

A Political Discourse Analysis of Social memory, Collective Identity and Nation-Building in *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* of Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013

A Dissertation Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements of the Doctor of Philosophy
Degree in Journalism and Media Studies

Rhodes University

By

Phillip Santos

Supervisors

**Professor Lynette Steenveld
Professor Enocent Msindo**

December 2016

The financial assistance of the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences-Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (NIHSS-CODESRIA) towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the NIHSS-CODESRIA

Abstract

Although much effort has been expended on studying many sites of social memory, little attention has been directed at the media's work of memory, especially in post-colonial Africa. The media's work of memory is important because of its social standing as a communicative and cultural institution, and because social memory is imbricated in processes of both collective identity formation and nation-building which partly shape patterns of economic distribution, recognition, and representation in society. It is in this context that this study shows how Zimbabwe's *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* newspapers used social memory to construct the country's national identity between 1999 and 2013 in the context of a socio-economic and political crisis for the country's poly-racial, and poly-ethno-linguistic communities. The study also explores how these newspapers worked as memory sites through their construction of Zimbabwe's national identity during the period under study. It achieves these tasks by analysing how these newspapers reported on such issues as Zimbabwe's colonial history, the country's narrative of decolonisation, the *Gukurahundi* narrative, the land reform process, elections and independence celebrations. The study takes a critical realist approach to qualitative research, and uses Fairclough and Fairclough's (2012) method of political discourse analysis as well as Aristotle's approach to rhetoric for a close reading of the sampled newspaper articles. It is informed by Nancy Fraser's Theory of Justice, Chantal Mouffe's Model of Agonistic Pluralism, and Jurgen Habermas's Discourse Ethics Theory. The study concludes that these two newspapers *actively* use social memory to construct versions of national identity for specific socio-political and economic ends. Editorials and opinions from *The Sunday Mail*, which construct Zimbabwean-ness in nativist terms represent the hegemonic appropriation of social memory to construct a sense of Zimbabwean nationhood. In contrast, *The Standard* uses social memory to construct Zimbabwean-ness in modernist terms with citizenship as the core organising principle of belonging. The political discourse analysis of *The Sunday Mail's* and *The Standard's* evocation of social memory shows that the two newspapers reflect the tension between indigenist and universalist imaginaries of belonging in Zimbabwe. But the newspapers' construction of belonging in Zimbabwe is informed by justice claims as seen from each of their political standpoints. As such, their respective definitions of Zimbabweans' justice claims in terms of their political standpoints, also propose how those justice claims should be addressed and who stands to benefit from them.

Dedication

For Ellen, Thandiswa and Raimundo

Acronyms

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| AIDS | Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome |
| AIPPA | Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act |
| AMH | Alpha Media Holdings |
| AMI | Africa Media Investments |
| ANZ | Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe |
| AU | African Union |
| BAZ | Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe |
| BBC | British Broadcasting Authority |
| BSA | Broadcasting Services Act |
| CABS | Central African Broadcasting Station |
| CAF | Central African Federation |
| CCJP | Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace |
| COPAC | Constitution Parliamentary Select Committee |
| ESAP | Economic Structural Adjustment Programme |
| EU | European Union |
| FBC | Federal Broadcasting Corporation |
| GNU | Government of National Unity |
| GPA | Global Political Agreement |
| HIV | Human Immunodeficiency Virus |
| HIV-AIDS | Human Immunodeficiency Virus - Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| LOMA | Law and Order (Maintenance) Act |
| LRF | Legal Resources Foundation |
| MDC | Movement for Democratic Change |
| MDC-M | Movement for Democratic Change - Mutambara |
| MDC-T | Movement for Democratic Change - Tsvangirai |

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| MIC | Media and Information Commission |
| NCA | National Constitutional Assembly |
| OSA | Official Secrets Act |
| PF | Patriotic Front |
| POSA | Public Order and Security Act |
| RBC | Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation |
| RBZ | Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe |
| RF | Rhodesian Front |
| RPPC | Rhodesia Printing and Publishing Company |
| RTV | Rhodesia Television Ltd |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| UDI | Unilateral Declaration of Independence |
| UFP | United Federal Party |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| VOP | Voice of the People |
| ZAMPS | Zimbabwe All Media Products Survey |
| Zanla | Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army |
| Zanu PF | Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front |
| Zanu | Zimbabwe African National Union |
| Zapu | Zimbabwe African People’s Union |
| ZBC | Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation |
| ZBC-TV 1 | Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation – Television 1 |
| ZBC-TV 2 | Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation – Television 2 |
| ZBH | Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings |
| ZCTU | Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions |
| ZESN | Zimbabwe Election Support Network |
| ZIANA | Zimbabwe Inter-Africa News Agency |

| | |
|------------------|---|
| Zimpapers | Zimbabwe Newspapers |
| Zipra | Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army |
| ZIS | Zimbabwe Information Service |
| ZMMT | Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust |
| ZUJ | Zimbabwe Union of Journalists |
| ZUM | Zimbabwe Unity Movement |

Contents

| | |
|---|-------------|
| Abstract | i |
| Dedication | ii |
| Acronyms | iii |
| Acknowledgements | viii |
| Preface | ix |
| Chapter 1: Socio-Political and Economic Context | 1 |
| Introduction | 1 |
| Socio-Political Vicissitudes in Zimbabwe | 2 |
| Conclusion | 18 |
| Chapter 2: Transformations in Zimbabwe’s Media Landscape | 20 |
| Introduction | 20 |
| Transformations in Zimbabwe’s Media Landscape | 21 |
| Cases Under Study | 39 |
| Conclusion | 42 |
| Chapter 3: A Conceptual Exegesis | 43 |
| Introduction | 43 |
| Social Memory | 43 |
| Nation-Building | 57 |
| Collective Identity | 74 |
| Conclusion | 83 |
| Chapter Four: The Politics of Nation and Identity in Zimbabwe | 84 |
| Introduction | 84 |
| Africa’s Contemporary Conundrum | 84 |
| The Case of Zimbabwe | 93 |
| Critical Reflections on Zimbabwe’s Contemporary Moment | 102 |
| Conclusion | 105 |
| Chapter 5: Theoretical Framework | 106 |
| Introduction | 106 |
| Why Study the Media’s Memory Work? | 107 |
| Nancy Fraser’s Theory of Justice | 109 |
| Chantal Mouffe and Agonistic Pluralism | 117 |
| Jurgen Habermas’s Discourse Ethics Theory | 121 |
| Convergences: Discourse Ethics, Parity of Participation and Agonistic Pluralism | 128 |
| Conclusion | 130 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| Chapter 6: Methodology and Methods | 131 |
| Introduction | 131 |
| Methodological Orientation | 131 |
| Research Design and Sampling | 137 |
| Quality | 143 |
| Analytic Method | 144 |
| Conclusion | 155 |
| Chapter 7: A Political Discourse Analysis of <i>The Sunday Mail's</i> and <i>The Standard's</i> Opinions and Editorials | 157 |
| Introduction | 157 |
| A Political Discourse Analysis of Articles | 158 |
| Chapter 8: A Political Discourse Analysis of <i>The Sunday Mail's</i> and <i>The Standard's</i> Opinions and Editorials | 198 |
| Introduction | 198 |
| A Political Discourse Analysis of Articles | 198 |
| Conclusion | 224 |
| Chapter 9: A Political Analysis of the Newspapers' Memory Work | 227 |
| Introduction | 227 |
| A Political Analysis of <i>The Sunday Mail's</i> and <i>The Standard's</i> Work of Memory | 228 |
| A Normative Critique of <i>The Sunday Mail's</i> and <i>The Standard's</i> Work of Memory | 239 |
| Conclusion | 249 |
| Chapter 10: Conclusion | 251 |
| Conclusion | 251 |
| References | 257 |
| Appendices | 279 |
| Appendix A: The Sunday Mail Sample | 280 |
| Appendix B: The Standard Sample | 281 |
| Appendix C: Chapter 7 Structure | 282 |
| Appendix D: Chapter 8 Structure | 284 |
| Appendix E: Chronological Story List | 285 |

Acknowledgements

I owe a debt of gratitude to people and organisations without whose support it would have been impossible to produce this work. To my supervisors Prof. Lynette Steenveld and Prof. Enocent Msindo, I say thank you for your sagacious guidance throughout the process of writing this dissertation. To my dear wife, Ellen, and my children Thandiswa and Raimundo, thank you for your love, unflinching support, and patient tolerance for my absence during the course of my studies. I would also want to extend my gratitude to South Africa's National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIHSS) for its generous financial and academic support, thank you. To my friends Jolly Ntaba, Francis Kapiri, Korir Kiplimo, Dr Albert Chakona, Dr Stanley Tsarwe, Dr Admire Mare, Sharon Karamagi, Blessing Jona, and Khulekani Ndlovu, thank you very much for your support and light moments without which it would have been difficult to remain sane. To my brothers Epton Moyo, Enzanai Moyo and their families, as well as my nephew Elton Moyo, I say thank you for all the support. It is very much appreciated. Kholwani Nyathi, Mabasa Sasa, Elias Mambo, Nqaba Matshazi, and the National Archives in Bulawayo, a big thank you for your help during my data gathering process. To my employers, the National University of Science and Technology, thank you for your support. I am also grateful to the Department of Journalism and Media Studies at NUST for its moral support, and to my students, for their patience and fruitful conversations. Lastly, a big thank you to Jabu Nene, Esteri Msindo and all staff members at the Rhodes University Library for your exceptional professionalism and support. May God bless you all!

Preface

Today's media of mass communication are one of the fundamental outcomes of modernity. Most, if not all contemporary social processes, are in one way or another contingent on the existence of media of mass communication which are partly behind the shift from face-to-face interactions between people to what Thompson calls "quasi-interaction" (2005:33). The media are also an important institution in socio-political and economic struggles. Thompson observes that by "using communication media, individuals create *new*¹ forms of action and interaction which have their own distinctive properties" (2005:32). Although Thompson mentions only individuals, the same could also be said of social groups. But, one of the most neglected political functions of the media is their work of memory (Zelizer 2008), and this is the focus of my research. This study's concern with social memory is premised on the understanding that social memory partly defines relationships between the individual and society, and enables a community to preserve its self-image for transfer through time (Zandberg 2010; Halbwachs 1992). Another dimension is the argument that social memory is the process through which the residue of the past is interpreted and transformed into material with contemporary resonance (Zelizer 1995). What is significant from these observations is the location of memory in the social as it endows narratives of the past with an important role in politics and society (Olick 1999). As Zelizer points out:

by definition, collective memory thereby presumes activities of sharing, discussion, negotiation, and, often, contestation. Remembering becomes implicated in a range of other activities having as much to do with identity formation, power and authority, cultural norms, and social interaction as with the simple act of recall. (1995)

It is this imbrication of social memory with other social processes that necessitates an examination of the media's work of memory. Edy argues that communication is a critical component of collective memory as it builds perceptions of the past's importance in social processes such as nation building and identity formation (1999:72). Another important observation is that unlike traditional elements of memory, the media "may encourage the personal and emotional connections with the past that are associated with collective memory" (Edy 1999:72). It has also been argued that "journalists can be seen as memory agents in three levels: telling the public about events, situating journalistic coverage within larger contexts, and identifying journalists' professional roles in shaping social memories" (Berkowitz 2011:302). It is therefore important to assess the media's memory work since "how memories

¹ All italics used in direct quotes throughout this paper are taken as they are from original sources.

are erased, forgotten, or willed absent has come to be seen as equally important to the ways in which memories are set in place” (Zelizer 1995:220; 2008). But, despite the media’s work of memory, it has also been noted that little attention has been paid to it as a site where the past is, *inter alia*, recalled, modified, related to the present, and used to inform political action (Edy 1999:72; Zelizer 2008). As Zelizer argues, “even today, decades into the systematic scholarly study of collective memory, there is still no default understanding of memory that includes journalism as one of its vital and critical agents” (2008:80). It is in this context that this research seeks to contribute to filling this knowledge gap. The study is significant in the sense that contestations over social memory, collective identity formation, and the way these interact with power and authority may potentially shape the nature of individual and group relations as well as the distribution of resources in society. A better understanding of the media’s memory work may thus help in formulating more democratic uses of social memory. This study is focused on how journalism’s work of memory manifests at the level of text because “the activity of remembering can also be collectively and discursively accomplished” (Billig 2001:213, see also Halbwachs 1980). The discursive has also been argued to carry within it power which can be “enacted by persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation, among other strategic ways to change the mind of others in one’s own interests” (van Dijk 2001:302). The study analyses how *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* newspapers of Zimbabwe work as sites of social memory, and in so doing construct collective identities and participate in the country’s nation-building processes. An important dimension to this study is that it is conducted in a post-colonial African context which is different from other studies conducted elsewhere such as that by Zelizer (1992).

This study seeks to investigate two major issues. The first, is how *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* newspapers of Zimbabwe used social memory to construct the country’s national identity between 1999 and 2013 in a context of ongoing nation-building processes, and against Zimbabwe’s poly-racial, and poly-ethno-linguistic character. Secondly, the study explores how these newspapers work as memory sites over the period under study. Zimbabwe makes a good case study, since, as with many other post-colonial African countries, it is a nationalising state (Kuzio 2001; Brubaker 1996a). It is at once an arbitrary creation of colonial design and post-colonial nation-building efforts unlike most of the Western societies on which much of the widely available literature on nation-building and nationalism is based. This presents an opportunity for studying the ways in which both colonial and post-colonial socio-political and economic realities shape patterns of belonging in such societies. Although this is not a new

area of research in Africa, of particular importance to this study is the media's memory work in the processes of nationalising poly-racial and poly-ethno-cultural post-colonial societies such as Zimbabwe, through their mediation of such realities. This study is limited to newspapers as they were the most common source of news for most people in Zimbabwe during the period under study. This is evidenced by the government's hostility towards privately owned newspapers, and its determination to control which newspapers are licensed to operate as well as who works as a journalist in such newspapers (see Moyo 2010; Chuma 2005; Chapter Two).

The study is structured as follows. Chapter One provides the socio-political and economic context for the study between 1999 to 2013. It illuminates the socio-political and economic events that unfolded during this time. The assumption here is that the media ecology in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013, although variable, partly constituted, or was constituted by, the concomitant socio-political milieu. Also, tracing the mutual relationship between the socio-political context and configuration of the media in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013, makes clear the choice of *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* as objects of study in this research. Chapter Two locates the trajectory of transformation in Zimbabwe's media policy during the shifting socio-political context outlined in Chapter One. The premise for this work is that shifts in socio-political developments in Zimbabwe both shaped and were, to some degree, shaped by the media. Chapter Two also shows the polar positions held by *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard*, and their potential productivity in explicating the dimensions of difference and contest in identity construction and the nation-building processes in Zimbabwe during this period. These two newspapers are useful in discerning the different ways in which different media, informed by different ideological orientations, work as memory sites in an environment of contesting discourses. Chapter Three explicates the study's key terms: social memory, collective identity and nation-building. This is necessary because these terms and phenomena are invested with a multiplicity of understandings not just at the conceptual level, but also in social praxis. Although this chapter explicates the general understandings of these terms, it also specifies the ways in which the terms have been appropriated for the study. Chapter Four discusses the politics of identity in Zimbabwe. Its premise is that the country's contemporary condition and the discourses associated with it are not significantly unlike other post-colonial experiences. The politics of nation and identity in Zimbabwe are thus located within the broader continental context. Chapter Five locates the media as an important site for studying memory work in society before discussing the theories that inform the study, namely,

Nancy Fraser's (2001, 2003, 2008) Theory of Justice, Chantal Mouffe's (1999, 2009) Model of Agonistic Pluralism, and Jurgen Habermas's (1989, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1998) Discourse Ethics Theory. Chapter Six presents the methodology and methods used in the study. It outlines the methodological orientation of the study which is critical realism, the research design used, namely, a comparative case study approach; the purposive sampling method used to select both the cases under study as well as articles for analysis; the quality considerations of this research process; and finally, the political-discourse-analytical approach used by the study. Chapters Seven and Eight use the political-discourse-analytical approach to analyse the sorts of arguments instantiated by both *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard*. This analytical work is informed by the conceptual outline provided in Chapter Three. The idea is to assess how these newspapers *actively* framed a sense of belonging using social memory. Chapter Nine focuses on the politics behind such constructions. It shows the nature of memory work performed by the two newspapers through an analysis of the sorts of political issues to which they spoke, and which shaped their discursive constructions. In this way, the chapter shows how social memory works as a function of the newspapers' social action. Lastly, Chapter Ten concludes the study.

Chapter One

Socio-Political and Economic Context

The constitutional referendum held in Zimbabwe in February 2000 challenged the hegemonic and increasingly authoritarian rule of President Robert Mugabe and his ruling nationalist Zanu (PF) party. Despite a prior trend of opposition, this marked a particular watershed in Zimbabwe's post-independence political history, precipitating dramatic shifts in the country's political, economic, social, cultural and spatial landscapes; shifts whose on-going dynamics and extensive effects have generically – though not without fierce contestation – come to be termed 'the Zimbabwe Crisis.' (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003:1)

It is fair to conclude that the politics of political and civic opposition that emerged in the late 1990s and continued through the first 13 years of the 2000s has come to an end in its current form. The political and economic conditions that gave rise to its emergence have changed substantially and the social forces that have emerged [...] pose new challenges for party and civic organisation and mobilisation. (Raftopoulos 2013:986)

Introduction

The period marked out by the observations above constitutes the temporal scope of this study owing to the unique socio-political, historical and economic issues and events characteristic of this era in Zimbabwe's recent past. However, some, if not most of the issues and events that became salient between 1999 and 2013 can be traced to developments dating as far back as pre-colonial Zimbabwe. As this is not a study of Zimbabwe's history, and because that history is well documented in many historical works on Zimbabwe,² this chapter briefly revisits that long history to the extent that it is necessary to put the period under study into perspective. The central concern of this chapter is to illuminate the socio-political and economic events that unfolded in the period under study. The assumption here is that the media configuration in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013 (its shifts notwithstanding), was either constitutive of, or constituted by, the concomitant socio-political milieu. Tracing the mutual relationship between the socio-political context and configuration of the media in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013 also makes clear the choice of *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* as objects of study in this research. The chapter is divided into three main sections which correspond to key phases of the country's history in the period before, during and after the peak of Zimbabwe's crisis. The first

²This is not an exhaustive list of historical texts on Zimbabwe: See Ranger 1967, 1977, 1985, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2005b; Raftopoulos 1999, 2001, 2007; Beach 1971, 1979, 1980, 1986, 1998; Cobbing 1977; Sithole, 1979, 1999; Kriger 1995, 1995b, 2003, 2005, 2006; Msindo 2007, 2012; Mudenge 1988; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2011; Mandaza 1986; CCJP/LRF 1997; Moyo 2001; Moyana 1984; Martin and Johnson 1981; Meredith 2002; Muzondidya 2001.

section discusses the events that eventually led to the Zimbabwean crisis, and is followed by a discussion of the crisis itself in the second section. The third section discusses the era of the Government of National Unity before concluding the chapter.

Socio-Political Vicissitudes in Zimbabwe

Prelude to Crisis

Contemporary Zimbabwe is a product of a protracted armed struggle against a racist colonial regime of Southern Rhodesia. Its independence came out of the synergistic efforts of, mainly, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (Zapu) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu) as well as their military wings, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (Zipra) and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (Zanla), respectively (Masunungure 2006; Alexander and McGregor 2006). However, common as their objective of jettisoning a racist socio-political and economic order in Southern Rhodesia was, this alliance was not without its problems (see Sithole 1999; Mlambo 2013). Some of the fiercest battles during Zimbabwe's liberation war were between Zanla and Zipra combatants (Mlambo 2013). Since Zapu's split in 1963, out of which Zanu was born, the relationship between these two parties has been characterised by a dialectic of fierce contest and co-operation. The split itself was a culmination of simmering tension within Zapu, and it amplified conflict between Zanu and Zapu in the years that followed.

Zanu's split from Zapu in 1963 has generally been explained in ethnic terms, pitting the Ndebele ethnic group (generally associated with Zapu) against the Shona ethnic group (generally associated with Zanu) (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007). Although this assessment seems logical in view of the former's popularity in Mashonaland and the latter in Matabeleland regions, some scholars have given more nuanced assessments of the rupture between these revolutionary parties (Msindo 2012:192-202). Without denying the contingency of ethnicity, Msindo argues that high expectations among younger nationalists informed by the broader continental political environment of an incipient decolonisation of Africa; personality clashes; Zapu leader Joshua Nkomo's poor handling of internal divisions within the party; and an overly optimistic expectation that independence was imminent, may have had added impetus to the split (2012:196). Msindo meticulously shows the acute escalation of conflict along both political and ethnic lines within Zapu, as well as between Zapu and Zanu, after the 1963 split (2012:202-210).

While attempts were made towards the end of the war to unite the two political formations as the Patriotic Front, the chasm between them widened and deepened in 1980 following Zanu's decision to contest Zimbabwe's first post-independence election separately from Zapu (Mlambo 2013:58; Msindo 2012). After winning the first election of independent Zimbabwe, the Zanu-led government embarked on an ambitious social project with the core task of uniting yesterday's enemies into a nation, through most significantly the policy of reconciliation. This was seen as foundational to the socio-economic and political development of the country. The framework for rebuilding a new nation was expressed by then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe thus:

If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you. The wrongs of the past now stand forgiven and forgotten [...]. I urge you, whether you are White or Black, to join me in a new pledge to forget our grim past, forgive others and forget, join hands in a new amity and together, as Zimbabweans, trample upon racialism, tribalism and regionalism and work hard to reconstruct and rehabilitate our society as we re-invigorate our economic machinery. (Mlambo 2013:50; Mpofu 2003)

This new nation, it was envisaged, would be guided by a form of developmental and inclusive nationalism that sought to even out socio-economic privileges across the social spectrum of Zimbabwean citizens (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009; Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003). The reconfiguration of the relationship between Zanu and Zapu after 1980, following the former's decision to contest the 1980 elections separately rather than as a unitary entity with the latter, unleashed a series of events that would, and continue to, put into question the notion of a consensus about Zimbabwe as a nation-state, and Zimbabwean-ness as a national identity (Mlambo, 2013:58). Significant among these was the dreadful violence meted out at the largely *isiNdebele* speaking civilian population of Matabeleland North, Matabeleland South and Midlands provinces between 1982 and 1987 (see a report by the Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice 1997; Mlambo 2013:58; Msindo 2012:212-219).³ Associated with this brutal episode is the continued economic marginalisation of the provinces of Matabeleland which has spawned a plethora of political initiatives variously seeking relative autonomy, full autonomy and outright secession of the Matabeleland provinces from the geo-political entity Zimbabwe (see Mhlanga 2010; Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008; Masunungure, 2006).

³ The government's military campaign in Matabeleland ended in 1987 with the signing of the Unity Accord between Zanu and Zapu.

Although the early years of post-independence Zimbabwe will always be marked by the state sponsored atrocities in Matabeleland, they also, in an ironic way, represent a period of significant socio-economic achievements (Mashingaidze 2005; Sachikonye 2002). As Muzondidya points out:

the government moved to dismantle colonial institutions and laws promoting oppression, ethnic polarisation and racial disharmony by erasing the legal status of racial distinctions and their institutional supports. The government also tried to transform and democratise the structure of governance in urban and rural areas through decentralisation of powers, resources and responsibilities to local authorities and locally administered bodies. (2009:174-175)

However, these transformations were to some degree limited by the Lancaster House Constitution⁴ which protected the political and economic interests of the settlers by, among other things, ensuring white representation in parliament through a quota system, and by delaying significant land reform for at least a decade (see Muzondidya 2009, 2010; Raftopoulos 2005; Sachikonye 2005). Nevertheless, the late 1980s and the early 1990s period was generally marked by a deteriorating economic situation which was exacerbated by the liberalisation and deregulation of the economy against the backdrop of IMF and World Bank sponsored Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) (Raftopoulos 2003). This stage in Zimbabwe's history magnified simmering discontent and dissent thereby setting in motion processes that would congeal into what has come to be referred to as the 'Zimbabwean Crisis.'⁵ These processes are outlined below.

Forced by an incipient economic decline in the late 1980s and the global impetus of neo-liberal thinking, the government was pushed to adopt the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), an economic programme styled by the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 1990 (Muzondidya, 2009:194; Raftopoulos 2003). This decision coincided with a severe drought in 1991-1992 which significantly undermined the country's economic performance (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003). Furthermore, as the same scholars note, the HIV-AIDS crisis was reaching unprecedented levels amid economic decline. But prominent during this period were the destabilising and negative effects of ESAP on both the economy and the working population. Some of these effects are summarised by Hammar and Raftopoulos thus:

⁴The Lancaster House Constitution came out of negotiations that ended the war of liberation and that marked Zimbabwe's independence from Britain.

⁵ For a comprehensive list of literature on the Zimbabwe Crisis see Raftopoulos (2009:201).

The negative effects of ESAP were both immediate and sustained. They included unprecedented increases in interest rates and inflation, a 65 per cent fall in the stock market, deindustrialisation precipitating a 40 per cent decline in manufacturing causing company closures and massive job cuts, and a substantial decline in real wages and overall standards of living. (2003:6)

This turn of fortune among much of Zimbabwe's citizens, in addition to the already disaffected population of the country's western provinces, added some momentum to public expressions of dissent which manifested in the then novel labour strikes led by a formerly acquiescent labour movement, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003). The government dealt with this rising public expression of dissent and discontent with force, which in turn inflamed anti-government sentiment (Chuma 2010). Liberation war veterans who failed to make it into the post-independence Zimbabwean defence forces or public service found themselves leading increasingly impoverished lives under a new, corrupt, political elite (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003). This was in addition to their dissatisfaction with the progress of land reform since independence. Although the government had initiated land reform in the early 1980s, the pace was slow mainly because the Lancaster House constitution's provisions on land limited significant reforms for at least the first ten years after independence (Mlambo 2013:60). As more and more people lost their jobs, they found themselves desperate for land, which was not available as land policy in the 1980s and 1990s was largely characterised by a willing buyer/willing seller arrangement (see Muzondidya 2009). The problem was that the white farmers who owned large tracts of arable land were unwilling to sell such land. They were only prepared to sell land that was not conducive to agricultural activity. Nevertheless, despite some notable progress on organised land reform in the immediate post-independence decade, there remained a huge appetite for land resettlement among Zimbabwe's black population (Palmer 1990). At this point (the 1990s), government policy towards unlawful land occupation was largely pro-business because of its newly found neo-liberal orientation (see Herbst 1990:55-56). During the first post-independence decade, the government swiftly responded to land occupations through forced evictions to sustain confidence among the largely white commercial farming community and to appease international sources of financial support (Alexander, 2003; Muzondidya 2009). For this reason, it can be argued that the government's attitude was as politically expedient then, as it was when it took a different turn in the latter years of the 1990s. The major turn of events came in the mid-1990s as war veterans sought more recognition in the country's socio-political and economic processes. Their unprecedented disruption of a presidential speech at the Heroes

Acre sent a strong message to the ruling party about their level of discontent, setting the course of events at a point of no return (Bauer 2013).

Government capitulation to the demands of the war veterans and other related events beyond that, opened a new chapter in the country's turbulent history.⁶ The politics of the day demanded a rethinking of hitherto taken for granted political associations. Many scholars and writers agree on the major causes of the crisis, but it is common wisdom that the legacy of colonial inequality, and the socio-political decisions of the Zanu PF government in response to rising discontent are its major progenitors (see Muzondidya 2010; Raftopoulos 2009). It is generally accepted that numerous political events significantly worsened the economic situation leading to frequent and often widespread unrest. These included the growing negative impact of ESAP; the government's decision to grant unbudgeted grants to the war veterans in October 1997; the announcement in November 1997 of plans to acquire white-owned commercial farms compulsorily: the subsequent, often violent land occupations; the sharp fall in value of the Zimbabwean dollar on 14 November 1997; and finally, the decision to send at least 11000 troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1998 to back the government of Laurent Kabila who was under attack from Rwandan and Ugandan backed rebels (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003; Raftopoulos 2009).

The Course of Crisis

Spurred by this plunge into economic decline and brutally repressive government responses to rising discontent and dissent, civic movements proliferated as counter-hegemonic sites in the late 1990s (Chuma 2005). Important among these were the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), college/university students, and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) who all pushed for constitutional reform and worker driven national democratic reforms (Raftopoulos 2009; Sachikonye 2011). Realising the popular demand for constitutional reform, the need to control such a process and its potential political expediency, the Zanu PF led government formed the Constitutional Commission to run a parallel process (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003; Raftopoulos 2009). Meanwhile, various social movements pursuing democratic reforms under the leadership of the NCA and ZCTU came together to form a political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 (Raftopoulos 2002;

⁶ Arguably, this happened partly as a strategic initiative to buy out the war veterans who were themselves a potential ally of the rising broad alliance between the ZCTU, the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) (a civic organisation seeking constitutional reform), and college student movements, among others in the late 1990s.

Raftopoulos 2009:202-210). The significance of this new political party was not immediately clear.

It only dawned on the government how popular and strong the opposition MDC was, and unpopular and fragile Zanu PF had become, when the draft constitution produced by the government's Constitutional Commission was rejected in a referendum in February 2000. This was the first time Zanu PF had ever been defeated in a poll since independence, let alone by an incipient oppositional political movement (Raftopoulos 2009). The referendum defeat was read by Zanu PF, which was to face the MDC in a parliamentary election in June 2000 and presidential election in 2002, as the party's failure of a pre-election *pons ansinorum* or test. Raftopoulos notes that the unpopular provision in the rejected draft constitution was one that sought to secure a powerful executive presidency (2009:209, 211). More significant was another provision which identified Britain as responsible for paying white farmers whose land had been identified for re-allocation as this was given a politically expedient reading by the ruling Zanu PF government. In this regard, the rejection of the draft constitution was seen by Zanu PF as demonstrating the potency of opposition, whose financial base, mainly Britain and commercial white farmers had to be weakened via strong propaganda campaigns.

From this point on, the MDC leadership, its support base, some elements of the civic community and white commercial farmers *inter alia* became targets of sustained politically motivated invective and violence. This marked a new era in the definition of state, nation, citizenship and belonging marked by intolerance of the "other" (see Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003). As Raftopoulos argues, President Mugabe took centre stage in African politics when his rhetoric assumed a sharp anti-Western tone and when he adopted anti-neo-liberal policy interventions accompanied by state-sponsored violence (2002). The newly formed MDC was labelled a proxy of mainly British, but also European and American, interests in the country and therefore dangerous and a threat to its sovereignty. The Zanu PF government and the party itself invoked notions of struggle against this perceived clear and present danger to the country's sovereignty and self-determination embodied by the MDC through what it called the *Third Chimurenga*.⁷ This incipient "revolution" was, from the outset, characterised by high

⁷ The word *Chimurenga* has been used in conventional parlance by Zanu PF to refer to an armed liberation struggle after the 1896-1897 (*First Chimurenga*) and the 1966-1980 (*Second Chimurenga*) armed revolts against the settler regime in the then Southern Rhodesia. The *Third Chimurenga* is a term used by the Zanu PF government to refer to land reclamation policies it adopted at the turn of the century and the economic indigenisation policies which

levels of intolerance for political competition, a compromised judiciary, a high degree of impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of violence in the name of Zanu PF, sharp economic decline, arbitrary land occupations and the polarisation of Zimbabwean society (Raftopoulos 2003). The *Third Chimurenga* was premised on the argument that the outcomes of both the *First* and *Second Chimurenga* had left some business unfinished — with the land question topping that list (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003). The rejection of the draft constitution was read by the Zanu PF government as Britain’s abdication of responsibility for compensating farmers for acquired land through her proxy political actors within Zimbabwe, read as the MDC, white farmers and the civic movement in general (Raftopoulos 2009). This engendered an intensification of political and social polarisation in the run up to the country’s 2000 parliamentary elections. While it has been generally appreciated that land reform was a necessary, if not inevitable, policy direction, some have noted that the form it assumed in 2000 and beyond was informed by the need to “coerce and demobilise the structures and support of the opposition” (Raftopoulos 2009; see also Alexander 2006). In addition to an exclusionary nationalistic discourse, the Zanu PF run state also restructured the judiciary to make it more pliant, promulgated laws that narrowed the public sphere, and continued to use violence in the run up to, and even, after elections (see Raftopoulos 2009:213-215).

The contesting meta-narratives of this new area in Zimbabwean politics pitted a form of “new nationalism” driven by a desire for realigning patterns of accumulation within a pan African-anti-imperialist framework, against movements driven by an internationalist understanding of democracy, civic and human rights (see Mamdani 2008). International consternation at, and reaction to the violence that beset this new dispensation immediately drove the Zimbabwean economy into a meltdown. Western countries imposed a range of sanctions, prominent among which were travel bans against Zanu PF officials and others prominently affiliated with them, and the United States’ Zimbabwe Economic Recovery and Democracy Act of 2001 (Raftopoulos 2002, 2009). These developments resonated with the MDC leader’s call for international sanctions against Zimbabwe, leading to an intensification of anti-opposition sentiment in government and the ruling party. A salient consequence of this development was the division of political players in the country into ‘patriots’ and ‘sell-outs.’ This division simplistically reduced Zanu PF supporters to ‘patriots’, and opposition supporters to ‘sell-outs’

are seen as a continuing struggle, this time against neo-colonialism. For a detailed discussion on the meanings of *Chimurenga* see Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012).

and ‘puppets of the west’ (Ranger 2004). This dichotomous rendering of political activity in the country formed the core nodal point around which issues of land, citizenship, identity, nation and belonging were contested. As Mlambo notes:

the labelling and demonising of political opponents was accompanied by an official rhetoric of Pan-African solidarity and revolutionary fervour that sought to revive the strong emotions of the struggle and to present Zimbabwe as a country caught in a life-and-death struggle for survival against the West’s determination to reverse the gains of the liberation struggle. Suddenly, whites had ceased to be fellow citizens of the unified country Mugabe represented during his reconciliation speech at independence and had become enemies of the state to be crushed. (2013:62)

These exclusionary processes extended to include immigrant farm and mine workers, and in other cases, even natives of Ndebele ethnic extraction were labelled new arrivals who did not belong to this new conception of Zimbabwe (Mlambo 2013:62; see also Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). The ideological impetus of this new nationalist imagination was vigorously developed through what Ranger calls “Patriotic History”, which he differentiates from “Academic History” (2004:228). Ranger describes “Patriotic History” as the over-simplifications of Zimbabwean history propagated through state controlled media, ministerial historians and intellectuals largely sympathetic to Zanu PF (2004:228). He notes that “Patriotic History” which “is proclaimed as a remedy for the failures of parents and teachers and especially of universities to instil the revolutionary spirit” divides Zimbabweans into “revolutionaries” and “sell-outs” (Ranger 2004:228; Miles-Tendi 2008). Miles-Tendi sums up the essence of patriotic history thus:

Patriotic history proclaims ZANU-PF as the alpha and omega of Zimbabwe’s past, present and future. Zimbabweans are encouraged to be ‘patriotic’, which means supporting ZANU-PF. Anything short of this is considered ‘unpatriotic’. Patriotic history has four main themes: land, no external interference based on ‘western ideals’ such as human rights, race and a ‘patriots’ versus ‘sell-outs’ distinction. (2008:379)

It foregrounds land as the primary concern during the liberation struggle and after it, ahead of social justice issues such as economic opportunities, political representation, human rights, gender equality, equality before the law *inter-alia* (Miles-Tendi 2008:379; Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003; Bhebe and Ranger 2001). Ndlovu-Gatsheni on the other hand draws parallels between Ranger’s patriotic history and what he calls the “ideology of *Chimurenga*” which he says:

is a tale of the invention of a complex politically usable narrative by Zanu in its bid to construct a post-colonial nation, unite people, gain popularity, and assume political power at the end of settler colonial rule. It was and is premised on a doctrine of permanent nationalist revolution against imperialism and colonialism. (2011:5)

He points out that another strand of Zanu PF's strategy for hegemonic continuity is that of '*Gukurahundi*'. For Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Zanu PF's violence against political opponents in the late 1990s and post-2000 is not a new phenomenon, but one rooted in a long tradition of brutal intolerance of dissent from both within and without the party (2011). He gives examples from Zanu PF's violent suppression of dissent during the second liberation struggle (the handling of the Nhari rebellion), the vicious attack on Zapu and the Ndebele people in the early 1980s and more recently the violence targeted at the opposition MDC and its support base (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011).

As this study assesses how memory-work in and through the media in Zimbabwe shapes identity formation and nation-building processes, how the past is told and incorporated in dominant national discourses is a central concern. Ranger, for example, points out that history⁸ is enormously important in Zimbabwe, but "the question was – which history for what Zimbabwe" (2004:217)? For the government, universities had become "anti-Government mentality factories", to which it responded by instituting a youth national service programme where young people were to be taught the biased history of Zimbabwe (Ranger 2004:219). However, the youth training programme has largely been criticised for extolling a very parochial version of the country's history, mainly in the service of Zanu PF's exclusionary nationalistic innuendos which cast the MDC as an agent of re-colonization against which Zanu PF patriots were fighting (Ranger 2004:220-221). Another observation is that the post 2000 patriotic history has become wider in scope compared to that promoted in the immediate post-independence era as it now includes Zapu and Zipra in the narrative with former Zapu leader Joshua Nkomo celebrated as 'Father Zimbabwe' (see White 2003). However, the virtues associated with Zipra forces would be erased by the adventurism associated with Zanla forces now manifest in pre-election violence and the violent fast-track land reform programme (see Ranger 2004).

The proliferation of patriotic history has not gone without notice. A significant feature of patriotic history that has attracted criticism is the narrative's omission of the 5th Brigade's massacre of mainly *isiNdebele* speaking civilians in the *Gukurahundi* campaign of the early 1980s (Ranger 2004). Furthermore, it has been criticised for essentialising Zimbabwean-ness as an unproblematic identity with a stable pre-colonial history largely defined around the Shona

⁸ A nuanced discussion of the differences and similarities between history and memory are given in Chapter 3.

speaking ethnic groups in the country (Mlambo 2013:51). It has also been criticised for its selective interpretation of the liberation struggle wherein the role of Zanu and Zanla is foregrounded while that of Zapu and Zipra is barely appreciated, if not obliterated (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009:950; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012).

This dimension to patriotic history has spawned counter-hegemonic narratives both in the academy and the public sphere. Many publications, especially by Ndebele-oriented academics, have questioned whether Zimbabwe and Zimbabweans exist at all, while at the same time asserting particularistic proclivities of the Ndebele people (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). Some scholars have also gone beyond this Manichean dichotomy to reassess the complexity of identity issues in Zimbabwe thereby problematizing most taken for granted beliefs about ethnicity and nationalism in the country (see Msindo 2012).

An offshoot of Zanu PF's patriotic history has been what Ranger calls 'Patriotic Journalism' (2005). Largely practised by the state controlled media in Zimbabwe and like its counterpart patriotic history, patriotic journalism is "narrow and divisive – a substitute for ideology and analysis" (Ranger 2005:10). As Ranger points out, patriotic journalism is an extension of the kind practised by Zanu affiliated media in the 1960s during the struggle for independence, except then the target was Zapu and Joshua Nkomo, and now (early 2000s) it was ironically former Zanu president Ndabaningi Sithole⁹, Morgan Tsvangirai, and the MDC (Ranger 2005). Although Ranger argues that patriotic journalism is qualitatively different, he advises it should be spoken of as 'returning', rather than 'rising', as it is a "product of challenge and division in Zimbabwean African politics" today as it was in 1965 (2005:11). Apart from a predictable pattern of vilifying Britain, Europe and the United States, the emphasis of patriotic journalism in state controlled media was on 'the enemy within', which referred to the opposition MDC and anti-government civic organisations, constantly labelled as proxy players of neo-colonial politics within Zimbabwe. As Ranger argues, "in this journalism, Zimbabweans are divided into patriots and traitors; the rest of the world is divided into supporters and imperialists" (2005:14). He laments that patriotic journalism makes "any rigorous discussion impossible", arguing that:

it lumps incompatibles together [...]. It prevents any self-reflection on the part of the regime because criticism of any kind can at once be categorised as treasonable and imperialist. (Ranger 2005:15)

⁹ In 1963 Ndabaningi Sithole became the leader of Zapu's then splinter group Zanu.

Within this matrix of public representations, socio-political players enter into and out of patriotic history/journalism depending on the political expediency of their position at any given time. Ranger suggests churches and the labour movements as cases in point (2005). A response to this one-dimensional form of journalism was the critical and antithetical form espoused by privately owned media such as *The Standard* newspaper.

As the political crisis unfolded, the economy was also in a steady downward spiral of collapse. In 2001 and 2002, the economy shrunk by 5 per cent and 7 per cent respectively and the country had arrears amounting to US\$1.2 billion during the last quarter of 2001 (Sachikonye 2002). Inflation continued to rise and the manufacturing sector collapsed leading to severe food shortages in 2002; corruption was increasing and Zimbabweans living below the poverty line rose to 75 per cent in 2000; the levels of HIV-AIDS infections and orphans continued to increase making the country one of the worst affected in the world (Sachikonye 2002). The political contestation that emerged from the early 1990s to date can thus be linked to economic decline.

Despite intense violent anti-opposition activities by Zanu PF supporters, the MDC narrowly lost the 2000 parliamentary election by only 5 seats, gaining 47 per cent of the vote (Sachikonye 2002; Raftopoulos 2009). This reshaped the country's political scene as Zanu PF lost its dominance in parliament. To understand Zanu PF's desperation amid its declining support base, it is necessary to quote Sachikonye at length. Commenting on the outcome of the 2000 parliamentary elections and the upcoming 2002 presidential elections vis-a-vis the generational gap between Zanu PF and the MDC, he observes:

the different formative influences and political experience of these generations are amply reflected in their outlook and rhetoric. Although about 60 per cent of the electorate is still drawn from the countryside, voters have become more sophisticated in their outlook; the state of the economy now features more highly in their calculations than the symbolism of nationalism and independence. In their view, history and participation in the liberation struggle are no longer the main criteria against which a party or aspiring leader is judged. This is understandably painful to Zanu PF stalwarts whose derision of the MDC stems from the apprehension that their role as 'custodians' of nationalism and history will be undermined if a new political regime wins power. (Sachikonye 2002:17)

The realisation by Zanu PF of this emergent threat to its hegemonic dominance of Zimbabwean politics since 1980 drove them to resort to extreme violence and an intensification of exclusionary rhetoric in the run up to the 2002 presidential campaign (Raftopoulos 2009).

Some have also argued that a new dispensation would not have allowed a culture of impunity to go unaddressed. This, it can be argued, threatened the privileged status of those responsible for the dreadful violence of the early 1980s in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. Thus, to further frustrate opposition efforts during the 2002 presidential election campaign period, legislation that severely restricted free assembly and expression was pushed through parliament (Raftopoulos 2009). The Public Order and Security Act (2002) which was carried over from Rhodesia, the deceptively named Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (2002), as well as the General Laws Amendment Act (2002) which was later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, are some of the laws that were used to undermine the MDC's pre-election campaign (Sachikonye 2002; Raftopoulos 2009). Because of repressive instruments of governance and unabated political violence mainly by the ruling party, President Mugabe, who received 56 per cent of the vote ahead of Tsvangirai's 42 per cent, won a hugely disputed and contested presidential election in 2002 (Raftopoulos 2009; Sachikonye 2002). The subsequent accelerated land occupations effectively eroded the capacity of white farmers to play any significant direct or indirect political role in Zimbabwe (Raftopoulos 2009; see also Pilosof 2012). Most of the farm workers labelled as aliens by the Zanu PF government found themselves politically disenfranchised and economically marginalised as they were largely associated with the white farmers and the "No" vote in the constitutional referendum of 2000 (Pilosof 2012).

However, the fast track land reform programme did not produce immediate positive results. Compounded by a drought, the lack of resources among, and supporting systems for, the newly resettled farmers inevitably led to severe food shortages up to 2008 (Raftopoulos 2009). Whilst western countries reacted to the Zanu PF driven political-economic mayhem in the country by imposing different kinds of sanctions on the government and individuals within and close to Zanu PF, the MDC continued to receive financial support which was used by Zanu PF as evidence of the MDC's proxy status (Raftopoulos 2009). Meanwhile, the economy continued to slide rapidly into decline with hyperinflation reaching "an official level of 230 million per cent by the end of 2008, devaluing both earnings and savings" (Raftopoulos 2009:220). Furthermore, "the party-state" as Kriger (2003:72-76) calls the Zanu PF government, continued with its strategy of *Gukurahundi*, (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011) through such violent political escapades as *Operation Murambatsvina* (Operation Refusal of Dirt) in 2005, which involved the destruction of urban properties deemed illegal; *Operation Mavhoterapapi* (Operation Whom did you vote for?) from April to August 2008; and *Operation Chimumumu* (Operation

Mute Person) which involved the abduction of oppositional figures (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011:11). These episodes of harassment were largely seen as punishment for not voting for Zanu PF and coercion of opposition members to vote for the ruling party (Raftopoulos 2009). Another significant development during this period was the massive exodus of Zimbabweans to other countries, mainly South Africa, Britain, Australia and the United States in flight from the worsening economic and political situation in the country (Crush and Tevera 2010; Tevera and Crush 2010; Raftopoulos 2009). This diasporic population led to an explosion of sources of information about Zimbabwe which was very important considering the stringent restrictions on the media in Zimbabwe and access to the country by foreign journalists (Moyo 2009).

In 2005, the MDC split into two factions with the bigger and popular group remaining under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai, while the smaller group came under Professor Arthur Mutambara. The major reasons for the breakup were internal differences over “the decision to participate in a senate election called by Zanu PF for 2006” despite an earlier undertaking not to participate (Raftopoulos 2009). This dealt opposition politics a blow as it divided the oppositional vote between these two parties – which served as a huge advantage to the ruling Zanu PF. But, despite the MDC’s breakup in 2005, and a sustained onslaught on MDC leaders as well as the public offices they held, the parties went on to win significant parliamentary seats in the 2005 and 2008 elections (Raftopoulos 2009). Both the 2005 and 2008 elections were highly contentious and each time Zimbabwe held elections, citizens would be left more divided (Raftopoulos 2010). While the opposition MDC argued for political legitimacy derived from democratic processes, Zanu PF’s interpretation of legitimacy was anchored on sovereignty drawn from the liberation struggle (Raftopoulos 2010). This was a major source of division as neither could meet the other’s expectations. Zanu PF had become overly authoritarian and the MDC hardly met the liberation credentials that would even in the slightest sense match Zanu PF. It is these ideological positions in counter-point to each other that continued to widen the chasm between these two political groups and their followers.

The shrinking and now largely informal economy as well as the formation of parallel worker and student unions by groups sympathetic to Zanu PF significantly weakened the ZCTU, civil society and by extension the MDC’s capacity to organise mass actions against the government (Raftopoulos 2010:708). The now collapsed health sector also failed to deal with a devastating cholera outbreak in 2008, leading to about 4000 deaths. Increasing acute poverty, the

weakening of civil society and government authoritarianism curtailed oppositional activism, although 2008 was election year (Solidarity Peace Trust 2008; Raftopoulos 2010). The government's continued brutality towards anything deemed oppositional prompted the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to appoint the South African President Thabo Mbeki to initiate dialogue between Zanu PF and the MDC with the objective of creating an environment for broadly acceptable elections in 2008¹⁰. The process was long drawn and often characterised by tension between the MDC and South African president Thabo Mbeki whom they saw as predisposed towards Zanu PF's continuity (Raftopoulos 2009).

Be that as it may, the actual Election Day was relatively peaceful. The two factions of the MDC won a combined tally of 109 seats in parliament against Zanu PF's 97, which effectively dislodged the latter's dominant position in the legislature. MDC T president Morgan Tsvangirai led the presidential election with 47.9 per cent of the vote ahead of Robert Mugabe's 43.2 per cent (Zimbabwe Election Support Network 2008). It is noteworthy that a prominent member of Zanu PF since independence, Dr Simba Makoni, left the party to contest the presidential election as an independent candidate. Thus, as Raftopoulos argues, Zanu PF's loss could be traced to both internal divisions in the party as well as its growing unpopularity with the electorate (2009). The credibility of the results was also undermined by the withholding of the results for a month by an electoral authority led by a former senior army officer. Despite Tsvangirai's win, he could not be declared winner because a new provision in the country's electoral laws required at least a "50 per cent plus one" clear winner (Masunungure 2009). This demanded a run-off election between Zanu PF's Robert Mugabe and MDC's Morgan Tsvangirai which was set for June the 27th.

The Government of National Unity

In the context of this loss, Zanu PF resorted to what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) calls the *Gukurahundi* strategy: unleashing deadly violence coordinated by the country's uniformed forces against opposition supporters. The violence was mainly concentrated in former Zanu PF strong-holds such as the provinces of Mashonaland West, Central and East (Onslow 2011). Tsvangirai quickly withdrew from the election hoping it would be rendered pointless and illegitimate, but this did not deter Zanu PF from declaring themselves winners by default, plunging the country into political uncertainty (Masunungure 2009; see also Mapuva 2013).

¹⁰ Parliamentary, presidential and council elections were scheduled to take place simultaneously.

Under pressure from mainly western countries, some members of SADC and civic society in general, SADC was persuaded to proceed with the talks which remained the most productive platform for solving the political impasse in Zimbabwe. Despite its political dominance, Zanu PF's lack of credibility in Britain, Europe and the United States left the party in a very weak position in light of a severe economic crisis at hand. Meanwhile, the MDC remained significantly marginalised within SADC and on the African continent largely due to its links with the west (Mutisi 2011). This scenario created a conducive environment to bring these parties together in a unity government through what Raftopoulos terms a "passive revolution" (2010). He argues that the formation of the inclusive government was a passive revolution:

in which a ruling party facing an organic political and economic crisis has used the space to reconfigure and renegotiate terms of its existence with the opposition, civil society and the international community. (Raftopoulos 2010:707)

He also notes that in equal measure the two MDCs were:

pushed into the GPA as a result of a combination of: state repression and violence against structures of the MDC; the inability of the opposition to translate their electoral victory in 2008 into state power in the face of Zanu PF's control of the coercive arms of the state; the structural erosion and political exhaustion of its support base, particularly in urban areas, as well as the weakening of the civil movement as a result of similar factors; and the limits of Western diplomacy in removing the Zimbabwe question from the SADC regional bloc in which Mugabe's Pan-Africanist message and the shortcomings of the regional body itself have ensured Mugabe regional cover against thunderous imprecations of the West. (Raftopoulos 2010:708)

The Global Political Agreement (GPA) between Zanu PF and the MDC was signed on 11 September 2008 under SADC mediation ushering in a new Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009 which continued to be dominated by Zanu PF (Raftopoulos 2010). Some of the deliverables of the GPA included security sector reforms, democratisation of electoral institutions and processes as well as the media, and the formulation of a new democratic constitution (Zimbabwe Europe Network *et al.* 2012; Dziva *et al.* 2013). Zanu PF, whose power has been sustained by the country's security arms, blocked any reforms to the security sector. Even within the ambit of an inclusive government, Zanu PF continued its corrupt syphoning off of natural resources – such as diamonds – through both party and individual accumulation (Zimbabwe Europe Network *et al.* 2012). Media reforms were only significant in the print sector.

Furthermore, the period of the GNU was characterised by intra-party and inter-party tensions. Within the MDC T, conflict between the party's President Morgan Tsvangirai and Secretary

General Tendai Biti worsened in 2010, although it did not escalate into another split within the party. Apart from major contentious reform issues within the GPA, another source of tension was the issue of sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe largely by Britain, Europe, Australia and the United States (Onslow 2011; Mutisi 2011). Zanu PF blamed the MDC for the sanctions and often pushed the MDC to call for their withdrawal. This did not work as most of the western nations retained the sanctions saying only a full implementation of the GPA would lead to the easing of the sanctions (Mutisi 2011; Lunn and Thompson 2010). The issue of constitutional reform remained a central concern for the opposition parties as it was seen to be foundational to democratic elections after the tenure of the GNU. Despite the contested nature of this process, a draft produced by the Constitution Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) in 2012 was put to a referendum on 16 March 2013 with just above 3 million people voting 'yes' and only around 180 000 voting 'no' (Raftopoulos 2013). The referendum was warmly welcomed by SADC and the European Union (EU) with the United States remaining largely pessimistic. Significant among the achievements of the GNU was the stabilisation of the economic decline through the dollarization of the economy.

The five-year term of the Global Political Agreement between Zanu PF and the MDC ended with the holding of elections in July 2013 in which Zanu PF emerged a clear winner against popular expectation¹¹. Although the outcome of this election was largely endorsed by SADC and the African Union (AU), it was contested by opposition parties and western countries including the EU which previously had been fairly satisfied with the constitutional referendum (Raftopoulos 2013). However, Raftopoulos has argued that while Zanu PF's overwhelming victory can be explained by the party's authoritarian tendencies, there are also other explanatory factors (2013). For instance, he argues that Zanu PF frustrated key reforms to the constitution; harassed civil society leaders monitoring its activities; started preparing for the elections early into the GPA while the MDC concentrated on constitutional reform; continued to use resonant ideological legacies of the liberation struggle among the rural population; and opened up mining activities to the informal sector among other things (Raftopoulos 2013: 979-984). But he notes that the MDC had been weakened by Zanu PF's continued control over the coercive infrastructure of the state during the GPA, internal divisions, the weakening of the party's social base through the informalisation of the economy and poor planning in the run up

¹¹ President Robert Mugabe received 61 per cent of the vote against Morgan Tsvangirai's 33 per cent. Zanu PF increased its parliamentary seat to 159 in 2013 against 99 in 2008 while the MDC T's number dropped from 99 in 2008 to 49 in 2013.

to the election (Raftopoulos 2013:984-985). He also attributed Zanu PF's victory to the SADC's unwillingness to come down hard on Zanu PF regarding the full implementation of the GPA and its acceptance of the election meeting minimalist conditions of legitimacy (Raftopoulos 2013:986).

Commenting on the outcome of the 2013 elections and its potential to reshape political play in Zimbabwe Raftopoulos observes:

it is fair to conclude that the politics of political and civic opposition that emerged in the late 1990s and continued through the first 13 years of the 2000s has come to an end in its current form. The political and economic conditions that gave rise to its emergence have changed substantially and the social forces that have emerged [...] pose new challenges for party and civic organisation and mobilisation. (2013:986)

In fact, in the eyes of Zanu PF, the 2013 electoral triumph is as important as that of 1980. They argue that they did not defeat the MDC but the full weight of a neo-colonial edifice, and that victory was not just for Zanu PF but for Africa. However, despite Zanu PF's election victory, the project of nation-building remains work in progress, and national identity, contentious. If anything, Zanu PF's resurgent domination of the Zimbabwean political terrain is likely to be met with increasing particularistic tendencies—especially among people in the provinces of Matabeleland who still find themselves in a state of both economic and political marginalisation in the context of an unresolved *Gukurahundi* issue. As Mlambo puts it:

in short, Zimbabwe still has to transform itself from a geographical expression established arbitrarily by British colonialism in 1890 and enthusiastically imagined by the anticolonial nationalists of the 1960s into a true nation with a common identity, common values and a shared vision for the future. (2013:63)

Conclusion

The above describes the general socio-political and economic context of this study. The chapter shows that Zimbabwe's socio-political context after the attainment of independence in 1980 is largely shaped, on the one hand, by Zanu PF's desire to establish and entrench its hegemony by any means necessary. On the other hand, the chapter has also shown that there is equal determination among the country's oppositional forces to resist and even overturn Zanu PF's hegemonic hold over the socio-political and economic spaces. The social struggles, violence, propaganda, the redefining of nation, citizenship and state among other things, are mostly shaped by the dialectic between the ruling party's autocratic pursuit of continuity, and the counter-veiling forces to that goal. This chapter is important because it shows the shifting

balances of power that continually shape, and in some instances, are also shaped, by the media. It is thus also important to trace the shifts in media policy in relation to the context outlined above as this helps in understanding the relationship between this social context, and the configuration of the media in Zimbabwe, as well as the ideological positions of the newspapers under study. This will be the focus of the following chapter.

Chapter Two

Transformations in Zimbabwe's Media Landscape

News is not a natural phenomenon emerging straight from 'reality', but a *product*. It is produced by an industry, shaped by the bureaucratic and economic structure of that industry, by the relations between the media and other industries and, most importantly, by relations with government and with other political organisations. From a broader perspective, it reflects, and in return shapes, the prevailing values of a society in a particular historical context. (Fowler 1991:222)

Introduction

This study is primarily concerned with showing how journalism works as a memory site through an assessment of reportage on a range of themes which speak to identity construction and nation building between 1999 and 2013, by Zimbabwe's *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* newspapers. The themes selected for this analytical work are not exhaustive in their demonstration of both the chosen newspapers' work of memory and discursive nodal points for identity construction and nation building in Zimbabwe. However, they were chosen because of their consistency and significance as nodal points around which identity issues as well as discourses of nation-building often assume prominence in the media in Zimbabwe's post-colonial history. This study thus focuses mainly on how *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* covered such issues as Zimbabwe's colonial history, the country's narrative of decolonisation, the *Gukurahundi* narrative, the land reform process, elections and the independence narrative. From this, it seeks to assess the implications such memory elements and identity constructions pose for the 'nation building project' in Zimbabwe and what this tells us about journalism's memory work in such a context.

This chapter locates the trajectory of the transformation of media policy in Zimbabwe over the shifting socio-political context outlined in the previous chapter. The premise for this work is that shifts in socio-political developments in Zimbabwe both shaped and were, to some degree, shaped by the media. In fact, as McNair shows, the media can assume a very influential position in contexts of political vacillation and indecision (2011). At the end of this chapter it should be possible to discern the polar positions held by *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* and their potential productivity in explicating the dimensions of fracture and contest in identity construction and nation-building processes in Zimbabwe over the period under study. This should also help in discerning the different ways in which different media, informed by

different ideological orientations, work as memory sites in an environment of contesting discourses.

For the analytical purposes of this study, the media environment and its shifting ecology in Zimbabwe is carved into four major phases. The first phase is that of the colonial era with particular focus on the 1964-1979 period. Although Rhodesian media policy before and after 1964 can be further discerned into different categories it is not particularly relevant to do so in this study as the trends were underlined by a general disenfranchisement of African voices. The second phase is the post-colonial period spanning 1980 and 1999. The third and most significant phase is between 2000 and 2008 which is the period of crisis in Zimbabwe. The last phase is from 2008 to date, although a ceiling is put at 2013. The third and fourth phases are inextricably linked to the first two, hence the need to give fair attention here to the former before narrowing to the latter.

Transformations in Zimbabwe's Media Landscape

Phase One: Rhodesian Censorship of the Press and Control over Broadcasting [1964-1979]

In general terms the colonial press was owned by settler capital and operated largely in the service of settler interests. In the case of Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia), this parochial and racialized media architecture took a nefarious turn upon assumption of premiership by Ian Smith in 1964, and following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain by his Rhodesian Front (RF) government in 1965. As Zimbabwe's first post-independence Minister of Information Nathan Shamuyarira put it, the colonial media were not Zimbabwean "in the sense of reflecting the views and aspirations of the majority of the population, since they were designed from the outset to promote the cause of white settler colonialism and business interests in South Africa" (Foreword to Windrich 1981:5). Instead, he argues:

while controversy and dissent, essential elements of free media, were permitted within the narrowly defined limits set by the white Rhodesian Establishment and the South African connection, this toleration did not extend to the African political parties, which were repeatedly silenced by the banning of their publications and detention of their leadership. (Foreword to Windrich 1981:5)

The three main features of media policy during Rhodesian Front rule (1962-1979) in Southern Rhodesia were absolute control over broadcasting activities from within the territory, censorship of the mainstream print media, and banning of the progressive press that was largely sympathetic to the anti-colonial nationalist cause (Windrich 1981; Windrich 2010; Moyo 2004;

Msindo 2009). At the centre of the regime's repressive media policy drive was a powerful and racist Ministry of Information led by a known right wing extremist even by the RF's standards, Pieter van der Byl (Windrich 1981). The Rhodesian Front came into power after the second world war when political momentum was directed at freeing African colonies from their mainly European colonisers to which it responded by unilaterally declaring independence from Britain, sparking a legitimacy crisis for its government. Faced with this situation, the racist RF government used several laws to restrict both nationalist political activities and the communicative space that promoted nationalist ideals. Thus, most radical nationalist political parties such as Zapu and Zanu were banned under laws that included the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act of 1960 (LOMA) and the Official Secrets Act of (1970) (Windrich 1979).

These restrictive laws [with The Emergency Powers (Censorship of Publications) Order of 1965 added] also led to the closure of many publications that were either against the UDI, or sympathetic to the anti-colonial nationalist movement. When these newspapers closed, only those owned by the Argus Press of South Africa through its local subsidiary the Rhodesia Printing and Publishing Company (RPPC) remained active (Windrich 1981). This artificially created monopoly worked as an opportunistic *raison d'être* for the regime's institution of censorship, since it saw the RPPC's publications as generally sympathetic to the white opposition United Federal Party (UFP) linked to Godfrey Huggins, Roy Welensky, and Edgar Whitehead who were against the unilateral declaration of independence from Britain (Windrich 1981). The motivation for censorship was to stifle both alternative views on the UDI and its economic consequences, and channels to vent criticism, rather than any threat to the RF regime from the press. Furthermore, as the war between the RF regime and African nationalists worsened, censorship was used to control information on the war, its casualties, and toll on the economy. In addition to controlling what the audiences received from the press, the regime subjected both black and white audiences to propaganda that misrepresented the nature of the war, its aims and economic implications (Frederikse 1982).

The regime's onslaught on the media did not end with controlling information flow in the mainstream print media but also extended to broadcasting. Here the task was easier for the RF government as it owned and controlled all broadcast services available from within the country's borders. At its inception, broadcasting in Southern Rhodesia was modelled along the British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) three objectives of informing, educating and entertaining, albeit within the narrow confines of settler political interests to the exclusion of

broad black African concerns (Windrich 2010, 1981). But the RF regime was determined to legitimate white minority rule and saw its task as that of ensuring and maintaining settler rule in Southern Rhodesia (Msindo 2009:671). Broadcasting was the vehicle through which this task would be achieved. The general features of the RF's control over the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation (RBC) were that the broadcaster became the voice of the party; opposition and other dissenting voices were denied access to the RBC which was run by party loyalists; RF ministers and the Prime Minister became the most prominent voices in the news; the RBC was made the only broadcaster through The Broadcasting Act of 1957; and lastly, African nationalists and later their military wings were labelled brutal communist terrorists who threatened "Christian values" and "the Rhodesian way of life" in an aggressive propaganda campaign (Windrich 1981, 2010, Frederikse 1982). However, the African population in Rhodesia, unlike their captive European counterparts, were not exposed solely to the propaganda onslaught of government controlled communication channels. As Windrich (2010) notes, this was because the nationalist movements Zapu and Zanu had established alternative radio broadcast channels in Egypt, Tanzania, Zambia (*Voice of the Revolution*) and Mozambique (*Voice of Zimbabwe*). In addition to these alternative party-controlled channels, RF propaganda and misinformation was counteracted by other sources such as the *BBC*, *Radio Netherlands*, *Radio Moscow* and the *Voice of America*, among others (Windrich 2010; see also Frederikse 1982).

It can be concluded therefore that the configuration of the media environment in Southern Rhodesia under the Rhodesian Front was shaped by a siege-like socio-political context. The RF government was facing a legitimacy crisis both from within and without Rhodesia because of its repressive discriminatory rule over the native population; unpopular unilateral declaration of independence from Britain in 1965; and overt racism towards the African population (see Mtisi *et al.* 2009). At independence in 1980, nationalist idealism sought to reverse this trend to suit the demands of the new dispensation which is the subject of the next section.

Phase Two: Tension between Democratic and Authoritarian Tendencies [1980-1999]

The immediate task of the post-independence government in Zimbabwe was to unite the disparate elements of a post-conflict society in a project of nation building and development. On the one side was the white population who had supported the Rhodesian Front government during the liberation war in the hope of securing their privileged status. On the other were the

often-antagonistic liberation movements, Zapu and Zanu, and their respective military wings, Zipra and Zanla. The challenge was not only to re-unite the generality of the civilian population, but also the former military elements of all parties to the pre-independence conflict. It is against this background that active processes of re-imagining the nation by the new government were set in motion. It is noteworthy that the Lancaster House Constitution which ushered in the post-independence dispensation had secured white privileges especially with respect to land ownership for the first decade after independence (Palmer 1990; Moyo 1995; Moyo 2013; Kagoro 2004).

Media institutions were seen as a central component of nation building processes and complementary to efforts directed at developing the economy. At independence, the media sector consisted of South Africa's Argus Press owned daily newspapers, the *Rhodesia Herald* and the Bulawayo *Chronicle* as well as their weekly equivalents *The Sunday Mail* and *Sunday News*; *The Manica Post*, the *Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation*¹² (*ZBC*, formerly *RBC*); *The Financial Gazette*; a resuscitated *Moto* magazine; *Parade*; and a few other specialised trade publications (Chuma 2005). Commenting on the reforms necessary to a media sector hitherto deployed in the service of party and settler interests by the RF government, Zimbabwe's first Minister of Information Nathan Shamuyarira noted:

thus was the situation inherited by the new Zimbabwe government in April 1980 – the media subservient to Rhodesian Front pressure and South African influence and control. Obviously, this kind of orientation could not be accommodated in a free and independent Zimbabwe. Therefore, one of the government's first priorities was to transform the state broadcasting corporation into an agency reflecting the realities of democratic rule and to change the control and editorial direction of the press. (Foreword to Windrich 1981:5)

It was not clear how the government was going to transform broadcasting services “into an agency reflecting the realities of democratic rule” (Shamuyarira cited in Windrich 1981:5) and what editorial direction the press was going to take under whose control. To address this challenge, a dilemma that faced the government must first be clarified.

Caught between socialist idealism and the realities of a negotiated peace settlement, the post-independence project of nation building became an arena for contesting and incompatible forces (Kagoro 2004). As Ronning and Kupe argue, the struggle for independence itself was the progenitor of the post-independence dual legacy of democracy and authoritarianism (2000).

¹² By 1985 ZBC comprised of four radio stations and two television stations.

The irony of this paradoxical duality is that the liberation war was fought to overturn the racist and repressive Rhodesian regime for an all-inclusive non-racial democracy “with a political agenda that often implied a contradictory attitude to fundamental democratic values” (Ronning and Kupe 2000: 138). As these two scholars argue:

the democratic agenda of the liberation movements was to be found in the demands of majority rule, but the democratic implications of this demand were often contradicted by an authoritarian ideology which often comprised a mixture of Soviet type Marxist ideology and Africanist one-party statism. (Ronning and Kupe 2000: 138)

The direction of reform thus stood at the crossroads of democratic and authoritarian tendencies. On the one hand, a BBC task force was commissioned in 1980 to assess and recommend possible reforms to broadcasting services in post-independence Zimbabwe (Moyo 2004; Ronning and Kupe 2000). The taskforce assessed the administrative, financial, editorial, transmission and training aspects of the ZBC. They recommended that “the first requirement is for the broadcasting service to be independent of government and properly insulated from government, party, commercial or any other pressure” (Mano 1997:45 cited in Moyo 2004:16). In addition to technical and administrative advice, the taskforce also advised “the ZBC to improve its programming in such a way that its service became responsive to the interests of its audiences and that it acted as a unifying, educational and informational force (Mano 1997 cited in Moyo 2004:16).

The government responded to most of the recommendations by, *inter alia*, revamping the composition of ZBC’s staff to include more black people and diversifying content to reflect “the cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity of Zimbabwe” (Moyo 2004:17). New educational channels were introduced in the form of Radio 4, Radio 2 and a second television service TV 2. Notwithstanding these reforms, ZBC’s monopoly status remained intact and most of the black employees seconded to work at and lead the broadcaster, came from Zanu’s war time *Voice of Zimbabwe* radio service, then based in Mozambique to the exclusion of Zapu people (Chuma 2010). Furthermore, the government remained in control of the ZBC through the Ministry of Information, as had been the case in Rhodesia (Moyo 2004; Makumbe and Compagnon 2000). Thus, as Ronning and Kupe conclude on broadcast policy reforms in post-colonial Africa and Zimbabwe in particular:

the broadcasting corporations, which to a lesser or greater degree had been the voices of the government under colonialism, changed editorial policies and personnel, but for all practical purposes continued the organisational forms and structures established under colonialism. The consequence of these developments was that the news media developed into praise-singers for the party and the leader in the name of national unity,

and their agenda consisted of an emphasis on development journalism in its most uncritical form. (2000:139)

These half-hearted reforms were the first signs of the tension between democratic and autocratic tendencies in post-colonial Zimbabwe.

But it was inconceivable to the Zanu government that the only mainstream press in the country was owned and controlled by white South African interests. Using a 5 million United States dollar grant from the Nigerian government, the Zimbabwean government bought out South African interests in the Rhodesia Printing and Publishing Company to form the Zimbabwe Newspapers Ltd. (Zimpapers) company in 1981 (Chuma 2010; Makumbe and Compagnon 2000). Unwilling to repeat the RF government's patronage over the press, the post-colonial government established an independent, not for profit, Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT) to oversee the running and expansion of the public print media (Chuma 2005, 2010; Makumbe and Compagnon 2000)¹³. Initially the government owned 43.2 per cent of the Trust's stock with the rest owned by other investors (Ronning and Kupe 2000). This changed in 1986 when the government increased its stock to 51 percent, effectively putting Zimpapers under its control. Essentially, the ZMMT was meant to work as a buffer between the public newspapers and the state as well as commercial interests (Ronning and Kupe 2000). This unique model was praised for its democratic character, but it did not last. The uneasy political environment of the early 1980s, Zanu's ambitions for a one-party state, and eventually the dreadful state sponsored violence of the 5th Brigade in Matabeleland between 1982 and 1987, gave the government the impetus to exert influence over the ZMMT and control over the public media. In fact, from the beginning, the ZMMT was dependent on the government for funding, thereby enabling the Ministry of Information gradually to impose its will on the Trust and Zimpapers (Ronning and Kupe 2000; Chuma 2005). Editors who covered controversial topics were systematically fired or reassigned to less influential positions (Ronning and Kupe 2000; Saunders 1999; Chuma 2005; Makumbe and Compagnon 2000). However, privately owned media such as *The Financial Gazette* which was owned by Modus publications, and which largely represented the interests of a small but influential white commercial sector, and the Catholic owned *Moto* magazine remained mildly critical of the government. This could have been because of the

¹³ In 1981, the government through the ZMMT, established a national wire news service, the Zimbabwe Inter-Africa News Agency (ZIANA), as a not for profit organisation which left it dependent on the former financially, leading to self-censorship by its journalists (Makumbe and Compagnon 2000). Furthermore, the Ministry of Information ran an in-house information service called the Zimbabwe Information Service (ZIS) (Makumbe and Compagnon 2000).

government's promise to allow media freedom, and because Zanu PF's hegemonic position was not under any serious threat at the time owing to the euphoria of independence and violent suppression of the opposition Zapu party through *Gukurahundi*.

After the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987 by Zanu and PF Zapu to end the murderous *Gukurahundi* campaign, the media environment opened slightly. Describing the status quo at the time, Saul and Saunders argue: "the likelihood that public criticisms would be labelled 'acts of treason' or 'dissident' activity as a matter of course, as they had been for much of the post-independence life of ZAPU, was now diminished" (2005:962). A formally supine *Parade* magazine increasingly became critical of the government in the late 1980s which led to the firing of its editor Andrew Moyse, by profit driven owners who feared government reprisals. He formed another financially troubled but trenchantly critical magazine, *Horizon*, in 1991. The magazine became an important vent for increasing voices of dissent in civil society and labour organisations in the 1990s, although it eventually closed in the same decade.

One of Zimpapers's own daily newspapers, the *Chronicle*, exposed a huge corruption scandal involving government ministers in 1988, after which the editor was reassigned to an administrative position at head office. At this point, the economy was also beginning to fail and resistance to Zanu PF's ambitions for a one-party state culminated in the formation of an opposition party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) by a former Zanu official Edgar Tekere in 1989. At the time, neo-liberal economic structural adjustment programmes were promoted as the panacea to ailing economies across the world by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Saul and Saunders 2005). As a remedy for the declining economy, government adopted the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), a move which amplified the contradictory elements of democracy and authoritarianism in the country (Saul and Saunders 2005). Although its general effect was to lead to more suffering among the lower rungs of society, the programme also led to the opening of both the political and media environments. However, the thriving open expression of dissent during this time invited heavy handed responses from the government (Saul and Saunders 2005). It is during the early 1990s that the first privately owned daily paper, *The Daily Gazette* (1992), and its sister paper the *Weekend Gazette* (1993), were established (Ronning and Kupe 2000). These papers were owned by Modus publications which had changed hands from white capital to a group of black businessmen led by former Zimpapers' Editor, Elias Rusike in the early 1990s.

These new publications, in addition to *The Financial Gazette*, were critical of the government and initially very popular, although this waned over time because of ethical issues. Consistent with Kasoma's (1997) critique of irresponsible privately owned newspapers in Africa, *The Daily Gazette*'s content was dominated by "stories from news agencies, and poorly researched reports, of an often sensationalist kind, and a form of snooping journalism which showed little respect for the privacy of individuals, based on very weak sources" (Ronning and Kupe 2000:147). The paper closed in 1994 only two years after its establishment in 1992 due to financial constraints and logistical bottlenecks.¹⁴

But the emergence of *The Daily Gazette* was important because it showed the possibility of challenging the dominance of the Zimpapers edifice and of providing an alternative voice. The newspaper also pushed its government controlled counterpart, *The Herald*, to practise competitive journalism. With an example already set, more newspapers were established in the 1990s. The former owners of Modus publications (owners of *The Financial Gazette* before 1989) Clive Murphy and Clive Wilson established the weekly *Zimbabwe Independent* in 1996 and a Sunday paper *The Standard* in 1997 (Ronning and Kupe 2000). *The Zimbabwe Independent* was initially intended to be a weekly financial newspaper supporting black empowerment initiatives, with *The Standard* providing "a form of upmarket populist entertainment" (Ronning and Kupe 2000). However, "both papers adopted a critical approach to coverage of the government and concentrated on predominantly political news" (Chuma 2005; Moyo 2005). Another privately owned weekly newspaper the *Zimbabwe Mirror* was established in 1997. The paper was owned by a highly-respected scholar and former civil servant, Ibbo Mandaza. Although critical of government policies, the *Zimbabwe Mirror* took a "nationalist and anti-imperialist approach to news" (Ronning and Kupe 2000:52). Its articles, which were mainly written by academics, analysed national problems within the context of global political economy. Notably, most of these newly established weekly newspapers only reached a small elite urban audience (Moyo 2005).

In addition, a hugely popular, well-resourced and highly critical daily newspaper, *The Daily News*, was established in March 1999 to fill the void left by urban oriented weeklies established

¹⁴ *The Sunday Gazette* (formerly the *Weekend Gazette*) closed in 1996. Both *The Daily Gazette* and *The Sunday Gazette* were closed just before a major election, a possible sign of political pressure (Makumbe and Compagnon 2000).

before it¹⁵. The launch of *The Daily News* coincided with the arrival of a formidable opposition party the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), rising dissent, a highly-contested process of constitutional reform, and state repression by a government facing a political crisis. In a media environment largely dominated by the Zanu PF controlled Zimpapers stable and ZBC, *The Daily News* became a channel through which dissenting voices were crystallised and expressed. However, the newspaper's ownership structure, which was heavily tilted towards British ownership at a time when the land issue had created a hostile relationship between Britain and Zimbabwe, would later prove to be its major weakness¹⁶. From its launch *The Daily News* sustained constant harassment and aggressive criticism by the government which labelled the paper an 'opposition press', as it had become the main channel for opposition expression.

The period between 1990 and 1999 was characterised by the constant harassment of journalists from the private press; political and economic pressure on the owners of the private press; a disciplining of critical editors in the public press, and lawsuits against the private press which amplified financial problems at these institutions. In one incident, a reporter Ray Choto and editor Mark Chavhunduka from *The Standard* were arrested by the army for reporting on a potential but foiled coup in the army (Ronning and Kupe 2000). They were tortured in detention with impunity before their release to civilian authorities after a judge declared their arrest unconstitutional. The then Minister of Information Chen Chimutengwende even said he wished *The Standard* editor Mark Chavhunduka had stayed in prison forever because:

if you read his newspaper every Sunday, there is a big lie. Their aim is to show Zimbabwe as unstable and that nobody should come here and invest [...]. Yes that is the position that we as a Ministry of Information have taken because the independent media goes as far as deliberately telling lies which tarnish, sabotage the economy. [*sic*] To us what they are doing is tantamount to treason. (cited in Ronning and Kupe 2000:152)

The broadcasting sector on the other hand remained firmly under the control of the Zanu PF government which intended to secure its hegemonic position in the country (Windrich 2010). The winds of free market thinking had but a slight effect on the government's intention to open the sector.

¹⁵ According to Moyo (2005:113) "market research statistics indicated that by 2000, *The Daily News* was commanding up to 30.6 percent of readership (about 2 million), with *The Herald* following with 28.9 percent (about 1.9 million readers)".

¹⁶ 83 percent of *The Daily News* was owned by Africa Media Investments (AMI), a company based in the United Kingdom (Chuma 2005:53).

However, the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1990 which required cutting of public expenditure slightly changed the government's attitude towards liberalisation of the broadcasting sector. While the government was willing to see ZBC commercialised to relieve fiscal commitment to the corporation's funding, it never envisaged losing control over the broadcaster. In February 1997, then Minister of Information Joyce Mujuru told parliament of her ministry's plans to act on a cabinet decision to allow new players to enter the broadcasting sector (Moyo 2004). Later that year, the government commissioned a British consultant Peter Ibbotson to assess the opportunities for commercialising the ZBC ahead of the expected liberalisation. In his report, Ibbotson recommended several steps that were aimed at reducing costs and increasing revenue at the ZBC including the privatisation of TV 2. Nothing much came of this process. Predictably, ZBC's monopoly status remained intact. Three new channels, (*LDM, Munhumutapa African Broadcasting Corporation* and *Joy TV*) were given space to lease on ZBC's TV 2. The result of this development was that ZBC became both player and regulator of these channels which were charged exorbitant rentals by the host station (Moyo 2004). The new television stations had an entertainment slant and could only reach an audience within the 70-kilometre radius around Harare, limiting their potential to perform a significant normative role in the public sphere (see Christians *et al.* 2009). It has been suggested that the Zanu PF government had learned the pitfalls of liberalisation from developments in the print media which was, and still is, forthright in its criticism of official malfeasance (Moyo 2004).

It must also be appreciated that the period between 1980 and 1999 was broadly underwritten by a legal framework that constrained the development of a free media. To begin with, the Lancaster House Constitution in force then, did not specifically provide for freedom of the press outside the broad-stroke provision for freedom of expression which came with several claw-back limitations regarding "the interest of public safety, national defence, public order, public morality, economic interests of the State and public health; and also in order to protect the reputation, freedom and rights of others" (Makumbe and Compagnon 2000:194). Other laws that circumscribed press freedom included *inter alia* the Defamation Laws which weighed too far in favour of protecting reputations; the Official Secrets Act (1970) whose limitations were very wide and vague; the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act (1960) which criminalised the publication of subversive and false statements as well as rumours likely to cause alarm and despondency or disturb public space; and the Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act (1971/1989/1991/2001) which severely limited the media's coverage of parliamentary

activities (Feltoe 2003; Makumbe and Compagnon 2000). Some of these laws carried provisions whose interpretation was open, with wide and unspecific limitations which had a compounded chilling effect on the practice of journalism in the country. Ironically, all the above-mentioned laws were transferred from the Rhodesian era.

In the end, it can be argued that although there were private players in the print media since independence, if the political environment solicited media criticism that potentially threatened Zanu PF's hegemonic project, such media would be at the receiving end of determined harassment by the government through both legal and extra-legal means. As far as broadcasting is concerned, the ZBC was used by the Zanu PF government in much the same way as the RBC had been used by the RF government: as a party instrument for relaying propaganda and shutting out dissenting views. Nominal attempts to reform broadcasting came to nothing at the end of 1999. ZBC's monopoly status and subjection to the government of the day was still protected by the Broadcasting Act (1959) inherited from Rhodesia. Thus, faced with shifts in the socio-political and economic context, the configuration of the media landscape in the period between 1980 and 1999 reflected the schizophrenic dual legacy of democracy and authoritarianism referred to by Ronning and Kupe (2000).

Phase Three: Nominal Change [2000-2008]

At the beginning of the 21st century, the Zanu PF government was faced with declining support locally; rising demand for land; concerted negative international media coverage following a series of violent land occupations; a rapidly declining economy; a trenchantly critical, local privately owned press, and a nascent but formidable opposition embodied by the MDC *inter alia*. It responded by tightening control over public media, narrowing operational space for private media and engaging in a vigorous, multi-faceted and determined propaganda campaign aimed at securing its hegemonic position over the country's polity (see Raftopoulos 2009; Bratton 2016). The rejection of a government sponsored draft constitution in the 2000 referendum left the Zanu PF government feeling under siege, to which it responded by reversing any gains towards liberalising broadcasting, and using both legal and extra-legal methods to contain the activities of the private media (see Chuma 2005, 2010).

Two significant developments within Zimbabwe's media sphere sparked the radical shifts in government's efforts to reshape the country's communicative space at the turn of the century

in 2000. The first development was the growing popularity of the newly established daily newspaper *The Daily News* and its perceived prominent role in promoting a ‘No’ vote against the government’s draft constitution, as well as its resonance with concerted criticism of the Zanu PF government by international, but especially British media. The second development was a constitutional challenge to ZBC’s monopoly over broadcasting in Zimbabwe by an aspirant broadcaster, Capital Radio in 2000. These two developments were read by the government as definers of the media’s role in a war to regain popularity, as well as to establish and sustain legitimacy. As was the case in Rhodesia under the RF government, Zanu PF’s new media strategy was entrusted to the Ministry of Information, Posts and Telecommunications which was transformed into the Department of Information and Publicity in the President’s Office. The department’s location in the President’s Office gave it access to generous funding. Furthermore, an eloquent, effective rhetorician and former critic of Zanu PF, Professor Jonathan Moyo was appointed Minister of State for Information and Publicity in the President’s Office in 2000. He had been the public face of the government’s Constitutional Commission in the lead up to the referendum, and an academic in the University of Zimbabwe’s Political Science department before then. Some scholars have drawn parallels between Jonathan Moyo and the RF’s Pieter van der Byl in view of his zealous approach to this new assignment (Windrich 2010). The configuration of the media sphere in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008 would be radically reshaped by the Department of Information and Publicity through the introduction, re-orientation and application of various laws affecting media operations and a more focused subjection of government controlled media to the Zanu PF political cause.

The Department of Information also deployed a widespread and multi-faceted propaganda strategy which involved, *inter alia*, the use of music and music concerts; publication of special supplements in friendly international magazines; expansion of government affiliated media in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region; use of online spaces to expand public media reach; employment of public relations organisations in western countries to fight off criticism coming from the international media and to harass opposition MDC leaders; use of patriotic history and memory to underline the message that Zimbabwe was under siege from powerful neo-colonial forces determined to return the country to British control, and to align ‘Zimbabwe’s cause’ with the interests of other African countries and the greater third world (Moyo 2012).¹⁷

¹⁷ For a detailed account of Zanu PF’s propaganda strategy between 2000 and 2008 see Moyo (2012).

When aspirant broadcaster Capital Radio challenged the constitutionality of ZBC's monopoly over broadcasting in Zimbabwe, the station was given an order by the Supreme Court allowing it to broadcast "on the grounds that the ZBC monopoly was an infringement of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression" (Windrich 2010:82). The government reacted by invoking the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) (Broadcasting) Regulations of 2000 to shut down and confiscate the station's equipment (Moyo 2012).¹⁸ This temporary judicial intervention made it difficult for new players to enter Zimbabwe's broadcast sector and was later turned into the Broadcasting Services Act (2001) by a Zanu PF dominated parliament.¹⁹ In principle, the Act seemed to promote the liberalisation of broadcasting, but it circumscribed this possibility through provisions that inhibited investment. It also provided for the creation of the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) whose members were to be appointed by the Minister of Information in consultation with the President, thus leaving applicants at the mercy of an interested party – the minister. It also provided for only one private national television broadcaster which, in consideration of the Information Minister's comments below, would not have been allowed to fall in the hands of someone believed to be 'politically incorrect'. The Minister of Information Jonathan Moyo justified the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) (2001) thus:

we had to re-examine our information policy. Key changes include the Broadcasting Services Act and we think it is the only one of its kind in the region. It was constructed out of recognition that the broadcast frequency spectrum is a limited resource just like land [...] The issue of security also comes in. We are not ashamed about that and we have restructured in such a manner that only indigenous Zimbabwe nationals have a right to a licence if they wish to operate a broadcast station. We will not completely liberalise the airwaves to the outside world. We are not a banana republic... (Moyo cited in *The Herald*, 22 November 2001; Moyo 2012:182)

Among other things, the BSA provided that all broadcasters should have 75 percent local content, which is not commercially viable; that licensees should provide an hour a week for free to government to explain policies to the public; restrictions to foreign funding; that broadcasting licensees could not be broadcast signal careers at the same time and each licence came with a limited operational period and would be charged an exorbitant application fee (Moyo 2004). Although the Parliamentary Legal Committee criticised some of the provisions

¹⁸ "The Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act, 1986, 'empowers the President to make regulations dealing with situations that have arisen or are unlikely to arise and that require to be dealt with as a matter of urgency.' The regulations are valid for a period of six months, after which they have to be tabled before parliament" (Moyo 2012: 195).

¹⁹ Despite the MDC's gains in the 2000 parliamentary elections, the President had power to appoint a significant number of parliamentarians over and above the elected ones.

of the BSA as unconstitutional on the basis that they infringed the right to free expression, that did not stop it from being passed into law. The BSA ensured ZBC monopoly at least until 2008.

The print media was particularly affected by the enactment of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act of 2002 (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act of 2002 (POSA) which had hitherto been the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act (1960) inherited from the Rhodesian era. The AIPPA which was described by a senior Zanu PF official and head of the Parliamentary Legal Committee Edison Zvobgo as “the most calculated and determined assault on our liberties” was passed as law after several amendments (Moyo 2004:25). In principle, the law was meant to enable access to information held by public bodies, but in practice it did more harm than good to the Zimbabwean public sphere. The conditions for such access are not compatible with journalistic practice. For instance, it can take months to access information from a recalcitrant public official if the set procedures are followed, by which time a story may have gone stale. The AIPPA also provided for the formation of the Media and Information Commission (MIC) whose members were handpicked by the Minister of Information (Feltoe 2003; Chuma 2005). Journalists and media organisations operating in the country were required to register with the MIC, but the registration could be cancelled should the commission or minister deem it necessary (Feltoe 2003; Chuma 2005). The law also limited foreign funding and ownership of newspapers, a provision that was meant to undermine, among others, privately owned media, like *The Daily News* whose strong links to foreign capital were known. AIPPA also gave the MIC power “to establish a code of conduct which is binding for all journalists” with a violation penalty of deregistration (Moyo 2004:26). Accreditation was not extended to non-citizen journalists except for limited periods, and such accreditation was not guaranteed (Moyo 2004). The notable impact of AIPPA was the arrest of many journalists and closing of *The Daily News* and the *The Daily News on Sunday* in 2003 for not registering with the MIC (Moyo 2004, 2005; Chuma 2005, 2010; Mazango 2005). At the time of its closure *The Daily News* was contesting the constitutionality of AIPPA in court. However, it has also been argued that *The Daily News*'s closure could also have been because of recklessness arising from its own popularity, economic and managerial problems, the dilemma of foreign ownership and funding structure, among other reasons (Moyo 2005; Mazango 2005). Other newspapers that were closed for their failure to comply with various provisions in the AIPPA include *The Business Tribune* and *The Weekly Tribune* (2004) as well as *The Weekly Times* in 2005 (Chari 2009).

The Public Order and Security Act (2002) was not directed at the media, but contained provisions that created a chilling effect on the practice of journalism. Among other things, it criminalises the subversion of a constitutional government; publication and communication to any other person of false statements prejudicial to the state; and undermining the authority of, or insulting, the President (Feltoe 2003). With these provisions, criticism of the President and government can easily land journalists and their respective organisations in trouble. While communication of false information is deplorable by journalistic ethical standards, to criminalise it promotes journalistic self-censorship which could paralyse the profession.

The laws remained in force beyond the 2008 election except for amendments made to the AIPPA in 2007 (Moyo 2012). The amendments included the replacement of the MIC by a more representative Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC) which included representatives from the media sector. The compulsory requirement for accreditation of journalists was modified to make accreditation necessary only when entering state property for journalistic purposes (Moyo 2012). As was the case in the first two decades after independence, several restrictive laws inherited from the Rhodesian era remained in force between 2000 and 2008. These laws include, *inter-alia*, Criminal Defamation Laws, the Censorship and Entertainments Control Act (1967/2001), Miscellaneous Offences Act (1964/2002), Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act (1971/1981/1989/1991/2001) and the Official Secrets Act (1970) among others (Feltoe 2003). The government added the Interceptions of Electronic Communications Act in 2007 to proscribe an explosion of resistive online communication platforms (Moyo 2009).

Apart from circumscribing the country's communicative space through legal instruments, the Zanu PF government and party members also used extra-legal methods to constrain the operation of the privately-owned press (Chuma 2005; Moyo 2009). For example, private media were prohibited from circulating their publications to Zanu PF dominated areas; copies of *The Daily News* would be confiscated and destroyed, and worst cases involved the bombing of *The Daily News's* printing press and another bomb which went off in a room just underneath the office of then editor-in-chief at *The Daily News*, Geoffrey Nyarota (Moyo 2009). Another aspirant broadcaster, *Voice of the People* (VOP), had its offices bombed in 2003. Although those responsible for the bombings were never established, the patterns of such acts of sabotage indicated that the bombers were against media that provided an alternative narrative to that promoted in the state controlled press which implicitly implicated the Zanu PF government and those associated with it.

