

**Public sector industrial relations in the context of Alliance  
politics: the case of Makana Local Municipality, South  
Africa (1994-2006)**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis is in the field of Industrial Relations. It concerns a micro-level investigation of the dynamics of public sector industrial relations in post-apartheid South Africa. It focuses on the Tripartite Alliance between the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and explores what the Alliance relationship has meant for the traditional roles of employees and their representatives on the one hand, and employers and their representatives on the other. The thesis examines the political, organisational and societal contradictions and implications for COSATU public sector union affiliates and their members in their relationship to the ANC as an ally (via the Alliance) and the context in which ANC members form part of management (in government). The South African Municipal Workers' Union (SAMWU) was used as an archetype of a COSATU public sector union affiliate that engages with the State as employer at the municipal level. It is a case study of Makana Local Municipality (Eastern Cape Province, South Africa) using qualitative research techniques and content analysis to derive the relevant information. The author conducted a series of in-depth interviews of key informants and observations at Makana Local Municipality were done. Based on the empirical data obtained from the investigation, the thesis argues that the traditional roles in the employment relationship at the workplace have been affected by the political alliance. Industrial relations roles have become increasingly vague especially since many within local government share ANC/SACP memberships with members of the trade union. The study also highlights that within an increasingly globalising post-apartheid environment, the Alliance provides

mixture of benefits and challenges for workplace negotiations and employment relations in ways that macro-level analyses of employer-employee relationships do not always capture.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

|      |                                    |
|------|------------------------------------|
| ACDP | African Christian Democratic Party |
| ADM  | African Democratic Movement        |

|                  |                                                    |
|------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| AEB              | Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging                        |
| AITUP            | Abolition of Income Tax and Usury Party            |
| AMP              | African Muslim Party                               |
| AMP <sub>a</sub> | Africa Moral Party                                 |
| AMWU             | African Mineworkers Union                          |
| ANC              | African National Congress                          |
| APF              | Anti-Privatisation Forum                           |
| AZAPO            | Azanian People's Organisation                      |
| BC               | Bargaining Committee                               |
| CC               | Central Committee                                  |
| CDP              | Christian Democratic Party                         |
| CEC              | Central Executive Committee                        |
| CFA              | Commission for Administration                      |
| COSATU           | Congress of South African Trade Unions             |
| CPSA             | Communist Party of South Africa                    |
| CTMWA            | Cape Town Municipal Workers Association            |
| CWU              | Communication Workers Union                        |
| DA               | Democratic Alliance                                |
| DENOSA           | Democratic Nursing Organisation of South Africa    |
| DIMES            | Durban Integrated Municipal Employees Society      |
| DP               | Democratic Party                                   |
| DPSA             | Dikwankwetla Party of South Africa                 |
| EC               | Executive Committee                                |
| ECLAA            | Eastern Cape Local Authorities Association         |
| EMSA             | Employment Movement of South Africa                |
| FA               | Federal Alliance                                   |
| FEDUSA           | Federation of Unions of South Africa               |
| FF               | Freedom Front                                      |
| FFP              | Freedom Front Plus                                 |
| GAWU             | General and Allied Workers Union                   |
| GEAR             | Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy       |
| GNU              | Government of National Unity                       |
| GP               | Green Party                                        |
| GPGP             | Government by the People Green Party               |
| GRACA            | Grahamstown Civic Association                      |
| ICA              | Industrial Conciliation Act                        |
| ICU              | Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union           |
| ID               | Independent Democrats                              |
| IDASA            | Institute for Democracy in South Africa            |
| IDP              | Integrated Development Plan                        |
| IEC              | Independent Electoral Commission                   |
| IFP              | Inkatha Freedom Party                              |
| IMATU            | Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union       |
| IP <sub>a</sub>  | Independent Party                                  |
| IP               | Islamic Party                                      |
| IPS              | Institute of Public Servants                       |
| ISRDP            | Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme |
| KISS             | Keep It Straight and Simple                        |
| LED              | Local Economic Development                         |
| LGNF             | Local Government Negotiating Forum                 |
| LGTA             | Local Government Transition Act                    |

|         |                                                            |
|---------|------------------------------------------------------------|
| LLF     | Local Labour Forum                                         |
| LRA     | Labour Relations Act                                       |
| LSAP    | Luso South African Party                                   |
| MF      | Minority Front                                             |
| MGWUSA  | Municipal and General Workers Union of South Africa        |
| MK      | Umkhonto we Sizwe                                          |
| MP      | Merit Party                                                |
| MSP     | Municipal Services Project                                 |
| MUM     | Mass United Movement                                       |
| MWUSA   | Municipal Workers Union of South Africa                    |
| NA      | National Action                                            |
| NACTU   | National Council of Trade Unions                           |
| NALEDI  | National Labour and Economic Development Institute         |
| NC      | National Congress                                          |
| NCP     | National Coalition Party                                   |
| NEC     | National Executive Committee                               |
| NEDLAC  | National Economic Development and Labour Council           |
| NEHAWU  | National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union        |
| NEM     | Normative Economic Model                                   |
| NFA     | National Framework Agreement                               |
| NLP     | New Labour Party                                           |
| NMC     | National Manpower Commission                               |
| NNP     | New National Party                                         |
| NP      | National Party                                             |
| NUMSA   | National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa            |
| NUPSAW  | National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers        |
| OP      | Organisation Party                                         |
| ORA     | Organisational Rights Agreement                            |
| PAC     | Pan Africanist Congress of Azania                          |
| PAWUSA  | Public and Allied Workers Union of South Africa            |
| PC      | Provincial Committee                                       |
| PEC     | Provincial Executive Committee                             |
| PFP     | Progressive Federal Party                                  |
| PGC     | Provincial Gender Committee                                |
| PJC     | Peace and Justice Congress                                 |
| PLP     | People's Liberation Party                                  |
| POPCRU  | Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union                      |
| POTWA   | Post Offices and Telecommunications Workers Association    |
| PSA     | Public Servants Association                                |
| PSC     | Public Services Commission                                 |
| PSCBC   | Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council            |
| PSCC    | Public Sector Co-ordinating Committee                      |
| PSI     | Public Services International                              |
| PSJAC   | Public Service Joint Advisory Council                      |
| PSL     | Public Servants League                                     |
| PSU     | Public Service Union                                       |
| RDP     | Reconstruction and Development Programme                   |
| RP      | Right Party                                                |
| SAAME   | South African Association of Municipal Employees           |
| SAAWU   | South African Allied Workers Union                         |
| SACCAWU | South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union |

|            |                                                            |
|------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
| SACP       | South African Communist Party                              |
| SACTU      | South African Congress of Trade Unions                     |
| SADNU      | South African Democratic Nurses Union                      |
| SADTU      | South African Democratic Teachers' Union                   |
| SAFCOL     | South African Forestry Company Limited                     |
| SALAWU     | South African Local Authorities Workers' Union             |
| SALB       | South African Labour Bulletin                              |
| SALGA      | South African Local Government Association                 |
| SALGBC     | South African Local Government Bargaining Council          |
| SAMWU      | South African Municipal Workers' Union                     |
| SANCO      | South African National Civil Organisations                 |
| SARHWU     | South African Railway and Harbour Workers Union            |
| SATAWU     | South African Transport and Allied Workers Union           |
| SATS       | South African Transport Services                           |
| SAWP       | South African Woman's Party                                |
| SOE        | State Owned Enterprise                                     |
| SPA        | Socialist Party of Azania                                  |
| SPP        | Sindawonye Progressive Party                               |
| TGWU       | Transport and General Workers Union                        |
| TLC        | Transitional Local Council                                 |
| UCDP       | United Christian Democratic Party                          |
| UDF        | United Democratic Front                                    |
| UDM        | United Democratic Movement                                 |
| UF         | United Front                                               |
| ULA        | Unemployment Labour Alliance                               |
| UPF        | United People's Front                                      |
| UPM        | United Pretoria Municipal                                  |
| URP        | Urban Renewal Programme                                    |
| UTATU      | United Transport and Allied Trade Union                    |
| WIRFI (SA) | Workers' International to Rebuild the Fourth International |
| WIVL       | Workers International Vanguard League                      |
| WKFP       | West-Kaap Federaliste Party                                |
| WRPP       | Women's Rights Peace Party                                 |
| XP         | Ximoko Party                                               |
| XPP        | Ximoko Progressive Party                                   |

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# CHAPTER ONE

## GENERAL INTRODUCTION OF THE STUDY

### 1.1 Introduction

Labour relations in South Africa have undergone profound changes over the last decade, primarily as a result of political, legislative and institutional changes with the advent of democracy. Since 1994, public servants in particular have been granted individual and collective rights, which were previously denied, and have begun to engage in increasingly participatory processes with the State, their employer. While these progressive changes had long been anticipated, they pose evident challenges for relations between the public sector union affiliates of the Congress of South African Trade Unions federation (COSATU) and the State as employer. COSATU has, for over a decade, formed part of the Tripartite Alliance comprising the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). Consequently, public sector union affiliates of COSATU have interacted with the ANC at two levels: firstly, in government as the majority party and part of management, and secondly as an ally.

The dominant focus in Industrial Relations theory has been on explaining the interaction between parties to employment relations in the private sector (Beaumont, 1992). These theories, when applied to the public sector, appear to fall short of fully explaining and predicting the relationship between public sector unions and the State. In most countries, labour movements and political parties have established specific relationships to serve their organisational interests. The political party has, in general, been the “principal instrument of labour” in the political sphere while the trade union has played an autonomous role (Marks, 1989). This aspect of political ties adds to industrial relations. Orthodox Industrial Relations theory explains the interaction between players to the labour relationship as separate but mutually dependent (Fox, 1974). However, questions arise concerning how to best explain public sector industrial relations in South Africa using an orthodox application, as employment relations hardly ever consist of distinct, separate union and management entities.

## **1.2 Research objectives**

This research investigates the impact of the contradictory situation created by the Tripartite Alliance on industrial relations between Makana Local Municipality and SAMWU. We hope the study contributes to the understanding of post-apartheid (1994-2006) public sector industrial relations at South African municipalities and provides an understanding of the political, organisational and societal implications and complexities for industrial relations when ANC representatives are part of management (in local government) and the ANC is an ally (outside the workplace).

I address the following research questions in the course of the research:

1. How do managers interpret their role as employers as opposed to party members who may belong to the same party branch as SAMWU members?
2. How do SAMWU representatives represent municipal workers in the bargaining arena (which is adversarial in nature) yet maintain a cooperative relationship with the ANC via the Alliance?
3. Has the Alliance changed the situation for SAMWU to mobilise against municipalities?
4. What have been the effects of the political alliance of SAMWU with the ANC via COSATU on the ways in which shop-floor matters are dealt with?

## **1.3 Research motivations**

This research is motivated by some topical observations. Firstly, public sector industrial relations in South Africa have, in the main, been a relatively under-researched area. Nevertheless, since the transition to democracy in 1994, the public sector appears to have become a broad area of concern. The public sector has been a target for reform in the economic restructuring strategies of government and with this there is evidence of a growing research interest. Most of this research, however, seems to have focused on macro-level matters. One major challenge appears to be the relationship between government and its employees and their representatives at a local level. Both the young democratic government and public sector unions seem to be relatively inexperienced in methods of participatory engagement with each other as the previous labour relations system was very authoritarian (Posel, 2000). Increased research into public sector industrial relations in South Africa can provide a clearer

understanding, via new ideas and information, which would contribute to improving maturity in the interaction between the State and unions.

Secondly, the strike activities by the South African Municipal Workers' Union (SAMWU) (July 2002; 8 July 2005; 2 August 2005), the South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU) (16 September 2004), the National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU) (16 September 2004) and the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) (5 March 2004; 2 September 2004) indicate a significant level of dissatisfaction amongst public sector union affiliates of COSATU. While conflict may be deemed as a healthy, acceptable outcome of industrial relations (Hyman, 1989), the events themselves are a legitimate cause for concern when one considers that dissatisfied public sector workers have major repercussions for the well-being of the broader population. For instance, evidence from Statistics South Africa revealed that not all municipalities were operating at full capacity in terms of service delivery. It was found that out of 284 municipalities in the country 232 municipalities provided water, 178 municipalities supplied electricity. 233 municipalities provided sewerage and sanitation and 226 municipalities provided solid waste management (Statistics South Africa, 2003). This essentially means that municipalities have had to deal with challenges of matching service delivery to service demand. One can expect that a frustrated workforce will affect the quality of general service delivery to communities.

Thirdly, research by the Finance and Fiscal Commission (1997) and the Unicity Commission (2000) revealed that intergovernmental transfers of funding from national to local government decreased by 85% in real terms between 1991 and 1997 and a further 55% between 1997 and 2000 (McDonald, 2002). Research by the National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI) further revealed that between 1995 and 2001 approximately 191 076 (or 13.6%) jobs were lost in major state enterprises and the public service through retrenchment, attrition and voluntary severance (Naidoo, 2003). McDonald (2002) argued that the policy instruments contained in the neo-liberal macroeconomic policy framework, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR), were a major contributing factor to these job losses. One can expect that budget constraints may affect the prioritisation of responsibilities by local government. This in turn may warrant union intervention to

protect member and society interests in an increasingly complex political, economic and social environment (Pottie, 1998; McDonald, 2002).

Dilemmas may arise for public sector union affiliates of COSATU when negotiating with government as the employer over conditions of service and wages. SAMWU, for example, negotiates<sup>1</sup> with the local government employer association, the South African Local Government Association (SALGA), over wage advancements. Its Alliance partner in government, the ANC, through its backing of neo-liberal principles and the GEAR policy, has promoted cuts in public spending and speedy restructuring of state assets which has implications for employment and government budgets. In a proposal named *An alliance for socio-economic transformation* (COSATU, 1997) COSATU communicated a growing concern amongst its affiliate members that GEAR would strip away the ability of government to ensure redistribution, growth and employment creation. GEAR did not meet many of its objectives (Hassen, 2001). Nevertheless, its introduction signalled a shift by government to neo-liberal economic policy. Affiliates of COSATU, such as SAMWU, have opposed the neo-liberal direction pursued by government. This study contributes to the understanding of public sector industrial relations in light of such broader economic adjustments.

Finally, SAMWU is known for its stance against GEAR and privatisation, yet its response to the ANC in government appears to be inconsistent. In July 2002, SAMWU staged a massive strike because SALGA signed a wage agreement with the Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union (IMATU) (SALB, 2002). Nonetheless, for the April 2004 national elections SAMWU pledged its support to the ANC manifesto (SAMWU, 2003). According to the Independent Electoral Commission since 1994, the ANC has consistently won a majority vote at national, provincial and local government elections despite a decline in voter turnout. In 1994, the ANC won 62.65% (252 parliamentary seats) of the national votes. At the 1995/96 local government elections, the ANC won 58.8% of the total votes. In 1999, the ANC won 66.35% (266 seats) of the national election votes. In 2000, the ANC won 59.4% of the local government election votes. In 2004, the ANC won 69.69% of the national vote

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<sup>1</sup> Local government negotiations take place at a national and provincial level in the South African Local Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC) and in Local Labour Forums (LLFs) at a local level. These bargaining structures comprise nominated representatives of SALGA, SAMWU and the Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union (IMATU).

(IEC, 2004). COSATU and its affiliates contributed significantly to these victories. In a press statement following the 2004 election results, COSATU proclaimed that it was “proud of the important role it played in achieving this victory” and thanked all its members, shop stewards, staff and office bearers for voting ANC (COSATU, 2004a). An investigation into some complexities for the membership of SAMWU can contribute to an understanding of relations between unions and politics in post-apartheid South Africa and under conditions of corporatism.

#### **1.4 Definition of terms**

The definitions adopted in the research include the following:

“Public sector” refers to “all institutions under public control where direct or indirect political control is exercised through appropriate legislation ... [it] includes a wide range of components: national and provincial departments, state-owned enterprises, and local authorities” (Adler, 2000:3). Definitions of the public sector tend to be variable and this definition best describes the South African public sector.

“Public sector union” refers to any union operating within the public sector as previously defined.

“Public service” forms part of the broader public sector. It is the single largest component of the public sector. It comprises national and provincial departments and agencies, such as service delivery agencies (for example, health and education), security agencies (such as the South African Police Service), administrative agencies and statutory agencies (for example, the Public Service Commission) (Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; Adler, 2000:5-6).

“Alliance” refers to the coalition between the ANC, SACP and COSATU. The terms “Alliance” and “Tripartite Alliance” are used interchangeably from this point on to refer to the affiliation. Emphasis is given to the ANC and COSATU organisations in the analysis. The scope of the research does not allow for extensive coverage of the dynamics of the Alliance relationship and events between all the Alliance partners.

“Black” – For the purposes of this research, “Black” generically refers to African, Coloured and Indian people (Employment Equity Act of 1998).


### **1.5 Research design and methodology**

This research adopted qualitative research design and research methods. Combinations of primary and secondary methods of data collection were used to acquire the relevant information. These consisted of semi-structured interviews, observations and content analysis of newspapers, reports and journal articles. A single case study was used in undertaking an empirical investigation of the research questions. The case study was conducted at Makana Local Municipality<sup>2</sup>, a local municipality in the Eastern Cape Province. The subjects were drawn primarily, although not exclusively, from that municipality. Figure 1 below is a map of the area of Makana Local Municipality. The interview sample included representatives and members of SAMWU, SALGA, ANC, the IMATU and the Democratic Alliance (DA).

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<sup>2</sup> Makana Local Municipality will be referred to as Makana Municipality as well from this point onwards.

**Figure 1: Makana Local Municipality, Eastern Cape Province, South Africa**



Source: Makana Local Municipality (2005:2)

### **1.6 Ethical considerations**

Ethics are an important consideration in social research (Mouton, 2001). The consent of the research participants was attained for interviews and all the respondents were assured of their anonymity. They were also given liberty to decline participation at any time in the research process. Pseudonyms have been given to the research respondents to protect their identities.

### **1.7 Research limitations**

The selection of a single municipality has limitations on the extent to which the findings from this study can be generalised. Generalisations may only be possible for municipalities with similar characteristics as Makana Municipality. Besides the limitations, the research provides insight into contemporary issues within public sector municipal industrial relations in South Africa.

### **1.8 Structure of dissertation**

*Chapter 1* is the introduction to the study. It discusses the context of the study and provides the motivations for pursuing this study. A rough outline of the research design and methodology used to address the research problem is incorporated.

*Chapter 2* is a review of the literature on conceptualising industrial relations and Alliance politics. It contains the theoretical framework that informed the study. It provides an overview of developments in the field to help locate the research problem.

*Chapter 3* gives an account of the research design and methodology employed. It includes a description of the data capturing and data analysis methods.

*Chapter 4* focuses on SAMWU. It gives an overview of SAMWU then examines the evolving nature of the relationship between SAMWU and local government.

*Chapter 5* provides background information to Makana Local Municipality. It begins with a brief history of the formation of the municipality then proceeds to highlight the post-apartheid characteristics of the municipality.

*Chapter 6* discusses the dynamics of post-apartheid industrial relations incorporating the evidence gathered at the case study. The chapter illustrates how industrial relations are played out within an Alliance context.

*Chapter 7* is the conclusion of the study. The research findings are examined in relation to research questions. Recommendations regarding further research are presented.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **CONCEPTUALISING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter begins with a review of literature on theory developments of the field of Industrial Relations. Broadly speaking, orthodox theories on Industrial Relations were developed from studies in the private enterprise context. The studies focused on the role of management and depicted the players to the labour relationship as distinct entities pursuing separate but mutually dependent interests, mainly through collective bargaining processes. Over time there were improvements to industrial relations theory and developments in public sector industrial relations. The review of industrial relations theories is followed by literature on the South African transition to democracy and developments in South African industrial relations,

#### **2.2 Early approaches to building Industrial Relations theory**

Developments in Industrial Relations have a long history. For the most part, early writers focussed on institutions rather than social relations in industry (Hyman, 1975). Beatrice and Sidney Webb (1897 and 1920), for instance, contributed significantly to early developments on British trade unionism by contending that trade unions were a “continuous association of wage earners” primarily concerned with maintaining and improving conditions “of their employment”<sup>3</sup> and functioned to enforce a “common rule” for trade in the shop via three processes—mutual insurance<sup>4</sup>, collective bargaining<sup>5</sup> and legal enactment<sup>6</sup> (Webb, 1897). From the 1920s to the early 1950s, economics,

<sup>3</sup> The Webbs later altered the phrase “of their employment” to “of their working lives”.

<sup>4</sup> Mutual insurance refers to “the provision of a fund by common subscription to insure against casualties, to provide maintenance, that is to say, in cases in which a member is deprived of his livelihood by cause over which neither he nor the unions has any control” (Webb, 1897:247).

<sup>5</sup> Collective bargaining refers to the negotiation between organised employees and their employers over matters such as wages, rules and working conditions (Webb, 1897).

<sup>6</sup> Legal enactment refers to regulation and support for union activity via legislation (1897).

politics and law began to influence the writing of many authors on Industrial Relations. In the United States, Commons (1923)<sup>7</sup> and Perlman (1928)<sup>8</sup> offered theoretical approaches for Industrial Relations from their analyses of trade unionism. Commons (1923) presented unions as emancipatory forces, dividing the power of one party (the employer) over the other (the worker), and Perlman (1928) argued that trade unions primarily gave attention to worker interests and provided workers with protection against the consequences of job shortage (in Blain and Gennard, 1970; Meltz, 1991). Dunlop (1944) similarly offered a model of the union as “an economic institution” by applying the economist theory of the firm to the trade union. Kerr (1948) displayed the limitations of a separate economic and political approach to trade unions as suggested by Dunlop (1944) and Ross (1948). Instead, Kerr (1948) proposed a combination of an economic and political approach for a better, more “realistic” analysis of trade unions.

From the early 1950s, writers began to shift their focus away from trade unions towards collective bargaining as a primary mechanism for handling employment matters (Chamberlain and Kuhn 1951; Cole, 1951). Shifts were made by various authors, for instance, Flanders and Clegg (1954) and Dunlop (1958), towards developing a refined Industrial Relations theory. Dunlop (1958) was the first to suggest that Industrial Relations be studied as a discipline in its own right, although his ideas did not represent any “real conceptual departure” from previous works (Lumley, 1979). He suggested that the Industrial Relations System could be seen as a distinct type or sub-system, functioning within the wider total social system with overlaps in the economic and political subsystems. Dunlop (1958) postulated that “abstractions”<sup>9</sup> came together to ascertain “rules” (procedural and substantive) to regulate the actors at the workplace and work community. From his observations, external factors in wider society impacted on the environmental factors that impinged directly on the actors of the Industrial Relations System. Dunlop (1958:ix) concluded that the central task of his general theory was to explain “why particular rules are established in particular

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<sup>7</sup> Commons, J.R. 1923. *Labour and administration*. New York: Macmillan.

<sup>8</sup> Perlman, S. 1928. *A theory of the labour movement*. New York: Macmillan.

<sup>9</sup> These existed in the form of actors in the system (managers and their representatives; workers and their representatives; and governmental agencies that would deal with either manager or worker organisations or individual workers), environmental contexts of the system (locus and distribution of power in larger society, technological characteristics of the workplace and work community and market and budgetary constraints) and ideology (that is, a body of common ideas that define the role, place and function of others in the system) (Dunlop, 1958:16).

Industrial Relations Systems and how and why they change in response to changes affecting the system”. It is arguable whether he portrayed all he intended of the “abstractions”.

Hyman (1975:11) argued that by concentrating on how conflict was contained and controlled rather than on the processes through which disagreements and disputes were generated, Dunlop (1958) portrayed the various institutions and procedures as compatible and well integrated and conflict as “self-regulating”. Hyman (1975) argued that the Systems model would be better if it focused on the institutions involved in negotiations. He proposed that the Industrial Relations System be redefined to include the “sources” and “consequences” of industrial conflict to ultimately describe Industrial Relations as “the study of processes of control over work relations” (Hyman, 1975:12). According to Jackson (1982:22), the Systems approach would be valuable if it integrated “the existence of contradictory processes and forces and therefore treat[ed] instability and stability as of equal significance as ‘system outcomes’ ” (that is, rules).

Wood, Wagner, Armstrong, Goodman and Davis (1975) composed constructive amendments to Dunlop’s model. The essence of their conceptual framework was on the Industrial Relations System as “a rule-making system”. Within the Industrial Relations System, “actors” produced rules, via “rule-making processes”, at different levels and within a “contextual environment” (Wood et al., 1975:304). They argued that “an analytical distinction [could] be made between the system which ‘produces’ rules (that is, the Industrial Relations System) and the system which is ‘governed’ by such rules (that is, the production system)” (Wood et al., 1975:295). This distinction would provide a framework for distinguishing between rules (substantive and procedural) that are an output of the Industrial Relations System to “govern” behaviour in the production system and rules (procedural) established for the “internal regulation of the conduct of the Industrial Relations System” (Salamon, 1992:46).

Between the 1960s and 1970s, the Oxford<sup>10</sup> school approach emerged as a decisive contribution to understanding Industrial Relations. Flanders (1965) was the most prominent author. His main assumption was that Industrial Relations involved the regulation of relations in industry via rule formulation (procedural<sup>11</sup> and substantive<sup>12</sup>) in collective bargaining. The procedural rules regulated “the behaviour of the parties to the collective agreement” (Flanders, 1965:11) and regulated “the making, interpretation and enforcement of ... substantive rules” (Flanders, 1965:11). Flanders (1965:10) argued that “unstructured” relationships did not feature in the rule making process. They existed “outside the scope” of Industrial Relations. He maintained that Industrial Relations should be defined as “the study of the institutions of job regulation” with collective bargaining as the chief institution of the rule-making process (Flanders, 1965:10-11). Margerison (1969) argued that the approach emphasised the consequences of industrial disputes rather than their causes and suggested that conflict be the basic concept that should form the basis of Industrial Relations study.

From the 1970s, the use of frames of reference (Unitary, Pluralist and Radical) began to dominate discussions on Industrial Relations Systems. The Unitary perspective depicted the enterprise as an integration of groups with shared interests and objectives, watched over by a single authority (management) in order to keep the organisation functional. Essentially, Industrial Relations were assumed to be “based on mutual cooperation and harmony of interest between management and managed within the enterprise” (Farnham and Pilmott, 1983:53). The Pluralist perspective arose as an alternative to the Unitary perspective with valuable contributions from Bakke (1946), Clegg (1975), Fox (1973 and 1974), Kerr (1954), Hyman (1978) and Kahn-Freund (1983). The Pluralist approach assumed that interest groups used “proper” or

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<sup>10</sup> Refers to the works of Clegg, H. 1970. *The system of Industrial Relations in Great Britain*. Oxford: Blackwell; Bain, G.S. 1970. *The growth of white-collar trade unionism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Fox, A. and Flanders, A. 1969. “The reform of collective bargaining: from Donovan to Durkheim”. *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 7 (2); McCarthy, W. 1966. “The role of shop stewards in British Industrial Relations”. *Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer’s Associations, Research Paper No. 1*.

<sup>11</sup> Procedural rules refer to the methods to be used and the stages to be followed in the settlement of disputes or the amenities and standing to be accorded to representatives of parties to an agreement (Flanders, 1965:11).

<sup>12</sup> Substantive rules refer to wage rates, working hours and terms and conditions of work (Flanders, 1965:11).

“legitimate” channels of influence and seldom resorted to coercion or sanctions against their elected rulers (Laffin, 1989). Pluralists were criticised for their concern with the outcomes of industrial conflict rather than sources of disputes (Hyman, 1972).

The Radical perspective argued for a broadening of analysis to realise more than the needs of maintaining stability and containing conflict in the employment relationship. In his arguments against the Pluralist perspective (a shift in his stance), Fox (1973) questioned the Pluralist presentation of the owners and controllers of property as just another group among many. He criticised the pluralists for neglecting the “propertyless” and their subjugation, and pointed out that the “propertied” seldom have to make their power noticeable. Their very power gave them the facilities to establish and maintain social attitudes and values “favourable” to their acceptance (Fox, 1973). Hyman (1975) argued that the organisation was reflective of wider society in that the productive system was privately owned and company policy was directed by profit. The interests of labour and capital conflicted with each other and, unlike in the Pluralist or Unitary approaches, power fundamentally skewed in favour of the employer. Hyman (1975) suggested that processes of conflict generation were therefore important in studying Industrial Relations. Both Fox (1973) and Hyman (1975) advanced that collective bargaining and compromise were inadequate as solid solutions to imbalance and emphasised that Industrial Relations should rather be located in the wider processes of social disproportion and class struggle<sup>13</sup>.

From the 1980s, many frameworks on Industrial Relations followed a Strategic Choice framework, as developed by Kochan, Katz and McKersie (1984 and 1994) in their investigation of United States Industrial Relations. The Strategic Choice framework emphasised that “industrial relations processes and outcomes [would be] determined by continuously evolving *interaction* of environmental pressures and organisational responses” (Kochan et al., 1994:13) along with strategic choices and values of managers, union leaders, workers and public policy makers. Turner (1991:230) criticised the Strategic Choice analysis for neglecting the organisational cohesiveness

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<sup>13</sup> Class struggle was first identified by Karl Marx as the antagonism between the bourgeoisie (the dominant class whose status came from possessing means of production or property) and proletariat or working class (the propertyless class that earns a living from selling its labour power) (Marx, 1867). In the Communist Manifesto (1848) Marx and Engels envisioned a worker revolution that would result in the victory of socialism (a social system with common ownership of means of production and distribution) over capitalism (an economic system in which means of production and distribution are privately owned).

of the labour movement, the status of organised management or labour within society and the structure of the political economy. In response to the Strategic Choice suppositions, Turner (1991:2) emphasised two important variables to explain the level of worker interest representation in response to existing change and variations in stability. He stressed, firstly, the degree to which unions were incorporated into managerial decision-making processes as opposed to adversarial unionism, and secondly, the existence or absence of corporatist bargaining structures or laws which regulate and promote firm-level union participation from outside the firm. According to Turner (1991:27), the manner in which union influence was institutionalised in the Industrial Relations System was the fundamental variable in operation, not necessarily employer values or strategies. Edwards (2003) noted that strategies emerged as a result of a complex progression of decisions made by people in different levels of the organisation and involved “continual reassessments and readjustments of position” Edwards (2003:160). Strategies did not always develop after discussions (Edwards, 2003) as implied by Kochan et al. (1994).

### **2.3 Public Sector Industrial Relations**

As public sector unionism has grown in strength across countries, authors have shown relative dissatisfaction with describing labour movements and Industrial Relations as a single entity (Troy, 1994). Troy (1994) notes that public and private movements and Industrial Relations have parallels but are distinct. To begin with, public sector unions can be conceptualised differently from those in the private sector (Troy, 1994). Freeman (1986) highlighted the political dimension of public sector unions as a distinctive feature. Public sector unions “can affect the demand for [their] labour through the political process, as well as affect wages and working conditions through collective bargaining” (Freeman, 1986:42). Troy (1994) went beyond Freeman’s (1986) idea by adding that public sector unions used political activity to reorganise the national income from the private to the public sector of the economy. His extension led to a definition (adopted from the Webbs’ definition of a trade union) of a public sector union as “a continuous association of salaried and wage employees organised to redistribute income from public employers to their employees through political and economic means; and to redistribute income from the private to the public economy” (Troy, 1994:22).

Beaumont (1992:10) summarised some of the differences between public and private organisations as follows:

1. market information, signals and incentives are relatively absent for public sector organisations, although they are subject to much greater influence by external political and governmental institutions;
2. public sector organisations are exposed to more external scrutiny and accountability than private sector organisations;
3. public sector organisations' goals are numerous, intangible and conflicting;
4. public sector organisations have more complicated, formal rules, inflexible hierarchical arrangements and reporting requirements; and
5. public sector managers have less autonomy because of constraints such as public service rules.

