"PRAGMATIC YET PRINCIPLED": AN ASSESSMENT OF BOTSWANA'S FOREIGN POLICY RECORD AS A SMALL STATE.

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ABSTRACT

International Relations (IR) theory has traditionally downplayed the capabilities of small states, focusing rather on how the behaviour of large powers dictates interactions of actors within an anarchic arena. This has been very much the case for the realist/neorealist and to a very large extent neoliberal canons of IR, which privilege the structure of the international environment ahead of the agency of actors. As such, the foreign policy analysis of smaller powers in IR – and especially that of African countries – has been marginalised to the periphery. In response to these oversights, constructivism has posited a set of theories in which state identities and interests are determined by an inter-subjective interactive process that gives meaning to the material world. These set of theories also point out that norms can constrain and indeed energise state behaviour in a socially constructed world. This has thus opened up a space within which small state foreign policy behaviour can be analysed – whether it is through conference diplomacy, negotiation skills or idiosyncratic behaviour predicated upon elite ideas and identities. This thesis draws upon the above framework to assess a number of foreign policy choices embarked upon by Botswana in which she has leveraged herself vis-à-vis more powerful actors. The study looks at how Botswana managed to break out of its hostage station within Southern Africa during apartheid, at a time when Gaborone was surrounded by unfavourable white minority rule (in South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique). The study also evaluates Botswana's leveraging of her favourable image perception amongst powerful actors, as well as her negotiation proficiency in managing to punch above her weight and obtain favourable outcomes – thereby mitigating the desperate economic conditions she had inherited from colonialism. In a time where much of Southern Africa (and indeed the continent as a whole) disregard and actively disrupt normative imperatives related to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the thesis also

assesses Botswana's principled foreign policy posture. Through these chapters, it will be demonstrated that Botswana is an example of a state that has managed to use a careful combination of pragmatism and principle to show that African small states can indeed exercise agency.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
A.N.C.	African National Council
AU	African Union
BDF	Botswana Defence Force
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
BLS	Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland
DTC	Diamond Trading Company
EU	European Union
FLS	Frontline States
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
IR	International Relations
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDA	International Development Association
DEBSWANA	De Beers Botswana
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
HCT	High Commission Territories
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MFDP	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
MPC	Mineral Policy Committee
N.A.M	Non-Aligned-Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDP	National Development Plan
NTC	National Transition Council

NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OOP	Office of the President
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SACUA	Southern African Customs Union Agreement
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordinating Conference
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UN GA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USD	United States Dollars
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwean African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This thesis assesses Botswana's foreign policy from a constructivist lens of International Relations (IR) theory. IR theories have traditionally downplayed the capabilities of small states – and in particular African small states – marginalising the potential impact that their foreign policies can have in relation to other states (Lee and Smith, 2010: 1091). This marginalisation has been perpetuated by realist and neo-realist perspective on international relations which only conceive of an anarchic arrangement between states, whose main purpose is to exert their national interests that are defined by power (Morgenthau, 1965). While neoliberal theories of complex interdependence open a space within which the role of actors beyond the state may be considered, they too are found wanting in that – as with neorealist scholarship – they posit rationalist accounts of behaviour between states in the international arena. As such, these sets of theories privilege the structure of the international system, ahead of the agency of its constituent units.

In contrast, Constructivism argues that relations between states are determined through an inter-subjective process of socialisation – regardless of structure – in which interests and identities are interactively defined. From this perspective, the foreign policies of smaller states can be adequately addressed, giving insight to why these states in asymmetric power relations are able to exercise agency and obtain favourable outcomes from the international environment.

The main focuses of this study is to assess how Botswana – through a pragmatic and principled foreign policy – has struck a chord in the international community leveraging her identity vis-à-vis other actors, to transcend her small state status and capitalise on the reputation that she gained for being a 'shining example of liberal democracy' on the continent (Tsie, 1996).

The first chapter provides a theoretical framework that underscores the limitations of realism/neorealism and neoliberalism for the purposes of this study, and posits constructivism

as the most appropriate scholarship for the analysis of small state foreign policy behaviour. The chapter also examines various options for small states to enhance their foreign policy potential, such as conference diplomacy, negotiation skills and alignment of similarly minded elites to achieve mutual interests. The concepts defined and outlined in this chapter are then employed in the subsequent chapters to analyse Botswana's foreign policy behaviour.

Chapter Two traces Botswana's foreign policy during the apartheid era. It is argued that Botswana followed a mixture of pragmatism and principle to leverage herself in different ways to prevent reprisals from her powerful neighbour to the south, but at the same time, she sought to break out of her hostage station by presenting herself as having a staunchly non-racial identity which was further aided by the fact that she was practically the only parliamentary democratic state in Africa prior to 1990. Botswana had long advocated an end to white minority rule in Southern Africa, and, in so doing, Botswana was able to ally herself with majority led African governments to the north, as well as draw international sympathy and support for her geopolitical plight. In this way, Botswana demonstrated a great degree of agency for a country that was surrounded by powerful white minority rule.

Chapter Three – also primarily set during the apartheid era – assesses Botswana's transcendence of its desperate economic state, upon receiving independence from Britain in 1966. The chapter looks at the various ways in which Botswana positioned herself against actors that were more powerful – such as the South African government in the SACU negotiations, De Beers in the negotiation for diamond mining and infrastructural development within the country and international aid donors. Botswana followed a prudent economic foreign policy that was predicated upon developmental policies. Gaborone leveraged herself against these actors in different ways, managing to project certain perceptions about her identity, which created an environment in which the actors were willing to accommodate her. Coupled with the use of skilful negotiations, Botswana was able to obtain an increase in the revenue share of SACU, a 50-50 share in production proceeds with De Beers in terms of diamond mining, as well as effectively manage aid relations, requiring donors to fall in with the strict requirements of the developmental policies of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. This chapter illustrates how Botswana (a small state) was able to again demonstrate a large measure of agency, transcending her economic situation.

The fourth chapter is set within the context of a changed international environment in which the Cold War and Apartheid had come to an end. Botswana's foreign policy here had to adapt to these changes and drawing on its reputation for being Africa's longest standing liberal democracy, Gaborone is seen to play a more activist role in which it seeks to promote democratic practices and the respect for human rights and the rule of law, in line with the tenets of international organisations. This chapter assess Botswana's positioning in terms of addressing Lesotho's troubled political landscape (in 1994 and 1998), Zimbabwe's electoral crisis of 2008 and the African Union and International Criminal Court feud over the jurisdiction to prosecute despotic leaders on the continent.

The conclusion then brings together all of the above and consolidates the main arguments presented in this thesis.

The methodology employed will be to draw on small state scholarship as well as IR literature to inform the theoretical framework of this thesis. The process will also involve the examination of existing primary texts such as the content analysis of the Botswana press, speeches made by leaders, and National Assembly debates to gain insights into how Botswana has conducted its foreign policy hitherto. Secondary texts by various authors who have written about Botswana's foreign policy since independence will also be analysed.

Chapter 1

SMALL STATE AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The chapter aims to illustrate the manner in which small states have come to matter in International Relations (IR) discourse, a reality which has traditionally been downplayed by the discipline (Lee and Smith, 2010: 1093). While small states were rendered incapable of dealing with their external conditions without bandwagoning with more powerful states, it has becoming increasingly clear that a number of states – Botswana and others – have transcended this vulnerable station to become small powers[1] that demonstrate much agency. This reading of small states has not been adequately accommodated by the traditional IR explanations of neorealist and neoliberal scholarship. This chapter then seeks to posit constructivism as the most appropriate theoretical framework that can adequately assess Botswana's foreign policy choices since independence.

By way of definition, International Relations is a discipline that concerns itself with identifying and explaining the occurrences that necessarily come about as a result of interactions between a number of actors: states, individuals, international organisations and commercial enterprises (Puchala, 2003: 223). The problem is that IR theory traditionally championed the Realist/neorealist and later the liberal/neoliberal paradigms which have tended to focus on the big powers – defined by their military and economic strengths – thereby ignoring the possibility of small state agency in external relations. These older currents of IR are fundamentally rationalist – or lend themselves to rational choice theory, which stems from game theory. This posits a world in which rational agents must constantly make choices which depend on the choices that other rational agents make – which in turn are choices made in anticipation of the former's behaviour (Kubalkova, 2001: 29). Such choices within the neorealist and neoliberal paradigms are exogenously given by an anarchic structure in which big powers are described, and as such these traditional IR theories provide little room for the foreign policy preferences of smaller states.

[1] For the purposes of this Thesis, a small power will be considered a state which through its foreign policy choices has managed to transcend its initial station of disadvantage (as a small state) to become agents that are able to manipulate facets of their external environment in such a way that benefits their national policy imperatives.

Foreign policy[2] as a subject has been treated by IR theory in a manner that does not generally take into account the internal social processes that drive state action at the external level. Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is considered a subfield of IR, although the former has been frequently treated as separate from the latter, leaving a gulf between the two that has not been specifically bridged by traditional IR theories (Walker, 2011: 7). This has motivated the concerns of writers such as David Patrick Houghton (2007) who assert that the manner in which traditional IR theories have treated the study of foreign policy, have rendered the subfield as a 'theory without a home' or an afterthought within the wider discipline (Houghton, 2007: 25). Houghton (2007: 24) however has suggested that, "... a dialogue with social constructivism provides the most logical base from which to launch a revitalized approach to FPA, especially the cognitive psychological approach to foreign policy." Houghton (2007) and Kubalkova (2001) have both argued that the study of foreign policy did focus on the subjectivity of leaders in particular situations, as well as ideational imperatives that drove their decision making – a process that was then taken up by constructivists (Houghton, 2007: 31; Kubalkova, 2001: 27-28). Houghton also identifies that constructivism and FPA are able to collaborate in a dialogue – about structure and agency – that allows for one to compliment the other where the other is lacking (2007: 34).

The chapter will argue that constructivism is the most appropriate theory to instruct a reading of small power agency that is otherwise not accommodated by Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The chapter locates small state theory within the constructivist ethos and through various tools such as conference diplomacy, negotiations and elite ideas and identities; a path is created to discuss the potential for African, and ultimately Botswana's adopted foreign policies.

[2] Which can be seen as the avenue of state political agency that creates a relationship between the decision making processes of an actor – and its internal milieu – and the external environment the actor faces (Hudson, 2005: 2).

1.1. Realism/Neorealism

Traditional/Classical Realism as championed by theorists such as Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and developed in a neoclassical form by Hans Morgenthau, all ascribe the political survival of the state as the primary concern of international relations. Machiavelli saw the world as a dangerous place which was laden with many opportunities to ensure survival. Those who seek to survive ought to be cognisant of these dangers and must ensure the necessary steps to guard against them. This necessarily involved the ruthless and skilful accumulation of power which exploits opportunities available at the expense of rivals (Jackson and Sorenson, 2007: 64). Only then could national freedom – as the ultimate driving force of the state – be obtained (Jackson and Sorenson, 2007: 63). Hobbes viewed the human condition in the state of nature – a pre-civil state of being – as fundamentally brutal and inescapably hostile such that the reasonable expectation of long-term survival was farfetched. To transcend this state of nature, individuals entered into a social contract that created civil societies (states), which provided security for people. This, however, created another state of nature at the international level in which states would mimic human nature – that was inherent in the pre-civil state of nature – which was fundamentally selfish and greedy (Jackson and Sorenson, 2007: 65-66). The international state of nature, which existed without a Leviathan (or a body of governance) thus exists in a perpetual state of war. Hans Morgenthau spoke of the *animus dominandi* – that is the human lust for power – which he sees as responsible for bringing men and women into conflict with one another.

Morgenthau wrote, "Politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring, maintaining and demonstrating it determine the technique of political action" (Morgenthau, 1965: 195). For Morgenthau, public/political and private ethics cannot be reduced to the same thing and this maxim is the essence of statecraft.

Taken together, classical realists conceive of a world in which politics is entrenched in human nature which in turn is inherently selfish, greedy and power seeking. This then informs the interaction between states in the international system, which are taken as rational, unitary actors whose ultimate political obligation, is the promotion of their national interests

as defined by power (Shimko, 1992: 286; Waltz, 1988: 616-617). This necessarily creates a zero sum environment in which, "... [T]he strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept" (Gallarotti, 2010: 96).

Building on the tenets of traditional realism, neorealism, underscores the importance of structure – alongside unit-level explanations – in the interactions between states in the international system. In departing from traditional realism, neorealists contend that it is insufficient to purely emphasize man's lust for power as the sole cause of conflict amongst units. Kenneth Waltz argues that at its simplest, neorealism seeks to underscore the concomitant link between interacting units, and the related outcomes of such interactions in the international system (Waltz, 1988: 617). The units that constitute this system are states who are taken to be unitary actors, and their mandate at the very least is to secure survival. As Keith Shimko affirms, "It is the dynamics of the system which compel states to behave in certain ways if the wish to survive, and survival is assumed to be the minimum objective of all states" (Shimko, 1992: 293). The paramount objective is relative rather than absolute security gains.

With the absence of a central authority that has a monopoly on the use of legitimate force, the system is essentially characterised by anarchy (Waltz, 1988: 619). Faced with this anarchic disarray, states must take responsibility for their own security leading to a suspicious and hostile environment in which anxious relations persist. This forms the foundation for the neorealist axiom that anarchy necessarily leads to self-help[3] (Waltz, 1988: 624).

The aggressive nature of this anarchic environment could be mitigated through alliance systems that are characterised by common interests – usually the fear of being dominated by other states (Shimko, 1992: 294). Waltz argues that these alliance systems are at their most stable in a bi-polar rather than a multi-polar world. Under neorealist theory, such alliance systems are dominated by principal actors (militarily powerful states), who, as Waltz notes,

[3] 'Self-help' is a situation in which, because there is no central governing body within the anarchic system to ensure collective security, each state must fend for themselves and provide their own security (Waltz, 1988: 624).

"... need to worry little about the faithfulness of their followers, who usually have little choice anyway" (Waltz, 1988: 621). In an environment driven by bi-polarity, the leading powers of the alliance have greater flexibility to devise strategies that cope with their chief rivals, at the expense of gratifying their own allies (Waltz, 1988: 622). Conversely, in a multi-polar world, alliance leaders do not enjoy the same flexibility because they have to find a way to keep their alliances together by satisfying the needs of their members. Waltz thus suggests that in a multi-polar world, the opportunity does exist for small states to exercise some form of agency. He argues that, "[i]n moments of crisis the weaker or the more adventurous party is likely to determine its side's policy. Its partners can afford neither to let the weaker member get defeated nor to advertise their disunity by failing to back a venture even while deploring its risks" (Waltz, 1988: 621). This arrangement however by neorealist logic is driven by uncertainty and creates a less stable atmosphere than a system that is primarily headed by two major powers that counterbalance each other.

This materialist explanation of the international environment – which is characterised by systemic considerations that exogenously structure the behaviour of state actors – is inadequate to account for the post-cold war rise of small powers in international relations, whose agency would otherwise be relegated to behaving in a manner that is only consistent with the preferences of more powerful states. It certainly provides no space for one to articulate African agency and foreign policy behaviour, and on its own, it will not be a useful tool to probe into the foreign policy trajectory that allowed Botswana to transcend its small state status.

1.2. Neoliberalism

As with neorealists, neoliberal scholars view the international system as being anarchic in nature and characterised by self-help, and they too take the state as the starting point of analysis. The difference between neorealists and neoliberals is on how this anarchic environment can be transcended (Chatterjee, 2003: 130). Arthur Stein claims that the conduct of states that arises from free and autonomous decision-making will tend towards the formation of regimes (in Baldwin, 1993: 4). Ruggie (1982) suggests that regimes can be defined as, "social institutions around which actor expectations converge in a given area of

international relations … accordingly … international regimes limit the discretion of their constituent units to decide and act on issues that fall within the regime's domain" (1982: 380). Neoliberalism allows for a greater level of cooperation between states, emphasising the role that complex interdependence[4] plays in constraining the foreign policy options for larger powers. Neoliberal theorists admit that while cooperation may be difficult and could possibly lead to conflict, states could profit from seeking cohesive strategies to obtain common interests. As long as states are rational enough to comprehend the potential concomitant benefits of their cooperation, then even adversarial actors will set aside their differences (Chatterjee, 2003: 135). Robert Keohane's understanding of cooperation involves a process by which states, "… adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination" (Keohane, 1984: 51). According to Keohane and Nye, complex interdependence revolves around a three-pronged assumption that because there are so many issue areas that go beyond traditional security concerns, "… (1) 'actors other than states participate directly in world politics'; (2) 'a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist'; (3) 'force is an ineffective instrument of policy' …" (Keohane and Nye in Michalak, 1979: 137).

Unlike neorealists, neoliberals underscore the importance of absolute, rather than relative gains obtained from international cooperation. Chatterjee in citing Stein asserts that, "... the liberal view of self-interest [is] one in which actors with common interest try to maximize their absolute gains. Actors trying to maximise relative gains ... have no common interest" (Baldwin, 1993: 6). Complex interdependence stems from the understanding that issue areas in the world today – such as the environment and international crime – transcend the traditional Westphalian demarcations. As a result transnational bureaucratic alliances, nongovernmental organisations and other international institutions will shape global agendas, affording formally weak states with the opportunity to assert their agency through conference diplomacy (Michalak, 1979: 137; 140).

[4] 'Complex Interdependence' as prescribed by Keohane and Nye (in Jackson and Sorenson, 2007: 106) is a situation where there is a multitude of actors – both state and non-state – whose interests and intersections are so intrinsically linked, that to consider harming one actor is inimical to one's own interests.

Neoliberalism present itself as a solid alternative to realism, however there are still concerns about its conception of the international environment. Chatterjee points out that for the most part, there is actually very little difference between neoliberal and neorealist rationalist accounts of international relations. The main difference between the two theories is the ease and manner through which the anarchic international condition is mitigated (Chatterjee, 2003: 134-135). Kubalkova notes that after 1990 and the end of the Cold War, there was a change in the distribution of material capabilities which had hitherto been usurped by the two superpowers. Neorealism and Neoliberalism – with their insistence that state behaviour is exogenously given by structure – were now unable to account for this sudden global distributional change (Adler, 2002: 96). Added to this, the most worrying wars were not fought between states, nor were there explicitly within them either. All of this underscored the fact that the world had become so complicated, the state – and its structurally conceived role – was no longer the centre of international relations (Kubalkova, 2001: 32-33). As such, Kubalkova (2001: 33) quite rightly states, "[j]ust as neoliberal institutionalism served to rescue a neorealist orthodoxy that had diverged too far from reality, it might well be the case that constructivism ... can rescue [IR] from sterility and irrelevance."

1.3. Constructivism

To fully understand the potential of small states then – in particular African small states – one needs to adopt a theory that opens up a space beyond the rationalist assumptions of the neorealist and neoliberal postulations of international interactions. The additional value of constructivism beyond the materialist calculative assumptions of rationalist paradigms, allows for an understanding of a metaphysical perspective that stresses the social nature of the world: a concern driven not by what neorealists and neoliberals posit, but rather what they ignore (Checkel, 1998: 324). In other words, constructivists are aware of the material nature of the world, but their main contention is that this materiality shapes and is fashioned by interpretations of that world through inter-subjective meanings (Checkel, 1998: 326). Fuchs (1992: 27) in Adler (1997: 322) admits this much when he states that, "we have no way of deciding whether statements correspond to reality except by means of other statements. It makes no sense to assume the independent existence of an external reality to begin with." Adler himself then goes on to say that constructivism, "... establishes new areas of empirical investigation – non-existent to realist, overlooked by liberals and unimportant to

psychological approaches – namely, the objective facts of world politics, which are facts only by virtue of human agreement" (Adler, 1997: 348).

Variations notwithstanding, constructivists all converge on a number of issues. First they agree that the world is constitutive of inter-subjective meanings that broaden the possibilities otherwise restricted by the more narrow neorealist and neoliberal interpretations (Adler, 2002: 100). Second, constructivists are in concert about the distinction between brute facts – those that inform the material world such as rocks and flowers – and social facts – which exist by virtue of human agreement – and how the latter accounts for most of the facts observed in international relations studies (Adler, 2002: 100; Houghton, 2007). Constructivists also agree with the strong notion of agency and the fact that agents and structures are mutually constitutive and we ought not to promote one over the other (Houghton, 2007: 28). Taken together, the common ground outlined above feeds into the notion that constructivists are, "... not interested in how things are, but in how they became what they are" (Adler, 2002: 101).

As we will recall from the earlier discussion, neorealists posit an anarchic environment which exogenously structures the nature of interaction between states. In this environment, states follow a self-help regiment which is geared at obtaining the greatest number of relative gains (Wendt, 1992 394). While neoliberals may differ in relation to whether the gains sought by states are relative or absolute – as seen in their conviction that cooperative behaviour can be a result of process even in a self-help structure that is exogenously given – they do however join the neorealist current – and as such buy into a rationalist packaging – by placing the state with its self-interest driven nature as the central premise of analysis in their theory (Wendt, 1992: 393). Constructivists such as Wendt are willing to agree that an anarchic environment exists, however, this environment by their judgement, need not lead to the self-help. Wendt argues (1992: 396) that:

> Put more generally, without assumptions about the structure of identities and interests in the system, Waltz's definition of structure cannot predict the content or dynamics of anarchy. Self-help is one such intersubjective structure and, as such, does the decisive explanatory work in the theory. The question is whether self-help is a logical or

> contingent feature of anarchy ... I develop the concept of a 'structure of identity and interest' and *show that no particular one follows logically from anarchy* (emphasis added).

