that have been experienced in Zimbabwe in the last couple of decades.

To also illustrate the ingenuity of the people of Mangwe to circumvent marginality and lack of services, some enterprising locals have set up informal bureau de changes of some sort. Here relatives in South Africa or Botswana send monies via cell phones to relatives in Zimbabwe who are then instructed to collect at certain homesteads for a small profit.³⁴⁵

³⁴³ The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 further racialized land ownership in Zimbabwe, with the white minority usurping large tracts of the fertile land and the black minority being pushed further into unproductive land. Twenty years later, another racist legislation known as the Native Land Husbandry Act was promulgated and dealt with the modalities of land use especially in African areas.

³⁴⁴ Nyamunda, *Cross border Couriers as Symbols of Regional Grievance?*, p 40.

³⁴⁵ Interview with Assah Khuphe, cited elsewhere.

This in my view shows how these people continuously evolve mechanisms to lessen the burden of existing on the margins of the mainstay economy.

4.7 Conclusion

The chapter examined the phenomenon of cross border migration in Mangwe. An attempt was made to give a historical background to the migration. Most importantly, there was an attempt to locate migration within the broader survival strategies that have been adopted by the people of Mangwe to mitigate the effects of marginalisation. The link between limited resources for empowerment, such as schools is used to illustrate the relationship between marginalisation, ethnicity and survival strategies. The chapter was able to show that cross border migration in Mangwe has a long history, and that it can be divided into different episodes. These different epochs were influenced by contemporaneous realities such as the war of liberation. In the later years, especially during the Matabeleland-Midlands disturbances, migration became intertwined with the politics of ‘tribalism’ associated with the Gukurahundi. In the aftermath, it became associated with the politics of marginalisation associated with the Shona-dominated nation state, hence it can be seen as a survival strategy of a group existing on the margins of society. The chapter highlighted that migration and the remittances accruing from it assist a lot in sustaining livelihoods in Mangwe. The next chapter explores yet another survival strategy that has been employed by the people of Mangwe: cross border trade.

CHAPTER FIVE

Informal cross border trade (I.C.T.B) and related activities in Mangwe 1940s to 2015.

5.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the nature and impact of informal cross border trade and related activities such as *omalayitsha* (cross border transporters) in Mangwe from the colonial to the post-colonial period. Though colonial boundaries started off a less rigid or defined, they evolved to define territorial boundaries that are common today. A more nuanced approach will reveal that, as with other activities such as mopane worm harvesting and migration, the deeper feelings of ethnic marginalisation characterised by massive unemployment in the district as well as the proximity to both Botswana and South Africa has led to the rapid spread of this activity in Matabeleland have rarefied the need to find alternative sources of income amongst the Kalanga.³⁴⁶ The chapter is divided into three sections. The first provides background information of the activities in the precolonial period. The second section examines colonial experiences while the third addresses the postcolonial activities.

Archival sources as well as newspaper articles from the colonial period going forward show that Africans across the country, as well as Europeans and Asians engaged in cross-border trade. Most of it raised the ire of the colonial government as it ran contrary to the regulations of trade set down by the governments then. Interestingly, as the following paragraphs will show, arrests and convictions did not discourage or stifle the trade. The phenomenon of informal cross border trade has been shaped and influenced by historical realities such as the war of liberation in Zimbabwe as well as the post-colonial disturbances such as

³⁴⁶ T. Dube, 'The Socio-Economic effects of Cross Border Migration in Zimbabwe's Border lying Communities-A case study of Beitbridge and Plumtree,' International Journal of Development and Sustainability, vol 3, no. 11, (0140 pp 89-107.

Gukurahundi and the economic meltdown experienced in Zimbabwe in the post 2000 period. Because of that, a more thematic approach will be used in this chapter where these historical realities will be employed to provide analytic tools for the nature, volumes, purposes and effects of this trade in Mangwe.

Several scholars suggests that informal cross border trade is a recent phenomenon in Zimbabwe, probably staring in the 1990s with the ‘collapse’ of the Zimbabwean economy because of the late 1990s economic structural adjustment programmes (ESAPS) amongst a plethora of other reasons.³⁴⁷ They argue that the phenomenon was a response to massive job retrenchments as well as the general shrinkage of the formal white collar job market in the country. Other scholars such as Nyamunda view it as a form of protest against a predatory state, for example when one analyses the activities of *omalayitsha*.³⁴⁸ It is possible to argue that there are political dynamics that help to explain the scale and expansion of parallel economies. However, there has always been a strong tradition of informal cross border trade not only in Zimbabwe but across the African continent. Since colonial times, large quantities of goods have been channelled back and forth across international boundaries without regard for customs procedure.³⁴⁹ In fact, over the years boundaries, rather than being barriers, have acted as theatres of opportunity for the

³⁴⁷ N. Muzvidziwa (2005), *Women without Borders: Informal Cross Border Trade among Women in the Southern African Development Community Region* (SADC), OSSREA; D.B Ndlela (2006), *Informal Cross Border Trade: The case of Zimbabwe*, JSTOR, J Crush and Dan Tevera(2010), *Zimbabwe exodus, crisis, migration, survival*(Kingdom and Cape Town: SAMP), J. Jeremy Jones(2010), ‘Nothing is straight in Zimbabwe’. *The rise of the kiya-kiya economy 2000-2008*, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 36(2).

³⁴⁸ T. Nyamunda (2014), *Cross border couriers as symbols of regional grievance: The Malayitsha remittance system in Matabeleland, Zimbabwe*, *African Diaspora* 7, pp 1-2.

³⁴⁹ N.T Kahjum, ‘Trading in an African Island’; *The Cameroun-Nigeria Bush Trade*, (Unpublished M.A thesis: University of Leiden, 2009), p34.

entrepreneurially minded.³⁵⁰ Stephen Golub has succinctly summarised the phenomenon as follows:

A confluence of factors contribute to the prominence of ICBT: long traditions of regional trade preceding the colonial era; artificial borders imposed by the colonial powers, largely maintained as African nations became independent around the early 1960s; strong ethnic and religious ties uniting people across borders; uncoordinated and often highly interventionist policies in the newly independent states, particularly with regard to trade policies; weak state institutions, which undermine the effectiveness of the enforcement of these policies, and widespread corruption; and inability of governments to control movements of people and goods across artificial borders.³⁵¹

Informal economic activities, under which rubric informal cross border trade and other related activities such as smuggling fall, is defined as

Economic activities not included in the nation's data on gross domestic product, and not subject to formal contracts, licencing, and taxation. These businesses generally rely on indigenous resources, small scale operations and unregulated and competitive markets. In addition, skills may be obtained outside the formal education system.³⁵²

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Stephen S Golub (2015), *Informal Cross Border Trade and Smuggling in Africa*, accessed from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277298336> on the 8th of August 2018.

³⁵² Michael M. Harris and Leyland F. Pitt (1995), '*Informal Sector as Entrepreneurship*', *Journal of Small Business Management*, quoted in L. Shinder, *Zimbabwe Informal Sector*, International Report, p1.

The term ‘informal’ has been variously defined since it was first used in 1972 by the International Labour Office.³⁵³ However, economic activities that operate outside the ambit of state control and restrictions are generally referred to as ‘informal’. For this thesis, cross border and the mopane worm economy in Mangwe are thus considered informal economic activities because they aptly fit the above definition. As the following paragraphs will show, informal economic activities such as cross border trade have a long history in Zimbabwe, contrary to what most researchers assumed.³⁵⁴ They involve activities such as smuggling which were carried out in the colonial period through to the post-colonial era.³⁵⁵ The main reason for the emergence of this activity appears to have been economic: in the colonial period for example the Africans were economically emasculated resulting in them looking for alternative methods to survive.³⁵⁶ As time went on, other variables such as ethnic identity and regionalism as well as proximity to borders influenced people to engage in informal cross border trade.³⁵⁷ Later, especially after the economic collapse of the 1990s in Zimbabwe, variables such as ethnic marginalisation and regionalism, and even distance appear to have been relegated to the backstage as the economic crises deepened in Zimbabwe.³⁵⁸

³⁵³ International Labour Office Report (1975).

³⁵⁴ NAZ S138/22-Native Movements: 1923-1933, Correspondence between the office of the Native Commissioner Gwanda and the Superintendent of Natives, on natives proceeding to the Union.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ C Mabhena, ‘*Ethnicity, Development and the Dynamics of Rural Development in Matabeleland*,’ IOSR, Journal of Humanities and Social Science, vol 19, issue 4, (2014)

³⁵⁸ These were the economic structural adjustment years in Zimbabwe, discussed elsewhere in the thesis.

The language used in the description of the trade by its participants informs on several salient aspects. In some instances, it represents a form of lawlessness and deviance (which might be a response to too many restrictions imposed by the state), for example *ukugumaguma* (as is used along the South Africa-Zimbabwe border), or the more respectable ones such as *ukulayitsha* (providing semi-formal cross border courier services). The language usually portrays what Kahjum sees as the importance the community attaches to the activity on one hand and what the state sees on the other.³⁵⁹ The debates on marginalisation and ethnicity help us to unlock how people who partake in informal economies conceptualise their activities. These images and conceptualisations usually are informed by their position in the state vis a vis access to resources or lack of it, and desires to circumvent state rules and regulations in the process.

5.2 The historical roots of informal cross territorial trade and smuggling in Zimbabwe.

The phenomenon of cross territorial trade in Zimbabwe can be traced back to the historical times. In the precolonial period, such as during the Great Zimbabwe era, evidence has been found that shows that inter territorial trade took place.³⁶⁰ I refer to it here as cross territorial trade because borders were only implemented in the colonial period in most parts of Africa, so the concept of borders was fluid in its application then. Though loosely defined then, communities defined the extent of their territorial reach (which we may call borders) through several ways and one of them was ethnic. This trade transcended continents and resulted in local goods such as gold reaching the near and Far East. At the Great Zimbabwe site, archaeological evidence such as Persian glass and China ware shows that there was external trade on a significant scale. This cross territorial trade was mostly controlled by

³⁵⁹ Kahjum, 'Trading in an African Island'; *The Cameroun-Nigeria Bush Trade*, p 7.

³⁶⁰ S Chirikure, *New Perspective on the Political Economy of Great Zimbabwe*, Journal of Archaeological Research, (New York: Springer, 2019), p23.

the ruling elite though it is plausible to argue that the common men and women were at the forefront in the production process. The phenomenon of cross territorial trade was a natural response to internal economic dynamics such as enhanced mining due to improved iron tools as well as improved transport and communication systems all over the world that allowed for travel and access to previously uncharted territories in the interior of continents such as Africa. In the precolonial period most of the trade was irregular and battering was the most common method of doing business.

Petty commodity trade has been reported for the period predating the settlement of the Tswana in Mangwe. The historical links between the Kalanga of Mangwe and those of Botswana provided a platform for a rich exchange of goods and services interrupted periodically by the activities of the Ndebele and the arrival of the British settlers and eventual colonisation. With the case of the arrival of the Ndebele, their continued expansion into Kalanga areas southwest of Zimbabwe led to the constraint of Kalanga activities.³⁶¹ In some instances though it led to the solidification and creation of bigger Kalanga polities especially along the border with Botswana.³⁶² These resistant Kalanga communities continued trading with the Ngwato of Botswana.³⁶³ Hence, cross territorial trade in Mangwe has its roots in the historical ties binding the Kalanga and the Ngwato (as well pockets of the Kalanga) in Botswana. The Kalanga and the Ngwato traded in an assortment of goods such as milk and iron products.³⁶⁴ The absence of a rigid 'border' between the Ngwato and the Kalanga even when the Kalanga were ostensibly under the control of the Ndebele meant that Kalanga-Ngwato trade links endured, probably experiencing

³⁶¹ Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, p31.

³⁶² *ibid*

³⁶³ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p44.

alternating periods of highs and lows depending on the relations between the Ndebele and the Ngwato. For example, Msindo alludes to periodic forays by the Ndebele into Kalanga areas to assert authority and so on.³⁶⁵

5.3 Colonial informal cross border trade in marginalised communities up to 1980.

Colonial illicit cross border trade developed because of the tightening of cross territorial controls and the continuously shrinking economic space for Africans in the new colonial economic polity. In some instances, the trade became quite sophisticated that ‘natives’ were suspected of constructing ‘private’ roads linking their areas with the South African border for use in transporting their contraband. It was noted that as early as 1912, illicit and unregulated trade up and selling goods to the locals.³⁶⁶ There appears to have been difficulties in acquiring permits for the settlers and the Africans to start up stores hence smuggling and informal trade emerged.³⁶⁷ In 1937, the colonial government gazetted a law that allowed for the police officers to act as immigration officials owing to the apparent increase in cases of informal trade and smuggling amongst both the ‘natives’ and the settlers along the borders, specifically Plumtree border post. Colonial records show that by the 1940, the police were already investigating cases of cross border smuggling and informal trade along the Limpopo River.³⁶⁸ It appeared that the general dealer shops along the borders, usually owned by whites acted as transit points for smuggling or shady trade networks and they inadvertently attracted the attention of the colonial police.³⁶⁹ The colonial police suspected that the store owners were illegally importing goods and were

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ NAZ. L/2/2/127-Central African archives, 1944.

³⁶⁷ NAZ S 1542 T 11, 1936-1942: Trading, January 1935- December 1939. The Superintendent of Native Commissioners (Salisbury) about itinerant vendors in the reserves no.537/store sites/15; NAZ S910/11/70, Police and Immigration Officers to act as Customs Officers.

³⁶⁸ NAZ A1345/390, Department of Customs and Excise, Southern Rhodesia, 15 July 1940.

³⁶⁹ Ibid, see also Memo by the Department of Customs and Excise, Beitbridge to the Controller of Customs and Excise, Salisbury, on suspected smuggling by M. Spraggon, 27 January 1940.

working together with the ‘natives’ in the illicit business.³⁷⁰ Part of their task was to ensure that the natives did not bring with them extra goods and clothing as would meet their reasonable needs. Some ‘natives’ were apprehended for selling goods of local and foreign origin in the reserves, and it was widely believed that some of the goods were smuggled through the country’s borders.³⁷¹ What worried the colonial administrators was that the informal trade in the native areas was jeopardising the operations of licenced, tax paying formal traders who saw their earnings drop by over fifty percent. Most of the licenced traders were whites, and this naturally unsettled the colonial system hence moves to eradicate it in the bud. The colonial authorities were announced that:

Investigations in connection with informal cross border traders was taking place. Every effort was being made to detect unlicensed trading although there were undoubtedly difficulties which were encountered. Police asked for the co-operation of both complainants in detecting the sale of goods other than Rhodesian manufacture, although the offenders were well on their guard in this respect. However, one case was heard at a local Bulawayo Magistrate’s Court when it was held that the goods being traded were manufactured in Rhodesia and the accused cross-border trader was discharged.³⁷²

The above quote clearly demonstrates that informal trade amongst both Africans and white settlers was a cause for serious concern in Southern Rhodesian, and that it was expanding

³⁷⁰ NAZ 0.2205/22/49, Southern Rhodesia Customs office, to the Staff Officer, the BSAP, Salisbury on alleged contravention of Customs Regulations by Messrs. McDougall and Spraggon of Nuanetsi.

³⁷¹ NAZ S 1542 T 11: Native Commissioners replying to the superintendent of Commissioners (Bulawayo) on the itinerant vendors trading in native reserves 18 June 1936.

³⁷² Ibid.

and becoming more and more complex. In the same vein, goods were being smuggled out of the colony for resale in neighbouring countries.³⁷³ The illicit and informal market spread to Indian shop owners in the urban areas and there is no doubt that their market included also the 'natives' resident in urban areas.³⁷⁴ In all this the Rhodesian government was desirous of regulating trade with its neighbours for it to remain viable and contribute to the national fiscus. For example, in 1935, a trade agreement was signed with the Bechuanaland Protectorate (now Botswana), for the importation of sugar, matches and cigarettes amongst other things. These trade arrangements appear to have done little to deter the smuggling of goods for resale in Southern Rhodesia as more cases of smuggling were reported.

Various explanations have been given to account for the increase in both smuggling and informal trade in Zimbabwe. The most obvious is linked to African unemployment especially in the urban areas.³⁷⁵ Reports of large crowds of Africans lining up factories looking for work as early as the 1950s attests to the rising levels of unemployment in a country that was perceived as a model of development in the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.³⁷⁶ The irritation caused by job seekers was so perverse that firms in the cities were being encouraged to put up signs on their premises to the effect that they did not have jobs to offer.³⁷⁷ Some firm managers were advising the colonial authorities that there was need to attract more investments or industrial concerns to operate in the country so as to

³⁷³ NAZ S915: War time controls 1943-1944, press cuttings: Rhodesian Herald, 19 July 1944, '*Contravention of export control, case reviewed in High Court*'; The Rhodesian Herald, 5 July 1944, '*Illegal export of car alleged.*'

³⁷⁴ NAZ S910/11/215: Importation of foreign goods: Memo by the Examining Officer to the Collector of Customs and Excise (Port of Umtali) on alleged availability of Japanese goods, 3 June 1950. ⁵²⁰ NAZ S910/46/1-8: Customs Agreement Bechuanaland Protectorate- Southern Rhodesia

³⁷⁵ The Daily News, 10 June 1959, '*Unemployment in city: No signs of improvement, firms worried by increasing number of job seekers.*' (National Archives of Zimbabwe).

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

ease the unemployment burden.³⁷⁸ What further compounded the problem was that locals were competing for jobs with people from as far as Malawi.³⁷⁹ In some instances the colonial authorities discouraged unemployed people from migrating into Rhodesia.³⁸⁰ The scarcity of jobs led to an increase in human flow between South Africa and Zimbabwe as more and more people migrated to South Africa to look for work. However, little has been said to link marginalisation and the phenomenon of smuggling and informal trade. Racially motivated colonial policies such as reserving certain jobs for Europeans also fuelled unemployment amongst Africans.³⁸¹ This led to the development of clandestine survival activities in ways like how the post-colonial government is viewed as marginalising along ethnic lines in Zimbabwe, leading to the development of *omalayitsha* and more smuggling of goods from South Africa and Botswana.

5.4 Ethnicity and the informal cross border trade in Mangwe since the 1980s.

Can the emergence of the informal economy amongst the Kalanga of Mangwe since the 1980s be explained in ethnic terms? Or was it purely an expected and natural response to economic issues and challenges? Or was it part and parcel of the competition for narrowing economic spaces amongst the different groups which inadvertently assumed an ethnic turn as resources became scarcer? To answer these questions, it is imperative to try and understand the underlining circumstances that have pushed most of the people of Mangwe to engage in the informal economy in such large numbers and in the choices made such as migration and informal trade. Critically, it is important to draw a link between Kalanga

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ NAZ S264/145: Unemployment in the colony.

³⁸¹ The Daily News, 21 March 1959, 'Council may be asked to open certain European jobs for Africans.' (National Archives of Zimbabwe).

grievances and the proliferation of informal economic activities. As Tinashe Nyamunda correctly observes, it is not enough to offer a blanket approach to understanding informal economic activities such as *omalayitsha* without linking them to localised regional grievances, and by extension ethnic cleavages and issues of regional marginalisation which continue to surface in countries such as Zimbabwe.³⁸² In the case of Mangwe, the theories explaining the emergence of the informal economy can be used to a certain extent, but they have limitations.

The classical neo-Marxist theory overemphasises economic factors as an important variable to explain the phenomenon. In that direction, it is therefore lacking as it does not fully explain why the concept of *ukulayitsha* for example, originated amongst the rural Kalanga and not in the urban areas where different ethnicities met and where economic grievances, as archival records show were acute³⁸³. To have a more grounded understanding of the ethnicised development of the informal cross border economy in the southwestern part of the country, it is crucial to identify the main grievances that have been raised by the Kalanga in that part of the country and see if ethnicity has anything to do with them. Since the 1940s, the main grievance amongst the Kalanga and the people of Matabeleland has been lack of development. By lack of development in Mangwe, symptoms are cited as lack of adequate health and educational facilities, absence of tared roads, little industrial activity and the employment of other ethnic groups in jobs that locals could do.³⁸⁴ That grievance has inevitably taken an ethnic slant.³⁸⁵ Explaining faction fights that occurred in Bulawayo

³⁸² Nyamunda, *Cross border couriers as symbols of regional grievance*, pp1-2.

³⁸³ NAZ S264/145: Unemployment in the colony, 1934.

