Contemporary Left Politics in South Africa: The Case of the Tri-partite Alliance in the Eastern Cape

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SIV HELEN HESJEDAL

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Abstract

This thesis aims to make sense of Left politics in South Africa within the Tri-partite Alliance between the ANC, SACP and COSATU. The thesis focuses on developments in the Eastern Cape, between 2000 and 2008. The thesis describes the prevalent forms of Left politics in the Eastern Cape and the tendencies in the Alliance that organise this Left. The thesis also examines the historical, social and political conditions and that shape the form and content of Left politics in the province.

Based on a survey of literature on what is considered the core manifestations of Left politics globally in the 20th Century Left politics is defined as the elements of the political spectrum that are concerned with the progressive resolution of involuntary disadvantage and with a goal of abolishing class society and capitalism. Although the Alliance as a whole should be seen to be on the Left on an international political spectrum, this thesis argues that the Left/Right dichotomy is useful for understanding the politics of the Alliance, as long as the second part of this definition is taken into consideration.

The Alliance Left is understood as those leaders and activists within the Alliance that have the SACP and Cosatu as their operating base. It will be argued that this Left is, in its practice, largely concerned with what insiders refer to as politics of 'influence', rather than with politics of 'structural transformation'. It is the ANC that is the leader of the Alliance and the party in government and thus it is on the terrain of ANC strategy, policy and positions that contestation in the Alliance plays itself out. Thus, for the Left, there is strength in the idea of the Alliance. However, there are significant theoretical and political weaknesses in the Left that undermine the possibility of making good use of various corporatist platforms to pursue the agenda of the Left in the Eastern Cape. There is also increased contestation within the Alliance Left itself about the continued usefulness of this strategy.

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List of Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
ANCYL	African National Congress Youth League
BC	Black Consciousness
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
CC	Central Committee
CEC	Central Executive Committee
CPSA	Communist Party of South Africa
Cosatu	Congress of South African Trade Unions
COPE	Congress of the People
CST	Colonialism of a Special Type
DA	Democratic Alliance
EC	Eastern Cape
ECDC	Eastern Cape Development Corporation
ECSECC	Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council
FNLA	National Liberation Front of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola)
FOSATU	Federation of South African Trade Unions
FRELIMO	The Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique)
GEAR	Growth Employment and Redistribution Programme
GNU	Government of National Unity
ICU	Industrial and Commercial Workers Union
IFP	Inkhata Freedom Party
IDASA	Institute for Democracy in Southern Africa
IDZ	Industrial Development Zone
ISL	International Socialist League
LRAD	Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development

MK	uMkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation)
MIDP	Motor Industry Development Programme
MPL	Member of Provincial Legislature
NALEDI	National Labour and Economic Development Institute
NEC	National Executive Committee
NEDLAC	National Economic Development and Labour Council
NDR	National Democratic Revolution
NUMSA	National Union of Metal Workers South Africa
NGC	National General Council
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NWC	National Working Committee
PEC	Provincial Executive Committee
PGC	Provincial General Council
PGDP	Provincial Growth and Development Plan
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SAAWU	South African Allied Workers Union
SADTU	South African Democratic Teachers Union
SANNC	South African Native National Congress
SACP	South African Communist Party
SACTU	South African Congress of Trade Unions
UDF	United Democratic Front
UNITA	Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola)
YCL	Young Communist League
WSF	World Social Forum

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background and context to the study

The African National Congress (ANC), which is a multi-class nationalist party, was founded in 1912. It was then known as the South African Native National Congress (SANNC). The ANC became the leading organisation in the national liberation movement in South Africa from the 1950s and was predominantly concerned with anti-racial and anti-Apartheid struggle (Callinicos, 1988, Fine and Davies, 1990, Gumede, 2005, Lodge, 1983). However, from 1969 the ANC adopted a more class based analysis and couched its struggle against the Apartheid regime as a National Democratic Revolution (ANC, 1969).

Apartheid ended in 1994 when the ANC won the first democratic elections. The ANC has been governing South Africa since. Formally, it is the ANC that contests elections, but in an alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). This Tri-partite Alliance[1] between the ANC, SACP and COSATU became formalised in the late 1980s and strengthened as the three organisations took part in negotiations with the Apartheid regime. The origins, evolution and the nature of the alliance between these three organisations will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. This is not a formal electoral alliance, but is rather considered a strategic alliance, with the recognition that the three organisations play different roles. For this introduction it is important to note that the Tri-partite Alliance is a multi-class alliance, whose ideological foundations are in the characterisation of South Africa as a 'colony of a special type', as well as in the liberation struggle waged as a National Democratic Revolution (NDR). This definition of the liberation struggle was adopted by the SACP in 1929, the ANC in 1969 and COSATU much later in 1987. Moreover, the Freedom Charter, adopted in 1955 and forming the basis for the original Congress Alliance[2], provides the ideological and mobilisation glue that holds the Alliance together. There is a great deal of overlapping membership between the three organisations, both among the rank and file, and leadership, at local, regional, provincial and national level.

[1] Formally, South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO), the Youth and Women's leagues of the ANC, as well as the youth wing of the SACP, the Young Communist League (YCL), are also members of the Alliance. However in this thesis the concern is with the three 'core' members of the Alliance, the ANC, SACP and Cosatu.

[2] The Congress Alliance was initially formed between the ANC, the South African Indian Congress, the South African Coloured Organisation, the (white) Congress of Democrats and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in 1953, as discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

Although founded on nationalist principles, the ANC is not a homogenous organisation and has, since its establishment in 1912, harboured a range of political traditions. The ANC is often referred to as a 'broad church', harbouring liberals, Christian democrats, communists, socialists, social democrats, African nationalists and Africanists (Saul, 2005, Gumede, 2005). The ANC is explicitly a multi-class party that does not officially adhere to a vision of socialism, although many of its members do. Gumede (2005) refers to a 'battle for the soul of the ANC', by which he means that, since its foundation, there has been contestation for the ideological and political direction of the ANC. This will be examined in detail in Chapter 4. Up until the late 1980s, this contestation was largely political, around strategy, tactics and mobilisation (Ibid, 2005). From the early 1990s, as the ANC was preparing to govern South Africa, economic policy was the centre of this contestation for the 'soul of the ANC' (Saul, 2005, Gumede, 2005). There is no formal pact or programme that binds the three organizations formally in an alliance. However, with the ANC being the leader of the Alliance, its political programme, 'Strategy and Tactics', is a major battle ground for political direction of the Alliance. Thus when in this thesis there is talk of contestation within the Alliance, it is largely contestation over ANC (and thus government) policy.

Saul (2005) writes that the ANC has since its establishment in 1912 itself been a 'site of class struggle', with petty bourgeois elements[3] and a membership largely made up of the working class and peasants. This struggle plays itself out as a struggle between 'moderates' and 'centrists' on the one hand and 'radicals', mainly from the SACP, and later COSATU, on the other. He argues that the ANC's historical reluctance to present itself as an organisation focusing on a class project and its post 1994 presentation as a government of all the people, demonstrates the dominance of the moderates (2001). This thesis is concerned with this struggle between the 'moderates' and 'radicals' within the ANC and the Alliance, and more especially the politics of the radical, or what is termed the Left faction within the Alliance after 1994.

Traditionally, anti-colonial and national liberation movements such as the ANC were placed on the Left, and were seen as part of a broad international Left movement (Bobbio, 1996). The ANC is currently a member of the Socialist International, an international organisation of

[3] Few professions were open to Black people before 1994. However, some professions such as teaching, medicine, law and priesthood was open to some black people, and these formed a layer of leadership within the ANC as discussed in Chapter 4.

170 social democratic, socialist and labour parties world-wide[4]. The ANC thus places itself on the Left internationally. In order to speak meaningfully of Left and Right within the Alliance, there is a need in this thesis for a stipulative definition. Taking the origins and history of a wide variety of international experiences into account, the Left is for the purpose of this thesis defined as the elements of the political spectrum that are concerned with the progressive resolution of involuntary disadvantage, and with a goal of abolishing class society and capitalism. The Right will be its opposite; reactionary and conservative. Chapter 2 is devoted to a discussion of Left politics internationally and will elaborate further on the definition of Left politics. It should also be noted that the Left and the Right are separated by the moderate Centre, and that there are multiple positions on both the Right and the Left.

Contestation between Right and Left *within* or *over* the Alliance has become more marked in the post-Apartheid era. The precise content of Left and Right wing groupings *within* organisations emerge and evolve in relation and response to one another and need to be understood and defined at a given point in time. It will be argued that if the above definition is accepted, the main axis for the Left/Right distinction occurs within the ANC and the Alliance itself. This thesis is concerned with identifying the politics on the Left side of the axis in the post-Apartheid period.

1.2 Changing policy trajectory and inter-Alliance contestation

A brief overview of the policy trajectory since 1994 reveals that the ANC government has gone through a series of policy changes; from the ANC's 1994 electoral platform, the Keynesian Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), to the 1996 Growth Employment and Redistribution programme (GEAR) framework "espousing many of the principles of a free market economy" (Dwyer, 2002:125). This trajectory is by no means a Leftwards trajectory, and represents a break with what many expected from the ANC government (see for example, Bond, 2000, Marais, 2001 and Saul 2005). Sharp critique of the policies of the South African government and the ANC leadership in government has also come from the SACP, COSATU and elements within the ANC. From 2004, government policy discourse shifted in favour of more state intervention and what has been called a

[4] See http://socialistinternational.org/viewArticle.cfm?ArticleID=31.

'developmental state'.[5] Although the notion of a developmental state has not been rejected by the Left, its meaning has been contested, with the SACP and Cosatu calling for a 'democratic developmental state (Cosatu, 2005, Vavi, 2006, SACP, 2008)

The Alliance Left's analysis of this trajectory is what the SACP in May 2006 termed the '1996 class project', characterised by the "restoration of the conditions for capitalist profit accumulation on a new and supposedly more sustainable basis" (SACP, 2006a:22). This is opposed to "a revolutionary/systemic transformation of society that begins to resolve the inherent contradictions in favour of the working class and its popular allies" that the SACP envisaged (Ibid, 2006). In addition to economic policy, other issues of contestation within the Alliance have been the response to HIV and AIDS, Zimbabwe and the slow pace of land reform. In the area of politics there has been great discontent over poor relations between Alliance partners, and the view that policy making in the ANC has increasingly become the forte of leadership and technocrats in government only, with a very limited role for 'grassroots' members of the ANC (Gumede, 2005, COSATU, 2007d, SACP, 2008). The Alliance continues to be heterogeneous with ANC policy at the centre of contestation.

In addition to policy, contestation within the Alliance has since 2005 been tied to the leadership race between former president of the ANC and the Republic, Thabo Mbeki, and his former deputy president, Jacob Zuma. With popular support mobilised by the SACP, COSATU and the ANC Youth League, Zuma was elected president of the ANC in December 2007. The notions of Left and Right have been used by the media and political commentators, to describe and place the politics of these two rival groups, particularly as the SACP and COSATU supported Zuma (See Mail and Guardian 22 June 2007, 27 January 2008, Pillay, 2008, Bassett and Clarke, 2008). However, the camps supporting Mbeki and Zuma cannot so easily and neatly be termed Left and Right. Mbeki's era was one of liberal social democracy and he terms himself a 'centrist'. Within Mbeki's government and ANC leadership, there were communists, unionists as well as Africanists and capitalists (Gumede, 2005:124). Although endorsed by COSATU and the SACP, the ANC leadership under Zuma also harbours all these groups that make up the 'broad church' that is the ANC: communists, unionists, nationalists and capitalists (ANC, 2008a).

[5] The concept of a 'developmental state' includes a greater role for the state, rejection of the 'Washington Consensus', increased government investment in infrastructure and less emphasis on privatisation, yet with a neo-liberal macroeconomic policy framework in place (see e.g. Cosatu, 2005, Edigheji, 2005 and 2008, Freund, 2006, Gelb, 2006, Mkandawire, 2006 and, Fine 2008).

For many on the Alliance Left, the 52nd National Conference of the ANC in December 2007 was a 'watershed', with the election of a supposedly more Left-friendly leadership and the possibility of opening up debate about a different economic and social policy regime in South Africa. Secretary General of COSATU, Zwelinzima Vavi, has argued that the Conference saw the adoption of Left-leaning pro-poor positions, although he further argues that it would be an exaggeration to say that the conference represents a radical policy shift in all respects (Vavi, 2008). Messages from the ANC have not been uniform after the Conference, and ANC President Zuma on some platforms promises national and international capital that there will be no change in economic policy under his tenure as ANC president. On other platforms he talks of policy change and an end to poverty and joblessness (Bond, 2007a and 2007b, Isaacson, 2008, Zuma 2008a, 2008b).

ANC General Secretary Gwede Mantashe argues that the policy regime after the 2007 Conference is one of "continuity and change" (2008a, 2008b). In other words building on what works and changing what is not working. Other areas include the placing of greater emphasis, on areas like education, health and rural development, and more vigorous work in order to create jobs (Mantashe: 2008a, Mantashe 2008b, ANC, 2008b). Mantashe, however, has disputed the notion that the ANC leadership elected in Polokwane is 'a bunch of Leftists' (Mantashe, 2008a).

In a controversial move, Thabo Mbeki was recalled from his position of President of South Africa in June 2008. Several cabinet ministers resigned and a group of people 'disillusioned with the changes in the ANC' formed the breakaway political party, Congress of the People (COPE) (Burbridge, 2008, Rossouw, 2008, Lekota, 2008, Shilowa, 2009) that contested the 2009 national and provincial elections[6].

It is contended that the diversity and the contestation within this Alliance, and the complex relationship between the ANC as a party in government and its strategic allies, warrants a study of Alliance politics, and moreover the politics of the Left faction or group in the Alliance. This thesis also sets out to test whether the Left-Right dichotomy is useful for understanding Alliance politics.

[6] COPE gained 7.43% of votes nationally, and 13.31% of the votes in the Eastern Cape in the 22 April 2009 national and provincial elections.

1.3 Studying the Eastern Cape

This thesis concentrates on the Province of the Eastern Cape. The history and the changes in the Alliance and its politics in South Africa have been studied extensively over the years, either on their own, in relation to the broader liberation movement or through biographies of some of its leaders (see Lodge, 1983, Meli, 1988, Lodge and Nasson, 1991, Drew, 1996 and 1997, McKinley, 1997 and Gumede, 2005). However, political organisations and the liberation movement in the Eastern Cape have not been studied in particular detail and there is very limited academic analysis of contemporary politics in the Eastern Cape.

The Eastern Cape is one of South Africa's nine provinces, made up of what was previously the Transkei and Ciskei 'Bantustans' and part of the all white Cape province. See Appendix One for a map of the province. Historically, the Eastern Cape was one of the first areas to experience contact with modern politics and was the terrain of the first colonial wars between the amaXhosa people and the British[7]. The Eastern Cape covers about 13.9% of South Africa's total land mass and has 6.9 million people (ECSECC, 2007). The Eastern Cape has 13.5% of the total population of South Africa, making it the third largest province after Gauteng (21.5%) and KwaZulu-Natal (20.8%) (StatsSA, 2008a). The Eastern Cape is one of the country's poorest provinces, with the majority living in poverty. This number is increasing, with 61.9% of the population reported to live in poverty in 2007, up from 54.3% in 1996. Unemployment is rife, with 53.3% of the population being without work in 2007, up from 48.4% in 1996 using the expanded definition (ECSECC, 2009:16). Apart from the automotive industry in Buffalo City and the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality there is no major industry in the province. The public sector is the major employer, employing 32.2% of those employed, with 15.9% being employed in manufacturing and 14.9% in trade (ECSECC, 2006).

Politically, the Eastern Cape has been dominated by the ANC and the Tri-partite Alliance as the election results in Table 2 below demonstrate. The Eastern Cape has a long history of activism. One of the first Black political organisations, and forerunner to the ANC, the South African Native Congress, was formed in the Eastern Cape town of East London on 1902 (Meli, 1988). The first independent African newspaper, Imvo Zabantsundu (African Opinion), was started in King William's Town in 1884 (Ibid, 1988). After initial organisation

[7] For more on the early history of the Eastern Cape as well as on early resistance and popular movements in the Eastern Cape, see Beinart, 1982, Beinart and Bundy, 1986, Peires, 2003.

of workers in the major cities of Cape Town and Johannesburg, organisation and unionisation of Black workers took root in East London and Port Elizabeth (Lodge, 1983). The 1950s defiance campaign was more successful and ran for longer in Eastern Cape towns than any part of the country (Karis and Carter, 1972, Lodge, 1983, Legassick, 2007). The Pondoland uprising in the north-east of the province in 1960 succeeded in resisting the Bantu Authorities System in the area (Mbeki, 1963).

The Eastern Cape was also a hot-bed of activism in the 1980s, with the first independent community union, South African Allied Workers Union emerging in East London in 1979 (Maree, 1987c). One of the key tactics of community mobilisation in the 1980s, the street committee, was pioneered in the Karoo area (Seekings, 2000). Also in the 1980s, school and shop boycott campaigns were initiated and ran for longer in the Eastern Cape than in the rest of the country (Seekings, 2000, Lodge and Nasson, 1991). The success of the defiance campaign in the 1950s and later school- and shop boycott campaigns, in the Port Elizabeth and surrounding area, is attributed to strong ANC, SACP and trade union relations in those areas (Lodge, 1983). Chapter 4 will discuss these events in more detail.

Within the ANC, the Eastern Cape is also important due to its size. The Eastern Cape is the largest voting block in the ANC, growing steadily from 13.11% of the voting delegates at the 1997 Conference, to 19.28% in 2002 and 22.23% in 2007 (IDASA, 2007:8) as illustrated by Table 1 below. This significance of the Eastern Cape as a block in the ANC creates great national interest in the province, and this, at times, fuels local factional politics, particularly in local government[8].

[8] Exemplified by the battles over who should become the mayor in many local municipalities, such as Buffalo City (East London), Mnquma (Butterworth), Nkonkobe (Alice) and Nyandeni (Libode), after the 2006 local government elections (Maqina et. al., 2006).

Table 1: Voting delegates in ANC National Conferences			
PROVINCE	% of delegates		
	Mafikeng 1997	**Stellenbosch 2002**	**Polokwane 2007**
Eastern Cape	13.1	19.3	22.2
Free State	7.7	7.2	8.9
Gauteng	12.5	11.4	8.7
KwaZulu Natal	13.7	11.6	14.9
Limpopo	14.4	9.5	9.8
Mpumalanga	8.4	10.5	8.0
North West	7.8	9.0	6.9
Northern Cape	3.5	5.3	5.4
Western Cape	6.6	6.5	5.4
Other Delegations	12.2	9.9	9.8
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
Source: Adapted from IDASA, 2007:8			

The ANC has won all the national, provincial and local elections in the Eastern Cape since 1994. Electoral support for the ANC the province remains consistently above the national support for the ANC, with the second highest support for the ANC in national elections 1994 and the 5th highest support in national and provincial elections 1999 and 2004 as illustrated by Table 2 below. In 2009 the support declined due to the emergence of COPE. In both the 2000 and 2006 local government elections the Eastern Cape was ranked number 2 in terms of support for the ANC.

Table 2: ANC Votes per province in national, provincial and local elections						
PROVINCE*	**% of votes**					
	National and provincial elections				**Local government elections**	
	1994	**1999**	**2004**	**2009**	**2000**	**2006**
Eastern Cape	84.39	73.91	79.31	69.70	72.3	81.74
Free State	77.42	81.03	82.05	71.90	70.4	76.66
Gauteng	59.07	68.16	68.74	64.76	58.7	62.47
KwaZulu Natal	31.61	39.77	47.47	63.97	33	46.59
Limpopo	92.73	89.3	89.72	85.27	78.6	83.99
Mpumalanga	81.88	85.26	86.34	85.81	77	80.64
North West	83.46	80.53	81.83	73.84	69.3	76.57
Northern Cape	49.81	64.4	68.75	61.10	62.4	69.95
Western Cape	33.60	42.62	46.28	32.86	39.7	40.24
NATIONAL	62.65	66.35	69.69	65.90		
Source: Data from the Independent Electoral Commission for the 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 national and provincial elections, www.elections.gov.za. Own calculations for 1994. Data from the Electoral Institute for Southern Africa for the 2000 and 2006 local government elections, www.eisa.org.za.						
*Some of the provinces changed names after 1994. Eastern Transvaal became Mpumalanga, Northern Transvaal became Northern Province and later Limpopo, Orange Free State became Free State, Pretoria-						

Witwatersrand-Vereeniging became Gauteng. See map in Appendix 1.

For these reasons of history and of size as a voting bloc, a study which takes the Eastern Cape as its case is useful not only in its own right, but also in shedding light on ANC and Alliance politics in South Africa as a whole.

1.4 Objectives of the study

The study seeks to identify, document and make sense of post 1994 Left politics in South Africa within the dominant political formation in South Africa, the Tri-partite Alliance between the ANC, SACP and COSATU. The thesis will focus on the period between 2000 and 2008. The study takes as its case the Eastern Cape Province, traditionally the heartland and the largest voting bloc in the ANC. There are two main questions which are explored in this research. Firstly, how useful are the notions of Left and Right for understanding the politics of the tri-partite alliance and its constituent members in South Africa and Eastern Cape? Secondly, what is the particular brand of Left politics being espoused by the Left in the Alliance, fourteen years after the end of Apartheid and attainment of formal political freedom?

More specifically, this research is concerned with the following objectives:

a. Identifying the dominant expressions of Left politics in the Eastern Cape Province and the organisations centrally involved in the mobilisation and organisation of activities in the province.
b. Examining the social forces that shaped the particular form of Left politics in the Alliance Left post 1994.
c. Identifying the demands and the interpretation of the issues that define Left politics in the province.
d. Examining the outcomes of Left politics.

1.5 Approach to the study

This is a sociological study rooted in historical and political sociology. As historical, the study is concerned with the sociology of the process (Abrams, 1982). This study is concerned with how ideas, paradigms, ideologies and political practice come to be, how they change over time and how they continue to evolve in constant dialogue with immediate and material conditions, local political concerns and local, national and international events. As political, the study is concerned with struggles for power and hegemony, relationships between economic factors and political life and the determinants of political behaviour and practice (Bottomore, 1993). The thesis will examine what Bottomore defined as one of the two main categories of political actors: "organized political formations" (1993:41)[9].

This study is approached from three angles; theory, history and fieldwork. Through the study of theory and history social structures and collective agents in the Eastern Cape and South Africa's history are identified. The study places itself within social theory and what social theory over the past two centuries has concerned itself with, namely the three main dimensions of social power: economic relations, ideology and patterns of political domination (Callinicos, 1999). Secondly, it is concerned with history, as the present can only fully understood in the light of the past (Carr, 1991). Left politics in the Eastern Cape today should be understood in the light of the history of Left politics in the Eastern Cape, South Africa and the world. The fieldwork looks at the present and aims to identify and understand the central tenets of contemporary Left politics through a dialogue with activists and leaders of the Left in the Eastern Cape today. It is important to note that the three approaches are not treated as separate, but rather interact with each other throughout the study. The study involves the constant process of triangulation; between theory, secondary data and the various sources of primary data.

[9] Organised political formations refer, in the main, to political parties. For Bottomore, the other category is "social movements". Bottomore defines the social movement as "a collective endeavour to promote or resist change in the society in which it forms part" (1993:41) emphasising the somewhat less organised characters of social movements.

1.6 Structure of the thesis

This thesis has eight chapters. This first chapter introduces the research problem and the context in which the research question has been conceived. Chapter 2 explores the dominant manifestations of Left politics internationally in the twentieth century and defines Left politics more precisely. Chapter 3 provides the methodological framework for the study and outlines what data was collected, why, from where and how it was collected and analysed.

Chapter 4 is an overview of Liberation politics in South Africa, most notably the politics of the Congress Alliance and the birth and evolution of the three organisations under study. In a sense, Chapters 2 and 4 serve as an exploration of the existing body of work on the Left and Left Politics. Chapter 5 discusses Left political practice in the Eastern Cape between 1994 and 2008, as well as the structures, leadership and membership of the three organisations under study. Chapters 6 and 7 present the analysis of the two sources of primary data used in this thesis; interviews with leaders and activists in the Alliance in the Eastern Cape and primary documents collected from the three Alliance organisations nationally and in the Eastern Cape. Chapter 6 explores the content of Left politics in the Eastern Cape and discusses the Alliance Left's theories of class and race and how these inform political practice. Chapter 7 examines what the Alliance leaders interviewed view as the strengths and weaknesses of the Left in the Eastern Cape.

Chapter 8 is the conclusion. Here the strands of what has been uncovered about contemporary Left politics in the Eastern Cape are drawn together. The focus then returns to the objectives of the research as set out in section 1.4 above. The theoretical implications of the findings and whether the Left/Right dichotomy is indeed useful for understanding and analysing the politics of the ANC Alliance will be discussed.

Chapter 2: International Left Politics in the 20th Century

2.1. Introduction

The Left, in social and political theory, broadly refers to the segments of the political spectrum associated with social democracy, socialism or communism. To the right on the spectrum one would place ideologies from conservatism, to fascism on the far right. Left and Right developed as political terms to represent polarisation and conflict in the political world (Lukes, 1990). Left is usually understood in opposition to Right. However, the terms Left and Right need not necessarily refer to distinct political entities or standpoints, but may also differentiate positions within movements and organisations and are what Thompson terms "a crude measuring instrument for mapping the spectrum of modern politics" (1997:3).

The Left/Right spectrum illustrates that political ideologies exist on a continuum. Bobbio (1996) refers to the Left/Right polarisation as a dyad, by which he means that the distinction covers the entire political universe and everything in politics must be either Left or Right. He stresses, however, that in spatial terms, the Left-Right dyad is represented as a half circle, and not two sides of a coin. It is not a simple dichotomy. Left and Right are separated by the political Centre. Further, Left and Right is not a set of fixed ideas, but an axis that shifts between generations and context. The antithesis between Left and Right is restricted to the political sphere and the respective force of the two terms is not established once and for all. Rather it depends on the period and the circumstances (see Anderson, 1994, Bobbio, 1996, Thompson, 1997).

The origin of the terminology of Right and Left to denote political identity is the French Revolution, where the most politically radical deputies, in the sense of favouring popular democracy and greater egalitarianism, sat on the left side of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Convention. The more cautious, traditionalist and property conscious took their seat to the right. Thus the name given to this political dichotomy was a chance spatial metaphor (Bobbio, 1996, Thompson, 1997). The importance of this dichotomy and the political polarity it represents, however, has persisted since the eighteenth century. Left politics are closely allied to the ideas of historical and social progress. The Left's distinctive feature in the landscape of modernity is its identification with social improvement and

regulation of economic structures in the interest of the masses (Carr, 1991, Thompson, 1997). The Left as a political category, Anderson argues, is a tradition from the Enlightenment, whose nucleus is to reduce what he terms "successive kinds of inequalities weighing on the less advantaged" (1994:17).

The meaning of the notion of the Left, writes Thompson (1997), can best be understood historically rather than by definition. In this thesis the concern is primarily with the Left side of the political spectrum and the study will examine the main manifestations of Left politics internationally in the 20th century; socialism and communism, social democracy, anti-colonial and national liberation struggles[10], and some of the political developments that have taken place since the end of the Cold War. Based on an analysis of ideas and political practice this chapter will conclude with a definition of Left politics.

2.2. Marxism, Socialism and Communism

While recognising that Left politics is not limited to Marxism, this discussion focuses on Marxist theory, emphasising class and social change. The major traditions that came to dominate Left politics in the twentieth century, were decided between 1914 and 1918, by World War I and the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia. Communism in the Soviet Union is briefly discussed here.

2.2.1. Marxism, Class and Social Change

The term Socialism has its origins in the 1830s, when the followers of the Utopian Socialists, Owen in Britain and Saint Simon in France, referred to a range of reformist and revolutionary ideas (Tucker, 1978). Later, however the term became associated with Marx and Engels' Scientific Socialism. Socialism became a science, wrote Engels, with "the two great

[10] With respect to social democracy, Hall points out that it is important "to remember that social democracy is not a homogeneous political entity but a complex political formation" (1979:16). Likewise Leggett (2007) warns that social democracy is not monolithic or unchanging, and one should be wary of easy descriptions of an ideal type of social democracy. The same could be said for the other positions on the Left spectrum examined here, let alone the many interpretations and accounts that exist of the experiences that are described in this chapter. Leggett further writes that the use of ideal-type devices per se is contested and certainly has limitations. However, due to limited space, some degree of generalisation is necessary.

discoveries of the materialistic conception of history and the revelation of the secret of capitalistic production through surplus-value" (Engels, 1978:700).

Marx's method is also referred to as historical materialism and is closely associated with social progress. Marx demonstrated how the existence of social classes is bound up with the historical phases in the development of the productive forces. Each historical phase is marked by a particular mode of production, distinguished by the particular social relations they involve. Every mode of production is associated with a certain mode of cooperation and this mode is in itself a productive force. In turn each social class is determined by its relations to the means of production, and struggle between classes is the driver of social and historical change (Marx, 1978). Each mode of production experiences two phases, one in which the relations of production stimulate the development of the forces of production and the second, in which the relations of production become fetters to further the development of the productive forces (Ibid, 1978).

It is here that class struggle assumes its importance, arising from the tensions in society between exploiters and the exploited. This struggle is a 'now hidden, now open' fight and becomes more intense when a systemic crisis of the mode of production occurs and ushers in an epoch of social revolution (Marx and Engels 1985, Callinicos, 1999). Thus class struggle is the motor of progress; the replacement of one mode of production with another. For Marx, the proletarian revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism as a stage of transition to communism was inevitable. This theory has not gone unchallenged, also by people on the Left, as will be discussed in sections below.

Capitalist relations of production constitute two main social groups or classes. There is the bourgeoisie, or the capitalists: the people who own and control the various means of production. The other major class is the proletariat, the working class. This group has no meaningful access to the ownership of the means of production and thus sell their labour power to the bourgeoisie. These two elementary social groups make up the relations of production under capitalism and form complex social structures – classes and class relationships. However, in its attempts to understand ever changing capitalism Marxist theory has developed considerably since the time of Marx and Engels.

Carchedi's work allows us to understand the reproduction of classes within capitalist production relations. Carchedi (1975:362) argues that capitalist production relations bind together three elements; two types of agents of production relations and the means of production. These relations should be viewed from three different points of view; ownership (owners, non-owners and the means of production themselves), expropriation of labour (the expropriated, the expropriators and the means of production) and the function performed. Under monopoly capitalism the social content of the function of an agent is given by the fact that an agent either performs the function of the collective worker (a labourer) or the global function of capital (a non-labourer) (Ibid, 1975:364). There are also agents that perform both functions, or occupy more than one position, and he demonstrates the presence of multiple classes or the ambiguous location of classes where the performance of functions and positions are mixed. The social content of a position rests either on the real ownership of the means of production or not, the expropriation of value or not and the performance of either the function of labour or of capital (Ibid, 1975:368). Carchedi demonstrates that the reproduction of social classes is governed by positions and agents of production. Identification of classes, he writes (Ibid, 1975:373), must always take place in terms of these three elements; ownership, expropriation of labour and the function performed.

Marxist theory of class also gives an account of the means through which change is achieved – class struggle. Moreover, historical materialism specifies the structural capacities possessed by agents by virtue of their position in relations of production, their class position. It is a theory in which agency plays a pivotal role. Agency in this conception stems from the antagonistic relationship between classes, and thus the power of classes is manifest in the relationship to the means of production (Callinicos, 2004, Anderson, 1984, Giddens, 1979). This is what Anderson (1984) calls an unprecedented form of agency – the collective pursuit of societal transformation.

For Thompson (1968) class is not a structure or a category, but a historical phenomenon, something that happens or can be shown to have happened. However, as much as class exists structurally (or scientifically), to have effect it also needs to be a product of consciousness – class happens when "some men (sic), as a result of common experiences feel and articulate the identity of their interest as between themselves, and as against other men (sic.) whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs" (1968:9-10). One can differentiate between "a class in itself" - social relationships to the means of , and a "class for

itself" - the material interests that provide the potential basis for unity in struggle that forges class-consciousness (Milliband, 1977, Hall, 1977). Change from one social or economic order, or one mode of production to another can only be actualised by the revolutionary action of the working class, although capitalism also "transforms itself from within itself" (Giddens, 1973:35).

At the high level of abstraction employed thus far, 'capitalism in general', Adesina, (1993) argues, class exists. Carchedi's analysis is at a slightly lower level of abstraction, he argues, but still "without gender, race, religion etc" (Adesina, 1993:126). Making sense of the working class at low levels of abstraction, the level of analysis of social formations, involves incorporating many 'mediations', relations and identities; gender, caste, race, ethnic segmentation, etc (Ibid, 1993).

2.2.2 Leninism and Stalinism

Marxist theory and its various interpretations and development marked Left politics in the twentieth century. The power of Marx and what has come to be a range of Marxisms lie not only in its analysis of capitalism, but also in its practical implications. Marx and Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto for the German Communist League and Marx had in the 1860s attempted to create an International Workingmen's' Association (the First International). During this latter part of the 1800s the industrial labour movements of northern Europe established themselves organisationally and saw in Marx' perspectives a world view and a vision that bound their members together. What in 1889 became the Second International marked the institutionalisation of a certain conception of the Left, and the forms of politics that it would be identified with (Thompson, 1997).