As public and private sector organisations are subject to forces very different to each other, an extension of analysis from private to public spheres would leave out very important variables in the employment relationship (Beaumont, 1992). One can expect idiosyncratic aspects to Industrial Relations when the State acts as an employer. The "political environment" in particular shapes the nature of public sector Industrial Relations (Beaumont, 1992). Ferner (1985) noted that government itself is a political institution and this political nature would make the features of public sector Industrial Relations distinct. He observed political costs and benefits of particular courses of action and argued that:

In the public enterprise ... political calculations are an inherent rather than a contingent characteristic, reflecting political control over the goals and objectives of the enterprises and over their financial arrangements. This [political] environment affects Industrial Relations both directly and indirectly (Ferner, 1985:68).

The peculiarities of the public enterprise point to differences in Industrial Relations and make extensive research into dynamic processes important for a better understanding of public sector Industrial Relations. Growth in public sector unions in different countries have especially allowed for expansive analyses into varied public sector union issues. Public sector reforms have also contributed to growing attention on the public sector. These reforms have been prominent because of the scale, extensiveness and significance of the changes (Halligan, 2001). The reform processes

have, amongst other things, presented a number of challenges especially for labour relations.

In looking at British local government Industrial Relations, Laffin (1989) alluded to problems in establishing and maintaining adequate relationships between management and unions within the workplace at local government level. He focused on five primary approaches in his study of British local government Industrial Relations: Pluralism, Corporatism, Fiscal Crisis, Social Action and the Marxist approach.

Using the Pluralist perspective, Laffin (1989) observed that public service unions existed as an interest group that had a somewhat “privileged position” (Wellington and Winter, 1971) as they could utilise political sanctions unavailable to other sectional interest groups. Institutions and rules would be given much importance within this approach compared to other factors.

The Corporatist approach considers the political system as a closed system in which hierarchically ordered strategic economic and social interest groups have a close working relationship with government policy makers (Schmitter, 1974; Panitch, 1977; Bramble and Kuhn, 1999). Laffin (1989:15) argued that consensus would be easier to maintain in the public than in the private sector because there is greater ideological consensus and less conflict in the public sector. For corporatist arrangements to continue, material concessions would have to be made on the part of the employer (medical benefits, pension, job security and so on). Laffin (1989:16) pointed to the presence of miniature corporatist arrangements at individual local authorities in Britain. These provided employees with the option of better involvement in management decisions.

The Fiscal Crisis approach describes unions as expressions of political disaffection. The approach emphasises differences between public and private sector workers which result in their varied responses in their context. The planned and executed fiscal restraint by governments and the resultant implications politicise and radicalise state workers on a broad range of interests. O'Connor (1973:249) indicated the effect of fiscal restraint as increased recognition by unions of their shared aims with other

groups, later coming to view them as “political equals, rather than as professional or State bureaucrats”.

The Social Action approach assumes that the determinants of industrial behaviour lie in larger society, outside the workplace. It presumes a greater scope of conflicts and interests than of a particular social class. Social actors pursue their goals according to their aims and principles in collectives rather than as individuals. In addition, meaning given by the actor (subjectivity) is taken as a starting point for explaining actions. Ultimately, “individual actors are seen as both actively shaping their society and, at the same time, deriving their values from their place in that society” (Laffin, 1989:11).

The Marxist approach shares many similarities with the Social Action approach. This approach presents industrial behaviour as lying in the larger society and definitions given by actors as underlying class relationship (Laffin, 1989:12). Marxists counter the Social Action approach arguing that meanings would have to be reinterpreted (Goldthorpe, 1969).

Laffin (1989) primarily used four of the above approaches (excluding the Social Action approach) in his work and derived a range of “strategies” used by both management and unions to cope in the employment relationship. In his view of the strategies, Laffin (1989:19) described local authorities as “negotiated orders”. Adjustments made would tend to be mutual. Both partakers of the employment relationship, that is local authority management and unions, applied the strategies.

Strategies used by management:

1. Incorporation or cooptation—management tries to “minimise the differences between the unions and themselves by absorbing unions into management structure and persuading union officials to accept the management definition of the rules of the game” (Laffin, 1989:36). This depends on the willingness of managers to sympathise with unions.
2. Collaboration—management gives “primacy to the interests of the union and is willing to bend the rules of the game in favour of the unions” (Laffin, 1989:36).

3. Conciliation—management combines “recognition of the legitimate role of unions as partners in bargaining with an emphasis on trust” (Laffin, 1989:36). This is not to suggest the absence of antagonism in conciliatory processes.
4. Confrontation—may be used to impose management will on unions in bargaining and could endanger the possibility of trust between the two sides (Laffin, 1989).

Strategies applied to or used by unions:

1. Cooptation—“arises exclusively in local authorities where the organisational and ideological affinities present within the labour movement create opportunities for cooptation” (Laffin, 1989:62) between the union and management.
2. Collaboration—refers to the “corporatist situation in which the local union organisation is virtually incorporated into the management structure and the leadership accept the employer’s definition of the situation” (Laffin, 1989:61). From the employer’s view this would be cooptation.
3. Conciliation—although integrated into “joint problem solving”, unions perceive such forums as “means for institutionalising antagonistic cooperation”. They will thus within this strategy “maintain a balance between the extremes of collaboration and confrontation” (Laffin, 1989:62).
4. Confrontation—this strategy may be adopted but this does not only refer to industrial action. Unions often perceive this more as a protective than offensive strategy. Industrial action or threats of action are used less to pursue union initiatives (Laffin, 1989:63).

When Beaumont (1992:12) presented an analysis of British public sector Industrial Relations, he argued that “the precise mechanisms and means by which political forces influence public sector Industrial Relations structure, processes and outcomes [had] certainly not been identified and researched in sufficient depth and detail”. He argued that more discussion on the nature of the State as an employer of labour is just as important as discussion on public sector Industrial Relations. Although his argument was for the British case, the same holds for the South African case. Before reviewing literature on industrial relations in South Africa, it is important to review literature that presents the South African context starting with the country’s transition to democracy.

## **2.4 The transition to democracy in South Africa (1994-2000)**

The history of South Africa prior the 1990s was marked by a struggle process against racial authoritarianism within society and managerial authoritarianism at the workplace. When the ANC, SACP and other political organisations were unbanned in 1990, this marked the beginning of change towards a democratic South Africa. Much of the literature on transitions to democracy in nations has provided either structural (for example, the state, policies and markets) or non-structural (for example, behaviours and decisions) explanations for these transitions. Lipset (1960) concluded that the possibility of democracy for a nation depended on its economic development. In contrast, Rustow (1970) did not perceive a simple cause and effect relationship between structural factors and democracy. The model he generated placed more emphasis on circumstances, behaviour and decisions of elites, administrators, social and political movements and wider society. Generally speaking, transition writers neglected the role of labour movements as essential actors in transitions. Valenzuela (1989:447) gave labour movements a “special place” among forces of civil society that react to initiate the transition out of authoritarianism. He observed that their uniqueness came from their great capacity to mobilise effectively and efficiently through protests and demonstrations and directly disrupt the economy through work stoppages (Valenzuela, 1989).

South Africa’s transition was a complex process that involved a number of social and political actors. In 1993, negotiations between the ANC and National Party (NP) for the Government of National Unity<sup>14</sup> (GNU), a transition government, began. In 1994, South Africa the ANC won the first democratic elections. Scholars writing about South Africa’s transition to democracy took various viewpoints in their analyses. Some scholars used comparative studies of democratisation in other countries and presented South Africa’s situation (Joseph, 1997). Other scholars analysed the structural aspects of South Africa’s transitions and focused on the positive role of major political events (Adam and Moodley, 1993), political parties (Rantete and Giliomee, 1992) and pacts (Sisk, 1994; Sparks, 1995; Herbst, 1997; Rantete, 1998; Spitz, 2000). There were also significant contributions by writers on the role of popular movements and struggle in

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<sup>14</sup> The GNU was headed by Nelson Mandela and consisted of members of the Inkatha Freedom Party, NP, women, different races and faith. Clause 88 allowed any party with twenty or more seats in the National Assembly to claim one or more cabinet portfolios and enter government. The NP left the GNU in 1996. The GNU existed until the 1999 national elections.

the origin, progress and results of transitions (Ginsburg and Webster, 1995; Marais, 1998; Webster and Adler, 1999).

Soon after the 1994 elections, many scholars debated the future shape of the post-apartheid political economy as change progressed (Nattrass, 1994; Sender, 1994). The pressures of globalisation made it increasingly important to discuss how the country would redistribute resources and achieve sustained economic growth. Globalisation<sup>15</sup> is a contested term and there is no universally accepted definition of this phenomenon. It can be broadly defined as the global integration of cultural, economic, religious, social and political systems (Raskin, Banuri, Gallopin, Gutman, Hammond, Kates and Schwartz, 2002). The effects of globalisation have been observed in financial, industrial, economic, informational, political, cultural, social, ecological, and transportation areas of numerous countries.

After the first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa entered what Webster and Adler (1998:58) termed a “double transition”-simultaneously consolidating democracy and liberalising the economy. These processes were potentially contradictory however they argued that they were potentially reconcilable when there was a compromise to resolve tensions caused by economic liberalisation and the consolidating of democracy. The double transition posed many challenges for unionised workers and the broader working class. Webster and Adler (1999) favoured institutionalised class compromise and contended that “a class compromise oriented towards growth and redistribution [could] better provide the economic foundations for sustainable democracy”.

#### **2.4.1 Corporatism, Co-determination and Class compromise**

South Africa experienced a trend towards corporatist economic decision-making from the 1990s to engage domestic capital and the different political forces of the apartheid era. During the transition, scholars debated corporatism and co-determination and the class compromise created by these mechanisms. Corporatism is described as “a political structure within advanced capitalism which integrates organised socio-

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<sup>15</sup> The emergence and strength of contemporary globalisation in the second half of the twentieth century has been attributed to neoliberalism (defined on page 40 of thesis) but the two terms are different. With the internationalisation of capital and the state and growth of international labour markets, this created an environment within which globalisation grew (Conway and Heynen, 2006:25-28).

economic producer groups through a system of representation and cooperative mutual interaction at the leadership level and mobilisation and social control at the mass level” (Panitch, 1981:24). Baskin (1993) argued that South Africa experienced “bargained corporatism”<sup>16</sup>, that is, “an institutionalised role for labour and capital in the formulation and regulation of economic policy” (Baskin, 1993:1). The widespread bipartite and tripartite consultations prior, during and after 1994 elections allowed the labour movement to be a stakeholder in discussions and decision making on a number of issues and policies. Scholars such as Baskin (2000b) and Webster (2001) took a position that the continued participation of COSATU in the Alliance and the post-apartheid policy reflected “a class compromise, in which pro-capitalist macro-economic policy and other policies are weighed up against labour’s achievements in terms of labour legislation (especially the Labour Relations Act) and corporatist institutions (especially NEDLAC)” (Seekings and Natrass, 2002:2). NEDLAC has bound labour to the institutionalised processes of class compromise with the State and capital.

Class compromise can be described as “workers consent to capitalism because a crisis of capitalism is not in their immediate interest” (Neuhouser, 1993:101). According to Przeworski (1985:165) “When profits are too low, when capitalists do not save or when they invest inefficiently, the rate of growth of product falls and the opportunity of anyone to improve material conditions falls with it. And under capitalism there are no ways to get out of a crisis other than to increase the rate of savings out of profits, increase the input/output efficiency or production, and/or reduce wages (or force savings, which is the same). The brunt of the cost becomes expressed either in terms of unemployment or a fall of wages. Unless one of these occurs, and quite likely both, the crisis must get deeper and under capitalism, the recovery more costly to wage-earners”. Przeworski (1985) further argues that workers are not tricked into backing capitalist democracy by compromising with the capitalist class. They have real material interests in capitalism (wages and jobs) that can be successfully pursued within democratic political structures (Przeworski, 1985).

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<sup>16</sup> Baskin (2000a) later proposed the concept “concertation” to portray the extent to which the trend came from below (union demands). Concertation is defined as “an institutional role for interest organisations (mainly economic) in the formulation and implementation/regulation of state policy” (Baskin, 2000a:48).

Faced with pressures from workers for improved wages, jobs and better living conditions during the transition, it is not surprising that labour analysts accepted corporatist arrangements. Maree (1993) encouraged corporatist developments and was hopeful that these would facilitate a rise in the standard of living for workers by producing good economic performance and high levels of employment with low levels of inflation as seen in Europe. Webster and Adler (1995) argued that the freedoms created by corporatist arrangements could be used strategically to “inject more progressive content into the democratisation process and wrest important concessions from reformers and moderates alike”. Critics of corporatism argued that corporatist mechanisms would weaken the working class, entrench capitalism and co-opt leaders of the working class (Vally, 1992; Callinicos, 1992; Harris, 1993).

As the corporatist trend continued, McKinley (2003) argued that the Alliance had also moved on to similar corporatist terrain and reflected a corporatist tripartite blend of the State, capital and labour. The ANC incorporated the roles of the State and a broad-based liberation political party, COSATU represented the organised working class and the SACP was the ideological keeper of the working class. McKinley (2003) criticised this political corporatism for compromising the working class. It had led to the persuasion of workers by the leadership of COSATU and the SACP that the unity of the Alliance was a crucial objective of working class struggle. Lenin’s arguments can explain the continued favour for the existence of the Alliance by the SACP and COSATU. Lenin argued that the efforts of workers alone would achieve trade union consciousness<sup>17</sup> which was limited and would not result in revolutionary change. Socialist consciousness could only come from beyond the capitalist-worker class struggle via a revolutionary party which expresses working class consciousness<sup>18</sup>. Lenin argued that the “more rapidly our employers join together in all sorts of societies and syndicates, the more urgent does the need for this organization by trades become” (1902:198).

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<sup>17</sup> Trade union consciousness is “the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the employers, and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation, etc” (Lenin, 1902:13).

<sup>18</sup> For Marxists, working class consciousness is “the comprehending in struggle of the process through which the proletariat develops from its identity as formed by capitalism (the mass of exploited wage-labourers, the class ‘in itself’) to the working class organised as a revolutionary force for the taking of power and the building of socialism (the class ‘for itself’)” (Slaughter, 1975:89).

The continued existence of the Alliance ensured “the political power and potential class positioning of its various leaderships while binding the most powerful political force in South Africa, the organised working class, to institutionalised, politically based class compromise and electoral loyalty” (McKinley, 2003). Habib and Taylor (1999:115) identified the growing influence of capital at the time and noted that “the ANC’s earlier strategic alliance with labour [was being] supplanted with the strategic alliance with capital”. COSATU’s role became increasingly marginalised (Southall, 2001a). COSATU’s paper *Advancing Social Transformation* adopted at the 7<sup>th</sup> National Congress in 2000 reflected accommodation with capital. Ballard, Habib, Valodia and Zuern (2005:620) have noted that over time COSATU’s influence on the ANC “has been steadily eroding”

Despite the dangers of corporatism, labour played a significant strategic role throughout the consultation processes via corporatist structures and made significant gains. Von Holdt (1993:47) identified the broad policies for macro-economic policy, industry restructuring and workplace reform put forward by unions within these structures as strategic unionism. This type of unionism introduced a new type of negotiation during the transition, one that allowed unions to deliberately partake in the transition. Labour influenced the transition and took opportunities to access the State and influence economic and social policy which had not been possible under apartheid. Baskin (2000a) notes that the consultations involving labour took four forms. Firstly, COSATU, the most organised component of labour, was able to consult informally with the ANC on major governmental decisions via the Alliance. Secondly, there were formal consultations with government, parliamentary standing committee and cabinet ministers. Thirdly, labour was consulted by governmental and civil society institutions on key issues. Fourthly, labour became grafted in more formal and institutionalised forms of decision-making between labour and capital, for example, the tripartist National Economic Forum (NEF) and National Manpower Commission (NMC) which merged in 1995 to form the corporatist National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC)<sup>19</sup>. Some of the successes labour gained through consultation include, the Labour Relations Act of 1995, the recognition of worker rights under the Labour Relations section of the Constitution, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act

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<sup>19</sup> The prime objective of NEDLAC is for organised labour and organised capital to reach consensus and conclude agreements on economic and social policy before they get to parliament. Former COSATU negotiations co-ordinator Jayendra Naidoo was its first executive director.

of 1997 and the Employment and Equity Act of 1998 which included provision for affirmative action. These accomplishments have improved the conditions of employment for workers.

The Labour Relations Act of 1996 introduced the rights and structures (bargaining councils and workplace forums) for co-determination. These institutional reforms introduced by the legislation shifted employment relations from being characterised by mistrust to being characterised by cooperation. Buhlungu (1999) noted that the emergence of co-determinist practices in South Africa was a contradictory process and that co-determinist practices presented the labour movement with opportunities and challenges. Opportunities existed to force back the frontier of managerial control thereby gaining greater control of the workplace for workers but workers risked the institutionalisation of worker struggles and co-option of workers. In order to avoid the risks of codetermination, Buhlungu (1999) suggested that unions build their power by improving their institutional and structural capacities, increasing union financial self-sufficiency, improving administrative systems and developing a clear strategy on workplace restructuring. Critics of co-determination such as Barchiesi (1998) and Lehulere (1995) argued that worker participation in co-determinist processes and formations would lead to the institutionalisation of worker struggles and the co-option of workers. Lehulere (1995:42) argued

Co-determination disarms workers because workers give up their right to strike on issues covered by co-determination agreements. Co-determination undermines the struggle for socialism because, instead of preparing workers for the struggle against capitalism, it promotes the idea that capitalism and workers have common interests. It therefore leads to the co-option of the working class.

In their review of post-apartheid South African employment relations in the context of corporatism and co-determination since 1994, Donnelly and Dunn (2006:12) observed that “the various multilayered institutions and processes have not always developed as hoped. In part, this has been due to design flaws, in part, to the response of the parties involved”. They noted the initial benefits of corporatism and co-determination and emerging flaws. Business and labour element responses were argued to have ranged from cautious approval to complete opposition. Possibly as a consequence of distrust and disregard inherited from the apartheid era. They observed that there has been little evidence that employers have moved “decisively towards an articulated system that

relies on full engagement with unions nationally and industrially, and legally backed employee participation in the workplace” (Donnelly and Dunn, 2006:21).

NEDLAC, which presented opportunities for weaker groups in society to contribute to policy also created a danger of adversarialism within social dialogue and “turf disputes” between NEDLAC and parliament (Donnelly and Dunn, 2006:10). Consequently, employer and union representatives have displayed ambivalence towards the NEDLAC process and even circumvented it when opportune. Donnelly and Dunn (2006) noted that COSATU affiliated unions have considered the Alliance route to the ANC as more productive than being bound by chamber decisions that might restrict future alternatives. They also noted that employers would withdraw from NEDLAC processes and approach government informally especially concerning changes to macroeconomic policy. Generally speaking employment relations reform has been rather piecemeal within the context of corporatism and co-determination. Donnelly and Dunn (2006) concluded that South Africa had performed reasonably well in terms of reforming employment relations over the last decade despite not tackling unemployment well. They proposed that the State’s support would be vital for future employment relations reforms.

#### **2.4.2 Transition to democracy and economic reform**

The new government introduced new economic policies to address racial inequalities and unemployment from the apartheid era while participating in the global economy. Redistributive policies were introduced to find a balance between addressing the legacy of apartheid while participating in the global economy. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which was articulated by the ANC in its 1994 election manifesto, represented the initial policy agenda of government. The Alliance partners, mainly COSATU, had contributed to the drafting of the policy framework. The RDP aimed at linking development with economic growth and contained Keynesian principles which placed the State at the head of the development process (Hassen, 2004b). It was driven by the need to address historic inequalities and meet basic needs. The RDP was never fully implemented and from 1995, the new government began to refocus on state reform as part of its interventionist strategy.

In July 1995, the new government published *The Restructuring of State Assets* in which the state sector was targeted for reform. In February 1996, the National Framework Agreement on the Restructuring of State Assets (NFA) was signed between the three union federations (COSATU, FEDUSA and NACTU) and the Government of National Unity (GNU) represented by the Ministry of Public Enterprises. This consultative agreement provided the plan for restructuring particular state assets (South Africa Forestry Company (SAFCOL), Telkom and Sun Air) within the mandate of NEDLAC. In June 1996, government introduced the Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy (GEAR) and this signalled a shift by government towards neo-liberal policy. The introduction of the programme was propelled by the need to stabilise economic growth. However, GEAR was reflective of neo-liberal principles in contrast to the RDP. GEAR proposed a reduction of the public sector based on the motivation that a large public sector would “crowd out” the private sector. It promoted the privatisation of state assets in order to raise funds for service delivery and debt reduction (Department of Finance, 1996).

The reasons for the introduction of GEAR were debated by many scholars. Some argued that it was a consequence of domestically entrenched structures of economic power (Swatuk, 1999), “elite pacting” (Bond, 2000), the “governmentalising” of the RDP (Gots, 2000) and the effect of neo-liberal discourse of the “trans-national managerial class” (Kunnie, 2000). Others argued that it was linked to the “petit-bourgeois” character of the ANC and the externalised nature of the liberation struggle (McKinley, 1997). GEAR became a controversial topic between labour and government and between the Alliance partners. Intense debates often reached the public arena.

In 1997, COSATU published *An Alliance Programme for Socio-Economic Transformation* in which it argued that the RDP should remain the programme of the Alliance and strategies for its implementation found. COSATU pursued a number of campaigns during which it predicted what it perceived as the inevitable failure of GEAR and the negative effects of the policy on workers. The SACP acknowledged that GEAR caused tensions between the Alliance partners. It encouraged debates on economic policy but appeared to take a cautious approach to confronting the ANC led government on GEAR while it acknowledged that GEAR corresponded with neo-

liberal orthodoxy (McKinley, 2003). Out of all the Alliance partners, the ANC appeared optimistic that the direction chosen by government to pursue GEAR would produce social and economic benefits. Towards the 1999 elections, the ANC received the support of the SACP and COSATU despite the tensions caused by GEAR. When addressing the question “Why vote ANC?”, the SACP stated in an election publication that it had not “conveniently forgotten” about GEAR (SACP, 1999). Instead, it argued that there had been constructive debate within the Alliance about GEAR and encouraged workers to “keep the macro-economic debate open” and support the RDP via supporting the ANC (SACP, 1999). By 2000 GEAR had not created the anticipated 400 000 jobs, achieved 6% sustainable annual growth or created 100 000 new municipal level jobs associated with new infrastructure investment (Bond, 2000). It was argued to have been a major contributing factor to job decreases (McDonald, 2002). According to Hassen (2001) and many others, GEAR had not successfully met its objectives. Nevertheless, some argue that GEAR created room for fiscal expansion from 2001 through its fiscal consolidation after it was introduced.

After the 1999 elections, various authors wrote on consolidating democracy in South Africa (Lodge, 1999) and questioned whether a weakening trade union movement would reverse consolidation as labour seemed to be playing a less influential role in formulating government economic policy (Adler and Webster, 2000). Other authors recognised and wrote on tensions within the Alliance after the transition period (Southall, 2001a:80-86; Southall, 2001b; Buhlungu, 1997:71-78; Rees, 2002:83-84; Habib and Taylor, 1999:112-119; Southall and Wood, 1999:121-124).

From 2001, the government has taken a more expansionary fiscal<sup>20</sup> position because of optimism about the country’s economic growth projections. The programmes government has embarked on since 2001 are reflective of this. In 2003, government announced the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) and in February 2006, the government announced the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGI-SA). The EPWP is an initiative that involves producing work and training opportunities for unemployed people using public expenditure in its first five years (that is, until 2008). It is a programme that

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<sup>20</sup> Expansionary fiscal policy involves a reduction in taxes, an increase in government spending or a combination of both.

cuts across all departments and spheres of government. Under the EPWP, all government bodies and parastatals are required to make a systematic effort to target the unskilled unemployed. They must formulate plans for utilising their budgets so as to draw significant numbers of the unemployed into productive work in such a way that workers gain skills while they work, so increasing their chances of getting out of the marginalised pool of unemployed people (Expanded Works Programme).

The ASGI aims to increase the economic growth of the country between 6% and 8% by 2014 in two phases. ASGI-SA has identified six sets of initiatives: infrastructure programmes, macroeconomic issues, sector investment strategies, skills and education initiatives, second economy interventions and public sector administration issues (South African National Government, 2006). The initiatives have not been extensively debated within the Tripartite Alliance although COSATU and SACP representatives have cautioned the ANC led government about the programmes.

### **2.5 The Alliance and working class politics**

Union-party alliances have been a common feature in many countries and South Africa has not been an exception (Webster, 2002). Historically, many trade unions in South Africa strategically linked themselves to political parties as well as community organisations during the national liberation struggle to enhance their influence in society. In the 1950s, a firm alliance between the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and the ANC was formed via the Congress Alliance<sup>21</sup>. SACTU participated in numerous political campaigns and was a clear example of political unionism. Although SACTU was suppressed by government and forced underground, its activities created ties between union members and the ANC, familiarised unions with participation in political alliances and the growing conflict between national and working class struggles. By the 1980s, working-class politics was characterised by radical social movement unionism as trade unions engaged in popular struggles (Von Holdt, 2005).

Social movement unionism or political unionism “attempts to link production to wider political issues. It is a form of union organisation that facilitates an active engagement in factory-based, production politics and in community and state power issues. It engages in alliances in order to establish relationship with political organisations on a

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<sup>21</sup> Congress Alliance organisations included the ANC, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the South African Coloured People’s Organisation (SACPO), the South African Congress of Democrats (SACOD) and SACTU.

systematic basis” (Lambert and Webster, 1988:21). Workers in the workplace forged alliances with working-class communities to fight against apartheid oppression and capitalist exploitation. The main intention was to escape the same drawbacks to longevity experienced by labour in history, namely apartheid oppression and capitalist exploitation (Pillay, 2006:169). In 1983 the populist United Democratic Front (UDF) was formed comprising a range of many local anti-apartheid organisations that emerged after the Soweto uprising in 1976. Controversy around the UDF began and unions had to decide whether to join or not join this political movement. Some small community based unions unaffiliated to FOSATU joined the UDF immediately but FOSATU, the General Workers Union and the Food and Canning Workers Union did not.

A workerist and populist division became apparent. Workerist unions refused to affiliate to the UDF but made it clear that they were not withdrawing from political action or opposed to the movement. The General Workers Union, for instance, argued that unions were influential because they represented the views and mandate of members in contrast to many community organisations that did not have or need such a mandate because they represented generalised interest groups. The General Workers Union also argued that it was a single class organisation while the UDF was a multi-class and affiliating to the UDF would be difficult (Plaut, 1992). The Municipal and General Workers Union, for example, held a populist perspective and became an affiliate of the UDF. The union argued that the nature of apartheid was discriminatory not only to workers but a broad range of people. Therefore it was the “duty” of the union “to be part of the struggle for freedom and justice” (Municipal and General Workers Union, 1983).

Following a series of discussions within the labour movement, COSATU was founded in 1985. Soon after the formation of COSATU, intense debate within the labour movement surfaced over how to best relate to the ANC and its allies and a Worker Charter (Plaut, 1992). Strong ties of solidarity formed between COSATU, ANC and SACP members through the liberation struggle (Buhlungu and Psoulis, 1999). Buhlungu and Psoulis (1999:121) noted that the liberation struggle had two dimensions: the individual and collective. “Individuals involved in this struggle shared a commitment to liberation and freedom ... But the resistance was simultaneously

about the collective affirmation of new values namely democracy and non-racialism” (Buhlungu and Psoulis, 1999:121). They further noted that a distinct “us” and “them” culture developed to distinguish those that contributed to the struggle (us) and those perceived as anti-liberation (them). Participants of the struggle shared common interests and strong bonds of solidarity developed within and among the struggle partners in the Tripartite Alliance (Buhlungu and Psoulis, 1999). The historic bonds of solidarity were carried into the transition process.

After the ANC, SACP and PAC were unbanned in 1990 unions were undecided as to which political path to follow if any. Tensions and debates over continuing alliances continued to grow. Plaut (1992:399) highlighted that “the unions were faced with a dilemma, as a number of officials became increasingly active within the emerging political parties, using time and resources to build the movements they supported”. Wilton Mkwayi, a trade unionist, an ANC leader and commander of Umkhonto we Sizwe stated “We used to say when organising people, that you cannot be a good trade unionist if you do not belong to the ANC, and as a worker, you cannot be a good ANC member if you do not belong to a trade union. So, there was a link there” (SALB, 1989:24). This wearing of “two hats” (union and political) as it were, caused a range of difficulties between and within unions. During that time, Jeremy Cronin, a Communist Party leader, argued that the country was “in a complicated transition period, whose outcome [was] far from clear ... the most critical organisational task [was] to build a powerful, mass-based, democratic and fighting ANC” (Cronin, 1991).

COSATU union affiliates maintained their support for the ANC despite the uncertainty of the transition. A number of critical debates over the Alliance took place before the 1994 democratic elections. In 1993 the National Union of Metalworkers (NUM) resolved at its Congress that once an Interim Government of National Unity was established, it should not pursue a formal alliance with the ANC (Mayekiso, 1993: 21). The South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union, (SACTWU), the third largest union at the time, also took a similar position in a report to its Congress (SALB, 1993:21-23). Its leadership recommended an end to alliance politics from the 28<sup>th</sup> April 1994. They feared that the union movement would be reduced to being a labour wing of government, that democratic practices would be “lobbyist” and that the labour movement would be split over which political party to ally with. That same year the

ANC/SACP/COSATU alliance in response to this culminating anxiety released a paper stating their joint strategy to maintain the Tripartite Alliance as a formal coalition. Part of the document read as follows:

An ANC cut loose from independent working class formations...would become ever more susceptible to the pressure of governmental office, and to the influence of non-popular strata, inside its ranks and beyond...A trade union movement that confines itself to meeting the ANC only as 'the government across the negotiating table' risks falling into narrow, economist unionism...An SACP 'going it alone' risks becoming a grievance party, a marginalised force. (SALB, 1993:22).

This affirmation seemed to transiently dispel discussions around discontinuing the Alliance. Despite the ambivalence amongst affiliates, COSATU continued in the Alliance and selected 20 of its leaders to be included in the 1994 national elections. These leaders included Jay Naidoo (general secretary, COSATU), Alec Erwin (education secretary, NUMSA), Marcel Golding (assistant general secretary, NUM), Moses Mayekiso (general secretary, NUM) and Thabadiawa (Sydney) Mufamadi (first vice-president, POTWA). One imminent question that stood to be answered was whether these people could exert a working class bias in the new parliament (Von Holdt, 1993:19).

After 1994, shifts by the ANC led government towards neo-liberal economic policy resulted in more apparent tensions between the Alliance partners. In 1997 COSATU released *An Alliance Programme for Socio-Economic Transformation* in which COSATU leaders acknowledged that there was "a general demobilisation ... most activists [were] no longer sure what the strategic objectives [were] ... [and] there [was] very little participation and involvement in decision and policy making ... the Alliance itself [had] no programme" (COSATU, 1997:3). Ironically, then general secretary of COSATU, Sam Shilowa emphasized that "The Alliance remains relevant...As long as progressive forces have a clear agenda, there is no possibility of the Alliance withering away" (Shilowa, 1997:73). Gostner and Buhlungu (1996:44) observed that the Alliance had been a "strategic resource" in attaining significant changes (social, political and legislative) for the working class.