³⁸⁴ The Chronicle, '*Plumtree chief appeals to government to tar major roads*', 25 September 2018; see also Newsday, '*Oxfam rescues Mphoengs villagers*', 2 April 2018.

³⁸⁵ Nyamunda, *Cross border couriers as symbols of regional grievance*, p2: Sabelo Gatsheni-Ndlovu, *Do Zimbabweans exist/ trajectories of nationalism, national identity formation and crisis in a post-colonial state*, (Oxford: PIA Publishers:2009).

in 1929-30, Msindo makes an important observation that these showed an ethnic or tribal slant, and centred on grievances such as competition for jobs amongst Africans of differing ethnicities in the city, on ethnic lines.³⁸⁶ This shows that in Matabeleland, perceptions of marginalisation have a long history.

In the post-colonial period, Mabhena argues that lack of development in Matabeleland is a result of internal colonialism, where the Shona dominated government has an unequal relationship with the people of Matabeleland characterised by a centrally imposed developmental agenda.³⁸⁷ Mabhena further posits that for most of the 1980s, the relations between the state and the people of Matabeleland were shaped by military/political, and not developmental goals because of the Gukurahundi issue.³⁸⁸ Though Mabhena tends to overemphasise his position, it is generally accepted that Matabeleland suffers from acute underdevelopment.

Because of perceived or genuine marginalisation, the development of informal economic activities such as *ukulayitsha* constitute an important strategy to ‘deal’ with the state amongst the Kalanga. Nyamunda posits that it is precisely because of this the *omalayitsha* are viewed as an important outlet of anger and resistance to the state by the people, hence their ‘iconic’ and celebrated status.³⁸⁹ Though the practise of ‘*ukulayitsha*’ has become common not only along border areas but also towns, amongst the Kalanga it is widely venerated and typically ‘owned’ by this group. As Thebe has demonstrated, the importance of the *ukulayitsha* activities in Matabeleland has become more of a lifeline than a mere

³⁸⁶ Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, pp 145-152.

³⁸⁷ C. Mabhena (2010), *Visible Hectares, Vanishing Livelihoods: A case of the fast-track land reform and resettlement in Southwestern Matabeleland*, Unpublished PhD thesis (University of Fort Hare)

³⁸⁸ Mabhena, *Visible Hectares, Vanishing Livelihoods*, p78.

³⁸⁹ Nyamunda, *Cross border couriers as symbols of regional grievance*, p2.

economic undertaking.³⁹⁰ A *malayitsha* (cross border courier), specifically a Matabeleland one is seen as symbol of defying neglect as well as power in a state that is seen as predatory and 'Shona' dominated, and the activities of the omalayitsha are sometimes evasive of state regulations and control. In that respect, the legalist theory of the development of informal economies may be applied, to show that groups that feel restricted may develop alternatives of circumventing that restriction in the process falling into the informal sector. In some instances, locals feel that restrictions put into their movement are a violation of their rights especially since they have relatives across borders, in Botswana or South Africa.

In a country where bureaucracy posts are dominated by the Shona ethnic group because of its high population, the activities of the omalayitsha and smugglers are prone to be stereotyped in ethnic terms. At the Mphoengs border post, for example one malayitsha was overheard by the author complaining of '*ma swinanyana iwaya ya*' (these little Shona things), a sign that acute feelings of anger still abound, one being that the official was a Shona in a Kalanga area (thus depriving the '*beni bahango-owners of the land*,) doing a simple job that a local of average education could do without let or hindrance), and the other being the bureaucratic red tape laced with corruption at the borders which frustrates the omalayitsha.³⁹¹ In this schema, ethnicity is thus invoked in the informal business in the district. In fact, the operations of the omalayitsha are firmly entrenched in the psyche of the people of Matabeleland as an important economic activity that it is no wonder that it has

³⁹⁰ V Thebe, *From South Africa with Love: The malayitsha system and Ndebele households' quest for livelihood reconstruction in south-western Zimbabwe*, the Journal of Modern African Studies, vol 49, no 4(2011), p1.

³⁹¹ The term '*swina*' is associated with a palpable dislike of the 'Shona' as a person and as ethnicity in general. Otherwise, the common term that denotes a measure of tolerance is simply 'Shona.' T Nyamunda, *Cross border couriers as symbols of regional grievance*, p3. See also S. Bracking and Sachikonye. L (2010), '*Remittances, Informalisation and Dispossession in Urban Zimbabwe*.' In J. Crush and Tevera. D (eds), *Zimbabwe exodus, crisis, migration, survival* (Cape Town: Samp), pp324-345; S Mawowa and A. Matongo, '*Inside Zimbabwe's roadside currency trade: The 'World Bank' of Bulawayo*', Journal of Southern African Studies, 36(2), pp 319-337.

become a form of ethnic identity and can therefore be linked to the regional grievance debate.

However, because the bureaucracy is dominated by the ‘other’ Shona speaking ethnic group as already alluded to above, there is an inescapable need for the Kalanga informal economy participants to either corrupt or forge alliances with them. Whilst such businesses are viewed as operating ‘parallel’ to the economy, research has shown that civil servants manning the bureaucracy sometimes collude and facilitate the movement of goods across the borders in ways which are opaque. Studies by Bracking et al, as well Matongo et al seem to overly suggest that the informal economy is operating outside the control of the state.³⁹² However, over the years the *omalayitsha* and other informal cross border traders have established relationships with bureaucratic actors that seem to suggest that the system has been corrupted to a certain extent to facilitate these activities.³⁹³ The *omalayitsha* provide an intriguing interface of ethnicity, marginalisation, and survival strategy of marginalised ethnic groups, because primarily their activities were born out Kalanga grievances. The history of their activities is intertwined with the history of Matabeleland especially since the 1980’s where the roots of the activity are located. In the period of the Gukurahundi, which many pro-Matabeleland groups identify as the manifestation of precolonial ethnic tensions of the people of greater Matabeleland and the Shona, as well as the beginning of post-colonial marginalisation, the *omalayitsha* became a source of livelihood and sustenance in a volatile and dangerous period. Typically, therefore the *omalayitsha* and their activities were not only viewed in pure economic or survivalist terms,

³⁹² Bracking and Sachikonye, ‘*Remittances, Informalisation and Dispossession*’, p12.

³⁹³ Newsday, 13 July 2018, ‘*ED warns against corruption at Zim borders*’; ‘*Corruption rife at Beitbridge border*’ Newsday, 14 December 2010; ‘*Stop the rot at the border Posts*,’ Herald, 26 August 2016; ‘*Porous borders; How Zimbabwe loses millions to smuggling*’ The Standard, 17 June 2018; ‘*Delays, Corruption rife at Zim borders*’. Dailynews Live, 6 April 2016.

but in a way as a movement in an ‘unresponsive’ state, where perceptions and realities of underemployment are interwoven with the desire to ‘stand up on our own.’³⁹⁴

5.5 Post-2000 informal cross border trade and women entrepreneurship.

In the early 2000s, with the economic crisis setting in in Zimbabwe, family links in South Africa and Botswana established over decades became important in facilitating the revival of old trade networks and the formation of new ones. Items of trade ranged from the mopane worm, clothing and car spare parts which were usually smuggled across the border.³⁹⁵ Women have played an important role in the evolution of informal trade especially after independence. In the *Gukurahundi* period, women became the fulcrum of family support as most men fled to South Africa or Botswana and could not remit easily due to security issues. In such situation ways were devised to keep their families going in very difficult circumstances.

Whilst men engaged in the courier business (*omalayitsha*), women found a niche in small quantity or petty trade.³⁹⁶ They crossed the border to purchase groceries and other items for resale in Zimbabwe. In this way, they raised cash to pay fees as well other day to day goods such as food, for their families. Traditionally, most women indicated that that they had relied on remittances from husbands in South Africa and Botswana, or in urban areas such as Bulawayo. However due to several reasons, such as declining employment opportunities for immigrants in host countries, remittances declined or became inadequate to cater for the

³⁹⁴ Interview with Qaphelani Moyo, a former malayitsha, Tembisa, Johannesburg, 18 August 2017.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ Interview with Namathohono, a small-scale trader, Makhubu Village, 20 April 2017.

expanding family responsibilities. In some instances, the women were widowed or unmarried. The story of two women traders, below captures their experiences.

NaBle is a 43-year-old woman widowed a decade ago. When her husband died, the only source of income for her vanished as well. She was left with two minor children to fend for. With minimum education, having failed to go to secondary school because of a combination of factors such as lack of fees and the sheer distance of the nearest secondary school she crossed borders at an early age and found herself in South Africa. It was in South Africa where she met and married her late husband. However, for one reason or another she decided to come back home as is the norm amongst Mangwe ladies that meet local 'boys' in South Africa. When her husband died, she decided to try a hand in cross border trade. She specialises in petty products such as soft drinks and airtime vouchers that she gets from neighbouring Botswana. With the little profits from the trade, she was able to buy clothes for her kids and sent them through primary school. She says though the profits are not huge, the activity gives a certain measure of financial independence that allows her to rely less heavily on her inherited livestock. NaBle appeared confident in the manner she dealt with her customers despite her gender especially considering that her clientele were mostly illegal gold panners. This was observed by the author in one of her transactions. She could even sell on credit, and she indicated that debt defaulters were minimal. She indicated that the society appeared to be embracing women entrepreneurs. However, she still felt more needed to be done to promote women informal traders especially cross border access as her passport quickly ran out of pages.

*In another instance, Mitchel is 25-year-old lady and unmarried with one child. What makes her story interesting is that she has ventured into the male dominated field of selling fuel. Her story started at the height of Zimbabwe's crippling fuel shortages. She started her business by engaging middlemen at the local border post who she paid a certain commission to 'smuggle' fuel from the Botswana side in 25 litre containers. Upon receiving the commodity, she goes back to her rural homestead where she sells the product to local taxi drivers at a profit. However, she said she abandoned the 'business' because the costs became unsustainable and after the fuel situation in Zimbabwe stabilised. She claimed that the venture at its peak sustained her and her family quite well, though it was laborious.*³⁹⁷

Since 2000, the gender angle in informal cross border trade has pointed to more women than men participating.³⁹⁸ Some of the reasons for this trend are to do with the high levels of unemployment in the formal economy in the country. Gaidzanwa has highlighted how the participation of women in the informal sector has led to enhanced expertise amongst women traders.³⁹⁹ In that regard, women have become more and more experienced in the trade, leading to a measure of economic liberation or independence. Apart from economic independence for women participators, it also marks a significant gender shift in rural economics in developing countries such as Zimbabwe. Through this trade women have been able to remove considerably large numbers of households from poverty.⁴⁰⁰ The view is supported by studies by Mwaniki which revealed that there was evidence that through

³⁹⁷ Interview with Mitchel Mpofu, 6 July 2022(via phone)

³⁹⁸ R. Gaidzanwa (1997), *Cross border trade in Southern Africa: A gendered perspective*. (SAPES books: Harare).

³⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁰ V. Muzvidziwa (2005), *Women without borders: Informal Cross border trade amongst women in the Southern African Development Community Region (SADC)*, in Organisation for Social and Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREAA), p 31.

this trade families were moved out of poverty.⁴⁰¹ In the case of Mangwe there appears to be a close relationship between the *omalayitsha* and women cross border traders, where the *omalayitsha* provide currier services to the traders who in turn assist in the movement of their goods through payment of transport and ‘facilitation’ fees. The ‘facilitation’ fee is allegedly used to soften border officials and law enforcement agents along the way and may be used for corrupt activities.⁴⁰² An important result of this trade is that it not only provided a survival strategy, but socially it assisted in reviving family links and renewed calls for repatriation.

The development of entrepreneurship amongst the Kalanga women cannot escape the scrutiny of marginalisation. NaBle for example had minimal education partly because of poverty and that the nearest secondary school to her was 15 kilometres away, thus reinforcing my view that the area has few educational facilities. The case of Mitchel is different. Though she was able to go through secondary education, her grades were not good enough (partly because of the long distances travelled to school as well) and her chances of employment were very slim in a district with little industrial activity. For women it is safe to argue that the marginalisation of Mangwe has been a double-edged sword. Firstly, because traditionally rural women were marginalised by the patriarchal setup that denied them access to education, and secondly by successive political formations that neglected the promotion of sustainable development in Matabeleland in general and Mangwe in particular. However, the versatility in entrepreneurial skills shown by the two women in the case studies help underline the main argument that Kalanga people have not

⁴⁰¹ J. Mwaniki (1998), *The Impact of informal cross border trade on Regional Integration and Implication on wealth creation*, in IRED-ESA, p41.

⁴⁰² Interview with a Kalanga *malayitsha* (name withheld), 20 December 2017, Cowdray Park, Bulawayo.

withered away in the face of marginalisation but have devised remarkable survival strategies.

5.6 Conclusion

As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the link between the economic choices of the Kalanga and ethnic marginalisation is in the history of relations between the Kalanga and groups such as the Ndebele, the Shona and the British settlers who colonised Zimbabwe. I argue that this relationship was often disadvantageous to the Kalanga owing to its ‘minority’ status. However, as Msindo demonstrates in *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*, the Kalanga rallied against threats to their survival by forming associations and engaging in a plethora of survival mechanisms which effectively revived their ethnic identity. Scholars have however barely attempted to link the emergence of Kalanga survival activities with their attempts to resist threats to Kalanga ethnicity and the erosion of their economic spaces. This includes both formal and informal businesses. The chapter traced the emergence of Kalanga informal economic activities from the pre-colonial period and showed how these evolved in the colonial and postcolonial period. Fundamentally, Kalanga economic activities have over the years been linked to their relationship with the groups they interacted with and cannot be adequately analysed on rational economic terms only as ethnicity appears to have shaped and influenced those choices.

CHAPTER SIX

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the marginalisation debate in Mangwe since 1990.

*'A DILAPIDATED classroom with no windowpanes, collapsing rooftops, lessons conducted under trees or in grass-thatched huts is somewhat normal in a number of remote Matabeleland schools...villagers across the river in Botswana, some few kilometres from Ramokgwebane have had no problems with water, a clear sign their government cared.'*⁴⁰³

6.1 Introduction.

The activities of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Third World countries continues to stir debate amongst scholars.⁴⁰⁴ Whereas some see them as promoting localised development through equipping rural people with skills, technical knowhow, funding and other services such as workshopping, others argue that they create a dependency syndrome, retard local initiative and shield government failures through doing work that normally should be done by the government.⁴⁰⁵ In all that, there is little denying that the NGOs sector has become an important ally in the development process of the third

⁴⁰³ Newsday, 'Oxfam rescues Mphoengs villagers', 2 April 2018.

⁴⁰⁴ For more on the various views of NGOs and development see the following texts: J. Clarke, *Democratising Development: The Role of Voluntary Organisations* (West Hartford: Kumaran Press, 1991); R.J. Fatton, *Predatory*

Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa (Lynne Publishers: London, 1992); J. Hearn, *The 'Uses and Abuses' of Civil Society in Africa*, *Review of African Political Economy in Africa*, 28(67), pp 43-53. Also by the same author, *African NGOS: The New Compradors?*, *Development and Change*, 38(6), pp1095-1110; J. Petras, *NGOs: In the Service of Imperialism*, *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 29(4), pp 429-440; J. Vivian, *'NGOs and Sustainable Development in Zimbabwe: No magic bullet'*, *Development and Change*, 25(1994), pp 167-193; J. B. Nugent, *'Between the State, Markets and Households: A Neoinstitutional Analysis of Local Organisations and Institutions'*, *World Development*, 21(4), pp 623-632.

⁴⁰⁵ C. R. Matenga, *The Orientation of Practise of Northern NGOs: Implications for African Development* (Lusaka: University of Zambia, 2001).

world.⁴⁰⁶ Donor agencies see NGOs as an important tool for empowering people, and many developing countries have embraced the intervention of these organisations as alternatives for poverty reduction.⁴⁰⁷ Chakawarika sees the rise in prominence of NGOs because of ‘the inadequacy of the state and the market...creating diverse social needs.’⁴⁰⁸ The post-colonial neo liberal agenda in Africa was concerned with creating a free market and ideas as a tool to institute and facilitate the democratisation process in this part of the world. Part of the reason for their ‘triumphant’ entry in less developed countries was facilitated by the ‘marked dwindling of the delivery of social services’ (by the central governments). This was often blamed on state ‘failure’ which tended to justify the need for NGOs to intervene in certain spaces, supposedly to fill in the void created by the state’s inability to perform its constitutionally mandated responsibility to provide reasonable service to its people. Most literature on NGOs and civil society has focused, unjustifiably to a large extent on the good work of NGOs and civil society organisations. However, not much has been discussed about the relationship between ethnicity, marginalisation, and NGO/civil society activities, or how activities of NGOs and civil society may be interwoven with localised grievances to produce sites of struggles and contestations, which this chapter attempts to do. In Botswana for, example, Survival International started a campaign to highlight the plight of the almost extinct San ethnic group, offering valuable arguments on how groups existing on the margins of the state have been exploited by dominant groups.⁴⁰⁹ The same applies

⁴⁰⁶ Y. A Badu and Parker A., *The Role of Non-governmental Organisations in Rural Development; The case of Voluntary Work camp Association of Ghana*, p34.

⁴⁰⁷ S. Mago, et al (2015), *non-governmental organisations and Rural Poverty Reduction Strategies on Zimbabwe: A case of Binga District in Zimbabwe*, Journal of Governance and Regulation, Vol 4, Issue 4, 2015, p 59; Q. Mutale, ‘*Factors affecting the success of NGO interventions in social service provision for the rural poor communities: Case of Luunga ward 1 in Binga District*, Unpublished Master’s Thesis (Midlands State University: 2016), p24.

⁴⁰⁸ B. Chakawarika, *Challenges faced by NGOs in the political harsh climate of Zimbabwe: Analysing the effects and sustainability and promotion of human rights*, unpublished Master’s thesis (University of Gothenburg: 2011).

⁴⁰⁹ O. J. Winters, *The Botswana Bushmen’s Fight for Water and Land Rights in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve*, Consilience: A Journal of Sustainable Development, Vol 13, Issue 1(2014), pp 285-300.

to organisations fighting for aboriginal rights in New Zealand, Australia or even the United States of America. This positivist approach has ignored fundamental entrenched NGO/civil society interests in disadvantaged communities, and as the case of Mangwe demonstrates has emasculated community initiative and literally let government off the hook in as far as its responsibility to the community is concerned.

The central argument in this chapter is therefore that the nature of NGO and civil society activities in Mangwe reflect a pattern which tends to highlight the oft mentioned local grievances, for example poor road networks, lack of clean water, lack of access to education, hunger and disease.⁴¹⁰ In some instances, political and social issues such as the promotion of TjiKalanga have surfaced in the area.⁴¹¹ Most of these grievances have over the years been explained by the people through the lenses of ethnic marginalisation. In that way, as the newspaper quotation above shows, NGOs have over the years become entangled in the politics of marginalisation in the communities that they serve, as will be demonstrated in Mangwe. The wording of the above quoted newspaper article, '*Oxfam rescues villagers in Mangwe*,' offers an insight into how roles of non-governmental organisations are viewed by both outsiders as well as locals. The term 'rescue' attests to neglect or desperation and pointedly refers to the perceived neglect of the people by the central government. Being a private newspaper (generally, it is given that private newspapers in Zimbabwe are largely viewed by the ruling party as anti-government), the article may as well have been written with a slightly biased view in that regard, but it

⁴¹⁰ World Vision and Oxfam, amongst others are some of the non -governmental organisations pursuing various interests in Mangwe

⁴¹¹ Informal discussion with Mthulisi Ncube (a Kalanga linguist and interpreter) and a Mr Sithole. Sithole works for a burgeoning community radio station in Mangwe, separately in Bulawayo, May 2017 and August 2018 respectively.

nonetheless captures the sentiment attached to perceived non-committal attitude of the government towards the development of the region of Matabeleland at large, and Mangwe in particular.

Pursuant to that regard, the chapter will demonstrate that in Mangwe the activities of NGO can be explained from two angles. The first being the perceived failure of governmental intervention/incompetence's and secondly the marked increase in rural poverty due several factors such as drought and climate related changes in the district. As Moyo argues, in some instances in Zimbabwe, the NGOs have taken over the duties normally expected to be carried out by the central government.⁴¹²

This chapter addresses the following fundamental questions about NGOs in Mangwe; (a) what role do they play in the livelihoods of the people in the area? (c) how can one locate the activities of the NGOs and civil societies in the ethnic marginalisation/neglect debate, *vis a vis* the role of government in development in such areas? Lastly, but intertwined with the above, the chapter will try and understand the relationship between the state, traditional leaders and NGOs/civil society in Mangwe in the period from 1990 to 2015. Pursuant to answering those questions, the activities shall be placed in juxtaposition with the reality and perceptions of marginalisation amongst the people of Mangwe.