As such, the anarchic environment as Wendt puts it, is what states make of it, and if they do find themselves in a self-help world, this is due to 'process' which involves interactions and learning (Wendt, 1992: 394-395). To this end, 'self' and 'other' identity constructions are endogenous to this interaction process in which states interactively create expectations and understandings of each other, which drives the environment within which they exist. If nuclear weapons are to be considered the highest level of material means – and in effect power – then this inter-subjective construction of identities and meanings thus accounts for why the large arsenal that Britain possesses does not create the same level of threat – nor meaning – as say the possibility of North Korea acquiring even one nuclear war head (Checkel, 1998: 324). In criticising the neorealist canon, Wendt thus concludes, "States act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not. Anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us which is which" (1992: 397). These identities then serve as the foundations of interests, and the conception of security then vary based on the cognitive identification of the self with the other. Interests and identities form structures which, when relatively stable, can be considered institutions that may be governed by norms and codified rules.

These institutionally defined roles acquire motivational force by virtue of an actor's involvement in collective knowledge (Wendt, 1992: 399). Through this collective knowledge over time, states are then able to, "... 'mirror' the practices of significant others over time. This principle of identity-formation is captured by the symbolic interactions notion of the 'looking-glass-self,' which asserts that the self is a reflection of an actor's socialisation" (Wendt, 1992: 404).

Richard Ned Lebow (2008) has also written on the importance of identity and constructivism in international relations and by drawing on various philosophical thought, he has sought to address the binary of the self and other. Philosophers such as Kant and Hegel had postulated that one cannot generate his or her own identity without stereotypically creating a negatively

conceived out-group, which served as a necessary contingent for national cohesion in the development of the state. These philosophers and others who followed in their footsteps had created a historical understanding of the state in which power accumulation was a central theme predicated upon internal solidarity of one set of people ('us') and the demonization of the out-grouping ('other').

Thus, for Kant and Hegel, identity formation was predicated on difference which also entailed a pre-existing difference of an 'other', the effect of which was the inevitability of a clash of groupings in 'war' (Lebow, 2008: 477). Other philosophers such as Habermas and Nietzsche frame identity as stemming from interactions between agents that produce dialogue, which in turn exposes contrasting metaphysical truths that each agent embraces (Lebow, 2008: 474). In international relations theory, this philosophical tug of war can be translated into the struggle between realism and idealism,[5] but Lebow seeks to solve the identity question by taking a middle way that dispels the Hegelian realpolitik conceptions of self and other, but also grounds the Habermas/Nietzschian dialogical prescriptions in some kind of empirical reality. In his conclusion in "Identity and International Relations", Lebow states (2008: 487):

> Hegel's… formulations of identity would lead us to expect that the boundaries between 'us' and 'others' are relatively inflexible once they are established. As identity is defined in opposition to others, and solidarity depends on distinction and even hatred of others, both would be threatened by the inclusion of peoples who were formerly excluded.

Lebow then goes on to observe that:

> It is remarkable just how fluid categories of 'others' turn out to be in practice. With regularity, 'others' who were not only excluded and demonized, but objects of violent ethnic cleansing, have subsequently been incorporated into the community with no loss of national identity or solidarity. English Catholics and Irish immigrants in Britain, Jews in Germany, Irish Catholics … (2008: 487).

[5] Idealism is seen as a perspective on international relations studies which neglects the role of power and posits a utopian perception of what the world ought to be like, instead of how it is (Mearsheimer, 2005: 139; Lebow, 2008: 474).

The reality of this fluidity shows an inter-subjective process that is constitutive of constructivist thought. The international environment need not be an atmosphere of zero-sum aspirations of power and domination. If identity is to be taken seriously – as this chapter advocates it should – then the possibility that identities and as such interests can over time be shaped to mean different things, must be taken into consideration when prescribing theories that demarcate international relations. These inter-relational meanings and understandings of identity that are created upon interactions between agents, can propel voluntarily cooperative communities to adhere to normative frameworks, without the exercise or threat of hard power.

Chayes and Chayes (1994: 65) in Hurrell (2002) define Norms as, "... 'a broad class of prescriptive statements – rules, standards, principles, and so forth – both procedural and substantive' that are 'prescriptions for action in a situation of choice, carrying a sense of obligation, a sense that they ought to be followed' …" (Hurrell, 2002: 143). Norms go beyond mere regulation of actors' behaviours, they constitute the very identity and as such the interest of such actors. These international forces which affect state to state relations are then transmitted through international organisations. These organisations and the norms they transmit shape the foreign policy of states by teaching them what their interests ought to be. Such norms included for example, the adoption of rule governed norms of warfare (initiated by the International Committee of the Red Cross) and states accepting limits to economic sovereignty thereby allowing redistribution to supersede production values (Jackson and Sorensen, 2007: 170). Neorealists only lend credence to norms if they are backed up by hard power. Taken together with neoliberals, these rationalist accounts only see norms as functional to the extent that they allow for a cooperative atmosphere that reduces the cost for transactions (Checkel, 1998: 327). Hurrell (2002), however, notes that:

> ... as the density and complexity of the international legal system increases and as globalisation opens up new channels of transnational political action, so the process of norm creation *becomes harder for even powerful states to control. Thus transnational NGO networks have carved out important roles and relatively weak states have been able to promote new and often far reaching rules and institutions* (emphasis added) ... (2002: 146).

Constructivist authors – such as Martha Finnemore have shown the powerful role that norms play in regulating the behaviour of actors and as such state foreign policies. Finnemore for example has studied the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and in so doing, she has sought to ascertain why in a short period of time, a large number of dissimilar countries have enacted science policy bureaucracies that are similar. Finnemore shows how a new norm – that attempted to make the modern state responsible for science – first began with a set of discourses within UNESCO, and finally permeated the domestic language of its member states (Finnemore, 1993: 566). Finnemore establishes a correlation between the establishment of such science bureaucracies at the national level, and the norms promoted by UNESCO by studying various regions such as Lebanon and East Africa. Checkel argues that the diffusion of such norms from outside forces – which were independent of internal constituencies and led to behavioural change – was an endogenous process of interest formation (Checkel, 1998: 331). Also linked to this, Checkel argues that Finnemore's contribution also shows that international organisations do not merely exist – as neoliberals argue – to reduce transaction costs and maximise mutual benefits of their member states. They can supersede state powers and constrain their behaviour and indeed constitute their interests (1998: 331).

The absorption of norms by a state and the formation of its social identity at the national level through this inter-subjective process, may also determine the role that a state sees itself playing within the international environment. As defined by Wendt, state identity, is seen as, "… relatively role specific understandings and expectations about itself …" (1992: 397). Philippe Le Prestre (1997) explains that identity – or in his words 'self-conception of roles' – are embedded in a state's, "… understanding of themselves and what they represent in the world" (1997: 9). In his definition of regimes, Krasner (in Haggard and Simmons, 1987) associates norms with principle, which in turn he associates with rectitude or morally acceptable behaviour. Krasner argues that these principles exhibit "… 'standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations' …" (Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 493; Hasenclever *et al*, 1997: 9).

Norms thus provide actions with legitimacy and meaning in specific situations. Nathalie Tocci argues that a country's foreign policy may be said to be underlain with normative goals

if the motives underlying the foreign policy promote, "democracy, human rights, the rule of law, international law and sustainable development …" in contrast to strategic goals which entail, "… protection of commercial interests, migration management or energy security" (Tocci, 2008: 6). The former are demonstrative of constructivist engagement, while the latter is primarily materialist and is not the only measure of interaction between actors.

Drawing from the above, constructivism has thus opened up a theoretical space within which the agency of non-state actors and small states can be adequately considered without the restrictive parameters of the older theoretical paradigms. With its focus on ideas and inter-subjective identity formation – which is constituted and regulated by international norms – small state theory can now find a niche in foreign policy studies, which accommodates agency alongside structure. This grounding accommodates foreign policy analysis, which is imperative for understanding how small states can position themselves in relation to their external environment.

1.4. Small State Theory

1.4.1. The Problem of Definition

Much of the previous small states literature has been concerned with finding a definition for smallness which has caused a great deal of theoretical discomfort for scholars. Traditional International Relations theories have been quantitatively fixated on capabilities as an indicator to whether or not a state is a small power (Thorhallsson, 2011: 140). Small states have typically been defined by the extent of a country's population size, geographical area, level of trade or Gross Domestic Product per capita. Population has been one of the more widely used categories of identification, with various organisations offering divergent upper limit estimations of what would constitute a small state. The American Enterprise Institute for Training and Research has denoted states with population figures ranging from 300, 000 to one million people as being small (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008: 8). The World Bank on the other hand place the value at 1.5 million people (Prasad, 2009: 44).

In terms of the economic classifications, some authors have associated small with developing or dependent whereas others have argued that some developed states can also be classified as small. Prasad (2009: 45-46) as well, has tabled small state GDP per capita to range from 50.2 in Sao Tome and Principe to 30276.75 in Iceland, by 2007. In terms of geographical area, it is classically argued for example that island states are typically smaller than larger continental countries and tend to be burdened by the further disadvantage that they are isolated and suffer from excessive transport costs in trade relations.

What stems from all of this is the accepted wisdom that there is no satisfactory definition for what it means exactly to be classified as a small state (Hey, 2003: 2). Some contemporary theorists dismiss quantitative measurements – which juxtapose smallness with vulnerability – as being arbitrary indicators of what smallness entails. These authors privilege qualitative measures concerning power, influence and self-image. Constructivists such as Donna Lee and Nicola Smith (2010) have argued that the concept of smallness should be considered more as a discursive prescription for such states, rather than merely being descriptive (2010: 1095). In line with constructivist scholarship, Lee and Smith contend, "... we suggest an alternative reading of smallness in which it is understood as a ... discourse rather than as a material 'fact' or analytical category. For if we accept that 'words ... don't just describe the world, they actually help make the world', then the language of smallness can be seen to make the world of small states" (Lee and Smith, 2010: 1095). In relation to neoliberal globalisation, the language of smallness was traditionally construed as a 'can't do' description which only sought to solve small state 'vulnerabilities' through compliance with accepted Western economic practices. Following Lee and Smith's route however, opens up a space in which the qualitative understanding of smallness gives rise to a won't-do attitude amongst states that have realised the inimical implication associated with such economic proposals (Lee and Smith, 2010: 1092).

1.4.2. Traditional Small State Theory

Conventional small state theory was heavily driven by neorealist scholarship and was mainly concerned with the survival of these states, whose main option was to bandwagon with powerful states rather than seek counter balancing measures (Vital, 1971; Hey, 2003: 8; Handel, 1990; Gvalia *et al*, 2013: 103). This picture that Handel paints captures the convictions of traditional small state theorists at the time:

> Domestic determinants of foreign policy are less salient in weak states. The International system leaves them with less room for choice in the decision-making process. Their smaller margin of error and hence greater preoccupation with survival makes the essential interests of weak states less ambiguous ... Therefore ... the student of small power policy even more than the student of great power policy, must concentrate on the environment in which his subject exists (1990: 3).

Vital paints an even more brutal picture in the introduction of his book *The Survival of Small States*:

> What is argued here is that given the intricacy and primacy of the connection between force and policy for all states, the central impact on the structure of contemporary international relations caused by the widening gap between the military capabilities of a very small number of states on the one hand and all other states on the other is not ... to constrain the strong *vis-à-vis* the weak. On the contrary ... it ... heighten[s] the latter's vulnerability and narrow[s] the ...options open to them (Vital, 1971: 3-4).

This fundamentally realist reading of the international environment as Hey (2003) notes, was understandably construed in the aftermath of the Second World War when it was unthinkable for scholars to fathom of a world where security was not the ultimate concern for states. Hey, however, notes that those priorities do not reflect most small state concerns today. According to Hey, the evolution of foreign policy analysis has revealed that, "... other factors at the individual, bureaucratic, and state levels, very often have at least as much influence on foreign policy behaviour as do international security concerns" (Hey, 2003: 8). As Hey quite rightly concludes, these theoretical approaches thrive in a vacuum that is ignorant of the environmental changes that have occurred in what he refers to as, 'the empirical world' (2003: 8). These environmental changes – which shall be elaborated upon below – have created a world in which diplomacy has become far more important than the traditional role that it played when the state was central to international negotiations.

Milan Jazbec has shown how diplomacy[6] is central to the ability of small states to successfully carry out a foreign policy that can have a regional or global impetus. During the Cold War, diplomacy served as an avenue of dialogue between states on a multilateral or bilateral level in which the non-interference in domestic affairs was considered sacred. Since the end of the Cold War however, security concerns have shifted, and one way in which this has happened can be seen in the fact that a number of wars are fought within states, rather than between them. The stability that bipolarity had provided during the Cold War has thus disappeared and as such has required an entirely different line of diplomatic engagement (Jazbec, 2010: 67). There are other subject areas which have refocused the concerns of diplomacy and as Jazbec notes, we have now seen a shift towards issues that were formally relegated to the periphery of international relations. Some of these issue areas – such as climate change, food security, energy security, human rights, democratic practices and migration – have given rise to a plethora of actors that go beyond the state itself – NGOS, individuals, civil society, the media and private enterprises (Jazbec, 2010: 69).

Baldur Thorhallsson has also argued that while neoliberal institutionalism goes some way in opening up a space for contemporary small state analysis, he also faults it for excessively focussing on the differences between the capabilities of states, leading to the charge that such institutions are formed by and for the most part benefit larger states (Thorhallsson, 2012: 141-142). This he argues has downplayed the ability of small states to influence such institutions as put forward by the socialisation processes within the constructivist paradigm.

What then are these environmental changes that have allowed small states to influence and set international agenda topics? Benko in Jazbec has identified a few of these changes (2010: 68):

- The current international community has become a global community and the role that geographic boundaries traditionally played has become less significant;

[6] Which he accepts to mean, "… that part of public administration, which deals with carrying out the foreign policy of a certain state" (Jazbec, 2010: 66).

- Global phenomena now cut across the political, military, economic and other spheres which have given rise to the linkage of external and internal environments and high level of interdependence.
- With the discrepancy of socio-economic systems in the world – developed versus underdeveloped regions – there have been varying degrees of international engagement and the chosen means to deal with issues of development, corresponding to the particular needs of different countries, groups of people, commercial enterprises and many other subjects.
- The security concerns of the contemporary international landscape are such that the human race is now faced with general questions of survival, owing to the development of potentially apocalyptic weapons technology and the ecological depletion of the planet.

As a result of these changes, diplomacy has also taken on a public character in which, "... what used to be typically off-stage activity appears lately to be increasingly on-stage activities" (Jazbec, 2012: 71). This 'on-stage' activity plays itself out in a number of international conferences which provide the platform for previously marginalised states to launch their preferences. Realism with its focus on the state as driven by hard power is clearly unequipped to accommodate these environmental changes within its scholarship. As such, hard power imperatives are seen to matter far less than soft power considerations.

1.4.3. Soft Power and Conference Diplomacy

Joseph Nye (in Thorhallsson, 2012) defines soft power as those qualitative features of a country – such as diplomacy, reputation and culture – that grants the state with the ability to court other states into wanting what you want (Thorhallsson, 2012: 143; Chong, 2010: 3). Thorhallsson has shown how soft power can be used in the realm of conference diplomacy to attain results that hard power *realpolitik* cannot account for. Thorhallsson focuses on how small states can influence the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and he has concluded that small states would have to:

1. have an in-depth understanding and knowledgebase of the Security Council's operational affairs and seek close relations with the permanent members of the UNSC

as well as prioritise on which issues would best offset the imbalance between members thereby maximising their influence;

2. states could also take the lead on or initiate certain matters, which the Nordic countries enjoy great amount of experience in – for example the former president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, has been involved in mediation envoys in Indonesia, as well as initiating attempts at determining Kosovo's future after the conflict;
3. build coalitions which can serve as voting blocs. This can be seen in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) comprising of 118 members that have engaged in consultations with UNSC members and the General Assembly; and
4. use their diplomatic skills to create a favourable image perception amongst the more powerful members of the UNSC – as seen in the credibility Norway attained from their mediation efforts in Sri Lanka and the Middle East, allowing them to take the lead in negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia (Thorhallsson, 2012: 152-158).[7]

These skills need not be particular to the UNSC and can be extrapolated and used in other conference forums where small states seek to maximise their influence. Jakobsen in Nasra (2011) has also identified similar techniques for small state within the European Union if they are to excel at influencing the regional body's foreign policy. Jakobsen suggest that, "... small states need to have a forerunner reputation, provide convincing arguments, excel in building coalitions and commit sufficient capabilities to support EU initiatives" (Nasra, 2011: 164).

Examples of small states that have used conference diplomacy to their advantage include the Caricom states. These are Caribbean small states that have managed to reach a consensus amongst each other and have channelled this cohesion into fruitful negotiations at the UN especially in the environmental sphere (Braveboy-Wanger, 2008: 170). Another example is the efforts of the Cotton Four African countries –Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali – who have fought against the depression of world prices in the 1990s through the use of diplomatic

[7] Also related to this particular strategy, Alan Chong (2010) has coined the term virtual enlargement as a symbolic outcome of soft power. In this article, Chong cites his earlier work in which he talks about 'leadership inside-out' – which relates to a country projecting its national characteristics such as model of governance, "… through the treating of one's national polity as a veritable showcase for emulation" (Chong, 2010: 386). Chong also refers to 'outside-in' leadership traits which relate to the structural transmission of one's foreign policy ideas through political and normative discourses that are supported by allies and friendly international institutions (2010: 386).

cohesion and technical and legal assistance, leading to success at the Doha round of the WTO negotiations (Lee, 2009: 201).

1.4.4. Negotiations as a Tool for Small Power Foreign Policy

Power and negotiation are two important issues to be grappled with if one is to consider the possibility of small states affecting outcomes at the international level. Indeed these issues are central to the relationships that exist within the context of diplomacy. The rationale behind traditional IR discourses, in particular neoliberalism, is that power relations will dictate the extent to which states can effect negotiation outcomes to their advantage. This narrow understanding of power does not take seriously the asymmetrical nature of North-South material capabilities and only accommodates equal footing within the negotiation process (Pillay, 2002: 8; Lee and Smith, 2010: 1095). As such small states are seen as 'can't do' actors who lack the necessary power that larger states with a more equal footing are said to possess. This line of thinking provides little space to analyse negotiations in asymmetrical relations (Pillay, 2002: 8).

As Habeeb notes, this narrow view primarily fixates on the aggregate structural powers of states, which he defines as, "... an actor's resources, capabilities, and position vis-à-vis the external world as a whole" (1988: 17). Habeeb also identifies issue specific structural power which he terms as, "... an actor's capabilities and position vis-à-vis another actor in terms of specific mutual interests" (1988: 19). The implication of issue specific structural power is that both parties to a negotiation may incur costs if their relationship was to deteriorate, and as such, a commitment to seeking mutual benefits becomes important. Also under issue-specific structural power, an actor can increase their leverage within negotiations by having alternative sources for the outcomes sought, or by being in a position to reduce the extent to which the actor is dependent on or needs a specific outcome (Habeeb, 1988: 19). In asymmetrical relations, weaker states are then able to leverage themselves on specific issues, giving them greater negotiation clout vis-à-vis the stronger actors. As Habeeb (1988: 143) argues, "The principal lesson for the weak state is that despite its weakness it may still achieve many, even most, of its objectives. But to succeed, it must be aware of its strengths and advantages." Thus, Habeeb argues that the key to success in this regard is through

behavioural power, which he defines as a process in which actors mobilise their resources as well as utilising their issue-specific power in such a way that they can achieve favourable outcomes (1988: 23).

1.4.5. Elite Identity as a Driver of Small State Foreign Policy

Beyond conference diplomacy, small state foreign policy may also be shaped by the ideas and identities of certain elites. As previously stated, constructivism holds that the identity of a state's external environment cannot be ascertained *a priori* without some forms of interaction which leads to perceived meaning of whether one is a friend or foe, or what foreign policy imperatives to take on in a given situation. Gvalia *et al* (2013) similarly present a case for considering the identity of elites within a given state, and how their idiosyncratic predispositions may shape foreign policies in a way that counters the expectations of the external environment. In the words of Ronald Grigor Suny, "Whether the elite views its state as a democracy, a great power, an empire, a victim, or a carrier of civilisation ... is key to its understanding of the state's interests" (Suny in Gvalia *et al*, 2013: 106). This then – unlike neorealism and neoliberalism – accounts for why states that are placed in similarly situated international environments may take on dissimilar foreign policy trajectories (Park, 2005: 231; Gvalia *et al*, 2013: 106). The authors point to two types of elite ideas relating to; 1) state identity and 2) the *raison d'état* or the purpose of the state.

The first type of elite ideas is predicated upon the favoured internal social order that the rulers desire for their state. The second type of ideas pushes the state to ally with countries that have similar dispositions of social order (Gvalia *et al*, 2013: 108). Taken together these preferences will shape the elites' ideas about the threats and opportunities of their environment. This is closely linked to Ausra Park's individual-level approach to foreign policy analysis. Park argues that understanding elite foreign policy preferences may require one to delve into a particular leader's background: his beliefs, motives, leadership style and perceptions (Park, 2005: 233-234). Park goes on to show how the Baltic States in general – notwithstanding their proximity to the former Soviet Union – have followed a pro-EU and pro-NATO oriented foreign policy (Park, 2005: 234). Gvalia *et al* have used their framework to show how for example, despite the August 2008 Russia-Georgia War – which saw the

Georgians lose large amounts of their territory – Georgia has retained a primarily Western-oriented foreign policy that it has followed since 2003 (2013: 110).