As South Africa experienced a trend towards corporatism and institutionalised class struggle, Southall and Wood (1999:80) argued that the way to continue extending

worker rights and pro-poor policies was for COSATU to remain in the Alliance, using mass action, parliamentary lobbying and forming coalitions with other progressive forces. The ANC government would then be kept accountable and the threat of capital interests overtaking subdued. Gostner and Buhlungu (1996) suggested the allies put up with the tensions and discover new methods of strengthening the partnership especially at local levels, which had proven to be the weakest. Habib and Taylor (1999) identified the Alliance as a possible threat to democracy. They argued for a fracturing of the Alliance to enhance the prospects of democratic consolidation (Habib and Taylor, 1999:118). Speaking in his own capacity, Phahla, a CEPPWAWU shop steward, argued that the Alliance had lost its relevance (Rees, 2002). McKinley (2003) argued that the Alliance weakened COSATU's ability to fully engage in the working class struggles. Habib and Taylor (2001:59) held that "the Tripartite Alliance ha[d] not enabled COSATU and the SACP to imprint a developmentalist political economy on the post-apartheid ANC government. They should therefore now consider establishing an independent political force capable of advancing such a goal".

Tensions seemed to peak in 2002 when President Mbeki criticised "ultra-leftists" (Mbeki, 2002) in COSATU and the SACP prior a two-day anti-privatisation strike planned by COSATU. Mbeki argued that they wanted "to transform [the] continuing national democratic struggle into an offensive for the victory of the socialist revolution" (Mbeki, 2002). Despite the tensions in 2002, COSATU and the SACP went on to support the ANC at national elections in 2004 and remained in the Alliance. Some COSATU leaders publicly acknowledged that an ANC-led Alliance was relevant for the labour movement (Mantashe, 2003a and 2003b). COSATU's post-2004 election CEC political discussion paper viewed the election victory of the ANC as a "working class victory" (COSATU, 2004a). From 2004, there was a renewed effort to mend the Alliance relationship. COSATU has begun a series of meetings to ensure productive relationships with government at all levels. COSATU recognised that the Alliance was "central" to transformation and should be strengthened to drive the process (COSATU, 2004b) and the SACP noted that the Alliance would commit to workers and the poor (Cronin, 2004). The "perceived shift in the ANC and the government has boosted hopes within COSATU and the SACP that a working-class politics can indeed be pursued within the context of the Tripartite Alliance" (Pillay, 2006:183). After an Alliance summit, COSATU president Willie Madisha declared the

unity of the Alliance partners and stated that “The Alliance is crucial because it brings together progressive forces from across society” (Sunday Independent, 2005:8). In a publication titled the *Alliance programme of action 2005*, the Alliance maintained that the ANC should govern on the basis of a broad mandate detailed in the RDP and ANC election manifesto and that the policies and programmes of the Alliance be aimed at giving expression to the RDP and election manifesto objectives (ANC homepage).

## **2.6 Contemporary COSATU Worker Challenges and Political Attitudes**

In 1994 and 1998 surveys were conducted among COSATU workers in the Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and Western Cape provinces on their political attitudes. These surveys became known as the *Taking Democracy Seriously* surveys<sup>22</sup> and they revealed a high level of support for the ANC and the Alliance. Despite the introduction of neo-liberal economic policies by government and the accommodation of capital by labour most COSATU workers believed that the Alliance should continue to exist (Psoulis, 1999; Satgar and Jardin, 1999). According to Satgar and Jardin (1999:10) 82% of members surveyed supported the Alliance in 1994 and in 1998 70% felt the Alliance was the best way to safeguard worker interests in government.

The publication *Trade Unions and Democracy: COSATU workers' political attitudes in South Africa* presents a recent study on the contemporary challenges for the working class post-apartheid and identifies the political attitudes of COSATU workers. It was the third stage of a time-series study of COSATU workers' attitude towards parliamentary democracy and is also known as the *2004 COSATU Worker Survey*<sup>23</sup>. The survey revealed that COSATU members had generally become more critical over the last decade. Within the publication *Trade Unions and Democracy*, authors discuss pertinent issues. Amongst these, the growing informalisation of work (Webster, 2006), black economic empowerment (Southall and Tangri, 2006) and union and parliamentary democracy (Cherry and Southall, 2006) are noteworthy. Generally speaking, these contemporary issues have had a bearing on the criticisms of COSATU workers.

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<sup>22</sup> These were the first two surveys of a time series study of COSATU workers attitudes towards parliamentary democracy.

<sup>23</sup> This survey was the third phase of a times series study of COSATU workers attitudes towards parliamentary democracy.

Webster (2006) highlighted the challenges created for the working class because of the liberalisation of the economy and the informalisation of work. These factors have impacted employment and the labour movement. The restructuring of work to reduce labour costs has led to several retrenchments and the subcontracting of various jobs. This has led to new forms of informal work by people to gain an income. Webster (2006:23) described the employment status of most of the new working poor as “transitional”, that is, moving from employment and self-employment into unemployment. Casual and low paid jobs and self-employment have increased. With this, Webster (2006:23) argued that a “crisis of representation for organised labour” has developed. As Webster (2006:23) noted “trade union rights do not exist for the new working poor, so the new labour relations system does not represent them”. COSATU has attempted to respond to this crisis by adopting recommendations to organise flexible workers and some unions have made attempts to organise these workers (Webster, 2006).

Southall and Tangri (2006) discussed the different approaches the ANC and COSATU have to Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). While the ANC has embraced the need for skills development, it has centred BEE on the formation of “a capital-owning ‘patriotic’ black bourgeoisie and black capture of control of the commanding heights of the economy” (Southall and Tangri, 2006:138). COSATU on the other hand has held a more radical vision of empowerment, one which focuses less on black capitalism and more on “a collectivised economy in which working class concerns predominate” (Buhlungu, 2006:17). In considering the findings of the *2004 COSATU Worker Survey*, Southall and Tangri (2006) noted that COSATU workers and their leaders prioritised skills development over ownership of capital. The difference between COSATU and the ANC’s vision of BEE has caused some suspicion within COSATU and the Alliance about the ANC’s approach. As opportunities for empowerment have increased, government and unions have become increasingly willing to invest strategically in developmental projects and encourage empowerment. The commercial ventures of the government have involved the awarding of tenders and contracts to persons. With the ANC as the majority party, the introduction of commercial interests within government has caused some contradictions. For example, according to Financial Mail (2007:3), in Kimberley, Mr. Motsamai Rantho and Mr.

Tshego Motaung (former civil servants) were at some point business partners with ANC provincial chairman Mr. John Block. Many ANC members have become involved in business and the ANC has been alleged to deploy “ANC comrades to business” (Financial Mail, 2007:3). In an organisational report at the 2005 ANC National General Council Mr. Motlanthe warned that the increasing participation of ANC members in business was affecting the party and relations within the Alliance (Financial Mail, 2007:3).

Unions have not been immune to accumulationist tendencies. After 1994, unions including COSATU affiliates (for example, SACTWU, SARHWU and NUMSA) began exploring company investments as an additional strategy to attain worker and union economic empowerment for social development. Union investment companies brought with them difficulties for working class solidarity. Union investments aimed to benefit workers based on good returns. However, good returns are attainable if companies are profitable. Given the growing influence of neoliberal strategies to improve the competitive advantage of companies to increase profit, measures such as sub-contracting and down-sizing would be included. Neoliberalism is a complex ideology and political project and it has had varied outcomes in countries where it has been implemented. Defining the term is not a straightforward process because it represents “a complex assemblage of ideological commitments, discursive representations and institutional practices, all propagated by highly specific class alliances and organised at multiple geographical scales” (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004: 275). Neoliberalism is generally accepted as a political movement that supports economic liberalism as a way of encouraging economic development and assuring political freedom. The neoliberal package includes reducing taxes and government spending; removing tariffs and other obstacles to trade; lessening regulations of labour markets, financial markets and the environment; and directing macroeconomic policies to control inflation rather than accelerate the growth of jobs (Pollin, 2003:53). These measures are argued to often have a negative effect on worker benefits and job security. The South African Labour Bulletin (1996) noted:

Through the investment companies, unions are becoming intimately tied up with company management...unionism is not about making money. It is about social issues, about worker solidarity at plant, industry and national levels to improve living and working conditions. Commercial values tend to squeeze out union values.

Following the findings of the *2004 COSATU Worker Survey*, Southall and Tangri (2006) noted that most union investment companies that have linked up with established and empowerment capital have been struggling. A major concern has been how union investment finance is becoming enmeshed with established corporate capital and how this has assisted former trade unionists become very wealthy (Southall and Tangri, 2006). Southall and Tangri (2006) proposed that union investments need a clear political strategy and policy guidelines to play a meaningful role in improving the lives of workers.

After examining COSATU worker attitudes in the context of improved unity within the Alliance, Cherry and Southall (2006) revealed that the political attitudes of COSATU workers had remained largely constant over the first decade of democracy. There had only been marginal changes since the 1994 and 1998 *Taking Democracy Seriously* surveys (Cherry and Southall, 2006). COSATU workers remained largely supportive of the ANC and Alliance. In the previous 1994 and 1998 surveys, 75% of COSATU workers surveyed expressed their preference of the ANC for national elections. In 2004, 74% of COSATU workers indicated that they intended on voting for the ANC in the 2004 elections (Cherry and Southall, 2006). Support for the ANC according to province<sup>24</sup>: North West province (98%), Gauteng (81%), Eastern Cape (79%), Western Cape (59%) and KwaZulu Natal (61%). Worker reasons for supporting the ANC strongly mirrored COSATU leadership reasons for supporting the ANC in the 2004 elections. 76% of workers surveyed from different sectors believed that the ANC had worker interests in mind. The survey revealed that there had been a decline in worker confidence in the ANC as a party compared to 91% in 1994 and 80% in 1999. However no other party had strongly attracted COSATU workers' votes. Cherry and Southall (2006:82) noted that:

While three-quarters of COSATU workers continue to identify with the ANC, they are not offering it a free hand...they retain their doubts about either the capacity or will of political parties to represent their cause, and they continue to insist that they need trade unions to protect their interests.

The 2004 survey revealed that COSATU worker support for the Alliance has decreased noticeably over the years. 66% surveyed in 2004 suggested that the Alliance was the best way to safeguard worker interests in Parliament compared to 82% in 1994

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<sup>24</sup> The lower voting preference in the Western Cape and KwaZulu Natal provinces could be attributed to the loss of ANC control in the 1994 and 1999 elections.

and 70% in 1998. 18% in 2004 felt that COSATU should not be politically aligned compared to 15% in 1994 and 14% in 1998. “This perhaps reflects the tensions around policy debates filtering down to shop-floor level, and the criticisms of the Alliance by COSATU leadership similarly being reflected in worker attitudes” (Cherry, 2006:155). Cherry and Southall (2006:79) argued that the figures indicated growing disenchantment with COSATU’s intimate relationship with the ANC as the party has increasingly marginalised the federation. Also, some noted that former trade unionist MPs had not significantly advanced worker interests using their “two hats” (unionist and political). The 2004 survey questioned workers on whether COSATU and its affiliates should send representatives to national parliament and whether COSATU should send representatives to provincial parliaments and/or local government. Despite the problematic relationship between former trade unionist MPs and COSATU, 88% responded positively to the former question and 86% responded positively to the latter. Workers did not perceive an alternative means of getting their leadership into government (Cherry and Southall, 2006:87). By and large, COSATU workers continued to see the Alliance as facilitating worker interests in Parliament, provincial assemblies and local councils. Although COSATU workers displayed a high level of support for the ANC and Tripartite Alliance in the context of socio-economic and political complexities, “they simultaneously retain[ed] firm beliefs that electoral support should be conditional upon those bodies delivering on their promises, that democracy should be participatory, that parties and unions should be accountable to their members, and that the ANC should represent both national and working class interests” (Buhlungu et al, 2006:204).

Overall the 2004 survey findings “indicated slowly changing perceptions of the ANC as a ruling party, and how COSATU as an organisation should relate to it” (Buhlungu, Southall and Webster, 2006:204). Most COSATU workers preferred the ANC and believed that there is and should be an “organic family relationship” between COSATU and the ANC and most believed that the two organisations shared interests and values bound by their mutual experience (Buhlungu et al., 2006:206). Ultimately, “for the moment COSATU workers incline strongly to the view that the ANC/COSATU relationship is natural to the South African landscape and is worth maintaining, even if ... the ANC’s domination of COSATU is becoming increasingly abusive” (Buhlungu et al., 2006:206).

## **2.7 Industrial Relations in the South African Public Sector**

According to Buhlungu (2003:186) “the labour movement confronts a dramatically altered political economy. It has had, consequently, to revise notions of ‘the enemy’ and ‘the oppressor’ and to modify its attitude to both the State and employers” (Buhlungu, 2003:186). Post-apartheid South African Industrial Relations exist within a complex transforming political and economic context. The public sector has experienced the most changes. The South African public sector was, for the most part, a hidden sector (Friedman, 1987) and research into public sector Industrial Relations was not as extensive as that on the private sector. Until the 1980s, public sector research analysed institutional matters, such as growth or decline of public sector employment or public services (Commission for Administration, 1982; Department of Manpower reports). The historic relationship between the State and public servants operated within a highly totalitarian environment, which impacted generally on the writings on public sector Industrial Relations. Golding (1985a:40) quoted a Regional Director of the Commission for Administration (CFA) speaking on State affairs at the time as stating “In the State information is confidential not secret”. Golding (1985a) clarifies that this statement summed up the problems in obtaining comprehensive information on internal State strategies in respect of its employees during that period. The existing literature can nonetheless be divided between different periods, because significant episodes in history affected the attention afforded to the public sector.

From the 1980s frustrated public servants became less tolerant of the methods of management used by the State. Literature on public sector Industrial Relations from the 1980s to the early 1990s records massive strike activity in the railway, postal, education, municipal and health sectors and a very volatile relationship between the State and public sector unions (Roux, 1989; Golding, 1985b; Centre for Applied Legal Studies 1989 and 1990; Roux, 1990; Bethlehem and Labour Bulletin correspondent, 1991; Vadi, 1993; Labour Research Service, 1991; Keet, 1992; Cooper, 1990; Pillay, 1990). Public sector union affiliates of COSATU, such as the South African Railway and Harbour Workers Union (SARHWU), the Post Offices and Telecommunications Workers Association (POTWA) and the National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU) were the most organised and led the majority of the strikes. Most of the strikes centred on trade union recognition, wages and conditions of

service. Although employers often responded harshly or blatantly refused to negotiate with these unions, which were largely Black unions, public servants used the “new political space” to organise themselves and take advantage of the new situation that would see some political, economic and social demands heeded (Roux, 1990).

Debates around the new challenges for the public sector intensified as shifts in macro and micro economic policy occurred. Writing after the introduction of the GEAR policy, Rix and Jardine (1996) argued that the privatisation of State assets would not provide the “radical change” needed in the South Africa public sector. Rix and Jardine believe “the corporate sector [could] only be trusted to provide advice aimed at advancing its own interests” (1996:78). With the introduction of proposals for public sector cutbacks, the future of the relationship between public sector unions and the State was uncertain. Collins (1995:19) noted that the cutbacks had “the potential to create severe discord between government and the public sector union”. Collins’ (1995) observation on labour relations during that period was that government would need to end unilateral decisions and public sector unions would need to devote their time and resources to equipping themselves to deal with critical issues. Dexter (1994:34) emphasised that “unions in the public service [would] have to change from a purely oppositional role to one of a sophisticated strategy of challenging, supporting or ignoring the new government where necessary”.

Literature on the South African public sector and public sector unions has focused on a spectrum of matters, with an ostensible focus being on matters concerning the restructuring of State assets. Public service reform and its effects, in particular, have been a major point of contention (Naidoo, 2005). Nonetheless, neo-liberal plans have persisted, and continued to strain relations between the State and public servants. The restructuring of the public sector changed workplace dynamics (SALB, 2003; Keet, 1999) and there has been evidence of growing interest in investigations into understanding public sector Industrial Relations at varying levels in a South African context. Adler et al. (2000) address pertinent contemporary matters affecting public sector labour relations, at national and provincial state departments. These matters include labour relations during the apartheid era (Posel, 2000), the constraints to public service unionism (Macun and Psoulis, 2000), changing labour relations in the education sector (Garson, 2000) and public service bargaining (Baskin, 2000a).

With reference to the education sector, Garson (2000) noted that the domestic political terrain presented new challenges for teacher unions and the way they organise and relate to each other. SADTU, for example, the biggest teachers' union, has had its affiliation to COSATU questioned. Garson (2000) discovered that relationships between former SADTU officials in government and SADTU had increased suspicions that the union was "cuddling up to government" and that "the closer its officials are to the corridors of power, the less interest they have in ordinary teachers' working conditions" (Garson, 2000:226). SADTU and other public sector affiliates of COSATU face the challenge of shifts of former comrades in labour to government. The sharp distinction between government and labour is now vague, especially when one considers the Alliance and the interconnectedness of relationships that developed in history. In an article on the controversy around a restructuring agreement signed in 2000 between public service unions and government, SALB (2003) observed that relations between the public service unions and the new government were "difficult". The observations highlighted, for instance, that "the leadership of the COSATU unions found themselves on the other side of the table to their former comrades" (SALB, 2003:9), comrades with whom they shared a history.

In September 2004, more than 700 000 public service workers went on strike again, but not before the state declared a formal dispute at the PSCBC after several meetings over salary increases. Hassen (2004a:56) noted two prospects of such a rare action for unions. Firstly, they could legally go on strike action and secondly, they had little alternative for resolving the dispute. The unions claimed that the declaration of a dispute by the State was an apparent act of bad faith. They went on a one day strike to show their frustration with the 5.5% pay increase offer by the State (Mtolo, 2004:54). The dispute was resolved with a wage agreement and new salary scales being set for workers (PSCBC, 2004). After observing the September 2004 public service workers strike and the wage negotiation process, Mtolo (2004:55) suggested:

If the leadership of a COSATU affiliate prefers an arm's length relationship with the ANC while the other prefers a closer one, it is likely that the former will hold back and not go out on strike. This is not so much because of support for the ruling party, but rather concerns that the latter might convince members that the final agreement will not be significantly different from what was on the table before the strike. This could affect future union elections, as members will lose confidence in the ruling union leadership.

Mtolo (2004:55) added that “one would be stupid in failing to speculate how the relationship [employment] is managed between Alliance members ... the Alliance does play a role in facilitating an agreement”. According to her observation, the public service strike bore “no reflection on the nature and intensity of the relationship with the Alliance” but did indicate that it was “about the internal relationships within the trade union parties, the power relations and survival strategies for those in, or aspiring towards future [union] leadership” (Mtolo, 2004:56).

## **2.8 Conclusion**

The maintenance of industrial peace to ensure steady productivity has been a chief objective within industry whether in the private or public sphere. Without sound Industrial Relations and procedures through which consensus on pivotal decisions is attained, the workplace as we know it would have a significantly different expression. Various authors have contributed to the field of Industrial Relations by attempting to understand the “labour problem” and the nature of employment relations at the workplace (Barbash, 1993a:68-75 and Barbash, 1993b). While these contributions have been influential to contributing to conceptualising Industrial Relations, they have focused on the private sector. The unique experience of the public sector needs to be taken into account as noted by Beaumont (1992). With regard to the South African case, the transition to democracy brought about significant changes to the political, economic and social spheres. Research on South African public sector Industrial Relations has yet to reach great depth. Given that Industrial Relations theory depicts management and labour entities as separate entities and South Africa’s case reveals that the Alliance has linked part management and part of labour, research into contemporary South African public sector Industrial Relations is necessary. This research makes a contribution to understanding local level public sector Industrial Relations in South Africa, which has a unique form and pressures associated with the Alliance. Given the increasingly complex nature of the environment that public sector unions find themselves in, it would be valuable to investigate this area.

The following chapter provides coverage on the methodology used in this research.

## CHAPTER THREE

### RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter details the research methods employed during the study. Different methods were used at different stages of the research. The aims of the research, research design, data collection techniques, data analysis techniques and limitations and sources of error in the research elaborated.

#### **3.2 Aims of this research**

According to Yin (1994) there are three possible classifications of research: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. Exploratory research is designed to “explore” a phenomenon. It aims to gather as much information as possible on a specific problem on which knowledge is inconclusive or not well known. Interviews tend to be best suited for this classification. Descriptive research is intended to describe various phenomena from which empirical generalisations are developed. It is better suited for a clearly structured problem where there is no intention to investigate cause-effect relations. Explanatory research is aimed at developing a precise theory that can be used to explain empirical generalisations. Yin (1994) specifies that a study is explanatory when it focuses on cause-effect relationships.

This study was primarily exploratory. It aimed to understand the post-apartheid industrial relations situation for public sector union SAMWU at a case study in the context of its affiliation to the Alliance. According to Yin (1989), defining the research question is perhaps the most critical step to be taken in a research study. For this reason, the research questions addressed in the course of the study were specified as follows:

1. How do managers interpret their role as employers as opposed to party members who may belong to the same party branch as SAMWU members?
2. How do SAMWU representatives represent municipal workers in the bargaining arena (which is adversarial in nature) yet maintain a cooperative relationship with the ANC via the Alliance?

3. Has the Alliance changed the situation for SAMWU to mobilise against municipalities?
4. What have been the effects of the political alliance of SAMWU with the ANC via COSATU on the ways in which shop-floor matters are dealt with?

### **3.3 Research design**

The research design serves as a plan for how the research would be conducted. It “situates the researcher in the empirical world and connects the research questions to the data” (Punch, 1998:66). The plan, so to speak, includes a strategy, conceptual framework, who or what will be studied and the tools and the procedures used for collecting and analysing the collected data (Punch, 1998). I opted for qualitative research design. This research design attempts to provide an in-depth description of situations and an understanding of behaviour via exploratory and descriptive means. It is especially designed to document matters while focusing on a primary unit of analysis (Marshall and Rossman, 1999).

### **3.4 Research methodology**

Qualitative research design necessitated qualitative research methods for the study. It is widely accepted that some of these types of methods provide a “deeper understanding” of social phenomenon (Silverman, 2000; Punch, 1998; Mouton, 2001) and are relatively flexible, done over an extended period of time and occur in natural interactions (Silverman, 2000; Marshall and Rossman, 1999). Another attractive feature of qualitative research methods is that they tend to allow the researcher to “document the world from the point of view of the people studied” (Hammersley, 1992:165).

Two main research methods have been used: 1) content analysis and 2) a case study.

#### **3.4.1 Content analysis**

Content analysis research methodology is defined as a systematic procedure “for analysing textual material, no matter where this material comes from ranging from media products to interview data” (Flick, 1998:192-3). It tends to allow for the vast accumulation of information and is useful for examining patterns in documents.

Documentary sources of data are a rich source of data used in social research. They include textual evidence as well as audio and visual evidence. When used in conjunction with other methods, documentary data can be very useful in augmenting interviews and observations (Punch, 1998). Documentary data can add to the development of a better understanding of the setting or group studied (Marshall and Rossman, 1999).

While there may appear to be an absence of problems with collecting documentary data, there are limitations. Firstly, “documentary reality does not consist of descriptions of the social world that can be used directly as evidence about it. One cannot assume that documentary accounts are ‘accurate’ portrayals in that sense. Rather, they construct their own kinds of reality” (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004:73). One would need to discount whether the accounts are precise depictions and rather question the form and function of the texts (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004).

Frankfort-Nachimas and Nachimas (2000:298) give three main applications of content analysis: “to describe the attributes of the message; to make inferences about the sender of the message and to make inferences about the effects of the message on recipients”. Krippendorff (1980) highlights six questions which need to be tackled in content analysis:

1. Which data is analysed?
2. How are the data defined?
3. Which population are they drawn from?
4. What is the context relative to which the data are analysed?
5. What are the boundaries of the analysis?
6. What is the target of the assumptions?

I sourced union documents, newspapers, annual reports, on-line data, meeting agendas and statements from official websites. These were filed and made ready for analysis. As the research was exploratory, categorisation of the data was not entirely systematic. Content analysis can be less fitting when the research question is open-ended and explorative and when an on-going rather than step-by-step process of analysis is planned. One way of dealing with this is to combine content analysis with other

qualitative methods such as conversation analysis or discourse analysis (Mayring, 2000).

### **3.4.2 The case study and justification of a single case**

In a case study, a program, group, individual or event can be studied comprehensively for a certain period of time. It is especially appropriate when little is known or understood of the situation (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). If it can be assumed that “every person, group, organisation, or event is unique—unlike any other in its detail—then, the case study becomes a suitable vehicle for depicting that uniqueness” (Murray Thomas, 2003:35). The case study often uses a mixture of methods: the use of informants for current and historical data; straightforward interviewing; personal observation; and the tracing and study of relevant documents and records (Cosley and Lury, 1987).

#### **Site selection**

The site selected for primary data collection was Makana Local Municipality. The selection of the site was primarily based on two key factors: firstly, a public sector union affiliate of COSATU and secondly, the presence of branches of the Alliance partners (COSATU, ANC and SACP) in the area. This information was determined after preliminary investigations which were done by searching the local telephone directory and then telephoning these branches to confirm their operation.

#### **Research subjects**

The selection of the research subjects was purposive. I wanted to access, although not exclusively, key municipality informants to provide information on the complexities of industrial relations. The research subjects were drawn primarily from, although not limited to, the Local Labour Forum (LLF). The LLF is a formal bargaining structure established at municipalities via an Organisational Rights agreement signed between SALGA, as the local government employer association, and two unions, SAMWU and the Independent Municipal Allied and Trade Union (IMATU). The forum institutionalises engagement between representatives of the State and municipal unions. Members from SAMWU were fundamental to the study thus constituted the greatest proportion of research participants.

Even with noteworthy advantages, there are problems with adopting a case study approach. In the situation of a single case being selected, any generalisations must await support from further research (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). It would be “risky” to apply it to other cases (Murray Thomas, 2003). Bryman (1988:88) questions “How do we know ... how representative case study findings are of all members of the population from which the case was selected?”.

### **3.5 Data collection techniques**

According to Cosley and Lury (1987) the case study method usually uses a mixture of methods (more than one), including the use of informants for past and current details, personal observation and the study of relevant documents. Yin (1989), on the other hand, suggests that a case study use as many methods as possible. Three techniques were used for the study.

#### **3.5.1 Semi-structured Interviews**

Interviews are a common feature of qualitative research methodology and there are a variety of possible forms and array of uses. One may conduct individual or group interviews, structured, unstructured or semi-structured interviews to access people’s perceptions, meanings, definitions and constructions of reality (Punch, 1998). They can be done face-to-face and one-to-one, in written form with the researcher sending typed questions and receiving typed responses via a computer network, telephonically and through simultaneous video transmission (Murray Thomas, 2003).

The limitations of interviews are that they take up a lot of time since they require meetings (Murray Thomas, 2003), they take a great deal of time to transcribe and analyse (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight, 1996), the researcher receives different information from different people and may not always be able to make interview comparisons (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001) and the subjects may be reluctant with sharing what the interviewer hopes to explore (Marshall and Rossman, 1999).

I used individual semi-structured interviews as a primary data collection method. The planned period of interviewing was mid-March to mid-April 2005. After deciding the form the interview would take, I drew up a semi-structured interview schedule for the

categories of the subjects to interview. These categories comprised the research subjects at Makana Local Municipality and a few from outside the Makana area. Subjects were selected using purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is a type of sampling in which subjects that fit a study are selected based on the researcher's assessment. Members of Makana Municipality bargaining structures and members of key organisations of the study (ANC, SACP, SAMWU, SALGA and SALGBC) were selected.

After the schedule was drawn up, I then moved to a process of identifying specific subjects to interview. The process of identification involved searching organisation websites and conducting telephonic enquiries to find the people who were best suited to provide responses to the questions. The result of the process of enquiry was a list of contacts that were reached for interviews. The case study was based on Makana Municipality and most of the subjects were from Grahamstown. National representatives of SAMWU were included for a holistic perspective of issues. Time and resources did not allow for an analysis for the other key organisations at those levels as well.

After the particular subjects were selected, it was possible to begin the thorough interview process. Some of the interviews were undertaken in person in personal offices and others were conducted over the telephone during working hours. In each case, the subject received a briefing of the purpose of the research where the interview information would be used, and was made aware of their anonymity in the research. Most of the interviews were tape-recorded to enable the researcher to easily refer back to the data. In view of this, consent for the tape-recording was sought from the subject before the interview was conducted. These steps were taken to maintain good ethics which are so highly esteemed in social science research (Punch, 1998:281).

The estimated time frame of one month of interviewing was reconsidered as the research unfolded. The interview process was extended to early July 2005. Many interviews were postponed because of busy schedules. Most of the interviews (personal and telephonic) were conducted at places of work and during working hours, which may have constrained responses. Some subjects eventually declined being interviewed because of unavailability. This necessitated replacements and even

abandonment of some of the subjects. Some unrecorded interviews were done intermittently with SAMWU members and representatives. Notes were taken of these. After the interview process was completed the interviews were then transcribed for analysis. Interviews were conducted again between July 2007 and August 2007 to augment the interview data obtained in 2005.

### **3.5.2 Observation**

Observation entails the “systematic” noting and recording of behaviours, events and objects in their natural social setting. It incorporates “listening” and “looking” (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). Punch (1998) differentiates between “structured” and “unstructured” observations. In the former, the researcher uses a detailed, pre-developed observation schedule to develop predetermined categories and classification and in the latter, the researcher makes observations in an open-ended manner as events naturally occur (Punch, 1998). Conducting observations tends to be very flexible, allowing the researcher to “easily shift focus as new data come to light” (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001:158).

Observations can, nonetheless, be problematic. They tend to be potentially very time consuming (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight, 1996). A major disadvantage is that written notes may not capture the “richness” of what is being observed (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). The presence of a video or tape recorder may very well alter behaviour or even be undependable, and this leads to errors in interpretation. I followed the “unstructured” method of observation to observe subjects during the interview process, SAMWU members at two strikes (July 2005) and two SAMWU general meetings at the site (August and November 2005). Field notes were taken at these events in as detailed manner as possible and transferred into a journal.

### **3.6 Data analysis**

Data analysis serves the purpose of making sense of the data collected. Different forms of data have different kinds of analysis appropriate for them. Kinds of data may be distinguished as either qualitative (words) or quantitative (numbers) and therefore would be analysed with those distinctions in mind (Blaxter et al., 1996).

A host of issues arise in analysing different kinds of qualitative data. With interviews one would have to define, for instance, whether the aims of the analysis are “realist” (that is, describe the reality of people’s lives) or “narrativist” (that is, to access the narratives through which people describe their worlds) (Silverman, 2000:136). With field notes, one would have to note what is seen and heard but also his or her own behaviour and treatment by the subjects. Texts would need precise intentions, for example, to establish a set of categories and then calculate the number of instances that belong to each category (content analysis) or to understand the subject’s categories and appreciate how these are used in particular activities (Silverman, 2000). Analysing interviews needs consideration of the interactive context within which they occur (Blaxter et al., 1996).

Meaning of qualitative data (verbal and non-verbal) may be drawn using content analysis and/or discourse analysis. Content analysis “is a detailed and systematic examination of the contents of a particular body of material for the purpose of identifying patterns, themes, or biases ... [It is] typically performed on forms of human communication” (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001:155) including newspapers, television, and transcripts of conversations. This type of analysis involves a great deal of planning. Discourse analysis “emphasises the way versions of the world, of society, events and inner psychological worlds, are produced in discourse ... this leads to a concern with participants’ constructions and how they are accomplished and undermined ... and leads to a recognition of the constructed and contingent nature of researchers’ own versions of the world” (Potter, 2004:202). Discourse analysis differs from content analysis in the manner it defines the content variables. The content variables are not predetermined and fixed they develop during the interpretation of the collected records and are changed during the analysis. Also, the unit of analysis differs in length from single utterances to whole conversations possibly spanning more than a single meeting (Truex, 1996). Both content and discourse analysis were selected for the study.