As was the case in Rhodesia under Rhodesian Front rule, an unintended but welcome consequence of a steadily shrinking mainstream public sphere was the emergence of a multiplicity of alternative communication channels. In the case of Zimbabwe, this development assumed a dual form: on the one hand, a number of radio channels operating in exile was established, and on the other, countless online platforms emerged through which professional communicators and ordinary voices could be heard. Through these channels, official narratives of the crisis in Zimbabwe and monolithic as well as expedient constructions of the nation, history, citizenship and identity were contested and supported, although the tendencies weighed heavily in favour of the former. Alternative communication spaces in Zimbabwe are direct offshoots of the mass exodus of Zimbabweans to other countries because of the escalating political and economic crisis in their home country. As Moyo points out:

in 2004, the Zimbabwean government, through its central Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), estimated that approximately 3.4 million Zimbabweans had left the country to settle in countries such as the UK (1.1 million legal and 800 000 illegal), United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa (1.2 million), and many other African countries. (2009: 59 citing BBC News, November 8, 2005)

The emigration of Zimbabweans continues to this day and the number of countries receiving Zimbabwean immigrants across the globe is far greater than the one represented in the quote above. This exogenous ‘nation’ forms the social category now popularly referred to as the Zimbabwean diaspora. As Tettey points out, “a very important consequence of diasporic location and the opportunities provided by the Internet is the extent to which the state’s hold on its trans-located citizens has been ruptured, if not completely eliminated” (2009:147). In the case of Zimbabwe, many news and other special interest websites emerged: the most prominent ones include *newzimbabwe.com*, *zimdaily.com*, *zimonline.com*, *zimbabwejournalists.com*, *inkundla.net* (see Moyo 2010; Moyo 2009). Radio stations operating in exile include Studio 7, which is hosted by the *Voice of America*, *SW Radio Africa*, which broadcasts from London, *VOP* which is believed to broadcast from the Netherlands and many other internet based radio stations (see Moyo 2004). The government did not only respond to these developments by introducing the Interceptions of Electronic Communications Act in 2007, it also tried to interfere with the radio signals of these “pirate” radio stations (Mazango 2005). Furthermore, the government intensified and expanded its propaganda channels by establishing online platforms to offline Zimpapers²⁰ media and the ZBC. The critical voices that filtered through

²⁰ The Minister of Information Jonathan Moyo dissolved the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust which led to explicit government control over Zimpapers (see Mazango 2005).

international airwaves also hardened the government's position against the liberalisation of the broadcasting sector.

It can thus be argued that government's reaction to its declining popularity and legitimacy crises (following a series of questionable election outcomes in 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008), was not dissimilar to that of the RF government during UDI Rhodesia. The Zanu PF government used the same methods as the RF to suppress dissenting voices and promote its legitimacy by constricting the communicative space within which critical privately owned media operated and expediently historicising propagandistic narratives of the nation through the state controlled media. While the threat under RF Rhodesia was framed as 'communists', in post-2000 Zimbabwe, it was the 'imperialists' and the 'enemy within'. Thus, the socio-political circumstances of the era influenced the government both wittingly and unwittingly to shape the configuration of the media in Zimbabwe and her diaspora between 2000 and 2008.

Phase Four: Nominal Expansion [2008-2013]

The period of the Global Political Agreement (GPA), a political settlement between Zanu PF and its rivals MDC T and MDC M, to form a Government of National Unity (GNU), was generally characterised by token reforms which were inadequate for the achievement of a democratic society in which a free, diverse, plural and critical media could flourish. At the core of this socio-political black hole was the retention of restrictive legal instruments such as Defamation Laws, AIPPA (2002), POSA (2002)²¹, Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (2004), the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act (1986/2005), the Official Secrets Act (1970), the Interceptions of Electronic Communications Act (2007) despite commitments by Zanu PF and the two MDC parties to repeal these laws during negotiations for the GPA (Zimbabwe Europe Network 2012). In 2011, *The Standard's* editor, Nevanji Madanhire and two other staff members at the newspaper faced defamation charges which remained in place throughout 2012 pending a Supreme Court decision (Freedom House 2013). Although many defamation charges faced by journalists are eventually dismissed in court, they create a chilling operational atmosphere. This was one of many incidences in which journalists found themselves at the receiving end of hostile political players, with Zanu PF as the main culprit. However, a positive development during this period was the consultative process

²¹ Political parties and other civic movements were required, under POSA, to seek police clearances before holding rallies or any public gatherings. This requirement was often used against opposition political parties and civil society organisations.

conducted during the building of a new Constitution. Although the process was characterised by intense contestation, a draft was produced and approved in a referendum vote of March 2013 before national elections in July of the same year (Mukuhlanzi 2014). This new Constitution explicitly provides for freedom of the media.

A nominal expansion of the media sector was achieved during the tenure of the GNU. It is apt to tag such changes 'nominal' as they did not significantly change the sector's configuration. To begin with, two radio stations were introduced during this period. Both are owned by entities with strong links to the Zanu PF government. The radio stations, *Star FM* and *ZiFM*, belong to Zimpapers which is largely owned and controlled by the government, and AB Communications, a private company owned by former ZBC News reporter and now Zanu PF member, Supa Mandiwanzira, respectively (Dziva *et al.* 2013). Long term aspirant community radio applicants were not successful which ensured that the broadcasting sector remained limited to the narrow interests of Zanu PF and like-minded individuals (Dziva *et al.* 2013). Meanwhile, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings (ZBH, former ZBC) continued its monopoly over television services. ZBH also perpetuated the presentation of a monolithic pro-Zanu PF world view, shutting out and sometimes excoriating its partners in government, the opposition MDC parties.

Journalists from the privately-owned newspapers were generally restricted from performing their roles freely. Reporting on stories to do with the constitutional reform process, killings in the diamond fields and pilfering from them always carried a significant element of danger (Onslow 2011). However, a positive development in the print media sector was the establishment of new publications such as Alpha Media Holdings' two dailies *Newsday* and *The Southern Eye* (now closed), *The Zimbabwe Mail* (now closed), which was believed to be linked to a Zanu PF official, and a resuscitation of *The Daily News*. Nonetheless, the broad picture of the Zimbabwean media remains bifurcated between on the one hand, media that are against Zanu PF (most privately owned newspapers and online publications), and on the other, those which sheepishly follow the official line (Zimpapers' owned newspapers and websites, the ZBC, and to some extent the new radio stations *Star FM* and *ZiFM*). The GNU period presented the independent press such as *The Standard*, with a dilemma as they could not criticise the opposition party MDC which was now part of a government that was patently facing many challenges. In contrast, government controlled media such as *The Sunday Mail*

were critical of the MDC, and often blamed it for the challenges faced by the Government of National Unity.

Nevertheless, the objects of this study, *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* represent two different socio-political perspectives and ideological forces which are in counter-point to each other. The standpoints represented by these two newspapers owe as much to their ownership structures as to the contesting political views their proprietors espouse (Golding and Murdock 2000; Hall 1977). These positions also largely reproduce the lines between Zimbabwe's major contesting social groups. Given the contextual exposition in this chapter thus, *The Sunday Mail* arguably offers the official world view against which that offered by the privately owned *The Standard* can be assessed.

Cases under Study

The Sunday Mail

The Sunday Mail is one of 13 newspapers published by Zimbabwe's oldest and largest newspaper publisher, Zimbabwe Newspapers (Zimpapers), a company in which the Zimbabwean government holds a majority share (Zimpapers 2013). It is a weekly newspaper published every Sunday in the capital, Harare, but distributed across the nation for a mass market aged mainly between 22 and 60 (Zimpapers 2013). According to the quarterly, Zimbabwe All Media Products Survey (ZAMPS), *The Sunday Mail* has the largest circulation and readership which points to its socio-political and cultural importance in the country (Reliefweb 2013)²². Its editorial policy as described by the current editor, Mabasa Sasa, can be understood at two levels, that is, the political and the socio-economic levels. According to him, "at the political level" *The Sunday Mail* is "nationalist and Pan-African as informed by the Preamble and Founding Values of the Constitution of Zimbabwe" (Sasa, personal interview, 2016 July 19). He also noted that "at the socio-economic level" *The Sunday Mail* is "pro-socio-economic transformation, empowerment and industrialisation for betterment of livelihoods of all Zimbabweans" (Sasa, personal interview, 2016 July 19). But some have argued that *The Sunday Mail* uncritically reproduces state propaganda because of "aggressive state intervention in media regulatory policies in the post-2000 epoch" (Moyo 2010:111). While this view is a valid critique of *The Sunday Mail*'s role in the public sphere, the nature of such a role should

²² *The Sunday Mail* is said to be read by 31 percent of people who read weekly newspapers. There are about 10 locally distributed weekly newspapers in Zimbabwe (Reliefweb 2013).

always be subject to further scrutiny using different tools and from different perspectives—hence this study. *The Sunday Mail* makes a good case study because of two other major reasons highlighted by its editor in a personal interview with the researcher. The editor noted that since *The Sunday Mail* is a family newspaper, it speaks “to family values and matters affecting families and communities *as the basic building blocks of any nation-state*”²³ (Sasa, personal interview, 2016 July 19). The editor’s statement shows that the paper actively participates in nation-building processes, and inculcates and cultivates certain values which it sees as consistent with its idea of the nation. This necessitates a study of the kind of nation and values envisaged and privileged by the newspaper, as well as an analysis of how the process of constructing this sense of belonging actually plays out. The second important reason for studying *The Sunday Mail* is encapsulated in the editor’s assertion that his newspaper is “a paper of record”, that is to say, it strives “to ensure that whatever we report on, pertaining economic, social and political policy can be taken as an official record” which is “informed by a strong sense of nationalism and Pan-Africanism” (Sasa, personal interview, 2016 July 19). While some may dismiss this as merely pointing to the paper’s reproduction of state propaganda, the view of this study is that *The Sunday Mail* offers an opportunity to analyse, not just the official record, but its deeper nuances beyond what is conventionally understood as state propaganda. Therefore, it can reasonably be argued that the paper’s wider national socio-demographic reach potentially shapes how a significant number of Zimbabweans construct their identities and a sense of belonging. Furthermore, since it is a weekly newspaper, it is assumed that most of the newspaper’s articles are well-researched in comparison to what one would get in a daily newspaper, providing a rich resource for nuanced textual analysis. *The Sunday Mail* is thus useful for assessing the government controlled mainstream media’s evocation, framing and use of social memory as a function of identity construction and nation building.

The Standard

The Standard is one of four publications owned by Alpha Media Holdings (AMH), Zimbabwe’s largest private newspaper company. It was established in 1997 as a Sunday paper for what the current editor, Kholwani Nyathi, terms “a mass-market” or “the lower ends of the market” (Nyathi, personal interview, 2016 August 5). On its website, AMH pledges that its newspapers give readers truthful facts and contextualised analysis in a non-judgemental,

²³ Italics my emphasis.

objective and fair manner, and in so doing, include all relevant opinions whilst ensuring that no significant strand of thought is neglected (*The Standard* 2013). In sum, the company asserts that its newspapers, not least *The Standard*, aim to serve Zimbabweans with integrity offering journalism that is professional, credible, reliable, trustworthy, dependable and totally transparent (*The Standard* 2013). Because of its editorial stance, *The Standard* has often been regarded as an ‘independent’ newspaper by some, but others have also highlighted its corporatist inclination arguing instead that it reproduces “market propaganda” (Moyo 2009:111). Moyo also argues that while restrictive media laws that were promulgated post-2000 “produced a culture of unquestioning loyalty and servitude in the public media”—of which *The Sunday Mail* is a part—they also “created hyper-adversarial responses in the private press,” such as *The Standard* “where negativity inspires and dominates news reports about most, if not all, government programmes” (2009:111). *The Standard* was chosen as the second case study because it allows for an analysis of discourses that contest official narratives in a largely polarized socio-political environment (see Moyo 2011). In a personal interview with the researcher, the current editor of *The Standard*, Kholwani Nyathi, indicated that even though their thrust is to cover a cross section of the mass-market, they “consider issues that affect the so-called man on the street”, that “resonate with the most common person”, and issues that are “topical among our target audience” (Nyathi, personal interview, 2016 August 5). The economic imperative in this strategy is axiomatic, and Nyathi confirms this when he also says “to be economically viable at times you have to follow the audience or risk closure” (Nyathi, personal interview, 2016 August 5). This is consistent with Moyo’s (2009:111) observation on the private press’s orientation towards both what he calls “market propaganda” and a hyper-adversarial attitude towards government, with content which audiences find appealing, thus satisfying the proprietors’ commercial imperatives. However, since *The Standard* is targeted at the ordinary person, its demographic reach is also potentially very wide which makes how it talks about social issues a matter of concern. Furthermore, the editor also emphasised that *The Standard*—whose content he says is mostly political—focuses on content that is “topical and of public interest”, and that gives “the ordinary person a platform to influence discourse on issues that affect them so as to improve their lives and shape a better future for their country” (Nyathi, personal interview, 2016 August 5). It is in this regard that identity issues and social memory potentially enter news discourse as they are caught up in political struggles. What is also of interest to this study about *The Standard* is that its political stories generate “wider interest compared to others” (Nyathi, personal interview, 2016 August 5). Nyathi’s explanation for this is that “most Zimbabweans are anxious about the future of their country” (Nyathi,

personal interview, 2016 August 5). He also pointed out that readers are more interested in their content because *The Standard* offers “uncensored news” because they are “an independent paper, that is neither influenced by the government or advertisers” (Nyathi, personal interview, 2016 August 5). If these factors have any tangible effect on the readers, it means that the paper’s content is likely to be more trusted than *The Sunday Mail*’s, whose slant is known at the outset. Given *The Standard*’s potentially good social standing, and its critical stance compared to *The Sunday Mail* which takes a clear pro-government position on issues, *The Standard* is useful for assessing alternative, if not contesting evocations, frames and uses of social memory as a function of identity construction and nation-building in Zimbabwe. These two newspapers thus enable an assessment of the interplay between political frames of socio-political issues and their media framing. Of concern is an assessment of these newspapers’ function as sites of social memory and their appropriation of identity construction and the ‘nation building project’ in Zimbabwe, and what this tells about journalism’s memory work.

Conclusion

It can thus be concluded that the shifting configuration of the media environment prior to independence and after its achievement in 1980 was shaped by concomitant shifts in the socio-political milieu. However, the direction of influence was not always linear and unilateral. In some instances, political actions were influenced by the nature of messages dominant in, especially, the ‘oppositional’ media. The RF government’s response to the Argus Press’s criticism of UDI and the Zanu PF government’s response to rising criticism in privately owned media such as *The Daily Gazette* and *The Daily News* are cases in point. In most cases, political players at the level of party and government took an active role in shaping a media environment that, in their opinion, best suited successful pursuit of their goals. This chapter has also mapped the fractures and contestations both in the socio-political condition of the country and its bifurcated media system. This helps to show the different symbolic positions represented by *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard*, which in turn allows us to discern the varied ways in which different media—informed by different ideological orientations—work as memory sites in an environment of contesting discourses around identity and nation-building. The next chapter provides a critical explication of this study’s central concepts: social memory, collective identity and nation-building.

Chapter Three

A Conceptual Exegesis

It remains important, however, to remember that the collective past is always a constructed past (and continually under reconstruction), that its construction is part of the processes by which societies do not smoothly inherit but actively thrash out and negotiate forms of collective identity, and that this thrashing out and negotiating is always at least latently and potentially problematic and disharmonious – an affair of claims and counter-claims, of power and resistance, and not just of mutual recognition and collective celebration. (Cubitt 2007:230-231)

Introduction

This study is centred on two problematics. On the one hand, it seeks to show, using the *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard*, how newspapers use social memory to participate in the construction of collective identities in multi-ethno-cultural and multi-racial societies, and the implications of such constructions for nation-building using the case of Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the study seeks to explore how these newspapers work as memory sites through their construction of collective identities and participation in nation-building processes.

To begin with, there is need for conceptual limpidity. Terms such as social memory, collective identity and even nation-building are invested with a multiplicity of understandings not just at the conceptual level, but also in social praxis. This chapter explicates the general understandings of these terms, and the ways in which the terms have been appropriated for the study. It starts by discussing social memory, chiefly, a concept and capacity at the centre of both collective identity formation and nation-building, followed by a discussion on nation-building which as both process and concept invokes elements of social memory and presages (or is presaged by) a sense of collective identity. Collective identity, simultaneously a product and facilitator of both social memory and nation-building, is the last of the three concepts to be discussed.

Social Memory

Memory and History

Modern societies engage with the past in two major ways, memory and history. While some scholars draw a line between memory and history, some look for points of convergence and others look beyond the dichotomy (Misztal 2003). This scenario draws our attention to the

memory-history encounter as a point of both contestation and convergence. On the one hand, contest is fiercest at the point of intersection between modernist “scientific history” (Le Goff 1992), and memory puritanism (see Nora 1989). On the other, it has been argued that phenomenological tendencies in history have a lot in common with memory (Cubitt 2007). It is thus necessary briefly to explicate the relationship between history and memory before zeroing in on social memory. The difference between history and memory can be located in their treatment of the relationship between the past and present. For history:

it is not the past that produces the present, but – figuratively at least – the present that produces the past, through an effort of the creative or analytical imagination [...] a past constructed through the complex mixture of reflection and recollection, research and imaginative representation, that allows us the feeling of conscious retrospection. (Cubitt 2007:27)

But for puritan approaches to memory, “past is linked to present in a continuous flow of development, and the present is thus to be thought of [...] as simply the latest moment in an inexorably advancing stream of historical happenings and interactions” (Cubitt 2007:27). This view is forcefully argued by Nora who observes that, “memory is perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present” whereas, “history is a representation of the past” (1989:8). Thus, modernist history’s view of the past as something to be viewed from a detached present is consistent with its “scientific”²⁴ approach to studying the past²⁵ which is the basis for criticisms levelled against memory, a supposedly subjective phenomenon rooted in the idiosyncrasies of the remembering groups or individuals (see Le Goff 1992). Nevertheless, this separation is reconciled in socio-cultural approaches to history. As Cubitt notes, social historians are interested in the following, among other things:

the experiential aspect of social processes and situations [...] engagement with the mental and social dynamics of remembering [...] the representation of the past as a vital feature of political and religious ideologies [...] the effects of total war and genocide on individuals and societies. (2007:1-2)

It is this phenomenological turn in social history that narrows the gap between memory and history, at least in terms of their epistemological orientation. For historians to address the issues raised above by Cubitt, they must engage with experiential or memory communities which, of essence, transplants them into the domain of memory (see Vidal-Naquet 1992). However, more radical positions see neither a boom in memory studies nor a phenomenological turn in social history as a healthy development, but a symptom of a memory crisis. Nora (1989:7) for instance

²⁴ See Hall (1982:54).

²⁵ For a critique of history’s claim to science see White (1978, 1984).

argues that a proliferation of the “sites of memory” is emblematic of memory’s degeneration. He points out that real memory is “social and unviolated” whereas history, whose goal he says is to “suppress and destroy” memory, “organises the past” for forgetful modern societies (Nora 1989:8, 9). Ultimately for Nora, “we speak of memory because there is little of it left” (1989:7). His view represents a form of traditionalism²⁶ which is grounded in the culturalist argument for the agency of human experience within structured social conditions (see Hall 1980; Pickering 1997). However, structuralist perspectives emphasise the contingent nature of experience saying “one could only ‘live’ and experience one’s conditions *in and through* the categories, classifications and frameworks of” culture, thereby, making experience the effect and not the source of these categories (Hall 1980:66). Furthermore, the vulnerability of memory to manipulation by contemporary elites has also been cited as a shortcoming that undermines its credibility (Le Goff 1992).

In summary, it can be deduced that on the one hand, history (especially the modernist kind) is generally venerated using positivist nomenclature, and on the other, memory is given phenomenological characterisation. This view of history is thus generally regarded as methodologically superior to memory as it is disciplined in a method of inquiry that is objective, evidentiary, scientific, and universal—among other positivistic qualities ascribed to it (Le Goff 1992; Misztal 2003; Cubitt 2007; Nora 1989). On the other hand, memory is described as subjective, concerned with “ordinary sense making”, experiential, operating from below, concrete, multiple, concerned with “continuities of consciousness between the past and present”, having group specificity and that it is social *inter-alia* (Cubitt 2007:30; Vidal-Naquet 1992; Misztal 2003; Nora 1989). This contestation reflects the concepts’ proximal and interwoven relationship. Therefore, this study takes the position that “history and memory are proximate concepts” which “inhabit the same mental territory” (Cubitt 2007:4). Furthermore, as Cubitt points out, there are four arguments that couple the concepts of memory and history: that history is an extension of memory; a form of memory; a codification or arrangement of memory; and that it is analogous to memory (2007:31).

Since the study analyses interpretive texts in print journalism as rhetorical devices and repositories of memory, the distinction between history and memory may be both difficult to

²⁶ Cubitt (2007:179) defines tradition as connections between generations which are “supplied by continuities in practice – by people, whether unconsciously or deliberately, taking the way things have been done before as the effective model for their own activity.”

draw and undesirable to establish. This is because, as some argue, journalism is the first draft of history (Edy 1999:71) and that, journalistic practice insists, invites and sometimes includes memory—which in some cases may just be history—in its engagement with the past (Zelizer 2008; see also Zandberg 2010; Edy 1999; Cubitt 2007). How exactly it does that, is the substance of this study as its remit is to establish the memory work of journalism using the instances under study.

Theories of Social Memory

Memory is a very broad term which encompasses all sorts of practices at various levels of society, and literature on this phenomenon is forbiddingly extensive. This makes a comprehensive and all-encompassing explication of the debates on memory rather difficult. This section starts by conceptualising social memory, followed by a discussion of different perspectives to the understanding of social memory, and ends with a discussion on the politics of memory which aims to show its contingent and contested nature. Generally speaking, memory can be:

mental or physical, natural or artificial, conscious or unconscious, individual or social: it may be embodied in animal instinct, or in cultural programming, or in electronic systems ('computer memory'), or at the limit, even in molecular structures that produce effects of 'shape memory' in certain physical materials. (Cubitt 2007:8-9)

Therefore, it is important to isolate social memory from the multiple understandings of memory. But social memory, both as concept and capacity is also manifest in a misty labyrinth of fluctuating, sometimes resonant, and sometimes contesting meaning frameworks. It has marked purchase in the fields of sociology, history, psychology and anthropology (Olick *et al.* 2011). Sociologists have largely concerned themselves with memory “as a major source for and carrier of identities”, its processes, “as well as contestation about and through images of the past” (Olick *et al.* 2011:42). Modernist history’s concern with memory is markedly epistemological, wherein history is argued to be organised, evidentiary and systematised in contrast with memory which is said to be subjective and disorganised (Le Goff 1992; Cubitt 2007). This perspective treats memory as history’s defining other (Cubitt 2007:31; Le Goff 1992). Psychologists focus more on the individualised dynamics of remembering, while anthropologists assume a relativist and cultural take on memory (Olick *et al.* 2011). A good starting point in conceptualising social memory is to explicate the notion of memory in its generic form before separating social memory from various other cognate terms. As Cubitt points out, the term ‘memory’ can be used to “describe and connect a disparate range of

practices and processes and phenomena, some occurring within individuals and some within the structures of society and culture, which are involved in producing consciousness of the past at various social levels” (2007:5). He goes on to show the term’s multivalent nature thus:

‘memory’ itself can be understood in different ways. According to some of these understandings, memory is something essentially personal and individual; according to others, it is basically connected to some social institutions and cultural forms; to some, it is a survival of past experiences; to others, it is essentially a reconstruction of those experiences from a present stand point. (Cubitt 2007:4)

It is this multivalence that necessitates some degree of a specificity of terms for analytical lucidity. This study is primarily concerned with social memory, a term which has been occasionally used, albeit inconsistently, also to mean “collective memory”, “public memory”, “cultural memory”, “popular memory” (see Zelizer 1995:214; Cubitt 2007:13). Furthermore, some have retained individual agency in social memory, through terms such as “collected memory” as opposed to “collective memory” (Kansteiner 2002:186). However, as Cubitt warns, “a word may be allowed to mean many things, but it is usually unwise to allow it to mean all of them simultaneously” (2007:6). Broadly speaking, collective remembering has been largely discussed as collective memory since memory studies grew out of Halbwachs’s (1926/1992) work on memory. Halbwachs is largely credited for developing an advanced understanding of how collective frameworks shape remembering (Coser 1992). However, because his own formulation was overly emphatic on the agency and unitary nature of the collective in framing processes of remembering, the term collective memory assumed popular usage.

This study uses the term social memory instead of collective memory although both terms are used interchangeably as the term social memory came into use as a “corrective to the other term’s supposedly misleading tendency to over-reify the collective aspects of existence” (Cubitt 2007:13). As Fentress and Wickham, who view the term ‘collective memory’ as somewhat deterministic, argue, social memory addresses “the question of how individual consciousness might relate to those of the collectivities those individuals actually made up” (1992: ix). It has also been noted that memory is social since it is actualised through language, symbols, as well as in social and cultural contexts (Misztal 2003; Schudson 1995; Zerubavel 1997). Social memory, Misztal argues, “refers not so much to living memory but to organised cultural practices supplying ways of understanding the world, and providing people with beliefs and opinions which guide their actions (2003:12). This is why it is necessary to assess the

media whose contribution to these processes is often ignored. Social memory, which Misztal also uses interchangeably with collective memory, is not just individualised remembrance, but is a group's constructed past which is at once "constitutive of the collectivity" (Misztal 2003:13). Also, as Schwartz observes, social memory "is part of culture's meaning-making apparatus" (2000:17). Furthermore, Olick *et al.* (2011:19) argue that all remembering is social as it "takes place with social materials, within social contexts and in response to social cues." Thus, the study of social memory allows an understanding of the "categories people, groups, and cultures employ to make sense of their lives, their social, cultural, and political attachments, and the concomitant ideals that are validated" (Olick *et al.* 2011:37). Its import in socio-political processes stems from its capacity to mediate the past and present, often through normative analogies (Misztal 2003). It also shapes identity formation both at the individual and societal level, is a source of truth in monolithic and authoritarian societies, and in some cases, is a source of social cohesion (Bastide 1978; Misztal 2003; Burke 1989). Therefore, it is also important to analyse the sites of social memory which include among others the media, as they shape the way society is constituted.

For a fair appraisal of the concept's expansive theoretical postulations, the study turns to Misztal (2003) who provides a useful framework from which to understand the different shades of social memory. Her framework is composed of four perspectives: the social context of memory, the presentist perspective (invention of traditions), the popular memory approach, and the dynamics of memory approach (Misztal 2003).

Halbwachs and the Social Context of Memory

French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs is considered by many to be the father of modern memory studies. Although his work was only popularised in the 1970s and 1980s during the so-called turn to memory, it spawned an expansive body of work leading to the incorporation of memory studies in the academy and the establishment of a journal dedicated to memory issues. Halbwachs drew much from Emile Durkheim (his teacher) whose ideas on social solidarity and identity influenced much of his writing (Coser 1992). He published and revised several of his works on collective memory between 1925 and 1945 when he died in a Nazi concentration camp (Coser 1992). The crux of Halbwachs's argument is that the process of remembering is anchored in, and structured by the social frameworks within which such remembering occurs (1926/1992). It is from this premise that he asserts "every group develops a memory of its own past that highlights its unique identity" (Misztal 2003:51). Thus, not only

does he socialise remembering, he also locates identity as a function of memory. Halbwachs also argues that memory is important to all types of societies (Miształ 2003:51). For him, what is remembered, either by an individual or group, and how it is remembered is always socially framed and linked to group identities. However, Halbwachs does not essentialise society as a monolithic entity but speaks of social groups, which cover all kinds of social agglomerations (1926/1992). Thus for him, there are as many memories as there are social groups (Miształ 2003:51). He also believed that a change in collective milieu, could also lead to shifts in patterns of collective memory (Miształ 2003:48). Consistent with Durkheimian thinking, Halbwachs saw collective memory as a concomitant condition for social order and solidarity. Since he argued that individuals draw on group context in the process of remembering, Halbwachs saw individual memory that lacked this contingency as meaningless (1926/1992).

Although his ideas are still considered the point of departure for most studies in social memory, they have also been widely criticised. Some have argued that Halbwachs remains unclear on how collective memory actually works (Miształ 2003). He has also been criticised for ignoring the tension, often arising from living memory, between personal memory and the construction of a collective past by influential social groups (Cubitt 2007:227). His thinking is seen as disconnecting the thought processes of individuals from the collective nature of social consciousness (Fentress and Wickham 1992). Halbwachs has also been criticised for taking the stability of group memories for granted, which has been taken to mean that he does not account for changes in the conception of the past, and that he sees identities as fixed in a certain social milieu (Olick *et al.* 2011:37). Notwithstanding such criticisms, Halbwachs's work remains key to the study of collective memory. His emphasis on the influence of social frameworks on the framing of social memory directs our attention to the memory work of social institutions such as the media.

Presentist Memory and the Invention of Traditions

The invention of traditions paradigm partly takes a presentist orientation in its formulation of social memory. Although many authors have produced a diverse body of work within this paradigm, Hobsbawm and Ranger's (1983) publication remains the exemplary text of the perspective. Authors within this paradigm see social memory as something that is invented for instrumentalist and functionalist reasons (Confino 1997; Burke 1989/2011:188; Megill 1998; Schwartz 2000). For them, invented public rituals are directed at social control (Miształ 2003:56; Zerubavel 1995). The approach analyses how powerful and influential social groups

in society manipulate stories about the past for political expediency. As Misztal points out, for researchers within this paradigm, “the past is moulded to suit present dominant interests” (2003:56). She notes that some of the studies within this paradigm:

have illustrated how new traditions and rituals are ‘invented’ in the sense of being deliberately designed and produced with a view to creating new political realities, defining nations and sustaining national communities. (Misztal 2003:56)

Thus, they view social memory as an invention of the past that is not necessarily genuine, which directs research within this paradigm towards the institutionalisation of remembrance (Zerubavel 1995). For instance, the invention of traditions paradigm analyses how “nationalist movements create a master commemorative narrative that highlights their members’ common past and legitimises their aspiration for a shared destiny” (Misztal 2003:56; see also Smith 2004, 2009). One of the aims of this study is to assess the ways in which remembrances are manipulated to legitimate certain configurations of power, especially through mediated narratives. The invention of traditions is also seen as a strategy for concealing these power dynamics and the asymmetrical distribution of wealth in a given social context. This paradigm suggests in more direct terms who is behind “memory’s selectiveness and points to causes of this selectiveness” (Misztal 2003:56). Thus, as Misztal argues, this paradigm is concerned with showing the functions of constructed versions of the past in creating “social cohesion, legitimising authority and socialising populations in a common culture” (2003:56). For this paradigm, the manipulation of memory proceeds through a dialectic of censorship and celebration or “socially organised forgetting and socially organised remembering” (Misztal 2003:56). Therefore, the invention of traditions paradigm is useful for analysing the purposeful construction of social memory, and those societies whose master commemorative narrative is heavily contested, because as Hobsbawm and Ranger argue, the invention of traditions is a means of exercising power (1983).

The paradigm has been criticised for being overly-emphatic on manipulation. For instance, Schudson (1997) argues that some memories filter through self-consciously. In other words, not all memories in a society are a product of manipulation and not everyone accepts the official memories. As Misztal points out, “people tend to reject any vision of the past which contradicts their recollection and sense of truth” (2003:60). Although the instrumental and functionalist tone of the invention of traditions paradigm puts more emphasis on the manipulation of remembrances by dominant power centres in older Western state systems, it remains very useful to the analysis of societies which actively promote invented traditions and suppress other

remembrances. It is also a useful perspective from which to analyse how processes of invention play out in the public sphere by paying particular attention to the media's memory work as they are the quintessential communicative institution of modern societies.

Popular Memory and Dominant Ideologies

The popular memory and dominant ideologies perspective is also primarily instrumentalist as it conceives popular memory in terms of resistance to dominant mnemonic narratives. In other words, dominant social groups are still seen as mobilisers of an expedient master commemorative narrative to ensure their own continuity and social stability, whereas popular memory is seen as functionally invoked by the marginalised to counter the former. Foucault, in fact, uses the term counter-memory alternatively with popular memory to bring out its oppositional flavour (1974/2011). Thus, it can be argued, both forms are seen through the functionalist lens, albeit in the service of social groups necessarily in contest. However, there is a bit of a difference between popular memory and invented traditions in the sense that popular memory recovers the agency of marginal groups (Foucault 1974/2011). The paradigm's departure point is that of contestation and therefore does not perceive marginal groups as subjected to master-commemorative narratives. The approach is thus less deterministic in comparison to the two paradigms discussed above. The popular memory paradigm asserts that under certain conditions, marginal groups reject or at least negotiate with dominant memory narratives through an assertion of their versions of the past (Miztal 2003:62). Researchers in this paradigm analyse the dynamics of contest between hegemonic orders of memory, and local group memories (Miztal 2003:62). Although the notion of popular memory was broached by Foucault, it gained traction through the work of the Popular Memory Group which was affiliated to the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham, England. The group saw hegemonic political systems as a constantly shifting "site of contestation between dominant social formations and marginalised social formations" (Pearson 1999:180). The Group emphatically stressed "the dialectical interaction between 'popular' and 'hegemonic' discourses and between private memory and public memory" (Miztal 2003:64). It noted that the attrition between hegemonic memory orders and counter-memory shapes the content of hegemonic memory (Popular Memory Group 1982). This process results in what the Group, following Foucault, also called public memory, which is a consequence of the negotiation between dominant memory and counter-memory (Popular Memory Group 1982). Although public memory is a product of negotiation, it is sustained by real processes of domination and therefore remains a site of further contestation (Miztal 2003:64). Public memory therefore

works ideologically to mediate the competing interests and meanings invested in mnemonic narratives (Misztal 2003:66). This does not mean that counter-memory is rendered useless in the process. As Misztal points out:

the idea of counter-memory illuminates the connection between the hegemonic order and historical representations because it allows us to overcome the presentist approach's failure to differentiate between the 'truth' and ideology, and provides the possibility of accounting for subordinated voices from the past. (2003:64-65)

The popular memory approach has been criticised for “an atemporal” conception of collective memory as it conceptualises the past as a fact manipulated in the present (Schwartz 2000:16). Furthermore, some have pointed out that public sentiment is not only an emanation of top-down remembrances, but can also emerge from the bottom-up (Misztal 2003:67). The popular memory approach has also been criticised for its oversight of popular memory emerging from shared symbols (Misztal 2003:67). However, it remains a useful perspective from which to analyse the interaction between contesting mnemonic narratives especially in mediated texts.

The Dynamics of Memory Approach

The dynamics of memory approach conceives of collective remembering as a continuous process of negotiation between and within mnemonic groups. It proceeds from the premise that there are limits to the discretionary manipulation of memory by those in the present. As Schudson argues, conflicts about the past limit self-serving manipulation of memory thereby inviting negotiation (1989). It also accommodates bottom up constructions of collective memory as memory is deemed to be not solely the province of official narrative as suggested by the invention of traditions approach. It sees memory as a dynamic phenomenon which is not always invoked for instrumental reasons, but a product of shifts in group values and beliefs (Misztal 2003:68; Olick *et al.* 2011). It argues against a priori assumptions that memory is manipulated, pointing out instead, that there are many sources of distortion (Schudson 1995). Furthermore, as Misztal observes, the dynamics of memory approach envisages a relationship between remembering and transformation, that is to say, memory can be altered for progressive reasons (2003). For instance, she points out that in some cases, traumatic experiences are remembered not only to honour the victims, but also to prevent a reoccurrence of such events (Misztal 2003:68; see also Todorov 2009). The dynamics of memory perspective also argues for the historicisation of identities and meaning making frameworks. This allows the perspective to overcome the essentialisation of identity by Halbwachs who assumes that identities are always stable and that they presage patterns of recollection (1926/1992). As

Misztal points out, the dynamics of memory approach, “argues for the need to historicise identities and meaning systems and tries to comprehend not only how people use the past but also how the past endures in the present” (2003:69). Therefore, since the approach sees social memory as something that is not durable, but a malleable product of dynamic shifts in identity formations, researchers informed by the perspective “analyse how, when and why some social events are more likely to form part of the collective memory” than others (Misztal 2003:71). Their research sites are primarily narrative reports of the past from which many stories can emerge through processes of remembering, such as the media (Zelizer 1995:357). Since this perspective accommodates multiple entry points to memory negotiation; uses research sites that allow for multiple interpretations; and takes collective memory as an outcome of processual remembering, it avoids both “political reductionism and functionalism” (Misztal 2003:73). This view is succinctly summarised by Zelizer who points out that:

its conceptualisation of memory as a contingent product of social and political actions and as a ground or basis of further action, highlights memory’s processual and interactive development as well as its unstable, multiple and fluctuating nature. (1995:218)

However, the dynamics of memory approach has been criticised for not paying enough attention to the cross-weaving relationship between private memory and public memory (Misztal 2003:74).

The Politics of Social Memory

Memory as representation and social process is at the crossroads of many contentious social activities. It permeates identity, nationalist, ethnic, religious, and racial politics among other such social spaces. It is usually caught up in multiple and competing interpretive frameworks across the social spaces referred to above. This has been compounded by the onset of modern technologies of memory transmission which have introduced its mediation. For example, literacy has transformed what we remember and how we remember (Olick *et al.* 2011). As Hutton argues, in literate societies, memory as habit is displaced by memory as representation, hence the importance of studying the media’s work of memory (1993:16). In addition, Burke points out that “remembering the past and writing about it – no longer seems innocent [...] because of selection, interpretation and distortion which is socially conditioned” (1989/2011:188). He also argues that representations of memory in the form of texts—such as in newspapers—are not memory themselves but the transformation of memory through writing or mediatisation (Burke 1989). These observations suggest an active process of memory

construction and transformation through publicised representations, especially in the media. Thus, as Burke argues, memories are malleable, and therefore it is important to explore how they are changed, who changes them and for what reasons (1989). Answers to these questions enable us to trace the changes in social power and show the constructed and contingent nature of both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic social memory. This can be achieved by analysing mediated texts among many other sites of memory.

It has also been argued that an interest in memory emerges “when/where collective identity is no longer as obvious as it once was” (Olick *et al.* 2011:8; see also Megill 1998), and the key site in thinking about “social and cultural forms of memory is the rise of nationalism, and the understandings of history it depended on” (Olick *et al.* 2011:13). This, as some have observed, is because memory is usually invoked to “justify and legitimate the existence of a nation-state” hence the importance of asking the question, “who wants whom to remember what, and why” (Burke 1989/2011:191). Answers to these questions also help us to understand “the social organisation of forgetting, the rules of exclusion, suppression or repression” (Burke 1989/2011:191). The task of exploring the social organisation of both remembering and forgetting, rules of inclusion and exclusion, the dynamics of memory suppression and repression brings researchers’ attention to the politics of memory. It helps us assess the ways in which memory is imbricated in power relations at different levels in society. For instance, as Zerubavel points out, to construct a sense of collective identity, a social group constructs a master-commemorative narrative around which individual commemorations orbit (1995). This master-commemorative narrative, which emanates from a significant social event in the group’s history, is the source of an ideological framework within which a historicised collective sense of identity is built (Zerubavel 1995). Narratives that seem to undermine the master commemorative narrative are marginalised or selected for collective amnesia (Megill 1998). It is from these suppressed narratives that counter-memory emerges to contest the master-commemorative narrative (Zerubavel 1995).

In the face of diversity and fragmentation of social interests within a context of globalisation, migration, and the politics of trauma, memory has become key to the construction of collective identity (Misztal 2003). It has arisen as a source of both individual and collective identity legitimisation (Cubitt 2007; Misztal 2003). As Fentress and Wickham point out, social memory has come to be seen as an expression of collective experience which identifies a group (1992). Groups are said to draw on important specific events to form and sustain particularistic

identities (Misztal 2003), although identity and memory can also be mutually constitutive (Gillis 1994). But, it should be appreciated that as historical phenomena, collective identities and social memory are unstable social constructs shaped by multiple and competing representations of the past in the public sphere (Cubitt 2007; Misztal 2003). Thus, it can be argued, the development of collective identities and nation-building processes draw a lot on the past which is why the evocation of social memory, not least by the media, has become a contested political space which necessitates deconstructive analysis.

Another site that merges collective identity formation and social memory is trauma. As Misztal points out, “traumas, representing the extremities of human experience, are the occasions on which collective identities are most intensively engaged” (2003:139; see also Jelin 2003). She argues that trauma modifies the processes of social memory as it “makes such memories particularly vivid, intrusive, uncontrollable, persistent and somatic” (Misztal 2003:142). Traumatic events can wield greater force in forging collective identities because as Renan points out, “suffering in common unifies more than joy does” (1882/2011:83). Thus, memories of traumatic events have also arisen as a source of intense counter-memory wherein “states are judged on how well they atone for their misdeeds” in the past (Olick *et al.* 2011:3-4). However, some have warned of the dangers of using memory as a basis of collective identities arguing that memories that are not anchored in knowledge or are not given enough thought can endanger other people (Megill 1998; Todorov 2009; Misztal 2003). The implication of the observation that social memory is constitutive of collective identity therefore, is that processes of social memory, also underwrite “contemporary political projects and cultural practices” (Olick *et al.* 2011:249). In sum, as Olick *et al.* point out, we must insist that:

all political activity is intrinsically a process of historical argument and definition, that all political programmes involve some construction of the past as well as the future, and that these processes go on every day. (2011:258)

Thus, memory is located at the centre of all struggles for political hegemony. Its constant evocation reflects the instability of the political domain within which it is operational since the alignment of past, present and future changes with historical change (Olick *et al.* 2011:37). The contests over memory play out between what some call “vernacular” versus “public memory” (Bodnar 1992/2011:265-268), “master-commemorative narratives” versus “counter-memory” (Zerubavel 1995/2011:240), and “popular memory” versus “public memory” (Foucault 1974/2011:252-253). These dichotomies reflect the tensions that arise between the official constructions of memory, which are usually politically expedient, and bottom up constructions

which arise from lived experiences and are generally oppositional, with their own sense of political expediency. As such, when constructions of memory emerge in politicised spaces, it is “all the more likely that the past will be used as a resource for legitimating rather than as an avenue toward the truth” (Schudson 1989/2011:287). For instance, social memory constructed within hegemonic frameworks is always incomplete and subject to contestation. As Schudson argues:

the full freedom to reconstruct the past according to one’s own present interests is limited by three factors: the structure of available pasts, the structure of individual choices, and the conflicts about the past among the multitude of mutually aware individuals or groups [...]. Control over the past is disputed and the past becomes contested terrain. (1989/2011:287)

The desire to control the past is not a preserve of the powerful but extends also to groups aspiring for greater political influence (Schwartz 2000). It is through narratives and interpretive discourses playing out in the processes of memory’s externalisation that this contestation plays out (Cubitt 2007). As Eyerman posits, narratives and discourses are “framing structures which include and exclude, voice and silence” thereby shaping who says what to whom (2011). One important social platform for such discursive tussles is the mass media (Cubitt 2007). Due to various internal and external limitations, mass media institutions may not be able to recall everything that happened nor do they necessarily reflect the spontaneously emerging popular memories. Instead, as mnemonic institutions, the mass media are “part of the more general structuring of society, responsive to larger economic, social, political or cultural evolutions” (Cubitt 2007:170). As such, an analysis of their role as a function of power in shaping social memory and by extension collective identity and nation-building processes should be taken seriously. Also, taking into consideration the centrality of social memory to both the formation of collective identities and to nationalist projects of nation-building (Cubitt 2007), “combinations of knowing, not knowing, remembering and forgetting are [...] a more useful mode of thinking about power relations” (Wagner-Pacifici 1996/2011:396).

The foregoing explicated the concept of social memory and showed its dynamic position and purchase within socio-political processes such as collective identity construction and nation-building. This nuanced explication of social memory emerging from literature provides a useful tool box for analysing the complex and ever changing processes of collective identity formation and nation-building. More specifically, it is useful to the analysis of complex processes of competing constructions by dominant and dominated groups alike in their endeavours to

achieve or sustain power in particular milieux. The next section focuses on the concept and practice of nation-building which is imbricated with social memory and collective identity.

Nation-Building

The Nation

A discussion on nation-building invites an elaboration of the notion of the nation, and the processes by which a nation comes to exist. This section thus begins with a discussion on the various ways in which the nation has been conceptualised. It proceeds to discuss nation-building and ends with an outline of a spectrum of understandings of nationalism, which is a central facet of nation-building processes. The term nation has been given many inflections including the ethnicist, the modernist, and the post-modern (Brubaker 1996b). It is also a subject of contest both in scholarly explication and as a form of collective identity which makes it a political subject (Hutchinson and Smith 1994). It can also be defined in objective and subjective terms (Hroch 1993:4). Ethnicist understandings anchor nations in their ethnic origins (Smith 1986, 2002, 2004, 2009; Connor 1992, 1978; Armstrong 1982). Within this perspective, a nation is seen as a “self-differentiating *ethnic* group” wherein a “prerequisite of nationhood is a popularly held awareness or belief that one’s own group is unique in a most vital sense” (Connor 1972:337). However, Smith modifies the conventional ethnicist conception of the nation to an ethno-symbolic perspective which he argues, “does justice to both ethnic and territorial conceptions” (2004:42). According to Smith, an ethno-symbolist conception sees the nation as:

a named and self-defining human community whose members cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and are attached to historic territories or ‘homelands’, create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standardised laws. (2009:29)

For modernists, the premise is that although nations may draw some formative material from their ethnic origins, they are primarily a product of modern institutions and processes (Anderson 1983, 1991; Gellner 1983, 2006; Hroch 1985, 1993; 1995; Breuilly 1993a, 1996; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Brass 1979, 1991). From this perspective, a nation is seen as “a large group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical), and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness” (Hroch 1993:4). Post-modernists “emphasise the fragmentary, the ephemeral, and the erosion of fixed forms and boundaries” (Brubaker 1996b:13).

Furthermore, Renan argues that the dialectical processes of remembering and forgetting are central to the constitution of nations (1882/2011). He argues that “the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common; and also that they have forgotten many things” (Renan 1882/2011:80). Some prefer to speak in terms of perception, arguing that nationhood is in fact a “self-view of a group” and not something tangible (Connor 1972:337). Connor also defines the nation in ways that are somewhat transcendent of ethnic moorings saying it can be “described in terms of its particular amalgam of the tangible characteristics, for example, in terms of the number of its members, the physical location, their religious and linguistic composition, and so forth” (1972:337). Another productive way of delineating a nation is to locate the elements that bind it which Hroch provides:

(i) a ‘memory’ of some common past, treated as a ‘destiny’ of the group – or at least its core constituents; (ii) a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the group than beyond it (iii) a conception of the equality of all members of the group organised as a civil society. (1993:5)

Despite their different understandings of a nation, these perspectives point to the concept’s problematic nature both in theory and in practice. Since the term is located in contesting discourses and practices, the important task therefore becomes that of reconciling the relationship between the state and nation (Smith 1986; Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007), and establishing how nationhood is institutionalised within and among states as a political and cultural form (Brubaker 1996b:16). It is these concerns that drive intellectual work towards the examination of nation-building—especially in Africa where nations are conceived in territorial terms (Brubaker 1996a). What necessitates the examination of nation-building processes, are the different and often irreconcilable conceptions of a nation and processes constitutive thereof. For instance, since the ethnicist perspective—in Connor’s sense—suggests that multi-ethnic states are also at the same time multi-national (Kuzio 2001), the logical question to ask is how do these different nations co-exist within a single polity? From the modernist perspective, the discernible implication is that statist nations built on the premise of modern imperatives such as the economy and the preponderant system of political organisation, the nation-state, have subsumed alternate fractions of collective identity within a universalised national identity. This begs the question: ‘how do states manage to sustain a *sense* of collective identity in such circumstances’? It is this manifest tension between particularistic and universalistic notions of a nation within and between state systems that necessitate an examination of nation-building processes in concrete situations. Central to this study is an examination of how journalism participates in this process through its memory work.

Nation-Building

The modern world order is premised on a system of nation-states (Smith 1986; Billig 1995; Anderson 1983). But as ethnicists warn, the hyphenate *nation-state* should not be taken for granted as it reflects a confusing inter-utilisation of the terms *state* and *nation* (Connor 1978/1994). The ethnicist argument is premised on the observation that ethnic groups morph into nations under certain historical conditions, and that since many modern states are multi-ethnic (Connor 1972), it cannot always be assumed that the nation is congruent with the state. Another view argues that most, if not all, of today's nation-states are products of processes of nation-building (Kuzio 2001). These sentiments capture the dynamics surrounding attempts to make every nation a state and every state a nation (Linz 1993). However, as Hroch argues, problems posed by nation-formation processes are not yet fully understood, and most defensible conclusions are still partial findings: hence the need for further investigation on the subject (1993). An entry point for an examination of nation-building is Brubaker's suggestion that we can either take a structuralist point of view which sees "groups as enduring components of social structure," or a constructivist view which envisions "group-ness as constructed, contingent, and fluctuating" (1996b:13).

This study sees it productive to take a constructivist perspective as it speaks to the idea of *nation-building*. Brubaker also argues that the notion of a nation should not be adopted without question as it takes the existence of a 'nation' for granted leaving space only for debate over its constitution (1996b; see also Billig 1995). This for him is an error as it may unintentionally reproduce or reinforce the "reification of nations in practice with a reification of nations in theory" (Brubaker 1996b). Rather, he advises, we should speak in terms of a "world of nations" as:

a world in which nationhood is pervasively institutionalised in the practice of states and the workings of the state system. It is a world in which nation is widely, if unevenly, available and resonant as a category of social vision and division. (Brubaker 1996b:21)

Also, as Sutherland points out, since nation-building is contingent, ideological, and incomplete, no form of social organisation is "True" (2005:185, 186, 191). Nation-building thus, should be understood as an ongoing process. Although nation-building processes may take various forms, their overriding objective is to build a sense of oneness out of many different social groups in a particular state (Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007). Smith defines nation-building as "social mobilisation, linguistic assimilation and the use of mass media and mass education" to achieve a "national participant society" (1986:231). It is this process that Brubaker refers to as

the “welding of a population into a nation by the state” (1996a:412). Some refer to this process as attempts by a society’s elites “to homogenise multicultural societies” (Kuzio 2001:139; see also Linz and Stepan 1996). Another comprehensive definition of nation-building is provided by Calhoun who sees it as the process through which:

nations are made by internal processes of struggle, communication, political participation, road building, education, history writing and economic development as well as by campaigns against external enemies. (1997:79)

Also as Dorman, Hammett and Nugent point out, the vocabulary and practice of nation-building shape “assumptions about how members of the nation should live, behave and identify themselves” (2007:8). It involves the selection of symbolic material, values, and memories, *inter-alia*, around which to build a nation (Kuzio 2001). For ethnicists, this process is centred on an ethnic core or cultural core of a territory (Smith 2004; Kuzio 2001). But for modernists:

the nation to be built was conceived as trans-ethnic or supra-ethnic. Its content was to be ‘civic’ rather than ‘ethnic’, its contours defined by the territorial and institutional frame of the state, rather than by cultural or ethnic boundaries. (Brubaker 1996a:413)

In an attempt to organise thought on nation-building, different scholars have developed typologies of the process (Hroch 1993; Brubaker, 1996a, 1996b; 1998; Smith 1986). For instance, Brubaker differentiates between a civic state and bi-national or multi-national models of nation-building (1996a, 1996b, 1998). In addition to these, he also added the notion of ‘nationalising’ states which, despite some criticism for its implicit assumption that civic states circumvented nation-building processes, remains a useful analytical model for nation-building processes (1996a). The civic state is conceptualised as that in which “all are granted citizenship regardless of ethnicity” (Kuzio 2001:138). In the bi-national or multi-national model, ethnicity is taken to play a central role in nation-building around “two or more ethno-cultural core nations” (Kuzio 2001:138). Lastly, in Brubaker’s scheme, nationalising states are those states seen by their dominant elite as “the states of and for particular nations” but existentially incomplete and “insufficiently national” (Brubaker 1996a:412). In response to some of the criticisms laid against his formulation, Brubaker notes that these models are not strictly distinct from each other but often overlap in practice (1998). As such, these models are useful in thinking about the different shades and shifts in the process of nation-building. They allow for an examination of the interplay between ethnic, institutional, and processual factors in nation-formation.

Most post-colonial states are faced with a challenge of uniting disparate social groups and those that were in direct conflict with each other during anti-colonial struggles. This challenge has many dimensions to it. On the one hand, there is a need to reconcile all parties formerly in conflict with each other and forge an inclusive dispensation around which a unitary sense of belonging and “broad-based loyalties” are to emerge (Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007:9). On the other hand, the former revolutionary movements which were constituted by many different social groups, had, apart from fighting a common enemy, little else in common (Connor 1972). These challenges are further compounded by the fact that most African countries inherited state systems that were still not yet fully developed, if not out rightly undeveloped, as they were designed to serve settler populations at the expense of others (Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007). Furthermore, these post-colonial states were not “congruent with cultural boundaries” (Brubaker 1996a:414). The challenge thus, is not only to build a nation out of the diverse and territorially bound social groups, but also to develop state institutions that would allow for effective nation-building.

Nationalist sentiment is a central component of these processes (Smith 1986). Brubaker’s conception of nationalism is useful to understanding the varied patterns of its deployment in both colonial and post-colonial Africa. He distinguishes between what he calls, “*polity-seeking* or *polity-upgrading*” and “*polity-based, nation-shaping (or nation-promoting)* nationalisms (Brubaker 1996a:411-412). *Polity-seeking* or *polity upgrading* nationalism is that which aims “to establish or upgrade an autonomous national polity” (Brubaker 1996a:412). This is arguably the kind that informed African nationalism during struggles for self-determination against colonial regimes and continues to inform aggrieved minorities pursuing secessionist objectives or enhanced participation in contemporary polities. On the other hand, *polity-based* or *nation-shaping* nationalism is that which seeks to “nationalise an existing polity” (Brubaker 1996a:412). This is arguably the kind of nationalism that post-independence poly-ethnic, poly-cultural and poly-racial Africa adopted for purposes of nation-building. Brubaker’s formulation is resonant with Smith’s observation that “every state needs a nation, and every nation its state” (1986:258). This study therefore focuses on the contribution of print media to nation-building in multi-ethno cultural and multi-racial societies such as Zimbabwe. The aim is to trace the ways in which newspapers perform memory work in order to show the implications of such work for nation-building and collective identity construction.

Since nationalism emerges as a central facet of nation-building processes across Africa and by association, Zimbabwe, it is necessary to map its conceptual contours before a discussion of collective identity.

Nationalism

Defining nationalism and its cognate terms, nation, nation-building, national identity, ethnicity, among others, is complicated not only by scholarly disagreement but also by their contested nature in practice. Although most scholars agree on the modernity of nationalism, they hardly agree on anything else (Ozkirimli 2000). Generally speaking, nationalism has been classified, but not without contest, using the categories of primordialism, perennialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism (Ozkirimli 2000). Although the world views represented by these categories have a lot in common, they also differ in many significant ways. Calhoun (1997) suggests another layer of categorisation that separates those views which essentialise the nation and its cognate terms, from those that approach these terms from a constructivist understanding (see also Ozkirimli 2000). This study adopts Calhoun's and Ozkirimli's categorisation because it clearly shows the points of fracture in thinking about social memory, nation-building and collective identity. Furthermore, it enables a functional meta-categorisation of the parochial categories referred to above. However, before an in-depth discussion of this categorisation, an explication of the multivalent manifestation of the term nationalism is given.

Nationalism has been variously defined as "loyalty to the ethnic group" (Connor 1972:334), as "that outlook which gives an absolute priority to the values of the *nation* over all other values and interests" (Hroch 1993:8), as a historically specific "way of thinking or ideological consciousness which naturalises social organisation around nation-states, national identity and national homelands" (Billig 1995:10), and as "a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (Gellner 2006:1). It has also been defined as a form of deliberate and innovative "social engineering" (Hobsbawm 1994:76), a form of politics exercised by groups "seeking or exercising state power" on the basis of "nationalist arguments" (Breuilly 1993a:2), a political movement (Brass 1991), a discursive formation (Calhoun 1997), a doctrine (Kedourie 1994), a cultural artefact (Anderson 1983), and an ideological movement (Smith 2004). For Pecora (2001), nationalism is that which seeks to flatten ethnic distinctions, since, as he argues, ethnic homogeneity at the level of nation-state is generally inexistent. All these scholars share the conviction that nationalism is a modern phenomenon but their understanding of what it is and how it works is largely shaped by their respective conceptions

of the nation, and how it comes about. For ethnicists, the nation engenders nationalism (Connor 1972) but for modernists, it is nationalism that engenders the nation (Gellner 1983, 2006; Calhoun 1997). A nuanced discussion of this protean phenomenon is given below.

The Essentialist Approach

To begin with, essentialism:

refers to the reduction of the diversity in a population to some single criterion held to constitute its defining ‘essence’ and most crucial character. This is often coupled with the claim that the ‘essence’ is unavoidable or given by nature. (Calhoun 1997:18)

This approach assumes that people must always neatly belong to a specific social group such as a nation, racial group, gender and that such membership must describe “neatly and concretely some aspect of their being” (Calhoun 1997:18). Essentialist understandings of nationalism fall within a continuum ranging from rigid naturalism to ethnic determinism. Those that hold extreme essentialist views on the notions of nationhood and nationalism are generally referred to as primordialists, and those whose views have a softer-cultural take on these concepts are referred to as perennialists (Smith 1998).

Primordialism and Nationalism

Ozkirimli categorises the variances within primordialism into “naturalist”, ‘sociobiological’ and ‘culturalist’ approaches (2000:66). First, the naturalist approach, which represents the most extreme view within primordialism, sees nations and national identity as “given in nature” (Smith 2009:3), that is, as “a ‘natural’ part of all human beings, just like speech or sight” (Ozkirimli 2000:66). Naturalists conflate nations with ethnic groups and argue that people are born into nations just as they are born into families (Smith 1995). They see nations as having existed across time and thus, nationalism is also taken as an attribute of humanity in all ages (Ozkirimli 2000:66-67). Second, the sociobiological strand holds that “*ethnies* and nations are ‘natural’, because they are extensions of kin groups which are selected by genetic evolution for their inclusive fitness” (Smith 1995:32; see also Smith 1998). This strand argues that the biological reproduction of nations takes priority and is ensured by a form of nepotism which promotes the reproduction of relatives and others within the broader social unit or ethnic community (van den Berghe 1978). This view argues that it is sociobiological attachments that engender such strong affective elements as “nationalism, tribalism, racism, and ethnocentrism” (Ozkirimli 2000:71). Third, the culturalist perspective focuses on how contemporary members of ethnic groups or nations draw on self-interpretations of their historical origins to construct a

sense of timeless identities (Smith 1995). In other words, the culturalist approach argues that “it is the members or participants that attribute a ‘primordial’ quality to their particular *ethnie*” (Smith 1995:32). Such groups are argued to see their ethnic qualities as enduring over time and as “lineal descendants of their medieval counterparts” (Ozkirimli 2000:69). As Geertz observes, ethnic groups in Africa often find state driven civic social orders in tension with their local ethno-centred sense of self (1973). The focus in primordialism, thus, is on the ethnic origins of modern nations in a stricter sense: the sense that one is, today, his/her past. One important site for these impressions is the media, hence the focus of this study.

Perennialism and Nationalism

It is difficult to draw a line between the culturalist variant of primordialism, and perennialism. However, as Smith points out, the perennialist position readily accepts:

the modernity of *nationalism* as a political movement and ideology, but regards nations either as updated versions of immemorial ethnic communities, or as collective cultural identities that have existed, alongside ethnic communities, in all epochs of human history. (Smith 1998:159)

This approach sees social groups as emphasising their ethnic identity over other alternative identities. But a clear break between perennialism and primordialism is in the former’s refusal to take nations and ethnicity as natural ‘givens’, preferring instead to see them as “strictly historical and social, rather than natural phenomena” (Smith 1998:159). Nevertheless, the perennialist view that contemporary nations can be traced back to antiquity (Ozkirimli 2000; Smith 1998; Armstrong 1982) is still consistent with primordialism.

A more sophisticated variant of perennialism is that propounded by Walker Connor. Connor’s premise is that rationalist renderings of nations and nationalism always leave out “the abstract ties that identify a true nation”²⁷ (1978/1994:41). He also argues that the wrongful inter-utilisation of the words *nation* and *state* has in fact created a contingent problem wherein “loyalty of segments of a state’s population to their particular nation” is described using alternative terms such as “ethnicity, primordialism, pluralism, tribalism, regionalism, communalism, and parochialism” rather than the term nationalism (Connor 1978/1994:43). For Connor, and by association, perennialists, “the nation is a more developed form of the ethnic group” and nationalism is loyalty to that ethnic group (Smith 1995:162; see also Connor 1972).

²⁷ Connor argues that “self-differentiating groups are in fact nations” (1972:334).

Although perennialism retains essentialist qualities through its emphasis on the ancestral basis of modern nations, Connor's argument differs from primordialism in that for him, "what ultimately matters is not *what is* but *what people believe is*" (1978/1994:37). In other words, his explanation for the rise of nations is not outlined in terms of 'givens' or nature, but that a nation comes into being "when most of the designated population is nationally self-conscious, that is, when the members of ethnic groups become aware of themselves as such" (Smith 1998:163). This line of thinking positions perennialism closer to a non-essentialist position as it accommodates the possibility that nationhood is cultivated or constructed. It also invites us to investigate how this consciousness comes about, and the ways through which it is discursively constructed in the public sphere not least by the media. Another softer version of perennialism is manifest in Armstrong's (1982) work. According to Smith, Armstrong's version of perennialism does not emphasise *continuity* between modern nations and pre-modern ethnic groups but emphasises the "*recurrence* of ethnic and national identities" (1998:167).

What is clear from the discussion above is that the essentialist approach is a continuum which ranges from the extreme naturalist form of primordialism to the soft phenomenological arm of perennialism. It goes without saying that essentialist thinking has been subjected to widespread criticism to a point where Brubaker had to remark that: "no serious scholar today holds the view that is routinely attributed to primordialists in straw-man setups, namely that nations or ethnic groups are primordial, unchanging entities" (1996b:15). Furthermore, as Calhoun argues, the reality obtaining in concrete situations is that:

nationalist visions of internally uniform and sharply bounded cultural and political identities often have to be produced or maintained by struggle against a richer, more diverse and more promiscuously cross-cutting play of differences and similarities. (1997:19)

Before moving on to discussing the constructivist approach, an appraisal of the criticisms of primordialism and perennialism is useful. Primordialism's naturalist claim that ethnic and national ties are 'givens' has been criticised for ignoring the transformative effects of "economic, social, and political forces" (Smith 1995:33), as well as "intermarriages, migrations, external conquests and the importation of labour" (Ozkirimli 2000:76). They have also been criticised for treating ethnic and national attachments as substantial entities. For instance, as Breuilly argues, the nationalist appropriation of ethnic cultures transforms their meanings (1993a). According to Breuilly, nationalists can construct identities anew using

historical myths to present this construction “as discovery rather than construction to which one must pay attention” (1993a:406). Primordialism’s emphasis on blood and kinship ties is also criticised for its failure to account for why some ethnic groups successfully reproduce themselves and others disappear over time (Ozkirimli 2000). Another criticism has questioned primordialism’s pre-occupation with ethnic identity over many other possible forms of identity (Ozkirimli 2000). Lastly, they have also been criticised for their insistence on the antiquity of nations as it has been argued that nations, particularly the nation-state, is a modern phenomenon which cannot be traced back to antiquity (Zubaida 1978). However, it is evident that most of these criticisms are targeted mostly at the naturalist and sociobiological variants of primordialism. Calhoun aptly sums up the general criticism laid against essentialist thinking by constructivists saying “it is rare [...] to find cultures so clearly discrete, non-overlapping and distinct that they ‘automatically’ become the basis for different social groupings” outside constructions within specific socio-political contexts (1997:32).

Nevertheless, the purchase of the essentialist approach to this study, despite the criticisms of it, is that it provides a framework from which to begin the analysis of ways through which political players, including the mass media, rhetorically construct narratives that present certain aspects of a social group’s qualities as natural to serve contemporary political projects which include, among others, nation-building and collective identity formation. Furthermore, the framework’s pre-occupation with continuities between modern nations and pre-modern ethnic groups as well as the recurrence of ethnic and national identities invites an analysis of the ways in which nationalism as a discursive formation invokes and evokes social memory in processes of nation-building and collective identity formation, especially through mediated discourses.

The Constructivist Approach

The constructivist approach emphasises “the historical and sociological processes by which nations are created” (Calhoun 1997:30). Preponderant motifs within the constructivist approach include, but are not limited to the following: the manipulative deployment of nationalist ideology by elites seeking or entrenching power within given contexts, the productive phenomenological experience of nationhood by ordinary people, and the role of the nationalist discursive formation or representation, in the construction of nations (see Calhoun 1997). This approach is dominated by scholarly views that are generally categorised as the modernist perspective to nations and nationalism. Another addition to the constructivist perspective is the ethno-symbolist view whose case has been largely argued for by Anthony D.

Smith. This discussion begins with an outline of the modernist school before moving on to discussing ethno-symbolism.

Modernism and Nationalism

The modernist paradigm can be split into three sub-categories; the economist, the political and the socio-cultural (see Ozkirimli 2000). Within the *first category* are neo-Marxist scholars who stress economic transformation in their explanation of nations and nationalism. On the one hand, they argue that nationalism can be explained by the historical uneven development of the capitalist economy (Nairn 1981). This view argues that asymmetrical capitalist development, “between capitalist centres in the West, and underdeveloped peripheries outside” (Smith 1998:49), led to the domination of some social groups by others, thereby provoking nationalist reaction to such domination in peripheral countries which eventually spread to those societies at the core (Nairn 1981). This view has been criticised for contradicting factual evidence by those who argue that nationalism started in Europe, rather than in anti-colonial struggles of the periphery (Breuilly 1993a). It has also been criticised for not providing an adequate explanation for the rise of nationalism, for its essentialism, and for economic reductionism (Ozkirimli 2000). On the other hand, the neo-Marxists explain nations and nationalism in terms of internal colonialism. According to this view, the core’s twin processes of political domination and economic exploitation in the colonies created asymmetrical beneficitation patterns among the dominated (Hechter 1975, 1985). In his argument, Hechter notes that the locals that were better integrated in the new economic system came out more advanced and powerful than the disadvantaged groups (1975). For him, this situation encouraged the oppressed groups to coalesce around an ethnic or other common identity, and challenge the oppressive group or system (1975). Like Nairn, Hechter is also criticised for being inconsistent with the facts. As Ozkirimli points out, not all groups clamouring for independence are poor. The examples of Catalonia in Spain and Scotland in the United Kingdom are given as cases in point. The view has also been criticised for economic reductionism (Smith 1983).

Those in the *second category* explain nations and nationalism in terms of transformation in the nature of politics. Firstly, nationalism is seen as referring to “political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments” (Breuilly 1993a:2). For Breuilly thus, to understand nationalism generally, the task of an analyst “is to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power” and “understand why

nationalism has played a major role in the pursuit of those objectives” (Breuilly 1993a:1). He develops a typology of nationalisms based on the functions performed by nationalist ideology. The first type is concerned with “the relationship between the movement and the state which it either opposes or controls” and the second type is “concerned with the goals of nationalist movements” (Breuilly 1993a:9). The goals of such a nationalist movement may include separation from the present state, its reformation in “a nationalist direction”, and its unification “with other states” (Breuilly 1993a:9). In the third type, Breuilly identifies factors such as coordination, mobilisation and legitimacy as another set of functions performed by nationalist ideology (1996). In this scheme, coordination involves the uniting of elite interests, and mobilisation involves the generation of “support for the political movement from broad groups hitherto excluded from the political process” (Breuilly 1996:166-167). Lastly, he argues that nationalist ideas can be used to legitimate or justify “the goals of the political movement” (Breuilly 1996:167). Since the media are the quintessential communication tool in modernity (Thompson 1995), they automatically become one of the key channels through which these processes play out. It is thus the concern of this study to investigate the mediated dimensions of nationalist discourses and processes, as well as their connections to power struggles playing out in society. Such an investigation helps in tracing the locus of media agency in the construction of social memory and collective identity, and the implications of these constructions to nation-building processes in poly-cultural, poly-racial and poly-ethnic societies such as Zimbabwe.

Another significant view in this category is that provided by Brass (1979, 1991), whose views are seen as instrumentalist. He holds that elite groups in society evoke ethnicity and national identities for political expediency (Ozкимli 2000). For him, ethnicity and national ties are continually modified in response to changing political conditions. He argues that the study of ethnicity and nationality:

is the study of the process by which elites and counter-elites within ethnic groups select aspects of the group’s culture, attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilise the group, to defend its interests, and to compete with other groups. (Brass 1979:40-41)

Furthermore, Brass holds that the politicisation of ethnicity is shaped by specific conditions which influence the definition and persistence of ethnic groups. Thus, he does not see ethnic conflicts as essentially a cultural problem but as contingent on the “political and economic environment which also shapes the nature of the competition between elite groups” (Ozкимli

2000:110). From this he deduces that ethnic resources are therefore mobilised as a political tool of the elite in specific struggles, and as such, ethnicity cannot be regarded as an unchanging given from antiquity (Brass 1991). The last view in this category is that of Hobsbawm who stresses the constructed-ness of nations and nationalism (1983). He argues that the nation and its related phenomena are invented traditions (Hobsbawm 1983). According to Hobsbawm, invented traditions are, “responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition” (1983:2). For him, traditions are invented through the modification and adaptation of old ways using exercises that are “often deliberate and always innovative” for particular purposes (Hobsbawm 1983:13). The major purpose of such inventions is to bring together social groups that would otherwise be lacking the desired cohesiveness. Hobsbawm argues that “the origins of nationalism should be sought at the point of intersection of politics, technology and social transformation” (Ozkirimli 2000:118). Generally speaking, therefore, Hobsbawm sees the nation and its cognate phenomena as resources at the disposal of the elite for the containment of citizens who may be in pursuit of interests that are not congruent with elite goals.

Views that seek to explain nations and nationalism in terms of political transformation have been criticised for failing to account for the persistence of pre-modern ethnic ties (Ozkirimli 2000). For instance, ethno-symbolists argue that new inventions will only succeed if they resonate with a living past (Smith 1991b). They have also been criticised for equating state-building to nation-building (Ozkirimli 2000). As Smith argues, the assimilative efforts of the elites may in fact alienate certain sections of multi-cultural populations (1995). Another criticism has been directed at the exaggerated role ascribed to elites in shaping national entities (Ozkirimli 2000). In the same vein, they have also been criticised for slighting the agency of ordinary people in the shaping of collective identities (Smith 1995). However, such criticisms notwithstanding, it is important to assess the ways in which the media discursively shape collective identities and nation-building processes, so that through such analysis, we can locate the locus of power in mediated discourses and evaluate its implications.

The *third category* explains nations and nationalism in terms of transformation in social and cultural practices. The first key view in this category is that of Ernest Gellner. For Gellner, nationalism “is a function of modernity” (Breuilly 2006:xx). He rejects Marxism’s focus on class as the principal source of identity and conflict, and the perennialist preoccupation with continuities between pre-modern and modern societies (Breuilly 2006). For Gellner, nations

can emerge “when general social conditions make for standardised, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities” (1983:55). It is on this basis that he argues the *idea* of nationalism to be the product, rather than the producer, of modernity (Gellner 1983, 2006; Breuilly 2006). As Breuilly points out, Gellner’s argument is that nationalism’s “success was not due to its intellectual power but to its function within a modern social order” (2006:xxi). Gellner’s efforts were aimed at generating a general theory of nationalism “within a universal historical framework” that transcended partial concerns hence the amount of criticisms laid against him (Breuilly 2006:xxxii).

Gellner’s theory has been criticised for being too functionalist and overly emphatic on nationalism’s contingent relationship to modernity (Ozkirimli 2000; O’leary 1996). Others have criticised Gellner for underestimating human agency and misreading “the relationship between industrialisation and nationalism” (Ozkirimli 2000:139). For instance, it has been pointed out that nationalism can be traced to some un-industrialised societies (Ozkirimli 2000:140). Furthermore, Gellner has been criticised for not explaining “ethnic and nationalist sentiments” in industrialised societies, “the passions generated by nationalism”, and for being too general (Ozkirimli 2000:140-142). However, as Breuilly notes, Gellner remains a useful source for a “uniquely powerful, multi-disciplinary and generalising approach” to understanding nationalism (2006:liii). Furthermore, his location of nationalism in modernity invites attention to one of the era’s key cultural institutions, the media. But it is Anderson’s (1983, 1991) work that provides a direct connection between, especially, print media and processes of collective identity formation and by association nation-building.

Anderson defines a nation as “an imagined political community” whose members are dispersed and unlikely to meet, “yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (1991:6). He argues that since most communities, large or small, are imagined, they cannot be distinguished “by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (Anderson 1991:6). He also argues that nations are imagined “as *limited*”, and thus surrounded by other nations, “as *sovereign*”, and thus free, and “as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 1991:7). Thus, Anderson argues that the appeal of the idea of a nation can begin to be explained by looking into “the cultural roots of nationalism” (1991:7). In his conception, therefore, “nationality and nationalism are cultural artefacts” which can be better understood by tracing “how they have come into being, in what ways their

meanings have changed over time and why they command such profound emotional legitimacy” (Ozkirimli 2000:143). For him, print capitalism is at the centre of the process of imagining nations (Anderson 1983, 1991). Of particular interest is the argument that nations cannot be distinguished “by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (Anderson 1991:6). Since Anderson argues that nationality and nationalism are cultural artefacts, it is therefore imperative to direct attention at the functionality of cultural institutions such as the media to the imagination of nationality and nationalism. Chapter Five provides a comprehensive discussion on the media’s importance to socio-political and cultural processes in modern societies. However, Anderson has been criticised for a cultural reductionism which is seen as “under-estimating the political dimension of nationalism” (Ozkirimli 2000:152; see also Breuilly 1985:71-72).

Nevertheless, the modernist perspective is useful to this study because it enables an assessment of the ways in which economic, political and socio-cultural transformations over time, shaped the notions of nation, nationalism, national identity, and ethnicity. These concerns have been largely neglected by primordialist thinking and have not been given enough thought by perennialists. Furthermore, although ethno-symbolists acknowledge the effect of modernity on the conception of nations and nationalism, their primary focus is on the ethnic origins of nations. Therefore, modernist thinking allows for an expanded analysis of nations, nation-building processes, the appropriation of social memory, and the construction of collective identities in contemporary society. It is also the contention of the researcher that modernism provides the most nuanced framework for developing a normative conception, and assessment of both nation-building and collective identity formation processes beyond the essentialised givens in primordialism, perennialism and to a significant extent, ethno-symbolism. As Calhoun argues, “these ‘primordial’ ties are potentially threats to projects of civic nationalism and civil society” (1997:31).

Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism

The ethno-symbolic approach to nations and nationalism emerged as a bridge to the bi-polar grand narratives of perennialism and modernism. Its foremost advocate is Anthony D. Smith. In Smith’s own words, the ethno-symbolic approach “provides an important supplement and corrective to past and present orthodoxies in the field” (2009:1). Unlike the perennialists, the ethno-symbolic perspective does not “conflate ethnicity and nationhood”, and unlike

modernists, it places “the link between nations and core *ethnies* (or ethnic communities) at the centre of its concerns” (Smith 2004:18). The *leitmotifs* of the ethno-symbolic perspective include a pre-occupation with the “symbolic elements of ethnicity”, the “ethnic bases and cores” of nations, “the historicity of nations”, the consonance between elite narratives of the nation and those of the general public, the conflicts arising from representations of the nation, continuities between past and present, and “the cultural history of the nation” (Smith 2009:23-40; see also Smith 2004). As Smith puts it, “ethno-symbolists consider the cultural elements of symbol, myth, memory, value, ritual and tradition to be crucial to the analysis of ethnicity, nations and nationalisms” (2009:25). They also argue that a productive way of studying modern nations and nationalism is to study them *la longue duree* or “over long time spans” (Smith 2004:20). They criticise modernists for “foreshortening the necessary time-span of historical periodization by omitting the ethnic basis of nationhood and of many specific nations” (Smith 2004:20). Arguing against the modernist nomenclature of “invention” or “imagination”, they note that there is “need to focus on the ideas of the rediscovery, reinterpretation and reconstruction of nations” (Smith 2004:24). From an ethno-symbolic perspective, the role of the nationalist is that of selecting “ethnic motifs (myths, values, traditions, symbols, rituals and memories) and their codification to create a uniform, flowing history out of many strands that form the traditions of the community” (Smith 2004:22). Within this perspective nationalism is the matching of “an ideology with a political movement with clear goals of national autonomy, unity and identity” (Smith 2004:23). They also aver that the selective retrieval and use of memories, myths, values *inter-alia*, subjects the grand narrative of a nation “to considerable dispute and change, with rival versions of communal ethno-history competing for popular allegiance” (Smith 2004:3). Since ethno-symbolists argue that shared memories and history are invoked in nation and identity formation processes within a framework of contestation, it follows that national identity is continually “reinterpreted and reconstructed at periodic intervals” (Smith 2004:3), especially in “periods of crisis” (Smith 2009:35).

Nevertheless, the core premise of the ethno-symbolic perspective is their belief that “various networks of ethnic ties (and the activities subsumed under them)” are the “single most important factor in the rise and persistence of nations and nationalisms” (Smith 2009:26). For them, it is “on the basis of an *ethnic model* and around a dominant *ethnic core* population that political actors and institutions helped to forge a nation” (Smith 2009:28). There are two major aspects about this perspective which make it constructivist. First, ethno-symbolists conceptualise the role of a nationalist as someone who is actively involved in constructing a

suitable narrative for the achievement of specific political goals. This view is not much of an improvement on perennialist-thinking, and some aspects of modernist-thinking (invention of traditions, imagining a nation, elite manipulation of historical narratives *inter-alia*). Second, ethno-symbolists also believe in the transformational force of external structures and processes as pointed out here:

in singling out the role of ethnicity in the formation and persistence of nations and nationalism, ethno-symbolists do not disregard or relegate the impact of other factors, economic, social and political. (Smith 2009:27)

But some have argued that this perspective retains essentialist qualities through its insistence on the “antiquity” (Smith 2004) of modern nations (Ozkirimli 2000:216). Some of the strongest criticisms raised against ethno-symbolism emanate from this ambivalence. The perspective has been criticised for being “conceptually confused” (Ozkirimli 2000:183). Arguably, this criticism is directed at their “inter-utilisation of the terms ethnicity, ethnic group and nation” (Ozkirimli 2000:183; see also Connor 1994). Another criticism is that ethno-symbolists exaggerate the continuity between modern nations and pre-modern ethnic communities (Symmons-Symonolewicz 1981:152; 1985a). As Calhoun argues, “the issue is not whether cultural commonalities exist, but how they are constructed and reconstructed as they are called into action by leaders and ideologues” (1997:32). It is this dimension which makes the analysis of mediated discourses all the more important. Furthermore, in contrast to the ethno-symbolist argument on the antiquity of nations, modernists insist that broad based identities constructed in a modern institutionalised framework are more durable than the fragmentary pre-modern identities (Breuilly 1996). They have also been criticised for “under-estimating the fluidity and malleability of ethnic identities” and for ignoring the problematic “relationship between modern national identities and the cultural material of the past” (Ozkirimli 2000:187). Others have also argued that “common ethnicity and cultural homogeneity” are products of modernisation processes and “not their determinants” (Zubaida 1989:331). Using the case of Western nations as an example, Zubaida argues that:

the success of the old Western nation-states is based on a long process of centralisation and the formation of institutions with a ‘deep penetration’ into the social structure on the one hand and economic success on the other. (1989:331)

Also, a broad criticism of constructivism in general—except for ethno-symbolism—is that it “tends to underestimate the power of culture, and the force of taken-for-granted identities that are tied to people’s very practical abilities to get along in the world” (Calhoun 1997:32).

However, despite the criticisms of ethno-symbolism, the perspective is useful to this study as it allows an examination of the appropriation of historical and mnemonic material in contemporary nation-building projects and processes of collective identity formation especially through mediated discourses. It provides the means to analyse both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic processes of nation-building and collective identity formation as represented in the media. Furthermore, it should be noted that this perspective is not going to be used in isolation, but as part of a matrix of conceptual frameworks that allow the analysis to speak to multiple factors attendant to the intersection between social memory, collective identity and nation-building in newspaper discourses. The study uses these theories and perspectives as a tool box that allows a flexible engagement with the contentious processes of social memory, collective identity and nation-building. Below is a discussion on the dimensions of another central concept to this study, collective identity.

Collective Identity

Collective identity, as with its cognate terms, social memory and nation-building, is a subject of investigation across several fields. It has also been at the centre of many conflicts and nation-building projects (Smith 1991; Wodak *et al.* 2009). As a concept, it is invested with shifting meanings both in theory and practice. Broadly speaking, the conceptualisation of identity plays out as “a tension between the notion that identity is essential, fundamental, unitary, and unchanging, and the notion that identities are constructed and reconstructed through historical action” (Handler 1994:29). The fixed, unitary and essentialist view of collective identity is usually preferred by nationalists (Handler 1994). However, as Hall observes, a variety of disciplines are “critical of the notion of an integral, originary and unified identity” (Hall 2000:15). Some have even argued that the concept of identity should itself be problematised, rather than taken for granted. For instance, Handler argues that “we should be as suspicious of ‘identity’ as we have learned to be of ‘culture,’ ‘tradition,’ ‘nation,’ and ‘ethnic group’” (1994:27). This view owes much to the realisation that these phenomena are conditional, historical and contingent (Hall 2000, 1992; Gillis 1994). It has also been argued, in the context of globalisation, migration and emigration, that at any given time, “individuals as well as collective groups such as nations are in many respects hybrids of identity” rather than homogeneous entities of identification (Wodak *et al.* 2009:16; see also Hall 1992; Billig 1995). This view implicitly dismisses any notion of stable forms of collective identification.

Nevertheless, this study heeds Hall's observation that although identity is "an idea which cannot be thought in the old way," it is also an idea, "without which certain key questions cannot be thought at all" (2000:16). For instance, if we accept that identities are not naturally occurring phenomena, it is necessary to ask questions such as, how do they come about, where, when, for what purpose, and in whose interest? Generally speaking, identity is used:

in reference to three aspects of human experience: first, to individual human persons; second, to collectivities or groups of human beings that are imagined to be individuated somewhat as human persons are imagined to be discrete from one another; and third, to the relationship between these two – in particular, to the ways in which human persons are imagined to assimilate elements of collective identities into their unique personal identities. (Handler 1994:28)

In this study, the major concern is with collective identity, which is a very broad term encompassing all sorts of group identifications. For instance, one can think of class, gender, race, ethnicity, and profession *inter-alia*, as nodal points around which group identities tend to crystallise. This study is concerned with identities that are mobilised at the level of the nation-state or state-nation. Specifically, the study is interested in examining national identity and citizenship as axes of identification that invoke social memory in nation-building projects. Citizenship has been incorporated to enable a normative critique of nation-building approaches that are anchored solely on ethno-nationalism or other narrow tendencies of identification, within the nation-state or state-nation. Gender and class, as non-territorial, universal and sometimes shifting forms of identification, do not lend themselves well to this study which is concerned with collective forms of identification in a specific territory, Zimbabwe, at the level of nation-state or state-nation (see Smith 1991:4-5). As Pickering points out, "although national belonging tends to subsume other forms of belonging, other popular associations and affiliations, belonging itself is not, in all its various forms, coterminous with a sense of national membership" (2001:79). The discussion below examines the dimensions of national identity, its politics, and outlines Smith's (1991) formulation for analysing national identity in relation to two major ways of conceiving the nation (the civic model and the ethnic model).

National Identity

This discussion takes the position that national identity is a historical, contingent and discursive construction (see Wodak *et al.* 2009). This is partly because national identity is tied to the notion of the nation, which in turn, as demonstrated above, interweaves with such contingent phenomena as nation-building, nationalism (both as ideology and movement) and social memory (see Gillis 1994; Le Goff 1992). Gillis observes that national identity as a historical

phenomenon is “constructed and reconstructed” in the flow and flux of life (1994:4). According to Hall, national identities “are formed and transformed within and in relation to *representation*” by the media among other social institutions (1992:292). For him, the nation is a “*system of cultural representation*” wherein people “participate in the *idea* of the nation as represented in its national culture,” and arguably also through the media (Hall 1992:292). Hall also argues that such national cultures are discourses which construct identities by producing meanings about the nation with which people can identify (1992:293). Wodak *et al.* reinforce the views expressed above noting that national identities are “special forms of social identities” which “are produced and reproduced, as well as transformed and dismantled, *discursively*” (2009:3-4). Further, Billig argues that national identity “is a form of life, which is daily lived in the world of nation-states” (1995:70). Barker and Galasinski also see national identity as a “form of imaginative identification with the symbols and discourses of the nation-state” that “is continually produced as discursive action” (2001:124). These observations raise questions about the nature and constitutive processes of national identity. For example: how are national identities constructed in particular contexts; who constructs these national identities; where does such construction take place and why; why are national identities constructed the way they are in specific contexts; and what are the meanings of such constructions? Therefore, as Billig notes, “the crucial question relating to national identity is how the national ‘we’ is constructed and what is meant by such construction” (1995:70). One of the most important sites for an analysis of the construction of collective identities is the media.

The construction, mobilisation and fixing of a sense of national identity also has pragmatic implications. As Smith points out, national identity defines the “social space within which members must live and work”; it provides the basis for autarchy; it underwrites “the quest for control over territorial resources”; it “underpins the state and its organs or their pre-political equivalents” in stateless nations; it is the basis for the “legitimation of common legal rights and duties”; it is the “main legitimation for social order and solidarity”; it enables the socialisation of nationals and citizens; it provides “a social bond” across a diversity of social groups within a nation; and it is “a powerful means of defining and locating individual selves in the world” (1991:16-17). From this, it can be observed that the definition and construction of national identity in specific contexts has huge implications for the enjoyment of the privileges contingent on national identity outlined by Smith (1991) above. This is because national identity is a relational phenomenon which includes as much as it excludes (Wodak *et al.* 2009). In other words, “the imagining of ‘our’ community involves imagining, either implicitly or

explicitly, ‘them’, from whom ‘we’ are distinct” (Billig 1995:66; see also Barker and Galasinski 2001; Hall 1992, 2000; Wodak *et al.* 2009). This constitutive other is excluded from the enjoyment of the privileges incumbent upon the ‘in-groups’. Thus, as Hall argues, since the process of identification:

operates across difference, it entails discursive work, the binding and marking of symbolic boundaries, the production of ‘frontier-effects’. It requires what is left outside, its constitutive outside, to consolidate the process... (2000:17)

Evidently, there is a lot at stake in the construction and actual deployment of national identity. This directs our attention towards the politics of national identity which is the subject of discussion below.

The Politics of National Identity

As is already evident in the chapter’s first two major segments, social memory is caught up in relations of power as much as are processes of nation-building. The construction of national identity, which to a significant extent, is a nationalist project that is imbricated with social memory (see Smith 1991; Gillis 1994), is no less imbricated in the patterns of power in particular contexts (Hall 2000). Furthermore, although national identity is tied to a specific nation-state, it is also inevitably imbricated in the power dynamics of international relations. This is so because for a nation whose identity is under construction “to be imagined in all its particularity, it must be imagined as a nation amongst other nations” (Billig 1995:81). In other words, national identity must be legitimated both at the national and international levels (Cubitt 2007). The achievement of such legitimation at the national level is complicated by the fact that the modern nation-state is constituted by multifarious cultural components that are often competing for hegemony, and out of which such a national identity must emerge (see Wodak *et al.* 2009; Pickering 2001; Hall 2000, 1992). As Hall argues, “national identities do not subsume all other forms of difference into themselves and are not free of the play of power, internal divisions and contradictions, cross-cutting allegiances and difference” (1992:299). These multiple, contradictory and competing potential locations of identification imply that:

different factions, whether classes, religions, regions, genders and ethnicities, always struggle for the power to speak for the nation, and to present their particular voice as the voice of the national whole, defining the history of other sub-sections accordingly. (Billig 1995:71)

Thus, as Billig concludes, “‘the voice of the nation’ is a fiction; it tends to overlook the factional struggles and the deaths of unsuccessful nations, which make such a fiction possible” (1995:71). This is achieved through the construction of the past in ways that reflect “the balance

of hegemony” in the present (Billig 1995:71). Simultaneously, for the same nation to gain international legitimacy, it “has to resemble other nations to gain their recognition” (Billig 1995:85). Thus, it is in this context of multiplicity, contest and the need for conformity with universal patterns of nationhood, that national identity is mobilised as a homogenising mechanism which offers “both membership of the political nation-state and identification with the national culture” (Hall 1992:296). As Wodak *et al.* put it, the “discursive constructs of nations and national identities [...] primarily emphasise national uniqueness and intra-national uniformity but largely ignore intra-national differences” (2009:4). Therefore, the responsibility of any analytical undertaking on national identities (however defined) is, “to decode them in order to discover the relationships they create and sustain” so that we can “learn more about those who deploy them and whose interests they serve” (Gillis 1994:4). One way of doing this is to analyse their construction by the media within specific institutional, socio-political, and economic contexts. Also, Smith’s (1991:99) observation that “any attempt to forge a national identity is also a political action with political consequences” implies that “the constitution of social identity is an act of power” (Laclau 1990:33 cited in Hall 2000:18). The unnatural and contingent nature of national identity draws our attention to it as an object of “discursive construction” (Wodak *et al.* 2009:22). Thus, what makes this study important is that it is aimed at analysing the ways in which the newspapers under study’s evocation of social memory shapes the construction of national identity in Zimbabwe as part of the country’s nation-building processes. To understand the confluence between nation-building, social memory and collective identity better, this study draws on Smith (1991). Smith’s conceptualisation of national identity, which he defines as “some sense of political community”, enables a clear formulation of the relationships between particular forms of nation-building and their concomitant formulations of collective identity (1991:9). His formulation is premised on the observation that the ethnic model of political nation is likely to produce a different kind of collective identity from the civic model (Smith 1991:99).