1.4.6. African Agency and African Small States

If small states as a global discursive concept have been marginalised by the dominant currents of IR theory, then nowhere has this been more evident than in the analysis of the agency of African foreign policies. Ross Herbert (2011) has argued that while the external environment and the limitation of resources must be considered when analysing African states, one must be aware that Africa is characterised by countries whose power bases are intimately linked with the presidency. As such the foreign policies of these leaders cannot be dismissed out of hand (Herbert, 2011: 5). Herbert also points out the fact that traditional IR theory tends to forget how international relations – characterised by Treaties, normative responsibilities, and institutional expectations – affects the domestic politics of both privileged and underprivileged states alike (Herbert, 2011: 6). As such, to solely champion the foreign policies of the powerful countries and ignore those of weaker states – particularly African states – is quite frequently at odds with empirical findings. One such example as discussed above is the 'won't do' attitude of the Cotton Four states in the Doha Round of the WTO negotiation process (Lee and Smith, 2010: 1099).

Cornelissen *et al* (2012) have also located Africa within a shifting geopolitical context in which economic penetration from states like China has reoriented traditional trade patterns to include a high level of activity within the global south (2012: 5-6). In having an ally that sees African states differently to the manner in which they have been viewed by the West, Chinese involvement on the continent includes, increased aid that has no preconditions, debt cancellation and increased levels of trade (Tull, 2006). Tull notes that, "China sought to construct a common identity with African states vis-à-vis the paternalistic West" (2006: 431). Although the relationship between African states and China is asymmetrical in nature, the opportunities that have come about allow for some degree of agency at the African state level which can no longer be ignored. As such, a more appropriate theoretical paradigm to employ would clearly be constructivism.

1.5. Conclusion and Roadmap

The foregoing discussion has sought to outline a theoretical platform upon which the foreign policy of small states can be adequately assessed. The older IR schools of Neorealism and Neoliberalism on their own have proven to be inadequate in arming the small state scholar with the conceptual tools to undertake this task. As such constructivism is favoured here as the appropriate theoretical niche for this undertaking as Houghton (2007) quite rightly suggests. Foreign policy analysis looks at a country's external behaviour which is geared at achieving various objectives that combine its capabilities, and the available means of executing such a policy – ranging from diplomatic negotiations to the use of force (Barston, 1973: 14). For small states, this is particularly important because their ability to traverse asymmetric structural relations and leverage themselves to demonstrate agency is intricately related to an analysis of their foreign policy behaviour. Though constructivism gains its theoretical currency after the end of the Cold War, the opportunities it presents for small states have also existed in the past. In the chapters that follow, the thesis will draw on the theoretical framework above to demonstrate how diplomacy, elite identity and ideas, negotiations and normative principles can be instructive in assessing Botswana's foreign policy record, both in the past as well as now.

Chapter 2

FROM HOSTAGE TO LIBERATION MOVEMENTS: BOTSWANA'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE APARTHEID ERA

In the previous chapter, a theoretical framework was presented in which Gvalia *et al* (2013) purport that elite ideas and identities can help explain unexpected foreign policy behaviours of small states which lay in proximity to more powerful ones, in that these elites mould and consolidate their preferred internal social and cultural order and then they look outwards to ally themselves with other actors that are similarly oriented. This is especially so around a constructivist reading of small state foreign policy behaviour not only in the present, but in the past as well. African foreign policy in general has demonstrated that states on the subcontinent can exhibit agency in dealing with stronger actors. Thorhallsson (2012) has also shown that small states are able to influence international forums by; prioritising certain issues and influencing other member states to take them on, taking the lead on certain matters, building coalition or solidarity amongst certain blocs and fostering a favourable image perception amongst more powerful members of such forums (2012: 152-158). This is also located within a constructivist reading of small state foreign policy behaviour in which such states are able to leverage themselves in certain ways that allow for favourable interpretations of their identity.

This chapter examines how Botswana, managed to use her diplomacy – under the leadership of Seretse Khama– to break out of the ring that South Africa had surrounded the BLS states with. South Africa had sought to make these countries entirely dependent on her. Botswana managed to leverage her identity in such a way that she embarked on a principled foreign policy, driven by Seretse's commitment to non-racialism (as seen in the country's contribution to the Frontline states and in its lead role in curbing British weapons sales to South Africa through the Commonwealth). In so doing, Gaborone attracted the friendship of similarly minded elites and actors, who assisted her in the drive to rid Southern Africa of white minority rule. At the same time, being mindful of her geopolitical context, Botswana also exercised a large measure of pragmatism by not engaging in conduct that could give Pretoria a pretext to respond by coercive means.

2.1. Botswana's Geopolitical Context

Upon receiving independence from Britain, Botswana's quantitative attributes were that of a small state that was heavily dependent on South Africa for its economic subsistence. This was largely (and arguably deliberately) a legacy of the colonial arrangement that had governed the country prior to 1966 (Chipasula and Miti, 1989: 12). Surrounded by white minority rule in the form of apartheid South Africa, Rhodesia – and until the mid-1970s – Angola and Mozambique, Botswana's vulnerability also lay in the fact that it was a landlocked country shielded from easily accessible ports. As such, South Africa was able to wield control over Botswana's economy through the labour market – which provided employment for a large number of Batswana even after independence – the Southern African Customs Union – which comprised of a revenue sharing formula that was heavily disproportionate in favour of South Africa, as well as a common monetary currency at the expense of the BLS states[8] – and trade and transport (Chipasula and Miti, 1989: 13-21). Trade and transport were particularly worrying in that Botswana's railway line was owned by Rhodesia, and the rail carts by South Africa, whose harbours were required for imports and exports to world markets (Osei-Hwedie, 1998: 425; Chipasula and Miti, 1989: 24). Compounding these external constraints were the fact that Botswana had a small population – which even by 1984 was only one million (Black *et al*, 1988: 64) – in a country the size of France or Kenya, with a low income per capita and no national army to defend its borders – save for a small mobile police unit (Osei-Hwedie, 1998: 426; Black *et al*, 1988: 64-66).

Taken together, these attributes placed Botswana in a station within which it was considered – along with Lesotho and Swaziland – as a hostage or client state to apartheid South Africa within a subordinate state system (Dale, 1976: 69; Halpern, 1965). A realist/neorealist reading of the environment outlined above would suggest that Botswana would have been wholly compliant to its more powerful minority led neighbours. As Dale puts it (1976: 72):

> It does not take too vivid an imagination or too thorough a grounding in the tenets of realism as taught in American political science curricula to become a confirmed pessimist about Botswana's future in Southern Africa. One could craft doomsday scenarios for Botswana were one so inclined.

[8] This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.

As shall become apparent, this however was not the case, and Botswana was to demonstrate various instances of agency driven by a foreign policy particularly championed by the beliefs and perceptions of Sir Seretse Khama,[9] and geared at defying as far as possible – within the confines of pragmatism – the constraints of white minority rule. In what follows, the chapter identifies instances where Gaborone pragmatically leveraged itself against South Africa, avoiding as far as possible, conduct that would prompt Pretoria to respond coercively. At the same time Botswana positioned herself – towards the rest of the continent and the world – as a non-racial liberal democratic state, in order to obtain allies in the pursuit of an end to white minority rule in the region.

2.2. Seretse's Principle of Non-Racialism

It is appropriate to evaluate Sir Seretse Khama's[10] anti-racial policy, and its subsequent influence on Botswana's foreign policy as a manifestation of elite ideas and identities. Gvalia *et al* (2013) have argued that in considering how elite identities and ideas shape foreign policy, one must first look at how a country's leader shapes the internal social order of his state, before looking at how this is projected in foreign policy.

For Seretse, the internal social order he sought to promote was driven by his bitter distaste for racism and racial structures. This anti-racial policy as Richard Dale (1976) points out, was in part responsible for Botswana's ability to transcend its station as a hostage state within the Southern African subordinate state system, and gain large amounts of international aid, notwithstanding the fact that at the time Dale was writing, Botswana was still ranked amongst the lowest income per capita states in the world (Dale, 1976: 72; Black *et al*, 1988: 64). Dale uses Professor Marshall Singer's idea of 'attraction' (Soft power) instead of coercion (Hard Power) to explain why Botswana traversed its subordinate station as a hostage state (1976:

[9] For a long time – since 1965 before independence – Botswana's foreign policy decision making and the Department of External Affairs were subsumed under the office of the President (OOP). By 1975, Botswana's diplomatic missions had multiplied and the small Department was upgraded to ministerial status, though the operations were still largely carried out in the OOP (Zaffiro, 1993: 41).

[10] Sir Seretse Khama was born in 1921 and in 1966 he became the first President of Botswana until his death in 1980. He was educated at Forte Hare University in South Africa where he obtained his BA general degree and then he went on to study law in Britain (Henderson, 1990: 29).

72). The idea of attraction – 'or attractive instruments of power' – as used by Dale (1976: 75) here can be seen today in the light of constructivist theory that states that actors are able to socialise other actors into wanting outcomes that they want (Wendt, 1992: 404; Thorhallsson, 2012: 143; Chong, 2010: 3). Dale argues that it became increasingly inexpedient for the West to defend its affiliation with the racist regimes of Southern Africa, and more attractive to look towards Botswana's multi-racial democracy as a model for the continent. Dale concludes, "Thus if to invest in South Africa would leave a nation and its investors open to charges of guilt by association, the same activities, if perused in neighbouring Botswana, would earn that nation probity and honor by association" (1976: 73).

Indeed, Seretse Khama had long been driven by the determination to do away with racial discrimination within Botswana, even before the protectorate became an independent republic. In the late 1940s, Seretse had married Ruth Williams (a British Caucasian), which had caused much discomfort amongst the apartheid bureaucrats in Pretoria – and much of Southern Africa – whose laws bitterly opposed interracial marriages. The marriage had sent ripples throughout the British Empire in general which in 1950 culminated in Khama's exile to London by the British authorities (Henderson, 1990: 30). Later, Seretse was also to accept a Dutch son-in-law for Jacqueline, his daughter (Dale, 1976: 70; Henderson, 1990: 29). These were among the early signs that Seretse was steadfastly opposed to racial differentiation and the concomitant political consequences that accompany it. In 1962, Seretse had submitted a motion to the protectorate's Legislative Council – first elected in 1961 – and the Council subsequently appointed a select committee – of which Seretse himself was a part of – to dispose of the question of racial discrimination within the protectorate (Gabatshwane, 1966: 31). The committee considered a number of areas within society – such as education and the legal/judicial system – and adopted as the basis of the inquiry the following definition for racial discrimination (Gabatshwane, 1966: 32):

> The affording of different treatment to different persons attributed wholly or mainly to their respective description by race whereby persons of such description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another such description are not made subject or are accorded privileges or advantages which are bit accorded to persons of another such description.

This definition was recommended as the threshold upon which such discrimination would be identified, and positive legislation was recommended which forbade racial discrimination. The final wording in Section 15 (3) of the constitution which was adopted in 1966 contained the words, "tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour or creed" after the word race, but retained the rest of the quote as given above (Constitution of the Republic of Botswana, 1966). The influence of the man who would ultimately be at the helm of Botswana's foreign policy formulation had thus began in earnest before the country had been declared a republic.

Seretse had continued to work hard to ensure that Botswana remained a non-racially prejudicial society as seen in a number of areas, such as education. Dale (1976) argues that Botswana was able to enlarge its non-racial identity to the world, through high schools such as Maru-a-Pula in Gaborone. While white parents living in the Bechuanaland protectorate were in the habit of sending their children to boarding schools in South Africa, Rhodesia and overseas, when the school was established it became less feasible or justifiable on education grounds to do so. The school thus housed local children as well as black and white expatriates, thereby creating a multi-racial student body (Dale, 1976: 74-75). There were very few schools at the time in the region that had taken on such a symbiotic character and this attracted the sentiment of actors beyond the Southern Africa region.

The Botswana government also showed its commitment to a multiracial society as seen in Vice-President Masire's address to the people of Francistown on race relations in 1969. Masire stated that anti-racism was, "... inextricably bound up with Botswana's national principles and objectives ..." (Henderson, 1974: 39). Put differently, it was a part and parcel of Botswana's identity.

As the theoretical framework prescribes for elite identities and ideas, Botswana's ruling elite had defined what type of socio-cultural internal order he sought – to wit multi-racial democracy– and would then use this image to gain favourable perceptions from outside actors that closely affiliated with these views. This aligns with constructivism in that Seretse had strived to cultivate the perception of an anti-racist country, which sought the assistance of

other similarly minded states to transcend the uncomfortable geopolitical setting within which Botswana found herself.

2.3. Foreign Policy towards Southern Africa: Principle within the Confines of Pragmatism

This non-racial identity at home was to form the basis of Botswana's foreign policy principles abroad – although this commitment to principle had to be couched within a great measure of prudence, given Botswana's geographical proximity to powerful white minority rule. In the immediate years after independence, political rhetoric demonstrated the sort of pragmatism expected for a country situated in Botswana's position. Khama had firmly pronounced that Botswana's foreign policy would be directed by, "the interests and peoples of Botswana" and would, "be dictated by reason and common sense rather than by emotions or sentiment" (Osei-Hwedie, 1998: 426). There are a number of instances which illustrate this cautious approach to foreign policy. For example, in 1966 Ethiopia and Liberia sought a judgment from the International Court of Justice to the effect that South Africa had dishonoured its mandate under the League of Nations to oversee the administration of South West Africa. The UN General Assembly (GA) protested and adopted a resolution ending the mandate and placing South West Africa under the control of the organisation. Botswana strategically opted to abstain from voting. This position was also followed when the GA adopted a number of resolutions: a vote encouraging the severing of diplomatic ties with Portugal (1966); another vote requiring the withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia (1968); a call for Britain to use force to bring about the end of white minority rule in Rhodesia if this were to prove necessary (1969) and a vote establishing a UN council on Namibia in 1976 (Niemaan, 1993: 28-29).

In terms of its refugee policy (discussed later), while Botswana was willing to lend moral, logistical and material support, Gaborone made it clear that it would not tolerate the territory being used as a 'springboard' for violent attacks on the countries of origin (Mgadla, 2008: 7). Botswana was also cautious not to abandon her membership to the Southern African Customs Union[11] in fear of economic repercussions from South Africa. Even within the context of the

[11] Botswana's relations towards SACU are discussed in Chapter Three.

Cold War, Botswana adopted a very prudent approach which saw Gaborone initially establish relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1966 because it could not afford to appear in the eyes of Pretoria as a country associated with communism (Taylor, 1998: 80).

The pragmatic Seretse had stated that he would cooperate with the surrounding hostile states in the spirit of good neighbourliness, but as noted by Tlou *et al*, he added a very important caveat, "... we align ourselves with any country or group of countries if our conscience permits us to do so and if such a relationship would benefit the people of Botswana" (1995: 252). The conscience that Seretse speaks of here can be extrapolated to encompass non-racialism and promotion of human rights, as evidenced by this quote,[12] "Our contention in Botswana is that the free world must speak out against the denial of basic human rights to others, and acts of human injustice ..." (Carter and Morgan, 1980: 24). Thus lay the foundations of a pragmatic foreign policy that was not to escape scrutiny and revision where principle demanded this be the case.

As Botswana's foreign relations began to develop, her posture and overtures would become more and more overtly principled – not only to reflect the country's actual identity of non-racialism – but also to be able to demonstrate to other African countries that she was not in favour of the status quo in the region.

The early pronouncements which were laden with a non-aggressive stance towards South Africa, made many of the leaders of majority led governments in 'Black Africa' suspicious of Botswana's motives, and reinforced in some minds the belief that Botswana was a 'puppet' or 'hostage' state of South Africa that sought to maintain the status quo in the region. Indeed in 1965 when Seretse stood up to address the OAU in Accra, the reception received was rather hostile (Henderson, 1990: 43). As well, there had been prior reports that Botswana's membership to the UN could be blocked by radical states like Guinea and Tanzania. Botswana began its outward reach to 'Black Africa' by forging relations with Zambia and Seretse called upon his friendship with President Kaunda to endorse Botswana's application

[12] This quote is taken from an address at a state banquet in honour of President Kaunda in Gaborone by President Khama in 1968.

into the UN (Tlou *et al*, 1995: 259).[13] Zambia in fact had served as a gateway interlocutor between Botswana and the rest of Africa. This was the only country in 1966 which shared a border with Botswana and was sympathetic to her plight. President Kaunda became the first state president to make a visit to Botswana, and offered 15 scholarships a year for Batswana students to study at Zambian Universities and also agreed to purchase beef from the country (Masire, 2006: 286-287). It was also announced in 1968 that Zambia would build a high commission in Gaborone and regular meetings between the two governments would commence. While relations with Lusaka seemed to have been cemented, the Zambian press – driven by pan-African sentiment – were still rather critical towards Botswana (Tlou *et al*, 1995:264).

Thus more work was required by Botswana if she was going to convince the continent of her anti-apartheid convictions and break out of the ring of 'hostage states'. As will soon become apparent, through diplomacy and speeches at conferences, Seretse began to win over other African countries such as Tanzania and Botswana's context and purpose became better understood.

Botswana's search for allies in Africa necessarily prompted the adoption of a non-aligned stance in the Cold War, which led to the establishment of ties with communist states – much to the frustration of Pretoria and Salisbury – with Moscow in March 1970, and Yugoslavia in September 1970 (Taylor, 1997: 77; Zaffiro, 1992).[14] Gaborone though had established relations with Japan and West Germany before which helped to diffuse suspicions of a communist leaning ideology (Taylor, 1997: 77). Botswana also voted with Zambia in favour of Beijing being admitted into the United Nations, when the two China question was debated

[13] Upon obtaining independence, Seretse dispatched Z.K. Mathews – who was one of South Africa's leading intellectuals and very active in ANC campaigns during apartheid, and had also been indicted in the great treason trial of 1956 to 1961 – to be Botswana's first UN representative and representative to the United States. In so doing, Seretse had announced to the world Botswana's principled anti-apartheid stance (Tlou *et al*, 1995: 260).

[14] The Soviet Union however, had been frustrated by Botswana's lack of overt assistance for forces of national liberation, operating in South Africa and Rhodesia, which had come to characterise relations between the two countries before Brezhnev came to power. Botswana however sought to appease the watchful eye of Pretoria who at one point had charged that the Soviet embassy in Gaborone was a spy centre for the ANC and the PAC (Zaffiro, 1992: 96).

at the General Assembly. By 1975, Botswana had established relations with Beijing while Taipei had severed relations in April of the previous year (Taylor, 1998: 81).

Within the region, Seretse had always maintained a clear line on white minority rule. He stressed his displeasure at the illegally constituted regime in Salisbury and the legally constituted regime in Pretoria (Henderson, 1990: 43). As such Botswana declined to establish official diplomatic relations with Rhodesia and South Africa, refusing the exchange of diplomatic personal – although Seretse made allowances for back channel communication or 'telephone diplomacy' (Osei-Hwedie, 1998: 431; Chipasula and Miti, 1989: 98).[15] Seretse and his government had unequivocally stated that they could not have such diplomatic exchanges all the while knowing that Batswana diplomats would be treated as un-equals by a regime that was explicitly predicated on this kind of societal arrangement (Masire, 2006: 251; Dale, 1976: 78).

What can be seen is an escalating level of defiance against South Africa, demonstrated by Botswana. In 1967, Masire declined an invitation to address South Africa's liberal opposition Progressive Party because Pretoria maintained that he would have to observe discrimination laws about transport and accommodation. Botswana also showed its defiance a number of years down the line when it refused to recognise the Bantustan system (Native Homelands) of South Africa. By 1963, Prime Minister Verwoerd had made reference to the possibility of creating ethnic homelands that would house various traditional groupings, in lieu of showing the world that separate development can actually work. By 1976, this policy was on the eve of becoming a reality (Dale, 1976: 79). Seretse's defiance was evident before the independence of the Transkei territory – which was zoned as a Xhosa homeland. In a speech to the Canadian's joint Foreign Relations Committee, Seretse stated that he refused, "... to extend moral and constitutional legitimacy to the institution of racial separation" (Tlou *et al*, 1995: 330). For Seretse, this separation of homelands was deplorable because it did not represent an equitable distribution of resources fragmented along racial lines. Seretse went on to state, "No one in the country has the right to deny others the enjoyment of its wealth and

[15] Botswana also refused to accept official aid from South Africa – unlike President Banda of Malawi who had established formal diplomatic relations with Pretoria and on occasion accepted aid (Chipasula and Miti, 1989: 98; Masire, 2006: 275).

economic opportunity, because these are the fruits of labour of all South Africans over centuries" (Tlou *et al*, 1995: 330).