⁴¹² Moyo, *The State and the Subaltern Classes during a Crisis*, 29.

6.2 Conceptualising civil society organisations and NGOs.

Definitions of civil society organisations and NGOs have undergone considerable change in the last few decades.⁴¹³ Many scholars and policymakers are agreed that these two are basically more similar than there are divergent. Civil society, when loosely defined appears to have a long history whereas NGOs appear in literature around 1945. NGOs in Africa and the Third world began to appear in the 1990s as part and parcel of a neo liberal agenda to promote markets and ‘good governance’.⁴¹⁴ A cursory survey of definitions of these two bodies appear to emphasise that NGOs are an offshoot of civil society, if the broad definition of civil society is anything to go by. For example, Van Dyck writing in 2012 defined civil society as organised and organic social and cultural relations existing in the space between the state, business and family...⁴¹⁵ This definition shows that civil society is malleable and includes generally all groups that purport to or exist outside the ambit of state control and in their stated aims push sectarian and sectorial agendas. The World Economic Forum defined civil society as the ‘space outside the family, market and the state,’⁴¹⁶ where ostensibly social interaction takes place. Others see civil society as the voluntary of the interests and aspirations of the citizens organised and united by common interests, goals, values or traditions.⁴¹⁷ The term was popularised in the 1980s in Eastern Europe as a response to the excesses of authoritarian regimes in that part of the world.⁴¹⁸ According to O’ Driscoll, civil society in Africa was often based on ethnic connections, spiritual and

⁴¹³ K Helliker, *Dancing around the same spot? Land Reform and the NGOs in Zimbabwe: A case of SOS Children’s villages*, African Sociological Review, 13(2), 2009, p 103.

⁴¹⁴ R Mohanty, *Civil Society and NGOs*, *Indian Journal of Political Science*, volume 63, no: 2/3, 2002, p 213.

⁴¹⁵ C. K Van Dycke, *Conception and Definition of Civil Society Sustainability*, Washington D.C, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2018, p4.

⁴¹⁶ World Economic Forum Report, 2018, p1.

⁴¹⁷ R Cooper, *What is Civil Society, its Role and Value in 2018?* K4DHelpdesk Report, 2018, University of Birmingham, p2.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

traditional organisations.⁴¹⁹ This was also observed by Msindo in his study of Bulawayo organisations in the 1950s, where it is clear that the different types of grouping that he studied represented an emergent civil society in Bulawayo in particular and Zimbabwe in general.

What emerges from these definitions is that civil society represented a wide range of organisations that have presence in public life, express the interests and values of their members and others based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious, or philanthropic considerations.⁴²⁰ An important observation in these definitions is that it is inescapable to leave out what became known as NGOs under this broad definition of civil society. NGOs themselves have suffered from a definition crisis. Helliker, for example shows how difficult it is to conjure a universally accepted definition of an NGO.⁴²¹ Willets also conceded that there is no generally accepted definition of the term. He however saw NGOs as an ‘independent, voluntary association of people acting together on a continuous basis for some common purpose other than achieving government office, making money or illegal activities.’⁴²² Vakil contended that NGOs basically work towards alleviating the plight of the disadvantages and emphasised on the ‘not-for profit’ aspect in his definition.⁴²³ Perhaps another important aspect in the definitions of NGOs is that it must be registered, and that makes it distinct from ‘voluntary’ organisations that may operate without the need

⁴¹⁹ D O’Driscoll, *Civil Society in Authoritarian Regimes*, K4D Helpdesk Report, Brighton, U.K, Institute of Developmental Studies, 2018, p 3

⁴²⁰ Van Dycke, *Conception and Definition of Civil Society Sustainability*, Washington D.C, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2018, p4.

⁴²¹ Helliker, *Dancing around the same spot? Land Reform and NGOs in Zimbabwe: A case of SOS children’s villages*, p 5.

⁴²² P Willets, *What is a NON –Governmental organisation*, *IHRN Human Rights NGO Capacity Building Programme-Iraq (UNESCO Encyclopaedia of Life Support System*, Section 1, Institutional and Infrastructure Resources Article: 44, 3, 7(article not dated).

⁴²³ A Vakil, *Confronting the Classification Problem: Toward a Taxonomy of NGOs*, in *World Development*, vol 25, no 12, 1997, p 20-57.

to do so, which is a rather controversial assertion by Goel and Kumar if the definition is applied to Zimbabwe.⁴²⁴ Helliker was able to show that NGOs sprout out of two versions of civil society, the liberal version and the radical version (itself also divided into two). The liberal version opposed the particularistic interests of the state, while the radical civil society embodies those movements that seek to transform society with or without the bodings of the state (what Helliker calls counter-power or antipower).⁴²⁵ NGOs can also be defined based on their size and scope of activity, and one may attempt to make a distinction between small, community-based organisations (CBOs) or Peoples' Organisations (POs) such as sports associations in colonial Bulawayo and large international post-Independence NGO such as World Vison. Considering the above, my understanding of civil society and the concomitant development of NGOs is premised on their inseparability as the discussions below will show.

6.3 Background on civil society /NGO activity in Zimbabwe.

Because of the flexible and protean nature of their scope and activities, NGOs and civil society organisations have tended to overlap and have a fairly long history (in Zimbabwe.)⁴²⁶ In early colonial Zimbabwe, these included the Section for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA).⁴²⁷ Most of these welfare organisations were formed in the period from the 1910s onwards, and they catered for a diverse set of sectorial or narrowed

⁴²⁴ S L Goel and R Kumar, *Administration and Management of NGOs: Text and Case Studies*, (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications Pvt Limited, 2004), p 4.

⁴²⁵ Helliker, *Civil Society and State Centred Struggles*, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 30:1, 2012, p 36-37

⁴²⁶ NAZ MS 587/1-International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1963.

⁴²⁷ S.R. Dorman, *Inclusion and Exclusion: NGOs and Politics in Zimbabwe*, Unpublished PhD thesis (Oxford University: London, 2001), p127. See also by the same author, *NGOs and the Constitutional Debate in Zimbabwe: From Inclusion to Exclusion*, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 29(4), pp 845-863.

needs.⁴²⁸ Msindo, in article on development of ethnicity and nationalism in a colonial town in Zimbabwe chronicled the complimentary development of ethnic based societies (and different other groups such as burial societies and sports clubs and council boards), and nationalism in this period. He posited that most of these societies developed as part and parcel of nascent activism amongst the urban and rural populations thus feeding to the broader development of nationalism in this period.⁴²⁹ In his understanding these early organisations morphed from organisations representing sectorial interests like sports, ethnicity, workers issues or other societal challenges into the bedrock on which mass nationalist parties emerged. These organisations represented an embryonic civil society activism that undoubtedly formed the basis for future ‘non-governmental’ organisations. In the 1970s, church aligned organisations began to emerge and represented what I believe were early manifestations of NGOs in Zimbabwe. A brief survey in the following paragraphs will attempt to highlight some of the organisations that were formed in this period. Important is the nexus between civil society and NGO culture that develops in Zimbabwe in this period. In 1920, the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association and Rhodesian Native Association were formed, representing elite demands for political and social recognition.⁴³⁰ The Gwelo Native Welfare Association, later renamed the Southern Rhodesian Native Welfare Association (SRNWA) was formed in 1926 as a response to the recommendations of the Morris Carter Land Commission.⁴³¹ The 1930s saw the radicalisation of most of these organisations leading to the formation of explicitly political organisations such as the Southern Rhodesian Bantu Congress (later renamed the Southern

⁴²⁸ Dorman, *Inclusion and Exclusion: NGOs and Politics in Zimbabwe*, p 126.

⁴²⁹ E Msindo, *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe*, in the *Journal of African History*, 48, 2007, pp 267-90.

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

⁴³¹ Ibid.

Rhodesian National Congress-SRNC).⁴³² So in essence, the S.R.N.C can be regarded as the first mass nationalist political party in Zimbabwe. The formation of these societies and welfare organisations was a response to the emerging unique challenges associated with waged labour development which took people away from their homelands into the mines and farms. The economic and socio-political marginalisation of the blacks by the whites represented an affront to the aspirations of these people hence the formation of these welfare organisations.

In the 1950s and the 1970s, non-governmental organisations were mostly aligned to the church. During the colonial period much of what we would refer to as NGO work today was restricted to social welfare organisations and later church-based organisations.⁴³³ The most prominent ones were the Christian Council, Christian Care, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace as well as the Zimbabwe Council of Churches. Most of the church-based organisations, such as Christian Aid and its affiliates like Christian Care concerned themselves with welfare of the oppressed. These organisations assisted political prisoners with legal representation or access to education. Christian Aid was one of the oldest NGOs to operate in Zimbabwe and it brought to the fore offshoots such as the Zimbabwe Project, another NGO that dealt with the welfare of political displacements or refugees.⁴³⁴ Other partners to Christian Aid included Hlekweni Friends Rural Service Centre, which was set in 1967 to offer a variety of skills to the rural people in areas such as building, carpentry, metal work, agriculture and even pre-school teacher training.⁴³⁵

⁴³² Ibid.

⁴³³ NAZ MS 308/15/1-7 Amnesty International, Campaign for detainees 1967-1980. For example Silveria House in Harare is an 'old' NGO that is Catholic Church aligned and dealt with women issues.

⁴³⁴ Ibid

⁴³⁵ Ibid.

Some of the organisations were formed to fight unjust settler laws, such as the death penalty (Law and Order Maintenance Act), infamously known as the ‘hanging law’.⁴³⁶ The Richard Mapolisa case (apparently Mapolisa was charged with attempting to burn down the house of a white man in Salisbury, now Harare and was sentenced to hang) received unprecedented attention from the NGO world.⁴³⁷ Amongst many other issues these church related organisations spoke against colonial injustices apart from harsh laws, were land related issues as well as excesses committed by security forces during and after the liberation war. Because of the sensitive nature of their thrust, most of these organisations had difficulties working with the governments of the day. The governments of Rhodesia and later that of Zimbabwe thus have had a love-hate relationship with organisations that are/or function independently as NGOs, especially when they acted against the interests of the status quo.⁴³⁸

At independence the government of Zimbabwe seemingly embraced NGOs as complimentary partners with a view to facilitate their developmental projects. Chizenga-Dzenga, quoted in Moyo opines that ‘in the 1980s the state encouraged NGOs to work and provide rural development programmes leading to the growth of the NGO sector in the country’.⁴³⁹ This demonstrates that at this juncture most of the emergent NGOs were caught up in their triumphant and optimistic age of the early days of Independence where a rosy picture of progress and democracy. In that discourse, few NGOs pertained themselves with the issues of governance or human rights, or even the accountability of the central government. Most of these were actually more or less co-opted to the thinking of the

⁴³⁶ NAZ MS 587/1-International Defence and Aid Trust Fund for Southern Africa, 1963.

⁴³⁷ The Rhodesian Herald, ‘African pleads not in first trial under the ‘hanging’ law.’ 17th of September 1963.

⁴³⁸ Z. Moyo, *NGOs, The State and the Subaltern Classes during a Crisis: Relations and Experiences in Mangwe District*, Unpublished M.A thesis (University of Johannesburg). Moyo’s example of Mugabe’s affiliation with Silveria at the height of his political activities in 1970s shows an NGO involving itself in politics.

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

government of the day, such as CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources).

The amicable relationship between the state and the NGOs was to become strained after the introduction and subsequent failure of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) in the late 1990s.⁴⁴⁰ The failure of ESAP coincided, naturally, with the emergence of radicalised NGOs which began to openly confront and criticise some of the policies of the state thus setting the tone for a bruising battle between the state and some sections of the NGO community. In 1996, the government passed a law whose primary objective was to regulate (read restrict) the activities of NGOs deemed anti-government.⁴⁴¹ The law was aptly named the Private Voluntary Organisations Act (1996).⁴⁴² Under the jurisdiction of the law, the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare was given the power to register and de-register NGOs, in the 'interests' of the public. This vague wording of what constitutes 'public interest' naturally put the operations of NGOs challenging the interests of the state at an unfair position.

The role of NGOs in Mangwe is intertwined with the concept of sustainable livelihoods and the marginalisation of the district. Sustainable livelihoods are defined as the means of gaining a living by using methods that do not undermine the natural resource base and are able to cope and recover from stresses and shocks, while maintaining or enhancing their capabilities. The concept dates to the works of Robert Chambers in the 1980s.⁴⁴³ How have NGOs in Mangwe adopted the concept of sustainable livelihoods to reduce the vulnerability

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid

⁴⁴² Moyo, *The State and the Subaltern Classes during a crisis*, p53

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

of these communities? The following section will identify and assess the different activities of NGOs in Mangwe since the attainment of independence by Zimbabwe in 1980. An attempt shall be made to critique the intervention mechanisms adopted by the NGOs in Mangwe, whether they have succeeded in reducing vulnerability or vice. The section thus traces, in a thematic way, the roles of NGOs in Mangwe from the early years of independence to 2015. I will summarise the works of two NGOs in Mangwe to emphasise the relationship between NGO intervention and the ‘enhancement’ of sustainable livelihoods vis a vis marginalisation.

6.4 World Vision

One of the most prominent NGOs to operate in Mangwe in the post-independence period is World Vision International. This organisation, which started operations in Zimbabwe in 1973 has a legendary status amongst the people, if sentiments expressed by locals are anything to go by. During the Zimbabwean liberation war, the organisation aided wartime refugees in camps outside the country.⁴⁴⁴ After independence, the organisation was transformed to focus on ‘community development.’ In its website, World Vision prides itself with offering participatory planning for its programmes. It emphasises on localised issues that seek to address pertinent developmental challenges in a specific area. This will be interrogated in the subsequent paragraphs of the chapter. In Mangwe, World Vision started operating in 1999 at Sanzukwi with a caption of Area Development Plan (ADP). World Vision in Mangwe is known mostly for providing food relief, but it counts agricultural education, training, HIV/Aids, water and sanitation, good governance, national peace and reconciliation, rebuilding the economy as well as promoting good international relations. Most importantly, the organisation claims to be a ‘facilitator’ not prescriber of

⁴⁴⁴ Moyo, *The State and the Subaltern Classes during a Crisis*, p60.

development. For purposes of this study, I will address two areas that the NGO has been actively involved in Mangwe: food security and agricultural development. Suffice to say that a background on the politics of food in Mangwe is importance the background I give below.

Food security (or insecurity) in Mangwe, as in most regions of Zimbabwe remains an area of serious concern. As one of the most important indicators of poverty and deprivation, it is cannon fodder for NGOs seeking funding and relevance. As a result, most of the NGOs in the district focus on poverty alleviation and food supply or donation. That on its own indicates that the district has a high poverty prevalence rate.⁴⁴⁵ According to the Zimbabwe Election Support Network report, Mangwe as a district suffers from chronic food shortages because of its climatic condition as well as its locations on the geographical margins of the state.⁴⁴⁶ Food also became an unfortunate tool of subjugation during the Gukurahundi period. Villagers talked of utter deprivation during this period.⁴⁴⁷ Those with livestock relied on meat with no '*hadza*' (thick maize meal porridge) which was itself unsustainable.⁴⁴⁸ This 'unplanned' use of livestock further decimated the already perilous numbers of stock amongst the Kalanga to an extent that one may argue that the practice further entrenched poverty amongst the communities of Mangwe. Some families reportedly wiped out their entire livestock and never fully recovered thus setting an unending vicious cycle of poverty hence a perpetual reliance on donor aid and/or continued manipulation

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁶ ZESN Report (2010), p1.

⁴⁴⁷ Interview with Sithandazile Tshuma, former Aid worker, Cowdray Park, 21 June 2019.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid.

through food by the different political forces in the district. There was no meal mealie because the shops were forcibly closed by the government.

The perennial shortage of food in Mangwe has created a condition of dependence on the part of the communities on food aid and food handouts. The net effect of that has been a ‘politicisation’ and ‘weaponisation’ of food aid in the district, whether donor or government funded. In the 1990s, World Vision was involved in schools feeding, where children were fed during the day at their respective schools.⁴⁴⁹ It was during this period that the organisation firmly established itself as a ‘saviour’ of the people in the district. Perhaps it is important at this stage to interrogate how that affected the thinking of the people of Mangwe. To start with, the district was still emerging from the challenges that have been brought by the Gukurahundi disturbances where the image of the state was badly tattered. Locals viewed their hunger and limited state assistance as part and parcel of their continued neglect. Where the state had tried to intervene, as it did during the droughts of the 1990s, the quality of the food aid left a lot to be desired. Most people interviewed talked negatively about the maize meal that was provided by the government: a yellow variety normally associated with stock feeding.⁴⁵⁰ The levels of desperation were so severe in the 1992 drought that such maize meal became a lifesaver. However, the villagers complained that it led to health problems such as diarrhoea and felt the state should have done better.⁴⁵¹ What was salient in the discussions with the villagers was that the aid from the government was somehow being compared with that which NGOs were giving. The government was thus seen as uncaring and detached as evidenced by the quality of aid it gave. This kind of

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁰ Interview with Baka Mavuka, villager, Ndabambi village, 23 August 2018.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

attitude described is in the neo-liberal slant with which NGOs were initially seen in a developmental discourse, where they were advocated for as welcome substitutes to the lethargy of the state. Villagers appeared to be confirming that thinking though, with numerous seemingly believing at the ‘generosity’ of World Vision as their saviour against an ‘uncaring’ state.⁴⁵² Such an attitude becomes even perverse in societies where ethnicity is salient, where central government is seen as belonging to ‘others.’ In that regard it is plausible to argue that the NGO may perpetuate the plight of the marginalised and poor especially in a ‘retributive’ state where loyalty is usually ‘bought’. Some villagers in Mangwe even felt that NGOs such as World Vision were rounding up their operations there because the state felt threatened by their voting patterns in elections and not that their term of operation had ended. Matter of fact, NGOs in Zimbabwe have not always had a smooth sailing relationship with the state, something I discuss in the paragraphs below.

Another important observation which emerged in the study was NGO aid in the form of food handouts became an arena of contestations amongst the villagers. World Vision relied on local ‘leadership’ as contact persons to mobilise people for food aid. Numerous villagers complained that they were denied food aid over frivolous reasons. The most said reason was that ‘*unamwana kuGoli.*’ (You have a child working in South Africa). Some were left out because they had children working as civil servants in Zimbabwe.⁴⁵³ But deeper than that, food aid galvanised localised frictions which followed many fault lines embedded in the community. It was not uncommon to hear of those selected to comply lists for food aid being accused of favouritism and bias in the drafting of names. This naturally asks us to pause and ask if NGOs really manage to assist the poorest of the poor in a society where

⁴⁵² Moyo, *The State and the Subaltern Classes during a Crisis*, p67.

⁴⁵³ Interview with Interview with Baka Mavuka, villager, Ndabambi, 23 August 2018.

localised power relations are mobilised in times of need. The food aid distribution point became a hotbed of local politics, and the NGO with its structured organogram and little understanding of local politics was therefore incapable of escaping these. In one food distribution event, which has become folkloric in the tales of villagers of one Titus Ndebele who became a notorious enforcer of food for work programmes, allegedly using his position to not only harangue villagers he disliked but also to get back at a local headman he disliked. This showed that at village level, some were using their newly found statuses as tools to delegitimise local leadership structures, settle scores or stake new claims of ‘village power.’ The boundaries of food aid were also hotly contested. One villager claimed that the so-called wards were expressly catering for ‘locals.’ Such sentiments bring to the fore that people are likely to use identity as a rallying call to access aid, even if it is for free. As a result, those who settled either as ‘economic refugees’ or illegal miners in informal settlements are barred from the food aid register regardless of their vulnerability status. As Moyo observed, NGOs sometimes helped accentuate local differences and widen the gap between those who could access aid and those who could not.⁴⁵⁴

The traditional and local leaders themselves became a source of discomfort within the local populace. As contact persons they enjoyed undue privileges such as access to NGO organised workshops as well as attending the so-called planning meetings. Even though most NGOs claim to encourage participatory approaches to development most of the village heads and local contact persons are of little literacy. Because of that it was the NGO operatives who set the agenda and chair those meetings, thus retarding local initiative in as far as contextualising their aid to local needs is concerned. Aligned to the World Vision approach in Mangwe therefore ended up creating elites in an endeavour that was meant to

⁴⁵⁴ Moyo, *The State and the Subaltern Classes during a Crisis*, p68.

promote voluntarists and charity. As mentioned, the local elites were not only confined to the local headmen like Patrick Nyathi and ‘enforcers’ like Titus Ndebele, but the staff themselves became overly respected to the point of veneration, which in my view complicated the whole process of charity.