Smith’s Conceptualisation of National Identity

The Civic Model of the Nation

For Smith, national identity involves “some sense of political community” (1991:9). He identifies two different types of political community that shape the nature of national or collective identity in such communities. First, is the civic model of the nation which draws a lot from the nature of Western polities. The civic model of the nation assumes “a predominantly

spatial or territorial conception” (Smith 1991:9). According to Smith, such a territory must be historic, or at least imagined as such, and the territory also provides “a repository of historic memories and associations” for the political community (Smith 1991:9). The civic model of the nation is also premised on an egalitarian “sense of legal community” and “its full expression is the various kinds of citizenship” that include among others, “civil and legal rights, political rights and duties, and socio-economic rights” (Smith 1991:10). He argues that the protagonists of civic nationalisms aim at achieving a territorial nation based on “residence and propinquity, as opposed to descent and genealogy,” as well as the “active participation of all citizens *on a territorial and civic basis*” (Smith 1991:117). According to Smith, although citizenship is also an element of the ethno-nation and nationalism, it “assumes a prominent role in territorial nations and nationalisms” (Smith 1991:118). Thus, in territorial nations, citizenship, “is used not simply to underline membership of the nation and differentiate ‘us’ from ‘them’ but even more to outbid the claims of competing allegiances and identities, notably ethnic ones” (Smith 1991:118). Furthermore, the civic nation emphasises civic education for the benefit of both the individual and the community (Smith 1991). In sum, the civic nation and a civic national identity are premised on:

the equality of rights and duties embodied in a common citizenship, the lack of barriers to mobility, geographical and social, inherent in a residential territorialism, the summons to active participation in public affairs, and above all the emphasis upon a standardised, public, civic education, often with considerable secular and rationalist content... (Smith 1991:121)

In Smith’s conception, the civic nation is a product of territorial nationalism which he categorises into two variants, pre-independence and post-independence territorial nationalisms (1991). He argues that the pre-independence or anti-colonial variety, “will seek first to eject foreign rulers and substitute a new state-nation for the old colonial territory” (Smith 1991:82). He also points out that the post-independence or integration variety, which remains basically civic and territorial, seeks “to bring together and integrate into a new political community often disparate ethnic populations” (Smith 1991:82). National identity in this model of the nation is built around the notion of citizenship and is achieved through integrative processes of nation-building. The neo-patrimonial politics of post-colonial polities, and a history of inequality between citizens among other historically shaped challenges, make this model difficult to achieve in Africa (see Young 2007; Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007; Mamdani 1996). Nevertheless, this model is used in this study as a foundation for imagining the ideal possible political model for Zimbabwe. It is also on the basis of this model that the normative roles of the media can be assessed and formulated in the Zimbabwean context. The central tenets of the

civic model are largely in counter-point to the ethnic-genealogical model which is usually a source of resistance to failing integrative processes.

The Ethnic Model of the Nation

The ethnic model of the nation emphasises “community of birth and native culture” (Smith 1991:11). The nation is conceptualised, essentially, as “a community of common descent”, with descent being held up as more important than territorial belonging (Smith 1991:12). The ethnic model of the nation is congruent with ethnic nationalism, which in Smith’s conception, can be split into two categories. First, is the pre-independence or secession and diaspora variant in which “the nation is basically ethnic and genealogical” (Smith 1991:82). This form of nationalist movement will “seek to secede from a larger political unit (or secede and gather together in a designated homeland) and set up a new political ‘ethno-nation’ in its place” (Smith 1991:82). Second, is the post-independence or irredentist and ‘pan’ variant. Here, the basis for the nation or national identity is also ethnic and genealogical. Nationalist movements of this kind:

will seek to expand by including ethnic ‘kinsmen’ outside the present boundaries of the ‘ethno-nation’ and the lands they inhabit or by forming a much larger ‘ethno-national’ state through the union of culturally and ethnically similar ethno-national states... (Smith 1991:82-83)

According to Smith, demotic ethno-nationalisms, which he says account for most “active nationalisms today [...] bring the contrasts between state and nation into sharp focus” (1991:123-124). This is because ethno-nationalisms emanate from particularistic tendencies uneasily subsumed within universalistic and state oriented definitions of the nation. For Smith, this form of nationalism stems from “processes of vernacular mobilisation and cultural politicisation,” and uses history, albeit selectively, in the process of imagining the nation (1991:126). In the African context, he notes, the trend is that ethno-nationalisms seek secession from the arbitrary boundaries of the colonial period (Smith 1991). Their dissatisfaction lies in the “plural nature and fragile legitimacy of the post-colonial state itself” (Smith 1991:133). Smith argues that post-colonial states are faulted for their failure to meet the expectations of their plural populations and for favouring “certain ethnic communities and categories at the expense of others” (1991:133). As such, Smith argues, the more the post-colonial states strive for national integration “out of a poly-ethnic mosaic, the greater the chances of ethnic dissent” (1991:134). He also argues that the post-colonial state’s processes of nation-building or

integration followed “the divisive policies of colonialism” which “frequently reinforced the processes of ethnic mobilisation and politicisation” (Smith 1991:136).

It can also be argued that since this model of the nation emphasises descent and genealogy in its formulation of national identity, the role of social memory becomes central to that process. Some have even argued that the evocation of social memory in nationalist projects is usually reflective of an identity crisis (Megill 1998). The relationship between identity formulation and memory has also been inferred by Gillis who observes that, “the core meaning of any individual or group identity, namely, a sense of sameness over time and space, is sustained by remembering; and what is remembered is defined by the assumed identity” (1994:3; see also Myszal 2003). The same observation has also been made by Le Goff, who points out that “memory is an essential element of [...] individual or collective *identity*” (Le Goff 1992:98; see also Myszal 2003; Fentress and Wickham 1992). Social memory and ethno-nationalism also assume a prominent role in defending “minority cultures,” in rescuing “‘lost’ histories and literatures,” in anchoring resistance to “tyranny,” in promoting “popular sovereignty and collective mobilisation,” and also in motivating “self-sustaining economic growth” among the dominated groups of poly-ethnic post-colonial societies (Smith 1991:18). Thus, the evocation of social memory in ethno-nationalisms shows its increasing politicisation (Huysen 1995:5).

But ethno-nationalism and social memory’s democratising potential come with some risks as well (Myszal 2003). For instance, Janoski and Gran argue that in addition to the fact that particularistic or secessionist movements, justified or not, threaten “the existing state” and “universal citizenship,” they may also “result in brutal civil wars” which threatens the lives of many citizens (2002:27; see also Myszal 2003). Janoski and Gran also argue that “secession creates a dispute between two groups that claim coercion as a means to obtain their goals” (2002:27). This follows from the Weberian logic that the state (which both a secessionist movement and the target of its resistance seek to control) has a monopoly over legitimate violence. Furthermore, such movements assume an essentialised conception of their group identities based on race or ethnicity and thus “must not have subcultures or subgroups that may themselves seek independence” (Janoski and Gran 2002:27). Consequently, Janoski and Gran also argue that “the ethnic repression of these smaller minorities within the new state may actually be greater than before secession” (2002:27). Others have also argued that “one-sidedly over-emphasised” and “over-estimated” identities typical of most fundamentalisms can escalate conflict to “dangerous proportions” (Wodak *et al.* 2009:17; see also Blok 1998). Thus,

the analysis of collective identity in an ethnic model of the nation and to some extent even the civic model, should focus not only on the functionalist and mechanistic evocation of social memory in identity politics, but also on its function as “an instrument and objective of power” (Le Goff 1992:98). The media is an important site for such analytical work because political movements that reify and over-emphasise national uniqueness may become hostile to the democratisation of social memory and the imagination of the nation (Gillis 1994; Misztal 2003). It is in light of this observation that Gillis also argues the following:

in this era of plural identities, we need civil times and civic spaces more than ever, for these are essential to the democratic processes by which individuals and groups come together to discuss, debate, and negotiate the past and, through this process, define the future. (1994:20)

Against this backdrop thus, one could argue that citizenship can be invoked as a redemptive form of collective identity because “it underscores universalism and equality,” and “underpins democracy” (Dahlgren 2009:59-60). Following from this, it is therefore the position of this study that a fusion of modernist and ethno-symbolic impulses in the processes of nation-building provides a more productive framework for establishing a genuinely civic nation with substantive citizenship for all members of such a nation at the core of its formulation.

However, it should also be noted that citizenship is not always a symmetrical experience as it is also characterised by “conditions such as marginalisation, powerlessness, and exploitation among certain groups” and in other cases, “there remain exclusions, inequities and suppressions of various kinds and to various degrees within democratic societies” (Dahlgren 2009:62). These asymmetrical experiences of citizenship are more pronounced in Africa. Nevertheless, its deficiencies notwithstanding, genuine “state-based citizenship” can be “an important pre-condition for the agency-based achieved dimension” of substantive citizenship (Dahlgren 2009:62-63). Furthermore, it is equally important to note that this approach does not discard difference, but takes it “as a point of departure for civic participation” (Dahlgren 2009:62). The import of the notion of citizenship, and by association a civic nation, to this study lies in the concepts’ implicit acknowledgement of the modern-day axiom that:

hybridity is key to discussions of identity not only because it complicates and even prevents neat categorisation of people, but also because it reasserts the fluidity and contingency of identity. Identities are the products of specific chains of historical events and ideas. An understanding of the history of a given group must enter into the just consideration of its citizenship rights... (Isin and Wood 1999:57)

It is thus appropriate to end this discussion on the three key terms of this study by returning to Cubitt’s quotation given at the very beginning of the chapter. Generally speaking, the

discussion above shows that social memory, nation-building and collective identity, both as concepts and phenomena of political practice, are imbricated in ever shifting configurations of power. Their emergence in public discourse is “an affair of claims and counter-claims, of power and resistance, and not just of mutual recognition and collective celebration” (Cubitt 2007:231). Thus, it is important to subject mediated representations of social memory, their construction of collective identities and implications for nation-building processes to deconstructive analysis. The aim is to show the contingency of media representations, and their implications to the achievement of genuine, all-inclusive societies characterised by substantive citizenship. This task is important in societies that are vulnerable to violent conflict arising from the politics of belonging and access to diminishing resources.

Conclusion

This discussion leads us to the conclusion that these three concepts are historical, always contingent, and in a perpetual state of construction and reconstruction pursuant to the nature of power contests playing out at any given time and context. However, as argued above, nation-building processes that genuinely pursue the achievement of a genuine civic nation, based on the principles of inclusive, active and substantive citizenship for all members are likely to temper the excesses of particularism and blind universalism, at least at the level of a nation-state/state-nation and other like-minded nation-states/state-nations. The various understandings of these concepts outlined above are also useful to this study for two reasons. First, they provide a comprehensive conceptual matrix with which to understand the actual, albeit complex and shifting processes of, and challenges to nation-building in Zimbabwe especially as they manifest in mediated representations. Second, they provide the tools with which to think the ideal “possible” in the Zimbabwean context. The next chapter evaluates Africa and Zimbabwe’s contemporary moment in reference to social memory, collective identity and nation-building. This is achieved through an appraisal of some of the ways in which social memory has been invoked in Zimbabwe to cast out, establish, and sustain particular collective identities in the country’s highly contested nation-building endeavours.

Chapter Four

The Politics of Nation and Identity in Zimbabwe

If you take identities existing in the present period as a given, then generalise them across historical time, how would it then be possible to understand the process of identity formation over time and relate it to the larger process of cultural change, economic development, and political transformation? (Mamdani 2013:97)

Introduction

Zimbabwe, as with most African countries, was colonised and the subsequent processes of decolonisation are still work in progress. The country's contemporary condition and the discourses associated with it are not significantly unlike other post-colonial experiences. Thus, the politics of nation and identity in Zimbabwe can be better understood within the broader continental context, hence the need to begin this chapter with an assessment of Africa's contemporary moment. But the continent's contemporary moment has been the subject of much intellectual debate, and the range and depth of this debate is too rich to be fully captured in this short chapter. Nevertheless, my discussion captures the dimensions of this debate that are pertinent to the study's key concerns. Following this I focus on Zimbabwe, with the aim of showing the tapestry of imaginations of nationhood in multicultural, multi-ethnic, and multiracial societies. The chapter ends with some critical reflections on forms of identification, belonging, and national imaginations in Zimbabwe.

Africa's Contemporary Conundrum

Two primal perspectives emerge in literature on Africa's present moment. First, is the politics of indigeneity practised by some contemporary post-colonial states and its descendant, irredentism, which seeks both to dismantle the artificial and arbitrary post-Berlin Conference territorial order in Africa, and a recognition of political self-determination as imperative (Ranger 2009; Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007; Herbst 2000; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Mhlanga 2013; Mhlanga 2013). Second, is a humanist call for the recognition of Africa's cosmopolitan population and the generic identification of its people with the rest of humanity, as a political point of departure (Mbembe 2001a, 2001b, 2002). The first tendency is valorised by its proponents in the name of a politics of self-determination amid state failure and violence, as well as stunted economic development (Herbst 2000; Mazrui 1995; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Mhlanga 2013; Mhlanga 2013). Simultaneously, it is criticised by humanists for its parochial

view of Africa's humanity (Mbembe 2002, 2001a, 2001b; Appiah, 1992, 2008). The second tendency is valorised by its proponents on the bases of a historically trans-nationalised global order and the innate humanity of Africans (Mbembe 2001b). Its universalistic overtones are criticised by indigenists "as no more than a series of subterfuges intended to disguise the violence of imperialism" (Mbembe 2002:635) and the failures of post-colonial nation-building projects (see Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007).

Mamdani describes this moment as "Africa's present predicament" which for him is characterised by the duality of modernist and communitarian tendencies (1996:3). He notes that the modernist tendency bemoans the embryonic state of civil society in Africa, whereas the communitarian tendency argues that indigenous Africans are marginalised from public life (Mamdani 1996). On the one hand, the communitarian tendency sees the solution to this predicament as putting "Africa's age-old communities at the centre of African politics" (Mamdani 1996:3). On the other, the modernist tendency sees the location of "politics in civil society" as the solution (Mamdani 1996:3). Viewed in a different way, this conundrum embodies the tension between the imagination of civic polities and ethnic or nativist polities which, as Smith (1991) argues in the previous chapter, variably shape nationhood and national identity. These perspectives are the subject of discussion below.

The Indigenist View

Years after gaining independence from their erstwhile colonisers, most African countries find themselves faced with multidimensional and corrosive effects of the colonial legacy. Significant among these are economic depression, deepening inequality, state failure, repression and violence, political instability, ethno-nationalism *inter-alia* (see Herbst 2000; Mazrui 1995). The indigenist position sees the intractable state of malaise across the continent as a bi-product of the colonial system which was largely reproduced and extended by post-colonial polities. The *leitmotif* within this approach is the call for total decolonisation of the vestiges of colonialism including a re-evaluation of the values of modernity (Mbembe 2008; Mazrui 2001), and the form and practices of the post-colonial state (Herbst 2000; Young 2007). This logic is aptly expressed by Mazrui, who argues that "three decades ago, decolonisation was equated with liberation" but now requires "the collapse of colonial structures" (1995:32).

At the centre of the African conundrum, Mazrui locates the failure of the postcolonial state and the negative economic effects of neo-colonialism (1995). He sees the failure of African states as emanating either from “too much or too little government” wherein, “an excess of government becomes tyranny” and “too little government becomes anarchy” (Mazrui 1995:29). He also postulates that ethnicity remains a vector in the failure or success of a state wherein state failure can result from having “too many ethnic groups or, paradoxically, because it has too few” (Mazrui 1995:30). For him, “the plural society endangers the state by having more sociological diversity than the political process can accommodate” (Mazrui 1995:30). Conversely, he also points out that societies with few or two major ethnic groups endanger “the state by having *less* sociological diversity than is necessary for the politics of compromise” (Mazrui 1995:30). Mazrui’s observations give credence to the perennialist and ethno-symbolist views as discussed in Chapter Three since they venerate the influence of ethnicity in contemporary African nation-states. These complex social matrices and their concomitant problems have been linked to the artificial and arbitrary colonial boundaries whose legitimacy is questioned on the basis that they were “initially nothing more than bounded units of subjugation” (Young 2007:247), that “rejected the entire precolonial tradition of multiple sovereignties over land with soft borders” (Herbst 2000:97). As with their colonial predecessors, post-colonial leaders were faced with the problem of managing difference in the post-independence era. Although their anti-colonial rhetoric was premised on the notion of “recovering the African past” (Herbst 2000:97), African leaders chose to retain both the nation-state as a form of political organisation, and colonial boundaries for reasons noted by Young (2007), below. Thus, at independence, these leaders prioritised nation-building (euphemism for state consolidation), a process that faces many challenges to this day, not least because of “exclusionary tendencies, which became more pronounced at times of political or economic crisis” (Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007:8). Broadly speaking, Brubaker’s (1996a) formulation of patterns of nationalism in both pre-and post-independence societies are useful frameworks for understanding these processes and their subsequent effects in Africa, and Zimbabwe in particular.

Social cleavages that continue to forestall successful nation-building and equitable economic development among other progressive political goals also originate from “informal networks of neo-patrimonial politics” fostered mainly by the ruling elite (Young 2007:249). The accretion of these and other factors has given impetus to ethno-nationalism which “tends to perceive, experience and perform identity in essentialised terms” (Young 2007:250). It is on

the basis of these essentialised imaginings of nationhood and the failure of post-colonial projects of nation-building that ethno-nationalists seek a revision of colonial borders. However, the narrative of timeless nationhood immanent both in the radicalised neo-patrimonial states²⁸ and ethno-nationalist movements and discourses has been criticised by some who argue that boundaries in precolonial Africa were “confused, fragmented, and constantly changing according to the varying fortunes of the different political units in a given neighbourhood” (Herbst 2000:252). In his description of such continuous transformations, Mbembe calls “precolonial territoriality [...] an itinerant territoriality” (2000:263). Arguing in the same vein, Mamdani avers that, “kinship as a basis of association was never strictly descent-based, even in the ancient era” (2013:104). Ultimately, as Ranger points out, “many historians have described how under colonialism bounded ethnicities replaced previously much more fluid, multicultural and multilingual networks of interaction and identity” (1996:274). Mbembe (2000) also argues that the borders drawn at the Berlin Conference were not as much of an anomaly as they are often argued to be. For him:

to state that current African boundaries are merely a product of colonial arbitrariness is to ignore their multiple geneses. In fact, their establishment long antedated the Congress of Berlin held in 1884, whose objective was to distribute sovereignty among the different powers engaged in dividing up the continent [...]. Far from being simple products of colonialism, current boundaries thus reflect commercial, religious, and military realities, the rivalries, power relationships, and alliances that prevailed among the various imperial powers and between them and Africans through the centuries preceding colonisation proper. (Mbembe 2000:265)

In summary, the above shows that there are views that see the post-colonial territorial order as based on a fundamentally erratic colonial cartography. Those who hold this view see these boundaries as multi-layered forms of bondage, particularly in the context of failing nation-building projects and ethnicised patrimony superintended by the post-colonial state. This group challenges the current territorial order using national imaginings that appeal to history, but are challenged by those who argue that precolonial Africa was in a continuous state of flux. Finally, Mbembe’s view seems to justify colonial cartography on the basis that it was informed by coeval socio-economic and political processes between Africans, as well as between Africans and Europeans. It is on the basis of these multiple and conflicting observations that it is useful to establish the contingency of political processes around such issues as social memory, collective identity and the imagination of nationhood—as argued in Chapter Three—especially as they manifest in discursive constructions.

²⁸ See Chapter One for a discussion on the Zimbabwean case.

It can thus be argued that socio-economic and political cleavages that arise from skewed processes of accumulation, differential development, and state tyranny often accompanied by savage violence against political opponents and marginalised ethnic groups, have led marginalised social groups to question the sanctity of the artificial and arbitrary African boundaries (see Mazrui 1994; Herbst 2000; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Mhlanga 2013; Mhlanga 2013). A coalescence of these factors has led to the emergence of a politics of self-determination among aggrieved ethnic and/or regional groups, a phenomenon, hitherto, expediently suppressed by post-colonial leaders in the name of nation-building (Young 2007; Herbst 2000; Mhlanga 2013). According to Young, the three major reasons that ensured the continuity of colonial boundaries and a suppression of secessionist tendencies include the general hostility of the international order towards the break-up of states, the lack of a viable “alternative guiding principle or mechanism for defining territoriality” and the “political elites, whose livelihood is tied to the existing state framework” (2007:244-245). These considerations can also be understood in the context of the state as the primary political institution with which the international community transacts its business, and also through which international corporations conduct their neo-colonial endeavours.

Yet another view argues that the fundamental problem facing Africa is “how to broadcast power over sparsely settled lands” (Herbst 2000:3). Herbst argues that the post-colonial African state’s failure to extend infrastructure development and services to remote locations within its borders necessitates a revision of colonial boundaries (2000). Such a revision, he argues, should enable the breaking up of large countries into more manageable units (Herbst 2000).

The failure of the African state to provide infrastructure and social services equitably across its territorial borders and its politics of violence, coupled with the continent’s marginal position within the global socio-economic and political order, have spawned disaffection among marginalised social groups. These patterns of disaffection have emerged along the interstices between different races, classes and ethnicities *inter-alia*. A consequence of this, on the one hand, has been the intensification of nativist rhetoric by the post-colonial African state (see Chapter One for a discussion on Zimbabwe) and on the other, by intra-state irredentist tendencies among marginalised ethnic groups and regions (see Werbner 1996). These observations are consistent with the argument that nationalism is contingent and conjunctural, that is to say, it is shaped by people’s responses to socio-political and economic changes and processes at any given time and in specific contexts. An analysis of discursive constructions of

these processes is helpful in mapping the nature of contingencies at play, and the ways through which they shape (or are shaped by) the political landscape within which they unfold.

In sum, the post-colonial African state finds itself grappling with the negative effects of neo-colonialism, local disaffection arising from the state's failure to ensure both progressive and equitable accumulation by all its citizens, and secessionist nationalisms spawned by both economic marginalisation and state violence against political opposition and ethnic 'others'. It is this shift by both the African state and irredentist groups, together with their intellectual echo-chambers towards nativist rhetoric and politics as a solution to the continent's predicament that has attracted the attention of humanists.

The Universalist-Humanist View

Among the many key voices within this view is that of Achille Mbembe. Mbembe has been particularly prominent in the recently popular debates about what he calls "nativism" and "Afro-radicalism" (2002:629). Mbembe, who can be described as a humanist, criticises Afro-radicalism and nativism as "dogmas and doctrines" that "have led to a dramatic contraction and impoverishment both in the modes of conceptualising Africa and in the terms of philosophical inquiry concerning the region" (2002:629). He argues that nativism as an essentialist mode of thinking, is "a form of culturalism preoccupied with questions of identity and authenticity" and "proposes a return to an ontological and mythical 'Africanness'" (Mbembe 2002:629). Further, he sees Afro-radicalism as an off shoot of Marxist political economy which "claims to have founded a so-called revolutionary politics, which seeks to break away from imperialism and dependence" (Mbembe 2002:629). For Mbembe, the African politics of nativism and Afro-radicalism constitute a "dead end" and an "impoverished form of orientalism" which subscribes "to the postulate of difference" (Mbembe 2002:630, 635). He argues that nativist and Afro-radical thinking is essentially autochthonous and confers "on Africa a character so particular that it is not comparable with any other region of the world" (Mbembe 2001b:1). He also laments the inadequacy of this tendency to thinking the challenges facing contemporary Africa saying "modern African reflection on identity is essentially a matter of liturgical construction and incantation rather than historical criticism" (Mbembe 2001a:2). According to him, the consequence of essentialising Africa and Africanness is that:

racial and territorial authenticity are conflated, and Africa becomes the country of black people. At the same time, everything that is not black is out of place, and thus cannot claim any sort of Africanity. The spatial body and the civic body are henceforth one,

the former testifying to an autochthonous communal origin by virtue of which everyone born on this land or sharing the same colour and the same ancestors is a brother or sister. (Mbembe 2001a:14-15)

This nativist imagination of Africa is seen as deficient for various reasons. For instance, Mbembe argues that autochthony “restricts civic relatedness,” and reduces the African to, “not someone who shares in the human condition itself, but a person who was born in Africa, lives in Africa, and is black” (Mbembe 2001a:15). For him, this view makes it impossible to conceive of “the existence of Africans of European, Arabic, or Asiatic origin—or that Africans might have *multiple ancestries*²⁹”, as is the case with people of mixed race (Mbembe 2001a:15). His criticism is by implication targeted at primordialist, perennialist and to some extent ethno-symbolic conceptions of selfhood or nationhood as they manifest on the African continent.

He also argues that, contrary to the essentialist conceptions of identity, racial categories are not fixed, which implies that there are “several kinds of whiteness as well as blackness” (Mbembe 2001a:24-25). Mbembe’s criticism of essentialised identities problematizes nativist ideas of collective identity and nationhood, and draws our attention to the active processes that are constitutive of these identities and the corresponding patterns of belonging they engender at the level of nation-state. This point has been made in the discussion of collective identity in the previous chapter. In his conceptualisation of the way forward, Mbembe takes a radical and critical humanist position, arguing that “the urgency today is to restore a separation on an intellectual level between *the desire to know and to think* and *the urge to act*³⁰” (Mbembe 2002:636). For him, critical humanism undergirds what he calls “a politics of hope”, which “revives our commitment to human dignity for all” (Mbembe and Posel 2005:284). Ultimately, this position sees the exigencies of Africa’s predicament as revolving around the question: “what are the obligations and responsibilities which a democracy requires of its citizens, as much as of its state” (Mbembe and Posel 2005:284)? This question allows the formulation of belonging beyond the narrow confines of nativism, more or less within Smith’s (1991) formulation of a civic nation. This is an important perspective from which to think collective identity issues in modern nation-states because as argued in Chapter Three, they are characterised by “plural identities” (Gillis 1994:20). The modernist approach, through Breuilly’s work, allows for a clear analysis of the power contests at play in all forms of

²⁹ Emphasis in original.

³⁰ Emphasis in original.

nationalism which enables a critique of each of such forms from a normative position of the civic.

Mbembe's views have also been echoed by another African scholar who warns that the notion of an essentialised African identity is not only a new phenomenon, "but the bases through which it has largely so far been theorised – race, a common historical experience, a shared metaphysics – presuppose falsehoods too serious for us to ignore" (Appiah 2008:88). In agreement with this view, Werbner also argues that "the story of ethnic difference in Africa threatens to overwhelm the larger debate about postcolonial identity politics across the continent" (1996:1). Arguing from a constructivist perspective, Appiah criticises essentialised ideas of identity (a tendency common in the imagination of ethnicity³¹):

every human identity is constructed, historical; every one has its share of false presuppositions, of the errors and inaccuracies that courtesy calls 'myth,' religion 'heresy', and science 'magic.' Invented histories, invented biologies, invented cultural affinities come with every identity; each is a kind of role that has to be scripted, structured by conventions of narrative to which the world never quite manages to conform. (2008:88)

Appiah who also argues that African identities are multiple and always in a state of flux, pointing out that such identities "grow out of a history of changing responses to economic, political and cultural forces, almost always in opposition to other identities" (Appiah 2008:90). This view speaks to questions raised by Mamdani (2013) in the epigraph to this chapter, and is consistent with the modernist position outlined in Chapter Three. It also directs attention to the conjunctural character of nations and the contingency of collective identities. For example, Mamdani traces the genesis of the conundrum facing Africa today back to colonialism. He argues that in its attempt to manage difference, the colonial system developed a bifurcated state divided along the axes of race (a category reserved for those of European origin or classified as such—non-natives³²), and tribe (a category reserved for the indigenous in origin—natives) (Mamdani 1996). These identities were fixed in terms of origin despite "subsequent developments, including, *residence*" and "an entire history of migrations" (Mamdani 2013:47). Races, especially those of European origin, enjoyed full civil rights including "the rights of free association and free publicity, and eventually of political representation" (Mamdani 1996:19). Although native tribes enjoyed access to rural but often arid land (a right denied to

³¹ See Young (2007:250).

³² Non-natives included foreigners such as Europeans and Asians, and those labelled as such (Arab, Coloured and Tutsi people) (Mamdani 2013).

non-native tribes), they were excluded from the enjoyment of civil rights (Mamdani 1996). According to Mamdani (1996) this anomaly was not adequately addressed in the post-independence era. Although civil society was deracialised, the colonial native political infrastructure remained unreformed. For him, a more desirable outcome would have “entailed the deracialisation of civil power and the detribalisation of customary power, as starting points of an overall democratisation that would transcend the legacy of a bifurcated power” (Mamdani 1996:24-25). Thus, the undemocratic elements of colonial native administration filtered through into the post-independence state, thereby providing roots for a politics of patrimony and subsequently, autochthony (Mamdani 1996). But in his view, solving the negative legacy of colonialism requires a form of political practice “that would create a form of citizenship adequate to building an inclusive political community” (Mamdani 2013:106). This view is shared by Appiah who points out that since “a biologically-rooted conception of race is both dangerous in practice and misleading in theory: African unity, African identity, need securer foundations than race” (Appiah 2008:89). Contrary to the arguments of the indigenist position, Appiah also argues that “‘race’ in Europe and ‘tribe’ in Africa are central to the way in which the objective interests of the worse-off are distorted” (2008:90-91). In other words, elite interests can be presented as those of a particular group—racial or ethnic—in ways that exclude others. This can potentially lead to the disenfranchisement of both the groups in whose name elite interests are expressed, and those excluded from such particularised racial and ethnic imaginaries.

The conundrum constituting the contemporary African moment is therefore characterised by tension between, on the one hand, particularist tendencies manifest both in the practices of the neo-patrimonial post-colonial state and the irredentist movements spawned by its inadequacies, and on the other, by universalist, cosmopolitan, and humanist tendencies whose political agenda is a pursuit of egalitarian and inclusive democratic polities. It can also be argued—in view of the discussion on social memory and collective identity given in the previous chapter—that autochthonous tendencies constitutive of this moment inevitably appeal to social memory for the validation of identities invoked by reactionary and neo-patrimonial post-colonial states. This is also true of secessionist political movements. But as clearly argued by Appiah, Mamdani, and Mbembe, collective identity as a “shared metaphysics” (Appiah 2008:88) ignores the diversity and continuous transformation of African identities, usually with serious consequences on political agency (Young 2007) in the context of limited and “diminishing resources” (Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007:4). It is in this context that this study has

chosen to engage with its central concerns, that is, with the way the mutual interaction between social memory, collective identity and national building is talked about in public discourses especially through the media. The subsection below reflects on the Zimbabwean context relative to the discussion above. However, since most of the dimensions of the Zimbabwean context have already been discussed in chapters one and two, the discussion here will be pithy and to the point.

The Case of Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwean nationalist struggle against settler colonialism was undergirded by two impulses: the pursuit of an all-inclusive democratic polity (Alexander *et al.* 2000:6), and the recovery of a sense of nativity lost to the vagaries of colonial “distortion” (Ranger 1996:273). The first impulse espoused civic values, and the second, ethno-racial autochthony. These impulses were mutually reinforcing in the early stages of anti-colonial nationalism up to around 1963 when Zanu split from Zapu (Msindo 2009, 2012). After the split, the nationalist project was seen, in the words of then Zanu President Ndabaningi Sithole, simply as “seeking relentlessly to eliminate eurocracy by supplanting it with afrocracy” and as “an effective instrument of establishing African rule” (Sithole 1968:57). The nebulous form of this understanding of nationalism is argued by Msindo (2009) to have been a fundamental weakness of anti-colonial nationalism in Zimbabwe as it lacked a clear vision of the kind of society that was to be built after independence, hence the contemporary preponderance of nativist thinking within the Zanu PF government. This exclusivist-nativist thinking can also be traced back to nationalist rhetoric which framed belonging in terms of descent through such epithets as ‘children of the soil’ that were used to refer only to black people with Zimbabwean ancestry, and binaries that included as many as they excluded from the nationalist imaginary of the nation to be (see Msindo 2009:7-9). In addition, Msindo (2012) argues that the split between Zanu and Zapu in 1963 fanned Shona-Ndebele ethnic rivalry and the subsequent regionalisation and ethnicisation of political affiliation, a development that culminated in violent confrontations between these parties—through their respective military wings Zanla and Zipra—both during the liberation struggle and in post-independence Zimbabwe (see also Mlambo 2013). These developments provided a strong foundation for the nature of politics in post-colonial Zimbabwe.

In post-independence Zimbabwe, the essence of the civic impulse was embodied by the policy of reconciliation declared at independence as part of the newly elected Zanu PF government's nation-building efforts (see Mlambo 2013; Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007:6). Autochthony was first evinced by the revocation of reconciliation in the immediate post-independence period when the government launched a savage military campaign in the south-western parts of the country following a low intensity rebellion in that region (see Alexander *et al.* 2000; Raftopoulos and Savage 2005; Msindo 2009), and later by its violent and exclusionary treatment of the 'othered', in land and opposition politics (Raftopoulos 2005, 2007; Muzondidya 2004; Msindo 2009). It can thus be argued that three developments in post-colonial Zimbabwe have had a decisive impact on the project of nation-building, collective identity formation, and the evocation of social memory. First, is the politics of land; second, is the state sponsored *Gukurahundi* scourge in the provinces of Matabeleland North and South as well as the Midlands; and lastly, is the rise of potent opposition politics and calls for secession by some groups in the Matabeleland region. These issues are also germane to the themes that are the subject of political discourse analysis in this study.

Land, Social Memory, Collective Identity and Nation

The land question in Zimbabwe is multi-dimensional and has a long history going as far back as the pre-colonial times, making it difficult to capture its dimensions in full here. This discussion thus focuses only on the salient features of the land question especially as they pertain to the definition of nationhood and collective identity in Zimbabwe. To begin with, it suffices to argue that the politics of land in Zimbabwe revolve around a nativist imagination of selfhood and belonging using race as the predominant nodal point of identification. It is one of the primal nodal points and *leitmotifs* of social memory in the ruling elite's master-commemorative narrative. Land is also a key nodal point of social memory for ordinary Zimbabweans, given the history of colonial dispossession and repression over a period of about 100 years (Sachikonye 2005; Rukuni and Jensen 2003).

The processes and patterns of dispossession during colonialism endowed the small minority of white settlers with huge tracts of the best arable land, while the majority native population was crowded in arid areas which were conducive neither for crop farming, nor livestock rearing (Marongwe 2003; Sachikonye 2005). Colonial land expropriation was aimed at two main outcomes: to provide white settlers with the best arable land in Zimbabwe on the one hand, and

on the other, to generate migrant labour from the overcrowded, barren, and arid land reserves occupied by the disenfranchised native population (Sachikonye 2005). The land question was one of the key motivators of the early uprising against settler colonialists in 1896 and the subsequent war of liberation which unfolded from the 1960s to 1980 (Rukuni and Jensen 2003). Also, related to the land question was the infamous arbitrary de-stocking of livestock in the reserves purportedly to maintain ecological balance (Sachikonye 2005). At independence expectations were high among ordinary Zimbabweans that colonial imbalances in land ownership would be redressed (Alexander 2003). However, the Lancaster House Constitution which came out of the negotiations to end the liberation war forestalled the post-independence land reform process in two major ways. First, it legally proscribed any significant land reform, and second, it only provided for such reform on an expensive and sluggish willing-buyer, willing-seller basis in the first post-independence decade (Sachikonye 2005). A further refrain from radical land redistribution in the immediate post-independence period came from the conciliatory tone adopted by government towards especially the white community who possessed most of the prime arable land (Alexander 2003). According to Sachikonye, although the objective at independence was to resettle “162 000 households on 9 million ha of land [...] only about 48 000 households had been resettled by 1989” (2005:7). This was mainly due to the fact that land was to be bought using scarce foreign currency under conditions of diminishing international financial support and the reluctance of white farmers to sell prime arable land (Rukuni and Jensen 2003; Sachikonye 2005). Even after the expiry of the Lancaster House terms and some favourable amendments to the Constitution in the 1990s, land resettlement remained subdued with only 25 000 households receiving land between 1990 and 1997 which still fell short of the target of 162 000 households (Sachikonye 2005:7-8). This period of land reform was generally fairly transparent and organised, although the process was not progressing fast enough for the majority of ordinary citizens resulting in land occupations (see Alexander 2003). Furthermore, official pronouncements on land reform in the 1980s were informed by the logics of reconciliation, modernisation and production rather than race (Alexander 2003). This tendency changed in the 1990s.

Due to population growth, growing unemployment, waning financial support for developmental programmes, and the poor performance of the economy, demand for land became intense in the late 1990s (Sachikonye 2005; Rukuni and Jensen 2003; Alexander 2003). During this period, government calls for land reform became more radical and were intoned in racial terms (Alexander 2003). These intensified demands came at a time of discord in relations

between the Zimbabwean government and the New Labour government in Britain after the latter reconfigured terms of funding land reform in Zimbabwe to the disapproval of the former (Sachikonye 2005). The Labour government under Tony Blair tied funding of land reform in Zimbabwe to governance issues, which was interpreted by the Zimbabwean government to mean that the British were renegeing on their promise to fund land reform.³³ Also, a formidable opposition party, the MDC, was formed in 1999 amid rising dissent against, and discontent with the ruling Zanu PF party whose support base was wearing off rapidly (Alexander 2003; Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003). These developments dramatically changed the government's approach to land reform at the turn of the century. Land occupations intensified and spread rapidly across the country in the late 1990s. In the context of waning support, the Zanu PF government resorted to compulsory acquisition of land so as to connect its political fortunes with popular demands for land. It invoked the memory of struggle against colonialism as part of its strategy to redefine the socio-political and economic agenda through self-legitimizing rhetoric which cast opponents as sell-outs, foreigners and puppets of imperial interests (Raftopoulos 2005). The common definer of the excluded 'others' was their purported association with white, but especially, British interests (see Raftopoulos 2005). Faced with waning popularity and popular demand for land among ordinary Zimbabweans, the Zanu PF government embarked on what it called the 'fast track' land reform programme which was violent, disorderly, and executed along racialized and ethnicised lines, as well as in terms of political patronage (Raftopoulos 2003; Muzondidya 2007).³⁴ At the centre of the new radicalised land reform programme was the definition of belonging as it formed the basis of land allocation.

The violent post-2000 land reform process in Zimbabwe redefined selfhood and national belonging in multiple ways. Among other things, it magnified the black—white, native—non-native, and patriot—sell-out dichotomies in the process of defining who is and who is not entitled to land. As Raftopoulos argues, land “formed the centrepiece of the ruling party's construction of belonging, exclusion and history” (2007:188). For the Zanu PF government, land could only belong to the native black Zimbabwean and not immigrant black farm workers, those of Asian origin, coloured people,³⁵ and those of European descent from whom most of

³³ The land question was one of the most contentious issues of the Lancaster House Conference which ended the war of liberation in Zimbabwe. The deadlock was only resolved when the United States and Britain promised to fund land reform in independent Zimbabwe (see Sachikonye 2005).

³⁴ For a more detailed discussion of the political developments during this period see Chapter One.

³⁵ People of mixed race.

the land was being expropriated (Muzondidya 2005, 2007; Rutherford 2007). As such, according to this new logic, to be Zimbabwean is to be black and indigenous to the land. In other words, a true Zimbabwean should be able to trace her/his ancestry to the pre-colonial era (see Muzondidya 2005, 2007). As hinted in Chapter Three, these developments suggest that social memory is often invoked for purposes of legitimation in arenas of political contest (Schudson 1989/2011), and when collective identity is not as certain as it may have been in particular contexts (Megill 1998).

However, in Zimbabwe, blackness was not enough for one to belong to the nation and qualify for land ownership. Those who were associated with opposition politics, belonged to small minority ethnic groups but also mainly aligned to opposition politics, and black immigrant workers were largely excluded from the category of deserving citizens (Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007; Rutherford 2007; Raftopoulos 2007). In some cases, ironically, wealthy and politically connected white farmers and conglomerates either retained or acquired huge tracts of land during this period.³⁶ In other cases, successful black commercial landowners were dispossessed of their land because of their affiliation to opposition politics.³⁷ In Zimbabwe the land issue thus constitutes a complex matrix of collective consciousness and is at the centre of a complex web of crony capitalism and the politics of patronage. Nevertheless, the official rhetoric framed the fast track land reform programme in terms of belonging and corrective redistribution of natural resources. It was both a force of inclusion and exclusion hence its importance to this study. As some have argued:

access to land symbolises local or regional citizenship in many African societies. The ultimate proof of belonging is the ability to possess – or at least make use of – part of the territory within which one resides. (Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007:16)

The processes of marking out citizens from non-citizens, those who belong and those who do not, those that can get land and those that cannot, involved the evocation of social memory. Social memory was evoked as a way of imagining indigeneity, which in turn was used to imagine Zimbabwean-ness. Consequently, as Muzondidya argues, the “processes and politics of land restructuring, which link the issue of land rights to history and ancestry alone, represent a drastic but retrogressive shift in thinking about rights and entitlements, citizenship and

³⁶ A typical example is that of Billy Rautenbach, a white businessman who owns large tracts of land in the south-eastern parts of Zimbabwe (Scoones 2015).

³⁷ An example is that of Edwin Moyo who lost his export-based Kondozi farm to Zanu PF politicians and some liberation war veterans because he was said to be a proxy of white capital (Masekesa 2014). The Kondozi case left about 5000 people whose livelihoods were connected to the farm, stranded, and living in abject poverty (Masekesa 2014).

nationhood in Zimbabwe” (2007:340). This patently goes against an all-inclusive civic idea of belonging in the sense pointed out by Smith (1991), and ignores the fact that “the Zimbabwe nation-state consists not only of millions of people who originate, historically, from different parts of the Continent, but also of different racial groups” (Muzondidya 2007:340). It is this parochial view of nationhood and African-ness that is criticised by the universalist-humanist position. Land as a marker of identification in Zimbabwe included as many as it excluded from a sense of national belonging across all the dichotomies mentioned above, thereby undermining an egalitarian, all-inclusive and genuine citizenship in the country.

The Gukurahundi, Social Memory, Collective Identity and Nation

The *Gukurahundi* scourge was experienced by its victims (mainly Ndebele speaking people of Matabeleland province in Zimbabwe), as a form of ethnic cleansing (Werbner 1991; Matshazi 2007). As Alexander *et al.* argue, “the brutal campaign of violence directed against Matabeleland in the 1980s powerfully confirmed its exclusion from the nation” (2000:1). The extreme and savage violence meted out to the civilian population of Matabeleland by the government’s 5th Brigade hardened “ethnic prejudice” and bolstered “a strong identification between ethnicity and political affiliation” (Alexander *et al.* 2000:224). The ethnic dimensions of this conflict were amplified by the fact that, on the one hand, the perpetrators of the violence were almost exclusively from the Shona³⁸ ethnic group, and that they often justified their violence in tribalistic terms; and on the other, the victims were mainly from the Ndebele ethnic group and others who spoke *isiNdebele* and lived in Matabeleland, although they may have belonged to other cognate groups (see Werbner 1998, 1991; Alexander *et al.* 2000; Msindo 2012, 2009). As Alexander *et al.* point out, “the violence of the army’s Fifth Brigade stands out as uniquely humiliating, tribalistic and political in civilian accounts” (Alexander *et al.* 2000:204; see also Werbner 1991). This event is one of the central elements of social memory in the Zimbabwean context, especially among the victim population. Although the experiences of *Gukurahundi* are etched in the memory of the people of Matabeleland, they also, at the same time, remain suppressed memory as the government forbids their public memorialisation (Werbner 1998; Msindo 2012). This has deepened a sense of alienation from both the state and nation among the people of Matabeleland (Werbner 1996, 1998). Werbner calls the extreme

³⁸ Ndhlovu shows that prior to 1931 “there was no language called Shona in Zimbabwe, which means that the present day Shona language is in reality” an “invention” (Ndhlovu 2013:88). It is the colonial government that categorised people who spoke mutually intelligible dialects into the Shona ethnic group (see Ndhlovu 2013).

reactions of postcolonial states to perceived threats, quasi-nationalism, which he argues to be “energised by a myth of being prior to the postcolonial nation-state, of carrying forward primordial identities and old scores arising from ancient hostilities” (Werbner 1998:92). Furthermore, Werbner points out that:

quasi-nationalism reaches a peak when its protagonists capture the might of the nation-state and bring authorised violence down ruthlessly against marginalised antagonists who are in the nation yet for terrible moments not entirely of it. The brutalised in quasi-national violence are the people who seem to stand in the way of the nation being one under one leader, being pure as one body, being truly free of alien rule and foreign intervention. (1998:93)

The violence exerted against the people of Matabeleland can be associated with quasi-nationalism for two reasons. First, the party in government, Zanu PF was (and still is) dominated by the Shona ethnic group which, as some have argued, implied that Zimbabwe was imagined as a Shona nation using Shona cultural symbols (Mhlanga 2013; Raftopoulos 2007). The implication of this argument is that the imagination of the nation around Shona myths, symbols and values is achieved by creating the “toxic other” against which this imaginary nation must be achieved (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Mhlanga 2013:16). Second, due to political tensions between the ruling Zanu PF party, and the then opposition, but former revolutionary contemporary, Zapu party, a small group of liberation combatants belonging to the latter’s military wing, Zipra, revolted against the government over the ill-treatment of Zapu officials and the party’s integrated military personnel (Alexander *et al.* 2000). In its response to the revolt, the government labelled these militants and everyone often falsely perceived to be associated with them, dissidents, and a threat to the newly independent nation (see Alexander *et al.* 2000; Werbner 1991; 1998). The military response to this threat commonly referred to as *Gukurahundi*, targeted mainly civilians leaving an estimated 20 000 dead (CCJP 1997). This has also been read as a deliberate attempt not only to eliminate Zapu and its political base, but also the Ndebele people as an ethnic group (Matshazi 2007). The *Gukurahundi* massacres, the failure to acknowledge the massacres by government, the suppression of its memory, and the economic marginalisation of the affected region have continued to nurture both feelings of oneness, and exclusion from the nation among the victims (see Msindo 2012; Mhlanga 2013; Werbner 1998). A corollary of this is that it is no longer clear “whether Ndebele today is an ethnic group, a regional entity, or a nation” (Msindo 2012:228). Nevertheless, it is as a result of such feelings of oneness and exclusion that some have broached secession as a solution to the “Matabeleland question” (Mhlanga 2013:270), a predicament described by Ndlovu-

Gatsheni and Mhlanga as “an uneasy ‘nation within a nation’” (2013:16). As Mhlanga points out:

Matabeleland’s revised secessionist bid [...] is driven by renewed regional and ethnic sensibilities, characterised by an explicitly renewed awareness of the total social whole – commonly referred to as *uMthwakazi*. (Mhlanga 2013:270)

Mhlanga—himself a sympathetic voice for the secession of Matabeleland—also argues that “irredentists’ calls, especially in Africa tend to follow historical-suzerainty in which people seek to re-imagine their pre-colonial arrangements” (Mhlanga 2013:274). Thus, apart from the regional identification with suffering among the people of Matabeleland, there is also among those who call for secession, an imaginary historical nation around which *uMthwakazi* can be imagined. The political constellation created by *Gukurahundi* resonates with Misztal’s observation that traumatic events are sources of vivid and persistent social memory through “which collective identities are most intensively engaged,” hence the importance of *Gukurahundi* to the analysis of interconnections between social memory, collective identity and nation-building in Zimbabwe (2003:139).

A few observations can be made on *Gukurahundi*’s effect on the imagination of collective identity in Zimbabwe. First, the actions of the government in Matabeleland were readily interpreted by the victims as suggesting that Zimbabwe is imagined as a Shona nation, out of which other ethnicities, particularly the Ndebele people, must be expurgated. Second, the violence of the 5th Brigade in Matabeleland led to some degree of collective solidarity among the victims despite their ethnic diversity (Msindo 2012). It is on the basis of this solidarity that a separatist nation is being imagined by some groups in the region. The persistence of *Gukurahundi* memories among the victims shows how counter-memory enters public discourse in fierce contestation of the official master-commemorative narratives such as the ones purveyed by the Zanu PF government in Zimbabwe (see Zerubavel 1995; Werbner 1991, 1998). Broadly speaking, *Gukurahundi* and its aftermath can be argued to evince a fractured and failed post-colonial nation-building project in the country.

The last axis around which a sense of belonging has been constructed in Zimbabwe is the political, wherein those who sympathise with opposition parties are taken as sell-outs and lesser citizens, whereas those who support the ruling Zanu PF party and go along with its narrative

of the liberation struggle as well as its latter-day manifestation in the Third Chimurenga, are treated as patriots and true citizens³⁹ (see Ranger 2004).

Subject Minorities and Subject Races

Another often ignored dimension to the politics of nationalism and belonging in Zimbabwe is the position of subject minorities and subject races within the nation (Muzondidya 2005; 2007). Subject minorities and races are constituted by two kinds of groups. First, are the small minority ethnic groups indigenous to Zimbabwe, and second, are those social groups referred to as non-indigenous both in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe (Muzondidya 2005, 2007). The first group includes the “Kalanga, Nambya, Tonga, Sotho, Dombe, Xhosa, Tonga of Mudzi, Venda, Shangani, Tshwawo, Tswana, Barwe, Sena, Doma, Chikunda and Chewa” ethno-linguistic groups (Hachipola 1998 cited by Ndhlovu 2013:80; see also Muzondidya 2007). The second group includes immigrant workers from Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique and subject ‘races’ such as “Indians/Asians, Cape Coloureds and other people of ‘mixed race’ descent” (Muzondidya 2005:215; see also Muzondidya 2007). There are some salient tendencies with regards to these social groups. The minority indigenous groups are largely marginalised, at least, at a cultural level. Although the government now recognises most languages spoken in the country, only three are privileged in the public sphere (Ndhlovu 2013). These are English, *chiShona* and *isiNdebele*. The rest of the 18 officially recognised languages have been generally marginalised (Ndhlovu 2013). This means that those people who belong to the other 15 ethno-linguistic groups are forced to learn at least two of the three hegemonic languages in Zimbabwe which obliterates diversity (Ndhlovu 2013).

The immigrant farm workers are probably Zimbabwe’s most marginalised group. This is true of them both in the period before and after independence as they were, and still are, prohibited from owning land because they are not considered indigenous to the country (Muzondidya 2007; Rutherford 2007). They were disenfranchised of most, if not all citizen rights and were treated mostly as a source of labour and the sole responsibility of white farmers (Rutherford 2007; Muzondidya 2005, 2007). As Ndakaripa observes, “in post-colonial Zimbabwe, citizenship was and continues to be used in ways that do not ensure individual rights, freedoms and entitlements conferred by genuine citizenship” (2013:309). This usually applies to social groups which pose a political threat. The immigrant farm workers in Zimbabwe were seen as

³⁹ For a more detailed discussion on this refer to Chapter One.

sympathetic to the white farmers and thus likely to vote against the ruling party, Zanu PF, which was behind the land reclamation process in the country, hence their continued disenfranchisement years after independence (Rutherford 2007).

Asians, Coloureds and Greek minorities *inter alia*, are also significantly excluded groups in the country as they have been largely denied access to redistributive post-colonial programmes including land reform and economic indigenisation programmes (Muzondidya 2005, 2007; Ndakaripa 2013). Their unique position emanates from the dilemma that they could not fit into both Rhodesian and the post-colonial black majoritarian nation of Zimbabwe on the basis of both race and ethnicity (Muzondidya 2005, 2007). They were not white enough for the Rhodesian state to get the same rights as white settlers, and they are not black enough to be included in redistributive economic programmes in post-colonial Zimbabwe.⁴⁰ Subject races thus could not own land in colonial Rhodesia as they were nominally classified European, and non-native, a category that was also used to deny immigrant labourers access to land (Muzondidya 2005). This is also true of their status in the post-independence period. Although subject races received preferential treatment in some respects during the colonial period, their true position within that system is captured by Muzondidya who argues that:

subject races were clearly defined as inferior, discriminated against and for all practical purposes excluded from European society [...]. Coloureds and Indians could not occupy or buy land and fixed property in strictly white areas. (Muzondidya 2005:216)

As can be discerned from the short discussion above, subject minorities (especially immigrant labour) and subject races are denied a true sense of belonging in Zimbabwe based on nativist notions of belonging. No case better illustrates the inadequacies of nativist imaginings of the nation than the circumstances of these two social groups both of which cannot claim indigeneity, and added to which the latter cannot also fit the racial profile preferred by the politics of indigeneity. As Muzondidya observes, “where the Rhodesian state emphasised white minority rights over majority rights, the current regime has simply turned the tables and emphasised majority rights over minority rights” (2005:230).

Critical Reflections on Zimbabwe’s Contemporary Moment

An important observation can be deciphered from the discussion of the Zimbabwean case. Given the multicultural, multi-ethnic and multiracial composition of societies such as

⁴⁰ The assumption here is that ‘race’ is morphologically defined by “differences of blood, color and cranial measurements” or “physical race distinctions” (Du Bois 2000:81).

Zimbabwe's population (Mlambo 2013; Muzondidya 2007) and those of many other African countries, some have argued for all-inclusive civic polities (Mamdani 2013; Mbembe and Posel 2005; Young 2007). This view recognises the transformative interventions exerted on African countries by socio-political processes that include *inter-alia*, contact between Africans and Europeans through trade, slave trade, colonialism, migration and globalisation (see Mbembe 2002). The same can be said of the relations between Africans and Asians, Arabs and other African people. This means that an essentialisation of Zimbabwean, and African identities for that matter, is ahistorical as it ignores these realities. For instance, Mlambo argues that Zimbabwe is still “a nation in the process of becoming” and that given the:

context of Zimbabwe's varied and contested pasts, the complicating factors of ethnicity, class, gender and a racially-defined and colour-based colonial political dispensation for almost 80 years, the reality could not be otherwise. (2013:238)

It can therefore be argued that almost all the problems that emerge as a hindrance to the achievement of an inclusive and egalitarian society in Zimbabwe have arisen from a politics of autochthony and nativism or in Werbner's terms, “quasi-nationalism” (1998:93). The following social circumstances can thus be argued as emanating from exclusive nativist thinking, the complex process of its genesis notwithstanding: contemporary Ndebele particularism which is largely a product of state violence and economic marginalisation (Mhlanga 2013); the exclusion of immigrant labourers from the nation (Rutherford 2007); the marginalisation of subject ‘races’ and minority ethno-linguistic groups (Muzondidya 2005; Ndhlovu 2013); and the politics of neo-patrimony which have had huge negative effects on the economy and the development of democratic institutions in Zimbabwe (Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007; Young 2007). The failure to uphold and nurture the policy of reconciliation by the Zanu PF government marked the country's departure from the pursuit of a genuine civic polity and spawned most of the problems that have made it impossible for a democratic and inclusive polity to emerge in the postcolonial period.

Furthermore, although Ndebele nationalism positively contributed to the democratisation of social memory and questioned the government's narrow master-commemorative narratives of the nation, it still remains trapped in the same mode of thinking that has produced its call for secession. As Werbner observes, “it is as if an old narrative, once told in terms of tribe and now in terms of ethnicity and ethnogenesis, is still spellbinding” (1996:1). Despite the fact that Matabeleland region hosts in excess of 12 ethno-linguistic groups and different racial groups, those calling for the secession of *uMthwakazi* (itself a Ndebele name), ignore this diversity

preferring instead to project Matabeleland as a Ndebele nation. If it is to be taken, as Mhlanga (2013) argues, that the Shona name 'Zimbabwe' means the country is imagined as Shona, equally, the imagination of Matabeleland as '*uMthwakazi*' implies that the new nation would be a Ndebele imaginary, despite the diversity of its population. Some may argue that the region's common experience of state violence unifies its people, but this argument is not significantly different from the colonial dynamics that saw different groups uniting in the anti-colonial struggle although they had much less in common beyond that objective. As Mlambo argues, "what had passed for nationalism in the days of the anti-colonial struggle was no more than a desire for self-determination" (Mlambo 2013:238).

In other words, the call for secession by some Ndebele political groups is informed by the same thinking espoused by the current government against which the secession groups are rebelling. Thus, nativist politics, whether by contemporary ruling elites or those seeking control of the state as a separate political entity, is built on difference and exclusion, which are fertile ingredients for violent conflict and the marginalisation or expurgation of excluded groups (Janoski and Gran 2002). Another weakness in the literature on nativism in Zimbabwe is that it focuses more on the parochial and essentialised idea of Zimbabwean-ness by the current government and like-minded intellectuals, while ignoring the reproduction of this tendency in the reactionary politics of secession which is no less autochthonous, exclusivist and essentialised. It is these often beguiling and expedient imaginaries of nationhood that make a constructivist analysis of the discursive intersection between social memory, collective identity and nation-building necessary. But as those arguing from a humanist view observe, one of the key problems in intellectual Africanist thinking is its failure to separate "*the desire to know and to think*" from "*the urge to act*" (Mbembe 2002:636). Awareness of the construction of identities and social memory tends to get lost when these two moments are not separated. This is because, as Appiah argues, "the demands of agency seem always in the real world of politics to *entail a misrecognition of its genesis*" that is to say one "cannot build alliances without mystifications and mythologies" (Appiah 2008:89), which is the case with partial narratives of the nation as told by both the Zanu PF government and secession movements in the Matabeleland region of Zimbabwe. The same observation has also been expressed by Breuilly:

national views of the past are contingent and constructed, constantly altering according to the results of diplomatic and military conflicts, changes in social and economic structures, and shifts in the idioms and methods used by historians. They are themselves contested, both between conflicting nationalisms and the 'same' nationalism. (2009:21)

This study takes the position that one of the tasks of intellectual work is to deconstruct the contingencies of discourses that seek to submit public political action to the whims and contests of power between certain political players at particular junctures. Such a task is especially important where and when the threat of violent conflict is imminent. The study is informed by Appiah's assertion that:

what we in the academy *can* contribute – even if only slowly and marginally – is a disruption of the discourse of 'racial' and 'tribal' differences. For [...] the reality of these many competing identities in Africa today plays into the hands of the very exploiters whose shackles we are trying to escape. (2008:90)

This study therefore takes seriously the challenges that are faced by African countries in general, and Zimbabwe in particular, through an assessment of the implications of the media's memory work for nation-building and collective identity formation.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that Zimbabwe's contemporary moment is characterised by a hegemonic nativist discourse purveyed by the ruling elite in response to which emerged two major oppositional discourses. First, is the 'rights' driven discourse of democracy largely espoused by oppositional political parties (see Chapter One). Second, is the particularistic and nativist discourse espoused by those groups pursuing the secession of Matabeleland from the current geo-political entity Zimbabwe. As has already been shown in this and the previous chapter, nativist discourses and political configurations are built on the basis of difference and exclusion, and thus are likely to create the same challenges as those created by their object of criticism, albeit in new ways and new spaces. A case is thus being made in this study for a genuine all-inclusive civic political order as a way out of the ailing, if not failed, nation-building processes in Zimbabwe. As some have argued, Africa needs to move from exclusive forms of citizenship defined in terms of ancestry (*jus sanguinis*) to more inclusive forms (see Young 2007; Herbst 2000). One important institution in the construction and transmission of social memory and collective identity in nation-building processes is the media. The next chapter discusses the importance of studying the media's memory work and outlines the theories that inform this study.

Chapter Five

Theoretical Framework

The production and reproduction of society is never guaranteed, automatic or mechanical, and the problematics of the phenomenon are often best revealed in moments of conflict and contradiction and in the rare but powerful episodes of coercive violence, social disorder, and chaos. But whatever the details of the production and reproduction of social life, it is through communication, through the integrated relations of symbols and social structure, that societies, or at least those with which we are most familiar, are created, maintained and transformed. (Carey 1989:110)

Introduction

As has already been argued in previous chapters, social memory, collective identity, and nation-building are the subject of multiple and contesting formulations both in theory and practice. This puts the media at the centre of contesting political forces and power configurations. The flows of power in public representations which shape the evocation and construction of social memory as well as collective identity and their implications to nation-building processes, are of particular interest here. Media of mass communication, today, are one of the fundamental outcomes of modernity. Most, if not all contemporary social processes are in one way or the other, contingent on mass media which are partly behind the shift from face-to-face interactions between people to what Thompson calls “quasi-interaction” (2005:33). The media have become an important institution in socio-political and economic struggles of this age. As Thompson observes, by “using communication media, individuals create *new* forms of action and interaction which have their own distinctive properties” (2005:32). Although Thompson mentions only individuals, the same could also be said of social groups. The three theories outlined in this chapter are oriented towards a formulation of the media’s normative position in the shaping of relations within, and between social groups. More specifically, these theories form the composite analytical lens through which both constructions of identity and the nature of memory work performed by the two newspapers in the context of on-going nation-building processes are to be understood.

The chapter begins by arguing the case for studying the media as a site of social memory that shapes collective identity formation and nation-building processes. This is followed by a discussion of the theories: Nancy Fraser’s (2001, 2003, 2008) Theory of Justice, Chantal Mouffe’s (1999, 2009) Model of Agonistic Pluralism and Jurgen Habermas’s (1989, 1990,

1993, 1997, 1998) Discourse Ethics Theory. Fraser's theory of justice is useful for mapping the political factors that inform the evocation of social memory by *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard*. Furthermore, her evaluative idea of participatory parity together with Mouffe's idea of agonistic pluralism and Habermas's discourse ethics provide a normative framework for evaluating the newspapers evocation and use of social memory as a function of identity formation and nation building in Zimbabwe.

Why Study the Media's Memory Work?

The media are an indispensable social institution in the modern world. Not only are they vehicles for the transmission of information, they also provide a platform for social interaction (Carey 1989). These attributes make the media a key site for the production, reproduction and circulation of symbolic forms (Thompson 1995). Media also enable symbolic forms to "outlive the practical and experiential settings that have produced them" (Cubitt 2007:182; see also Thompson 1995). Furthermore, they give symbolic forms a degree of concrete existence which when cast "as a story enhances their chances of being passed from generation to generation" (Cubitt 2007:186). Part of the material transmitted across generations is that which is used to construct collective identities (Thompson 1995:207). Mediated symbols provide individuals and social groups with resources to reflect on who they are. The nature of such reflection and mediated symbols are themselves always shifting, thereby suggesting that the process of identity formation is a fluid and ever-changing experience. However, these processes are also shaped by the power dynamics within their contexts of realisation (Cubitt 2007). This implies that "mediated visibility is not just a vehicle through which aspects of social and political life are brought to the attention of others: it has become a principal means by which social and political struggles are articulated and carried out" (Thompson 2005:49). In Carey's words; "problems of communication are linked to problems of community, to problems surrounding the kinds of communities we create and in which we live" (1989:33). Drawing on these observations, it is arguable that to study the media is to study the nature of society. This study is more interested in how the media—working as sites of memory—shape processes of both identity construction and nation-building. As others have argued, social memory depends on, and is shaped by, the technologies of memory such as media of mass communication (Van House and Churchill 2008; Sturken 2008). Wagner-Pacifici notes similarly that "the fact of embodiment in form is what all collective memories share, regardless of ideological position or articulating source" (1996:302). But, since Sturken argues that "a practice of memory is an

activity that engages with, produces, reproduces and invests meaning in memories, whether personal, cultural or collective” (2008:74), the need to analyse mediated constructions of social memory in context cannot be over-emphasised.

Edy locates the role of the media in memory work when she points out that communication is a critical component of collective [social] memory as it “makes possible the unique capacity of collective memory to preserve pasts older than the oldest individual” and in shaping perceptions of social memory’s importance to processes of nation building, identity formation *inter-alia* (1999:72). Another important observation is that unlike traditional elements of memory, the media “may encourage the personal and emotional connections with the past that are associated with collective memory” (Edy 1999:72). Furthermore, some have argued that the media can also help constitute, preserve, and undermine a cultural space or collective identity through reiteration, questioning, silencing, demonization, and modification (Schlesinger 1993; Chiumbu 2004). Others have also suggested that “journalists can be seen as memory agents at three levels: telling the public about events, situating journalistic coverage within larger contexts, and identifying journalists’ professional roles in shaping social memories” (Berkowitz 2011:302; see also Meyers 2011:323). It is important to assess the media’s processes of framing social memory since “how memories are erased, forgotten, or willed absent has come to be seen as equally important to the ways in which memories are set in place” (Zelizer 1995:220, 2008). From this, it can be noted that the concept of social memory “serves as a rich means of showing how the past informs news of the present while also demonstrating how journalism represents the culture on which it reports” (Berkowitz 2011:303). But despite the media’s work of memory, little attention has been paid to it as a site where the past is recalled, modified and related to the present (Edy 1999:72; Zelizer 2008; Berkowitz 2011). Zelizer puts this point across more forcefully when she argues that, “even today, decades into the systematic scholarly study of collective memory, there is still no default understanding of memory that includes journalism as one of its vital and critical agents” (2008:80). It is in this context that this research contributes to filling this knowledge gap. The study is significant as contestations of memory, identity formations and the way these interact with power and authority may potentially shape the nature of individual and group relations. Focus is now directed at the theories that undergird this study starting with Nancy Fraser’s (2001, 2003, 2008) theory of justice.

Nancy Fraser's Theory of Justice

As has already been shown in chapters three and four, collective identity formation, social memory and processes of nation-building almost always play-out in highly contested political struggles. The contestations manifest both at the levels of theory and practice. This is significant because theory can provide an ideational basis for some political struggles in much the same way as these struggles provide the basis for theoretical development. The theoretical framework invoked in this chapter is useful in thinking through contemporary social struggles. Nancy Fraser's (2001, 2008) theorisation of justice provides a holistic framework within which most such struggles take shape—hence its adoption for the study. The conception of justice invoked here is necessarily open.

According to Rawls, human societies are characterised by impulses of both “a conflict as well as an identity of interests” (1999/1967:130). For him, an “identity of interests” arises because “social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any would have if everyone were to try to live by his own efforts” (Rawls 1999/1967: 130). Further and concurrently, a conflict of interests arises because “men [*sic*] are not indifferent as to how the greater benefits produced by their joint labours are distributed, for in order to further their own aims each prefers a larger to a lesser share” (Rawls 1999/1967:130). This social dialectic necessitates a normative conception of justice which Rawls refers to as “a set of principles for choosing between the social arrangements which determine this division and for underwriting a consensus as to the proper distributive shares” (Rawls 1999/1967: 130). Fraser argues that social justice is a moral issue as it is universally binding and therefore deontological: it has three dimensions: distribution, recognition and representation (2000, 2001, 2003, 2008). These three dimensions constitute the spheres of contestation for social justice. But as she argues, none of these dimensions, by itself, provides a sufficient basis for remedying social injustices (Fraser 2000, 2001, 2003, 2008). The emancipatory aspects of these dimensions “need to be integrated in a single comprehensive framework” (Fraser 2001:22). This cohesive approach is necessary, to overcome the usual dissociation of struggles for recognition from those of redistribution (Fraser 2001). The tendency that Fraser seeks to overcome treats struggles for redistribution as moral and universal, and those for recognition as ethical and therefore relative (2001, 2008; see also Blum 1982). Her critique of this dualism is motivated by a desire to move beyond the culturalist reduction of struggles for recognition to identity politics, by linking such struggles to

distributive and political concerns without neglecting the core concerns of each of these dimensions.

Distributive Justice

According to Fraser, proponents of distributive justice draw “on long traditions of egalitarian, labour and socialist organising” to “seek a more just allocation of resources and goods” (2001:21). Calls for redistribution seek a redress of the asymmetrical material distributive patterns in society, and because of this, the politics of distribution are taken to be evidently moral (Fraser 2001:23). This suggests that the standing of distributive justice as a moral claim is not in question and therefore will not be the subject of much discussion here. Distributive patterns in society are a matter of concern to Fraser’s conception of justice to the extent that “the economic structure of society and [...] economically defined class differentials” affect the egalitarian participation of all people (adults) in social life (2001:30). The injustice to be remedied here is maldistribution. For her, the ideal situation is when economic structures are such that they do not deny people access to resources—material or otherwise—that they need to participate as full and equal members of society (Fraser 2008). Since distributive concerns are also entwined with other dimensions of justice in Fraser’s conception, there will occasionally be reference and clarification of its attributes in the discussions below.

Recognition

The politics of recognition have attracted a lot of attention because they are framed in two different and sometimes conflicting ways. On the one hand, the politics of recognition are usually framed in culturalist terms with particular focus on identity (see Taylor 1994; Honneth 1992, 2003, 2007, 2011). On the other, there is an attempt to link the politics of recognition with calls for a just redistribution of material wealth in asymmetrical societies (Fraser 2000, 2001, 2008; Honneth 2003). What makes this second dimension of justice (recognition) important is that claims to recognition drive:

many of the world’s social conflicts, from campaigns for national sovereignty and subnational autonomy, to battles around multiculturalism, to the newly energised movements for international human rights, which seek to promote both universal respect for shared humanity and esteem for cultural distinctiveness. (Fraser 2000:107)

The currency of claims to recognition has been argued to lie in the logic that “nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being” (Taylor 1994:25; see also Honneth 1992, 2003,

2007). For Taylor, the “self-depreciation” of the victims of misrecognition can be “one of the most potent instruments of their own oppression”, suggesting that “their first task ought to be to purge themselves of this imposed and destructive identity” (Taylor 1994:26). However, Fraser is critical of recognition’s weak standing as a justice issue in this literature because she sees claims for recognition as having a particularised orientation—and therefore a matter of the good life—rather than having a universal or moral orientation (Fraser 2001, 2003, 2008). For her, the solution lies in coming up with a theory of justice that gives recognition a deontological interpretation. She does this by examining the weaknesses of framing struggles for recognition in identitarian terms, arguing instead that struggles for recognition should be treated as a “question of *social status*” (Fraser 2001:24). Before exploring her conception of the status model, I will first review the weaknesses of the identity model.

The Identity Model

Fraser argues that the problem with current struggles for recognition is that they are framed in terms of identity—a form of politics that emphasises the recognition of “group-specific cultural identity” (2001:23). This form of politics is concerned with “the depreciation of such identity by the dominant culture and the consequent damage to group members’ sense of self” (Fraser 2001:23). For her, the immanent weaknesses of the identity model come in two currents. The first displaces redistributive struggles by abstracting “misrecognition from its institutional matrix” and obscuring “its entwinement with distributive justice” (Fraser 2000:110). The second current acknowledges the imbrication of redistributive struggles and struggles for recognition, but misunderstands the nature of this relationship by reducing economic inequalities to derivatives of “cultural hierarchies” (Fraser 2000:111). This “maldistribution can be remedied indirectly, by a politics of recognition”, that is, “to revalue unjustly devalued identities is simultaneously to attack the deep sources of economic inequality; no explicit politics of redistribution is needed” (Fraser 2000:111). For her, this is a fundamental error as it amounts to “vulgar culturalism” which she argues “is no more adequate for understanding contemporary society than vulgar economism was” (Fraser 2000:111). Despite making this point forcefully, she also acknowledges that:

culturalism might make sense if one lived in a society in which there were no relatively autonomous markets, one in which cultural value patterns regulated not only the relations of recognition but those of distribution as well. In such a society, economic inequality and cultural hierarchy would be seamlessly fused; identity depreciation would translate perfectly and immediately into economic injustice, and misrecognition would entail maldistribution. Consequently, both forms of injustice could be remedied

at a single stroke, and a politics of recognition that successfully redressed misrecognition would counter maldistribution as well. (Fraser 2000:111)

This latter observation is not taken lightly in this study given the contextual tendencies outlined in the previous chapters that suggest the imbrication of socio-cultural and distributive dynamics in Zimbabwe. In other words, there is always a possibility of this imbrication in hegemonic political configurations. As Honneth argues, “even the ‘material’ inequalities that most concern Fraser must be interpretable as expressing the violation of well-founded claims to recognition” (2003:134). Nonetheless, another major problem with the identity model’s emphasis on the self-realisation of different identitarian enclaves is the reification of identity. As Fraser observes, by “stressing the need to elaborate and display an authentic, self-affirming and self-generated collective identity, it puts moral pressure on individual members to conform to a given group culture” (2000:112). This presents both a theoretical and political challenge as it implies a potential ideological role for recognition. As Honneth acknowledges in response to some of his critics:

social recognition can always also operate as a conformist ideology, for the continuous repetition of identical forms of recognition can create a feeling of self-worth that provides the motivational resources for forms of voluntary subordination without employing methods of repression. (Honneth 2007:326)

However, he defends his valorisation of a politics of recognition by noting that forms of recognition must have material dimensions such as “gestures, speech acts, or institutional policies” arguing that “such expressions or measures are always cases of recognition if their primary purpose is somehow to affirm the existence of another person or group” (Honneth 2007:330). He argues that “ideological forms of recognition have to represent positive classifications whose evaluative contents are sufficiently credible for their addressees to have good reason to accept them” (Honneth 2007:341).

But, as Fraser also argues, the identity model’s reification of identity has the overall effect of imposing “a single, drastically simplified group-identity which denies the complexity of people’s lives, the multiplicity of their identifications and the cross-pulls of their various affiliations” (2000:112). This, she argues, does not only make the identity model ironically serve “as a vehicle for misrecognition” since “in reifying group identity, it ends by obscuring the politics of cultural identification, the struggles *within* the group for the authority—and the power—to represent it” (Fraser 2000:112). Furthermore, she notes that “by shielding such struggles from view, this approach masks the power of dominant fractions and reinforces

intragroup domination” (Fraser 2000:112). Ultimately, she argues that the identity model “lends itself all too easily to repressive forms of communitarianism, promoting conformism, intolerance and patriarchalism” (Fraser 2000:112). It is on this basis that she proffers the status model as a productive framework within which to frame struggles for recognition without reducing them to identity politics.

The Status Model

Fraser formulates two ways through which the politics of recognition can be transformed into a deontological project that includes both recognition and distributive claims. First, she suggests a shift from an identitarian framing of struggles for recognition to what she calls the “status model”, and second, she suggests an expansion of the conception of justice (Fraser 2001:24). The latter point is discussed below. The status model treats recognition “as a question of *social status*” (Fraser 2001:24). For her:

what requires recognition is not group-specific identity but rather the status of group members as full partners in social interaction. Misrecognition, accordingly, does not mean the depreciation and deformation of group identity. Rather, it means *social subordination* in the sense of being prevented from *participating as a peer* in social life. (Fraser 2001:24)

The core concern in this model is the degree to which individuals or groups participate in social life as peers, on an egalitarian basis. This model directs the politics of recognition towards the institutional and structural “patterns of cultural value for their effects on the relative standing of social actors” (Fraser 2000:113). To be misrecognised, is “to be denied the status of a full partner in social interaction, as a consequence of institutionalised patterns of cultural value” (Fraser 2000:113). Ultimately, the goal of the status model is “to de-institutionalise patterns of cultural value that impede parity of participation and to replace them with patterns that foster it” (Fraser 2000:115). The status model also considers all remedial possibilities to the problem of recognition and “in every case, the status model tailors the remedy to the concrete arrangements that impede parity” (Fraser 2000:115-116). Since in this formulation the problem is now of status, the concomitant solution would therefore be “overcoming subordination by establishing the misrecognised party as a full member of society, capable of participating on a par with other members” (Fraser 2001:24). Some of the merits of this model are that it avoids “hypostatizing culture and substituting identity-engineering for social change [...] essentialising current configurations and foreclosing historical change” (Fraser 2000:119). It “submits claims for recognition to democratic processes of public justification” whilst

“avoiding the authoritarian monologism of the politics of authenticity and valorising transcultural interaction, as opposed to separatism and group enclaves” (Fraser 2000:119).

Representation

Arguing that theories of justice must be three dimensional, Fraser (2008) added the political dimension of representation to her earlier formulation of a theory of justice which focused on only the politics of distribution and recognition. To recap, the politics of distribution is primarily centred on the material and economic factors that either enable or limit the participation of individuals or groups in social interaction as peers. The politics of recognition is primarily concerned with the ways in which institutionalised cultural values affect the equal participation of individuals and groups in social life. The central questions in struggles for redistribution and recognition are the “what” and the “who”, respectively (Fraser 2008:15). To these two, Fraser adds a third dimension of the political which is concerned with the “how” question of justice claims (Fraser 2008:15). The political dimension is concerned with processes that shape the inclusion and exclusion of people from “the circle of those entitled to a just distribution and reciprocal recognition” (Fraser 2008:17). According to Fraser the political dimension “structures contestation” by shaping “the stage on which struggles over distribution and recognition are played out” (2008:17). It sets the boundaries for resolving problems of both distribution and recognition. As Fraser points out, the political dimension:

sets the procedures for staging and resolving contests in both the economic and cultural dimensions: it tells us not only who can make claims for redistribution and recognition, but also how such claims are to be mooted and adjudicated. (2008:17)

To capture the central concerns of the political dimension one could say that it operates at two levels. At the first level, it is concerned with the structures of inclusion and exclusion across the dimensions of distribution and recognition, and at the second level, it is concerned with the rules that govern the nature of contestation, especially among the included. In this regard, Fraser raises the following questions:

do the boundaries of the political community wrongly exclude some who are actually entitled to representation? Do the community’s decision rules accord equal voice in public deliberations and fair representation in public-decision making to all members? (2008:18)

Evidently, these questions speak not only to the participatory character of the political processes themselves, but also to the communicative dimensions of such processes which makes the structures of media institutions and content a central aspect of these concerns. As

Fraser notes, the central concern of the political dimension of justice is representation which at one level “is a matter of social belonging”, and at another concerns “the procedures that structure public processes of contestation” (2008:17). The central injustice in the political dimension is misrepresentation which occurs “when political boundaries and/or decision rules function wrongly to deny some people the possibility of participating on a par with others in social interaction – including, but not only, in political arenas” (2008:18). According to Fraser (2008), there are two levels of political injustice. First, there is what she calls “ordinary-political misrepresentation” and second, there is “misframing” (Fraser 2009:18-19). Ordinary-political misrepresentation is when “decision rules wrongly deny some of the included the chance to participate fully, as peers” (Fraser 2008:18-19). She gives the example of limits to participation in electoral processes for this type. Misframing, which is subtler than ordinary-political misrepresentation, is “when the community’s boundaries are drawn in such a way as to wrongly exclude some people from the chance to participate at all in its authorised contests over justice” (Fraser 2008:19). Fraser argues that “frame-setting is among the most consequential of political decisions” because it involves the simultaneous constitution of members and non-members, and in so doing “effectively excludes the latter from the universe of those entitled to consideration within the community in matters of distribution, recognition, and ordinary political representation” which can result in “a serious injustice” (2008:19). The question of framing and the political dimension in general become questions of justice in and of themselves, although they are imbricated with the dimensions of distribution and recognition – hence Fraser’s three-dimensional theory of justice.

As noted above, Fraser’s first method of transforming recognition from an ethical to a moral claim was to move the politics of recognition from an ‘identity model’ to the ‘status model’. The second involves the pursuit of the normative ideal of parity of participation which is the subject of discussion below. It makes sense to discuss parity of participation last because its concerns cut across all the three dimensions of justice discussed above.

Parity of Participation

One of the ways through which Fraser integrates the three dimensions of justice discussed above is by expanding the very conception of justice. She achieves this by making the notion of parity of participation the normative core of her conception of justice (see Fraser 2000, 2001, 2003, 2008). For her, “the most general meaning of justice is parity of participation” (Fraser

2008:16). She argues that the three main obstacles to the achievement of parity of participation among all adults are maldistribution, misrecognition and misrepresentation (Fraser 2008). Maldistribution is when people are “impeded from full participation by economic structures that deny them the resources they need in order to interact with others as peers”; misrecognition manifests when people are “prevented from interacting on terms of parity by institutionalised hierarchies of cultural value that deny them the requisite standing” (Fraser 2008:16). Lastly, misrepresentation, is when “political boundaries and/or decision rules function wrongly to deny some people the possibility of participating on a par with others in social interaction – including, but not only, in political arenas” (Fraser 2008:18). A just society is thus one which affords its members “social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers” (Fraser 2001:29). Apart from its exclusion of those outside the category of adults, Fraser points out that parity of participation is a universal normative ideal that transcends the limits of the identity model because it envisages the inclusion of all (adult) people in social interaction and “presupposes the equal moral worth of human beings” (Fraser 2001:30).

The purchase of parity of participation as a normative-evaluative standard of political struggles across the three dimensions of justice mentioned above lies in its rigour. For instance, it requires claimants of maldistribution to demonstrate clearly how “existing economic arrangements deny them the necessary objective conditions for participatory parity”, and how claimants of misrecognition are denied the intersubjective conditions by institutionalised patterns of cultural value for participatory parity (Fraser 2001:32-33). The evaluation does not end with qualifying the claims to justice across the three dimensions of justice, but extends to the proposed remedies. As Fraser notes, participatory parity also requires that:

redistribution claimants must show that the economic reforms they advocate will supply the objective conditions for full participation to those currently denied them – without significantly exacerbating other disparities. Similarly, recognition claimants must show that the sociocultural institutional changes they seek will supply the needed intersubjective conditions – again, without substantially worsening other disparities. (Fraser 2001:33)

Thus, the social changes sought by any claimants to justice must “promote parity of participation” and not undermine it for others “both across and within groups” (Fraser 2001:33, 38). Although claims to representation must also be treated as unique, Fraser argues that:

representation is always already inherent in all claims for redistribution and recognition. The political dimension is implicit in, indeed required by, the grammar of the concept of justice. Thus, no redistribution or recognition without representation. (2008:21)

Fraser's theory of justice is useful to this study in many ways. First, it provides a frame through which appropriate democratic models for, and roles of, the media in contemporary society can be thought. Secondly, it allows for an analysis of both mediated representations of social memory and collective identity through the lens of democratic theory, and the implications of such representations for the constitution of inclusive and egalitarian societies, which in this study speaks to the task of nation-building. Thus, Fraser's theory of justice allows us, at one level, to trace whether and how, social memory is evoked as an issue of recognition, distribution or representation or a combination of these. At another level, it allows us to use the normative ideal of participatory parity to assess the democratic potential of such frames. Ultimately, it allows us to assess if the two newspapers under study exhibit the attributes of participatory parity in their reportage of issues that speak to the study's central problematics: social memory, collective identity and nation-building.

The study also draws on Chantal Mouffe's theory of radical democratic politics with special attention given to the model of agonistic pluralism as an analytical frame to think the democratisation of contemporary societies. It is the position of this study that Mouffe's conception of democratic politics breathes life into some aspects of Fraser's treatise given above. This theory is the subject of discussion below.

Chantal Mouffe and Agonistic Pluralism

Premise for an Agonistic Model of Democracy

There are several propositions for modelling democratic societies, the frameworks of which can be also used to think the role of the media in society (see Christians *et al.* 2009; Held 1992, 1995, 2006; Mouffe 1992a, 1999, 2000, 2005, 2009; Habermas 1989, 1999; Rawls 1993). One such proposition is Chantal Mouffe's conception of agonistic pluralism. Her theory and others chosen for this study perform the double and complementary tasks of providing both a normative framework for analysing the newspapers' discursive constructions of particular issues, and for exploring more democratic forms, not only of discursive practices, but also of society. As noted in Chapter Three, the study is positioned within an anti-essentialist understanding of society largely because "social objectivity is constituted through acts of power" which "implies that any social objectivity is ultimately political and that it has to show

the traces of exclusion that governs [*sic*] its constitution” (Mouffe 1999:752). This brings to the fore the integral role of discursive practices in constituting society—hence the focus on media of mass communication. However, the discursive dimensions of social constitution are discussed in depth in the following chapter. For now, the focus is on Chantal Mouffe’s conception of agonistic pluralism as a model of democratic society.

According to Mouffe, any project in democratic politics should take the political as its starting point (2009). Politics refers to the “set of practices and institutions whose aim is to create an order, to organise human coexistence in conditions which are always conflictual because they are traversed by ‘the political’” (Mouffe 2009:7). She defines the political as the “dimension of antagonism that is inherent in all human society, antagonism that can take many different forms and can emerge in diverse social relations” (Mouffe 1999:754). It is this immanence of the political in society which makes it a necessary “starting point for an adequate reflection on the aims of democratic politics” (Mouffe 2009:6). It is also on this basis that Mouffe’s theory is formulated. Three major factors form the basis of Mouffe’s conception of agonistic pluralism as a model of radical democratic politics.

First, she argues that the political is centred on the constitution of collective identities; a process that she argues is inherently conflictual (Mouffe 2009). On her view, the creation of an identity—as already shown in chapter three—involves the construction of a “we” whose own existence is contingent on “the demarcation of a ‘they’” (Mouffe 2005:15). This implies that the construction of identities involves marking boundaries of difference, which “is often constructed on the basis of a hierarchy” (Mouffe 2005:15). It is this creation of the “constitutive outside”, as a condition for the existence of the “we” which leaves room for the possible emergence of conflict. Second, she argues that any democratic project must contend with the ineradicable presence of both power and antagonism—even in democratic societies (1992a, 1999, 2000, 2005, 2009). Mouffe understands power as something that is not only constitutive of identities, but also for which many social groups or interests are in contention (1999; see also Laclau and Mouffe 1985). For her, power is stabilised, albeit temporarily, when one of the contending social interests or groups achieves a hegemonic status (Mouffe 1999). Thus, for Mouffe, a pluralist democracy should, as part of its architecture, always acknowledge and accommodate “the permanence of conflict and antagonism” (2000:32-33) because it “is the condition for the very exercise of democratic rights” (2000:4). This line of thinking leads her to conclude that:

if we accept that relations of power are constitutive of the social, then the main question of democratic politics is not how to eliminate power but how to constitute forms of power that are compatible with democratic values. (Mouffe 1999:753)

Thus, one of the premises of Mouffe's conception of agonistic pluralism is that "the presence of antagonisms is not eliminated, but 'sublimated'" (2009:9). Third, she argues that the most advanced contemporary models of conceiving a democratic society within the omnipotent liberal tradition—that is Habermas's formulation of deliberative democracy and the Rawlsian attempt to reconcile democracy with liberalism (Mouffe 2000)—are impotent because of their failure "to acknowledge the dimension of power and antagonism and their ineradicable character" (Mouffe 1999:752). Mouffe criticises deliberative democracy's call for the achievement of public consensus through rational deliberation made possible by the "conditions of ideal discourse"—whose attributes include openness, egalitarianism, impartiality, non-coerciveness and the supremacy of better argument (Mouffe 1999:748)—for its indifference to the dimensions "of power and antagonism and their ineradicable character" (Mouffe 1999:752). She argues that since the social is traversed by power and difference, it is neither possible nor desirable to eliminate conflict (Mouffe 2009). Instead, a more effective democratic project is that which does not seek to eliminate power but "to constitute forms of power that are compatible with democratic values" and pluralism (Mouffe 1999:753, 2009). It is in this context that she proffers 'agonistic pluralism' as a model of "radical and plural democracy" (Mouffe 1999:753).

The Agonistic Model

This model is premised on the observation that the political ineradicably traverses all dimensions of the social. Its departure point is both an acknowledgement of the presence of antagonism in the social, and the assertion that politics "consists in domesticating hostility" (Mouffe 1999:754). Mouffe therefore argues that it is "only in trying to defuse the potential antagonism that exists in human relations, that we can pose the fundamental question for democratic politics" (Mouffe 1999:754). She sees deliberative democracy's pursuit of a rational consensus arrived at through egalitarian inclusivity in the public sphere as an impossibility (Mouffe 1999, 1992a) because the limiting factor is always the way political communities are constituted, and the way in which citizenship is conceived. She notes:

there will always be a 'constitutive outside,' an exterior to the community that is the very condition of its existence. It is crucial to recognise that, since to construct a 'we' it is necessary to distinguish it from a 'them,' and since all forms of consensus are based

on acts of exclusion, the condition of possibility of the political community is at the same time the condition of impossibility of its full realisation. (Mouffe 1992a:30)

This is why an agonistic model proposes that democratic politics should aim at building consensus on institutions that govern interaction across difference—rather than seek to eliminate difference. For Mouffe, what is at stake in an agonistic model is “how to establish the us/them discrimination in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy” (Mouffe 1999:755). From this perspective, the ‘Other’ should not be seen as an *enemy* but as an *adversary* against whom a battle of ideas can be waged (Mouffe 2009). Mouffe argues that this transformation can reduce conflict from the plane of antagonism between enemies, to agonism between adversaries (2009). For her, an adversary is someone with whom “we share a common allegiance to the democratic principles of ‘liberty and equality for all’ while disagreeing about their interpretation” (Mouffe 2009:9). Here, conflict (agonistic struggle between two or more hegemonic projects) is characterised by mutual respect for the right of the other to hold different views about issues and events.

However, in her conception, the nature of their differences goes beyond that which can be resolved rationally because of the passions associated with them (Mouffe 2009). It is also the presence of passions that Mouffe argues makes rationalist deliberative democracy fall short of the demands of modern multi-polar societies. The merit of the agonistic model is that it seeks neither a rationalist consensus nor the elimination of passions, but rather the transformation of those passions towards democratic ends (Mouffe 2009). She also argues that models of democratic politics that fail to factor in difference and conflict are likely to give way to “confrontation between essentialist forms of identification or non-negotiable moral values” (Mouffe 2005:30). Therefore, on her view, the remedy is a form of democratic politics that grasps “the economic, social and political conditions” which give rise to essentialism (Mouffe 2009:12). This line of thinking is consistent with Fraser’s (2001, 2003, 2008) argument for the achievement of parity of participation in terms of distributive justice, recognition and representation. For a model of democratic politics that precludes essentialism, Mouffe offers agonistic pluralism. Thus, agonistic pluralism is a model of democracy which, because of the ineradicable presence of conflict in society, does not seek “a rational consensus reached without exclusion” as is the case in the deliberative model, but “aims at the creation of unity in a context of conflict and diversity” (Mouffe 1999:755). It does not seek to do away with the us/them distinction, but to establish it “in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy” (Mouffe 1999:755). This model envisages the negotiation of difference under conditions of

“shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of democracy”, although there will always be disagreements on the meaning of those principles, which Mouffe argues are only temporarily resolved in on-going agonistic confrontations (1999:755). According to her, these temporary resolutions are the “result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilisation of power [...] that always entails some form of exclusion” (Mouffe 1999:756). Ultimately, Mouffe argues that:

it is only in the context of a perspective according to which ‘difference’ is construed as the condition of possibility of being that a radical democratic project informed by pluralism can be adequately formulated. (2000:19)

This model is useful to this study as it allows for a normative rethinking of difference and conflict in democratic and democratising societies. It speaks from a pragmatic position to the struggles about recognition, distribution and representation as outlined by Fraser above. However, its emphasis on difference is also, simultaneously, its weakness. It is always possible that the coincidence of an accommodation of ‘passions’, and hegemonic status can easily degenerate into a totalitarian and identitarian community characterised by an exclusive form of hyper-nationalism. It is for this reason that this study has chosen to include Habermas’s formulation of discourse ethics as an alternative framework from which to establish “solidarity among strangers” (Garnham 2007:203).

Jurgen Habermas’s Discourse Ethics Theory

The third theory adopted for this study is Habermas’s formulation of discourse ethics. His conception of discourse ethics has been criticised, above all, for its utopian character, which some argue makes it less useful to the development of actual democratic societies and procedures (see Mouffe 1999). But as shown in this discussion, the Habermasian conception of discourse ethics is not only functional to the extent that it defines the discursive rules of engagement in democratic and democratising societies, but is also consistent with, at least, the two theories presented above. Its main purchase to this study is that it formulates in more specific terms the actual ways through which parity of participation as outlined by Nancy Fraser, and Chantal Mouffe’s radical democratic programme of agonistic pluralism, can potentially be actualised in concrete situations.