The homeland of Bophuthatswana in particular – with its inhabitants as South African Tswanas – had close ties to the people of Botswana and there was some expectation or hope that Botswana would eventually amalgamate the territory within its country. Indeed, while on a trip to the United States, Bophuthatswana's leader, Chief Lucas Mangope had hinted that he would not look upon such a move with an unfavourable disposition (Dale, 1976: 79). The cultural similarities notwithstanding, Seretse's government lent no credence to the idea of a merger. Addressing parliament in November 1977, the Minister of External Affairs, Archie Mogwe, reiterated this position and further added that the Botswana government would not recognise Bophuthatswana travel documents. The minister though relayed that on humanitarian grounds, the government would minimise the immigration barriers between the homeland and Botswana, by issuing special entry permits. These permits would then be surrendered upon departure from the country (Botswana National Assembly, 1977: 17). As part of its regional policy, South Africa had sought to force recognition (or de facto recognition) of the homelands, and amongst the BLS states. It particularly sought to do so through the SACU agreement. South Africa would for example delay the distribution of revenue as a means of trying to achieve this recognition (Johnson and Martin, 1989: 116). This goes to show the extent of Botswana's defiance against South Africa, even while the possibility of economic repercussions[16] loomed large. Where Botswana demonstrated its greatest commitment to principle, was in its participation in the Frontline States, thereby leveraging its identity towards Africa and the world, as a leading advocate for the end of white minority rule in Southern Africa.

[16] As part of the SACU Agreement, goods, services and people were meant to move freely across the borders. South Africa repeatedly used its border to coerce Botswana by way of economic sanctions by instituting a slowdown in traffic. This happened at the Tlokweng post for 40 days from December 1987 to January 1988. This took the form of strict searches that led to the accumulation of 100 or so cars and trucks in stagnant queues (Johnson and Martin, 1989: 117; Anglin, 1988: 553). South Africa also withheld refrigerated waggons for transporting Botswana beef whenever Gaborone voiced its criticism of apartheid in the UN and the OAU. Pretoria also created transport problems for Botswana by delaying oil deliveries through South Africa (Hanlon and Spray, 1986: 220-221).

2.4. Botswana's Search for Sympathetic Friends

As initially stated, Gaborone's approach to Southern Africa's liberation movements began with grave caution, so as to not provide South Africa with a reason to invade Botswana.[17] As time went on, and the situation in Southern Africa became more desperate, Seretse's government embarked on a more active policy in favour of frontline states.[18] Seretse worked tirelessly to use his diplomatic skills to advance his regional objectives in various international forums.

Having opened up to 'Black Africa', Botswana displayed much diplomatic clout in mobilising support for its delicate cause. What was rhetorically known as Seretse's 'outward policy' was by 1969 focused on image building and securing connections with influential international organisations (Tlou *et al*, 1995: 275). In September 1969, Seretse captured the hearts of the General Assembly when he delivered a powerful speech to the United Nations in which he outlined Botswana's desolate position vis-à-vis South Africa but stressed Botswana's uncompromising stance on non-racism and democracy, "Botswana as a thriving majority ruled state ... will present an effective and serious challenge to South Africa[n] racial policies ..." (Carter and Morgan, 1980: 65). Seretse closed his address with this appeal:

> Botswana needs the support and sympathy of friendly nations. We recognise that our independence ultimately depends on the durability of our political institutions and our success in achieving economic development. But our independence is also buttressed by our external relations. We have friends in all continents (Carter and Morgan, 1980: 66).

Khama concluded his speech to a jubilant General Assembly that – save for South Africa and Portugal – gave him a standing ovation. So successful was the image that Khama had projected of Botswana that his speech was entered into the United States congressional record (Henderson, 1974: 42). Massachusetts senator Edward Brooks contended that, "Botswana in

[17] Indeed in June 1985 South African Defence Force commandos stormed into Gaborone and destroyed four houses and killed 12 people while injuring six. Two of the fatalities were Batswana citizens (Dale, 1987: 78). Another attack in May 1986 on a housing complex in Mogoditshane (which was a village near Gaborone) killed one man and injured another three (Johnson and Martin, 1989: 108).

[18] Masire is said to have coined the phrase 'on the frontline' (Masire, 2006: 275; Tlou *et al*, 1995: 311)

some ways more than any other nation, occupies a key position in the fight for human rights" (Tlou *et al*, 1995: 282). Botswana had thus successfully positioned herself to the outside world, gaining strong credentials as an exemplary non-racial liberal democracy.

Another instance in which Botswana demonstrated skilful diplomacy was in July 1970 when Edward Heath – Prime Minister of Great Britain – announced that British weapons manufacturers would consider doing business with South Africa (Tlou *et al*, 1995: 291). This move would catalyse the reverses that Seretse had vowed to stamp out. In other words weapons sales to South Africa would not only arm an already tyrannical minority government against forces of liberation, but would also deliver a blow to the principle that such minority rule was illegitimate.

During the Non-Aligned-Movement (N.A.M.) conference in Lusaka in September 1970, Seretse cleverly addressed the issue, warning against the British and French promoting an arms race in a region as volatile as Southern Africa. Seretse also reminded the delegates about Botswana's vulnerability to South Africa (Tlou *et al*, 1995: 291). This impressed the delegates of the N.A.M. and in Singapore in 1971, the Commonwealth African leaders turned the issue into a pressing matter at the heads of government summit. Meanwhile, Seretse had flown to London to urge the Prime Minister to, at the very least, suspend the sale of arms until the conference had actually taken place. These moves are demonstrative of Khama's diplomatic ability to take the initiative on pressing matters, prioritise them in conference and bilateral settings and then build consensus amongst sympathetic actors who could then take up the issue as well.

By the time the conference took place, views about the weapons sale were deeply divided. Khama – knowing very well that Botswana still needed aid from Britain – took on an interlocutory role in which he sought to broker consensus between African leaders and Edward Heath. Thus in public sessions, Seretse would show solidarity with his fellow Africans as seen in his expression that, "... it is imperative that nations who are in a position to influence events should actively look for ways of minimizing existing violence and the prospect of new violence and maximising the possibility of peaceful solutions" (Carter and

Morgan, 1980: 115-116). Seretse in the same speech stated that he did not see how British sales of weapons to South Africa would actually lead to the apartheid government retracting their repression, when the French and Italian arms sales seemed only to energise it (Carter and Morgan, 1980: 120). On the other hand, in closed sessions, Seretse employed strategically, sharply timed responses, enveloped in his well-known broad smile, which eased the tensions between diverging views (Tlou *et al*, 1995: 292; Henderson, 1990: 45). From this conference, Seretse emerged with great prestige as a leader that projected reasonableness. This bought him great favour with Premier Pierre Trudeau of Canada and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, as well as increased respect amongst his African colleagues, Kaunda and Nyerere (Henderson, 1990: 47: Tlou *et al*, 1995: 293). As with his abovementioned success at the United Nations, Seretse had thus used his diplomatic prowess to create a favourable image perception amongst more powerful members of the Commonwealth, which is consistent again with Thorhallsson's (2012) prescription of how small states can influence international organisations, and the constructivist notion of leveraging oneself vis-à-vis powerful actors to obtain favourable outcomes.

During Khama's state visit to Tanzania, Julius Nyerere – who had initially viewed Botswana with suspicion – now understood Seretse's delicate position within Southern Africa and expressed that Gaborone's attitude towards liberation movements was just and that Botswana could not be expected to commit suicide by providing military bases. Nyerere then praised Seretse as, "a fighter, a tight-rope walker, and an expert football dribbler all rolled into one" (Henderson, 1990: 47).

2.5. Botswana as a Frontline State

As it became increasingly clear that the white minority regimes were not willing to entertain majority rule, the Botswana government in the 1970s adapted its understanding of how change in Southern Africa ought to take place (Osei-Hwedie, 1998 427-428; Tlou *et al*, 1995: 305). In a speech at the opening of the Botswana Democratic Party headquarters in Gaborone, Khama projected that white minority rule had a limited future in Africa and the transition to majority rule was imminent. Khama went on to say that, "It is these governments which will determine whether the white-ruled states of Southern Africa will achieve true democracy and

equality by peaceful transformation or through bitter warfare" (Morgan and Carter, 1980: 178). This support was however qualified, the Seretse government knowing very well the potential of the South African security forces, warned that Botswana would not be used as a springboard nation to launch military attacks against Salisbury and Pretoria. The Minister in the Office of the President, Daniel Kwelagobe stressed this point when he said, "… If we allowed freedom fighters to come here in order to cross into South Africa or Rhodesia, they might be checked and forced to retreat. If they are followed, how do we put up resistance …" (Morapedi, 2012: 75). Never the less, Botswana was now committed to providing what support they could, for the Frontline states (FLS).

The FLS were a political alliance based on the Lusaka Manifesto – comprised of the core members of Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania, and later Angola and Mozambique. The manifesto – sponsored by Nyerere and Kaunada – was the accepted strategy by the OAU in 1969 on the process of liberating Southern Africa from white minority rule (Niemmann. 1993: 29). While Botswana could not actively encourage liberation wars to be fought from her soil, Gaborone did, however, offer asylum to people who fled from oppressive racist regimes by keeping an Open Door policy. From a normative perspective, Botswana's proximity to the surrounding troubled countries, coupled with the liberal democratic ideology that she followed, demanded an exigent consideration for refugees on humanitarian grounds. In addition, Botswana's obligations to the UN General Convention on Refugees, demanded that the question of asylum be considered with the utmost urgency (Osei-Hwedie, 1998: 430). Those refugees who were in need of genuine political asylum were given refugee status and allowed to live within the country – though this caused considerable constraints for the government. Those who sought to act politically and use Botswana as a springboard for attacks against their countries of origin, were imprisoned or deported to Zambia – or any other country that would not be hostile to the refugees (Mgadla, 2008: 8). For his role in taking on this commitment, Serertse was ultimately awarded the Nansen Medal by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, further adding to what had already become impressive credentials of democracy and tolerance for people of all societies (Niemann, 1993: 31).

Botswana worked very hard to accommodate and maintain the FLS alliance. Masire – who deputised for Seretse when his health was beginning to disintegrate – recalls that while many

of the leaders within the FLS were against dialogue with Pretoria, Kaunda saw the benefits of open interchange. In 1981, when Kaunda sought to engage with P.W. Botha, Botswana facilitated the arrangements and the meeting took place on the border of South Africa and Botswana (Masire, 2006: 275). Botswana also took the lead in forming the Southern African Coordinating Conference (SADCC)[19] in April 1980. In the early years of SADCC's inception, Botswana invested the majority of the staff and leadership for the organisation. SADCC was a way of keeping the FLS together politically and advancing collective economic survival, thereby reducing dependency on South Africa, even beyond the fall of apartheid. For her efforts and due to the trust she had earned from the other members of SADCC as well as external donors, Botswana became the first chair and was subsequently re-elected for another 16 years (Masire, 2006: 277).

In the context of the detente between South Africa and the FLS, a strategy of diplomacy – or a negotiated transition which avoided full-scale guerrilla warfare – was adopted, but there was also recognition of armed struggle where this failed. Botswana's assistance took on a very diplomatic character. Between 1973 and 1974, Rhodesia had descended into a civil war between Ian Smith's forces and the liberation forces of ZANU and ZAPU.

One of the first successful diplomatic moves that were made by the FLS was to secure the release of captured nationalist leaders in Rhodesia, who were then flown to Lusaka (Tlou *et* al, 1995: 312). Tlou *et al* credit Seretse Khama for keeping together the FLS – which almost disintegrated as Nyerere grew tired of the internal squabbles between ZANU and ZAPU – by appealing to Nyerere with the words, "Julius, you cannot walk out on Rhodesia" (Henderson, 1990: 41). When Nyerere was convinced by this calm and simple appeal, the FLS managed to broker a union between ZANU and ZAPU under the umbrella term African National Council – A.N.C.[20] (Venter, 1976: 8; Tlou *et al*, 1995: 312). This created a united negotiation front against the Smith government and British mediators. Botswana's important diplomatic role as a leading member of the Frontline state is thus quite evident. Seretse had mobilised his political tact into socialising the FLS states into remaining together, which in turn led to the

[19] SADCC later in 1992 became the Southern African Development Community (SADC) after the demise of apartheid.
[20] Although by 1975 this union had begun to split (Tlou *et al*, 1995: 324).

creation of the A.N.C. in Rhodesia – which also in turn led to the release of Mugabe and other detained nationalist leaders.

Seretse's hopes for an eventual negotiated settlement were devastated by Ian Smith's pronouncement that any constitutional settlement within Rhodesia would have to perpetually guarantee a white minority government at all times (Venter, 1976: 11). Khama had now become disillusioned with the prospects of a negotiated peace with Smith. When asked by a journalist in 1976 if engaging with Ian Smith was still worthwhile, Seretse responded in a frustrated fashion, "... He has said No to majority rule in his lifetime, in a thousand years. So it doesn't matter how patient you are, how much goodwill you have, nor how much you shun bloodshed, you must at some stage get fed up" (Tlou *et al*, 1995: 326).

Seretse sought to use his diplomatic tact to argue before the world why supporting liberation movements was becoming a morally desirable cause. On a state visit to India, in responding to questions as to why the FLS had forsaken Ghandi's teachings and endorsed violence, Seretse stated that Ian Smith was a deep-seeded racialist and as such he could only be persuaded by force (Tlou *et al*, 1995: 327).

Even as early as 1971, Seretse had noted to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Singapore that, "We can no more condemn those who resort to violence to gain freedom in such situations, than we could condemn the violence of European resistance movements against German occupation or the violence of the Hungarians against the Russians in 1956" (Carter and Morgan, 1980: 115). Seretse played to this double standard again in 1976 when he attacked the western world for collaborating with the white minority governments in Southern Africa, while they promoted democracy which necessarily involves one man-one vote (Carter and Morgan, 1980: 229). Addressing Oxford University's African Society, Khama then went on to proclaim:

> Much as we in Botswana would have preferred peaceful change in Rhodesia (for which we have worked so hard) to violent revolution, we have now accepted that it

> would be unrealistic for us to expect peaceful change in a situation where the oppressors of our people prefer war to peace (Carter and Morgan, 1980: 231).

Botswana struggled throughout 1976 with numerous border skirmishes with its Rhodesian neighbours who often took the lives of her police mobile paratroopers, and innocent citizens of the Republic – which was the main reason why by 1977 an official Defence Force was established (Chipasula and Miti, 1989: 108, Dale, 1987: 85). Botswana, however, consistently engaged with the UN, seeking international condemnation and a pledge to resolve the situation. These attempts did not fall on deaf ears, and in 1977, the Security Council adopted Resolution 406 which supported Botswana against continued attacks by what it referred to as an 'illegal racist regime' (United Nations Security Council, 1977). The Resolution went on to encourage "... all States to give the matter of assistance to Botswana their most urgent attention and to provide Botswana with the financial and material help it urgently needs" (United Nations Security Council, 1977).

Similarly, when the South African Defence Force raided Gaborone in June 1985 looking for ANC strongholds, the Government of Botswana turned to the UN Security Council demanding reparations. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Chiepe addressed the Council, telling them that Botswana had long resisted the signing of a 'non-aggression pact' with South Africa,[21] and that the problem in the region was the apartheid system. Chiepe then went on to state that if apartheid came to an end, "there will be no Sowetos, Uitenhages, Sharpevilles, Langas, and the rest – no more refugees scattered all over the subcontinent … raring to return to their country at all costs" (Dale, 1987: 83). The Security Council adopted resolution 568 on 21 June, 1985 – with no absenters or absences. The resolution condemned the raid – along with other measures of coercion employed by South Africa – and demanded compensation to be paid to Botswana. These resolutions are examples of what Thorhallsson (2012) refers to in prescribing that small states can influence the international forums by having an understanding of operational affairs and seeking close relations with more established members of such forums – as with the permanent members of the Security

[21] South Africa had sought to compel Botswana to sign a non-aggression pact in the same way that Mozambique had done under the 'Nkomati-Accord'. Gaborone objected to the signing of such a pact on a moral level because it not only gnawed away at her sovereignty, but it also gave South Africa control over the fate of refugees fleeing into Botswana (Claus and Weimer, 1991: 323-324).

Council. This was also a time when Botswana was able to take advantage of the image she had projected to the West of virtually being Africa's sole parliamentary success story, in an era when the continent had experienced a large number of life time presidencies.

2.6. Conclusion

This chapter has sought to explain how by leveraging its identity as a non-racial liberal democracy, Botswana managed to traverse its 'hostage' station within the Southern African subordinate state system. In so doing, it was discovered that Seretse Khama's personal views about non-racial societies legitimated by electoral majorities, created the identity that would ultimately inform Botswana's foreign policy. This principled anti-racist foreign policy, however, had to be coupled with a large degree of pragmatism so as to prevent negative reprisals from Pretoria. This sense of principle, allowed Khama to skilfully draw upon various diplomatic techniques to increase Botswana's prestige and influence, thereby attracting support in various forums for a liberation cause that he shared with the FLS. In the final analysis, Botswana was able to embark on a more independent foreign policy, while other states within the system – such as Lesotho and Swaziland – arguably were not. In the chapter that follows, the study assesses Botswana's ability to punch above its weight and effectively use negotiations to transcend the poor economic state that it had inherited from Britain upon attaining independence.

Chapter 3

BOTSWANA'S USE OF NEGOTIATIONS TO TRANSCEND THE PROBLEM OF THE POST-COLONIAL ECONOMY

In chapter One, a theoretical framework was delineated in which the inter-subjective process of constructivism can create an environment where states socialise other actors into changing positions and perceptions they may have otherwise held, and through arguing, states can leverage themselves vis-à-vis the external environment, convincing these actors that certain mutual outcomes are within their interests as well. This can help a small state to transcend its political or economic station. Habeeb (1988) further added that small states can increase their influence in negotiations through the merging of their aggregate structural power with their issue-specific power, to inform their behavioural power, which is aimed at achieving favoured outcomes.

Chapter Two focused on the manner in which Botswana was able to transcend its political hostage station by following a foreign policy that showed a combined mixture of pragmatism and principle – pragmatism to prevent antagonising its powerful neighbours in the form of South Africa and Rhodesia, and principle in linking up with similarly oriented governments to obtain allies (both on the continent and abroad) who would then aid in bringing about the end of white minority rule in the region.

While the focus of the last chapter was on Botswana's transcendence of its hostage political station, this chapter seeks to assess how – through leveraging herself within the international environment in various ways – Botswana was able to rise from the desperate economic conditions that characterised her economy at the time of independence in 1966. The Chapter illustrates how Botswana was able to demonstrate a great measure of agency, punching above its weight, and negotiating with more powerful actors to obtain vital outcomes that would transcend her small state economy. This in turn led to the country obtaining the status of upper middle income power, by the mid-1990s.

In what follows, the chapter assesses Botswana's pivotal negotiations (along with Lesotho and Swaziland) in which Gaborone took the lead against South Africa, culminating in the 1969 SACU Agreement – thereby allowing for the country to break away from its dependence on British aid. The chapter then looks at the way in which Botswana, through a number of negotiations was able to convince the De Beers diamond cartel to accept a 50-50 share in mining rights (amongst other things) in the 1970s, culminating in a boom in mineral exports and government budgetary surpluses. Finally, the chapter evaluates Botswana's aid management relations and considers how Gaborone was able leverage itself as a politically stable country that had the credentials of the leading example of liberal democracy on the continent. This allowed for Botswana to obtain aid from various donors, and skilfully negotiate with them in such a way that they followed the developmental requirements of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning.

3.1. Post-Colonial Economic Legacy

As mentioned above, upon gaining independence, Botswana faced a harsh geo-political environment in which it was surrounded by unfavourable white minority rule. This was coupled with bleak internal economic and administrative constraints (Granberg and Parkinson, 1988: 110; Tsie, 1996: 599). In 1966, the prospect of a mineral based economy did not exist and the newly independent government drew its development spending and 60 per cent of its recurrent budget from aid provided by Britain (Kerapeletswe *et al*, 2008: 18; Maipose and Somolekae, 1998: 441; Maipose *et al*, 1997: 18). Botswana also relied on migrant labour earnings from South Africa, and revenue drawn from cattle exports, a sector that had been riddled with years of drought (Granberg and Parkinson, 1988: 110). Botswana's administrative capacities were by the mid-1960s still partially located in Mafikeng in the Cape Colony and largely manned by former British protectorate officials.

The economic dependency on Britain required that Botswana renegotiate support on a yearly basis, which involved an entire audit by the British of the country's expenditures and British proposals on economic policy would then be issued (Granberg and Parkinson, 1988: 110). By 1970, the country's per capita income was USD 240 and government revenue and spending was USD 34 million (Maipose *et al*, 1997: 17). As noted by Tsie, "Botswana was a very

poor country at independence. No one knew whether it would become a Bantu Homeland or a Pan-African outpost" (Tsie, 1996: 612).

So desperate was Botswana's economy that her leadership realised the need for a pragmatic approach to development and a number of commentators have lauded at the manner in which the government has avoided reliance on radical ideologies. If Botswana's foreign policy was to aid in this process, according to Seretse, it would have to, "be dictated by reason and common sense rather than by emotions or sentiment" (Tlou *et al,* 1995: 252). In this pragmatic vein, government vested the country's progress in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) which issues recurring policy documents in the form of National Development Plans (NDPs).