The voluminous amount of information I gathered from the interviews, field notes, texts and transcripts were synthesised to make sense of the data, therefore qualitative data analysis techniques were applied. The following steps were taken:

1. The details about the case were organised in chronological order (where needed).

2. Information from the categories of meaningful groups were identified and clustered. This information included that from formal and informal interviews.
3. Information from single instances was noted, namely a strike involving SAMWU and IMATU (July 2005) and two SAMWU general meetings (August and November 2005).
4. The data and their interpretations were scrutinized for underlying themes and patterns.
5. An overall portrait of the case was constructed (chapter 8 of the thesis) and conclusions drawn (chapter 9 of the thesis).

(Creswell, 1998; Stake, 1995; Leedy and Ormrod, 2001)

### **3.7 Limitations and sources of error**

A number of limitations were attached to this study that affects the quality of the data. To begin with, the findings cannot be generalised beyond the single case. The occurrences at Makana Municipality were specific to Makana. Moreover, the problems encountered during the data collection process may have resulted in inaccurate or inadequate information. This is particularly true where intermittent interviews were made which were not always recorded immediately. The sample of participants was small therefore one can expect gaps in the evidence given the nature of the research.

The next chapter gives an account of the South African Municipal Workers' Union.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **THE SOUTH AFRICAN MUNICIPAL WORKERS UNION**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter outlines the emergence and growth of SAMWU and evaluates its organisational strength and character pre-1994 and post-1994. The chapter begins by giving an account of historical achievements and then presents SAMWU's organisational developments post 1994.

#### **4.2 Background to SAMWU**

SAMWU was launched on 24-25 October 1987 out of an amalgamation of five COSATU affiliates: the Cape Town Municipal Workers Association (CTMWA), the General and Allied Workers Union (GAWU), the Municipal Workers Union of South Africa (MWUSA), the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) and the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). At the time of the launch, SAMWU had a paid-up membership of 14 892. Bringing the five unions together had not been an easy process, especially within a rapidly changing political environment. Each union had different organisational expressions and political traditions and this resulted in numerous disagreements between the different unions during this stage of the liberation struggle. GAWU, MWUSA and SAAWU were general unions shaped by the widespread trade union militancy of the early 1980s, while CTMWA and TGWU shared commitment to strengthening trade union structures (Ernstzen, 1991). CTMWA, once a conservative staff association, was a core organisation in the launching of SAMWU. Although CTMWA had not aligned itself with nationalist politics or the UDF, at the formation of SAMWU it was blended with unions that were (Barchiesi, 2001).

SAMWU merged with other local government unions in different regions in the country. These regionally based unions were part of the 1980s revival of Black worker militancy in the municipal sector, mainly in Johannesburg and Eastern Cape areas, and were inclined towards the ANC-aligned UDF (Barchiesi, 2001:398). In the Transvaal, the Union of Pretoria Municipal (UPM) became part of the Pretoria Area Council of

SAMWU. In the Cape Province, the Eastern Cape Local Authorities Association (ECLAA) was taken into the Port Elizabeth Area Council of SAMWU. The Vredenburg-Saldanha Werkersvereniging joined the West Coast Area Council and the Munisipale Werkersvereniging merged with the Boland branch. The Durban Integrated Employees' Society (DIMES) also joined with SAMWU (Ernstzen, 1991). The overall result of the mergers was a "peculiar mix" of radical community unionism and radicalised established unionism (Barchiesi, 2001:398). SAMWU participated in many workers' campaigns led by COSATU, for example, the anti-Labour Relations Act Campaign<sup>25</sup>, the Living Wage Campaign<sup>26</sup> and the Workers' Charter Campaign<sup>27</sup>.

SAMWU also participated in political struggles, for example, SAMWU staged a month long strike in Lingeletu West (Khayelitsha) from 14 November-14 December 1990 demanding the resignation of councillors. Gabriels (1991:37) noted that it was particularly significant that the strikes supporting political demands were backed by the ANC. The ANC coordinated activities with COSATU and COSATU affiliates. This resulted in the formation of ties of solidarity between SAMWU and ANC members. Also, many SAMWU members became ANC members. When commenting on the early progress of SAMWU, then Secretary General of SAMWU Mr. John Ernstzen noted that the participation of SAMWU in COSATU national level structures (the National Executive Council, Central Executive Council and National Congress) had been good (Ernstzen, 1991). A spin-off of SAMWU's involvement in COSATU structures was closer interaction with the ANC. ANC representatives would often present at COSATU discussions and meetings and SAMWU influenced its political ally this way.

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<sup>25</sup> The Anti-LRA campaign by COSATU was launched after government proposed amendments to the LRA in 1987. These amendments included: restrictions on the right to strike, reversal on the gains of the union movement such as job security and negotiated retrenchments, complicated strike procedures and punitive measures for strike action (Seftel, 1995).

<sup>26</sup> The Living Wage Campaign was formally launched in 1987. The instruments used to mobilise, coordinate and broadcast the campaign were mass regional rallies, local, regional and national structures and mass media. Early key demands included: a living wage for all workers, a forty hour week, job security, six months maternity leave, March 21 and June 16 as paid public holidays, the right to decent education and training and an end to the hostel system (Rees, 1995).

<sup>27</sup> COSATU embarked on the Workers' Charter campaign to draw up a Charter that would "articulate the basic rights of workers" and "be guaranteed by the constitution of a people's government". It was presented as an alternative to the Freedom Charter and was hoped to reflect the requests of the "broadest section of the oppressed and exploited masses" of the country (Seftel, 1995).

### **4.3 SAMWU pre-1994 campaigns**

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, working class struggles escalated. Strike action escalated at all three state levels due to dissatisfaction with worker wages, lack of union recognition and poor conditions of employment (Golding, 1985b:57). COSATU embarked on a number of campaigns to enhance the organisational strength of unions and to oppose the apartheid system. SAMWU participated in these as a COSATU affiliate but also launched its own campaigns. It adopted social movement unionism as a response to political authoritarianism and to respond “to the union’s need to articulate a discursive strategy and a moral standing based on its members’ specific location as workers and community residents, and as producers and consumers of services” (Barchiesi, 2007:56)

#### **4.3.1 Local government restructuring**

SAMWU advocated the desegregation of residential areas and services at all levels. One of its objectives had been “One Non-Racial City, One Non-Racial Municipality” (Ernstzen, 1991:33). Both political and economic privileges were based on and Black areas were left with few resources or equal chance of improvement. Local government structures developed under the Group Areas Act No.40 of 1950 were used by the NP government to entrench apartheid. The Act provided for municipal establishments with very few constructive consultative and management systems to deal with problems of disparity (Botes, Brynard, Fourie and Roux, 1995). SAMWU deemed these establishments as ineffective mechanisms for democratically distributing services and launched its own campaigns advocating changes. SAMWU proposed that interim structures be organised in each local community pending a new national outcome after the 1994 national elections. Furthermore, SAMWU established a research group on local government restructuring to recommend solutions to the difficulties of the existing ineffective local government structures. At its Third National Congress (1991), SAMWU resolved to embark on an education programme on public sector restructuring and to cooperate with civic allies involved in discussions with local authorities (Gabriels, 1991).

### **4.3.2 Anti-Privatisation**

SAMWU launched its own Anti-Privatisation Campaign in 1988 in response to the public sector privatisation plans of the NP government. In 1987, the government formed a Government Privatisation Unit and announced its intention to begin the process of privatisation with the commercialising of the large state-owned enterprises, namely Eskom, Telkom. Government also introduced a job freeze to the public sector, a process of natural attrition whereby resigned, retired or deceased public sector workers were not replaced, and managerial autonomy in the public sector (Rix and Jardine, 1996; Van Driel, 2003). These introductions had a negative effect on public sector workers.

SAMWU recognised that it needed to coordinate its efforts in order to intercept government's privatisation plans. At its 2nd National Congress (1989), SAMWU noted:

We need to unite like never before – not only in SAMWU but with our comrades in POTWA, SARHWU and NEHAWU to work out a national programme of action against privatisation. And because privatisation is a threat to the interests of the whole working class COSATU needs to be part of that campaign (SAMWU, 1989 in Ernstzen, 1991:33).

Ernstzen (1991) noted that the efforts of SAMWU against privatisation had not been very coordinated and effective. The process of restructuring state enterprises continued after the 1994 elections. Post-1994, the Anti-privatisation campaign has grown to be a dominant campaign of SAMWU. SAMWU has committed “to oppose privatisation and to fight for the direct provision of all the basic necessities of life by the state at all its levels” (SAMWU constitution).

### **4.4 SAMWU structures post-1994**

SAMWU refined its objectives, principles and practices to guide its actions and activities after the end of the apartheid era. SAMWU has drawn most of its strength from shop-floor activity and community-oriented trade unionism (Barcheisi, 2007). Some of the post-1994 objectives of SAMWU are to cooperate with or form alliances with any community organisation, social movement or political party nationally or internationally if this will advance the interests of members and to oppose privatisation

and to fight for the direct provision of all the basic necessities of life by the State at all its levels (SAMWU constitution:4-5). Shifts in government policy post 1994 have created opportunities for SAMWU to revive and form relationships with different social movements. It has formed relationships with social movements, for example, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign and the Anti-privatisation (Lier and Stokke, 2006).

SAMWU's objectives, principles and practices have been shaped by its history and have evolved with the changing political, economic and social environment. They have influenced SAMWU's approach to local government changes post-apartheid. SAMWU is the largest and only local government union within COSATU and is presently one of the most vocal and significant local government workers' organisations in the country. The total membership of SAMWU<sup>28</sup> in 2005 was 116 632. Table 4.1 is a provincial break-down of the union's membership.

**Table 4. 5: SAMWU membership as at July 2005**

| <b>Province</b>          | <b>SAMWU membership</b> |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| <b>Eastern Cape</b>      | 13 175                  |
| <b>Free State</b>        | 9 286                   |
| <b>Gauteng</b>           | 35 436                  |
| <b>KwaZulu-Natal</b>     | 16 627                  |
| <b>Mpumalanga</b>        | 6 684                   |
| <b>North West</b>        | 6 513                   |
| <b>Northern Cape</b>     | 4 029                   |
| <b>Northern Province</b> | 5 677                   |
| <b>Western Cape</b>      | 19 205                  |
| <b>Total membership</b>  | 116 632                 |

Source: SAMWU membership statistics (2005)

Membership is open to workers directly or indirectly employed in local authority. Workers eligible for membership include those providing services in electricity generation and distribution, health and social services, libraries, cultural and other community services, parks and recreation, public administrative services in municipalities and local authorities, public transportation and traffic control, road construction and storm water drainage, scientific and technical services, solid waste

<sup>28</sup> See Appendix I for SAMWU membership according to metropolitan municipalities.

management and environmental services, telecommunication and information services and water and sanitation (SAMWU constitution: 5).

**Table 4. 5 SAMWU national leadership as at 2005**

| <b>Position</b>                      | <b>Name</b>         |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------|
| <b>President</b>                     | Mr. Petrus Mashishi |
| <b>1<sup>st</sup> Vice President</b> | Mr. Xolile Nxu      |
| <b>2<sup>nd</sup> Vice President</b> | Mr. Nyameka Mafani  |
| <b>Treasurer</b>                     | Mr. Sam Maloka      |
| <b>General Secretary</b>             | Mr. Roger Ronnie    |
| <b>Deputy General Secretary</b>      | Mr. Andile Sihlahla |

Source: SAMWU homepage

SAMWU has organisational structures that exist at national, provincial and local levels. Having structures at these levels has improved the organisational strength of SAMWU. Four structures exist at a national level. The National Congress (NC) is the supreme governing body of the union. Its key functions are to adopt general and specific policy and guidelines to govern union affairs. The President, first and second Vice Presidents, National Treasurer, General Secretary and Deputy General Secretary are amongst the members elected to the body. Meetings take place at least once in three years and it is there that SAMWU resolutions or constitutional amendments are made.

The Central Executive Committee (CEC) is the highest governing body between the NC. It consists of elected National and Provincial office bearers, elected by NC and PC respectively, who meet at least twice a year. Some of its key functions are to negotiate on, reach agreement, declare disputes and attempt to resolve such disputes with employers or any other bodies and determine rules in terms of which lower structures may do so; to coordinate and supervise the activities or decisions of provincial structures; to suspend any union structure that fails to comply with the constitution or acts contrary to the interests of the union; to make rulings on any organisational matter which enhances the development of the union; and to take whatever steps it considers necessary for the proper administration and control of union finances.

The National Executive Committee (NEC) is made up of all the National Worker Office bearers (including the General Secretary and Deputy General Secretary ex officio) and the Provincial Chairperson and Provincial Secretary (ex officio). Meetings are held at least four times a year between meetings of the CEC and may be convened at any time decided by the National Office bearers. Its powers and functions include coordinating and overseeing the implementation of union policy as determined by the NC and CEC; monitoring the implementation and development of union structures and campaigns; and making recommendations on policy issues to be decided upon by the CEC. The National Gender Committee exists for the same purposes as the Provincial Gender Committee although at a national level (SAMWU constitution: 18-23). The most experienced leaders of SAMWU participate in these structures. All these office bearers hold a term of three years which has contributed to the retention of an experienced leadership.

The structures at a provincial level are responsible for the affairs of the union in the province and their powers to determine policy are subject to amendment or reversal by the Central Executive Committee (CEC) and National Congress (NC) (national level structures). There are three provincial bodies. The Provincial Congress (PC) is the highest policy making body of the union within a province. Its primary function is to develop policy and provide mandates for the province for debate. All policy decisions are made by written resolution duly proposed, seconded and voted upon. PC meetings are meant to take place at least once a year.

The Provincial Executive Committee (PEC) coordinates and supervises the activities of branches within the province. It is responsible for the provincial affairs of the union and the implementation of the policies and programmes of the union within the province. It may amend, reverse or prohibit any decision or activity of a branch or its sub-structures which it considers being contrary to the union or membership interests or which does not comply with adopted policy. Its financial responsibilities include opening and operating bank accounts in the name of the province; preparing a budget for approval by the CEC for the province and all its branches; and maintaining and administering consolidated books of accounts for all provincial and branch accounts within the province. It facilitates disciplinary processes by appointing a standing Disciplinary Sub-Committee in terms of the disciplinary procedure of SAMWU. It

may ratify or substitute any decision by Disciplinary Committees after appeal procedures are exhausted. PEC meetings are expected to take place at least every three months.

The Provincial Gender Committee (PGC) exists to raise gender awareness among men and women in the union; to ensure all union activities and programmes are gender-sensitive; and to ensure that gender related issues are taken up by the union as part of the broader working class struggle (SAMWU constitution: 14-17).

At the local level, the constitution of SAMWU guides the election of shop stewards and the setting up of Shop Steward Committees that operate as direct channels to the membership. The responsibilities of shop stewards and Shop Steward Committees include running the affairs of the union in the area of jurisdiction and implementing duly agreed policies and campaigns of the union (SAMWU constitution:10-11). The post-1994 structures of SAMWU previously mentioned have enabled SAMWU to coordinate and mobilise action around a number of pertinent matters. The relationship between SAMWU and government has not, however, been without complexities. The nature of the relationship has largely been influenced by the changing post-apartheid national context.

#### **4.5 An evolving local government**

Challenges for SAMWU increased as local government evolved. By the early 1990s, the inevitability of change was eminent but the prospects of the future for local government vague. Debates over labour issues in particular, amongst other events of the time, dominated discussion tables as new methods of employer-employee relations had to be examined. The transformation process for local government required new systems of governance in place of the former ineffective ones. The Local Government Transition Act No. 209 of 1993 (LGTA) was an important piece of legislation that supported local government changes and moulded a new system of local government labour relations. The LGTA came about after discussions within the Local Government Negotiating Forum (LGNF)<sup>29</sup>. The LGTA mapped out three phases of

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<sup>29</sup> The LGNF was formed in 1992 as a spin-off of discussions between representatives of twenty-six political groups at Kempton Park. It influenced the basic framework for the Local Government Transition Act. The forum mainly consisted of political representatives from the NP and the ANC.

local government transition (pre-interim, interim and final) and set out the vision for the new developmental local government system (White Paper on Local Government, 1998).

The pre-interim phase prescribed the establishment of local negotiation forums to negotiate the appointment of temporary councils which would regulate until the 1995 municipal elections. These temporary councils were a mixture of representatives of different groups, including the previous municipal government establishment (as it existed before the end of apartheid) and previously inhibited groups, such as trade unions. COSATU locals in particular played a role in community struggles against illegitimate local governments (COSATU, 2000) and continued to be involved in the transitional process. Many of the COSATU locals were made up of public sector workers who were organised into NEHAWU, POTWA and SAMWU (The Shop steward, 1995). COSATU locals later nominated a considerable proportion of these public sector workers as candidates to the proportional representation list<sup>30</sup> of the ANC. This helped extend the influence of labour in the transformation process.

The interim phase was delayed and the pre-interim mechanisms were extended to August 1996, when KwaZulu-Natal province and Cape Town did not participate in the 1995 municipal elections. This was a result of problems experienced with the registration of voters and candidates in the areas and disagreements over municipality boundaries (Swift, 2004). Despite the setback, the interim phase did eventually commence after the municipal elections in 1995-1996. The elections held during that period were for the following municipal types:

- Transitional Metropolitan Councils and Transitional Metropolitan Substructures;
- Transitional Local Councils;
- Transitional Representative and Rural Councils;
- District Councils; and
- Remaining Areas

(Local Government Transition Amendment Act No. 61 of 1995).

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<sup>30</sup> The ANC proportional representation list consisted of candidates who would be involved in local councils after the first municipal election in 1995.

The delineation of outer boundaries of these areas and of wards was determined at a provincial level and each province had a different size and number of councils. Each province operated within a framework provided by the LGTA. These temporary arrangements lasted until the new local government system was designed and legislated in 2000<sup>31</sup>. The provisions for local government, in terms of responsibilities and demarcations, were particularly significant for this phase. Chapter 7 of the new South African constitution deals with the provisions and divisions of the present local government. All municipalities are provided with the right to govern local government affairs of their communities, subject to national and provincial government. In addition, the executive and legislative authority of any municipality rests with its Municipal Council (South African constitution, 1996: section 151; Municipal Systems Act, 2000: section 2). Municipalities have the responsibilities of structuring and managing their administration, budgeting and planning processes; promoting social development of their communities; and participating in national and provincial development programmes (South African constitution, 1996: section 153). South African municipalities were divided into three categories<sup>32</sup>, each with different roles.

COSATU was very involved in the interim phase and played a major role in supporting the municipal electoral effort of the ANC. Many COSATU leaders and affiliate leaders (including leaders of SAMWU) were elected to serve as community councillors on transitional local councils<sup>33</sup> (COSATU, 2000). These elected ANC representatives expected to receive support from COSATU members while changes to local government were being made. In some instances, SAMWU members and leaders became involved in national decision-making bodies during this phase. For example,

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<sup>31</sup>The boundaries of some wards were being finalised at the time of writing.

<sup>32</sup> Category A—refers to municipalities that have exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority in their area. These cover the six metropolitan municipalities: Tshwane, Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, Ethekwini, Cape Town and Nelson Mandela

Category B—refers to municipalities that share municipal executive and legislative authority in the area with a category C municipality within whose area it falls. There are 284 local municipalities in category B.

Category C—refers to municipalities that have municipal executive and legislative authority in an area that includes more than one municipality. There are forty seven district areas or municipalities in this category (South African constitution, 1996, section 155).

<sup>33</sup> Transitional councils included a local government co-ordinating committee, a transitional local council and a transitional metropolitan council. These were divided between transitional local councils for non-metropolitan areas of local government and transitional metropolitan councils for metropolitan areas of local government (Local Government Transitional Act, 1993).

Mr. John Ernstzen<sup>34</sup> became a chief negotiator for the Department of Public Service and Administration.

When describing the employment relationship at the Grahamstown Transitional Local Council<sup>35</sup> (1995-2000), Mr. Tom Litteley<sup>36</sup>, a DA councillor, noted that “White people” were considered an “enemy”. He reminisced:

when there was local bargaining and the senior officials, who guided and advised the councillors about the employer’s position, were White, some ANC councillors happily leaked the employer’s position to unions in advance of negotiations, but with national collective bargaining, this has stopped (Interview: Tom Litteley).

A Makana Municipality SAMWU member in Grahamstown, Ms. Nancy Noluza<sup>37</sup>, recalled a similar history whereby ANC councillors and labour would discuss matters together with a common purpose during the transitional phase (Interview: Nancy Noluza).

The interim phase saw the drawing up of the Labour Relations Act (1995), the new South African Constitution (1996), the formation of SALGA (1996), the Green Paper on local government (1997), the formation of 843 transitional municipalities when White and Black areas merged, the White Paper on local government (1998), the Municipal Demarcation Act (1998)<sup>38</sup> and the Municipal Structures Act (1998)<sup>39</sup>. At the end of the interim phase, COSATU recognised “the main achievement ... of the interim phase [as] the de-racialisation of local governments by creating unified municipalities supported by a single tax base in urban and rural areas. This laid the basis to address the disparities inherited from apartheid” (COSATU, 2000). On the

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<sup>34</sup> John Ernstzen is presently the Deputy Chairperson of the Public Service Commission.

<sup>35</sup> This was later dissolved to form Makana Local Municipality.

<sup>36</sup> Pseudo name.

<sup>37</sup> Pseudo name.

<sup>38</sup> The Municipal Demarcation Act (1997)—situates the framework for the demarcation of municipal boundaries for an integrated, practical and non-racial municipality.

<sup>39</sup> The Municipal Structures Act (1998)—defines the categories and types of municipalities to be instituted throughout South Africa and the local government electoral system.

whole the federation presented a positive outlook on the prospects of local government in the final stage of the transition process.

The final stage was reached on 5 December 2000 after municipal elections were held in the 284 new municipalities. The ANC won the municipal elections with a majority vote of 59%, notwithstanding the low voter turnout of 48% (ANC homepage). Soon after elections, a new local government system was established and various local government programmes were developed to create a more efficient, effective structured local government.

After the final stage of local government development, government continued with plans to further develop local government. In February 2001, President Thabo Mbeki broadcast the Urban Renewal Programme (URP) and the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme (ISRDP) which are aimed at conducting a “sustained campaign against rural and urban poverty and underdevelopment, bringing in the resources of all three spheres of government in a coordinated manner” (Department of Provincial and Local Government homepage). The Local Economic Development (LED) programme was introduced soon after “to maximize the economic potential of all municipal localities throughout the country, and to enhance the resilience of the macro-economic growth through increased local economic growth, employment creation and development initiatives within the context of sustainable development” (Department of Provincial and Local Government homepage). In 2000/1, the Integrated Development Plan<sup>40</sup> (IDP) was instituted as a plan for municipalities to encourage the integration and balance of social, economic and ecological pillars of sustainability. The municipalities prepare five-year strategic plans, which are reviewed annually in consultation with stakeholders and communities (Department of Provincial and Local Government homepage). The outcomes of the various programmes have varied in degree and success.

#### **4.6 Changing state of relations between SAMWU and government**

Pre-1994, SAMWU reacted to undemocratic local authorities using massive protest action, at times with the support of the Alliance partners. In March 1993, the NP went

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<sup>40</sup> The IDP is a process for municipalities whereby municipalities prepare five-year strategic plans which are reviewed annually in consultation with stakeholders and communities ([www.dplg.gov.za](http://www.dplg.gov.za)).

on to formally adopt a neo-liberal programme called the Normative Economic Model (NEM). Some elements of the programme included creating efficient market structures to enhance competition in labour and product markets, as well as wage restraints; fiscal discipline to reduce government spending and manage macroeconomic stability; a tax relief system for companies and individuals to encourage the release of funds for investment by the private sector; and ending exchange controls (Central Economic Advisory Services, 1993; also Van Driel, 2003). The NEM was not fully executed because the National Party lost the 1994 elections soon after the implementation of the programme. However, the NEM set in motion significant processes in policy that have had spin-offs in the present approach by government to policy on the restructuring of the State.

SAMWU challenged government on the negative consequences of the NEM. In August 1993, SAMWU embarked on a national strike following national wage negotiation deadlocks. Strike activity by municipal workers was illegal at the time but SAMWU went ahead with the strike, in the face of threats by employers to dismiss striking workers and to use court interdicts. The inability of SAMWU to challenge employers on their applications to use court interdicts against the strikes frustrated the activities of SAMWU. Several municipal workers were dismissed for participating in the strikes or failing to return to work by an appointed time. In the Cape Province, for instance, 2 000 workers were dismissed at about twenty-five municipalities for failing to return to work on a set date<sup>41</sup>. SAMWU criticised this behaviour by employers as unacceptable “union-bashing” (Daily Dispatch, 1993c:2) and managed to gain the sympathy of other organisations during the strike.

The ANC and COSATU showed their support for the concerted effort by SAMWU to challenge the unreasonable actions of undemocratic local authorities and improve the lives of workers through decent wages. Pending the 1993 national municipal workers strike over wages, the ANC released a statement on its concern at “the intransigence of the municipal employers in dealing with the legitimate demands of the SAMWU” (ANC, 1993). The ANC expressed that it would join all community and other organisations, as well as the Public Service International, “in giving its unqualified support to the municipal workers demands for an end to unilateral restructuring and

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<sup>41</sup> The reinstatement of some of these workers was negotiated at a later stage.

rationalisation; a living wage for municipal workers; [and] an end to intimidation of workers” (ANC, 1993). The party called for “an end to union bashing tactics” by municipal employers (ANC, 1993). Similarly, COSATU resolved to mobilise resources behind SAMWU in its efforts to resolve the dispute between the employer organisations and SAMWU (Daily Dispatch, 1993b:5). These expressions of support for SAMWU by both organisations indicated a significant degree of cooperation between the organisations prior to elections.

Between 1994 and 2000 SAMWU engaged with a transforming local government during the democratic transition. The transitional period introduced a number of legislative and policy changes that eventually fed into changes at local government level. After the first democratic elections in April 1994 until February 1997, South Africa was governed in terms of the Interim Constitution of the country (Daily Dispatch, 1993a:1). Clause 88 of the Interim Constitution provided for the GNU. New policies were introduced in line with the new Constitution and the new government had to deal with addressing the legacy of apartheid while incorporating the country into the global economy. Many of the early post-1994 policies were based on the objectives of the election programme of the ANC, the RDP. The RDP was an audacious programme aimed at linking development with economic growth. It placed government at the head of the development process. With regard to SOEs, the RDP ambiguously read:

The process of commercialisation and privatisation of parastatals must be reviewed, to the extent that such processes are not in the public interest. This will require the elaboration of more appropriate business plans, and publication of those plans for open debate. The democratic government will reverse privatisation programmes that are contrary to the public interest (Clause 4.4.4.3).

The issue of “public interest” and interpretations of parts of the RDP created numerous debates in the country. Many of these debates continue today and privatisation has remained a notably important issue (Hassen, 2004b).

In 1995, government refocused on reducing the state sector. Government published *The Restructuring of State Assets* in July 1995, in which parastatals were grouped into the following types for reform: State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) with a patent role in providing basic needs; non-essential SOEs with a public role; and SOEs with no role in

matching basic needs (Van Driel, 2003). In December 1995, then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki announced the complete sale of Sun Air and six radio stations within the South African Broadcasting Corporation and the partial sale of Telkom and South African Airways. In response, COSATU took to the streets on 16 December 1995 and threatened a national stay-away on 16 January 1996. The stay-away was suspended once negotiations with government began. In that same period, preparations for municipal elections were under way and COSATU purposed to encourage its affiliates to assist the ANC secure a majority in local authorities. COSATU affiliates including SAMWU gave their support despite the apparent brewing tensions between the Alliance partners over national economic policy. The ANC won the majority vote (67%) at local government elections in 1995. The labour movement hoped that a stronger presence of ANC membership at both national and local government levels would produce democratic changes and increase sympathy for the working class via the contributions of the Alliance relationship.

In February 1996, the National Framework Agreement on the Restructuring of State Assets (NFA) was signed between the three union federations (COSATU, FEDUSA and NACTU) and the GNU. This consultative agreement provided the plan for restructuring particular state assets (SAFCOL, Telkom and Sun Air) within the mandate of NEDLAC (Department of Public Enterprises, 1996). SAMWU opposed the endorsement of the NFA at the COSATU Executive Committee on the basis that SAMWU had not been awarded a chance to present the matter to its membership. In addition, the NFA did not “reject privatisation as a tool for restructuring” (SAMWU 1996:12). SAMWU remained resistant to the NFA and took a perspective that privatisation forms “part of globalisation and is capital’s response to the crisis of profitability internationally” (Van Driel, 2003:74).

Soon after signing the NFA, government introduced the GEAR policy, which placed further strain on government relations with SAMWU. GEAR, amongst other things, escalated restructuring which was argued to have impacted on service delivery (McDonald, 2002). Neither COSATU nor the Alliance was able to engage with government in a comprehensive manner over GEAR and restructuring. SAMWU actively dealt with escalating privatisation at an enterprise level with the aim of slowing down the privatisation process. SAMWU sometimes took action with the

support of COSATU, however, Van Driel (2003) notes that after the introduction of the NFA, SAMWU and COSATU pursued the privatisation matter from different positions. This created perceptions, by some workers, of disunity among COSATU affiliates (Interview: Mr. Patho). COSATU was reproached for always threatening protest action as a method to coerce the ANC-led government to the negotiating table and then suspending the threat once that objective has been achieved. COSATU adopted this tactic in 1996 around the issue of the NFA, in 1998 when it planned a national strike against privatisation of water in the Nelspruit area and later in 2002 when COSATU threatened to strike against continuing privatisation by government (Van Driel, 2003). Conversely, SAMWU consistently challenged privatisation matters through numerous campaigns using different strategies. These strategies may be summed up as achieving public opinion through informing members (at workplaces) and communities, embarking on alternative ways of improving service delivery and developing plans for the transformation of services (Pape, 2001; Van Driel, 2003).

The second general election held in June 1999 ended the period of the GNU and brought more changes and challenges for relations between SAMWU and government. At the end of a three day National Congress in 2000, SAMWU resolved to accelerate union action against GEAR and support COSATU in all its campaigns for demands for a new policy framework (Sapa, 2000). SAMWU was against GEAR and restructuring plans that imposed privatisation methods. In a press statement on housing in Gauteng, SAMWU stated:

Government needs to take this opportunity to move away from its reliance on the private sector, developers and bank with regard to housing ... It is one of the realities brought about by the government's GEAR policy that millions of people are without jobs, homes or access to services ... The very same GEAR policy has made sure that townships have remained populated with shacks and devoid of greenery and park areas (SAMWU, 2001).

In December 2000, SAMWU members at the ANC-led Johannesburg Metropolitan Council went on strike in collaboration with IMATU workers against privatisation plans in the Igoli 2002. The unions had not been consulted on the plan and felt that the Igoli 2002 Plan, which planned for privatisation, would threaten job security. SAMWU devoted an entire section on their website called *Anti-Igoli 2002*, in which it expressed disapproval of the plans. The President of SAMWU, Mr. Petrus Mashishi, remarked "Running local government on business principles will only benefit the rich, and the

poor will suffer. Business principles imply that profit must be made from services” (Woza News, 2000). The strike gained the support of other organisations, such as, the South African Students’ Congress (SASCO) and South African Council of Churches (SACC) (Financial Mail, 2000:9). The support SAMWU received from community organisations indicated a strengthening relationship between SAMWU and community-based social movements in confronting government. Resistance to Igoli 2002 escalated but the leadership of the Alliance endorsed Igoli 2002. The Alliance attempted to contain the growing resistance to Igoli 2002 politically and organisationally. The struggles eventually led to the formation of the APF with some former SAMWU officials, (for example, Anna Weeks) and former members of the SACP (for example, Dale McKinley) and ANC (for example, Trevor Ngwane) as APF representatives. During this period, the relationship SAMWU had with the APF was embryonic but cooperation continued as the social movement grew in significance.