This discussion first outlines the dimensions of Habermas’s discourse ethics and shows how they provide a practical framework for the development of democratic communicative institutions and procedures. Second, it shows that despite the many criticisms of the

Habermasian formulation of discourse ethics, not least by Chantal Mouffe among others, there is in principle congruity between discourse ethics and the two theories discussed above, if not with theories of democracy in general. The discussion below also shows that Habermas's discourse ethics provide a procedural framework within which to actualise parity of participation and agonistic pluralism. This is a vital dynamic for this study because it means discourse ethics can potentially accommodate elements of both universalistic and particularistic concerns in thinking about the problem of democracy in contemporary societies.

Discourse Ethics

Habermas's discourse ethics theory proposes procedures for the inter-subjective discursive formulation of a moral basis for action in post-traditional societies characterised by pluralism and conflict. The theory, as with Fraser's (2001, 2003, 2008), is Kantian in orientation and therefore "deals only with problems of right or just action" (Habermas 1989:39). According to Habermas, Kantian philosophy is concerned with moral justification "of actions in terms of valid norms and, in turn, to justify the validity of norms in terms of principles worthy of recognition" (Habermas 1989:39-40). These valid norms and the principles by which they are validated must emerge from practical discourse which he defines as argumentation "carried out in discourse", which "insures that all concerned in principle take part, freely and equally, in a cooperative search for truth, where nothing coerces anyone except the force of the better argument" (Habermas 1989:41).

The purchase of this theory to thinking the problem of democracy in the modern world is that, "moral judgments serve to explain how conflicts of action can be settled on the basis of rationally motivated agreement" (Habermas 1989:39). Thus, consistent with Kantian philosophy, the formative basis for discourse ethics is an overarching concern with conflict resolution and social solidarity (see Rehg 1994). For Rehg, discourse ethics provide an answer to the question: "what constitutes the moral basis of social cooperation?" (1994:1). This question arises in the context of plural and competing interests about which he argues:

in the late twentieth century this question has taken on immediate, indeed overpowering worldwide relevance: even as a growing plurality of national groups presses for sovereignty, networks of international exchange and inter-dependence continue to grow and thicken. Thus the conflicts that arise today, both within and between nations, pose an increasingly acute problem of cooperation [...] At stake often enough are human rights, or questions of freedom, equality, fair treatment, and so on. (Rehg 1994:1)

Also as Habermas points out, conflicts playing out in “norm-guided interactions can be traced directly to some disruption of a normative consensus” (1990:67). A remedial programme to this disruption can mean either “restoring intersubjective recognition of a validity claim after it has become controversial or assuring intersubjective recognition for a new validity claim that is a substitute for the old one” (Habermas 1990:67). For example, this could be true for a nation of questionable unity or a new nation formed in place of an old one. It is in this context that Habermas asserts that his formulation of discourse ethics proceeds “on the assumption that the participants do not wish to resolve their conflicts through violence, or even compromise, but through communication” (Habermas 1998:39). He calls “interactions *communicative* when the participants coordinate their plans of action consensually, with the agreement reached at any point being evaluated in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity claims” (Habermas 1997:287; see also Habermas 1990). It is the centrality of communication to the resolution of conflict in society that underpins the participants’ impulse to “engage in deliberation and work out a shared *ethical* self-understanding on a secular basis” (Habermas 1998:39). It is for this reason that this theory is deemed useful to this study. As shown in the first section of this chapter, the media are the quintessential communicative institution in complex and dispersed modern societies, and thus it is through the media that most public discourses are actualised. This point is summarised well by Wahl-Jorgensen and Galperin who argue that “for public opinion and social solidarity to come about, then, we need to enlist the assistance of the mass media” (2000:23). Habermas also argues that since “moral argumentation [...] serves to settle conflicts by consensual means [...] what is needed is a ‘real’ process of argumentation in which individuals concerned cooperate” (1997:292 see also Habermas 1992). The point is that the participants must understand the basis of what is considered ‘moral’ or ‘right’. Central to this process is the participation in public deliberations by those whose concerns are the subject of such deliberation.

But as he notes, such deliberation is unlikely to be successful given the different, competing and sometimes irreconcilable conceptions of the good life—that is the particularistic interests, value and belief systems in society (Habermas 1998). The solution is not to settle for “a mere *modus vivendi* as substitute for a threatened moral way of life” but that “participants must now rely on the ‘neutral’ fact that each of them participates in *some* communicative form of life which is structured by linguistically mediated understanding” in their pursuit of rational solutions to conflict (Habermas 1998:40). Thus, if communication is to play such a critical role in processes that seek conflict resolution and social solidarity, the form of such communication,

and the rules by which it should be governed matter—hence Habermas’s concern with discourse ethics⁴¹. It is on this basis that Habermas proposes a moral and procedural solution that avoids both the reification of particularism (that is particular forms of the good life), and a universalism characterised by “false abstractions” such as preoccupation with the equality of persons “*at the expense of the aspect of individuality*” (1998:40). At the centre of such a formulation is the quality of argumentation or public discourse—a process through which moral claims are validated by the force of a better argument or moral reasoning—and the degree of participation by those whose interests are at stake (Calhoun 1992:2).

What emerges from this discussion is that modern societies are plural, and because of such pluralism they are characterised by many competing interests which inevitably makes conflict integral to the socio-political and economic spheres of life across the globe. Such conflict can be resolved either through coercive or communicative means. Normatively speaking, a communicative resolution of such conflict is the most preferable, but as Fraser (2001, 2003, 2008) argues, only when parity of participation is actualised. However, because of competing and sometimes irreconcilable differences, it may be difficult for participants in a communicative encounter to agree on a solution. It is on this basis that Habermas proposes a deontological communicative approach within which he argues that:

valid statements must admit of justification by appeal to reasons that could convince anyone irrespective of time or place. In raising claims to validity, speakers and hearers transcend the provincial standards of a merely particular community of interpreters and their spatiotemporally localised communicative practice. (1993:52)

However, his conception of discourse ethics does not completely ignore the particular or the relative passions that Mouffe refers to. In this regard, he argues that “any universalistic morality is dependent upon a form of life that *meets it halfway*” (Habermas 1989:50). Thus, as he argues, discourse ethics, as a moral theory, speaks to both the question of justice, which encompasses “the subjective freedom of inalienable individuality”, and the question of solidarity, which refers “to the well-being of associated members of a community who intersubjectively share the same lifeworld” (Habermas 1989:43). It is on this point that Habermas’s thinking resonates with Fraser’s notion of parity of participation wherein there is a recognition of difference, but on the basis of being an equal member of society along with other individuals and social groups. In this kind of set up, both scholars envisage a diverse, egalitarian, and just society

⁴¹ It has been pointed out that the term “discourse ethics” is “misleading” since Habermas understands ethics in “a distinct non-moral sense” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2014; see also Habermas 1989).

characterised by a “*nonappropriating* inclusion of the other *in his otherness*” (Habermas 1998:40).

In the final analysis, if we take it that argumentation—both institutionalised (as with mediated discourses) and informal—is the rational basis by which norms that guide social action are formulated and validated, it also follows that the rules which govern such argumentation provide another important layer of validation for such norms. Habermas therefore argues that “procedural characteristics of the process of argumentation itself must ultimately bear the burden of explaining why results achieved in a procedurally correct manner enjoy the presumption of validity” (1998:37). It is thus timely to spell out Habermas’s formulation of discourse ethics or what he refers to as the three steps that “lead to a theoretical justification of the moral point of view” (Habermas 1998:41).

At the centre of his discourse ethics theory are the principles (D) and (U) as well as the assumption that argumentation is omnipresent in all societies, if not at an institutional level, then at least at an informal level (Habermas 1998). The principle (D) which is constitutive of step one, is concerned with “a procedure of moral argumentation”, and the principle (U) which constitutes step two, “plays the part of a rule of argumentation” (Habermas 1989:40). The third step is concerned with the achievement of universal agreement through argumentation (Habermas 1998). These three steps are presented in detail below.

In his explication of the **first step** towards a theoretical justification of a moral point of view, Habermas points out that:

if the practice of deliberation itself is regarded as the only possible resource for a standpoint of impartial justification of moral questions, then the appeal to moral content must be replaced by the self-referential appeal to the form of this practice. (1998:41)

For him, this dimension, is captured by principle (D) which asserts that: “only those norms can claim validity that could meet with the acceptance of all concerned in practical discourse” (Habermas 1998:41; see also Habermas 1989, 1990, 1993, 1997; Rehg 1994).

Step two is premised on the observation that “the hypothetically introduced principle (D) specifies the condition that valid norms would fulfil if they *could* be justified [...] But what is still needed for the operationalization of (D) is a rule of argumentation specifying how moral

norms can be justified” (Habermas 1998:42). This rule is expressed by principle (U) which says:

a norm is valid when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of *each individual* could be *jointly* accepted by *all* concerned without coercion. (Habermas 1998:42)

Habermas argues that this principle’s concern with “interests and value-orientations” prevents the “marginalisation of the self-understanding and worldviews of particular individuals or groups and, in general” seeks “to foster a hermeneutic sensitivity to a sufficiently broad spectrum of contributions” (1998:42). He also argues that the:

generalised reciprocal perspective-taking (‘of each,’ ‘jointly by all’) requires not just empathy for, but also interpretive intervention into, the self-understanding of participants who must be willing to revise their descriptions of themselves and others (and the language in which they are formulated). (Habermas 1998:42-43)

Moreover, he also points out that principle (U)’s:

goal of ‘uncoerced joint acceptance’ specifies the respect in which the reasons presented in discourse cast off their agent-relative meaning and take on an epistemic meaning from the standpoint of symmetrical consideration. (Habermas 1998:42-43)

The third step in the theoretical justification of a moral point of view states that:

the participants themselves will perhaps be satisfied with this (or a similar) rule of argumentation as long as it proves useful and does not lead to counterintuitive results. It must turn out that a practice of justification conducted in this manner selects norms that are capable of commanding universal agreement—for example, norms expressing human rights. (Habermas 1998:43)

As already pointed out, Habermas notes that step three requires an assumption that argumentation—formal or informal— “is to be found in all cultures and societies” as a non-substitutable form of problem solving (1998:43). For him, this is important because “in view of the universality and nonsubstitutability of the practice of argumentation, it would be difficult to dispute the neutrality of the principle (D) (Habermas 1998:43). However, he also argues that ethnocentric particularisms may manifest through the principle (U).

Thus, for Habermas, the practice of argumentation is not only based on some level of cooperation but also creates further opportunities for such cooperation through agreements that are based “on the rational force of arguments” (1998:44). He also identifies some of the features that make such a process of argumentation ideal for outlining the moral basis of social action. To capture these features and the justification of such features, it is necessary to quote him extensively. Habermas points out that:

the rational acceptability of a statement ultimately rests on reasons in conjunction with specific features of the process of argumentation itself. The four most important features are: (i) that nobody who could make a relevant contribution may be excluded; (ii) that all participants are granted an equal opportunity to make contributions; (iii) that the participants must mean what they say; and (iv) that communication must be freed from internal and external coercion so that the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ stances that participants adopt on criticisable validity claims are motivated solely by the rational force of the better reasons. If everyone who engages in argumentation must make at least these pragmatic presuppositions, then in virtue of (i) the public character of practical discourses and the inclusion of all concerned and (ii) the equal communicative rights of all participants, only reasons that give equal weight to the interests and evaluative orientations of everybody can influence the outcome of practical discourses; and because of the absence of (iii) deception and (iv) coercion, nothing but reasons can tip the balance in favour of the acceptance of a controversial norm. Finally, on the assumption that participants reciprocally impute an orientation to communicative agreement to one another, this ‘uncoerced’ acceptance can only occur ‘jointly’ or collectively. (Habermas 1998:44)

In short, discourse ethics refer to “a procedure of moral argumentation” (Habermas 1989:40). But while discourse ethics provides a framework for defining moral norms by which conflicts should be resolved and solidarity fostered, a complication arises when one expands the notions of participation and consent beyond the living. In this regard, Habermas asks a very important question especially regarding dead victims of violence for whom justice is sought:

but how can we live up to the principle of discourse ethics that postulates the consent of *all*, if we cannot make restitution for the injustice and pain suffered by previous generations—or if we cannot at least promise an equivalent for the day of judgement and its power of redemption? Is it not obscene for present-day beneficiaries of past injustices to expect the post-humous consent of slain and degraded victims to norms that appear justified to us in light of our own expectations regarding the future? (Habermas 1989:52)

His answer to this question is that the net effect of moral theory is not substantive—that is to say, moral theory does not prescribe the substance of discourse—since it provides, in the main, normative guidelines for such public discourse (Habermas 1989). In other words, Habermas is acknowledging the Hegelian critique of moral theory as existing mainly in the realm of the “ought”, which makes its practical force dependent on the extent to which its normative component is actualised in social praxis (1989). However, he also argues for the normative value of moral theory in post-traumatic social experiences noting that:

by singling out a procedure of decisionmaking, it seeks to make room for those involved, who must then, under their own steam, find answers to the moral-practical issues that come at them, or are imposed upon them, with objective historical force. (Habermas 1989:53)

Thus, in the end, the value of Habermas's discourse ethics theory lies not only in its moral premise, but also in its potential role as a political ethic (Murphy III 1994). Its value can be understood through Murphy III's observation that:

Habermas's discourse ethics can best be interpreted as a detailed explication of the conditions that need to be met in order to treat equals as equal in the context of a discourse. This is neither a trivial nor banal accomplishment, but provides a basis for critiques of existing practices. (1994:134)

Convergences: Discourse Ethics, Parity of Participation and Agonistic Pluralism

This short section traces the locus connecting the first two theories to Habermas's discourse ethics theory. This task seems important given the criticism brought to bear on Habermasian normative theory by Mouffe (1999, 2009). Furthermore, there is need to show that Habermas's discourse ethics theory speaks to the concerns apparent in both Fraser's theory of justice, and Mouffe's radical democratic project of agonistic pluralism, albeit, at a practical and procedural level. Thus, the argument being made here is that Habermas's discourse ethics theory does not take anything away from what is proposed by both Fraser and Mouffe, but instead expands the normative scope within which the problem of democracy in contemporary societies can be thought. These three theories provide a normative framework against which to analyse the nature and implications of discourses on collective identity formation, and nation-building processes as purveyed by the newspapers under study. They are also useful as a framework for analysing how the newspapers worked as sites of social memory. This combination of theories is holistic as it enables analysis from both 'modernist' and 'post-modernist' perspectives. On the one hand, Mouffe's (1999, 2009) model of agonistic pluralism provides a 'post-modernist' perspective to the analysis as it takes difference—and the passions that come with it—as a point of departure in thinking the problem of democracy in contemporary societies. On the other hand, Habermas's (1989, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1998) discourse ethics theory provides a 'modernist' perspective through its emphasis on rational argumentation as a way of addressing social conflict. Finally, Fraser's (2001, 2008) theory of justice attempts to reconcile both 'modernist' and 'post-modernist' perspectives by combining concerns for distributive justice and recognition into one analytical framework.

But one can also trace some linkages between these theories. For instance, it can be observed that, on the one hand, Fraser's theory of justice is concerned with the achievement of parity of participation in social interactions of any kind (2000, 2001, 2003, 2008). She argues that this

can be achieved by overcoming asymmetries that cut across dimensions of justice such as distribution, recognition and representation (Fraser 2000, 2001, 2008). In view of this, it can be argued that Habermas's discourse ethics theory is, at its core, consistent with Fraser's thinking as it is concerned both with the resolution of conflict, its sources notwithstanding, and the fostering of social solidarity, which can be addressed through the achievement of parity of participation (see Habermas 1998; Rehg 1994). Furthermore, as with Fraser, Habermas is also concerned with the procedural framework guiding the resolution of social conflict (conditions for parity of participation in Fraser), which he expresses through his conceptualisation of discourse ethics. Thus, it can be argued, Habermas's discourse ethics theory outlines a framework for establishing parity of participation, at a discursive level at least, which for him is an important plane for addressing justice issues (1998). Discourse ethics theory thus speaks directly to the concerns that Fraser raises through her conception of a theory of justice.

On the other hand, Mouffe argues that if we take the political—the source of immanent conflict in society—as the starting point for thinking the problem of democracy, then an agonistic form of pluralism is best suited to transform the passions that fan social conflict (2009). She dismisses rationalist models of thinking the problem of democracy because they valorise both the elimination of conflict in society and the achievement of consensus in resolving such conflict. But as argued here, Habermas's discourse ethics theory also takes the presence of social conflict as its starting point (see Habermas 1998; Rehg 1994). For him, such conflict must be resolved through egalitarian and participatory modes of argumentation guided by valid procedures (see Habermas 1990, 1993, 1998). This process of argumentation over issues that originate from social conflict can, in and of itself, constitute a form of agonistic pluralism which leads to some form of agreement, however tenuous and provisional it may be. Secondly, and consistent with Mouffe's theorisation of agonistic pluralism, Habermas argues for a secular procedural framework for regulating the resolution of social conflict. Here, Habermas's theory is consistent with Mouffe's position to the extent that her model envisages the negotiation of difference under conditions of "shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of democracy", although there will always be disagreement on the meaning of those principles, which she argues are only temporarily resolved in on-going agonistic confrontations (1999:755). It can be argued that discourse ethics constitute the "ethico-political principles of democracy" that she is talking about. Furthermore, Habermas, as with Mouffe (1999), also refers to the temporary resolution of disagreements through argumentation not least in the media, when he argues that:

a majority decision must be arrived at in such a fashion, and only in such a fashion, that its content can be claimed to be the rationally motivated but fallible result of a discussion concerning the judicious resolution of a problem, a discussion that has come temporarily to a close because coming to a decision could no longer be postponed. (1992:450)

His argument presupposes ‘agonistic’ interaction which can only be interrupted on those occasions where fallible decisions must temporarily be reached using a majoritarian imperative, but not as the final arbiter over the contestations playing out in the public sphere. In the final analysis, it can be argued that Habermas’s (1989, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1998) discourse ethics complements Fraser’s (2001, 2003, 2008) theory of justice, and Mouffe’s (1999, 2009) conception of a radical democratic project of agonistic pluralism in this study. Furthermore, it allows this study to pull together issues raised in both Fraser’s (2001, 2008) and Mouffe’s (1999, 2009) theories through a specific analysis of discursive dimensions of democratic practice using the cases selected for this study.

Conclusion

The theories outlined in this chapter suggest possible ways of dealing with challenges faced by both democratic and democratising societies in the modern world. Their combined thrust is useful because contemporary societies are characterised by competitive pluralism and conflict owing to both different conceptions of the good life and social asymmetry across the dimensions of justice such as distribution, recognition and representation (see Rehg 1994; Habermas 1990, 1993, 1998; Fraser 2000, 2001, 2008; Mouffe 1992a, 1999, 2000, 2005, 2009; Rawls 1999). It is in this context that the theories are deployed to analyse current practices at a discursive level. Although these theories are normative in principle, their normativity is premised on a critique of current practices with a view to mapping better ways of building more inclusive societies that avoid the trap of exclusivist particularism and blind universalism (Habermas 1998). Therefore—keeping in mind Carey’s (1989) observation given in the epigraph to this chapter—the study uses the three theories outlined above to analyse discourses purveyed by both *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* newspapers of Zimbabwe, paying particular attention to how they constructed collective identity and performed memory work in the context of on-going nation-building processes. The next chapter presents the methodology and methods deployed in this study.

Chapter Six

Methodology and Methods

An analysis of persuasive definitions and evaluative terms in various premises, as well as a normative framework for analysing deliberation, can provide a clearer understanding of what is going on in this speech: rhetorically motivated representations (including metaphors or particular ways of ‘framing’) should not be seen as isolated features of the text but as having an argumentative function of steering the argument towards a certain conclusion and precluding other conclusion from being arrived at. (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:116)

Introduction

Since this study views the discursive as a form of social action which is both contingent and conjunctural, it approaches its problem from a qualitative, but critical realist position (see Maxwell 2012), within the general rubric of symbolic interactionism as outlined by Blumer (1969). The study treats newspaper discourses as generative platforms of argumentation, and therefore, as forms of social action. The methodological approach adopted here is useful both to the explication of the nature of social action manifest in the newspaper articles under study, and the socio-political and economic factors attendant to, and resultant from, such social action. The chapter begins by outlining the methodological orientation of the study, followed by a discussion on the sampling procedures used to select articles for analysis and the quality implications of this research process before ending with a discussion on the analytical method adopted for the study.

Methodological Orientation

Clarity on one’s operating paradigm is an appropriate starting point for any research as it provides the axiological positioning of the researcher (O’Reilly and Kiyimba 2015). As Blumer argues, “the *entire act* of scientific study is oriented and shaped by the underlying picture of the empirical world that is used” (1969:24-25). A paradigm is “a basic set of beliefs or assumptions adopted by a scientific community which define the nature of the world and the place of individuals in it” (O’Reilly and Kiyimba 2015:3; see also Guba and Lincoln 1994). It considers the ontological, epistemological, and methodological questions pursuant to the research task (Guba and Lincoln 1994). Ontology refers to the “beliefs about what there is to know about the world” (Snape and Spencer 2003:11). There are four major ontological perspectives in social research: realism, materialism, idealism, and critical realism (Snape and

Spencer 2003). Realism is premised on the belief that “there is an external reality which exists independently of people’s beliefs or understanding about it” (Snape and Spencer 2003:11). Materialism, which is closely related to realism, “claims that there is a real world but that only material features, such as economic relations, or physical features of that world hold reality”, whereas idealism, from which relativism derives, “asserts that reality is only knowable through the human mind and through socially constructed meanings” (Snape and Spencer 2003:11). Critical realism, which is discussed in-depth below, takes the position that “social phenomena are believed to exist independently of people’s representations of them but are only accessible through those representations” (Snape and Spencer 2003:13).

Epistemology “is concerned with ways of knowing and learning about the social world” (Snape and Spencer 2003:13). Epistemological considerations revolve around the conception of the relationship between the researcher and researched, the notion of ‘truth’, and whether to follow inductive or deductive research processes among other things (Snape and Spencer 2003:13-22). Finally, methodology refers to “the particular research approach grounded in a particular school of thought” (O’Reilly and Kiyimba 2015:3). There are three major methodological approaches to social research: quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods research (see Creswell and Plano Clark 2011). Quantitative research is informed by positivist thinking (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004:14), whereas mixed methods research is informed by pragmatist thinking wherein the nature of the problem, or research question, is believed to determine the combination of methods to be used (Creswell 2015; Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009). It sees the combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques as potentially productive when dealing with complex problems in social research (Creswell 2015; Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009). This study uses a critical-realist approach to deal with its problem. Critical realism combines a realist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology (Maxwell 2012). It enables the analysis of ways in which newspapers talk about the material world external to their discursive work, and the implications of such discursive work on the material world. However, this study uses a critical realist approach within a qualitative framework, which stresses:

the diverse orientations of people involved in social activities; the way in which people actively make sense of their surroundings, and how this shapes what they do; the unintended and unforeseen consequences of actions; and the resulting contingency of most courses of events. (Hammersley 2000:394)

This study is qualitative and is informed by Blumer's (1969) conception of symbolic interactionism which encapsulates the central concerns of critical realism.

Herbert Blumer and Symbolic Interactionism

Blumer identifies 5 main tenets of symbolic interactionism. First, it sees human society "as consisting of human beings who are engaging in action" (Blumer 1969:6). This implies that the starting point in social research is that, "fundamentally human groups or society *exists in action* and must be seen in terms of action" (Blumer 1969:6). Second, symbolic interactionism sees human beings as interactive, and as such, their activities "occur predominantly in response to one another or in relation to one another" (Blumer 1969:7). Blumer also argues that human interaction is not a passive process but one that is formative and generative (1969). For example, in addition to ensuring the endurance of old ways of understanding in a particular society (such as social memory), the processes of interaction also spawn new understandings, both of which may form the basis for social action (such as nation-building). Third, symbolic interactionism sees the "worlds" that exist for human beings and societies as "composed of 'objects'" which are products of "symbolic interaction" and which Blumer defines as "anything that can be indicated or referred to" (1969:10-11). He sees objects (e.g. identity) as products of interactive meaning making processes and argues that "from the standpoint of symbolic interactionism human group life is a process in which objects are being created, affirmed, transformed and cast aside" (Blumer 1969:12). Fourth, symbolic interactionism sees a human being as an acting organism which makes "indications to others and interprets their indications" (Blumer 1969:12). This suggests that human beings actively participate in interactive processes by offering and receiving interpretations, as well as creating and receiving meanings that may form the basis of their actions. Fifth, symbolic interactionism sees human beings as actors whose actions are "built on the basis of what they note, how they assess and interpret what they note, and what kind of projected lines of action they map out" (Blumer 1969:16). Sixth, human action is seen as interlinked across space and time, and therefore a joint activity, and as something that is caught up in processes of both continuity and re-fashioning (Blumer 1969).

Given these tenets, Blumer argues that symbolic interactionism rests on the following premises:

the first premise is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them. [...] The second premise is that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one's fellows. The third premise is that these meanings are handled in, and modified through,

an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters. (1969:2)

These premises have methodological implications. First, the premise that “human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them” (Blumer 1969:2), implies that for social researchers to understand human action, they must understand the meanings that human beings have for both the objects towards which they act and their actions (Blumer 1969). This also implies that such meanings should be understood from the perspective of those making such meanings. Second, Blumer argues that the consequence of the premise that “social action is built up by the acting unit through a process of noting, interpreting, and assessing things and of mapping out a prospective line of action”, is that in order for the social researcher “to treat and analyse social action”, s/he has “to observe the process by which it is constructed” (Blumer 1969:56). It is on this basis that this study pursues its goals. First, for a fair understanding of the nature of action instantiated by the newspapers under study through their argumentative work, one must study the dimensions and social potency of those argumentative moves and their construction. In other words, one should question the nature of the discursive action performed by the newspapers and what subsequent actions were proposed by their actions. Second, by analysing the newspapers’ discursive action, it is also possible to analyse the processes by which such action plays out, hence the methodological stance taken by this study. Finally, by analysing the argumentative moves instantiated by these newspapers, it is also possible to trace the ways in which phenomena such as collective identity and social memory are treated in discourse as part of interactive, generative, and meaningful human action in this context.

Thus, Blumer’s explication of symbolic interactionism informs this study in two major ways. First, it forms the basis for the qualitative methodological approach taken by the study. Symbolic interactionism locates its empirical work in the world of those under study, and “lodges its problems in this natural world, conducts its studies in it, and derives its interpretations from such naturalistic studies” (Blumer 1969:47). It also advocates the valorisation of the researched society’s meaning categories as a way of understanding them, and their actions (Blumer 1969). An understanding of their meaning making processes is important as it gives the researcher access to the ways in which the society under study’s “process of designation and interpretation is sustaining, undercutting, redirecting, and transforming the ways in which the participants are fitting together their lines of action” (Blumer 1969:53). Second, it informs the study’s understanding of argumentation as a form of

social action, which in turn, works as a premise for further action in the socio-political and economic sphere. If the departure point in social research, as argued by Blumer (1969), is to understand human beings as always engaged in action, it also follows that practical argumentation is a critical site of social research as it is not only a form of action in and of itself, but one that is exercised in favour of, or against, other forms of action (see Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; van Eemeren *et al.* 1996).

Qualitative Research

Qualitative research can be understood as “a naturalistic, interpretive approach concerned with understanding the meanings which people attach to phenomena (actions, decisions, beliefs, values etc.) within their social worlds” (Snape and Spencer 2003:3; see also Bryman 2012). It can also be characterised at many levels. First, is its view on the “perspective of the researcher and the researched” (Snape and Spencer 2003:4); the qualitative researcher should take the emic view which sees the world from the perspective of the researched (Bryman 2012; Babbie and Mouton 2001; Flick 2006). Furthermore, s/he should aim for a contextual and in-depth understanding of social phenomena and processes (Bryman 2012; Mason 2002; Babbie and Mouton 2001; Hammersley 2000). Second, it uses a flexible approach to research, which is to be conducted in the natural settings of those under study (Bryman 2012; Snape and Spencer 2003; Mason 2002). Third, during data generation the researcher is close to the researched so that s/he is not only aware of contextual dynamics attendant to the studied phenomena, but also understands the meaning categories of the studied (Bryman 2012). Its methods seek a deeper and contextual understanding of phenomena with some degree of “demonstrable wider resonance” (Mason 2002:8). They include “observation, in-depth individual interviews, focus groups, biographical methods such as life histories and narratives, and analysis of documents and texts” (Snape and Spencer 2003:4; see also Bryman 2012, 1988a). Fourth, qualitative analysis reflects “the complexity, detail and context of the data” and identifies “emergent categories and theories from the data rather than imposing a priori categories and ideas” (Snape and Spencer 2003:4). Furthermore, qualitative analysis concerns itself mainly with “explanations at the level of meaning rather than cause” (Snape and Spencer 2003:4), and does not always seek generalisation as it takes each case as unique (Yin 2011). In the end, qualitative research aims to provide “detailed descriptions and ‘rounded understandings’ which are based on, or offer an interpretation of, the perspective of the participants in the social setting” (Snape and Spencer 2003:4; see also Mason 2002). Qualitative results are also aimed at “mapping

meanings, processes and contexts” as well as taking into consideration “the influence of the researcher’s perspectives” (Snape and Spencer 2003:4; see also Lichtman 2014).

However, despite these common features, there are many ways of conducting qualitative research (O’Reilly and Kiyimba 2015; Mason 2002). This study takes a critical realist approach to qualitative research as argued by Maxwell (2012). Its departure point is Blumer’s observation that “an empirical science presupposes the existence of an empirical world” (1969:21). Maxwell’s conception of critical realism is consistent with this view in the sense that it provides for the “distinction between ontology and epistemology” (2012:vii). For him, critical realism:

combines a realist ontology (the belief that there is a real world that exists independently of our beliefs and constructions) with a constructivist epistemology (the belief that our *knowledge* of this world is inevitably our own construction, created from a specific vantage point, and that there is no possibility of our achieving a purely ‘objective’ account that is independent of all particular perspectives). (Maxwell 2012:vii)

This view is consistent with symbolic interactionist thinking in the sense that critical realism’s separation of the discursive from that to which it refers, makes the instantiation of the discursive, a form of social action. Furthermore, it brings out the contingency of societal understandings as interpretations of objects and processes that have a material existence outside such interpretations. This perspective makes the study’s approach social constructionist. The study thus views “discourse as (at least partly) constitutive of the social, but that the social is constituted does not mean that it is not real” (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002:178; see also Fowler 1991). From a social constructionist perspective, “groups construct knowledge for each other and thus a culture of shared meaning is created” (O’Reilly and Kiyimba 2015:18). This view is consistent with discussions of social memory, collective identity and nation-building given in Chapter Three. Maxwell also argues that the processes of meaning making are as real as the objects which we make sense of and talk about (2012). This view implies that there is interaction between our ontological and epistemological positions of meaning making, as well as between human beings involved in the processes of meaning making. For him, “the world as we perceive it and therefore live in it [*sic*] is structured by our concepts, which are to a substantial extent expressed in language” (Maxwell 2012:9). As Maxwell argues, “critical realism also supports the idea that individuals’ physical contexts have a causal influence on their beliefs and perspectives” (Maxwell 2012:20). Thus, in the final analysis, Maxwell argues that critical realism’s view of meaning making processes “as part of reality supports an

interpretivist approach to understanding mental and social phenomena without entailing a radical constructivism that denies the existence, or causal relevance for mind, of a physical world” (Maxwell 2012:20). This approach therefore enables a nuanced understanding of “the relationship between actors’ perspectives and their actual situations” (Maxwell 2012:20).

But, qualitative research has been criticised for being “too subjective”, lacking transparency, having problems with generalisation, and for being “difficult to replicate” among other things (Bryman 2012:405-406). These criticisms largely emanate from quantitative researchers who cite the omnipotent role of the qualitative researcher throughout the process of research as the major problem (Bryman 2012). Nevertheless, although the criticisms may have some merit, they do not consider that qualitative research is simply a different way of conducting social research: it is neither inferior nor superior to quantitative research. Therefore, any criticisms directed at qualitative research should be judged against the backdrop of its own procedures and goals.

Research Design and Sampling

This qualitative study uses a multiple, or comparative case study approach which “entails studying two contrasting cases using more or less identical methods” (Bryman 2012:72). The strength of the comparative approach is captured in the “logic of comparison” which “implies that we can understand social phenomena better when they are compared in relation to two or more meaningfully contrasting cases or situations” (Bryman 2012:72). Case study research has been variously described as that: (1) which “investigates a few cases, often just one, in considerable depth” (Hammersley and Gomm 2000:3); (2) which “concentrates on one thing, looking at it in detail,” but (3) “not seeking to generalise from it” (Thomas 2011:3); (4) which provides “detailed and intensive analysis of a single case” (Bryman 2012:66); and as (5) “an in-depth examination of a particular case (e.g., individual, program, project, work unit) or several cases” (Lichtman 2014:118). In sum, the case study can be described as any “bounded system” of interest (Stake 2000:23). Case study researchers aim “to capture cases in their uniqueness” (Hammersley and Gomm 2000:3); to provide “descriptions that are complex, holistic and involving a myriad of not highly isolated variables” (Stake 2000:24); and to understand “*how* and *why* something might have happened or why it might be the case” (Thomas 2011:4; see also Yin 2009).

But it has been criticised for its inability to produce generalizable results, for indeterminate procedures which undermines built-in rigour, and for dependence on researcher interpretations that are liable to bias (Yin 2009). But as Yin points out, these criticisms are not unique to case study research, but are also true of other designs such as the experiment (2009, 2014). Therefore, as is the case with experiments and surveys, when conducted rigorously and systematically using transparent procedures, the case study remains a useful research design for understanding “complex social phenomena” in ways that cannot be achieved using other designs (Yin 2009:4, 2014). Although all the attributes of a case study given above speak to the character of this study in one way or another, the study’s fundamental concerns are to understand the how and why questions attendant to newspaper constructions of collective identity using social memory in the context of nation building processes in Zimbabwe.

The decision to study *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* was informed by the observation that “the unit of analysis in case study research is rarely isolated from and unaffected by factors in the environment in which it is embedded” (Babbie and Mouton 2001:282).⁴² In other words, case study research is not just about unpacking a deeper and focused understanding of a particular phenomenon, but also its “wider resonance” (Mason 2002:8). This means that apart from analysing how *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* work as sites of social memory, it is also possible to analyse the socio-political processes of which they are a part, through their work of memory (see Fairclough and Fairclough 2012).

Because it is generally not feasible to study phenomena in their totality (Maxwell 2012; Robson 2002), most social researchers must select samples through which they can study the dimensions of both expansive and localised phenomena. There are two major types of sampling methods: probability and non-probability (Robson 2002; Ritchie *et al.* 2003; Bryman 2012; Babbie and Mouton 2001). This study uses non-probability sampling methods which are synonymous with qualitative research (Ritchie *et al.* 2003). The selection of sample members in non-probability sampling is largely informed by the study’s data needs and the relevance of the sample elements to the study’s objectives (Bryman 2012; Mason 2002). This study uses purposive sampling to select not only the newspapers under study, but also articles from each of these newspapers. Purposive sampling is concerned with “the selection of units [...] with

⁴² See Chapter Two for a detailed rationale for choosing *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* newspapers as case studies in this research project.

direct reference to the research questions being asked” (Bryman 2012:416). The selection of sample elements relative to the goals of the research ensures “that units of analysis are selected in terms of criteria that will allow the research questions to be answered” (Bryman 2012:418). According to Ritchie *et al.* samples can be purposively selected for two reasons:

the first is to ensure that all the key constituencies of relevance to the subject matter are covered. The second is to ensure that, within each of the key criteria, some diversity is included so that the impact of the characteristic concerned can be explored. (2003:79)

It is within this framework that sampling decisions were made in this study. These decisions were made at two major levels. First, the researcher purposively chose the specific newspapers (*The Standard* and *The Sunday Mail*) to study primarily because they represent two major ideological positions within Zimbabwe’s mainstream media (see Chapter Two for rationale). Second, the researcher purposively selected specific articles for analysis from each of the newspapers. Sampling decisions at each of these two levels were made bearing in mind that “case study investigators who rely on documentation as a source of evidence need to appreciate the differences in perspectives, if not ideologies, represented by the authors of the various types of documents” (Jacobs 2004:156). This allowed the researcher to assess “contrary evidence or views” to test “rival explanations” within their context of analysis (Yin 2011:88). However, it is imperative to emphasise that although textual studies are usually expected to map shifts in discourses over a particular period, this study treated the period between 1999 and 2013 as unique in and of itself (see Raftopoulos 2013; Chapter One). While issues and events may have changed over this period, the core ideologies that informed and were informed by the selected newspapers remained stable. *The Sunday Mail’s* and *The Standard’s* treatment of the different issues and events that emerged during the study period speaks to the core ideologies they represent in Zimbabwe’s polarised socio-political environment. Therefore, the comparative analyses conducted in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine focus on how the two newspapers treated the sub-themes which form the nodal points around which social memory, identity and nation-building tended to emerge, notwithstanding the specific time of publication during the period under study. The discussion below outlines the decision-making that informed the selection of articles for analysis.

Since the study is concerned with human action, the analysis of discourse is directed at showing how the newspapers, through argumentation drawing on social memory, construct the audiences’ sense of reality—especially relating to collective identity. But because of financial

and time constraints it was not possible to study the selected newspapers in their entirety. Therefore, the first major sampling decision was to narrow focus to editorial comment, and opinion articles in each of the two papers. The rationale for this is that editorials indicate the newspaper's position on what it considers an important issue at any given time, and in so doing sometimes direct the general angling of other stories (Keeble 2006; Fink 2004; Fowler 1991; Hodgson 1989). Furthermore, because editorials are written in authoritative and persuasive ways, they actively seek to engage the audience (Hodgson 1989; Fink 2004), thereby, instantiating a form of social action. In addition, editorials are written by people with "a clear head, an informed background and an ability to mould a few words into a piece of incisive, persuasive prose" (Hodgson 1989:71; see also Keeble 2006)—which has the potential to shape both public opinion, and social action. They are socially significant as they are written by people who are aware that they "carry enormous journalistic and social responsibilities" because they comment "on those issues of compelling, not secondary, importance" (Fink 2004:1, 2). As Fink argues, editorials and opinions can potentially change things in the socio-political sphere of society (2004). Thus, opinion articles and editorials are not a matter of personal indulgence, but a serious social responsibility. Some of the basic guidelines for writing opinions and editorials include the realisation that such articles must serve the public and "provide a forum—a marketplace of ideas—for readers, community, nation" (Fink 2004:4). Furthermore, they must act as "society's watchdog", and they are expected to "inform and guide" readers "to cause change" (Fink 2004:4). These observations are true of *The Standard* and *The Sunday Mail*. For instance, *The Standard's* editor Kholwani Nyathi, noted that while their editorial comment "seeks to persuade our readers to see things the way we see them," it also aims "to influence public opinion and promote debate" (Nyathi, personal interview, 2016 August 5). He also added that opinion articles in his paper "offer different perspectives and help promote diversity in our content" so as to "provoke debate and be informative" (Nyathi, personal interview, 2016 August 5). *The Sunday Mail* editor Mabasa Sasa, noted that through the editorial comment, "the idea is to encapsulate or condense broad ideas into a specific issue representing our position on policy direction. It should help the reader understand why we report the way we do on certain issues" (Sasa, personal interview, 2016 July 19). Regarding opinion articles, he noted that *The Sunday Mail's* "Op-Eds should encourage deeper introspection and more refined debate on national questions" (Sasa, personal interview, 2016 July 19). These factors make both editorials and opinion articles active forms of social action with potentially far-reaching consequences. It is thus important to assess the processes through which this kind of action unfolds, as editorials "employ textual strategies which foreground the

speech act of offering values and beliefs” that potentially draw on social memory, and make up the resources for the formulation of collective identities (Fowler 1991:208-209).

The selection of specific articles from each of the two newspapers was guided by the two major considerations in purposive sampling. First, sampling was done to ensure the inclusion of key narratives concerning social memory, collective identity, and nation-building. In other words, the selected editorials and opinion articles focus on issues that, in one way or another, bring up key dimensions of the study’s central concerns. Examples include articles focusing on independence, national heroes, *Gukurahundi*, the land issue, decolonisation *inter-alia*. Second, there was a deliberate attempt to ensure diversity among the selected editorials using such factors as authors, angling, and year of publication. This was meant to enable a fair reflection, not only of the issues around which social memory, collective identity and nation-building were manifest, but also how these were talked about during the 15-year period under study.

The first stage of selection was directed at picking any editorials, and one or two opinion articles per issue that, in a broad sense, spoke to the chosen themes of independence, national heroes, *Gukurahundi*, the land issue, decolonisation, and those that focused on elections in ways that invoked Zimbabwean national identity. **Stage one** of selection was first applied to *The Standard* generating 1016 articles. Consequently, a more focused selection procedure which sought to eliminate articles that did not feature elements of social memory was used on *The Sunday Mail at the outset* to avoid huge amounts of irrelevant data, thereby generating 246 articles. In both cases, those articles that focused on operational issues to do with elections, Independence Day celebrations, heroes day celebrations and opinion articles that dealt with collective identity in cursory terms were eliminated. However, these figures (1016 for *The Standard* and 246 for *The Sunday Mail*) remained too high for a qualitative study that aims at deeper textual analysis (see van Dijk 1983). So, to refine the sample, in **stage two** only those articles that fell in the year preceding an election year, and the election year itself were selected: because issues that significantly inform political decision-making in Zimbabwe tend to crystallise during this period.

At this stage, articles from *The standard* were reduced to 316 (by also eliminating those that did not invoke social memory in a significant way), and those from the *The Sunday Mail* were cut to 187: still too many for qualitative discourse analysis. In **stage three**, the aim was to ensure diversity in the final sample regarding authors, article type (editorials and opinions),

thematic trends, and the spread of discourses across the study period (1999-2013). To do this, the researcher read all 503 articles and selected only those that were explicit about their subject, and whose treatment of the themes mentioned above was perspicacious. Furthermore, those that discussed many themes in one article were selected as a way of cutting down on the numbers without compromising on the range of discourses. This process yielded 20 articles (10 Editorials and 10 Opinions) per newspaper. However, 40 articles are still too many for discourse analysis. Therefore, **in stage four**, the researcher used the same considerations for attaining diversity as in stage three to eliminate articles that exhibited some degree of repetition, and those that could be substituted by more explicit and extensively argued articles. As a result, articles by loyal and consistent authors such as *Tafataona Mahoso* of *The Sunday Mail*, Alex Magaisa of *The Standard* and editorials dominate the sample because of the authors' privileged access to the respective newspapers and their depth of argumentation (see Ranger 2004; Tendi 2010). It should be kept in mind that not all opinion articles included in the sample were written by these two authors. *The Sunday Mail's* sample consists of 10 articles which include 4 opinion pieces, 3 of which were authored by Tafataona Mahoso and 1 by Alexander Kanengoni. The other 6 are editorials which could have been written by the editor or anyone assigned by the editor. As argued earlier, Tafataona Mahoso's articles dominate the paper's selected opinion articles not only because he elaborately presents his arguments, but also because his articles were a consistent feature in *The Sunday Mail* throughout the period under study. This suggests preferential treatment by *The Sunday Mail*, evidently, because of his consonance with, and eloquent expression of the paper's ideological stance. Regarding *The Standard*, 4 opinion articles are divided between three authors, Chenjerai Hove, Brilliant Mhlanga and Alex T. Magaisa which creates a fairly diverse mix. Two of Magaisa's articles were selected because of their relevance in the respective themes that they are used in analysis. The other 6 are editorials which could have been written by the editor or anyone assigned by him/her. The final sample thus consists of 10 articles—6 editorials and 4 opinions—per newspaper (see Appendices A and B). This selection process aims at putting together articles that engage with those themes around which social memory, national identity and nation-building are invoked and evoked by the two newspapers (see Chapter Two and Four). This is critical to the assessment of the newspapers' construction of national belonging, and subsequently their political uses of social memory in Zimbabwe. Such analytical work explicates the nature of social action performed by both *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard*. The attention paid to the articles' relevance regarding the study's key objectives is consistent with the objectives of purposive sampling in qualitative research (Ritchie *et al.* 2003).

Quality

The question of quality in qualitative research is occasioned by two main factors: a general scepticism over the methodological rigour of qualitative research, and the lack of a “clearly defined set of quality criteria available for judging it” (Hammersley 2007:287). However, Hammersley argues that judgement of quality in research cannot be easily achieved through “the application of explicit, concrete and exhaustive indicators” (2007:289). He argues instead that such criteria emerge out of, and are shaped by, the research process itself (Hammersley 2008, 2007). For him, this approach is central to qualitative research which is composed of a plurality of approaches whose procedures, purposes, outcomes, and paradigmatic outlooks vary so widely (Hammersley 2007, 2008). As already established above, this study approaches its problem from the critical realist perspective outlined by Maxwell (2012). Therefore, its frames of reference for quality are informed by the ontological and epistemological imperatives within critical realism as discussed above. Furthermore, it accepts that scientific knowledge is contingent, not only because of methodological choices that guide what subject/object is investigated, how it is investigated, and why it is investigated, but also because social constructionist research is critical, and therefore, politically informed by the socio-economic and political context within which it is conducted (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002; Maxwell 2012). However, what separates scientific knowledge from other forms of knowledge is that the process and procedures used to generate evidence that forms the basis for conclusions and inferences made about a particular phenomenon, is systematic. The quality of a study can be assessed through an exposition of the study’s research’s process, and the thinking that informed decision making at each level of this process (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002; Lewis and Ritchie 2003; Yin 2011). This ensures the transparency of the process by which the researcher arrived at the outcomes of the research (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002; Lewis and Ritchie 2003; Yin 2011). This allows others to test the process itself, and the inferences drawn from evidence generated out of this process (Yin 2011). Another factor that informs quality considerations in this study is the ineluctable tendency to effect some degree of generalisation in qualitative studies (Maxwell 2012; Lewis and Ritchie 2003; Mason 2002). As such, there is a need to assess how the evidence used as a basis for generalisation was gathered and selected, and whether the inferences drawn are supported by evidence (Maxwell 2012). Also, related to the latter point, is the need to establish whether such evidence is enough to support such inferences (Yin 2011). From a critical realist position therefore, validity is the central consideration in ensuring the quality of one’s study as it is concerned with the empirical basis of inferences.

A realist approach to validity centres on two major factors: the methodological rigour of a study and the conclusions, understandings, and inferences enabled by data or evidence generated by the methodological procedures whose rigour is in question (Maxwell 2012). On Maxwell's view, focus should not be primarily on the procedures, as qualitative research is not "procedure bound", but "on what the data generated by these procedures allow the researcher to conclude" (Maxwell 2012:132). Furthermore, as Maxwell argues, since researchers are not disconnected from the situations they study, the products of their studies are fallible and therefore should be assessed against the phenomena to which they refer (2012; see also Phillips and Jorgensen 2002). Maxwell identifies three types of validity within a realist approach to qualitative research: descriptive, interpretive and theoretical validity. In a nutshell, validity within a realist approach to qualitative research encompasses the accurate description of phenomena under study, the recognition of emic perspectives in the inferences drawn (Maxwell 2012:127-138), and peer approval of theoretical constructions used in, or derived from, the study by the researcher (Maxwell 2012:139-148). Since this study deals with documents that are presented from the perspective of the newspapers, the first two aspects of validity are within reach. However, theoretical and conceptual weight is brought to bear on these documents at an analytical level and the inferences drawn here are subject to peer review.

To improve the validity of the findings, the research process is guided by principles that improve the generalisability, however limited, of the study's outcomes (see Lewis and Ritchie 2003). These principles are integrated throughout the research process. Thus, an attempt is made to get and use original data, to encompass a diversity of perspectives in sample selection as shown above, and to achieve "full and appropriate use of the evidential base" to arrive at conclusions (Lewis and Ritchie 2003:277). In addition, the outline of the study and the actual analysis, implicitly and explicitly, show the "analytic routes" used, and the "interpretation" effected (Lewis and Ritchie 2003:278). Furthermore, the research design used and its limitations are outlined in this chapter. What informs these processes is the desire to improve the generalisability of the findings not only to the cases under study—which could not be studied in their totality—but also at a theoretical level.

Analytic Method

As already shown in the previous chapters, this study takes the view that the social plays out in a context of competing and contingent interests owing to the pluralistic and competitive

character of modern societies. It also proceeds on the view that conflict is a central characteristic of modern societies, and that social reality shapes, and is in turn shaped by, the nature of various discourse genres, but not least those of a journalistic kind (see Richardson 2007; Phillips and Jorgensen 2002; Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Following insights from symbolic interactionism, political discourse, argumentation, and Aristotelian rhetoric-analytic approaches, the study treats media texts as forms of social action (Blumer 1969; Fairclough 1995, 2003; Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; Phillips and Jorgensen 2002; Wetherell 2001; Richardson 2007; van Eemeren *et al.* 1996; van Dijk 1997b; Aristotle 2012). In other words, the study treats media texts as generative or productive forms of argumentation—that is to say, they are aimed at, and can result in material outcomes in the social sphere (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; Richardson 2007). Media texts are seen here, as active propositions in favour of, or against certain standpoints in public life (van Eemeren *et al.* 1996; Richardson 2007). These propositions can potentially shape the direction of human action and the nature of social reality (see Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; Fowler 1991). But the study also recognises that not all discourses and argumentative moves are benevolent as some may, *inter alia*, be informed by exclusivist ethnocentrism, while others may wittingly or unwittingly establish and sustain asymmetrical relations of power in society (see Thompson 1991). In such cases, these discourses and argumentative moves, overtly or covertly contribute to maintaining unjust circumstances for some social groups (however tenuous the effect) along the justice dimensions outlined by Fraser (2001, 2008) and shown in the previous chapter.

Following from this, the study's analytical approach is premised on the function of critical social science that textual "evaluation is linked to a concern to understand possibilities for, as well as obstacles to, changing societies to make them better" (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:79; see also Phillips and Jorgensen 2002). It takes it that "ideas need to be socially explained and social life needs to be explained in part ideationally, in terms of the effects of ideas" (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:79). Therefore, the study uses Fairclough and Fairclough's (2012) formulation of political discourse analysis to unpack the propositions of the discourses in *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* in terms of the construction of collective identity using social memory in the context of Zimbabwean nation-building between 1999 and 2013. This study approaches its objects and subject of study from a social constructionist position as argued by Phillips and Jorgensen (2002:190). The discussion below outlines the political discourse analytic approach that sees media texts as primarily argumentative. However, since the objects of analysis are the explicitly *positioned* editorials and opinion

articles, the argumentative approach used for analysis also includes Aristotle's approach to rhetoric. These issues are discussed at length below.

Media Texts qua Political Discourse

Since the study uses political discourse analysis for its analytic work, it is useful to clarify what is meant by the political, discourse, and political discourse. First, this study understands 'the political' in Mouffe's terms, as the "dimension of antagonism that is inherent in all human society, antagonism that can take many different forms and can emerge in diverse social relations" (Mouffe 1999:754). For Mouffe, politics—by which she means a "set of practices and institutions whose aim is to create an order, to organise human coexistence in conditions which are always conflictual because they are traversed by 'the political'" (Mouffe 2009:7)—should take the political as its starting point. What is fundamental to my argument is that media texts are not only discursive manifestations of the political, but also political actors. These connections become clear at the end of this discussion. Second, discourse is broadly understood in Fairclough and Fairclough's (2012) sense:

- (a) signification as an element of the social process; (b) the language associated with a particular social field or practice (e.g. 'political process'); (c) a way of construing aspects of the world associated with a particular social perspective (e.g. a 'neo-liberal discourse of globalisation). (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:81)

Third, political discourse is "partly topically about politics itself" although it "usually combines its topics with those from other societal domains" (van Dijk 1997b:25). Van Dijk also argues that political discourse "is identified by its *actors* or *authors*, viz., *politicians*" (1997b:12). It is this latter observation that necessitates further discussion as it seems to discount mediated discourses *qua* political discourse. van Dijk's definition, with which Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) agree, narrows political discourse to that which emanates from politicians. But an argumentative approach to mediated discourses suggests that by arguing for certain socio-political and economic views, policies, and systems among other things, mediated texts become political actors of sorts (see Richardson 2007).

Furthermore, if we concede that political actions and practices are partly discursive and that political discourse can be viewed "as a special case of political action, and as functional or strategic part of the political process" (van Dijk 1997b:18), then mediated texts qualify as political discourse to the extent that they shape political processes. Contrary to his assertion above, van Dijk implicitly qualifies mediated texts as political discourse when he avers that

people, and media institutions, “are participants of political discourse only when acting *as political actors*, and hence as participating in political actions” (1997b:14). He makes this point explicitly when he argues that “written texts, or rather writing texts, are a form of social and political action” (van Dijk 1997b:20). Thus, “as soon as a discourse or part of a discourse is directly or indirectly functional in the political process [...] such discourse should be categorised and analysed as being (also, mainly) political” (van Dijk 1997b:22). It is in this sense that media content can be taken as political discourse and therefore assessed as a component of the political process.

This qualification is fundamental to this research since it focuses on assessing the kinds of argumentation advanced by the two newspapers. An analysis of such argumentation shows the kind of society and mode(s) of belonging being argued for or against by *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* in view of the discussion presented in Chapter Three. Such observations provide analytic resources for a normative critique of such political discourses informed by the theories outlined in Chapter Five. Ultimately, findings from this analytic work enable an assessment of the memory work performed by these two newspapers. From the discussion above, it is clear that not only are newspapers participants in the political process, but the nature of their participation is traversed by the political. This implies that the most insightful analytic method for studying newspaper content is that which sees them as political actors.

Fairclough and Fairclough’s Political Discourse Analysis Approach

The study draws on Fairclough and Fairclough’s (2012) approach to political discourse analysis for its analytic work. They argue that political discourse is “primarily a form of argumentation” that involves “more specifically, *practical* argumentation” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:1). They define practical argumentation as “argumentation for or against particular ways of acting”, and “argumentation that can ground decision” making (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:1). Since this study considers newspaper discourses as forms of practical argumentation, it is necessary to explore the dimensions of this form. Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) divide practical argumentation into two forms: first, practical argumentation is derived “from circumstances and goals, which cannot justify a claim except tentatively, presumptively” because such an argument “is always open to defeat if new relevant considerations come to light” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:49). Second, practical argumentation is “an argument from consequences, which takes the probable consequences of the action as a premise”

(Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:49-50). Those involved in this form of argument argue for a certain means to reach their goals often expressed in terms of a “desirable or normatively appropriate future” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:50). Participants in this form of argumentation may also have to consider the unintended consequences of their intended action to the achievement of their goals. They can do this by, as much as possible, exhaustively considering “all the probable consequences of action that would count as reasons against it” and only adopt the action if it survives criticism (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:50). The import of treating practical argumentation as central to analysing political discourse is that:

politics is most fundamentally about making choices about how to act in response to circumstances and goals, it is about choosing *policies*, and such choices and the actions which follow from them are based upon practical argumentation... (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:1)

Furthermore, Fairclough and Fairclough argue that political discourse analysis should focus on how representations “provide agents with reasons for action” (2012:1). The purchase of this view of political discourse analysis is that “understanding the argumentative nature of political texts is therefore key to being able to evaluate the political strategies they are a part of” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:18). It is on this basis that they argue analysis of “political discourse should centre upon analysis of practical argumentation” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:1). An explication of the notion of argumentation follows as it is a defining concept of this study’s approach to analysing political discourse.

Argumentation

Argumentation has been variously defined as the “process of giving and receiving reasons” or “a set of statements (explicit or implicit), one of which is the conclusion (claim) while the others are the premises” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:4, 36). Premises are the reasons behind, or justification for, a conclusion, and the conclusion follows from the premises (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Argumentation can also be seen as “a *complex speech act*” which involves the justification or refuting of claims and the persuasion of a “*reasonable critic*” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:36). For van Eemeren *et al.*, argumentation is when one “uses certain words and sentences to state, question, or deny something, to respond to statements, questions or denials, and so on” (1996:2). They also note that argumentation is “a *social activity*” as it is “directed at other people”, and that it is “an activity of *reason*” as it “indicates that the arguer has given some thought to the subject” (van Eemeren *et al.* 1996:2). They also note that “argumentation starts from the presumption, rightly or wrongly, that the standpoint

of the arguer is not immediately accepted, but is *controversial*' (van Eemeren *et al.* 1996:2; see also van Eemeren 2013), thereby necessitating the need "to *justify* one's standpoint, or to *refute* someone else's" (van Eemeren *et al.* 1996:3). It is also the case that argumentation does not always play out in situations of co-presence between the arguers. In some cases, as in newspapers, "pro-arguments often presuppose certain contra-arguments, and vice versa" (van Eemeren *et al.* 1996:4). This suggests that most texts are always in conversation or arguing with other texts, views, or goals. After condensing these dimensions of argumentation, van Eemeren *et al.* come to a comprehensive definition of argumentation as:

*a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting forward a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before a rational judge*⁴³. (1996:5)

These definitions suggest that argumentation is action oriented. It is not simply a matter of representations and discourses, but intentional deliberative work directed at practical outcomes necessitated by real life problems (Richardson 2007; Fairclough and Fairclough 2012: 11; van Eemeren 2013). This functional orientation in argumentation makes political discourse analysis useful to this study. Since these problems, goals and circumstances are traversed by the political in conditions of pluralistic and competing interests, such argumentation is inevitably dialogic, and therefore deliberative (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012).

But Fairclough and Fairclough also point out, "all arguments have logical, rhetorical and dialectical aspects", and can be analysed from any of these perspectives (2012:52). They also note that a good argument is one which is well-expressed in terms of all three aspects: the logical, dialectical and rhetorical (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). The **logical perspective** to argumentation is primarily characterised by rational persuasiveness: "premises must be rationally acceptable, relevant to the claim, and together must provide sufficient support (or adequate grounds) for the claim" (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:52). For rational persuasiveness to be achieved, the argument's premise must be supported by reasons that are evidentiary, and "supported by reliable testimony or authority or by cogent argumentation" (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:52). For Fairclough and Fairclough, rational persuasiveness "takes into account the fallibility of human knowledge claims, and replaces 'soundness' as a cogency criterion" because in some cases premises may be false or unreasonable, since truthfulness of premises is not always easy to ascertain (2012:52). They note that *ad hominem*

⁴³ Italics taken from original source.

attacks and emotional appeals are potentially fallacious and therefore lacking rational persuasiveness (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). They also note that such arguments are often used to persuade people although they may lack “premise acceptability, relevance and sufficiency” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:52). However, a further complication arises when:

a weakly supported claim, one for which there is little and or no evidence, or one which is supported by an invalid or in other way fallacious argument, may very well be a true claim. In other words, to say that an argument is not good is not the same as showing that the conclusion is false. The conclusion may well be true, but it may be inadequately supported by the argument in question. (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:53)

Such a conclusion can be successfully challenged using a rationally persuasive counter-argument (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012).

The second perspective of argumentation is the dialectical. From the **dialectical perspective** argumentation is viewed as immanently dialogic (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 2004). In other words, every instance of argumentation is a discussion between two or more people in which the arguer responds to a difference of opinion, and speaks to anticipated sources of doubt or criticism (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Such argumentation is also seen as a form of social action that is both purposeful and goal oriented (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Its major goal is to resolve “*a difference of opinion in a reasonable way or ‘on the merits’*” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:53; see also van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 2004; van Eemeren 2010). The underlying assumption is that the participants want to resolve their differences through rational deliberation (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Thus, because of its dialogic nature, successful and legitimate dialectical argumentation requires a normative framework of rules governing such argumentation (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 2004). An example of this is Habermas’s discourse ethics as discussed in the previous chapter. However, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, 2004) also provide a framework for ensuring reasonable argumentation through their pragma-dialectical approach. The normative rules for governing rational argumentation can be set at the levels of practice, in the form of acceptable procedures; institutions, in the form of rules and regulations; and at the broader social level in the form of regulations, laws and constitutions (see Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Ideally, these rules should generally enable deliberation. Therefore, from a dialectical perspective, “unreasonable or fallacious argumentative moves are those which violate these rules and thus obstruct the

goal of the procedure” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:53). Thus, the more democratic the deliberative or argumentative conditions, the more reasonable the argumentative moves.

The third aspect of argumentation is **rhetoric**. The study of rhetoric is concerned with the art of persuasion and the effectiveness of such persuasion (van Eemeren 2013). Rhetoric is viewed in both negative and positive ways. On the negative view, traced back to Plato, rhetoric is seen as treating both the negative and positive sides of an issue or claim equally even where the former is clearly objectionable (van Eemeren 2013; Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Plato’s impression of rhetoric was proffered in contrast to dialectics which he saw as “cooperative search for truth, by means of dialogue, or questions and answers” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:56). Some also use the word rhetoric to refer to “words without substance, spin, language intended to deceive and manipulate” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:56). The negative view is also manifest in those instances where rhetoric is seen in positive terms since the concern is sometimes argued to be only with the persuasive-effectiveness of an argument, its normative standing, notwithstanding (see Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Thus, on this view, the danger with focusing on the persuasive-effectiveness of rhetoric is that the rhetor can use:

his skills to persuade people of the acceptability of a standpoint that is unacceptable, either because it is false (in epistemic argumentation), or because it is wrong (in practical argumentation). These are situations where a reasonable resolution (on the merits of the case) is in principle possible and rhetorical argumentation may be precisely designed to obstruct that resolution. (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:58)

However, this view of rhetoric is turned on its head by the Aristotelian formulation which sees rhetoric as a counterpart of dialectical forms of argumentation (see Aristotle 1926:xxxix). In this regard, van Eemeren, argues that the import of rhetoric should not necessarily be judged only by its effectiveness to persuade, but also by the normative substance of the persuasive act (2010; see also van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002b). It is on this basis that Fairclough and Fairclough argue for the valorisation of rhetoric within the deliberative framework (2012). For them, in addition to being effective, a rhetorical argument should also be logically and dialectically valid so that it is less prone to being fallacious (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; see also van Eemeren 2010; van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002b). On this view, then, it can be argued that rhetoric should be deployed “within a context of choice and action, where several reasonable alternatives are possible” as this locates it within a deliberative matrix (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:59; see also van Eemeren 2013). If this is achieved, the rhetorical perspective therefore, becomes:

relevant to our concerns with political arguments, which are inherently fallible and put forward in a context of incomplete knowledge, uncertainty and risk, where a multiplicity of contingent factors can causally affect the most carefully planned strategies of action, and are also underlain by persistent and irresolvable conflicts of value and interest. (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:59)

Another way of incorporating rhetoric into rational argumentation is to see it as a tool for arguing in favour of normative positions against other propositions. After all, as Rescher argues, “reasoned argumentation is ultimately dependent on rhetoric” (1998:316). He also points out that “the key work of rhetoric in rational dialectic is accordingly to elicit from our interlocutors a variety of concessions on whose basis the work of actual inference can come into operation” (Rescher 1998:317). It is the view of this study that Aristotle’s formulation of rhetoric incorporates the positive dimensions of rhetoric discussed above. This study also uses the Aristotelian approach to rhetoric for analysis and its dialectical or deliberative dimensions are shown in the discussion below.

Aristotle’s Approach to Rhetoric

Aristotle defines rhetoric as “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion” (2012:8). The main aim in rhetorical action is to win arguments through the skilful use of language and structuring of the argument. In other words, rhetorical argumentation is the art of persuasion, through which persuasion can be achieved despite the correctness of the premises of such arguments (see Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). For example, as Aristotle notes, “the arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case” (Aristotle 2012:3-4). This study draws on Aristotle’s approach to rhetoric because he also argues that “the argumentative means of persuasion are the core and the non-argumentative means of persuasion are secondary” (van Eemeren 2013:57 citing Aristotle 1354a:10-20). This study analyses newspaper articles using Aristotle’s approach to rhetoric to discover the ways in which persuasion is actualised in these articles, as seen through the normative framework set out in Chapter Five. The discussion below outlines Aristotle’s approach to, and shows the dialectical potential in, rhetoric.

Aristotle’s Typology of Rhetoric

Aristotle categorises rhetoric into three types: forensic or legal rhetoric, epideictic or ceremonial rhetoric, and deliberative or political rhetoric (2012, 1926; Richardson 2007). In this scheme, forensic or legal rhetoric is a form of argumentative discourse “which condemns

or defends someone's past actions" (Richardson 2007:157). It is primarily concerned with the justice status of these actions (Aristotle 2012, 1926). Unjust actions are subject to condemnation while just actions are defended (Richardson 2007). The rhetorical process proceeds through either accusation or defence depending on the justice status of the subject (Richardson 2007). The second category of rhetoric in Aristotle's scheme is epideictic or ceremonial rhetoric. This type is concerned with proving that something or someone is "worthy of admiration or disapproval" based on their nobility or ignobility (Richardson 2007:157). It is concerned "with the *present*" and "its means are praise and censure" of the subject, while "its special topics are honour and dishonour" (Richardson 2007:157). The third category of argumentative rhetoric is deliberative or political rhetoric. This type is often used "when deliberating on the desirability or otherwise of a decision", particularly that of a political kind (Richardson 2007:157). It is concerned with the future, that is, with what is advantageous or disadvantageous about a future action(s) (Richardson 2007; Aristotle 2012). If the political rhetor:

urges its acceptance, he does so on the ground that it will do good; if he urges its rejection, he does so on the ground that it will do harm; and all other points, such as whether the proposal is just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, he brings in as subsidiary and relative to this main consideration. (Aristotle 2012:17)

It therefore seeks either to induce or dissuade people from doing something based on its normative-strategic standing. Deliberative rhetoric fits well within Fairclough and Fairclough's approach to political discourse analysis discussed above. Central to rhetorical argumentation are the mechanics of persuasion as discussed below.

Modes of Persuasion

Aristotle emphasises that the study of rhetoric should primarily concern itself with the modes of persuasion used by rhetoricians: "rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion" (2012:5-6). This could be because he sees rhetoric as "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion" (Aristotle 2012:8). He identifies three modes of persuasion: "the first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself" (Aristotle 2012:9). An alternative way of understanding the strategic deployment of modes of persuasion is to view them through what Richardson calls "a rhetorical triangle" (2007:151). His conception of the rhetorical triangle is based on the realisation that successful rhetorical argumentation is anchored on one, or a

combination of the following: the “*arguer, audience and argument*” (Richardson 2007:151). In other words, “an arguer can attempt to persuade an audience by leaning more heavily on any of the points of the triangle: the argument, the audience or the arguer herself” (Richardson 2007:159).

The first mode of persuasion is that which uses an *ethotic* argument, and is arguer centred in the rhetorical triangle (see Richardson 2007). In this type of argument, “an audience can be persuaded through the character of the arguer, or what is called *ethos*” (Richardson 2007:159). Aristotle argues that “persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible” (2012:9). Such credibility can be based on the arguer’s experience, knowledge or expertise and having a good character (Richardson 2007:160). But for this type of argument to be successful, the audience must believe the arguer to be whom s/he claims or presents herself or himself to be (Richardson 2007). However, Aristotle cautions that “this kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak” (2012:9). It can thus be argued that the more knowledgeable the *ethotic* arguer is about a certain topic, and the more insightful their experience is likely to be, in comparison with others, the more persuasive their argument is likely to be.

The second mode of persuasion—the *pathotic* argument—appeals to the emotions of the audience (Aristotle 2012, 1926), and is audience centred in the rhetorical triangle (see Richardson 2007). As Richardson notes, a *pathotic* argument can be used to “move the audience from one emotional state to another” (Richardson 2007:160). He argues that by drawing on *pathos*, arguers can both “move an audience to anger (or pity, fear, etc.)”, and to “calm an audience down” (Richardson 2007:160). In each case, the intention of the arguer is “to put the audience in a frame of mind that makes them more receptive to what the arguer wants them to believe” (Richardson 2007:160).

The third mode of persuasion is centred on the logic and structure of the argument itself and is argument-centred in the rhetorical triangle. It is referred to as a *logetic* argument. In this mode, arguments are supported by evidence and reason and their strength in these terms determines their persuasive capacity (see Richardson 2007). Thus, the stronger the evidentiary support or the cogency of a *logetic* argument, the more persuasive it is. *Logetic* arguments can be either deductive or inductive (Richardson 2007:162). It is this third mode of persuasion that can

potentially rescue rhetorical argumentation from its major weakness—that “logically flawed arguments can be rhetorically effective” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012:57). The implication is that *logetic* arguments within a rhetorical framework of argumentation can be seen in the same light as logical and dialectical arguments as discussed above, which makes rhetoric not only a persuasive, but also a dialogic form of argumentation.

This study uses a rhetorical approach because its sample consists of editorial and opinion articles that argue in favour of a specific position(s) (see Fowler 1991). Although some may argue that the success of a rhetorical argument is measured in terms of its material effect on the audience, this study approaches these texts from a political discourse analysis perspective, that is, as forms of action. By focusing on the arguments in these articles, it is possible to assess the frames of collective or national identity advanced by the two newspapers, and the nature of memory work performed through such argumentation. The actual analysis of the texts focuses on how language is used to argue for or against certain forms of action (see Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; Fairclough 2003; Richardson 2007). Such analysis should show the kind(s) of society the two newspapers are pushing for, their concomitant modes of belonging, and the implications of this framing in the context outlined in chapters One, Two and Four. To offset the poverty of normativity in rhetoric, this study uses the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Five as the normative framework within which to assess the rhetorical argumentation performed by *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard*.

Conclusion

This chapter establishes the study’s methodological position, and the concomitant research procedures and processes followed. It focuses on symbolic interactionism which sees human beings as engaged in action that is relational and responsive, as well as productive, and goal oriented. Furthermore, it sees human societies as consisting of conceptual and physical referents, to and from which discursive activities are oriented. It is these factors which make the task of this study fundamental to understanding the politics at play in newspaper articles because they suggest that discursive meaning-making is not only a function of human action, but is also contingent, purposeful, and potentially generative of subsequent actions in the social sphere. The methodological approach outlined here therefore not only approaches newspaper articles as sources of social meanings, but also as forms of action which may inform subsequent, or second tier actions. The selected newspaper articles are analysed against the

standpoint that they can potentially shape both social meaning making, and human action. The idea is to locate the nature of the discourses purveyed in the articles, their implications, and the actions performed by such discourses as sites of social memory. The next chapter provides a discursive analysis of the selected articles.

Chapter Seven

A Political Discourse Analysis of *The Sunday Mail's* and *The Standard's* Opinions and Editorials

Discourse always has in mind an implied addressee, an imagined subject position which it requires the addressee to occupy. Newspapers are concerned – and deliberately, despite the unnoticeability of the discursive process – to construct ideal readers. (Fowler 1991:232)

Introduction

Using Zimbabwe's *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard*, this research shows how newspapers use social memory to participate in the construction of collective identities in multi-ethnic and multi-racial societies, and the implications of such constructions for nation-building. It also explores how these newspapers work as memory sites through their construction of collective identities and participation in nation-building processes. The articles selected from *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* are examined in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine.

Chapters Seven and Eight use a political discourse analysis approach to analyse these articles. First, they probe the kinds of arguments that emerge especially as they pertain to forms of belonging being proposed or reinforced, and those being marginalised. They also show how the arguments are made using Aristotle's conception of modes of persuasion. Second, they show the forms of social memory at play in the emergent arguments and how these forms are used in these arguments. These chapters thus provide a comparative analysis of the two newspapers' treatment of thematic nodal points around which issues to do with collective identity, social memory, and nation emerge as discussed in Chapters One, Two, and Four. These nodal points include themes such as the land reform process, the narrative of (de)colonisation, *Gukurahundi*, the narrative of unity, the discourses around such events as elections, and the commemoration of independence as well as national heroes. As some of these themes are interrelated regarding both their topics, and the way they are discussed in the original articles, they are grouped according to these tendencies. Each section of the comparative analysis is followed by a discussion that is informed by the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter Three. Concluding remarks regarding these issues are presented in Chapter

8. A normative analysis which draws on the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Five is provided in Chapter Nine.

The chapter is structured as follows: it discusses two themes: first, Independence and Decolonisation; and second, Land and Elections. In each of these themes I analyse selected articles from the government controlled *The Sunday Mail*, and the privately owned *The Standard* using a political discourse approach. I conclude each themed section with a discussion of their treatment of Social Memory and National Identity⁴⁴.

A Political Discourse Analysis of Articles

Theme 1: Independence and Decolonisation

The Sunday Mail (Government Controlled)

Robertson's Remarks Sickening

This is an opinion article written by a published writer and war veteran Alexander Kanengoni, for *The Sunday Mail* (13 January 2002). Kanengoni's article is a response to a *The Daily News* article (December 27 2001) written by a 'white' economist, John Robertson, who justified colonialism based on what he saw as its modernising benefits. Kanengoni's article provides a counter-argument to the latter by emphasising the malignant aspects of colonialism. The article uses forensic rhetoric as it is concerned with the justice status of past actions (Richardson 2007). In this instance, colonialism (and neo-colonialism) is condemned as a quintessential case of injustice. As the article is written by a war veteran and a known writer, it can be argued that the mode of persuasion used is *ethotic* (Richardson 2007): his argument is strengthened by his status as a victim of colonialism, a war veteran who fought against settler occupation in Zimbabwe, and his intellectual standing in society.

The article is dialogical at four major levels. First, it directly addresses Robertson, and second, by extension, white people seen largely as responsible for the colonial experience dealt 'Africans' by 'Europe'. Third, the article is directed at the 'black African' population on whose behalf the writer seems to be speaking; and lastly, it is directed at those 'black Africans' the author views as complicit with the project of colonialism and subsequently, neo-colonialism. The premise of his argument is two pronged. At one level, he argues that colonialism

⁴⁴ See Appendix C.

interrupted Africa from its own trajectory of development, however slow it may have been compared to Europe. At another level, he argues that colonial policies, particularly in the field of agriculture, were deliberately designed to restrict meaningful participation of Africans or black people in agricultural activities, especially commercial agriculture. At this point his argument assumes a *logetic* approach as he identifies the reasons that kept African participation in agricultural activities at a subsistence level. For instance, he cites the selective pricing of agricultural commodities by the Grain Marketing Board, a parastatal that buys farm produce for national consumption. He also cites the relocation of Africans to semi-arid areas by white settlers who reserved for themselves prime farming land as another method for ensuring the marginalisation of African farming activities. In his argument, Kanengoni makes direct reference to both identity and social memory. He explicitly identifies himself with ‘black people’ and ‘Africans’, whom he argues are victims of colonialism, and Robertson with ‘white people’ and ‘Europeans’, whom he argues are the colonial oppressors and exploiters. He writes of his “entire African personality”, speaks of Africans as “my people”, who have a history of their own “before the advent of the white man”, and when referring to this history notes: “we were a proud people with a vibrant culture, a system of values, a clear and established way of doing things, a complete civilisation” (Kanengoni 2002:10). When addressing Robertson, Kanengoni explicitly categorises him and white people in general as his “constitutive outside”, the “other” (see Hall 2000:17). For example, he speaks of “your people” who “came without our invitation and forced us into a future of your design and in the process stripped and dispossessed us of all that we were and owned: land, cattle, values and identity” (Kanengoni 2002:10). He also refers to the settler colonial government as “your fellow whites”, and frames Robertson as the embodiment of the colonial settler regime when he says “you were afraid of competition, so you thought the best way was to shut the black man out” (Kanengoni 2002:10). Associated with this identity “are those blacks who believe what Mr Robertson is saying. Those blacks who believe that they are inferior to the whites. Those blacks who believe that prior to the coming of Cecil Rhodes, they were nothing” (Kanengoni 2002:10). He warns blacks who belong to this category that “Mr Robertson does not want anything less than Rhodesia⁴⁵ on a silver plate with the head of Mr Mugabe as the bounty” (Kanengoni 2002:10). Given his conflation of Robertson with white people in general and the Rhodesian colonial settler regime, it can be argued the warning is not about Robertson’s personal intentions, but the intentions of these social groups which he is seen as embodying. Thus, Kanengoni evokes the memory of

⁴⁵ Zimbabwe’s colonial name.

colonial experience juxtaposed with the precolonial and postcolonial realities in ways that create distinct associations between these periods and their coeval configurations of racial identities. The identities invoked simplify the historical experience of Zimbabwe to an encounter between ‘white’ and ‘black’ people in fundamentally antagonistic ways. The implications of this framing are discussed below, after the analysis of the articles in this section.

Importance of Collective Memory

The article is an opinion piece written by Tafataona Mahoso for *The Sunday Mail* (23 September 2007). Tafataona Mahoso is a scholar employed by a government department that regulates the registration and practice of the media in Zimbabwe⁴⁶. It was written following an unusual occasion of unanimity in a parliamentary vote for a Constitutional Amendment that, among other things, reduced the term of the presidency by a year to, five years; harmonised presidential, parliamentary and local government elections; and eliminated a provision that allowed the president to appoint 20 Members of Parliament (Chikuhwa 2013). However, the main opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), was criticised by civic groups such as the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) for lending their support to this amendment that they saw as carrying partial and minor reforms (Chikuhwa 2013). The form of rhetoric used by the author combines epideictic and deliberative approaches (Aristotle 2012; Richardson 2007). It is epideictic as the argument praises the approval of the amendment by antagonistic political parties within the Zimbabwean parliament. It is deliberative as the author also uses this occasion to persuade Zimbabweans to use their social memory as the basis for making decisions about the future. The modes of persuasion used are *ethotic* and *logetic* (Aristotle 2012; Richardson 2007). It is *ethotic* as Mahoso is a public intellectual whose voice is likely to be seen as credible as he is a public scholar (see Ranger 2004). Furthermore, he is an elderly man and is therefore expected to have had first-hand experience of colonialism, making his voice on such experiences authoritative; at the same time, his age implies his awareness of the ‘timeless’ value systems that undergird indigenous traditions which partly inform a sense of belonging in Zimbabwe. It is *logetic* as Mahoso builds arguments and supports them with logical reasoning and evidence. Thus, his standing in society as an elderly man, a scholar, a public official, and his experiences of colonialism strengthen the force of his argumentation.

⁴⁶ Initially the Media and Information Commission (MIC), later renamed the Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC).

The article's central argument is that collective memory is a key facet in planning the future course of post-colonial societies, including Zimbabwe, and is therefore a target of imperial forces. For Mahoso, the "scrambling" of collective memory is at the centre of any imperialist project (2007:8). He uses the institution of the Rhodesian colonial administration in 1890, and the adoption of neo-liberal economic programmes such as ESAP in 1990, as examples of this. Mahoso argues that such "scrambling" creates a "culture of lies" which replaces original "African memory" with, *inter-alia*, "memories of apartheid, tribalism and sectarianism" (2007:8). For him, the value of collective memory lies in its capacity to foster "national cohesion and self-determination" (Mahoso 2007:8). He defines it as that which "connects a people together", so that they can "understand" each other, "work" together, "live" together and "defend one another against recognisable threats if necessary", as well as "the capacity to create and keep a dynamic and comprehensible relationship between past, present and future" (Mahoso 2007:8). The sources of such collective memory are the physical body, social institutions that "foster solidarity" and "the land, the ground, the space within which autonomy, expression, work and identity are made possible" (Mahoso 2007:8). He argues that its importance to a society's contemporary and future goals is that it enables any people to "define and recognise their national interest, to defend their national sovereignty and to anticipate any threat to the same" (Mahoso 2007:8). Thus, his conception of collective memory venerates anti-colonial struggle, provides a foundation for future social action, provides a basis for the censure of imperialist ideological tactics of domination, and sustains an 'original' sense of African-ness. While its revolutionary and democratising potential is evident in the argument, it is arguably also inward looking. It envelops a people in a static conception of identity sustained by both a shared sense of historical ties, physical living space, and protection against threats to this sense of historical ties and interests (see Smith 1991). This has the potential effect of excluding those people who do not fit within this historicised sense of belonging as shown in Chapter Four (Muzondidya 2005, 2007; Rutherford 2007). Those who are not seen as sharing in the collective memory in question are likely to be viewed as a potential threat to the group whose collective memory is of concern. The author also celebrates the cooperation of oppositional parties in approving Constitutional Amendment No. 18 as a triumph of collective memory. This is against the backdrop that members of the opposition party MDC are argued to be part of "a significant minority among Zimbabweans" that "had succumbed to the Euro-American assaults and had suffered a disabling memory loss or disorientation" (Mahoso 2007:8). His view of collective memory can thus potentially provincialise Zimbabwean-ness, and by extension African identity, to that which fits with essentialist conceptions of 'African

memory' (Muzondidya 2005, 2007). This line of argumentation thus sets up collective memory as a tool for inclusion, exclusion and labelling—which forms the basis for such inclusion and exclusion.

Economic Empowerment is Every Zimbabwean's Birthright

This editorial (*The Sunday Mail*, 22 April 2012) was written following independence celebrations on the 18th of April 2012 at which the president addressed the issue of economic empowerment among other things. It was also written against the background of a promulgation of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act of 2008. The crux of its argument is that economic empowerment is an ineluctable goal that should be pursued vigorously after gaining political independence. This goal is justified on the basis that anti-colonial struggle is an ongoing process whose current pre-occupation is with the economic empowerment of “our people” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:8). Its rhetorical perspective is deliberative as the editorial is concerned with future actions or actions oriented towards the future (Aristotle 2012; Richardson 2007). Its mode of persuasion is *ethotic* as it relies on authoritative voices to make its case (Aristotle 2012; Richardson 2007). The editorial draws on such eminent figures as the Pan-Africanist former Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah, notable academic, the late Professor Ali Mazrui, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, and lastly the Bible, to argue for both the necessity of economic empowerment, and the need to act on it decisively. Its argumentative attributes cut across the logical, dialectical and rhetorical perspectives (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). It is logical as it is rationally persuasive of its addressee; dialectical, as it presumes an antagonistic arguer who is seen as complicit with imperialism; and rhetorical in that it seeks to persuade its addressee to accept the ineluctability of a post-colonial economic revolution in Zimbabwe and act towards its realisation. Two key issues arise in the argumentative action of the article. First, while the title of the article suggests an all-inclusive approach to economic empowerment, it also begs the question of who is a Zimbabwean. This question is answered implicitly in the body of the editorial. For *The Sunday Mail*, economic empowerment is sought for “our people”, who after gaining “political sovereignty” in 1980 must now transform it “to economic sovereignty before the masses can confidently affirm that they have tasted total freedom” (2012:8). Second, the editorial draws on social memory, noting that “President Mugabe, his generation, and past generations have all toiled for a better future for this nation” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:8). For the newspaper, such a bright future “is embodied in the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:8). Following from this, it is arguable that the Zimbabwean nation that is

imagined in this drive for economic empowerment is that of indigenous people. Despite occasional references to inclusive categorisations such as “all Zimbabweans in general” and “every Zimbabwean”, the editorial forcefully reaffirms the identity of its indigenous addressee using social memory (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:8). For instance, the writer connects the current struggle for economic empowerment to previous such struggles in ways that implicitly specify the addressee:

Mbuya Nehanda, Sekuru Kaguvi and King Lobengula all died fighting for a free Zimbabwe whose children are masters of their own destiny. President Mugabe alongside our departed heroes Dr Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo, Herbert Chitepo, Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo and Simon Muzenda, to mention a few accepted the relay button from the heroes of the First Chimurenga/Imfazo and gallantly prosecuted the Second Chimurenga. At the turn of the millennium, the Third Chimurenga restored our land to its rightful owners. The on-going indigenisation and economic empowerment revolution is logically the last Chimurenga. (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:8)

This clearly defines the addressee as an indigenous Zimbabwean who relates via kinship to both *The Sunday Mail* and the heroes to which it refers. The newspaper defines those who do not belong to this group of addressees in terms of their relationship to the privileged addressee in the past (colonialism), and their attitude towards contemporary economic empowerment policies. Regarding the first group, the editorial notes: “the time has come to implement and defend indigenisation in a manner that consolidates our independence and silences those who would seek to re-colonise this nation” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:8). The ones who hold different views about the indigenisation policy are ‘othered’ and described as “those who connived with oppressors yesterday, when others sought to liberate Zimbabwe”, and who still “continue to walk hand in glove with the imperialist forces” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:8). The privileged addressee is identified more specifically in racial terms towards the end of the article, noting that “politicians who are campaigning against indigenisation are essentially defending the continued marginalization of the black majority” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:8). This is in stark contrast to the title of the editorial which frames economic empowerment in broader and more inclusive terms. The editorial is thus arguing for economic empowerment, not for all Zimbabweans, but those who are indigenous – and more specifically, the ‘black’ race (see Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003; Raftopoulos 2005).

The Standard (Privately Owned)

Independence: Was it Worth the Sacrifice?

This opinion article (*The Standard*, 3 March 2007) was published against a background of some Zimbabweans questioning the idea of independence in the context of ever-increasing economic

hardships and political repression. The argumentative perspective is both dialectical and logical (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). The author's argument is a dialectical counter-point to views that question the idea of independence based on the poor performance of the Zanu PF government. The article is thus in dialogue not only with those who hold these views, but also the newspaper's general readership, and Zimbabwean citizens. Its logic is evidenced in the carefully arranged reasoning of its central thesis (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Its modes of persuasion are mainly *logetic* and *ethotic* (Aristotle 2012; Richardson 2007): *logetic* as rational argumentation is the key function of its persuasive act which is *ethotic*. The writer, Alex Magaisa, is an academic at the University of Kent's Law School in the United Kingdom, and his article is published in a newspaper with its own sense of authority as a social commentator. His argumentation is thus strengthened not only by his standing as a Zimbabwean academic stationed at a British university, but also by his ability to argue his position logically, a skill attributable to his training both as a lawyer and academic. The author's central argument is that even for "a heartbroken nation beginning to doubt itself and the foundation of its existence", it is ultimately important for Zimbabweans:

to not let the understandable bitterness that people have against the current regime, to detract from the idea and struggle for independence, which was and remains a key ideal, because in an [*sic*] event true Uhuru is yet to be achieved. (Magaisa 2007:11)

While for him the ideal of independence itself is noble, the failure of the current government to transform Zimbabwe, first into an economic success, and second, a political democracy, means that the status of citizens is similar to what it was during colonialism. This line of argumentation can change the way Zimbabweans perceive their sense of belonging, especially as it relates to their perception of the official narrative of independence as shown in the analysis of the *The Sunday Mail* above. As Magaisa suggests, how independence is perceived has fundamental implications for the current socio-political situation in Zimbabwe—which is why he takes the issue seriously. For instance, he sees questions about independence in Zimbabwe as "pertinent" since they speak to

the very root of the nation's existence, for the definition of Zimbabwe, as we now know it, is inextricably connected to the encounters, both harsh and sweet, between the peoples of different races and tribes who constitute it. (Magaisa 2007:11)

The basis of his objections to those views that question the very notion of independence in Zimbabwe is that some of the criticisms directed at Zanu PF's failure to deliver on the promises of independence and liberation, have assumed both racial and tribal overtones. He argues against this conflation saying, "it is important in my opinion, to avoid being unnecessarily

divisive on racial grounds by denigrating a whole race or tribe based on the incompetence of a particular regime”, as that shifts the issue from “one about the incompetence of particular leaders, to one about racial or tribal responsibility” (Magaisa 2007:11). This view is not surprising, because as shown above, his point of departure is an acknowledgement of the plural nature of the Zimbabwean populace owing to various social encounters over time. His argument is thus directly linked to the question of identity and belonging from a more inclusive position. His argument for the separation of the ideal of independence from the poor performance of the Zanu PF government is aimed at precluding the reduction of identity politics in Zimbabwe to either race or ethnicity. As he puts it:

it is an historical fact that Zimbabwe has broadly speaking, both white and black people, among others and also people from various ethnic tribes. The challenge has always been and remains achieving reasonable co-existence, respecting the dignity, equality and Zimbabweanness of every man and woman who claims it. (Magaisa 2007:11)

He has chosen to raise this issue in terms of how independence in Zimbabwe is perceived because he sees the achievement of an inclusive sense of Zimbabwean-ness as dependent on how historical events are spoken about today, a position that puts social memory at the centre of the politics of belonging in Zimbabwe. In this regard, he argues that Zimbabwe’s future depends on how its different people “are able to negotiate a reasonable co-existence”, and that

part of this process involves finding common ground and understanding on the key aspects that define the nation – among which include the liberation struggle, the contribution of the settler and immigrant communities and also overcoming bitter and divisive aspects such as Gukurahundi. (Magaisa 2007:11)

In terms of Aristotle’s classification of rhetoric, Magaisa’s argument cuts across the forensic, epideictic and deliberative types (2012). It is forensic in so far as it defends both the ideal of independence and the struggle for it. This is because the achievement of, and struggle for, independence is at once about the past, and primarily concerned with issues of justice. The argument is epideictic as on the one hand it seeks to prove that the actions of liberation fighters are worthy of admiration, and on the other, it disapproves of those who question the ideal of independence based on the failures of the post-independence government using racial and/or tribal invective (Richardson 2007). In the final analysis, it is clear that Magaisa’s argument is informed by a desire for a just society that is economically successful and affords its citizens political freedom, and inclusive belonging.

Zimbabwe Betrays Ideals of the Revolution

This editorial (*The Standard*, 10 October 2004) was published when the government was evicting villagers from farms that they had been allowed to occupy in 2000, in a politically expedient move that was expected to secure victory for the ruling Zanu PF party, in a parliamentary election that year. The editorial's argument is that the government's actions contradicted the ideals of the revolution and reflected its policy inconsistency and corruption. The argument is thus deliberative as it seeks to influence the readers' perception of the Zanu PF government by undermining the very basis of its legitimacy claims: a revolutionary pedigree and the drive for land reform. The argument is also framed in logical and dialectical terms (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). The logical aspect is evident in its use of deductive reasoning to support its claims. Its dialectical form is evident in the way it addresses the master narrative of the Zanu PF government on the primacy of land reform as a revolutionary goal both before and after independence. The mode of persuasion is primarily *ethotic* since editorials are written from the newspaper's position of authority as a social commentator (see Richardson 2007).