The First Transitional Development Plan of 1966 stated that, "The Botswana Government wishes to stress its belief in the necessity of planning the social and economic development of the nation" (The Government of Botswana, 1966: 6). These NDPs strategize financial planning over five or six year periods with mid-term reviews where updates may be required to keep up with changes in the economic climate of the day (Land, 2002: 4). NDPs and developmental issues are deliberated upon by an Economic Committee of cabinet and are discussed in parliament which then, through consensus, enacts such plans into law (Maipose and Somolekae, 1998: 442). In 1976, the government also withdrew from the Rand Monetary Area[22] and established its own Reserve Bank thereby adopting its own currency, which allowed it to adapt exchange rate policies in Gaborone's favour instead of being completely dependent on developments in South Africa (Hudson, 1978: 119; Bhuiyan, 1987: 173). The government has also followed a conservative fiscal policy that has kept inflation in check and led to surplus revenue, which was used to accumulate a healthy reserve that can provide relief for periods of economic decline. The Bank of Botswana has also prudently invested budget surpluses and foreign exchange reserves and these offshore outlays were by 1997 the second largest share of government revenue (Maipose *et al*, 1997: 18).

[22] The RMA required members of the Southern African Customs Union to use the same currency, however there was no representation for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland on the South African Reserve Bank Board, thus these smaller countries did not have a voice on matters that clearly affected their economies. Botswana had expressed its profound opposition to this set up (Chipasula and Miti, 1989: 19).

This pragmatic internal policy planning, however, did not exist in a vacuum, independent of Botswana's external relations. The policies were both facilitated by and indeed set the framework for important international negotiations in which Botswana managed to out-manoeuvre more powerful actors, and successfully pursue its own developmental policies. Outstanding examples of these manoeuvres include its deliberations regarding, the SACU Agreement of 1969, Botswana's diamond deals with De Beers and Botswana's relationship with international aid donors.

Through leveraging itself pragmatically (and avoiding where it could, activity that would antagonise Pretoria) and adopting liberal economic ideologies as a state with well-known democratic credentials, Botswana was able to position itself in relation to these external actors in such a way that she convinced them of the advantages of agreeing to mutual interest, that benefited her domestic imperatives. This is indicative of the inter-subjective process of socialisation that constructivism appeals to.

3.2. The 1969 SACU Negotiations and Agreement

3.2.1. Background: the 1910 Agreement

The Southern African Customs Union has historically proven to be a significant aspect of Botswana's economic relations with its powerful neighbour South Africa. The Customs Union was quite important not only to Botswana's economy, but also to those of Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS). The initial involvement of these countries as High Commission Territories (HCTs) of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland in the Customs Union of 1910 was very much out their control. As far as the British were concerned, the 1910 Customs Agreement was brokered based on the supposition that the HCTs would ultimately be absorbed into the Union of South Africa, except this never occurred (Gibb, 2006: 589; Chipasula and Miti, 1989: 17). In some respects, this explains why the agreement profoundly favoured the South Africans at the expense of the HCTs. All this considered, it must be noted that revenue

obtained from the Customs arrangement served as an important financial source for the High Commission Territories (Chipasula and Miti, 1989: 17).

Policies and procedures of governing the 1910 Agreement – such as tariff setting and allocation of revenue – were to fall wholly within the purview of the South African government and its institutions, without input from the HCTs (Gibb, 2006: 589). The HCTs were expected to follow whatever tariff structure South Africa set up and apply these tariffs to imports they received from sources outside of the Customs Union. A formula with fixed percentages was adopted in which Bechuanaland would receive 0.2762 per cent of the total revenue pool – while Basutoland and Swaziland each received 0.88575 and 0.149 per cent respectively (Lord Hailey, 1963: 41).

After 1966, in an attempt to industrialise its own economy, South Africa – under its rights from the 1910 agreement – increased its external tariffs significantly. In so doing, the revenue pool available for distribution to the BLS was reduced because more production was taking place inside the country, exceeding imports. In addition, the polarization effect that normally accompanies a customs arrangement in which one party is significantly larger than the smaller members was further exacerbated (Grynberg and Motswapong, 2012: 4).[23] The British government had long maintained that the SACU revenue sharing formula had been beneficial to Botswana in terms of the net revenue amount which would steadily flow in her direction, and had unburdened her of the task of managing her own independent customs and excise system. As HCTs moved towards gaining independence, the dissatisfaction with the terms of the 1910 agreement had begun to surface. Botswana in particular started becoming vocal about the whole arrangement. The inequity of the 1910 Agreement was first brought to the attention of parliament by Member of Parliament for Botletle (Boteti) area and treasurer of the BDP, Benjamin Steinberg. Steinberg's initial appraisal of the situation was that Botswana was losing between 3 and 4 million Rand per annum – revenue that could have gone a long way to balancing the budget and reducing the dependency on British Aid (Tlou *et al*, 1995: 256). The denunciation of the 1910 Agreement in principle and the determination to

[23] At the same time that South Africa was protecting its industries, it was prohibiting Batswana's only possible export, beef, through weight restrictions that only white farmers within the Bechuanaland Protectorate could meet. Batswana were thus left with the only option of exporting labour to South African mines (Grynberg and Motswapong, 2012: 4).

commit South Africa to negotiations was boldly laid out in the Transitional Development Plan which was released in 1966 on Independence Day (1966: 10).

Botswana took the lead in the negotiation process between the BLS and South Africa, which had begun in earnest by 1968 after all the HCTs had obtained independence from Britain (Henderson, 1990: 44).Granberg and Parkinson purport that the, "… apparent change in the relative fortunes of … [Botswana] … has, in some part, been affected by Botswana's skilful handling of the South African dimension, by her political acumen in pressing after independence for radical changes in the Southern African Customs Union" (1988: 113-114).

As outlined in Chapter Two, in the 1960s Botswana had positioned herself in relation to South Africa in such a way that Gaborone followed a policy of 'good neighbourliness' and avoided overt action that would antagonise Pretoria – such as allowing her territory to be used as a launch-pad for attacks against white minority governments. It was this pragmatic positioning that opened up the space for South Africa to become receptive towards accommodating and listening to Botswana when the SACU negotiations took place. As constructivism suggests, Botswana had leveraged herself in such a way that South Africa could view her in favourable terms and cooperate, instead of jumping to use her economic might to frustrate negotiation processes.

3.2.2. Negotiations leading up to 1969

Leading up to the Southern African Customs Agreement (SACUA) signed by South Africa and the BLS in 1969, South Africa had produced a proposal that did not have any of the pertinent features that the BLS sought, which included: the protection of infant industries from South African manufacturers; consultation rights on matters such as tariff revisions; an increase in the revenue share which had hitherto been unfavourable to the BLS; a role in influencing tariffs to be placed on imports of major importance – for both present and future goods; the exclusion of South Africa's proposal to protect existing industries vis-à-vis new competitors (Ettinger, 1973: 101).

In his memoirs, former President Sir Quett Ketumile Masire – who was the then Minister of Finance and Development Planning, as well as the Vice President – conceded that staying in the Customs Union was of extreme importance not just for the potential revenue benefits, but also due to the fact that it provided a platform for political discussion with South Africa, which gave Botswana the added impetus of resisting pressures to extend full diplomatic relations with Pretoria (Masire, 2006: 256). Masire pragmatically saw the issue of leaving the Union as potentially counterproductive in that most of Botswana's imports came from South Africa, and that Gaborone could not rely on international law alone to ensure the safeguard of these goods. Thus, Pretoria's goodwill and cooperation would also be vital. In his negotiation manoeuvres, Masire recalls that it was essential to hide these vulnerabilities during the negotiation process, otherwise Botswana's bargaining potential would have been severely compromised (Masire, 2006: 256-257).

As such, the tactic adopted by Masire's team was to constantly steer the conversation towards the high protected prices of South African manufactured goods and the fact that the fixed revenue from the Customs pool was inadequate in compensating for the high priced goods produced in South Africa (Masire, 2006: 257). Tackling the South African giant in the negotiations required much planning and preparation. Accordingly, Botswana solicited the services of outside professors and economic experts who counselled the Botswana government on the effects of large economies next to small ones, as well as the nuances involved in the effects of regional polarisation. These experts furnished the Botswana government with an opinion accompanied by a cost benefit analysis. The president and his cabinet would then approve the negotiating tactics and set limits as to how far negotiators could pursue an issue before returning back to cabinet or the relevant ministries (Masire, 2006: 257-258). Masire also recognised during the negotiations that it was possible to ascertain which officials were staunch right-wing apartheid advocates – such as Andries Treurnicht, known within the South African media as 'Dr No' – and which were more left leaning and amenable to dialogue – such as the then Foreign Minister Pik Botha (Masire, 2006: 257). Botswana was able to make the most of this information, all the while bearing in mind that even the left leaning officials were working under the grander instructions of the apartheid government.

The *modus operandi* was that officials conducted the actual discussions leaving ministers in reserve in case things spiralled out of control (Masire, 2006: 257-258). Indeed, there was one issue which had both sides drawn to a stalemate, and that was the formula for the distribution of SACU revenue. By this time, South African had begun to throw its weight around, and was brandishing unrealistic proposals. Pretoria would only accept a new revenue formula which was pegged to actual increases year on year of imports and exports for the BLS if the latter in turn agreed that infant industries would be charged a certain duty upon entering South Africa (Tlou *et al*, 1995: 274). While negotiations were still on going, South Africa had aggravated the discussions by announcing the introduction of a sales tax on luxury and semi-luxury goods, which was to be collected from points of manufacture and at the points of access into the country (Ettinger, 1973: 104). While the BLS were clearly unhappy with this policy, it did improve their bargaining position when talks did resume in that the sales tax issue had occasioned the very real possibility that the BLS could walk out of the Customs Union if they did not gain any reasonable terms. At the same time, Pretoria was anxious to avoid any more accusations of 'high-handedness' towards the smaller countries (Ettinger, 1973: 105).[24]

When the officials were unable to reach a consensus on the revenue distribution issue, a meeting between ministers was held in Cape Town. Masire as the Minister of Finance and Development Planning was left alone to face the South Africans and his officials wondered what he may agree to or concede. However, Masire had been well coached on the facts and details by his officials. He carried the message to the other ministers of Lesotho and Swaziland who were not all that knowledgeable on the subject matter. (Masire, 2006: 258). In his biography, Masire avers, "When one is in a meeting with people who are not as knowledgeable, and one demonstrates one's knowledge, the others tend to keep quiet; they don't want to say something that would make them appear to be fools" (2006: 258). Masire notes that his knowledge ahead of the other ministers – from Lesotho, Swaziland as well as

[24] This was within the context of South Africa's adopted foreign policy in the 1960s. With an increase in the number of African states gaining independence, Pretoria moved out of the isolationism that had hitherto governed apartheid South Africa's foreign policy. After the formation of the OAU, African countries became vocal about their discontent for apartheid. South Africa developed an 'outward-looking' foreign policy which sought 'cooperation' and friendship with African governments, provided they remain silent on the issue of apartheid (Nolutshungu, 1975: 114). Prime Minister Voster had stated that he would, "… accept 'dialogue' as an opportunity to get rid of some of the 'misconceptions' African leaders had concerning apartheid" (Nolutshungu, 1975: 275).

South Africa – and also the fact that he 'appeared to know more than [he] was saying' allowed for him to achieve great strides in 'carry[ing] the day' and obtaining considerable improvements on the agreement (Masire, 2006: 258). Botswana had taken the lead throughout the negotiation process on, behalf of the BLS, mobilising Lesotho and Swaziland to adopt a consolidated position against South Africa. Lesotho and Swaziland, who were not as well prepared for the negotiations, relied on Gaborone's leadership to leverage the BLS position against South Africa.

Under Gaborone's guidance, the BLS were also able to demonstrate to South Africa that there was ample precedent in which Customs Unions composed of unequal partners have had a mechanism that compensates for the polarisation effect (Ettinger, 1973: 107-108). In this regard, Botswana had used its knowledge on the issues at hand to leverage herself in such a way that she played a leadership role in convincing South Africa that she was not just a passive small state that would accept dictated terms. The fostering of this image perception, which contributed to Botswana (and the BLS) success here, is part of the constructivist paradigm of inter-subjective identity formation, delineated in chapter One.

This handling of the SACU negotiations is also demonstrative of what Habeeb (1988) means when he says that in asymmetrical power relations, small states can significantly alter the playing field through a reconfiguration of power relations at the issue specific level (1988: 19). Botswana's negotiators were clearly able to do this by keeping to the issues at hand, and being more knowledgeable than the other actors, thereby carrying the day and obtaining improvements on the SACU agreement.

3.2.3. Outcomes of the 1969 Agreement

Largely as a result of Botswana's leadership in the negotiations, the BLS managed to gain considerable outcomes in the 1969 negotiation process. South Africa agreed to grant the BLS the right to protect their infant industries for eight years. Pretoria also agreed to regular consultation on customs related issues – though not to the satisfaction of the BLS – and a compromise was reached in which the BLS could submit specifications of certain industries

on which the common external tariff would not be raised without their consent. As well, Pretoria would consider allowing the BLS to make proposals for greater protective tariffs on the same basis as South African industries. This had great potential for Botswana's sulphur, soda ash and salt industries. South Africa also agreed to drop the proposal for the protection of their existing industries against new ones from the BLS (Ettinger, 1973: 101; Turner, 1971: 273-275).

The most important outcome however was the increase in the revenue share by a 1.42 multiplier effect which had the effect of compensating the BLS for the negative effects of being in the Union. This substantially increased the revenue amounts received by the BLS. In Botswana's case for instance, under the 1910 agreement, the country received R, 1,870,000, whereas under the 1969 agreement, the total was R 5,030,000 (Chipasula and Miti, 1989: 19; Landell-Mills, 1971: 76). The long term significance of the 1969 SACU agreement was that Botswana's economy would now no longer be dependent on Britain, although it did mean as had been the case in the past that Botswana and the other BLS states were dependent on South Africa's trading patterns.

3.3. Negotiations of Diamonds

One area in which Botswana has been praised for obtaining invaluable outcomes has been in its relations with the major South African diamond mining cartel, De Beers. Obtaining some form of ownership over minerals and extraction rights was a drawn out and very difficult task for the Botswana government. Diamond prospecting in Botswana had begun as early as 1955, this at a time when Botswana's primary mineral prospects had been salt and soda ash from the Makgadikgadi pans, as well as copper in the Mmatsitama area (Harvey and Lewis, 1990: 119; Tlou *et al*, 1995: 225). While the SACU Agreement of 1969 provided sufficient revenue to balance the budget deficit, "Seretse and his Cabinet correctly diagnosed that … sufficient surplus for significant development of the Botswana economy could only come from mineral exports" (Tlou *et* al, 1995: 255). This was echoed in the National Development Plan for the period 1970-1975 which stated that the development of the economy was to be, "entirely dependent on the successful creation of a mining sector" (in Niemann, 1993: 41).

Shortly before independence, in the highly secretive fashion that was to characterise the early De Beers and Botswana government negotiations later, Harry Oppenheimer[25] whispered into Seretse's ear that there existed viable deposits of kimberlite at Orapa (Masire, 2006: 205). One of the obstacles that lay in the government's way was the fact that certain areas of mineral land were owned by different authorities. Thus, for example, minerals that lay in tribal lands belonged to that particular land through their chief's custodianship. The problem was at that point, Botswana had not developed a comprehensive legislative framework to oversee mineral production (Harvey and Lewis, 1990: 113-114).

Seretse Khama had been determined to bring the ownership of all mineral rights within the central government's control. In this vein, the central government convinced the tribal leadership to relinquish their claims to mineral rights. By 1967, Parliament had passed the 'Mineral Rights in Tribal Territories Act' – which bestowed upon government all mineral rights – and the 'Mines and Minerals Act' – to govern prospecting and mining within the country. The latter Act fashioned the framework under which negotiations with De Beers for the Orapa mine discovery were to be conducted (Harvey and Lewis, 1990: 114).

De Beers had been eyeing Botswana's Diamond potential for some time. Indeed by 1968, Harry Oppenheimer, in marvelling at the diamond extraction prospects in Botswana remarked, "I cannot help feeling that somehow providence intends that this should be a highly successful and happy country" (Muluzi, 2013). The previous year, a kimberlite pipe – the second largest ever to be revealed – was discovered at Orapa which is situated in the north-central area of the country. A mine was constructed beginning in 1969 and by 1971 diamond production had begun (Harvey and Lewis, 1990: 119). At that point in time, the government did not have the capital required to finance diamond production and, as such, all the development of the mines was to be mainly for De Beers to deal with. The government briefly negotiated a 15 per cent stake in DEBSWANA (De Beers Botswana) – a company formed in 1969 to oversee the development of the mine and a small town – while De Beers retained 85 per cent (Hartland-Thunberg, 1978: 50; Harvey and Lewis, 1990: 52). One element of this initial agreement which came to serve Botswana well was a clause which

[25] Who was the then chairman of De Beers as well as Anglo-American.

required that the government and De Beers renegotiate if there came a point where the deal heavily disadvantaged one of the parties. Botswana sought to invoke this clause when it became increasingly clear that the mine would be extremely profitable. De Beers had paid the Botswana Government USD 20 million for the diamond concession while the cartel made three times as much in profits each year (Stiglitz, 2002: 39). It was around this time as well that De Beers started looking to exploit another kimberlite pipe that had been discovered in Letlhakane, an area 40 kilometres away from Orapa, while at the same time expanding Orapa's capacity to meet global requirements. It was within this context that a long drawn-out, negotiation process began (Harvey and Lewis, 1990: 124).

In his memoirs, Masire recalls that the overall negotiating strategy developed by government, was not all that different to the processes that took place with the SACU arrangements. A Mineral Policy Committee (MPC) was set up, comprising of the permanent secretaries of the minerals and finance ministries, the Attorney General and a high-ranking official from the Office of the President. This MPC consulted with technical experts in a number of areas – financial, legal,[26] geological, mining etc. – and then advised the Minister in charge of mineral resources, who in turn would submit a proposal on objectives and negotiation strategy to cabinet. The cabinet would then either approve the approach, or make amendments (Masire, 2006: 201). As with the SACU arrangements, officials from the civil service would take the lead in the negotiation process and if there was a stalemate at this level, the minister or someone occupying a more senior position would step in. Masire recalls that the hypothetical chain of command was such that, in his capacity as Vice-President, he would be the one given the task of meeting Oppenheimer directly to resolve any impasses at the ministerial level, and if he failed, then the President would have to intervene directly (Masire, 2006: 202).

Unlike in the SACU meetings, this chain of command was never really called upon because the civil servants on the MPC were, on their own, always able to reach agreements with their

[26] One such example where Botswana liaised with legal experts was when a lawyer from the World Bank having reviewed the initial post-independence agreement, forcefully argued for a re-negotiation of the arrangement, much to the frustration of De Beers. The South African mining cartel worked as hard as it could to discredit the lawyer, leading to a letter released from the World Bank stating that he did not speak on their behalf (Stiglitz, 2002: 39). Botswana responded to this announcement by the World Bank by saying, "That is precisely why we are listening to him" (Stiglitz, 2002: 39).

De Beers counterparts. By July 1975, an agreement between the Botswana government and De Beers pertaining to Orapa had been reached in which the governments shareholding was raised to 50 per cent, with no casting vote to be given to either party,[27] the Letlhakane mine would be developed while Orapa's output would be doubled – the funding of which was to come wholly from De Beers itself – and up to 75 per cent of the profits would be attained by government, partly through royalties, dividends and taxes (Hartland-Thunberg, 1978: 50; Harvey and Lewis, 1990: 124-125; Masire, 2006: 206). This was clearly a lucrative deal that the government had managed to squeeze out of the mining giant. Indeed, in his 2002 book, *Globalisation and its Discontents*, Joseph Stiglitz argues "Botswana would not have fared as well as it did if its original contract with the South African diamond cartel had been maintained" (2002: 39).

In the aftermath of the 1975 deal, the London Financial Times released an article entitled, 'Botswana Joins the Rapacious League' – which was heavily poised in De Beers' favour – arguing that Botswana had been greedy and unreasonable in its approach towards foreign mining corporations. This complaint did not really reflect that true nature of the arrangement in which even at only 25 per cent profits, De Beers would still draw hundreds of millions in turnover from diamond sales, which would increase upon the discovery of more mining potential at Jwaneng (Masire, 2006: 206: Harvey and Lewis, 1990: 125). While negotiating a deal for mining in Jwaneng, Oppenheimer had informed Masire that De Beers only intended to mine 40 per cent of the diamond potential there because he argued that as a small country, Botswana did not have enough resources to commit to the security of the mine. Masire then told Oppenheimer that somebody else would have to be contracted to mine the remaining 60 per cent. This alarmed Oppenheimer who feared Botswana might turn to De Beers' 'enemies' for support. Indeed when the negotiations did become difficult, a small delegation was sent out to the United States and Canada to explore the possibility of alternative investors. De Beers in the final analysis decided that they would take on the whole project themselves if other investors were going to be approached (Masire, 2006: 209). In 1978, these protracted negotiations culminated in an agreement to open a mine at Jwaneng, which by the mid-1980s was the most profitable mine in the world producing between 12 and 13 million carats per year (Masire, 2006: 209). With mineral exports beginning to dominate Botswana's income,

[27] This provision was worked well into the deal so that neither party could act unilaterally or bestow on the other party the liabilities of making difficult decisions because of majority ownership (Masire, 2006: 206).

dependence on the Customs Union reduced, from 54 per cent of total revenue in 1974 to 14 per cent in 1990 (Niemann, 1993: 41).