By 1910 the Left on a world scale could be regarded as coterminous with the labour movements of the period. What came to dominate Left politics in the twentieth century, however, was decided between 1914 and 1918 by World War One and the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia. The principal dividing line was drawn between those whose national loyalty and constitutional sentiments had determined their actions during the conflicts around World War I and the 1917 revolution, and the proponents of international class war. This divide corresponded with the divide between those on the Left who celebrated the Bolshevik revolution as the transfer of class power to the workers and the realisation of socialism's

objectives and those on the Left who viewed the revolution and its aftermath as the triumph of barbarism and the negation of democratic ideals (Liebman, 1986, Patnich, 1986). The Second International was dissolved in 1916 and the Communist International (Comintern) was formed in 1919. The Comintern criticised the reformist socialists or social democrats that participated in bourgeois elections and declared that the task of Communist Parties in countries where Soviet government[11] had not yet been established was to "explain to the broad mass of the workers the historic significance and the political and historical necessity of the new, proletarian, democracy which must replace bourgeois democracy and the parliamentary system" (Comintern, 1919)

In December 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was formed, with Vladimir Lenin as the leader of the new country. Lenin's strategy for revolution had been laid out in *What is to be Done?* in 1902. He emphasised the importance of theory and a revolutionary party guided by that theory. He emphasised that political agitation should raise the consciousness of the workers (and other classes) from that of their own situation to an understanding of the "relationships of *all* classes and strata to the state and the government ... to clarify for *all* and everyone the world-historic significance of the struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat" (1976:99-100, emphasis in original). He also stressed democratic participation (Ibid, 1976). What came to be known as Marxism-Leninism developed further in response to the conditions faced in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period.

Lenin died in 1924 and Stalin came to power in 1925. Stalin promoted the policy of 'socialism in one country'. He advocated that socialism should be built, economically and politically in the Soviet Union, instead of promoting revolutions abroad. This constituted a retreat from Lenin's international vision of the Soviet revolution. The autocratic style of leadership and breaking up of popular power in the soviets has been well documented (see e.g. Liebman, 1975 or Deutscher, 1949, 1984). The USSR became increasingly isolated. The USSR initially signed an agreement of cooperation with Germany, but the German army invaded the Soviet Republic in 1941. The Soviet offensive came three years later, in 1944 (Thompson, 1997). After the war, Germany was split down the middle and increasingly two

[11] The Soviet system was a system of workers councils and peasant councils – the Soviets. These councils, or Soviets, had originated during the 1905 Russian revolution. After the 1917 revolution a system of Soviet government was instituted and a Council of Workers Deputies was set up.

power blocs emerged: the Communist Soviet bloc in the East and the capitalist West, dominated by the United States and its allies in Western Europe.

2.3. Social Democracy

Social democracy, the form of Left politics that became prevalent in Europe in the 20th Century, has its origins in the socialist movement in Europe in the late 1800s, and the loosely unified socialist movement of the Second International that split in 1916 (Sasoon, 1998). In 1920, the defunct Second International was re-established and continued to exist until 1940. Social democracy became prevalent among its members and the reformist social democratic parties enjoyed the support of workers in Europe and elsewhere (Przeworski, 1980:27). The discussion now looks at the origins of social democracy, its development in Europe in the 20th Century and how the content and direction of social democracy changed in the course of the century.

2.3.1. Social Democracy Takes Root

Social democracy started as a movement for universal (male) suffrage and full political rights, with the use of the mass strike as a key political weapon. With universal suffrage obtained, the movement needed to make a choice between legal and 'extra parliamentary' tactics. Przeworski (1980:27-28) argues that the socialist movement faced definite choices that arose from the very organisation of capitalist society. Firstly, whether to seek advancement of socialism through the political institutions of capitalist society or to confront the bourgeoisie directly. Secondly, whether to seek the agent of socialist transformation exclusively in the working class or to rely on multiclass and supra-class support. Lastly, whether to seek improvements and reforms within capitalism or to dedicate all efforts and energies to its complete transformation. Social democrats, Przeworski (Ibid, 1980) argues, choose participation, seek supra-class alliances and struggle for reforms. It must be noted that these questions are not answered once and for all, but that choices are made continuously in the pursuit of politics. Common experiences of defeat and repression[12] led the socialist parties

[12] While strikes oriented toward suffrage had been generally successful, the use of mass strikes for economic goals resulted in political disasters in Belgium in 1902, Sweden in 1909, France in 1920, Norway in 1921, and Great Britain in 1926. All these strikes were defeated. In the aftermath trade-union membership was decimated and repressive legislation was passed (Przeworski, 1980:30).

towards electoral and parliamentary participation and they were rapidly integrated into the state apparatus (Liebman, 1986).

Eduard Bernstein of the German Social Democrats argued that socialism would come from within capitalism, through gradual reforms, and not through the collapse of capitalism and class struggle. Trade union struggles, social reform and the political democratisation of the state were for Bernstein the means of the progressive realisation of socialism (Bernstein, 1899 in Luxembourg, 1973). Rosa Luxembourg[13], who belonged to the revolutionary group in the German social democratic party wrote *Reform or Revolution* in response to Bernstein. She labelled Bernstein and his group opportunists and revisionists and argued that promoting legislative reform in the place of the conquest of political power and social revolution would lead to a programme not for the realisation of socialism, but the reform of capitalism.

Social Democratic parties entered into electoral politics and won large support around the turn of the century[14]. Originally social democracy was founded on the organisation of the working class and the long term goals were the abandonment of capitalism and the abolishment of classes. However, as electoral politics became a reality for social democratic parties they began seeking alliances, recruiting peasants, the middle classes and the intelligentsia (Przeworski, 1980, Sasoon, 1998).

Anderson (1984:2-3) writes that social democracy in Western Europe was traditionally divided into two distinct zones. Historically the mass parties of the Second International arose in the Northern countries. In Britain, Germany and Belgium there was a concentration of heavy industry and a large working class. In Scandinavia there was a greater standoff between capital and labour, and small farmers joined the social coalition. Capital permitted itself to be regulated in return for self-restraint on the part of labour. It was not public ownership that became the hallmark of this zone of social democrats, but construction of

[13] Luxembourg broke with the social democrats in 1914 as they supported the drive towards the First World War. She was part of founding the German Communist Party in 1918 and was assassinated in 1919 (Thomson, 1997).

[14] In Germany the SPD became the largest party with 19.7 % of the vote in 1890. By 1912 their share of 34.8 % was more than twice that of the next largest party. In Finland in 1907 Social Democrats won 37 % in the first election under universal suffrage. The Austrian Social Democrats won 21.0 % after male franchise was made universal in 1907, 25.4 % in 1911, and 40.8 % in 1919. The Belgian Parti Ouvrier won 13.2 % in 1894 and kept growing in leaps to win 39.4 % in 1925. In the Netherlands, socialism increased its support from 3 % in 1896 to 18.5 % in 1913. The Danish party obtained 4.9 % in 1884, the first election it contested, only 3.5 % in 1889; but continued to increase until 1935 when it won 46.1 %. The Swedish party first offered candidates on joint lists with Liberals, winning 3.5 % in 1902, 28.5 % in 1911 after suffrage was extended, and 30.1 % and 36.4 % in the two successive elections of 1914 and 39.1 % in 1917. The Norwegian Labour Party grew about 5 % in each election from 1897 to 1915 when its share reached 32.1 % (Przeworski, 1980:34-35). The United Kingdom got its first Labour Prime minister in 1924. In 1935 Labour gained 38% of the vote and in 1945 it got 50% of the vote (http://www.labour.org.uk/history_of_the_labour_party).

welfare states with full employment and wide social services. The second zone was southern Europe where industrialisation had come less completely or later. Anarcho-syndicalism was a major current in the Second International while by 1945 Communist parties formed by the Third International had become the leading force in the labour movement. The Left was structurally weaker here. The communist parties in France, Spain and Italy adopted a conciliatory constitutionalism in keeping with Western as opposed to Soviet traditions. Southern social democracy did not succeed in reproducing the northern achievement of full employment. Rather modest social reforms were introduced (Anderson, 1994).

2.3.2. Welfare States and Keynesian Economic Policy

Private property and the capitalist system of production was initially seen by the social democrats as fundamentally unjust and the market economy as incapable of assuring a just distribute of income and property. Socialisation or nationalisation of the means of production was seen as the principal method of realising socialist goals and hence the first task to be accomplished by social democrats after the conquest of power. Until World War I, socialist parties had concentrated their efforts on winning suffrage and organising workers as a class. World War I changed the established political order and social democratic parties formed governments in a number of countries. After World War II, the social democratic parties formed the Socialist International. With the exception of the French arms industry, not a single company was nationalised by a social democratic government in the period between the First and Second World Wars (Przewroski, 1980).

In the absence of economic reforms came the shift in emphasis from public ownership to welfare. Measures designed to improve the conditions of workers were implemented and included housing programmes, some measure of protection from unemployment, minimum wage laws, income and inheritance taxes and old age pensions (Przeworski, 1980, Liebman, 1986, Panitch, 1986). Compromise between labour and capital was important in this period, and welfare reform was often founded on a ‘social compact’, or corporatism. (Liebman, 1986, Panitch, 1986). Corporatism as a political phenomenon integrates organised socio-economic producer groups through a system of representation and co-operative mutual interaction at the leadership level and mobilisation and social control at the mass level (Catchpowle and Cooper, 2003). Corporatism usually requires a formal tripartite commitment by labour, capital and the state. However corporatism is not as much institutional as it is

political, premised on the voluntary subordination of sectional or class interests to the 'national interest' (Catchpowle and Cooper, 2003, Nordbye, 1994).

Przeworski further argues that such supra-class alliances must be based on a convergence of immediate economic interest of the working class and of other groups. He writes that "this convergence cannot be found in measures that strengthen the cohesion and combativeness of workers against other classes" (1980:43). This is the dilemma of social democratic parties, and this dilemma is created by the very system of electoral competition (Przeworski, 1980:43). However, for mass parties operating in a constitutional state this transformation may not have been escapable, argues Thompson (1997).

It is argued that social democracy had no economic policy of its own, save for Sweden, Norway and to a lesser extent France. Here, in response to the Great Depression, social democratic governments responded to unemployment with a series of anti-cyclical policies that broke the existing orthodoxy (Przeworski, 1980:51). It was not until Keynes' General Theory that social democrats were provided with the justification of their governmental role and simultaneously transformed the ideological significance of the distributive politics that favoured the working class (Przeworski, 1980, Liebman, 1986, Panitch, 1986). The state became transformed into an institution by which society could regulate crises to maintain full employment. From the mid 1970s, economic downturn set in globally and social democracy lacked the policies to meet the crisis, and as ideological revival of monetarism picked out excessive social spending and strong trade unions as sources of stagflation. Conservative governments took power, for example in Britain.

By the 1980s, the situation had changed again and the essence of the policies of social democratic parties was

> "the conviction that the market can be directed to those allocations of any good, public or private, that are preferred by citizens and that by gradually rationalising the economy the state can turn capitalists into private functionaries of the public without altering the juridical status of private property" (Przeworski, 1980:54).

Social Democracy had ceased to be a reformist movement, it was concerned with regulating the operations of the private sector and mitigating the distributional effects of the market through welfare measures (Liebman, 1986) In the same period, 'welfare corporatism' was

replaced by 'neoliberal corporatism', marked by unfettered free market ideologies and state regulation in favour of capital (Catchpowle and Cooper, 2003).

By 1994 social democracy had reached an impasse and had been reduced to "a helpless onlooker as the tide of the jobless steadily rises, from one business cycle to another," writes Taylor (2008). It appears to have "lost its compass", writes Anderson, trapped between a shifting social base and a contracting political horizon (1994:16). In the early 1990s the concept of 'Third Way[15]' became popular in Britain, and the Labour party termed itself 'New Labour'. The 'Third Way' set out to be an alternative to social democracy as well as to laissez-faire and neo-liberal capitalism: 'beyond Left and Right'. However, New Labour eventually had to root itself in the social democratic tradition and rather be a 'new' or modernised social democracy (Leggett, 2007). The Third Way had resonance with labour and social democratic parties across Europe and in Latin America (Sandbrook et al, 2006, Taylor, 2008 and Robinson, 2008). These 'Third Way' regimes are not homogenous, but are each one a particular synthesis of Left and Right. What all have in common is the surrender of the socialist vision in favour of capitalism, albeit not in its laissez-faire version, concessions in the form of privatisation, public-private partnerships, and an emphasis on supply-side measures to enhance employment and increase productivity and equity (Sandbrook et al, 2006). The Socialist International still exists and has 170 social democratic, socialist and labour parties world-wide. More than 60 of these are from outside of Europe, 30 of which are in Africa[16].

2.4. Anti-colonial and National Liberation Movements

Coterminous with the periods discussed above, colonialism and imperialism had ravaged large parts of the world outside Europe. The African and Asian continents were made up of colonies of the European powers. African nationalism, and national liberation or anti-colonial movements became an important part of the Left internationally.

[15] The 'Third Way' originated as a slogan in the United States intended to differentiate Bill Clinton's New Democrats from both the republicanism of Reagan and the statist approach to economic and social problems of previous Democratic leaders such as Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson (Callinicos, 2003:3).
[16] See http://socialistinternational.org/viewArticle.cfm?ArticleID=31.

The period between 1880 and 1900 became known as the 'scramble for Africa' and was a period of rapid European colonisation (Boahen, 1990, Mamdani, 1996). Colonies were made up of culturally and historically diverse national groups, whose boundaries were arbitrary lines decided by European rulers in Germany at the Congress of Berlin in 1885 (Boahen, 1990). The colonial experience varied from classical colonialism with settler populations and direct domination, to more indirect domination, where the colonial power was made up in part or mainly by the native population (Cabral, 1979, Mamdani, 1996). We turn now to the nationalist and liberation movements on the African continent.

2.4.1. African Nationalism and National Liberation

Boahen (1990) writes that nationalism in colonised Africa differed from the nationalism in Europe in the nineteenth century[17]. In the colonial territories, the subjection to a common alien ruler was the main base for unity. African nationalism expressed the desire of these different communities, or what Boahen (1990) terms cultural nations, to forge new identities in the struggle against colonial administration. It was a pan-African nationalism. He further argues that the racial discrimination embedded in colonialism ensured that racial consciousness became the basis for African nationalism.

Although there had been resistance to colonial imposition in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the period between 1919 and 1935 was the period that formed nationalism in the African colonial territories. The League Against Imperialism formed in Belgium in 1927 brought together communist and socialist groups with representatives of nationalist movements in colonial territories. The impact of the anti-imperialist pan-Africanist work of Marcus Garvey and WEB Du Bois[18] in the US proved very popular among African nationalist movements because it offered a way to overcome both regionalism and ethnic divides by stressing commonalities and a common oppression. It is important to note, however, that African nationalism developed unevenly and that the type of colonial administration played a role. Nationalism was stronger where the colonialists had settled and

[17] Nationalism in Europe had been the expression of the desire of communities which were culturally identical, who shared a common historical past, for an independent, sovereign existence in states of their own. See Stalin, 1913, Hobsbawm, 1990, Harman, 1992 and Anderson, 2006.

[18] Marcus Garvey (1887–1940) and W. E. B. DuBois (1868–1963) were the two most notable leaders of early Pan-Africanism. Garvey, whose outspoken nature attracted many followers, believed that blacks would never be treated as the equals of whites in America and must return 'home' to Africa if they were to be free. DuBois, who had earned a doctorate in history from Harvard in 1896, argued that Africa had a glorious past and that Africans had deeply influenced Western civilisation. He believed that Africa had to be freed from colonial rule if African Americans were to be liberated.

the indigenous population was firmly subjugated (Boahen, 1990:240-248, 270-278 and 314-326).

The Soviet Union was perceived as an ally of anti-colonial movements, who considered themselves anti-imperialist. The Comintern argued that the nationalist struggle in the colonies was an important part of the 'world revolution'. They were anti-capitalist, although they were not necessarily 'communistic' (Seth, 1995:56). Comintern adopted the native republic thesis in 1927. The thesis proposed national self-determination through struggle against imperialism. Imperialism was defined by its colonial character, including both foreign and racial domination, more than its capitalist character (Drew, 2000). Communist parties were instructed to assist the bourgeois-democratic liberation movements in the 'subject and oppressed countries' (Seth, 1995:58). It was, however, recognised that these movements were not communist, and communists should not support the development of a local bourgeoisie.

Marxist doctrine became indigenised and gave rise to the concept of African Socialism. The leaders of African socialism, writes Saul (2005), argued that there was a socialism distinctive to Africa, one that springs from egalitarian cultural predispositions and communal practices predating the European penetration of Africa. The term socialism, according to Nkrumah, should be used to "describe a complex of social purposes and the consequential social and economic policies, organisational patterns, state structure, and ideologies which can lead to the attainment of those purposes" (1976:1). The first generation of liberation movements were led by Léopold Senghor of Senegal, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sekou Touré of Guinea, the 'Humanism' of Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, the *ujamaa* of Julius Neyrere in Tanzania, Ben Bella and the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria. This was the first wave of independence and of liberation politics on the African continent, lasting from 1945 until 1970. This period also saw the consolidation of state-led development (Zeilig and Seddon 2002).

The next generation African liberation movements were found mainly in Southern Africa in the late 1970s and into the 1980s (Zeilig and Seddon, 2002, Saul, 2005). According to Saul (2005), this period included independence for Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Saul argues that Frelimo in Mozambique found in Marxism an alternative to what he terms "the vague nostrums of African Socialism" as well as a possible guide to realising the collectivist aspirations of the movement (2005:38). But the leaders of

these movement, such as Cabral in Guinea-Bissau and Eduardo Mondlane in Mozambique were reluctant to be labelled as Marxists or socialists (Wallerstein and Bragança, 1982).

Cabral stressed the need to know and to understand the historical reality that the liberation movements aspire to transform, and criticised the leaders and movements who did not emphasis this for 'ideological deficiency' (Cabral, 1979:122-123). Fanon criticised the nationalist petty bourgeoisie for having "noting more than an approximate, bookish acquaintance with the actual and potential resources of their country's soil and mineral deposits" (2001:121).

Munslow (1986:28) writes that this latter group of Marxists envisaged a transitional stage where the working class could be strengthened and grow in power. This intermediary phase was seen as a people's democratic, or a national democratic, revolution. Central to this national democratic revolution was class alliances and revolutionary intellectuals, workers and peasants would be moulded together by the party. The concept of the national democratic revolution came to be particularly influential in South Africa, as will be seen in Chapter 4.

Seddon and Zeilig argue that the period from 1985 was associated with the demise of the Soviet Union, deepening economic crisis and the ascendancy of neo-liberalism and globalisation, bringing structural adjustment and the privatisation of the state in Africa. Whatever the intentions of the liberation movements, external and economic or material circumstances made the post colonial projects in the movements and liberated countries very difficult, writes Saul (2005). For example, in independent Mozambique, Frelimo supported neighbouring liberation movements and became the target of Rhodesian and South African counter-revolutionary wars of destabilisation. Independent Africa was caught in the cold war and western regimes intervened to disrupt and even overthrow socialist regimes in power.

2.4.2. Marxism, Class and National Liberation in Africa

Liberation movements grappled with the strategic and tactical problems posed by the nature of the class forces in the liberation movement and in their countries. Munslow (1986), Lopes and Rudebeck (1988) and Saul (2005) all stress the fact that the African socialism projects took place at the periphery of global capitalism. There was a small working class, and the movements relied on mobilisation of the peasantry. This impacted on the ability of the socialist projects to succeed. Consider now class in the African colonies, in the theory and

practice of the African liberation movements and moreover some of the theoretical contributions arising from liberation leaders.

Colonialism had meant the reorganisation of production structures. This reorganisation of production structures created new classes, reorganised existing political structures and created new nations (Bragança and Wallerstein, 1982, Boahen, 1990). The ambiguous relationship and interconnectedness of class and ethnic 'membership' or consciousness is a structural creation of the colonial situation. For the most part, the basis for popular support for the democratic revolution was a worker-peasant alliance. Mafeje (1978:23) stresses that this relationship is not primarily a question for "abstract theory", but a question to be answered in "revolutionary struggle".

Perhaps the most important theoretical contribution to class analysis from the liberation movements themselves came from Guinea-Bissau's Amilcar Cabral. He argued that the motive force of history was not class struggle, but the level of development of the productive forces. His central argument was that

> "classes appear neither as a generalised and simultaneous phenomenon throughout all groups of mankind, nor a finished, perfect, uniform and spontaneous whole. The formation of classes is basically the result of progressive development of the productive forces and the way in which the wealth produced by these groups – or usurped by other groups – is distributed. This means: socio-economic class arises and develops as a function of at least two essential and interdependent variables: the level of productive forces and the system of ownership of the means of production. ... Once a certain point has been reached in the process of accumulation, it then leads to qualitative changes which are shown by the appearance of class, classes and class conflict" (1979:123).

Without this understanding of history, Cabral argued, the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America would be placed outside history until the moment they encountered imperialism. National liberation was for Cabral "the phenomenon in which a socio-economic whole rejects the denial of its historical process" (1979:130).

Fanon wrote that the middle class that takes over power after liberation is an "under-developed" middle class, concerned not with productive activity but with "activities of the intermediary type" (2001:120). Nationalism, writes Fanon,

> "stops short, falters and dies away on the day that independence is proclaimed. Nationalism is not a political doctrine, nor a programme. If you really wish your country to avoid regression, or at best halts and uncertainties, a rapid step must be taken from national consciousness to political and social consciousness" (2001:163)

Fanon was not so much against nationalism as he was against the substitution of the colonial masters with the petty-bourgeoisie. Decolonisation did not require replacing "certain 'species' of men by another 'species' of men" (Ibid, 2001:27), but changing the whole social structure created by colonialism.

Cabral was also concerned with the situation after liberation. The colonial situation, he wrote (1979) did not permit the development of a "native bourgeoisie", rather it was the petty bourgeoisie that was offered "the historical opportunity of leading the struggle against foreign domination" (1979:135). In the colonial context this group could be considered revolutionary. But no matter its revolutionary potential, he wrote, the petty bourgeoisie, as a service class, does not have at its disposal the economic bases that would guarantee it the taking of power over it. The petty bourgeoisie does not possess real power. The power lies with imperialist capital on the one hand and the 'native classes of workers' on the other. In order not to betray the objectives of the national democratic revolution this class had to *commit class suicide* (1979:136).

Adesina writes that the radical nationalist project of the 1970s and the 1980s was defined by this injunction of class suicide by Cabral and inspired a "*petty bourgeois class with proletarian/peasant aspirations*" (2004:137, emphasis in original). By 1990 this had been replaced by "*a petty bourgeoisie with bourgeois aspirations*" (Ibid, 2004:137, emphasis in original). Adesina writes that the origins of this change is the rise of monetarism and conservative politics in Europe and North America, the debt crisis in Africa and Latin America as well as the decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet bloc (Ibid, 2004). With these changes, the era of liberation politics was over and the placing of the former liberation movements on the Left of the political spectrum was no longer a *fait accompli*.

2.5. Left Politics after the Cold War

After World War II a Cold War broke out between the capitalist United State in the West and the Communist Soviet Union in the East. The US was supported by Western Europe. In the period between 1945 and 1989 rivalry between the two superpowers was expressed through military coalitions, propaganda, competitive industrial, technological and weapons development. Both superpowers engaged in numerous proxy wars, many fought in the former colonial territories. Towards the end of the 1980s the Cold War was coming to an end and in 1989 the Berlin Wall, that had since 1945 separated the East from the West, fell.

Left parties and movements across the world had not been uniform in their reproach or support for the USSR and were far from homogenous. The end of the Cold War, nonetheless, left the international Left with a conundrum, as the 'end of history' was pronounced and there seemed to be consensus that there would be no alternatives to liberal democracy and free market capitalism. This was the ideology known as TINA, 'There is no alternative' (Derber, 1995, Callinicos, 2003). In the 20 years after the fall of the Berlin wall, it seems, however, that the Left is all but dead. Consider briefly now a discussion of two of the manifestations of Left politics internationally since 1990; the global social justice movement and the revival of Left regimes in Latin America.

2.5.1. The Global Social Justice Movement and the World Social Forum

From about the time of the World Trade Organisation trade talks in Seattle in 1999, and the 40 000 strong protests by activists from trade unions, farmer organisations in both the North and the South, non-governmental organisations and activists campaigning for social, economic and environmental justice, the Anti-globalisation or Anti-capitalist movement was formally born. This gave birth to a wave of global anti-capitalist protest that resounded all over the world. However, within the movements there are great differences with regard to the centrality of class as a concept, strategy and tactics, use of violence, modes of organisation, attitude towards electoral politics and so on. The movement sees a range of people from environmentalists, pacifists and religious groups, autonomists, anarchists, syndicalists, socialists and communists, social democrats, protectionist western farmers and peasants from the south fighting for access to markets – a mix of reformists and revolutionaries, and 'old' (trade unions and political parties) and 'new' Lefts (social movements). This is not only a

movement of the West but is linked to grassroots movements on all continents. Although this wave of protests did not mark the beginning of resistance to globalisation and neo-liberalism, it took the contestation to a new level, and it revived social critique (One Off Press, 2001, Callinicos, 2003, Kingsnorth, 2004, Sen, Anand, Escobar and Waterman (eds), 2004, or Sen, Kumar, Bond and Waterman (eds), 2007). Callinicos (2003:13) argues that with the emergence of this movement "the great debate over capitalism has been resumed."

Much of this movement has been coming together at the World Social Forum (WSF). The WSF first took place in Porto Allegre in Brazil in 2001. The forum was set up to be an open space for articulation of alternatives embodied in the call "Another World is Possible." Sen et al writes that the forum brings together three novel and interrelated dimensions: the *form* of the political and of political discussion; the *question* of the renewal of imaginaries and utopias; and questions of *strategy* (2004:xxiii, emphasis in original). Social Forums have since 2001 taken place on all continents, in many countries and have also been set up in towns and cities around the world. This movement does not have a common or overt political programme. In 2005 a group of individuals and organisations connected with the movement issued a statement called the 'Bamako Appeal', providing a common programme for the loose movement and calling for the WSF to become a base for coordinated anti-imperialist and socialist action (Sen et al, 2007). This sparked much debate in the WSF and the global movement and the question of a political programme for the Forum remains. Those heralding the WSF as an 'open space' were particularly critical of what they considered a 'hijacking' of the WSF (Ibid, 2007). Some argue that this global movement has stalled and failed to move beyond a negative anti-capitalism (Robinson, 2008).

2.5.2. The 'Pink Tide' in Latin America

The other area of international Left politics that will be discussed here is the wave of Left governments that has come to power in Latin America in the past 10 years. Latin America has long been at the cutting edge of struggles against neoliberalism, and several alternatives to the dominant model of global capitalism appear to be emerging in the region. Robinson (2008) refers to this as the 'pink tide'. The 'pink tide' governments and leaders include Hugo Chavez in Venezuela (1998); Lula and the Workers Party in Brazil (2002); Lagos and the socialist party in Chile (2002) followed by Michelle Bachelet of the same party (2006); Nestor Kirchman in Argentina (2003); Evo Morales in Bolivia (2005); Tabare Vasques and

the Broad Front in Urugay (2004); Rafael Correra in Ecuador (2006) and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (2006) (Robinson, 2008).

This tide is made up of two Lefts, dominated by reformists who seek to reintroduce a mild redistributive component into the global capitalist programme in the region. This group identifies with social democracy (Vellinga, 2007), but there has been no significant redistribution of income or shift in basic property and class relations despite a shift in political blocs and discursive shifts in favour of the popular classes. The more radical Left seeks a more substantial transformation of social structures, class relations and international power dynamics (Robinson, 2008). Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador can, according to Robinson, be placed in the latter category. Here redistributive reforms have been much deeper and linked to transformation in state structure and property relations as well as empowerment of the popular classes (see also Maya, 2007, Harnecker, 2007, Stedile, 2007, Enzinna, 2007). Robinson however notes that there are limitations to the reintroduction of a redistributive project at the level of the nation state in the current global(ised) context (2008).

2.6. Conclusion: Defining Left Politics

In this chapter some of the dominant manifestations of Left politics internationally in the 20th Century have been covered. There are, however, ideologies, movements and organisations that could be placed further to the Left than what have been covered here, such as organisations that reject any participation in bourgeois organs or institutions, organisations that refuse any form of class collaboration, anarchists and syndicalists. Also there has not been a focus on trade unionism as a phenomenon. This because trade unions, although organised formations of the working class, are not *ipso facto* Left, but may be limited to economic or material struggles without being linked to a wider political agenda. Likewise, the struggles against women's oppression and for gender equality are an omission here. However, the study elected to focus on those ideas and movements that organised large sections of the working class, and moreover those that inspired the three organisations that will be studined in this thesis; the ANC, the SACP and COSATU. A history of these organisations will be provided in Chapter 4, and the inspiration as well as the influence of the

world historical movements discussed here will be visible in the history of the three organisations.

It has been noted in this chapter that at the onset there were things that the Left political movements surveyed have in common. Firstly, the belief in historical progress, largely inspired by 'socialism as a science'. Central to this belief is that it is possible for human collectivities at the level of states or larger or smaller units to take their social fate into their own hands and consciously direct the enhancement of material wealth or social amenity (Thompson, 1997:9). Cabral's (1979) definition of national liberation as a phenomenon in which 'a socio-economic whole' reclaims its right to determine its historical process has also been noted.

Secondly, the belief in equality and opposition to oppression. Lukes (1990) writes that this started with the idea of equal citizenship, of a community of free and equal citizens, the universalist republican principle. Linked to this is what he calls the 'rectification principle': "the progressive rectifying of involuntary disadvantage, and the continual seeking out of new kinds and new sources of inequality. It began with the franchise but then progressively encompassed constitutional rights and later economic, social, cultural, [national, racial], gender-based, regional, and other forms of inequality" (1990:575). The study considers this within states as well as on a global scale.

A third element has been the identification with the working class and belief in working class power and agency. It has been noted that in certain contexts this identification has been with the peasantry. It should be noted that there are many varieties of class analysis and many theories of class. Lastly, and closely linked with the latter is the necessity for the abolishment of capitalism and the oppression of one class by another. It should be noted here that the struggle for the abolishment of capitalism may take many forms, and many tactics may be used. As Luxembourg (1973) wrote, the question is not simply one of reform or revolution, but that the goal of abolishing capitalism should not be abandoned.

It is important to note that the Left in history has often deviated sharply from one or more of these principles (Lukes, 1990). It has also been seen in this chapter that two and sometimes three of these principles have been more or less abandoned and that much of the Left described above remain committed only to the second sets of issues; ending inequality and

oppression. The Socialist International is an example of this. Its declaration of principles adopted in 1989 makes no mention of abolishing capitalism or of an end to class divided societies (Socialist International, 1989). Rather, the declaration states that "all socialists are united in their vision of a peaceful and democratic world society combining freedom, justice and solidarity" (Ibid, 1989:5) The Socialist International would place itself on the Left "even if social democracy should become as notional for them tomorrow as socialism is today" (Anderson 1994:17).

The Left is thus limited to the rectification principle. The work of rectification, Anderson (1994) writes, requires no general theory of an alternative society, and accepts the Right as a perpetual counterweight to itself. He wrote in 1994 that the appeal of this vision of abandoning the idea of socialism while retaining the notion of a Left was likely to grow among social democrats. In this chapter it has been seen that this did indeed take place among the majority of social democratic movements. The discussion has considered the difficulty of 'redistributive projects' at the beginning of the 21st century and identified a few strands of alternatives.

The Right becomes the side of the political spectrum that is made up of those seeking to preserve hierarchies or to restore old ones. Lukes also associates the Right with seeking to impose forms of society that "arrest the process of rectification", equate citizenship with ethnicity, or nationality or religion, devalue the public sphere and those that denounce the project of the Left as social engineering and who deny the very possibility of rectification (1990:576).

Left and Right are antithetical and can be put to descriptive, evaluative or historical use. As descriptive dichotomies, this pair can summarise two sides in a conflict. As evaluative the pair can express a positive or negative value judgement and as historical can indicate the passage from one political phase to another, in the life of a nation (Bobbio, 1996) or in this case, a political movement. It has been illustrated that Left politics changes over time, and that it differs in different contexts. However, it is still possible to provide a stipulative definition for the purpose of this thesis. The Left is defined as *the elements of the political spectrum that are concerned with the progressive resolution of involuntary disadvantage, and with a goal of abolishing class society and capitalism.* This definition allows identification of

the Left as a whole, as well as permitting the identification of variation and the denoting of spaces on the Left side of the political spectrum.

Chapter 3: Methodology and Fieldwork

3.1 Qualitative Research

As set out in Chapter 1, this study aims to gain an in-depth understanding of contemporary Left politics in the Eastern Cape. The research problem warrants an exploratory and open research design. The process of research has not been neatly arranged or linear, but is a constant interaction between theory, history and field data, the past and the present, secondary and primary data, reflection and analysis (Dane, 1990, Flick, 1998 and Babbie and Mouton, 2001). In other words, the research design did not follow a standard inductive or deductive method, and the research was not about testing an hypothesis but rather about further exploring a phenomenon. The social phenomena that is Left politics, is analysed in a specific context and setting, the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa between 2004 and 2008, 10 to 14 years after the negotiated settlement that ended Apartheid.

This study made use of qualitative research methods. Babbie and Mouton (2001:270) refer to qualitative research as a "generic research approach in social sciences that takes as its departure point the insider perspective on social action." This approach is used in research that aims at in-depth or 'thick' description and understanding of social phenomena or social action. This approach is opposed to positivist or quantitative research involved in hypothesis testing (Parker, 1994). Moreover, social action must be understood in its own context; in this case the historical, social, political and material context of COSATU, the SACP and ANC in the Eastern Cape.

Two methods of data collection for the primary data were used for this study; in- depth interviews and content analysis of documentary sources. In-depth interviews allow for an 'insiders' perspective' into the ideology and practice of contemporary Left politics. Content analysis of documentary sources is an unobtrusive research method used in order to gain a better insight into official positions of the Left, and the evolution of these positions. As such, multiple sources of data are brought to bear by using multiple methods. Use of multiple sources of data allows for establishing patterns of convergence, *within* and *between* the sets of data, and understands the Eastern Cape in relation to the dominant national politics.

3.2 Fieldwork in practice: Preliminary research and 'snowballing' between 2005 and 2008

This study was carried out in the period between February 2005 and July 2008. Since the start of 2005, the researched has engaged in conversations with people who can be considered gatekeepers to the Left in the Eastern Cape. Gatekeepers are persons who can assist a researcher in gaining access to the field, to information and informants (Dane, 1990). The gatekeepers in this case were elected leaders of the three Alliance organisations (2), 'organic' leaders, and past and present activists of the ANC, SACP and COSATU (4), trade union activists, activists and leaders in other political parties, such as the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) (1), Socialist Party of Azania (SOPA) (1), activists in social movements and NGOs (3), independent academics and political commentators (2). There have also been discussions with gatekeepers on what can be considered the non-Alliance, or independent, Left nationally (4).