The argument is built on four premises. The writer undermines the Zanu PF government's claim to revolutionary credentials by showing its inconsistency, brutality, corruption, and injustice regarding the land issue, thereby questioning the very notion of independence and its cognate narratives, especially around identity. The editorial demonstrates the government's inconsistency in two ways. First, it argues that the evictions contradict its position in 2000 when it "encouraged the invasions and occupations" (*The Standard* 2004:8). To emphasise the gravity of this inconsistency, the writer notes that at the time (2000) the government "vowed there would be no going back" on what it termed the "Third Chimurenga" (a term associated with anti-colonial struggle in Zimbabwe), which was accompanied by calls such as "*ivhu kuvanhu*" (land to the people), and "the land is the economy" (*The Standard* 2004:8). This inconsistency is presented as symptomatic of a greater inconsistency that is "the betrayal of the ideals of the liberation struggle" (*The Standard* 2004:8). The implication is that just as it had failed to deliver on something over which it declared "there would be no going back" in the recent past, the Zanu PF government had also reneged on the goals of the liberation struggle (*The Standard* 2004:8). Furthermore, the article argues that the nature of the inconsistency is ironic as it replicates the brutality of the settler regime against which the liberation struggle was fought. The evictions are likened to colonial policies of land expropriation such as the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. The scale of human rights abuses during the evictions is

described as “incomparable” (*The Standard* 2004:8). To further undermine the standing of Zanu PF and its government as liberators, the editorial argues that the benefits of independence, especially in terms of land ownership, have now been concentrated “in the hands of an elitist political group and protégés who have decided to secure their future by transforming Zimbabwe into a private property where the majority will exist at the pleasure of the new landed class” (*The Standard* 2004:8). To show that this anomaly is not unintentional, the editorial also refers to the government’s unwillingness and failure to act against “multiple farm owners” among the “political elite” despite the availability of evidence (*The Standard* 2004:8). This attitude is juxtaposed with the government’s belligerent actions in its bid to evict villagers from farms that they were encouraged to occupy by them in 2000. To sum up the newspaper’s view on these developments, the editorial argues that “the struggle for independence is thus reduced to a struggle by blacks to supplant whites in order to perpetrate and perpetuate the injustices that were synonymous with settler administration” (*The Standard* 2004:8).

The editorial’s argument has huge implications for the construction of identity in Zimbabwe as it undermines the very basis on which the essence of Zimbabwean-ness is constructed by the government. That the government is not only presented as acting brutally against its own poor people, but also against the goals of, and the very ‘race’ (‘black people’) for which it fought, the liberation struggle, means that the Zanu PF government is worse than those against whom the liberation struggle was fought. This turns the government’s imagination of nationhood along, especially, racial lines, on its head. The implications of this are explicated in the discussion section below.

Not yet Uhuru for the Masses

This editorial (*The Standard*, 14 April 2013) was published a few days before the commemoration of Zimbabwe’s independence on 18 April 2013. Its central argument is that the contemporary situation in the country is at odds with the year’s commemorative theme: “Zimbabwe @33 – Peace, Prosperity and Economic Empowerment for National Development” (*The Standard* 2013). The argumentative approach is both logical and dialectical (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). The logical approach is evidenced by the reasoning that constitutes the premise of the central argument. Furthermore, since the article disputes claims made by the commemorative theme, it is in dialogue with the government of Zimbabwe, the proponents of the theme. The modes of persuasion are both *logetic* and *ethotic* (Aristotle 2012; Richardson 2007): *logetic*, as the persuasion is achieved through the marshalling of reasons; and *ethotic*,

as the editorial represents the voice of an important social institution, a newspaper. Furthermore, since the article focuses on the failures of the current government, its rhetorical approach is deliberative as it aims at influencing public opinion against the government and its leader Robert Mugabe (Richardson 2007). To show the ironic nature of the commemorative theme, the writer juxtaposes claims contained in the theme and the statement of reconciliation made by President Robert Mugabe in 1980 when the country attained its independence, with contemporary realities. According to the editorial, in 1980, the president had “preached unity and forgiveness urging the nation to “turn swords into plough shares” (*The Standard* 2013:10). But the editorial challenges these claims. For instance, it argues that “plough shares have been literally turned into weapons again as government cracks down on dissenting voices ahead of the watershed harmonised elections this year” (*The Standard* 2013:10). It also notes that peace, “has remained a mirage as the human rights situation continues to deteriorate”, and that “those who replaced yesteryear colonisers have not hesitated to use the same oppressor’s methods to remain in power and to plunder the nation’s wealth” (*The Standard* 2013:10). The article also cites corruption (even among opposition members), the plunder of mineral wealth, the collapsing health and education sectors, erratic water and electricity supply, high unemployment and investor unfriendly policies as some of realities that contradict the commemorative theme and independence ideals. Significantly, it questions the very basis upon which the ruling Zanu PF government claims to be serving the interests of citizens—just as the party did during the war of liberation. As the title of the editorial suggests, its argument is that the situation in Zimbabwe today is just as bad as it was during the colonial period. This problematises the very conception of Zimbabwean-ness based on the narrative about the attainment of independence. In short, the editorial’s argument undermines the ruling party’s claims to political legitimacy based on its role during the liberation struggle.

Discussion: Theme 1—Independence and Decolonisation

This discussion focuses on three fundamental issues that pertain to discourses on independence and decolonisation explicated above: the dimensions of social memory at play, the identities invoked both implicitly and explicitly, and the nature of the national imaginary. In short, it compares the government-controlled *The Sunday Mail*’s and the privately-owned *The Standard*’s constructions of social memory and nation.

Social Memory

Stories in the section above deal with the inter-related themes of independence and (de)colonisation. This discussion begins with an analysis of how social memory is evoked by *The Sunday Mail*, and is juxtaposed with *The Standard's* treatment of it. Social memory is evoked by *The Sunday Mail* in three major ways. First, it reminds the paper's readers or addressees—who presumably belong to *The Sunday Mail's* idea of the Zimbabwean nation—of their identity traceable back to pre-colonial times (Muzondidya 2005). Second, it reminds the addressees of how their experience of colonialism distorted their pre-colonial being, and dispossessed them of their natural resources or control over them. Together these two ways of evoking social memory construct the authors' definition of the "constitutive outside" (Hall 2000:17): the one who is blamed for distorting original African identities, and for dispossessing Africans (in this case Zimbabweans) of their natural resources, the white European. The distortion of an originary identity is said to have been achieved through the "scrambling of national collective memory" (Mahoso 2007). For Mahoso, "imperialism and colonialism in Zimbabwe" dissected and chopped "up the web of African memory" only "to replace it with the 'separate but equal memories of apartheid, tribalism and sectarianism'" (2007). This view is also evident in Kanengoni's article that argues that Africans, and presumably Zimbabweans, "were a proud people with a vibrant culture, a system of values, a clear and established way of doing things, a complete civilisation" before European imperialists came "without our invitation", and "in the process stripped and dispossessed us of all that we were and owned: land, cattle, values and identity" (2002:10). It is also against this background that *The Sunday Mail* editorial argues for the economic empowerment of the "black majority" through "indigenisation in a manner that consolidates our independence and silences those who would seek to re-colonise this nation" (*The Sunday Mail*, 22 April 2012).

These three ways of evoking social memory provide the basis for thinking contemporary relations and realities in modern day Zimbabwe with a view to formulating appropriate future action. For the authors, appropriate action—whether in terms of economic policy (economic empowerment and land reform) or in formulating a sense of self or nationhood—must recognise that Africans have a precolonial history upon which they should build their future. They also specify the antagonist in this process: the erstwhile imperialists and colonisers, the 'whites' and 'Europeans'. It is against this background that Kanengoni (2002:10), speaks of an "African personality", "my people" "we", "the sort of people that we were", "us", to identify himself with his addressee (black Zimbabweans) on whose behalf he speaks. He does this in

ways that clearly identify his “constitutive outside” (Hall 2000:17) as “the white man”, “your people”, “your kind”, and “Rhodesia” (Kanengoni 2002:10). This way of evoking social memory restricts the scope of Zimbabwean identity construction to the encounter between ‘black Africans’ and ‘white Europeans’. But as Mbembe (2001a) argues, it obliterates the racial diversity both within the meta-categories of ‘black’ and ‘white’, and across the racial tapestry that characterises most modern societies, including Zimbabwe.

On the other hand, although *The Standard’s* articles also draw on social memory in their argumentation, the intensity is lower, and the approach different from that of *The Sunday Mail*. *The Standard* draws on the past mainly to show the failures of the present government whose legitimacy is anchored through its historical role in the liberation struggle. The most elaborate of these articles, written by Alex Magaisa, argues that the ideal of independence, although noble, should not be diminished by citizens’ perceptions of the post-independence government’s failures. Whilst he valorises the struggle for independence and the sacrifices that came with it, he argues that the post-independence government failed to live up to the expectations that came with the achievement of independence, especially as related to economic empowerment. For him the value of independence and the sacrifices made for it is that they provide the normative yardstick against which the current government should be assessed. His argument is consistent with *The Standard’s* editorial, *Not Yet Uhuru for the Masses*, which also argues that Zimbabwe’s contemporary condition is a fundamental negation of the goals of independence and the policy of reconciliation announced by the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe at the onset of independence in 1980. It is against this disjuncture, that both Magaisa (writing in 2007) and *The Standard* (writing in 2004, 2013) assert that independence is yet to be achieved. In the editorial, *Zimbabwe Betrays Ideals of the Revolution*, *The Standard* also criticises the eviction of villagers from farms by the government, which it condemns for betraying the revolution. It also creates an analogy between the government’s human rights abuses of villagers, and their evictions, with colonial policies. This position supports the argument that independence, in an ideal sense, has not yet been achieved. Magaisa also draws on the memory of colonisation, not in a racially divisive and antagonistic tone typical of *The Sunday Mail*, but to argue that modern-day Zimbabwe is multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic. *The Standard’s* evocation of social memory thus reminds the government and people of Zimbabwe about the ‘nation’s’ originating ideals. It also fosters a more inclusive society informed by the democratic ideals of the revolution.

As some have argued, remembering the past is not an innocent exercise. It is therefore important to ask, “who wants whom to remember what, and why?” (Burke 1989/2011:191) as this is useful for thinking about power relations in particular contexts (Wagner-Pacifici 1996/2011). *The Sunday Mail*'s patterns of memory evocation regarding (de)colonisation and independence can be better explained using the presentist, or invention of traditions view (Confino 1997; Burke 1989; Megill 1998). Those who argue from this standpoint see social memory as something shaped “to suit present dominant interests”, to define and sustain nations and national communities, and to create social cohesion, legitimate authority and socialise a population into a common culture (Miztal 2003:56). This view is also concerned with analysing how nationalist movements create a master commemorative narrative that highlights a common past and desire for a shared destiny (Miztal 2003). The three articles from *The Sunday Mail* evince these observations in various ways. Kanengoni and Mahoso's articles, wittingly or unwittingly, seek to socialise 'black' Zimbabweans into thinking that they have a common past and desire a shared destiny. They accomplish this in two ways: by referring to a definitive precolonial past, and second, to the common experience of colonialism. These experiences are key to the master-commemorative narrative of the Zanu PF government that has significant influence over *The Sunday Mail*'s content. That nationhood is imagined in these articles in terms of a pre-colonial past shows the active mobilisation and interpretation of the past in ways that seek to socialise Zimbabweans into a common sense of selfhood informed by value systems that are argued to have endured over time. This is a politically useful frame of social memory in Zimbabwe. Since the Zanu PF government defines nationhood in terms of a common past shared by 'black' Zimbabweans and distorted by 'white' colonialists against whom Zanu PF fought the war of liberation, it is logical for them to present themselves as the legitimate custodians of a genuine Zimbabwean nation and the aspirations of its people. This allows them to isolate and cast out those whom it sees not only as a threat to that sense of Zimbabwean-ness, but also to its interests. One way of doing this evident in the articles and discussed in Chapters One, Two, and Four, is to label those who threaten the status quo as collaborating with colonial forces. But as discussed in Chapter four, as pre-colonial identities were fluid, claims to an essential pre-colonial identity suggested in the articles demonstrates the malleability of the use of social memory.

In contrast, *The Standard*'s evocation of social memory is better explained using views about popular memory and the dynamics of memory. The former conceives popular memory as resistance to dominant mnemonic narratives, and public memory as a product of negotiations

between dominant and counter-memory (Popular Memory Group 1982; Pearson 1999). However, the public memory view does not rule out the impact of processes of domination—and accommodates demotic memory (Misztal 2003). The latter, does not take the manipulation of memory as the starting point, but sees remembering as a continuous process of negotiation (Zelizer 1995). The stance of *The Standard* can also be understood from the perspective that shifts in collective contexts lead to shifts in patterns of collective memory (Halbwachs 1992). In *The Standard*, social memory is evoked as a normative basis for thinking the contemporary socio-political condition of Zimbabwe's body politic, especially as this pertains to identity. For example, Magaisa's defence of the notion of independence, the struggle for it, and need for public dialogue over aspects that shape Zimbabwean-ness today, is motivated by his concern over the racialisation and ethnicisation of public communication. He refers to the struggle for independence as a point of departure for thinking inclusive forms of belonging, not as a way of demarcating identity along ethnic and racial lines. For him, as with the universalist view discussed in Chapter Four, good (immigration etc.) and bad (colonisation etc.) encounters brought people of various shades together in Zimbabwe, and therefore, these encounters should be taken as the starting point for thinking belonging. The critique of the government in the two editorials also point to *The Standard's* concern over the country's democratic deficit. This is fundamental to identity since an open society that respects the rights of its citizens as individuals and members of social groups, is a central ingredient for open deliberation about their sense of belonging. *The Standard's* editorials critique the government's failure to implement the policy of reconciliation enunciated in 1980, and to realise an egalitarian socio-political and economic programme after independence. The implication is that had such programmes been successfully implemented, public discourses over Zimbabwean-ness would have been more open and inclusive. *The Standard's* evocation of social memory is consistent with the views that it is a product of resistance to dominant mnemonic narratives, a product of negotiations between dominant and counter-memory, and that remembering is a continuous process of negotiation. Its articles also seem to suggest that the shift from a euphoric and more open immediate post-independence period to the savage violence of the *Gukurahundi* and deteriorating economic and political situation in Zimbabwe, transformed the meanings of independence and the liberation struggle as remembered by some Zimbabweans.

Nation and Identity

The Sunday Mail articles provide a definitive conception of Zimbabwean-ness as part of the “black” race with an “African personality” (Kanengoni 2002:10) that is threatened by the

“scrambling of social memory” (Mahoso 2007). It is a nation imagined around a set of ‘black’ heroes, the achievement of independence in 1980, and a common experience of colonialism. The nation is also understood as involved in a struggle against neo-colonialism, still defined in terms of a ‘black’ versus ‘white’ duel, with the exception of those ‘blacks’ seen as conniving with white imperialism (Kanengoni 2002; Mahoso 2007). These Zimbabweans, it is argued, suffer “a disabling memory loss or disorientation”, a condition which threatens “national cohesion and self-determination” (Mahoso 2007). The articles take the concepts of a ‘nation’, ‘the national’ and Zimbabwean-ness for granted. The social differences that characterise most modern societies (see Gillis 1994) are reduced to what Mahoso calls “the ‘separate but equal’ memories of apartheid, tribalism and sectarianism” (2007). Without denying the divisive legacy of colonialism, it is arguable that the ethno-linguistic diversity of most societies—sometimes manifest in socio-political struggles of all kinds as will be discussed in Chapter Nine—are not the outcome of only colonialism, but actual ethno-linguistic and cultural differences (see Msindo 2012). The emphasis on pre-colonial African identities as the basis of Zimbabwean-ness today conflates race and nation, as well as ethnicity and nation, thereby narrowing the conception of Zimbabwean-ness to ‘black’ ethno-linguistic groups who can trace their genealogy back to pre-colonial times. This conception of Zimbabwean-ness excludes many other ‘races’, immigrant populations, and ethnic groups whose history does not fit within this frame.

The Sunday Mail’s reification of pre-colonial African identities in Zimbabwe suggests a primordial but culturalist imagination of Zimbabwean-ness (see Ozkirimli 2000; Smith 1995). The culturalist-primordialism is evident in the interpretations of the nation’s historical origins to construct a sense of timeless identities (Smith 1995). *The Sunday Mail’s* construction of nationhood is also ethno-symbolist as the arguments seek to rediscover, reinterpret and reconstruct that timeless basis for contemporary Zimbabwean-ness (Smith 2009). This sense of a timeless identity is framed as the basis of the liberation struggle and contemporary struggles against neo-colonialism based on common experiences of colonialism. The nation is thus centred exclusively around the “black African’, imagined in indigenist terms as shown in Chapter Four, and in terms of what Smith calls the ethnic model of the nation. This, he argues, is “a community of common descent”, which is regarded as being more important than territorial belonging (1991:12). But, in *The Sunday Mail* the emphasis is more on ‘race’ than ethnicity. However, there is also a modernist dimension to *The Sunday Mail’s* discourses on nation and nationalism. Its emphasis on the material dimensions of colonialism and neo-

colonialism suggest a nationalism postulated by neo-Marxists. These scholars argue that economic differences between countries of the core and the periphery are the source of nationalism in the periphery (Ozkirimli 2000). This is exacerbated in countries that experienced the dispossession and exploitation of colonialism. Identity is thus imagined in relation to resistance to the imperialist, colonialist, and the contemporary post-colonial outsiders.

In contrast, *The Standard* defines Zimbabwean nationhood in inclusive terms. This is most evident in Magaisa's article that criticises the reduction of the Zanu PF government's failures to both race and tribe. Instead, the article argues for the recognition of the ideal of independence. For him, the concept of independence is a fundamental aspect since it is central to the definition of nationhood in Zimbabwe, which is "inextricably connected to the encounters, both harsh and sweet, between the peoples of different races and tribes who constitute it" (Magaisa 2007:11). In his words, Zimbabwe's future "is dependent upon how these different constituencies are able to negotiate a reasonable co-existence" and discover a "common ground and understanding on the key aspects that define the nation" including "the liberation struggle, the contribution of the settler and immigrant communities and also overcoming the bitter and divisive aspects such as Gukurahundi" (Magaisa 2007:11). The inclusion of the *Gukurahundi* as one of the key aspects that define nationhood in Zimbabwe is fundamental. In contrast to *The Sunday Mail's* position, Magaisa acknowledges the divisions among 'black' Zimbabweans because of the trauma of *Gukurahundi*. Settlers and immigrants are not viewed negatively, but as people who contributed to the building of what is today, Zimbabwe. Furthermore, there is no consensual understanding of the liberation struggle, but rather a process whose contribution to Zimbabwean nationhood requires negotiation. This position acknowledges the complexity of social life and puts the role of communication and argumentation at the centre of nation-building. It also leaves a space for dialogue about who is and is not Zimbabwean at any point in time.

The Standard also takes the concept of a nation and Zimbabwean-ness for granted. But its approach differs from *The Sunday Mail* as its arguments are framed in terms of both a universalist-humanism that conceives of identity in inclusive terms as shown in Chapter Four, and Smith's (1991) conception of the civic model of a nation. For Smith (1991), the civic model of a nation is premised on an egalitarian "sense of legal community" and "its full expression is the various kinds of citizenship" that include "civil and legal rights, political rights and duties, and socio-economic rights" (1991:10). Unlike those pursuing an ethnic model of the nation,

civic nationalisms aim at achieving a territorial nation on the basis of “residence and propinquity, as opposed to descent and genealogy,” as well as the “active participation of all citizens *on a territorial and civic basis*” (Smith 1991:117). *The Standard’s* criticism of the civic deficit in post-independence Zimbabwe is informed by a desire for a more inclusive society where belonging is established through open, deliberative processes.

Theme 2: Land and Elections

The Sunday Mail (Government Controlled)

Global Racism and the Land Issue in Zimbabwe

This opinion article (*The Sunday Mail*, 23 April 2000) was written at a time when white commercial farmers were losing their farms, either because they had been listed by the government for resettling landless Zimbabweans, or were arbitrarily occupied by landless peasants and former liberation fighters.⁴⁷ The author’s central argument is that courts—and by extension a justice system based on English Law and Roman-Dutch Law—cannot provide a solution to the racist structure of land ownership patterns in Zimbabwe since they are part of the problem. The argument manifests both logical and dialectical aspects of argumentation (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). It is dialectical as he is addressing white farmers who chose to challenge the fast track land reform programme in the courts. The article is logical as the author dissuades the farmers from pursuing a legalistic solution to the land issue. The rhetorical approach used cuts across the forensic, epideictic and deliberative types (Aristotle 2012; Richardson 2007): it is forensic as the author is concerned with the past, condemning the role of the courts in institutionalising racist land ownership structures during colonialism (see Richardson 2007). It is epideictic as the argument disapproves of the role of the courts in solving the land issue in the present, but approves of the roles played by the President and other Zanu PF functionaries in the fast track land resettlement programme (Richardson 2007). Lastly, it is deliberative as it is concerned that the court system can worsen an already bad situation hence his attempt to dissuade farmers from seeking recourse in the courts. The author uses mainly *ethotic* and *logetic* modes of persuasion (Richardson 2007): his persuasion is *ethotic*, because his views are more likely to be credible to readers as he is a scholar. Furthermore, he associates his voice with *The Sunday Mail*, a newspaper which has its own authority as a social commentator. For example, he begins his article thus: “*The Sunday Mail*, through this column, warned the Commercial Farmers Union...” (Mahoso 2000:11). The mode of persuasion is also

⁴⁷A more detailed discussion of the land issue in Zimbabwe is provided in Chapter One and Four.

logetic since he supports his argument using evidence and reason (Richardson 2007). The strength of his argumentation is therefore based on the force of his rational persuasiveness, his association with a prominent newspaper in Zimbabwe's public space, and his own intellectual standing in society.

To support his argument, Mahoso shows how the court system was complicit in creating a racist structure of land ownership during colonialism, and he questions its moral basis in comparison with the government's intentions and motivations. To do this, he shows the contradiction between the immorality of the courts (and by extension of Roman Dutch Law and English Law), and the morality of the government's land reform programme. Thus, on the one hand, he argues that the courts cannot provide a solution to the land issue for three major reasons. First, that "the legal transformation from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe is far from complete" (Mahoso 2000:11). The implication here is that the justice system in Zimbabwe represents the same settler interests that it represented during colonialism and cannot be expected to foster progressive social transformation. Second, he argues that white commercial farmers should not seek recourse in the courts since "the land scandal in fact began in the colonial courts" (Mahoso 2000:11). For him, the courts have been "part and parcel of the problem, not the solution" (Mahoso 2000:11). To support his view, he lists a number of discriminatory Acts of Parliament that were enforced by the same justice system whose moral standing he questions. Third, he argues that "litigation under Roman Dutch Law and English Law" has various negative consequences (Mahoso 2000:11). For instance, he criticises it for encouraging the polarisation of society, creating false equivalences between a corporate being and a "land-hungry peasant or War Veteran", as well as for treating someone representing personal interests "the same way as a person representing a whole society, a person articulating the needs and aspirations of a whole people" (Mahoso 2000:11). It is on these grounds that he argues that Roman Dutch Law is an instrument of global racism which is predisposed against the needs of poor 'black' peasants.

On the other hand, he argues that President Mugabe and his government have been virtuous in two major ways. First, he argues that despite waiting twenty years to address the land issue, President Mugabe's government had been betrayed by the erstwhile colonisers who "broke their pledge when they suspended the payments" that were meant to support land reform (Mahoso 2000:11). This view shifts the source of injustice from the Zimbabwean government against whom the farmers are seeking recourse in the courts, to the British government which

is now presented not only as the source of injustice against the greater Zimbabwean society, but the one perpetuating current injustices. Secondly, the author also argues that the farmers and their sympathisers are both dishonest and beguiling in their criticism of the government's land reform programme. To demonstrate this observation, the author argues that the farmers and those who support them, defend "the British breach of the Lancaster agreement by arguing that in the 21st Century land will no longer be important" (Mahoso 2000:11). This view is deceptive since:

the same forces are now saying that the police should remove the War Veterans from the land they had occupied because Britain, the US, the European Union, the IMF, the World Bank and all donors are concerned about the on-going land reclamation. (Mahoso 2000:11)

This evidence belies the claim that land will no longer be important in the 21st Century. He argues that the momentum against land reform shows the determination among Western powers to keep Africans in a state of dispossession. Mahoso argues that:

what is meant therefore is that the African should no longer be concerned about land precisely because it is so important for Britain, for the US, for the European Union and for all the donors to keep it in the hands of the minority. (2000:11)

His argument thus frames injustice around the land issue in terms of race. He makes a connection between the legacy and sustenance of racist land ownership patterns in Zimbabwe, and Africa, with the interests of Western countries and institutions. Although the argument may be effective in locating the racial dimension of the land question, it does not offer a solution that transcends racial frames. Instead, it implicitly suggests a racialized solution and sets up the conception of belonging in Zimbabwe and Africa along racial lines (see Tendi 2010; Muzondidya 2007).

No Land for Foreigners, editorial

This editorial (*The Sunday Mail*, 20 August 2000) was written after the Minister of Local Government and National Housing, Dr Ignatius Chombo, had said farm workers would be included in the fast-track land reform programme. The central argument is that land should not be made available to foreigners, but only Zimbabwean citizens. The argumentative approach is mainly rhetorical as it persuades the government not to resettle foreign nationals on Zimbabwean land (see Richardson 2007). It also appeals to the readers' emotions by inviting them to view the resettlement of farm workers as dangerous as they may be Mozambican bandits. The mode of persuasion used is *pathotic* since it appeals to the emotions of both government officials and the newspaper's readers (Richardson 2007). It appeals to the emotions

of government officials by associating Mozambique and Zambia with former white farmers who left Zimbabwe, and those of the readers' emotions by associating farm workers with acts of banditry. The newspaper's argument is thus strengthened by making emotive connections between the farm workers and people (white farmers in Mozambique and Zambia), as well as events (acts of banditry) that potentially conjure negative feelings among the addressees.

The persuasive strategy adopted in the editorial frames the intentions of *The Sunday Mail* and the government as noble, and those of the farm workers and their sympathisers as pernicious. It juxtaposes the government's good intentions with dangers perceived to be associated with foreign farm workers. Although the editorial claims that *The Sunday Mail* agrees "in principle" with the resettlement of farm workers, it discredits the farm workers as worthy beneficiaries (*The Sunday Mail*, 2000:8). For example, the editorial claims that many people came to Zimbabwe during a civil war in neighbouring Mozambique, and some of them "moved in illegally to destabilise Zimbabwe" (*The Sunday Mail*, 2000:8). It associates this group with "incidents of banditry" in the north-eastern parts of Zimbabwe without providing any evidence (*The Sunday Mail* 2000:8). As the civil war between the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) rebels, and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) government occurred between 1977 and 1992, there is no way of telling whether foreign farm workers intended to cause any harm to Zimbabwe in 2000 when the editorial was written. Furthermore, the editorial claims that "such people [...] in any case are illegal immigrants, who should not be resettled" without providing any proof that this is the case (*The Sunday Mail* 2000:8). The plight of farm workers during this period is discussed in depth by Rutherford (2007) and Muzondidya (2005) as shown in Chapter Four.

The editorial also frames the government positively claiming that "we are not asking for such people to be deported but for a resolution to be worked out between the governments of the respective countries for their repatriation" (*The Sunday Mail* 2000:8). This does not make any difference in as far as resettlement is concerned, as it simply points to a difference in method of exclusion. The editorial also induces the fear of not getting land because of foreign farm workers. It argues that "to resettle everyone who would have decided to come to Zimbabwe will spell disaster" since "the country is not expanding and our own people are already congested in rural areas and are crying out for land" (*The Sunday Mail* 2000:8). This kind of argument can easily induce Zimbabwean citizens to see foreign farm workers as mortal enemies who threaten their access to land, a prime source of livelihood in the country. The

foreign farm workers are also framed as greedy since they are being put up for resettlement in Zimbabwe whose land “is not expanding” when “there is no shortage of land in Mozambique” and “in Zambia” (*The Sunday Mail* 2000:8). The newspaper also frames itself and the government of Zimbabwe as magnanimous by presenting their approach as considerate in comparison with “those opposed to the land reform programme”, a euphemism for opposition political parties (*The Sunday Mail* 2000:8). For instance, it argues that “the plight of farm workers” has been “hijacked by those opposed to the land reform programme and used to whip up opposition to efforts to resettle landless people before the rain season” (*The Sunday Mail* 2000:8). This frame is juxtaposed with *The Sunday Mail*’s call for “a proper solution” to be found for foreign farm workers (*The Sunday Mail* 2000:8). However, it is evident that part of the solution envisaged by *The Sunday Mail* did not include consideration for resettlement of foreign farm workers that came in after 1985 when other such workers were granted citizenship. The editorial is clear about who should have access to national resources, and who should not. It does not leave room for the integration of immigrants who have contributed to the well-being of the country—in some cases over a significant period of time. The treatment of foreign farm workers is also emblematic of the newspaper’s and government’s attitude towards those defined as foreign or non-Zimbabwean. Others have even argued that farm workers were marginalised for political reasons as the ruling elite anticipated that they would vote for the opposition in sympathy with their dispossessed former employers—white farmers (Rutherford 2007).

Reasons Why 2005 Elections Should Be Anti-Blair

This opinion article (*The Sunday Mail*, 5 December 2004) was written by Tafataona Mahoso, a scholar employed by a government department which regulates the registration and practice of journalists and the media in Zimbabwe—the Media and Information Commission (MIC). He wrote this article in the run up to the country’s parliamentary elections of 2005. The central argument is that Zimbabweans must vote against the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which Mahoso argues is an extension of Tony Blair’s anti-working class New Labour aristocracy. For him, the problem is that Tony Blair’s New Labour government seeks “to facilitate global corporate interests in exchange for wealth and power” at the expense of “the most oppressed majority of the people” (Mahoso 2004:9). The article’s techniques of argumentation cut across the logical, dialectical and rhetorical perspectives (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). It is logical as the author synthesises evidence and reason to make his point. The opinion is also dialectical because on the one hand, it addresses the discourse of Blairism,

and on the other, the argument is directed at the Zimbabwean citizenry whose voting he wants to influence. It is also rhetorical because the author uses reasoned argumentation to persuade his addressee to guard against what he calls the modern imperialist threat, a project of Britain's New Labour government. Mahoso's argumentation is both *ethotic* and *logetic* (see Richardson 2007): *ethotic* because he is a known public scholar and works for a government which associates itself with anti-imperialist struggle. It is *logetic* because of its rationalist orientation. His argumentation is thus strengthened by his intellectual standing in society, his association with a revolutionary government, and his ability to articulate himself logically to the addressee. Mahoso argues that Tony Blair's New Labour Party is an anti-labour aristocracy that promotes the interests of global capital both in Britain and globally. He suggests that Blair's party achieves this by creating "other minority labour aristocracies around the world" on the one hand, and by overthrowing "liberation movements in the South and the East", on the other (Mahoso 2004:9). His argument is premised on two major views: one by a delegate from Britain to Zanu PF's Fourth National People's Congress, Harpal Brar, and the other by the late former Minister of Higher Education in Zimbabwe Dr Stan Mudenge—also a highly regarded historian. Mahoso draws on Harpal Brar of the Zimbabwe Solidarity Front, which is based in Britain, to show the corporatist character of the New Labour government. According to Mahoso, Brar said that Tony Blair had "intensified the creation of two apartheid societies in Britain" (2004:9). On the one hand is "the white Anglo-Saxon and neo-liberal minority ruling class whose objective is to facilitate global corporate interests in exchange for wealth and power" (Mahoso 2004). On the other hand:

is the Britain of working people, the abandoned real Labour, who have come from all over the world and all over Britain and have a proud history of resistance to corporate greed, a proud history of defending real working people all over the world. (Mahoso 2004:9)

This view does not only present Tony Blair's New Labour as a threat to the interests of the working class in Britain, but also across the world. The author casts doubt on the intentions of Zimbabwe's labour-oriented opposition party, the MDC. Mahoso's argument is also informed by Dr Mudenge's observation that "Western 'socialists' see themselves as the rightful heirs to imperialism and the custodians of the new brand of corporate cannibalism called 'globalisation'" who:

think by attaching these new labels to contemporary imperialism they have, in fact, abolished global oppression and rebaptised the West as the teacher and guarantor of human rights, democracy and good governance. (2004:9)

He suggests that the MDC, which was formed by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), among other civic organisations, is part of the contemporary imperialist project at the centre of which is Tony Blair's labour government. On the basis of these two premises Mahoso outlines the reasons why the 2005 elections should be anti-Blair or anti-MDC. He argues that Tony Blair's New Labour seeks to overthrow liberation movements—such as Zanu PF—so as to pave the way for “elitist labour aristocracies” such as the MDC (Mahoso 2004:9). For him, the labour aristocracies such as the MDC will abandon the “marginally employed”, “the self-employed” and “the peasants who are the most oppressed majority of the people” (Mahoso 2004:9). He argues that the solution is an election “based on the ideology of pan-African and national liberation whose basic objective is the unity of all the elements and sectors of society resisting imperialism” (Mahoso 2004:9). He also argues that what makes the imperialist project able to supplant a liberation movement with an elitist labour aristocracy is that it targets for erasure “that memory which would make it possible for new generations to understand the new forms which imperialism has assumed” (Mahoso 2004:9). The solution is to elect a liberation movement since it is the “most authentic challenge to imperialism” because it seeks “to cement the usual ethnic and class divisions which capitalism has created and employed to keep its victims weak” (Mahoso 2004:9). As such, he argues that an anti-Blair election brings all sections of Zimbabwean society together by “opposing tribalism, regionalism, elitism and careerism in the interest of a cohesive national and pan-African liberation movement” (Mahoso 2004:9). In essence, Mahoso's argument puts social memory at the core of anti-imperialist struggle. According to him, imperialists distort original African social memory to lower resistance against contemporary imperialist projects in the South and the East. On the other hand, he argues that social memory is a resource that can work against imperialism as it enables Africans both to recognise new forms of imperialism, and to forestall social divisions that expose Africans to imperialist control. In the case of Zimbabwe, Mahoso frames the MDC as a dangerous imperialist project, and Zanu PF as a progressive liberation movement.

Zim Poll: Africa's Defining Moment

This editorial (*The Sunday Mail*, 3 March 2002) was written a few days before a presidential election in which the incumbent President, Robert Mugabe, faced a popular opposition candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC. The editorial's central argument is that the Zimbabwean voter's choice is between consolidating independence by voting for President Robert Mugabe, or reinstating colonial rule by voting for the MDC's Morgan Tsvangirai, whom the paper argues is British Prime Minister Tony Blair's proxy. The argumentative

approach used is mainly rhetorical since the newspaper persuades the addressee to vote for President Mugabe rather than Morgan Tsvangirai (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; Aristotle 2012). The editorial uses *pathotic* argumentation and *logetic* argumentation (Richardson 2007). Its evocation of colonial rule is meant to arouse feelings of anger and resentment against Morgan Tsvangirai, but its method of persuasion is rational (see Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). The editorial's argumentation is strengthened by an appeal to the addressee's emotional disposition against colonial rule to discourage him/her from voting for Tsvangirai. This appeal is also strengthened by the use of evidence (however questionable it may be as it is perception that matters) to associate Tsvangirai with the threat of recolonization.

The body of the editorial shows how a vote for President Robert Mugabe will consolidate independence, and how a vote for the MDC's Morgan Tsvangirai will reinstate colonial rule. On the one hand, President Mugabe is argued to be the champion of Zimbabwe's "right to sovereignty" and the drive "to redistribute land" both to decongest rural areas and "to economically empower blacks" (*The Sunday Mail* 2002:8). To boost his standing in the eyes of the addressee, the editorial aligns President Mugabe's message with the goals of an important event in the country's history, the liberation struggle. It argues that President Mugabe's intention to redistribute land would be a fulfilment of the central issue on the liberation struggle's agenda, land reform. The editorial also argues that land is important as it is a "unifying factor" which brought "the liberation movements – Zanu and Zapu" together "to challenge the land-grabbers" (*The Sunday Mail* 2002:8). This implies that a vote for Tsvangirai is both a vote for disunity and against land reform. To show the gravity of the land issue, the newspaper also mentions that "thousands perished" during the liberation struggle fighting for land (*The Sunday Mail* 2002:8). This emphasises that anyone who undermines land redistribution is not only betraying the country, but also those who lost their lives during the struggle for independence. Ownership of land is also argued to be one of Zimbabwe's "sacrosanct" "values, rights and wishes", the betrayal of which is incomprehensible (*The Sunday Mail* 2002:8).

In contrast, Morgan Tsvangirai is presented as the antithesis of what President Mugabe stands for. He is seen as Tony Blair's puppet, defending "imperial interests" (*The Sunday Mail* 2002:8). This is significant because Tony Blair is also represented as a latter-day colonialist who "feels the master-servant relationship of the colonial era [...] has to be kept alive" (*The Sunday Mail* 2002:8). Tony Blair is also blamed for reneging "on his pledge" to fund the land

reform programme as contained in the Lancaster House Agreement which led to Zimbabwe's independence. Tsvangirai's association with Blair is presented rhetorically as the ultimate betrayal of everything that the liberation struggle had achieved, and what is yet to be achieved. For instance, the editorial notes that despite Blair's reneging on his pledge he can still find "willing allies in the form of the MDC", thereby questioning its legitimacy as a Zimbabwean political party. To amplify the threat posed by Tsvangirai and the MDC, the article describes the presidential election as an opportunity for Zimbabweans "to decide the fate of their country 22 years after attaining their hard-won independence" (*The Sunday Mail* 2002:8). This frame presents the choices available as extremes with fateful consequences: one good and one very bad, with Tsvangirai framed as an agent of the latter. Given this dichotomy, the editorial argues that even other African countries support Zimbabwe and President Robert Mugabe. The reason given is that "African states have seen through Blair's racist agenda" and therefore see his "uncalled for interference in the affairs of a sovereign state" as a reminder "of the 1884 Berlin Conference, where Europe agreed to partition Africa" (*The Sunday Mail* 2002:8). The African position is juxtaposed with Tsvangirai's acquiescence to Blair's interference and his political resonance with "the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the US and the EU" (*The Sunday Mail* 2002:8). The article associates Morgan Tsvangirai with imperialism and President Robert Mugabe with anti-imperialist struggle, thereby framing Tsvangirai's supporters as a threat to Zimbabwe's national interests.

The Standard (Privately Owned)

Confronting Zanu PF's Anti-Imperialist Rhetoric

This opinion article (*The Standard* 1 April 2007) was written by Alex Magaisa, an academic and lawyer. Magaisa's article attempts to transcend the polarisation of political discourse in Zimbabwe's multi-pronged crisis, by problematizing both Zanu PF's anti-imperialist discourse, and in turn, the MDC's hyper-criticism of Zanu PF. The argumentative orientation of the article is logical since the author is engaged in a rational critique of Zanu PF's anti-imperialist discourse, which he argues shapes political thought and action in and outside of Zimbabwe (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Magaisa's rhetorical orientation is both epideictic and deliberative (Richardson 2007). It is epideictic in the sense that he disapproves of the expedient, and polarised political discourses in Zimbabwe since they petrify progressive engagement with other African nations. It is deliberative in the sense that Magaisa's article is in dialogue with both Zanu PF and the MDC, whose political discourses he addresses directly. His article uses both *ethotic* and *logetic* modes of persuasion (Richardson 2007). It is *ethotic*

as the arguer's intellectual standing both as a lawyer and academic gives his argument persuasive force. He uses a *logetic* mode of persuasion to engage with Zimbabwe's major political discourses in a rational way. Magaisa's intellectual standing strengthens the force of his argumentation.

Magaisa's main argument is that since Zanu PF's "anti-imperialist discourse" shapes local and international understanding of the Zimbabwean crisis, it must be engaged with critically as it also obfuscates the party's culpability for the current state of affairs in the country (Magaisa 2007:11). For Magaisa, what necessitates criticism of Zanu PF's anti-imperialist discourse is that the Zimbabwean crisis is at a stage where engagement with Africa is fundamental to its resolution. However, he argues that the challenge is that Zanu PF "has largely succeeded in re-defining the Zimbabwean problem in its own (anti-imperialist) terms" to get African support, thereby obscuring other fundamental dimensions to the crisis including "human rights issues and severe economic problems" as well as "governance matters" (Magaisa 2007:11). He also argues that Zanu PF invoked the anti-imperialist discourse in the late 1990s when its government was confronted with "difficult socio-economic challenges" that threatened its continuity as the governing party (Magaisa 2007:11). Zanu PF invoked the anti-imperialist discourse mainly for political expediency. But to build continental support, Magaisa argues, Zanu PF conveniently linked its anti-imperialist discourse with "the sensitive Land Question" because some Africans would "find it hard to disconnect from the emotion that attaches the legitimate question of resource distribution" (Magaisa 2007:11). As a result of this:

Zanu PF was able to turn what was essentially an internal challenge to its continued rule in the late 1990s into a broader struggle, defining itself as the driver of revolutionary change and the victim of a Western conspiracy for daring to do so. (Magaisa 2007:11)

The author credits the New Labour government's refusal to support land reform in Zimbabwe, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair's statement to the House of Commons that "the British government was working with the MDC to bring about change in Zimbabwe", for giving Zanu PF's anti-imperialist discourse some traction (Magaisa 2007). He argues that these developments made it possible for Zanu PF to characterise the most potent opposition party in Zimbabwe, the MDC "as no more than an agent of Western Imperialists" (Magaisa 2007:11). However, it is also interesting to note that in his criticism of Zanu PF's anti-imperialist discourse, Magaisa chooses to describe a statement made to parliament by a Prime Minister in a country of Britain's stature as "unwitting", and other incidents which validate Zanu PF's anti-imperialist discourse as "unfortunate incidents" (2007:11). These epithets undermine the

strength of his argument as they suggest his trivialisation of otherwise serious political discourse. His argument would have been stronger had he dealt with the British government's statements systematically rather than just dismiss them as 'unwitting' and 'unfortunate incidents'. Nevertheless, the corollary of Zanu PF's successful deployment of an anti-imperialist discourse is that:

whatever mistakes, wilfully, recklessly or negligently committed by Zany PF since 1980, have invariably been considered by the African leaders to be immaterial or at best, incidental, to the broader picture of the purported goal of restoring resource distribution. (Magaisa 2007:11)

He also argues that the second corollary of this discourse's successful deployment is the reduction of political discourse in Zimbabwe to "two diametrically opposed standpoints" which are: "on the one hand, that the MDC represents Western interests and on the other hand, that Zanu PF represents crazy power mongers hanging on through redundant anti-imperialist rhetoric" (Magaisa 2007:11). Magaisa criticises this reduction for its tendency to preclude consideration "for alternatives that fall outside of the two standpoints but with the capacity to accommodate valid aspects of both" (2007:11). To overcome this problem, the author argues that political discourse in Zimbabwe must include a consideration of "legitimate and valid" aspects of both Zanu PF's and the MDC's perspectives (Magaisa 2007:11). Furthermore, he argues that "efforts must continue to enlighten the Africans about the nature of the domestic crisis outside of the anti-imperialist rhetoric" (Magaisa 2007:11). What is significant about Magaisa's argument is that while he accepts that there are some valid aspects to the anti-imperialist discourse, he is critical of its tendency to obscure other fundamental aspects of the crisis such as "human rights issues and severe economic problems" as well as "governance matters" (Magaisa 2007:11). His concerns indicate the kind of society and forms of belonging he envisages for Zimbabwe as discussed below. Although the article was not written for a specific election event, it addressed a key discourse recurrent in most, if not all, the elections held between 2000 and 2013.

The Choice is Clear

This editorial (*The Standard*, 10 February 2002) was written a month before a presidential election set for March 2002. The article's central argument is that given, among other things, the failure and brutality of President Mugabe's government, the voters should not vote for the incumbent president. *The Standard's* argument manifests all the three aspects of argumentation: the logical, dialectical and the rhetorical (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). It

is logical since the newspaper draws on evidence and uses cogent argumentation to make its point. It is dialectical as it critically addresses Zanu PF's political discourse which is usually centred on the party's revolutionary pedigree. It is rhetorical in the sense that its major aim is to persuade Zimbabweans to vote against Robert Mugabe. The editorial uses forensic, epideictic and deliberative rhetoric (Richardson 2007). It uses forensic rhetoric in the sense that the article condemns the actions of President Robert Mugabe's government. But since it seeks to influence the addressee's vote in the future, the editorial uses deliberative rhetoric to argue against a vote for President Mugabe. The modes of persuasion used are both *pathotic* and *logetic* (Richardson 2007). The argument's mode of persuasion is *pathotic* as it invokes the citizens' suffering under President Mugabe's leadership to induce them to vote against him. It is *logetic* in the sense that the argument uses rational persuasiveness supported by cogent reasoning (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). The editorial's argument is thus strengthened by its appeal to the addressee's emotional disposition towards President Mugabe's government based on its performance in the recent past, and the use of logical reasoning based on evidence.

The article's argument is presented in dialogic form. It anticipates the sorts of arguments likely to be made in favour of President Robert Mugabe's candidacy, and provides counter-arguments that either challenge or dismiss the former. For instance, *The Standard* points to the pre-election violence which it argues "has been vicious, bloody and profoundly damaging to the fabric of our society and the country's economic standing", to undermine any pretences of democracy as maybe suggested by the very act of holding an election (*The Standard* 2002:8). It also challenges the impression that Zanu PF is responsible for Zimbabwe's independence by pointing to the role played by ordinary Zimbabweans during the liberation struggle. The article argues that while "it cannot be denied that Zanu PF played a pivotal role in bringing about political independence to Zimbabwe" it must also be acknowledged that "thousands of unsung heroes, who neither held a gun nor went to Mozambique or Zambia [...] contributed immensely to the liberation struggle" (*The Standard* 2002:8). Their contributions ranged from looking after the liberation fighters, spreading the message of freedom, and through other logistical forms of support such as providing shelter, funds and transport to those "who today live off the fat of the land" (*The Standard* 2002:8). The article also argues that although Zanu PF brought "political stability to Zimbabwe in the aftermath of Independence through the policy of reconciliation", President Mugabe's ruthless determination to remain in power has exposed him as an "unscrupulous dictator" (*The Standard* 2002:8). It is ironic that an editorial that seeks to undermine the president's standing in an election that it describes as a 'historic event' omits

to mention his government's culpability for the early 1980s *Gukurahundi* massacres in the south-western parts of the country. But to undermine President Robert Mugabe's standing in society, the article also refers to some of his government's controversial policy decisions. For example, it notes his capricious decision to pay out a significant, but unbudgeted for, gratuity to War Veterans who had become restive in the late 1990s. This decision is largely seen as the cause of the Zimbabwe Dollar's rapid loss of value (Bratton 2016:67). The editorial also criticises the Mugabe government's involvement in the costly Congo War in 1998. The newspaper also argues that the intervention in Congo was questionable since "most" regional (SADC) countries, including the block's much revered then-Chairman, South African President Nelson Mandela, were against it (*The Standard* 2002:8). But *The Standard* was much more critical of President Mugabe's reaction to the rejection of "his flawed draft constitution" in the year 2000 (*The Standard* 2002:8). The editorial argues that in response to the rejection, "the president declared war against his own people by sanctioning farm invasions under the guise of speeding up land reform" (*The Standard* 2002:8). It is to these "farm invasions", that the newspaper attributes the Zimbabwean crisis:

since then Zimbabweans have borne the brunt of state-sponsored violence, repressive laws designed to roll back the freedoms won in the 1990s, and rapidly deteriorating economic conditions including lately food shortages. (*The Standard* 2002:8)

In the above quotation, *The Standard* labels what President Mugabe's government calls land reform, "farm invasions" (*The Standard* 2002:8). It is for these reasons that *The Standard* argues re-electing the president would lead to "more of the same", that is, "more misrule, more misallocation of public funds, more economic decay, more unemployment, more food shortages, and more isolation" (*The Standard* 2002:8). Having presented a gloomy picture not only of the Zimbabwe that the President's government created hitherto, but also of what stands to be gained from his re-election, the editorial poses a rhetorical question which limits the addressee's choice to anything but a future under President Mugabe: "is that what Zimbabwe needs? Is that what Zimbabweans want?" (*The Standard* 2002:8). Although an answer is already implied in the argument, the editorial gives an explicit answer, arguing that "the choice on March 9/10 couldn't be clearer. It is a once off opportunity for people to finally unshackle themselves from the chains of a man who has betrayed their trust" (*The Standard* 2002:8). The editorial's argument, as with others from *The Standard* analysed above, challenges Zanu's version of nationalism in Zimbabwe and allows the addressee to think of Zimbabwean-ness and belonging outside Zanu PF's frames.

No More Excuses

This editorial (*The Standard* 28 May 2000) was written after the promulgation of amendments to the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 at a time when the land reform process was characterised by violent confrontations between, on the one hand, peasants, war veterans, and other Zanu PF functionaries, and on the other, white farmers. The Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000 enabled the Zimbabwean government to compulsorily acquire land without compensation (Coldham 2001). The responsibility to pay for the land was placed on Britain, and the government of Zimbabwe was obligated to pay only for “any improvements on or to the land” (Coldham 2001:228). The central argument of the article is that in view of the gazetted amendments to the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, the Zimbabwean government has no excuse for allowing the extra-judicial occupation of commercial farms to continue as there is now an enabling legal basis to speed up land reform (*The Standard* 2000). The editorial uses rhetorical argumentation to persuade the government to proceed speedily with land reform within the confines of the law (van Eemeren 2013; Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). The argument uses *ethotic* and *logetic* modes of persuasion (see Richardson 2007). It is *ethotic* as it is an editorial written by a newspaper that is generally positioned as pro-democracy, and therefore likely to influence its addressee. The mode of persuasion used is *logetic* since the central argument is based on cogent reasoning (Richardson 2007). As the argument is concerned with the future and is based on the belief that lawful land reform is advantageous to the country’s economy, its rhetorical orientation is deliberative (Richardson 2007). The article’s association with a newspaper seen by some readers as pro-democracy, and its use of cogent reasoning strengthen the persuasive potential of its argumentation.

The editorial’s call for a speedy and lawful resolution of the land issue is motivated by economic reasons. *The Standard* argues that an orderly, peaceful and lawful resolution of the land question “would not only benefit the economy by restoring confidence in the sector, but would go a long way towards demonstrating to the international community that sanity still prevails in Zimbabwe” (2000:8). It sees the gazetted amendments to the Land Acquisition Act (1992) as an opportunity for renewal—following the negative publicity incidental to the government’s approach to land reform—and thus argues, “now is the time to mend Zimbabwe’s battered image and bring it back to the international fold” (*The Standard* 2000:8). To persuade the Zanu PF government to be receptive to its call, the newspaper juxtaposes the potential benefits of what it sees as an organised and lawful approach to land reform, with the negative impact of its current character, to both party and government. At one level it shows

how the government's current land reform programme is hurting its own image, and that of Zanu PF as a party. At another level, it shows how such a battered image is affecting (or would affect) the very constituency in whose favour land reform is conducted, "the impoverished masses" (*The Standard* 2000:8). With regards to the former, the newspaper argues that:

it is no secret that the government has taken much flack for using the land issue as a political weapon, to the benefit of Zanu PF. It has been accused, among other things, of creating the impression that it alone can address this anomaly and of favouring privileged people by allocating them farms for almost next to nothing. (*The Standard* 2000:8)

To strengthen its argument, the editorial addresses the government's defence, that "international and local private media" tarnish "its image by portraying it as a violent and senseless party" (*The Standard* 2000:8). It argues that events such as "the farm invasions, murder and terrorism, do not stand the party in good stead" (*The Standard* 2000:8). In addition, it also argues that "the government, with the full backing of President Mugabe, has refused to back court orders—to stop the invasion—by instructing the police to stay out of it" (*The Standard* 2000:8). Regarding the image of government and Zanu PF, the editorial argues that the gazetted amendments provide "an opportunity for the ruling Zanu PF government to embark on an image mending mission by expeditiously, yet transparently, implementing the exercise" (*The Standard* 2000:8). Subsequently, it commends the President's assurance of "the international community that the redistribution exercise would not be used as a tool for meting out vengeance, but would ensure that land was divided in an orderly and transparent manner" (*The Standard* 2000:8). The editorial also uses the plight of "ordinary citizens" as a premise for its argument, suggesting that "being cut off from the international community inflicts more damage to the ordinary citizens than it does to the governing party" (*The Standard* 2000:8). Although this observation is not supported by evidence, the implication is that if the ruling Zanu PF government is really committed to what it believes is a "worthy cause", then normalising its image, and the image of the country among other nations is imperative. The editorial is using *logetic* persuasion to dissuade the government from its current approach to land reform and to adopt a lawful and organised method. The article raises national identity issues. Its concern over how Zimbabwe is perceived by "the international community" evidences Billig's observation that Zimbabwe "must be imagined as a nation amongst other nations" (1995:81). That is to say, it must conform to the expected image of a functional nation.

Discussion: Theme 2—Land and Elections

Social Memory

The evocation of the past in public communication is not an innocent exercise (Burke 1989/2011). It is thus important to ask who wants whom to remember what, as this helps us understand the social organisation of remembering and forgetting (Burke 1989/2011). Understanding the social organisation of social memory in a particular context helps us understand the politics of which its evocation is a part. In this section, the discussion identifies and discusses the uses of social memory in the articles analysed above and their implications for the construction of national identity in Zimbabwe.

The evocation of social memory by *The Sunday Mail* in the stories analysed above reflects two major tendencies. First, the newspaper evokes the memory of colonisation and the dynamics of dispossession associated with it to frame Africans as a people unified by this common experience, and Western countries as the constitutive outside that poses a constant imperialist threat. For instance, Mahoso's (2000) article entitled *Global Racism and the Land Issue in Zimbabwe*, evokes the memory of the colonial justice system which enforced laws that provided for both the expropriation of arable land from the country's indigenous population, and its segregation from European spaces. He did so to support his argument that courts based on Roman-Dutch Law and English Law cannot be used to solve the land issue in Zimbabwe as they are part of the problem. He argues that the "courts' enforcement of these racist codes of white 'just us'⁴⁸ is still fresh in the memory of most Africans" (Mahoso 2000:11). Mahoso also argues that a victory for white farmers in these courts today, is not a victory against individual government officials managing land reform, but the whole of society. For him, such a court ruling, "attempts to defeat more than a hundred years of African aspirations" (Mahoso 2000:11). He also draws on the memory of the liberation struggle in an article entitled *Reasons why 2005 Elections Should Be Anti-Blair* to argue that social memory is a resource "for new generations to understand the new forms which imperialism has assumed" (Mahoso 2004:9). The author argues that the injustices of colonialism are perpetuated through the erasure of social memory by latter day imperialists. The same goes for *The Sunday Mail's* editorial entitled *Zim Poll—Africa's Defining Moment*. The editorial refers to both the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, and the Berlin Conference of 1884, to explain African solidarity and a sense of common struggle against imperialism both of which can provide the raw materials for identity

⁴⁸ He uses this term in place of the word 'justice'.

formation. These articles' use of social memory builds and sustains 'us' and 'them' relationships between people from the former colonising countries, and the colonised. In fact, modern socio-political and economic programmes such as land reform are presented in ways that suggest an on-going struggle between the same forces that were in conflict during colonialism, which precludes any possibility for solidarity across different social groups in Zimbabwe. In other words, the usage builds and sustains racialised and antagonistic imaginations of belonging. The paper also uses social memory as a premise for its arguments. In other words, the social actions being proposed—that is, dissuading white farmers from appealing against land reform in courts, and encouraging the addressee to vote for Zanu PF *inter alia*—are justified on the basis of memories evoked. Second, the newspaper also evokes social memory to separate Zimbabweans from non-Zimbabweans at the level of the nation. In an article entitled *No Land for Foreigners*, *The Sunday Mail* draws on the memory of the Mozambican civil war to induce fear of the other—especially farm workers from Mozambique—among Zimbabweans. The newspaper frames farm workers as a dangerous threat with a history of banditry in the north-eastern provinces of Zimbabwe. This use of memory contradicts the Africanist frame apparent in the other articles as shown above. It emphasises the sovereignty of Zimbabwe as a nation, rather than see it in Pan-Africanist terms. The African identity is often invoked when the threat is perceived to be Western powers. *The Sunday Mail* thus evokes social memory, on the one hand, to identify Zimbabweans with the rest of Africa, and on the other, to identify Zimbabwe as a nation with its own unique characteristics within the African milieu.

The Sunday Mail's evocation of social memory can be explained in three major ways. First, its memory work is presentist in the sense that the past is evoked to justify contemporary socio-political and economic objectives such as to win elections, and to resettle indigenous citizens (Misztal 2003). Furthermore, these objectives require a clear sense of who can be voted for and who cannot, who can be resettled and who cannot, and what is at stake. From the discussion, it is clear that the newspaper draws on social memory to draw boundaries of belonging that cast opposition parties as puppets of the West, and therefore, illegitimate representatives of the nation. The newspaper also marks for exclusion from redistributive programmes such as land reform, Africans from other countries, and other Zimbabwean citizens who do not fit within the idealised sense of national belonging. It is this use of social memory which some argue is ahistorical, as it does not consider the dislocations of, and encounters between different people across time in Zimbabwe (Ranger 1996). Second, *The Sunday Mail's* constant reference to

colonial experience as a departure point for thinking contemporary social projects shows an attempt to create a sense—among Africans and Zimbabweans in particular—of a common past and a shared destiny (Misztal 2003). For example, the experience of colonialism and continuous struggle against imperialism in Africa is emphasised. The aim is to create solidarity among ‘African’ people—as understood from an indigenist standpoint—and legitimacy for the politicians invoking these narratives. This was arguably meant to address Zimbabwe’s isolation from the community of nations (see Billig 1995), especially after her withdrawal from the Commonwealth. Third, *The Sunday Mail*’s silence on such events as *Gukurahundi*, corruption, and intervention in the Congo War point to the social organisation of memory where some elements have to be selected for amnesia if the master commemorative narrative is to be sustained (Misztal 2003). However, it is also arguable that the evocation of colonial memories to explain or inform contemporary struggles shows that social memory provides the intellectual resources for resistance against dominant ideologies such as capitalism (Popular Memory Group 1982).

The Standard evokes social memory both to question official narratives of the government, and to expand the addressee’s understanding of historical events. For instance, in an article entitled *The Choice is Clear*, the newspaper questions the impression that Zanu PF alone is responsible for bringing about Zimbabwe’s independence. Instead, the newspaper argues that while “Zanu PF played a pivotal role in bringing about political independence to Zimbabwe [...] thousands of unsung heroes, who neither held a gun nor went to Mozambique or Zambia”⁴⁹ also “contributed immensely to the liberation struggle” (*The Standard* 2002:8). The paper specifies the specific roles played by some of these unsung heroes which in itself invites the addressee to recall these experiences thereby democratising the memory of the liberation struggle, and exposing the monolithic narrative of the government. This can also potentially result in the addressee thinking about Zimbabwean-ness, and the basis for such an identity outside the government’s frame of reference. *The Standard* also refers to the government’s policy of reconciliation enunciated at the onset of independence in 1980 to show how badly the Zanu PF government’s attempt at nation-building had collapsed. It argues that despite President Mugabe’s government and Party having brought

political stability to Zimbabwe in the aftermath of Independence through the policy of reconciliation [...] faced with a serious fight for his political life, Mugabe had proved

⁴⁹ Mozambique and Zambia hosted training bases for Zanla and Zipra forces, respectively.

to be nothing more than an unscrupulous dictator who will do anything to stay in power.
(*The Standard* 2002:8)

The Standard contradicts *The Sunday Mail*'s view of blaming the interference of the West for internal divisions, pointing instead to the Zanu PF government as the very source of social discord in Zimbabwe owing to its desire to hold on to a hegemonic position in the country's body politic. The paper also attributes the contemporary Zimbabwean crisis to the Zanu PF government's unbudgeted for gratuity to the war veterans, and its costly intervention in the internecine Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict of the late 1990s. The subjects of remembrance chosen by *The Standard* thus question the neo-imperialist rationale often used by the government to explain the crisis, and to frame African and Zimbabwean identity. Another subject of criticism is what *The Standard* refers to as "farm invasions" (2002:8). *The Standard*'s consistent reference to 'farm occupations' of the early 2000s as 'farm invasions', points to fractures in the land issue narrative. *The Standard*'s choice of words criminalises the land occupations, and almost rejects Zanu PF's emphasis on land resettlement as the most pressing issue at the time. The newspaper's position challenges the very basis upon which physical space is used to imagine Zimbabwean-ness by the Zanu PF government. The paper's evocation of social memory regarding land and elections attributes most of the problems faced by Zimbabwe at the time, to Zanu- PF's actions, rather than external factors.

The Standard's evocation of memory can be understood in two major ways. First, the newspaper resists the dominant interpretation of challenges facing contemporary Zimbabwe (Misztal 2003). Rather than attributing everything to the legacy of colonialism and neo-imperialism, *The Standard* refers to the past to show the mistakes and failures of the current government, and how these may have contributed to some of the country's contemporary problems. Furthermore, it shows how the government is manipulating the memory of key events in the nation's history to support its own impression of nationhood (Burke 1989). A good example is when the paper refers to the role played by ordinary Zimbabweans during the liberation struggle, which is often obscured to amplify the sense of sacrifice by those officially selected for valorisation as heroes. Secondly, that *The Standard* continuously questions the Zanu PFs government's explanations for the Zimbabwean crisis and its proposed solutions, shows the dynamic nature of social memory (see Popular Memory Group 1982). It shows that the government's narrative of the nation will always be subject to contestation as suppressed memories are vented in alternative communicative spaces.

Nation and Identity

The Sunday Mail's construction of nation and identity in the stories analysed above takes two forms. At one level, the newspaper defines Zimbabwean-ness in terms of race, and at another, it defines Zimbabwe as a sovereign nation among other nations. The notion that there is such a thing as a Zimbabwean is taken for granted in all articles analysed. However, a closer look at the articles' arguments reveals a specific sense of Zimbabwean-ness implied. Referring to the forthcoming presidential election, the editorial *Zim Poll: Africa's Defining Moment* notes that "Zimbabweans will once more use their democratic right to decide the fate of their country 22 years after attaining their hard-won independence" (*The Sunday Mail* 2002:8). This sentence suggests that a Zimbabwean is someone who 22 years ago was not independent, but now is. It is as if Zimbabwean-ness is reserved only for those who were once colonised—that is the native 'black' population of the country—but have now attained "*their*⁵⁰ hard-won independence" (*The Sunday Mail* 2002:8). In one opinion article written by Tafataona Mahoso, Zimbabwe's 2005 elections are defined as anti-Blair in the sense that they "are based on the ideology of pan-African and national liberation whose basic objective is the unity of all the elements and sectors of society resisting imperialism" (Mahoso 2004:9). While the statement sounds inclusive of all who are against imperialism, the author specifies his referent. He argues that "the liberation movement is the biggest and most authentic challenge to imperialism" (Mahoso 2004:9). Thus, for him, no one can authentically be anti-imperialist except the liberation movement. The character of the liberation movement is implied in his definition of an anti-Blair election as that which brings "together all our pan-African and nationalist intellectuals, professionals, workers, farmers and peasants" and "opposing tribalism, regionalism, elitism and careerism in the interest of a cohesive national and pan-African liberation movement" (Mahoso 2004:9).

Evidently, Zimbabwean nationhood is conceived by the author in terms of unity across many other sources of difference except 'race'. This is a telling omission as it implicitly suggests that Zimbabweans belong to only one 'race'. It can therefore be argued that the constitutive outside is imagined in terms of an imperialist threat, which is taken as synonymous with white people, and other Zimbabweans—especially from the opposition MDC—who are represented as puppets of imperialists. Silence on 'race' as a marker of difference leaves out the Indian, Coloured and Asian people living in Zimbabwe, implying that they do not belong to the social

⁵⁰ My emphasis.

groups who should be united within the ambit of an anti-Blair election (Muzondidya 2005, 2007). The newspaper also speaks of Zimbabweans as a “sovereign people”, and the “right to sovereignty of an independent Zimbabwe” to separate it from other nations (*The Sunday Mail*, 3 March 2002). Zimbabweans are thus imagined in contrast to other nationalities such as Mozambicans, Zambians and the British.

The Sunday Mail's arguments evidence an indigenist construction of national identity. Indigenist constructions are characterised by, among other things, calls for the total decolonisation of the vestiges of colonialism (Mbembe 2008; Mazrui 2001), the politics of self-determination (Ranger 2009; Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007), and the reification of African-ness, blackness and ethnicity (Mbembe 2002). Mahoso's article, *Global Racism and the Land Issue in Zimbabwe*, specifies the need to transform “the legal framework from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe” so that it reflects “the values and aspirations of the majority of this nation” (2000:11). The implication is that the law must assume a particularistic character which reflects the “values and aspirations of the majority” (Mahoso 2000:11). The basis for this argument is that the justice (‘just us’) system in Zimbabwe serves the minority settler interests whom he refers to as “the white Rhodesian in Zimbabwe” (Mahoso 2004:9). His argument ironically suggests transformation from one form of particularism to another, which is likely simply to shift the patterns of injustice from one group of people to another. Also, by equating the ownership of land by white farmers in Zimbabwe to it being “so important for Britain, for the US, for the European Union”, Mahoso excludes them from the Zimbabwean nation (2000:11). Another group of people targeted for exclusion from the nation are foreign farm workers whom *The Sunday Mail* argues cannot be resettled unless they are Zimbabwean citizens (2000). This position shows the tension between African identity and national identity. While the newspaper invokes African identity when it is expedient to do so, it also invokes a nationalistic identity as a way of excluding other Africans from its frame of reference. For example, the newspaper refers to “Zimbabweans”, “the right to sovereignty of an independent Zimbabwe” and to Africa's support for “Zimbabwe's sovereign right to determine her destiny” (*The Sunday Mail* 2002:8). Lastly, Zimbabwe is spoken of in terms of its struggle against imperialist forces against which it must assert its self-determination. But to do so, the imperialist forces and their assumed proxies are identified for exclusion from the conception of Zimbabwean-ness. *The Sunday Mail's* discussion of land and elections in Zimbabwe thus tends to particularise and narrow Zimbabwean-ness to native ‘blacks’ who fit the master-commemorative narrative definitive of its nationhood.

In contrast, *The Standard's* representation of belonging counteracts the reductionism that is evident in *The Sunday Mail*. Its arguments avoid the reduction of African-ness and Zimbabwean-ness to blackness, as well as whiteness to imperialism. It also avoids the reduction of opposition politicians and their supporters to puppets of the west, and Zanu PF and its supporters to revolutionaries. As Magaisa argues, “there is a large body of Zimbabweans that does not necessarily agree with Zanu PF politics, but still has issues with the West and its handling of international affairs” (2007:11). This view contradicts Zanu PF’s usual conflation of opposition politics with a naïve understanding of imperialism’s contemporary forms. For him, “one can still oppose Zanu PF without necessarily becoming a stooge of the West” (Magaisa 2007:11). Furthermore, he argues that opposition to Zanu PF does not mean that one is sympathetic to the opposition “MDC’s political agenda” (Magaisa 2007:11). Thus, someone “who is critical of the MDC” is not necessarily a Zanu PF loyalist (Magaisa 2007:11). *The Standard's* editorial entitled *The Choice is Clear* also criticises limiting credit for the attainment of independence to Zanu PF. Instead, the newspaper argues that although Zanu PF played a key role “in bringing about political independence to Zimbabwe. There are also thousands of unsung heroes” (*The Standard* 2002:8). This argument expands belonging on the basis of participation in the liberation struggle beyond Zanu PF functionaries. Furthermore, articles from *The Standard* do not blame only neo-imperialism for the failure of post-independence nation-building projects, but internal factors as well. For example, the newspaper criticises President Mugabe and his government for failing to deliver on the policy of reconciliation enunciated at the onset of Zimbabwe’s independence. *The Standard's* editorial *No More Excuses* criticises the farm occupations by landless peasants as “farm invasions” (*The Standard* 2000:8). This is a telling choice of words. Unlike *The Sunday Mail*, the editorial indicates that *The Standard* treats white farmers as people who are entitled to the farms which are being ‘invaded’. The term invaders, suggests that the land occupiers are the ones whose presence on the farms is illegal, as opposed to *The Sunday Mail* which treats the white farmers as the illegal occupiers of the farms. However, as with *The Sunday Mail*, the notion of Africa and African-ness, as well as Zimbabwe and Zimbabwean-ness are taken for granted. This suggests that the nation-state is not questioned as a framework for thinking identity.

The Standard's conception of national identity is consistent with a humanist or universalist view of belonging. This view encompasses “a politics of hope”, characterised by “human dignity for all” (Mbembe and Posel 2005:284). Although it takes Zimbabwean-ness for granted, *The Standard* does not limit the sense of Zimbabwean-ness to a particular group. For

example, the newspaper democratises the narrative of independence by valorising the role of ordinary people in the liberation struggle. It also criticises the government's failure to implement the policy of reconciliation which shows the newspaper's orientation towards a more inclusive society after the attainment of independence. *The Standard* characterises President Mugabe's reaction to the rejection of a draft constitution, which his government had put up for consideration in a referendum, as a declaration of "war against his own people by sanctioning farm invasions" (2002:8). This implies that white farmers are considered as much the President's "own people" as 'black' Zimbabweans who are often addressed in those terms by *The Sunday Mail*. The paper's criticism of the ideological reductionism that treats opposition politics as complicit with imperialism, and Zanu PF's politics as pro-people (mostly native blacks Zimbabweans), shows the newspaper's orientation towards an inclusive imagination of Zimbabwean-ness. *The Standard's* narrative on land and elections does not narrow Zimbabwean-ness according to race or ethnicity, but evidences an orientation towards citizenship as the basis for thinking belonging in the country.

The political discourse analysis of opinions and editorials from *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* continues in Chapter Eight.

Chapter Eight

A Political Discourse Analysis of *The Sunday Mail's* and *The Standard's* Opinions and Editorials

Discourse always has in mind an implied addressee, an imagined subject position which it requires the addressee to occupy. Newspapers are concerned – and deliberately, despite the unnoticeability of the discursive process – to construct ideal readers. (Fowler 1991:232)

Introduction

This chapter is a continuation of the analytic work started in Chapter Seven. It discusses two themes: first, *Gukurahundi*; and second, Unity and National Heroes. In each of these themes I analyse selected articles from the government controlled *The Sunday Mail*, and the privately owned *The Standard* using a political discourse analysis approach. I conclude each themed section with a discussion of their treatment of Social Memory and National Identity⁵¹.

A Political Discourse Analysis of Articles

Theme 3: Gukurahundi

The Sunday Mail (Government Controlled)

Unity Begins with All of Us

I selected this article (*The Sunday Mail* 22 December 2013) for analysis because it is one of a very few articles that addressed *Gukurahundi* in *The Sunday Mail* in the period under study. It was written following the memorialisation of Zimbabwe's late Vice President Dr Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo, after whom an international airport and main street in Zimbabwe's second largest city, Bulawayo, were named. His statue was also erected in the city along the newly named Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo Street. Dr Nkomo is revered by many Zimbabweans for his role in the liberation struggle as leader of both Zapu, and its military wing, Zipra. He is also credited with ending the savage killing of civilians in Matabeleland during *Gukurahundi* by sacrificing Zapu's autonomy for a Unity Accord with its rival Zanu, in 1987. He is thus represented by the government as a symbol of national unity, hence the unveiling of his memorialisation on Unity Day (22 December). The argumentative perspective used by *The Sunday Mail* is dialectical since the article engages with Zimbabweans—especially those seen

⁵¹ See Appendix D.

as less embracing of the ideal of unity (see Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). The newspaper uses both epideictic and deliberative rhetoric since it is concerned with both the present and the future (Richardson 2007). By invoking Dr Nkomo's sacrifices it uses his struggle stature to support the main argument that Zimbabweans should foster national unity.

The Sunday Mail takes it for granted that unity among Zimbabweans is in question and requires reinforcement. Also, such questions as “are Zimbabweans truly united?” and “is everyone benefitting from it?” (*The Sunday Mail* 2013) indicate the paper's awareness of issues which fracture the conception of Zimbabwean-ness. To engage its addressee, the newspaper outlines the benefits of unity to the nation (which is also taken for granted), thereby inviting the diversity of Zimbabweans to participate in thinking about what it means to be a nation (see Hall 1992). It highlights conditions associated with both the presence and absence of unity. By focusing on the benefits it encourages the addressee to embrace unity, but it also offers the perilous consequences of unity's absence to discourage the pursuit of divisive ends. It argues that unity works as “the glue that enables the people of Zimbabwe to work together in fulfilment of national objectives”, and that it is the precondition for “a shared vision” (*The Sunday Mail* 2013). However, a corollary of this line of thinking is that anything that falls outside the accepted notion of Zimbabwean-ness, its national objectives and vision can be taken as divisive and therefore treated as a threat. The paper argues that “without a shared vision, we are all self-centred individuals wandering aimlessly in the dark with no prospect of seeing beyond our whims and caprices” (*The Sunday Mail* 2013). This argument persuades the addressee to embrace national unity and work towards its achievement by reducing the fundamentals threatening such unity to mere whims and caprices. In this way *The Sunday Mail* anticipates resistance from some social groups with historical grievances, but trivialises these grievances as mere whims and caprices. Any challenge to the desired unity is therefore framed as self-serving and impulsive. In addition, the newspaper also uses the spectre of violence and war to persuade its addressee to embrace unity. It argues that “many of the people who cherish unity are those who have experienced the brutality of war and violence”, and uses Zimbabwe as an example of this:

Zimbabwe, after all, is a nation that has had more than its fair share of strife. From the days of bloody colonial conquest in the 1890s to the armed liberation struggle and eventually to Independence in 1980, the trend was clearly defined. In the 1980s, the nation was plunged into atrocious violence, culminating in the signing of the 1987 Unity Accord. (*The Sunday Mail* 2013)

The newspaper's association of the absence of unity with war and violence persuades its addressee in two ways. First, it anticipates resistance especially from victims of *Gukurahundi*, pacifying them with the argument that those who have experienced the brutality of war cherish unity as a pre-condition for peace. *The Sunday Mail* also directs the addressee's attention away from past traumatic experiences towards a future characterised by unity. It argues that although the emotional scars left by the country's violent history cannot be fully healed, "there is also a determination to look to the future with optimism" because "while we cannot change the past, we can shape the future" (*The Sunday Mail* 2013). Second, by framing unity in terms of the absence of war, the newspaper classifies voices that are discordant with national unity as posing the threat of violence and war. This argument implicitly suggests that threats to unity may be handled violently since they also pose a threat of violence and war. The addressee may be persuaded to embrace unity for their own survival or self-preservation.

The newspaper also addresses other sources of dissent that stand in the way of unity's achievement. For instance, it also refers to the unequal regard for vernacular languages, especially *isiNdebele* and other minority languages, the lack of linguistic diversity in the media, and the unwillingness of government officials to learn other languages spoken in the country. This set of problems is listed in specific terms because the issues raised are less complicated to deal with than those associated with previous experiences of violence and war. It is evident that the newspaper is avoiding more serious issues raised by people from the Matabeleland provinces of Zimbabwe, such as economic marginalisation, the memorialisation of *Gukurahundi*, as well as justice and restitution for the atrocities committed during *Gukurahundi*, directing them instead towards a future characterised by national unity. The implications of this argument for social memory and nation-building are discussed below.

The Standard (Privately Owned)

Diplomatic Talk and the Marginalised

This opinion piece (*The Standard* 25 November 2007) was written by Brilliant Mhlanga in response to a statement by then Spanish Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Santiago Martinez-Caro, whose suggestions on what should be considered for an inclusive government neglected the specific grievances of people from Matabeleland. The author's central argument is that any process that seeks to move the country in a positive direction must consider unresolved historical grievances such as the violence meted on the people of Matabeleland during *Gukurahundi*, and their continued marginalisation. The argumentative perspective used is

dialectical as the author engages the Spanish ambassador, politicians, and Zimbabwean citizens. It also uses forensic and deliberative rhetoric. The rhetoric is forensic as it is concerned with the injustices of *Gukurahundi*, and deliberative, since it seeks to induce politicians to address the grievances associated with *Gukurahundi* in future political actions. The mode of persuasion used is mainly *ethotic* as the persuasion is based on the author's reputation as a human rights activist and a victim of *Gukurahundi* violence.

The author's criticism of the Spanish ambassador's statement is his concern that the statement fails to engage with these issues at a critical time, as the 'nation' is looking for a long-term solution to its crisis through a negotiated settlement between competing political forces, at the centre of which he argues, is the legacy of *Gukurahundi*. One of the main reasons why Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe has remained in office for so long (which some argue is germane to the crisis) is *Gukurahundi* (probably to evade prosecution). He argues that the importance of *Gukurahundi* to the country's political situation is evident in the discursive restrictions on the topic. Mhlanga also argues that the ambassador's statement is part of a "dismissive discourse" "which seems not to be addressing the core issues" of the people of Matabeleland (2007:11). The "dismissive discourse" precludes open and free discussion of the grievances of the people of Matabeleland because it criminalises and trivialises "open, honest and candid expression, seeking to show the deeper meaning of the politics of Zimbabwe" (Mhlanga 2007:11). He criticises the ambassador's use of the phrase "retribution for past activities, on a regional and ethnic basis" as an example of how "dismissive discourse" can "soil various civil society initiatives to forge for a forum to openly discuss the crisis of the people of Matabeleland, particularly the genocide" (Mhlanga 2007:11). He engages his addressee as "a person from Matabeleland", and from this position, speaks of *Gukurahundi* as "the horrors committed on us" in "an act which was done in the fashion of Hitler's Holocaust" during which there was "loss of our loved ones" (Mhlanga 2007:11). However, despite his declared identification with Matabeleland, Mhlanga also positions himself as a Zimbabwean. For instance, he speaks of "dark patches in our history as a nation" and in his reference to *Gukurahundi*, argues that "it happened and we must find a common solution to it as Zimbabweans" (Mhlanga 2007:11). His identification with Zimbabwean-ness is also evident in his criticism of the ambassador's statement as potentially divisive. The basis for his argument is that the trivialisation of crises faced by people of Matabeleland can alienate them from the Zimbabwean collective. Mhlanga thus argues for the resolution of grievances particular to the people of Matabeleland both at a regional and national levels. But, at another level, his

argument also reveals the tension between his regional and national inclinations. For example, while accepting that the crises faced by people from Matabeleland are a national problem, he argues against emphasis on a “national agenda” since this approach demands that “what happened to other sections must be swiftly swept under the carpet” (Mhlanga 2007:15). His concerns can be understood in the context that the idea of nation or ‘the national’, is sometimes constructed to serve certain configurations of power (see Smith 2004). Against this background, he argues “for an all-embracing approach which encompasses a wide section of Zimbabwe’s troubled groups” (Mhlanga 2007:15). He also indicates that the talks’ failure to accommodate these groups threatens the very idea of Zimbabwe when he says that he hopes the talks “will be the beginning of a political transition which [...] will end in a national framework which all Zimbabweans will be able to accept” (Mhlanga 2007:15). This statement implicitly suggests that the current framework is not acceptable to all Zimbabweans, thereby showing the fractures in Zimbabwean-ness.

Discussion: Theme 3—Gukurahundi

Social Memory

The Sunday Mail’s editorial draws on social memory to argue the importance of unity in two major ways. First, it refers to Dr Nkomo’s “immense personal sacrifices, courage, determination, and the ideal of a higher calling” (*The Sunday Mail* 2013)—without specifying the context for such sacrifices—urging the addressee to espouse unity. The newspaper uses the occasion of Dr Nkomo’s memorialisation as an opportunity to appeal for unity among Zimbabweans. The persuasive potential of such an appeal is enhanced by referring to his sacrifices, his courage and ideals, for which the addressee must show gratitude by at least participating in the idea of a united Zimbabwe. It is significant that the newspaper does not specify when such sacrifices were made since this also includes his ostracisation by the same government which today, through *The Sunday Mail* which it controls, and his memorialisation, is inviting the addressee to participate in nation-building. But *The Sunday Mail*’s description of the sacrifice as “immense” is an acknowledgement of Dr Nkomo’s sacrifice during the liberation struggle, *Gukurahundi*, and through the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987 which led to his political party being subsumed by Zanu. The appeal to be receptive to the idea of unity, as was Dr Nkomo, is to those who were traumatised by *Gukurahundi*, and denied justice afterwards. To warn its addressee of how perilous the situation can get in the absence of unity, it refers to the violence of colonisation in the 1890s, the violence of the armed liberation struggle for independence in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the violence of *Gukurahundi* in

the early 1980s. However, it speaks of *Gukurahundi* violence in terms that do not assign responsibility to anyone as that might expose the ambiguity of the call to unity since it was the government-deployed 5th Brigade which inflicted deadly violence on the mainly civilian population of Matabeleland. The editorial discourages a re-examination of these historical incidences of violent conflict by arguing that a future characterised by unity is the only way to preclude the recurrence of such violence. Instead, it cites grievances around language use as one of the major threats to unity without addressing more fundamental issues such as the trauma of *Gukurahundi*, violence during elections, the violent fast track land reform programme of the early 2000s and so on.

This editorial's use of social memory shows both the construction of identities in contemporary societies, and the concomitant negotiation between competing memories. It shows the effort invested by different social groups in recovering and re-interpreting their past to construct their sense of belonging (Halbwachs 1992). It does this by tracing the history of modern day Zimbabwe as far back as the 1890s to naturalise a sense of common past and shared destiny to create social cohesion (Misztal 2003:56; see also Smith 2004, 2009). The editorial also shows how powerful groups manipulate memory for political expediency (Misztal 2003). For instance, very little is said about the *Gukurahundi* conflict because that history can undermine the legitimacy of the current government. It emphasises memories that are expected to reinforce cohesion (the history of colonisation and the struggle against it) rather than foster division as does that of *Gukurahundi*. The editorial also shows how dominant interpretations of the past negotiate with counter-memories to come up with an acceptable form of public memory (Popular Memory Group 1982). This is evident in the way the editorial addresses, albeit in a passive and defensive way, grievances that are associated with counter-memory. Examples include reference to *Gukurahundi*, and the language issue. The memory of *Gukurahundi* is only evoked as a caveat against divisive tendencies. However, since the evocation of social memory in this editorial is aimed at uniting Zimbabweans, presumably to preclude violent conflict, the evocation can also be said to be progressive (see Misztal 2003; Todorov 2009).

In contrast to *The Sunday Mail's* editorial, the opinion article from *The Standard* emphasises *Gukurahundi*. The author, who tacitly identifies himself with the victims of *Gukurahundi*, draws on its memory to argue for “an all embracing approach” to the talks that sought to address Zimbabwe's multi-pronged crisis in 2007. He refers to the “horrors committed on us” and how the people of Matabeleland lost “our loved ones” (Mhlanga 2007:11). Mhlanga also draws on

the memory of “Hitler’s Holocaust” to argue that *Gukurahundi* was genocide (2007:11). The author’s evocation of the memory of “Hitler’s Holocaust” is meant to provide a strong counterpoint to the Spanish Ambassador’s description of demands for justice by people from Matabeleland, as pursuit of “retribution for past activities, on a regional and ethnic basis” (Mhlanga 2007:11). He also traces the economic marginalisation of the Matabeleland region back to 1980 when Zimbabwe became an independent nation. In other words, Mhlanga’s use of social memory is aimed at showing the gravity of the grievances of people from Matabeleland, and to question the very idea of Zimbabwean-ness if these grievances remain unaddressed. The latter point is made more explicit at the end of the article where he calls for a political transition that takes into account grievances about the *Gukurahundi* genocide and economic marginalisation in Matabeleland, in order to create “a national framework which all Zimbabweans will be able to accept” (Mhlanga 2007:15). Thus, in contradiction to *The Sunday Mail* which evokes *Gukurahundi* as a warning against divisiveness, Mhlanga, evokes it as a potential source of divisiveness unless it is addressed through a “common solution” (2007:11).

As some scholars have argued, nationalists use a master-commemorative narrative that emanates from a specific historical event as an ideological framework to build a collective sense of identity (Zerubavel 1995). Narratives that can potentially undermine the master commemorative narrative are either marginalised or chosen for amnesia (Megill 1998), and then become a source of counter memory (Zerubavel 1995). This practice is more evident with marginalised memories of traumatic events which tend to be a source of intense counter-memory (Misztal 2003:139). It is thus evident that in contrast to *The Sunday Mail*’s editorial, Mhlanga’s article is concerned with the mnemonic marginalisation of *Gukurahundi* within the master-commemorative narrative—as demonstrated in his critique of its omission in the talks aimed at addressing the Zimbabwean crisis. He criticises the Spanish Ambassador for encouraging the people of Matabeleland “to forget about the horrors committed” during *Gukurahundi* in the name of addressing the “national agenda” (Mhlanga 2007:11, 15). His evocation of *Gukurahundi*’s memory, wittingly or unwittingly, challenges the master-commemorative narrative whose function as the basis for Zimbabwean-ness is contingent on forgetting the 1980s atrocities (Misztal 2003). *Gukurahundi* emerges in Mhlanga’s article as demotic memory sustained by the victims of *Gukurahundi* who resist the master commemorative narrative (see Foucault 1974/2011). The difference between *The Sunday Mail*’s and *The Standard*’s treatment of *Gukurahundi* as part of national memory shows that what is remembered is always socially framed (Halbwachs 1992). The master commemorative

narrative promoted by *The Sunday Mail* fosters social cohesion around the liberation struggle in the context of diversity and difference, whereas the counter-memory of *Gukurahundi* is sustained by the denial of justice for the victims. However, Mhlanga's evocation of *Gukurahundi* is as much a nationalist project as the evocation of the struggle for independence by the Zimbabwean government. In as much as the struggle for independence is used to create social cohesion by the government, Mhlanga is also using the memory of *Gukurahundi* to create cohesion among "the people of Matabeleland" (Mhlanga 2007:11). Mhlanga's evocation of *Gukurahundi* thus works as both counter-memory (against the government's master-commemorative narrative) and master-commemorative narrative for the people of Matabeleland.

Nation and Identity

The Sunday Mail editorial evidences the challenges of conflating race and nation in a context of difference along ethnic, racial, and cultural lines, amongst others. On the one hand, *The Sunday Mail* treats Zimbabwe as a timeless entity that can be traced back to precolonial times when it speaks of it as a "nation that has had more than its fair share of strife. From the days of bloody colonial conquest in the 1890s to the armed liberation struggle and eventually to Independence in 1980" (2013). Given the diversity of modern day Zimbabwe's ethno-linguistic and cultural groups, this universalisation can only be achieved in terms of race. Thus, in accordance with the argument of *The Sunday Mail's* editorial, Zimbabwe refers to some sections of its black population because it is only they who can trace their history to 1890 when they encountered bloody colonial conquest. Based on this view, *The Sunday Mail* takes it for granted that there is such a thing as "Father Zimbabwe", "the people of Zimbabwe", "national objectives", "shared vision", "National Unity", "Zimbabweans", "Zimbabweanhood", "national cohesion", "national television", and "a nation with a history of strife" among other things (2013). On the other hand, the very call for unity implicitly acknowledges that Zimbabwe today is still an ongoing project of nation-building. For example, the editorial refers to divisions when it acknowledges that some languages "appear more important than others" and when "the rich diversity of Zimbabwean languages does not find full expression on national television, radio and the newspapers" (*The Sunday Mail* 2013). Speaking of the legacy of *Gukurahundi*, the paper uses the passive voice to obfuscate who the perpetrators and the victims were (*The Sunday Mail* 2013). The paper's call for unity shows in more explicit terms its active role as an agent of nation-building. It does this first, by speaking of Zimbabwean-

ness in terms of its historical origins, and second, in terms of the concomitant processes of homogenisation evident in the call for unity.

The Sunday Mail's conception of Zimbabwean-ness is in terms of what Brubaker calls polity based nationalism (1996a:411-412). This is when a government or nationalist movement seeks to “nationalise an existing polity” (Brubaker 1996a:412). What is ironic, however, is that the newspaper’s conception of Zimbabwean-ness reflects a form of culturalist-primordialism since the kind of unity sought is conceived in terms of a nation with historical origins going as far back as the onset of colonialism (Ozkirimli 2000). This means that social groups falling outside this conception will remain excluded, if not explicitly, then in subtle ways. From the patterns emerging from the stories analysed so far, it can be concluded that when social memory is at the centre of identity construction in *The Sunday Mail*, such identities tend to be of an essentialist kind, with the privileged group being those of the indigenous ‘black’ race.

The Standard's opinion article shows how demotic memories of traumatic events can put pressure on the imagination of nationhood. The article was written by a human rights activist, Brilliant Mhlanga, who experienced the savagery of *Gukurahundi*. This may explain why he begins by foregrounding his regional identity “as a person from Matabeleland”, and his identification with the victims of *Gukurahundi* (2007:11). As noted above, he criticises the Spanish Ambassador’s statement for encouraging “us to forget about the horrors committed on us and the loss of our loved ones” (Mhlanga 2007:11). Having clarified his position, he shifts to using the third person in his reference to “the people of Matabeleland” in the rest of the article (Mhlanga 2007:11, 15). He also refers to Matabeleland as an outpost within the broader confines of the country to emphasise the alienating effect of their marginalisation. For instance, he refers to Matabeleland as “a seemingly God-forsaken region in all respects”, and as “that part of the country” (Mhlanga 2007:11). Furthermore, in his criticism of the Spanish Ambassador’s views, he argues that “the problems of Matabeleland are quite dissimilar to those of Harare” (Mhlanga 2007:11). This is a confusing statement because it makes a comparison between a region which is almost half the size of the country, and Zimbabwe’s capital city, Harare. But it can be argued that the statement reveals his impression of Matabeleland as both an alienated region of Zimbabwe, and as a separate region with some sense of subjugated sovereignty. His use of Harare does not necessarily refer to the city itself, but to the regions that are not marginalised and whose capital is Harare. Nevertheless, Mhlanga also identifies himself with the Zimbabwean identity when he speaks of “dark patches in our history as a

nation”, and also when he argues, in reference to *Gukurahundi*, that “we must find a common solution to it as Zimbabweans” (2007:11). In the rest of the article, he consistently refers to “the people of Matabeleland” when he is talking about their grievances which include the experience of genocide, aspirations for justice, and fight against marginalisation among other things. In contrast, he refers to Zimbabwean identity when he proposes formulating solutions to the crisis in Zimbabwe, and to address the grievances of people from Matabeleland. For example, he speaks of “solutions for Zimbabwe as a whole”, “addressing the political crisis in Zimbabwe”, and “a framework which all Zimbabweans will be able to accept” (Mhlanga 2007:15). Mhlanga’s article shows how social groups whose traumatic historical experiences and marginalisation within a ‘nation’ can challenge the idealised imagination of that ‘nation’. He shows that even though Matabeleland is currently encapsulated within the cartographic demarcation called Zimbabwe, its people’s historical experience of genocide and continued marginalisation afterwards, threatens their identification with ‘Zimbabwe’.