The government throughout the years also managed to obtain a number of other favourable outcomes in the diamond industry. By 1987, DEBSWANA (which is 50 per cent owned by the Botswana government) had sensibly used diamond stockpiles that had accumulated due to a soft international market in the early 1980s to purchase 5.3 per cent of shares in De Beers itself. The added benefit of this is that it, "… gave DEBSWANA the right to appoint two directors to the board of De Beers Diamonds throughout the world" (Niemann, 1993: 34). By 2011 the Botswana Government share proportion in De Beers had increased to 15 per cent (Nevin, 2012). Under Mogae's leadership, the government also managed persuade De Beers to consider setting up a diamond cutting and sorting corporation – a process also known as diamond 'aggregation' – which also receives diamonds mined in other countries (Mokone, 2006). In 2011, the Botswana government and De Beers reached a sales and marketing deal in which the two parties agreed to relocate the Diamond Trading Company in London – which had hitherto been responsible for diamond 'aggregation' – to Gaborone, with the launch of the first phase of relocation taking place in 2012 (Benza, 2012). The importance of the diamond industry to the economy of Botswana cannot be understated. A statement from the World Bank, (in Robb, 2011: 660) read:

> in a [n]utshell: [c]lever minerals policy [in Botswana] initiated and stimulated [economic] growth, and well-thought long-term development planning was crucial in channelling budget surpluses (from diamond revenues) into public investments that promoted growth and human development while maintaining fiscal discipline.

As seen in the constructivist argument of small states being able to leverage themselves against larger powers to create a certain type of image, Botswana had positioned itself against De Beers in such a way that the diamond cartel took the proposals of the government seriously and agreed to a deal that other countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have been unable to solicit. As well, by demonstrating that the government stood ready to engage with alternative avenues of investment, Botswana had increased its negotiation clout, leading De Beers to agree to finance the Jwaneng mine production, an

outcome which worked very much in Gaborone's favour. Habeeb (1988) also argues that one of the characteristics of issue-specific power relations is that a state can increase its negotiating clout in relation to a more powerful actor by demonstrating that it can seek alternative sources to obtain the outcomes in question.

3.4. Effective Aid Management and Negotiations

Given Botswana's desperate economic state upon obtaining independence, the older generation of leadership followed a pragmatic economic policy which stressed that whatever aid the country was able to obtain ought to be put to efficient use (Maipose and Somolekae, 1998: 441). The authors argue that, "An often cited aspect of Botswana's performance in development (and not just the utilisation) of aid is the quality of her leadership. Resources alone, without far-sighted leadership, would not have brought widespread benefit" (Maipose and Somolekae, 1998: 441).

Botswana had attracted favour from aid donors for its relatively relaxed and stable domestic climate which was characterised by relatively low rates of crime and corruption. This impressed aid workers who enjoyed working in the country, leading to a favourable image perception amongst the donor community (Kerapeletswe *et al*, 2008: 25). Indeed the manner in which Botswana positioned itself as a pragmatic and liberal democratic state – at a time when Southern Africa was characterised by political instability – increased its license to obtain better terms and conditions from aid donors than other countries on the continent. Whitfield and Fraser express this point quite eloquently:

> Botswana's uninterrupted democratic governance based on multiparty elections has given it high domestic political legitimacy…. Donors were keen to be associated with a democratic success story during the period when military and one-party regimes emerged around the continent, and the government keenly portrayed itself as a model of political and economic liberalization for the rest of the continent (Whitfield and Fraser, 2010: 362)..

Additionally, Tsie observes that because of Botswana's pragmatic stance in relation to wars of national liberation, Gaborone in 1960s and 1970s was not targeted by Pretoria's destabilisation politics – in the same way that Angola, Mozambique Lesotho and Zimbabwe were – thereby adding to its image as a relatively safe destination (Tsie, 1996: 621). The constructivist framework can thus be seen in which Gaborone leveraged its identity and created a certain image perception amongst the donor community leading to Botswana being described in such favourable terms as a 'donor darling' (Kerapeletswe *et al*, 2008: 25) or as being 'morally attractive' as an aid destination (Hopkin 1994: 396).

Botswana's exceptional aid management success can be seen in the manner in which the government has approached the practice of obtaining and implementing aid, centralising the whole process. As such, this process was linked directly with the developmental policies of the government, a practice that required sound governance and political cohesion. In many of the other African countries, effective aid usage fails because the management of the economy tends to be controlled by small groups of technocrats or individual ministries, whose uncoordinated activities result in financial and accountability problems (Maipose *et al*, 1997: 25; Maipose and Somolokae, 1998: 442). This further feeds into the constructivist conception of identity, in which Botswana – a liberal democracy with a good record of accountability – leveraged herself in the eyes of donors as a desirable destination for aid because she had cultivated an image of a trustworthy and financially credible country

The centralisation of aid management, mentioned above, facilitates fiscal regulation, as well as manpower planning. This centralised planning has traditionally fallen within the purview of the Division of Economic Affairs inside the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) which has pegged aid requirements to the previously mentioned National Development Plans. The success of such centralised planning has also been coupled with the fact that Botswana has managed to sustain capable state institutions as well as an efficient civil service machinery that occupies the relevant positions within the MFDP (Hopkin, 1994: 397; Whitfield and Fraser, 2010: 355).

When government seeks to obtain aid, donors are expected to target that particular aid towards priority targets, and not just supply a lump sum of money. These National development plans are created in relation to what the government refers to as a 'shopping list' of projects and the donors can then decide which projects are most attractive to them and decide upon how much they should grant the Botswana government (Maipose and Somolekae, 1998: 445-447). So for example, by 1989, Swedish aid was focused on developing water supply and education, Canada's interest area was transport, the Federal Republic of Germany focused on education and natural resources, while Norwegian aid went into healthcare (Chipasula and Miti, 1989: 103).

As well, procedures and requirements that are traditionally set for recipient countries by the donors are not allowed to fundamentally inhibit government preferences and development implementation. The government is also strict on the role played by personnel sent by donor countries to participate in the aid relationship. Aid or technical assistance personnel are absorbed into line positions contained within the various ministries that a particular project has been designated to. Such personnel have traditionally been directly responsible to the Botswana government first, and then to the donor countries second. The government had consistently resisted the idea of creating local posts to service particular projects, refusing to approve aid programmes that could not be carried out by available staff (Maipose *et al*, 1997: 26). In recent years however, the government has sought to engage expatriate expertise, where local personnel has been lacking (Land, 2002: 5). In this way, Botswana has managed to obtain and maintain 'ownership'[28] of her aid relationships and processes, while avoiding the pitfalls of structural conditions prescribed for other African countries – thereby retaining much of their economic and political sovereignty (Hopkin, 1994: 397; Whitfield and Fraser, 2010: 351-352). The Botswana government was able to streamline donors in the manner prescribed above because it was one of the few governments on the continent that successfully used aid for the purposes of development, at a time when the country enjoyed a relatively low rate of corruption. It would have been difficult for donors to effectively go against a system that was actually working, in stark contrast to most of the continent.

[28] Whitfield and Fraser (2010) define ownership here as, "…the degree of control that recipient governments are able to exercise over policy design and implementation, irrespective of the objectives they pursue" (2010: 343).

Coupled with this sense of pragmatic management is the effective fiscal policy the government successfully enacted following the revenue growth stemming from the successful renegotiation of the SACU revenue-sharing formula. Further increases in revenue surfaced upon the discovery of diamonds and the mineral wealth output thereof. This wealth began to exceed the absorption within the economy and the Bank of Botswana began to invest the surplus which amounts for the greater proportion of the government's total revenue (Maipose and Somolekae, 1998: 443).[29] The consequences of the strengthened economy – which by the 1980s meant that the state was not as dependent on the monetary value of aid – was that Botswana's leverage for aid negotiations was increased, allowing the government to have a choice of who to obtain aid from, and in some instances having the flexibility to say 'no' to some donors, especially if Botswana's specific developmental priorities were not being met (Whitfield and Fraser, 2010: 354; Maipose and Somolekae, 1998: 443; Land, 2002: 6).

The negotiations are characterised by a strong sense of consultation and consensus between the government and donors, and until such consensus is reached, new projects are not undertaken (Maipose *et* al, 1997: 24). These consultations are usually taken up by civil servants and political leadership, and in instances where large sections of the citizenry may be affected, widespread public discussion is also carried out. This process can take a while and donors have complained that some of these internal and public consultations are quite lengthy and interrupt the negotiation process, but they do agree that as a result, the implementation phase is usually smooth (Land, 2010: 6; Maipose *et al*, 1997: 24; Hopkin, 1994: 398).

In terms of aid negotiations, unlike other African countries, Botswana's officials avoid Round Table or Consultative Group discussions, opting to engage with donors at a bilateral level. By dealing with donors individually, the government is able to make the most out of each donor's individual approach and conditions of aid, thereby avoiding the drawbacks of facing donors as a powerful group with a united negotiating front. As well, because the government already coordinates the effective implementation of aid programs as part of its general planning strategy, roundtable meetings with donors are seen as unproductive and redundant,

[29] In a period of four years between 1967 and 1981, the Botswana government income and expenditure had grown tenfold at a rate of 23 per cent a year (Lewis and Mokgethi, 1983: 72).

resulting in minimal consensus between equals (Maipose *et al*, 1997: 16). Also, due to its pragmatic handling of the economy – which has resulted in avoiding balance of payment problems – the Botswana government has been able to impose its own stabilisation and adjustment policies, instead of having such policies dictated to them by groups of donors in debt rescheduling sessions (Maipose *et al*, 1997: 16). In this regard, Maipose and Somolekae argue that Botswana has come to be recognised as a country that exhibits exemplary negotiation skills, outsourcing to outside expertise when internal capacity was lacking (1998: 454).

This bilateral negotiation approach allowed for the government to have alternatives when negotiating with donors, giving them the leverage to reject proposals that did not suit them. As Habeeb argues this is an example of how a small state at the issue-specific level can balance the playing field in asymmetrical power relations to obtain outcomes that are favourable to it. This ability to swing between donors is indicative of good negotiation skills, which also explains why material wealth on its own does not give the full picture about how Botswana has successfully managed to leverage itself amongst more powerful actors in aid relations.

Predictably, as Botswana economic and developmental paths began to demonstrate large levels of success, donor countries began to consider 'exiting' from their arrangements. These countries included Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Sweden (Kerapeletswe *et al*, 2008). Botswana's success has increasingly made it ineligible for the type of development funding usually reserved for poor nations. As such the last time the country received IDA credit was in 1974 and added to that has been the country's reclassification into a middle, and later, an upper-middle income country (Kerapeletswe *et al*, 2008: 15). The dependency on aid declined markedly, from having been approximately 15 per cent of GDP in 1979, it fell to about 3 per cent in 1997 (Kerapeletswe *et al*, 2008: 18) and reaching less than 1 per cent of GNI in the years 2003 to 2005 (Whitfield and Fraser, 2010: 353). While the exit of donor aid was not, as such, harmful to Botswana, Kerapeletswe *et al* however argue that the withdrawal of technical assistance – around about the same time – did pose various problems for the government who would have hoped that such assistance could replace aid as it was phased out (Kerapeletswe *et al*, 2008: 31, 62). Botswana's response especially in cases like Sweden

and Norway was not to question the decisions at the political level, as the government considered the 'exits' to be an administrative issue. Senior Botswana government officials however did at some junctures express their disappointment and in some instances aver that such 'exit' strategies seemed to be 'punishing success' (Maipose *et al*, 1997: 34). Scholarship on aid management however has come to view such donor 'exits' as a rare positive indication of an African country that has effectively managed to move away from financial dependency (Whitfield and Fraser, 2010: 351).

3.5. Conclusion

The foregoing chapter has sought to demonstrate how Botswana has managed to punch above her weight, leveraging herself against powerful actors and using effective negotiation strategies, to elevate herself from the desperate conditions that shaped her economy upon obtaining independence. The government adopted a very conservative and pragmatic approach towards expenditure and development and this was facilitated by increased revenue stemming from an improved Customs Union sharing formula and the benefits of a well negotiated partnership with the De Beers diamond cartel. This strict developmental approach of the Botswana Government also allowed the country to effectively manage its aid relations with donors, streamlining them into projects predetermined by the MFDP, while the relative wealth of the country gave Botswana bargaining clout in which they could essentially turn down what did not suit them. In these three examples Botswana was seen to leverage herself against more powerful actors, creating various perceptions of herself, and leading to the attainment of favourable outcomes in her foreign economic policy.

This foreign economic policy – as well as the foreign political policy discussed in Chapter Two – occurred within the context of the apartheid/Cold War era. In the post-1990 era, Botswana reached a point where it was now a middle income country and as the donor exits suggest, could not position itself as a small state that needed urgent international support, in the same way that it had done during the apartheid era. As well, in the wake of the 1990s, Botswana's shining example as a democratic state within the context of Africa was becoming less impressive because other countries within the region – such as Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa – had now democratised. Botswana's foreign policy also had to adapt and one

area in which Botswana has sought to play an important role on the continent is in the active promotion of democratic norms.

In the next chapter, the study will focus on Botswana's foreign policy from a normative perspective, in which the country has sought to project a principled role that promotes human rights, democratic practices and the rule of law – and where this role has turned to public chastisement of leaders on the continent, where these principles have been violated.

Chapter 4

BOTSWANA'S POST-1990 POSTURE TOWARDS AFRICA: A PRINCIPLED FOREIGN POLICY ROLE

> Democracy must be nourished and we must not be afraid to go chest out, without fear of favour to say as Botswana, as a country renowned for our democratic credentials, this is what we believe in, whether he or she agrees with us or not. We should therefore practice what we preach (Botswana National Assembly, 2011: 11).

In chapter one, we saw that constructivism prescribes that, foreign policy behaviour is predicated upon the social context within which a state finds itself. As such the state's identity can be shaped by both international and domestic laws and values, and this in turn determines what role the state sees itself playing in the international arena. This then informs the manner in which a state positions itself vis-à-vis its international environment to shape its image perception. The role of the state can be driven by the meanings that are attached to the conduct of other states with respect to accepted norms that govern all the actors within these contexts. States with normative foreign policy goals exude an identity of promoting international law, human rights, democracy and the rule of law amongst other actors within their environment.

In chapters Two and Three we saw that during the apartheid era, Botswana managed to follow a foreign policy trajectory that allowed her to transcend her political hostage station within the ring that South African had placed around the BLS states, and overcome the dire economic legacy that it had inherited from colonialism. In chapter two, Botswana positioned herself pragmatically against South Africa to avoid retribution, but at the same time leveraged herself as a non-racial democracy that was driven in principle to bring about the end of white minority rule in the region – thereby attracting allies on the continent and abroad. Chapter three assessed Botswana's positioning vis-à-vis external economic actors in which Gaborone managed to leverage itself against South Africa (in relation to SACU), De Beers and the aid donor community, to obtain favourable outcomes in negotiations. Thus, in the context of the

apartheid era, Botswana's foreign policy sought to transcend political and economic obstacles to its development as an independent country.

After the end of the Cold War and the fall of apartheid in the 1990s, the international environment had now changed such that Botswana was no longer a hostage state to South Africa nor was it one of the only democracies on the continent as a large number of states had now democratised. These changes notwithstanding, Botswana still enjoyed a large degree of international political prestige based on its long established democratic credentials. Gaborone's foreign policy would now slightly depart from that which was followed in the past in that Botswana would actually seek to play an active role in promoting and maintaining democratic practices within the domestic affairs of African countries, while others still insisted on the sanctity of state sovereignty and non-interference.[30] This was the foreign policy role that Botswana would now define for itself. The country sought to leverage this position in regional international forums, although this became increasingly difficult as other African countries came to view Botswana's identity as intimately related to the neoliberal ideologies championed by the west.

This chapter draws on the theoretical principles outlined above to assess Botswana's foreign relations in the post-apartheid era from a moral and ethical point of view, driven by the constructivist notion of identity. The chapter contends that Botswana's foreign policy in principle has followed a pattern consistent with safeguarding democratic norms embodied in regional (SADC) continental (AU) and global (the UN and ICC) regimes. The chapter argues that there are a number of instances in which Botswana's foreign policy posture in the post-apartheid era, has taken on a moral and ethical trajectory largely driven by institutionalised norms that promote these democratic practices. It is argued that Botswana having largely entrenched these values within its own domestic landscape, has projected its identity as a beacon of democratic practice and good governance onto its foreign policy. In earlier years under the Masire and Mogae administration, while Botswana's foreign policy sought to imbue these normative values, the approach in dealing with countries that deviate from these

[30] As we recall from Chapter Two, Botswana's foreign policy was more concerned with attracting friendly African governments in the quest to liberate Southern Africa from white minority rule. As such Botswana respected the internal integrity of these countries, even though many of them were characterised by life-time presidencies.

principles has not been as confrontational as Ian Khama's administration (Mogae's successor). This has in some instances placed Botswana on a collision course with fellow African members who privilege sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs as appropriate modes of association between states. To illustrate this morally oriented foreign policy, Botswana's attitude towards Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the African Union's position with respect to the International Criminal Court (ICC) will be addressed.

4.1. Democratic Norms in the context of Africa as a Whole

The norms of democracy, human rights and the rule of law are values that are entrenched within the charters of various multilateral forums that most African countries are party to. They are not just values agreed to in principle, but are a set of codified measuring yardsticks that member states are expected to adhere to. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Treaty for example prescribes, *inter alia*, that its members must act in accordance with the principles of, "sovereign equality … solidarity, peace and security… human rights, democracy, and the rule of law … equity, balance and mutual benefit … [and] peaceful settlement of disputes (SADC, 1992: art 4; Nathan, 2012: 23, Khadiagala, 2001: 140).

SADC as well as the African Union (AU) have taken on numerous treaties, behavioural codes and formal declarations committing to democratic practices and frowning upon counter-constitutional changes of government. The AU adopted many of its democratic principles from its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), who had by 1999 committed itself to excluding from their summits, those governments who had profited from non-constitutional regime changes. Having been adopted in the Lome Declaration of 2000, SADC also followed suit and adopted the same principle (Cawthra, 2010: 12). These values can also be found in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance which was adopted in Addis Ababa in January 2007, binding AU member states. Insofar as the United Nations is concerned, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (1966) are examples of binding treaties that seek to entrench democracy as a universal value to be honoured and safeguarded by all states worldwide. The legal and normative mandate for democratic practices is thus abundantly clear at the regional, continental and the global level.

All this considered, much literature pertaining to Africa and its democratic record in the post-colonial era, paints a rather distressing image. Lifetime presidential tenures; one-party dictatorships; deficiency or complete absence of the rule of law; the suppression of political opponents, the press and organisations of civil society; detentions without trial; the personalisation of political power amongst other considerations, have all become increasingly ubiquitous on the continent (Nnoli, 1989: 266). To get an enhanced flavour of the true sense of the democratic track record in Africa, Mobutu Sese Seko who had plundered the economy of the DRC lining his personal bank accounts for 30 years famously stated that, "democracy was not for Africa" (Swarns and Onishi, 2002). In 1991 the president of Cote D'Ivoire Felix Houphouet-Boigny proclaimed that, "... 'There is no number two, or three or four ... in Cote D'Ivoire ... [T]here is only number one, that's me and I don't share my decisions' ..." (Leon, 2010: 2). Sklar (1989) also highlights the fact that many African leaders have been guilty of rent-seeking, which involves the extraction of a population's wealth – from workers, industrialists, farmers etc – to service and appease the urban intelligentsia and surrounding circles of loyal officials, thereby lacking public accountability (1989: 274).[31]

These despotic patterns of undemocratic behaviour have in some cases persisted due to the stagnation of regional and continental international organisations which have for the most part sought to privilege the norm of respect for sovereignty ahead of the respect for democracy, human rights and good governance, and especially in the case of SADC, have leaned more on quiet diplomacy instead of public chastisement (Badza, 2009: 157).

4.2. Botswana's Democratic Record

With the crisis of democracy in Africa outlined above, much scholarship has devoted praise to Botswana, championing it as a beacon for democracy and good governance on the continent. Within SADC, Botswana and Mauritius are the only two countries that have maintained multi-party elections without interruptions, while most countries in the region held their first multi-party elections in the early 1990s (Molutsi, 2005). Nnoli (1989)

[31] It must be noted though that all these negative indicators notwithstanding, there is today a more positive outlook on the prospects of democratic practice than has ever been the case before. Tony Leon notes that by 2009, 10 African countries were seen as free, 23 as partly free, whereas in 1980 the numbers were 4 and 15 respectively (Leon, 2010: 3). Leon also notes that in Africa today, "… it is only democracy – often admittedly of the very rickety or pseudo sort – that is seen as the legitimate form of government on the subcontinent" (Leon, 2010: 3).

observed that in addition to fostering an environment that allows for a plurality of political parties that regularly contest elections, Botswana enjoys an independent judiciary and a relatively good human rights record. The press is largely independent and both the ruling class and sections of the disadvantaged classes benefit from basic political freedoms (1989: 267). Sklar (1989) has also argued that because Botswana has managed to avoid the pitfalls of rent-seeking tendencies, the country has been able to enjoy a relatively liberal and stable economy. Since the country's constitutionally adopted a limitation of terms on presidential tenure in 1997, the incumbent heads of state have stepped down in accordance without incidence (Leon, 2010: 14). Being party to the aforementioned regional, continental and global forums, Botswana has accepted as a part of its law the imperatives of democracy which are also entrenched in the Bill of Rights section of its constitution. Indeed Molutsi (2005: 10) states that, "On all counts it is evident that the electoral democracy has become a part of the country's political culture." In his state of the nation address in November 2013, President Ian Khama stated:

> For nearly five full decades now it has been the power of this simple fact, the ability of citizens to freely exercise the wisdom of their democratic will, which has assured our nation's steady progress. We are all deeply indebted to the founders of our great Republic, who ignored the example of many by remaining true to their own conviction that Government governs best when it governs by and with, as well as for, the people (Khama, 2013).