Without defining the Left narrowly, discussions focused on the Left in the Eastern Cape and elicited suggestions about who would be useful informants for this study. Many of the discussions tended to elicit more information about the past, particularly the 1980s. With regard to the post 1994 period, little optimism was expressed, and few names cropped up from gatekeepers outside the Alliance. Some that were considered on the Left prior to the 1990s and immediately after 1994 had since become businessmen, members of national parliament or national government, often referred to as having 'sold out' by the trade union activists and activists outside of the Alliance. In many conversations people would be referred to as having been on the Left, but perhaps not any more.

During these initial discussions in 2005 and 2006 the study was not limited to the Alliance members only, and used Left politics in a broad sense. The discussion also concerned what other political parties, political groups or social movements exist in the province. It was found that there was a PAC presence in some municipal councils, and in the provincial legislature[19], after the national elections in 2004 and local elections in 2006. There is a presence of SOPA, the Azanian People's Organisation, the Unity Movement, the Workers

[19] This PAC member of the legislature defected to the African Peoples Convention (APC) in 2007, and is as such no longer a PAC MPL, but an APC MPL. The member subsequently left politics.

Organisation for Socialist Action, the Workers International Vanguard League, Socialist Group and Socialist Initiative in the province. However, the presence of these organisations is small and in some cases limited to a few individuals. Social movement organisations such as Jubilee 2000, Right to Work and the Anti-Privatisation Forum, also have a presence, but this is small and they do not constitute considerable social forces, nor do they organise large numbers of people. It emerged from this preliminary research that the Congress Alliance is by far the most dominant, in numbers, and in access to power on the political scene, and the largest political organiser of the working class in the Eastern Cape. In the Eastern Cape, the ANC dominated during local and national elections post 1994. It was thus resolved that the study would focus on the Alliance and its three member organisations ANC, SACP and COSATU, and would study these in more depth. After this initial period of preliminary research in 2005 and 2006, the focus and objectives of the study were more clearly formulated.

The researcher attended political meetings and events, such as COSATU policy workshops in 2005, 2006 and 2008, the 2006 and 2009 provincial COSATU congress, National Union of Metal workers of South Africa (NUMSA) and South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) policy workshops, political education and planning sessions in 2005, 2006 and 2008, and the provincial NUMSA conference in 2008. Also attended was a meeting of the Amathole region of the SACP in 2006. These meetings were attended in an official capacity for a research, policy and planning organisation in the province, or through political engagement as an activist, where the purpose for participation was not primarily for this research. Many political rallies, such as May Day rallies in 2006 in East London and 2008 in King Williams Town, marches during the general strike on 27 June and 03 October 2005 and 18 May 2006, the solidarity strike march during a public sector strike on 13 June 2007 and the general strike on 08 July 2008 were attended. The researcher also participated in a picket during a strike at the retail chain Shoprite on 02 September 2006. These occasions were used for informal conversations, observation, listening to discussions, gathering documents, and gaining access to informants. These occasions also contributed to the building of rapport and trust.

This study has been conducted over a four year period. Political tensions, factionalism and leadership battles increased during this period, particularly in the wake of the 2004 elections and the run up to the 52nd ANC National Conference held in Polokwane in December 2007,

as described in Chapter 1. Local government elections were conducted in March 2006. The three organisations studied held provincial leadership elections during the period; COSATU in June 2006, where the leadership was re-elected unopposed and May 2009 where a new leadership was elected, the ANC in December 2006, with a new leadership elected and the SACP in June 2008 with a new leadership elected. All these developments have impacted on the choice of informants as well as the focus of the study. The interviews were in the end conducted between May and July 2008. The flexibility of the research design allowed intuition and hunches to be followed and the pursuit of different avenues of inquiry as the research problem became more focused and a more purposive sample emerged. After the interviews, additional data was collected through informal and formal conversations in the process of writing up the study, as political events unfolded.

3.3 Research methods: in-depth interviews and content analysis of primary documents

Two main methods of research were used in this thesis, in-depth interviews and content analysis of primary documents. This section will outline the sampling and data collection process, as well as some methodological consideration with regards to both methods.

3.3.1 In-depth interviews

Schostak (2006) refers to in-depth interview in qualitative research as the *inter-view*. The insertion of this hyphen, Schostak asserts, enables a change of focus, and creates the basis for engagement, dialogue and modes of drawing out views. It also creates a basis for the writing of these views. The interview method in this research was very much one of dialogue. Although the interviews followed a structure, a guide with pre-set themes, it took the form of a conversation about politics in South Africa and more specifically the Eastern Cape, and the respondents' own place in, and experience with, it. For Schostak (2006:4) the interview also has resonance with two other key terms, intersubjectivity and intertextuality. It refers to a process "extending beyond the given instance, individual, utterance and text" and one respondent or subject connects with the other as does one text and one view in a way that allows contemporary circumstances and debates to be explored. Below is a discussion of the interview sample and the interview guide used in this study.

3.3.1.1 The Interview Sample

The first source of primary data is in-depth, semi-structured interviews with activists and leaders within the ANC, SACP and COSATU in the province. A total of 9 interviews were carried out with leaders from the Alliance organisations and with people who work closely with these organisations. Purposive sampling was employed with the following criteria: information rich cases, diversity in experience, leadership and knowledge of internal discussions, insight into ideas and political practice, diversity in traditions within the Left. Politically important cases have been included. The sample consisted of leaders within the Left, both elected and 'organic' leaders, and people who are 'deployed' in government. It must also be understood, that the leaders of the Alliance organisations are likely to be members of all the organisations and to be active in more than one of them, and to move in and out of positions in the three organisations. This also impacts on their politics and positions, as shall be seen in Chapter 7.

The sample included one municipal councillor, who is also an ex-provincial trade union leader and a member of the national Central Committee of the SACP. It included one SACP leader who is a member of the Provincial Legislature (for the ANC), as well as two provincial SACP leaders who did not hold public office at the time. The sample included three senior COSATU leaders, with a background in different affiliates of COSATU. One has subsequently been elected national General Secretary of a major COSATU affiliate. All the respondents who are leaders in the SACP and COSATU are also active at branch, regional or provincial level in the ANC, or involved in activities such as political education within the ANC. Likewise one of the COSATU leaders also holds a provincial leadership position in the SACP, and a regional position in the ANC. The sample also included three respondents who are not elected leaders in the three Alliance organisations, but who work very closely with one or more of these at the level of educational, policy and theoretical work. Availability played a role, and thus the sample does not contain national political leaders who hail from the Eastern Cape. The sample also does not contain people considered by a majority of gatekeepers to be 'on the Right' or 'having sold out' as the purposive sampling technique stresses information rich cases, not 'balance' or 'representivity'. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. Although informants did not express concerns over the use of their names in the thesis, pseudonyms will be used in the text to protect privacy. The pseudonyms are true to the gender and race of the informants and only first names are used.

Given the research problem and the nature of data required, a purposive sampling technique was employed for this research. Purposive sampling is employed to obtain maximum information from a limited number of interviews. The actual number of interviews is relatively less important than the potential of each informant to aid in developing insights into the area of life being studied (Flick, 1998 and Dane, 1990). More specifically, during this period of formal and informal discussions and participation in the events mentioned above, theoretical sampling was used. Glaser and Strauss (1967:45) define theoretical sampling as "the process of data collection for generating theory, whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses his (sic) data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his (sic) theory as it emerges." Theoretical sampling is valuable in better understanding the subject of study, establishing preliminary categories and pursuing these until theoretical saturation is achieved, and no new categories can be found.

Although the focus of the interview in this study is on the *content*, the in-depth interview also allows us to learn about the personal experiences and the complex connections between these experiences, as well as the alternative perspectives and understandings that the respondents may have and the process by which the content come into being (Babbie and Mouton, 2001, Schostak, 2006). Thus the same authors stress that the interview is not a simple and ready-made tool to be employed in a given project. The in-depth interview was seen to be an appropriate method in this study given the desire to explore politics in depth with a few individuals who are players on the political scene. The aim of this research is mainly to gain insight and understanding rather than a representative view among members of the three Alliance organisations. The emphasis is thus on depth rather than breadth, and insight rather than 'facts' (Gillham, 2000).

3.3.1.2 The Interview Guide

The interviews were semi-structured, and an interview schedule was prepared prior to the interviews. The discussion was guided, as far as possible, by the interview schedule, to allow for some comparison between the interviews. The interviews, nonetheless, took the form of free flowing discussions. An initial interview schedule was piloted in 2007, but found to be too abstract. The interview schedule was thus revised, and a clearer focus on examples and contemporary issues included. The pilot interviews do not form part of the final sample.

The final interview schedule was divided into four main areas. The first part sought to generate a discussion about what Left politics is, how applicable or useful the concept is, and also who and what the Left is in the Eastern Cape. Informants were asked to explain what they understand by Left politics and then a series of follow up questions were asked. The second section sought to deepen the understanding of what Left politics is through a discussion about the key concepts used in this study; viz., class and race. Discussion focused on these concepts, how they are used, understood and contested within the Alliance and the three organisations, and informants were asked to provide concrete or practical examples of how the concepts are employed in analysis and political practice. The examples were important to ensure the discussion went beyond rhetoric and repetition of 'the party line' and would also make the discussion more contemporary and 'alive' rather than static and rehearsed.

The two next sections sought to deepen the use of the politics of class and race on the two contemporary issues, namely land and employment creation. The interview was rounded off with some general questions about the strengths and weaknesses of the Left, reflections on the impact the Left has had on policy-making in government, and, in the run-up to the 2009 elections and the 'post-Polokwane' situation.

3.3.2 Content analysis of primary documents

The second source of primary data in this study is documentary sources, more specifically contemporary official and non-official political documents. Documentary sources include reports, plans and programmes, discussion documents, policy documents and press statements from the three organisations, the ANC, SACP and COSATU. The bulk of the documentary material was drawn from the period under study; 2004 to 2008. Some historical material was also used in the theoretical framework (Chapter 2), the historical overview (Chapter 4) and where necessary to provide background to the analysis of interview data and documentary sources in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The process of selection of documents as well as some approaches to content analysis are discussed below.

3.3.2.1 Selection of documents

This started with identifying the key events that have taken place during the period of study; The SACP Special National Congress in April 2005, the ANC National General Council in

June 2005, the Eastern Cape COSATU Congress in June 2006, the COSATU National Congress in September 2006, the Eastern Cape ANC Conference in December 2006, the ANC National Policy Conference in June 2007, the SACP 12th Congress in July 2007 and the ANC 52nd National Conference in December 2007. Also included was the SACP Eastern Cape Conference in May 2008. The reseracher then identified the key documents prepared before these events such as political reports, organisational reports, discussion documents and a draft political programme in the case of the SACP and Strategy and Tactics in the case of the ANC. Also identified were resolutions, declarations and final programmes that emerged after the conference.

The primary documents were gathered from the national organisations, through websites or via personal contacts. Attempts were made to gather documents at provincial level. However, it was difficult to obtain a large amount of written material at the provincial level. This material is largely not available publicly to the same extent as national materials, which are easily accessible from the internet. Attempts to get access to the records of the provincial organisations were not successful and the documents obtained were obtained through key informants, gatekeepers or participation in events. Some documents that have been presented to conferences, internal or confidential discussion documents and the like, have elicited some of the internal discussions and differences between the Alliance organisations as well as within them. Documents were read, filed and made ready for analysis. Detailed content analysis took place between May and August 2008, as the research problem had become focused, a purposive sample emerged and the main categories were elicited from the interview data.

3.3.2.2 Approaches to content analysis

Content analysis is considered to be a mode of observation and although it is generally well suited to the study of communications it was seen to be appropriate for this study. Content analysis of documentary sources constitutes a part of the primary data collected and analysed for this study. Babbie and Mouton (2001) note that, as a mode of observation, content analysis requites a considered handling of *the what*, and the analysis of data collected addresses questions of *why* and *with what effect*. Content analysis, or textual analysis, allows discernment of the analysis, ideas, positions of the three organisations under study, and, moreover, allows for the analysis of how positions have changed over time. It is possible to

look at whether the Eastern Cape positions differ from those of the national organisations and to what extent the province has been reacting to national positions or is a proactive driver of the national positions. Further, it is possible to detect differences between the interview data and the data from the texts, as well as intertextuality. Reading of documentary sources was used to prepare for interviews and at times play 'the Devil's Advocate' in interviews. Moreover it allowed for a look at the application of the key concepts under study; class and race.

Social movement theory[20] warns against some of the dangers of relying on documents in the study of collective action or ideas, and ideology within social and political movements (see Diani and Eyerman, 1992, Donati, 1992 or Melluci, 1992), since this will bias the voices of the literate, the leaders and the powerful. However this study has been particularly concerned with the dominant ideas and those of the leaders of these organisations. The use of official documents may also leave out the nuances of debates and discussion that are 'simmering behind the scenes' and only present one view of the debate. However, this is where triangulation between interview data, observation and data from the text is useful and the interviews allowed for much more nuance than the documents.

Another method of analysing text, and political material, is discourse analysis. Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis' (2000) draw on Laclau and Mouffe's 1985 work and provide a range of examples of how the political can be given primacy in discourse analysis in order to examine ideologies, movements, collective action, political construction of social identities, political institutions, forms of struggle and so on. According to Howarth et al. (Ibid, 2000), discourse is a social and political construction that enables a system of relations between different objects and practices, while providing subject positions with which social agents can identify. Discourse theory investigates the way in which social practices articulate and contest the discourses that constitute social reality. Further, discourses are concrete systems of social relations and practices that are intrinsically political, and always involve the exercise of power[21].

[20] For more material on social movement studies, see for instance Diani and Eyerman's Studying Collective Action (1992), Della Porta and Diani's Social Movements: an Introduction (1999) or Maheu's Social Movements and Social Classes: the future of collective action (1995) for more discussions on Social movements and social movement theory. See also Barker and Dale's Protest Waves in Western Europe: A critique of "New Social Movement" Theory (1998) for a critique.

[21] See also Fairclough (1992), who places primacy on context and the interplay between social relations, social context and discourse. Wilson (2001) on the other hand puts the analysis of lexical choices, syntactic selections and grammar at the

3.4 Data analysis

Data collected means very little until it is evaluated and interpreted with reference to the context in which it was generated. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, research must be analysed in the context where it was undertaken (Babbie and Mouton 2001). Content analysis of interview transcripts and text is, first and foremost, about organising the substantive content. There are two strands to this analysis, namely identifying key substantive points and putting these into categories (Gillham, 2000). For the interview data and documentary sources, main and subcategories were identified and the data was further analysed to find patterns of similarity and difference, to identify key concepts and to analyse these.

Drawing on grounded theory, open coding and selective coding was used in the analysis of both the interview and the documentary data. Open coding is the process of creating categories pertaining to certain segments of the text, such as sentences or paragraphs. Selective coding is "the process of selecting a core category, systematically relating it to other categories, validating those relationships, and filling in categories that need further refinement and development" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990 cf. Babbie and Mouton, 2001:500). The core category is the central phenomenon around which all other categories are integrated.

The qualitative approach to research makes the researcher the most important research 'instrument', and this places added responsibility on the researcher to be unbiased in the interpretation and analysis of the data. In order to enhance validity and reliability of data, it is suggested that qualitative researches make use of triangulation, that is, the use of multiple sources and multiple methods of collecting data. Member checks, the practice of sending transcripts or even analysis to informants is encouraged (Babbie and Mouton, 2001, Corbin and Strauss, 1997). In this study transcripts were sent to informants. Some comments were received, but none of the informants edited the transcript[22]. It is also suggested that researchers subject their project to peer review and that an audit trail is kept. In this case, an offer was made to present the research findings to the informants and their organisations.

centre of political discourse analysis and states that one of the core goals of political discourse analysis is to seek out ways in which language choice is manipulated for specific effect.

[22] The comments were largely self reflective, such as "thanks again for the script, it represent a good read. I really surprise even myself how frank I am about the state of our Party. I think this will help in putting more effort in building the Party" (15 July, 2008)

However, it is uncertain if or when this will take place. Documentary sources and transcripts will be kept in a retrievable database.

3.5 Conclusion: Reflections on fieldwork and limitations of the study

This chapter has discussed the qualitative research methods used in this study, namely in-depth interviews and content analysis of documentary sources. The chapter also described the research process in some detail. This conclusion will provide some reflections on the experiences with research in the field and the limitations of the study.

In principle, access to informants was not a constraint in this study. However, time constrains on the side of informants was a challenge. In some cases informants did not turn up for set appointments. They frequently changed times and dates and there were occasions where the researcher travelled long distances to meet an informant, only to find that the informant was no longer available, or was 'double booked' and did not have time for the scheduled interview. This challenge has had an impact on the final sample. Another challenge pertained to getting the informants to go beyond rhetoric in interviews, and to speak honestly and openly. Although there was a certain level of trust obtained between the informants and the interviewer, there was still reservation when it came to talking about individuals, giving concrete examples and discussing sensitive events. A further challenge pertained to language. During the events described above, the dominant language was isiXhosa[23]. While the researcher has some basic conversational isiXhosa knowledge, formal observation would have required translation.

The difficulty in gaining access to contemporary documentary material from the organisations in the Eastern Cape has also presented a challenge. The ANC, SACP and COSATU would not grant access to their archives and documents, such as minutes from meetings, non-public discussion documents, correspondence, etc. This has led to reliance on public documents and documents from the national organisations rather than the ones from the Eastern Cape. The research also revealed a poor state of archives in the SACP and Cosatu in the province.

[23] isiXhosa is one of the eleven official languages in South Africa and is indigenous to the geographical area that is now the Eastern Cape.

This study has mainly been concerned with what can be considered the 'political elite' within the Alliance in the Eastern Cape, and not the rank-and-file membership of the three organisations, ANC, SACP and COSATU. Social Movement theory warns against biasing elites in the study of social (or political) movements (Cox, 1998, Melucci, 1992). Due to these challenges in the field, one can expect some limitations and gaps in the evidence. Although this study focuses on the Eastern Cape, the importance of the Eastern Cape demonstrated in Chapter 1, and the use of national documentation, allows for conclusions to be made not only about the Eastern Cape, but also about the Alliance Left in South Africa.

Other limitations pertain to politics at municipal level, where Left activists or 'deployed comrades' may have succeeded in making certain policy or programmatic advances with the budget of the municipality. Such analysis was not within the scope of this study.

Chapter 4: A Brief History of ANC, SACP and Cosatu politics in South Africa.

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the history of the three organisations that are the focus of this study, the ANC, the SACP and COSATU will be discussed. The emergence of these three organisations and how they formally came to be in a tripartite Alliance in 1990 and 1991 after the unbanning of the ANC and the SACP will be examined. There will be focus on political practise as well as debate and ideology, within and between movements and organisations. The three organisations will be placed in the context of the history of the South African Left and the anti-Apartheid movement.

4.2 The early politics of class and the formation of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA)

The ideas of socialism, social democracy and syndicalism came to South Africa with European immigrants. The early socialist movement was fragmented along racial lines and prejudiced towards white male labour (Drew, 2000). Early Marxist analyses were based on British and European experiences, rather than evolving in response to South Africa's particular conditions of colonial and imperial domination (Drew, 1997 and 2000). A minority in this movement argued for the organisation of Black workers and formed the first Black trade union, the Industrial Workers of Africa, in 1917. Until the early 1920s the majority of these socialists continued to see the colour or race question as something which would distract from the class question.

The Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 and the formation of the Comintern inspired about ten socialist groups operating in South Africa to move towards unity (Drew, 2000, Simons and Simons, 1969). In 1920 the Industrial Socialist League merged with the Communist League and some members of the Social Democratic Federation to form the

Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), with branches in Cape Town and Johannesburg. In July 1921 the CPSA (Section of the Communist International) was formed (Simons and Simons, 1969).

The newly formed CPSA was well aware of the limitations posed by the dominance of whites in the Party. Simons and Simons (1969) observed that branches hesitated to accept Africans who applied for membership. In the early 1920s it was the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU), and not the CPSA that recruited African and Coloured workers into trade unions. The communists saw as their main function the direction of the militancy of white workers against the capitalist system, and to transform the race war into a class war. White workers were protecting the colour bar and threatened revolt if semi-skilled jobs were opened up to Africans and Coloureds on the mines and in the railways. By 1922 unskilled Afrikaners had replaced many of the English workers who had left due to the First World War. In the face of wage cuts and retrenchments white miners struck in January 1922, a strike which culminated in the violent Rand Revolt in March that year. While the organisations that made up the CPSA had largely ignored the Black strikes in Natal and on the Witwatersrand a few years earlier, the party supported the revolt. Thus, the CPSA were seen by Black radicals as supporting white labour, and indirectly, the repression of Black labour (Meli, 1988, Drew, 2000, Simons and Simons, 1969).

In the mid 1920s the Party increasingly turned to Black workers and engaged in night schools, trade union work, meetings and public gatherings. By 1928 the party claimed that 1600 of its 1750 members were Black and it had recruited a number of Black leaders. Party activists became increasingly involved in the ICU's branches in Port Elizabeth and East London, Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town. However, the communists had competition from the interests of white liberals and others for their influence in the ICU and in 1926 communists were expelled (Drew, 1997 and 2000, Simons and Simons, 1969).

4.3 Influence of the Comintern and the Native Republic thesis

As noted in Chapter 2, the Comintern started giving more attention to anti-colonial and national liberation struggles in the colonies as prospects of revolution in Europe waned in the mid- 1920s. This was a period in which the Comintern increasingly became involved in the

affairs of the CPSA. For South Africa the land question was at the core of struggle. At the time, the native republic thesis offered a particular solution to South Africa's national question: majority rule as a stage towards socialism (Drew, 2000).

Prominent activists, Black and White, at first opposed the thesis. Some argued that the thesis would alienate white workers and send them into the hands of the white bourgeois nationalist government, and that the slogan would not be readily understood by 'the natives'. Leading communists held the view that there "is no need to go through the laborious and dangerous process of building up a native bourgeoisie movement, the leadership of which must be displaced before the proletarian revolution can be achieved" (Roux 1928a, in Drew, 1997, p 81-84). Other prominent CPSA activists, however, believed that the road to socialism lay through majority rule, established through a national liberation struggle, and that this liberation movement was potentially revolutionary, no matter its class leadership. (Bunting, 1928a, 1928b, Roux, 1928a, 1928b in Drew, 1997, Drew, 2000).

There was also unhappiness about the doctrinaire authority of the Comintern and activists from the party engaged in a process that attempted to amend the thesis to South Africa conditions. Nonetheless, at the CPSA's Sixth Congress in January 1929 the thesis was adopted, and the formal thesis read: *'An Independent South African Native Republic as a stage towards the Workers and Peasants Republic, guaranteeing protection and complete equality to all national minorities'.* The ultimate goal among most communists at the time was to achieve unity of the proletariat across the colour line. They accepted that racial inequality obstructed any chance of such unity. Hence, in challenging racial inequality, the Native Republic thesis was seen as a means to promote working class unity and the final thesis was an effort to combine democracy and socialism in one stage (Drew, 2000).

4.4 Early Black resistance and the birth of the SANNC

In 1882, Africans in the Cape formed the first Black political organisation, Imbumba yama Africa (Union of Africans) which advocated African unity and planned representations to the white authorities. The first African Native Congress was formed in 1900 in Natal, and the South African Native Congress was formed in East London in 1902. Subsequently similar organisations were formed in the Cape, Natal and the Orange Free State. These early African

political organisations were concerned with the conditions of Africans, their marginalisation, and they campaigned for representation in parliament and the extension of the franchise to ('civilised') Africans throughout the country (Meli, 1988).

The first Coloured political organisation, the African Peoples Organisation (APO), was established in 1902 in Cape Town and was set up to 'safeguard the Coloured people's interest'. APO mainly engaged in electoral politics in the Cape, but was also the first organisation to call for full equity among all South Africans. The Natal Indian Congress was formed in Durban in 1894. These early organisations and the resistance among Blacks was mainly concerned with the injustices against the different communities - racial, colour-caste or what came to be known as 'nations' - rather than any widespread unity and organisation between them (Meli, 1988).

The South African Native National Congress (SANNC) was formed in Bloemfontein in January 1912. Unlike previous organisations that based their tactics on working with sympathetic whites, it recognised that Africans should themselves pressure government with their demands and looked forward to backing their own candidates in the elections (Karis and Carter, 1972). Its founding members were rural and urban African professionals, landowners, chiefs and independent peasants. The aspirations and empowerment of this social group was threatened by racist laws and a range of measures leading up to the 1913 Native Land Act, to restrict the purchase of land by Africans and to the squashing of African competition to less efficient white farmers (Seme, 1911, Jabavu, 1912, Karis and Carter, 1972, Meli, 1988, Lodge, 1983).

The founders of the SANNC had recognised that they needed to unite and fight on a national basis. The SANCC aimed to "bring into common action as one political people all tribes and clans of various tribes or races and by means of combined effort and united political organisation to defend their freedom, rights and privileges" (SANCC, 1919:77). The early SANNC rejected the colour bar and any form of political segregation based on race (see Seme, 1911, Dube, 1914). Its main commitment was towards the attainment of equal political rights, within the existing system, with an approach that was marked by deep-seated moderation, exemplified by no less than three deputations to Britain. SANNC disassociated itself from the industrial strikes between 1916 and 1920.

In the first twenty years of the twentieth century, the number of African workers in mining and manufacturing grew, and African workers increasingly became conscious. The less affluent members of the African middle class that the SANCC drew its support from shared many of their experiences with the workers. Lodge (1983) argues that although there were some signs towards radicalisation of the SANCC from 1918-1920, spurred by African strikes and the 1919 pass protests, there was considerable unease among the founders of the SANCC about radicalisation, what they termed 'Bolshevism and nihilism'. Lodge maintains that the de-radicalisation that the founding leaders embarked upon was assisted between 1920 and 1924 by a series of measures, such as the native Housing Act, that detached the petty-bourgeois Africans from the popular classes. The Congress leadership came to be diverted in those years into the Joint Councils movement, which provided for some consultation between Blacks and white liberals (documents 33a-33c in Karis and Carter, 1972,). Karis and Carter (1972) assert that by the mid-1920s ICU was challenging the pre-eminence of the ANC[24] in African politics.

As the government further entrenched segregation and restriction on both movement and resistance among Blacks between 1920 and 1935, African and Black protest continued to express itself. The issue of political participation was the most pressing issue within the ANC. Joint conferences of non-Europeans (Africans, Indians and Coloureds) were held in 1927, 1930, 1931 and 1934 (documents 44 – 47in Karis and Carter, 1972,). However, it was difficult to build a united front against the white government as the three groups all sought to preserve their distinct 'national' identity.

Meli (1988: 67) argues that moderate politics dominated the ANC until the end of the Second World War, after which they began to relate to a wider social base of support, particularly amongst poorer Africans. This change was born from experience as the more radical members began to recognise that their previous tactics were not bringing them any nearer to their aim. The Hertzog Bills, which further restricted the voting and property rights of Africans were passed in 1936, and the ANC for the first time saw that it would have to resolve its divided loyalties; to the people's demands or to the government (Meli, 1988:86).

[24] SANNC had in 1923 been renamed African National Congress (ANC).

4.5 ANC turn to the masses and closer collaboration with the CPSA

In the 1940s, the ANC saw a greater turn to mass mobilisation, as an attempt to solve the problem of an over-reliance on a small support base among a specific social group and a growing recognition that structurally entrenched racism blocked their aspirations. A growing African workforce, due to increasing industrialisation and urbanisation, had also resulted in a changing social composition of African society (Lodge, 1983, Drew, 2001). A newly formed and more radical ANC Youth League (ANCYL) took over the leadership of the ANC. This group had little connection to trade unions or township communities, but nonetheless argued for a 'turn to mass struggle,' including civil disobedience and non-cooperation. The political content still lay in the liberal democratic tradition of participation in the 'governing bodies' and abolition of racial institutions (Fine and Davis 1991, McKinley, 1997). Alexander argues that ANCYL's Africanism had not moved much beyond that of the early ANC and was based on national unity between "heterogeneous [African] tribes" and cooperation with "other Non-European groups as separate units", closely intersecting with the SACPs analysis at the time (1979: 58).

By the end of the 1940s there had been the 1946 African mineworkers' strike, communal and anti-pass protests, boycotts and some ANC members had participated in the establishment of trade unions in the Transvaal. The leadership of the ANC embraced a strategy based on mass action, despite their limited support for campaigns such as the Alexandra bus boycotts in 1943 and 1944 and the squatter movements in the Johannesburg Black townships in the mid-1940s (Drew, 2001). Although institutionalised racism had long existed, the election of the Afrikaner Nationalists into government in 1948 and the series of repressive laws that followed formally institutionalised Apartheid as a form of government. The ANC adopted a Programme of Action for the first time in 1949, and which reflected the new leadership of the Youth League and paved the way for bolder political action than had previously been possible, and represented a "turning point for the ANC in its relation to the 'masses" (Fine and Davis, 1991: 110).

The ANCs first mass campaign, the Defiance Campaign in 1952 drew large popular support. The campaign, based on groups of volunteers defying petty apartheid laws, and subsequently blocking the judicial system, sparked strikes, protests and riots all over the country. The campaign was most successful in the Eastern Cape towns of Port Elizabeth and East London,

and in smaller towns such as Peddie, Uitenhage and Grahamstown (Lodge, 1983, Legassick, 2007). Nationwide, however, the ANC was unable to contain protests and abandoned the planned second phase of the Campaign. A debate over approach, and polarisation of labour and the elite was raging simultaneously inside the ANC[25] (Karis and Carter, 1973, Legassick, 2007).

After the adoption of the 'native republic thesis' the CPSA began pursuing a 'people's front' agenda that aimed to bring together differing social groups to strengthen the national liberation struggle. This meant limiting the party's earlier criticism of nationalism and working closer with the ANC. In 1950 the government passed the Suppression of Communism Bill and CPSA dissolved in June the same year. The Party reconstituted underground in 1953. By this time, the majority of communists believed that the path to a socialist revolution was through a nationalist struggle and the Party devoted its energy to influence the course of the nationalist movement (Lodge, 1983: 30). The CPSA argued for a revolutionary nationalism and a transformation of the national movement into a "revolutionary party of workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie… in alliance with class conscious European workers and intellectuals" (Fine and Davies 1991:113). After its dissolution its activists started working mainly inside the ANC and the other Congress Alliance organisations and largely subordinated its strategy to that of the ANC.

4.6 The Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter

In 1953 the Congress Alliance was established. The Congress Alliance was made up of the ANC, the all white Congress of Democrats, the South African Coloured Organisation and the South African Indian Congress. The South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and the Federation of South African Women were also included in the Alliance. Alexander (1979) notes that although racial, or what he terms colour-caste, consciousness was very deep among the leaders and members of the three congresses, their leaders had recognised the need to unite across racial barriers. Although the leaders of the four organisations realised that they

[25] In a 1952 circular, the Cape Province of the ANC reflects on the success of the defiance campaign in the Cape and states as one of its victories: "We have got rid of pleading, cowardly and hamba-kahle [go slow] leaders who were always ready to compromise after they had been flattered by taking tea with the rulers of the people. These leaders have now been isolated and are siding with their masters to justify oppression and exploitation; GOOD RIDDANCE" (Working Committee of the ANC (Cape), December 1952 in Karis and Carter, Vol 2, 1973)

had to fight oppression jointly, and not separately, they all accepted the idea that South Africa is made up of four 'national groups'. The three congresses were to remain until 1967, when non-Africans were allowed as members of the ANC for the first time. It was only at the ANC conference in Kabwe in 1985 that non-Africans would be elected to the leadership of the ANC.

The Congress Alliance drew up the Freedom Charter in 1955 and the charter represented a consensus position between the member organisations. McKinley (1997) holds that the adoption of the Freedom Charter as the ANC's political and economic programme was important because it confirmed the ANC's commitment to an accommodationist approach to national liberation and prioritised the multi-class character of the national liberation struggle. The ANC took a leading role in the Congress of the People and the development of the Charter. This period, Dwyer (2003) contends, was the start of the ANCs hegemony over the national liberation movement.

As discussed with regards to other liberation movements in Chapter 2, the African nationalism of the Congress Alliance was not 'nationalist' in the classical sense of a single linguistically or culturally constituted entity[26]. African nationalism was anti-racial and anti-colonial and predominantly about seeking freedom from foreign, or White, oppression. The ANC and the Youth league however recognised that different racial groups, including Europeans, had "come to stay", but that "interracial peace" had to be founded on an end to White domination (ANCYL, 1948, see also documents 48-60 in Karis and Carter, 1972). The 1955 Congress of the People was important in that non-European unity was forged for the first time.

Albert Luthuli, the ANC President was critical of the concept of multi-racialism, preferring the 'non-racialism' and an 'all inclusive' African nationalism that embraced persons of all races who made Africa their home (Karis and Carter, 1972:38). Critics from the Non-European Unity Movement argued that organisation according to Apartheid racial categories represented the segregationist consciousness of the state in the heart of the liberation movement itself. A group of Africanists left and formed the Pan African Congress (PAC) in the aftermath of the Congress of the People, arguing that the revolutionary fervour of African

[26] See e.g. Hobsbawm, 1990, Harman, 1992 or Anderson, 2006.

nationalism was being subordinated to the "liberal influence of 'multi-racialism" (Fine and Davies 1991: 133). The PAC argued that it was Africans only that formed the nation.

4.7 Trade unionism and mass struggles.

In 1955 the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) was formed, and effectively became the trade union wing of the Congress Alliance. The Black urban working class continued to grow in the 1950s and 1960s. With this growth trade unions also grew, and new unions were formed in the Cape and on the Rand in the mid 1950s. Lodge (1983) argues that from its inception SACTU recognised that it would have a role in political as well as economic struggles[27]. In his inaugural address in 1955, its Chairperson, Pieter Beylefeld, stated that "the Trade Unions must be as active in the political field as they are in the economic sphere because the two hang together and cannot be isolated from each other" (Luckhart and Wall, 1980). Strikes and mobilisation were most successful where there were linkages between the local Congress and trade unionists. Trade unions often functioned as 'launch pads' for entry into political activity, particularly in Port Elizabeth.