Mhlanga’s article supports the view that “‘the voice of the nation’ is a fiction” as it tends to over-look the struggles “which make such a fiction possible” (Billig 1995:71). The article clarifies the source of division in the imagination of national identity in Zimbabwe. It shows the deep-seated grievances that nurture a sense of injustice and marginalisation among the people of Matabeleland. This explains the government’s emphasis on unity evident in *The Sunday Mail*’s editorial. As others argue, remembering and forgetting are central to the constitution of a nation and can be used to legitimate or justify the goals of a political movement (Renan 1882/2011). In the case of *The Sunday Mail*, the objective is to evoke elements of social memory that mobilise Zimbabweans towards the achievement of unity. But Mhlanga argues that the achievement of such unity is conditional on the achievement of justice for the people of Matabeleland—a point obfuscated in *The Sunday Mail*’s narrative. The evocation of social memory by the two newspapers regarding *Gukurahundi* shows that the construction of the past reflects “the balance of hegemony” in the present (Billig 1995:71). On the one hand, *The Sunday Mail* evokes social memory as a way of legitimating and entrenching the hegemonic position of the status quo. On the other, *The Standard* evokes social memory both to empower marginalised social groups in Zimbabwe, and to question the legitimacy of Zimbabwe’s current political system. The legacy of *Gukurahundi* in Zimbabwe also resonates with the indigenist view shown in Chapter Four, which explains the fragility of the post-colonial state in Africa in terms its failure to create egalitarian societies, thereby spawning a politics of self-determination among marginalised social groups within a country (see Herbst 2000; Mazrui 1995).

Theme 4: Unity and National Heroes

The Sunday Mail (Government Controlled)

Let us All Share Nkomo's Vision

This editorial (*The Sunday Mail* 4 July 2004) was written during the commemorative week for the late former Zimbabwean Vice-President Dr Joshua Nkomo who died on July 1 1999. It was also written at a time when the opposition MDC posed the biggest political challenge to the ruling Zanu PF which has been in power since independence in 1980. The crux of the editorial's argument is that Zimbabweans must put Dr Nkomo's vision for a united nation into practice. Its argument uses both dialectical and rhetorical forms of persuasion (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). The dialectical approach is evident as *The Sunday Mail* addresses the opposition MDC, possibly Ndebele nationalists, and anyone assumed to be undermining the paper's position on national unity. It persuades its addressee to emulate, and heed the late Vice-President's call for national unity. Its epideictic approach foregrounds Dr Nkomo's noble reputation (Richardson 2007). It also uses a deliberative form of persuasion arguing for the desirability of unity in Zimbabwe both currently and in the future (Richardson 2007). It seeks to persuade its addressee to take practical steps towards the actualisation of national unity. The argument's persuasive act is *ethotic* as the newspaper uses the character of Dr Nkomo to underline its message. It is also *pathotic* as it draws on the figure of Dr Nkomo—a much respected person in Zimbabwe—who died in the recent past, and who, despite his persecution by both the colonial government and the post-independence government, still called for unity among Zimbabweans. The sense of personal sacrifice associated with his experiences potentially invokes an emotional response by the editorial's addressee.

The editorial's central argument is that “ours should be a quest for one nation united behind one vision” (*The Sunday Mail* 2004:8). It shows Dr Nkomo's eminent position in both pre- and post-independence Zimbabwe so that his views, and the editorial's argument, are read against the backdrop of his character and pedigree. For example, it notes:

in our memories, Dr Nkomo stands tall as a symbol of liberation, a symbol of economic empowerment, a symbol of self-sacrifice, and, above all, he stands as a symbol of national unity. Hence the title Father Zimbabwe or Umdala Wethu, which fits him perfectly. (*The Sunday Mail* 2004:8)

Against this backdrop, the addressee is invited to participate in building national cohesion in accordance with the vision of one of the country's founding fathers who among other things, symbolises “above all, [...] national unity” (*The Sunday Mail* 2004:8). The editorial argues that

because of his pedigree, Zimbabweans should honour the late Vice-President by “implementing his teachings” and transforming his vision (for a unified Zimbabwe) into reality (*The Sunday Mail* 2004:8). The editorial concentrates the addressee’s attention on the issue of national unity. Its form of persuasion is *ethotic*, arguing that since Father Zimbabwe’s vision “was a lifelong quest for unity”, so should ours be too (*The Sunday Mail* 2004:8). The aim of the argument is to frame those seen as frustrating the achievement of unity, and negating Dr Nkomo’s vision, as threatening the integrity of the Zimbabwean nation, and serving short-term interests. For example, the opposition MDC is criticised for selling-out Zimbabwe after British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s “declaration in the House of Commons that London was working with the MDC to effect a regime change in Harare” (*The Sunday Mail* 2004:8). The basis for *The Sunday Mail*’s criticism is that regime change is not simply about changing the government of the day, but “a reversal of what this country presently stands for, a reversal of the land reform programme. Indigenisation programme, etc” (2004:8). The notion of a regime change speaks to a shift in the country’s “destiny” that includes control by Zimbabweans over the “resources of their country” which they can develop “for their own sake and for the sake of posterity” (*The Sunday Mail* 2004:8)—which the MDC is presented as undermining. The editorial sees the MDC’s association with the Blair government as an indication that it does not share in the nation’s vision, but serves imperialist interests. It argues that the MDC seeks to sabotage the economy, works with former colonisers, advances imperialist interests, and advocates for sanctions against Zimbabwe. Furthermore, it indirectly addresses *Gukurahundi*, another major source of disunity in Zimbabwe. It argues that the reason Dr Nkomo signed the Unity Accord of 1987 was because “Zimbabwe is not attaining its full potential because of disunity” (*The Sunday Mail* 2004:8). For *The Sunday Mail*, the Unity Accord eliminated ethnic considerations “in the administration of the national affairs of the country” but criticises “some” for resuscitating “that dark past” (2004:8). What remains unsaid is the full context preceding the signing of the Unity Accord, and reasons why some people still refer to *Gukurahundi*. Ironically, *The Sunday Mail* is not as eager to talk about *Gukurahundi* as it is about the colonial era, even though both are sources of social division in the country. The editorial’s use of *ethos* and *pathos* in its argument is a strategy for precluding reasoned discussion over the sources of division (especially *Gukurahundi*) which have to be overcome to achieve genuine unity, and for narrowing the conception of national unity to its own terms of reference.

We Know Our Heroes

This editorial (*The Sunday Mail* 12 August 2012) appeared on Heroes Day, a day set aside for remembering those classified as national heroes who died during and after the liberation war in Zimbabwe. It was also published at a time when COPAC—a parliamentary committee tasked with developing a new Constitution—had produced a draft which *The Sunday Mail* argues downplayed “the significance of our liberation history and the contribution of our living and fallen heroes” (2012:10). Its central argument is that a hero is someone who takes practical steps to deal with “poverty, hunger, disease and economic inequality” in Africa, rather than someone who serves “the interests of global capital” at the expense of the poor (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). Its modes of argumentation are both dialectical and rhetorical (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). The editorial dialectically engages with those it sees as condescending to both liberation heroes, and living war veterans. It persuades Zimbabweans to value economic freedom as much as they do political freedom, and to venerate those who have fought, and are still fighting, for the former. The editorial’s rhetorical orientation cuts across the forensic, epideictic and deliberative types (Richardson 2007). Forensically it defends the role played by “our living and fallen heroes” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10); epideictically it seeks to prove that heroes—past and present—are worthy of admiration; and deliberatively it exhorts “true patriots” to fight for people’s “economic emancipation” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). It uses *logotic* modes of persuasion based on cogent argumentation, and *pathotic* appeals to the addressee’s negative emotional disposition towards exploitation and domination (Richardson 2007). *The Sunday Mail*’s explication of threats to economic emancipation, and its appeal to the addressee’s antipathy for exploitation, domination and poverty, strengthen its persuasive potential.

To show who is considered a hero in Zimbabwe, *The Sunday Mail* juxtaposes the responses and actions of two different groups of people to the crises faced by Africans. The newspaper argues that:

on a continent mired in poverty, hunger, disease and economic inequality, a hero is the person who takes practical steps in confronting these evils. A hero can never be a person who fights to preserve the interests of global capital at the expense of the down-trodden masses. (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10)

From this position *The Sunday Mail* argues that democracy rings hollow as long as it is not accompanied by the economic emancipation of “the black majority” in Africa (2012:10). The editorial recommends ‘resource nationalism’ and economic indigenisation as a solution to this

challenge. It argues that ‘resource nationalism’ is part of Africa’s, and by association Zimbabwe’s, “determination to correct the injustices of the past” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). Those who have taken up this challenge before, and who do so today, are categorised as heroes by the newspaper. Thus, for *The Sunday Mail*, “brave sons and daughters of the soil who took up arms against colonial occupation and racist minority rule” count as true heroes (2012:10). It describes these heroes as people who “went to war for land, economic empowerment, non-discrimination, political, economic and social rights, peace and sovereignty” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). They are also taken as “custodians of the gains of the struggle” and therefore cannot allow “reactionaries [...] to reverse the people’s revolution” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). In the case of Zimbabwe, *The Sunday Mail* argues that war veterans (living heroes), those who died during the liberation struggle, and by association Zanu PF and PF Zapu, are the country’s heroes.

In contrast, the villains are those who fight “to preserve the interests of global capital at the expense of the down-trodden masses”, as well as those “who want to hand back the land, undo the economic empowerment programme and create a looters paradise for Western corporations” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). The editorial cites the MDC faction led by Morgan Tsvangirai as an example of this. It argues that not only does the Movement for Democratic Change - Tsvangirai (MDC T) “sup with the high priests of imperialism at book launches in South Africa” as the country remembers its “gallant liberators”, it also rubbishes “Zimbabwe’s liberators, labelling them failures and pouring scorn on their achievements” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). *The Sunday Mail* excludes MDC T and its supporters from its conception of a hero because of its association with imperialist forces which it argues perpetuates the suffering of the downtrodden. COPAC is also seen as reversing the progress regarding land reform, and is castigated for not according the liberation struggle its due recognition in its draft constitution. Ultimately, this dichotomous classification of heroes and villains is used as a premise to invite “true patriots” to the call for “resource nationalism” which the editorial argues is “the people’s determination to correct the injustices of the past” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). Those categorised as heroes or associated with the heroes, are seen as “brave sons and daughters of the soil”, “freedom fighters”, and “liberators”, whereas those classified as consorting with imperialists are viewed as “reactionaries”, “clueless puppets”, “surrogates” of global capital, “sell-outs”, and “rented crowds [...] campaigning for the return of die-hard Rhodies” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). It is clear that heroes are spoken of in more inclusive terms using words such as “our”, as opposed to the villains who are expunged using “they”.

The Standard (Privately Owned)

In Search of an Identity

This opinion article was written for *The Standard* (29 October 2000) by Chenjerai Hove, one of Zimbabwe's renowned authors. It was published when Zimbabwe's white population was heavily criticised by the Zanu PF government after its draft constitution was rejected in a referendum. The opinion's central argument is that Zimbabwe's white population is as much a part of the country's citizenry as other Zimbabwean citizens. The author uses logical, rhetorical and dialectical approaches to construct its argument (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). His opinion piece logically argues for harmonious relations between black and white people in Zimbabwe—and Africa; it dialectically engages with those who do not see white people as real Zimbabwean citizens; and finally, it rhetorically persuades its addressee to accept white citizens as belonging to Zimbabwe, as much as their black and Asian counterparts. Its rhetorical perspective is mainly deliberative as it is concerned with future political action that accords white citizens the same status as other Zimbabwean citizens (Richardson 2007; Aristotle 2012). The opinion uses *ethotic* modes of persuasion (Richardson 2007; Aristotle 2012) as the author, Chenjerai Hove (now late) is one of Zimbabwe's highly regarded social commentators and authors. Hove also uses a rationalist approach to persuade his addressee. In sum, Chenjerai Hove's reputation as a writer and social commentator, and his ability to argue his points cogently strengthen the force of his persuasion.

To bolster his argument that all of Zimbabwe's citizens should be accorded the same status, Hove shows similarity in terms of origin, and patterns of social action between different racial groups in the country. For instance, he argues that as with other Zimbabwean citizens, white people came to the country in pursuit of "economic prosperity"; are constituted by good and bad people; and that their ostracisation is part of political brinkmanship (Hove 2000:5). He argues that "Zimbabwe was colonised by a private company", the British South Africa Company, and became "the private property of an individual", Cecil John Rhodes (Hove 2000:5). As such, the first white settlers were driven by economic reasons as "they were fortune seekers" who responded to Cecil John Rhodes's call for adventurers using the slogan: "come with me, I will make you a millionaire" (Hove 2000:5). However, he does not use this argument to excuse the barbarity of colonialism, acknowledging that the "the colonial experience was, for blacks, nasty and bitter" (Hove 2000:5). Nevertheless, his point of departure is that independence in 1980 was supposed to usher in a new era for the country because then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe declared that Zimbabwe "was our country, all of us, whites, black,

coloureds, Asian” (Hove 2000:5). He also notes that the people had “agreed and said it was no longer necessary to grow new trees of hatred” since “we had all arrived from some place in search of living space” (Hove 2000:5). However, he criticises Zimbabwe’s white population for alienating itself from the country’s public affairs after independence, despite the call for reconciliation. He argues that since “they still owned their farms” they had “decided that the hand of reconciliation was simply a hand which said we should go on the way we had done before” (Hove 2000:5). Hove criticises their indifference to black suffering during the liberation struggle and loss of land by Africans during colonialism. He also criticises their withdrawal from Zimbabwe society and creation of parallel social spaces to separate themselves from other races. For example, he criticises white people for opening “new private schools which their children attended at exorbitant fees”, and for opening their own “private sports clubs after withdrawing from their long-established clubs on the grounds that blacks had ‘invaded’ them” (Hove 2000:5). For him, this signalled that they had “cancelled all possibilities of new cultural and political encounters with blacks” resulting in a situation where whites “had their own world and blacks had theirs” (Hove 2000:5).

However, he argues that despite these tendencies white farmers “are citizens of this land” and that “among them are people of great hearts as well as people of ugly hearts” who “would not care a hoot what social and economic conditions their fellow citizens (blacks) are in” (Hove 2000:5). He emphasises that these attributes are not exclusive to white people since there are also “bad black citizens” and that it is not just the whites who exclude themselves from Zimbabwe’s public spaces since “there are also people of Asian origin who have also isolated themselves in this country” (Hove 2000:5). Hove also argues that white people are not the only people “who arrived from some place in search of economic prosperity” as “all the ethnic groups of our country arrived from some place” (2000:5). For him, “the question of why whites are here” is irrelevant, as “it is a matter of who arrived from where and when” (Hove 2000:5). Hove engages with the paradox that after years of political dormancy, the participation of Zimbabwe’s white population in the 2000 elections was interpreted as an attempt to protect their privileges since they owned “most of the prime land in Zimbabwe” (Hove 2000:5). He argues that their participation also came at a time when President Mugabe was “facing the most serious challenge to his rule from a formidable opposition” (Hove 2000:5). The land reform programme and the concerted attacks on the white population were part of Zanu PF strategy for political survival. Hove argues that the whites voting in 2000 at a time when the government was pushing for land reform cannot be explained in terms of their seeking to protect their

privileges. Rather, he argues that the “farm invasions” were not “a spontaneous occurrence” but were “used to intimidate farm workers not to vote in the same manner as their employers” (Hove 2000:5). He also argues that land imbalances had not been fully addressed two decades after independence, not because of the intransigence of white farmers, but a lethargic government. He notes that the white population was not only aware of the land imbalances, but had also “been urging government to deal with it in a manner not disruptive to farming” without success (Hove 2000:5). For him, that there was no dialogue with the white population on the resolution of the land issue was due to President Mugabe and his government, and not the “white population” (Hove 2000:5). Hove’s opinion article frames belonging in more inclusive terms. It does not create antagonistic binaries, but refers to commonalities—good or bad—between people of different races. This bestows on all Zimbabwean citizens a responsibility to model an inclusive society characterised by mutual concern for each other’s welfare.

Now is the Time

This editorial (*The Standard* 11 July 1999) was published after the burial of Zimbabwe’s late Vice-President Dr Joshua Nkomo. It argues that when choosing a replacement for Dr Nkomo, Zanu PF must select someone who can genuinely unite the people of Zimbabwe. The editorial’s argumentation cuts across the logical, dialectical and rhetorical perspectives (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). It logically argues its case, and also dialectically addresses the nation and Zanu PF. It rhetorically persuades political leaders to emulate Dr Nkomo’s political maturity. Its rhetorical approach assumes forensic, epideictic and deliberative types (Richardson 2007). Its approach is forensic as it defends Dr Nkomo’s past actions such as when he “sacrificed his party” by signing the Unity Accord in 1987 to end *Gukurahundi* (*The Standard* 1999:8). Its epideictic stance is evident on the one hand, when it seeks to prove that Dr Nkomo is worthy of admiration, and on the other hand, noting that his “contemporaries, including President Mugabe” are not worthy of admiration as they lack his “political maturity” (*The Standard* 1999:8). The mode of persuasion is *ethotic* as it uses Dr Joshua’s Nkomo’s character as the basis to persuade its addressee to consider its main argument; and it argues its case logically. Thus, the editorial’s use of Dr Nkomo’s reputation to support its argument, and its logical rationalisation strengthen the force of its argumentation.

The Standard uses Dr Joshua Nkomo to criticise the conduct of Zimbabwe’s current leadership, and to suggest qualities to consider when appointing Nkomo’s replacement. First, it argues that the “phenomenal attendance” at Dr Nkomo’s funeral supports a “claim he made in his auto-

biography that: ‘my comfort has been to trust in and be trusted by the masses’” (*The Standard* 1999:8). Second, it also argues that when Dr Nkomo sacrificed the integrity of his party, PF Zapu, by signing the Unity Accord that ended *Gukurahundi* in 1987, he demonstrated that the masses’ trust in him was not misplaced. The editorial then criticises President Mugabe for lacking “political maturity” following his criticism of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at Dr Nkomo’s funeral (*The Standard* 1999:8). It also draws on Zimbabwe’s former Chief Justice Dr Enoch Dumbutshena, to criticise President Mugabe for not engaging with the *Gukurahundi* issue at Dr Nkomo’s funeral, which was an opportunity,

to win the trust of those who may doubt his ability to ensure unity prevails in the country, by failing to pledge reparations or apologise categorically for the atrocities committed against civilians in Matabeleland during the dissident era. (*The Standard* 1999:8)

This shows the contrast between President Mugabe’s “cheap politicking, and the statesmanship that we remember Nkomo for” (*The Standard* 1999:8). It also argues that unlike Dr Nkomo whose “African nationalism” had always argued for unity between Zapu and Zanu PF, President Mugabe’s “party nationalism” had been “at the forefront of Zimbabwean politics since independence” in 1980 (*The Standard* 1999:8). The editorial also contrasts Dr Nkomo’s virtues with the venality of the current government:

while we owe it to nationalist heroes like Nkomo for delivering us from the shackles of our colonial past, the unbearable system of Rhodesian fascism has now been replaced with a system of governance akin to state capitalism; a system in which opportunities have evaporated for all except those with access to the state. (*The Standard* 1999:8)

It is against this state of affairs that *The Standard* advises Zimbabweans to “look for somebody new with the creative genius capable of achieving a national unity which transcends the marriage of convenience once forged between two opposition parties of yore” (1999:8). It is evident that the figure of Dr Nkomo is being used to reinforce the integrity of the Zimbabwean nation-state although his memory is evoked as a basis for thinking a more democratic and more inclusive form of Zimbabwean-ness which is characterised by genuine “national unity” (*The Standard* 1999:8).

Is this the Zimbabwe we Fought For?

This editorial (*The Standard* 11 August 2002) was written just before Heroes Day, a commemorative holiday set aside to remember those seen as having played key roles in the struggle against colonial rule. The crux of its argument is that the Zimbabwe of today is anything but what those who died for its liberation had hoped for. It makes its argument

logically; dialectically addressing both the government which is the subject of its criticism, and ordinary Zimbabweans, whose plight it is highlighting; and rhetorically by inviting Zimbabweans to reflect on their current circumstances as a basis for thinking about their future (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). It motivates social action against venal contemporary political leadership, and the country's dire socio-economic situation. Its rhetorical orientation is forensic and deliberative (Richardson 2007). It is forensic in condemning the actions of the country's leadership, and deliberative, in seeking to persuade Zimbabweans to find solutions to their current predicament. The editorial's modes of persuasion cut across the *ethotic*, *pathotic*, and *logetic* (Richardson 2007; Aristotle 2012). It is *ethotic* as the newspaper argues from both its privileged position as a social commentator, and also by associating itself with the goals of the fallen heroes. It is *pathotic* as it seeks to induce a feeling of betrayal and anger towards the country's political leadership. And it is *logetic* because its argument is supported by cogent reasoning and evidence. *The Standard* thus makes its case through logical argument, its evocation of the suffering associated with post-independence misgovernance, and by its own standing as a pro-democracy social commentator.

The editorial's argument shows how Zimbabwe's political leadership since independence has failed to deliver the society its heroes had died for. It also exhorts all Zimbabweans, regardless of race and ethnicity, to collectively find a solution to their predicament. The editorial begins by setting up the ideal situation against which to assess the actual state of affairs before suggesting ways to remedy the situation. The ideal is framed as what the fallen heroes had died for. *The Standard* argues that on Heroes Day:

we remember those who perished in the liberation struggle fighting for a society based on the rule of law, respect for human rights, fair play, reconciliation and vast improvement in the material well-being of all Zimbabweans regardless of colour, creed or the shape of one's nose. (2002:8)

Its point of departure is that the fallen heroes would not recognise contemporary Zimbabwe as it has radically drifted from what was promised in 1980. It argues that "Zimbabwe's current situation" can be summed up "in a few words: hunger, poverty, lawlessness, corruption and a fractured society" (*The Standard* 2002:8). It also describes Zimbabwe as "the land of shattered dreams, of fabulous wealth for the few and grinding poverty for many, of mindless chieftism and arrogance of power, of splendour and rags, of famine and disease" (*The Standard* 2002:8). Based on these realities, the editorial argues that rather than "fulminate and froth at the mouth about 'British imperialists'" it is better "to take stock and reflect on our present predicament"

(*The Standard* 2002:8). As part of its critique, the editorial undermines Zanu PF's discourses of sovereignty, and criticises the government for unleashing "hatred and pain on fellow Zimbabweans" (*The Standard* 2002:8). To show that Zimbabweans are not a sovereign people as claimed by President Mugabe's government, the editorial argues that Zimbabwe can no longer feed its citizens, is no longer a united nation, has a weak currency which is continuously depreciating, and that many Zimbabweans are escaping the tough economic situation to other countries. It also notes that Zimbabweans are now "much poorer than at any time in the past", that there is "declining spending on social services, deteriorating physical infrastructure everywhere", a collapsing health system, declining education system and "growing corruption" (*The Standard* 2002:8). The editorial's references to this situation show the gap between the ideals fought for by fallen heroes and the nightmare that has become of their dream. It argues that although the liberation struggle was "a struggle for a whole new country in which oppression and injustice would be replaced by justice, harmony, opportunity and prosperity for all", the contemporary reality is a far cry from this goal (*The Standard* 2002:8). Instead, "Zimbabwe has become a fractured society" in which "the social cohesion that makes countries work has been shattered" as a result of the government's response to the emergence of a strong opposition party and its land reform programme (*The Standard* 2002:8). The editorial also argues that "the land reform programme is a total farce" since "it is the so-called chefs with jobs and businesses in cities and towns who have largely benefited" (*The Standard* 2002:8). Thus, it is the poor who have suffered as a result of Zanu PF's mismanagement of the country, since "Zimbabweans have fewer jobs, less education, less health, less income, less food" (*The Standard* 2002:8). *The Standard* thus exhorts Zimbabweans to reflect on and resolve their perilous situation as a collective:

Zimbabweans of all races and creeds are part of the same people. Blacks, whites, Indians—one and all—Zimbabwe is their only home and heritage. We have been joined together by fate and history. It is therefore unmitigated folly to dissipate our energies opening up old wounds which do not add any value to the development of Zimbabwe. (*The Standard* 2002:8)

The editorial subscribes to an inclusive, democratic and egalitarian sense of belonging. Its critique undermines *The Sunday Mail's* anti-imperialist discourse of belonging. *The Standard's* evocation of social memory and its framing of nation and identity in terms of unity and national heroes is discussed below.

Discussion: Theme 4—Unity and Heroes

Social Memory

Interest in social memory emerges when and where collective identities are no longer as obvious as they used to be (Olick *et al.* 2011). Some have also argued that memory is usually used to justify and legitimate the existence of a nation-state (Burke 1989/2011). Furthermore, processes of social memory under-write contemporary “political projects” which include the creation of social cohesion (Olick *et al.* 2011:249). Therefore, an argumentative analysis of events, issues, and figures selected for both remembrance and amnesia, is explicative of social memory’s political work. The two articles from *The Sunday Mail* are texts of social memory. The first editorial centres on the memory of the late Vice-President of Zimbabwe Dr Joshua Nkomo, and the second one, on the memory of Zimbabwe’s fallen heroes of the liberation struggle. The first editorial entitled, *Let Us All Share Nkomo’s Vision* uses the memory of the Vice-President to invite its addressee to participate in the creation of a united Zimbabwe. The second editorial uses the memory of Zimbabwe’s fallen heroes to promote the unity of citizens around the politico-economic project of “resource nationalism” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). Both of them engage their addressee using discourses which invoke ‘the nation’. In the editorial *Let Us All Share Nkomo’s Vision*, the figure of Dr Nkomo is evoked as “a symbol of liberation, a symbol of economic empowerment, a symbol of sacrifice” and above all “as a symbol of national unity” (*The Sunday Mail* 2004:8). Having reminded its addressee that Dr Nkomo’s “lifelong quest” was for a united Zimbabwe and that he had sacrificed the autonomy of his own political party, Zapu, after signing the Unity Accord that ended *Gukurahundi* in 1987, the editorial argues that the quest for unity “should be ours too” (*The Sunday Mail* 2004:8). The editorial also uses the memory of the late Vice-President to imagine Zimbabwe as a nation whose existential template for the present and the future is rooted in the vision of the country’s founding fathers such as Dr Nkomo. His memory is not only used to provide a symbolic basis for Zimbabwe as a nation-state, but also to foster the unity of the people within the nation-state. The article, *We Know Our Heroes*, justifies contemporary redistributive programmes on the basis of the liberation struggle’s aims which included *inter alia*, a just distributive order. The major aim is to justify ‘resource nationalism’, including the land reform programme, and the drive towards the indigenisation of the economy. Those at the forefront of “resource nationalism” today are argued to be as much heroes as those who fought during the liberation struggle (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). Those seen as undermining resource nationalism today are likened to ‘sell-outs’ who collaborated with the colonial administration during the time of Rhodesia. They are also seen as betraying “our gallant liberators”, “the supreme sacrifices of

our heroes who fought racist oppression since 1893”, and “our brave sons and daughters of the soil who took up arms against colonial occupation” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). The evocation of social memory by *The Sunday Mail* serves two major purposes: first, to create social cohesion by calling for national unity among Zimbabweans. National unity is presented as something demanded of contemporary Zimbabwe by those to whom the nation owes its independence. Second, social memory is evoked to justify contemporary and future socio-political and economic projects such as resource nationalism and indigenisation. These programmes are presented as a continuation of the anti-colonial struggles stretching as far back as 1893. It is arguable then, that *The Sunday Mail’s* evocation of memory is motivated by the emergence of counter-memories which are challenging the government’s master commemorative narrative. The sense of Zimbabwean-ness as argued by the government and institutions such as *The Sunday Mail* is heavily contested by victims of *Gukurahundi*, and also by opposition politics which challenge the very premises upon which the government constructs Zimbabwean-ness. These aspects are evident in *The Standard’s* evocation of social memory as shown below. These emergent challenges to hegemonic constructions of national identity prompted the evocation of mnemonic events and figures seen as fundamental to defining and unifying the nation.

In a nutshell, it is arguable that *The Sunday Mail’s* evocation of social memory is useful to “present dominant interests” since it provides resources for criticising resistance to government programmes as a betrayal of the liberation struggle (Misztal 2003:56). It also evokes social memory to promote social cohesion within parameters set by the government (Misztal 2003:56). But, since Dr Nkomo was considered a dissident and persecuted by the government during *Gukurahundi*, it can also be argued that he embodies the suffering of the people from Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. His personal memorialisation thus constitutes his institutionalisation in public memory to promote national unity (Zerubavel 1995). While Dr Nkomo’s memorialisation honours his role during the liberation struggle, it also reflects the negotiated nature of public memory (Popular Memory Group 1982): the victims of *Gukurahundi* may see his recognition as a partial recognition of their suffering. But since his memorialisation alone cannot amount to restitution, his representation in public memory is likely to continue to be a source of contestation, which is likely to lead to further negotiation between the master commemorative narrative popularised by the government, and counter-memories emerging from victims of *Gukurahundi*.

The Standard evokes social memory to preclude exclusivist formulations of national identity, and as a source of critique of the venality and failures of the contemporary political establishment. In *In Search of An Identity*, Hove evokes the memory of colonisation to show that white people, like any other ethnic group in Zimbabwe, had come “in search of economic prosperity” (2000:5). This use of memory undermines constructions of national identity that suggest that black Zimbabweans of today have always been around, and are a distinct people with specific values traceable to pre-colonial times. In the editorial *Now is the Time*, *The Standard* evokes the memory of Zimbabwe’s late Vice-President Dr Joshua Nkomo to criticise President Mugabe. For instance, the newspaper uses the Unity Accord of 1987 to argue that, unlike President Mugabe, Dr Nkomo demonstrated political maturity by sacrificing the autonomy of his party when he signed the Accord to end *Gukurahundi*. President Mugabe is criticised for not acknowledging, and acting against the venality of his government, and for not taking the necessary steps to secure national unity. The newspaper also evokes the memories “of Rhodesian fascism” to draw parallels with the current government (*The Standard* 1999:8). It argues that contemporary patterns of selective access to resources based on political patronage create the same asymmetries that existed during colonial administration. In other words, the current government is seen as simply having transplanted the institutionalisation of race-based privileges, with privileges based on political patronage. In the editorial, *Is This The Zimbabwe We Fought For?* *The Standard* also uses the memory of the liberation heroes to show the failures of the current government and its hypocritical use of the memory of the liberation struggle. First, it argues that we remember heroes because they

perished in the liberation struggle fighting for a society based on the rule of law, respect for human rights, fair play, reconciliation and vast improvement in the material well-being of all Zimbabweans regardless of colour, creed or the shape of one’s nose. (*The Standard* 2002:8)

It then uses this to show how the government has failed to deliver not only on aspects of rule of law, human rights, fair play, and reconciliation, but also on material issues such as food supply. *The Standard* also criticises the government’s tendency to blame neo-imperialism for its failures. It argues for a future-oriented approach to solving Zimbabwe’s problems, contradicting *The Sunday Mail*’s strong orientation towards the past. *The Standard* thus uses social memory to problematize the government’s use of memory for narrow political ends, rather than reinforcing hegemonic ideas of belonging. For instance, by showing the contradiction between the goals of the liberation struggle and the contemporary situation in the

country, *The Standard* undermines the government's premises for poorly implemented political projects, and the premises upon which it defines Zimbabwean-ness.

The Standard's evocation of social memory shows how popular memory spawns resistance to dominant mnemonic narratives (Foucault 1974/2011). The newspaper uses the values that undergirded the liberation struggle to provide a counter-narrative to the expedient master-commemorative narrative popularised by the government. It is thus evident that present circumstances can potentially limit the influence of the master-commemorative narrative generated to serve particular power configurations (Schudson 1989). A second and fundamental aspect of *The Standard's* use of social memory is that it historicises belonging (Misztal 2003). Hove's opinion article, and the editorial, *Is This the Zimbabwe we Fought For*, argue that all Zimbabweans came from somewhere looking for a place to live and eke out a living. This view undermines the essentialisation of Zimbabwean-ness as the country's 'black native'. Its evocation of the memory of colonialism is meant to remind Zimbabweans of the inclusive values that undergirded the liberation struggle and also the "itinerant" (Mbembe 2000:263) nature of life prior to, and during, colonialism in Africa.

Nation and Identity

The Sunday Mail treats Zimbabwe as an unproblematic entity that is rooted in the struggle for liberation. For the newspaper, Zimbabwe is a nation with its own "founding fathers" whose vision for the nation, "is the template for the present and the future survival of this country" (*The Sunday Mail* 2004:8). This template can easily work as a marker for inclusion and exclusion since it is represented as determinant of the country's very survival. Those who threaten this survival are represented as challenging the founding fathers' vision, and are consequently marked for expurgation (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya 2011). The emergent complication is who gets to define such a vision and for what purposes? *The Sunday Mail* (which is closely associated with the Zanu PF government) uses national unity and heroes to perform this work. For example, the newspaper uses the figure of Dr Nkomo to invite Zimbabweans to participate in forging unity among themselves. It uses the anti-imperialist narrative to divide those whose actions are seen as undermining unity, and those whose actions are seen as emblematic of the Zimbabwean spirit. Those associated with imperialist interests are represented as undermining national unity, and are thus excluded from Zimbabwean-ness. These include those who "preserve the interests of global capital", "sell-outs", "clueless puppets", "loud mouths", "Western imperialists", "die-hard Rhodies", "Rhodie goons",

“political stooges”, and “reactionaries” among others (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). It is clear from the editorials that these epithets refer to the opposition MDC and its supporters, as well as white Zimbabweans. On the other hand, Zimbabwean-ness is constructed in terms of congruity with the vision of the country’s “founding fathers”, and the goals of the liberation struggle as defined by the Zanu PF government. Those who belong to this category are addressed affectionately as “our war veterans”, “our gallant liberators”, “our living heroes”, “brave sons and daughters of the soil” (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10), “founding fathers of this nation” (*The Sunday Mail* 2004:8). These epithets are reserved for those supportive of the Zanu PF government’s redistributive programmes (however partisan or sectarian they may be), and those whose sense of Zimbabwean-ness fits within its master-commemorative narrative. As shown in Chapters One, Two and Four, the government’s master-commemorative narrative puts Zanu PF at the centre of the liberation struggle which is constructed as the definitive event of the ‘nation’.

These stories demonstrate the media’s active role in constructing an imaginary nation (Anderson 1983, 1991). *The Sunday Mail* emphasises national unity as a foundation upon which to rally support for national projects, and subsequently for defining belonging. Its call for unity shows the paper’s active participation in the process of nation-building. Its point of departure is an implicit acknowledgement of competing allegiances and interests that necessitate nation-shaping narratives. But unlike *The Standard’s* inclusive conception of Zimbabwean-ness, *The Sunday Mail* uses the liberation struggle as the basis for thinking national unity which leaves out social groups that do not fit within the government’s narrative of the Zimbabwean nation.

Although *The Standard* takes Zimbabwean-ness as a given, its point of departure is very different from that of *The Sunday Mail*. While *The Sunday Mail* uses an exclusive hegemonic commemorative narrative to define the Zimbabwean nation, *The Standard* invokes an inclusive conception of citizenship. But this does not mean it is blind to both the brutality and avarice associated with colonialism, as well as with the indifference of white and Indian communities towards the suffering of black people in Zimbabwe after independence. For example, the article *In Search of an Identity*, criticises the indifference of an opulent white community which owned “most of the prime farming land in Zimbabwe” towards their fellow black citizens (Hove 2000:5). The newspaper also acknowledges the barbarity of colonialism, but venerates the struggle for independence precisely because it was aimed at undoing the unjust colonial system.

For *The Standard*, “the struggle for Zimbabwe was a struggle for a whole new country in which oppression and injustice would be replaced by justice, harmony, opportunity and prosperity for all” (2002:8). It is also on this basis that its articles criticise the post-independence government’s legacy. Although the liberation struggle had been waged for an inclusive and egalitarian society, and the policy of reconciliation enunciated in 1980 meant that Zimbabwe was now to be for “all of us, whites, blacks, coloureds, Asians” (Hove 2000:5), the paper argues that “it has become a fractured society” (*The Standard* 2002:8). It also criticises the Zanu PF government for its failure to meet most of the goals of the liberation struggle. For example, in the editorial *Is This the Zimbabwe we Fought for?* *The Standard* also criticises corrupt governance and the politics of patronage for marginalising vulnerable Zimbabweans. The marginalisation of Zimbabwe’s poor is telling in terms of belonging. It means that those who are excluded from the benefits of redistributive programmes are nominal citizens whose situation is similar to their colonial experiences. *The Standard* also criticises the government’s nativist politics of identity. The newspaper’s own understanding of Zimbabwean-ness is an historicised inclusivity. It argues that since people in Zimbabwe today “arrived from some place in search of economic prosperity” (Hove 2000:5), and based on the enunciation of reconciliation in 1980, that “Zimbabweans of all races and creeds are part of the same people” as “we have been joined together by fate and history” (*The Standard* 2002:8). *The Standard* also criticises President Mugabe for failing to secure unity and emulate the “political maturity” of Dr Nkomo by addressing the issue of *Gukurahundi*. The newspaper’s inclusion of the *Gukurahundi* issue is fundamental as it shows the other sources of division in Zimbabwe outside the government’s anti-imperialist rhetoric. *The Standard’s* articles thus argue for a more inclusive and egalitarian sense of Zimbabwean-ness which acknowledges the historical encounters of its various social groups.

The Standard’s construction of Zimbabwean-ness is consistent with Smith’s notion of the civic model of the nation (1991). Its understanding of Zimbabwean-ness is premised on an egalitarian sense of community and is expressed as inclusive citizenship. The paper’s articles emphasise the need to accommodate all shades of Zimbabweans to participate as citizens in national processes. In other words, the newspaper foregrounds citizenship as the basis of belonging and participation over competing allegiances, be they political, racial, or ethnic (Smith 1991). *The Standard’s* narratives also demonstrate the difficulty of forging a nation in multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies such as Zimbabwe. This difficulty is evident in the tension between *The Sunday Mail’s* and *The Standard’s* construction of

Zimbabwean-hood. On the one hand, *The Sunday Mail* uses the history of colonialism and the spectre of neo-colonialism to exclude white Zimbabweans and those seen as consorting with imperialist forces, from a sense of Zimbabwean-ness. On the other hand, *The Standard* uses historical encounters such as colonialism to justify the institutionalisation of an inclusive Zimbabwean-ness based on common citizenship. Thus, its construction of Zimbabwean-ness is historicist and constructivist.

Conclusion

Chapters Seven and Eight show how *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* use social memory to participate in the construction of national identity in multi-ethno-cultural and multi-racial Zimbabwe, and the implications of such constructions for nation-building. This is an important task considering that memory is a means of legitimising both individual and collective identity (Cubitt 2007; Misztal 2003). Furthermore, as Hutton argues, in literate societies memory as habit is displaced by memory as representation (Hutton 1993:16). However, as collective identities and social memory are historical phenomena, they are also unstable social constructs shaped by multiple and competing representations of the past (Cubitt 2007; Misztal 2003). These two chapters thus show “who wants whom to remember what, and why” (Burke 1989/2011:191). It is notable that the newspapers’ discursive engagement with social memory and identity issues in Zimbabwe was active, not passive. The articles actively performed the political work of constructing the Zimbabwean nation through argumentation and rhetoric. In other words, their evocation of social memory was not incidental, but central to the discursive work at play in the newspapers. However, their motivations were fundamentally different. *The Sunday Mail* frames Zimbabweans as a people with a history traceable to pre-colonial times. Some of its articles spoke of colonialism as a process that both interrupted and dislodged an already existent Zimbabwean nation. For instance, Mahoso argues that colonialism dissected and chopped up “the web of African memory” and replaced it “with ‘separate but equal’ memories of apartheid, tribalism and sectarianism” (2007:8). The implication is that Zimbabweans, and by extension Africans, were once a united people that knew no divisions, until they were divided along ethnic, racial, and sectarian lines by colonial administrations. This view reduces Zimbabwean-hood to ‘blackness’ as ‘black’ Africans were the only inhabitants prior to colonialism. The view is also evident in *The Sunday Mail’s* narrative of national unity. The newspaper speaks of unity only in terms of ‘black Zimbabweans’. But this view is not consistent with that held by ethno-symbolists such as Smith (2004; 2009) who place

ethnicity at the centre of modern nations. *The Sunday Mail* also uses the memory of colonialism and the liberation struggle as a rallying point for the contemporary construction of Zimbabwean-ness. Zimbabweans are constructed as those who having struggled to dislodge the yoke of colonialism, still find themselves fighting contemporary forms of imperialism. What is significant about this narrative is that it uses racial frames to define imperialism. White Zimbabweans and Anglo-American interests are conflated with imperialism, thereby constructing them as a threat to the integrity of Zimbabwe. Black Zimbabweans who oppose the Zanu PF government are also included in this group and are targeted for expurgation because they are regarded as betraying true and patriotic Zimbabweans. *The Sunday Mail* articles do not mention any other 'races' that are found in contemporary Zimbabwe such as Asians, Arabs, and coloureds.

In contrast, *The Standard* uses social memory in two major ways. First, it evokes the memory of the pre-colonial and colonial period to show the encounters—good or bad—that brought the diversity of people in contemporary Zimbabwe together. *The Standard* takes this as its departure point for thinking Zimbabwean-ness today. Its idea of Zimbabwean-ness is thus an inclusive one based on national unity constituted by citizenship that transcends racial, ethnic, and other social divisions. Second, *The Standard* evokes the memory of the liberation struggle not only as an event that brought black people together in the fight against imperialism, but also as a movement premised on creating an inclusive and egalitarian society. The newspaper thus uses the memory of the liberation struggle to criticise the government's failure to live up to the goals of the liberation struggle. *The Standard* likens the government's ruling practices to those of the colonial oppressors that the liberation struggle sought to eliminate. It criticises the government's betrayal of those for whom the liberation struggle was fought, showing how its corruption, brutal treatment of white farmers, and opposition members have jeopardised the country's social cohesion. It also criticises the government's savage treatment of the people of Matabeleland during *Gukurahundi*. But it is also apparent that both *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* are reluctant to discuss *Gukurahundi* openly, although this is more pronounced in *The Sunday Mail*. That *The Sunday Mail* hardly mentions the word *Gukurahundi* shows that it is an event selected for amnesia so as to make possible the imagination of a Zimbabwe whose black population is united and ready to confront threats to this unity.

In sum, the disparate ways in which the two newspapers evoke social memory show its location in multiple and competing interpretive frameworks. The memories selected for interpretation

are socially shaped as they speak to the political goals advanced by the two newspapers (Burke 1989). Although both newspapers draw on social memory through their editorial and opinion articles to (re)think Zimbabwean-ness, *The Sunday Mail* does so in essentialist terms, and *The Standard* in constructivist terms. But in both cases, there is also the sense that Zimbabwean identity is in question (Olick *et al.* 2011; Megill 1998). For *The Sunday Mail*, the aim is to recover what it sees as genuine Zimbabwean identity: which is nativist. It sees this identity as threatened by contemporary imperialist forces. In contrast, *The Standard* is primarily concerned with recovering the civic, citizenship-based sense of Zimbabwean-ness which it sees as threatened by the government's nativist narrative. Both newspapers draw on the memory of the liberation struggle in ways that show its successful deployment as an ideological framework within which a historicised collective sense of identity is built (Zerubavel 1995). But for the master commemorative narrative of the liberation struggle to work as the basis for national unity—at least among the country's black population—discordant memories such as of *Gukurahundi* are marginalised by *The Sunday Mail* as they belie the sense of national unity it seeks to construct. As Mhlanga's article in *The Standard* shows, it is from these marginalised memories that counter-memory emerges, hence their suppression and marginalisation (Zerubavel 1995; Megill 1998). The constant reference to the past in all the articles also shows the instability of the political domain within which it is operational since the alignment of past, present, and future changes with historical change (Olick *et al.* 2011:37). The two newspapers reflect the tension between essentialist and constructivist conceptions of the nation. *The Sunday Mail* conceptualises Zimbabwean-ness in terms of Smith's ethnic model of a nation, although its orientation is racial, not ethnic. Within this model, the nation is conceptualised as “a community of common descent” (Smith 1991:12). On the other hand, *The Standard's* conception of the nation follows Smith's civic model of a nation that premises national identity on inclusive citizenship (1991). Social memory can thus be used both for essentialist imaginations of national identity—as in *The Sunday Mail*—and to historicise identities for more inclusive and democratic outcomes—as in *The Standard*. But it is also imperative to examine the political factors that orient *The Sunday Mail* towards essentialist imaginings of national identity, and *The Standard* towards a constructivist orientation. In other words, we need to inquire into the politics of the constructions explicated in Chapters Seven and Eight. The next chapter uses theories outlined in Chapter Five to probe the politics behind the newspapers' evocation of social memory and their construction of national identity in Zimbabwe. The aim is to show the nature of memory work performed by both *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* in Zimbabwe.

Chapter Nine

A Political Analysis of the Newspapers' Memory Work

Particular visions of the past can be used either to legitimise present political and social arrangements or to supply a standpoint from which these may be criticised or resisted. Those who seek either to consolidate and extend or to capture or to resist power therefore have a vested interest in shaping the ways in which the past is represented; those who seek to influence the directions that a society or political community takes in the present and future will seek to mould and to propagate an understanding of the past that legitimises their present agendas. (Cubitt 2007:224)

Introduction

Chapters Seven and Eight establish the preponderant discourses *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* use in their construction of national identity using social memory. This chapter focuses on the politics behind such constructions. It shows the nature of memory work performed by the two newspapers through an analysis of the sorts of political issues to which they spoke, and which shaped their discursive constructions. In this way, the chapter shows how social memory works as a function of the newspapers' social action. As shown in Chapters Seven and Eight, *The Sunday Mail's* evocation of social memory privileges essentialist notions of Zimbabwean-ness and African-ness, whereas *The Standard* evokes social memory both to critique the former, and as the basis for thinking an inclusive national identity. Against this background, this chapter probes the motivations behind such constructions by examining the politics at play and showing how the newspapers engage with the processes of nation-building. The chapter uses Fraser's (2001, 2003, 2008) Theory of Justice to trace whether, how, and why social memory is evoked as a justice issue along the dimensions of distribution, recognition and representation. At another level, Fraser's theory allows us to use the normative ideal of participatory parity to assess the democratic potential (or lack thereof) of such frames. It also uses Chantal Mouffe's (1999, 2009) conception of a radical democratic politics expressed in her Model of Agonistic Pluralism to think the harmonisation of difference and conflict in democratising societies such as Zimbabwe. Habermas's (1989, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1998) Discourse Ethics is also used as a normative evaluative framework of identity constructions instantiated by the two newspapers. The Chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the political dimensions of the representations explicated in Chapters Seven and Eight, and the second section provides a normative critique of such representations.

A Political Analysis of *The Sunday Mail's* and *The Standard's* Work of Memory

Chapters Seven and Eight show, on the one hand, that *The Sunday Mail* evokes social memory to justify the Zanu PF government's socio-political and economic programmes in ways that privilege an essentialist imagination of Zimbabwean-ness. As Zanu PF has been in government since Zimbabwean independence in 1980, it holds a hegemonic position in the country's body politic and therefore its construction of the past constitutes a master-commemorative narrative (Zerubavel 1995). On the other hand, the chapters show that *The Standard* evokes social memory to criticise and undermine Zanu PF's master-commemorative narrative in ways that privilege a constructivist notion of Zimbabwean-ness. Since *The Standard's* evocation of the past is fundamentally counter-posed to that of *The Sunday Mail*, its use of social memory constitutes a form of counter-memory (Zerubavel 1995). *The Sunday Mail's* evocation of social memory serves "to legitimise present political and social arrangements" as much as *The Standard* evokes social memory "to supply a standpoint from which these may be criticised or resisted" (Cubitt 2007:224). This scenario suggests, as Cubitt argues, that "those who seek to influence the directions that a society or political community takes in the present and future will seek to mould and to propagate an understanding of the past that legitimises their present agendas" (2007:224). It is therefore imperative to ask why *The Sunday Mail* evokes the past that it evokes, the way it does? By the same token, why does *The Standard* evoke the past that it evokes, the way it does? Answers to these questions could explain both the newspapers' memory work and the politics of which they are a part (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). To answer these questions, this section uses Fraser's (2001, 2008) dimensions of justice—distribution, recognition and representation—to show the preponderant political issues in the newspapers' evocation of social memory.

Distribution

Fraser's three dimensions of justice are evidently central to *The Sunday Mail's* evocation of the past. Distributive patterns in society are a matter of concern to Fraser's conception of justice to the extent that "the economic structure of society and [...] economically defined class differentials" affect the egalitarian participation of all people (adults) in social life (2001:30). The distributive dimension is concerned with the "what" question of justice claims (Fraser 2008:15). *The Sunday Mail's* concern with distributive justice is evident in two ways. First, the paper refers to past distributive injustices borne of the colonial experience to justify the government's current socio-political and economic policies, as well as its vision for the

country's future. The government's vision for Zimbabwe's future is centred on correcting distributive imbalances traceable to the colonial era, although the actual implementation of such programmes shows that they are politically expedient (see Chapter One). For instance, the government's drive towards redistribution emerged at a time when Zanu PF's support was waning, and when a new formidable opposition party, the MDC was formed prompting Zanu PF to appeal to people's concerns for distributive justice (Raftopoulos 2009). Second, it is concerned with contemporary forms of imperialism that *The Sunday Mail* argues create and sustain distributive imbalances between black and white people, the rich and poor, as well as between African and Western nations. It is this matrix of material asymmetries with race at its core that links its narrative of distributive justice to identity. Some examples that show *The Sunday Mail's* treatment of distributive justice follow. Kanengoni's opinion piece blames Europeans and Zimbabwe's white population, for the economic marginalisation of black Zimbabweans (2002:10). He is particularly critical of how the colonial system dispossessed Africans of their land, cattle and other forms of wealth (Kanengoni 2002:10). He also criticises the colonial agricultural policies that promoted white farmers at the expense of black farmers, thus marginalising them economically (Kanengoni 2002:10). His observations justify calls for land reform in favour of the majority black Zimbabwean citizens. *The Sunday Mail* also argues for the economic empowerment of Zimbabwe's majority black population as an extension of anti-colonial struggle (2012:8). In this case, economic empowerment is sought for "our people" as a way of consolidating independence and silencing those who "seek to recolonise this nation" (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:8). Mahoso also criticises Zimbabwe's post-independence justice system for continuing to protect settler capital interests over those of native black Zimbabweans (2000:11). He argues that conflict over the land reform programme cannot be resolved through the courts as they are part of the problem (Mahoso 2000:11). For him, the Rhodesian justice system, which he argues has not yet been transformed to reflect the aspirations of the majority black population hitherto, zealously enforced laws that were used to create and sustain racist land ownership patterns that privileged white settlers over black Zimbabweans (Mahoso 2000:11).

Mahoso also criticises Tony Blair's New Labour government for extending racist global capital interests to nations of the South including Zimbabwe through proxies such as the country's main opposition party, the MDC (Mahoso 2004:9). The MDC's predisposition towards what he calls the New Labour aristocracy comes at the expense of poor workers and peasants within countries from the South and East (Mahoso 2004:9). Against this backdrop, he argues that only

liberation struggles pose a serious challenge to imperialism in contemporary times (Mahoso 2004:9). For him, it is only the ruling Zanu PF which can guarantee material gains such as land ownership by black Zimbabweans because of its revolutionary pedigree. *The Sunday Mail* also criticises Tony Blair's government for seeking regime change in Zimbabwe, arguing that it amounts to the reversal of all the political and material gains traceable to the liberation struggle (2004:8). The paper also defines national heroes in terms of their role in reversing economic imbalances during and after colonialism (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10), arguing that only those who take practical steps to deal with poverty, hunger, disease, and economic inequality in Africa count as worthy heroes (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). By the same token, those defined as serving global capital interests are condemned for betraying the struggle for the economic empowerment of native black Zimbabweans (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). The paper also calls for 'resource nationalism' as a way of correcting the injustices of the past still evident in contemporary Zimbabwe (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). Evidently, distributive justice is at the centre of *The Sunday Mail's* evocation of social memory. The newspaper takes a political position in favour of the ruling Zanu PF government and its nativist rhetoric on the grounds that it has a history of fighting imperialism, and for the material well-being of native black Zimbabweans. At the same time, it associates processes of dispossession with Europeans and the country's white population. The newspaper's understanding of distributive justice in Zimbabwe thus works as a marker of identity, associating the white population with activities that suggest it does not belong to Zimbabwe as it is responsible for the suffering of black Zimbabweans. Distributive concerns are expressed only in binary terms of how whites dispossessed blacks—identified in terms of indigeneity—thereby excluding all other people from the imagination of Zimbabwean-ness and redistributive policies associated with 'belonging'.

Distributive justice is also at the centre of *The Standard's* evocation of social memory and construction of national identity. The newspaper evokes the memory of the liberation struggle primarily to show how Zimbabwe's post-independence redistributive programmes have failed to live up to the goals of the liberation struggle and the expectations associated with the attainment of independence (*The Standard* 2002:8, 2004:8). It argues that heroes who participated in the liberation struggle had fought for "vast improvement in the material well-being of all Zimbabweans regardless of colour, creed or the shape of one's nose" (*The Standard* 2002:8). It is against these expectations and liberation goals that Magaisa criticises the government for failing to transform Zimbabwe into an economic success (2007). *The Standard*

criticises the post-independence government, which claims legitimacy based on its liberation war credentials, for both betraying the ideals of the revolution and for failing to deliver on its goals (*The Standard* 2002:8, 2004:8). For example, it criticises the Zanu PF government for corruption, for creating a form of state capitalism that concentrates wealth in the hands of the political elite and their protégés at the expense of ordinary Zimbabweans (*The Standard* 2002:8). It also criticises the government's eviction of peasants from farms which they had been encouraged to occupy by the government for political expediency (*The Standard* 2004:8). What is unacceptable to *The Standard* is that many government officials who were enforcing the eviction of villagers from occupied farms were themselves multiple-farm owners. *The Standard* criticises the government's concentration of wealth in the hands of the few as this replicates the colonial system against which the liberation struggle was waged (*The Standard* 2002:8). It argues that the position of an ordinary Zimbabwean today is similar to that which they occupied during colonialism—despite having a majoritarian government in place (*The Standard* 2004:8). *The Standard* also criticises the Zanu PF government's anti-imperialist rhetoric for obfuscating the economic problems borne of its mal-governance (Magaisa 2007:11). It argues that the government has created the multi-pronged Zimbabwean crisis through imprudent decisions such as giving unbudgeted for gratuities to war veterans, and its costly military incursion into the Democratic Republic of Congo (*The Standard* 2002:8). *The Standard* also criticises the government for compromising the country's economy through its extra-legal approach to land reform, and the adoption of indigenisation policies that threaten foreign direct investment (2000:8). Unlike *The Sunday Mail*, *The Standard*, through opinion articles such as Mhlanga's, brings to the fore the economic marginalisation of Matabeleland as a justice case of mal-distribution. In sum, it criticises the post-independence distributive imbalances that have kept the ordinary person in a marginalised position more than two decades after the attainment of independence. *The Standard's* evocation of social memory, especially of the liberation struggle and fallen heroes, thus provides the basis for a critique of the government's failures, and its politically expedient drive towards resolving distributive imbalances in the country. It also uses social memory as a premise for thinking an inclusive and more democratic Zimbabwe as this was one of the aims of the liberation struggle. In the case of *The Standard*, social memory is evoked for purposes of influencing the transformation of the country's economy into one where economic structures are such that they do not deny people access to resources that they need to participate as full and equal members of society (Fraser 2008).

Recognition

The politics of recognition is primarily concerned with the ways in which institutionalised cultural values affect the equal participation of individuals and groups in social life (Fraser 2001, 2003, 2008). The import of claims to recognition lies in the logic that “nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being” (Taylor 1994:25; see also Honneth 1992, 2003, 2007). Recognition is concerned with the “who” question of justice claims (Fraser 2008:15). It is largely in this sense that issues of recognition arise in the two newspapers. On the one hand, *The Sunday Mail* focuses on how the colonial experience degraded a sense of African being, and how this debased sense of self is sustained by contemporary imperialist projects and unresolved distributive imbalances. Its stories show a struggle to recover an original sense of African-ness and to valorise all the sites of anti-colonial struggle and redistributive processes that actively engage with imperialist discourses that demean African identity. *The Sunday Mail* applies arguments about the misrecognition of Africans to the Zimbabwean context. For example, Kanengoni argues that colonialism has:

stripped and dispossessed us of all that we were and owned: land, cattle, values, and identity whilst at the same time attempting to mould us into an unrecognisable caricature of yourselves, a horrible image that even you, its creators, preferred to keep at arm’s length. (2002:10)

This sense of a distorted African identity is also evident in Mahoso’s articles. For example, he speaks of how genuine African memory was replaced with “memories of apartheid, tribalism and sectarianism” (2007:8). He argues that contemporary divisions based on ethnicity were created by colonialism and are therefore not *bona fide* indigenous African memories. This means that Africans, and Zimbabweans, who identify themselves by tribe, are actually misrecognising themselves. But this view does not explain the existence of different ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural groups among the native black population of Zimbabwe. The different languages and cultural practices associated with different ethnic groups could not have been a creation of imperialism (see Msindo 2012). *The Sunday Mail*’s reference to colonial experience thus shows its active attempt to create and reaffirm what its articles consider an original sense of African, and by association Zimbabwean, identity. However, it is ironic that *The Sunday Mail*, which reproduces a sharp racial division between black Zimbabweans, and other ‘non-white’ as well as white Zimbabweans, refers to apartheid as an identity distorting memory. This shows the political uses of both social memory and identity constructions. While the division of Africans along ethnic lines blunted cohesive African

resistance to colonialism during the colonial period, attempts to homogenise the native black population by post-colonial governments through nation-building projects (Ranger 2004; Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007) subsumes specific justice claims by certain groups under the national frame thereby ensuring the continuity of such governments since they are the ones who define the national agenda. It is also arguable that the newspaper's call for distributive justice, that is, its support for the indigenisation of the economy, land reform, and what it calls 'resource nationalism' are closely linked to issues of recognition. In other words, the maldistribution of resources in Zimbabwe along racial lines is seen as evidence and cause of the misrecognition of black Zimbabweans. This has the effect of entwining recognition and distributive aspects of social justice in ways that foreground racialised identities without considering how these aspects of justice manifest within particular racial groups or taken for granted identity groups. For *The Sunday Mail*, the redistribution of land to the landless majority black population, indigenisation of the economy, and an assertion of national sovereignty is a part of the project of recovering the recognition of black Zimbabweans as worthy human beings. However, the complication that arises is that *The Sunday Mail* narrows the politics of recognition to the encounter between black and white Zimbabweans or Europeans and Africans. This obfuscates other sites of misrecognition in the conceptualisation of Zimbabwean identity. For example, such a bifurcation ignores the status of Asians and coloured people on the one hand, and the status of other marginalised social groups such as immigrant labourers, on the other (see Muzondidya 2005, 2007). While *The Sunday Mail* recognises the misrecognition of other ethno-linguistic groups and recommends that their languages be given the same status as those that are recognised (2013:9), it fails to acknowledge the victims of *Gukurahundi*'s call for recognition. The genocidal aspects of *Gukurahundi* left the people of Matabeleland—dominant among which are the Ndebele—feeling dehumanised and degraded. The misrecognition of this social group is one of the most telling cases of injustice with far reaching consequences on national identity in Zimbabwe. It is ironic that *The Sunday Mail* is very eloquent about the misrecognition of black Zimbabweans during the colonial period and in contemporary imperialist encounters, and at the same time, fails to acknowledge the misrecognition of the victims of *Gukurahundi* who also suffered dehumanising violence and unjust treatment.

One could conclude that *The Sunday Mail*'s concern with misrecognition is closely imbricated with aspirations for distributive justice that emanate from the legacy of colonialism, albeit in politically expedient ways. Discourses on redistribution in *The Sunday Mail* invoke the politics

of recognition mostly in identity terms along racial lines, thereby excluding groups that are represented as a threat to the continuity of Zanu-PF's hegemonic politics. In so doing, the justice claims for redistribution called for by these excluded groups cannot be met because their social standing as full citizens is not recognised.

In contrast, *The Standard* is concerned with recognition as the hegemonic construction of Zimbabwean-ness excludes some of the country's social groups. First, it criticises the reduction of Zimbabwean-ness to the native black majority which excludes white Zimbabweans, Asians, coloureds and immigrant farm workers from countries such as Zambia and Mozambique. Second, one of its opinion articles (Mhlanga 2007) and an editorial *Now is the Time* criticise the misrecognition of the people of Matabeleland, especially the victims of *Gukurahundi*. One of the ways in which *The Standard* evokes social memory is to use the values that underpinned the liberation struggle to criticise the exclusivist conception of Zimbabwean-ness by the current government. It is arguable that the newspaper sees the exclusivist construction of national identity by the government as a form of misrecognition of other racial and immigrant groups constitutive of the country's citizenry. For example, Hove's opinion piece makes the argument that all social groups in Zimbabwe today had come from somewhere and had equal claim to belonging (2000:5). Furthermore, he also argues that the policy of reconciliation enunciated in 1980 by then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe means that Zimbabwe "was our country, all of us, whites, blacks, coloureds, Asians" (Hove 2000:5). This same point is made in *The Standard's* editorial *Is this the Zimbabwe we Fought for?*, in which the newspaper argues that "Zimbabweans of all races and creeds are part of the same people [...] joined together by fate and history" (2002:8). *The Standard's* criticism of a narrow conceptualisation of Zimbabwean-ness based on indigeneity addresses the misrecognition of those Zimbabwean citizens who do not belong to the privileged group. In other words, *The Standard* is showing the shortcomings of the government's thinking about belonging in particularised (racial) terms, as this is likely to shift patterns of mal-distribution and misrecognition from one racial group to another or others. It is therefore arguable that the newspaper is arguing for status-based forms of inclusion that foreground citizenship over particularised forms of identification (Fraser 2001, 2003, 2008).

As shown in Chapters Seven and Eight, the government is reluctant to discuss the grievances of *Gukurahundi* victims (as evident in *The Sunday Mail*), since it considers the memory to be potentially divisive and probably also because of the government's culpability for the atrocities.

Consequently, such grievances have been marginalised from the country's master-commemorative narrative leaving the victims of *Gukurahundi* feeling misrecognised. This sense of misrecognition is clearly evident in Mhlanga's (2007) article. One aspect of the misrecognition is what Mhlanga refers to as the "dismissive discourse" used regarding the *Gukurahundi*. His criticism of the Spanish Ambassador's statement as part of the "dismissive discourse" on *Gukurahundi* is a call for recognition. Mhlanga also argues against the prioritisation of what he calls the "national agenda" which obfuscates "what happened to other sections" of the Zimbabwean population (2007:11). For him, a united Zimbabwe can only emerge if the grievances of the country's "troubled groups" are addressed (Mhlanga 2007:15). In other words, his argument is that a united Zimbabwe can only emerge when all social groups in the country are accorded due recognition. Unlike *The Sunday Mail* which is concerned with the misrecognition of Africans and black people within the framework of imperialism, *The Standard* is mainly concerned with the misrecognition of Zimbabwean citizens who do not fit well within the hegemonic construction of national identity. *The Sunday Mail's* emphasis on race as a marker of national identity frames justice issues in identitarian terms. In contrast, *The Standard's* focus on inclusive citizenship frames justice issues in terms of social status (Fraser 2001, 2008). In sum *The Sunday Mail's* position is framed by identity politics, whereas *The Standard* seems to be promoting a politics of justice. However, as Fraser has argued, neither position is sufficient—hence her attempt to understand identity claims not as particularistic ones, but as claims for recognition, a justice claim (2001, 2003, 2008).

Representation

Fraser's third dimension of justice is that of the political, and it is concerned with the "how" question of justice claims (2008:15). The political dimension of justice focuses on representation which at one level "is a matter of social belonging", and at another concerns "the procedures that structure public processes of contestation" (Fraser 2008:17). The key injustice in the political dimension is misrepresentation which occurs "when political boundaries and/or decision rules function wrongly to deny some people the possibility of participating on a par with others in social interaction – including, but not only, in political arenas" (Fraser 2008:18). This begs the questions: who is constructed as entitled to make claims for both recognition and distributive justice? And how are such claims to be made?

The Sunday Mail divides the included and the excluded using race as a marker of belonging and entitlement. Distributive anomalies are defined in terms of the legacy of colonialism and contemporary forms of imperialism. In other words, for *The Sunday Mail*, colonialism is the progenitor of both the misrecognition of black people, and the mal-distribution of resources that disadvantages black Zimbabweans, and by extension Africans. To draw boundaries of inclusion and exclusion therefore, *The Sunday Mail* simply blames Europeans and white people for colonialism and what it sees as the contemporary remnants of imperialism. It also categorises black people as the *bona fide* victims and claimants of justice in post-independence Zimbabwe. *The Sunday Mail* therefore constructs Zimbabweans as those black people whose history is traceable to pre-colonial times and whose land was occupied by Europeans, and were dehumanised, dispossessed of their material resources, and exploited by white settlers. The newspaper constructs this group of people as deserving claimants of both recognition and distributive justice. For *The Sunday Mail*, those who belong to this category seek redress to mal-distribution through such redistributive programmes as land reform, and the indigenisation of the economy. However, the newspaper is aware that race is not an adequate rallying point for belonging in multi-ethno-linguistic and multi-cultural societies such as Zimbabwe. As shown in Chapters Seven and Eight, class, ethnicity and ideological differences also work against the homogenisation of national identity.

It is also clear from Chapter Eight that gross injustices such as *Gukurahundi* are substantial sources of division unless fully addressed. To overcome this complexity, *The Sunday Mail* invokes the discourse of unity. *The Sunday Mail* uses the idea of national unity as a tool “to homogenise” citizens into a monolithic sense of Zimbabwean-ness, although this is done through the lens of race (Kuzio 2001:139; see also Linz and Stepan 1996). To do this, the newspaper uses both the memory of national heroes such as Dr Joshua Nkomo, the struggle against colonialism, and the notion of collective memory to invite Zimbabweans to participate in the creation of social cohesion via the notion of national unity. ‘National unity’ is also used as a basis for defining belonging. Those who are seen as undermining unity are framed, on the one hand, as threats to the integrity of the Zimbabwean nation, and on the other, as going against the country’s founding principles and fathers. Such principles are defined in terms of allegiance to the ruling Zanu PF party and its government, based on its liberation credentials. Opposition parties and their members are simply marked for expurgation by linking them with imperialism which *The Sunday Mail* tacitly blames for both the misrecognition of, and mal-distribution afflicting, black Zimbabweans and Africans. The effect is to mark opposition

politics as working in the service of global capital and imperialism “at the expense of the down-trodden masses”, which makes it an enemy of Zimbabwe (*The Sunday Mail* 2012:10). When victims of *Gukurahundi* call for restitution and the memorialisation of their experiences, they are criticised for not heeding Dr Nkomo’s call to unity and for seeking to destabilise and divide the country. In sum, it is arguable that *The Sunday Mail* uses race as the basis of inclusion and exclusion of people from “the circle of those entitled to a just distribution and reciprocal recognition” (Fraser 2008:17). In the Zimbabwean case, that circle is constituted by people defined by the newspaper as Zimbabweans. To make such a construction stable, *The Sunday Mail* appeals for the unity of those defined as Zimbabweans to ‘heal’ social divisions.

On the other hand, *The Standard’s* concern with representation shows two major tendencies that contradict *The Sunday Mail’s* approach. It argues for an inclusive and cohesive form of belonging in Zimbabwe, suggesting that it proposes a form of representation that accords the right to make justice claims to all citizens. *The Standard* uses social memory to argue for the “reciprocal recognition” of all Zimbabweans, and just distribution across all social groups (Fraser 2008:17). This view is informed by two premises. First, the newspaper argues that people constituting the citizenry of modern day Zimbabwe “have been joined together by fate and history” as they all came from somewhere looking for economic prosperity (*The Standard* 2002:8). On this basis, *The Standard* criticises the narrow conception of Zimbabwean-ness by the government. For example, Hove’s article challenges the framing of Zimbabwean-ness based on race arguing that white, black, coloured and Asian Zimbabweans all belong in equal measure (2000:5). Second, it argues that the liberation struggle had been fought for a “whole new country in which oppression and injustice would be replaced by justice, harmony, opportunity and prosperity for all” (*The Standard* 2002:8). In this regard, *The Standard* argues that the government’s corruption, brutality, and failure to deliver a just and inclusive society after independence explains the continued misrecognition of some social groups, and the unjust distribution of resources across the country’s citizenry. For example, the paper criticises the expedient and corrupt implementation of redistributive programmes such as land reform and economic indigenisation, arguing that they only benefit an elite political class at the expense of ordinary Zimbabweans. In its criticism of this tendency, *The Standard* observes that:

the struggle for independence is thus reduced to a struggle by blacks to supplant whites in order to perpetrate and perpetuate injustices that were synonymous with settler administration. (2004:8)

The newspaper also criticises the ruling Zanu PF party for the violence that accompanied the land reform process and elections (*The Standard* 2004:8; 2002:8). This is a significant objection as it speaks to the nature of processes that limit the ability to make justice claims by the citizenry. Also, for *The Standard*, the violent nature of land reform, and the invective directed at the country's white population contradict the policy of reconciliation enunciated at the attainment of independence in 1980. Although the government-controlled media blamed white farmers for holding on to multiple farms with the best arable land, *The Standard's* columnist Chenjerai Hove challenges this view blaming the government for ignoring calls by white farmers to resolve the land issue (Hove 2000:5). His argument suggests that the invective, and sometimes violence, directed at white Zimbabwean farmers were unjustified as the government itself had been slow to address land ownership imbalances. His argument thus undermines the very basis used by the government to represent white farmers as imperialists, or extensions of imperialist interests.

The newspaper also argues for social cohesion through its call for genuine national unity across the social tapestry of the country (*The Standard* 1999:8). For *The Standard*, the Unity Accord of 1987 is a weak basis for national unity as it was a "marriage of convenience [...] forged between two opposition parties of yore" (1999:8). On this basis Magaisa exhorts Zimbabweans to create a "reasonable co-existence, respecting the dignity, equality and Zimbabwean-ness of every man and woman who claims it" (2007:11). Unlike *The Sunday Mail*, the kind of unity advocated by *The Standard* is not limited to a specific racial, ethnic or class demographic, but is universalist in outlook. Furthermore, the unity *The Standard* advocates is based on a substantive sense of citizenship since it argues that liberation heroes had died for:

a society based on the rule of law, respect for human rights, fair play, reconciliation and vast improvement in the material well-being of all Zimbabweans regardless of colour, creed, or the shape of one's nose. (2004:8)

The Standard thus uses social memory to criticise the government's representation of Zimbabwean-ness as it excludes social groups who may be entitled to make justice claims. Furthermore, it criticises the processes by which such claims to justice are adjudicated. For example, the newspaper criticises the violence that usually precedes elections, restrictive laws that govern communication and assembly, and the violence that accompanied land reform (*The Standard* 2002:8). It raises these concerns because such a hostile environment can potentially limit citizens' ability to make justice claims even if they are included in the ideal conception

of Zimbabwean-ness. These criticisms show the newspaper's orientation towards inclusivity, or in Fraser's (2008) terms, representation.

The two newspapers' evocation of social memory clearly performs political work. They draw on social memory to construct a Zimbabwean identity that is consistent with the political programmes or ideological standpoints they represent. Since *The Sunday Mail* is largely controlled by the Zanu PF government, its evocation of social memory and subsequent constructions of national identity seek "to consolidate and extend" its hold on power by using the past "to legitimise present political and social arrangements" which ensure its continuity (Cubitt 2007:224). In contrast, as *The Standard* is privately owned it is oriented towards a 'modernist' understanding of democracy and is generally anti-government. Its evocation of social memory provides "a standpoint from which" the government's master commemorative narrative can "be criticised or resisted" (Cubitt 2007:224). In different ways both newspapers show that they "seek to influence the directions" that Zimbabwe as a country "takes in the present and future" (Cubitt 2007:224). *The Sunday Mail's* vision for Zimbabwe's future is informed by an indigenist world view that seeks to put "Africa's age-old communities at the centre of African politics" (Mamdani 1996:3). In contrast, *The Standard's* vision for Zimbabwe's future is informed by a universalist and humanist world view which seeks to locate "politics in civil society" (Mamdani 1996:3). In order to engage with this complex political terrain which includes justice claims for 'reciprocal recognition', equal distribution and representation, in deontological terms (Fraser 2001, 2003, 2008), I now turn to Fraser's (2001, 2008) work on parity of participation, Mouffe's (1999,2009) model of agonistic pluralism, and Habermas's (1980, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1998) conception of discourse ethics.

A Normative Critique of *The Sunday Mail's* and *The Standard's* Work of Memory

The previous section shows the multiple fractures in the evocation and use of social memory to construct national identity in Zimbabwe by *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* newspapers. These fractures emerge across distribution, recognition and representation, Fraser's dimensions of justice (2001, 2003, 2008). It is not an anomaly that there are such fractures. As Mouffe argues, conflict is inherent in all social arrangements as they are traversed by the political, and power (1999, 2009). Because of this, she argues that any democratic project has to contend with the ineradicable presence of both power and antagonism (Mouffe 1992a, 1999, 2000, 2005, 2009). For her, a more effective democratic project is that which does not seek to

eliminate power but “to constitute forms of power that are compatible with democratic values” and pluralism (Mouffe 1999:753, 2009). It is within this framework that a normative evaluation of the tendencies explicated above is conducted.

The normative critique of *The Sunday Mail's* and *The Standard's* work of memory begins with a normative critique of the political uses of social memory outlined above using Fraser's evaluative notion of parity of participation (2001; 2008). The section also uses Mouffe's (1999, 2009) conception of agonistic pluralism and Habermas's (1989, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1998) discourse ethics theory to think the media's memory work in constructing national identity for democratic ends.

Parity of Participation

Fraser's view of justice has three dimensions: distribution, recognition and representation (2000, 2001, 2008). She argues that the emancipatory aspects of these dimensions “need to be integrated in a single comprehensive framework” (Fraser 2001:22). This framework is meant to overcome the usual dissociation of struggles for recognition from those of redistribution (Fraser 2001). To do this, she argues that claims for recognition should not be thought in terms of identity, but rather should be treated as a “question of *social status*” (Fraser 2001:24). She expands the very notion of justice by making parity of participation the normative core of her conception of justice (Fraser 2000, 2001, 2003, 2008). In other words, a just society is one that affords its members parity of participation, or “social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers” (Fraser 2001:29)—based on the view of “the equal moral worth of human beings” (Fraser 2001:30). The normative value of participatory parity lies in its rigour. On the one hand, it requires adequate justification for justice claims, and on the other, it requires valid justification of proposed solutions to the injustices raised by the claimant. It is therefore imperative to ask whether *The Sunday Mail's* and *The Standard's* use of social memory to construct national identity accords all Zimbabweans the status of participatory parity?

As shown above, *The Sunday Mail's* evocation of social memory is guided by its sense of exigent justice issues in the Zimbabwean context. Two motifs emerge in this regard. On the one hand, *The Sunday Mail* is concerned with redistribution in post-colonial Zimbabwe, evident in its approach to issues such as land reform and the indigenisation of the economy.

On the other hand, it is concerned with the threat posed by what it regards as contemporary forms of imperialism, to the creation of a just society in Zimbabwe. The claimant of justice in both cases is presented as the black native. Given the effect of colonialism on Zimbabwe's black population, framing justice claims in this way is not entirely inappropriate. As Mamdani argues, the colonial system treated black Africans, not as full citizens, but subjects (1996). This meant that they did not enjoy parity of participation during colonialism. Furthermore, because this social group had also been dispossessed of material assets such as land and cattle by the colonial government, it meant that unless such distributive injustices were resolved after independence, their situation would not change significantly even after gaining political independence from colonial powers (Sachikonye 2005; Alexander 2003). Thus, one of the most exigent issues of social justice at the onset of independence in Zimbabwe was the need to address distributive anomalies that prevented its black population from enjoying parity of participation. However, *The Sunday Mail* ignores the marginalisation of other 'non-white' people during colonialism and after independence. Furthermore, it defines Zimbabwean-ness in terms of pre-colonial realities that exclude 'non-white' subjects such as Asians and Coloureds, immigrant workers on both farms and in the mines, as well as the country's white population, from a sense of national belonging. This is a significant construction since the newspaper constructs justice in terms of belonging. For example, non-native blacks—or immigrant labourers resident in Zimbabwe—are excluded because they are not considered Zimbabweans. Similarly, white Zimbabweans and members of opposition parties such as the MDC are excluded because they pose a threat to redistributive programmes since they are deemed to serve global capitalism or imperialist interests. And 'Asians' and 'coloureds' are excluded because they are not 'black' and cannot trace their history to pre-colonial Zimbabwe. *The Sunday Mail's* use of memory in constructing Zimbabwean national identity, in the main, falls short of the normative demands of participatory parity. For instance, its reduction of distributive justice to identitarian imperatives falls short of 'parity of participation' as claimants for recognition and redistribution must show that the:

reforms they advocate will supply the objective conditions for full participation to those currently denied them – without significantly exacerbating other disparities. (Fraser 2001:33)

The Sunday Mail's conflation of calls for distributive justice with the recognition of a specific racial group (native black Zimbabweans) excludes other racial groups—Asians and coloureds—that did not enjoy reciprocal recognition and distributive justice during the colonial period, and still do not, years after independence (Muzondidya 2005, 2007). Furthermore, the

land reform programme did not take into consideration farm workers. Since they were excluded from both the imagination of Zimbabwean-ness and redistributive programmes such as land reform, they remained in a state of both mal-distribution and misrecognition (see Rutherford 2007). The white farmers from whom the land was expropriated are largely framed as the embodiment of imperialism and are thus excluded from consideration as Zimbabwean citizens deserving of both recognition and distributive justice. *The Sunday Mail* also does not engage with calls for recognition and distributive justice by the victims of *Gukurahundi*. While it argues for the recognition of black Zimbabweans and their calls for distributive justice, it simultaneously marginalises the same calls by victims of *Gukurahundi*. However, it is also evident that the newspaper's call for the recognition of black Zimbabweans across the justice dimensions of recognition and distribution is consistent with the notion of parity of participation since this group's status was undermined by the discriminatory socio-economic and political arrangements of the colonial period some of which endured well into the post-independence era. *The Sunday Mail's* call for the recognition of black people in a context of unequal socio-economic relations is thus informed by the desire to raise the status of this social group to that of white citizens. But *The Sunday Mail's* evocation of social memory falls short of the participatory parity requirement that claims for recognition, distribution and representation should not create or worsen "other disparities" since it valorises claims for justice by native black Zimbabweans at the expense of other social groups as shown above (Fraser 2001:33).

In contrast, *The Standard's* call for the recognition, representation, and distributive justice for all Zimbabweans is consistent with Fraser's evaluative norm of participatory parity for all adult people which is based on the idea of an "equal moral worth of human beings" (2001:30). Forms of belonging based on the norm of participatory parity thus transcend particularistic and sectarian imaginations. In other words, belonging that is based on parity of participation in a specific nation-state is modelled along Smith's civic model of the nation (1991). It has a universalist or cosmopolitan outlook that is underlined by an egalitarian distributive order in which all citizens are accorded reciprocal recognition and are not misrepresented in social life.

Unlike *The Sunday Mail*, *The Standard's* evocation of social memory as a tool for constructing national identity is premised on the norm of participatory parity. *The Standard* uses social memory as a premise for two major normative standpoints. First, it uses social memory to transcend the essentialist conception of Zimbabwean-ness as an identity that can be traced back

into antiquity. The newspaper shows that the diversity of people who constitute contemporary Zimbabwe were brought together by particular socio-economic and political forces, and should therefore negotiate ways of co-existing within an inclusive, egalitarian and democratic polity. This view is evident in Magaisa's (2007:11) opinion article *Independence: Was it Worth the Sacrifice*, Hove's (2000:5) opinion article *In Search of an Identity*, and *The Standard's* (2002:8) editorial *Is this the Zimbabwe we Fought for?* They exhort Zimbabweans to negotiate inclusive and egalitarian forms of co-existence. In this way, the newspaper's evocation of social memory promotes nation-building: a sense of oneness out of many different social groups in Zimbabwe without obliterating the country's cultural diversity (Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007). Second, the newspaper evokes the memory of anti-colonial struggle to underscore the democratic values that informed both its prosecution, and the democratic society that it aimed to achieve. *The Standard* uses this mnemonic evocation as the normative basis upon which to criticise the government's narrowly conceived forms of belonging, and the redistributive programmes contingent on such forms of belonging. *The Standard* thus subscribes to the principle of "the equal moral worth of human beings" (Fraser 2001:30). This principle enables the newspaper to use social memory to transcend the nativist representation of belonging preponderant in *The Sunday Mail*. In addition, since *The Standard's* point of departure is the pursuit of an inclusive and egalitarian society premised on the democratic values that informed the liberation struggle, the kind of society that it argues for is predisposed towards addressing barriers to participatory parity such as mal-distribution, misrecognition and misrepresentation (Fraser 2001, 2008).

Framing Democratic Uses of Social Memory for Nation-Building

An Agonistic Perspective

For Mouffe, any project of democratisation must contend with the ineradicable presence of both power and antagonism in the social because conditions of human coexistence are always traversed by 'the political' (1992a, 1999, 2000, 2005, 2009). She defines 'the political' as the "dimension of antagonism that is inherent in all human society, antagonism that can take many different forms and can emerge in diverse social relations" (Mouffe 1999:754). Power is something that is not only constitutive of identities, but also for which many social groups or interests are in contention (1999; see also Laclau and Mouffe 1985). However, since politics "consists in domesticating hostility" (Mouffe 1999:754), what is required is a form of democratic politics that grasps "the economic, social and political conditions" which give rise to antagonism (Mouffe 2009:12). On this basis Mouffe argues for agonistic pluralism as a

model that “aims at the creation of unity in a context of conflict and diversity” (Mouffe 1999:755). Her model of agonistic pluralism thus provides a useful framework for considering the possibilities of constituting a democratic society—in this case, Zimbabwe—recognising the permanence of antagonism and conflict. As already shown in Chapters Seven and Eight, and in the discussion above, the evocation of social memory is germane to justice claims⁵² across the dimensions of recognition, distribution and representation. It is also clear that national identity is a key frame through which justice claims are expressed. But as argued in Chapter Three, identity is a relational phenomenon characterised by difference that is sustained through conflicting, but mutually constitutive, conceptions of self-hood (Hall 2000; Billig 1995). These constructions are also shaped by “the economic, social and political conditions” which give rise to claims for justice as shown above (Mouffe 2009:12). It is out of these conditions that conflict is likely to arise as they shape the nature of contests between different social groups. For example, Chapters Seven and Eight as well as the analysis conducted above, show the conflict between a nativist conception of Zimbabwean-ness by *The Sunday Mail*, and the universalist-humanist tendency of *The Standard*. *The Standard* also shows the fractures inherent in nativist discourse, which emanate from traumatic experiences which are ‘symbolically annihilated’ (Tuchman 1979) by the master-commemorative narrative expressed in *The Sunday Mail*. The multiple lines of conflict that inform the different ways in which social memory is evoked validate Mouffe’s argument on the permanence of power and antagonism in the constitution of collective identities (2009). If this is taken as the point of departure to theorise national identity in Zimbabwe, *The Sunday Mail*’s categorisation of Zimbabweans into ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’ based on the justice claim at issue, creates antagonism—rather than agonism—between the conflicting social groups (Mouffe 2009). For instance, those constructed as imperialists and their collaborators by *The Sunday Mail* are treated as enemies, rather than adversaries with whom a battle of ideas can be waged (Mouffe 2009). It is thus evident that *The Sunday Mail*’s articles do not “sublimate” conflicts between different social groups in Zimbabwe towards democratic ends, but rather accentuate them along the lines of justice claims definitive of the conflicting social groups (Mouffe 2009:9). As noted, *The Standard* takes a universalist approach to defining nationhood in Zimbabwe. While this approach is inclusive and promotes egalitarian economic policies, the newspaper’s emphasis on universalism disregards the passions—or axes of affect—associated with particular social

⁵² This term is used in Fraser’s (2001, 2003, 2008) sense to refer to justice claims across the dimensions of recognition, distribution, and representation. As shown in the discussion above, claims to justice along these dimensions are entwined with constructions of collective identities such as national identity.

groups (Mouffe 2009). Such passions can emanate from social, economic and political factors. In other words, they can originate from any of Fraser's dimensions of justice—recognition, distribution and representation—around which national identity is defined, reinforced and contested. *The Standard's* universalist orientation explains its negligible coverage of the *Gukurahundi* issue. For instance, the one aspect about the legacy of *Gukurahundi* that *The Standard* ignores are the concomitant calls for secession by some political groups from Matabeleland who feel alienated from the hegemonic conception of Zimbabwean-ness (Mhlanga 2013). The marginalisation of this discourse by both *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* is inconsistent with Mouffe's model of agonistic pluralism that requires the transformation of passions to serve democratic ends (Mouffe 2009). By neglecting the passions associated with *Gukurahundi*, the two newspapers fail to bring into the public sphere the issues whose resolution requires practical argumentation, thereby discursively forestalling the achievement of democratised human coexistence in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the two newspapers' respective evocation of social memory falls short of the agonistic requirement for democratically "domesticating hostility", albeit in uniquely different ways (Mouffe 1999:754).

On the one hand, *The Sunday Mail's* particularistic conception of Zimbabwean-ness excludes other citizens who are entitled to make justice claims due to them, and glosses over the differences within the native black population of Zimbabwe. From an agonistic perspective, this approach gives way to "confrontation between essentialist forms of identification or non-negotiable moral values" (Mouffe 2005:30). In other words, it fails to establish an 'us' and 'them' distinction in ways that are "compatible with pluralist democracy" (Mouffe 1999:755). On the other hand, *The Standard's* universalist construction of national identity ignores the agonistic maxim that power and antagonism are permanent features of conditions governing human coexistence (Mouffe 2009). In so doing it fails to accommodate group specific justice claims that can potentially spawn conflict between essentialist identities borne out of unaddressed justice claims (see Renan 1882/2011:83).

The newspapers' failure to negotiate universalistic and particularistic forms of national identity can be explained in several ways, but I will highlight only two prominent ones. First, the ownership structures which shape these newspapers' coverage of issues and use of social memory in constructing national identity may be partly to blame, since mass media are "part of the more general structuring of society, responsive to larger economic, social, political or cultural evolutions" (Cubitt 2007:170). *The Sunday Mail's* definition of Zimbabwean-ness is

shaped by the Zanu PF government's political goals for which it is expedient to evoke social memory in essentialist terms as shown in Chapters One, Two and Four. Since *The Standard* is oriented towards inclusive democratisation, it is less inclined to heed genuine particularistic calls for justice as that would undermine its universalist outlook. Second, the two newspapers' discursive work is not guided by the same normative or moral guidelines. In other words, the kinds of Zimbabwean-ness they construct are informed by two different moral outlooks. *The Sunday Mail's* use of social memory has an ethical or relativist orientation compared to *The Standard's* moral or deontological orientation. One way of narrowing the gap between their discursive positions to create "unity in a context of conflict and diversity" (Mouffe 1999:755), is to base the conception of social justice and national identity on Fraser's inclusive and egalitarian norm of participatory parity as discussed above. Another is to negotiate difference under conditions of a "shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of democracy" (Mouffe 1999:755). In order to consider these "ethico-political principles" (Mouffe 1999:755), this study draws on Jurgen Habermas's discourse ethics. This study uses Habermas's discourse ethics to propose how people can be treated as equals in a political community such as Zimbabwe (Murphy III 1994).

The Discourse Ethics Perspective

The challenge to nation-building projects in modern societies emanates from their pluralistic nature that makes consensus on national identity difficult to achieve owing to competing forms of a good life, and claims to justice. The solution to this challenge potentially lies in the establishment of social institutions and communicative processes that enable the constitution of a diverse, egalitarian, and just society characterised by a "*nonappropriating* inclusion of the other *in his otherness*" (Habermas 1998:40). Also as Habermas points out, conflicts playing out in "norm-guided interactions can be traced directly to some disruption of a normative consensus" (1990:67). Discourse ethics is premised on the assumption that social groups in a plural but conflictual and antagonistic society "do not wish to resolve their conflicts through violence, or even compromise, but through communication" (Habermas 1998:39). It is the centrality of communication to the resolution of conflict that underpins the participants' impulse to "engage in deliberation and work out a shared *ethical* self-understanding on a secular basis" (Habermas 1998:39). It is on this basis that he proposes a moral and procedural solution that avoids both the reification of particularism (that is particular forms of the good life), and a universalism characterised by "false abstractions" such as preoccupation with the

equality of persons “*at the expense of the aspect of individuality*” (Habermas 1998:40). He calls this framework discourse ethics.

Chapters Seven and Eight as well as the analysis conducted in the first section of this chapter show that the idea of Zimbabwean-ness is at the crossroads. Articles from both newspapers presume what Habermas calls “some disruption of a normative consensus” (1990:67). A remedial programme to this disruption can mean either “restoring intersubjective recognition of a validity claim after it has become controversial, or assuring intersubjective recognition for a new validity claim that is a substitute for the old one” (Habermas 1990:67). In Zimbabwe, both of these scenarios apply. First, whatever consensus there was on the idea of Zimbabwean-ness during the anti-colonial struggle became controversial and difficult to sustain following *Gukurahundi* atrocities of the early 1980s, violence against opposition political party members over the years, and violence against white farmers during the fast track land reform programme *inter-alia*. The Zimbabwe that was expected to replace the racist white settler regime of Rhodesia has arguably reproduced the same oppressive tendencies synonymous with the latter (Muzondidya 2005). Secondly, there has been an attempt since independence to build a sense of oneness out of many different social groups in Zimbabwe following the attainment of independence in 1980 (Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007). Due to disparate and conflicting interests associated with different social groups, and their respective justice claims, this process is still work in progress (Mlambo 2013). It is thus partly due to these disruptions to the normative consensus on Zimbabwean-hood that the country’s national identity has become highly contested. *The Sunday Mail* sees the universalistic values of ‘modernist’ conceptions of a democratic society “as no more than a series of subterfuges intended to disguise the violence of imperialism” (Mbembe 2002:635) which the government’s redistributive programmes seek to address. The normative challenge confronting *The Sunday Mail’s* conception of Zimbabwean-ness, is to address justice claims emanating from the negative legacy of colonialism without creating new sites of injustice. For *The Standard*, the narrow conception of Zimbabwean-ness by the Zanu PF government and its violence against oppositional voices violates the normative consensus that informed the liberation struggle which venerated an inclusive and egalitarian post-colonial Zimbabwe (Alexander *et al.* 2000:6). Its challenge is thus to argue for an inclusive and egalitarian Zimbabwe without marginalising the passions of particular social groups and their justice claims. Failure to address this conundrum by either newspaper is likely to confine the debate over Zimbabwean national identity to the palpable tension between nativist conceptions discursively represented by *The Sunday Mail*, and

universalist conceptions represented by *The Standard*. What is required, therefore, is a framework for thinking democratic belonging that is transcendent of the weaknesses immanent in these two world views. It is in this context that this study proposes thinking the discursive construction of Zimbabwean national identity within Habermas's framework of discourse ethics. Habermas's theory of discourse ethics consists of two key principles. The first principle (D) asserts that "only those norms can claim validity that could meet with the acceptance of all concerned in practical discourse" (Habermas 1998:41; 1989, 1990, 1993, 1997). The second principle (U) asserts that:

a norm is valid when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of *each individual* could be *jointly* accepted by *all* concerned without coercion. (Habermas 1998:42)

Principle (D) provides for the resolution of social conflict through "practical discourse" also referred to as "the discursive redemption of normative claims to validity" (1990:103). However, since practical discourses are not substantive, they depend "on content brought to them from outside", because practical discourses "are always related to the concrete point of departure of a disturbed normative agreement" (Habermas 1990:103). Social memory and the justice claims prompting its evocation by the newspapers under study are the concrete basis for the practical discourse definitive of Zimbabwean-hood. Thus, the interpretations of the social memory evoked over the justice claims at issue, must emerge from practical discourse or actual argumentation in the public sphere (Habermas 1990). The agreements that emerge from this process are fallible and only resolve the justice claims temporarily, thereby instantiating a form of agonistic pluralism since the contest remains open (Habermas 1992; Mouffe 1999). Furthermore, principle (U) "regulates only argumentation among a plurality of participants" and proposes the open and egalitarian inclusion as participants in practical discourse of "all affected" (Habermas 1990:66). This inclusion of "all affected" in practical argumentation enables a discursive forum where different interests and worldviews are subjected to public scrutiny under open, inclusive, egalitarian and non-coercive conditions (Habermas 1998:44).