Lier and Stokke (2006) note that new social movement unionism such as that pursued by SAMWU faces the new obstacles due to political relations between the state, trade unions and civil society. There is a growing gap between ANC aligned organisations and oppositional groups. The majority of the labour movement that is aligned to the ANC faces the difficulty of aligning itself with social movements that mobilise, for example, around the impacts of cost recovery. They face the challenge of being categorised as “constructive and collaborationist unions and civics” or “disruptive ‘ultra-left’ forces” by the ANC (Lier and Stokke, 2006:2). Nevertheless, “attempts to forge alliances between trade unions and social movements in South Africa can be seen as an attempt to bridge this political gap, while addressing their concrete differences in terms of interests, organisational characteristics and political tactics” (Lier and Stokke, 2006:2) and therefore necessary. SAMWU continues to work with social movements even though this has at times caused tensions between the union and government.

#### **4.7 SAMWU and the South African Local Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC)**

The South African Local Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC) was formed in March 2001. The SALGBC constitutes SAMWU, IMATU and SALGA representatives. The revised South African Constitution established a new system of

local government by providing differentiated powers, functions and structures for the previously diverse categories of metropolitan, urban and rural governments. The SALGBC is the prime bargaining institution for local government and it replaced the preceding numerous Industrial Councils. The SALGBC operates at a national level and some of its functions include: administering, supervising and enforcing said agreements; performing dispute resolution functions referred to in section 51<sup>42</sup> of the LRA; seeking to reach agreement on forms of consultative committees, including workplace forums, to be established in municipalities and to confer on such forums or committees additional issues for consultation; and delegating any of its powers and functions to divisions, committees or employees through collective agreement (SALGBC constitution, 2001). The SALGBC has 4 sub-structures: Central Committee<sup>43</sup>, Executive Committee<sup>44</sup>, Bargaining Committee<sup>45</sup> and Working Groups<sup>46</sup>. Each has different functions and contributes to the handling of local government bargaining.

Local or municipal level bargaining structures called Local Labour Forums were also instituted for various municipalities under the Organisational Rights Agreement<sup>47</sup> (ORA). These structures handle matters at the workplace and have equal representation from the employer and trade unions at meetings. The workplace representatives consist

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<sup>42</sup> Section 51 of the LRA provides the dispute resolution functions of council.

<sup>43</sup> The Central Committee has sixty seats equally divided between SALGA and labour. Its responsibilities include handling the finances of the council and dealing with negotiations and disputes within its registered scope. This committee meets at least three times a year.

<sup>44</sup> The Executive Committee was set up after an amendment to the SALGBC constitution, to deal with the day-to-day matters of the council.

<sup>45</sup> The Bargaining Committee has a primary function to collectively bargain wage and salary increases, conditions of service and so on. This was formerly a function of the CC but was handed down because of the number of delegates involved was too large.

<sup>46</sup> Working groups include a total of eight working groups and committees that deal with matters that arise for the local government sector: Employee Benefits Working Groups, Data Working Groups, Services Working Groups, Essential Services Working Groups, Occupational Health, Safety and Environment Working Groups, Job Evaluation Working Groups, Finance Committees, Human Resources Committees and Technical Advisory Committees. These groups and committees comprise delegates from SALGA, SAMWU and IMATU (ORA, 2005).

<sup>47</sup> The Organisational Rights Agreement (first signed in May 2001 then again in May 2005) sets out the standards to be applied at municipalities with regard to organisational rights, trade union subscriptions, time off, rights and duties of shop stewards, the Local Labour Forum, trade union meetings and facilities and representation on statutory and other bodies ([www.salgbc.org.za](http://www.salgbc.org.za)).

of councillors (provided they make up less than one-third of the delegation) and management (usually including the Human Resource manager). Trade union representation is divided in proportion to respective union membership in the workplace. Up to two trade union officials or office bearers and SALGA officials may attend the meetings, as long as prior notice is given to the other side. Overall, the number of employer and union representatives should not consist of less than three or more than twelve representatives in proportion to the members at the workplace (ORA, 2005). Meetings are meant to be held at least once a month (ORA, 2005). A LLF may set up sub-committees (Human Resources Development Committees<sup>48</sup>, Workplace and Services restructuring Committees<sup>49</sup> and Basic Conditions Committees<sup>50</sup>).

A number of issues have been disputed since the inception of the SALGBC. Table 4.3 reveals national disputes between 2001 and 2005. Many of the disputes have been referred to the SALGBC by SAMWU.

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<sup>48</sup> Human Resources Development Committees would be responsible for consultation and technical preparatory work in education, training, employment policy and other Human Resources related issues (ORA, 2005).

<sup>49</sup> Workplace and Services Restructuring Committees deal with any proposed changes related to service restructuring, for example, the introduction of new technology, privatisation proposal or alternative service delivery methods (ORA, 2005).

<sup>50</sup> Basic Conditions Committees deal with other affairs related to working conditions, health and safety proposal and working hour arrangements (ORA, 2005).

**Table 4. 5: National SALGBC disputes 2001-2005**

| <b>Date referral received</b> | <b>Referral party</b>        | <b>Respondent</b>         | <b>Status of dispute</b>                           | <b>Nature of dispute</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>27/3/2001</b>              | SAMWU                        | IMATU                     | Arbitrator ruled on jurisdiction                   | Number of divisions- SAMWU wanted to reduce number of divisions from 13 to 9.                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| <b>3/6/2002</b>               | SAMWU                        | SALGA                     | Matter withdrawn                                   | Restructuring- employer alleged to have failed to follow procedures laid down in an earlier correspondence with the union.                                                                                                                                        |
| <b>13/6/2002</b>              | SAMWU                        | eThekweni municipality    | Closed                                             | Pension fund- employer failed to abide by a collective agreement that prevents employer from a) transferring between funds and b) the introduction of any new retirement funds.                                                                                   |
| <b>13/8/2003</b>              | SAMWU /IMATU                 | SALGA                     | Case finalised- employer to deduct required monies | Alleged breach of ORA Clause 4.1 <sup>51</sup> - SALGA did not give notice of intention to continue making deductions in favour of trade union initiated micro loan schemes and terminated stop order facilities in respect of trade union initiated micro loans. |
| <b>13/5/2004</b>              | SAMWU +IMATU                 | SALGA                     | Open                                               | Outstanding matter of micro lending in Organisational Rights dispute.                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| <b>13/5/2004</b>              | IMATU                        | Saldanha Bay municipality | Open                                               | Interpretation/Application of collective agreement- conditions of service.                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| <b>1/4/2005</b>               | IMATU obo Fraiser and others | Tshwane municipality      | Open                                               | Failure by the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality to comply with National Collective Agreement on conditions of service.                                                                                                                                   |
| <b>5/10/2005</b>              | IMATU                        | Molemole municipality     | Open                                               | Interpretation/Application of collective agreement- working hours.                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| <b>14/6/2005</b>              | IMATU +SAMWU                 | SALGA                     | Closed                                             | Accrued leave.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| <b>30/6/2005</b>              | IMATU                        | City of Johannesburg      | Pending                                            | Interpretation/Application of collective agreement- medical aid.                                                                                                                                                                                                  |

<sup>51</sup> Clause provides that workplaces shall deduct trade union initiated schemes from the salary/wages of trade union members for whom it holds written authority in favour of the trade union concerned and should not levy any charges for such deductions.

|                   |                 |                          |      |                                                                                                                                |
|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>20/7/2005</b>  | SAMWU<br>+IMATU | SALGA                    | Open | Interpretation/Application of collective agreement- section 57.                                                                |
| <b>16/9/2005</b>  | SAMWU           | Govan Mbeki municipality | Open | Interpretation/Application of collective agreement-employer not complying with disciplinary procedure clause 6 <sup>52</sup> . |
| <b>26/10/2005</b> | SAMWU           | City of Cape Town        | Open | Interpretation/Application of collective agreement- medical aid.                                                               |
| <b>27/10/2005</b> | SAMWU<br>+IMATU | SALGA                    | Open | Mutual interest- the inclusion of employees appointed in terms of S57 of the Municipal Systems Act.                            |

Source: SALGBC homepage

Institutionalised bargaining has not always been an easy process. During times of dispute, there has been evidence of tensions between union representatives and ANC representatives.

At the 6<sup>th</sup> SAMWU Congress in 2000, before the establishment of the SALGBC, SAMWU addressed a concern by its members of growing tensions and contradictions between SAMWU and ANC councillors because SAMWU was perceived as being in alliance with the employers (SAMWU, 2000). This allegation implicated SAMWU as being in agreement with emerging employer policy, which largely favoured privatisation. Seeing the difficulties in its relation to the ANC and the need to make a clear position on privatisation matters, SAMWU 6<sup>th</sup> Congress resolutions concurrently articulated support for anti-privatisation forums and the Alliance. SAMWU resolved to continue to work with COSATU in the anti-Igoli campaign, and in building solidarity action for workers being victimised and seek appropriate political solutions to the current problems including engagement within the Alliance (SAMWU 6<sup>th</sup> Congress resolutions, section 24.5,7). Similar resolutions were made at the 7<sup>th</sup> Congress, except by this time the SALGBC had been instituted. The establishment of the SALGBC meant that SAMWU would challenge the employer directly. The establishment of local government bargaining structures increased complexities for the relationship between SAMWU and government.

<sup>52</sup> Clause 6 of Disciplinary Procedure collective agreement sets out procedures to be followed in the case of misconduct of an employee.

In April 2001, a month after the registration of the SALGBC, annual wage talks with the employer, SALGA, deadlocked. The two unions involved in the bargaining, SAMWU and IMATU, wanted a 10% or R300 across the board pay increase, including a minimum wage of R1 900, but the offer by government was 5% (Mail and Guardian, 2001). A SAMWU branch in Mpumalanga Province said in a letter to Father Smangaliso Mkhathshwa<sup>53</sup>, chair of SALGA and an ANC official:

You are now becoming a threat to the workers, even the community itself. The 5% is promoting poverty to the people. We were busy convincing people to cast their vote for the ANC, so that the ANC can end poverty. Now it seems like the person at the top forgets about other people ... we all worked hard to ensure this council is a majority ANC one, it's the only one in the southern Cape. Now workers are feeling betrayed. What is the difference between having voted for the ANC instead of the Democratic Alliance? (Mail and Guardian, 2001).

The statement revealed that strikes were a platform to address workplace and political grievances. It showed dissatisfaction amongst SAMWU members with the performance of some ANC members participating in local government management. The singling out of ANC individuals and mentioning of political matters during strikes seems to be a consequence of the Alliance relationship which exists beyond the workplace. One can especially attribute this to the shifting of individuals from union into government positions. A number of ministers and high profile government officials have trade union backgrounds or were involved in the labour movement during the struggle for democracy. For instance, the Minister of Labour, Mr. Membathisi Mdladlana, was once the National President of the Democratic Teachers' Union (1990-1994). The Minister of Provincial and Local Government, Mr. Sydney Mufamadi, was a founder member of COSATU (1985) and was General Secretary of the General and Allied Workers Union (1982 and 1984). The consequences of shared political and trade union backgrounds between trade union and government officials have not been easy to predict in every circumstance. It has often been during industrial disputes that SAMWU's political and organisational relations have been challenged.

In July 2002, SAMWU took to the streets in one of the biggest strikes ever against SALGA. The strike lasted three weeks and the public was directly exposed to the

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<sup>53</sup> In 1994, he was elected to Parliament as an ANC MP and from 1994 to 1996 he was Chairperson of Committees in the National Assembly. He was the mayor (ANC member) of the City of Tshwane from 2000 to 2006.

strike as many towns and cities were trashed and streets flooded with striking workers.

In a press statement, ANC spokesperson Smuts Ngonyama asserted:

The ANC condemns in the strongest possible terms the trashing of our cities across the country in the mayhem that characterized the strike action by municipal workers, under the banner of the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) ... For this mayhem, the nation is owed an apology and the leadership of SAMWU should come out openly in condemnation of these unforgivable acts of vandalism (Ngonyama, 2002).

The strike itself was arguably about much more than SALGA acceding to the demands of SAMWU for a 9% wage increase. On the surface, SAMWU would appear to have been propelled by membership interests. However, an article by the APF interpreted the strike as being “against the ANC government” (APF, 2002:29). This comment and the strong positions of the APF placed SAMWU in a difficult position because of SAMWU’s affiliation to the ANC via the Alliance. By this time, the APF was growing in influence and SAMWU had to balance relations between its political ally the ANC and the social movement. SAMWU has continued its relationship with the APF even though the APF has come across as antagonistic to the ANC led government.

Relations between government and SAMWU continued to experience tension after the establishment of the SALGBC. In a press statement before the SAMWU 7<sup>th</sup> Congress in 2003, SAMWU recognised the “obstructive nature of SALGA”, at that time, as a key problem facing SAMWU in decision-making within the SALGBC (SAMWU, 2003b). In the same press statement, SAMWU expressed that SALGA tended “towards unilateral action by municipalities that entrenches disregard for the views of labour and communities” (SAMWU, 2003b). In July 2005, SAMWU went on a national strike.

Siyayinyova ngeSALGA, siyayinyova ngeSALGA, siyayinyova ngeSALGA,  
batyebile oswayni iziso zingaka, batyebile oswayni iziso zingaka. Sibulalwe  
yiSALGA<sup>54</sup>.

These were the chants of over a hundred fervid, discontent Makana Local Municipality SAMWU and IMATU members in Grahamstown participating in a national strike after a wage dispute with SALGA in July 2005. SAMWU and IMATU demanded a 9% or

<sup>54</sup> “We go against/resist SALGA [three times], they have developed huge bellies like pigs, they have developed huge bellies like pigs, SALGA is killing us” (loose translation). Strike in Grahamstown 12 and 13 July 2005.

R400 increase and a minimum wage of R3 000 per month and SALGA offered a 6% wage increase. SAMWU boasted that there was an overwhelming membership turnout across the country at the strikes. Many of the strikes were characterised by several incidents of violence, mainly in the Johannesburg and Cape Town areas. The police interrupted several of the strikes using teargas and rubber bullets where workers behaved unruly and many strikers were either injured or arrested in the process (Mail and Guardian, 2005b).

The episodes of the 2005 municipal strikes mirrored the public sector strike activity of the volatile early 1990s period, except, the municipal workers were challenging a new government, one with an ANC-majority. In Johannesburg, fifty workers were arrested after a day of violence for contravening the Gatherings Act. Leaders included in the arrests were SAMWU provincial organiser Mr. Sonnyboy Sekaledi, SAMWU Johannesburg branch chairperson Mr. Essawu Mbele, SAMWU Johannesburg secretary general Mr. Dumisani Langa and Johannesburg branch treasurer Ms. Paulina Sekaledi. The leadership of SAMWU condemned the police action publicly (Mail and Guardian, 2005b). During the same period, a national SAMWU representative disclosed that relations between SAMWU and SALGA at that point were “very tense” but had never been very good at a national level because according to him, SALGA was accustomed to “unilateral” decision-making (Interview: Danny Farmer).

SAMWU and IMATU received support for their demands from different organisations. Speaking in Cape Town, COSATU Western Cape secretary Mr. Tony Ehrenreich remarked to a crowd of striking municipal workers “We can’t allow the apartheid gap to continue” (Mail and Guardian, 2005a). COSATU general secretary, Mr. Zwelinzima Vavi, remarked that the SAMWU strike was “a warning shot” for SALGA, and that many more strikes could be expected from SAMWU from July 2005 to February 2006 if SALGA did not “make more progress” in its offer (Mail and Guardian, 2005c). The APF released a press statement in support of the strike and its position was that “SAMWU’s strike [was] part of a much larger working class struggle for a living wage, against poverty and managerial arrogance/greed and against capitalist barbarism” (APF, 2005).

Incidentally, the threatened period of strikes covered the same period that preparation for local government elections (1 March 2006) would take place. Mr. Themba Mana<sup>55</sup>, a provincial SALGA representative, identified the threatening of strike activity towards election time as a union strategy to “leverage” at negotiations. He inferred:

The fact that they [SAMWU] are part of the broader Tripartite Alliance through COSATU gives them [SAMWU] an edge, in terms of seeking to influence SALGA politicians towards their favour (Interview: Mr. Mana).

When commenting on the relationship between SAMWU and SALGA at a national level, Mr. Danny Farmer<sup>56</sup>, a national SAMWU representative, described the employment relationship between SAMWU and SALGA as being “a very difficult relationship” (Interview: Danny Farmer) over the years. He described the bargaining approach of SALGA over the years as increasingly unilateral despite the dispute resolution mechanisms in place. He accused SALGA of, at times, undermining the bargaining processes. Mr. Mana, a SALGA Eastern Cape provincial representative, expressed a different viewpoint. He described relations at SALGBC as “quite good” and “sound”, although he recognised some points of difference, especially over salary increments (Interview: Mr. Mana). In response to strike actions by SAMWU, he insisted that SALGA could not “simply produce popular decisions that do not have a sound business sense at the end of the day” (Interview: Mr. Mana).

A SAMWU Eastern Cape provincial representative, Mr. Tali Bester<sup>57</sup>, acknowledged that since the formation of the SALGBC, the presence of many ANC members in SALGA had been a positive characteristic of the bargaining structure at a provincial level. He remarked:

If we [SAMWU representatives] have got something that we want to push within the structure of SALGA, [we] caucus with those ANC members who are members of SALGA. We caucus with them [pause] secretly, then perhaps we ... agree that they are going to assist us because not all, for instance, not all members of SALGA are members of the ANC, although the majority of them are ... if they have got no problem with assisting us, they do assist us ... sometimes ... [certain] problems [hinder] members of the ANC who are willing to assist us [SAMWU representatives] (Interview: Mr. Bester).

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<sup>55</sup> Pseudo name.

<sup>56</sup> Pseudo name.

<sup>57</sup> Pseudo name.

Mr. Bester's statement pointed to the response of some SAMWU representative to the new bargaining situation which is characterised by predominantly ANC aligned SALGA members. He went on to locate the general response of SAMWU to SALGA by commenting that:

If SALGA is doing well, we [SAMWU representatives] praise them, but if they are doing anything that will affect the workers lives, we'll protect our workers from that kind of exploitation (Interview: Mr. Bester).

#### **4.8 SAMWU and the ANC**

The *2004 COSATU Worker Survey* revealed that there is a generally high support for the ANC amongst workers. In confronting SALGA during industrial disputes, SAMWU has inadvertently brought to light contradictions in its own relationship with the ANC party. In a discussion document, the ANC commented:

Governance has added many new possibilities and also complexities to the tasks facing the ANC, it has also brought new challenges to the broader alliance. As members of a governing party, for instance, leading ANC cadres now find themselves playing the role of managers/employers of tens of thousands of ANC members/supporters, and also of organised COSATU affiliated public sector unions. The inevitable tensions in these new realities do not have to become irresolvable contradictions ... [T]hese kind of challenges underline the need for an effective Alliance that is able to manage and negotiate sectoral perspectives and interests within the wider context of a common national democratic transformation struggle (ANC, 2005).

Since 1994, the new government has consisted of a number of ANC members, SACP members and former unionists that were involved in the liberation struggle. These members sit on various influential committees and participate on consultative bodies with labour. When the ANC came to power, COSATU and the SACP were no longer simply a part of a liberation movement but part of a "governing coalition" (McKinley, 2003). Since then the extent of involvement by COSATU and SACP in the "governing coalition" was questioned. COSATU was argued to play an increasingly marginalised role (Southall, 2001a). In a document, COSATU complained that:

The balance of forces in the Alliance today favours those who want only a limited role for the Alliance and indeed the ANC itself...Once elections are over, we [COSATU] go back into the painful reality of being sidelined... we are routinely told that 'government must govern, there is no dual power, there is no co-determination, and COSATU must not treat the Alliance as a bargaining chamber' (COSATU, 2003c).

Despite this, it is certain that COSATU continues to encourage its members to bolster the ANC and SACP as a “strategic buy-in” to ensure “participation by the organized working class in the ‘people’s government’ (ANC-led) and the ‘people’s movement’ (the Alliance) and provide the best means to achieve the political and socio-economic transformation promised by the RDP as the programmatic embodiment of working class struggles” (McKinley, 2003:46).

SAMWU has consistently expressed support for the ANC at national and municipal elections as part of its resolutions since 1994. At its 7<sup>th</sup> National Congress in 2003, SAMWU resolved that it would make resources available for national election campaigns (April 2004) including the release of officials to campaign for the ANC (SAMWU, 2003). In 2004, SAMWU pledged its support to the ANC manifesto for national government elections and one would never have supposed that two years prior to that, SAMWU had taken to the streets in one of the biggest strikes in its history against SALGA. Nevertheless, in 2006, SAMWU pledged support for the ANC during municipal elections.

In his support for the ANC as a party, Mr. Gordon Sithole<sup>58</sup>, a Makana Municipality SAMWU shop steward in Grahamstown stated, “We [SAMWU representatives] will always urge our members to support the ANC because we do not want to be led by any other government but the ANC” (Interview: Mr. Sithole). He further proclaimed “We, as SAMWU, will always support the ANC-led government irrespective of the disagreements that we have because we agree to disagree. There’ll always be problems in politics” (Interview: Mr. Sithole). He did not support the ANC in denial of visible problems with the ANC as a party. Some SAMWU members perceive certain individuals within the ANC as pursuing personal interests, instead of living up to the ideals of the organisation. Mr. Sithole stressed:

I think people [in the ANC] these days are not actually in politics because they want to develop the communities. They are in politics as a stepping ladder to better life for them. Yes, the ANC is saying better life for all but when you look at issues, you’ll find it’s not better life for all, it’s better life for certain individuals (Interview: Mr. Sithole).

These perceptions have apparently led to some discussions of the SACP as an option to the ANC. As the SACP does not run for elections, support for the SACP can only be

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<sup>58</sup> Pseudo name.

judged on the basis of articulated backing. Mr. Sithole commented:

I believe that the SACP is a very strong organisation and also it has a strong following among the working class because it is a vanguard of the working class ... if [the SACP ran for local government elections] I believe they might take local government somewhere (Interview: Mr. Sithole).

Representatives of the SACP frequently contribute to SAMWU congresses and branch meetings. As the “political vanguard” of the working class, the SACP seems to be accepted as a mouthpiece to drive and represent a broadly desired socialist agenda. In 2004, there were perceptions of a potential separation of the SACP from the Alliance. In an attempt to rectify perceptions of a strained ANC-SACP relationship, representatives of the ANC and SACP met to renew organisational “vows” to the Tripartite Alliance in August 2004 (Sowetan, 2004a). SACP veteran, Brian Bunting remarked that the Alliance at times “saved the ANC from destroying itself” (Sowetan, 2004a:4).

Despite that, the perceptions of problems within the ANC do not appear to have constituted a big enough threat to the immediate general support of the ANC by the leadership and membership of SAMWU. Some SAMWU members perceive the continual support of the ANC as an important venture to building a significant Tripartite Alliance. A Makana Municipality SAMWU member, Ms. Barbara Hash<sup>59</sup>, commented:

It [the Alliance] is an organic alliance ... cemented with blood and there’s no papers signed saying that ‘this is an alliance’. I know people are saying ... the Alliance will break away, but that is not my feeling (Interview: Barbara Hash).

Ms. Hash suggested that there was no formal agreement that bound the Alliance however this is inaccurate. After a meeting between SACTU and COSATU in March 1990, it was resolved that SACTU be absorbed into COSATU with the aim of achieving a one country one union federation situation. Following this meeting, in May 1990 the COSATU CEC debated the Tripartite Alliance and at a meeting the ANC, SACP and COSATU formally constituted the Tripartite Alliance under the leadership of the ANC (COSATU homepage).

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<sup>59</sup> Pseudo name.

There is historic rhetoric of this term “organic alliance”. In early 1950 the Central Committee of the Communist Party warned against adopting a "dogmatic hostility to nationalism" and called for an “organic alliance” with the ANC (Vadi, 1995). The Communist Party anticipated that by allowing the relationship with the national movement to develop naturally during the struggle against apartheid, new possibilities of developing class consciousness were possible. In pursuit of national consciousness<sup>60</sup>, the ANC would facilitate class consciousness as there was a strong link between national and class struggles during that period (Vadi, 1995). Ms. Hash’s statement suggested that she perceived the Alliance as a natural rather than officially existing and hence her perception of a never-ending Alliance.

Mr. Bester proclaimed:

We believe that our Alliance is not just an alliance that has been established only to look at the question of trying to overcome or oppose other political parties ... we are fighting for ... our [SAMWU] resolution ... therefore the Alliance is still necessary (Interview: Mr. Bester).

Mr. Sam Patho<sup>61</sup>, a SAMWU Eastern Cape provincial representative and former Umkhonto we Sizwe member commented:

Because most of them (SAMWU members) are members of the ANC, they end up supporting the question of the Alliance ... there are some members who believe that we should not have an alliance with the ANC, but the majority of our members [agree] to that kind of alliance (Interview: Mr. Patho).

In 2003, the SAMWU Congress, however, criticized the Alliance for only existing “when nearing elections and when it is convenient for the ANC” (SAMWU, 2003). To deal with this SAMWU resolved to encourage SAMWU members to “participate in all structures of the Alliance ... to join those structures so as to be able to influence positions and build the ANC, SACP, COSATU and SANCO” (SAMWU, 2003). Consequently, it is acceptable that many SAMWU members be actively involved in these organisations, although not necessarily at a leadership level. Membership within the ANC seems to be highly favoured despite the complications. One SAMWU representative reasoned:

We believe that if members of SAMWU per se are also members of the ANC and participating effectively within the structures of the ANC, they will be able to influence those people within the structures of the ANC or within the rank

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<sup>60</sup> National consciousness is the collective consciousness of individuals of a nation.

<sup>61</sup> Pseudo name.

and file of the ANC ... if members of SAMWU in their majority are participating in the structures of the ANC and they become majorities over those members of the ANC who support capitalism ... we must be there in the ANC with the objective of influencing our direction towards socialism (Interview: Mr. Bester).

After the 8<sup>th</sup> Congress in 2006, SAMWU noted that “the Alliance was strategically entered into because it was argued that it was a necessary vehicle to advance socialism” (SAMWU, 2006). Noting this, SAMWU took a position that that debate of “whether the Alliance should continue to exist or not must constantly be evaluated against its ongoing value as a vehicle to fight for socialism” (SAMWU, 2006).

#### **4.9 Conclusion**

The environment within which relations between SAMWU and government exists has shifted over time. As local government has transformed to meet social and economic demands, the relationship between SAMWU and government has met with difficulties. In response, SAMWU has fairly consistently coordinated activities to put pressure on government and businesses to desist with liberalisation. Government has a broad responsibility to meet the varied demands of different groups within the nation. With an ANC majority in government, the existence of the Alliance has placed strain on SAMWU relations with government. While historically SAMWU and the ANC collaborated as allies against the apartheid system, a common enemy, such an association meets with difficulties under the present democratic political and economic environment. Distinctions between the ANC in government and the ANC as an ally have become difficult. The next chapter presents the background of Makana Local Municipality.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **BACKGROUND TO MAKANA LOCAL MUNICIPALITY**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

The previous chapters have pointed to a range of emerging contradictions and industrial relations difficulties because of the relationship between SAMWU and the ANC via the Alliance. This chapter introduces early political and municipal changes during the transition to democracy that have contributed to the character of the present Makana Local Municipality. The rest of the chapter provides a background to the structures and key features of the municipality before moving on to chapter six where the dynamics of the employment relationship are explored in the case study.

#### **5.2 Early municipal government developments**

Historic municipal developments of Makana Municipality were largely influenced by national events as South Africa experienced social, economic and political changes. From the 1980s, independent municipalities were established in Grahamstown: Grahamstown City Council (governed White areas), Rhini City Council (governed African areas) and the Coloured Management Committee (governed Coloured areas). Councillors and committee members were elected for a period of two years and were given a stipend. The Progressive Federal Party (PFP) and the NP were the main political parties until the launching of the ANC Grahamstown branch in 1990 (Grocott's Mail, 1990d:2). During the pre-interim phase of local government developments, a Local Government Negotiating Forum (LGNF) was set up in 1993. It consisted of members of the Grahamstown City Council, the Rhini City Council, the Coloured Management Committee, political parties, SANCO, labour organisations and the Grahamstown Civic Association (GRACA). This forum was set up to negotiate the appointment of temporary councils which would regulate until the 1995 municipal elections.

Noteworthy political developments began to take place after the 1994 national elections and 1995 municipal elections. A significant development from 1994 was the consistent electoral victory of the ANC. In 1994, the ANC won the majority vote in the

national elections in the former Albany Magisterial District area<sup>62</sup>. The overwhelming victory of the ANC in the area revealed that there was strong support for the ANC in the area.

**Table 5. 1: 1994 Election results: Albany Magisterial District**

National Assembly

| <b>Party</b> | <b>Number of votes</b> | <b>Percentage of votes</b> |
|--------------|------------------------|----------------------------|
| ANC          | 34 847                 | 75.8                       |
| NP           | 6 657                  | 14.5                       |
| DP           | 2 258                  | 4.9                        |
| PAC          | 734                    | 1.6                        |
| ACDP         | 327                    |                            |
| FF           | 298                    |                            |
| AMCP         | 74                     |                            |
| FP           | 43                     |                            |
| DPSA         | 24                     |                            |
| SOCCER       | 22                     |                            |
| WRPP         | 31                     |                            |
| KISS         | 17                     |                            |
| WLP          | 16                     |                            |
| ADM          | 15                     |                            |
| MF           | 13                     |                            |
| LUSAP        | 3                      |                            |
| XPP          | 4                      |                            |
| AMP          | 4                      |                            |

Provincial Assembly

| <b>Party</b> | <b>Votes</b> | <b>Percentage</b> |
|--------------|--------------|-------------------|
| ANC          | 34 819       | 75.9              |
| NP           | 5 605        | 12.2              |
| DP           | 3 437        | 7.5               |
| PAC          | 800          | 1.7               |
| ACDP         | 401          |                   |
| FF           | 311          |                   |
| IFP          | 141          |                   |
| ADM          | 54           |                   |
| MP           | 25           |                   |

Source: Grocott's Mail

After the 1994 elections, plans for a transitional council took place. The Grahamstown Transitional Local Council was set up from 1 January 1995. This Transitional Local Council functioned from 1995 to 2000. In November 1995, Grahamstown had the first

<sup>62</sup> Grahamstown was the seat of the District. New municipal boundaries were drawn by 2000.

democratic local government elections. 22 086 people out of 32 016 registered voters voted at these elections. The ANC gained 13 out of 20 seats on the Grahamstown Transitional Local Council, the DP secured five seats and the last two seats went to independents put forward by GRACA. Table 5.2 shows the composition of the Grahamstown Transitional Local Council after the 1995 elections. It reveals that ANC councillors were a majority on the council.

**Table 5. 2: 1995 Grahamstown Transitional Local Council**

| <b>Party</b>      | <b>Area</b>      | <b>Councillor name</b> |
|-------------------|------------------|------------------------|
| ANC               | Ward 1           | Mr. Vuyani Kolisi      |
| ANC               | Ward 2           | Mr. Zolile Makile      |
| ANC               | Ward 3           | Mr. Colley Draai       |
| ANC               | Ward 4           | Mr. Dala Manakali      |
| ANC               | Ward 5           | Ms. Nosipho Plaatjie   |
| ANC               | Ward 6           | Mr. Xanti Nojoko       |
| DP                | Ward 7           | Mr. John Porter        |
| DP                | Ward 8           | Ms. Mary Allen         |
| IND <sup>63</sup> | Ward 9           | Mr. Gerald Accom       |
| IND               | Ward 10          | Mr. John Walton        |
| DP                | Ward 11          | Mr. Leslie Reynolds    |
| DP                | Ward 12          | Mr. Michael Whisson    |
| ANC               | PR <sup>64</sup> | Mr. Mzukisi Mpahlwa    |
| ANC               | PR               | Ms. Nontuthuzelo Faku  |
| ANC               | PR               | Mr. Charles Wessels    |
| ANC               | PR               | Ms. Phumla Ntsunguzi   |
| ANC               | PR               | Mr. Mbali Mzizi        |
| ANC               | PR               | Ms. Nosipho Mango      |
| ANC               | PR               | Mr. Mvuleni Booi       |
| DP                | PR               | Mr. Izak Smuts         |

Source: Grocott's Mail

During the transitional phase a new integrated system of local government was put in place. Within the Transitional Council, councillors worked together to deal with problems such as slow service delivery, complaints by residents about poor services, failure of residents to pay for services and other administrative matters.