Another notable contribution that World Vision introduced in Mangwe is what I will judge as a noble but ill-fated heifer project. World Vision set up cattle restocking project in this district with limited success. Livestock restocking remains one of the critical challenges faced by the people of Mangwe (and it is not far far-fetched to the ever-increasing incidences of droughts as a cause of the situation). Credit for such projects is inadvertently shared with the government of the day showing how blurred lines of operation are between the state and NGOs. The main reason why the project was introduced was upon the realisation that most families had traditionally been partly surviving on livestock rearing but had over the years been deprived of that of that livelihood because of a combination of factors such as poverty-induced over-selling and drought. That provided enough fodder for the NGO to initiate the heifer project. Primarily villagers noted that the restocking project was faulty from the start. One of the reasons given was the way the cattle exchange took place. The first beneficiary was given a heifer and it was believed that when it calved, he or she would pass the original heifer and remain with the calf.⁴⁵⁵ The major problems arose from non-cooperative beneficiaries.⁴⁵⁶ Some reported the cattle missing.⁴⁵⁷ With intermittent droughts some of the cattle were genuinely lost. However noble the heifer project was, the organisation was unable to make a proper follow up. The actual impact of

⁴⁵⁵ Interview with Justice Sibanda, teacher, Cowdray Park, 23 June 2020(his community was a beneficiary of the project and has first-hand experience of its workings.)

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid

the project in as far as restocking was concerned was minimal. Critically though, what emerges from the less than successful heifer is that the NGO pursued a diagnostic approach to the livestock crisis in Mangwe without properly assessing the suitability of the recipients to manage a project that on its own appeared complex. In such a scenario, the assistance was more prescriptive than based on a sound assessment of the variables at play, such as the suitability of the beneficiaries. As for the heifer project, local relations played a big part in its low success rate. Some beneficiaries pointed out that some partners were ‘difficult’ to share with because of salient mistrust between villagers. Important to the thesis, however, the activities of World Vision in Mangwe have been viewed more in positive light, thus in the process glossing over some of the intricacies and complications arising from developmental aid, especially in communities reeling from the effects of marginalisation which are associated with ethnicity.

6.5 Organisations for Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP).

Unlike World Vision International, ORAP prides itself as a home-grown NGO. It was founded in 1980 when its progenitor, the Rural Development Coordination Council (RDCC) morphed into ORAP. One of its founding members is ZANU-PF MP, Sithembiso Nyoni whose educational inclination was on social work with emphasis on rural development.⁴⁵⁸ In fact, it was founded by an elite professional class comprising teachers as well as some church people. In that regard its founding principles were thus elite driven in as much as it sought to ‘develop’ the rural people who were generally illiterate in the 1980s which in my view is a weakness on its own. One of its stated aims as was to improve

⁴⁵⁸ Moyo, *The State and the Subaltern Classes during a Crisis*, p62.

the life of the rural people based on ‘priorities and culture.’⁴⁵⁹ ORAP wanted to ‘fight all forms of poverty’ using culture in development.⁴⁶⁰ Its motto encouraged ‘self-pride and self-service, where the individual was expected to develop skills to self-employ using available indigenous knowledge. In its existence the organisation has grown tremendously and has been nominated for and won international awards for rural development. Some of the awards included the Right Livelihood Award in 1993 as well as the We-the 50 Community award both related to community development.⁴⁶¹

ORAP being a community organisation operates in the three main areas: namely food security, micro entrepreneurship, and vocational training skills. In Mangwe ORAP partnered another NGO, Christian Relief Services in a programme dubbed Promoting Recovery in Zimbabwe (PRIZE).⁴⁶² In its scope, PRIZE focused on the following: increased household food production, promoting entrepreneurship, improving access to markets, and improving community resilience.⁴⁶³ Some of the methods that have been adopted by ORAP have been tried by other organisations before. One of them is the food for assets programme whereby villagers were tasked with developing a community asset such as dip tank or borehole in return for food aid. ORAP has also assisted in skills development for the youth as well as restocking, areas that other NGOs such as World Vision have attempted with limited success. In the restocking sector, however ORAP mostly assists with the establishment of sake pens for small livestock, rehabilitation of dip

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁶¹ T Dube, *ORAP and the Spirit of Zenzele*, in Chigudu, H(ed), *Composing a new song: Stories of Empowerment from Africa*, The Commonwealth Foundation, London: 2004), p23.

⁴⁶² Moyo, *The State and the Subaltern Classes during a Crisis*, p64

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

tanks and pasture management amongst others.⁴⁶⁴ Apart from livestock related activities the NGO is also involved in the promotion of sustainable crop cultivation through establishment and rehabilitation of irrigation schemes, as well as establishment of nutritional gardens.

6.6 An evaluation of NGO role in a marginalised community; 1980-2015.

As mentioned in the discussion on the NGOs above, the assistance that the people of Mangwe have received from these organisations has not been without controversy. A cursory survey of the major projects undertaken in the last two or so decades flatters to deceive. Recent examination of developmental aid has been scathing on several areas. One of the main weaknesses is that most of these organisations is their prescriptive aid. Though organisations such as World Vision are quick to point out in their preambles that they offer participatory development aid, nothing could be farther from the truth. As Moyo rightly argues, the activities of NGOs in Mangwe have produced a measure of donor dependence, which unfortunately has shielded the central government on what it is constitutionally mandated to do-provide reasonable service to the people. As a result, the people are ‘demobilised’ to challenge the state and their grievances are only marginally attended to.⁴⁶⁵ Because the NGOs themselves are usually hamstrung politically, that is they are not allowed to appear overtly political in their operations, they steer away from politically charged sentiment amongst the beneficiaries and try to project an apolitical stance in Mangwe. In Mangwe however, there seems to be a thin line between addressing what are essentially historically rooted problems of unemployment and marginalisation and staying

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid, p 65.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

apolitical.⁴⁶⁶ In some cases, for instance, the politicisation of aid became so perverse that election agents and traditional leaders got caught in the web, thus severely limiting the rights of people to choose leaders of their own desire.⁴⁶⁷ In some instances (the politicisation of aid) was so brazen that some of it was publicly used to spruce up images of candidates in elections.⁴⁶⁸ It was common in Mangwe to hear people complaining that politics were common at food distribution points for example where certain politicians (or their local agents) would appropriate aid and distribute it on partisan lines, or threatening hunger and lack of support to ‘politically incorrect’ villagers especially in the ‘*manuqonde*’ phase mentioned elsewhere in the thesis.

Another critique of NGO aid is its top-down approach in implementing projects. In Mangwe for example, so called experts such as AGRITEX officers are ‘hired’ to mobilise communities in teaching them agriculture related activities. This not only conspires palpable disinterest from the rural populations but also severely limits their own localised initiative hence leading to limited success. This loophole is also exploited by government which happily ‘seconds’ its experts to facilitate NGO work and in the process harvesting undue credit should the projects succeed. Moyo rightly argues that such a scenario literally ‘silences’ the masses against demanding more from the government, thus legitimating state failure and leading to more problems.⁴⁶⁹

In Mangwe, I would argue that the activities of NGOs have had an impact in as far as placating feelings of marginalisation are concerned. In any case, most of their activities

⁴⁶⁶ The Daily News, 10 June 1959, ‘*Unemployment in city: No signs of improvement, firms worried by increasing number of job seekers*,’ (National Archives of Zimbabwe).

⁴⁶⁷ ZCC Annual Report, 1994-1995, pp 60-64.

⁴⁶⁸ Moyo, *The State and the Subaltern Classes during a Crisis*, 74

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid, p75.

address short term needs such as hunger. Very little has been done towards creating lasting solutions to local problems, such as addressing shortages of schools for example. More forward-looking projects such as the heifer project have suffered from poor follow up and have ended without clear results, and no long-lasting solution to the region's restocking needs. In other words, despite their developmental slant in Mangwe, structurally the region remains peripheral and poor. In that regard, in the marginalisation debate, and as a contributory factor to shaping the socioeconomic and political history of Mangwe, NGOs have at best placated the failures of state interventions in Mangwe and at worst delayed the rise of radical activist politics demanding a visible and sustainable developmental agenda for Mangwe.

6.7 Conclusion.

This chapter tried to highlight the nature of relations that exist between the community, the state, and the NGO sector in Mangwe since the attainment of independence in Zimbabwe. An attempt was made to locate these ever-changing relations in the marginalisation debate in Mangwe. As Moyo puts it, the relations between the state, NGOs and the community were largely fuelled by the changing socio-economic and political landscape of the time.⁴⁷⁰ The role of traditional authority in the broader relations that have ensued in Mangwe over the years between the community, fronted by traditional leaders, the NGOs and the state is also made mention of. The general scarcity of literature in this direction shows that it is an area that needs further research. In summary, the three competing and complimentary forces of community (under traditional leaders), the state and the NGO sector are examined under the rubric of ethnicity and marginalisation. In the final analysis of NGO activity in Mangwe, their activities here do not assist in reversing marginalisation to a large extent,

⁴⁷⁰ Moyo, *The State and the Subaltern Classes during a Crisis*, pii.

because as I said most of them are concerned with maintaining political correctness at the expense of cultivating village politics. In a nutshell, in as far the role of the NGOs, ethnicity and survival strategies is concerned, the NGOs in Mangwe help obscure the marginalisation of the region with long term negative effects on its development.

CHAPTER 7

Gold panning and resource politics in Mangwe 1940 to 2015.

7.1 Introduction.

Like in most parts of the country where this activity takes place, gold panning (also known as artisanal small scale gold mining) in Mangwe has been fraught with several challenges. The most highlighted is the thuggery and violence that takes place in those informal and semiformal mines, most of which operate parallel to the laws of the land.⁴⁷¹ However, little has been said on how communities where these activities take place perceive both the mining and the attendant problems such as the violence and the damage to the environment. Chief Nyangazonke of Kezi, a neighbouring district with a similar problem once remarked:

*'We are living in such extreme poverty, yet we are literally walking on fortunes. We have lost our pastures, we have lost our fields, and they come here and dig wherever they wish. The children have lost their playground. It is no longer safe.'*⁴⁷²

Informal or small scale mining, despite its controversial nature persists even to this day and governments in Southern Africa have enacted laws to try and 'regularise' or destigmatise this activity.⁴⁷³ The Kalanga of Mangwe (together with other groups domiciled in Mangwe such as the Ndebele), I will argue feel entitled to the land and all that lies beneath it hence I also explore the concept of indigeneity as espoused by scholars such as Al Mazrui and Mamdani, where I try to understand how that has a bearing on Zimbabwe's indigenous laws

⁴⁷¹ The Chronicle, 'Gold panner's head left hanging in brutal attack,' 05 June 2019; The Chronicle, 'Mangwe Rural District Council bans mining activities,' 10 October 2013; The Chronicle, 'Chiefs demand police presence in mining areas,' 21 August 2015; The Standard, 'Mat South gold wars turn bloody gangs rampage,' 12 May 2019.

⁴⁷² The Chronicle, 'Communities endure poverty amidst gold glitter: The case of gold smuggling and porous borders in Zimbabwe', 15 October 2019.

⁴⁷³ D. Miller, et al (2000), *Indigenous gold mining in Southern Africa: A review*, in *Southern African Archaeological Society*, African Naissance: The Limpopo Valley 1000 years Ago, vol 8, p 91, p97.

vis a vis resources and ethnic ‘boundaries.’ However, these laws also need further interrogation because in some instances they have not clearly defined the boundaries of who owns what and where within the country, thus throwing the concept of indigeneity to the broader debate. As the laws stand it is difficult to chase away the illegal or legal miners because they are by law Zimbabwean. Considering the above the main thrust of this chapter is thus to unpack the subtle yet resilient attempts by the Kalanga of Mangwe to reassert their control of resources found in the area against a background of perceived marginalisation and intrusion.

The first section of the chapter gives a brief history of mining in general in Zimbabwe, where an attempt is made to trace the roots of gold mining in the country *vis a vis* its importance in the economic structures of nascent precolonial Zimbabwean societies. The second part examines the development of mining after colonial conquest in Zimbabwe, with a particular emphasis on how colonial mining policies led to the development of artisanal or informal mining in Zimbabwe. The third part examines the social changes brought about by artisanal mining in Mangwe, where I will seek to prove that apart from tearing up hitherto established social patterns of life in Mangwe, these mining activities have also contributed immensely to raising the standard of life of some people in the constituency. The last section, which covers the post-colonial period answers to the broader arguments in the whole thesis analyses the politics of gold mining in the district in as far as they relate to the debates on resource politics and ethnicity in local communities.

7.2 A brief history of gold mining in Zimbabwe in the precolonial period.

Mining, in general is well documented in the history of Zimbabwe. Kritzinger has identified numerous sites and locations of mines in Zimbabwe using early Portuguese documents.⁴⁷⁴ Phimister, in a view generally shared by other researchers, observed that ‘for over nine hundred years, inhabitants of South-Central Africa engaged in mining and trade in minerals.’⁴⁷⁵ From the Portuguese documents one can deduce that early mining in Zimbabwe was scattered across the country and it was crude artisanal mining using the basic of tools. The sketch map below, by Phimister shows the gold belt in early Zimbabwe and by its own nature shows that gold workings were quite extensive during this period. The sketch clearly shows that the gold belt into the southern parts of the country nearer to the case study of Mangwe.

⁴⁷⁴ A. Kritzinger, ‘Zimbabwe’s Precolonial mines identified from a Portuguese document-with particular reference to Manyika in the Eastern Highlands’, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315519438>, Accessed 28 March 2019.

⁴⁷⁵ I Phimister, *Ancient Mining near Great Zimbabwe*, Journal of Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, vol 74, issue 6, 1974, pp 233-237. See also in the same journal, T N Huffman, *Ancient Mining in Zimbabwe*, pp 238-241; D Miller, Desai N and Lee-Thorpe L, ‘Indigenous Gold Mining in Southern Africa: A review’, in South Africa Archaeological Society, Godwin series, 8, 2000, pp 91-99.




Fig 8: Map showing the areas of precolonial gold reef mining. (I Phimister, *Ancient Mining near Great Zimbabwe*, Journal of Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, vol 74, issue 6, 1974.) The south westernmost stretch of the mining belt shows that the area under study had goldmining sites.

The history of gold mining (or any other mineral for that matter) and gold trade in southern Africa goes back nearly a thousand years.⁴⁷⁶ The scale and importance of this trade can be deciphered from both oral and archaeological evidence, two sources which point to extensive mining in the Zimbabwean plateau. There are also extensive Portuguese documents from the late 15th century onwards of indigenous gold mining in Southern Africa as shown by scholars such as Axelson and Pikirayi.⁴⁷⁷ Summers opined that most of the old mines were identified by the colonial regime and became the focal point of the modern ones.⁴⁷⁸ An example is the modern Enterprise Gold Belt just outside Harare which has a

⁴⁷⁶ D. Miller, et al (2000), *Indigenous gold mining in Southern Africa: A review*, in Southern African Archaeological Society, *African Naissance: The Limpopo Valley 1000 years ago*, vol 8, p 91.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid, p 92.

⁴⁷⁸ R. Summers, *Ancient mining in Rhodesia*, Museum memoirs no. 3(Salisbury), p80.

long history as evidenced by the ancient washings which were discovered there.⁴⁷⁹ Karl Mauch also talked about gold reefs and abandoned mine workings when he studied Great Zimbabwe.⁴⁸⁰ Huffman's archaeological findings also attest to early, rudimentary gold mining in Zimbabwe. He concludes that gold mining and Zimbabwe were 'intimately linked.'⁴⁸¹ Such evidence as presented by archaeologists such as Summers, Huffman, MacIver, Theal and Catton-Thompson attests to a long history of artisanal or small-scale mining in Zimbabwe that predates white intrusion.⁴⁸² Huffman suggests that the gold mining experienced periods of decline with the arrival of the Portuguese and of course the disruptions brought about by the Nguni incursions.⁴⁸³

Unlike nowadays, most of the artisanal mining in the precolonial or early colonial period was done in September and October.⁴⁸⁴ An explanation to this change in the pattern of artisanal mining is that agriculture then was a mainstay to the economy and gold acted only as a support system to an agro-based economy. Hundreds of men and women partook in this activity.⁴⁸⁵ Another equally important observation of the early mining is that more women than men partook in this activity. Kerr weighs in and adds that the Africans were so adept in their trade.⁴⁸⁶ The African artisanal miners described in the numerous documents are shown having not only partaking in a thriving gold trading industry, but also demonstrated expertise in measurement of the weightage of the gold that amazed

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁰ Karl Mauch, an early German traveller in Zimbabwe is also associated with the debates and the controversies associated with the Great Zimbabwe culture origins. He apparently favoured a foreign origin of the site.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid.

⁴⁸² R. Summers (1969), *Ancient mining in Rhodesia*; D.R MacIver (1906), *Medieval Rhodesia* (Macmillan Press: London); G Caton-Thompson (1931), *The Zimbabwe Culture*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford); Huffman, *Ancient Mining in Zimbabwe*; Theal, G.M, *Records of South-Eastern Africa*, vol 7. Huffman, 'Ancient Mining and Zimbabwe,' p241.

⁴⁸³ T N Huffman (1974), 'Ancient Mining and Zimbabwe,' p4.

⁴⁸⁴ NAZ H MSS.ED 6/1/1 'Reminiscences of 'Wirri' Edwards.

⁴⁸⁵ NAZ M3 /8/1/1 NC Gutu to CNC Salisbury, 10 Nov 1908.

⁴⁸⁶ Kerr, *The Interior*, 1, 184, 11, p8.

Europeans. Most recently, Mlambo and Masiya discussed the history of small-scale mining in Zimbabwe from the precolonial up to the postcolonial period, arguing that the sector has never escaped the challenges that have followed it since time immemorial, problems such poor working conditions and lack of technical knowhow.⁴⁸⁷ All these works attest to the presence of a well-established mining industry on the Zimbabwean plateau. Relevant to Mangwe, the map below shows a rich gold belt that stretched to the lower reaches of the district, where it will suffice to say that gold deposits of a sizeable proportion existed in Mangwe in the precolonial period. Mapela, itself archaeologically proved to have been a gold mining site is located relatively closer to the area under study.

⁴⁸⁷ T. Masiya and Mlambo L. (2012), *Small scale mining in Zimbabwe: Historical Perspective*, paper submitted at the Global Conference on Business and Finance, vol 7(2), pp286-295.




Fig 9. Map showing the approximate distribution of gold ore and other resources in Zimbabwe (Source: S Chirikure, *New Perspectives on the Political of Great Zimbabwe*, in *Journal of Archaeological Research*, 2019, p13.)

7.3 Mining in Mangwe in the colonial period: A brief survey 1942-1980.

In Mangwe, as is on greater Matabeleland, oral interviews and archival records point to a long history of extensive prospecting and informal mining, especially of gold.⁴⁸⁸ Some of the mines were established way before the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.⁴⁸⁹ The area around Makubu in the broader Mphoeng area, for example is littered with old disused open cast mining pits which were abandoned by colonial small-scale miners and prospectors. These numerous pits are of varying sizes and depth clearly showing that there

⁴⁸⁸ NAZ S2252/13, Mines visited by the Native Commissioners in Matabeleland, 1915. See also NAZ S2252/32 Mining Commissioner's Tour: Inyati and Mbembesi, September 1919; NAZ S2252/18-Notes on the Tour of Gwanda district by mining Commissioner, Bulawayo, 7 August 1919.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid.

was a lot of prospecting in the area.⁴⁹⁰ These old diggings have over the years been occasionally visited by prospectors hoping to hit a rich reef. Artisanal mining and prospecting in Mangwe during this period were mostly a white undertaking because of the colonial laws that prohibited Africans from dealing in precious minerals. The African provided the labour (pottery or digging) and the marketing of the metal remained exclusively limited to the white mine owners. This encouraged in a way the growth of a semi-legal and parallel trade in the gold and its smuggling from the mines.