It is this procedural framework that can potentially enable the construction of an inclusive national identity which is as sensitive to particularist justice claims, as it is to universalist ones. Since the discursive environment it proposes is open, egalitarian and non-coercive, it provides room for the expression and acceptance of justice claims emanating from "all affected", thereby making principle (U), a route towards the formulation of genuinely inclusive forms of belonging.

It is this facet that is evidently lacking in the articles analysed in Chapters Seven and Eight. *The Sunday Mail's* exclusive conception of Zimbabwean-ness and its indifference to particularist justice claims such as those raised by *Gukurahundi* victims, falls short of principle (U)'s demands. *The Standard's* emphasis on universalist inclusivity also neglects particularist concerns that question the integrity of a Zimbabwean nation. Habermas's discourse ethics thus provide an evaluative framework for actual discourses that define Zimbabwean-ness in the media, and a normative framework within which to model more democratic forms of such discourses. In so doing, Habermas's discourse ethics also provide a pragmatic framework within which Fraser's notion of participatory parity and Mouffe's notion of agonistic pluralism can be genuinely instantiated.

Conclusion

The Sunday Mail's and *The Standard's* memory work is embedded in justice claims associated with both the unjust legacy of colonialism, and the failures of the post-colonial Zimbabwean state. In other words, the two newspapers evoke social memory to underpin their arguments for specific justice claims by different social groups in ways that, on the one hand, construct and reinforce certain identities, and on the other hand, undermine and resist others for particular political ends. For instance, *The Sunday Mail* uses social memory to create and reinforce a nativist conception of Zimbabwean national identity based on justice claims that it argues are owed to the country's majority black population. In contrast, *The Standard* uses social memory to make a case for an inclusive, egalitarian and universalist Zimbabwean identity to counteract an exclusivist nativism promoted by the Zanu PF government, and its sectarian redistributive programmes. However, although *The Sunday Mail's* use of social memory is expedient to Zanu PF's political goals, it also reflects the justice claims borne of Zimbabwe's colonial experience. In the same vein, although *The Standard's* use of social memory reflects the modernist penchant for universalist imaginaries, it also reflects the failure of Zimbabwe's post-independence nation-building project. The entwinement of social memory and collective identity with justice claims in the two newspapers reflects the unique uses of social memory in the context of post-colonial societies such as Zimbabwe. That is to say, justice claims that are informed by social memory in post-colonial societies, such as Zimbabwe, constitute social collectivities inasmuch as they reinforce and undermine them. The three theories used in the study provide a useful framework for understanding and analysing the discursive processes constitutive of national identities in post-colonial Africa in general, and Zimbabwe in

particular. They also provide a normative framework for constituting democratic forms of national identity that are at once inclusive, egalitarian and sensitive to particularist sensibilities. The study also makes the conclusive argument that a genuinely inclusive form of Zimbabwean national identity based on the normative principles of participatory parity and agonistic pluralism can be actualised through social interaction that is premised on Habermas's discourse ethics.

Chapter Ten

Conclusion

This study investigates two major issues. First, it investigates how *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* newspapers of Zimbabwe used social memory to construct the country's national identity between 1999 and 2013 in a context of ongoing nation-building processes, and against the backdrop of its poly-racial, and poly-ethno-linguistic character. Second, the study explores how these newspapers worked as memory sites through their construction of Zimbabwe's sense of national identity over the period under study.

Regarding the first objective, this thesis argues that the articles from both *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* show that in a multi-ethno-linguistic and multi-racial post-colonial society such as Zimbabwe, national identity is partly constructed discursively (Brubaker 1996a; Wodak *et al.* 2009; Hall 1992). Although this process may unfold in passive ways through what Billig (1995) calls 'banal nationalism', these two newspapers show the ways in which social memory has been *actively* used to construct versions and sub-versions of national identity. It is this discursive construction of national identity which leads Ranger and Hobsbawm (1983) to call national myths, symbols, and the so-called national ethos 'invented traditions', and Anderson (1991:6) to call the nation "an imagined community". As Anderson argues, nations can be distinguished "by the style in which they are imagined" (1991:6). In this regard, the study shows that the discursive construction of Zimbabwe's national identity based on variable memory evocations by the two newspapers, is shaped by their (newspapers') competing ideologies and political goals (Olick *et al.* 2011). On the one hand, the editorials and opinions from *The Sunday Mail*, speak of Zimbabwean-ness in essentialist terms (Calhoun 1997). The newspaper evokes the memory of pre-colonial Zimbabwe in primordialist and perennialist terms to frame and legitimise Zimbabwean-ness as an existential category that can be traced back, unproblematically, to antiquity (Ozкимli 2000; Smith 1995, 2004). In other words, *The Sunday Mail's* evocation of social memory shows how contemporary nations such as Zimbabwe draw on self-interpretations of their historical origins to construct a sense of timeless identities (Smith 1995). But, even if one were to accept that there are elements of contemporary Zimbabwe that are traceable to antiquity, nationalist appropriation of these historical forms transforms their meanings and their contemporary importance (Breuilly 1993a; Brass 1979, 1991). For instance, since *The Sunday Mail* largely represents the hegemonic appropriation of

social memory to construct a sense of Zimbabwean nationhood, its constructions are informed by the government's political goals (Breuilly 1996). To stabilise these constructions, the newspaper 'symbolically annihilates' elements of social memory, such as *Gukurahundi*, that threaten the hegemonic imaginary of Zimbabwean-ness. As Renan argues, "the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common; and also that they have forgotten many things" (Renan 1882/2011:80). The Zanu PF government thus seeks to ensure its own continuity by defining modern day Zimbabwe and its future goals in terms that frame contemporary socio-political and economic policies as contiguous with the country's anti-colonial struggles with which it associates itself. Generally speaking, *The Sunday Mail* thus evokes social memory as the basis for imagining Zimbabwean-ness in terms of a nativist model of the nation to justify the Zanu PF government's socio-political and economic goals (Mbembe 2002, 2001a, 2001b; Appiah, 1992, 2008). By so doing, it narrows a sense of belonging to the native black population, thereby excluding other social groups constitutive of contemporary Zimbabwe.

In contrast, *The Standard's* opinion articles and editorials use social memory to construct Zimbabwean-ness in modernist terms with citizenship as the core organising principle of belonging. It uses social memory as a premise for a national identity which accommodates all social groups in contemporary Zimbabwe. Its approach is consistent with humanist ethics that undergird "commitment to human dignity for all" (Mbembe and Posel 2005:284). *The Standard* does this by using social memory to show the immigrant status of the country's different social groups, and by using the civic values of the country's liberation struggle to criticise the hegemonic, narrowly nativist imagined Zimbabwean identity promoted by the Zanu PF government as represented by *The Sunday Mail*. A nativist imaginary is problematic as it "restricts civic relatedness," and reduces the African to "not someone who shares in the human condition itself, but a person who was born in Africa, lives in Africa, and is black" (Mbembe 2001a:15). *The Standard's* evocation of social memory thus undermines the hegemonic nativist discourse on national identity and premises Zimbabwean-ness on Smith's notion of the civic model of the nation (1991). This approach is premised on the observation that identities "grow out of a history of changing responses to economic, political and cultural forces" and therefore, are never static as implied by nativist arguments (Appiah 2008:90). But *The Standard's* emphasis on a universalist national identity can potentially preclude the accommodation of specific sensibilities—such as those associated with *Gukurahundi*—emanating from unique ethno-linguistic, racial, cultural and regional social groups in the imagined Zimbabwean

national identity. In sum, the political discourse analysis of *The Sunday Mail's* and *The Standard's* evocation of social memory show that the two newspapers are a microcosmic reflection of the tension between indigenist and universalist imaginaries of belonging constituting the African conundrum as argued in Chapter Four. As Mamdani argues, the African conundrum is characterised by the duality of modernist and communitarian tendencies (1996:3).

Regarding the second objective which sought to explore how *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* worked as memory sites through their construction of Zimbabwe's sense of national identity over the period under study, the thesis concludes that the newspapers perform active memory work at least through their editorial and opinion articles. Since editorials and opinions are primarily argumentative, the newspapers' evocation of social memory is deliberate and purposeful (see Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; Fowler 1991). *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* actively draw on elements of Zimbabwe's social memory to influence the course of social action in the country's present and future discursively, as shown in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine. For example, *The Sunday Mail* does this by evoking elements of Zimbabwe's social memory to define justice claims due to the country's black population. The newspaper uses the country's history of colonialism and its impression of neo-imperialism to justify the Zanu PF government's land reform programme and its economic indigenisation policies. This justification is arguably necessitated by controversy arising from the exclusivist implementation of such programmes and their political expediency (Raftopoulos 2009; Alexander 2006). *The Standard*, on the other hand, criticises the exclusivist and corrupt implementation of the government's redistributive programmes, arguing for a more inclusive and egalitarian Zimbabwe. Furthermore, since such argumentation is a form of social action that is integral to other forms of social action, it can also be concluded that *The Sunday Mail's* and *The Standard's* memory work is consistent with Blumer's argument that human beings should always be understood as engaged in action (1969). In other words, these two newspapers actively evoke social memory in ongoing interactive communicative encounters with readers to shape their sense-making of issues and events. Their argumentation does not end simply with guiding meaning-making, but potentially shapes how readers act based on the meanings that they take from the newspapers' editorials and opinions (Blumer 1969). For example, by defining people's justice claims, the newspapers also propose how those justice claims should be addressed and who stands to benefit from them—as shown in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine (see Bennett 1982). To the extent that the foregoing holds true, it can be concluded that

the newspapers' memory work exemplifies Blumer's (1969) notion of symbolic interactionism. That is to say, the two newspapers' argumentation instantiates a form of social interaction with the readers and other competing world views out of which meanings that inform present and future social action emerge. However, since it has also been demonstrated that the newspaper's framing of Zimbabwean national identity is largely informed by exigent claims for distributive justice, it is important to frame democratic ways of defining belonging and the ways through which such distributive justice can be achieved for all Zimbabweans. This study argues that Habermas's discourse ethics provides a democratic framework through which the reciprocal recognition, representation and distributive justice claims of all Zimbabwean citizens can be democratically pursued. Discourse ethics accommodate particularistic claims to justice as much as they promote a universalistic order (Habermas 1998). In other words, the newspapers' evocation of social memory must cultivate open, inclusive, egalitarian and non-coercive practical argumentation that accommodates the justice claims of all social groups for an inclusive and egalitarian sense of Zimbabwean national identity to be achieved (Habermas 1989, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1998). However, since the study is wholly textual, it is difficult to say whether the newspapers' evocation of social memory has any material effect on the construction of Zimbabwean-ness. This can only be established through an audience study which can be used to establish the actual effects of these newspapers' memory work. Nonetheless, the study achieves its objectives as it was mainly concerned with establishing how *The Sunday Mail* and *The Standard* work as sites of social memory through their construction of Zimbabwean-ness against the backdrop that the media have some effect on the audiences, however tenuous this may be (Gans 2003; Couldry 2012).

To achieve these research goals, the study combines aspects of the work of Fraser, Mouffe and Habermas for thinking democratization, inclusive belonging and egalitarian citizenship in Zimbabwe. Fraser's understanding of the necessity for recognising both justice and recognition claims in order to establish "parity of participation" (2003: 36) is a useful starting point for considering the 'African conundrum' as explicated by Mamdani (1996). Furthermore, Mouffe's understanding of agonistic pluralism which recognises difference but argues for the construction of 'adversaries' rather than 'enemies' engaged in agonistic, discursive contestation is a valuable way of thinking about political contestation in incipient democracies. And finally, Habermas's concept of discourse ethics is an invaluable framework for discursive engagement in asymmetrical conditions of power. Although all of these frameworks are

mindful of social conditions of inequality, they are all formulated from within ‘northern’ or ‘western’ political conditions. While they are useful to my analysis of the situation in contemporary Zimbabwe, my application of them reveals certain ‘short-comings’ in this particular context. For instance, since the colonial system deprived Zimbabwe’s native population and other subject groups of “parity of participation” (Fraser 2003:36) on the basis of race, a remedial social framework must address all forms of justice claims *at once*, albeit without creating new sites of injustice. In such a context, Fraser’s (2003) argument that maldistribution and misrecognition can only be solved simultaneously in societies that are based either on purely market or kinship ties is undermined by the Zimbabwean case as shown in this study. Also, while Mouffe’s (1999, 2009) emphasis on the recognition of difference is imperative to thinking the problem of misrecognition, it does not adequately address the challenges that arise when particular social groups monopolise control over state institutions and use this social position to marginalize others based on, *inter alia*, ethnicity, political affiliation, religion as has been argued to be the case with Zimbabwe. For example, some have argued that Zimbabwe is imagined as an ethnic nation despite the existence of more than 15 ethno-linguistic and other ‘racial’ groups in the country (see Mhlanga 2013; Ndhlovu 2013). In the same vein, a secessionist movement driven by Ndebele nationalism in Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland region (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008) seeks to establish a nation-state called *Mthwakazi*, which is arguably just another nationalist movement that seeks hegemonic control of the state and over a geographical area with more than 10 ethno-linguistic groups (see Ndhlovu 2013; Breuilly 1993a:1; Brass 1979). Habermas’s (1990, 1998) discourse ethics theory may fall short of practical effectiveness in that it seeks to engender social transformation at the level, mainly, of discourse. To this extent, it fails to accommodate those instances where the resolution of conflict cannot be achieved discursively through practical argumentation only. Since colonialism itself was a violent system, which in Zimbabwe was jettisoned using violence, the chances that aggrieved social groups will resort to violence as a default route towards a solution to social problems is real.

The study shows that media are an important site of social memory although their evocation of mnemonic resources varies based on the ideological standpoints informing (or informed by) the political goals they advance. It also shows that the media’s memory work, is actively instantiated through argumentation and other rhetorical practices in an effort to shape actual social action external to mediated representations. In view of these findings, the political role of the media’s memory work should be taken into account when reviewing the role of the media

in societies that have a contested history of ethnic and nationalist conflict. Whereas justice issues in western countries largely revolve around economic issues as argued by Fraser (2001, 2003, 2008), in post-colonial Africa they are inextricably entwined with the politics of representation and recognition. By combining a political discourse analytical approach informed by Fraser's (2001, 2003, 2008) Theory of Justice, Mouffe's (1999, 2009) formulation of democratic politics as agonistic pluralism, and Habermas's (1989, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1998) Discourse Ethics, this study reveals how the mediated representations of social memory potentially shape both identity construction and political struggle. The construction of collective identities such as national identity, are shaped by the patterns of distribution, representation and recognition manifest in the media's operational contexts. Thus, an understanding of the construction of national identity in post-colonial African context(s) must include the ways in which its media contribute to this process through its memory work.

In applying these frameworks and identifying the ways in which they fall short of addressing Zimbabwe's post-colonial condition, the study contributes to the broader theoretical discussions about the mass-mediated use of social memory in the construction of social identities in the struggle to build democratic states in post-colonial societies.

References

- Alexander, J. 2003. 'Squatters', Veterans and the State in Zimbabwe. In Hammar, A., Raftopoulos, B. and Jensen, S. (Eds.) *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*. Harare: Weaver Press. 83-117.
- Alexander, J. 2006. *The Unsettled Land: State-Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe 1893-2003*. Harare: Oxford: James Currey.
- Alexander, J. and McGregor, J. 2006. Veterans, Violence and Nationalism in Zimbabwe. In Bay, E. G. and Donham, D. L. (Eds.) *States of Violence: Politics, Youth and Memory in Contemporary Africa*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 215-235.
- Alexander, J., McGregor, J. and Ranger, T. 2000. *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the 'Dark Forests' of Matabeleland*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Anderson, B. 1983, 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Appiah, K. A. 1992. *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Appiah, K. A. 2008. African Identities. In Geschiere, P., Meyer, B. and Pels, P. (Eds.) *Readings in Modernity in Africa*. Oxford: James Currey. 88-92.
- Aristotle. 1926. *The "Art" of Rhetoric*. (Trans. John Henry Freese). London: William Heinemann.
- Aristotle. 2012. *The Art of Rhetoric*. London: Harper Press.
- Armstrong, J. 1982. *Nations before Nationalism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. 2001. *The Practice of Social Research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Barker, C. and Galasinski, D. 2001. *Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis: A Dialogue on Language and Identity*. London: Sage Publications.
- Bastide, R. 1978. *The African Religions of Brazil: Toward a Sociology of the Interpenetration of Civilisations*. (Trans. Helen Sabba) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Bauer, J. 2013. *The Flight of the Phoenix: Investing in Zimbabwe's Rise from the Ashes during the Global Debt Crisis*. Berlin: epubli GmbH.
- Bennett, T. 1982. Theories of the Media, Theories of Society. In Gurevitch, M., Bennett, T., Curran, J. and Woollacott, J. (Eds.) *Culture, Society and the Media*. London: Methuen. 30-55.
- Berkowitz, D. A. 2011. News as Collective Memory. In Berkowitz, D. A. (Ed.) *Cultural Meanings of News: A Text-Reader*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 301-303.
- Bhebe, N. and Ranger, T. (Eds.) *Historical Dimensions of Democracy in Southern Africa. Volume 1*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.

- Billig, M. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage Publications.
- Billig, M. 2001. Discursive, Rhetorical and Ideological Messages. In Wetherell, M., Taylor, S. and Yates, S. J. (Eds.) *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader*. London: Sage. 211-221.
- Blok, A. 1998. The Narcissism of Minor Differences. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 1(1): 33-56.
- Blum, L. A. 1982. Kant's and Hegel's Moral Rationalism: A Feminist Perspective. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 12(2): 287-302.
- Blumer, H. 1969. The Methodological Position of Symbolic Interactionism. In Blumer, H. *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1-60.
- Bodnar, J. 1992. *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bodnar, J. 1992/2011. Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century. In Olick, J. K., Vinitzky-Seroussi, V. and Levy, D. (Eds.) *The Collective Memory Reader*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 265-268.
- Brass, P. R. 1979. Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity among the Muslims of South Asia. In Taylor, D. and Yapp, M. (Eds.) *Political Identity in South Asia*. London: Curzon Press. 35-68.
- Brass, P. R. 1991. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Bratton, M. 2016. *Power Politics in Zimbabwe*. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
- Breuilly, J. 1985. Reflections on Nationalism. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 15(1): 65-75.
- Breuilly, J. 1993a. *Nationalism and the State. 2nd Edition*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Breuilly, J. 1996. Approaches to Nationalism. In Balakrishnan, G. (Ed.) *Mapping the Nation*. London: Verso. 146-174.
- Breuilly, J. 2006. Introduction. In Gellner, E. *Nations and Nationalism. Second Edition*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. xiii-liv.
- Breuilly, J. 2009. Nationalism and the Making of National Pasts. In Carvalho, S. and Gemenne, F. (Eds.) *Nations and their Histories: Constructions and Representations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 7-28.
- Brubaker, R. 1996a. Nationalising States in the Old 'New Europe' – and the New. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 19(2): 411-437.
- Brubaker, R. 1996b. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brubaker, R. 1998. Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism. In Hall, J. A. (Ed.) *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 272-306.

- Bryman, A. 1988a. *Quantity and Quality in Social Research*. London: Routledge.
- Bryman, A. 2012. *Social Research Methods*. Fourth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burke, P. 1989. History as Social Memory. In Butler, T. (Ed.) *Memory: History, Culture and the Mind*. Cambridge Blackwell. 1-32.
- Burke, P. 1989/2011. History as Social Memory. In Olick, J. K., Vinitzky-Seroussi, V. and Levy, D. (Eds.) *The Collective Memory Reader*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 188-192.
- Calhoun, C. 1992. Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere. In Calhoun, C. (Ed.) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. London: The MIT Press. 1-42.
- Calhoun, C. 1997. *Nationalism*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Carey, J. W. 1989. *Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society*. New York: Routledge.
- Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe/The Legal Resources Foundation (CCJP/LRF). 1997. *Breaking the Silence, Building the Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and Midlands 1980-1988*. Harare: CCJP/LRF.
- Chari, T. 2009. Ethical Challenges Facing Zimbabwean Media in the Context of the Internet. *Global Media Journal: African Edition*, 3(1): 46-79.
- Chikuhwa, J. W. 2013. *Zimbabwe: The End of the First Republic*. Bloomington: AuthorHouse.
- Chiumbu, S. 2004. Redefining the National Agenda: Media and Identity – Challenges of Building a New Zimbabwe. In Melber, H. (Ed.) *Media, Public Discourse and Political Contestation in Zimbabwe*. Uppsala: Nordiska AfrikaInstitutet. 29-37.
- Christians, C. G. 2009. *Normative Theories of the Media: Journalism in Democratic Societies*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Chuma, W. 2005. Liberating or Limiting the Public Sphere? Media Policy and the Zimbabwe Transition, 1980-2004. In Raftopoulos, B. and Savage, T. (Eds.) *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation*. Harare: Weaver Press. 119-139.
- Chuma, W. 2005. Zimbabwe: The Media, Market Failure and Political Turbulence. *Equid Novi*, 26(1): 46-62.
- Chuma, W. 2010. Reforming the Media in Zimbabwe: Critical Reflections. In Moyo, D. and Chuma, W. (Eds.) *Media Policy in a Changing Southern Africa: Critical Reflections on Media Reforms in the Global Age*. Pretoria: Unisa Press. 90-109.
- Coldham, S. 2001. Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 2000 (Zimbabwe). *Journal of African Law*, 45(2): 227-229.
- Confino, A. (1997) Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method. *The American Historical Review*, 102(5): 1386-1403.
- Connor, W. 1972. Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying? *World Politics*, 24(3): 319-355.
- Connor, W. 1978, 1994. A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a ... In Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (Eds.) *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 36-46.

- Connor, W. 1978. A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a ... *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1(4): 377-400.
- Connor, W. 1992. The Nation and its Myth. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 33(1-2): 48-57.
- Connor, W. 1994. *Ethno-nationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Coser, L. A. 1992. Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs 1877-1945. In Coser, L. A. (Ed.) *Maurice Halbwachs: On Collective Memory*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1-34.
- Couldry, N. 2012. *Media, Society, World: Social Theory and Digital Media Practice*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Creswell, J. W. 2015. *A Concise Introduction to Mixed Methods Research*. London: Sage.
- Creswell, J. W. and Plano Clark, V. L. 2011. *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research*. 2nd Edition. London: Sage.
- Crush, J. and Tevera, D. 2010. Exiting Zimbabwe. In Crush, J. and Tevera, D. (Eds.) *Zimbabwe's Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival*. Cape Town: SAMP. 1-51.
- Cubitt, G. 2007. *History and Memory*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Dahlgren, P. 2009. *Media and Political Engagement: Citizens, Communication, and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Dorman, S., Hammett, D. and Nugent, P. 2007. Introduction: Citizenship and its Casualties in Africa. In Dorman, S., Hammett, D. and Nugent, P. (Eds.) *Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa*. Leiden: Brill. 3-26.
- Du Bois, W. E. B. 2000. The Conservation of Races. In Back, L. and Solomos, J. (Eds.) *Theories of Race and Racism: A Reader*. London: Routledge. 79-86.
- Dziva, C., Dube, B. and Manatsa, P. 2013. A Critique of the 2008 Government of National Unity and Human Rights Protection in Zimbabwe. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention*, 2(8): 83-92.
- Edy, J. A. 1999. Journalistic Uses of Collective Memory. *Journal of Communication*, 49(2): 71-85.
- Eyerman, R. 2004. The Past in the Present: Culture and the Transmission of Memory. *Acta Sociologica*, 47(2): 159-169.
- Eyerman, R. 2004/2011. The Past in the Present: Culture and the Transmission of Memory. In Olick, J. K., Vinitzky-Seroussi, V. and Levy, D. (Eds.) *The Collective Memory Reader*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 304-306.
- Fairclough, I. and Fairclough, N. 2012. *Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students*. London: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. 1995. *Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Longman.

- Fairclough, N. 2003. *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. London: Routledge.
- Feltoe, G. 2003. *A Guide to Media Law in Zimbabwe*. Harare: Legal Resources Foundation.
- Fentress, J. and Wickham, C. 1992. *Social Memory*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Fink, C. C. 2004. *Writing Opinion for Impact*. Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Flick, U. 2006. *An Introduction to Qualitative Research*. Third Edition. London: Sage Publications.
- Foucault, M. 1974/2011. Film in Popular Memory: An Interview with Michel Foucault. (Trans. Martin Jordan). In Olick, J. K., Vinitzky-Seroussi, V. and Levy, D. (Eds.) *The Collective Memory Reader*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 252-253.
- Fowler, R. 1991. *Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press*. London: Routledge.
- Franklin, H. 1949. Central African Broadcasting Station, Lusaka: Development of Broadcasting in Central Africa. Retrieved 07 November 2014 from http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/inventories/inv_pdfo/AD1715/AD1715-36-3-2-001-jpeg.pdf
- Fraser, N. 1992. Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy. In Calhoun, C. (Ed.) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. London: The MIT Press. 109-142.
- Fraser, N. 2000. Rethinking Recognition: Overcoming Displacement and Reification in Cultural Politics. *New Left Review*, 3(May/June): 107-120.
- Fraser, N. 2001. Recognition without Ethics? *Theory Culture and Society*, 18(2-3): 21-42.
- Fraser, N. 2003. Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation. In Fraser, N. and Honneth, A. *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (Trans. Joel Golb, James Ingram, and Christiane Wilke). London: Verso. 7-109.
- Fraser, N. 2008. *Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalising World*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Fraser, N. and Honneth, A. 2003. *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*. (Trans. Joel Golb, James Ingram, and Christiane Wilke). London: Verso.
- Frederikse, J. 1982. *None but Ourselves: Masses vs. Media in the Making of Zimbabwe*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
- Freedom House. 2013. Zimbabwe: Freedom of the Press 2013. Retrieved 17 November 2014 from <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/zimbabwe>
- Gans, H. J. 2003. *Democracy and the News*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Garnham, N. 2007. Habermas and the Public Sphere. *Global Media and Communication*, 3(2): 201-214.

- Geertz, C. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. London: Fontana.
- Gellner, E. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Gellner, E. 2006. *Nations and Nationalism. Second Edition*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Gillis, J. R. 1994. Introduction – Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship. In Gillis, J. R. (Ed.) *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 3-24.
- Golding, P. and Murdock, G. 2000. Culture, Communications and Political Economy. In Curran, J. and Gurevitch, M. (Eds.) *Mass Media and Society*. 3rd Edition. London: Arnold. 70-92.
- Guba, E. G. and Lincoln, Y. S. 1994. Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research. In Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.) *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. London: Sage. 105-117.
- Habermas, J. 1989. Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics? *Northwestern University Law Review*, 83(1&2): 38-53.
- Habermas, J. 1989. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Habermas, J. 1990. *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*. (Trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Habermas, J. 1992. Further Reflections on the Public Sphere (Trans. Thomas Burger). In Calhoun, C. (Ed.) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. London: The MIT Press. 421-461.
- Habermas, J. 1993. *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics*. (Trans. Ciaran P. Cronin). London: The MIT Press.
- Habermas, J. 1997. *Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 287-302.
- Habermas, J. 1998. *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Habermas, J. 1999. Three Normative Models of Democracy. In Cronin, C. and De Greiff, P. (Eds.) *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Hachipola, S. 1998. *A Survey of Minority Languages in Zimbabwe*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.
- Halbwachs, M. 1926/1992. *On Collective Memory*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Halbwachs, M. 1980. *The Collective Memory*. (Trans. Ditter, F. J. and Ditter, V. Y.). New York: Harper and Row.
- Hall, S. 1977. Culture, the Media and the 'Ideological Effect'. In Curran, J., Gurevitch, M. and Woollacott, J. (Eds.) *Mass Communication and Society*. London: Edward Arnold. 315-348.
- Hall, S. 1980. Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms. *Media, Culture and Society*, 2(1):57-72.

- Hall, S. 1982. The Rediscovery of 'Ideology': Return of the Repressed in Media Studies. In Gurevitch, M., Bennett, T., Curran, J. and Woollacott, J. (Eds.) *Culture, Society and the Media*. London: Routledge. 52-86.
- Hall, S. 2000. Who Needs Identity? In du Gay, P., Evans, J. and Redman, P. (Eds.) *Identity: A Reader*. London: Sage Publications. 15-30.
- Hall, S. 1992. The Question of Cultural Identity. In Hall, S., Held, D. and McGrew, T. (Eds.) *Modernity and its Futures*. Polity Press/The Open University. 273-316.
- Hammar, A. and Raftopoulos, B. 2003. Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation. In Hammar, A., Raftopoulos, B. and Jensen, S. (Eds.) *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*. Harare: Weaver Press. 1-47.
- Hammersley, M. 2000. The Relevance of Qualitative Research. *Oxford Review of Education*, 26(3-4): 393-405.
- Hammersley, M. 2007. The Issue of Quality in Qualitative Research. *International Journal of Research and Method in Education*, 30(3): 287-305.
- Hammersley, M. 2008. *Questioning Qualitative Inquiry: Critical Essays*. London: Sage.
- Hammersley, M. and Gomm, R. 2000. Introduction. In Gomm, R., Hammersley, M. and Foster, P. (Eds.) *Case Study Method*. London: Sage Publications. 1-16.
- Handler, R. 1994. Is 'Identity' a Useful Cross-Cultural Concept? In Gillis, J. R. (Ed.) *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 27-40.
- Hechter, M. 1975. *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966*. London: Routledge.
- Hechter, M. 1985. Internal Colonialism Revisited. In Tiryakian, E. A. and Rogowski, R. (Eds.) *New Nationalisms of the Developed West*. Boston: Allen and Unwin. 17-26.
- Held, D. 1992. Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order? *Political Studies*, 40(Special Issue): 10-39.
- Held, D. 1995. *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Cornwall: Polity.
- Held, D. 2006. *Models of Democracy*. 3rd Edition. Cambridge: Polity.
- Herbst, J. 1990. *State Politics in Zimbabwe*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Herbst, J. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hobsbawm, E. 1983. Introduction. Inventing Traditions. In Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. (Eds.) *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1-14.
- Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. (Eds.). 1983. *The Invention of Tradition*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Hobsbawm, E. J. 1994. The Nation as Invented Tradition. In Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (Eds.) *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 76-82.
- Hodgson, F. W. 1989. *Modern Newspaper Practice: A Primer on the Press*. Second Edition. Oxford: Focal Press.
- Honneth, A. 1992. Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on the Theory of Recognition. *Political Theory*, 20(2): 187-201.
- Honneth, A. 1994. *The Struggle for Recognition*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Honneth, A. 2003. Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser (Trans. Joel Golb, James Ingram). In Fraser, N. and Honneth, A. *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (Trans. Joel Golb, James Ingram, and Christiane Wilke). London: Verso. 110-197.
- Honneth, A. 2007. Recognition as Ideology. In Van Den Brink, B. and Owen, D. (Eds.) *Recognition and Power: Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 323-347.
- Honneth, A. 2007. Rejoinder. In Van Den Brink, B. and Owen, D. (Eds.) *Recognition and Power: Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 348-370.
- Honneth, A. 2011. Rejoinder (Trans. Joseph Ganahl). In Petherbridge, D. (Ed.) *Axel Honneth: Critical Essays with a Reply by Axel Honneth*. Leiden: Brill. 391-421.
- Hroch, M. 1985. *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hroch, M. 1993. From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation. *New Left Review*, 1(198): 3-20.
- Hroch, M. 1995. National Self-Determination from a Historical Perspective. In Periwal, S. (Eds.) *Notions of Nationalism*. Budapest: Central European University Press. 65-82.
- Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. 1994. Introduction. In Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (Eds.) *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3-13.
- Hutton, P. 1993. *History as an Art of Memory*. Burlington: University of Vermont Press.
- Huyssen, A. 1995. *Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia*. London: Routledge.
- Isin, E. F. and Wood, P. K. 1999. *Citizenship and Identity*. London: Sage Publications.
- Jacobs, R. N. 2004. Civil Society and Crisis: Culture, Discourse, and the Rodney King Beating. In Yin, R. K. (Ed.) *The Case Study Anthology*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 155-178.
- Janoski, T. and Gran, B. 2002. Political Citizenship: Foundations of Rights. In Isin, E. F. and Turner, B. S. (Eds.) *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*. London: Sage Publications. 13-52.
- Jelin, E. 2003. *State Repression and the Labors of Memory*. (Trans. Judy Rein and Marcial Godoy-Anativia). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

- Johnson, R. B. and Onwuegbuzie, A. J. 2004. Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm whose Time has Come. *Educational Researcher*, 33(7): 14-26.
- Kagoro, B. 2004. Constitutional Reform as Social Movement: A Critical Narrative of the Constitution Making Debate in Zimbabwe, 1997-2000. In Raftopoulos, B and Savage, T. (Eds.) *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation*. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. 236-256.
- Kansteiner, W. 2002. Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies. *History and Theory*, 41(2): 179-197.
- Kansteiner, W. 2002/2011. Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies. In Olick, J. K., Vinitzky-Seroussi, V. and Levy, D. (Eds.) *The Collective Memory Reader*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 300-303.
- Kasoma, F. P. 1997. The Independent Press and Politics in Africa. *International Communication Gazette*, 59(4): 295-310.
- Kedourie, E. 1994. *Nationalism*. 4th Edition. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Keeble, R. 2006. *The Newspapers Handbook*. Fourth Edition. London: Routledge.
- Kruger, N. J. 2003. *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980 – 1987*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kuzio, T. 2001. 'Nationalising States' or Nation-Building? A Critical Review of the Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence. *Nations and Nationalism*, 7(2): 135-154.
- Laclau, E. 1990. *New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time*. London: Verso.
- Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. 1985. *Hegemony & Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. London: Verso.
- Le Goff, J. 1992. *History and Memory*. (Trans. Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Claman). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lewis, J. and Ritchie, J. 2003. Generalising from Qualitative Research. In Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. (Eds.) *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*. London: Sage Publications. 263-286.
- Lichtman, M. 2014. *Qualitative Research for the Social Sciences*. London: Sage.
- Linz, J. J. 1993. State Building and Nation Building. *European Review*, 1(4): 355-369.
- Linz, J. J. and Stepan, A. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lunn, J. and Thompson, G. 2010. *Zimbabwe since the Global Political Agreement*. London: House of Commons Library.
- Makumbe, J. and Compagnon, D. 2000. *Behind the Smokescreen: The Politics of Zimbabwe's 1995 General Elections*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.

- Mamdani, M. 1996. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mamdani, M. 2008. Lessons of Zimbabwe. *London Review of Books*, 30(23): 17-21.
- Mamdani, M. 2013. *Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
- Mano, W. 1997. The Plight of Public Service Television in Zimbabwe. *Report No. 5*, Oslo: University of Oslo.
- Mapuva, J. 2013. Governments of National Unity (GNUs) and the Preponderance of the Incumbency: Case of Kenya and Zimbabwe. *International Journal of Political Science and Development*, 1(3): 105-116.
- Marongwe, N. 2003. Farm Occupations and Occupiers in the New Politics of Land in Zimbabwe. In Hammar, A., Raftopoulos, B. and Jensen, S. (Eds.) *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*. Harare: Weaver Press. 155-190.
- Masekesa, C. 2014. Kondozi Farm 10 Years On. *The Zimbabwean*, Retrieved 25 October 2015 from <http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2014/04/kondozi-farm-10-years-on/>
- Mashingaidze, T. M. 2005. *The 1987 Zimbabwe National Unity Accord and its Aftermath: A Case of Peace without Reconciliation?* Dakar: CODESRIA.
- Mason, J. 2002. *Qualitative Researching*. 2nd Edition. London: Sage Publications.
- Masunungure, E. 2006. Nation Building, State Building and Power Configuration in Zimbabwe. *Conflict Trends*, 1(1): 3-8.
- Masunungure, E. 2009. Zimbabwe's Power Sharing Agreement. Unpublished Paper. *Workshop on the "The Consequences of Political Inclusion in Africa."* American University, Washington DC.
- Matshazi, M. J. 2007. *Zimbabwe: With Robert Mugabe to the Brink of the Abyss*. University of Fort Hare.
- Maxwell, J. A. 2012. *A Realist Approach for Qualitative Research*. London: Sage.
- Mazango, E. 2005. Media Games and Shifting of Spaces for Political Communication in Zimbabwe. *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture*, Special Issue (November): 33 – 55.
- Mazrui, A. A. 1994. The Bondage of Boundaries. *IBRU Boundary and Society Bulletin*, (April): 60-63.
- Mazrui, A. A. 1995. The Blood of Experience: The Failed State and Political Collapse in Africa. *World Policy Journal*, 12(1): 28-34.
- Mazrui, A. A. 2001. Pretender to Universalism: Western Culture in a Globalising Age. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 21(1): 11-24.

- Mbembe, A. 2000. At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in Africa. *Public Culture*, 12(1):259-284.
- Mbembe, A. 2001a. African Modes of Self-Writing. *Identity, Culture and Politics*, 2(1): 1-39.
- Mbembe, A. 2001b. Ways of Seeing: Beyond the New Nativism. Introduction. *African Studies Review*, 44(2): 1-14.
- Mbembe, A. 2002. On the Power of the False. (Trans. Judith Inggs). *Public Culture*, 14(3): 629-641.
- Mbembe, A. 2008. What is Postcolonial Thinking? An Interview with Achille Mbembe. *Eurozine*, Retrieved 26 September 2015 from <http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2008-01-09-mbembe-en.pdf>
- Mbembe, A. and Posel, D. 2005. A Critical Humanism. *Interventions*, 7(3): 283-286.
- McNair, B. 2011. *An Introduction to Political Communication*. Fifth Edition. London: Routledge.
- Megill, A. 1998. History, Memory, Identity. *History of the Human Sciences*, 11(3): 37-62.
- Meyers, O. 2011. Memory in Journalism and the Memory of Journalism: Israeli Journalists and the Constructed Legacy of Haolam Hazeh. In Berkowitz, D. A. (Ed.) *Cultural Meanings of News: A Text-Reader*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 321-335.
- Mhlanga, B. 2010. Zimbabwe's Post-Colonial Antinomies as the 'Northern Problem': Policy Projections. *African Security Review*, 19(4): 104-113.
- Mhlanga, B. 2013. Post-coloniality and the Matabeleland Question in Zimbabwe. In Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. and Ndhlovu, F. (Eds.) *Nationalism and National Projects in Southern Africa: New Critical Reflections*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. 270-293.
- Misztal, B. A. 2003. *Theories of Social Remembering*. Philadelphia: Open University Press.
- Mlambo, A. S. 2013. Becoming Zimbabwe or Becoming Zimbabwean: Identity, Nationalism and Nation Building. *Africa Spectrum*, 48(1): 49-70.
- Mlambo, A. S. 2013. Becoming Zimbabwean: Nation and State-Building in the Context of Southern Africa. In Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. and Ndhlovu, F. (Eds.) *Nationalism and National Projects in Southern Africa: New Critical Reflections*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. 235-252.
- Mouffe, C. 1992a. Citizenship and Political Identity. *October*, 61(Special Issue: The Identity in Question): 28-32.
- Mouffe, C. 1999. Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism? *Social Research*, 66(3): 745-758.
- Mouffe, C. 2000. *The Democratic Paradox*. London: Verso.
- Mouffe, C. 2005. *On the Political: Thinking in Action*. New York: Routledge.

- Mouffe, C. 2009. Democratic Politics and Agonistic Pluralism. Unpublished Paper. *Seminario Interdisciplinar: O(s) Sentido(s) Da(s) Cultura(s)*. Consello Da Cultura Galega.
- Moyo, D. 2005. The 'Independent' Press and the Fight for Democracy in Zimbabwe: A Critical Analysis of the Banned *Daily News*. *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture*, Special Issue (November): 109-128.
- Moyo, L. 2009. Repression, Propaganda, and Digital Resistance: New Media and Democracy in Zimbabwe. In Mudhai, O. F., Tettey, W. J. and Banda, F. (Eds.) *African Media and the Digital Public Sphere*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 57-71.
- Moyo, L. 2010. The Dearth of Public Debate: Policy, Polarities and Positional Reporting in Zimbabwe's News Media. In Moyo, D. and Chuma, W. (Eds.) *Media Policy in a Changing Southern Africa: Critical Reflections on Media Reforms in the Global Age*. Pretoria: UNISA Press. 110-132.
- Moyo, S. 1995. *The Land Question in Zimbabwe*. Harare: SAPES Books.
- Moyo, S. 2013. Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform: Implications for South Africa. In Hendricks, F., Ntsebeza, L. and Helliker, K. (Eds.) *The Promise of Land: Undoing a Century of Dispossession in South Africa*. Auckland Park: Jacana. 251-282.
- Moyo, D. 2004. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Change without Change? Broadcasting Policy Reform and Political Control. In Melber, H. (Ed.) *Media, Public Discourse and Political Contestation in Zimbabwe*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika Institutet. 12-28.
- Moyo, D. 2012. Mediating Crisis: Realigning Media Policy and Deployment of Propaganda in Zimbabwe, 2000-2008. In Chiumbu, S. and Musemwa, M. (Eds.) *Crisis! What Crisis?* Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council. 176-198.
- Mpofu, B. 2003. Brainstorming Racial Reconciliation in Southern Africa. *The First International Conference on Race: Racial Reconciliation*. University of Mississippi.
- Msindo, E. 2009. 'Winning Hearts and Minds': Crisis and Propaganda in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1962 – 1970. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 35(3): 663-681.
- Msindo, E. 2012. *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe: Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860-1990*. Rochester: University of Rochester Press.
- Msindo. 2009. Towards a New Understanding of Nationalism in Zimbabwe: Ideologies, Alternative Platforms, and the Place of Violence. Unpublished Paper. *African Studies Association Annual Conference*. New Orleans.
- Mtisi, J., Nyakudya, M. and Barnes, T. 2009. Social and Economic Developments during the UDI Period. In Raftopoulos, B. and Mlambo, A. (Eds.) *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008*. Harare: Weaver Press. 115-140.
- Mukhlani, T. 2014. Zimbabwe's Government of National Unity: Successes and Challenges in Restoring Peace and Order. *Journal of Power, Politics and Governance*, 2(2): 169-180.
- Murphy III, T. M. 1994. Discourse Ethics: Moral Theory or Political Ethic? *New German Critique*, 62: 111-135.

- Mutisi, M. 2011. Beyond the Signature: Appraisal of the Zimbabwe Global Political Agreement (GPA) and Implications for Intervention. *Accord*, (004): 1-7.
- Muzondidya, J. 2005. Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans: Invisible Subject Minorities and the Quest for Justice and Reconciliation in Post-colonial Zimbabwe. In Raftopoulos, B. and Savage, T. (Eds.) *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation*. Harare: Weaver Press. 213-235.
- Muzondidya, J. 2007. Jambanja: Ideological Ambiguities in the Politics of Land and Resource Ownership in Zimbabwe. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 33(2): 325-341.
- Muzondidya, J. 2009. From Bouyancy to Crisis, 1980-1997. In Raftopoulos, B. and Mlambo, A. S. (Eds.) *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008*. Harare: Weaver Press. 167-200.
- Muzondidya, J. 2010. The Zimbabwean Crisis and the Unresolved Conundrum of Race in the Post-Colonial Period. *Journal of Developing Societies*, 26(1): 5-38.
- Muzondidya, J. and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. 2007. 'Echoing Silences': Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2007. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 7(2): 275-297.
- Nairn, T. 1981. *The Break Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism*. 2nd Edition. London: Verso.
- Ndakaripa, M. 2013. The State and Contested Citizenship in Zimbabwe, 1980-2011. In Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. and Ndhlovu, F. (Eds.) *Nationalism and National Projects in Southern Africa: New Critical Reflections*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. 294-320.
- Ndhlovu, F. 2013. The Burden of 'National Languages' and the Bondages of Linguistic Boundaries in Postcolonial Africa. In Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. and Mhlanga, B. (Eds.) *Bondage of Boundaries and Identity Politics in Postcolonial Africa: The 'Northern Problem' and Ethno-Futures*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. 79-98.
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. 2008. Nation Building in Zimbabwe and the Challenges of Ndebele Particularism. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 8(3): 27-55.
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. 2009. *Do 'Zimbabweans' Exist? Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in the Post-Colonial State*. Bern: Peter Lang.
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. 2011. The Construction and Decline of *Chimurenga* Monologue in Zimbabwe: A Study in Resilience of Ideology and Limits of Alternatives. *Panel 109: Contestations over Memory and Nationhood: Comparative Perspectives from East and Southern Africa at the 4th European Conference on African Studies (ECAS4) on the Theme: African Engagements: On whose Terms?* Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala.
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. 2012. Rethinking *Chimurenga* and *Gukurahundi* in Zimbabwe: A Critique of Partisan National History. *African Studies Review*, 55(3): 1-26.
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. and Willems, W. 2009. Making Sense of Cultural Nationalism and the Politics of Commemoration under the Third *Chimurenga* in Zimbabwe. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 35(4): 945-965.

- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. and Muzondidya, J. 2011. *Introduction: Redemptive or Grotesque Nationalism in the Postcolony?* In Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. and Muzondidya (Eds.) *Redemptive or Grotesque Nationalism?: Rethinking Contemporary Politics in Zimbabwe*. Bern: Peter Lang. 1-31.
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. and Mhlanga, B. (Eds.). 2013. *Bondage of Boundaries and Identity Politics in Postcolonial Africa: The 'Northern Problem' and Ethno Futures*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. and Mhlanga, B. 2013. Borders, Identities, the 'Northern Problem' and Ethno-Futures in Postcolonial Africa. In Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. and Mhlanga, B. (Eds.) *Bondage of Boundaries and Identity Politics in Postcolonial Africa: The 'Northern Problem' and Ethno-Futures*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. 1-22.
- Nora, P. 1989. Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire. *Representations*, Special Issue (26): 7-24.
- O'Leary, B. 1996. On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner's Writings on Nationalism. In Hall, J. A. and Jarvie, I. (Eds.) *The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner*. Atlanta: Rodopi. 71-112.
- O'Reilly, M. and Kiyimba, N. 2015. *Advanced Qualitative Research: A Guide to Using Theory*. London: Sage.
- Olick, J. K. 1999. Collective Memory: The Two Cultures. *Sociological Theory*, 17(3): 333-348.
- Olick, J. K. and Robbins, J. 1998. Social Memory Studies: From 'Collective Memory' to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24(1): 105-140.
- Olick, J. K., Vinitzky-Seroussi, V. and Levy, D. 2011. Introduction. In Olick, J. K., Vinitzky-Seroussi, V. and Levy, D. (Eds.) *The Collective Memory Reader*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3-62.
- Onslow, S. 2011. *Zimbabwe and Political Transition*. London: LSE Ideas.
- Ozkirimli, U. 2000. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Palmer, R. 1990. Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990. *African Affairs*, 89(355): 163-181.
- Pearson, R. 1999. Custer Loses Again: The Contestation over Commodified Public Memory. In Ben-Amos, D. and Weissberg, L. (Eds.) *Cultural Memory and the Construction of Identity*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 176-201.
- Pecora, V. P. 2001. Introduction. In Pecora, V. P. (Ed.) *Nations and Identities*. Oxford: Blackwell. 1-42.
- Phillips, L. and Jorgensen, M. W. 2002. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*. London: Sage Publications.
- Pickering, M. 1997. *History, Experience and Cultural Studies*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

- Pickering, M. 2001. *Stereotyping: The Politics of Representation*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Pilosof, R. 2012. *The Unbearable Whiteness of Being: Farmers' Voices from Zimbabwe*. Harare: Weaver Press.
- Popular Memory Group. 1982. Popular Memory: Theory, Politics and Method. In Johnson, R., McLennan, G., Schwarz, B. and Sutton, D. (Eds.) *Making Histories: Studies in History Making and Politics*. London: Hutchinson. 205-252.
- Raftopoulos, B. 2002. Briefing: Zimbabwe's 2002 Presidential Elections. *African Affairs*, 101(404): 413-426.
- Raftopoulos, B. 2003. The State in Crisis: Authoritarian Nationalism, Selective Citizenship and Distortions of Democracy in Zimbabwe. In Hammar, A., Raftopoulos, B. and Jensen, S. (Eds.) *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*. Harare: Weaver Press. 217-241.
- Raftopoulos, B. 2005. Unreconciled Differences: The Limits of Reconciliation Politics in Zimbabwe. In Raftopoulos, B. and Savage, T. (Eds.) *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation*. Harare: Weaver Press. viii-xxii.
- Raftopoulos, B. 2007. Nation, Race and History in Zimbabwean Politics. In Dorman, S., Hammett, D. and Nugent, P. (Eds.) *Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa*. Leiden: Brill. 181-194.
- Raftopoulos, B. 2009. The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008. In Raftopoulos, B. and Mlambo, A. S. (Eds.) *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008*. Harare: Weaver Press. 201-250.
- Raftopoulos, B. 2010. The Global Political Agreement as a 'Passive Revolution': Notes on Contemporary Politics in Zimbabwe. *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 99(411): 705-718.
- Raftopoulos, B. 2013. The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe: The End of an Era. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39(4): 971-988.
- Raftopoulos, B. and Savage, T. (Eds.) 2004. *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation*. Harare: Weaver Press.
- Ranger, T. 1996. Postscript: Colonial and Postcolonial Identities. In Werbner, R. and Ranger, T. (Eds.) *Postcolonial Identities in Africa*. London: Zed Books. 271-281.
- Ranger, T. 2004. Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 30(2): 215-234.
- Ranger, T. 2005. The Rise of Patriotic Journalism in Zimbabwe and its Possible Implications. *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture*, Special Issue (November 2005): 8-17.
- Ranger, T. 2009. The Politics of Memorialisation in Zimbabwe. In Carvalho, S. and Gemeine, F. (Eds.) *Nations and their Histories: Constructions and Representations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 62-76.
- Rawls, J. 1993. *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Rawls, J. 1999/1967. Distributive Justice. In Freeman, S. (Ed.) *Collected Papers: John Rawls*. London: Harvard University Press. 130-153.
- Rehg, W. 1994. *Insight and Solidarity: The Discourse Ethics of Jurgen Habermas*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Renan, E. 1882/2011. What is a Nation? In Olick, J. K., Vinitzky-Seroussi, V. and Levy, D. (Eds.) *The Collective Memory Reader*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 80-83.
- Rescher, N. 1998. The Role of Rhetoric in Rational Argumentation. *Argumentation*, 12(2): 315-323.
- Richardson, J. 2007. *Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ritchie, J., Lewis, J. and Elam, G. 2003. Designing and Selecting Samples. In Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. (Eds.) *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*. London: Sage Publications. 77-108.
- Robson, C. 2002. *Real World Research*. Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Ronning, H. and Kupe, T. 2000. The Dual Legacy of Democracy and Authoritarianism: The Media and the State in Zimbabwe. In Curran, J. and Park, M. J. (Eds.) *De-Westernising Media Studies*. London: Routledge. 138-156.
- Rukuni, M. and Jensen, S. 2003. Land, Growth and Governance: Tenure Reform and Visions of Progress in Zimbabwe. In Hammar, A., Raftopoulos, B. and Jensen, S. (Eds.) *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*. Harare: Weaver Press. 243-262.
- Rutherford, B. 2007. Shifting Grounds in Zimbabwe: Citizenship and Farm Workers in the New Politics of Land. In Dorman, S., Hammett, D. and Nugent, P. (Eds.) *Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa*. Leiden: Brill. 105-122.
- Sachikonye, L. 2011. *When a State Turns on its Citizens: 60 Years of Institutionalised Violence in Zimbabwe*. Auckland Park: Jacana.
- Sachikonye, L. M. 2002. Whither Zimbabwe? Crisis and Democratisation. *Review of African Political Economy*, 29(91):13-20.
- Sachikonye, L. M. 2005. The Promised Land: From Expropriation to Reconciliation and *Jambanja*. In Raftopoulos, B. and Savage, T. (Eds.) *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation*. Harare: Weaver Press. 1-18.
- Saul, J. S. and Saunders, R. 2005. Mugabe, Gramsci and Zimbabwe at 25. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, 60(4): 953-975.
- Saunders, R. 1999. *Dancing Out of Tune: A History of the Media in Zimbabwe*. Harare: ESP.
- Schlesinger, P. 1993. Wishful Thinking: Cultural Politics, Media and Collective Identities in Europe. *Journal of Communication*, 43(2): 6-17.
- Schudson, M. 1989. The Present in the Past versus the Past in the Present. *Communication*, 11: 105-113.

- Schudson, M. 1989/2011. The Past in the Present versus the Present in the Past. In Olick, J. K., Vinitzky-Seroussi, V. and Levy, D. (Eds.) *The Collective Memory Reader*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 287-290.
- Schudson, M. 1995. Distortion in Collective Memory. In Schacter, D. L. (Ed.) *Memory Distortion*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 346-363.
- Schudson, M. 1997. Lives, Laws, and Language: Commemorative versus Non-Commemorative Forms of Effective Public Memory. *The Communication Review*, 2(1): 3-17.
- Schwartz, B. 2000. *Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Scoones, I. 2015. Zimbabwe's Land Reform: New Political Dynamics in the Countryside. *Review of African Political Economy*, 42(144): 190-205.
- Simon, R. 1982. *Gramsci's Political Thought*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Sithole, M. 1999. *Zimbabwe: Struggle-within-the-Struggle (1957-1980)*. 2nd Edition. Harare: Rujeko Publishers.
- Sithole, N. 1968. *African Nationalism. Second Edition*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, A. D. 1983. *Theories of Nationalism. Second Edition*. London: Duckworth.
- Smith, A. D. 1986. State-Making and Nation-Building. In Hall, J. A. (Ed.) *States in History*. New York: Blackwell.
- Smith, A. D. 1986. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Smith, A. D. 1991. *National Identity*. London: Penguin Books.
- Smith, A. D. 1991b. The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed? *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 20(3): 353-368.
- Smith, A. D. 1995. *Nationalism in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Smith, A. D. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism*. London: Routledge.
- Smith, A. D. 2002. When is a Nation? *Geopolitics*, 7(2): 5-32.
- Smith, A. D. 2004. *The Antiquity of Nations*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Smith, A. D. 2009. *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism*. London: Routledge.
- Snape, D. and Spencer, L. 2003. The Foundations of Qualitative Research. In Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. (Eds.) *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*. London: Sage Publications. 1-23.
- Solidarity Peace Trust. 2008. *Punishing Dissent, Silencing Citizens: The Zimbabwe Elections 2008*. Johannesburg: Solidarity Peace Trust.
- Stake, R. E. 2000. The Case Study Method in Social Inquiry. In Gomm, R., Hammersley, M. and Foster, P. (Eds.) *Case Study Method*. London: Sage Publications. 19-26.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2014. Jurgen Habermas. Retrieved 29 August 2016 from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/#HabDisTheMorPolLaw>

Sturken, M. 2008. Memory, Consumerism and Media: Reflections on the Emergence of the Field. *Memory Studies*, 1(1): 73-78.

Sutherland, C. 2005. Nation-Building through Discourse Theory. *Nations and Nationalism*, 11(2): 185-202.

Symmons-Symonolewicz, K. 1981. National Consciousness in Medieval Europe: Some Theoretical Problems. *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, VIII(1):151-165.

Symmons-Symonolewicz, K. 1985a. The Concept of Nationhood: Toward a Theoretical Clarification. *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, XII(2):215-222.

Taylor, C. 1994. The Politics of Recognition. In Gutmann, A. (Ed.) *Multiculturalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 25-73.

Teddlie, C. and Tashakkori, A. 2009. *Foundations of Mixed Methods Research: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches in the Social and Behavioural Sciences*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Tendi, B. 2008. Patriotic History and Public Intellectuals Critical of Power. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 34(2): 379-396.

Tendi, B. 2010. *Making History in Mugabe's Zimbabwe: Politics, Intellectuals and the Media*. Bern: Peter Lang.

Tetty, W. J. 2009. Transnationalism, the African Diaspora, and the Deterritorialized Politics of the Internet. In Mudhai, O. F., Tetty, W. J. and Banda, F. (Eds.) *African Media and the Digital Public Sphere*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 143-163.

Tevera, D. and Crush, J. 2010. Discontent and Departure: Attitudes of Skilled Zimbabweans Towards Emigration. In Crush, J. and Tevera, D. (Eds.) *Zimbabwe's Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival*. Cape Town: SAMP. 112-132.

Thomas, G. 2011. *How to do Your Case Study: A Guide for Students and Researchers*. London: Sage.

Thompson, J. B. 1991. *Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Thompson, J. B. 1995. *The Media and Modernity: A Social theory of the Media*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Thompson, J. B. 1996/2011. Tradition and Self in a Mediated World. In Olick, J. K., Vinitzky-Seroussi, V. and Levy, D. (Eds.) *The Collective Memory Reader*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 349-351.

Thompson, J. B. 2005. The New Visibility. *Theory, Culture and Society*, 22(6): 31-51.

Todorov, T. 2009. Memory as Remedy for Evil. *Journal for International Criminal Justice*, 7(3): 447-462.

- Tuchman, G. 1979. Women's Depiction by the Mass Media. *Signs*, 4(3): 528-542.
- van den Berghe, P. 1978. Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1(4): 401-411.
- van Dijk, T. A. 1983. Discourse Analysis: Its Development and Application to the Structure of News. *Journal of Communication*, 33(2): 20-43.
- van Dijk, T. A. 1997b. What is Political Discourse Analysis? In Blommaert, J. and Bulcaen, C. (Eds.) *Political Linguistics*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 11-52.
- van Dijk, T. A. 2001. Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis. In Wetherell, M, Taylor, S. and Yates, S. J. (Eds.) *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader*. London: Sage. 300-317.
- van Eemeren, F. H. 2010. *Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse: Extending the Pragma-Dialectical Theory of Argumentation*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- van Eemeren, F. H. 2013. In What Sense Do Modern Argumentation Theories Relate to Aristotle? The Case of Pragma-Dialectics. *Argumentation*, 27(1): 49-70.
- van Eemeren, F. H. and Grootendorst, R. 1992. *Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies*. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- van Eemeren, F. H. and Grootendorst, R. 2004. *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The Pragma-Dialectical Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- van Eemeren, F. H. and Houtlosser, P. 2002b. Strategic Maneuvering: Maintaining a Delicate Balance. In van Eemeren, F. H. and Houtlosser, P. (Eds.) *Dialectic and Rhetoric: The Warp and Woof of Argumentation Analysis*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 131-159.
- van Eemeren, F. H. et al. 1996. *Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory: A Handbook of Historical Backgrounds and Contemporary Developments*. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Van House, N. and Churchill, E. F. 2008. Technologies of Memory: Key Issues and Critical Perspectives. *Memory Studies*, 1(3): 295-310.
- Vidal-Naquet, P. 1992. *Assassins of Memory: Essays on the Denial of the Holocaust*. (Trans. Jeffrey Mehlman). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Wagner-Pacifici, R. 1996. Memories in the Making: The Shape of Things that Went. *Qualitative Sociology*, 19(3): 301-321.
- Wahl-Jorgensen, K. and Galperin, H. 2000. Discourse Ethics and the Regulation of Media: The Case of the U.S. Newspaper. *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, 24(1): 19-40.
- Werbner, R. 1991. *Tears of the Dead: The Social Biography of an African Family*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Werbner, R. 1996. Introduction: Multiple Identities, Plural Arenas. In Werbner, R. and Ranger, T. (Eds.) *Postcolonial Identities in Africa*. London: Zed Books. 1-25.
- Werbner, R. 1998. Introduction – Beyond Oblivion: Confronting Memory Crisis. In Werbner, R. (Ed.) *Memory and the Postcolony: African Anthropology and the Critique of Power*. London: Zed Books. 1-17.

- Wetherell, M. 2001. Themes in Discourse Research: The Case of Diana. In Wetherell, M., Taylor, S. and Yates, S. J. (Eds.) *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader*. London: Sage. 14-28.
- White, H. 1978. *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- White, H. 1984. The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory. *History and Theory*, 23(1): 1-33.
- White, L. 2003. *The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo*. Harare: Weaver.
- Windrich, E. 1981. *The Mass Media in the Struggle for Zimbabwe: Censorship and Propaganda under Rhodesian Front Rule*. Gweru: Mambo Press.
- Windrich, E. 2010. Broadcasting in Zimbabwe: An Historical Perspective. In Moyo, D. and Chuma, W. (Eds.) *Media Policy in a Changing Southern Africa: Critical Reflections on Media Reforms in the Global Age*. Pretoria: Unisa Press. 73-89.
- Windrich, E. 1979. Rhodesian Censorship: The Role of the Media in the Making of a One-Party State. *African Affairs*, 78(313): 523-534.
- Wodak, R. et al. 2009. *The Discursive Construction of National Identity. Second Edition*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Yin, R. K. 2009. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Fourth Edition. London: Sage.
- Yin, R. K. 2011. *Qualitative Research from Start to Finish*. London: The Guilford Press.
- Yin, R. K. 2014. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Fifth Edition. London: Sage.
- Young, C. 2007. Nation, Ethnicity, and Citizenship: Dilemmas of Democracy and Civil Order in Africa. In Dorman, S., Hammett, D. and Nugent, P. (Eds.) *Making Nations, Creating Strangers*. Leiden: Brill. 241-264.
- Zandberg, E. 2010. The Right to Tell the (Right) Story: Journalism, Authority and Memory. *Media, Culture and Society*, 32(1): 5-24.
- Zelizer, B. 1992. *Covering the Body: The Kennedy Assassination, the Media, and the Shaping of Collective Memory*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Zelizer, B. 1995. Reading the Past Against the Grain: The Shape of Memory Studies. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 12(2):214-239.
- Zelizer, B. 2008. Why Memory's Work on Journalism does not Reflect Journalism's Work on Memory. *Memory Studies*, 1(1): 79-87.
- Zerubavel, E. 1997. *Social Mindscape: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Zerubavel, Y. 1995. *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israel National Tradition*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Zimbabwe Election Support Network. 2008. *Report on the Zimbabwe 29 March 2008 Harmonised Elections and 27 June Presidential Run-Off*. Harare: Zimbabwe Election Support Network.

Zimbabwe Europe Network *et al.* 2012. Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement Implementation: 4 Years on, At Best Faltering...At Worst Failing. Retrieved 16 November 2014 from: <http://www.zimbabweurope.org/sites/default/files/ZIMBABWE%20GPA%20IMPLEMENTATION.pdf>

Zubaida, S. 1978. Theories of Nationalism. In Littlejohn, G., Smart, B., Wakefield, J. and Yuval-Davis, N. (Eds.) *Power and the State*. London: Croom Helm. 52-71.

Zubaida, S. 1989. Nations: Old and New. Comments on Anthony D. Smith's The Myth of the Modern Nation and the Myths of Nations. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 12(3): 329-339.

Newspaper Articles

- Hove, C. 2000. In Search of an Identity. *The Standard* (Harare). 29 October: 5.
- Kanengoni, A. 2002. Robertson's Remarks Sickening. *The Standard* (Harare). 13 January: 10.
- Magaisa, A. T. 2007. Confronting Zanu PF's Anti-Imperialist Rhetoric. *The Standard* (Harare). 1 April: 11.
- Magaisa, A. T. 2007. Independence: Was it Worth the Sacrifice? *The Standard* (Harare). 11 March: 11.
- Mahoso, T. 2000. Global Racism and the Land Issue in Zimbabwe. *The Sunday Mail* (Harare). 23 April: 11.
- Mahoso, T. 2007. Importance of Collective Memory. *The Sunday Mail* (Harare). 23 September: 8
- Mahoso, T. P. 2004. Reasons Why 2005 Elections Should Be Anti-Blair. *The Sunday Mail* (Harare). 5 December: 9
- Mhlanga, B. 2007. Diplomatic Talk and the Marginalised. *The Standard* (Harare). 25 November: 11.
- The Standard. 1999. Now is the Time. *The Standard* (Harare). 11 July: 8.
- The Standard. 2000. No More Excuses. *The Standard* (Harare). 28 May: 8.
- The Standard. 2002. Is this The Zimbabwe We Fought For? *The Standard* (Harare). 11 August: 8.
- The Standard. 2002. The Choice is Clear. *The Standard* (Harare). 10 February: 8.
- The Standard. 2004. Zimbabwe Betrays Ideals of the Revolution. *The Standard* (Harare). 10 October: 8.
- The Standard. 2013. Not Yet Uhuru for the Masses. *The Standard* (Harare). 14 April: 10.
- The Sunday Mail. 2000. No Land for Foreigners. *The Sunday Mail* (Harare): 20 August: 8
- The Sunday Mail. 2002. Zim Poll: Africa's Defining Moment, *The Sunday Mail* (Harare). 3 March: 8
- The Sunday Mail. 2004. Let Us All Share Nkomo's Vision. *The Sunday Mail* (Harare). 4 July: 8
- The Sunday Mail. 2012. Economic Empowerment is every Zimbabwean's Birthright. *The Sunday Mail* (Harare). 22 April: 8
- The Sunday Mail. 2012. We Know Our Heroes. *The Sunday Mail* (Harare). 12 August: 10.
- The Sunday Mail. 2013. Unity Begins with All of Us. *The Sunday Mail* (Harare). 22 December: 9

APPENDICES

Appendix A: The Sunday Mail Sample

| Article | Article Type | Thematic Nodes | Author | Date of Publication |
|---|---------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|
| No Land for Foreigners | Editorial | Land | | 20 August 2000 |
| Zim Poll: Africa's Defining Moment | Editorial | Elections | | 3 March 2002 |
| Let Us All Share Nkomo's Vision | Editorial | National Unity | | 4 July 2004 |
| Economic Empowerment is Every Zimbabwean's Right | Editorial | (De)colonisation | | 22 April 2012 |
| Unity Begins with All of Us | Editorial | <i>Gukurahundi/Unity</i> | | 22 December 2013 |
| Global Racism and the Land Issue in Zimbabwe | Opinion | Land | Tafataona Mahoso | 23 April 2000 |
| Robertson's Remarks Sickening | Opinion | (De)colonisation | Alexander Kanengoni | 13 January 2002 |
| Reasons Why 2005 Elections Should Be Anti-Blair | Opinion | Elections | Tafataona Mahoso | 5 December 2004 |
| Importance of Collective Memory | Opinion | (De)colonisation | Tafataona Mahoso | 23 September 2007 |
| We Know Our Heroes | Editorial | National Heroes | | 12 August 2012 |

Appendix B: The Standard Sample

| Article | Article Type | Thematic Nodes | Author | Date of Publication |
|--|---------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Now is the Time | Editorial | National Unity | | 11 July 1999 |
| Is this the Zimbabwe we Fought For? | Editorial | National Heroes | | 11 August 2002 |
| Zimbabwe Betrays Ideals of the Revolution | Editorial | (De)colonisation | | 10 October 2004 |
| No More Excuses | Editorial | Land | | 28 May 2000 |
| The Choice is Clear | Editorial | Elections | | 10 February 2002 |
| Not Yet Uhuru for the Masses | Editorial | Independence | | 14 April 2013 |
| In Search of an Identity | Opinion | National Unity | Chenjerai Hove | 29 October 2000 |
| Diplomatic Talk and the Marginalised | Opinion | <i>Gukurahundi</i> | Brilliant Mhlanga | 25 November 2007 |
| Independence: Was it Worth the Sacrifice? | Opinion | Independence | Dr. Alex T. Magaisa | 11 March 2007 |
| Confronting Zanu PF'S Anti-Imperialist Rhetoric | Opinion | Elections | Dr. Alex T. Magaisa | 1 April 2007 |

Appendix C: Structure of Analysis in Chapter 7

Chapter Seven

A Political Discourse Analysis of *The Sunday Mail's* and *The Standard's* Opinions and Editorials

Introduction

A Political Discourse Analysis of Articles

Theme 1: Independence and Decolonisation

The Sunday Mail

Robertson's Remarks Sickening

Importance of Collective Memory

Economic Empowerment is Every Zimbabwean's Birthright

The Standard

Independence: Was it Worth the Sacrifice?

Zimbabwe Betrays Ideals of the Revolution

Not yet Uhuru for the Masses

Discussion: Theme 1—Independence and Decolonisation

Social Memory

Nation and Identity

Theme 2: Land and Elections

The Sunday Mail

Global Racism and the Land Issue in Zimbabwe

No Land for Foreigners

Reasons Why 2005 Elections Should Be Anti-Blair

Zim Poll: Africa's Defining Moment

The Standard

Confronting Zanu PF's Anti-Imperialist Rhetoric

The Choice is Clear

No More Excuses

Discussion: Theme 2—Land and Elections

Social Memory

Nation and Identity

CONTINUES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

Appendix D: Structure of Analysis in Chapter 8

Chapter Seven

A Political Discourse Analysis of *The Sunday Mail's* and *The Standard's* Opinions and Editorials

Introduction

A Political Discourse Analysis of Articles

Theme 3: Gukurahundi

The Sunday Mail

Unity Begins with All of Us

The Standard

Diplomatic Talk and the Marginalised

Discussion: Theme 3—Gukurahundi

Social Memory

Nation and Identity

Theme 4: Unity and National Heroes

The Sunday Mail

Let us All Share Nkomo's Vision

We Know Our Heroes

The Standard

In Search of an Identity

Now is the Time

Is this the Zimbabwe we Fought For?

Discussion: Theme 4— Unity and National Heroes

Social Memory

Nation and Identity

Conclusion

Appendix E: Chronological Story List

- Kanengoni, A. 2002. Robertson's Remarks Sickening. *The Standard* (Harare). 13 January: 10.
- Mahoso, T. 2007. Importance of Collective Memory. *The Sunday Mail* (Harare). 23 September: 8
- The Sunday Mail. 2012. Economic Empowerment is every Zimbabwean's Birthright. *The Sunday Mail* (Harare). 22 April: 8
- Magaisa, A. T. 2007. Independence: Was it Worth the Sacrifice? *The Standard* (Harare). 11 March: 11.
- The Standard. 2004. Zimbabwe Betrays Ideals of the Revolution. *The Standard* (Harare). 10 October: 8.
- The Standard. 2013. Not Yet Uhuru for the Masses. *The Standard* (Harare). 14 April:10.
- Mahoso, T. 2000. Global Racism and the Land Issue in Zimbabwe. *The Sunday Mail* (Harare). 23 April: 11.
- The Sunday Mail. 2000. No Land for Foreigners. *The Sunday Mail* (Harare): 20 August: 8
- Mahoso, T. P. 2004. Reasons Why 2005 Elections Should Be Anti-Blair. *The Sunday Mail* (Harare). 5 December: 9
- The Sunday Mail. 2002. Zim Poll: Africa's Defining Moment, *The Sunday Mail* (Harare). 3 March: 8
- Magaisa, A. T. 2007. Confronting Zanu PF's Anti-Imperialist Rhetoric. *The Standard* (Harare). 1 April: 11.
- The Standard. 2002. The Choice is Clear. *The Standard* (Harare). 10 February: 8.
- The Standard. 2000. No More Excuses. *The Standard* (Harare). 28 May: 8.
- The Sunday Mail. 2013. Unity Begins with All of Us. *The Sunday Mail* (Harare). 22 December: 9
- Mhlanga, B. 2007. Diplomatic Talk and the Marginalised. *The Standard* (Harare). 25 November: 11.
- The Sunday Mail. 2004. Let Us All Share Nkomo's Vision. *The Sunday Mail* (Harare). 4 July: 8
- The Sunday Mail. 2012. We Know Our Heroes. *The Sunday Mail* (Harare). 12 August: 10.
- Hove, C. 2000. In Search of an Identity. *The Standard* (Harare). 29 October: 5.
- The Standard. 1999. Now is the Time. *The Standard* (Harare). 11 July: 8.
- The Standard. 2002. Is this The Zimbabwe We Fought For? *The Standard* (Harare). 11 August: 8.

Remarks sickening

• From Page 10

Muzorewa before him and before Chief Chirau and Ndweni. And before them several other lesser known tribal leaders who were bought over to the side of the Pioneer Column for as little as a jar of sugar and a bottle of whisky.

There have always been such kind of people during the course of our revolution.

I would want to throw this challenge to you Mr Tsvangirai: How do you feel, when, as a last act of contempt, Mr Robertson finally compares us with the chimpanzees and gorillas of the

jungles and mountains of east and central Africa?

Does that not sound like Ian Smith at the university in 1973 telling the booing black students to go back to the mountains where their fellow baboons were?

How do you feel, when Mr Robertson arrogantly declares that just as one cannot teach these poor gorillas and chimps to be engineers and lawyers neither can one teach the poor rural folk to be commercial farmers?

Tell me, Mr Tsvangirai, how do you feel? As for me, I feel a severe battering across the face

of my African identity. I am unable to speak, choked with anger. And yet there you are, poised to take off your hat to thank Mr Robertson for it! I feel betrayed.

Lately, I have lost a considerable number of my white friends. Except for the few normal pleasantries, we have nothing to talk about anymore.

My advice to Mr Robertson is that he had better go to blacks like Mr Tsvangirai, my cousin Tendai or perhaps Mr Nelson Mandela if he wants to be thanked for colonising us. Because blacks like myself find that request sickening.

OPINION

Robertson's remarks sickening

LATELY, quite a number of my white friends no longer want to talk with me.

I do not know the reason but I suspect it is because they realise I do not agree with their perception of the sort of person that they believe I should be: a condescending and imperious perception, a perception that always assumes a position of control, a perception that has been abundantly demonstrated by Mr John Robertson in his outrageous contribution to *The Daily News* of December 27 2001.

I did not see that particular issue of *The Daily News* because I had gone home for Christmas.

I only saw a reproduction of it in *The Sunday Mail* of January 6 2002 and as I went through it, I have never felt my entire African personality being insulted as much.

There he was, a white man called John Robertson, asking me to kneel down and pray to a god that his people had created for me called Colonialism.

There he was, asking me to pray to that ugly phenomenon because it had brought my people into contact with the superior culture of the white

man from where we are alleged to have reaped huge benefits, including the English language that I write so well. No, I will not kneel down to pray.

The fact that I defied kneeling down a long time ago and instead took up a gun to fight should be adequate demonstration that I would never kneel down to pray to the man-made god called Colonialism.

Because what sort of a person does Mr Robertson think I am to believe that the history of my people began with the coming of the white man?

How can he dismiss that entire historical period of my people before the advent of the white man as insignificant, no, nothing at all?

How can he reduce that entire epoch down to zero merely because it was plagued with diseases, droughts, warfare and other tragedies, so he claims, as if the part of the world where he came from was spared of such calamities in one form or another?

What Mr Robertson needs to understand is that the forces and circumstances that took my people to the historical point where the white man

found them in 1890 would be the same forces and circumstances that would propel them into the future even if his kind had not come.

In spite of how other people might have perceived it, we were a proud people with a vibrant culture, a system of values, a clear and established way of doing things, a complete civilisation.

And it would, therefore, be folly for anyone to form a negative judgment about the sort of people that we were, based on his opinion of that level of civilisation.

Different people in different parts of the world have always moved into the future at different speeds and it should never be perceived as a fault for one to occupy a position that is behind that of his neighbour.

Mr Robertson, your people came without our invitation and forced us into a future of your design and in the process stripped and dispossessed us of all that we were and owned: land, cattle, values and identity whilst at the same time attempting to mould us into an unrecognisable caricature of yourselves, a horrible image

that even you, its creators, preferred to keep at arm's length.

How can you, Mr Robertson, have the arrogance to ask us to take our hats off and thank you for that dehumanising act?

When, for instance, shall you accept the fact that agriculture by the blacks in this country has moved beyond subsistence to commercial level?

When shall you admit the fact that agriculture for the blacks was maintained at subsistence level largely because of the policies of the successive governments of your fellow whites?

Was that intended to raise the level of their agricultural output?

Or have you developed deliberate amnesia about these things that I am talking about? You were afraid of competition, so you thought the best way was to shut the black man

paid less than half for a bag of maize from a black farmer than it would pay for the same bag from a white farmer? Have you forgotten that blacks were not allowed to grow such lucrative crops as tobacco, cotton and wheat?

What were such hideous and racist policies intended to achieve?

What was the policy to herd blacks into barren, dry and overcrowded "reserves" intended to achieve?

Was that intended to raise the level of their agricultural output?

Or have you developed deliberate amnesia about these things that I am talking about? You were afraid of competition, so you thought the best way was to shut the black man

out. Do you know how it feels to be treated like an incomplete human being?

Of course, you would never know that kind of pain because all you know is how to inflict it.

But what makes me seethe with anger is how unrepentant your kind is, how, in fact, in spite of our extended hand of reconciliation, you spurned it, expecting us instead to thank you for the horrible pain of colonising us.

Are you not ashamed to turn around and tell us the current effort to give land to everyone will destroy agriculture?

Where did you get the idea that giving me land would destroy agriculture?

Are you aware I am already engaged in successful commercial farming at my father's smallholding in Mt Darwin and that it is he who supplies that whole district with eggs?

So you think I am not telling the truth? Is that the kind of gossip that you feed each other with in your dwindling circles that blacks are not able to do anything like that?

Yes, Mr Robertson, keep holding on to the colonial myth that blacks are in all respects

inferior to you because it is that fallacy that keeps you going.

If you did not know, that fallacy in any situation is what is called racism and that is the foundation upon which the staggering structure called colonialism was constructed.

But, of course, our biggest tragedy are those blacks who believe what Mr Robertson is saying. Those blacks who believe that they are inferior to the whites. Those blacks who believe that prior to the coming of Cecil Rhodes, they were nothing. Those blacks who believe that without the white man driving the agricultural sector, it would collapse. People like my cousin Tendai, the MDC and all that they stand for.

I have tried but failed to understand how people like Mr Morgan Tsvangirai and my cousin can stomach the kind of collective insult from people like Mr Robertson.

Because how then can people like Mr Tsvangirai, as the leader of the MDC, continue to seek and utilise the advice of people like Mr Robertson?

Perhaps they are able to stomach the insult for the sake

of the money (my cousin Tendai works for some vague NGO that now pays him in sterling!).

But Mr Tsvangirai, as leader of a political party with a significant following, must be promptly reminded of the enormous implications of his actions: Mr Robertson does not want anything less than Rhodesia on a silver plate with the head of Mr Mugabe as the bounty.

But, however, it must be understood that there have always been people like Mr Tsvangirai since the advent of the white man because how else could the white man have survived and thrived without such kind of people?

The reassuring thing though is that these people have always been cast aside by the sweeping tide of the will of the people.

Like numerous others before him, Mr Tsvangirai was created by the white man to serve the white man's purpose and in Mr Tsvangirai's case to try and stop the land reform programme but, unfortunately, he will not be able to do it.

There was Mr. Abel

• To Page 12

13/1/2002

By Alexander Kanengoni



Sept 23-29 2007

OPINION

Importance of collective memory



AFRICAN FOCUS
By Tafataona Mahoso

THE recent agreement between ruling Zanu-PF Members of Parliament and their opposition MDC colleagues to co-sponsor

and approve Constitutional Amendment No. 18 on September 19 2007 has opened the opportunity for Zimbabweans to reclaim and reconfigure their collective memory, which was being assaulted and contaminated by the British and their North American and Australian cousins since the early 1990s.

The assaults on Zimbabwe's collective memory were so intense and so relentless that, when the agreement between Zanu-PF and the MDC was announced, it came as a shock to the "regime change" forces and made news on BBC, CNN, Sky News and throughout the imperial conveyor belt of lies. The agreement made shocking or surprising news because since 1997-1999, a significant minority among Zimbabweans had succumbed to the Euro-American assaults and had suffered a disabling memory loss or disorientation, making it difficult to imagine that our Parliament could ever reach a unanimous decision on an issue of strategic importance for all the people. Some had come to treat the disorientation or memory lapse of the MDC-affiliated minority as something so permanent and so contagious as to be irreversible.

Perhaps the strategic value of collective memory in the life of a people can be understood by appreciating what happens when that capacity for collective cohesion has been scrambled, compromised or wiped out. In her article called "The Culture of Lies", Debravka Ugresic called the opposite or scrambling of national collective memory

"terror by forgetting".

In other words, she described the scrambling of national memory as a form of terror, and she called the result of such scrambling "The Culture of Lies". A collective memory lapse allows imperialists to cultivate a culture of lies throughout our society.

In other words, a people who allow outsiders to assault, scramble and reconfigure their collective memory will not only live a culture of lies but also suffer a form of collective madness. Ugresic was describing what happened to the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when the collective memory and cohesion of its people were assaulted by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato), the major states of the European Union (EU) and their various spy agencies.

Ugresic was not speculating. The dismantling of Yugoslavia was carefully and strategically planned. For example, the US government under President Ronald Reagan issued two directives which included ways to effect "regime change" in Yugoslavia.

The first one, National Security Decision Directive 54 (NSDD54), was issued in 1982 and dealt with Yugoslavia as part of a whole East European region which required "regime change". The second one, NSDD133, was issued two years later in 1984, focusing specifically on Yugoslavia.

While the underlying reasons for these directives was to capture Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia for corporate benefit, the means to be used had to include the scrambling of the collective memory of each of the nations involved. The collective memory of the people, the basis for national cohesion and self-determination, had to be stolen or at least disoriented enough to allow the looting of resources and markets. The culture of lies, employing intellectual and spiritual "terror

by forgetting" had to be cultivated first.

This is what happened in Zimbabwe in 1890. This is what happened again especially in the 1990s, through the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (Esap) and the creation of the foreign-sponsored Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

Vapambepfungwa always preceded *vapambepfumi*. The so-called NGO sector or civil society sector attacking the passage of Constitutional Amendment No. 18 Bill today are the present successors to Cecil John Rhodes' *vapambepfungwa* of the 1890s. Collective memory is important for any people together to be able to define and recognise their national interest, to defend their national sovereignty and to anticipate any threat to the same.

Before defining what this memory is, we may start by describing what it is used for: to facilitate collective strategic thinking, planning and decision-making.

In order for people to plan effectively for their survival, solidarity, autonomy and prosperity, they and their leaders must be able to read the world.

Reading the world means deciphering more than just papers and books. For a people to prevail, they must read and understand complex situations, that is, be able to perceive and decipher their own situational texts based on original strategic observation. For example, the situation created by the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution with its myth of "willing-buyer-willing seller" was not sustainable for Zimbabwe.

A people and their leaders must also be able to read and understand complex relationships among themselves and between themselves and other people: They must be able to perceive and decipher relational texts, based on their strategic observations. Can the relations be sustained, adjusted, condemned or abandoned?

In the modern world, a people must be able to read and understand the character or characters of other societies, other people's leaders, other people's institutions and parties and what they portend for the future. This means they must be able to perceive and understand dispositional texts.

They must also be able to recall past events and facts in order to place them in the context of the present and the future, that is, remember and use recalled texts.

They must be able to read and share written evidence and documents or books which also contribute to or facilitate their collective memory, that is to read and understand what are called scripto-centric texts.

In the digital age, they must also be able to scan and make use of electronic texts, putting them into their proper context and using them strategically.

A people must also be able to use what they have experienced or what others have reported in order to imagine and project what they have not yet encountered themselves, that is, they must be able to create or read imagined texts, while placing them also in their proper place.

Now, what enables people to do all these things is memory. Memories or the products of recall are a very small part of memory. Memories may facilitate memory but they do not make memory.

Memory is a collective web which connects a people together so that individual groups or families or persons can go to sleep or go to church or to a picnic and expect that, when they come out, society and the neighbours will still understand them, work with them and continue to live with them, ready to defend one another against recognisable threats if necessary. This memory is, therefore, more concerned with a collective future than with the past, even though the inputs or data it uses to do so definitely come

from the past.

This collective memory is, therefore, the capacity to mobilise for mutual survival and fulfilment; the capacity to create and keep a dynamic and comprehensible relationship between past, present and future; the capacity to develop and maintain a dynamic and comprehensible relationship between the individual and the family, the family and the community, the community and the rest of society.

There are many resources that help to build and sustain memory. But in the *umhu* or *ubuntu* philosophy, there are three fundamental bases: the body which contains and carries ancient DNA; the social institution, which can be the family, the school, the temple, the church, the Parliament or the liberation movement. The job of this social institution is to foster solidarity. The land, the ground, the space within which autonomy, expression, work and identity are made possible is the third base. These bases form a triad of memory and they are linked to three basic values, which in Euro-centric thinking are called "rights".

The body (whether it is the individual body, or the family or the movement or the nation or the community) will strive for its survival and prosperity. The social institution strives to foster solidarity as the basis for civilisation, for work, for mutual protection and advancement. The land, the ground, one's own space, is the arena within which to create, to celebrate and defend autonomy. Therefore, in most languages, the loss of memory is defined in terms of one's relationship to ground and space. If a person or a people are described as fleeting, unrooted, baseless, shifting or clutching at straw: they are assumed to be suffering a memory lapse or loss of memory, even though they may be tormented by too many disjointed memories.

The idea of memory as an invisible web

which makes it possible for a people to feel connected is not just imaginary.

We determine our ages by using linear dating, using the date of birth from which the date of conception can be roughly determined also.

But the voice of Nehanda telling the youths of the 1970s to go and take up the gun to free Zimbabwe is not just a voice from two thousand years back which now occupies new spirit mediums. No. The very genes, the very blood constituting the bodies of the youths are also as ancient as Nehanda. The linear births of these youths may have taken place in the 1950s and 1960s, that is under colonial occupation. But the memory births of the very same youths, as defined by genetic science, are ancient and, therefore, capable of remembering freedom, remembering a time when there were no settlers, no slavery and no colonialism, even if the person is now in jail.

Now, white imperialists and colonists have always feared African memory. So the first objective of imperialism and colonialism in Zimbabwe was to dissect and chop up the web of African memory and to replace it with the "separate but equal" memories of apartheid, tribalism and sectarianism. Imperialism dissects the web of African memory in order to replace it with tribes, uprooted tribes, denominations, congregations, sects and single-interest NGOs such as the Girl Child Network.

How does imperialism do all this? If we take the example of Zimbabwe, imperialism sent a Pioneer Column of thugs, thieves and liars to instigate the culture of lies similar to what Ugresic wrote about in the case of Yugoslavia. The people who helped Cecil John Rhodes to steal Zimbabwe were liars cultivating a culture of lies. Liar number one was Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor of Cape Colony in South Africa. He forged the imperial seal on the letters given to Cecil Rhodes to deceive King Lobengula.

When Rhodes' team of liars reached Lobengula in Zimbabwe they found the king already surrounded by 30 other speculators, liars and fortune hunters also seeking to deceive the same king.

22-28/4/2012

Economic empowerment is every Zimbabwean's birthright

The central philosophy of legendary Pan-Africanist and first President of independent Ghana, Dr Kwame Nkrumah, was encapsulated in his unforgettable slogan: "Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all things shall be added unto you."

Dr Nkrumah had realised that it would be impossible to improve the lives of dispossessed Africans without first gaining political independence. He was, of course, spot-on.

But, as Professor Ali Mazrui has eloquently stated, the inheritors of Dr Nkrumah's mantle have every right to proclaim: "Seek ye first the economic kingdom, and all things shall be added unto you."

The reasoning behind this is clear enough for anyone to understand. While Dr Nkrumah's motto acknowledged the primacy of politics in human affairs — and rightly so — the discourse had to shift from political freedom to economic emancipation once independence had been attained.

Although political sovereignty, which Dr Nkrumah called the "political kingdom", is a wonderful achievement for any oppressed people, it must be transformed to economic sovereignty before the masses can confidently affirm that they have tasted total freedom.

In our case, Zimbabwe's indigenisation and economic empowerment programme will ensure that the hard-won "political kingdom" which ended Rhodesia's racist colonial settler rule in 1980 will now transform into an "economic kingdom" for posterity.

If the masses of our people continue to be excluded from mainstream economic activity, Prof Mazrui says, we may as well change Dr Nkrumah's slogan to: "Seek ye first the political kingdom — and all else will be subtracted from it."

Listening to President Robert Mugabe's Independence Day address at the National Sports Stadium in Harare last week, most Zimbabweans would have been struck by the following words: "We are living in the afternoon, if not in the evening, of our lives and those who are still in the morning of their lives will have the benefits we are fighting for. They do not have to toil as we have done. It would be much easier for them to proceed into the future."

President Mugabe, his generation and past generations have all toiled for a better future for this nation. The age-group which has been dubbed "Generation 40" has a responsibility to pay close attention.

The bright future the President refers to is embodied in the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act. All Zimbabweans in general and Generation 40 in particular should heed the wise counsel of James Chapter 1 verse 22: "Do not merely listen to the word, and so deceive yourselves. Do what it says."

Mbuya Nehanda, Sekuru Kaguvi and King Lobengula all died fight-

ing for a free Zimbabwe whose children are masters of their own destiny. President Mugabe, alongside our departed heroes Dr Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo, Herbert Chitepo, Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo and Simon Muzenda, to mention a few, accepted the relay baton from the heroes of the First Chimurenga/Imfazo and gallantly prosecuted the Second Chimurenga. At the turn of the millennium, the Third Chimurenga restored our land to its rightful owners. The ongoing indigenisation and economic empowerment revolution is logically the Last Chimurenga. In that connection, Independence Day was celebrated under a befitting theme: "Indigenisation and Empowerment for Social and Economic Transformation".