Following from the above, it is argued that Botswana's identity is one that is intimately tied to its perception as, "a shining example of liberal democracy" (Tsie, 1996: 599). This highflying reputation led the United States Congress in February 1998 to adopt a resolution commending Botswana for its commitment to democracy. The resolution read, "… the House of Representatives … commends the people of Botswana for their commitment to democracy … commends Sir Ketumile Masire for his long and distinguished service to his country and the cause of democracy in Africa … encourages the government of Botswana to continue promoting peace, democracy, respect for human rights, and economic reform in Africa" (United States Government Printing Office, 1998).

Predicated on this perception of the self, Botswana has perceived of its role in the international arena as a country that seeks to confront those countries that deliberately violate

the universal norms of human rights, democratic governance and the rule of law. The Democratic Coalition Project (2002) recognised that, "Botswana frequently has drawn on the prestige and capital it has acquired as a regional model of stability and democratic governance to exercise diplomatic leadership … [and has] used a range of policy tools to express its disapproval of violations of democratic governance."

When addressing parliament in 2011, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Phandu Skelemani remarked that given its highflying record and prestige such as it was, "Botswana ha[d] an obligation to play active role[s] in addressing existing and emerging global challenges for the betterment of all humanity" (Botswana National Assembly, 2011: 115). This perception of Botswana's foreign policy role was echoed by President Khama who also stated that:

> Our international engagements are predicated on advancing our national interests, which include such trans-national priorities as promoting sustainable economic development, good governance and international peace and security. Guided by the principles and spirit of the United Nations Charter, we actively support positions on global issues that advance the interests of humankind (Khama, 2013).

The argument then is that having consolidated a democratic ethos since gaining independence in 1966,[32] Botswana instilled these values within its foreign policy and has projected them in various instances, where human rights, the rule of law and constitutional governance, have

[32] While it is true that for a long time Botswana has shown exemplary democratic practices within the country, there has been an increase in literature that points towards a decline in these credentials. Kenneth Good (an ardent critic of the Botswana government) is chief amongst these authors. In his earlier works, Good has highlighted the undemocratic nature of Botswana's automatic succession of the Presidency, which involves the incumbent head of state stepping down before his term has ended to allow the Vice-President – who is chosen by the President – to assume the reigns (Pegg, 2005: 830). This particular line of criticism led President Mogae to deport Good from Botswana in 2005, drawing on powers given to the president by the constitution, which permit him to declare any person a Prohibited Immigrant (Pegg, 2005: 829-830). Good has also referred to how the Government of Botswana has mistreated the local san population of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (known in Setswana as Basarwa), illegally uprooting them from the area, in order to exploit diamond deposits in 1997 and 2002 (Good, 2008: 4). Under the leadership of Lieutenant General Ian Khama, there has been evidence of personalisation of power and governance by presidential directives or edicts (Good, 2009: 320). One area explored by Good in this regard, is the imposition of restrictions on alcohol trade at certain times within the country as well as introducing a liquor levy of 30 per cent in 2008 (which has since risen sharply), with little regard for people's private lives and the impact on the entertainment industry as well as Kgalagadi Breweries. Good argues that this grip on the alcohol industry was at the instance President Khama, whose distaste for alcohol is well known (Good, 2009: 320). Good also stated that the Botswana government had in 2006 attempted to have a form of control on personal communication through surveillance technology that could intercept calls, and when this failed (due to budgetary and logistical reasons) the government required people to register their cell phones, threatening disconnection for those who did not comply (2009: 321). By and large however, the institutional practice of democracy in Botswana mentioned above does still exist, although we are witnessing a decline which in some instances is at odds with the foreign policy projected abroad.

suffered from disregard and disruption. In this way, Botswana would capitalise on its reputation as a longstanding beacon of democracy, on a continent that had experienced a history that is incommensurate with such practices. What follows is an example of this projection of values in various instances where actors, in Botswana's view, have not lived up to prescribed norms and expectations of democratically ethical behaviour. Three examples which fit behaviour that is not commensurate with these normative standards include; Lesotho's 1994 constitutional dilemma and its 1998 electoral crisis; Zimbabwe's 2008 electoral crisis; and the AU's disdain for the International Criminal Court (ICC). Botswana's attitude towards these issues is assessed. On each, Botswana adopted its very own foreign policy position, which, especially in the case of the ICC and Zimbabwe, differed from the common views held within the AU and SADC respectfully.

4.3. Botswana's Foreign Policy Posture towards Africa

4.3.1. Lesotho

Alongside the big powers of the region (South Africa and Zimbabwe), Botswana was now playing a prominent role in addressing the domestic environment of countries experiencing political turmoil. Botswana's positioning in this regard was largely due to the leading role that she had played in the FLS alliance and the formation of SADCC (discussed in Chapter Two). What was also important was the establishment of full diplomatic relations with South Africa under Nelson Mandela's leadership in June 1994, and her acceptance into SADC in August of the same year. From this point onwards, the two countries would work closely together as allies within SADC, seeking to promote regional security, which was, "… explicitly related … to fostering democracy, transparency, and respect for human rights" (Khadiagala, 2001: 140). In a time when Mandela's foreign policy sought to reinvent South Africa's image in the world through a commitment to the above principles (van Wyk, 2004: 116) – in sharp contrast to the apartheid era – Botswana and South Africa enjoyed 'cordial relations' (Lebanna, 2013). This early relationship within SADC between Botswana and South Africa under Mandela's administration contextualises the approach taken towards Lesotho's political problems in the 1990s.

Botswana's involvement in Lesotho's troubled political landscape begins in earnest in January 1994, when army faction infighting began to surface publically. The concerns of the United Nations and the Commonwealth prompted the two bodies to send representatives to assess the situation in Maseru. Even though the envoys had warned that an unconstitutional change of government would not be tolerated, fighting on the ground rapidly broke out and stalled the efforts of the organisations (Selinyane, 2006: 66). After converging in Gaborone, an agreement was reached by Botswana South Africa and Zimbabwe to suggest various recommendations – mainly geared at smoothening tensions within the army and establishing a better relationship between it and the government. A fact finding mission was deployed which submitted a report to Presidents Robert Mugabe and Sir Ketumile Masire. The two presidents familiarised themselves with the report and then arrived in Lesotho in February 1994. The two presidents observed that, "... 'It was and still remains our very clear impression that, notwithstanding a recognised need for national reconciliation, little if any progress had been made towards the realisation of such a policy or towards the promotion of truly national dialogue' ..." (Pherudi, 2003: 373). The February Mugabe-Masire mission had proposed "... an impartial inquiry into the causes of friction in the army, an assurance of the neutrality of the civil service, and clear lines of communications between the army and various government ministries, as well as confirmation of the legitimacy of the monarchy in Lesotho's polity..." (Selinyane, 2006: 66-67).

The Lesotho government failed to institute these recommendations, leading to increased conflict and detention of members of Cabinet by the army. The government only considered implementing the Masire-Mugabe recommendations after the Deputy Prime Minister had been assassinated in an unfortunate turn of events (Selinyane, 2006; 67).

In August 1994, King Letsie III dissolved the Lesotho government and replaced it with his own interim government. Protests and marches on the palace by the citizenry were squashed by the army, resulting in a national strike. Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe convened again in Gaborone and expressed their condemnation of events in Maseru, and a demand for the restoration of government was issued. This demand was later echoed in Pretoria when the Troika – along with the OAU secretary general – met with King Letsie III and Prime Minister Mokhehle (Selinyane, 2006: 67). The Pretoria meeting also warned that sanctions would be

imposed in the event that the threat of military and economic sanctions was not enough to bring Lesotho in line, and in September 1994, a memorandum of agreement made the Troika of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, "... the guarantors of the agreement, instead of the usual witnesses" (Selinyane, 2006: 68). This would have a significant impact upon how the electoral crisis of 1998 would be dealt with. Botswana also hosted the Lesotho army to tutor them on how the relationship between the army and the political leadership existed within the country, but Masire notes that ultimately, without military force, an agreement cannot be enforced unless the parties within Lesotho committed themselves to adopting suggested solutions (Masire, 2006: 289).

In 1998, following disputed election results – in which the Lesotho Congress for Democracy won a landslide victory – supporters of the country's opposition parties demanded that the King dissolve the legislature and dismiss the elected government in favour of a new one. After a fact finding mission dispatched by the Troika – which had hinted to some irregularities in the way the elections had been conducted – the Lesotho government concluded that there was no reason to overturn the mandate it received from the polls (Botswana National Assembly, 1998: 22). What ensued was an atmosphere of chaos – characterised by looting and property destruction – which in effect paralysed the government. The situation became ever so worse when junior officers of the Lesotho army arrested 50 or so senior officers, appointing a new army commander.

In his address to Parliament in 1998, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lieutenant General Mompati Merafhe stated, "There was no doubt that these actions amounted to a military take-over" (Botswana National Assembly, 1998: 23). Under a military operation codenamed "Boleas" the Botswana and South African governments – stating that they were acting under a SADC mandate and that they had been invited by the host nation – sent army divisions to curtail the civil unrest. By and large the operation achieved its mandate as Merafhe stated to Parliament during the same address (Botswana National Assembly, 1998: 24):

> I am pleased to report, to this Honourable House, that Operation Boleas has been a resounding success; lawlessness and anarchy have been nipped in the bud; the attempt

> to overthrow constitutional order has been curtailed ... the banner of democracy, good governance and the rule of law has triumphed and, above all, SADC has lived up to its Treaty obligation.

In the post 1990 period, this was one of the early examples of Botswana playing a more activist foreign policy role, projecting principles of democratic practices within the Southern African region.

It is argued in some respects that, amongst other reasons, this operation was not really sanctioned by SADC because the organization had been suspended at the time and had not formally met to discuss the issue (Nathan, 2012). Indeed Selinyane has presented the joint military exercise as 'state elites ganging together'. Selinyane argues that the Lesotho government well aware that a political solution may not have served its interests, lobbied for military intervention from outside forces (2006: 70). Others have argued that the operation was less for the benefit of the Lesotho people then it was for the protection of South African interests in the form of the Katse Dam which supplements South Africa's water supply (Neethling, 1999).

These criticisms however seem to be aimed more at South Africa than at Botswana. Masire states that, "[f]or some reason, all the parties were very appreciative of what Botswana did, but they thought the South Africans were a bit rough on them. Our troops were there for almost a full year, and we established good rapport with the army and other parties" (Masire, 2006: 290). Likoti (2007) argues that Botswana and South Africa seemed to have different perceptions of their responsibilities in Lesotho. While the SANDF pounded various locations in the country, appearing as if it were an invasion force, the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) came in much later, flying a white flag, identifying itself as a peacekeeping force (Likoti, 2007: 256). In this way, Botswana had positioned themselves in the eyes of the Lesotho people as genuine promoters of democratic process, while South Africa had attracted an unfavourable image.

4.3.2. The Conflict between the AU and the ICC

Botswana had long positioned itself as a country that sought to make continental and regional organisations work and had favoured functional and cohesive OAU, and subsequently AU institutions that would promote collective development and mutual realisation of interests. Sekgoma (1998) observes that Botswana enthusiastically contributed to the development of conflict management organs and avenues of preventative diplomacy for both SADC and the OAU (1998: 483). The 1969 BDP Manifesto stated, "[W]e are proud of our membership of OAU, the Commonwealth and United Nations. Membership of these bodies brings in new friends … with whom we can discuss problems of common concern" (Chipasula and Miti, 1989: 101).

The current Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Phandu Skelemani also underscored the good relations that Botswana and the AU enjoy when he told Parliament in March 2011 that, Botswana will continue to play its role in the, "… promotion and protection of human rights, respect for the rule of law, democracy and good governance through various fora such as the United Nations …Southern African Development Community … and the African Union …" (Botswana National Assembly, 2011: 114). As Skelemani highlighted, this relationship between Botswana and the African Union can be seen in the fact that the AU worked closely with Gaborone to facilitate and endorse Botswana's hosting of the India-Africa Diamond Institute (Mmegi Online, 10 January 2011). Thus, it can be seen that Botswana has had good relations with the AU, however the two fell out over the issue of supporting ICC prosecutions for African leaders that had been responsible for atrocities committed within their countries. The deterioration between Gaborone and the AU over this issue is now discussed.

Briefly, the ICC is predicated on the Rome Statute which came into effect in July 2002 when the Democratic Republic of the Cong became the 60th country to ratify it. By June 2012, 121 countries had ratified the statute of which 33 were African States – constituting more than two thirds of the African Union (du Plessis *et al*, 2013: 2). The Rome Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction to prosecute a number of atrocities including, crimes against humanity, genocide,

war crimes and the crime of aggression (Murithi, 2013: 2). Many African countries were optimistic about the ICC – especially having observed the carnage that had ensued during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 – and had actively participated in the negotiations leading up to the formation of the court. African leaders had become convinced that it was in the continent's best interest to endorse an international justice system that could confront large scale human rights violations and castrate a tendency towards impunity – a posture adopted by the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) (Tladi, 2009: 59, Murithi, 2013: 2). Relations between the AU and the ICC began to show signs of strain when many African leaders began to question the universal application of the court's jurisdiction as it appeared to target African countries specifically. This was viewed with particular suspicion because under the Rome Statute, the UN Security Council can refer cases for prosecution, and while they have referred Libya and the Darfur region of Sudan, they have not referred Israel or Syria (du Plessis *et al*, 2013: 2). This is compounded by the fact that all of the current ICC cases are exclusively focused on the African continent. However a close inspection of the situation reveals that a number of these cases stemmed from referrals from African countries themselves, such as the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, which at some level mitigates the charge that Africa is a target of the ICC (Murithi, 2013: 2).

The collision course between the two bodies came to the fore in March 2009 when on the recommendation of the Security Council, an arrest warrant for President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir of Sudan was issued, citing crimes against humanity and war crimes (Tladi, 2009: 59). The AU's response to the initial submission by the ICC chief prosecutor in 2008 was to reiterate their position in favour of combating impunity and gross human rights violations, however they asked the security council to defer the issuing of the arrest warrant, "… to ensure that the ongoing peace efforts are not jeopardized, as well as the fact that in the current circumstances, a prosecution may not be in the interests of victims and justice" (Tladi, 2009: 60). The AU was incensed when the pre-trial chamber of the ICC issued the arrest warrant, criticising the court for being an instrument of arrogant neo-colonial tendencies (du Plessis *et al*, 2013: 11, Tladi, 2009: 61).

In response, in 2009 at a summit held in Libya – and under Gadhafi's chairmanship – the AU adopted a resolution that was later reinforced at the 15th AU summit held in Kampala (July 2010) to the effect that African countries would not surrender President Al-Bashir to the ICC (Sibalukhulu and Louw, 2010). This placed those countries who had treaty obligations with the ICC in a rather precarious position in which they had to choose; a commitment to the principle of confronting impunity and safeguarding human rights as a universal norm, or allegiance to fellow African members in the AU. Botswana's position had been made public from the beginning. In July 2009 a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation read, "The government of Botswana does not agree with this (AU) decision and wishes to reaffirm its position that as a State Party to the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court (ICC) it has treaty obligations to fully cooperate with the ICC in the arrest and transfer of the President of Sudan to the ICC" (Mail and Guardian, 6 July 2009). The statement continued that, "The people of Africa and Sudan in particular have been victims of these crimes. Botswana strongly holds the view that the people of Africa, including the people of Sudan, deserve to be protected from the perpetrators of such crimes" (Mail and Guardian, 6 July 2009).

In the aftermath of the abovementioned 15th AU summit in 2010, Botswana's Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in response to the reaffirmed position of the AU to snub the Rome Statute told journalists that, "We have not surrendered the sovereignty of this country to the AU… the International Criminal Court (ICC) Rome Statute is signed by a Country not AU. Botswana does not fear being isolated by other African countries since they [Botswana] are implementing the international protocols they have signed" (Sibalukhulu and Louw, 2010).

Within the context of the AU's insistence on delegitimizing the authority of the ICC, Botswana has remained consistent in their support for the Rome Statute. This position was repeated in relation to Muammar Gaddafi when he was condemned by the wider international community for atrocities committed during the Libyan crises of 2011 and an arrest warrant was issued by The Hague. Botswana's official position was that while it had taken cognisance of the AU's position which declined to cooperate with the ICC, Botswana herself

was in favour of the arrest warrant and condemned Gaddafi's violent campaign against the people of his country (The Namibian, 8 July 2011). What was also significant about the Gaddafi indictment was the fact that the sitting Judge that issued the arrest warrant was Sanji Monageng who is also from Botswana (Ganetsang, 2011). In the fog of the human rights violations perpetrated by the Gaddafi regime, Botswana broke off diplomatic relations and later invited the Interim National Transitional Council (NTC) to set up an embassy in Gaborone, much to the frustration of the AU who had insisted on not recognising the NTC (Madibana, 2011). While debating the issue in parliament, Skelemani stated:

> When trouble started in Libya ... I told them it would be better if the leader comes out and talks about calmness. That is what I expected a leader to do ... But when he came out, he said ... that there would be bloodshed, and suppose that I must keep quiet. No I would not, there is no way ... We say that we have nothing against the Libyans, but with this one, we are breaking off (Botswana National Assembly, 2011: 134).

When The Hague also targeted certain members of the Kenyan government for the election violence that ensued in 2008 in which over 1000 people were killed and 500,000 displaced, the government sent out a number of emissaries who were charged with obtaining support to quit the ICC. In response to this, Phandu Skelemani stated:

> ... They want to lobby, because they are saying 'kgang e, e ya kgakala' (the ICC has gone overboard), that if Africans are just going to be targeted we have to do something about it (ICC) … We [Botswana] are full members of the ICC. We intend to keep it (membership) until we feel there is something wrong with it. At the moment we have no qualms with it … (Mmegi Online, 24 January, 2011).

What comes out clearly from the assessment above is that Botswana was caught in the midst of two battling regimes that it had pledged itself to. While the temptation could easily have been to lean towards the African consensus of the AU, Botswana understood its role differently. It saw itself as party to a greater set of standards that it found binding, and desperately more pressing – that being the safeguarding against impunity towards African despotic leaders. Other African countries however believed it was more important to snub the

authority of the AU. South Africa on the other hand, while principally supporting the ICC, was not as vocal as Botswana in condemning what was becoming a pattern of collectively endorsing impunity by ignoring international legal instruments.

4.3.3. Zimbabwe's Electoral Crisis

In the aftermath of the 2008 Zimbabwean elections, Botswana alongside states like Zambia became isolated from the rest of SADC due to a difference in opinion about how to deal with Mugabe's violations of democratic principles and rule of law, which as stated above are deeply entrenched in the regional body's treaties and protocols, as well as in AU and UN codified norms.

Under President Festus Mogae, Botswana's approach towards Zimbabwe was along the lines of silent diplomacy, which was a practice adopted by SADC as a whole, towards engaging with political issues in the region, while maintaining the sanctity of equal sovereignty amongst nations. SADC had sought to limit as far as possible the interference within the domestic landscape of its member states, promoting solutions that could be realised from within the countries. Zimbabwe troubled political landscape increasingly became a challenge for SADC's quiet diplomacy, and by 2008, Botswana had adopted a more direct and activist role in dealing with Mugabe.

Zimbabwe's woes in this regard, date back to the year 2000 in which Mugabe's Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), lost a constitutional referendum causing a spike in political violence and state repression, culminating in the dispossession of farmland from white owners. (Cawthra, 2010: 7; Nathan, 2012: 64). Mugabe successfully prompted SADC to publically agree that the problems in Zimbabwe were due to a pressing need for land reform and redistribution, as well as the negative effects of Western sanctions. By 2002 a presidential poll was held in which many international observers had expressed concerns about vote-rigging and violence, however many African countries had concluded that the elections were satisfactory – as also seen in its approval by the SADC Secretariat (Cawthra,

2010: 7, 24). Nathan (2012) quite rightly states that, "... SADC leaders might have believed that their cautious diplomatic approach would be more efficacious than castigating Mungabe ... [i]nstead, he disregarded the Summit entirely, making it look foolish, and SADC's tolerance of his transgressions damaged its credibility" (2012: 67).

According to the Democratic Coalition Project (2002), in some respects, SADC's solidarity approach was in aid of negating the potential for the former colonial powers to dominate the regional political landscape. As such – especially on the issue of Zimbabwe – Botswana initially adopted the role of quiet diplomacy. Former Vice-President and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Lt General Mompati Merafhe had stated that the solution to Zimbabwe's problems ought to be a home grown one. In an interview with Stephanie Hanson, Merafhe argued that, "The best we can do is to try and use whatever little influence we can manage in order to persuade them to find solutions to their own problem" (Hanson, 2007).