In 1999, municipal national and provincial elections took place. Once again, the ANC won the majority vote at these elections.

<sup>63</sup> IND – Independent.

<sup>64</sup> PR – Proportional Representation.

**Table 5.3: 1999 Municipal national and provincial election results: Grahamstown Transitional Local Council**

|                                                                  | <b>Municipal national election</b> |                            | <b>Municipal provincial election</b> |                            |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| <b>Party name</b>                                                | <b>Number of votes</b>             | <b>Percentage of votes</b> | <b>Number of votes</b>               | <b>Percentage of votes</b> |
| <b>ACDP</b>                                                      | 413                                | 1.34                       | 409                                  | 1.33                       |
| <b>AEB</b>                                                       | 26                                 | 0.08                       | 22                                   | 0.07                       |
| <b>AITUP</b>                                                     | 12                                 | 0.04                       |                                      |                            |
| <b>ANC</b>                                                       | 23 687                             | 76.88                      | 23 798                               | 77.39                      |
| <b>AZAPO</b>                                                     | 294                                | 0.95                       |                                      |                            |
| <b>DP</b>                                                        | 4 187                              | 13.59                      | 4 242                                | 13.79                      |
| <b>FA</b>                                                        | 33                                 | 0.11                       | 35                                   | 0.11                       |
| <b>FF</b>                                                        | 42                                 | 0.14                       | 35                                   | 0.11                       |
| <b>GPGP</b>                                                      | 65                                 | 0.21                       |                                      |                            |
| <b>IFP</b>                                                       | 71                                 | 0.23                       | 70                                   | 0.23                       |
| <b>MF</b>                                                        | 18                                 | 0.06                       |                                      |                            |
| <b>NNP</b>                                                       | 546                                | 1.77                       | 473                                  | 1.54                       |
| <b>PAC</b>                                                       | 403                                | 1.31                       | 483                                  | 1.57                       |
| <b>SPA</b>                                                       | 11                                 | 0.04                       |                                      |                            |
| <b>UCDP</b>                                                      | 19                                 | 0.06                       |                                      |                            |
| <b>UDM</b>                                                       | 983                                | 3.19                       | 1 185                                | 3.85                       |
| <b>Total</b>                                                     | 30 810                             | 100                        | 30 752                               | 100                        |
| <b>National and provincial election voter turnout percentage</b> |                                    | N/A                        |                                      |                            |

Source: Independent Electoral Commission homepage

Municipal elections were held in 2000 and this marked the end of the interim phase of local government developments. Table 5.4 reveals that the ANC gained a majority vote after the 2000 municipal elections. This translated into an ANC majority municipal council. The ANC won 11 out of 20 seats on the council. Table 5.5 shows the list of council members and highlights the significant presence of ANC representatives on the council.

**Table 5. 4: 2000 Municipal election results: Makana Local Municipality**

| Party name                                   | Number of votes | Percentage of votes |
|----------------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| <b>ACDP</b>                                  | 892             | 2.02                |
| <b>ANC</b>                                   | 36 291          | 82.01               |
| <b>DA</b>                                    | 6 181           | 13.97               |
| <b>UDM</b>                                   | 889             | 2.00                |
| <b>Total</b>                                 | 44 253          | 100                 |
| <b>Voter turnout percentage<sup>65</sup></b> |                 | 57.66               |

Source: Independent Electoral Commission homepage

**Table 5. 5: 2000 Makana Local Municipality council members**

| Party | Area    | Councillor name                      |
|-------|---------|--------------------------------------|
| ANC   | Ward 1  | Mr. Zamuxolo J. Peter                |
| ANC   | Ward 2  | Mr. Buyisile B. Maloni               |
| ANC   | Ward 3  | Mr. Mbabli Mzizi                     |
| ANC   | Ward 4  | Mr. Ndumiso D. Madinda               |
| ANC   | Ward 5  | Mr. Khululikhaya C. Mfecane          |
| ANC   | Ward 6  | Mr. Xolela Yili                      |
| DA    | Ward 7  | Mr. Leslie Reynolds                  |
| ANC   | Ward 8  | Mr. Ben Dlukulu                      |
| ANC   | Ward 9  | Mr. Mxolisi P. Ntshiba <sup>66</sup> |
| ANC   | Ward 10 | Mr. Reggie Waldick                   |
| ANC   | Ward 11 | Ms. Ruth Platjie                     |
| ANC   | Ward 12 | Mr. Mvuleni J. Booi                  |
| ANC   | PR      | Mr. Gerald Accom                     |
| ANC   | PR      | Ms. N.V. Kepe                        |
| ANC   | PR      | Ms. Elaine Louw                      |
| ANC   | PR      | Mr. Vumile Lwana                     |
| ANC   | PR      | Mr. Zolile B. Makile                 |
| ANC   | PR      | Mr. Phumla G. Matyumza               |
| ANC   | PR      | Ms. Nozipho Mpahlwa                  |
| ANC   | PR      | Ms. Julia Wells                      |
| ACDP  | PR      | Mr. Stifani Louw                     |

<sup>65</sup> Voter turnout percentage is the percentage of registered voters that actually voted.

<sup>66</sup> He was deputy-secretary of SANCO in 1995.

|    |    |                     |
|----|----|---------------------|
| DA | PR | Mr. Xolani Madyo    |
| DA | PR | Mr. Michael Whisson |


Source: Grocott's Mail

After the 2000 municipal elections, the racially based Rhini City Council and the Coloured Management Committee and Grahamstown City Council were completely dissolved and the TLC ended. Following the results, new municipal borders were drawn and a municipality name was selected. Grahamstown was joined with Alicedale and Riebeeck East to establish Makana Local Municipality according to the Municipal Structures Act (1998). Since 2000, Makana Municipality has incorporated the towns of Grahamstown and the surrounding towns of Alicedale, Fort Brown, Carlisle Bridge, Sidbury, Salem and Riebeeck East. Grahamstown was established as the seat of the Municipal Council of Makana Municipality in 2000. In terms of the present municipal demarcations, Makana Municipality belongs to category B and is situated in the Eastern Cape Province<sup>67</sup> under the Cacadu District municipality. Makana Municipality has 12 wards. Figure 2 shows the location of the different wards.

**Figure 2: Makana Local Municipality wards<sup>68</sup>**

<sup>67</sup> The Eastern Cape Province is divided into one metropolitan municipality (Nelson Mandela), six district municipalities (Cacadu, Amatole, Chris Hani, Ukhahlamba, O.R. Tambo and Alfred Nzo) and thirty-eight local municipalities (Camdeboo, Blue Crane Route, Ikwezi, Baviaans, Kouga, Kou-Kamma, Makana, Ndlambe, Sunday's River Valley, Mbashe, Mquma, Great Kei, Amahlati, Buffalo City, Ngqushwa, Nkonkobe, Nxuba, Inxuba Yethemba, Tsolwana, Inkwanca, Lukanji, Intsika Yethu, Emalahleni, Engcobo, Sakhisizwe, Elundini, Senqu, Malethswai, Gariep, Mbizana, Ntabankulu, Ingquza, Port St John's, Nyandeni, Mhlontlo, King Sabata Dalindyebo, Umzimkulu and Umzimvubu) ([www.dplg.co.za](http://www.dplg.co.za)).

<sup>68</sup> Wards 6, 7, 9, 10 and 12 not shown in the map are situated within Grahamstown.



Source: Demarcation Board homepage

Since 2000, the Municipal Council<sup>69</sup> of Makana Municipality has had council members comprising the Mayor, Municipal Manager, municipal officials and ward councillors<sup>70</sup>. The Mayor is elected by the council to coordinate the work of the council and is the political head of the council. The Municipal Manager/Chief Executive Officer is the head of the administration of the council. The municipal officials work for the administration (for example, Department Directors or Assistant Directors). The ward councillors are elected representatives who represent the local community on the Municipal Council and at council meetings. Ward councillors are also part of Ward Committees, which are advisory committees that make recommendations on matters affecting their wards. The Committees are made up of ward councillors (who chair the meetings) and a maximum of ten people from the community. They have been established to allow better participation from the community in the council and effective communication between the council and the community. In sum, the aforementioned council members (the management component) have the overall

<sup>69</sup> Municipal councils are set out in terms of sections 158-160 of the South African constitution (1996).

<sup>70</sup> Councillors are elected for a term of five years.

responsibility of ensuring the efficient execution of services to the communities of the demarcated areas (Municipal Systems Act no. 32 of 2000).

### **5.3 Political party presence at Makana Local Municipality**

The ANC has progressively won the majority vote at national, provincial and municipal elections at Makana Municipality. It is worthwhile to note that according to a survey by the Human Sciences Research Council (2006), national voter turnout for national and provincial elections has been fairly high over the years while voter turnout for municipal elections has been low. Despite often low voter turnout, evidence reveals that the ANC has generally had overwhelming election victory at Makana Municipality.

Table 5.6 reveals that the ANC won the 2004 national and provincial elections at Makana Municipality. This revealed that the ANC held the most support in this area.

**Table 5. 6: 2004 National and Provincial election results: Makana Local Municipality**

|                                                     | <b>National election</b> |                            | <b>Provincial election</b> |                            |
|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| <b>Party name</b>                                   | <b>Number of votes</b>   | <b>Percentage of votes</b> | <b>Number of votes</b>     | <b>Percentage of votes</b> |
| <b>ACDP</b>                                         | 504                      | 1.46                       | 561                        | 1.63                       |
| <b>ANC</b>                                          | 27 577                   | 79.88                      | 27 633                     | 80.36                      |
| <b>AZAPO</b>                                        | 317                      | 0.92                       | 310                        | 0.90                       |
| <b>CDP</b>                                          | 23                       | 0.07                       |                            |                            |
| <b>DA</b>                                           | 3 772                    | 10.93                      | 3 732                      | 10.85                      |
| <b>EMSA</b>                                         | 20                       | 0.06                       |                            |                            |
| <b>ID</b>                                           | 715                      | 2.07                       | 549                        | 1.60                       |
| <b>IFP</b>                                          | 54                       | 0.16                       | 42                         | 0.12                       |
| <b>KISS</b>                                         | 16                       | 0.05                       |                            |                            |
| <b>MF</b>                                           | 12                       | 0.03                       |                            |                            |
| <b>NA</b>                                           | 15                       | 0.04                       | 22                         | 0.06                       |
| <b>NLP</b>                                          | 6                        | 0.02                       |                            |                            |
| <b>NNP</b>                                          | 134                      | 0.39                       | 112                        | 0.33                       |
| <b>OP</b>                                           | 11                       | 0.03                       |                            |                            |
| <b>PAC</b>                                          | 345                      | 1.00                       | 346                        | 1.01                       |
| <b>PJC</b>                                          | 16                       | 0.05                       |                            |                            |
| <b>SPA</b>                                          | 27                       | 0.08                       | 34                         | 0.10                       |
| <b>UCDP</b>                                         | 26                       | 0.08                       | 42                         | 0.12                       |
| <b>UDM</b>                                          | 865                      | 2.51                       | 956                        | 2.78                       |
| <b>UF</b>                                           | 8                        | 0.02                       |                            |                            |
| <b>FFP</b>                                          | 62                       | 0.18                       | 49                         | 0.14                       |
| <b>Total</b>                                        | 34 525                   | 100                        | 34 388                     | 100                        |
| <b>National election voter turnout percentage</b>   |                          | 81.05                      |                            |                            |
| <b>Provincial election voter turnout percentage</b> |                          | 80.53                      |                            |                            |

Source: Independent Electoral Commission homepage

Table 5.7 reveals the 2006 municipal election results at Makana Municipality. It is worth noting that the ANC received fewer votes in 2006 than in 2000 and that voter turnout went down by 5.29%. Despite the lower voter turnout, the ANC won 11 out of 12 seats on council. Table 5.8 shows that the majority of councillors on council after the 2006 municipal elections were ANC councillors.

**Table 5. 7: 2006 Municipal election results: Makana Local Municipality**

| Party name                      | Number of votes | Percentage of votes |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| <b>ACDP</b>                     | 622             | 1.40                |
| <b>ANC</b>                      | 35 958          | 80.90               |
| <b>AZAPO</b>                    | 487             | 1.10                |
| <b>DA</b>                       | 6 272           | 14.11               |
| <b>ID</b>                       | 166             | 0.37                |
| <b>IP<sub>a</sub></b>           | 59              | 0.13                |
| <b>PAC</b>                      | 442             | 0.99                |
| <b>UDM</b>                      | 442             | 0.99                |
| <b>Total</b>                    | 44 448          | 100                 |
| <b>Voter turnout percentage</b> |                 | 52.37               |

Source: Independent Electoral Commission homepage

**Table 5. 8: 2006 Makana Local Municipality council members**

| Party | Area    | Councillor name            |
|-------|---------|----------------------------|
| ANC   | Ward 1  | Ms. Boniwe Bonani          |
| ANC   | Ward 2  | Ms. Misiswe Madinda        |
| ANC   | Ward 3  | Mr. Zamuxolo J. Peter      |
| ANC   | Ward 4  | Mr. Melikaya Phongolo      |
| ANC   | Ward 5  | Mr. Luyanda Nase           |
| ANC   | Ward 6  | Mr. Zonwabele Mantla       |
| ANC   | Ward 7  | Ms. Nomhle S. Gaga         |
| ANC   | Ward 8  | Ms. Nomazwi J. Fuku        |
| ANC   | Ward 9  | Mr. Mxolisi P. Ntshiba     |
| ANC   | Ward 10 | Mr. Xolani G. Simakuhle    |
| DA    | Ward 11 | Ms. Lena C. May            |
| ANC   | Ward 12 | Mr. Ntsikelelo G. Stamper  |
| ANC   | PR      | Ms. Thandeka J.P. Veliti   |
| ANC   | PR      | Ms. Thuleka Ngeleza        |
| ANC   | PR      | Ms. Nosipho C. Faltein     |
| ANC   | PR      | Ms. Nonzameko C. Tyantsula |
| ANC   | PR      | Ms. Nomnqwewo J. Mshubeki  |
| ANC   | PR      | Ms. Nombulelo C. Masoma    |
| ANC   | PR      | Mr. Monwabisi E. Fulani    |
| ANC   | PR      | Ms. Julia Wells            |
| DA    | PR      | Mr. Leslie M. Reynolds     |
| DA    | PR      | Mr. Michael Whisson        |

Source: Grocott's Mail

Election results since 2000 reveal that there has been a significant degree of support for the ANC at Makana Municipality despite low percentage of voter turnout as

revealed in the tables. Also, since 2000 the majority of Makana Municipality council members have been ANC councillors.

In addition, since 1994 the mayors in council have been ANC representatives. From 1994 to 2000 mayors under the Grahamstown Transitional Local Council were ANC representatives and from 2000 to 2006 under Makana Municipality the mayors were ANC representatives. Table 5.9 is a list of mayors from 1994 to 2006 and their political party membership.

**Table 5. 9: Municipality mayors (1994-2006)**

| <b>Year(s)</b>    | <b>Mayor name</b>                   | <b>Political party membership</b> |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1994-1997         | Mr. Mzukisi Mpahlwa                 | ANC                               |
| 1997-1999         | Ms. Nontuthuzelo Faku <sup>71</sup> | ANC                               |
| 1999-2000         | Mr. Likhaya Ngqezana <sup>72</sup>  | ANC                               |
| Sep 2000-Dec 2000 | Mr. N. Vilakazi                     | ANC                               |
| 2000-2005         | Mr. Vumile Lwana                    | ANC                               |
| 2005-2006         | Mr. Phumelelo Kate                  | ANC                               |

Source: Grocott's Mail

In 2005, the chairpersons of various municipal committees were ANC councillors and many municipal officials had ANC memberships. Table 5.10 shows these chairpersons. Table 5.11 reveals the political and other memberships of some municipal officials at Makana Municipality in 2005. Many of these municipal officials were responsible over some workers that shared their ANC or union memberships.

<sup>71</sup> She was also involved in the ANC Women's League during her mayorship.

<sup>72</sup> He was president of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) in 1995 and ANC councillor in 2000.

**Table 5. 10: 2005 Municipal Council committee chairpersons and their political affiliation**

| <b>Councillor</b> | <b>Position on Council</b>                                           |
|-------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ANC               | Chairperson: Environment, Disaster Management and Heritage Committee |
| ANC               | Chairperson: Finance and Service Delivery Committee                  |
| ANC               | Chairperson: Social Services and Empowerment Committee               |
| ANC               | Chairperson: Land Housing and Infrastructural Development Committee  |
| ANC               | Chairperson: Social Services and Community Empowerment Committee     |
| ANC               | Chairperson: Tender Committee                                        |
| ANC               | Chairperson: Human Resources and Administration Committee            |

Source: Makana municipality homepage

**Table 5. 11: 2005 Political party and other memberships of some municipal officials**


| <b>Political party and other membership</b>    | <b>Position</b>                                  |
|------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| ANC member + SACP member                       | Director: Corporate Services                     |
| ANC member                                     | Director: Technical and Infrastructural Services |
| ANC member + former SAMWU shop steward         | Director: Social and Community Services          |
| ANC member + former IMATU member               | Director: Financial Services                     |
| ANC member + SACP member + SAMWU member        | Assistant Director: Human Resources Manager      |
| SAMWU member                                   | Assistant Director: Fire Department              |
| ANC member + SACP member + former SAMWU member | Assistant Director: Electricity Department       |

Source: Field notes (2005, 2006)

Figure 3 shows the macrostructure of Makana Municipality in 2005. It reveals that the municipal officials with ANC memberships had a responsibility of managing some workers in a number of departments and divisions<sup>73</sup> that shared their ANC membership.

<sup>73</sup> Access to the precise number of workers was limited.

**Figure 3: 2005 Makana Local Municipality: macro structure**



Source: Municipality macrostructure document

#### **5.4 SAMWU at Makana Local Municipality**

SAMWU and IMATU have been the representative unions at Makana Municipality since 2001. In 2005, out of approximately 600 full-time employees SAMWU had a membership of 487 and eight shop stewards and IMATU had a membership of 74 and two shop stewards. SAMWU and IMATU have significantly different traditions and histories. SAMWU was very involved in liberation movement politics as an affiliate of COSATU and had a strong following amongst Black semi-skilled and unskilled workers. SAMWU is a non-racial union but consists of a chiefly Black membership at Makana Municipality. At Makana Municipality the predominant Black worker membership was very evident at general meetings observed in August and November 2005. IMATU was a formation of a merger between two main unions, the South African Association of Municipal Employees (SAAME) and the South African Local Authorities Workers' Union (SALAWU) and became an affiliate of the non-politically aligned FEDUSA. The two unions that merged formerly represented White, professional municipal employees. As a result, the membership of IMATU has predominantly been made up of White, professional municipal workers although it is presently a non-racial union. In an interview in 2005, Mr. Stewart, an IMATU shop steward, disclosed that IMATU had experienced difficulties appealing to workers in the area and securing membership. He observed that IMATU was perceived as a "Whites only union" (Interview: Mr. Stewart). SAMWU on the other hand had experienced gradual growth (Interview: Mr. Patho).

Table 5.12 provides information of the leadership of the SAMWU local branch. The research revealed that most of the leaders of the local branch held ANC memberships and some were involved in the SACP and other organisations.

**Table 5. 12: SAMWU local branch leadership since 2005/6**

| <b>Position</b>           | <b>Name</b>       | <b>Involvement</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|---------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Chairperson</b>        | Mr. Ndamase       | - SAMWU member since 1997<br>- SAMWU shop steward since 2001<br>- Young Communists League member since 2003<br>- ANC League member since 1989<br>- SACP member since 1991                                                                                          |
| <b>Deputy chairperson</b> | Ms. Zono          | - SAMWU member since 1997<br>- ANC member since 1995                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| <b>Secretary</b>          | Mr. Siphiso Kate  | - SAMWU member since 1999<br>- ANC member 1994-1996<br>- ANC Fingo Village branch chairperson 1997-1999<br>- Ward 8 ANC branch chairperson since 2001<br>- SACP member since 1999<br>- SAMWU branch deputy chairperson in 2000<br>- COSATU local secretary in 2005 |
| <b>Shop steward</b>       | Mr. Moneli        | - SAMWU member since 1999<br>- ANC member since 1992<br>- SAMWU shop steward since 2004                                                                                                                                                                            |
| <b>Shop steward</b>       | Mr. Kiti          | * Unavailable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| <b>Shop steward</b>       | Mr. Luvuyo Sizane | - ANC member since 1990s<br>- ANC branch deputy chairperson in 2006                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| <b>Shop steward</b>       | Mr. Edward Vayo   | - SANCO member since 1986<br>- ANC member since 1990s<br>- SACP member<br>- SAMWU shop steward since 2000                                                                                                                                                          |
| <b>Shop steward</b>       | Mr. Zondani       | * Unavailable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |

Source: Grocott's Mail and interviews

### **5.5 The Local Labour Forum**

Makana Municipality established a LLF in 2001 in accordance with the provisions of the Organisational Rights Agreement (2000, 2005). The members to this forum include SALGA, SAMWU and IMATU representatives. SALGA representatives comprise councillors and municipal officials. A typical LLF meeting may consist of up to twelve persons. The LLF is the primary forum where the unions and management debate and settle matters such as human resources related issues, alternative service delivery methods, privatisation proposals and other workplace matters of mutual concern. According to Mr. Tiza Sape<sup>74</sup>, a SALGA representative on the LLF, relations between the different partners had been “generally very sound” since the establishment of the forum (Interview: Mr. Sape). Both SAMWU and IMATU shop stewards held similar sentiments about “sound” relations within the forum.

The LLF convened at least once a month or as agreed by the parties. The municipality has other committees for the effective running of the municipality, for instance the Recruitment and Selection Committee but involvement by labour on these committees is less direct than on the LLF. Union representatives held observer statuses on other committees. Out of ten to twelve persons attending LLF meetings, not less than five of these tended to be members of the ANC. ANC councillors constituted a majority at Makana Municipality and were a majority at meetings, although their attendance of the meetings was not based on political affiliation. Oftentimes attendance was dependent on availability (Interview: Mr. Sithole).

### **5.6 Organisational transformation at Makana Local Municipality**

From 1994 to 2006, Makana Municipality has gone through important political as well as organisational changes. The organisational changes have mostly been an outcome of changes in macro and micro economic policy to redistribute municipal resources and redress the legacy of apartheid at municipalities. Since 2000, Makana Municipality has embarked on administrative restructuring to redress the imbalances and inadequacies left from the former local government system. The Municipal

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<sup>74</sup> Pseudo name.

Systems Act 32 of 2000 requires that the municipality annually monitor and evaluate its developmental performance.

During April 2002, an Integrated Development Plan (IDP) was internally set up for the municipality and approved by the Makana Council. The rationale behind the IDP is “to ensure the allocation of the resources available to the municipality to those projects and programmes that will address specific development priorities” (Makana IDP Review, 2004). The projects have been categorised into technical and infrastructure, community and social service, local economic development and finance projects. As of April 2002, the municipality identified its development priorities as the provision of: portable water, sanitation, roads, health care (HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and access to care), education and training, land redistribution, housing and safety, electricity and communication, local economic development (job creation and poverty alleviation), emergency services (including disaster management) and transport (rail, taxis, bus and air) (Makana IDP Review, 2004). A number of donors have contributed to assisting the transformation of the municipality. These include Rhodes University, the Department of Housing, Local Government and Traditional Affairs, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, the Provincial Housing Board, the Department of Land Affairs, the Public Works Board, the Cacadu District Municipality, the Municipal Infrastructure Grant, the Integrated Development Plan, the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the Municipal Income Grant.

Tables 5.13 and 5.14 give a breakdown of the Makana Municipality 2003/4, 2004/5 budgets, respectively, compiled based on the IDP. The incomes, expenditures, surpluses and deficits of the different directorates are given. The tables reveal how the budgets have been distributed in light of the IDP to facilitate social development. The tables reveal that the municipality budgeted for technical and infrastructural services the most. In 2003/4 and 2004/5, the Technical and Infrastructural Services (housing), Corporate Services and Community and Social Services directorates experienced deficits, meaning that there was more expenditure than budgeted income. The budgets show the financial constraints facing reform at the municipality. Financial limitations restrict maximised implementation of reform plans. The budget is only one indicator of the reform situation at the municipality and other factors, such

as, tangible evidence of reform outputs (buildings, sewerage systems, roads) and community perspectives on reform would need to be considered for a more accurate picture of the state of reform.

**Table 5. 13: Makana Local Municipality budget compilation 2003/4**

| <b>Directorate</b>                                   | <b>Income 2003/4</b> | <b>Expenditure 2003/4</b> | <b>Surplus (+)/<br/>Deficit (-)</b> |
|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Community and Social Services                        | 10 969 120           | 25 388 530                | - 14 419 410                        |
| Corporate Services                                   | 3 484 390            | 13 214 890                | - 9 730 500                         |
| Dog tax                                              | 31 420               | 29 500                    | +1 920                              |
| Executive Mayor                                      |                      | 849 830                   | - 849 830                           |
| Financial Services                                   | 19 893 510           | 2 235 640                 | + 17 657 870                        |
| Municipal Manager                                    | 200 000              | 1 965 380                 | - 1 765 380                         |
| Parking areas                                        | 21 760               | 53 450                    | -31 690                             |
| Technical and infrastructural services               | 10 435 240           | 13 218 770                | - 2 783 530                         |
| Technical and infrastructural services (electricity) | 31 819 330           | 24 367 590                | +7 451 740                          |
| Technical and infrastructural services (housing)     | 161 100              | 202 800                   | - 41 700                            |
| Technical and infrastructural services (water)       | 13 731 360           | 9 190 920                 | +4 540 440                          |
| <b>Total</b>                                         | <b>90 747 230</b>    | <b>90 717 300</b>         | <b>+ 29 930</b>                     |

Source: Makana municipality homepage

**Table 5. 14: Makana Local Municipality budget compilation 2004/5**

| <b>Directorate</b>                                   | <b>Income 2004/5</b> | <b>Expenditure 2004/5</b> | <b>Surplus (+)/<br/>Deficit (-)</b> |
|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Community and Social Services                        | 13 171 850           | 27 774 500                | - 14 602 650                        |
| Corporate Services                                   | 4 383 390            | 12 855 970                | - 8 472 580                         |
| Dog tax                                              | 38 920               | 27 500                    | +11 420                             |
| Executive Mayor                                      |                      | 910 370                   | - 910 370                           |
| Financial Services                                   | 23 617 710           | 2 740 310                 | + 20 877 400                        |
| Municipal Manager                                    |                      | 1 592 320                 | - 1 592 320                         |
| Parking areas                                        | 1 860                |                           | +1 860                              |
| Technical and infrastructural services               | 8 856 060            | 16 435 370                | - 7 579 310                         |
| Technical and infrastructural services (electricity) | 33 618 620           | 25 673 190                | +7 945 430                          |
| Technical and infrastructural services (housing)     | 162 000              | 208 890                   | - 46 890                            |
| Technical and infrastructural services (water)       | 13 166 300           | 8 705 680                 | + 4 460 620                         |
| <b>Total</b>                                         | <b>97 016 710</b>    | <b>96 924 100</b>         | <b>+ 92 610</b>                     |

Source: Makana municipality homepage

### **5.7 Conclusion**

Significant municipal and political developments took place during the transition phase. Since 1994, the ANC consistently won at national, provisional and municipal elections. After Makana Municipality was established in 2000, the municipal council was characterised by predominantly ANC councillors and the municipality was characterised by a number of ANC members. With regard to union presence, SAMWU had the greatest membership at the municipality as of 2005. In effect, employment relations at the municipality was characterised by shared ANC membership between workers and managers.

The next chapter explores the dynamics of labour relations at the municipality when workers and managers share memberships and political histories.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **THE EXPLORATION OF THE DYNAMICS OF LABOUR RELATIONS AT MAKANA LOCAL MUNICIPALITY**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the dynamics of labour relations at the case study. It shows the contemporary dynamics of labour relations at Makana Local Municipality within the context of the Alliance. This chapter presents the dynamics of labour relations based on the information generated from a case study framework which applied direct observations, interviews and content analysis.

#### **6.2 Post-1994 Labour Relations Challenges at Makana Local Municipality**

Historic municipal employment relations were governed largely by common laws because there was no legislation that provided for local government bargaining systems (Botes et. al., 1992). Important changes to municipalities occurred from the late 1980s as more unions challenged undemocratic municipalities and battled for improved conditions of employment. Post-1994, the Labour Relations Act of 1995 and the Municipal Systems Act became the primary legislation governing post-apartheid employment relations at municipalities. Management and union representatives revealed that relations between workers and management had been “good” since 2000. In an interview, SAMWU shop-steward Mr. Sithole identified that Makana Municipality faced a number of challenges while it transformed its departments as required by municipal policy and delivered services with limited resources. He revealed that alleged corruption and alleged political appointments had been contemporary challenges for labour relations since the municipality has been ANC dominated (Interview: Mr. Sithole). Some municipal workers also identified these two issues as factors that have caused difficulties for relations between management and unions.

##### **6.2.1 Corruption**

SAMWU has led demonstrations against alleged corruption by some individuals at the municipality. In 2003, municipal workers at the Makana Municipality alleged that

there was corruption within the electricity department and presented the matter to SAMWU. In September 2003, SAMWU alleged that there was misuse of funds at the municipality electricity department. In March 2004, discontented municipal workers picketed outside Makana municipal offices in Grahamstown demanding an end to corruption and the resignation of the Municipal Manager, Mr. Pravine Naidoo and the mayor Mr. Vumile Lwana because they apparently had not met with workers to discuss their grievances over the alleged corruption case. A month after the picket, SAMWU provincial organiser Ten-Ten Ndyalivani gave a statement to the Grocott's Mail, a local newspaper, that there was prima facie evidence of corruption by certain individuals at the municipality (Grocott's Mail, 2004a:3). SAMWU gained support from its alliance partner the SACP and also the local UDM for pursuing the corruption allegations. The SACP accused the municipality of being "a centre of corruption" with "poor administration" and "lacking internal audit measures".

In April 2004, Mr. Lungile Mxube<sup>75</sup>, then director of corporate services (also an ANC member), was dismissed for gross insubordination towards the municipal manager after did not submit a report on the allegations in the electricity department. Mr. Mxube alleged that he was dismissed because he had recommended that the Municipal Manager be suspended because he had not acted on proof of corruption in the electricity department (Grocott's Mail, 2004d:1). COSATU, SAMWU and the SACP expressed support for Mr. Mxube during this period and demanded his reinstatement (Grocott's Mail, 2004b:3). In May 2004, the auditor general's office in Port Elizabeth revealed that the municipality had accrued electricity distribution losses of R2.3 million that it could not justify (Grocott's Mail, 2004d:1). In June 2004, the Scorpions and a Joint Anti-Corruption Team investigated the allegations of fraud and corruption at the municipality. In September 2005, the Joint Anti-Corruption Team spokesperson Mr. Mzukisi Fatyela, revealed that four municipal officials would face charges of fraud and corruption (Grocott's Mail, 2005:1). The Scorpions and Joint Anti-Corruption Team presented a document to the public prosecutor at the end of 2005. At the end of 2006, the report on the outcome of corruption investigations was in possession of the public prosecutor and the case had not yet been concluded.