Lambert and Webster (1988) argue that engagement in and with the Congress Alliance facilitated the rapid development of trade union organisations. It should also be noted that the CPSA was by now banned, and would influence the unions only indirectly (Bonner, 1980, in Lodge, 1983). SACTU members were building the union movement and Congress movement at the same time. Many of these militants also joined the SACP. Fine and Davies (1991) argue to the contrary that the bargaining power of the workers was still weak, and the working class was 'invisible' politically.

Worker militancy sparked urban as well as rural struggles, and with no viable competitors the ANC was able to assert its leadership and serve as a focus for widespread discontent. However, Lodge (1983) argues that the ANC had limited involvement in this wave of

[27] Bonner (1980, in Lodge, 1983:200) states that two ideological currents combined to influence SACTU. Firstly, there was the notion of two-stage revolution as adopted by the SACP. Trade unions should subordinate class struggle to the national democratic struggle. The second idea was that of Lenin's view of the limitations of trade union consciousness which, even in the context of national democratic struggle, might induce unions to be economist and reformist. The leadership was openly critical of reformism, but Bonner argues, there is no substantial evidence that African trade unionists generally subscribe to the two stage theory. (1980, in Lodge, 1983: 200)

struggles, such as the Alexandra bus boycotts in the late 1950s, and the anti-pass militancy that broke out in the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. The ANC and the PAC was banned in 1960, following the nationwide upheaval ensuing from the Sharpeville massacre.

4.8 Consolidating the theory of national liberation

After the banning in 1952, the CPSA had gradually reconstituted itself in the underground and announced itself formally in 1960 as the South African Communist Party (SACP). The SACP in its 1962 programme spelled out a new direction and argued that workers should be organised in their own party. It prided itself in being a non racial organisation, admitting women and men 'regardless of race and colour'. The programme articulated the thesis of 'colonialism of a special type'. It was defined by the fact that South Africa since 1910 had been an independent state, yet the majority of South Africans did not enjoy independence or freedom. South Africa combined the characteristics of both an imperialist state and a colony within a single, geographic, political and economic entity, and 'Non White South Africa' was the colony of 'White South Africa' (SACP, 1962). The SACP called for a national democratic revolution to destroy white domination and break the power of monopoly capitalism. National democracy was defined as a transitional stage from capitalism to socialism and the programme explicitly stated that it was not a programme for a socialist state, but for the building of a national democratic state (SACP, 1962, Bundy, 1989 Fine and Davies, 1991).

It had earlier been argued that, as the majority of Black people were workers and peasants, and there was no substantial African bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie, there would be a 'seamless transition' between the struggle for national liberation and the struggle for socialism (see, e.g. Harmel, 1953 and Jordaan, 1954 in Drew, 1997). However, the CST thesis was also criticised from within the SACP. Wolpe argued "the conceptualisation of class relations, which is present in the theory, is accorded little or no role in the analysis of relations of dominance and exploitation, which are, instead, conceived of as occurring between 'racial', 'ethnic', and 'national' categories" (Wolpe, 1975:1). Further, "the theory of internal colonialism is unable to explain the relationship between class relations and race or

ethnic, etc, relations." (Wolpe, 1975:7). Wolpe had earlier (1972:429) argued that the racist ideology and policy of the state were not only means for the reproduction of segregation and racial discrimination generally, but also for the reproduction of a particular mode of production. Magubane (1979) writes that "the seemingly 'autonomous' existence of racism today does not lessen the fact that it was initiated by the needs of capitalist development or that these needs remain the dominant factor in racist societies" (1979:3).

The ANC's view was that the time had come for an all out assault on the Apartheid state and for new methods of struggle (Lodge, 1983, Fine and Davies, 1991).The ANC leaders were also inspired by events in neighbouring countries and across the world where guerrilla movements were liberating their people from colonial oppression. The armed struggle seemed a solution. It was difficult, however, for the ANC with its commitment to non-violence to make this decision (see Luthuli, 1952 and 1964, Mandela, 1962 and Tambo, 1968).

The Congress Alliance formed a military wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), better known as MK, in 1962. Operating both inside and outside the country, acts of economic sabotage were to prepare the ground for guerrilla warfare. The idea was that economic sabotage would force capital from the country and in the long run be a heavy drain on the economy. It was assumed that this would eventually lead the white voters to rethink their position (McKinley, 1997, Legassick, 2007). In this period, use was made of the SACP's contacts in the Soviet Union to supply military hardware and financial support for MK operations and the setting up of ANC and MK camps in exile.

The regime passed the Sabotage Act in 1962 and by 1964 MK inside the country had been uprooted. By 1966 little of the armed underground was left inside the country. In the years to come sabotage campaigns failed to incite the masses to action and the congress organisations were collapsing under the strain, as activists from mass organisations and SACTU were recruited or forced to go into exile. SACTU went from 59 952 members in 63 organisations in 1961 to 16 040 members in 13 organisations in 1969 (Fine and Davies, 1991:239). Many SACTU leaders also went into exile in the 1960s. After the banning, the ANCs programme of mass struggle virtually ceased inside the country. From the early 1960s, legal mass work was the 'minor side of work' while illegal work was the 'major side'. Increasingly, the strategy of the ANC was also to canvass for international support.

In 1969 the ANC held a consultative conference in Morogoro, Tanzania. The SACP and SACTU were present. The conference adopted the ANC Strategy and Tactics document as the political programme of the Alliance and with it the CST thesis. Although not a socialist programme, it stated that the ANC's nationalism should not be "confused with the classical drive by an elitist group among the oppressed people to gain ascendancy so that they can replace the oppressor in the exploitation of the mass" (ANC, 1969:12). Further it stated that "it is inconceivable for liberation to have meaning without a return of the wealth of the land to the people as a whole. It is therefore a fundamental feature of our strategy that victory must embrace more than formal political democracy" (ANC, 1969:15). The ANC allowed the entry of non-Africans into its ranks for the first time. Some ANC 'dissidents' did not appreciate the election of Joe Slovo and Yusuf Dadoo, two communist party leaders onto the Revolutionary Council, a structure with representatives from all Congress Alliance partners. This dissident Group of 8 was later expelled (Moloka, 2002). The opening up for non-Africans in the ANC effectively dissipated the other national congresses[28].

The program articulated the essence of what was understood as the NDR at the time. The SACP stated that the main aims of the South African democratic revolution were defined in the Freedom Charter (1962:26). In the SACPs' conception, as with that of other liberation movements, there would be an uninterrupted transition towards social emancipation after the capture of state power. The NDR was a 'direct route' to socialism (Slovo, 1988). The NDR was understood among the liberation movements as a revolution led by motive forces from among the oppressed to defeat repressive and colonial regimes and build people's, or national, democracies. This would be both an objective in itself, and a necessary process if the 'balance of forces' prevented an immediate transition to socialism (Nzimande, 2006). The NDR was not a socialist programme, but expressed "the broad objective interests not only of the working class but also of most of the other classes within the nationally-dominated majority, including the black petit-bourgeoisie and significant strata of the emergent black bourgeoisie" (Slovo, 1988:3). This reality, he wrote "provides the foundation for a struggle which aims to mobilise to its side all the oppressed classes and strata as participants in the national liberation alliance" (Ibid, 1988:3).

[28] It appears, however, that some form of organisation of Indian communities remained. Lodge (1983) refers to the Natal Indian Congress as instrumental in the boycott of the South African Indian Council in 1979-1980, indicating that at least the Indian Congress remained after this period. In 1988 a joint statement was issued by the ANC, the Natal Indian Congress and the Transvaal Indian Congress after meetings in Lusaka (ANC, 1988a).

While some in the ANC expressed admiration for the Tanzanian Arusha declaration (see 1967 Sechaba article in Wallerstein and Braganca, 1982) others, such as Mandela stated that although 'attracted to the idea of a classless society' he was not a socialist, but an admirer of the parliamentary system and would "borrow the best from the West and the East" (1964 in Wallerstein and Braganca, 1982:91-95).

4.9 Increased worker militancy in the 1970s, and the 1976 Soweto revolt

After two decades of limited political activity inside South Africa, and almost an entire generation of political leaders and trade unions banned, jailed or exiled, the 1970s saw a massive upsurge in political activity[29]. Durban continued to be the centre of these strikes up to 1976, with militancy spreading to East London and the East Rand. Trade unions emerging at this time had constituted themselves in a bottom-up, factory based process. The leadership of the unions came from intellectuals outside the ranks of the organised working class, and most of the unions were 'non racial'.[30] As a result of this wave of militancy, the government opened up for official registration of unions organising African workers through the Wiehahn commission reforms in 1979. The Wiehahn commission proposed that through a system of formal registration African trade unions should be incorporated into the officially sanctioned collective bargaining system. With this, statutory jobs reservation would also be phased out. The independent[31] unions resisted registration on principle, as registering would be tantamount to condoning the system (Maree et al, 1987a).

Black Consciousness ideas emerged to occupy the vacuum left by the banned Congress movement. Black Consciousness (BC) had its roots in African nationalism, however it differed from earlier versions in its inclusivity of all non-white groups and urged a common

[29] During the 1960s an average of 2000 workers went on strike each year in South Africa, and there was a slight increase to 5000 in 1972. In the first three months of 1973, there were 160 strikes, with over 61000 workers involved (Lodge, 1983:326-327, Maree, 1987b:2). A smaller strike wave in 1974 saw workers pouring into the newly formed unions.
[30] Apart from the unions supported by the Witwatersrand Urban Training Project, which adhered to exclusively African leadership (Maree at al, 1987).
[31] In this period 'independent' unions refer to those unions that did not register with the government. A few years later the meaning of 'independent' unions took another form, namely those that were not affiliated to the UDF and the Congress Alliance.

solidarity and struggle amongst the African, Indian and coloured groups[32]. The primary driver of BC, the South African Student Organisations was formed in 1968 as an alternative to the segregated National Union of South African Students. Subsequently the Black Peoples Convention was formed. At the core of the BC philosophy was the reawakening of the humanity and dignity of Black people. Students who had been exposed to BC teachings and ideas at university became school teachers, priests and journalists and had a major influence on township cultural events, schools and the popular press (Lodge, 1982, Motlabi, 1984 and Meli, 1988).

On the 16 June 1976, 15 000 - 20 000 school children from Soweto demonstrated against the imposition of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in schools. Police opened fire and killed one person in what was to become a wave of school student protest all over the country. During the next few days the revolt spread across the East Rand, Johannesburg and to Natal and by August the protest and ensuing police repression had spread to the western and eastern Cape and the fatalities mounted. Schools remained empty for most of the year and by October 1977 the riots had claimed 700 official deaths, though the total number was probably much higher (Lodge, 1983, Meli 1988). Massive police repression followed and scores of young people left the country, where many came to join the ANC and the MK camps (Hirson, 1979, Lodge 1983, Meli, 1988). This movement was largely not working with the trade unions. However some linkages were made by the students and workers in the aftermath of Soweto (Mafeje, 1978, Marx, 1992).

Raymond Suttner (2008) has brought to the fore new evidence about the underground struggles of the ANC from about 1953 to the unbanning of the ANC in 1990. Suttner contests the dominant view of scholars and historians that the decade between 1964 and the Durban strikes in 1973 and the 1976 youth revolts was a quiet decade, with the ANC ceasing to operate inside the country. Suttner rather argues that this decade saw a small, but significant, and growing underground network. This provides important explanation for the re-emergence of ANC symbols and support for the ANC in 1976-77 as well as in the 1980s.

[32] In fact, the very conception of Black, as group of oppressed, made up of Africans, Indians and Coloureds as used it is in this thesis and the way it is now widely used in South Africa, stems from Black Consciousness.

4.10 Resurgence of mass politics in the 1980s

In 1982 and 1983 the government proposed reform of the influx control system and a new constitution with a tri-cameral parliament, with separate chambers for Coloureds and Indians, was launched. Africans would get representation in segregated local government. This was one of the reforms designed to attract the support and collaboration of the Indian and Coloured population and break the unity of the oppressed. However, there was mass resistance to these reforms and the proposals acted as a catalyst for the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) which came to be the umbrella for mass organisation in the 1980s. Many of the leaders and activists in the UDF were also active in the underground structures of the ANC (Suttner, 2008, Seekings, 2000). The preferred tactic of the UDF was consumer boycotts, which forced local (white) business people to support the demands of the civics. Nationwide school-class boycotts started in the Eastern Cape in 1985 and spread across the country. In places such as Port Elizabeth the UDF was closely linked to trade unions. States of emergency were imposed in response to mass action in 1985 and 1986, renewed annually for four years and were marked by detentions, censorship and de facto military rule. Two thirds of the total arrests during the emergency were in the Eastern Cape (Seekings, 2000).

The rapid growth both in members and in unions increased political consciousness and militancy among the African working class continued in the 1980s. Several of the new unions were also involved in community and political struggles, such as the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) in East London[33] and Motor Assembly and Component Workers Union in Port Elizabeth. These unions argued that as workers were also members of communities, unions should also fight for their members' interest outside the point of production (Lambert and Webster, 1988). It is common to speak of 'workerist' and 'populist' unions in this period. The workerist unions focused on workplace organisation and building workplace power. The emphasis was on worker control and leadership, even where union members engaged in community and political organisation (Lambert and Webster, 1988, Pillay, 2006). The 'populist' unions emphasised alliances with communities and affiliated to the UDF. Workerist unions did not affiliate to the UDF. Anti-populism and rejection of nationalism was the sentiment of many of the unions affiliated to the Federation of South

[33] SAAWU had political significance in that it was not started by white intellectuals or former trade unionists, but was rather formed by young workers and activists in the Eastern London area. The union also played an overtly political role and was drawn into community struggles in townships such as Mdantsane (Maree, 1987c).

African Trade Unions (FOSATU), which had been formed in 1979 (Lambert and Webster, 1988, Baskin, 1991).

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was formed in 1985 after years of 'unity talks' between unions. By March 1986 a formal relationship between COSATU and the exiled ANC group had been cemented (Marx, 1992). COSATU advocated mobilisation on the shop floor as well as in townships and a political vision based on a future that was conceived as non racial, democratic and socialist (Baskin, 1991). Baskin (1991:91-96) writes about the tensions in the first 18 months of COSATU's existence and stresses the differences over the relationship to the ANC and the UDF. However, in 1987 both the UDF and COSATU adopted the Freedom Charter. Adopting the charter also meant adopting the SACP as the political vanguard of the working class (Ibid, 1991). The effective banning of the UDF in 1988 further entrenched COSATU's role as a social and political union, intimately involved with township struggles, and unionists began to perceive themselves as having an agenda largely consistent with the interest of the Black working class in the country (Marx, 1992).

The central ideology of the UDF, and the 1980s 'Charterist'[34] movement had been that of national identity. Class analysis, although used rhetorically had remained secondary to race or nation, and the primary focus of the UDF was strategic unity rather than ideological cohesion. Some UDF leaders recognised that greater focus on class identity could unite the by-now-established and class conscious unions and the community organisations. This, writes Marx (1992), was consistent with the increasing radicalisation of many activists seeking to gather popular resistance for a final push to state power, with the ANC and SACP playing major roles. For the ANC the immediate objective was an end to the Apartheid regime and a new democratic order (ANC, 1987a, 1988b). As part of the upsurge in the 1980s, MK attacks increased from 4 in 1976 to 234 in 1987 (Marx, 1992:186).

The mass democratic movement had regrouped by the late 1980s and calls were increasingly made for the unbanning of the ANC, the release of Nelson Mandela and an end to all Apartheid legislation (see ANC, 1988b). From 1988-1990 trade unions were practically the only legal formations inside the country which asserted leadership of the internal struggle. ANC/MK activities increased and 'came to a crescendo' in 1988 (Lodge, 1991). The ANC

[34] 'Charterist' refers to the organisations aligned to the ANC and that had adopted the Freedom Charter as their programme.

rejected President Botha's invitation for negotiations and participation in the proposed National Council in 1987 (ANC, 1987). F W De Klerk was elected president of South Africa in 1989, signalling a move towards change and a more conciliatory climate. By this time, leaders of industry had visited the ANC headquarters in Lusaka. Mandela had had no less than 47 meetings with the regime (Marais, 2001).

The 1980s had confirmed for the regime that the popular forces could not be curbed by a reformist project of adjustments in the socio-economic realm. The South African Defence Force had been defeated in Cuito Cuanavale, Angola in March 1988 and Namibia gained independence in 1990 (Marais, 2001). However both the ANC and the regime recognised that the ANC posed no real military threat to the regime. There was also withdrawal of military support for the ANC during the collapse of the Soviet Union and its changing relations with the West. International sanctions and divestment, however, had a profound impact on the economy. These moves led to the unbanning of the ANC, the SACP and PAC and 71 other organisations and the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners in 1990. Marx (1992) also states that the regime wanted to negotiate with the 'old generation' of leaders before a new generation of more militant leaders took over. On its part, the ANC had refined its preconditions for negotiations in the 1989 Harare declaration (OAU/ANC, 1989). In 1988 the ANC in exile developed a set of constitutional guidelines detailing principles for the nature of the state, national identity, a bill of rights, the economy, land reform, a charter protecting workers rights, women and international relations (see the guidelines in Lodge, 1991). The guidelines were firmly rooted in the Freedom Charter.

4.11 Negotiations and the formalisation of the ANC, SACP and COSATU Alliance

In 1990, after the unbanning of the ANC and SACP and other organisations the "strategic alliance with the central objective of dismantling Apartheid and building a non-racial, democratic and unitary South Africa" between ANC, SACP and COSATU became more formal (Baskin, 1991: 432). This Tripartite Alliance, formally constituted at a meeting in May 1990, adopted the ANC as the leader, and agreed to be based on democratic principles and practices, with consultation and consensus as the basis for decision making. It was also recognised that each organisation was independent and would develop its own position and

campaigns, but that the Alliance was to form a joint programme on agreed issues. Baskin (1991), however, notes that, at the time, there was still resistance to this alliance within COSATU. Many leading activists held multiple positions in COSATU, the ANC and SACP. The UDF was disbanded in March 1991 and with it a range of other organisations were incorporated into the ANC.

After the unbanning, the main task of the ANC and SACP was to rebuild their internal structures. The Tripartite Alliance and the South African government started negotiations in 1990. The regime made use of extensive violence, including the arming of vigilante groups and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), to force negotiations, and significantly weaken the grassroots of the movement. South African capital also made their demands clearly heard in the negotiations; the need for a market economy, social and political stability, continuity in state institutions and restraints from radical redistributive measures (Marais, 2001). There was a large gap between the expectations of the mass organisations and the organisations' ability and willingness to meet these expectations.

There was an expectation among many ANC, SACP and COSATU members that the state would wield considerable control over the economy, that nationalisation of the 'commanding heights of the economy' and extensive land reform, based on the Freedom Charter, would be on the cards under an ANC government. During the negotiations period, however, Mandela and other ANC leaders started indicating otherwise on the international arena, to donors and business, while maintaining a radical discourse towards the workers and the mass organisations at home (McKinley, 1997). In 1992 the ANC NEC wrote that changes in Southern Africa were making it increasingly difficult for the ANC to conduct its struggle and that it could not defeat the enemy militarily (ANC, 1992). Further, the international community was making renewed attempts to impose a settlement plan. By this time the ANC has established itself as a legal national political organisation and commanded the support of the majority of South Africans and still had the capacity to mobilise large-scale mass action. The ANC argued that negotiations represented a victory for the democratic movement and a defeat for the forces of apartheid, and that "a peaceful political settlement has always been the first option of the liberation movement" (ANC, 1992).

Within the Alliance, the debates centred on the role and level of 'command' that should be reserved for the state, the role of 'the enemy' i.e. power sharing between ANC and the

National Party and economic policy. At the centre of the negotiations was the shape of the 'development path' that South Africa would need to follow. Marais writes that the negotiations required "that the hegemony of the ruling block be refurbished along dramatically new lines and become based on inclusive principles. This implied a major risk; that the main political force in the democratic movement could be saddled with the task of salvaging South African capitalism by accepting and then managing a historic class compromise" (2002:85). The key to liberation therefore, for the ANC, lay in winning state power and a process of political transformation that would enable it to "gradually vanquish social and economic inequalities" (Ibid, 2002:85).

The negotiations led to much discontent and debate within the ANC and the Alliance partners, and such sentiments were expressed openly in the movement. An example is the response to Slovo's article *Negotiations, what room for compromise* in the African Communist in 1992 (Slovo, 1992). Critics within the SACP such as Pallo Jordan argued against the elevation of negotiations to a strategy, and the 'deep seated pessimism' of the ANC (Jordan, 1992:12). Slovo and other SACP leaders served on the NEC of the ANC and formed part of the negotiations team. The roles played by these leaders were important for the pro-negotiations group to dominate all elements of the Alliance.

The state had failed to defuse political resistance and international sanctions had taken a toll on the state as well as capital. In 1991 the ANC suspended the armed struggle. After the deadlock in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa in May 1992, talks began again with the Multi-Party Negotiation Process. A changed international climate, advocating a 'peaceful transition' and 'multi-party democracy' also put pressure on the negotiating parties. Three years of negotiations ended with a settlement in 1993, based on a liberal-democratic system, as defined in an interim constitution. The final terms of the settlement paved the way for an election in 1994, which the ANC won with an overwhelming majority. The constitution was completed and adopted in 1996.

By this time the international situation had changed dramatically. As stated in Chapter 2 the period of Marxist post-colonial projects in countries such as Mozambique had been destroyed. The ANC thus gained political power in a period of growing neo-liberal capitalist hegemony in the world.

4.12 Conclusion: Multi-class alliances and post 1994 contestation

This brief overview of the ANC-led national liberation movement from about 1912 to 1994 has shown that the Alliance and the ANC, the SACP and COSATU are not homogenous and monolithic organisations, but that strategy and tactics are constantly subject to debate between and within them, as well as reaction to national and international circumstances. At the centre of this contestation, for much of the twentieth century, was the relationship between class and national struggles and the class leadership of the liberation movement. Dwyer (2003) places what he refers to as the "Janus face" of the ANC at the centre of this. At the centre of Alliance politics is "an overall (nationalist based) strategy and, as a means of focusing mass discontent towards prosecuting the NDR in political alliances with other social groups – a multi-class alliance" (Ibid, 2003: 22).

The commitment to multi-class alliance politics permeated the three organisations and to a large extent continues to do so today. Immediately after 1994, the Alliance was concerned with building a democratic government, and changing a state apparatus that had served the needs of a minority of the population only. The immediate programme of the Alliance was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), a programme that was the result of inputs by grassroots activists and trade unions. The terms of the settlement, however, placed severe limitations on the ability of the ANC to implement the Keynesian flavoured RDP in the way its adherents had imagined. Bond (2000) writes of an "elite transition" in the early years of the ANC government, particularly marked by its neo-liberal economic policy. Capital and leading liberals wooed many leaders of the Alliance to their side in what Sparks (2003) calls "the great u-turn".

During an orchestrated process of scenario planning and preparations for government, key leaders in the unions and the ANC were presented with a picture of an economy in crisis and came to accept the need for orthodox economic policy that gave rise to the 1996 Growth Employment and Redistribution programme (GEAR). The RDP office was closed down only 2 years after it had been opened. Catchpowle and Cooper (2003) note that the ANC government adopted corporatism at a time when 'welfare corporatism' has been replaced by 'neo-liberal corporatism' (see Chapter 2). Corporatism triumphed as a result of simultaneous pressure from big business for economic policy changes, a 'U-Turn' on the side of the ANC, pressure for implementation of the RDP and from trade unions. A corporatist framework

secured the legitimacy of the ANC Government and was used to overcome opposition to economic agendas that would ensue (Ibid, 2003).

COSATU and the SACP reacted with fervour, and have continued to do so on numerous occasions. Intellectuals, as well as the media, have repeatedly predicted the split of the Alliance. However the Alliance remains, as does the allegiance to the Freedom Charter, the CST, the national democratic revolution and thus the need for a multi class ANC. However, despite a rhetorical 'bias towards the workers and poor' the working class has suffered severe blows since 1994 and this has made the contestations for class hegemony over the Alliance, and thus the ANC, more prominent. This is what will be explored in the coming three chapters.

Chapter 5: Left politics in the Eastern Cape 1994-2008

5.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter the history of the three organisations under study, the ANC, the SACP and Cosatu and their evolution in the course of the national liberation struggle was discussed. In this chapter the focus will be on the Eastern Cape and on Left politics in practice after 1994. The chapter starts with a discussion of the Alliance post 1994; what it is and what 'roles' the three constituent parts play. Secondly there will be a return to the definition of Left politics that was raised in Chapter Two and discussion of the relevance of the Left/Right dichotomy for studying Alliance politics. Given the two pronged definition of Left politics adopted in Chapter 2, it will be argued that there is a Right and the Left wing within the Alliance and the ANC, and that the NDR (National Democratic Revolution) and its characterisation is important for this distinction.

The study will proceed to outline the structure, leadership and membership of the Alliance partners. Further it will chronicle the main events on the Eastern Cape political calendar between 1994 and 2008 and place these in a national context.

5.2. The Tri-partite Alliance

As discussed above, the Tri-partite Alliance is made up of the ANC, the SACP and Cosatu. This alliance is referred to as the Tri-partite Alliance, or simply the Alliance. In policy documents, the Alliance is referred to as a strategic alliance, not an electoral alliance (SACP, 2008:7). There is no formal pact or contract between the partners, but the constitutions of the ANC and the SACP make some reference to the Alliance and the nature of the relationship between the three organisations. The Constitution of the ANC notes that the 'parties in alliance' are the SACP and Cosatu, and that dual membership and holding of office is permitted (ANC, 2007d:24). The Constitution of the SACP states as one of its aims, "to participate in and strengthen the revolutionary alliance of all classes and strata whose interests are served by the immediate aims of the national democratic revolution" (SACP,

2006c:2). In its political program "the SACP expects all of its members who are ANC public representatives to be exemplary communists, respecting the integrity, unity and discipline of our leading alliance partner, the ANC, without losing their own communist identity, principles and morality." (2007a:25). The Constitution of Cosatu makes no reference to the Alliance. However, its political programme does. Cosatu states that it entered into a strategic alliance with the ANC and SACP "in recognition of our common aims and the historic reality that no trade union, acting on its own, can liberate a country" (Cosatu, 2003b:1). In its 2015 programme, Cosatu also recognises the limitations of this alliance in practice and the contestation that takes place over the direction and characterisation of the NDR (2003b:6).

The three organisations play different 'roles' in the alliance. The ANC, the leader of the Alliance, is described as a non-racial, non-sexist and democratic liberation movement that aims to

> "unite all the people of South Africa, Africans in particular, for the complete liberation of the country from all forms of discrimination and national oppression. [And] end apartheid in all its forms and transform South Africa as rapidly as possible into a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic country based on the principles of the Freedom Charter and in pursuit of the national democratic revolution" (ANC, 2007d:2).

Membership in the ANC is open to all South Africans over 18 years that agree with its programme (2007d).

The SACP aims to be the leading political force of the South African working class and states that its interests are to advance, deepen and defend the national democratic revolution to achieve socialism. SACP identifies itself as a vanguard of the working class and seeks to win acceptance as such "by democratic means and in ideological contest with other political parties" (2006c:1). Further, the SACP aims "to end the system of capitalist exploitation in South Africa and to establish a socialist society based on the common ownership of, participation in, and control by the producers of the key means of production" (2006c:1). The SACP is guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism as laid out by Marx, Engels and Lenin (2006c). Membership is open to all South Africans over 16 years who agree with its principles and programme (2006c).

Cosatu is a federation of 22 affiliate industrial unions and states in its constitution that it is committed to a unified, democratic South Africa, free of oppression and economic exploitation under the leadership of a united working class. The aims of Cosatu are to fight for workers' rights, build solidarity, encourage industrial unionism and support its affiliates. Membership in Cosatu is open to all unions that subscribe to its constitution. Rules for individual membership in Cosatu's 22 affiliate unions differ, but Cosatu only accepts unions that are controlled by democratically elected worker representatives at all levels and limit their membership to specified industries. Affiliate union officials should have no voting rights in Cosatu affiliate unions (2003c).

There is no formal pact or programme that binds the three organisations formally in an alliance. The SACP and Cosatu do not have voting power in the National General Council nor the National Conference of the ANC, although they send delegations. There is some degree of overlapping membership and leadership. Overlapping leadership overlap in the Eastern Cape will be discussed in sections 5.4 and 5.6 below. It is common that leaders of the ANC have a background in the SACP or Cosatu. For example, the last three Secretaries General of the ANC were former Secretaries General of the National Union of Mineworkers. The current Secretary General of the ANC is also the Chairperson of the SACP. Of 53 ANC Members of the Legislature in the Eastern Cape, seven have a background as leaders of Cosatu in the province. A survey investigating Cosatu workers' political attitudes found that 74% of Cosatu members would vote for the ANC in the 2004 provincial and national elections. For the Eastern Cape the figure was slightly higher, at 79% (Cherry and Southall, 2006:79).

The three partners meet in the National Alliance Secretariat. In addition, there are periodic Alliance Summits that debate policy matters. There is also an Alliance Secretariat at the provincial level made up of the secretaries of the ANC, SACP and Cosatu. Between 1999 and 2004, the Alliance Secretariat in the Eastern Cape would meet every week, however this stopped after the 2004 national elections. Prior to the ANC's National Conference in December 2007, Cosatu and the SACP complained of poor Alliance relations and argued that "the Alliance hardly exists on the ground" (SACP and Cosatu, 2007, Cosatu, 2007d, SACP, 2008). In response to the experiences with deployment and the placing of SACP and Cosatu representatives on ANC lists, Cosatu and the SACP in 2007 and 2008 called for a 'reconfigured alliance'. An alliance or electoral pact to be signed before the 2009 national

and provincial election was proposed, including quotas for SACP and Cosatu on the ANC list and some degree of direct accountability and recall for the SACP and Cosatu (Cosatu, 2007d, SACP, 2008). The idea of a pact was mooted in Cosatu at the time of the unbanning of the ANC and the SACP. The pact would be a formal agreement binding all Alliance partners to an agreed programme framework for governance. However the idea was abandoned in favour of joint Alliance commitment to the Reconstruction and Development Programme before the 1994 elections (Cosatu, 2007d).

With the ANC being the leader of the Alliance, and the organisation that contests elections, its political programme, 'Strategy and Tactics', is a major battle ground for political direction of the Alliance. Cosatu has adopted a policy of 'swelling the ranks' of the ANC. Its objective is to influence the ANC from branch level upwards (Cosatu, 2003b). When talking of contestation within the Alliance in this thesis, this largely refers to contestation over ANC, and thus government, policy.

5.3. Can the Left/Right dichotomy be applied to the Alliance?

In Chapter 2 the Left was defined as the elements on the political spectrum that are concerned with the progressive resolution of involuntary disadvantage and with the goal of abolishing class society and capitalism. It was noted that the Left/Right dichotomy is used to describe distinct political entities or standpoints, but also to differentiate positions within movements and organisations. It was stressed that political ideologies and positions exist on a continuum. Further, it was argued that an organisation or a movement can be placed on the Left/Right spectrum, but that an organisation, in the case of this study, an alliance of organisations, may also harbour groups that occupy multiple spaces on this continuum. It has been maintained that the ANC and the Alliance is a 'broad church' made up of liberals, Christian democrats, communists, socialists, social democrats, African nationalists, Africanists, religious people and atheists.

Nowhere in official documents does the ANC refer to itself as right wing or as harbouring right wing tendencies. The ANC is however avowedly non-socialist, as expressed by Thabo Mbeki in his speech to the 2002 ANC Policy Conference when he criticised the 'Ultra-Left' for aiming to "transform our continuing national democratic struggle into an offensive for the

victory of the socialist revolution, however defined" (Mbeki, 2002:6). Although Mbeki did not mention SACP and Cosatu, the speech was a thinly disguised attack on these two organisations. The SACP in its response warned against brandishing labels such as 'Ultra-Left' without defining the meaning of such labels (2002b). Mbeki had also expressed similar sentiments in an article published in 1984 when wrote that "the ANC is not a socialist party. It has never pretended to be one, has never said it was, and is not trying to be. It will not become one by decree or for the purpose of pleasing its 'left' critics" (Mbeki, 1984:609). The 1997 Strategy and Tactics of the ANC use the term 'Ultra-left' to refer to those who advocate "pure class struggle" without the need for a national democratic revolution (ANC, 1997a:25). The term is understood in the same manner by the SACP and Cosatu (see e.g. SACP, 2007a, Cosatu, 2002).

The ANC defines itself as a 'disciplined force of the Left'. In 2007 this was defined as the ANC being "organised to conduct consistent struggle in pursuit of a caring society in which the well-being of the poor receives focussed and consistent attention" (ANC 2007: 11). The expression appeared for the first time in the Strategy and Tactics in 1997. The 1997 definition is very similar to the 2007 definition, save for the absence of "a caring society" (ANC, 1997). By 'a disciplined force of the Left' it is understood that the ANC belongs to a broad international Left tradition. It was stated in Chapter 4 that the ANC is a member of the Socialist International. The ANC does in this sense qualify for the first part of the definition of Left politics; it is 'concerned with the progressive resolution of involuntary disadvantage' – disadvantage caused by segregation and Apartheid. The ANC as a whole cannot be placed on the Right of the political spectrum, but taking the second part of the definition into account, a Left and a Right wing can be identified within the ANC and Alliance.

Following the attacks by Mbeki in the 2002 ANC Conference (Mbeki, 2002), the debate between the ANC, SACP and Cosatu about 'ultra Leftism' surfaced again in the polemic between the SACP and the ANC National Working Committee (NWC) in May and June 2006, and in Thabo Mbeki's opening speech at the July 2007 ANC policy conference (See SACP, 2006a and 2006b, ANC 2006a and 2006b, ANC 2007a). The ANC accused the SACP of looking for a "needle in a haystack – to find a declaration of socialist objectives on the part of the ANC" (2006a:7). The SACP responded that socialism is alluded to in the Freedom Charter and the Morogoro Strategy and Tactics, although the ANC has never officially adopted socialism (2006b:2). The ANC was accused of 'managing capitalism' and not

'leading the NDR' and the SACP argues that the question is about the character and direction of the NDR (2006b:3).