While Merafhe's pronouncements seemingly assured solidarity between Botswana and Zimbabwe, some of his parliamentary colleagues began to question this line of foreign policy that Botswana publically following. This opposition was evident in the ninth meeting of parliament in 2007. The Member of Parliament for Gaborone Central Dumelang Saleshando remarked, "The strategy of silent diplomacy may have some merit in it, but I think at one point, Lt Gen. Mompati Merafhe, even those who are not schooled in military practice would know that there ought to come a time to change strategies" (Botswana National Assembly, 2007: 118). Saleshando likened what was defended by Merafhe as silent diplomacy to conduct consisting of, 'see no evil', 'hear no evil' and 'say no evil' policy (Botswana National Assembly, 2007: 118). Salishando went on to point out that during apartheid, the Botswana government was clear on its sentiments towards the despotic regime and that they were actually practicing double standards by allowing the Zimbabwean leadership leeway to strangle its people's rights and that the racial differences between the two regimes were irrelevant. His sentiments were echoed by amongst others, Mr Mabiletsa of Kgatleng East, Mr Lefhoko of Shoshong and specially elected Member of Parliament, Mr Ntuane. Ntuane pointed out that:

> The problem is the roots are much deeper. The roots lie in a violation of certain values of good governance, democracy and the culture of rights. These are universal, you cannot say, no, we have a certain standard for Africans, you should maintain a certain standard for Europeans or for Americans, no, rights are universal ... Rights are rights no matter who you are. Tyranny is tyranny, it has no colour (Botswana National Assembly, 2007: 118).

Elements of Botswana's parliament were clearly prompting to the Foreign Minister that the quiet diplomacy approach was not commensurate with the identity of a 'shining example of liberal democracy' that Botswana had come to be proud of and gained great international recognition from. For members of parliament such as Salishando, Lefhoko, Ntuane and Mabiletsa Botswana had a role to play in condemning despotic governance.

Indeed these sentiments were present in President Ian Khama's foreign policy outlook which was evident in his speech to the opening of the fifth session of parliament entitled, "Empowering the Nation through Democracy, Development, Dignity and Discipline" (Khama, 2008). In this speech, Lt General Khama stated that, "Whilst we respect the principle of non-interference ... we shall discharge our international responsibilities in line with our own values, regional protocols and global consensus ..." (Khama, 2008).

It was the 2008 election crisis in Zimbabwe that saw a marked shift in the way Botswana would approach the Zimbabwean government. The international community had been optimistic about these elections, hoping that would be the beginning of the end of the problems that Zimbabwe had experienced for the preceding eight years. Instead the country slipped into a crisis that was deeper than any other that had been experienced in their post-independence era (Jonas *et al*, 2013: 2). The initial harmonised elections of March 2008 were considered to be relatively free although there were reservations about how fair they were. There had been a large measure of violence and intimidation surrounding the election process leading to loss of life, property and the detention of opposition leaders such as Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change – MDC (Badza, 2009: 152). Coupled

with the unfavourable conditions for democracy, the government had withheld the presidential election results for a number of weeks before finally releasing them under international pressure (Jonas *et al*, 2013: 7; Nathan, 2012:71).

The result was that 47.9 per cent of the vote had gone to Morgan Tsvangirai, while 43.2 per cent was attributed to Mugabe. This then necessitated a runoff election because neither party had acquired more than 50 per cent of the votes (Nathan, 2012: 71). Tsvangirai refused to take part in the run-off presidential elections, fearing that the MDC supports would incur the wrath of the power hungry ZANU-PF leader. Mugabe subsequently went on to win an uncontested election giving him yet another term in office (Badza, 2009: 152).

Botswana had watched the developments in Zimbabwe with growing concern and by the time Mugabe declared himself the winning candidate in an unopposed election, Gaborone had decided that it had had enough. President Ian Khama and Levy Mwanawasa stood as lone voices in the corridors of SADC as they chastised Mugabe from his initial loss in the March 2008 elections. On 4 July 2008, the ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation released a press statement that gave Botswana's position on Zimbabwe. The statement in effect refused to recognise the new government that Mugabe had formed on the basis of the illegitimate run-off presidential elections, because they violated the principles of the AU, SADC and the UN. The government also recommended that Zimbabwe be excluded from attending SADC and AU meetings (Badza, 2009, 166).

By now, Merafhe had become Vice-President of Botswana. His earlier sentiments about a home grown solution in Zimbabwe were replaced with a more confrontational stance. At an AU summit in 2008 he called upon SADC and indeed the African Union to suspend Zimbabwe from the two regional bodies. Merafhe stated that this exclusion was necessary because attendance by Zimbabwean delegates, "would give unqualified legitimacy to a process which cannot be considered legitimate" (Mmegi Online, 3 July 2008; Whande, 2008). When SADC convened at its 28th Ordinary Summit in Johannesburg in August 2008,

Botswana boycotted the meeting in protest to Mugabe's presence there. Phandu Skelemani stated before the meeting that, "Until they have agreed on whatever formation of government, Botswana will not be attending the meeting with those that want him to attend" (Modise, 2008).

This level of engagement pitted Botswana and Zimbabwe against each other on a rather unprecedented scale. Mugabe also accused Botswana of training MDC rebels that would then use the country as a launching pad to try and topple the longstanding regime. Indeed, the social temperature between Botswana and Zimbabwe had reached such heated proportions that there was talk of possible war between the two countries. In 2010, the Botswana government had recalled its Defence and Intelligence attachés and expelled the Zimbabwean counterparts (The Zimbabwean, 5 February 2010). There were also reports of a build-up of Botswana Defence Force (BDF) divisions along the border between Botswana and Zimbabwe, while Harare had instructed its war vet ex-combatants to be on standby to repel a possible invasion (Jonas *et al*, 2013: 4-5). While the prospect of war was undesirable – and in all probability unlikely – Botswana had demonstrated its role in the region as a motivator of democratic practices, ready to stand alone if the other nations were not prepared to be helpful.

South Africa had not been particularly helpful and had in some instances frustrated Botswana's efforts, over the issue in Zimbabwe. Phandu Skelemani was taken aback when Mbeki had declared, "I wouldn't describe that as a crisis. It's a normal electoral process in Zimbabwe" (*The Telegraph Online*, 12 April 2008). These curious words by Mbeki prompted Skelemani to respond:

> Everyone agreed that things are not normal, except Mbeki. Maybe Mbeki is so deeply involved that he firmly believes things are going right. But now he understands that the rest of SADC feels this is a matter of urgency and we are risking lives and limbs being lost. He got that message clearly (Rossouw and Moyo, 2008).

Mbeki clearly had a lack of urgency on the matter and Skelemani's response sought to remind South Africa of their responsibilities towards the promotion and safeguard of

democracy and human rights. South Africa's conduct also seemed to fuel what was already a volatile situation. In the aftermath of the March 2008 election, ZANU-PF started arming themselves heavily in anticipation of a civil war. ZANU-PF had made contact with China to acquire such military armaments that they felt they might need. In April 2008, a ship had been traced by MI6 (British Intelligence) which had a large amount of weapons, scheduled to dock in Durban. The cargo on board the ship was destined for Zimbabwe and it took protests from unions as well as political pressure from Britain and the United States, before the ship was refused permission to dock (Jonas *et al*, 2013: 2).

Overall, Botswana had battled to mobilize other African states into adopting a tougher stance against Zimbabwe. The AU had acknowledged the need for a government of national unity between the Mugabe and Tsvangirai camps, but had fallen short of overtly criticizing Mugabe – much to the dismay of political analysts and western onlookers (Borger, 2008). It appears many states in the AU were driven by their conviction not to allow western influences to interfere in African politics, and to some degree Botswana was perceived as being a puppet of the west – an image perpetuated by the Mugabe himself (Jonas *et al*, 2013: 2). Botswana however was able to align her identity of liberal democracy with other similarly minded elites in Zambian (President Levy Mwanawasa), Kenya (Prime Minister Raila Odinga), Nigeria and Senegal, who all expressed concerns about Mugabe's legitimacy during the violence that characterized the election period (Pambazuka News, 23 June 2008).

In 2008, Botswana also took advantage of Kgalema Motlanthe's interim presidency in South Africa, to advance discussions on the Zimbabwe issue in a manner that would have been difficult to achieve under the Mbeki presidency. In a meeting held between Ian Khama and Motlanthe in 2008, the two presidents agreed that key to a solution on the political crisis in Zimbabwe was for Morgan Tsvangirai to be sworn in as Prime Minister, while Arthur Mutambara would become Deputy Prime Minister, to form an inclusive government (Mmegi Online, 25 November 2008). Thus, in terms of leveraging her position here, Botswana did not experience a total failure. By 2009, a compromise was reached in which Morgan Tsvangirai could be included in a government of national unity, whereas in the aftermath of the 2008 elections, this opportunity was not present. In maximizing on her identity as a liberal democratic state, and adopting a foreign policy role that promoted international norms, Botswana was lauded by the West as a nation committed to defending principle – as seen in

an invitation extended to Phandu Skelemani to appear on BBC's HARDtalk interview with Stephen Sackur, on the issue of African states being passive towards Mugabe (BBC News, 26 November 2008).

4.4. Conclusion

What the chapter has sought to establish is that Botswana's foreign policy outlook has by and large followed a moral trajectory which has stressed the protection of human rights, the promotion of good governance, the rule of law and freely contested elections, all of which form the cornerstone of universally accepted democratic norms. Whereas during the apartheid era, Botswana's foreign policy was concerned more with building alliances with African states against white minority rule – even though some of these countries were characterized by lifetime presidencies – after 1990, and in the context of widespread democratization, Gaborone has played a more activist role in reminding the continent of the norms that are inherent within international institutions.

While in the pre-Khama era, the country sought to realise these principles in tandem with the region – as in the case of Lesotho – it has become clear in some instances that this kind of solidarity does not necessarily serve the fundamental interests of humanity. A case in point is the constant resolve of the AU to ignore and boycott the jurisdiction of the ICC, when it is clear that gross human rights violations are being carried out by perpetrators that bank on impunity of other countries to survive. Botswana has projected itself as a defender of principle, riding on its longstanding image of liberal parliamentary democracy. This has also been evident in the case of Zimbabwe where it acted upon its imperatives and refused to recognize Mugabe's post-2008 government and called upon the wider international community to apply pressure to achieve lasting solutions to the country's problems. A constructivist reading of the examples discussed above points to Botswana's perceived identity being projected in its foreign policy role, which has given her international prestige amongst members of the wider international community.

Chapter Five

CONCLUSION

From a constructivist reading of international relations, the study has sought to analyse Botswana's foreign policy to demonstrate how she has been able to leverage herself in her relations with more powerful actors and gain a high level of prestige within the wider international community. For a very long time before the 1990s, Botswana had projected its identity as the most striking example of a liberal democratic state, in a continent otherwise riddled with undemocratic regimes. This was achieved largely through following a pragmatic foreign policy that was also accompanied by a large degree of principle.

Chapter One provided the theoretical framework that the subsequent chapters would draw from to make their arguments. In this chapter, the argument was made that realism/neorealism has treated the small state problem in international relations in a manner in which the agency of such states has not been taken seriously. A constructivist understanding of International Relations was thus adopted in which inter-subjective meanings constitute reality and material conditions. To this end, agents and structures are mutually constitutive and neither one ought to be privileged over the other. Thus, as argued by Alexander Wendt (1992), anarchy is what states make of it and it does not necessarily lead to the self-help notions purported by rationalist accounts of IR. With this inter-subjective construction of the anarchic environment, interests and identities are also not exogenously given but rather endogenously constituted. Thus through interaction, interests and role identities can be collectively defined and enemies and friends mutually perceived as a result of behaviour. Also important in a constructivist reading of IR is the role that norms play in shaping and regulating behaviour between states. Norms can also shape the roles that states see themselves playing within their environment, leading them to act in ways that promote principle even if this seems to be at odds with the possible material gains of taking alternative routes of action. Constructivism thus provides us with a way of understanding how small states can leverage their identities in relation to other actors, thereby altering the structure of the international environment to obtain favourable outcomes.

Taken together, these tenets of constructivism opened a space within which small state foreign policy options could be explored. Changes in the international environment that came about in the post-Cold War period have allowed for diplomacy to take on a character which had not been acknowledged by the older studies of IR theory. Through conference diplomacy small states have now and in the past been able to leverage themselves against powerful actors and influence international forums by means of: an in-depth understanding of operational affairs; taking the lead on various issues; building coalitions or forming voting blocs and creating a favourable image perception among powerful states. As well, Chapter One points out that small states can use negotiations as a tool to obtain favourable outcomes vis-à-vis stronger actors within asymmetrical power relations, by using behavioural power to emphasise specific issue areas of mutual interest. In this way, small states can obtain favourable outcomes even where the odds seem to be stacked against them. It was also argued in Chapter One that small state behaviour, especially where it appears idiosyncratic, can be explained by elite ideas and identities in that such elites mould and consolidate their preferred internal social and cultural order and then look outwards to ally themselves with similarly minded actors. The thrust of the theoretical framework is that small states can leverage themselves within the international environment to influence other actors to agree to mutual interests that benefit both parties. This framework was then employed in the subsequent chapters to assess Botswana's foreign policy behaviour.

Chapter Two sought to account for why Botswana managed to break out of the ring of dependency that South Africa had tried to put around her and the other BLS states during the apartheid era. Drawing on elite ideas and identities from Chapter One, it was determined that Seretse Khama had developed a particularly non-racial internal cultural order, which he projected as an important principle of his foreign policy identity. In this way Botswana – surrounded by white minority rule – leveraged herself through the principle of non-racialism to obtain the friendship of similarly minded elites in the black African North (particularly Zambia and Tanzania).

This principled approach was to be governed with a large degree of pragmatism. As such, while Botswana sought to demonstrate its desire for the bringing about of majority rule in Southern Africa, it positioned its foreign policy vis-à-vis the minority governments very carefully so as not to provoke Pretoria or Salisbury into responding through coercive means. However, as it became increasingly clear that the white minority governments had no desire to accommodate majority rule, Botswana's principled approach towards a non-racial foreign policy became more and more pronounced – culminating in her central role in the Frontline States (FLS). This approach had the desired effect of attracting the sympathies of more black African states who understood Botswana's plight. A constructivist reading of this foreign policy shows Gaborone leveraging herself to change previously held perceptions by African countries – about its identity – who thought Botswana was a hostage state that acquiesced with South Africa's preferences.

The chapter also drew upon conference diplomacy techniques to demonstrate how Botswana was able to make her case for the desperate geopolitical context she found herself in, as well as defend the position of the FLS in international forums. In this regard for example, Botswana was successful in getting the Commonwealth to apply pressure on Britain to abandon her ambitions to sell arms to South Africa, and later Gaborone obtained two UN Security Council resolutions condemning Salisbury and Pretoria's intrusive military actions upon her territory. In this way, Botswana benefited enormously – in relation to the West – as a result of her successfully projected identity as being virtually the sole parliamentary democracy on the continent before 1990. From a constructivist perspective, it can be seen that Botswana – through this carefully measured pragmatic yet principled foreign policy – was able to traverse her hostage station within the Southern African subordinate state system.

While Chapter Two focused on Botswana's political foreign policy during the apartheid era, Chapter Three assessed how Botswana was able to overcome the bleak economic conditions that she had inherited from her colonial legacy in the same period. It was found that the governing elite upon obtaining independence had pragmatically committed itself to adopting developmental policies that governed the major sectors of the economy. As such, government expenditure and external economic relations were to be governed by National Development Plans (NDPs). This prudent economic approach aided and set the parameters for relations

with external actors. The chapter assessed three instances in which Botswana leveraged herself against powerful economic actors, punching above her weight to obtain favourable outcomes.

In the first instance, it was found that having obtained relevant expert counsel on the dynamics of the Southern African Customs Union, Botswana was able to take the lead and carry the day in negotiations from the BLS perspective, resulting in a more favourable outcome from a powerful actor in the form of South Africa. South Africa was also accommodating towards Botswana because she had prudently leveraged herself as a country that did not permit wars of national liberation to be sprung from her territory. The increased revenue from the SACU agreement was important in that it allowed Botswana to balance her budget deficit and reduce her dependency on British aid.

In the second instance, Botswana employed skilful negotiations to convince De Beers to accept a 50-50 per cent share agreement (amongst other things) which was a major improvement from the initial 20-80 in favour of De Beers. The increased revenue from this agreement was invaluable in that the mineral exports led to a government budget surplus. Due to sensible government fiscal policy and stock piles of diamonds resulting from the soft market in the early 1980s, the government was able to purchase a five per cent share in De Beers leading to fifteen per cent in the 1990s. In later years, the government was also able to successfully negotiate the relocation of the Diamond Trading Company from London to Gaborone.

Thirdly, it was found that Botswana managed its aid relations very well. The increase in revenue from SACU and diamond sales do not on their own account for why Botswana was able to successfully deal with aid donors. As such, it must be acknowledged that Botswana's stable political environment – which was very much a consequence of pragmatic domestic and foreign policies followed by the government – to a large degree created the conditions under which aid donors were willing to deal with the country. Botswana took advantage of its liberal democratic credentials as well as the image it had projected of a financially credibility and trustworthiness, to court western countries into viewing her as a 'donor darling'.

Gaborone was also able to ensure that its aid negotiations with donors were to comply with the stringent requirements set by the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) and the policies of the National Development Plans. As such, the management and negotiation of aid was highly centralized preventing donors from negotiating directly with individual ministries: a problem found in most other African countries. The bilateral negotiation approach adopted by the government was also important in facilitating this process, and it gave Botswana the flexibility to turn down aid which did not fit within its developmental imperatives, while looking elsewhere.

The successful 1969 SACU and later mineral negotiations as well as effective aid management led to Botswana attaining the status of 'upper middle income country' thereby prompting donors to consider exit strategies by the 1990s. While the Botswana government were not pleased by the donors' exit decisions, these exits (especially in a case like Botswana's) are illustrative of a country that has graduated from aid dependence and in effect transcended its small state economic station.

In the post-Cold War era, Botswana's foreign policy which had hitherto been focused on transcending its political (Chapter Two) and economic (Chapter Three) small state status in the region, now had to adapt to a changed international environment. With an increase in the number of democratised countries on the continent and the reduced impetus on Botswana's shining example of democratic credentials, Botswana adopted a foreign policy in which Gaborone sought to redefine its role as a promoter of democratic principles. Chapter Four thus illustrated how Botswana projected a principled foreign policy fundamentally driven by normative goals as prescribed by regional, continental and global norms. The chapter drew on the constructivist notion that a state's identity is socially constructed through an inter-subjective process. This process allows the state to determine the role that it sees itself playing in the international arena. In this way Botswana had attempted to enhance its reputation as a longstanding liberal democratic country, by leveraging herself on the continent in such a way that she would try to use international organisations to condemn despotic practices and advance democracy.

Having internalized human rights, democracy and the rule of law as part of her cultural identity, Botswana has projected these norms onto her foreign policy. There have been various instances in the post-apartheid era in which Gaborone has demonstrated its willingness to get involved in the internal landscape of countries that disregard these values.

Chapter Four dealt with three instances; Botswana's involvement with Lesotho (both 1994 and 1998), Botswana's condemnation of Zimbabwe's electoral crisis of 2008 and Botswana's position vis-à-vis the African Union in relation to the International Criminal Court. It was found in the case of Lesotho that in 1994, Botswana along with its fellow Troika members (South Africa and Zimbabwe) was able to address a constitutional crisis in which the army had fallen out with the government. In the same year, Botswana invited the Lesotho army to come and observe the relationship between the army and the government. A memorandum of agreement was also reached in which the Troika would be called upon to guarantee democratic and constitutional stability in Lesotho. On the basis of this agreement in 1998, Botswana (a small state) together with South Africa (the continent's biggest power) engaged in a military intervention in Lesotho to quell an uprising resulting from an electoral crisis. In a time when both Botswana and South Africa were attempting to present themselves as activist democratic countries, South Africa attracted criticism for her aggressive involvement, while Botswana was seen as playing more of a peacekeeping role.

On Zimbabwe, Botswana along with Zambia were one of the few vocal countries within SADC's corridors to chastise Mugabe for the electoral crisis of 2008 – in which presidential election results were unreasonably withheld for a long period of time and there was a large amount of violence against opposition parties and voters. When Mugabe declared himself as the winner of the run-off election in which he was unopposed, the Khama administration refused to recognize his presidency. In what followed Botswana sought to have Mugabe removed from official international forums until a proper process of elections had been completed. This process was not aided by South Africa's (nor indeed SADC's) 'quiet diplomacy', which only served to extend legitimacy to an ill formed government – although

Botswana had engaged with South Africa, reminding her of her responsibilities in promoting democratic practices on the continent.

In relation to the African Union and the ICC, Botswana consistently made it clear that she would not abandon her commitments to the Rome Statute while the rest of the AU sought to completely disregard its authority. In this regard, Botswana stood alone when Gaborone determined that leaders such as Al Bashir and Gaddafi should stand trial at The Hague for atrocities committed within their countries. This is demonstrative of a country willing to defend a principled foreign policy even if it meant standing in isolation. These attempts, however, for the most part, failed to mobilise the support Botswana sought and she was quite often left as a lone voice on the continent.

Botswana has thus followed a mixture of pragmatism, as well as principle, in her foreign policy approach. While mindful of the constraints of her international environment, Botswana was able to demonstrate that small states – and indeed African small states – are able to successfully leverage themselves vis-à-vis more powerful political and economic actors, thereby transcending their situation.

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