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<sup>75</sup> Mr. Mxube became the district secretary of the SACP Cacadu branch from 2005.

### **6.2.2 Appointments**

During the interim phase between 1995 and 2000, the Grahamstown TLC had a majority of ANC councillors. These councillors were involved in the handling of municipal affairs and participated in the selection process of municipal employees. In 1996 the Grahamstown TLC appointed Mr. Mbekela as Human Resources manager ahead of another candidate. In response to this appointment, the candidate not appointed wrote a letter to the Grocott's Mail alleging that the appointment was "purely a political appointment" because Mr. Mbekela was an ex-ANC councillor. Mr. Cridland, Chief Executive at the TLC, responded to the letter via Grocott's Mail and emphasised that the process had been fair. He revealed that there was a panel of twenty-one members including council members, representatives of three union and two senior officials. Incidentally, most of the council members were ANC representatives and SAMWU was a union represented. The case of alleged unfair labour practice was not pursued and Mr. Mbekela kept his post until resigning in 2000 during an appointment dispute of Mr. Charles Wessels, a former Grahamstown deputy mayor.

Ms. Betty Banda<sup>76</sup>, a councillor from 1997 to 1999, revealed that during the transitional period councillors faced a dilemma of being part of municipal management and acting as elected politicians. They often lacked knowledge on how to deal with operational matters and often ran the risk of taking politically based actions on the council. She disclosed that this was particularly true during appointments (Interview: Ms. Banda). In February 2000, the Grahamstown TLC was accused of unfair labour practice after appointing a political associate of local ANC leaders, Mr. Charles Wessels, ahead of Mr. Kaiser Nxamleko, the candidate who won the council selection committee's vote. At the time, Mr. Wessels worked for the provincial arts and culture department in Port Elizabeth and Mr. Nxamleko was a senior administrative officer. Council policy gave preference to internal candidates but in this case Mr. Wessels was appointed to the post of deputy city secretary. IMATU, the union Mr. Nxamleko belonged to, declared a dispute against the Grahamstown TLC for the appointment of Mr. Wessels. In March 2000 SAMWU issued a statement supporting the appointment. Mr. Howard Skweza, then secretary of the SAMWU local branch, said that SAMWU had short-listed Mr. Wessels

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<sup>76</sup> Pseudo name.

because they “believed that his abilities, potential and his experience as a former deputy mayor of Grahamstown made him the best possible candidate” (Grocott’s Mail, 2000:2). Mr. Skweza concluded his statement by adding:

“When we (SAMWU) question ourselves as to why the DP is fighting for someone (Mr. Nxamleko) from a previously disadvantaged community, we arrive at the conclusion that DP is fighting against Mr. Wessels, who is also from a previously disadvantaged community, because he used to give them a tough time while he was an ANC councillor and deputy mayor of this town” (Grocott’s Mail, 2000:2).

Mr. Nxamleko was appointed as deputy city secretary instead.

In 2005, a municipal official and SALGA representative, Mr. Tiza Sape<sup>77</sup>, noted that the issue of appointments was potentially “fertile ground for dissent” at Makana (Interview: Mr. Sape) but highlighted that discussions with union representatives prior to selections had aided the decision-making process. He commented that SAMWU union representatives had occasionally attempted to persuade internal appointments:

Towards the direction of their members ... despite the fact that in many instances, the [union] members [did] not necessarily possess the same kind of skills or competencies required for the post (Interview: Mr. Sape).

He explained the tendency of SAMWU representatives to recommend members to various posts they might not qualify as “an issue of loyalty” (Interview: Mr. Sape). He supposed that SAMWU representatives would endeavour to assist as many suitable SAMWU members as possible into municipal positions. Recognising this possibility, Mr. Sape stressed that the responsibility of management was to continually ensure that the best decisions on recruitment and selection were arrived at in an amicable manner. On the other hand, SAMWU shop steward Mr. Sithole commented that management did not consistently address appointment matters at the municipality although union supported applicants were qualified. He argued:

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<sup>77</sup> Pseudo name.

Some of our members are not being appointed to senior posts that they are applying for and end up having disputes ... some of our members have applied for senior positions but have not been appointed ... one of our members applied for a post and it was not given to her for reasons which to us were discriminatory<sup>78</sup> (Interview: Mr. Sithole).

Mr. Dally Monza<sup>79</sup>, a Makana municipal official and member of the ANC and SACP, acknowledged that, from a management perspective, employment relations at Makana Municipality had been “good” over years (Interview: Mr. Monza). He noted that the case of the promotion of a worker, Mrs. Landiwe Mantla had strained relations at the municipality. In October 2003, Mrs. Mantla, applied for the position of senior foreman in the Community and Social Directorate. She was recommended for the post by a selection panel which included the municipal manager and the head of the directorate but the mayor, Mr. Vumile Lwana, refused the appointment. He argued that the candidates were not asked questions in compliance with the job description. Mrs. Mantla approached SAMWU, her union, and SAMWU lodged a formal grievance with the municipality. In June 2004, an arbitrator ruled that the interference by the Mayor in the appointment was an unfair labour practice and that the complainant be promoted. An advocate to the case pointed out that an interpretation of the Municipal Systems Act and Recruitment and Selection Policy gave the Municipal Manager the responsibility of staff appointments and not the Mayor (Grocott’s Mail, 2004c). The dispute was taken to the bargaining council and won SAMWU. This outcome was challenged by the Mayor. The matter was taken to the Labour Court and a settlement was reached that the top three candidates, including Mrs. Mantla, be re-interviewed. Another candidate was selected for the post.

According to Mr. Wally Gray<sup>80</sup> an ANC and SACP Cacadu district representative who was a Makana municipal official from 2001 to 2004, workers often alleged that appointments at the municipality took place on the basis of political connections to ANC councillors or personal connections to ANC councillors. In September 2006, the brother of Mayor Phumelelo Kate, Mr. Siphiwo Kate (also a SAMWU representative) was promoted from a cleaner and messenger at the local library to personnel clerk in

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<sup>78</sup> This case was previously referred to and had been initially deemed unfair labour practice. A resolution later passed resulted in the re-advertising of the post and the worker lost the position (Interview: Wally Gray).

<sup>79</sup> Pseudo name.

<sup>80</sup> Pseudo name.

the Human Resources division. This appointment was questioned by workers at the municipality (Grocott's Mail, 2006:3) but the appointment was not disputed.

### **6.3 Management at Makana Local municipality**

The research revealed that the management at Makana Municipality consisted of two main entities: municipal officials and councillors. Management balanced a wide range of community, organisational, economic and political interests at Makana Municipality. Mr. Monza<sup>81</sup>, a municipal official (also member of ANC and SACP), emphasised that management needed to attain a "balance" between diverse interests from the community and workers in order to maintain "good" workplace relations at the municipality (Interview: Mr. Monza). Since the first democratic elections, the numerous relevant social, economic and political developments have meant that management ensures that all decisions made are in line with national and municipal objectives.

In his capacity as a municipal official, Mr. Sape (a member of the ANC, SACP and SAMWU) indicated that managing interests at the municipality was at times complicated by shared political membership. The history of South Africa's liberation struggle entrenched loyalties between individuals and organisations and created bonds of solidarity (Buhlungu and Psoulis, 1999). Post-apartheid, managers at Makana Municipality revealed that these loyalties existed and affected their management roles. Mr. Sape remarked:

You, as a manager ... are expected to be driven by some ethical code that will say to you that [at negotiations] you represent the employer ... but sometimes loyalty, because of [political] affiliation [makes you] sympathetic [to workers] ... but at the end, you ... have to find a way which cannot actually be misconstrued to be or which may not actually compromise your professional integrity because at the end you choose where your loyalty [lies] ... You [a manager] are appointed to take particular decisions, which sometimes may contradict with your own conscience ... but if the institution says do this, you just have to – it's a challenge (Interview: Mr. Sape).

His statement highlighted the predicament for some managers in executing their duties because of shared political affiliation as some municipal workers. Mr. Sape emphasised that the goals of the "institution" were the primary goals for municipal

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<sup>81</sup> Pseudo name. Mr. Monza was involved in the Provincial Executive Council of the ANC Youth League and worked as a provincial research coordinator for the ANC in the Eastern Cape Province before he joined the municipality.

officials to pursue despite the possibility of managers acting contrary to their “conscience”.

Mr. Monza, a municipal official and ANC and SACP member, recognised that the dominance of the ANC at a national level had affected the direction of policy developments by government and at a local level ANC dominance had affected how managers implemented these policies. Mr. Monza indicated that the decisions made by management were influenced by the policies of the majority party, in this case, the ANC irrespective of whether managers supported the ANC or not. Mr. Monza stated:

there is no way that management of any government institution may ignore the policies of the party in the majority ... therefore decisions that we [managers] find ourselves implementing will take the form of decisions [of] the majority party ... So directly or indirectly, whether you are a member or not you are influenced by those decisions by the majority party, regardless of whether you embrace them or not (Interview: Mr. Monza).

While he recognised that a party majority influenced how policies were implemented he noted that his particular background with the ANC had been beneficial. Mr. Monza stated:

Being part of the organisation [ANC] outside the institutional arrangement [that is, the workplace] definitely shapes your approach because it makes it easier for you to interpret and understand those policies because you are part of those forums where such policies are discussed and I would imagine with [my] experience ... I would know all the [ANC] policies ... what I might be required to do is to interpret that within the context of Makana Municipality guided by the Council ... we at a management level don't behave as politicians because we are not, we're only employed ... we must embrace all people regardless of their political affiliation ... we service the community ... but as a manager I would know what the ANC wants because I've participated in its structures and I continue to participate in my own right (Interview: Mr. Monza).

Mr. Monza highlighted that his involvement in the ANC allowed him to interpret ANC policies well when these were implemented at the municipality. He recognised that he was not an ANC politician but acknowledged that his experience with the party gave him valuable insight the objectives of the ANC led government policies at the municipality.

Since 1994, councillors formed part of management at Makana Municipality as political representatives and not major administrative decision makers. They shared

the responsibility of “balancing” organisational, community and political interests at Makana Municipality, although their political roles were central. These elected representatives represented the interests of their constituencies within the Municipal Council. They acted as a bridge between their constituencies and the municipality. Different councillors represented the interests of their constituencies on different portfolio committees<sup>82</sup>. From 1994 to 2006, ANC councillors have had the greatest representation on the municipal council and within portfolio committees. Portfolio committees discuss, for instance, the building or closure of roads. If there is a disagreement on a matter within the portfolio committee, this is discussed within the committee and a recommendation is then forwarded to the Executive Committee and Executive Mayoral Committee which makes a final decision (IDASA, 2006). Generally speaking, the decisions finalised at the municipality form part of the recommendations made by the portfolio committees and have a bearing on development of areas that fall under Makana.

Mr. Ben Mandla<sup>83</sup>, an ANC councillor, a representative on the LLF and a member of the Corporate Services Portfolio Committee, expressed delight at an ANC majority within management at Makana Municipality. He acknowledged that an ANC majority had given members of the ANC the greatest representation in the municipal council and therefore the greatest vote on matters discussed and decided in the council. Mr. Mandla reasoned:

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<sup>82</sup> The portfolio committees include: the Human Resources and Administration Committee; the Community Tender Committee; the Environment, Disaster Management and Heritage Committee; the Economic Development and Tourism Committee; the Service Delivery and Community Empowerment Committee; the Executive Committee; the Social Services and Employment Committee; the Finance and Service Delivery Committee; the Executive Mayor Committee; the Land House and Infrastructure Committee; the Delivery Committee; the Local Economic Development and Tourism Portfolio Committee; the Land, Housing and Infrastructural Development Committee; the Mayoral Committee; the Grahamstown Diocesan Council Committee; the Grahamstown Cathedral Council Committee; the College of Transfiguration Committee; the Gkhwezi Women’s Economic Development Project Committee; and the Aesthetics Committee ([www.makana.gov.za/council.asp](http://www.makana.gov.za/council.asp)).

<sup>83</sup> Pseudo name.

The reason why we campaign at elections [is] so that we have more representation in council to put in our [ANC] manifesto ... in the Local Labour Forum we've only one person who's not an ANC councillor ... he's DA ... he puts his views in and ... we discuss things ... [but] you find you [do not see] he's opposition kind of element ... we take the lead in terms of discussions and influence (Interview: Mr. Mandla).

Mr. Tom Litteley<sup>84</sup>, a DA councillor and representative on the LLF, observed that over the years the growing support for the ANC at the municipality had been well received by the majority of workers at Makana Municipality. As a participant in management, he observed:

Now that the ANC now control nearly all senior official positions, as well as the elected council positions, there is probably a greater sense of unity and common purpose ... there is probably a sense that the ANC councillors are on the side of the workers, which generates a less confrontational approach [by workers]...there is probably greater goodwill between the ANC councillors and labour as Alliance partners ... Until the departure of the senior White staff ... the White officials could be blamed as being the cause of disputes and misunderstanding ... they [ANC and SAMWU representatives] speak the same political language and ... there is a sense of common purpose, which works to the benefit of human relations, but I'm not sure that it works to the benefit of the efficiency of the organisation [that is, the municipality] (Interview: Mr. Litteley).

Mr. Litteley's statement highlighted that loyalties between ANC and SAMWU representatives had continued post-apartheid as a result of the Alliance and had influenced employment relations at the municipality. Mr. Litteley, however, questioned the impact of the ANC majority on the "efficiency" of the management at the municipality. The sense of "common purpose" between ANC councillors and SAMWU members provided by the Alliance provided no guarantee that decisions made for the sake of unity would be in the best interests of the municipality. Speaking "the same political language" could not guarantee an efficiently run organisation.

Mr. Jim Marks<sup>85</sup>, an IMATU shop steward at Makana Municipality (no political party membership) observed:

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<sup>84</sup> Pseudo name.

<sup>85</sup> Pseudo name.

Political influence in the workers' sphere is not always a good thing ... SAMWU [representatives] are swayed by political opinion and not by workers' opinion ... there is the perception that they [SAMWU representatives] always have information before us [IMATU representatives], obviously because they [SAMWU and ANC councillors] move around in [the same] political sphere and things that normally come down to the ground level are discussed there first ... not that you could put your finger on it but ... [the Alliance] has ... an influence [at the municipality] some way or another (Interview: Mr. Marks).

The observations made by Mr. Marks and Mr. Litteley suggested that management had to an extent been shaped by an ANC majority and the existence of the Alliance. They indicated there appeared to be cooperation between some ANC councillors and SAMWU representatives based on political affiliation. This apparently gave SAMWU representatives a comparative advantage when bargaining with management over shop-floor matters.

Mr. Sape stated:

the majority of the councillors at the municipality are ANC councillors and the majority union ... is SAMWU, so, it is very easy [for both these representatives] to find one another on almost all aspects ... the majority of the councillors actually come from the Alliance tradition, which means that they come from the ANC and they also appreciate the fact that SAMWU is an affiliate of COSATU, which is part of the Tripartite Alliance. So, in that way, you would actually find situations where there [is] no open questioning, [by SAMWU] as it were ... because the councillors [are] from that [Alliance] ... [the Alliance] has helped in many ways ... it was a great relief to ... employees who are largely members of SAMWU ... it [the Alliance] [has been] able to assist in ... influencing relations between ourselves [management and employees] because there [is] that acceptance between the parties (Interview: Mr. Sape).

Mr. Dave Stewart<sup>86</sup>, an IMATU shop steward, emphasised that managers with ANC membership had to show impartiality when performing their duties and especially when they interacted with SAMWU members at the workplace (Interview: Mr. Stewart).

Mr. Sape emphasised that despite the overlap of ANC membership between some managers and some SAMWU members and loyalty to the Alliance, managers had to prioritise the objectives of the municipality. He stated:

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<sup>86</sup> Pseudo name.

we [managers] have to balance ... [expectations] ... with a general interest of the organisation ... that's been the challenge ... you [a municipal official] represent the employer and you are not elected by the [ANC] membership to represent them ... you are appointed to take particular decisions (Interview: Mr. Sape).

Similarly, Mr. Monza stated:

We [municipal officials] ... at management level, don't behave as politicians because we are not, we're only employed ... there is a difference from us as managers, we [municipal officials] must embrace all the people regardless of their political affiliation ... we service the community that is not defined along political lines ... but as a manager, I know what the majority party want because I've participated in its structures and I continue to participate in my own right as a member of [the ANC] ... we know what the requirements of our professions are ... we have a strong appreciation of work ethics ... [performance] is checked ... we are managing employees who come from different political histories ... we should be beyond reproach ... we can't be party politicians internally ... that's how we exercise and create the distinction ... I practice my political affiliation outside [that is, the workplace]. I don't practice it here ... because ... I would have to take responsibility of those [actions] (Interview: Mr. Monza).

In effect, municipal officials ensured that even though party politics was a dimension to local government, politically motivated actions could only be taken up by councillors. Policies and performance assessments were important measures in restricting political behaviour at the workplace.

The general perception amongst several municipal workers was that it was "right" to have an ANC majority in management to lead municipal changes. Ten municipal workers during a strike in Grahamstown (2005) expressed their content with the dominance of the ANC nationally and at the municipality. They felt that the ANC was in the "right place", that is, maintaining a majority membership within government and at Makana. Some of these municipal workers had ANC and SACP membership and perceived an ANC majority in management as an "advantage" for workers. They felt that as most municipal workers were members of the ANC there was a greater possibility that managers would pay attention to their concerns. Other municipal workers with ANC/SACP membership did not share these sentiments of an "advantage". Instead, some felt that shared ANC/SACP membership with management had little significance in terms of how they were treated by management. Ms. Nancy Noluza<sup>87</sup>, a SAMWU member at Makana Municipality and

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<sup>87</sup> Pseudo name.

a member of the SACP and ANC, remarked that while the ANC had a majority at the municipality, this had not led to a privileged section of workers. She noted that even though there were municipal officials known to hold ANC membership, they did not give “special treatment” to any workers (Interview: Ms. Noluza).

#### **6.4 Relations between SAMWU and management**

Both representatives of SAMWU and management described their relations over the years as being “good”. Mr. Sithole<sup>88</sup>, a SAMWU shop steward and member of the LLF, emphasised that management had handled most municipal disputes well. Where there were points of difference, for example over appointments, management and SAMWU were able to “find one another” in most cases (Interview: Mr. Sithole). At a SAMWU general meeting on 8 August 2005, after a protracted<sup>89</sup> strike over wages by SAMWU and IMATU in July 2005, SAMWU shop stewards gave members feedback on the strike. According to a shop steward, management resolved to deduct two days of pay from the eight day strike. This information was well received by the entire SAMWU membership present at the meeting. Many stood and applauded upon hearing the news. This applause was acclamation of management at that time. One SAMWU shop steward named a municipal official (an ANC and SACP member) who had assisted the negotiation process of this moderate pay deduction. The shop steward went on to reassure the membership of SAMWU that there were some managers who are “cooperating” with SAMWU. Two specific municipal officials were mentioned. Both were members of the ANC and SACP. This additional information of persons involved in the negotiation process created a positive impression of persons in management with ANC and SACP memberships amongst SAMWU members at the meeting.

Mr. Monza, a municipal official with ANC and SACP memberships, admitted to attending<sup>90</sup> SAMWU meetings when available although he was not a SAMWU member (Interview: Mr. Monza). On 15 November 2005 he addressed SAMWU members at a general meeting on matters of concern at the municipality, namely,

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<sup>88</sup> Pseudo name.

<sup>89</sup> The strike went on for about three weeks.

<sup>90</sup> The municipal official had not yet attended an IMATU meeting before August 2005.

changes in local government policy affecting the municipality, alcohol abuse by some workers, the appointment of casual workers and the processes of filling job posts. He was given a few minutes to address the SAMWU members at their meeting and during his presentation he repeatedly addressed the assembly as “maqabane<sup>91</sup>”. This term was often used by SAMWU representatives when addressing members at the general meeting. After the address by the municipal official, SAMWU representatives reiterated the need to give attention to the concerns expressed by this municipal official. They emphasised that management was generally “cooperating” with SAMWU, particularly on the LLF and that workers should cooperate too.

Mr. Patho drew attention to the difficulty SAMWU representatives had because most SAMWU representatives were ANC members and many managers were ANC representatives too. According to Mr. Patho, some SAMWU members did not welcome what they claimed as a seemingly cooperative relationship between SAMWU representatives and some managers because of the shared ANC/SACP affiliation. He disclosed:

As SAMWU, we have got members who don't belong to the ANC. How do you [a SAMWU representative] begin to accommodate [these members] ... sometimes we [SAMWU representatives] are alleged to ... compromise<sup>92</sup> [when bargaining] simply because the people on the other side, the employers, are also members of the ANC. As negotiators of SAMWU we are also members of the ANC ... [Some SAMWU members] complain...that we do sacrifice or easily compromise because these [the managers with ANC membership] are our brothers and sisters ... we have to convince our members that, no, it's not the case (Interview: Mr. Patho).

The details of what proportion of SAMWU members felt that some SAMWU representatives were “compromising” was not pursued but Mr. Patho's statement revealed that he recognised that shared political affiliation between worker and employer representatives was not always perceived as beneficial for workers by SAMWU members.

One found that relations between SAMWU representatives and councillors appeared different from relations between SAMWU representatives and municipal officials.

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<sup>91</sup> Translation: “comrades”

<sup>92</sup> Due to time constraints the details of which SAMWU members alleged the compromises and references to specific cases of compromise was not possible.

ANC councillors formed large proportion of members on the municipal council.

According to Mr. Sape:

the majority of the councillors at the municipality are ANC councillors and the majority union ... is SAMWU, so, it is very easy [for both these representatives] to find one another on almost all aspects ... the majority of the councillors actually come from the Alliance tradition, which means that they come from the ANC and they also appreciate the fact that SAMWU is an affiliate of COSATU, which is part of the Tripartite Alliance. So, in that way, you would actually find situations where there [is] no open questioning, [by SAMWU] as it were ... because the councillors [are] from that [Alliance] ... [the Alliance] has helped in many ways ... it was a great relief to ... employees who are largely members of SAMWU ... it [the Alliance] [has been] able to assist in ... influencing relations between ourselves [management and employees] because there [is] that acceptance between the parties (Interview: Mr. Sape).

The ANC councillors are elected by their communities and account to their constituencies for their decisions. Relations between SAMWU and ANC councillors, in particular, were perceived by some SAMWU representatives as less pleasant over the years. Mr. Patho stated that relations between SAMWU and ANC councillors had “not always been very good” (Interview: Mr. Patho). He attributed this to “personal problems” between some SAMWU members and some ANC councillors disguised as “political problems” (Interview: Mr. Patho). Mr. Patho suggested:

They [the problems] are political in a sense but if you check them, if you analyse them, they are personal ... the relationship was not so good ... because we once revealed the corruption that took place in the Electricity department ... ever since we had marches against the municipality and councillors ... then the relationship between ourselves [SAMWU] and themselves [ANC councillors] has been very sour ... people are camouflaging to say it's a political problem but when you check it directly, it is a personal issue (Interview: Mr. Patho).

His statement suggested that the problems were an outcome of a specific case and were between individuals and not necessarily caused by organisational difficulties between SAMWU and the ANC. He added that many SAMWU members had difficulty in distinguishing between ANC councillors as “comrades” via the Alliance and bosses when part of management. Mr. Patho stated:

In our meetings, for instance, Alliance meetings, it is difficult to talk to your comrades as your comrade, to talk to the mayor as your mayor ... you'll find that also people [SAMWU members] are divided ... members on the ground are divided because they are following a certain person in a certain direction, not the organisation because of lack of understanding (Interview: Mr. Patho).

Mr. Mandla, an ANC councillor, argued that ANC councillors were elected to represent the political interests of their constituency and they had a responsibility to execute organisational tasks guided by ANC principles when acting as managers. He emphasised that the role of councillors was not to compromise the interests of the community (workers included). After acknowledging that SAMWU had the greatest membership at Makana Municipality and that SAMWU representatives and ANC councillors interacted at LLF negotiations, he stated:

Labour will remain labour ... we stand for the ANC and ... are making sure that we don't merely take what SAMWU is saying but everything is taken into consideration. Yes of course there are times when we [ANC councillors] conflict with SAMWU ... it's a situation we cannot avoid ... we're making sure that we don't compromise the interests of the workers and the people [community] at large ... there is an issue ... about corruption [that] made relations between ourselves [ANC councillors] and SAMWU [representatives] not good but we [SAMWU representatives and ANC councillors]... sat down [and discussed] that this should not be something that should strain our relations but it's something that has to be looked at [through] legal processes (Interview: Mr. Mandla).

Mr. Mandla perceived SAMWU members as an interest group like other interest groups at the municipality. In his view, SAMWU members did not hold a privileged position over other interest groups. He accepted that conflict was inevitable between SAMWU and ANC councillors and he pointed to the use of bi-lateral discussions to resolve conflict.

Outside the workplace, SAMWU members addressed ANC councillors at ward meetings over workplace issues as ANC members. According to ANC councillors, worker issues would often be placed on ward meeting agendas. Municipal councillors oversee ward meetings and a range of matters concerning members of those wards are discussed.

### **6.5 Relations between SAMWU and IMATU at Makana Local Municipality**

During a strike (July 2005) some IMATU and SAMWU members commented that relations between the two unions at Makana Municipality were "good". Representatives of both IMATU and SAMWU also described relations between the unions at the municipality as relatively "good". IMATU shop stewards Mr. Marks and Mr. Stewart argued that the two unions shared similar worker interests, for example, disciplinary actions and training. Representatives of both unions claimed

that SAMWU and IMATU shared similar worker concerns at the municipality. Mr. Marks did, however, note that “when it comes to negotiations obviously there is a difference in approach” (Interview: Mr. Marks). SAMWU used a more confrontational approach to confronting the municipality compared to IMATU. According to SAMWU representatives, SAMWU members often took to the streets when there was a dispute with the municipality. IMATU, on the other hand, had not declared a dispute with Makana Municipality since 2000. Mr. Stewart, an IMATU shop steward, admitted that:

[SAMWU members] are the guys that physically go on strike ... they toyi-toyi and down tools...but IMATU guys basically just sort of sit around and wait to see what happens and the result at the end of the day benefits [are] enjoyed by both unions...it has been said that when these [SAMWU members] guys go on strike against salary increases they [IMATU members] don't participate and they're [SAMWU] sort of fine with that (Interview: Mr. Stewart).

This less confrontational approach taken by IMATU created perceptions amongst some municipal workers that IMATU was not a “serious union” (Interview: Mr. Sithole). Mr. Monza described the involvement of IMATU representatives in committees as “inconsistent” compared to SAMWU (Interview: Mr. Monza). One could argue that the size of SAMWU compared to IMATU allowed more consistent participation by SAMWU at Makana Municipality. In 2005, SAMWU had four times more shop stewards than IMATU.

According to Mr. Marks the political affiliation of SAMWU to the ANC and SACP was a distinguishing feature between the two unions. This political affiliation influenced the relations between SAMWU and IMATU. IMATU shop steward Mr. Marks remarked:

There is the perception that they [SAMWU representatives] always have information before us [IMATU representatives], obviously because they [SAMWU and ANC councillors] move around in [the same] political sphere and things that normally come down to the ground level are discussed there first ... IMATU is a non-political union. So we do not get involved in the politics. We are purely there for the worker. We don't have political parties prescribing as to how we should treat our membership. I think that's the biggest difference [between the SAMWU and IMATU]...the union [SAMWU] tends to sway in the direction of its political party [the ANC] so if the political party feels strongly about a particular issue, I get the feeling that they [SAMWU representatives] would sway towards that feeling instead of towards what they really feel and they...persuade their membership to vote or sway towards political suggestion (Interview: Mr. Marks).

Mr. Marks indirectly identified political affiliation as a factor affecting relations between the two unions and his statement suggested some discontent over the possibility that some SAMWU representatives had access to ANC councillors because of political affiliation. When commenting on the influence of the Alliance on relations between the two unions and the influence of the Alliance on employment relations at the municipality, Mr. Marks remarked:

We've [IMATU and SAMWU] always had a good relationship but obviously it [the Alliance] does make a difference because it seems as though SAMWU are swayed by political opinion and not by workers opinion ... Not that you could put your finger on it but ... it [the Alliance] has ... an influence some way or another (Interview: Mr. Marks).

Mr. Stewart also noted that the Alliance had an influence on employment relations at the municipality and stated:

The Makana council ... have to show impartiality and be unbiased towards any situation you know. They [the council] must be seen not to take sides so to speak with SAMWU because SAMWU is sort of mainly ANC ... They [the council] also have to be seen to treat SAMWU as just another trade union like IMATU ... basically they must be seen to be in the middle and not take sides. That's what I reckon (Interview: Mr. Stewart).

Mr. Stewart emphasised the responsibility of the municipal council to ensure that it treated both unions fairly. The presence of an ANC majority and the existence of the Alliance had created a situation that warranted evidence of an explicitly fair municipal council.

### **6.6 SAMWU and the Tripartite Alliance**

Makana Municipality has branches of the ANC, SACP and COSATU<sup>93</sup>. The relationship between the three organisations was described by their representatives as "good". Representatives of these three organisations stated that representatives from the other organisations often attended their branch meetings as a sign of solidarity between the different organisations. Representatives of the ANC and SACP revealed that worker issues were often placed on their agendas and discussed at their branch meetings<sup>94</sup>. According to Mr. Gray, an SACP and ANC representative, industrial matters were discussed at ANC and SACP branch meetings and often representatives

<sup>93</sup> All the shop stewards of COSATU union affiliates (including SAMWU) meet weekly as the COSATU local and any resolutions taken there are taken as COSATU decisions and not individual union decisions.

of these organisations encouraged workers to resolve any disputes amicably. He emphasised that ANC and SACP representatives were primarily political representatives but because of the Alliance they could not ignore industrial matters. He stated that worker issues could not be separated from worker issues and if these organisations wanted to receive the continual support of workers they would have to give some attention to worker issues. Ms. Banda, a former councillor claimed that “councillors sometimes acted like shop stewards” (Interview: Ms. Banda) in the manner in which they addressed worker issues.

The *2004 COSATU worker survey* revealed that recent support for the Alliance amongst COSATU workers has been high (Cherry and Southall, 2006). At Makana municipality, representatives of SAMWU revealed that ANC, SACP and COSATU representatives often attended SAMWU general meetings and sometimes addressed SAMWU members at these meetings. Mr. Sithole, a SAMWU shop steward, explained this was common practice and observed that the attendance by the ANC, SACP and COSATU representatives was overtly a political gesture. He noted that it was necessary for SAMWU members with memberships in those organisations within to “see” that the Alliance was “still strong” and relevant. The Alliance partner representatives attended the meetings and even addressed members yet some SAMWU members probably did not belong to the ANC or SACP.

At SAMWU general meetings in August and November 2005, SACP and COSATU representatives were introduced at the start of the meetings. They sat at the front facing the SAMWU members and participated in the singing of songs during the meeting.

Viva ANC viva! Viva SACP viva! Viva COSATU viva! Viva ANC Women’s League Viva! Viva SANCO Viva! Viva ANC Youth League Viva! Amandla ngawethu! Gcina umsebenzi gcina<sup>95</sup>!

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<sup>94</sup> The details of worker issues discussed at branch meetings could not be explored due to time constraints.

<sup>95</sup> “Long live ANC long live! Long live SACP long live! Long live COSATU long live! Long live ANC Women’s League long live! Long live SANCO long live! Long live ANC league long live! The power is ours! Keep/retain your job, keep it!” (loose English translation).