Fig 10. *the mine waste dumps are what remain of what was popularly known as the Smith Mine near Mphoengs border post (KoSmith- The Smith mine is presumably named after the late Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Douglas Smith and for that reason it is safe to conclude that the mine thrived in the years of his administration).*

⁴⁹⁰ Interview with Gift Nyathi, Mangwe resident, Bulawayo, 27 May 2020.

Despite the existence of early mining and mining related activities in Mangwe, the activity was however not very popular amongst the communities during the colonial period.⁴⁹¹ There appear to have been no well-established mineral workings in the area despite the archaeologically proven presence of various minerals in the area. Most of the mining activity was still centred on the level of isolated diggings, whereas Madimu posits in his thesis, miners were given unlimited latitude to prospect in the width and breath of the country.⁴⁹² In Mangwe, as was elsewhere in Zimbabwe, one of the most important limiting factors was that the colonial gold trading policies recently enacted effectively shut out the Africans from the gold trade. These included such legislation such as the A Gold Trade Ordinance Act, published in 1913 prohibited Africans from dealing in gold.⁴⁹³ What the policies and practises of the company, and settler law in general showed that there was little desire to see the development of a parallel African mining industry which would jeopardise the mining interests of the BSA company. Curiously, some Europeans connived with African gold washers to illegally get African acquired gold though the African was placed at a great disadvantage in as far as getting a fair deal was concerned.

As a result, gold claims were pegged throughout the country with individual holders and companies staking claims, encroaching and taking over African ‘ancient’ mines and land in the process. In Mangwe numerous abandoned gold diggings abound the mountain ridge that stretches from Thogotsoeu to the east up to Maboledi to the Southwest. Dispossessed Africans were then forced to work in the ‘new’ European owned mines. Earlier on, in 1903 the government allowed small scale miners to peg and dig throughout the country without

⁴⁹¹ Interview with SaKudzi, local resident, Makhubu Village, 27 May 2020.

⁴⁹² Madimu, *Miners and farmers*, chapter 2.

⁴⁹³ F Muchemwa, *Struggle for Land in Zimbabwe*, p34.

having to form big companies.⁴⁹⁴ These were part and parcel of the nascent settler community which was still trying to find its footing in a new territory. As such, small scale mining at this stage was mostly practised by white settlers who were reluctant to engage fully into agriculture because of several reasons. The chief reason, as archival records show was that the government, up to the 1920s or so was still reluctant to give agriculture the kind of support that it gave the miners.⁴⁹⁵ Prospective farmers, for example, had difficulties in obtaining permission to start their activities.⁴⁹⁶ Miners were given unlimited threshold and flexibility to the usage of the land on which their operations lay.⁴⁹⁷

To that end, ‘rudimentary’ artisanal mining was carried out by a few whites by way of scattered prospecting, ‘sampling’ and digging.⁴⁹⁸ The other reason was that most of the youth in the area, who otherwise constitute the bulk of the miners preferred migrating to South Africa where wages in the mining sector were higher and the working conditions were better than those found in Southern Rhodesia. As alluded to in the earlier sections of the thesis, Mangwe fell in an area where some of the routes used to migrate to South Africa cut through. As a result, the marginal propensity was to join the bandwagon to South Africa especially via the Mafikeng route.⁴⁹⁹ Another reason is that during this period, less lucrative mines like the Smith, Power and Jojo mines could not attract African labourers who preferred to filter onto towns where employment opportunities were high in less burdensome tasks such as in retail or manufacturing industries which were sprouting up in

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid, p 43.

⁴⁹⁵ NAZ 2BN2/1/2-Synopsis of Gold Mining in Southern Rhodesia; NAZ S 482/274/39/1-Mining matters general, 1928-1933; NAZ 480/77 H-Mining Industry petition to the Premier, 1924; NAZ S480/55B Disputes:

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁹ Daimon., *‘Settling in Motion: Nyasa clandestine migration through Southern Rhodesia into the Union of South Africa.’* p 3

centres such as Bulawayo. These mines were thus abandoned, and they included the Smith Mine, Power Mine and Jojo mine as well as numerous unnamed diggings found in the area.⁵⁰⁰

Another reason was that agriculture remained a viable alternative because the climatic conditions in the area were favourable as compared to today.⁵⁰¹ Villages in the area point out that adequate rainfall and relatively large fields enabled a thriving subsistence agricultural economy. Evidence of large clearings of fields showed that crop cultivation was profitable.⁵⁰² Villagers lamented the actual depreciation of harvests and attributed it to climate change. Apparently, due to climate change and the increasing incidence of drought the sizes of the fields have continuously shrunk as families reduce the land under cultivation as yields versus the effort put continue to drop. Clearly though, if both the sizes of abandoned fields and old cattle kraals are anything to go by, most of the people concentrated on cultivation of crops and the tending of their animals as opposed to the risky and arduous job of mining. The mining industry in Mangwe district was relatively on a small scale as compared to other districts such as Gwanda. The following section which focuses on the post-colonial period saw an upsurge in mining activities in the broader swathes of Mangwe for several reasons discussed therein.

7.4 Artisanal mining in Mangwe: 1980-2015.

This section deals with the proliferation of illegal and semi-legal artisanal mining in Mangwe after the attainment of independence. The section will interrogate the reasons for the proliferation of this activity in the area. Most importantly, there shall be an examination of how mining activities in the area have helped to rarefy the politics of resource competition in

⁵⁰⁰ Interview with Godfrey Nyathi, local headman, Makhubu Village, 27 May 2020.

⁵⁰¹ Interview with A Madabu, Brunapeg, 23 April 2017.

⁵⁰² The large clearings of fields were observed by the author during fieldwork and the sizes of fields attests to periods of good rains in the past.

Mangwe, yet at the same time how some few Kalanga have sought to navigate the gold ‘boom’ through starting small business to profit off the gold panner. While the previous section illustrated in brief that the prevalence of mining in Mangwe during the colonial period was negligible due to the absence of a major find, apparently that scenario changed in the postcolonial period for several reasons to be outlined. Suffice to say that at independence the government of Zimbabwe acknowledged the presence of small-scale miners and sought to co-opt their operations into mainstream mining or economy.⁵⁰³ Between 1980 and 2000, the activities of small-scale miners were relatively limited because the country had a strong economy which meant that the industries and the formal sector were absorbing workers. The gold sector in Zimbabwe, which is the focus of discussion in this section is a highly monitored area and is governed by several legislative and regulatory tools. The parent acts governing gold related activities in Zimbabwe is the Mines and Minerals Act and the Gold Trade gazetted in 1961. In 2016, some amendments to the Acts were tabled before Parliament to align them to meet contemporary challenges in the mining sector.⁵⁰⁴ In 2013, the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET) attempted to strengthen the operations of the small-scale mining sector through creating so called mining syndicates, but the operations of these miners have been continuously affected by a vague application of the law.⁵⁰⁵

There was also a move to correct the historically skewed support for small scale miners which over the colonial period had disadvantaged black miners. However, it is imperative to stress that the definition of small-scale miners at independence did not necessarily encompass the ‘illegal’ gold miners, but as time went on that definition became rather vague (even the word

⁵⁰³ NAZ S/M15475- Mining news: Newsletter of small-scale miners’ association, issue 1, February 1988.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid, p2.

⁵⁰⁵ ibid

‘illegal’ has been removed in some instances especially at political rallies). Small scale miners at independence were usually associated with ‘formal’ small holdings which were not necessarily black owned. In most cases the mines belonged to whites and were trying to position themselves in the new economy hence the formation of a small-scale miners association.⁵⁰⁶ This mining body was called the Zimbabwe Mining Development Cooperation. Rural Councils were given the mandate to issue permits for gold panning in the rural areas.⁵⁰⁷ A statutory instrument aptly called the Regulations on Alluvial Gold Panning in Public Streams was set up in 1991.⁵⁰⁸ Permits for artisanal mining activities were now issued by the Ministry of Mines, and Fidelity Printers was identified as a sole buyer of gold for the reserve bank, including gold from artisanal miners.⁵⁰⁹ Some argue that this attitude by the government to grant concessions to small scale miners was because of the recognition that it could in a way provide employment in a country that was beginning to experience economic problems in the 1990s, as an informal sector. As a result of the economic meltdown, small-scale mining like other small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) assumed a greater significance in the economy of Zimbabwe, as Gutu rightly observed.⁵¹⁰ Currently, the SMEs sector accounts for over 60% of the countries labour force (about 5, 7 million workers according to a survey carried out by Finscope in 2012).⁵¹¹ In a way, these small-scale miners were thus ‘legal’.

In Mangwe, most of the first generation of post -independence miners were from outside the district.⁵¹² In the 1980s, these miners were usually of ‘Nyasa’ origin.⁵¹³ Most of them, though

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ N Chipangura, *Towards the decriminalisation of artisanal gold mining in Eastern Zimbabwe*, in the Extractive Industries and Society, 6(2019), p 154.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ Gutu, *Artisanal and Small-scale Mining in Zimbabwe-Curse or Blessing*, p2.

⁵¹¹ Ibid.

⁵¹² Interview with Assah Khuphe, villager, Makhubu village, 17 April 2017.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

of Nyasa origin, had been domiciled in Bulawayo. In most cases, they struggled to speak the local language, especially TjiKalanga and they struggled with the little IsiNdebele language absorbed in their stay in Bulawayo.⁵¹⁴ Then they were still referred to as ‘*zvimbamigodi*’ (pit diggers) in corrupted TjiKalanga.⁵¹⁵ They were so named because of their tendency to dig around as they prospected for the gold. In most cases, however, they dug in and around mines abandoned during the colonial period. Because they were relatively few, they did not present a major challenge to the locals. Most of their work was confined to the old digging sites and they were largely well behaved and mingled well with their host communities. From the assertions made by the locals, most of these people were older and more mature than the present band of miners. In as far as upsetting the local economic and social setup, their impact was minimal. One explanation to this was that their operations were negligible and therefore requiring little machinery or smaller amounts of chemicals such as cyanide and mercury. Some however married into the local community at least for the duration of their stay, mostly for purposes of accommodation. It is important to stress here that though many of these people were of Nyasa origin, some came from places in Matabeleland such as Filabusi and Gwanda. Amongst the people of Mangwe, the practise was relatively unpopular as a few people joined in the fray partly because most of them preferred migrating to South Africa and Botswana. As the following section will seek to show, that situation rapidly changed after 2000 as a new wave of miners descended on Mangwe.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid.

⁵¹⁵ Interview with William Borman Ncube, villager and artisanal miner, Makhubu village, 17 April 2017.

7.5 Artisanal mining in Mangwe 2000 to 2015.

The economic meltdown in Zimbabwe after the year 2000 triggered what I may term ‘large scale’ semi-legal artisanal mining in Mangwe district. Most of the chaotic and sometimes violent gold rush activity started in the second decade of independence with the collapse of the economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) which led to the closure of industries and the resultant rise in unemployment in Zimbabwe. ESAP and its twin ‘evil’ known as Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) were economic reform blueprints prescribed to Zimbabwe by the Bretton Woods institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In Zimbabwe, it was introduced in January 1991 and it was prescribed for five years.⁵¹⁶ ZIMPREST on the other hand was introduced in 1995 and it also ran for five years.⁵¹⁷ ESAP dealt mostly with deregulation and liberalisation of the economy whilst ZIMPREST added the social and human development index to the whole body of economic reform. Some of its recommendations included a cut in public expenditure and privatisation of public institutions.⁵¹⁸ ESAP was basically part and parcel of a western neoliberal agenda to streamline the global south to conform to the economic principles of the west. Economic historians are generally agreed that the ESAP had far reaching negative economic repercussions for Zimbabwe. Some of the most common ones included a rise in unemployment, collapse of public institutions, corruption and mass exodus of people fleeing Zimbabwe for the diaspora, as well as the erosion of social security, effects on household security, removal of price controls, amongst others.⁵¹⁹ In Mangwe, a sizeable number of urban

⁵¹⁶ D Potts and Mutambirwa C, ‘Basics are now a luxury:’ *Perceptions of structural adjustments’ impact on rural and urban areas in Zimbabwe*, in *Environment and Urbanisation*, volume 10, no 1, 1998, p13.

⁵¹⁷ D Ranga, *The Migration Effects of the Economic Structural Adjustments Programme in Zimbabwe on a rural Community*, *African Population*, Vol 19, no. 1, p 167.

⁵¹⁸ Potts and Mutambirwa, ‘Basics are now a luxury’, p 14.

⁵¹⁹ For more on ESAP and its attendant effects on Zimbabwe see C Kingstone, et al , *The Impacts of the World Bank and the IMF structural adjustments Programmes in Africa: The Case Study of Cote d’voire, Senegal, Uganda and Zimbabwe*, *Sacha Journal of Policy and Strategic Studies*, Vol 1 no. 2, 2011, p12; C M Marquette, *Current Poverty, Structural Adjustment, and Drought in Zimbabwe*, in *World Development*, vol 25, Issue 7, pp 1141-1149, 1997; R D Makoni, *Effects of the Structural Economic Adjustment Programme in the Participation*

based men and women returned home from towns such as Bulawayo.⁵²⁰ Most of them had been working in the industries in Bulawayo and were affected by the mass retrenchments occasioned by the debilitating effects of ESAP. Most of them joined the trek to South Africa with the intention of starting anew.

In a rather paradoxical move, the attitude of the government vis a vis the situation of artisanal miners showed a slide towards criminalising the activity at a time when the unemployment rate was soaring. Some argue that a combination of factors led to this. One being that mineral exploitation was becoming a haven for politicians to gain unorthodox access to the riches of the land, hence laws were being passed to eliminate competition in the sector.⁵²¹ The other one had to do with the pressure applied by nongovernmental organisations and the voting public on the destruction caused by gold panning in the rural areas. In 2006, the government actually set up an agency whose primary objective was management of the environment, called Environment Management Agency (EMA), which was seen as a direct attack on the activities of gold panners.⁵²² In 2006, the government escalated its attack on gold panning by launching a police operation known as *Isikorokoza Siphelile/Chikorokoza Chapera/Gold Panning must end*.⁵²³ Apart from the terrible environmental damage that was blamed on the gold panners, the

of Secondary school girls in Zimbabwe, Zambesia, xxvii, volume 2, 2000, pp 231-234; D Ranga, *The Migration Effects of the Economic Structural Adjustments Programme in Zimbabwe on a rural Community*, *African Population*, Vol 19, no. 1, p 167; N Kanji, 'Gender, Poverty and Economic Adjustment in Harare, Zimbabwe,' in *Environment and Urbanisation*, vol 1 no 1, pp 37-55; G Standing, 'Structural Adjustment and Labour Policies; Towards Social Adjustment?' in Standing G and V Tokman, (ed) *Towards Social Adjustment*, ILO, Geneva, 1991, pp 5-52; P Kadenge, 'Zimbabwe's Structural Adjustment Programme: The First Year Experience', in Mwanza, A(ed) *Structural Adjustment in SADC*, SAPES books, Harare, 1992.

⁵²⁰ Interview with Godfrey Ndebele sited elsewhere.

⁵²¹ S J Spiegel, *Shifting Formalisation Policies and Recentralising Power: The Case of Zimbabwe's Artisanal Gold Mining Sector*, in *Society and Natural Resources*, 28, 2015, pp 549-554.

⁵²² N Chipangura, *Towards the decriminalisation of artisanal gold mining in Eastern Zimbabwe*, in the *Extractive Industries and Society*, 6(2019), p 154.

⁵²³ *ibid*

government also accused the panners of not selling their gold on the official market thus depriving it of millions of dollars in revenue.

The vacillating nature of the government in dealing with the artisanal miners was shown again in 2013, when the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) led a subtle campaign to remove the restrictions on the activities of artisanal miners. The narrative pushed by the RBZ was that the artisanal miners were too important to ignore considering the amount of gold that they were contributing to the national gold output. The opaque way government policy was applied to deal with artisanal gold miners could be explained as an attempt by the government to reign in rampant unemployment in the country and in the process distract criticism for economic mismanagement. The matters became even murkier when the new a regime was installed in Zimbabwe in 2017. The activities of artisanal miners gained prominence when the most senior politicians in the country were fingered to be part and parcel of the rampant illegal artisanal activities in Manicaland, Midlands and the two Matabeleland provinces. On a legal frame work there was a subtle yet sustained and massive campaign to legitimise the activities of the artisanal miners with a further softening and downright repudiation of laws and regulations that governed the sector.⁵²⁴ For example, the registration fees were scrapped or reduced.⁵²⁵ EMA also softened its stance on the artisanal miners though scrapping the EIA requirement.⁵²⁶ Public pronouncements in political rallies seemed to show an acceptance of artisanal miners in the economic politico social setup of the country. All these measures showed that the government had a dicey relationship with artisanal miners based on political and economic considerations.

⁵²⁴ Chipangura, *Towards the decriminalisation of artisanal gold mining in Eastern Zimbabwe*, p 156.

⁵²⁵ Ibid.

⁵²⁶ Ibid.

Relevant to this study, of the broader implications of ESAP and other factors such as alleged economic mismanagement in Zimbabwe, most of the youth increasingly found it difficult to get jobs in the formal sector.⁵²⁷ As a result, the ‘new’ breed of miners who descended on Mangwe from the late 1990s into the 2000s were youthful and most of them were coming from other districts within the broader Matabeleland region, from places such as Lupane-Nkayi, Gwanda, Filabusi and Maphisa or Matobo. However, with the worsening economic crisis, the miners were coming from as far as the provinces of Mashonaland.⁵²⁸ One artisanal miner claimed he was from Mashonaland West.⁵²⁹ This hodgepodge of people ruptured the socio-economic life of the locals leading to the development of a subtle yet ethnicised narrative of competition for space, resources and land in an area already reeling from effects of poverty and perceived or real marginalisation.

The arrival of the new wave of miners presented the locals with several challenges at different levels. These were economic, social, political as well as environmental. Because of the increasing intensity of the mining activities and an alleged government lack of interest to deal with the concerns of the locals over the environmental and social challenges brought about by the miners, the communities of Mangwe have been quick to weave this into the whole marginalisation debate. In Mangwe, the competition usually takes ethnic forms in situations where there is perceived lack of control by the authorities or the central government, or where central authority is seen to be surreptitiously encourages this competition for political gain. As is ably demonstrated in this district, different groups tend to find it difficult to converge over

⁵²⁷ Ibid.

⁵²⁸ Interview with ‘Mshona’ (local nickname), artisanal miner, Ingwizi River, 23 December 2017. (the miner was never interested in disclosing his full name).

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

or share scarce resources leading to rationalised or ethnicised conflicts.⁵³⁰ These conflicts are not necessarily violent but may manifest themselves in several ways such as accusations and counteraccusations over issues of livestock theft, increasing moral decadence and delinquency, and general despondency amongst the people. The country's indigenisation laws have also complicated matters. The ownership of mining claims in the district have not escaped the controversies associated with the laws. The Kalanga of Mangwe, like most groups in Africa claim ownership of the lands based on their assumption that they are autochthonous to the area, having settled presumably earlier than the other African groups such as the Ndebele. The concept of indigeneity, as espoused by scholars such as Mamdani has been widely debated and to repeat it here will serve little purpose. Suffice to say that indigeneity has been used by the Kalanga of Mangwe to challenge intruding 'others' into their geopolitical and social space.



Fig 4. Illegal artisanal miners in action in this file photo (courtesy of The Herald, 14 August 2018).

⁵³⁰ R Ilorah, *Ethnic Bias, Favouritism and Development in Africa*, in *Development Southern Africa*, 26:5(2009), pp 695-707; N. Noyoo, 'Ethnicity and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa,' in *Journal of Social Development in Africa* vol 15, no 2(2000), pp58-60.