This is where one can discern the Left groups or factions in the Alliance; those that subscribe to the second element of the definition: the abolishment of class society and capitalism. The SACP, as was seen above, seeks to end the "system of capitalist exploitation in South Africa" (2006c:1). Cosatu does not officially declare itself socialist in its constitution or political programme, but it is clear from its documents that it seeks to work towards socialism (see e.g. Cosatu 1996, 1997, 2000, 2007a and 2007b). Those groups and individuals within the Alliance that strive towards the abolishment of class society and capitalism will be treated as its Left wing. Organisationally, those that have the SACP and/or Cosatu as their operating base constitute the Left wing of the Alliance. Ultimately, Left politics is defined not by what people say, but what they do. It is this Left wing that is the subject of study here.

The Right wing will be those who seek to rectify disadvantage within a capitalist society and with no aim of working towards the abolishment of capitalism and class exploitation. Cosatu argued in 2001 that there was an attempt by some in the ANC "to strip the NDR of its class content and present it simply as the de-racialisation of capitalist class relations. This emerges in the free-market approach adopted in the GEAR and more recent government documents" (2001:3). Cosatu in the same document argues that a right-wing has emerged within the ANC (Ibid, 2001). The breakaway and formation of the Congress of the People (COPE) in 2008 speaks to this Left/Right divide, as many of the individuals associated with this Right wing faction were among those who left the ANC and joined COPE. However, COPE also contains former Cosatu and SACP leaders and likewise, business leaders and leaders associated with Mbeki remain in the ANC and its leadership structures, calling for a more nuanced appreciation of the break-away and the remaining ANC.

It is here that the NDR assumes its importance. It has been argued that the NDR is the 'ideological glue' that holds the strategic tripartite alliance together (see also SACP, 2004, Shivambu, 2007, Masondo, 2007). The NDR in its broadest sense is referred to as "the liberation of Africans in particular and Blacks in general from political and socio-economic bondage" (ANC, 2007a:4) and is premised on the characterisation of South Africa as a 'colony of a special type'.

The national question, for the ANC, is about the liberation of Blacks in general and Africans in particular. It is about the struggle to create a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and united South Africa; a single united South African nation with a common overriding identity, resolving the antagonistic contradictions between black and white. Lastly, it is about combating tribalism, racialism or any other form of ethnic chauvinism (ANC, 2005b:2).

The Alliance Left wing is concerned with the intersection between the national question and class and believes that since racial domination is linked to capitalism, the national question can only ultimately be solved together with the total emancipation of the working class and the "eventual destruction of the existing capitalist structure" (Slovo, 1990:11). It asserts that "the shortest route to socialism is through a democratic state" (Ibid, 1990:6), but one which implements economic measures aimed at racial rectification. However, the immediate concern in South Africa is national liberation. The 'social content of the NDR' is distinct from the socialist transition, and some measure of the redistribution of wealth and ownership is necessary, as at the end of Apartheid 99% of the wealth was owned by Whites (Ibid, 1990:13). However, for this transition to take place, the working class must be the politically dominant social class. Although the document quoted here was written in the political context of 1990, it is widely quoted and drawn upon today.

At the centre of this debate is the character of the NDR; who asserts hegemony over its content and direction, who defines the motive forces and who determines the character. This necessarily involves the determination of the motive forces and the role that the motive force must play. It will be argued that this is at the centre of contestation within the Alliance. Asserting its hegemony over the theory and meaning of the NDR as well as the NDR itself, is at the core of the Left's strategy. This contestation has in the period under review played itself out predominantly in the 2005 ANC NGC, the ANC policy conference in July 2007 and National Conference in December 2007.

Here it is pertinent to return to the three choices facing organisations operating within the capitalist system posed by Przeworski in Chapter 2. The Left wing of the Alliance seeks participation in electoral institutions through the ANC and pursues class alliances in the ANC and the Alliance. It also seeks improvements and reforms within the existing South African polity. The Deputy Secretary General of the SACP, Jeremy Cronin (2007), argues that there is a "very real", but difficult and contested, possibility of "using democratic state power to roll-back capital and build working class power, capacity and hegemony," which should not

be ruled out (2007:94). Thus for the Alliance Left, the question is *how*, not *if*, the state can be 'used'.

In addition to participation in formal politics, the Left wing is concerned with the work of building consciousness among the working class and mobilising mass support for reforms and legislative changes (Cosatu, 2003b, SACP, 2007a). Demands for reforms are 'buttressed' by high-profile mass mobilisation, protests, marches and strikes.

5.4. Alliance structures and membership

In this section the decision-making structures of the three organisations under study and present membership statistics of the ANC, the SACP and Cosatu in the Eastern Cape will be outlined.

5.4.1. ANC

The highest decision-making organ in the ANC is the National Conference, held every five years. The Conference elects the President, Deputy President, National Chairperson, Secretary General, Deputy Secretary General, the Treasurer General and the remaining 80[35] members of the National Executive Committee (NEC). Between conferences, the NEC convenes a National General Council (NGC) within 30 months of the conference and at any other time. The NEC elects a National Working Committee (NWC) (ANC, 2007d).

A Provincial Conference is held every four years. ANC provinces coincide with the political structure of governance in South Africa and there are nine. Conference elects the Provincial Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Treasurer and the additional 20 members of the Provincial Executive Committee (PEC). A Provincial General Council (PGC) is convened at least once a year between Provincial Conferences. The PEC is the highest decision-making organ of the ANC in a province between Provincial Conferences. The PEC elects a Provincial Working Committee.

[35] The number of members in the NEC has changed over time and the 80 members refer to the NEC elected in the ANCs 52nd Conference in Polokwane in 2007. The amended constitution of the ANC, adopted at the same conference, stipulated the change in the number of NEC members.

A province is divided into regions corresponding to district and metro municipal boundaries in each province. Each region is expected to hold a regional conference every three years. This conference elects the members of the Regional Executive Committee. Every member of the ANC normally belongs to a branch, which is the basic unit of the organisation. Branches are registered with the PEC and have a minimum of 100 members (ANC, 2007d). Membership statistics are presented below.

Table 3: Eastern Cape ANC Membership

PROVINCE	1997 NC Audit	1998 Provincial Audits	1999 Provincial Audits	2002 NC Audit	2004/05 Provincial Audits	2005 NGC Audit	2007 NC Audit
Eastern Cape	44 684	68 385	104 611	89 167	70 651	70 651	153 164
National total	385 778	N/A	N/A	416 846	440 708	401 454	621 237
Eastern Cape as % of national	11.6	N/A	N/A	21.4	16.0	17.6	24.6

Source: ANC, 2005 and 2007d, IDASA, 2007

Table 3 shows that there was a large growth in membership in the ANC in the Eastern Cape between 1997 and 2007. ANC's first membership audit was held in 1997. Although figures were not cited for pre-1997, the province by 1997 experienced a decline in membership and the majority of the wards did not have functioning branch structures (ANC, 1997b). By 2007 this tendency appears to have been reversed and almost 25% of ANC members are to be found in the Eastern Cape (ANC, 2007d). The number of branches in good standing has increased from 70% in 2002 to 73% in 2007, after a drop to 37.8% in 2005 as table 4 below shows. The Eastern Cape PEC attributes this partly to challenges with the process of alignment between branches and wards[36], and poor record keeping (ANC EC, 2002, 2006g, ANC, 2007d)

[36] In 2001 the ANC resolved to align branches with wards, in line with the demarcation of municipalities.

Table 4: ANC Branches in the Eastern Cape

	2002		2005		2007	
	Eastern Cape	National	Eastern Cape	National	Eastern Cape	National
Branches in good standing*	426	2 232	241	1 935	467	2 696
Potential Branches**	603	3 788	638	3 933	638	3 933
% of wards with branches in good standing	70.6	58.9	37.8	49.2	73.2	68.5

Source: ANC, 2002, ANC 2005c and ANC 2007d
*A branch in good standing must have held an AGM in the last fifteen months before an audit and fulfil other constitutional requirements.
** The number of potential branches should equal the number of wards. Some wards have more than one branch, thus the number of potential branches is higher than the number of demarcated wards. The number of wards has fluctuated due to changes in municipal demarcation since 1994.

The table below shows the five office bearers of the ANC elected in 1998, 2003 and 2006. In the PEC elected in 2003, three were also on the SACP PEC and one on the SACP NEC. In 2006, this number had fallen to one SACP PEC member. The full list of ANC PEC members can be found in Appendix 2.1 and the SACP PEC in Appendix 2.2.

Table 5: Eastern Cape ANC Office Bearers (top 5 Provincial Executive Committee members) 1998 - 2007

Position	1998	2003	2006
Chairperson	Makhenkesi Stofile	Makhenkesi Stofile	Stone Sizani
Deputy Chairperson	Stone Sizani	Enoch Godongwana	Mbulelo Sogoni
Secretary	Humphrey Maxegwana	Humphrey Maxegwana	Sipothati Handi (resigned December 2008) Pemmy Majodina (acting)
Deputy Secretary	Mahlubandile Qwase	Mbulelo Sogoni	Pemmy Majodina Humphrey Maxegwana (acting)
Treasurer	Noxolo Kiviet	Thokozile Xasa	Thokozile Xasa

Source: ANC EC, 2002 and 2006g, personal communication, June 2008.

5.4.2. SACP

The highest authority of the SACP is the National Congress, held every five years. The National Congress elects the General Secretary, National Chairperson, National Treasurer, Deputy General Secretary, Deputy National Chairperson, and members of the Central

Committee. Eight other members, together with the elected office bearers, constitute the Political Bureau. The Political Bureau conducts the day-to-day work of the SACP.

The SACP has nine provincial structures. The Provincial Congress is the highest structure of the SACP in each province and is held every three years. It elects the Provincial Secretary, Provincial Chairperson, Provincial Treasurer, Deputy Provincial Secretary, Deputy Provincial Chairperson, and up to 15 members of the Provincial Executive Committee (PEC). The PEC comprises of the provincial office bearers and the Secretary and Chairperson of each District Executive. The PEC elects a Provincial Working Committee. The basic structure of the SACP is the branch. A branch is formed in a residential area or industrial location (SACP, 2006c). Membership in the SACP has been increasing, although it experienced a drop between 2001 and 2002, as Table 6 below illustrates.

Table 6: Eastern Cape SACP membership and branch numbers

		2000 DECEMBER	2001 DECEMBER	2002 APRIL	2007
Eastern Cape	Members	2 300	4 306	4 108	
	Districts	5	5	6	
	Branches	64	70	52	
South Africa	Members	16 071	22 020	19 466	52 651
	Districts	38	37	40	
	Branches	316	353	347	714

Source: SACP, 2002, EC SACP, 2008

Note: Personal communication with previous SACP staff members reveal that membership statistics are disputed due to poor record keeping. The numbers presented here for 2000-2002 were presented to the SACP Central Committee. 2007 figures are obtained from http://www.mg.co.za/article/2007-07-13-sacp-goes-back-to-the-people and Nzimande (2008). Figures post 2002 could not be obtained for the Eastern Cape.

The table below shows the four office bearers of the SACP elected between 1997 and 2008. In 2004 to 2008 three PEC members were also ANC PEC members and one a Cosatu PEC member. None of the PEC members elected in 2008 were members of the ANC PEC elected in 2006. Six were on the Cosatu PEC, demonstrating a new leadership of the SACP and closer ties with Cosatu. The full list of PEC members in 2003-2006 and 2006-2009 can be found in Appendix 2.2. In 1994 there were two SACP PEC members elected into the Eastern Cape legislature, in 1999 four, in 2004 eight and in 2009 six SACP PEC members. Of the SACP leadership elected in 2008, three were MPLs. The full list of MPLs can be found in Appendix 3.

Table 7: Eastern Cape SACP Office Bearers (top 5 Provincial Executive Committee members) 1999 - 2008

Position	1997	2001	2004	2008
Chairperson	Enoch Godongwana	Phumulo Masualle	Phumulo Masualle	Mzoleli Mrara
Deputy Chairperson	Vuyo Mosana	Bulelwa Tunyiswa	Phila Nkayi	Bulelwa Tunyiswa
Secretary	Phumulo Masualle	Mandla Makupula	Mandla Makupula	Xolile Nqata
Deputy Secretary	Irvin Jim	Irvin Jim	Pumzile Mnguni	Pumzile Mnguni
Treasurer	Mbulelo Goniwe		Bulelwa Tunyiswa	Vuyani Limba

Source: Personal communication, June 2008.

5.4.3. Cosatu

Cosatu has a structure of eight levels of decision-making. The National Congress is the highest decision-making body that meets every three years and elects the five top office bearers. The Central Committee (CC) meets at least once between ordinary meetings of the National Congress and adopts general and specific policy. The Central Executive Committee (CEC) manages the affairs of the Federation between meetings of the two above named structures and has executive powers with regards to policy, membership, employment, finances, legal matters, structures and leadership.

There are nine Regional Congresses, one for each province. Regional leadership made up of a Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Secretary and Treasurer is elected every three years at the Congress. Between meetings of the Regional Congress, matters are managed by the Regional Executive Committee (REC). Other members in the REC are the office bearers of Cosatu Affiliates. A region is responsible for setting up Local Shop Steward Councils, or 'locals'. There is also a Local Executive Committee made up of local office bearers of affiliates or a representative of an affiliate, if an affiliate does not have a local structure (Cosatu, 2003c).

Socialist forums concerned with political education are set up at local municipal level. Socialist forums in the Eastern Cape deal with issues such as service delivery, jobs and poverty and class theory. In 2006 there were 21 locals and 21 socialist forums in the Eastern Cape. Of these, 3 were characterised as 'weak', three had 'collapsed' and the remaining 15 were characterised as 'normal' (Cosatu EC, 2006:35). Of the 22 unions affiliated to Cosatu, 17 are present in the Eastern Cape. Affiliate membership is presented below.

Table 8: Membership of Cosatu Affiliates in the Eastern Cape

Cosatu Affiliate Union	2003	2006
Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers' Union (CEPPAWU)	6 045	6 697
Communication Workers Union (CWU)	2 721	2 135
Democratic Nurses Union of South Africa (DENOSA)	6 814	6 792
Food and Allied Workers Union* (FAWU)	8 414	22 269
National Education Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU)	47 900	31 786
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)	7 039	8 570
National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA)	25 641	27 395
Public and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (PAWUSA)	-	2 762
Police and Prison Civil Rights Union (POPCRU)	10 087	12 684
South African Agricultural Plantation and Allied Workers Union* (SAAPAWU)	3 037	-
South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU)	9 437	9 437
South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTU)	11 695	6 230
South African Democratic Nurses Union (SADNU)	3 218	3 169
South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU)	48 404	46 970
South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU)	13 288	14 410
South African State and Allied Workers Union** (SASAWU)	8 963	10 595
South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU)	4 158	5 831
SASBO: The Finance Union	4 122	-
Total	22 0983	20 6732

Source: Cosatu EC, 2003
*Note: SAAPAWU became integrated into FAWU
**The increase in SASAWU membership is as a result of a share of national departments and parastatals membership that had not previously been added to the provincial membership (Cosatu EC, 2003)

The table below shows the four office bearers of Cosatu between 2000 and 2006. The full list of PEC members in 2003-2006 and 2006-2009 can be found in Appendix 2.3. In 1994 there were five Cosatu PEC members elected into the Eastern Cape legislature, two of which joined in 1996, one in 1999 and one in 2004. Only one of these was not re-elected in 2004. The other six remain.

Table 9: Eastern Cape Cosatu Office Bearers 1998 – 2009

Position	1998	2003	2006	2009
CHAIRPERSON	Alfred Mtsi*	Zanoxolo Goodman Wayile	Zanoxolo Goodman Wayile	Mpumelelo Saziwa
DEPUTY CHAIRPERSON	Xola Phakati	Mpumelelo Saziwa	Mpumelelo Saziwa	David Toyis
TREASURER	Lindelwa Dunjwa	Buyiswa Ntlangwini	Buyiswa Ntlangwini	Maria Hermanus
SECRETARY	Patrick 'Pinky' Mzwamadoda Ntsangani	Xola Pakathi	Xola Pakathi	Mandla Isaac Rayi

* Note: Xola Phakati took over as a Chairperson in 1999 when Mtsi was elected into the legislature. Phakati proceeded to become the Secretary in 2002 when Ntsangani passed away.
Source: Personal communication, June 2008, Cosatu Conference, May 2009.

5.5. Role of Provinces and Provincial Government

South Africa is a unitary state with three spheres of government (national, provincial and local). The distinct responsibility for each sphere is determined by the Constitution (Act no 108 of 1996). The three spheres are autonomous and should not be seen as hierarchical. Laws and policies are approved by the National Parliament. The National Parliament is made up of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, both elected every five years. Provincial or local government may not do anything that is against the laws or policies set down by national government (RSA, 1996, http://www.pmg.org.za/parlinfo/sectiona2). Provincial government gets most of its money from the national government through Treasury and is an implementer of national government programmes. Between 2003/2004 and 2007/2008 the Eastern Cape government received between 97.3% and 98.5% of its revenue from national government (ECSECC, 2009:65, own calculations).

There are nine provincial governments, each with a Provincial Legislature. Some provincial laws and policies are approved by Legislatures and the Legislature also passes a provincial budget every year. Legislatures are elected in provincial elections that are held concurrent with national elections every five years. The Eastern Cape legislature has 63 Members of Provincial Legislature (MPLs). In the April 2004 elections, 54 members from the ANC, five from the Democratic Alliance (DA), four from the United Democratic Front and one from the

African People's Congress[37] were elected (www.eclegislature.gov.za). Following the 2009 elections, the ANC gained 44 seats, COPE nine, the DA six, the United Democratic Movement three and African Independent Congress one seat.

Constitutionally, provincial Premiers are elected by the Legislature. The Premier in turn appoints Members of the Executive Council (MECs) to be the political heads of each provincial department. The MECs and the Premier form the Provincial Executive Council, also called Cabinet. The Eastern Cape Cabinet has 12 members. Within the ANC, the President had the prerogative to appoint Premiers prior to 2007. The ANC in 2007 resolved that Premiers should be appointed by the NEC of the ANC, based on nominations from the PEC (ANC, 2007f).

5.6. Chronology of main events

In this section a chronology of the main events within Alliance politics in the period between 1999 and 2008 will be provided. The focus is on events in the Eastern Cape, but within the context of national politics. The section about the 1994 – 1999 period is very brief and predominantly focused on the country as a whole, and is intended to provide a background to the more detailed discussion about the 1999-2008 period.

5.5.1 1994 – 1999: Consolidating government and policy shifts

The ANC, supported by the SACP and Cosatu won the elections in 1994 with 62.65% of the national votes and 84.38% in the Eastern Cape (www.elections.gov.za /Elections94.asp). The ANC governed South Africa in a Government of National Unity, a coalition with the Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) and the National Party (NP). Nelson Mandela became the President and Thabo Mbeki his first deputy. Nationally there were nine Cosatu 'deployees' on the ANC parliamentary list and 34 from the SACP (Rantete, 1998:237). As stated earler, there were three Cosatu 'deployees' and two SACP 'deployees' to the Eastern Cape legislature in 1994. Another two Cosatu leaders joined the legislature in 1996 as other members resigned. National SACP leader Raymond Mhlaba was the first Premier of the Eastern Cape. Mhlaba

[37] This member was initially elected as a member of the PAC, but defected from the PAC and joined the newly formed African People's Congress in 2007.

was removed in 1996 and replaced by Reverend Makhenkesi Stofile, who was then the ANC Chief Whip in national parliament.

The RDP formed the basis for the collaboration between the ANC, SACP and Cosatu in the 1994 elections. The then Cosatu and ANC economist, Alec Erwin (1994:40-41), argued that the RDP aimed to harness the energies of a highly mobilised civil society. The RDP had five key components; meeting basic needs, developing human resources, building the economy, democratising the state and society and the necessary institutional framework for implementing the RDP itself (RSA, 1994).

Fissures already started to appear in the Alliance at this stage. The SACP held its 9th Congress in April 1995 and questions were raised about the role of the SACP in the Alliance, and the ability of SACP MPs to toe the SACP line and adopt positions in the interest of the working class (Collins, 1995). In 1996 the ANC government adopted GEAR without consultation with the Alliance partners and announced its intention to privatise state assets (Buhlungu, 1997, Marais, 2001). In 1997 Cosatu argued that there was demobilisation of the Alliance, little participation of the Alliance in policy-making, and no coherent programme of the Alliance (Cosatu, 1997b). Commentators argued that the Alliance was becoming defunct (Buhlungu, 1997). The then Secretary General of Cosatu replied that the "the Alliance remains relevant… As long as progressive forces have a clear agenda, there is no possibility of the Alliance withering away" (Shilowa, 1997:73).

In the 1997 National Conference of the ANC Thabo Mbeki was elected president of the ANC and Jacob Zuma his deputy. The Eastern Cape ANC rejected GEAR and proposed a resolution to that effect. However, it did not succeed (Cosatu EC/SACP EC, 2008, Xolani and Nkululeko, interview). In its 1997 Congress Cosatu debated the nature of deployments and the relationship between the Alliance and Cosatu. It resolved to build the ANC with a working class bias. Leaders would not be deployed directly in the 1999 elections the way they were in 1994, but should rather be elected onto the ANC's electoral list through their participation in the ANC or the SACP (Vlok, 1999, Cosatu 1997b, 1997c). The 1998 Conference of the SACP also reaffirmed its commitment to the Alliance (SACP, 1998).

5.5.2 1999 – 2004: Confrontation

Elections were held in June 1999 and the ANC this time won 66.5% of the national vote and 73.21% in the Eastern Cape (http://www.elections.org.za/Results/Elections99.asp). Thabo Mbeki became the President of South Africa and Jacob Zuma his deputy. The Premier of the Eastern Cape, Makhenkesi Stofile, appointed two MECs from the SACP to his Cabinet; Phumulo Masualle for Roads and Public Works and Ncumisa Kondlo for Social Development. Members of Cosatu and the SACP participated in the Deployment Committee of the ANC; the committee that makes decisions regarding deployment to positions in the Legislature, the Provincial Executive Committee and Mayors and Executive Mayors in local government in the province. In this period, the secretaries of the ANC, SACP and Cosatu met regularly, with meetings held every Tuesday.

Nationally this period was however marked by increasing tensions between the Alliance partners, most notably over economic policy. This contestation was particularly marked in the run up to the 2002 National Conference of the ANC. In October 2002 Cosatu staged a two day stay-away in protest against the privatisation programme of the ANC government. 180 000 workers marched throughout the country. The strike was supported by the SACP and a range of other civil society organisations (Hlangani, 2002). In the run up to the 2002 ANC Conference in Stellenbosch there were numerous allegations that the SACP and Cosatu were 'ultra-Left'. ANC NEC Member Makhaye in 2002 accused the SACP and Cosatu for harbouring 'Left factionalists' that attacked the Alliance and the NDR (Makhaye, 2002). SACP Secretary General Blade Nzimande accused the ANC of 'McCarthyism' (SALB, 2002). This attack came to a head in the Stellenbosch conference where President Thabo Mbeki in his speech reiterated that there had never been a "merger between the socialist and the national liberation goals" within the ANC (2002:6), as discussed in Section 5.3 above. Contestation within the Alliance was becoming clearer, and what Cosatu termed a "right and left wing of the liberation movement" had emerged (2001:5). Cosatu argued that the attempts to reduce policy debates in the Alliance to power plays reflected a divisive strategy of seeking to "divide the Alliance, reducing its strength and driving the government into the arms of capital." The ANC, it argued failed "to accept the importance of mass mobilisation and action, which is how the majority can exercise power, in counteracting the demands of capital" (Ibid, 2001).

Prior to the same conference, the Eastern Cape ANC held its Provincial Conference and elected a provincial leadership that was seen as not supportive of Thabo Mbeki and the

direction of policy under his leadership. The Conference was nullified by the ANC Head office after accusations of irregularities and the old PEC reinstated. The official position of the ANC headquarters was that the ANC had been facing organisational problems and divisions among structures in the O R Tambo region and the province. This had an impact on the Regional Conference that was set to launch the newly demarcated regions. In some places parallel branches existed (ANC, 2002). The O R Tambo Regional Conference was also nullified. A new conference with new elections was held months later, where leadership elections were again won by the same anti-Mbeki group. (ANC, 2002, Carroll, 2002, Cull, 2003a, 2003b, Gumede, 2002, ANC EC, 2006g).

For the SACP and Cosatu leaders interviewed, this period was characterised by 'robust discussion' and a good relationship between the Alliance partners within the Province. One of the major joint political programmes of the Alliance in this period was the development of the Provincial Growth and Development Plan (PGDP) (ANC EC, 2006g and Cosatu EC, 2006). The PGDP was a ten year plan for socio-economic growth and development in the Eastern Cape and was developed through a consultative process between 2002 and 2004, in which the Alliance, most notably Cosatu played a large part. The plan was completed in 2004, but not launched officially until after the April 2004 elections.

5.5.3 2004 Elections to December 2007: 'Right-wing' in power?

National and provincial elections were held in April 2004, with the ANC obtaining 69.69% of the votes nationally and 79.31% in the Eastern Cape. President Thabo Mbeki installed Nosimo Balindlela as Premier for the Eastern Cape Province and removed Makhenkesi Stofile whom he appointed Minister for Sports and Recreation. Balindlela was seen to be an Mbeki loyalist and after a short period in office purged a range of politicians and officials that were seen as not loyal to Mbeki and the national ANC leadership at the time. These included Finance MEC Enoch Godongwana, Finance Head of Department Monde Tom and Chief Executive Officer of the Eastern Cape Development Corporation, Mcebisi Jonas.

Shortly after taking office, Balindlela established a commission of inquiry under the leadership of Judge Pillay, known as the Pillay Commission. The Commission was established to enquire into, "all aspects of provincial departments and the functioning of government departments in the Province, including inefficiencies, irregularities and any impropriety" (ECPA, 2008:1). The institution of the Commission was used as a pretext to fire

Godongwana as MEC for Finance in June 2004. The Commission made findings against Stofile, Godongwana, Sizani and Mcebisi in addition to reports on each provincial department. However, the said individuals were never called to testify before the commission, and argue that the purpose of the commission was to discredit these leaders (personal communication, June 2008). The Commission's report was finally released in June 2008 but its findings were nullified in the Grahamstown High Court on 18 May 2009 after a challenge by Stofile, Godongwana, Sizani and Mcebisi (http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-05-18-judge-rules-pillay-report-be-scrapped). Mcebisi was also accused of corruption, but was found not guilty of corruption charges in court in 2005 (Robinson, 2005).

Local Government elections were held in March 2006. The SACP and Cosatu had by now been excluded from the deployment committee of the ANC. The leaders interviewed argue that the Premier appointed mayors without any consultation with the Alliance partners (Ayanda, Mvusi, Babalwa). There were battles over who should become the mayor in many local municipalities, such as Buffalo City (East London), Mnquma (Butterworth), Nkonkobe (Alice), Nyandeni (Libode) and Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality (Port Elizabeth) (Maqina et. al., 2006).

Cosatu held a series of marches and stay-aways in June and October 2005 and May 2006 as part of the national 'Jobs and Poverty Campaign'. In June 2006 Cosatu held its provincial conference, and the office bearers were elected unopposed.

The ANC in the province held its Conference in December 2006 where a PEC led by Stone Sizani was elected (see Table 5 above). Mcebisi Jonas, the candidate supported by Cosatu and the SACP, was defeated. The elected leadership was considered to be supportive of President Thabo Mbeki and led the campaign for Mbeki's third term as ANC president. Cosatu in its 2006 Provincial Congress expressed support for rival candidate Jacob Zuma.

In the run up to the ANC National Conference in Polokwane the SACP and Cosatu led a debate about the direction of the NDR and of the ANC. The ANC was criticised for introducing new lexical items and suggesting a fundamental deviation from key ANC policies (Cosatu, 2007c, Vavi, 2007). At the centre of the critique was the character of the NDR, prompting Cosatu to release two discussion documents (2007a and 2007b). The Left's critique stated that the NDR has been 'watered down' and had lost many of its radical elements. The working class was reduced to "the most vulnerable within society" and Cosatu

argued that this suggested a radical break from the stated aim of abolishing the gender, class and racial domination stemming from national oppression (Cosatu, 2007c:7). Another point of criticism was that class interest in the ANC documents was reduced to "narrow self-interest of a particular class or stratum or group" which "may not necessarily coincide with that of other motive forces" (Cosatu, 2007c:21).

5.5.4 Polokwane and After: Growing Influence of the Left

The ANC held its 52nd National Conference in December 2007 in Polokwane where Jacob Zuma won the Presidential elections. Cosatu had put together a list of names and many of the office bearers elected were on the Cosatu list. For many of the respondents this represented a significant shift, and that the Left was regaining strength in the Alliance and the ANC. The Polokwane Conference passed resolutions on key areas including organisational renewal; social transformation; economic transformation; climate change; rural development; land reform and agrarian change as well as transformation of state and governance. The Polokwane resolutions were further elaborated in the Alliance Economic Summit held in October 2008, in preparation for the 2009 election manifesto. The Polokwane conference decided to remove the prerogative of the president to appoint Premiers. This should now be done by the NEC and the PEC of the ANC (2007e). This was in reaction to Mbeki's appointment of Premiers outside of the ANC leadership in the provinces.

Soon after the Conference there were calls from the SACP and Cosatu in the Eastern Cape that the Premier should resign, citing poor service delivery and the poor state of the provincial administration. Balindlela was removed from her position by the ANC NEC in June 2008. Cosatu and the SACP were adamant that their candidate, Phumulo Masualle, MPL and now national Treasurer of the SACP should be placed in the position. A list of three names was presented by the Eastern Cape PEC to the NEC, which appointed Mbulelo Sogoni, the Deputy Chairperson of the ANC in the province. Masualle was appointed MEC for Finance and Economic Affairs.

Mbeki was recalled by the ANC NEC in September 2008, which stated that he no longer enjoyed the confidence of the party (ANC, 2008b). The Deputy President, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, 14 cabinet ministers and deputy ministers resigned. ANC Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe was sworn in as President of South Africa. He retained two of the ministers that had resigned.

Shortly after, former Chairperson of the ANC and former Defence Minister, Mosiua Lekota 'served divorce papers' on the ANC and expressed dismay with what he termed 'changes in the culture of the ANC' such as lack of respect for the 'rule of law' and democratic institutions (Lekota, 2008a and 2008b, Rossouw, 2008). Other prominent members of the ANC, most notably Mluleki George, former Deputy Minister of Defence, Premier of Gauteng Province, Mbhazima Shilowa and the ANCs former Head of the Presidency Smuts Ngonyama also resigned from the ANC. Shilowa is a former Secretary General of Cosatu, Ngonyama was an MEC in the Eastern Cape between 1994 and 1999 and George was the Chairperson of the Amathole region of the ANC in the Eastern Cape. A new political party, Congress of the People (COPE) was formed in November 2008. In the Eastern Cape, the sacked premier Balindlela, along with PEC members Sipothati Handi and Andile Nkuhlu, joined COPE in December 2008 and January 2009. It should be noted that other leaders who supported Mbeki's bid for a third term, such as Chairperson Stone Sizani, have not joined COPE.

It appears that the 'balance of forces' have shifted in favour of the Left, and that a greater number of people considered to belong to the Left wing of the Alliance have become powerful in the Alliance in the province. Alliance secretariat meetings have resumed after the resignation of ANC secretary Handi in December 2008. But the Cosatu and SACP leaders interviewed for this study in May to July 2008 also warned against complacency. Sipho says

> "Even the very space opened post-Polokwane, there is nothing permanent about that space. That space is going to be stolen by other class forces or be closed, and that is why it is important how we conduct ourselves as Left forces".

This is reiterated by Secretary General of NUMSA, Irvin Jim, who says "It is about building the working class so that when Zuma opens his mouth and sees the masses there he has to speak to them. He must fear the masses" (Personal communication, July 2008).

Table 10 below shows that the number of MPLs from Cosatu and SACP has fluctuated in the four elections since 1994, with an increase in the number of Cosatu MPLs in 2009, while there was a drop in the number of SACP MPLs in 2009 compared to 2004. The number of MPLs is a measure of influence. However the real question is whether seats in the Legislature have manifested themselves in impact on policy and decision making, as will discussed in the next two chapters.

Table 10: MPLs from Cosatu and SACP, 1994 – 2009.

	1994	1999	2004	2009
Cosatu MPLs	5	1	1	3
SACP MPLs	2	4	8	6
No of ANC MPLs	50	51	54	44
% of MPLs from Cosatu	10.0	2.0	1.9	6.8
% of MPLs from SACP	4.0	7.8	14.8	13.6

Source: Eastern Cape Legislature and personal communication with Mandla Rayi, 12 May 2009 and Xola Phakati, 04 May 2009.

The group considered leaders of the Left in the 2000-2004 period has since dispersed and former allies, Stone Sizani and Mcebisi Jonas, contested the ANC Chairperson positions in the Provincial Conference in 2006. Sizani is a businessman and became a Member of Parliament in 2008. Godongwana is an ANC NEC member and became a Member of Parliament in 2008. He was in May 2009 appointed Deputy Minister of Public Enterprises. Jonas is also a businessman, and was appointed a member of the Legislature in 2008. Sizani, Jonas and Godongwana have fallen out of favour with Cosatu and the SACP. Jonas and Masualle were in the running for the Premiership before the 2009 elections. Masualle was supported by the SACP and Cosatu. Neither was appointed Premier, but both serve in the Provincial Cabinet, Masualle as MEC for Health and Jonas as MEC for Finance and Economic Development. Jonas and Masualle will also contest the ANC provincial chairpersonship, scheduled for election in July 2009, where Masualle is once more supported by Cosatu and the SACP.