The theme spoke to the bright future which President Mugabe's generation and our forebears relentlessly toiled for.

Economic empowerment is the birthright of every Zimbabwean. The time has come to implement and defend indigenisation in a manner that consolidates our independence and silences those who would seek to re-colonise this nation.

Those who connived with our oppressors yesterday, when others sought to liberate Zimbabwe, are the same people today who still continue to walk hand in glove with the imperialist forces who have been looting this country under the guise of promoting "foreign investment".

Politicians who are campaigning against indigenisation are essentially defending the continued marginalisation of the black majority. They are seeking to protect an unsustainable system of economic apartheid. For that reason, history will judge them harshly.

Resource nationalism is being taken seriously all over Africa, Latin America and Asia. Surprisingly, the same Western governments that are supporting the indigenisation policies of certain countries are vigorously opposing Zimbabwe's indigenisation programme. Why the double standards?

To the British government, indigenisation is all right in Ghana and Nigeria, but in Zimbabwe it is corrupt and discriminatory. They will never forgive Zimbabweans for the agrarian revolution which swept away white farmers. It is a grudge they will never let go.

Indonesia, South-east Asia's biggest economy, has enacted a law last month which obliges foreigners to divest at least 51 percent of their shares to Indonesians over a 10-year period.

Have you ever heard the British and the United States imposing sanctions on the people of Indonesia over this? Not at all. The question is: if economic justice is good for Nigerians, Ghanaians and Indonesians, why is it bad for Zimbabweans? Are we the children of a lesser god?

Independence: was it worth the sacrifice?

... when the fruits of freedom are elusive

WAS it really worth the effort? In the beginning, it may have been a murmur. It might have been whispered in the security of private enclosures. It is the question that, 27 years ago might have been contemptuously dismissed, given the euphoric atmosphere attendant upon the advent of *Uhuru* in Zimbabwe. But it has now become uncomfortably audible and fairly commonplace, a sad sign of a heartbroken nation beginning to doubt itself and the foundation of its existence. It has become like the pungent odour that slowly invades the trapped atmosphere of a small room, creating an enforced silence and imposing a sense of collective guilt. Hard though you might try to pretend otherwise, it cannot be ignored, because it is so stubbornly and uncomfortably present.

It is, in our current circumstances, a question that is at once painful and pertinent; requiring the mind to enquire whether, given the physical decay that has been visited upon Zimbabwe, independence (and the struggle for it) has been worth the sacrifices that were made. Was it, after all, a lost cause?

It is painful because thousands of lives were sacrificed to achieve *Uhuru*. Indeed, some would consider such a question to be an insult to the memory of those who paid with their lives to displace the colonial system, arguing that they cannot be condemned for the gross failures of their compatriots who lived on to assume power and whose inept political and economic management has brought harsh consequences upon the country. But it might also be said that, the sacrificed souls must surely now rest rather uneasily given the manner in which the dreams for which they fought appear to have been jettisoned by their living comrades.

It is pertinent however because it goes to the very root of the nation's existence, for the definition of Zimbabwe,

reflections with

DR ALEX T MAGAISA



as we now know it, is inextricably connected to the encounters, both harsh and sweet, between the peoples of different races and tribes who constitute it. Its future too, is dependent upon how these constituents are able to negotiate a reasonable co-existence and part of this process involves finding common ground and understanding on the key aspects that define the nation — among which include the liberation struggle, the contribution of the settler and immigrant communities and also overcoming the bitter and divisive aspects such as Gukurahundi.

Citizens are asking this and related questions more openly because of the physical degeneration of the country since independence and the negation of the idea and spirit of independence by those who led the fight for its achievement. The struggle after all, was meant to achieve freedom and lead to the improvement of their material conditions. Yet most people have become worse off materially, than they were at the time of independence in 1980 and the emasculation of the freedoms is no different from their position in colonial Rhodesia. In short, they have not seen the fruits of the struggle for freedom.

That notwithstanding, there is an important distinction that must be made between the ideals of the struggle for independence and the outcome of that process as seen today. It would, in my opinion, be unfortunate to nonchalantly dismiss the notion of independence on the basis of the failures of the leadership. Freedom is a natural right and to the extent that the colonial system deprived other people of that right and claims to allied rights, it was necessary to fight for independence. The post-in-

dependence regime appears to have failed dismally, to deliver what was envisaged in the struggle for independence but that cannot be used to detract from the notion of independence. It is important always, to distinguish Zanu PF's failures and the idea of independence, which by all accounts, is still to be achieved.

A troubling trait of the debate about the value of independence is what appears to be an attempt, in some circles, to impose collective blame for the failures of Zanu PF, on the black people. Accusatory statements are sometimes recklessly thrown about, implying that the failures of Zanu PF provide conclusive proof that black people cannot govern. This has not been helped by the chaotic land reform programme, the poor implementation of which has caused a dramatic fall in agricultural productivity. It is important, in my opinion, to avoid being unnecessarily divisive on racial or other grounds by denigrating a whole race or tribe on the basis of the incompetence of a particular regime.

The generalisations have unwittingly turned otherwise well-meaning people into defenders of what is ordinarily indefensible, simply because the issue would have shifted from one about the incompetence of particular leaders, to one about racial or tribal responsibility.

It seems to me that the problem is that during both colonial Rhodesia and independent Zimbabwe, the political landscape has been dominated by extremists on either side and unfortunately those extremists have held positions of power to make key decisions that have sown the seeds of polarisation along racial and tribal lines. It is an historical fact that Zimbabwe has broadly speaking, both white

and black people, among others and also people from various ethnic tribes. The challenge has always been and remains achieving reasonable co-existence, respecting the dignity, equality and Zimbabweanness of every man and woman who claims it.

You cannot blame every white person for the excesses of the Smith regime, no more than you can blame every black person for the excesses of the Mugabe regime. But this appears to happen with reckless abandon causing bitter but unproductive divisions in the communities.

Despite both colonial Rhodesia and independent Zimbabwe having the common denominator of pursuing unsatisfactory politics, the independence regime has the distinction of having performed dismally on the economic front. Their colonial predecessors appear to have fared better in economic management, which even when it guaranteed unequal treatment, still had some excess to cushion the marginalised.

It is a fact of life that socio-economic conditions remain the core interests of citizens. There can be an unfavourable political system, but they will thrive so long as they can get by economically. Citizens who say they were better off before independence are not necessarily condoning the repressive political system of that time; they are simply confirming that they care more about their economic well-being.

This of course, is a lesson for any future government, that whatever you do, the most important aspect is the economy. It is also the same message to every politician that the key lies in finding a pragmatic solution that reverses the economic decline. They care less about who does it; they just want to see something done, by Zanu PF, MDC or whomsoever can deploy the necessary skills and resources towards that end.

11-03-2007

Independence: was it worth the sacrifice ?

FROM PAGE 11

The bitter lesson for Zimbabweans appears to be that regardless of their worthy efforts, liberators are not always the best governors. The science of leading a liberation struggle is significantly different from the science of governance. Experience has shown that the liberators lacked the transferable skills that could be deployed in the process of government. There has always been a militaristic approach in handling party and government affairs, which probably explains the frequent resort to military personnel and methods in governance matters. If there is any lesson to be learnt by those at the forefront of today's liberation, it is that when the time comes, instead of clamouring for power and staying there until the end of time, they ought to defer to those of their own who have the skills to manage the economy.

But at the end of the day, it important to not let the understandable bitterness that people have against

the current regime, to detract from the idea and struggle for independence, which was and remains a key ideal, because in an event true Uhuru is yet to be achieved. It is not about rhetoric and slogans — it constitutes finding ways of promoting co-existence of the people regardless of the bitter past and creating systems for the management of resources, both human and material, to improve the socio-economic well being of the people. As we have seen, the erosion of socio-economic status of the people has now caused people to openly question the whole idea of independence. It is sad because in some ways, it represents a decline in collective self-confidence; a psychological crisis that will drag down a whole nation. That collective mental fall will be harder to recover from than the rebuilding of the physical structures that have deteriorated.

● Alex Magaisa can be contacted at wamagaisa@yahoo.co.uk

Zimbabwe betrays ideals of the revolution

THE forced removals of villagers from farms by the very people who encouraged the invasions and occupations in 2000 mark a new height in cynicism and betrayal of the ideals of the liberation struggle.

What has been happening on occupied farms in Mashonaland East and West, Masvingo and Matabeleland provinces in recent weeks is a monumental tragedy that best captures the bitter experience of post-independence rule in this country.

At the beginning of 2000 the government instigated villagers to invade and occupy commercial farms, saying equitable land distribution was at the core of the struggle for independence.

Amid chants of "ivhu kuvanhu", "People First", "the land is the economy" and "Third Chimurenga", the government allowed villagers to settle anywhere they liked. The police were rendered powerless. The government vowed there would be no going back.

However, in recent weeks the same government has brought in police details to oversee mass evictions of the villagers it encouraged to resort to lawlessness. But the bitter irony now is the resemblance in approach to the settlers when they were ejecting indigenous people from their ancestral lands under the Land Apportionment Act in order to open up vast farmlands for commercial farmers.

The Standard comment

The brutality of settler colonial administration can never be excused although it was not unexpected of those determined to subjugate the indigenous people of this country, but the brutality of one of our own is unparalleled, treacherous and unforgivable. It is the worst form of oppression and could be sowing and watering the seeds of future conflict in this country. This is blatant hijacking of the revolution.

The scale of the evictions, dispossessions and human rights abuses is incomparable, while the silence from domestic and international rights organisations is perplexing. It is as if the villagers have absolutely no rights at all.

What is happening as a result of the mass evictions is a covert agenda to concentrate the ownership of land in the hands of an elitist political group and protégés who have decided to secure their future by transforming Zimbabwe into a private property, where the majority will exist at the pleasure of a new landed class.

The struggle for independence is thus reduced to a struggle by blacks to supplant whites in order to perpetrate and perpetuate the injustices that were synonymous

with settler administration and for which it came to be violently despised.

Despite three audits and mounting evidence that the political elite in this country are multiple farm owners, the government has elected to ignore this evidence and instead has chosen to victimise villagers it encouraged to invade and occupy farms since 2000.

Ironically, the one lesson to emerge from all this is that the government is finally admitting that its land reform programme has been an unmitigated disaster and needs to be scrapped, while it returns to the drawing board.

What is also tragic about the evictions is that senior leaders from the struggle, who ideally should comprise the guardians of the ideals of the revolution, see these things and yet remain silent, as if they have been rendered impotent by a bitter power struggle.

John Nkomo, who is the Minister of Special Affairs responsible for Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, keeps referring issues about the evictions to provincial governors as if governors suddenly have the power to veto directives from central government. Failure to put his foot down and to demand

an immediate end to the evictions is all the more puzzling especially given that he is the chairman of the ruling Zanu PF party.

There is a paralysis of indecision even in a case where it is obvious potential voter support is being squandered. The opposition is being gifted an election chance by the ruling party!

One possible explanation for all this and the lack of decisive response by the government, on behalf of the villagers being evicted, could be that if land invasions and occupations were indeed spearheaded by former freedom fighters, then what is being witnessed is the emergence of a schism between ruling politicians and war veterans. This could lead to the emergence of a political force drawing its support from war veterans, but still within the ruling party.

Last week *The Standard* reported that more war veterans will be fielded as candidates challenging senior Zanu PF officials in the run up to next year's March parliamentary elections. The chairman of the War Veterans Association, Jabulani Sibanda, attributed this unprecedented development to the "reawakening of the revolutionary spirit" among former freedom

fighters.

The government ministers and senior ruling party officials who are threatened by the war veterans' decision could have hatched a strategy to disrupt the power base of the former freedom fighters by scattering people who are likely to vote for ex-combatants.

Dispersing the people who invaded and occupied former commercial farms would thwart the plans by former freedom fighters. People who move out of constituencies could encounter problems in voting for candidates put forward by the war veterans, thus securing victory for the status quo.

The evictions have serious implications. The villagers have children who were due to write their qualifying examinations this year. The evictions will mean a wasted year for hundreds of school children. But there is also the issue of disruptions to farming activities with the possibility that this could adversely impact on food production. The villagers will have neither the resources to buy inputs nor the land to grow food. The government may have created a class of people it will need to feed in the immediate and medium term.

The evictions suggest that the "agrarian reform" has become a scramble for land by the political elite and that the government has stopped pretending that it cares or ever cared about ordinary people.

Not yet Uhuru for the masses

Zimbabweans celebrate 33 years of Independence from colonial rule on Thursday.

People from all walks of life will converge at various centres around the country for the commemorations to be held under the theme: *Zimbabwe @33 — Peace, Prosperity and Economic Empowerment for National Development*.

Ironically, such a grandiose theme is at odds with what is prevailing in the country.

In 1980, then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe preached unity and forgiveness urging the new nation to “turn swords into ploughshares”.

Thirty-three years later, those ploughshares have been literally turned into weapons again as government cracks down on dissenting voices ahead of the watershed harmonised elections later this year.

The peace that Zimbabweans anticipated when they gained independence has remained a mirage as the human rights situation continues to deteriorate.

Those who replaced yesteryear colonisers have not hesitated to use the same oppressor's methods to remain in power and to plunder the nation's wealth.

The country's natural resources, particularly diamonds, have been pillaged by the elite despite Treasury insisting that revenue from diamonds should go to the consolidated revenue fund.

More worrying for Zimbabweans is the cancer called corruption that has taken root in the new political arrangement. While Zanu PF and the MDC formations that constitute the inclusive government have different ideologies, they have found a common denominator in looting.

Young ministers who only a few years ago did not have anything to their name, now own mansions in leafy suburbs and drive top-of-the-range vehicles, thanks to their four years in government.

While the pillaging has been allowed to go on, the health and education sectors, which had been revamped in the 80s, have collapsed.

Water and electricity are hard to get, and mismanagement has become the buzzword. On the economic front, populist policies have driven away investors and companies have either retrenched staff or closed shop leaving the unemployment rate hovering around 90%.

For the majority of unemployed Zimbabweans, the fruits of independence remain elusive.

Quote of the week

“I am still very sad about the situation. Acquittal means nothing to me as that will not bring back Adam and Nomqhele to life.” — Soccer legend Peter Ndlovu after his acquittal on culpable homicide following the deaths of his brother Adam and female companion Nomqhele Tshili in a road accident last year.

FEATURES

Global racism and the land issue in Zimbabwe

AFRICAN FOCUS

By Tafataona Mahoso

- The Land Apportionment Act (Rhodesia);
- The Land Husbandry Act (Rhodesia);
- The Masters and Servants Act (South Africa and Rhodesia);
- The Group Areas Act (South Africa);
- The Tribal Trust Lands Act (Rhodesia);
- The Separate Amenities Act (South Africa).

The courts' enforcement of these racist codes of white "just us" is still fresh in the memory of most Africans.

The more the farmers frequent the courts the more they remind Africans of these laws.

In both South Africa and Zimbabwe, every African who is forty years

or older experienced the daily enforcement of most of these racist laws.

The third reason was that going to court under English and Roman Dutch Law tends to encourage the parties to use everything they can find to weaken the other side and to strengthen their own side.

In other words, litigation encourages over kill, which ensures the escalation of an otherwise mild dispute.

This leads to social polarisation.

The media supporting the CFU have contributed to this unnecessary escalation and polarisation.

They described the War Veterans as "ma-

rauding," as if they were animals.

They described the War Veterans as "squatters" and "invaders," which they certainly are not.

Litigation under Roman Dutch Law and English Law also means (since 1886) that a corporate monopoly such as Anglo-American or Lonrho becomes a person in court against a land-hungry peasant or War Veteran.

This is a fiction, since Lonrho's power and strength is not comparable to that of a land hungry peasant.

There is no doubt as to who is empowered by that fiction.

Likewise, litigation means that a person representing his own personal interest is treated the same way as a person representing a whole society, a person articulating the needs and aspira-

tions of a whole people.

This is also a fiction. The two court applications by the CFU did not just defeat Border Gezi, Chenjerai Hunzvi and Augustine Chihuri. But that is how the court fiction represents the case.

What is hidden in that fiction is the fact that the High Court ruling turns a whole society into "losers".

It attempts to defeat more than a hundred years of African aspirations under the pretence that it is only Robert Mugabe, Augustine Chihuri and Border Gezi who have "lost".

The problem is not necessarily caused by the sitting judges. The problem is integral to English and Roman Dutch "just us".

It is part of the structure, theory, philosophy and technique of white colonial law in Zimbabwe. There are many things for which this kind of law

may be excellent.

The land scandal in Zimbabwe is not one of them.

The courts and the media supporting the CFU were not alone in fuelling the crisis.

The responses of the British government have been particularly offensive and provocative.

The addition of the European Union and the United States to the list does not help the farmers.

These Euro-American forces have been waging a genocidal war on the people of Yugoslavia which is based on the same premises: that they are fighting President Slobodan Milosovic, just as here they believe it is Mugabe, Chihuri, Gezi and Hunzvi they are fighting.

Zimbabweans need to step back from this scandal and look at themselves more honestly. The

following points may be a starting point.

It was President Mugabe's Government which the people to be patient and to expect Britain and others to provide the funds to finance the willing-seller-willing-buyer approach to land redistribution.

The British broke their pledge when they suspended the payments.

The white farmers and those media supporting them tried to justify the British breach of the Lancaster agreement by arguing that in the 21st Century land will no longer be important.

As late as a month or so ago, Zimbabweans heard from the CZI, the MDC, The Daily News and the Zimbabwean Independent that land was no longer an election issue, that it was just President Mugabe, who wanted to make it an issue.

There were even some fraudulent surveys done to justify this fiction.

Yet the same forces are now saying that the police should remove the War Veterans from the land they have occupied because Britain, the US, the European Union, the IMF, the World Bank and all donors are concerned about the on-going land reclamation.

Now, if land was not important, if land was not an issue for the 21st Century, why would all these forces be concerned?

What is meant therefore is that the African should no longer be concerned about land precisely because it is so important for Britain, for the US, for the European Union and for all the donors to keep it in the hands of the minority.

Finally, the first death in these land reclamation actions, that of David Stevens, happened two

days after the second High Court ruling against the War Veterans.


All along the movement had been relatively peaceful, much more disciplined and peaceful than the so-called stay-aways of 1998 which were backed by some industrialists and followers of Mr Morgan Tsvangirayi.

The contrasting responses of the corporate Press and the western powers to the stay-aways then and to the land movement now are a real revelation.

The stay-aways were treated as absolutely necessary and contributing to "democracy" and "freedom of expression". The current movement to reclaim land is treated as chaotic, tyrannical, unjust and illegal.

That must tell us what these people think "democracy" is.

ZIMBABWE LAND TALKS



SUNDAY MAILBAG

Debates trivial

Nation must pay

...remained lame for years as society mourned the appalling living and working conditions of farm workers.

Some elderly farm workers were dumped onto the streets when their working lives were over and government and civil society had to look after them. A visit to old people's homes would testify to the piteous situation these people were left in.

It is a fact that commercial farmers employ thousands of workers and any changes to the ownership of land will affect them. It is for this reason that we agree with calls for the inclusion of farm workers in any resettlement programme.

Dr Chombo said most farmworkers of Malawian and Zambian origin who had been in Zimbabwe for decades were given Zimbabwean citizenship in 1985 and are now holders of the Zimbabwean national identity card and in some cases the Zimbabwean passport and thus can benefit from the resettlement programme.

The issue of farm workers should never be used to frustrate the land reform programme as it can easily be solved.

Those using the name of farm workers to block the fast-track programme should actually redirect their efforts to assisting in the resettlement of these workers either in Zimbabwe or in their countries of origin.

COMMENT

No land for foreigners

Elsewhere in this issue we report on the statement by the Minister of Local Government and National Housing, Dr Ignatius Chombo, that farm workers will not be left out of the fast-track resettlement programme. He said every farm worker is free to enlist for the programme.

We agree in principle with the idea of resettling farm workers but would insist that these people should be citizens of Zimbabwe. There are a lot of people who came and settled in Zimbabwe during the destabilisation of Mozambique by Renamo. They were running away from a war situation and it was only understandable that they moved into a neighbouring country such as Zimbabwe.

There were also a number of them who moved in illegally to destabilise Zimbabwe. Several incidents of banditry were reported in Mashonaland Central and Mashonaland East. Most of these people had been employed in commercial farms. Government even warned farmers then not to employ people willy-nilly because some of them did not have good intentions.

It is such people who, in any case are illegal immigrants, who should not be resettled, people who, were it in countries like South Africa and Botswana would have been deported. But in our case we are not asking for such people to be deported but for a solution to be worked out between the governments of the respective countries for their repatriation.

A good number of them returned home after the end of the war in Mozambique. Organisations such as the UNHCR were quite instrumental in returning these people home.

To resettle everyone who would have decided to come to Zimbabwe will spell disaster. The country is not expanding and our own people are already congested in rural areas and are crying out for land. But there is no shortage of land in Mozambique. Neither is there a shortage of land in Zambia.

If white farmers are moving into Mozambique to start farming operations; it means there is a lot of land. The agricultural sector in that country can also be made vibrant.

Mozambique certainly would need people with experience to work on the farms or to work the land on their own. Already we know of cotton farmers who grow cotton in Mozambique and come to sell it in Zimbabwe in places like Mukumbura and Guruve North.

This problem could well be likened to that of the rural to urban migration. The government had to come up with the idea of growth points and rural service centres to arrest the flow of people into urban areas. In the same vein, if farming conditions are made attractive in neighbouring countries then we will not have this one way traffic into Zimbabwe.

All we are saying is that the issue of foreign farm workers should be discussed thoroughly and a proper solution found. There is nothing taboo about it.

Yet we have seen the plight of farm workers being hijacked by those opposed to the land reform programme and used to whip up opposition to efforts to resettle landless people before the rain season. We even now have organisations like the Farmworkers Action Group, which strangely remained lame

Reasons why 2005 elections should be anti-Blair

S/12/2004



AFRICAN FOCUS
By Tafataona P. Mahoso

IN the last instalment we demonstrated the significance of making our 2005 parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe anti-Blair elections against the latest demonstration "elections" which British Prime Minister Tony Blair and US President George W. Bush have organised at gunpoint in Afghanistan and Iraq. We are anti-Blair because we will not make people vote for our candidates at gunpoint the way Blair and Bush have done in Afghanistan.

Most foreign delegates to the Fourth National People's Congress of Zanu-PF in Harare this week showed us more ways in which our 2005 parliamentary elections should be anti-Blair.

Support statements from the December 12 Movement in the United States of America and the Zimbabwe Solidarity Front in the United Kingdom were most significant in this regard.

Cde Coltrane Chimurenga of the December 12 Movement described the administration of George W. Bush not only as racist and hostile to Zimbabwe but also as a real and present danger to world peace. But he added: "We come from the belly of the beast but we are not afraid of the beast." Cde Harpal Brar of the Zimbabwe Solidarity Front said Prime Minister Tony Blair had intensified the creation of two apartheid societies in Britain.

There is the Britain of the white Anglo-Saxon and neoliberal minority ruling class whose objective is to facilitate global corporate interests in exchange for wealth and power, on the one hand. There is the Britain of working people, the abandoned real Labour, who have come from all over the world and all over Britain and have a proud history of resistance to corporate greed, a proud history of defending real working people all over the world, on the other hand. New Labour is in reality an anti-working class aristocracy which seeks to use its sponsorship from global corporations to create other minority labour aristocracies around the world.

Therefore there is another, even more profound, meaning to the anti-Blair elections. Tony Blair's "New Labour" is the most brutal and most backward Labour Party government in the history of the United Kingdom. Its significance for the rest of the world can be gathered from the latest quarrel between the Youth League of the African National Congress of South Africa and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) on the meaning of the Zimbabwean African land reclamation movement.

Its significance can also be gathered from studying the Honourable Dr Stan Mudenge's paper delivered at the Liberation Movements' Conference in Harare in April 2004. The paper was called "Western Socialists' View of Ex-Liberation Movement Governments".

These Western "socialists" see themselves as the rightful heirs to imperialism and the custodians of the new brand of corporate cannibalism called "globalisation"; and they think by attaching these new labels to contemporary imperialism they have, in fact, abolished global oppression and rebaptised the West as the teacher and guarantor of human rights, democracy and good governance.

In Dr Mudenge's paper we find reference to the World Socialist Website which noted the dangerous, racist and backward role of Europe's new socialists in two publications in 1999: "Promotion of the MDC by (white) middle-class radicals politically disarms the working class" and "Zimbabwe: Trade unions step in to form a new pro-business party", meaning the MDC, of course.

These announcements marked a critical

chapter in the history of the liberation movement. It is that critical chapter which makes it necessary to see the 2005 parliamentary elections as anti-Blair elections.

The following reasons demonstrate the importance of the new chapter in history and the logic of the anti-Blair elections.

• First, Tony Blair's "New Labour" seeks to co-opt or set up foreign-funded and elitist labour aristocracies to overthrow former liberation movements in the South and the East. The elitist labour aristocracies in our region are represented by Cosatu and the faction of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), which formed the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe.

• Second, the formation or co-optation of the elitist labour aristocracy immediately abandons the working majority to corporate cannibalism by accepting sponsorship from corporate employers, by accepting and promoting the massive retrenchment of workers and by isolating the declining numbers of formally employed workers from the marginally employed and from the self-employed urban and rural classes. In other words, the MDC in Zimbabwe and Cosatu in South Africa would preside over a very small and declining working class cut off from the marginally employed, from the self-employed and from the peasants who are the most oppressed majority of the people.

Our 2005 elections will be anti-Blair because they are based on the ideology of pan-African and national liberation whose basic objective is the unity of all the elements and sectors of society resisting imperialism. New Labour and its MDC stooges do not recognise imperialism as a problem. They use it as an opportunity. The liberation movement is the biggest and most authentic challenge to imperialism because it seeks, first of all, to cement the usual ethnic and class divisions which capitalism has created and employed to keep its victims weak. Therefore, being anti-Blair in 2005 means bringing together all our pan-African and nationalist intellectuals, professionalists, workers, farmers and peasants. It means opposing tribalism, regionalism, elitism and careerism in the interest of a cohesive national and pan-African liberation movement.

• Third, the ability of the Western white "socialists" to co-opt, sponsor or create a labour aristocracy in the South and East and to overthrow the liberation movement's government depends on wiping out the memory of the South and East especially that memory which would make it possible for new generations to understand the new forms which imperialism has assumed. Again, Tony Blair's New Labour presents the best example of neoliberalism as the enemy of human memory. It is not only the white Rhodesian in Zimbabwe who joins the MDC and starts talking about our history as "water under the bridge" or Africans being stuck in the 19th century or our leaders being too senile to understand the new "information age". The British Labour government of Tony Blair itself premised its dealings with Zimbabwe on amnesia as the first step forward.

Blair's Secretary for International Development, Ms Clare Short, emphasised the ideal of as short a memory as possible when in 1997 she wrote to Zimbabwe's Minister of

Agriculture concerning the African majority's demand for its stolen land, saying:

"I should make it clear that we (the British New Labour government) do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new government from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish and as you know we were colonised and not colonisers."

This is a most telling point about the significance of Blairism. One must use the children of the formerly enslaved and the formerly colonised in order to erase the memory and the claims against those who benefited from slavery and colonialism.

Blairism means that we are expected to believe, for instance, that US President George W. Bush's administration cannot be accused of racism nor can any claims for reparations be made against it, why? Because its cabinet is from diverse backgrounds, you see. It has included Uncle Tom Colin Powell and Auntie Jamaima Condoleezza Rice as house niggers, you see. That must settle the entire reparations question, especially if those who can now eat rice with the master themselves confirm that the rice more than suffices for any claims for reparations which could have been made.

In the case of New Labour, the presence of a formerly oppressed white Irish woman in Blair's cabinet was enough to stop the African majority of Zimbabwe from demanding their land back!

For New Labour, the fact that Africans still remembered in 1997 that their land was stolen by Britons at gunpoint in 1890 meant that the Africans

were backward people still stuck in the 19th century.

To progress means to have no history, no memory, except that memory which imperialism is cloning through its sponsored MDCs, through its Cosatus and through its global conveyor belt of lies called "free and independent media".

INVITATION TO TENDER I

The United Nations - Food and Agriculture Org and human resources development in member Africa is organising 3-month training courses in **and Implementation of Smallholder Irrigation**

The students will be largely qualified engineers knowledge of irrigation. The courses will give them skills needed to implement successful sch

The training will include formal classroom sess visits. Technical support will be given to the tra vised experience in the actual planning and im

The training courses will be based on an Irriga cessful Consultant(s). The manual is split into 1

- Module 1:** Irrigation Development: A multi and environmental issues to be
- Module 2:** Natural Resources Assessment:
- Module 3:** Agronomic aspects of irrigated
- Module 4:** Crop water requirements and irr
- Module 5:** Irrigation Pumping Plant
- Module 6:** Guidelines for the preparation of
- Module 7:** Surface irrigation Systems: Plan
- Module 8:** Sprinkler Irrigation Systems: Plk
- Module 9:** Localised irrigation systems: Plk
- Module 10:** Irrigation Equipment for pressu
- Module 11:** Financial and economic appraisal
- Module 12:** Guidelines for the preparation o
- Module 13:** Construction of irrigation scherr
- Module 14:** Monitoring the technical and fin

Interested firms are hereby invited to submit CV are qualified to teach all of the above modules consultants.

A daily rate should also be given for a Coordin logistics and the inputs of the different trainer training background.

The consultant should quote for the teaching a will be paid at the current UN rates for any trav US\$ equivalent and be valid for 3 months.

The training venue, student subsistence, transp arately by FAO or the partner government(s).

Submissions will be accepted for up to 2 week

Food ar
6th I
Cnr Jaso

Rusununguko High School Vacancies

1. FARM MANAGER

Urgently wanted for a big farm in Bromley area.

Qualifications:

Diploma/Certificate in Agriculture plus 5 years' experience.

2. BOARDING SUPERVISOR

For boys' section with 500 residents from Form 1-6.

Qualifications and Experience:

'O' Level, uniformed service experience or retired teacher or Practicing Boarding Master with 5 years' experience or more.

For shortlisting phone:
(073) 22791/2/8 or 3143

1811026-15

COMMENT

Zim poll: Africa's defining moment

IT'S exactly six days from today that Zimbabweans will once more use their democratic right to decide the fate of their country 22 years after attaining their hard-won independence. And the issues at stake appear to be quite straightforward — consolidation of their independence or reverting to colonial rule.

Central to President Mugabe's campaign is the right to sovereignty of an independent Zimbabwe.

This to Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, is anathema as he feels the master-servant relationship of the colonial era during the days of the Clifford Duponts, the John Gaunts and the Desmond Lardner-Burkes has to be kept alive.

But the British, cunning as they are, decided to use some blacks as their puppets to remote-control them into defending imperial interests. The MDC, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, is there for everyone to see.

As a sovereign people, Zimbabweans have values, rights and wishes which they hold sacrosanct — among these is ownership of their land.

In his election campaign President Mugabe has been quite emphatic in pointing out the need to redistribute land, not only in order to decongest the rural areas, but also to economically empower blacks.

After all, top on the agenda of the liberation struggle in which thousands perished was the land issue.

The question of land has always been a crucial and unifying factor. That is why the liberation movements — Zanu and Zapu — joined hands to form the Patriotic Front to challenge the land-grabbers.

The Lancaster House Agreement almost came to nought until the British and the US promised to fund the land redistribution exercise.

Needless to point out that Blair has since reneged on his pledge.

And yet he still finds willing allies in the form of the MDC, a supposedly Zimbabwean political party.

With the presidential elections ominously looming and defeat staring in the face of the British puppets, a desperate Blair is now overtly trying all sorts of tricks to discredit President Mugabe to ensure the survival of his surrogate Tsvangirai.

In an effort to influence the outcome of the elections, Blair has submitted spurious arguments related to the upholding of human rights, democracy and the rule of law to persuade the EU and the US to impose targeted sanctions on President Mugabe.

Blair's obsession with sanc-

tions, on the assumption that a suffering Zimbabwean electorate might vent their anger on President Mugabe at the polls, has proved misplaced.

When Tsvangirai took the cue from his master and advocated the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe by South Africa, he was shocked by the public reaction.

It is this dangerous spirit that has witnessed hoarding, price-control busting and shutdown of businesses.

In his relentless onslaught on Zimbabwe on Wednesday Blair told the British parliament that the UK would be pushing for the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth.

However, it is not surprising that the UK stance has received the snub it deserves from many fronts.

For a start the EU is divided. African states have seen through Blair's racist agenda and have refused to go along with him, except Tsvangirai, of course.

Uncalled for interference in the affairs of a sovereign state has reminded them of the 1884 Berlin Conference, where Europe agreed to partition Africa.

On Friday, the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group rejected Blair's attempts to suspend Zimbabwe from the Club at a pre-summit meeting in Australia.

African presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Sam Nujoma of Namibia and other countries in Sadc have all recently expressed their concern about Britain's attitude towards Zimbabwe.

What remains puzzling, however, is that although Africa is firm in supporting Zimbabwe's sovereign right to determine her destiny, Tsvangirai has other ideas. His thinking is in line with that of the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the US and the EU.

And this is a man who needs the votes of Zimbabwean Africans on March 9 and 10.

The documentary on Tsvangirai's alleged assassination plot couldn't have been more apt. "It would seem that Tsvangirai may have the overwhelming support of Whitehall, Canberra, Brussels and Washington, but not that of his own people, not enough to guarantee his victory," it concludes.

This has to be demonstrated at the polls come March 9 and 10.

The inevitable resounding victory of President Mugabe will be a strong message to Blair and his unholy alliance that Africa has come of age. Plans to unseat liberation movements using black surrogates will have been dealt a severe blow.

Confronting Zanu PF's anti-imperialist rhetoric

1-04-2007
● The task is to critique premise of discourse

OVER and above the human rights issues and severe economic problems, one principal aspect around which local and international opinion on the genesis and character of the Zimbabwe crisis is sharply divided is the anti-imperialist discourse as set, defined and championed by the ruling Zanu PF party.

Given the way in which this discourse has moulded regional and international reaction to the crisis, no matter how strongly disdainful some individuals feel about the matter, it cannot be easily brushed off. Rather, the task must be to critique the premises of this anti-imperialist discourse for purposes of enlightening those whose view of Zimbabwe is somewhat jaundiced by the incessant rhetoric. It is important, as Zimbabweans now look to the African bloc to negotiate a way out of the crisis.

Even its worst critics are sometimes hard-pressed to not concede that, at least until now, Zanu PF has largely succeeded in re-defining the Zimbabwean problem in its own (anti-imperialist) terms and resultantly, to galvanise African backing and stave off pressure. Faced with difficult internal socio-economic challenges threatening its reign in the late 1990s, Zanu PF played the key card of anti-imperialism, conveniently building this agenda around the sensitive Land Question, which, in my opinion, had been mishandled at the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference in 1979, when short-sighted constitutional arrangements were put in place, leaving room for its future manipulation, as events have demonstrated. Africans in similar situations have found it very hard to disconnect from the emotion that attaches the legitimate question of resource distribution.

As it happened, Zanu PF was able to turn what was essentially an internal challenge to its continued rule in the late 1990s into a broader struggle, defining itself as the driver of revolutionary change and a victim of a Western conspiracy for daring to do so. It did not help that in November 1997, the then new

reflections with

DR ALEX T. MAGAISA



Labour government in the UK appeared to disown what it regarded as past obligations of previous UK governments in respect of the Land Question. That was an error of judgment, which could have been avoided.

As it is, the November 1997 letter from the British government to the Zimbabwe government has been waved constantly as an indicator of the UK's breach of its obligations on the land issue and therefore, as the source of Zimbabwe's problems, notwithstanding the fact that the record of the Zimbabwe government was already in a state that in law would be referred to as *res ipsa loquitur* — the economic deterioration was patently clear, it did not require further evidence to demonstrate the government's failures.

In the process, Zanu PF has tried regularly to characterise the MDC as no more than an agent of Western imperialists. The veracity of this persistent allegation is immaterial in the scheme of things because its impact was to ensure an overriding perception, among Zanu PF loyalists and Africans on the continent, that the MDC was an imperial vehicle. Some might say, with the benefit of hindsight, that the MDC itself could have done more from an early stage to vigorously counter this perception in order to gain the confidence of the African countries that appeared to swallow wholesale the government rhetoric, and therefore view the MDC with suspicion.

It does not help that sometimes the MDC's Western sympathisers unwittingly provide invaluable raw material for the Zanu PF propaganda machinery, such as when a couple of years back British PM Tony Blair suggested in the House of Commons that the British government was working with the MDC to bring about change in Zimbabwe or more

recently, when Minister of the Foreign Office, Ian McCartney, erroneously stated that President Mugabe's daughter is studying at a London University. Zanu PF seizes upon these unfortunate incidents to hype its anti-imperialist rhetoric that the MDC is a tool of the West which concocts falsehoods to demonise Zimbabwe and President Mugabe.

It is arguable that until now, the lack of serious African effort in resolving the crisis owes as much to African leaders' affinity to their liberation era comrade, President Mugabe, as it does to the suspicions sown in their minds about the character of the MDC as a creature of the West. It matters very little that this characterisation is incorrect — the image alone, left unchecked, has been damaging.

The tragedy is that to most Africans, the bone of contention between Zanu PF and Zimbabwean opponents in respect of governance matters has therefore played second-fiddle to the anti-imperialist agenda propagated by Zanu PF. Consequently, whatever mistakes, wilfully, recklessly or negligently committed by Zanu PF since 1980, have invariably been considered by the African leaders to be immaterial or at best, incidental, to the broader picture of the purported goal of restoring resource redistribution. Little attention is paid to the fact that the modalities are as important as the goal itself and that the methods adopted in Zimbabwe have so far been counter-productive.

The net product of this complex mash of perception and reality is two diametrically opposed standpoints that have emerged among Zimbabweans and observers: on the one hand, that the MDC represents Western interests and on the other hand, that Zanu PF represents crazy power-mongers hanging on through redundant anti-imperialist rhetoric. And therein lies the problem, because there is

very little space for alternatives that fall outside of the two standpoints but with the capacity to accommodate valid aspects of both.

For all the chaos characterising Zanu PF rule, it would be foolhardy for any serious observer to completely dismiss those aspects of its perspective that remain legitimate and valid, though they may somewhat be soiled by the attendant unnecessary vitriol. But Zanu PF itself must understand that Zimbabweans are not foolish and that they do appreciate the broader picture and dynamics of international politics. There is a large body of Zimbabweans that does not necessarily agree with Zanu PF politics, but still has issues with the West and its handling of international affairs. Yet those people are often contemptuously dismissed as Western puppets simply because they have been critical of Zanu PF. Zanu PF must appreciate that it does not hold a patent on ideas or criticism of the West. The bottom line is that one can still oppose Zanu PF without necessarily becoming a stooge of the West. To say that every Zanu PF opponent is a Western puppet is to disrespect and underestimate the intelligence of Zimbabweans.

Similarly, notwithstanding Zanu PF propaganda, it would be unreasonable for any serious observer to simply dismiss the valid claims of the MDC. It is a significant political player in Zimbabwe, which commands considerable support and it would be contemptuous to suggest that a large section of the population is so ignorant that it willingly submits itself to be used by the West. Yet the MDC itself must also be awake to the fact that in the maze of Zanu PF failures, there are also some valid points raised that cannot be dismissed without due consideration. Those ideas may be currently unpopular not because they are irrational, but because their source is no longer taken seriously.

The MDC and its loyalists ought to appreciate that not

Confronting Zanu PF's rhetoric

1-04-2007

FROM PAGE 11

everyone who disagrees with Zanu PF necessarily agrees with MDC's political agenda. Therefore, it is disrespectful to characterise every person who is critical of the MDC as a Zanu PF loyalist. They are critical not because they hate the MDC or support Zanu PF, but because they would like to see the country improve, regardless of who rules the country. There is a large body of people that remembers that during the liberation struggle and after independence, it was almost taboo to question the party line and this lack of checks and balances between the leaders and the citizens has contributed to the poor quality of governance, which has landed us in this quagmire. Fundamentally, in order for it to gain the African ear, the MDC ought to cleanse itself of the unfortunate image of a Western puppet by encouraging its sympathisers to adopt an approach that does not antagonise the Africans that are now really vital in resolving this problem.

The anti-imperialist rhetoric has been crucial in defining the approach of the African countries to the Zimbabwe crisis. Zanu PF has played the card for too long now but signs are that Africans are beginning to see through the façade. There are undoubtedly some key points that are raised within the Zanu PF perspective but equally so the MDC has staked its claim and it is becoming increasingly laughable to summarily dismiss it as a Western puppet. Efforts must continue to enlighten the Africans about the nature of the domestic crisis outside of the anti-imperialist rhetoric. The MDC itself can do this by taking up those legitimate issues raised within the Zanu PF perspective, and demonstrating to the African allies that they have the capacity and willingness to deal with them. This should allay their concerns. The best way to counter the negative image is to play the game and try to win it.

Dr Magaisa can be contacted at wamagaisa@yahoo.co.uk.

The Standard comment

The choice is clear

WITH exactly four weeks to go before the March 19/20 presidential election it is time for Zimbabweans, if they have not already done so, to weigh the importance of this historic event.

The run-up to the poll has been vicious, bloody and profoundly damaging both to the fabric of our society and the country's economic standing.

All because one very fallible man believes he has the sole right to rule Zimbabwe for as long as he pleases.

Of course it cannot be denied that Zanu PF played a pivotal role in bringing about political independence to Zimbabwe. There are also thousands of unsung heroes, who neither held a gun nor went to Mozambique or Zambia, who contributed immensely to the liberation struggle. These people, the peasants who looked after the liberation fighters, the teachers who spread the message of freedom, and the hundreds of well-wishers at home and abroad who sheltered, ferried and funded those who today live off the fat of the land, are the real heroes, for without them there would have been no water for the Zanu/Zapu 'fish' to swim in.

This is an historical fact that has not been given its due prominence.

Robert Mugabe and his Zanu PF party also did pretty well in bringing political stability to Zimbabwe in the aftermath of independence through the policy of reconciliation which saw the southern African country blossom and become a model for aspiring democracies.

Unfortunately, faced with a serious fight for his political life, Mugabe has proved to be nothing more than an unscrupulous dictator who will do anything to stay in power. He has also demonstrated that he has a knack for making unilateral decisions with far-reaching repercussions to the country.

Some of the unpopular and costly decisions the 77-year-old leader has made include the awarding of unbudgeted gratuities to war veterans which sucked an unbudgeted \$4 billion from the fiscus in 1997. This irresponsible move saw the country's currency dramatically plunge overnight and also marked the beginning of the current economic crisis.

Mugabe should also be held accountable for the infamous DRC misadventure which has cost Zimbabwe untold billions of dollars, as well as a substantial toll in human life while our health system collapsed. Even as people prepare to go to the polls, our troops are stuck in a quagmire where there is no easy way out.

It is important for voters to bear in mind that the intervention on behalf of the unelected Kabila regime was not at the behest of Sade, as it is so often pretended, but was a unilateral decision by Mugabe and his cronies which some members of Sade chose to endorse. Most did not.

The intervention was sharply criticised by the then Sade chairman, Nelson Mandela.

But 2000 is arguably the year the mercurial Mugabe revealed his true colours. After failing to trick the nation into approving his flawed draft constitution, the president declared war against his own people by sanctioning farm invasions under the guise of speeding up land reform. Since then, Zimbabweans have borne the brunt of state-sponsored violence, repressive laws designed to roll back the freedom won in the 1990s, and rapidly deteriorating economic conditions including lately food shortages.

Mugabe's final "gift" to the nation could well be the famine that is now projected to stalk the land.

Against such a catalogue of misdeeds, the president is of the view that Zimbabweans should give him another chance.

What does he propose to do in the next six years that he feels he has not had an opportunity to do in the past 21?

More of the same is the obvious answer. More misrule, more misallocation of public funds, more economic decay, more unemployment, more food shortages, and more isolationism.

Is that what Zimbabwe needs? Is that what Zimbabweans want?

Leave us alone Mr President. You have proved what you can do. Now it's time to give somebody else a chance. Somebody who can fix what you have broken.

The choice on March 19/20 couldn't be clearer. It is a once-off opportunity for people to finally unshackle themselves from the chains of a man who has betrayed their trust.

Mudede gives out mixed

THE registrar-general, Tobaiwa Mudede, is either displaying his usual incompetence and stupidity or else he is acting with his usual bias towards Zanu PF.

A number of my friends who renounced their Zimbabwean citizenship under duress have received a notice from him by registered post. The notice tells the person concerned that he/she is not qualified for registration as a voter in terms of Schedule 3, section 3(3) of the constitution because he/she has ceased to be a citizen.

The referred to section of the constitution provides that a person is qualified to be a voter if he/she is a citizen or has been permanently resident in Zimbabwe since 31 December 1985. It is

clear, therefore, that merely because one has ceased to be a citizen does not mean that one does not qualify for registration as a voter.

If he were being honest, which is perhaps too much to ask, the registrar-general would mention both a qualifications for registration as a voter in his notice. As it is, many people will not bother to appeal because they know that they have ceased to be citizens and do not realise that they are entitled to remain on the voters' role if they are permanent residents. Those wanting to appeal may not do so since they have to pay a \$50 fee. Everyone who receives a notice from the registrar-general should appeal on the grounds that he/she has been a perma-

Tsvangirai ensuring better future

I REFER to the letter by Sakunatsi ndiya Sakupwanya (*The Standard* 27 January 2002).

Like him, I support the MDC president's call for South Africa to impose sanctions if such measures will help reduce the rate of the political violence planned mainly by the ruling party.

In Mufakose, where I live, Zanu PF and the war veterans have announced a plan to move door to door checking on whether people have ZanuPF membership cards and those found without are likely to be assaulted, many of them fatally. If sanctions can prevent this, they are welcome.

What surprises me most is why the ruling party always panics over statements made by MDC officials. It shows that Zanu PF is in all sorts of trouble. The call for sanctions is a political game. I remember how at one time during the liberation struggle, the same party asked for sanctions against Rhodesia. Were the people who were suffering then not the same who are suffering now? So just like Tsvangirai has done Zanu PF once called on Britain to impose sanctions on the country.

Because Zanu PF have nothing to offer, they are in a state of panic, day and night. I would like Mr Mugabe to

The people will survive

I HAVE just finished rereading Nngiriwa Thiongo's fine novel, *Petals of Blood*.

The message in the book might be somewhat prophetic for those of us who want to see our present predicament in a historical context rather than as a passing phase.

The basic theme of the novel is: In any given situation, there will always be exploiters and the exploited.

First, there is exploitation and then resistance with its acts of heroism and betrayal. Next, if the cause is won as it was indeed won in Zimbabwe in 1980, there is elation, visions of new beginnings, and hope.

The new set of oppressors and corrupt leaders set in and resistance be-

gins again...the masses always remaining at the starting point, so to speak. This is the view of human history depicted in Nngiriwa Thiongo's *Petals of Blood*. To many like-minded people, this is a historical truth which only the naive can dismiss.

But for those of us who do not easily become despondent about the future and who believe in the triumphant march of freedom, the picture is rather different. As someone who has for long observed at first hand, the behaviour of human beings, the impression I am left with is not of overwhelming helplessness and self-pity, but of the triumph of humanity. Pessimism has never been of positive value either now or in the past.

Makepekepe regain position as kings of football

ALLOW me space in your lovely newspaper to applaud Caps United director, Twine Phiri, and his chief executive officer, Andy Hodges, for their efforts in making the team the mighty soccer kings they were in the early 80s and late 90s.

They are leading by example and I believe with this kind of commitment, vision, dedication, professionalism and determination, they will transform 'Makepekepe' from being an ordinary side to championship contenders and the most attractive and exciting team to watch in the 2002 season. Classy and ambitious, the green-shirted Manchester Road Boys will definitely be in for a sensational and stunning revival this season.

I want to urge the chairman, man-

Colleen Taffrey
Harare

The Standard

Chief Executive Officer: Trevor Ncube
Editor: Mark Chavunduka
Group marketing director: Sarah Thompson.
The Standard is published weekly by Standard Press (Private) Limited, Suite 8, One Union Avenue, Harare, Zimbabwe, P O Box 661230, Koppie.
Phone: 750461, 751351, 755046, 755122, 755124, 772555, 758994, 771435 - Fax: 773854.
E-mails: -incubeta@imind.mweb.co.zw
-management@imind.mweb.co.zw
-editor@standard.mweb.co.zw
-assistant@standard.mweb.co.zw
-chf@substandard.mweb.co.zw
-subeditor@standard.mweb.co.zw
-art@standard.mweb.co.zw

Directors:
Mark Chavunduka, Mike Curing, Matthews Kunaka, Beatrice Mwaema, Trevor Ncube (CEO), Prof. Norman Nyazema (Chairman), Sarah Thompson.

Editorial Staff:
Editor: Mark Chavunduka, Assistant Editor: Tendai Mutsekwa,
News Editor: Cornelius Mwaema, Chief sub-editor: Renhilda Chanutsa, Sub-editor: Stewart Chabwira,
Sports editor: Michael Karara, Entertainment Editor: Pungayi Kanyuchi,
Senior staff writers: Chenguayi Zvauya, Fanni Mutakwa,
Business writer: Paul Nyakazeya
Advertising sales staff:
Advertising sales representatives:
Alex Chimomo, Blessing Chirhande, Alexus Mutiyikano, Olias Katsonga, Marica Samuya

Dulawayo office
Suite 202
CIPF Centre, cnr
Tel: (Direct) 64738
P O Box AC 558, Harare
E-mail: zimbabwe@celladvertising.com

Subscriptions:
Publications Distribution
8 Cradler Road, Seke
P O Box 4260, Harare
Telephone: 666631
Emergency Tel: 011
E-mail: pubdist@standard.mweb.co.zw

New Distribution:
92B Fife Street, Harare
Telephone: 72482
E-mail: newsdist@standard.mweb.co.zw

Distribution:
Munn Marketing (Pvt) Ltd
P O Box UA 400, Umuhozi
Tel: 961018/576007
E-mail: munn@standard.mweb.co.zw

Printers:
Originated & Printed by
8 Cradler Road, Seke
P O Box 57, Harare



NO MORE EXCUSES

NOW that the amendments to the Land Acquisition Act have been gazetted, thus allowing the government to "speed up" the land redistribution exercise without any hitches, let us see this issue tackled once and for all. All the politicking aside, it is an opportunity for the ruling Zanu PF government to embark on an image mending mission by expeditiously, yet transparently, implementing the exercise—after all, they have only six months to do it, before it is subject to ratification by parliament.

If Zanu PF is really interested in redistributing land to Zimbabwe's impoverished masses, it should do so within these six months as there is no guarantee that it will muster the necessary support to do so in parliament after the parliamentary polls of 24 and 25 June.

It is no secret that the government has taken much flack for using the land issue as a political weapon, to the benefit of Zanu PE It has been accused, among other things, of creating the impression that it alone can address this anomaly and of favouring privileged people by allocating them farms for almost next to nothing. In response to these accusations, the government has accused the international and local private media of tarnishing its image by portraying it as a violent and senseless party.

It is understandable that the party should be worried about its image, moreso if it is convinced that it is doing whatever it is being accused of for a worthy cause. Unfortunately, events that have taken place in Zimbabwe, ie, the farm invasions, murder and terrorism, do not stand the party in good stead. That the government, with the full backing of President Mugabe, has refused to back court orders—to stop the invasion—by instructing the police to stay out of it, is not good for the party either.

ARAY of hope has, however, been cast by the president in the last couple of months. First, during his visit to Cuba, the president assured the international community that the redistribution exercise would not be used as a tool for meting out vengeance, but would ensure that land was divided in an orderly and transparent manner. He said only farms bordering communal lands or owned by those with more than one farm, would be affected. Those farmers with lands bordering communal areas, would be compensated with farms acquired elsewhere, from landlords with more than one farm, thus ensuring commercial agriculture was not adversely affected. The president repeated this assurance during his recent visit to Mauritius. This sounds extremely reasonable, coming from a man who has been accused of thriving on lawlessness.

We challenge President Mugabe to not only carry out his promise, but to go a step further and instruct the invaders occupying commercial farms to withdraw immediately. This would not only benefit the economy by restoring confidence in the sector, but would go a long way towards demonstrating to the international community that sanity still prevails in Zimbabwe.

With the amendment of the Land Acquisition act, there is no excuse for the lawlessness and tyranny that has been occurring under the guise of the current invasions, to continue. Now is the time to mend Zimbabwe's battered image and bring it back into the international fold. Being cut off from the international community inflicts more damage to the ordinary citizens than it does to the governing party. In the interest of the public at large, let sanity prevail.

LETTERS TO THE MacKinnon

I AM disappointed with the statement of the Commonwealth secretary-general, Don MacKinnon, that the 24 and 25 June elections in Zimbabwe will be fair. It's disheartening that as leader of one of the most powerful international organisations, one which advocates democracy among its member states, he did not even bother to meet with the opposition, in particular, with the MDC, which has been seriously affected by government-sponsored violence.

What was his main purpose in visiting Zimbabwe? To meet with Mugabe and

Grace, or to potentially explain in the country. He tasted the cake when the assurances of a

The Editor
The Standard
P O Box 66177
K177

fair election Mugabe reg busy terror and rural pov voting for The world people who are doing th

Blacks, whites be considered

I WISH to register my objection to the notion that Mugabe can lead the government—throw weight behind Mugabe for 2002 poll zette, 11 May 2000.

The *Fingaz* writer made it crystal clear that the war vets and the army now want President Mugabe to be the sole candidate for the 2002 presidential election apparently because they perceive him to be the best candidate for the job. The naked truth, however, is that the war vets and the army are trying to revive his dwindling power/popularity by using the leadership of the war vets and the army to lead the country.

I personally have no qualms about President Mugabe being re-elected, as long as this is done in a fair and open atmosphere. But if Mugabe remains in power by dubious means, then even those who do not farm in them. He is not able to do any farming in them. He is not guaranteed by a group of people who do not respect their electorate.

I know that a grave injustice was done to the whites of Zimbabwe. However, I don't believe it is fair to make the whites pay for the sins of the past. At the same time, I call upon some whites to show a better attitude and accept blacks as equal citizens of Zimbabwe. I don't like the idea of them excluding blacks from their schools, hospitals, residential areas and social clubs through exorbitant fees.

The only way forward for Zimbabwe is for the voices of the oppressed to be heard. Britain may not have the right to impose its policy, but the good thing about it is that it respects the rights of her citizens, is respected by

Jennings Rukani
UK

A plea for tolerance

THE Zimbabwe Council of Churches continues to preach the gospel of peace, to our nation, and has committed itself to working with all political parties, all communities and the government, in the search for peace.

The political violence, as witnessed and experienced by some of our communities, runs contrary to the divine message of peace, harmony and caring for one another which includes:

- tolerance of one another's views
- right to move freely
- respect for the rule of law
- reconciliation and forgiveness.

As we move towards our national general election set for 24 and 25 June, we appeal to all Zimbabweans

to abide by the rule of law on the part of the people to show the freedom by all the freed divergent

We call on all parties to themselves tolerance supported violence, murder, threats, and favour the violent prevail in

Rev E. President

The Sunday Mail

The leading family newspaper



Established 1935

Unity begins with all of us

IT HAS taken many years, but at long last the man known as Father Zimbabwe is being honoured in a manner that will immortalise his memory.

Although Dr Joshua Mqabuko Nyongolo Nkomo passed away in 1999, he lives on in our hearts and will never be forgotten. His achievements are too many to list. He is a legend.

In Bulawayo today, on Unity Day, the people of Zimbabwe will witness the official commissioning of the Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo International Airport and the unveiling of his statue in the heart of the city. It is a historic occasion.

The choice of day is superb. Unity is the glue that enables the people of Zimbabwe to work together in fulfilment of national objectives. Without unity, there is no shared vision. Without a shared vision, we are all self-centred individuals wandering aimlessly in the dark with no prospect of seeing beyond our whims and caprices.

In the late Vice-President Nkomo, we have the embodiment of immense personal sacrifice, courage, determination, and the ideal of a higher calling. Zimbabweans owe him a huge debt of gratitude.

Is the importance of unity understood by everyone? National unity means different things to different people, but if we are going to have an honest conversation on this topic, it is vital to at least attempt to define what constitutes national unity.

What does national unity mean to you? Is unity the absence of war? Are Zimbabweans truly united? Is everyone benefiting from it? The questions are endless.

The best way to appreciate the various notions of unity is to travel the length and breadth of the country and talk to Zimbabweans in their diversity.

To some, unity means peace, in other words the absence of war. Many of the people who cherish unity are those who have experienced the brutality of war and violence. The physical scars may have healed but the emotional ones are still fresh. Zimbabwe, after all, is a nation that has had more than its fair share of strife. From the days of bloody colonial conquest in the 1890s to the armed liberation struggle and eventually to Independence in 1980, the trend was clearly defined. In the 1980s, the nation was plunged into atrocious violence, culminating in the signing of the 1987 Unity Accord.

There is no one in this country who can definitively say whether the emotional scars of yesterday can

ever heal fully. But despite the mist of ambiguity, there is also a determination to look to the future with optimism. While we cannot change the past, we can shape the future.

In some communities, there is a great deal of anxiety that some languages appear more important than others. And we should never underestimate the power of perception—real or imagined.

Passports and other vital documents are still replete with embarrassing grammatical mistakes which leave many patriots shaking their heads in disbelief. Why are some languages always clumsily misspelt, in a country with such a high literacy rate? Such actions may not necessarily be deliberate and may actually be a manifestation of incompetence and dereliction of duty by public officers, but the bottom line is that they bode ill for national cohesion.

A passport is a very important document. The English part is written in coherent, grammatically correct language and yet the national language part — especially the Ndebele bit — is written in mangled language. Such things are strange.

The media in this country is also culpable. The rich diversity of Zimbabwean languages does not find full expression on national television, radio and in the newspapers. Those who run these public platforms behave as though English, Shona and Ndebele are the only languages in this country. And yet we expect everyone to happily pay for such media services? Yes, legally speaking, citizens must render unto Caesar what belongs to Caesar, but it is morally unconscionable.

Some public officials have repeatedly violated the spirit of national unity by refusing or failing to embrace the rich cultural tapestry that defines Zimbabweanhood.

To serve the public in a better manner, public officials should be encouraged to familiarise themselves with the languages and cultures of the places where they are stationed. That way, they become much more than just civil servants — they become members of the local community.

Civil servants who refuse to learn local languages, it appears, have learnt this behaviour from some politicians. In this country you can find a politician who has been a minister since 1980 but who refuses to speak languages other than English and Shona. Surely, 33 years is enough time to learn the national languages in their rich diversity. President Mugabe makes an effort to speak these languages, so why are some politicians resisting knowledge?

Diplomatic talk and the marginalized

AS a person from Matabeleland, I wish to respond to the statement posted by the Spanish Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Santiago Martinez-Caro.

His statements are part of the dismissive discourse which seems not to be addressing the core issues of the people of that region. The Ambassador wishes to encourage us to forget about the horrors committed on us and the loss of our loved ones; an act which was done in the fashion of Hitler's Holocaust.

A critical mind gleans a summative amount of unsaid issues from the Ambassador's statement alone. One is puzzled therefore to note that the Ambassador tactfully embraces the notions of the one who commented carelessly, as if seeking to dismiss what Gordon Moyo said, about the talks, the history of negotiations and Unity Accord, Matabeleland and the unfortunate dark patches in our history as a nation.

It would appear, the Ambassador does not have deeper knowledge of what happened to the people of Matabeleland, during the Gukurahundi period. This probably explains his wish for us to follow the Spanish model. I respect his wish, but it might not work in an environment where the political nuances and contexts are different. I believe this is why certain models have not worked in Africa.

If Moyo said it and the Ambassador has issues with it, I then wish to request that we do not blame Moyo, but the people of Matabeleland for having been killed and continuously labouring in their toil to try and talk about their ill-treatment and calling for a just cause. We should then agree to blame them on history, because their actions are a total summation of an unjust historical act on them. One would have expected them to talk about it.

However, I wish to emphatically stress to the Ambassador that the Gukurahundi genocide did take place. Maybe he was simply not aware of it. A lot has been written and said about it lately. I will not delve into the details of it now. I will be happy if he could approach the crisis of the down-trodden masses — our crisis, with an open mind seeking to strategically engage us in mapping out a constructive way forward, than showing us a dismissive attitude.

I say so because from his statement the words, "ret-

**sunday
view**

BY BRILLIANT MHLANGA

tribution for past activities, on a regional and ethnic basis" seem not to be a positive gesture of nudging positive solutions for Zimbabwe as a whole. If anything those words criminalise and trivialize an otherwise open, honest and candid expression, seeking to show the deeper meaning of the politics of Zimbabwe. These statements tend to soil various civil society initiatives to forge for a forum to openly discuss the crisis of the people of Matabeleland, particularly the genocide. And so it tends to impede any positive move aimed at addressing the political crisis in Zimbabwe. I therefore submit that it is a sign that we cannot easily ignore and relegate it to a historical non-event. It happened and we must find a common solution to it as Zimbabweans.

I would surely be among those who are happy to acknowledge that what Moyo did was the best given the circumstances. The effort alone must be commended, given, that very rare occasion where an entourage of ambassadors visited that part of the country; a seemingly God-forsaken region in all respects. The problems of Matabeleland are quite dissimilar to those of Harare where he is stationed. Venturing into most marginalized regions with that in mind tends to help in the avoidance of what might end up being perceived by the indigenous people as some kind of "deliberate vagueness".

Such actions and statements can even be more divisive if inappropriately put across. In this case I humbly submit that the statements by the Ambassador of Spain are surely divisive and uncalled for. They seek to trivialize the crises the people of Matabeleland have gone through since 1980. Indeed, the people of Matabeleland have an unresolved problem: they have seen very little of development.

I can confirm this by reminding the Ambassador what the Minister of Health, Dr David Parirenyatwa, said when he visited hospitals in Bulawayo. He openly lamented Matabeleland's marginalization and regretted that this had been going on for a long time.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 15

standardfeatures

Diplomatic talk and the marginalized

FROM PAGE 11

This was widely covered in the media in Zimbabwe, even by the State media.

I wish to submit to the Ambassador that some of these unresolved issues seem not to be part of the broader arrangement of the SADC initiated talks. As a result, the approach to the talks is a blanket mindset, hinged on a general assumption that the crisis is truncated within the locus of the so-called "national agenda", and that what happened to other sections must be swiftly swept under the carpet.

I am not sure whether the Ambassador is aware that this is likely to cause more problems in future. In my view Zimbabwe's problems are bigger than that approach by a group of the selected "wise ones".

There is need therefore for an all-embracing approach which encompasses a wide section of Zimbabwe's troubled groups. I wish to further pose the following questions: Is it not a paradox that the nexus of the talks discusses Mugabe's exit package, yet it ignores one of the major causes for his unrelenting grip on power, the Gukuruhundi genocide? If it is so trivial, then why is it not being openly discussed in Zimbabwe to this day? Do we therefore have to blame the people of Matabeleland and concerned Zimbabweans for raising this historical fact?

I promise to talk about it

until it is embraced, particularly by members of the diplomatic community, including Ambassador Martinez-Caro.

Maybe the Ambassador might also want to know from his advisors what happened to Thabo Mbeki (current President of South Africa) in the early 1980s when he was in Zimbabwe as an ANC emissary. I hope the brief, will include that he, Mbeki, was arrested together with the political prisoners from Matabeleland and thrown into Maximum prison in Zimbabwe. Some of the political prisoners never came out alive; Mbeki knows that.

Is it not an elaborate surprise then that this issue is now expected to be swept under the carpet and not even raised during the talks? I will not delve deeper into the nuances of the SADC initiated talks as they remain shrouded in mystery, but I wish to comment and urge everyone to remain alert. Otherwise these wild leaps into darkness might turn into serious own goals for the opposition.

Lastly, I agree with the Ambassador's first two major points on the talks and differ with the rest. The points are:

1. The current negotiations taking place between Zanu PF and the opposition have to be held with a certain discretion if they are to have any chance of succeeding. I therefore cannot agree with those who continuously demand publicity and enlargement of the talks.

2. The outcome of those negotiations cannot be, because of time constraints and level of representation, a final and definitive solution to Zimbabwe's problems. On the contrary, I believe and hope they will be the beginning of a political transition which may last for quite some time and which will end in a national framework which all Zimbabweans will be able to accept.



THE CHURCH

THE ANGLICAN
Archdiocese

Tel: Res: 02 236

Off: 02 223

Fax: 02 221

Cell: 02 783

7 November 2007

COMMENT

Let us all share Nkomo's vision

THE beginning of July is a special month for Zimbabwe as we take time to remember and celebrate a life of achievement lived by the late Vice-President Dr Joshua Nkomo.

In our memories, Dr Nkomo stands tall as a symbol of liberation, a symbol of economic empowerment, a symbol of self-sacrifice, and, above all, he stands as a symbol of national unity. Hence the title Father Zimbabwe or Umdala Wethu, which fits him perfectly.

Annually a musical gala is held in his memory, moving from province to province and each year there is resounding approbation for this noble gesture. It is indeed a fitting honour.

This is also a time for us, individually and corporately, not to honour him by just paying lip service to what he stood for. We must start implementing his teachings. His was a lifelong quest for unity. It should be ours too.

Ours should be a quest for one nation united behind one vision. We have attained one nation but have we also attained one vision? Indeed, we might have different eyes but do we see the same destiny? When a nation has two or more competing visions, division is inevitable. And a house divided against itself cannot stand.

In honour of Dr Nkomo, the nation should seek to achieve congruity of visions and rally behind one principal vision. The obtaining scenario where one is laying the bricks and the other is removing them is a sad and retrogressive one. The house will either take longer to be finished or it may never be completed.

In the just-ended week, there was fierce debate in Parliament arising out of British Prime Minister Tony Blair's declaration in the House of Commons that London was working with the MDC to effect a regime change in Harare. That revelation brought widespread condemnation.

MDC secretary-general Professor Welshman Ncube sought to evade the sell-out crown looming above his head and those of his colleagues by saying the MDC was indeed seeking a regime change but through legitimate means.

This begs a number of questions: Why then seek to sabotage the economy? Why work with the former colonisers? Why then advance imperialist interests? Why then advocate sanctions against your own country?

There is also a significant difference between seeking a change of government and a regime change.

A change of government speaks of a change of stewards or a change of drivers, but still with the same destiny.

A regime change speaks of a reversal of what this country presently stands for, a reversal of the land reform programme, indigenisation programme, etc. It speaks of a complete change of direction. A regime change is

what we had in 1980 when the Smith regime was defeated.

In the US, the Democrats are fighting for a change of government, and not a regime change.

In Britain, the Tories are also seeking a change of government, and not a regime change.

One who works for a change of government does not seek to destroy a country's economy. Rather he or she comes up with programmes and policies which show a better future for the people and sells them to the voters.

We have not heard of such policies coming from the MDC. Instead theirs has been a concerted effort to stop the ruling party from implementing its programmes. In a sense it's an admission that Zanu-PF's programmes work and if they are allowed to work then the opposition and its alien interests would be done for.

The majority of Zimbabweans know what they want. They want to drink and eat of the milk and honey of this country. They want to take charge of their destiny, to control the resources of their country and develop them for their own sake and for the sake of posterity.

This has and is still the standpoint of the founding fathers of this nation. This is what Dr Nkomo stood for.

A study of his speeches and writings, including the much vaunted Story of My Life, reveal a perpetual lament that Zimbabwe is not attaining its full potential because of disunity.

It is the same lament that brought him to the 1987 Unity Accord, which sealed the national unity of this country. Since that historic day there is neither Ndebele nor Shona in the administration of the national affairs of this country (although some try to resuscitate that dark past):

National unity has been attained and continues to be cemented. The enemy has only succeeded in trying to sell a pseudo vision, which in effect is a division or diversion meant to distract the nation from what it had set its eyes on — reclaiming its economic resources, beginning with land.

This has slowed down the progress of the country and continues to do so as shown by the bitterly hostile attempt to foil the Homelink programme being promoted by Reserve Bank Governor Dr Gideon Gono as part of his turnaround programme.

Yet it is within our means as a country to emerge from the state of economic paralysis we are in.

It is within our means to reduce inflation to below 200 percent by year-end. It is also within our means to make the agricultural revolution work.

As we remember Dr Nkomo and extol what he stood for, we must return to that vision that has been set for us by the founding fathers. It is the template for the present and future survival of this country.

The Sunday Mail

The leading family newspaper

Established 1935



12-18/08/2012

We know our heroes

On a continent mired in poverty, hunger, disease and economic inequality, a hero is the person who takes practical steps in confronting these evils. A hero can never be a person who fights to preserve the interests of global capital at the expense of the down-trodden masses.

In Africa, high-sounding rhetoric about "democracy" will ring hollow as long as the black majority continues to be exploited by ruthless capitalism.

As the people of Zimbabwe remember the brave sons and daughters of the soil who took up arms against colonial occupation and racist minority rule, there is one crucial fact that refuses to be forgotten: political freedom is meaningless without economic emancipation.

Resource nationalism is the only way forward. Predictably, the owners of global capital and their surrogates are running scared.

A recent survey by Ernst & Young, the consultancy, shows that resource nationalism was viewed as the "biggest risk" in 2011 and 2012 by Western corporations operating in Africa. Well, if they choose negativity instead of optimism, that's their funeral.

Africa is forging ahead with resource nationalism and no amount of scare-mongering will ever reverse the people's determination to correct the injustices of the past.

Some Western companies have tried to resist the indigenisation tide, but they have come to grief because governments are not relenting.

In any case, Western companies would find it extremely costly to throw a tantrum and withdraw from Africa.

Last year, as the survey shows, seven of the 10 biggest mining deals were in Africa. If there is money to be made, it can only be minted here in Africa.

Forget the fake debate about "Africa's Third Liberation". The only game in town is resource nationalism and indigenisation.

Anything else is a pathetic game of smoke and mirrors meant to dupe naive African politicians who still think that, in this day and age, a Western imperialist is God's best gift to mankind.

The time has come for Zimbabwe's true patriots to stand up and be counted. We cannot allow a situation where the treacherous Copac draft constitution blatantly downplays the significance of our liberation history and the immense contribution of our living and fallen heroes.

History will judge us harshly if we allow a Western-funded and donor-written document to betray the supreme sacrifices of our heroes who have fought racist oppression since 1893.

Democracy is not made in Washington DC or London.

Democracy is what we taught the white man here in this part of Africa.

Today our war veterans, collaborators and detainees are being ridiculed by sell-outs who are doing the bidding of global capitalism.

Our living heroes, whether retired or still serving in the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, are also being lampooned with reckless abandon by a coterie of Western imperialists and their clueless puppets.

Why are war veterans being victimised for exercising their political rights?

It is no coincidence that the loud-mouths who are attacking our liberators are the same rented crowd that is relentlessly campaigning for the return of die-hard Rhodes.

They want to hand back the land, undo the economic empowerment programme and create a looters' paradise for Western corporations.

They say our war veterans must be apolitical, yet the Rhodie goons are still active out there, mobilising resources for their political stooges, churning out racist propaganda via a steady stream of books and films, funding their captive media mouthpieces, and telling the Western governments to impose illegal sanctions on the people of Zimbabwe.

Why should our war veterans — who are a creation of politics — be apolitical? Our freedom fighters are the custodians of the gains of the struggle.

They cannot be expected to sit and watch while reactionaries seek to reverse the people's revolution.

Our liberators went to war for land, economic empowerment, non-discrimination, political, economic and social rights, peace and sovereignty.

It is tomfoolery of the highest order to expect them to relinquish their political rights, which they fought for, just because someone says war veterans should be apolitical.

In this sacred month of August as we remember our gallant liberators, MDC-T has the temerity to sup with the high priests of imperialism at book launches in South Africa.

While gleefully rubbing shoulders with the Helen Zilles and the Oppenheimers of this world, they rubbish Zimbabwe's liberators, labelling them failures and pouring scorn on their achievements.

Who says the nationalists have failed? Who exactly have they failed and how?

Have they failed our fallen heroes, Zimbabweans or neo-colonial interests? Go and ask our thousands of tobacco farmers whether our nationalists have failed.

Go and ask beneficiaries of the economic empowerment revolution whether our nationalists are failures.

Go and ask the beneficiaries of Zimbabwe's world-class education system whether our nationalists have failed.

The biggest failure of any African politician is the failure to think for oneself.

CECIL John Rhodes, whose company invaded Zimbabwe in 1890, used the slogan: "Come with me, I will make you a millionaire."

At that time, he was busy recruiting adventurers from South Africa where he was prime minister of the Cape province. Thus, when he eventually managed to get the commitment of about one thousand 'pioneers', he had the audacity to give his name to the country now called Zimbabwe.

He had it named Rhodesia. And his company was the British South Africa Company. Eventually, he established a security company to protect his company property.

In short, Zimbabwe was colonised by a private company and it was the private property of an individual.

Cecil John Rhodes did not cross the Limpopo without a map of what he wanted. He alleged that across that vast river, all the hills and mountains were filled with gold and diamond. It was only later that he discovered that his dream was only a dream.

The maps he carried were drawn by many hunters and adventurers who had crossed the Limpopo in search of ivory and gold. After the hunters, there were also the missionaries who came in search of the souls of the 'natives'.

The tradition of the 'whites' who came after these events was that they wanted to make money. They were fortune seekers. Then they had children, and their children had their own children who also had their own children. It went on and on until 1980.

For the whites of Rhodesia, it was also clear why they were in this country. They tried to dig for gold and other minerals, but it did not work. They went on for endless years.

Then they discovered that the real gold of the land

was the soil and they went on to try one crop after another until it eventually emerged that the real gold was tobacco. That is why Zimbabwean tobacco is called 'the golden leaf'.

The colonial experience was, for blacks, nasty and bitter.

The class structure of the citizens was clear—at the top, were the whites, then came Asians and coloureds. Everybody knew where they stood.

The whole map had to do with who earned what money and even where they could drink. It was a small apartheid in a small country.

Come 1980, and we had the flower of independence. Freedom had come. That was the time to celebrate.

Poets celebrated with poetry. A poetry anthology titled *And Now the Poets Speak* was published, edited by Musaeura Zimunya and Mudereri Kadhani.

In that anthology, everyone is a poet. Trade unionists, priests, preachers, prophets, teachers, politicians and all. It was the voice which signalled the arrival of our dignity. At least we could now write our history in our own words, even if it meant writing that history with fingers dipped in our own blood.

Why not? Prime Minister Robert Gabriel Mugabe had said it was our country, all of us, whites, blacks, coloureds, Asians. After all, we had all arrived from some place in search of living space where we could plough the land and dream our dreams in peace.

The people agreed and said it was no longer necessary to grow new trees of hatred. Most whites accepted it as a kind gesture in shaping our own complex destiny. But then, they still owned their farms and decided that the hand of reconciliation was simply a hand which said we should go on

In search of an identity

the way we had done before.

I remember one farmer asking me if I had been a freedom fighter during the war. When I said "No", he relaxed. He was quick to assure me that I had to know that there had been a lot of pain among white farmers because of the war.

I asked him how many relatives he had lost in the

war of liberation. He replied that he had lost a son and a few friends. He did not feel anything when I told him that I had lost dozens of relatives and brothers and sisters to the war.

With vast farms in their hands, they decided to withdraw from all general aspects of social life which included involvement in the life of the country at all levels.

They opened new private schools which their children attended at exorbitant fees. They opened their own private sports clubs after withdrawing from their long established clubs on the grounds that blacks had 'invaded' them.

What it all meant was that they cancelled all possibilities of new cultural and political encounters

with blacks. They had their own world and blacks had theirs. For many years, I talked with those whites who were accessible, about issues such as the land, the economy, tourism. I told them to stop being tourists in their own country. It was good for them to realise that the land which they feel so strongly about once


are in this country to make money and would not care a hoot what social and economic conditions their fellow citizens (blacks) are in.

But there are some who have realised that this is their country and they have worked to make it beautiful, especially since they have the economic means to assist their black brothers to improve life.

Much as there are bad black citizens, there are also bad white citizens. That the white citizens isolated themselves is not typical of them alone. There are people of Asian origin who have also isolated themselves in this country. You see them in their shops and bid them farewell at night. They go to their own residential areas and forget about the rest of the country.

Zimbabwe, like every southern African country, is unique. Europe is also unique. No country is excluded from this uniqueness. Whites are not the only people in this country who arrived from some place in search of economic prosperity.

Chenjerai Hove's ancestors arrived from far away places in search of economic fortune. The Ndebele are the same. All the ethnic



belonged to some black person's ancestor and that blacks felt as strongly about it each election time in the past twenty years. The land issue always came up, and died a natural death soon after.

We can talk about what the white farmers are like at the moment. That is not an issue. The issue is that they are citizens of this land. Among them are people of great hearts as well as people of ugly hearts.

There are bad and good citizens who still think they

groups of our country arrived from some place. It is a matter of who arrived from where and when.

So, the question of why whites are here is not relevant. Everybody deserves to be asked the same question. While the whites thought they were in this country to civilise blacks, some of them also realised that they had much to learn from this country.

Others enclosed themselves in their social and economic cocoons. Jeannie M Boggie, MBE, received her honours from the Queen of England for writing, among other books, *First Steps in Civilising Rhodesia*.

In that book she openly admits that while she and others were trying to teach blacks about life, they were also learning a lot. Boggie was the wife of one of the first whites to 'invade' our country. But their history of invasion ends with the invaders.

It will not be transferred to the great great grandchildren. You may have parents, but you may not be the one to choose who you want your parents to be.

The sad thing about the presence of whites in Zimbabwe is that they stood up to vote for the first time only when they realised that the recent referendum had serious implications on the land issue. That they own most of the prime farming land in Zimbabwe is well known.

But their reappearance on the political scene was interpreted as an attempt to keep the land privileges they had inherited from their ancestors.

Their appearance also happened at the same time that President Mugabe is facing the most serious challenge to his rule from a formidable opposition.

So, at the moment, Zimbabweans are seeing a political situation in which

a desperate Mugabe regime is searching for the weakest community among Zimbabweans in order to portray that community as the sole evil of our country.

It is a well known fact that President Mugabe always invents a suitable enemy at the time of elections. Farm invasions are not a spontaneous occurrence. They are well planned by the ruling party and are usually stopped only after elections because they will be used to intimidate farm workers not to vote in the same manner as their employers. Nothing else.

The white population in Zimbabwe has been shouting out its awareness as they exist and it has been urging government to deal with it in a manner not disruptive to farming.

But the Mugabe government has not been forthcoming. It is important for the world to realise that the dialogue Mugabe should have initiated many years ago with the white population did not happen because of him, not because of the white population.

Zimbabwean political leaders have allowed corruption to mushroom. Nothing has been done about it. There is hardly a minister of government who does not have a farm.

The people of Zimbabwe cannot be taught a new form of racism. White-hate is as unviable an alternative as black-hate. The viable alternative is to ensure that there is good governance in our African countries.

Our African leaders must know that government does not belong to an individual.

Will this crisis change the relations between blacks and whites in Africa—and how does it do so?

• *Chenjerai Hove is an award winning Zimbabwean writer.*



Now is the time

THE phenomenal attendance at the funeral of the late Dr Joshua Nkomo is testimony to the claim he made in his autobiography that: "My comfort has been to trust in and be trusted by the masses". He sought this comfort, he wrote, after his trusting disposition had been taken advantage of by his opponents. That Joshua Nkomo sacrificed his party to ensure that unity prevailed in the country, is a guarantee that the trust of the masses was not misplaced. It also demonstrates the political maturity of the man. It was a shame that the late vice president's contemporaries, including President Mugabe, failed to pay tribute to this maturity by attempting to emulate it at his funeral. The President's recklessness in using the solemn occasion as a platform for taking a swipe at the IMF, and demanding them to "support us in accordance with our programmes ..." could not have been more ill-timed as the IMF considers a new aid package for Zimbabwe. The president was implying that foreign donors should place confidence in his government's ability to conduct sound financial management, a myth that has surely been put paid to now that one such "major programme", the District Development Fund, has exposed its shameful mien to all and sundry following allegations that \$100 million worth of donor money had been diverted, from its intended use in rural development, to the purchasing of vehicles.

Also, as Dr Enoch Dumbutshena—a contemporary of the late vice president's—noted last week, President Mugabe missed an ideal opportunity at the funeral to win the trust of those who may doubt his ability to ensure unity prevails in the country, by failing to pledge reparations or apologize categorically for the atrocities committed against civilians in Matabeleland during the dissident era. Again, the contrast between his cheap politicking, and the statesmanship that we remember Nkomo for, was starkly apparent. It was, after all, Joshua Nkomo who more than two decades ago stated his belief in a "creative unity" coming about through the "grinding mill of the armed struggle", which would eradicate all traces of mistrust between Zanu and Zanu. It is evident Nkomo believed in African nationalism, not in the 'party nationalism' that has been at the forefront of Zimbabwean politics since independence.

We can now expect the pundits and the activists to start haggling about the merits or otherwise of installing a successor to Joshua Nkomo from the Zanu wing of Zanu PE. The President, meanwhile, has suggested the post might become redundant under the new constitution currently being hammered out by the Constitutional Review Commission. Now might be an appropriate time to reflect upon Nkomo's thoughts on leader selection. In a speech he delivered to the United Nations in 1977, he distinguished between the "creative unity" of the Patriotic Front, and a counter-productive "mixed grill" type of unity under which selecting a leader becomes, in the absence of a clearly thought out alternative "... the beginning and the end of [an] organization's programme." Joshua Nkomo took the British government and Ian Smith's government to task over such shortsightedness; namely, the holding of a referendum aimed at replacing Rhodesia's white minority government with a pliant black leader who would maintain the status quo. Now is not the time to commit the mistakes Nkomo adroitly avoided.

While we owe it to nationalist heroes like Nkomo for delivering us from the shackles of our colonial past, the unbearable system of Rhodesian fascism has now been replaced with a system of governance akin to state capitalism; a system in which opportunities have evaporated for all except those with access to the state. We are all unified by a mutual predicament, which, as Dr Dumbutshena pointed out last week, demands the retrieval of the economy but needs "a completely new set of young men to accomplish the wishes of the majority."

With the passing away of one of the fathers of African nationalism, it is time to look around for somebody new with the creative genius capable of achieving a national unity which transcends the marriage of convenience once forged between two opposition parties of yore.

LETTERS TO THE IMF not seeking

STUART Commerbach—the government's trouble shooter and 'image creator' extraordinaire, may believe that if he writes at great length, there is more chance of convincing his readers. Even the government's own *Herald* told us that one of his letters had to be shortened. Brevity is the soul of wit, Stuart.

Despite the *Herald* headline, 'Embassies working hard to polish Zimbabwe's tarnished image abroad'—no amount of polishing will help unless, and until, the government grasps the nettle and drastically cuts down on what it spends—and wastes—on itself. Any student of public relations could tell Stuart that PR can help a situation if the product is right. If the product is unsound, forget it. And there's no point in shooting the messenger.

So what must be done to get Zimbabwe out of its mire? First, get the product right. The president, God help him, doesn't help. At every opportunity, he knocks the IMF to such an

extent that a Mars might be getting the impression it is the IMF winging loans from Earth.

At the future, said Zimbabwe Exactly. Who so?

A tiny, poor Zimbabwe, design exchange

The Editor,
The Standard,
P.O. Box 6,
Kupie

foreign debt of a lion, just car fifty plus cabine with fleets of M opulant style 1 and when they frequent visits a who needs dis nora?

Can we aff 37 overseas e Commerbach about the terribl they are doing, needs them? Fau countries these an ambassador vantage point fr

Shame on you.

I am somewhat puzzled by the tone of recent articles in your newspaper which come dangerously close to deifying Mr Joshua Nkomo, the now-deceased former vice-president of Zimbabwe.

Nowhere have I read any reference to the fact that Mr Nkomo was largely a figurehead, helping to prop up a regime better known for raping its country's financial resources than for managing them.

Nowhere have I seen a reference to Mr Nkomo's silence on the intimidation and outright torture of several of the nation's leading journalists by a government which daily makes a mockery of the term 'democracy'.

Nowhere have I seen a reference to Mr Nkomo's failure to mitigate the government corruption which has enabled government figures, from the president downwards, to enjoy luxury automobiles, palatial accommodation, trips abroad, and other self-granted perquisites at a time when inadequate health care has resulted in one of the high-

est HIV related d in the world.

Nowhere have single word of p tered by Mr Nkomo acquisition of v holdings and othe enterprises of a ce which have only cured by outright monies from the Zimbabwe.

Nowhere have single word of pro Nkomo recorded i to the fact that Mugabe is squand country's dwind sources on adventurism in th adventurism whic endly serves no purpose than to po pain people's ill got investments there.

Lauding the so-c compliments of who has only heli tinue the prelate corrupt governer journalism. It is ganda. Shame o writers who partici this sham.

Mike Streele
Canada

Swallow your pride Mr President

WE, the white Zimbabweans, are sick and tired of President Mugabe's rantings in which he continually blames whites for the economic decline. The fact is that white Zimbabweans are a stabilising section of our present day corrupt society.

We do not agree with his assertion at the Vice President's funeral that Dr Nkomo could have lived a lot longer had he and other nationalists not been tortured by Ian Smith. The vice-president succumbed

to prostrate cancer, is not caused by tor

This is a very st assertion coming from a man who has just condoned the tort Mark Chavumuka, Choto. It is criminal human for a white to torture a black, but it is very civil human for a black to torture black perso happen to voice a political viewpoint.

We only have proved wrong if it Mark suffer from p cancer later on in the

Is this the Zimbabwe we fought for?

TOMORROW, we remember those who perished in the liberation struggle fighting for a society based on the rule of law, respect for human rights, fair play, reconciliation and vast improvement in the material well-being of all Zimbabweans regardless of colour, creed or the shape of one's nose.

But, if those who lived to witness the birth of a new Zimbabwe were alive today, would they recognise the Zimbabwe they fought for? Certainly not. Without any equivocation, without a doubt, they would sum up Zimbabwe's current situation in a few words: hunger, poverty, lawlessness, corruption and a fractured society.

This is indeed Zimbabwe. The land of shattered dreams, of fabulous wealth for the few and grinding poverty for many, of mindless chieftism and arrogance of power, of splendour and rags, of famine and disease.

Everything under the Zimbabwean sun is profoundly depressing—not to mention, of course, the Aids epidemic which is taking its gruesome toll on families and communities.

This is the time not to fulminate and froth at the mouth about the "British imperialists" but to take stock and reflect on our present predicament. What sovereign people are Zanu PF leading and to where? Why is the president and Zanu PF unleashing so much hatred and pain on fellow Zimbabweans?

During 1992 and 1993, Zimbabwe was in the grip of the worst drought

in living memory. Nobody starved. We had surplus maize from previous years and there was no shortage of forex to import food. The government, non-governmental organisations (both local and international) and the Zimbabwean society as a whole rose to meet the challenge. It was then a Zimbabwe which was a united and proud nation, admired and respected by the international community. The Zim dollar then was 8 to 1 US dollar.

Now Zimbabwe is in the throes of yet another crippling drought—this time largely man-made or is it *Made-made*? Long queues for scarce commodities such as mealie meal, sugar, bread, milk, cooking oil, margarine and other basics are commonplace. Not to mention the other long and chaotic queues at the Harare passport Office—Zimbabweans anxious to escape to Britain, the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand to become economic refugees.

The message is clear here. Zimbabweans are finding it tough-going and can no longer make ends meet in the country of their birth. They have to escape to survive. The consequences of families being decimated and torn apart as a result of this great escape are too ghastly to contemplate.

Twenty two years on, Zimba-

bweans are much poorer than at any time in the past. Incomes have halved since 1980. The Zim dollar is now a staggering 700 to 1 US dollar. Unemployment stands at about 70%. Annual inflation is now over 122%.

Other fundamentals are crystal clear: declining spending on social services, deteriorating physical infrastructure everywhere, collapse of the health system, backward steps in our education system (that was once the envy of the world) and growing corruption. As a result of Zanu PF-induced anarchy, we are fast becoming a nation of criminals. It is a worrying trend in a nation famous for warm and friendly people.

Zimbabwe has indeed become a fractured society. The social cohesion that makes countries work has been shattered. The events of the past two and half years that have shattered the commercial farmers, farmworkers and the opposition are not simply painful events. They are disasters. They are unnatural catastrophes. The national trauma that this country has suffered will take many years to heal.

The struggle for Zimbabwe was a struggle for a whole new country in which oppression and injustice would be replaced by justice, harmony, opportunity and prosperity for all. People did not sacrifice their lives to enable the few to line their

pockets at the expense of the majority.

The land reform programme is a total farce. The talk of resettling landless blacks is pure rhetoric. The reality on the ground is very different. In practice, it is the so-called chiefs with jobs and businesses in cities and towns who have largely benefited. Genuine land-hungry Zimbabwean have not been empowered to any significant extent.

It is the power elite who have grabbed farms left, right and centre. They are the ones, together with their courtiers, who have been obtaining forex through corrupt means. Because of all this, there is angry silence right now in Zimbabwe.

In truth, the victims of this struggle for spoils by the Zanu PF elite have been the people of Zimbabwe. Poor Zimbabweans are the real losers. The crux of the matter is that Zimbabweans have fewer jobs, less education, less health, less income, less food and indeed less everything than five years ago. Their dreams for a better future for their children have been destroyed.

Leadership is all about finding solutions to problems affecting a country. But in our situation, there is paralysis. Nobody appears to be in charge. The Zanu PF leadership is turning away while Zimbabwe-

ans of all races are left wounded and naked at the roadside.

The question that Zimbabweans are asking each other is just how long can this continue? We have said it before and we say it again that the capacity of ordinary people to inflict damage on the political leadership if they are driven to do so by anger, frustration and hopelessness should not be underestimated. For that capacity is a function not only of power measured in conventional terms, but of desperation and a willingness to resort to extreme measures even at great cost to themselves.

Zimbabweans of all races and creeds are part of the same people. Blacks, whites, Indians—one and all—Zimbabwe is their only home and heritage. We have been joined together by fate and history. It is therefore unmitigated folly to dissipate our energies opening up old wounds which do not add any value to the development of Zimbabwe.

The heroes commemoration tomorrow should therefore afford us yet another opportunity to pause and take stock of the enormous damage that the political leadership is inflicting on this country and to ponder on the kind of legacy they are going to leave behind. Whose better words to quote that those of St Francis of Assisi:

"Where there is discord may we bring harmony. Where there is error may we bring truth. Where there is doubt may we bring faith. Where there is despair may we bring hope."

The Standard comment