7.6 The economic impact of artisanal mining in Mangwe 2000-2015.

Economically the influx of the artisanal miners in Mangwe has over the years brought about a lot of changes in the area. Fundamentally though, the overall economic benefits of the presence of the artisanal miners have been positive. Local businesses recorded brisk business whenever the miners strike gold, literally and figuratively. Record sales have been realised especially on beverages and clothing enterprises, and foodstuffs.⁵³¹ This has led to the sprouting of small-scale business centres in most of the wards. For example, Makhubu, Ingwizi, Patse and Brunapeg business centres have grown tremendously over the last two decades. For instance, Ingwizi business centre had two small stores in the late 1990s, but today it has seen that number increase to over a dozen. Makubu business centre has grown from a single shop centre to numerous relatively well-built structures, some of them boasting of modern entertainment devices such as pools and disco machines, between 1994 and today. Other businesses centres which have seen rapid expansion are Mabuledi, Ewadini, Sanzukwi, Ngulubeni, and Nkedile to name but a few. In the same vein, the presence of artisanal miners appears to have spurred locals based in the diaspora to invest at home. These have over the years opened shops, sports bars and clothing outlets to meet the ever-increasing demands of the artisanal miners. These new businesses such as hardware shops and butcheries have emerged and expanded to a large extent due to the presence of artisanal miners who are well known for spending big.

Most of the artisanal miners have no permanent bases in the area so most of their earnings are spent on food and drink. There are some though who claim that they do remit some of their earnings to their families back home.⁵³² The remittances within the state have assisted to alleviate the suffering in their original homelands and are thought to be encouraging further

⁵³¹ Interview with Madawu, a shop attendant, Makhubu business centre, 25 April 2017.

⁵³² Interview with Ngwenya, an artisanal miner, 'Makokoba' informal settlement, Makhubu, 24 April 2017.

immigration into Mangwe as witnessed by the sudden upsurge of artisanal mining.⁵³³ What emerged was that most of the remittances were done through non-formal methods. For example, one artisanal miner hinted that he has never opened a bank account, so he relied on non-formal channels such as hiding the money in foodstuffs he sends home when he gets to town. Though the method was risky, he emphasised that the money always gets to its destination safely.⁵³⁴ Internal remittances have shown to play a critical role in reducing poverty amongst households in developing countries⁵³⁵. The artisanal miner claimed he had built a house back home and that generally his family was surviving.⁵³⁶ There are other direct economic benefits that have accrued to the district because of the presence of the artisanal miners. One of them is electricity infrastructure. The picture below shows the power poles erected to service the numerous crushing or stamping mills dotted throughout the district. The electricity installations were paid for by the stamp mill operators and primarily benefit them, with the villagers benefiting from the fringe spill overs such as water.

⁵³³ Ibid.

⁵³⁴ Interview with Thulani Ndlovu, artisanal miner, Makokoba informal settlement, Makhubu, 24 April 2017.

⁵³⁵ A McKay and Dishankar P, *Internal remittances and Poverty: Further evidence from Africa and Asia, migrating out of Poverty*, Working Paper 12, 2014.

⁵³⁶ Interview with Thulani Ndlovu, artisanal miner, Makokoba informal settlement, Makhubu, 24 April 2017.



Figure 5. Power lines in rural Mphoengs to service the stamping mills dotted in the district .



Figure 6. The picture above shows the electrified fence of the Mphakathi stamping mill, Makhubu.

Since the attainment of independence in 1980, most of the district had no electricity connection and those requiring electricity relied on solar power for their electricity needs. The lack of government effort to electrify the area in numerous rural electrification programmes was always sited as one of the indicators of neglect and marginalisation. However, the sprouting up of numerous stamping mills has led to the installation of electricity at least in some parts of the district. Some of the stamping mills, like the Smith mill located near the Ingwizi River are located near an old gold working site, though the majority in the district are new establishments. Both old and new sites were not connected to the electricity grid. The Mphakathi and Jones stamping mills are some of the popular stamping mills that operate in the electricity grid. This electricity, as alluded to earlier, though primarily connected to the stamping mills and not rural households does benefit the people indirectly. For example, there are able to charge their cellular phones or solar batteries enabling them to communicate with members of the family they normally had difficulties calling, especially those in South Africa, Botswana or overseas.⁵³⁷ The ability to communicate allows the locals to link with their diasporic relatives thus leading to improvements in the sending and receiving of money and other goods from the Diasporas, thus further assisting in ameliorating the plight of the communities in a timeous manner.

Other benefits that locals have enjoyed over the years include access to clean water in the stamping mills. Since the mid-2000s, locals have been allowed to draw water from the stamp mills at no cost.⁵³⁸ The quality of the water is significantly better than that drawn from the local

⁵³⁷ The author occasionally had his phone batteries charged at the stamping mills during fieldwork, and so did many locals who expressed gratitude at the gesture by stamping mill owners.

⁵³⁸ Observation during fieldwork. Locals generally happy with access to cleaner sources of water in the stamping mills.

river and suffice to say that this has assisted greatly in ameliorating some of the water related challenges in this very dry area. As suggested elsewhere, water scarcity remains one of the longstanding grievances in the area and the failure by the government to harness the erratic rainfall through the creation of more dams has not escaped the attention of locals. Employment opportunities have also been created in the stamping mills. For example, several locals have over the years been employed as guards or stamp attendants.⁵³⁹ As a result, these locals have managed to acquire property and household goods from that form of employment. Interestingly, most of those employed at the stamps are ‘retired’ returnees from South Africa such as the Ndlovu brothers Lala and Mavuka who would otherwise be seated at home with no means of getting a regular supply of income.

However, despite these benefits, the presence of artisanal miners in the district has not escaped the politics of exclusion and marginalisation that have long troubled the region. It is arguable that the mining operations in the district can be properly organised and accrue more benefits to the communities.⁵⁴⁰ The problem of ethnicity and resource competition was also discussed with regards to the mopane worm economy, where I argued that the harvesting of the worm by people perceived as ‘foreigners’ in Mangwe has not escaped the dialectics of ethnicised ownership of economic spaces. The artisanal mining operations are hardly immune to this negativity. The following sections will attempt to examine some of the negatives accruing from this activity.

⁵³⁹ Interview with Lucky Khuphe, artisanal miner and ‘local boy’ Makokoba informal settlement, 25 April 2017. Interview with ‘Mphakathi’, a stamping mill operator, Brunapeg, 21 December 2018.

⁵⁴⁰ Bulawayo 24, ‘Mangwe residents up in arms against panners and Plumtree town council,’ 24 January 2013.

7.7 The social impact of artisanal gold mining in Mangwe-The Story of Millicent*(not her real name).

Millicent is a 21 old young woman who lived with her grandmother in the Makhubu area of Mphoengs. She is orphaned after both her parents who were migrant labourers died in South Africa where they worked. Her grandmother tried sending her to school, where she went as far as Form Three. However, her education coincided with the unprecedented influx of artisanal miners into the Mphoengs area. She, like most kids in the area travelled long distances to the nearest secondary school, about 13 kilometres by road to be precise. Their route passed through a notorious artisanal miners' compound known as Makokoba located by the side of the Ingwizi River. It is suspected that she was lured into 'falling' in love with one or more of the artisanal miners who roamed the compound because of the associated 'spoiling' that her lover/s treated her to. As a result of the illicit relationship, she fell pregnant and had to drop out of school. When she was questioned on the paternity of the child she was 'unable' to identify the man responsible because the one he identified was apparently unavailable. As a result, all the rites associated with pregnancies were thus forfeited, including the payment of damages. Millicent gave birth to a child who was by all intents and purposes without a 'properly identified' father. The child has been adopted by the grandmother who is approaching her 70s. With the child barely two years old, Millicent had 'fallen' in love with another artisanal miner who got her pregnant again. In the second case, the miner eloped with Millicent and she was rumoured to be domiciled at Shurugwi town. She has not been physically seen ever since. Her grandmother remains pained by Millicent's experience.

Though the above story is a common read across Zimbabwe especially in areas where artisanal mining takes place, its use here is to illustrate the extent to which the sudden influx of miners

has impacted on the social relations of the community under study. For example, young school going children are reportedly being targeted by the gold panners who lure them with money.⁵⁴¹ Most of them end up pregnant, like Melissa and drop out of school thus putting their future in great jeopardy. Other vices allegedly perpetrated by these gangs include alleged stock theft and public violence. A local headman lamented the increase in petty crimes in the area as a result of the presence of gold panners in the district. Police officers also confirmed that the presence of artisanal miners has kept them busy in area normally associated with quiet and tranquil.⁵⁴² Some of the gold panners are blamed for the spread of sexually transmitted diseases in the community.⁵⁴³ Villagers also talked of married women falling prey to the gold panners, thus leading to collapse of several marriages in the area.⁵⁴⁴ In some instances the women are married to *‘injiva’* who would have neglected their families back home for one reason or another.

Generally, the treatment of women in the ‘Makokoba’ settlement bordered on contempt and disrespect. Most of the vendors in the settlement were women, and it was common to hear unprintable language being directed at them by the panners. Such treatment of women appears common in similar settlements elsewhere in the country.⁵⁴⁵ However, some locals, especially men were not very kind to some of the women who had sexual relations with artisanal miners. Writing of similar experiences in Chibi district during the early years of colonial rule and the nascent development of the mining industry, Makambe highlighted those local men appeared threatened by the sexual liaisons of their womenfolk with artisanal miners from outside of the

⁵⁴¹ Interview with Lucky Khuphe, gold panner, ‘Makokoba’ informal settlement, Makhubu, April 2017.

⁵⁴² Interview with Constable Dube, Makhubu Business Centre, 22 August 2018.

⁵⁴³ Interview with Daniel Ncube, nurse, Brunapeg Hospital, 8 June 2020.

⁵⁴⁴ Interview with Godfrey Ndebele, Villager, Sikwana village, 28 May 2020.

⁵⁴⁵ The Chronicle, ‘Women still exploited and unsafe in the small-scale mining industry.’ 18 February 2020.

district.⁵⁴⁶ The ‘other’ men appeared to be generally accepted by the local women because they are seen as less stingy compared to local men. That appeared to cause a great deal of conflict in mining areas. In one informal mining settlement toured by the author, the consensus was that most of the affairs were consensual and mutually beneficial.

Most of the gold panners were reportedly from other parts of Matabeleland which included Kalanga speaking areas of Kezi and therefore have no challenges with the local language. That enables to mix and mingle with the locals much easier. However, some are Shona speaking and generally struggle with the local languages and are generally despised because of their association with Harare and Gukurahundi, thus cementing the ethnic and marginalisation undertone of locals and the ‘ethnic’ others.

7.8 Gold mining politics in Mangwe, 2000-2015.

This section deals with the question of contestations of mining claims in Mangwe. With regards to that, most of the arguments about who owns what and where show marked similarities with those of the mopane worm political economy discussed elsewhere. As will be shown, these arguments are largely influenced by what locals view as an intrusion into their economic and social spaces by people from outside, as well as what they view as unbridled display of greed and destruction by people with little regard to the welfare of the district as they are ‘foreigners’. In the politics of mining, the first challenge arose with the allocation of mining claims, especially the question of who was entitled to claim and how. The indigenisation discourse in Zimbabwe can be traced back to 1980, on the question of land. Upon the attainment of independence, the government made conscious efforts to foster an inclusive conciliatory policy

⁵⁴⁶ E. P. Makambe, *The African Immigrant Factor in Southern Africa, 1890-1930: The Origin and Influence of External Elements in a Colonial Setting*, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of York, England, 1979, p971.

in the country that was based on reconciliation of races.⁵⁴⁷ To that end Zimbabwe was projected as a multi-racial society and by extension belonging to all Zimbabweans. While the thrust of this thesis is not to debate the indigenisation laws of Zimbabwe, it is incumbent that we discuss how they affected resource ownership in an area that portrays itself as marginalised.

Gold mining claims in Mangwe district have not escaped the politics of resource entitlement. In parts of Makhubu and Mabuledi wards, most of the mine claims and the stamping mills were pegged by black Zimbabweans. That according to the Zimbabwean constitution and the Indigenisation Laws of 2007 is perfectly legal.⁵⁴⁸ However over the years, locals in Mangwe have voiced concern through local leadership of the need to give preference to local Kalanga and Ndebele people as deciphered in interviews. This brings the question of indigeneity into the picture. Scholars such as Mamdani have long explored this concept and the problematics that arise from it.⁵⁴⁹ Igor Kopytoff also contributed to the debate in his frontier theory by creating a dichotomy between ‘original inhabitants’ and ‘late comers’.⁵⁵⁰ Indigeneity may assume that a person is autochthonous to a place. To most villagers, the new breed of gold panners displays a mercenary attitude, where issues that seemed to bother locals such as cyanide spills or siltation of the rivers looked peripheral to their core interest of looking for gold.⁵⁵¹ In the dry season, livestock such as goats drink water laced with cyanide leading to some of them dying. To compound matters animals dying in this manner are not consumed by

⁵⁴⁷ H. Zvoushe, et al (2017), *‘Indigenisation, Politics of Exclusion and Problematics of Autochthony in Zimbabwe’s Redistributive Agenda’*, Unpublished article, January 2017, p 6. ⁷¹⁹ Ibid, p7.

⁵⁴⁸ The Indigenisation Act, 2007. Bulawayo 24, *‘Mangwe residents up in arms against panners and the Plumtree town council’*, 26 Jan 2013. Interview with .Madabu, cited elsewhere, 23 April 2018. Mr Madabu questioned why the author was not getting involved in the business.

⁵⁴⁹ M Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late Colonialism* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), p 16.

⁵⁵⁰ I Kopytoff(ed), *The African Frontier: The Reproduction of African Traditional Societies* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1987), ‘Introduction’, pp 2-5.

⁵⁵¹ The Chronicle, ‘Environmental price of gold panning,’ 23 January 2020.

humans, leading to a double loss. Part of the reasons that the panners gave for their disregard for rehabilitating the environment they damage is that because their activity is illegal and such they are always running away from the police.⁵⁵² The Environmental Management Agency (EMA) as well as the incumbent Environment Minister have also complained bitterly about the wanton destruction of the environment by illegal miners. Local members of parliament have also joined the attack on gold panners, arguing that locals should be given preference in the exploitation of their resources.⁵⁵³ It is important to highlight that these are usually opposition MPs and Kalanga activists who have vested interests in pursuing such line of thinking. However, it is arguable that it is a thinking that is fed by the palpable tension between the locals and the gold panners. Woven to that, the ‘us’ and ‘them’ attitude becomes embedded in the psyche of the people.

In Mangwe, this concept of indigeneity appears problematic. This is explained in two reasons. The first is that the two main groups in the area-the Ndebele and the Kalanga have themselves had an uneasy relationship on who truly is indigenous to Mangwe. The Kalanga claim an early settlement while the Ndebele believe their triumphant entrance into Zimbabwe places themselves at a strong position to claim ‘citizenship’ to the area. The second is that the successive governments in the region have for one reason or another allowed, sometimes unintentionally groups from other regions to penetrate the district either as labourers, in the security sector or on government business. These movements though not necessarily large scale have had an impact in the socio-economic set up of the district. After independence, government officers who are mostly ‘Shona’ have been accused of deliberately ‘favouring’ their kith and kin in allocating mining claims as well as business stands, which has seen a steady

⁵⁵² Ibid.

⁵⁵³ Bulawayo 24, ‘*Mangwe residents up in arms against panners and Plumtree town council*,’ 24 January 2013.

increase in the number of ‘outsiders’ in Mangwe.⁵⁵⁴ This is one of the oft said grievances. The ownership of claims and stamping mills since the 2000s has created a lot of friction between the locals and the ‘alien’ miners as accusations of favouritism have inadvertently taken an ethnic twist amidst cries of marginalisation. ‘Alien’ miners are those coming from other districts who are usually neither Kalanga nor Ndebele.

In order to show that ethnicity has been mobilised to challenge the pegging of mine claims by people perceived to be coming from outside one villager wondered why the local educated ‘elite’ were not joining in the scramble to peg mine claims, thus allowing ‘foreigners’ from other districts to dominate the local mining industry.⁵⁵⁵ One could grasp the sense of indictment being placed on these ‘elites’, which could be used to explain the sense of entitlement that the Kalanga and the Ndebele hold over the land they inhabit. A cursory observation however revealed that some of the small claims were owned by locals, meaning that they were not entirely shut out. However, the stamping mills were mostly owned by outsiders, as well as a white man. One of the owners is a Shona woman. Clashes over ‘entitlement’ to resources is a worldwide political and economic problem. As mentioned elsewhere in the thesis in Nigeria, for example, the Ogun people who reside in the Niger Delta have long clashed with the central government over the distribution of income accrued from the oil in the Niger Delta area.⁵⁵⁶ In Kenya, ethnicity has also been mobilised to stake claims in naturally occurring resources as well as land.⁵⁵⁷ All these examples show the salience of ethnicity in rural settings in as far as

⁵⁵⁴ Interview with B. Ndlovu, shop owner, Ingwizi Business Centre, 19 April 2017.

⁵⁵⁵ Interview with Borman William Ncube, cited elsewhere, 23 April 2017.

⁵⁵⁶ J. Osagie, Funmilayo A., Fred A., Samuel E., *Conflicts in the Niger Delta as expressed by the youth in Delta State*, *Procedia and Behavioural Sciences* 5(2010), pp 82-89.

⁵⁵⁷ M. Githinji and Holquist F., *Kenya’s Hopes and Impediments: The Anatomy of a Crisis of Exclusion.*’ *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, Vol 2(2), pp 344-358; B. Ogot, *Ethnicity and Conflict in Kenya*,

the contestations for economic spaces are concerned. The politics of small-scale artisanal mining have become a hotbed of discussion amongst traditional leaders, local elite such as political representatives and the common people of Mangwe. Apart from the claim ownership squabbles, the seemingly semi-legal nature of the trade stirs local sentiments. Local ‘gold barons’ have emerged, and their seemingly untouchable status has over the years caused disquiet in the community. For example, in 2015 workers of one of the stamp mill operators were accused of going around harassing locals especially in the business centres exhibiting total disregard of law enforcement. Such behaviour helps foment anti-immigrant feelings amongst the Kalanga which end up getting entangled with the broader issues of marginalisation. These ‘gold barons’, ‘foreign’ as they are to the people of Mangwe represent a perpetuation of historically rooted sentiments of neglect and undue pressure on the communities of Mangwe, exerted by people they perceive to be outsiders. Traditional authorities and councillors in the region decried their emasculation in dealing with the gold panners’ menace.⁵⁵⁸ In that scheme of things, there is an emasculation of traditional leaders itself seen as a serious degradation of local institutions and this radiates negative connotations on the government’s seriousness with tackling Mangwe issues. It is also worth noting that the grievances of some of the Kalanga traditional authorities, for example are longstanding. For instance, a number of them such as Chief Sangulube and Hobodo had for a long time been stripped of their chiefly powers and acted more or less as headmen, presided over by Ndebele chiefs and only regaining chiefly powers in the recent years.⁵⁵⁹ Chief Hobodo, for example had been demoted to headman in 1951 by the colonial regime for ‘intransigency.’⁵⁶⁰ That, and the menace of ‘lawless’ gold panners helped exacerbate feelings of emasculation amongst

⁵⁵⁸ The Chronicle, ‘*Environmental price of gold panning*,’ 23 January 2020.

⁵⁵⁹ The Sunday News, ‘*Chief Hobodo installed*’, 9 August 2015.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid.

traditional authorities in the area which explains why some of them have been vocal in complaining about wanton harvesting of mopane worms or rampant illegal gold panning.

In some instances, the gold barons have fought pitched battles using their proxies in the district.⁵⁶¹ In one of the fights, a gold panner's head was allegedly left hanging from the torso in a brutal gangland murder that shook the community.⁵⁶² In some instances, the fights have become a serious cause for concern and traditional leaders have been heard complaining about them.⁵⁶³ The violence that has sporadically visited Mangwe in the artisanal miners' turf wars has been linked to the '*bhemba*' phenomenon whose roots are thought to lie in the Midlands town of Shurugwi in Zimbabwe. The '*bhemba*' phenomenon was linked to machete wilding gangs who became notorious for terrorising rival miners in the bushes where artisanal miners carry out their activities. The name is thus derived from the weapon that they normally carried in the fights. The '*bhemba*' gangs attained notoriety in the period spanning 2010 up to 2020 and have generally subsidised due to a combination of factors such as exhaustion of contested gold claims and of course intermittent police action. The '*bhemba*' gangs are thought to be connected to influential politicians and that makes their reputation even more fearsome not only in Mangwe but in the different areas of the country where gold panning is practised.⁵⁶⁴ An artisanal miner narrated how he narrowly survived a '*bhemba*' attack in one of the notorious

⁵⁶¹ The Chronicle, '*Gold panner's head left hanging in brutal attack*,' 05 June 2019; The Chronicle, '*Mangwe Rural District Council bans mining activities*,' 10 October 2013; The Chronicle, '*Chiefs demand police presence in mining areas*,' 21 August 2015; The Standard, '*Mat South gold wars turn bloody gangs rampage*,' 12 May 2019.