After the 2009 elections, Cosatu and the SACP continue to speak of "marginalisation" and of "sectarian practices" in the Alliance in the Eastern Cape (Cosatu EC, 2009). Both provincial SACP Secretary Nqata and Cosatu Chairperson Saziwa said in speeches to the Cosatu Congress in June 2009 that there had been no 'Polokwane in the Eastern Cape', indicating that the Left's influence on policy and deployments is not as strong as it appears on the national level.

5.7. Conclusion

In this chapter the discussion has moved from the history of the Alliance organisations to some of the political battles and trajectory of contestation in the 2000-2008 period in the

Eastern Cape. It was concluded that although it would be difficult to place the ANC and the Alliance as a whole on the Right of the political spectrum, there exists within the Alliance what might be termed a Left and a Right wing. Some of the ebbs and flows, the 'balance of power', between the Left wing and the Right wing groupings in the Eastern Cape, based on interviews, personal communication and documentary material were discussed.

Among the respondents there were differing views about how the Left should be understood within the Alliance. Xolani argues that "I won't subscribe to a view that says anyone that is in the Communist [Party], that is called a Communist is necessarily on the Left. I won't say [we have got] COSATU, then we have got a Left. [...]"There are many comrades but comrades are few." For Xolani and Nkululeko, the Left wing in the Alliance is made up of a few committed individuals that are "consistent to the path" (Xolani). Left politics cannot be defined simply organisationally, but rather through the consciousness and action of individuals. Other respondents, however, identify the Left purely organisationally, and argue that the Left in the Eastern Cape is made up of the SACP and Cosatu (e.g. Molefe and Ayanda). The Right, then, is those individuals and groups within the ANC and the Alliance that use politics and positions for material gain, and consciously undermine and oppose the Left's agenda of 'structural transformation' (see Chapter 6).

Chapter 6: *Structural Transformation*: Left politics in the Alliance

6.1 Introduction

In Chapter 5 an overview was provided of some of the main events in which contestation between what is termed the Left and the Right wing in the Alliance in the Eastern Cape played itself out. It was stated that the Alliance Left is concerned with the building of a democratic post-Apartheid state, as well as with mobilisation and political education work. In this chapter the discussion will focus on what the demands and issues that the Left has been pursuing in the Eastern Cape in the 2000-2008 period are, and the analysis that underpins these issues.

For this, politics must be understood as political positions and standpoints. In Chapter 7 politics as practice and the strategy and the execution of this strategy by the Alliance Left in the Eastern Cape will be interrogated.

6.2 Structural Transformation*:* Ideology and Analysis on the Left

Therborn refers to ideology as the "aspect of the human condition under which human beings live their lives as conscious actors in a world that makes sense to them in different ways" (in Callinicos, 2004:168). Ideology, Callinicos (2004) argues, invites people to accept a particular social identity. Chapter 4 noted that the ANC and the Alliance have two main strands of ideological influence; the pan-national African nationalism of the liberation movements and Marxism. This particular brand of nationalism is referred to as revolutionary nationalism (SACP, 2007a). The SACP writes that there are three dimensions to the 'national' in the NDR; national self determination, nation building and revolutionary nationalism (Ibid, 2007:18). Revolutionary nationalism means that,

> "the struggle for working class and popular hegemony of African nationalism is a struggle against elite abuse of nationalism for narrow self-promotion, a tendency that invariably reduces African nationalism to an exclusivist ideology, to vacuous and

> sentimental notions about the uniqueness of one group of people as opposed to others" (Ibid, 2007:18).

To paraphrase Fanon, national consciousness should be transformed into political consciousness (2001).

This struggle for 'hegemony of African nationalism' is expressed in terms of 'correcting' or 'changing power relations' and 'changing the structure of ownership' in society.

> "If you are talking about Left politics in South Africa, immediately you enter the terrain of challenging the structure of society in economic terms, in social terms, in political terms. [It] means really a radical, thoroughgoing transformation of society, a radical, thoroughgoing politics of transformation. (Thabo).

Thabo here argued that Left politics is set aside from other politics through its challenge to the *structure of society*, in economic, social and political terms. In Chapter 4 saw how South African society is above all shaped by its segregationist and Apartheid past, due largely to white capital's expanding need for cheap (Black) labour in the emerging mining, agriculture and industry sectors. It is thus the view of the respondents that formal political freedom is not sufficient; a view, also seen in Chapter 4, that has been dominant in the Alliance at least since the 1969 Morogoro Conference.

In a joint paper Cosatu and the SACP in the Eastern Cape states that

> "We propose that all spheres of government should develop an agenda to fundamentally alter the structure of the South African economy. This must ensure that the basic wealth of our country is shared and controlled by the majority, in particular the working class" (SACP/Cosatu EC, 2008:6).

This paper was written in the context of a government turn-around plan, thus the focus on government. The passage however illustrates that structural transformation refers to a change in redistribution of wealth and control and ownership of the economy by the working class. In the same paper the SACP and Cosatu in the Eastern Cape argue that

> "We need to be frank and admit that the national democratic revolution (which should be about qualitative change in the realms of production relations and ownership) has been captured by the ruling class through the post-apartheid state. Any systematic political analysis of the past decade will show that the state has intervened and ruled in the interest of the old ruling class. It is this class that has benefited most from 'transformation" (SACP/Cosatu EC 2008:4).

What the respondents referred to as structural transformation is understood as changes in the economic structure, which is broader than de-racialising capital through Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) [38]. Xolani argued that it is about a "socialist outcome of the [national democratic] revolution" and the extent to which programmes put in place, and the reforms demanded by the Left, contribute towards a broader agenda of socialism. 'Structural transformation' is here understood as not limited to political freedom, but also to economic freedom, which is not guaranteed by national liberation.

The fundamental or structural transformation advocated by the Left was seen by the respondents as opposed to an approach that is about "trickle down", "tinkering with things" or "letting the markets take care of it" (Xolani, Molefe, Ayanda, Mvusi, Balalwa). Among the respondents the state is seen as central in addressing social and economic problems, whereas they see the Right position to be one that seeks market-based solutions and promotes privatisation, something that includes the Right-wing in the ANC. It is here that 'structural transformation' becomes Left politics. In the Eastern Cape, the emergence of COPE has not changed this view, as the concluding paragraph in Section 5.6 alluded to.

These issues that the Left pursue are also pursued by other political forces, both on what are considered the Left and the Right. The respondents to this thesis however argue that the Left approaches questions in a manner that aims to structurally transform society and serve the working class interest, as opposed to reproducing existing social and economic structures and inequalities. The respondents stated that these issues largely arise out of the ideological persuasion of the organisations, in this case Cosatu and the SACP, and analysis of the issues denotes political ideology. Thus for the Left, the analysis of the issues are rooted in the need

[38] The stated aims of BEE are to allow more Black people to participate in the economy and to grow ownership, managerial and operational control by Black people. The BEE policy of the South African government is tied to small and medium enterprise and industrial development policies promoting investment in black enterprises or joint enterprises in order to transfer skills and/or create jobs (RSA 2003a, Ronnie, 2006).

for 'fundamental' or 'structural transformation', systematic redress of Apartheid and a vision of a socialist society.

Transformation, in the South Africa context, is a much used, but contested notion. Motala (2004) argues that transformation refers to both minimalist and maximalist interpretations of change; from the politically conservative, liberal to radical constructs of social intervention or processes. Transformation, in describing post-Apartheid South Africa is commonly used to underscore the fact that it is not revolution that is taking place, but reformation of a specific aspect of society (Porteus and Ramadiro, 2008).

Here, however, concern is with *structural* transformation. Structure, in the Marxist sense, refers to the economic, or material structure of society. This economic structure is the totality of the relations of production in a given stage of the development of the material forces of production (Marx, 1970). This structure influences the rest of social life; political, legal, ideological, nonmaterial and spiritual. Structural transformation is, then, a change in this economic structure; the material forces and relations of production.

In literature 'structural transformation' is a concept used to describe, or promote, a process of structural reform. Structural reform is different from the reforms propagated by social democrats discussed in Chapter 2. For any reform to be structural, Saul (1991 and 1992) writes, it must not be "comfortably selfcontained" or "a mere improvement". Structural reform should "instead be allowed self consciously to implicate other 'necessary' reforms that flow from its part of an emerging project of structural transformation" (1991:5). Structural reform needs to constantly articulate, both to itself and to its broadest potential constituency, the goal of structural transformation or socialism. Further, he argues, "structural reform cannot come from on high; instead it must root itself in popular initiatives in such a way as to leave a residue of further empowerment" (1991:5-6). Kagarlitsky (1990 in Saul, 1991) argues that structural reforms must lead to a gradual rupture with the existing order and not rectify the 'individual consequences of capitalism'. Naturally, capital will resist this, and the closer one gets to the point which distinguishes revolution from reform, the more intense the social conflict gets. He further argues that whereas traditional social democratic reformism confined itself to changes in the sphere of distribution and indirect regulation of the economy, strategic revolutionary reform (structural reform) has to affect the spheres of property and organisation of production (Ibid, 1990).

As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, the ANC as a whole has not embarked on such an agenda of structural reforms, but rather a set of market based reforms. The SACP and Cosatu, however, promote this agenda of structural transformation as inherent in the NDR. It is this insistence on the need for structural transformation that allows the SACP and Cosatu to argue that the NDR is not a 'stage' but a continuation of struggle towards socialism. Critics of the SACP like Adams (1997) and Barchesi (2004), on the other hand, argue that the SACP's adoption of 'structural reform' in the negotiations period gained the Party political space inside the Alliance and allowed the SACP to be the ideological vehicle for acceptance of negotiations, but that the outcome has been severely compromised.

From the SACP and Cosatu in the Eastern Cape, the outcome of this approach in the period after 1994 is also questioned.

> "The question posed by our analysis is: what agenda we should be pursuing to fundamentally alter these inherited social and economic arrangements and bring about qualitative changes in the lives of the African majority? [...] Revolutionaries need to ask themselves whether by accommodating such sectional [bourgeois or petty bourgeois] interests we don't compromise the whole revolution? (SACP/Cosatu EC, 2008:4-6)

While the NDR logic necessitates a pre-socialist stage, the Alliance Left's contestation has been over the 'direction' and 'character' of the NDR. The Left aims to define the meaning of the NDR, and win hegemony in the ANC that the NDR involves class struggle and struggle for socialism. The May 2008 SACP Eastern Cape Provincial Congress "resolved to continue to deepen the understanding that there is no dichotomy between the NDR and the struggle for socialism but that there is indeed a continuum of struggle!" (EC SACP, 2008b:1). It is not a question of a simple dichotomy between reform and revolution, rather the focus should be on the perspective from which reforms are viewed, what they aim to achieve and what else besides reforms are being pursued by an organisation (Milliband, 1977). It is thus the *analysis, the content,* and the *demands* that matter, as well as the action that an issue gives rise to, not the choice of an issue per se (see 6.3 below). Williams (2008) terms this the struggle for "revolutionary reforms". In this sense, structural transformation allows for the coexistence of capitalism and socialism, where the conditions for a transition to socialism

have to be created within capitalism by developing socialist 'logics'. Thus the call for a 'socialist oriented NDR' (Ibid, 2008, Cosatu, 2007a and 2007b, SACP 2006a and 2007a).

Among the respondents the working class was seen as "raw materials that can be reconstructed, that can be mobilised, that can be organised, that can be used as a machinery to bring about total change" (Xolani). Further, Xolani said that "the working class need to be organised, need to be conscientised, and [know] that the solution to their problem is when they will arise one day and capture back the labour surplus value that is robbed from them in broad daylight." (Xolani). These quotes from Xolani illustrate a functionalist view of class, where individuals are "raw material which ideology transforms into subjects ready to submit their destined role in the relations of production" (Callinicos, 2004:178). In this view people are 'bearers of social roles' and the party is the primary agent.

6.2.1 The 1996 class project

Chapter 5 suggested that contestation over direction of policy in the ANC and the Alliance came to a head around the ANC NGC in 2006 and in the run up to the ANC conference in December 2007. In May 2006 the SACP published a document in which the concept of the 1996 class project was introduced. For the SACP, the '1996 class project' is an agenda that became dominant within the ANC. It refers to a project of "restoration of the conditions for capitalist profit accumulation on a new and supposedly more sustainable basis" (SACP, 2006a:22). The SACP argues that this is opposed to the "revolutionary/systemic transformation of society that begins to resolve the inherent contradictions in favour of the working class and its popular allies" (Ibid, 2006a:22). For the SACP, it was the latter that was assumed to be the vision of the Alliance and the NDR; structural transformation.

While the document presents a critique of the ANC and ANC policy in the period between 1996 and 2007, the strategy and focus of the SACP, and the Alliance Left, is itself also under scrutiny. The conclusion of the document is that the strategy of the Alliance Left and SACP is not irrelevant, but that it should not be reformist – it should be revolutionary, "it must systemically *transform* class, racial, and gendered power. ... [I]t must actively *transform* the persisting capitalist accumulation path ..." (Ibid, 2006a:28, emphasis in original).

Transformation here is used in a maximalist sense. This also gives an indication that the discourse of 'structural transformation' among the respondents' is consistent with the dominant discourse of the Alliance Left. The discourse of structural transformation also allows continued coexistence with the ANC and necessitates the need to influence ANC, and, thus, government policy.

Many of the respondents used the concept of the '1996 class project' as an explanation for the weakness of the Left in the Eastern Cape in the 2004 to 2007 period. More frequently, 'the 1996 class project' is used as a label for individuals pursuing personal and material interests within the ANC or the government and to refer to changes in the national question towards a personal 'accumulation question'. 1996 is also used to mark the start of increased contestation over policy, notably economic policy in the ANC. While the notion of the 1996 project is accepted, respondents see the 'project' as individuals seeking, and for some time successfully managing, to influence the direction of the ANC.

> "... we have had, through the 1996 class project, a particular section within the African majority that has been elevated, not to be capitalist per se, because they are not really, they don't own the means of production. [...] They are just rich guys who have a lot of money. So we have seen that component rising up through GEAR that attempted to restore the profitability of capitalism" (Molefe).

> "There is no way [ ] we can say, no, the African National Congress has moved to the right. I don't believe it. It's individuals that want to influence. You may call them the 1996 class project if you like" (Veliswa).

Babalwa made an example of how 'the 1996 class project' plays itself out in the employment of a senior municipal employee:

> "[They are] certain individuals within the class project. Why I'm saying they are in the class project is because the person that we are talking about that was number two [on the shortlist] but will be taken to the council [for approval] is a person that I am working with currently. He is failing the department. He cannot do anything, but they have a good reason to say he must be employed as Municipal Manager. Why are they

> doing that? Currently they are using him to get tenders, currently they are using him to recruit their own people for interests of their own."

Some of the respondents, notably Xolani and Thabo, however, provided a criticism of the concept of the '1996 class project'. Xolani states that "if you sit back you will appreciate that it is not necessarily very accurate, this thing of the 1996 class project". It is a project that is not uniquely South African and it is not something that started in 1996, but rather "1996 was a true manifestation of how the movement was, in a way, captured by the capitalist class on their own path of what they were willing to give and what they were not willing to give in [the negotiations]."

Thabo argued that the concept of the 1996 class project was a 'bogeyman' set up by the SACP because "the ANC path to Socialism was in a crisis and it had to rescue itself" (Thabo). According to Thabo, the SACP leadership was not prepared to move away from the dominant NDR and Marxist/Leninist mode of analysis and practice. But rather

> "went so far as to give theoretical expression to the frustrations [of its membership] and [ ] basically built up this bogeyman of the '1996 class project', and then went to lengths to critique that-- but what it does not do is to look at the strategy [of the Left] itself." (Thabo).

Thabo called the strategy of the Alliance Left of electoral support for the ANC and deployment of cadres into government through the ANC the "ANC path to socialism", i.e. that the struggle for socialism is through parliamentary power for the ANC, and policy and legislative reforms. He argues that this strategy "was in a crisis" due to the limited results it had yielded and the relative power of the non-socialist faction under Mbeki's leadership of both the ANC and government. The "frustrations" that Thabo mentions is the growing impatience of many SACP members with the current strategy, and the call for the Party to contest elections on its own that surfaced at the 2005 Special Congress. The SACP document that first developed the concept of the '1996 class project' also reflected on these issues (SACP, 2006a). Thabo argues that the concept of the '1996 class project' was devised to move the focus away from the Left's strategy, or the Party itself, to the ANC; thus the characterisation as a "bogeyman".

While Xolani's critique that the '1996 class project' was neither unique nor new is correct, the concept does represent something more than a 'bogeyman' within the Alliance. The concept illustrates the difference between the 'NDR route to socialism' and a departure from that route to sustaining the capitalist project. Whether the current approach of the Left does indeed contribute to an 'NDR route to socialism' and structural transformation will be interrogated further below and in Chapter 7. However, these differing responses illustrate differing points of view within the Alliance Left, as well as a differing capacity to engage with theory and policy. The positions of Thabo and Xolani also demonstrate the willingness to engage with what is the official position of the SACP and adopted by Cosatu.

6.3 Issues and Campaigns on the Left

Having argued that at the core of the Left's politics is the concept of 'structural transformation' the study will here analyse the key issues that the Left has been concerned with in the period under study and if the approaches to these do indeed aim to 'structurally transform society'. Two examples will be analysed in more detail, namely the Left's analysis of and responses, to questions of land and jobs and economic policy. Firstly, the main issues that the Alliance Left in the Eastern Cape has been concerned with and the origins of these issues will be identified.

6.3.1 The power of the Freedom Charter: Identifying key issues for the Left

From the analysis of documents as well as interviews conducted it can be asserted that the issues that are at the core of the Left's agenda are public health, public education, poverty reduction and job creation rooted in critique of economic policy. Agriculture, land and rural development are also high on the agenda and are often seen as 'the solution' to the high levels of poverty and unemployment in the Eastern Cape. Here the emphasis is on a state led collectivised approach to rural development and agrarian program that rests on mass redistribution of land and guarantees employment. Infrastructure such as housing and roads in townships and rural areas was also seen to be on the agenda. The Left supports collective over individual ownership, thus the SACP places great emphasis on support for cooperatives.

The issues and campaigns are derived from the historical political programmes and demands of the liberation movement, above all the 1955 Freedom Charter. With regard to the Freedom Charter, SACP leader Veliswa said

> "It means our analysis of what we seek to achieve, whether it's class or whatever agenda, it is based on the Freedom Charter. [...] So those are the issues that you look at, the primary health care-- if you are a Left you will always guard those things because you believe that those people in 1955 knew exactly what they [wanted], and the communists were part of that. You are not really going to, at this stage, introduce things that are not there [in the Charter]."

Veliswa treats the Freedom Charter as a closed canon; it cannot be added to or taken away from. The Charter also provides a basis for the policy positions and campaigns of the Left. Rooting political demands in the Freedom Charter is consistent with the overall discourse of the ANC (e.g ANC, 2007c) and not limited to the Left wing of the Alliance. However, there are clauses in the Freedom Charter that have been abandoned by the ANC. For example, one of the clauses in the Freedom Charter was regarding restoration of the wealth of the country to the people, and transferring ownership of mineral resources to 'the people as a whole' (ANC, 1955). Upon his release from prison in 1990, Mandela promoted nationalisation (Mandela, 1990). However by 1992 nationalisation was no longer treated as an ideological imperative, and it has not been part of the Government's programme after 1994 (Bond, 2000, Marais, 2001).

The issues are also rooted in immediate material concerns. It was argued in Chapter 1 that the Eastern Cape is one of the poorest provinces in South Africa, with 61.9% of the population reportedly living in poverty in 2007, up from 54.3% in 1996. The Eastern Cape's history as an area made up of two homelands, Transkei and Ciskei, has led to high population density in the areas that are poorest and have the least access to services such as water, sanitation and electricity (ECSECC, 2009). There is near universal enrolment of children in education, with a net enrolment ratio of 97.9% in 2006/2007. However, only 71% of learners reach grade five and 55% reach grade nine. It is estimated that 3.95 million people lived in poverty in 2007. Inequality is high, with a Gini-coefficient of 0.67 in 2007 (Ibid, 2009). More than 60% of the Eastern Cape population is rural, well above the national average of 54% (Global Insight, 2008). These indicators go some way in explaining the Left's focus on

education and basic infrastructure. The respondents, however, did not give concrete evidence of campaigns or political action outside of government in this regard. Consider now land and economic policy in more detail.

6.3.2 *Grabbing land for themselves*: The Left on Land

Access to, and ownership of, land has been one of the key demands of the ANC since its formation in 1912. The opposition to the 1912 Squatters Bill and the 1913 Land Act (Karis and Karter, 1987, document 24 and 26) attest to this. Resolving the land struggle was a motivation when the CPSA adopted the native republic thesis in 1928 (Drew, 2000). Demands for redistribution of land are also rooted in the Freedom Charter: the land shall be shared by those who work it (ANC, 1955). Land dispossession in South Africa was an integral part of colonialism, segregation and Apartheid[39]. The ANC government in 1994 set out to redistribute 30% of South Africa's commercial farming land, or 84 million hectares by 2004 (RSA, 1994). Land redistribution was also aimed at changing the social and economic relations in the countryside (Ibid, 1994). In 2000 the timeframe was extended to 2015 (Hall, 2007). By the end of 2008 only 4.8 million hectares of the envisaged 84 million hectares had been redistributed (DALA, 2008). The ANC has not been the only contender in the land question. The PAC has taken a more radical view and favours expropriation (PAC, 2009). The Democratic Alliance supports the redistribution of land, but is concerned with protecting the existing property rights of those who own land (DA, 2009).

The respondents all stated that land was one of the most important issues for the Left. The demand for land redistribution is rooted in a three-pronged analysis. Firstly, some respondents seek redress for dispossession and argued that "[the land] is what the struggle was all about" (Babalwa). Secondly, land was seen as the "main force of production" (Molefe) and it was argued that "Mother earth is the economy" (Xolani). For these respondents, the land issue is essentially about control and ownership of resources. Lastly, the demand for land is rooted in the demand for a state-led rural and agrarian strategy that

[39] The 1913 Land Act provided for the establishments of African reserves on 7% of the land. Communal land rights had already been destroyed in 1894 with the Glen Grey Act. Labour for mines and other urban employees were drawn from the reserves. African residence on White land was restricted to labour tenancy or wage labour, and African land ownership outside of the reserves was prohibited. The 1936 Native Trust and Land Act extended the size of the reserves, but Africans were still confined to 13% of agricultural land. The reserves provided the basis for what later became the African 'Bantustans' or 'Homelands', of which the Ciskei and Transkei were in the Eastern Cape.

ensures jobs in the agricultural sector for people (Xolani, Molefe, Babalwa, Sipho and Ayanda).

The responses of Babalwa, Molefe and Xolani are not typical of Alliance discourse. Alliance discourse on land after 1994 centres above all on restoration of land rights to the historically dispossessed, land for housing and improved services and livelihoods for people in rural areas (ANC, 2002b, Lahiff, 2005:). The SACP has been more engaged in campaigns for land reform, situating land as part of agrarian reform, for household food security and peoples' land committees as a form of 'peoples power' (SACP, 2005, 2006a, 2007a). In the Polokwane Conference, however, the ANC resolved to broaden the focus to a programme of rural development, land reform and agrarian change (ANC, 2007f). This was partly as a result of pressure from the SACP and Cosatu, and the draft resolution adopted in the 2007 ANC Conference was authored in the Eastern Cape (Joe). The ANC's resolution proposes expropriation "where necessary", but does not have a specific emphasis on collective ownership (ANC, 2007f:26-28).

The analysis of the respondents is that the land redistribution programmes of the ANC government after 1994 have largely been about creating Black capitalist farmers, not about empowering the masses or ensuring mass redress. The ANC government implemented the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme in 2001, accelerating the transfer of land for agricultural use[40]. In support of the view of the respondents to this thesis, Lahiff (2005) writes that from about 2002, LRAD shifted towards a more private-entrepreneurial model.

According to some of the respondents, the sluggish pace of land reform is also due to the property clause in the constitution. Xolani argued

> "I think this property clause has done everything to undermine the Freedom Charter's objectives in terms of "the land shall be shared among those who [work it]", the [products] of the land shall be shared among those who produce and so forth".

The respondents also argued that the economic policy focus adopted after 1994 has contributed to the slow pace of redistribution.

[40] LRAD was first directed at transfer of land to groups of people pooling grants and purchasing White-owned commercial farms.

> "Because of the neo-liberal policies that have been adopted, our own self-imposed structural adjustment as represented by GEAR [land reform is slow]. We have got to take a different route. Whilst you have got a constitution of the country that has got a property clause, at the same time you have got a clause that talks about expropriation. We have not even used that clause. [We have not said] these things about [the] property clause pose some constraints, that's fine, but it does not suggest that there has not been space for us to do more" (Sipho).

Market-led land reform was characterised by the principle of 'willing buyer, willing seller' in which land was bought from whites at market price. Cosatu, SACP and a range of land sector NGOs and social movements outside of the Alliance have criticised this principle. A national Land Summit was held in 2005 and resolved that the 'willing buyer willing seller' principle be reviewed. Consequently, both the 2005 ANC NGC and the 2007 Polokwane Conference resolved to do away with the 'willing buyer willing seller' principle (ANC, 2005d and 2007f).

Section 25 of the constitution adopted in 1996 is referred to as the property clause. It entrenches the right to private property as well as the principle of compensation (RSA, 1996). The same section of the constitution also enables the state to expropriate land, as referred to by Sipho above. Respondents, such as Ayanda argue that the absence of political will has hampered land reform. Ntsebeza (2007) supports Sipho's view that the property clause has hampered the land reform programme, as white farmers are allowed to determine the price of land in the case of land reform claims outside the homelands. This view is also largely consistent with the larger discourse of the SACP (SACP, 2005) and more recently in SACP and Cosatu's support for the proposed Expropriation Bill[41] (Cosatu, 2008, Craven, 2008).

Sipho, as well as other respondents states that neo-liberal economic policies, predominantly the 1996 GEAR policy has contributed to the slow pace of land redistribution. Sipho refers to GEAR as a "self imposed structural adjustment programme". This view is consistent with the SACP and Cosatu's criticism of GEAR (Cosatu 1997b and 2007b, SACP, 2004 and 2006a). GEAR was adopted immediately following the first sharp fall in the value of the Rand after 1994, aimed at achieving macro-economic stability. Central to GEAR was the reduction of

[41] The Expropriation Bill was tabled to Parliament in April 2008, but has yet to be signed into law by the President. The bill provides for expropriation of property, including land, in the public interest or for public purposes (RSA, 2008).

state spending, the size of government, reduction of debt, and privatisation of state assets (RSA, 1996). This policy package is similar to the structural adjustment programmes imposed on countries by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank after qualifying for debt management, or what came to be known as the Washington Consensus.

For these respondents the land question is about the basis on which land is being redistributed, and which class interest redistribution serves. Respondents argued that "what leaders have done is to grab land for themselves, for their elite" (Sipho). This, for the respondents sets apart the approach of the Left and the Right within the Alliance to the Land question. Molefe argues that for the Right

> "It's about grabbing as much as you can of the prime properties in Transkei, grabbing as much property as you can in Port St Johns, Coffee Bay[42], essentially enriching yourself. But for some of us in the Left it is not about that, it is about understanding that the majority of the rural proletariat is located in that part of the province" (Molefe).

Babalwa and Ayanda made similar points with regard to use of urban land for shopping centres for people with connections to the ANC leadership. The official discourse of the SACP and Cosatu is more concerned with the pace and scale of land redistribution. Lahiff's (2005) research supports Molefe's position and he argues that the excessively commercial orientation of the land reform programme has limited the potential to reach the very poor and provides evidence that formerly state-owned agricultural land has been handed over to better off farmers who had acquired land under the homeland system, and gives Port St Johns as an example of this.

The Left's position on land has been used as an example of the issues that the Left is concerned with and how these issues are analysed and approached. What sets the Left apart from the Right is the broad-based nature of land restitution and a collectivised approach to land access and use; socialisation of ownership and property relations in land. The Eastern Cape Left advocates the utilisation of state or collectivised land for government employment programmes and favours expropriation to redistribute land. The SACP has run campaigns on

[42] Port St Johns and Coffee Bay are small towns on the pristine Wild Coast of the Eastern Cape.

land reform, and has cooperated with the *Vulamasango Singene* campaign to reopen betterment[43] claims. It has also implemented the Red October campaigns on land reform.

The respondents also argue that "We have not sufficiently distributed land in the way that we should have, during the time that we were in control of this province as the Left, you see" (Ayanda). The period where the Left was "in control" that Ayanda refers to is the period prior to 2004, as discussed in Chapter 5. However, as also pointed out by Ayanda, land reform is not a provincial competency and the province does not distribute land per se. Thus the Left's influence will be limited to campaigning, and influencing the use of state owned land.

6.3.3 *The Jobs Bloodbath:* The Left on Jobs and Economic Policy

Another issue that all the respondents stress is the issue of jobs and economic policy. In the Eastern Cape, unemployment is rife, with 28.4 % of the population being without work in the first quarter of 2009 (StatsSA, 2009). Unemployment figures have fluctuate between 23% and 29% in the past ten years, with 25.4% of the Eastern Cape population being unemployed in 2000, 29.6% in 2004 and 23.1% in 2007 (ECSECC, 2009:16). These figures use the official or 'narrow' definition, which excludes discouraged work seekers. If discouraged work seekers are included, and an expanded definition of unemployment is used, the figures rise to 53.3% of the population being without work in 2007, up from 49.4% in 2000, but down from 56.1 in 2005 (ECSECC, 2009:16). SACP leader and municipal councillor Babalwa said

> "If you go to communities, they all say "We need jobs" you know. They won't talk about anything else, so that is why it is central because whatever we are saying we must be echoing what communities are saying. That's why jobs are important to us, because that's what they want".

The specific initiatives taken by the Left in the period under study with regard to jobs include mobilisation for the national Jobs and Poverty Campaigns. This has largely consisted of

[43] Betterment planning was implemented in the former homelands and other so-called black areas from the 1930s onwards, in an attempt to regulate these areas and control land usage. Under betterment, designated areas were divided into distinct land use zones for residential, arable and grazing usage, and all people were forced to move into the demarcated residential zones. Furthermore, people were also dispossessed of arable and grazing land through the process of betterment (BRC, 2009b). Provincial support for the *Vulamasango Singene (*Open The Door, So That We Can Come In) campaign to reopen betterment claims would allow more than 1200 villages or 45 000 households to claim land dispossessed through the 'betterment' scheme of the 1950s (BRC, 2009a). The SACP has supported the campaign.

marches and rallies, held on 27 June 2005, 03 October 2005 and 18 May 2006. In the march in October 2005 Cosatu demanded that the province hold a Jobs Summit to protect existing jobs and create new jobs. This summit was held in February 2006 and Cosatu signed an agreement with government, business, civil society and higher education institutions modelled on the national Growth and Development Summit held in 2003. The agreement did not, however, contain concrete targets for job creation or protection (ECPG, 2006).

Cosatu has a seat on the boards of several public entities in the province; two seats on the board of the Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council, one seat on each of the boards of the Eastern Cape Development Corporation, the Eastern Cape Tourism Board, and East London Industrial Development Zone. Cosatu and NUMSA were involved in starting up the Uitenhage-Despatch Development Initiative, a facilitating body that has been established to promote economic development in the Mandela Bay Metropolitan region. There is one union representative on the board of the Initiative. A national union representative sits on the board of the Coega Industrial Development Zone.

Cosatu leader Ayanda said that

> "[The Left has] been primarily working on ensuring that the economy of the province grows and that jobs are created, that the social security system with regard to education, health and all those critical matters [are functioning]. [...] That's how the PGDP [Provincial Growth and Development Plan] came about."

Some of the main activities of the Left with regard to job creation have already been discussed above, and at was noted that the Left is not directly involved in job-creation and "growing the economy", but supported initiatives by the state and business in this regard. The focus will now be in more detail on the PGDP, as this plan was mentioned by many of the respondents as an important contribution of the Left to development in the province. The development of the PGDP, as seen in Chapter 5, was at the core of the political programme of the ANC and Alliance between 2001 and 2004. The PGDP came about as a result of the cohesiveness in the Alliance at the time, with the strongest pressure coming from Cosatu. The technical work of developing the plan, however, was carried out by the Office of the Premier and its public entity, the Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council (ECSECC). After the launch in August 2004, it became the programme of government; a technical

programme rather than a political programme of the Alliance in which Cosatu continued to play a strong role (Joe, Xolani, Mvusi, Ayanda).

The PGDP rooted its analysis in the Apartheid legacy of inequality and a bifurcated economy in the province. The aim of the plan was to provide a stimulus for social and economic transformation through six pillars; poverty reduction, agrarian transformation, manufacturing diversification, infrastructure, human resource development and public sector transformation (ECPG, 2004). The programmes that were adopted as part of the PGDP were, however, largely a combination of existing government programmes rather than new programmes. The ANC led and supported the plan by virtue of being in government. Cosatu was a 'social partner' to the PGDP and participated in the multi-stakeholder reference group and working groups. The SACP largely participated by virtue of its MPLs in the pre-2004 period.

It should be noted that the PGDP was developed by the political and government leadership under Premier Stofile, but was launched by Premier Balindlela. Her government did not have the support of Cosatu and the SACP. Thus Ayanda argued that after 2004 "unfortunately what happened, there was a change of guard, and [ ] this thing [PGDP] was watered down". Xolani holds a similar view and argues that "As the Left we succeeded to put [the PGDP] together, but at the level of government it was not implemented - deliberately. [ ] When we were about to implement that plan [Premier] Stofile was fired". An assessment carried out in 2008 concluded that while most of the PGDP programmes had been implemented and some service delivery indicators had improved, the plan had not had a substantial effect on poverty, unemployment or inequality. Neither had implementation of the plan challenged Apartheid spatial patterns of development nor the structure of the economy in any meaningful way (ECSECC, 2009).