These were the chants of SAMWU representatives at the beginning of general meetings observed in August and November 2005. These representatives combined political discourse with workplace discourse and received a positive response from SAMWU members. The shouts were echoed by a room of over one hundred SAMWU members. There were possibly some SAMWU members that were not members of the ANC, SACP, ANC Women's League, SANCO and ANC Youth League. Nonetheless, most of the SAMWU members repeated the exclamations in support of the Alliance organisations. According to a SAMWU member the use of political speech was common at union meetings and especially during election periods. The echoes seemed to show that there was strong general support for the Tripartite Alliance amongst many SAMWU members at those meetings. According to a few municipal workers at the meetings, a significant number of municipal workers were members of the ANC and/or the SACP and a union affiliate of COSATU<sup>96</sup> (mainly SAMWU).

According to SAMWU representatives, many SAMWU members at the municipality supported the Alliance and possessed memberships in the ANC and SACP. Mr. Sithole stated that even though some SAMWU members were not "card-carrying members" of the ANC and/or SACP, many supported one of the two parties (Interview: Mr. Sithole). He also stated that many SAMWU members and representatives actively participated or had participated in the branches of the ANC, SACP, ANC Women's League, ANC Youth League and the SACP Youth League. He added that SAMWU had contributed to the recruitment of SAMWU members to the Alliance organisations by encouraging members to join the ANC and SACP. At a general meeting in August 2005, SACP registration forms were circulated before the meeting to encourage SAMWU members to join the organisation. These were collected at the general meeting in November 2005.

SAMWU representatives at Makana actively bolstered support for the Alliance organisations and encouraged members to vote for the ANC during elections. They did this in fulfilment of SAMWU resolutions to support the ANC during election time. Mr. Patho admitted the process of convincing SAMWU members to support the

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<sup>96</sup> Some municipal workers also belong to the Democratic Nursing Organisation of South Africa (DENOSA).

ANC was a difficult process because SAMWU had members belonging to other political parties. Mr. Patho explained:

It's easy to mobilise members ... when you speak about wages and conditions of service, it has got no political content ... it's easy to mobilise people around those issues. But, when you mobilise people for elections [pause] then it's a different scenario. You are forced to stand in front of the people knowing very well that you've got different members, people who belong to the UDM, or whatever ... but we [SAMWU representatives] are forced to stand in front of them again [and again] because we are part of the Alliance and say, 'Please can you vote ANC because one, two, three' (Interview: Mr. Patho).

Even though campaigning for the ANC had been a "difficult" process, Mr. Patho argued that it had taken place fairly successfully. He emphasised that the ANC was generally "on the correct track" and that ANC councillors could expect to have the support of SAMWU at elections in the near future (Interview: Mr. Patho). Similarly, Mr. Sithole asserted that despite problems with local government, SAMWU representatives would continue to urge members to vote for the ANC because they "do not want to be led by any other government but the ANC" (Interview: Mr. Sithole).

When asked whether ANC councillors at Makana expected support from COSATU affiliates (including SAMWU) during the 2006 elections, ANC councillor Mr. Mandla was very optimistic that they would receive support. He disclosed that the Alliance had been an advantageous relationship for votes. He maintained:

Members of COSATU are members of the ANC ... we believe we will get support from COSATU affiliates ... [The] Alliance is long lived ... The Alliance is not just an alliance which was formed without proper consideration. It ... was formed a long time ago ... [and] is here to live for a long time ... there [are] problem[s] but ... I believe in it. I believe [in] this movement. We'll not do better ... if this Alliance was abolished (Interview: Mr. Mandla).

The Alliance gave ANC councillors some certainty of electoral support from SAMWU members during elections. Mr. Bob Matutu, an ANC councillor and member of the Community Development Portfolio Committee, similarly acknowledged the general significance of the Alliance. He stated:

[The Alliance is] a revolutionary alliance cemented by the historical events of the Alliance. It is there to stay. It is going to be there for quite a long time. There is no point that [the organisations] actually disengage from each other. The Tripartite Alliance ... has to be strengthened and consolidated ... it has a progressive impact [at Makana Municipality] in terms of actually understanding the components of the workers [COSATU affiliates] and the vanguard of the workers, that is the South African Communist Party ... and the African National Congress. [It has an impact] in actually understanding each other on issues that have to be deliberated [but] when you're an employer and an employee, there will be ... disagreement around particular issues at the workplace (Interview: Mr. Matutu).

Mr. Matutu indicated that mutual support for the Alliance amongst some workers and some managers had facilitated good employment relations at Makana Municipality. He accepted that "disagreements" or disputes could be expected in the employment relationship whether the Alliance was present or not.

SAMWU members seemed to have differing opinions about the Alliance. Mr. Joseph Mantu<sup>97</sup>, a SAMWU member, was supportive of the Alliance. He acknowledged its historic relevance and argued:

If you look at the development of this Alliance, there was no conference that the SACP, the ANC and COSATU sat down and said now we are going to form an alliance. It's an organic alliance. It's cemented with blood and there's no papers signed saying that 'This is an alliance'. I know people are saying 'No, this is not a Muslim marriage<sup>98</sup>, somewhere somehow the Alliance will break away', but that is not my feeling ... You must also respect the independency of each organisation in the Alliance. Sometimes you get conflicting views. It's like a family. There will be sour days within the family but the Alliance has one strategy in perspective which is the National Democratic Revolution that guides it ... it's an organic alliance (Interview: Mr. Mantu).

Mr. Mantu held similar sentiment to that of Ms. Hash of the Alliance as an "organic alliance" and the same misconception of an absence of formal agreement between the organisations. Mr. Mantu confirmed the perspective held by other COSATU workers of the Alliance as an "organic family relationship" (Buhlungu et al., 2006:206). Mr. Mantu suggested that the Alliance relationship went beyond the formalised relationship. The liberation struggle had "cemented" the relationship "with blood" in his view the Alliance. He strongly believed that the Alliance was not going to split, it was worth maintaining. Cherry and Southall (2006) noted that some COSATU

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<sup>97</sup> Pseudo name.

<sup>98</sup> Muslim marriages are revered and are not often characterised by divorce.

workers were becoming disillusioned with the ANC and COSATU's close relationship to the party through the Alliance.

In contrast to Mr. Manti, Ms. Noluza acknowledged:

The bond between the Alliance was very strong in the past years but these years [presently] it seems as if the bond is not like the way it used to be because some of the ANC members are taking things this way and the other members of the SACP are taking things that way but it's supposed to have collective decisions and whatever activities that are taking place, they [the Alliance partners] are supposed to take them collectively (Interview: Ms. Noluza).

Ms. Noluza was not as optimistic about the Alliance as Mr. Mantu and she identified differences in action taken by the ANC and SACP as reasons why she believed the strength of the Alliance was deteriorating. With reference to the impact of the Alliance at Makana Municipality, she observed:

SAMWU is not benefiting from the Tripartite Alliance. Yes COSATU is fighting for the rights of the union but unfortunately we have got a management that does not listen, that is not working for the benefit of workers (Interview: Ms. Noluza).

According to Ms. Noluza's observations the Alliance had not benefited SAMWU members at the municipality.

When asked their opinions of the Tripartite Alliance, Mr. Sape and Mr. Monza, (municipal officials with ANC and SACP memberships) expressed their support for the Alliance. Speaking in his personal capacity, Mr. Monza said that he "understood" the relationship and therefore appreciated its existence. Mr. Sape and Mr. Monza noted that as long as the Alliance existed, government would continue to face challenges when "harmonising various class interests" that exist in the country.

## **6.7 Conclusion**

The evidence presented from the case study shows that Makana Municipality has gone through significant socio-economic and political changes. These changes have occurred as local government has been transformed. The dominance of the ANC at the municipality has been an outcome of political change. This fed into the employment relationship at the municipality. Evidence revealed that the municipality was characterised by shared political memberships between employers and

employees. The next and final chapter concludes the findings of the research and suggests recommendations based on the findings.

# CHAPTER SEVEN

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 7.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the conclusions of the research. The research questions are evaluated and the findings of the research study are discussed. The information obtained through the content and discourse analysis and the case study brought to light a range of issues. The research began with a presentation of literature on Industrial Relations theory to show how relations between management and employees have been portrayed in theory. This presentation led to questions around how industrial relations in the South African public sector are played out when management representatives and union members share political membership. At the end of the chapter, some recommendations for further research are discussed.

### 7.2 Political alliances and industrial relations

Orthodox literature on industrial relations depicts management and union entities as separate and distinct. According to Flanders (1965:10) “unstructured” relationships do not feature in the rule making process of industrial relations systems. They lie “outside the scope” of industrial relations. However, public sector industrial relations have a distinctly political nature which influences the character of industrial relations. As Ferner (1985:68) notes “political calculations are an inherent rather than a contingent characteristic” of the public enterprise and therefore have a bearing on industrial relations.

Since 1994, the Tripartite Alliance has been the most significant political alliance in South Africa although COSATU has been argued to play an increasingly marginalised role within it (Southall, 2001a). The 2004 COSATU worker survey revealed that the Alliance and the ANC continue to enjoy a high level of support amongst COSATU workers. According to McKinley (2003) the Alliance has bound the working class to “institutionalised, politically based class compromise and electoral loyalty”. From 1994, COSATU has pledged its electoral support to the ANC. In this research, an assessment of political party dominance at the national level revealed that the ANC had attained the greatest voter support in the country

over the years. At Makana Municipality, the ANC won the 2000 municipal elections with 82.01% of the votes, the 2004 national elections with 79.88% of the votes and the 2006 municipal elections with 80.90% of the votes. The statistics revealed that the ANC had consistently held the greatest voter support at the Makana municipal area. In addition to high voter support, the research revealed that there was strong support for the ANC amongst workers at the Makana Municipality and many workers at Makana Municipality were members of the ANC. The investigation revealed that a significant number of municipal officials, for example, directors held ANC/SACP membership and were involved in important decision-making structures with workers, for example, the co-determinist LLF.


According to Turner (1991:27) the manner in which union influence is institutionalised in the Industrial Relations System is a fundamental variable. The introduction of corporatist and co-determinist structures institutionalised the working class struggle and created a compromise between capital and labour at the workplace. At the Makana Municipality, the dominance of the ANC and existence of the Alliance resulted in shared ANC/SACP membership between management and SAMWU members at the workplace. Municipal council members were found to comprise a considerable number of ANC members. Some of the managers in the municipality hold or have held memberships in SAMWU and IMATU like many workers at the municipality. The dominant ANC membership meant that management frequently dealt with workers and negotiated with worker representatives that shared political party membership with them.

Wellington and Winter (1971) argued that unions in the public service existed as an interest group with a “privileged position”. The study found that SAMWU had some “privilege” during negotiations. A SAMWU Eastern Cape provincial representative, Mr. Tali Bester, acknowledged that the presence of many ANC members in SALGA had been a positive aspect of bargaining at a provincial level. He noted that at times some SAMWU representatives were able to secretly “caucus” with some ANC members in SALGA (Interview: Mr. Bester). At the Makana Municipality, SAMWU and ANC representatives acknowledged that their relations were good and that sharing political membership contributed to “good” relations as it became “very easy

[for both these representatives] to find one another on almost all aspects” of workplace negotiations (Interview: Mr. Sape).

Figure 4 illustrates an overlap created between management and labour components of the employment relationship when political party membership is shared. The overlap is an area of shared membership and various industrial relations and political opportunities and challenges may be created for both municipal management and labour.

**Figure 4: A diagrammatic representation of management and labour components when ANC/SACP membership is shared**



This overlap creates a sphere for interaction between members with shared membership of political parties. It exists at the workplace but is not confined to the workplace as social relations are not fixed to one area. Kochan et al., (1994:13) emphasised that industrial relations processes and outcomes would be “determined by continuously evolving interaction of environmental pressures and organisational responses” along with the strategic choices and values of managers, union leaders, workers and public policy makers. One could argue that at Makana Municipality those affected by shared ANC/SACP membership may use opportunities to further their interests (political, work, organisational or social) by making “strategic choices” (Kochan et al., 1994). The decision of a two day pay deduction instead of eight days after a strike and the attendance of SAMWU meetings by municipal official Mr.

Monza are examples of such “strategic choices” facilitated by shared ANC/SACP membership. It was discovered that at times SAMWU “strategically” used strike action as leverage during bargaining “to influence SALGA politicians [in] their favour” (Interview: Mr. Mana). Strike action in the lead up to elections was considered as a strategic choice by SAMWU. During strikes some SAMWU representatives took opportunities to address political issues by addressing specific ANC politicians, for example, in 2001 when the Mpumalanga Province SAMWU branch wrote a letter to Father Smangaliso Mkhathshwa (Mail and Guardian, 2001).

Some representatives of local government management were given the status of “brothers and sisters” and “comrade” amongst SAMWU members (Interview: Mr. Patho). At a SAMWU general meeting at Makana Municipality, SAMWU members applauded two managers with ANC membership after they were identified by SAMWU representatives as “cooperating” with SAMWU during a wage dispute. This indicated that shared membership could improve the workers perspective of management. Also, their shared political party membership with some workers gave them legitimacy to implement unpopular decisions. The two managers were provided with an opportunity to gain the trust of workers through the efforts of SAMWU representatives. SAMWU representatives were presented with a similar opportunity to gain the trust of management by facilitating a positive portrayal of management to the SAMWU membership.

With regard to workplace negotiations, one could argue that the sphere of shared membership formed as a result of ANC dominance contributed to relatively “good” bargaining relations at the municipality. However, one cannot conclude that shared ANC membership of persons involved in bargaining as the only factor facilitating “good” relations. There were workers at the municipality that are neither members of the ANC nor SAMWU. Other factors such as a supportive management or good communication channels between workers and managers may have facilitated “good” relations at Makana Municipality. Nevertheless, based on the findings of this study, the dominance of the ANC made a mostly positive impact on local level bargaining. One may expect a different scenario if another political party were dominant at Makana Municipality.

Laffin (1989) identified a series of strategies available to municipal management and union. According to Laffin (1989), management and unions may choose incorporation or cooptation, collaboration, conciliation or confrontation strategies. What is clear from the findings is that both management and unions at Makana Municipality used conciliatory strategies. Management has the responsibility of balancing community, political party and worker interests. Management would choose this strategy in “recognition of the legitimate role of unions as partners in bargaining with an emphasis on trust” (Laffin, 1989:36). Unions would select this strategy in order to maintain “a balance between the extremes of collaboration and confrontation” (Laffin, 1989:62) with management. Laffin (1989) also observed that rules and institutions relative to other factors were important for guiding rule making at the level of the municipality.

With reference to the South African case, Mtolo (2004) suggested that the Alliance exerts influence on public sector employment relations. She argued that “one would be stupid in failing to speculate how the [employment] relationship is managed between Alliance members...the Alliance does play a role in facilitating an agreement” (Mtolo, 2004: 55). The research revealed that some municipal officials were members of the Alliance and were aware of the distinctions between their roles and the roles of councillors. When questioned on the role ANC membership had on the execution of decisions, Mr. Sape, a municipal official, said his shared ANC membership with other workers led him to be “sympathetic” towards workers at times. Nonetheless, his organisational role was more important at the workplace than his loyalty to the ANC. He recognised that even though at times he faced the challenge of making decisions that were contrary to his “conscience”, he ultimately could not “compromise” his “professional integrity” (Interview: Mr. Sape). Pursuing overtly political agendas would jeopardise the position of municipal officials. Mr. Sape recognised that the appropriate place for municipal officials to act politically was at political party meetings and not the workplace.

Industrial relations systems and political systems are not separate (Dunlop, 1958). Industrial relations systems and political systems overlap and the external factors in wider society affect the environmental factors that impinge directly on the actors of the industrial relations system (Dunlop, 1958). At Makana Municipality, ANC councillors recognised their political responsibilities to their constituents and the

community. Some ANC councillors interacted with SAMWU representatives at the workplace and beyond the workplace. Mr. Mandla distinguished that “labour will remain labour” despite any political affiliation and recognised that representing the broad interests of the community, of which labour was a part, were primary to political affiliation. As an ANC councillor, he identified his responsibility to a broader base (the community) rather than SAMWU (a political ally). However, Ms. Banda noted that ANC councillors sometimes lacked experience to manage their organisational duties at the municipality (Interview: Ms. Banda). She argued that they often ran the risk of acting politically within the municipality because of difficulties some councillors experienced in distinguishing between their industrial and political roles.

What is clear from the findings is that “unstructured” relationships do play a role in public sector industrial relations. The Alliance has especially had an effect on industrial relations at Makana Municipality. Considering the evidence above, as the Alliance persists, it can be expected that industrial relations at municipalities will be characterised by contradictions. Management and unions cannot be perceived as separate entities if the Alliance and loyalty to the Alliance continue.

### **7.3 Role of SAMWU representatives in the context of political affiliation**

A prominent feature of post-apartheid politics in South Africa has been the presence of the Tripartite Alliance. Since 1994, COSATU affiliates have supported the ANC at elections and the SACP as an Alliance partner. As a result, many affiliated union representatives wear “two hats” (union and political). SAMWU has been aligned to the Alliance via its affiliation to COSATU for many years. SAMWU has given organisational and human resource support to the ANC and other Alliance organisations since the Alliance was formalised. SAMWU has continually resolved to support the ANC at elections. A major implication of this is that SAMWU representatives have fulfilled their union roles while also fulfilling political roles. These SAMWU representatives have acted as unelected political representatives of the ANC and SACP via the Alliance when they have bolstered support for the ANC and SACP amongst SAMWU members. When a SAMWU member becomes a SAMWU representative, it is mandatory that s/he will be at some point be involved in campaigning for the ANC during election time before a SAMWU membership with

diverse political party membership. SAMWU representatives maintain a constant balance between union and political roles.

The literature on industrial relations generally concentrates on the workplace role of unions while the literature on public sector industrial relations accepts the political aspects of the role of public sector unions. Troy (1994:22) defined a public sector union as “a continuous association of salaried and wage employees organised to redistribute income from public employers to their employees through political and economic means; and to redistribute income from the private to the public economy”. Inevitably, these “political means” would vary depending on the characteristics of the political system. When observing the South African public sector industrial relations, Garson (2000:226) found that relationships between former SADTU officials in government and SADTU had increased member suspicions that the union was “cuddling up to government” and that “the closer its officials are to the corridors of power, the less interest they have in ordinary teachers’ working conditions”.

At Makana Municipality, SAMWU representatives were sometimes accused of being on the “side” of management because they encouraged SAMWU members to support the ANC and SACP yet bargained with the management which had many ANC/SACP representatives. They often had to reassure members that they were not on the “side” of management. Some SAMWU members at Makana Municipality criticised their leaders for sacrificing member benefits. According to Mr. Patho, SAMWU representatives attempted to convince SAMWU members that they were not conceding to the demands of management against member interests when they were met with criticisms (Interview: Mr. Patho).

Much therefore depends on the ability of SAMWU representatives to manage their “two hats”. Union membership interests vary and SAMWU members comprise persons with different political party preferences. Not all SAMWU members at Makana Municipality were members of the ANC or SACP. Whenever SAMWU representatives encouraged support for the ANC or SACP or the Tripartite Alliance, they faced the challenge of losing the trust of some members who were not members of these organisations. While Mr. Patho recognised this risk, he disclosed that SAMWU representatives continued to rally support for the ANC and the Alliance

because it was their “mandate” (Interview: Mr. Patho). Some SAMWU representatives may be said to have benefited from fulfilling their political mandate. During negotiations, SAMWU representatives who “spoke” the “same political language” (Interview: Mr. Litteley) with some managers with ANC membership could lobby at negotiations over municipal decisions. In exchange, ANC councillors seemed to rely on the support of SAMWU representatives at election time. At Makana, during election time in particular, representatives of the ANC, SACP and SAMWU representatives of these organisations visibly interacted with each other.

By and large, SAMWU representatives distinguished their roles as union representatives and ANC and SACP lobbyists. Keeping their union and political roles separate has been a challenge because in fulfilling their political roles they were exposed to criticisms from members. Nevertheless, political affiliation has facilitated strategic choices by SAMWU, for instance, the use of political affiliation to lobby at negotiations over industrial or workplace matters.

#### **7.4 SAMWU mobilisation against municipalities**

According to Buhlungu (2003), the South African labour movement faces a modified political economy. The labour movement “has had, consequently, to revise notions of ‘the enemy’ and ‘the oppressor’ and to modify its attitude to both the State and employers” (Buhlungu, 2003:186). Pre-1994, public sector unions confronted an authoritarian government (Posel, 2000). Post-1994, public sector unions confront a government that comprises many “former comrades” (SALB, 2003). This has especially created difficulties for public sector unions when they have confronted their employers on conditions of employment.

Pre-1994, SAMWU mobilised its union members around political and industrial matters. During this time, SAMWU formed bonds of solidarity (Buhlungu and Psoulis, 1999) with the ANC and SACP through the struggle. SAMWU often aided these organisations during campaigns and SAMWU gained their support in return. Municipality boundaries were poorly defined and local government structures were largely illegitimate. Post-1994, municipal boundaries became more distinguished and legitimate local government bargaining structures were put in place at national, provincial and local levels. Bargaining disputes by SAMWU at times highlighted

dissatisfaction amongst SAMWU members with the performance of some ANC members involved management. For instance, during a strike, a SAMWU branch in Mpumalanga Province alleged that workers were “feeling betrayed” by Father Smangaliso Mkhathshwa, a chair of SALGA and an ANC official because he was neglecting working class interests (Mail and Guardian, 2001).

The research found that SAMWU actively mobilised members around a number of industrial, social and economic matters that affect workers. SAMWU has a particularly strong position against privatisation and has actively sought alternatives and engaged government about the privatisation of state assets. The evidence showed that SAMWU had taken a strong position on privatisation despite the fact that the Alliance had not articulated a strong stance on privatisation.

At Makana Municipality, SAMWU was identified as more involved than IMATU. SAMWU would often publicly challenge management. SAMWU did this despite the dominant membership of the ANC in the area. With regard to mobilisation of members, Mr. Patho noted that “It’s easy to mobilise members ... when you speak about wages and conditions of service” (Interview: Mr. Patho).

### **7.5 Support for the Alliance**

Buhlungu and Psoulis (1999) found that participants of the liberation struggle shared common interests and developed strong bonds of solidarity through their activities. These factors have been used to explain the persistence of the Alliance. A 2004 survey of COSATU workers revealed that there had been a decline in support for the Alliance over the years, however, most workers believed that the Alliance should remain (Cherry, 2006:155). Generally speaking, most literature on the Alliance has noted the tensions within the Alliance and reflected high support for the Alliance amongst workers.

At Makana Municipality, many workers expressed their support for the Alliance despite differences between COSATU and the ANC that have been noted over the years (Buhlungu et al., 2006). Most of these workers were members of the Alliance. Some SALGA representatives with ANC/SACP membership supported the Alliance. These representatives supported the Alliance in their personal capacities. Some

SALGA representatives with ANC membership were able to draw on their ANC membership to “caucus” (Interview: Mr. Bester) with SAMWU representatives that had ANC membership. Mr. Monza stated that although he was a SALGA representative for Makana Municipality he was able to “understand” the Alliance relationship and appreciate its existence through his membership in the ANC.

While the Alliance had facilitated good employment relations at Makana, Mr. Mandla emphasised that SALGA representatives would not merely accept what SAMWU representatives proposed at negotiations simply because of the shared connection to the Alliance some representatives had (Interview: Mr. Mandla). Mr. Mandla stressed that SALGA representatives would consider all things as they represent the interests of workers and the broader community. For the most part, SALGA did not respond to SAMWU considerably differently because of the Alliance. However, political affiliation enabled some SALGA representatives to “caucus” with SAMWU.

Despite the generally high level of support for the Alliance not all workers were optimistic about the Alliance. Pillay (2006) notes that support for the Alliance had declined in 2004 compared to previous years. At Makana Municipality, Ms. Noluza argued that SAMWU had not benefited from the Alliance. She observed that the different directions taken by the organisations over the years had been a problem for the Alliance. Her pessimism “perhaps reflects the tensions around policy debates filtering down to shop-floor level, and the criticisms of the Alliance by COSATU leadership similarly being reflected in worker attitudes” (Cherry, 2006:155).

In conclusion, orthodox theories on Industrial Relations have depicted the players to the labour relationship as separate entities pursuing distinct but mutually dependent industrial interests. The research reveals that the Alliance and the shared ANC membership and political histories between management representatives and SAMWU representatives has resulted in the pursuing of distinct but mutually dependent industrial and political interests at the workplace. SAMWU has been able to use the Alliance relationship to mobilise workers behind the ANC as a party and as a lobbying tool when bargaining with SALGA. The Alliance has offered SAMWU opportunities to extend the benefits of political affiliation in political and industrial spheres (the industrial sphere being the most important). A benefit of drawing on political affiliation in the political arena has been that SAMWU has fulfilled its

mandate of strengthening the Alliance and Alliance objectives. However, a challenge is presented when one considers that the Alliance may not be a permanent feature. In the industrial sphere, new channels of reaching consensus have been created by the Alliance but a number of contradictions remain as employers and employees engage in the employment relationship within the context of an Alliance. Tensions and contradictions are likely to continue as long as the Alliance remains. Social, industrial and political relations are dynamic and SAMWU's challenge at the workplace will be to maintain a member-driven focus when dealing with matters.

### **7.6 Further research**

This research explored a range of topics around a principal research question. The findings of the research make a contribution to understanding micro-level public sector labour relations in South Africa post-apartheid. The state of these relations invariably has a bearing on service delivery. The breadth of a master's level dissertation cannot afford adequate time and resources to capture an inclusive investigation of the research topics and this level of research may not have captured all the details of the research area. Also, further investigations into contract labour, personal versus political issues and details of ANC/SACP branch meetings were not possible due to time constraints and changes in administration after the local government elections. Nonetheless, there are implications of this research in the area of public sector industrial relations. It has contributed to discussions on where to situate political affiliations and their effects in public sector employment relations. One would recommend that research further explore the perspectives and workplace experiences of municipal workers that do not belong Alliance organisations, the workplace experiences of political affiliation to the Alliance at municipalities without ANC dominance, workplace relations and political affiliations at district and metropolitan municipalities, power dynamics between unions, management and the Alliance and workplace relations when there is shared membership of a dominant non-political organisations. In addition, ways of analysing the dynamics of employment and political relations in a rapidly changing South African public sector can further be explored.

## APPENDIX I

### SAMWU MEMBERSHIP AT METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITIES AS AT JULY 2005

| <b>Eastern Cape Province</b>                        | <b>Membership</b> |
|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Amathole Branch</b>                              | 3 929             |
| <b>Chris Hani Branch</b>                            | 2 046             |
| <b>Nelson Mandela<br/>Metropolitan Municipality</b> | 3 637             |
| <b>O.R. Tambo Branch</b>                            | 1 582             |
| <b>Pinky Ntsangana Branch</b>                       | 1 981             |
| <b>Total</b>                                        | 13 175            |

| <b>Free State Province</b>  | <b>Membership</b> |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Lejweleputswa Branch</b> | 2 406             |
| <b>Mongwame Branch</b>      | 1 777             |
| <b>S.M. Pule Branch</b>     | 2 904             |
| <b>Thabo Mafutsanyana</b>   | 2 199             |
| <b>Total</b>                | 9 286             |

| <b>Gauteng Province</b>                 | <b>Membership</b> |
|-----------------------------------------|-------------------|
| <b>East Rand Extended<br/>Branch</b>    | 7 608             |
| <b>Greater Johannesburg<br/>Branch</b>  | 15 712            |
| <b>Greater Pretoria Branch</b>          | 6 226             |
| <b>Greater Vaal Extended<br/>Branch</b> | 4 310             |
| <b>West Rand Branch</b>                 | 1 580             |
| <b>Total</b>                            | 35 436            |

| <b>Mpumalanga Province</b>     | <b>Membership</b> |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Eastern Highveld Branch</b> | 1 126             |
| <b>Highveld Branch</b>         | 2 091             |
| <b>Highveld Ridge Branch</b>   | 1 776             |
| <b>Lowveld Branch</b>          | 1 691             |
| <b>Total</b>                   | 6 684             |

| <b>KwaZulu-Natal Province</b>         | <b>Membership</b> |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Durban Metropolitan<br/>Branch</b> | 7 923             |
| <b>Newcastle Branch</b>               | 1 612             |
| <b>North Coast Branch</b>             | 1 804             |
| <b>Pietermaritzburg Branch</b>        | 3 365             |
| <b>South Coast Branch</b>             | 1 923             |
| <b>Total</b>                          | 16 627            |

| <b>North West Province</b> | <b>Membership</b> |
|----------------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Mafikeng</b>            | 2 704             |
| <b>Northern Branch</b>     | 1 770             |
| <b>Southern Branch</b>     | 2 039             |
| <b>Total</b>               | 6 513             |

| <b>Northern Cape Province</b> | <b>Membership</b> |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|
| <b>De-Carna Branch</b>        | 742               |
| <b>Kim-Kuru Branch</b>        | 1 977             |
| <b>Up-Nama Branch</b>         | 1 310             |
| <b>Total</b>                  | 4 029             |

| <b>Northern Province</b> | <b>Membership</b> |
|--------------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Far North Branch</b>  | 1 237             |
| <b>Northern Branch</b>   | 2 769             |
| <b>Southern Branch</b>   | 1 671             |
| <b>Total</b>             | 5 677             |

| <b>Western Cape Province</b>     | <b>Membership</b> |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Boland</b>                    | 3 965             |
| <b>Cape Metropolitan Branch</b>  | 11 027            |
| <b>Garden Route-Karoo Branch</b> | 2 607             |
| <b>North West Branch</b>         | 1 606             |
| <b>Total</b>                     | 19 205            |

**Grand total: 116 632**

Source: SAMWU research office

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## INTERVIEWS

Mr. Dally Monza – SALGA representative at Makana Municipality and municipal official. March 2005.  
 Mr. Sam Patho – SAMWU Eastern Cape Provincial representative. March, July 2005.  
 Mr. Ben Mandla – ANC councillor, member of Corporate Services Portfolio Committee and SALGA representative at Makana Municipality. February 2005.

- Mr. Tom Litteley – DA councillor and member of the LLF at Makana Municipality. March 2005.
- Mr Jim Marks – IMATU shop steward and member of LLF at Makana Municipality. April 2005.
- Mr. Gordon Sithole – SAMWU shop steward and member of LLF at Makana Municipality. March, July 2005.
- Mr. Tiza Sape – SALGA representative and municipal official at Makana Municipality. March 2005.
- Mr. Bob Matutu – ANC councillor and member of Community Development Portfolio Committee at Makana Municipality. May 2005.
- Ms. Nancy Noluza – SAMWU member at Makana Municipality. March 2005.
- Mr. Joseph Mantu – SAMWU member at Makana Municipality. March 2005.
- Mr. Dave Stewart – IMATU shop steward at Makana Municipality. April 2005.
- Mr. Danny Farmer – SAMWU national representative and member of the SALGBC. July 2005.
- Mr. Themba Mana – SALGA Eastern Cape Provincial representative. July 2005.
- Mr. Tali Bester – SAMWU Eastern Cape Provincial representative. July 2005.
- Ms. Barbara Hash – SAMWU member at Makana Municipality. March 2005.
- SAMWU and IMATU members at Makana Municipality. July 2005.
- Mr. Wally Gray – ANC and SACP Cacadu district representative. July 2007.
- Ms. Betty Banda – former ANC councillor. August 2007.
- Mr. Ndamase – SAMWU Makana Municipality branch chairperson. August 2007.
- Ms. Zono – SAMWU Makana Municipality branch deputy chairperson. August 2007.
- Mr. Kate – SAMWU Makana Municipality branch secretary. August 2007.
- Mr. Moneli – SAMWU Makana Municipality branch shop steward. August 2007.
- Mr. Sizane – SAMWU Makana Municipality branch shop steward. August 2007.
- Mr. Vayo – SAMWU Makana Municipality branch shop steward. August 2007.