⁵⁶² The Chronicle, '*Gold panner's head left hanging in brutal attack*,' 05 June 2019.

⁵⁶³ The Chronicle, '*Chiefs demand police presence in mining areas*,' 21 August 2015.

⁵⁶⁴ The Standard, '*Politics, Dollars and Criminals: Why violence is rising in Zimbabwe's small-scale mining*,' 19 January 2020.

'bhemba' wars, and showed the author scars and visible evidence of physical harm.⁵⁶⁵ There are also allegations that the law enforcement agents are bribed by the miners and thus making it very difficult to make effective arrests. In some areas the police have been arrested for partaking in illegal mining activities.⁵⁶⁶ In Mangwe, some of the artisanal miners openly boasted that *'sidla labo laba'* (we eat together-we are in this together) referring to law enforcement agents. One civil servant lamented the lack of free beer now that the gold panners were not getting as much gold as they used to.⁵⁶⁷ This in way helps show the economic might that gold panners yielded in the rural business centres of Mangwe, and by extension the emasculation of government employed workers such as the police in being able to challenge or control them should they digress from the laws of the land.

Closely linked to the above, it is important to stress that whatever benefits accrued to the district of Mangwe with the proliferation of artisanal mining, these have not been wholly felt by the district. The elite and a few households have access to the electricity and the water in the stamping mills. The majority are faced with increasing challenges such as siltation of rivers and damage to the environment as shown by the pictures below:

⁵⁶⁵ Interview with sa Junior, artisanal miner and bhemba attack victim, Cowdray park, Bulawayo, 26 October 2020.

⁵⁶⁶ The Chronicle, *'17 cops arrested: Illegal gold mining lands Bubi police in trouble.'* 28 January 2017.

⁵⁶⁷ Interview with Daniel Ncube, a local nurse, via WhatsApp message platform, 7 June 2020.



Fig 13 showing extensive pit diggings on a stretch of land by the roadside, Makhubu, Mphoengs, December 2018.



Figure 14. Mine dumps from extensive diggings near the Ingwizi River, Mphoengs, December 2018. Note that very little vegetation grows in the disused land.



Fig 15. Environmental damage caused by illegal artisanal mining in Inyati. Such sightings are common in Mangwe as well, as shown in a photo elsewhere in the thesis (p 164). Note the extensive damage to the tree foliage. (Photo courtesy of Nqobile Tshili, The Chronicle, 23 January 2020).

The environmental cost of artisanal mining in Mangwe is succinctly expressed in this long quote:

Illegal gold diggers are washing away tonnes of soil into rivers at great loss to aquatic biodiversity. These activities are not only destroying vast portions of both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems but are also threatening the livelihood of thousands of villagers along the river valleys where these operations are concentrated. For example, the herbs that used to be collected from the riverbanks by rural communities, to prepare natural home-made remedies for mild ailments, are fast disappearing and/or no longer growing

*along the rivers because of heavy pollution by dangerous chemicals that the gold miners use, such as mercury and cyanide.*⁵⁶⁸

7.9 Conclusion.

The chapter has demonstrated that artisanal mining in Zimbabwe in general and Mangwe has a long history. Precolonial societies were heavily involved in the rudimentary mining for an assortment of minerals in Zimbabwe, which I argue gave the African valuable skills in individualised and less mechanised mining operations. Archaeological evidence has been sufficiently mobilised to show that early societies on the Zimbabwean plateau took part in this activity, primarily for trade and ornamental use, as well as tribute and other forms of economic exchanges found in these early societies. The Kalanga as shown by the evidence produced by archaeologists such as Chirikure show that precolonial artisanal mining was found in areas inhabited by the Kalanga today. The chapter moved on to examine the difficulties experienced by African artisanal where I mentioned that restrictive colonial and post-colonial legislation stifled the growth of artisanal mining amongst the Africans. Those restrictive measures marginalised the African miner from engaging in this activity ‘profitably.’ The chapter interrogated the politics of gold mining in the district where ownership of mine claims remains heavily contested amongst the locals themselves and between the locals and people from outside the district. The concept of entitlement to resources, which is a recurring theme in the whole thesis was evident in the gold mining business, especially considering how locals and ‘outsiders’ have constantly engaged each for space and resources. Socially, Kalanga feelings of abuse and marginalisation are expressed in their manner of interaction with the artisanal miners, where palpable friction exists especially when artisanal miners interact with Kalanga

⁵⁶⁸ Mazvita et al, *A call to halt Destructive, illegal Mining in Zimbabwe*, p1.

women. The way the activity plays out in Mangwe has assisted in the ‘revival’ as it were of parochial identities in Mangwe, one of which is ethnicity. As a means of assisting the Kalanga navigate their marginal status, the activity has seen the emergence of Kalanga entrepreneurs seeking to profit from the trade, on the other hand. Despite the few positives accrued economically, I posit that the Kalanga have not benefited meaningful from their resource and that supports their claims of being marginalised. The next chapter provides the conclusion to the thesis.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion.

By virtue of having experienced varying levels and types of marginalisation through successive governments, Kalanga of Mangwe have devised strategies that have assisted them to circumvent and confront a plethora of challenges partly brought about by their existence as a marginalised group. The activities, mostly economic (but as shown by researchers such as Msindo and Dube to be also social and political in nature), appear like a desire to navigate existing on the margins, or in a peripheral economy. The thesis highlighted the various indicators of the marginalisation of the Kalanga of Mangwe, such as the dilapidated public infrastructure, lack of industry, scarcity of health and educational facilities, poor road and communication networks, cultural and linguistic marginalisation amongst others. Though the above mentioned problems and challenges are not peculiar to the Kalanga of Mangwe as they may be found elsewhere, I observed that their unique geographic location and the manner of interaction that they have had with groups such as the Ndebele, the white settlers and the broader 'Shona' has necessitated the emergence and growth of a unique political and cultural economy that can be interpreted as a survivalist strategy in the face of marginalisation.⁵⁶⁹ The thesis sought to prove that marginalisation becomes the basis for ethnic identification, and by extension attendant activities mentioned above. Granted, it is not easy to wholly link ethnicity to marginalisation/and or certain economic activities in Mangwe (because marginalisation and those activities are not peculiar to the Kalanga), but the underlining argument was that the activities practised by this group in Mangwe are interwoven with the broader debates of

⁵⁶⁹ F Barth (Ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969); P Valent, *Introduction to Survival Strategies*, in *From Survival to Fulfilment: A Framework of Life-trauma Dialect*, (Philadelphia: Brunner, 1998).

marginalisation that often recur in discussions about Matabeleland in general and Mangwe in particular.

Though not primarily concerned with ‘ethnically’ identifying the Kalanga as a group (because I believe researchers such as Msindo and Dube have done justice in that regard), I posited that Kalanga ethnicity has undergone profound transformation over the years. Concurring with the two scholars, the Kalanga used several methods to not only reconfigure Kalanga identity but to effectively reclaim it after years of being ‘marginalised’ by the successive regimes that they fell under. However, to provide a better context of the discussion, I confined my discussion to the inhabitants of Mangwe who since the precolonial times have come to be identified, and identify themselves as Kalanga, and occupy that geographic space, speak, or associate with the Kalanga language and culture and have been subjected to different forms of marginalisation over that period. Ethnicity as a concept is useful in determining parameters of group behaviour as well as choices made in a socio-economic and politico geographic space. Whether activities such as cross border trade and harvesting mopane worms can be ascribed ethnically to certain groups is subject to another debate, but the thesis using the marginalisation lenses demonstrated that activities practised amongst the Kalanga are primarily derived from their existence as a marginal entity: due to lack of industry, education and so forth.

Ethnicity remains a complex concept for analysing group behaviours. The thesis demonstrated that studies in ethnicity have undergone profound changes in the last couple of decades.⁵⁷⁰

⁵⁷⁰ D.L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); J.D. Fearon and Laitin, D. D, *Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity*, *International Organization*, 54(4), 845-877(2000); J. D. Eller, *From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).

Initially, ethnicity was thought to be a fixed and unchanging genetically inherited phenomenon, with enduring blood ties that transcended all other aspects. However, as was ably demonstrated in the chapter, the primordial nature of ethnicity has serious flaws which have been successfully exposed and challenged by later scholars of ethnicity. Critical to the study though, is the realisation that in as much as the primordial ethnic ties may not be enduring and static, they nonetheless serve as an important rallying call for ethnic mobilisation. In the case of the Kalanga of Mangwe that was informed by what I believe was a systematic and prolonged socioeconomic and political marginalisation by successive regimes that presided over them in Zimbabwe. To that end, as the subsequent sections and chapters showed, language and culture played an important role in configuring a Kalanga identity around which issues of marginalisation and the politics of exclusion and inclusion are discussed. I tried to show that the everyday experiences of the Kalanga, be it economic, political, and social showed that they were able to reconfigure their identity and use it to develop strategies for survival.

The chapter, in setting the tone for a conceptual understanding of issues to be discussed, tried to contextualise the issue of marginalisation. Marginalised groups, it was shown encompasses a wide range of area which includes social, cultural and structural marginalisation. The fundamental argument here was that a marginalising state tends to craft policies, intentionally or unintentionally which perpetuate the marginalisation of some groups, for example often through the ‘propaganda’ of national unity. In such a situation, the marginalised groups tend to respond by crafting mechanisms to circumvent, thwart or confront the marginalisation tendencies through several means. These means form the basis of this thesis where I argue though most of the activities practised by the Kalanga in Mangwe do not necessarily represent

secessionism or an 'exit from the state as propagated by Bayart,⁵⁷¹ they nonetheless represent an attempt by the group to reassert themselves socially economically and to an extent even politically. The activities showed that the Kalanga of Mangwe continue to engage with the state at various levels for example socially through registering Kalanga cultural associations with the government, politically through parliamentary or traditional authority engagement and economically through using state infrastructure such as borders for their activities.

The chapter, in a thematic way provided the thesis chapter breakdown. Fundamentally the chapters are arranged in such a way that the main thread of the argument: survival strategies of a marginalised group, consistently shines throughout the thesis.

The second chapter provided background information on the Kalanga as an ethnic group and on Mangwe as a geopolitical entity. The chapter relied quite extensively on the works of pioneering Kalanga researchers such as Masola, and later academics such as Msindo and Dube. Most importantly, the relationship between the physical environment and the Kalanga was interrogated with the desire to show that the economic choices of the communities in this region are a product of years of ever-changing interaction with their environment as well as immigrant or settler groups. Through inference from evidence gleaned from archival and secondary sources, as well as some interviews the chapter demonstrated that the Kalanga have a long history in the area under study as well as in the broad swathes of Matabeleland as shown by the naming patterns in the whole of Matabeleland: with strikingly Kalanga sounding names.

The second chapter buttressed the now widely held view that the Kalanga belonged to the proto-type Bantu groups that populated the Zimbabwean plateau in the periods around the 8th and 9th

⁵⁷¹ J F Bayart, *"Civil Society in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power"* in P. Chabal (ed.) *Political Domination in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

centuries AD.⁵⁷² This chapter also tried to describe the different sub-groups that in the different epochs of history also populated Mangwe, with the aim of showing how their interaction with the Kalanga shaped the Kalanga and their identity. Of particular interest was the interaction between the Kalanga and the Ndebele, which I argued set in motion the marginalisation of the Kalanga. The chapter provided a closer analysis of the Ndebele caste system, and how it laid the ground for contestations for socio-political power within what was referred to as the Ndebele state and its subsequent manifestations. The caste system in its very nature created second class citizens out of the Kalanga, and subsequently set in motion the peripherisation of their language, culture, and customs. Ndebele power, however, was not eternal. The Ndebele witnessed periods of subjugation in the hands of the colonial regime which weakened their power. The chapter thus tried to show how the weakening of Ndebele power had a bearing on inter-ethnic relations in the district. In some areas both Kalanga and Ndebele chiefs were revived or destroyed, and even relocated to newer areas thus creating an interesting setting for cultural and linguistic interaction which has produced to a certain extent distinct identity of ethnic groups in Mangwe. In the process, some previously disadvantaged Kalanga chiefs have witnessed the restoration of their traditional authority, examples being the Sangulube and the Wobodo/Hobodo chieftaincies in later day Zimbabwe

The chapter also tried to describe the geography of Mangwe. This was done to contextualise the debates in the thesis by showing how its geographical location as well as climate has shaped the history of Mangwe. Some of the economic activities described in the thesis inform on the broader themes such as survival strategies as well as resource competition which I try to explore

⁵⁷² A. T. Mabuse, 'Settlement History of the Kalanga,' www.kalanga.org; C. Van Waarden, *Butua and the End of An Era: The Effect of the Collapse of the Kalanga State On Ordinary Citizens; An Analysis of Behaviour Under Stress* (Archaeopress: Oxford, 2012); Nyathi, *Dynamics of Power in a Multi-Ethnic Community*; J. B. Richards, 'The Mlimo Belief and practise of the Kalanga', in NADA Vol 19, 1942, 54.

in several chapters in the thesis. These geographical and or natural occurrences and resources are interwoven with issues of ethnicities in some of the chapters in the thesis to explain the behaviour of the Kalanga and buttress their case for marginalisation.

To further explain the marginalisation of the Kalanga, the chapter also tackled colonial and post-colonial policies that worked against the Kalanga as an ethnic group. For example, the colonial ethnic policy appeared to initially give the Kalanga little attention in as far as promoting Kalanga culture and language was concerned. Apart from that, the chapter tackled the colonial economic policy particularly on land and showing how land alienation further complicated the position of the Kalanga, weakening them economically and socially through relocations and so on. In the post-colonial period, I argued that the state in a way continued though not explicitly the marginalising tendencies of its predecessors through giving little attention to the Kalanga. Archival records for organisations such as Kalanga Cultural Promotion Society were used to show that the new state was not fundamentally different from its predecessor in as far as giving the Kalanga the attention it deserved, hence continued cries of marginalisation.

The violence of the Gukurahundi period is also used to explain the transiency of ethnic identity in Mangwe, where I argued that the Kalanga bore some brunt of a conflict that was essentially ethnicised between the Shona and the Ndebele, thus showing how Kalanga identity had become embedded with that of the Ndebele though long years of interaction and sharing of experiences. Because the Kalanga had tried over the years to reconfigure their own identity and escape both Ndebele and state hegemony, the period of Gukurahundi provided an anti-climax to Kalanga effort in a way because in a sense, Kalanga identity had become submerged in the broader

Matabeleland identity whose overarch was Ndebele, and the Gukurahundi in a way showed how such a submersion of identities can have very unfavourable consequences.

The Kalanga, the chapter demonstrated are ideal in analysing the coping strategies of a group experiencing ethnic marginalisation because as argued throughout the thesis they have had a long experience in that regard. Mangwe as a district provides a fitting context for the main argument of the thesis because apart from having a significant, if not majoritarian Kalanga population, the area also has visible traits of being a marginalised area. The chapter also sought to justify the period of study where I argued that the 1940s provided important watersheds in the history of Zimbabwe. The most important of these was the blossoming of mass nationalism which sought to right the wrongs of the colonial regime. Kalanga elites played an important role in this process, men such as Joshua Nkomo and George Silundika. These elites were also instrumental in reviving Kalanga identity through identifying with it and being active members of Kalanga cultural capital.

The third chapter was the first in a series of chapters that attempted to give an analysis of the different strategies that have been employed by the Kalanga to circumvent marginalisation. Here the study focused on the mopane economy in Mangwe. The chapter highlighted the mopane worm is part of a growing list of non-timber products that are being harvested by communities to mitigate poverty and accrue income. The chapter examined how the mopane economy in Mangwe has become an important economic activity owing to rampant unemployment in the district which is a result of years of economic, social, and political marginalisation. The mopane worm economy, I argued was historically a peripherally economy whose primary purpose was to supplement the dietary requirements of the people. I further argued in the chapter that the importance of the mopane economy has evolved to become an

important source of income or employment in a district characterised by lack of industry and development.

The chapter also developed the view that the importance of the mopane worm as an economic activity has created a vibrant linkage between rural Mangwe and urban areas such as Bulawayo. In the process that has led to the development of other economic activities such as small grocery shops, therefore implying that this has opened newer avenues for economic interactions between the rural folk and their urban counterparts.

The chapter addressed the history of the harvesting of the mopane worm since 1980, though a conscious effort was made to show that the activity has a long history not only in Mangwe but in Zimbabwe. Archaeological evidence, though scant was presented to show that the collection of the worm was done in early periods of settlement in Zimbabwe. To further develop and infuse the chapter with the main arguments of the thesis, I also placed the economy in the broader debates of ethnicity and resource competition in developing countries. Mangwe residents, sometimes led by their traditional leaders or acting on their own volition, have been vocal in airing sentiments of discontent when people from outside the district descend on the area to harvest the worm. The calls by chiefs and other interested parties for a ‘regulated’ harvesting of the worm, I argued is part and parcel of a broader attempt to protect Kalanga monopoly of the resources which are found in the district. The frustrations over resource encroachment by the outsiders causes tension in the communities already compounded by thoughts of being marginalised.⁵⁷³ The role of traditional leadership in regulating the trade was interrogated in the chapter, where it was discovered that traditional leaders are expected to be

⁵⁷³ A Kefale, *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia; A Comparative Regional Study*, (London: Routledge, 2013) pp12-23; Z Mohammed, *Resource Competition and Inter-ethnic Relations: A Case of the Arsi Oromo and Sidama in South Central Ethiopia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2008); R. A. LeVine and D.T. Campbell, *Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes and Group Behaviour* (New York: Willey, 1972). ⁷⁴⁹ J Lonsdale, ‘Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism’, Wissenschaftliche Tagung Vereinigung der Afrikanisten in Deutschland, (Duisburg, April 1995.).

custodians of local resources. However, I mentioned in the chapter that in the politics of the mopane economy, 'tribalism' as espoused by scholars such as Lonsdale is sometimes clearly palpable. The 'tribal' card is usually covered up as a desire to maintain a semblance of 'sanity' and 'sustainability' in the collection of the mopane worm, but on closer analysis it informs on the debate of trying to protect Kalanga interests in the area, perceived or real.

The chapter attempted to place the mopane economy within the discourse of livelihoods, here using arguments posited by scholars such as Scoones and Mushongah, amongst others. In marginalised communities, livelihoods often take an ethnic dimension especially when the usage of local resources is concerned. The chapter also examined the gender dimensions in the harvesting and trade in mopane worms. The thrust here was to trace the evolution of the gender roles in mopane worm harvesting, where I argued that as the mopane economy became more and more lucrative, gender differentiation in as far as collection and trade was concerned became increasingly blurred. Both men and women became active participants in the mopane economy. Historically, I emphasised in the chapter, women were the most active in the collection of the worm for domestic consumption, but, because of rampant unemployment in the area the trade has seen more men joining in. For the benefit of magnifying the scale of this, the chapter also provided a quantity analysis of mopane worms collected per households. This was done to show the relative importance of the mopane worm as an economic activity. In the same vein there was an attempt to show the typology of social classes that partake in the mopane worm economy. It was concluded that the harvesting of the worm was most prevalent amongst the poorer households though a sizeable number of middle-income households also took part. The high-income classes were mostly the buyers or the middleman who bought for resale in towns. The main point answering to the thesis was that the mopane worm economy has been important in ameliorating some of the challenges brought by existing on the margins.

Lastly the chapter draws the reader to the effects of the mopane economy on the environment, where the destruction of the mopane bearing forests has helped feed into the ‘them’ and ‘us’ dichotomy where foreigners are blamed for not following ‘proper’ harvesting procedure, disrespecting local laws and depleting the resource. This, I posited helps magnify anti-foreign feelings amongst the locals and placed chiefs in a rather awkward position in as far as ‘defending’ local resources was concerned.

The fourth chapter traced the history of cross border migration of the Kalanga in Mangwe. It was discussed that, from archival sources, cross border migration in Mangwe and Zimbabwe in general has a long history dating back to the times of Bantu migrations, Mfecane, the mineral revolution as well as different historical occurrences in the history of southern Africa. It was demonstrated that Kalanga migrations into South Africa were noticed as early as the 1870s, but there is justifiable belief that the migrations could be traced way back the mineral revolution period.