Among the respondents to this thesis, macroeconomic policy was presented as the main explanation of high levels of unemployment. Responses to the crisis were also seen to lie in changing economic policy. This point was pursued more strongly by the trade union leaders, who drew on their industrial experience, particularly from the automotive sector (e.g. NUMSA leader Xolani). Arguments were made for a stronger role for the state in the economy, 'disciplining capital' and nationalising industry (Xolani, Ayanda, Sipho). The campaign for an industrial strategy is not new to Cosatu and the SACP (see e.g. Cosatu, 2005, 2006 and 2007a, Nzimande, 1997 SACP, 2006). The 1996 GEAR policy with deregulation

and privatisation was mentioned as a reason for the 'jobs bloodbath'. Other issues mentioned were the changing nature of work, casualisation and prevalence of 'hamburger jobs'[44]. These points are largely consistent with the broader discourses of the Alliance Left (see e.g. Cosatu, 2005, 2007a and 2007b, SACP 2006a and 2007a). With pressure from Cosatu, an Industrial Development Strategy was developed for the Eastern Cape in 2007. However consensus on the strategy was not achieved and the strategy has not been adopted (Personal communication, Andrew Murray, May 2009).

Respondents from the SACP all argued that cooperatives are one of the solutions to the problem of unemployment. Cooperatives are supported because they "promote collective forms of ownership of the economy" (Babalwa), are truly "broad based empowerment, empowerment of the mass of rural people" (Veliswa). But it is also recognised that "people cannot just go and start their own business, they are hungry now" (Sipho), and that a number of respondents argue that there should be state-led employment and collective or state led farming programmes as noted under the section on land above.

The SACP's work has consisted largely of putting pressure on government to support the development of cooperatives, funding cooperatives and mobilising its members and supporters to form cooperatives, and participate in the support of cooperatives. Babalwa argued that the establishment of cooperatives is a way of creating jobs and reducing poverty and that the state should play a central role in making this happen. In addition, cooperatives are seen as a way of ensuring that workers benefit. Babalwa and Veliswa argue that this point sets this approach apart from the result of large foreign direct investment projects.

The SACP has been promoting state support for cooperatives and this has resulted in programmes for supporting and funding cooperatives in government departments such as Education, Social Development, Public Works, Agriculture, Economic Development and Environmental Affairs. District and Local Municipalities also have programmes for funding and supporting cooperatives. A provincial strategy for cooperative development was adopted in 2009. However, these support programmes have yet to lead to a strong cooperative movement in the Eastern Cape, and cooperatives remain largely economically unsustainable

[44] See Barchesi (2004) for a treatment of changing subjectivities in response to casualisation of jobs.

as most do not provide their members with a salary (ECSECC/DEDEA 2009, DEDEA, 2009).

Short of creating jobs, the area of jobs and economic policy is one where the Left largely plays the role of attempting to influence policy and decision-making by the state, and in the case of Cosatu, employers. Economic policy making is not the forte of provincial government. Both macro- and micro-economic policy is developed nationally. While the Alliance Left makes demands and attempts to influence economic development decision-making, the provincial government does not command the necessary resources, nor the constitutional power to make economic or other policy that can bring about 'structural transformation'. It is here that influence in the ANC, both provincially and nationally becomes important for the Left.

6.4 Conclusion

It has become clear in this thesis that the Alliance Left politics is rooted in the ANC's brand of 'revolutionary nationalism' and informed by the analysis of South Africa as a colony of a special type. The politics of the SACP and Cosatu and Left individuals or positions is a politics that is about what is termed 'structural transformation'; change in ownership and distribution. As discussed above, the essence of this is the need for change in production relations, but it is not expressed as such.

Although the SACP and Cosatu are not electoral parties in their own right, they are part of an alliance with the ANC that pursues parliamentary elections. They are part of the nominations process and nomination of people from the SACP and Cosatu to serve for the ANC in local councils, provincial and national parliament and executives is an important part of their battle within the Alliance. It can thus be said that the SACP and Cosatu do participate in electoral politics. This raises the challenge of accountability of parliamentarians to the SACP and Cosatu, when elected on an ANC 'ticket' and it is about the impact of social mobility of individuals and organisations. This will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 7.

The Left is above all engaged in a struggle for hegemony of the ANC and power to articulate and give meaning to ANC discourse, although recognising that the ANC is not a socialist

organisation, and that the Alliance is a multiclass alliance. This struggle is politically about the character of the NDR, but it is also about progressive reforms pursued by the state and the use and deployment of state resources. Michelle Williams (2008) in her comparative study of the SACP and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in the state of Kerala argues that the mass mobilisation promoted by the SACP is about enlisting high profile mobilisation in support of state led development, or what she terms "hegemonic generative politics", which is a politics of subordination of civil society by the state and the economy organised around particular class interests. This includes an extended role of the state; a mode of activity that includes working within capitalism forms of social organisation (2008:9-10, 71-77). Her analysis corresponds with what in this study has been termed 'structural transformation' promoted by the Left in the Eastern Cape. The strategy to achieve reforms is deployment of Left individuals into positions of power in the state, formal participation in policy processes and corporatist engagements coupled with what Williams (2008) calls the enlisting of high profile mass-mobilising practices. This structural transformation rests on decisive action by the state, thus at the core of the Left's strategy is 'influence' over policy and decision-making in the ANC and government, at national, provincial and local municipal level.

Chapter 7: *"The party is in ICU"* Strengths and Weaknesses of the Eastern Cape Left

7.1 Introduction

Having established the key tenets of Left politics in the Alliance in the Eastern Cape, this chapter will reflect on some of the strengths and weaknesses of this Left politics. It will discuss what the leaders interviewed saw as the strengths and weaknesses of the Left in the Eastern Cape, and how this is connected with the very strategy of the Left. Based on the data presented in Chapters 5 and 6, it can be argued that the strategy of the Left centred on placing demands on the state for progressive reforms. This is done through participation of individuals in the ANC and the ANC government and applying pressure on the government through the Alliance. This reinforces the importance of the Alliance for the Left. Babalwa says

> "...this whole thing of Alliance, it helps us to keep the ANC in check. Because if you have an Alliance, a working Alliance, not only [an] Alliance that is in the books, [but a] fighting Alliance; people who are going to say "Wake up and smell the rat" just like we did, it is going to work. It is going to work, they [the ANC] do not have a choice."

Demands for reforms are underpinned by mass mobilisation. This chapter will reflect on the impact on the organisations themselves of this political strategy and on their ability to carry out the strategy.

7.2 *'The Party is in [the] ICU [Intensive Care Unit]':* Strengths and weaknesses of the Eastern Cape Left

The interviews with SACP and Cosatu leaders were conducted between May and June 2008. This was after the ANC Conference in Polokwane, but before Nosimo Balindlela and Thabo Mbeki were 'recalled' from office as Premier of the Eastern Cape and State President, respectively, and before the formation of the breakaway party, Congress of the People (COPE). The Left became more influential in the Alliance in the Eastern Cape after the

Polokwane conference, particularly as the Left group in the Eastern Cape was closely linked with the national leadership of the ANC elected in Polokwane. Nkululeko says, even if electorally weak inside the ANC, the Left group has "influence" on the ANC nationally, through voters in conferences and the "ear" of certain national leaders. The responses of the respondent were, nonetheless, marked by the experience of the 2004 to 2008 period, which all the respondents characterised as a period in which the Left group was marginalised from policy and decision-making within the Alliance and government in the Eastern Cape. Respondents reflected on the outcome of their politics in this period and the responses focused on the internal, political organisational weaknesses that the Left faced, the 'balance of forces', as well as what will be termed the politics of 'influence' below.

7.2.1 *Not about sheer mass:* The Politics of 'Influence'.

The majority of the respondents said that the Left was generally weak, meaning that it did not enjoy hegemony in the ANC in the Eastern Cape. Some, however, claimed that the Left was strong, although not hegemonic. One area used to illustrate the strength of the Left was numerical growth of the SACP and "inroads [made] into communities through recruiting" (Molefe), as illustrated by the rising membership of the SACP nationally, and as cited in Chapter 5. A second area is that the Left group is "well placed to destabilise the right wing in the province" even if the Left groups do not hold electoral majority within the ANC (Nkululeko). This is illustrated by the heightened level of political tension in the 2004 to 2007 period.

A third area of strength relates to the influence that the Eastern Cape has on national politics, both in the ANC, SACP and Cosatu. This is exemplified by the proposal from the Eastern Cape that the SACP should begin to *"adopt a much clearer position on the attitude to government"* in the May 2005 special conference of the SACP (Nkululeko). The proposal that the SACP should contest elections on its own emanated from the Buyisela Ngwenda (Port Elizabeth) region of the SACP. The SACP has not accepted the proposal to date, but it remains a subject of debate in the Party and led to a series of proposals for a reconfigured Alliance (SACP, 2008). The proposal was developed in response to 15 years of experience of an electoral Alliance with the ANC, and the perceived marginalisation of the Left as has discussed. After the Polokwane conference, however, there has been less emphasis on this question of state power for the SACP. Thus, even if electorally weak inside the ANC in the

Province, the Left has 'influence' on the ANC nationally, particularly as an ANC leadership seen to be more Left friendly was elected in the Polokwane conference.

A fourth area used to indicate the strength of the SACP is the change in leadership and a perceived change in policy that took place at the 52nd conference of the ANC in Polokwane in December 2007. For Xolani, the Left is regaining strength. "If you judge us by Polokwane, that from nowhere we have managed to take a very firm position, we put together a line-up".

A key determinant of strength is the influence that a small group of people can wield, in this case over the ANC

> "It's not about the sheer mass that they have, it's the influence that they have [...]. It's not really about that, it's more about how a concentration of forces can be brought to bear on a particular socio-political phenomenon and produce a Left outcome, but whether that concentration of forces is sustained over time or not, that is another matter" (Nkululeko).

The concentration of forces may not be only in terms of people who hold formal positions, but how particular groups within the Alliance can influence non-party members in decision-making positions. This influence can force a particular decision; produce a Left 'outcome'. Examples of such outcomes will be particular policy decisions, within the ANC or the other Alliance partners, or within government. Within government it may also be decisions regarding the use of resources. It may also be the appointment of people to certain positions within the Alliance or within government. At the level of municipal decision-making, Cosatu has been involved in a campaign to stop the sale of East London beachfront property owned by the Buffalo City Municipality to private developers (Personal communication, Mandla Rayi, February 2009). At provincial level, the SACP and Cosatu, in collaboration with community organisations and NGOs such as the Treatment Action Campaign, mobilised to stop the implementation of the Department of Health's Service Transformation Plan that would see the downgrading of health facilities in townships and district areas (Ayanda, Sipho). At the level of deployments, the support of Cosatu and SACP for SACP Treasurer Massualle for the premiership after the 2009 elections is a case in point.

Some of the respondents who were working either within, or closely with, the state all raised this issue of 'left tools' or 'instruments'. However the issue was raised largely as a question,

not as a series of proposals. Nkululeko says "the key thing is how you assemble the tools you use, the tools that you put into the kit that you call the Left, and how you deploy them among these individuals [that work in the government]." Joe argues that the lack of a precise definition of such tools is a demonstration of the lack of hegemony of the Left in the Alliance, or alternatively, inability to turn positions into policies and programmes of government.

> "Let's say [the goal is] more equitable access to means of production and productive assets, land, machinery, plant, whatever the case may be, technology. If that is an outcome, what are the means you put in place, or the instruments you put in place, the policies, the policy instruments you put in place to achieve that?

These are the 'tools' or 'instruments' that will contribute to 'structural transformation' as discussed in Chapter 6. Such 'tools' will be the development and implementation of policies and programmes, and decisions regarding the use of state resources that are available to members of the Legislature, the Executive or senior government bureaucrats. Chapter 6 gave some examples of the Left's action with regard to land reform, job-creation and economic policy.

The ability to influence the deployment of people to leadership positions in the ANC, in provincial legislature and administration, and local councils and administration, is seen as a measure of strength, and an important way of gaining influence. The emphasis on 'marginalisation' of the SACP and Cosatu in deployment decisions in the Eastern Cape in the 2004 to 2008 period is a case in point. This particularly pertains to the deployment of people into positions in the provincial legislature and executive after the 2004 national elections and into municipal and district councils after the 2006 local elections. Central to this 'politics of influence' is the battle to put the 'correct' candidates in power

> "Now it depends upon who is at the leadership at a particular point, because if the person who is a leader is inclined, or is comfortable with the creation of [the] petty bourgeoisie as a class they then [s/he] will drive the ANC to that line and marginalise everybody [else] into the periphery." (Ayanda).

Chapter 5 revealed hat the SACP has consistently had many of its PEC members in the Provincial Legislature, and Cosatu had some, but fewer than the SACP. It should be noted,

though, that once a Union leader assumes a place in the legislature, she or he will no longer be a union leader as the unions allow only workers to be elected as leaders. It was also noted in Chapter 5 that most of the leaders 'deployed' by Cosatu in 1994, 1996 and 1999 remain in the Legislature. After the 2009 elections, there are six SACP PEC members and three Cosatu PEC members in the Legislature.

For the respondents, as is also evident in the political programs of the SACP and Cosatu (SACP, 2002, 2007a, Cosatu 2003b), the strategy is to focus on policy work and mass mobilisation. For Xolani, there is a close relationship between the two, where mass mobilisation is used to support policy work, and exert pressure on government, capital and at times the ANC:

> "I think the Left needs very solid leadership that is willing to educate workers around these issues, to mobilise them, to mobilise communities. Take them to the street, impose policies on the state because I'm convinced that unless you do that, impose public policies on the state that will ensure that the economy is treated in a particular manner, otherwise capital does not have any morality."(Xolani)

It was similarly argued in this thesis that Left politics in the Alliance is about using relative power and influence to ensure particular decisions within a framework of a democratic, but capitalist state; in this case, predominantly through the ANC. Although it was stated in Chapter 6 that the Alliance Left advocates 'structural transformation', the strategies discussed here fall within the broad category of early social democratic politics: struggle for radical reforms in the legislative and policy field. It is thus a struggle for strengthening, and providing direction to the state and not for the transformation of the social relations of production that is at the heart of this strategy. The focus will now turn to look at the respondents' reflections about their relative preparedness to exert this influence in the Eastern Cape.

7.2.2 Policy capacity and participation in corporatist institutions

This politics of influence on policy is also prasticed through participation in a range of corporatist institutions and via policy and parliamentary inputs. In Chapter 5 it was noted that Cosatu in particular participated in the development of the Provincial Growth and Development Plan in 2002-2004 and the provincial Job Summit in 2006. Cosatu participated

in Growth and Development Summits held in all seven districts in the Eastern Cape in 2006 and 2007. Cosatu also takes part in forums in Local Municipalities, such as the Local Economic Development forums and Integrated Development Plan Representative Forum[45]. Cosatu, as organised labour, it was noted, is considered a 'social partner' to the state. The SACP, as a political party, does not directly participate in such forums.

That core to the strategy of the Alliance Left is a recognition that fundamental structural reform is required, and that the strategy for this is reforms to be won through the state has already been discussed. In this situation, the Alliance Left is expected and required both to take part in policy-making processes as organisations and individuals. Organisations participate as members of NEDLAC, in submissions to Parliament and government departments and in a range of committees and forums that are part of the corporatist environment. Individuals are deployed into positions in all spheres of the state, and fill the seats on the plethora of forums and 'platforms' that have been created. In addition to NEDLAC there is a range of corporatist structures at all levels of state; participation and consultation are in many cases legislated. For example, the Municipal Structures Act (Act no 117 of 1998) legislates consultation and public participation in the development of Integrated Development Plans and budgets. In the Eastern Cape, there is the Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council (ECSECC), a NEDLAC equivalent public entity responsible for policy making and planning and ensuring participation of 'stakeholders', including labour, in all policy processes.

At national level inputs into policy processes are made much more frequently and on a more organised basis, as Cosatu and its affiliate unions have built considerable policy and research capacity, internally and in institutions such as NALEDI[46]. While national organisations can provide general material, advice, and inputs into the national policy process, there is limited capacity at provincial level to process the large amounts of information needed, formulate policy positions and make inputs. Inputs are often made in the form of discussion in meetings and less frequently in writing. Neither Cosatu nor any of its Affiliates have dedicated

[45] An Integrated Development Plan (IDP) is a 5 year plan for a local or district municipality. The IDP is a strategic plan for the development of the municipality which links, integrates and co-ordinates plans from all spheres of government and takes into account proposals for the development of the municipality. The IDP is meant to align the resources and capacity of the municipality with the implementation of the plan and set out an annual and five year budget (RSA, 2000).

[46] NALEDI is the National Labour and Economic Development Institute, a non-governmental organisation which undertakes labour and economic research. One of NALEDI's central roles is to improve the capacity of the union movement to engage with key policy issues and they work closely with Cosatu and other unions. The SACP and Cosatu also established the Chris Hani Institute in 2003 to provide education to working class leadership in the areas of political economy of the changing global and South African realities from the standpoint of the interest of the working class.

researchers and such work is often the task of the Secretary and at times education officers or organisers. In 2006 only three affiliates had full-time educators and education programmes (Cosatu EC, 2006). Cosatu states that limited resources severely constrain its political education programmes (Ibid, 2006). Demands on senior officials and leaders are many and there are, in many cases, few resources available in order to access, analyse information and formulate positions in the plethora of areas where it is possible. As a result of these factors, the policy capacity of the Left at provincial level is limited. In other words, while the corporatist framework is assumed to be working in favour of the working class, there is limited capacity to make use of existing forums and institutions.

In order to achieve progressive reforms through such forums these individuals and organisations need to be well-equipped with knowledge and a sophisticated understanding in order to be able to impact on policy processes and decision-making for those in positions, often led by government officials or consultants. This is referred to as 'policy capacity'. When discussing the success of the Left in the Eastern Cape in recent years and the impact that 'deployed individuals' have had on policy and reforms, one respondent said that "I think the score card is close to zero, primarily because the SACP does not have policy capacity" (Thabo). This 'policy capacity' is what would produce the 'Left outcomes' and 'Left tools' discussed in Section 7.2.1 above. Joe has a similar evaluation

> Whether it's land reform, whether it's dealing with mass poverty in the former Bantustans or whether it's dealing with cooperatives. I think whatever analysis you're doing you're seeing that any of those haven't been prioritised, so you can only conclude by that that if there is a Left project it is definitely not hegemonic within the ANC, or if it is hegemonic within the ANC it definitely hasn't found expression in state policy and implementation thereof" (Joe).

Joe argues that the Left is neither hegemonic in the Alliance, nor in government. This is given the fact that some of the issues that are at the centre of the Left's agenda, as discussed in Chapter 6, have not been prioritised by the provincial government. Neither have there been significant changes in these areas.

7.2.3 *There must be no angels, there must be no holy cows:* Theoretical renewal and capacity

In Chapter 6 it was contended that what sets the Left apart from the Right, or the political centre is the analysis that underpins key issues and campaigns on the Left. In this section an examination of what is called theoretical and policy capacity of the Left in the Eastern Cape will be undertaken. This issue was mentioned by most of the respondents, and is important if one accepts that influence on policy through the state and corporatist institutions is at the centre of Left politics. In many of the interviews respondents argued that there is not enough political education and political and theoretical engagement within the Alliance Left. This is backed up by informal discussions with activists and leaders in the Alliance and also through personal researcher experience of participating in some of these corporatist or 'multi-stakeholder' processes in the Eastern Cape in the period between 2004 and 2008, as mentioned in Chapter 3. This is illustrated by Xolani in the quote below.

> "Part of what we need to continue to do is to be very hard on ourselves, is to continue to study, is to continue to read, is to continue to share experiences with other comrades all over [the] globe... [...] I would also think that we need to revisit theory, and when I mean theory there must be no angels, there must be no holy cows. All of us, everybody who has accepted the responsibility of being in leadership, I think it's high time to think and think hard, and actually revisit the working class theory" (Xolani).

Theory here refers to the theory of Marxism/Leninism dominant within the Left. Xolani's statement that there is a need to 'revisit the working class theory' refers to revisiting the continued applicability of the CST thesis and the NDR in understanding capitalism in South Africa. There is, however, a small group of people who are questioning the dominant approach and are asking if the NDR is the 'route' that should be pursued by the Alliance Left.

> "I know that in theory we talk about "There is a direct route," but where is this direct route? I'm not saying the NDR is not the path that we must be entrusted, but there is no formula of how we will go to Socialism" (Xolani).

Thabo presents an argument similar to Xolani

> "We lack a radical critique of post-apartheid capitalism, simply because we are stuck with old tools of analysis. We seek to reinterpret and interpret, and reinterpret and reinterpret the world with the tools that we know. It's a sad legacy, actually, that the Communist Party and Cosatu have really not produced waves and layers and generations of new thinkers."

Thabo's argument relates to two points. Firstly, that the Alliance Left's continued characterisation of South Africa as a colony of a special type and a conceptualisation of struggle as a national democratic revolution does not lead to the necessary understanding and critique of capitalism in South Africa post-Apartheid. Secondly, that the SACP and Cosatu have not produced a 'layer' of new theoreticians and leaders after 1994. Thabo further argues that "We rather rely on the safe space that Jeremy Cronin provides, and then you get others cutting and pasting from Jeremy Cronin's frameworks. [...] [T]hat is what is killing theoretical innovation." Cronin is the Deputy Secretary General of the SACP and its main theoretician.

Questioning of the direction of the Alliance can also be seen in a joint paper on the provincial turn-around plan[47] written by the SACP and Cosatu in October 2008 and quoted in Chapter 6. The paper states that the tension in the Alliance over policy is rooted in the 'business interest' of individuals "who will do everything to take control of the organisation because they need to abuse both it and the state to get their hands on material resources" (2008:6). The paper questions whether the Left should continue to accommodate such (class) interests. This paper has a more radical tone than official documents of the SACP and Cosatu and demonstrates that there is a group of people within the Eastern Cape Alliance Left that is increasingly questioning the strategy not only of the ANC, but also of the Left itself. This view is, however, not dominant in Cosatu and the SACP, as the differing responses of the leaders interviewed for this research demonstrate.

[47] The turn-around plan refers to a provincial turn-around plan put in place by Premier Mbulelo Sogoni in August 2008 when he became the Premier of the Eastern Cape. Sogoni requested provincial government departments to develop plans for how to turn around their performance to meet government's targets for the 2004-2009 election period.

7.3 Overlapping leadership and *'ideological inbreeding'*

Elsewhere the movement of people between the three Alliance organisations and the different roles of the organisations has been addressed. Cosatu has functioned like a 'supplier' of leaders to the ANC and to parliament and legislatures both nationally and in the province (Bramble, 2003, Lehulere, 2003 or McKinley, 2003). This situation creates what Nkululeko terms 'ideological inbreeding'. Thus he argues, one cannot use a 'metaphysical, fixed conceptualisation' of what Left politics is in the context of the ANC Alliance and its history. Rather one has to understand the dialectical relationship between the identities and political practices that being a trade unionist, an African, a member of the working class, a government official or legislator give rise to.

> "There was a lot of inbreeding, ideological inbreeding, they would be Communists, they would be trade unionists, they would be also ANC. [...] You see, to understand it you can't use a metaphysical fixed conceptualisation, you need to use concepts that have the ability to appreciate the complexity of human life in its totality. They will move in and out of, in fact, various class positions as it is." (Nkululeko)

First, Nkululeko addresses what he terms 'ideological inbreeding'. This refers to the fact that leaders of the Alliance organisations will often be trade unionists, communists and ANC members primarily concerned with anti-racial struggle at the same time. As such, these leaders and activists "move in and out of various definitions" and identities that shape their political beliefs and actions. Nkululeko elaborates:

> *"*As a trade unionist and as a worker I'm defending my job. At a political level I understand that this system is exploitative and I need to overthrow it, but as an African I understand also that I am coming from a background in which this system was imposed upon me violently and ruthlessly"

However, does this constitute *"moving in and out of class positions"*? In Chapter 2 it was argued that class is a function of the relation to the means of production and not a function of organisational or occupational position. The discussion elaborated on Carchedi's (1975) theory that identification of classes must always take place in terms of ownership of the means of production, expropriation of labour and performance of either the function of global labour or global capital. Thus, shifting organisational positions and defence of different

interest does not constitute changing of the class position of an individual. However, for a trade unionist the defence of jobs may in fact be the defence of specific units of capital and the unions end up advancing the interest of capital. Likewise a politician or a government official who considers herself or himself a communist must take decisions that in some cases may be in the interest of capital, e.g. offering incentives for investors that will lead to the creation of jobs. This serves the immediate material interest of workers that need work and incomes to survive, but not workers as a class whose collective interest is to change their relationship to the means of production. Nkululeko also speaks to the interplay between class and race, and in part illustrates how 'race has class', as was discussed in Chapter 2.

This is particularly a contradiction for a trade union whose leaders and members negotiate for jobs and wages and at the same time is active in a communist party. For Nkululeko

> "I'm not a 'left left', I'm a trade unionist, so there comes a time when...[I must defend] the interests of the MIDP [Motor Industry Development Program] [48], for example, the motor industry. I'm defending subsidies to a capitalist faction, to a faction of capital and all that kind of stuff. As soon as I walk out of that meeting I'm attending a South African Communist Party [meeting] and I'm talking about violently overthrowing this system".

Among the respondents to this research, however, none talked about overthrowing the (capitalist) system, by violent or other means, but rather about state reforms and 'structural transformation'. Progressive state reform, and not the capture or overthrowing of the state, is also the main thrust of the official documents of the SACP and Cosatu. It should also be noted that both Cosatu and the SACP supports the policy of BEE and sees de-racialising capitalism as progressive, albeit insufficient[49] (Cosatu, 2003a and 2006, Nzimande, 2004 and 2005).

[48] The Motor Industry Development Program (MIDP) is a subsidy scheme to the automotive industry by the Department of Trade and Industry. The programme was first initiated in 1995 to help the motor industry adjust to South Africa's reintegration into the global economy. The programme has been reviewed and is scheduled to continue until 2012. Through the MIDP the industry benefits from a wide variety of other initiatives ranging from provision of infrastructure, factory facilities and special financial arrangements (Flatters, 2005, Department of Trade and Industry, 2004)

[49] Cosatu and SACP's criticism of BEE has not been a criticism of the principle of BEE per se, but that the BEE policy does not have sufficient emphasis on job creation and reducing inequality. In addition, BEE has not contributed sufficiently to the development of the forces of production, and to transformation to the benefits of the great majority. Rather BEE has been primarily about increases in the numbers of black people that manage, own and control South Africa's economy (Cosatu, 2003a and 2006, Nzimande, 2004 and 2005).

The Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP) was used as an example that exemplifies the 'contradiction' between trade union struggles/economic struggle and broader class struggles. Nkululeko argues "[NUMSA] has no choice but to defend state subsidy to the auto industry when there is no universal subsidy to poverty, to the working class, but for those 60 jobs, 70 jobs, 3000 jobs, they need them. As a trade union they play their defensive role." This tension has become more marked, particularly for NUMSA in the wake of the global economic crisis and mass job losses in the automotive industry in late 2008 and early 2009.

NUMSA leader Xolani explains

> "You know this thing that Marx called unity of the opposites? In many instances we have to go out and engage capital because it is in the best interests of our members to do so. Sometimes contradictions arise because we represent different interests. That is what we have to manage all the time as unionists, because in the cause of wanting to save jobs, or calling for a particular intervention on a matter you then have to ensure that in the process capital will also want to benefit. It is a contradiction that you have to manage as a trade unionist all along."

The same contradiction exists for SACP leaders that are either holding political offices or working in senior positions in government "in their real lives actually survive by sustaining capitalism which, unfortunately, is a dialectic that I think is common in all societies" (Nkuleluko). This is a tension that is common to Left, socialist or labour parties engaging in parliamentary or electoral politics across the world, and has been the subject of debate since the split between the social democrats and the socialists in Europe in the aftermath of World War One as was noted in Chapter 2. But for Nkululeko

> "... what then makes them a particular kind of Left, for me, is to a large extent how conscious they are in projecting their beliefs, their practises and that kind of stuff to sustain a particular Left identity within the broad spectrum of the Left."

That is, their political practice or the 'Left tools' they assemble and their ability to 'squeeze something good out of the state' is fundamental to describing the dominant brand of Left politics in the Alliance as was also discussed in section 7.2.1 above.

7.4 Deployment, changed material conditions and changed consciousness

The issue of deployment of leaders into government was discussed both with regard to the impact it has on the organisation if these are not accountable or if it leads to the neglect of 'party work'. Related to this, as well, is the impact on individual 'comrades' in terms of the material changes that often take place in their lives. It is the assertion of a number of respondents that the deployment of Left 'comrades' into government has had a negative effect, organisationally; in this case for Cosatu and the SACP. The first argument is with regards to the lack of accountability to the organisation for decisions made, particularly when the accountability to the ANC takes precedence over accountability to the SACP and/or Cosatu. There is a view that accountability needs to be strengthened, and that the Left needs to have a clear plan for the individuals that are deployed.

> "You must define what it is that they are going to do there. That has not been done by the Party nationally or even here provincially. We never defined what it was that we wanted to achieve, what the key tasks are which these comrades must carry as they go there. Failure to do that, then the Communist Party comrades in parliament become an extension of the Party [and] the Party becomes an extension of those who are in parliament, without making an impact as this distinct organisation with a clear understanding of what should be achieved. Even now we have not gone into that thing of defining what is it that we would want Party members deployed to do in parliament" (Mvusi).

Two issues arise from Mvusi's argument. Firstly, is the Party an extension of the ANC or vice versa? Secondly, Mvusi says that deployment has had limited impact on decisions taken. Support for this argument is provided by the discussion in Chapter 6. SACP members are elected into Parliament or Legislatures as members of the ANC, not the SACP. The SACP in between 2005 and 2007 debated the question of the SACP and state power as well as the experience with electoral politics after 1994. Much the same as Mvusi, the SACP concluded that "the Party had had some successes and impact but that a major review and improvement in all these areas was necessary" (SACP, 2008:2). The actions of SACP cadres elected on ANC lists is guided by the Constitution of the SACP. Party members can advocate their positions openly but must accept the majority decisions. This constitution states that

> "Members active in fraternal organisations or in any sector of the mass movement have a duty to set an example of loyalty, hard work and zeal in the performance of their duties and *shall be bound by the discipline and decisions of such organisations and movement.* They shall not create or participate in SACP caucuses within such organisations and movements designed to influence either elections or policies" (SACP, 2006c:5, reserachers emphasis)

This, however, does not negate Mvusi's argument that adequate preparation is not done and that the open advocacy has not had the necessary impact thus far, but provides some explanation of how SACP members negotiate their positions as ANC politicians.

When asking some of the SACP leaders holding positions in the provincial legislature and local councils how they respond to this difficulty two answers were forthcoming. Veliswa responds that the positions of all the Alliance members are based on the Freedom Charter, therefore there is no real difficulty[50]. With experience as an ANC municipal councillor, Babalwa on the other hand says

> "Yes, you do find such situations where you will be forced to agree to something that you know that is not in line with policies of your own organisation, but the handicap there is that you are deployed by the ANC, you are not deployed by the Communist Party, so you have to find ways of massaging that."

The 'massaging' consists of making an input into the decision or policy area before it comes to the municipal council decision-making process. Babalwa further argues that influence is important

> "... in the interim phase, when it is still in a concept phase. That's where you need to be strategic, you start influencing-- your communist influence at that stage, because when it comes to your standing committees, your council, you will be dominated by other interest."

A result of focus on electoral politics is that it may lead to the neglect or lack of prioritisation of party work by the individuals who are occupying full-time positions in government. Attention is placed on the daily running of parliament, legislatures and the executive, and this

[50] See Dwyer (2003) for an analysis of the impact on Cosatu and Cosatu activists in the Western Cape who were elected to the first democratic Legislature in the Western Cape.

is prioritised in terms of time, at the expense of building the organisation. This harms the party as it is often the theoretically strongest and most articulate comrades who are being deployed into positions. Mvusi makes this argument about the experience with the ANC leaders and SACP leaders placed in important positions in the period between 2000 and 2004.

> "I have this view that people like them have a particular blame to take in what we see in the province now. I'm saying that because how they relied into the position they had then and demobilised the organisation, and denied the organisation even information, because they constituted a powerful network located in the ECDC [Eastern Cape Development Corporation] and in government and they thought that there is permanency about that. They forgot to build the organisation in order to defend what we have, and forgot to build a layer of leadership that is equally having access to information and what should be done" (Mvusi).

These individuals who were considered important leaders of the Left group in the 2000-2004 period were removed from their positions by Premier Nosimo Balindlela after the 2004 elections and the group split up, as was seen in Chapter 5.

7.5 Conclusion

In Chapter 5 data was presented that allowed an understanding of who the organised political actors and key leaders that organise Alliance Left politics are, and it was argued that the Alliance Left are those that have the SACP and Cosatu as their operating base. Key political developments and events in the period between 2000 and 2008 in the Eastern Cape were outlined. Chapter 6 focused on the key demands of this Left and the ideology, analysis and interpretation informing these demands. It was contended that the Left advocates for 'structural transformation', understood as significant change in the relations of production and distribution of resources, capital and wealth. Through analysis of the action of the Left group that was allegedly 'in power' between 1999 and 2008, it was identified, however, that political action on the Alliance Left has been more concerned with a 'politics of influence' than with a politics of 'structural transformation'.

This chapter has been dedicated to interrogating the political strategy of the Left. The argument is that this strategy consists of participation in parliamentary or electoral politics through the ANC, participation in corporatist forums and processes, and political mobilisation to influence ANC policy decisions through the Alliance. Analysis of documentary data as well as the reflections of the Alliance leaders interviewed for this thesis lead to the conclusion that there are theoretical and political weaknesses that undermine the possibility of making good use of various corporatist platforms to pursue the agenda of the Left in the Eastern Cape. There is also increased contestation within the Alliance Left itself about the continued usefulness of this strategy. In the concluding chapter reflection will be on some of the political events, continuities and shifts in the passions of the Left in the period after the interviews were conducted in May and June 2008.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

The introduction to this thesis outlined the objectives of this study. It indicated that there were two broad questions the thesis would address; to identify the particular brand of Left politics being espoused by the Left in the Alliance and to examine how useful the Left/Right dichotomy is for understanding the politics of the ANC Alliance in South Africa, generally, and the Eastern Cape in particular.