An attempt was made to describe the different theories that inform on patterns of migration on a global scale.⁵⁷⁴ I posited that, relevant to the main arguments pursued in this thesis, most of the migration that has taken place in Mangwe over the years is best explained in the theories that capture the transitory and historical nature of migration. To buttress the theoretical foundation of the chapter, migration was shown to be rooted in the inefficiencies and deficiencies of the capitalist system which marginalised certain sections of the population thus engendering tendencies such as migration in the affected groups. The overarching argument in

⁵⁷⁴ L. Kurekova, ‘*Theories of Migration: Conceptual Review and Empirical Testing in the Context of the EU East West flows*’, paper prepared for the Interdisciplinary Conference on Migration: Economic Change, Social Challenge, (University College London, 2011); R. Miles, *Capitalism and Unfree Labour: Anomaly or Necessity*, (London: Tavistock Publications, 1987); O Stark, *The Migration of Labour* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991); R. C. Bush and Martinello G., ‘*Migrant Labour in Southern Africa: an Historical and Theoretical Perspective*’, retrieved from <https://www.inventati.org/ababilonia/migrantlaboursouthafrica.pdf> accessed on the 18th of October 2017.

the chapter was that in as far as the Kalanga of Mangwe are concerned, scarcity of opportunities due to lack of access to economic and political power has led to high outmigration in the district.

The chapter also highlighted that the issue of cross border migration was an integral part of colonial labour policy throughout the colonial period. In that regard, policies such as Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) attested to the centrality of labour movements without and within borders, to support the colonial economy. In the same vein, the different ‘waves’ of migration were explained, stretching from WNLA migrations, liberation war movements, Gukurahundi displacements, Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, and the post-2000 economic crisis in Zimbabwe.⁵⁷⁵ An explanation was given on these different epochs of migration, and the concepts of survival strategies as it links to the prevalence of migration was elaborated on. The WNLA was used as a strategy to mobilise labour to work in the South African mines and it formed an important conduit for the migration of the Kalanga. I pointed out in the same chapter that despite lack of education and/or formal training, the Kalanga migrants were able to acquire an impressive array of skills in the technical fields that otherwise they would not have acquired back home (arguably owing to lack of access to educational facilities in Mangwe). Suffice to say, the chapter demonstrated that colonial

⁵⁷⁵ Phimister, ‘*African Worker Consciousness: Origins and Aspects to 1953*’, NAZ F137/186 E: Migrant Labour. Discussions with the Union Government, 1949-52. A letter to the chief secretary, 8 September 1952; C. van Onselen (1973), *Worker Consciousness in black mines: Southern Rhodesia 1900-1920*, *Journal of African history*, vol. no, pp 13-25; I. Phimister and R Polissof, *Wage labour in historical perspective: a study of the deproletarianisation of the African working class in Zimbabwe, 1960-2010*, *Wage Labour and Capital in Africa: Issue 2 Volume 58*, 2017; A S Mlambo, ‘*History of Migration in Zimbabwe*’, www.academia.edu; G Arrighi, *Labour Supplies in Historical perspective: A Study of the Proletarianisation of the African Peasants in Rhodesia*, *Journal of Development Studies*; D.B. Mugodzwa(2013), *Labour Appropriation in Buhera District, South-eastern Zimbabwe 1890-1930: The Accidental Proletarianization of an African Peasantry by a Foreign Capitalist Oligarchic Enterprise*, in the *European Journal of Sustainable Development*, 2, 4; B Raftopolous and I Phimister, (eds), *Keep on Knocking. A History of the Labour Movement in Zimbabwe, 1900-97*.

migration in the federation period increased the numbers of Kalanga crossing the borders into South Africa to look for work.

Attendant to this migration, there were visible social effects in Mangwe. I demonstrated that the most obvious was the demographic changes which because of gender dimensioned migration. In Mangwe, for example more males than females migrated though the trend has changed over the period under study due to several reasons. I showed that some of the patterns of migration affected agricultural work and as a result increased the prevalence of food shortages in the area. Because of drought and poor external support in terms of investments into the area, I argued that remittances play an important role in sustaining the livelihoods of the people of Mangwe. The issue of remittances was discussed, and their contributions towards mitigating the effects marginalisation were highlighted. Most importantly, the chapter emphasised that remittances come in many forms. They may be monetary or may include nonmonetary categories such as skills, technology, and knowledge. In the colonial period, monetary remittances came in handy in the payment of taxes and in purchasing as the economy rapidly monetised. The social status of migrants has been significantly raised, and that attracted more young men and women to migrate to South Africa or Botswana. Finally, an attempt was made to show how years of migration have altered the social fabric as well as the language of the area, where new words have been introduced to the Mangwe lingua franca.

The chapter was able to show that the Kalanga were also involved in war time migration. During the war of liberation Kalanga men and women crossed borders either to join the war effort or as refugees. The patterns of migration were obviously affected by the war. The motives for migrating changed and security became the prime mover of people from the district. As indicated in the chapter, security reasons weakened the migration numbers but did not stop the migration.

Upon the attainment of independence in 1980, migration patterns in Zimbabwe showed a fascinating trend. In Mangwe, I argued the Kalanga continued with their migration to the neighbouring countries precisely because even after independence the new state did not adequately address the concerns of the Kalanga as shown by the continued complaints of neglect by associations such as the KCPS. The high hopes offered by the new country; Zimbabwe at Independence did not deter the Kalanga from migrating. When the Zimbabwean economy started to experience problems after the failure of the ESAP project, and the unprecedented economic precipice that followed the land reform programme in Zimbabwe, migration patterns shot up. Amongst the Kalanga, this only worsened their already perilous situation and there is evidence to show that Mangwe experienced unprecedented outmigration during this period.

In order not to lose sight of the main argument of the thesis, on the link between ethnicity, marginalisation and survival strategies, the chapter tried to explain the relationship between these concepts. The chapter demonstrated that the most pronounced stages of migration were during the colonial period where colonial segregating policies rendered the Africans productive capabilities limited to a large extent. In other words, the marginalisation of the African to the peripheries of the capitalist economy was cited as one of the reasons for the migration of the Kalanga in particular. As was the case of the Kalanga, the chapter demonstrated that the marginalisation of the Kalanga continued well into the post-colonial period as was shown by the low levels of investment into the area and that meant cross border migration, amongst other strategies continued.

A further examination of the coping strategies of the Kalanga as an ethnic group was carried out in chapter five, where I focused on informal cross border trade that is prevalent in Mangwe district. The chapter discussed the nature and impact of informal cross border trade in the district, with inferences made to the broader experiences in the country. It was discovered that

informal cross border trade has deep roots in the district. Most scholarship on informal cross border trade in Zimbabwe had seemed to suggest that the activity is a recent phenomenon, and part of the argument in this chapter was to show that the activity has only increased in volume. Petty commodity trade has been recorded between chiefdoms in the period preceding colonial contact.

I argued that though economic factors remained paramount in influencing the choice of engaging in this business, it is still plausible to add that amongst the Kalanga of Mangwe issues of marginalisation have been intertwined with the emergence of activities such as informal cross border trading. In that regard the chapter made a broad attempt to continue the analytical framework of linking the economic activities practised in Mangwe to the debates on ethnic marginalisation.

To fully understand the historical development of this economic activity, the chapter was divided into three main areas: the first one provided the background to informal cross border trade, the second examined the colonial experiences whilst the third focused on post-colonial activities. Archival records showed that a good measure of informal trade and related activities were carried out during the colonial period. Related activities included smuggling and unregulated cross border trade which raised quite an ire amongst the colonial authorities as they tried to grapple with these unusual economic crimes. The colonial authorities tried with little success to regulate the underground/ or informal cross border trade, and even set up border patrols. What emerges however is that the roots of informal and unregulated cross border trade scenario help to explain appeared to be a response to the colonial predatory state that narrowed the economic space of the Africans? The African devised strategies to survive against the background of restrictions on alternative economic activities for the Africans. Colonial police records show that clandestine and illicit trade developed between South Africa and Zimbabwe

and that WNLA workers were the main movers of this trade as they were the most mobile during this time.⁵⁷⁶

The above scenario, as highlighted in the chapter was explained in the activities of the *omalayitsha*: an informal economy that has thrived in Matabeleland since the 1980s.⁵⁷⁷ The *omalayitsha* were identified as one of the most obvious examples of a response to state predatorism, where, in attempt to provide service in an increasingly disadvantaged community the activities of the *omalayitsha* become entangled in the politics of marginalisation and exclusion. I argued that part of the motivation of the *omalayitsha* comes from the sentiments of being excluded. The shady nature of their activities is a product of the limited space in which they operate. The chapter used the example of the *omalayitsha* to emphasise that they are seen as a symbol of ethnic grievance as well as enterprising businesspeople who are functioning in a predatory and exclusionist state.

There was an attempt to redefine the term informal, using a framework provided by different theorists such as the structuralists, legalists and rationalists. What emerged was that the informal economy is essentially a product of many factors including but not entirely limited to marginalisation and unequal development. The main body of scholarship is of the view that the emergence of an informal economy can be linked to the inadequacies of the capitalist system which created a dualised economy which functioned to keep labour costs down. In its exploitative nature the capitalist system feeds well into the marginalisation debate that is central to this thesis.

⁵⁷⁶ NAZ 0.2205/22/49, Southern Rhodesia Customs office, to the Staff Officer, the BSAP, Salisbury on alleged contravention of Customs Regulations by Messrs. McDougall and Spraggon of Nuanetsi; NAZ S910/22, Suspected smuggling; Memo from the Department of Customs and Excise, Salisbury to the Commissioner of Customs, Pretoria, 1940.

⁵⁷⁷ T. Nyamunda, *Cross border couriers as symbols of regional grievance: The Malayitsha remittance system in Matabeleland*, Zimbabwe, African Diaspora 7, 2014.

I argued in the same chapter that excessive bureaucracy tends to frustrate groups that exist on the margins, that the Kalanga have arguably been historically side-lined in the bureaucratic structures of the state in Zimbabwe hence their active participation in informal economic activities such as *omalayitsha*. In the same the corollary argument would be that with more liberalisation of the economy the informal sector might shrink. However, the human agency was also highlighted in the chapter where I posited that human beings make rational decisions to partake in an activity, and that the activities done by the Kalanga are not necessarily confined to them alone.

The gender dynamics of this trade was also highlighted, where I suggested that the entry of women into the activity was by no means a coincidence, but rather a calculated move occasioned by sound economic considerations. Women were mostly active in the small commodity trade. Finally, the chapter surmised that informal cross border trade has managed to pull a sizeable number of households in Mangwe out of poverty.

A slightly different approach is applied in Chapter six, where non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are discussed. This chapter discussed the operations of NGOs in Mangwe, and their activities were juxtaposed with the ethnicity and marginalisation debate. The background or history of NGOs in the country in general activity was discussed, where I noted that earliest forms of NGOs in Zimbabwe were primarily concerned with the interests of white people because they were dominant then. The NGOs however evolved over time and manifested themselves in welfare organisations which began to talk about the interests of black people as well. These welfare organisations began to appear around 1910 and they were mostly spearheaded by the emerging educated class of Africans. Organisations such as the Ndebele National Home Movement fell into that category. These welfare organisations catered for a divers set of needs. Perhaps more relevant to this study, most of these organisations were territorial and ethnicised.

As time went on, these organisations metamorphosed into bodies making explicit political demands such as the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association. These were however elitist in their nature and were not as broadly appealing as such. However, they were important in laying the foundation for future welfare organisations and nationalist parties. Another important dimension that emerged from the discussion in the chapter was that most early organisations were church based, and these organisations devoted most of their time to fighting colonial excesses and injustices.

There was also discussion on the relations between the state and the non-governmental organisations, where I argued that the two institutions have experienced periods of cooperation and confrontation depending on the agenda of the NGO on one hand and the socio-political and economic wherewithal of the state at the time, on the other. In Mangwe, I argued that the operations of the NGO are made more complex because their activities appear to be directly linked to grievances that otherwise the state should address, for example sparsity of educational and health facilities as well roads. In fact, the central argument in the chapter was that NGOs, as agents for development have become entangled in the politics of exclusion and marginalisation in Mangwe. In some instances, the interventionist tendencies of NGOs is seen as vindicating the failings of government, hence the chapter concluded that in some cases NGOs are sued as tools for political gamesmanship, where political players and other stakeholders try to accrue 'capital' out of the activities of NGOs.

In the same vein, the role of traditional leaders vis a vis the NGO was discussed. Here, traditional leaders were identified as the focal point in as far as development is concerned in Mangwe. They are expected to highlight local grievances which I argued in the case of Mangwe is problematic because of the thin line that exists between local grievances and ethnic marginalisation. The chapter proposed that traditional leaders in Mangwe are in a precarious

position in as far as pushing local developmental agendas without falling foul with the government on whose payroll they are in. Because NGOs attempt to ‘address’ local grievances which I have emphasised are interlinked with the marginalisation of the Kalanga in Mangwe, I suggested that their role has inadvertently placated local initiative towards holding the central government accountable to the developmental needs of the people of Mangwe. Using both the food aid and heifer programmes of an NGO that operated in Mangwe, NGO aid appeared both short term and created local challenges such creating elitist classes thus impeding on their ‘welfare’ nature.

What came out of the discussion was that non-governmental organisations in Mangwe and Zimbabwe in general have been intricately intertwined with the developmental agenda, and as a marginalised region development and/or lack of it is highly politicised in Mangwe.

The penultimate chapter looked at a very pertinent issue not only in Mangwe but across Zimbabwe: gold panning and its attendant vices, as helping in entrenching feelings of marginalisation and neglect. Chapter 7 thus takes the reader through the historical roots of gold mining in Zimbabwe, and in Mangwe. What emerged from the discussion is that artisanal gold mining is an old activity in Mangwe. The discovery of abandoned gold pits, some of which acted as focal points for colonial mineral prospecting, showed that gold deposits were exploited in the area even before colonial mining. The chapter argued that the way the gold mining activity is carried out in the district: issues of ownership and the violence and thuggery accompanying it showed followed closely the narrative and powerlessness often reflected in the thinking of the citizens of Mangwe.

The chapter moved on to examine the prevalence of artisanal mining in the early years of colonial rule, where I mentioned that restrictive colonial legislation stifled the growth of artisanal mining amongst the Africans. However, the activity was not completely shut down as

Africans continued to engage in this activity sometimes in cohorts with white settlers. The Africans colluded with some Europeans to produce gold which was clandestinely traded.

The long years of colonial rule saw the spread of prospecting and mining activities to large swathes of Matabeleland, including Mangwe where disused pits and diggings are a common sight. These pits have over the years been revisited by bands of small-scale artisanal miners hoping to strike gold. Some of the pits have been reported to be rich but some have been abandoned again leaving behind an unpleasant environmental sight characterised by damage and deforestation.

The chapter interrogated the politics of gold mining in the district where ownership of mine claims remains heavily contested amongst the locals themselves and between the locals and people from outside the district. The concept of entitlement to resources, which is a recurring theme in the whole thesis is also highlighted in this chapter, how locals and ‘outsiders’ have constantly engaged each for space and resources.⁵⁷⁸ Reasons for the expansion of this activity are highlighted, but most importantly is the way the locals have responded to this intrusion that feeds into the ethnicity and marginalisation thread that informs on this thesis. What emerged was that some of the people in Mangwe have found ways to accrue gain from this rather ‘unwelcome’ activity through setting up of shops and small businesses that supply the ever-

expanding informal mining sector. The local elite, such as retired civil servants have been at the forefront in seeking a stake in the mining sector. However, as demonstrated in the chapter

⁵⁷⁸ Z Mohammed, *Resource Competition and Inter-ethnic Relations: A Case of the Arsi Oromo and Sidama in South Central Ethiopia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2008).

ownership of most stamping mills as well as the composition of the miners remains largely ‘foreign’ to the district.

To deepen our understanding of the issues under discussion and link to the broader parameters of the thesis, I attempted to explain that gold mining in Mangwe has blurred ethnic and citizenship boundaries in the district, where resource ownership and the politics thereof have surfaced in Mangwe. The challenges and problems emanating from the mining activities in the area has irked the locals, especially where mining activities have resulted in environmental damage or have endangered the wellbeing of livestock through polluting scarce water sources. Like the mopane worm economy discussed in another chapter the tensions between locals and ‘foreigners’ has not escaped the ethnicity and marginalisation lens that characterises most multi-ethnic communities in Africa.

Fundamentally, the thesis traced the socio-economic history of the Kalanga from the 1940s. There was an attempt to synthesise the socio-economic activities of the Kalanga within the broader debates of ethnicity and marginalisation, based on the experience of the Kalanga.

Appendix

Questions for fieldwork. (*Questioning solely depended on the level of education of the interviewee and the author reserved the rights to rephrasing questions to suit the different interviewees*)

1. Different groups of the Kalanga have filtered into this area at different periods in history, would you elaborate on how your grandparents settled in this area and the reasons why. Would you care to describe the distinguishing traits of your own group and how it relates with other groups (Kalanga or non-Kalanga) in and around your area?
2. Would you explain how your grandparents and your parents, across generations have survived in this seemingly dry and harsh climate?
3. Do the Kalanga in your area have any relationship with those in Botswana, and if yes how have they used these ties to promote economic exchanges such as trade?
4. In the colonial period and beyond, the Kalanga in this area have regularly crossed into Botswana for various reasons. How has this cross-border movement affected the social way of life of the people in your area since the 1940s?
5. Before the construction of the border post, how did the people in this area move goods and people into Botswana and beyond, and what methods did they use to circumvent arrest and criminality? How has the construction of the border post affected this way of life?
6. This area is a well-known mopane worm area, and the worm has been harvested for generations. How have the people marketed the worm and how have they used their earnings?
7. Would you explain how you, your parents or grandparents dealt with the colonial experience, for example the land policy or livestock issues? How did such policies shape the social and economic geography of your area?

8. Comment on the effects of the war of liberation on the social and economic way of life of the people in your area. How did the different groups, particularly the youth respond to the demands of the war and how did this alter the economics/social structure of the area?
9. Some areas in Mangwe are littered with disused gold mines and have a seemingly rich history of gold mining. Would you elaborate on the gold mining activity in this area and how it has transformed the socio-economic history of the Kalanga of Mangwe over the decades? Comment on recent government programmes such as community share trust, especially how they have affected the economic way of life of communities such as Mangwe.
10. In the recent past there has been an upsurge in the numbers and scale of illegal gold panning in your area, affecting not only your economy but your social activities. Elaborate further on this issue with special emphasis on the friction caused by this activity between the illegal gold panners and the community.
11. Mangwe, like the rest of Zimbabwe has not escaped the hot issue of land reform. Briefly comment on how land politics have affected the social and economic history of Mangwe since independence. Still on that issue of land, elaborate more on the issue of '*madeluka*' and '*mampande*', especially on the reasons why these two groups appear to be 'unpopular' in some areas in Mangwe.
12. IsiNdebele seems to be the language of business in this area, as a Kalanga how do you feel about that and what do you think needs to be done to promote Kalanga language and culture? Comment on the efforts of the Kalanga since the 1940s, and hindrances thereof, to promote Kalanga language and culture in the colonial and postcolonial periods. How has Ndebele dominance affected Kalanga cultural and social history?
13. '*Bakalanga milikani muhinge mumuse hango yenyu mugelileni wale*' (Bakalanga stand up and work to revitalise your nation-what are you waiting for!) is a verse extracted from a

song by a popular Kalanga band. As a Kalanga going back in the history of your area, what emotions are invoked by such statements and how (and with what success) have the Kalanga attempted to revitalise/reinvent themselves since the 1940s particularly in the business front?

14. What are your views and perceptions on the general distribution of industries, social services, and the state of roads in Bukalanga since the 1940s though to independence? Comment on the efforts by both the colonial and postcolonial governments to promote industrial growth in Mangwe.

15. Comment on the role of non-governmental organisation (since independence) in Mangwe in as far as assisting people mitigate the effects of drought and lack of infrastructure is concerned. Why in your own view, are non-governmental organisations thriving in this area since the attainment of independence, and how has this affected your perceptions and views about your local government representatives such as councillors and MPs since independence?

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Informal discussion with Mandla Ndlovu, PhD, University of Johannesburg, working on the demobilisation and integration experiences of Zimbabwean liberation struggle ex-combatants.

Informal discussion with Mthulisi Ncube (a Kalanga linguist and interpreter) and a Mr Sithole. Sithole works for a burgeoning community radio station in Mangwe, separately in Bulawayo, May 2017 and August 2018 respectively.

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