Further, there were four specific questions around which the thesis was centred. Firstly, the thesis sought to identify the dominant expressions of Left politics and the political formations central in the mobilisation and organisation of activities in the Eastern Cape Province. Secondly, to identify the demands and the interpretation of the issues that define Left politics in the province and thirdly to examine the social forces that shaped and continue to shape the particular form of Left politics that we find in the Alliance post 1994. Lastly it set out to examine the outcomes of Left politics.

Based on a survey of literature on some of the core manifestations of Left politics globally in the 20th Century Left politics was defined as the elements of the political spectrum that are concerned with the progressive resolution of involuntary disadvantage, and with a goal of abolishing class society and capitalism. This two-pronged definition allowed for the identification the Left as a whole, as well as for the identification of variation and for the denotation of places on the Left side of the political spectrum.

This conclusion is structured around the objectives of the research. Firstly it will present the conclusions about what Left politics is in the Eastern Cape, through addressing the questions above. Then it will discuss how useful the Left/Right dichotomy is for understanding the politics of the multiclass ANC-SACP-Cosatu alliance. Lastly it will note some issues for further research.

8.2 Identifying Left politics in the Eastern Cape

Below is a summary of the main findings and arguments of this thesis and a discussion of the theoretical and political implications of these findings.

8.2.1 Dominant Expressions and Organised Political Actors: Cosatu, SACP and the ANC

This study has been concerned with the study of organised collective action and social groups as they engage in political practice. Moreover it has been concerned with organised political actors on the Left of the political spectrum. The study set out to identify the organisations that are at the centre of organising and mobilising the Left in the Eastern Cape. In taking the Tripartite Alliance in the Eastern Cape as a case study, the reserach identified the three core organisations in the Alliance; the ANC, Cosatu and the SACP. It also predominantly identified as the Alliance Left the activists and leaders that have the SACP and Cosatu as their operating base. However, it was also argued that the Left cannot be defined purely organisationally, and that one would treat as the Left wing of the Alliance those groups and individuals within the Alliance that recognise that social, political and economic challenges cannot be solved within the confines of capitalism.

The ANC, SACP and Cosatu came together in a strategic alliance founded on the adoption of the Freedom Charter and allegiance to the NDR as the core political program. Hence, the SACP and Cosatu are part of a governing coalition. In this coalition the ANC is the leader and thus it is on the terrain of ANC strategy, policy and positions that contestation in the Alliance plays itself out. For the Left, there is strength in the idea of the Alliance, and there have been repeated calls for placing the Alliance at the political centre in past years after allegations that the ANC marginalised its Communist and Trade Union partners.

The thesis argued that the politics of the Alliance Left centres on ‘structural transformation’ and ‘influence’. Structural transformation is rooted in the view that the necessary response to social and economic inequality cannot take place within the current ‘structure of society’; the remnants of racial capitalism that have persisted after 1994. However, structural transformation is also rooted in the NDR and the need for a transitional phase of national

democracy. This necessitates coexistence between capitalism and socialism, where elements of socialism are constructed from within the capitalist society through a process of "revolutionary reforms" (Williams, 2008:28-29). The long-term vision of socialism is thus constructed from within the current conditions through a process of 'structural transformation'.

It has been argued in this thesis that this view of 'structural transformation' gives rise to a 'politics of influence' where the primary role of the Left in the Alliance is to influence ANC and government policy in order to ensure that this 'structural transformation' takes place. Influence takes place via deployment of leaders in the ANC and in the spheres of government as well as participation in corporatist forums at various levels of the state.

8.2.2 The historical and social forces that shape Left politics

In the analysis of historical and contemporary data the historical and social forces that shaped and continue to shape the particular brand of Left politics that we see in the Alliance have been identified. Firstly, the particular brand of nationalism adopted by the three Alliance members at different points in the 20th century was identified. This nationalism has changed from the ANC's initial demands for inclusion in the South African polity to more radical anti-colonial struggles and struggle against White oppression. Given the interrelationship between class and racial oppression in South Africa, anti-racial or 'national' struggle is still at the core of the Alliance's politics; both Left and Right.

Further, the terms of the negotiated settlement in 1994 and the subsequent adoption of neo-liberal corporatism has had a profound effect on politics. Through a state centred agenda and corporatism, popular discontent and resistance as well as the politics of the Alliance partners have been channelled through corporatist and other 'consultative' channels, giving rise to the 'politics of influence'. The end of the Soviet model of socialism in 1989 also had a profound impact on the Alliance Left due to the absence of any systemic alternative to capitalism.

For the respondents however, the 2007 national Congress of the ANC might represent a change in the direction of the strength of the Left within the ANC and thus in turn withint government. In conclusion, it can argued that all these forces have combined to create a dominant political discourse on the Left that is centred on the state and on influence over and

in the state, rather than a politics that is centred on changing the social relations of production based on collective class and human agency.

8.2.3 Structural transformation: Core demands of the Left

Chapter 6 postulated that key campaigns for the Left are public health, public education, poverty reduction and job creation. Moreover, the demands of the Left centre on economic policy and economic transformation. Demands for nationalisation of industry were abandoned shortly after Nelson Mandela's release from prison in 1990, but have now been placed back on the agenda by the Alliance Left. This can be seen by the positions of Cosatu and the SACP put forward in Polokwane and at the October 2008 Economic Policy Conference of the Alliance. While proposals for nationalisation were adopted in Polokwane and the policy conference, they were not part of the ANC's 2009 election manifesto (ANC, 2007f and 2009, ANC/SACP/Cosatu, 2008). Other demands include a state-led rural and agrarian reform programme creating jobs and redistributing land. These are demands that are placed on the ANC, and on the government, with regard to economic and social policy. The state is thus seen as the main actor in this process of structural transformation. Mass mobilisation is enlisted to support central demands and campaigns.

However, the issues listed above are also issues that are on the agenda of other political forces in South Africa, both inside and outside the ANC. For the Left, however, what sets their politics apart is the rooting of these issues in the politics of structural transformation. Both the documents analysed and the interviews conducted focus on 'structural transformation', and 'changing of the accumulation path'. By this is meant a development trajectory that does not reproduce the racial, spatial and class patterns of inequality that Apartheid capitalism produced.

Within the Eastern Cape it was seen that there are some activists and politicians that are more radical and more critical, questioning the NDR and the impact of deployment in the ANC. There is also a group that is more moderate, which focuses on welfare reforms, essentially occupying a more social democratic position. There are also differing positions with regard to whether the SACP should contest elections on its own. Contesting elections was abandoned in favour of continuing to support the ANC within the parameters of a 'reconfigured Alliance' (Cosatu, 2007d, SACP, 2008). However, when the breakaway party COPE was

formed in October 2008, and as the 2009 elections drew closer, such demands disappeared from the agenda in favour of all out support for the ANC in the elections.

8.2.4 Politics of *'Influence'*: Outcomes of Left politics

This research has argued that the overarching strategy of the Alliance Left in the Eastern Cape has been one of 'influence', participation in a governing Alliance, deployment of cadres onto the ANC electoral list in national, provincial and local elections and the participation, most notably of Cosatu, in a range of corporatist forums attached to government. Some outcomes of this politics have been highlighted; in the policy terrain and in the impact on the movement itself. In Chapter 5 examples of the impact of this 'politics of influence' on the policy arena, including the development of the Provincial Growth and Development Plan were discussed. In the economic policy arena, the Left has demanded, and in turn supported, a range of initiatives such as the establishment of Industrial Development Zones, a Jobs Summit in 2006 and District Growth and Development Summits in 2006 and 2007.

With the ANC in power, the movement as a whole, since 1994 has been managing a capitalist state. This places demands on organisations and deployed individuals that have over time changed the policies of the organisations. Deployment of 'comrades' into government contributes to the weakening of theoretical capability; it reinforces state-centred politics. It was also noted that there are policy and theoretical weaknesses on the Left that coalesce to prevent effective use of the various platforms that the corporatist terrain provides.

8.2.5 Left 'influence' post-Polokwane

The interviews in this study were conducted between May and July 2008. There have been significant political events and developments within and around the Tri-partite Alliance since that time, and which were outlined in Chapters 1 and 5. While follow-up or new interviews have not been conducted after June 2008, participation in events and informal discussions with Cosatu and SACP leaders in the period does elicit some insight. Two questions will be briefly reflected upon here; has the Left gained more influence in the Eastern Cape after the Polokwane conference and the departure of the provincial ANC leadership to join COPE and has the emergence of COPE affected the views and positions of the Left?

There is a greater degree of synergy between the top six leaders of SACP and the ANC than at any point since 1994, particularly with Gwede Mantashe being the Secretary General of the ANC and the Chairperson of the SACP. As such, the Left has won increased influence and the strategy identified above has yielded significant result in terms of deployment and positions in the ANC. SACP leaders Blade Nzimande and Rob Davies hold ministerial posts, and Jeremy Cronin a deputy ministerial post. Cosatu Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi, however, declined nomination to serve on the ANC NEC and nomination for the ANC's national electoral list for the 2009 General Elections.

This 'influence', together with mass mobilisation of the rank-and-file, has led to some shifts in the tone of ANC policy after the 2007 Polokwane Conference. The ANC's election manifesto has five focal areas, namely creation of decent work and sustainable livelihoods, education, health, crime and rural development (including land reform), and food production and security. The ANC policy discourse has shifted in favour of state intervention and a state-led industrial policy programme for economic transformation, in addition to expansion of social welfare (ANC, 2009). Other policy issues include proposals for a National Health Insurance, and on the economic policy side, the cutting of interest rates while inflation remains above the targeted percentage (http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-05-28-reserve-bank-cuts-repo-rate-to-75) as well as running the 2009/2010 budget with a deficit (Manuel, 2009). It is however, likely that the global recession does play a part here, with South Africa officially considered to be in recession from the first quarter of 2009 (StatsSA, 2009).

While inspired by the support for former President Thabo Mbeki, the split in the ANC and the emergence of COPE is both ideological and about personality. The leadership of COPE contains some former communists and labour leaders. However it is largely a party that is led by a core of former ANC leaders considered to be on its Right wing. The party has also attracted other liberal and business leaders and individuals, and its Premier candidate for the Eastern Cape was businessman Wiseman Nkuhlu. COPE's policies are promoted as a 'defence of the constitution' and constitutional democracy, in favour of 'good governance' and a return to the ideals of the 1955 Freedom Charter. The party favours direct elections of the President, Premiers and Mayors, and business support for 'increased productivity' and 'decent work' (COPE, 2009). The emergence of COPE did not mean that all business friendly leaders and individuals left the ANC, notably business tycoon Tokyo Sekwale, who was appointed Minister of Human Settlements after the April 2009 elections. However, the

emergence of COPE has, nonetheless, opened up some space for the Left in the ANC as illustrated by the policy shifts mentioned above. In a shift to the Left on the political spectrum from the tone prior to 2007, however, the ANC election manifesto does not suggest a move towards 'structural transformation' being the policy of the ANC.

In the Eastern Cape, however, according to the Secretary of Cosatu, the ANC continues to be dominated by "remnants of the George-group" (personal communication, Mandla Rayi, June 2009); that is, people associated with former Deputy Defence Minister and Chairperson of the Amathole Region of the ANC, Mluleki George, but who did not leave the ANC and join COPE. Chapter 5 showed how both the SACP and Cosatu argued in the Provincial Congress of Cosatu that "there has been no Polokwane in the Eastern Cape" and Cosatu and the SACP are still "marginalised" in ANC decisions (Mpumelelo Saziwa and Xolile Nqata). This contest is playing itself out in the preparations for the July 2009 ANC Provincial Conference, in which a new ANC leadership will be elected. Again, contestation plays itself out with regard to leadership and positions, and less so with regard to policy positions. Rural Development was one of the major elements of the ANC's campaign, and indicated above, a key issue for the Left. While the provincial government is developing a Rural Development Strategy, Cosatu and the SACP have not presented any positions as to what the strategy should entail (personal communication, Cosatu Secretary Mandla Rayi, June 2009, SACP Secretary Xolile Nqata, June 2009 and SACP PEC member and MPL Phila Nkayi, May 2009).

8.3 Is the Left/Right dichotomy useful for analysing Alliance politics

This study maintains that the ANC and the Alliance is a 'broad church' made up of liberals, Christian democrats, communists, socialists, social democrats, African nationalists, Africanists, religious people and atheists. The ANC defines itself as a 'disciplined force of the Left'. The expression appeared for the first time in the Strategy and Tactics in 1997, and appeared again in 2007. By 'a disciplined force of the Left' it is understood that the ANC belongs to a broad international Left tradition. It was stated in Chapter 4 that the ANC is a member of the Socialist International.

Left politics is in this thesis defined as elements of the political spectrum that are concerned with the progressive resolution of involuntary disadvantage, and with a goal of abolishing class society and capitalism. It has been argued that the ANC does in this sense qualify for

the first part of the definition of Left politics; it is 'concerned with the progressive resolution of involuntary disadvantage' – disadvantage caused by segregation and Apartheid. The ANC as a whole cannot be placed on the Right of the political spectrum, but taking the second part of the definition into account, a Left and a Right wing can be identified within the ANC and Alliance.

This thesis has used Bobbio's (1994) concept of a dyad to make sense of Left politics. A dyad should be understood in spatial terms as a half circle, not as two sides of a coin. Left and Right is not a set of fixed ideas, but an axis that shifts between generations and context (Ibid, 1994). It is contended that because The study involved a contested and multi-class political Alliance, the Left/Right dichotomy is of analytical use to understand the politics of the different wings of the ANC. It should, however, be stressed that the Left/Right dichotomy is not a simple dichotomy of binary opposites. The antithetical nature of the two terms Left and Right, explains why there is constant contestation over Alliance and ANC politics, and that there are objective and subjective forces that move the three organisations as well as the Alliance consensus to different points on the dyad at different points in time. The Left has been broadly identified with the group that argues that the structural challenges in South Africa cannot be solved within a capitalist paradigm of development and the Right with a position that advocates development within a capitalism paradigm. Nonetheless, the Left argues for building socialism from within capitalism through a process of 'structural transformation'.

8.4 Issues for further research

This study cannot claim to have provided an exhaustive account of Left politics in the Eastern Cape, and how these politics have evolved and continue to evolve in response to material, political and other circumstances in South Africa and globally. However, as an historian of contemporary events, the researcher hopes to have succeeded in showing the volatility and tentativeness of the situation under study (Alexander, 2001). Recognising the limitations of the study, both methodologically and in scope, this section will suggest some issues for further research.

Further studies of the Left in the Eastern Cape would benefit from using larger samples for interviews and not relying on leaders only. Gaining access to written material, particularly material such as records from meetings and discussion, would lead to greater insight into the particularities of Eastern Cape politics. There are also other issues touched on in this study that would benefit from further research. These include:

Policy analysis - The respondents in the study refer to some policy gains and 'victories' in the Eastern Cape. A class based analysis of some of these policies, for example, the Eastern Cape Provincial Growth and Development Plan, would assist in verifying both the claim that it was a victory for the Left and would elicit the key tenets of what the Left's positions consist of at the policy level. This could be extended to the local municipal level.

Differentiating trade union and communist party politics – In this study the Alliance Left in the Eastern Cape has been treated primarily as one organisation or movement with only slight differentiation between the politics of trade unions and that of communist parties, or political parties. Further study could provide further differentiation between the ideologies, interests, strategies and resulting politics of these two different types of political formations.

Class structure and formation - A thorough study of the class structure of the Eastern Cape, as well as how government and Alliance policy and post-Apartheid capitalism has contributed to class formation and reproduction, would be of interest.

Gender - This study elected not to grapple with the question of gender on and in the Left in any detail. A gendered analysis of Left politics and practices would throw more light on this question. Such an analysis would also elicit information about the experiences of women in Left politics, and whether there is any difference between the Alliance Left and Right's treatment of the gender question.

Independent Left politics - There is little research on independent Left politics in the Eastern Cape and what exists of social movements and other forms of political community activism. Further studies could identify this, as well as how independent Left politics plays itself out in a province traditionally dominated by the Alliance organisations.

Protest and community mobilisation – Community mobilisation and what has become known as 'service delivery protest' are frequent also in the Eastern Cape. In some cases, such

mobilisation is led by the local Alliance formations, and in other cases activists from the Alliance play a leading role. In some cases such mobilisation is independent of the Alliance. Over and above newspaper reports, there is limited documentation and research on such protests and mobilisation in the Eastern Cape.

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Appendix 1 Maps

1.1.Map of South African Provinces

Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/south_africa_map.htm

1.2. Map of the Eastern Cape with district and local municipalities and major towns



Source: http://www.ecsecc.org/maps/50/Eastern_Cape_District__Local_Municipalities__Unframed

Appendix 2: ANC, SACP and Cosatu Provincial Executive Committee members

2.1 African National Congress

	1996	1998	2002	2006
Chairperson	Makhenkesi Stofile	Makhenkesi Stofile	Makhenkesi Stofile	Stone Sizani
Deputy Chairperson	Stone Sizani	Stone Sizani	Enoch Godongwana	Mbulelo Sogoni
Secretary	Humphrey Maxegwana	Humphrey Maxegwana	Humphrey Maxegwana*	Sipothati Handi (COPE 2008)
Deputy Secretary	Mahlubandile Qwase	Mahlubandile Qwase	Mbulelo Sogoni	Pemmy Majodina (Acting Secretary)
Treasurer	Noxolo Kiviet	Noxolo Kiviet	Thokozile Xasa	Thokozile Xasa
Additional members	Nosimo Balindlela	Bongani Gxilishe	Mahlubandile Qwase	Humphrey Maxegwana (Acting deputy secretary)
	Bongani Gxilishe	Nosimo Balindlela	Mandisa Marasha	Sisisi Tolashe
	Mcebisi Jonas	Nomsa Jajula	Gloria Barry	Phila Nkayi*
	Zoleka Langa	Dumisani Mafu	Guguile Nkwinti	Thobile Mhlahlo
	Singatha Mafanya	Gloria Barry	Dumisani Mafu	Gloria Barry
	Dumisani Mafu	Mafuza Sigabi	Phummullo Masualle*	Sicelo Gqobana
	Sonwabile Mancotywa	Ntja Mapheele	Zoleka Langa Capa	Mondumiso Maphazi
	Ntja Mapheele	Zoleka Langa	Mafuza Sigabi	Nombulelo Mbandla
	Mandisa Marasha	Mandisa Marasha	N Botha	Pumelele Madikiza
	Vuyo Mlokothi	Mcebisi Jonas	Phila Nkayi*	Thabo Mdukizwa
	Phila Nkayi	Sonwabile Mancotywa	Noxolo Kiviet	Winnie Nomfusi Nxawe
	Guguile Nkwinti	Phila Nkayi	Mcebisi Jonas	Mboniswa Nodlabi
*SACP PEC		Sipho Mphahlwa	S Somyo	Sisimone Phillip Rakadibe
** Cosatu PEC			Buyelwa Sonjica	Noxolo Kiviet
*** SACP NEC			Nosimo Balindlela	Mcebisi Jonas
			GG Mpumza	Pumza Dyanti
			Nceba Faku	Andile Nkhuhlu (COPE 2008)
			S Mafanya	
			N Kondlo***	
			P Dyanti	

Source: ANC EC, 1998, 2002, 2006g, personal communication, January 2009.

2.2 South African Communist Party

	2003	2008
CHAIRPERSON	Phumulo Masualle***	Mzoleli Mrara**
DEPUTY CHAIRPERSON	Phila Nkayi*** +	Bulelwa Tunyiswa***
TREASURER	Bulelwa Tunyiswa***	Vuyani Limba
SECRETARY	Mandla Makupula***	Xolile Nqatha
Deputy Secretary	Pumzile Mnguni***	Phumzile Mnguni***
Additional members	Mfengu Makalima***	Zanoxolo Wayile**
	Zukiswa Ncitha	David Mzwandile Toyise**
	Frazer Mnguni	Noncedo September
	Vuyani Limba	Noluthando Mapu
	Noncedo September	Kholiswa Fihlani
	Beauty Dlulane	Nonkolis Ngqongwa
	Huphrey Maxegwana*** +	Feziwe Loliwe**
	Noxolo Abraham***	Irvin Jim**
	Vuyo Mosana	Feziwe Sibeko
	Robert Nogumla	Phila Nkayi*** +
	Vincent Capa	Beauty Dlulane
	Xola Phakathi**	Malihambe Socikwa
	Simphiwe Thobela	Mandla Makupula***
	Mokgantso	Mzwamadoda Gabela
		Teboho Qolosha
		Mpumelelo Saziwa**
		Mluleki Fihlani
		Mvuleni Mapu
		Zukile Jodwana
		Anele Ntsangani
		Boyce Melitafa
+ ANC PEC		Mpumelelo Makapela
** Cosatu PEC		Lungile Mxube
*** MPL elected in the 2004 elections		Mzimasi Ndongeni
		December Mjo

Source: Personal Communication, January 2009.

2.3 Congress of South African Trade Unions

		2003	2008
AFFILIATE	POSITION	OFFICE BEARERS	OFFICE BEARERS
COSATU	Chairperson	Goodman Wayile	Goodman Wayile
	Deputy Chairperson	Mpumelelo Saziwa	Mpumelelo Saziwa
	Treasurer	Buyiswa Ntlangwini	Buyiswa Ntlangwini
	Secretary	Xola Pakathi	Xola Pakathi
CEPPWAWU	Chairperson	Oracular Siqingqi	Oracular Siqingqi
	Deputy Chairperson	Karools Adams	Mathew Sohopu
	Treasurer	Lydia Diko	Nomandla Mahlatha
	Secretary	Sakiwo Zako	Sakiwo Zako
CWU	Chairperson	Toto Ntetho	Chris Mgedini
	Deputy Chairperson	Ntomboxolo Maheneza	Ntomboxolo Maheneza
	Secretary	Khandlela Seteni	Mcvicar Dyasopu
	Deputy Secretary	Thembela Manina	Thembela Manina
	Treasurer		Khumbulani Ndzonde
DENOSA	Chairperson	Vuyani Baart	Vuyani Baart
	Deputy Chairperson	Rushda Henricks	Linda Bovana
	Treasurer	Linda Bovana	Rushda Hendricks
	Secretary	Koliswa Tota	Koliswa Tota
FAWU	Chairperson	Mandla Gidana	Siyabonga Soci
	1st Deputy Chairperson		Boy Mfuphi
	Deputy Chairperson	Siyabonga Soci	Anorld Koerster
	Tresurer	Zomtsha Jonase	Funeka Njenene
	Secretary	Mninwa Nyusile	Mbaliso Thonga
NEHAWU	Chairperson	Monwabisi Jaxa	Thozama Mantashe
	Deputy Chairperson	Beauty Komana	Maki Clay
	Treasurer	Tandi Maqoko	Maria Hermans

	Secretary	Cyril Langbooi	Xolani Malamlela
NUM	Chairperson	Tebatso Mokoena	Tebatso Mokoena
	Deputy Chairperson	Mthuthuzeli Mekeni	Mthuthuzeli Mekeni
	Treasurer	Nolwazi Mdoda	Nolwazi Mdoda
	Secretary	Richard Kahlu	Richard Kahlu
	Deputy Secretary		Phumzo Mfuku
NUMSA	Chairperson	Xolisile Copiso	Phumzile Nodongwe
	Deputy Chairperson	Peter Martin	Xolani Samana
	Treasurer		Mphumzi Maqungu
	Secretary	I. Jim	Irvin Jim
SACCAWU	Chairperson	Benjamin Ndawo	Mzimasi Simangentlonko
	Deputy Chairperson	Vusumzi Seyisi	Thabiso Wana
	Treasurer	Ernest Gubula	Sithembele Mhlana
	Secretary	Victor Poswa	Victor Poswa
SACTWU	Chairperson		Mpumelelo Gubayo
	Deputy Chairperson		Nontombi Tafane
	Treasurer		Mary August
	Secretary	Mzukisi Nukayo	Lawrence Xola
SADTU	Chairperson	Simphiwe Mnguni	Mzoleli Mrara
	Deputy Chairperson	Mzoleli Mrara	Fundile Blakes Gade
	Treasurer	Churchil Ndlanzi	Churchil Ndlanzi
	Secretary	Mxolisi Dimaza	Mxolisi Dimaza
	Deputy Secretary		Fezeka Loliwe
SAMWU	Chairperson	Mvuleni Mapu	David Toyise
	Deputy Chairperson	Xhongwana	Doroty Sigagayi
	Treasurer	Ntombi Ndulula	Mathew Blauw
	Secretry	Boyce Melitafa	Siphiwo Ndunyana
SATAWU	Chairperson	Ntabethemba Ngumla	Ntabethemba Ngumla
	Deputy Chirperson	Nimrod Nyamkazi	Nomond Jawa
	Tresurer	Mncedi Ubrey Zwakala	Andile Hewu

	Secretary	Lubabalo Tinzi	Honest Sinama
POPCRU	Chairperson	Avril Swarts	Sangweni Matwele
	Deputy Chairperson	Lennox Pika	Klas Titus
	Treasurer	Tshaka Mdiya	Lungi Ntsangani
	Secretary	Sangweni Matwele	Tshaka Mdiya
SASAWU	Deputy Secretary	Manelisi Tyatyantsi	Mongezi Bathembu
	Chairperson	Mangaliso Xhwangu	Mangaliso Xhwangu
	Deputy Chairperson	Thozama Rixana	Bongiwe Geca
	Secretary	Lindelwa Ndzima	Manelisi Tyatyantsi
	Treasurer		Yoliswa Tutu
SADNU	Chairperson	Nozipho Pantshwa	Sithile Kene
	Deputy Chairperson	Sindiswa Mdlazi	Kayise Mnyengeza
	Secretary	Dutu Mildred Rini	Tandisizwe Ndamase
	Deputy Secretary	Zuko Msithi	Cwayita Tyali
	Tresurer		Vumile Zimela
	Organiser		Siyabulela Magalela
PAWUSA	Chairperson		Mekeni Maseti
	Deputy Chairperson		Berlin Roseberry
	Secretary		Phila Smanga
	Deputy Secretary		Germaine Afrika
	Tresurer		Lawrence Mostert

Please note that only the 5 Cosatu office bearers are elected at the Cosatu conference. The rest of the PEC is dependent on Affiliate leadership elections that are held at different points.

*SACP PEC
** ANC PEC
*** MPLs elected in 2004 provincial elections

Source: Personal communication, January 2009.

Appendix 3.1: Members of the Eastern Cape Legislature 1994-2009

	Election period		
Notes	**1994-1999 (List as of May 2008)**	**1999-2004 (List as of July 1999)**	**2004-2009 (List as of December 2008)**
	Raymond Mhlaba**	Zisiwe Beauty Balindlela	Abraham-Ntantiso, Phoebe Noxolo (Mec: Sport, Arts & Culture)**
***Cosatu PEC**	Smuts Ngoyama	Gloria Barry	Bam, Thobile Sithili
****SACP PEC/NEC**	Michael Xego	Price Mike Basopu	Barry, Ghishma (Mec: Roads & Public Works)
	Cecil Mlungisi Ndamase	Andre Eloff De Wet	Basopu, Price Mike
	Sindisile Maclean	Makhenkesi A Stofile	Gogo, Mabandla
	Mzolisi Mabude	B Goqwana	Goqwana, Monwabisi Bevan
	Matthews Mfengu Makalima**	Enoch Godongwana	Gqobana, Sicelo Hamilton (Chief Whip)
	Thobile Mhlahlo*	S H Gcobana	Hoosain, Nealkanthi Bhen Jeevan
	Ezra Mvuyisi Sigwela	G D Gwadiso	Jajula, Lizzie Nomsa
	Vumile Ernest Nkwinti	Phaki A Hobongwana	Jamjam, Nomfundo Faith
	Ncedani Samson Kwelita	Nealkanthi Mhen Jeevan Hoosain	Jordan, Thethinene Joe
	Dennis Neer*	Nomsa Lizzie Jajula	Kiviet, Noxolo (Speaker)
	Edmund Mandla Magaqa	T W Jordaan	Komose, Deborah Nomalinde
	Mkhangeli Matomela*	Noxolo Kiviet	Liberty, Tyrone Adolph
	Sheperd Malusi Mayatula	Ncumisa Kondlo**	Luyenge, Zukile
	Ntsikayeswe Twentyman Sigcau	S N Kwelita	Majodina Pemmy Castelina Pamela (Mec: Health)
	Lydia Bici	Grant T Snell	Makgato Johny
	Mutile Maxwell Mamase	Z Luyenge	Makhalima Mfengu Matthews**
	Nathaniel Searche	Sindisile Maclean	Makupula Mandla**
	Mzimasi Leslie Mangcotywa	K M Madlingozi	Malgas Hope Helene
	Nomhle Mahlawe	T N Majokweni	Mamase Mutile Maxwell
	Siphiwo Sam Mazosiwe	N Mahlawe	Mampunye Mziwandile Melvin
	Nealkanthi Mhen Jeevan Hoosain	Mahlubandile Qwase	Martin Christian (Mec: Public Works)
	Dolly Xoliswa Mazidume	M M Makalima**	Masualle Godfrey Phumulo (Mec: Treasury)**
	Andre Eloff De Wet	Z Makina	Matomela Mkangeli Manford

	Mandisa Dona Marasha	J Makgato	Maxegwana Humphrey C.**
	Price Mike Basopu*	Mandla Makupula**	Mazosiwe Siphiwo Sam
	Ntombizanele Esther Nogaya	Hope Malgas	Mhlahlo Thobile Silex (Mec: Housing & Safety, Liaison)
	Zisiwe Beauty Balindlela	G J Malherbe	Mnguni Phumzile Justice
	Nancy Ntombizonke Xatula	M M Mamase	Moerane-Mamase Neo
	Gloria Carol Barry	M M Mampunye	Mququ Phindiwe Claribel
	Malizo Bantu Mphele	Sonwabile Mancontywa	Mtitshana Esther Nomxolisi
	Sally Belvia Nqodi	M L Mangcontywa	Mtongana Viola
	Sicelo Hamilton Gqobana	A T Manyosi	Mtsi Skuta Alfred
	Nomsa Lizzie Jajula	M D Marasha	Nazo Lulamile
	John Eldrid Smith	Phummulo G Masualle**	Neer Dennis
	Harris Sithembile Mayeke	M M Matomela	Nel Willem Hugh
	Gertrude Christine Thomas	S Mazosiwe	Nesi Bonisile
	Velile Vicks Zanexhoba Tonjeni	T A Metele	Nkayi Phila Victor**
	Khululekile Madlingozi	Neo Moerane	Nkwinti Gugile Ernest (Mec: Agriculture)
	Buyelekaya Zwelinbanzi Dalindyebo	Chris Motsilili	Nyusile Mninawa*
	Zingisa Xerxes Goduka	Thobile Mhlahlo	Qwase Mahlubandile Dickson (Mec: Education)
	Arwell Themba Manyosi	M H Mpahlwa	Snell Grant Trevor
	Somwabile Mancotywa	Alfred Mtsi	Sogoni Mbulelo (Premier)
	Phongomile Fadana	Stone Sizani	Suka Litho
	Litho Suka	Dennis Neer	Tolashe Nokuzola Gladys
	Nelson Mzandile Bula	Phila Nkayi**	Tom Xoliswa Sandra
	Mxolisa Gawe	R Z Nongumla	Tunyiswa Bulelwa**
	Enoch Godongwana* (joined 1996)	G S K Nota	Xasa Tokozile (Mec: Local Govt And Traditional Affairs)
	Noxolo Kiviet* (joined 1996)	G E Nkwinti	Xhanti Ntombizodwa Tamara
		Alfred Mtsi*	
	Note: People marked with * or ** in 1994 were not necessarily PEC members in 1994, but active leaders of SACP or Cosatu at provincial or regional level. For 1999 and 2004, asterisk refers strictly to PEC members of SACP or Cosatu.		

Source: www.ecleg.gov.za and personal communication, January 2009.

Appendix 3.2: Members of the Eastern Cape Legislature 2009

Members of the Eastern Cape Legislature 2009			
SURNAME	**NAMES**	**POLITICAL PARTY**	*Cosatu PEC
Abraham-Ntantiso	Phoebe Noxolo	ANC	**SACP PEC/NEC
Bam	Thobile Sithili	ANC	
Barry	Ghishma	ANC	
Dimaza*	Mxolisi Mackson	ANC	
Fihlani	Koliswa Claribell	ANC	
Galo	Mandlenkosi Phillip	AIC	
Gqiba	Nomawetu	ANC	
Gqobana	Sicelo Hamilton	ANC	
Jonas	Mcebisi Hubert	ANC	
Kiviet	Noxolo	ANC	
Komose	Deborah Nomalinde	ANC	
Mabandla	Mary Nombulelo	ANC	
Majodina	Pemmy Castelina Pamela	ANC	
Makupula**	Mandla	ANC	
Martin	Christian	ANC	
Masualle** (SACP NEC)	Godfrey Phumulo	ANC	
Matomela	Mkangeli Manford	ANC	
Maxegwana	Comely Humphrey	ANC	
Mnguni**	Pumzile Justice	ANC	
Moerane	Neo	ANC	
Mpushe	Phumeza Theodora	ANC	
Mququ	Phindiwe Claribel	ANC	
Mrara** *	Mzoleli	ANC	
Mtitshana	Esther Nomxolisi	ANC	
Mtongana	Viola	ANC	
Mtsi	Skuta Alfred	ANC	
Mvana	Nonkosi Queenie	ANC	
Neer	Dennis	ANC	
Nkayi**	Phila Victor	ANC	
Nkomonye	Fezeka	ANC	
Nodada	Mary Bernadette	ANC	
Nqata**	Xolile Edmund	ANC	
Nyusile	Mninawa	ANC	
Pakati	Xola Anderson	ANC	
Peter	Michael Masonwabe	ANC	
Pikinini	Imamile Aubin	ANC	
Ponco	Alice Nomvula	ANC	
Qoboshiyane	Mlibo	ANC	
Qwase	Mahlubandile Dickson	ANC	
Sogoni	Mbulelo	ANC	
Tom	Xoliswa Sandra	ANC	
Tunyiswa-Gqoboka**	Bulelwa	ANC	
Wana	Tabiso	ANC	
Xhanti	Ntombizodwa Tamara	ANC	
Source: http://www.eclegislature.gov.za/mpls/list_of_mpl39s			